Contesting ‘Xenophobia’ through Civic Education: Explorations with ARESTA in Khayelitsha

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Abstract

This thesis suggests that out of the work of ARESTA, a new notion of citizenship and belonging was developed, as a result of their workshops. This notion is furthermore articulated in various communities. In this notion, citizenship is no longer linked to indigeneity, but rather escaping war and hardship, the need to work, and place of work. It is further justified by the concept of Pan-Africanism and a common humanity. Contradictions in the findings of the thesis point to the limitations of this workshop and the importance of broader societal issues. This thesis concludes that ARESTA’s intervention makes a significant contribution in opposing xenophobia, in the light of what is possible in South Africa today. However, its work is ameliorative rather than radical structural change, what may be needed is far more elusive at present.
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Introduction

I began a six-month internship at the UNHCR Cape Town Field Office in June 2015. This sparked my already existing interest in migration and the challenges it brings. Early on the internship provided me with insights, interests and questions. I was exposed to the daily challenges that refugees face through short and long face to face interviews as well as through email correspondence. Common key themes that came up were: problems with the Department of Home Affairs and documentation, difficulty finding employment, discrimination, violence and crime. Refugees and asylum seekers reported numerous robberies of their shops and physical attacks on their persons, some being purely motivated by crime, and others involved xenophobic sentiments and motives.

Through conversation with a colleague I came to know about the Peace Ambassadors and Peace Monitors campaign, an initiative carried out by the Agency for Refugee Education Skills Training and Advocacy (ARESTA) but supported and partly funded by the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). It involves residents of Cape Town’s townships, high school students and adults, being taught about refugees and asylum seekers in order to change mind-sets and prevent xenophobic outbreaks. Indeed, my colleague was of the opinion that these workshops were the reason that the 2015 outbreak of xenophobic attacks in Durban and Gauteng did not reach Cape Town. I became intrigued about these ‘peace ambassadors’ and ‘peace monitors’. I was curious as to how and whether they prevented violence against foreign nationals in townships and whether they aided integration and social cohesion. Thinking along these lines brought me to the focus of my research.

The Agency for Refugee Education, Skills Training & Advocacy (ARESTA) is a Cape Town based Non-profit Organization. They provide education and skills training to refugees, asylum seekers and South Africans, in order for them to develop their own strengths and become self-reliant. They claim to empower South Africans and foreign nationals on social cohesion, mediation and peace building through workshops in communities previously affected by ‘xenophobic violence’. ARESTA’s vision is that refugees are integrated in South African society and experience full democratic rights and benefits (http://www.aresta.org.za/welcome-to-aresta).
An extensive amount of literature has been written on ‘xenophobia’ and ‘xenophobic’ attacks on mostly African (there have been tensions with Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Chinese foreign nationals) foreign nationals. These studies range from documenting the ways in which African foreign nationals experience everyday discrimination (Dodson, 2010; Morris, 1998; Warner & Finchilescu, 2003); to surveys on South Africans’ views of African foreigners (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010); to the large-scale xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals that gripped the nation in 2008 and 2015 (Steinberg, 2008; Hall, 2015). Attempts have also been made to provide explanations for the xenophobic climate in post-Apartheid South Africa (Neocosmos, 2006; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Landau, 2010; Harris, 2002). However, not a lot of literature exists on how to contest everyday xenophobia and prevent large-scale attacks. This is where this thesis enters. In the midst of this literature on xenophobia, such as its explanation or causes, are suggestions for how we may combat xenophobia against African foreign nationals.

Many studies on xenophobia in South Africa, besides surveys, investigate it from the experiences and voices of foreign nationals or refugees. My thesis departs from this point and looks at xenophobia through the perspective of South Africans, their voices and perceptions. I assess the consequences of civic education carried out by ARESTA in the communities enumerated by ward 97 in Khayelitsha, and the communities inhabited by the peace ambassadors. This is civic education about refugees and asylum seekers, and about conflict resolution through their ‘social cohesion’ department, with one of the aims being to contest xenophobia.

One advantage of my thesis is that it looks at how South Africans view refugees, asylum seekers and other African foreign nationals. Another advantage is that it looks at an attempt by an organization to build active citizenship and to look at the dynamics in a host community, instead of only looking at the post-conflict protection of African foreign nationals.

The significance of my study is that it deals with an important and very current issue. It is clear that in the present period, migration is here to stay. Foreign nationals from the African continent will continue to migrate to South Africa in the near future. Xenophobic attitudes and practices are prevalent and well documented in society. On
two occasions there has been campaigns of widespread attacks across the country on African foreign nationals. How to prevent attacks of this nature is critical, as well how to deal with the smaller and more common everyday experiences of xenophobia. This talks to changing mind-sets, behaviours, preventing violence and issues of social cohesion and integration.

This thesis begins with a review of the literature addressing: the existence of ‘xenophobia’ against African foreign nationals in South Africa; the experience of subtle forms of everyday discrimination; explanations for xenophobia; and finally searches for ways to contest xenophobia implicit in the literature. The review is followed by the methods section, which outlines the case study design, methods of data collection and analysis, and includes the research question. Next is the findings section, followed by the analysis and concluding remarks.

This thesis poses the following questions: Does the work of ARESTA go far enough to contribute to lasting changes in attitudes and a sense of citizenship in the community? How much ‘change’ is possible? According to which paradigm is it possible?
Literature Review

Xenophobic Attitudes

In South Africa, xenophobic attitudes are prevalent and widely held amongst citizens and depicted in the media. Research has shown that South Africans of all demographic profiles hold xenophobic attitudes (Danso & McDonald, 2001:116). A national attitudinal survey carried out by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) in 2008 presents telling results. 21% of respondents believe that one of the two reasons why African foreign nationals come to South Africa is to commit crime. Two-thirds believe that foreign nationals ‘use up’ resources, take jobs and commit crimes. 75% agree with deporting any foreign national not contributing economically to the country; 61% agree with deporting any ‘foreigner’ with HIV/AIDS and a half support the deportation of all migrants, including those who have ‘legal’ status. 72% think it should be compulsory for foreign nationals to carry identification with them at all times. 30% of respondents were willing to ‘take action’ to prevent foreign nationals from moving into their area, 16% noted that they would combine with others to ‘force them to leave’ and 9% stated that they would use violence (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010: 216-217).

The media also plays a role in shaping the discourse around African foreign nationals, as well as reinforcing the attitudes of its followers. Danso and McDonald’s (2001) quantitative analysis of English-based newspaper clippings related to migration from 1994 to 1998 provides telling insights. Their analysis characterizes the (English) print media as

“largely ‘unanalytical’ in its coverage of migration issues (70%), with another third (33%) of the coverage being blatantly anti-immigrant. This latter figure… increases substantially when one considers the more subtle forms of discrimination and xenophobia that permeate the headlines and text of newspaper reports on the subject” (122-123).

Furthermore, this negativity towards foreign nationals cannot be sufficiently balanced out by ‘pro-immigration’ articles because of a polarization of analysis, with little space for the debate of different interpretations around migration issues (Danso & McDonald, 2001:123). Danso and McDonald (2001:124) find evidence of the stereotyping of migrants in print media. The most common three stereotypes are:
‘migrants as job stealers’, ‘migrants as criminals’ and ‘migrants as ‘illegals’. Furthermore, the use of sensational language and headlines is common, as well as the questionable use of statistics on the number of undocumented migrants in the South Africa (124).

**Everyday Discrimination**

A large body of research depicts the everyday experiences of xenophobia via the stories of foreign nationals. Xenophobia and the discrimination of African foreign nationals conjures up images of the 2008 and 2015 attacks, its publicity in the media and the popular reaction seen on social network sites such as Facebook. However, it has been widely documented that African foreign nationals experience xenophobia and discrimination in their daily lives (Dodson, 2010; Morris, 1998; Warner & Finchilescu, 2003), in forms that involve physical violence but also in those that are more subtle. Studies from different South African cities (Dodson, 2010; Morris, 1998; Warner & Finchilescu, 2003) found foreign nationals experiencing similar forms of discrimination. Foreign nationals feel unwelcome amongst their South African communities. They commonly cite being asked where they are from and when they will they be returning to their country of origin. They are called ‘makwerekwere’, a derogatory phrase for foreigners who speak a language which is unintelligible. Respondents often cite that once they cannot speak a host community’s language such as isiXhosa, people no longer make the effort to communicate with them. Various stereotypes are accorded to them, common ones being that they are stealing South Africans’ jobs and that the men are commandeering their women. Nigerians generate the worst stereotypes and are said to be involved in all sorts of crime, such as drug peddling (Warner & Finchilescu, 2003)

Foreign nationals are commonly harassed and receive ill treatment from the police, being overzealously checked for their papers and at times having them torn up. They also commonly experience harsh treatment from employees at Home Affairs, with employees being unwilling to help them or dishing out discriminatory remarks. Finally, foreign nationals report being discriminated against in their search for employment and in their attempts to continue their studies. They feel that are not able to gain employment for the sole factor that they are foreign (Dodson, 2010; Morris, 1998; Warner & Finchilescu 2003).
Although studies have shown that all demographic profiles in South Africa harbour xenophobic attitudes (Danso & McDonald, 2001:116), the common trend is that the perpetrators of xenophobic and discriminatory acts are generally South African black men. In both Morris (1998) and Warner and Finchilescu (2003), migrants point out that they find black South Africans and especially black men to be the most hostile. Morris (1998:1128) indicates that because of the spatial and class locations of most African foreign nationals, the South Africans that they most interact with are black South Africans.

**Xenophobic Attacks**

Xenophobia and attacks on African foreign nationals are not a new phenomenon and have been recorded as far back as 1994 (Morris, 1998: 1120). In-between the 11th and 26th of May 2008, nationwide xenophobic attacks gripped the nation. The attacks are believed to have started in Alexandra and spread from there. 62 people, the majority being foreign nationals, were killed by mobs in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and elsewhere (Steinberg, 2008:1-2). An additional 670 people were wounded, dozens reported rape, and thousands were verbally abused. Furthermore, more than 100 000 foreign nationals were displaced (Landau, 2008:2).

Between the xenophobic attacks of 2008 and April 2015, 350 foreign nationals were killed in what could be described as ‘xenophobic attacks’ (Hall, 2015: 73). In April 2015 there was a “flare-up of anti-foreigner rioting and killings” (71), where 7 foreign nationals were murdered. The victims were from Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somali, the DRC and Zimbabwe. Foreign nationals were targeted during rioting in Durban’s central business district, and in Johannesburg a week later. The Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini was credited by the South African media for igniting the attacks, with his comments in a speech referring to foreign nationals in South Africa as “lice” who should be “plucked out and left in the sun” (Hall, 2015: 72).

**Explanations of Xenophobia**

Explanations of xenophobia and the 2008 xenophobic attacks can generally be divided along six axes. However, one author may fall into more than one axis and some axes themselves may be interrelated (Dodson, 2010:5). The first axis consists of
economic and material explanations. This refers to the accusations against foreign nationals that they steal jobs and housing from South Africans, as well as a resentment from tax payers that tax money goes to looking after foreign nationals. The second axis refers to the process of constructing a new national identity after 1994. In the process of attempting to create and unify a non-racial nation, an ‘other’ was created. For an ‘us’ to exist, there was the need for an ‘other’. The third axis argues that post-1994, South Africans were exposed to a greater number of African migrants, and from a greater number of countries, some of which South Africans had not been exposed to before. This increased contact between South Africans and African foreign nationals created negative stereotypes of African foreign nationals by South Africans and vice versa. The fourth axis is political in nature and relates to a newly acquired citizenship, and the need to protect it and the rights and entitlements that come with it from outsiders. The fifth axis is also political, and relates to a lack of political leadership. There is a production and reproduction of xenophobic attitudes by politicians, which may be seen in their behaviour and attitudes. However, this may also be seen as too strong a leadership in the wrong direction. The sixth axis is one of denial, a complete denial of xenophobia. This is best exemplified by the responses by Mbeki in 2008, Zuma in 2015 and many official government responses. However, this position has also been taken up by academics, such as the Council of Anthropology Southern Africa in response to the xenophobic attacks of 2008 (Dodson, 2010:5-9).

Gelb (2008:79-80) argues that the violence which took place in the 2008 xenophobic attacks is a result of inequality. It is not just about being poor, but rather a sense of unfairness arising from inequality, of being discriminated against. This creates hostility to those better off or who are deemed to have received preferential treatment. Similarly, Pillay (2008:94) argues that “class inequality as a systemic problem of uneven development” led to the 2008 violence, with foreign nationals as scapegoats. Gelb and Pillay’s explanations would fall under the first axis, economic and material explanations.

Referring to Steve Biko, Mngxitama (2008:200) addresses the damaged black psyche. He argues that the creation of the “beastly black” is directly linked to the South African socio-economic system. He refers to the treatment of black people under colonization, and how in post-apartheid South Africa, black people are fighting over
the “crumbs” in a neo-apartheid state managed by elites. He refers to the structural violence experienced by the majority of black South Africans. Referring to Fanon, he argues that the problem being faced by black South Africans is both psychological and a matter of livelihoods (Mngxitama, 2008:204). Mngxitama’s explanation would fall under the first axis, material and economic explanations, with an additional element of the wounded psyche.

Gibson (2008:704-5) argues that the xenophobic attacks in 2008 on foreign nationals were both a result of pauperization and the state’s silencing of alternatives, oppositional discourses from the poor, where the poor organize and make their own demands on the state. Gibson gives an example of the Harry Gwala settlement, where after struggling against forced removals, the organization faced severe repression from the state. In 2006, resistance to further removals was met with force by the police. Then in 2008 ‘mobs’ of citizens burnt down shacks belonging to people from Mozambique. In contrast, in many but not all areas where there were poor militant organizations in conflict with the state, there were no attacks in 2008.

