Narrative Strategies in Selected Novels of Henry James

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For my family
ABSTRACT

In the course of Henry James's novelistic career, his works reveal an increasing emphasis on the representation of consciousness. This is reflected in a modulation from the authorial to the figural mode of narration as the novels are more consistently focalized through the consciousness of one or more central reflectors. This thesis attempts to explore the narrative strategies through which the shift is implemented. It will be seen that aspects such as ambiguity, imagistic representation and the deployment of analeptic excursions through the consciousness of the reflector as opposed to the narrator assume new significance.

Although James formulated his own conception of his narrative strategies in his Prefaces, discrepancies can often be found between his theoretical perspective and his novelistic practice. Such disparities are indicated where relevant.

In the dissertation I endeavour to explore these and other aspects of James's narrative technique in the light of Dorrit Cohn's model as set out in Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction (1978). The study also moves beyond Cohn's theoretical framework, demonstrating that certain adjustments or further refinements of terminology are necessary in applying Cohn's paradigm to the novels of Henry James.

In the first chapter, I consider relevant contributions of various contemporary narrative theorists while justifying the selection of the model devised by Cohn as being most appropriate to an elucidation of the techniques used by James in the representation of consciousness. Other issues discussed here include James and narrative theory, the position of the reader in James's texts, and concepts such as mimesis/diegesis; showing /telling; scene/summary and figural and authorial narration. In the course of the dissertation, discussion
of the concepts used by narrative theorists, including Cohn herself, is accompanied by suggested modifications to the critical terminology.

In chapter 2, I endeavour to present a coherent account of the central features of Cohn's paradigm as presented in *Transparent Minds*, and establish its usefulness as an approach to a primary concern in James — the representation of consciousness. In subsequent chapters I discuss a representative selection of novels from James's early, middle and late phases which exemplify diverse aspects of his technique, and particularly the significant shift towards more sustained focalization through the consciousness of one or more central reflectors. I also demonstrate that imagistic representation shifts progressively from narratorial comment and dialogue in *Roderick Hudson* to being far more closely interfused with the modes for representing consciousness in the later novels.

Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on *Roderick Hudson* and *The Portrait of a Lady*, respectively, as examples of "quasi-figural" narration. Here the intrusive commentating narrator is still much in evidence. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss *The Golden Bowl* as exemplifying multi-figural or variable focalization. In consideration of the complexity of James's last completed novel, two chapters are devoted to an exploration of its thematic and stylistic density. Chapter 5 examines general issues concerning focalization and the deployment of the imagistic mode in the representation of the consciousness of the characters before focusing more specifically on the depiction of Amerigo, Charlotte and the Assinghams; chapter 6 concentrates on the presentation of the Ververs and pays particular attention to the elaboration of the concept of hypothetical discourse or what I have called "imputed monologue".
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Bibliography
Notes on Presentation

Where a work is frequently referred to, I have in general footnoted only the first reference, and incorporated further references into the text without announcing my intention of doing so. However, where such incorporation could have led to confusion, I have resorted to footnotes. Where possible, the edition used has been the New York Edition of The Novels and Tales of Henry James. Reference to the novels and longer tales such as "The Beast in the Jungle" are usually from this edition. For some of the shorter tales, I have used The Collected Tales of Henry James, ed. and introd. Leon Edel. For novels which are not included in the New York Edition, I have generally used the Penguin edition. To avoid unnecessarily cumbersome parenthetical information, parenthetical references to the works have been abbreviated. The following abbreviations are used:

AN – The Art of the Novel
Amb – The Ambassadors
GB – The Golden Bowl
PL – The Portrait of a Lady
RH – Roderick Hudson
WW – Watch and Ward

Where several consecutive quotations are drawn from the same page, I have generally given the page reference after the last quotation rather than after each one.
Certain idiosyncrasies in spelling might be noted: as the term "focalization" recurs throughout the thesis, the spelling used by the theorists most frequently cited (notably Dorrit Cohn and Rimmon-Kenan) has been adopted. Elsewhere, English rather than American spelling conventions have been observed.

Acknowledgements

I should like to express my gratitude to my promoter, Dr Gail Fincham, for her consistent encouragement, good humour and generosity with her time. Her constructive criticism contributed greatly to the clarification of my ideas. Dr Fincham can obviously not be held responsible if, in spite of her judicious endeavours, this thesis has taken on the dimensions of a Jamesian bête noire, "the loose and baggy monster", nor if it is held to merit the censure bestowed by Henry James himself on a contemporary aspirant writer, Mrs Oliphant:

the poor soul had a simply feminine conception of literature: such slipshod, imperfect, halting, faltering, peeping, down-at-heel-work – buffeting along like a ragged creature in a high wind, and just struggling to the goal, and falling in a quivering mass of faintness and fatuity....

I am grateful also to others who assisted me in my "struggling to the goal" and prevented me from "falling in a quivering mass of faintness ...": Elspeth Scott-Millar and Sue Marks for helping with the proof-reading, and the staff of Jagger Library for their
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
NARRATIVE THEORY: A BRIEF SURVEY

The novel is of all pictures the most comprehensive and the most elastic. It will stretch anywhere - it will take in absolutely anything. All it needs is a subject and a painter. But for its subject, magnificently, it has the whole human consciousness.¹

Given Henry James's emphasis on the "comprehensiveness" and "elasticity" of the novel, and his conception of the nature of its subject - "the whole human consciousness" - any critical approach to James's own oeuvre should be equipped with a comparable capacity to "stretch anywhere" in its attempt to elucidate the subtleties and complexities of his presentation of consciousness. In this thesis I shall endeavour to demonstrate that Dorrit Cohn's model, as set out in Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction (1978), is, with certain modifications, pre-eminently well-adapted for this enterprise. The elucidation of Cohn's model and its application to a representative selection of James's novels will be preceded by a discussion of relevant contributions of other contemporary narrative theorists.

I: "TOWER OF THEORY" VERSUS "HOUSE OF FICTION"

Dorrit Cohn herself has commented on the proliferation of contemporary theories of narrative:

The discourse on narrative discourse is still in Babel. Its categories are variously labeled (narrative) perspective, mode, distance, person, register, presentation, situation, point of view, aspect, focalization, field, position, voice, transmission, vision. Its domain is divided in two, three, four, six, eight, twelve... [O]ther banes to comparison and communication [include] "real"
language barriers, divergent (sometimes alien) corpora, unfamiliar referential frames, arcane theoretical bases.¹

In view of these comments on the confusing plethora of contemporary manifestations of "discourse on narrative discourse", any attempt to discuss the narrative strategies of James's novels in the light of current literary theory might seem an enterprise doomed to incoherence or futility. It would be presumptuous to attempt to impose a preparatory harmonising synthesis, to reduce the divergent voices of "Babel" to a convenient univocality. I have endeavoured instead, in my encounter with some of the "unfamiliar referential frames" and "arcane theoretical bases" of contemporary narrative theory, to concentrate on those aspects which seem most useful for practical interpretive activity. I thus propose, in this introductory section, to examine certain central categories of selected theorists and determine their relevance to a discussion of the works of Henry James.

Initially, as David Lodge reminds us, criticism was conceived of as a "second-order discourse" dependent on the "first-order discourse" of fiction. It involved description, interpretation and evaluation of texts, with different schools emphasising different aspects of these activities. The function of theory was to provide an increasingly comprehensive and refined methodology for achieving these aims.²

The situation today is radically different. One encounters views such as: "The theorist is no longer a servant of the literary critic. Theory and criticism should not take second place to imaginative writing", and "The author is dead. Long live the Theorist!"³ Thus the value or significance of the "second-order discourse" or "metaliterature" is often perceived as superseding that of the "first-order discourse" of literature itself, with Cohn's formidably fortified and entrenched "Babel" of
theoretical discourse overtopping and overshadowing the more modestly hospitable (and habitable?) "House of Fiction". Although the "Tower of Theory" is planted squarely beside the "House of Fiction", even the most rudimentary signs of neighbourly intercourse are often glaringly absent. Contiguity is not necessarily a guarantee of communication.5

Of the many windows in the Tower of Theory—each representing a different critical approach or mode of viewing the literary text—that provided by Cohn seems to yield the most rewarding vista, particularly as it offers a fruitful method of viewing the literary text itself rather than looking past it at some nebulous "mote in the middle distance".6 As Brian McHale has noted, Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction "fills the need for a kind of research—sensitive to actual phenomena, well-informed theoretically but not in itself theoretical—which poetics is beginning to feel now that the first flush of model-building has passed".7 It is largely through the framework constructed in Cohn's seminal study that this thesis will focus on representative works of Henry James. The elucidation of some of the central categories mentioned in Cohn's comments in "The Encirclement of Narrative", cited earlier (for example: narrative perspective, voice, focalization), which are further refined by Cohn, should facilitate an enriched understanding of James's oeuvre by drawing attention to crucial facets of his narrative technique.

After a brief consideration of general issues in literary criticism I discuss, in this introductory chapter, James and narrative theory (Section II), the position of the reader in James's texts (Section III), discrepancies between James's theoretical perspectives and narrative practice (Section IV), the concepts mimesis/diegesis; showing/telling; scene/summary (Section V), and "story" and "teller", which encompasses inside
and outside views, figural and authorial narration and focalization (Section VI). Critical discussion of these terms - with suggested modifications - is accompanied by justification for adopting the model proposed by Cohn as being most appropriate to an elucidation of James's narrative strategies.

In chapter 2, I attempt to present a coherent account of the central features of Cohn's paradigm as set out in Transparent Minds and establish its usefulness as an approach to the primary concern in James - the representation of consciousness. In subsequent chapters, I concentrate on the following works, which exemplify diverse aspects of James's technique: firstly, in chapters 3 and 4 respectively, I discuss *Roderick Hudson* and *The Portrait of a Lady* as "quasi-figural" narration or precursors of the fully figural novel. Here I hope to demonstrate inter alia that James's comments in the Prefaces create an erroneous idea of his novelistic project in these earlier novels. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with *The Golden Bowl* as example of multi-figural narration or variable focalization employing two or more focalizers or reflectors.

In spite of D.H. Lawrence's contention that "criticism can never be a science: it is, in the first place, much too personal, and in the second, it is concerned with values that science ignores", criticism today has indeed become far more "scientific". The recent espousal of theoretical approaches in literary criticism is the outcome, as Lodge points out, of an infusion of ideas from the "more systematic, abstract, theoretically rigorous and 'scientific' tradition of European structuralist criticism" into the mainstream Anglo-American tradition of "formalist criticism, essentially empirical and text-based, theoretically rather underpowered but hermeneutically productive".

The challenge, then, is how to apply the findings of the theoretical explosion to the close reading of
literary texts in a productive rather than a reductive manner. This study attempts to deploy critical terminology judiciously to facilitate this enterprise: to aim at an approach which both maintains theoretical rigour and precision and is "hermeneutically productive".¹⁰

According to Franz Stanzel, literary theory has now evolved beyond the Linnaean age of the theory and criticism of the novel, with its emphasis on the definition of different species, kinds and types of the narrative genre. In this pre-Darwinian age,

the foundations were ... laid for modern theories of narrative literature in which the main accent is no longer on the classification of basic forms but on the variations and modulations of these forms, on their combinations and fusions as they appear in a particular novel or short story.¹¹

Stanzel, in modifying his own initial theoretical position, categorises his new approach as a move towards a "grammar of fiction" which will attempt to

combine a rigorously systematic theory of narration with an analysis of some of the most important formal elements which through combination and variation produce the multifarious plurality of the possibilities of fictional narration. (p. 248)

Although I have reservations about Stanzel's faith in a "grammar of fiction" as a totalising system, various aspects of his project are useful and their contribution will be considered, together with the findings of such other contemporary theorists as Scholes and Kellogg, Gérard Genette, Rimmon-Kenan and Cohn. In applying some of their most significant insights to a consideration of the novels of Henry James a sense of their relative validity should emerge so that, in accordance with Stanzel's evolutionary image, those best adapted to the demands of contemporary critical discourse should survive
and the less fit be relegated to the critical cul-de-sac of obsolete terminology. Genette himself has foreseen—and accorded anticipatory approval to—such a process: in the Afterword of his *Narrative Discourse* he states:

The categories and procedures put forward here are certainly not faultless in my eyes.... In an area we regularly grant to intuition and empiricism, the proliferation of concepts and terms will doubtless have annoyed more than one reader, and I do not expect 'posterity' to retain too large a part of these propositions. This arsenal, like any other, will inevitably be out of date before many years have passed, and all the more quickly the more seriously it is taken, that is, debated, tested, and revised with time.12

Lodge has identified three principal approaches to the study of narrative texts: firstly, that of "narratology and narrative grammar" (that is, the effort to discover the langue of narrative, the underlying system of rules and possibilities of which any narrative parole (text) is the realisation—a problematic enterprise, as indicated earlier); secondly, the "poetics of fiction" (attempts to describe and classify techniques of fictional representation) and thirdly, "rhetorical analysis" (analysing the surface structure of narrative texts to show how the linguistic mediation of a story determines its meaning and effect).

(Working with Structuralism, pp. 18-21.)

Narratology and narrative grammar encompass the theoretical enquiries of European scholars such as Propp, Bremond, Greimas, Levi-Strauss, Todorov and Barthes; Northrop Frye's *The Anatomy of Criticism* and Frank Kermode's *The Sense of an Ending* represent contributions from the domain of Anglo-American criticism.

Under poetics of fiction, Lodge includes the seminal contribution of the Russian Formalists with their distinction between *fabula* and *sjuzet* (the story in its most neutral, objective, chronological form as opposed to the actual text in which the story is embodied with all
its "gaps, elisions, emphases and distortions" (Working with Structuralism, p. 20). The implications of this distinction were further pursued by Genette in his Discours du Récit. Genette identified two main areas in which "story" is modified by "text": time, and point of view or perspective. (Genette's crucial distinction between "perspective" – who sees – and "voice" – who speaks – will be discussed in context later). Lodge cites also Lubbock's The Craft of Fiction (1921), Wayne Booth's The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961), Seymour Chatman's Style and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (1978) and Cohn's Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction (1978) as making significant contributions in this area.

The third approach, rhetorical analysis, is associated with the techniques of close-reading developed by the New Criticism and exemplified by studies such as Mark Shorer's "Technique as Discovery" (1948) and the discipline of stylistics. It includes attention to features such as structural patterning and the thematic significance of symbolism, imagery and irony.

As already indicated, I have reservations about the first of the approaches identified by Lodge (narratology and establishing a grammar of fiction), and therefore concentrate on aspects of the second and third: examining techniques of fictional representation (as cited under "poetics of fiction") and the verbal texture of novels (rhetorical analysis). The works Lodge mentioned as contributing to the poetics of fiction are referred to when relevant. The theoretical component of this study is embedded in and illustrated by the exploration of representative texts throughout.

James himself, as critic no less than as novelist, made a significant contribution to the development of narrative poetics in the first decade of this century. He formulated his "theory" of the novel in his Prefaces (published collectively as The Art of the Novel)14 and
other critical writings, and his pronouncements still exert a considerable influence in the increasingly analytic critical ambience of today. Not only was the problem of point of view largely ignored in literary criticism before the advent of Henry James, but he also formulated or brought to the fore terms such as scene and summary, drama and picture, foreshortening, centre of consciousness, reflector and ficelle. These are still central concepts in contemporary narrative theory. In the following section, the focus is on James's critical observations.

II: JAMES AND NARRATIVE THEORY

In this introductory chapter I survey, in necessarily schematic form, some of the crucial concepts foregrounded by James and elaborated and refined by subsequent theorists. Before tracing the mutations of these seminal categories, however, it would be useful to consider James's own conception of the novel. This was most cogently enunciated in "The Art of Fiction" (1884) which has been described as "perhaps the most popular and surely the most influential brief statement of fictional theory ever made".15

In "The Art of Fiction" (1884), James states that "The only reason for the existence of the novel is that it does attempt to represent life".16 He defines the novel as follows:

A novel is in its broadest definition a personal, a direct impression of life: that, to begin with, constitutes its value, which is greater or less according to the intensity of the impression. (p. 29)

The novelist "must possess the sense of reality" (p. 31); indeed, "the air of reality (solidity of specification) seems to me to be the supreme virtue of
the novel" (p. 33). The importance of the novelist's fidelity to "reality" is further stressed in the conception of the novelist as primarily an historian (p. 26). James's objection to the authorial intrusions in the novels of Trollope, for instance, is grounded in his belief that the author's admission that he is only "making believe" is "a betrayal of his sacred office.... It implies that the novelist is less occupied in looking for the truth than the historian" (p. 26). Such authorial asides are condemned as "little slaps at credulity" which violate the novelistic "illusion of reality".17

Both in his novels and his critical writings, James contributed to the gradual disappearance (or displacement) of the omniscient commentating author, thus inaugurating the transition from the Victorian to the modern novel. As Beach has observed,

In a bird's-eye view of the English novel from Fielding to Ford, the one thing that will impress you more than any other is the disappearance of the author. In Fielding and Scott, in Thackeray and George Eliot, the author is everywhere present in person to see that you are properly informed on all the circumstances of the action, to explain the characters to you and insure your forming the right opinion of them, to scatter nuggets of wisdom and good feeling along the course of the story, and to point out how, from the failures and successes of the characters, you may form a sane and right philosophy of conduct.18

James's endeavour to minimise omniscient narration is repeatedly expressed in his Prefaces. In advocating the suppression of the vocal authorial voice explaining, evaluating, and "scattering nuggets of wisdom", he observes that "Anything ... must always have seemed to me better - better for the process and the effect of representation, my irrepressible ideal - than the mere muffled majesty of irresponsible authorship" (AN, p. 328).
Paradoxically, although in "The Art of Fiction" James conceives of the novelist primarily as an historian aiming to achieve an "air of reality", the other images in terms of which he expresses his views on the nature of the novel and the task of the novelist emphasise that artistry or artifice is an inherent feature of the novelistic project. "Life being all inclusion and confusion, and art being all discrimination and selection" (AN, p. 120), the artist's procedure is to "surround with a sharp black line, to frame in the square, the circle, the charming oval, that helps any arrangement of objects to become a picture" (AN, p. 101). Through art, then, the inchoate, unstructured confusion of raw "reality" is transmuted into an aesthetically coherent representation. This image from the visual arts is complemented by an image emphasising the meticulously "scientific" – yet idiosyncratic – nature of this enterprise:

Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they shall happily appear to do so. (AN, p. 5)

All these images, then, stress the crucial presence of the constructive artist. In conceiving of the novelist's role as that of historian, philosopher, painter and dramatic poet ("The Art of Fiction", pp. 25-26), James highlights the multifaceted nature of an enterprise in which accuracy of observation and interpretive creativity are conjoined in the production and patterning of the novelist's fictional world.

In the course of his creative career, James modified his initial conception of the novel. In his earlier critical writings such as "The Art of Fiction" one can discern a much greater emphasis on creating an "air of reality", that is, on mimetic criteria generally, than in
the later Prefaces where, in assessing his own creative output, he expressed appreciation of the formal perfection of novels such as *The Portrait*:

 Such is the aspect that to-day "The Portrait" wears for me; a structure reared with an architectural competence ... that makes it, to the author's own sense, the most proportioned of his productions after "The Ambassadors".... (AN, p. 52)

The criteria here are clearly aesthetic or formalist rather than narrowly mimetic. This movement from mimetic to more formalist/aesthetic considerations (and this is largely a matter of emphasis) is paralleled in his movement away from the "realist" mode of his early novels to a more symbolic register in later works such as *The Golden Bowl*.

James has been taken to task for his criticism of novelists such as Thackeray and Trollope who adopted the stance of the narrator as "maker" as opposed to "histor". Scholes and Kellogg point out that the "histor" – the narrator as inquirer, constructing a narrative on the basis of such evidence as he has been able to accumulate (p. 164) – is only one facet of the narrator as persona, a projection of the author's empirical values (p. 266). Other facets include that of "bard" (the narrator can include unspoken thoughts when appropriate) (p. 268) and of "maker" (when he admits he is making things up and brings his artistic problems before the reader). The narrator of the novel (as opposed to the empirical author) is often an amalgam of "histor", bard and maker. In spite of James's claims in "The Art of Fiction" that the novelist is essentially a "histor", elements of bard and maker in his own "narrator persona" are discernible, as we shall see, throughout his own oeuvre.

In addressing the question of the disappearance of the narrator, Scholes and Kellogg contend that James "insisted on submerging the narrator in a character
called the 'central intelligence' in the belief that this was the most dramatic way of telling a story" and that the influence of James, should it prevail, would be ... pernicious; for the Jamesian method leads inevitably to the death of narrative art by a kind of artistic suicide. The narrator is to eliminate himself for the good of his art.19

This claim seems to stem from a radical misunderstanding of both James's novelistic practice and his stated position on the narrator. James certainly never claimed that the narrator could – or should – be entirely eliminated or exterminated but that he should restrict his function or posture to that of "historian" and eschew intrusive, omniscient commentary on, or evaluation of, the characters, the plot and the technique of presentation.

Scholes and Kellogg seem to be confusing two separate issues, those that Genette designated "perspective" (who sees?) and "voice" (who speaks?). The reflector or centre of consciousness in James, who "sees", is not to be equated with the narrator, who "speaks". The narrator, far from being "submerged" in a character called the "central intelligence", is a distinctly separate entity in the text. Filtering the action of the novel through the consciousness of the reflector does enable James to restrict the function or curtail the presence of the narrative voice but it is certainly not eliminated.

The use of free indirect style is of crucial importance here. According to Roy Pascal, Free indirect style [is] one of the major devices by which narratorial report and explanation [are] supplanted; [and is] also one in which, as we shall see, the subjective perspective of the character is cunningly brought into the broader focus of the narrator's view.20
The comments made by Scholes and Kellogg evince misinterpretation or failure to take cognisance of James's observations on his strategy of adopting "a certain indirect and oblique view of my presented action", which he subsequently qualified as being perhaps, "on the contrary, any superficial appearance notwithstanding, the very straightest and closest possible". His mode of presentation should be seen not as my own impersonal account of the affair in hand, but as my account of somebody's impression of it — the terms of this person's access to it and estimate of it contributing thus by some fine little law to intensification of interest. (AN, p. 327)

Scholes and Kellogg contend that James "imbibed the notion" of adopting "the disappearance of the author" as an "aim" from Flaubert who held that "the author should be in his work like God in the universe: everywhere present but nowhere apparent" (p. 268). Significantly, this differs from James's own formulation of Flaubert's position in "Gustave Flaubert" (1893): "It's one of my principles that one must never write down one's self. The artist must be present in his work like God in Creation, invisible and almighty, everywhere felt but nowhere seen" (my emphasis). His presence, then, is inevitably apparent but not always overtly "seen" or rendered visible/audible. It is clear that James's formulation would be consistent with his own views on this question of the projected light of the individual strong temperament in fiction — the colour of the air with which this, that or the other painter of life (as we call them all), more or less unconsciously suffuses his picture.... [It is] something that proceeds from the contemplative mind itself, the very complexion of the mirror in which the material is reflected. This is the nature of the man himself — an emanation of his spirit, temper, history; it springs from his very presence, his spiritual presence, in his work....
This all-pervasive although impalpable presence—felt rather than seen or heard—is certainly not consistent with the notion of "artistic suicide".

Furthermore, James by implication refutes Scholes and Kellogg's charge that he "sought to translate the formal qualities of stage-drama to the novel in a[n] ... attempt to refine the artist out of the art" (p. 269): on the contrary, he states that "'Dialogue', as it is commonly called, is singularly suicidal from the moment it is not directly illustrative of something given us by another method, something constituted and presented". He notes

the impossibility of making people both talk "all the time" and talk with the needful differences. The thing, so far as we have got, is simply too hard. There is always at the best the author's voice to be kept out. It can be kept out for occasions, it can not be kept out always. The solution therefore is to leave it its function, for it has the supreme one. This function, properly exercised ... [is] illustrative and indispensable. 23

Ironically, there is indeed an essential contradiction or paradox in James's stance on the narrator, but it stems from discrepancies between his theoretical precepts and narrative practice, as is demonstrated in Section IV, rather than finding expression in the kind of suicidal self-annihilation postulated here.

The concept "narrator", usually associated with the Latin verb narrare, to narrate, is derived from the Latin word "gnarus", meaning "knowing", "expert", "acquainted with". 24 The ironic implications of this term as applied to the spectrum of narrators in James's novels is evident in view of the suppression of the traditional omniscient narrator and the pervasive ambiguities of knowing which inform his novels. The speculative pose often adopted by the narrator in the later fiction reinforces this. Instances of the narrator's disavowal of pretensions to
superior knowledge in *The Portrait* can be found in comments such as "Our heroine's biographer can scarcely tell why ..." (I, 154); "I know not whether it was on this occasion or some other ..." (I, 275), the "working of this young lady's spirit was strange, and I can only give it to you as I see it, not hoping to make it seem altogether natural" (II, 21-22).

Scholes and Kellogg claim that James's criticism of authors such as Trollope, Thackeray and Meredith for their failure to "play the game" by adopting the posture of narrator as maker is unfounded, especially in view of his own, more clandestine, indulgence in this practice. In an oblique shaft obviously directed at James it is stated that

The novelist is not supposed to call his characters puppets or pretend to bare his technical problems through the narrator of the story. But it is quite all right for him to call them "ficelles" in a preface and to impress the reader there with the author's skill in solving problems.... The assumption that the reality of fiction depends on the reader's "belief" in it is a highly dubious one.... (The Nature of Narrative, p. 268.)

This issue could be seen in the light of "the exquisite problem of the artist" concerning where and how to draw the circle demarcating the fictional world from the empirical. James's statement in the Preface to *Roderick Hudson* could be relevant again here in a different context:

Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they shall happily appear to do so. (AN, p. 5)

This "exquisite problem" has ramifications beyond the boundaries of the fictional world created within a specific novel, and could be seen as illustrating the difficulties inherent in drawing the circle demarcating
the "boundaries of narrative" as such, to separate the fictional world from the empirical. Perhaps the generally accepted parameters of the term "fictional" need to be extended here. Should James's Prefaces be regarded not merely as retrospective authorial ruminations on his novels — author-itative pronouncements of the magisterial Master — but as an integral part of his fictional world, emanations of the narrator or implied author rather than the "real" author? In that case, he could be seen as a precursor of metafiction, a novelist who, instead of injecting intermittent comments on novelistic presentation into the body of the text at regular or irregular intervals, presents them all in summarised form, for the convenience of the reader, in a kind of meta-preface. The effect of his stance, if not the avowed purpose of his project, is to collapse the boundaries between "fictional" and "empirical".

Irrespective of the nature and status of the authorial or narratorial voice in the Prefaces, James's purported effacement of the intrusive narrator in his own novels is less complete than he claims — or than his criticism of Trollope and Thackeray would suggest.

In discussing James's criticism of Trollope for "reminding the reader that the story he was telling was only, after all, a make-believe", John Carlos Rowe claims that "James himself often exposes the illusion of the real that is sustained by art".  This occurs through James's inveterate use of the first-person narrator even in works in which this mode of narration is virtually effaced, such as The Portrait of a Lady and The Ambassadors, as well as in James's own narrative asides. Examples of such deviations from the principles enunciated in James's critical works are more closely examined in Section IV; discussion of the ironic first person mode in both the novels mentioned by Rowe and other works follows in subsequent chapters.
Just as a critical examination of James's purported effacement of the intrusive narrator reveals that it is less complete than he claims, so too his conception of the novelist as historian and the narrative as history can be subjected to critical scrutiny. Contemporary researchers, by and large, regard the "objectivity" of history and the irreproachably "reliable" historian as a chimera. The "story in itself" is inaccessible; even in the ostensibly impartial relaying or relating of facts, history evinces an element of the factitious — history is inevitably "his story", a specific time and culture-bound interpretation of events. Furthermore, as far as James's narrative method is concerned, it is clear that his favoured deployment of a "reflector" or centre of consciousness is diametrically opposed to the method of presentation of the historian where the ideal of — or aspiration towards — "objectivity" is based on the suppression of individual or subjective viewpoints. In James's figural novels events are perceived or reflected from an individual, subjective point of view — an approach which contrasts with that of the historian who assembles and collates data from a variety of sources to present an "objective", ordered account of a complex sequence of events. Paradoxically, it could be said that the historian in effect adopts the stance of an omniscient narrator — a stance from which James dissociated himself.26

The relation between the suppression of the authorial voice and the creation of the illusion of reality is clearly far more complex than James's perhaps simplistic equation of authorial effacement and an "air of reality" would suggest. In practice, as I have indicated, James himself did not entirely banish the audible authorial voice from his novels, and the occasionally vocal authorial or narratorial presence does not necessarily derogate from the credibility of the
narrative. Authorial mediacy can take many forms and is even compatible with such complex self-reflexive modes as metafiction.27

James seems reluctant to acknowledge that while narrators manifest their presence differently, no one form of "manifestation" is necessarily more legitimate than another. The difference between the interfering and the disappearing or "effaced" author is not, as has been noted, that

the one exists in the novel while the other does not, but rather that the one conveys his presence directly, while the other does so only through the inferences we inevitably draw from the way the fiction is presented. It is simply a question of different styles of discourse.28

Thus, even when the author does not adopt the persona of guide or commentator, the implications of authorial presence – in features such as point of view, distance, tone, manipulation of chronology – are still very much in evidence.

On this issue of the intrusive versus the self-effacing author, James can perhaps be seen as displaying a curious lack of awareness of the implications of his own admonition not to be too prescriptive. In "The Art of Fiction", he speaks of

the mistake in attempting to say so definitely beforehand what sort of an affair the good novel will be ... certain traditions on the subject, applied a priori, have already had much to answer for ... the good health of an art which undertakes so immediately to reproduce life must demand that it be perfectly free.... The only obligation to which in advance we may hold a novel, without incurring the accusation of being arbitrary, is that it be interesting. (p. 28-29)

A similar view is expressed in "The Future of the Novel" where James claims that "The novel is of all pictures the most comprehensive and the most elastic. It will stretch anywhere – it will take in absolutely anything"
(pp. 50-51.). It is evident, then, that the elasticity and versatility of the authorial voice, as amply demonstrated in James's fiction, is not given due recognition in James's non-fictional condemnation of authorial intrusions.

James carried the project of suppression of the authorial voice to its logical conclusion in The Awkward Age, a novel written almost entirely in dialogue and constructed like "the successive Acts of a Play" (AN, p. 110). Even here, however, in a novel based on "really constructive dialogue, dialogue organic and dramatic" (AN, p. 106) where "the objectivity ... came from the imposed absence of that 'going behind' to compass explanations and amplifications" (AN, p. 111), authorial or narratorial intervention is sometimes indispensable in providing information difficult to convey through dialogue alone. Description of the physical appearance of characters, for example, is provided through authorial comment. So we are informed, through the authorial voice, that

Mrs. Brookenham was, in her forty-first year, still charmingly pretty.... She had about her the pure light of youth - would always have it; her head, her figure, her flexibility, her flickering colour, her lovely silly eyes, her natural quavering tone, all played together towards this effect by some trick that had never yet been exposed. (p. 42)

Although various characters in the novel would have access to some of the facets revealed here, none explicitly evaluate her eyes as "silly", and only the author could furnish the information that she "would always have" her rather specious "pure light of youth".

In The Ambassadors, by contrast, virtually all the descriptions of the characters - with the notable exception of Strether (who is described as viewed by Maria Gostrey), and Waymarsh (described by the narrator) - are filtered through Strether's own perception.
Paradoxically, greater dramatic intensity is achieved through the latter technique of presentation, as such a device succeeds in illuminating simultaneously both the perceiver and the perceived.

"The Inward Turn of the Novel"

James's observation that the subject of the novel is not only the life of overt action — "of flood and field, of the moving accident, of battle and murder and sudden death" (AN, p. 57) but "the whole human consciousness" ("The Future of the Novel", pp. 50-51) is an indication of the emphasis on the representation of consciousness — "the inward turn of the novel" — and the move towards psychological realism which is explored by Cohn in Transparent Minds. It is also consistent with the development of phenomenology and the concomitant insight into the crucial role of the observer or perceiver; James's novels reflect the notion that the world "in itself" is inaccessible to human understanding and all knowledge is relative to a particular observer. James's conception of the novel as a personal impression of life does not imply an attempt to transcribe or replicate a "reality out there", a reality in itself, as no direct access to such a "reality" is possible. The reality of the inner world of others is clearly even more inaccessible or opaque. It is because of this fundamental "opacity" — the fact that minds are not "transparent" — that writers adopt various strategies to represent them. The strategies adopted by James in a representative selection of his novels are the main focus of subsequent chapters in this thesis.

James reveals in both his novels and his critical writings his awareness that "reality" as we know it is essentially a subjective construct. The world, in both its physical and more intangible manifestations — its
spiritual, ethical and psychological dimensions – is experienced differently by each individual consciousness: "it all depends on the observer, the nature of one's observation, and one's curiosity".\(^\text{30}\) This view is reinforced in, for example, James's image of the novelist as a watcher at one of the "million" windows of the "House of Fiction" (AN, p. 46). He is equipped with "a pair of eyes, or at least with a field-glass, which forms, again and again, for observation, a unique instrument, insuring to the person making use of it an impression distinct from every other". His personal instrument of observation ensures that

he and his neighbours are watching the same show, but one seeing more where the other sees less, one seeing black where the other sees white, one seeing big where the other sees small, one seeing coarse where the other sees fine.

Not only is the vantage point of each novelist circumscribed by "the need of the individual vision", but the "aperture" through which he observes, the literary form, is a window and not a "hinged door opening straight upon life" (AN, p. 46).

This would imply that the novelist has no direct unmediated access to reality "in itself"; he is obliged to render it through a specific mode. James, stressing both the variety and the unpredictability of the images or views afforded by different novelists, states "There is fortunately no saying on what, for the particular pair of eyes, the window may not open; 'fortunately', by reason, precisely, of this incalculability of range" (AN, p. 46).

The pictorial analogy recurs throughout the Prefaces. James claims, we recall, that "Life [is] all inclusion and confusion, and art [is] all discrimination and selection" (AN, p. 120); the artist's task can thus be seen as according salience to certain aspects of life by framing them for our attention. This "framing"
inevitably implies imposing a personal perspective, suppressing some aspects and highlighting others. Ironically, the manipulation of reader response through framing devices is echoed in the reader's own deployment of specific interpretative strategies: a particular theoretical perspective determines the practice of reading. Just as the novelist's procedure is "to surround with a sharp black line, to frame in the square, the circle, the charming oval, that helps any arrangement of objects to become a picture" (AN, p. 101), so the reader inevitably imposes a certain framework through which to view the novel, thus highlighting certain features and relegating others to the relative obscurity of the un-viewed.

The imperative to impose pattern and meaning is shared by reader and novelist. Hence "man's constant demand for what [the novelist] has to offer is simply man's general appetite for a picture" ("The Future of the Novel", p. 50). Then, in a modulation of the metaphor of a picture as representation, he adds, "Till the world is an unpeopled void there will be an image in the mirror" ("The Future of the Novel", p. 51).

In a different context, the mirror image is used to suggest the consciousness of the protagonist — the reflector — as opposed to that of the novelist, as in James's comment on the practice adopted "from Roderick Hudson to The Golden Bowl": "that provision for interest which consists in placing advantageously, placing right in the middle of the light, the most polished of possible mirrors of the subject" (AN, p. 70). Protagonists viewed by James as "mirrors" include Rowland Mallet in Roderick Hudson, Isabel Archer in The Portrait, Merton Densher in The Wings of the Dove, Strether in The Ambassadors — "he a mirror verily of miraculous silver" and "the Prince in the first half and ... the Princess in the second half of 'The Golden Bowl' [sic] (AN, p. 70-71)."
James's image of the novelist wielding a field-glass - an instrument of observation which is essentially adapted to both sweeping panoramic survey and focusing on individual objects of interest - is in keeping with a Balzacian view of the novelist as "historian" depicting the fate of individuals against the background of a wider social fabric. It is also "no less realistic in its spatio-optical clarity than Stendhal's portable mirror", as Cohn points out (Stendhal depicts the novel as "un miroir qu'on promène le long d'un chemin") (p. 6).

These images suggest that the novelist's task is to scrutinise and represent - or reflect - life, and yet, as Cohn observes, the representation of the inner life cannot proceed so unproblematically. There is an essential paradox at the heart of narrative fiction: "The special life-likeness of narrative fiction, as compared to the drama [and] cinematic art ... depends on what we all, writers and readers alike, know least in life - how another mind thinks" (Transparent Minds, p. 5). We can, in the nature of things, have no access to the sensory and psychological experience of another organism. "In depicting the inner life, the novelist is truly a fabricator" (p. 6). Our optical images now seem inadequate - a mirror can reflect only physical and not psychological realities; similarly, the penetration of a field-glass is confined to surface phenomena.

Although the image of the mirror is employed by James, Stendhal and George Eliot in their endeavours to characterise their fictive art, the image proposed by Ortega seems most apt in suggesting the minute analysis of the psychological or cognitive dimensions of experience explored by writers such as James and Proust who inaugurated "the inward turn of the novel". Ortega states that these writers are engaged in "discovering, lens in hand, the microcosm of life" (Cohn, p. 9).

An illuminating variation on the mirror image in literary discourse is provided by a comment by Borges on
the nature of narrative fiction - the claim that it is "a mirror that reflects the reader's own features and it is also a map of the world". Scholes comments on the significance of the difference between maps and mirrors as ways of imaging the world around us:

They are pointedly non-verbal signs of reality, and they are signs of different sorts. Mapping is based on a sign system that is highly arbitrary in its symbols but aspires toward an exact iconicity in its proportions. Mirrors, on the other hand, are superbly iconic in their reflections of reality, but patently artificial in at least three respects. They reduce three dimensions to a plane surface of two, they double distance and reduce size ... and, most significantly, they reverse right and left. (Fabulation and Metafiction, p. 12)

The significance of Borges's mirror is that the emphasis is placed not on a peregrinating reflecting medium reproducing images of the mud below and the sky above (Stendhal) nor on the (possibly idiosyncratic) configurations of the author's creative mind ("the mirror is doubtless defective - the reflection faint or confused", according to George Eliot) but on the observer gazing into it: "it reflects the reader's own features". Art is merely a map of the world, but it is a map that can point accurately to what is "out there".

Such mirroring and such mapping take us deep into reality, though the images are obviously fabulations rather than transcriptions... Reality cannot be transcribed directly ... fiction functions as both map and mirror at the same time. Its images are fixed, as the configurations of a map are fixed, and perpetually various, like the features reflected by a mirror. (Scholes, p. 13)

The possibility of an infinite plurality of readings is suggested, as a mirror not only gives different images to different gazers peering into it but never gives the same image to the same person. "Work that endures," says Borges, "is capable of an infinite and plastic ambiguity" (pp. 14-15).
Thus, while the classical image of art as a mirror held up to nature ignores issues such as the nature of the mirror and the question of who looks into it and who perceives the image, the emphasis here is on what is perceived by the viewer or reader.

This emphasis would be compatible with the view that literary mimesis can be seen as not a philosophical but a rhetorical language game: it aims at conveying an impression, creating an effect, persuading a possible reader that it is the semblance of true discourse. A mimetic text is, in a broad sense, like a set of instructions for constructing a fictional world... This "world" would consist of representations not essentially different from those a reader may make himself of the "real" world in any major respect other than his being able to characterize them as fictional. Let us call this practice the Mimetic Language Game.32

Who, then, is envisaged as participating in this "mimetic language game"? What is the projected nature and function of the reader responsible for constructing the fictional world? This question is addressed in the following section.

III: THE POSITION OF THE READER IN JAMES'S TEXTS

A list of possible or hypothetical readers of the literary text has been compiled by Rimmon-Kenan; perhaps the projected participant in the "mimetic language game" would be an amalgam of them all. Rimmon-Kenan cites the "Actual Reader" (Van Dijk, Jauss), the "Superreader" (Riffaterre), the "Informed Reader" (Fish), the "Ideal Reader" (Culler), the "Model Reader" (Eco), the "Implied Reader" (Booth, Iser, Chatman, Perry) and the "Encoded Reader" (Brooke-Rose).33 Stanley Fish has extended the concept of an individual Reader by positing the notion of "interpretive communities" incorporating a certain set of
norms, conventions and beliefs. A paradoxical concomitant of Fish's position is that

the text which we study is, qua construct, the consequence of the interpretation for which it is supposedly evidence: reading produces rather than discovers the text's structure. All 'form' is constituted by the reader, who in turn is constrained by the norms of his interpretive community.34

By investing the reader with well-nigh sole responsibility for the production of meaning (even if constrained by the assumptions of his interpretive community), Fish is diametrically opposed to the view that the text itself is the repository of all meaning. His stance seems to ignore the fact that the author's own encoded meanings also structure or are embedded in the text. My position is that the reader's interpretation of the text is indeed influenced by the framework of assumptions (cultural, social, ethical, epistemological) that are prevalent in his/her community - as well as theoretical perspectives, if [s]he is part of the academic community - but it is also controlled by textual features through which the author's own assumptions and concerns (thematic and stylistic) are expressed. Reading should be seen as essentially a dialogic or dialectical process.

Furthermore, in trying to establish whether this notion of an "interpretive community" is a viable one, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the logical conclusion of such a position might be that the reader is irrevocably bound to the restricted interpretive community of his/her specific historical and cultural context and thus unable to extricate him/herself sufficiently to choose one set of interpretive strategies over another. This would clearly be an untenable position. The responsible reader in effect endeavours to select and apply - or if necessary to construct - a set
of interpretive strategies best adapted to the demands of a specific text. Each reader produces a selective realisation of the text: in focusing on a restricted spectrum of narrative strategies the responsible or responsive reader attempts to adopt the appropriate interpretive strategies. Each reading of a specific text is then, to some extent, the product of selective interpretive strategies adopted by the individual reader rather than stemming from an "interpretive community".

Instead of attempting to differentiate the "Actual Reader" from the more exalted "Model Reader" or "Ideal Reader", one should perhaps accept that one's own stance is only one of many viable approaches: that actual readers, striving to attain the elusive status of "Ideal Reader", should content themselves with becoming - more modestly - one of many "Appropriate" or "Relevant" Readers. Thus, just as the narrator as persona is a projection of the author's empirical values, so one could postulate a comparable complementary construct, the "appropriate reader", whose interpretive strategies would be in a state of constant re-adjustment in response to the solicitations of different texts. Disaffection with the omniscient narrator could perhaps be seen as entailing a concomitant distrust of the notion of an impersonal, all-seeing eye - that of the omniscient "Ideal" or "Model" Reader - trained on the text. One should acknowledge that, in terms of James's formulation, "some see more, others see less", and all see differently.

What James called the "responsive, imaginative" reader (AN, p. 336) would arguably be in a better position to respond in appropriate fashion to authorial tone, to the stance adopted by the implied author towards his readers, as well as to the ministrations of the authorial voice such as those embodied in direct appeals to the reader (through rhetorical questions, for example) and indirect appeals (through generic statements and
other references to a commonality of experience and judgement) (Leech and Short, p. 283). It will be shown in the following section that James himself issued such appeals and directives to the reader in the text of individual novels.

The concept of an appropriate reader engaging in a mimetic language game would be in accord with the approach of James, who, in effect, anticipated that emphasis on the participatory role of the reader in the "construction" of the text which has been explored by exponents of reader response such as Iser. He claimed that

In every novel the work is divided between the writer and the reader; but the writer makes the reader very much as he makes his characters. When he makes him ill, that is, makes him indifferent, he does no work; the writer does all. When he makes him well, that is, makes him interested, then the reader does quite half the labour.35

In his collected Prefaces, which represent an explicit exploration by the author of the activity of reading (or, in this case, of re-reading his own works), James's critical response clearly anticipates subsequent theories of reception aesthetics. His conception of his dual role of writer and reader is clearly expressed in the Preface to The Golden Bowl where he asserts that

As the historian of the matter sees and speaks, so my intelligence of it, as a reader, meets him halfway, passive, receptive, appreciative, often even grateful; unconscious, quite blissfully, of any bar to intercourse.... Into his very footsteps the responsive, the imaginative steps of the docile reader that I consentingly become for him all comfortably sink.... (AN, pp. 335-36)

Throughout his Prefaces James evinces an interest in the response of other - empirical or projected - readers who, he claims, often lack the desired "responsive" and "imaginative" qualities in their appreciation of the
composition (as opposed to "story" or content) of the novel. At times his scepticism about the capacity of the general reader to accord to the novel the close examination it demands is clearly demonstrated. He deplores "our so marked collective mistrust of anything like close or analytic appreciation" and "the odd numbness of the general sensibility" (AN, pp. 227-28). In the Preface to "The Figure in the Carpet" he speaks of the author Vereker's "dependence, for the sense of being understood and enjoyed, on some responsive reach of critical perception that he is destined never to waylay with success" (AN, p. 228). This comment echoes his claim in the Preface to The Awkward Age that, as an author, he endured a similar disappointment in that the novel never "succeeded in producing the impression of any plan on any person. No hint of that sort of success, or of any critical perception at all in relation to the business, has ever come my way" (AN, p. 108).

Perhaps a distinction should be drawn between the reader in the most general sense, the reader who responds to "the appeal to wonder and terror and curiosity and pity and to the delight of fine recognitions" as well as to "the joy, perhaps sharper still, of the mystified state" (AN, p. 253) and the reader as critic, prepared to grant that disciplined "attention of perusal" (AN, p. 304) that James demands. James deplores the dearth of such readers and welcomes all manifestations of "the seasoned spirit of the cunning reader" (AN, p. 253).

The participatory role of the reader is stressed in the way the reader is linked with the protagonist and the author — "The posted presence of the watcher at the window" — in the viewing experience, participating vicariously in their "subjective adventure". The image of the window, in particular, serves to link the consciousness of the reader (and the author) with that of the central characters in the novels. James speaks in the Preface to The Wings of "watching [Milly] as it were,
through the successive windows of other people's interest in her" (AN, p. 306). In the Preface to The American, James asserts that "the interest of everything is all that it is his vision, his conception, his interpretation: at the window of his wide ... consciousness we are seated, from that admirable position we 'assist!'" (AN, p. 37).

It is generally believed that readers read novels at least in part to have access to another — or another's — experience or "reality". We read because "we want to see with other eyes, to imagine with other imaginations, to feel with other hearts". The idea that readers desire to participate vicariously in an alternative "reality" is supported by the view that "stories appeal primarily because they offer a simulacrum of life which enables an audience to participate in events without being involved in the consequences which events in the actual world inevitably carry with them" (Scholes and Kellogg, p. 241).

James expressed a comparable view of the reading experience in "London Notes" (July, 1897), where he states that

The great thing to say for them [novelists] is surely that at any given moment they offer us [readers] another world, another consciousness, an experience that, as effective as the dentist's ether, muffles the ache of the actual.... What we get of course, in proportion as the picture lives, is simply another actual — the actual of other people. (Theory of Fiction, p. 321)

One of the ways in which James considers the writer could encourage participation by the reader (in the construction — as opposed to the critical appreciation — of the narrative) is in exercising discretion in the deployment of the intrusive, commentating "omniscient" authorial voice. Although this concern with reader response is regarded as a fairly recent phenomenon,
James's position in fact perpetuates a tradition established by Sterne, who states in similar vein that

Writing ... is but a different name for conversation: As no-one who knows what he is about in good company would venture to talk all: so no author who understands the just boundaries of decorum and good breeding would presume to think all: The truest respect which you can pay to a reader's understanding is to half this matter amicably, and leave him something to imagine, in his turn, as well as yourself. For my own part, I am eternally paying him compliments of this kind, and do all that lies in my power to keep his imagination as busy as my own.37

James's concern with keeping the authorial voice within carefully demarcated bounds is also illustrated in his criticism of H.G. Wells, whom he clearly considers to have transgressed "the just boundaries of decorum". He complains that

The more this author learns and learns, or at any rate knows and knows ... the greater is this impression of his holding it good enough for us, such as we are, that he shall but turn out his mind and its contents upon us by any free familiar gesture and as from a high window forever open....38

This procedure is evidently a violation of the elevated position occupied by "the watcher" at the window of the House of Fiction - a gross "betrayal of his sacred office". To James, Wells's self-indulgent evacuation of amorphous mental matter is an execrably sloppy business (in all senses of the term), issuing no doubt in the production of the "fluid puddings" and "loose baggy monsters" that James so deplored.

James's justification for advocating authorial or narratorial restraint does not stem only from a desire to encourage adherence to "the just boundaries of decorum"; the reader's participation in the "mimetic language game" would be facilitated if he were spared the authorial asides which, as was mentioned earlier, were held to
detract from the reality of the narrative.

James's celebrated injunction to "dramatise! dramatise!" (and his concomitant preference for "showing" over "telling") to reduce the perceptibility of the authorial voice and create the impression that the story "tells itself", should be seen primarily as the outcome of this concern to create an "air of reality". In What Maisie Knew and The Ambassadors, for example, James, instead of telling the reader what he as narrator sees, shows us what Maisie and Strether see.

In James's later novels, suppression of the overt authorial voice takes the form of a transmutation or transubstantiation into other modes. Guidance is provided not by the personalised voice of the narrator but by, inter alia, a complex metaphorical mode which provides "signs" by which the reader is enjoined to participate actively in the construction of the narrative by engaging in interpretation of its complex imagistic texture. This procedure one could call, perhaps, "semiotic realism". (It is a technique which inevitably results in increased ambiguity; in The Golden Bowl, for example, the reader is unsure whether the "right" interpretation is ultimately attained.) The deployment of the metaphorical mode in a sense compensates for, or fills the gap left by, the virtual abolition of the audible authorial voice.

In spite of James's avowed project to reduce or camouflage the perceptibility of the authorial voice, however, many instances of its overt manifestations can be discerned throughout his creative oeuvre. These and other deviations from principles enunciated in his critical writings will be the focus of the following section.
IV: DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE AND NARRATIVE PRACTICE

As indicated in section II (James and Narrative Theory), James's purported effacement of the intrusive narrator is less complete than he claims. Many instances of the visitations of the supposedly defunct first-person narrator—a ubiquitous shadowy presence—do in fact abound. In James's first novel, *Watch and Ward*, first-person references proliferate; surprisingly, they are still in evidence in his later works, albeit in a more ironic mode. In *The Portrait*, for example, we find "I may not count over all the links in the chain which led Isabel to think of Madame Merle's situation as aristocratic" (I, 271), "I know not whether it was on this occasion or on some other that when the conversation had taken the turn I have just indicated ..." (I, 275), "It was surprising for a variety of reasons which I shall presently touch upon. On the evening I speak of..." (II, 177). It would seem, then, that as long as the first-person narrator manifests himself in his capacity as "historian" reporting on events his presence is acceptable.

We note further that evaluative comments on the characters by the first-person narrator are often accompanied by or embedded in a direct address to the reader: "Smile not, I venture to repeat, at this simple young woman from Albany..." (I, 146), "the reader has a right to a nearer and clearer view" (I, 163), and, ironically adopting the stance of narrator as historian addressing a real audience on a matter of empirically verifiable fact, "You might have seen it in the newspapers ..." (I, 164). At times the first-person narrator assumes the role of biographer while simultaneously reminding the reader that he is participating in a fictitious enterprise, as in the following extract from *Washington Square*:
In her younger years she [Catherine] was a good deal of a romp, and, though it is an awkward confession to make about one's heroine, I must add that she was something of a glutton.... As regards this, however, a critical attitude would be inconsistent with a candid reference to the early annals of any biographer. 39

The narrator's mock-apologetic tone in introducing his fictional creation is in ironic contrast to his claim to be recording authentic events - "annals". In some novels an assumption of complicity or of a "community of vision" linking narrator and reader as participator in the story is often present, as in "If we look at her now through his eyes we shall at first not see much to remind us of the obedient little girl..." (PL, II, 107).

Proleptic references - indicative of the narrator confiding to the reader the subsequent outcome of events - are another overt manifestation of the guiding, manipulative presence of the narrator, as in "...those who judge her severely may have the satisfaction of finding that, later, she became consistently wise only at the cost of an amount of folly which will constitute almost a direct appeal to charity" (PL, I, 145). Other proleptic references can be found in the comment that "What it [Isabel's inheritance] did for her in the imagination of others is another affair, and on this point we must also touch in time" (PL, I, 322), and, reinforced by direct reference to the reader, "The reader already knows more about him [Ralph] than Isabel was ever to know, and the reader may therefore be given the key to the mystery..." (PL, II, 145).

Comments on novelistic technique - comparable to those of Trollope and Fielding which James so roundly condemned in "The Art of Fiction" - can also be found in The Portrait. For instance, commenting obliquely on the use of summary, the narrator states "it must be observed parenthetically [that Madame Merle] did not deliver
herself all at once of these reflexions, which are presented in a cluster for the convenience of the reader" (I, 282) — a remark reminiscent of the earlier explanation that "I may not count over all the links in the chain...." (I, 271). The narrator comments too on having "given a sketch" of Madame Merle's conduct (II, 159).

In the same passage we find a generalisation about human nature proffered by the narrator: "A dissatisfied mind, whatever else it may miss, is rarely in want of reasons; they bloom as thick as buttercups in June". Such generalisations, although not as ubiquitous as in the novels of Trollope and Thackeray, have not been completely expurgated: "It was not exactly that it would be base or insidious; for women as a general thing practise such manoeuvres with a perfectly good conscience, and Isabel was instinctively much more true than false to the common genius of her sex" (II, 177-78).

Surprisingly, comparable references also occur in a later novel such as The Ambassadors. The first-person narrator makes sporadic appearances, sometimes commenting on novelistic procedures, as in "If we should go into all that occupied our friend ... we should have to mend our pen" (I, 139), with "we" representing the editorial or magisterial plural form. Occasional proleptic references and generalisations also occur here and in the other late novels. (These are discussed in context.)

Ironically, then, James's practice, particularly in his early works, was often at odds with the precepts enunciated in his critical writings such as "The Art of Fiction" (1881) and the Prefaces. Although a certain disparity is explicable, perhaps even inevitable, between James's early practice and his later retrospective theorising (the Prefaces were written much later, for the revised New York Edition of 1906-09), some anomalies are worth investigating. In the Prefaces to Roderick Hudson and The Portrait, for instance, James, in commenting on
the narrative procedures adopted in these two novels, implies that he has attained a much more consistent adherence to the principle of employing a central "reflector" than he in fact achieves. (This claim was made after re-reading the novels and having recourse to "the painter's sponge and varnish bottle" — implementing certain revisions in accordance with later theoretical perspectives.) In his Preface to Roderick Hudson, James declares that his subject had defined itself — and this in spite of the title of the book — as not directly, in the least, my young sculptor's adventure. This it had been but indirectly, being all the while in essence and in final effect another man's, his friend's and patron's, view and experience of him.... From this centre the subject has been treated. The centre of interest throughout "Roderick" is in Rowland Mallet's consciousness, and the drama is the very drama of that consciousness. (AN, pp. 15-16)

However, the action of the novel is not filtered consistently through the consciousness of Rowland, as "reflector"; much is presented directly by a very vocal omniscient narrator, particularly in the early sections of the novel. The same is true of The Portrait, where James claims to have "place[d] the centre of the subject in the young woman's own consciousness" (AN, p. 51). Far from employing Isabel as the sole "reflector", James flagrantly uses Ralph — the most important of "the heroine's satellites" — as a subsidiary "lucid reflector". In fact, whereas in Roderick Hudson the reader has access to no other fictional consciousness apart from Rowland's, in The Portrait access is given to the consciousness of virtually every major and many of the subsidiary characters of the novel. Furthermore, whereas in Roderick Hudson the protagonist is "on stage", or present throughout the action of the novel, in The Portrait Isabel is excluded from many significant scenes. In The Ambassadors, a far more consistently figural
novel, Strether is present throughout and employed far more consistently as a focalizer or centre of consciousness. Many other examples of departures from or imperfect realisations of specific principles could be adduced. For instance, in spite of the author’s deploiring "the custom of the seated mass of information after the fact, the inserted block of merely referential narrative" (AN, p. 321), *The Portrait*, for example, abounds in "block[s] of merely referential narrative", particularly in the early sections of the novel. Apart from extensive authorial comment on Isabel's character, the disparaged practice of "harking back to make up" (AN, p. 321) is employed in the narrator's sketching in of Isabel's background ("harking back" from Gardencourt to Albany) in chapter VI. It is only in the second half of the novel that authorial comment is applied with a less liberal hand, reinforcing the narrowing of distance between the narrator and "reflector". (In extenuation, of course, it could be observed that the Prefaces were written much later and should in any event not be seen as prescriptive; however, they do often represent an inaccurate description of novelistic practice in the works referred to.)

Although the principle of using his heroine as a centre of consciousness is violated far more often than remarks in the Preface would lead one to believe, this technique has enabled James to dispense - partially - with the services of the omniscient narrator. In the later novels, in accordance with James's professed project, the omniscient narrator's adjudicating presence has been more effectively banished. In *The Ambassadors*, for example, virtually everything is filtered through the consciousness of the protagonist, and the "merely referential" is largely supplanted by the "relational". Thus Strether's background is not presented in the form of an "inserted block" of authorial information or
"harking back" in the authorial voice, but is either conveyed in conversation (mainly with the "ficelle", Maria Gostrey) or evoked through a "backward picture" (I, 83) — conjured up in memory — as in the scene in the Luxembourg Gardens. Strether's retrospective musings about his past convey far more than factual information vouchsafed by the narrator could do. The principle enunciated in the Preface to The Portrait that the interest inheres not in the facts or the "adventures" as such but in the protagonist's "sense of them, her sense for them", without which "they are next to nothing at all" (AN, p. 56), is carried to its logical conclusion in The Ambassadors where insight is given into Strether's conception of his background.

Even in The Ambassadors, however, there are significant disparities between professed project and novelistic practice. Apart from the departures already mentioned from the aim of "employing but one centre and keeping it all within my hero's compass" (AN, p. 317), several others have been noted by Tilford in "James The Old Intruder". In The Ambassadors, then, although everything is indubitably filtered far more consistently through the consciousness of the protagonist, one notes with Percy Lubbock that

the seeing eye is with somebody in the book, but its vision is reinforced; the picture contains more, becomes richer and fuller, because it is the author's as well as his creature's... it is not all the work of the personage whose vision the author has adopted... someone else is looking over his shoulder — seeing things from the same angle, but seeing more, bringing another mind to bear on the scene.42

As in the other figural novels, one is aware of a certain ironic detachment with which the narrator, "looking over his shoulder", views his protagonist.

The distinction between the narrator's "view" or voice and that of the characters is the main focus of the
following section.

V: MIMESIS/DIEGESIS; SHOWING/TELLING; SCENE/SUMMARY

The differentiation between the "voice" of the author and that of his characters in the novel should be seen in the context of Plato's distinction between diegesis and mimesis. The characteristic feature of diegesis is that "the poet himself is the speaker" and does not even attempt to suggest to us that anyone but himself is speaking. In mimesis, on the other hand, "the poet tries to create the illusion that it is not he who speaks" (Rimmon-Kenan, p. 106). Later, the term "mimesis", which was originally used by Socrates (or Plato "imitating" or mimicking the voice of Socrates) to designate a direct rendering of speech, was expanded to include the idea of a representation or imitation of an action. "Used in this broad sense, 'mimesis' is made to encompass diegesis as one of its types, and the original Platonic opposition is somewhat neutralized" (Rimmon-Kenan, p. 107).

Genette, at the conclusion of a detailed discussion of the concepts 'mimesis' and 'diegesis', avers that as far as representation is concerned, the only mode that literature knows is narrative, the verbal equivalent of non-verbal events and (as illustrated in Plato's example) of verbal events.... Literary representation, the mimesis of the classical notions, is thus not the narrative plus the discourses. It is the narrative, and only the narrative. Plato opposed mimesis to diegesis as a perfect imitation to an imperfect imitation. However, a perfect imitation is no longer an imitation; it is the thing itself. Ultimately, the only imitation is the imperfect one. Mimesis is diegesis.

Genette then proceeds to establish "a distinction at the very heart of diegesis" which does not appear in either Plato or Aristotle and which "will draw a new
frontier within the domain of representation". He notes that two types of representation occur in varying proportions in every narrative: "representations of actions and events, which constitute the narration properly speaking, and representations of objects or people, which make up the act of what we today call description" (p. 5). A major function of description is at once explicative and symbolic (p. 6). Description, because it "lingers over objects and beings considered in their simultaneity ... seems to suspend the flow of time and to contribute to spreading out the narrative in space". The narration itself, as it "links itself to actions or events ... puts emphasis on the temporal and dramatic aspects of narrative" (p. 7). The two types of discourse are not, however, sufficiently antithetical to justify breaking "that narrative-descriptive unit (with the narration dominating) which Plato and Aristotle named narrative" (p. 7). As Genette notes, "from the standpoint of modes of representation, to recount an event and to describe an object are two similar operations which put the same resources of language into play" ("Boundaries of Narrative", p. 7).

This position is comparable to that of James, who deplored the practice of establishing "a kind of internecine distinctness" between components which are "intimately associated parts of one general effort of expression" ("The Art of Fiction", p. 34). He argues that "I cannot conceive ... of a passage of description that is not in its intention narrative, a passage of dialogue which is not in its intention descriptive...." (p. 34).

According to a typology of literary modes based on Plato's distinction between diegesis and mimesis, pure mimesis is exemplified by tragedy and comedy, in which the poet speaks exclusively in "imitated" voices, and pure diegesis is exemplified by dithyramb, a kind of hymn in which the poet speaks exclusively in his own voice.44
The mixed form of the epic, which combines mimesis and diegesis, the voice of the poet and the voice of the characters, is clearly the forerunner of the later genre, the novel. Lodge points out that the classic realist novel is also a "mixed" form in a different sense: it not only combines or alternates the two discourses, but "fuses them together, often indistinguishably and inextricably, through the device of free indirect speech" ("Middlemarch and the Idea of the Classic Realist Text", p. 225). The original Platonic opposition is thus further "neutralized" by the use of this technique — as is the opposition highlighted by Benveniste and Genette between the objectivity of "histoire" and the subjectivity of "discours". The presence of the author is still manifested in the reference to the character in the third person pronoun, and the use of the past tense, but by omitting tags such as "she said", "he wondered", and by using

the kind of diction appropriate to the character rather than to the authorial narrator, the latter can allow the sensibility of the character to dominate the discourse, and correspondingly subdue his own voice, his own opinions and evaluations. (Middlemarch and the Idea of the Classic Realist Text", p. 226)

The term "free indirect speech" is sometimes replaced by other theorists by "free indirect discourse", which can more effectively accommodate both free indirect speech and free indirect thought. Cohn's justification for subsequently introducing the term "narrated monologue" to further facilitate these distinctions is discussed later in a more detailed examination of this device.

Concepts relating to mimesis and diegesis — "scene and summary", "drama" and "picture", "foreshortening" — were brought to the fore by Henry James in his theoretical observations on the novel. In addition to
the previously mentioned images in terms of which James's conception of the novel was expressed - the novel as picture or mirror of life, the novelist as painter, historian, philosopher, and dramatic poet - a further structuring metaphor is that of the theatre. According to Jameson,

The ... model which organizes Jamesian point of view is the metaphor and the ideal of theatrical representation. As in the development of "perspective" (itself the end product of a theatrical metaphor) the structural corollary of the point of view of the spectator is the unity of organization of the theatrical space and the theatrical scene; hence, the obsessive repetition through the nineteenth-century novel of theatrical terms like "scene", "spectacle", and "tableau", which urge on the reader a theater-goer's position with respect to the content of the narrative. 46

Although "scene" is generally equated with a preponderance of dialogue, James explains in his Preface to The Ambassadors that "To report at all closely and completely of what 'passes' on a given occasion is inevitably to become more or less scenic" (AN, p. 325). Lubbock, the influential disseminator of James's views on narrative poetics, also considers a detailed narration of an event as scenic. What characterises scene is "the quantity of narrative information and the relative effacement of the narrator" (Rimmon-Kenan, p. 54.). The purest scenic form is dialogue, where the narrator's presence is virtually imperceptible. Genette has a different emphasis: using the criterion of duration or tempo, "scene" is where story-duration and text-duration are conventionally considered identical. "Scene" is thus differentiated from "summary", where the pace is accelerated through a textual condensation or compression of a given story-period into a relatively short statement of its main features (Rimmon-Kenan, p. 53). 47

The completely "scenic" novel seems to be a chimaera, or a contradiction in terms. Even in the most
"scenic" of James's novels, *The Awkward Age*, which most closely approximates to his expressed ideal of the "dramatic" novel, dialogue is interspersed with or embedded in some authorial comment. The following extract is a typical example of dialogue intermittently shorn of *verba dicendi* and authorial comment.

"Oh, I don't care what she does!" Nanda replied.
"What I meant just now was that Mr. Longdon could n't understand why, with so much to make them so, they could n't be decently happy."
"And did he wish you to explain?"
"I tried to, but I did n't make it any better. He does n't like them. He does n't even care for Tish."
"He told you so - right out?"
"Oh, Nanda said, "of course I asked him. I did n't press him because I never do - !"
"You never do?" Mrs. Brook broke in as with the glimpse of a new light.
The girl showed an indulgence for this interest that was for a moment almost elderly. "I enjoy awfully with him seeing just how to take him." Her tone and her face evidently put forth for her companion at this juncture something freshly, even quite supremely suggestive. (p. 322)

Even here, as we see, authorial comment intermittently "attends and amplifies". Dialogues such as these surely represent one end of the continuum scene/summary, mimetic/diegetic, and far from being "dramatic foreign bodies", as Stanzel claims, are an integral part of the complex fabric of the novel. It should be clear, then, that Stanzel's exclusion of such dialogue from the concept "scenic" presentation is of dubious validity.

For James, the "scenic law" (AN, p. 158) implied a regular recurrence of little constituted dramas.... The treatment by "scene" regularly, quite rhythmically, recurs; the intervals between, the massing of the elements to a different effect and by a quite other law, remain, in this fashion, all preparative, just as the scenic
occasions in themselves become, at a given moment, illustrative.... (AN, pp. 157-58)

Complementing the "scenic law" is the law of the picture (AN, p. 323). In the Preface to The Ambassadors, James states that "everything in it that is not scene ... is discriminated preparation, is the fusion and synthesis of picture" (AN, p. 323).

