

CAPTIVITY IS CONSCIOUSNESS

An exposition of Julia Kristeva's thought and its
application to selected literary texts

Patricia Anne Fotheringham

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Supervisor: Professor J.M. Coetzee

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ABSTRACT

Julia Kristeva's research into language philosophy and literary theory, together with her own particular mode of psychoanalysis, has given rise to revolutionary notions of subject and text. This thesis examines the potential for a new approach to literary texts made possible by Kristeva's theoretical insights. Broadly speaking, Kristevan theory challenges the literary critic to refuse the role of interpreter, whose aim is locate meaning. Instead, the Kristevan analyst must attempt to understand the unconscious by unveiling the processes that constitute the text itself, and by isolating the effects of the pre-linguistic on the written text.

The first of the three chapters of the thesis is an exposition of Kristeva's major theoretical works and illustrates the development in her thought in over twenty years of publication. I begin with the first essays Kristeva wrote on coming to the West in 1966, go on to make comparisons between her theory of the subject as presented in Revolution in Poetic Language (1974), and as it appears, expanded and developed, in Tales of Love (1983). I conclude with a discussion of Kristeva's psychoanalytical procedures.

In chapter two, the Kristevan notions of subjectivity and text are applied to the poetry of Emily Dickinson. This chapter investigates how and why Dickinson's verse defies meaning through a valorisation of the pre-linguistic, for instance, rhythm. I conclude that Dickinson's ambiguous semantics gives rise to multiple condensations and displacements which create an "other" text beneath the written text. I argue that the impact of the verse on the reader is the result of the reader's own unconscious phonemic displacements and condensations which simultaneously create an "other" text for him/her as s/he reads.

Henry James's novel, The Wings of the Dove, is the object of Kristevan commentary in the third chapter. Here, the examination of his later style reveals that James's language, like that of the poet Dickinson, is characterised (in Kristeva's terminology) by semiotic as much as symbolic traits. I also demonstrate how Kristeva's psychoanalytic apparatus may be used as a reading process. Thus both

chapters two and three examine the work of art as part of the artists' life and show that art, like therapy, has the potential to engender psychic renewal.

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DEDICATION

To my mother: whose memory of unfulfilled dreams has sustained me, and whose own courage and determination have been a constant source of inspiration.

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INTRODUCTION

Seen in psychoanalytic terms, the rights of man comprise not the right to calculate what life is but to understand the unconscious, to understand it even to the gates of death. Psychoanalysis thus sheds a sardonic light on the individual will to dominate existence, and life as the ultimate value of existence. It is the height of nihilism to claim, in the name of the rights of man--or superman--rights over life itself. The analyst takes another view: he looks forward to the ultimate dissolution of desire (whose spring lies in death), to be replaced by relationship with another, from which meaning derives.¹

In 1966, Julia Kristeva, Bulgarian by birth, arrived in Paris all set to embark on her doctoral thesis. Working closely with Tzvetan Todorov and under the guidance of Lucien Goldmann and, most importantly, Roland Barthes, she was soon published in Paris' most prestigious avant-garde journals--Tel Quel and Critique. In 1967 the Parisian intelligentsia witnessed the publication of Jacques Lacan's Écrits and Michel Foucault's Les mots et les choses and in May 1968 revolution erupted in their own streets. Ignited by students and teachers and commandeered by the workers,² the May revolution had an appreciable impact on the French left as it encouraged them to believe that "intellectuals did have a role to play [in Marxist Revolution] after all".³

Such momentous literary and political events, in combination with Kristeva's own intellectual background--her Marxist training, her familiarity with Russian Formalism and her preoccupation with Jakobsonian linguistics--has generated a discourse which is as uniquely revolutionary as it is formidable. It is marked by the influences of Kristeva's mentors and teachers, but original in its dynamic and often challenging responses to them.

One of the chief difficulties confronting the reader of Kristeva's work is its highly intellectual nature and its demand for familiarity with a variety of schools of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and linguistics. Lacan's theory of subjectivity, together with his famous conclusion that "the unconscious is structured like a language",⁴ has encouraged literary theorists to attend to the role of the reader in creating the text.⁵ Some of Kristeva's earlier works--in particular "Word, Dialogue and Novel" (1967) and Revolution in Poetic Language⁶ (1974)--and some of her literary

strategies both in writing and in unravelling a text seem to have a Lacanian ring. Nevertheless this thesis attempts to demonstrate that Kristeva consistently maintains a stance which is marginal.⁷ She moves beyond the key personae who initiated the revolution in thought of the late sixties, cultivates Bakhtinian dialogue with their theses, and arrives at a new theory of subjectivity which celebrates marginality, reveals corporeal affects on language and proposes ways of curing the sickness of the modern age, mal d'amour.

Confused, downcast, even discouraged, the reader asks how he should best read her.⁸ Should he study her sources to find out "where she came from", or is it possible to draw conclusions by examining her text's surfaces in conjunction with its vast subtext of notes and references? The problem of understanding and explaining a Kristevan text has been remarked upon even by Kristeva's admirers. Philip Lewis claims Revolution in Poetic Language is a "wager" which "testifies to and contests the legitimacy of the work of the avant-garde and academic critics in general" (28). In virtually the same breath, however, he remarks on the "immense scope of its problematics", and concludes that "there is hardly any alternative to relatively partial, fragmented perceptions of [this] monumental work" (28).

Kristeva's self-reflexive semiotics,⁹ in which theory and practice are inseparable, adds to her reader's confusion. Often Kristeva seems to adopt the terminology or the critical procedures of another theorist, when in fact she re-writes them with her own psychoanalytical slant.¹⁰ Kristeva's remarks often seem to emerge from nowhere: sections of Tales of Love, for example, are best understood in light of the work of the little-known psychoanalyst André Green. And whilst her own texts are not conceived as "poetic language", "a body of words in a state of ferment and working", as Leon Roudiez observes, there are sequences "here and there that come pretty close to it" ("Introduction," DL 12).

Whilst the "highmindedness" and the inaccessibility of Kristeva's ideas seem at times an almost insurmountable problem, the mutations in Kristeva's own thought--represented by nearly twenty years of publication--are an additional hurdle.

Kristeva's first article translated into English was "Word, Dialogue and Novel" (1967) and she has most recently published Soleil noir: dépression et mélancholie (1987). Kristeva began her training as a psychoanalyst in 1974. Consequently her work during and after this period (as the different titles of the two works cited above index) bear the marks of this new venture.

Although Kristeva's feminism is as unorthodox as her other stands,¹¹ it is perhaps more controversial. In an interview with Jean-Paul Enthoven in 1977, Kristeva speaks out against the "mythicizing of femininity" which, she believes, relies too much on an existential concept of woman because it attaches a guilt complex to the maternal function (99). Toril Moi comments on Kristeva's (marginal) feminism in the introduction to The Kristeva Reader. In defence of Kristeva, Moi argues that she has been consistent in her disapproval of the feminist insistence on the need to politicize all human relationships, and has kept her distance from the call for explicitly feminist ^Papproaches to the Western cultural tradition (9).¹²

My exposition of Julia Kristeva's theories of subject and text has a double purpose. I attempt to illustrate the development of Kristeva's thought from her first essay "Word, Dialogue and Novel" and its application in "The Bounded Text". I explore the development of these ideas in her work of the seventies (which includes her doctoral thesis Revolution in Poetic Language [1974]) and I focus finally on her most recently published works: Tales of Love (1983), In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith (1987) and Soleil noir: dépression et mélancholie (1987).¹³ Although I have attempted to maintain a chronological structure, this becomes impossible when one is confronted by the detailed and scientifically-worded observations Kristeva makes in essays such as "Giotto's Joy" and "The Bounded Text".¹⁴

The opening theoretical chapter on the work of Kristeva is divided into four sections. The first looks at two of Kristeva's earliest essays, "Word, Dialogue and Novel" and "The Bounded Text", in order to contextualise her thought and establish

how she arrived at her revolutionary notions of text and subject. The second is a detailed exposition of Revolution in Poetic Language, which must be examined in tandem with the third section where I illustrate how the ideas it sets out, and more specifically Kristeva's theory of the subject, are developed in Tales of Love and Soleil noir.¹⁵ This third section also examines Kristeva's psychoanalytic procedures, and leads into the fourth part, which prepares the way for my application of Kristeva's theories.

Because I attempt to illustrate the applications of Julia Kristeva's theories to literary texts--the poetry of Emily Dickinson, and Henry James's novel, The Wings of the Dove--my exposition is also directed towards those aspects of Kristeva's writing which are most illuminating to my purpose. It will become clear to the reader that in the application sections I have applied extensively the Kristevan notion of a sujet-en-procès. In my chapter on Emily Dickinson's verse in particular, and in my section of James's syntax, I examine how pulsions (drives) from the unconscious disturb the fixed position of the subject, and how this disruption is represented in a syntax that is also disturbed. The Kristevan theory of the subject--as it is presented in Tales of Love--and the notion of "lovesickness" provides me with an unusual entry into Henry James's The Wings of the Dove, whilst the Kristevan notion of comportement and the tenet that the artist achieves psychic renewal through his/her art has been applied to both Dickinson and James. It is important to emphasise here that whilst these specific Kristevan ideas have been particularly useful for my work on Dickinson and James, they belong to a coherent body of thought and cannot find adequate expression outside that body. Therefore the section on Kristeva is somewhat long.

The exposition undertaken in this thesis remains ever-conscious of the presence of Bakhtin, Jakobson, Freud, Barthes, and of course Derrida and Lacan. But to account fully for their many and varied influences and Kristeva's interpretations of them is to exceed the limitations of this project. I have therefore

assumed a general understanding of the ideas of these and other thinkers, such as Hegel and Husserl.

It may appear that I have suppressed any criticism of Kristeva's thoughts and theories.¹⁶ The point is that by positioning myself as explicator and more particularly, by attempting Kristevan practice, I have had to speak in the Kristevan voice (however impertinent and outrageous that may seem). The result is that whilst I suspend judgement in the body of my text, I do express some reservations or criticisms in content notes.

Finally, it should be clear that to undertake a Kristevan reading of a literary text is to embark on an arduous and hazardous voyage. Arduous because it is to adopt a new vocabulary--one that is steeped in linguistics and the formulae of neo-Lacanian analysis. And hazardous because it is to attempt to speak in the voice of someone who--now safe in her professorial chair of linguistics at Paris University--has worked towards dissolving meaning and those very processes that once constituted "literary analysis".¹⁷

Let me return to the Kristevan quotation with which I began. The Kristevan analyst looks ahead to the dissolution of desire, and the establishment of the relationship with an "other". It is from this relationship with an "other", that Kristeva suggests we may find meaning. Throughout Tales of Love and Soleil noir, Kristeva is consistent in her belief that the life of the artist and his work are inextricably linked. It follows that once we have failed to calculate what life is, we have simultaneously failed to find the meaning of art. In Tales of Love Kristeva demonstrates that the key to "meaning" and "relationship" is the unconscious, for it is in the pre-Oedipal stage where the relationship with the "other" (the father of personal pre-history/the abject mother) is established.¹⁸

To understand the unconscious, therefore, and to understand it "even to the gates of death" is the ultimate challenge of the Kristevan project and is the exorbitant wager with which the Kristevan-analyst must contend (IBL 62). With the Kristevan apparatus at hand, we must attempt to locate and understand the work of

the unconscious. By exposing the processes that constitute the text in my applications of Kristeva's theories, through my examination of the role of the phonic rhythm in the creation of the genotext of verse, and through the application of Kristeva's psychoanalytic procedure in the examination of mal d'amour, I have attempted to do precisely this.

In a further prefatory note to this dissertation, "Captivity is Consciousness", I should like to emphasise that the first sixty pages or so consist almost entirely of an exposition of Julia Kristeva's thought. A dictionary definition of "exposition" (Oxford) is "to offer forth", to "expose", and to "make clear". Or in French, which is perhaps closer to the original intent, "action de placer sous les regards de public des objets divers, notamment des oeuvres d'art....Partie d'une oeuvre litteraire dans laquelle on fait connaitre le sujet". It is imperative that the reader be aware that the intention of this section of the thesis, therefore, is not to comment on Kristeva, or to criticise or disagree with her theories. The purpose is, rather, to show, by means of an exposition/an offering forth, in the clearest possible way, the development of Kristeva's thought from her earliest article "Word, Dialogue and Novel", to her latest work, "Le Soleil Noir".

I have already made the point that mine is an arduous and hazardous undertaking. I have adopted a new vocabulary, and through my close reading of Kristeva, perhaps a new mode of expression. Consequently, there are times when Kristeva's words and my own exposition merge; there are sentences which are not wholly Kristevan, nor, seemingly, wholly my own and, as one critic noted, at times it is "difficult to see where Kristeva begins, and I end". I wish to point out that whilst this "merging" may not be in strict accordance with regular academic referencing practice, it became unavoidable. It is essential that the reader realise, first, that there is no intention to render Kristeva's words my own. Second, that the merging is the result of my (perhaps over zealous) desire to be accurate and rigorous in my presentation of Kristeva's extremely difficult and often incomprehensible discourse. Third, that in order for the reader to appreciate fully the applications' sections and remain completely aware of the Kristevan modus operandi, I found it necessary to attempt to speak in a Kristevan voice. Consequently, I have used numerical subject headings in order to illustrate that the theory has been understood and applied, from exposition to applications and vice-versa. To summarise, then, the unique quality of Kristeva's writings, in combination with the intentions of the thesis (to attempt an exposition of Kristeva's writings), has resulted in this exposition -- a different but, I would argue, necessary approach.

Furthermore, it has become clear to me that I should re-emphasise here that I have not relied on any single critic's response to Kristeva. My exposition emerged from a close examination of Kristeva's primary texts. My original section on Kristeva was over four hundred pages long; this final version, only sixty. If there are similarities in wording between my exposition and that of Kristeva's own discourse, these should be seen as the result of the intensity of my research and the frequency with which I read the Kristevan texts -- all in an effort to perfect my own understanding of Kristeva.

CHAPTER ONE
KRISTEVAN ANALYSIS: AN EXPOSITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
JULIA KRISTEVA'S THOUGHT

Unveiling is not reduction but passion. Logically, the reader of the Divine Comedy is Dante, that is, no one--he, too, is within "love," and knowledge is here but a metaphor for a far more radical experience: that of the letter, where life, death, sense, and nonsense become inseparable. Love is sense and nonsense, it is perhaps what allows sense to come of out nonsense and makes the latter obvious and legible. [...] Language is seen as the scene of the whole, the way to infinity: he who knows not language serves idols, he who could see his language would see his god. (Sollers Logiques 76; qtd. in Kristeva NP 159)

By rhythm, too, listening ceases to be a purely supervisory activity and becomes creation. Without rhythm, no language is possible: the sign is based on an oscillation, that of the marked and the non-marked, which we call a paradigm. The best legend which accounts for the birth of language is the Freudian story of the child who mimes his mother's absence and presence as a game during which he throws away and pulls back a spool attached to a thread: he thereby creates the first symbolic game, but he also creates rhythm. (Barthes The Responsibility of Forms 249)

watching
 doubting
 rolling
 shining and meditating
 before stopping
 at some last point which sanctifies it
 Every Thought Gives Forth a Throw of the Dice.
 (Mallarmé "A Throw of the Dice," Stéphane Mallarmé 187)

Kristevan notions of text, subject and the politics of marginality; Kristevan psychoanalysis

1.1 KRISTEVA'S DIALOGUE WITH BAKHTIN: APPLICATION IN "THE BOUNDED TEXT"

Mikhail Bakhtin has been dubbed cudak, a term connoting intense strangeness, derived from the Russian word cudo, "a wonder".¹⁹ It is, oddly enough, a kind of Slavic equivalent of the "name" given to Julia Kristeva by Roland Barthes--"l'étrangère":

[She] changes the order of things: she always destroys the latest preconception, the one we thought we could be comforted by, the one of which we could be proud: what she displaces is the already-said, that is to say, the insistence of the signified; what she subverts is the authority of monologic science and filiation. ("L'Étrangère" 19)

But the links between Bakhtin and Kristeva do not exist merely on the denotative level of their "outlandish" names, for once names are inserted within history and society they become junctures of relationships and ideologies. They both stand as outsiders in relation to the accepted analytic procedures of their time. Bakhtin writes against Formalism whilst Kristeva, as "Word, Dialogue and Novel" and "The Bounded Text" testify, stands precariously on the brink of Poststructuralism.²⁰

A recent forum on Mikhail Bakhtin provoked the following question: "Who speaks for Bakhtin?".²¹ Bakhtin's writings on literature and his own philosophy of language derive so much from the works of Freud and Marx that it is not surprising that Structuralists and Poststructuralists alike have often tried to speak for him. In doing so most of them have failed him, as Susan Stewart protests:

Erasing not only Bakhtin's sense of the radically unsystematic nature of the linguistic world but also the conflicting, anarchic nature of his very texts ... [they] have let him speak only by silencing him. (266)

Julia Kristeva's own background means that it is appropriate for her first published piece, "Word, Dialogue and Novel", to be an essay on Bakhtin. In fact

Toril Moi points out that through this essay she was, with Tvzevetan Todorov, instrumental in introducing Bakhtin and his work to the West ("Introduction," KR 4).

Bakhtin moulds his philosophy into his discourse, creating writings which exemplify his theories. One of the ways he does this is by writing allegorically, in what the Russians called "Aesopian language" (Morson 234). He fashions ironies and suggestions into the most ambivalent words, "as if he set out to carnivalise ... the normal periods and figures we use to define the relay of culture" (231). Like Bakhtin, Julia Kristeva "displaces the already said", and she achieves more than mere summary in "Word, Dialogue and Novel". She engages in critical dialogue with Bakhtin's ideas as she capitalises on his sense of the radically unsystematic nature of the linguistic world and succeeds in speaking with and through him, without silencing him.

The opening lines of "Word, Dialogue and Novel" express Kristeva's concern with the failure of "systematic and scientific modes of analysis to meet the demands of those structures based on a logic which is 'other' than scientific" (WDN 35).²² This paragraph conceals Kristeva's real concern in her essay: to find a new semiotics capable of analysing the more radical and anarchic texts created by the revolution of the word which had begun in her own time (with the advent of works by Philippe Sollers and the discovery in France of Finnegans Wake). In "The Bounded Text", Kristeva adopts a similar strategy. She appears to direct her thoughts to a predominantly Structuralist audience, but in fact goes beyond these static strategies in her writing and in her conclusions.

Through "Word, Dialogue and Novel" Kristeva introduces herself to the French literary establishment in the guise of Bakhtin's interpreter. In "The Bounded Text" she comes as illuminator of the French medieval story, Jehan de Saintré (1456).²³ But, as we shall discover, we should be wary of Bulgarians bearing gifts: Kristeva turns out to be a kind of Trojan horse who comes to overthrow what she purports to offer.

1.2 From Formalism to Dialogism

At the time of writing "Word, Dialogue and Novel" Kristeva was grappling with what she believed to be the failures of Structuralism. Consequently one of her major interests in Bakhtin lies in how and why he was able to confront Formalism. Without directly attacking Formalism, Kristeva praises Bakhtin for his ability to "shun the linguist's technical rigour" (WDN 35) and lauds his ability to wield an "impl^usive and at times even prophetic pen" as he grapples with the fundamental problems of a structural analysis of narrative (WDN 35).

At the centre of the Formalist struggle was the desire to establish the study of literature as an autonomous science, one which had its own methods and procedures. The Formalists were concerned with the question of "literariness", that is, how to specify the formal and linguistic properties which, they believed, distinguished literature from other types of discourse. From this impulse arose first, a methodology which considered only the formal properties of a text and which denied the impact of history on its creation, and second, the notion of defamiliarisation: rather than representing reality, they held that literary texts have a tendency to "make it strange", to defamiliarise it, and thus render it the site of a renewed attentiveness.²⁴

One of the ways in which Bakhtin combats Formalism is by situating the text within economic, social and political textual realities, all of which react on and are reacted upon by the text. Bakhtin's model is based on the principle that literary structure does not exist as a stable entity or structure awaiting exploration but is, rather, generated in relation to another structure (WDN 35).

Bakhtin challenges the Formalist's abstraction of literariness by arguing that abstraction can be avoided through dialogism. For Bakhtin, the audience shapes the utterance as it is being made. Every utterance is the product of the reciprocal relationship between the speaking subject and his audience. This "dialogue" (between subject and addressee) becomes the Bakhtinian notion of dialogism. As a narrative device, dialogism occurs when the discourse sets up a dynamic interaction

between two or more voices. As a textual phenomenon, dialogism exists through the creation of a signifying structure in relation or opposition to another structure. History, the text, and the word are intricately related units, continuously involved in processes of reading and re-writing one another.

Thus Bakhtin takes stock of economic, historical and philosophical factors as he searches for the roots of the "novel" and poetic logic. He concludes that any literary system may be "novel" if it reveals the limits or the artificial constraints of its own literary system (DI xxxi; 5-7). Since poetic language adheres to a logic which is foreign, or "other" than accepted social codes, Bakhtin believes its roots, like that of the novel itself, may be found in the carnival. He argues that poetic language/carnavalesque discourse is manifested in subversive texts (like the novel itself), which draw on the language of fringe culture:

This idealization of the past in high genres has something of an official air. All external expressions of the dominant force and truth (the expression of everything conclusive) were formulated in the valorized-hierarchical category of the past, in a distanced and distant image (everything from gesture and clothing to literary style, for all are symbols of authority). The novel, however, is associated with the eternally living element of unofficial language and unofficial thought ... in popular laughter, the authentic folkloric roots of the novel are to be sought. (DI 20-21)

Bakhtin draws the conclusion that identity exists between challenging official social laws and challenging official linguistic laws. He explores the specific development of the word from its birth into language, into form and in particular, the organization of poetic discourse on the textual level. Consequently, he "redistributes" genres by injecting them with a highly historical and social flavour. For instance, "the menippea's topicality and public quality ... is in a way the 'journalistic' genre of antiquity, pointedly reacting to the ideological issues of the day" (DI 27).

These two basic premises were clearly influential--at this point in her career--in shaping Kristeva's approach to avant-garde texts and her politics of marginality. Kristeva makes this point in Revolution in Poetic Language:

In confronting the world of discourse in its constitutive laws, poetry ceased being poetry and opened a gap in every order where the dialectical experience of the subject in the signifying process might begin. (84; emphasis added)

1.3.1 Poetic language is double

Kristeva, following Bakhtin's lead but adding to it the notion of the psyche as text, sets up three co-ordinates of textual space--as opposed to Bakhtin's two (writing as a reading of texts, and the text as an absorption of and reply to another text). Kristeva's co-ordinates are writing subject, addressee and exterior text. Like Bakhtin, she emphasises the dynamic power of the logos,²⁵ claiming that it is first a mediator between structure and culture; second, that it is a regulator which controls literary structure; and third, that it is an intersection of words where at least one other word can be read.

In order to illustrate the double nature and transgressive logic of poetic language, Kristeva first summarises, and then extends Saussure's apparatus expounded upon in his "Anagrams".²⁶ In his "Anagrams", Saussure begins by assuming a connection between historic events and their transposition into legend. This connection, based on a reading of the Nibelungen legend, prefigures the connection that he goes on to make between the hypogram (theme word) and the developed text. The bulk of Saussure's "Anagram's" are, therefore, exercises in decoding: the linguist breaks down the verse of several Latin poets (see Starobinski vii) into phonic patterns of alliteration and assonance which, when doubled, create an "anagram". For instance, Saussure discovers the name "Hector" in eight anagrams between lines 268 and 290 in book two of Virgil's Aeneid. A single fragment delivers two sets of anagrams (Starobinski 37).

According to Kristeva, Saussure's research indicates that poetic language is at least double, not in the sense of the signifier/signified dyad, but in terms of one and other (WDN 40). The suggestion is that poetic language functions as a tabular model, where each "unit" (which is double) acts as "a multi-determined peak" (WDN 40). Thus, Kristeva argues, any logical system based on a zero-one

sequence (true-false, nothingness-notation) is unable to account for the operation of poetic language (WDN 40). This "0-1" logic is founded on the Greek (Indo-European) sentence which begins as a subject-predicate and grows by identification, determination and causality. Such a logic, Kristeva says, is ineffective when it comes to poetic language where "1" is not a limit because "another word can be read" (WDN 40). Kristeva's point is that it is impossible to formalise poetic language according to this existing "0-1" logic without distorting it.

What Kristeva wants is a literary semiotics that can account for poetic logic, that is, one which will embody the "0-2" interval, where "0" denotes and "1" is implicity transgressed. The "0 to 2" logic suggested by Saussure--where 0 denotes silence and a transgression occurs--fails to express adequately the real transgression which Kristeva believes is intrinsic to poetic language. This is because they fail to explain what or who is "transgressed". Kristeva adds to this "0-2" logic the number "1" which stands for truth, God or Law. Thus like Saussure she sees poetic language as tending towards "2" but, more importantly, her re-writing incorporates the transgression of the Law, God, or truth as represented by the number "1". Poetic language goes beyond "1" and is therefore in its very nature dialogue and ambivalence.

For Kristeva, then, narrative discourse/epic discourse is a monologism because it is subordinated to the code "1", to God: it is religious, theological and potentially dogmatic. Similarly, the realist novel, with its description, character and personality creation, is also monological. Carnavalesque discourse, however, achieves the "0-2" of poetic logic because its structure is "anti-Christian" and "anti-rationalist" and it is a "consecration of ambivalence and vice" (WDN 50).

1.3.2 Authorship?

It follows that Bakhtin and Kristeva are both fundamentally opposed to the linking of authorship with authority. Bahktin claims that the concept of language as system is a fiction. For him it is, rather, a constant struggle amongst systems. He locates its roots in an "almost Manichean sense of opposition and struggle, a

ceaseless battle between centrifugal forces that strive to keep things apart, and centripetal forces that strive to make things cohere" (DI xxviii). Bakhtin makes the following comment:

The language of the novel can be located neither on a surface nor on a line. It is a system of surfaces that intersect. The author as creator of everything having to do with the novel cannot be located on any of these linguistic surfaces. ("Slovo o romane," 84; qtd. in Kristeva WDN 61)

And Kristeva concludes: "attributing a single centre to the author would be to constrain him within a monological, theological position" (WDN 61). Clearly each theorist is concerned with the kind of language that is dynamic, mutating^w, and that "breaks through codified discourse" (WDN 45).

Whilst Bakhtin radically re-orders "the word" and sees it as a "minimal structural unit", and an intersection of textual surfaces, Kristeva argues that language is itself dialogical. Dialogism, she explains, is implicitly present in the langue/parole distinction and in the syntagmatic and systematic axes of language proposed by Saussure and Jakobson. Bakhtin suggests that dialogism--by which narrative discourse may establish a dynamic interaction between two or more voices--has specific textual ramifications. Kristeva however, fashions Bakhtin's version into her own textual variation. Writing is subjectivity and communication or intertextuality:

The new signifying system may be produced with the same signifying material; in language, for example, the passage may be made from narrative to text. Or it may be borrowed from different signifying materials: the transposition from a carnival scene to the written text, for instance. In this connection we examined the formation of a specific signifying system--the novel--as the result of a redistribution of several different signifying systems: carnival, courtly poetry, scholastic discourse. The term inter-textuality denotes this transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into another....(RPL 59-60)

The borrowing and adaptation which is involved in the intertextual process results in the blurring of the "person-subject" of writing and the triumph of "ambivalence". Intertextuality becomes a key Kristevan term. In Revolution in Poetic Language, it is aligned with the unconscious processes of condensation and displacement and is

one of the ways in which the corruption of the symbolic occurs.²⁷ More concretely, in "The Bounded Text" which came close on the heels of "Word, Dialogue and Novel", Kristeva demonstrates that intertextuality is one of the processes that creates the novel. This idea must be seen in conjunction with the notion (which has obvious Bakhtinian roots) that the novel developed as a linguistic form only after a fundamental change occurred in the perception of the sign itself.

1.3.3 Narrative and "typology of discourse"

The discussion of narrative takes two directions in "Word, Dialogue and Novel". First Kristeva summarises Bakhtin's "typology of discourse" with very little interference (see Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics 150-168).²⁸ Second, Kristeva draws up a theory of narrative which, most importantly, takes the split subject into account. Kristeva argues that a story not only presupposes an intervention by the speaker within the narrative but that it also presupposes an orientation towards an "other". The writer is himself a split subject; a subject of enunciation and a subject of utterance. According to Kristeva, then, narration consists of a dialogue between the subject of narration (S) and the addressee (A), who is also the reading subject. The addressee is himself double for he is a signifier in relation to the text, and a signified in relation to the "subject of narration":

The writer is thus the subject of narration transformed by his having included himself within the narrative system; he is neither nothingness nor anybody, but the possibility of permutation from S to A, from story to discourse and from discourse to story. He becomes an anonymity, an absence, a blank space....(WDN 45)

Thus narration is always constituted as a "dialogical matrix" by the addressee. Any narration, be it History or Science, contains a "matrix" formed by the narrator's dialogue with an other. As Kristeva points out, the ramifications of these language structures are only fully developed in certain types of narrative--in fact they are crucial to the existence and operation of specific texts. (Kristeva goes on to coin the word signifiante for the characteristic feature of the "specific texts" of the avant-garde).

The "polyphonic novel"--a term originally used by Bakhtin to denote a text with more than one structural voice--is an example of a text which is an absorption of and a reply to carnival. It falls under Bakhtin's mixed genre, "Menippean".

Bakhtin touches upon the psychic aspect of Menippea, as this quotation demonstrates:

[M]ore psychological experimentation appears for the first time in the menippea: the representation of man's unusual, abnormal moral and psychic states--insanity of all sorts. (DI 26)

But he is not concerned to make the kind of psycholinguistic connections Kristeva does. What Bakhtin simply terms "carnival", Kristeva entitles "a homology between the body, dream, linguistic structures and structures of desire" (WDN 48). Bakhtin's discussion of the carnivalesque emphasises the political aspects of comedy, whilst Kristeva's attends to the exploration of the language of sexuality, death, ambivalence and vice.

1.4 Epic and Menippea: monologism and dialogism

I have already noted Kristeva's concern with the transgressive logic of poetic language--that it goes beyond one (Law, truth and God). Appropriately, she is equally preoccupied with how this subversive impulse reiterates itself in narrative. But how does Kristeva distinguish between the impulse of the realist novel and the impulse of the subversive novel? She extends Bakhtin's distinction between the Epic and Menippea, and adapts his network of textual relationships into her own network of psycholinguistic relationships (see WDN 52-55).

Epic expresses fully the dominant impulses of its society, resulting in a shared topos between subject and addressee. The subject's discourse is thus already tailored and there is no need for dialogue. The realist novel, which falls into this category, takes the philosophical expression of reality accepted by the dominant culture for granted, and writes within it.

The Menippean mode is exemplified by the polyphonic novel. This kind of novel has a dialogical structure and the external entity (God, Law, the community), which had the power to suffocate the conflict between the subject and the addressee

in the realist novel, for example, is weakened. The dialogue between the subject and the addressee occurs within the text itself, for the writer is both subject and addressee, the one who writes and the one who reads. The writer's addressee is the writer himself, but as the reader of another text. Consequently the writer is also a text which re-reads itself as it re-writes itself. This process of reading-writing creates the dialogical structure of the polyphonic novel.

1.5 "The Bounded Text": exemplification

Kristeva exemplifies her Bakhtinian theory of narration in "The Bounded Text" through her discussion of Antoine de la Sale's work Jehan de Saintré. "The Bounded Text" is a peculiarly difficult essay not merely because it contains a summary of Kristeva's thesis in linguistics, but also because it explores the structure of a medieval story (an early form of the novel) in terms of logic and mathematics. Here, Kristeva's focus (understandably in the light of Bakhtin) is on the impact of the ideological space which surrounds the text on the author or speaking subject, and consequently on the type of enunciation created.

The philosophy of Nominalism is central to Kristeva's argument in "The Bounded Text", because it marks a decisive stage in the passage from symbol to sign. Nominalism attacks the symbol in its realist and conceptualist mode and makes a distinction between "the concept" and "the term". For Kristeva, Nominalism breaks the ground for a way of thinking that uses terms (names) as signs (not symbols). Reality is seen as a combination of terms (signs), and literature, which represents reality, also represents the series of terms or names.²⁹

In the ensuing discussion of the process which constitutes the sign--instituting its referent-signifier-signified hierarchy--Kristeva augments Bakhtin's notion of the "Manichean sense of opposition and struggle" as she applies it to the structure of the novel.³⁰ The term "trajectory" is used to describe the path of the novel. For Kristeva the early novel is performed within the unrepresentable "trajectory" of enunciation and utterance. Whilst enunciation is a compromise between testimony

and citation (the voice and the book), utterance refers mainly to extranovelistic sources which intertextually structure the novel.

In keeping with this philosophical-logical slant is Kristeva's argument that the sign does not represent a universal transcendence (like the symbol), but reified particulars instead. The term "ideologeme" is used to refer to the relationship between textual utterances and their social-historical co-ordinates.³¹ In the light of this, ideology is not "tagged-on" to what is primarily linguistic, but in fact makes up the sign or text. In a particularly Bakhtinian gesture, Kristeva shows that the sign is in fact programmed by the ideologeme which constitutes it.³²

Kristeva's closing remarks are worth noting because they concern the development of the novel. Kristeva concludes that Jehan de Saintré is a doubly terminated, bounded text (BT 59). It is bound dead structurally in that it is limited by the functions of the sign's ideologeme and it is born-dead (né-mort) compositionally because the narrative is explicated as a written text. In other words, the social text excludes all incomplete production from its domain in order to "confection", to substitute a product, and create the marketable commodity, literature. Thus Kristeva concludes:

Every literary work partaking of the semiotic practice of the sign (all "literature" before the epistemological break of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries) is therefore, as ideologeme, closed and terminated in its very beginnings. (BT 41)

1.6 Philosophy and revolution

In her closing remarks Kristeva is quick to acknowledge her indebtedness to Bakhtin, as well as her own growth out of his ideas:

I should finally like to insist on the importance of Bakhtin's concepts (on the status of the word, dialogue and ambivalence), as well as on the importance of certain new perspectives opened up through them. (WDN 57; emphases added)

This quotation underlines Kristeva's two-fold project in "Word, Dialogue and Novel". On the one hand she demonstrates the existence of texts in our century which are more than merely revolutionary. These radical literary texts are not bound/closed, like the early forms of the novel such as Jehan de Saintré, and do not

exist as phenomenon (narrative), or literature (discourse), but rather as productivity. This is because the profound political, philosophical and social "break" which occurred at the end of the nineteenth century, the discovery that "God is dead" and that the centre cannot hold, unleashes the full Menippean force of the novel. Kristeva's interest in Nominalism for example, in "The Bounded Text", and the exact time and place of this crisis in thought may be read as index of the debates in the same University of Paris in Kristeva's own time:

[The] debates took place above all at the University of Paris and especially in the Faculty of Arts: on 25 September 1339 they were condemned; and on 29 December 1340 certain Occamist and nominalist theses were prohibited. ("From Symbol to Sign" 68)

The Nominalist debates gave birth to the bounded text, the early novel. The epistemological break at the turn of the nineteenth century and the debates of Kristeva's time in turn give birth to an inexhaustibly novel literature. Those texts, such as Sollers' Drame, which question the very act of writing, fulfil the incomplete revelation of Nominalism (WDN 59).

On the other hand, Kristeva is searching for new ways of looking at texts: for a new semiotics that is able to deal with polyphonic novels. In "The Bounded Text", for example, she borrows from Bakhtin the word "translinguistic" to denote the process of assessing that which "creates" the trajectory of the novel (36). She emphasises this point in the 1968 essay, "Semiotics: A Critical Science/A Critique of Science":

[E]ither it [contemporary semiotics/structuralism] continues to formalise the semiotic systems from the point of view of communication ... or else it opens up to the internal problematics of communication (inevitably offered by all social problematics) the "other scene" of the production of meaning prior to meaning. (84)

As a counter-action to the failures of contemporary semiotics (Structuralism), Kristeva goes on to formulate the literary practice semanalysis. Semanalysis is both the analysis of the text and psychoanalysis of the subject, and it parallels the division of the subject and the text that Kristeva sets out in Revolution in Poetic Language.

1.7 Conclusion

This opening section has demonstrated that Kristeva uses Bakhtin's challenge to Formalism as the basis of her own challenge to Structuralism. Whilst Kristeva's use of Bakhtin demonstrates how she was influenced by him, it also lays the foundation for some of the expository techniques she uses in many of her essays of the seventies. She comes disguised as teacher, as expositor (in this case, of Bakhtin), but through dialogue she encodes her ideas into her discourse, creating another text in relation to her main text.

By exploring selected sections of "The Bounded Text", I have attempted to illustrate Kristeva's own struggle with the problems of the scientific approach (for instance, the algebraic formulations used by anthropologists such as Lèvi-Strauss). The text used to exemplify her points, Jehan de Saintré, is a bounded text, one that is closed and monological--there is no unleashing of a Menippean force within it. In the writing of "The Bounded Text", Kristeva succeeds in demonstrating both the sterility of a scientific approach, and the need for a self-reflexive semiotics. She filters psychological opinions into her analysis and she applies logic, mathematics and philosophy to her burgeoning theory of the novel as she searches for logic which is not Aristotelian.

Kristeva believes that the dialogism of Menippean and carnivalesque discourses translates a logic of relations and analogy rather than of substance and inference, thereby standing against Aristotelian logic. She adds:

From within the very interior of formal logic, even while skirting it, Menippean dialogism contradicts it and points it towards other forms of thought ... Writers of polyphonic novels seem to disapprove of the very structures of official thought founded on formal logic. (WDN 55)

In the light of these comments, and given Kristeva's own preoccupation with the negative logic of the early novel, one may read "The Bounded Text" negatively, as a demonstration of the dynamic potential within the unclosed text. In "The Bounded Text" Kristeva illustrates what is, that is, the Menippea, the polyphonic novel through what is not: the bounded, dead Medieval novel, Jehan de Saintré.

The crux of these two essays lies in the word "relationship". Kristeva's later psychoanalytic theory proposes that it is only through relationships that any "meaning" may be found. "Word, Dialogue and Novel" demonstrates how Kristeva suspends her own desire to make meaning from Bakhtin's text, but enters into dialogue with him as she presents her own theory. In "The Bounded Text" she tests her relationship with Structuralism by writing an essay that illustrates the sterility of the scientific approach as she develops her own theory of text and novel. In both cases Kristeva's relationship with text and author is somewhat concealed, almost disguised. In the exposition of Revolution in Poetic Language that follows, we witness her counter-action of this strategy of deception, (practised as it was by a foreign doctoral student), as we discover how (with publication and fame) she arrived at her own revolutionary semiotics.

2.1 REVOLUTIONARY SEMIOTICS

If it is possible to make any assumptions about Kristeva's doctoral dissertation, it is that we should assume nothing. Kristeva believes that it is only by confronting the very basis of the social order that real headway may be made in the social and economic transformation of Western society. Thus in her huge and unwieldy thesis, Revolution in Poetic Language, she sets out to resist and undermine in all possible ways the definitions and logic of Western culture.

The fundamental concerns of Revolution in Poetic Language are precisely those of its title. The key terms revolution and poetic are syntactically linked because in Kristeva's thesis they are textually and socially intertwined. For Kristeva, a text is like a political revolution because it engenders in the subject what revolution introduces into society. Working from Bakhtin, but with the emphasis on the body, Kristeva arrives at the idea that poetic language is a violent signification of drives which work through and within the moral, scientific, familial and economic aspects of society. It therefore has the potential to disturb the dominating logic of the social order:

In confronting the world of discourse in its constitutive laws, poetry ceased being poetry and opened a gap in every order where the dialectical experience of the subject in the signifying process might begin. (RPL 84)

Such a radical position calls for a dynamic signifying subject and gives birth to a unique analytic practice: semanalysis. Fulfilling the strategies of "The Bounded Text", Kristeva's research probes deep into the engendering process of both artistic subject and text as it seeks to unveil the "other scene" of language concealed in the metrical and rhythmic impulses of modern poetry.³³ From her appropriation of Lacan's critique of ego psychology arises her "double" poetic subject which neither states meanings nor is constructed through language, but is constantly created in a dialectical process where language is "corrupted" by pre-linguistic instinctual impulses.

2.2 The failure of Structuralism

If Kristeva came in the guise of the Trojan Horse in her essay on Bakhtin, she certainly establishes a more openly defiant stance in Revolution in Poetic Language. Her thesis begins with a direct confrontation of the fundamental problems of Structural linguistics. She declares that the Structuralist approach renders language static, a-historical and the manifestation of a subject which is "sleeping"--still and silent, outside the socio-historical process.

Kristeva criticises the structures of Zellig Harris and the generative grammar of Noam Chomsky on the grounds that they deny the existence of the repressed processes of the body which, she believes, disturb the smooth surface of language.³⁴ Quite simply, they fail to account for the vagaries of "modern" phenomena represented by the artistic practices of the avant-garde, in the writings of a Mallarmé and an Artaud. In "Word, Dialogue and Novel", these "specific signifying practices" were "nameless", and only identifiable through specific traits: Menippean aspects, the carnivalesque and a logic which produced a polyphonic novel. In her thesis Kristeva boldly calls this novel form of signification, this "shattering of discourse", signifiante (RPL 17).³⁵

The burgeoning psycholinguistic impulse which indexed Kristeva's difference from Bakhtin in "Word, Dialogue and Novel" is fully developed in Revolution in Poetic Language. Signifiante, for example, is both a process that consists of biological urges which are socially controlled and excess-producing, and a practice that transforms natural and social resistances, limitations and stagnations through linguistic and communicative codes. As Kristeva herself establishes, it is:

[an] unlimited and unbounded generating process, this unceasing operation of the drives toward, in, and through language; toward, in, and through the exchange system and its protagonists--the subject and his institutions. This heterogeneous process, neither anarchic, fragmented foundation nor schizophrenic blockage, is a fragmented and de-structuring practice, a passage to the outer boundaries of subject and society. (RPL 17)

In her thesis, Kristeva's argument against Structuralism takes her earlier points in two major directions. First, she argues that "the shattering of discourse" reveals that linguistic changes constitute changes in the status of the subject (RPL 15). It also reveals that normalised language is just one way of articulating the signifying process that encompasses the body, the material referent and language itself. (Through her theory of divided text and subject, Kristeva finds ways of linking and interrelating these strata.) Second, because the capitalist mode of production is, after Structuralism, no longer necessarily bound within linguistic and social norms, Kristeva is able to argue that art--as shattering--can and does display the productive basis of the subject and text (RPL 16). Consequently, "magic, shamanism, esoterism, the carnival and incomprehensible poetry" all underscore the limits of socially useful discourse (by filling the absence with another, differently structured, discourse) because they sanction what language represses: that is, "the process that exceeds the subject and his communicative structures (RPL 16). Through her theory of the subject, Kristeva demonstrates how her displacement of art's boundaries relates to socio-economic changes and, of course, to revolution.

In Revolution in Poetic Language Kristeva sets out to offer an alternative philosophy of language and a methodology that investigates the interpersonal and intersocial mechanisms of language and its production-prior-to-the-product. She

deconstructs the notion of the expressive subject and explodes the phonetic, lexical and syntactic objects of structural linguistics by casting them into a new model of signification based on the corporeal, linguistic and social functions of the subject.

2.3 Two modalities of signification

Kristeva's theories of text and subject may be traced back to the two basic trends in the linguistic research of her time. One trend takes its lead from thinkers such as Benveniste and Husserl in its exposition of a subject of enunciation. According to these language philosophers, logical modal relations or relations of presupposition are placed between speakers within the speech act in what Kristeva refers to as "very deep structure" (RPL 23). Language is articulated by a subject who means and who is embedded within "very deep structures" that articulate semantic, logical or intercommunicative categories (RPL 23). Language is changed by historical linguistic changes, diachrony is linked to synchrony, and formal linguistics is opened up to all possible influences and especially to philosophy.

The second trend, based on Freud's theory of the unconscious, denies the arbitrary relation between signifier and signified by valorising those methods which regard the relationship as motivated. Drives (pulsions) and primary processes (displacement and condensation) connect so-called empty signifiers to "psychosomatic functions" and link them in a chain of metonymies and metaphors. In other words, the formal relations of language are connected with an externality in the psychosomatic realm, enabling what was once "arbitrary" to mutate into articulation (the body speaks).³⁶

These two movements within linguistic research come to figure for Kristeva two inseparable modalities within the signifying process. The former trend is termed the symbolic, whilst the latter is known as the semiotic mode. This is a peculiarly subversive naming process because the signifier "symbolic", by convention, refers to that area of signification we are accustomed to regarding as "semiotic". In the Kristevan model the symbolic includes those aspects of language which fall under the sign: the area of expressive, communicative activity--not the "semiotic" as in

the model we are accustomed to using. The semiotic realm, on the other hand, is constituted by drives and those primary processes which displace and condense the energies of the body. It has the potential to disturb, even mark, the symbolic order.

It is the dialectic which exists between these two modalities that determines the type of discourse: whether it be philosophy, poetry, narrative or metalanguage. Natural language, for example, harbours both modes of articulation whilst certain non-verbal signifying systems, such as music, are constructed almost exclusively on the basis of the semiotic. Kristeva argues throughout her thesis that this exclusivity is itself relative because of the dialectic which exists between the two modalities:

Because the subject is always both semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system he produces can be either "exclusively" semiotic or "exclusively" symbolic, and is instead necessarily marked by an indebtedness to both. (RPL 24)

2.4.1 The Semiotic Chora

In order to demonstrate the fundamental connectedness of the mind to the body, Kristeva has to find a "language" and a philosophical and psychoanalytical language in which to write it. Kristeva's first modality, the "semiotic", refers to the drives of the body. This term is qualified with the word chora which is borrowed from Plato's Timaeus where it defines "an invisible and formless being which receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the unintelligible and is most incomprehensible".³⁷ The semiotic chora is thus a "psychic space" which contains the drives. Like chora, "semiotic" is of Greek origin and in the Kristevan vocabulary retains its etymological origins of mark, trace and index.

2.4.2 Giotto, Freud, Kristeva

Even though Kristeva fails to articulate fully how she uses Freud to arrive at the notion of the semiotic chora in Revolution in Poetic Language, some of the grains of the idea may be traced in an earlier essay of 1970, "Giotto's Joy" (re-published in Desire in Language), although the term "semiotic chora" is notably absent. Freud's "Metapsychology" and more specifically, his essays "Instincts and their Viscissitudes" and "Assessment of the Unconscious", are central to her

argument. To keep the line of my argument clear, I follow Kristeva's dialogue with Freud in my content notes.³⁸

In Revolution in Poetic Language Kristeva argues that those energies which move freely around the pre-conscious subject are gathered up in, and constitute, the semiotic chora. The chora is therefore a "non-expressive totality formed by drives and their stases in a motility that is as full of movement as it is regulated" (RPL 25). In the course of the subject's development they are rearranged according to constraints imposed on the subject by familial and social structures.

The chora also "contains" one of Kristeva's other preoccupations: negativity.³⁹ Kristeva claims that the chora possesses a fundamentally paradoxical nature. As rupture and articulation (rhythm), it defies and denies axiomatic form and causes all discourse to depend on and reject it simultaneously--it precedes evidence, verisimilitude, spatiality and temporality. But it is also a maternal and nourishing signifiante as it lacks a thesis and a position. Consequently the chora is without unity, identity or deity; it is subject to a kind of "regulation" (réglementation) in that it articulates discontinuities and continually, repeatedly, re-articulates them (RPL 27).

In other words, the chora is a modality in which the sign is not yet articulated as the absence of an object and as the distinction between the real and the symbolic: it is pre-sign, symbolic, real (RPL 26). Even its own ordering process--voice, gesture, rhythm--is always subject to the ordering of societal constraints. The energies which "move around" the pre-conscious subject are drives: pre-Oedipal processes that connect and orientate the body towards the mother.⁴⁰ The dominating drives of this receptacle are anal and oral and are, therefore, simultaneously constructive and destructive. These drives render the semiotised body the place of permanent scission, and the maternal body the ordering principle of the semiotic chora and the mediator of the symbolic law (which in turn organises social relations). It is this dual impulse of drives--the anal/oral-positive/negative

duality (or doubling as Kristeva phrases it)--that generates an overall destructive wave upon the subject, in a constant attack against stases.

