RESCUING URBAN REGENERATION FROM URBAN PATRONAGE:
TOWARDS INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE VOORTREKKER
ROAD CORRIDOR

BY
Lauren Kim Uppink

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Philosophy in Development Policy and Practice,
Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice,
University of Cape Town

Supervisor: Professor Brian Levy

February 2016
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
ABSTRACT

The Voortrekker Road Corridor in Cape Town was recently identified as an Integration Zone according to National Treasury’s Integrated City Development Grant (ICDG). Prior to this a number of private and public stakeholders founded the Greater Tygerberg Partnership, in response to the need for a coordinating body to champion inclusive regeneration and local economic development in the corridor and neighbouring northern suburbs. Funded wholly by the City of Cape Town for its first three years of operation, the Partnership had after two years in operation appeared to have made little progress in catalysing interest and tangible investment in the area, even on a micro level.

This dissertation utilises the qualitative analysis method of process tracing for the period of 2012-2015 to explore themes of urban governance and conversely urban patronage. It firstly considers whether the apparent stasis is due to the Partnership being subjected to capture by strong private and political elites. Subsequently it examines whether incremental, micro-level governance initiatives and acts of public entrepreneurship, though seemingly small, have the potential to build momentum capable of overcoming such threatening predatory networks, and in so doing redirect the organisation towards achieving substantive inclusive and equitable regeneration.

KEY WORDS

Urban governance, urban patronage, urban regeneration, local economic development, coalitions, multi-stakeholder governance
DECLARATION

In submitting this dissertation, I declare that the work contained herein is my own and where the work of others has been used, it has been acknowledged in accordance with the rules of the University of Cape Town.

Signed by candidate

Signature removed

Lauren Kim Uppink

February 2016
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

“If you are more fortunate than others, it is better to build a longer table than a taller fence” – Anon

I read the above quote recently, and it truly resonated with me and my insatiable desire to affect greater inclusion, access and equality of opportunity in the country I call home. In reflecting on the recent (and ongoing) #feesmustfall movement, and in stark contrast on the profound opportunity afforded to me through my participation in the inaugural class if the MPhil in Development Policy and Practice, I am reminded that my academic journey has been one of great privilege. It has been a privilege that many others are not afforded, yet no less deserve. And I am overwhelmed with a responsibility to leverage that privilege not for my own benefit, but for the greater collective good.

I am greatly indebted to the Directors of the Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice, who were willing to take a chance on the young ‘aspiring public servant’, and who granted me access into the GSDPP classroom and essentially the broader ‘doing development differently’ community. Special mention must be given to my supervisor Professor Brian Levy, and also to Professor Matt Andrews, for giving me the tools to navigate the complexities of development policy with which I had already found myself grappling; and the courage to act on the gut responses I had already felt. Your willingness to go ‘against the grain’ of traditional policy reform resonated profoundly with my views on the public and social sector, and I am honoured to have been taught by individuals of your calibre and courage! I am grateful to Brian in particular for his patience, his mentorship, and his sense of humour that enabled me to plod through this dissertation journey to reach this point.

Furthermore it would be amiss to not pay tribute to Professor Chris Breen, who started me on a pivotal personal voyage of discovery, and Irene Streeten who subsequently guided me through it. Without both Chris and Irene, who patiently and objectively listened, I would not have been able to navigate my own internal complexities, thus enabling me to have the resilience and patience necessary for this journey.

Additionally, the privilege of undertaking this academic pursuit would not have been possible had it not been for the financial support of the City of Cape Town and the Graduate School, who both generously sponsored large portions of my studies.

Lastly, but most certainly not least, gratitude must be given to the network of individuals that supported me personally through this journey. I am thankful to my colleague and mentor Chris O’Connor, who consistently supported me to earn this degree part-time while working on his team, and provided me with the scope and freedom to pursue most of the experiments detailed in this
paper. I am forever grateful to my special friends and two dearest sisters who kept me (almost) sane during a wedding and a relocation in the midst of this academic adventure. Both my sisters, and each of these friends, have gifted me with their time, tissues, motivation and generous hospitality, and have encouraged and challenged me in equal measure throughout the last two years.

With regards to my parents, to whom I owe the educational foundation on which this Degree is built, words unfortunately cannot adequately capture the depth of appreciation I have for the gift of enquiry and learning they both gave me in my formative years. Special mention must be given to my mother who selflessly spent weeks packing up my life in Cape Town, and helping me to unpack it all over again in Johannesburg, all while I was glued to delivering the various iterations of this paper. Without your support, your computer and your hard work, and of course Dad being willing to live a few weeks without you, I would not have completed this dissertation.

And finally, my love and adoration goes to my husband, Daniel. His unwavering support, willingness to feed me and go to bed alone while I was glued to my computer, and his daily commitment to building a longer table together, has given me the freedom and strengthened my dedication to produce this work.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>FULL NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>African Centre for Cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Area Coordinating Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AML</td>
<td>Advanced Management Locality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCC</td>
<td>Bellville City Core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPO</td>
<td>Business Process Outsourcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>Bellville Transport Interchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Benefit Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Community Impact Chattanooga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CME</td>
<td>Construction Management and Economics Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoCT</td>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAG</td>
<td>Development Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIU</td>
<td>Development Integration Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EESP</td>
<td>Economic, Environmental and Spatial Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICDG</td>
<td>Integrated City Development Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plan 2012 - 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUDF</td>
<td>Integrated Urban Development Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCGM</td>
<td>Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFMA</td>
<td>Municipal Finance Management Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MURP</td>
<td>Mayoral Urban Renewal Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUTP</td>
<td>Mumbai Urban Transport Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCRI</td>
<td>The Ottawa Centre for Research and Innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLIP</td>
<td>Ottawa Local Immigration Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGWC</td>
<td>Provincial Government of the Western Cape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLF</td>
<td>Public Leadership Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRASA</td>
<td>Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>Residents' Welfare Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACN</td>
<td>South African Cities Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Spatial Development Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIP</td>
<td>Strategy and Investment Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>State-owned Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPUD</td>
<td>Department of Spatial Planning and Urban Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Special Ratings Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOD</td>
<td>Transit-oriented Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOP</td>
<td>The Ottawa Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRC</td>
<td>Voortrekker Road Corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRCID</td>
<td>Voortrekker Road Corridor Improvement District</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CONTENTS

**CHAPTER ONE | Introduction**  
1.1. Addressing Spatial Inequality through Infrastructure Development  
1.2. The Voortrekker Road Corridor  
1.3. Purpose of the Study  
1.4. Problem Statement  
1.5. Limitations of the study  
1.6. Chapter Outline

**CHAPTER TWO | Why the Voortrekker Road Corridor? The Opportunity**  
2.1. The Voortrekker Road Corridor Integration Zone  
2.2. Designing for Integration and Inclusivity  
2.3. Access to Land as a Lever for Inclusive Development

**CHAPTER THREE | Understanding the Voortrekker Road Corridor – The Challenge**  
3.1. Demographics in the Voortrekker Road Corridor  
3.2. Socio-Economic Status and Levels of Living  
3.3. Industry and Economic Trends  
3.3.1. Economic Activity and Land Use in the Voortrekker Road Corridor  
3.3.2. Economic Incentives and Initiatives in Voortrekker Road-Rail Corridor  
3.3.3. Socio-economic Infrastructure and Facilities

**CHAPTER FOUR | Hypothesis and Methodology**  
4.1. Hypothesis  
4.2. Methodology

**CHAPTER FIVE | Literature Review**  
5.1. Understanding Inclusive Urban Regeneration  
5.1.1. Transit oriented development  
5.1.2. Urban Regeneration and Gentrification  
5.1.3. Mixed-Income Housing to combat Gentrification in TOD  
5.2. Urban Governance
5.2.1. From government to governance ................................................................. 38
5.2.2. Associative Governance ........................................................................... 39
5.2.3. Participatory Urban Governance .............................................................. 40
5.2.4. Political and elite capture ......................................................................... 41
5.2.5. Participatory processes dominated by middle-class ............................... 42
5.2.6. City-building nonprofits .......................................................................... 43
5.2.7. Time horizons for stakeholder goals ....................................................... 45
5.2.8. Urban Governance in the Voortrekker Road Corridor ......................... 45

CHAPTER SIX | Great Expectations: June 2012 – June 2014 ........................................ 46

6.1.1. Mayoral Urban Renewal Programme ....................................................... 46
6.1.2. Establishment of the Voortrekker Road Corridor Improvement District and the Greater Tygerberg Partnership ................................................................. 47
6.1.3. Section 67 Grant-in-Aid ........................................................................ 48
6.1.4. Legal Status, Criteria for Membership and Board of Directors ............ 48
6.1.5. Membership and Representation of the GTP ......................................... 50
6.1.6. Imagining the Future and Design the City Workshops ....................... 50

6.2. Defining Roles and Responsibilities: March 2014 – May 2014 ......................... 52
6.2.1. City of Cape Town Developmental Mandate ........................................ 52
6.2.2. The Birth of a Liaison Forum: March 2014 ........................................... 53
6.2.3. Navigating Conflict: April 2014 ........................................................... 54
6.2.4. Implementation Protocol and Decision Gates Matrix: April-May 2014 .... 59

6.3. Identification and Prioritisation of GTP Projects ........................................ 62
6.3.1. A Regeneration Framework ................................................................. 62
6.3.2. Fourteen Partnership Programmes ....................................................... 63
6.3.3. The Accomplished Corridor ................................................................. 64
6.3.4. Whose Interests Do Special Purpose Vehicles Serve? ......................... 66
6.3.5. Prioritised Projects within the Voortrekker Road Corridor: April-May 2014 .... 67
1.1. ADDRESSING SPATIAL INEQUALITY THROUGH INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

City of Cape Town is a fast-growing metropolitan city, and its planners and leaders acknowledge the complex need to manage the varying developmental trends and challenges that exist in order to ensure it grows in a beneficial and sustainable manner (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 18). Furthermore, there is a need to develop infrastructure in such a way as to not only physically accommodate the growing population and number of job-seekers within its bounds, but also to grow economically in order to adequately provide services and opportunities for this growing population.

Due to historical reasons, spatial planning in the City initially served to perpetuate segregation and enforce barriers between various groupings and this can be seen quite obviously in the design of the city, its various suburbs and districts, as well as through the accessibility or lack thereof for different groupings of the Cape Town population (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 20). The City’s Spatial Development Framework takes these concerns into consideration and outlines a long term, 20 year vision and plan for “the desired spatial form and structure of Cape Town” (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 8).

In order to address the existing spatial inequality of the city, while simultaneously planning for a growing population and the need for rapid employment-centred growth, the City has identified the need to focus infrastructure development efforts on the older urban areas where maintenance and upgrades have been neglected due to a more recent focus on greenfield development and housing infrastructure (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 20). The High Risk Electricity and High Risk Wastewater areas tend to be positioned along the east to west band stretching from the Cape Town Central Business District (CBD) to what can be classified as a second metropolitan node, the Bellville CBD. It is intended that investing in infrastructure upgrades in this area will result in intensification of land use and the necessary densification needed to contain the urbanisation of the city (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 20).

Alongside addressing obvious infrastructure gaps and needs, in order to address the economic inequality and livelihood needs of the growing population, the City states it must “promote inclusive,
shared economic growth and development, support the informal economy, and improve people’s access to economic opportunities and urban amenities” (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 20).

To improve accessibility to social amenities and economic opportunities for all residents of the Cape Town Metro, the City must not only ensure accelerated economic and job-centred growth, but recognises in its 2012 Spatial Development Framework (SDF) the need to develop a movement system that will provide both affordable and convenient access for all Capetonians to such amenities and opportunities. The SDF therefore calls for a movement system that is “public-transport orientated and provide[s] an equitable pattern of access” (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 30).

1.2. THE VOORTREKKER ROAD CORRIDOR

The Voortrekker Road Corridor (VRC) stretches along Voortrekker Road from Salt River Circle in the West to the Stikland Bridge in the East, and includes areas as diverse as Parow, Bellville, Maitland, Salt River, Goodwood and Elsies River. The Corridor is identified as the City of Cape Town’s “Urban Core Corridor” which connects the Cape Town CBD with the Bellville CBD, exhibits a wide variety of activity, and provides for a significant portion of the city’s formal employment opportunities (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 34).

What is referred to as the second metropolitan node of the city includes the Tygervalley Precinct and the Bellville Central Area, of which the latter overlays a portion of the corridor and extends as far south as the University of Western Cape and Cape Peninsula University of Technology campuses (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 10). This node forms an integral part of the infrastructure and transport development plans for the corridor, with particular reference to the Bellville Rail Station and surrounding public transport interchange.

Voortrekker Road was recently identified as an Integration Zone according to National Treasury’s Integrated City Development Grant (ICDG). As such, it is currently the focus of a dedicated City if Cape Town Strategy and Investment Plan (SIP) development process which aims to determine the best location and sequencing for catalytic public sector investment along the corridor, to spark urban regeneration and revitalisation of the adjacent neighbourhoods and commercial nodes.

Simultaneously the municipality has co-founded and wholly funded the establishment of the Greater Tygerberg Partnership (GTP), which is essentially an area economic partnership that aims to lead collaborative, and importantly inclusive, efforts towards the revitalisation and economic development of Cape Town’s northern suburbs, and in particular the Voortrekker Road Corridor. Set up as a not for profit private company, the GTP has been in operation since 2012, but has shown relatively few signs
of progress since establishment, and concerns have been raised with regards to leadership and in particular the modes of urban governance exhibited. In the beginning of 2014 a group of City of Cape Town officials, in conversation with relevant politicians, commenced a process of trying to assess and improve governance in the region and of the organisation. This study tells a story of urban governance, urban regeneration, and urban patronage, and the complexity with which they are all linked.

1.3. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study is thus an attempt to uncover and analyse examples of micro-level initiatives in urban governance which have been undertaken in the Voortrekker Road Corridor Integration Zone, and to determine the extent to which they have served as a platform for the emergence of ‘islands of effectiveness’. The study aims to trace a timeline of this incremental approach and related initiatives in an attempt to understand their cumulative effect on longer term gains in urban governance, as well as on the achievement of inclusion and economic development in the corridor.

1.4. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The success of inclusive urban regeneration efforts is by and large dependent on the urban governance arrangements in which they are undertaken. Modes of governance in relation to cities in particular have been well observed and analysed by the likes of Pieterse (2002), Bramwell, Nelles and Wolfe (2008), Andrew and Doloreux (2012) and more recently Chattopadhyay (2015). It is broadly understood that governance approaches tend to be positioned along a continuum between an idealistic urban politics which involves “the creation of socially inclusive ‘economic communities’ underpinned by networks and ‘civic capital’” (Bramwell et al., 2008, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1291), and an urban politics “captured by global neoliberalism” (Bramwell et al., 2008, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1291), the latter often characterised by “the withdrawal of state and the entry of private capital in urban development” (Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 23).

Efforts, especially those by the Greater Tygerberg Partnership, to inclusively regenerate the Voortrekker Road Corridor region of the Cape Metropole exhibit a palpable tension between these opposite ends of the spectrum; an inevitable tension between the purported broad goals of integration and socio-economic inclusion and the private interests of the powerful stakeholders involved. It is widely acknowledged that societies and the localities in which they exist are spaces of
deeply embedded hierarchies and inequalities, so much so that inclusive or participatory development efforts are often susceptible to manipulation by those who are better equipped in terms of economic power, social capital, or skills and expertise (Chattopadhyay, 2015). This dynamic is explored in great detail by Levy (2014) who identifies two key challenges in multi-stakeholder engagements;

“There is the ubiquitous challenge of facilitating cooperation among participants to achieve joint benefits, in a way that limits the classic free rider... But there is also a second challenge. When cooperation works, it creates a valuable asset (a quasi-rent, in formal economic parlance)... which potentially can attract the attention of powerful actors seeking to capture the returns from multistakeholder governance for themselves” (Levy, 2014, p. 150)

An examination of examples of this type of manipulation or predation in various cities is presented in the literature review and serves to contextualise the Cape Town example in a broader conversation about capture of this kind.

The Voortrekker Road Corridor is unfortunately no different. As this paper fleshes out, not only does the VRC region comprise of a broad range of socio-economic classes, but spatially it continues to reflect a geographic segregation between such classes reminiscent of Apartheid era planning policies. For this reason the transport corridor located along Voortrekker Road, which serves as both a physical and metaphorical border between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots,’ presents itself as a ripe opportunity for substantive inclusive regeneration. However, it has also proven susceptible to the ‘neoliberalisation’ of urban development, and exhibits the warning signs of predatory behaviour through observable expressions of the underlying power dynamics that are wielded by certain stakeholders.

The challenge therefore arises in how to strengthen participatory and multi-stakeholder governance initiatives in such a way as to genuinely achieve inclusive redevelopment of the corridor without allowing the processes to be manipulated by those predators seeking to capture for themselves the returns of the private and public investment into the area (Levy, 2014).

This study will therefore interrogate two complementary hypotheses, the first of which explores whether, in spite of stated intentions of inclusive regeneration and economic development, the

---

2 For ease of reading, all further direct quotations from authors utilising American English spelling, including, inter alia, Levy (2014), Andrews (2014), Andrews et al. (2012) and Carpenter (2001) will utilise the original American English spelling.
3 An institutionalised policy or system of segregation and oppression on the grounds of race, enforced by law in South Africa from 1948 to 1994. (Oxford University Press, 2016a)
4 For a thorough discussion of Neoliberalism in urban governance see Andrew and Doloreux (2012) Economic Development, Social Inclusion and Urban Governance: The Case of the City-Region of Ottawa in Canada.
Greater Tygerberg Partnership has been subject to capture by strong private and political elite interests, thereby threatening the achievement of genuine developmental outcomes. The second considers whether incremental, micro-level governance initiatives, though seemingly small, have the potential to build the necessary momentum capable of trumping such threatening predatory networks. Using the qualitative analysis method of process tracing, the author will share a chronological account of the history of the Integration Zone and the Greater Tygerberg Partnership, and subsequently explore these two hypotheses empirically to determine the possible causal mechanisms that may account for the observed tensions.

1.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study is located in the metropolitan city of Cape Town and is therefore limited to the context of the Voortrekker Road Corridor Integration Zone, although there may be relevant outcomes or learning that could be transferred or modified for elsewhere, such as the Corridors of Freedom in Johannesburg. Although the literature review considers international examples of urban regeneration, the observations are focused on the context, dynamics and complexities that have been experienced in the Integration Zone itself.

Importantly, the author is a member of the Development Integration Unit (DIU) and was involved in the short-term action learning experiment in the corridor, detailed in Chapter 7, as well as the roll-out of a number of the micro-level initiatives executed in the corridor. The author has therefore undertaken questionnaires with other GTP staff members to corroborate the findings and prevent bias as far as possible.

1.6. CHAPTER OUTLINE

The following outline gives a brief overview of the structure of this paper:

CHAPTER 2: Why the Voortrekker Road Corridor? - The Opportunity

Chapter 2 details the valuable planning opportunity that exists in the Voortrekker Road Corridor for the development of an integration zone. Here a mutually supporting relationship between land use and a broad range of transport services provides fertile ground for high-density urban development where access to residential and livelihood opportunities are in close proximity, thereby potentially fulfilling a range of economic and social needs for the adjacent neighbourhoods and their communities.
CHAPTER 3: Understanding the Voortrekker Road Corridor – The Challenge

Chapter 3 considers the demographics and economic and socio-economic realities of the residential areas abutting the Voortrekker Road Corridor. A brief consideration of factors such as socio-economic status and levels of living tell a story of spatial patterns and inequalities reminiscent of segregationist Apartheid policies that continue two decades beyond the fall of the regime. The chapter therefore details the great challenges that may arise when trying to plan for inclusion and integration in an area as complex as the Voortrekker Road Corridor.

CHAPTER 4: Hypothesis and Methodology

Chapter 4 details the two hypotheses that this paper sets out to empirically explore, and situates the concepts in the work of development practitioners currently investigating mechanisms for ‘doing development differently’, such as Levy, Andrews and Carpenter. Furthermore it gives clarity as to the research design chosen to explore these hypotheses, which employs the qualitative analysis method of process tracing for the key research period identified as 2012 – 2015.

CHAPTER 5: Literature Review

The literature review explores the concepts and characteristics of transit-oriented development as a set of planning principals for the regeneration of a region, as well as the conditions and context in which urban regeneration or gentrification may arise, and in which the latter may usefully be combated through mixed-income housing initiatives. It subsequently appraises several forms of urban governance and their potential for success, and also usefully for their demise through neoliberalisation or elite capture.

CHAPTER 6: Great Expectations

Chapter 6 primarily explores hypothesis A, and whether or not the Greater Tygerberg Partnership has been subjected to patterns of urban patronage and private or political capture. Through an analysis of documents reflecting the period of June 2012 to June 2014, the author aims to interrogate issues such as the institutional arrangements, the GTP’s perceived role and the rationale behind project prioritisation, to determine whether the activities and decision-making processes of the Partnership do tend towards domination by middle-class priorities and private sector interests.

---

5 The Doing Development Differently Manifesto Community is an eclectic community of over 400 people from 60 countries who are committed to doing development “close to the ground; focused on solving problems that local agents in governments and communities cared about; through step-by-step processes” (Andrews, Wild, Foresti, & Samji, 2014)
CHAPTER 7: Turnaround – July 2014 – Present

The final chapter of this paper empirically explores Hypothesis B and is presented in two parts. The first reflects on the time period of July to October 2014, during which the DIU team undertook an action-learning experiment designed to flush out those contextual factors that were inhibiting progress against developmental aims, as well as to try achieve small-scale quick wins to the end of gaining legitimacy for acts of public entrepreneurship in the corridor.