An example of the implementation of this technique in The Portrait is the incident where Isabel, on returning from a walk with Pansy, surprises Madame Merle and Osmond in what she perceives to be a revealing situation:

Madame Merle was standing on the rug, a little way from the fire; Osmond was in a deep chair, leaning back and looking at her. Her head was erect, as usual, but her eyes were bent on his. What struck Isabel first was that he was sitting while Madame Merle stood; there was an anomaly in this that arrested her. Then she perceived that they had arrived at a desultory pause in their exchange of ideas and were musing, face to face, with the freedom of old friends who sometimes exchange ideas without uttering them. There was nothing to shock in this; they were old friends in fact. But the thing made an image, lasting only a moment, like a sudden flicker of light. Their relative positions, their absorbed mutual gaze, struck her as something detected. (II, 164-65)

What Isabel sees is that their collusive air, their "familiar silence", indicates a degree of intimacy and a deeper bond than she has hitherto been aware of. This first recognition scene has been prepared for in accordance with James's technique of "arranged alternation" of "picture" and "scene" (AN, p. 300-01). This principle is applied effectively here in that the "scenic occasion" (AN, p. 158) - Isabel's observation of Madame Merle and Osmond in intimate association - is preceded by a "preparative" passage in which Isabel's understanding of her situation at that stage has been revealed. In this passage of "discriminated preparation"
(AN, p. 323) a summary is given of Isabel's feelings about her marriage up to that point, feelings which make her more susceptible to the kind of illuminating perception afforded by the subsequent scene.

In the "preparative" passage, it is revealed that although Isabel's initial romantic view of Osmond has been dispelled after a few years of abrasive propinquity, she still refuses to accept the truth of Mrs Touchett's assertion that Madame Merle had engineered her marriage — was in fact in cahoots with Osmond: "It was impossible to pretend that she had not acted with her eyes open; if ever a girl was a free agent she had been.... There had been no plot, no snare; she had looked and considered and chosen" (II, 160). The use of free indirect discourse (Cohn's "narrated monologue") here emphasises Isabel's deluded state, and the dramatic irony is further underlined by the scene following immediately upon it which casts doubt on Isabel's conviction.

Although dialogue usually predominates in scene, the proportion can vary from one scene to the next. A closer examination of a typical "scene" would reveal too that setting, gesture, and description of activity are also integral aspects. "In a staged play they are visible to the spectator; in the novel they are often made visible through the voice of the narrator."

Although James characterised his system as one of alternation of scene and picture, the two at times overlap, so that, as James points out, there are instances where "the boundary line between picture and scene bears a little the weight of double pressure" (AN, p. 300). Chapter XLII of The Portrait can be seen as exemplifying this procedure, as "it was designed to have all the vivacity of incident and all the economy of picture" (AN, p. 57), "incident" in this context being synonymous with "scene".

James, supported by Lubbock, advocates "showing" (mimesis) rather than "telling" (diegesis), where showing is the purportedly direct presentation of events and
speech, the narrator seeming to disappear, as in drama, and "telling" is a form of presentation mediated by the narrator. According to Lubbock, who elevated "showing" into the summum bonum of narrative fiction, "The art of fiction does not begin until the novelist thinks of his story as a matter to be shown, to be so exhibited that it will tell itself" (p. 62).

Stanzel notes that the report of a narrator - "telling" - has as a rule a certain affinity with aperspectivism, while "showing", scenic and figural presentation through a reflector-character, has an affinity with perspectivism (A Theory of Narrative, p. 120). In terms of the development of the novel it is interesting that Stanzel's typological circle (first drawn up in 1955 and revised in A Theory of Narrative in 1979) reveals clearly the predominance of the aperspectival narrative style in the earlier novel. As Stanzel points out, a tendency towards perspectivism was inaugurated in the novels of Flaubert and Henry James. "Perspectivization in the sense of view of a thing as it presents itself from the personal, subjective point of view of a novel-character or narrator consequently means subjectivization" (p. 123).

As we have seen, perspectivism is extolled by commentators such as Lubbock; on the other hand, aperspectivism is defended by writers such as E.M. Forster in his Aspects of the Novel.

James himself did not write exclusively in the perspectival mode; novels such as Watch and Ward, The Bostonians, Washington Square, The Europeans and The Princess Casamassima, are all aperspectival and deploy authorial comment in a variety of ways. In Washington Square, the narratorial voice is at the outset strikingly similar to that of the protagonist's father, Dr Sloper, in its adoption of a markedly ironic, often mocking tone. In the course of the novel the two voices diverge, as the
narrator dissociates himself from the cruelty inherent in the mordantly ironic and unsympathetic tone deployed by Sloper.

A shift in narratorial stance can be discerned in the novels written after James's experiments with the theatre in the mid-1890's. In the later novels, the narrator as historian or biographer is largely superseded by the more evanescent hypothetical observer. This facet of his narrative technique will be further examined in the discussion of The Golden Bowl.

Stanzel has noted the interesting correlation established by Lodge between omniscient authorial narration (aperspectivism) and an explicitly Christian world-view, and, correspondingly, between limited narrators and a more secular, humanist world-view (A Theory of Narrative, p. 125). This analogy seems to have a certain validity in terms of the general history of the novel. Lodge's theory is partially corroborated by Stanzel's typological circle: in the historical development of the novel, we note that omniscient authorial narration, aperspectivism, is gradually displaced by perspectivism towards the middle of the nineteenth century, a shift which corresponds with a decline in religious faith and the growth of secularism. On the other hand, as we have seen, James uses both modes, the choice of mode depending on the nature and demands of the specific novel.

The debate on telling/showing; diegesis/mimesis is given a different slant by Booth, who points out that "the line between showing and telling is always to some degree an arbitrary one ... though the author can to some extent choose his disguises, he can never choose to disappear". Genette later goes even further and contends that

the very idea of showing ... is completely illusory: in contrast to dramatic presentation, no narrative can "show" or "imitate" the story it tells. All it
can do is tell it in a manner which is detailed, precise, alive, and in that way give more or less the illusion of mimesis which is the only narrative mimesis, for this single and sufficient reason: that narration, oral or written, is a fact of language, and language signifies without imitating. (Narrative Discourse, pp. 163-64)

In a recent study, Alexander Gelley discusses the concept of "scene" in the light of current trends in literary theory: he observes that the Jamesian tradition, as elaborated by Percy Lubbock and others, has elevated the scene as the pre-eminent representational mode of narrative art:

it governs the internal organization of the narrative segments ... and is most powerfully and directly orientated toward the act of reception. In this tradition the scene denotes the highest degree of mimetic representation; it is designed to bring the reader into the most unobstructed proximity to the subject matter of the narrative. 53

Gelley notes that terms like "proximity" and "mimetic" implicate a representational system that contemporary theory, "both in its deconstructive or Derridean side and in its semiotic and narratological variants, has consistently challenged" (p. 157). Thus it is perfectly predictable that current approaches to narrative should tend either to avoid the issue of scenic presentation or to treat it in a way that is "designed to neutralize its ostensive and visual elements". So Genette argues that mimesis is hardly ever operative in fictive narrative — the notable exception being direct dialogue — and that all narrative effects are therefore to be reclassified as species of diegesis, that is, in terms of the narrating or telling function. As noted earlier, scene, according to Genette — as opposed, for example, to summary, description, or ellipsis — comes about when "narrative time" (the duration of the telling) most nearly approaches "diegetic time" (the duration of the action told). For Genette, the scenic element is
determined in terms of a quasi-temporal principle that is itself wholly defined in terms of textual organisation rather than degree of mimetic effect. As Gelley points out,

Genette and other structuralist critics have in effect so much reduced the notion of scene that is not possible to problematize mimesis and representation in narrative if one accepts their formulation of the question. (Narrative Crossings, p. 158)

One could conclude, therefore, that no absolute distinctions are possible, that presentation in the novel modulates constantly between varying degrees of showing and telling, scene and summary.

According to Genette, "Summary remained, up to the end of the 19th century, the most usual transition between two scenes, and thus the connective tissue par excellence of narrative, whose fundamental rhythm is defined by the alternation of summary and scene" (p. 50). The Awkward Age represents a radical departure from this practice, being, Lubbock claims, "an example of the dramatic method pursued à outrance" (The Craft of Fiction, p. 196). In this novel we find a preponderance of dialogue, a proliferation of "scenes" with the "connective tissue" of summary reduced to the minimum. Here James is indeed implementing his admonition to an aspirant writer regarding the presentation of character — "Good heavens! Madame! ... let the poor things speak for themselves!"

The Awkward Age embodies the realisation of James's ambition to "dramatise! dramatise!" by means of "really constructive dialogue, dialogue organic and dramatic, speaking for itself, representing and embodying substance and form" (AN, p. 106). James comments that "the beauty of the conception was in the approximation of the respective divisions of my form to the successive Acts of a Play" (AN, p. 110). Objectivity here is achieved,
according to James, by "the imposed absence of that 'going behind' to compass explanations and amplifications, to drag out odds and ends from the 'mere' storyteller's great property-shop of aids to illusion" (AN, p. 111).

Even here, nevertheless, the "connective tissue" of summary and authorial amplification is not entirely excised. In the first chapter, for example, where the novel begins in medias res, a full page of authorial "going behind", giving information about the immediate context of the relationship between Van and Mr Longdon (their meeting at the dinner-party of mutual acquaintances, the as-yet-unnamed Brookenhams) precedes the first lengthy conversation between these two gentlemen. This conversation is, moreover, interspersed with liberal provisions of narratorial scene-setting and non-dialogic passages affording additional insight into the characters. We are provided with, inter alia, a description of Longdon as seen through the eyes of Van, and direct authorial comment on Van himself, as in "Vanderbank, for that matter, had the kind of imagination that likes to place an object ..." (p. 6). This is a pattern which recurs throughout the novel, James's disclaimers notwithstanding. Although written largely in the form of dialogue, the novel is interlaced throughout with the misprized - but nevertheless indispensable, it seems - "connective " tissue of authorial summary. The authorial voice, although attenuated, is still audible, still "constantly attends and amplifies". It would appear that although its manifestations are protean, ranging from the flamboyantly vocal in Tom Jones, for example, to the barely audible, the merest whisper-behind-the-scenes of The Awkward Age, its presence cannot be completely expunged. In Stanzel's terminology, we recall, it is mediacy of presentation - rather than mimetic pretensions - which is the inalienable essence of
narrative fiction, and mediacy can take on a myriad forms.

The question of mediacy of presentation is an important aspect of the discussion in the following section, which concentrates on the notion of "story" and the relationship between the teller and the tale. The emphasis will thus move from the textual categories of scene and summary to the agents of transmission – teller and reflector.

VI: "STORY": THE TELLER AND THE TALE

By definition narrative art requires a story and a story teller. In the relationship between the teller and the tale, and that other relationship between the teller and the audience, lies the essence of narrative art. (Scholes and Kellogg, The Nature of Narrative, p. 240.)

In a more recent study, Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics, Rimmon-Kenan develops this proposition. She distinguishes three basic constituents of narrative fiction – "story", "text", and "narration", based on Genette's categories "histoire", "récit" and "narration". "Story" is equated with "the narrated events, abstracted from their disposition in the text and reconstructed in their chronological order, together with the participants in these events" (who did what and when). "Text" is the verbal discourse embodying the story – what we read. In it, the events do not necessarily appear in chronological order and are presented from a specific perspective or point of view. (Genette's categories are in turn an elaboration of the Russian formalist distinction between fabula (the story as it would have been enacted in actuality) and sjuzet (the presentation of that story in a discourse). The act or process of production (or transmission) is the third
constituent, "narration". The aim of narrative theory, then, is to explore the complex relations between "story" and its representation in the text.

One important aspect of this relationship is the discrepancy between the succession of events in the abstracted "story" and their embodiment in the text. Genette has drawn attention to the significance of these "anachronies", which take the form of "analepses" or "prolepses", the relation of events after or prior to their occurrence in the story (Rimmon-Kenan, p. 46). Although prolepsis (foreshadowing or anticipation) is not a prominent device in the Western tradition of narrative fiction, analepsis (flashback, retrospection) is frequently employed.

The question of the perspective or point of view adopted in the transmission process is generally regarded today as of vital importance. The shift of emphasis from the textual categories - scene, summary - to the agents of transmission - teller, reflector - was initiated by Stanzel. As stated earlier, mediacy of presentation is, according to Stanzel, the generic characteristic of narration. A Theory of Narrative (1979), in which Stanzel revises ideas expressed in his earlier Narrative Situations in the Novel (with its emphasis on classification of narrative types), concentrates on this question of mediacy. The central aim of a theory of narrative, according to Stanzel, is "to systematize the various kinds and degrees of mediacy that result from the shifting relationship in all storytelling between the story and how it is being told" (p. XI).

"Inside" vs "Outside" views

In earlier studies of narrative theory, as we have seen in the discussion of the binary oppositions diegesis/mimesis, telling/showing, summary/scene, the
comparison of the mediate, indirect form, narration, with
the direct form, drama, centered the discussion of
mediacy upon the question of whether the creation of an
"air of reality" was impeded by the intrusive authorial
voice (Stanzel, *A Theory of Narrative*, p. 4). Stanzel
reveals that as early as 1910 Käte Friedmann inaugurated
a significant move away from Lubbock's normative stance
in which "telling" (diegesis), was regarded as inferior
to "showing", (scene, drama). She contended that the
mediacy of narration is by no means inferior to the
immediacy of drama, but instead "constitutes a sort of
analogue to our experience of reality in general": the
narrator in effect symbolizes the epistemological view
established by Kant that we do not apprehend the world in
itself, but rather as it appears through the medium of an
observing mind (p. 4).

One could qualify this point by suggesting that the
reflector-character of the figural narrative situation as
opposed to a personalised, perhaps even omniscient
narrator would be a more appropriate analogue.

Stanzel introduced the term "figural narration" to
designate the technique of moving away from omniscient
narration to a narrative stance in which "the narrator
has become invisible and his or her place is taken by a
figural medium or reflector character". The reader is
given the "illusion of being able to follow the mental
processes of the central figure directly, without the
obtrusive mediative presence of the narrator" (Narrative
Situations, p. 99). The perspective, then, is internal,
as it is that of the reflector-character who is within
the fictional world. In "authorial" narration, on the
other hand, where the story is told by an omniscient
narrator, the perspective is external, as the
author/narrator is not part of the fictional world.

It is important to stress that the terms "figural"
and "authorial" represent two extreme possibilities
which are rarely found in a "pure" form. Stanzel
observes that "the figural novel is only rarely realized in a consistent, typical form ... it tends to include authorial elements in the figural situation" (Narrative Situations, p. 92). Genette, concurring, points out in his own terminology that "what we call internal focalization is rarely applied in a totally rigorous way" (p. 192).57

Stanzel notes too that as the narrator's presence is effaced and the illusion is created that we are being shown the characters in the process of living, perceiving and analysing their experience, we find that there is a preponderance of scenic narration as opposed to the report-like narration or summary associated with the authorial mode.

The dramatic immediacy achieved in this mode of narration is also highlighted by Norman Friedman:

The reader perceives the action as it filters through the consciousness of one of the characters involved, yet perceives it directly as it impinges upon that consciousness, thus avoiding that removal to a distance necessitated by retrospective first-person narration.58

The figural novel, then, is invested with an unequalled dramatic intensity superior to that of the first person novel. This point is lucidly expanded by A.A. Mendilow:

Contrary to what might be expected, a novel in the first person rarely succeeds in conveying the illusion of presentness and immediacy.... The essence of such a novel is that it is retrospective, and that there is an avowed temporal distance between the fictional time — that of the events as they happened — and the narrator's actual time — his time of recording those events. There is a vital difference between writing a story forward from the past, as in the third person novel, and writing one backward from the present, as in the first person novel. Though both are equally written in the past, in the former the illusion is created that the action is taking place; in the latter, the action is felt as having taken place.59
In figural narration, then, although the past tense is used, the reader experiences the action as the present. Thus one could say that it is in the figural novel, such as *The Ambassadors*, and not, paradoxically, in a "scenic" novel like *The Awkward Age*, that James comes closest to achieving his ideal of the dramatic novel. As Wiesenfarth has put it,

The peculiar problem that James faced in dramatizing the novel was to create in a form controlled by a narrator and committed to action in the past — even if 'the only interval between its occurring and the reader hearing about it is that occupied by the narrator's voice telling it' — the qualities of intensity, objectivity and economy peculiar to a dramatic form uncontrolled by a narrator and committed to action and dialogue in the present. (Henry James and the Dramatic Analogy, p. 14)

Wiesenfarth, discussing in the early sixties the techniques employed by James to create the sense of dramatic present, does not take into account what is probably the most important factor in the technique used to create this sense of immediacy — the use of free indirect style. (The significance of this technique will be more fully discussed in subsequent chapters.)

Stanzel contends that "point of view" and "narrator" are the two most important concepts for the critical and theoretical analysis of the transmission process in a narrative. He develops a set of three basic analytic categories — "mode", "person" and "perspective" — in terms of which he discusses fundamental questions surrounding narrative mediation. An author's first outline of the plot of a narrative, which is roughly the equivalent of Rimmon-Kenan's "story", exhibits the work still lacking in narrative mediacy (constituted through point of view, management of the sequence of events etc.). Stanzel cites James's *Notebooks*, in which the first notation ("suggestive germ") and later, the more detailed synopsis ("scenario") of a novel such as *The*
Ambassadors exemplify degrees of mediacy. The "zero grade of mediacy" in the first entries in the Notebooks takes on a degree of mediacy in the "scenario" and full mediacy is exhibited in the novel itself where questions such as the point of view and disposition of events in the text have been resolved.

In introducing his first constitutive element, "mode", Stanzel explains that "Narration can be considered to be effected by two kinds of narrative agents, narrators (in a personalized or unpersonalized role) and reflectors" (p. 48). The mode of narration comprises the range or continuum of all possible variations of the narrative forms between the two poles narrator and reflector: narration in the true sense of mediacy, that is, the reader has the impression that [s]he is confronted by a personalised narrator, as opposed to direct or immediate presentation, that is, the reflection of the fictional reality in the consciousness of a character.

The second constitutive element, "person", is determined by the identity or non-identity of the realms of existence of the narrator and the fictional characters:

If the narrator exists in the same world as the characters, he is a first-person narrator according to traditional terminology. If the narrator is existentially outside the world of the characters, we are dealing with third-person narration in the traditional sense.

Stanzel observes that the traditional terms "first-person" and "third-person" narration are unsatisfactory and cause confusion because "the criterion of their distinction, the personal pronoun, refers in the former to the narrator, but in the latter to a character in the novel who is not the narrator". In a third-person narrative such as Tom Jones, and even, albeit to a lesser degree, in Jane's novels such as The Portrait and The
Ambassadors, as we have seen, the narratorial "I" is still in evidence. So it is not the occurrence of the first person of the personal pronoun in a narrative outside the dialogue which is the criterion, but rather the location of the designated person within or outside the fictional world of the characters of a novel or story.

"Perspective", the third constitutive element, can be internal or external. It depends on whether the point of view according to which the narration is orientated is located in the story (in the protagonist or in the centre of action), or else outside the story or its centre of action, in a narrator who does not belong to the world of the characters or who is merely a substitute figure, such as a first-person narrator in the role of observer. Internal perspective, then, denotes a view of the fictional world from within as in first-person narration or in a figural narrative situation; an external perspective implies a narrator outside the fictional world, as in an authorial narrative situation or in those first-person accounts where the narrator is a witness of the action or biographer of the hero. The opposition of external and internal perspective includes the traditional distinction between omniscience and limited point of view: there is a close affinity between external perspective and omniscience, on the one hand, and internal perspective and limited point of view on the other (p. 258).

Stanzel also comments on the difference between inside views (the thoughts of the characters) being presented from the external perspective of an authorial narrator and from an internal perspective — "for instance the ruminations of Mrs Ramsay's mind while knitting a stocking". According to Stanzel,

the internal perspective provides a strategy of presenting an inside view which facilitates a reader's empathy with a character and supports the
illusion of the reader of being directly confronted with the "non-material substance of consciousness".60

Later discussion focuses on Cohn's further refinement of terms designating the presentation of this "non-material substance of consciousness" in fiction.

Cohn claims that "Stanzel's perspectival approach to the presentation of consciousness is ... even terminologically so complex and confusing that it tends to invalidate itself" ("The Encirclement of Narrative", p. 176). She contends that a crucial weakness of Stanzel's perspectival approach to the narrative presentation of inner life is "the tendency to associate his two types of 'view' with different techniques for presenting consciousness — outside view with thought report, inside view with monologue". On the contrary, as Cohn has also persuasively argued in Transparent Minds, all three principal techniques (thought report — or, as Cohn calls it, psycho-narration — narrated monologue and quoted monologue) can

mix and match freely in the authorial as well as in the figural narrative situation, and their predominance or modification in different texts can be readily accounted for in terms of Stanzel's modal scale between dissonant (narrator-dominated) and consonant (reflector-dominated) narration. ("The Encirclement of Narrative", p. 178)

(The terms psycho-narration, narrated monologue and quoted monologue refer to three modes of presentation of consciousness in the context of third-person narration.)

Although Stanzel's formulations lack Cohn's clarity and precision, his comments serve to alert us to an area neglected thus far in critical studies:

It is surprising to note ... that the distribution of inside views among the characters of a novel and the rhythm of their recurrence in the course of a novel have hardly been studied yet in a systematic way. (Narrative Situations, p. 258)
This point is developed in *A Theory of Narrative* (p. 128-29), where Stanzel observes that the distribution of the presentation of inside views among the various characters and their relative frequency for a specific character can create a shift in the reader's sympathies to the character who is favoured by the presentation of inside views. This point is discussed in the analysis of *The Golden Bowl*, where the distribution of inside views can indeed be seen as a factor in the creation of sympathy for specific characters—a kind of "subliminal wooing of the reader" (Stanzel, p. 178).

Where Stanzel uses the term "perspective", other theorists such as Genette and Rimmon-Kenan prefer "focalization". This concept is elucidated in the following section.

"Focalization"

In explaining her preference for the term "focalization", Rimmon-Kenan points out that Genette's terminology has the advantage of dispelling the confusion between perspective and narration which often occurs when terms such as "point of view" are used (p. 71).

Rimmon-Kenan supports Genette's contention that most studies of point of view, such as those of Brooks and Warren (1943; rpt. 1959), Stanzel (1955), Friedman (1955) and Booth (1961), fail to distinguish between two related but essentially different questions: "who sees?" and "who speaks?" Rimmon-Kenan stresses that although seeing and speaking, focalization and narration, may be attributed to the same agent, this is not invariably the case (p. 72). In novels based on "third-person centre of consciousness" such as Joyce's *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, and James's *The Ambassadors*, the centre
of consciousness or reflector is the focalizer, whereas the user of the third person is the narrator.

In terms of Cohn's distinction between consonant (reflector-dominated) and dissonant (narrator-dominated) narration, there is a greater degree of consonance between the narrator and the figural consciousness in *A Portrait of the Artist* than in *The Ambassadors* where, *inter alia*, "distancing appellations" (such as "poor Strether") and the use of prolepses are evidence of the overt controlling presence of the narrator. In Stanzel's terminology, one could say that although *A Portrait of the Artist* and *The Ambassadors* are both examples of figural narration, the perspective in *The Ambassadors* is intermittently external whereas that in the Joyce text is consistently internal.

Rimmon-Kenan also demonstrates that focalization and narration are separate activities in first-person retrospective narratives such as *Great Expectations*, where there is a significant discrepancy between the experiencing self and the narrating self. As far as focalization is concerned, there is no difference between third-person centre of consciousness and first-person retrospective narration. In both, the focalizer is a character within the represented world. The only difference between the two is the identity of the narrator. The different types of focalization — external and internal — as well as various facets of focalization highlighted by Rimmon-Kenan will be examined in the context of the selected texts.

Genette's terminology differs somewhat from Stanzel's in that he speaks of nonfocalized narrative (narrative with zero focalization), narrative with external focalization and narrative with internal focalization. Nonfocalized narrative is that with an omniscient author, a novel with external focalization is one in which "the hero performs in front of us without our ever being allowed to know his thoughts or feelings"
(for example, Hemingway's "The Killers") and narrative with internal focalization is written from the point of view of a character in the novel. According to Genette, there are three types of narrative with internal focalization: fixed, as in The Ambassadors, where everything is filtered through the consciousness of the central character, Strether; variable, as in Madame Bovary, where first Charles, then Emma, then Charles again, act as focalizer, and multiple, as in epistolary novels, where the same event may be related many times according to the point of view of various letter-writing characters (pp. 189-90).

An important aspect of focalization, then, which will be examined in this study, is that of degree of persistence. In some cases, as in James's Roderick Hudson and The Ambassadors, focalization remains "fixed" (that is, restricted to a single character) throughout the narrative. In other novels, focalization can alternate between two predominant focalizers, as in The Golden Bowl, where James claims that

> the whole thing remains subject to the register, ever so closely kept, of the consciousness of but two of the characters. The Prince, in the first half, virtually sees and knows and makes out, virtually represents to himself everything that concerns us

and "the function of the Princess, in the remainder, matches exactly with his; the register of her consciousness is as closely kept" (AN, p. 329). In The Wings of the Dove, where five characters serve (to varying degrees) as focalizers, focalization again functions as a crucial stylistic and thematic resource.

Although Genette's distinctions between fixed, variable and multiple focalization contribute a greater measure of precision in discussion of narrative perspective, a certain ambiguity or lack of clarity still needs to be dispelled. The concept of "fixed"
focalization, for instance, is applied to novels as diverse as *What Maisie Knew* and *The Ambassadors*. Although focalization in the two novels is "fixed" in the sense that the protagonist in each case is theoretically the sole focalizer (in practice, the primary focalizer), the two differ profoundly in that in *What Maisie Knew* an initial cognitive dissonance between narrator and protagonist is gradually superseded by consonance: disparity between the immature and ignorant Maisie and the knowing narrator decreases in the course of the novel. To obviate confusion and increase precision here, perhaps the term "fixed" focalization should be replaced by something like "single" or "unitary" focalization. Or, retaining Stanzel's term "figural", within unitary focalization the mode could be either "fixed", as in *The Ambassadors*, or fluid/sliding, as in *Maisie*.

Furthermore, the term "multiple" could surely serve for both novels with several focalizers, like *Madame Bovary* and *The Wings of the Dove* ("variable" focalization), as well as for "epistolary novels where the same event may be related many times according to the point of view of various letter-writing characters". As the determining factor is the focalizer rather than the focalized object or event, it is the number of characters reflecting or reflecting on a specific event or events which is important, not whether they reflect on the same event or several. To preclude all ambiguity, it might be preferable to adopt Cohn's term "multi-figural" for these novels.

Genette's "non-focalized narrative", with omniscient narration, would be the mode dominated by Stanzel's "teller-character" who narrates, records, informs, quotes witnesses and sources, refers to his own narration, addresses the reader, comments on the story, anticipates the outcome of an action or recapitulates what happened before the story opens (*Theory of Narrative*, p. 144). The potential ambiguity or lack of clarity here in
Stanzel's classification as "teller-characters" narrators who are as diverse as the teller of *Tom Jones* and *Vanity Fair* on the one hand, and *David Copperfield* and *Moll Flanders* on the other, is dispelled when he later qualifies his initial taxonomy by employing the term "authorial teller", rather than "teller-character", for the first group. It is unfortunate that he tends to revert to "teller-character" in subsequent discussion.

Cohn points out that Genette has also found it necessary to review Stanzel's terminology here:

> For where Stanzel views a relative difference (and thus a sliding scale) between the "I" of a David Copperfield and the "I" of a Fielding, Genette establishes an absolute barrier between "two very different situations which grammar renders identical". ("The Encirclement of Narrative", p. 165)

Cohn has noted that in spite of discrepancies in terminology and grouping, the principal categories employed by Stanzel and Genette show a remarkable correspondence. This is demonstrated in the chart below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STANZEL</th>
<th>GENETTE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
<td><strong>Opposition</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person</td>
<td>Voice: Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Person</td>
<td>Homodiegetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vs. Third Person</td>
<td>vs. Heterodiegetic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>-Distance Diegesis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>vs. Mimesis</td>
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<tr>
<td>vs. Reflector</td>
<td>Mode:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perspective External P.</td>
<td>-focalization Zero +</td>
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<tr>
<td>vs. Internal P.</td>
<td>External F.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>vs. Internal F.</td>
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In her comments on the chart, Cohn notes that Stanzel separates into two categories (Mode and Perspective) two concepts that Genette designates as different components of his Mode (Distance and focalization). Furthermore, Cohn argues that as Stanzel's perspectival opposition (External/Internal) corresponds so closely to his modal opposition (Narrator/Reflector) it should be eliminated as a separate category. As this suggestion is soundly substantiated the resultant simplification should be welcomed.

Cohn further points out, in justification of this merger, that the basic correspondence of Stanzel's Mode to Genette's concept of Distance is evident from the common pedigree to which both theorists refer: Plato's distinction between diëgēsis (pure narration, presentation) and mimesis (pure imitation, representation) as well as to the Telling/Showing and Summary/Scene pairs of Anglo-American vintage. (p. 170).

Cohn welcomes Stanzel's introduction of "a new conceptual creature, the reflector, at the mimetic pole of his typological circle" (p. 171). This is regarded as a salutary move, if only because it should put a stop once and for all to the sloppy habit of calling the protagonists of figural novels (Stephen of The Portrait ... or Strether) the "narrators" of their stories. For the Jamesian term reflector, as his name indicates far more precisely than James' more popular term "centre of consciousness" or even Stanzel's rather ghostly term "figural medium", is a fictional character who reflects (registers) and reflects (mediates) [sic; i.e., meditates?] on the fictional events, but who (by definition) "never 'narrates'". (p. 171)

Juxtaposing Stanzel's typological circle with Cohn's amended version — showing the subsuming of perspective under mode — reveals the greater clarity and simplicity of her schema:
Concern for clarity and simplicity also motivates Cohn's justification for eliminating Genette's "Greek neologisms", homodiegetic and heterodiegetic narration. (Homodiegetic is a narrative that posits the identity of the narrator's and the characters' realms of existence; heterodiegetic posits the non-identity of these realms). These terms correspond to the more generally accepted "first-person" and "third-person" narration, which will now be examined.

In contrast to Stanzel's teller-character, a reflector-character such as Strether, Stephen Dedalus or Emma Bovary never narrates in the sense of verbalising his or her perceptions, thoughts and feelings, since he or she does not attempt to communicate these to the reader. This produces the illusion in the reader that [s]he obtains an unmediated and direct view of the fictional world, seeing it with the eyes of the reflector-character. Thus the main function of a reflector-character such as Strether is to reflect, that is, to register or mirror in his consciousness what is happening in the world outside or inside himself, and to reflect on the fictional events. Stanzel also stresses the point that while the concepts "reflector-character" and "teller-character" can refer to the first as well as to the third person, the concept "figural narrative situation" is applicable only to the third-person form (p. 145).

First and Third Person Narration

Stanzel has pointed out that the opposition between the forms of first- and third-person narration, which he, with theorists like Kate Hamburger, regards as an essential generic feature of fiction, was neglected by, inter alia, Wayne Booth (Towards a Grammar of Fiction, p. 254). In The Rhetoric of Fiction, Booth contends that
Perhaps the most overworked distinction is that of person. To say that a story is told in the first or the third person will tell us nothing of importance unless we become more precise and describe how the particular qualities of the narrators relate to specific effects. (p. 150)

On the contrary, according to Cohn, this distinction has been "decidedly underworked by the French narratologists, at least until Genette rehabilitated it in the guise of his heterodiegetic and homodiegetic narrative types" (p. 162). She points out further that "Stanzel's intensive, even-handed discussion of the long-neglected opposition of person is a welcome corrective to the person-blindness of other modern theorists" ("The Encirclement of Narrative", p. 163). Among those afflicted with "person-blindness" would be, of course, Wayne Booth in the first edition of The Rhetoric of Fiction.63

Although Stanzel's discussion of the figural novel is generally illuminating, and he does refer to technical features such as the displacement of thought report by free indirect style, it is Dorrit Cohn who, of all the theorists considered in this schematic introduction, gives the most comprehensive account of the presentation of consciousness in the figural novel and in fiction generally. I have therefore adopted her theoretical framework in this study. The central concepts in Transparent Minds are set out in the following chapter in which the focus is on the representation of consciousness in the fiction of Henry James.


5 Wayne Booth, in his Afterword to the second edition of *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (1961; rpt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) endorses the view that although much in current literary theory is interesting, it is not all equally relevant to the elucidation of specific literary works (pp. 401-57).


10 No attempt will be made to establish a "grammar of fiction", as recent theorists have largely discounted these early Structuralist projects. As Jacques Berthoud has observed, "The attempt to construct a narrative grammar to account for our capacity to recognise and discuss plots or stories extractable from narrative texts has been thoroughly discredited" ("Narrative and Ideology: a Critique of Fredric Jameson's *The Political Unconscious*", in *Narrative from Malory to Motion Pictures*, ed. Jeremy Hawthorn (London: Edward Arnold, 1985), p. 100.)


13 The French term "narratologie" was coined by Todorov to designate the study of narrative structure. It has been defined as follows by Gerald Prince: "The (structuralist-inspired) theory of narrative. Narratology studies the nature, form and functioning of narrative (regardless of medium of representation).... More particularly, it examines what all and only narratives have in common (at the level of story, narrating and their relations) as well as what enables them to be different from one another.... 2. The study of narrative as a verbal mode of representation of temporally ordered situations and events (Genette). In this restricted sense, narratology disregards the level of story in itself ... and focuses on the possible relations between story and narrative text.... Specifically, it investigates problems of tense, mood, and voice. (Gerald Prince, A Dictionary of Narratology (1987; rpt. Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1988), p. 65). The term "narratology" has been seen as indicative of the hankering after "scientific" status in the new poetics. A somewhat sceptical commentator has claimed that "The very naming of the proposed discipline suggests its pretentions to an alliance with such prestigious disciplines as biology, physiology, and cardiology, forgetting in the moment of naming the existence of numerology, phrenology, and astrology...." (Virgil L. Lokke, "Narratology, Obsolescent Paradigms, and 'Scientific' Poetics", Modern Fiction Studies 33 (1987): p. 546.) A pertinent comment from Chatman, however, provides a more balanced perspective: "The Anglo-American intellectual community is suspicious of free-swinging uses of -ology, perhaps with justification. The questionability of the name, however, should not be confused with the legitimacy of the topic." (Story and Discourse: Narrative Study in Fiction (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1978), p. 9).


capacity to represent "reality" can be seen as problematic given the current claims by theorists such as McCabe and Belsey about "classic realism" and "expressive realism". The notion of the referentiality of language, and hence the capacity of fictive texts to render a "sense of reality", has been widely debated in recent theoretical studies. Catherine Belsey, for example, deplores the prevalence even today of the assumptions of "expressive realism" - "literature is still widely taken to be a reflection of life" (Critical Practice, 1980; rpt. London: Methuen, 1986), p. 13). "Expressive realism" Belsey defines as "the theory that literature reflects the reality of experience as it is perceived by one (especially gifted) individual, who expresses it in a discourse which enables other individuals to recognise it as true" (p. 7). Both "expressive" and "classic" realism should be seen in terms of the Aristotelian concept of art as mimesis, the "imitation of reality" (p. 7). The term "classic realism" is used to designate "literature which creates an effect or illusion of reality" (p. 51). Lodge notes that the term "classic realist text" derives from the criticism of Roland Barthes, especially S/Z (1970). ("Middlemarch and the Idea of the Classic Realist Text", p. 220). Raymond Tallis has drawn attention to the ambiguity of the term "mimesis" which is often understood to mean "at least metonymic replication of reality" - rather than "representation" (Not Saussure: A Critique of Post-Saussurean Literary Theory (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1988), p. 259. Tallis contends that the anti-realist case is based on myths about realism such as the belief that those who write realistic fiction can do so only because they believe that language is a reflecting mirror or a transparent window (p. 100). Belsey, indeed, claims that "Realism offers itself as transparent" (p. 51). In contesting this claim, both Tallis and David Lodge produce convincing arguments to refute the naive assumption that realist fiction simply reflects a preexisting reality. According to Tallis, "there is little to support the notion that writers of realistic fiction believe in a naive "window" or "mirror" model of language" (p. 101).

The claim made also by Barthes, Eagleton and Culler, that readers, no less than writers, of the realist novel were so credulous that they believed they were looking not at a work of fiction but through a window at the real world - dubbed "the fallacy of the credulous window-gazers" - has been roundly criticised too by Cedric Watts in his essay "Bottom's Children: The Fallacies of Structuralist, Post-Structuralist and Deconstructionist Literary Theory", in Reconstructing Literature, ed. Lawrence Lerner (Oxford: Basil Blackwood, 1983), p. 32.


26 According to Milan Kundera, the novelist is neither historian nor prophet: he is an explorer of existence. "A novel examines not reality but existence. And existence is not what has occurred, existence is the realm of human possibilities, everything that man can become, everything he's capable of" (*The Art of The Novel*, trans. Linda Asher (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), p. 42.

David Lodge maintains that writing cannot imitate reality directly; it can only imitate ways of thinking and speaking about reality, and other ways of writing about it. Realistic fiction, being concerned with the actions of individuals in time, approximates to history. "history is a novel which happened; the novel is history as it might have happened" as the Concourt brothers put it. ("What is Realism?" in *The Modes of Modern Writing*, p. 25). Thus the realistic novel, from its beginnings in the eighteenth century, modelled its language on historical writing of various kinds: biography, travelogue, letters, diaries, journalism and historiography.

27 John Fowles's *The French Lieutenant's Woman* (1970) would be a good example of this mode of fiction.


29 *The Inward Turn of the Novel* (Princeton: University of
Princeton Press, 1973), is the title of a study of this phenomenon by Erich Kahler.

30 Henry James, "Guy de Maupassant" (1888; rpt. in The House of Fiction, ed. Leon Edel) p. 148.


40 In commenting on his revision procedures in the Preface to Roderick Hudson, James uses the analogy of the painter applying his sponge and varnish bottle to refurbish his work (AN, p. 11).

41 Modern Fiction Studies IV, (Summer 1958): 157-64.

42 The Craft of Fiction (1921; rpt. London: Jonathan Cape, 1932), p. 258. Lubbock's comment can be seen as an alternative formulation of Fowler's term "a bifocal arrangement" for the technique whereby the reflector "becomes both subject and viewpoint simultaneously". An interesting connection between this "bifocality" and the concept of a "dual voice" as formulated by Roy Pascal in his study of free indirect discourse/style will be explored in subsequent chapters.


47 Stanzel contributes a certain confusion by using the term "scene" to designate also the non-dialogue parts of novels in which one finds the "reflection of the fictional events through the consciousness of a character in the novel without narratorial comment" (A Theory of Narrative, p. 48). The justification for the use of the term "scenic" here is based on the non-appearance of the narrator and consequent illusion of immediacy. However, I feel that Stanzel's application - or misapplication - of the term "scene" here creates unnecessary ambiguity which is compounded by overlapping with Lubbock's term "pictorial" presentation for the same device.

Stanzel asserts that "the confusing and in part contradictory terminological diversity in this area results especially from the difficulty of distinguishing the phenomenon reportorial narration or telling from scenic presentation or showing" (p. 144), but greater precision and consistency in the use of these terms would surely help to obviate many of the difficulties. Stanzel also maintains that

Dialogues of characters without introductory verbs of the type 'he said,' etc., and without explanatory authorial 'stage directions' are non-narrative parts of the text, and as such are actually dramatic foreign bodies in a narrative. Strictly speaking, they must, therefore, be excluded from the concept scenic presentation" (p. 143).

Perhaps "pedantically speaking" would be more appropriate: this distinction here is merely obscurantist, an unfortunate example of narrative theory contributing obfuscation rather than clarification.

Stanzel does not cite examples of such "dramatic foreign bodies", or indicate precisely how extended
such an exchange should be to qualify as "foreign". In the novels of Henry James one rarely finds more than four or five units of dialogue - or four or five exchanges - without encountering either verba dicendi or explanatory authorial "stage directions" affording supplementary information about the respective speakers. In contravention of Stanzel's conceptual categories, James mixes mimetic and diegetic modes.


49 James's critical vocabulary is sometimes problematic in that he frequently uses a single term to designate various related concepts. When he speaks of the author's "love, when it is a question of picture, of anything that makes for proportion and perspective" (AN, p. 153), the meaning of the term "picture" is clearly very different from that in the previous context where it was differentiated from "scene". In the first instance, "picture" refers to the novel as a picture of life - a novel is a picture in that it is an ordered composition. In the second use, picture is a non-dialogic structural block which alternates with scene. Picture, here, when it is associated with "richly summarised and foreshortened effects" (AN, p. 139) is comparable to "summary", with the important qualification that it is never merely referential narrative. It is "usually related to and given value by the sensibility of a character" (Wiesenfarth, p. 37).

50 The typological circle provides an illuminating summary of his taxonomic system and reveals that most of the Victorians - Dickens, Thackeray, Trollope, George Eliot - as well as their counterparts Balzac and Tolstoy, narrate aperspectively (p. 122).

51 Critics such as Booth, W.J. Harvey and Barbara Hardy also defend aperspectival novels. According to Barbara Hardy, in her Introduction to The Appropriate Form,

there is after all some sense in calling novels like Middlemarch and Anna Karenina large and loose, but... this largeness and looseness has a special advantage, allowing the novelist to report truthfully and fully the quality of the individual moment, the loose end, the doubt and contradiction and mutability. James was wrong to call such novels "fluid puddings" (p. 8.)

52 The Rhetoric of Fiction, p. 20.


55 Modern Criticism and Theory, ed. David Lodge, p. 16.


57 The criticism made earlier of James's failure to realise fully in his novelistic practice the principles enunciated in his Prefaces should perhaps be tempered, in the light of these comments. I would maintain, however, that James's formulation is in any event misleading in that it creates expectations concerning the rigorous employment of a centre of consciousness which cannot be attained in practice.


61 The distance between the experiencing self and the narrating self can represent an important thematic dimension of the novel. Questions concerning the extent to which the narrating self evinces greater insight than his erst-while "predecessor", the experiencing self, can assume great relevance. To what extent can he distance himself from his past experience, adopt a more critical view of it or display a measure of self-criticism? Do first-person texts inevitably dramatise degrees of obtuseness or perceptiveness? Questions such as these would be relevant in a discussion of first-person texts such as The Sacred Fount and The Aspern Papers which lie beyond the scope of this thesis.


63 In his Afterword to the second edition, Wayne Booth cites the first sentence of the above quotation from the first edition and comments, "Plainly wrong. It
was radically underworked.... It had been talked about a lot, more than most aspects of technique, but the talk had been, like mine following the comment, superficial" (p. 412).
CHAPTER 2:
THE REPRESENTATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN FICTION:
DORRIT COHN'S MODEL

I: CHARACTER AND TEXTUALITY/CHARACTERISATION IN THE NOVEL

Elaborate - and perhaps labyrinthine - analyses of concepts such as diegesis and mimesis, focalization, perspectivism etc. can make one lose sight of more basic categories such as character and plot. It is generally believed that structuralist criticism, for example, underplays or ignores the significance of character or reduces character to anaemic notions such as "voice". Culler notes that "Character is the major aspect of the novel to which structuralism has paid least attention and has been least successful in treating". According to Rimmon-Kenan, "Structuralists can hardly accommodate character within their theories, because of a commitment to an ideology which 'decentres' man and runs counter to the notions of individuality and psychological depth" (p. 30). A contrary view is maintained by other theorists who believe, for instance, that "We may articulate in various ways the shape of novelistic structures, but their substance remains human relationships ... an ethical dimension inheres in the nature of narrative".  

Henry James himself stressed the primacy of character in his novels - a view which is endorsed by Scholes and Kellogg's assertion that "Characters are the primary vehicles for meaning in narrative" (p. 104) - and emphasised the interdependence of character and plot in fiction:

What is character but the determination of incident?
What is incident but the illustration of character?
What is either a picture or a novel that is not of
character? What else do we seek in it and find in it? ("The Art of Fiction", p. 34)

James might well be surprised at the plethora of answers provided today to his supposedly rhetorical question. The very notion of character has been challenged by recent theorists. The purist or semiotic argument holds that the differentia specifica of characters in narrative fiction are exclusively of a verbal and non-representational order.

The position of theorists such as Propp and Greimas who subordinate character entirely to action — relegating character to the role of mere "actantial" function — is diametrically opposed to that of James. It is clear that the imposition of their schematised grid of seven general roles, although feasible in the case of fairy tales (or narratives of a formulaic nature) where characters have clearly defined roles, would be highly inappropriate when applied to sophisticated literary texts such as novels populated by characters of a Jamesian complexity. Barthes contends that "the actantial model proposed by Greimas (and adopted by Todorov in another perspective) seems to stand the test of a large number of narratives", and speaks of "holding out the hope of an actantial typology of narratives". This is, surely, a forlorn hope, when one has more complex narratives to contend with. Such a typology can at best be tentative, at worst irredeemably reductionist. "Maggie Verver: neither Saint nor Witch" succinctly captures the difficulty of categorising in such a simplistic fashion characters which elude even more basic distinctions such as "hero" and "villain". The approach represented by these theorists is reminiscent of the attitude of Rowland Mallet at the beginning of Roderick Hudson: he believed that "there ran through all things a strain of right and wrong as different after all in their complexion as the texture, to the spiritual sense, of Sundays and weekdays"
"Right" and "wrong", "hero" and "villain", are revealed in the Jamesian oeuvre to be notoriously nebulous constructs whose configurations are relative to specific contexts.

The reduction of character to "actants" or roles is also seen as simplistic by Chatman, who avers that the role a character plays is only part of what interests the reader:

We appreciate character traits for their own sake, including some that have little or nothing to do with 'what happens'. It is difficult to see how the particularities of certain roles can be explained as instances or even complexes of elementary categories like 'helper', 'avenger', 'judge'. How, for example, can we account for the full irony of the role of 'ambassador' played by Lambert Strether – dispatched to retrieve a prodigal New England son and becoming 'prodigal' himself in[to] the bargain? (Story and Discourse, p. 112)

The notion that characters merely dissolve into textuality would clearly be opposed by James, who consistently treated character as a central focus of his novels. In his Preface to The Portrait, for instance, he explains that

the germ of my idea ... consisted not at all in any conceit of a "plot" ... but altogether in the sense of a single character, the character and aspect of a particular engaging young woman, to which all the usual elements of a "subject", certainly of a setting, were to need to be super-added. (AN, p. 42)

James's views concerning the pre-eminent position of character in the novel were expressed within the framework of a largely realist aesthetics, a position he modified in his later critical writings. His stance, as enunciated in "The Art of Fiction", represents one of the "two different codes for talking about the novel" as designated by Malcolm Bradbury. The code derived from the aesthetics of realism emphasises aspects such as plot
and character, setting and theme, dénouement and
discovery. The other code, emanating from "the new
symbolist aesthetics of what came to be called the Modern
Movement", highlights aspects such as myth, symbol, angle
of vision, point of view and stream of consciousness
(Bradbury, p. 4). These concerns, notably those of angle
of vision and point of view, are prominent in James's
later writings such as the Prefaces.\(^8\) (Although James's
later novels are characterized by the adoption of a
complex metaphorical mode, he rarely (if ever)
expatiated, in his critical studies, on the deployment of
symbolism in his creative oeuvre.)

Of all the multifarious facets of characterisation,
the one which has received most attention from recent
narrative theorists is that of the representation of
speech and thought. This accords well with James's own
emphasis on the inner life as opposed to the sphere of
overt action and will be the main focus of the next
section and indeed of this chapter.

II: THE REPRESENTATION OF THE INNER LIFE: SPEECH AND
THOUGHT

Recent studies have drawn attention to the varieties of
point of view that can be achieved through deployment of
the authorial voice not primarily in its guise of
"histor", "bard" and "maker" but in relation to the
voices of participants in the fiction. Indeed, it has
been noted that

These subtle interactions between speech and thought
presentation and point of view have become one of
the richest and open-ended [sic] areas of
interpretive significance in the novel, and thus
constitute an extremely fruitful aspect of the study
of style in fiction. (Leech and Short, Style in
Fiction: A Linguistic Introduction to English
Fictional Prose, p. 350)
Before examining more closely the valuable insights that Dorrit Cohn has contributed to this field of study, it would be useful to consider briefly the prior position on these issues as represented by Scholes and Kellogg's *The Nature of Narrative* (1966).

In tracing the development of techniques of characterisation, Scholes and Kellogg point out that the concept of the developing character who changes inwardly is a fairly recent phenomenon in narrative. "The character whose inward development is of crucial importance is primarily a Christian element in our narrative literature" (p. 165). In primitive narrative literature, whether Hebraic or Hellenic, the inward life is assumed but not overtly presented. Thus, although fictional consciousness is regarded as the special preserve of narrative fiction, it is a preserve which has fairly recently been appropriated.

This appropriation, if not initiated by James, was certainly consolidated and extended in his oeuvre where the centrality of the concept of inward development or a "process of vision" is so marked. What James says of Strether's experience in *The Ambassadors* may be applied to all of his characters, albeit to varying degrees: "he now at all events sees, so that the business of my tale and the march of my action, not to say the precious moral of everything, is just my demonstration of this process of vision" (AN, p. 308).

One could say that the depiction of some sort of "process of vision" is now (and indeed was before the advent of James) a well-established novelistic convention, and that a novel by its very nature presents a continuous, multifarious series of responses to experience - in perception and in action - during which the protagonist's inward development (usually from a state of naivety or ignorance to a relatively enlightened state) is portrayed. In the works of Henry James,
however, the concern with this process in his protagonists is more consistently searching and more "inward" than that of his predecessors. Hence his development of techniques such as that of the "centre of consciousness", through which the events of the novel are filtered, to render this process with more subtle dramatic force. Hence, too, the greater complexity in his deployment of the techniques of rendering consciousness.

The earliest and simplest method of presenting the inward life in narration is that of "direct narrative statement" (Scholes and Kellogg, p. 171). This technique of direct definition of character, although less prominent in the more modern novel, is still in evidence in James's oeuvre. We find, predictably perhaps, that in his earlier novels this method is used more extensively than in later works. Even in The Portrait, as we have noted, considerable insight into the protagonist's character is afforded in extensive passages of authorial comment in the first few chapters. In the later novels, as we shall see, this direct method of characterisation is rarely found.

The notion of analysing or dramatising the contents or process of consciousness, and assuming access to "transparent minds" — instead of depicting only words and deeds — was of central importance to James virtually from the outset. In an early tale, "A Tragedy of Error" (1864), he observed that

Though I have judged best hitherto, often from an exaggerated fear of trenching on the ground of fiction, to tell you what this poor lady said and did rather than what she thought, I may disclose what passed in her mind now.9

By the time James wrote his later work he was no longer curbed by this "exaggerated fear"; his concern was at least as much with what his characters "thought" as with what they "said and did". He deplored the unreality
of the sharp distinction between "doing" and "feeling", stating that "I see their doing ... as immensely their feeling, their feeling as their doing" (AN, p. 65). Far from "trenching on the ground of fiction", James's depiction of "what passed in [the] mind" evinces an interest in the inner life, the representation of consciousness, which is "the subject (par excellence) that distinguishes narrative fiction from non-fictional narrative to one side, from non-narrative fiction to the other - that is, from drama and film, the other genres populated by invented persons" (Cohn, pp. 7-8).

Earlier writers, of course (notably Jane Austen, Flaubert, Stendhal and George Eliot), abound in examples of analytical passages dealing with the inner life of their protagonists. In representing consciousness, however, the tendency was still largely to conceive of thought as simply speech minus the sound, a trend that could be traced back to Plato, who described thought as "the talk which the soul ... has with itself about any subject which it considers".10 This concept of thought as a kind of internal dialogue, taking the same linguistic form as oral speech, remained the prevailing assumption about the nature of thought until fairly recently (Scholes and Kellogg, p. 180).

Cohn points out that this erroneous assumption is also manifested in studies that apply the model of the techniques for quoting spoken discourse to the techniques for presenting consciousness. She cites the example of Genette, who, in his "Discours du Récit", "pairs spoken and silent discourse according to degrees of 'narrative distance', arriving at a threefold division between the poles of pure narration (diegesis) and pure imitation (mimesis)".11 As Cohn points out, this is an oversimplification, as it assumes too readily the complete correspondence between silent discourse and spoken thought. Speech is, by definition, always verbal, whereas thought is not necessarily so constituted:
"whether thought is always verbal is to this day a matter of definition and dispute among psychologists" (p. 11). (Consciousness is often held to include what William James called "other mind stuff" which cannot be quoted but only narrated.)

Furthermore, it has been noted that

the distinction between speech and thought is a necessary one in view of the fact that the communication contexts of speech and thought are fundamentally different, the addresser and addressee being identical in the case of thought presentation.12

The prevalence of this fallacious conception of thought as unspoken speech resulted in thought in literature being represented, until fairly recently, exactly as speech would be represented. A character's unspoken thoughts were rendered in a prose very like that of his spoken discourse. Even James, in The Portrait, for instance, makes use of inquit phrases such "she said" to indicate inner speech. We find, for example,

she [Isabel] retired to rest with a sense of good fortune, with a quickened consciousness of possible felicities. "It's very nice to know two such charming people as those," she said [to herself], meaning by "those" her cousin and her cousin's friend. (I, 91)

... [Ralph's] conviction [was] that if Mr. Goodwood were interested in Isabel in the serious manner described by Miss Stackpole he would not care to present himself at Gardencourt at a summons from the latter lady. "On this supposition", said Ralph [to himself], "he must regard her as a thorn on the stem of his rose..." (I, 176)

In later novels such as The Ambassadors these phrases are replaced by more appropriate verbs such as "he reflected".

"Interior monologue", which is a more direct and dramatic device for presenting consciousness than the first method, that of "narrative analysis", was
extensively used by nineteenth century authors such as Stendhal. George Eliot, by contrast, relies heavily on "narrative analysis"; furthermore, in Middlemarch, for example, portrayal of the thoughts or consciousness of the characters is supplemented by extensive moral generalisations.

Scholes and Kellogg note that George Eliot and Flaubert illustrate the two principal ways of solving the problem of representing "the psyches of ordinary human beings, whose verbal patterns in speech and thought are inadequate in themselves to inspire the kind of interest that their authors seek on their behalf" (p. 198). Whereas George Eliot relies on "narrative analysis", Flaubert adopts the technique of "the symbolic use of physical correlatives". In Madame Bovary, for instance, by using physical objects such as Emma's bridal bouquet and her dog, and varying perceptions of her garden, to symbolise his protagonist's mental states, Flaubert creates the "desired image of her psyche" without resorting to extensive or obtrusive narrative analysis.

In the case of the protagonists of James's late novels, who are by and large not "ordinary human beings" but "supersubtle fry" invested with a superabundance of intelligence and imagination, a different technique is in evidence. By contrast with George Eliot's Middlemarch, for example, where the narrator's rhetoric is suffused with intricate patterns of imagery, in the James novels it is in the language of the characters themselves (in the representation of both speech and thought) that a highly metaphorical mode is deployed. In The Golden Bowl, for instance, the crucial image of the pagoda is conjured up in the context of the protagonist's own consciousness rather than by an authorial narrator commenting on her predicament. Thus, when Maggie conceives of her situation in terms of an exotic pagoda, the device is not a physical correlative but – to coin a
more accurate if inelegant neologism - an "imagistic correlative". (Whereas in the Flaubert text it is a material or "real" physical object which symbolises mental states, in The Golden Bowl it is an object imaged in or generated by the protagonist's imagination - the image-making faculty - that fulfills this function.)

Cohn has observed that Scholes and Kellogg's term "narrative analysis" (like "omniscient description" and "internal analysis") is unsatisfactory. The notion of "interior monologue", too, needs to be reassessed. Her own terminology, which will now be examined, aims at greater clarity and precision.

III: DORRIT COHN'S MODEL

According to Cohn, the concept "narrative analysis" does not allow for other possibilities of presentation such as "the plainly reportorial, or the highly imagistic ways a narrator may adopt in narrating consciousness" (p. 11). The validity of this objection is obvious when one considers the densely imagistic mode of James's presentation of consciousness in his later novels. The term Cohn has coined, "psycho-narration", has the advantage of indicating more accurately "both the subject-matter and the activity it denotes". This, then, is the first (and the most indirect) of Dorrit Cohn's three designated modes of presenting consciousness in fiction in the context of third-person narration.

For the second basic technique Cohn proposes the term "quoted monologue" to replace the earlier "interior monologue": "since the interiority (silence) of self-address is generally assumed in modern narrative, 'interior' is a near-redundant modifier, and should ... be replaced by 'quoted'". The two factors common to all thought-quotations, as Cohn points out, are "the
reference to the thinking self in the first person, and to the narrated moment (which is also the moment of locution) in the present tense" (p. 12).

The third technique is one which has been largely neglected in English criticism until relatively recently. As we have seen, Scholes and Kellogg identify only "two principal devices for presenting the inner life: narrative analysis and interior monologue" (p. 193). The device omitted is in fact the technique "that probably renders the largest number of figural thoughts in the fiction of the last hundred years", that known in French as "style indirect libre" and in German as "erlebte Rede". Cohn adopts the term "narrated monologue" to replace "free indirect speech", as this implies its position "astride narration and quotation". She explains that

Linguistically it is the most complex of the three techniques: like psycho-narration it retains the third-person reference and the tense of narration, but like the quoted monologue it reproduces verbatim the character's own mental language. (p. 14)

Summarising the main features of each technique, then, Cohn presents "in capsule formulation": 1. "psycho-narration: the narrator's discourse about a character's consciousness; 2. quoted monologue: a character's mental discourse; 3. narrated monologue: a character's mental discourse in the guise of the narrator's discourse" (p. 14).

Cohn points out that the study of techniques for rendering consciousness has thus far concentrated virtually exclusively on third-person narrative texts, to the exclusion of first-person texts. This is a serious omission, as "retrospection into a consciousness ... is no less important a component of first-person novels than inspection of a consciousness is in third-person novels" (p. 14). As the same basic types of presentation are involved, the same terms can be used, "modified by
prefixes to signal the modified relationship of the narrator to the subject of his narration"; so psychonarration in a first-person text will be "self-narration", and monologues can in that context be either "self-quoted" or "self-narrated". Cohn justifies the retention of the terms first-person and third-person as opposed to Genette's corresponding terms "homodiegetic" and "heterodiegetic" on the grounds that the unfamiliarity of these terms does not compensate for the small gain in precision.

The bipartite division of Cohn's study into third- and first-person narrative forms stems from the recognition of profound differences between the two forms, differences which she states have been underestimated by recent structuralist studies (and by Booth, as we have seen). Genette, for example, does not take sufficient cognisance of differences of person (voice) in his account of focalization (point of view) (p. 273). An important aspect of this difference involves the altered relationship between the narrator and his protagonist when that protagonist is his own past self. The narration of inner events is much more strongly affected by this change of person than the narration of outer events, as past thought must now be presented as remembered by the self, not only as expressed by the self (p. 15).

Before proceeding to a more detailed consideration of Cohn's three modes of presentation of consciousness in third person texts, it might be useful to illustrate the "inward turn of the novel" through reference to an eighteenth-century novelist, Henry Fielding, and the nineteenth/twentieth-century Henry James. An illuminating comparison can be drawn between the resolute refusal of the narrator to reveal the inner life of a character in Tom Jones and a contrasting readiness to do so in a comparable situation in James's The Portrait. In Tom Jones, we find "A gentle sigh stole from Sophia at
these Words, which perhaps contributed to form a Dream of no very pleasant kind; but as she never revealed this Dream to anyone, so the Reader cannot expect to see it related here".\textsuperscript{14} In *The Portrait*, by contrast, chapter XLII is devoted to the evocation of Isabel's thoughts — also "of no very pleasant kind" — which she never communicates to anyone. The playful assumption of the narrator of *Tom Jones* that what is not revealed to others cannot be related (an arch anticipatory exoneration from the charge of shirking his narratorial duty to keep his readers informed?) highlights the paradox that Cohn explores: that narrative fiction attains its greatest "air of reality" in the representation of a lone figure thinking thoughts she will never communicate to anyone. Where the narrator of *Tom Jones* implies that it would be straining the bounds of credulity to pretend to communicate to the reader phenomena to which he can have no access, in James's novel there is no suggestion of "trenching on the ground of fiction" in revealing the contents of consciousness.

III. i: Psycho-narration

In exploring the first mode of presentation, psycho-narration, Cohn gives examples of the avoidance of this technique in early novels. In Thackeray's *Vanity Fair*, for instance, the narrator observes that "How Miss Sharp lay awake, thinking, will he come or not tomorrow? need not be told here".\textsuperscript{15} The narrator's lack of interest in his character's thoughts — and the concomitant avoidance of psycho-narration — exemplifies a type of fiction in which "a hyperactive narrator deals with a multitude of characters and situations by rapid shifts in time and space". Prolonged inside views appeared rarely outside first-person novels; third-person novels concentrated on overt action with the inner selves of the characters
revealed only indirectly through spoken language and expressive gesture. In typical nineteenth-century novels (for example, those of Dickens and Turgenev) the predominance of directly quoted conversations and the rare examples of self-communion reveal this tendency toward dramatic form.

This could be illustrated through examining a recurrent motif in novels by Dickens and James: that of the lone female figure engaged in a meditative fireside vigil. In *Hard Times*, Louisa Bounderby's fireside vigils dramatise her sense of isolation and futility, but little access is given to her private thoughts: her disillusionment and cynicism are revealed in narratorial comment or in direct dialogue with her mother. In *The Portrait*, by contrast, direct and sustained access to Isabel's consciousness is rendered in a comparable scene (chapter XLII).

A significant factor deflecting the novels of authors such as Fielding and Thackeray from presenting inside views is the presence of a "vocal authorial narrator, unable to refrain from embedding his character's private thoughts in his own generalizations about human nature" (Cohn, p. 22). His narrative stance commits him to explicit and often didactic evaluation. *Vanity Fair* abounds in illustrations of this phenomenon.

Thackeray and Fielding can be seen in this respect as being at the opposite pole of a novelist like James who, in the later novels particularly, provides little authorial guidance or didactic evaluation. James himself made an apposite comment on the approach of Fielding (who, in James's book, would be categorised with Thackeray as a fellow-transgressor) claiming that Tom Jones's author

has such an amplitude of reflexion for him and round him that we see him through the mellow air of Fielding's fine old moralism, fine old humour and fine old style, which somehow really enlarge, make every one and every thing important. (AN, p. 68)
In James's later novels, by contrast, there is minimal authorial "amplitude of reflexion" for or around his characters. The reader is enjoined to see them not through a specific moral perspective defined by the author but in the light of his own tentative speculations.

Cohn notes that "a typical passage of psycho-narration in a narrator-orientated novel starts with a brief sentence or two in the past, followed by several longer and more elaborate sentences in the present" (p. 23), (the gnomic present tense being used for aphoristic generic comments). Such authorial rhetoric can impede the evocation of the inner life, substituting instead either a battery (sometimes a battering) of aphoristic utterances or generalisations or else a series of mock-serious parodic injunctions (as in *Vanity Fair*) - or both.

In James's earlier novels residual traces of this pattern can still be detected, although he rarely provides sustained exemplification of the kind of authorial narration practised by George Eliot where the inner life of a specific character serves primarily as "a sounding-board for general truths about human nature". In his first novel, *Watch and Ward*, we find, for example:

He flung [the purse] on the floor, and passed his hands over his face. "Nora, Nora," he cried, "say it outright; you despise me!"

He had become, in the brief space of a moment, the man she once had loved; but if he was no longer the rose, he stood too near it to be wantonly bruised. Men and women alike need in some degree to respect those they have suffered to wrong them. She stooped and picked up the porte-monnaie, like a beggar-maid in a ballad. (p. 231)

Instead of a brief sentence or two in the past, followed by several longer and more elaborate sentences in the present, the Jamesian narrator restricts himself
to a brief excursion into the aphoristic present tense – the generalisation is short and pithy rather than protracted and wide-ranging. This tendency is manifested throughout the novel, as indeed in the later novels when such generalisations make a sporadic appearance.

Similarly, in this extract from Washington Square, the brevity of the aphoristic generic statement is indicative of a shift away from the typical markedly authorial mode:

if she had been told at such a moment that he would not return for a year, or even that he would never return, she would not have complained nor rebelled, but would have humbly accepted the decree, and sought for consolation in thinking over the times she had already seen him, the words he had spoken, the sound of his voice, of his tread, the expression of his face. Love demands certain things as a right; but Catherine had no sense of her rights.... (p. 67)

James's novels, then, provide only attenuated examples of the recurrent pattern characteristic of traditional authorial narration in which the narrator mentions an inner happening, then imposes a value judgement, which is immediately followed by a change of tense from narrative past to gnomic present, and a change of subject from the specific to the species – for example, "men and women alike" – as exemplified in Vanity Fair and Middlemarch.

In terms of the historical development of the novel, it is apparent that as the intrusive, vocal narrator withdraws from the fictional scene a figural consciousness of greater intellectual complexity emerges (p. 25). It is understandable then, as Cohn points out, that those authors who first "insisted on the removal of vociferous narrators from fiction – notably Flaubert and Henry James – were also the creators of fictional minds with previously unparalleled depth and complexity" (p. 26).
This could be illustrated through a comparison between James's Strether and Fielding's Tom Jones, described by James as

a hero as intimately bewildered as a young man of great health and spirits may be when he has not a grain of imagination: the point to be made is, at all events, that his sense of bewilderment obtains altogether on the comic, never on the tragic plane. He has so much "life" that it amounts, for the effect of comedy and application of satire, almost to his having a mind, that is to his having reactions and a full consciousness; besides which his author—he handsomely possessed of a mind—has such an amplitude of reflexion for him and round him.... (AN, p. 68)

In the case of Tom Jones, then, all imagination, perception, "mind", is monopolised by his creator who invests his protagonist only with lively animal spirits. Because of the immeasurably greater imaginative range and intellectual complexity of James's Strether, with his capacity for "amplitude of reflexion" in his own right, his "bewilderment" has both comic and tragic resonances.

Dissonance and Consonance

Dorrit Cohn employs the terms "dissonance" and "consonance" to designate the two typical narrative situations which Stanzel defines for third-person narration: authorial and figural. The term "dissonant" applies to the relationship between the narrator and the protagonist in an authorial narrative situation, and the term "consonant" to that relationship in a figural narrative situation (p. 275). These terms (authorial/figural, dissonant/consonant) correspond to a whole series of polarities designated by recent critics: vision par derrière—vision avec (Pouillon, Todorov), telling—showing (Booth), non-focalized—focalized (Genette). Cohn cites two novels which exemplify these
two types of psycho-narration: Death In Venice by Thomas Mann and Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist. In the Jamesian canon, one could mention Watch and Ward, Washington Square, The Bostonians as authorial or "dissonant", with the narrator remaining distanced from the consciousness he narrates, and The Ambassadors as figural or "consonant", in that it is "mediated by a narrator who remains [largely] effaced and who readily fuses with the consciousness he narrates" (Cohn, p. 26). (Roderick Hudson and The Portrait are more problematic as they exemplify what I have called "quasi-figural" narration.)