Gibson (2008:703) conducts a Fanonian analysis, addressing the “primary economics” of the new South Africa. Here the poor are informed that foreign nationals are the cause of the dire situation of the country. The violence of the lived experience of the poor is channelled inward. Deflected from the real sources of suffering and needing to be expressed, the anger is released onto African foreign nationals, as “black on black violence”. Xenophobia therefore repeats the psychological economy of violence and poverty, as Fanon found in his analysis of colonial and postcolonial repression.

Morris (1998) accounts for xenophobia by referring to the increased amount of African migrants to South Africa post-1994, coming from an increasing number of countries. South Africans were now exposed to Africans from more countries than before, north of Southern Africa. These migrants stand out due to their appearance and physical traits, but they are also culturally different. The exposure of a previously isolated South Africa to an increasing amount of migrants can explain some of the xenophobic attitudes amongst South Africans. Morris (1998) also accounts for xenophobia by referring to the economic and material difficulties experienced by the
majority of South Africans, such as poverty and unemployment. Therefore, looking at Dodson’s (2010) axes, Morris (1998) would fall into the first and third axes.

Steinberg (2008) conducted investigations into the 2008 xenophobic attacks in different parts of Gauteng where the violence occurred. He found that conflicts between South Africans, part party-political and part old ethnic tensions, influenced the atmosphere, which led to the eventual xenophobic attacks. Steinberg argues that these areas were characterized by struggles for state patronage. Individuals saw the national economy as constituting a finite amount of resources that could be accessed through patrons. As resources are finite, any resources acquired by foreign nationals were resources they could not acquire. Furthermore, the presence of African foreigners making money without access to state patronage disturbed some South Africans’ notion of their relationship with the state. This explanation may fall into Dodson’s (2010) fifth axis, bad political leadership.

Similarly, Landau (2009:106) notes that during the 2008 xenophobic attacks, local political actors took advantage of the feeling of their communities, and in removing unwanted foreigners from their communities they gained more trust, legitimacy, revenue and clients. Local political groups and individuals were involved in organizing attacks, in order to gain control of local state authority for political and economic gain (105).

Landau (2010:1) argues that a history of efforts by the South African state to control physical and political space has created two ‘demons’ within South African society. The first refers to the construction of an enemy within, threatening ‘outsiders’ who are difficult to exclude spatially. The second ‘demon’ is a South African society which is prepared to get rid of outsiders in order to realize the post-apartheid dream, and who find it important to control the movement of foreigners, in order to protect South Africa’s security, prosperity and nation building. In this context, the state is responsible for producing the conditions for xenophobic violence and is unable to come up with solutions to bring an end to it (3).

For Landau (2010:17), xenophobic violence is about more than just the resurgence of nationalism, but must rather be seen in how insiders come to view the free movement
of outsiders as a threat that needs to be neutralized. The author highlights two features begun in colonial and apartheid South Africa, but continue to resonate in post-apartheid South Africa, and work to create the ‘demonized alien’. The first is the labelling of unregulated and regulated mobility as detrimental to the economic and psychical well-being of insiders, and national achievement. The second feature is the use of cultural and geographic markers of origin to designate citizenship (Landau, 2010:8). Key to this is how the state uses legal, extra-legal and coercive measures to exclude African foreign nationals (9). Furthermore, Landau (2010:17) argues that although some incidents of violence may be driven by competition or criminality, the social space in which these attacks happen are based on a set of norms, values and bureaucratic practices. Landau’s explanation would loosely fit under Dodson’s (2010) fourth axis, the need to protect a newly acquired citizenship.

Nyamnjoh (2006) argues that xenophobia in South Africa needs to be seen in the light of pressure under increased globalisation and neo-liberalism. Accordingly, increased globalisation, with the absence of restitution under apartheid, has increased the distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. This is in a context where there is a hierarchy of citizenship by race, class, gender, and geography, and where the majority of the black population have not been granted access to real benefits of citizenship. The hierarchy of citizenship and lack of access to resources for the majority, in conjunction with finite resources, means that it is in the interest of citizens to police their borders and protect the small amount of resources that they are entitled to. Nyamnjoh’s explanation would fit under Dodson’s (2010) fourth axis, the need to protect a newly acquired citizenship.

Harris (2002:6-7) explains xenophobic violence by situating it within South Africa’s transition for a racist past to a nationalist future. He specifically focuses on the role of institutions, such as the media, in creating specific images of foreign Africans. Furthermore, he argues that xenophobia needs to be contextualized in the context of a culture of violence in South Africa (12). Finally, Harris argues that xenophobia is not a pathology, as it is often represented, but rather a core component of the ‘New South African’ nation (14). Harris’s explanation would fit under Dodson’s (2010) second axis, constructing a new South African identity, and additionally a culture of violence in South Africa.
Another explanation of xenophobic violence is that of “violent entrepreneurship”. In the context of poor communities with high levels of violence and crime, a great deal of attacks on spaza shops run by foreign nationals can be explained by “violent entrepreneurship”, where businesses make use of violence to further their gains and to deal with competition. Charman and Piper (2012) look at violence against both local and Somali run spaza shops in Delft. They find that xenophobic sentiments alone cannot explain the violence. Rather a “violent entrepreneurship” is characteristic of the violence. There are systems of patronage where business owners find protection from powerful landlords and are thus less vulnerable. Gangsters acquire protection fees from shop owners to look out for their businesses and to refrain from robbing it. Furthermore, spaza shop-owners engage in violence against other shop owners in order to push out the competition. Although this has largely been directed at Somali businessmen by South Africans, there have also been cases of intra foreign national conflict. Therefore, they find that although xenophobic sentiments may exist, it is not sufficient to explain the violence against Somali-run spaza shops, and that such violence must be seen in the context of criminal activities and economic competition, through a “violent entrepreneurship” (Charman & Piper, 2012). This argument is similar to Dodson’s (2010) sixth axis of denial (and would lend support to it), where those who attack foreigners are seen as criminal elements. However, it is more sophisticated and suggests violent business practices to deal with competition in a context of a culture of violence. Furthermore, Charman and Piper (2012) do not suggest the non-existence of xenophobic attitudes.

According to Neocosmos (2006:v), existing explanatory accounts of xenophobia are deficient because they are primarily asocial and apolitical. For this reason, they are unable to suggest ways of overcoming xenophobia. Furthermore, xenophobia cannot be explained solely by reference to state interpellation, competition over scarce resources or social change. For Neocosmos an explanation must include some reference to popular-democratic politics or its absence (18).

Neocosmos (2006:20) sees xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa as an “effect of the hegemony of a particular form of state politics, a politics which reduces citizenship to indigeneity and a politically passive conception of citizenship”. This
hegemony was secured because of a failure to maintain an alternative popular-democratic politics, which had stressed the centrality of political agency and inclusiveness in the construction of South African citizenship. This hegemonic mode of politics was enabled by a specific theoretical understanding of apartheid, characterized by African nationalism.

African nationalism promised freedom to the nation, and furthermore, to address the economic “penury” associated with ethnic identity and rural life. Free movement to the cities was said to provide access to jobs, in such a way that freedom became explicitly or implicitly identified with urbanization. The understanding of ‘nation’ adhered to by the nationalist movement was therefore a strictly urban one. This understanding of ‘nation’ formed a conception for which the migrant labour system was seen as the basis of apartheid. Apartheid was less a form of state and more a form of rural migrant labour control, which was maintained in the Bantustans against its will by the pass system. This led to a conception for which the banning of migrant labour from Southern Africa could be justified as part of dismantling apartheid, and thus as a democratic process. This form of ideological resistance to the apartheid state could then form the basis of a discourse of “national chauvinism” or be perfectly congruent with it (Neocosmos, 2006:22-23).

Neocosmos (2006:69) argues that in contrast to the exclusive nationalism outlined above, popular nationalism tended to be inclusive and it saw no distinction between citizenship and anyone participating in anti-apartheid politics in the region. Popular nationalism, according to Neocosmos, equated citizenship with an active citizenship founded on direct democratic control and popularly elected leadership. Popular nationalism thus saw national identity as not in any way founded on a conception of indigeneity but rather universal popular-democratic political activity. This was the case during the urban popular upsurge in South Africa in the 1980s (such as the UDF). There was very little space for xenophobia within this discourse and politics.

However, the migrant labour system was transformed in the post-apartheid period as a process of nation formation led by the state, which then led to a distinction between foreigners and citizens. This distinction differed from both the apartheid state’s and that of the popular nationalists’ which was founded on political agency. Citizenship
was now reduced to indigeneity and formalized through legislation. It was formed largely by state prescriptions as opposed to popular ones (Neocosmos, 2006:72).

For this form of state politics to be hegemonic, it required the defeat of popular-democratic ideology and its replacement by state politics. Popular organisations were de-mobilised in the 1990s, along with the de-politicisation of society, and the development of a civil society as an NGO dominated sphere whose role became one of supplementing state activities. The result is thus that the hegemony of state politics was secured over a popular-subaltern realm (Ibid, 71). Neocosmos falls outside of Dodson’s (2010) axes.

In contrast to Neocosmos, von Holdt (von Holdt, 2012; von Holdt et al, 2011) looks at collective violence and the interplay between service delivery related community protests and xenophobic violence. In a series of case studies on collective action in 2009, von Holdt et al (2011) found that many community protests merged into xenophobic violence with the initial focus being on service delivery. However, in some cases, xenophobic attacks were the primary focus.

The community case studies presented rapid processes of class formation. New elites emerged as well as an underclass comprising of those precariously employed and those unemployed. This gave rise to struggles over inclusion and exclusion, within the elite, between the elite and subalterns, and within the subaltern group. These struggles were marked by the contests over the meaning of citizenship. With the processes of class formation and “differential citizenship”, subaltern groups developed an “insurgent citizenship” with claims that “destabilise the differentiated”. These insurgencies not only fought for expanded citizenship but also xenophobic exclusion (von Holdt et al, 2011: 6-7).

Struggles over the meaning of citizenship are also struggles over rank, status, and power. von Holdt borrows from Bourdieu (2000) and notes that there are struggles over the symbolic order, “which structures the meaning and hierarchies of distinction in post-apartheid South Africa” (von Holdt et al, 2011:7). Finally, these instabilities and contestations in social relations and the meanings of these relations lead to violent struggles over social order and hierarchy. This results in a precarious society,
characterized by “social fragmentation and competing local moral orders” (von Holdt et al, 2011:7). Thus, von Holdt et al (2011:3) warn that if social and economic inclusion are not addressed, further fragmentation and violence are likely to take place in the future.

A symbolic order means that there is a hierarchy of status and power. The symbolic terms of male power in the underclass are reversed. A young man needs money to have a girlfriend. Without money, he cannot afford to pay lobola to get married and thus he cannot start a family. In their research von Holdt et al (2011:23) found that the young unemployed men in their research often compared themselves to the men in the elite, and experienced feelings of anger and powerlessness. However, their research found that participation in collective violence can extend a sense of empowerment for those who live in the shadows because of poverty and unemployment, especially when this action involves a disruption of the dominant symbolic order and presents a subaltern symbolic order of resistance. In this environment young and emasculated men may recover their masculinity though symbols and practices of a “militarized masculinity”. This involves a recovery of agency for subaltern groups (von Holdt et al, 2011:28).

von Holdt et al (2011) found common patterns in the forms the protests took. They were often organized by certain factions of the local ANC. There were political entrepreneurs who used the grievances of the people to their advantage. However, many common protestors were aware of this but used the situation to their advantage, to air their grievances. These protests and the collective unrest were usually characterized by a degree of infighting in the local ANC and there were instigators who were motivated by gaining access to the local state and its resources. Much of the violent service delivery protests took place after peaceful means of protest had been used to no avail. There were also triggers that turned peaceful protests violent, such as aggressive behaviour from the police. After protest movements had died down, protest organizers were absorbed into the local ANC. Thus, no independent civic organizations were developed which kept going after the protest action died down.

Although von Holdt et al (2011:16) found similar repertoires in their case studies, there were differences in the relationships between xenophobic attacks, the local state
Xenophobic attacks were found to be organized by a combination of formal organized groups, and informal groups which include South African businesses and unemployed youth. Furthermore, xenophobic attacks tend to be at their most prolific in semi-formal and informal settlements, with weak state structures where local elites and civic organisations have taken over control of state duties, such as the allocation of land and the juridical system, and where there is intense competition for resources (von Holdt et al, 2011:17).

Elites engage in symbolic struggles to manage inequalities between classes, and to present it as normal. The protests establish an insurgent citizenship which insists on the expansion of citizenship rights, in the form of access to jobs and services, as well as respect for all, including subalterns. Protest action constitutes a disruption of the symbolic order of the elite (von Holdt et al, 2011:24). Insurgent citizenship is when citizens feel that they are entitled to something, which they are being denied, and they then turn to protest and violence to demand the rights which come with citizenship. They are entitled to rights, to electricity, housing and clean water etc. When the state fails to deliver on this, they engage in a form of action which demands service from government. The protestors burn tyres and damage or destroy government property. Burning down property belonging to the local municipality constitutes a symbolic disruption of that authority, a statement of the grievances of the community (von Holdt et al, 2011:27). Insurgent citizenship is intrinsically linked to violence. Violence takes the form of a language, it constitutes a message and a warning. Collective violence becomes a means for subalterns to force the powerful to acknowledge their dignity, and to hear their collective demands (von Holdt et al, 2011: 27).
Xenophobic attacks often take place while communities are exercising insurgent citizenship, and as such this ‘insurgent citizenship’ or its darker forms may lead to xenophobic attacks. Therefore, subalterns may protest against elite attempts to maintain the symbolic order, but they may also protest to enforce a national citizenship regime, whereby they are defined as citizens who have the right to the redistribution of resources, and where ‘foreigners’ are simultaneously excluded, and their access to resources is seen as illegitimate. In this light, xenophobic attitudes may be seen as methods to re-enforce the exclusion of non-citizens, and at the same time, secure their own inclusion. Symbolically, the subalterns are enforcing a new order of citizenship, especially where the state is seen to be failing to enforce such an order of citizenship. Thus, insurgent citizenship is not only a struggle for the expanded citizenship for those who experience a ‘differentiated citizenship’ due to class struggles, but also a struggle for new forms of differentiation which exclude ‘foreigners’. This constitutes not only a struggle over an abstract idea of citizenship but also a concrete struggle over belonging. Citizenship in this light may be seen as an ethnic citizenship (von Holdt et al, 2011:24). von Holdt also does not fit neatly into Dodson’s (2010) axes, but has some elements of axes 1, 4, and 5. von Holdt highlights the importance of economic and material issues, such as inequality; citizenship and exclusion; and the role of bad leadership in xenophobic attacks.