The second part considers the time period from October 2014 onwards, which coincides with the secondment of a senior City of Cape Town official from the DIU to the Greater Tygerberg Partnership to perform the role of CEO. It considers the actions undertaken by the new CEO and his team against the lens of Carpenter’s (2001) and Levy’s (2014) writings on bureaucratic autonomy and public entrepreneurship respectively, and assesses the role these actions may have played in the building of momentum to trump the predatory networks at work.

CHAPTER 8: Moving Forward – Conclusion and Recommendations

Chapter 8 effectively concludes the paper and summarises the outcomes of the research, including the learning that have been made in undertaking the research. It illustrates the value of the research and provides a recommendation as to how the GTP should proceed with regards to its work in affecting inclusive regeneration in the Voortrekker Road Corridor.
CHAPTER TWO | WHY THE VOORTREKKER ROAD CORRIDOR?
THE OPPORTUNITY

As Cape Town has developed over time as a port city, it exhibits a radial nature with a number of spatially discrete and diverse areas, all connected by a “higher-order road network, which has begun to represent elements of a loosely defined grid system” (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 30). The SDF highlights the need to further develop this grid into a multi-directional accessibility grid which facilitates multi-directional movement between suburbs, districts and urban nodes (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 30). Within this context a number of development corridors exist, along which economic opportunity is intensified, as is the movement of people, goods and services (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 30). The SDF describes a development corridor as “characterised by a dynamic, mutually supporting relationship between land use and the supporting movement system. Development corridors are generally supported by a hierarchy of transport services that function as an integrated system to facilitate ease of movement for private and public transport users” (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 32).

Furthermore, “The concentration of intense bands of high-density urban development reduces overall trip lengths and improves access to opportunities, offering a means of conveniently integrating communities with service provision, and fulfilling a range of economic and social needs” (City of Cape Town, 2012, p. 32)

2.1. THE VOORTREKKER ROAD CORRIDOR INTEGRATION ZONE

The Voortrekker Road Corridor (VRC) is one such corridor, which has subsequently been identified as an Integration Zone in the City of Cape Town’s 2013/2014 Draft Built Environment Performance Plan (BEPP). National Treasury has, in response to the National Development Plan, introduced the Integrated City Development Grant (ICDG) for metropolitan municipalities, to incentivise municipalities to plan a range of catalytic investments in defined integration zones to focus their efforts and “affect a more compact and inclusive urban spatial form” (City of Cape Town, 2014a, p. 9).

National Treasury (2013 in City of Cape Town, 2014a, p. 9) define integration zones as consisting of:

- “Identified township or urban hubs, primary transport linkages and activity corridors connecting these hubs to established urban nodes and the CBD,
- Areas of opportunity to leverage private investment through the use of available tax and investment incentives,
- Areas of opportunity for breaking down the segregated, exclusive nature of South African cities, through promoting inclusion and supporting interaction across historical divides of race and class,
And programmatic interventions for catalytic public investment in core urban infrastructure services, land and human settlements development, economic infrastructure investments and public transport infrastructure and services” (National Treasury, 2013 in City of Cape Town, 2014a, p. 9).

This corridor has been endorsed as an Integration Zone in the SDF as it offers the opportunity for job-centred investment and economic growth, alongside the potential to enable opportunity and accessibility through public transport development built on existing City of Cape Town assets (City of Cape Town, 2014a, p. 25). The Spatial Planning and Development Department (SPUD) has, since the beginning of 2014, been developing its Strategy and Investment Plan, which has importantly been based on not only a wealth of economic and planning data, but on targeted dialogue with a number of key stakeholders or decision makers who could play a significant role in the infrastructure development of the corridor, including inter alia, finance institutions, major landowners, social housing companies, and private developers.

The corridor is divided into several parts, the demarcation of which differs according to different role players. The City of Cape Town’s Tygerberg District Plan (2011) refers to several sub-districts which incorporate portions of the corridor. These include the following:

- Sub-district 2: Goodwood, Parow, Bellville Central and East, Stikland
- Sub-district 3: Voortrekker Road, Van Riebeek Road, Durban Road (South of N1) Activity Corridors
- Sub-district 4: Greater Elsies River, Ruyterwacht, Parow Valley, Tygerberg Hospital, Bishop Lavis, Uitsig
The Greater Tygerberg Partnership, the civil alliance of stakeholders which have invested interests in the future of the VRC, separates the corridor area into four focus areas:

- **Western Focus Area:** Salt River to Maitland;
- **Central Focus Area:** Goodwood to Parow;
- **Eastern Focus Area:** the Bellville Central Area between the N1 and the Northern rail line; and
- **Southern Focus Area:** the Bellville Central Area South of the Northern rail line including Bellville South, the Transnet Marshalling Yard (Belcon site) and extending down to the campuses of the University of Western Cape and the Cape Peninsula University of Technology (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 11).

Furthermore, in its entirety, the corridor incorporates 21 ward councils representing a population of over 700 000 according to the National Census of 2011 (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 11).

### 2.2. DESIGNING FOR INTEGRATION AND INCLUSIVITY

The concepts of inclusivity and integration, in relation to urban form and regeneration, are widely used in current South African government policy, both National and Local. The National Development Plan (NDP) calls not only for inclusive economic growth, but for integrated and inclusive rural and urban development (National Planning Commission, 2011). The Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) seeks to interpret and give meaning to the NDP vision of integrated and inclusive economies, but more importantly acknowledges that while “urbanisation generates significant opportunities for growth, poverty reduction and environmental sustainability... urban growth is also associated with growing levels of inequality” (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2013, p. 7).

Kitchin and Ovens (2008) provide a useful definition of integration that describes it as the “consequence of the ability of the poor and disadvantaged to have access (in a spatial, economic and institutional sense) to the opportunities afforded by the city” (Kitchin & Ovens, 2008, p. 4) and a process which “facilitates increased access of the poor to work opportunities, improved residential opportunities, improved access to social facilities and, ideally, an increased sense that they are part of the city, rather than marginalised from it” (Kitchin & Ovens, 2008, p. 4).

The South African Cities Network’s (SACN) Inclusive Cities report (2008) describes an inclusive city as one in which all citizens have access to basic services and employment opportunities, can participate
in creative and community activities, and have freedom of political expression and affiliation. Furthermore an inclusive city is spatially and socially cohesive, recognises and promotes cultural and human rights, recognises the human capital of all its people and proactively meets development challenges (South African Cities Network, 2008, p. 7).

The Voortrekker Road Corridor offers a unique opportunity in that not only does it already have the basic transport infrastructure upon which further transit-oriented development could be delivered to maximise land use and densification, but it also dissects a vast range of suburbs and communities that differ in class, race and socio-economic status. Bellville Train Station and the Bellville Transport Interchange see over 160 000 individual passengers pass through on a daily basis, travelling between lower and higher income areas for the purposes of accessing retail as well as work opportunities. This constant transition of people through the existing transport infrastructure places it as a corridor ripe with opportunities for greater social and economic inclusion.

With this opportunity in mind, it is valuable to consider planning approaches and an appropriate vision for the corridor that aligns with the principals of inclusive and integrated cities. Goltsman and Iacofano (2007a) promote an inclusive planning and design approach which is based on the premise that all citizens of a city should be allowed to improve economically as a physical environment improves. They state “cities need planning that recognizes that every individual has the right to full and equal participation in the built environment – and that through their direct involvement they can shape their own environment to meet their own needs” (Goltsman & Iacofano, 2007, p. 2).

Kitchin and Ovens (2008) refer to an inclusive city as a city where “people have access to infrastructure, health and education opportunities, are able to build strong communities, participate fully in urban life with a sense of security, can set aspirations and have some confidence that these will be able to be met” (Kitchin & Ovens, 2008, p. 4). In theory the Voortrekker Road Corridor is an ideal physical environment in which to try develop such an inclusive city.

2.3. ACCESS TO LAND AS A LEVER FOR INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT

Urban regeneration efforts are often seen as a vehicle towards achieving greater economic growth, and the interventions to direct and attract both public and private investment into the Voortrekker Road Corridor are considered a mechanism towards increasing economic growth for the region and the city as a whole. However in order to move towards an inclusive city and greater integration, economic growth would similarly need to be inclusive. Ali (2007 in Ali and Son, 2007, p. 1) defines inclusive growth, in a report initiated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), as ensuring that
economic opportunities that are created through economic growth are available to all, in particular the poor. Ali and Son (2007) explain “the growth process creates new economic opportunities that are unevenly distributed {and} the poor are generally constrained by circumstances or market failures that disable them to avail of these opportunities” (Ali & Son, 2007, p. 1) thus ultimately the poor do not very often benefit from growth of an economy.

In line with the above, Kitchin and Ovens (2008) assert that the increased spatial accessibility to well-located land for the urban poor can enable increased access to employment opportunities, metropolitan facilities and civic amenities, and that appropriately developed and managed land can be utilised to “facilitate the integration of the poor into the fabric of the city” (Kitchin & Ovens, 2008, p. 4).

The SACN (2008) supports this notion, in that it recognises degrees of spatial cohesion in its framework of indicators for measuring inclusivity in a city. This is measured by land use patterns and densities, as well as commuting time and cost disparities for different groups of citizens. The rationale suggests that in most cases the historical spatial distribution of employment, commerce and shopping opportunities can exclude the poor, due to the access-restricting time and monetary cost of commuting. Furthermore “inclusivity is best served by a settlement pattern that allows for high interaction and sufficient space for individuals to enjoy personal freedom without affecting others negatively” (South African Cities Network, 2008, p. 76). Obtaining access to well-located urban land for the poor, whether to satisfy residential or livelihood needs, is considered to be a notable method through which to increase inclusivity and integration within an urban area.

Once more the Voortrekker Road Corridor presents itself physically as an ideal environment in which to leverage vacant land to achieve the above-mentioned urban integration aims. A number of large pockets of land, predominantly owned by the state, currently lie un- or under-developed, but are extremely suitably placed for developments such as affordable housing that would enable a greater number of residents to have access to well-located urban land and economic opportunities.
CHAPTER THREE | UNDERSTANDING THE VOORTREKKER ROAD CORRIDOR – THE CHALLENGE

3.1. DEMOGRAPHICS IN THE VOORTREKKER ROAD CORRIDOR

As briefly alluded to above, the residential areas abutting the VRC tend to still largely reflect the spatial inequalities of the segregationist Apartheid policies. Voortrekker Road runs alongside the Northern Line of the Metrorail service, which in the past augmented the division between the “bo-dorp” and the “onder-dorp” (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 47). Today an analysis of the demographic statistics of the National Census of 2011 draws similar spatial patterns, as do a range of socio-economic indicators.

The Tygerberg Planning District which encompasses the majority of the demarcated VRC has a population of 721,814; constituted racially by 61.7% Coloured people, 18.5% Black African people and 16.2% White people (Strategic Development Information and GIS Department, 2013a). However, as Table 3.1. below indicates, those areas which are located north of the railway and Voortrekker Road, such as Goodwood and Bellville, exhibit a large majority white population, with 44% and 61% respectively (Strategic Development Information and GIS Department, 2013b). Parow, which is situated predominantly north of the transport corridor has a 57% majority Coloured population, but has a 28% white population which is far higher than the White populations in the suburbs located South of the corridor (Strategic Development Information and GIS Department, 2013b). Bellville South, Belhar, Elsies River and Bishop Lavis all consist of majority Coloured populations between 88% and 92%, which is in stark contrast to the demographics of those in the North (Strategic Development Information and GIS Department, 2013b). This general trend tends to suggest that the racial distribution of the population has not changed dramatically towards greater racial integration.

These figures are presented in Table 3.1 below, alongside figures for the average household size, percentage of adults over the age of 20 with a Grade 12 certificate, and the percentage of households with a monthly salary of less than R3200. What is interesting to note is that these indicators of education or income tend to increase or decrease according to their position in relation to the north-south spatial distribution to the railway and Voortrekker Road, and in terms of their racial constitution. This indicates that not only has racial segregation been somewhat maintained over the last two decades, but that economic segregation is still spatially observed in the city. An understanding of these very marked realities is essential to the planning around the corridor and its intended efforts to improve accessibility and inclusion.
### Table 3.1: 2011 Census Suburb Profiles (Strategic Development Information and GIS Department, 2012, 2013a, 2013b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suburb</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Average Household</th>
<th>% of adults over 20yrs with Gr12</th>
<th>Race Majority</th>
<th>% of households with monthly salary of R3200 or less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>3740025</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42% coloured, 39% black African</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tygerberg Planning district</td>
<td>721814</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>62% coloured</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TYGERBERG PLANNING DISTRICT SUBURBS ABOVE VOORTREKKER ROAD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellville</td>
<td>44209</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>61% white</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwood</td>
<td>32510</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>44% white 32% coloured</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parow</td>
<td>69808</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57% coloured, 28% white</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TYGERBERG PLANNING DISTRICT SUBURBS BELOW VOORTREKKER ROAD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruyterwacht</td>
<td>10773</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51% coloured 33% white</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellville South</td>
<td>24642</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>88% coloured</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belhar</td>
<td>56234</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>90% coloured</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsies River</td>
<td>90 574</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>89% coloured</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop Lavis</td>
<td>54006</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>92% coloured</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delft</td>
<td>152030</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>52% coloured 46% black African</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TABLE BAY PLANNING DISTRICT SUBURBS IN VOORTREKKER ROAD-RAIL CORRIDOR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kensington</td>
<td>24161</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>91% coloured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt River</td>
<td>6577</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>45% coloured 40% black African</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mailland</td>
<td>9762</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>50% coloured 42% black African</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornton</td>
<td>5862</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>49% coloured 28% black African</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2. **SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND LEVELS OF LIVING**

In 2006, the City of Cape Town Information and Knowledge Management Department released *The Spatial Distribution of Socio-Economic Status, Service Levels and Levels of Living in the City of Cape Town*, based on the data obtained in the 2001 National Census. The report developed a socio-economic hierarchy of suburbs in the metro based on three indexes, the Socio-Economic Status (SES) Index, the Service Level Index and the Levels of Living Index (City of Cape Town, 2006, p. 3).

In 2007, the *Planning District Profiles (2007)* and *Planning Districts Socio-Economic Analysis (2007)* were published based on the 2001 Census, and detail the demographic, socio-economic, housing and crime information for the City’s eight planning districts, to enable better planning around future...
development. Tygerberg Planning District, District D, makes up almost 18% of the population of the metro, and in comparison to the other seven districts is situated in the middle in terms of the socio-economic status index (Gie, Small, & Haskins, 2007, p. 8).

The District has the largest percentage of formal dwellings in the metro, and is the best-off district on the service level index, being consistently best off in terms of access to electricity, flush or chemical toilets, potable water and refuse removal (Gie, Small, & Haskins, 2007, p. 9). While this would suggest that the District has a reasonably high standard of living, it reported the second highest incidence of rape and business crime consistently from 2001-2006 (Gie, Small, & Haskins, 2007, p. 14). Incidences of drug-related crime reported as per the South African Police Crime Statistics increased from 1120 in 2001/2 to 3906 in 2005/6, overtaking the Cape Town Table Bay District which includes the CBD as the district most plagued by such incidents (Gie, Small, & Haskins, 2007, p. 16).

Again there are discrepancies within the District which display interesting trends according to spatial distribution. Table 3.2 below indicates several Census 2001 suburbs in the VRC, most of which have a fairly decent level of services and living, however as per Figure 3.1 (van Heyningen, 2007, p. 81) it can be seen that those suburbs above Voortrekker Road exhibit higher levels in these regards. Several of the suburbs below Voortrekker Road and further away from it fall into the worst quintile of suburbs with regards to service levels or socio-economic status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suburb</th>
<th>Service Level Index</th>
<th>Levels of Living Index</th>
<th>Socio-Economic Status Index – Worst 20% of Suburbs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bellville Ext 44</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belhar</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>15.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parow North</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwood</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parow</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellville Ext 43</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avondale Parow</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruyterwacht</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>15.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belrail</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>12.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellville South</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uitsig (Elsies River)</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>26.38</td>
<td>49.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belhar 13</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>28.73</td>
<td>54.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellville Central</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>14.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsies River</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>18.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deified South</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>32.64</td>
<td>60.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop Lavis</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>23.88</td>
<td>42.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belhar 10</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>31.62</td>
<td>55.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Spatial Variations in Levels of Living (City of Cape Town, 2006)
Figure 3.2 (van Heyningen, 2007, p. 83) on the other hand provides a visual presentation of the results of the socio-economic status of the suburbs according to the same data, which once again shows a trend depending on location above or below Voortrekker Road. In this case it is clear that those suburbs above Voortrekker Road fall either within the best off percentage of suburbs, or very near best off, while the majority of the suburbs below Voortrekker Road tend to be located either towards the middle of the scale or worst off. These clear north to south variations contextualise the complex spatial patterns that the City of Cape Town seeks to address through its Integration Zone Strategy and Implementation Plan.

3.3. INDUSTRY AND ECONOMIC TRENDS

3.3.1. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND LAND USE IN THE VOORTREKKER ROAD CORRIDOR

The VRC links the economic hubs of Cape Town CBD and Bellville CBD, and the 2005 Regional Service Council data indicating company turnover showed that while nearly 25% of turnover was generated in the Cape Town CBD, a further 43% was generated in the corridor vicinity, between Salt River and Bellville (City of Cape Town, 2010, p. 6). The Bellville/TygerValley area was shown to make up the
second largest economic centre in the metropolitan (City of Cape Town, 2010, p. 5). Furthermore evidence suggests that most jobs in the city are located in the broad band of the corridor, and particularly in older economic areas such as Epping Industria. Many of these areas along the corridor however are in decline, due to safety and security issues and general uncleanliness which have had negative impacts on investor confidence and thus investment in the area (City of Cape Town, 2010, p. 7).

The relative decline in business conditions along the corridor has been attributed in part to the growth of major suburban retail centres in close proximity to VRC, such as Century City and N1 City, and poor urban management resulting in concerns such as petty crime, congestion and a degraded urban environment (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2012a, p. 8), both of which have contributed to businesses choosing to relocate elsewhere.

Trends in rental data and building plan submissions suggest a number of changes in the VRC area. Many commercial spaces have been converted both formally and informally into residential space in recent years, and submission of building plans have decreased significantly in value from R500 million per year in 2005 – 2007, to less than R200 million per year since 2009 (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2012a, p. 8). The Greater Tygerberg Partnership has witnessed a shift in demand towards residential housing units which are affordable, accessible and close to blue collar working opportunities and academic institutions (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2012a, p. 8).

Along the corridor, particularly in Goodwood and Parow, industrial areas are recorded to be facing above-average vacancies and poor rental performance, especially in comparison to more accessible industrial areas such as Epping Industria. Accessibility therefore remains a constraint in terms of household and commercial investment in the broader VRC area. A noticeable trend is the development of vibrant and relatively dense retail driven hotspots located in areas of high footfall by consumers who are dependent of public transport. The CBD area of Parow, along Station Road is a good example of this change. The informal economy has also reflected this type of foot traffic, being concentrated on Station Road between Parow Station and Voortrekker Road itself, which is frequented by rail commuters accessing livelihood opportunities in the corridor (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2012a).

The above trends are replicated in the Bellville CBD, where a significant shift of retail and business users northwards toward the Tygervalley precinct has eroded the prominence of the CBD as a more traditional economic node in the city. An analysis of the land use activity in Cape Town reflected a decline in formal retail trade as a user of land from 42% to 31%, and a notable increase in housing from 5% to 17% (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2012a, p. 12). This increase reflects the shift of
Bellville CBD into a high density residential environment, which is further reflected through the increase of the informal economy in the area centred on retailing personal and domestic goods (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2012a, p. 13). As in Parow, the informal economy is largely concentrated in the extremely busy transport interchange of Bellville which includes the Bellville Rail Station, bus terminal and taxi rank.

3.3.2. Economic incentives and initiatives in Voortrekker Road-Rail Corridor

Several independent economic interventions have been implemented in recent years to try incentivise development and investment in areas on the VRC. The Bellville CBD and Salt River, as part of the Cape Town CBD, were in 2004 declared Urban Development Zones which “allows a developer to write off an asset within the declared zone quicker when (s)he claims for the erection, extension or improvement to an entire building for the purposes of trade” (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2012a, p. 14). Furthermore the City of Cape Town Economic Development Department has implemented gazetted trading plans for Bellville and Parow to encourage informal trading in the areas.

Lastly, Bellville CBD has benefited from the establishment of a Special Rating Area, “a clearly defined geographical area where property owners from the area pay an additional rate to fund top-up services for that specific area” (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2012a, p. 15). These top up services have included public safety and cleansing services in order to upgrade the urban environment and serve to make the area more attractive to investors and residential users, however business or property owners in the area tend to not always assess the return of investment in a positive light and have mixed reviews of the efficacy of the implementing agency.

3.3.3. Socio-economic infrastructure and facilities

The VRC is well equipped with social or ‘people serving’ infrastructure, with a concentration of medical and educational facilities to the east of the corridor. The broader corridor is home to both the University of the Western Cape and Cape Peninsula University of Technology’s Bellville campuses, as well as University of Stellenbosch’s Medical and Health Sciences Faculty and School of Leadership. Furthermore UNISA and Northlink College are situated along the corridor, bringing the total number of students frequenting the area to over 100 000 (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a).
Fourteen hospitals, both public and private, can be found in the corridor, including the large Tygerberg Hospital, which provides for 2894 hospital beds in the vicinity, and the corridor is home to the Medical Research Council (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 11).