Cohn identifies a number of stylistic features which typify psycho-narration with maximal dissonance. These include ex cathedra statements in the gnomic present tense, the use of "distancing appellations" (such as "poor Catherine" in Washington Square, and even "poor Strether", in The Ambassadors, "our young lady" in The Portrait, The Wings of the Dove and The Golden Bowl) and the use of an abstract analytical vocabulary to describe the inner world. This conceptual language reveals that a dominant narrator presents the inner life in a detached way, a manner far removed from the psychic experience itself (p. 28). These features all indicate the narrator's superior knowledge of the character's inner life and a concomitant superior ability to present it and assess it.

A comparison between the depiction of Catherine's response to her scheming suitor, Morris, and Isabel's to hers, Gilbert Osmond, could illustrate this point. In Washington Square, (dissonant narration), the narrator informs us that "Morris Townsend was an object on which she found that her imagination could exercise itself indefinitely" (p. 50); in The Portrait (comparatively consonant narration) we are shown the process whereby Isabel's imagination exercises itself on the subject of her ostensibly noble and self-effacing suitor, Osmond.
We are given access to the workings of Isabel's imagination, not merely told of its activity. In *Washington Square*, it is through largely dissonant psycho-narration—highlighted here through the abstract analytical vocabulary, the presence of an *ex cathedra* statement in the gnomic present tense and the distancing appellation "the poor girl"—that we learn of the nature of Catherine's passion:

> If she had been told she was in love, she would have been a great deal surprised; for she had an idea that love was an eager and exacting passion, and her own heart was filled in these days with the impulse of self-effacement and sacrifice.... Love demands certain things as a right; but Catherine had no sense of her rights; she had only a consciousness of immense and unexpected favors.... the poor girl's dumb eloquence irritated [her father]. (p. 67-68)

In chapter XLII of *The Portrait*, by contrast, we note the absence of the aforementioned features and the way in which psycho-narration modulates constantly into narrated monologue and moves away from an abstract analytical vocabulary into the more metaphorical mode associated with figural narration. Thus, instead of being told by the narrator of Isabel's ardent impulse of self-sacrifice and desire to be of service, we participate in her imaginative recreation of her earlier feelings which are dramatised in imagery such as

> He was like a sceptical voyager strolling on the beach while he waited for the tide, looking seaward yet not putting to sea. It was in all this she had found her occasion. She would launch his boat for him; she would be his providence; it would be a good thing to love him. And she had loved him, she had so anxiously and yet so ardently given herself.... (II, 192)

When imagery is used in *Washington Square* to depict Catherine's feeling for Morris, it is generally used by the narrator in dissonant psycho-narration rather than narrated monologue (as in the extract from *The Portrait*).
and, being appropriate to a conventional and limited protagonist, consists largely of tired clichés such as "she had regarded it [Morris' love], very naturally, as a priceless treasure" (p. 79). Isabel is an infinitely more imaginative and intelligent protagonist than Catherine, and this is reflected in part in the language (speech and thought) attributed to each protagonist. A comparison between these two extracts also demonstrates that the reflector mode is better adapted to the depiction of fictional psyches of greater depth and complexity: the vocal authorial narrator is dispensable in novels such as these where the characters are eminently well endowed with the capacity for speaking — and thinking — for themselves.

A comparison between the meditative fireside vigils of the two protagonists could further elucidate differences between the dissonant authorial and (intermittently) consonant figural modes:

Catherine sat alone by the parlor fire — sat there for more than an hour, lost in her meditations. Her aunt seemed to her aggressive and foolish; and to see it so clearly — to judge Mrs Penniman so positively — made her feel old and grave. She did not resent the imputation of weakness; it made no impression on her, for she had not the sense of weakness, and she was not hurt at not being appreciated. She had an immense respect for her father, and she felt that to displease him would be a misdemeanor analogous to an act of profanity in a great temple.... (p. 121)

In Isabel's meditative vigil, in contrast to the "abstract and analytical vocabulary" used in Washington Square to present the protagonist laboriously puzzling things out, we find her experiencing a "mind assailed by visions". Her attainment of understanding is presented not primarily through an abstract analytical vocabulary reflecting ratiocination but through a variety of images which at times have an almost hallucinatory quality. Her recognitions are filtered through her own consciousness.
and presented in a vividly metaphorical mode. This contrasts with the abstract and sophisticated vocabulary in which Catherine's thoughts are couched - "A misdemeanor analogous ... temple" - which emphasises that the formulation is that of the narrator rather than that of the character (thus increasing the impression of dissonance.)

According to Cohn,

> the cognitive and linguistic disparity between a narrator and his character is of particular relevance to the narration of those levels of consciousness that cannot be clearly shaped into verbal patterns by the fictional mind itself. (p. 29)

This means that psycho-narration has a greater capacity to explore the subliminal areas of the mind. (Hence the preponderance of psycho-narration in What Maisie Knew). Furthermore, both explicit and implicit evaluative judgement of the figural figure by the narrator is possible through psycho-narration; this accounts for the approval of critics like Booth who favour the dispensation of moral guidance for the reader of the novel.

The absence of authorial rhetoric in consonant narration (as in, for example, Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist) creates the impression that the narrator's knowledge of the character's psyche coincides with the character's own self-knowledge (p. 31). In The Ambassadors, there are subtle disparities between Strether's knowledge and ethical norms and those of the narrator. Although The Ambassadors is held to typify what Cohn terms "consonant" narration, cognitive and ethical or normative discrepancies do exist between narrator and figural consciousness. Strether's equation of a "virtuous attachment" with a chaste relationship, for example, would presumably not be subscribed to by the narrator, and the real nature of the relationship between
Strether and Madame de Vionnet is apparent to the reader long before Strether himself is enlightened. In What Maisie Knew, the cognitive distance between narrator and figural consciousness is gradually narrowed towards the end of the novel. Paradoxically, a disparity of knowledge and of values between narrator and protagonist characterises James's figural novels.

**Stylistic Contagion**

Another feature foregrounded by Cohn is what she terms "stylistic contagion" - places where psycho-narration verges on the narrated monologue, marking a kind of mid-point between the two techniques where a reporting syntax is maintained, but where the idiom is strongly coloured by the mental idiom of the mind it reflects (p. 33). This phenomenon is also discussed by Leech and Short who designate as "slipping" the unobtrusive shift from one mode to another. "Slipping", it is noted, can be effectively exploited in the manipulation of point of view:

> It allows an author to slip from narrative statement to interior portrayal without the reader noticing what has occurred, and as the reader has little choice but to take on trust the views of the narrator, when character and narrator are merged in this way he tends to take over the view of the character too. (p. 340)

In the terminology used here, "narrative statement" would correspond to "psycho-narration" and "interior portrayal" to "narrated monologue". The demonstrable lack of clarity in Leech and Short's terminology emerges here, as "interior portrayal" could refer to either narrator-dominated psycho-narration or the merging of the two voices in narrated monologue. In "slipping" or
"stylistic contagion" the ironic effect often created by narrated monologue is dissipated as the narrator moves closer to the sympathetic pole.

Chatman's discussion of this phenomenon would seem to confirm this interpretation. He states that (with reference to speech rather than thought):

Sometimes it is not possible to decide whether the words in indirect free form are the character's or the narrator's, for example, if both speak in a highly literate manner. This is not a negative characterisation, since the merging of the two voices may well be an intended aesthetic effect. The implication is "It doesn't matter who says or thinks this; it is appropriate to both character and narrator." The ambiguity may strengthen the bond between the two, make us trust still more the narrator's authority. Perhaps we should speak of "neutralization" or "unification" rather than ambiguity. (Story and Discourse, p. 206)

An example from Washington Square could clarify this:

"If I don't marry before your death, I will not after", she said.

To her father, it must be admitted, this seemed only another epigram; and as obstinacy, in unaccomplished minds, does not usually select such a mode of expression, he was the more surprised at this wanton play of a fixed idea. (p. 124)

Here the statement "obstinacy ... expression" could be interpreted as emanating from either the narrator or Dr Sloper, thus ostensibly creating a sense of complicity between the two voices and "neutralizing" any possible disparity between them. Later this complicity is subverted as the narrator distances himself from Sloper's mordantly ironic stance.

Scenic descriptions of Rome in both Roderick Hudson and The Portrait often exemplify stylistic contagion, as uncertainty persists as to whether the perception of the scene reflects that of the narrator or the character concerned. In The Portrait, for example, we find:
She had long before this taken old Rome into her confidence, for in a world of ruins the ruin of her happiness seemed a less unnatural catastrophe.... as she sat in a sun-warmed angle on a winter's day, or stood in a mouldy church to which no one came, she could almost smile at it and think of its smallness. Small it was, in the large Roman record, and her haunting sense of the continuity of the human lot easily carried her from the less to the greater. (II, 327)

It is not clear here whether the comment that Isabel's misery was "small" in terms of the "large Roman record" should be assigned to the narrator or Isabel herself. The effect created is that of a merger of the two voices and an identification of Isabel's perception with the narrator's own.

In *Washington Square*, Dr Sloper expresses himself in a "highly literate manner", and a witty epigrammatic style of expression characterises both his and the narrator's discourse. Wit and irony are often used at Catherine's expense, as when the narrator's comment (stating the obvious through understatement) "But Catherine could never be sharp" is echoed three lines down by "her satiric parent" who comments sarcastically to himself, "Decidedly, my daughter is not brilliant" (p. 58). Later the opposite effect is created when the diction of Dr Sloper himself resonates in the narrated monologue with an almost parodic effect. Narrated monologue here is preceded by quoted monologue, but in this context the juxtaposition of the two modes does not seem to identify the formulation of the narrated monologue as that of the narrator.

"No wonder she... thinks me a cruel tyrant, which of course she does, though she is afraid — she hasn't the animation necessary — to admit it to herself. Poor old Catherine!" mused the Doctor; "I verily believe she is capable of defending me when Townsend abuses me!"

And the force of this reflection, for the moment, was such in making him feel the natural opposition between his point of view and that of an
infatuated child, that he said to himself that he was perhaps after all taking things too hard, and crying out before he was hurt.... (p. 73)

The imitation of Sloper's own diction here emphasises the limitations of the simplistic antithesis between his point of view (epitomising verity or rectitude, to his mind) and that of his unfortunate daughter who is dismissed as a mere "infatuated child". The extract illustrates an incipient divergence between the voice of the narrator and that of Sloper, a divergence which is more strongly manifested as the novel progresses.

"Slipping" or stylistic contagion, then, can serve to create specific thematic and stylistic effects. Attention has also recently been drawn to a related technique, that of "switching", which can take two forms: "the first occurs when the mode of speech and/or thought of a particular character changes over time ... a form of switching which is associated with or indicative of some degree of character or personality change", and the second type occurs when the author or narrator "consistently uses different forms of speech or thought presentation for different characters within a dialogue" (McKenzie, p. 44). The first form is exemplified in What Maisie Knew where the gradual switch from psycho-narration to narrated monologue in the latter part of the novel reflects Maisie's growing capacity to think for herself; she becomes less dependent on the narrator's formulations. The incidence and implications of these techniques will be more closely examined in the context of the selected texts.

Interestingly, although the question of ambiguity in James has been examined by various commentators (Rimmon-Kenan, Charles Samuels and Edmund Wilson, inter alia), all fail to establish a connection between this ambiguity and the aforementioned technique (stylistic contagion and "switching") — or, indeed, with the use of free indirect
discourse (the term covers both free indirect speech and free indirect thought/narrated monologue). The ambiguity stemming from its use not only in association with other techniques for rendering spoken or silent discourse but even as a device in its own right, one which neutralises the distinction between diegesis and mimesis, between the narrator's voice and that of his characters, has not been fully explored.

Another important feature distinguishing psycho-narration from quoted and narrated monologues is that of temporal flexibility. This will be discussed with reference to the mode's capacity for "summary and expansion".

*Summary and Expansion*

In the modes of quoted monologue and narrated monologue the rendering of consciousness is "temporarily restricted to the sequential instants of silent locution, the time of narration roughly coinciding with the narrated time" (pp. 33-34). Psycho-narration, by contrast, can be used to summarise an inner development over a long period of time, to render the flow of successive thoughts and feelings, or to expand and explore a specific mental instant. Chapter XLII of The Portrait is perhaps the most vivid illustration of the device of summary psycho-narration, evoking as it does Isabel's perception of three years of married life with Osmond which had previously been elided or to which only oblique references had been made.
"Imagistic distillates"

Cohn draws attention to an effective device -- favoured by Flaubert -- for "vitalizing" summary psycho-narration: the striking image, which often takes the form of a "hyperbolic simile" (p. 36). One of the examples selected from *Madame Bovary* makes an interesting comparison with a comparable image from *The Golden Bowl*: in Flaubert's text, we have "As for the memory of Rodolphe, she had buried it in the very depths of her heart; and it remained there more solemn and immobile than the mummy of a king in a subterranean tomb". In *The Golden Bowl*, Maggie conceives of her egregious situation, her relationship with her husband and his mistress, her father's wife, in terms of a fantastic structure, "some strange, tall tower of ivory, or perhaps rather some wonderfully beautiful, but outlandish pagoda" (p. 299). Whereas in the Flaubert text, the image is rendered in the narrator's discourse, psycho-narration, in *The Golden Bowl* the presentation is ambiguous, as the reader is not initially sure whether the image is conjured up by Maggie herself or by the narrator on her behalf. This uncertainty -- associated, as we have seen, with "stylistic contagion" -- is subsequently dispelled by the narrator's comment, "She had walked round and round it -- that was what she felt" (p. 301).

In some instances, the authorial provenance of these "synoptic similes" or "imagistic distillates" is stressed and the character's own mental processes are set in the ironic context of a more enlightened perspective.

These "imagistic distillates" or analogies contrast forcibly with the kind of detailed analysis of mental processes employed by earlier novelists such as Jane Austen. An apt example here would be Elizabeth's reaction to Darcy's letter in *Pride and Prejudice*. Prominent linguistic features here include the repetition of phrases suggesting cognitive activity such as "She
perfectly remembered ...", "She was now struck with ...", "She saw ...", "She remembered that ...", "She remembered also, that...." The narrator's analytic report is followed by quoted monologue introduced by "How despicably I have acted!" she cried", and ending with the climactic "Till this moment, I never knew myself". The method of presentation here contrasts with the densely imagistic mode employed in The Portrait to render comparable cognitive activity which also culminates in the revelation of prior self-deception and the attainment of self-knowledge. The "process of vision" in The Portrait, as already noted, is conveyed through a variety of images generated by the protagonist's imagination.

Cohn points out that Austen's analytical surveys are more typical of realist novels, whereas Flaubert's (and, one could add, James's) "imagistic surveys anticipate a technique frequently found in modern psychological novels, where "psycho-analogies" are used to convey a mental instant" (p. 37). Interestingly, in Jane Austen's novels, characters using imagery in their speech are often suspect (for example, Collins in Pride and Prejudice): the pompous, pretentious or duplicitous indulge in imagistic language.

Summary psycho-narration is found infrequently in figural novels, as this technique, with its capacity for rendering surveys covering an extended temporal span, advertises the presence of a narrator with a distanced, bird's-eye view. In James's novels, "broader inner-time vistas" are generally achieved by being filtered through the memory of the protagonist. In The Portrait, for example, chapter XLII illustrates the use of this "mnemonic flashback pattern". During Isabel's retrospective vigil, the early period of her married life, to which no reference had been made up to that point, is evoked through memory. At the beginning of The Wings, Kate's present position is rendered through her musings rather than narratorial report. In The Golden
Bowl, too, the Prince's situation at the inception of the novel is similarly conveyed through his own retrospective evocation, creating the impression that we have his view of it rather than the narrator's. In Isabel's vigil, in which she is depicted as "motionlessly seeing", it is through "imagistic distillates" conjured up by her imagination rather than through sustained sequential rational analysis that she attains clarity of understanding.

Whereas psycho-analogies in summary narration serve to distill the essence of mental events occurring over a long period of time, the same device in punctual narration has the opposite effect of expanding time or arresting it (p. 41). Some authors, like Proust, employ psycho-analogies in a markedly authorial manner, whereas James infuses similes more directly into the thought-stream of his characters.

At times, similes seem to induce a fusion between the narrating and the figural consciousness by blurring the line that separates them. It is difficult to tell with certainty whether a specific analogical association originates in the mind of the narrator or in the protagonist's own. In The Ambassadors, the image of the pail carried to the fountain could be that of Strether or of the narrator.

The time seemed already far off when he had held out his small thirsty cup to the spout of her [Maria Gostrey's] pail. Her pail was scarce touched now, and other fountains had flowed for him; she fell into her place as but one of his tributaries. (II, 48).

Further on, we find that "she had shrunk to a secondary element ... and now mainly figured for him as but part of the bristling total – though of course always as a person to whom he should never cease to be indebted" (II, 49). In the first extract, the analogical association seems to emanate from the narrator, whereas
in the second the formulation suggests Strether's own expression. The implications of this kind of ambiguity are further elucidated in context in subsequent chapters.

Cohn points out that "imagistic excursions" are used by Virginia Woolf to convey "moments of vision" (p. 45). It is clear that this device is also prominent in James's novels where a central focus is invariably on "the process of vision" of the protagonist: the imagistic mode is adopted to render moments of intense illumination where the character attains sudden insight — authentic or spurious — into a specific aspect of his or her situation. In The Portrait, the recognition scenes (and particularly Isabel's meditative vigil), and in The Golden Bowl, Adam's quasi-epiphanic revelatory experience inspiring him to propose marriage to Charlotte provide instantiation of this.

Cohn demonstrates convincingly, then, that psycho-narration, with the opportunities it affords for metaphoric representation of the inner life, is an invaluable tool for the novelist "discovering, lens in hand, the micro-structure of life" — where the lens, obviously, is that of a microscope rather than telescope.

Narration of Sub-Verbal States

An aspect of "the micro-structure of life" which is most successfully rendered through psycho-narration is that of sub-verbal states. Because of its "verbal independence from self-articulation", psycho-narration has the capacity not only to structure and explain a character's conscious thoughts better than the character himself, but also to "effectively articulate a psychic life that remains unverbalized, penumbral, or obscure" (p. 46). James's novel What Maisie Knew provides an interesting exemplification of the capacity of psycho-narration to
render thoughts and perceptions which the protagonist herself is unable to articulate (p. 47).

James observes in the Preface that "small children have many more perceptions than they have terms to translate them". The narrator, then, uses the mode of psycho-narration to "translate" Maisie's inchoate perceptions and groping thoughts into articulate form. Maisie is the "ironic centre" of the story, whose subverbal perceptions the narrator's "own commentary constantly attends and amplifies ... in figures that are not yet at her command" (AN, p. 146). A significant aspect of What Maisie Knew is the increasing proportion of narrated monologue as opposed to psycho-narration in the latter section of the novel, as Maisie develops the capacity to formulate her own conceptions.

Unlike Maisie, Strether has at his command a whole battery of "figures", images which function as double-edged weapons which can either clarify or obfuscate. After the revelatory encounter by the river, he conceives of his previous impossibly idealistic conception of the relationship between Chad and Madame de Vionnet as being that of someone who "had dressed the possibility in vagueness, as a little girl might have dressed her doll" (II, 265). In a sense, the mature Strether too is an intermittent "ironic centre" in that, as has been noted, there is often a discrepancy between his awareness and that of the narrator; furthermore, there is a disparity between his conscious understanding of the nature of the "virtuous attachment" between Chad and Madame de Vionnet and his subliminal realisation of what the attachment really entails.

Discussion of the selected novels in subsequent chapters will focus on the way in which psycho-narration — particularly in the metaphorical mode — is used in conjunction with other techniques for the representation of consciousness.
Psycho-narration is also eminently suited to rendering erotic experience, "an inner realm particularly in need of narrative mediation ... with its singularly simultaneous involvement of psyche and soma" (p. 49). Sceptics might maintain that the erotic is a realm into which James ventured rarely — or ponderously, if at all. André Gide, for instance, claims that James's characters "are only winged busts; all the weight of the flesh is absent, and all the shaggy, tangled undergrowth, all the wild darkness".20 Edith Wharton echoes this criticism in an appropriately hirsute image, complaining that James "stripped his characters of all the human fringes we necessarily trail after us through life".21 While one would willingly concede that James is at the furthest possible remove from his eponymous author in "Greville Fane", who "wrote only from the elbow down",22 it does not necessarily follow that he wrote only "from the neck up", as Gide's comment seems to imply, to produce mere bloodless cerebration. This idea would be promptly dispelled by even a cursory reading of the last scene between Isabel and Caspar Goodwood or the scenes of controlled — or indulged — passion between Charlotte and the Prince in The Golden Bowl.

Dorrit Cohn stresses that it is often impossible to delimit psycho-narration clearly from the narration of sensations that impinge on a character's mind, from within or from without. This is particularly true of figural narration where the "narration of external reality is intimately related to subjective perception" and the boundary between the external and the internal is blurred. Merging of the realms of inner and outer fictional reality is facilitated when the sights characters see and the sounds they hear are introduced by perception verbs (p. 49). In such instances, psyche and scene are linked and it is difficult to distinguish between psycho-narration and scenic description. This phenomenon is prevalent in The Ambassadors; one could
cite Strether's perception of the facade of Chad's house, the scene in Gloriani's garden and his general perception of Paris:

It hung before him this morning, the vast bright Babylon, like some huge iridescent object, a jewel brilliant and hard, in which parts were not to be discriminated nor differences comfortably marked. It twinkled and trembled and melted together, and what seemed all surface one moment seemed all depth the next. (I, 89)

Another vivid example can be found in his perception of and response to the French countryside in the episode where he encounters Chad and Madame de Vionnet on the river. He sees the scene in terms of a landscape painting:

The oblong gilt frame disposed its enclosing lines; the poplars and willows, the reeds and river ... fell into a composition, full of felicity, within them; the sky was silver and turquoise and varnish; the village on the left was white and the church on the right was grey. (II, 247)

Later his perception becomes more impressionistic as he sees "a village that affected him as a thing of whiteness, blueness and crookedness, set in coppery green, and that had the river flowing behind or before it — one could n't say which" (II, 252).

A detailed examination of this scene would reveal that narrated perception here performs the thematic function of dramatising the change in Strether's mode of viewing from that associated with the Lambinet landscape he was seeking to recapture, to that of the Impressionists. In the course of the novel Strether is initiated into a new mode of perception in which the play of light on surfaces ("the high light of Paris, a cool full studio-light, becoming yet treacherous") seems to dissolve all firm outlines and blur fixed perspectives, both visual and moral.
Purely imaginary perceptions are at times introduced by the same phrases that signal a character's perception of the world around him; for example, hallucinatory visions can be introduced by the phrase "he [Adam] saw ...", as in *The Golden Bowl*. In this instance, the technique is used for conveying moments of spurious or suspect (as opposed to authentic) insight.

Psycho-narration is also used for the evocation of dreams in fiction (p. 51). However, since James tends to restrict his area of concern to the more rational, articulate areas of consciousness and avoids frequent or prolonged delving into the penumbral regions of the psyche, only isolated instances of dream-evocation occur. 24

According to Leon Edel, "the unconscious cannot be expressed in its own unconscious form, since obviously this is unconscious. We can only infer it from symbols emerging in the conscious expression of the person" (Edel's emphasis). 25 As Cohn remarks — and Edel does not seem to perceive — "a novelist need not limit himself to symbols of the unconscious that appear in his character's consciousness as long as he uses his own language rather than his character's". Thus psycho-narration can be seen as the most direct, indeed the unique — and yet the most mediated — means of access to the sub-verbal strata of the mind.

In summary, we find that psycho-narration is used for conveying subliminal areas of experience, for the erotic, for the sphere of dreams and visions and to render thoughts and perceptions which the protagonist herself is unable to articulate. (*The Portrait* and *The Golden Bowl* furnish examples of the evocation — through psycho-narration — of the hallucinatory quality of revelatory insights experienced by Isabel, Maggie and Adam Verver.)

Thus Cohn has demonstrated in her illuminating account of the nature and function of psycho-narration
that, contrary to the view of theorists such as Stanzel, this mode of representation, the most indirect and traditional, is eminently well-adapted to the portrayal of the least conscious strata of psychic life. Quoted interior monologue, which is the next mode to be discussed, "is by definition limited to the linguistic activity of the mind, whereas the unconscious is by definition radically devoid of language" (p. 57).

III. ii Quoted Monologue

It was only about the middle of the nineteenth century that the quoted interior monologue became a fully established technique. In earlier novels elaborate authorial introductions preceded the infrequent monologues which were invariably conducted in a clearly audible voice. In Tom Jones, for instance, we find a chapter entitled "Containing a conversation which Mr. Jones had with himself", in which the aforementioned conversation is indeed conducted à haute voix. Even in James's novels, particularly earlier works such as Watch and Ward, formulations such as Roger "said to himself" are frequently present.

In early fiction, then, characters spoke their thoughts aloud to themselves and writers used inquit phrases (phrases performing the function of identifying the speaker and sometimes indicating the mode of speaking; for example, "he cried", "she exclaimed", "they shouted"). This method of representation of silent thought is prevalent throughout pre-Realist novels.

The audibly soliloquising voice is often associated with self-conscious posing, rationalisation or self-deceit. James makes use of this device in Watch and Ward, for instance, where the opportunist Fenton's self-conscious posing is revealed:
Fenton, of course, was forced to admit that he had reckoned without his host. Roger had had the impudence not to turn out a simpleton; he was not a shepherd of the golden age; he was a dogged modern, with prosy prejudices; the wind of his favour blew as it listed. Fenton took the liberty of being extremely irritated at the other's want of ductility. "Hang the man!" he said to himself, "why can't he trust me? What is he afraid of? Why don't he take me as a friend rather than an enemy? Let him be frank, and I will be frank. I could put him up to several things. And what does he want to do with Nora, anyway?" (p. 84)

This extract is a vivid illustration of the "rationalization and self-deceit" often attending quoted monologue, especially as the quoted monologue is embedded in authorial comment and dissonant psycho-narration which highlights the contrast between Fenton's real and professed concerns. His frustration at being unable to hoodwink Roger emerges in his soliloquising rationalisation. Fenton pretends, even to himself, that his motives are above suspicion, and his solecism "Why don't he ..." emphasises the disparities of class and education (in addition to differing ethical standards) which exist between Fenton and his host.

It is noteworthy that in *Washington Square* the character who is superlatively deficient in characteristics of "rationalization and self-deceit", Catherine Sloper, is the only important character who is not accorded access to the monologic mode of expression. Both her father and her duplicitous suitor, Morris, at times express their innermost thoughts in the form of quoted monologue. In Dr Sloper's case, the use of quoted monologue highlights the discrepancy between his stance of parental concern for Catherine's welfare and his secret enjoyment of the game of exercising power over her and pursuing what is his prime concern — that of being proved right.

This emerges clearly in the scene where he adopts the pose of Rejected Parent disparaged by a Heartless
Ingrate of a Daughter. Having informed Catherine that "If you see him, you will be an ungrateful, cruel child; you will have given your old father the greatest pain of his life" (p. 126), he ejects her coldly and unceremoniously from his inner sanctum, refusing to respond compassionately to her sincere display of grief. His suppressed excitement at the unexpectedly interesting dimensions the game is acquiring and his cold-blooded lack of concern for his daughter's suffering is revealed in his quoted monologue: "By Jove", he said to himself, "I believe she will stick - I believe she will stick!"

His callousness is highlighted by contrast with Mrs Almond's choice of verb - "She will cling" (rather than "stick") suggesting that she perceives Catherine's stance as a desperate need of affection rather than an obdurate refusal to give way.

Morris's quoted monologues all express his derogatory views of Mrs Penniman and Catherine, and stress the contrast between his professed and his real feelings. For example, when Morris is in conversation with Mrs Penniman: "'The woman's an idiot!' thought Morris; but he was obliged to say something different" (p. 112).

Mrs Penniman asks Morris about his intentions:

"Do you mean - do you mean another marriage?"

Morris greeted this question with a reflection which was hardly the less impudent from being inaudible.

"Surely women are more crude than men!" And then he answered, audibly,

"Never in the world!" (p. 177)

When discussing Catherine's projected trip to Europe, Morris asks her,

"Should you like to see all those celebrated things over there?"

"Oh no, Morris!" said Catherine, quite deprecatingly.

"Gracious Heaven, what a dull woman!" Morris exclaimed to himself. (p. 148)
Morris's quoted monologues — seen in conjunction with his spoken discourse and his manifest behaviour — underline his contempt for Catherine and Mrs Penniman and his perception of women as a category of convenient beings peculiarly well adapted to the purpose of exploitation and manipulation, creatures to coerce through charm or intimidation into satisfying his needs.

"Silencing" of the monologic voice is accompanied by a change in the rhythm of quoted monologue. It is no longer confined to isolated moments set aside for inner debate (as in the chapter previously cited from Tom Jones) but is presented in a text which alternates between inner and outer scene, a repeated shifting back and forth between report and quotation, as is evident in the extracts cited above.

As the term "stream of consciousness" was coined by William James, it is perhaps ironical that Henry James himself made scant use of this technique. The "illogical, ungrammatical, mostly associative patterns of human thought" are not explored by Henry James. In scenes where mental activity is generated by the imaginative faculty rather than ratiocination (as in Isabel's midnight meditation), associative imagistic patterns are rendered through psycho-narration and narrated monologue rather than through quoted monologue or stream of consciousness.

Although James frequently places "the centre of the subject in the [protagonist's] own consciousness" (AN, p. 51), he presents that consciousness not in the state of amorphous flux that the term "stream of consciousness" suggests but in its highly organised articulate manifestations. The character's train of thought — with all the associations of the sequential, of logical organization, of moving in a specific direction, that the term inevitably implies — is rendered in somewhat
stylised form, the outcome of a selection process in which "other mind stuff" has been rigorously expunged. The mental activity of James's characters is superlatively lucid and logical. As Stanzel notes of James's method of presentation in *The Ambassadors*, "he executes a cross section through Strether's consciousness at a height where the content of this consciousness already appears formulated as thoughts expressed in their traditional verbal forms" (*Narrative Situations in the Novel*, p. 100).

**Narrative Context**

The reader's evaluation of a character's quoted thoughts is determined by the perspective - which could be for example neutral, empathetic or ironic - in which he is placed by the narrator (p. 66). The context of a monologue, then, is as important as its content. The varying relationship between narrator and character, the whole range of permutations between the two extremes of dissonance and consonance, distance and closeness, authorial and figural, is indicated by the following factors: the use of inquit phrases; narratorial comment; contrast between the content and the tone of psycho-narration and quoted thought; indications of the narrator's omniscience and indications of temporal distance (pp. 69-70).

Cohn highlights the misconception that frequent monologising is an indication of a unified, figural point of view; on the contrary, the aforementioned features need to be taken into account in determining the degree of consonance or dissonance. The narrator is not committed to the point of view of the character by the quotation of either spoken words or silent words.

Interior monologues are often used to reinforce the ironic distance between narrator and fictional character,
as revealed in the extracts from *The Portrait* and *Washington Square*. The conjunction of interior monologues and authorial glosses heightens the disparity between the narrator's insight and his character's myopia or obtuseness.

In the following example from *Washington Square*, Dr Sloper's monologue is set in the ironic perspective of narratorial comment on the real state of affairs:

"...why doesn't she marry?", he asked himself. "Limited as her intelligence may be, she must understand perfectly well that she is made to do the usual thing." Catherine, however, became an admirable old maid.... From her own point of view the great facts of her career were that Morris Townsend had trifled with her affection, and that her father had broken its spring.... There was something dead in her life, and her duty was to try and fill the void. (p. 203)

Doctor Sloper's tragically crass lack of understanding of his daughter is foregrounded here by the device of juxtaposing his own thoughts (rendered in quoted monologue) with the narrator's greater insight which is rendered through psycho-narration — not of Sloper's consciousness but that of Catherine.

It is clear from the examples cited that a duality of viewpoint is achieved when direct thought-quotations are combined with authorial glosses or authorially oriented psycho-narration. Although James does not indulge frequently in the kind of narrator's commentary exemplified by Thackeray, who often moves from psychological characterisation towards the generalisations about human nature which are typical of the authorial mode, he does achieve a distancing effect by embedding thought-quotations in ironically coloured psycho-narration or narrative report as in the examples from *The Portrait* and *Washington Square*.

Cohn demonstrates that psycho-narration and quoted monologue, although used together with telling effect in
authorial novels (in James's oeuvre, novels such as Washington Square and The Bostonians) do not blend very effectively in figural narrative situations. The creators of the greatest figural novels such as The Ambassadors, Madame Bovary, A Portrait of the Artist, use hardly any quoted monologues, but instead long stretches of narrated monologue combined with psycho-narration (p. 71).

When quoted monologues do occur, they tend to distance the figural consciousness from the narrator. The following examples from The Ambassadors illustrate this point:

"He thinks us sophisticated, he thinks us worldly, he thinks us wicked, he thinks us all sorts of queer things," Strether reflected; for wondrous were the vague quantities our friend had within a couple of short days acquired the habit of conveniently and conclusively lumping together. (I, 42)

"What's he up to, what's he up to?" - something like that was at the back of his head all the while in respect to Little Bilham. (I, 113)

"If I'm going to be odiously conscious of how I may strike the fellow", he reflected, "it was so little what I came out for that I may as well stop before I begin." This sage consideration too, distinctly, seemed to leave untouched the fact that he was going to be conscious. He was conscious of everything but of what would have served him. (I, 138)

And the consciousness of all this in her charming eyes was so clear and fine that as she thus publicly drew him into her boat she produced in him such a silent agitation as he was not to fail afterwards to denounce as pusillanimous. "Ah don't be so charming to me! - for it makes us intimate, and after all what is between us when I've been so tremendously on my guard and have seen you but half a dozen times?" (II, 94)

(Here what the narrator labels Strether's "silent agitation" is articulated inwardly in quoted monologue, which takes the form of a silent address to Madame de Vionnet.)
In each of these examples (though to varying degrees) the quoted monologue is embedded in authorial comment or dissonant psycho-narration (sometimes containing the distancing appellation "our friend"), ironic comment such as "sage consideration" or evaluative comment - "He was conscious of everything but of what would have served him". This device highlights Strether's lack of self-knowledge and heightens the disparity between narrator and figural consciousness. Perhaps the dubious status of The Ambassadors as fully figural novel is attested to by the fact that quoted monologues do indeed make a sporadic appearance.

In The Golden Bowl and The Wings of the Dove the device of the quoted monologue takes on new permutations as it modulates towards imagined speech - discourse ostensibly reflected in the consciousness of a specific character but attributed to another - or perhaps, in some contexts, attributable to the narrator. An illustration of this device is Maggie's "imagined speech" on the occasion of the Prince's return from Matcham - the depiction of what she imagines him to hear her saying. Ambiguity often attends the attribution of such suppositious speeches and their designation: can they indeed be classified as quoted monologues? This is a mode of thought representation which does not seem to be adequately catered for in Cohn's model. Further discussion of this feature of represented (or imagined/hypothetical) inner speech follows in chapters 5 and 6.

The effect of quoted monologues thus depends on the context in which they occur. In authorial narrative situations, especially when they are accompanied by explicit quotation signals, monologues tend to increase the distance between a narrator and his character, "to induce ironic remove by dramatizing figural fallacies". In figural narrative situations, on the other hand,
monologues are most effective when special devices are brought into play to insure the smooth blending of the narrating and the figural voices: omission or discreet use of inquit signals, espousal of the character's vantage point on the surrounding scene, omission of psycho-narration, syntactic ambiguity, or coloration of the narrator's language by a character's idiolect. (p. 76)

These features are considered in context in the discussion of the relevant novels in subsequent chapters.

Psychological implications:

Monologues create the illusion that they reproduce what a character "really thinks" to himself, just as dialogues create the illusion that they depict what characters "really say" to each other. However, whereas fictional dialogue "imitates" real-life speech, which is readily observable, fictional monologue purports to imitate a concealed linguistic activity whose very existence cannot be objectively established (pp. 76-77).

Contrary to popular belief, interior monologue imitates neither the Freudian unconscious, nor the Bergsonian inner flux, nor William James's "stream of consciousness"; what it renders is the mental activity psychologists call inner speech or interior language. As mentioned earlier, Henry James did not attempt to render the flux of unarticulated "mind stuff" which William regarded as a vital component of the "stream of consciousness". According to William James's account, the "mind stuff" includes visual images; in Henry James's novels, indeed, visual images are an important component of mental activity and play a vital role in a character's acquisition of understanding. One could cite, for example, the revelatory nature of the images conjured up by Isabel's febrile imagination in The Portrait. When under stress, the imagination generates images —
primarily visual - in terms of which a character can conceive of his situation. These visual images are transmuted or transcribed into verbal formulation which is rendered largely through the modes of narrated monologue and psycho-narration - not quoted monologue, as the mediation of the narrator's verbal faculty is required to articulate these images. The dramatic immediacy of the image is retained by this method of "transcription" which the character herself is incapable of at that time.

Novelists who shun interior monologues do not conceive of thought primarily as verbalisation. For them, thought takes shape independently of language; language is merely the vehicle of an already accomplished thought. In Isabel's midnight vigil, for example, "thought" is primarily conceived in terms of images.

Quoted monologue invariably acquires an air of sincerity when it is used against the backdrop of dialogue: "for no matter how insincere we are with ourselves, we are always more insincere with others" (p. 82).

Cohn demonstrates that most writers prefer to tell rather than to show "those psychic happenings that their characters cannot plausibly verbalize" (p. 88). Thus, in contradiction to Lubbock's stance lauding "showing", Cohn offers persuasive proof that "telling" can portray realms otherwise inaccessible to linguistic probing, "employing analyses, analogies and other authorial indirections to penetrate the speechless nether realm" (p. 88).
Stylistic tendencies

Cohn notes that

Since interior monologue purports to render a real psychological process, the mimetic norms that apply to its content apply equally to its form: like the language a character speaks to others, the language he speaks to himself will appear valid only if it is "in character". (p. 88)

As demonstrated in the extract depicting Fenton's quoted monologue in Watch and Ward, James, in rendering Fenton's thoughts, scrupulously adjusts the register and vocabulary, even incorporating grammatical errors to reproduce a convincing simulacrum of the form as well as the content of his thoughts. This endeavour is, of course, impeded by the fact that there is no empirical basis for establishing the verisimilitude of this form of "speech" in fiction. Nevertheless, adjustments in register, vocabulary and syntax are deployed to create an "air of reality". (This aspect is of particular importance in What Maisie Knew where the most radical adjustments had to be made to accommodate the immature mind of the child.)

Before proceeding to a more detailed consideration of narrated monologue, it would be useful to indicate some salient features of the three modes:
Firstly, quoted monologue: as Cohn has shown, what it gains in directness, it loses in complexity as it lacks the capacity to capture depths of thought - what transcends the verbal; psycho-narration, by contrast, gains in depth but loses in directness, while narrated monologue represents a "synthesis of antitheses". As a synthesis of showing and telling, mimesis and diegesis, it is invested with both directness and complexity, paradoxically achieving enhanced immediacy through mediacy.
III. iii Narrated Monologue

Cohn's definition of narrated monologue as "the technique for rendering a character's thought in his own idiom while maintaining the third-person reference and the basic tense of narration" succinctly identifies the most important features of this mode of narration (p. 100). In a sense, one could say that psycho-narration and narrated monologue can explore or render the spaces between words, whereas quoted monologue is restricted to the verbal fabric, the words themselves.

Whereas quoted monologue presents thoughts formulated in the mind of a character, in narrated monologue the relationship between words and thoughts can be latent; the figural consciousness is suspended on the brink of verbalisation. Ambiguity arises from this uncertainty as to whether or not the thoughts are verbalised.

Another significant feature of narrated monologue is that, in contrast to quoted monologue, it can, with its greater flexibility, be inserted with greater ease and subtlety into psycho-narration. The text can weave in and out of the character's mind without perceptible transitions, fusing outer with inner reality, gestures with thoughts, facts with reflections, as illustrated in the extracts from The Ambassadors depicting Strether's response to Paris and the French countryside. As the same basic tense is employed for the narrator's reporting language and the character's reflecting language, there is a merging of two usually distinct linguistic streams. Chapter XLII of The Portrait illustrates this procedure. It starts with a description of Isabel's physical position (seated in her chair in front of the fire, with the servant coming in to attend to the fire), followed by a shift into Isabel's consciousness as she considers Osmond's veiled threat that she should use her influence
over Warburton to persuade him to propose to Pansy: her imagination "wandered among these ugly possibilities" until she momentarily "broke out of the labyrinth, rubbing her eyes". This is followed by Isabel's more generalized consideration of her blighted life and relationship with Osmond: her past illusions, her deception, Ralph's prophetic insight and Ralph's response to her pose of contentment. At the conclusion of the scene the focus reverts to Isabel "linger[ing] in the soundless salon" and the narrator presents concluding comments on the state of "her mind, assailed by visions" (II, 204).

In examining the linguistic relationship between narrated monologue, psycho-narration and quoted monologue, Cohn identifies the distinctive grammatical features which differentiate narrated monologue from the other two modes: tense and person separate it from quoted monologue, the absence of mental verbs (the equivalent in the realm of thought, of inquit phrases in speech) such as "he thought" (and the resulting grammatical independence) separates it from psycho-narration. Narrated monologue stands grammatically between the two other forms,

sharing with quoted monologue the expression in the principal clause, with psycho-narration the tense system and the third-person reference. When the thought is a question, the word-order of direct discourse is maintained in the narrated monologue, increasing its resemblance to quoted monologue and its distinction from psycho-narration. (p. 105)

In its meaning and function, as in its grammar, the narrated monologue occupies a mid-position between quoted monologue and psycho-narration, "rendering the content of a figural mind more obliquely than the former, more directly than the latter". Imitating the language a character uses when he talks to himself, it renders that language in the grammar a narrator uses in talking about
him. Thus in narrated monologue two voices that are kept distinct in the other two forms are superimposed. Indeterminacy characterises this mode, as it is suspended between the immediacy of quotation and the mediacy of narration, representing a synthesis of mimesis and diegesis.

Context is crucial in determining the function of narrated monologue:

when it borders on psycho-narration, it takes on a more monologic quality and creates the impression of rendering thoughts explicitly formulated in the figural mind; when it borders on spoken or silent discourse, it takes on a more narratorial quality and creates the impression that the narrator is formulating his character's inarticulate feelings. (p. 106)

Thus difficulties in identifying narrated monologue - as well as determining the function - must be considered in context. Clues may be contextual, semantic, syntactic, or lexical.

To summarise, then: the narrated monologue is at once a more complex and a more flexible technique for rendering consciousness than the other techniques. "Both its dubious attribution of language to the figural mind, and its fusion of narratorial and figural language charge it with ambiguity" (p. 107).

Theoretical and Historical Perspective

In placing the relatively recent mode of narrated monologue in its theoretical and historical perspective, Cohn points out that although the French and German terms "style indirect libre" and "erlebte Rede" have been the subject of intense critical discussion in France and Germany since the turn of the century, the phenomenon has been relatively neglected by English theorists until fairly recently. Significantly, since the publication of
Transparent Minds, studies of the technique of "free indirect discourse" have been undertaken by inter alia Roy Pascal (1962, 1977), Ann Banfield (1973, 1978, 1981), Bronzwaer (1970), Hernadi (1971, 1972), McHale (1978) and Norman Page (1972, 1973). (Cited by Rimmon-Kenan, p. 110). General studies on narrative such as those by Roger Fowler (Linguistics and the Novel, 1977), Seymour Chatman (Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction, 1978), and Geoffrey Leech and Michael Short (Style in Fiction: A Linguistic Introduction to English Fictional Prose, 1981) also include sections on "free indirect discourse".28 When seen in conjunction with Dorrit Cohn's own work, most of these studies furnish interesting complementary material. However, the emphasis of some theorists, such as Banfield, is more linguistic than literary. An innovation suggested by the latter is the introduction of the term "subject-of-consciousness" to replace point-of-view or centre of consciousness, "because, in spite of its awkwardness, it is a human noun, while neither of the other two terms have this feature".29 However, I feel that the usefulness of this emendation could be disputed, as one could contend that the term "subject-of-consciousness" could lead to increased ambiguity if "subject" is taken with its grammatical rather than its psychological connotations. More usefully, Banfield draws attention to features such as the fact that "in free indirect style third-person pronouns that refer to the subject-of-consciousness will behave like first-person pronouns" (p. 32). She also comments on "the unusually frequent use of pronouns in the free indirect style", pointing out that as this style does not represent communication, it is natural that "the subject-of-consciousness should not always identify the referents of his pronouns by name or description, since he knows these facts" (pp. 32-33).

Norman Page's Speech in the English Novel predictably concentrates on the presentation of speech
rather than thought, although some aspects of what he establishes with reference to speech representation could apply to the presentation of thought. Characters are individualised substantially through their speech, with individual modes of expression; in examining the novels of James one could consider whether comparably significant differences or idiosyncrasies in ideolc or mind-set can be discerned.

Roy Pascal's *The Dual Voice: Free Indirect Speech and its Functioning in the Nineteenth Century European Novel* (1977) affords a comprehensive and illuminating account of the origin, identification and vicissitudes of "*style indirect libre*". He points out in his historical account of early investigators of the principle of narrative perspective that none discuss associated stylistic or grammatical forms. Indeed, the observations of James himself — and Percy Lubbock — could be seen in the light of these comments: for example, although James notes that in *The Golden Bowl*

> the whole thing remains subject to the register, ever so closely kept, of the consciousness of but two of the characters.... The Prince, in the first half of the book, virtually sees and knows and makes out, virtually represents to himself everything that concerns us ... [and the] function of the Princess, in the remainder, matches exactly with his (AN, p. 329)

he does not expatiate on the stylistic or grammatical means whereby these subjective perspectives are embodied or dramatised. This lack of terminological precision has been remedied by the more recent theoretical studies discussed here.

Pascal traces the early manifestations and subsequent refinement of "*style indirect libre*" (first described and analyzed by Charles Bally in 1912) which "reached full stature in Flaubert and Zola" (pp. 8, 11). In a study which complements and extends the scope of Cohn's work, he devotes separate chapters to "*style indirect libre*", 
"erlebte Rede" (literally "experienced speech") and "free indirect speech". He points out that early theorists fail to formulate "the double function of SIL, to hear it as a 'dual voice'" (p. 17). He credits Bally with enlarging the scope of SIL beyond the reproduction of words and thoughts to include "the inarticulate vision of the characters, their sentient and nervous response to the outer world, the description, for instance, of the countryside through their eyes" (p. 1) — what has been referred to earlier as "narrated perception".

Pascal acknowledges Dorrit Cohn's amended typology but furnishes reasons for his preference for the term "free indirect speech" as opposed to "narrated monologue", while indicating that "the term 'speech' in these contexts refers not to actual spoken language, but to a mode of discourse" (p. 32). For Pascal, then, "free indirect speech" seems to include free indirect thought; hence the term "free indirect discourse" would surely obviate ambiguity here.

The second part of Pascal's book concentrates on an examination of selected texts exemplifying free indirect speech, but unfortunately omits the novels of Henry James "in whose work it is triumphantly established" (p. 35).

Leech and Short's Studies in Fiction: A Linguistic Introduction to English Fictional Prose (1981) also offers a detailed and lucid exposition of speech and thought presentation. This work highlights the complexity of the mode by demonstrating (with the aid of examples from Jane Austen, Dickens and Nabokov) that neither the presence of the past tense and third person pronouns nor the absence of a reporting verb are criterial in themselves for the definition of free indirect speech. "Our definition, then, is one in terms of 'family resemblance' rather than one dependent upon the presence of a particular defining feature" (pp. 329-30). Leech and Short in effect stress that contextual considerations are paramount in identifying
free indirect speech, in contrast to Norman Page, for example, who "assumes that syntactic features alone determine the speech presentation category" (p. 331).

Cohn demonstrates that although English theorists have only recently recognized the significance of the device of free indirect discourse/narrated monologue, other European scholars accorded it attention much earlier. In 1955, in his *Narrative Situations in the Novel*, Stanzel discussed "erlebte Rede" as a characteristic feature of the figural novel. Todorov and Genette, inter alia, have related it to their central categories of mode, aspect and voice, but have not as yet explored it fully. Genette, in *Figures III* (1972), accorded only a brief reference — a single paragraph — to *style indirect libre*, which he regarded as a "variant" of indirect discourse (p. 291). As Cohn points out,

In view of the importance both these critics give to the relationship between narration and discourse, it is surprising that they never studied the technique where the borderline between these two language fields becomes effaced. (p. 291)

Cohn declares that the failure of English theorists to study or even demonstrate familiarity with narrated monologue is particularly inexplicable in view of the fact that an English author, Jane Austen, was "the first extensive practitioner of the form and that it has been the preferred mode for rendering consciousness in the works of James, Lawrence, the early Joyce, Virginia Woolf...." (p. 108). 30 David Daiches, Ian Watt, Wayne Booth and Scholes and Kellogg are cited as examples of eminent theorists who have failed to appreciate the significance of narrated monologue. Their observations on the selected texts will be considered in context when relevant.

Cohn differentiates between the French and German terms "*style indirect libre*" and "*erlebte Rede*" and her own concept "narrated monologue", pointing out that the
French and German terms designate not only the rendering of silent thought "but also the analogous rendering of spoken discourse, which displays identical linguistic features" (p. 109). Cohn has chosen a term that excludes this analogous employment of the technique because the problems presented by the narration of silent thoughts are different from those presented by spoken discourse. She notes that "narrated discourse", as opposed to "narrated monologue", "involves neither the ambiguity concerning the actual-potential status of language that characterises the narrated monologue, nor the difficulties of recognising it within its narrative context". Hence the justification for adopting a more appropriate term: "so special a phenomenon deserves a separate name" (p. 110).

Chatman points out that other terms suggested for narrated monologue are, inter alia, "substitutionary speech", "independent form of indirect discourse", "represented speech", "narrative mimicry", "monologue interior indirect" (Story and Discourse, p. 203). Cohn, however, advances persuasive arguments to justify the adoption of the term "narrated monologue". In approving of the term, Chatman notes that "narrated" accounts for the indirect features - third person and prior tense - while "monologue" conveys the sense of hearing the very words of the character (p. 203).

Cohn, then, stresses the latency of verbalisation in narrated monologue, the uncertainty as to whether the thought is articulated by the character or not.

Leech and Short emphasise a related aspect of the difference between free indirect speech and free indirect thought:

While FIS distances us somewhat from the characters producing the speech, FIT has the opposite effect, apparently putting us directly inside the character's mind. The reason for this is that the norm or baseline for the presentation of thought is IT, whereas the norm for speech [is] DS. (p. 344)
This can be accounted for by the fact that the thought of others – as opposed to their speech – is not accessible to direct perception or observation, and so "a mode which only commits a writer to the content of what was thought is much more acceptable as a norm. Thoughts, in general, are not verbally formulated, and so cannot be reported verbatim" (pp. 344-45).

Thus the presentation of thought in narrated monologue is closer to empirically verifiable norms than that of quoted monologue where the author purports to render "verbatim" what a character thinks: the reader here is enjoined to muster a greater degree of "suspension of disbelief" than is demanded by narrated monologue.

Exemplification of the distancing effect of free indirect speech as opposed to free indirect thought (narrated monologue) can be seen in The Portrait, where free indirect speech is often the preferred mode for rendering the speech of Madame Merle (for example, in conversation with Isabel and the Countess Gemini) and free indirect thought is frequently used to render the thoughts of Isabel and Ralph (particularly in the early part of the novel).

**Narrated Monologue and Figural Narration**

Cohn draws attention to the special relationship between figural narration and narrated monologue, which she describes as one of "mutual affinity and enhancement" – figural narration offers the narrated monologue its "optimal habitat". The narrated monologue, in contrast to the quoted monologue, suppresses quotation marks that would demarcate it from the narration, and
this self-effacement can be achieved most perfectly in a milieu where the narrative presentation adheres most consistently to a figural perspective, shaping the entire fictional world as an uninterrupted "vision avec." (p. 111)

It is important to realize, however, that the narrated monologue itself is not "vision avec", but what Cohn dubs "pensée avec":

here the coincidence of perspectives is compounded by a consonance of voices, with the language of the text momentarily resonating with the language of the figural mind. In this sense we can regard the narrated monologue as the quintessence of figural narration ... as the moment when the thought-thread of a character is most tightly woven into the texture of third-person narration. (p. 111)

What is achieved is thus a "special two-in-one effect" rather than merely a "dual presence", as the hiatus between the narrator and the figure is reduced to the greatest possible degree. The narrator's identification - rather than his identity - with the character's mentality is enhanced by this technique (p. 112).

It is clear that the implications of this mode of presentation can be fruitfully explored in James's figural novels. Furthermore, as we have noted in discussing concepts such as centre of consciousness, reflector, effacement of the authorial narrator, "Henry James's own theoretical pronouncements revolve around the axis of the narrator/protagonist relationship" (p. 114).

Before moving to a more detailed examination of the deployment of this mode of rendering consciousness in James's novels - in conjunction with quoted monologue and psycho-narration - a brief indication of the various functions and effects of narrated monologue is necessary.
Irony and Sympathy

Because the narrated monologue is dependent on the narrative voice that "mediates and surrounds" it, it is essentially dependent on tone and context. Although the tone of the text in which narrated monologue is embedded might seem impersonal, narrated monologues tend to commit the narrator to attitudes of sympathy or irony.

Precisely because they cast the language of a subjective mind into the grammar of objective narration, narrated monologues amplify emotional notes, but also throw into ironic relief all false notes struck by the figural mind. (p. 117)

The ironic pole of this tonal range is most clearly in evidence when narrated monologues show up in a pronouncedly authorial milieu, framed by explicit commentary (p. 118). This effect was apparent in the extracts from Washington Square and Watch and Ward. A character's illusions and a narrator's worldliness, romance and realism, are thrown into ironic relief through this juxtaposition. Framed by markedly dissonant psycho-narration, a narrated monologue appears as though it were enclosed in tacit quotation marks, creating an effect of mock-impersonation.

The empathetic pole of this technique's tonal scale, according to Cohn, can be observed in James's The Ambassadors and James Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist. One could add that in some of James's other figural novels, such as The Wings and The Golden Bowl, the empathetic attribution is not as unambiguous. The pervasive ironic mode makes it difficult to determine where one's sympathy should lie. The issues here are less clear-cut; perhaps one should distinguish between a cognitive and an emotive or empathetic scale. This question assumes particular relevance in The Golden Bowl and is discussed in chapter 6 and in the Conclusion.
At times, ambiguity is heightened when the tense of the narrated monologue shifts from past to present as the protagonist formulates generalisations in her/his mind; these sound identical to the narrator's *ex cathedra* statements in the gnomic present tense. In *Roderick Hudson*, for example,

Witnessing the rate at which he did intellectual execution on the general spectacle of European life, Rowland at moments felt vaguely uneasy for the future; the boy was living too fast, he would have said, and giving alarming pledges to ennui in his later years. But we must live as our pulses are timed, and Roderick's struck the hour very often. (p. 106)

Here the aphoristic utterance could be that of the narrator or Rowland; the ambiguity is not really resolved, and the effect of an essential empathy between the two is created.

**Dimensions and Conjunctions**

The narrated monologue is an ideal medium for "revealing a fictional mind suspended in an instant present, between a remembered past and an anticipated future" (p. 126), as in chapter XLII of *The Portrait*. In such scenes, the narrated monologue adopts the temporal orientation of the figural consciousness and the past tense loses its retrospective function.

Narrated memories often refer to moments that predate the narrated time of a novel, replacing the authorial exposition of more traditional fiction (p. 128). In *The Ambassadors*, there is the scene in the Luxembourg gardens presenting Strether's "backward picture" of his past; in *The Portrait*, chapters IV and VI present Isabel's childhood in the form of flashbacks. Similarly, Kate in the first scene of *The Wings*, and the Prince in the opening scene of *The Golden Bowl*, relive
aspects of their past through memory. (Narrated memories and narrated fantasies are examined in context in subsequent chapters.)

Cohn draws attention to the hazy region where inner and outer fictional realities are intertwined, the sphere of "narrated perception" which has been defined as "the report of a character's conscious perceptions ... presented in such a manner that they resemble objective report", but are really "transcriptions of consciousness rather than reality" (p. 133). Exemplification of this phenomenon will be explored in The Golden Bowl.

The conjunction of narrated monologue with the two alternative techniques for rendering consciousness produces many interesting effects. The most recurrent sequence is the triad psycho-narration, narrated monologue, quoted monologue (p. 134), as seen in the following extracts from Watch and Ward and The Portrait:

He meditated much as to whether he should frankly talk it over with her and allow her to feel that, for him as well, their relation could never become commonplace. This would be in a measure untender, but would it not be prudent? Cought he not, in the interest of his final purpose, to infuse into her soul in her sensitive youth an impression of all that she owed him, so that when his time had come, if her imagination should lead her a-wandering, gratitude would stay her steps? A dozen times over he was on the verge of making his point, of saying, "Nora, Nora, these are not vulgar alms; I expect a return." (WW, pp. 61-62)

He found it hard sometimes to keep pace with Nora's pattering step; through the flowery lanes of poetry, in especial, she would gallop without drawing breath. Was she quicker-witted than her friend, or only more superficial? .... Roger was for ever suspecting her of a deeper penetration than his own, and hanging his head with an odd mixture of pride and humility.... "It's worse than useless," he would declare. "How can I ever have for her that charm of infallibility, that romance of omniscience, that a woman demands of her lover?" (WW, pp. 67-68)

He wondered whether he were harbouring "love" for this spontaneous young woman from Albany: but he judged that on the whole he was not. After he had
known her for a week he quite made up his mind to this … Lord Warburton had been quite right about her; she was a really interesting little figure…. If his cousin was to be nothing more than an entertainment to him, Ralph was conscious that she was an entertainment of a high order. "A character like that," he said to himself — "a real little passionate force to see at play is the finest thing in nature…."

Cohn points out that in such "triads"

Each technique assumes its most standard function: psycho-narration summarizes diffuse feelings, needs, urges; narrated monologue shapes these inchoate reactions into virtual questions, exclamations, conjectures; quoted monologue distills moments of pointed self-address that may relate only distantly to the original emotion.

This insensible shading of narrated monologue into psycho-narration, or vice versa, is very frequent in figural narrative situations (p. 137). (The narrated monologue and the quoted monologue, on the other hand, overlap only under very special circumstances.)

In summarising the three techniques for presenting consciousness in third-person texts, Cohn recapitulates the central features of the relation between technique and narrative situation. Although the three techniques are used in varying proportions and combinations in a continuum ranging from the authorial to the figural, psycho-narration tends to dominate in authorial narration, narrated monologue in figural narration. Cohn reaffirms the point that in an authorial milieu, both quoted monologue and narrated monologue tend to take on an ironic modality. In a figural milieu, psycho-narration and quoted monologue move toward each other (and toward the narrated monologue): "psycho-narration by coloration from the figural language, quoted monologue by camouflaging itself as best it can" (p. 138). These features are examined more closely in the following chapters.


3 Todorov takes issue with James's standpoint that narrative is "an illustration of character", stating that

We rarely have occasion to observe so pure a case of egocentricity presenting itself as universality. Though James's theoretical ideal may have been a narrative in which everything is subservient to the psychology of the characters, it is difficult to ignore a whole tendency in literature, in which the actions are not there to "illustrate" character but in which, on the contrary, the characters are subservient to the action; where, moreover, the word "character" signifies something altogether different from psychological coherence or the description of idiosyncrasy.

Todorov cites inter alia The Odyssey, the Decameron and the Arabian Nights as exemplifying this "literary a-psychologism". (The Poetics of Prose (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977) p. 66). Todorov, then, distinguishes two main categories: character-centred (psychological), and plot-centred (a-psychological) narratives.

This would accord with Barthes' classification of narratives (Image - Music - Text, London: Fontana/Collins, 1977): he makes a distinction between narratives which are "heavily functional" (such as folk tales) and those which are "heavily indicial" (such as psychological novels); between these two poles lies a whole series of intermediary forms (p. 93).

4 Under the aegis of semiotic criticism characters lose their privilege, their central status, and their definition..... As segments of a closed text, characters at most are patterns of recurrence, motifs which are continually recontextualised in other motifs. In semiotic criticism, characters dissolve. (Joel Weinsheimer, "Theory of Character: Emma", Poetics Today I, 1-2 (1979): p. 195. Quoted by Rimmon-Kenan, p. 32.

Another way in which character is "dissolved" or transubstantiated is represented by the approach of Propp and Greimas, who subordinate character entirely to action. Their position represents an extreme form
of Aristotle's conception of characters as necessary only as agents or performers of the action. According to Propp, the performance of characters can be categorised in terms of seven general roles: the villain, the donor, the helper, the sought-for person and her father, the dispatcher, the hero and the false hero. (Rimmon-Kenan, p. 34) Similarly, Greimas labels characters *actants* (a term which includes human beings, inanimate objects and abstract concepts such as "destiny"). Although *acteurs* are numerous, the number of *actants* is reduced to six in Greimas's model (Rimmon-Kenan, p. 35).


6 The reference here is to the Penguin edition (Harmondsworth, 1986). As mentioned elsewhere, the early rather than revised (New York) edition has been used for purposes of comparison with the later works.


8 Contemporary commentators could perhaps take issue with Bradbury's postulation of only two "codes", as it ignores the many other "codes" operative today (for example, the five codes in Barthes' taxonomy). Nevertheless, Bradbury's distinction does highlight the two codes most relevant to a discussion of James's position. As noted in chapter 1, these two "codes", the realist and aesthetic/formalist, can be seen both as consorting and contesting with - and complementing - each other.


13 Studies of the technique of "free indirect discourse" which have appeared since the publication of Transparent Minds are discussed in Section III. iii, Narrated Monologue: Theoretical and Historical Perspective.

14 Henry Fielding, The History of Tom Jones, eds. Martin C. Battestin and Fredson Bowers (Oxford: Clarendon,

15 Vanity Fair (1848; rpt. London: Blackie, n.d.), p. 34.

16 Cohn notes that this retrospective evocation is in fact "a narrated fantasy within a narrated memory", and points out that such "Chinese-box effects" occur frequently in James's narrated monologues (p. 130).


19 Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art, p. 33; cited by Cohn, p. 9.


23 This is explored more fully by Viola Hopkins in "Visual Art Devices and Parallels in James", in Henry James: Modern Judgements ed. Tony Tanner, pp. 96-98.

24 In Watch and Ward, for instance, Roger dreams of Nora while ill, and in Roderick Hudson, one could cite Rowland's dreams about Mary Garland and his vision of Roderick's "fall":

His idea persisted; it clung to him like a sturdy beggar. The sense of the matter, roughly expressed, was this. If Roderick was really going, as he himself had phrased it, to 'fizzle out', one might help him on the way - one might smooth the descensus Averni. For forty-eight hours there swam before Rowland's eyes a vision of Roderick, graceful and beautiful as he passed, plunging like a diver into a misty gulf. The gulf was destruction, annihilation, death.... (p. 251)

26 See Scholes and Kellogg, The Nature of Narrative, on the use of monologue in earlier fictional forms: epic and romance (pp. 177-90; 284-89).

27 This is foregrounded in Roy Pascal's concept of a "dual voice", which highlights the bifocality of this mode. Cohn emphasises a "two-in-one" effect rather than duality.

28 Publication details can be found in the Bibliography.


30 As Leech and Short point out, free indirect speech, as opposed to free indirect thought, was used fairly extensively by Fielding (p. 332).


32 Chatman also distinguishes between free indirect thought and free indirect perception or "substitutionary perception" - a phrase used by Bernard Fehr, in "Substitutionary Narration and Description: A Chapter in Stylistics", Von Englands geistigen Bestanden (Frauenfeld, 1944), pp. 264-78. (Story and Discourse, p. 204.)

33 Cohn sets out these points in tabular form: the diagrammatic presentation of the relationship between these techniques and levels of consciousness illustrates the point that "The more direct the technique, the more evidently verbal the activity of the mind, and therefore the more clearly conscious the mind that is exposed". See below: p. 139.

Diagram 1.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Ucs} & \text{psycho-narration} & \text{Cs} \\
\text{narrated monologue} & \text{quoted monologue} \\
\end{array}
\]

Diagram 2.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{psycho-narration} & \text{Ucs} & \text{Cs} \\
\text{narrated monologue} & \text{quoted monologue} \\
\end{array}
\]
CHAPTER 3:
QUASI-FIGURAL NARRATION: RODERICK HUDSON

"The Drama is the very Drama of [Rowland's]
Consciousness"

I: THE "SUBJECTIVE ADVENTURE" IN JAMES

Although this study will restrict its focus to a representative selection of James's "intense perceivers" (Rowland in RH, Isabel in PL and Maggie in GB) who find their "categories [taken] by surprise (Amb, I, 271) as they are subjected to their respective "ordeal[s] of consciousness", a comprehensive exploration of "the range of wonderment" (AN, p. 156) would include characters as diverse as the telegraphist of "In the Cage", Maisie in What Maisie Knew, Morgan Moreen of "The Pupil" and "portentous little Hyacinth" of The Princess Casamassima, who "collapses ... overcharged with treasures of reflexion and spoils of passion" (AN, p. 156). Strether too is charged with "treasures of imagination" at the conclusion of his adventure. Similarly, for the young lady providing the "germ" of The Rebergerator, "her spoil ... had been a treasure of impressions; her harvest ... a wealth of revelations" (AN, p. 184).

In this chapter the emphasis will be on the representation of the "expanding consciousness" in what is generally regarded as James's first novel, Roderick Hudson (1876).¹

Jamesian protagonists are frequently depicted as "constantly staring and wondering" (PL, I, 45) as they are subjected to "the strain of observation and the assault of experience" (AN, p. 147). Their bewilderment is the precondition for their embarking on a "process of vision"; as Paul Armstrong has noted, "Bewilderment throws into question the interpretative constructs we
ordinarily take for granted as our ways of knowing the
world". Each of these protagonists, then, is obliged to
undertake a reassessment of his or her respective
"interpretative constructs".