Neocosmos sees xenophobia as a result of a lack of political agency, and a lack of political prescriptions on the state. von Holdt’s insurgent citizenship cannot be accounted for by political passivity. The protests are exercising agency and are organized politically, through their ‘insurgent citizenship’. In this context, von Holdt would not agree with Neocosmos when he claims that xenophobia is a result of political passivity amongst the majority. However, there is a point where the two converge, even if only artificially. Neocosmos claims that there is a lack of political prescriptions exerted against the state and a lack of political organization independent of the government. In von Holdt et al, the demands being made in the context of community protests characterized by insurgent citizenship are not politically prescriptive. They do not critique the status quo or offer alternative forms of politics. Rather, they are claims for delivery, for the government to deliver in line with the managerialism of liberal politics. Furthermore, there is no real independent political organization as factions of the ANC often lead the protests, and the protest leadership
is usually absorbed by the local ANC, leaving behind no independent political organization, envisaged by Neocosmos which would constitute active citizenship. The argument may thus be made that there is a politically passive citizenry, which is not very active for the majority of the time, and only comes to life when the demands of citizens to their rights (‘delivery’) have not been met and frustration has passed boiling point. Even when the communities become active, they are still doing so largely within the ambit of the local ANC, a sub-branch of the state. They are acting within the status quo. Therefore, a truly active citizenship may still be found wanting.

South African Exceptionalism and Xenophobia
News and images of ‘the rest of Africa’ are usually dark and brutal: AIDS, civil war, genocide, dictatorships and corruption and other forms of backwardness that do not lead to a civilized state. Foreign Africans are the antithesis of modernization. Having to face these ‘invaders’ could be daunting for black South Africans anxious to enjoy the full benefits of citizenship. The dangers of Dark Africa results in the need to police borders, to have tough immigration laws and attitudes (Nyamnjoh, 2006:40).

The South African discourse of exceptionalism is not solely that South Africa is an exception in Africa because of its industrial development, but also includes seeing the rest of the continent as rural, backward, poverty-stricken, politically unstable and corrupt. From here the assertion emerges that African non-nationals want to share in the benefits of South Africa’s democracy and economy (Neocosmos, 2008:78-79).

Contesting Xenophobia
This section moves away from the explanations of xenophobia and addresses ways in which it may be contested, which can be found amongst the literature.

Nyamnjoh (2006:75) argues that in the context of flexible mobility and belonging (frequent travel by migrants between home countries and work destinations), lie the routes for a flexible citizenship bounded less by geography. Furthermore, a territorial notion of citizenship in the context of flexible mobility only leads to practices of confrontation that “deny individuals and communities their reality as melting pots of multiple and dynamic identities”.
Nyamnjoh (2006:81) calls for a flexible citizenship unrestricted by the notion of the ‘nation state’ and its synonymity between culture, race and polity. For Nyamnjoh, the nation state is an illusion that results in a denial of citizenship along various socio-cultural lines. He envisions migrants mobilizing for equal political, cultural and economic representation in host countries (Nyamnjoh, 2006:81).

According to Nyamnjoh (2006:240-241), there is a need to re-conceptualize citizenship in order to create political, cultural, social and economic space for excluded citizens and foreign nationals. This space should be for both individuals and collectivities. He calls for an inclusion via a “flexible citizenship” which is not restricted by race, ethnicity, class, gender and geography. This citizenship should be conscious and critical of hierarchies that make citizenship and rights more available to some than to others. Nyamnjoh’s flexible citizenship would be able to be articulated at different levels, such as from the local to the global, and from the individual to the collective. He stresses the freedom of individuals and communities to negotiate their inclusion or opt out with total flexibility.

This flexible citizenship would be fought for by migrants (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 240-241). It would be granted by the state. However, the state would not be the only institution granting citizenship, as Nyamnjoh (2006:237) notes that “contexts, practices, and meanings” make citizenship possible for some and not for others. Thus social practices are equally important. This flexible citizenship would be open to difference and would focus not only on individuals but also communities and collectivities. Nyamnjoh (2006) does not go into detail about how such a flexible citizenship would be won, other than that ‘citizenship’ needs to be re-conceptualized and that migrants may negotiate their inclusion.

Neocosmos argues that liberal politics and a discourse of human rights are incompatible with overcoming xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. In liberal discourse, politics is reduced to the state. Politics takes place within the domain of the state. This phenomenon has become pervasive in post-apartheid South Africa where the state can ‘deliver’ everything, from human rights, development, to peace in Africa. This has resulted in politics being reduced to managerialism. Debate is then
restricted to opinions on effective governance and there is no space left for competing notions of politics or modes of politics (Neocosmos, 2006:115).

According to Neocosmos (2006:133-134) overcoming xenophobia needs to be a political struggle and would necessitate popular politics. It would require an active citizenship, which could then lead to prescriptive politics in society. The state should enable the development of migrant organizations and active citizenship in society in general. However, the state would need to be pressured in order to do this. This would necessitate extensive politicization in society.

Demands and prescriptions on the state can be for everyone to be documented rather than deported and ‘documentation for all working people’. These demands cannot be made by human rights NGOs substituting themselves for popular political activity. Only a democratic political organization or self-organized migrants could make these prescriptions on the state (Neocosmos, 2006:134-135).

Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) is an example of an organisation that constitutes the active citizenship that Neocosmos addresses, and one which fought against the 2008 xenophobic attacks. AbM, the largest shackdweller organisation and organized outside of the ANC, articulate a notion of “being on their own” and “speaking for themselves”. They have created an ongoing ‘living politics’ comprising of the active participation of the poor in solving their own problems, such as “living discussions” in the shack settlements. AbM also represents the politicization of a shack settlement, as opposed to the de-politicization of shack revolts, one of the factors leading to the 2008 xenophobic attacks according to Gibson (2008:704).

In Durban and Pietermaritzburg in the 2008 xenophobic attacks, there were no attacks in the 24 shack settlements linked to AbM and none in the 10 where the organization had a strong presence. AbM instead spoke of solidarity and the unity of the oppressed. They spoke about a basic humanism and stated that a person cannot be illegal. AbM further argued that the solution to xenophobia is not to educate the poor about xenophobia, but to give the poor what they need to survive so that they may be more generous (Gibson, 2008:705-706).
von Holdt et al (2011) do not directly address how to contest or prevent xenophobia and collective violence. However, they provide an example of how one such community, Bokfontein, did so through a community works program (CWP) and an organizational workshop (OW) facilitated by two outside community developers. Bokfontein, an area characterized by poor service delivery, was created to accommodate two different communities which both experienced evictions at separate points in time (von Holdt et al, 2011:108). Early periods in this community were characterized by tension and violence between the two communities (109).

The OW was designed to help the community deal with its challenges, including collective trauma through a participatory action model and consciousness raising. The workshop began with a community needs assessment. Themes covered included: dealing with the past, helping community members see their community with new eyes and imagining the future. It also dealt with community mapping, models of development, dealing with problems of crime, alcohol abuse, xenophobia and violence. Discussions were also held about identity and difference, which challenged community members’ attitudes and stereotypes about one another. The OW also addressed the economic needs of the community (von Holdt et al, 2011:110).

The CWP was developed out of the Extended Public Works Program (EPWP), as a supporting anchor. CWP was designed to provide regular employment to community members with a predictable number of days of work. It employed more than 800 people in Bokfontein. South African citizens and foreign nationals worked in various projects, such as: road maintenance, gardening, home-based care, after-school care, cutting grass, installing pipes for water, and working on the park. The CWP provided a safety net for community members (von Holdt et al, 2011:111-112).

Although xenophobic sentiments did exist in Bokfontein and there were grievances against the local municipality, there have not been any service delivery protests and neither were there any xenophobic attacks in 2008. Community members further prevented residents from attacking foreign nationals in Bokfontein. Community members claimed that this would not have been possible without the OW, which helped them deal with issues of identity and respect for diversity (von Holdt et al, 2011:114).
The community development initiatives carried out through the CWP served as significant factors against service delivery protests. Also important was the fact that the community leaders were highly involved and concerned with community development, rather than political infighting and gaining access to state power and resources. The OW helped the community deal with negative feelings in a constructive manner, to mourn and to deal with the losses of their evictions. Participation in development projects was also key. These factors created a sense of empowerment amongst community members. The OW and CWP dealt with the community’s economic and psychological needs, and this was key in preventing xenophobic attacks and collective violence (von Holdt, 2011:117-118). This example highlights the importance of addressing the economic needs of a community when addressing the cohesion of a community, as von Holdt et al (2011) argue that xenophobia and xenophobic sentiments will not disappear until the economic needs of South Africans are met. Furthermore, this example highlights how a strategy to overcome xenophobia should not neglect economic issues and would do well to create a program that gets South Africans and foreign nationals to work together.

Landau and Freemantle (2010) point out that for various reasons, migrants do not always strive to be included, fight for their integration and against exclusion. Rather, they may engage in a form of self-exclusion, and this is important to bear in mind when addressing means of contesting xenophobia and fostering integration. Migrants subscribe to a “tactical cosmopolitanism” where they negotiate partial inclusion into South African society without being bound by it (375). Migrants retain loyalties to their countries of origin and orient themselves for life in a third country. In a response to xenophobia and harsh administrative and immigration procedures, many foreign nationals have developed a rhetoric of self exclusion which cherishes their position as permanent outsiders, distancing oneself from commitments to a local community. Thus, rather than attempting to integrate or assimilate, migrants’ interactions with South Africans are leading to a reification of differences and a “counter-idiom of transience and superiority” (382-383).
Methods

A) Research Question

My research question was “How does ARESTA try to fight against and lessen ‘xenophobia’ in Khayelitsha (in ward 97 and those communities inhabited by the peace ambassadors)? How does it speak to notions of citizenship and belonging in South Africa?”

B) Research Design

I made use of a case study design, using qualitative research methods. A case study design was useful for looking closely at one case of an attempt to contest xenophobia. I needed to look closely at ARESTA’s community education program, their workshops and peace activists. Therefore, I conducted a case study of ARESTA’s social cohesion department, focusing on three sources: their community education program (more broadly and including the workshops), the peace ambassadors from Esangweni Secondary School, and the peace monitors and communities that make up ward 97, Khayelitsha.

I chose qualitative research methods because they best suited my research questions and the aims thereof. I was searching for words rather than numbers. Qualitative analysis allowed me to look at the perspectives of individuals; to search for in-depth, contextual descriptions of events and actions; and to take account of social action in its specific context (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 270).

A qualitative research design was also suitable because of the size of my thesis project. Due to my thesis being relatively small in scope, it was feasible to interview a limited amount of people in-depth to shed light on the shared meanings the respondents held on their activities. I would not be interviewing a large enough number of people to start quantifying my findings.

C) Data Collection and Sampling

I made use of purposive and snowball sampling to find and approach my respondents. Snowball sampling involves asking people you have have already interviewed or who
you have spoken with to identify other people who meet your research criteria (Richie and Lewis, 2013:94). Purposive sampling refers to the intended selection of individuals who match the criteria of one’s research questions (Richie and Lewis, 2013:79). I approached Mr Mncedisi Mbatha, the campaign manager of the community education department, and asked him for permission to do my research. After explaining to him the nature of my research, he put me in contact with a teacher at Esangweni High School in Khayelitsha. He felt that they would be the best high school students for me to interview because they are highly active in their roles as peace ambassadors. I spoke to the teacher and asked for permission to interview ten students who were peace ambassadors. I informed her that I wanted a mix of boys and girls. She then approached the students on my behalf, asked them if they were willing and for those that were, she gave them a permission letter from me for their guardians to sign, which also contained easy to read and detailed information about my research. I conducted these ten interviews over a week in an empty classroom in the school interviewing five boys and five girls, in grade 10 and 11, between the ages of 15 and 18.

Then I spoke to Mr Mbatha about interviewing ‘peace monitors’, adults from one community in Khayelitsha. He informed me that the monitors in ward 97 in Khayelitsha would be the best group to interview because they are very active. Mr Mbatha then put me in touch with a peace monitor in ward 97. After I explained to her the nature of my research, she agreed to be interviewed and to help me contact further interviewees. I found the rest of the interviews in this manner, interviewing eight peace monitors, two men and six women. This was in line with the fact that in many communities there were a lot more female peace monitors than men. They varied in age from 26 to 55.

I also interviewed two ARESTA staff and one from the UNHCR field office in Cape Town. At ARESTA I interviewed the campaign director of the social cohesion programs, who runs the workshops, as well as another staff member who is also involved in the workshops. AT the UNHCR, I interviewed a ‘protection officer’ who liaises with ARESTA with regards to the workshops, as they are supported by and partially funded by the UNHCR. This added up to a total of 21 interviewees.
The main focus of my research was on black and isiXhosa speaking South Africans. The purpose was not to focus on stereotypes, but because Khayelitsha is predominantly a ‘black’ and isiXhosa township. Furthermore, most of the townships where the xenophobic attacks of 2008 took place and subsequently where the peace workshops are held are predominantly inhabited by black South Africans. Furthermore, I was specifically focusing on African foreign nationals, xenophobia and discrimination against foreign nationals from the African continent.