The effects of Apartheid on social infrastructure planning still impact on the accessibility and functionality of the facilities. Planning in the Apartheid era did not allow for property ownership along the Voortrekker Road spine for non-white individuals, resulting in “mono-functional dormitories to the South and...a fragmented approach to providing racially designated universities, hospitals and public facilities” (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 56). A focus on motorised transport also contributes to facilities not being easily accessed by public transport (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 56). Furthermore, there is a common perception that public services in the area are sub-standard, or second rate when compared with the services provided in Central Cape Town, where many head offices or governmental operations are centred (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 51). This, paired with the observed business flight of more formal established businesses does suggest that while the opportunity for inclusive regeneration of the Corridor appears great, the complexity of the task and related necessary governance mechanisms are even greater.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Private Hospitals</th>
<th>Government Hospitals</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Clinics</th>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Libraries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: People-Serving Facilities in Regeneration Focus Areas (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a)
CHAPTER FOUR | HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY

4.1. HYPOTHESIS

In his book, *Working with the Grain*, Levy (2014) posits that even within complex governance arrangements, an incremental approach towards achieving ‘good governance’ can be undertaken. He suggests that adopting an incremental approach is sometimes necessary in order to achieve development goals in countries where “the incentives, authority and long-term horizon needed for comprehensive reform to take hold will be lacking” (Levy, 2014, p. 133) and where instead “politics is open and competitive, but power is fragmented and contested, time horizons are short, and the rules of the game are personalized” (Levy, 2014, p. 133). Such an incremental approach, Levy (2014) explains, “is based on a different theory of change, one where micro-level initiatives provide a platform for the emergence of ‘islands of effectiveness’ within a broader sea of dysfunction, securing some gains in the short term, and serving as a platform for cumulative gains over the longer-run in both governance and poverty reduction” (Levy, 2014, p. 134).

This approach, while lacking the “bold allure of comprehensive governance reform” (Levy, 2014, p. 134), may provide an environment in which developing countries can avoid what Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock (2012) refer to as capability traps. Andrews et al. (2012) suggest that many governments and organisations that aim to achieve comprehensive ‘good governance’ reforms resort to pretending to reform “by changing what policies or organisations look like rather than what they actually do” (Andrews, Pritchett, & Woolcock, 2012, abstract). This occurrence of ‘isomorphic mimicry’ is often characterised by high level administrative, policy or legislative changes, which on the ground reflect no real change as they are rarely implemented or used (Andrews et al., 2012, p. 1). Isomorphic mimicry, as used by Andrews et al. (2012), refers therefore to the “tendency to introduce reforms that enhance an entity’s external legitimacy and support, even when they do not demonstrably improve performance” (Andrews et al., 2012, p. 2).

With an understanding of the geographic, social and economic context of the Voortrekker Road Corridor, the problem statement at hand, and the assertions made above, this study seeks to explore the following initial hypotheses:

A. In spite of stated intentions of inclusive regeneration and economic development, the GTP has been subject to capture by strong private and political elite interests, threatening the achievement of genuine development outcomes.
Beyond mere imitation and pretence, the surface-level approach that is ‘isomorphic mimicry’ becomes further problematic in that it can lead to ‘capability traps’, “a dynamic in which [governance institutions] constantly adopt ‘reforms’ to ensure ongoing flows of external financing and legitimacy yet never actually improve [which ultimately] undermines the impetus for effective action to build state capability” (Andrews et al., 2012, p. 2).

In this context, Rodrik’s (2007) distinction between form and function is relevant in considering the role of governance institutions and related initiatives towards achieving either perpetual isomorphic mimicry under the guise of comprehensive reform, or credible yet incremental developmental progress. He writes:

“First-order economic principles do not map into unique policy packages. Good institutions are those that deliver these first-order principles effectively. There is no unique correspondence between the functions that good institutions perform and the form that such institutions take. Reformers have substantial room for creatively packaging these principles into institutional designs that are sensitive to local constraints and take advantage of local opportunities”. (Rodrik, 2007, pp. 15-16).

A second hypothesis is therefore explored which addresses the context in, and level at which interventions were undertaken by the Greater Tygerberg Partnership to arrest said capture:

B. Incremental, micro-level governance initiatives, though seemingly small, have the potential to build momentum capable of trumping the threatening predatory networks

Hypothesis B draws heavily on Levy’s (2014), and therefore Carpenter’s (2001), writing on public entrepreneurship and bureaucratic autonomy respectively. Levy (2014) asserts that all collective action initiatives, such like the Greater Tygerberg Partnership and the Voortrekker Road Corridor regeneration efforts comprise of stakeholders that reflect a diverse range of interests, where “some are protagonists of the development purpose; others are predators that seek to capture for their own private purposes what the protagonists are seeking to build” (Levy, 2014, p. 153). He posits that both the protagonists and the predators have their own resources and influence networks on which to draw to achieve their overarching aims, referring to these networks and resources as ‘trumping’ and ‘threat’ resources respectively (Levy, 2014, p. 153).

Levy (2014) continues to explore three broad conditions for enabling the trumping resources or influence networks to prevail over those who threaten the conditions for genuine development, which are of relevance to the discussion of Hypothesis B:
“There are stakeholders with strong incentives to have the collective effort succeed. The stakeholders could be direct participants in the collective effort, or they could be “outsiders.” Their incentives could be based on their own self-interest, insofar as they directly benefit from the fruit of the collective effort. They could also derive from the self-defined mission of an active civil society organization; and

These stakeholders are well-connected politically, with influential ruling factions; and/or the external stakeholders are able to draw on widely held social norms of justice and fairness; and

Leaders are skillful in mobilizing and coordinating the stakeholders in support of the collective purpose; these leaders could come from within the collective endeavor, or could be external stakeholders who are skillful in mobilizing to bring to bear pressure for good performance.”

4.2. METHODOLOGY

The research design employs the qualitative analysis method of process tracing for the key research period identified as 2012 – 2015. Process tracing “attempts to identify the intervening causal process, the causal chain and the causal mechanism between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable,” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 206). This method is particularly useful in instances where several varying causal interactions may be viable as explanations for a particular occurrence (George & Bennett, 2005), and in practice it provides for “the use of evidence from within a historical case to make inferences about causal explanation of that case” (Bennett & Checkel, 2014).

A variety of sources authored during this period of time, including inter alia, reports, policy documents, meeting minutes and presentation notes, have been analysed against a proposed set of hypotheses, to ascertain what specific action, interventions and factors may have led the set of actors discussed in the study to diverge from the trend of urban patronage and political and private sector capture in urban regeneration efforts.

This research process will be corroborated with questionnaires administered to employees of the Greater Tygerberg Partnership which investigate their perspectives on the leadership, governance and institutional arrangements, and the changes thereof, over the same research period, and thus establishes those key historical events, interventions and decisions that were noticeable within the organisation as indicative of a possible divergent trend.
CHAPTER FIVE | LITERATURE REVIEW

Cities are seen not only as the primary engines of national economic competitiveness and prosperity, but also where public problems are experienced most acutely, and therefore, where innovative governance mechanisms are most productive. This theoretical emphasis on flexible, associative forms of governance has been influential in encouraging experimentation with different locally driven collaborative governance mechanisms based on local partnerships... and empirical research on variation in governance arrangements and best practices is beginning to emerge.

Allison Bramwell et al., Re-locating the Local (Bramwell, Nelles, & Wolfe, 2008, p. 7)

In order to adequately contextualize this study it is useful to go beyond the exploration of the existing literature relating to urban regeneration and those planning mechanisms that can be used in an attempt to arrest urban decline. Importantly, it is both useful and critical in trying to prove the overarching hypotheses of this study, to undertake an analysis of existing literature and academic thought on the issue of urban governance, as well as the form, and relative success thereof, of different urban governance mechanisms that have been adopted in cities around the world.

As Purcell (2007, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012) asserts, city-regions indeed “stand out...because they seem to be emerging as a key spatial unit in the ongoing restructuring of the global political economy” (Purcell, 2007, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1289). Furthermore, Bramwell et al. (2008, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012) argue that local development is underpinned by a political dimension, and thus an urban governance approach to local city-level development should underscore “the role of political agency in cities’ efforts to chart their own courses for social and economic development, and involve the creation of socially inclusive ‘economic communities’ underpinned by networks and ‘civic capital’” (Bramwell et al., 2008, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1291).

The greatest challenge herein is the concern that any such local politics has the potential to be captured by global neoliberalism to such an extent that it is unable to serve the purpose of authentically creating the above-mentioned socially inclusive economic communities (Bramwell et al., 2008, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012).

The following literature review will thus briefly explore the concepts and characteristics of transit-oriented development as a set of planning principals for the regeneration of a region, as well as the conditions and context in which urban regeneration or gentrification may arise, and in which the latter may usefully be combated through mixed-income housing initiatives.

It will then thoroughly appraise several forms of urban governance and their potential for success, and also usefully for their demise through neoliberalisation or elite capture. Examples from cities in
developed countries such as Ottawa, Canada and Chattanooga, Tennessee, as well as from developing countries such as Mumbai and Delhi in India, enable an assessment of the viability and risks of newer collaborative and innovative urban governance mechanisms that have similar features to the institutional arrangements of the Greater Tygerberg Partnership.

These examples and the supporting literature shed light on the complex, and ‘wicked’ challenges that arise while trying to catalyse local economic development and urban regeneration that is inclusive and authentic, and suggest that the challenges that exist in the Voortrekker Road Corridor is typical rather than an aberration that is unique to the Cape Town context. Ultimately an inevitable tension exists, one between the broad goals of inclusion and poverty reduction on the one hand, and the influence of powerful stakeholders led by predatory urban patronage politics.

5.1. UNDERSTANDING INCLUSIVE URBAN REGENERATION

The following three sub-sections document global best-practice approaches to inclusive regeneration, those conceptual approaches which theoretically inform the existing policy direction of the Greater Tygerberg Partnership, many of which are referred to in key GTP documents such as the Regeneration Framework discussed in Section 6.3.1. These concepts and approaches thus contextualise the spatial and urban planning theories underpinning the intended direction of the organisation.

5.1.1. TRANSIT ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT

*Recent discussions on the impacts of transport infrastructures suggest that transport systems are likely to form segments and pathways; enclaves and fragments which may create isolation and/or connectivity and fluidity ... Therefore, they can be the facilitators of integration, development and growth; yet, at the same time the causes of disintegration, exclusion and socio-spatial inequalities.*

**Graham and Marvin, Splintering Urbanism** (2001 in Beyazit, 2015, p. 13)

The Cape Town Integrated Transport Plan makes the case for transit-oriented development, and presents a strategy for such development on the urban core corridor. The City’s Transit Oriented Development (TOD) strategy promotes “high density development to support public transport along key corridors and intense mixed use development focussed on identified urban nodes” (City of Cape Town, 2014b, p. 6).
The GTP has adopted this strategy as the most efficient and sustainable development strategy for the Voortrekker Road-Rail Corridor, and therefore expects to achieve the following objectives detailed in the Integrated Transport Plan:

- “To maximise the attractiveness of public transport by strategically encouraging supportive forms of development along the transit system (i.e. proposing an optimal distribution of origin / destination land uses that will ensure multi-directional transport flows throughout the day)
- To ensure a high quality, safe public environment around points of access to the transit system
- To support improved access to public transport for those who are dependent on it, by supporting the unlocking of proximate land for higher density development, with a particular focus on affordable housing” (City of Cape Town, 2014b, p. 6).

Clagett (2014) explains that Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) is a set of principles as opposed to a template for development. Physically, it promotes “higher density, residential or mixed use development built within [walking distance] of a transportation corridor” (Scott LeFaver et al, 2001, in Clagett, 2014, p. 4). However, it is ultimately a sustainable development strategy that “encourages the efficient use of land and resources by promoting higher population densities [and] protects lower-income populations from marginalisation by offering mixed-income housing in a connected and socially and economically diverse setting” (Clagett, 2014, p. 2). Clagett (2014) in fact argues that TOD is not true TOD if it does not offer mixed-income housing, and further states that “a diverse economic cross-section” (Clagett, 2014, p. 2) is critical to the success and effectiveness of TOD.

There are numerous benefits associated with cities designed around TOD principles that are centred on human movement and scale rather than that of automobiles. People living or working in these areas walk more, there is less pollution, and economically there is more foot traffic for local businesses, increased ridership improves the sustainability of transport infrastructure, and often property values increase “in theory offering cities a chance to incorporate mixed-income housing” (Clagett, 2014, p. 4). Furthermore there are obvious environmental benefits, including a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, contained urban sprawl and conservation of public open spaces (Clagett, 2014).

Clagett’s (2014) concern however, for the American planning landscape in particular, lies in the fact that TOD has proven so popular that both public and private sector investment are not able to keep up with the market demand, and therefore such developments become expensive and attract only those
that can or are willing to pay in such areas. The challenge here is that TOD corridors or areas are usually planned and built in “existing neighbourhoods with proven transit ridership [and] gentrification is a common result” (Clagett, 2014, p. 2). Clagett (2014) shares that the Centre for Transit-Oriented Development states “most new [transit-oriented] housing is being built for the high end of the market, and many of the low-income residents who already live in these locations are being forced out” (Clagett, 2014, p. 9).

5.1.2. URBAN REGENERATION AND GENTRIFICATION

Although in many American cities, and South African ones alike, the desire for suburban lifestyles has emptied many urban centres of residents, leaving behind conditions of what can be considered urban decay or blight; urban centres do often remain the hub of employment opportunities, as well as arts and cultural opportunities not originally found in suburban neighbourhoods (Clagett, 2014).

Roberts (2000 in Colantonio and Dixon, 2009: 19) broadly defines urban regeneration as a process which encompasses “a comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental conditions of an area that has been subject to change” (Roberts, 2000: 17, in Colantonio and Dixon, 2009: 19). Urban regeneration can be instigated in several ways, of which the property-led, business-driven and urban form and design perspective approaches have been adopted for the regeneration of the Voortrekker Road Corridor. The property-led physical approach in particular utilises major retail-led or mixed use schemes to generate upgrade and subsequent investment in an urban area which has suffered significant disinvestment (Colantonio & Dixon, 2009, p. 19).

According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2009 in Clagett, 2014) gentrification takes place when “the restoration and upgrading of a deteriorating or aging urban neighbourhood by middle-class or affluent persons [results] in increased property values and often in displacement of lower-income residents” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2009 in Clagett, 2014, p. 10). Gentrification is often a result of successful urban regeneration, whereby increased investment in a particular area leads to increased property values, and a significant demographic change (Boyle, 2009). Vigdor (2002 in Boyle, 2009:5) notes that new incoming households are typically characterised by higher socio-economic statuses than those households that currently exist in the area. This can become problematic when it leads to the unintended involuntary displacement of the existing households.
Clagett (2014) explains, as can evidently be seen in many of the inner city suburbs of Cape Town such as Woodstock, Salt River and the Bo-Kaap, that gentrification is primarily caused by a “widespread and resurgent desire to live in an urban center” (Clagett, 2014, p. 10).

Both critics and proponents of gentrification exist. Proponents justify their argument by a) acknowledging the influx of money it can bring to areas of disinvestment or cities on a whole, b) the realisation of a mix of social and economic classes living within the same neighbourhood, and c) the ability it has to blend political agendas between such differing classes (Clagett, 2014, p. 11). Critics of gentrification focus on three main arguments, including a) a loss of community or sense of belonging, b) the inability of existing residents to continue to afford to live in their homes, and importantly c) that “it fosters racial tension and class segregation” (Clagett, 2014, p. 11).

Beyond the opposing views, the Freeman Study suggested that regardless of the views on displacement, “there will always [be] a need for society to anticipate the effects of gentrification on a given area, and to plan accordingly” (Clagett, 2014, p. 12).

### 5.1.3. Mixed-Income Housing to Combat Gentrification in TOD

Clagett (2014) proposes that combining mixed-income housing goals with TOD goals can result in mutually shared opportunities and benefits for both TOD stakeholders and low-income populations. He argues that current affordable housing methods tend to further marginalise low-income populations by situating affordable housing at urban peripheries, as the housing itself may be affordable, but such developments ignore the great financial burden of transportation costs (Clagett, 2014). For this reason, combining the two approaches to create mixed-income housing developments in close proximity to multi-modal transport hubs can alleviate transport costs and create “genuinely affordable housing” (Clagett, 2014, p. 17).

Furthermore Clagett (2014) explains that the social benefits that can be achieved through mixed-income neighbourhoods, such as reduced class segregation, can be done so on a larger scale as low-income residents would not only have greater access to economic and social opportunities within their own neighbourhoods, “but they would also be connected to other neighbourhoods by an inexpensive and reliable means of transportation” (Clagett, 2014, p. 18). By combining mixed-income housing goals with TOD, it may therefore be possible to prevent TOD plans or transport infrastructures from being the cause of disintegration, exclusion or social-spatial inequalities as warned by Graham and Marvin (2001 in Beyazit, 2015, p.13).
5.2. URBAN GOVERNANCE

5.2.1. FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE

Andrew and Doloreux (2012) explore the question of whether issues of social inclusion in city-regions are integrated into regional economic development strategies, and whether they have an effect on the social and economic development of the city-region itself (Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1289). The article, while focusing specifically on the Canadian city-region of Ottawa, also interrogates the development of innovation and competitiveness in city-regions, and to what degree this impacts on processes of governance and social inclusion, or lack thereof (Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1289).

In introducing this question, Andrew and Doloreux (2012) explain that new regionalists believe the measured liveability of a city or city-region is very rarely based on issues of social exclusion or adopted modes of governance, and instead focus on economic competitiveness and innovation; which seems concerning considering that many, such as Purcell (2007, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1289) state that “city-regions stand out as a point of interest because they seem to be emerging as a key spatial unit in the ongoing restructuring of the global political economy” (Purcell, 2007, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1289). Jonas and Ward (2007, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1290) claim that such units are not only the spatial building blocks of the economy, but also those of the architectural, social, and cultural spheres, and therefore the city-regions that really thrive are those that invest in economic, as well as social and cultural development (Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1290).

In light of this, Jonas and Ward (2007, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1290) believe that city governments that move from urban government to urban governance are more likely to become competitive, and such urban governance will comprise of proactive economic growth strategies, including the support of local and small business, job creation and the attraction of outside investment. Linked to this, Bramwell et al. (2008, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1291) argue that governance mechanisms should recognise the political dimension of local development, and urban governance approaches should therefore underscore “the role of political agency in cities’ efforts to chart their own courses for social and economic development, and involve the creation of socially inclusive ‘economic communities’ underpinned by networks and ‘civic capital’” (Bramwell et al., 2008, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1291). Importantly however, they believe the empirical question is positioned along a continuum, “with a local politics captured by global neoliberalism at one end and a local politics capable of skilfully creating specific place-based, economic, social, cultural and environmental coalitions” (Bramwell et al., 2008, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1291). It is along this continuum that the GTP finds itself positioned, and in accordance with Hypothesis A, this paper ultimately aims to explore to which end it is more closely situated.
Additionally, while city-regionalism and competitiveness have featured prominently in discourse surrounding regional economic development, many of the writings are too generalised in scale, or too focused on particular aspects related to the growth of city-regions, such as democracy or economic production without attempting to understand the interplay between such aspects. Accordingly, the most recent discourse on such topics seek to understand the combination and interdependency of social cohesion, good governance and economic competitiveness at a local level (Buck et al., 2005, in Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1291).

5.2.2. ASSOCIATIVE GOVERNANCE

Andrew and Doloreux (2012) present several examples of associative governance structures that were developed in Ottawa, such as The Ottawa Partnership (TOP), The Ottawa Centre for Research and Innovation (OCRI) and the Ottawa Local Immigration Partnership (OLIP), which have had varying levels of success. The emergence of these structures, according to Andrew and Doloreux (2012) are due to the Ottawa context where the government was downscaling and a more active private sector presence elicited changing views on the source and nature of leadership at a city-region scale.

Associative governance builds on the view that “collective leadership must come from a broad base of actors that feel they have ownership of the issue” (Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1298), however these early examples seemed to all rely on a traditional view of the relevant actors in local politics, namely government leaders, leaders in business, heads of tertiary education institutions, and sometimes the more prominent leaders in the civil society sector. The challenge therefore lies in the fact that TOP, OCRI and OLIP all were structured to be very “inclusive of the included and not necessarily of the marginalised” (Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1298). The results of this apparent oversight, is that the economic development interventions exercised in the Ottawa City-Region resulted in the noticeable increase in prosperity, for those residents earning some of the highest income levels in the country, but the number of poor and marginalised citizens has increased noticeably, resulting in a further polarisation between the poor and the rich (Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1298). This is of relevance to the Voortrekker Road Corridor and the construction of the multi-stakeholder partnership of the GTP, which as explored in Chapter 6, possessed all the external signs of being inclusive when founded, but questionably does not appear to have made room for the involvement of a broader range of civil society participants, let alone the most marginalised and disenfranchised members of the neighbourhoods such as migrants, refugees and street people.
5.2.3. Participatory Urban Governance

Developmental policies related to governance at metropolitan level should therefore ideally deliver “substantive citizenship, equity and spatial integration” (Pieterse, 2002, p. 4) and much of the literature on governance and participation is based on the underlying assumption that “more participatory governance is good for the poor and improves the likelihood of developmental policies” (Pieterse, 2002, p. 4). However in his article “From divided to integrated city” Pieterse (2002) provides evidence that those measures put in place to enhance participation “do not necessarily increase the power of the poor or advance their interests, especially in the context of multi-stakeholder politics that rests on deliberative processes” (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2001 in Pieterse, 2002, p. 4).