To conclude, then, the Kristevan "semiotic chora" is a zone in which the subject is both generated and negated, where "unity succumbs before the process of charges and stases that produce [the subject]" (RPL 28). Most importantly, however, these drives, once checked by socio-biological restraints or stases, have the potential to irrupt as marks through those **material** supports which are susceptible to semiotisation--features such as voice, gesture, and colour. The Freudian processes of displacement and condensation participate in the organisation of this semiotic network (these are examined in more detail below).

The process of "semiotisation" may only be revealed in dream logic or in certain poetic texts. Mallarmé, for example, calls attention to the semiotic rhythm in language when he writes of a space underlying the written which is, in Kristeva's words, "rhythmic, unfettered, irreducible to its intelligible verbal translations; it is musical, anterior to judgement, but restrained by a single guarantee: syntax" (RPL 29; emphasis added). Kristeva clarifies how the process of semiotisation occurs in language in the section of her thesis which has been translated into the article, "Phonetics, Phonology, and Impulsional Bases". (The process of semiotisation will be examined in detail in the chapter on Emily Dickinson.)

Although Kristeva is adamant that the semiotic chora is not a new language, but a pressure that can never be caught up in the closure of traditional linguistic theory, it should be clear that it has come to represent her **difference**: it stands for, even stands as, the basis of her revolutionary language philosophy. Ironically, the signifier itself contains the unique and marginal aspects of Kristeva's theory. For it is only once the subject is part of the (Lacanian) symbolic, that the chora is more or less repressed or concealed within the structures of communicative language and is only visible as a pressure on/within symbolic language; as a rhythm, musicality, as contradictions, meaninglessness, disruption, silence and absence.

The pressure of the chora has been felt by Kristeva's supporters and ardent critics alike. Derrida, for instance, criticises the term chora for its "ontological essence".⁴¹ However, it is inequitable to censure Kristeva, as many other theorists have, for over-emphasising the role of the semiotic in the formation of art and subject. Neither is it accurate to claim that its importance diminishes in her later work. Kristeva is consistent because she only highlights that which, in previous philosophies of language, has been undervalued: the impact of the unconscious processes on language, on the symbolic order itself; the fundamental connection between the mind and the body. The presence of the semiotic chora in her work must therefore be seen as compensation for that which has long been neglected.

Furthermore, the semiotic chora and the process of semiotisation does not "disappear" in the re-working of her theory of the subject in Tales of Love. Rather, Kristeva re-emphasises the importance of the pre-Oedipal phase as she focuses on the pre-Oedipal subject's identification with a "father of individual prehistory" (TL 26). And in the work In the Beginning was Love, what Kristeva refers to here as "semiotic pulsions" are given added impetus in their psychoanalytic function as "affects".⁴² (I elaborate on this argument in the third section of my exposition.)

2.5 The sujet-en-procès

What might be disturbing for the reader at this stage is the question of how the semiotic chora fits into Kristeva's notion of subjectivity. Kristeva works towards her sujet-en-procès through dialogue with Husserl and phenomenology and through critical engagement with Hjelmslev and Frege.⁴³ Her challenge to these thinkers centres on the philosophical positioning of the subject in the realm of the symbolic and semiotic. In short, she confronts their theses which conceive of meaning "as already there" and replaces them with a sujet-en-procès/a subject on trial (RPL 31).

It is possible to see how the new Kristevan subject is born by examining Kristeva's confrontation with Husserlian phenomenology. Kristeva regards Husserlian phenomenology as a kind of "slide" from Cartesianism because it

advocates the positioning of the ego as the single unique constraint on all linguistic acts/practices. Phenomenology thus acts as a bridge which crosses over to the kind of discourse that interrogates the positionality of the speaking subject--from his permutating self, to his destructive self.⁴⁴

But Kristeva's main quarrel with phenomenologists (as with the Structuralists) is that they consider drives only from the point of view of their relationship to language: they are stripped of their drive-bases. By re-writing and therefore interpreting and transforming Lacan's theory of the subject in an even more radical return to Freud, Kristeva removes drives from their phenomenological refuge and defines them as processes that form the signifier: "logically anterior to the grammatical sequences the Cartesian subject generates, but synchronous with their unfolding" (RPL 42). Intrinsic to Kristeva's re-writing is a description of the splitting (coupure) of the "semiotic" or the thetic break, which, in her theory of the subject, is vital for the production of signification.

2.6 The Thetic: rupture and/or boundary

[By now the distinction between symbolic signification and the "semiotic" should be clear: the former is always already a position and judgement (denoted in Husserlian phenomenology by the concepts of doxa, position and thesis) which establishes the identification of the subject and its object as preconditions of propositionality. The latter is none of these: it is positionless, a continuum of drives.

The break (coupure) of the chora, which enables the child to attribute differences within his surrounding continuum, is termed the thetic phase. Because it is the threshold of language, the thetic is the deepest structure of the possibility of enunciation and forms the barrier between the conscious and unconscious subject. It is quite clear that for Kristeva all enunciations, even the first utterances of a child--which are generally metaphoric or metonymic (such as "woof-woof" for dog)--are thetic because they are part of a process of separation. In other words,

the object is separated from the subject and is given a semiotic fragment which at length becomes a signifier:

[T]he subject must separate from and through his image, from and through his objects. This image and objects must first be posited in a space that becomes symbolic because it connects the two separated positions, recording them or redistributing them in an open combinatorial system. (RPL 43)

Kristeva follows the lead of Freud and Lacan at this stage in her argument (and not Husserl who casts the thetic as the productive origin of free spontaneity), as she examines the thetic phase as a stage of the developing subject. The thetic initiates the process of production of the signifying process and marks the two phases in the development of the subject:

1. the mirror stage (primary narcissism)
2. the "discovery of castration".

Before I begin my discussion of Kristeva's version of the development of the subject, I must emphasise that it is written with her knowledge and understanding of Lacan's theory of the subject at hand.⁴⁵ In short, Kristeva presupposes Lacan's triangular structure of the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary, but in her theory each domain is linked to actual processes. Similarly, whilst Lacan's subject tends to be the already posited linguistic subject, Kristeva goes beyond this as she attempts to bring the real into the symbolic by positing the semiotic chora from which drives irrupt into the symbolic order.⁴⁶

The second problem is inherent to the development of Kristeva's thought. Some of the lacunae that arise in this section of the thesis, such as how and why the thetic phase occurs and what breaks up the autoeroticism of the child and engenders the mirror stage, are taken up in Tales of Love. In this latter text Kristeva, with her new-found knowledge and qualification of psychoanalyst, is better equipped to furnish the missing details. In an attempt to maintain clarity and in order to illustrate the development of her thought clearly, I first present a discussion of how

Kristeva's theory appears in Revolution in Poetic Language, and then focus on the additions as they are represented in Tales of Love.

2.7 The mirror stage: "the specular image is the prototype for the world of objects" (Lacan Écrits: A Selection 319)

When the child reaches the age of about 6-18 months, he is at the border of the mirror stage. It is at approximately this time that he produces his first holophrastic utterances and that signification is established. The mirror stage produces the spatial intuition found at the heart of the functioning of signification (in signs and sentences). Once the child reaches this stage in his development he is only able to capture his image unified in a mirror if he remains separate from it. All the while his body is agitated by the positive/negative drive process: that is, the semiotic motility. His body is fragmented rather than united in representation. It is only once the imaged ego has been posited, that is, when the image is caught and invested with drives thereby bringing about primary narcissism, that the objects are similarly detached from the semiotic chora and become signifiable.

These two separations, that of the image and the object, prepare the way for the sign: "the voice that is projected from the agitated body (from the semiotic chora) onto the facing imago or onto the object ... detached[ed] from the surrounding continuity" (RPL 46-47).⁴⁷ Each of the following processes, separation from the mother's body, the fort-da game, and anality and orality, "activate" the semiotic motility. They thus become a permanent negativity that destroys the image as well as the isolated object. Language acquisition is therefore a confrontation between positing-separating-identifying and the motility of the semiotic network (RPL 73-75).

2.8 Castration

Castration puts the finishing touches to the process of separation that posits the subject as signifiable, always confronted by an other: the image in the mirror, and the semiotic processes. It is the mother, or the evocation of the maternal chora, who stands at the threshold of the real into the symbolic. And because the mother

is the addressee of every demand, she occupies the place of alterity. Her body, as the receptacle and guarantor of demands, stands in place of all narcissistic and imaginary effects and gratifications and hence in place of the phallus. It is the mother who is at the point where the drives become manifest as the material base of language, art and all subjectivity.

Only once the subject has separated from "fusion" with his mother is he able to find his identity in the symbolic. It is the discovery of castration that detaches the subject from his dependence on his mother: the perception of the lack (manque) makes the phallic function a symbolic function--the symbolic function (47).⁴⁸ Thenceforth, the subject's jouissance is linked to the genital,⁴⁹ and the semiotic motility is transferred to the symbolic order. The importance of this moment is captured in Kristeva's own words:

This is a decisive moment fraught with consequences: the subject, finding his identity in the symbolic, separates from his fusion with the mother, confines his jouissance to the genital and transfers semiotic motility onto the symbolic order. (RPL 47)

This moment completes the thetic phase which posits the gap between the signifier and the signified "as an opening up toward every desire but also every act, including the very jouissance that exceeds them" (RPL 47). It is thus that the phallus totalises the effects of signifieds.⁵⁰

2.9 Enunciation: "the constitution of an Other is indispensable for communicating with an other" (RPL 48).

Because the phallus is not an utterance in itself, but rather a kind of pre-condition that makes enunciation possible, enunciation can only occur if the child has a need, and the desire to express it. For this to happen, the child's ego must be posited in the signified. Once the child has separated from his mother, then begins to establish his identity in the symbolic, a gap arises between the imaged ego and the drive motility--between the mother and the demand made on her. This gap is the break that sets in place the Lacanian Other as the location of the signifier. A manque à être, or a gap in being, confers on an "other" the use of language, and the

subject is concealed by an ever purer signifier. Because the subject is separated from the mother in the mirror phase and through castration, this other is no longer the mother, but the place of the signifier that Lacan calls the "Other".

To summarise then, the thetic phase--imago, castration and the semiotic motility--is the place of the Other and the precondition for the positing of language. It marks the threshold between the two heterogeneous realms--the symbolic and the semiotic--and may be denoted by the scission between the signifier and signified:

$$\frac{S(r)}{S(d)} \text{ "THETIC"}$$

Once the speaking subject has entered the symbolic, the chora is more or less repressed and acts as a pulsional pressure on symbolic language. In the speaking subject, fantasies articulate this irruption of drives within the realm of the signifier. The drives that the thetic phase was unable to "subdue"/"put to death" by linking them into signifier and signified become poetic distortions of the signifying chain.⁵¹

The thetic is what distinguishes a text as a signifying practice from the kind of "drifting-into-nonsense" characteristic of neurotic discourse. Thus even though some forms of poetry deny the thetic--existing as if a text did not require completion to hold it together--and even if semiotic pulverisations make language "a new device", completion is necessary for language to come about. In Tales of Love, this "thetic completion/incompletion" is clarified as Kristeva introduces her own notion of foreclosure.

2.10 Frege: enunciation and denotation. What happens to signification once the signifier has been posited?

Frege's ideas are the basis of Kristeva's proposition that the thetic becomes the precondition for both enunciation and denotation. Frege, says Kristeva, declares that there are signs, and in particular artistic signs, which have no denotation, only meaning. Taking her lead from him, Kristeva proposes that art's specific status in signification is a consequence of a "constantly maintained

ambiguity" between "meaning that amounts to grammaticality, and a denotation that is, likewise, given in the very structure of the judgement or proposition but exists only under certain conditions" (RPL 53). The thetic posits the signifiable object thus:

- 1) denotation of the object in signification,
- 2) enunciation of a displaced subject, absent from the signifying and signified position.

Even in the simple act of naming, the thetic is already propositional and syntactic. Consequently "subject" and "predicate", "verb" and "noun", figure for Kristeva the modalities of the thetic which represent the posited and positing, linked and linking, denotation and enunciation--all of which maintain a position which may not be separated from the thetic process. Thus the signifying process displays the two faces of the thetic break.

It follows that syntax has the potential to represent the thetic break and also to represent the displacement of the thetic. Before I illustrate how Kristeva reasons this, let me add a brief reminder that once the subject becomes part of language, and becomes the bearer of syntax, the "true" subject is omitted. Kristeva argues that if the transformation from drive to signifier produced by the thetic is registered as an intersyntactic division (subject-predicate) and if transformation (from drive to signifier) produced within the speaking subject comes about only if the subject is left out, it follows that when the (true) subject emerges or when the semiotic chora disturbs the thetic position through the realignment of the signifying order, the denoted object and the syntactic relation are also disturbed:

The denoted object proliferates in a series of connoted objects produced by the transposition of the semiotic chora ... the syntactic division (modified-modifier, NP-VP, or the placement of semantic features) is also disrupted. (RPL 55)

The irruption of the semiotic chora marks each category of the syntactic sequence and prevents the "other" from being posited as an identifiable syntactic term, as subject, predicate, or modifier. Consequently, in poetic language "otherness" can

only be set up and maintained within the pure signifier and/or syntactic element with great difficulty. Kristeva remarks:

For the Other has become heterogeneous and will not remain fixed in place: it negativises all terms, all posited elements and thus syntax, threatening them with possible dissolution. (RPL 56)

This argument adds impetus to Kristeva's proposal that although all signification implies the possibility of denotation, literary signification tends towards the exploration of the limits of grammar and/or towards enunciation (see chapter two, section 3 and chapter three, sections 3 and 4). It also directs Kristeva to a discussion of "mimesis" as a process that "breaches the thetic". Mimesis attempts to express the "truthness" of an object as the construction of an object not according to truth but according to verisilimitude (RPL 57). Kristeva arrives at an important conclusion here. She proposes that mimesis is the product of a subject of enunciation who does not suppress the semiotic chora, but rather raises it to the status of a signifier. Therefore, because it imitates the constitution of the symbolic as meaning, mimesis dissolves not only the denotative function, but the thetic function of positing the subject as well.

Poetic language, on the other hand, attacks both denotation and meaning. Because (in the Kristevan model) it is produced by a sujet-en-procès, poetic language corrodes the convention of verisilimitude which underlies classical mimesis and the very position of enunciation. But the moment that poetry stops being glossolalia and becomes part of the linguistic order, it is confronted by denotation and enunciation, verisilimitude and the subject, and becomes social. In the light of the above reasoning, it is possible to comprehend how Kristeva can argue that the thetic is the intersection of the boundaries between true and false.⁵² The thetic is maintained where signification is maintained, and it is shaken by the flow of the semiotic into the symbolic. Furthermore, the thetic even conditions the possibilities of truth in language: all transgressions of the thetic are a crossing of the boundary between true and false.⁵³

2.11 The corruption of the symbolic/semiotisation of the symbolic

The corruption of the symbolic occurs through the following three processes:

1) abjection (see 2.14); 2) displacement and condensation; 3) intertextuality.

2) The unconscious processes of displacement and condensation are evidence that the unconscious functions like a "language". Freud said this of condensation:

[T]he first thing that becomes clear to anyone who compares the dream-content with the dream-thoughts is that a work of condensation has been carried out. Dreams are brief, meagre and laconic in comparison with the range and wealth of the dream-thoughts. ("The Interpretation of Dreams" 279)

One is tempted to think that condensation operates by omission; that the dream is not a faithful transmission of the dream-thoughts but incomplete and fragmentary (see Kristeva, LU 270). On the contrary, Freud explains, more than omission, condensation is a matter of nodal points "upon which a great number of the dream-thoughts converged, because they had several meanings in connection with the interpretation of the dream" ("The Interpretation of Dreams" 281). Each element of the dream's content turns out to have been represented in the dream-thoughts many times over. They are, if anything, overdetermined.

The principle of displacement is as important in dream formation, as Freud notes:

What is clearly the essence of the dream-thoughts need not be represented in the dream at all. The dream is, as it were, differently centred from the dream-thoughts--its content has different elements as its central point. ("The Interpretation of Dreams" 305)

The consequence of the displacement is that the dream-content no longer resembles the core of the dream-thoughts and that the dream gives no more than a distortion of the dream which exists in the unconscious. But we are already familiar with dream-distortion. We traced it back to the censorship which is exercised by one psychical agency in the mind over another. Dream-displacement is one of the chief methods by which that distortion is achieved. (308)

(I demonstrate the "condensation" and "displacement" of phonemes, or "signifying differentials" as Kristeva terms them, in the section on Emily Dickinson.)

3) Intertextuality, the passage from one sign system to another, is a process at work in the unconscious which disturbs the thetic moment and therefore participates in the structuring of language and signifying systems. It results from a combination of displacement and condensation, and evolves from a change in the thetic position and therefore in a change in the position of enunciation and denotation. The new signifying material may well be the same as in the old signifying system, but it may also be borrowed, for example, as in the transposition from carnival scene to written text and the novel--which has its origins in a redistribution of various sign systems: carnival, courtly poetry, scholastic discourse.

2.12 Sacrifice and Sacrificial Practice

It has already been emphasised, both in the opening paragraph of this section and in Kristeva's discussion of the thetic break, that Kristeva (working from Bakhtin) is occupied with the parallel between disruptions in the social order and disruptions in syntax. Kristeva is more specific in Revolution in Poetic Language. She argues that the regulation of the semiotic in the symbolic through the thetic break is re-enacted not only through language but on all levels of social discourse. For example, in all known societies the equivalent of the thetic is the founding break of the symbolic order as represented by murder, the killing of a man, slave or animal. The Romulus-Remus myth, in which a murder marks the founding of Rome, is an apt example of this "founding break".

Kristeva applies the equation "thetic = founding-break = murder" to her theory of language acquisition. Because language is both semiotic chora and symbolic system always "tormented" by the death drive, it manages to divert and confine the deadly force. Societies such as those in the civilised West where murder is forbidden, reveal the confinement of the death drive. Death and murder are on the inner boundary of the signifying process. It is by producing art and thus introducing themes, ideologies and social meanings into the symbolic that the artist arouses an "a-social drive" and in fact crosses the founding-break of the thetic. Kristeva claims that the artist thereby becomes a kind of "bearer of death": he takes

on murder and moves through it. At the same time, however, the artist also carries the semiotic motility over into the symbolic and thus becomes part of a regenerative process, a kind of re-birth.

There are two events in the social order which are counterparts of the thetic moment that institutes symbolism: sacrifice and the "practice accompanying sacrifice".

2.13.1 Sacrifice

By favouring the opinions of "classical anthropological sociologists" who assign to sacrifice an ambiguous role--both violent and regulatory--Kristeva argues that sacrifice is the "watershed" upon which the "semiotic" and the "symbolic" are instituted (RPL 74). It is the equivalent of the thetic which imprisons the violence of the drives, that is, semiotic, pre-symbolic violence is imprisoned in one place, the signifier:

Far from unleashing violence, sacrifice shows how representing that violence is enough to stop it and to concatenate an order. Conversely, it indicates that all order is based on representation: what is violent is the irruption of the symbol, killing substance to make it signify. (RPL 75)

If approached from this angle, sacrifice (of the semiotic) emerges as that which sets up the symbol and the symbolic order simultaneously. The first "symbol" which is equivalent to the victim of a murder represents the structural violence of the irruption of language. It also "represents" the murder of the body, and the transformation as well as the captivity of drives.

2.13.2 Sacrificial practice: Kristeva and art

Sacrificial practice is the practice that precedes the slaying (which is also the thetic). It is dance, song, mime, art and poetry. A concrete example of this practice may be found in Dionysian festivals where the representations of the slaying before the actual sacrifice are more exalted than the act itself.⁵⁴ Thus:

[Sacrificial practice] deploys the expenditure (dépense) of semiotic violence, breaks through the symbolic border, and tends to dissolve the logical order, which is, in short, the outer limit founding the human and the social. (RPL 79)

Sacrificial practice is "artistic" in that it "semiotises the symbolic":

[b]y reproducing signifiers--vocal, gestural or verbal--the subject crosses the border of the symbolic and reaches the semiotic *chora*, which is on the "other" side of the social frontier. (RPL 79)

Sacrifice, and art as sacrificial practice, represent for Kristeva two aspects of the thetic function respectively: the prohibition of jouissance by language and the introduction of jouissance through language. As Kristeva argues:

In cracking the socio-symbolic order, splitting it open, changing vocabulary, syntax, the word itself, and releasing from beneath them the drives borne by vocalic or kinetic differences, jouissance works its way into the social and symbolic. In contrast to sacrifice, poetry shows us that language lends itself to the penetration of the socio-symbolic by jouissance, and that the thetic does not necessarily imply theological sacrifice. (RPL 79-80)

2.14 Abjection: Powers of Horror⁵⁵

Like the semiotic chora, the abject is marginal to and opposes the paternal rule-governed symbolic. Whilst the maternal semiotic chora characterises the pre-Oedipal state of the child (anal and oral drives), abjection delineates the threshold of the child's acquisition of language and its relatively (because it is always dialectical) stable enunciative position. The locus of emotion, of drives, of aggression towards the lost object, the resistance to logico-syntactic naming, is the locus of the abject. Because it is neither subject nor object, the "abject" may be defined as a kind of "pre-object" or a fallen object.

In the section above I have shown that the unclean or the disorderly bodily elements must be "sacrificed" in order for proper sociality and subjectivity to be established. But in the same way that the semiotic chora with its drive motility can never be fully repressed/silenced by the symbolic, neither can the subject's corporeal functions. They hover at the border of the identity of the subject, threatening apparent unities and stabilities with disruption and possible dissolution. When the subject recognises the unclean, or the "taboo", he becomes susceptible to the sensation Kristeva terms "abjection".

It follows that society erects taboos against all those abject objects--food (which provokes oral disgust), all types of bodily waste, (including faeces and saliva), because they threaten the establishment and stability of the symbolic. Abjection should not, however, be linked to dirt or putrefaction but should be seen to represent any kind of transgressive, ambiguous or intermediary state.

The abject therefore represents the first effort of the "subject-to-be" to separate itself from the pre-Oedipal mother. Nausea, distaste and horror are the signs of this radical ~~repulsion~~^v which serves to situate the "I", or more accurately to create a first fragile sense of "I", in the space where before there was only emptiness. Abjection expresses the acknowledgement of the body that the boundaries and limits imposed on it are in fact social projections. Abjection also expresses the precarious positioning of the subject in the symbolic, for there is always the threat that the subject may fall back into the morass of corporeal instincts from whence it came (see chapter two, section 3.3).⁵⁶

2.15 The genotext and the phenotext

As a logical development of her notion of the "doubled subject" constituted through the thetic break, Kristeva maps two "modalities" of text: the genotext and the phenotext.

The genotext includes the semiotic processes and the advent of the symbolic, and is thus linked to Kristeva's semiotic modality. It refers to and "expresses" drives, their division of the body, pre-Oedipal relations with parents (semiotic processes), as well as the emergence of object and subject and the constitution of meaning. The genotext is the only transfer of drive energies to organise a "space" in which the subject is not yet a split unity. Although it is visible in language, it is not in itself linguistic but is rather a process that articulates "ephemeral" structures or drive charges. It is aligned with the semiotic chora in that it is also the space in which the subject is generated through the imposition of the constraining symbolic.

One of the ways in which the analyst can locate the genotext of a written text is by highlighting the transfers of drive energy in phonematic and melodic devices

through examination of repeated phonemes, rhythm or intonation. The repetition and re-distribution of phonic and semantic potentialities proper to language produce new structures of signification. Kristeva, using I^{van} Fonagy's essay on the drive origins of specific phonemes as her basis, spells out the make-up of phonological oppositions beginning with the first morphemes pronounced by the child: mama and papa. The /m/ phoneme--labial, nasal, liquid--and the /p/ phoneme--labial, explosive--translate through articulatory means the sucking and explosion of the Freudian "da" and "fort", the incorporating orality and the destructive anality.⁵⁷ Through Fonagy, Kristeva links the liquids /l/, /r/, /m/ and the closed anterior vowels with the oral drive. The anal drive is associated with the open posterior vowels, and the urethral drives with the unvoiced constrictives /f/, /s/. Highlighted too is the tendency to phallicise this drive in the voiced constrictives /v/, /z/, /ʒ/. The unvoiced explosives /p/, /t/, and /k/ and the voiced explosives /b/, /d/, /g/ are linked to the aggressive drive of rejection whilst the apical /r/ is associated with the phallic-erectile drive (see chapter two, section 3).

The phenotext, on the other hand, denotes language that serves to communicate and is the artistic equivalent of the symbolic mode. It is a structure that obeys rules of communication and presupposes a subject of enunciation and an addressee. Although all texts are made up of the phenotext and genotext, only some signifying processes "encompass the infinite totality of that process locking it into a given surface or structure" (RPL 88). In other words, the semiotic chora visibly modifies linguistic structures in certain literary texts (see chapter two, sections 3, 4, 5 and chapter three, sections 4.1, 5.1, 6.1). In capitalist society, which emphasises the finished product, these particular literary texts are the texts of the avant-garde.

2.17 The poetic language of the late nineteenth century

Thus far I have demonstrated Kristeva's effort to argue that poetry, with its roots in ritual, confronts order at its most fundamental level: the logic of language and the logic of the state becomes a confrontation between jouissance and the thetic. The ground-breaking work in the essays "Word, Dialogue and Novel" and "The

Bounded Text" is developed fully as Kristeva demonstrates that "poetic language changed at the end of the century precisely because it became a practice involving the subject's dialectical state in language" (RPL 81).

For Kristeva, Joyce and Bataille are emblematic of the most radical aspects of twentieth-century literature (heralded by Lautréament and Mallarmé), because their work tests the dialectic of the subject in language. Kristeva's argument is that these two authors go beyond madness and realism into a literature of "delirium", producing an art which is neither rhetorical nor Formalist, but which has a violence or even a vehemence about it that penetrates the era (RPL 83). Such a negativity is the result of these artists' marginal positions in society, created by their impulse to disturb the logic dominating the social order. To achieve revolutionary art means a descent into the most archaic stage of the positioning of the subject, one contemporaneous with the positing of social order. It means a descent into the positing of the thetic which enables violence to surge up through phonetic and syntactic orders into the order that had once repressed it.

Philip Lewis suggests that Kristeva's analysis of Artaud, "Le sujet en procès", is a kind of synopsis of the analysis which takes place in the third section of Revolution in Poetic Language (31). Kristeva, in a near eulogy, expresses her admiration of the poetic work of the avant-garde and its political programme:

Through a specific practice which touches upon the very mechanism of language (in Mallarmé, Joyce, Artaud) or the mythic or religious systems of reproduction (Lautréament, Bataille) the "literary avant-garde" confronts society--even if only on its fringes--with a subject in process, assailing all of the stases of a unitary subject. The avant-garde thus assails closed ideological systems ... social structures of domination (the state) and accomplishes a revolution which, however distinct from or up to now unknown to the socialist and Communist revolution, is not its "utopian" or "anarchist" moment, but designates its blindness to the very process which sustains it. This "schizophrenic" process of avant-garde activity introduces a new historicity, a "monumental history" cutting across the myths, rites and symbolic systems of humanity, declaring its detachment from contemporary history ... or following this contemporary history in order to open it onto the process of negativity which propels it. (qtd. in Lewis 31)

3.1 TALES OF LOVE: LOVE/LOVESICKNESS, MELANCHOLIA

In the previous section I attempted to reveal the origins of Kristeva's thought in an exposition of her radical conceptions of subject and text. I have already pointed out the difficulties inherent in explicating the work of a theorist who continues to adapt and change. This difficulty is manifested in the following section where I demonstrate how Kristeva's later works, Tales of Love, In the Beginning was Love and Soleil noir expand on her original thoughts and present further ways of applying her notions of subjectivity and text to literary works.

Like Revolution in Poetic Language, Tales of Love is a vast and intimidating work. In short, Kristeva psychoanalytically re-writes ancient love philosophies into an elaborate history of subjectivity. At the same time she expounds a view of art which speaks to the crisis of our age, in which the individual's symbolic and imaginary capacities have become atrophied due to a growing absence of love and an increasing presence of melancholia.⁵⁸ The other Kristevan text to focus on love, In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith, conspicuous by its simplicity (a determined departure from the theoretico-verbal acrobatics of some of the essays of the late sixties and the seventies and the deliberately poetic style of Tales of Love), interrogates the precarious relationship between love-based analysis and faith. In this work, Kristeva reads through the Creed and exemplifies--via Freud, Lacan, Green and the case-histories of some of her patients--the fundamentals of her own love-based psychoanalysis.⁵⁹

This discussion begins with two quotations from Tales of Love which, in my mind, index the development of Kristeva's thought:

We have lost the relative strength and security that the old moral codes guaranteed our loves either by forbidding them or determining their limits ... we have buried love within shame for the benefit of pleasure, desire, if not revolution....(TL 5 emphasis added)

Today Narcissus is an exile, deprived of his psychic space, an extraterrestrial with a prehistory bearing [sic], wanting for love. An uneasy child, all scratched up, somewhat disgusting, without a precise body or image, having lost his specificity, an alien in a world of desire and power, he longs only to reinvent love. (TL 382)

That Kristeva openly acknowledges both the strength and security of "old moral codes", and that she comments on revolution's suppression of love, evinces how far she has moved since her near-eulogy on the revolutionary potential of avant-garde writing. Whilst these quotations demonstrate Kristeva's passionate belief in the individual's need for love, they also highlight her preoccupation with the individual's attainment of a new psychic space through love-based psychoanalysis.

As Kristeva writes:

Transference love, including especially its paroxysmal instance of acting out, arises on the couch in order to allow the scalpel of the discourse assumed by a subject to outline the domain of its possible manifestations. In other words: to sort out the types of representations of which this subject is capable--symbolic, imaginary, real. While perceiving them, thanks to the variety of relationships he has with his analyst, the analysand may attempt to construct his own reality. (TL 10)

From her earliest discussion of Bakhtin and the carnivalesque which destroys a god in order to impose its own dialogical laws, bringing to light a structure's underlying unconscious: sexuality and death (WDN 46), through to her examination of "Giotto's Joy" where love of the mother is made visible through colour, Kristeva has positioned herself on the interface of culture and politics. But it is notable that although her trip to China was obviously politically motivated, Kristeva claimed at the time that the journey was also due to her "honest love of the individual" (qtd. in Moi "Introduction," KR 11).

It has been suggested that a combination of factors--the failure of China to realise the hopes of the Tel Quel intellectuals, Kristeva's own experience of motherhood and her training as a psychoanalyst--engendered her shift in direction, the shift towards love (7). Kristeva's selection and emotive positioning of words such as "forbidden" and "limits" around the word love in the passages quoted, the pitiful description of the "scratched up" exile who longs only to re-invent love, and the extravagant analogy of the "extra-terrestrial's" traumatic isolation in a "world of desire and power" certainly mark love as her overriding preoccupation (TL 382).

But what kind of "shift" is this? Has Kristeva really altered her position radically? In her work, In the Beginning was Love, Kristeva makes it quite clear that she believes the role of the psychoanalyst is to reawaken the imagination of the patient so as to "reestablish a kind of coherence, eccentric or aberrant though it may be" (IBL 13, see section 3.10). In order to do this, she argues that the analyst must permit illusions to exist. This does not mean the illusions or fantasies that brought the patient to analysis in the first place (the analysand gains access to his symptoms through speech during analysis, and is thus able to more or less eliminate them [IBL 7]), but rather, what Kristeva terms "lucid illusions". She believes that these fantasies provide both an imaginary identity which is less crushing a burden than the suffering due to burning desire (desire for the other who is constantly fleeing, never to be possessed [IBL 7]) and the energy for a "kind of artifice, for the art of living" (IBL 9; emphasis added).

Thus Kristeva does not devalue the productive and creative potential which springs from psychotic crises. Furthermore, she is even more adamant that art is constituted of the subject, rather than constituted by the subject:

It is necessary to see how all great works of art--one thinks of Mallarmé, of Joyce, of Artaud, to mention only literature--are to be brief, masterful sublimations of those crises of subjectivity which are known, in another connection as psychotic crises ... I would even say that signs are what produce a body, that--and the artist knows it well--if he doesn't work, if he doesn't produce his music or his page or his sculpture, he would be, quite simply, ill or not alive. (qtd. in Meisel 131-2)

Kristeva believes that the nature of any artistic work depends on the psychological state of the subject. The semiotic--as she has always maintained but explains more clearly in Tales of Love--is revealed as having a rejuvenating effect on the individual. For in evoking the semiotic chora, she argues, the artist enables jouissance to irrupt into the symbolic, and the work of art becomes a possible mark of a "vanquished depression" (MI 109; TL 16 [see chapters two and three, sections 5 and 7 respectively]).

I suggest, therefore, that the "shift to love" is largely a mark of Kristeva's firm commitment to psychoanalysis, and it follows, psychic renewal. And I shall go on to show, through my exposition of Kristeva's theory of the subject as it is presented in Tales of Love, how love comes to be fundamental in Kristevan analysis for the transference opening the way to the cure (see section 3.8-3.10).

3.2 Tales of Love

Kristeva's diagnosis of the illness of the modern age is lovesickness. The mal de siècle is mal d'amour, as she explains:

The speaking being is a wounded being, his speech wells up out of an aching for love and the "death drive" (Freud) or the "unbeing" (Lacan) that are coextensive with human nature determine, if they do not justify them, the discontents of civilisations [...] Within our empty space we are afflicted. Because today we lack being particular, covered as we are with so much abjection, because the guideposts that insured our ascent toward the good have been proven questionable, we have crises of love. Let's admit it, lacks of love. (TL 372; 7)

Kristeva holds that while the Western self was safe within the space assigned to pure love or goodness, it could integrate crises (TL 6). For instance, whilst the Western Self could think of itself as an Ego affectus est, with Bernard Clairvaux, its psychic space (container of primary narcissism) was constantly able to integrate crises (TL 378). Similarly, the death of God, who once was love, has deprived the Western Self of a discourse of love which once enabled it to respond to narcissism (I discuss narcissism and idealisation in detail in sections 3.2-3.8 below).⁶⁰

Consequently, by examining the amatory codes that previously guaranteed love (such as Christianity), Kristeva establishes in what way these codes fulfilled or came close to fulfilling the psychic needs of the individual. Kristeva demonstrates that on the "near side of the grandiose Cartesian project" with its systematics of knowledge there were philosophical and theological discourses (still under the shadow of monotheism) that considered the importance of the dynamics of appetancy (TL 5).

There are two points worth noting here. First, Kristeva remains suspicious of abstraction as in the earlier essays, but here she is opposed to the rigorous

speculative abstraction of Aquinas. After Aquinas, she argues, unGodly philosophers, such as Spinoza, distorted the pull towards the One and the appropriation of the good from theology, creating in their place ethics and morality. St Bernard's ideas form the basis of Kristeva's own corrective of speculative abstraction. His notion of corporeal spirituality founded in human desire and affect engenders the Kristevan emphasis on the difference between desire and affect and leads to Kristeva's "re-definition" of love.⁶¹ Being "in-desire", Kristeva explains, is not the same as being "in-love". St Bernard's discourse of love is based on the reality of the human condition constituted by sin, for he believes that "taking our depravity into account, we must reach the city of God" (Kristeva TL 166). St Bernard, according to Kristeva, confronts man's avid tendencies towards egoism and narcissism as he argues the need for holy violence to constitute love in order to reach the ideal. Without holy violence, he says, Christian love would simply be a philosophy of good (TL 167).

From St Bernard's thoughts on love and his conclusion that love is an affect, springs Kristeva's notion that love is the rudimentary and essential bond between subject and Other.⁶² Love, she declares, is pathos or drive, violence and passion; it is primitive in nature and unnameable to the law (TL 156). Moreover, loving requires a "wrenching of the self for the sake of ideal identification of the loved one" (TL 26; emphasis added). Kristeva's re-definition of love is crucial. First, because love is associated with good, the symbolic permits its expression from the force of the unconscious. It may thus be used as part of the cure in psychoanalysis. Second, because of its "primitive nature", it may be aligned with the semiotic chora as marginal to the symbolic. Kristeva appropriates St Bernard's term "affect" to describe the irruption of this primitive "wrenching" into the symbolic order.

Kristeva parallels the Cistercian ascent to pure love with the stages of our mutating love for our family and friends. "[W]e have difficulty in loving", she explains, "because we have difficulty idealising" (TL 169). Similarly, we succeed in loving because "someone" was able to withstand our unflagging power of

distrust, hatred and fear of delegating ourselves to an ideal otherness (TL 169). Reiterating the paradoxical Bernardian position of a human being interposed between a voracious self and a tyrannical ideal, unsatisfied desire and assured possession, Kristeva couches the dilemma in her own psychoanalytic terms: the subject is an I that is split between the Other and the affect, an "I" that is because I love (TL 169).

The Thomistic notion of amor sui prompts Kristeva's description of Lacan as a Thomist without God. Her reason is that for him "drives were already signifying" (TL 183). We shall see how St Thomas' description of self-love results in Kristeva's interrogation and adaptation of narcissism, a radical gesture which sets her apart from Freud and Lacan and forms the pivot of her theory of primary identification.⁶³

These conclusions lead into Kristeva's investigation of the amorous dynamics of philosophical or theological systems: they all open up to each other through love. Amatory intertextuality is also an example of the semiotic flow within symbolicity, as Kristeva notes: "[T]he ordeal of love puts the univocity of love and its referential and communicative power to the test" (TL 2; emphasis added).

3.3 Love the lack: narcissism

As he tried to quench his thirst ... he saw an image in the pool and fell in love with unbodied hope, and found a substance in what was only shadow ... the strangeness of his infatuation. (Ovid Metamorphoses 350)

Having presented her view of love, Kristeva turns to and draws on Freud--the "post-Romanticist" who turned love into a cure--in order to explain why love is central to the psychic health of the individual (TL 8; TL 381). Freud goes straight to the disorders that love brings about in the speaking subject: errors, deceits, hallucinations and physical ailments. His psychoanalytic method, according to Kristeva, proposes that once the patient has identified his desire, he may construct his reality as "more or less the fragile border of his love life" (TL 8).

Kristeva, with her focus on the relationship between narcissism, love and idealisation, searches for and finds evidence in Freud's work which suggests the domination of narcissistic primacy and **not Eros** over psychic life. Freud casts self-deception as the basis of the subject's relation to reality. For Kristeva, self-deception points to a narcissistic destiny which underlies all object choices. In other words, she believes that the choice of the love object is satisfying only if the object relates to the subject's narcissism.⁶⁴

Kristeva maintains that even the transference of claims and desires toward a true object as defined by parental and social codes is actually a revival of narcissism. This is due to a kind of Freudian omnipresence of narcissism where narcissism penetrates the other realms (symbolic, real) until it comes to rest in an object where it is reflected. Freud proposes that narcissism is a "new action", that of a "third realm" which supplements the auto-eroticism of the mother-child dyad, thereby making it independent of the Oedipal Ego (TL 23).

The Freudian omnipresence of narcissism has caused some to suggest that it is no more than a Freudian fantasy and that nothing else exists but originary mimetism.⁶⁵ But Kristeva finds that narcissism in the Freudian text (especially as it appears in its first stage) seems to be a mimetic play that has the potential to establish psychic identity [Ego, object] (TL 23). This play finally, in what Kristeva refers to as a "dizziness of rebounds", is revealed as a screen over emptiness. Kristeva, acknowledging her indebtedness to André Green, formulates the following argument and conclusion:

- 1) Freud discovers the symptom as metaphor (condensation of fantasy),
- 2) Lacan reads the symptom as a screen through which one analyses the workings of signifiante (process of formation and de-formation of meaning and the subject).

Kristeva argues that the arbitrariness of the Saussurean sign has placed the subject in front of a bar of emptiness--the visible aspect of which has been expressed by Lacan as the gaping hole of the mirror stage.

3.4 Where does narcissism come from?

Freud delves no further; Kristeva does. She argues that the emptiness intrinsic to the beginnings of the symbolic function appears as the first separation between what is not yet an Ego and what is not yet an object. This emptiness is protected by narcissism. Narcissism causes but is also the "lining of that emptiness" which prevents the dissolution of borders and the reign of chaos which would itself result in melancholy and the triumph of abjection. As Kristeva states:

Without that solidarity between emptiness and narcissism, chaos would sweep away any possibility of distinction, trace and symbolization which would in turn confuse the limits of the body, words, the real and the symbolic. (TL 24)

Kristeva wants to know two things. What preserves the emptiness? And second, if auto-eroticism existed in the beginning, what or whom was added to autoeroticism to bring about narcissism? The mirror phase must have come from somewhere. Kristeva answers both these questions through the notion of primary identification:

It prompts one to conceive of an archaic disposition of the paternal function, preceding the Name, the Symbolic, but also preceding the "mirror stage" whose logical potentiality it would harbour--a disposition that one might call that of the Imaginary Father. (TL 22; emphasis added)

3.5 The preservation of emptiness, the break in the child's autoeroticism: primary identification: einfühling

Einfühling (in Kristeva's reading) is the assimilation of other people's feelings: a kind of madness in which the perception of the real is blurred and "handed over to the ego ideal" (TL 25). Einfühling is linked to archaic identification which is characteristic of the oral phase of libidinal organisation, where "what I incorporate is what I become, where having amounts to being" (TL 26). But Einfühling is not objectal because identification is itself not exactly objectal: primary identification exists in a relationship with what is offered as a model (ideal). This is a kind of "archaic reduplication" (as opposed to imitation) which occurs before any choice of object.⁶⁶

Freud links archaic identification (becoming as the one) to the "oral phase of the libido's organisation" and therefore simultaneously links it to the processes of introjection and incorporation. Taking her lead from him once again, Kristeva interrogates the relation between "having" and "being-like". What she wants to know is when the one switches over to the other--when "having" changes over to "being-like". If the subject is constituted by language, then this is the crux. As Kristeva explains:

When the object that I incorporate is the speech of the other--precisely a nonobject, a pattern, a model--I bind myself to him in a primary fusion, communion, unification. An identification. (TL 25)

Restraint must be exerted on basic needs for the process of identification to occur. In other words, psychic repression is required. In a way, therefore, the new subject starts to nourish himself with words. Or expressed differently; in order to receive, assimilate and repeat the "other's" words, one must become like him (the Ideal), a subject of enunciation. This occurs through psychic osmosis or identification which occurs through love:

In order to be, one must first identify

In order to identify, one must love

The one with whom the subject identifies is a Father--"a father in individual pre-history, the father of the imaginary".

In this way, the entire symbolic matrix sheltering emptiness is set in place in an elaboration that precedes the Oedipal complex. To recapitulate:

NARCISSISM SCREENS: Emptiness=separation → not yet ego
 → not yet object

SEPARATION OCCURS WHEN: what I incorporate is what I become

BEING OCCURS WHEN: when the object of having becomes speech


↓
 for this to happen

↓
 RESTRAINT must exerted on basic needs -- REPRESSION

IDENTIFICATION must occur so that one becomes LIKE THE OTHER
 for this to happen

ONE MUST LOVE

And with the aid of a diagram:



3.6 From Lacan to Kristeva

Kristeva refuses to find an answer to the enigma, "who might be the object of primary identification, daddy or mummy?", because she believes that it would open up the impossible quest for the absolute origin of love as a psychic and symbolic capacity (TL 28).

But it is Kristeva's emphasis on primary identification with an early "father-figure" that highlights her difference from Lacan. For Kristeva, the child's relationship with this early "father-figure" is not one of desire or metonymical displacement as Lacan would see it. It is rather one of love or of metaphorical

identification. The "object" of ein^uföhlung is a metaphoric object: "I am set up as an opposite One" (TL 25). Metaphor is movement towards the discernible, the visible: anaphora, gesture, indication (see chapter three, section 3).

The result is that the object of love becomes a metaphor for the subject. The object of love is the constitutive metaphor of the subject and consequently becomes

its unitary feature, which by having it choose an adored part of the loved one, already locates it within the symbolic code of which this feature is a part. (TL 30)

This logic of idealising identification enables Kristeva to posit (as a lining of the visual) the specular structure of the fantasy in search of the ever inadequate image of a desired other. If the object of fantasy is receding or metonymical, Kristeva reasons, it is because it fails to correspond to the preliminary ideal that the identification process has constructed. The subject exists because it belongs to the Other. It is the movement away from that symbolic belonging which makes him a subject--subject to love and death. This movement enables the subject to set up for himself an imaginary object of desire (see TL 34-36).⁶⁷

The loving subject does not have access to that Other as to an object, but as to the very possibility of the perception, distinction, and differentiation that allows one to see. The Ideal remains a blinding, nonrepresentative power. Thus, Kristeva reasons, when Romeo says that Juliet is the sun, the loving metaphor transfers onto Juliet the glare Romeo experiences (from the Ideal) in the state of love (TL 36). Kristeva concludes that the metonymic object of desire controls the phantasmatic narrative whilst the metaphoric object of love rules the "poeticalness" of the discourse of love (TL 30). Thus love is present in poetry and art in general through the agency of metaphor.

To conclude, then, the ideal identification with Symbolic upheld by the Other thus activates speech more than the image: it is the signifying voice that, in the final analysis, shapes the visible.⁶⁸ And because the Other is a magnet for loving identification, it must be understood not as a "pure signifier", but as the very space of metaphoric shifting: a condensation of semantic features as well as

nonrepresentable drive heterogeneity that subtends them (the semantic features), goes beyond them and slips away (TL 38).

3.7 Two identifications and their discourse

It should be clear by now that the subject exists only in so far as he identifies with an ideal other, who is the speaking other [who is the other in so far as he speaks] (TL 35). There are two types of identification. Primal identification results from a sentimental archaic and ambivalent affection for the maternal object. This is frequently created by the impetus of guilt-producing hostility. It is manifested in phobia, psychosis and depersonalisation. The other form of identification underlies the introjection into the ego of an object itself already libidinal. This is closer to hysterical love-hate: it takes to itself the phallic ideal that it pursues.

3.8 Conclusion

Kristeva has argued that primary narcissism is a structure previous to the Oedipal complex and that it operates on three terms which the disintegration of Christianity has left in suspense. The first term, emptiness, is a central node of connection, disconnection, and fullness. It stands for the instability of the subject. Emptiness is also the primer of the symbolic function and is precisely encompassed in linguistics by the bar separating signifier from signified and by the arbitrariness of the sign, the gaping of the mirror. Second, the subject is attracted by the magnet of primary identification (love, the seed of the Ego ideal) to the father of individual prehistory--the identity of the mother and her desire (the phallus) is the unity of the archaic "father". Third, as a correlative to primary identification to/from the archaic father, the subject is also driven by a magnet of desire and hatred, fascination and disgust, constituted by the archaic mother, the abject mother.

Although it should be clear by now that the Kristevan notion of subjectivity is based on the recognition of the speaking subject as a split subject, ever in conflict with the dominating structures of the symbolic order and its own unconscious desires, it should be emphasised that the Kristevan subject is also a suffering

subject. This is because the separation from the union with the mother is psychically extremely painful:

The child king becomes irremediably sad before proferring his first words: it is being separated from his mother, despairingly with no going back, that decides him to try and recuperate her, along with other objects in his imagination and later in words. (MI 104)

Because the imagination is inherently melancholic, it is possible to find in the discourse of analysis and certain types of literary texts (more specifically in poetic language), traces of the pre-linguistic semiotic processes which constitute the pre-subject.⁶⁹ These traces constitute the "catastrophic anguish" of the text, engendered as they are from the suffering subject. Simultaneously, identification with the father of personal pre-history through love is the basis of the formation of a successful narcissistic structure--one that enables the symbolisation of loss and the formation of desire. These two psychoanalytic procedures mark Kristeva's shift from the position set up by Freud and Klein to one which deals expressly with depressive psychosis.

3.9 Kristevan Psychoanalysis

The delight and anguish of that freedom are intensified today because we lack a code of love; no stable mirrors for the loves of a period, group or class. The analyst's couch is the only place where the social contract explicitly authorizes a search for love--albeit a private one. (TL 6)

Kristeva holds that it is want of love that ultimately draws a patient to analysis. Because the analytical situation sanctions the expression of wounds suffered, it is the haven where the discussion of possible new identities and new modes of self expression may take place. In this way it is like art. For art, like analysis, allows the subject to cry out in agony and suffering and to express the pain of his primitive trauma.