I used semi-structured interviews, which facilitated an in-depth understanding of the interviewees’ social realities. The interviews did not have a specific and fixed schedule, but were not devoid of any structure. I used an interview guide to give direction to the key issues of the study (Richie and Lewis, 2013:115). This interview technique allowed me to ask new questions as they arose and to develop new questions, while sticking to the aims of the research questions. Key (general and thematic) questions were drawn up for the interviews.

I carried out four participant observations, when I was able to attend ARESTA’s events. For each event, I took field notes and typed them up afterwards. I attended one peace building and social cohesion workshop for peace ambassadors at Intlanganiso Secondary school over a Saturday and Sunday; a Heritage Day celebration in Monwabisi, Khayelitsha with sports and an anti-xenophobia theme; a peace ambassadors certificate ceremony at Esangweni Secondary school, with performances with anti-xenophobia themes; and an award ceremony for peace monitors in section D, Khayelitsha.

D) Data Analysis and Coding

I conducted a narrative analysis, specifically a thematic analysis. Narrative analysis offers a way to systematically explore personal narratives of experience and “refers to a family of approaches to diverse kinds of texts, which have in common a storied form” (Riesmann, 2005:1&9). In a thematic analysis, the emphasis is on the content, ‘what’ is being said. The focus is more on what is said, than how it is being said. Thematic analysis involves collecting stories and creating conceptual groupings from the data (Riesmann, 2005:2).
I began by transcribing my interviews. Then I proceeded to code my interview
transcripts and participant observations using Nvivo version 11 and the Miles and
Huberman (1994) approach.

Codes are tags or labels which assign meaning to descriptive or inferential data in a
study. They are usually attached to ‘chunks’ of information of various sizes (words,
phrases etc) and may be connected or unconnected to a specific setting. The meaning
is of significance rather than the actual words. Codes organize and retrieve chunks of
information. This involves some system of categorization, so that important
information relating to a specific research question can be retrieved easily (Miles and

Codes may be created by developing a starting list from one’s conceptual framework,
research questions, and/or hypotheses (Miles and Huberman, 1994:58). There are two
levels of coding. First level coding is more descriptive while second level coding is
more inferential and at a higher level of abstraction (Miles and Huberman, 1994:69).

There are three types of codes: descriptive, interpretive, and pattern codes.
Descriptive codes entail little interpretation; they attribute a class of phenomena to a
segment of text. Interpretive codes entail a similar process as the latter code except
they require some interpretation as opposed to straightforward description. Pattern
codes are even more inferential and explanatory. A coded segment of text may
indicate an emergent pattern that has arisen from local events and relationships. These
codes are used later on as patterns become clearer (Miles and Huberman, 1994:56-
57). First-level coding is used to summarize segments of data. Pattern coding is then
used to group these summaries together into a smaller number of sets (Miles and

I began with first-level coding and then moved on to pattern-coding. This process
assisted me in beginning the analysis and enabled me to see patterns of meaning in the
text. It also helped me organize, reduce and make sense of a large amounts of data.

E) Ethics
I was aware that I was engaging in a highly sensitive issue involving teenagers, foreign nationals and refugees, and a community that has experienced tension and violence between foreign nationals and South Africans. I was an outsider to this community in Khayelitsha. All of the above necessitated a cautious and sensitive approach. For the peace ambassadors who were high school students and under 18, I acquired written parental consent for their participation. All interviewees were asked for their consent and were well informed about the purpose of the interviews. The interviewees were also informed that their names may remain anonymous and that our discussions can be kept confidential, if they wish. In the end, I used pseudonyms for the high school students but got consent to use the real names of the adults.
Findings

ARESTA, Social Cohesion and Mr Mbatha

ARESTA is an NGO that focuses on the integration of refugees and asylum seekers into South African society. It provides education and skills training to refugees and asylum seekers and advocates on their behalf. ARESTA’s Community Education or Social Cohesion Department works towards fostering social cohesion between refugees and their host communities. Towards this goal, they have peace monitors and peace ambassadors programs, cultural diversity festivals, sports tournaments, and marches (http://www.aresta.org.za/welcome-to-aresta).

The campaign manager of the community education department is Mr Mncedisi Mbatha, who is affectionately know as ‘Mr Big’. He is in charge of the social cohesion based activities. Mr Mbatha started working at ARESTA in 2010, before that he was working as a caretaker in a Catholic Church and coordinating his own project with youth in Khayelitsha, with the support of the Kolping family, a Catholic organisation. Mr Mbatha is incredibly good with people. He radiates energy, is a real entertainer and communicator. He is brilliant at capturing the attention of the youth, getting them to take part in his campaigns and to listen. He also does well with the adults. For this reason, the success of his programs would not be the same without him and his ability to get through to people, as I witnessed on several participant observations. A peace monitor emphasizes this,

“You know for instance Mr Big, he’s a very entertaining person. You know when he does a workshop, it’s not some kind of a lecture… He lets you to be part of the team. He gives you a task to do, so a person like that lets you have the confidence…he lets you know…how to tackle people. If there is the situation you know what to do. So a person like that is a real treasure. He is a real facilitator. You know there, at ARESTA they have facilitators, and people like those are needed. They are needed in our communities, because you are being inspired every day when you see his style of work. But the whole thing he is trying to do is not for us to copy him. He wants us to think for ourselves and do things in our own way” (Xolani, thirty-five-year-old male monitor).
In 2009, before he was working at ARESTA, Mr Mbatha had the vision of conducting a cultural diversity festival to tackle xenophobia. He was working on this with two young people from Germany with funding from Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU). The festival was planned for 2010, during the World Cup. However, the festival did not take place because a week before the festival took place, different stakeholders held an event at a school in Khayelitsha, Site C, where they informed youth about their organizations. This included the UNHCR, ARESTA, the City of Cape Town and other NGOs. During the evaluation, which Mr Mbatha was part of, it was discovered that many of the South Africans knew very little about refugees and asylum seekers and also, held xenophobic mind-sets. There were also rumours going around that all foreigners would be chased out after the world cup. This was a warning and when M. Mbatha became involved in activities aimed at preventing xenophobic attacks (Interview with Mr Mbatha).

Shortly after this Mr Mbatha began working at ARESTA. They began hosting cultural diversity festivals at schools with the aim of contesting xenophobia. This consisted of song and dance by South Africans and foreign nationals, with an additional anti-xenophobia theme. However, from these workshops, Mr Mbatha realized that it is not enough to focus solely on the youth because when they go home they may encounter xenophobic attitudes from their parents. In 2011, they continued doing cultural diversity festivals at schools, but began piloting anti-xenophobia workshops and soccer tournaments. Later they found that calling them “anti-xenophobia” workshops may be counter productive, so the name was changed to “social cohesion and peace building workshops” (Interview with Mr Mbatha).

The pilot of the anti-xenophobia workshop was in Khayelitsha, site B, and was only for adults. The workshops then spread to the rest of Khayelitsha, Gugulethu, Nyanga, Crossroads, Philippi and Delft. These areas were specifically chosen because they were hotspots in the 2008 xenophobic attacks. The soccer tournaments and cultural diversity festivals also focused on these areas (Interview with Mr Mbatha).

Soon, the social cohesion and peace building workshops expanded to include a separate high school program in the same areas. The “peace monitors” are adults and the “peace ambassadors” are high school students. The workshops for the two groups
are the same, except the real-life examples are targeted at the appropriate age group (Interview with Mr Mbatha).

I attended a workshop for peace ambassadors on the weekend of the 22nd and 23rd of August 2015 at Intlanganiso High School in Khayelitsha. Students from three different schools attended, including those from my case study, Esangweni Secondary School. The students were taught about refugees and asylum seekers, why they are in South Africa, and what their rights and obligations are. Most of the workshop was presented by Mr Mbatha, but another staff member from ARESTA spoke about human rights and the constitution of South Africa. The students were told about the conditions in the refugees’ countries of origin that forced them to leave. They also addressed the xenophobic attacks of 2008 and 2015 and the hardship endured by foreign nationals. Pictures were also used for effect. The main message throughout the workshop was about the humanity of all foreign nationals, and the need to spread tolerance and protect fellow Africans, if possible.

The other section of the workshop was on peacebuilding and conflict mediation. The workshops deal with peace not only between South Africans and foreign nationals, but also between South Africans themselves. Various methods were discussed on how to understand all the dimensions of a conflict, how to listen actively and how to be an effective communicator. The students were taught that conflict is natural, what is important is how to deal with it. An important part was understanding conflict, an onion exercise was used as an analogy. In every conflict there are many layers, and in order to deal with a conflict one needs to peel back all the layers until one gets to the root of the conflict. Peace ambassadors are meant to be able to understand conflict, get to the core of an issue, and to be able to sense when a situation may become dangerous, such as xenophobic attacks. The idea then is not that they would confront a mob, but inform a trustworthy adult or call the police. The ambassadors are meant to become leaders and the workshops are meant to develop their leadership capabilities. To keep the attention of the students, Mr Mbatha entertained them, often making jokes. Games were held in between exercises to rejuvenate the students.

Marches have been organized several times by Mr Mbatha and by peace monitors in different communities. They are usually attended by members of ARESTA, peace
monitors, ambassadors, foreign nationals and the wider community. These peaceful demonstrations are organized around issues of xenophobia, crime and violence. They often end up with a memorandum being handed to the local police station (interview with Mr Mbatha).

The soccer tournaments are organized as means for promoting tolerance and acceptance using sports as a tool. This is done by involving different ethnic groups, foreign nationals and locals. The tournaments are organized by the peace monitors of the specific area in question. Each team will have to have a certain number of foreign nationals. The organizers invite speakers from different communities to speak at the tournament, on issues of social cohesion, anti-xenophobia and unity (interview with Mr Mbatha).

The central idea for peace monitors and peace ambassadors is for them to spread tolerance through information sharing and to counter widespread myths about foreign nationals, as well as to create early warning systems, where they sense a conflict may start and inform a police officer with whom they have a relationship (Interview with Mr Mbatha).

The high school students in my case study, from Esangweni high school, come from different parts of Khayelitsha, such as: Harare, Makhaza, Litha Park, Kuyasa, Site B and Site C. The monitors in my case study all live in the municipal ward 97, the different groups of monitors are divided by wards. Ward 97 constitutes of Town 2, a section of Mandela Park, and two sections of Makhaza. It consists of both informal settlements and areas made up of RDP houses (Interview with Mr Mbatha).

'Peace' Activities: Ambassadors at Esangweni Secondary School
The project does not end with the workshops. The peace monitors and peace ambassadors in each ward and school need to develop plans of action and proceed to carry them out. At Esangweni secondary school the peace ambassadors came up with such an action plan. Peace activities do not have to be limited solely to issues relating to foreign nationals, but can cover issues of social cohesion and peace and safety amongst South Africans. The ambassadors at Esangweni started with physical searches of students and their bags at their school. They did this because their school
encountered a serious problem of gangsterism the year before and some students brought weapons and drugs to school. The ambassadors came up with the idea as a way to deal with and prevent the use of drugs and actions of violence at their school. They obtained permission from the principle and conducted the activity with their teachers. The ambassadors also cleaned their school as part of their activities, saying that “everyone deserves a clean and beautiful school”.

At the certificates ceremony at their school, the ambassadors performed anti-xenophobia themes through drama, poetry and singing. They have also scheduled a similarly themed show for some time in the future. They marched alongside ambassadors from other schools, monitors and Mr Mbatha in Site C, Khayelitsha against xenophobia. They were also planning an event where someone would speak to them about teenage pregnancy. The ambassadors were focused on drugs, gangsterism and teenage pregnancy.

The ambassadors organized an event at their school where they addressed the school about xenophobia in their communities and how to prevent it. The peace ambassadors were also in the process of organizing a talent show in Kuyasa, Khayelitsha. Foreign nationals were to be invited and the aim would be to show that foreign nationals are not so different to South Africans. One of their ongoing activities is to talk to their fellow learners about the importance of being tolerant towards foreign nationals, of fighting against xenophobia. They aim to convince their fellow students, to “convert” them, but without forcing them to do anything.

The peace ambassadors accompanied Mr Mbatha to mediate in a conflict in Marikana, Lower Cross Roads over housing, where some houses were burnt and people killed. This conflict was only between South Africans. The ambassadors accompanied Mr Mbatha for a learning experience. There was also a peace march and prayers for the people of Marikana. The monitors from ward 97 also attended this.

Peace Activities: Monitors

The monitors meet every Wednesday evening to discuss the way forward, for improving relations between South Africans and foreign nationals. Their next activity is to speak to every Somali shop owner in Ward 97, to find out what his (tend to all be
male) problems may be and to write them down. Each month they focus on one of the four areas of ward 97. For the next step, the peace monitors hold a general meeting in each of the four areas. They take note of the problems that the South Africans have with the foreign nationals and vice versa. Then they share the problems of each party with the other party. Then there is some discussions or arguments, and the monitors mediate. One issue arose of Somalian shops selling cigarettes to young children. The peace monitors managed to mediate this issue and claim that no Somalian shops are selling cigarettes to underage youth anymore.

Following this, the monitors go door to door in the communities to search for foreign backyarders. The monitors sit down with the landlords and backyarders and find out if there are any problems, to which they mediate if there are issues.