Chattopadhyay (2015) explores participatory urban governance in Indian cities, and considers what can be learnt by other cities in the global south in relation to urban development. He explains that policy-makers in Indian cities, much like in Cape Town it appears, are met with the difficult challenge of addressing two conflicting objectives, “serving the population’s needs for basic services and the ... infrastructural needs for making cities ‘world class’, as desired by international business interests” (Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 23). He observes that this urban crisis coincides with the public policy shifts towards neo-liberalism, which too has influenced a shift in paradigm for Indian urban development policies (Chattopadhyay, 2015). Characterised by “the withdrawal of state and the entry of private capital in urban development and ... the rescaling of government from central to local levels through the process of decentralisation of the government and the private sector” (Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 23), urban development governance has been steered towards a new participatory framework.

Understanding such a new participatory framework requires the interrogation of three primary concerns, which actors participate in such governance arrangements versus which are excluded, what are the decision-making and implementation processes that are relied upon in such arrangements, and do such participatory governance arrangements improve urban service outcomes, and if so, for who? (Chattopadhyay, 2015). All three of these questions become relevant in trying to tease out the inherent tension in urban development initiatives, that tension that exists between a pro-poor, pro-integration agenda, and that of private sector investment and profit; and therefore must be posed when considering the intentions, actions and desired outcomes of the GTP.

Furthermore, in this new mode of governance, Chattopadhyay (2015) explains that government is only one of the actors, joined by the private sector and civil society, but he distinguishes ‘governance’ from that of ‘participatory governance’, due to the latter placing “a particular emphasis on the inclusion of the people, especially the poor in the governance mechanism” (Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 24). He asserts that participatory practices that actively engage citizens from all socio-economic strata can
contribute significantly to the deepening of democracy (Chattopadhyay, 2015). However he does warn that “positive outcomes associated with decentralisation and related participatory mechanisms presuppose the existence of institutions and rules providing equal opportunities to all deliberating parties, and, importantly, parties could enter deliberations as conscious and empowered forces” (Beaumont & Nicholls, 2008, in Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 24). Once more, the de jure set up and stated intentions of the GTP suggest that the institutional arrangements are thus that equal opportunities are provided to all segments of the region’s population; however this study will continue to flesh out whether the de facto arrangements do in fact protect rules that enable equal participation.

Understanding the de facto arrangements become critical, as it is widely acknowledged that societies, and the cities in which they are located, are spaces of deeply embedded hierarchies and inequalities, and therefore participatory processes of this kind are always susceptible to manipulation by those who are better equipped in terms of economic power, social capital or skills and expertise (Chattopadhyay, 2015). Chattopadhyay (2015) therefore suggests that to achieve tangible success through participatory governance methods, it is vital that among stakeholders there is a relative balance of power (Chattopadhyay, 2015).

5.2.4. POLITICAL AND ELITE CAPTURE

Chattopadhyay (2015) found that in the Indian city examples, civic organisations such as Residents’ Welfare Associations (RWAs), as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community benefit organisations (CBOs) in many cases, actually perpetuated unequal access to participatory forms of urban governance. In the case of NGO- and CBO-led participatory projects, most were merely successful in finding new opportunities to entrench political and elite capture (Chattopadhyay, 2015). In Mumbai, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) aimed to roll out a solid waste management improvement intervention through its 24 ward offices. To do this, it identified CBOs to serve as the intermediary between those living in the Mumbai slums and the MCGM. The CBOs were expected to organise among slum-dwellers, arrange and facilitate meetings between local officials and representatives, manage the garbage collection processes, and importantly recruit and pay community volunteers as well as collect the monthly payments from the residents for the services (Chattopadhyay, 2015).

Capture became evident when it became clear that in most cases, the CBOs that were selected to undertake the management of these projects often consisted of individuals who were politically affiliated or connected. In return these CBOs, the slum residents for whom they catered services, and their members, “all became ‘political capital’ for the councillors” (Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 30). This,
combined with the fact that the CBOs collected the monthly fees for garbage collection and therefore enabled great financial gain for the officials, councillors and the appointed CBO, served to imply the “politicization of the partnership arrangement that hardly presented any participatory opportunities for the ordinary people” (Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 31).

In a similar fashion, the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) embarked on a partnership approach to the rehabilitation and resettlement programme of over 20,000 households. Instead of organising communities, leading participatory forums and ensuring the engagement of the intended beneficiaries, a “critical examination of the function of the NGOs in the … programmes revealed that they had acted as the contracted agents of the state apparatus” (Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 31).

Chattopadhyay (2015) posits that members of the elite manage, in cases such as these, to dominate the participatory arrangements and thus serve to disempower the poorer members of the area. Such members, who are most often connected politically, leveraged the participatory opportunities to misappropriate public funds or reroute them to those portions of society that prove to be loyal supporters. Additionally, Chattopadhyay (2015) concludes “given the difficulty that the poor people face in accessing state resources, elected councillors in the decentralized set-up mediated in the day-to-day functioning of the municipalities, developed control over the distribution of state resources and exchanged resources … in return for their support” (Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 34).

5.2.5. PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES DOMINATED BY MIDDLE-CLASS

To illustrate this Chattopadhyay (2015) tells the story of the Advanced Locality Management scheme in Mumbai, much like other Indian residents’ welfare associations (RWAs), which provided a variety of channels for, usually middle-class, residents to deal with officials in the municipal government. The Mumbai Advanced Management Locality (AMLs) Scheme (a peoples’ association at the building or street level) worked together with the MCGM around issues of urban management, such as refuse removal and general cleanliness, and did so through monthly ward-level meetings (Chattopadhyay, 2015). Due to their relatively superior socio-economic standing, the middle-class members of the AMLs were better at organising and rallying broader groups of middle-class residents to vote in municipal elections, and soliciting the services of professionals in the financial, engineering and legal professions to supervise municipal projects (Chattopadhyay, 2015).

These processes enabled the ALM residents to leverage the participatory processes to have great influence on the decision- and policy-making processes, but Chattopadhyay (2015) notes that “a close look at the nature of the members and their issues of concern reveals quite a disturbing picture” (Chattopadhyay, 2015). ALM meetings were almost always housed in the middle-class and upper-
middle-class neighbourhoods, and well-educated professional elites and middle-class housewives dominated the ALM activities and priorities. This of course is problematic when trying to roll-out urban participatory processes, which as a consequence are left far from inclusive or substantively democratic (Chattopadhyay, 2015). This context was materialised in the Vision Mumbai which served to direct city restructuring processes, and endorsed by the ALMs, it envisaged a “modern, clean and efficient city cleared of hawkers, shanties, encroachment of public space and chaos” (Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 29).

Similarly, the RWAs in Delhi, Chennai and Bangalore established partnerships with municipal governments towards improving service delivery, but were found to be “dominated by the members of the middle classes who identify the urban poor, urban slums and squatter settlements as nuisance and quite threatening to any future urban development perspective” (Harris, 2010, in Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 29). In Delhi, reinforcing the conflicting objectives of urban development, middle-class groups utilised litigation to support their endeavours to clean up their city to position them as global cities that are attractive to international capital, thereby criminalising those who set up businesses or dwellings on private or public land, and subsequently rendering them ineligible to access public services (Chattopadhyay, 2015).

5.2.6. CITY-BUILDING NONPROFITS

Fraser and Kick (2014) write about the coalitions between public and private actors that are typically established to promote urban regeneration or restructuring efforts common in the inner-city neighbourhoods of United States cities. Their article particularly looks at an example of a ‘city-building non-profit established by a public-private growth coalition to both “execute the redevelopment of urban space... and manage neighbourhood resident participation in these efforts”’ (Fraser & Kick, 2014, p. 1445). The complexity they seek to understand is the conflict that arose between neighbourhood residents who, as they began to see themselves as change agents, increasingly came into conflict with the non-profit funders’ objectives for the revitalisation (Fraser & Kick, 2014). Their article is useful in interrogating the relationship between nonprofits of this kind, gentrification, displacement, and community building in relation to urban regeneration. Fraser and Kick (2014) describe the city Chattanooga, and a neighbourhood called Southside, which experienced similar decline to that observed in Bellville, Cape Town; resulting in local businesses closing or relocating, and absentee landlords allowing their buildings to deteriorate and be utilised for illegal or anti-social behaviour (Fraser & Kick, 2014). In the early 2000s however, rapid gentrification took place with the in-migration of new middle-class residents, and the Southside District displayed the highest rate of out-migration of low-income African-Americans in the country (Walton, 2012, in Fraser & Kick, 204, p. 1446). What is
initially surprising, but appears to corroborate some of the later observations made by Chattopadhyay (2015) in Indian cities, is that the “principal organization that orchestrated this population shift was not city government or private developers but Community Impact Chattanooga (CIC), a nonprofit created through a partnership between the City of Chattanooga and private foundations” (Fraser & Kick, 2014, p. 1446).

Fraser and Kick (2014) posit that this example of the CIC taking on the role of restructuring urban spaces positions it as a “shadow state”, taking on a role that governments would have once provided for citizens, examples of which are most often seen in social services. In this case the CIC performs the role of drawing private investment into areas specifically targeted by the state for regeneration, and does so by aligning people and place (Fraser & Kick, 2014). The purpose of viewing CIC from the perspective of the shadow-state theories is to attempt to understand “the way public-private agendas operate through civil society during processes of urban restructuring” (Fraser & Kick, 2014, p. 1447). They suggest that community development and community-building processes have change since the 1960s, mostly because “neoliberalism has matured [and] no longer are impoverished, minority group members given the latitude to be adversarial in relation to state and market actors; rather, they are enrolled as a community to participate in consensus-building exercises” (Fraser & Kick, 2014, p. 1449). They describe a new form of interaction, where in theory everyone can have a seat at the table, but “from a governmentality perspective, particular demands may be voiced during neighbourhood-redevelopment efforts, but only insofar as they do not challenge the overarching framework of neoliberalism” (Fraser & Kick, 2014, p. 1449).

Fraser and Kick (2014) believe, especially in this case in the United States, that this new breed of city-building non-profits are set-up and used as vehicles to enable public and private sector capitalist expansion into those neighbourhoods that have experienced disinvestment, in other words, low-income neighbourhoods. In tracking the development of the CIC, Fraser and Kick (2015) note that the strategies of the organisation tended to diverge from the stated aims, which claimed it was established to act as a community-building initiative to undertake actions that would benefit the existing residents. Its stated role as a catalyst for creating an improved quality of life for the participating neighbourhoods seemed to be contradicted by its willingness to be co-opted by the public and private stakeholders that were looking to attract major capital investment into the area (Fraser & Kick, 2014). This co-option was demonstrated through the organisations buy-in to a new approach for development in the area which far-better suited the time demands of the market, that of developing “’competitive neighbourhoods’ where people ‘with a choice’ would want to move” (Fraser & Kick, 2014, p. 1454), utilising the development of new market-rate housing towards a mixed-income housing neighbourhood. The resulting interventions and economic strategies were in complete
contrast to the previously stated community-building aims, and instead seemed to pertain to a neoliberal mentality (Fraser & Kick, 2014).

5.2.7. TIME HORIZONS FOR STAKEHOLDER GOALS

A role that seems to be considered of great importance for city-building nonprofits, is the maintenance of resident involvement over time, which is often complicated by the varying sets of goals that exist for the non-profit itself, the board of public-private stakeholders and of course the existing residents (Fraser & Kick, 2014). Aligning these goals is a mammoth task in itself, but Fraser and Kick (2015) assert that “even if all stakeholder goals for neighbourhood revitalisation are similar in the broadest sense, the timing in which revitalisation strategies are implemented can itself be problematic” (Fraser & Kick, 2014, p. 1459). Weber (2002, in Fraser & Kick, 2014) notes that “the temporal horizons of investors, developers and residents rarely coincide” (Weber, 2002, p. 518, in Fraser & Kick, 2014, p. 1459), which finds city-building nonprofits in a position wherein they have to try and keep all stakeholders happy, involved and feeling relevant in the revitalisation efforts (Fraser & Kick, 2014). In the case of the Chattanooga Southside district, the traditional community-building process took too long according to the intended plans of the state and market actors, and the lack of tangible neighbourhood change resulted in the state and market actors radically redefining the CIC’s purpose to suit their needs, hence the shift to redeveloping housing to attracting a new class of residents of higher incomes (Fraser & Kick, 2014). This seemingly seamless shift to a new priority without the willingness or ability to “bring the community along in a meaningful way... was indicative of the complex power geometries that existed between the CIC shadow-state organisation, its board of state and market actors, and, in contrast, residents” (Fraser & Kick, 2014, p. 1459).

5.2.8. URBAN GOVERNANCE IN THE VOORTREKKER ROAD CORRIDOR

As Chapter 6 will elaborate, the plans for the Voortrekker Road Corridor are based on a commitment to inclusion and integration that can hopefully be achieved through specific development and spatial planning interventions. The Greater Tygerberg Partnership has been established with the core mandate to facilitate partnership building and consensus around a vision and implementation plan to achieve this in the local context. However as discussed above such initiatives can often be at great risk of being co-opted by either or both private and public stakeholders whose agendas may centre on promoting capitalist expansion into the area. As this paper will progress it will attempt to determine the extent to which the GTP and its initiatives may be vulnerable to similar risks.
Chapter 6 primarily explores hypothesis A, and whether or not the Greater Tygerberg Partnership has, like the examples in Chapter 5, been subjected to patterns of urban patronage and private or political capture. Through an analysis of documents reflecting the period of June 2012 to June 2014, the author aims to interrogate issues such as the institutional arrangements, the GTP’s perceived role and the rationale behind project prioritisation, to determine whether the activities and decision-making processes of the Partnership do tend towards domination by middle-class priorities and private sector interests. The Chapter presents a range of evidence for interrogation, interspersed with interpretations made by the author which is presented in italics.


6.1.1. MAYORAL URBAN RENEWAL PROGRAMME

Although Cape Town is considered internationally to be a wealthy and prosperous city, one does not have to travel far to realise that prosperity is not the reality for a number of communities in the greater Cape Town municipality. In order to focus greater efforts on addressing this obvious inequality in environment and socio-economic reality, Mayor Patricia de Lille introduced the Mayoral Urban Renewal Programme (MURP) in early 2012 (City of Cape Town, 2012). Through a targeted area-based approach, reliant on Area Coordinating Teams (ACT) and publicly determined Community Action Plans, the MURP was launched as a mechanism for improving safety, quality of life and the socio-economic situation in ten focus areas. Bellville Transport Interchange (BTI) precinct including the Voortrekker Road Corridor was identified as one of these target areas, all of which are considered to be accessible mini-CBDs, selected with the intention of stimulating economic growth, development and inclusion for broader communities of Cape Town residents (City of Cape Town, 2013).

The stated rationale behind the programme is “to introduce a sustainable system of operations and maintenance of public infrastructure and facilities, in partnership with communities, with the immediate objective of stabilising areas and providing a platform for effective public and private investment” (City of Cape Town, 2013, p. 15). ACTs are expected to represent a diverse range of participants from the local community and businesses, who will collaborate with officials from the area to develop Community Actions Plans which stipulate a unique package of interventions for the MURP area.
6.1.2. Establishment of the Voortrekker Road Corridor Improvement District and the Greater Tygerberg Partnership

Within this context, the Stellenbosch School of Leadership, based in Bellville, believed that it was an imperative that a complementary, inclusive and knowledge-based participatory process, including all relevant societal structures, needed to be created in order to “capture and utilise the collective knowledge and commitment of citizens in an inclusive approach and methodology” (Public Leadership Forum and Business Consult, 2012, p. 8).

Therefore in support of the MURP strategy, the School established a governance innovation forum titled the Public Leadership Forum (PLF) with the intention of bringing together partners from private, public, academic and civil society sectors into a dialogue around governance, public leadership and service delivery. Being based in Bellville, the PLF embarked on a series of innovation discussions related to the Voortrekker Road Corridor (VRC) which resulted in the establishment of a Special Ratings Area (SRA) and the Voortrekker Road Corridor City Improvement District (VRCID) in August 2012 (Public Leadership Forum and Business Consult, 2012, p. 3). In this demarcated area, property owners agree to pay a special levy over and above normal rates charges, for services of a supplementary or complementary nature aimed at enhancing the physical and social environment of the area. The VRCID are then mandated to spend the money collected to “top up” pre-existing council services, according to an approved business plan (Voortrekker Road Corridor Improvement District, 2012).

Beyond the establishment of the VRCID, the discussions led to the agreement that an innovation alliance partnership should be set up as a permanent legal entity that would champion the advancement of the larger initiative around improving the VRC, beyond the daily urban management issues of crime and grime. The purpose of this entity would be to “inform a continued strategic innovative development process, drawing on the strengths of the partners contributing to development, investment and service delivery” (Public Leadership Forum and Business Consult, 2012, p. 3).

The Greater Tygerberg Partnership (GTP) was therefore developed with the intention of being the idea generating body that would “initiate, plan, coordinate and oversee the implementation of strategies and actions together with the partners” (Public Leadership Forum and Business Consult, 2012, p. 3). The vision was therefore, as captured in its founding document:

“... to inclusively and innovatively facilitate the creation and sustained existence of a vibrant, thriving, desirable and value adding economically prosperous area for the benefit of citizens and inhabitants, by
introducing and utilising world class cutting edge knowledge-based strategies, structures and

6.1.3. SECTION 67 GRANT-IN-AID

On this premise, The Greater Tygerberg Partnership secured a City of Cape Town Section 67 Grant-in-Aid effective 1 March 2013, and valid for a period of three years. The Partnership’s services were defined in the Memorandum of Agreement as “providing strategic support and other activities in terms of the organisation’s business plan in respect of achieving regeneration and associated socio-economic benefits for the area through innovative solutions-focused partnerships in the Voortrekker Road Corridor” (City of Cape Town, 2013, p. 4).

This would in turn benefit the City of Cape Town a great deal in terms of its objectives set out in a number of policy documents, most notably the City of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan 2012 - 2017 (IDP) and Spatial Development Framework (SDF), towards developing a second metropolitan node which will drive inclusive and equitable economic growth in the broader metropolitan.

The grant was structured in such a way that the funding dedicated to staffing and operational costs at the outset would be 100% in the first financial year, and then reduced annually so as to direct more funding towards project costs. GTP would then be responsible for designing and implementing a funding strategy to determine and secure alternative income generating streams for long term sustainability.

As a grant beneficiary, the GTP is expected to provide monthly progress reports to the City of Cape Town, as well as quarterly reports for submission to the Portfolio Committee for Economic, Environmental and Spatial Planning (EESP) (City of Cape Town, 2013).

6.1.4. LEGAL STATUS, CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS

The GTP is registered as a Non-Profit Company (NPC) with non-voting members, who are incorporated for public benefit. The Memorandum of Incorporation was adopted in September 2012, and sets out inter alia the criteria for membership, the rights and requirements of members, and the process for applications or termination of membership. The criteria states that membership of the company is open to “organisations or persons participating in the [sic] Cape Town’s economic development,

---

6 For more detail on the Spatial Development Framework’s plans for the VRC see Chapter 1.
7 The GTP financial year is aligned to that of the City of Cape Town, its primary funder, and it runs from July to June.
academic/learning institutions and social society systems” (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2012b, p. 7) and lists a number of agencies and organisations which can register for membership, including, for example, sector development agencies, labour related associations, local authorities, community based organisations or social movements.

According to the GTP Founding Document, the board is to consist of no more than twenty directors, three of which will represent the City of Cape town, one from the Provincial Government of the Western Cape (PGWC), and four directors with specialised knowledge from either academic institutions or relevant professions, and two from civil society. The remaining ten will represent the private sector, consisting of four directors each from organised business and macro businesses, and two with special expertise (Public Leadership Forum and Business Consult, 2012).

The GTP’s Regeneration Framework (2014) states that “The GTP’s board composition reflects the diversity of stakeholders in the development of the sub-region. Representatives of organised business, City of Cape Town and Western Cape Provincial Government officials, councillors, and community organisations are well balanced on the board of directors” (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 15).