In tracing the "process of vision" which encompasses
this hermeneutic enterprise we find that for Jamesian
characters the mode of "seeing" is not fixed or static
but is a dynamic process which both determines and
reflects the nature of the experiences in which they are
involved. Indeed, the interconnectedness of "seeing" and
"being" underlies all James's fiction. "As a man is, So
he Sees". James would no doubt have subscribed to
William Blake's aphoristic statement on the importance of
"seeing", not only as an expression but also as a
determinant of one's being. Just as a person's
perception is governed by what [s]he essentially "is", so
the mode of self-perception and the way one "sees" others
and the world, helps to determine one's nature. In the
Jamesian world, particularly, "seeing" is consistently
equated with understanding; it does not operate merely on
the level of simple physical perception but involves all
the faculties of observation, intuition, imagination and
rational thought. For James, Pliny's formulation would
still be valid: "The mind is the real instrument of sight
and observation; the eyes act as a sort of vessel
receiving and transmitting the visible portion of
consciousness". Sight, then, is invariably associated
with insight.

In rendering the process of vision or "ordeal of
consciousness" of his "intense perceivers", James's
fiction demonstrates that he "conceived of seeing in a
multiple sense, as an act of the inward even more than of
the outward eye". In his novels, the stimulus provided
by what is perceived by the "outward" eye has far-
reaching repercussions on all levels of consciousness.
Seeing involves interpreting, activating what E. H.
Gombrich has called the "filing systems of the mind".
According to Gombrich, "When we are aware of the process of filing we say we 'interpret', where we are not we say we 'see'" (Art and Illusion, p. 89).

In many novels a character's "wealth of revelations" is precipitated by what is seen, or crystallises around a response evoked by certain works of art such as paintings. In Strether's case, the image of a landscape painting literally and figuratively opens up startlingly new perspectives; for Milly, in The Wings of the Dove, the Bronzino portrait evokes a comparably revelatory insight. These images, then, can be either literal or analogical.

Similarly, revelatory disclosures can be afforded by images conjured up by the "inward eye" of the imagination. So for Maggie in The Golden Bowl, an image conjured up in her imagination rather than perceived in actuality (what was dubbed an "imagistic correlative" in chapter 1) affords the greatest insight. Although the disclosure resulting from her encounter with the purveyor of the golden bowl precipitates startling recognitions comparable to those arising from Isabel's perception of the "absorbed mutual gaze" linking Osmond and Madame Merle, it is the emblematic intuition crystallised in images such as that of the pagoda and the "family coach" which have the greatest cognitive force.

I.i: The Metaphorical Mode in the "Subjective Adventure"

Although early works such as Roderick do employ complex patterns of imagery, the significance of emblematic images conjured up by the figural consciousness increases in the later novels. Thus, although imagery can serve various functions in the novel, a central focus in this and subsequent chapters is the cognitive function of metaphors — their role of representing the world. The rhetorical function of metaphor — that of expressing the
speaker's feelings or influencing the hearer — is obviously more marked in direct discourse, and as the emphasis in this study is on the representation of thought rather than speech this range of functions would be less relevant here. However, it could perhaps be argued that even metaphors used in the portrayal of thought rather than speech have a subsidiary function of expressing the thinker's (rather than speaker's) feelings, or even, in the case of an inner debate or process of rationalisation as seen in The Portrait, influencing the "hearer" or thinker herself.

The prevalence of the metaphoric mode in the representation of the consciousness of his central reflectors attests to James's interest in the constitutive powers of the creative imagination. Indeed, in depicting the process of vision of his protagonists, James stresses throughout the part played by the "blest imagination ... that ... helped [them] to discriminate" (AN, p. 316). The role of the imagination in the growth and refinement of perception and consciousness is crucial: the way one sees oneself, others, and the world, the way one "images" reality, is determined largely by the conceptions of the image-making faculty, the imagination. An analysis of any of James's novels would reveal the important part played by the imagination in the accession to sound insight or moral vision.8

The function of the imagination is manifested in the way both the figural and the narrating consciousness employ metaphor to define ideas and analyze situations and relationships in concrete terms. A significant development in James's method of presentation can be observed through comparing the management of the metaphoric mode in Roderick, The Portrait and The Golden Bowl: whereas in the early novel it is in dialogue, narratorial comment and psycho-narration that the imagery is most densely clustered, a progressive shift towards a
greater imagistic density in narrated monologue can be
discerned. The midnight vigil in *The Portrait*,
exemplifying the presentation of the protagonist engaged
in the process of "motionlessly seeing", foreshadows the
more extensive use of this device in the later novels
where it culminates in lengthy explorations of the
figural consciousness in *The Golden Bowl*. Here imagistic
representation, instead of being more prevalent in
psycho-narration, predominates in narrated monologue.
Thus the increasing "inwardness" in the presentation of
consciousness entails a shift of the imagistic mode from
passages of psycho-narration to those (increasingly
extensive) of narrated monologue.

This appropriation of the imagistic mode by the
figural as opposed to the narrating consciousness
reflects the increasing capacity of the protagonist to
respond imaginatively to the urgent injunction enunciated
in *What Maisie Knew* and *The Golden Bowl* to "Find out for
yourself ...." The depiction of this "finding out for
oneself", as opposed to having the cognitive process
managed by the narrator on the character's behalf, is
reflected in the ever-increasing capacity of the
protagonist to exploit the cognitive power of metaphor.
The epistemological implications are significant: as
Peter Garret has observed, "To image a situation is to
move toward mastery of it, to make it more firmly
possessed by consciousness". The recognition that a
specific image arises in the consciousness of the
character rather than of the narrator is telling, as the
"locus" of the image indicates who is responsible for the
generation or formulation of meaning. Increasingly it is
the figural rather than the narrating consciousness which
is empowered through being conceded control over the
deployment of metaphor.

Although various critics have commented on the
greater density of imagery in James's later novels — and
in his revisions of the earlier works as reflected in the
New York Edition — little attention seems to have been paid as yet to the location of this imagery: its concentration in the presentation of consciousness. An important facet of James's use of metaphor is the marked incidence of iterative images, those recurring not only throughout a specific novel but running through his entire œuvre. The increasing subtlety and sophistication of James's use of metaphor could be demonstrated in a comparison between the deployment of recurrent images, such as that of the lock and key, in *Watch and Ward*, *Roderick Hudson*, *The Portrait* and *The Golden Bowl*:

In *Watch and Ward*, Roger "thought of his angry vow the night before to live only for himself and turn the key on his heart.... Before twenty-four hours had elapsed a child's fingers were fumbling with the key" (p. 34). He "thought of Nora ... as a kind of superior doll, a thing wound up with a key ..." (p. 56). In a later scene an unintended comical effect results from the verbal echo activating a conjunction of the figurative and literal "keys": Nora enters the room to demand the use of Roger's watch-key.... Roger's key proved a complete misfit, so that she had recourse to Hubert's. It hung from the watch-chain which depended from his waistcoat, and some rather intimate fumbling was needed to adjust it to Nora's diminutive time-piece. (WW, p. 109)

Even readers responding from a pre-Freudian perspective would surely find this conjunction of terms rather disconcerting — or ill-timed. In the later novels, this kind of naive or inept use of metaphor is replaced by a more sophisticated deployment of the metaphoric mode. In *Roderick Hudson*, the image is used mainly in dialogue, as in Roderick's "speculations as to the possible mischances of one's genius. 'What if the watch should run down,' he asked, 'and you should lose the key?'" (p. 195). The image is taken up by Rowland in
his letter to Cecilia where he writes "I suppose there is some key or other to his character, but I try in vain to find it; and yet I can't believe that Providence is so cruel as to have turned the lock and thrown the key away" (p. 237).

In The Portrait, the key image tends to occur more frequently in psycho-narration and narrated monologue. We find that Isabel "took alarm at her candour: it was as if she had given to a comparative stranger [Madame Merle] the key to her cabinet of jewels" (I, 267). When confronted with Osmond's declaration of love, Isabel experiences "the slipping of a fine bolt — backward, forward, she could n't have said which" (II, 18).

The ambiguity in this image (liberation or imprisonment?) is absent in its appearance in Amerigo's narrated monologue at the beginning of The Golden Bowl: when contemplating his imminent marriage, the Prince considers that "his fate had practically been sealed.... the moment had something of the grimness of a crunched key in the strongest lock that could be made" (I, 5). The image often recurs in the delineation of Maggie's consciousness: so "the question dangled there as if it were the key to everything" (II, 15), and her accumulations of the unanswered ... were like a roomful of confused objects, never as yet "sorted", which for some time now she had been passing and repassing, along the corridor of her life. She passed it when she could without opening the door; then, on occasion, she turned the key to throw in a fresh contribution. (II, 14)

II: "QUASI-FIGURAL" NARRATION

In this and the following chapter I discuss an early novel, Roderick Hudson, and a novel from James's middle period, The Portrait of a Lady, as examples of quasi-figural narration or precursors of the fully figural
In fully figural narration, as Stanzel points out, the narrator has become invisible and his or her place taken by the figural medium or reflector-character. In what I have called quasi-figural narration, the intrusive narrator is still intermittently visible—or overtly audible—temporarily displacing the figural medium; in such instances, then, focalization is not solely through the figural consciousness. In discussing Roderick and The Portrait I hope to demonstrate that although James employs a central reflector or single centre of consciousness in these novels, his comments in the Prefaces create an erroneous idea of the consistency with which this method of presentation is implemented.

In Roderick Hudson, much of the fictive world is filtered through the consciousness of the central reflector, Rowland Mallet, but the vocal narrator is very much in evidence, particularly in the early sections of the novel. In The Portrait, too, the narratorial voice constantly "attends and amplifies", and again is most prominent in the early chapters; in the course of the novel, a gradual narrowing of distance between narrator and central focalizer takes place. However, The Portrait differs from Roderick Hudson in that the presence of the vocal narrator is complemented by that of an additional focalizer and commentator, Ralph Touchett, "the most important of the heroine's satellites", who serves as a supplementary "lucid reflector". Furthermore, whereas in Roderick no direct access is given to the consciousness of characters other than the central reflector, in The Portrait the reader has access, even if only momentarily, to the consciousness of virtually every character in the novel. Roderick also conforms more closely to the pattern of the figural novel in that the central character is "on stage" throughout, whereas Isabel Archer is absent from a number of crucial scenes involving other characters in The Portrait. (In the later, more consistently figural novel, The
Ambassadors, greater conformity to the figural mode is attained in that the narratorial presence is relatively invisible (or inaudible), the central character is not excluded from any scenes and no access is given to the consciousness of any other characters in the novel. The subject is presented far more consistently through the consciousness of the central focalizer.\textsuperscript{13}

In his Preface to Roderick, James states:

My subject ... defined itself - and this in spite of the title of the book - as not directly, in the least, my young sculptor's adventure. This it had been but indirectly, being all the while in essence and in final effect another man's, his friend and patron's, view and experience of him.... From this centre the subject has been treated.... The centre of interest throughout "Roderick" is in Rowlan Mallet's consciousness, and the drama is the very drama of that consciousness.... [A]s what happened to him was above all to feel certain things happening to others, to Roderick, to Christina, to Mary Garland, to Mrs. Hudson, to the Cavaliere, to the Prince, so the beauty of the constructional game was to preserve in everything its especial value for him. (AN, pp. 15-16)

The subject of the novel, then, is "in essence and in final effect" Rowlan's "view and experience" of Roderick. As previously mentioned, however, not everything is filtered through the consciousness of Rowlan as the novel's single focalizer. The "view and experience" of the narrator are often overtly manifested.

Before looking more closely at examples of overt narratorial intrusion, it might be useful to consider the implications of James's comment that "It had, naturally, Rowlan's consciousness, not to be too acute - which would have disconnected it and made it superhuman" (AN, p. 16). It would seem that, paradoxically, a measure of cognitive dissonance is an inevitable concomitant of James's particular mode of figural narration. The consciousness of the narrator is inevitably more acute than that of his reflector, whose experience is to
varying degrees set in the ironic— or more or less knowing— perspective of the narrator. Lubbock's observation on *The Ambassadors* is applicable to all James's figural or quasi-figural novels:

> the seeing eye is with somebody in the book, but its vision is reinforced; the picture contains more, becomes richer and fuller, because it is the author's as well as his creature's .... It is not all the work of the personage whose vision the author has adopted ... some one else is looking over his shoulder— seeing things from the same angle, but seeing more, bringing another mind to bear on the scene.\(^4\)

In fully figural narration, we recall, the narrator has become invisible and his place is taken by the figural medium or reflector-character. In quasi-figural narration, where the narrator is still intermittently visible— or audible— the "amplifying" vision of the narrator is manifested in the ways in which he transcends the parameters of the perceptual and conceptual world of the figural consciousness. Proleptic references, narratorial generalisations in the gnomic present tense, definition of and comment on the characters in the novel, remarks on novelistic procedures and all forms of direct address to the reader are evidence of the constant attendance of the audibly intrusive narrator. Discussion will now focus on examples of these manifestations of the presence of the intrusive narrator.

Proleptic references in *Roderick* include comments such as "Mallet afterwards learned that this fair slim youth could draw indefinitely upon a fund of nervous force ..." (p. 64), "What he [Rowland] was really facing was a level three years of disinterestedness" (p. 100), "long afterwards, in retrospect, he used to reflect that ... " (p. 251), "It was the first time Rowland had ever seen them there [tears in Roderick's eyes]; he saw them but once again" (p. 282) and— a comment reminiscent of or anticipating Strether's refusal to name to Maria
Gostrey the mysterious object manufactured at Woollet—
"It was a lasting joke with Cecilia afterwards that she
would never tell what Mr Whitefoot's little book had
been" (p. 96).

Some proleptic references incorporate an assumption
of cultural identity with contemporary readers and
ironically reflect the stance of narrator as "histor", as
in the description of the success of Roderick's statue of
Adam: "He never surpassed it afterwards, and a good judge
here and there has been known to pronounce it the finest
piece of sculpture of our modern time" (p. 114).

The occurrence of direct definition of or comment on
characters—typifying the authorial rather than the
figural mode—also contributes to the status of Roderick
as a quasi-figural novel. The reader is informed at the
outset, for example, that "Rowland Mallet had an
uncomfortably sensitive conscience" and that in his sense
of guilt for having neglected to visit his cousin Cecilia
more frequently "Mallet's compassion was really wasted,
because Cecilia was a very clever woman and a skilful
counter-plotter to adversity" (p. 49). Departures from
the pattern of the figural novel are also evident in that
it is the "mere muffled majesty of irresponsible
'authorship'" (AN, p. 328) which is responsible for
producing the potted biography of Rowland in chapter I.
Justification is produced: "a rapid glance at his
antecedents may help the reader to perceive ..." (p. 54)
and to appreciate the nature of Rowland's Puritan
sensibilities and philanthropic impulses. (In a later
work, such as The Ambassadors, this kind of information
is provided through Strether's "backward picture" in the
Luxembourg gardens or emerges in conversations with
Maria.)

Descriptions of other characters, however, are often
rendered through Rowland's perception. In the initial
description of Roderick, for example, we find that after
an authorial or narratorial introduction focalization shifts to Rowland:

Hudson was a tall slender young fellow, with a singularly mobile and intelligent face. Rowland was struck at first only with its responsive vivacity, but in a short time he perceived it was remarkably handsome. (p. 64; my emphasis)

On the other hand, the introductory descriptions of Gloriani, Miss Blanchard and other subsidiary characters are rendered in a mode which is predominantly authorial, although it modulates to the figural at times with objective narrator's report alternating with Rowland's subjective impression. This is illustrated in the following extract, which constitutes our introduction to Gloriani:

an American sculptor of French extraction or remotely perhaps of Italian, for he rejoiced in the somewhat fervid name of Gloriani. He was a man of forty, he had been living for years in Paris and in Rome, and he now drove a very pretty trade in sculpture of the ornamental and fantastic sort. In his youth he had had money; but he had spent it recklessly, much of it scandalously, and at twenty-six had found himself obliged to make capital of his talent. This was quite inimitable, and fifteen years of indefatigable exercise had brought it to perfection. Rowland admitted its power, though it gave him very little pleasure; what he relished in the man was the extraordinary vivacity and frankness, not to call it the impudence, of his opinions. He had a definite, practical scheme of art, and he knew at least what he meant. In this sense he was solid and complete. (p. 117)

Here the authorial register shifts to the figural, as the last two sentences could represent either narrator's report or Rowland's opinion.

A comparable fluctuation from the authorial to the figural voice is evident in the following extract depicting Rowland's perception of Christina Light:

Rowland had already been sensible of something in this young lady's tone which he would have called a
want of veracity.... But the trait was not disagreeable, for she herself was evidently the foremost dupe of her inventions. She had a fictitious history in which she believed much more fondly than in her real one, and an infinite capacity for extemporised reminiscence adapted to the mood of the hour. She liked to idealise herself, to take interesting and picturesque attitudes to her own imagination; so that the many-coloured flowers of fiction which blossomed in her talk were not so much perversions as sympathetic exaggerations of fact. And Rowland felt that whatever she said of herself might have been under the imagined circumstances. (p. 227)

Here psycho-narration in the first sentence modulates into narrated monologue as Rowland's own perceptions of Christina are formulated in his mind. At times, however, it is difficult to establish whether the voice is that of Rowland or of the narrator; the lively wit of the phrase "infinite capacity for extemporised reminiscence adapted to the mood of the hour" seems to reflect the formulation of the narrator rather than that of Rowland. However, "And Rowland felt ..." could indicate that the following sentence is a continuation of what had been Rowland's formulation all along.

Descriptions of scenes or settings by the narrator — as opposed to the perception of a specific setting by a character — also reflect the perceptibility of the narrator and the temporary effacement of the figural consciousness. In many cases, however — for example, in the descriptions of Rome — it is not clear whether the description emanates from the narrator or from Rowland. When this kind of "stylistic contagion" occurs in narrated perception it highlights the fusion of the two voices, that of the narrator and the figural consciousness.

Some descriptions emanate unambiguously from the narrator:

It was all consummately picturesque; it was the Italy that we know from the steel engravings in old keepsakes and annuals, from the vignettes on music-
sheets and the drop-curtains at theatres; an Italy that we can never confess ourselves — in spite of our own changes and of Italy's — that we have ceased to believe. (p. 347-48)

Frequently description modulates from objective narrator's report to the central character's perception. A transition from narrator-focalized to character-focalized description is illustrated in the following extract:

it may perhaps be said that there is no other place in which one's daily temper has such a mellow serenity, and none at the same time in which acute attacks of depression are more intolerable. Rowland found, in fact, a perfect response to his prevision that to live in Rome was an education to the senses and the imagination. (p. 159)

Generalisations about human nature, or aphoristic generic statements in the gnomic present tense, also testify to the overt presence of the narrator, but here again uncertainty frequently impedes the distinction between generalisations by the narrator and those of Rowland himself. At times the generalisation is clearly preferred by the narrator, as in the following examples:

"Many another man, in Rowland's place, would have greeted this information with an irate and sarcastic laugh" (p. 327).

"Gloriani, like a genuine connoisseur, cared nothing for his [Roderick's] manners; he cared only for his skill" (p. 281) — an evaluative comment reflecting the narrator's own values rather than Rowland's.

"The conversation had been brief, but like many small things it furnished Rowland with food for reflection. When one is looking for symptoms one easily finds them" (p. 368).
At other times, "stylistic contagion" reinforces the merging of the narratorial and figural voices, and the generalisation could be attributed to either Rowland or the narrator—or seen as reflecting their shared assumptions: the effect created is that of consonance between the narrating and the figural consciousness:

Witnessing the rate at which he did intellectual execution on the general spectacle of European life, Rowland at times felt vaguely uneasy for the future; the boy was living too fast, he would have said, and giving alarming pledges to ennui in his later years. But we must live as our pulses are timed, and Roderick's struck the hour very often. (p. 106)

In the New York Edition of the novel, "the boy was living too fast, he would have said, and giving alarming pledges to ennui in his later years" is replaced by the less abstract and more colloquial "he was eating his cake all at once and might have none left for the morrow" (NYE, 90), expressed in narrated monologue. This emendation seems to reflect Rowland's puritanical distrust of excess; taken in conjunction with the gnomic observation which follows, the effect is that of a corrective to the view espoused by Rowland: this generalisation then becomes more unambiguously that of the narrator. A certain ironic distance between narratorial and figural consciousness is thus established here.

Another illustration of this device of stylistic contagion is where we are told that

Rowland greatly pitied her [Mrs Light], for there is something respectable in passionate grief, even in a very bad cause; and as pity is akin to love he felt rather more tolerant of her fantastic pretensions than he had done hitherto. (p. 304)

In the amended New York Edition, we find "Rowland greatly pitied her — so respectable is sincerity of sorrow" (NYE, 396-97), which could be read as narrated
monologue reflecting Rowland's feeling and not that of the narrator, who seems indeed to take a satirical view of Rowland's impressionability here. Here again a certain distance is established between the narrator and the reflector.

Indeed, citing a truism in a tone of mock-ignorance or assumed bemusement is a practice not infrequently indulged in by the narrator: "Women are said by some authorities to be cruel; I know not how true this is, but it may at least be pertinent to remark that Mrs Hudson was intensely feminine" (p. 336). This comment is omitted from the New York Edition, and in the following sentence psycho-narration shifts into narrated monologue in the revised version: the original "It often seemed to Rowland that he had too decidedly forfeited his freedom, and that there was something grotesque in a man of his age being put into a corner" becomes "It often struck him that he had too abjectly forfeited his freedom. Was n't it grotesque, at his age, to be put into a corner for punishment?" (NYE, 447).

In this version Rowland evinces a greater degree of self-excoriation which is foregrounded by the substitution of "abjectly" for "decidedly" and the addition of "for punishment" after "into a corner" to stress not only entrapment but punishment of the kind customarily inflicted on transgressing juveniles.

The extracts cited above demonstrate that the status of generalisations occurring in a passage of psycho-narration can often be ambiguous; context can be decisive in making the distinction. A comparison between two extended passages of psycho-narration recording Rowland's agonising uncertainty about Mary Garland's continuing attachment to Roderick illustrates this. In the first we read

There are women whose love is care-taking and patronising, and who attach themselves to those persons of the other sex in whom the manly grain is
soft and submissive. It did not in the least please Rowland to believe that Mary Garland was one of these, for he held that such women were only males in petticoats, and he was convinced that this young lady's nature was typically girlish. (p. 337)

The ascription of the first generalisation is initially ambiguous, particularly as it is cast in the gnomic present tense: it could be interpreted as emanating from either the narrator or Rowland. In the following sentence Rowland has indisputably appropriated the opinion expressed. (On the other hand, the first sentence could be interpreted as narrated monologue and the second psycho-narration, thus crediting Roland with — or holding him responsible for — both utterances. Modern readers would presumably prefer to exonerate the Jamesian narrator from implication in these sexist beliefs!)

In the later extract, the narrator at first intervenes to remind the reader of the substance of Rowland's continuing inner debate: "Rowland, in Florence, as we know, had suffered his imagination to wander in the direction of certain conjectures which the reader may deem unflattering to her constancy" (p. 353). The narrator's voice becomes more muted as the passage continues in psycho-narration:

[Rowland] did not risk the supposition that Mary had contrasted him with Roderick to his own advantage; but he had a certain consciousness of duty resolutely done which allowed itself to fancy at moments that it might not be unnaturally rewarded by the bestowal of such stray grains of enthusiasm as had crumbled away from her estimate of his companion.... If some day she had declared in a sudden burst of passion that she was completely disillusioned and that she gave up her recreant lover, Rowland's expectation would have gone halfway to meet her. (p. 353)

This is followed by two transitional sentences; although the first could be seen as narrator's report, it is more likely to be narrated monologue, like the second sentence:
And certainly if her passion had taken this form no generous critic would utterly condemn her. She had been neglected, ignored, forsaken, treated with a contempt which no girl of a fine temper could endure.

A generalisation then sets Mary's situation in the context of that of (other) fictional heroines:

There were girls, indeed, whose fineness, like that of Burd Helen in the ballad, lay in clinging to the man of their love through thick and thin and in bowing their head to all hard usage. This attitude had often an exquisite beauty of its own, but Rowland thought that he had solid reason to believe it never could be Mary Garland's. She was not a passive creature; she was not soft and meek and grateful for chance bounties. (p. 353)

Here the generalisation, in the past tense, ("There were girls ...") is clearly Rowland's, as is clarified by the context: the preceding sentence (above) in narrated monologue expresses a view held by Rowland rather than by the narrator. Dramatic irony comes into play here to expose the fallaciousness of Rowland's reasoning. In grappling with the problem of Mary's character and motivation, Rowland ironically makes no allowance for the egoism of passion and is unprepared for her later demonstration that she is ready to sacrifice everything, and even endanger Rowland's own life, for Roderick's sake. In spite of the way in which she has been treated, Roderick's interests are paramount, having a claim superior to both Rowland's and her own.

In detailing Rowland's inner debate, the narrator, anticipating a sceptical response in the reader, again intervenes with a pre-emptive justification: "He may perhaps be deemed too rigid a casuist, but I have repeated more than once that he was solidly burdened with a conscience" (p. 354). Here the dramatic irony is subverted by the intrusive narrator who interferes with his own orchestration of ironic effects. In this form of
quasi-figural narration the narrator, rather than relinquishing control, reverts to the didactic mechanism of direct adjudicating intervention to guide the reader's response.

Such instances of direct address to the reader – especially in the form of the first person – also reinforce the distancing effect typifying external perspective as opposed to the internal perspective of figural narration. In the following example, the first-person narratorial voice again guides the reader's judgement of Rowland: "That Mallet was without vanity I by no means intend to affirm; but there had been times when ... you might have asked yourself what had become of his vanity" (p. 52).

In some instances, the narrator adopts an archly speculative pose, as in

Just why it was that Roderick should not in consistency have been captivated [by Mary], his companion would have been at a loss to say; but I think the conviction had its roots in an unformulated comparison between himself and the accepted suitor. (p. 161)

This speculative stance is presumably calculated to encourage a comparably speculative activity in the reader – the generation of interpretive hypotheses which must be tested against subsequent disclosures.

A similar coyness pervades the next comment that follows the "reproduction" of Mary's letter to Rowland which "was so much shorter [than Cecilia's] that we may give it entire": "It is a question whether the reader will know why, but this letter gave Rowland extraordinary pleasure" (p. 134). Cecilia's letter, the narrator confides, was so long that "we must content ourselves with giving an extract" (p. 133).

Commentary on the purpose and problems of novelistic presentation also abounds, at times reflecting the narrator's stance as "histor". We are told that "it will
be part of the entertainment of this narrative to exhibit that Rowland Mallet had an uncomfortably sensitive conscience" (p. 49), that "this history undertakes to offer no record [of the criticisms passed upon Roderick's Adam]" (p. 115), that "this lady's further comments upon the event are not immediately pertinent to our history" (p. 319). Such remarks imply that the narrator-historian is carefully sifting his material before selecting that most germane to his purpose. Relevance is a prime consideration: "We shall not rehearse his [Roderick's] confession in detail; its main outline will be sufficient" (p. 137). At times a comprehensive account is called for: "After the visit which I have related at length ... (p. 169)"; at other times, ellipsis is practised as "Nothing especially pertinent to our narrative had passed" (p. 176).

Although Rowland is the single focalizer, there are other ways in which the focus becomes blurred, and insight — albeit largely indirect — is afforded into the minds of other characters. (This contrasts with the strategy adopted in The Portrait where direct and often extensive access is given to the consciousness of most of the characters in the novel.) At the first appearance of Christina Light, for instance, the description seems to reflect the perception of Roderick rather than Rowland. When the Light ménage advance towards them in the gardens of the Villa Ludovisi, we are initially told that "the young men, looking up, saw three persons advancing" (p. 109). The description that follows seems to be the narrator's report, and then Rowland's speculations concerning Mrs Light are recorded: "She had such an expansive majesty of mien that Rowland supposed she must have some proprietary right in the villa and was not just then in an hospitable mood". The subsequent description of the Cavaliere and Christina accompanied by her poodle could initially be narrative report or objective narration rather than the subjective perception of either
of the two young men, but when the focus narrows to a close-up of Christina's startlingly beautiful face it appears to be Roderick's perception which is registered:

Roderick, with his customary frankness, greeted the spectacle with a confident smile. The young girl perceived it and turned her face full upon him, with a gaze intended apparently to enforce greater deference. It was not deference, however, that her countenance provoked, but startled submissive admiration; Roderick's smile fell dead and he sat eagerly staring. A pair of extraordinary dark blue eyes, a mass of dusky hair over a low forehead, a blooming oval of perfect purity, a flexible lip just touched with disdain, the step and carriage of a tired princess - these were the general features of his vision. (p. 109)

The impression that the view of Christina presented here is essentially Roderick's is reinforced by his exclamation immediately after this description - "Immortal powers!" cried Roderick, "what a vision!" (p. 110) which echoes the formulation in the description itself.

On the other hand, this could well be interpreted as Rowland's impression or formulation of Roderick's vision of Christina; indeed, the perceptive observation that in spite of her splendid beauty her deportment reflected "the step and carriage of a tired princess" seems to indicate a range of intuitive sympathy which Roderick reveals he is deficient in.

Departures from the figural mode also occur when focalization seems to veer towards an inside view of Mrs Hudson's feelings to which Rowland could not plausibly have access. (The purpose of this shifting focalization is presumably to enhance the ironic effect by giving the reader information denied to Rowland). We are told, for instance, that "she found it infinitely comfortable to lay the burden of their common affliction upon Rowland's broad shoulders. Had he not promised to make them all rich and happy?" (p. 326). The first sentence clearly
could not reflect Rowland's own view (the phrase "Rowland's broad shoulders" if used by Rowland himself would be at variance with the narrator's repeated claim that he is incorruptibly modest) and must be the narrator's comment. However, the second sentence, in narrated monologue or free indirect speech, suggests that Mrs Hudson functions momentarily as focalizer. An inside view of Mrs Hudson's mind is also reflected in the statement that

The little unpainted inn ... reminded her of places of summer sojourn in her native land; and the beautiful historic chambers of the Villa Pandolfini passed from her memory without a regret and without having in the least modified her ideal of a satisfactory habitation. (p. 351)

The above examples all illustrate ways in which the figural mode is imperfectly realised in Roderick. Attention will now be focused on the incidence and interaction of the three modes for presenting the consciousness of the central reflector in the novel.

III: QUOTED MONOLOGUE IN RODERICK HUDSON

As might be expected in a novel cast largely in the figural or quasi-figural mode, conventional quoted monologues, which tend to create an ironic distance between the narrator and the figural consciousness, are relatively infrequent. Rigorously quantitative analysis would demonstrate that not more than about ten instances of quoted monologues occur in the novel. Whereas some are relatively innocuous as in "'What is it now?' he asked himself, and invited Roderick to sit down" (p. 369), quoted monologues in some contexts do dramatise significant discrepancies between the articulated and the unarticulated.
Quoted monologue is used in self-communing, articulating thoughts and feelings that the character does not communicate to others. In some cases it is used to formulate an opinion which a character is prevented from expressing by the conventions of social propriety. The following exchange with Mary Garland illustrates this:

'I don't know how it seems,' she interrupted, - 'to careless observers. But we know - we know that you have lived - a great deal for us.'

Her voice trembled slightly, and she brought out the last words with a little jerk.

'She has had that speech on her conscience,' thought Rowland; 'she has been thinking she owed it to me, and it seemed to her that now was her time to make it and have done with it.' (p. 275)

Rowland's slightly cynical interpretation of Mary's utterance is rendered here in quoted monologue. Articulating these thoughts to himself might provide him with the satisfaction of feeling that he has not been "taken in"; he could hardly convey to Mary herself his suspicion that she is being insincere or at least lacking in spontaneity. Of course, the reader's interpretation might differ from his: the fact that "her voice trembled slightly", and her jerky delivery might be evidence of Mary's acutely embarrassed awareness that this expression of gratitude is one which Roderick himself should be conveying to Rowland; Roderick indeed could be classified with those "careless observers" who fail to perceive the extent to which Rowland has devoted himself to the interests of his protégé and his entourage.

Quoted monologue serves a different function in the following example, where Rowland is exclaiming to himself in wonder at the burgeoning of Mary Garland's aesthetic sense in response to Rome:

'Oh, exquisite virtue of circumstance!' cried Rowland to himself, 'that takes us by the hand and leads us forth out of corners where perforce our
attitudes are a trifle contracted, and beguiles us into testing unappreciated faculties!' (p. 270)

Here Rowland's rather effusive quoted monologue, with its quaintly formal (if not archaic and self-consciously literary) wording, perhaps reflects too his incorrigible modesty; hence his attributing Mary's development to the abstract (but personified) "virtue of circumstance" when it is he himself who is the most significant feature of that "circumstance", he who by playing cicerone is "leading her forth". Perhaps his ever-vigilant conscience does not wish him to acknowledge, even to himself, the role he is playing in facilitating the felicitous development of his friend and protegée's fiancée.

This reading seems to be supported by the revision in the New York Edition where "cried Rowland to himself" is replaced with "her companion admirably mused" - "admirably" suggesting that Rowland is taking no credit for her transformation. The rest of this passage also undergoes extensive revision in the later edition. Whereas in the original the quoted monologue is followed by "When he said to Mary Garland that he wished he might see her ten years hence, he was paying mentally an equal compliment to circumstance and to the girl herself", in the amended version we have, with narrated monologue replacing the narratorial report,

She would develop, evidently, right and left, and to the top of her capacity; and he would have been at the bottom of it all. But that was where he would remain, essentially and obscurely; all taken for granted, merely for granted, as a good cellar, with its dusky supporting vaults, is taken for granted in a sound house. (NYE, 344)

In the original, only "circumstance" and "the girl herself" are credited with responsibility for the transformation; in the revised text, with the introduction of narrated monologue, Rowland's awareness
of his own unacknowledged contribution is recorded with a hint of petulant resentment. The repetition in "all taken for granted, merely taken for granted", with the tinge of bitter incredulity in "merely", heightens this effect. Once again the introduction of a more imagistic mode makes the presentation of Rowland's consciousness more vividly dramatic.

The majority of the examples of quoted monologue cited here are embedded in psycho-narration, the exception being the dialogue on p. 275. The following extract is a rare example of a configuration conforming to the pattern of the triad described by Cohn: psycho-narration, narrated monologue, quoted monologue:

He was not sure it was not a mere fancy, but it seemed to him that he had never seen her look just as she was looking then. It was a humble, touching, appealing glance, which threw into wonderful relief the nobleness of her beauty. 'How many more metamorphoses,' he asked himself, 'am I to be treated to before we have done?' (p. 291)

The first sentence in this extract is psycho-narration, the second is probably narrated monologue, and the third indubitably quoted monologue. The quoted monologue here is employed for expressing the mixture of fascination and exasperation he experiences in his confrontations with the protean Christina. The concept of a creature subject to - or indulging in - endless metamorphoses is also applied to the vacillating Roderick: "Rowland said nothing. He was willing to wait for Roderick to complete the circle of his metamorphoses, but he had no desire to officiate as chorus to the play" (p. 224).15 The perception this time is expressed in narrated monologue rather than quoted monologue, with the verbal echo ("metamorphoses") indicating Rowland's own formulation. The application of the same image to both Christina and Roderick also emphasises essential similarities between them: they are both capricious,
passionate, wilful, impulsive, lacking the stability and sustained moral seriousness which characterise Rowland.

Conflicting impulses or demands in Rowland himself can be highlighted through quoted monologue, as in the evocation of his response to Rome. At the beginning of the novel we are told that

idleness in any degree could hardly be laid at the door of a young man who took life in the serious, attentive, reasoning fashion of our friend. It often seemed to Mallet that he wholly lacked the prime requisite of a graceful flaneur - the simple, sensuous, confident relish of pleasure. (p. 58)

After some time spent in Rome, Rowland starts succumbing to its appeal. His response is traced initially through psycho-narration:

He grew passionately, unreasoningly fond of all Roman sights and sensations.... He could not have defined and explained the nature of his relish, nor have made up the sum of it by adding together his calculable pleasures. It was a large, vague, idle, half profitless emotion, of which perhaps the most pertinent thing that may be said is that it brought with it a sort of relaxed acceptance of the present, the actual, the sensuous - of life on the terms of the moment. (p. 159)

Further on in this passage, contrasting impulses all exerting powerful influences on Rowland are dramatised in the confrontation between his more hedonistic urges and the voice of conscience; the conflict is foregrounded through the use of quoted monologue:

to live in Rome was an education to the senses and the imagination; but he sometimes wondered whether this were not a questionable gain in case of one's not being prepared to subside into soft dilettantism. His customary tolerance of circumstances seemed sometimes to pivot about by a mysterious inward impulse and look his conscience in the face. 'But afterwards ...?' it seemed to ask, with a long reverberation; and he could give no answer but a shy affirmation that there was no such thing as tomorrow and that to-day was uncommonly fine. (p. 159-60)
The tendency towards a greater infusion of imagery in the later works is again exemplified in the revised version of this extract in the New York Edition; "to live in Rome" becomes "to live in the lap of the incomparable sorceress", and the following sentence becomes the more tortuously complex "but he sometimes wondered whether this were not a questionable gain in case of one's not being prepared to ask no more of consciousness than they [presumably the senses and the imagination] could give" (NYE, 172). Perhaps the amended version prepares the way more effectively for the introduction of (or assertion of) the claims of "his conscience" (complementing the senses and the imagination as components of consciousness) further on. The alteration of "His customary tolerance of circumstances" to "His growing submission to the mere insidious actual" seems more clearly to capture the specific nature of Rowland's "temptation", especially in view of the implicit departure from his initial stance of one who was incapable of response to "the simple, sensuous, confident relish of pleasure". The personification of Rome in the New York Edition is extended when the abstract formulation "the mere insidious actual" is followed by "which resembled somehow the presence of an extravagant, flattering visitor, questionably sincere" (NYE, 172); this adds a new dimension to the quality of Rowland's captivation - it is presented as a form of seduction, of being led away from the straight and narrow and along a morally suspect primrose path. It is through the subtle interplay of quoted monologue and psycho-narration that these contradictory impulses are evoked.

The ironic effects achieved through this subtle interplay are many and various. The following example illustrates the way in which Rowland, in consciously formulating optimistic interpretations of Roderick's temperament and conduct, suppresses recognition of less
commendable features of his personality of which he has a lurking intuition. The quoted monologue is set in the ironic perspective of summary psycho-narration, shifting into punctual psycho-narration, which reveals subsequent developments and exposes the view expressed in the monologue to be an illusion now consigned to the past.

Rowland had found himself wondering shortly before whether possibly his brilliant young friend were without a conscience; now it dimly occurred to him that he was without a heart. Rowland as we have already intimated was a man with a moral passion, and no small part of it had gone forth into this adventure. There had been from the first no protestations of friendship on either side, but Rowland had implicitly offered everything that belongs to friendship, and Roderick had apparently as deliberately accepted it. Rowland indeed had taken an exquisite satisfaction in his companion's easy inexpressive assent to his interest in him. 'Here is an uncommonly fine thing,' he said to himself, 'a nature unconsciously grateful, a man in whom friendship does the thing that love alone generally has the credit of — knocks the bottom out of pride!' (pp. 189-90)

This quoted monologue is analeptic in that it refers to a view formulated early on in their friendship and recalled now in a different context — embedded in a passage of summary psycho-narration which traces subsequent modifications of his initial opinion of Roderick's nature.

We note too the way in which psycho-narration in the first sentence is followed by the evaluative comment by the intrusive narrator reminding the reader that Rowland "was a man with a moral passion". This explicit comment on Rowland's character helps to highlight an essential difference between the two men, a difference which can be seen in the context of Rowland's suspicion that his friend lacks both a conscience and a heart, equally essential components of Rowland's own character. Rowland is beginning to discern that although Roderick is endowed with creative or aesthetic passion — which in his
relations with Christina becomes interfused with erotic passion – he is radically devoid of "moral passion". Through the interplay of quoted monologue and psycho-narration, then, Rowland is depicted as grappling with these complex issues.

In the New York Edition the terms "conscience" and "heart" are further elaborated by the addition of "that indispensable aid to completeness, a feeling heart" (NYE, 220), which links with the discussion of the notion of "completeness" in both editions. Rowland says of himself at the beginning of the novel, "I sometimes think that I am a man of genius, half finished. The genius has been left out, the faculty of expression is wanting; but the need for expression remains" (p. 53). In identifying and encouraging the development of Roderick's genius, Rowland in a sense attains a feeling of "completeness". Singleton comments on Roderick's "beautiful completeness" as an artist – "Complete, that's what he is" (p. 171). Roderick himself responds to Christina's jibe that he is "weak" by claiming that "I am not weak. I am incomplete perhaps" (p. 214) – presumably as a man rather than as an artist. In a later letter to Cecilia Rowland confirms this diagnosis: "The poor fellow is incomplete" (p. 237), associating this incompleteness with a lack of moral sense.

Further on in this extract psycho-narration modulates to narrated monologue as the narrator's comment, "Rowland adhered to his conviction of the essential salubrity of genius" (p. 190), is followed by the expression of Rowland's belief as formulated by himself: "Genius was priceless, inspired, divine; but it was also at its hours capricious, sinister, cruel; and men of genius accordingly were alternately very enviable and very helpless" (pp. 190-91); this opinion does not necessarily enjoy the endorsement of the narrator.

Rowland is not yet consciously facing the possibility that "the essential salubrity of genius"
might be an illusion if a radical disjunction exists between the creative imagination and the moral imagination; moral "salubrity", then, would not necessarily be the inevitable concomitant of aesthetic endowment. In his later letter to Cecilia (p. 236) Rowland is finally to question this concept.

In accordance with the predominant pattern of the novel, psycho-narration and narrated monologue in this chapter alternate with extended passages of dialogue as Rowland and Roderick discuss the issues which Rowland is also grappling with internally. The narrator's voice also makes a sporadic appearance to guide the reader's judgement without imposing his own too dictatorially, as in

It was ... characteristic of Rowland that he complied with his friend's summons without a moment's hesitation. His cousin Cecilia had once told him that he was the dupe of his perverse benevolence. She put the case with too little favour, or too much, as the reader chooses; it is certain at least that he had a constitutional tendency to magnanimous interpretations. (p. 193)

In the revised New York Edition the less abstract reformulation of the last sentence serves to highlight the paradox in Cecilia's observation and restrict the range of possible interpretations in the narrator's comment to one specific meaning:

His cousin Cecilia had once told him that he was too credulous to have a right to be kind. She put the case with too little favour, or too much, as the reader chooses; it is certain at least that he gave others, as a general thing, the benefit of any doubt, reserving for himself the detriment. (NYE, 226-27)

Either way, Cecilia's judgement of Rowland is implicitly confirmed by both his conduct and the narrator's comment; after ostensibly granting the reader the choice of accepting or rejecting Cecilia's judgement the narrator
states categorically that "It is certain ...

The introduction of a more densely imagistic mode of expression in the New York Edition also vividly dramatises the gap in understanding between them. In the original we have:

'You are the best man in the world,' he said, 'and I am a vile brute. Only,' he added in a moment, 'you don't understand me!' And he looked at him with eyes of such pure expressiveness that one might have said (and Rowland did almost say to himself) that it was the fault of one's own grossness if one failed to read to the bottom of that beautiful soul.

Rowland smiled sadly. 'What is it now? Explain.' (p. 191)

In the revised version a variation on the recurrent sea imagery — but reminiscent now of comparably complex images in *The Golden Bowl* — is introduced; in contrast to the narrative technique in the later novel, however, the image here is presented in the narrator's voice rather than being refracted through the consciousness of the figural mind. (In *The Golden Bowl* these imagistic representations are more prevalent in narrated monologue, as emanations of the experiencing rather than the narrating consciousness).

And he looked at him out of such bottomless depths as might have formed the element of a shining merman who should be trying, comparatively near shore, to signal to a ruminating ox.

Rowland's own face was now a confession of his probably being indeed too heavy to float in such waters. (NYE, 223)

Here the last sentence again seems to represent the narrator's interpretation of Rowland's expression rather than Rowland's own awareness.

It is evident from the above discussion that the three modes of representing consciousness (quoted monologue, narrated monologue and psycho-narration) occur in different combinations and to varying effect in *Roderick*. The latter two modes (psycho-narration and
narrated monologue) are relatively more prevalent and almost invariably occur together; the text often weaves in and out of the mind of the figural consciousness, fusing inner and outer reality, objective narratorial report and subjective reflection. By subtle deployment of these modes of representation, insight is afforded into characters by narrating their unvoiced reflections without judging them directly. The reader is implicated in the process of identifying self-deception and distinguishing lapses in logic and clear-sightedness. The rest of this section on Roderick concentrates on examining further representative examples of the incidence and interaction of these two techniques.

IV: ALTERNATION AND INTERACTION OF PSYCHO-NARRATION AND NARRATED MONOLOGUE IN RODERICK HUDSON

An extract near the beginning of the novel provides a useful illustration of how psycho-narration, modulating into narrated monologue, can render the nuances of the reflector's state of mind. This passage is embedded in a scene of dialogue between Rowland and Cecilia; illuminating comparisons can be drawn between the voiced and the unvoiced assumptions and feelings.

He [Rowland] had suspected from the first hour of his stay that Cecilia had a private satisfaction, and he discovered that she found it in Hudson's lounging visits and boyish chatter. Now he wondered whether judiciously viewed, her gain in the matter were not her young friend's loss. It was evident that Cecilia was not judicious, and that her good sense, habitually rigid under the demands of domestic economy, indulged itself with a certain agreeable laxity on this particular point. She liked her young friend just as he was; she humoured him, flattered him, laughed at him, caressed him - did everything but advise him. It was a flirtation without the benefits of a flirtation. She was too old to let him fall in love with her, which might have done him good.... It was quite conceivable that poor Cecilia should relish a pastime; but if one had
philanthropically embraced the idea that something considerable might be made of Roderick, it was impossible not to see that her friendship was not what might be called tonic. So Rowland reflected, in the glow of an almost creative ardour. There was a later time when he would have been grateful if Hudson's susceptibility to the relaxing influence of lovely women might have been limited to such inexpensive tribute as he rendered the excellent Cecilia.

'I only wish to remind you,' she went on, 'that you are likely to have your hands full.'

(pp. 79-80)

In the first sentence, summary psycho-narration records the way in which over a period of time Rowland's vague suspicion of Cecilia's enjoying a "private satisfaction" changes in focus to an identification of the specific source of this "satisfaction"; the company of the flamboyant Roderick Hudson. In "Now he wondered whether, judiciously viewed, her gain ... were not her young friend's loss", a transition is made from a past to a present state of understanding; a shift then occurs from psycho-narration to narrated monologue in the following sentence where the word "judicious" recurs as indubitably Rowland's own formulation. Preceded by "It was evident ..." the narrated monologue here alerts the reader to the rationalisation that Rowland is indulging in. An ironic discrepancy is apparent: what is "evident" to Rowland might not appear so to the narrator or the reader who, reading between the lines — or between and behind the articulated thoughts — senses that Rowland, in criticising the "injudiciousness" of Cecilia's friendship, is emphasising to himself that his own friendship with Roderick would be eminently prudent and salutary for the young sculptor. His use of terminology such as "philanthropically" also suggests that he is repressing any recognition that his own motives might be similarly tainted with damaging self-interest rather than adorned with glowing altruism.
The next thirteen lines in narrated monologue continue to render the substance of Roderick's thought, with the statement "So Rowland reflected" finally signalling the "re-entry" of the univocal narratorial voice (as opposed to the "dual" voice of narrated monologue) to dispel any ambiguity as to whether the above reflections might be attributed to the narrator rather than to the central reflector. (In later novels, the attribution becomes more ambiguous.)

The emphatic "It was impossible not to see", which echoes the earlier construction "It was evident", reinforces the impression that Rowland is indulging in self-justification and establishing the superiority of his friendship for Roderick over that of Cecilia which was "not what might be called tonic". Rowland evidently feels that by providing an infusion of informed encouragement — and funds — supplemented by sporadic injections of the fortifying "advice" that Cecilia failed to provision Roderick with he will be able to guarantee the optimum opportunity for the efflorescence of Roderick's artistic talent. By failing to distinguish between the aesthetic and the ethical — or by assuming too glibly that a superabundance of creative power necessarily entails a comparable endowment of moral strength — Rowland is blind to the possible nature of the challenge enunciated further on by Cecilia: that of guaranteeing "not only the development of the artist but the security of the man". Ironically, Cecilia is far more perceptive than Rowland when it comes to understanding Roderick's frailties and susceptibilities.

Rowland's assumptions, expressed through psycho-narration and narrated monologue (and in dialogue with Cecilia) are set here in the ironic context not only of Cecilia's premonitory comments but also of the narrator's proleptic reference to future developments which support Cecilia's warning: "There was a later time when...."
In his conversation with his cousin, Rowland understandably does not express his reservations about her possibly deleterious effect on Roderick but instead concentrates on the positive benefits to accrue to the young sculptor from accepting his friendship and patronage. He acknowledges that apart from the altruistic desire to "start our young friend on the path to glory" he himself hopes to achieve a vicarious sense of fulfilment in that "it would give at least a reflected usefulness to my own life to offer him his opportunity" (p. 80).

This recognition could be seen as casting an ironic light on his declared "philanthropic" pretensions, although it could be argued that there is inevitably an element of self-gratification in all ostensibly altruistic or "philanthropic" enterprises. That Rowland has pondered the question of whether one has the moral right to interfere directly with the "destiny" of another when motives are so mixed is clear from his statement to Cecilia that "I remembered there were dangers and difficulties, and asked myself whether I had a right to drag him out of his obscurity" (p. 80). What he had not sufficiently taken cognisance of perhaps was the possibility of endangering what Cecilia calls "his moral, his sentimental security" (p. 81).

Cecilia's warning that "circumstances, with our young man, have a great influence" (p. 81) alerts us to the crucial issue of the influence of changed circumstances upon personal development, particularly when these changed circumstances encompass also all the ramifications of the "international theme" - the contrast between the cultures of America and Europe, which is rather simplistically viewed as a contrast between the simple and the more complex, the naive, spontaneous and idealistic and the more sophisticated, refined but often morally decadent (or at least dubious).
Cecilia's (perhaps unrealistic?) demand that "you guarantee us not only the development of the artist but the security of the man" (p. 80) taken in conjunction with Rowland's own idea of his mission as expressed here in psycho-narration and narrated monologue foregrounds an important issue in the novel: that of Rowland's accountability. Other crucial issues implicit in this extract include the whole question of the artist in society, the contrast between the creative and contemplative temperaments ("doing" and "knowing") and the related issue of the connection between the creative and the moral imagination; Rowland is to discover that the two do not necessarily co-exist.

Some central issues in the novel, then, are revealed here in the interplay of psycho-narration, narrated monologue, direct speech and narratorial comment. The passage also illustrates Rowland's characteristic mindset or ideolex: the careful, logical consideration and balancing of opposites — "her gain" ... "her young friend's loss" — and the judgmental contrast between frivolous indulgence (emphasised by the plethora of verbs such as "flattered, laughed, caressed") on the one hand, and the restraint and sobriety of "advise" on the other. At a later stage, Rowland's distrust of the frivolous or merely pleasurable is be assailed by the captivating charms of Rome, but he does not succumb with Roderick's joyous abandon.

Some significant emendations in the New York Edition of Roderick give greater precision to some of the effects created in this extract. The possible ambiguity in "It was a flirtation without the benefits of a flirtation" is dispelled by the addition of "for Roderick". Similarly, greater precision is attained by the addition of the word "right" after "She did everything but advise him" (NYE, 48). (Ironically, Roderick, as Rowland is yet to discover, has no penchant for being advised "right"; Rowland's later declaration that he is to "preach
[restraint] to my protege ... by example as well as by precept" (p. 81) is doomed to dramatic failure.) The impression of naivety in Rowland's view that "She was too old to let him fall in love with her" becomes one of arrogance or well-meaning prissiness in setting himself up as a moral arbiter in determining that "She was too old to make it quite exemplary she should let him [Roderick] fall in love with her". The change from "her inclination was to keep him young" to "it was her perversity to keep him notoriously fresh" is also indicative of a more condemnatory attitude on Rowland's part towards Cecilia (as this is narrated monologue rather than narrator's comment). The narrator's stance towards his protagonist becomes proportionately more critical, as is indicated in the change from "So Rowland reflected" to "So at least Rowland reflected" (NYE, 48), indicating a greater measure of ironic detachment on the narrator's part.

Rowland's decision to "transplant" Roderick to Rome is given new poignancy in a later scene where Rowland, having discussed with Mrs Hudson and Mary his vision of Roderick's prospects in Europe, is struck on his homeward walk with the beauty of the environment from which he is removing Roderick. In this passage, scenic description, psycho-narration and narrated monologue are closely interwoven as we move in and out of the figural mind.

The scenic description of "The great Northampton elms interarch[ing] far above in the darkness ..." (p. 92) moves virtually imperceptibly to an evocation of the impact of the scene on the figural consciousness and is interwoven with his recollections of the scene he had just participated in:

He had laughed and talked and braved it out in self-defence; but when he reflected that he was really meddling with the simple stillness of this little New England home, and that he had ventured to disturb so much living security in the interest of a
far-away fantastic hypothesis, he paused, amazed at his temerity. (p. 92)

Psycho-narration then shifts into narrated monologue: "It was true, as Cecilia had said, that for an unofficious man it was a singular position" and back into psycho-narration — "There stirred in his mind an odd feeling of annoyance with Roderick for having so peremptorily taken possession of his mind" — to suggest the charmed effect that Roderick has on him. This is followed by an evocation of his visual perception of the simple harmonious beauty of the Northampton homes:

As he looked up and down the long vista, and saw the clear white houses glancing here and there in the broken moonshine, he could almost have believed that the happiest lot for any man was to make the most of life in some such tranquil spot as that.

The clear white houses, objects of his perception, are invested with moral significance as narrated monologue is used to clarify what they symbolise for Rowland: "Here were kindness, comfort, safety, the warning voice of duty, the perfect absence of temptation". Although the narrated monologue mode suggests that this is Rowland's own interpretation, the implicit endorsement of the narratorial voice is sensed. The "clear white houses" seem to represent the ordered, harmonious, simple beauty of Northampton life which contrasts with the exuberant baroque splendour of Rome. Rowland is almost seduced into renouncing his scheme, but the qualification — "he could almost have believed" — indicates that he is not completely won over. The narratorial voice then links Rowland's thoughts with his perception of the outer world:

And as Rowland looked along the arch of silvered shadow and out into the lucid air of the American night, which seemed so doubly vast, somehow, and strange and nocturnal, he felt like declaring that here was beauty too — beauty sufficient for an artist not to starve upon it. (p. 92)
At this point we move out of the figural mind as visual and auditory perception predominates with the description of the irruption of the ebullient Roderick himself upon the scene. Rowland's momentary misgivings about his plan for Roderick are providentially dispelled by the appearance of the young sculptor himself singing a song which coincidentally echoes the comment made in the preceding scene by Mary about Rowland's advent being "like something in a fairy tale" taking the form of "carrying off my cousin in a golden cloud" (p. 91). Narrated monologue reappears here to "transcribe" Rowland's interpretation of Roderick's mood: "He was dreaming of the inspiration of foreign lands - of castled crags and historic landscapes. What a pity after all, thought Rowland, as he went his own way, that he shouldn't have a taste of it!" (p. 93).

Any incipient over-simplification in the contrasts evoked by the "international theme" are countered here by Rowland's recognition that the American way of life as represented by Northampton is not simply a negation or absence of all Europe has to offer, limited though it is in terms of cultural richness and diversity. Although "the complete contradiction of Northampton" (p. 107) is what Roderick later relishes in Rome, Rowland is sufficiently aware of the positive attributes of this tranquil, simpler yet potentially fulfilling way of life.

Although the use of the device of "analogous landscapes" is a well established novelistic convention, we see here that in the figural as opposed to the authorial mode the awareness of the analogy is ascribed to the focalizer: the interpretation of the symbolic setting is undertaken by the reflector rather than the narrator. Similarly, later, in the scene in the Alps, it is Rowland rather than the narrator who registers the potentially premonitory quality of the stormy atmosphere.
A good example of how presentation can oscillate from the authorial to the figural pole is found in chapter V, which opens three months after the departure from Northampton. Initially, the authorial mode dominates for "setting the scene" before the transition to dialogue between Rowland and Roderick and later summary psycho-narration as the gap created by the ellipsis is filled by the evocation of the experience of those first three months in Europe through Rowland's recollections: "One warm still day, late in the Roman autumn, our two young men were sitting beneath one of the high-stemmed pines of the Villa Ludovisi" (p. 103). The authorial mode is reinforced by the use of the distancing appellation "our two young men" and the subsequent "objective" description of the Ludovisi Gardens by the narrator rather than through a depiction of Rowland's impressions. After a passage of dialogue in which Roderick and Rowland discuss their experiences of the past three months, a transition is effected to summary psycho-narration as Rowland "looked back on these animated weeks" (p. 105-6). In James's own terminology, this is an example of "scene" followed by "picture"; in this case a "picture" structured by "foreshortening" as it is a condensed account of Rowland's three months' experience with the salient points foregrounded.

The predominant mode of the next three pages is psycho-narration, employed to depict Rowland's perception of the changes in Roderick and his own high expectations of Roderick's artistic career - intermingled with vague stirrings of premonitory concern for his future development. There are momentary shifts to narrated monologue for observations such as: "Surely youth and genius hand in hand were the most beautiful sight in the world" (p. 107). The narratorial voice is not completely eclipsed and manifests itself in gnomic utterances such as "But we must live as our pulses are timed" (discussed earlier) and observations on Rome such as "And indeed
Rome is the natural home of those spirits with which we just now claimed friendship for Roderick" (p. 108). Another generalisation here — in the past tense as opposed to the gnomic present — is clearly not sponsored by the narrator and indeed reveals Rowland’s capacity for self-delusion:

[Roderick] gave Rowland to understand that he meant to live freely and largely and be as interested as occasion demanded. Rowland saw no reason to regard this as a menace of grossness, because in the first place there was in all dissipation, refine it as one might, a vulgarity which would disqualify it for Roderick’s favour; and because in the second the young sculptor was a man to regard all things in the light of his art, to hand over his passions to his genius to be dealt with, and to find that he could live largely without exceeding the circle of pure delights. (p. 108)

The use of narrated monologue here establishes these two "truisms" as emanating from Rowland. He is to be disabused of both these illusions in the course of the novel: Roderick’s Baden-Baden escapade is the first of many indications that the "vulgarity" of such dissipation is in fact no deterrent, "refine it as [Rowland] might". Roderick's ostensible capacity to "hand over his passions to his genius to be dealt with" and "transmute all his impressions into production" (p. 108) is proved to be illusory.

Rowland's blithe confidence here is set in the ironic context of the narrator's greater insight and highlighted by the dramatic irony of Roderick's subsequent irresponsible self-indulgence at Baden-Baden. Even after Baden-Baden Rowland endeavours to convince himself that Roderick could benefit ultimately from the experience: "Rowland said at last that such experiments might pass if one felt one was really the wiser for them. "By the wiser," he added, "I mean the stronger in purpose, in will" (p. 138).
Roderick's reply seems to lend credence to Cecilia's warning about the influence of circumstances on Roderick: "Oh don't talk about the will!" Roderick answered ... "Who can answer for his will? Who can say beforehand that it's strong? ... It all depends upon circumstances".

The New York Edition presents Rowland in a more critical light: "By the wiser," he sententiously added "..." (NYE, 140), emphasising the difference between the two on all essential moral issues. At a later stage Rowland is obliged to re-examine all these assumptions: "Do what he would, Rowland could not think of Roderick's theory of unlimited experimentation, especially as applied in the case under discussion, as anything but a pernicious illusion" (p. 192).

The protracted excursion into Rowland's consciousness afforded here by psycho-narration and narrated monologue is abruptly terminated by the appearance of Mrs Light; the narrative mode shifts into a detailed account of the ensuing scene and subsequent animated discussion of the "vision" by Roderick and Rowland.

V: THE IMAGISTIC MODE IN REPRESENTATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN RODERICK

In Roderick, the imagistic mode in the representation of consciousness occurs more frequently in psycho-narration than in narrated monologue, indicating the narrator's control in presenting the character's thought-processes. In The Portrait, and particularly in the later Golden Bowl, conceptualisation through metaphor is assigned more consistently to the reflector (the experiencing rather than the narrating consciousness) and is thus found more frequently in narrated monologue. The imagistic mode in the representation of consciousness in Roderick is the central focus of this section.
Conceptualisation through metaphor implies a process whereby clarification of situations, relationships, experiences, ideas and attitudes, is attained through the crystallisation of insights in vivid images or emblematic intuitions which can take the form of complex psycho-analogies. A related activity is that whereby the symbolic import of an event or situation is perceived. As has been indicated, it is often the reflector rather than the narrator in Roderick who registers the symbolic import of a scene.

An important scene which is invested with symbolic significance by Rowland's perception and interpretation of it is that of the artist's party where Rowland, in his emblematic position as observer on the sidelines ready to intervene if necessary (sometimes in a *deus ex machina* capacity, as in the scene at the Coliseum) is confronted with a striking tableau:

> he was struck by the group formed by the three men. They were standing before Roderick's statue of Eve.... Rowland stood looking on, for the group struck him with its picturesque symbolism. Roderick, bearing the lamp and glowing in its radiant circle, seemed a beautiful image of a genius which combined sincerity with power. Gloriani, with his head on one side, pulling his long moustache and looking keenly from half-closed eyes at the lighted marble, represented art with a worldly motive, skill unleavened by faith, the mere base maximum of cleverness. Poor little Singleton, on the other side, with his hands behind him, his head thrown back and his eyes following devoutly the course of Roderick's explanations, might pass for an embodiment of aspiring candour afflicted with feebleness of wing. (p. 127-28)

The composition of the tableau is such that the special lighting effect focuses all attention on the central figure of Roderick. At this stage of his career the reader endorses Rowland's interpretation of his symbolic status: he does indeed seem to be the epitome of the romantic creative genius bearing the lamp to guide
the lesser luminaries clustered around him. Roderick is often associated with the symbolism of light; there are various references to his possessing "the sacred fire" (for example, pp. 70, 215) and ironically, when his powers start declining, he refers in a conversation with Rowland to "poor fellows whose candles burnt out in a night" (p. 196).

Another significant network of imagery is introduced here in Rowland's interpretation of Singleton as representing "aspiring candour afflicted with feebleness of wing". At this stage Roderick seems to be the one about to soar above lesser mortals; indeed, in a later scene we find Rowland reflecting "It was reassuring to hear that Roderick in his own view was but 'just beginning' to spread his wings" (p. 161). However, the image complex takes a new twist when Roderick, in justifying his conduct with Christina and refusing to accept the curbs Rowland attempts to impose, claims that "If you want a bird to sing, you must not cover its cage" (p. 192). Rowland applies the same image in reflecting upon Christina's valiant effort to thwart her mother's mercenary ambitions and renounce plans for marrying her off to Prince Casamassima. Here the image occurs in narrated monologue:

Rowland thought with horror of the sinister compulsion to which the young girl was apparently still to be subjected. In this ethereal flight of her moral nature there was a certain painful effort and tension of wing; but it was none the less piteous to imagine her being rudely jerked down to the base earth. (p. 311)

A week after the triumphant party, when Roderick, in despair, tells Rowland "I have struck a shallow! I have been sailing bravely, but for the last day or two my keel has been grinding the bottom" (p. 129), the imagistic mode again permeates Rowland's reflections, which are rendered in psycho-narration. His observation that "He
might have fancied that the fatal hour foretold by Gloriani had struck" links with the recurrent imagery of the inexorable ticking of a timepiece which is applied with such different effect to the diligent labours of Singleton; near the end of the novel, Roderick observes to Singleton that "You remind me of a watch that never runs down. If one listens hard one hears you always - tic-tic, tic-tic" (p. 361). In grappling with the problem of loss of creative inspiration he asks Rowland "What if the watch should run down ... and you should lose the key?" (p. 195). Imagery such as this, which occurs in psycho-narration as well as in direct speech, differs from that employed in the authorial mode (as represented by George Eliot, for example) in that it is used in the presentation of the thought or speech of a character rather than that of the narratorial voice.

The network of imagery connected with a voyage is also employed in various modes - in psycho-narration, narrated monologue and direct speech. When Roderick speaks of having struck a shallow we recall that Rowland had spoken of his enterprise as "launching Roderick": "I have launched you, as I may say ... and I feel as if I ought to see you into port "(p. 78). The contrast between Roderick and Singleton's mode of production is indicated by Rowland's observation to the painter that "You sail nearer the shore, but you sail in smoother waters" (p. 171), unlike "so many of the aesthetic fraternity who were floundering in unknown seas" (p. 117).

Although this pattern of imagery is often employed in direct speech it is also incorporated into Rowland's reflections. In Roderick, however, imagery is less pervasive in the modes of psycho-narration and narrated monologue than in spoken discourse. (In later novels, imagery becomes a more pervasive integral component of thought representation as the reflectors acquire the capacity to "think for themselves", and exploit the
cognitive force of metaphor.) In the passage of psycho-narration embedded in the dialogue between Roderick and Rowland here the sea image reappears in conjunction with other significant recurrent images:

Rowland was perplexed. He was in a situation of a man who has been riding a blood-horse at a steady elastic gallop, and of a sudden feels him stumble and balk. As yet he reflected, he had seen nothing but the sunshine of genius; he had forgotten that it has its storms. Of course it has! And he felt a flood of comradeship rise in his heart which would float them both safely through the worst weather. (p. 129)

Here psycho-narration modulates to narrated monologue — "Of course it has!" — to suggest that Rowland is trying to convince himself that Roderick's being "grounded" or immobilised is temporary and simply part of a predictable pattern. "Sunshine" must inevitably alternate with "storms". This image is proleptic in that it foreshadows the scene of Roderick's death in the storm in the Alps; we recall too that Rowland "enjoyed Roderick's serene efflorescence as he would have done a beautiful summer sunrise" (p. 108) — an essentially evanescent phenomenon.

The contrast between Rowland's generous comradeship and Roderick's egotistical self-absorption is hinted at by the use of a similar image at the artist's party, prior to this exchange, where we find "[Roderick] was floating on the tide of his deep self-confidence" (p. 128). Rowland's "flood of comradeship" is less efficacious than he realises as a re-launching or buoyancy-promoting medium for someone who is essentially self-contained. The image recurs with poignant force near the end of the novel when, in an anguished passage of psycho-narration interwoven with narrated monologue, a transformation in Rowland's seemingly imperturbable benevolence is evoked: "He felt conscious of a sudden collapse in his moral energy; a current that had been
flowing for two years with liquid strength seemed at last to pause and stagnate" (p. 369).