The peace monitors organized a collective prayer in Mandela Park in April. There were about 100 people, South Africans and foreign nationals. Christians prayed and the Muslims listened, and then the Christians listened in silence while the Muslims prayed. There were people from Somalia, Mozambique, Malawi and Namibia. Before the prayer, they showed videos of the 2015 xenophobic attacks in Durban and Johannesburg. It was a meeting to bring people together in the wake of the attacks and to mourn for those who were affected by the attacks.

The monitors organized a football tournament at Kwamfundu Secondary School in Harare in June 2015. There were teams from different wards in Khayelitsha, and each team was mixed with South Africans and foreign nationals. After the tournament, one person from each nationality spoke about their experiences playing together. There was also a tournament organized by ARESTA, the monitors and the City of Cape Town in June 2016 in Harare, Khayelitsha, with mixed teams and an anti-xenophobia message.

The peace monitors mediated a conflict between a South African spaza shop owner and a Somalian spaza shop owner. The South African was angry because most of the people would go to the Somali’s shop because the prices were cheaper and he felt that he could not reduce his and still make a profit. The peace monitors intervened and spoke of the importance of Ubuntu. After the Somali shop owner said that he can sell
things cheaper because he buys in bulk, the monitors compared both shops’ prices and then went with both of them to the wholesaler to witness how the Somali owner buys his goods cheaper. The monitors mediated the situation and got the South African to buy in bulk and to sell at lower prices, those of the Somali. Now both shops remain and the South African learnt something useful from the Somali.

The peace monitors attend to problems as they arise, attend meetings, marches and mediate problems. Occasionally, they join the activities of peace monitors from other areas. They also attend events and meetings of other organizations and use the opportunity to spread their message. Finally, a key role for peace monitors and ambassadors is to educate the community about foreign nationals and tolerance, and to challenge people’s perceptions when they hear conversations about foreign nationals.

**Interventions into Community Problems and Crime**

There was a South African shop owner who would send gangsters to rob a Somali owned shop in his street. After hearing about this, the peace monitors in ward 97 went to him and spoke with him at length, about the importance of Ubuntu, condemning his behaviour and persuading him not to carry on with this practice.

As part of ARESTA’s strategy, the peace monitors have a good relationship with a station commander for their area. When they phone the usual landline for the police they claim that the police do not respond or take too long to respond. Now they have a private number for a station commander who, they report, arrives promptly when he is called. There were two incidents in February where a Somali shop was robbed close to where one peace monitor named ‘Lady’ lived. During one of the incidents, a neighbour witnessed the incident and called her. She then called the station commander who arrived in two minutes but unfortunately the robbers had already left. Lady often gets people calling her or knocking at her door when there is a problem in her street because of her leadership role and because they know she has a good relationship with the police.

Some important interventions were made by peace monitors that were not part of the area I studied for this thesis, and by the organization itself. An important strategy in
preventing xenophobic attacks was initiated by ARESTA. It is called an ‘early warning system’. Peace monitors are trained to sense when the atmosphere is getting tense and when they think an attack may happen. Once they sense this, they pass on the information to ARESTA, which has working relationships with police commanders. ARESTA then informs a police commander and then ideally an attack may be prevented.

During the xenophobic attacks in Soweto in January 2015, a peace monitor in Samora Machel received a WhatsApp message inciting people to engage in xenophobic attacks. This monitor was a member of Seskona People’s Rights Movement. A message was sent out to members along the lines of “It’s happening now in Johannesburg, can we start now comrades?” The peace monitor then phoned Mr Mbatha and they then went to the police station in Samora Machel. They showed the message to an officer, the person responsible was apprehended and any attacks were prevented from happening. In Samora Machel, peace monitors were also patrolling the streets in the mornings and afternoons when the youth were going to school, as there had been a problem where the youth could not go to school because of gangsterism. Finally, the monitors in Samora Machel also intervened and stopped a situation where a local politician was charging a Somali Shop owner R100 a month for protection.

In 2013 a conflict began between the South African and Somali business community in Harare and Litha Park in Khayelitsha, and ARESTA and the UNHCR were called in to intervene. The issue was that the South African business community felt that the Somalis had not honoured an agreement that was made after the 2008 xenophobic attacks that stipulated that no more Somali owned shops could enter in the area. The South Africans felt that there had indeed been an increase in the number of Somali owned shops after the legally unofficial agreement was made. The situation got tense and some South Africans had destroyed some shops owned by Somalis. Then the UNHCR and ARESTA were called in to intervene. They sat down with the two groups and mediated. In the end an agreement was made that the Somali shops that were operating then would remain but that no new Somali shops would be opened.
Attitudes Towards Foreign Nationals

Respondents went though a change of mind-set during the workshops. The majority of the 18 interviewees admitted that they held xenophobic attitudes prior to the workshops. Furthermore, some noted that they were sceptical about attending the workshop. The question then is: why would someone attend the workshop if they held xenophobic attitudes? Mr Mbatha, the campaign director, explains that individuals with xenophobic attitudes would be interested in a workshop about refugees, even if they had not intended on changing their mind-set,

“Remember that when people are called to these trainings, they are called to be capacitated around issues of contact. Around issues of refugees and asylum seekers. And if I have an attitude towards refugees and asylum seekers, I would love to be part of that, because maybe I want to raise my concerns around refugees and asylum seekers and getting information, it empowers me…” (Interview with Mr Mbatha).

A peace ambassador explained this,

“Yes they (the workshops) were helpful. Because the learners, we thought they would never change but they did change. Yes, they were telling themselves that ‘no this is not gonna work, it’s just useless’ but after they go to the workshop, now they are changing” (Ambassador 3, teenage male).

The vast majority of respondents admitted that they held xenophobic attitudes before the workshop and that the workshop changed their mind. Closely mirroring the literature, common themes about foreign nationals before the change were that they were here to steal South Africans’ jobs and businesses, to destroy the country and our health, sell drugs, commit crime, steal ‘our’ girlfriends, and that they were involved in witchcraft and Satanism. Some admitted that they called foreign nationals ‘makwerekwere’, that they laughed when people talked badly about them, and that they did not want to interact with them. Furthermore, a few noted that they thought fighting with foreigners was ‘good’.

“I was thinking that those people they come just to destroy our country because they come and sell drugs in our country and then the other people are
buying booze in our country, drugs and also alcohol… yes, selling those things” (Ambassador 10, teenage male).

“I also thought that the reason being our mothers and father not working is because of them. Because when they get into the workplaces, they want a cheaper salary, but our mothers and fathers demand a higher salary. So the employees will choose them, because they want a minimum salary” (Ambassador 9, teenage female).

“‘I don’t trust this guy. Maybe like, these guys, these guys are foreigners, they eat people. They just eat people, like they are like wild animals, they just bite you. If they call you to come to their house, they just cook you. They just put you in the pot and cook you and eat you. It’s just like that…Ja, ja, ja, like as I told you before, like I grew up, like I grew up, like I see them like negative. Like I see them negative way before the workshop because I normally see them with those attendance (attitudes) of black people by saying those things. ‘These guys are bringing drugs’, ‘these guys are doing these things’ and then I was one of those members in my communities who normally, when we see that we have to hit them with stones and etcetera, when we see, when they are doing wrongs, even that time of xenophobic attack, I was one of those people because I was young and then I was just following the people. I was excited of people singing the songs and then just throwing the stones back then” (Ambassador 2, teenage male).

“…when you see someone who is from another country, you will say like I’m in a taxi rank, I’m about to get into a taxi, when I’m about to get a taxi, there’s someone who is from Nigeria, and who want to enter first me, and I will say ‘hey, hey, hey, you are Makwerekwere, just go away” (Ambassador 7, teenage male).

The vast majority of interviewees noted that their attitudes towards foreign nationals changed during the workshop. Reasons frequently cited were that they acquired information and learnt something about foreign nationals that they did not know before which changed their perception of the foreign nationals; or that they heard
something specific about the lives of the migrants and were so touched that their perception changed.

“About the workshop – they normally tell me what – they just give me the root. That root was on how to handle conflict and how to treat others like brothers and sisters because we are one from Cape to Morocco, Madagascar, we are one, you see and then like by those things, giving you those things, those ideas, those like – those – that knowledge I began to change my mind because I knew I’ll be better here, like they just give me what is good for me. Telling me what is the fact…” (Ambassador 2, teenage male).

“Well I thought they were the ones who was selling drugs in our country but after I’ve learned about them, I’ve learned no, they are doing good things because they are bringing more skills in our country, they are contributing to our GDP. So they are doing good job in our country…I’m no longer seeing them as bad people who are here to steal our opportunities or what not, because I now know that we learn from them, yes” (Ambassador 3, teenage male).

“It changed, as I said before that, the way that they showed at the workshops, the way they showed that how they live in their countries has touched me very much, so I thought that this is not fair for them to be a victim and called names, because of they come from their countries to be safe here, and escape the poverty. So I thought that no man, the poverty that I left at home is not compared to the one that I live in their country, so I thought there’s no use at being angry at them saying that they are here to take the jobs of our mothers and fathers” (Ambassador 9, teenage female).

“Yes, it did. It changed, because even myself, I was part of the persons who had fear about foreign nationals. Ja I had these perceptions about them – they come to take our jobs and all that stuff. But you know when ARESTA came into our lives through workshops, it made me think differently about foreign nationals. It was my first time in my life that I’ve been told that foreign people, foreign nationals, even if you are a refugee or an asylum seeker, they
are paying taxes as well. So it was my first time to hear that. Like for instance they are making a meaningful contribution. They have got projects in this country – they employ South Africans. So for me it was my first time to hear that kind of a workshop that no, they really contribute to the economy of South Africa, of which really they are needed. Especially in this area, because in a South African context whereby this country lacks skilled people, we lack in vendors, people who can produce things. So I’ve learnt a lot about refugees. Ja. We might see them as refugees, but they have got something to make. They have got something meaningful to contribute to this country” (Xolani, thirty-five-year-old male monitor).

The campaign manager stressed this change,

“Ja, there’s a big change, there’s quite a bit of a huge change. Because of the way they speak before, we deal with them, it differs after they are departing to our workshops. You will find someone who was like using words like ‘Amakwerekwere, they are taking our jobs’ and everything. After the workshop, you will find the same person being able to tell you ‘no, no, no, you can’t call them Amakwerekweres’. You find the same person being able to tell you’ honestly, before I came to this workshop, I didn’t think like this, but since I’ve been part of this, experiencing this training, my mind towards foreign nationals have changed’. Some of the people confessed on Saturday of how they feel now about foreign national compared to the way they felt about them before. So that’s the change that we’re talking about” (Mr Mbatha, campaign manager).

However, although their mind-set changed a lot and they had bought into the peace activities, two peace ambassadors, sisters, still maintained prejudice,

“Some of them. Most of the girls, they love Somalias, but I can’t have the relationship with the Somalia or a Nigeria, I can’t, sorry. I’m a peace ambassador, but I can’t. I don’t have that feeling” (Monitor 5, teenage girl), and “I think Somalis are not the problem here. The problem are the Zimbabweans, because they are the ones who trying to break down the South Africa. They are selling drugs. They are selling our CD’s, so we must talk to them, they mustn’t do that, because that’s not good” (Monitor 6, teenage girl).
However, only these two individuals overtly maintained prejudice.

The few respondents who said the workshop did not change their view of African foreign nationals reported that they did not have negative views before the workshop and had had positive relationships with migrants, further describing themselves as people who enjoy interacting with different cultures.

Philosophy and Motivations

Through the work of the peace monitors and ambassadors, one may find common motivations, and messages that they spread. These revolve around a wish to bring peace and unity, talking about the positives that foreign nationals bring, acceptance, ‘we are all black and Africans’, and the importance of Ubuntu. Some quotes demonstrate these visions:

“But that’s my – that was my aim, bru, like to just bring peace. That’s my vision. That’s why I normally enjoy those projects like that because I always like to keep myself busy to a community” (Ambassador 2, teenage male).

“So we are only focusing on the negative things. That’s where ARESTA came for. To change those negative things and say remaining that we are Africans, that’s a fact, we are Africans…According what they told me about the workshop, we are Africans, even if you have your own way to praise God, I have my own way to praise God, but the thing is we are praising one God. If we can understand our national anthem, it doesn’t say God bless Nkosi Sikeleli South Africa. It says Nkosi sikeleli iAfrica. So if we can take that, even just that line, and we focus on that line, we will know that to be an African, it doesn’t mean you’re from Tanzania, you’re from South Africa, the main is as we are African, it means we are one. So let’s try by all means. If I love my culture, then you also adapt it to understand the other cultures, not discriminate or undermining the other cultures, let’s try to be equal. No, I know that you won’t do as I do on my culture, but if you accept my culture as it is, it’s easy for me to accept your culture, so that we can join and build a better Africa, with peace and love” (Fungile, 40-year-old male monitor).
Conversions

Peace ambassadors and monitors have reported “converting” others, and many believe that they are able to do so. This is when they have been in conversation with someone who is saying something xenophobic and they have been able to change his or her view, where they have been able to persuade someone to see things the way they do, to be more tolerant. Sibusiso, a peace ambassador was on a train when he overheard a man talking about a Zimbabwean work colleague and saying “These guys are cheap labour, I hate them. I hate them”. The man on the train was complaining that the Zimbabweans at his work will work for any amount of money, no matter how small, and that they would work even if the rest of the staff were protesting. Sibusiso engaged this man,

“I spoke to that guy. I went there where the train is, I talk to him a lot and then we began to have a – one, one mind, one mind. After that we began to be united, ‘my brother you have helped me a lot’. What I told him is that, ‘bru, we have to be unite. Division is a weakness but unity is a strength. Just go there with them and learn with them, and then just go there and ask how to do this thing? Start to begin your thing, to do your thing, even yourself. So that, so that you don’t have to like to chase them away, just learn from them, learn from them what they are doing. We will remain like poor because nothing will change if we just chase them away. Nothing will change because you have not learnt something before, before we chase them’… So I began like, that guy I began to convince him better. I began to convince him better… we were in the train, while we were on motion, people were just listening to me and others were quoting my numbers. ‘Where do you stay? Where do you stay? Where did you get this information?’ I just tell them that ‘no, I just, I’m a peace ambassador. Like we normally do some workshop but I’m a peace ambassador, I learn these things, these ideas and then guys why you can’t work together, stop these things.’ Then they begin loving my idea, ja… I think the guy changed his mind because he was excited by that time because he saw me, I was younger than him. Then he said, ‘wow bru, but you’re still young, you got this idea” (Sibusiso, teenage male peace ambassador).