The analyst becomes the most important and powerful person for the patient, because it is the analyst's role, via transference, to restore the patient's confidence and his capacity for love. A relationship of mutual love and trust must be established between them:

Here and now the omnipotent author of my being or malady (my father or mother) is the analyst. The deep meaning of my words is governed by this hidden drama, which presupposes that I grant considerable power to the analyst. But the confidence that I place in him is based on my love for him and what I assume is his love for me. (IBL 2-3)

3.10 The analyst as Loving Other

The pain, the primitive trauma at the root of the patient's estrangement from the symbolic order, may be sexual in nature or it may even be a deep narcissistic injury. The headache, the paralysis or haemorrhage of a patient are symptoms of the return of an unsymbolised repressed object. The repressed language of hatred or love re-activate energies no longer filtered by any psychic trace or representation, but which attack and disrupt the functioning of the body's organs (IBL 6). Similarly fantasies or phantoms are seen not as aberrations but reveal in some way the truths of the speaking subject, even if they appear to be delusions. The amatory discourse that the analyst engages in with the analysand will reveal the nature of the analysand's problem. This is because such a discourse is inherently emotional and is stripped of signification without simultaneously losing instinctual meaning. It is from these pre-linguistic emotional traces, linguistic representations, and by extension, ideologies (symbolic representations), which are all woven into a kind of narrative fiction, that the analyst attempts to interpret the symptoms and fantasies of his patient (IBL 19). Kristeva explains:

Analytic discourse ... issues from the web of the imagination. It works through enticements, shams, approximations ... to arrive at truths that become absolute only because they find their exact meaning in the evanescence of the imaginary construct. (IBL 18)

But why should an unsymbolised repressed object arise to torment the subject? Because there is a failure of primary identification. This is what Kristeva calls "foreclosure". In the Lacanian school, foreclosure of the Name of the Father denotes a primordial expulsion of the fundamental signifier (the phallus) from the subject's symbolic universe. According to Lacan, if the subject forecloses on the castrating phallus, he may be said never to have entered the symbolic at all. But Kristeva, focusing on the pre-Oedipal phase, claims that it is not so much a question

of foreclosing the paternal signifier in its Oedipal or symbolic guise, but is rather a point of foreclosing the earlier paternal pre-"object", or the "father of individual prehistory". If this Kristevan foreclosure occurs, the child remains the mother's sole object of desire and the triangulation necessary for the development of the mirror phase and the Ego never takes place. This subject has never felt loved for himself, because, paradoxically, his mother loved only him, and no other. This subject, not wholly part of the symbolic, is thus a "borderline" personality.⁷⁰

In order to bring about psychic renewal, the Kristevan analyst has to enter into amatory discourse with his patient. In other words, the analyst must play the part of loving Other to the analysand,⁷¹ so that the analysand can imagine that the analyst is not a dead Father, but a living Father, and more particularly, a non-desiring and loving father. Once the analyst has done this, his aim is to reconcile the analysand's ideal Ego with his Ego Ideal. In other words, before killing the father of individual prehistory upon entering the mirror phase, the (speaking) being loves him (or the psychoanalyst in the guise of the father) in order to speak.

This love-relationship creates the psychic space where analysis, and therefore transference, can take place. Transference (through love) displaces the pain of the analysand onto the analyst and releases the analysand into a discovery of his own potential for psychic renewal, intellectual innovation and physical change. The analysand's new-found certainty finally enables the patient to distance himself from the analyst.⁷²

4.1 KRISTEVAN ANALYTICAL LANGUAGE, ART AND THE APPLICATION TO LITERARY TEXTS

If narcissism is a defence against the emptiness of separation, it follows that the whole contrivance of imagery, representation, identifications and projections that accompany it [art] on the way toward strengthening the Ego and the Subject is a means of exorcising that emptiness (MI 108-09). As Kristeva phrases it:

Literary creation is that adventure of body and signs that bears witness to the affect: to sadness as the mark of separation and the beginnings of the dimension of the symbol, to joy as the mark of triumph, placing [the artist] in that universe of artifice and symbol which [he tries] to make correspond ... to [his] experiences of reality. (MI 108)

It is separation from the mother, preconditioned by love (love for the imaginary father, support of the symbolic triumph) and begun as an expulsion of an object by the drives, that completes the subject's entry into language.

4.2 Interpretation/Interpreting poetry

In order to fulfil the Kristevan definition of a "wise interpreter", the literary analyst is encouraged to indulge in language play and frequently give in to delirium:

I would suggest that the wise interpreter give way to delirium so that, out of his desire, the imaginary may join interpretive closure, thus producing a perpetual interpretive creative force. (PP 87)

Without using the signifier "delirium" but focusing instead on the following phrase "so that out his desire, the imaginary may join interpretive closure, thus producing a perpetual creative force" (PP 87), I derive a procedure which clarifies and extends what might otherwise be another version of playful-critical madness.⁷³ It is this, in combination with the following point that Kristeva makes about the role of the phonic rhythm in creating the poetic text, that provides one of the keys to a Kristevan reading of poetry:

[T]he repetition and redistribution of the phonic and semantic potentialities proper to the language produce new structures of signification ... open[ing] the normative usage of language on the one hand toward the underlying and repressed body and semiotic chora and on the other toward multiple displacements and condensations which produce a strongly ambivalent if not polymorphous semantics. (PPIB 33-34)

As the exposition of Kristeva's ideas has already illustrated, a Kristevan analysis is both the psychoanalysis of the subject and the analysis of the text: semanalysis. To be Kristevan, the approach must promise to show that the subject is a sujet-en-procès, that it is divested of egological unity and is caught in the dialectic of the signifying process--the contradiction of the symbolic and the semiotic. Concurrently, the analysis of the text must focus, as Kristeva's does, on a poetic practice which devalues meaning, propositions and words to the advantage of

a rhythm, a music, a melody. Or as the psycholinguist herself points out: "Poetic discourse measures rhythm against the meaning of language structure and is thus always eluded by meaning in the present, while continually postponing it to an impossible time-to-come" (RPL 33).

The Kristevan challenge therefore is to "break through the sign, dissolve it" and by way of semanalysis "tear the veil of representation to find the material signifying process beneath" (PPIB 103). To do so, the "wise interpreter" must relinquish^s the lexical, syntactic and semantic operation of deciphering and concern himself with **unveiling the processes that have produced the text itself**. In order to locate the phonic rhythm of a poetic text, for example, the analyst has to trace repeated phonemes and highlight both the patterns (the rhythm) which are created through the processes of the unconscious, that is, through multiple condensations and displacements (PPIB 34). To illustrate this latter dream logic it is appropriate to go back to Freud who, in his exposition, refers to an example of dream interpretation reported by Artemidorus:

I think too that Aristander gave a most happy interpretation to Alexander of Macedon when he had surrounded Tyre and was besieging it but was feeling uneasy and disturbed because of the length of time the siege was taking. Alexander dreamt he saw a satyr dancing on his shield. Aristander happened to be in the neighbourhood of Tyre, in attendance on the king during his Syrian campaign. By dividing the word for satyr into sa and tyr he encouraged the king to press home the siege so that he became master of the city. (sa + tyr = Tyre is thine). ("The Dream Work" 99; qtd. in Kristeva LU 269)

In the Greek language, satyr is a unit whose two syllables have no meaning by themselves. Even so, outside this unit, the signifiers sa and tyr do have another signified, namely Tyre whose imminent conquest motivated the dream. Freud went on to clarify and develop this crude dream-paranomasia in his later writings and concluded that it is a "relative autonomy of the signifier under which slides a signified which is not necessarily included in the morpho-phonological unit such as it appears in the communicated utterance" (qtd. in Kristeva LU 269).

I have already demonstrated that Kristeva goes so far as to link phonemes to specific drives of the body. By appropriating these connections, the analyst is able to reveal the trans-symbolic "corporal" role of the sounds of language in a poetic text whilst simultaneously unearthing the "other" text, the genotext beneath the printed text/the phenotext. By exposing the text's phonic rhythm and linking repeated phonemes to drives, the analyst is in a position to argue that the subject that created the text is a sujet-en-procès caught in the dialectic between symbolic language and the drives of the body. It is possible to conceptualise the "rhythmicity based on acoustic-impulsional distinctions" (PPIB 35), by seeing it as the "passion" of verse--what we might understand as the "magic" of a poem.

Consequently, because the "passion" of verse is a function of the reader's response to the text, it is also the result of the interaction between the shifting phonemes of the phenotext (signifying differentials) and the displacement/condensation processes of the unconscious of the reader as analyst.⁷⁴ So when the analyst probes the signifying act that produced the text, he not only exposes the processes that have constituted the text itself, but, as he does so, his imaginary joins interpretive closure to produce a perpetual interpretive creative force.

4.3 Art and Life

It follows that any analysis which attempts to be Kristevan must attend to the irruption of the semiotic chora into the symbolic, whether it be on the level of theme, subject matter or through linguistic disturbances. By the same token a literary analysis must discuss the way in which the writer inscribes the semiotic--as it stands for the negative, the rejected, the love-sick, the marginal, the feminine--within literature. But because Kristeva believes that absence (of the mother) and mourning (for the loss of union with the mother) set the imaginary act in motion, and because foreclosure of the imaginary father engenders a borderline psychic state and the writing of delirium, Kristevan analysis must also explore the psychological state of the artist and illustrate its relationship with his art.

What this involves, broadly speaking, is an examination of mood and affect (semiotic pulsions; rhythm, musicality, intonation) in the text. In more specific cases, for example that of the narcissistic depressive, sadness is the only object. The art which results is "objectless" in that there is only mood in the text: the "psychic representation of displacements of psychic energy provoked by external or internal traumas" (MI 107). The analyst should look for images of sorrow, such as Nerval's soleil noir here (even though the black sun does not represent sorrow) and he might read (as Kristeva does) the black sun as an indeterminate "Thing", a something, a "light without representation" (ED 160-61).

But how does the melancholic artist triumph over his melancholy: how does he reconcile his art with his life? If the Kristevan psychoanalyst has to find a way of turning the unknown "Thing" at the root of the subject's sorrow into an object so that transference may occur, so too must the literary analyst, and the artist as analyst. There are four points to be made here.

First, the artist must identify with a third instance, that is, father, form or schema. It is this identification that assures his entry into the universe of signs. Here is the dénégation, the disavowal[^]: "No, I haven't lost anything; I evoke, I signify: through the artifice of signs and for myself, I bring into existence that having been separated itself from me" (MI 109). The form (or in Kristeva's earlier terminology, the completion of thethetic) of the artwork which holds it together thus figures for Kristeva the artist's place in the symbolic.⁷⁵

Second, if all imaginary artistic works, even those which are intensely emotional, are created with a certain detachment, as Kristeva asserts, the artist exemplifies an attachment to the Thing in the sense that there is a continuity (comportement) between his life and his work. This is not to say that art represents life, but rather that the work is part of the artist's life. As Kristeva explains:

Perhaps, then, Dostoevski's excessive gambling, equivalent to an evacuation of drive energy, would be the precondition for the detachment, and, as he remarked himself, clarity of mind necessary for him to write his moving fiction. (qtd. in Lechte 35)

The excess of suffering experienced by an artist such as Dostoevsky gains an almost sensual pleasure once it is verbalised. This is not conscious because it redistributes the order of language through stylistic aberrations or in images which represent that which is "forbidden" by society. In other words, the artist's continual evocation of the mother is visible in the genotext of the artwork: through the semiotic chora, as it appears in rhythm, alliteration, intonation, and laughter. If these features are present in the artist's work, the analyst may argue that the work of art evokes and exorcises sadness or melancholia, and is a possible mark of a "vanquished depression" (MI 109). Psychic renewal thus occurs in the creation of the art-work itself.

Third, because metaphor is the point at which ideal and affect come together in language, love is present in poetry and art in general through the agency of metaphor. The analyst's task, therefore, is to examine metaphor, or "metaphoricalness" (anaphora, gesture, indication) within the literary text so as to establish the existence of love, and, it follows, the subject in the process of identification. According to Kristeva, metaphor is love as the dissolution of otherness, as the metamorphosis of self into "someone". The Kristevan analyst may thus read the lyricism of a poem as the artist's attempt to dissolve the object by merging all objects into one. The examination of the phonic rhythm within verse will also illustrate this aspect as it demonstrates that the artist is a subject in process.

Because a continual evocation of the mother through the semiotic chora brings about a loss of coherent identity (it threatens the symbolic and therefore stable identity) the artist may in life attempt to resist the mother. Baudelaire, for example, copes with his loss through Dandyism. This desperate assertion of independence and social survival is his challenge to (and represents his separation from) the mother.

~~Finally,~~ if the reader/the literary analyst stands as the audience for the artist, he may also fulfil the role of psychoanalyst. This point takes three directions. First, the artist may inscribe the semiotic chora--lovesickness or love-hatred--into

his art on the level of the phenotext as well as linguistically (on the level of the genotext). In other words, he may evoke the semiotic chora and therefore the mother through the fiction itself: through plot, theme or characterisation. His art becomes his psychoanalytical haven for the expression of his wounds or his primitive trauma. And he uses his art-work to express his own lovesickness.

But because the semiotic chora is repressed in symbolic language, its affects may not be easily found in the text. It is the role of the reader, as loving Other to the artist, to locate the lost object or the "Thing" in the text, and to explore how and why this "Thing" becomes an object.

Finally, in order to understand or to struggle to understand the lyricism of writing, means that the reader becomes open to the notion that it is the product of another's love-struggle. This means that the reader is capable of love for this other. To experience art to the full, as is the critical project, is to open oneself up to the other as the artist he is. This is to appreciate art with love. The work of art has an analytic effect, therefore, in that it augments the symbolic and imaginary capacities of the subject (the reader) who appreciates it. Consequently the reader/analyst, suspending desire, not only becomes part of a re-writing process in his reading process, but as his imaginary joins interpretive closure he opens himself up to the analytic effects of the work, and produces a perpetual creative force.

CHAPTER TWO

EMILY DICKINSON, DEATH AND MELANCHOLY; THE PHONIC

RHYTHM AND VANQUISHED DEPRESSION

[W]e have this **rhythm**; this repetitive sonority; this thrusting tooth pushing upwards before being capped with the crown of language; this struggle between word and force gushing with the pain and relief of a desperate delirium; the repetition of this growth, of this gushing forth around the crown-word, like the earth completing its revolution around the sun ... we have the "ego," situated within the space of language, crown, system: no longer rhythm, but sign, word, structure, contract, constraint....(Kristeva EL 28-29)

No Rack can torture me --
 My Soul -- at Liberty --
 Behind this mortal Bone
 There knits a bolder One --

You cannot prick with saw --
 Nor pierce with Scimitar --
 Two Bodies -- therefore be --
 Bind One -- The Other fly --

The Eagle of his Nest
 No easier divest --
 And gain the Sky
 Than Mayest Thou --

Except Thyself may be
 Thine Enemy --
 Captivity is Consciousness --
 So's Liberty.

(Emily Dickinson, poem 384)

Estranged from language, women are visionaries, dancers who suffer as they speak. (Kristeva "Oscillation Between Power and Denial"; qtd. in Marks and de Courtivron 165-66)

1.1 Introduction: Jakobson, Kristeva and Dickinson

Language, negativity and death

"It is quite an experience", says Julia Kristeva, "to listen to Roman Jakobson reading Mayakovsky and Khlebnikov" (EL 27). In the recording of his 1967 lecture, "Russian Poetry of my Generation", Jakobson imitates the voices of the Russian poets, their "lively rhythmic accents", their "softly whispered words" and the "sustained swishing and whistling sounds" of the Russian language (EL 27). For Kristeva, the aural peculiarity of Jakobson's reading, and his angry question "How can we speak about Mayakovsky, now that what prevails is not rhythm but the poet's death?" is charged with a theoretical (even ethical) significance. In reading the verse aloud Jakobson vocalises the struggle between the "force and the word" (EL 28), and the disintegrating voyage to the mother.¹ And by questioning the relationship between a poet's death and the nature of his verse, Jakobson does more than condemn a generation that murdered its poets (EL 31). He betrays his own fascination with the destructive relationship between rigid society and art.²

How does poetic language make a poet "easy prey" in the eyes of society? Kristeva answers the question through Jakobson by focusing on rhythm: in so far as rhythm can be seen as a presence that precedes the signification of object or emotion (and therefore precedes the thetic) a poet who wants to turn rhythm into a dominant element becomes a revolutionary:

[H]e wants to make language perceive what it doesn't want to say, provide it with its matter independently of the sign, and free it from denotation. For it is this eminently parodic gesture that changes the system. (EL 31)

Murder, death and unchanging society, Kristeva argues, represent the inability to hear or to understand the signifier as a presence that is connected to pre-linguistic drives.³ A society that suppresses the drives of its subjects is a stable society--and will only remain that way if poetic language is subdued.⁴ Thus poetic language becomes a "risky practice": first because it enables the speaking animal to sense the rhythm of the body as well as the upheavals of history, and second because it alone carries on the struggle against death.⁵

Kristeva resurrects and gets to the root of Jakobson's line of reasoning in her doctoral thesis Revolution in Poetic Language. Here, "rigid society" is aligned with "the Law of the Symbolic", and art with "poetic language". Although I have already detailed how Kristeva supplements Lacan's theory of the subject with the thetic break which is represented by syntax in the denoted object and the enunciation of the displaced subject, it is important to emphasise here that the drives of the subject are "subdued" or put to death (as Kristeva phrases it) at the thetic phase when they are linked into signifiers and signifieds. This crucial addendum enables Kristeva to argue that whilst syntax can represent the thetic break, it can also represent its displacement. When the semiotic chora disturbs the thetic position through a realignment of the signifying order, the denoted object and syntactic relation are also disturbed. In certain signifying systems, like poetic language, the drives which the thetic phase was unable to "put to death" become poetic distortions of the signifying chain. In these systems the thetic is always represented as disturbed and displaced through a syntax which is also disturbed.

Language which refuses to allow syntax to "put the drives to death", says Kristeva, is a negativity and a discourse about death. Poetry which pulverises the signifier/signified relation through a phonic rhythm, which devalues meaning for musicality, describes this very negativity as it carries on a struggle against death whilst simultaneously exorcising it. A poet who in this fashion tries to make language say what it does not want to say, who tries to free it from denotation, works against the law and becomes a revolutionary. Such an exorcism of death through negativity and a phonic rhythm is the verse of another revolutionary, Emily Dickinson.

2.1 The Dickinson Revolution

Emily Dickinson has been described as "baffling" because her writing seems to bear little relationship to the historical period in which she worked.⁶ Dickinson is also a source of curiosity and speculation because her work is so radically

different from that of other women writers of the nineteenth century. And Dickinson has been charged with virtual incomprehensibility because the very nature of her language defies easy interpretation. Her writing is puzzling because it is polyvalent: it provokes, even demands, multiple interpretations and analysis.⁷

Whilst it is apt to use the writings of one such as Kristeva, who is l'étrangère,⁸ to talk about a poetry that itself enacts strangeness, I am aware of the vast amount of critical scholarship that Dickinson's "strangeness" has engendered. By embarking on a Kristevan reading of Emily Dickinson's poetry, I submit to the revolutions, the revelations and to the constraints that this approach demands.

My Kristevan discussion of the psychology of the poet, Emily Dickinson, the themes and the subject matter of the poetry, will all form part of my attempt to illustrate that Emily Dickinson's poetic practice evokes the renewal of the metrical and rhythmic experience of the subject. I shall argue that it forms the American equivalent of the revolution in poetic language which Julia Kristeva painstakingly describes in her analyses of French poetry of the late nineteenth century--that of the male avant-garde.

Julia Kristeva links melancholy and its art not only to religious, cultural and political upheavals--as I have detailed above--but also to a personal crisis and "illness". She makes this point quite clear in an interview with Perry Meisel in 1984:

It is necessary to see how all great works of art--one thinks of Mallarmé, of Joyce, of Artaud to mention only literature--are, to be brief, masterful sublimations of those crises in subjectivity which are known in another connection as psychotic crises ... I would even say that signs are what produce a body, that--and the artist knows it well--if he doesn't work, if he doesn't produce his music or his page or his sculpture, he would be, quite simply, ill or not alive. (131-2; emphasis added)

The first part of my Kristevan analysis focuses on the phenotext of Emily Dickinson's verses. The purpose here is to determine in what way Dickinson's personal crises, together with religious, familial and historical upheavals, inspired and generated her melancholic and subversive art.

The section that follows will explore the "otherness" of Dickinson's language in great detail. It will demonstrate how Dickinson--an accomplished pianist and musician--like Mallarmé, Rilke, Valéry and Hopkins, consciously but also unconsciously created patterns of sound in her verse which enhanced the strangeness of her poems and which exorcised death through their phonic rhythm. By examining a selection of Dickinson's more obscure poems, I shall demonstrate--through the Kristevan semi-phonetic breakdown--how Dickinson broke with denotation and was able to "make language say what it does not want to say" (EL 31; PPIB 34), and how, therefore, she created her own regenerative power of horror.

2.2 A personal crisis; melancholy

In April 1862 Emily Dickinson confessed to Thomas Wentworth Higginson (her mentor and confidant) that she had felt a "terror" since September. She adds mysteriously: "I could tell to none -- so I sing, as the Boy does by the Burying Ground -- because I am afraid" (Letter 261).⁹ The majority of Dickinson's most powerful and well-known verses date back to this year (1862), which witnessed the birth of almost four hundred poems. A chilling and recondite piece, 512, opens with a description of torment and the paralytic effects of fear:

The Soul has Bandaged moments --¹⁰
 When too appalled to stir --
 She feels some ghastly Fright come up
 And stop to look at her --

Salute her -- with long fingers --
 Caress her freezing hair --

.....

(512)

Verses three and four express the delirious joy of the soul's moment of escape, but in a kind of manic depressive cycle the poem returns to its melancholic motif and closes on a perverse note of relief that horror has returned:

The Horror welcomes her, again
 These are not brayed of Tongue --
 (512)

The ominous appearance of a "Fright" that taunts, and the threat of derangement implicit in these lines, is expressed with cruelty in another poem of 1862, 410. Here, the speaker experiences and endures the terror of the "first Day's Night" but is unable to withstand a further bizarre encounter with "a Day as huge/As Yesterdays in pairs". Once its horror has unrolled in her face and blocked her eyes, her brain begins to laugh. Finally she recognises that "internal change" may in fact be insanity:

.....
 And tho' `tis Years ago -- that Day --
 My Brain keeps giggling -- still.

And Something's odd within --
 That person that I was --
 And this One -- do not feel the same --
 Could it be Madness -- this?

(410)

In the light of Dickinson's revelation to Higginson, it is not surprising that scholars have read these lines (and indeed many other Dickinson poems) as expressions of a personal crisis that resulted in mental instability. The poet's "terror" and her "madness" has in fact become a vexed issue.¹¹ John Cody, in his work *After Great Pain*, uses Dickinson's well-known poem "I felt a Funeral in My Brain" (amongst others) to support his claim that Dickinson suffered a psychotic breakdown. After close examination of Dickinson's verse, Carla Sonntag proposes that the poet suffered from epileptic seizures and that these experiences--rather than a psychosis--are reflected in some of her poems. Jerry F. Reynolds arrives at a different conclusion by the same procedure: examination of the verse. He is convinced that Dickinson had "systematic lupus eruthematosus", a disease which causes photosensitivity to the eyes, bronchial trouble and a skin rash (46).

Diagnosing Dickinson is dangerous because more often than not it is based on the premise that the speaker of the poems is the poet, Dickinson herself. This ignores the poet's own instruction and defense: detachment. Dickinson fiercely denied that she was ever the "persona" of her poems. Once again, she confides in

Higginson: "When I state myself, as the Representative of the Verse -- it does not mean -- me -- but a supposed person" (L268).¹²

A critic such as Martin Wand goes a different route and diagnoses exotropia. The symptoms of this latter condition include "eyestrain, blurring of vision, headaches, etc.", symptoms which appear in the poet's correspondence (qtd. in Whittle 22). Other less medically-minded critics such as Gilbert and Gubar suggest in their work, The Madwoman in the Attic, that Dickinson articulates in her poetry the details of the plot she contrived for her reclusive and eccentric life. They argue that the fictional shape Dickinson gave her life was a gothic and romantic one, mostly because the gothic/romantic mode was so frequently employed by the women writers whom Dickinson admired almost more than any other literary artists (594).¹³

Whatever Dickinson's affliction, she did recognise in art a therapeutic effect. This is demonstrated by yet another note to Higginson: "I felt a palsy, here -- the Verses just relieve --" (L265), and by a poem of 1862, 544:

The Martyr Poets -- did not tell --
But wrought their Pang in syllable --
That when their mortal name be numb --
Their mortal fate -- encourage Some --

The Martyr Painters -- never spoke --
Bequeathing -- rather -- to their Work --
That when their conscious fingers cease --
Some seek in Art -- the Art of Peace --
(544)

If we accept that Dickinson experienced a moment of personal crisis, and if we accept that her writing was a form of therapy, why then did she write about death? For many more of Dickinson's poems focus on death and dying than on madness. Of the one thousand seven hundred and seventy five poems Dickinson wrote, well over two thirds deal directly with death and explore its relationship with a painful living reality. In his Emily Dickinson's Poetry, Robert Weisbuch goes so far as to claim that "nearly every poem Dickinson wrote has to do with death, with endings" (78).¹⁴

Kristeva believes that the imagination of the artist is inherently melancholic because separation from the mother is psychically extremely painful (this has already been explained in detail in section 3.8 of chapter one). The artist, says Kristeva, tends towards the melancholic pole of the psychical spectrum. True melancholy (which is different from the melancholy of the artist) verges on psychosis because it demonstrates an almost total failure of the subject to express loss of the mother in signs, or to form an identity in the symbolic (through identification with the father of prepersonal history, see chapter one, sections 3.2-3.8). Because the real melancholic does not succeed in bringing the mother back in signs (dénégation), he tends towards loss of words, silence and despair. Signs are detached from objects and are instead attached to the Thing--the object as not lost. The psychoanalyst's task is to connect the melancholic subject with its objects and to turn the Thing into an object.

The artist, by way of contrast, does have control over the use of signs. Kristeva holds that any art-work, no matter how emotional, is wrought with a degree of detachment. Attachment to the Thing, therefore, exists in so much as there is continuity (comportement) between the artist's life and work. Attachment to the mother is evoked through the semiotic dimension of the signifying process through rhythm, alliteration, and musicality. Because the artist, unlike the psychotic or true melancholic, gives his loss form in the work of art, Kristeva concludes that the artwork is therefore the possible mark of a vanquished depression.

Before drawing any Kristevan conclusions about this seemingly happy New England girl who experienced what she called "a terror" and began to write poems about death, we need to examine the melancholic motif in Emily Dickinson's subversive art.

2.3 The American Revolution: a way of death

Although there is no evidence to suggest that Dickinson lost a close relative or a lover in the war, her verses,¹⁵ which abound with military metaphors, descriptions of funerals with drumbeats and trumpets, as well as numerous accounts of brave men confronting death, index her emotional participation in the American upheaval of history--the war between the states.¹⁶ Even though Dickinson's triple protection--her quiet Massachusetts life, her self-imposed reclusiveness, and her gender--meant that she was safe from the physical violence and bloodshed of the war, she was not protected from the rituals of mourning and their accompanying theatricals.¹⁷ And because she was an intellectual and a writer, she was also not immune to the sentimental love tradition--a popular cultural genre at the time--which had its own unique strength and purpose.¹⁸

But in the same way that Dickinson failed to conform to the social stereotypes of a woman of her class and status, she did not yield easily to woman's passive participation in the war.¹⁹ She refused to enact the role of "woman mourning at the graveside" or "woman waiting for the return of loved one"--by writing. A similar refusal to be locked into a specific feminine role emerges in the writing itself, in which death, grief and pain are inextricably intertwined--rather than the sentimentality exemplified by her contemporaries such as Mary Warner and Lydia Hunt Sigourney.²⁰ By way of contrast to Dickinson, who sings "as the Boy does, by the burying ground", Sigourney, is hailed as "the sweet singer of Hartford" (St Armand 44). Her writings, which respond to the American sentimental love tradition adopt a harmonious, gentle and feminine tone as they describe mourning maidens, mute tombstones, and melancholy weeping willows:

Pale Willow, drooping low,
 In gentle sympathy --
 Thy flexile branches wave
 Like broken harp-strings o'er the grave
 Where our lost treasures lie.

(qtd. in St Armand 45)

Dickinson's scorn of such a romanticisation of death emerges with forceful impact in her portrait of the dying:

I like a look of Agony
 Because I know it's true --
 Men do not sham Convulsion,
 Nor simulate, a Throe --

The Eyes glaze once -- and that is Death --
 Impossible to feign
 The Beads upon the Forehead
 By homely Anguish strung.

(241)

By presenting the painful reality of death through the physical deterioration of the dying, Dickinson spurns the popular genre that portrays death as the bringer of peace and a tranquil afterlife. Never does she appropriate the jargon of her time by writing about "lambs whom the Saviour taketh untask'd, untried" (St Armand 46). And nor does she pay lip-service to dominant religious sentiments by pursuing, within her verses, a notion of sinlessness and death that is "a glorious heritage" (St Armand 45). Dickinson upsets the traditional responses to death by familiarising herself with death and by making it a part of everyday life without sentimentalising it: she makes Death tangible without detracting from its power or horror. Her speaker admits that she likes a look of agony--because it's true. And furthermore, her subject does not find agony alien and foreign, but rather finds it homely.

In poem 241 Dickinson expresses a justifiable preference for "truth" in dying and writing--without either the sham of convulsion or sentimentality. Furthermore, because Dickinson captures death's pain and horror at the same time as expressing her preference for death, what she infers is her fearlessness of the power of horror.

This does not mean that Dickinson did not write as mourner. On the contrary, poems such as 561, 793 and 341 express her understanding of that painful role. But unlike Sigourney who ascended "the elevating flight of love up the ladder of belief" (St Armand 50), lines such as these from 610 explore the pain and grief of mourning and render the distress of the speaking subject without allowing

melodrama or emotionalism to creep in:

And when this World -- sets further back --
 As Dying -- say it does --
 The former love -- distincter grows --
 And supersedes the fresh --

And Thought of them -- so fair invites --
 It looks too tawdry Grace
 To stay behind -- with just the Toys
 We bought -- to ease their place --
 (610)

The final two lines express loss by focusing on absence and by filling this absence. There are no platitudes to comfort the mourners; there is no glorification of death.²¹ Instead, Dickinson describes how "toys" are used to fill the place of the dead. She evokes pity by taking on a child-like persona whilst simultaneously highlighting the inadequacy of such a replacement. Death, she seems to say, is attractive because it takes one away from substitute lovers to true love.²²

2.4 Religious upheaval

Dickinson's fascination with and her portrayal of death and moments of dying were also a reaction to the religious fervour of her family and community. The Dickinsons embraced the Calvinist tradition and its dogma of predestination with a whole-hearted piety. St Armand, who details the influence of Dickinson's religious background on her poetry, concludes that Dickinson was schooled in the "science of the grave" from an early age (52). Deathbed behaviour would also be regarded as a test of a person's spirituality. Serenity on the face of the dying would herald a peaceful ascent into heaven; anguish a descent to hell. Sometimes moments of dying are perceived by onlookers:

I've seen a Dying Eye
 Run round and round a Room --
 In search of Something -- as it seemed --
 Then Cloudier become --
 And then -- obscure with Fog --
 And then -- be soldered down
 Without disclosing what it be
 'Twere blessed to have seen --
 (547)

Sometimes they are experienced by the speaker herself as in "I felt a Funeral in my Brain --" (280), or in 1046:

I've dropped my Brain -- My Soul is numb --
 The Veins that used to run
 Stop palsied -- 'tis Paralysis
 Done perfecter on stone

Vitality is Carved and cool.
 My nerve in Marble lies --
 A Breathing Woman
 Yesterday -- Endowed with Paradise.
 (1046)

But rather than expressing a joyful reconciliation with the "dear saviour" as dictated by the faith of Dickinson's father, these lines are reminders of the pain and finality of death. In poem 547, the contrast established between the eye that "runs round and round" and the eye that is "soldered" conveys the stillness of death, whilst the verb "soldered" expresses both the intolerable pain of torture and its mutilation, for the lid can never again be opened. Dying is presented as an excruciating process whereby each of the life-bearing or life-representing parts of the anatomy are annihilated, slowly, one by one. First the speaker's brain drops, then her veins coagulate; her vitality solidifies and nerves lie in marble. Much of the impact of 1046 is simply a result of the action of the poem: Dickinson's systematic dissection and entombment of the speaking subject. But the horror lies in the fact that the process of death is ruthlessly detailed and not sentimentalised, which conveys a sense of inhuman detachment from the marmoreal tale. Thus poem 1046 illustrates not only Dickinson's break with faith and literary tradition, but it also underlines the subversive nature of her project--her desire to overthrow "taboo" by trying to express what language and society do not want her to say.

In the same way that Dickinson expressed her rejection of the sentimental love tradition by delighting in the horror of death (241), or by undercutting the sacred and taboo by exploding their absurdity through "laughter" (793),²³ she mocks the art of her religious culture by re-writing (and subverting) hymns such as those of Isaac Watts. The Dickinson family library housed two volumes of Watts'

work: his Church Psalms and the Spiritual Songs of Isaac Watts.²⁴ Although Dickinson never mentions Watts by name in her letters, she does quote from him and, as the musical member of the Dickinson family, it is widely accepted that she played, read and sang his hymns. Cristanne Miller suggests that Dickinson's use of hymn meter, "except for a few metrically experimental poems" illustrates the influence of his work on her writing (141). Dickinson, however, subverts the hymns both semantically--through her religious scepticism--and structurally. She creates her own tempo and rhythm through the dashes which establish their own phrasing.

Watts' hymns clearly distinguish between sinners and their fate, and Christians, who await the angelic hosts to remove them from this world. Compare stanza five of hymn 632:

And must my body faint and die?
 And must this soul remove?
 O, for some guardian angel nigh,
 To bear it safe above!

(632)

And these stanzas from hymn 630:

Then, swift and dreadful, she descends
 Down to the fiery coast,
 Among abominable fiends,
 Herself a frightened ghost.

There endless crowds of sinners lie,
 And darkness makes their chains;
 Tortured with keen despair, they cry,
 Yet wait for fiercer pains.

(630, qtd. in Miller 142)

with this extract from Dickinson's 286, "That after Horror -- that 'twas us --":

The possibility -- to pass
 Without a Moment's Bell --
 Into Conjecture's presence --
 Is like a Face of Steel --
 That suddenly looks into ours
 With a metallic grin --
 The Cordiality of Death --
 Who drills his Welcome in --

(286)

Dickinson makes no distinction between "the sinner" and "the saved" and their respective fates, preferring to use the first person plural "our" to emphasise Death's overriding, democratic power. But it is the poet's portrayal of the persona of death that makes her poem chilling where Watts' hymn is only a little spooky. In Dickinson's poem death is cordial, but he is also unrelenting. He has a face of steel, but he "drills his Welcome in --". By juxtaposing contradictory adjectives and nouns with each other and by presenting Death as wooer and threat, Dickinson succeeds in making death tangible without eliminating his power or his terror. She undercuts her reader's expectations at the same time as she works on her reader's fear.

Isaac Watts hymns are commonplace in any Protestant Church hymnal.²⁵ From a sample of nineteen hymns and tunes found in Hymns Ancient and Modern, I found that only three of the hymn tunes had required musical adaptation (hymns 125 [1]; hymn 7 [3]; hymn 10 [3]). Four other hymns had had music written especially for them. Taking poem 286 as an example, I attempted to see if Dickinson's verse--which uses so-called hymn meter--could be fitted to the melody written by Michael Haydn (1737-1806), and adapted for Isaac Watts' hymn 125 [1]. Dickinson's poem could be sung to Haydn's tune, but only if the dashes were given no metrical value at all.

However, if a dash is read as a form of musical rest, the break created by the dash (in line one of stanza one) between the first phrase, "The possibility", and the second, "to pass/Without a Moment's Bell -- " shifts the heavy stress from "without" to "pass". This enhances the aural similarities between "possibility" and "pass". Similarly, in the second stanza, had there been a break after "ours" and "grin", the stress of the second line would have fallen on "a" rather than on "metallic". Much of the aural impact, such as the echo of "metallic" in "drill", which emphasises the rhyme that follows (on "in" and "grin") would have been lost.

Therefore, even though some of Dickinson's verses are similar to those of Isaac Watts in the way that they use four-line stanzas with alternate rhymes as well as polysyllables to fill a line, in many others, Dickinson's more compact metaphors and her dashes set up their own rhythm and phrasing. As early as 1899, two of Dickinson's poems, 136 and 794, were set to music by Clarence Dickinson. In the 1930's, Ernst Bacon issued a cycle of five songs written for voice and piano (see Wager). And in 1951 Aaron Copland wrote a vocal score for twelve of Dickinson's poems in which he sought "a musical counterpart for the unique personality of the poet" (qtd. in Wager 135).

Copland's songs are of specific interest because he is so erratic in the musical value he gives the dash. Sometimes he almost completely ignores the dash: lines two and three of poem 1320 for example. Sometimes he gives the dash the same metrical value (a crotchet) as the break at the end of the line, and sometimes the last note before a dash is held for six or more beats on a dotted minum or breve.

Such evidence gives credence to the argument that Dickinson wanted to make rhythm a dominant element of her verse. But the fact remains that in setting her poems to music, composers such as Copeland took liberties with the verse itself (see "Dear March, come in!") and attached their own value to the dashes--value which best fitted in with the melody they had written and with their own overall intentions for the piece.²⁶ Dickinson did write musical poetry, yes, but I argue here (and in detail in section 3) that her dashes have a specific function for the reader of her verse. Real music might add to the poem, but the dashes (and prosody) indicate that Dickinson clearly intended her poems to be read in a particular way, a way in which the music of the words would be fulfilled.

2.5 The War and religion

Because many who went away to war never came back, journeying or "going away" becomes a synonym for death. In poem 615, for example, the

speaker's military journey is also a spiritual one. He takes the Fork in being's road that leads him through the Forest of the dead and finally to eternity:

.....
 Retreat -- was out of Hope --
 Behind -- a Sealed Route --
 Eternity's White Flag -- Before --
 And God -- at every Gate --
 (615)

On the one hand, in a strangely unfeminine way, the speaker seems to envy those soldiers who maintained a tenuous relationship with life, and who had therefore gained an intimate knowledge of physical death. As Dickinson describes below:

It feels a shame to be Alive --
 When Men so brave -- are dead --
 One envies the Distinguished Dust --
 Permitted -- such a Head --
 (444)

But more than simply providing material for her verses, the war (and the loss and sorrow it brought) becomes a yardstick against which Dickinson measures her own personal distress. As she explains in a letter to the Norcross cousins: "sorrow seems more general than it did, and not the estate of a few persons, since the war began; and if the anguish of others helped one with one's own, now would be many medicines" (L436). Thus Dickinson goes on to write poems about her speaker's own death--poems in which Death looks and passes (258), where the speaker feels dead but stands up (510), or feels a funeral in her brain (280), or cannot see to see (465). As she does this, she transforms the crises of history and religion into moments of personal upheaval and personal pain.

The tension between physical death embraced by soldiers and this "other" kind of death--a spiritual or emotional death, because the speaker always lives to tell the tale--becomes analogous to Dickinson's own debate between "inner and outer" death. Whilst at Mount Holyoke Female Seminary, Dickinson was under considerable pressure to convert. However she refused to "give up and become a Christian" (L23). Once Dickinson had rejected a perfunctory Christ, Death became

more important than the door to heaven and hell.²⁷ It became an all or nothing proposition inextricably linked with pain:

Rather than a vision of light, of Jesus, or her lover, deathbed throes might bring only a trivial deliverance from pain ... rather than opening the door to Hades or paradise. (St Armand 55)

The war created an ambience which preyed on Dickinson's own melancholy and consecrated her embrace of a painful living reality. Although this preoccupation with anguish has been read as her appropriation of the Arminian heresy of justification through suffering, it is difficult to find evidence to suggest that Dickinson believed in "justification" of any kind.²⁸ Her pain was the pain of having to live with the knowledge of death, with the knowledge that it would not be quick and honourable, and that finally, that without faith it did not necessarily open the door to eternal life. Living with this knowledge is worse than dying, as these lines from 335 explain:

'Tis not that Dying hurts us so --
'Tis Living -- hurts us more --
But Dying -- is a different way --
A Kind behind the Door --
.....
(335)

As do these from 414:

.....
And when the Film had stitched your eyes
A Creature gasped "Reprieve!"
Which Anguish was the utterest -- then --
To perish or to live?
(414)

In these poems Dickinson yet again finds ways of describing dying that express her familiarity with death without detracting from its horror. Eyes, most sensitive and precious parts of the human anatomy, are "soldered" in 547 and "stitched" in 414. By using verbs which convey a sense of artistry and precision, Dickinson portrays a mutilation of control and detachment. Through references to "A Creature" who "gasps" she exploits the grotesque and shrouds the poem in an almost gothic terror. And it is out of this bizarre landscape that comes the unholy question "Which Anguish was the utterest -- then --/To perish or to live?".

Dickinson seems to find the answer to this mortal dilemma in another poem of 1862:

The Heart asks Pleasure -- first --
 And then -- Excuse from Pain --
 And then -- those little Anodynes
 That deaden suffering --

And then -- to go to sleep --
 And then -- if it should be
 The will of the Inquisitor
 The privilege to die --

(536)

These poems reveal, as do the others I have examined, Dickinson's ability to create a scenario that destroys preconceptions--about ways of writing, about death, and of death and life itself--at the same time as it exploits convention by confronting and honing it into a strange and dangerous game with taboo. That Dickinson had the courage to ask such questions about mortality reveals her inability to use faith as a sustaining illusion or as a means of releasing her from the pain of life. And that she was able to write poems that are frightening and powerful in their horror reveals her sensitivity to the vulnerability of the human mind and her relentless pursuit of the true "look of Agony" (poem 241).

Dickinson's own comments on language are similarly radical and prophetic. In one of her letters she describes poetry as that which has the power to inflict physical pain, revealing her awareness of the sensual power of poetic language: "If I read a **book** it makes my body so cold no fire can warm me I know that is poetry. If I **feel** physically as if the top of my head were taken off, I know that is poetry (L342; qtd. in Pollak 18). In the poem below she encapsulates the destructive

power of art as she exposes its ability to disorientate and horrify:

She dealt her pretty words like Blades --
 How glittering they shone --
 And every One unbarred a Nerve --
 Or wantoned with a Bone --

She never deemed -- she hurt --
 That -- is not Steel's Affair --
 A vulgar grimace in the Flesh --
 How ill the Creatures bear --

To Ache is human -- not polite --
 The Film upon the eye --
 Mortality's old Custom --
 Just locking up -- to Die.

(479)

Dickinson herself deals words like blades and skilfully unbare nerves. Her selection of words to describe the (often personified) emotions such as anguish ("homely") and terror ("icicles upon my soul" [768]), or the nouns used to convey madness and death; brains that are haunted, giggle or cleave; bodies that drop like planks; souls that are scalped and paralysed, are often capricious and sometimes perverse--as is her obvious delight in creating these unpredictable combinations. But often at the most terrifying moment of a poem Dickinson uses a kind of laughter that is close to parody to release her and her reader from the tight reign of horror. She also undercuts the seriousness of her argument by infusing her poem with self-irony, as the following piece demonstrates:

The only Ghost I ever saw
 Was dressed in Mechlin -- so --
 He wore no sandal on his foot --
 And stepped like flakes of snow --

His gait -- was soundless, like the Bird --
 But rapid -- like the Roe --
 His fashions, quaint, Mosaic --
 Or haply, Mistletoe --

His conversation -- seldom --
 His laughter, like the Breeze --
 That dies away in Dimples
 Among the pensive Trees --

Our interview -- was transient --
 Of me, himself was shy --
 And God forbid I look behind --
 Since that appalling Day!
 (274)

This is also a form of subversion as Kristeva points out:

The laughter of the carnival is not simply parodic; it is no more comic than tragic; it is both at once, one might say that it is serious ... Modern writing offers several striking examples of this omnified scene that is both law and others--where laughter is silenced because it is not parody but murder and revolution. (WDN 50)

2.6 Conclusion

Like Mayakovsky and Maria Tsvetaeva, Dickinson wrote when her world was undergoing its own crisis: many of her most powerful poems were composed while her country was in the throes of civil war. Born into a world and a family that was at odds with her intellectual and (unorthodox) spiritual desires, she suffered social and cultural alienation.²⁹ Through her poetry Emily Dickinson gives form to her melancholic imagination as she enacts the crisis of her age by writing of death and dying. But, because she refuses to mimic, but rather undermines traditional responses to death, and because she makes rhythm a dominant element, she creates a subversive revolutionary art. Her use of peculiar and often unpredictable combinations of adjectives, nouns, and verbs, and her valorisation of rhythm and musicality (I discuss this in great detail below) means that she hovers on the border of the symbolic in a dangerous game with taboo.

Julia Kristeva is of the opinion that the role of revolutionary artist is far more perilous for a woman than it is for a man. Her reasoning takes three directions. First, Kristeva argues that Christianity recognises in a woman only that which it demands of her to include her within its symbolic order. She must either be chaste (a virgin impregnated by the Word/a male homosexual) or--if this identification is not successful--engaged in an endless struggle between the maternal body and the symbolic prohibition (ACW 145-52). Thus Kristeva declares

"woman" melancholic or ecstatic, for these are the two extremes of the female's attempt to gain access to the symbolic order (ACW 149).

This duality is representative of the woman's peculiar relationship with language. Because the daughter is rewarded by the symbolic upon identifying with the father, she recognises herself as rival to the mother. Thus, unlike her masculine counterparts, the woman cannot use the mother as sacred or farce, but must provide it for herself. Kristeva holds that invasions of speech through irruptions from the semiotic chora ("unphrased, nonsensical, maternal rhythms" [ACW 150]) do not soothe the woman artist (as they do the male), but rather destroy her "symbolic armour" (ACW 150):

A woman has nothing to laugh about when the symbolic order falls. She can take pleasure in it if, by identifying with the mother, the vaginal body, she imagines she is the sublime, repressed forces which return through the fissures of the order. But she can just as easily die from this upheaval. (ACW 150)

So, Kristeva concludes, if no legitimisation is provided for the woman, the woman becomes suicidal or psychotic. Women artists such as Virginia Woolf, Maria Tsvetaeva and Sylvia Plath who were disillusioned with meanings, says Kristeva, took refuge in lights, rhythms and sounds, and finally fled from life itself.

Even though Dickinson's lyric poetry opens the word up to the "unspeakable", thus exposing her to the "risks of psychosis that this breakthrough implies" (ACW 158), she did not commit suicide. For a woman, and for Emily Dickinson in particular, the problem of how to inscribe the repressed, the body, jouissance, in language without collapsing into silence or psychosis--the struggle with the death drive--is her verse. Emily Dickinson dies and lives in a poetry that struggles with death on the level of the phenotext and the genotext. Death is invoked in the phenotext and exorcised in the phonic rhythm. Emily Dickinson makes the difficulty of her feminine position her privilege: she undermines the symbolic by refusing to put the "drives to death" in her poetry and, as I shall demonstrate below, releases them in the fullest exploitation of language demanded by the lyric genre.

3.1 Lytic poetry; the phonic rhythm

"And the Raven, never flitting, still is sitting; still
 is sitting
 On the pallid bust of Pallas just above my chamber door
 And his eyes have all the seeming of a demon's that is
 dreaming
 And the lamp-light o'er him streaming throws his shadow
 on the floor;
 And my soul from out that shadow that lies floating on
 the floor
 Shall be lifted--nevermore!
 (Poe "The Raven" 119)

The systematic study of the relationship between sound and meaning undertaken by Jakobson in his analysis of Edgar Allan Poe demands the phonetic transcription of key words and phrases in order to establish links between words effectively. In his discussion of Poe's poem "The Raven" (see above), for example, Jakobson observes that whilst the utterance is itself inhuman, (in its cruelty and in its automatic, repetitive monotony), the poet creates a subhuman but articulate creature because in most of its phonemes the noun raven is simply an inversion of the sinister word never (Language and Literature 54).

Jakobson's point is that a sound or sound sequence, striking enough to be set in relief by repetitive use in the key word and surrounding vocables, may even determine the choice of such a word (60; emphasis added). He concludes: "This propensity to infer a connection in meaning from similarity in sound illustrates the poetic function of language" (60).³⁰ Kristeva's view of poetic language is very similar, but it is not the same. I have already shown that for Kristeva, poetic language is distinct from language used for ordinary communication because it is a language in which the writer's effort is less to deal rationally with concept words than to work with the sounds and rhythms of words. The difference between Jakobson's practice and Kristeva's procedure is that in the Kristevan thesis, poetic selections based on sound occur in a transrational fashion, affect multiple condensations and displacements and create a "strongly ambivalent if not polymorphous semantics" (PPIB 34).