Another image of note in this extract is that drawing an analogy between Rowland and a man riding a high-spirited horse which suddenly stumbles and stalls. The sentence following "Rowland was perplexed" is of uncertain designation in this context as it could be either the narrator's comment on Rowland's position or Rowland's own imagistic conception of his experience rendered in narrated monologue.

Ironically, the image recurs in one of Roderick's outbursts on the precarious nature of creative genius where he states to Rowland that "Nothing is more common than for an artist who has set out on his journey on a high-stepping horse to find himself all of a sudden dismounted and invited to go his way on foot" (p. 196).

In association, the two variations on the image are significant in that in each case the person formulating the image sees himself as the rider in control of a spirited but sometimes recalcitrant mount. The image dramatises Rowland's conception of his role as being one of both spurring on and applying salutary curbs when deemed necessary, and could be linked with the implications of his name, "Mallet", in bringing to the fore his attempt to mould Roderick according to his own conception of the true artist.

Just as narrated monologue is the mode employed here to foreground the way Rowland clings with relief to a neat if implausible explanation of Roderick's behaviour as a phenomenon characterising all men of genius, so at the end of this chapter it is a rhetorical question in narrated monologue which highlights Rowland's naive faith that Roderick's moral values are after all in accord with his own: "And then - and then - was it not in itself a guarantee against folly to be engaged to Mary Garland?" (p. 131).
The interaction of psycho-narration, narrated monologue and narratorial comment is exploited to evoke Rowland's state of mental turmoil in a passage which culminates in the dramatic imagistic portrayal of his "temptation". His mood of bitter disillusionment is rendered in psycho-narration:

He was sore at heart, and as the days went past the soreness deepened rather than healed. He felt as if he had a complaint against fortune; good-natured as he was, his good nature this time quite declined to let it pass. (p. 249)

With a shift into narrated monologue we are given a more detailed rendering of his actual thoughts:

He had tried to be wise, he had tried to be kind, he had engaged in an admirable enterprise; but his wisdom, his kindness, his energy, had been thrown back in his face. (p. 249)

There is a fusion of inner and outer reality, a sense of weaving in and out of the character's mind, as descriptions of his actions and perceptions of his surroundings are interspersed with portrayal of his psychological or spiritual state:

He went to the Pitti Palace, and Raphael's Madonna of the Chair seemed in its soft serenity to mock him with the suggestion of unattainable repose. He lingered on the bridges at sunset and knew that the light was enchanting and the mountains were divine, but there seemed to be something horribly invidious and unwelcome in the fact. (p. 250)

Representation of his thoughts later modulates back into psycho-narration to focus on his state of mind:

He felt, in a word, like a man who has been cruelly defrauded and who wishes to have his revenge. Life owed him, he thought, a compensation, and he should be restless and resentful until he found it. He knew - or he seemed to know - where he should find it; but he hardly told himself, and thought of the thing under protest, as a man in want of money may think of certain funds that he holds in trust ...
the idea of concrete compensation in a word - shaped itself sooner or later into the image of Mary Garland. (p. 250)

The monetary image used here is significant; the very fact that his notion of "compensation" in the form of Mary Garland is couched in monetary terms suggests a fundamental flaw in his reasoning, as human emotion can hardly be reduced to or calculated in terms of mercenary notions such as profit and loss, defrauding and compensation. (The intercalated "He knew - or he seemed to know -" indicates the narrator's ironic stance here.)

Although monetary images often occur in the novel, they are most frequently used with reference to Roderick's artistic talent, and usually in dialogue as opposed to psycho-narration or narrated monologue. After Baden-Baden, for example, Rowland advises Roderick "If you have got facility, revere it, respect it, adore it, hoard it - don't speculate on it" (p. 138). Later, when he feels his inspiration is running out, Roderick asks "Who shall assure me that my credit is for an unlimited sum?" (p. 196) and after completing the bust of his mother, "Well, I have paid the filial debt handsomely" (p. 277). An earlier example of monetary imagery occurring in psycho-narration is where

He [Rowland] wondered gloomily at any rate whether for men of his companion's large easy power there was not a larger moral law than for narrow mediocrities like himself, who, yielding Nature a meagre interest on her investment (such as it was), had no reason to expect from her this affectionate laxity as to their accounts. (p. 170)

In the extract under discussion the image acquires new configurations as Rowland conceives of his disappointment in terms of being "defrauded" and needing a compensatory award in the shape of Mary.

At this point the vocal narrator, anticipating a sceptical response in the reader, intervenes to dissipate
possible misinterpretation:

Very odd, you may say, that at this time of day Rowland should still be brooding over a girl of no brilliancy, of whom he had had but the lightest of glimpses two years before; very odd that so deep an impression should have been made by so lightly pressed an instrument. We must admit the oddity, and remark simply in explanation that his sentiment apparently belonged to that species of emotion of which by the testimony of the poets the very name and essence are oddity. (p. 250)

This form of direct address to the reader in which the narrator discusses the character behind his back, as it were, or more specifically, discusses the plausibility of his reactions or conduct (and thus, obliquely, his own narrative technique) is rarely found in such overt form in the later novels. The comments of the narrator here echo those of the empirical author in his Preface where similar misgivings are expressed:

though there was no reason on earth ... why Rowland should not, at Northampton, have conceived a passion, or as near an approach to one as he was capable of for a remarkable young woman there suddenly dawning on his sight, a particular fundamental care was required for the vivification of that possibility. The care, unfortunately, has not been skilfully enough taken, in spite of the later patching-up of the girl's figure. We fail to accept it, on actual showing, as that of a young person irresistible at any moment, and above all irresistible at a moment of the liveliest other preoccupation, as that of the weaver of ...[the] spell that the narrative imputes to her. The spell of attraction is cast upon young men by young women in all sorts of ways, and the novel has no more constant office than to remind us of that. But Mary Garland's way does n't, indubitably, convince us; any more than we are truly convinced, I think, that Rowland's destiny, or say his nature, would have made him accessible at the same hour to two quite distinct commotions, each a very deep one, of his whole personal economy. (AN, p. 17)

The reader, of course, may feel that this preemptive action on the part of the narrator — and
retrospective recuperative stance, incorporating the scepticism of hindsight, on the part of the author – are quite uncalled-for, and that indeed there is no violation of plausibility in Rowland's falling in love with a girl so eminently suited to his temperament. The narrator's attempt to achieve a "suspension of disbelief" in the reader through an invocation of appropriately eminent literary precedents – the effusions of lyric poets on the subject of romantic love – might strike one as unnecessarily arch.

In the New York Edition the last sentence is replaced with a narratorial generalisation – "It is of the very nature of such impressions, however, to show a total never represented by the mere sum of their constituent parts" (NYE, 313) – which appeals to accepted wisdom for authentication rather than relying on the authority of illustrious literary precedents to elicit the reader's concurrence.

An element of the meta-fictional seems to be lurking here: a blurring of boundaries between statements in the empirical author's Preface on the one hand and the narrator's fictive world on the other. (This phenomenon was discussed in Chapter I.)

The fusion of inner and outer reality, with psycho-narration alternating with narrative report to create the effect of weaving in and out of the figural mind – incorporating portrayal of ambient atmosphere with evocation of Rowland's mental state – is vividly illustrated in the continuation of the extract cited above:

One night he slept but half an hour; he found his thoughts taking a turn which excited him portentously. He walked up and down his room half the night. It looked out on the Arno; the noise of the river came in at the open window; he felt like dressing and going down into the streets. Towards morning he flung himself into a chair; though he was wide awake he was less excited. It seemed to him that he saw his idea from the outside, that he
judged it and condemned it; yet it stood there
before him, very distinct, and in a certain way
imperious. (p. 250)

The metaphorical presentation of the temptation
embodied in Rowland's "idea" takes on different
configurations: "His idea persisted; it clung to him like
a sturdy beggar" (p. 251). The expulsion of this
importunate presence is finally achieved in the scene in
the monastery garden where Rowland, in conversation with
a monk, identifies it as "the Devil" which has been
successfully "conquered" (p. 252-53).

Psycho-narration, as Dorrit Cohn points out, is the
mode best suited to the portrayal of visions or
hallucinatory dimensions of experience; this is
exemplified in the following section where the evocation
of the temptation to which Roderick is exposed is vividly
achieved through psycho-narration modulating into
narrated monologue for the ostensibly rhetorical self­
justificatory question "but if death were decreed, why
should not the agony be brief?"

The sense of the matter, roughly expressed, was
this. If Roderick were really going, as he himself
had phrased it, to 'fizzle out', one might help him
on the way – one might smooth the descensus Averni.
For forty-eight hours there swam before Rowland's
eyes a vision of Roderick, graceful and beautiful as
he passed, plunging like a diver into a misty gulf.
The gulf was destruction, annihilation, death; but
if death were decreed, why should not the agony be
brief? (p. 251)

After an introductory statement in the narratorial
voice, the imagistic mode predominates. The proleptic
image of Roderick "plunging like a diver into a misty
gulf" foreshadows his death plunge in the Alps later,
where we find that "He had fallen from a great height ... and his clothes and his hair were as wet as if the
billows of the ocean had flung him upon the strand"
(p. 386). The recurrence of the image reanimates the
question of Rowland's accountability: although in this temptation scene he does successfully resist the impulse to hasten Roderick's "descensus Averni" - even making the suggestion later that Roderick send for Mrs Hudson and Mary in an attempt to revive the relationship and "save" him - we are alerted to the possibility of his indirectly precipitating Roderick's fall by exposing him in their last confrontation to the full revelation of his heartless egoism. (At the conclusion of their last interview Roderick declares "I am fit only to be alone. I am damned!" (p. 379) before setting off on his walk.)

The fusion of the literal and the metaphorical in the image of Rowland's "fall" is also foreshadowed in an earlier warning given to Roderick by Rowland after observing the effect on him of the news of Christina's engagement to Prince Casamassima: "You are standing on the edge of a gulf. If you suffer this accident to put you out, you take the plunge" (p. 244) and in Roderick's declaration to Rowland that "If I hadn't come to Rome I wouldn't have risen, and if I hadn't risen I wouldn't have fallen" (p. 329).

Rowland's rationalisation, rendered in narrated monologue, "but if death were decreed, why should not the agony be brief?" is particularly ironic in view of his own previously expressed confidence in the power of the will and rejection of the notion of "destiny" operating independently of human action or volition. His formulation "if death were decreed ..." has overtones of predestination - an appeal to the notion of which would be a diabolically devious method of self-exculpation.

Another image, that of the magic lantern projecting the elusive figure of Mary, reflects the object Rowland wishes to attain. This is followed by the macabre notion of being cruelly kind by hastening the merciful end of a man being burnt at the stake:
When of old a man was burnt at the stake it was cruel to have to be present; but if one were present it was a charity to lend a hand to pile up the fuel and make the flames do their worst quickly and the smoke muffle up the victim. With all deference to your charity, this was perhaps an obligation you would especially feel if you had a reversionary interest in something the victim was to leave behind. (p. 251)

The last sentence seems to shift out of narrated monologue and to be suffused with the more ironically detached presence of the narratorial voice; this creates an effect of mock-ventriloquism as he parodies Rowland's unuttered thoughts, inserting a submerged comment on his self-interest posing as charitable impulse. In the New York Edition, "with all deference to your charity" becomes "And it didn't diminish the charity" (NYE, 315), which suggests a continuation of self-justificatory narrated monologue and less overt or audible presence of the narrator.

At the end of the novel, it is Rowland as figural consciousness who again seems to register the symbolic import of the storm-laden Alpine atmosphere on behalf of the narrator. The temporal deictic "to-day" in "the air was oppressively heavy .... Today ... the white summits were invisible; their heads were muffled in sullen clouds and the valleys beneath them curtained in dun-coloured mist" (p. 368) reinforces the impression that it is the central reflector rather than the narrator through whom the scene is focalized. (In a sense the term "pathetic fallacy" takes on new connotations here as it is the central reflector and not the narrator who registers the analogy between the landscape and the emotions at play in this scene.)

In a continuation of this image one page further on we have "Rowland looked away at the sallow vapours on the mountains; their dreariness had an analogy with the stale residuum of his own generosity" (p. 369). Punctuation is particularly significant here as a colon between the two
parts of the sentence would indicate that the formulation of the analogy between Rowland's state of mind and the landscape was probably his own, expressed in narrated monologue; the semicolon leaves open the possibility that this might be psycho-narration.

As in *The Portrait* and *The Golden Bowl*, moments of intense revelatory insight are conveyed through dramatic, often hallucinatory images. In all these novels light imagery, suggesting sudden illumination, predominates, but whereas in the later novels narrated monologue is the predominant mode for this range of cognitive imagery, in *Roderick*, these images tend to occur more frequently in psycho-narration. Thus we find, when Mary Garland asks Rowland to endanger his own life by setting out to search for Roderick, "The question seemed to him a flash intenser than the lightning that was raking in the sky before them. It shattered his dream that he weighed in the scale!" (p. 382). His illusions about Mary's possibly rewarding him for his devotion are finally shattered.

In the New York Edition this image acquires rather melodramatic overtones: "The question struck him as a flash intenser than when the jaws of the night opened to the whiteness of a thousand teeth" (NYE, 517). On the other hand, this image, with its possible reference to an all-engulfing leviathan, is perhaps calculated to link with that of a tempestuous sea which follows: "But before he could answer the tempest was in possession and the rain, about them, like the sound of the deeps about a ship's side". The fusion of the literal and metaphoric references to the disastrous wreck of Roderick's career is thus proleptic, foreshadowing the discovery of Roderick's drenched body lying "as if the billows of the ocean had flung him upon the strand" (p. 386).

At the conclusion of the novel, the revised version again deploys the imagistic mode of psycho-narration more fully to portray Rowland's sense of arid desolation. In
the original edition we find an echo of Othello in the statement that "Now that all was over Rowland understood how exclusively, for two years, Roderick had filled his life. His occupation was gone" (p. 387). In the New York Edition the theatre imagery recurs, appropriately, to portray Rowland's state of mind:

Now that all was over Rowland understood how up to the brim, for two years, his personal world had been filled. It looked to him at present as void and blank and sinister as a theatre bankrupt and closed. (NYE, 526)

At the conclusion of Roderick Hudson, Rowland is depicted as undergoing a process of bitter soul-searching as he watches over his friend's body in a seven-hour vigil. In trying to understand the disastrous end of his enterprise he is portrayed as weighing up a series of anguished hypotheses, trying to reason it all out. In a sense his vigil adumbrates and forms a significant comparison with Isabel's more famous midnight vigil where, in a process of "motionlessly seeing", she attempts to understand her situation. In Isabel's more extended introspective vigil the imagistic mode predominates; she is depicted not as puzzling things out through ratiocination but through being "assailed" by vivid and dramatic images.

As indicated in the comments comparing the original and the revised versions of Roderick, the later New York Edition is characterised by a greater infusion of imagery. The tendency to move away from the abstract to the more metaphorical is exemplified throughout James's later work, but what is most pertinent to this study is the increasing predominance of the metaphoric mode in the representation of consciousness. Just as James's novels trace, in different ways and with varying degrees of intensity, the "milestones on the road of so much inward or apprehensive life" for their respective protagonists, so each novel in itself marks a significant "milestone"
in the author's representation of "so much inward ... life". As we shall see, there is an increasing tendency to refract the action of the novel through the consciousness of the central reflector(s). Concomitantly, the metaphoric mode becomes progressively more closely interfused with the modes for representing consciousness.

We have seen that in Roderick imagery is most concentrated in narratorial comment and dialogue; in subsequent novels the imagery becomes more predominant in psycho-narration (in *The Portrait*) and narrated monologue (*The Golden Bowl*). The cognitive force of metaphor is also more fully demonstrated in the later novels, where conceptualisation through imagery is engaged in by the reflector rather than by the narrator. This development is traced in the following chapters.
1. *Watch and Ward*, published in 1871, is in fact James's first novel, but was not included in the revised New York Edition of 1908.


8. Other functions of metaphor which could be profitably explored in James's work but which fall beyond the scope of this study would include (apart from the general thematic function of heightening the significance of a passage and emphasising a structurally important action, situation, or gesture): the use of imagery for characterisation, for foreshadowing future events (proleptic imagery) and rendering concrete what is abstract. Some of these functions are implicit in the present focus: the way a character attains understanding through imagery would include rendering concrete what is abstract, and imagery used to evoke the way in which people conceive of each other would encompass the role of imagery in characterisation.


Carolina Press, 1977) and Austin Warren, "Henry James: Symbolic Imagery in the Later Novels" in Rage for Order: Essays in Criticism (1948). Matthiessen, in "The Painter's Brush and Varnish Bottle", the appendix to Henry James: The Major Phase (1944; rpt. New York: Oxford U.P., 1970), has commented on "the growth from ideas to images" (p. 158) resulting from James's revisions, and has noted that "one of his most recurrent types of revision [is] endowing his dramatis personae with characterizing images" (p. 159). These works on imagery tend to be early studies; more recent criticism has developed different emphases.

11 Hereafter referred to as Roderick, in keeping with James's own practice in his Prefaces. Page references are to the Penguin Classics edition, 1986, which is a reprint of the 1878 text (James's revision of the origin serial version published in the Atlantic Monthly (January to December 1875). As the novel was extensively revised for the New York Edition, the original text of James's "first" novel was selected in this instance. Comparisons between the two versions are mentioned when relevant.


13 Stanzel cites James's Strether in The Ambassadors as being one of the earliest representatives of figural narration; he fails to take cognisance of the earlier Roderick.


15 The theatre imagery in the above extract forms part of a network of such images contributing to the presentation of some of the central issues of the novel. Related images recur frequently in psycho-narration and narrated monologue, less frequently in direct speech. In describing Christina, Rowland declares to Madame Grandoni that "the girl is so deucedly dramatic ... that I don't know what coup de théâtre she may have in store for us" (p. 285), and in a letter to Cecilia: "She is an actress, she couldn't forego doing the thing dramatically, and it was the dramatic touch that made it fatal.... she desired to have the curtain drop on an attitude ..." (p. 239). His first impression of Christina - "Rowland received an impression that for reasons of her own she was playing a part" (p. 147) - takes on darker resonances when Rowland realises that she has been coerced into marrying Prince Casamassima: "The dark little drama of
which he had caught a glimpse had played itself out" (p. 317). Theatre imagery also dramatises Rowland's insight into his friend's character in the revised New York Edition, presented here in narrated monologue: "Of his never thinking of others save as they figured in his own drama ["game" in the original version] this extraordinary insensitivity to the injurious effects of his eloquence was a capital example" (NYE, 429). Rowland views himself essentially as stage manager rather than hero of the play, with the vivid presences of Roderick and Christina as those of the centre stage (ironically, both are subject to powerful influences behind the scenes).

16 Another significant change is that Roderick's comment on "all kinds of indefinable currents moving to and fro between one's will and one's inclination... It all depends on circumstances" becomes "all kinds of uncanny underhand currents moving to and fro between one's will and the rest of one - one's imagination in particular.... my imagination and my conscience are much nearer together..." (NYE, 141).
CHAPTER 4:
FROM AUTHORIAL TO FIGURAL: THE PORTRAIT OF A LADY

"Place the Centre of the Subject in the Young Woman's Own Consciousness"

I: AUTHORIAL VS. FIGURAL NARRATION IN THE CREATION OF "INSIDE VIEWS"

James's Preface to The Portrait unequivocally establishes that his primary concern is depicting the developing consciousness of his central reflector, Isabel Archer. As in Roderick, the emphasis is less on his protagonist's "adventures" as such than on "her sense of them, her sense for them" (AN, p. 56). However, in spite of his declared intention to "Place the centre of the subject in the young woman's own consciousness" (AN, p. 51), opinions differ as to the consistency with which he adhered to this approach. Whereas James has been considered by some to have created in Isabel Archer "a center of consciousness comparable in intensity to what he later created in Lambert Strether", others have criticised his authorial stance as being that of "the benevolent, omniscient author familiar to us from Victorian fiction".

In a sense, both these claims have a certain validity. In the early sections of the novel the intrusive omniscient narrator is very much in evidence, introducing, analysing, commenting on the characters and generally guiding the reader's response (often addressing the reader directly in the first person). Gradually, however, the preponderantly authorial mode of the early section modulates into more sustained figural narration as events are filtered more consistently through the consciousness of the central reflector, Isabel. By the end of the novel Isabel could with greater justification
be described as approximating the status of "a center of consciousness comparable in intensity" to Strether. However, this status is not consistently maintained; we note that although Strether is "on stage" throughout The Ambassadors, Isabel, unlike both Strether and Rowland Mallet, is excluded from many significant scenes throughout the novel and is indeed absent from the very last scene.

The movement from authorial to figural narration that Stanzel delineates in terms of the historical development of the novel can be observed in microcosm in The Portrait, with its gradual withdrawal of the authorial narrator, so vociferous in the early sections of the novel, and the concomitant increasing prominence of the central reflector. Whereas in the early sections of the novel both the protagonist and subsidiary characters are presented primarily through the narrator, a change in technique of presentation is introduced in chapters XVII-XXXV where the shift from the authorial to the figural mode becomes more evident. At the beginning of the novel we see Isabel as the narrator - and Ralph - see her; in chapter XVIII, the perspective changes, and we see through Isabel's eyes as she encounters first Madame Merle and then Osmond. Focalization alters, then, as Isabel moves closer to becoming a centre of consciousness.

This shift is implemented gradually, however; after three years of marriage to Osmond, Isabel is revealed to the reader "framed in the doorway" by Rosier's focalizing vision. This view of her is then juxtaposed with the far more penetrating observation of Ralph before we are given access to Isabel's own consciousness in chapter XL, preparatory to more intensive immersion in chapter XLII. Isabel's perspective then prevails for the latter section of the novel.

In the early sections Isabel's perception is often supplemented or rectified by that of the narrator: her
view of Caspar, for example, is placed in perspective by the narrator's own "portrait" which is prefaced by the comment that "the reader has a right to a nearer and a clearer view" (I, 163). Similarly, Isabel's limited understanding of Ralph is indicated by the narrator's observation that "The reader already knows more about him than Isabel was ever to know ... " (II, 146). By contrast, in her last confrontation with Madame Merle (in the convent) Isabel's perception of her erst-while friend is neither directly rectified by the narrator nor indirectly qualified by irony, as in her first encounters with that lady.

Stylistically, the shift from authorial to figural narration is reflected (in Stanzel's terminology) in the displacement of "thought report" by "free indirect style" in the presentation of consciousness: whereas the psychological portrait of Isabel in the early part of the novel is characterized by direct narratorial comment, this is gradually superseded by presentation dominated by narrated monologue in which the narrator's voice is merged with that of the figural consciousness.

II: THE CENTRE OF CONSCIOUSNESS/CENTRAL REFLECTOR AND THE "SATELLITES": DISTRIBUTION OF INNER VIEWS

James's comments in the Preface lead one to expect that presentation in The Portrait will be that of single focalisation, comparable to that employed in Roderick. However, in spite of Isabel's functioning as a centre of consciousness, in the course of the novel we enter the consciousness of every major character and most of the subsidiary characters, if only briefly.

On the other hand, from closer consideration of the context of James's pronouncement on "plac[ing] the centre of the subject in the young woman's own consciousness", 
it emerges that his technique of deploying subsidiary "reflectors" is indeed obliquely indicated. Using the image of a balance, James explains his design to put the heaviest weight into that scale, which will be so largely the scale of her relation to herself.... Place meanwhile in the other scale the lighter weight ... press least hard ... on the consciousness of [the] heroine's satellites, especially the male. (AN, p. 51)

Although it is generally recognized that James makes use of Ralph (the most important of his heroine's "satellites") as a subsidiary "lucid reflector", little attention has been paid to the stylistic means whereby this "press[ing] least hard on the consciousness of [the] heroine's satellites" has been implemented. Dorrit Cohn's model can clearly contribute greater precision here. Using her model, it is demonstrable that "put[ting] the heaviest weight into the scale" of Isabel's own consciousness entails giving greater access to her perceptual and conceptual world, access which is afforded through the three modes of presentation of consciousness: psycho-narration, narrated monologue and quoted monologue. A greater intermixture of these techniques of presentation can therefore be discerned in the portrayal of Isabel than in that of her "satellites". Furthermore, psycho-narration, with its more marked narratorial presence, is generally the mode used for portraying the inner world of subsidiary characters; the mode of narrated monologue is employed less frequently for the depiction of the inner world of characters other than Isabel and, to a lesser degree, Ralph.

Although it is difficult to determine distribution of inside views with mathematical or statistical precision (and it might be of dubious desirability, were it feasible) careful reading of the text reveals that "press[ing] least hard on the consciousness of the heroine's satellites, especially the male" is
stylistically reflected in proportionately meagre access to the consciousness of these subsidiary characters through the three designated modes. By contrast, Ralph, as supplementary reflector, is accorded many extended passages of psycho-narration, narrated monologue and - albeit to a lesser degree - quoted monologue, particularly in the first two-thirds of the novel. Indeed, examination of the "distribution of inner views and the rhythm of their occurrence" (Stanzel, p. 258) reveals that in the first section of the novel (the first seventeen chapters) Ralph's perspective is as much in evidence as Isabel's, and throughout the novel we are accorded greater access to his point of view than to that of any other subsidiary character. In effect, he is "the novel's central observer and its second center of consciousness" (Ora Segal, p. 34).

Thus, although the growth of Isabel's consciousness is the focus of interest, James employs Ralph as an ancillary "intense perceiver" to complement the consciousness of the protagonist. Ralph, as subsidiary "lucid reflector" is indeed at the outset endowed with more lucidity and insight than Isabel herself. His function is more than that of a mere "ficelle", like Henrietta Stackpole; he provides valuable insight into Osmond's real character which anticipates and throws into dramatic relief the subsequent discoveries of Isabel herself. (Ralph's surname, Touchett, suggests a touchstone or criterion of truth in terms of which Isabel's own perceptions may be judged.)

Isabel's "subjective adventure" (AN, p. 157) during which, like Maisie, she is subjected to "the strain of observation and the assault of experience" (AN, p. 147), is essentially a "process of vision". For Isabel, as for Fleda Vetch, and indeed in varying degrees for all James's protagonists, "the progress and march of [the] tale became ... that of her understanding" (AN, p. 128). In this process of discovery and enlightenment Isabel
overcomes her deficiencies of understanding and perception and ultimately achieves an approximation of Ralph's perspective as she shares his "illumination of wisdom" (II, 60). The process of vision here involves a convergence of Isabel's view with that of Ralph and, to a lesser degree, of others who were previously "in the know". This process culminates at the point where Isabel and Ralph are finally united in "looking at the truth together" (II, 414).

Ralph's perspective, however, is not the only complementary view offered us. What Isabel perceives and understands is enmeshed in a closely patterned network of parallels and contrasts with the perceptions of the other subsidiary characters. Indeed, James stresses the importance of placing "the more deeply wondering ... the really sentient" (AN, p. 62) in combination with those less perceptive characters who lack "the finer grain". In his Preface to The Princess Casamassima he states:

I never see the leading human interest of any human hazard but in a consciousness (on the part of the moved and moving creature) subject to fine intensification and wide enlargement. It is as mirrored in that consciousness that the gross fools, the headlong fools, the fatal fools play their part for us — they have much less to show us in themselves. (AN, p. 67)

Although not all subsidiary characters can be fitted into one or other of these categories of "fools", their role is primarily one of interaction with those capable of a continuously expanding consciousness — in this case Isabel. The "lucid reflector", then, is seen in conjunction with a constellation of lesser luminaries, who represent a range of perceptiveness varying from those who are much less perceptive than Isabel herself to Ralph, who is endowed with the greatest acuity and insight.

The spectrum encompasses positions as diverse as Mrs Touchett's surprisingly astute observation that "there's
nothing in life to prevent her marrying Mr. Osmond if she only looks at him in a certain way" (I, 395) to the Countess Gemini's stupefied inability to understand her naively idealistic sister-in-law. Perceptions or opinions of Isabel held by other "satellites" such as Goodwood, Rosier and Warburton are expressed in conversation or in brief excursions into their respective consciousnesses. (As for Henrietta, it is perhaps appropriate that for so blunt and categorical a commentator - and one whom Isabel accuses of having "no sense of privacy" (I, 121) - her opinion should be expressed in direct discourse only rather than in inward ruminations.)

Apart from the view cited above which Mrs Touchett expresses in conversation with Ralph, access to her inner world produces acerbic opinions such as:

that a young lady with whom Lord Warburton had not successfully wrestled should content herself with an obscure American dilettante, a middle-aged widower with an uncanny child and an ambiguous income, this answered to nothing in Mrs. Touchett's conception of success. (I, 394)

A glimpse into the inner world of Warburton himself, when he is depicted at the opera in Rome with Isabel and Osmond, reveals his perception of a less admirable aspect of her character (the presentation modulates from psychonarration to narrated monologue):

Poor Lord Warburton had moments of bewilderment. She had discouraged him, formally, as much as a woman could; what business had she then with such arts and such felicities, above all with such tones of reparation - preparation? ... Why should she mark so one of his values - quite the wrong one - when she would have nothing to do with another, which was quite the right? (II, 3-4)

In exerting her charm over her rejected suitor here Isabel seems to be acting in anticipatory gratification of one of her new admirer's prejudices: after the scene
at the opera, it is revealed that Osmond "perceived a new attraction in the idea of taking to himself a young lady who had qualified herself to figure in his collection of choice objects by declining so noble a hand" (II, 9).

Access to the inner life of Goodwood also reveals that he has more perception than Isabel seems to give him credit for. For example, far from being taken in by her assiduously cultivated pose of conjugal harmony, he intuitively grasps the real state of affairs; in spite of Osmond's charming manner he notes what Isabel had taken years to discover: "It seemed to him ... that the man had a kind of demonic imagination" (II, 313).

Rosier's initial view of Isabel after a few years of marriage is a superficial one: "framed in the gilded doorway, she struck our young man as the picture of a gracious lady" (II, 105). This contrasts forcibly with Ralph's more penetrating view as he perceives the reality behind the mask. Through psycho-narration and narrated monologue in the portrayal of the inner world of the "satellites" we are enabled to make comparisons between the thoughts of characters such as Rosier, Goodwood, Warburton and Mrs Touchett on the subject of Isabel and compare their insights with those of both Ralph and the narrator.

Isabel's process of vision is in essence her slow progress towards seeing herself as others have seen her. She gradually learns that some, like Osmond and Madame Merle, have seen her only in the light of an adjunct to their own purposes, while others, notably Ralph, have appreciated her for herself but have also been obliged to reassess her. Isabel's process of vision, then, encompasses seeing herself through "the successive windows of other people's interest in her" (AN, p. 306).
III: INCIDENCE AND DEPLOYMENT OF MODES OF PRESENTATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The crucial emphasis throughout the novel is that of the presentation of consciousness, primarily that of Isabel and, to a lesser degree, Ralph. Of the three modes of presentation of consciousness as established by Cohn, quoted monologue here, as in Roderick, occurs least frequently, although, predictably, this mode is more prevalent in The Portrait than in Roderick as direct access is afforded to the consciousness of more than one reflector. As would be expected, Isabel is accorded the most generous proportion of quoted monologues (at least fifteen), Ralph about five (with diminishing frequency, and all in the first two-thirds of the novel), Rosier two and Osmond one, embedded in a passage of dissonant psycho-narration and narrated monologue.

This rare instance of quoted monologue in the depiction of Osmond's inner world is particularly revealing, set as it is the ironic perspective of critical narratorial comment which highlights his hypocritical self-justification. Osmond is experiencing "the sense of success - the most agreeable emotion of the human heart" (II, 11) at the imminent prospect of securing Isabel:

"Ah no, I've not been spoiled; certainly I've not been spoiled," he used inwardly to repeat. "If I do succeed before I die I shall thoroughly have earned it." He was too apt to reason as if "earning" this boon consisted above all of covertly aching for it and might be confined to that exercise. (II, 11-12)

Here the flaws (both logical and ethical) in Osmond's mode of reasoning are explicitly rather than implicitly exposed through the conjunction of quoted monologue and narratorial comment.

The inner worlds of Madame Merle, Mrs Touchett and even the Countess Gemini are briefly illuminated through
psycho-narration and narrated monologue. In spite of the claim that "Pansy is ... the only significant character James never goes behind", even the inner world of the opaque Pansy is in fact recorded in observations such as "But Pansy was not indiscreet even in thought; she would as little have ventured to judge her gentle stepmother as to criticize her magnificent father" (II, 383). Explicit comment on Pansy is rendered here through the narratorial voice in psycho-narration. This contrasts with the use of narrated monologue in conjunction with psycho-narration for the evocation of Isabel's consciousness in the latter part of the novel: there the reader is obliged to read between the lines — or behind the articulated thoughts — relying on his own interpretation in the absence of direct narratorial comment.

As in his other novels, James employs thematically invested focalization here: the significance of the distribution of inside views is reflected in the pattern whereby, in the latter part of the novel, Ralph's perspective, so predominant in the early section, is no longer directly accessible and virtually everything is refracted through the consciousness of Isabel. The thematic significance of this stylistic device is evident in that the reader is restricted to Isabel's own perspective, participating (unaided now by the voice of direct narratorial guidance) in the "process of vision" whereby she develops greater insight into motivation previously unclear to her.

IV: FOCALIZATION AND THE POSITION OF THE READER VIS-A-VIS ISABEL'S "SUBJECTIVE ADVENTURE"

In the earlier sections of the novel, the reader is vouchsafed more insight than Isabel into the real nature of both Madame Merle and Osmond, so sharing the cognitive
privilege of the narrator. This is accomplished not only by the reader's being a "privileged" spectator at scenes from which the heroine is by necessity excluded but also by crucial knowledge being afforded by direct narrator's report on events undisclosed to Isabel and, most significantly, through the portrayal of thoughts of the other characters (through the three modes of presentation of consciousness).

The reader, for instance, is able to "witness" the crucial scene between Madame Merle and Osmond (before his meeting with Isabel) in which vital information as to the true nature and motives of each is revealed. Osmond is depicted as cynical, world-weary and prepared to consider making a new acquaintance only on the basis of his prime consideration — "What good will it do me?" (I, 343). The reader is prepared for Isabel's later realisation that she has been acquired as a choice objet d'art for Osmond's collection by being privy to the cold, calculating way in which he evaluates people. When Osmond stipulates the conditions on which he is prepared to condescend to have Isabel presented to him — that she be "beautiful, clever, rich, splendid, universally intelligent and unprecedentedly virtuous" (I, 344), Madame Merle assures him that Isabel "fills all your requirements" (I, 345) as though she were an inanimate object to be sent on approval before being slotted into a predetermined place in his "sorted, sifted, arranged world" (I, 377).

The reader is in a position to pick up the verbal echo of Ralph's declaration to his father that he wishes his bequest to make it possible for Isabel to "meet the requirements of [her] imagination" (I, 261); this foregrounds the difference in motivation between these two admirers, a difference which Isabel is only later to discover.

The impression conveyed in conversation with Osmond's erst-while consort is later reinforced by the
glimpses of his inner world afforded by a few extended passages of psycho-narration and narrated monologue during his courting campaign in which his egotistical mode of viewing his prospective spouse is further revealed. (These passages will be discussed later when the effects created by juxtaposing "inner views" of Osmond and Isabel are examined.)

Isabel herself, of course, has no inkling of what is vouchsafed to the reader concerning her "lover's" real motives at this stage. Thereafter, the reader sees Osmond only through Isabel's eyes (except for the dramatic scene between Osmond and Madame Merle which is presented in the form of a conjectural projection of a conversation which Isabel would have been able to hear "If she had been concealed behind one of the valuable curtains" (II, 321). After their marriage, the reader has only indirect access to Osmond's consciousness through Isabel's perception, his own direct discourse (notably in conversations with Isabel, Madame Merle and Caspar Goodwood) and descriptions of his facial expressions and expressive gestures such as the contempt with which he greets Rosier at one of his Thursday receptions:

Osmond stood before the chimney, leaning back with his hands behind him; he had one foot up and was warming the sole .... Rosier ... went up to shake hands with him.... Osmond put out his left hand, without changing his attitude. (II, 103)

Similarly, restricted access only is given to the consciousness of Isabel's other suitors, Warburton and Goodwood, in much shorter passages of psycho-narration and narrated monologue.

The shift from authorial to figural narration in the course of the novel inevitably imposes greater demands on the reader's interpretive activity. For example, when Isabel first meets Madame Merle, her impressions of her new friend are conveyed in narrated monologue with little
supplementary narratorial comment to amplify or rectify her view. We find "our speculative heroine" (I, 245) interpreting her new acquaintance but, being dazzled by her accomplishments, failing to perceive signs of a possible discrepancy between her charming manner and appearance and her real nature. In the absence of direct narratorial comment, the reader has to be alert to subtle revelatory indications of artifice. These appear in, for example, the ambiguity inherent in the repetition, in the description of her piano playing, of "It showed skill, it showed feeling" (I, 245), echoed later in the linguistic parallelism of "She knew how to think... Of course, too, she knew how to feel..." (I, 267). Madame Merle's action in "turn[ing] quickly round, as if [my emphasis] but just aware of her presence" (I, 245) also suggests a well-rehearsed display of spontaneity.

Isabel's perception that Madame Merle "knew how to think" is embedded in interesting generalisations coloured by stylistic contagion:

There are many amiable people in the world, and Madame Merle was far from being vulgarly good-natured and restlessly witty. She knew how to think - an accomplishment rare in women; and she had thought to very good purpose. Of course, too, she knew how to feel; Isabel could n't have spent a week with her without being sure of that. (I, 267)

Initially, the comment about "amiable people", cast in the present tense, seems to derive from the narrator, as does the ostensibly sexist - and potentially offensive - generalisation concerning the imputed inability of most women to think. What emerges from the context, however - "Isabel could n't have spent a week with her without being sure of that" indicates that the preceding sentences are in narrated monologue - is that both generalisations should be attributed to Isabel. With her limited experience of her more sophisticated and intellectually advanced peers, she was determined not to
join the ranks of those women who had not made the most of opportunities for intellectual stimulation and development.

What Isabel does not perceive, of course — but the reader can — is the moral ambiguity in "she knew how to feel", a formulation which again reinforces the impression of artfulness and lack of spontaneity created in their first encounter. The use of narrated monologue here subtly distances the narrator from Isabel's point of view and sets Isabel's thoughts in the ironic context created by the cognitive superiority of the narrator and reader. Isabel's naivety and susceptibility to a polished facade are subtly revealed with minimal narratorial nudging.

This is further reinforced through the judicious deployment of revelatory imagery, as in the garden image which highlights an essential difference between the freshness, vitality, spontaneity and openness of Isabel's nature and the essentially self-contained and carefully cultivated artifice of Madame Merle: "our heroine ... wandered, as by the wrong side of the wall of a private garden, round the enclosed talents, accomplishments, aptitudes of Madame Merle" (I, 270). Here, as elsewhere, the imagistic mode in psycho-narration functions to convey to the reader implications to which the protagonist is impervious.

In the course of the novel the narrowing of cognitive distance between the narrator and reflector is such that Isabel's perceptions are no longer supplemented by those of the more knowing narrator.
Apart from Chapter XLII, where virtually the whole chapter is devoted to rendering the activity of Isabel's hyperactive consciousness, the presentation of consciousness in the novel occurs in conjunction with other modes such as direct, indirect and free indirect discourse, narrator's report or commentary, description etc.

In James's terminology, the predominant pattern in the novel is one where "picture" alternates with "scene" and "summary". In chapter XII, for example (depicting Warburton's proposal), after an initial half page of "scene" - description of Warburton's arrival and exchange of civilities with Isabel - dialogue gives way to nearly three pages of "picture" or psycho-narration dominated by an evocation of Isabel's state of mind concerning Warburton and marriage. Through psycho-narration we are also given a brief inner view of Warburton's feelings towards Isabel which prompt him to propose. A degree of foreshortening or summary psycho-narration is in evidence here. Six pages of dialogue are then followed by a concluding page where the extract modulates back into "picture" (presentation of Isabel's consciousness) where psycho-narration and narrated monologue dramatise Isabel's state of mind. Within one dramatic unit, then - that of Warburton's proposal - we find a "scene" dominated by dialogue, with brief references to setting and gesture, modulating back to scene and finally again to "picture" in which psycho-narration is interspersed more liberally now with narrated monologue rendering Isabel's own thoughts "verbatim" in interrogative form:

Who was she, what was she, that she should hold herself superior? What view of life, what design upon fate, what conception of happiness, had she
that she pretended to be larger than these large, these fabulous occasions? (I, 156)

It is noteworthy that it is through psycho-narration that Isabel's fundamental reasons for rejecting Warburton are revealed, reasons which contrast with the more conventionally acceptable justification for refusal that she proffers him in spoken discourse. Psycho-narration reveals the more "metaphysical" dimension of her desire for personal liberty (which is as vague as it is compelling) which it is impossible for Isabel to communicate to Warburton:

She couldn't marry Lord Warburton; the idea failed to support any enlightened prejudice in favour of the free exploration of life that she had hitherto entertained or was now capable of entertaining. (I, 155)

This conclusion is reached after the implications of such a match as envisaged by Isabel are explored in an earlier passage of psycho-narration:

What she felt was that a territorial, a political, a social magnate had conceived the design of drawing her into the system in which he rather invidiously lived and moved. A certain instinct, not imperious, but persuasive, told her to resist - murmured to her that virtually she had a system and an orbit of her own. (I, 144)

Later, the full irony is to emerge of her rejection of Warburton on the grounds of his being a potential threat to her liberty in his capacity as "a territorial, a political, a social magnate". Isabel, who shies away from the inevitable restrictions involved in being allied to "a collection of attributes and powers" (I, 143), later falls prey to a man who is merely a collection of conventions and poses. Osmond's reification of his wife as an item in his collection of precious objects represents a much greater desecration of her personal
A notable feature of the representation of consciousness through both narrated monologue and psycho-narration is their densely imagistic texture. An interesting comparison with Roderick emerges here: in the earlier novel, as we have seen, imagery, although varied and recurring in complex patterns, tended to be restricted to the narratorial voice, the direct discourse of the characters (notably Roderick and Rowland himself) and Rowland's letters to Cecilia (a form of written direct discourse); it occurred relatively infrequently in the presentation of consciousness through narrated monologue. (When found in narrated monologue, such imagery tended to represent later revisions added in the New York Edition after completion of the later novels where imagery is most prevalent in psycho-narration and particularly in narrated monologue).
In this chapter on The Portrait, then, the primary focus is on the exploration of the incidence and implications of the deployment of this complex imagistic mode in the presentation of consciousness. A comparison between the narrator-dominated chapter VI and the reflector-dominated chapter XLII could elucidate crucial differences between dissonant narration (which is abstract, analytical) and consonant narration (largely imagistic) in The Portrait. Although there is a constant oscillation between the two modes in the novel (with a marked swing away from the dissonant in the latter half), the authorial and figural modes are in a sense epitomised in these two chapters.

VI. i: Imagistic Focalization in the Depiction of Isabel Archer: Chapters VI and XLII Contrasted

In chapter VI, where the narrator comments on and analyses Isabel's psyche, an abstract analytical vocabulary is used for rendering her inner world of which the narrator has a clearer understanding than Isabel herself. Cognitive and linguistic disparity exists between the narrator and the reflector. In chapter XLII, by comparison, the preponderance of narrated monologue indicates that the narrator espouses the syntax and images of Isabel's own consciousness; the adjudicating narratorial voice is suppressed, and in the absence of authorial rhetoric, disparities between the narrator's and the character's understanding are hinted at only obliquely.

In chapter VI, the narrator, adopting the stance of historian or "biographer" (I, 68), informs us inter alia that

Isabel Archer was a young person of many theories; her imagination was remarkably active.... Her thoughts were a tangle of vague outlines ... she had
an unquenchable desire to think well of herself.... The girl had a certain nobleness of imagination which rendered her a good many services and played her a great many tricks. She spent half her time in thinking of beauty and bravery and magnanimity; she had a fixed determination to regard the world as a place of brightness, of free expansion, of irresistible action.... (I, 66-68)

An indication of the ambivalence of the imagination—the image-generating faculty—is given here in the narrator's comment on Isabel's romantic idealism. Her "nobleness of imagination" affords her "services" in endowing her with a potential for vivid appreciation of the varied cultural riches of Europe and a heightened sensitivity to the possibilities of life in general. However, the comment that "she had a fixed determination to regard the world as a place of brightness" indicates that her inflexibly idealistic view of life could blind her to the darker aspects of human nature. Later, we find that it renders her incapable of seeing through a character like Gilbert Osmond as "her imagination added the human element which she was sure had not been wanting" (I, 383). Reference to the "many tricks" played on her by her imagination can be seen as a premonitory pointer to the most devastating "trick" of all to be played on her when her imagination, dexterously steered by Madame Merle, leads her to choose Osmond.

The reference to Isabel's romantic imagination gives the reader an anticipatory inkling of a psychological weakness, hinted at earlier in chapter IV, which is to prove Isabel's undoing: "at important moments, when she would have been thankful to make use of her judgement alone, she paid the penalty of having given undue encouragement to the faculty of seeing without judging" (I, 42). This analytic comment is preceded by an observation couched in more imagistic form which is confided by the narrator during his account of Isabel's meditative vigil
in the Albany house: "Her imagination was by habitidiculously active; when the door was not open it jumped
out of the window. She was not accustomed indeed to keep
it behind bolts" (I, 42).

The architectural metaphor introduced here in
psycho-narration recurs throughout the novel. The image
of the bolted door ironically anticipates the proleptic
intuition which Isabel experiences in response to
Osmond's proposal, the implications of which she fails at
the time to grasp: she is to experience "the sharpness of
the pang that suggested to her somehow the slipping of a
fine bolt - backward, forward, she couldn't have said
which" (II, 18). Later, in Osmond's fortress-like
Palazzo Roccanero, her mind is indeed to be confined
"behind bolts", the potential ambiguity of the proleptic
image - the "slipping of the fine bolt" suggesting either
liberation or confinement - having been firmly resolved.
The architectural image takes on these more sinister
resonances in chapter XLII, where Isabel conceives of
herself as restricted to the narrow confines of Osmond's
mental construction: "[Osmond's mind] appeared to have
become her habitation" (II, 194) as "he had led her into
the mansion of his own habitation ... the house of
darkness, the house of dumbness, the house of
suffocation" (II, 196).

The later fusion of literal and metaphorical levels
is anticipated here as the symbolism of the series of
suggestive habitations which Isabel is to be confronted
or tempted with in the course of the novel gradually
emerges. As Richard Chase has observed,

The idea of leaving or entering a house, the
contrast of different kinds of houses, the question
of whether a house is a prison or the scene of
liberation and fulfilment - these are the substance
of the metaphors in The Portrait of a Lady.5

Architectural images occur in psycho-narration, in
direct discourse and in the narrator's comment. By
contrast with chapter VI, where the narrator analyses Isabel in the abstract, as it were, without reference to her physical presence or her own meditations, the architectural image in chapter IV emerges in the context of the account of Isabel's first meditative vigil as she "passes in review" her life up to that point and is overwhelmed by "a host of images" (I, 42). This scene could indeed be regarded as an adumbration of the process of "motionlessly seeing" which is rendered so vividly in the climactic midnight vigil. It thus gains in significance by being placed in the illuminating perspective of both the central fireside scene and the later episode on the train when, returning to Gardencourt, she is subject to "disconnected visions" which pass through her mind (II, 390). The predominant mode for rendering these "disconnected visions" is psycho-narration (modulating intermittently into narrated monologue), which, as Cohn has demonstrated, is the preeminent mode for portraying subliminal areas of experience.

In those scenes, as here, "things ... as memory played over them, resolved themselves into a multitude of scenes and figures .... The result was kaleidoscopic" (I, 46). The image of the kaleidoscope, suggesting a multiplicity of self-reflecting and mutually illuminating facets, aptly evokes the impression of the shifting perspectives experienced in a state of heightened awareness.

Narratorial Stance

The narrator in these early chapters at times adopts a stance of disarming archness - or mock-modest speculation - as when his ostensible omniscience is undercut by comments such as "It may be affirmed without delay that Isabel was probably very liable to the sin of self-
esteem" (I, 67; my emphasis) and, in a previous chapter, "Of what Isabel then said no report has remained" (I, 39).

In summarising Isabel's most salient features, the narrator spells out to the reader the intended response to his preliminary sketch of her character:

Altogether, with her meagre knowledge, her inflated ideals, her confidence at once innocent and dogmatic, her temper at once exacting and indulgent, her mixture of curiosity and fastidiousness... her desire to look very well and to be if possible any better, her determination to see, to try, to know... she would be an easy victim of scientific criticism if she were not intended to awaken on the reader's part an impulse more tender and more purely expectant. (I, 69)

We find later, in one of several proleptic references, that those resistant readers who in spite of the narrator's ingenuous statement of intent persist in criticising his heroine are also catered for: in a later address to his readers, the narrator advises

Smile not, however, I venture to repeat, at this simple young woman from Albany who debated whether she should accept an English peer before he had offered himself... if there was a great deal of folly in her wisdom those who judge her severely may have the satisfaction of finding that, later, she became consistently wise only at the cost of an amount of folly which will constitute almost a direct appeal to charity. (I, 144-45)

Such direct or oblique references to the reader are frequently found in chapter VI, as in "you could have made her colour, any day in the year, by calling her a rank egoist" (I, 72). In this paragraph, however, the abstract analytical vocabulary which continues in the following sentence "She was always planning out her development, desiring her perfection, observing her progress" shifts into the imagistic mode for an elaboration: "Her nature had, in her conceit, a certain
garden-like quality, a suggestion of perfume and murmuring boughs, of shady bowers and lengthening vistas . . . ." (I, 72). Thus another important network of imagery is introduced in this early chapter; later, particularly in chapter XLII, this cluster of imagery takes on significantly different resonances.

Other indications of the greater perceptibility of the narrator in this early chapter can be found in, for example, distancing appellations such as "our young lady" (I, 73), "our rustling, quickly-moving clear-voiced heroine" (I, 75), appellations which are absent from the later chapter. Nevertheless, in spite of the generally unobtrusive nature of the narratorial presence in chapter XLII, there are brief manifestations of the presence of the first-person narrator as in "that sense of darkness and suffocation of which I have spoken took possession of her" (I, 99), "it used to come over her, as I have intimated . . . ." (I, 202), and at the end of the chapter when, after the prolonged exploration of Isabel's consciousness through psycho-narration and narrated monologue, the mode of presentation reverts to a more detached form of narrator's report of Isabel's physical attitude and perceptions of the world around her, "As I have said, she believed she was not defiant" (II, 205).

VI. ii: The Imagistic Mode in Isabel's Perception of Madame Merle and Osmond

In The Portrait, a complex of visual images dramatises different modes of viewing others. In the portrayal of Isabel's perception of Madame Merle and Osmond these visual images incorporate references to light and to viewing objects as diverse as pictures and landscapes. Isabel's perception of Osmond is anticipated in the way she responds to Madame Merle, in whom are adumbrated many qualities brought to perfection in Osmond. Isabel "liked
her extremely, but was even more dazzled than attracted" (I, 270-71), that is, being half-blinded by her brilliance, by the perfections of the consummately achieved "social animal", Isabel cannot judge Madame Merle very clearly or impartially. In a proleptic image, the narrator conveys that Isabel "wished to hold up the lamp for Madame Merle" (I, 270), the better to illuminate her perfection — as she is destined to do for Osmond. The image recurs in direct discourse when Osmond expresses his appreciation of Isabel — seen in her capacity as a source of illumination — in a related image:

"It's just as when one has been trying to spell out a book in the twilight and suddenly the lamp comes in. I had been putting out my eyes over the book of life and finding nothing to reward me for my pains; but now that I can read it properly I see it's a delightful story." (II, 81)

Isabel could interpret this as meaning that she, as the "light of his life", has endowed Osmond's existence with a sense of meaning and purpose previously lacking; not being adept at reading between the lines, (particularly those of his "book of life"), she little realizes that to him the "golden glow" she cast over his book means, primarily, valuable endowment of a different order. She is, in fact, to be relegated to "holding up the lamp" for Osmond, to highlight his superiority to the world, as she had wished to do — on a much more modest scale — for Madame Merle.

The "picture" Isabel constructs of Osmond after her visit to his hill-top villa is a vivid illustration of the composing powers of the consciousness, or, more specifically, the constitutive capacity of the creative imagination. (Prior to the visit, Madame Merle had with consummate art sketched a preparatory portrait of her erst-while consort, Osmond; with the canvas prepared, she could propel Isabel firmly in Osmond's direction so that
the finishing touches could be applied to her masterpiece.) Isabel then constructs an interpretive hypothesis about Osmond and fails to adjust this hypothesis in the face of both subsequent intuitions and warnings from others. Her creative imagination constructs an appealing portrait: an image which embodies or makes concrete, as it were, her charmed vision. Like all artistic creations her picture relies on selective interpretation, highlighting the more picturesque aspects of his situation. Through psycho-narration, modulating into narrated monologue for the tentative question Isabel asks herself half-way through the extract, the image is evoked:

the image of a quiet, clever, sensitive, distinguished man, strolling on a moss-grown terrace above the sweet Val d'Arno and holding by the hand a little girl whose bell-like clearness gave a new grace to childhood. The picture had no flourishes, but she liked its lowness of tone and the atmosphere of summer twilight that pervaded it. It spoke of the kind of personal issue that touched her most nearly; of the choice between objects, subjects, contacts — what might she call them? — of a thin and those of a rich association; of a lonely, studious life in a lovely land.... of a care for beauty and perfection so natural and so cultivated together that the career appeared to stretch beneath it in the disposed vistas and with the ranges of steps and terraces and fountains of a formal Italian garden.... (I, 399-400)

It is noteworthy that what Isabel sees is "visible only to a sympathetic eye" (I, 400) and that her picture "put on for her a particular harmony with other supposed and divined things" (I, 399). What Isabel "supposes" and "divines" is in effect a specious projection of her aesthetic imagination which creates a romantic frame in which to place its idealised portrait. Being afforded access to Isabel's inner world through the interplay of the different modes of presentation of consciousness, the reader can see through Isabel's eyes and simultaneously, being devoid of her romantic illusions, and equipped with
inside knowledge of Osmond's real nature, can perceive more than she does. So it is made clear, without the need for overt narratorial comment, how much is superimposed on the actual scene by Isabel's aesthetic imagination.

Isabel fails to perceive the sinister overtones in the picture she has conjured up. These are more strongly implicit in Osmond's development of Isabel's image as he sketches their future life together (the image is now employed in direct discourse): "... what a long summer afternoon awaits us. It's the latter half of an Italian day - with a golden haze, and the shadows just lengthening, and that divine delicacy in the light, the air, the landscape..." (II, 81). Only later does Isabel realize that the "lengthening shadows" can be regarded as premonitory of her future situation where, as she perceives during her midnight vigil - in a related image now cast in narrated monologue - "it was as if Osmond deliberately, almost malignantly, had put the lights out one by one" (II, 190). In a modulation of the image, the "disposed vistas" of Isabel's own vision take on symbolic significance as she later finds "the infinite vista of a multiplied life to be a dark, narrow alley with a dead wall at the end" (II, 189).

Thus the changes in Isabel's vision are dramatised by the imagery, by the shifting connotations of the same basic elements employed in complex configurations in psycho-narration, narrated monologue and direct discourse. So too the metaphoric overtones of the "formal Italian garden" are activated when seen here in conjunction with the garden imagery often used to depict Isabel's nature. We recall the narrator's observation, in psycho-narration, about Isabel's nature having "in her conceit, a certain garden-like quality, a suggestion of ... shady bowers and lengthening vistas" (I, 72). The "garden-like quality" evokes associations of natural growth and vitality, a soul more conducive to jardin à
l'anglaise disposition, that is, natural growth gently directed by cultivated forms, than the rigid pattern of the formal Italian garden suggesting Osmond's inflexible forms and conventions. A later stage in Isabel's process of vision is rendered in a modulation of this image in narrated monologue when she realizes that "Her mind was to be his - attached to his own like a small garden-plot to a deer-park" (II, 200): she is to be reduced in Osmond's eyes to a mere adjunct of himself.

The modulations of images such as these, then, serve to dramatise stages in the process of vision - and re-vision - and the later visions ascribed to Isabel, particularly in her midnight meditation, are examples of the convergence, at different levels of awareness, of the process of vision of protagonist, reader and narrator.

Thus the manner in which characters view both themselves and each other - a view which can be either static or dynamic - is vividly suggested through the imagery. Some view others primarily in terms of the roles in which they can be cast: Isabel sees herself as the leading lady in the drama of her life, unaware that she might be cast in another role by others more adept at stage management or at imposing their own scenario - polished performers who see her merely in a supporting role (in all senses of the term). Isabel, who is engaged in a quest for a fulfilling role to play in life, is tricked into accepting a ready-made subservient role, imagining that to play the supporting part to the leading man of her choice, Gilbert Osmond, will afford her fulfilment. In Madame Merle and Osmond, by contrast, role-playing is associated with duplicity and a deliberate attempt to manipulate the view of them held by others.

Isabel's aesthetic imagination generates her highly embellished picture of Osmond. Her initial aesthetic appreciation is expressed in an appropriately pictorial image: "he was not handsome" - Isabel is not crude enough
to be attracted by the conventionally handsome visage — "but he was fine, as fine as one of the drawings in the long gallery above the bridge of the Uffizi" (I, 356).

An illuminating comparison could be drawn between the image in terms of which Isabel conceives of Osmond and the comparable image used by the narrator:

he suggested, fine gold coin as he was, no stamp nor emblem of the common vintage that provides for general circulation; he was the elegant complicated medal struck off for a special occasion. (I, 329)

The narrator's image succinctly captures features which Isabel does not detect, such as Osmond's cultivated air of exclusivity. The combination of art and money imaged by the coin also suggests the aesthetic facade masking his mercenary nature.

The image of the picture is taken up and developed by Osmond, in a passage giving access to his consciousness after the successful conclusion of his courting campaign. Here psycho-narration seems to veer towards narrated monologue in a mock-impersonation of his own idiolect in the latter part of the extract. Osmond imparts rather disquieting nuances to the image, nuances coloured by his egotism:

If an anonymous drawing on a museum wall had been conscious and watchful it might have known this peculiar pleasure of being at last and all of a sudden identified — as from the hand of a great master — by the so high and so unnoticed fact of style. His "style" was what the girl had discovered with a little help; and now, besides herself enjoying it, she should publish it to the world without his having any of the trouble. (II, 12)

The illusory nature of Isabel's belief in her own independence is dramatised here by the conceit of a work of art manipulating the response it elicits from an unsuspecting observer. What Isabel does not perceive, either, is that Osmond is all meretricious "style" and no substance. The subtly sketched outlines of the "fine"
and "anonymous" drawing are to be fleshed out by Isabel's creative imagination - which "supplied the human element she was sure had not been wanting" (I, 383) - and given the stature of a fully achieved masterpiece.

In spite of her "wondrous vision of him fed through charmed senses and oh such a stirred fancy" (II, 192), Isabel does experience several apparently unaccountable premonitory intuitions about Osmond before finally succumbing. These provide qualifications of her defects of vision. As these intuitions are largely impervious to rational formulation by the figural consciousness they are rendered through imagistic psycho-narration. When Isabel considers Osmond's proposal, for example, it is through a highly suggestive image that her imagination registers an intuitive sense of foreboding which she is unable to elucidate rationally:

What had happened was something that for a week past her imagination had been going forward to meet; but here, when it came, she stopped - that sublime principle somehow broke down... Her imagination ... now hung back: there was a last vague space it could n't cross - a dusky, uncertain tract which looked ambiguous and even slightly treacherous, like a moorland seen in the winter twilight. But she was to cross it yet. (II, 21-22)

The narrator's proleptic comment concluding the extract emphasises his cognitive privilege and hence the discrepancy between the insight of the figural consciousness and that of the narrator at this stage of the novel. Unlike the protagonist, the narrator and the reader are in a position to explore the link with the pervasive garden imagery and recall the elaboration of the image in chapter VI where attention is drawn to Isabel's awareness that "there were a great many places that were not gardens at all - only dusky pestiferous tracts, planted thick with ugliness and misery" (I, 72). The verbal echo here emphasises the irony that Isabel is unwittingly about to undertake the crossing of such a
dusky, uncertain" and "pestiferous" tract, an illusory "garden" in which, as she is only later to perceive, Osmond's "egotism lay hidden like a serpent in a bank of flowers" (II, 196).

The ominous references to the descending dusk of "winter twilight" also contrast strongly with the glowing picture evoked earlier of the "long summer afternoon ... await[ing] us". Isabel is as yet impervious to these recognitions, as to the full import of another premonitory intuition received when reassuring Pansy that she would be kind to her: "A vague, inconsequent vision of her coming in some odd way to need it had intervened with the effect of a chill" (II, 86). These forewarnings— which parallel those experienced during her early acquaintanceship with Osmond—are, however, soon dispelled for lack of corroborating evidence to sustain them.

Although Isabel's imagination—"that sublime principle"—gives her access to these admonitory signs, the "wondrous vision" it has created of Osmond interferes with her ability fully to grasp their meaning. Her hyperactive imagination is not sufficiently controlled by her "faculty of judgement".

These extracts provide an adumbrative illustration of the cognitive function of metaphors— their role of representing the world. Through metaphor, what is abstract is rendered concrete; so Isabel's amorphous, undefined fear finds form and expression in the image of a "dusky, uncertain tract". This role of metaphor as an enabling device making possible the imaging or rendering concrete of intuitions about relationships which are not amenable to rational analysis is more fully demonstrated later in more sustained depictions of the activity of Isabel's consciousness; this occurs most notably in her midnight meditation where narrated monologue is more extensively used.
Just as Isabel's impressions of Madame Merle and Osmond are rendered largely in terms of recurrent images, so Ralph's perception of - and response to - Isabel is frequently expressed in imagistic terms. This will be more closely examined in the following section.

VI.iii: The Imagistic Mode in Ralph Touchett's Perception of Isabel

Extensive access to Ralph's view of - and aspirations and fears for - Isabel is afforded, particularly in the early sections of the novel. These are frequently expressed in extended passages of imagistic psycho-narration and narrated monologue interspersed with quoted monologue. One of the significant images clusters is that of the recurrent sea imagery which is deployed in the presentation of both thought and speech, animating both psycho-narration and narrated monologue as well as direct and indirect discourse. Ralph perceives Isabel as embarking on a voyage of discovery in Europe; it is to facilitate her free exploration of life - and make the most of opportunities denied to himself - that he persuades his father to leave her a fortune: "I should like to put a little wind in her sails" (I, 260) and "to see her going before the breeze" (II, 262). He again employs the sea image in direct discourse when he confidently (but mistakenly) opines to his mother that

"She has started on an exploring expedition, and I don't think she'll change her course, at the outset, at a signal from Gilbert Osmond. She may have slackened speed for an hour, but before we know it she'll be steaming away again." (I, 396)

The same cluster of imagery is employed in direct discourse by Henrietta, who expresses her concern about Isabel to Ralph by claiming that "Isabel is changing
every day; she's drifting away - right out to sea" (I, 70).

Ralph himself is described as "drift[ing] about the house like a rudderless vessel in a rocky stream" (II, 61) when feeling powerless to deflect her from her decision to marry Osmond.

This analogy between Isabel and a ship recurs in narrated monologue in Isabel's midnight vigil when, in her own consciousness, she recalls the initial idealistic impulse motivating her decision to marry Osmond. Ironically, it is in much the same way that Ralph had sought vicarious fulfilment in generously facilitating the realisation of the supposedly worthy ambitions of another. Here Ralph's image is reversed as Isabel sees herself as "launching" Osmond:

He was like a sceptical voyager strolling on the beach while he waited for the tide, looking seaward yet not putting to sea.... She would launch his boat for him; she would be his providence.... (II, 192)

Ralph's interest in and admiration of Isabel are clearly revealed in an extended passage of psycho-narration interspersed with an unusual abundance of quoted monologue. He expresses his conception of Isabel's value in terms of analogies with representative works of art:

If his cousin were to be nothing more than an entertainment to him, Ralph was conscious that she was an entertainment of a high order. "A character like that," he said to himself - "a real little passionate force to see at play is the finest thing in nature. It's finer than the finest work of art - than a Greek bas-relief, than a great Titian, than a Gothic cathedral.... Suddenly I receive a Titian, by the post, to hang on my wall - a Greek bas-relief to stick over my chimney-piece. The key of a beautiful edifice is thrust into my hand, and I'm told to walk in and admire. (I, 86)

The imagery employed here vividly illuminates the difference between Ralph and Osmond's respective ways of
viewing Isabel. Both conceive of Isabel in terms of images drawn from the arts, but whereas Ralph's images, reflected in his quoted monologue (a Greek bas-relief, a Titian, a Gothic cathedral) suggest his respect for the beauty and integrity of the work of art in itself, the aesthetic, mercantile and commercial images Osmond employs (in narrated monologue) — for example, that comparing her mind to a "silver plate" capable of reflecting his thought "on a polished, elegant surface" (II, 79) — reveal his conception of Isabel's aesthetic and utilitarian function as an objet d'art fashioned for the sole purpose of reflecting the good taste of its owner.

Ralph's quoted monologue is followed by direct narrator's report indicating the limitations of his understanding of his cousin: "The sentiment of these reflections was very just; but it was not exactly true that Ralph Touchett had had a key put into his hand". The narratorial voice conveys that although Ralph recognises that "his cousin ... would take ... a good deal of knowing", his fuller understanding of her nature is hampered perhaps by an incipient emotional prejudice: "his attitude with regard to her, though it was contemplative and critical, was not judicial". It emerges later, of course, that Ralph underestimates the influence of Isabel's naively idealistic views, her susceptibility to appearances and her "faculty of seeing without judging" (I, 42).

The use of quoted monologue for the formulation of Ralph's view of Isabel perhaps suggests that he is voicing what he feels it is safe to articulate — to acknowledge, even to himself — and that he is suppressing awareness of his incipient emotional attachment by formulating his conception of her in terms of these distancing analogies with works of art which serve to establish a measure of safe detachment.
The architectural image first used in Ralph's quoted monologue — "the key of a beautiful edifice" recurs in the narrator-dominated psycho-narration which reveals the limitations of his access to Isabel's mind:

He surveyed the edifice from the outside and admired it greatly; he looked in at the windows and received an impression of proportions equally fair. But he felt that he saw it only by glimpses and that he had not yet stood under the roof. (I, 87)

An interesting analogy can be discerned between the narrator's imagistic representation of Ralph's perception of Isabel here and the empirical author's image in the Preface of the literary creation erected around his protagonist: he refers to

this single small corner-stone, the conception of a certain young woman affronting her destiny, [which] had begun with being all my outfit for the large building of "The Portrait of a Lady." It came to be a square and spacious house ... put up round my young woman...." (AN, p. 48)

The analogy highlights the convergence of perspective between the authorial voice and that of his representative "touchstone" in the novel.