The original Board of directors was constituted as follows:

Table 6.1: Membership of the GTP Board of Directors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIVATE SECTOR</th>
<th>CITY OF CAPE TOWN</th>
<th>ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th>CIVIL SOCIETY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Musa Shezi (Chairman)</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
<td>NB Publishers / Via Afrika Publishers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Tienie Le Roux (Executive Director)</td>
<td>Director and Business Consultant</td>
<td>Tienie le Roux Business Consult</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Johan Bester</td>
<td>Senior Advisor : Group Governance</td>
<td>Sanlam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Llewellyn Delport</td>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Trans Hex Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Patrick Parring</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Parequity (PTY) Ltd / NTI Security Solutions (PTY)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Karin Rautenbach</td>
<td>Owner/Director</td>
<td>Dala Junction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Hardus Zevenster</td>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Radio Tygerberg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Johan van der Merwe</td>
<td>Mayoral Committee Member: Economic, Environmental &amp; Spatial Planning</td>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Craig Kesson</td>
<td>Director of Policy and Strategy – Mayor’s Office</td>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ald. Marian Nieuwoudt</td>
<td>Alderman</td>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clr. Sam Pienaar</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Larry Pokpas</td>
<td>Institutional Planning</td>
<td>University of the Western Cape</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Erwin Schwella</td>
<td>Professor of Public Leadership</td>
<td>Stellenbosch School of Public Leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Thelo Wakefield</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Western Province Rugby Football Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Interpretation**

It is interesting to note that the Founding Document makes provision for only two civil society representatives, against ten private sector representatives, as well as four from academic institutions or relevant professions, which appears to suggest, regardless of the diversity claims made in the Regeneration Framework, that the private sectors interests are far more represented on the board of the organisation. Considering the vision of the organisation to facilitate inclusive and innovative development of the corridor, it would seem to be far more suitable to incorporate a broader variety of civil society members on the board. As per the table above only one director represents civil society, Mr Thelo Wakefield of the Western Province Rugby Football Union, which cannot really be considered to be representative of the diversity of civil society in the area and raises concerns about the genuine participatory nature of the partnership as warned by Fraser and Kick (2014) and Chattopadhyay (2015).

### 6.1.5. Membership and Representation of the GTP

As of March 2014, the GTP website did not provide a list of existing members, but listed the following several partner organisations which included the Western Cape Economic Development Forum, Stellenbosch School of Public Leadership, University of the Western Cape, Sanlam, the Western Cape Business Opportunities Forum and the Afrikaanse Handels Instituut (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2013a).

The GTP Regeneration Framework makes further reference to partners and stakeholders including Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Northlink College, state-owned enterprises Transet and the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), and National Government Departments (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a).

### 6.1.6. Imagining the Future and Design the City Workshops

In order to develop a programme for regeneration for the VRC that was inclusive and engaged all stakeholders in the sub-region, the GTP embarked on the Future Tyger public engagement process which was said to be an inclusive conversation aimed at building an interactive community that would provide input into the programme. The first three stages of this process were intensive public engagement initiatives (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 15).
Phase 1, titled “Feeling the Temperature” took the form of public meetings in Salt river, Kensington, Parow, Goodwood, Ravensmead, Belhar, Bellville and UWC Campus, where the “initial spatial argument” (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 15) was presented to community organisations, City officials and councillors, investors and ratepayers associations.

Phase 2 took the form of 2-day specialist seminars which engaged a similar mix of interest groups, but also brought in the voice of urban designers and planners, researchers and built environment professionals. This “Imagining the Future” phase utilised scenario planning to map development trajectories over the milestones of 2020, 2030 and 2040, and align them to National, Provincial and Local policies (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 15).

“Design the City” was the third phase, which was a series of sectoral-specific design sessions which led to the development of development proposals for the regeneration of the corridor. It is understood that a wide variety of interested parties were invited to attend these events, but it is not certain which groups did participate (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 15).

Only four key community based organisations, which would add valuable insight with regards to equitable and inclusive development of the corridor, were invited, as per Table 6.2. However, it appears as though only the Development Action Group, a leading NGO in the urban governance environment, participated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Action Group</th>
<th>NGO focused on the urban sector and urban governance, housing and human settlements etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isandla Institute</td>
<td>Public interest think-tank focused on fostering just, equitable and democratic urban settlements, urban land and integration through land use planning and management systems that enhance the right to the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slum Dwellers International</td>
<td>SDI and its subsidiary Community Organisation Resources Centre focuses on people-centre development initiative with a focus on housing development and livelihoods and job creation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance Learning Network</td>
<td>A network of SA NGOs that aims to promote participatory, effective, accountable and pro-poor local governance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: Urban Settlements NGOs based in Cape Town (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2013b)

It is therefore possible to surmise that although the stated aims of the Future Tyger process was to enable inclusive input into the design of the short-, medium-, and long-term plans for the region; the attendance was poor and far from representative. This is supported by reflections of GTP staff members. One explained that the project planning and programming of the organisation tended to
consist of “a number of charrettes\(^8\) and stakeholder engagements with a limited range and number of stakeholders. I do not consider them as being sufficiently inclusive of all stakeholders and communities” (Anonymous Questionnaire with GTP Staff Member 1, 2016), while another stated “This was not very successful. As far as I know there was hardly any community involvement” (Anonymous Questionnaire with GTP Staff Member 2, 2016).

**Interpretation**

*As was the case with the partnerships in Ottawa, analysed by Andrew & Doloreux (2012), this style of associative governance falls short in that it remains inclusive only of those considered traditional participants in multi-stakeholder governance. The Future Tyger process therefore ran the risk of merely reflecting the desires and objectives of a narrow cross-section of VRC stakeholders, enabling capture should there actors who desire to do so.*


6.2.1. **CITY OF CAPE TOWN DEVELOPMENTAL MANDATE**

The City of Cape Town is legally mandated and responsible, in terms of the Municipal Systems Act (2000) Section 25, for the adoption of a “single, inclusive and strategic plan for the development of the municipality which links, integrates and co-ordinates plans and takes into account proposals for the development of the municipality, [and] aligns the resources and capacity of the municipality with the implementation of the plan” (South Africa, 2000, p. 36). Therefore the City itself is responsible for the urban planning within the municipality, aligned to this Integrated Development Plan.

As the Voortrekker Road Corridor has been identified as an integration zone as per National Treasury’s Integrated City Development Grant, the Department for Spatial Planning and Urban Design (SPUD) initiated the Voortrekker Road Corridor Strategy and Investment Plan process, so as to best determine the focus and scheduling for public investment into the integration zone over the next several years, such that it will crowd in the most value in terms of private sector investment into the area (City of Cape Town, 2014a).

---

\(^8\) A charrette is a public meeting or workshop which is devoted to a concerted collaborative effort to solve a problem or plan the design of something, often used in reference to planning, urban design or architecture initiatives (Oxford University Press, 2016b).
Although the City of Cape Town played a significant part in the impetus behind the establishment of the Greater Tygerberg Partnership, and at present remains the principal funder of the organisation, by early 2014 SPUD was finding it difficult to collaborate with the GTP, due to a perceived overlap in functions between that which the City is constitutionally mandated to do, and that which the GTP sought to do. The Development Integration Unit (DIU) was requested to chair a workshop to establish a preliminary conceptual framework for the roles and responsibilities of the GTP and each relevant line department, which would eventually enable the Partnership to assimilate into the systems of the relevant line departments.

Ultimately the greatest perceived overlap was related to infrastructure development and development processes in the municipality. As stated above, the City of Cape Town is mandated to design and implement the infrastructure development of the city, while taking into consideration competing needs for resources across the metropolitan. At the workshop, held on 10 March 2014, the GTP made a presentation in which they asserted that a key role of the organisation was to be a development catalyst for the region. This was met with concern, especially by SPUD, who believed the role of designing and driving development in any given area of the city was firmly situated in their department, regardless of whether a Partnership such as the GTP was in existence (Development Integration Unit, 2014a). The Director of Spatial Planning and Urban Design asserted in the workshop that the GTP should rather primarily serve as custodian of the multi-stakeholder partnership and network, and a resource of intelligence and innovation (Development Integration Unit, 2014a).

The key recommendations that thus arose from this workshop were that a Liaison Forum was necessary as a regular interaction between City officials and the GTP, and that a representative from the respective parties would meet to devise a roles and responsibilities framework to be presented to this forum upon its first meeting (Development Integration Unit, 2014a). Also captured in the minutes, was clear contention around whose role it would be to package and plan infrastructure projects in the corridor, and this was flagged for further attention (Development Integration Unit, 2014a).

Furthermore it was agreed that the GTP would prepare a prioritised list of their projects for presentation to the forum which would identify the level of City involvement required and the urgency with which each project should be delivered (Development Integration Unit, 2014a).

Thus a process was embarked upon for the next several months, through which it was hoped that the GTP would align better with the City of Cape Town’s internal budgeting and service delivery programming. This was done while simultaneously drafting a framework wherein the different players could co-exist and work alongside and together with each other in such a way as to maximise the
impact of efforts in the Corridor. This unpacking of the roles and responsibilities would eventually take far longer than originally expected, with each of the Forum member parties battling it out over the authority for the urban development of the region. What would eventually result in a Decision Gates Matrix (Development Integration Unit, 2014b) and an unsigned Implementation Protocol was a process of at least three months of much the same debate.

6.2.3. Navigating Conflict: April 2014

In undertaking the process to better delineate and understand the roles and responsibilities of the CoCT and the GTP in the regeneration of the Corridor, it became clear that there were many misconceptions as to the extent of the GTPs authority and decision-making ability with regards to the planning and implementation of interventions in the corridor. The placement and network of the GTP, as well as its enthusiasm to see change through action in the corridor did on some occasions lead to conflict between the Partnership and the City of Cape town line departments, where projects not necessarily agreed to with the City, nor viable in terms of the current capacity of the Departments or City budgets, were presented or promoted to external companies or agencies. This led to a mismanagement of expectations within the private sector, or among the political leaders of the City.

For example, minutes from the first Liaison Forum meeting, held on 9 April 2014, record that City officials expressed concern about the GTP making a commitment on its behalf with a Dutch organisation named DASUDA (Development Integration Unit, 2014c). A proposed MOU had already been developed by the GTP and DASUDA, and up until that point the City had not been “privy to conversations regarding such agreements” (Development Integration Unit, 2014c, p. 3). In another recorded example, the City requested that GTP be more aware of lobbying, or having premature discussions with private property developers regarding the development of state-owned land, where it was the responsibility of state-owned enterprises, or the City itself as land-owners, to package property and put it out for tender (Development Integration Unit, 2014c). This was particularly important because one of the priority land parcels that was repeatedly brought up for debate was the Bellville Transport Interchange, and the large undeveloped parcel of land belonging to Transnet’s freight operations. Based on these concerns, in a subsequent meeting on 15 May 2014, it was documented that “SOEs [state-owned enterprise] would only be approached by GTP at the specific request of CoCT or PGWC – as there are existing platforms through which government engages with the SOEs” (Development Integration Unit, 2014d).

In order to mitigate this type of conflict and misalignment, the GTP tabled a proposed framework for collaboration at the first Liaison Forum, starting with the outline of eight roles of the partnership as
detailed in Table 6.3. below. These roles, which included for example Development Catalyst, Regional Champion and Partnership Programme Facilitator, were supplemented with some examples of projects in which they would expect to play those particular roles.

With these roles, the GTP also presented a project cycle framework which attempted to delineate the different project stages in a typical Public Private Partnership (PPP) development project as seen in Table 6.4., as well as the different roles both the GTP and City Departments would play in each project stage (Development Integration Unit, 2014c).

On the most part the City officials who were represented on the Liaison Forum were in support of the proposed roles and the stages of a PPP project, however there was one particular area that continued to cause concern, meeting after meeting, debate after debate. The role that caused the most amount of tension was that of Development Catalyst, which as it reads in the table was diluted from the first iteration which positioned the GTP as the drivers of combining public and private investment into viable and sustainable development projects. This in turn linked to Stage 5 in the project phases which is referred to as the “Setting Up” Phase (Development Integration Unit, 2014c).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIMARY ROLES</th>
<th>Regional Champion (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Social Partnership (1)</td>
<td>• Marketing and promoting the region (VRC) for public and private investment, social and economic opportunities and spending with events, promotions and investment marketing and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manage an inclusive, well informed and authentic debate on the immediate, short term, medium term and long term regeneration of the region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implement clear and visionary goals and objectives to deliver regeneration through an integrated business and strategic plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mobilise provincial, national and international support from the public, government and business</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Champion (2)</td>
<td>• Marketing and promoting the region (VRC) for public and private investment, social and economic opportunities and spending with events, promotions and investment marketing and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Programme Facilitator (3)</td>
<td>• Initiate, maintain, lead, organise and oversee knowledge and innovation contributions and inputs of the alliance partners into a functioning regional ecosystem that embraces:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integrating the budgets, programmes, projects and resources of its partners into programmes that crowd in resources and align partnership action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation &amp; Economic Development Enabler (4)</td>
<td>• Other economic development partnerships &amp; innovation systems,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other economic development partnerships &amp; innovation systems,</td>
<td>• Government agencies,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other economic development partnerships &amp; innovation systems,</td>
<td>• Knowledge Institutions, Sector Agencies,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other economic development partnerships &amp; innovation systems,</td>
<td>• Skills, business development &amp; Incubation intermediaries,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government agencies</td>
<td>• Industrialists &amp; Corporates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECONDARY ROLES</th>
<th>Lobbyist for Infrastructure, Services and Policy (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development Catalyst (5)</td>
<td>• Lobby for the appropriate and timeous delivery of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifying opportunity for combining public and private investment into viable and sustainable development projects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government agencies</td>
<td>• Services &amp; infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondar Year Roles</td>
<td>• Utility Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbyist for Infrastructure, Services and Policy (6)</td>
<td>• Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbyist for Infrastructure, Services and Policy (6)</td>
<td>• Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL PROJECTS</td>
<td>PPP DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Concept Development &amp; Programme Integration</td>
<td>Spatial &amp; Transport Alignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pre-feasibility / Business Modelling</td>
<td>Site Identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Feasibility / Business Planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Funding &amp; Partnering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Setting Up</td>
<td>Asset &amp; Development Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land Assembly / Tender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rights Procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plan Approval &amp; Construction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4: Project Cycle for Public Private Partnership Development Projects (Development Integration Unit, 2014c, p. Appendix)

This Stage 5 refers to the packaging of land, and the land release and tender process. If the projects being dealt with here were straightforward private development projects, then this would not be a cause for alarm, however, because it refers specifically to Public Private Partnership development projects, the assumption is that the land parcels will be owned by state entities. At the very least, key catalytic land parcels such as the Bellville Station, Paint City (a large vacant parking lot near the station) and the Transnet Freight grounds were all state owned, whether belonging to SOEs or the City itself.

As legislated by South African Law in the Municipal Finance Management Act, No 56 of 2003, the transfer of land is strictly regulated by the Local Government: Municipal Asset Transfer Regulations (2008) which is applicable to all municipalities and municipal entities transferring and disposing of
capital assets, or granting a right to use, control or manage capital assets. As this is strictly a responsibility of local government, it is not in the interests of fair practice or transparency to allow a non-state actor such as the GTP to play a “driving” role in this stage. The GTP however proposed in the initial forum that three key projects related to this particular Setting Up stage were of urgent importance if the City wished to see catalytic development in the corridor. These were:

- “An overlay zone for development in the area,
- Mixed Use Development Vehicle: Similar to the JHB Housing Agency – an aggressive focused vehicle championing and implementing TOD in the corridor [and a];
- Public Land Transfer Agreement/Vehicle: Incorporating City, Province, PRASA and Transnet for example, to establish a trust into which pockets of land or assets can be transferred for development. Such as a VRC Trust, which would not be subject to the MFMA.” (Development Integration Unit, 2014c)

These discussions brought to the surface a particular tension that would re-emerge several times, which was the fact that the GTP appeared to see a specific role for itself in driving the development of an asset release and development vehicle. This tension was heightened, when regular references to entities such as the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) or the Khayelitsha Development Trust (KDC) suggested that the GTP appeared to have the desire to morph into a special purpose vehicle (SPV) itself for the purpose of developing public owned land in the corridor.

**Interpretation**

At the outset this undoubtedly raises eyebrows in that an organisation that is directly funded by the City of Cape Town as a non-profit company, which had deliberately set out, or professed to set out, to be a genuine multi-stakeholder initiative, appeared to be more focused on property development projects as opposed to being a custodian and champion for the region, or an idea-generation body as stipulated in the vision in Chapter 6.

Not only did the proposal of such projects and a possible structure of the GTP raise alarm, but further conversation revealed that the GTP had already embarked on a number of conversations with private developers and landowners that supported the notion that it was already acting as if it had the mandate and authority to be such a vehicle. With regards to several proposed regeneration and development projects in the area, GTP at this stage was already facilitating and leading discussions with key state-owned enterprises and private companies around the vision planning for key public
pockets of land, in some cases making commitments to particular parties including local City of Cape Town subcouncils without agreement as to whether this fitted into the broader planning programmes of the Spatial Planning and Urban Design Department, or other critical line departments. Behaviour such as this, where the GTP sought to have their intentions validated through the Liaison Forum, but more surreptitiously through politically-linked ward councillors in the area, is reminiscent of the scenarios detailed by both Fraser and Kick (2014) and Chattopadhyay (2015), where they refer respectively to “the way public-private agendas operate through civil society during processes of urban restructuring” (Fraser & Kick, 2014, p. 1447) and the concerning manner in which middle-class agendas are imposed upon the urban decision- and policy-making processes, through the actions and perceived legitimacy of a civil society vehicle (Chattopadhyay, 2015).

This positioning of the GTP was revealed in the third Liaison Forum meeting held on the 20 June 2014, where an in depth discussion on the Bellville Station was held. The GTP reported to the Forum on a private sector proposal that the GTP was lobbying for in relation to the redevelopment of the station. The minutes state that the GTP was about to commission work on design scenarios for the Bellville City Core (BCC), which in itself unsettled the bureaucrats who felt that such design work was their sole responsibility, but also that the GTP reported on “a private sector agent which would like to bid to be the development agent for PRASA with respect to the Bellville station redevelopment [and] has developed a vision for the station which shows the potential it has for development with a major retail component” (Development Integration Unit, 2014e).

The Spatial Planning department response, requesting quite strongly that these two projects be kept clearly separated, indicated an apprehension that this may cause a conflict of interest. SPUD was recorded as requesting that “we clearly separate the BCC project from the private sector bid. It is likely that the private sector bid will request input from SPUD prior to presenting to PRASA itself. City and GTP must not slow on their own plans, and must be sure not to punt the private plan while investigating the investment potential in the area, thus we must be wary of favouring a particular parties interests” (Development Integration Unit, 2014e). The minutes continue to explain that the VRC Strategy and Investment Plan that was being developed internally in alignment with the Integration Zone grant funding (as detailed in Section 2.1) must remain transparent and open to all possibilities, and as partners the CoCT and the GTP should ensure that the “plans for the station fit into what we determine is best for the area and not vice versa” (Development Integration Unit, 2014e).
6.2.4. IMPLEMENTATION PROTOCOL AND DECISION GATES MATRIX: APRIL-MAY 2014

In order to try suffocate the possibility of the GTP forging ahead with its somewhat dubious, or private sector-leaning activities, the Liaison Forum developed an Implementation Protocol and Decision Gates Matrix which sought to succinctly capture the different types of projects on which the GTP might embark, and then the processes whereby approval or agreement needed to be sought from the City based primarily on the extent to which the project may impact on public land.

The matrix itself provided an indication of boundaries in the project cycle stages, which identified in each case the extent to which the GTP may proceed without further agreement from the City. To do this the matrix cross-references the developmental roles of the GTP (and examples of projects in which they would perform those particular roles) with the project stages, ultimately combining the original data put forward in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. As the role of Development Catalyst was continuously raised as a point of contention, it was the most difficult to negotiate and agree upon between the parties. In order to make it even less threatening linguistically, the role was renamed Investment and Development Promoter.

Table 6.5 shows an example of how the secondary roles and stages were cross-referenced and how this was expanded to determine the extent of the GTP’s autonomy at each stage. Each orange or red line indicated a ‘decision gate’ at which the GTP could either respectively progress while informing the Liaison Forum (and by extension the relevant line departments) or not proceed without express agreement form the necessary decision makers at the City of Cape Town. For the most part, the protocol and matrix explicitly stated that the GTP could not have any direct involvement with the Setting up phase, apart from making recommendations to the City of Cape Town on how best to develop a package of plans for any particular project to promote and incentivise development (Development Integration Unit, 2014b).

In order to further legitimise this agreement, a draft Implementation Protocol was devised and presented to the Forum, an excerpt of which is presented below.

5.1 The CITY and the ORGANISATION agree to collaborate on programmes and projects to be determined through the Voortrekker Road Integration Zone Strategy and Investment Framework.

5.4 Within this framework it is understood that a variety of different projects may exist. While some projects or programmes may be entirely embedded within private or NGO sector priorities or infrastructure, a majority of the infrastructure development projects will rest within, or overlap to some degree with the mandated work of City of Cape Town Line Departments, PGWC or National
Public Agencies such as Transnet or PRASA. Alternatively projects may depend or impact on public land or infrastructure.