Thus, whilst Jakobson's approach clearly reveals how language is made and unmade--poien--and, as Kristeva herself acknowledges, contributes to the theory of the unconscious (EL 26), there is no elaboration, nor any direct link made between the conscious operations in the selection of words and the displacement and condensation processes of the unconscious (see Jakobson "Subliminal Verbal Patterning in Poetry" 250-66). In her analyses of verse, Kristeva integrates and re-writes the Jakobsonian approach, (with its valorisation of phonetic elements), into contemporary semiotics as informed by psychoanalysis. The unconscious processes are linked to language which can be used to signify something quite other than what it says.

Kristeva adopts a practice which traces patterns of repeated sounds which "infuse the text with passion" (PPIB 35). This practice is the "semi-phonetic breakdown" of verse; the "patterns of sound", Kristeva labels the phonic rhythm. But Kristeva goes a step further. She takes the reader's unconscious into account by suggesting that the "magic of a poem" or the emotional impact of a poem, may be due to the "presence" of another text, one that is created by the reader's unconscious. I shall demonstrate this in the disussion below, but first, let me recapitulate the main points that Kristeva makes about phonemes and their repetition:

- 1) The repetition of phonemes or phonematic groups produces an effect foreign to the common usage of language. It is possible to regard these repetitions as a movement to a phonetic state which can be observed in children, that is, through them (the repetitions) we locate the presence of the archaic subject.
- 2) The repetition of phonemes connected to semes creates a semantic constellation which establishes relationships of agreement between semes which belong to different morphemes and lexemes.
- 3) These phonemic groups organise a network of semantic values which are not necessarily those of the phenotext.

- 4) These groups, or signifying differentials as Kristeva calls them, may fail to respect their limits and undergo displacement through phonic resemblance, and thus take upon the signification which the other lexemes confer upon them.
- 5) These in turn articulate a network of differences which though they do not have an immediate semantic value, acquire such a value through displacement and condensation.³¹

In the analysis which follows, I shall undertake a semi-phonetic and, at times, even a full phonetic breakdown of lines, in order to expose the processes of the unconscious which participated in the creation of the phenotext and genotext of three Dickinson poems: 244, 280 and 465.

3.2 Dickinson: lyric poetry and the phonic rhythm

Although it was Hopkins who claimed that "Verse is ... speech employed to carry the inscape of spoken sounds", and Valéry who wrote "Le Lyrisme est le développement d'une exclamation" (qtd. in Masson 3), Dickinson herself could have made either of these comments.³² She insists, in addition, that "when I could not say it, I put it in verse" (L243),³³ indexing both her need for and her understanding of the "fullest exploitation of language" that is provided by lyric verse. As Suzanne Langer explains:

The fullest exploitation of language, sound and rhythm, assonance and sensuous associations, is made in lyric poetry ... it is the literary form that depends most directly on pure verbal resources--the sound and evocative power of words, meter, alliteration, rhyme, and other rhythmic devices, associated images, repetitions, archaisms, and grammatical twists. It is the most obviously linguistic creation, and therefore the readiest instance of poesis ... the lyric poet uses every quality of language because he has neither plot nor fictitious characters nor, usually, any intellectual argument to give his poem continuity. The lure of verbal preparation and fulfillment has to do almost everything. (qtd. in Hymes 34; emphasis added)

The first of Dickinson's poems to be examined in detail, 244, is one of the poet's most impenetrable and obscure. It comes close to fulfilling the Kristevan description of a poetry that "pulverises the signifier and signified through the phonic rhythm" (PPIB 35). Here the "pulverisation" is marked in the phenotext, the

printed text of 244, where meaning, propositions and words are devalued to the advantage of the poem's phonic rhythm.

Poem 244

It is easy to work when the soul is at play --
 But when the soul is in pain --
 The hearing him put his playthings up --
 Makes work difficult -- then --

It is simple to ache in the Bone, or the Rind --
 But Gimlets -- among the nerve --
 Mangle Daintier -- terribler --
 Like a Panther in the Glove --

(244)

In keeping with Langer's definition of lyric poetry, 244 contains neither "plot nor fictitious character". Instead the poem evolves out of a series of apparently simple statements, each of which can be read as the speaker's attempt to qualify the opening comment: "It is easy to work when the soul is at play -- ". Yet instead of elucidating by adding information, these very "qualifications" drive the poem further away from accessibility and claimable meaning. Lines seem absurdly simple, because they comply with the rules of normative English syntax,³⁴ and also because the lexemes themselves are either mono- or bi-syllabic. For instance, the first line of the second stanza, "It is simple to ache in the Bone, or the Rind -- ", contains no archaisms, proper names or words of more than two syllables (unlike poems 675, 139 and 137 respectively).

What is achieved by the two opening lines of each stanza is a false sense of ease and coherence, which on closer examination is not mimicked in the semantic relationships between the words themselves. In the opening stanza, the soul "at play" is compared with the soul "in pain". The poet adds that "The hearing ... makes work difficult". Then in the second stanza, which is more fragmented and disparate than the first, the poet writes of aches in bones and in rinds. This is clearly semantically peculiar, for things with rinds do not have feelings. The poem concludes with an almost unfathomable simile: "Like a Panther in the Glove".

Even though each stanza has four lines, the characteristic Dickinsonian dashes divide the first stanza into four "phrases" and the second into six.³⁵ The first line of each stanza begins with the third person neuter of the verb "to be" -- "It is", which is qualified by an adverb ("easy" (1[1]) and "simple" (2[1])). This in turn is followed by an infinite verb (to work; [1]), to ache; [2]). The second line of each stanza opens with the negative qualifier "But".³⁶ Thenceforth the linguistic structure of each stanza differs: a relative clause of time initiated by "when " follows the verb in stanza one, line one and again the "But" in line two. In the case of the second stanza, the preposition "in" (locative) establishes the whereabouts of the "aching" in stanza two [1], and the "But" is followed by "among" which again expresses place, although in this case the place of the "Gimlets".

In her discussion of the grammar of Dickinson's verse, Cristanne Miller suggests that Dickinson's poems are highly compressed and contain both recoverable and non-recoverable deletions. Recoverable deletions, which include the omission of auxiliary verbs and repeated subjects or verbs, are generally used to intensify meaning, avoid redundancy and to maintain a specific rhythm without sacrificing clarity or meaning (Miller 28). Non-recoverable deletions on the other hand, effect a poem's meaning more directly by creating a syntactic and/or logical ambiguity. Consequently any attempt to "fill in" these gaps rests on the reader's own (preconceived) interpretation of the poem.

That poem 244 contains a number of non-recoverable deletions, which further semantic ambiguity and multiply possibilities of interpretation, becomes clear through a close examination of the third and fourth lines of each stanza (which must be read as one phrase according to the poet's instructions through the dashes). First, there are syntactic ambiguities: the verb "to hear" is used in the noun form with a definite article giving "The hearing", a noun with legal connotations. Because "The hearing" is not immediately followed by the preposition "of", indicating possession, but rather by the object pronoun "him", exactly who or what is the subject of the verbs "put" and "makes" becomes ambiguous. Does the poet

mean that "The hearing" makes work difficult, or does she mean that the hearing [of] him [the soul (by the speaker)] put his playthings up makes work difficult? In lines three and four of stanza two, why does the poet uses the plural "Gimlets" and singular "nerve" when it would make more sense if there were many "Gimlets" amongst many "nerves"? This raises the question whether the simile "Like a Panther in the Glove" refers only to the mangling of gimlets among the nerve, or to the entire stanza, or even the whole poem.

The non-recoverable deletions also create logical ambiguities in 244. Even if it is possible to imagine "gimlets among the nerve", how does a Panther mangle a Glove? In any case, how does a Panther fit into a Glove? Is it a little Panther in a big Glove--or vice versa? And how does this image of torment/imprisonment relate to the soul at play/in pain?

Because there is so much deletion in Dickinson's poetry the poems demand a highly active and expectant reading. Miller's strategies of "filling in" may be interesting and pleasurable but they fail to answer the questions posed above satisfactorily. Moreover, the reader's participation becomes inseparable from his/her own interpretation of the poem, thus engendering a critical strategy which is at odds with the tactics of the Kristevan "wise interpreter" who is urged to suspend interpretation and unveil the processes of the text (PP 81). Miller's approach also ignores the important role that repeated phonemes play in the poet's conscious and unconscious selection of nouns, verbs, subjects and predicates. And it denies the implications implicit in a psychoanalytical critical approach that considers the role of the unconscious in the creation of the poetic text.

The Kristevan approach offers two fundamental ways of loosening the chains of what seems to be a dense and inaccessible poem. First, rather than an identifiable speaking subject, an "I" that narrates, Dickinson selects the ambiguous "It" as the subject of the main verb ("to be"). This not only increases indeterminacy, but it also, and most importantly, shifts the enunciation of the poem away from a speaking subject who means. The discussion of the phonic rhythm and

its role in the selection of words and phrases will demonstrate the validity of reading the subject of this Dickinson poem, as a Kristevan divided subject (sujet-en-procès), one that is caught in the dialectic between the drives of the semiotic chora and the symbolic.

Whilst the non-recoverable deletions create semantic ambiguity, the dashes operate against the structure and the punctuation of the poem, indicating that the poet intends it to be read in a specific way. More than this, however, these unique Dickinsonian textual traits demand a re-definition of the poetic text itself. Because of its logical and syntactic ambiguities, 244 cannot be regarded simply as a linguistic phenomenon fixed within a linear structure and bearing a given message. I shall illustrate that it should be seen as what Kristeva terms an engendering, a process. By demonstrating the validity of this definition of text and therefore subject through the analysis of the poetry, I fulfil the Kristevan role of the "wise interpreter": I probe the phenotext in order to locate the topology of the signifying act.

Because the dashes break lines and propel words with repeated phonemes into a semantic network, the second direction of this analysis takes the form of what Kristeva terms the "semi-phonetic breakdown" of the text. By exposing the repetition of the phonemes which create a semantic constellation, thereby establishing relationships of agreement between semes which belong to different morphemes and lexemes, the analyst unveils the genotext, the "other" text of the poem: "the Imaginary [of the analyst] joins interpretive closure producing a perpetual creative force" (PP 81).

The analysis of the poem that follows moves away from a discussion of connections between signifiers and signifieds and what they mean to an intense examination of the processes that created the text. I shall investigate the process of selection on the level of the phenotext: according to similarity in the case of metaphor, or contiguity in the case of metonymy. This investigation will also

account for the "selective" process of the unconscious--both the reader's and the poet's--and the subsequent creation of the genotext.³⁷

3.2.1 The phonic rhythm of 244

Stanza one:

Stanza one is characterised by the repetition of entire words: **soul** (thrice), **work** (twice) **when** (twice) **play** (twice). The repetition of consonantal phonemes will be examined first, followed by a discussion of repeated vowels which will include a discussion of diphthongs. It should be pointed out here that repetition, like compression and disjunction, is a defining feature of poetic language. It is interesting that Dickinson not only repeats nouns, syntax and structure, but also repeats a grammatical class of word: function words such as pronouns are often clustered (Miller 76). The analysis that follows will show that this is most often for aural effect.

Before embarking on this Kristevan analysis, it should be noted that Kristeva compares the frequency of certain phonemes in a poetic text with their frequency in everyday language and claims that poetry uses the typical sounds of language more, emphasising their presence, whilst suppressing rare sounds.³⁸ The high frequency of the /p/ and /t/ and /k/ phonemes in the poem as well as the /s/, /z/ variation and the /ð/, which also occur with great frequency in everyday English, confirm this statement .

The consonant repetitions of 244

In this first stanza, five consonant phonemes are repeated three times:

- a) the bilabial fricative /w/ of the lexeme "work" (twice) and its breathed variation in "when",
- b) the bilabial plosive /p/ in "play", "playthings" and "pain" (which in the first instance is breathed, and in the second, voiced),
- c) the breathed glottal fricative /h/ of "him" and "his", and because voiced sounds precede "The hearing", the voiced variant of /h/ in "hearing",

- d) the /s/ phoneme: a breathed blade-alveolar fricative, in "soul" (twice), and because the preceding sound is a voiced consonant, it is also found in the denotation of the third person singular of "Makes",
- e) the voiceless velar plosive /k/ in "Makes", "work" and "difficult",
- f) The voiced consonant /z/ corresponding to the breathed /s/ is found five times: in "easy", "is" (twice), "his" and "playthings",
- g) Each line contains some form of the dental fricative phoneme /ð/: in its voiced form: "the" (3) and "then"(1) or in its breathed form /θ/ in "playthings".

The Vowel repetitions

- a) The so-called long sound of the written letter "e", /i:/ (cardinal vowel no.1) is found in the following repetitions: in its long sound /i:/ in "easy" or /i:zi/. The short sound of /i/ is repeated in "it", "is", "in", "him", "difficult", "hearing", "playthings" and "easy" (although the long /i:/ sound which precedes it ("easy") means that the short /i/ here is longer than in the above mentioned cases). It is notable that the diphthongs of "play" /plei/; "pain", /pein/; "make"; /meik/ are all variants of the long sound of the letter "a" (the vowel phoneme /e/), but move towards the short /i/.
- b) The short sound of the letter "e" (cardinal vowel no.3) /e/ is found in "then" and in "when". The diphthong /ɛə/ starts about half-way between /i/ and /ae/ and terminates at about /ə/ in "Hearing".
- c) The phoneme /ʌ/ as the short sound of the written letter "u" occurs in "up"; the other short sound of the written "u", occurs in the phoneme /u/ of "put".
- d) The long sound /ɔ:/ is found in "work" (twice), with a voiced alveolar approximate (in accordance with American pronunciation) giving /wɔ:k/.
- e) The diphthong /ou/ (no.14) from the written "o" as in "soul" occurs twice.
- f) The /ae/ (vowel no.4) in the preposition "at".


The dash found at the end of each line in this stanza divides it into five phrases, alters intonation and stress and engenders a new, phonic rhythm. In lines one and two for example;

/ (I) t iz i: z i: t e w a k w e n δ ə s o u l iz a e t p l e i -- /
 / But w e n δ ə s o u l iz i n p e i n -- /


The repetition of the /z/ phoneme and its alternation with /t/ phoneme establishes a "pure sequence" in the first two instances and a chiasmus in the second.³⁹ The consonance on the /w/ of "work" and "when", and the repetition of the /l/ in "soul" and "play" as well as the dash at the end of the line--which marks it off as a single phrase--engenders a "constellation of sounds".⁴⁰

In the second phrase, the words "it is easy" and "play" are replaced with "But" and "pain". "[P]lay" becomes "pain" through the displacement of the shifting /n/ phoneme, which also displaces /z/ of /iz/ to produce /in/. Because of the repetition of "when the soul is" and the dash which follows, as well as the repeated diphthong /ei/, the lexeme "**pain**" is heavily emphasised and its semantic difference from "**play**" forcibly marked. In both "phrases" there is only one bi-syllabic word, "easy". In this case the kind of musical/graphic notation that Jones provides is useful in illustrating how the lines should be read. The dots denote approximately level pitches. The curves denote rising and falling intonations, and strongly stressed syllables have large dots. It is convenient to place these marks on a stave of three lines, the upper and lower lines representing the upper and lower limits of the voice, and the middle line representing an intermediate pitch (see Jones 277-8).

Rather than tune 1 which ignores the dash at the end of line one and the phonic rhythm:



we have tune two: the phonic tune created by the dashes and the repetition of phonemes:



There are so many phonic repetitions and patterns of repetitions (motifs or tunes)⁴¹ in the long third phrase, "The Hearing him put his playthings up/Makes work difficult --", that the differences between the lexemes themselves becomes negligible, or as Mallarmé says, "The Word becomes difficult to recognize in its own personality" (qtd. in Kristeva PPIB 36).

The first part of the phrase is characterised by the alternation between the /p/ and /h/ motifs. First, the short written "e" of "the" is echoed in the diphthong /ə/ of "hearing". The /h/ phoneme is repeated in the "him" which follows and the short /i/ occurs yet again in "hearing" and "thing". "Put" interrupts the "/h/ motif" and reintroduces the "/p/ motif". The /ut/ of "put" echoes the /ut/ of the line above which recurs in "difficult" and "up". "His" reintroduces the /h/ tune, echoing both the /h/ and short /i/, and re-introduces the shifting /z/.

The two motifs become one in "**Playthings**"; /pleiθɪŋz/. This word is entirely constituted by the phonemes which have preceded it. As a condensation of sounds it has a key role to play in the organization of semantic values which are not those of the phenotext.

"Makes" repeats the /ei/ diphthong of "play" and "pain" and introduces the /k/ motif. This is echoed in "work" and again in "difficult" which repeats the short /i/, the long /i:/ of "easy" and the plosive /t/. "Then", followed by a dash, rhymes with "when" of the opening line. Because of the repetition of the entire word "work" and the insertion of "then", resulting in "Makes work difficult -- then", a comparison is established between this line and the opening one: "work when". The word "then" has no real semantic value, but acts rather as a pause, or musical rest which gives the reader time to "breathe" before the "music" begins again. The position of "then" also has an important isolating and emphatic effect on the word "difficult". "Difficult" interrupts the established phonic rhythm as it introduces into the stanza a consonant phoneme which is not repeated in the poem at all: that is, the /f/, a labial fricative. Added to which, it is tri-syllabic, as opposed to the bi-

syllabic or mono-syllabic senses of the rest of the stanza. I shall argue that it therefore has an important semantic role to play within the poem.

The use of terms such as "motif" or "tune" illustrates that the phonic rhythm becomes a process which disconnects the phoneme from its lexeme and sense, and reconnects the phoneme to the articulating apparatus, the body and therefore to the drives. Because a child, on the threshold of language, is able to grasp "certain phonetic differences between words without understanding their signification" and because analogous phenomena can be found in aphasia or schizophrenia, the poetic text touches on this critical threshold of language (PPIB 34; RPL 16). This is what Kristeva regards as the degree zero of the text, where the distinctive linguistic value of the phoneme is suspended, the sense of its morphemes disappears and a primitive sound is left. The intense accumulation of phonemes, and the drifting between phonemes of neighbouring or similar groups, opens up the text to multiple displacements and condensations (such as "playthings") and it is this which produces the strongly ambivalent semantics of poem 244.

The above breakdown makes no attempt to propose connections between signifiers and signifieds, but illustrates their pulverization through the phonic rhythm instead. Every lexeme in this stanza (except "difficult") is made up of phonemes that are repeated at least once; sometimes the interjection of a single phoneme changes the lexeme but in all cases this phoneme is echoed in a following word. Often alternation between phonemic groups juxtaposes words for semantic effect such as "play" and "pain"; sometimes they condense into a single, new word such as "playthings"; and often they set apart words of non-repeated phonemes such as "difficult".

What was previously construed as problematic on semantic grounds (due to the prominence of non-recoverable deletions and the strange syntactic structure of these lines) is thus the result of the phonic rhythm. In other words, the placement of words, such as "The hearing him" which had seemed peculiar or abnormal can be seen as the end result of the displacement and condensation of phonemes.

Consequently, the accumulation of sounds and their order (which create a pattern or tune) dominate the stanza--at the expense of formal syntax.

3.2.2 Stanza Two

Because of the structural similarities between the first two lines of each stanza of 244, the poem is set out in the following way (see below) in order to demonstrate the kinds of selections, phoneme shifts and substitutions that were involved in creating some of the lexemes of the second stanza. And because the poem makes almost as much sense when written in this way, it endorses Kristeva's differentiation between the poetic function of language and the communicative function of language and adds credence to the analysis I have undertaken. By illustrating the existence of a phonematic mechanism which is irreducible to language as symbolic system of communication, I demonstrate the irruption of the semiotic chora in the symbolic order.

It is easy to work when the soul is at play --
It is simple to ache in the Bone, or the Rind/

But when the soul is in pain --
But Gimlets among the nerve -- /

The hearing him put his playthings up
Mangle daintier -- terribler -- /

Makes work difficult -- then --
Like a Panther in the Glove --.

Combinations and Selections

In the first line, the short /i/ vowel phoneme is repeated in "simple", "It", "is" and "in". There is also a slight echo of this in "Rind" because the diphthong /ai/ moves towards the short "i"; /raind/ (as indicated by the phonetic notation). Because the word "simple" contains virtually no part of the word "easy", that is, there are no repeated phonemes within them, it is safe to say that the word "simple" is substituted mainly because of its similarity in sense to "easy". What is "easy" in the first stanza is "simple" in the second.

It may not be convincing to associate "work" with "pain", but "ache" is associated with "pain" through the well-known colloquialism "aches and pains". This link is firmly established through the phonetic connections between "makes" and "pain", that is, through the repeated diphthong of /plei/ and /pein/ giving /meiks/ and /eiks/. Notable here is the differentiating role of the shifting phonemes /m/ and /s/. Following Kristeva's logic, which proposes that these kinds of repetition establish relationships of agreement between semes which belong to different morphemes or phonemes, the word "makes" is displaced (the word carries with it all the psychoanalytic associations) by the word "ache" through the subtraction of the signifying differentials /m/ and /s/ and through its contiguous association with "pain". Stanzas one and two are linked by the genotext: **pain makes aches**.

Similarly, "aches" is associated with "Bones" (aching bones) on the grounds of contiguity and through its phonetic evolution. The lexeme "Bones" is created through the shifting phonemic differential, the labial plosive /b/, in combination with the long "o" of "soul". (The effects of the the shifting /s/ have already been noted). The shifting /n/ is introduced with the locative "in", and there already exists a slight chiasmus in the alternation between the /in/ and /o/ sounds in the poem ("in" moves to "Bone", which moves to "or", which moves to Rind). To conclude, then, it is the conscious process of metonymy and the unconscious process of displacement that results in the word "**Bone**".

Returning to sense and meaning, how is it possible to ache in the Rind? Even if Dickinson meant it to refer to an external type of "pain", it is curious that she should use the preposition "in". The reader is hard put to find repeated phonemes or aural similarities between the two words "Bone" and "Rind". If the selection of this word is the result of its similarity to "Bone" on the grounds of sense rather than of sound, the question as to how "Bone" is similar to a "Rind" arises. By definition, bones form the skeleton of the body; they uphold the flesh. "Rind" has two definitions: it may simply denote crust, or peel which in the case of

fruit is analogous to the skin of a human being. It is also defined as the supporting mechanism of a cross-shaped millstone, but it is unlikely that Dickinson had this latter meaning in mind.

"Gimlets", a word noted for its strangeness, is in fact made up almost completely of those phonemes which make up "It is simple"; /It iz simpl/. These phonemes are condensed into /gimlits/ with the introduction of the velar plosive /g/. Although there exist no phonic similarities between the "soul is in pain" and its substitute in the second stanza, "among the nerve", there are other phonetic links between the two stanzas: "among" slightly echoes "difficult", whilst "nerve" repeats the vowel phoneme of "work". "[H]earing" and "playthings" are very slightly echoed in "among" and "mangle" and their phonetic similarities are intensified through the alliteration on "mangle" and "makes". "Gimlets" and "among the Nerve" are thus connected phonetically and by association to the "aches" and "pains" of the lines above.

The word "Daintier" is especially peculiar because it is an adverb describing the action of mangling. How is it possible to mangle daintily? The phonetic notation, /dein'ti /, demonstrates how the word repeats many of the previously repeated phonemes of the stanza, for example, the /ei/ of /pein/, and the /i/, /t/ alternation of the opening line. The signifying differentials in this case are the plosive and dental labials /p/ and /d/ respectively. What appears to have occurred on the phonetic level is that the /p/ of /pein/ is displaced by the intrusive /d/ (recall the earlier comments on the word "difficult"), so that the word carries with it the associations of the words "pain" and "difficult". The phonic rhythm creates a "new structure of signification" here: **to mangle "daintier" is "difficult" and "makes pain"**.

The dash before and after "terribler" sets it apart from "daintier" and "Like". One of the reasons for this strange grammatical form is that it echoes the /ə/ of "daintier", "Panther" and "the" of the line below as well as the /ei/ diphthong of "play" and "pain". In this case grammar is "pulverised" by the phonic rhythm

because the adverb "terribler" is not commonly used in sophisticated English, although a child might use it. According to Kristeva this very pulverisation and "child-speak" denotes the presence of the archaic subject. And thus the implication is that **what is difficult** in the opening stanza, becomes "**terrible**" in the second.

Finally, "glove" obviously echoes the earlier /v/ of "nerve", the vowel /ʌ/ of "among" immediately above it, as well as /gl/ of "mangle". In the same way that "Playthings" was revealed to be an accumulation of phonemes in stanza one, the condensation of repeated phonemes results in the words "**Glove**" and "**Panther**" in stanza two. The displacement of the /m/-/p/ variation and the other features already mentioned results in the creation of "**Panther**". By way of the displacement of the phoneme /p/, "**Panther**" is associated with "**Mangle**" and "**pain**". Working through these relations or "semantic constellations" as Kristeva calls them (which establish relationships of agreement between semes which belong to different morphemes and lexemes) more carefully, there is a link between the first and second stanzas: **a panther mangling daintily evokes a sense of pain which is terrible**. Even so, this fails to clarify first, why or how "a Panther" is in "the Glove", and second, how it is possible for a panther (in the glove) to mangle daintily thereby evoking a sense of pain which is terrible.

Previously in this chapter I asked the question "Why Panther? Why Glove?". How does a Panther fit in a Glove? And how can a panther in a glove evoke a sense of pain? What does Dickinson mean? Thus far I have established relationships of similarity and difference between the lexemes of the poem, through association of sound and sense, without attempting to interpret what the poem "means". It has been demonstrated that what is "easy" and "difficult" in terms of "work" in stanza one becomes "simple" and "terrible" in terms of the body ("Bone", "Rind" and "nerve") and "a Panther" in stanza two. Almost every lexeme is in some way connected to "aches" or "pain" which are "difficult" or "terrible", depending on whether the affect is located in the "soul" or in the body. Two words seem to remain unlinked: "playthings" and "Glove". But because both words are

made up entirely of phonemes which are repeated in each stanza, and because each is a condensation of sounds, it is possible (according to Kristeva) to find some (albeit unconscious) connection between them, a link that will establish what it is that creates the pain. The key word is "playthings" because it is linked phonetically with "Panther" (see above) and, as I shall argue below, associatively with "Glove".

The question the Kristevan analyst asks first is whether there are any associative connections between "panther", "glove" and "playthings" (I have already established the phonetic relationships between the lexemes). By definition the word "glove" is a "covering for the hand". Is it possible for a "covering for the hand" to be a "plaything"? Here is the link. A "covering for the hand" may in fact be a "**plaything**" if it is a glove-puppet. If this is so, then the Panther in the glove is none other than a Panther-puppet, because as such, it is also a plaything. By unveiling the unconscious processes of condensation and displacement in poem 244, I locate, in the genotext, the Thing that is the cause of the pain: a **Panther-puppet** (a Panther in the glove, a plaything). Thus it is a panther-puppet which is the unnamed, unsymbolised object of torment in poem 244.

3.3 Conclusion

By examining the phonetic motifs in this Dickinson poem, the analyst listens for the vocal gesture of the poet that expresses the repressed body and the melancholic imagination. The semi-phonetic breakdown has illustrated that connections exist and that relationships are established through the phonic patterns of the verse. These phonic relationships create a new text, a new structure of signification, that is, the genotext.

Although the phenotext of 244 is disguised as a carrier of meaning, it approximates but never achieves coherence, intention or meaning. There is a void, emptiness, where meaning might be. Through the phonic rhythm, the poem becomes a vibratory of uncertainty and the "Word becomes difficult to recognise in its own personality" (PPIB 36). The phenotext begins by defying meaning and sense as the genotext shifts from the tension between orality and anality of the often

repeated liquids and closed anterior vowels. It (the genotext) climaxes on forceful notes of aggression, created by phallicised explosion and rejection (characteristic of the plosives and the voiced constrictives) (see chapter one, section 2.15).

In a Kristevan context, poem 244 may be read as an aspect of the return to that place which escapes naming and can only be named if the artist plays on the whole register of language--as in Dickinson's lyric poem--and if the reader, as analyst, locates the unsymbolised by unveiling the genotext. The locus of emotion, of drive, of aggression to the lost object, the resistance to logico-syntactic naming, is the locus of the abject. Neither subject, nor object, the "abject" may be defined as a kind of "pre-object" or a fallen object. The abject represents the first effort of the "subject-to-be" to separate itself from the pre-Oedipal mother. Nausea, distaste and horror are the signs of a radical revulsion which serves to situate the "I", or more accurately, to create a first, fragile sense of "I" in a space where before there was only emptiness. The Panther-puppet, an accumulation of sounds, comes to "represent" the partial object. It is "terrifier", it is fascinating. It is powerful in its horror.

The analyst may try to locate meaning in poem 244, but because he is immersed in the abject in the poem, he is fundamentally displaced and his desire for meaning is never satisfied. If the poem is read as the subject's attempt to create a first, fragile sense of "I" (there is no spoken "I" in this poem), the nonmeaning of the poem is the emptiness which exists before the birth of the subject. The combination of rhythm with drive-bearing consonants enables the analyst to locate the emotions of the speaker: loss, pain and repulsion. The impact of the poem relies on the ability of these emotions to filter from the genotext through the phenotext to [^]effect the reader. The power of the poem resides in its expression of this speaking subject's repulsion and horror at the first separation from the mother. Because the poem becomes the locus of horror, it speaks finally and fundamentally of abjection.

This investigation has repeatedly questioned the "presence" of a non-symbolised, non-signifiable object: the unnameable Thing that is the cause of the speaker's loss and pain. Through the semi-phonetic breakdown I have demonstrated that the object of torment the speaker attempts to name in the "plaything"/the Panther in the Glove, is the **Panther-puppet**. The Panther-puppet as a partial object--a Thing, embedded in the genotext--becomes part of an aesthetic object in the poem. It escapes signification, but as I have demonstrated, it exists as an object in the genotext of the art-work. If the panther-puppet stands (as does Nerval's soleil noir) as a dark immeasurable object of torment--perhaps a deep narcissistic injury which occurred in the poet's childhood--and the mark of the poet's melancholy, the entire poem stands as a vanquished depression.⁴² Thus the pain of the body, Dickinson's own narcissistic injury and her affinity to the death drive, are transcended in poem 244.

4.1 Death and Sound: poems 280 and 465

Poem 280

I felt a Funeral, in my Brain,
And Mourners to and fro
Kept treading -- treading -- till it seemed
That Sense was breaking through --

And when they all were seated,
A Service, like a Drum --
Kept beating -- beating till I thought
My Mind was going numb --

And then I heard them lift a Box
And creak across my Soul
With those same Boots of Lead, again,
Then Space -- began to toll,

As all the Heavens were a Bell,
And Being, but an Ear,
And I and Silence, some strange Race
Wrecked, solitary, here --

And then a Plank in Reason broke,
And I dropped down, and down --
And hit a World, at every plunge,
And Finished knowing -- then --

(280)

Unlike poem 244 which contains no literal "I", and unlike poems 258 and 510 where nature or pure negativity are the means of describing the deathly moment, poem 280 does have a narrative: the poem is a bizarre and uncanny account of a funeral. Bizarre because the funeral occurs in the brain of the speaker, and uncanny because rhythm becomes the dominant element. The analysis of this poem will examine how the phonic rhythm devalues meaning to sound, freeing "language from denotation", and "making it perceive what it doesn't want to say" (Kristeva EL 31). In the light of this, and with the Kristevan definitions of subjectivity and text at hand, the analysis that follows will interrogate the make-up of the persona, the speaking subject of the text, and will thereby unveil the constitutive processes of the text itself.

There are four operations within the poem which heighten its strangeness. The first, which occurs in the phenotext, underlines the extraordinary nature of the speaker's experience. Rather than portraying the funeral service as an external event perceived by eye-witness, Dickinson reveals its effects on the speaker's mind and her body. But in each case the sensual experiences of sight or touch, are qualified by an aural experience. In the opening stanza, for example, the speaker feels the funeral. By making her subject describe mourners moving "to and fro", Dickinson captures the unrelenting monotony of the funeral march. Through references to "Boots of Lead" and "treading -- treading", the sense of treading becomes the sound of treading--for lead boots are heavier, create more pain and consequently result in a louder sound.

In the second stanza the speaker describes how the service appears to her: the mourners are seated and the service commences. But because the service is likened to a drum which keeps "beating -- beating", an aural experience again qualifies the visual one. Here too the effects of the experience are related to the persona's mental state: the speaker thinks her mind is going numb. The third stanza focuses on what the speaker hears and sees: "I heard them lift a Box/And creak across my Soul". The aural element prevails here as well, for rather than

using a simple action verb such as "move" or "walk", Dickinson selects "creak" to describe the action of the pall-bearers. And in the final line, the aural impact of the funeral is so overwhelming that even space begins to "toll".

In the first three stanzas Dickinson's speaking subject feels, sees, and hears the motion of a funeral. Because each of these experiences is related to her persona's mind, Dickinson emphasises both her speaker's powerlessness and her horror, and implies that the event becomes a kind of torment which borders on insanity. More than this, Dickinson shifts the sensory experience towards aurality-- both on the level of the phenotext as I have described and, as I shall argue below, on the level of the genotext. The poet succeeds in making her reader feel what her speaker feels by repeating phonemes, lexemes, and syntax. These repetitions, with the phrasing created by the dashes, initiate a steady, monotonous rhythm in the first two lines of each stanza. This is the second operation of the poem which occurs in the first two stanzas.

In the long opening phrase of the first stanza, "I felt a Funeral, in my Brain,/And Mourners to and fro/Kept treading --", the bilabial fricative /f/ is repeated three times in "felt", "funeral" and "for". Because the first two words are separated only by the indefinite article "a", there is alliteration and therefore an emphasis on "felt" and "Funeral". In the same line the short /i/ of "in" finds an aural and visual alliteration in "Brain" because the diphthong /ei/ moves towards the short /i/ whilst the /ai/ diphthong is repeated in "I" and "my". The short /e/ is repeated in "Kept" and "treading" which are linked through the close proximity of the dental plosive /t/. There is also the repetition of entire words such as "**and**" which contain identical phonemes in the same order. In this opening phrase, then, long vowel phonemes alternate with shorter ones. Repeated phonemes and longer vowel phonemes are consequently stressed, engendering a light-heavy rhythm which works with the sense to enhance the steady monotony of the funeral march.

The dash after the first "treading", and the fact it is bi-syllabic (unlike the words which have preceded it) interrupts the light-heavy rhythm of the opening

phrase. But this in no way reduces the monotonous impact of the stanza. First, because "**treading**" itself is repeated and second, because it echoes the short /e/ phoneme and /t/ of its preceding word "kept". Furthermore, the second "treading" stands apart from the rest of the words in the stanza because it has a dash on either side which emphasises it at the expense of other words in this phrase.

In the third and final phrase, the /t/ motif continues in combination with the short /i/ sounds in two separate words which follow one another: "till it seemed" (there is a pure chiasmus on "till it"). The word "seemed" flows into "sense" through the repetition of the /s/ phoneme. Here, as in the case of the vowel sounds mentioned above, the long and short vowel variations alternate and thus re-introduce the light-heavy phonic rhythm of the opening phrase. The lexeme "**Breaking**" is entirely made-up of sounds which have preceded it. It repeats the "br", /ei/ combination of "brain" (/brein/) as well as the "**ing**" of "treading" and the /k/ of "Kept". As such, it is a condensation of sounds and is placed in a relationship of agreement with those words whose sounds it repeats.

As I have explained in this chapter, Kristeva claims that the condensation or displacement of phonemes organises a network of semantic values which are not necessarily those of the phenotext. In this poem "**brain**", "**Kept**", and "**treading**" produce "**breaking**". The "breaking" of Dickinson's speaker begins in this stanza in the genotext and continues until she "Finish[es] knowing -- then". Similarly, the semantic and aural relationship between the funeral and the "treading" established in the stanza, unveils another seme which is not present within the phenotext of the poem, but which is created within the genotext through the unconscious process of displacement. This is the word "**dead**", engendered through its aural affinity with **treading**, and its contiguous association with funeral. Dickinson herself makes the connection between death and the brain in the following extraordinary poem:

It don't sound so terrible -- quite -- as it did -
I run it over -- "**Dead**", **Brain**, "**Dead**."
Put it in Latin -- left of my school --
Seems it don't shriek so -- under rule.

.....

It's shrewder then
 Put the Thought in advance -- a Year --
 How like "a fit" -- then --
 Murder -- wear!

(426)

In the first phrase of the second stanza, "And when they all were seated,/A service, like a Drum --", the repetition of the /s/ phoneme and the /i:/ phoneme of "seated" (like "seemed" above) and "Service" (/səˌvɪs/) emphasises the words, lightening the stress of the already short "A" that separates them. This relationship is intensified by the repetition of the long vowel phonemes in "were" and "Service". "[L]ike" introduces the /ai/ motif once again, and this tune is repeated in "I", "My" and "Mind". As in the first stanza, words with the /ai/ phoneme contain only one syllable and alternate with words which repeat sounds or, in this case, introduce new sounds altogether, that is, "Drum". This lexeme stands out in the line not only because it contains no repeated sounds (of words that have gone before it, although, of course, it rhymes with **numb**), but also because it is followed by a dash which interrupts the light-heavy stress of the previous lines.

The action and the sound of the "drum" is, logically, a "beating". "Beating" is not only repeated twice but its vowel sound, and therefore its action, is echoed throughout the poem in the following words: "seemed" [1(3)]; "seated" [2(1)]; "creak" [3(2)]; "Being" [4(2)]; "Ear" [4(2)]; "here" [4(4)]; "Reason" [5(1)]. The analyst is thus constantly reminded of both the action and the sound. The effect of this relentless beating, like that on the speaker, is **numbing**.

In these first two stanzas senses which contain phonemes that are repeated alternate with short words whose semantic and aural role is negligible. Those words which repeat phonemes are stressed at the expense of other words in the stanza. Aurally, the **beating** or "treading" is enacted in the rhythm of the stanza. In these two stanzas, then, where the phenotext itself refers to aurality, sense and meaning are relatively clear. But in the final two stanzas the phenotext no longer describes sound, but sound itself takes over, and meaning, like knowing, is shrouded.

The third operation of poem 280 is the movement away from locatable meaning and sense to a kind of writing that is almost wholly phonetic. This tendency towards a higher frequency of repeated phonemes begins towards the end of the middle stanza: "With those same Boots of Lead, again,/Then Space -- began to toll". It is at this point, where sound takes over on the level of the phenotext and even space begins to "Toll", that the poem becomes increasingly compressed: there are many deletions and the number of lexemes which contain repeated phonemes is far greater than in any of the previous stanzas:

*As all the Heavens were a Bell,
And Being, but an Ear,
And I, And Silence, [some strange Race
Wrecked, solitary, here --]*

It is notable that this entire stanza is one phrase: the only dash comes at the end of the final line after "here --" and there are no full stops to indicate the close of a sentence. There is only one proper verb in the stanza, "were" (although the gerundive "wrecked" has a verbal function). Auxiliary verbs are deleted, as are introductory phrases or conjunctions which, once inserted, might result in the following rendition: [It was] As [if] all the Heavens were a Bell,/And [if] Being [was] but an Ear,/And I, And Silence [were] some strange Race/[Who were] wrecked [and (lie)] solitary, here --".

Where deletions of syntax occur, words of similar sound are thrust together, for example, in "As all" and the thrice repetition of the /b/ phoneme in "Bell", "Being", "but". "Ear" slightly echoes the /i:/ of "Being". The long "i" (/ai/) of "I" and "Silence" are perfectly spaced by the repeated lexeme "And". "[S]ome" and "strange" pick up the twice repeated /s/ of "Silence". "Race" directly echoes the /r/-/ei/ combination of "strange" and the previous /s/ phoneme, and its /r/ is taken up in "wrecked". "Solitary" introduces the /s/ motif again, and "here" rhymes with "ear".

The compression of this stanza, combined with the fact that each lexeme contains at least one phoneme of the word that has preceded it, means that the

lexemes seem to lead on to one another. This conveys a sense of heightened awareness and urgency in the speaker, and a rush and richness not present in any of the preceding stanzas. Because of the aural affinities between the words of this stanza, the "univocal character of every lexical item is lost" and the text itself seems to **ring** (Mallarmé; qtd. in Kristeva PPIB 36).

This "**ringing**" is reiterated on the level of the genotext. The phenotext declares that "Space begins to toll"; "Heavens"--a substitute for "Space" on the grounds of contiguity--and "Bell" repeat the /e/ of "treading" and "lead". In addition, the latter word, "Bell", picks up the "ll" of "toll" and "all". On the level of the genotext, the sound of the "Bell", that is, its **tolling**, combines with the sound of the funeral ("treading", "beating"), to create "**Being**"--which the phenotext declares, becomes an "ear". Combining sense and sound, we find another word in the genotext of the poem which enhances the "passion of the verse": "**ringing**".

The lexeme "Wrecked" (like "beating") is a condensation of sounds. It echoes (although it does not replicate) "kept" and repeats the /r/ of "race". "Race", of course, rhymes with "Space" but it also repeats the /ei/ diphthong of "brain" and the /ei/-/r/ combination of "strange". But why are the speaker and silence "some strange race" and how is she "wrecked" and "solitary"? The /li/ of "solitary" is an echo of the "lift" of stanza three. Each of these adjectives are connected aurally to words found in the first two stanzas and, most importantly, in the case of "wrecked", to those which on the level of the genotext described the "**breaking**" of the speaker's "brain". Although the speaker or her brain cannot literally "break" or be "wrecked", the emotional and mental stress resulting from the funeral are such that she feels as though she is losing control or like a wreck, as though she is breaking up.

In stanza five the "breaking"/"wrecking" of the subject is described in the phenotext and is reiterated in the linguistic structure of the lines themselves. First, because they do not repeat any of the phonemes of the previous stanzas, the words "plank" and "plunges" are selected on the grounds of contiguity with "wrecked".

Here the analogy is to that of a ship being wrecked; the speaker "hits a world" in the same way that a ship tossed at sea might hit an island or a rock:

And then a Plank in Reason, broke,
And I dropped *down, and down* --
And hit a World at every plunge,
And Finished knowing -- then --

Dickinson builds up the momentum of this final stanza by repeating the word "And" at the beginning of each line. This is the way a child writes when wishing to create build up of tension to a climax: here the implication is that the persona's state of mind is such that she is no longer able to construct a sophisticated sentence. This is the "wrecking" of the speaker's consciousness which is enacted in the disturbed syntax of the phenotext. The speaker finishes "knowing" because she cannot understand or even explain her experience, and because the language of the symbolic fails to express what she is trying to say. The poem ends without any finality, but on a holding note, "-- then --", as if to say that this is not end.

4.2 Conclusion

In his analysis of 280, Robert Weisbuch links the funeral to the rationalising tendencies of the mind. He reads the "plank" of reason as the floor or ground of sequential being which, once it has broken, leaves the mind free to fall through ontological realms until mentality itself is left behind (105). He makes the lowering of what he reads as a coffin analogous to the movement of the dying persona beyond ordinary consciousness. He goes on to argue that the stranded consciousness is suited only to a nonspatial realm of silence, whilst the experiential being has the ability to hear. Weisbuch concludes:

The coffin is lowered into a grave with no bottom; the mind falls through ontological realms until mentality itself is left behind ... Beyond, above, beneath the floor of reason, somewhere else, the persona travels through realms of silence; wherever those realms are and whatever values are attached to this journey, the persona is transported to a final eschatological place and to a final circumference of expanded or violated consciousness. (105)

Crucial to Weisbuch's argument, and indeed to his dismissal of Clark Griffith's reading of the final chaotic fall as the mind's descent into madness, is his refusal to

define the aftermath. He is adamant that because it is silence, any conceptualisation of what comes after knowing is finished would be a falsification. There are two points worth taking up in Weisbuch's argument. The first is his assumption that the speaker has died and that her coffin is lowered into her grave. The second is his failure to develop the relationship between sound and what he refers to as an "experiential being".

It seems unnecessary to assume that the speaker is lowered into her grave in a coffin. To do this is to deny the impact of the word "wrecked" and to ignore the interregnum of the last line. The result is a need to close the poem in the silence of death. Weisbuch wants to read the poem as optimistic, but within the limitations of this reading, which assumes that the speaker is finally silenced in death, he is unable to do so.

The semi-phonetic breakdown of 280 has illustrated the important role of sound patterns within the poem. Through these we have established relationships between semes which although they do not have an immediate semantic value, acquire such a value through displacement and condensation. This has been exemplified through "**breaking**", "**dead**" and "**ringing**". By focusing on "**wrecking**" and reading the speaker as only being "finished" on one level of her mind, we open the poem up to a Kristevan deciphering which vetoes the kind of problems envisaged by Weisbuch.

"**Wrecking**", like the breaking of the brain, does not necessarily imply the end of the speaker. Weisbuch himself refers to a stranded consciousness, illustrating his own unconscious perception of what (I shall argue) in fact happens in the poem. In 280 the death of the "soldier" and his funeral become the "**breaking**" of the speaker and the "**death**" of reason and knowing. In other words, the speaker's conscious self, her knowing self, the "self" that is created in the language of the symbolic, may be silenced: "Captivity is Consciousness" cries Dickinson in poem 384. But even though she is "wrecked" or stranded, her unconscious

processes--or in Kristevan terms, pulsions from the semiotic chora (in the form of the phonic rhythm which disturbs syntax)--are neither captive nor silenced.

In a Kristevan context, then, poem 280 may be read as a ceremony which evokes the archaic subject. The corrosion of the "I", the knowing subject who means, is established on the level of the phenotext when "a plank in reason breaks" or when the brain breaks, as Dickinson herself explains:

I felt a Cleaving in my Mind --
As if my Brain had split --
I tried to match it -- Seam by Seam --
But could not make them fit.

The thought behind, I strove to join
Unto the thought before --
But Sequence ravelled out of Sound
Like Balls -- upon a Floor.

(937; emphasis added)

Here, as in poem 280, the drives are not "put to death" by the symbolic. On the contrary, in poem 937 the sequence itself ravel "out of Sound" and the echoes of balls bouncing remain. The relentless certainty of death and the monotony of the phonic rhythm of the first two stanzas in 280 are overpowered by the rich aural textures of the repeated sounds of the last two stanzas. Thus meaning is devalued, sound "frees language from denotation" and makes it perceive what it does not want to say. Once the plank in reason has broken, all that remains are sounds.

Through that which precedes language itself--rhythm/prosody--Dickinson creates an effect foreign to the common usage of language. By analysing the struggle between meaning and the phonic rhythm I locate this "other" subject, Weisbuch's "experiential subject", or Kristeva's archaic subject. The real death of the soldier becomes another kind of death--of sense and meaning[̄] but the poetic subject lives to tell the tale. She is stranded, divided, split between reason and the unconscious. Reason may seem to disappear, when in fact it is subordinated to sound. Musicality remains, for "Being" is but an "ear".

Of course Dickinson herself does not die. Even though she writes about an experience that expresses her knowledge of the power of death and horror, she does

not take refuge in death. The destructive impulsional irruption of meaning designated as death or nothingness becomes a form of esthetic positivity. The poetic execution, the rhythmic arrangement of the signifying process, becomes for Dickinson "the only way of avoiding, while passing through it, psychotic a-symbolism" (Kristeva PPIB 35). In this poem, the revolutionary poet exorcises death (on the level of phenotext and the genotext) through jouissance of sound. And the art-work, more than merely relieving a palsy, becomes a source of re-birth and pleasure for the artist, Emily Dickinson.

5.1 Laughter: not parody, but murder and revolution

Poem 465

I heard a Fly buzz -- when I died --
 The Stillness in the Room
 Was like the Stillness in the Air --
 Between the Heaves of Storm --

The Eyes around -- had wrung them dry --
 And Breaths were gathering firm
 For that last Onset -- when the King
 Be witnessed -- in the Room --

I willed my Keepsakes -- Signed away
 What portion of me be
 Assignable -- and then it was
 There interposed a Fly --

With Blue -- uncertain stumbling Buzz --
 Between the light -- and me --
 And then the Windows failed -- and then
 I could not see to see --

(465)

The analysis of poem 280 demonstrated how the funeral in the speaking subject's brain effected an extreme psychological condition which seemed analogous to the speaker's own death. That poem 465 opens with the line "I heard a Fly buzz -- when I died -- " implies that in this poem the persona articulates her own death on the level of the phenotext. Unlike poem 510, the speaker does not describe the deathly moment through negation, but each circumstantial revelation is presented in relation to the annoying buzz of a fly. This subversive strategy constantly undercuts the seriousness of the event as it "introduces ... the critique of the one-sided

seriousness of the lofty direct word" and provokes the "corrective of reality that is always richer" (Bakhtin DI 55).