On the other hand, the recurrent architectural imagery also dramatises the similarity between Ralph's as yet imperfect understanding of his cousin and Isabel's comparable frustration at being denied access to his inner world. Ralph confides to Isabel that "I keep a band of music in my anteroom" which effectively muffles direct communication with the outside world (I, 82). This is a reference to the mocking, playful, ironic stance he adopts in social intercourse — as a self-defence mechanism. Isabel feels thwarted at being relegated to the periphery and debarred from the inner sanctum: "she would have liked to pass through the anteroom, as her cousin called it, and enter the private
apartments" (I, 82). The acquisition of more profound knowledge of each other, however, is a slow and painful process.

The contrast between the subtlety, complexity and tact of the approach of Isabel and Ralph with that of Henrietta is wittily conveyed in dialogue between Ralph and Isabel where Ralph, employing another variation on the architectural image, complains that Henrietta has no sense of privacy:

"She's too personal.... She walks in without knocking at the door."
"Yes," Isabel admitted, "she does n't sufficiently recognize the existence of knockers; and indeed I'm not sure that she does n't think them rather a pretentious ornament. She thinks one's door should stand ajar." (I, 129)

Portrayal of Ralph's state of mind shifts from psycho-narration to narrated monologue when the elaboration of the architectural image of the key to an edifice takes a more practical application: "What was she going to do with herself?" The ascription of the generalisation which follows is initially uncertain, as it could emanate from either the narrator or the figural consciousness:

This question was irregular, for with most women one had no occasion to ask it. Most women did with themselves nothing at all; they waited, in attitudes more or less gracefully passive, for a man to come that way and furnish them with a destiny. (I, 87)

The statement that "Isabel's originality was that she gave one an impression of having intentions of her own" could also be that of the narrator, and is comparable to the observations made in the psychological portrait of Isabel in chapter VI. However, the return to quoted monologue here dispels the ambiguity and identifies the preceding observations as indubitably Ralph's: "Whenever she executes (her intentions)," said
Ralph, "may I be there to see!" (I, 87).

Devices such as these – blurring of the boundaries between the observations of the narrator and those of the figural consciousness (expressed in narrated monologue, as in the above extract) – have the effect of further reinforcing the close association between the perspective of the narrator and, in this context, that of Ralph. Indeed, Ralph could be regarded as "the impersonal author's concrete deputy or delegate, a convenient substitute or apologist for the creative power otherwise so veiled and disembodied" (AN, p. 327).

Ralph, unlike Isabel, sees through Osmond from the outset. His more penetrating view of Osmond, which qualifies and rectifies Isabel's initially purblind view, and confirms his earlier impressions, is presented in a passage summarising his impressions of the Osmond ménage after two years of marriage. The passage is a conjunction of quoted monologue, psycho-narration and narrated monologue which concludes with the direct intervention of the first-person narrator: "I give this little sketch ... [of Ralph's view] for what it is worth" (II, 145).

Unlike Rosier, who is taken in by Isabel's appearance as "a picture of a gracious lady", Ralph sees through the mask to the reality of the change wrought in Isabel:

The free, keen girl had become quite another person; what he saw was the fine lady who was supposed to represent something. What did Isabel represent? Ralph asked himself; and he could only answer by saying that she represented Gilbert Osmond. "Good heavens, what a function!" he then woefully exclaimed. (II, 143-44).

Ralph registers valid insight into Isabel's situation long before she herself has achieved this understanding.

Another exemplification of Ralph's functioning in the capacity of "concrete author's delegate" can be seen
in the incidence of phrases first used by Ralph (in conversation with Isabel) which are then taken up not only by the fictional narrator but by the empirical author in his comments on the novel in his Notebooks. So, for instance, we have Ralph commenting to Isabel that "You wanted to look at life for yourself — but.... You were ground in the very mill of the conventional" (II, 415), an observation which is echoed virtually verbatim by James in his Notebooks: "The idea of the whole thing is that the poor girl, who has dreamed of freedom and nobleness ... finds herself in reality ground in the very mill of the conventional".6

VII: STYLISTIC CONTAGION

In the extract cited above, the term "stylistic contagion" (see chapter 2 of this thesis) takes on very specific connotations, crossing as it does the boundary demarcating the fictional from the empirical world. Generally, stylistic contagion involves the blurring of boundaries within the text, between psycho-narration and narrated monologue; a reporting syntax is maintained, but the idiom is strongly coloured by the mental idiom of the mind it reflects (Cohn, p. 33). Frequently, it incorporates a cluster of images which could be attributed to either narrator or character and are employed elsewhere by the narrator in psycho-narration or assigned to the respective characters in narrated monologue or direct discourse.

The following example, which incorporates the iterative sea imagery, illustrates this procedure. It is an extract in which Isabel, having learnt from Henrietta that Caspar has come to Rome, recalls her last interview with him before her marriage and ponders the nature of their relationship. In this extract, she muses that
He [Caspar] had left her that morning with a sense of the most superfluous of shocks: it was like a collision of vessels in broad daylight. There had been no mist, no hidden current to excuse it, and she herself had only wished to steer wide. He had bumped against her prow, however, while her hand was on the tiller, and—to complete the metaphor—had given the lighter vessel a strain which still occasionally betrayed itself in a faint creaking. It had been horrid to see him, because he represented the only serious harm that (to her belief) she had ever done in the world: he was the only person with an unsatisfied claim on her. (II, 279)

Here there is ambiguity as to whether the mode is psycho-narration or narrated monologue, with the concomitant uncertainty concerning the provenance of the metaphoric comment. Initially, the mode appears to be narrated monologue as Isabel's own recollected perception is presented in the form of a metaphor depicting "a collision between vessels in broad daylight". However, the self-conscious phrase "to complete the metaphor" would seem to indicate that the mode is that of psycho-narration, with the narrator rather than Isabel ("the lighter vessel") employing the metaphor. The narrator's metaphor "faint creaking" could then be interpreted or translated as the pangs of conscience experienced by Isabel at the thought that "he represented the only serious harm that (to her belief) she had ever done in the world". Here the mode is indubitably narrated monologue as the formulation "It was horrid" indicates. The qualification "to her belief" would then be Isabel's, and not an ironic hint on the part of the narrator that she had in fact been responsible for much more. One page further on, the image recurs in slightly cryptic or modified form, the term "concussion" recalling the collision image but shifting from a nautical to a drawing-room confrontation:

This gave his figure a kind of bareness and bleakness which made the accident of meeting it in memory or in apprehension a peculiar concussion; it
was deficient in the social drapery commonly muffling, in an overcivilized age, the sharpness of human contacts. (II, 280)

Here the critical or evaluative comment "an overcivilized age" should presumably be attributed to the narrator rather than to Isabel, although this too is not devoid of ambiguity — particularly since it recalls Isabel's ostensibly innocuous (but drily telling) comment to Warburton about her husband having "a genius for upholstery" (II, 131).

The conjunction of psycho-narration and narrated monologue is frequently exploited to foreground psychological processes such as rationalisation and self-deception. This ironic dimension will now be more closely considered.

VIII: THE IRONIC DIMENSION OF PSYCHO-NARRATION AND NARRATED MONOLOGUE

Isabel's initial obliquity of vision — or reluctance to face the truth — is displayed in her myopic view of both Osmond and Ralph. Her self-deception is highlighted through the interplay of psycho-narration and narrated monologue. In a passage affording access to the consciousness of both Isabel and Ralph at the end of chapter XXX the limitations of her insight — and Ralph's well-founded reservations — are clearly revealed. Through psycho-narration we learn — and register the irony undetected by Isabel herself — that Isabel "noted afresh that life was certainly hard for some people, and she felt a delicate glow of shame as she thought how easy it now promised to become for herself". In attempting to come to terms with Ralph's disapproval of her choice Isabel resorts to rationalisation which is clearly revealed through narrated monologue:
it would be his privilege — it would be indeed his natural line — to find fault with any step she might take toward marriage. One's cousin always pretended to hate one's husband; that was traditional, classical; it was a part of one's cousin's always pretending to adore one. (II, 60-61)

Here narrated monologue highlights her suppression of the unpalatable recognition that Ralph's opposition might well stem from more than the conventional cousinly stance on such matters. The generalisation, cast here in the past tense rather than the gnomic present employed by the narrator, is obviously Isabel's — a suspect truism from which the narrator would dissociate himself. Ironically, Isabel is to discover that Ralph's supposedly "traditional" adoration is indeed genuine, as opposed to the specious adoration displayed by Osmond ("if you've been hated you've also been loved. Ah but, Isabel — adored!") (II, 417).

Another generalisation in Isabel's narrated monologue — "You could criticize any marriage; it was the essence of marriage to be open to criticism" — foregrounds the irony of her subsequent thought: "How well she herself, should she only give her mind to it, might criticize this union of her own!" and demonstrates her aforementioned faculty for "seeing without judging". Ironically, this rejection of the necessity for "giving her mind to it" foreshadows her later midnight meditation when she does at last, belatedly, put her mind (and more specifically, her imagination) to it.

The cognitive privilege of the narrator at this stage is underscored by the shift out of narrated monologue for his statement that "We, who know more about poor Ralph than his cousin..." (II, 61) and is reinforced by the use of the distancing appellations "our young woman" and "our young lady" in the following section.

Isabel's obliquity of vision — or reluctance to face the truth — is manifested in her dealings with Ralph, Osmond, Caspar and Warburton. To suppress lingering
feelings of guilt about her treatment of Caspar, she indulges in a ludicrously inept display of "logical induction". In trying to establish what motivated Caspar to visit her in Rome a few years after her marriage, Isabel concludes, conveniently (with his supposed reason given in narrated monologue) that he came because he wanted to see her. In other words he had come for his amusement. Isabel followed up this induction with a good deal of eagerness, and was delighted to have found a formula that would lay the ghost of this gentleman's ancient grievance. (II, 291)

Psycho-narration then changes back to narrated monologue for "following consciousness through its paces", miming the steps in her reasoning process with parodic effect. (The narrator's term "induction" is obviously used ironically as applied to the succession of non sequiturs Isabel takes refuge in:)

If he had come to Rome for his amusement this was exactly what she wanted; for if he cared for amusement he had got over his heartache. If he had got over his heartache everything was as it should be and her responsibilities were at an end. (II, 291-92)

Quod erat demonstrandum!

Another illustration of Isabel's increasing capacity for self-deception can be found later in her pondering the issue of the proposed match between Warburton and Pansy. Here again insight into the workings of the protagonist's mind is afforded by the narration of her unvoiced reflections with no overt judgement by the narrator. We find that Isabel appears to be succumbing to Osmond's influence and adopting his moral values:

She had come little by little to think well of the idea of Pansy's becoming the wife of the master of beautiful Lockleigh.... It would please [Osmond] greatly to see Pansy married to an English nobleman, and justly please him, since this nobleman was so sound a character. (II, 173-74)
In the first part of this quotation, it is clear that Isabel, like Osmond, is thinking of Warburton as a personage rather than as a person and evaluating him in terms of his extrinsic rather than his intrinsic merits, so moving towards Madame Merle's position on the importance of the "shell" or "envelope of circumstances" (I, 287) rather than qualities of "self" – a view she had so vehemently opposed before. She is obviously trying to delude herself in clinging to the notion that Osmond's pleasure would be "just" because "this nobleman was so sound a character". Osmond is more concerned with Warburton's wealth, rank and position in society; character is a secondary consideration, as is his daughter's own preference for Rosier. Isabel is in fact in danger of aiding and abetting Osmond and Madame Merle to perpetrate against Pansy the same injustice that they had perpetrated against her: manipulating her into a mercenary marriage, a marriage of convenience – to others.

Narrated monologue takes us through Isabel's self-justificatory catalogue of reasons for complicity in this scheme, a catalogue of suspect motives concluding with "Lastly, it would be a service to Lord Warburton, who evidently pleased himself greatly with the charming girl". A convenient omission from this catalogue is of course the interests of Pansy herself, and it is rather chilling to discover that Isabel, like Osmond, had "carefully abstained" from consulting Pansy.

Isabel also abstains from pursuing the question of Warburton's real motives. She resorts to obfuscatory generalisations:

...who could say what men ever were looking for? They looked for what they found; they knew what pleased them only when they saw it. No theory was valid in such matters, and nothing was more unaccountable or more natural than anything else. (II, 174)
Ralph's "theory", as we know, is valid, and accounts for Warburton's desire to ally himself with Isabel's stepdaughter. Once again Ralph's insight anticipates a recognition that Isabel is only later to attain. In her midnight vigil she is finally to face this question squarely:

She asked herself with dismay whether Lord Warburton were pretending to be in love with Pansy in order to cultivate another satisfaction and what might be called other chances. Of this refinement of duplicity she presently acquitted him; she preferred to believe him in perfect good faith. (II, 187-88)

Narrated monologue enacts the steps in the process by which she persuades herself that Warburton

had not cared for her so much as he had supposed. Or if he had, he had completely got over it, and it was natural that, as that affair had failed, he should think something of quite another sort might succeed. (II, 175)

Whereas Ralph sees clearly what an unnatural course of action this in fact would be, Isabel assiduously suppresses all such recognitions. Her formulation, expressed in narrated monologue - "It was a pity, however, that Edward Rosier had crossed their path!" (II, 175) and "An impediment that was embodied in poor Rosier could not anyhow present itself as a dangerous one; there were always means of levelling secondary obstacles" (II, 176) - is reminiscent of Osmond's own attitude and is again a chilling illustration of how Isabel's thinking has been infected by the cynicism and opportunism of Osmond and Madame Merle. Deployment of such impersonal abstract terms - reinforced by a plethora of euphemisms - is calculated to stifle the knowledge that Pansy's own preferences are being ruthlessly disregarded.

When representation shifts out of narrated monologue and the narrator intervenes in the first person to
comment that "It may seem to the reader that Mrs. Osmond had grown of a sudden strangely cynical" (II, 175), it is perhaps appropriate that she should be referred to by that hollowly honorific title "Mrs. Osmond" rather than "Isabel", for in this extract she demonstrates to what extent she is prepared, as a dutiful wife, to espouse his interests (literally and figuratively). As Ralph had observed, Isabel is taking on the "function" of "representing Gilbert Osmond".

The excursion into Isabel's consciousness provides corroboration of Ralph's impression and is evidence of the potential realisation of Osmond's expectations of acquiring in his wife "a high spirit attuned to softness". Isabel also reveals an incipient readiness to exploit Pansy's vulnerability and pliancy, seeming to ally herself with Osmond in another series of crass euphemisms and evasions. Stylistic contagion is in evidence here as psycho-narration moves towards narrated monologue reflecting Isabel's own formulations:

Isabel was perfectly aware that she had not taken the measure of Pansy's tenacity, which might prove to be inconveniently great; but she inclined to see her as rather letting go, under suggestion, than as clutching under deprecation - since she had certainly the faculty of assent developed in a very much higher degree than that of protest. She would cling, yes, she would cling; but it really mattered to her very little what she clung to. (II, 176)

A verbal echo here enables the reader to recall that Madame Merle, in discussing the projected match with Osmond, had pointed out in response to his observation that it didn't matter at all whether Pansy preferred Rosier, and "neither do I believe she has thought of him", that "That opinion's the more convenient" (II, 114). The verbal echo emphasises the similarity between Isabel's thoughts and Osmond's own stance. In that scene, Osmond declares "It's what I educated her for. It
was all for this — that when such a case should come up she should do what I prefer" (II, 115).

Later, when Isabel grasps the full implications of Osmond's mercenary ambitions and the lengths to which he is prepared to go to secure his daughter's assent — including a period of genteel incarceration in the convent — she dissociates herself from his schemes for Pansy; she establishes the limits of her pliancy both by refusing to manipulate Warburton on his behalf and defying his prohibition to go to Ralph on his deathbed.

Isabel's initially deluded view of both Ralph and Osmond is more fully revealed in a significant passage at the beginning of chapter XXXV in which access is given successively to her consciousness and that of her "lover", Osmond (II, 77-80).

IX: JUXTAPOSITION OF INNER VIEWS OF ISABEL AND OSMOND

The device of juxtaposing inner views of Isabel and Osmond on the eve of their marriage vividly illuminates their respective modes of viewing each other and their imminent union. The juxtaposition of the two passages of psycho-narration and narrated monologue is revealing, exposing as it does the fallaciousness of Isabel's conception of Osmond — and validating Ralph's contention that "There's no more usual basis of union than a mutual misunderstanding" (I, 205).

Isabel dismisses the opposition of her family and friends to her alliance with Osmond; she prides herself on her superior taste and discernment in being able to recognize his generally unacknowledged merit, so demonstrating her liability to "the sin of self-esteem". She dismisses Ralph's misgivings as unworthy of serious consideration, as
[Ralph's] talk about having great views for her was surely but a whimsical cover for a personal disappointment. Ralph apparently wished her not to marry at all— that was what it really meant— because he was amused with the spectacle of her adventures as a single woman. His disappointment made him say angry things about the man she had preferred even to him: Isabel flattered herself that she believed Ralph had been angry. (II, 78)

Narrated monologue here vividly enacts the activity of Isabel's mind as she engages in a process of rationalisation, suppressing any lingering misgivings afforded by her imagination. The punctuation, particularly the semi-colons and dashes, performs the mimetic function of enacting the pauses in her mental activity, while the adverbs "surely" and "apparently" reinforce the impression that she is trying to reassure herself by dismissing her own unacknowledged subconscious doubts by refusing to allow them rational expression. She minimises the significance of Ralph's distrust of Osmond as an individual by trying to persuade herself that he objects to her marrying per se, adopting the convenient view that his disapproval stems from the imminent loss of a source of entertainment—that of the "spectacle of her adventures as a single woman". Ironically, Ralph had indeed initially regarded Isabel as a source of entertainment "of a high order", but the reader is aware, as Isabel is not, that his feeling for her is based not merely on the pleasure of vicarious participation in her free exploration of life but on deep unselfish devotion.

Narrated monologue shifts into psycho-narration as the narrator intervenes to highlight the discrepancy between Isabel's mistaken interpretation of Ralph's stance in the preceding scene in the Florentine garden and the true state of affairs: "Isabel flattered herself...." (Isabel finds it convenient, of course, to believe that Ralph's warning was grounded in mere
personal disappointment and frustration, as it could then be more easily dismissed as coloured by personal interest and so lacking credibility."

Feeling herself justified in her claim, Isabel concludes with the expression of the generalisation that "one's right was always made of the wrong of someone else"; ironically, she is unaware of the extent to which she herself has been "wronged" by Osmond and his friend's exploitative scheming.

An aspect of this "wrong" emerges in the following section which shifts from an inner view of Isabel to one of Osmond's consciousness. It is also significant in that it would seem to invalidate Stanzel's claim that

The more a reader learns about the innermost motives for the behaviour of a character, the more inclined he tends to feel understanding, forbearance, tolerance, and so on, in respect to the conduct of this character. (A Theory of Narrative, pp. 128-29).

This would certainly not be true of the reader's response to the revelation of Osmond's thoughts. The more the reader learns about Osmond's innermost motives for wanting to ensnare Isabel — motives which contrast so forcibly with his overtly expressed desires — the more his/her sympathy recedes or is withdrawn from Osmond.

As already mentioned, Osmond's exploitative, egotistical motives were revealed earlier in a conversation with Madame Merle, prior to meeting Isabel. Here, through the representation of his consciousness, even more sinister dimensions of his egotism are exposed, as in chapter XXXV. As always, the crucial function of imagery is evident, as Osmond conceives of Isabel in terms of objects of aesthetic and utilitarian value: "a silver plate", a "gift".

The first part of the extract is in psycho-narration:
The elation of success, which surely now flamed high in Osmond, emitted meanwhile very little smoke for so brilliant a blaze. Contentment, on his part, took no vulgar form... (II, 78)

The obviously authorial provenance of the image (Osmond could scarcely be conceived of as applying the image to himself) results in the character's own mental processes being set in the ironic context of a more enlightened perspective. This heightens the irony of the contrast between the emotions customarily experienced on such occasions and Osmond's own "elation of success" - rather than, say, of requited love - at the triumphant completion of his courting campaign. Overt signs of jubilation - "smoke" - are carefully suppressed so as to conceal the true source and extent of the "blaze" of his triumph. In this, as always, Osmond (for whom, according to Ralph, "the great dread of vulgarity" is "his special line"), is prompted not by ethical considerations but by observance of form: it would be "vulgar" form (apart from being inept and inexpedient) to display his real emotions.

For the reader, the image awakens echoes of the adage "there's no smoke without fire", recalling the misgivings expressed by Ralph about the projected match and reinforcing the realisation - afforded by the presentation of Osmond's consciousness in this scene - of how misguided Isabel had been in ignoring these warning signs.

As a polished performer who, like Madame Merle, "knew how to feel", Osmond scrupulously observes all the forms appropriate to an "admirable [rather than "genuine"] lover". Far from being sincerely in love, as Dorothea Krock maintains, Osmond - too fastidious to be merely mercenary - relishes his role of lover smitten with the charms (carefully catalogued) of his beloved. Osmond's egotism, lack of spontaneity (and lack of real feeling for Isabel as an individual in her own right) are
emphasised by the narrator's intervention with the repetition and play on the phrase "forgot himself"; "He never forgot himself, as I say; and so he never forgot to be graceful and tender, to wear the appearance ... of stirred senses and deep intentions" (II, 79). His intentions, needless to say, are deeper than Isabel can imagine.

After the narrator's observation that "He was immensely pleased with his young lady;" the semi-colon signals a shift to narrated monologue where his own thoughts are more directly conveyed: "Madame Merle had made him a present of incalculable value". This throws into ironic relief Isabel's illusion, expressed above, that "she married to please herself"; in effect, she is marrying primarily to please Madame Merle and Osmond.

The terms in which he conceives of Madame Merle's felicitous arrangement give us insight into the coldly inhuman way in which he evaluates her "worth", her monetary, aesthetic and utilitarian value, as an object about to be accorded the honour of incorporation into his collection of precious objets d'art: he views Isabel as "a present of incalculable value" (the reader knows, of course, that Isabel's monetary value — well in excess of 70,000 pounds — had been meticulously calculated before the deal was clinched). In the continuation of his narrated monologue, the three successive rhetorical questions dramatise his thought processes and expose both his warped sense of values and his inadequate understanding of Isabel's real nature:

What could be a finer thing to live with than a high spirit attuned to softness? For would not the softness be all for one's self, and the strenuousness for society, which admired the air of superiority? What could be a happier gift in a companion than a quick, fanciful mind which saved one repetitions and reflected one's thought on a polished, elegant surface? (II, 79)
Osmond's egotistical narcissism, emanating from his aestheticism, is revealed in his appreciation of Isabel's mind primarily, if not solely, as a merely passive reflecting medium; he applauds its supposed capacity to "reflect one's thoughts on a polished, elegant surface". Ironically, in spite of his complaint to Madame Merle about Isabel having "too many ideas" (I, 412) — her only fault in his eyes — he overestimates his ability to eradicate them and reduce her to a creature as passive and pliant as his daughter. The hidden menace in "a high spirit attuned to softness" is premonitory both of the subtle process of coercion to which Pansy is later to be subjected and his comparable endeavour to coerce Isabel into compliance with his mercenary ambitions for his daughter. (Later, Isabel is to demonstrate that her "high spirit", although suffering a temporary deflection, will not be "attuned" to moral malleability and to accepting a course of action inimical to her ideals of moral integrity.)

The conspiratorial alliterative sibilance in "softness for ... self, and strenuousness for society ... superiority" emphasises Osmond's hidden agenda, intentions which are carefully concealed from Isabel and which Ralph is the first to detect.

The concept of Isabel's mind as a decorative reflective surface is succinctly captured in the image of the "silver plate that he might heap up with ripe fruits, to which it would give a decorative value, so that talk might become for him a sort of served desert". This view of Isabel as a passive receptacle, incapable of acting independently — dependent on him to elicit any response — is further developed in the reference to "the silver quality" Osmond finds in Isabel: "he could tap her imagination with his knuckle and make it ring". This propensity to "tap" Isabel both psychologically and financially is amply demonstrated later; even in their last interview before her departure for Gardencourt,
Osmond exerts this power: "There was something in her imagination he could always appeal to against her judgement" (II, 354).

The imagery used here in the presentation of Osmond's consciousness is revealing, and is given added impetus through the interplay of psycho-narration and narrated monologue. The technique creates a new dimension in the revelation of Osmond's subtle egotism. (This was more overtly expressed in his exchange with Madame Merle where he cruelly enquired after Isabel's credentials for presentation.)

Far from eliciting sympathetic understanding for Osmond, the portrayal of the inner life here, with the insight afforded into Osmond's fundamental duplicity, alienates the reader's sympathy. Consideration of the full import of such access to Osmond's consciousness thus disproves the traditional assumption, supported by Stanzel, that interiorisation of the "villain", with the heightened understanding it affords, necessarily leads to a concomitant increased sympathy with his position.

The device of juxtaposing portrayal of Osmond's thoughts about the proposed marriage to Isabel with what he declares to her in dialogue — that is, covert thoughts and overt declarations — reveals the full extent of his hypocrisy. In a conversation immediately following this extract, he declares, proffering a glib aphorism, that

"I won't pretend I'm sorry you're rich; I'm delighted. I delight in everything that's yours — whether it be money or virtue. Money's a horrid thing to follow, but a charming thing to meet. It seems to me, however, that I've sufficiently proved the limits of my itch for it: I never in my life tried to earn a penny.... (II, 80)

Osmond adopts a pose of disinterested appreciation of all Isabel's qualities, pretending that her wealth is an optional extra rather than the prime requisite. Isabel fails to detect the flawed logic of his claim to
have proved the limits of his itch for money: she doesn't perceive that indolence is hardly a guarantee of immunity from avarice. (Osmond has already proved his avarice in courting Isabel and is to give further proof in his pursuit of the wealthy Warburton and rejection of the relatively impecunious Rosier as suitor for his daughter.) She also fails to detect the anomaly in his putting "virtue" on the same level as money as a desirable attribute.

After this chapter, no sustained access is afforded to the consciousness of Osmond. It is through the perceptions of Ralph and Isabel that the implications and consequences of the attitudes revealed in these extracts are reflected.

X: FROM AUTHORIAL TO FIGURAL, FROM ABSTRACT TO PICTORIAL IN CHAPTER XLII

Chapter XLII, depicting Isabel's midnight vigil, differs from the earlier extensive explorations of Isabel's inner world (in chapter VI, for example) where we have the narrator imparting his knowledge of Isabel to the reader. Here Isabel herself is portrayed in the process of attaining knowledge both of herself and those around her as she grapples with certain crucial issues. Instead of the static, already-achieved insight conveyed by the narrator, the impression created here is of the process of thought being enacted sur le vif.

Through the skilful management of narrated monologue, the reader has the impression of participating in the process whereby the reflector attains insight rather than merely registering the received wisdom of the narrator. "The language does not express thoughts so much as the process of thinking": Michael Bell's comment, albeit made in a different context, seems an apt characterisation of the method of presentation here.
Isabel's "motionlessly seeing" here represents the most significant of the recognition scenes through which she attains understanding. The process of vision in The Portrait has many facets; it is accomplished by the protagonist both in scenes of recognition where she is either present as a witness or directly involved as a participant, and also in various scenes rendering a process of "motionlessly seeing" in solitary contemplation. (Her meditative fireside vigil is preceded by the scene in the Albany house and followed by a comparably meditative "backward picture" on the train returning to Gardencourt.) These insights are supplemented by information or revelations afforded by other characters, perceptions which range from the "illumination of wisdom" (II, 60) provided by Ralph to the "new and violent light" (II, 374) of sensational disclosures vouchsafed by the Countess Gemini.

Here, instead of indulging in rationalisation and warding off discomforting truths, Isabel is actively engaged in elucidating her situation and attaining new insight into herself, Osmond and her whole network of relationships. It is in response to the impact of Osmond's words and their menacing implications — reinforced by the "strange impression she had received in the afternoon of her husband's being more in direct communication with Madame Merle than she suspected" (II, 188) — that Isabel, her mind "assailed by visions" (II, 204), undertakes a drastic reassessment of her whole situation.

That first recognition scene, where the relative positions, the collusive air and the "absorbed mutual gaze" of her husband and Madame Merle indicated a degree of intimacy previously undetected by Isabel, had aroused as yet unconfirmed suspicions. Isabel's perception of that tableau had later been referred to by the narrator as "an occasion commemorated in this history with an emphasis appropriate not so much to its apparent as to
its real importrance" (II, 331). The "real" as opposed to the "apparent" importance of this and other phenomena is what Isabel is to grapple with in her midnight vigil. She is obliged to exercise, to an ever-increasing extent, "the power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implication of things" ("The Art of Fiction", p. 32).

Her observation of Madame Merle and Osmond in intimate association was preceded by a passage of "discriminated preparation" (AN, p. 323) summarising her view of her marriage at that stage. We find that although her romantic view of Osmond had been effectively dispelled after a few years of abrasive propinquity, Isabel had no suspicion of the way she had been manipulated by Madame Merle. With her passionate desire to be just, she had refused to accept the truth of Mrs Touchett's assertion that Madame Merle had engineered her marriage. Narrated monologue highlights her deluded view:

It was impossible to pretend that she had not acted with her eyes open; if ever a girl was a free agent she had been... There had been no plot, no snare; she had looked and considered and chosen. (II, 160)

The dramatic irony here is underlined by the passage following immediately upon it which casts doubt on Isabel's conviction. Her delusion receives a jolt from the "something detected" in the relationship between Madame Merle and Osmond. She is brought to realize that there is far more to their relationship than meets the eye, even though it is what does meet the eye which precipitates new insight.

In tracing Isabel's gradual awakening to the extent of her own self-deception, we recall her expressed conviction that "the only thing is to see our steps as we take them - to understand them as we go. That, no doubt, I shall always do" (I, 270). Ironically, as we have
seen, she is in fact destined to understand not as she takes the steps leading her to Osmond's "house of darkness" but only afterwards, in retrospect. Thus her enlightenment proceeds in accordance with Kierkegaard's conviction that "Life can only be lived forward and understood backward".\textsuperscript{11} It is indeed through retracing those steps in imagination that, with the wisdom of hindsight, she attains true understanding.\textsuperscript{12} A narratorial comment in \textit{The Bostonians} is particularly pertinent to Isabel's experience here:

> these hours of backward clearness come to all men and women, once at least, when they read the past in the light of the present, with the reasons of things, like unobserved finger-posts, protruding where they never saw them before.\textsuperscript{13}

The best example of this procedure is to be found in the most crucial of her recognition scenes, in what was described in the Preface as Isabel's "extraordinary midnight vigil which was to become for her such a landmark" (AN, p. 57).

The scene also illustrates how, in rendering the process of vision of his "intense perceivers", James demonstrates not only that he conceived of "seeing" as an act of the inward even more than the outward eye but also that "seeing" as an act of the outward eye can prepare for and culminate in insight as an acquisition of the inward eye.

Isabel's tendency to conceive of her situation in visual terms is vividly manifested here in her attempts to clarify and comprehend her situation. Mulling over what Osmond has said, she finds that "his words had put the situation before her and she was absorbed in looking at it" (II, 186). Though superficially a static "picture", this scene, as James points out in the Preface, "throws the action further forward than twenty 'incidents' might have done". He explains that "it was
designed to have all the vivacity of incident and all the economy of picture" (AN, p. 57).

James's comment could be taken as an alternative formulation of the conjunction of narrated monologue and psycho-narration, the dramatic immediacy of narrated monologue having the "vivacity of incident" as it enacts the activity of the protagonist's consciousness, miming its very movements, while "the economy of picture", encompassing James's notion of foreshortening, suggests the possibilities of the more panoramic surveys of psycho-narration which can summarise and condense impressions and thoughts - those arising here from three years' experience of married life with Osmond.

The terminology of both James and Cohn point to the complex shifts in time and space, the smooth sliding between the reflector's present moment and her remembered past and projected future. Detailed imagistic depictions of Isabel's present state (or, more accurately, process) of understanding are embedded in evocations of other past conceptions or experiences and possible future implications: "Isabel, scanning the future with dry, fixed eyes, saw..." (II, 191).

Cohn points out that chapter XLII, which epitomises a completely inward scene (a drama of consciousness as opposed to drama presented in dialogue) is "a supreme illustration of the paradox that narrative fiction attains its greatest 'air of reality' in the representation of a lone figure thinking thoughts she will never communicate to anyone" (Transparent Minds, p. 7). The scene demonstrates the truth of James's contention that the dramatisation of the "subjective adventure", which is essentially an interpretive enterprise, can "make the mere still lucidity of her act as 'interesting' as the surprise of a caravan or the identification of a pirate" (AN, p. 54).14

In this fusion of "incident" and "picture",...
she sits up, by the dying fire, far into the night, under the spell of recognitions on which she finds the last sharpness suddenly wait. It is a representation simply of her motionlessly seeing. (AN, p. 57)

Isabel passes her life in review as she had done in Albany before leaving for Europe; one experiences a similar "kaleidoscopic" succession of images which bring to mind T.S. Eliot's lines "The memory throws up high and dry/A crowd of twisted things." The memory, stimulated by stress, generates or "throws up" images, impressions and thoughts in an apparently haphazard fashion. Events are recalled not necessarily in chronological order but by a process of association; fragments are framed for scrutiny before sinking back into the matrix of memory. Certain crucial revelations are presented in the form of images. Thus Isabel's access to increased self-knowledge is attained not only through ratiocination but through images, which at times have an almost hallucinatory quality. These images rise to mind in previously undiscerned combinations, and an inchoate pattern of meaning gradually emerges to be imposed on formerly disparate elements of experience.

X. i: The Cognitive Force of Metaphor: Iterative Imagery in the Representation of Isabel's Consciousness

As mentioned earlier, chapter XLII marks a significant move away from the authorial mode characterized by abstract analytical vocabulary for the portrayal of the inner world. Here, a complex metaphorical mode predominates throughout, vividly illustrating the way in which a character attains understanding through images generated by the imagination. The cognitive function of imagery is also illustrated in the recurrence of certain
key images in new configurations, demonstrating the significant role of iterative imagery in emphasising the important stages in the development of the character's understanding.

A close examination of the imagery reveals the extent to which disclosures are conveyed by means of vivid and often recurrent images. Isabel's mind is "assailed by visions" (II, 204) which are triggered partly by the same vision with which the scene closes: "Isabel stood there gazing at a remembered vision – that of her husband and Madame Merle unconsciously and familiarly associated" (II, 205). That image, the import of which gradually emerges, is "like a sudden flicker of light" (II, 165) which acts as a stimulus to start to life a host of submerged images which surge up to be subjected to rational analysis.

Of the many significant streams of images converging here, the most striking are those relating in some sense to vision or insight; this would include the recurrent light imagery. Although some of these images occur elsewhere in speech – as in Osmond's ominous declaration to Caspar that he and his wife are "as united ... as the candle and the snuffers" (II, 309), it is largely in psycho-narration and narrated monologue that this cluster of images makes its full impact. So we find Isabel musing, in an image which makes more explicit the implications of the "candle and snuffers", that "Osmond deliberately, almost malignantly, had put the lights out one by one" (II, 190).

Thus the contrast between Isabel's early idealistic aspiration (rendered in somewhat ironic psycho-narration) to "move in a realm of light, of natural wisdom" (I, 68), and her present altered vision (rendered in narrated monologue) is emphasised by her realisation that Osmond was extinguishing her independent spirit.

Ironically, although Isabel perceives that Ralph has "the illumination of wisdom" (II, 60) she had failed to
heed his warning to "wait ... for a little more light" and to appreciate that he "might have struck a spark or two" (II, 66) of insight to highlight Osmond's defects.

Metaphors evoking the theme of seeing or perceiving also reinforce the idea that Isabel is now seeing things differently, "in the light of deepening experience" (II, 194). Just as she had learnt to "view her friend [Madame Merle] with a different eye" (II, 323), so she now has a modified perception of her husband. When he had originally declared his love for her, they were described as "exchanging a long look - the large, conscious look of the critical hours of life" (II, 17-18). Now, Isabel's perception of the distance separating them is rendered in narrated monologue in which their alienation from each other is signalled by the metaphorical modification of this literal exchange of looks: "a gulf had opened between them over which they looked at each other with eyes that were on either side a declaration of the deception suffered" (II, 189).

Other complexes of iterative imagery which dramatise the succession of revelatory disclosures include those connected with the theatre, architecture and the ubiquitous garden images.

The composing power of the creative imagination is vividly exemplified in this capacity to reduce experience to images. It is also significant that most of the images are conjured up by Isabel herself, in narrated monologue, rather than by the narrator, on her behalf, in psycho-narration. This is a measure of her cognitive progress; as Peter Garrett has observed, "To image a situation is to move toward mastery of it, to make it more firmly possessed by consciousness".16

Images can represent seminal stages in the evolution of consciousness when a character attains "an emblematic perception, a symbolised intuition".17 Thus, as Garrett emphasises,
The problem ... of determining whether a given image proceeds from the character's consciousness or from the narrator is therefore quite important; the locus of the image will indicate responsibility for the creation of meaning. (Scene and Symbol from George Eliot to James Joyce, p. 107)

Dorrit Cohn's model can contribute greater precision here: the fact that images are located more frequently in narrated monologue than psycho-narration indicates that Isabel is attaining understanding and control of her experience.

The cognitive power of metaphor, although apparent to the reader, is not necessarily understood by the reflector. Isabel does not consciously appreciate the significance of these images or of the imagination itself as an "aid to lucidity". When trying here to wrestle with the problem of Warburton's real motives for wanting to marry Pansy, Isabel, whose thoughts are traced through psycho-narrated modulating into narrated monologue, "broke out of the labyrinth, rubbing her eyes, and declared that her imagination surely did her little honour and that her husband's did him even less" (II, 188). She rubs her eyes to dispel the nightmarish interpretation of the truth to which her imagination is giving her access; but what her imagination is projecting is in fact a valid reflection of the true state of affairs. Her reluctance to accept this is underscored by stylistic contagion as her thoughts are rendered in psycho-narration veering towards narrated monologue in which her own formulation is suggested; "her imagination surely ..." (my emphasis).

In effect, her imaginative faculty, which had previously been responsible for creating and sustaining illusions, becomes more rigorously disciplined in the course of her disillusionment and becomes actively employed in the process of judging, interpreting and elucidating; so we find that "Isabel's imagination
applied itself to this elusive point", that is, it is now employed in deciphering mysteries such as that of the conspiratorial couple "in combination".

Cohn notes that the function of Isabel's analeptic excursion is not primarily to fill in the gap created by skipping over the first years of her married life; "her remembering psyche does not focus on the elided events themselves, but engages in a kind of retrospective self-analysis" (p. 129). The most crucial insight attained is Isabel's recognition that in her idealistic assessment of Osmond she had been taken in by his facade: "she had imagined a world of no substance" (II, 192) and "had not read him right" (II, 192). We recall her propensity, revealed earlier by the narrator, to be "guided in the selection (of books) chiefly by the frontispiece" (I, 29-30). The recurrence of the image indicates the convergence of Isabel's understanding with that of the narrator, a convergence which is reflected more generally in the effacement of the narrator's voice and its displacement by that of the figural consciousness.

The recurrence also of terms or concepts originally used by Ralph emphasises the part he has played in guiding Isabel's growing insight. For example, Isabel's newly acquired realisation, expressed here in narrated monologue, that Osmond "took himself so seriously, it was something appalling" (II, 196), recalls Ralph's asseveration to Isabel in the Florentine garden: "I think he's narrow, selfish. He takes himself so seriously" (II, 70). Ralph also perceived that "under the guise of caring only for intrinsic values Osmond lived exclusively for the world... He lived with his eye on it from morning till night..." (II, 144). Isabel, now seeing through Osmond's pose of indifference to the world, couches her discovery, which is rendered in narrated monologue, in similar terms: "this base, ignoble world, it appeared, was after all what one had to live for; one
was to keep it for ever in one's eye ... to extract from it some recognition of one's own superiority" (II, 197).

Isabel's painfully acquired (but swiftly stifled) insight into Warburton's true motives - "She asked herself with some dismay whether Warburton were pretending to be in love with Pansy in order to cultivate another satisfaction and what might be called other chances" - also echoes that voiced by Ralph who had asked Warburton whether "among Miss Osmond's merits her being ... so near her stepmother is n't a leading one?" (II, 153).

Her most crucial recognitions, albeit still imperfect, concern her husband. Lunar imagery is used for the expression of her belief that

he had not disguised himself, during the year of his courtship, any more than she. But she had seen only half his nature then, as one saw the disk of the moon when it was partly masked by the shadow of the earth. She saw the full moon now - she saw the whole man.... she had mistaken a part for the whole. (II, 191)

The recognition that Isabel's thoughts here are rendered in narrated monologue enables the reader to regard them critically - as not necessarily having the endorsement of the narrator; thus the reader can perceive the limitations of what Isabel ironically believes to be a full understanding of "the whole man". She does not yet perceive that during his courting campaign he had in fact deliberately suppressed or held in check the more reprehensible aspects of his nature, and had artfully misled her as to the real nature of his interest in her, masking his mercenary motives behind a facade of urbane indifference to the worldly. Osmond's true motives had been partly masked by the rosy illumination (rather than "shadow") carefully cast by his accomplice, who was described by Ralph in appropriately cosmic imagery as "the great round world itself" (II, 362).
Although "the whole man" is not yet in fact completely unmasked - Isabel discovers only later, for example, that "he had married her, like a vulgar adventurer, for her money" (II, 330) - she does perceive that he represents a way of life which is the very antithesis of what she had imagined; far from epitomising "the infinite vista of a multiplied life" (II, 189) and "the high places of happiness" and liberty, which would guarantee Isabel "an orbit of her own" (I, 144) he has attempted to relegate Isabel to the subsidiary position of satellite to what she now perceives to be an alien and hostile orb.

This perception is reinforced through a recurrence of the garden imagery. Psycho-narration, through which it is conveyed that "The real offence, as she ultimately perceived, was her having a mind of her own at all", shifts into narrated monologue for transforming this observation into a deeply realized imaginative insight:

Her mind was to be his - attached to his own like a small garden-plot to a deer-park. He would rake the soil gently and water the flowers; he would weed the beds and gather an occasional nosegay. It would be a pretty piece of property for a proprietor already far-reaching. (II, 200)

Setting this image in the context of the earlier garden imagery suggesting Isabel's vitality, spontaneity and dislike of confinement emphasises the tragedy of this free spirit being reduced to a mere adjunct of a chauvinistic poseur.

Isabel has the magnanimity not only to "pity" Osmond for the deception suffered but to see herself as largely responsible for the deception. Here again the more enlightened perspective of the narrator and reader allow us to see that in attempting to render scrupulous justice, Isabel in fact apportions more blame to herself than strict justice or an enlightened eye would demand. There is an important difference between deceiving "in
intention", as Osmond does, and deceiving unwittingly, in good faith, as Isabel does; moreover, the motive in each case is very different. So it is difficult to agree with the contention that in this section "much of the analysis seems calculated to justify Isabel" who is "fittingly made to pay for her own deception". As we have seen, Isabel is infinitely more deceived and plotted against than deceiving. A recognition of the function of narrated monologue and psycho-narration in revealing what should be ascribed to the narrator and what to the figural consciousness would elucidate the specific kind of ambiguity exploited here and arguably obviate such misinterpretation.

Thus Isabel does not yet see "the whole man" or grasp the full picture. Other ramifications have yet to be revealed in further scenes facilitating her process of vision, including the lurid revelations of the Countess Gemini and Madame Merle's disclosures at the convent.

The constitutive power of consciousness is foregrounded here in Isabel's realisation that she had misconstrued Osmond partly because "she had mistaken a part for the whole" (II, 191). According to Paul B. Armstrong,

Isabel's efforts to correct her imperfect view transform into the stuff of drama the very workings of the hermeneutic circle — the circle whereby one can understand the parts of any state of affairs only by projecting a sense of the whole, even as one can grasp the whole only by explicating its parts.... In portraying Isabel's wakening, James offers as an adventure in itself the ever-shifting relation between parts and wholes through which she seeks to recompose her world. James did not invent the hermeneutic circle, obviously, but he did discover that its movements could themselves form the action of a novel.19

Apart from dramatising the interpretive process, this midnight meditation can also be regarded as a scene of temptation in that Isabel is shown weighing the
possibility of adopting her husband's view, and specifically, of seeing in his way the projected match between Warburton and Pansy. After being confronted with Osmond's scarcely veiled threat that he would hold her responsible if the scheme failed, she is obliged to reassess her stance. The scene begins and concludes with a reference to the temptation of playing the role of dutiful wife and helping him realize his ambitions for his daughter in violation of her own wishes. Ultimately, understanding the true state of both Warburton's and Pansy's feelings, Isabel resists the temptation to propitiate or placate Osmond. At this stage, however, as the portrayal of Isabel's consciousness shifts out of narrated monologue to establish greater critical detachment, the narrator intervenes in the first person and employing a telling image, indicates the limits of her understanding:

As I have said, she believed she was not defiant, and what better proof of it than that she should linger there half the night, trying to persuade herself that there was no reason why Pansy should n't be married as you would put a letter in the post-office? (II, 205)

The narrator's image here suggests a heartless readiness to despatch Pansy almost on a C.O.D. basis, and reinforces the impression that Isabel is adopting Osmond's instrumentalising view, being prepared to view others as a means to an end. Her view of Ralph, too, is problematic, still obscured by self-delusion. A generalisation in the gnomic present tense — reinforced by the ironic narratorial comment in the last sentence — serves to stress the cognitive distance between the protagonist and the narrator here:

...it seemed to her an act of devotion to conceal her misery from him.... It gave her plenty to do; there was passion, exaltation, religion in it. Women find their religion sometimes in strange exercises, and Isabel at present, in playing a part
before her cousin, had an idea that she was doing him a kindness. It would have been a kindness perhaps if he had been for a single instant a dupe. (II, 203-04)

In her self-deluded state, Isabel does not yet perceive that Ralph both recognises the true state of affairs and would welcome her confidence. As narrated monologue foregrounds the disparity between the understanding of the reflector and the reader, the latter can see, as Isabel manifestly does not, that her policy toward Ralph is compounded both of concern for him and of pride.

The midnight meditation, then, is one of the important "milestones on the road of so much inward or apprehensive life", a milestone which indicates both the distance Isabel has travelled and the tracts she has yet to traverse.

XI: THE CULMINATION OF ISABEL'S "SUBJECTIVE ADVENTURE": (EXTERNAL) DISCLOSURES AND (INTERNAL) CONCEPTUALISATION THROUGH METAPHOR

Before Isabel's process of vision is complete, the insights achieved in various ways by Isabel herself have to be corroborated and supplemented by others. Her last crucial recognitions are derived from revelations vouchsafed by the Countess Gemini and Madame Merle. These disclosures have been prepared for not only by dramatised scenes of recognition and "motionlessly seeing" but also, less obtrusively, through the activity of her subconscious mind rendered through psycho-narration. Thus, for instance, we find that "sometimes, at night, she had strange visions; she seemed to see her husband and her friend - his friend - in dim, indistinguishable combination" (II, 278).
Isabel's reaction to her sister-in-law's revelations is appropriately rendered in visual terms, as a response to what she "saw": after being exposed to the Countess' Pandora's Box of exotic disclosures, Isabel is described as sitting "staring at her companion's story as at a bale of fantastic wares some strolling gypsy might have unpacked on the carpet at her feet" (II, 368).

Similarly, in the last meeting between Isabel and Madame Merle at the convent, Isabel is depicted as seeing in the crude light of that revelation which had already become part of experience ... the dry staring fact that she had been an applied handled hung-up tool, as senseless and convenient as mere shaped wood and iron. (II, 379)

Here again her strongly visual imagination - and tendency to conceive of things in analogical terms - is manifested. Furthermore, in "she saw the dry staring fact" the act of attaining insight is dramatised by endowing a normally perceptual verb with strong cognitive connotations, and simultaneously giving abstract thoughts and perceptions the status of objective entities. Thus, Isabel "saw" not a visible object but a "fact", an intangible abstract entity which is invested with concrete reality (in effect, the essential process of metaphor is encapsulated here in vividly rendering concrete what is abstract). This procedure is reinforced in the way adverbs describing how she saw - staring dry-eyed, gazing fixedly - are transposed into adjectives describing what she saw: "dry, staring fact".

The phrasing also recalls the earlier important moments of recognition enacted in her midnight vigil where Isabel was depicted as "scanning the future with dry, fixed eyes" (II, 191). Now, when we find in psycho-narration that she "saw it all as distinctly as if it had been reflected in a large, clear glass" (II, 378), what Isabel "sees" has more validity than in chapter XLII where it is through narrated monologue that her imperfect
insights are conveyed, as when she thinks, mistakenly, that "she saw the whole man". Thus the phrase "she saw (that)" could in some contexts be ambiguous, as it could indicate either objective report or subjective reflection. The status or validity of what is "seen" is affected accordingly.

It is significant that in this scene an evocation which starts as narrator's report shifts virtually imperceptibly into narrated monologue or narrated perception so that no distinction is made between the interpretation of the narrator and that of Isabel:

She had not proceeded far before Isabel noted a sudden break in her voice, a lapse in her continuity, which was in itself a complete drama. This subtle modulation marked a momentous discovery - the perception of an entirely new attitude on the part of her listener. (II, 378)

The phrase "Isabel noted ..." is followed by an account of Madame Merle's discovery that "the person who stood there was not the same one she had seen hitherto, but was a very different person - a person who knew her secret". This insight is ascribed to Madame Merle by Isabel; the fact that no confirmation of her interpretation is provided by the narrator indicates that her interpretations can now be regarded as consonant with the narrator's and can hence replace them. At this stage of the narrative, then, Isabel's perceptions no longer have to be qualified or supplemented by the narrator.

Isabel's realisation that she has been manipulated and exploited as though she were a mere inanimate object is appropriately rendered in an image which implies the further indignity of having been deposed from the realm of the aesthetic and relegated to the sphere of the utilitarian. We recall that Osmond had regarded her as having "qualified herself to figure in his collection of choice objects" (II, 9) and had subsequently regarded her as being "almost as smooth to his general need of her as
handled ivory to the palm" (II, 11). The Countess Gemini had earlier informed Isabel that she should consider herself as "a woman who had been made use of" (II, 371). Here, this truth takes on new configurations for Isabel in the telling image of the "applied handled hung-up tool" in terms of which Isabel conceives of the function she has performed for Osmond.

The conjunction of sea and light imagery, occurring in psycho-narration, again dramatises Isabel's process of vision. She was described as "far afloat on a sea of wonder and pain" after her discoveries concerning Madame Merle and Osmond; prior to this, Isabel's "prayer to be enlightened" as she gazed into Madame Merle's face was initially thwarted as "the light of this woman's eyes seemed only a darkness..." (II, 327). Then, later, "it had come over her like a high-surfing wave that Mrs. Touchett was right. Madame Merle had married her" (II, 327).

When Madame Merle reveals that "it was Ralph who imparted to you that extra lustre which was required to make you a brilliant match" (II, 388) Isabel, described at the outset as "constantly staring and wondering" (I, 45) once again, and for the last time, "stood staring" (II, 388) just as other Jamesian heroines are portrayed as staring wide-eyed in wonder and disbelief as the more startling aspects of their respective worlds are revealed. This oblique indication of their state of mind supplements the more direct exposure through psycho-narration and narrated monologue.

Isabel's return to the Edenic Gardencourt completes the circular movement framing the action of the novel with its concomitant growth of consciousness in the protagonist; it throws into relief the distance - spiritual, emotional, cognitive - which she has travelled since setting out on her exploration of life. Like Laura Wing in "A London Life", she now "knew almost
everything.... The place was the same but her eyes were different: they had seen such sad, bad things in so short a time".21

Throughout the novel, the theme of illumination or revelation - or extension of consciousness - has been dramatised in visual metaphor or imagery associated with light. Undergoing her "process of vision", Isabel, far from radiantly "moving in a realm of light" (II, 368), finds herself in a realm pervaded by the eerie chiaroscuro of surrealistic nightmare. Just as "there was a lurid light on everything" (II, 303) during her midnight meditation, and subsequently, embroiled in successive bouts of recognition generated by the Countess Gemini and Madame Merle, Isabel "seemed today to live in a world illumined by lurid flashes" (II, 388).

In Isabel's last scene with Caspar Goodwood, a confluence of two streams of imagery - the iterative light imagery and a cluster of sea images - vividly dramatises their final encounter. Isabel's previous conception of Caspar as providing a possible place of refuge is in a sense put to the test here. In a passage of psycho-narration modulating to narrated monologue Caspar had at one stage been perceived as representing a haven rather than a threat to her liberty:

...she reflected that she herself might know the humiliation of change ... and find rest in those very elements of his presence which struck her now as impediments to the finer respiration. It was conceivable that these impediments should some day prove a sort of blessing in disguise - a clear and quiet harbour enclosed by a brave granite breakwater. (I, 323)

In their last encounter in Rome, prior to Isabel's return to Gardencourt, Caspar's passionate response to Isabel was evoked through psycho-narration charged with sensuous imagery which modulates into narrated perception:
Now that he was alone with her all the passion he had never stifled surged into his senses; it hummed in his eyes and made things swim round him. The bright, empty room grew dim and blurred, and through the heaving veil he felt her hover before him with gleaming eyes and parted lips. (II, 317)

In their final encounter, the sea imagery again predominates, now evoking Isabel's response to Caspar's display of passion:

The world ... seemed ... to take the form of a mighty sea, where she floated in fathomless waters.... here was help; it had come in a rushing torrent. I know not whether she believed everything he said; but she believed just then that to let him take her in his arms would be the next best thing to her dying. This belief, for a moment, was a kind of rapture, in which she felt herself sink and sink. (II, 435)

A noteworthy feature of the evocation of Isabel's consciousness here is the reassertion of the presence of the intrusive narrator with the arch disclaimer of omniscience: "I know not whether she believed...."

Imagistic psycho-narration, in which sea imagery is combined with the iterative light imagery to suggest revelatory insight, continues to be employed to depict Isabel's turbulent emotional state: "the next instant she felt his arms about her and his lips on her own lips. His kiss was like white lightning, a flash that spread, and spread again...." Isabel, after submitting to the "white lightning" of Caspar's kiss, resurfaces to extricate herself: "So had she heard of those wrecked and under water following a train of images before they sink. But when darkness returned she was free" (II, 436).

We recall Isabel's belief early in the novel that "if a certain light should dawn she could give herself completely" (I, 72). She had subsequently been deceived as to the nature of the "light" prompting her to give herself to Osmond, and when now confronted with the "white lightning" of Caspar's sexual power, this "flash
of white lightning" with its Lawrentian associations of intense consuming physical passion evokes the idea of violent illumination complementing the other lurid flashes to which Isabel has been exposed. In a new flash of insight, she now sees that flight with Caspar offers no feasible alternative.

"The whole of anything is never told; you can only take what groups together" (Notebooks, p. 18). At the culmination of her "subjective adventure" or hermeneutic enterprise Isabel has attained self-knowledge and insight into her situation. As the emphasis in this study is on the representation of consciousness, space does not permit discussion of the merits of her decision to return to Rome. Through application of Dorrit Cohn's model, however, insight can be gained into her state of mind and conflicting impulses, her tendency to rationalise and the residual romanticism or unexpunged personal pride prompting her to cling to the "ghastly form" of her marriage.

It has been noted that in The Portrait, the shift from authorial to figural narration in the course of the novel is reflected in the increasing preponderance of narrated monologue in the representation of Isabel's consciousness in the latter half of the novel. The process of conceptualisation through metaphor (in the consciousness of the reflector as opposed to that of the narrator) which is so vividly exemplified in chapter XLII, is to be implemented with even greater complexity in James's last completed novel, The Golden Bowl. Whereas Roderick and The Portrait (and later, The Ambassadors and Maisie), employ single focalization — with varying degrees of consistency — The Golden Bowl, like The Wings of the Dove, exemplifies multiple focalization. This is accompanied by the virtual effacement of the intrusive first-person narrator. Once again, however, as will be demonstrated in the following
chapter, significant discrepancies exist between James's declared project as set out in the Preface and the strategies implemented in the novel itself.


3 *The Finer Grain* is the title of a volume of short stories by James published in 1910.


8 Dorothea Krook, in *The Ordeal of Consciousness*, has examined this aspect of the novel in depth.

9 Osmond often dispenses glib aphorisms, telling Isabel, for example, that "A woman's natural mission is to be where she's most appreciated" (I, 380); here again a woman is seen as essentially passive, a recipient rather than initiator of appreciation. A slight modification of this "truism" would produce a more apt expression of Osmond's real position: that a woman's "natural" or most desirable mission is to be where her value, particularly that measured in monetary terms, can appreciate – to the credit and benefit of the woman's appreciator!
The Context of English Literature 1900-1930 (London: Methuen, 1980), p. 65. As Cohn has noted, the use of the past tense does not detract from the sense of immediacy, as in such portrayals one has the illusion of participating in a present process. (Narrated monologue, Cohn points out, adopts the temporal orientation of the figural consciousness (p. 127).


The procedure whereby "life is ... understood backward" is exemplified also in, inter alia, The Wings of the Dove, The Ambassadors (Strether’s "backward picture" in the Luxembourg Gardens) and The Golden Bowl, where this device will be explored more fully.


Cohn notes the inadequacy of Gordon Taylor's account of the method used for rendering Isabel's thoughts in this chapter: "although still cast in the third person, [it is] divested of most authorial trappings", and the "third-person intrusions approximate convincingly, though they fail to reproduce exactly, the links in her own train of thought". The Passages of Thought: Psychological Representation in the American Novel 1870-1900 (New York, 1969), pp. 64 and 70.


The Challenge of Bewilderment, p. 6.


CHAPTER 5:  
DUAL OR MULTIPLE FOCALIZATION? : THE GOLDEN BOWL

"Baths of Benevolence and the Vigilance of Care"

I: AUTHORIAL AND FIGURAL NARRATION IN THE CREATION OF "INSIDE VIEWS" IN THE GOLDEN BOWL

I. i: "The Unvoiced Narrator"

Although the intrusive omniscient narrator is less pervasively present in The Golden Bowl than in James's earlier novels, the authorial mode has not been completely eclipsed by the figural. The voice of the narrator—often, surprisingly, in its first-person manifestations—is still intermittently present. In the earlier novels the narrator sometimes emerges as a distinct personality (for instance, in Washington Square) and invariably guides the reader in his assessment of the characters and the action of the novel; in The Golden Bowl, no distinct narratorial "personality" emerges and narratorial comment is largely confined to observations on novelistic presentation punctuated by the occasional gnomic utterance.

In introducing Amerigo "at the moment we are concerned with him" (I, 3), for example, the narrator refers to him as "our personage" and subsequently describes his state of mind on "the occasion of which we thus represent him" (I, 10–11). Throughout the novel, phrases such as "As I have said" (I, 19), and, more appropriately perhaps, "as I have hinted" (I, 153), "we have seen how ... for our young woman" (II, 41), and "as we know" (II, 280) recur.

Comments on novelistic procedure such as "The little crisis was of shorter duration than our account of it"
"might I so far multiply my metaphors, I should compare her to ..." (II, 7) are less ubiquitous than in The Portrait, but are often cast in similar vein. One, however, is particularly striking for its "meta-novelistic" overtones: the narrator, after an evocation of Adam Verver (past and present) in the billiard-room at Fawns, returns to the present of narration and refers to his presentation of Adam "on the occasion round which we have perhaps drawn our circle too wide" (I, 150-51). This comment inevitably recalls the observation made by the author (as opposed to the narrator) in the Preface to Roderick Hudson, where he speaks of novelistic technique in terms of an analogy with the geometer who must not draw his circle too wide (see chapter I of this thesis): "Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they shall happily appear to do so" (AN, p. 5).

Surprisingly, one even finds the occasional generalisation in the gnomic present tense, as in: "so apt is the countenance, as with a finer consciousness than the tongue, to betray a sense of this particular lapse" (I, 342), and, in an observation worthy of George Eliot, "We have each our own way of making up for our unselfishness, and Maggie ..." (II, 101). The formulation is reminiscent of a comparable gnomic utterance in Middlemarch: "We are all of us born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves. Dorothy...."1

In view of the cited representative examples of narratorial intrusion, it is an oversimplification to aver, as David Seed does, that "the narrator tends, in the post-1910 novels, to be subsumed into the very texture of the prose".2

The Golden Bowl differs from The Portrait in that there is no marked shift from authorial to figural narration in the second half of the novel, as there is in
the earlier work. Although there are almost twice as many instances of direct narratorial intrusion in the first half as in the second, these are in the form of isolated sentences or phrases. The progressive effacement of the narratorial voice in favour of the figural consciousness is much more consistently implemented in The Portrait. In The Golden Bowl, the modulation is more from that of multiple focalization in the first volume, where access is given to the consciousness of virtually every character, to single focalization in the second, where everything is filtered almost exclusively through Maggie's consciousness.

I. ii: The Narrator, the Reader and the Suppositious Spectator

The function of the narratorial voice is thus more circumscribed in The Golden Bowl. There is no flaunting of cognitive privilege such as in The Portrait, where confidential asides to the reader - "We, who know more than [the protagonist] ..." - emphasise the narrator's omniscience. There is no such assumption of shared cognitive superiority linking narrator and reader in The Golden Bowl. Whereas the reader in The Portrait is told that "The reader has a right to a nearer and a clearer view" than that of the protagonist, and "the reader knows more about him [Ralph] than Isabel was ever to know", The Golden Bowl is devoid of such reassuring acknowledgement of fundamental reader's "rights". The reader is restricted to the perspective of the characters, and is denied the advantage of conspiratorial asides from a narrator who, as Lubbock put it, "looks over the character's shoulder, sees what he sees and simultaneously sees more". The perceptions of the characters are not supplemented or rectified by the narrator, as Isabel's are in The Portrait; the reader's
understanding is not guided by "inside information". The reader is left floundering, implicitly enjoined to "do half the labour [her]/himself", as in response to Maggie's injunction to the Prince to engage in the epistemological and moral project to "Find out for yourself!" (II, 203).

In James's earlier novels, as we have seen, the narrator frequently adopts the stance of biographer or historian "objectively" presenting "facts" about his characters - particularly information concerning their past. In *The Golden Bowl*, the "facts" about a specific character's past history are largely filtered through the consciousness of other characters in the novel. In the opening section of the novel, for example, the "history" of the relationship between Amerigo and Maggie is refracted through the consciousness of the Prince. Retrospective evocation of the past is supplemented by "filling in" in dialogue, as in the colloquies between Fanny and Bob Assingham in which Fanny relates Charlotte's past and her connection with both the Ververs and Amerigo. Adam seems to be a significant exception here; his past experience is presented by the narrator rather than by any of the other characters.

A feature which is more marked in *The Golden Bowl* than in earlier novels is the emergence of a hypothetical observer or suppositious spectator to whom the narrator makes frequent allusion. A new narratorial stance is thus established. As David Seed has noted, "In place of biographer, historian or lawyer, the narrator, from 1895 onwards, typically phrases his comments by reference to a hypothetical observer" (p. 514). Seed links this development to the influence of James's experiments with the theatre, pointing out that "such references also put the reader into an imaginary audience and limit the narrator's scope to explaining what might be inferred from a particular scene" (p. 514). (It might be argued that this approach is already adumbrated in *The Portrait*,...
where in the first scene, for instance, the reader participates with the narrator in gradually establishing or inferring information about the characters.)

These allusions thus function as a means of establishing the contract with the reader, implying that the narrator is merely a slightly more cognitively advantaged version of the reader and that they share the same world to which the language of the novel refers. In discussing this point in a general study of the narrative stance in various fictional texts, Culler notes, with reference to the novels of Balzac, that "The hypostatized observers act as personae for the reader and suggest how he would have reacted to the spectacle that is being presented". In *The Golden Bowl*, the intention at times seems to be to suggest how the reader *should* have (rather than *would* have) reacted. The following ironic comment seems to be an oblique hint as to the putative deficiencies of the "real" as opposed to the "Ideal" reader: the narrator, demonstrating how "taste in [Adam] as a touchstone" (II, 345) "served him to satisfy himself both about Amerigo and the Bernardino Luini ... [and] about Charlotte Stant and an extraordinary set of oriental tiles" (I, 196-97), states blandly that "Nothing perhaps might affect us as queerer, had we time to look into it, than this application of the same measure of value to such different pieces of property as old Persian carpets, say, and new human acquisitions" (I, 196).

Here, the assumption of shared cognitive superiority becomes one of complicity in superficiality as the narrator implies that neither he nor his readers have time to linger over the implications of Adam's attitude, central though this may be to developments in the novel. Perhaps the irony is directed at the *persona* of the narrator himself and his conventional contract with the reader: what is being ironised would be his traditional function of commenting fully on the action in the manner of Trollope or George Eliot. Is the contract between
reader and narrator being subjected to ironic re-evaluation? Or perhaps the narrator is implying that, having been alerted to the significance of Adam's aestheticism by the narrator, the reader should explore the implications for her/himself — "do half the labour". The suppositious observer, in other words, is often guilty of superficial observation which merits chiding in the same way as does the practice of "people who read novels as an exercise in skipping" ("The Art of Fiction", p. 27). On the other hand, this could be taken as a satirical or snide comment on a society made up of readers who either share Adam's materialistic approach or fail to dissociate themselves from it.

Other references to the hypothetical observer in the novel are usually less ambiguous and do not often entail the kind of narratorial nudging implicit in the above example. There are innocuous references such as "Adam Verver ... might have been observed, had there been a spectator in the field" (I, 125), "a chance spectator of this process" (I, 156), "for a spectator of these passages between the pair" (II, 128), counterpointed with the more ironic "the spectator of whom they would thus well have been worthy might have read meanings of his own into the intensity of their communion" (I, 33) and "for a spectator sufficiently detached they might have been quite the privileged pair they were reputed" (II, 354). An ironic contrast between what is seen by the characters and what is perceived by the narrator and reader is further exemplified in the last scene of the novel where Adam and Maggie observe Amerigo and Charlotte seated together:

Their eyes moved together from piece to piece, taking in the whole nobleness .... The two noble persons seated in conversation and at tea, fell thus into the splendid effect and the general harmony: Mrs. Verver and the Prince fairly "placed" themselves, however unwittingly, as high expressions of the kind of human furniture required aesthetically by such a scene. The fusion of their
presence with the decorative elements, their contribution to the triumph of selection, was complete and admirable; though to a lingering view, a view more penetrating than the occasion really demanded, they also might have figured as concrete attestations of a rare power of purchase. (II, 360)

The narrator's tone here is unmistakably sardonic. "A view more penetrating than the occasion really demanded" is the view the "hypostatized observer", the reader, can share with the narrator; the characters themselves cannot afford such penetrating gazes which would expose the speciousness and fragility of their painfully achieved "general harmony". Here, as Kenneth Graham has observed, "Narrative penetration ... takes place in the very act of denying its appropriateness".4 (Further discussion of the implications of this extract will follow later).