5.5 Where projects fall outside of the scope of 5.1, the framework provides a model which must be adhered to in projects or initiatives that involve or impact upon any City land and/or services. (City of Cape Town, 2014c)

Furthermore in an attempt to ensure transparency and separate the GTP from any developer role the protocol explicitly stated the following:

In the case of a project embarked upon by the GTP which falls directly within the mandate of a City of Cape Town Line Department (i.e. Transport for Cape Town, SPUD), the GTP must ensure:

a. Its role remains one of lobbyist, or resource of intelligence inputting into CoCT conceptualisation phases until such time as the project is accepted and endorsed as a City of Cape Town project;

b. Once a project is accepted, the Partnership participates as a collaborator, providing innovative insight and presenting research and proposals to Line Departments, to influence the packaging of projects at a formal City level;

c. No agreements are made with developers or interested collaborators on behalf of the City of Cape Town, as GTP does not act as an agency on behalf of the City in this respect;

d. The Partnership has no authority over the alienation of land or the appointment of service providers;

e. The GTP and all family and business partners will remain excluded from tendering for property or the provision of services to the CoCT, and similarly excluded from providing consultancy services to any CoCT tenderers and;

f. The Partnership will respect the legislative and transparency measures put in place to ensure fairness in the tender process. (City of Cape Town, 2014c)

According to minutes, the GTP felt that both the matrix and the protocol “did not reflect the role GTP can play in setting up the development vehicles and land transfer mechanisms in property related projects [and] development in the area cannot take place without the setup of such vehicles” (Development Integration Unit, 2014d). In further support of Hypothesis A, and the notion that this inherent tension between the broader inclusionary goals and the possibility for private sector capture did in fact exist, the GTP representatives categorically stated that such activities should be the “core competency of the partnership so as to aggressively drive development of land” (Development Integration Unit, 2014d).
### SECONDARY ROLES OF GTP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Investment and Development Promoter</th>
<th>Lobbyist</th>
<th>Urban Organiser</th>
<th>Socio-Economic Integrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identifying opportunity, ensuring planning (not spatial) is in place, facilitating the infrastructure and combining public and private investment into viable and sustainable development projects. Includes working with government agencies, finance institutions, public and private landowners /developers.</td>
<td>Lobbying for appropriate and timeous delivery of services/infrastructure, transport, ICT, broadband, medical, educational and policies/registrations.</td>
<td>Facilitate qualitatively and quantitatively efficient, effective and integrated urban management for safety, security, cleanliness and a positive business environment</td>
<td>Integrate social and economic development capacities and programmes of government, industry, SETA's, NGOs and community organisations in a manner that best serves the interests of the region.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### STAGE

1. **Concept Devt & Programme Integration**
   - GTP cannot progress beyond Stage 1 unless agreed upon with City Departments. GTP can lobby for projects and innovations at this stage.
   - GTP can lobby throughout the project process, bearing in mind the decision points that must be adhered to by City officials, and that not all GTP ideas and proposals will be accepted.
   - GTP continues to facilitate improved urban management where appropriate. Where it impacts on City service delivery, approval must be sought from Line Departments. Where work is strictly CID deliverables, GTP must rely on CID to carry out. Any interventions that have impact on public property/infrastructure or land to be considered under (5).
   - GTP cannot progress beyond Stage 1 unless agreed upon with City Departments. GTP can lobby for projects and innovations at this stage.

2. **Pre-feasibility / Business Modelling**
   - If a project/process is supported by the CoCT, GTP can undertake pre-feasibility and modelling processes where agreed to with CoCT.
   - If a project/process is adopted, GTP can take part in a collaborative pre-feasibility and planning process with the City. Regularly report to LF.

3. **Feasibility / Business Planning**
   - GTP cannot progress beyond Stage 3 unless the applicable parties are in agreement that the project is feasible and viable and will be undertaken.
   - GTP cannot progress beyond Stage 3 unless the applicable parties are in agreement that the project is feasible and viable and will be undertaken.

4. **Funding & Partnering**
   - GTP cannot implement stage 5 for projects on public land. GTP can up until Stage 4 lobby for the adoption of principals or plans for certain projects.
   - If the project is related to land release or development/use of public property, GTP cannot implement Stage 5. GTP can play a role in influencing the packaging of such work.

5. **Setting Up**
   - GTP can contribute to the lead government department in preparation for set up i.e. land assembly, tender, plan approval etc. During stage 5, GTP have an important role to play in public engagement and managing the network.

6. **Evaluation & Review**

---

Table 6.5: Liaison Forum Decision Gates Matrix – Secondary Roles of the GTP (Development Integration Unit, 2014b)
6.3. IDENTIFICATION AND PRIORITISATION OF GTP PROJECTS

6.3.1. A REGENERATION FRAMEWORK

Over the course of its first two years of operation, the GTP committed a significant amount of resources, both human and financial, to rolling out the Future Tyger process, detailed in Section 6.1.6. This process, which aimed but was not necessarily successful to garner input from a variety of stakeholders to re-imagine the Voortrekker Road Corridor, provided the foundation for the development of the GTP Regeneration Framework, a lengthy document of over 100 pages which sought to embody the “action mandate” that the GTP was requesting of its partners, members and stakeholders (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 2).

In theory the Regeneration Framework was intended to capture the outcomes of the Future Tyger public conversation about the VRC and Bellville Central, and aimed to trigger further debate and input on an inclusive and broadly-adopted approach to regeneration interventions in the short-, medium- and long-term. In practice however, only one NGO was present, and no representatives of the communities in the area were recorded as attending, which as Andrew and Doloreux (2012) warn, veers away from associative governance in which “collective leadership must come from a broad base of actors that feel they have ownership of the issue” (Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1298) and ultimately was “inclusive of the included and not necessarily of the marginalised” (Andrew & Doloreux, 2012, p. 1298).

The Beta version of this document, which was handed over to the City of Cape Town officials for comment and guidance, included a chapter dedicated to the following 18 months (mid-2014 to end-2015), and detailed proposed projects which the GTP identified as imperative in the short term to catalyse development in the area. Many of these projects were reportedly selected based on either the Future Tyger visioning exercises for the corridor, which has been highlighted previously as somewhat problematic, or opportunities that had been identified through conversations with external stakeholders, the latter equally concerning in terms of whose interests they would serve.

The chapter in the Regeneration Framework dedicated to these short-term catalytic interventions is ambiguous as to who initiated the ideas and who or what are the driving forces behind them. This document therefore serves as potential red flag which might suggest that much like Community Impact Chattanooga, discussed in Section 5.2.6., the strategies of the organisation had started to diverge from its stated aim as a catalyst for creating an improved quality of life for the participating neighbourhoods, and move dangerously towards a willingness to be co-opted by the public and private stakeholders that were looking to attract major capital investment into the area (Fraser & Kick, 2014).
The GTP Regeneration Framework makes reference to fourteen partnership programmes grouped under six regeneration imperatives. These imperatives, which are outlined in Table 6.6., also seemed to serve as a warning sign, in this case of potential isomorphic mimicry (described in Chapter 4) or quite simply obfuscation. They showed a clear understanding of current writings and planning trends for urban regeneration, and took an overtly futuristic view on development of the corridor, but in and of themselves held no real meat. It could be said that each of the selected fourteen programmes were either included to provide suitable homes in which to embed private sector-driven projects, or to possibly give the impression that at a high-level the organisations understanding and intentions regarding inclusive development were internationally sound and viable.

Furthermore, these fourteen corridors served as a newly introduced framework for organising the GTPs intended projects, which was also proposed as a complete replacement of the original priority programmes that provided the framework for GTP’s 2012-2015 business plan (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014b), detailed in Table 6.7. The Regeneration Framework ideally would serve as the basis for the development of the second GTP business plan for the period of 2015-2018, rendering the initial seven programmes, as shown in the Table below no longer relevant. This high-level policy change, much like Andrews et al. (2012) posit, showed a tendency toward reforms adopted mostly for the purpose of enhancing an entity’s “external legitimacy and support” (Andrews et al., 2012, p. 2) as a means of securing ongoing flows of external financing, and in this particular case, quite possibly as a diversion from monitoring and evaluating the original seven programmes and their success or lack thereof.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGENERATION IMPERATIVE 1</th>
<th>GROWTH AND INNOVATION GENERATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innovation Corridor</td>
<td>Synergising the knowledge and learning capacity of institutions located in the Corridor for maximum impact in regard to education, skills development and the application of innovation to business development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Corridor</td>
<td>Integrating the knowledge, air/road/rail/sea logistics and manufacturing capacity of the Corridor to drive “aerotropolis” development, ICT, green technology, bio technology and niche manufacturing and ensure the retention of existing manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services Corridor</td>
<td>Developing clusters of office development, business process outsourcing, business tourism and retail development that couple large scale corporate businesses and complexes with small and informal business networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGENERATION IMPERATIVE 2</th>
<th>PEOPLE SERVING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caring Corridor</td>
<td>Providing quality public facilities and over the counter services for the public at large and livelihood and support opportunities for vulnerable groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Corridor</td>
<td>Providing leadership development, career guidance, learning support, cultural, sport and recreation opportunities that capture the needs and aspirations of young people for whom the Corridor is the most accessible place to fulfil those needs and aspirations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGENERATION IMPERATIVE 3</th>
<th>INTER CONNECTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ease of Movement Corridor</td>
<td>Modernising public transport, developing non-motorised transport and integrating both with development and private transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadband Corridor</td>
<td>Extending quality affordable last mile broadband and access points in areas of highest need, density and footfall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGENERATION IMPERATIVE 4</th>
<th>FULLY DEVELOPED AND DENSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accomplished Corridor</td>
<td>Developing vacant and underutilised public land</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3.3. THE ACCOMPLISHED CORRIDOR

The “Accomplished Corridor”, as detailed in Table 6.6, refers to the programme related to the development of vacant and underutilised public land, which could be said to be one of the key drivers of regeneration in the sub-region.

Under the banner of this programme, the GTP stated that in the following 18 months it would “ensure the establishment of effective development vehicles, structured finance networks, and would champion and support local and foreign direct investment [through the] development of an accelerated land release/transfer mechanism that meets the requirements of the MFMA and the PFMA [and the] assessment of feasibility, legality and modelling of Special Purpose Vehicles for very large integrated re-development as well as strategic land sites” (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014a, p. 87).
Apart from the documented written intention of the GTP to embark on the development of a special delivery vehicle for the corridor as discussed previously, the GTP were reported to have regularly talked to the critical need for such a vehicle, and their role in setting up such a vehicle as discussed in section 6.2.3.

In all the Liaison Forum meetings, the GTP representatives tended to return to a conversation about special purpose vehicles as a critical mechanism for enabling development in the corridor, and more notably, their critical role in setting such a vehicle up. This was proposed as an opportunity for an appointed trust or agency to work outside of the restrictions of the Municipal Finance Management Act, which currently restricts fast-track development in municipalities due to the financial regulations (South Africa, 2008).

This proposal was met with concern by all of the City of Cape Town representatives on the Liaison Forum for several valid reasons. Most significantly is the fact that most of such agencies were set up and established prior to the enactment of the MFMA in 2003, and therefore were set up in a far more flexible legal and financial environment. At present, the MFMA does not allow for such an agency to exist in the same form, and even if one were to be developed into which public land was transferred, it would be held to the same regulations of the MFMA as would the City itself (South Africa, 2008) (Development Integration Unit, 2014d).

Secondly, the minutes of the May 2014 Liaison Forum appear to suggest that several of the City representatives believed that making an assumption that a special development vehicle or public land transfer vehicle was necessary at that stage was wholly premature and presumptive (Development Integration Unit, 2014d). While the Liaison Forum agreed that alternative mechanisms or a ‘package of plans’ approach would most likely be needed, there was concern that no evidence existed as of yet to suggest that a special development vehicle was the appropriate or most viable approach to enable development in the corridor (Development Integration Unit, 2014d). A member of the Liaison Forum was documented as having said, “There is still an extensive process to undertake in order to identify the best mechanisms for land release and development. A lot of work needs to be done to understand the intended outcome prior to determining the right vehicle to achieve this. GTP was not set up to be an SPV, and there is concern that this ambition to become a development agency will cloud the initial purpose of the GTP as a vehicle for facilitating development in the area” (Development Integration Unit, 2014d).

Thirdly, in many of the interactions much as referred to in the above statement, it seemed as though GTP saw itself as playing the role of such a vehicle, which is problematic in and of itself. Many statements within the Liaison Forum meetings, and communicated to the City of Cape Town through
external channels, seemed to point to the intentions of the GTP to morph into such a vehicle. A
decision was therefore taken to make it clear to the GTP that under no circumstances would it be
appropriate let alone legal, to morph into such a vehicle, due to the grant legalities and the
constitutional set up of the GTP as an NGO, and this was set out clearly in a bilateral meeting between
SPUD and the GTP in June 2016 (Development Integration Unit, 2014g). This decision was also
supported by the GTP board, who remained adamant that the GTP would at no stage desire to or
attempt to become a development vehicle, and that its primary role would remain that of facilitator,
so as to guide the role-players and their partnerships to develop and promote the sub-region
(Development Integration Unit, 2014g).

**Interpretation**

In analysing the process undertaken to get to this point, it is useful to note that had the Liaison Forum
process not been initiated, the ability of the various members of the Forum to band together and insist
on a more transparent role for the GTP, would have unlikely appeared. The institutionalisation of a
genuine multi-stakeholder engagement was already laying the groundwork for ensuring the GTP would
remain as neutral and inclusive as possible.

6.3.4. **Whose Interests Do Special Purpose Vehicles Serve?**

A further decision was taken at the Liaison Forum that the GTP develop a concept note which outlines
specifically their reasons for believing that a special purpose vehicle was the correct mechanism for
delivering regeneration in the corridor. Subsequent to this, it was suggested that further research be
conducted that would feed into the broader Voortrekker Road Integration Zone Strategy and
Investment Plan, where ideas could be both tested and deliberated on (Development Integration Unit,
2014g).

**Interpretation**

A question that did need to be answered was whose specific interests would be served and in what
ways by such a mechanism, and more importantly whether such proposals aligned with the broader
ideology of delivering inclusive and equitable development of the corridor. At this initial stage of
discussions it was not completely clear, but it is likely that the Liaison Forum and the ultimate decision-
makers would need to quite thoroughly investigate the manner in which such a vehicle would be set
up, and who would be most suited to run it. Such a vehicle or mechanism could run the risk of being captured by private developers in the area who could stand to gain greatly from mega block scale development in the area, especially with access to public land. Far more thought and consideration was therefore needed with regards to whether such a vehicle would serve the needs of a broader market in terms of mixed use development, and residential and transport related development in the corridor.

6.3.5. Prioritised Projects within the Voortrekker Road Corridor: April-May 2014

At the very first Liaison Forum meeting, in April 2015, the GTP also tabled a list of their planned projects, as identified in the Regeneration Framework and in conversations with other stakeholders. This list presented over 130 projects under the fourteen partnership programmes (Development Integration Unit, 2014c).

On the most part the particular projects that had received the most attention in the Liaison forum interactions up to this point were those that would result in mega block scale development. These were arguably the projects that would produce the most tangible measurable of so-called regeneration in the area. However, without adequate research and strategy having been done yet, it would be premature to select specific areas or pieces of land for development projects of that scale at this early stage in the prioritisation process.

The Liaison Forum were however in agreement that a pragmatic approach was necessary, and that reasonable “quick-win” options should be identified and prioritised so as to catalyse interest in the area (Development Integration Unit, 2014g).

For this reason, a de facto decision was made to focus on Bellville Central and the Bellville Transport Interchange for small-scale projects over the next 18 months (Development Integration Unit, 2014g). This decision was made at a bilateral held between GTP and SPUD in June 2016, where it was documented that:

“Agreement that development of key nodes in the corridor are inextricably linked. The existing multi-disciplinary focus on Bellville does not suggest that Bellville is “prioritised” over Parow or Maitland or any other area as such. However there is understanding across the board that regardless of the prioritisation and linkages that will be identified and planned through the [SIP], Bellville will undoubtedly be a focus area of the corridor. Therefore while the [SIP] is in process, all parties acknowledge that Bellville interventions can begin to go ahead [and] Bellville Central presents an opportunity to spend existing budgets and to build momentum for the rest of the
investments and implementation plans for the entire integration zone” (Development Integration Unit, 2014g).

Apart from Bellville, it was agreed that identification of other key prioritised local areas would only be possible through a thorough unpacking of the corridor on the whole, the interdependencies of the areas, the nuances of particular sites, and consideration of how to adequately invest public funds in such a way as to optimise the corridor for transit oriented development, and crowd in private funding (Development Integration Unit, 2014g, p. 2).

In order to narrow down the list of projects, GTP representatives also presented their criteria for prioritisation of the projects, so as to narrow these down to the most important projects that would be undertaken over the rest of 2014 and the duration of 2015 (Development Integration Unit, 2014c).

The projects were subjected to a rating of 1-10 under three areas, causative, coordinative and catalytic. Those projects which scored either 9 or 10 as an overall average score were then rated as the priority projects, of which there were eventually 36. Those that were rated as high priority included a VRC Overlay Zone, a VRC Mixed Use Development Vehicle, and a Public Land Transfer Agreement/Vehicle, as expanded upon in the extract in Table 6.8. What was also of notable concern, was that certain ‘corridors’ showed several projects which were not fully developed or thought through, and some ‘corridors’ were not represented in the list of priority projects, for example the Caring Corridor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VRC Overlay Zone</th>
<th>SUPER PRIORITY: GTP believe that much of the TOD development interventions rely on the implementation of an overlay zone.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VRC Mixed Use Development Vehicle</td>
<td>SUPER PRIORITY: There is a need for a mixed use development vehicle, like the JHB Housing Agency, an aggressive and focused vehicle that will unlock and deliver development in the area. Similar to the V&amp;A set up where City and GTP etc. are shareholders in the development agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Land Transfer Agreement / Vehicle(s)</td>
<td>SUPER PRIORITY: Implement a trust, i.e. the VRC Trust into which public land such as the hospital is transferred, and then the trust would not be subject to the MFMA. This agreement would be developed between City, Province, PRASA and Transnet for example. Necessary to understand that GTP will lobby for these interventions, but this does not mean they will be adopted as the way forward for the development in the area. City Support Programme of the World Bank will also assist in identifying the most appropriate and effective methods for such transactions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8. Extract from GTP Priority Project Scoping (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014c)
As discussed in the literature review, one mechanism for ensuring transit-oriented development goals align with the inclusion agenda of the state and the well-being of low-income populations is the utilisation of mixed-income housing interventions. Clagett (2014) asserts that in order to create “genuinely affordable housing” (Clagett, 2014, p. 17) proponents of inclusive development should create mixed-income housing developments in close proximity to multi-modal transport hubs so as to simultaneously alleviate transport costs.

With this in mind, it was striking that although Social Housing was prioritised as one of the top 36 projects, no efforts to expand the concept had yet been undertaken, and in fact the table recorded that particular project as “To be defined” (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014c). Instead focal projects which showed the most detail as shown in the table above, included precinct size block developments that would focus on mixed use development, to increase retail and business opportunities in the area – and were predominantly those that required the release of public land for further development.

It was specifically recorded in the April 2014 Liaison Forum that housing considerations were a glaring gap in the prioritisation of the projects, and this conversation continually reared its head in the Forum meetings, with the representative from Western Cape Provincial Government’s Regeneration Department raising the concern that “the project teams and Forum are still not talking about housing and people which is where the crisis lies at this stage” (Development Integration Unit, 2014f, p. 5). The representative continued by asking if the forum has investigated the types of housing models available, or more importantly, those necessary for city living, and furthermore “Where are people going to live and work, and how are the partners going to stimulate economic development which is critical in terms of providing such opportunities?” (Development Integration Unit, 2014f).

Representatives of SPUD supported this concern, noting that “the corridor’s development should be primarily about jobs and housing and that their initial research has shown that the development driver in the corridor will be social housing. We need to understand the financial viability of housing in the corridor, as well as understand the levers that we have to create the necessary preconditions for types of housing that we want in the area” (Development Integration Unit, 2014f). This gap was further highlighted in the GTP’s 2014 Annual Report, which when listing its 30 projects for the following twelve months (i.e. July 2014 – June 2015), no reference to affordable, social or mixed-income housing projects were referred to at all (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014e).
In addition, it is also noticeable that in the list of priority projects, there was no reference to projects related to informal trading and lower-income livelihoods, which according to inclusive development literature, should be close to, if not directly centre stage in inclusive regeneration efforts. One of the GTP staff members reflected that the list of projects:

“seemed very aspirational and tended to have too much focus on property development and the construction of industrial and technical parks etc. My concerns were mainly in respect of it being very forward looking/visionary and too focussed on the built environment and too little emphasis on the communities that needed to be included in the vision”. (Anonymous Questionnaire with GTP Staff Member 1, 2016).

**Interpretation**

As Chattopadhyay (2015) asserts, the deepening of democracy in such environments is reliant on actively engaging citizens from all socio-economic strata. The prioritisation of mega-block scale developments and the built environment by the GTP perpetuate a concern that GTP’s approach and planning processes tend to serve the interests of private property owners or developers. Furthermore the GTP’s prioritisation of projects and the noticeable omission of social housing and informal economy related projects, suggest that, much like observed by Fraser & Kick (2014) in Chattanooga, that the interventions and economic strategies were in complete contrast to the stated inclusive aims, but rather pertained to an emerging neoliberal mentality (Fraser & Kick, 2014).

**6.3.7. Rational for the Selection of Projects**

It would be naïve to expect GTP to be completely void of external drivers for their own success beyond the broad goal of regeneration of the Voortrekker Road Corridor. At this time, they were (and continue to be) funded only through the Section 63 grant in aid from the City of Cape Town, the duration of which was three years ending in June 2015 (City of Cape Town, 2013). Following this, there was no certainty at that stage that they would receive a second three-year grant from the City, nor whether it would be greater or lower in value to the original funding agreement.

The Memorandum of Agreement was structured in such a way so as to encourage the GTP to secure their own funding for running costs, and so budget dedicated to staff and operational costs would decrease in percentage of total budget every year (City of Cape Town, 2013).
Interpretation

This need to secure its own funding, or merge into a profit-driven SPV, seems to be a large factor in determining which projects were proposed or prioritised, which could ultimately become problematic. If the GTP were to continue to design or select projects based predominantly on whether they will secure funding for the organisation, then this runs the risk of skewing the focus from identifying and facilitating the best projects towards the inclusive regeneration of the corridor, rather towards identifying projects that could be funded by the private sector.