The pulverisation of the signified and signifying unit in a rhymed, semiotised timbre is designated by Mallarmé and Kristeva as "an execution, as an act of aggression against unity, as a negativity" (PPIB 36). This Kristevan analysis will therefore expose the comic-tragic essence of 465 as it examines how Dickinson creates a subject who is "overwhelmed and who gains no certainty" (Weisbuch 100). It will show that the persona of the poem is not a speaking subject who means, but is rather a sujet-en-procès caught in the dialectic between the symbolic and the drives of the body. By focusing on the syntax and prosody of the poem, the analysis will also demonstrate that the "text" fails to fulfil the criteria of a linguistic phenomena within a linear message bearing meaning, but is rather an engendering that initiates a scene that is both "Law and others" (Kristeva WDN 50).

The Phenotext

In one of her earliest letters to her brother Austin (L142), Dickinson tells of a "splendid sermon" by Professor Park, and describes the event in a way that suggests it might be a possible source for 465: "The students and chapel people all came, to our church, and it was very full and still -- so still, the buzzing of a fly would have boomed like a cannon" (qtd. in Weisbuch 187). Here, the silence is a function of the pious congregation's intense concentration and awe in the presence of the Word of the Lord. In creating 465, Dickinson "puts" the incident "in verse". Not only does she re-construct the event into a scenario that evokes horror even as it undermines it, but through her intensely compressed and therefore often ambiguous lines she also devalues the Word and celebrates sound. These are the two major operations within the poem.

The poem opens with the persona attempting to capture the peculiarity of the moment "when she died". The simile which sets the "Stillness in the Room" in relation to the "stillness" which occurs between the "heaves of storm" implies that the subject is caught in an "in-between" state of consciousness. The threat implicit

in "heaves" and "storm" simultaneously highlights the tenuousness and the strangeness of such a state.

Cristanne Miller defines "syntactic doubling" as the process whereby a single phrase is used to cover two non-parallel syntactic contexts or to describe two different subjects, usually without marking the division of these contexts by punctuation (37). Even though the repetition of the second phrase is considered necessary by all normal grammatical rules, it is deleted (by the poet). Thus the undeleted phrase has to function twice (37).

Syntactic doubling occurs in the first three phrases of poem 465. It is noticeable first, in the opening stanza, where the relative clause of time "when I died" refers both to the fly buzzing and the third phrase of the stanza, "The Stillness in the Room/Was like the Stillness in the Air --". Collapsing the two actions into one in this way makes it impossible to ascertain which action happens first, thus enhancing the oddity of the event by implying that it occurs "out of time". Because it is a form of deletion, syntactic doubling multiplies the possibilities for interpretation in the poem by increasing indeterminacy. The resultant compression creates a density of narrative and enduces rapid movement between the stages of narrative and argument. This latter result works with the phonic rhythm of poem 465, thrusting lexemes close together, inducing multiple condensations and displacements.

"Buzz" stands out in the opening line of the poem as it is bracketed off by two sequences of repeated sounds: "I heard a Fly Buzz when I *died* --". The /ai/ and /d/ motif is condensed in the lexeme "*died*", which is also heavily emphasised because of the dash which follows. The dashes after "died" and after "storm" indicate that the analyst must read the next two lines as a single phrase: "The *Stillness in the Room/Was like the Stillness in the Air* --". Although in these two lines, the phoneme /s/ alternates with the /z/, whole lexemes are repeated--such as "the", "in" and "Stillness".

In the fourth phrase, the /st/ of "stillness" (twice) is reiterated in Storm and the long written "e" (/i:/) creates an internal rhyme in Between, in Heaves (which again repeats the /s/-/z/ alternation). Unlike poem 280 where the long and short vowel variation engendered a light-heavy rhythm, here the presence of fly "buzzing"--and the continual reminder of his presence through the repeated /s/ and /z/ phonemes--works in opposition to the seriousness of the event. The phonetic similarities between words, enhanced by their often close proximity to one another, detract from their semantic importance and form part of the process which trivialises the ritual of dying. Kristeva expresses this process of negation in the following way:

When the phonematic distinction is thus overburdened with new economies (drives, alliterations, repetitions, displacements, condensations etc.) the univocal character of every lexical item is lost. (PPIB 35; emphasis added)

In the second and third stanzas the speaker and her world break down. What is "normal" for a funeral--the mourners cry and try to maintain composure by firming their breaths--is constructed in such a way as to heighten strangeness, thus triggering a sense of abnormality. The synecdoche of "Eyes" and "Breaths" conveys a sense of dislocation or even dismemberment whilst the arrival of the King, recorded on the face of the dying persona, is an "onset"--a disturbing threat rather than a welcome relief.

What is most notable about the stanza, however, is its strange grammar. First, there is the insertion of the third person plural pronoun in its object form "them". It would have made better sense had Dickinson written "The Eyes around had been wrung dry" or even "The Eyes around had wrung dry". And even if she is implying the somewhat archaic reflexive "themselves", this still does not explain why she does not write it. Then there is the peculiar use of the verb "to be". Dickinson writes "when the King be witnessed in the Room", rather than "when the King is [was, would be] witnessed in the room".

In the third stanza, the distribution of the persona's "keepsakes" becomes a distribution of herself: she assigns what portions of "me be assignable" (note the internal rhyme on "me be"). That she is able to do this implies that her decision-making faculties are still in tact. The detachment of this process of self-mutilation breaks with the sentimental love tradition's emotional presentations, but it also injects a note of irony into the poem. This is underlined yet again with the reminder that "There interposed a Fly". By shifting the focus back to the fly, Dickinson debunks the solemnity and self-importance that she had obviously witnessed in previous death-bed rituals as she simultaneously belittles her speaker's death. These subversive strategies form part of the negative process of the poem, which violates the sacredness of death itself.

In the opening line of the second stanza, the consonant phonemes of the stressed words (words with long vowel phonemes) of /ai/ (eyes); /r/, /d/ (around); /r/ (wrung); /d/, /r/, /ai/, are repeated and condensed in "*dry*". This motif is tempered with the alternation between the /s/, /z/ and /st/ tune. Had Dickinson written "themselves" instead of "them" she would have diminished the effect of the phonic rhythm.

The third phrase furthers the destabilising effects of the pulverising phonic rhythm: the short vowel of "And" initiates a light stress which is followed by "breaths" which would normally take a long stress. But because the long vowel diphthong of "were" is repeated in the two words that follow, "gathering firm", and because there is a consonance on the fricative /f/ of "firm for", the usual alternating stress pattern based on the lengths of vowel sounds deteriorates. The phonic rhythm emphasises and juxtaposes lexemes with climactic effect: "firm"/"for" moves into the long, resounding phrase "that last Onset -- when the King -- /Be witnessed in the Room". The dash which separates "onset" and "when" heightens the aural similarities between "last" and "onset", whilst the dash separating "witnessed" from the final phrase "in the Room" engenders a rhyme on "onset" and "witnessed".

The dashes divide the third stanza into three phrases. The /s/ phoneme is repeated no less than four times, the /z/ twice. These serve as reminders of the constant, almost malevolent presence of the fly. The /ai/ motif in "I", "my" and "Signed", as well as the /i:/ motif in "^kKeepsakes" and "me be", are reiterated and alternate with the /ei/ diphthong here: "...sakes -- Signed away/What portion of me be (A)ssignable -- . Because "Assignable" is separated from the following phrase "and then it was", the stress rests heavily on "signable" which echoes the earlier word "signed". In the concluding phrase of the stanza, the unusual grammatical structure of the "and then it was/There interposed a Fly" forces a heavy stress on the "was", underlining its internal rhyme with the "posed" of "interposed". Furthermore, the /i:/ phoneme repeated in the final line of stanza one in "between" and "Heaves" is reiterated in the "Be witnessed" of stanza two and in "Keepsakes" and the "me Be" of the final phrase of stanza three. Without the reiteration of this unusual form of the verb "to be", the impact of the /i:/ motif would have been negligible and the "signed"/"assignable" echo, lost.

In the first three stanzas of this poem the phonetic repetitions act as a "corrective mechanism" which shifts the focus away from the words and what they mean, to their sounds, and their patterns. As Kristeva puts it: "the univocal character of every lexical item is lost ... it splinters into a thousand facets in accord with its signifying differentials, mainstays of 'flesh' and 'bone'" (PPIB 35). In poem 465, the phonic rhythm undercuts the seriousness of the event as it constantly reminds the reader of the aural presence of the fly. In the final stanza, Dickinson maintains her subversive stance but acknowledges--as she resists--the power of death and horror.

The dashes divide the final stanza into six phrases. Here too syntactic doubling is used to enable rapid movement through the narrative. We read "With Blue -- uncertain stumbling Buzz/ -- Between the light -- and me --", but we understand "There interposed a fly with blue uncertain stumbling buzz between the light and me". In addition, the short phrases created by the dashes, the "piling up"

(acervatio) of adjectives in the opening line with their high density of repeated sounds, convey the speaker's confusion and her growing fear of the moment of her death: the moment when she cannot "see to see".

But the speaker's confusion and anguish are not portrayed as the result of her fear for the fate of her soul. "Blue"--isolated from the other adjectives by the dash--with "uncertain" and "stumbling" is on the level of the phenotext, a visual qualification of the sound of the fly: "Buzz". This, together with the fact that each qualifier selected is one not usually applied in reference to a "fly", but to a person, engenders dis-ease in the reader, and implies that the fly's "uncertain, stumbling" state is also the speaker's.

How do "windows fail"? Only if they do not provide light or a view. The fly comes between the speaker and the light. How can a fly's buzz be "Blue"? As darkness falls, the only wave-lengths that one can see are at the blue end of the spectrum. The fly's "buzz" is blue, because the light is blue. This displacement of sensation, or synaesthesia, reflects the speaker's own confusion and the disintegration of her cognitive self.

Thus, it is the fly, and not the speaker's perception of it, that is the only knowable, tangible thing about this poem. For it is the sound of the fly, his Buzz, that is so deafening that it comes between the light and the speaker. The repeated phonemes devalue the meanings of words, or mimic the buzzing sound of a fly so that finally, sound takes over. In describing the effects of this death on the mourners, Dickinson breaks all the taboos of acceptable metaphor and linguistic procedures, and through the phonic rhythm, closes in on the realm of the unconscious.

Finally, it is worth noting that in her essay, "Giotto's Joy", Kristeva suggests that the colour blue has a non- or de-centering effect on the subject, and that it lessens object identification. Her argument (which is extremely detailed and scientific) is based on the premise that the colour perception occurs before the mirror phase and more particularly, that the colour "blue", because of its position in

the light spectrum, is one of the first colours that the child sees. Her conclusion is that the colour blue returns the subject to the archaic moment of its dialectic, before the development of the specular "I" (see GJ 221-23).

Thus the presence of the archaic subject is evoked both through the phonic rhythm which creates a "vibratory of uncertainty" and subordinates meaning to sound, and in the fly's blue buzz which prevents the speaker from seeing.

5.2 Conclusion

The comedy of the earlier stanzas comes to an end in the final stanza where the speaker claims that she cannot "see to see". More than this, however, it is clear that the speaker cannot understand, she cannot "see to see" because meaning is subordinate to the Fly through its constant aural, and peculiar visual, presence. The horrible presence of the Fly, the carrion-gourmand, is the constant reminder of mortality.

The Laws of language and the Laws of expectation are corroded in this poem. Through her aberrant sentence construction, which makes meaning subordinate to sound, and through the disintegration of intelligence and understanding in the final stanza, Dickinson creates a scenario of horror and "otherness". She criticises and undermines accepted forms of consolation literature as she denies that meaning and eternity exist.

The Fly, the constant reminder of her speaker's mortality both evokes and silences laughter. The poem is therefore not parody, but murder and revolution. Murder because the speaker becomes a victim of sound. And revolution because death is exorcised and transcended through sound. Such a rendering, as an evocation of jouissance in language through the irruption of the semiotic chora becomes, according to Kristeva, a form of artistic rebirth.

By creating a poem that demonstrates the speaker's awareness of the humour and horror of death on the level of the phenotext, Dickinson reveals her own detachment from the process of dying (and living). By transposing affect into a celebration of sound, Dickinson evokes attachment to the mother. Detachment and

jouissance are the two processes that hold the death-drive at bay. Poem 465 is thus not merely a mark of a vanquished depression, but it is a sacrificial practice that renders art, for Dickinson, the primary mode of sustaining life.

6.1 Conclusion: Dickinson; Art and Life

The purpose of this analysis thus far has been to demonstrate first that Emily Dickinson--revolutionary artist--challenged the symbolic by subverting the artistic norms of her time. Second, I have shown that she challenged the unity of the symbolic by making rhythm, the phonic rhythm, the dominant element of her verse. More than this, however, I have suggested that whilst Dickinson invoked death in the phenotext of her poems, she also exorcised it through the jouissance of her writing, lyric verse.

Whilst I have already noted Dickinson's intimacy with death through a discussion of the cultural and historical impulses of her world, it remains for me to examine the comportement, that is, the continuity that exists between her art and her life. Because of the nature of Dickinson's verse, in which a phonic rhythm devalues meaning, she is a subject in fusion. Such a precarious position in the symbolic puts the individual's identity at risk, and because Dickinson is a woman, she is even more at risk (see section 2). She needs, in her life, to formulate a way of coping with the loss of coherent identity which her poetry precipitates:

In poetic art, the victim becomes a creator of his condition: by setting it to verse he brings forth, for him as well as for us, the painless, anaesthetized defense of a permanent suffering. The appearances put on are the bandages over unbeing, the anaesthesia against narcissistic pain. (Kristeva TL 337)

Kristeva suggests that Dostoevsky's excessive gambling (as an equivalent to drive energy) was the precondition for the detachment necessary for him to write his moving fiction. What was Dickinson's? Who was Emily Dickinson?

There are four points to be made here. First, we should remember that Dickinson consciously worked towards detachment from her verse, as she emphasises in letter 268: "When I state myself, as the representative of the Verse --

it does not mean -- me -- but a supposed person" (see section 2 of this chapter).
 Second, Dickinson physically and intentionally "detached" herself from the outside world. After 1870 Dickinson left her house only to visit Austin and "Sister Sue" who resided next door, other close neighbours and to work in her garden.⁴³ Gilbert and Gubar make the ~~valid~~ observation that Dickinson was not forced to lock herself into her room, but that she chose to remain within the secure space offered by agoraphobia.⁴⁴

Third, Dickinson, like Baudelaire, took it upon herself to wear a "disguise".⁴⁵ Emily Dickinson only wore white, as Thomas Wentworth Higginson notes:

[I]n glided a little plain woman with two smooth bands of reddish hair ... in a very plain and exquisitely clean white pique and a blue net worsted shawl. (qtd. in Gilbert and Gubar The Madwoman in the Attic 581)

What we have, therefore, is Emily Dickinson, the "Queen Recluse" of Amherst. What we have is Dickinson as a "woman in white" and a "madwoman in an attic".

Kristeva proposes that the artist, puts on an "aspect, an image" as a kind of challenge to authenticity (TL 246). She also holds that the appearances put on are the bandages over unbeing, and ^{an}esthesia against narcissistic pain (TL 337). Many Dickinson biographers, such as Vivienne Pollak and Helen McNeil, have suggested that Dickinson felt rejected by both her parents. Many more, as the opening section of this chapter illustrated, have diagnosed her as suffering some form of mental illness. Perhaps Emily Dickinson, decked out in white, as virgin, nun, angel, or child was rebelling against whatever (in herself or in others) believed that sexuality and especially heterosexuality is essential. Perhaps we should read Dickinson's chastity, proclaimed in her nun's garb, as a fulfilment of the Kristevan claim that if the woman artist does not identify with the mother, she must be virgin or female homosexual.

But Dickinson's life and poetry are more complex than that. As a writer of lyric poetry and as a near-recluse, Dickinson also denied the symbolic, the paternal

position. Existing as recluse and woman in white, Dickinson desperately tried to assert independence and social survival--against the mother and the father.

Through her brief psychoanalysis of Maria Tsvetaeva, Kristeva explains that Tsvetaeva's suicide was her cry "not to be" (ACW 156-8). She argues, furthermore, that it was not a cry "to be God", but expressed Tsvetaeva's desire to dissolve being itself, to free it of the word, of the self, of God. In fact, Tsvetaeva writes in her notes "I don't want to die. I want not to be" (qtd. in ACW 158; emphasis added).

What is clear is that Emily Dickinson used her verse to relieve "a palsy". She exorcises the pain of her body in the jouissance of her language. She writes constantly about death, but as she invokes death, she exorcises it through the pleasure of her text, through the phonic rhythm. By doing so, she succeeds in transcending that which for her, woman poet, was the most seductive alternative: suicide. Furthermore, by denying herself the social contract and wearing white, Dickinson lived a life of supreme detachment: she lived as an asexual recluse. Thus comportement for Emily Dickinson exists in so much as her life was a living death:

And when the Film had stitched your eyes
A Creature gasped "Reprieve!"
Which Anguish was the utterest -- then --
To perish, or to live?

(414)

CHAPTER THREE

IDEALISING LOVE, LOVE-HATE, LOVESICKNESS: A KRISTEVAN READING OF HENRY JAMES'S THE WINGS OF THE DOVE

There is no value in saying that [lovesickness] is a disease of the soul, the healing of which should be left to the moral philosophers and theologians ... If the **soul** is afflicted by love, it is by owing to the mutual sympathy between it and the **body**, as the Genius of Nature [Aristotle] has clearly taught us in Physiognomy and several other texts ... I will be satisfied for now in just relating to you an observation by the ever-laughing Democritus, "that the diseases of the body amaze and baffle the soul and bind up reason by sympathetic influence".¹

Love is the time and the space in which "I" assumes the right to be extraordinary. Sovereign yet not individual. Divisible, lost, annihilated; but also, and through imaginary fusion with the loved one, equal to the infinite space of superhuman psychism. Paranoid? I am, in love, at the zenith of subjectivity. (Kristeva Tales of Love 5)

"Ah, torturing love, why hast thou clung to me
Like some leech of the fen, and drained all the
Dark blood from my body?"
(Theocritus Idyll 11 55-56)

1.1 Introduction: success in perversity

"[It] is a music that is inscribed in language" says Julia Kristeva of Philippe Sollers' novel, H (1973) (NP 159). She continues, "It whisks you from your comfortable position; it breathes a gust of dizziness in you ... you must read, listen, immerse yourself in its language; discover its music, its gestures, its dance" (NP 159). Such is the essence of Kristeva's analysis of H: she listens to the writer read.

By exploring the relationship between the semantics, the logico-syntactic ambiguities and the rhythm of H, Kristeva locates music in its unpunctuated sentence fragments. From her examination of the intonation of each fragment, she proposes that nothing is brought to completion, because enunciation is not finished. Rather than ending on the characteristic descending intonation of French declaratives, sentences close on a level or rising intonation of imperatives instead (NP 171-72).

Kristeva argues that in H, networks of alliteration (correlatives of signifying differentials--see chapter two, section 3) establish trans-sentence paths that are superimposed over linear sequences or clauses. These networks set up associative chains that crisscross the text, for example, "sollers-sollus", or "cata cata catalyse" (NP 169). They introduce into the logical-syntactic memory of the text a phonic-instinctual memory (NP 171; PPIB 36-37), in an "anarchic outcry against the thetic and socializing position of syntactic language" (NP 174). Thus, Kristeva reasons, H is more like a rhymed semiotised timbre than a narrative because it achieves the transposition of trans-linguistic operations (as above), without recourse to versification (unlike Mallarmé for instance).² Kristeva concludes that in H, rhythm and intonation--as instinctual breakthrough--situate the semiotic experience "beyond the sentence", and thus establish it as a practice which occurs "beyond signification and meaning" (NP 167).

William James, in a letter dated October 1902, comments on the "perverse success" of his brother's latest novel, The Wings of the Dove.³ Initially expressing astonishment and apprehension, he finally gets to what has distressed him about the

book: "What shall I say of a book constructed on a method which so belies everything I acknowledge as law?"⁴ He goes on to qualify his dis-ease with The Wings of the Dove in these remarks on its unorthodox construction:

You've reversed every traditional canon of story-telling (especially the fundamental one of telling the story, which you carefully avoid) and have created a new genre littéraire which I can't help thinking perverse, but in which you nevertheless succeed.

And he makes this observation--as an almost back-handed compliment--about the style:

For I read with interest to the end (many pages and innumerable sentences over to see what the dickens they could possibly mean) and all with unflagging curiosity to know what the upshot might become ... and the worst of it is that I don't know whether it's fatal and inevitable with you, or deliberate and possible to put off and on.

But putting his reservations about The Wings of the Dove aside, William James urges his brother to send him anything else he does, because "it will add great solace to our lives". Although he finds the style difficult, it is above all "beautiful". William confesses that he "wondered" at it all the while [he] was reading it (Gard 317; emphases added).

William James's response to what is, to his mind, a very novel piece of work provides an apt Kristevan entry into The Wings of the Dove. By suggesting that it exceeds "the law" both syntactically and structurally, he pin-points what Kristeva believes is at the quick of the avant-garde text: subversion. The salient Jamesian words are "perversity" and "law". The key Kristevan terms are "carnavalesque", "jouissance" and "revolution", as these excerpts demonstrate:

The poetic word, polyvalent and multi-determined, adheres to a logic exceeding that of codified discourse and fully comes into being only in the margins of recognized culture ... Carnavalesque discourse breaks through the laws of a language censored by grammar and semantics and, at the same time, is a social and political protest. There is no equivalence, but rather, identity between challenging official linguistic codes and challenging official law. (WDN 36)

[T]his heterogeneous process, neither anarchic, fragmented foundation nor schizophrenic blockage, is a structuring and de-structuring practice, a passage to the outer boundaries of the subject and society. Then--and only then--can it be jouissance and revolution. (RPL 17; emphasis added)

Kristeva--as I established in chapter one of this thesis--maintains that two modes shaped European narrative: the epic and the carnivalesque (see chapter one, section 1.5). In "The Bounded Text", she proposes that those literary works participating in the semiotic practice of the sign are, as ideologeme, closed and terminated in their very beginnings (BT 41; see section 1.6). In her doctoral thesis and "The Novel as Polylogue", Kristeva attends to those texts (signifiante) which are anti-Aristotelian in their logic, which, structurally, are no longer bound to an exterior law (God, truth, the community), and which exceed the laws of grammar and semantics (see chapter one, sections 1.2-1.7).

Although Kristeva's list of the inheritors of the anti-epic tradition does not include Henry James with the more radical artists of subversion such as Dostoevsky, Joyce and Sollers, and given that the purpose of this chapter is not to categorise James rigidly within any mode (the epic or the carnivalesque), I suggest that Henry James's novel, The Wings of the Dove, delineates a movement away from the epic mode towards a kind of writing which,⁵ in Kristevan terms, cannot be reduced to "representation".⁶ As I have already demonstrated in chapter two (see sections 2 and 3) Kristeva links this revolution in the word (and text) to moments of historical and personal crisis, as she explains in "El Desdichado":

[T]he elements pertaining to states of psychical crisis were modified and inserted in a polymorphic and polyvalent spiritualistic syncretism. The Word was experienced less as an incarnation and euphoria than as a quest for passion remaining unnameable or secret, and as a presence of an absolute meaning that seems as omnivalent as it is elusive and deserting. (ED 181; emphases added)

Thus one of the directions of this chapter is an investigation into the "lawlessness" of James's syntax, or in Kristevan terms, the way in which the thetic position of the subject is disturbed by irruptions from the semiotic chora. Following Kristeva's lead, I attempt to locate the music (rhythm and intonation), of Henry James's peculiarly "long" and "innumerable" sentences in The Wings of the Dove.⁷

William James was not, however, merely curious about the "lawlessness" of The Wings of the Dove. He found it "beautiful"; it added "great solace" to his life. These comments lead in three other major directions in my Kristevan reading. The first is an examination of how the semiotic corrupts the symbolic, on the level of theme, characterisation and in the presentation of the relationship between love and idealisation. This point is illustrated on two levels: that of the artist's (James's) subjectivity--to show that the artist is a sujet-en-procès--and that of the textual subjects. I shall also be interrogating the fundamental comportement between the writer's life and his work, in an attempt to demonstrate how, through art, the pain of the body can become jouissance in writing.

Because the Kristevan theory of art is inextricably linked to psychoanalysis, this chapter embarks upon a Kristevan psychoanalytic reading of ~~the~~ The Wings of the Dove. In this sense the endeavour is in a slightly different direction from that of the previous chapter. There, the purpose was to show, through an examination of the phonic rhythm and an unveiling of the processes that constitute the text itself, how the melancholic artist, Emily Dickinson, inscribed her loss (of the mother), and her rebellion (against the father/the symbolic), semiotically by giving ^{them} it a certain form in her lyric verse. In this chapter I attempt to be **loving Other** to The Wings of the Dove, by revealing the analytic effect of the art-work on artist and reader. Intrinsic to this procedure is a probing into the "other" concealed text, the genotext, which is created through omissions in the narrative, logico-syntactic ambiguities and through pre-Oedipal familial relationships. Adopting these Kristevan approaches means that I, a "wise interpreter", shall be involved in a creative process of appreciation, that is, appreciation with love.

2.1 Deathly sources

The Wings of the Dove has been selected for this analysis not only because, in Kristevan terms, it subverts the Law. For The Wings of the Dove was born out

of a particularly Kristevan impulse--art as therapy--and pursues a peculiarly Kristevan theme--lovesickness--on the level of both phenotext and genotext.

In his 1909 preface to The Wings of the Dove, James remarks that the novel "represents to [his] memory a very old--if [he] shouldn't perhaps rather say a very young--motive" (preface xxxi). Most biographical critics, including Leon Edel and F.O. Matthieson, trace the "motive" back to the death of James's beloved cousin, Minnie Temple, who "would have given anything to live" (Notes of a Son and Brother 453-515). In a letter to Grace Norton on the death of Minnie Temple, James declares that Minnie's life was "a strenuous, almost passionate question", which his mind at least, "lacked the energy to offer the elements of any answer for" (L137; qtd. in Edel The Untried Years 326). The question mark, the abyss which surrounded Minnie's untimely death, "remained long" with James. He confesses that he sought through The Wings of the Dove, written almost thirty years after the event, "to lay the ghost by wrapping it, a particular occasion aiding, in the beauty and dignity of art" (The Art of the Novel 288).

Furthermore, Minnie Temple's early death fused in James's consciousness with his own "private catastrophe"--the "obscure hurt" he suffered at eighteen. In his autobiography James described the effect of this "hurt" as a "kind of death".⁸ Minnie's struggle to live parallels the climax and conclusion of James's own youth. Her death, ironically, marks James's return to health, as Henry notes in a letter to his brother, William:

I slowly crawling [sic] from weakness and inaction and suffering into strength and health and hope; she sinking out of brightness and youth into decline and death (qtd. in Edel The Untried Years 326)

But what has The Wings of the Dove--with its origins in a ghostly memory of a lost love and a personal trauma--to do with lovesickness? Setting aside Kristeva's definition of "lovesickness" for the moment, there are two historically-related points which have a bearing on the theme of lovesickness in general, and for The Wings of the Dove in particular. The first is that there exists in Western culture an entire tradition devoted to the phenomenon of lovesickness which has attempted to address

the question "Is love a sickness, and if so must it then be cured?" (TOL 3).⁹

Interest in the topos is constant in Western medicine from the eleventh century, but it was only in the sixteenth century that it underwent extensive and cogent medical analysis.

Many of the Western physicians writing in the early part of the sixteenth century followed the Arab founders of the tradition of amor hereos by perpetuating the definition of love as a form of insanity, "arising from an inordinate desire to enjoy an object of beauty, an insanity accompanied by intense fear and sadness" (TOL 4). So defined, love is not yet an entirely somatogenic disease.¹⁰ But by the mid- to late-sixteenth century, the Arabic influence waned and the Galenic approach (with its emphasis on purges), which made the crucial connection between the psychological and the physiological, became most influential. In 1581 the physician Battisto Fregoso, in his work L'anteros au Contramours, went so far as to claim that when the erotic appetite provokes a melancholy brooding, fires the passions, burns the tumours, and wastes the strengths of the body, "love is not merely behavior resembling sickness, but is a true disease, virulent and dangerous" (TOL 60).

In his 1610 work, A Treatise on Lovesickness, Jacques Ferrand, basing his definition of love on that of Plato (expounded upon in the Symposium), investigated the literary origins of the disease from antiquity to his own time.¹¹ He also proposed various medical--methodical, surgical and pharmaceutical--remedies for its cure. For Ferrand, lovesickness was a compound disease, the product of causes efficient, real, internal, external, contributing, remote, and material (TOL 7; 350-366). Most importantly, and the reason why Ferrand stands apart from many of the physicians and philosophers that came before and after him, is that he was the first to examine lovesickness rigorously as a disease of melancholy.¹²

By the eighteenth century, the disease of lovesickness was virtually synonymous with erotic melancholia. In 1740, Dr George Cheyne published a work The English Malady--heavily influenced by Galen--in which he described the symptoms and the cures for the affliction "nervousness", whose symptoms were

"sensitivity", "spasms, loss of appetite and a somber mood" (qtd. in Drinka 32-40). From Cheyne's work on "nervousness" arose the Angelic Invalid Myth which continued to influence thinkers in the nineteenth century. Other myths which had an impact on nineteenth-century research into neurosis--hysteria, hypochondria and melancholia--were the Genius myth, the Degenerate myth and its successor, the Noble Savage myth.¹³ Each myth had speculative dimensions in medicine, in early works such as Robert Whyatt's Observations on the Nature, Cause and Cure of Those Disorders which are Commonly Called Nervous, Hypochondriacal or Hysterical or Thomas Trotter's A View of the Nervous Temperament, and in literature, by artists such as Emile Zola (the degenerate myth) and even Jane Austen (the angelic invalid myth) (see Drinka 34-56; Veith 80-106). In Sense and Sensibility (1811), Austen writes of a young and sensitive girl Marianne, who loses her love, Willoughby, and wastes away, losing her beauty, her appetite and her health.¹⁴

Medical names synonymous with these myths of nervous disorders in the nineteenth century are Morel and Moreau (Hale-White 69-106). Names such as J. Hughlings Jackson, Jean Charcot, and of course Sigmund Freud are synonymous with exploding these myths, through their work on hysteria, and in Freud's case, with the practice of hypnosis, analysis and the discovery of the unconscious.

Whilst it is beyond the scope of this project to delve fully into the birth of neurosis, or to examine all its permutations and cures, it is not without significance that Henry, William and in particular, Alice James, were all believed to be nerve sufferers.¹⁵ William went on to explore the relationship between religious experience and neurosis in his work, The Varieties of Religious Experiences, which was based on his Gifford Lectures. William's approach differed from that of his materialist medical contemporaries (such as Charcot), for whilst he was willing to admit the reality of mental and nervous illness in "religious geniuses"--viewing many saints and especially ascetics as very ill and even perverse individuals--he held back from diagnosing all religious experiences as mental illnesses.¹⁶

William completed the Gifford Lectures during his five month stay with his brother Henry, at Lamb House, Rye (Auchard 95). To aid William's progress, Henry James provided the services of his own typist, Miss Mary Weld, who completed the final version of the lecture text. A few days after finishing her work on the lectures, Miss Weld began taking dictation on The Wings of the Dove. John Auchard draws this conclusion:

In conversation, in draft, in composition, and in final published form, "Varieties of Religious Experience" was perhaps the work of his brother which Henry James knew on most intimate terms. (96-7)

Auchard's purpose is to isolate parallels between Milly Theale's self-imposed isolation and silence and the supreme state of self-denial experienced by mystics near the end of the via negativa--as described by William James in his work (108).¹⁷ My purpose thus far has been to demonstrate that the topos of lovesickness--as a psychological and physiological "disease"--could not have been foreign to Henry James. Given the preoccupation with the relationship between the psychological and the physiological and the forays into the causes of nervous conditions (such as hysteria, hypochondria, epileptic seizures and erotic melancholia) in the nineteenth century, given the James's family history of nervous disorders, and given that neurosis was a phenomenon of particular interest to Henry's brother, William, I suggest, rather, that it was foremost in his mind when he began The Wings of the Dove.¹⁸

Kristevan psychoanalysis, as it is presented in Tales of Love (1987), focuses on "lovesickness" as a "sickness of being". Kristeva goes beyond Freudian hysteria to locate the subject's first identification with an imaginary father (see chapter one, section 3). Kristeva argues that in order to receive, assimilate and repeat the Other's words--to speak--the child must become like the Other (who is Other because he speaks). The child identifies with the Other, through "psychic osmosis" which occurs through love (TL 28-31--see chapter one, section 3). Love, therefore, is the primary bond between the subject and Other. The father of ~~pre~~personal

history, says Kristeva, emerges prior to any idealisation but is the basis of idealisation, especially in love. She concludes:

Transferred to the Other as to the very place from which he is seen and heard, the loving subject does not have access to the Other as to an object, but as to the very possibility of the perception, distinction, and differentiation that allows one to see. That ideal is nevertheless a blinding, nonrepresentable power ... the ideal identification with the Symbolic upheld by the Other thus activates speech more than image ... the signifying voice, in the final analysis shapes the visible, hence fantasy. (TL 36-7)

Kristeva argues that a subject who forecloses on this early pre-Oedipal father prevents the emergence of a successful narcissistic structure, one which enables the symbolisation of loss and the formation of desire. Such a subject is what Kristeva terms a "borderline case", because he/she is not fully integrated into the symbolic order.

It is important to emphasise here that identification with the archaic father is concurrent with separation from the mother, a process which is psychically extremely painful (see chapter one, section 3.8; chapter two, section 2). The subject who forecloses on the name of the father, by the same token therefore, has also undergone an unsuccessful separation from the mother. No object (no other) replaces the mother, and no sign expresses the loss (of the mother), and consequently desire fails to emerge. The primitive trauma at the root of the subject's symptom/pain (and the estrangement from the symbolic) may be sexual in nature, or a deep narcissistic injury. Thus Kristeva argues that the headache, the paralysis, or the haemorrhage afflicting the "neurotic" or the "ps¹chotic" are symptoms of the return of the unsymbolised, repressed object, the Thing--the object as not lost. These symptoms form part of a process which re-activates energies no longer filtered by any psychic trace or representation, but which attack and disrupt the functioning of the body's organs (see chapter one, section 3.10).

More than this, however, Kristeva believes that in modern society, where amatory codes no longer exist to guarantee love or to sublimate psychic crises, the **sickness of love** is rampant. For the imaginary and symbolic capacities of

individuals have atrophied through an absence of love and an abundance of melancholy (TL 373).

To return to the question that generated this discussion of lovesickness, what has lovesickness to do with the artist, Henry James? First, Kristeva argues that if the artist experiences a personal crisis, but is unable to symbolise his loss in signs, he suffers from the sickness of being (see chapter one, section 3.1). If the artist is unable to work, says Kristeva, or unable to produce his painting, his music, or his writing, he is "quite simply ill or not alive" (qtd. in Meisel 131-2). Kristeva holds that the artist tends towards the melancholic pole of the psychic spectrum. Whilst the artist may not necessarily be classified as a real psychotic/melancholic, or as a borderline case, he may suffer from a similar pain of being, such as depression. Art, Kristeva believes, has a therapeutic effect because it can sublimate the crisis of the artist into signs: art may be the mark of a vanquished depression. More importantly, however, she argues that this power of symbolic production "to constitute soma", and to "give an identity", may in fact be visible in certain texts (qtd. in Meisel 131-2).

Second, "lovesickness" (as a real "sickness of being") is present in the phenotext of The Wings of the Dove through Milly Theale. Milly's illness is never defined in medical terms, that is, she is never diagnosed. Moreover, her symptoms of "paleness", "tiredness", "melancholy", and an inability to experience life to the full are the very symptoms of Jacques Ferrand's seventeenth-century version of lovesickness (see TOL 269-87), and are the symptoms which resulted in the diagnosis of hypochondria, or general neurosis, in the nineteenth century (I examine Milly's illness in great detail in section 6 below).¹⁹ Through Kristevan psychoanalysis, I explore Milly Theale's "lovesickness"--her decline and her death--as a "sickness of being".

Lovesickness, as a disease, and as the artist's affliction (depression) therefore, is the central, informing motif of The Wings of the Dove. It is not merely implicit in Milly Theale who loves, loses and dies, but is also James's

preoccupation in the genotext, both in his desire to lay the ghost of Minnie Temple with beauty and dignity, and in his own psychic need to express the pain of his being--his personal trauma and his primary loss (of the mother)--in signs.

3.1 To revolution: from early to late James

In order to demonstrate the structural and linguistic development from the earlier to the late James, as part of the development away from epic monologism (see chapter one, section 1), I begin with a comparison between The Portrait of a Lady (1881) and The Wings of the Dove (1902). In "Word, Dialogue and Novel" Kristeva, reading (and re-writing) Bakhtin, lists the following as the "descriptive narrative elements" of the monologic text; "realist description, definition of 'personality', 'character creation' and 'subject development'" (WDN 41). In the monologic text the "addressee" of the text is an extra-textual, absolute entity (God or community) that relativizes dialogue to the point where it is reduced to monologue (WDN 57).

In the dialogic text, on the other hand, there is a development away from and even a complete disappearance of central narrator. The writer of this kind of text is neither "nothingness nor anybody, but the possibility of permutation from subject to ^{addressee}" (WDN 22). Because, in the dialogic text, there is a shift in emphasis to the inner life of the characters, the timescale becomes relatively indeterminate. The movement away from cause and effect to analogy and disjunction in dialogism results in the disintegration of objectivity and subjectivity. Intertextuality, whereby the text is no longer fixed within a specific genre, but becomes an amalgam of many "genres", is rife. The "ultimate" problems of existence become increasingly important in these texts, resulting in the creation of textual psychologies as opposed to personalities or characters.²⁰

James's heroine in The Portrait of a Lady is Isabel Archer,²¹ the quintessential American innocent, who is not stupid, but "knows nothing about money" (PL 27). Isabel meets up with her relatives (the Touchett family) on a visit

abroad and inherits a small fortune from them so that she can "spread her wings" and "rise above the ground" (PL 222). However, in Europe she marries the evil conspirator Osmond,²² to whom she has some value for herself, but mostly for her money. Yet even when she realises she has made a "terrible mistake", and that she has been "used", she cannot bring herself to leave him.

In his review of The Wings of the Dove, William James reprimands his brother for reversing every traditional canon of story-telling and especially "the fundamental one of telling the story". In its barest form the story has the air of great romance and melodrama: an immensely wealthy but afflicted young woman (Milly Theale) falls in love with a young man (Merton Densher) secretly affianced, but without prospects and therefore unacceptable to the family of the bride-to-be.²³ The engaged couple (Kate Croy and Merton Densher) concoct a plot to deceive Milly into marrying Merton so that he will inherit her wealth and thus enable them (Kate and Merton) to marry.

Whilst there may seem nothing "lawless" about the bare bones of the plot, if "the traditional way of telling the story" means having a reliable central narrator, the way in which James unfolds the story does subvert this law.²⁴ The opening book of The Wings of the Dove introduces the first of James's three main centres of consciousness, Kate Croy. Kate confronts her father, visits her sister Marion, and then introduces the reader to her Aunt Maud. The first paragraph of book second introduces the second centre of consciousness, Merton Densher, who has already been referred to in book first by Kate's father and sister. The third book finds Susan Stringham centre stage, as Kate exits, and Milly Theale is seen through Susan Stringham's consciousness. It is only in the opening paragraph of book four that Milly Theale herself becomes the lucid reflector. The following books focus on the development of Kate and Milly Theale's friendship, and the opportunity of "living" offered to Milly Theale. This is once again foregrounded by an absence, Merton Densher, whom Milly has met in New York, although she is initially unaware of the intimate liaison between Kate Croy and Merton. Merton and Kate discuss their

abhorrent plan to deceive Milly in book seven. By book eight Milly has fallen in love with Merton. In the ninth book Milly, having accepted the "truth" of Kate and Merton's relationship, "turns her face to the wall" and finally dies in book ten.²⁵

In The Portrait of a Lady there is virtually no temporal ambiguity,²⁶ and almost the entire first volume is taken up with material which would very likely have been excluded from the work of the later years (see Bradbury 78-80). Lord Warburton's proposal, the bequest of Mr Touchett to Isabel and his death form an integral part of the action of the story rather than part of the antecedent facts as they might have been in the later work.²⁷ Ralph Touchett's death, unlike Milly's, is reported directly as it happens:

She begged him to be quiet now. "We needn't speak to understand each other," she said.

"I don't believe that such a generous mistake as yours can hurt you for more than a little."

"And remember this," he continued, "that if you've been hated you've also been loved. Ah but Isabel--adored!" he just audibly and lingeringly breathed.

"Oh my brother!" she cried with a movement of still deeper prostration". (PL 578)

The narrative duration of The Portrait of a Lady reflects Isabel's growth: her movement from innocence to experience corresponds with what she sees and understands. By way of contrast, Milly Theale's "growth" is doomed from the start, through her illness and through the contradiction between her desire to be happy and her reluctance to live.

In The Portrait of a Lady, James, attempting his first "big" novel (Bradbury 65), makes Isabel the focal, rather than the contributory character, by centering everything in her consciousness and thus emphasising her view of herself. The thoughts of the characters in this early work are relatively short and seldom interrupt sequential chronology. Sensations are presented but their description is consonant with time. Moreover, the interpretations of events through the narrator result in irony and intrusion; Isabel's questioning on page 384, or Ralph's reasoning on page 392, are swiftly followed by dialogue or pre-empted by intervention by the first person narrator, as in this extract: "Ralph, as I say, had wished to see for

himself; but while engaged in this pursuit he had yet felt afresh what a fool he had been to put the girl on her guard ..." (PL 392).

By way of contrast, there are three main consciousnesses in The Wings of the Dove: Kate Croy, Milly Theale and Merton Densher. Authorship is in a sense transferred to Kate Croy, who attempts to "make meaning" by weaving a plot of deceit. Thus James subverts the law of "story-telling" by not using a central narrator, and by allowing his textual subjects (especially Kate) to tell the story. Milly Theale is only just present in five of the eight books. Events are seldom described directly. Instead, they are transformed from action of cause and effect to analogy, through the perceptions of the various characters. Neither the revelation of Merton and Kate's secret engagement which makes Milly turn her face to the wall, for example, nor even Milly's death, is directly reported to the reader.

In this later novel, the characters are constantly engaged in "heavy ratiocination", ever in the process of sensing, contemplating, reflecting. Seymour Chatman observes that in The Wings of the Dove verbs of mental activity total 250 in a two-hundred sentence sample of which 65 percent are predicated of Milly Theale. This is virtually three times as many as are predicated of Mr Overton the narrator of The Way of all Flesh, and almost double those predicated of Newman in The American (Chatman 7). In an identical sample from The Portrait of a Lady verbs of mental action total only 10, of which half are predicated of Isabel Archer.

Whether one holds that Isabel's decision is the result of her pride, her promise to Pansy, the preservation of appearances or even a "fear of herself", her desires and needs are presented amidst societal conflict (or harmony). Her thoughts, as the passage below demonstrates, are grounded in natural attitude:

She could live it over again, the incredulous terror with which she had taken the measure of her dwelling. Between those four walls she had lived ever since; they were to surround her for the rest of her life. (PL 375)

Isabel accepts what she has done and must make the most of her "four walls". The dialectic between self and society is more apparent in the The Portrait of a Lady

than in The Wings of the Dove, where the multiple points of view corrode the objective perception of the external world. Thus the emphasis in the earlier work is on the validity of the external world, and withdrawal is not an alternative:

... "You won't confess you've made a mistake. You're too proud."
 "I don't know whether I'm too proud. But I can't publish my mistake. I don't think that's decent. I would much rather die."
 "You won't think so always," said Henrietta.
 "I don't know what great unhappiness might bring me to; but it seems to me I shall always be ashamed. One must accept one's deeds. I married him before all the world; I was perfectly free; it was impossible to do anything more deliberate ..."
 Henrietta gave a rich laugh. "Don't you think you're rather too considerate?"
 "It's not of him that I'm considerate--it's of myself!" Isabel answered. (PL 488)

In the later work withdrawal is an alternative. It is Milly Theale's alternative. External reality merges with the inner world of the characters through its presentation as thoughts, observations and perceptions. Thus whilst the more realist text, The Portrait of the Lady, takes the centred self for granted, the Jamesian consciousness in the later work questions the nature of subjectivity and the validity of an external "reality":

[The later work] goes beyond the more simplistic acceptance of a given moral and ethical code of behaviour as presented in nineteenth-century novels and attempts to deconstruct many of these preconceived notions by dealing with them as part of a complex, idiosyncratic psychological apparatus rather than as something preordained by an external system of values. (Przybylowicz 18)

Instead of depicting only characters in situations of conflict with an external world, James makes his central consciousnesses confront alternate versions of the self. Milly Theale, for example, sees herself as "dead, dead, dead" in the Bronzino portrait and Kate Croy sees herself diminished in the mirror. The subject in this later text, (as I shall detail in sections 4,5 and 6) is therefore not a fully constituted or centred subject, but rather one which is involved in constant self-interrogation and self-investigation.

The narratorial voice mediates between reader and narrated realm in The Portrait of a Lady, thereby controlling the interaction between society and the

universe of central consciousness. In the later text, the external narratorial voice tends to blend into the thoughts of the characters. Irony results from disjunction between what is thought and what is said in The Wings of the Dove, rather than from the disjunction between what is done and what is thought; or between what is thought by a character and interpreted by the narrator in the earlier work. Thus, in The Wings of the Dove there is virtually no fixed point of meaning, but rather a series of perceptions and observations (points of view) which create multiplicity and multiple possibilities of meaning.

Moreover, the presence of the narratorial voice and its corrective effect is, at times, even concealed through its syntactic presentation. The following excerpt from Book First of The Wings of the Dove is a type of "intervention" by an external narrator, and the comment does not take the form of an explanation of what or why Kate is thinking, but is rather a metaphor of life itself (I use bold-face to highlight repeated phonemes):

Her father's life, her sister's, her own, that of her two lost brothers-- the **whole** history of their **house** had the effect of some fine florid, voluminous **phrase**, say even a musical, that dropped first into words and notes, without sense, **and** then, hanging unfinished, into no words, nor any notes at all. (WD 2; emphases added)

In Tales of Love Kristeva examines "metaphor" within the amatory economy of the subject of the utterance act, because she believes that metaphor "represents" the complex process of identification: "I want to be as the One" (the Other who speaks: narcissism and idealisation) (TL 268). And because the Other is an ideal, "a blinding representation", metaphor is also a movement "**toward the discernible, a journey toward the visible. Anaphora, gesture, indication**" (TL 30). Metaphor, in the general conveyance of meaning, is the "economy that modifies language when the subject and object of the utterance act muddle their borders" (TL 268; emphasis added).

Because love is a striving, fuelled by symbolic idealisation (identification with an imaginary father) for union with an object, Kristeva concludes that lyricism, whereby the subject-object distinction collapses through phonetic similarity or

displacement and condensation, and metaphor--the point at which ideal and affect come together in language--are inextricably linked to love (see chapter one, sections 3.3-3.8).

By the same token, because the unity of the archaic father is the identity of the mother and her desire, the subject's separation from the mother (which is psychically extremely painful and renders the imagination inherently melancholic) decides him to try and recuperate her in his imagination and in words (see chapter one, section 3.8). The artist evokes attachment to the mother through the semiotic dimension of language (jouissance), for instance, through rhythm, alliteration and intonation. Thus Kristeva concludes that language has a specificity that no other system based on differences possesses:

[It] divides (signifier/signified) and joins (modifier/modified = = sentence); it is sign-communication-sociality. "Musicating" this dividing-joining movement involves exploding rhythm into division, of course, but also, into juncture: into the metaphoric-metonymic slippage that corrugates lexemic items ... but especially, into the juncture of logic and sentence where socio-symbolic order is rebuilt ... [I]ntervening at the point where sociality constitutes itself by killing, by throttling the outlay that keeps it alive--that means **intervening** precisely when the sentence pulls itself together and stops. The problem is to raise and transform this very moment, to allow it to sing. (NP 168; emphases added)

In the passage quoted from The Wings of the Dove, the metaphor diminishes the corrective effect of what would have been denotative narratorial intrusion. In fact, the "music" (rhythm and intonation [see NP 167]) of the enunciation obstructs the sense (of the sentence), in general, and the meaning that the metaphor conveys, in particular.