I. iii: "An indirect and oblique view of my presented action" and the Problem of Ambiguity

The Golden Bowl represents the culmination of the process adumbrated in the other late novels of embodying outward "reality" in the consciousness of the reflector or reflectors. The comment that The Golden Bowl is "the novel to end all novels"5 (an ambiguous statement, as it implies that the work could be regarded either as the apex or the deathblow of the novel as a form) is thus ironically appropriate, as The Golden Bowl carries to its logical conclusion the view held by Dorrit Cohn that the presentation of consciousness is the special preserve of narrative fiction.

In his Preface to The Golden Bowl, James refers (obliquely) to his narrative strategy in his observation on "the still marked inveteracy of a certain indirect and oblique view of my presented action" (AN, p. 327). This
method of presentation gives the reader little interpretive guidance and can lead the unwary into an epistemological labyrinth. As Dorothy Krook avers,

the indirect method of presentation predominates here to the almost complete exclusion of direct statement; and as one grunts and sweats one's way through this most late of Jamesian works, perpetually losing one's way amidst the qualifications and parentheses, struggling to keep a hold on the proliferating subtleties of analysis, the relentlessly sustained metaphors, the tormenting crypto-statements of the elliptical, allusive, digressive dialogues, one has reason to believe James meant what he said when, in a letter to Hugh Walpole ... in reply to some unforgivable question Walpole had asked about The Ambassadors, he commented, "How can you say I do anything so foul and abject as to 'state'?" (The Ordeal of Consciousness, p. 25)

Krook's comments reflect many of the difficulties readers customarily experience in grappling with The Golden Bowl. (I hope to demonstrate later that the "relentlessly sustained metaphors" have a more functional purpose than Krook seems to acknowledge.) Indubitably, mere "abject" "stating" or "telling" by an omniscient narrator has been virtually superseded by "showing"; "scene" and "picture" have displaced the authorial "summary". The character as reflector in effect assumes the narrator's function, but whereas the narrator in third-person narration is, by and large, "reliable", reflector-characters are limited by or "tainted" with subjectivity; their views are by their very nature partial — in all senses of the term. Indeed, it is clear that when the consciousness that registers events is located not in the narrator but in a character, or when focalization shifts from one character to another, knowledge is inescapably partial. Ambiguity is thus an inherent aspect of figural narration.

James himself draws a distinction between an ambiguity of "appearance" and an ambiguity of "sense"
He states that he finds "a charm in any produced ambiguity of appearance", then qualifies this by claiming that this ambiguity of appearance "is not by the same stroke, and all helplessly, an ambiguity of sense" (AN, p. 324). However, James does not discriminate sufficiently clearly between the two kinds of ambiguity, nor does he appear to acknowledge that ambiguity is in effect inherent in his narrative strategy. Perhaps he should have added a further distinction, that between the two kinds of ambiguity mentioned (but not sufficiently elucidated) and the further ambiguity of presentation exemplified in figural narration. Recognition of ambiguity as an inherent facet of figural narration would cast a different light on statements such as

few novels resist clear analysis more stubbornly than The Golden Bowl. No novel in my acquaintance poses so many questions while providing so few definite answers, and none contains so many careful ambiguities of ultimate meaning. Ambiguity, indeed, could be called one of the book's major themes.6

Ambiguity is indeed not only a major theme but a concomitant of the technique, the "indirect and oblique view of [the] presented action".

More recent critics such as J.A. Ward ("The Ambiguities of Henry James", Sewanee Review vol. 83 1975), C.T. Samuels (The Ambiguity of Henry James, 1971), Allon White (The Uses of Obscurity: The Fiction of Early Modernism, 1982) and John Carlos Rowe (The Theoretical Dimensions of Henry James, 1985) have commented on Jamesian ambiguity.7 According to White, the function of ambiguity has been imperfectly grasped; for example, the "New Critical" cherishing of ambiguity "failed to analyse the function of obscurity as a structure of meaning rather than a subtle multiplier of sense" (The Uses of Obscurity: the Fiction of Early Modernism, p. 18). Rowe notes that "James's ambiguity is not just that of the
"literary symbol"; it is a more profound ambiguity that inheres in language" (p. 65). Although these and other contemporary critics offer valuable insights into the nature of ambiguity as exploited by James, they do not explore the link between ambiguity and figural narration.  

This ambiguity is more pervasive in *The Golden Bowl* than in *The Portrait*, as the abdication of the adjudicating narratorial voice is more marked in the later novel and is reinforced by the absence of a reliable subsidiary commentator. Whereas in *The Portrait* considerable insight is afforded by Ralph Touchett as supplementary "lucid reflector", no comparably reliable commentator or "touchstone" is provided in *The Golden Bowl*. In place of the steady "illumination of wisdom" generated by Ralph, one has erratic sparks of insight struck by Fanny Assingham, who, though often astute, is sometimes more like an *ignis fatuus* than a guiding light. (She is certainly fatuous when interpreting Charlotte's motives for her unexpected return on the eve of Maggie's marriage, determinedly seeing those motives in the best light possible — that is, in an idealistic, romantic light — and giving Charlotte credit for noble motives which she must have suspected were lamentably absent).

In the course of the novel it emerges that as choric commentator Fanny is fallible and, unlike Ralph, has limited insight; she is ultimately superseded by Maggie herself as "lucid reflector" invested with the most complete understanding.

II: FOCALIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF INNER VIEWS

It is in *The Golden Bowl* more than in any previous work that James demonstrates his conception of the novel's primary focus: "for its subject, magnificently, [the novel] has the whole human consciousness". His strategy
of refracting virtually everything through the consciousness of the central reflectors is stylistically implemented through a greater preponderance of narrated monologue, in passages of greater length and complexity.

In his Preface to *The Golden Bowl*, James creates the impression that this novel is constructed on the principle of dual rather than multiple focalization— or even of single focalization, twice:

> the whole thing remains subject to the register, ever so closely kept, of the consciousness of but two of the characters. The Prince, in the first half of the book, virtually sees and knows and makes out, virtually represents to himself everything that concerns us.... The function of the Princess, in the remainder, matches exactly with his; the register of her consciousness is as closely kept. (AN, p. 328-29)

However, the "solicitous or even attentive" reader (AN, p. 330) might notice certain apparent discrepancies: Volume I abounds in scenes from which the ostensibly sole reflector, the Prince, is excluded; indeed, access is given to the consciousness of all the central characters, thus exemplifying multiple rather than single focalization. Furthermore, although in Volume II, "The Princess", there is only one scene which takes place entirely outside Maggie's consciousness (chapter III—a conversation between Fanny and Bob Assingham), focalization is not fixed in the rest of the volume: in the scene depicting the smashing of the golden bowl, it is Fanny rather than Maggie who functions as focalizer. Thus, as in *The Portrait*, observations in the Preface create erroneous expectations: what is supposedly dual focalization is in effect multiple focalization. Furthermore, the multiple focalization is only partly figural; instances of narratorial mediation occur throughout.9

In each case, then, the organization of inner views is more complex than comments in the relevant Preface
lead us to expect. In *The Golden Bowl*, departures from the compositional structure of dual focalization ("the register ... of the consciousness of but two of the characters") can be clearly revealed in a schematic outline of the distribution of inner views in Volume I: Volume I of *The Golden Bowl*, "The Prince", consists of three Books. In Book First the Prince is the reflector in five of the six chapters. In chapter IV, we find the first of the analytical colloquies between Fanny and Bob Assingham, and chapter VI, although dominated by the Prince, also gives brief access to Charlotte's consciousness. Book Second employs Adam Verver as centre of consciousness in its seven chapters, but in chapters III and IV we find brief excursions into Maggie's inner world. Book Third consists of eleven chapters; in the first, Charlotte functions as reflector, but not throughout, as Fanny's consciousness then becomes the focus - until the end of chapter III. From chapter IV to chapter IX the focus again reverts to the Prince, although intermittent access is afforded to Charlotte's consciousness. In the last two chapters the choric commentary of the Assinghams again predominates.

The shift in focalization is signalled by the initial phrase of each of the three Books of Volume One: In Book First, "The Prince had always liked his London" (I, 3); Book Second: "Adam Verver, at Fawns ..." (I, 125); Book Third: "Charlotte, halfway up the 'monumental' staircase ..." (I, 245). Thus, in what appears to be a departure from James's declared strategy, we find that the Prince is the focalizer in only eleven of the twenty-four chapters of "his" half of the novel - and a focalizer heavily mediated by the narrator, at that.

The author's elaboration of his initial observation clarifies this ostensible anomaly:

the Prince, in the volume over which he nominally presides, is represented as in comprehensive cognition only of those aspects as to which Mrs.
Assingham does not functionally supersede him. This disparity in my plan is, however, but superficial; the thing abides rigidly by its law of showing Maggie Verver first through her suitor's and her husband's exhibitory vision of her, and of then showing the Prince through his wife's. It is the Prince who opens the door to half our light upon Maggie, just as it is she who opens it to half our light upon himself. We see Charlotte also at first, and we see Adam Verver, let alone our seeing Fanny Assingham, and everyone and everything else, but as they are visible in the Prince's interest, so to speak — by which I mean of course in the interest of his being himself handed over to us. (AN, p. 330)

Each volume, then, is presented primarily in the light of a specific "interest", pertaining to each of the two central reflectors. In Volume I, where the Prince is the central focus, access to the consciousness of Fanny, Charlotte and Adam serves primarily to reveal their respective relations with and attitudes towards him. Here, where both marriages are contracted and the adulterous relationship between Charlotte and Amerigo is initiated, the Prince marvels at "the extraordinary substitute for perception" (I, 333) blinkering Maggie; in Volume II, where Maggie becomes aware of her situation and of the complications engendered by her imperfect perception, she is accorded centrality and brought fully into play as a "compositional resource" (AN, p. 329).

Thus the switch to Maggie as a centre of consciousness coincides with her awakening to consciousness; this is consistent with James's position that

the figures in any picture, the agents in any drama, are interesting only in proportion as they feel their respective situations; since the consciousness, on their part, of the complication exhibited forms for us their link of connexion with it. (AN, p. 62)

In Volume II, Maggie becomes one of the "more deeply wondering ... the really sentient" (AN, p. 62). In her
"exposed and entangled state" (AN, p. 65) she grapples doggedly for understanding and control. This volume, then, is dominated by Maggie's "process of vision" as she is precariously launched on her "adventure of the imagination" (AN, p. 351).

The incident near the end of the novel where Maggie takes the "right volume" of a three-part novel to Charlotte can be seen as emblematic of the structure of the novel. In presenting her with "the right volume" (II, 308), the missing section of the three-part novel without which the work would be incomplete, Maggie can be seen as offering Charlotte her version of events: the volume devoted to the consciousness and interpretation of "The Princess". Her companion, however, merely "flung it down again" (II, 317) as she is incapable of "reading it right", of understanding Maggie's point of view or attempting to see things her way; she has no interest in collating the different volumes or reconciling different interpretations. (As she explains to the Prince, "I can't put my self into Maggie's skin ..." (I, 311).

Maggie explains that "I could n't bear to think you should find yourself here without the beginning of your book. This is the beginning; you've got the wrong volume, and I've brought you out the right" (II, 311). In a sense it is Maggie herself who is deprived of the "beginning" of the novel (Volume I), and who through the activity of the creative imagination attempts to reconstruct the section depicting "The Prince". She "put them [the two books] together and laid them down" (II, 318), juxtaposing the two volumes which portray their complex relationships.

The reader is in an analogous situation. [S]he has only one volume depicting the point of view of the Prince and Charlotte, as no direct access to the thoughts of the latter is afforded in Volume II - the reader has to rely on conjecture based on Maggie's perceptive observations and imaginings. (Maggie has direct access to only one
half of the story — her own perception of the situation — but can make imaginative excursions into the experience of Charlotte and Amerigo; her imagination makes it possible for her to enter the experiential worlds of others). The reader has access to both volumes and is enjoined to establish connections and points of comparison between them. In this way the reader can effect a reconciliation or balance between the divergent points of view, seeing each in the perspective established by the other and by securing reciprocal illumination extend his understanding. While one version is explicit, the other is implicit; thus while Volume II is largely refracted through the consciousness of Maggie, the first volume — showing how things stand in the Prince's book — is nevertheless persistently present in a qualifying capacity. Hence Maggie's personal perspective does not annul that of the Prince and Charlotte, even though she does have the last word — or is accorded the last thought — in terms of the structure of the novel.

III: DEPLOYMENT OF NARRATIVE MODES FOR REPRESENTATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The change of perspective from authorial to figural is accompanied by — or implemented through — a shift from narrative report and psycho-narration to more extended and complex passages of narrated monologue. A comparison with the mode of presentation in The Portrait of a Lady could again be illuminating here.

In The Portrait, extended passages of narrated monologue interspersed with psycho-narration predominate in chapter XLII and recur intermittently, particularly in the latter half of the novel; in The Golden Bowl, the entire Volume II is dominated by excursions into Maggie's consciousness in which narrated monologue is the prevailing mode, with the narrator-dominated psycho-
narration less in evidence. Retrospective evocations where the characters "revert ... in thought" to previous experience are extensively employed, as in the first section of the novel where the Prince relives in imagination his relationship with the Ververs up to that point.

Analepses refracted through the consciousness of the characters (as opposed to those evoked by the narratorial voice) are more frequent and more extended than in The Portrait, where they are represented primarily by Isabel's retrospective musings by the fireside. Amerigo, Adam and particularly Maggie are frequently involved in the "play" of "this backward speculation" (I, 323). The first section of the novel is dominated by an extensive flashback recorded through Amerigo's consciousness, and he is to undertake many other such excursions. Later, for example, "It was, as I say, at Matcham ... that it most befell him, oddly enough, to live over inwardly, for its wealth of special significance, this passage by which the event had been really a good deal determined" (I, 327). We find that Adam, too, "could live over again ... the long process of his introduction to all present interests" (I, 149) — and does, for many pages. Charlotte also, when access is given to her consciousness, "was to remember ... was inwardly to dwell on" various occurrences (I, 289). It is for Maggie in particular, of course, that "Her best comprehension ... was in her recall" (II, 222). She undertakes the most complex and extended excursions into retrospection, finding that "it was not till afterwards that she discriminated" (II, 28) as to the significance of a specific event.

This technique of portraying an occurrence (an event, conversation, encounter etc.) not immediately, as it occurs, but later, as it is recalled, confers further accretions of meaning in that an additional process of selection, that imposed by the memory of the reflector,
is at play. "Backward speculation" as a means of imposing or extracting meaning is given new impetus in this novel where analeptic excursions are so predominant.

Thus the events of the novel are refracted far more consistently through the consciousness — and more specifically, through the memory — of the reflector. In the Prince's perambulatory evocation of scenes with Maggie we have not merely the narrator "recording" the contents of the focalizer's mind or process of thought: the action is presented as passing through the additional filter of the focalizer's memory. What is registered is an indication of its significance to Amerigo, as the memory activates its own subjective screening mechanism.

The workings of the memory — what is retained and what suppressed — provide an indication of the values, priorities, and criteria of the reflector. Of his prenuptial discussions with Maggie, Amerigo recalls and ruminates on what is most meaningful to him. As will emerge later, a significant contrast can be observed between his first portrayed response to Maggie in retrospective evocation of his conversations with her and the immediate rendering of his direct, sensuous response to Charlotte.

Scenes often slip imperceptibly from the past to the present, as in the first section of the novel, where description of the present occasion shifts subtly into what is "reverted to in thought". Fanny too is described as analysing in "the snug laboratory of her afterthought", although her cognitive capers are usually confined to her discussions with Bob. By contrast, Maggie's struggle for understanding is enacted in her consciousness rather than in conversation; this emphasises her essential aloneness in meeting the challenge of her "ordeal of consciousness".

Paul Armstrong has noted that "James's depiction of the present of reflection reduplicating the past of perception celebrates temporal distance as the enabling
condition of self-consciousness" (The Challenge of Bewilderment, p. 267). This is certainly demonstrated in The Portrait, particularly in chapter XLII, where it is with the wisdom of hindsight that Isabel can understand her present position. Maggie in The Golden Bowl also exemplifies the truth of this claim, which is supported by Kierkegaard's contention (cited earlier) that "life is lived forward and understood backward."

Quoted Monologue and "Imputed Monologue"

When examining the deployment of the three modes of representing consciousness in The Golden Bowl, one finds a significant difference between this and earlier works in the use of quoted monologue. Traditional quoted monologue is proportionately less well represented in The Golden Bowl, and of the dozen examples all occur in Volume II and all represent the thoughts of Maggie Verver. Maggie thus has the monopoly of the quoted monologue mode. This is generally signalled by phrases such as "mutely reflected" (II, 69), "she commented deep within" (II, 52) "she groaned to herself" (II, 80) or "she was saying to herself" as opposed to the formulation "he said" — with the implication "to himself" — which often accompanied quoted monologue in the earlier novels (for example, Watch and Ward).

Although Amerigo is the central focalizer in Volume I, his thoughts are never expressed in quoted monologue. Only one dubiously classifiable example of this mode occurs in this volume. At the Embassy ball, Charlotte confides to Fanny that Adam "did tell me that he wanted me just because I could be useful about her [Maggie] .... So you see I am!" This is followed by Fanny's unvoiced response, which, being tacitly directed at Charlotte, is not strictly quoted monologue:
It was on Fanny Assingham's lips for the moment to reply that this was on the contrary what she saw least of all; she came in fact within an ace of saying: "you strike me as having quite failed to help his idea to work ...." (I, 262)

Furthermore, the device of the quoted monologue takes on new permutations as it modulates towards imagined discourse, or, to coin a neologism, "imputed monologue": discourse ostensibly formulated in the consciousness of a specific character but in effect attributed to that character by another (the reflector). (This feature of imagined/hypothetical, or "imputed" discourse, although also present in The Wings, becomes far more prevalent in The Golden Bowl.)

An example of imputed monologue can be seen in the following extract from a conversation between Maggie and Adam in which each tries to conceal from the other an awareness of unforeseen complications in their relations with Charlotte and Amerigo. In a shift from dialogue to representation of Maggie's consciousness, an "imputed monologue" is embedded in narrated monologue:

So much was crowded into so short a space that she knew already she was keeping her head. She had kept it by the warning of his eyes; she should n't lose it again; she knew how and why, and if she had turned cold this was precisely what helped her. He had said to himself, "She'll break down and name Amerigo; she'll say it's to him she's sacrificing me; and it's by what that will give me - with so many other things too - that my suspicion will be clinched." (II, 268)

Here the context (narrated monologue) makes it clear that it is Maggie and not the narrator who has assigned this monologue to Adam.

At times, however, ambiguity attends the attribution of such suppositious speeches and their designation. In some contexts, this hypothetical discourse could be attributable to either the reflector or the narrator. On Amerigo's return from Matcham, for example, the
hypothetical/imputed speech seems to represent what Maggie would like to imagine him hearing her saying:

It would have been most beautifully therefore in the name of the equilibrium, and in that of her joy at their feeling so exactly the same about it, that she might have spoken if she had permitted the truth on the subject of her behaviour to ring out....

"'Why, why' have I made this evening such a point of our not all dining together? Well, because I've all day been so wanting you alone that I finally could n't bear it, and that there did n't seem any great reason why I should try to .... After all I've scarcely to explain that I'm as much in love with you now as the first hour; except that there are some hours ... that show me I'm even more so. They come of themselves — and ah they've been coming! After all, after all —!" Some such words as those were what did n't ring out, yet it was as if even the unuttered sound had been quenched here in its own quaver. It was where utterance would have broken down by its very weight if he had let it get so far. Without that extremity, at the end of a moment, he had taken in what he needed to take — that his wife was testifying, that she adored and missed and desired him .... (II, 18-19)

Although this speech is in quotation marks, it is clearly not a transcription of Maggie's uttered words, but rather a rendering of the words she "might have spoken". But does the speech qualify as quoted monologue if it represents not words that Maggie has indeed formulated in her mind, but "some such words as these [which] did n't ring out"? Has the narrator formulated the words on her behalf or does the speech represent words which Maggie imagines the Prince to have divined in her from her manner — that is, the "speech" is Amerigo's hypothetical interpretation of her thoughts? The discourse could be seen as the Prince's quoted or imputed monologue, as "heard" in "the mind's ear", intuitively perceived and interpreted by Maggie.

The designation and attribution of these "speeches" is suffused with uncertainty. At times they could be interpreted as being speech which is "supposititious" as
opposed to (or in addition to) "suppositious", embodying Maggie's wishful thinking in these projections of her imagination.

The phenomenon of "imputed monologue" could be linked to the increasing prevalence of mute or subliminal communication in the late novels. Like the conventional quoted monologues, these occur most frequently in Volume II and are largely the preserve of Maggie herself.

The importance of "the unmistakeable language of a pair of eyes" and "the element of the unuttered" (GB, I, 289), of hearing or perceiving "in the mind's ear" (as opposed to the mind's eye) pervades all the late novels. Where Isabel is engaged in guessing "the unseen from the seen", Maggie is involved also in "guessing the unheard from the heard" or exploring the implications of the intuited. This process is adumbrated in What Maisie Knew, where the child learns to "translate" what is conveyed when it is at variance with what is overtly expressed.

"Am I to tell him?" the child went on. It was then that her companion addressed her in the unmistakable language of a pair of eyes of deep dark grey. "I can't say No", they replied as distinctly as possible: "I can't say No, because I'm afraid of your mama, don't you see? Yet how can I say Yes after your papa has been so kind to me...?" (p. 18)

Maggie is engaged in a comparable process of "translation", as she grapples with the discrepancies between what is expressed and what remains unexpressed - or what is expressed through verbal language on the one hand and "body language" on the other. A gnomic observation by the narrator highlights this process in The Golden Bowl: "It made her look for a moment as if she had actually pronounced that word of unpermitted presumption - so apt is the countenance, as with a finer consciousness than the tongue, to betray a sense of this particular lapse" (I, 142).
A vivid example of the "translation" or transcription of what is conveyed by the countenance as opposed to the tongue can be found in Maggie's interpretation of Adam's smile in the scene where Maggie becomes aware of the "silken halter" linking him to Charlotte. Maggie responds to her father's "mute facial intimations"

which his wife's presence did n't prevent his addressing his daughter .... They amounted perhaps only to a wordless, wordless smile, but the smile was the soft shake of the twisted silken rope, and Maggie's translation of it, held in her breast till she got well away, came out only, as if it might be overheard, when some door was closed behind her.
"Yes, you see — I lead her now by the neck, I lead her to her doom...." (II, 287)

Here the facial expression ("wordless smile") is first invested with metaphoric import by being compared to a "twisted silken rope", with its connotations of genteel yet menacing compulsion, and then "translated" into imagined speech. There is no direct narratorial endorsement to guarantee that Maggie's "interpretation" is just, but the device of stylistic contagion suggests a conjunction of the perceptions of the narrator and reflector and reinforces the impression that the reader is to take Maggie's interpretation as author-itative — in all senses of the term.

As in The Portrait, the "absorbed mutual gaze" in The Golden Bowl often conveys more than can be communicated verbally. In a lull in a conversation between Fanny and Amerigo, "The unspoken had come up, and there was a crisis ... during which they were reduced, for all interchange, to looking at each other on quite an inordinate scale". The "intensity of their communion" (I, 33) does not find verbal expression. Fanny later registers a discrepancy between the Prince's words and his real meaning: "Was n't it simply what had been
written in the Prince's own face beneath what he was saying?" (I, 286).

Charlotte's reference to the vendor of the golden bowl as having a "way of saying nothing with his lips when he's all the while pressing you so with his face" (I, 105) could also apply to Amerigo's later approach to Maggie. The "element of the unuttered" precludes verbal expression. Maggie conjures up the words she would like to hear the Prince utter to dispel her fears: "'Come away with me, somewhere, you' .... She waited for them, and there was a supreme instant when by the testimony of all the rest of him she seemed to feel them in his heart and on his lips; only they did n't sound ..." (II, 60). At the end of the novel their "mutual gaze" (rather than spoken utterance) consolidates the newly created bond between them and confirms the restoration of harmony: "each recording to the other's eyes that it was firm under their feet" (II, 364).

Psycho-narration

As in the novels discussed earlier, we find in The Golden Bowl that psycho-narration is eminently suited to rendering erotic experience, "an inner realm particularly in need of narrative mediation ... with its simultaneous involvement of psyche and soma" (Cohn, p. 49). The passionate embrace of Amerigo and Charlotte, evoked in vividly imagistic psycho-narration, illustrates the use of this mode:

They vowed it, gave it out and took it in, drawn, by their intensity, more closely together. Then of a sudden, through this tightened circle, as at the issue of a narrow strait into the sea beyond, everything broke up, broke down, gave way, melted and mingled. Their lips sought their lips, their pressure their response and their response their pressure; with a violence that had sighed itself the
next moment to the longest and deepest of stillnesses they passionately sealed their pledge. 
(I, 312)

Tumultuous passion is evoked through the image of tempestuous straits and seas where everything "broke down, gave way", suggesting a casting off of restraints and strictures. Although not as apocalyptic as D.H. Lawrence's images of seismic convulsions and electrifyingly fiery explosions, the image of seething waters does vividly convey the chaotic tumult of erotic passion.

Adam's hallucinatory vision in The Golden Bowl exemplifies the way in which purely imaginary perceptions are at times introduced by the same phrases that signal a character's perception of the world around him. In the context of the full evocation of his "vision", the repetition of the verb "he saw" underlines the paradox of mental vision.

Light broke for him at last, indeed, quite as a consequence of the fear of breathing a chill upon this luxuriance of her [Maggie's] spiritual garden. As at a turn of his labyrinth he saw his issue, which opened out so wide, for the minute, that he held his breath with wonder.... This hallucination ... was brief, but it lasted long enough to leave him gasping.... (I, 207)

Adam's revelatory hallucination - or quasi-epiphany - issues in his decision to marry Charlotte. In extracts such as this, psycho-narration tends to be dissonant rather than consonant, suggesting an ironic distance between the reflector and the narrator. In Volume II, where emphasis is on the presentation of Maggie's consciousness, psycho-narration tends to be consonant as the distance between reflector and narrator is lessened.
Narrated monologue

Narrated monologue, like psycho-narration, gives access to the thoughts of most of the characters in Volume I and Maggie's in Volume II. As the deployment of narrated monologue in the portrayal of the central characters will be examined in detail later, mention will be made here only of some general features.

Firstly, the ironic dimension. The pervasive "dialectic between blindness and insight" (Armstrong, The Challenge of Bewilderment, p. 19), which is an abiding feature in all James's novels, acquires greater complexity in the later novels, such as The Golden Bowl, as it is an inherent feature of the modes of presentation of consciousness. The dialectic between blindness and insight is manifested in the interplay between what a character knows or acknowledges and what he or she does not know or suppresses. This discrepancy between the overt and the covert pervades the mode of narrated monologue: as seen in earlier works, narrated monologue is used to highlight these disparities between the acknowledged and the suppressed. This often takes the form of rationalisation and self-deceit, as instantiated by the process whereby Adam persuades himself of the soundness of his scheme to marry Charlotte, and Amerigo later convinces himself that his renewed liaison with Charlotte is morally acceptable.

In The Golden Bowl, this process has added complexity in that the mode of narrated monologue foregrounds not only equivocation and the evasion of unpleasant truths but also the recasting or restructuring of those "truths" through a process of linguistic transmutation. In this often satirical portrayal of representatives of the "Wording Class", who have no vulgar obligations to earn a living in the conventional 9 to 5 routine, and are endowed with infinite leisure for the production of decorous euphemistic terminology to
camouflage the reality of their activities, rationalisation rises to new heights— or sinks to new depths. Charlotte and Amerigo, it will be seen, are particularly adept at this game. Concepts such as "decency", "trust", "good faith", [the] "sacred" are twisted out of shape and invested with new meanings. This procedure can be observed at play in the presentation of both speech and thought. In effect, "double-speak" takes on new permutations as it becomes "double-think".

In a sense, this process represents the obverse of the capacity of the creative imagination, as demonstrated in Maggie, to constitute or compose relevant "pictures" or images corresponding to and elucidating the situation which the character is trying to understand.

The second significant feature is the high incidence of stylistic contagion, particularly in Volume II, where it is often impossible to distinguish narrated monologue from psycho-narration and determine whether the voice is that of the reflector or the narrator. These features are discussed in context. The third feature, which will now be discussed in greater detail, is the prevalence of narrated monologue in the densely imagistic representation of consciousness.

IV: IMAGISTIC REPRESENTATION IN PSYCHO-NARRATION AND NARRATED MONOLOGUE

The complex metaphorical mode employed in The Golden Bowl has led to much critical controversy. Dorothea Krook objects to "the relentlessly sustained metaphors" (see above) of The Golden Bowl and Gabriel Pearson condemns the "increasing addiction to the alchemy of metaphor and the reticulation of reality in syntax" ("The Novel to End all Novels", p. 314). In this section I attempt to consider the validity of these comments and determine the
thematic and aesthetic rationales for James's use of what was disparagingly dismissed as "the alchemy of metaphor". If alchemy entails the transubstantiation or metamorphosis of reality, this figure is ironically an apt one for evoking the power of metaphor to metamorphose or transform. The constitutive power of consciousness is reflected at least in part in its capacity to deploy metaphor creatively. The phrase "the reticulation of reality in syntax" also implies a process whose validity should not be summarily dismissed; a character's "reality", as is demonstrated in The Golden Bowl, is to a large extent a linguistic construct, a construct of consciousness.

The "imagistic density" of James's œuvre indubitably increased substantially in the late novels. What is more significant than the increased density, however, is the proportional distribution — the mode in which the imagery is incorporated. As mentioned earlier, the metaphoric mode in James's œuvre shifts progressively from narratorial comment and dialogue in Roderick Hudson, to being deployed more frequently in psycho-narration in The Portrait and in narrated monologue in The Golden Bowl. Thus in the later novels it is more closely interfused with, or embedded in, the modes for representing consciousness, and particularly the mode of narrated monologue.

Furthermore, the connection between the effacement of the intrusive adjudicating narrator and the preponderance of imagery has not been fully appreciated by the above-mentioned critics. As previously mentioned, the imagistic mode in a sense "fills the gap" left by the absent narrator, and is a valuable guide to the reader in his/her interpretation of the novel.

In James's œuvre, different novels are characterised by specific iterative image patterns. Imagery in the later novels is drawn from a more varied field of experience. In Roderick Hudson and The
The major image clusters are drawn from nature (gardens, flowers, birds) art and architecture, the sea (particularly suggesting exploration and discovery), the commercial world and the theatre. In The Golden Bowl, these images recur but are supplemented by a new range of imagery drawn from, for example, the animal world (indicating a heightened awareness — usually attributed to Maggie — of predatory elements in human nature) and the circus (sometimes in conjunction with theatre imagery). The familiar light/dark dichotomy acquires new nuances when supplemented by that of the "white curtain" or concealing mist. A crucial iterative image which often recurs in the evocation of Maggie's consciousness is that associated with balance or equilibrium, which emphasises her conception of the precarious nature of human relationships.

Although (as has been noted) a number of studies have been written on James's use of metaphor, none examines the role of metaphor in the representation of consciousness. Some surprisingly inept observations have been made, including the contention that Maggie Verver is said to "have" images of the mechanical sort but although the novel contains very many, James himself uses most of them and the remainder are distributed among the characters, with Maggie getting few or none. As a matter of fact, she uses few images of any sort.

A more careful reading of the novel would reveal that Maggie in fact uses a wider number and range of images than any other character in the novel. Short's misconception stems from his failure to differentiate between the use of images in the representation of speech and of thought. Maggie admittedly uses fewer images in dialogue than, say, Amerigo and Roderick Hudson, the eponymous hero of the first novel discussed, but in the representation of her thought, as opposed to her speech, the imagistic mode is very much in evidence. Imagery is,
indeed, extensively used in the representation of the consciousness of all the central characters. One of the crucial aspects of imagery in this context is its cognitive function, which will be discussed in the following section.

IV. i: The cognitive function of metaphor in *The Golden Bowl*

Just as in *The Portrait*, where the reflector's process of vision is dramatised through recurrent clusters of imagery, so in *The Golden Bowl* the prime function of iterative imagery is to present the cognitive processes of the central characters. Images deployed in *The Golden Bowl*, however, are often more complex and can take on the dimensions of a metaphysical conceit, as in the extended image of the pagoda. Here the very elaboration of the conceit dramatises the slow, tortuous nature of Maggie's struggle for comprehension. By contrast, a more concrete and immediate image depicts Adam's swift, instantaneous vision — "light broke for him" (I, 207) — prompting him to marry Charlotte. The very instantaneous "coup de foudre" nature of the image suggests a state of auto-suggestion and highlights the spurious nature of his ostensibly inspirational "idea".

Of all James's novels, *The Golden Bowl* most vividly demonstrates the cognitive power of metaphor. Most prominent among the images with a strongly cognitive function is that related to light — suggesting different forms of insight — but the iterative images mentioned earlier all share to a greater or lesser extent in this cognitive function. In the following discussion of the deployment of psycho-narration and narrated monologue in the portrayal of the central characters in the novel, particular emphasis will be given to the cognitive function of the imagistic mode.
V: DEPLOYMENT OF NARRATIVE MODES OF REPRESENTATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE PORTRAYAL OF THE CENTRAL REFLECTORS

V. i: Amerigo

a) "Backward Speculation"

Psycho-narration and narrated monologue in the portrayal of Amerigo are restricted to Volume One, "The Prince", as the reader is given only oblique access to his consciousness in Volume Two. The initial representation of the Prince consists largely of a retrospective evocation of events and conversations leading up to this present state of his relations with Maggie. Extracts from conversations with Maggie are presented as conjured up in his memory which can be seen as acting as a supplementary "screen"—filtering out what is most significant to be recalled and dwelt on later in thought.

After the initial description of the London setting the narrator informs the reader that "at the moment we are concerned with him" (I, 3) what is most significant in Amerigo's life is not what he is doing or perceiving around him but what he is recollecting. Emphasis is on his consciousness "on the occasion of which we thus represent him as catching the echoes from his own thoughts while he loitered" (I, 10-11). The scenes depicted in this first section are presented not as conventional "scenes", as in punctual narration, but as retrospectively evoked through the consciousness of the reflector. It is the first of many passages in which the characters "revert to in thought" (I, 191) or "live over inwardly" (I, 327) significant experiences in their lives.

Although the focus is on Amerigo's consciousness, the physical setting in which his thoughts are recorded
is significant. He is appropriately placed in the context of "Imperium", surrounded by "the loot of far-off victories" (I, 3), exotic and valuable goods acquired by a rapacious materialistic society. Although he himself, as Maggie informs him, has been acquired as a "morceau de musée" (I, 12), a "representative precious object" of great historical and aesthetic value, Amerigo conceives of himself and his impending marriage in terms of the victor of a successfully concluded campaign: "capture had crowned the pursuit — or success, as he would otherwise have put it, had rewarded virtue" (I, 4). In a narrated monologue, he formulates the idea "Well, he was of them now, of the rich peoples; he was on their side — if it was n't the rather pleasanter way of putting it that they were on his" (I, 18).

An indication of Amerigo's characteristic mode of thought and speech emerges clearly in these extracts and is further established in the early sections of the novel. His mode of thinking and perceiving is revealed in the way his discourse is often expressed in balanced antitheses, as in "capture/pursuit", "success/virtue" and "he was on their side ... or they were on his". He recalls that in discussing the Verter's romanticism he had said to Maggie that "her father, though older and wiser, and a man into the bargain, was as bad — that is as good — as herself" (I, 11). The use of antonymous pairs is again illustrated in his recollected observation to Maggie on the subject of the Verter's "romantic disposition": "You see too much — that's what may sometimes make you difficulties. When you don't, at least," he had amended with a further thought, "see too little" (I, 11). (Ironically, although Amerigo prides himself on his own discernment and believes that Maggie is "constitutionally inaccessible" to knowledge (I, 334), he himself lacks insight into her character and initially "sees too little" of her real substance.)
Amerigo's conception of the difference between the European and the American sense of morality is expressed in terms of an antithesis between a "tortuous stone staircase ... in some castle of our quattrocento" and the "'lightning elevator' in one of Mr. Verver's fifteen-storey buildings" (I, 31). Amerigo explains to Fanny Assingham that "Your moral sense works by steam - it sends you up like a rocket. Ours is slow and steep and unlighted, with so many of the steps missing ..." (I, 31). These paired images can be seen as proleptic of developments in the novel where Amerigo demonstrates that, contrary to what his conduct might indicate to a superficial eye, he does have a developed moral sense; it is simply very different from that which he attributes to the Americans. Ironically, he underestimates Maggie's capacity to dissociate herself from the "lightning elevator" type of moral response; she is to demonstrate her capacity to eschew the lightning elevator reaction. She does not react with knee-jerk rocket-like rapidity to the disclosure of her husband's infidelity and indulge in the denunciation and rejection which would seem, in terms of the Prince's image, to follow automatically. Maggie undertakes a tortuous route - one that is "slow and steep and unlighted", like Amerigo's "staircase" mode of ascent, but is ultimately successful in creating a new set of relations between them.15

Amerigo's penchant for euphemistic qualification or reformulation is demonstrated in his fairly innocuous substitution of "success had rewarded virtue" for "capture had crowned ... pursuit" (I, 4); this nevertheless foreshadows his later reformulation and radical subversion of moral concepts when transforming his renewed liaison with Charlotte into a "sacred" trust. By coining new concepts to undermine the currency of those in general circulation Amerigo can justify his own actions. Thus what would commonly be regarded as an
adulterous liaison is transmuted into a bond that is "too beautiful", "too wonderful" (I, 312) and redolent of the sacrosanct.

Amerigo's adoption of a high moral tone is matched by Charlotte who speaks of their new arrangement as compatible with "one's decency and one's honour and one's virtue. These things, henceforth ... are my rule of life, the absolute little gods of my worship, the holy images set up on the wall" (I, 318). The warped idealism in this conception of a highly egregious situation is echoed in Amerigo's correspondingly distorted idea, expressed in narrated monologue, of "that intimacy of which the sovereign law would be the vigilance of care, would be never rashly to forget and never consciously to wound" (I, 325).

What Amerigo had appreciated from the outset in Charlotte as "a strange sense for tongues, with which she juggled as a conjuror at a show juggled with balls" (I, 54) takes on new permutations as it is revealed to entail an ability (shared by Amerigo) to juggle with language itself — with the meanings of words. Through deft linguistic virtuosity words such as "decency", "trust" are drained of their accepted connotations and infused with new meanings which invariably veer towards the aesthetic register. As will be seen, the ease with which he can deploy linguistic manoeuvring is illustrated in both speech and thought.

In reliving in imagination his prenuptial conversations with Maggie, Amerigo evinces a certain disquiet at the realisation that Maggie's appreciation of him is based on his lineage, his family history — and the romantic associations of the name "Amerigo" — rather than on an appreciation or understanding of his individual self. Ironically, he had maintained that he himself, on the other hand, knew enough about the Ververs "never to be surprised", and had continued, as he recalls:
"It's you yourselves meanwhile ... who really know nothing. There are two parts of me .... One is made up of the history, the doings, the marriages, the crimes, the follies, the boundless bêtises of other people ... you 've both of you wonderfully looked them in the face. But there's another part, very much smaller doubtless, which represents my single self, the unknown, unimportant - unimportant save to you - personal quality. About this you 've found out nothing. (I, 9).

Neither Maggie nor Amerigo can, of course, appreciate the full ironic import of her rejoinder (which, with its echo of Othello, is reminiscent of the ending of Roderick Hudson): "Luckily, my dear ... for what would then become of the promised occupation of my future?"

He recalls her acknowledgement that

"What was it else that made me originally think of you? It was n't ... what you call your unknown quantity, your particular self. It was the generations behind you, the follies and the crimes, the plunder and the waste .... Where, therefore ... without your archives, annals, infamies, would you have been?" (I, 9-10)

Through this flashback, it is revealed that Amerigo is perturbed about Maggie's lack of understanding of his personal self; his "personal quantity" is eclipsed in her eyes by his public self. The situation recalls that in Middlemarch, where, according to George Eliot's authorial comment,

a man may be ... belauded, envied, ridiculed, counted upon as a tool and fallen in love with, or at least selected as a future husband, and yet remain virtually unknown - known merely as a cluster of signs for his neighbour's false suppositions.16

What Amerigo does not perceive is that he also has a blinkered view of Maggie, seeing her merely as a "cluster of signs", a representative of a particular highly desirable class and way of life that he wishes to espouse.
Indeed, through access to Amerigo's consciousness the reader is in a position to perceive that each of the prospective spouses has a limited understanding of the other outside of categories such as those of nationality, class, rank and status. Each views the other less as an individual than as a "collection of attributes and powers" (PL, I, 143) guaranteeing a desirable "envelope of circumstances" (PL, II, 287) and is accorded appreciation on the same basis.

Later, at the Ververs' dinner party, the Prince thinks of Maggie in terms of "the transmitted images of rather neutral and negative propriety that made up, in his long line, the average of wifehood and motherhood" (I, 322). Just as he takes refuge in a "generalised view of his father-in-law" (I, 324) as an evasion of real understanding "as the substitute for communities, from man to man" (I, 324) so he takes a generalised view of Maggie, seeing her in terms of stereotypes, and allows the polished perfection of his manner to substitute for real communication.

In a passage of psycho-narration presenting the Prince's "backward speculation" (I, 323) at Matcham where he "live[s] over, inwardly, for its wealth of special significance" the events of the party itself, more insight is given into his psyche. It is clear that on both a personal and a social level, he feels a sense of alienation, and that he lacks substance as an individual on social occasions:

something of him, he often felt at these times, was left out; it was much more when he was alone, or when he was with his own people — or when he was, say, with Mrs. Verver and nobody else — that he moved, that he talked, that he listened, that he felt, as a congruous whole. (I, 328)

These insights into the workings of Amerigo's mind prepare the reader for his indulgence in his opportunity to feel "as a congruous whole" during his sojourn at
In his view of himself, Amerigo makes a distinction between vices of a "personal" and a "racial" origin. Where Maggie sees the glamour of his ancestral history, Amerigo is conscious of the vices it displays. Although in conversation with Fanny he avers that he has no "moral sense" (I, 31) as Americans understand the term, his unvoiced reflections reveal that he is conscious of "dangers from within" (I, 16) and is determined to withstand the assaults of "arrogance and greed" (I, 16) to which his ancestors had so flamboyantly succumbed. An extended passage of psycho-narration and narrated monologue evokes his meditations on this topic during his prenuptial perambulation in the first chapter. We find that

Personally, he considered, he had n't the vices in question - and that was so much to the good. His race, on the other hand, had had them handsomely enough, and he was somehow full of his race. Its presence in him was like the consciousness of some inexpungable scent in which his clothes, his whole person ... might have been steeped as in some chemical bath. (I, 16)

The "chemical bath" of Amerigo's ancestral tradition, then, threatens to counteract the effect of the "aromatic bath" in which he feels he is steeped by the Ververs. The image serves to highlight the question as to whether Amerigo will openly follow the family tradition, flout it entirely or fall prey to his inherited traditions in a more insidious way - like the ancestral (and therefore of dubious celibacy) Pope, indulging in a "sanctified" quest for personal gain and self-gratification. When Fanny Assingham calls Amerigo "Machiavelli" (I, 31), "the Prince" is obliquely placed in the context of the famous book bearing that title, a tome in which are expounded the Machiavellian "virtues" of opportunism, ruthlessness and the cynical belief that the ends justify the means.
Access to Amerigo's consciousness, afforded through psycho-narration and narrated monologue, allows the reader to perceive the quintessential male chauvinism in his attitude to Maggie, marriage and women in general. Surrounded, in Bond Street, by opulent material objects in shop windows and "possibilities in faces" of pretty women on the street, he accords both a comparably appreciative scrutiny. Indications of previously indulged philandering propensities are hinted at in the observation that "the last idea that would just now have occurred to him in any connection was the idea of pursuit" (I, 4; my emphasis). Amerigo has the conventional stereotypical view of the Italian "galantuomo", seeing women primarily, in contemporary parlance, as "sex objects". (This is corroborated by Fanny's remark that Amerigo doesn't "really care for Charlotte", implying that the bond between them is primarily erotic). This attitude is revealed through presentation of both his thought and his speech, as in the following extract from a recalled conversation with Maggie, recorded in indirect speech:

he knew but one way with the fair. They had to be fair — and he was fastidious and particular, his standard was high; but when once this was the case what relation with them was conceivable, what relation was decent, rudimentary, properly human, but that of a plain interest in the fairness? (I, 165)

The Prince's notion of "decency", as the reader discovers later, is surprisingly elastic, and can stretch to cover what the less linguistically innovative would regard as an adulterous affair. Although the comment cited above occurs in the context of light-hearted banter between Maggie and the Prince, access to his thoughts confirms the more serious implications of arrogant condescension in his attitude to women:
The Prince's notion of a recompense to women ... was more or less to make love to them.... He liked in these days to mark them off, the women to whom he had n't made love: it represented ... a different stage of existence from the time at which he liked to mark off the women to whom he had. (I, 21-22)

Even allowing for the more attenuated connotations of the term "make love" as used by James, it is clear that at this stage Amerigo has a very restricted range of possible responses to women. Balanced antitheses again characterise his mode of thought when he considers that "he had, after all, gained more from women than he had ever lost by them" (I, 350). The same "profit and loss" considerations animate his view of Charlotte in particular: in an extended passage of narrated monologue in which he muses on Charlotte's possible motives in renewing contact immediately prior to the wedding, he relegates her to a generalised class - "the woman" - whose behaviour "produced for the man that extraordinary mixture of pity and profit in which his relation with her, when he was not a mere brute, mainly consisted" (I, 50). The Prince prides himself on his percipience, on his clear-sighted recognition that

She always dressed her act up, of course, she muffled and disguised and arranged it, showing in fact in these dissimulations a cleverness equal to but one thing in the world, equal to her abjection .... She [Charlotte] was the twentieth woman, she was possessed by her doom, but her doom was also to arrange appearances, and what now concerned him was to learn how she proposed. (I, 50)

Ironically, the Prince fails to perceive exactly how Charlotte manipulates him; firstly, during their expedition undertaken ostensibly to choose a gift for Maggie, and later when he is adroitly manoeuvred into re-establishing their former liaison. The term "arrange appearances" is ironically proleptic both of the decorous forms beneath which, as a protective camouflage, they conduct their affair, and the linguistic manipulation
which transforms their adulterous affair into a sacred trust. (Amerigo is later unaware of the extent to which Maggie is obliged to arrange appearances of her own in response to her recognition of the "miracles of arrangement" (II, 110) which, she confesses to Fanny, she lives in the midst of.

Like Densher in The Wings, Amerigo is prepared to remain passively aloof while "the woman" arranges appearances from which he is to benefit. This attitude is reminiscent too of Osmond who welcomed a "prize" dropped into his lap by Madame Merle without his stir. Verbal echoes highlight the similarity between Osmond and Amerigo here in the Prince's exculpatory rationalisation which is dramatised through narrated monologue: "He had n't struggled nor snatched; he was taking but what had been given him; the pearl dropped itself, with its exquisite quality and rarity, straight into his hand" (I, 358).

b) The Ironic Dimension of Psycho-narration and Narrated Monologue in the Portrayal of Amerigo's Consciousness: Euphemism, Equivocation and Rationalisation

It is clear that there is often a discrepancy between what is grasped by the reflector in his backward speculations and general meditations and what is perceived by the reader. This pervasive ironic dimension is often intensified by an element of ironic mimicry which foregrounds the disparity between the acknowledged and the suppressed, or the dialectic of blindness and insight. Stylistic contagion is exploited, as psycho-narration sometimes blends imperceptibly into narrated monologue or incorporates vocabulary characteristic of the reflector rather than the narrator, creating a parodic effect. This is frequently evident in the
presentation of Amerigo's thoughts on the eve of his marriage, even in a statement as ostensibly innocuous as the following: "If there was one thing in the world the young man, at this juncture clearly intended it was to be much more decent as a son-in-law than lots of fellows he could think of had shown themselves in that character" (I, 5). The narrator's comment shifts into the idiom of the Prince in the course of this sentence, with the parodic effect highlighting the oddity of his reasoning. The most important person to him in his newly acquired set of contractual relations is not his wife but his father-in-law. (The term "decency", as has been indicated, is to be problematic). Indeed, at this stage in his relations with Maggie he exhibits careful and politic consideration for her rather than a spontaneously appreciative response to her personal qualities.

Through psycho-narration it is revealed that he was attracted primarily by Maggie's position as a wealthy heiress: "It was in fact, content as he was with his engagement and charming as he thought his affianced bride, his view of that furniture that mainly constituted our young man's 'romance'" (I, 15-16). "That furniture" refers to all the material accoutrements and other palpable advantages of the Ververs' position. The term also ironically recalls (or anticipates) the phrase "human furniture" at the end of the novel and implies that in the aesthetic instrumentalising view of Amerigo and Adam the human and the material are essentially on the same level. Here Amerigo is determined to "fulfill his side of the bargain" in this marriage which the reader perceives is more like a commercial transaction: "He felt ... as if his papers were in order, as if his accounts so balanced ... [and] he might close the portfolio with a snap" (I, 19) — as though concluding a highly satisfactory business deal. An illustration of how the subtle deployment of psycho-narration and narrated monologue reveals these ironic disparities can
be found in the following extract from Amerigo's thoughts at Matcham; the extract highlights the discrepancy between what he imagines is a course of action freely embarked upon and the reality of his manipulation by Charlotte.

He had taken it from her [Charlotte], as we have seen moreover, that Fanny Assingham did n't now matter – the "now" he had even himself supplied, as no more than fair to his sense of various earlier stages.... he had for the first time ... a little disappointedly, got the impression of a certain failure, on the dear woman's part, of something he was aware of having always rather freely taken for granted in her. Of what exactly the failure consisted he would still perhaps have felt it a little harsh to try to say; and if she had in fact, as by Charlotte's observation, "broken down", the details of the collapse would be comparatively unimportant. They came to the same thing, all such collapses - the failure of courage, the failure of friendship, or the failure just simply of tact; for did n't any one of them by itself amount really to the failure of wit? - which was the last thing he had expected of her and which would be but another name for the triumph of stupidity. It had been Charlotte's remark that they were at last "beyond her"; whereas he had ever enjoyed believing that a certain easy imagination in her would keep up with him to the end. He shrank from affixing a label to Mrs. Assingham's want of faith.... (I, 313-14)

In this passage, the shift from psycho-narration to narrated monologue highlights the dubious nature of the Prince's contention that the reasons for Fanny's "collapse" - what the uninitiated or less linguistically adept might call her failure to condone an adulterous relationship - are unimportant. The Prince evades examining Fanny's stance, as it is much more convenient to take refuge in a suspect generalisation, the claim that "all such collapses" can be attributed to "the failure of courage ... friendship ... tact ... or wit". The repetition of "failure" also underscores both the Prince's belief in the "success" of his own interpretation of the situation and the contrast with
"triumph" (the Prince's thinking is again characterised by antonymic pairs). The use of the interrogative form - "did n't any of them by itself amount really to the failure of wit?" (as usual, an aesthetic rather than ethical category) - suggests the process by which the Prince is trying to convince himself of the validity of his own interpretation. The oxymoronic "triumph of stupidity" is a label conveniently conjured up to facilitate the contemptuous dismissal of Fanny's objections to their liaison.

Although "he shrank from affixing a label to Mrs. Assingham’s want of faith", both he and Charlotte do in effect indulge in a strategy of affixing anodyne or reassuring labels to their activities as part of their policy of "treating" the Ververs. Language itself is employed for swaddling them in protective tenderness while indulging in a sanctified affair behind their pampered backs.

Ironically, the reader is in a position to recall a conversation with Charlotte in which these very terms "courage" and "wit" were employed to influence Amerigo into accepting Charlotte's view of the situation. The reader is aware, as Amerigo is not, of the insidious influence of Charlotte's mode of reasoning. She demonstrates her linguistic virtuosity in the way in which sanitised "labels" or euphemistic linguistic tags are affixed to legitimise or justify. Charlotte had, during the visit which culminated in their passionate embrace, subtly manoeuvred the Prince into "seeing their way together": "It's not that you have n't my courage, Charlotte said, "but that you have n't, I rather think, my imagination. Unless indeed it should turn out after all ... that you have n't even my intelligence" (I, 301). Charlotte shrewdly employs these terms "courage ... imagination ... intelligence" as a challenge to Amerigo to demonstrate, by seeing things her way, that he is indeed endowed with these qualities and can match her
- in all senses of the term. As always, it is the aesthetic register which predominates in her mode of reasoning.

This passage provides a significant illustration of how words used by Charlotte in conversation seep into Amerigo's consciousness and recur in narrated monologue as he persuades himself of the "right view of their opportunity for happiness" (I, 246).

Later, at Matcham, a verbal echo confirms the pattern whereby such justificatory concepts can influence consciousness. In a narrated monologue, Amerigo responds to the sensuous appeal where "every aspect of the picture [was] a glowing appeal for the immediate", where "intelligent acceptance" was required, where "Its demand -- to that the thing came back -- was above all for courage and good humour" (I, 332). There is clearly no narratorial endorsement for this interpretation; it is Amerigo's, subtly inculcated by Charlotte.

Amerigo, of course, is unaware of being manipulated. In the first section of the novel, Amerigo recalls how he had relied on Fanny Assingham, his sponsor and mentor, to guide him; later, through access to his consciousness in psycho-narration and narrated monologue, it is revealed that he never perceives how, through her insidious influence, Charlotte gradually ousts Fanny in this capacity and persuades him to see things her way.

Another illustration of the way moral concepts are distorted in self-justificatory rhetoric can be seen in the following narrated monologue, where Amerigo muses on the "rightness" of his relation with Charlotte:

They had these identities of impulse -- they had had them repeatedly before; and if such unarranged but unerring encounters gave the measure of the degree in which people were, in the common phrase, meant for each other, no union in the world had ever been more sweetened with rightness. (I, 356)
The unfounded assumptions and sweeping claims expressed here emphasise the ironic use of the equivocal term "rightness", which in this context has decidedly blurred epistemological and moral contours. Their union is clearly not invested with conventional moral "rightness"; Amerigo, judging in accordance with "the touchstone of taste", a purely aesthetic criterion, assumes that if the perfection of form is adhered to, if they behave "beautifully" and the Ververs are protected from exposure to knowledge of the true situation, everything is "right".

c) The Imagistic Mode in the Portrayal of Amerigo’s Consciousness

Among the many functions of imagery in the portrayal of Amerigo one of the most significant is the cognitive. His attempts to understand the Ververs and the intricacies of his own position in relation to them are often couched in vivid imagery. In securing the wealthy Maggie Verver, Amerigo (whose name in itself has metaphorical overtones, suggesting the discovery, exploration and perhaps appropriation of a New World) had indeed established himself, as Fanny put it, "in [the] port ... of the Golden Isles" (I, 27). Fanny, to whose good offices he is indebted for the successful arrangement of his marriage, is to satisfy his abiding need for a lodestar or "educative" consort.

The sea imagery dramatises this theme in both dialogue and representation of consciousness. In a conversation with Fanny, Amerigo explains "I'm starting on a great voyage – across the unknown sea; my ship's all rigged and appointed .... But what seems the matter with me is that I can't sail alone .... I must keep your sail in sight for orientation" (I, 26).
This image recalls that used in both *Roderick* and *The Portrait* to suggest being launched on the exploratory voyage of life; here, it takes on more complex resonances in psycho-narration when access is given to Amerigo's consciousness. An image from his childhood reading is recalled and the sea imagery becomes interfused with that of the obfuscatory "white curtain":

He remembered to have read as a boy a wonderful tale by Allan Poe ... the story of the shipwrecked Gordon Pym, who, drifting in a small boat further toward the North Pole — or was it the South? — than any one had ever done, found at a given moment before him a thickness of white air that was like a dazzling curtain of light, concealing as darkness conceals, yet of the colour of milk or of snow. There were moments when he felt his own boat move upon some such mystery. The state of mind of his new friends, including Mrs. Assingham herself, had resemblances to a great white curtain. (I, 22)

The parenthetical question "or was it the South?" indicates that the mode here shifts into narrated monologue, evoking the exploratory movement of Amerigo's mind as he grapples with the mystery of the composition of the American mind. He clearly finds it difficult to orientate himself when confronted with the "white curtain" of what he takes to be the New World mentality. To him, this "dazzling curtain of light" is an emanation of the hazy romantic imagination of the Americans in which their intentions, expectations and very nature are shrouded.

The Prince wonders "what was, morally speaking, behind their veil" (I, 24), but when he questions Fanny he finds that even she, ostensibly his guiding light, is enveloped, albeit to a lesser degree, in the obfuscating element; in his perception, her laugh "came out, for his fancy, from behind the white curtain" (I, 26).

The image of the "white curtain" of nebulous American romanticism as perceived by Amerigo is associated with the related image of "exquisite colouring
drops" depicting Maggie's "good faith". The sea imagery takes on different permutations here as "the waters in which he now floated" lose their connotations of danger and mystery as their reference is narrowed down to the comfortable circumference of an "aromatic bath" in which the Prince feels he is luxuriating. In a passage of narrated monologue Amerigo conceives of the buoyant security of wealth as

the element that bore him up and into which Maggie scattered, on occasion, her exquisite colouring drops. They were of the colour — of what on earth? of what but the extraordinary American good faith? They were of the colour of her innocence, and yet at the same time of her imagination, with which their relation, his and these people's, was all suffused. (I, 10)

In Amerigo's conception, these "exquisite colouring drops" are dispensed from "a gold-topped phial", again emphasising that the Ververs' romanticism is an emanation of their opulent liquidity.

After Maggie's exposure to the golden bowl and its implications in Volume II, and her admonition to the Prince to "Find out for yourself!" (II, 203) what revelations had been afforded by this purchase, he is again depicted as grappling with an obfuscating medium: "He was walking ostensibly beside her [Maggie] but in fact given over, without a break, to the grey medium in which he helplessly groped" (II, 281). The image here is refracted through Maggie's consciousness as it represents her perception of his condition. The "grey medium", contrasting with the "dazzling curtain", suggests the condition of bleak ignorance in which Amerigo is later steeped.

The complex of sea and ship imagery dramatises issues involving exploration, discovery or embarking on new experiences. It occurs in presentation of both thought and speech. At times it takes on more comical overtones. It is suffused with humour when it occurs in
fairly light-hearted banter as in Fanny's awareness that "it had taken his father-in-law's great fortune ... to surround him with an element in which ... he could pecuniarily float" (I, 268), and when Amerigo explains to Fanny that he and Charlotte are "in the same boat" (I, 267), Mr Verver's boat, which "is a good deal tied up at the dock, or anchored, if you like, out in the stream. I have to jump out from time to time to stretch my legs..." (I, 270). Charlotte too, he explains, "has to take a header and splash about in the water" at times. Through the use of sea imagery in its more comical mode, the reader, with Fanny, is forewarned that "one of the harmless little plunges, off the deck, inevitable for each of us" (I, 270) is bound to have more serious repercussions.

Although the images of the white curtain, silver mist and grey medium often suggest impediments or challenges to insight — or degrees of purblindness? — light imagery in its more conventional forms often evokes moments of heightened insight. This complex of imagery occurs most frequently in depicting Maggie's moments of revelatory insight, but there are instances where Amerigo's sudden access of insight is also rendered in terms of light imagery. Immediately prior to the arrival of Charlotte in Portland Place on the memorable occasion which is to terminate in their passionate embrace, Amerigo experiences what he takes to be a moment of visionary clarity which makes him more susceptible to Charlotte's charms. In an extended passage of introspection rendered through psycho-narration and narrated monologue, Amerigo comes to the conclusion that he is merely a peripheral presence in the Verver household, and that Adam and Maggie share a "community of interest" from which he is excluded. He experiences a moment of revelatory lucidity in which he sees himself as a nonentity in their eyes and realises that he is appreciated only as a contributor to the Ververs'
lustrously opulent "shell". A series of observations rendered in psycho-narration and narrated monologue culminate in the following insight:

the series together resembled perhaps more than anything else those fine waves of clearness through which, for a watcher of the east, dawn at last trembles into rosy day. The illumination indeed was all for the mind, the prospect revealed by it a mere immensity of the world of thought. (I, 294)

He is subsequently confronted with the appearance of Charlotte, whose advent at this moment seemed surely providential: "Charlotte Stant, at such an hour ... Charlotte Stant turning up for him at the very climax of his special inner vision, was an apparition charged with a congruity at which he stared almost as if it had been a violence" (I, 295).

What Amerigo "sees" so vividly is the possibility of a resumption of their former relationship. "His vision of alternatives ... [to his present situation] opened out" (I, 297), and in a related visual image he "sees" a pictorial presentation of palpable renewal: "The sense of the past revived for him ... it made that other time somehow meet the future close, interlocking with it, before his watching eyes, as in a long embrace of arms and lips ..." (I, 297-98). This visual image presented in psycho-narration graphically anticipates the physical embrace with which their encounter is concluded.

Another significant cluster of images which frequently recurs in Amerigo's narrated monologues is that involving references to monetary transactions. In The Golden Bowl, as in the earlier novels, commercial metaphors are often used to indicate the way in which characters regard or assess each other; these highlight the inversion of values obtaining in a society where human "worth" is expressed in materialistic terms.

The Prince feels that his intrinsic personal worth (as opposed to his worth as a "personage") is not
adequately acknowledged by the Ververs. He recreates in imagination an exchange with Maggie in which he claimed that his worth would be recognised only "if it were a question of parting with me .... My value would in that case be estimated." Maggie's rather glib reply, "Yes, if you mean that I'd pay rather than lose you" (I, 13) ironically foreshadows the process of "payment" she has to endure - and the role of scapegoat she feels obliged to assume.

The monetary image is elaborated during Amerigo's meditative musings on the way the Ververs take his worth for granted as though he were a representative example of valuable articles in general circulation. In the following extract, the abstract formulation of the first sentence modulates into imagistic expression in narrated monologue:

What was singular was that it seemed not so much an expectation of anything in particular as a large bland blank assumption of merits almost beyond notation, of essential quality and value. It was as if he had been some old embossed coin, of a purity of gold no longer used, stamped with glorious arms, medieval, wonderful, of which the "worth" in mere modern change, sovereigns and half-crowns, would be great enough, but as to which, since there were finer ways of using it, such taking to pieces was superfluous. That was the image for the security in which it was open to him to rest; he was to constitute a possession, yet was to escape being reduced to his component parts. What would this mean but that practically he was never to be tried or tested? (I, 23)

The image of the gold coin recalls that used in The Portrait to describe Osmond, but here the image is used by the reflector, in narrated monologue, rather than by the narrator in the authorial mode. In a sense, of course, Amerigo is indeed to be tried or tested in the course of the novel.

An analogy with a commercial transaction also later crystallises Amerigo's perception of his position in the
Verver household. In an extended narrated monologue, access is afforded to his perception that

Mr. Verver then in a word took care of his relation to Maggie, as he took care, and apparently always would, of everything else. He relieved him of all anxiety about his married life in the same manner in which he relieved him on the score of his bank account. (I, 292)

This narrated monologue reflects Amerigo's awareness that Adam's paternalism - in all senses of the term - has deprived him of any sense of meaningful occupation, even on the domestic level.

Amerigo feels that his father-in-law, in keeping with his position as a good banker, values him primarily as a good investment, a speculation that has paid off and yielded handsome dividends (perhaps even the production of the Principino, a tangible extension of the Verver empire, could be seen as a form of capital growth). His interpretation of Adam's mode of viewing him is reflected in the following thoughts:

This directed regard [from Adam's "decent family eyes"] rested at its ease, but it neither lingered nor penetrated, and was, to the Prince's fancy, much of the same order as any glance directed, for due attention, from the same quarter, to the figure of a cheque received in the course of business.... It made sure of the amount - and just so, from time to time, the amount of the Prince was certified. He was being thus, in renewed instalments, perpetually paid in; he already reposed in the bank as a value, but subject, in this comfortable way, to repeated, to infinite endorsement. The net result of all of which moreover was that the young man had no wish to see his value diminish. (I, 324-25)

Adam's glance presumably "neither lingered nor penetrated" because he is not interested in plumbing the implications of his view of the Prince; he sees him only as a son-in-law, an adjunct of the Ververs, with little intrinsic interest as an individual in his own right. (This is, of course, a conjectural perception, attributed
to Adam by the Prince, but a certain narratorial endorsement for this interpretation is later afforded by access to Adam's own consciousness.)

Ironically, Amerigo himself is implicated in this mode of viewing others in materialistic and instrumentalising terms. This is most vividly exemplified in the preponderance of monetary images, in combination with comparisons drawn from the arts and the natural world, which pervade his appraisal of Charlotte at her first reappearance. As it is through Amerigo's perception rather than the narrator's description that Charlotte is depicted, his "exhibitory vision" of Charlotte sheds as much light on himself as on the woman he is observing. A combination of aesthetic, commercial and mechanistic images animates what amounts to a sensuously indulgent inventory of her charms rendered in narrated perception:18

But it was, strangely, as a cluster of possessions of his own that these things in Charlotte Stant now affected him; items in a full list, items recognised, each of them, as if, for the long interval, they had been "stored", wrapped up, numbered, put away in a cabinet... he took the relics out one by one.... He saw again that her thick hair was, vulgarly speaking, brown, but that there was a shade of tawny autumn leaf in it for "appreciation"... something that gave her at moments the sylvan head of a huntress. He saw the sleeves of her jacket drawn to her wrists, but he again made out the free arms within them to be of the completely rounded, the polished slimness that Florentine sculptors in the great time had loved .... He knew her narrow hands, he knew her long fingers and the shape and colour of her fingernails, he knew her special beauty of movement and line when she turned her back, and the perfect working of all her main attachments, that of some wonderful finished instrument, something intently made for exhibition, for a prize. He knew above all the extraordinary fineness of her flexible waist, the stem of an expanded flower, which gave her a likeness also to some long loose silk purse, well filled with gold pieces, but having been passed empty through a finger-ring that held it together.
It was as if, before she turned to him, he had weighed the whole thing in his open palm and even heard a little the chink of the metal. (I, 46-47)

A striking feature of this passage is the controlled cumulative rhythm reinforced by the repetition of "he saw ... he knew ...." The subdued erotic overtones in this appraisal by an obviously informed appraiser confirm the impression that the more specifically Elizabethan connotations of the verb "knew" are intended to be exploited. (Fanny later assures Bob that there wasn't time for Charlotte to have become the Prince's mistress, but one feels that Bob's rather ribald rejoinder, "Does it take so much time?" (I, 72) is probably closer to the mark. The Prince is clearly intimately acquainted with Charlotte's physical attributes.)