Nosibulelo had a similar experience in her community,
“I was here in the office, then I have a conversation, someone else she didn’t talk about the Somalis and she says like Makweri Kweri. I just to correct her and told her that those people they come for a reason to South-Africa you mustn’t treat her like that. She is a human being like you, and she has a blood like you. She stopped like that and said ‘who are you?’ I said I am a peace ambassador. She said she want to join me. At the time, when I meet her she didn’t want to talk about the Somalis, and then when I talk to her, like these people are human beings like you, she wants to listen to me what I am talking about and I told her what I am talking about…Yes and she changed her mind and said that before she had thought they come here to do drugs to do prostitute and to do everything that is sin...” (Nosibulelo, thirty-year-old female peace monitor).

Lady believes that people will have a positive view of their work and will react well to their message if they put their message forward in the right way. It all depends on how one puts their message across. This means that people can be ‘converted’ if the message is put through in the right way.

“Yes (some people like their message about foreign nationals and some do not), but it depends how you motivate. How you put your story when you are speaking to somebody. Yes. If you know your story very well, it’s not a problem”, and

“It (whether people respond positively or negatively to their message about foreign nationals) all depends how do you put the message across. Yes. So they don’t have a problem. I didn’t have a problem yet, because when I speak to them, they listen” (Lady, monitor in her fifties).

Citizenship and Belonging

A notion of citizenship may be extrapolated from the monitors’ and ambassadors’ views on foreign nationals and their access to rights. Their views were surprisingly similar and uniform. They advocated that African foreign nationals should be allowed to enter South Africa’s borders, given documentation and should be able to work. Furthermore, they believed that foreign nationals should have the same rights as South Africans, minus the right to vote. These views on citizenship are a result of the
workshops because the majority of the respondents did not hold these views before, and their feelings towards foreign nationals underwent change during the workshops.

During my research I expected that the monitors and ambassadors would develop a bias for refugees and asylum seekers along with the message of the UNHCR, which is present at the workshop. The workshops talk about the troubles refugees and asylum seekers face and uncritically distinguish between refugees and economic migrants. Therefore, I thought some of the respondents may be open and tolerant to the Somalis and Congolese fleeing war, but not to those escaping poverty, labelled as economic migrants. This would be something similar to the discourse of ‘deserving refugees’ found in Europe. However, the respondents all (including the two sisters who still held some prejudices) believed that those who come to South Africa to work or to escape poverty and hunger should be able to do so.

The reasons articulated for African foreign nationals being able to live and work in South Africa revolved around themes of: a common humanity, ‘we are all Africans’, the need to help those escaping war and also those escaping poverty, and because foreign nationals create employment and benefit the South African economy. Some quotes demonstrate these notions,

“Even, we’re always complaining about high rates of unemployment, but those guys, when they came, they came with their skills, and then they want to share, maybe they came for doing, to have that skill of doing burglars and windows and lots of stuff. They don’t work alone. They need assistance to do that, so they take us. So why don’t give them a permission to do that job? They are coming to minimize the unemployment firstly, and then they also are working to do minimize also hunger. So when the business, when they come for the business here, unemployment rates are going down and then instead of poverty, it’s also going down. So it will be appreciated that even those who came for business, they must be given their permit to do that. Because it helps us and it also helps them too” (Fungile, 40-year-old male monitor).

“Yes (they should be given the same rights as locals), because most of the people in the government, are from exile from other countries. Some of us are
from exile, not in South Africa, fighting for freedom. Now why can’t they be given the permanent (residence or visa)? Why? Because most of us went outside and fight with the apartheid government to liberate this country” (Lady, female monitor in her fifties).

“They can accept them (economic migrants). They are coming to look for work. All of us, we need to eat at the end of the day. We need to provide for our families. We need to provide for ourselves as well” (Xolani, thirty-five-year-old male monitor).

“Ja, I will feel the same way, because that is a valid reason. Those people have a family to feed, so ja, I will feel the same way. Because it’s just the same thing that they want to feed the families and live a good life” (Ambassador 9, teenage female).

The discourse of citizenship and belonging becomes an ‘inclusive citizenship’, to quote Nyamnjoh (2006). Citizenship is tied to work and the need to work, to one’s contribution, to a common humanity, and because South African exiles were hosted on the continent. This idea of citizenship goes back to the Freedom Charter and the notion that ‘South Africa belongs to all those who live in it’. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, many of the respondents admitted to holding xenophobic attitudes before the workshop and their peace activities. Secondly, because some of the respondents were unemployed, some were underemployed and all of them worked in poorly paid jobs. They were in the right class category to feel threatened by immigration, making their ideas of citizenship all the more significant.

Community Perception of ‘Peace Activities’

The wider community’s perceptions of the ‘peace activities’, including the friends and families of the monitors and ambassadors, were mixed. Respondents reported a lot of support for the work they were doing and the message they were preaching. However, there were also people who did not want to hear their message and who did not like it. Overall, there was a resounding feeling that more people liked what they were doing than those who were against it. Furthermore, there were many cases of people
wanting to join the peace monitors or ambassadors after hearing about them or observing them. Below are some examples of these feelings.

“In Crossroads Philippi, the peace monitors are seen as the light at the end of the tunnel in problems that they are encountering in Crossroads and Marikana issues because they play a role of trying to put the two groups together in the conflict that is happening there. They are putting a value in a peaceful initiative program. I have been there recently where they marched about peace and prayer, organized by the peace monitors. In Samora Machel, the peace monitors there they are having patrols in the morning and in the afternoon when the kids are going to school and when the kids are going out. They’re trying to address the issue of kids not being able to go to school because of the gangsterism” (Mr Mbatha).

“Hmm, they accept them very much. They are very glad for them, because most of the older people are at home inside during the day, during the night, we’re inside and the monitors are going around, and they see the difference. They see the difference, more quiet. But before ‘wah, wah, wah’ in the street. Ooh that one is fighting, this one is fighting, everybody is in the street. Now since the peace monitors started, it’s all quiet now, it’s all peaceful. Even in December, it was nogal nice. It was peaceful” (Dawn, 50-year-old female monitor).

“The other students, mostly of them do understand the peaceful ambassadors, but others has still the mind-set of their communities that they (foreigners) don’t deserve to be in South Africa. Why do they escape their countries? So they belong to their countries, they don’t belong here because of the stigmatizing and generalization that they take our work, like because the sister has finished her matric and she is not working, so why do you side with those people? Others don’t want to listen to anything, they just say that is a waste of time because my mind is already made” (Ambassador 9, female teenager).

“Some of the meetings, when we first came from ARESTA and then we run those meetings, the community meetings… Ja. They will walk away from the
meeting. Some people walk away, because they beat their feet down and say we don’t want foreigners in here” (Fungile, 40-year-old male monitor).

“Yes, my mother and my other friends, I tell them why people they came here. Some of them, they believe me, some of them say ‘no, you are telling a lie, they came to destroy our country and taking our jobs’. So I must hit them. I say ‘no, it’s not good’. (Ambassador 5, teenage female).

Impact of ARESTA’s work
The peace monitors in ward 97 believe that since ARESTA began working with the community, there has been less crime and less xenophobia. Furthermore, the area has been more peaceful. The biggest problem they cite when it comes to foreign nationals is gangsters, mostly youth, who target Somali shops. However, ARESTA and Mr Mbatha have managed to train a few peace monitors who were previously gangsters and have now changed their ways, which directly targets this problem, if only in a small way (Interview with Nosibulelo, thirty-year-old female monitor).

“Since they start to do this workshop, the peace workshops we have had a lot of fighting and gangsterism here, a lot of it and even the people in the shebeens, you know there were a lot of fights, but since they will mingle with the people, the peace monitors, it’s all quiet now. So the people have a very good outlook on it. Very good, because it’s quiet now, you don’t get the fighting, you don’t get, even the robbing, you know, there were people that robs a lot. In Khayelitsha its all down since they been doing that” (Dawn, 50-year-old female monitor).

“It’s through education (the situation improved), I could say. I think it’s through education amongst the communities, because I think ARESTA has played a big role here. In education, in educating our people about seeing foreign nationals as aliens, as people who, I can say who are hungry, like something that you see on TV. Like when you see Somalia, when you see Rwanda, you see wars, you see people who are hungry and desperate. Whereas on the other hand, there is a good thing that is coming out of those countries and they have skilled people. So an organization like ARESTA has
intervened. It might not be 100%, but they have tried their best” (Xolani, thirty-five-year-old male monitor).

“Ja. But now I’m glad, because of I will say that since I’ve been in ARESTA, I’ve noticed that it’s been at least there’s a lot of change. There’s a lot of change, because now as much as we educate, as much as ARESTA are doing those march and road shows, people do understand. Certain people do understand and some are neighbours of those guys who are doing businesses, the shops. They could stand for them now. If they notice that these guys, the youth, are walking around here, we don’t know them and we can see which means that we do notice that they are up to something. So all the neighbours will stand and say no... It is a new thing. Because on my own I notice that since ever I have been in ARESTA, so I’ve got an eye to notice that okay, there is a change. There is a change. So I think those march(es) ARESTA used to do have been helpful towards those African guys” (Fungile, forty-year-old male monitor).

Mr Mbatha believes that the success of ARESTA’s workshops is evident in two developments: that the xenophobic attacks of 2015 never spread to Cape Town and specifically Khayelitsha; and that during these times, when organization were concerned about possible attacks, many called ARESTA.

“I think on that, we have seen, remember that we started in 2010, pilot phase, 2011 we started to implement another, we put another element into the programs. We were dealing with communities, different communities, in various communities and all the townships, where we implemented this, during 2015, xenophobic attacks in Durban and Gauteng and Johannesburg, we saw the impact of what we planted from 2010. Because in the Western Cape each and every stakeholder that was involved in trying to prevent the anti-xenophobia, that they were involved in anti-xenophobia in the Western Cape, they will call this office, ‘ARESTA, we need your expertise. We are having a march, or we are having a problem of this nature, can you come and be part of us? Because you’re the only organisation in the Western Cape that we know talks around these issues of anti-xenophobia’. Remember this, it’s what we planted years before. Now it’s reaping what it sows, what we sow in
the soil, because people are able to identify us with the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. To us it was a very huge success, which we don’t see that there is a space to stop doing what we are doing. It doesn’t need to have people being attacked or killed for us to act. Prevention is better than cure, so this has taught us that” (Mr Mbatha, campaign manager).

Meshack, a staff member at the UNHCR who takes part in the workshops, echoes Mr Mbatha,

“The impact, I wouldn’t really measure the impact, but ever since we started introducing these programs of peace monitors and peace ambassadors, especially in Khayelitsha, we haven’t had like an outbreak of xenophobic attacks, even though you will find people’s shops being broken into, but when it comes to sort of the massive attacks on foreign nationals, it hasn’t happened in Khayelitsha where this program has started and that can be attributed to the fact that the peace monitors who have been trained and they are educating their locals wherever they are staying” (Meshack, UNHCR staff).

Weaknesses, Contradictions and the Role of Foreign Nationals

A contradiction emerges between the good work that is attributed to the peace monitors and ARESTA, the ‘conversions’, the decrease in xenophobia and crime; and the lack of community engagement by foreign nationals. If people’s attitudes are changing towards foreign nationals, and communities are becoming safer, naturally the engagement of foreign nationals in community structures and life should increase. However, this has not been the case in Khayelitsha as well as the other townships where ARESTA has its campaigns. The lack of foreign national involvement in communities, and the idea that they may be too scared to be involved with South Africans stands in contradiction to the respondents’ claims of success.

An important issue and challenge for ARESTA’s campaign is the role of foreign nationals, as well as their lack of participation. Within ARESTA’s campaign there is a role for foreign nationals. Their role is to be as active as they may be in the community’s and in community issues. There should be foreign nationals as peace monitors and at the workshops, so that it presents an opportunity for South Africans and foreign nationals to meet each other. It would also make the workshops more
powerful for the participants to be able to hear from a foreign national. Foreign nationals ideally would also attend the events that are organized in their name, such as cultural celebrations. These types of events with anti-xenophobia messages are much less effective when there are no refugees or foreign nationals present. Aside from ARESTA, taking part in community issues may assist in fostering better relations and understanding between locals and foreign nationals.

Mr Mbatha noted that it is difficult to get refugees and asylum seekers to take part in events with local communities. He notes that seem reluctant for various reasons, one of them being out of fear. Through my participant observation I noticed this trend of a lack of participation from refugees and asylum seekers, and foreign nationals in general. While I was doing my internship at the UNHCR, some staff and I went around Cape Town, handing out pamphlets and talking to foreign nationals, inviting them to attend our World Refugee Day celebration in Philippi. We met hundreds of foreign nationals and handed out hundreds of pamphlets. Many people we spoke to said that they did not want to go to Philippi to attend the celebration because they did not feel they would be safe, although we told them it would be a safe environment with a security presence. Others informed us that such a celebration would not improve their lives, while others said that they would indeed attend. The celebration turned out to be disappointing in terms of the numbers of refugees and asylum seekers. There was a much bigger group of South Africans. There were some refugees but not a significant amount, not more than fifty. Many people who said they would come did not. This made such an endeavour less successful as the goal was to get South Africans and refugees together in one space, with music, dance and food.