Tenor and vehicle are separated by a succession of qualifiers which are aurally linked. The four qualifiers of the central phrase, "the whole history of their family", come before rather than after the general idea, engendering ambiguity. These four qualifiers (7 syllables) are themselves syllabically and rhythmically balanced on either side of the bi-syllabic segment "her own": 7:2:7.

The noun phrase is then further qualified through analogy: "the whole history of their house" is like a "fine, florid voluminous phrase". Analogy qualifies

again: "say even a musical", and these two analogies alternate as they are specified: "first into words, into notes ... ", again obscuring, rather than clarifying, sense. Notable here is the recoverable deletion (see chapter two, section 3) of "phrase", which is, presumably, the noun that the adjective "musical" qualifies.

Whilst this excerpt is a single sentence, the short phrases, which are distinguished from each other through the punctuation, actually create "sentence fragments". Moreover the /h/ phoneme, thrice repeated in "whole", "history" and "house", creates a fragment which is syllabically balanced with the motif created by the repeated /f/ phoneme, of "fine", "florid", "voluminous" (echo) and "phrase". These two motifs, together with the repetition of "into" and "no", which finds a perfect echo and a near-pure chiasmus in "notes", create a phonic rhythm.

Had this long, single sentence been broken into two or even three smaller sentences, the rhythm of each phrase would have been radically altered and much of the aural impact lost. Furthermore, as analogy builds upon analogy, and the predicative sequence itself breaks up into phrases that function as subjects and others that function as predicates, the end point of the sentence, the closure of the VP, is deferred. One of the consequences is a continuous, rising intonation. I demonstrate below both the rhythm and the rising intonation of these fragments by means of the staff notation devised by Daniel Jones (see chapter two, section 3).

Let me recapitulate briefly. The dots denote approximately level pitches, and strongly stressed syllables have large dots. The curves denote rising and falling intonations. The stave of three lines represent the upper and lower limits of the voice, and the middle line represents intermediate pitch. Jones uses the term "non-final groups" for those segments which have a continuous rising intonation.²⁸ More importantly, Jones's categorisation of intonation into two tunes, based on differences between stressed and unstressed syllables, cannot be successfully applied to James's prose.²⁹ I suggest that one of the reasons for this failure is that James's lengthy sentences have their own rhythm and intonation. These, at times, even approach a kind of prosody.

the whole history of their house had the effect of some

fine florid musical phrase,

In this excerpt meaning is shrouded as rhythm predominates through the syllabically balanced phrases of each qualifying analogy and in the phonic motifs. Rhythm and intonation, as breakthrough of instinct, situate the semiotic experience beyond the sentence, and thus beyond signification and meaning.

Second, and most importantly, the qualifications and analogies create a continuously rising intonation as if to deny completion. The sentence fails to limit the signifying process to "an attitude of request and communication" (NP 174). The effect, rather, is that language moves towards something "discernible", that it is "a journey towards the visible". In other words it is, in Kristevan terms, "metaphoric". By noting the effects and the engendrement of the text through the examination of its "metaphoricalness" and semiotic pulsions, the critic unveils the processes that constitute the text.

It is not without significance that ~~that~~ Seymour Chatman observes a marked increase in metaphor in the later style.³⁰ Chatman (clearly not informed by Kristeva's definition of metaphor) concludes that the increase is a manifestation of James's desire to enrich the otherwise "dry" abstraction of the inner thoughts of his characters (6).

In this Kristevan reading, and as I have illustrated above, I propose that metaphor (according to Kristeva's definition) and semiotic impulses (rhythm and intonation amongst others) index the development in James's writing towards a kind of discourse that attempts to free language from denotation, to "make it say what it does not want to say" (EL 35). Moreover, this destructive, impulsive irruption of meaning (designated as complexity or nothingness), becomes for the artist, Henry

James, a form of esthetic positivity. James himself confessed--in response to William's query as to whether the style of The Wings of the Dove was "fatal or inevitable" to him--that it was inevitable. Most importantly, he added that it "grew more and more positive with him" (qtd. in Gard 318). Because these impulses are pre-linguistic impulses, they have an unconscious impact on the reader. Thus they also render the text a site of positivity--or as William James puts it--"a solace", for the subject who reads it.

The analysis of The Wings of the Dove that follows, re-writes the text through Kristevan psychoanalysis, at the same time as it explores the "amatory experience of the subject" as it is expressed through the relationship between symbolic language and semiotic impulses, metaphor and therefore love.

4.1 The father and the daughter: Kate Croy; narcissism; the desire to make meaning

The Wings of the Dove has its genesis in an abundance of loss. Book First begins with the death of the mother and an exploration of the primal bonds between father and daughter. It closes with the fall of the father, having exposed the idealisation and hatred at the root of amatory feeling, indeed at the origin of "subjectivity" itself. Kate Croy, the daughter, takes up the story where the father, Lionel Croy has left off. She is determined to make **meaning**: "The broken sentence, if she was the last word, would end with a sort of meaning" (WD 3).

Book Fourth of The Wings of the Dove evolves out of loss and absence. Milly Theale, portrayed to the reader through the consciousness of her companion Susan Stringham, has lost everyone: hers is a New York history, "confused as yet, but multitudinous, of the loss of parents, brothers, sisters, almost every human appendage ..." (WD 75). Milly, however, will not concern herself with the making of meaning but will struggle to live as she strives to **love**.

Thus The Wings of the Dove is generated (engendré) between two antithetical female consciousnesses: one whose desire is to "mend the broken

sentence" thereby creating new signification which has meaning, and one whose crisis is the crisis of being. I shall show that each signifies a different and contrasting element within the consciousness of the artistic subject himself, Henry James.

The opening scene of The Wings of the Dove is presented through the consciousness of the daughter, Kate Croy, who, as she looks at herself in the mirror, is revealed as a split subject. Kate's is a highly reflexive consciousness. She is defined in terms of her reflection on her environment and how she is situated in relation to the Law (her father, her duty) rather than by descriptions of physical or personality traits. (This immediately establishes her difference from Milly and Densher who are physically "described" albeit through another consciousness).

She waited, Kate Croy, for her father to come in, but he kept her unconscionably, and there were moments at which she showed herself, in the glass over the mantel, a face positively pale with the irritation that had brought her to the point of going away without sight of him. (WD 1)

I use the term "segment" to denote a phrase bracketed off from the sentence through punctuation, for instance, by commas on either side. Segments are sometimes broken into "fragments" through (syllabic) rhythm or intonation (non-final groups). In this single sentence there are seven "segments" created by the punctuation (commas) and seven verbs ("waited", "to come" [infinite], "kept", "were", "showed", "brought", and "going"), although not each "phrase" has a verb. Four of these verbs are predicated of Kate, and two of her father. There is also a number of shifts in tense: perfect ("waited"), pluperfect ("had brought"), and present ("going"). Other features which contribute to the complexity, indeed, the obscurity, of this sentence are: the adverbs "unconscionably" and "positively" (what does being "positively pale" actually look like?), the deferred reason for Kate being "positively pale", the unnecessary reflexive pronoun "herself" and the recoverable deletion which would have connected "she showed herself" with "a face positively pale".

There are two points to be made here. First, had the sentence been broken into two or even three separate sentences, the effect of the rising intonation, created by James's strange syntax and the resultant punctuation, would have been lost. But what is effected through the fragmentation of the noun phrase into "She" and "Kate Croy", for example, is both the deferment of the verb (and its phrase) and the creation of another non-final group ("Kate Croy") which engenders a pattern of rising intonation. For example, if I write segment one as a single sentence, "Kate Croy waited for her father to come in.", this is the tune:

Kate Croy waited for her father to come in.

This is the tune created by the first three segments in James's text:

She waited, Kate Croy, for her father to come in,

Second, the final segment is the longest and most complex. Because it is broken into six fragments ("a face positively pale", "with the irritation", "that had brought her", "to the point", "of going away", "without sight of him") and each fragment relates in a number of different ways with the noun phrase, ambiguity results. The overriding sense is that closure of the sentence is being deferred.

Kristeva uses the term intervention to describe this kind of disruption of syntax.

Because the intervention occurs precisely at the moment when the sentence is about to pull itself together and stop (NP 168), and renders the syntactic order opaque, it is designated as a semiotic, rather than a symbolic trait.

4.2

The Kristevan dialectic between the symbolic and the semiotic and its destabilising effect on the subject is revealed by the disruption of the thetic position in the opening line: "She waited, Kate Croy ... " and reiterated in the phrase "she showed herself" (WD 1). Here, the textual subject is split between herself, "she", and her name. The name, Kate Croy, links her, the female subject, irrevocably

with the Father, and the family. Part of Kate's "self" (and her text) will be dictated by this law, the law of her duty to her father and to her mother (through her mother's sister, Aunt Maud) and to her sister, as Marion reminds her:

"I can't imagine," Marion on this occasion said to her, "how you can think of anything else in the world but the horrid way we're situated [...] But I don't see why, conveniently, I shouldn't insist to you once and for all on the plain truth of the whole matter. The truth my dear, of your duty. Do you ever think about that. It's the greatest duty of all". (WD 25,30)

The text of duty which is already written for Kate concedes her as "valuable" in so far as she can be of economic benefit: she must go to Aunt Maud in order to be in a position to "marry well"; she must do this so that she can provide for her widowed sister, her (Marion's) four children and of course the father. According to Kristeva, the relationship established with the father and the symbolic ultimately determines the nature of the discourse: "the dialectic between the symbolic and the semiotic determines the nature of discourse, be it narrative, poetry or philosophy" (RPL 24). Why Kate refuses to participate fully in the text of duty, as well as the kind of text she goes on to write, may therefore be determined through an examination of her confrontation with the father.

As Kate waits, she looks at her "self" as "other" in the mirror. It is her reflection, her "other" self, that is "pale with irritation". When the father enters the room, Kate puts aside her "other" self (in Kristevan terms, the "true self", which is omitted when the subject becomes the bearer of syntax) and the artifice of social language takes over. Her spoken acknowledgement of her father's delay is subservient and flattering: "I'm glad you're so much better" and "You're beautiful--n'en parlons plus" (WD 5). The focus on appearance and the use of French marks the shift from "truth" to "representation". Kate responds to her father in the language that he understands best, that is, the sophisticated language of appearance and material use. Thus Kate initially presents the "self" to the father which she believes he would most like to see.

To find out about the daughter, Kate, the reader must look first at the father. Who is Lionel Croy?³¹ According to Kate (according to her mother) Croy made a terrible husband. He did "something that made him impossible" (WD 47). The reader never discovers exactly what because the details of Lionel Croy's "fall" and his shameful past are absent from the phenotext of The Wings of the Dove. There is no central narrator to interpret, or to reveal the "Truth" for the reader. Rather, his misdeeds and his fraudulence are described through Kate's consciousness and through her discussion with Densher. It is Kate, therefore, who controls what the reader learns: the reader learns only what Kate appears to know, that is, what she in turn was told to believe which is nothing "except that he is odious and vile" (WD 48).

What results is a double censorship of Croy's evil history--both by Kate's mother to her and by Kate (through Merton) to the reader. That the father only speaks (he is virtually never a subject of a verb of action) and that the facts concerning his fall are omitted from the phenotext render his function symbolic: he exists as a Law (of duty). The censorship also implies that the father has committed a crime that is "taboo". Croy is a mark of disgust and shame on the family. One of the ways in which Kate attempts to mend the broken sentence of her family history, and make meaning is by re-writing the wrongs of the father:

[T]he precious name she so liked and that, in spite of the wrongs her wretched father had done it, wasn't yet past praying for. She loved it in fact the more tenderly for that bleeding wound. (WD 3)

But if I, the reader-analyst, am being loving Other to the text, the question that I must address is what does the daughter, Kate, really want from the father? Before doing this, however, I must ascertain what he is capable of giving.

The phenotext makes it quite clear that Lionel Croy has no paternal love for his daughter. He has abandoned his family, abandoning at the same time his responsibilities as husband and Father. He judges his daughter on her appearance and her own beautiful plausibility because for him, appearances are all: "It gave him pleasure that she was handsome, that she was in her way a tangible value" (WD

6). Alive with signifiers denoting "vows" and "witnesses", the scene takes on the guise of a near Faustian pact of devilry. Croy considers each word, and he weighs up the effect of each reply. He "plays the game" of "dirty diplomacy" with his daughter because he can manipulate her pity (WD 4). He wants the daughter to feel guilty about his impecunious state, but above all he wants "a great deal of satisfaction for the little he gives" (WD 16). Kate must be dutiful, but she can expect nothing in return. Croy wants everything, but will give nothing.

The discourse of the father, Lionel Croy, is smattered with insinuation and sarcasm. He is "cold and distinct" (WD 16), and callous. His text is one of manipulation and selfishness because for him, there is only duty, the duty of others to him. Croy is a devouring father. In his discourse there is no spontaneity, no giving without receiving, and no such thing as sacrifice for an ideal. Thus hatred spills out of every sentence. He is a subject who exists only ~~of~~^{by} words which signify his hateful, love-less condition.

Given that Kate is thoroughly aware that her father is "bad", and given her determination not to submit to the meaningless text of duty, it seems all the more strange that she should offer herself to him (I explain the typography below):

"Yes--even now I'm willing to go with you. I don't know what you may have wished to say to me, and even if you hadn't written you would within a day or two have heard from me. **Things have happened, and I've only waited, for seeing you, till I should be quite sure. I am quite sure. I'll go with you.**"

It produced an effect. "Go with me where?"

"Anywhere. **I'll stay with you.** Even here." She took off her gloves and, as if she had arrived with a plan, she sat down. (WD 6; emphases added)

The use of the intangible "Things" and the ambiguity of "where" they might go, render a sense of aimlessness, a floundering. The "as if", implying uncertainty, even undermines the facts of the utterance--that Kate is "quite sure", that "she had arrived with a plan". Whilst the contradiction between the phenotext and the genotext reveals Kate Croy, split between the unconscious desire to preserve the authority of the father and her desire to translate the humiliation of his "fall" in a text that has meaning, it also exposes an artistic sujet-en-procès, Henry James.

Here, the language of denotation--meaning--is subordinate to a rhythm--a semiotic breakthrough of instinctual drive. The rhythm is engendered by the short phrases (bold-face) of four syllables ("Things have happened"; "for seeing you"), which alternate with longer phrases (italics) of six syllables each ("and I've only waited"; "till I should be quite sure"). On one level, then, disruption of meaning occurs through semiotic breakthrough: rhythm. On another--that of Kate's fiction--we shall see how her desire to make meaning is threatened by Merton Densher (his real need) and eventually destroyed by Milly Theale.

Vain preservation of the authority of the father is one thing, self-sacrifice is another. Now Kate presents the self of sacrifice, now Kate wants something from the father that he is incapable of giving:

"My idea has been that it should have some effect for each of us. I don't at all, as I told you just now," she pursued "make out your life; but whatever it is I hereby offer to accept it. And, on my side, I'll do everything I can for you". (WD 10; emphases added)

The absence of the verb in Croy's question "What can you?" de-activates Kate. Her gesture of self-sacrifice is rendered defunct because it is interpreted (by the father) and re-constructed into nothing more than another expression of her duty. The father has made it quite clear that love, idealism and self-sacrifice have no place in his text. The duty of the daughter is to provide the father with economic stability.

Kate must yet discover "who she is" in the presence of the father. In her claim that she does not make out his life, she offers to ignore his past, his history of abandonment. And by offering herself to him thus, she offers to love him unconditionally. Kate dramatically turns away from the father to look at herself in the mirror, yet again. But this time the mirror has shrunk: she is diminished. In the Kristevan theory of the subject, the mirror stage, or primary narcissism, is one of the stages fundamental to the development of the subject into the symbolic (see chapter one, section 2 and sections 3.2-3.6). Consequently, if Kate were to see herself as the same in the mirror, it would be understood that she had made no

progress in her development as a subject in the symbolic. However, by looking at her image in the mirror here, she offers to start afresh. She, in this Kristevan reading, expresses a yearning for the imaginary, a yearning for the archaic, soothing love which is the subject's identification with the imaginary father (see chapter one, section 3.7-3.9). Is this then what Kate really wants?

Kate tells her father that if she were to go to Aunt Maud she would have to sacrifice her relationship with him. Croy's response is coldly devastating as he acknowledges his approval of Aunt Maud, calls upon Kate's duty and threatens her with his curse. This is Kate's response:

"It's simply a question of your not turning me away--taking yourself out of my life. It's simply a question of your saying: "Yes then, since you will, we'll stand together. We won't worry in advance about how or where; we'll have a faith and find a way. That's all--that would be the good you'd do me. I should have you, and it would be for my benefit. Do you see?". (WD 15; emphases added)

Kate's need for her father to say the word "Yes", as a token of "faith" for the "good" it would do her, denotes the second fundamental process necessary to development of the subject--idealisation of the word of the Other (the first being the identification of primary narcissism revealing the subject--see chapter one, section 3). As Kristeva explains:

[W]hen the object that I incorporate is the speech of the other--precisely a non-object, a pattern, a model--I bind myself to him in a primary fusion, communion, unification. Identification. (TL 25)

According to Kristeva, the subject must then "kill the father" in order speak/in order to establish an identity "other" than the father. These two points take three Kristevan directions in The Wings of the Dove. First, I have established that Kate's readiness to sacrifice herself to her father is an expression of her love, as Kristeva maintains: "love is a striving fuelled by symbolic idealisation for union with an object" (TL 26-7). Because Kate is refused love from the father and is forced into a text of duty, she is also refused idealisation. One of the consequences of this is her attempt to create an "ideal" fiction, one that fulfils her duty, at the same time as it realises her own desire to make meaning.

Second, what is crucial to an understanding of Kate is that she does not "kill the father" but she becomes the father instead. By attempting to write an ideal text, she takes on the symbolic position. Third, the father with whom Kate identifies is loveless; he is not "good". The impulse of negation at the root of this daughter's identification with a "bad" father manifests itself both in the daughter's (Kate's) own inability to form "good" relationships, and in the hatred that feeds her own text of deceit.

Once the subject has identified with the imaginary father, the subject must accept a real other to replace the image and contend with the symbolic father. Kate Croy cannot "have" her father. He does not "want" her and he does not love her. Croy's veto--as a figure for the veto of the Oedipal father--results in her integration into the symbolic. Whilst it represents his refusal to be the object of Kate's desire, it also institutes Kate as a subject of the symbolic and a subject of desire.

Croy will only acknowledge Kate as a subject of desire (and not as a subject who loves). In this sense, therefore, he sees more than Kate imagines. He is the winner in this game of words because he has the phallus and he unveils the phallus. Merton Densher, he reminds Kate, is the object of her desire: "The matter with you is that you're in love, and that your aunt knows and--for reasons, I'm sure, perfect--hates and opposes it" (15-16).

The consequences of Kate's refusal to "kill the father" and, concurrently, her firm identification with a father who has no love, are played out in the phenotext of The Wings of the Dove. Lionel Croy, the symbolic father, has controlled his daughter through language. Kate learns the "game of dirty diplomacy" from her father and uses it to her advantage in the making of her text. She becomes her "father's daughter" both in her manipulation of words and others. In her interview with her father she discovers that if she masters "words" she will be the one who holds the power--as her father does in her interview with him (as she does with Merton and attempts to do with Milly). She becomes as the father: driven by greed and selfishness. She becomes beautifully plausible, and she "does

something terrible". The way Kate finds language--through rejection and hatred--forms not only her text, but is the basis of all other relationships she establishes in The Wings of the Dove.

If the entire chapter figures the development of Kate as a subject entering the symbolic, it also explores the destructive potential of a subject who longs for idealisation and love, but who is refused it. Kate cannot be the phallus to the father, neither can she escape the Law. Kate can do nothing to wipe the slate clean--the past is not recoverable but creates the present. The loveless father, his dismal history and his shame are at the heart of the text that Kate attempts to re-write throughout The Wings of the Dove.

Kate's desire to make meaning is a response to her emptiness (the emptiness which exists where there should be love) and her desire to be (like) the father, as Kristeva remarks:

[F]or the girl, she will retain the traces of that primary transference only if assisted by a father having a maternal character, who nevertheless will not be of much help in her breaking away from the mother and finding a heterosexual object. She will thus tend to bury that primary identification under the disappointed feverishness of the homosexual, or else in abstraction, which, as it flies away from the body, fully constitutes itself as "soul" or fuses with an Idea, a Love, a Self-sacrifice....(TL 48; emphasis added)

Kate's story (her Ideal fiction [abstraction]) is thus born through her primary lack, love. Kristeva argues that the metaphoric object of love rules the poetic nature (Kristeva's term is "poeticalness") of the discourse of love. But if the object of fantasy does not correspond to the preliminary ideal, says Kristeva, it is receding, metonymic. Thus, Kristeva concludes, the metonymic object of desire rules the phantasmatic narrative (TL 30). Kate's text closely approximates the latter type of discourse: the impulse at the root of her longing to re-construct her life--the writing of her own text--becomes a substitute for her lost ideal. And because the word of the father, the idealised word is not "Yes", but negative, destructive, a word of rejection, and because the only meaning that the father teaches Kate is bound up in selfish gain, Kate's narrative is also one of hatred: it is a text of the refusal to give

up what she thinks she loves (Merton Densher) because of what she hopes she will gain, and it is a murderous text of deceit, a "wondrous silken web" whose victims are the other two main centres of consciousness, Merton Densher and Milly Theale.

4.2³ Conclusion

The opening book of The Wings of the Dove turns on the dichotomy between affection and duty, between love and hate, and between truth and lies. James reiterates the thematic concerns in the language of the discourse, for example, as love and hate are placed in opposition to one another. If hatred is the opposite of love, hatred is present in discourse that has no love, and, it follows, no metaphor. According to Kristeva, love is poetry, metaphor, the dissolution of self into pure condensation, hatred is separation, rejection, the disintegration of self into nothing. This is Lionel Croy. The language of greed and hatred predominates his discourse, as the language of love--poetry, metaphor--diminishes.

Kristeva argues that once the subject becomes part of language, and the bearer of syntax, the "true" subject is omitted. The "true" subject emerges when the semiotic chora disturbs the thetic position through the realignment of the signifying order. Whilst I have attempted to demonstrate this through a reading of "what Kate really wants", I have also suggested that the textual subject's ability to use language as a means to an end is a further index of his/her integration into the symbolic and, it follows, of his/her veracity.³² The sophisticated Lionel Croy (and eventually Kate Croy) is the supreme manipulator of language and he has "no truth in him" (WD 6). As Kate's text unfolds, she becomes increasingly like the father, adopting his linguistic strategies of sarcasm and insinuation, and even repeating some of his phrases.

It is significant that Kate uses sex as a weapon in her deceitful plot (see section 5 below) and that her attempt to make meaning fails. Kristeva argues that when language is being "torn apart by rhythm" (ACW 158), the male artist uses "woman" as the axis for ^{the} sacred or farce. We shall see how Kate's manipulation and deceit, as well as her status as "fallen woman", render her the antithesis of "sacred"

Milly Theale. Kate Croy is therefore not James's principle of ideal love in The Wings of the Dove, but rather the locus of (sexual) repressed desire for the object not lost (see chapter 1, sections 3.4-3.8). I shall demonstrate below how Kate Croy's desire to order her world on principles of negativity (the principles of the father), together with the abject image (not metaphor) of "panther" assigned to her, stand as the mark of James's own failure to make sense of a world that was becoming increasingly distasteful to him and as a sign of his own melancholy (see section 6.4, 7.1 and note 40).

The fluidity of the distinction between reality and fantasy is revealed in the fact that although there is the subject's accession into the intersubjective order, involving the acquisition of language, there is also regression into the intrasubjective imaginary realm of narcissistic mirror images. The perception of the need for idealisation and love in the formation of the subject is a recognition that there is evidence in social life of a risk of stultifying the imaginary domain of the subject.

Moreover, because James draws the reader into the text by creating omissions in the phenotext, and by making meaning subordinate to the rhythm of the sentences, he refuses the reader the position of objective interpreter. In this sense The Wings of the Dove is a Barthesian writerly rather than readerly text. By becoming a Kristevan "wise interpreter" and unveiling ~~the~~ both the character's unconscious impulses and the processes that create the text itself, the reader's imaginary and symbolic capacities ~~of~~ are augmented. Kristeva holds that this augmentation of the individual's (the reader's) psyche is one way that the subject becomes open to art as therapy (see TL 380-83). To read The Wings of the Dove thus, and to read it by revealing subjects' in need of love, is to appreciate art with love.

5.1. Merton Densher and Kate Croy: love?: love-hate

Because it is Kate who attempts to make meaning, the question that the analyst must address here is: what does Kate want from Merton, and concurrently, what can Merton give Kate? (The second question: how Merton serves Milly Theale, and how she serves him, will be addressed in part below, and in detail in section 6).

The phenotext makes it clear that Kate and Merton's relationship is founded on their difference: one that is concretised in their different appearances, and in their different wants and needs. Their relationship "abounded in such oddities as were not inaptly symbolized by assignments that had a good deal more appearance than motive" (WD 38).

Kate can use Merton in her text because he is her opposite. The opening pages of Book Second introduce Merton Densher to the reader through this description (in the first extract I distinguish the four sentences from each other by means of different brackets; see below for an explanation of the typography):

(More than once during the present winter's end he had deviated toward three o'clock, or toward four, into Kensington Gardens, **where he might for a while, on each occasion, have been observed to demean himself as a person with nothing to do.**) [He made his way indeed, for the most part, with a certain directness over to the north side; but once that ground was reached his behaviour was noticeably wanting in point.] {He moved, **seemingly at random, from alley to alley; he stopped for no reason and remained idly agaze; he sat down in a chair and then changed to a bench;** after which he walked about again, only again to repeat both the vagueness and the vivacity.} <Distinctly he was a man either with nothing at all to do or with ever so much to think about.> (WD 33; emphases added)

He is like a coin awaiting its stamp:

He suggested above all ... that wondrous state of youth in which the elements, the metals **more or less precious**, are so in fusion and fermentation that the question of the final stamp, the **pressure** that fixes the value, must wait for comparative coolness. (WD 34)

5.2

In her article "Language and Character Delineation in The Wings of the Dove", Kathleen Komar argues that James reveals "the quality of consciousness"

through the subtleties of his language (476). Komar examines the relationship between semantics and linguistics, and claims, for example, that Densher's consciousness is marked by a "flurry of nondirected activity", that he is presented as "dissolving in a vague 'sense' of inactivity and a proliferation of qualifying phrases and clauses" (477). In his work, The Later Style of Henry James, Chatman breaks James's language up into categories such as "psychological verbs", "cleft sentences" and rigorously argues that all so-called linguistic deviations seem strange because they engender a sense of abstraction.

What neither of these approaches takes into account is the artist's--James's--own split subjectivity. Komar implies that James's conscious intentions create the relationship-of-meaning between language and character. Furthermore, neither critic comments on the rhythm and intonation of the sentence fragments. I have already pointed out that James himself confessed that he felt the later style was "inevitable" with him (see section 3.1 above). The Kristevan apparatus (as I have demonstrated in great detail in chapter two and again in section 2 of this chapter) engages with the text as engendrement, as phenotext and genotext. It demands that the analyst look for what denotative "language does not say" (EI 31), in order to establish the presence of the pre-linguistic within signification.

In a Kristevan context, then, both passages are striking because language itself seems to be in flux. Again I use the term "segment", or if it is appropriate Jones's "non-final group", to denote a phrase, or qualifying clause which is bracketed off with commas (or other punctuation such as a colon or semi-colon, but not a period) on either side, and the term "fragment" to denote a further distinction created by rhythm or intonation.

The first sentence is made up of six segments, the second of four, the third has seven and the fourth sentence one. In the first segment, the modifier of the verb phrase ("had deviated into Kensington Gardens") comes before the verb, engendering ambiguity, but also enabling the qualification of "toward three o'clock" by "or toward four". This is an example of the first semiotic process which occurs

in this extract: that is, addition through a qualification whose semantic role is negligible, which creates ambiguity, and defers the closure of the sentence. The fourth, fifth, and sixth segments (the sixth segment is divided into two fragments, indicated in the text by alternating bold-face with italics) of the first sentence are notable through their repetitive, regular rhythm: segments four and five have six and five syllables respectively, whilst the two fragments of the sixth sentence have nine syllables each. I write these segments as verse and scan them to illustrate the rhythm. Noteworthy is the final fragment whose rhythm is peculiarly regular:

wh̄ere h̄e miġht f̄or ǎ wh̄ile
 on̄ eāch occ̄asiōn
 hav̄e b̄een observ̄ed t̄o d̄emeān h̄imself
 as̄ ǎ p̄erson with n̄othing t̄o d̄o.

The format above also demonstrates how the sense bearing fragment "as a person with nothing to do" is pre-empted by those fragments whose semantic impact, comparatively speaking, is negligible. Thus semantic clarity diminishes as rhythmic intervention defers the moment when the sentence "pulls itself together and stops" (NP 168), transforms the moment, and makes it sing!

In the third sentence, the first two segments have six syllables each and the third and fourth segments are broken into two fragment also of six syllables each (bold-face alternates with italics). Here the segments are bracketed off from each other by semicolons. The fragments function as non-final groups which, together with the lower intonation (but not final--as would be the case if there were a period) created by the semi-colons, engender an alternating rising and falling intonation. Thus the rhythm and intonation create their own punctuation which transcends the limits of the sentence itself.

In the second passage, narratorial intervention is dramatically underpinned through the richly aural poetic language. The alliteration and consonance on "fusion and fermentation" which is picked up in "final", the alternation between the /f/ and /s/ phonemes, the aural echo in "pressure and precious" pulverise the signifier and signified. The shifting phonemes, for example, the combination of

/ou/-/in/ of "so" and "in" condense in "fusion" and are echoed in "fermentation" and "question". The subtraction of the /m/ phoneme from "metals" to "more" to "or", the echo of /es/ from "less" in "precious" /prefis/ introduce a phono-instinctual memory into the logico-syntactic memory of the text.

What this Kristevan examination of each extract reveals is a signifying practice which is not based on a request and an exchange of information (NP 172). Sentence closure is deferred and language appears approximative--a gesture, an indication--whilst rhythm and intonation--instinctual breakthrough--predominate. Such a signifying process, says Kristeva, does not pursue meaning, but has another goal, that is, jouissance. By exploring the topology of the signifying act in this way, the analyst locates the presence of the archaic subject: that is, the evocation of the mother through semiotic breakthrough; and the complex process of identification implicit in metaphoric discourse.

5.3

Merton and Kate enter their relationship on different terms. Merton idealises Kate: she is for him a "view--a grand one" into which he may "perfectly enter" (WD 60). Moreover, unlike the father, he is eager to be used by her. Even though he is afraid of Aunt Maud, he wants to please "her personally" (WD 66), even though he "wants" Kate, he will endure being "hated" by Kate in order to deceive Milly.

Both impulses--a willingness to be used and idealisation--with their connotations of self sacrifice, demonstrate Merton's love for Kate. As Kristeva explains: "loving requires a wrenching of the self for the sake of ideal identification of the loved one" (TL 158). Merton suspends "the distrust, hatred and fear of delegating his self to an ideal otherness" because he loves Kate (TL 32). He claims that if she were to fail him, it would "kill him" (WD 218), because, in Kristevan terms, she would no longer be his "ideal other". Thus Merton will "play the trick" on Milly by not seeing Kate, against his own desire, because she has persuaded him of "the difference it will make" (WD 237).

In a Kristevan context, for Kate to love Merton she would also have to idealise him. Indeed, Kate's initial dealings with him illustrate that she perceives all too well his limitations: "Men are too stupid--even you" she says when he seems incapable of understanding why she wants to post her letters to him herself (WD 72).³³ Whilst Kate seems to have found an object of desire in Merton, the fact is that he is not her "ideal other". Their relationship proves unsatisfying because Kate really wants the father. (Densher, therefore, fails to relate to Kate's preliminary ideal.)

Densher does serve a purpose for Kate--but only on the level of her fiction. On this level, Densher's indistinction is precisely his attraction to Kate. His openness means that he may be of use to Kate; as a "coin" ready to be stamped by Kate he will become valuable as a bargaining weapon against Aunt Maud; he will be of use as a sign in her text of destruction. Consequently, Kate's seduction of Merton takes the form of vows, of words, of the making of fictions. Kate weaves around Merton "a wondrous, silken web" (WD 219) and she finds it amusing. Kate can only benefit from her relationship with Merton if he remains on the level of her own fiction--if he remains within the text that she writes for him. It is on this level, and this level only, that he is satisfying, because he reflects her own desires.

Kate's affection for Merton is also fuelled because it exists outside the law. Only after the discussion as to what Aunt Maud (Kate's "mother") wants for her does she cry: "I engage myself to you forever" (WD 67). According to Kristeva, breaking the law is the initial condition of amatory exaltation (TL 209). It is the challenge to the law, therefore, that feeds the fire of Merton and Kate's relationship.³⁴

Kate's words are initially sustenance enough for Densher. He is a willing participant in her text because he translates her words into a passion, a physical comfort and he is titillated by their beauty: "this was one of the speeches, frequent in her, that, liberally joyfully, intensely adopted, and in itself, as might be embraced, drew him as close to her, and held him as long, as their conditions

permitted" (WD 72). The turning point for Densher--when Densher is no longer only a loving, idealising subject--is when words can no longer satisfy, and when he is no longer fiction, but driven by a real need, sex.

So, first, on a phenotextual level, Milly Theale's adoration and Merton's perception of its difference--from what Kate feels for him and from what he is not getting from Kate--arouses his suspicion and fear. In addition, Merton begins to understand just how much he is being used. "I want," said the girl, "to make things pleasant for her. I use, for the purpose, what I have. You're what I have of most precious, and you're therefore what I use most" (WD 154). Densher, in response, expresses his need: "I wish I could use you a little more." Second, the problem of deceiving Aunt Maud diminishes as need, sexual desire destroys idealism, and threatens Kate's fiction making:

Their mistake was to have believed that they could hold out--hold out, that is, not against Aunt Maud, but against an impatience that, prolonged, made a man ill. He had known more than ever, on their separating in the court of the station, how ill a man, and even a woman, could be with it; but he struck himself as also knowing that he had already suffered Kate to begin finely, to manipulate it. (251)

Densher's need to use Kate is physical and passionate. He wants sex. He becomes ill with desire, physical desire. He realises that he is in fact getting nothing from Kate (at least he is getting adoration from Milly):

There glowed for him in fact a kind of rage for what he was not having; an exasperation, a resentment, begotten truly by the very impatience of desire, in respect to his postponed and relegated, his so extremely manipulated state ... but he held his breath a little as it came home to him with supreme sharpness that, whereas he had done absolutely everything that Kate had wanted, she had done nothing whatever that he had. (283)

To conclude, then, when Kate's words are no longer idealised by Merton, and Merton refuses to give only to receive words, his idealising love mutates into desire. Merton, unlike Kate, is incapable of existing solely within the symbolic order (the fiction) but is driven to seek "the animal sources of passion that deifies the Name to the advantage of loss of self in the flood of pleasure" (TL 246). Thus it is passion, that ultimately sows the seeds of destruction between Kate and Merton.

Kate initially refuses Densher's passion and sex becomes a weapon, a point of bargaining, for both. Once Kate has exposed her plan for manipulating Milly's growing affection for Merton, and Merton sees how he is being used in Kate's fiction, he must avenge his castration. He will not obey Kate unless she "comes to him". Kate agrees because she still needs Merton in the writing of her fiction.

Kate and Merton's intercourse not only fails to satisfy either party but changes their relationship fundamentally. Kate is no longer Merton's ideal "other". Merton remains in Venice with Milly and Kate returns to London. When Merton meets Kate again in book ten, he discovers that she is different:

It was in seeing her that he felt what their interruption had been, and that they met across it even as persons whose adventures, on either side, in time and space, of the nature of perils and exiles, had had a peculiar strangeness. He wondered if he were as different for her as she herself had immediately appeared....(WD 441)

Towards Merton Kate becomes increasingly like her father. She has always demanded a great deal of satisfaction for the little she gives. She will not allow Densher any remorse and she will not allow Merton his one moment of truth:

"Wouldn't it have been possible then to deny the truth of the information? I mean of Lord Mark's?"
Densher wondered. "Possible for whom?"
"Why for you."
"To tell her he lied."
"To tell her he's mistaken."
Densher started--he was stupified; the "possible" thus glanced at by Kate being exactly the alternative he had had to face in Venice and to put utterly away from him ... "And lie to myself, you mean, to do it?" (WD 448)

Merton's refusal to lie to Milly is what frees him completely from Kate's fiction. He will no longer be a sign in Kate's textual exchange. For Kate, however, Merton's failure to remain within her fiction, implicit in their sex and his "moment of truth", feeds her growing hatred of him. Kate cannot be satisfied by sex because the erotic satisfaction of desires is not the soothing primary identification (TL 28), the love which Kate has failed to find, the love which Kate really wants. Once she has experienced intercourse with Merton, and he fails to lie to Milly, he is no longer part of her fiction and therefore no longer "idealised". He is no longer the

empty coin onto which she can stamp her image, but is tainted, even stamped by the influence of Milly Theale. As one who is different from herself, Densher is an object of hatred. As Kristeva remarks:

As soon as an other appears different from myself, it becomes alien, repelled, repugnant, abject--hatred. But as soon as the strength of desire that is joined with love sets the integrity of the self ablaze; as soon as it breaks down the solidity through the drive-impelled torrent of passion, hatred--the primary bench mark of object relation--emerges out of repression. Eroticized according to the variants of sadomasochism or coldly dominant in more lasting relationships that have already exhausted the delights of infidelity, as delusive as it is seductive, hatred is the keynote in the couple's passionate melody. (TL 222; emphases added)

5.4 Conclusion

Kristevan psychoanalysis has demonstrated the difference between idealising love, and love that becomes desire and hatred when condemned in time: "squeezed into the present moment, but just as magnificently trusting of its power [love] takes refuge in blindness, in darkness" (TL 223). I have shown that under the guise of sex, it is hatred that prevails (TL 223).

Kate's desire to make an ideal fiction, one which will realise her own fantasy (to be the father) is foiled by Merton Densher who refuses to remain part of her text. We shall see below how Milly's death and Merton's memory of her destroy Kate's fiction altogether.

Milly Theale, James's "sacred spark" (preface xxxv), is not a subject who moves from innocence to experience, or from the imaginary to the symbolic, having acquired sexual knowledge. Rather, she is a subject whose relationship with the symbolic is marginal, not merely because she is ill, but also because she claims that she models herself upon the metaphor that Kate, the "author" of the text, bestows upon her: a dove. The notion of Milly-as-metaphor is crucial to The Wings of the Dove because Milly--and not Kate--is the one who finally makes meaning. This "meaning", I argue, is not textual meaning, but psychoanalytical meaning; that is, therapy for the artistic subject, Henry James.

6.1 Milly Theale: lovesickness

Milly Theale enters The Wings of the Dove through the consciousness of her companion, Susan Stringham. Consequently, when the reader finally meets Milly Theale, it is with the full and expanding knowledge of the other individual consciousnesses with whom she will come into contact. (This is in contrast to the way in which the reader finds Kate and is further evidence that the two consciousnesses represent opposing elements of James's psyche).

To begin with, and on the level of phenotext, Milly Theale is, like Densher, an object of use. She is a sign in Kate Croy's ideal fiction, and she serves a dual purpose for Susan Stringham. Stringham sees herself as protectress and teacher of Milly. She prides herself on her ability to "read" Milly:

[S]he moved, the admirable Mrs Stringham, in a fine cloud of observation and suspicion; she was in the position, as she believed, of knowing much more about Milly Theale than Milly herself knew, and yet of having to darken her knowledge as well as make it active. (WD 73)

Susan must "darken her knowledge" and "make it active" because she imagines that she is Milly's confidante. She has first-hand knowledge of Milly's illness, and simultaneously, her desire "to live". But Susan's devotion to Milly is not, as she presents it to be, one of pure self-sacrifice. She gains a great deal from having this "perfect young thing" (WD 74). Like Kate, Susan works with "models" and not reality. She is ambitious, and she always longed to be someone great:

To be in truth literary had ever been her dearest thought ... There were masters, models, celebrities, mainly foreign, whom she finely accounted so and in whose light she ingeniously laboured....(WD 7)

Milly is "ideal" for Susan because in her very "innocence" she is perfectly "imperfect". She seems (as Merton does to Kate) to be a subject that Susan can actually "model". More than this, however, Milly has something that Susan always lacked, wealth. Like Kate's mother, Susan made a marriage inferior to Maud: "Maud Manningham had made, she believed, a great marriage, while she herself had made a small...." (WD 99). Their lives become "distant, different", they lose contact (WD 99). Susan lives with the knowledge that she had been "just sensibly

outlived or, as people nowadays said, shunted" (WD 100). Like Kate, Susan is on a mission of revenge, and like Kate, Milly Theale is the means for Susan Stringham to avenge the past. Susan sees her "shy conceits--secret dreams that had fluttered" as being realised in her relationship with Milly (WD 100). With Milly at hand, Susan feels "the happy consummation, the poetic justice, the generous revenge, of her having at last something to show" (WD 101). As a "trophy", a social and economic acquisition, Milly is most used by Susan. But in the same way for Kate, whose ideal fiction is eventually destroyed when Milly dies, Susan's plottings come to naught. She is left with nothing to show and a memory to live with.

Susan Stringham provides the only description of Milly Theale. This is the closest the reader comes to "seeing" Milly Theale. Because Milly is one of the three main centres of consciousness in The Wings of the Dove, the reader more often views the world through her eyes (I add my own brackets to distinguish sentences from each other, and use bold-face to highlight important phonemic repetitions):

(The slim, constantly pale, delicately haggard, anomalously, agreeably angular young person, of not more than two-and-twenty in spite of her marks, whose hair was somehow exceptionally red even for the real thing, which it innocently confessed to being, and whose clothes were remarkably black even for robes of mourning, which was the meaning they expressed.) [It was New York mourning, it was New York hair, it was a New York history, confused as yet, but multitudinous, of the loss of parents, brothers, sisters, almost every human appendage, all on a scale and with a sweep that had required the greater stage; it was a New York legend of affecting, of romantic isolation, and, beyond everything, it was by most accounts, in respect to the mass of money so piled on the girl's back, a set of New York possibilities.] {She was alone, she was **stricken**, she was **rich**, and, in particular, she was **strange**--a combination in itself of a nature to engage Mrs Stringham's attention.} (WD 75; emphasis added)

My Kristevan analysis of this description of Milly Theale takes two directions. The first part demonstrates how the selection and combination of lexemes convey "otherness". The second examines how the rhythm and intonation of the passage expose an artistic (James) sujet-en-procès because they evoke the pre-linguistic.


The overriding effect is, in Kristevan terms, metaphoric: "movement toward the discernible, a journey toward the visible. Anaphora, gesture, indication" (TL 30).

6.1.1 First, a combination of the specific and the unspecific in the adverbial and adjectival modifiers evokes intangibility. For example, whilst Milly's hair is specifically a "New York hair", it is also "somehow exceptionally red". But what is a "New York" hair? Perhaps it is a style particular to New York? Exactly how red is "somehow exceptionally red"? (The phenotext fails to distinguish the redness of Milly's hair from crimson, scarlet, or strawberry blonde.) That Milly is dressed in robes of mourning is quite clear, but what is a "New York mourning"; how black is "remarkably black"? Thus, these modifiers function in opposition to their normal role of clarification, by intensifying intangibility and strangeness. Vagueness and allusiveness are also suggested through the adverbial modifiers, "delicately haggard", "anomalously, agreeably angular", because semantically they contradict the adjectives they modify. And Milly's age is approximate rather than precise: she is "not more than two-and-twenty".


The description is also synecdochic. Milly, as a single known entity, disappears in the reduced syntax, as though the reader is getting fleeting glimpses of her through the window of a passing train. The use of anaphora engenders ambiguity which opens the imagination to speculation: "it" refers first to mourning, then to Milly's hair, and presumably to her history. Thus habitual and stereotypical linguistic responses are destroyed through obliquity.

6.1.2 In the first sentence, there are five modifiers before, and four subordinate clauses after "young person". Each combination of adverb and adjective (usually a segment), beginning with and including "the slim", has at least two more syllables than the previous segment. The gradual syllabic incrementation climaxes on the twelve syllables of "anomalously, agreeably angular" which is also stressed through the assonance on each word. This, together with the internal echo of the repeated phonemes /li/ (of each adverb, for example, /kɒnstɪntli/) sets up a phonic rhythm and a continuously rising intonation. Once again I use Jones's model to

demonstrate the intonation of these "non-final groups", as well as the effects of the rhythm and the phonic tune [see Jones 290-91]):



the slim, constantly pale, delicately haggard, anomalously,



agreeably angular young person,

The second sentence is extremely long and is again characterised by non-final groups, such as "brothers, sisters", as well as a number of repeated phrases, such as "It was New York". Here a semi-colon divides the sentence into two. The clause leading up to the semi-colon has its own rhythm, two groups of four syllables and one group of eight (four plus four). It would have made better sense had James written "great" as opposed to "greater" (greater than what?) but had he done so, he would have broken the syllabic rhythm. There is also a slight rhyme on "had" and "required". I write it as though it were in verse to demonstrate:

all̄ on̄ ā scalē
and̄ with̄ ā sweep̄
that̄ had̄ required̄
thē greater̄ stage;

I inscribe it as a tune to demonstrate the rising intonation at the end of each line and the rhythm:



all on a scale and with a sweep that had required the greater stage;

It is notable that as the sentence finally moves to closure the penultimate phrase is the longest and most complex: "it was [by most accounts], in respect to the mass of money so piled on the girl's back". The vague interruption through "by most accounts", the clumsy "in respect to", together with the additional metaphor of "money piled on the girl's back" work against, or even defer closure, shrouding rather than clarifying meaning. Furthermore, that the final phrase of the second

half of this second sentence is almost identical to the non-final groups that preceded it ("a set of New York possibilities"), means that the sentence ends on a level, rather than falling intonation.

In the third, short sentence, the description climaxes on the signifier "strange" which echoes the two preceding adjectives: "stricken" and "rich". But once again the usual falling intonation of the final word is diminished because the sentence closes on yet another non-final group, "she was strange" and the hyphen, with its addition, insists that this is not the end.

To conclude, then, sentences are not brought swiftly to closure, but expand through a form of semiotic intervention whereby the VP-NP, modifier-modified whole of syntax is disrupted (see chapter two, note 34). The upshot is a constantly rising intonation and a deferment of sentence closure. Furthermore, the "piling up" (acervatio) effect of the descriptive elements, the constant qualification, and the listing of nouns such as "brother's, sister's" imply that language is approximate, or as Kristeva phrases it, "gesture", "movement towards an ideal" (WD 30).

This valorisation of the pre-linguistic--by making sound and rhythm dominant elements--gives rein to the "discourse of the unconscious", allowing the semiotic play, which dissolves across meaning. These features are **not** particular to the language of expressive communicative activity, the definitive language of meaning (the symbolic), but denote a movement towards a different kind of poetic, metaphoric discourse. Because Kristeva believes that metaphor "represents" the complex process of identification, what is represented here is the amatory economy of the utterance act. And we locate the presence of the archaic subject: Henry James, a sujet-en-procès, in face of the "nonrepresentable power", the "blinding ideal" (TL 36-7).

Thus, this description as the æsthetic representation of James's dear cousin, Minnie Temple, whose memory he wanted to lay with "beauty and dignity", is part of a metaphoric discourse, in which the reader, appropriately, locates the presence of love. And it is also a semiotic discourse, in which the artist evokes the mother

through the pre-linguistic. The rhythm and the rising intonation, the jouissance in language, are part of the movement through psychotic a-symbolism, towards positivity, an esthetic positivity.

I began part three of this chapter with a reading of Kate Croy's confrontation with her father as a figure for the birth of the subject. I adopt a similar approach here, but my Kristevan psychoanalysis reveals Milly to be a borderline subject, one who barely enters the symbolic, and who dies from a sickness of being, lovesickness. It must be stressed at this point, however, that because "lovesickness" is a concern of both the phenotext and genotext, my Kristevan analysis, which unveils the genotext, is partially a dialogue with the evidence presented by the phenotext.