6.3.8. GREAT EXPECTATIONS, EVEN GREATER CONCERNS

Interpretation

In reflecting on Chapter 6, it becomes apparent that there are two predominant concerns with the manner in which the GTP was established and how they determined their core work focus for their initial few years in operation. The formation of the organisation, while reflecting a commitment to inclusivity and integration in the founding documents and the intended Future Tyger processes, seem to upon closer inspection show a shallow and superficial commitment to genuine engagement with the broad range of local actors and their needs. Membership of the board in particular is dominated by older educated white men, and does not represent targeted communities either through their actual representation on the board, or through civil society actors that may be expected to act on their behalf.

The selection of priority projects focuses repeatedly on mega-block scale retail and commercial property development opportunities that would serve first and foremost a certain segment of the population who would stand to benefit from these type of developments. Key interventions that are considered to be vital for the successful roll out of inclusive transit-oriented development are missing or have not been developed nearly to the same level of detail as more private sector focused projects. These key omissions include social or affordable housing and projects related directly to empowering the informal economy and job creation.

The insistent focus on a special purpose vehicle, without sufficient research and evidence that it is the best vehicle through which to catalyse investment in the area, continues to rear its head and suggests that the GTP’s focus was at severe risk of being captured by neoliberal desires and interests. These observations and evidence therefore appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that the Greater Tygerberg Partnership has been subject to capture by strong private and political elite interests, threatening the achievement of genuine development outcomes.
The idea that action should only be taken after having all the answers and all the resources is a sure recipe for paralysis. The planning of a city is a process that allows for corrections, always... It is supremely arrogant to believe that planning can be done only after figuring out every possible variable. To innovate is to start! Hence, it is necessary to begin the process. Imagine the ideal, but do what is possible today.

Jaime Lerner, Former Mayor of Curitiba, Brazil (Worldwatch Institute, 2013)

The final chapter of this paper empirically explores Hypothesis B which states that incremental, micro-level governance initiatives, though seemingly small, have the potential to build momentum capable of trumping the threatening predatory networks. It is presented in two parts, the first reflects on the time period of July to October 2014, during which the DIU team undertook an action-learning experiment designed to flush out those contextual factors that were inhibiting progress against developmental aims, as well as to try achieve small-scale quick wins to the end of gaining legitimacy for acts of public entrepreneurship in the corridor.

The second part considers the time period from October 2014 onwards, which coincides with the secondment of a senior City of Cape Town official from the DIU to the Greater Tygerberg Partnership to perform the role of CEO. It considers the actions undertaken by the new CEO and his team against the lens of Carpenter’s (2001) and Levy’s (2014) writings on bureaucratic autonomy and public entrepreneurship respectively, and assesses the role these actions may have played in the building of momentum to trump the predatory networks at work.

7.1. ACTION LEARNING IN THE VRC: JULY – OCTOBER 2014

Over the months from July 2014 to November 2014, the DIU engaged in a number of interventions influenced by the methodology of Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA), a new approach to policy implementation being championed by academics of the Centre for International Development at Harvard University. Andrews (2013) describes PDIA as a process which "begins with problem identification, given the argument that reforms are more likely to fit their contexts when crafted as responses to locally defined problems [and] relevant solutions – those that are politically acceptable and practically possible – emerge through a gradual process of step-by-step experimentation to solve such problems" (Andrews, 2013, p. 3). Designed to combat the stasis and ineffectiveness often
associated with complex policy reform, PDIA is effectively described by Andrews et al. (2012) as an alternative approach to improving the capability of public institutions that enables organisations to avoid and overcome capability traps, discussed in Section 4.1.

Andrews et al. (2012) describe this pragmatic synthesis of approaches based on the following four broad principles.

“The four elements, to be amplified below, stress that reform activities should

i. aim to solve particular problems in particular local contexts via
ii. the creation of an ‘authorizing environment’ for decision-making that encourages experimentation and ‘positive deviance’, which gives rise to
iii. active, ongoing and experiential (and experimental) learning and the iterative feedback of lessons into new solutions, doing so by
iv. engaging broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate and relevant—that is, are politically supportable and practically implementable.”

(Andrews et al., 2012, p. 10)

The action learning process was documented by the author of this paper, and a number of striking observations and outcomes are addressed in a working report (Uppink, 2014) that tells part of the story of utilising the method to not only identify entry points for quick win interventions and consensus building, but how the approach enabled the DIU team to flush out some of the more complex characteristics of what could only be described as a wicked problem.

It is recognised that the nature of such evidence is unusual, considering the author of this paper was involved in the implementation and reporting of the process itself. Furthermore, as this process was undertaken very recently, it is premature to draw any definite conclusions as to the efficacy of the evidence, but it nonetheless provides for an interesting and alternative perspective on the ability of incremental, micro-level initiatives to affect change in the policy reform environment.

7.1.1. A COMPLEX AUTHORISING ENVIRONMENT

Andrews et al. (2012) promote an approach that is reminiscent of what is commonly referred to as incrementalism or gradualism, attributed most often to Lindblom (1959) who “famously referred to these processes as ‘muddling through’” (Lindblom, 1959 in Andrews et al., 2012, p. 14). Such an approach involves relatively cheap experiments that have the “prospect of early success, or quick wins [where] the blend of cheapness and demonstrable success characterise positive deviations and are important in context where change encounters opposition, which is usually the case with government reforms” (Andrews et al., 2012, p. 14). Testing out such small-scale and localised solutions offers the opportunity to develop hybrid combinations of solutions, often referred to as “bricolage” (Dacin,
Goodstein & Scott, 2002, in Andrews et al. 2012, p. 15), which is mostly only made possible if and when “novelty is encouraged and rewarded within the authorizing environment within which key decisions are made” (Andrews et al., 2012, p. 15).

This process of iteration can also be utilised not only for the flushing out of contextual factors or to enable the emergence of possible contextualised solutions, but to allow for the progressive growth of “the authority needed to adopt and implement and institutionalise these solutions” (Andrews, 2014, p. 2). In addressing many different developmental challenges, there often exists complexities in these authorising environment as they usually involve “many different agents operating in different authorising structures, with high levels of interdependent and opaque relationships (both political and bureaucratic), and limited revealed capacity” (Andrews, 2014, p. 5). The Voortrekker Road Corridor challenge was shown to be no different, with the authorising environment including inter alia, the City of Cape Town Mayor, the Directors and Executive Directors of the relevant departments and directorates, the councillors in the local subcouncils and wards, and of course the administrative and political leadership of the GTP itself; the Chief Operations Officer, the Executive Director and the Chairperson and members of the GTP board.

As detailed by Andrews (2014) the authorising environment is thus constantly shifting, and therefore in order to achieve tangible progress, such that in this case inclusive regeneration can be affected over time, the “reform process must embed intentional initiatives to consistently consolidate and build authority” (Andrews, 2014, p. 8).

Utilising the PDIA approach enabled the DIU team to better understand and navigate the authorising environment, and most importantly identify the key authorisers that would enable the DIU not only to chair the Liaison Forum, but to play a more formative role in the strategy development and direction of the GTP itself. This need to play a more formative and leadership role was identified due to the fact that the leadership arrangements within the administrative team of the GTP was not merely complex, but very messy and regularly considered to be ineffective. For the immediate success of the organisation, or at least its short-term prioritised projects to be realised, it was identified that the leadership arrangements should most likely be revised.

Initially it was assumed that the Liaison Forum was the authority on determining the de facto strategy and programmatic priorities of the GTP, however it was soon unveiled that authority for the DIU staff rested first with the Executive Director of the EESP Directorate, but more so with the politically connected Directors of the GTP Board (Uppink, 2014). As the City of Cape Town was, and still remains, the sole funder of the organisation, the GTP ultimately is required to gain legitimacy and authorisation for their projects directly from the Mayor’s Office, represented on the GTP Board by one City of Cape
Town official and three councillors. This authorisation dynamic became clearest when the City of Cape Town made the recommendation to the GTP board that they make use of an offer to provide a senior City of Cape Official to be seconded to the role of Chief Executive Officer of the GTP (Uppink, 2014).

The Chairperson of the Board for the period 2012 – 2015 explained in the GTP’s 2015 Annual Report that the 2014/15 financial year had contained some substantial internal changes on the governance front. He reported that:

“After an intensive investigation into the effectiveness of the Board and the office of the GTP, a number of the Board members resigned and the Chief Operating Officer was replaced with a seconded official, Chris O’Connor, from the City of Cape Town. Chris is still part of the GTP’s plans for the near future and is making a mammoth contribution towards the GTP reaching its objectives and ensuring that all the deliverables are on time and within budget. I would like to convey our gratitude to the City of Cape Town for making the services of Chris available to us. A lot has been achieved within a short space of time since his arrival.” (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2015a, p. 6).

As Chris O’Connor was not only the Chairperson of the Liaison Forum, but also the Manager of the Development Integration Unit, as of the GTP Board Meeting on 20 October 2014, he was now well-prepared, and officially authorised to recommend and action the necessary direction-changing actions for the GTP to become more inclusive in its strategy and programme identification (Uppink, 2014).

7.1.2. A Fine-grain Understanding of the VRC Demographics

As observed by the Western Cape Provincial Government representative in the August 2014 meeting of the Liaison Forum, up until then the GTP project team was still “not talking about housing and people which is where the crisis lies” (Development Integration Unit, 2014f, p. 5). This was observed more and more often, and it started to become glaringly obvious that while the GTP team had highly detailed, visionary and ‘best practice’ conceptual ideas for the development of the corridor, when pressed for information, there was a noticeable gap in understanding of who actually lives, works, or plays in the Voortrekker Road Corridor, or even Bellville for that matter. A staff member explained that “Many of the projects defined were very long term projects that would only be realised fully in 10-30 years. The work undertaken was quite high level and not ‘on the ground’. The GTP had little knowledge of the intricacies of the area, what the people needed and wanted and who and what was going on in the area” (Anonymous Questionnaire with GTP Staff Member 2, 2016).
Without this base micro-knowledge of the demographics and nuances of the area, it becomes a lot more complex to determine why certain trends (perceived or real) exist; such as business flight, or urban degradation. In order to try ascertain why people have negative perceptions about the area, the DIU, in collaboration with GTP staff members, set about trying to collect data that would shed light on the granular context in the Bellville CBD.

7.1.2.2. CRIME STATISTICS AND ROLEPLAYERS

The process began with a series of meetings with key stakeholders operating in the area, for example the Head of Security from the Voortrekker Road Corridor Improvement District (VRCID). The meetings with the VRCID were also followed by walkabouts in the area, where on-the-ground challenges, such as illegal gambling, and ‘problem buildings’ were pointed out.

These meetings with the VRCID in particular were very valuable, as they allowed the team to gain a far more detailed understanding of the dynamics of the local communities, which had been garnered through daily interaction with them (Uppink, 2014). Importantly, it allowed for the team to come to grips with “the dynamics between the various law enforcement agencies and patterns of crime in the area” (Uppink, 2014, p. 5) and the “local conditions concerning crime...how the crime report data is captured and interpreted, and the challenges with the publication of such data” (Uppink, 2014, p. 5).

This type of engagement was critical when trying to understand why certain projects did or did not feature on the prioritised list, or when determining if and how to revise the strategy, list of projects or project scopings in order to steer the organisation away from isomorphic mimicry. For example, none of the 36 prioritised projects targeted safety and the integration of law enforcement stakeholders, a key challenge identified in the area. Engagement with the VRCID fleshed out that the GTP had in fact previously attempted to set up a safety forum, but that it had crumbled due to differences of opinions, and issues of authority and ownership (Uppink, 2014). The VRCID explained too that one of a number of data and reporting related challenges that exists was that certain agencies believe that ”reporting a higher number of arrests suggests that crime has risen in the area, and therefore certain leaders in the law enforcement agencies choose to ignore the data the VRCID collects. For this reason certain agencies are struggling to work together as the manner in which they record their work and/or report on success differs” (Uppink, 2014, p. 5).

It therefore became apparent that efforts around the integration of law enforcement and urban management efforts in the corridor had been omitted from the priority projects, most likely due to its high levels of complexity. The team therefore highlighted this as a ripe opportunity for further PDIA related experimentation (Uppink, 2014).
7.1.2.1. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE BELLVILLE CBD

The above process indicated further gaps in data that were essential to understanding the local contextual factors in which the projects were expected to succeed. Most noticeably, there were significant gaps with regards to what businesses operate in the CBD; and also what other activities, whether economic or not, take place in the buildings in and around the central Bellville area.

One of the 36 prioritised projects presented by the GTP in April 2014 was labelled the “Central Bellville Business Processing Centre and Paper Factories”, for which the motivation stated:

“Research indicates that Bellville has the capacity to develop an office park and retail area similar in size to Century City. Develop the Bellville node into the new financial precinct of CT, but need to progress to the stage where [GTP] can deliver investment collateral in order to sell the vision. Area incorporates from Elizabeth Park to Sanlam Centre. Paper factories refer to two towers to house BPO [Business Processing Outsourcing] services”. (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014c).

The research referred to was undertaken by an outsourced service provider, a private firm specialising in town planning, property research, real estate economics and property consultancy. However, the general agreement in the Liaison Forum, especially among the technical specialists, was that too little information was yet known about the economic drivers in the area. Furthermore, although the transport and office infrastructure made sense for ‘best practice’ plans such as BPO services, the GTP appeared to be edging itself into a capability trap.

This initially became apparent when members of the Liaison Forum were requested to provide comment on the content of the Regeneration Framework. Representatives of SPUD made the following remarks about the data attributed to the above-mentioned study:

- “The document provides little interpretation of property development trends and business location demands. These are key drivers of regeneration and require further analysis and understanding.
- There is a general concern regarding loose interpretation and incoherent articulation of the evidence base. For instance, although TOD is mentioned as an integral part of the corridor framework, evidence-based analysis of supply and demand patterns are required to provide a full understanding of the corridors transport dynamics.
- Clearer evidence based, locality specific reflections of the factors limiting more intense mixed use development within parts of the corridor are required. This information will be obtained and assessed through the Strategy and Investment Framework”. (Development Integration Unit, 2014h, p. 4).
In order to therefore grasp a more fine-tuned understanding of the businesses and economic activity clusters in the area, with a longer term view of understanding how the area operates as a node in relation to other economically defined areas, such as Tygervalley and the Cape Town CBD; the GTP and DIU team embarked on a process of mapping the multi-level commercial activity in a defined geographic area, resulting in a database as well as 3D Modelling of the commercial activity in the CBD (Uppink, 2014). Interesting outcomes of this work showed that the area was a wholesale and retail hub dominated by the migrant Somalian population, that economic activity unsurprisingly was clustered around the transport interchange and train station, and that other significant clusters including the beauty and hair industry, as well as the cash loan and small-scale financial services industry, were prominent in the CBD.⁹

At the same time, due to a commitment to being the “ear on the ground”, the now-CEO of the organisation began to engage with housing and development specialists, the Development Action Group (DAG), about what steps could be taken to understand the housing requirements of those currently living or working in the CBD. What both of these processes appeared to signal were the first iterative steps towards identifying integrated projects that could over the longer term make a sustained impact for not only private sector investors and property developers, but more so for the lower-income communities who constitute the communities and neighbourhoods in the area.

7.2. PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN ACTION: OCTOBER 2014 - PRESENT

Bureaucratic autonomy prevails when a politically differentiated agency takes self-consistent action that neither politicians nor organized interests prefer but that they cannot or will not overturn or constrain in the future.

Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy, (Carpenter, 2001, p. 17)

The following section considers the portion of the GTP’s history during which the City of Cape Town official was seconded as CEO of the organisation. It utilises Carpenter’s (2001) and Levy’s (2014) work to assess whether the GTP team has exhibited actions that can be likened to bureaucratic autonomy and public entrepreneurship, and if so, the degree to which these actions have enabled the organisation to overcome threats from a predatory network.

⁹ Appendix A captures this data, and data captured since, in a visual form (infographic). Once collected, this data enabled the GTP to communicate the information to interested parties and stakeholders in the region.
In his book *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies*, Carpenter (2001) posits that “[b]ureaucratic autonomy occurs when bureaucrats take actions consistent with their own wishes, actions to which politicians and organized interests defer” (Carpenter, 2001, p. 4). He argues that politicians will only defer to officials or bureaucrats with opposing aims if “(1) failure to do so would forfeit the publicly recognized benefits of agency capacity and/or (2) the agency can build coalitions around its innovations that make it costly for politicians to resist them” (Carpenter, 2001, p. 17). For an agency to obtain and exercise this type of autonomy it must develop “unique organizational capacities” (Carpenter, 2001, p. 14) towards exercising efficient policy design and administration, and facilitate “experimental doing as well as inferential learning” (Carpenter, 2001, p. 22). It is as important however that such an agency must develop “political legitimacy, or strong organizational reputations embedded in an independent power base” (Carpenter, 2001, p. 14), which can be achieved through the cultivation of “coalitions of diverse actors who value the agency services and who support agency moves” (Carpenter, 2001, p. 31).

Levy (2014) builds on this approach labelling the behaviour ‘public entrepreneurship’. He posits that opportunities for public entrepreneurs to enable islands of effectiveness within a more broadly dysfunctional environment can be achieved through building internal capabilities and external alliances simultaneously (Levy, 2014). He explains these activities as:

- “Targeted efforts to improve public management – focused on specific functions, sectors, public agencies and locales where there exist credible champions and an appetite for reform [and]
- Multi-stakeholder initiatives which bring to center stage the participatory engagement of non-governmental as well as governmental stakeholders in the (micro-level) processes of formulating the relevant rules and policies, and assuring their implementation”. (Levy, 2014, p. 156)

More specifically, when adopting these ‘with the grain’ approaches, any chance of success is reliant on an incentive compatible approach, one in which reformers must identify that “critical mass of actors who both have standing and have a stake in the proposed arrangements, and so are in a position to support and protect them in the face of opposition” (Levy, 2014, p. 142).

As Chapter 6 elaborates, the GTP embarked enthusiastically on the process of championing the regeneration of the VRC, but unfortunately appears to have been subjected to capture by powerful elites. Whether the organisation has been captured or not, the evidence suggests that the initial inclusive aims of the organisation have been replaced by a desire to affect large-scale retail and commercial property development. This behaviour of the GTP could be described as the result of a
group of actors being sufficiently incentivized to renege on agreed upon rules and practices in favour of private gain and advantage.

Based on this premise, the first part of Chapter 7 has thus far detailed how the DIU team built a coalition with the GTP staff and while doing so, adopted a PDIA-style approach to the developmental challenges at hand. In so doing, the team was able to successfully flush out the underlying complexities and challenges, and navigate them in such a way so as to reform the leadership arrangements in such a manner as to enable several quick wins and gain the necessary legitimacy to continue experimenting and pushing for genuine change.

While successful in its own right, the PDIA approach was strengthened by a number of other micro-level initiatives that relied upon the enactment of public entrepreneurship in this complex and somewhat dysfunctional environment. Levy (2014) describes public entrepreneurship as “the presence of leadership capable of skilfully mobilizing and coordinating stakeholders” (Levy, 2014, p. 157).

These initiatives can be usefully classified unto two separate groups according to Carpenter’s (2001) assertions, the first is unique and context-specific capacity development which enables experimentation and inferential learning, and the second is the cultivation of multi-stakeholder coalitions of actors who will support and protect the aims of the organisation (Carpenter, 2001).

The rest of Chapter 7 explores these two sub-groups of public entrepreneurship, the actions undertaken by the GTP that appear to be consistent with this approach, and the effect these actions have had thus far on the effectiveness of the organisation.

7.2.1. LOCAL ORGANISATION-LEVEL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: OCTOBER 2014

One of the hoped for advantages, or on the contrary, the potential concerns, of placing a City of Cape Town official at the helm of an organisation such as the GTP, is that what should be an agile and adaptable partnership organisation could be subjected to action-retarding bureaucratic practices and policies. While the latter may be the outcome if the partnership organisation is already functioning well as an entrepreneurial vehicle for achieving public good, it is more likely that in the case of an organisation which is seen to be somewhat dysfunctional, the implementation of public sector-like processes can have a positive effect.

In the case of the GTP, the secondment of a senior public official had the effect of what Levy (2014) terms public management ‘lite’, a set of reforms that “comprise piecemeal – incremental, but perhaps
cumulative – variants of a more comprehensive agenda” (Levy, 2014, p. 144) and have the potential to “reduce discretion and strengthen rule-boundedness” (Levy, 2014, p. 145) within an organisation.

Once appointed, some of the new CEO’s very first actions included the development of a revised business plan for the remainder of the 2014/15 financial year, and a risk register and strategic scorecard for the Board of Directors. The latter two documents were newly developed, and sought to achieve two things simultaneously. These tools, modelled very closely on the similar tools utilised across the board at the City of Cape Town, aimed to:

1. Steer the direction of the board, and thus the organisation, towards more suitable, and importantly, achievable desired deliverables; and
2. Serve to ‘problematise’ the situation in which they found themselves, with the aim of raising awareness of “structural weaknesses they usually do not consider” (Andrews et al., 2012, p. 9) thus leveraging the acknowledgement of problems to generate immediate action and change given the frequent argument that “[i]nstitutional change and improvement are motivated more by knowledge of problems than by knowledge of success” (Cameron 1986: 67, in Andrews et al. 2012, p. 9).