I attended a Heritage Day celebration on the 24th of September 2015 in Monwabisi, in Endlovini, Khayelitsha. It was a cultural celebration and a soccer tournament for the youth and it had a theme of foreign nationals and peace. Apart from UNHCR and ARESTA banners advocating tolerance, this message was to be carried out through speeches from various community members, including refugee leaders, and entertainment by South Africans and foreign nationals. However, there were no foreign nationals in attendance. Those scheduled for speeches or song and dance did not show up, and there were none in the audience. The event nevertheless was a success in terms of how well the message was spread and received through the
speeches of respected community leaders mixed with entertainment for the community. However, this does not bode well for the integration of foreign nationals if they are absent from these types of events and from the public life of South Africans. My understanding from the event was that the lack of foreign nationals at the event was a combination of both bad organizing and a lack of interest on the side of refugees and other foreign nationals. These observations helped me understand comments relayed to me later about the need for the participation of foreign nationals in the lives of communities.

“Part of the reasons why these programs are being established, was to bring that better understanding between the locals and the South Africans, between the locals and the foreigners, because they’ve got a role to play here. They cannot always be aloof or distant from the South Africans, because they stay with them at the end of the day. And trying to bring them together is for them to share their story with whoever they interact” (Meshack, UNHCR Staff).

“You find even these programs, for instance soccer games, sports that have been organised to try and breach the bridge, but still they don’t come. Even though transport has been provided, I know of the Zimbabweans where buses had to go and fetch them, but came back empty” (Meshack, UNHCR staff).

“Let me put an example of what is happening now, we talk about sixteen days of activism against women and children abuse and activities are happening in the communities. Where are the foreign nationals in supporting such? And you will find out they are not there in those marches. They think it is South African issues, ‘we, we need to just stand our stuff’. In Khayelitsha, in Khayelitsha, I have been in some of the marches that were hosted by different NGOs. You won’t see foreign nationals there. Sometimes the question is, were they invited?... Let us talk about the way things are in the townships. In the townships they go to radio stations. People, they use the loud hailers to invite every community. So you don’t need a specific letter to be part of the challenges that are facing the communities” (Mr Mbatha, campaign manager).

Mr Mbatha explained why there are so few foreign nationals as peace monitors and how the participants for the workshops are chosen,
“we lobby the different wards, we talk to them to give us 25 people from different stakeholders, be it NGO, churches, different foreign nationals, civil societies, all the stakeholders that they work within the ward and when they do that, so we have different, from different sectors of that community. As part of social cohesion, we ask those people’s names and then the community themselves will select the different people from these different sectors, or those people who sent the names of the participants to the workshop to the social cohesion workshop, then we want to get those people”.

Mr Mbatha noted that they do not lobby refugees and other foreign nationals to be peace monitors. Rather, those that have become peace monitors have been able to because they have been part of community structures and activities. Thus, if foreign nationals do not take part in communities, then it is unlikely they will get the opportunity to take part in the peace monitors’ workshops (Interview with Mr Mbatha).

Meshack notes that refugees were specifically invited to two workshops but they did not attend,

“Yes, I know of 2 workshops where foreign nationals were invited, because the reason why we will have these workshops in the locations, you probably take them to where you know there are a lot of foreign nationals residing in that particular location. Now if they don’t come, then it becomes a problem, and then in a number of invitations that were extended to foreign nationals, some of them, especially Somalis, because they are the most vulnerable ones, they are the ones who don’t even come and attend these workshops and yet they know that they will be the ones paying the price. So they do get invited” (Meshack, UNHCR staff).

Meshack and Mr Mbatha provided insight into why refugees and other foreign nationals may not want to take part in the workshops and other events,

“I think I’ve said it before that foreigners still feel that they cannot find themselves sitting under the same roof as the South Africans. And I think another thing, foreigners feel that the only time they have is to put food on the table. So they only concentrate on working other than attending the workshops
that deals with the social cohesion. So it’s more onto making money than attending these workshops” (Meshack, UNHCR staff).

“The reason behind that will be one, the foreigners within the township, that’s, they’re real scared to be, to move around the local communities and also the reasons of them being in the townships totally different. Some are there just to do business and go back to where they stay, they may be staying in the township, they may be staying in suburbs. Some they don’t have time for the local programs that are, that are happening, they always feel that its, it’s for the South Africans, as much as we are trying by all means to talk to them but that’s the thing that is there and the fear that they have” (Mr Mbatha, campaign organizer).

Another weakness around the campaign includes the fact that there is no real monitoring of the work that the peace monitors do. Mr Mbatha does reach out to the monitors and ambassadors and follows up on their activities. However, there is no formal monitoring (Interview with Meshack, UNHCR staff). Another constraint is in the budget. The peace monitors and the peace ambassadors are not paid or given a stipend for their work. It is thus difficult for them to keep their projects going when they are at work, or are looking for employment. A basic stipend would allow the monitors to spend more time in their peace activities (Interview with Aleck, ARESTA staff).

Perceptions of Xenophobia

A substantial amount of respondents believed that there was no xenophobia in their communities, the respective communities of the ambassadors and especially ward 97 for the monitors. This was particularly due to a widespread understanding (amongst respondents) of xenophobia as single and widespread physical attacks, the most extreme violent acts, and not to the continuum of everyday acts of discrimination. Thus many respondents believed that there was xenophobia before, in 2008 but not recently and not in 2015 when it happened in Durban and Johannesburg. This was not due to a language barrier. After asking whether they thought there was xenophobia in their communities I substituted xenophobia for other more easily and less controversial sounding words and phrases, such as whether there were people in the
community who did not like foreigners. Many respondents understood xenophobia to be about physical attacks. However, even when I substituted the word, the majority still believed there was no xenophobia or people that had a dislike for foreign nationals. There was xenophobia before but not now. Many of the respondents contradicted themselves in the interviews, saying that no one disliked foreigners, only later to say that people blame them for taking jobs and treat them in a ‘harsh way’. Furthermore, many of the monitors and ambassadors brushed off the importance of people with xenophobic mind-sets, saying that they cannot force people to change and they are not worried about them.

Here Dawn contradicts herself. She says that there is not a lot of dislike for foreign nationals and it is a lot better now. The only problem is jealousy from shop owners,

“No, it wasn’t a lot (dislike for foreign nationals), besides the jealousy. I think there was a lot of jealousy, because especially from the people who own shops, the South Africans who own shops. They didn’t want them to do their business, because then there’s a lot of shops that will make less money daily and so on and so on. You know, the scale, it’s not the same now... So now we, as we talk to them and explain to them leave the people. Now it’s a little bit better. It’s much better now...No, no. They were leaving them alone, it’s only when they were told or bought to make some trouble...There was no tension between us, besides them as sellers, the shop owners, people who owns shops and stuff, so the fight was between them” (Dawn, 50-year-old female monitor).

Later, Dawn says that people are very negative towards foreign nationals, blame them for taking jobs and do not want them living in the same area,

“So sometimes they don’t understand the hardship these people go through. They say they came here to take our money and our jobs and they just like to live nice on our system. (I hear that) Every time. Even if they want a place to stay, then they wah, wah, wah, wah! Here in Town 2, ja. Ja, very negative towards them. Very negative towards them, so it’s there where I try to explain to them – these people are not as negative as you make them be. I hear this a lot. In the streets, like me, you know I stay with this lady (foreign national). Then my sister will say ‘you must chase her out. You must chase her out, she
mustn’t stay here’. Then I ask her: ‘Ja. Why? Why? What’s wrong with you?’ ‘No, I don’t like her!’. So there’s much negativity for them, but they are holding out’ (Dawn, 50-year-old female monitor).

Siphokazi also contradicts herself. She said that there used to be conflict and tension between South Africans and foreign nationals, but there is not anymore. She goes on to say that there are not people in Khayelitsha who dislike foreign nationals but later admits people call them derogatory names and say they should leave.

“No, (there are not people who do not like foreigners in Khayelitsha) is like foreigners now, because of because of ARESTA, I say so” and “Yes they call ‘Makweri kweri’, they say ‘no not belong here, Makweri kweri must go, must go” (Siphokazi, 34-year-old female monitor).

Khanyisa understands xenophobia to be “a fear of foreigners”, she does not understand the literal meaning to be limited to physical attacks. When asked whether xenophobia exists in Khayelitsha, she says that it was there in the past and is not present now, focusing solely on the physical attacks,

“No that much, but I will say years ago it was really existing bad, because people who were breaking shops of Somalis and take their stuff, like they will say start in that community and go to another one, all of the shops, they will break it and take their things, they will beat the Somalis (2008 attacks) …Ja, it got better now. I think the reason why it got better, is because some of the South Africans stood up and fought for the foreigners, so they saw that that is why. Because it was all over, like in Durban, in this year, they were doing those things, breaking the Somali shops, so I think now it is very low”.

Later, when asked whether there are people in Khayelitsha who dislike foreign nationals, Khanyisa claims that there are some, those who are unemployed and drink a lot.

“Ja, I think ja, ja. There are…The reason you know, I don’t know what to say, but most of people who don’t like Somalis, people like I would say, are people who are uneducated. Most of them, because they don’t have jobs, and they will say these Somalis came in our communities and take our jobs. So most of people are uneducated people, that are drinking alcohol most of the time,
sitting in our community doing nothing” (Khanyisa, teenage female ambassador).

Yoliswa understand xenophobia as South Africans attacking foreign nationals. To get around the difficulty of this word, she was asked whether there were any problems or tensions between South Africans and foreign nationals in her community. She claimed that there were problems during the xenophobic attacks of 2008, where Somalis were attacked in her community, but not after that and not in 2015, like in Johannesburg, “but we stopped that, we didn’t like that… Because this one, were happening in Jo’burg, there was nothing here”. She focuses solely on the physical attacks when asked about any tensions between the two groups. When asked about people who dislike foreign nationals she says,

“Some of them, but now there are few. Some of them they don’t like it, but we don’t care about them. One day they will realise that this is not right. You see, we as a people don’t think this (foreign nationals) is the problem”.

Earlier, when asked about what community members think of their peace activities, she addresses some of them,

“If the boys from this township robbed them, they said ‘ja, you are right. Do it, they must leave this country, they don’t belong here. They came here to corrupt our country” (Yoliswa, thirty-four-year-old female monitor).

Thus, Yoliswa places physical attacks as the main problem and downplays the significance of anti-foreigner attitudes.

Then there are a few respondents who claim that there is no xenophobia, but they do not contradict themselves by relating stories of dislike or discrimination. Finally, there was also a substantial group of respondents who believed that there was xenophobia, dislike and discrimination of foreign nationals in their communities.

“Ja, they think of that cause, like if you go to town, Cape Town, specifically to restaurants you find more of borders (foreign nationals) working there, so they think that when they don’t have, like matriculants coming from this school, then they don’t have anything to do, or they need money to go to school, so they don’t have, they have to work. So in the restaurants there are borders, so they think that they are here just to take the work from them… By saying that it happens a lot, like people, the foreigners are being criticised in a way that
they are being called names and their tribe is not respected, and also that they are being criticised if one, like for an example, one South African is using a train to travel to work, and also the foreigners are using the train, maybe sometimes people are sitting in the train because it gets full a lot of times. So one foreigner and he’s hanging like this, so one would say that’ Amakwerekwere their kids are smelling like yuck, like really’. So they are stigmatising… Specifically they don’t like Zimbabweans, because basically here in Kuyasa, they are the ones who fixes phones and tailor shoes, so when one incident had happened, maybe your phone has been taken out apart by that Zimbabwean, so they will stigmatise that Zimbabweans are taking parts of our phones so they are not right, or something like that” (Ambassador 9, teenage female).

Aleck, an employee at ARESTA and Mr Mbatha provide their insights from their line of work,

“I’ve just picked up the similar sentiment in all the townships that I’ve been, that you know tension is definitely there and I definitely blame the government for the tension. Because I mean there are a lot of misconceptions when these guys are sitting at home, they think that foreign nationals don’t pay tax, they sit you in an office, they think that when you get paid, you send all your money to your parents, you know and they forget that before you even receive it in your account, SARS gets a portion, you know one, one foreign national steals from a community member and then they label all foreign nationals as the same” (Aleck, ARESTA employee).

“So if you live in Khayelitsha, at any given time, even in Khayelitsha, a scourge of xenophobia may occur because of that mentality, or ja, people they make use of that in scoring points in political issues as you are going to 2016, you will out find out that people will start protest and everything and those elements, they find it not that people intended to see themselves looting the Somali shops and what but because of some elements within as we put it as, there will be a criminal act but that would be resulted to raise xenophobic violent act because the mentality that would be accompanying the criminal act will cause that damage… So there is no area within the black townships where
you may find that, this area you can’t find xenophobic tendencies or xenophobic mind-sets” (Mr Mbatha, campaign manager).

Mr Mbatha provided some insights into why many of the respondents thought that there was no xenophobia anymore. For Mr Mbatha the ‘converted ones’ will not see that there is xenophobia in their communities specifically because they are ‘converted’, because they have a positive mind-set towards foreign nationals, they are less likely to take notice of those who have opposing views.