6.2 The birth of a subject

In Kate Croy, James creates a subject who wants to make meaning. In Milly Theale, he creates a heroine who has lost every "human appendage" but who has gained immense wealth; who so wants to love and to live, but who believes she is ill. Milly, unlike Kate, has no duty, and unlike Kate or Susan or Lionel Croy, she is without selfish desires. Milly is "good"; she is "impossibly without sin" (WD 231). The extract below is Milly's perception of the dinner with Aunt Maud at Lancaster House:

The very air of the place, the pitch of the occasion, had for her both so sharp a ring and so deep an undertone. The smallest things, the faces, the hands, the jewels of the women, the sound of words, especially of names, across the table, the shape of forks, the arrangement of flowers, the attitudes of the servants, the walls of the room, were all touches in a picture and denotements in a play....(WD 105)

Milly casts herself as detached observer enjoying a painting, or play, but she finds herself in a state of "vibration"; a state that is almost "too sharp for her comfort" (WD 105). She cannot resist the pleasure of the "rich and strange" world she sees before her. The dinner scene, thus presented to the reader through Milly's consciousness, has all the features of an epiphany. If this is so, the question the

reader must ask is: in what state of being was Milly before this moment of heightened consciousness?.

On the phenotext, both Milly's innocence and her strangeness set her apart from the other textual subjects. When the reader first meets her in book four, she has been in a state of reclusion, contemplating life on a mountain. Here her difference is foregrounded by her inability to read people, and more specifically, her inability to interpret words and actions. At this point in her development, people are what they appear.

Milly's social inexperience and her naivety are exposed as Lord Mark attempts to correct her interpretation of the dinner "text". Milly reads Aunt Maud as an idealist, and Lord Mark questions her interpretation: "'Ah she strikes you as an idealist?'" (WD 117; emphasis added)." Milly finds Kate "beautiful", and Lord Mark, once again, begs Milly to question the veracity of her observation, for appearances are deceptive: "'Beautiful in character, I see. Is she so? You must tell me about her'" (WD 117). He goes so far as to warn Milly (this warning is repeated by Kate) that she might be made use of: "'Nobody here, you know, does anything for nothing'" (WD 117). Yet even with Lord Mark's diligent cautioning, the scene remains for Milly her "first full sense of a scene really romantic" (103).³⁵

Milly wonders at the world as a child longing for things which are out of reach. Indeed, she has "amusements of thoughts that were like the secrets of a little girl playing with dolls when conventionally 'too big'" (WD 105). Moreover, Lord Mark insists that Milly is close to having her imagination realised in the symbolic, as this excerpt demonstrates: "'But you'll see. You'll see everything. You can, you know--everything you dream of'" (WD 116). Milly herself seems to be aware of her own detachment from life, as this extract demonstrates:

As Milly made out these things--with a shade of exhilaration at the way she already fell in--she saw how she was justified of her plea for people and her love of life. It wasn't then, as the prospect seemed to show, so difficult to get into the current, or to stand, at any rate, on the bank. It was easy to get near--if they were near; and yet the elements were different enough from any of her old elements, and positively rich and strange. (WD 124; emphases added)

It is clear that the phenotext presents a textual subject who is first, ascetic (she must "justify her "plea for people" and her "love of life"); second, who has been afraid of life (so difficult for her to get into the current); and third, has existed in a world that has not been "rich" (these elements being so different from any of her old elements). I believe that these traits (together with my opening observations), cast Milly as a typical nineteenth-century neurotic.³⁶ Further phenotextual evidence of this will be established through a discussion of Sir Luke Strett and the "cures" he recommends for Milly.

But Kristevan psychoanalysis provides a different reading of Milly's state of mind. At this stage in her development, Milly not is a fully integrated subject of the symbolic. In a Kristevan context, then, it would appear that Milly has adhered to a law--a law of self denial--that refuses desire, pleasure, life itself.³⁷ Her child-like state is the result of her advocacy of renunciation, and the annihilation of the self (TL 304). She has existed in a state of indifference without quest for personal satisfaction. Milly has kept her desires on the level of the unconscious or preconscious, she has had too much imagination, she is too much imagination. Such a state is one of emptiness, of non-being, as Kristeva observes: "Indeed, the annihilation of one's own attributes, the muffling of desires, will, personal concerns, [is] in short the death of the self ..." (TL 304).

Thus the birth of Milly Theale as a subject who loves and desires--her integration into the symbolic--is begun at the dinner at Lancaster House. Indeed her reflection here is marked by jouissance. This, in Kristevan terms, is the result of her "immediate conveyance of an empty Self to the blazing ideal ..." (TL 307). For Milly, the danger lies in whom she idealises and loves. Before going on to discuss the repercussions of Milly's misplaced ideal love, her illness and finally her death, I examine three incidents which index Milly's growth as a subject in the symbolic because, ironically, each contributes to Milly's renewed preoccupation with her illness.

For Milly to become part of the symbolic, in Kristevan terms she must, "speak", she must "lose the thing":

[T]he most archaic unity that we thus retrieve--an identity so autonomous that it calls forth displacement--is that of the Phallus desired by the mother ... To settle within the Symbolic, is to lose the thing. But the avoidance of sexuality and its naming, is for the archaic thing to exist, rather than the object of desire. (TL 40)

Milly's initiation into the symbolic will therefore be complete with the acknowledgement of sexual desire. Sexual desire is set in motion through Merton Densher (whom Milly met in New York), and it is Densher who changes Milly's perception of Kate Croy.

At the dinner the reader is aware of Milly's idealisation of Kate Croy. Milly "wonders" at Kate; she cannot keep her eyes off her (WD 113). In Milly's eyes, Kate Croy is not merely beautiful, but she is sophisticated, witty and clever. The "handsome English girl", from the "heavy English house", is a figure in a picture which steps "by magic out of its frame" (107). (Milly's "idealisation" is necessary for Kate's fiction, because it prevents Milly from realising that she is being used).

It is Merton Densher who changes Milly's idealising friendship with Kate Croy. And Milly becomes an interpreter of meaning when she becomes suspicious of Kate: she finds it difficult to believe that Kate really thinks she is extraordinary, and she senses that Kate has some secret that she is not revealing. "Milly didn't quite see what her friend could keep back, was possessed of, in fine, that would be so subject to retention" (WD 161). But as long as Milly avoids sexuality and its naming, she is unable to understand why Kate, who knows she (Milly) knows Densher, does not mention Densher to her.

Once Milly has learned of Kate's connection with Densher--and even though she believes Kate's lie (that Merton cares for her, Kate, but the feelings are not reciprocated)--Milly can only look at Kate as if through Merton's eyes. Milly even goes so far as to discuss Kate and Merton's relationship with Kate's sister, Marion, but again she refuses to ask the absolutely essential question: does Kate care for Merton? Furthermore, when she sees Merton and Kate together at the National

Gallery, she represses the implications of why they might be there together (a lover's tryst). She represses the "truth" of the situation and focuses her energies on Densher instead:

She was unable to think afterwards how long she had looked at him before knowing herself as otherwise looked at; all she was coherently to put together was that she had had a second recognition without his having noticed her. The source of this latter shock was nobody less than Kate Croy(WD 176-7)

Milly's self-imposed veto is her refusal to face the "truth" of Merton and Kate's relationship. By the same token, it is a refusal to acknowledge sexual desire. At this point, Milly's happiness declines. She tells Mrs Stringham that she will not be present when Densher gets back, and she claims that she does not know what she wants to "run away from" (WD 175). By not facing her fear, that is, the fear of her own desire, Milly retreats into the safety of her semiotic condition. This retreat, I propose, is a retreat into her illness, her lovesickness:

"Since I've lived all these years as if I were dead, I shall die no doubt, as if I were alive--which will happen to be as you want me. So you see," she wound up, "you'll never really know where I am. Except indeed when I'm gone, and then you'll only know where I'm not". (WD 124)

Thus far, Milly Theale's integration into the symbolic has been limited by her refusal to acknowledge her own desire. The fact remains, however, that by throwing herself into the river of life, she has opened herself up to desire. The problem for Milly is that she cannot have her ideal "Other" because, by all accounts, he, Merton Densher, does not care for her.

The third incident that compounds Milly's growing preoccupation with her "illness" is Lord Mark's revelation of the Bronzino portrait. Lord Mark, up until now Milly's corrector and teacher, shows Milly the Bronzino painting in which he sees her. Unlike Kate, Milly does not see herself as "other", but someone else, someone who looks like her. What she sees is an aestheticised version of herself. Unlike Kate who attempts to transcend the past by writing a text that has meaning, Milly is captured and imprisoned in a version of her(self) from the past (WD 161).

Moreover, the woman looks "dead, dead, dead". In the Kristevan theory of the subject such a confrontation with a dead, aestheticised "other" denotes an unsuccessful narcissistic structure. Ovid's Narcissus for example wants otherness, he is in love with his image, but he also refuses it and he will not accept a real other to replace the image. The youth beside the pool is frozen at the very point of desiring an object outside himself, thereby confirming his subjectivity. His death is the sign of the failure of psychic space to form. According to Kristeva, psychic space fails when there is a failure of a sense of loss to form (an unsuccessful separation from the mother) as the basis for love--love which would make the other essential to one's own psychological make-up (TL 104-121 [see chapter one, sections 3.2-3.7]).

Seeing herself as other, as a dead other, Milly is frozen at the point of desiring an object outside of herself. Because the other is dead, there is no confirmation of subjectivity, but a denial of it instead. Milly, looking at the painting through tears says, "I shall never be better than this" (161).

6.3 Sir Luke Strett: doctor/analyst

Thus far I have shown that the phenotextual presentation of Milly Theale's symptoms parallels aspects of nineteenth-century "nervousness". Through Kristevan analysis of Milly's "otherness" I have also suggested that she is not a subject who is fully integrated in the symbolic order. And in the two discussions above, I have shown first, that Milly becomes a subject who desires when she falls for Densher, but also that she refuses to acknowledge both her own feelings for him--her own sexual desire--as well Merton's desire for Kate. Third, I have suggested that Milly's vision of herself as "dead" exposes an unsuccessful narcissistic structure. In the discussion that follows, I explore the phenotext's presentation of the doctor-analyst Sir Luke Strett, his relationship with Milly and his failure to "cure" her. I then examine Milly's condition and death through lovesickness in terms of Kristevan psychoanalysis.

It should be emphasised once again that the physical reality of Milly's condition is virtually absent from the phenotext. However, her psychological condition (on the phenotext) is revealed through her discussions with Sir Luke Strett and through what she tells Kate and Mrs Stringham. The Kristevan reading examines the "other" text, the genotext, beneath the phenotext.

The phenotext reveals that Milly is not in any pain, as this conversation with Susan Stringham illustrates:

"Are you in trouble--in pain?"
 "Not the least little bit. But I sometimes wonder--!"
 "Yes"--she pressed: "wonder what?"
 "Well, if I shall have much of it."
 Mrs. Stringham stared. "Much of what? Not of pain?"
 "Of everything. Of everything I have ... I only mean shall I have it for long? That is if I have got it". (WD 93)

Through Kate the reader learns that Milly is not tubercular (WD 346). And in her final interview with Merton, she is not even bedridden. Moreover, she never smells of medicine (as Kate prophesied) but lies "stiffening herself, clinging to it all ...", "quiet and grim" (WD 414). The only physical evidence of Milly's illness, as I have already mentioned, is that she is pale and haggard, and that she tires.

The first interview Milly has with Sir Luke is indirectly reported, that is, we have only Milly's version:

"He asked me scarcely anything--he doesn't need to do anything so stupid," Milly said. "He can tell. He knows," she repeated "and when I go back--for he'll have thought me over a little--it will be all right". (WD 165)

Although the language is ambiguous, there is no indication that Milly is physically examined. The verbs describing the actions of the doctor denote psychological probing rather than physical action. Sir Luke "knows", he "thinks her over", he "can tell" (WD 165). This is in keeping with the kind of relationship that Milly establishes with him: that is, one of emotional intimacy rather than one of physical dependency which would characterise the relationship of patient to clinician or surgeon. Such a relationship is also representative of one which a nineteenth-

century neurotic might have had with a doctor who advocated (what was then known as) the "talking cure":

By listening to a patient's intensely personal narrative such a doctor could picture hereditarily diseased nervous tissue, unbalanced environmental forces, and individual psychic stresses....(Drinka 346)

Milly refers to their "friendship", Sir Luke's "general goodwill", and she feels that she can relinquish herself to this man who is "half like a bishop" (WD 310). She struggles, but she surrenders:

There was a moment at which she almost dropped the form of stating, of explaining, and threw herself, without violence, only with a supreme pointless quaver that had turned, the next instant, to an intensity of interrogative stillness, upon his general goodwill. (WD 323; emphasis added)

Milly sees Sir Luke as a "parent" and she speaks of herself as a child, desirous of attention and requiring care. Sir Luke tells her "not to worry about anything in the world", and that "if [she'll] be a good girl and do exactly what he tells [her], he'll take care of [her] for ever and ever" (WD 141; emphases added).

Thus Milly's "examination" takes the form of a confession. She feels relieved of a burden: "Of course I like it. I feel--I can't otherwise describe it--as it I had been on my knees, to the priest. I've confessed and I've been absolved. It has been lifted off" (143). Sir Luke attempts to counter Milly's fear of "being too happy" and her melancholy ("I want abysses") through conciliatory statements. There is no sign of a physical remedy; rather, discourse is the treatment: "Oh no, you're extremely difficult to treat. I've need with you, I assure you, of all my wit." (255) Sir Luke encourages her to believe in her right, which is the right to be happy (WD 256). He also encourages her to "live" and he urges her to go abroad--typical remedies of a nineteenth-century practitioner (women suffering from neurasthenia or hypochondria were often ordered abroad or to the coast by their doctors in the hopes that a change of air would "lighten their spirits").³⁸

What emerges from Sir Luke's conversations with Milly Theale, and his suggested remedies (in this phenotextual discussion) is that there is no real reason why Milly should not have a "grand long life". In other words she is not suffering

from a terminal illness (such as cancer). The implication is, moreover, that if Milly believes she can live, she will. Milly herself acknowledges this, and exclaims, "Oh, of course, I know that" (WD 291).

But if Sir Luke does affect an absolution/cure, as Milly herself suggests in the phenotext, why does Milly's condition worsen, and why does she die? Furthermore, what does he absolve? What is the "it" that Milly claims has been "lifted off"?

6.4 Milly analysed

I have established above that Milly is a subject who is estranged from the symbolic order. Through this phenotextual discussion of Milly's condition, I have also shown that she feels guilty (because she feels the need for absolution). Third, it is clear that Milly believes she is ill, that she will never be more than "dead", and fourth, she is afraid of her own desires.

According to Kristeva, the analyst must get to the cause of the pain, the primitive trauma, that has engendered the patient's estrangement from the symbolic order. Kristeva proposes that in order for the psychoanalyst to locate the unsymbolised repressed object at the root of the analysand's symptoms, he may play silent Other to the analysand or he may draw out the problem thereby enabling the analysand to rage, to describe dreams, or simply to pour out his/her pain.

What is revealed in the "intensity of interrogative stillness" of Sir Luke's "talking cure", is that Milly has lost her entire family. Moreover, throughout The Wings of the Dove, there is no other reference to Milly's family at all. Milly expresses her loneliness and isolation in this metaphor: "I am a survivor, a survivor of a general wreck" (WD 172). This is also implicit in her adoption of Sir Luke as "father", and Susan Stringham as her "mother". Is Milly's guilt at being the sole remainder of a lost family the "trauma" that has induced her affinity with the death drive?

If this is so, and Milly's fear of living is bound up in the pain of losing, then in order to live she must love and not lose. To overcome the unsymbolised

repressed object, the "it" that torments her/the loss of her family, Milly must find an "other" identity. She can do this if she finds an "ideal other" who loves her in return. In Kristevan psychoanalysis, the process of finding an "other identity" would be effected by the analyst, who would play the role of "loving Father" to the analysand, by pretending s/he was not a dead father, but a living, nondesiring Father. By doing this, the analyst would return the analysand to the "place" or "moment" where narcissism holds sway, surrounded by emptiness and the quest for paternal love. For, as Kristeva proposed, it is in this "haven" of "ideal love", that the analysand transfers her/his pain onto the analyst (in the guise of the loving father) and psychic renewal takes place (see chapter one, section 3.10).

Furthermore, "being" and "having/living", in Kristevan terms, are both related to the third point above, idealisation and love: "the subject is an I that is split between the Other and the affect, an "I" that is because I love" (TL 174). In a Kristevan context, therefore, once Milly is capable of loving because "someone" is able to "withstand her unflagging power of distrust, hatred and fear of delegating herself to ideal otherness" (TL 169) she must be loved in return. Lord Mark makes this observation: "You want somebody, you want somebody" (276), and adds:

"You want to be adored." It came at last straight. "Nothing would worry you less. I mean as I shall do it. It is so"--he firmly kept it up. "You're not loved enough."
 "Enough for what, Lord Mark?"
 "Why to get the full good of it". (WD 273)

But in The Wings of the Dove there is no analyst who can induce Milly's transference (Sir Luke Strett is a failure),³⁹ and Milly continues to suffer through a want of love. She is lovesick; she is ill precisely because she does not have her "ideal other", Merton Densher. (This is because Merton Densher is not hers to be loved).

To return to the phenotext, however, Lord Mark, rejected by Milly, attempts to make Milly "see" (recognise) Kate's alliance with Merton: to make her see that Kate is not a perfect model, and Merton is not an ideal "other" for her. He reveals that Merton and Kate are engaged. Milly will not believe him initially because they

are such "tremendous friends" (she believes in Kate) but his comment does have some effect on her:

"He had made her within a minute, in particular, she was aware, lose her presence of mind, and she now wished that he would get off quickly, so that she might either recover it or bear the loss better in solitude". (WD 268)

It is only in Venice that Milly finally believes Lord Mark, and it is in Venice that Milly dies.

6.5 The death of Milly Theale

Once in Venice, Milly constructs for herself a romantic world of art and history (WD 282). Kate and Aunt Maud return to England and Merton remains in order to fulfill his side of the contract with Kate. Even though Milly is retreating through the pain of "not having her other" there is yet potential for her to live. Mrs Stringham even claims that she is "really better" (WD 393) and Milly herself says to Merton that she can live (WD 322).

But why does Milly die? The only fact that the phenotext supplies is that once Lord Mark has revealed that Kate and Merton are secretly engaged, and Milly believes him, her condition worsens, or as Susan Stringham puts it, "she [turns] her face to the wall" (WD 412). Milly realises that she has been used. This is Susan's opinion:

"It was his [Lord Mark's] visit that she couldn't stand--it was what then took place that simply killed her." ... "The way it affected her was that it made her give up. She has given up beyond all power to care again and that is why she's dying". (WD 447)

Merton Densher threatened Kate with the possibility of his death if she failed him.

Both Kate and Merton fail Milly in the sense that they use her. She has learnt the truth about Merton and Kate. Merton can never be Milly's because he is engaged to Kate. This is Kate's opinion:

She never wanted the truth--Kate had a high headshake. "She wanted you. She would have taken from you what you could give her and been glad of it, even if she had known it false ... For that was your strength, my dear man--that she loved you with a passion. (WD 451)

Both Susan Stringham and Kate are convinced that Milly's realisation that she could never have Merton, and therefore that she had merely been used, was Milly's death knell. They both seem to think that Milly dies of a broken heart.

Milly's progress into the symbolic--both in her friendship with Kate and a growing capacity for love (which shapes Kristevan subjectivity)--is destroyed as her capacity for idealising love is destroyed. The person whom she has trusted, Kate, and her "ideal other", Merton Densher, both fail her at the same time.

What kept Milly alive was the possibility of having a loved "other". What kills her is the certainty that she never will. Milly earlier saw herself as "dead" in the painting, and now she "faces the wall". She can find no reflection, no "other". This is precisely the point of emptiness that Milly reaches: the death of the self and a return to silence. In seeking love, Milly loses herself. In Venice, Milly retreats into her imagination, to a state of non-being. In her silence, she is returned to the imaginary.

If I read the metaphor of "a broken heart" as a metaphor for Milly's psychological condition of lovesickness, as I do, the final question that I must address is how physical death can result from the death of self. It is here that Kristeva's theory of subjectivity, based on identification with a prepersonal father through love and idealisation, breaks new ground.

Kristeva, taking her lead from Freud, links archaic identification to the "**oral phase of the libido's organization**", and to the primal processes of introjection and incorporation. She believes that the pre-Oedipal state of "having" changes over to "being" through language:

When the object that I incorporate is the speech of the other--
precisely a nonobject, a pattern, a model--I bind myself to him in a
primary fusion, communion, unification. An identification. (TL 25)

Thus, when there is no longer a possibility of loving any "other", or of being loved, Milly "turns her face to the wall" and retreats into silence. Because language creates "being", when she retreats into silence, she simultaneously retreats into non-

being, into having. However, physical death will only occur if the subject no longer "haves", or in Kristevan terms, no longer has the primary oral urge.

If Milly's death of lovesickness causes a real death, it is because, by "turning her face to the wall" she denies the oral urge. She wants "not to be". The death of Milly Theale, then, is a kind of suicide, because it is a death through starvation.

6.4 Conclusion

It is particularly significant, for this Kristevan analysis, that it is not only James's style that is "metaphoric". There is a metaphor at the centre of the text, and it is bestowed upon Milly Theale by Kate Croy. In one of the most powerful scenes of the text, Kate warns off Milly, by advising her to "drop [her] while she can" (WD 201). In response, Milly asks, "Why do you say such a thing?" Kate's reason is simply "Because you're a dove". Kate's description of Milly as a dove becomes an ideal for Milly:

That was what was the matter with her. She was a dove. Oh wasn't she?--it echoed within her as she became aware of the sound, outside, of the return of their friends ... That, with the new day, was once more her law--though she saw before her, of course, as something of a complication, her need, each time to decide. She should have to be clear as to how a dove would act. (WD 202-3)

On the level of the phenotext, there are obvious connotations engendered by the word "dove", for example, freedom and peace, as these lines from Psalm 55 express: "Oh that I had wings like a dove! for then would I fly away and be at rest". But in a Kristevan reading, these associations are not as important as how the metaphor--Milly's dovelikeness--effects Kate's text of meaning. Milly's death is described in the following way by Kate Croy:

"I used to call her, in my stupidity--for want of anything better--a dove. Well she stretched out her wings, and it was to that they reached. They cover us."
"They cover us," Densher said. (WD 508)

Kate makes Densher choose between her and the money Milly has left him. She explains that there is one thing that will save him from having to make the choice:

"Your word of honour that you're not in love with her memory."

"Oh--her memory!"

"Ah"--she made a high gesture--"don't speak of it as if you couldn't be. I could in your place; and you're one for whom it will do. Her memory's your love. You want no other". (WD 509; emphases added)

Kate fails to "make meaning" because Merton's memory of Milly means that she and Merton can never again be as they once were. Kate's fiction is never completed and she returns to the father. Thus, it is Milly as the dove, that finally destroys Kate's murderous fiction. It is Milly and not Kate, who finally who makes the meaning of the tale: Milly Theale as Minnie Temple will remain forever--not as a ghost in James's memory--but as a work of art.

In the same scene in which Milly becomes the dove, Kate is perceived by Milly to be like a panther--a dark beast of prey:

She recalled with all the rest of it, the next day, piecing things together in the dawn, that she had felt herself alone with a creature who paced like a panther. That was a violent image, but it made her a little less ashamed of having been scared. (WD 201)

Whilst this image indexes Milly's unconscious fear of Kate and her knowledge of her power and beauty, it is also an apt converse to the metaphor of the dove. A dove is helpless in the presence of a panther unless it should fly away--which is precisely what Kate is trying to persuade Milly to do here, and precisely what happens in The Wings of the Dove, through Milly's death.

But the difference between the two--as the difference between Kate and Milly--is that of the image and the metaphor. Whilst James symbolises his pain of the loss of Minnie Temple in Milly Theale, through the language of love--metaphor--he also gives Kate Croy an image, that of a dark, beast of prey. This Thing is the mark of James's personal hurt (perhaps a deep narcissistic injury suffered in childhood, his "obscure hurt", or the depression which resulted from the failure of his work on stage) as is Nerval's soleil noir, or Emily Dickinson's "Panther in the Glove".

Therefore The Wings of the Dove is a double triumph for James. For in this art-work, the novel, James symbolises a personal loss by creating the aesthetic

object of love--Milly Theale--the dove. But he also triumphs over his personal despair as the panther, the unsymbolised repressed Thing that tormented him is objectified and put to rest in Kate Croy and her failure to make meaning.

7.1 James's late style, analytic effects of art, conclusion

Thus far I have suggested that The Wings of the Dove, born out of the specific impulse to lay the ghost of Minnie Temple, served as therapy for the artistic subject, Henry James. But this is to limit myself to a single metaphor and image. Through the examination of James's late style, I have also shown how James created sentences which defy closure through their length and which have a (Kristevan) "metaphoric effect" through their syntactic presentation. Furthermore, by making rhythm and intonation dominant elements, James attempts, in a further revolutionary gesture, to make language "say what it does not want to say" (EL 31). There are two points to be made here.

In her article "Novel as Polylogue", Kristeva defines narrative as "the fulfillment of a request, the exchange of information, the isolation of an Ego amenable to transference, imagining and symbolizing" and poetry as a "return to the near side of syntactic articulation, a pleasure of merging with a rediscovered, hypostatized maternal body" (174). I have already suggested that rebellion against the "law" of narrative is evident in The Wings of the Dove, because "authorship" is transferred to the textual consciousnesses, and in particular to Kate Croy. Perhaps more pertinent to this Kristevan reading of The Wings of the Dove is that Kate's own fiction collapses because she fails to "make meaning", and that Milly Theale dies because transference fails to take place. What meaning exists, may be found only in the genotext through the aesthetisation of James's own memory of a lost ideal.

In the Wings of the Dove, James creates an amatory discourse through the language of love--metaphor--and a positive esthetic through the continuous rising intonation of the "long" and "innumerable sentences" (James himself confessed to

William that his style was becoming increasingly positive--see section 2 above). Thus by enabling the semiotic to irrupt into the symbolic and disrupt syntax, James expresses the pain of being in the jouissance of poetic language, "the pleasure of merging with a rediscovered hypothesised maternal body" (NP 174).

Through the exploration of love and its variants--idealising love, love-hate and love-sickness--James demonstrates an understanding of the fundamental relation between love and being. In the development of an increasingly intricate novelistic style, in which the mysteries of the work merges with the complications of the novel process itself, James asks the reader to question his own power of knowing and what this entails. And by revealing the inner thoughts of his characters, James creates a relationship of intimacy between reader and text. To read The Wings of the Dove thus--as the product of another's love-struggle--is to "become a wise interpreter" and to appreciate art with love.⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

I speak in favour of imagination as antidote for the crisis. Not in favor of "power to the imagination," which is the rallying cry of perverts longing for the law. But in favor of saturating powers and counterpowers with imaginary constructions--phantasmic, daring, violent, critical, demanding, shy... Let them speak, the ET's shall live. Imagination succeeds where the narcissist becomes hollowed out and the paranoid fails. (TL 381)

The exorbitant Kristevan wager I set myself in writing this thesis was "to understand the unconscious"--or to adopt a phrase oft-used by Kristeva, "to understand it even to the gates of death" (IBL 62). In order to do this, I took on the role of Kristevan "wise interpreter". With the Kristevan notions of text and subject at hand, I attempted to suspend my own desire to make meaning and concentrated on unveiling the processes that create the text instead.

My exposition of Kristeva's thought and its applications has shown that the linguistic subject is a "subject in process" (sujet-en-procès). It has demonstrated that any text also exists as process (engendrement), that is, it exists as a dialectic between the conscious language of the symbolic, and semiotic impulses from the unconscious. Throughout this thesis I have drawn attention to how the unconscious participates in the creation of a text, and, it follows, how it participates in creating the reader's response to that text. This has meant highlighting the effects of the unconscious on the symbolic through the examination of disruptions in syntax by rhythm, intonation, and through phonemic displacements and condensations.

The Kristevan apparatus has enabled me to demonstrate how the unconscious plays a role in selecting language used for characterisation and how such selections and combinations relate to the psyche of the artistic subject. Through an examination of the "metaphoricalness" of the text, I have revealed the presence of the archaic subject--the pre-Oedipal subject of love. Each of these Kristevan procedures, which attempt to account for the presence of unconscious in the conscious, bring us closer to an understanding of that which constantly refuses understanding, the unconscious.

Kristevan psychoanalysis, which recognises the necessity of fiction-making to therapy, has made the link between art and therapy. More than this, however, Kristeva insists that the work of art is part of the artist's life. In keeping with Kristeva's theory of the subject and her psychoanalysis, I therefore conclude, that captivity is consciousness. For, as Kristeva argues, and as I have attempted to demonstrate, when the unconscious is allowed to speak, when it irrupts into the language of communication and creates a poetic work of art, it may enlarge the symbolic and imaginary capacities of both artist and reading subject, thereby engendering psychic renewal.

What we should be wary of now is not Bulgarians bearing gifts, but the dangers implicit in repressing our own "savage horse", the unconscious. What we should know is that there can be no absolute meaning, no complete cure, but only a relative position of stability. After Kristeva, there are no Gods and no absolutes, but only the self who is constantly being made and unmade, like a poetic text.

Notes to Introduction and Chapter One

1. Julia Kristeva, In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith 62-63, hereafter abbreviated IBL. Abbreviations will be used for all other texts by Kristeva cited more than twice. These are: WDN for "Word, Dialogue and Novel"; BT for "The Bounded Text"; GJ for "Giotto's Joy"; EL for "The Ethics of Linguistics"; PPIB for "Phonetics, Phonology and Impulsional Bases"; ACW for About Chinese Women; RPL for Revolution in Poetic Language; TL for Tales of Love; MI for "On the melancholic imaginary"; DL for Desire in Language; LU for Language the Unknown; ED for "El Desdichado"; PH for Powers of Horror; SN for Soleil noir: dépression et mélancholie; PP for "Psychoanalysis and the Polis" and NP for "The Novel as Polylogue".
2. As the editors of the New Left Review wrote in November 1968: "The May events vindicated the fundamental socialist belief that the industrial proletariat is the revolutionary class of advanced capitalism ... It has at the same stroke, made indisputable the vital revolutionary role of intellectuals, of all generations. The combination of the two was precisely the chemical formula which produced the shattering explosion of May" (qtd in Moi "Introduction," The Kristeva Reader 5). Hereafter The Kristeva Reader will be abbreviated KR.
3. Toril Moi points out that the unsupportive role of the the French Communist Party in the May revolution and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 resulted in the French Left's disillusionment with Soviet Communism. Moi makes the observation that these events also played a role in fuelling the interest in China which seemed to offer a radical perspective in keeping with the theoretical and artistic endeavours of the intellectual Left Bank (Moi "Introduction," KR 5-6). I am also indebted to Leon Roudiez's introduction to Desire in Language 8, and Annette Lavers' Roland Barthes: Structuralism and After for this historical information.
4. See Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, as well as Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection. In the latter text, Lacan refers to the dual

planes upon which language operates, and explores the possibilities of using it to signify "something quite other than what it says" (155). The important article of Lacan's using literature to illustrate a technical point in his theory is his "Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter'," which appears in translation in Yale French Studies.

5. See, amongst others, Robert Con Davis, "Introduction: Lacan and Narration," 855-58; Neal H. Bruss, "Lacan and Literature: Imaginary Objects and Social Order" 62-92; Neal Oxenhandler, "The Horizons of Psychocriticism" 89-103, as well as the 1977 edition of Yale French Studies, volumes 55/56 and the following article by Lacan in particular, "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet" 11-52.

6. Originally published in 1974 as La Révolution du langage poétique by Seuil. Hereafter, I shall be referring to Margaret Waller's English translation as "the doctoral thesis"/Revolution in Poetic Language, although it should be noted that this version contains only the theoretical chapters of the original French edition.

7. At a colloquium on psychoanalysis and politics held in Milan in 1973, Kristeva remarked: "I never intended to follow a correct Marxist line, and I hope I am not correctly following any other line whatsoever" (qtd. in Armando Verdiglione, ed. Psychanalyse et politique 73).

8. I use the masculine pronoun in order to be consistent with Kristeva. Because the debate surrounding the issue of women writing about women is beyond the scope of the present project, I refer my reader to the following texts: Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism; Patricia Meyer Spacks, The Female Imagination: A Literary and Psychological Investigation of Women's Writing; Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice; Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender; Shoshana Felman, "The critical phallacy"; Josette Féral, "Antigone or the irony of the tribe"; Alice Jardine, ed., The Future of Difference; Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron, eds., New French Feminisms; Elizabeth Wright, Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in Practice; Mary Jacobus, ed., Women Writing and Writing about Women.

9. In her preface to Desire in Language, Kristeva defines semanalysis as a practice which "describes the signifying phenomenon" whilst "analyzing, criticizing, and dissolving 'phenomenon,' 'meaning,' and 'signifier'" (vii).

10. See, for example, Kristeva's dialogue with Jakobson in "The Ethics of Linguistics", her dialogue with Bakhtin in "Word, Dialogue and Novel" or her "appropriation" of Freud in "Giotto's Joy". A further, slightly different example is "Stabat Mater" (161-186). In this essay, Kristeva fragments the page and juxtaposes an extraordinarily poetic rendering of her own experience of motherhood with a theoretical discussion of the cult of the Virgin Mary, and its implications for the Catholic understanding of motherhood and femininity.

11. See, for example, Jane Gallop in Feminism and Psychoanalysis: The Daughter's Seduction, where she attempts to debunk "Stabat Mater" by mimicking, even as she undermines both the structure and the content of the essay. Gallop is unable to reconcile Kristeva's valorisation of motherhood with feminism (129). A further source of feminist opposition to Kristeva is found in the article by Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, "Sexual Linguistics: Gender, Language, Sexuality". Gilbert and Gubar postulate that it may not be necessary to regard (as they believe Kristeva does) sexual difference as issuing in different (male/female) relationships to the symbolic contract. They suggest that "the idea that language is in its essence or nature patriarchal is a reaction-formation against the linguistic (as well as the biological) primacy of the mother (536)". See also Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's article "French Feminism in an International Frame". Spivak declares Kristeva's interest in China "eclectic" and undertakes a deconstruction of Kristeva's work About Chinese Women. Spivak decries Kristeva's "principled anti-feminism", and claims that Kristeva establishes a "set of directives for class- and race-privileged literary women" (158). Spivak is not merely concerned with the alienating effects of Kristeva's highmindedness and her intellectualism. She also finds Kristeva's methodology deplorable for the inconsistency of its "sweeping historiographical scope" and its "lack of archival evidence" (159).

12. For a succinct rendering of the theoretical positions of Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray, see Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory. In chapters 3-5, Moi also details some of the central issues surrounding the dispute between French feminists and American and British feminist theorists. See also Verena Andermatt Conley, Hélène Cixous: Writing the Feminine; Ann Rosalind Jones, "Writing the body: toward an understanding of l'écriture féminine" 247-63; Annette Kolodny, "Some notes on defining a 'feminist literary criticism'" 75-92; Rosalind Coward, Patriarchal Precedents: Sexuality and Social Relations, and Jaqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision.

13. Although the translation of Tales of Love was published in 1987, the original French version, Histoires d'amour, was published in 1983. Similarly, In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith (1987) was first published as Au commencement était l'amour: psychanalyse et foi in 1985. As yet there appears to be no full translation of Soleil noir: dépression et mélancholie (1987). My English quotations in reference to this latter work will be from the unpublished translated manuscript entitled "El Desdichado", Louise Burchill's translation of Kristeva's essay, "On the melancholic imaginary", and from John Lechte's own translations from his essay "Art, Love, and Melancholy".

14. Leon Roudiez notes that Kristeva originally intended to pursue a career in astronomy or physics (see "Introduction", DL 2). The mathematical and scientific influence is particularly evident the essays of the late sixties.

15. In his essay, "Art, Love, and Melancholy", John Lechte highlights the development in Kristeva's psychoanalytic thought, and its aptitude for describing the human condition, by comparing Tales of Love with Soleil noir. He claims that the former presents a picture of where we partially were, and what we may aspire to--with the help of psychoanalysis (25)". The picture presented in Kristeva's latest book Soleil noir, he believes, is "where we are now" (25).

16. My exposition has not relied on any single critics response to Kristeva. Toril Moi's relentless pursuit of a Kristevan meaning-text has been extremely valuable,

but there remains a dearth of comment on how Kristeva's theories may be applied to literary texts.

17. I shall show, both in this chapter and in the application sections, how Kristeva goes beyond Formalism and Structuralism to create her own psychoanalytical approach to literary texts. See also chapter two, section 3, where I demonstrate the similarities and differences between Kristeva's "semi-phonetic" breakdown, and Jakobsonian close sound-analysis.

18. Kristeva does not consistently capitalise terms such as the "real", the "symbolic", the "imaginary" or the "other". I follow Kristeva's lead by not capitalising them. I capitalise these terms only when Kristeva herself does, which is generally when she refers to Lacan. See, for instance, sections 2.8-2.10.

19. Michael Holquist, ed. and intro., The Dialogic Imagination vii. Hereafter The Dialogic Imagination will be abbreviated DI.

20. For this compilation, and my understanding of structuralism, I am indebted to Frank Lentriccia, After the New Criticism; Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics; Jonathan Culler, Saussure; Frederick Jameson, The Prison House of Language; Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice and Julia Kristeva, "Structural Linguistics", Language the Unknown 217-261. I follow the lead of Toril Moi in capitalising this term.

21. This forum has been partially published in Critical Inquiry as the article, "Who Speaks for Bakhtin?: A Dialogic Introduction" by Gary Saul Morson, and stands as an introduction to a collection of articles on Bakhtin in the same edition of Critical Inquiry.

22. See Kristeva's later essay, "Semiotics: A Critical Science and/or a Critique of Science" in The Kristeva Reader 74-88. For an interpretation of Kristevan "science", see Evelyn Zepp, "The Criticism of Julia Kristeva: A New mode of Critical Thought".

23. It should be noted that I have used the version "The Bounded Text" from Desire in Language in this thesis. My text therefore makes reference to Jehan de

Saintré and not Histoire et plaisante chronique du petit Jehan de Saintré et de la jeune dame des Belles Cousins, as found in "From Symbol to Sign" in The Kristeva Reader.

24. For my views on Formalism, I am indebted to the following texts: Tony Bennett, Formalism and Marxism; S. Baun and S. Bault, eds., Russian Formalism; Mikhail Bakhtin and P.N. Medvedev, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship; Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine. My own comments on Bakhtin are derived from the following works: Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination; Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics; Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World.

25. See Caryl Emerson, "Outer Word and Inner Speech". Emerson notes here that "Bakhtin profoundly redefined the Word itself and attempted to infuse it with its original Greek sense of logos ('discourse')" (248). Emerson adds that for Bakhtin, words cannot be conceived apart from the voices who speak them; thus every word raises the question of authority (248-49). Bakhtin also foreshadows Benveniste's notion of discourse--as Kristeva points out in "Word, Dialogue and Novel" (39).

26. Kristeva's source for Saussure's "Anagrams" is Jean Starobinski, Les Mots sous les mots (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), translated by Olivia Emmet as Words upon Words. The "Anagrams" were written shortly before Saussure's death and were never published as an entity. As far as I can see, Kristeva--at this stage in her thinking--really wants to use the "Anagrams" to demonstrate the failure of a logical system based on a zero-one sequence to account for the (translinguistic) operations of poetic language. It is important to note, however, that although Kristeva makes no reference to the "Anagrams" in either Revolution in Poetic Language, or "Phonetics, Phonology and Impulsional Bases", there are distinct similarities between her "semi-phonetic breakdown" and Saussure's procedures. Although I touch on the relationship in section 4 of chapter one, and in the Dickinson analysis (section 3), I urge the reader to delve into the "Anagrams" him/herself, as any synopsis of Saussure's practice would be inadequate.

27. See sections 2.3-2.5 of this exposition for the Kristevan definitions of the symbolic and the semiotic.
28. The "direct word", for example, is described as "enunciating, expressive, direct, denotative; it provides the writer with objective comprehension and is the last possible degree of signification by the subject" (WDN 43).
29. See Williard von Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View. I am also indebted to Georg Henrik von Wright, An Essay on Modal Logic; Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of Logic 9-43; Francis Herbert Bradley, The Principles of Logic 128-242, and John N. Keynes, Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic 57-63; 84-107, for my understanding of these concepts and this compilation.
30. Through the language of logic and mathematics, Kristeva argues that the sign sets itself up as a resolution of contradictions. In the domain of the symbol, contradiction is resolved through exclusive disjunction whilst in the sign's signifying practice contradiction is resolved by nondisjunction. This latter kind of logic, in fact the negative of disjunctive logic, is a "yes-no" logic. As an alternating kind of logic it may be represented in the following way: **not** (P or Q). Because the novel is made up of signs means that it is also governed by this latter logic. Kristeva borrows two terms from von Wright's An Essay on Modal Logic and argues that the novel is a combination of the **alethic** modality of opposition and the **deontic** modality of reunion. Paralleling these modes with Bakhtin's concepts of dialogism and monologism, she concludes that whilst this early novel absorbs the dialogism of the carnivalesque, it submits to the univocity, the monologism of symbolic disjunction, guaranteed by transcendence. As Kristeva herself phrases it: "the novel covers the trajectory of deontic synthesis in order to condemn it and to affirm, in the alethic mode, the opposition of contraries" (BT 44; emphasis added).
31. Kristeva borrows the term "ideologeme" from Mikhail Bakhtin and P.N. Medvedev, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship 3.
32. It would be impossible to detail all the arguments and conclusions of "The Bounded Text", and their manifestations in Kristeva's later works, as this is itself a

thesis. For the full argument, I refer the reader to the essay "The Bounded Text", and urge him/her to read the subtext of Kristeva's argument in the notes and references.

33. For further insight into how Kristeva approaches texts from this angle, see the following essays in Desire in Language: "Ethics of Linguistics" 23-35; "The Novel as Polylogue" 159-209, as well as "From One Identity to another" 124-47.

34. Kristeva refers the reader to Zellig Harris, Mathematical Structures of Language (New York: Interscience Publications, 1968) and Maurice Gross and André Lentin, Introduction to Formal Grammars trans. M. Salkoff (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1970). She fails to elaborate upon her criticism of these theories.

35. Because I refer to so many Kristevan texts, I include all the abbreviated references to the Kristevan texts in my thesis in order to maintain clarity.

36. For a detailed picture of the development from Structuralist linguistics to psychoanalysis and language, as well as an overview of semiotics in general, see Kristeva, Language the Unknown 217-279; 295-329.

37. Plato, Timaeus 51 (Jowett translation), quoted in Leon Roudiez's introduction to Desire in Language 6. It is notable that the Timaeus itself has a discussion of importance of the balance between the Mind and the Body--Kristeva's corrective of contemporary language philosophy. In the Republic, Plato enumerates three souls in man. In the Timaeus, this division is more scientific: the rational soul has its seat in the head and is separated from the other parts by the neck. The irascible soul is placed within the breast over the diaphragm, and because it is near the head, it can hear the voice of reason. It represses the passionate soul, which is located under the diaphragm and is bound there as a "savage horse". See the Timaeus, 69d-e; 70e. I am indebted to the editors of A Treatise on Lovesickness for directing me to this section of the Timaeus.

38. Kristeva believes that Giotto's work marks an important stage in the development from symbol to sign (I have pointed to this development in the opening section) because he was one of the first to humanise, or to use her own term,

democratise the Christian legend. Kristeva argues that in the Last Judgement section of Giotto's Padua Frescoes (characterised by impressive changes in colour, texture and contour), Giotto attempts to represent the opposite side of the norm: the antinorm, the forbidden, the excessive, the repressed--in other words, the unconscious. Kristeva's point is that like rhythm, colour has its basis in instinctual drives. If, in a painting, colour is pulled from the unconscious into the symbolic order, thereby escaping censorship, colour (like rhythm in language) may be regarded as a menace to the self (GJ 222). But how exactly does colour "escape censorship"? How is it that rhythm with its base in drives disrupts the symbolic? Freud's detailed argument is clearly not only crucial for Kristeva's points in "Giotto's Joy", but is central to a full understanding of Kristeva's own theory of the subject.

- a) conscious presentation of an object may be split up into word-presentation and thing-presentation,
- b) the Ucs contains the "thing-cathexes" of the object (true, original object-cathexes),
- c) the Pcs occurs when this "thing-presentation" is hypercathexed through being linked with the word-presentations corresponding to it.
- d) These hypercathexes bring about a higher psychical organisation and render it possible for the primary processes to be succeeded by the secondary processes which **are in fact** dominant in the Pcs.

Kristeva concludes that Freud sees a split between perception and thought process. Freud situates word-presentations in a position which is made up of two categories: the perceptual and the verbal. In Freud's text (Kristeva argues) "thing-presentation" seems to principally designate the pressure of the unconscious drive which is linked to or provoked by objects (fort-da). Thought, on the other hand, denotes conscious processes--the various syntactical and logical operations which result from the imposition of repression and which hold "thing-presentations" at bay.

"Word-presentation" is a more difficult term to define. It seems to refer to a complex drive that cathects the symbolic level where instinctual drive is replaced/repressed by the sign representing it in the communicative system. Within word-presentation, the pressure of the drive is first directed at an external object, then becomes a sign in a system and finally may be seen to emanate from the body, from some "biological organ" that articulates the psychical basis of such a sign.

Word-presentations are, like thing-presentations, derived from sense-perceptions. But in fact they are doubly linked to the body in that they represent not only exterior objects denoted by the word and the pressure itself, but also an interior object, internal perception and the eroticisation of the body proper during the act of formulating the word as a symbolic element.

The upshot of this is a bodily "duel" (duel/duality--a deliberate pun) which couples the inside and the outside and the two instinctual pressures linked to both (GJ 217). It is upon this bodily "duel" that repression is set--thereby transforming the complex and heterogeneous pressure into a sign within a communicative system, and finally transforming it into language. From this, Kristeva derives the "triple register". The "triple register" is made up of a pressure marking the inside and outside, another linked to the body proper and a sign. Kristeva works from this Jakobsonian formal apparatus for human language, and proposes that an analogous formal apparatus can be proposed for colour perception. In other words colour may be *seen* first, as an instinctual pressure linked to external visible objects; second, as an instinctual pressure causing the eroticisation of the body proper through visual perception and gesture; and third, as an insertion of this pressure under the impact of censorship as a sign in a system of representation.

Kristeva expands on Freud's ideas by positing a further factor in the development of the "triple register". Because the artistic function is not based on verbal communication, it introduces a pivotal order into the symbolic. This artistic pivot, which Kristeva terms charnière, modifies the symbolic order by energising it with instinctual drives. It modifies "thing-presentations" by cathecting them into

signifying relationships (which the perceptions could not have because their cathexes correspond only to relationships between thing-presentations). In "Giotto's Joy", the charnière therefore is both energetic pressure and an imprint, and it stands between the self's destructive and conservative tendencies.

What emerges most clearly here is Kristeva's growing concern with the irrational and convulsive motions of a language inseparable from corporeal functions. As she puts it, paraphrasing Freud: [the drives' pressure] emanates from the biological organ that articulates the psychic basis of such sign (the vocal apparatus, the body in general [GJ 217]). We have seen how she argues that through colour the subject may escape the confines of any code--whether it is representational, ideological or symbolic--which it, as a conscious subject, accepts. Kristeva believes that through colour, Western painting began to escape the constraints of narrative and perceptual norms, and representation itself. Through colour, meaning is destroyed and death adds its negative force to that meaning in order for the subject to survive.

39. For the details of Kristeva's relationship with Hegelian negativity, see Revolution in Poetic Language 140-46. As I shall demonstrate, Kristeva determines an event which occurs before and within the trajectory of Hegelian negativity, an event that lies between and beneath the psychoanalytic distinction between "desire" and "need". This is the thetic break: separation, scission, rejection (RPL 146).

40. The semiotic chora has been subjected to a number of misreadings. In particular, the Marxist-Feminist Literary Collective associate it with the feminine. Toril Moi voices this corrective in Sexual/Textual Politics: "The fluid motility of the semiotic is indeed associated with the pre-Oedipal phase, and therefore with the pre-Oedipal mother, but Kristeva makes it quite clear that like Freud and Klein she sees the pre-Oedipal mother as a figure that encompasses both masculinity and femininity" (165).

41. For Kristeva's position with respect to Of Grammatology see pages 40-41 of The Revolution in Poetic Language. Here Kristeva writes: "The functioning of

writing [l'écriture], the trace, and the grammè, introduced by Derrida ... points to an essential aspect of the semiotic. Of Grammatology specifies that which escaped Bedeutung. We shall nevertheless keep the term semiotic...." (40).