These tools were tabled at the first board meeting subsequent to the appointment of the new CEO, and were adopted in principal by those present. The strategic scorecard in particular proposed a number of indicators and desired outcomes that were reasonably achievable in the short-term (6 months to a year), thus influencing the board to take a shorter-term approach to development in the area. Furthermore they focused on tangible indicators, such as the establishment of forums and implementation of public space interventions, all of which could be achieved within the remaining 8 months of the financial year. In reflecting on the changes made to the business plan 15 months later, a staff member detailed the change that this had inspired:

“This has changed over the last year or so, to the GTP focussing on detailed research to understand the area, spending more time personally in the area and interacting with stakeholders and building the relevant partnerships, the projects are focused on producing tangible outcomes and deliverables with short timeframes and the work is more focussed” (Anonymous Questionnaire with GTP Staff Member 2, 2016).
7.2.2. A TRUMPING COALITION

Collective action arguably lies at the heart of government policymaking. It can usefully characterize the process through which coalition governments... reach agreement as to which development initiatives to prioritize. And it may also be a useful depiction of how governments... reach agreements... at a micro-level as to which are the domains in which they will refrain from destructive conflict, and thereby allow development initiatives to proceed.


As has been indicated throughout this research, the foundation and formative years of the GTP appeared to have been captured by predatory networks, who seemed to have set up and leveraged the GTP’s institutional structure and funding for the intention of furthering their own and their networks’ private interests. Predation, as described by Levy (2014) “refers specifically to actions that use channels of political support external to the specific arena of cooperation to override with impunity the formal and informal rules of the game associated with the collective effort” (Levy, 2014, p. 152).

As discussed in Section 4.1, Levy (2014) lists three conditions under which a network of protagonists may triumph over, or trump, a network of predators, 1) there are stakeholders who are strongly incentivised to see the collective actions succeed, 2) the stakeholders are widely enough connected politically, or through other alliances to be able to draw on “widely-held social norms of justice and fairness” (Levy, 2014, p. 154), and 3) leaders are effective public entrepreneurs and thus able to skilfully mobilize and coordinate other stakeholders in support of the collective action (Levy, 2014).

Several actions that supported the achievement of these conditions were undertaken by the new leadership of the GTP and the DIU team. A notable one was in the arena of affordable housing. One of the key partnerships or alliances that was established after October 2014 was with the Development Action Group (DAG), an NGO whose overarching vision is “the creation of sustainable human settlements through development processes which enable human rights, dignity and equity” (Development Action Group, n.d.). Two of DAG’s key areas of intervention is in participatory urban governance and housing and human settlements. (Development Action Group, n.d.), and they have a lengthy history in working with communities across various neighbourhoods in Cape Town to build capacity and drive advocacy efforts. Through this DAG “seeks to build inclusive urban governance processes and platforms in partnership with key players from government, civil society and private sector. Ultimately it seeks to provide solutions that will redress social, economic and spatial inequalities in order for citizens to have sustainable livelihoods and an improved quality of life” (Development Action Group, n.d.).
The partnership with DAG resulted in the undertaking of an in depth study of the needs and aspirations of those living and working in the Bellville CBD, as well as a housing and building audit of the area. This resulted in the development of a socio-economic and built environment assessment of the Bellville Station Precinct, which identified some key challenges of perception, and importantly some strong arguments in support of densification of the urban core through affordable and mixed-income housing modalities.

A key finding of the study was the validity of perceptions of ‘degeneration’ or ‘regeneration’ in relation to the study area. DAG summarised in their key findings report:

“The ‘degeneration’ or ‘regeneration’ of an urban node is based on a historical paradigm of how it functioned and existed. However, this paradigm is dependent on what or whose story is told. How the Bellville Station Precinct is positioned and perceived by the City of Cape Town, and the wider the [sic] Cape Town public, is also dependent on its spatial politics. Therefore, the ‘regeneration of Bellville’ is a phrase used by an array of interested and concerned parties that want to see a change in Bellville. However, there is an existing population that continuously ‘generate’ socio-economic activity in the area on a daily basis.

The lens through which Bellville CBD is viewed is more nuanced and layered than is often mainstreamed in the public and political discourse of urban development and redevelopment. This is prescribed in various plans and policies to ascertain the future investment directive of state expenditure – driven by dominant political agendas. At the same time, however, private investment of various scales are also setting the development agenda for the Bellville. This complex urban system of investment and development is most evident in the Bellville Station Precinct due to its multi-purpose use and range of investors/users”. (Development Action Group, 2015, p. 8).

This approach to the CBD was shared with other external stakeholders that the GTP had begun to develop partnerships with, such as representatives of the University of Cape Town’s Construction Management and Economics Department (CME), the African Centre for Cities (ACC), social housing companies, PGWC Urban Regeneration Department and of course members of City of Cape Town line departments.

As this coalition towards more substantive equitable development was built, an event held by the GTP in September 2015 showed a stark contrast to a similar event held a year earlier, prior to the change in leadership, and thus prior to the thorough development of a trumping coalition. In 2014, a GTP business breakfast was hosted under the theme of Property Development. Representatives of the Western Cape Developers Forum and Rode & Associates both gave presentations on the analysis of the property in the area, and the opportunities for retail and office accommodation developments in the area. The presentations and resulting dialogue focused primarily on private sector property
development concerns and promoted a very narrow vision for property development in the area, aligned strongly to the private-sector led projects of the GTP. A GTP staff member explained that the breakfast was:

“more academic and focussed on interpretation of stats obtained from Rode & Associates’ property development surveys. The ‘facilitated’ discussion between attendees at the Business Breakfast and speakers then led into the difficulties and moans and groans from a segment of the developers’ community on how difficult it was for developers who struggled with getting development approvals from, inter-alia, the City of Cape Town. It appeared to have left many attendees of the breakfast with more questions than answers/solutions”. (Email correspondence with GTP Staff member, 2016)

A year later the GTP held another quarterly business breakfasts under the theme of Alternative Investment Mechanisms, and focused specifically on answering the question of how to invest in property development in the area in such a way as to serve the existing and potential populations that currently live, work or play in the area. Importantly DAG presented the findings of the above-mentioned report, providing a nuanced analysis of the people of the community and their stories and aspirations. This was built on by presentations by Francois Viruly, a property economist with over 20 years experience, who lectures Urban Economics in UCT’s CME, and Rob McGaffin, a town planner and land economist who, with experience in both the City of Cape Town and the Gauteng Department of Economic Development, is a specialist in affordable housing and financing affordable housing interventions. McGaffin’s talk in particular proposed that affordable housing is the most sensible and viable tool for the regeneration of Bellville CBD (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014d).

The dialogue that ensued, as well as the feedback received from the event showed enthusiasm and much buy in from a range of stakeholders, and served to shift expectations of the extent of inclusion that could be achieved in the area while still being attractive to private sector interests. The same GTP staff member reflected:

“The speakers highlighted the importance of gathering the appropriate types of information and knowledge of the existing conditions in the area... applied it to experiences and trends /lessons learnt from elsewhere and then came up with realistic and practical pointers for mechanisms that would bring about investment into the area. Feedback from those that attended the Business Breakfast was very positive and they said that they found real benefit from the subject matter and the manner in which it was presented. The general feeling was that realistic options and solutions were provided by the speakers which spoke directly to the Bellville specific conditions, challenges and opportunities” (Email correspondence with GTP Staff member, 2016).
This was one example of how the trumping coalition was beginning to succeed in broadening the interests that could be served by the GTP.

Another key, and final indication of potential rescue of the GTP from predation, was the appointment of a new Board of Directors in October 2015. By this stage the initial Board had served their three year term and it was necessary for the Nominations and Appointment committee to advertise for, recruit and select a new board that would take the organisation forward for the next three years. Work was done here to actively engage candidates that had over the past year become involved in the organisation, or had vested interests in the shared success of the GTP and the VRC. The team also deliberately sought out professionals who would add great value to certain priority areas of work through their areas of expertise, such as property economics, or transport and innovation, so as to heighten the possibility of a board comprising of enthusiastic and engaged individuals who could champion certain parts of the 3 year business plan. This attempt to attract applications from a range of valuable individuals paid off, and the Nominations and Appointment committee selected four new board members that not only fulfil the above desires, but also provide for a far more demographically and culturally diverse group of individuals.

The previous board also took the decision prior to stepping down to amend the Memorandum of Incorporation to provide for a smaller more focused board, and the subsequent establishment of an Advisory Committee that would enable a far broader range of voices to contribute to the direction and overarching strategy of the GTP in the short and longer term. When asked whether the efforts of the GTP facilitate meaningful opportunities for all communities to participate in its activities and contribute to the future of the VRC, a GTP staff member responded “it has started the process of establishing an Advisory Council which is aimed at increasing the reach-in of all communities and stakeholders to give input, advise and influence the strategies and work of the GTP - directly to the GTP Board. This is still not sufficient and other mechanisms will need to be put into place to improve participation of all communities.” (Anonymous Questionnaire with GTP Staff Member 1, 2016).

A further change, which has served to lessen the possibility for political elite capture, was to no longer allow for City of Cape Town councillors or officials to serve as voting members of the board. Therefore instead of having four voting members on the board as was the case previously, the new board has two City of Cape Town councillors who serve as non-voting representatives.

The table below shows the details of the new board members elected to serve the GTP as directors from October 2015 to October 2018 alongside those that have been reappointed.
## RE-APPOINTED BOARD MEMBERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Background and Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Johan Bester</td>
<td>Senior Advisor : Group Governance Sanlam</td>
<td>JP completed his articles at PWC in 1977. He was a senior Accounting lecturer at University of Stellenbosch before joining Sanlam in 1980. After holding various positions in the Group, he was appointed General Manager in 1993, Chief Accountant in 1997 and Company Secretary in 1998. He was also responsible for the group-wide implementation of various projects, including King III corporate governance programmes. He retired at the end of 2012, but still represents Sanlam on various subsidiaries and associated entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Pokpas</td>
<td>Institutional Planner and Executive Assistant to the Rector and Vice-Chancellor, University of the Western Cape</td>
<td>Larry is the Institutional Planner and Executive Assistant to the Rector and Vice-Chancellor at, and graduate from, the University of the Western Cape, co-ordinating and implementing several strategic change initiatives. Since 2003 he has coordinated several internationally funded programmes and national and regional partnerships to enhance responsiveness and capacity of regional higher education. He actively participates in national e-skills activities and initiatives. Larry is member of a joint Cape Higher Education Consortium-Western Province Government task team, and the Western Cape Education Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Erwin Schwella</td>
<td>Professor of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University</td>
<td>Prof Schwella obtained a Ph.D. in Public Administration from Stellenbosch University in 1998. He holds a full professorship in Public Leadership and was a Director of the School of Public Leadership at the same university. An author of over 50 academic publications, Prof Schwella consults on governance, leadership, organisational development and public management, and has lectured in South Africa and abroad. He is a rated researcher at the National Research Foundation and holds directorships with education and health companies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## NEWLY APPOINTED BOARD MEMBERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Background and Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sanett Uys (Vice Chairperson)</td>
<td>Founder and Managing Director Serendipity Remix</td>
<td>Sanett is the founder and managing director of Serendipity Remix. She has an extensive background in property economics and property research, as well as an MBA from the University of Stellenbosch. Previously Sanett worked as the Editor of Rode’s Retail Report of South Africa, research manager at Broll Property Group and Director of Western Cape operations and research at Colliers International South Africa. Currently she serves as the executive for Research, Consulting and Valuations for JHI Advisory. Sanett also serves as the Chair of the Research Committee and a Member of the National Council for SAPOA, and fulfils several committee positions for the South Africa Council of Shopping Centres. She is also the previous National Chair of the Women's Property Network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig Kensley</td>
<td>Entrepreneur and Founder Pragmatics</td>
<td>Craig is a serial entrepreneur with a background in tourism, marketing, management consulting and local economic development. Craig has previously served on the board of Cape Town Tourism and the South African Youth Travel Confederation, and currently oversees the management of the Kimberley Diamond Cup Skateboarding Championship. Craig has lectured strategic communications and marketing at Cape Peninsula University of Technology, designed projects and programmes for National and Provincial Departments of Tourism, and currently runs his business Pragmatics which provides training and consulting in SMME development in the hospitality industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Coetzee</td>
<td>Founder and Director/Transport Engineer GoMetro</td>
<td>Justin is a registered professional Transport Engineer and the founder of the GoMetro, a mobile application that pairs public transport operations, a predictable event-based dataset, with the big data of unpredictable desires of individual trip-making, to improve public transport usability in Cape Town and across the country. Justin has served on the SAICE Young Members Panel National Committee and the CESA YPF National Committee, as well as provided mentorship through the mLab and Innovation Hub platforms. He has won countless local and international awards for his work, including the Vodafone AppStars Global Best App of the year in 2013, Top 10 Global Mobile Startup in the VentureOut Challenge in 2013, and the Frost and Sullivan Global Best Practices Award for New Product Innovation in the Value Added Services for the Transportation Industry this year.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dr Heather Tuffin  
Medical Doctor,  
Flow Improvement Advisor  
Western Cape Emergency Medical Services  

Heather Tuffin completed her MBChB Degree at University of Cape Town in 2000 and currently serves as the Flow Improvement Advisor for the Western Cape Emergency Medical Services. Her work focuses around improving systems and processes around inpatient flows, and Heather designed, convened and co-ordinate a 2-year Patient Flow Collaborative effort among the provincial hospitals in the Cape Metropole, from 2013-2015. Furthermore Heather convenes the modules on "Patient Safety and Flow" and “Continuous Quality Improvement” modules of the MPhil in Emergency Medicine for UCT, teaches improvement science for both UCT and Stellenbosch and is designing the first Post-graduate Diploma in Improvement Science on the African continent. Heather is also the adoptive mother of two Angolan teenagers (Kynaston, 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY OF CAPE TOWN REPRESENTATIVES (NON-VOTING)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cllr. Sam Pienaar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Pienaar serves as the Chairperson of Subcouncil 6, Bellville and is one of the City of Cape Town’s representatives at the GTP as well as the Voortrekker Road Corridor Improvement District. Within the City of Cape Town structures, Cllr. Pienaar serves on various committees including the Mayoral Urban Renewal Programme, the City’ Finance Committee, the Energy and Climate Change Portfolio Committee and the Bellville Problem Building committee. Furthermore he chairs the Metro Local Government Bargaining Council and is a member of the Local Labour Forum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Dr. Johan van der Merwe                     |
| Mayoral Committee                           |
| Member: Economic, Environmental & Spatial Planning |
| City of Cape Town                           |
| Dr. van der Merwe obtained a Ph.D. in 1998 and has a broad background in financial and legal activities. As a proportional councillor at the City of Cape Town, he is the Chairman of the Finance Portfolio Committee and a member of Sub-Council 1, Ward Forum III, South African Local Government Association (SALGA) working committee on finance and the Mayor’s sub-committee on Urban Renewal. He is the City’s representative at the GTP and the Voortrekker Road Corridor Improvement District and is actively involved in various community and sport initiatives. |

Table 7.1: Membership of the GTP Board of Directors – as of 8 October 2015 (Greater Tygerberg Partnership, 2014f)

Notable changes include the appointment of two females to the board, and one to the position of Vice-chairperson. Additionally, three of the four new members all run their own small businesses which are locally based, and contribute to economic development and job creation in the area. Furthermore the work undertaken by both Craig Kensley and Justin Coetzee can be considered to be social entrepreneurship in action, in that it delivers return on investment that can be measured in terms of socio-economic outcomes.

Dr Tuffin, although she works for the Provincial Government, serves the board in her own capacity, and while she is very suitably placed to contribute to the work the GTP does in the health sector, she also brings with her a thorough understanding of the concerns of refugees living in South Africa and the irregular processes associated with home affairs.

These changes to the internal leadership and governance structures of the GTP, most especially the decision to establish an advisory council, appear to reflect a marked change in direction for the organisation, and are hoped to further deepen the democratic processes of urban revitalisation in the corridor. Ultimately these changes reflect a bold move, based on incremental steps, towards rescuing urban regeneration from the threat of urban patronage.
CHAPTER EIGHT | MOVING FORWARD - CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Consider the way in which two Nobel Prize-winning economists, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson, define institutions and governance. According to North, institutions are ‘humanly devised constraints which govern human interaction’. Williamson builds on this, suggesting that ‘governance is an effort to craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realise mutual gains’.

In focusing on the governance dimensions of development we are thus... seeking mechanisms of addressing a struggle between our better and our baser natures in a manner which facilitates cooperation. So it is unsurprising that when we look closely – and especially when we look at settings where the restraints themselves are still being contested - we see this struggle in action, with the outcome profoundly uncertain... Confronting such primal uncertainty is profoundly discomfiting, in all its messiness and all its ambiguity. So, instead, we embrace ways of escape.

Brian Levy, Working with the Grain. (Levy, 2014, pp. 208-209)

Undertaking this study has enabled an exploration of the finer, somewhat messier dimensions of the urban regeneration landscape, in particular one which is governed by a multi-stakeholder partnership. As is the case with broader development debates, urban regeneration efforts in the case of the Voortrekker Road Corridor, are premised on an assumed shared commitment to genuine and equitable growth for all stakeholders involved, in an attempt to alleviate poverty, design for integration and facilitate job creation and inclusive economic growth in the process.

Hypothesis A posited that ‘in spite of stated intentions of inclusive regeneration and economic development, the political economy of the Greater Tygerberg Partnership shows signs of potential private and political elite capture which threatens the achievement of genuine developmental outcomes’. An exploration of this hypothesis, supported by an analysis of varied and relevant related literature showed the evidence to be consistent with the hypothesis. Utilising the method of process tracing, the author demonstrated this trend towards capture through the GTP’s insatiable and insistent desire to morph into a development vehicle that would serve predominantly private sector aims in stark contrast to its stated aims of inclusive regeneration and partnership building. It was further demonstrated through a somewhat skewed prioritisation of projects and representation on its board, its inability or disinterest towards bringing a genuinely broad range of stakeholders from civil society or marginalised groups into the development debate, and not least by its clear omission of planning and prioritisation of key inclusive city-building strategies such as social and affordable housing and local economic development.
Based on the assertion that the initial evidence was consistent with Hypothesis A, Hypothesis B was explored through an analysis and appraisal of the efforts undertaken by the Development Integration Unit, and subsequently a newly built GTP team, to rescue the organisation from capture by the predatory networks.

Hypothesis B was therefore addressed in Chapter 7, with a thorough analysis of key interventions that were undertaken using the approach of Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation, and leveraging the methods of Public Management ‘Lite’, and Trumping Coalitions to direct the GTP away from capture towards a more genuine multi-stakeholder governance arrangement.

The study reflects that it is possible to confront the messiness and ambiguity often related to taking on complex developmental challenges through a more iterative, piecemeal approach. An approach in which public entrepreneurs choose not to seek out best practice, top-down and often large and unwieldy solutions to these challenges, but rather seek out pragmatic micro-level interventions based on evidence and authentic engagement on the ground appear to yield positive outcomes. Taking this latter approach appears to have thus far enabled the team at the GTP to navigate around potential capability traps and direct themselves on a new and promising pathway towards legitimate, albeit small-scale, progress in the pursuit of inclusive urban regeneration in the corridor.

While this is merely the start of a longer journey, the evidence suggests at the very least that an approach that takes as its starting point what can be done now, and strives towards achieving incremental and modest gains, can potentially result in fundamental changes to far larger institutional realities such as the leadership and governance arrangements of an organisation. In so doing, such modest and incremental gains could very possibly be leveraged to “give rise to a cascading sequence of change for the better” and potentially serve to deepen the democratic engagement of a far more representative alliance of stakeholders.

The GTP team is realistically only at the beginning of a far longer-term development process, one which will no doubt continue to be rife with complexity, threats of urban patronage, and the ever-present tension between those who wish to see the achievement of joint benefits, and those who wish to capture the benefits for themselves. This study suggests that for the organisation, and the broader set of stakeholders that it strives to serve and convene, to move forward in the creation of an integrated and value-adding corridor it is an imperative that they continue to utilise micro-level initiatives as demonstrated in this paper towards the realisation of genuine and equitable multi-stakeholder governance.


(2016, January 25). Anonymous Questionnaire with GTP Staff Member 1.

(2016, January 15). Anonymous Questionnaire with GTP Staff Member 2.


City of Cape Town. (2006). *The spatial distribution of socio-economic status, service levels and levels of living in the City of Cape Town.* Cape Town, South Africa: City of Cape Town.


City of Cape Town. (2013). Memorandum of agreement between City of Cape Town and Greater Tygerberg Partnership. Cape Town, South Africa: City of Cape Town.


City of Cape Town. (2014b). Contract document for the provision of professional services in respect of the development of an integrated transport / land use plan for Bellville Central area. Cape Town, South Africa: City of Cape Town.

City of Cape Town. (2014c). *VRC Integration Zone implementation protocol.* Cape Town, South Africa: City of Cape Town.


Development Integration Unit. (2014b). Voortrekker Road Corridor decision gates matrix. Cape Town, South Africa: City of Cape Town.


Development Integration Unit. (2014g). Minutes of bilateral between SPUD and GTP: 2 June 2014. Cape Town, South Africa: City of Cape Town.

Development Integration Unit. (2014h). Voortrekker Road Corridor regeneration framework: City of Cape Town comments. Cape Town, South Africa: City of Cape Town.

(2016, February 8). Email correspondence with GTP Staff member. Cape Town.