“…sometimes the converted person may seem indifferent but a lot of ordinary South Africans, but if you talk to someone in a shebeen, to that person about issues, you’ll find a different taste of the feeling of xenophobia. So me, I always think like that, we converted people may see different, that’s why for me, I always make it… Even in the areas where we have trained peace monitors there will be those people with xenophobic mind-sets… remember that when we train people Shaun, we train 25 people in the area, now we are talking about a ward that has more than thirty thousand people, twenty thousand people, voting people around eighteen or sixteen thousand people of all these wards. Twenty-five people and twenty thousand, we have that big, big gap. These twenty-five people cannot preach the gospel of xenophobia to 18000 people... Remember that they are converted, so that’s why they would say that, that’s what they will think of. But if you go deeper to, even in the same street they are staying and find someone else who is not yet even maybe talked with some of them or you’ll find a person who talks something different of that” (someone who speaks negatively about foreign nationals) (Mr Mbatha, campaign manager).

There are two possible reasons for the respondents to understand xenophobia in such a limited way or at the surface level. This may be due to a limitation of the workshops, as it is not easy talk to get people to see beyond the most obvious manifestations of xenophobia. At the workshop, the presenters did attempt to counter myths that influence everyday discrimination, however they did not stress that foreign nationals may experience xenophobia in a continuum, from the violent to the everyday. The second reason may be because violence is more shocking, more dramatic, in your face and hard to miss. It is also symbolic, as it says ‘you are not
wanted here’. Finally, for such everyday discrimination to be easily visible to South Africans, it may take broader societal change.

Summary of Findings
ARESTA’s campaign has had a significant effect in ward 97 and other in other parts of Khayelitsha. This is not only in terms of contesting xenophobia but also crime and violence. Furthermore, high school students have made efforts at creating a more positive environment for learning. However, ARESTA’s programs are not without limitations, such as the lack of monitoring and lack of foreign national participation in community structures and ARESTA’s programs. Contradictions arise when one compares the reported impacts of the programs and the lack of foreign national participation, partly linked to a fear of South Africans. Furthermore, the monitor’s and ambassadors’ focus on the most extreme form of xenophobia, violence, and the ignorance of a continuum of everyday experiences of xenophobia is problematic and points to a limitation in the workshops.
Analysis

The aim of this discussion and thesis is to discuss two items. The first is how ARESTA contests xenophobia, in Ward 97 and other parts of Khayelitsha. The second is what the former tells us about citizenship and belonging in South Africa.

Intervention Regarding Relationship between Lit Review and Findings

There are strong disjunctions which need to be outlined at the outset of the presentation of the findings. The biggest disjuncture is posed by the approach of Neocosmos who as a leftist class analyst focused on the consequences of contemporary capitalism, sees change in the communities afflicted by xenophobic violence and daily prejudice as needing to take a particular form, that of an anti-capitalist struggle against the core reason for xenophobic violence, extreme poverty. His clean concepts of popular democracy, active citizenship and struggle are an ideal-type which may feature with the struggle of AbM but are not common place in change processes in SA. The examples of CWP and ARESTA are more likely to appear in communities across the country where programs on human rights, tolerance, religious values of ‘togetherness’ and ‘oneness’, Pan-Africanism, and humanism are the order of the day.

Xenophobia and Citizenship

The attitudes of the respondents before the workshops closely mirror the literature on the attitudes of South Africans towards foreign nationals, through surveys and the media. The majority of respondents held xenophobic attitudes before the workshop. Common themes or stereotypes amongst the respondents and members of their communities are that foreign nationals: steal ‘our’ women, steal ‘our’ jobs, sell drugs, commit crime, and are involved in witchcraft and Satanism. This mirrors findings from the SAMP survey (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010: 216-217) and common stereotypes from the print media, such as: ‘migrants as job stealers’, ‘migrants as criminals’ and ‘migrants as ‘illegals’ (Danso & McDonald, 2001:124). Although not a statistical endeavour, this qualitative case study brings home how pervasive these stereotypes really are as the majority of respondents reported having them before they attended a workshop.
The common trend from the literature is that black South African men are the perpetrators of xenophobic and discriminatory acts (Warner & Finchilescu, 2003; Morris, 1998). The campaign director of ARESTA and driver of the anti-xenophobia projects is a South African black male and ARESTA works with many South African black males, teenagers and adults. Many who fit this profile are now peace ambassadors and monitors, who are contesting xenophobia in their communities. ARESTA does not specifically target black males. Rather it intervenes strategically in volatile areas that were hotspots in the 2008 xenophobic attacks, all being predominantly black areas. Mr Mbatha, the campaign director at ARESTA believes that woman can be equally xenophobic to men (Interview with Mr Mbatha). Nonetheless, ARESTA is intervening with the demographic profile which is seen as the most prone to xenophobia, black men.

ARESTA’s workshops changed the views of many respondents towards African foreign nationals. Subsequently, a new idea of citizenship emerged. Citizenship was now open to African foreign nationals coming from both war and poverty. It is open to people who want to work and to contribute to the South African economy. It is underpinned by a humanism and a Pan-Africanism. Here one does not need to be born in South Africa in order to claim citizenship. Citizenship is not reduced to indigeneity as it is in post-apartheid South Africa according to Neocosmos (2006). This version of citizenship represents a form of flexible citizenship, as envisioned by Nyamnjoh (2006). It ties citizenship to the need to work and to the place of work. This notion of citizenship comes from an initiative by an NGO, with the work and contributions of ordinary community members. This is different from what both Nyamnjoh and Neocosmos envision for the fight for a flexible and more inclusive citizenship. Nyamnjoh sees the need for migrants to negotiate for a more inclusive citizenship. Neocosmos feels that this fight could not be carried out by an NGO, but rather by migrants themselves or a democratic political organization. Although the work of ARESTA, the monitors and ambassadors does not secure a more flexible citizenship for migrants in real terms, their work is one small step in that direction and allows a comparison with the theory.
NGOs and Contesting Xenophobia

Neocosmos (2006:115) argues that a human rights discourse is incompatible with overcoming xenophobia. ARESTA’s workshops contain teachings about human rights and a lot of the content falls into the human rights discourse. Nevertheless, although xenophobia was not overcome, xenophobia was successfully contested by both an NGO and through a human rights discourse. Thus, this thesis suggests that it is possible to contest xenophobia within an NGO which follows a human rights discourse.

Does the work of ARESTA’s peace monitors and peace ambassadors constitute active citizenship according to Neocosmos (2006)? Neocosmos would respond positively to the political aspects of the peace monitors’ work, to the articulation of anti-xenophobia and its motivation in the community. These aspects may resemble active citizenship. However, Neocosmos would not envision active citizenship as working through an NGO as well as with the local government structures. Rather, he envisioned alternative and popular democratic organizations, outside of the state and NGO realm, who would put popular prescriptions to the state.

ARESTA’s attempts at contesting xenophobia may be compared with others in the literature. AbM involved political discussions amongst shack dwellers and was not led by an NGO. The group articulated their anti-xenophobia stance by calling for a ‘unity of the oppressed’ and arguing that ‘a person cannot be illegal’, and then defended foreign nationals from attacks in their areas in the 2008 attacks. Their ideological position did not come from an NGO initiative but their activities were more about protection during the attacks, as opposed to prevention and challenging mind-sets. AbM’s strength lay in its grassroots formation, its independence from the state and ANC and its political nature, mirroring Neocosmos’s (2006) active citizenship, being an alternative democratic organization.

The Community Works Program (CWP) involved two outside parties as facilitators. The initiative involved dealing with trauma and speaking about diversity. It also involved a public works program, where both South Africans and foreign nationals worked. Its strength lay in the fact that it dealt with economic issues and allowed for South Africans and foreign nationals to work together. ARESTA’s programs involved
a greater NGO involvement. However, the activists largely carried out their programs on their own. It was limited by the fact that it did not address economic issues. Its strength lay in its reach, targeting all the main townships in Cape Town and its relationship with other actors, such as the police.

Another strength of ARESTA lay in the organic leadership of the campaign manager, Mr Mbatha. He is from the Khayelitsha community, can relate to its problems and knows the community well. His natural and charismatic leadership style make it seems as if he is acting as a community member and not on behalf of ARESTA. This contributes to his success in getting through to communities.

Dodson’s (2010) Six Axes Applied

Dodson’s (2010) six axes of the explanations of xenophobia can be used as a framework to analyse the work of ARESTA. Using each type of explanation of xenophobia, one can analyse what contribution ARESTA makes in addressing the specific issues which contribute to xenophobia.

**Axis 1: Economic and material explanations**

Economic and material explanation point to poverty and deprivation. They also point to the accusations made by South Africans that foreign nationals are ‘stealing their jobs’. ARESTA’s activists have undertaken an economic intervention in ward 97. They did this by intervening in the conflict between the South African and Somali spaza shop owners, and by facilitating in allowing the transfusion of business know-how from the Somali to the South African, so that both are doing business today, without the South African making use of violence to deter competition.

**Axis 2 and 4: Constructing a new national identity after 1994 and the need to protect a newly acquired citizenship**

Axis 2 creates an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, while axis 4 creates the need to protect a recently earned citizenship. Both result in the exclusion of African foreign nationals. ARESTA and its activists countered both of these axes through the creation of an ‘inclusive
citizenship’, where African foreign nationals have the right to live and work in South Africa and where their humanity is recognized.

**Axis 3: Increased exposure to Africans from further north**

This created negative stereotyping of foreign nationals by South Africans and vice-versa. There is ample evidence of ARESTA breaking down various stereotypes of African foreign nationals and replacing them with an improved understanding of their cultures and life-situations which led them to South Africa.

**Axis 5: A lack of political leadership**

This involves a lack of leadership by politicians and local government officials but also bad leadership, such as the perpetuation of negative stereotypes. This was not ARESTA’s focus, however, they did work with local councilors and the local ANC in Khayelitsha, and got them on board with their project.

**Axis 6: Denial**

This refers to a denial of xenophobia. As mentioned in the findings, there was a strong denial in the communities of ‘everyday discrimination’, as xenophobia was mostly seen in relation to violence. Although ARESTA raised awareness about foreign nationals and their troubles, they were not able to raise significant awareness about the everyday discrimination experienced by African foreign nationals.

**Limitations**

Contradictions which arose from the research point to the limitations of the workshops, in a context of broader societal factors, and thus the need for broader interventions into society or societal change. The respondents reported major successes from their work, their areas being safer, and some pointing to the current non-existence of xenophobia or a significant reduction. However, at the same time and despite this progress, foreign nationals still do not take part in community structures and seem unwilling to do so. In this light, this thesis argues that ARESTA’s workshops and subsequent peace activism did make a significant contribution to
fighting xenophobia. However, it has its limitations and the issues in broader society are still important.

Landau and Freemantle (2010:375) note how foreign nationals are involved in self-exclusion. They subscribe to a ‘tactical cosmopolitanism’ where they negotiate partial inclusion into South African society without being bound by it. This may partially explain why foreign nationals are reluctant to take part in community structures and activities, and presents an avenue for future research. During my internship at the UNHCR I interacted with many refugees who were in the process of resettlement to a third country or those who desired it. Their minds were completely oriented on leaving South Africa and being in the third country. However, the process can take up to 2 years or more to complete and one may be rejected in the end. They still had to make a (better/more secure/more integrated) life in South Africa, however, this was not their focus.

Ameliorative and Substantial Change

Earlier it was noted that there was a disjuncture between the theory of Neocosmos and my findings. This bring us to the difference between ameliorative (tolerance, peace) and substantive (or radical) change. Neocosmos is focused on struggles that unite migrants and oppressed South Africans in an anti-capitalist democratic popular fight against extreme inequality which would root out the conditions that breed xenophobia. This may be what is needed in the long run to overcome xenophobia in South Africa, to eliminate it. However, the argument of this thesis is that the current conditions in South Africa do not support such a struggle, not without independent poor people’s organizations. Furthermore, foreign nationals are not united to join in this fight, as they tend towards a self-exclusion. The work of ARESTA contributes significantly to opposing xenophobia, but it can be argued that its work preaching peace and tolerance is piecemeal, like applying bandages to a more structural problem. It is closer to reform than to radical change.
Concluding Remarks

ARESTA contests xenophobia through civic education and community engagement. Through workshops, ARESTA staff teach adults and high school students about refugees and asylum seekers and why they are here, their rights and obligations. Mr Mbatha and other ARESTA staff promote tolerance at the workshops, where peace monitors and ambassadors are trained. These peace activists spread tolerance in their communities, ‘converting’ some people on the way. They also mediate in community conflicts between South Africans and foreign nationals, and between foreign nationals themselves.

The majority of respondents went through a change of great proportions during the workshops. Many held xenophobic attitudes before these workshops, and by the end believed strongly in the rights and humanity of all African foreign nationals. This may be partly explained by the charismatic leadership of the campaign manager Mr Mbatha. New notions of citizenship and belonging emerged from the workshops and subsequent ‘peace’ activism. This notion of citizenship was no longer tied to indigeneity, but was based on the need to work, escape war and hardship, and place of work. It was further justified by Pan-Africanism and a common humanity. It further represents a flexible citizenship as envisioned by Nyamnjoh. This achievement was brought about through the work of an NGO which followed a human rights discourse, something Neocosmos (2006) argues against.

ARESTA’s work presented some contradictions, such as the reported progress, reduced crime and xenophobia vs the lack of foreign national involvement in community structures and ARESTA’s peace activities. Furthermore, many respondents equated xenophobia with violence and were not aware of the everyday discrimination experienced by foreign nationals. This presented limitations to the workshops and peace activism. ARESTA’s does a lot to oppose xenophobia, and works within what is presently possible in South Africa, such as through human rights discourse and organizations. However, its work is ameliorative, rather than radical, what may be needed to overcome xenophobia but is not currently possible in South Africa.
There is a great need for further research on methods of overcoming xenophobia, theoretically and with examples of real efforts. This is important for theoretical and empirical data, but also for its practical importance in the name of social justice. Furthermore, notwithstanding the broader socio-political changes that need to occur, import work done by organizations like ARESTA, that are organically led by people who know their communities at the grassroots level, should continue and be supported.
Reference List