42. In her work In the Beginning was Love, Kristeva explains that analytic language works with signs that encompass representations of words (close to the linguistic signifier), representations of things (close to the linguistic signified), and representations of affects (labile traces subject to the primary processes of displacement and condensation [which are semiotic, as opposed to symbolic representations inherent to the system of language]) (4).

43. Hjelmslev, according to Kristeva, objects to the distinctions between morphology, vocabulary, and syntax. Even so, she explains, the meaning he posits as coming to existence through form and substance, content and expression, is the meaning of "an unavowed thetic consciousness which reveals its transcendence, even as it conceals it under its substitute: the existing object" (RPL 39).

44. Kristeva is firm about the differences between the semiotic chora and Husserl's hyle. Because the hyle is always functional, signifiable and the projection of consciousness' positionality, it simply does not resemble the semiotic chora. And furthermore, Husserlian "meaning" cannot be allied with the Kristevan "symbolic" or "semiotic" because it denies the possibility of heterogeneity, the possibility of articulation prior to the projection of a subject's positionality. This how Kristeva moves beyond Husserl: the basic impulses of his thought "bear the specific qualities of intentionality", and even though his hyletic data is multiple, it is in fact always centred on the position of the essentially possible individual consciousness (Husserl Ideas 261-62; qtd. in Kristeva RPL 33).

45. It would be facile to say that there are "traces" of Lacan's thought here because at times so much about Lacan is assumed that there seems to be very little, if any, logical connections between Kristeva's sentences and paragraphs. In other words, Kristeva practises Bakhtinian dialogism as she reads and re-writes Lacanian theory,

thus creating an ambivalent discourse. See Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection 280-325.

46. Looking ahead to Kristeva's re-working of this part of her theory of the subject in Tales of Love, it is important to bear in mind the shift from the notion of the psychic object of desire or metonymical displacement, to the psychic object of metaphorical identification.

47. For Kristeva's shift from this position, see section 3.4-3.9 of this chapter, and Tales of Love where Kristeva declares that "[t]he ideal identification with the Symbolic upheld by the Other thus activates speech more than image", and asks: "[D]oesn't the signifying voice, in the final analysis, shape the visible, hence fantasy?" (TL 37).

48. Lacan's critics have been most hostile to his valorisation of the role of the phallus. Because this thesis is not on Lacan but Kristeva, I direct the reader to the following articles which detail some of the anti-Lacanian arguments: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's introduction to Jacques Derrida's Of Grammatology lxii-lxvii; Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology; Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism; Jacqueline Rose's introduction 11, in Feminine Sexuality 44, and Michael Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction 104-112.

49. For Kristeva, then, jouissance has meaning closely related to that given the word by Jacques Lacan in his 1972-3 seminar which, when published in France, bore a photograph of Bernini's sculpture, The Ecstasy of St Theresa, on its cover. In Kristeva's vocabulary, jouissance conveys total joy and, more importantly, through the working of the signifier, implies the presence of meaning, requiring it by going beyond it (see Leon Roudiez's "Introduction", DL 16).

50. Kristeva's definition of language as deriving from the death drive is confirmed in Lacan: "From the approach that we have indicated, the reader should recognise in the metaphor of the return to the inanimate (which Freud attaches to every living body) that margin beyond life that language gives to the human being by virtue of the fact that he speaks, and which is precisely that in which such a being places in

the position of a signifier, not only those parts of his body that are exchangeable, but this body itself" (Écrits: A Selection 103; qtd. in Kristeva RPL 244).

51. Kristeva argues from this that mimesis is the transgression of the thetic and truth. It follows that truth is no longer refers to an object that is identifiable outside of language, but refers instead to an object that can be constructed through the semiotic network but which is nevertheless posited in the symbolic (RPL 51).

52. Kristeva explains: "Through a specific practice which touches upon the very mechanism of language (in Mallarmé, Joyce, Artaud) or the mythic or religious systems of reproduction (Lautréament, Bataille), the "literary avant garde" confronts society--even if only on its fringes--with a subject in process, assailing all of the stases of a unitary subject. The avant-garde thus assails closed ideological systems ... social structures of domination (the state) and accomplishes a revolution which, however distinct from or up to now unknown to the Socialist and Communist revolution, is not its "utopian" or "anarchist" moment, but designates its blindness to the very process which sustains it. This "schizophrenic" process of avant-garde activity introduces a new historicity, a "monumental history" cutting across the myths, rites and symbolic systems of humanity, declaring its detachment from contemporary history ... or following this contemporary history in order to open it onto the process of negativity which propels it....(qtd. in Caws 7).

53. For insight into how Kristeva adapts these two boundaries and uses them in her psychoanalysis, see the paper she prepared for her seminar at the Service de psychiatrie of the Hôpital de la Cité Universitaire in Paris, entitled "Le Vréel" (translated by Sean Hand as "The True Real" in The Kristeva Reader 214-37).

54. John Lechte has drawn parallels between Kristeva and Nietzsche. In his chapter "Art, Love, and Melancholy", he writes: "For art, in both thinkers, is the way to re-birth--although this is present in a much more elaborate form in Kristeva than in Nietzsche; Kristeva, in short, is Nietzsche's heir on this point. While Nietzsche dances on the surface of things, as it were, Kristeva, the analyst, opens up new, complex symbolic domains" (39). At this point it is worth noting a further

interesting parallel between Kristeva's ideas concerning sacrifice (amongst others), and those of another "revolutionary" thinker, Georges Bataille. In fact, the relationship between the two (Bataille and Kristeva), and especially how it becomes apparent in Bataille's Eroticism: Death and Sensuality, seems to me to be an area for useful and interesting research.

55. See Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, and chapter one in particular.

56. Maud Ellman uses the Kristevan notion of "abjection" in an illuminating article on T.S. Eliot's The Waste Land. See "Eliot's Abjection," 178-200, in Abjection, Melancholia and Love. Further interesting research into abjection has been undertaken by Elizabeth Grosz, "The Body of Signification" 80-103, and Victor Burgin, "Geometry and Abjection" 104-23.

57. Kristeva uses the term "explosives" and not the standard English term "plosives".

58. Kristeva is more specific about the crisis in values and its consequences in In the Beginning was Love. In this text she argues that the crisis arises because "God is dead". Christianity and its offering of unconditional love (from a God who is love) can no longer provide for the psychic needs of the individual. To detail fully Kristeva's argument, and the conclusions she draws concerning the relationship between faith and psychoanalysis, would be to exceed the limitations of this project. I refer my reader to the above mentioned text, to the final chapter of Tales of Love, "Extraterrestrials Suffering for Want of Love" 372-83, and to my notes 59 and 60.

59. See the chapter entitled "Credo in Unum Deum", In the Beginning was Love 37-44. For instance, Kristeva argues that "the trinity itself, that crown jewel of theological sophistication, evokes, beyond its specific content and by virtue of the very logic of its articulation, the intricate intertwining of the three aspects of psychic life: the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real" (IBL 43).

60. Kristeva expands on these ideas in In the Beginning was Love. For example, in the chapter entitled "Credence-Credit" she suggests that transference (as a gift of the self) is what Christianity celebrates in divine love. She continues: "God was

the first to love you, God is love: these apothegms reassure the believer of God's permanent generosity and grace. He is given a gift of love without any immediate requirement of merit ... This fusion with God, which, to repeat myself, is more semiotic than symbolic, repairs the wounds of Narcissus, which are scarcely hidden by the triumphs and failures of our desires and enmities" (25).

61. St Bernard explains: "We also love our spirit in carnal fashion when we break it through prayer, with tears, sighs and moans. We love our flesh with a spiritual love when, after we have subjected it to the spirit, we exercise it spiritually for the good and watch with judgement over its conservation" (TL 167).

62. St Bernard claims there are four affects: love, sadness, joy and fear (TL 155). According to him, "[a]ffects, simply called, are found in us naturally, it seems as though they emanate from our own being, what completes them comes from Grace; it is indeed quite certain that grace regulates only what creation has given us, so that virtues are nothing but regulated affects" (qtd. in Kristeva TL 156).

63. Kristeva's argument is extremely difficult to follow here and any kind of summary would be inadequate. I therefore quote her discussion of Lacan and St Thomas in full: "' [T]o the extent that we consider the other's good as our own, because of the union in love, we take delight in the good that, for our sake, befalls to others, mainly to our friends, as we do in our own good.' Would amour sui as kernel of Thomistic love be the angelical treatment of alienation--a recommended paranoia, deemed necessary, and thus necessarily successful? Lacan must have known something about this, since drives, for him, were already signifying. Lacan a Thomist? As Marx was a Hegelian? The one without God, the other without absolute Spirit? To no avail whatsoever, for the sake of the impossible, and with every chance of failure" (TL 182-3).

64. There are two categories of choice of narcissistic object: if Narcissus is a subject, the choice is the result of personal narcissitic reward. If Narcissus is the "other" the choice is due to narcissitic delegation (see Tales of Love, 28).

65. Kristeva suggests that this is a paranoid version of what might lie at the basis of social and symbolic relations --what she goes on to explain through her theory of identification with the pre-Oedipal "father". She claims that it finds its mechanism in Melanie Klein's "scapegoat" theory, where Klein's "projective relationship" (unwittingly) serves as a cornerstone for society and the sacred (TL 23). See also André Green, Narcissisme de vie, narcissisme de mort; Melanie Klein, Envy and Gratitude, and Freud, On Narcissism: An Introduction.

66. This intervention occurs at four months and remains the only explanation of the shift from paranoid to the depressive position. See Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego 105-110 and The Ego and the Id 30-40.

67. See "The True-Real" for Kristeva's discussion of neurosis, which operates through the disavowal of desire and/or the signifier, and psychosis, which proceeds by the disavowal of reality, and demands that the signifier be real in order to be true (222-27).

68. Kristeva makes the point here that when one observes how children learn forms, one understands the extent to which "sensorimotor spontaneity" is of little avail without the help of language (TL 37).

69. Melancholia is the equivalent of a mourning for a partial loss which cannot be symbolised. The individual is that loss, full of despair, weighed down by tears. Kristeva terms the loss of unity with the mother dénégation (translated in "On the melancholic imaginary" by Louise Burchill as "disavowel"). The depressive denies dénégation and consequently he is unable to express his loss of the mother in signs, nor is he able to bring the mother back (MI 109). See also "The True-Real" 225-25, where Kristeva distinguishes between negation (Freud) and dénégation. Briefly, negation is a sign of lifting of repression, as in the statement: "No, I didn't mean that".

70. I am indebted to Tales of Love 1-56; 372-83, and In the Beginning was Love for this compilation.

71. I use the phrase, "play the part", intentionally because Kristeva suggests that the activity between analyst and analysand is a kind of fiction-making. For example, she describes the experience of analysis in In the Beginning was Love thus: "Together, then, we created a world, which to the objective observer (for objective observation is also part of my role as analyst) is completely unreal and illusory, an amalgam of pretenses, games and masks. We are in a sense actors who take up our roles at the beginning of each session" (IBL 17). And it is this imaginary relationship that accommodates the real violence of the analysand's (Paul, the artist) memory--which had been "rendered mortal and lethal by repression" (IBL 17).

72. I exemplify Kristeva's psychoanalytic procedure by means of a synopsis of the following case, "Matthew or the Walkman against Saturn". See Tales of Love 54-56. Matthew, a university student and mathematician retreats sans speech into the musical world of his walkman. His problem is that music not only isolates him from the violence of the aggressive world, but also overpowers him, cutting him off from others, as if he were "surrounded with a chalk circle, invisible and impassable" (TL 54). For Matthew nothing is taboo because nothing has meaning; words mask nothing--the void.

In her analysis of Matthew, Kristeva concentrates her discussion on the walkman and its role in Matthew's life. Whilst Matthew is undergoing treatment, the image of a devouring father is constantly brought up in discussion. Kristeva explains that as she discussed Matthew's father with him, his phobo-obsession with the walkman declined. She argues that the reason for this is that Matthew feared paternal seduction. He therefore remained fixed to his mother who was in any case the key figure in the family. Matthew never ceased from being the phallus to his mother. Music took the place of Matthew's father and became the intermediary between confusion and the "chalk circle". The walkman also provided Matthew with a "mobile identity" over which he had control: "the headphones were a spot that included all other spots, an organized, differentiated infinity that filled him with

consistency and allowed him to face Saturn's devouring but also to have his own destructiveness towards him recognised" (TL 55).

Through the case history of Matthew, Kristeva demonstrates that at the root of obsessional neurosis there is a drifting and an instability that is the consequence of the failure or fragility of primary identification. She sets up a relationship between the creation of a "nut shell" world (as in the case of Matthew's walkman) and the "remaking of the imaginary father", by taking the father's place in her discussions with Matthew, and therefore within language. By doing so, she returns Matthew to the "place" or "moment" where narcissism holds sway, surrounded by abjectness, emptiness and the quest for paternal love.

73. In the mode of Irigaray and Cixous, as Patricia Yaeger points out in Honey-Mad Women: "Cixous's ^wba^ydy bodily language is designated to amuse, to disrupt the status quo, to repolemise our thinking about the relationship between philosophy, writing and physicality...." (209).

74. The similarities between Saussure's practice in his "Anagrams" and Kristeva's is worth noting here. See Jean Starobinski, Words upon Words. Kristeva, however, unlike Saussure, attributes the phonic rhythm to the unconscious processes. This is examined in more detail in chapter two.

75. Kristeva adds: "one can read the sonnet without knowing anything of these referents, letting oneself be seized solely by the phonic and rhythmic coherence that marks a boundary relative to the free associations inspired by each word or proper name. One understands, thereby, that the triumph over melancholy consists as much in the constitution of a symbolic family (ancestor, mythical personage, esoteric community) as in the construction of a symbolic object: the sonnet" (MI 113; emphasis added). Kristeva's examination of names (but not the conclusions she draws concerning their role in the psychic development and the psychic state of the artist) at times strongly resembles Saussure's procedure in the "Anagrams". See also "El Desdichado" 157-63 and "The True-Real" 234-36.

Notes to Chapter Two

1. The phrase "movement towards the mother" is one way of describing language that is connected to pre-linguistic drives. Kristeva also uses the phrase "irruptions from the semiotic chora" to describe the same process. For valuable insight into the listening process, see Roland Barthes, "Listening" in The Responsibility of Forms 245-260. Barthes writes: "Corporality of speech, the voice is located at the articulation of body and discourse, and it is in the interspace that listening's back-and-forth movement might be made" (255).
2. Kristeva enters into dialogue with Jakobson in the essay "The Ethics of Linguistics" published in Desire in Language. I explore the Kristeva-Jakobson connection, together with the Kristeva-Saussure connection, more fully in section three of this chapter.
3. Kristeva makes a similar point in the later work, Tales of Love, where she writes, "If through a writing that is synonymous with the amatory condition--an experience at the limits of the identifiable--the writer can find no other place in the bosom of bourgeois society than that of a refugee at the side on non-productive nobility or the Church, which protects fetishes under the symbolic umbrella, we can only interpret that as an indictment of the that very society rather than the evidence of the writer's error or 'failure'" (TL 339).
4. Jakobson argues that a stable society is only one which can subdue poetic language. See "Ethics of Linguistics" (29-33).
5. Such upheavals of history and the body through language and rhythm are taken up again from a slightly different angle in Kristeva's discussion of Roland Barthes in "How does one speak to Literature". According to Kristeva, Barthes refers more broadly to literature (as opposed to poetic language), and asserts that language functions negatively because it is the initial limit of the possible (107-8).
6. John Lynen, "Three Uses of the Present: The Historian's, the Critic's, and Emily Dickinson's", College English 28 (Nov. 1966) 129, quoted in Vivienne Pollak, The Anxiety of Gender 18. Lynen adds, "She stands apart, as indifferent to

the literary movements of her day as to its great events" (129). My analysis will reveal that I am not in total agreement with the latter observation.

7. I am indebted to Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic 581-650; Patricia Yaeger's Honey-Mad Women 239-48; Margaret Homans' Women Writers and Poetic Identity 162-236, and Cristanne Miller's A Poet's Grammar 1-19; 160-86, for these insights. For other critics who examine Dickinson's language and life, see David Porter, The Art of Emily Dickinson's Early Poetry; Albert Gelpi, Emily Dickinson: The Mind of the Poet; Vivienne Pollak, The Anxiety of Gender; Joanne Feit Diel, Emily Dickinson and the Romantic Imagination, and Helen MacNeil, Emily Dickinson.

8. Toril Moi develops this idea in her introduction to The Kristeva Reader. She writes: "Her [Kristeva's] own personal situation in Paris, and as a woman in an extremely male-dominated environment ... also helped to give shape and edge to her ambitious semiotic project" (3). Moi quotes from the first sentence of Kristeva's Semeiotiké to ratify her observation: "To work in language, to labor in the materiality of that which society regards as a means of contact and understanding, isn't that at one stroke to declare oneself a stranger/foreign [étrangère] to language?" (qtd. in KR 3).

9. All quotations of Dickinson poems are from the 1960 edition of The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson edited by Thomas H. Johnson. Unless specified otherwise, all quotations from Dickinson's letters are from The Letters of Emily Dickinson, ed. Thomas H. Johnson. Hereafter, the letter "L" precedes such citations to differentiate letters from poems. The numbers refer to the chronological numbering in this work.

10. I shall be using the double dash with a space before and after to differentiate between the Dickinsonian dash and those used in my own text. It should be noted here that typescript fails to capture the peculiar quality of these unique marks. I refer my reader to Cristanne Miller, Emily Dickinson: A Poet's Grammar 48,

where a reproduction of a facsimile of Dickinson's poem "He fumbles at your Soul" may be found. I use "dash" for want of a better word.

11. Amberys R. Whittle's article, "Second Opinion: Diagnosing Emily Dickinson", provides a succinct summary of several diagnoses of Dickinson's "illness". See also John Cody, After Great Pain; Vivienne Pollak, The Anxiety of Gender; Robert B. Sewell, The Life of Emily Dickinson; Thomas H. Johnson, Emily Dickinson: An Interpretive Biography; Joseph Lyman, The Lyman Letters: New Light on Emily Dickinson and Her Family; David Higgins, Portrait of Emily Dickinson: The Poet and Her Prose, and Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic 581-650.

12. Vivienne Pollak notes in The Anxiety of Gender: "The extent to which the life of Emily Dickinson can be used to organize the perceptions and experience of her 'supposed person' has been a central concern of Dickinson criticism from its inception" (16).

13. In Letter 368 Dickinson writes: "Mrs Hunt's Poems are stronger than any written by Women since Mrs -- Browning, with the exception of Mrs Lewes -- " (qtd. in Pollak The Anxiety of Gender 17). Robert Weisbuch makes the following observation: "But if Dickinson prized any contemporary writer above all others, it was not Emerson or any other American but George Eliot" (8). He adds, "In her second world, the world of limit and negation, Dickinson resembles the critical author, not the dreamy heroine, of the early chapters of Middlemarch" (8). For insight into Dickinson's relationship with other women writers of the nineteenth century, see Cristanne Miller, "Nineteenth-Century Women Writers," Emily Dickinson: A Poet's Grammar 154-59; Vivienne Pollak, The Anxiety of Gender, 240, and Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic 539-80.

14. Barton Levi St Armand refuses to diagnose Dickinson by ascribing her obsession with death to a "general or particular psychopathology". He sees it rather as "an authentic response to a popular cultural genre" (Emily Dickinson and Her Culture 41-42). Thomas W. Ford in Heaven Beguiles the Lured: Death in the

Poetry of Emily Dickinson (University: Alabama UP, 1966), has this opinion:

"Though there were many possible reasons for her great concern with death, at the heart of her preoccupation was a religious motivation ... Because she was deeply concerned with religious values, she was equally anxious to investigate every attitude toward death. It may be that Man's ability to foresee death is at the core of every religion in general" (18-19; qtd. in Pollak The Anxiety of Gender 191).

Pollak disagrees and claims that Dickinson's preoccupation with death was "an experience of social powerlessness which was both reinforced and assuaged by the religious myths of her culture" (191). Robert Weisbuch has this opinion: "In cultural terms, when Dickinson's second world is presented in its quieter, more resigned aspect, when, for instance, a persona admits to helplessness and calls on a higher power for aid, we find a puritan strain of humility and dependence; while in its angrier, more resentful aspect, when Dickinson posits no god, or a cruel one, we find the ^{ag}gnish of modern spirit, Henry James's 'imagination of disaster'" (9).

See also Inder Nath Kher, The Landscape of Absence.

15. I find no evidence to suggest the contrary in any of the texts on Dickinson that I have read.

16. Vivienne Pollak makes a similar observation in The Anxiety of Gender, but goes on to remark that even though most of Dickinson's poems appear to have been written between 1861-1865, thus coinciding with the American Civil War, Dickinson "has nothing to say about its precipitating causes, its events, or its consequences" (18).

17. See St Armand, The Soul's Society 99-114. St Armand also argues that the war played a role in formulating Dickinson's notion of romance: "Like the Wars of the Roses in Shakespeare's history plays, the American Civil War provided an epic background for the acting out of these intense wars of romance, both public and private" (103). See also pages 84, 100, 186.

18. St Armand argues: "Sometimes she accepted its [popular gospel of consolation] formulas without question; sometimes she subverted them through

exaggeration, burlesque and distortion; sometimes she used them for outright skepticism and satire" (108).

19. Pollak argues in The Anxiety of Gender that "the sexual politics of the Dickinson household replicated a world view in which men initiated actions and women responded to them. Thus Dickinson reacted to a social text that conferred virtue on her rather than power ... through her relationships with women she sought to redress this balance of power. These relationships ... were themselves fraught with the social and erotic tensions that initially caused her to withhold her assent from God the Father and his human surrogates" (29). Further valuable insight into Dickinson's relationship with her father is made by Barbara Mossberg in her work, Emily Dickinson: When a Writer is a Daughter. Mossberg also writes at length about Dickinson's role as letter writer in her family and the differences between mother's and daughter's relations to the written word (see 38-45).

20. Barton Levi St Armand comments: "[T]he type of mortuary poetry that can be found so often in Mary Warner's scrapbook had a profound effect on Emily Dickinson's sensibility. It set standards of taste, provided models of behaviour, refined images of grief, and developed strategies of consolation that the poet would test in her own individual manner" (41-42). See also Cristanne Miller, Emily Dickinson: A Poet's Grammar 154-59.

21. Lydia Hunt Sigourney, for instance, sees no need to question the sincerity of emotion or the fate of her speaking subject. Grief may be "bitter" but it "flees the tomb" and only evokes "sweet tears" because through faith, death loses its sting:

But that bitter grief
Which holds stern vigil o'er the mouldering clay,
Keeping long night-watch with its sullen lamp
Had fled thy tomb, and faith did lift its eye
Full of sweet tears; for when warm tear-drops gush
From the pure memories of a love that wrought
For others happiness, and rose to take
Its own full share of happiness above,
Are they not sweet?

(qtd. in St Armand 49)

22. In the first three stanzas of another poem, 793, Dickinson diminishes grief through absurd analogy--again in contrast to the consolation literature of time. Stanza one claims that "Grief is a Mouse" who "baffles quest". In stanza two, grief is a "Thief" and in the third stanza, he is a "Juggler" as well as a "Gourmand". Each different analogy reveals the poet's awareness of the failure of language to express adequately an emotion such as grief, and so, appropriately, the poet's final claim is that "Best Grief is Tongueless -- ":

.....
 Best Grief is Tongueless -- before He'll tell --
 Burn Him in the Public Square --
 His Ashes -- will
 Possibly -- if they refuse -- How then know --
 Since a Rack couldn't coax a syllable -- now.
 (793)

Here, Dickinson rejects her society's responses to death and dying by attempting to make grief "speak" in a poem that expresses the pain as pain of torture. By emphasising that her analogies are simply approximations of the emotion itself, Dickinson anticipates Lacanian and Kristevan theories of language. For a synopsis of several different theoretical approaches to Emily Dickinson's use of language, see Cristanne Miller's chapter, "The Consent of Language and the Woman Poet", Emily Dickinson: A Poet's Grammar 160-84. See also Robert Weisbuch's chapter "Analogical Poetics" in Emily Dickinson's Poetry 11-39, and Patricia Yaeger's Honey-Mad Women 239-48.

23. For an informative perspective on parody in Dickinson's earlier work, see Vivienne Pollak, "Emily Dickinson's Valentines".

24. See Cristanne Miller's discussion in the chapter "Influences on the poet's language," 141-44. Miller makes particular note of Isaac Watts.

25. All quotations of Isaac Watts' hymns are from the fourth volume of The Works of the Reverend and Learned Isaac Watts D.D., unless otherwise specified. Because each volume is divided into books, I have indicated this further division through numbers in square brackets.

26. Aaron Copland, "Dear March, come in!"; "Going to Heaven!"; "Sleep is Supposed to be,"; "Because I would [sic] not stop for death," Twelve Poems of Emily Dickinson. Inez Wager makes the point that Copland chose two poems of death, two contrasting songs of nature, two of life, and the rest of eternity for the cycle. Wager also observes that the musical form and place in the cycle that Copland gives "Sleep is Supposed to be", expresses his [Copland's] own interpretation of the poem: "eternal, cosmic and eschatological" (35).
27. Cristanne Miller notes that waves of religious revivalism swept New England and Amherst during Dickinson's girlhood and youth, and all her friends, not to mention her family, joined the church (132). See also Margaret Homans, Women Writers and Poetic Identity 169-70, Richard Sewall's account of Dickinson's early anxieties about religion in The Life of Emily Dickinson 356-83, and Richard Chase, Emily Dickinson 18-34.
28. St Armand writes: "Dickinson eagerly appropriated the Arminian heresy of justification through suffering that allowed sentimentalists to counter the Calvinist dogma of predestination, but in doing so she also was forced to confront the new gospel's emphasis on deathbed rituals and their weighty significance" (52).
29. A number of biographical critics delve into Dickinson's poor relationship with her father in terms of her refusal to make a firm religious commitment. See Barbara Mossberg, When a Daughter is a Writer; John Cody, After Great Pain; Barton Levi St Armand, The Soul's Society and Vivienne Pollak, The Anxiety of Gender. Pollak, in keeping with her argument that Dickinson's attitude to God, nature and death were the products of her social experience, goes so far as to suggest that the poet's love for Rev. Charles Wadsworth was based on her ideal image of his sexual and religious redemptive powers. Pollak concludes: "What she needed was a male figure of unimpeachable personal integrity she could adore from afar, whose physical reality would not encroach on the solitude she had elected to perpetuate the spiritual boldness of her strongest self, while controlling the masculine sexual identification close friendship with women activated" (101).

30. Jakobson's definitions are useful to bear in mind here. For him, paranomasia is a "semantic confrontation of phonemically similar words irrespective of any etymological connection [which] plays a considerable role in the life of language" (The Language of Literature 434). He adds, "The pun, or to use a more erudite and perhaps more precise term--paronamasia, reigns over poetic art and whether its rule is absolute or limited, poetry by definition is untranslatable (434). He uses the German word Wahlverwandtschaften for those words which are linked together by both sound and meaning and which manifest "elective affinities" which modify the shape and the content of the vocables involved (435). See also Roman Jakobson and Linda Waugh, The Sound Shape of Language.

31. Although she makes no note of it, Kristeva's thinking is also influenced by Saussure's "Anagrams" here. However, Kristeva does refer to the "Anagrams" in Texte du Roman, where she also enters into dialogue with Lacan through her footnotes. In his introduction to Desire in Language, Leon Roudiez concludes that this "clearly reveal[s] a convergence with Lacan's linking of language to the unconscious" (4).

32. Robert Weisbuch comments: "All her near-1 800 poems are extremely brief lyrics--I doubt that any other poet in the non-haiku world has written so many poems of less than forty lines--and yet even her briefest poems seem unbounded in scope, seem to be taking in, from a particular angle, everything at once" (11).

Vivienne Pollak notes that Jack L. Capps, in Emily Dickinson's Reading: 1836-1886 (Cambridge: Harvard U P, 1966), observes that "several of Dickinson's poems have Byronic echoes" (The Anxiety of Gender 162).

33. Cristanne Miller comments: "Poetic form allows Dickinson greater revelation and more precise expression of feeling than the more common or "Saxon" demands of prose. The poet's distortions of grammar and syntax as well as her use of "jingling" meter, stanzas, and rhyme may provide a purely formal discipline she needs to be able to articulate chaotic or rebellious feeling and thought" (12). For other critics who deal with Dickinson's "rebelliousness" in a similar fashion, see

Margaret Homans, Women Writers and Poetic Identity 160-214; Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic 581-650; Suzanne Juhasz, ed., Feminist Critics Read Emily Dickinson and with reference to women poets in general, Alicia Ostriker, Stealing the Language.

34. I quote from Revolution in Poetic Language to demonstrate what Kristeva means by the disruption of syntax: "[W]hen the semiotic chora disturbs the thetic position by redistributing the signifying order, we note that the denoted object and the syntactic relation are disturbed as well. The denoted object proliferates in a series of connoted objects produced by the transposition of the semiotic chora and the syntactic division (modified-modifier, NP-VP, or the placement of semantic features) is disrupted ... the completion of the grammatical sequence does not take place because the division is not completely rejoined in a NP-VP, modified-modifier, etc. whole: ellipses or syntactic non-completion" (56). See also Language the Unknown, 250-56; 297; 271; 245-46.

35. Miller has her own version of the functions of dashes: "Overall, they create a suggestion that the mind at work in the text is unfettered by normal rules of logical procedure. To spend much time with a mind that allows itself such fascinating stops and shifts is to fall into the habit of allowing oneself to move more freely between topics and thoughts. Dickinson's punctuation, like her poetry, teaches the reader to trust the play of the mind" (51).

36. Cristanne Miller discusses the function of "but" in Emily Dickinson: A Poet's Grammar, both in the chapter on syntax (88-112), and in terms of "women's style" in the section "The Consent of Language and the Woman Poet" (160-186).

37. I am indebted to Daniel Jones, An Outline of English Phonetics, for my understanding and notation of phonemes. I have checked Jones's inscriptions against the standardised IPA form as set out in the Phonetic Symbol Guide in order to ensure that I inscribe the correct American pronunciation. Thus I make no attempt to inscribe Dickinson's nineteenth-century New England dialect, but treat her verses as though they were spoken in Standard American English instead.

Furthermore, as far as phonemic patterns are concerned, pronunciation differences have little effect--the pattern remains the same.

38. In particular, those phonemes which are not regarded as especially frequent in everyday language, and their alternation with the more common phoneme repetitions.

39. For these and some of the other terms I use, I am indebted to David Masson, "Vowel and Consonant Patterns in Poetry" 3-18.

40. For an alternative perspective on the semiotic approach to poetry, see Michael Riffaterre, The Semiotics of Poetry, and the chapter entitled "Sign Production" 23-46, in particular.

41. "Motif" is a term used by David Masson in "Thematic Analysis of Sounds in Poetry". It denotes a "recurrent combination of sounds" (55).

42. For the Kristevan argument concerning narcissism, idealism and narcissistic injuries, I refer the reader to chapter one of this thesis, section 3.2-3.8; chapter one of Tales of Love, "Freud and Love: Treatment and its Discontents" 21-56 as well as the chapter entitled "Narcissus: The New Insanity", in Tales of Love 104-21.

43. Evidence for this is found in a number of Dickinson's letters, but more often biographers refer to Dickinson's 1870 interview with Higginson (see Pollak 51; Sewell 5). Dickinson's self-imposed reclusivity has lead commentators to the conclusion that she was agoraphobic. Pollak, for example, accepts this diagnosis without question. She concludes that Dickinson was "unable to cross the bridge between adolescent and adult sexuality", and so retreated into a physical space that "perpetuated some of the conditions of her childhood" (51). See also Frances Bzowski, "Half Child--Half Heroine" 154-69; Suzanne Juhasz, "Renunciation transformed: the Dickinson heritage: Emily Dickinson and Margaret Atwood" 251-70; Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic 604-5, and Vivienne Pollak, "Thirst and Starvation in Emily Dickinson's Poetry" 356-90.

44. See Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic 539-580, for a detailed discussion of the aesthetics of renunciation adopted by Dickinson and

other women writers of the nineteenth century. See also Amy L. Cherry, "'A Prison gets to be a friend': Sexuality and Tension in the Poems of Emily Dickinson" 9-21; Joan Burbick, "Emily Dickinson and the Economics of Desire" 361-78. For further insight into Emily Dickinson as nun, see Frances Bzowski, "Half Child--Half Heroine"; J. S. Wheatcroft, "Emily Dickinson's White Robes" 135-47, and Paula Bennet, "Emily Dickinson and the Value of Isolation" 40-49.

45. For Kristeva's comments on Baudelaire, see Tales of Love 336-40. As I have already suggested, a number of critics pay attention to Emily Dickinson's "posing". For an interesting interpretation of her child-like pose, see Frances Bzowski, "Half Child--Half Heroine" and Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, A Madwoman in the Attic 622-28. For a consideration of the fairy tale quality of Dickinson's verse, see Clark Griffith, The Long Shadow.

Notes to Chapter Three

1. Jacques Ferrand, A Treatise on Lovesickness 305, hereafter abbreviated TOL.
2. In contrast to poets such as Mallarmé and Dickinson who clearly do use versification to achieve the transposition of translinguistic operations (see chapter two, section 3). It should be emphasised that my use of Kristeva's analysis of Sollers' text to begin this chapter is no indication of any relationship between H and The Wings of the Dove--other than specific "translinguistic" traits, such rhythm and intonation. Indeed, Sollers' work, first published in 1973, indulges in the kind of word-play that was clearly not an option to the writer of narrative at the turn of the century.
3. All quotations from The Wings of the Dove are from the 1984 World's Classics edition, edited and with an introduction by Peter Brooks, hereafter abbreviated WD.
4. William's letter to Henry takes the form of a "review" and is part of a collection of responses--contemporaneous and present--to Henry James's work, which is compiled and edited by Roger Gard. See Roger Gard, The Critical Heritage 300-340, for other responses contemporary to the publication of the 1902 version of The Wings of the Dove.
5. I emphasise toward here because James was clearly not in a position to revolutionise the word (and text) to the extent of a modernist such as James Joyce. My point is that the narrative and stylistic developments that occurred in the late James are, nevertheless, a form of innovation. See also Elissa Greenwald, "I and the Abyss: Transcendental Romance in The Wings of the Dove" 179-22, where she argues that James uses Hawthorne to create a non-realist mode of representation; Sergio Perosa, Henry James and the Experimental Novel, who argues that James's later works engage in "full scale experimentation" (7). See also my note seven for commentators on the later style.
6. To illustrate this development most clearly in my Kristevan analysis, references will be made to one of James's earlier texts The Portrait of a Lady. One of the reasons I have selected this text is because the question of Isabel Archer's origins

has become something of a controversial issue for critics. Oscar Cargill, for example, argues against Leon Edel's claim that Isabel, like Milly Theale, was motivated by Minnie Temple. See Cargill, The Novels of Henry James 79-80.

7. For other critics who have approached The Wings of the Dove through a discussion of the style, or identify innovation or experimentation in the style, see Seymour Chatman, The Later Style of Henry James; Kathleen Komar, "Language and Character Delineation in The Wings of the Dove" 471-87; Laurence Holland, The Expense of Vision 289-90; Robert Scholes and Robert Kellog, The Nature of Narrative 270-91 and Ian Watt, "The First Paragraph of The Ambassadors: An Explication" 269-70. Royal Gettman, in "Henry James' Revision of The American", writes of James's search for "specific, the concrete, the explicit ... the right word" (279).

8. See Henry James, Notes of a Son and Brother 453-515, Leon Edel, The Untried Years 331-2, and Jean Kimball, "The Abyss and The Wings of the Dove: The Image as Revelation" 282-290.

9. For further valuable insight into the literary origins of the topos, and those of the ancient Greek and Roman authors in particular, see the chapter entitled "Love Melancholy as a Medical Idea in the Ancient World" in A Treatise on Lovesickness 39-58.

10. Herein lay the challenge for the physician who sought to exercise his professional control over the passions of the soul: only by demonstrating material causes, could he assert his prerogative. One such solution was to claim that the malady of lovesickness was hereditary (the nineteenth-century medical materialists also demonstrated this propensity). Another was to associate erotic love with other states of mania which arose entirely from the body. The third was to explain love as a disease of the blood brought on by alien and poisonous spirits or vapors of the blood that entered through the eyes (TOL 3-5).

11. Given Kristeva's own use of the term chora from the Plato's Timaeus, it is worth noting here that this work is also believed to be one of Ferrand's ancient sources (see TOL 175-77).
12. However, Ferrand makes no mention of the form of melancholy that characterises philosophers and poets. Incessant thinking was believed to bring about material alternations within the brain. The natural condition conducive to creating men of deep thought was a form of mixed melancholy "more dry than moist, but with a little blood, and without excrements in the brain" (TOL 195). See also Jourdain Guibelet, Trois discours philosophiques (1603). The principle source on the scholar's melancholy is Marsilio Ficino, De vita libri tres, written ca. 1480. More recent texts which examine erotic love as a sickness are, amongst others, Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vols. 1 and 3 in particular; Lawrence Babb, The Elizabethan Malady, and Denis de Rougement, The Myths of Love.
13. See George Drinka, The Birth of Neurosis 17-73. For this extremely brief historical overview, I am also indebted to the following works: Ilza Veith, Hysteria: The History of a Disease; F. Alexander and S. Selesnick, The History of Psychiatry; Sir William Hale-White, Great Doctors of the Nineteenth Century.
14. This is an area for further research. One text that could be included in a discussion here would be Laclos' Les liaisons dangereuses, with particular reference to the demise of the Marquise de Merteuil.
15. Alice James suffered from a series of fits in 1878, and in 1883 she was placed in a Boston hospital for the nervous but not insane, where she underwent a modified version of the then popular rest cure. In 1884 she saw a Russian emigré physician who recommended exercise. This also failed (see Drinka 316-17). William was plagued with eye weakness and indigestion, as well as backaches, general weaknesses and depression (Drinka 279). Henry's "obscure hurt" and his back-ache has generated much critical speculation. See, for example, Jean Kimball, "The Abyss and The Wings of the Dove" and Leon Edel, Henry James: The Treacherous Years.

16. See lectures 14,15 entitled "The Value of Saintliness" 262-300, lecture 1, "Religion and Neurology" 11-29, and lectures 6,7, "The Sick Soul" 109-138, in particular.
17. It must be stressed at this point that this thesis makes no attempt to discuss the influence of mysticism in The Wings of the Dove, nor to prove any point about Henry James's own religious beliefs. Indeed, Auchard makes the valid point that there "may be many presences on the altars of the living and the dead in Henry James, but not one of them feels much like a deity" (96).
18. Further ratification of Henry James's understanding of "lovesickness" as a state of mind is found in the following points originally made by Auchard. The first concerns Jean Pierrot, a nineteenth-century writer renowned for his work on Mysticism and Catholicism. Pierrot, investigating the work of the avant-garde of the late nineteenth century, discovers a subtle shift back to Mother Church in the form of a "diffuse nostalgia for the supernatural" (95). Pierrot argues that in a world where "faith has gone" the artist is no longer satisfied with a universe reduced solely to the interplay of purely material and physical forces. In his examination of the work of Baudelaire, Pierrot discovers an attitude to woman which he sees as a "combination of quasi-religious worship and a sensual urge toward profanation" (qtd. in Auchard 96). Auchard also makes reference to the French writer and novelist Paul Bourget who was one of the first of the symbolist circle to reconcile himself with some old ecclesiastical impulses. Bourget published a work entitled Essais de psychologie contemporaine which argued that the pervasive modern sadness brings man close to a religious sensibility that he can no longer accept" (qtd. in Auchard 95). Bourget also makes the observation that although in time faith would depart, mysticism, even when expelled from the intelligence, would "linger in the sensations" (95). Bourget was in fact both friend and intellectual inspiration to James. James's only comment on Bourget's work, Essais de Psychology Contemporaine, was that it was "almost brilliant" (95).

19. See George Drinka, The Birth of Neurosis; Fielding Garrison, History of Neurology and F. Alexander and S. Selesnick, The History of Psychiatry.
20. For a different procedure with respect to the innovation in the later work--one which nevertheless draws similar conclusions--see Donna Przybylowicz, Desire and Repression 1-38. Przybylowicz's reading is heavily Lacanian. For example, she argues that the late works of James "exhibit the predominance of impressionist and expressionist narrative forms" as they examine "the dialectic between conscious demand and unconscious desire" (21).
21. All quotations from A Portrait of a Lady are from the 1978 Penguin edition, hereafter abbreviated PL.
22. Oscar Cargill claims that Osmond is Henry James's most completely evil character (87). I suggest that there are a number of interesting parallels between Osmond and Lionel Croy. For instance, Osmond's aestheticisation of Isabel, and Croy's perception of Kate's "beautiful appearance" which gives her a "tangible value" (WD 61). This is an area for further research for Jamesian critics.
23. James published a story in 1884 which he entitled "Georgina's Reasons". In this story two women bear the names that James later used in The Wings of the Dove, that is, Mildred Theory (Milly Theale) and her sister Kate (Kate Croy). Because of her sister's impending death, Kate has to suspend her love for a handsome naval officer, Raymond Benyon (who became Merton Densher) who is secretly married to a woman in New York named Georgina. Georgina, who has borne Benyon's child, remarries leaving Benyon free to marry Kate, but he is unable to replicate the bigamy of his wife and sails away for another long voyage. Once again, James arranges his story leaving his uncomfortable hero unmarried and his heroine suspended in a void (Edel The Untried Years 113).
24. In his chapter, "The Morality of Deceit: The Representation of Historical Process in The Wings of the Dove", Doran Larson focuses on the novelistic plot as "some manner of breakdown in the circulation of values, meanings or signs, which must be rectified or covered over" (1). His argument is that The Wings of the

Dove--unlike the other texts he examines, Lord Jim and Pamela, where resolution of the plot occurs as a structuring of relationships originally threatened--constitutes a break, a "new manner of resolution" (1). Larson attempts to demonstrate that in The Wings of the Dove the narrative configuration is one which progresses and shapes itself in alterity.

25. James made it very clear that he meant to keep Milly's death out of The Wings of the Dove. His intentions are discussed in the preface (xxxii-iv).

26. See Donna Przybylowicz's work, Desire and Repression, for a valuable discussion of What Maisie Knew 25-35, to whom I am indebted for some of my comparative observations. See also Dorrit Cohen, Transparent Minds, 158-67; 21-57.

27. It is noteworthy that both texts portray (in different ways) the corrupting effects of wealth. In The Portrait of the Lady the destructive consequences of greed are played out through the machiavellian plottings of Mme. Merle and Osmond.

Isabel's inheritance provides her with freedom, but it also makes her an object of value, open to exploitation. There is a similar process of exchange at the centre of The Wings of the Dove, but it is a more complex one. Milly Theale is like Isabel Archer in that she is immensely wealthy and therefore an object of material value, but unlike Isabel, she is also "stricken and strange" (WD 75).

28.

Chatman) that the increase in metaphor makes the later James more concrete (175). See also Sidney J. Krause, "James's Revisions of the Style of The Portrait of a Lady" 68-73, and John Carlos Rowe, "The Symbolization of Milly Theale: Henry James's The Wings of the Dove" 147-53.

31. For a further and different perspective on metaphor, see I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric; Max Black, Models and Metaphors, and Roman Jakobson, Fundamentals of Language.

32. The mystery of the Father is enhanced by the "veiling" of his illness (with the implication that it can neither be understood nor cured). He is ill here and ill in the closing pages of the book. His illness appears to be mental rather than physical (like Milly's) for the symptom's are ambiguous; Kate offers the information that he lies in bed and weeps.

33. By way of contrast, Milly Theale's relatively unsophisticated use of language (not to mention her "otherness") sets her apart from Kate and her father, and together with James's semiotic presentation of her, aligns her with the "truth".

34. Most critics have found it difficult to understand how Kate is attracted to Densher at all. For other interpretations of Kate Croy and Densher, see Kathleen Komar, "Language and Character Delineation in The Wings of the Dove, 471-89; Oscar Cargill, The Novels of Henry James; 338-82; Nicola Bradbury, The Later Novels of Henry James; Doran Larson, "The Morality of Deceit in The Wings of the Dove and Charles Thomas Samuels, The Ambiguity of Henry James 61.

35. As I have already mentioned, Kate's duty is also connected to her relationship with her Aunt Maud, her mother's sister. Her desire to "go with her father" is thus also a rejection of this devouring mother figure. For Kristeva's theoretical perspective, see About Chinese Women 148-58.

36. Komar claims that this has a nursery-rhyme effect. Without disagreeing with her, I refer the reader back to the Dickinson section where I make a similar, but Kristevan point about "nursery rhyme" language, as "child-speak". Virginia C. Fowler, in her article "Milly Theale's Malady of Self", reasons that Milly is

incapable of love, and prefers what she calls "simple cash relationships" with characters such as Eugenio and Sir Luke Strett (40). My Kristevan approach results in a different reading (see chapter three, section 6). For other critics views on Milly Theale see Nicola Bradbury, The Later Novels of Henry James 56-104; Oscar Cargill, The Novels of Henry James 338-82; John Auchard, Silence in Henry James 84-109; Elissa Greenwald, "I and Abyss: Transcendental Romance in The Wings of the Dove" 177-92 and Doran Larson, "The Morality of Deceit in The Wings of the Dove".

37. As I mentioned in section 2, Milly Theale has symptoms which associate her with the Angelic Invalid Myth. The symptoms of such sufferers were "delicateness, sensitivity and nervousness" and a "failure to partake in life, reclusion." See George Drinka, Myth, Malady and the Victorians.

38. Kristeva's reading of the quietist mystic Jeanne Guyon, in the chapter entitled "A Pure Silence: The Perfection of Jeanne Guyon" in Tales of Love, 297-317 is particularly relevant to this discussion of Milly Theale.

39. Henry James had a similarly unproductive encounter with a physician. Jean Kimball remarks, "The young Henry James consulted 'a great surgeon' for an answer to his 'less and less bearable' affliction. The Boston surgeon informed James that there was nothing matter with him and James concluded that 'the graceful course ... was to behave as if the assurance was true'" (287).

40. It remains for me to discuss the fundamental comportement, the continuity between James's art and his life. Because, in the The Wings of the Dove, James subordinates meaning for rhythm and metaphor, he is a subject in fusion. Such a precarious position in the symbolic puts the individual's identity at risk. James needs, in his life, to formulate a way of coping with the loss of coherent identity which his fiction precipitates.

Kristeva argues that any imaginary work of art is executed with a degree of detachment. Dostoevsky's excessive gambling, as an equivalent to an evacuation of drive energy, she believes, was his precondition for the requisite detachment. What

was Henry James's? Who was Henry James? There are three Kristevan points to be made here.

Unlike the woman artist, whose identity is most dangerously at risk when the father is no longer "calling the tune", and language is being "torn apart by rhythm" (ACW 158), the male artist can use a woman as the axis for sacred or farce.

Kristeva explains:

[Through her he makes] himself known, to lean on her and be guided by her through the social labyrinth, though not without his own occasional ironic commentary. Méry-Laurent for Mallarmé, Madame Strauss for "little Marcel", Miss Weaver for Joyce, the series of fiancées taken by Kafka (AWC 158)

So too Henry James. In life he constantly idealised and almost worshipped younger women such as Minnie Temple, as Leon Edel reports:

In life he required the friendship of protective and sheltering females, to whom he could be kind and attentive, but who gave him everything and seemed satisfied that he be "kind" in return (Henry James: The Master 113)

Thus, part of James's protection against the mother was to regard "woman" as sacred--in art and in life. He could never bring himself to marry. Furthermore, it has been suggested that James fled to Europe to surround himself with art and beauty and to escape an increasingly materialistic America. By doing so, he detached himself from the realities of a corrupt world, and virtually exiled himself from his mother country.

Finally, James preferred the company of intellectuals. Biographers record that he not only enjoyed friendships with Edmund Gosse, and Stephen Crane, that he corresponded with Joseph Conrad, and that he enjoyed visits by literati such as H.G. Wells and, of course, his brother William at Lamb House. One biographer has even remarked that in his later years, James became increasingly social (Moore 105). Fellow writers have also noted that James preferred the company of intelligent society women, such as Edith Wharton.

Thus, if there is comportement between James's life and his work, it is that his life was aesthetic. It was an appearance, an artistic haven over which he was the

master, and into which he could escape from what he clearly saw as a fatuous and cheap world outside.

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