The description of Charlotte as seen by Amerigo is also revealing in that the possibility of predatory proclivities underlying a charming surface are hinted at by the telling comparison, "the sylvan head of a huntress". Ironically, the Prince, although formulating this comparison, does not perceive the subliminally registered truth that Charlotte is capable of ensnaring and manipulating him.

Thus, in a curious compound of the proprietorial, the aesthetic, the erotic and the utilitarian, Amerigo sees Charlotte successively in terms of a Florentine statue, an instrument (and here a feminist objection to the "sex object" implications in his appreciation of "the perfect working of all her main attachments" would be valid), a flower and a silk purse. Personal profit, and more specifically sensual gratification, is often depicted in terms of clinking lucre; this image recurs during the sojourn at Matcham, for instance, when Amerigo again experiences "the chink of gold in his ear" (I, 345) at the prospect of renewing an intimate relationship with Charlotte and sees the possibilities of his position in terms of "a bottomless bag of solid shining British
sovereigns" (I, 333). Prior to that, he had conceived of the bond linking them as the forging of a "mystic golden bridge" (II, 325) between them.

V. ii: Charlotte

As Amerigo and Maggie are the two most important reflectors in the novel, with Adam assuming the position of reflector in the seven chapters of Book Second of Volume I, comparatively little sustained access is given to the consciousness of Charlotte. Nevertheless, the reader is given significant if tantalisingly infrequent glimpses into her inner world.

The first important excursion into Charlotte's consciousness occurs when, after an ellipsis of a few years following her marriage to Adam, Charlotte is portrayed in all her splendour at the Embassy ball. As noted earlier, the shift in focalization is signalled by the opening sentence of Book Third, chapter I: "Charlotte, halfway up the 'monumental' staircase ..." (I, 245). The narrator comments that "At the particular instant of our being again concerned with her", Charlotte is depicted "with a consciousness materially, with a confidence quite splendidly, enriched" (I, 245). Through narrated perception we have access to her awareness that "She was herself in truth crowned, and it all hung together, melted together, in light and colour and sound" (I, 246).

At this stage, Charlotte has just attained the recognition that, as she explains to Fanny, Adam's feeling for Maggie is "the greatest affection of which he is capable", and that being "placed" or "fixed as fast as a pin stuck, up to its head, in a cushion" in this anomalous situation where, as his wife, she is less important and necessary to his happiness than his
daughter (I, 261-62), she should be prepared to react accordingly.

The light imagery, which, as seen earlier, dramatises Amerigo's comparable recognition, recurs here in Charlotte's narrated monologue as she recognises "in the direction in which the light had dawned" (I, 255) that her solution lay in "the direction of her greater freedom". Through this access to her consciousness we find that she is aware of "hovering and warning inward voices" but manages to dispel them in favour of adopting "the right view of her opportunity for happiness" (I, 246). The term "right" is again fraught with ambiguity, as in this context it can be equated not with "correct" or morally sound but "expedient" or "opportunistic".

By the time she confronts Fanny "She had already accepted her consciousness, as we have already noted, that a crisis for them all was in the air" (I, 251). She conveys to Fanny that she intends to respond imaginatively to the challenge of her situation. Charlotte has by now grasped the full implications of Adam's original motives for wanting to marry her; as she says to Fanny, "He did tell me that he wanted me just because I could be useful about her [Maggie]" (I, 262). Charlotte's endeavour now, having been "exposed ... to much more competent recognitions of her own" (I, 247), is to initiate Amerigo into her way of seeing.

In Book Third chapter IV, after an interlude of conversation between Fanny and Amerigo in chapter II, and an intense discussion between Fanny and Bob in chapter III, the focus is again on Charlotte's consciousness for the first half of the chapter (I, 288-91) before reverting to Amerigo.

Psycho-narration in this section seems at times to be portraying the combined consciousness of Charlotte and Amerigo, thus emphasising the shared "community of vision" they have attained (AN, p. 299). The terms applied to Kate and Densher in the Preface to *The Wings*...
seem applicable at times to Charlotte and Amerigo: "the associated consciousness of my two prime young persons ... [becomes] a practical fusion of consciousness" (AN, p. 299): "It appeared thus that they might enjoy together extraordinary freedom, the two friends, from the moment they should understand their position aright" (I, 288). The term "aright" here is again ambiguous; no distinction is made by "the two friends" between what is "right" from the ethical point of view and what is right in terms of the "touchstone of taste".

The ironic statement that in Amerigo's view "the wonderful thing was that her sense of propriety had been, from the first, especially alive about it [their "case"]" further highlights Charlotte's failure to recognise that her sense of propriety and sense of morality are at variance. "Propriety" as Charlotte's criterion, complements "taste" as Amerigo's; in this situation the reader can see, as Amerigo and Charlotte apparently choose not to, that propriety and taste can be radically out of kilter with morality.

According to Charlotte, the apportionment of blame is a self-evident affair:

"There has been plenty of 'doing', and there will doubtless be plenty still; but it's all theirs, every inch of it; it's all a matter of what they've done to us." And she showed how the question had therefore been only of their taking everything as everything came, and all as quietly as might be. Nothing stranger surely had ever happened to a conscientious, a well-meaning, a perfectly passive pair: no more extraordinary decree had ever been launched against such victims than this of forcing them against their will into a relation of mutual close contact that they had done everything to avoid. (I, 289)

The modulation from direct to indirect and then free indirect speech foregrounds the irony in Charlotte's asseverations. Her view is of course riddled with half-truths and suppression of established facts. Charlotte
employs linguistic camouflage to disguise the fact that she was not coerced into marriage with Adam and its attendant proximity to the Prince. Furthermore, the contention that they are "perfectly passive" is ironic in that, although Amerigo does display a culpable passivity or readiness to be manipulated, Charlotte herself has actively schemed and worked for the resumption of their liaison.

Access to Charlotte's consciousness after this reported speech reveals that she is aware of this distortion of facts in her account of their "fate". She recognises too that the Prince, although prepared to accept her version of events, is no mere dupe. Once again the full import of the exchange emerges in her "backward speculation" when she "reverts to it in thought" as the following passage of psycho-narration and narrated monologue depicting her thoughts on this occasion reveals:

She was to remember not a little meanwhile the particular prolonged silent look with which the Prince had met her allusion to these primary efforts at escape. She was inwardly to dwell on the element of the unuttered that her tone had caused to play up into his irresistible eyes; and this because she considered with pride and joy that she had on the spot disposed of the doubt, the question, the challenge ... that such a look could convey. He had been sufficiently off his guard to show some little wonder as to their having plotted so very hard against their destiny, and she knew well enough of course what in this connexion was at the bottom of his thought, and what would have sounded out more or less if he had n't happily saved himself from words. (I, 289-91)

Suppression of the truth by "saving oneself from words" or substituting others which conform more closely to one's desires is, as we have seen, a strategy frequently indulged in by Amerigo and Charlotte. In a continuation of this narrated monologue, Charlotte then produces an axiom concerning "all men" which is
All men were brutes enough to catch when they might at such chances for dissent — for all the good it really did them; but the Prince's distinction was in being one of the few who could check himself before acting on the impulse. This, obviously, was what counted in a man as delicacy. If her friend had blurted or bungled he would have said, in his simplicity, "Did we do 'everything to avoid' it when we faced your remarkable marriage?" (I, 290)

In Charlotte's book, honesty is equated with "blurting", "bungling" and "simplicity"; suppression of the truth is seen as proof of "delicacy".

An indication of the success with which Charlotte imposes her interpretation is given in a passage of narrated monologue featuring Amerigo's thoughts at the end of this chapter:

What had happened in short was that Charlotte and he had, by a single turn of the wrist of fate — "led up" to indeed, no doubt, by steps and stages that conscious computation had missed — been placed face to face in a freedom that extraordinarily partook of ideal perfection, since the magic web had spun itself without their toil, almost without their touch. (I, 298)

The "steps and stages" — and stratagems — whereby Charlotte, undetected by the Prince, has "led [him] up to" espousing her view of their "opportunity", are more easily detected by the reader. The pervasive ironic mode makes it unnecessary for an intrusive narrator to point out that the implicit disclaimer of personal responsibility is not endorsed by the narrator.

After this chapter, access to Charlotte's consciousness is largely oblique. Her views are expressed in dialogues with Amerigo and Fanny, in which her "independent, not to say original, interpretation of signs" (I, 288) is often manifested. In Volume II, it is only through Maggie's projection of her thoughts that the reader has access to her state of mind.
the central characters are engaged in, Fanny's analysis usually takes the form of thinking aloud in her dialogues with Bob. She too responds to the "element of the unuttered" and attempts to decipher it:

with the meeting of their eyes something as yet unnameable came out for her in his look, when something strange and subtle and at variance with his words, something that gave them away, glimmered deep down, as an appeal, almost an incredible one, to her finer comprehension. What, inconceivably, was it like? Was n't it, however gross such a rendering of anything so occult, fairly like a quintessential wink, a hint of the possibility of their really treating their subject — of course on some better occasion.... (I, 271)

In this extract the shift from psycho-narration to narrated monologue is marked by the urgent questions through which Fanny attempts to grasp the meaning of what the Prince, through subliminal communication and "the language of the eyes", is conveying to her.

The image of water (or, in the case of the "drops" of the Prince's "eloquence", an unspecified fluid) recurs in more comical guise in a passage of psycho-narration when the narrator coyly elucidates his own image:

She felt like the horse of the adage, brought — and brought by her own fault — to the water, but strong, for the occasion, in the one fact that she could n't be forced to drink. Invited, in other words, to understand, she held her breath for fear of showing she did, and this for the excellent reason that she was at last fairly afraid to. It was sharp for her, at the same time, that she was certain, in advance, of his remark; that she heard it before it had sounded, that she already tasted in fine the bitterness it would have for her special sensibility. (I, 272)

This reluctance to accept the implications of what he is conveying — with the concomitant sense of self-blame — contrasts with her previous attitude, also expressed in terms of gastronomic inducements: at that stage, after listening to Charlotte's account of how
Maggie and Adam preferred to spend their time with each other, leaving their respective spouses to their own devices, Fanny had seen the situation in terms of a banquet of cognitive possibilities:

Fanny Assingham had at this moment the sense as of a large heaped dish presented to her intelligence and inviting it to a feast — so thick were the notes of intention in this remarkable speech. But she also felt that to plunge at random, to help herself too freely would ... tend to jostle the ministering hand, confound the array and, more vulgarily speaking, make a mess. She picked out after consideration a solitary plum. "So placed that you have to arrange?"

"Certainly I have to arrange." .... 
"And does [the Prince] arrange", Mrs. Assingham asked, "to make up his arrears?" The question had risen to her lips — it was as if another morsel, on the dish, had tempted her. (I, 259)

Later, in the carriage on the way home with Bob, Fanny's refusal to partake freely of the insights proffered by her erstwhile protegés is manifested. She steadfastly wards off uncomfortable recognitions: "The sense of seeing was strong in her, but she clutched at the comfort of not being sure of what she saw" (I, 277).

Fanny's rather Byzantine cognitive contortions (expressed most frequently in dialogue with Bob and thus beyond the scope of this discussion) contrast forcibly with the blunt truth uttered by Bob: "What in the world did you ever suppose was going to happen? The man's in a position in which he has nothing in life to do" (I, 278). In Bob's book, therefore, adultery would be one of the inherent occupational hazards of what I have dubbed the "Wording Class" — stemming from the sheer lack of alternative forms of productive activity.

In Volume II, it is through Fanny's perspective, and not Maggie's, that we experience the climactic scene of the smashing of the golden bowl. This shift of focus has not been noted by commentators on the novel; even a critic as perceptive as Nicola Bradbury has claimed that
in "The Princess" volume, "Apart from one scene between the Assinghams ... every perception and reaction is reached through the heroine, either directly or in her projections of the other characters". On the contrary, it is Fanny who serves as focalizer for this crucial scene. And when Maggie requests her immediate attendance at Portland Place, it is Fanny's view of Maggie which is portrayed. On her arrival,

The Princess, she noted, was completely dressed ... and she presented herself, in the large clear room ... as for the first time in her life rather "bedizened". Was it that she had put on too many things, overcharged herself with jewels, wore in particular more of them than usual, and bigger ones, in her hair? (II, 151-52)

The shift from psycho-narration to narrated monologue dramatises Fanny's sense of wonderment; the portrayal of her consciousness then modulates back to psycho-narration for her interpretation of Maggie's bedecked state and flushed cheeks:

These ... items of her aspect had promptly enough their own light for Mrs. Assingham, who made out by it that nothing more pathetic could be imagined than the refuge and disguise her agitation had instinctively asked of the arts of dress, multiplied to extravagance, almost to incoherence. (II, 152).

Fanny intuitively realises that Maggie's symbolic change of attire here is undertaken in response to a new emotional perspective. The reader recalls that to mark the significance of her reception of the Prince alone, at Portland Place, on his return from Matcham, Maggie had "bedecked" herself in her newest frock which was "even perhaps a little too stiff and too grand for a familiar and domestic frock" (II, 12). Her new garb expresses the recognition that the "familiar and domestic" is inadequate in a situation where she is obliged to don all the worldly arts and artifices as aids in her struggle,
After Maggie's account of the discovery of the golden bowl, rendered in indirect speech, it is again Fanny's response that is portrayed: "Mrs. Assingham wondered ... how much she even now knew", and, when perceiving that Maggie did not intend to blame her, "the elder woman felt... relief...", and then, in a modulation into narrated monologue, she experiences the reassuring perception that "She should n't be judged - save by herself" (II, 160).

Fanny's revelatory insight concerning Maggie's intentions is rendered in terms of a visual perception: "She saw her - or she believed she saw her - look at her chance for straight denunciation, look at it and then pass it by" (II, 162).

Fanny accurately grasps Maggie's "lucid higher intention". The narrated monologue in which she reads Maggie's motives - "It was like a fresh sacrifice for a larger conquest" - then modulates into what I have called "imputed monologue" as Fanny interprets, or renders in verbal form, what she imagines Maggie is thinking and trying to convey to her subliminally:

"Only see me through now, do it in the face of this and in spite of it, and I leave you a hand of which the freedom is n't to be said." The aggravation of fear - or call it apparently of knowledge - had jumped straight into its place as an aggravation above all for her father; the effect of this being but to quicken to passion her reasons for making his protectedness, or in other words the forms of his ignorance, still the law of her attitude and the key to her solution. She kept as tight hold of these reasons and these forms, in her confirmed horror, as the rider of a plunging horse grasps his seat with his knees and she might absolutely have been putting it to her guest that she believed she could stay on if they should only "meet" nothing more. (II, 163)

Fanny, to whom, as she acknowledges to Bob, "the forms are two-thirds of conduct" (I, 390), is to be only too willing to keep up the "forms" of her own ignorance,
pretending that she suspects nothing untoward in the relationship between Amerigo and Charlotte.

Fanny's interpretation of the way she sees Maggie "look at her chance for straight denunciation, look at it and then pass it by" (II, 162) is proleptic in that it alerts the reader to the possibility of Maggie rejecting "straight denunciation" of Charlotte and Amerigo as well – as she does in the crucial scene of the card game later. In resisting the temptation to apportion blame, Maggie is already demonstrating that she is to react more imaginatively instead of acting "with the blind resentment with which, in her place, ninety-nine women out of a hundred would act" (II, 125). The path of vindictive retaliation is one which, as Fanny senses, Maggie is to abjure.

Fanny's response to the golden bowl also adds another dimension to the symbolism of the bowl whose significance lies less in its status as an emblematic object in itself than in the way it is perceived by the characters. Fanny's response to the gilt cup is presented through narrated perception. Her first impression is that "it was inscrutable in its rather stupid elegance", then "The golden bowl put on, under consideration, a sturdy, a conscious perversity; as a 'document' somehow, it was ugly, though it might have a decorative grace" (II, 165). When considering it more closely,

She looked at the precious thing – if precious it was – found herself in fact eyeing it as if, by her dim solicitation, to draw its secret from it rather than suffer the imposition of Maggie's knowledge. It was brave and firm and rich, with its bold deep hollow; and, without this queer torment about it, would ... figure to her as an enviable ornament, a possession really desirable. (II, 167)

When discovering that the bowl is in fact not gold but gilded crystal, and not perfect but cracked, Fanny declares "Then your whole idea has a crack" and smashes
the bowl dramatically to the floor. Throughout this scene, the focus is on Fanny's consciousness; with the dramatic appearance of the Prince there is a shift of focus to Maggie and little further direct access is given to Fanny's consciousness. The device of using Fanny as focalizer in this scene serves to involve the reader in a sense of shared mystification as to exactly what Maggie knew.

b) Bob Assingham

It has been claimed that "James tells the story through the eyes of Colonel Assingham, rather than through his own". This statement is ludicrous, and could emanate only from a careless or cursory reading of the text. On the other hand, the fact that Bob does indeed function at times as focalizer seems to be ignored by commentators on the novel who tend to see the Assinghams only as choric commentators. Access to his consciousness is of course limited, and invariably occurs in association with the presentation of inside views of Fanny's consciousness which are incorporated in their lengthy dialogues.

These dialogues between Fanny and Bob are described as "their old custom of divergent discussion, that intercourse by misunderstanding" (I, 365). This description is reminiscent of Austin Warren's account of the mode of knowing that he called "dialectic":

a cerebral process, pursued by two or more minds, in contrapuntal movement of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. The topic is attacked from without; the speakers circle round it .... There are mutual misunderstandings, false clues, shifts of position.

Nevertheless, in spite of the frequency of "mutual misunderstanding", Bob does in effect display understanding and sympathy for Fanny in her tortuous
grappling with the intricacies of the situation. Fanny attempts to plumb the depths, and Bob accompanies her, as far as possible, when she launches herself on her exploratory cognitive excursions. Imagistic representation with occasional comical overtones is employed to depict these epistemological excursions. So Bob shares her "consciousness of deep waters". This iterative image takes on almost baroque proportions in the following portrayal of Bob's perspective:

He hadn't quitted for an hour, during her adventure, the shore of the mystic lake; he had on the contrary stationed himself where she could signal to him at need. Her need would have arisen if the planks of her bark had parted — then some sort of plunge would have become his immediate duty. His present position, clearly, was that of seeing her in the centre of her sheet of dark water, and of wondering if her actual mute gaze at him did n't perhaps mean that her planks were now parting. He held himself so ready that it was quite as if the inward man had pulled off coat and waistcoat. Before he had plunged, however — that is before he had uttered a question — he saw, not without relief, that she was making for land. He watched her steadily paddle, always a little nearer, and at last he felt her boat bump. The bump was distinct, and in fact she stepped ashore. "We were all wrong. There's nothing." (I, 366)

The bathetic outcome of the convoluted elaboration of the image underlines the ludicrous nature of Fanny's obfuscatory cognitive contortions. So much intellectual effort — to produce nothing but a lie. The continuation of the image in what appears to be narrated monologue indicates that Bob is aware of his role as accomplice in this process of self-deception. Convincing herself (and Bob) that she was mistaken in her suspicions is to be Fanny's only conceivable salvation — or method of salving her conscience.

This complicated image thus depicts, in psycho-narration, the procedure whereby Bob conceives of Fanny's elaborate mental processes. He observes the manoeuvres
Fanny deploys to convince herself (largely as a self-exculpatory exercise) that there is "nothing" untoward in the relationship between Amerigo and Charlotte. After a lengthy and convoluted discussion in which she deploys her linguistic virtuosity to persuade Bob that all is well, the water image recurs with the intrusive narrator again in evidence (as he had been to explain the labyrinthine water image) to comment on their achieved state of understanding. Having secured Bob's concurrence in her interpretation, Fanny lapses with Bob into the silence of achieved understanding:

their silence ... might have represented their sinking together, hand in hand for a time, into the mystic lake where he had begun, as we have hinted, by seeing her paddle alone — the beauty of it was that they now could really talk better than before, because the basis had at last once for all, defined itself. What was the basis, which Fanny absolutely exacted, but that Charlotte and the Prince must be saved — so far as consistently speaking of them as still safe might save them? It did save them somehow for Fanny's troubled mind — for that was the nature of the mind of women. He conveyed to her now, at all events, by refusing her no gentleness, that he had sufficiently got the tip, and that the tip was all he had wanted. (I, 378)

The gnomic generalisation concerning the nature of the mind of women is embedded in narrated monologue, and thus emanates from the consciousness of Bob rather than the narrator. Bob clearly sees through Fanny's transparent attempt to dispel all well-founded misgivings and cling to the illusion that "still speaking of them as safe might save them". Her capacity for lighting upon a conveniently innocuous term and investing it with far-reaching implications had previously been demonstrated in the way she pounced on Bob's term "rum": "That's all I claim," she seemed thankful for the word. "I don't say it's anything more — but it is distinctly rum" (I, 374).

At the conclusion of this scene a brief shift to narrated monologue again gives access to Bob's thoughts:
He watched her as if she left him positively under the impression of her mastery of her subject; yes, as if the real upshot of the drama before them was but that he had, when it came to the tight places of life ... the most luminous of wives. (I, 399)

The iterative light imagery here again has ironic overtones in view of the display of obfuscatory rhetoric that Fanny has indulged in. When Bob follows her upstairs, "making out how all the clearness they had conquered was even for herself a relief — how at last the sense of the amplitude of her exposition sustained and floated her" (I, 399), the convergence of light and sea imagery is charged with ambiguity as the reader perceives how wilfully-chosen blindness confers immunity from self-reproach. This ambiguity, reinforced by the illusory nature of light, recurs in the dramatization of Adam's consciousness and will be discussed in the following section.

Ironically, the gastronomic image discussed earlier reappears, this time applying to Bob's desire to put another probing question and extract another juicy morsel of information: "He held her a minute longer — there was another plum in the pie" (I, 399).

At the conclusion of the last scene between Fanny and Bob, at the end of Volume I, Fanny expresses her conviction that Maggie is at last "awake". It is with her awakening to consciousness of her situation that she assumes centrality in Volume II. Before we are given direct access to Maggie's consciousness, the effects of the change in her on her friend and confidante are revealed, in much the same way that in The Portrait the reader is first given Rosier and Ralph's impressions of Isabel before her inner world is revealed.

Before discussing the deployment of modes of representation of consciousness in the depiction of Maggie, the use of these techniques in the portrayal of
Adam will be examined. The presentation of the Ververs forms the subject of the following chapter.


7 Further details concerning publication of these works are noted in the Bibliography.

8 It would be impossible to list all the critics who have commented in passing or in depth on ambiguity in James. Among the more prominent are Sallie Sears, in The Negative Imagination: Form and Perspective in the Novels of Henry James (1968) and Ruth B. Yeazell, in Language and Knowledge in the Late Novels of Henry James (1976).

9 This recurrent pattern is also exemplified in The Wings. In the Preface, James states that Kate is the reflector in the section set in Venice: "She is turned on largely at Venice" (AN, p. 301); however, only limited access to her mind is given in Venice, as Milly and then Densher function as reflectors in this section of the novel.

10 The original title, "The Marriages", reveals the crucial significance of these relationships.


13 This range of experience is adumbrated in The Ambassadors with Strether's perception, in Gloriani's garden, that "There was something in the great world covertly tigerish, which came to him across the lawn.
and in the charming air as a waft from the jungle" (I, 219); the implication is that the social world is governed by "survival of the fittest" jungle morality.


15 Maggie's strategy contrasts forcibly with that of the eponymous heroine of "Madame de Mauves" in a comparable situation. When confronted with the fact of her husband's infidelity and subsequent repentance, Madame de Mauves adopts an unflinchingly unforgiving attitude, with disastrous consequences.


17 Amerigo's attitude exemplifies that described by MacIntyre, in After Virtue, as "the manipulative mode of moral instrumentalism; it substitutes transaction for interaction, possessions for people". Quoted by Richard Freadman, Eliot, James and the Fictitional Self: A Study in Character and Narration (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 103.

18 See chapter 2 for an account of narrated perception.


"Constitutionally Inaccessible to Knowledge"?

I. ADAM VERVER: "A RARE POWER OF PURCHASE"

The first sustained access to Adam's inner world is given in Volume I, Book Second, chapter I: "Adam Verver, at Fawns ... might have been observed ... had there been a spectator in the field" (I, 125) enjoying his solitude in the billiard room. In a rare assumption of shared experience linking narrator, reader and character, we find "We share this world ... for the hour, with Mr. Verver". And in a comment surprisingly reminiscent of the observation concerning the desired response to Isabel in The Portrait, the narrator speaks of "investing him with an interest that makes our attention ... tender indeed almost to compassion". (The difference, of course, is that the narratorial voice exudes irony here). This is followed by what appears to be a characterisation of Adam in the authorial mode, a procedure abjured or sparingly used in the presentation of the other characters: "For it may immediately be mentioned that this amiable man bethought himself of his personal advantage, in general, only when it might appear to him that other advantages, those of other persons, had successfully put in their claim" (I, 125-26). Later, with hindsight, the reader can see that once again this ostensibly direct characterisation is tinged with irony: Adam's egotism takes far more subtle and insidious forms, as will be seen in the train of reasoning leading up to his decision to marry Charlotte.

The presentation of Adam's consciousness modulates from apparently direct definition through psycho-narration and narrated monologue. In the evocation of
his past financial success, Adam's single-minded dedication to making his fortune is underscored by a parodic rhetorical question:

Variety of imagination — what is that but fatal in the world of affairs unless so disciplined as not to be distinguished from monotony? Mr. Verver then, for a fresh full period ... had been inscrutably monotonous behind an iridescent cloud. (I, 128)

In Adam, "variety of imagination" is essentially curtailed by his egotism. Although his aesthetic imagination is well-developed, this is accompanied by atrophy of the sympathetic or vicarious imagination as he is incapable of seeing others save in terms of their usefulness to Maggie and himself. In spite of his ostensible generosity in considering the claims of his guests before allowing himself to indulge in a snatched "quarter of an hour of egotism", his claim to more than superficial amiability is suspect. The "iridescent cloud", his "native envelope", recalls the impenetrable "white curtain" registered by Amerigo, and suggests perhaps a deceptively nebulous softness concealing the steely resolution beneath.

Just as Book I opens with Amerigo in a state of contemplative solitude reviewing, or "reverting to in thought", his immediate past, so the first chapter of Book Two presents Adam in a state of "backward speculation". This is achieved through a series of analepses which fluctuate from the authorial to the figural mode, with Adam's past being recalled by the narrator as much as by Adam himself.

In a summary evocation of the past twenty months, which is largely refracted through Adam's consciousness, the iterative architectural image occurs in psycho-narration modulating to narrated monologue to conjure up Adam's conception of his son-in-law:
At first, certainly, their decent little old-time union, Maggie's and his own, had resembled a good deal some pleasant public square, in the heart of an old city, into which a great Palladian church, say - something with a grand architectural front - had suddenly been dropped. (I, 135)

In re-living in imagination the impact made by his presence, Adam concedes with satisfaction that the potential for inconvenient disruption of the pleasant commerce of their lives had not, however, materialised:

no violence of accommodation, in retrospect, emerged. The Palladian church was always there, but the piazza took care of itself ... the Prince, for his father-in-law, while remaining solidly a feature ceased to be at all ominously a block. (I, 135-36)

The architectural image here vividly presents Adam's mode of thought and demonstrates how Adam conceives of Amerigo in purely aesthetic terms in which accent is laid on his imposing appearance and social cachet - "grand architectural front": he provides an appropriate backdrop which, while enhancing the tone of the piazza, does not impede or obstruct its established modus vivendi. (Adam, of course, fails to grasp the implications of this image.)

This conception, rendered metaphorically, is the counterpart of Amerigo's realisation that he has been relegated to a position of peripheral impotence in their domestic arrangements. Socially, he has provided Maggie with the lustre of a romantic backdrop and historically imposing connections, biologically he has fulfilled his role in furnishing her with an heir (an essential component of any dynasty) but the intensity of the shared intimacy between father and daughter remains unimpaired.

Adam's notion of the Prince being devoid of "angularity" encapsulates for him his son-in-law's prime quality. The capacity to employ euphemistic terms to ensure the smooth operation of one's schemes is exemplified in Adam as much as in Amerigo and Charlotte.
He clung to that description [not "angular"] of his daughter's husband as he often did to terms and phrases, in the human, the social connexion, that he had found for himself: it was his way to have times of using these constantly, as if they had just then lighted the world, or his own path in it, for him.... (I, 136)

He is later, in a comparable feat of linguistic engineering, to fabricate the right terms to "light his path" towards proposing to Charlotte with full justification of his motives.

In both instances his "producing ... that right good word" which "figured for him clearly as a final idea, a conception of the last vividness" (I, 137) is invested with the quasi-epiphanic. The analogy conjured up in his mind between the Prince and a Palladian church is further elaborated (in psycho-narration) as he explores the qualities usually associated with "the sharp corners and hard edges, all the stony pointedness ... of [a] spreading Palladian church"; these include the potential for rigid assertiveness or an adamantine intractability, qualities which the Prince fortunately does not display. What Adam appreciates in his son-in-law is the contact with "practically yielding lines and curved surfaces" (I, 137), a pliancy that he expresses in the concept "round" as opposed to "abominably square". What Adam does not conceive of is the possibility of a Palladian facade and ostensibly accommodating structure housing features that express resistance or dissent, not in overt opposition but in more subtle and imperceptible forms.

An ominous hint of underlying ruthlessness in Adam (the steely heart behind the soft "iridescent cloud") appears in his complacent appreciation of the Prince's "smoothness ... yielding lines ...." It is not clear whether the observation "Oh, if he had been angular! - who could say what might then have happened?" is rendered in narrated monologue or free indirect speech, but either
way there is a hint of sinister menace in this bland statement. The implication is that Amerigo would have had his edges smartly — albeit subtly — rounded off, just as Charlotte is later to be chastened through the smooth operation of the "silken halter".

This impression is later corroborated when he tells Charlotte, in reply to her query as to Amerigo's possible reaction to their marriage plans, "I'm afraid ... [then] he'll just have to accept from us whatever his wife accepts; and accept it ... just because she does. That ... will have to do for him" (I, 232).

Adam's other, complementary conception of Amerigo is that of "a pure and perfect crystal" (I, 138). Once again it is the perfection of form and finish that is suggested by this image. Adam is to discover, however, that Amerigo is not as transparent as the crystal image might lead him suppose; other facets of the "crystal" are later to be revealed. Amerigo's response to Adam's image is indeed proleptic: "I believe that they (crystals) sometimes have cracks and flaws..." (I, 139). Adam, who prides himself on being a connoisseur, does not consider the possibility that his perfect specimen might have hidden flaws.

Having been afforded this access to Adam's inner world, the reader sees a new relevance in Amerigo's being placed, in the opening passage of the novel, amid the spoils of Empire and concrete embodiments of the acquisitive urge of Imperium. He himself is subjected to the same acquisitive urge as epitomised in Adam.

In a rare direct intrusive comment, the narrator deflects attention from consideration of the ramifications of Amerigo's reply and the notion of his "good taste" to point out that "It is his [Adam's] relation to such aspects, however, that now most concerns us, and the bearing of his pleased view of this absence of friction on Amerigo's character as a representative precious object". Adam, like Amerigo
himself, adheres to the "touchstone of taste" which had guided him in his assessment of the Prince. Amerigo is placed in the context of all the other "representative precious object[s]" that had "for a number of years ... so engaged all the faculties of his mind, that the instinct, the particular sharpened appetite of the collector, had fairly served as a basis for his acceptance of the Prince's suit" (I, 140).

A later analogy drawn by Adam between Maggie and a statue or "an image in worn relief round and round a precious vase" (I, 187) again exemplifies his tendency to see people in terms of aesthetic objects. "The trick, [of discerning such analogies] he was n't uncomplacently aware, was mainly of his own mind; it came from his caring for special vases only less than for precious daughters" (I, 188).

In this section dealing with Adam's view of his past and present situation, there is a shift into a more extensive analeptic excursion for the account of Adam's first revelatory experience. Psycho-narration is employed here, as elsewhere, to render hallucinatory moments of insight in which his "vocation" is dramatically revealed to him.

Adam's moment of recognition of his "mission" is ironically placed in the perspective of Keats' Cortes: "His 'peak in Darien' was the sudden hour that had transformed his life, the hour of his perceiving ... that a world was left him to conquer" (I, 141). The ubiquitous and ambivalent light imagery again dramatises this experience: when "the light, in his mind, had so broken", Adam had pledged himself, with the fanatical dedication of the convert, "to rifle the Golden Isles". He recalls how he had thus, "read into his career, in one single magnificent night, the immense meaning it had waited for" (I, 142). The modulation from psycho-narration to narrated monologue in the following extract highlights his arrogant egoism:
The thought was that of the affinity of Genius, or at least of Taste, with something in himself... He was equal somehow with the great seers, the invokers and encouragers of beauty — and he did not after all perhaps dangle so far below the great producers and creators. (I, 141)

His conception of his scheme for Atlantic City is presented in narrated monologue which foregrounds the ironic resonances:

It had not merely, his plan, all the sanctions of civilisation; it was positively civilisation condensed, concrete, consummate, set down by his hands as a house on a rock — a house from whose open doors and windows, open to grateful, to thirsty millions, the higher, the highest knowledge would shine out to bless the land. (I, 145)

The mockingly alliterative "civilisation condensed, concrete, consummate" underscores the absurdity of his pretensions. And the parodic Biblical overtones of "set down ... as a house on a rock"; designed to effect "the release from the bondage of ugliness" (a variation on the Christian release from the bondage of sin) stresses the preposterously Messianic nature of his scheme. Furthermore, just as historical religious crusades were characterised by looting and plunder, so Adam's latter-day cultural crusade has inherently sinister overtones.

In this flashback to Adam's discovery of his mission, when he "read into his career, in one single magnificent night, the immense meaning it had waited for" (I, 142), it emerges that he had realised, with hindsight, that his aesthetic sense had initially been stunted by his sentimental attachment to his wife. His sense of incredulity at his previous benighted state is expressed in narrated monologue: "The futilities, the enormities, the depravities, of decoration and ingenuity, that before his sense was unsealed she had made him think lovely!" (I, 143). This misdirection of his aesthetic sense — or blunting of the touchstone of taste — seems to
appal him more than the tragedy of her early death. Her death indeed is seen only in terms of its effect on his own development: "he even sometimes wondered what would have become of his intelligence... if his wife's influence upon it had n't been, in the strange scheme of things, so promptly removed" (I, 143). Adam seems to feel that the timely removal of this unfortunate impediment to his aesthetic development was in fact providential, liberating him for a higher realm. A series of questions in narrated monologue highlights the egotism which has been so studiously if ironically disavowed in the first part of this chapter. "Would she have led him altogether, attached as he was to her, into the wilderness of mere mistakes? Would she have prevented him from ever scaling his vertiginous Peak?" (I, 143). His attachment to her is seen in retrospect as a millstone round his neck, an instance of youthful folly which would have hampered his subsequent dedication to the only valid touchstone, that of taste.

In view of all these considerations, the claim that "We are no more meant to disapprove of Adam Verver's tycoonery than we are of old Mr Touchett's banking" is clearly not valid. It stems at least partly from the failure to distinguish the voice of the narrator from that of the reflector, and particularly from the thoughts expressed in narrated monologue.

The role of memory as a filtering mechanism has interesting implications in Adam's "backward speculation". As we have seen, his abiding memory of his wife is primarily that of a mere impediment to his development. His most vividly accessible memory, indeed, concerns his "road to Damascus" conversion. "The very finest spring that ever responded to his touch was always there to press - the memory of his freedom as dawning upon him, like a sunrise all pink and silver... some three years after his wife's death" (I, 150). Adam
"could live over again at almost any quiet moment the long process of his introduction to his present interests" (I, 149).

In the amplification of the epiphany briefly referred to earlier, this experience is evoked in terms of the pervasive—and ambivalent—light imagery. In a narrated monologue Adam's idea of enjoying preferential supernatural sponsorship is conflated with that of revelatory insight. He believes that "A wiser hand than he at first knew had kept him hard at acquisition of one sort as a perfect preliminary to acquisition of another", and that "It was the strange scheme of things again: the years of darkness had been needed to render possible the years of light" (I, 144). The device of narrated monologue highlights his perception of a teleological guiding hand in his destiny, nurturing him for his "mission".

The permutations of the light imagery again predominate in the evocation, largely through dissonant psycho-narration, of the hallucinatory vision inspiring Adam to propose to Charlotte. He is moved primarily by a desire to secure Maggie's peace of mind:

Light broke for him at last, indeed, quite as a consequence of the fear of breathing a chill upon this luxuriance of her [Maggie's] spiritual garden. As at a turn of his labyrinth he saw his issue, which opened out so wide, for the minute, that he held his breath with wonder. He was afterwards to recall how just then the autumn night seemed to clear to a view in which the whole place, everything round him, the wide terrace... lay there as under some strange midnight sun. It all met him during these instants as a vast expanse of discovery, a world that looked, so lighted, extraordinarily new... The hallucination, or whatever he might have called it, was brief, but it lasted long enough to leave him gasping. (I, 207)

The illuminating perception giving Adam access to his solution or "remedy" (I, 208) is described in terms reminiscent of his sudden accession of aesthetic
illumination. The eerie hallucinatory quality of Adam's vision suggests an inversion of the value of light, which is usually associated with sudden illuminating insight. The world as lit up by Adam's light takes on a surrealistic quality and can be seen as an emanation of the falsifying imagination associated with the "white curtain". In this state of auto-suggestion, the fulgent flash highlighting Charlotte as a "remedy" could be seen as a travesty of the "coup de foudre" which traditionally strikes the smitten lover. Adam is first and foremost a smitten father:

The sharp point to which all his light converged was that the whole call of his future to him as a father would be in his so managing that Maggie would less and less appear to herself to have forsaken him. And it not only would n't be decently humane, decently possible, not to make this relief easy to her - the idea shone upon him, more than that, as exciting, inspiring, uplifting. (I, 207-08)

Here psycho-narration modulates to narrated monologue in the second sentence, highlighting the repertoire of self-deceiving stratagems that Adam employs to convince himself of the transcendent rectitude of his "idea". The awkward succession of negatives and the ironic repetition of "decent" suggests the process of elaborate rationalisation and reinforces the impression of slippery logic justifying his decision. The conventional connotations of the term "decent" are once again subverted here; his process of self-deception entails ignoring the indecency of treating Charlotte as a means to an end - that of securing his daughter's peace of mind.

Adam's reification of Charlotte is foregrounded by the way in which his proposal of marriage coincides with his purchase of a set of precious Damascene tiles. In each case
It was all at bottom in him, the aesthetic principle, planted where it could burn with a cold, still flame; where it fed almost wholly on the material directly involved, on the idea (followed by appropriation) of plastic beauty, of the thing visibly perfect in its kind. (I, 197)

Like Osmond in The Portrait, Adam instrumentalises his prospective wife by seeing her "in the chill of his egotism and in the light of her use" to himself and his daughter. Charlotte, "by becoming for him a domestic resource had become for him practically a new person" (I, 201).

Access to Adam's inner world — and specifically to the images in terms of which he conceives of his "idea" — reveals that marriage, to him, is a magnificent form dedicated to the Ververs' interests. Proceeding with "the deliberation of a plan" (I, 211) he envelopes his scheme in a romantic aura, and, like Osmond, endeavours to play the conventional role of romantic lover; he successfully deludes himself that he had always been captivated by her charms, even rising to admiration of "Her extraordinarily fine eyes, as it was his present theory that he had always thought them" (I, 230). Here the sly innuendo points to his self-justificatory rationalisation or pseudo-romantic indulgence.

By being privy to Adam's conception of his marriage, the reader realises that it is basically a marriage of convenience — but one where the desired convenience is primarily that of a third person, the daughter of the aspirant spouse. For Adam, of course, this is seen as justification, although his view of Maggie as essentially an extension of himself merely makes his attitude that of egoism at one remove — or egotism in a more rarefied form.

Ironically, Adam finds satisfaction in the rationality of his "majestic scheme" (I, 210). In a narrated monologue, his thought on this topic is expressed in a series of balanced antitheses reminiscent
of Amerigo's mode of deliberation: "He was acting — it kept coming back to that — not in the dark, but in the high golden morning; not in precipitation, flurry, fever, dangers these of the path of passion properly so called, but with the deliberation of a plan" (I, 211).

The glow of the "high golden morning" is later linked to — or displaced by — the "red glow" (I, 216) accompanying "the burning of his ships" (I, 160). Adam seems somehow oblivious to the connotations of danger. Although he sees "the sacrifice of his vessels" (I, 218) as irrevocable, he does not register the implicit sense of disaster. On the contrary, "the fine pink glow, projected forward, of his ships, behind him, definitely blazing and crackling — this quantity was to push him harder than any word of her own could warn him" (I, 221).

By a process of mental attrition, Adam gradually persuades Charlotte to see things his way, to "make Maggie right" (I, 226). Ironically, this phrase recalls the authorial comment made after the apparently successful consummation of the marriage between Maggie and Amerigo, when Maggie and Adam discuss their fortunate state at Fawns: "might n't the moment possibly count for them — or count at least for us while we watch them with their fate all before them — as the dawn of the discovery that it does n't always meet all contingencies to be right?" (I, 167).

Adam, of course, has no way of knowing that Charlotte, who is by no means a starry-eyed romantic, could be accused of a culpable complicity in going along with his idea of a marriage of convenience as a way of securing a more advantageous "state" — and permanent proximity to the Prince.

In Volume II, access to Adam's consciousness is restricted to Maggie's projection of his thoughts, feelings and attitudes. Maggie's consciousness assumes centrality in the second volume as she undergoes her "process of vision".
II: MAGGIE VERVER: "THE EXTRAORDINARY SUBSTITUTE FOR PERCEPTION"

In Volume I, the portrayal of Maggie is accomplished largely through "her suitor's and her husband's exhibitory vision of her" (AN, p. 330) complemented by the "exhibitory" views of Adam, Charlotte and the Assinghams. All are aware, to varying degrees, of the limitations of Maggie's romantic view of life, of her tendency to shy away from unpleasant knowledge and her seeming inability to acknowledge the existence of the darker recesses of human nature. Charlotte's view of Maggie as a "special case" irremediably steeped in ignorance and innocence is corroborated by Fanny when she tells Bob that "There are things that no-one could tell Maggie .... She was n't born to know evil. She must never know it" (I, 78). One is reminded of Little Bliham's words to Strether in The Ambassadors: "You're not a person to whom it's easy to tell things you don't want to know" (I, 202).

By the end of Volume I, Fanny has modified her view to express the conviction that "Her [Maggie's] sense will have to open ... to what's called Evil - with a very big E .... To the harsh bewildering breath, the daily chilling breath of it" (I, 384-85).

Fanny also provides a "scenario" of subsequent developments - anticipating Maggie's awakening to "Evil" and her "taking it all on herself" so as to protect her father and preserve the marriages; Volume II, where much of the action is refracted through Maggie's consciousness, represents a shift from Fanny's "scenario" to Maggie's "drama of consciousness".

In one of Amerigo's narrated monologues we find that he too is profoundly frustrated by
Like Fanny and Charlotte, he is struck by the fact that "her imagination was clearly never ruffled by the sense of any anomaly" (I, 334) in him "'go[ing] about' at such a rate with such a person as Mrs. Verver in a state of childlike innocence, the state of our primitive parents before the Fall" (I, 335). In Volume II, Maggie's imagination is at last "ruffled", and through access to her consciousness we can examine the forms in which this "ruffling" is expressed as she undergoes her "awakening". This is the central focus of the second volume.

One of the crucial questions in the portrayal of Maggie's awakening to consciousness is that concerning the extent of her insight. Does she attain complete understanding or is she still purblind with regard to Adam, refusing to acknowledge his defects, even to herself? Careful consideration of the terms (and specifically images) in which she conceives of him and his relations to others, particularly Charlotte, provides invaluable clues to the nature and extent of her insight.

As the ramifications of the ironic dimension of narrated monologue have been fully examined in the preceding discussion of the other characters, and as irony is interfused with greater subtlety and complexity here, rarely taking the more overt forms of rationalisation and self-deceit, this examination of the portrayal of Maggie's consciousness will concentrate on, firstly, the phenomenon of "imagined discourse", and secondly, the imagistic mode in psycho-narration and narrated monologue.

The composing power of the consciousness or creative imagination is primarily manifested, as has been seen, in the capacity to "image" experience. However, another
important aspect of the activity of the creative imagination is its capacity to project the unvoiced discourse of an interlocutor. This feature — the ability to conjure up in imagination what I have called "imputed monologue" or "hypothetical discourse" — is another significant aspect of cognitive activity and complements that of imagistic representation.

Before moving to an examination of imagistic representation I propose to look more closely at this phenomenon of imagined discourse and specifically "imputed monologue."

II. i: "Imagined discourse"/"Imputed monologue"

An important contrast between the two volumes lies in the preponderance of imagined monologues or dialogues in Volume II as opposed to the dramatically enacted dialogues in Volume I.

Extended passages of imagined discourse abound in Volume II and represent Maggie's endeavour to "get into the skin" of the other characters (AN, p. 37). Unlike Charlotte, who admits to Amerigo that "I can't put myself into Maggie's skin — ... It's not my fit. I shouldn't be able, as I see it, to breathe in it" (I, 311), Maggie attempts to make imaginative excursions into the "skin", or more specifically the inner world, of others; this is achieved in part by "translating" or giving verbal formulation to their unexpressed thoughts.

This activity is reminiscent of James's own description of the endeavour of the creative artist; he writes of "the intensity of the creative effort to get into the skin of the creature, the act of personal possession of one being by another at its completest" (AN, p. 37). Cohn comments that "This espousal of a character by his narrator 'at its completest' is precisely what James attains in moments when he uses the
narrated monologue" (p. 115). By the same token, it could be said that imputed monologue or imagined discourse is the stylistic device which represents the most complete identification of the reflector with another character in the novel, by the most far-reaching kind of vicarious participation in their experience. The reflector could thus be seen as superseding the narrator through the device of imputed discourse as [s]he overcomes the "opacity" of other minds and attributes thoughts to them - an act which is traditionally the function of the narrator.

This activity is exemplified in Maggie; acting in fidelity to her belief that "One must always, whether or no, have some imagination of the states of others" (II, 258), Maggie projects herself into the state of mind of others so that she can adopt their perspective. Her capacity to look "with Charlotte's grave eyes" (II, 283), for example, is manifested in her ability to project or deduce Charlotte's thoughts, to think, vicariously, with her troubled mind.

The first significant instance of imagined discourse occurs on the Prince's return from Matcham, when Maggie, departing from custom by awaiting his return at Portland Place, attempts to convey by mute communication what she cannot put into words (see earlier discussion of this passage). As there is initially no indication that this is not a passage of quoted monologue, it is only at the conclusion of this "discourse" that one discovers that it is not a direct quotation of her thoughts but an approximation rendered by the narrator: "Some such words as those were what did n't ring out" (II, 18).

In other instances, it is more unambiguously Maggie herself who renders in verbal form an impression based on the "language of the eyes", gestures, facial expression or "body language". We find, for example,
It was as if he might for a moment be going to say: 
"You needn't pretend, dearest, quite so hard, 
needn't think it necessary to care quite so much!" 
-- it was as if he stood there before her with ... 
some such intimate reassurance, on his lips. Her 
answer would have been all ready -- that she was n't 
in the least pretending.... (II, 27)

Here Amerigo's imagined speech or thought is 
counterpointed with Maggie's formulated but unvoiced 
speech.

In another scene, Maggie "translates" into verbal form 
what she imagines Charlotte is conveying in response to 
Maggie's repeated reassuring comments on the smooth 
accommodating "benevolence" of the Verver spouses:

"But, my poor child," Charlotte might under this 
pressure have been on the point of replying, "that's 
the way nice people are, all round, so that why 
should one be surprised about it? We're all nice 
together -- as why should n't we be?" (II, 40)

Here Maggie's projection of Charlotte's thought in 
the form of a rhetorical question -- and her ironic 
repetition of the seemingly bland word "nice" -- indicates 
that she is subconsciously registering what her conscious 
mind is reluctant fully to acknowledge.

Maggie's rendering, in imagination, of Charlotte's 
mute communication takes on ever greater intensity in 
the course of the novel. During the scene where she 
follows Charlotte into the garden, with the purpose of 
further reinforcing the "saving lie" she has proffered 
Charlotte, she imagines the form that Charlotte's 
probable misinterpretation of her motives might take:

... the Princess had the vision of her particular 
alarm. "It's her [Maggie's] lie, it's her lie that 
has mortally disagreed with her; she can keep down 
no longer her rebellion at it, and she has come to 
retract it, to disown it and denounce it -- to give 
me full in my face the truth instead." This for a 
concentrated instant Maggie felt her helplessly gasp 
-- but only to let it bring home the indignity, the 
pity of her state. (II, 310)
Through imputed monologue, as through imagistic representation, Maggie can enter imaginatively into the experience of Charlotte's anguished condition. In a protracted excursion into Maggie's consciousness (which is embedded in a dialogue with Fanny) the convergence of the two modes captures the intensity of Maggie's compassionate identification with Charlotte's suffering:

Behind the glass lurked the whole history of the relation she had so flattened her nose against it to penetrate — the glass Mrs. Verver might at this stage have been frantically tapping from within by way of supreme, irresistible entreaty.... She could thus have translated Mrs. Verver's tap against the glass, as I have called it, into fifty forms; could perhaps have translated it most into the form of a reminder that would pierce deep. "You don't know what it is to have been loved and broken with. You have n't been broken with, because in your relation what can there have been, worth speaking of, to break? Ours was everything that a relation could be, filled to the brim with the wine of consciousness." (II, 329)

The image culminating in Maggie's "translation" of her intuitive perception of what lay behind "the glass" recalls a comparable evocation of an impenetrable yet seemingly transparent barrier between the questing self and the object of knowledge in What Maisie Knew. For Maisie, "the sharpened sense of spectatorship ... gave her often the odd air of being present at her history in as separate a manner as if she could only get at experience by flattening her nose against a pane of glass" (p. 107). In Maisie's case, it is the ignorance and inexperience of youth, of not being fully "in the picture", which imposes a barrier to understanding. For Maggie, it is simply an inherent aspect of subjectivity, of being restricted, as regards others, to "spectatorship", which entails a concomitant awareness of the barriers to understanding imposed by being confined to one's own consciousness.
Through projections of the creative imagination attempts are made to penetrate the glass, but there is no objective criterion in terms of which to ascertain the accuracy of these projections—no narratorial corroboration of the reflector's insights. The narrator "records" Maggie's "translation"—one of many possibilities, and perhaps invested with no more validity than any other.

In this imputed monologue, Maggie ascribes to Charlotte views which in fact reflect her own growing awareness of the initial poverty of her relation with her husband. In projecting onto Charlotte this mordant criticism of the relationship between herself and Amerigo, imputing this consciousness to her rival (and, ironically, echoing Fanny's assertion that she and Amerigo had never really known each other), Maggie evinces a new clarity of insight.

The device of hypothetical or imagined discourse is deployed in Maggie's relations with Adam and Amerigo as well as Charlotte. With Adam, it sometimes takes the form of a protracted imaginary dialogue, as in the following passage. Here Maggie's narrated monologue modulates into imagined speech (imputed to Adam): "...as if he had said to her, in default of her breaking silence first: "Everything is remarkably pleasant, isn't it?—but where for it after all, are we?" This is followed by a shift back to narrated monologue for Maggie's consciousness that "The equilibrium, the precious condition, lasted in spite of rearrangement" (II, 73). Later, we have Maggie's (instead of Adam's) unuttered speech: "She would have been all ready to say to him, "Yes, this is by every appearance the best time we've had yet; but don't you see, all the same, how they must be working together for it ...?" (II, 73-74). In a narrated monologue which incorporates imagined speeches emanating from both herself and Adam, Maggie then wonders
For how could she say as much as that without saying a great deal more? Without saying "They'll do everything in the world that suits us, save only one thing—prescribe a line for us that would make them separate." How could she so much as imagine herself even faintly murmuring that without putting into his mouth the very words that would have made her quail? "Separate, my dear? Do you want them to separate? Then you want us to—you and me? For how can the one separation take place without the other?" That was the question that in spirit she had heard him ask.... (II, 74)

In most instances it is clear that Maggie is formulating thoughts on Adam's behalf—or intuitively grasping what he might be trying to convey, and imagining what her response might be, as in, for example, "it would be open to her to retort to his possible 'What are your reasons, my dear?'" However, she at times drops the qualification "possible", that is, the recognition that his thought is rendered as construed by herself:

.... she knew already she was keeping her head. She had kept it by the warning of his eyes; she should not lose it again; she knew how and why, and if she had turned cold this was precisely what helped her. He had said to himself, "She'll break down and name Amerigo; she'll say it's to him she's sacrificing me; and it's by what that will give me ... that my suspicion will be clinched." (II, 268)

In this instance, imputed monologue comes closest to quoted monologue: quoted monologue is ascribed by a narrator to a specific character, and here the reflector virtually assumes the role of narrator by authoritatively attributing certain unvoiced reflections to another character.

The context here—the imputed monologue is embedded in a passage of narrated monologue—helps to establish that the monologue is indeed assigned by the reflector rather than the narrator. Out of context, it could be taken as quoted monologue. This could be taken as a more complex instantiation of "stylistic contagion".
Near the end of the novel, Maggie's translation of Adam's "mute facial intimations" when observing Charlotte acting as "cicerone" are complemented by her interpretation of Fanny's "mute appeal" (II, 291): 'You understand, don't you, that if she did n't do this there would be no knowing what she might do?' This light Mrs. Assingham richly launched ..." (II, 291).

Maggie's response to Charlotte's penitential activity is very different from the attitude of vindictive triumph suggested by her translation of the imaginary discourse which she ascribes to Adam: "yes, you see, I lead her now by her neck ..." (II, 287). It is impossible to verify whether what Maggie hears "in the mind's ear" is also detected by Adam. At times it seems to be indicated that he does share her compassionate anguish:

The high voice went on; its quaver was doubtless for conscious ears only, but there were verily thirty seconds during which it sounded, for our young woman, like the shriek of a soul in pain.... Maggie felt herself the next thing turn with a start to her father. "Can't she be stopped? Has n't she done it enough?" - some such question as that she let herself ask him to suppose in her. Then it was that, half across the gallery ... he struck her as confessing, with strange tears in his own eyes, to sharp identity of emotion. "Poor thing, poor thing" - it reached straight - "is n't she, for one's credit, on the swagger?" After which, as held thus together they had still another strained moment, the shame, the pity, the better knowledge, the smothered protest, the divined anguish even, so overcame him that, blushing to his eyes, he turned short away. (II, 292)

According to Maggie's interpretation, Adam does share her "conscious ears" and can discern "in the mind's ear" the unvoiced pain Charlotte is expressing. But as the interpretation of Adam's emotion - "shame, pity ... protest ... anguish" - is that of the reflector rather than the narrator, it is difficult to establish with any certainty what his emotions are. It has been suggested
that "her need to believe that Adam is both in control yet capable of genuine sympathy has caused her to exaggerate his commiseration with his wife".\footnote{5} Perhaps Maggie's attribution of these feelings to Adam is indeed unjustified; in this instance, suppositious discourse could be tinged with the supposititious. (This question of the implications of the inherent ambiguity in figural narration will be explored more fully later in the discussion of imagistic representation.)

The device of imagined discourse is most in evidence in the portrayal of Maggie's endeavours to fathom the depths of both her father's and her husband's understanding. When it is initially unsignalled it enhances the ambiguity as to what exactly is expressed and what left unvoiced, as in the following extract:

> From hour to hour she fairly expected some sign of his [Amerigo's] having decided on a jump. "Ah yes, it has been as you think; I've strayed away, I've fancied myself free, given myself in other quantities, with larger generosities, because I thought you were different – different from what I now see. But it was only, only because I didn't know – and you must admit that you gave me scarce reason enough. Reason enough, I mean, to keep clear of my mistake; to which I confess, for which I'll do exquisite penance, which you can help me now, I too beautifully feel, to get completely over."
>
> That was what, while she watched herself, she potentially heard him bring out. (II, 141)

What this imagined discourse also "brings out" is Maggie's own acknowledgement of her culpability: those commentators who find Maggie implausibly good or impossibly blind could find indications in these hypothetical speeches that Maggie does indeed accept some share of the blame, even if ostensibly obliquely, by attributing insights such as the above to another. The reader, having had access to the Prince's version in Volume I, is in a position to compare these insights with how things stand in the Prince's book and can establish
that her intuitive understanding is indeed close to the truth.

Imagined or potential discourse such as this marks stages in Maggie's cognitive progress, as she demonstrates that she is now becoming "accessible to knowledge" and capable of an accurate projection of Amerigo's feelings and motives.

In the scene depicting the aftermath of the smashing of the golden bowl, Maggie, far from gloating triumphantly over the Prince and enjoying his discomfiture, desires to spare him the pain and humiliation of its incriminating disclosures. She turns away from him to avoid exposure to his distressed expression, and, unable to convey her sentiments verbally, hears "in her mind's ear" what she wants to communicate. This then is an unvoiced rather than an imagined speech, but cannot be classified as conventional quoted monologue as it is silently addressed to another.

She wanted to say to him "Take it [time], take it, take all you need of it; arrange yourself so as to suffer least, or to be at any rate least distorted and disfigured. Only see, see that I see, and make up your mind on this new basis..." (II, 184)

In a more complex manifestation of this subliminal communication, Maggie attributes to the Prince an awareness of what she is trying to convey; she invests him with her own ability to read between the lines or hear behind the spoken words:

"Yes, look, look," she seemed to see him hear her say even while her sounded words were other — "look, look, both at the truth that still survives in that smashed evidence [of the golden bowl] and at the even more remarkable appearance that I'm not such a fool as you supposed me. Look at the possibility that since I am different there may still be something in it for you — if you're capable of working with me to get that out."... And her uttered words meanwhile were different enough from those he might have inserted between the lines of her already-spoken. (II, 187-88)
What Maggie imagines – and hopes – the Prince is hearing in his "mind's ear", or inserting between her spoken words, is at variance with what is verbally asserted. Her "uttered words" concern themselves only with the factual account of the purchase of the bowl and the subsequent disclosures vouchsafed by the shopkeeper. As this projected discourse is embedded in a passage of narrated monologue, it is clear that "she seemed" implies that she seemed to herself rather than to the narrator.6

This imagined speech complements that quoted above (II, 141): in the latter, the Prince's thoughts are formulated on his behalf by Maggie; in the second extract, she credits him with being able to sound her own thoughts which are generated in response to his (as projected by her). What Dorrit Cohn calls James's "Chinese box" effects (p. 130) takes on new permutations in this complex interlinking network of communication which is achieved through an oblique interchange of consciousness and not through the uttered discourse of the characters.

At times it is unclear whether the interpretation of the unspoken thoughts is that of the narrator or the reflector:

She affected him [Amerigo] as speaking more or less for her father as well, and his eyes might have been trying to hypnotise her into giving him the answer without his asking the question. "Had he [Adam] his idea, and has he now, with you, anything more?" – those were the words he had to hold himself from not speaking and that she would as yet, certainly, do nothing to make easy. (II, 192)

The Prince's quoted question (in this case, a deliberately suppressed imputed communication) appears at first to be in quoted monologue, and hence in the narrator's voice; however, consideration of the context, which is dominated by Maggie's narrated monologue containing speculative observations such as "what stirred
in him ... must have been the impulse ..." (my emphasis) confirms that this is again her own interpretation. Through this kind of stylistic contagion reflector and narrator have become so interfused that the two are, in such passages, virtually indistinguishable.

The last significant imagined discourse between Maggie and Amerigo incorporates once again the notion of gauging from "the language of the eyes" what cannot be verbally communicated:

she had imagined him positively proposing to her a temporary accommodation. It had been but the matter of something in the depths of the eyes he finally fixed upon her, and she had found in it ... the tacitly-offered sketch of a working arrangement. "Leave me my reserve; don't question it — it's all I have, just now, don't you see? so that, if you'll make me the concession of leaving me alone with it for as long a time as I require I promise you something or other, grown under cover of it, even though I don't yet quite make out what, as a return for your patience." She had turned away from him with some such unspoken words as that in her ear, and indeed she had to represent to herself that she had spiritually heard them.... (II, 220-21)

The device of the imputed monologue, apart from functioning as a cognitive aid, appears here to be also a sophisticated self-defence mechanism — part of the strategy whereby Maggie attempts to preserve the equilibrium, the form, of the marriages. Maggie is in effect anticipating the Prince's overt request to her later to "wait" (II, 351) until the departure of Adam and Charlotte before he can offer her "a return for [her] patience". The image of "something grown" which Maggie imputes to Amerigo links up with the image of the flower conjured up later in a narrated monologue, where Maggie feels a sense of potentiality and promise in their altered relationship: "It was like hanging over a garden in the dark; nothing was to be made of the confusion of growing things, but one felt they were folded flowers ..." (II, 295).
As is evident in this and many of the other extracts discussed above, imagined discourse works in conjunction with imagistic representation in facilitating the reflector's cognitive progress. This cognitive function of metaphor in the representation of Maggie's consciousness will be the focus of the last section of this discussion of *The Golden Bowl*.

II. ii: Imagistic Representation in the Portrayal of Maggie's Consciousness

Volume II, "The Princess", opens with an elaborate psycho-analogy conjured up in Maggie's imagination; in an extended passage modulating from psycho-narration to narrated monologue, Maggie conceives of her egregious situation in terms of an exotic pagoda erected in "the garden of her life" (II, 3). The bizarre eidetic image of the pagoda represents the culmination of a series of earlier recognitions and perceptions, vague unformulated misgivings which are now embodied in more specific form.

A narratorial comment confirms that the image is conjured up by Maggie herself in narrated monologue rather than by the narrator in psycho-narration:

> If this image ... may represent our young woman's consciousness of a recent change in her life .... The pagoda in her blooming garden figured the arrangement — how otherwise was it to be named? — by which ... she had been able to marry without breaking, as she liked to put it, with her past. (II, 4-5)

The question Maggie poses herself in narrated monologue reinforces the impression of her groping for understanding by the aid of both imagistic representation and the more logical processes of linguistic "naming". (Indeed, the acquisition of a more highly developed capacity for linguistic manipulation is an important
aspect of Maggie's growing cognitive sophistication.)

By means of a flashback it is later revealed that in terms of this imagistic correlative of her situation, what Maggie sees as her first tentative tap on the surface of the pagoda corresponds to the first of the "small variations and mild manoeuvres" (II, 9) she is to embark upon: her unprecedented decision to disrupt expectations by leaving her father in Eaton Square while she awaited her husband's arrival from Matcham at Portland Place. The faint response elicited to her "tap" represents Amerigo taking note of her change of attitude, of her awakening to new perceptions.

This first important recognition scene is comparable to Isabel's fireside vigil in The Portrait in that in each case the reflector "had a long pause before the fire during which she might have been fixing with intensity her projected vision" (II, 23). In each case the protagonist is assailed by predominantly visual images which present her experience in quasi-pictorial form. This is achieved retrospectively, in "backward speculation": for Maggie,

the whole passage was backwardly there, a great picture hung on the wall of her daily life .... It fell, for retrospect, into a succession of moments that were watchable still; almost in the manner of the different things done during a scene on the stage.... (II, 10-11)

The theatre image is supplemented by that of a string of pearls: "Several of these moments stood out beyond the others, and those she could feel again most, count again like the firm pearls on a string" (II, 11), she frequently returns to in imagination. The implication seems to be that her "later and more analytic consciousness" (II, 20) constantly relives those moments in thought. It is suggested that unlike Isabel, who is depicted in the process of a specific retrospective evocation, Maggie returns repeatedly to these
retrospectively evoked incidents.

This section abounds in images supplementing that of
the pagoda which contribute to portraying Maggie's state
of agitation. Whereas the pagoda is conjured up by
Maggie herself, other comparisons are drawn by the
narrator, as in, for example, "might I so far multiply my
metaphors, I should compare her to the frightened but
clinging young mother of an unlawful child" (II, 7).
This suggests that Maggie is slightly appalled at, yet
protective of and determined to retain, this nascent new
awareness. At times it is unclear whether the image is
Maggie's or the narrator's, as in "she tried to deal with
herself, for a space, only as a silken-coated spaniel who
has scrambled out of a pond and who rattles the water
from his ears" (II, 6-7). At first this appears to be an
image employed by the narrator but later seems to be
Maggie's in the light of her self-protective assertion,
in narrated monologue, that "she had not, so to speak,
fallen in; she had had no accident, and had not got wet",
and in a shift to psycho-narration, "this at any rate was
her pretension" (II, 7).

The imagistic density of this first chapter in
Volume II is considerably higher than in Volume I and
indeed foreshadows the generally greater preponderance of
imagistic representation in "The Princess". Apart from
the images already mentioned, those featuring most
prominently in this chapter and forming part of an
intricate network of iterative images include the
following: imagery concerned with performance – drama and
dancing; military, animal, architectural, sea and light
imagery; images of a key, spring, cup, "family coach",
flower, medallion, "silver tissue" and balance.

As it is impossible to explore all these images
fully, those metaphors which play the most important part
in dramatising Maggie's cognitive progress will now be
more closely examined.
Metaphors of Performance: drama, dancing and the circus

In this first recognition scene Maggie's decision to revert to more active participation in the Verver's social life is expressed in terms of an analogy with resuming activities such as "the proper playing of one's part" or participation in dancing: to her mind, "the case resembled in a manner that of her once-loved dancing, a matter of remembered steps that had grown vague from her ceasing to go to balls. She would go to balls again . . ." (II, 8). This image is amplified by the narrator: "She would have been easily to be figured for us at this occupation; dipping ... into her rich collections and seeing her jewels again a little shyly but all unmistakably glow" (II, 8). Amerigo, we recall, had also thought of Maggie in terms of her resemblance to "a little dancing-girl at rest" (II, 322).

In learning to deploy with greater facility and expertise a whole gamut of social skills (including equivocation, prevarication, and what she calls "humbugging") Maggie is compared to various exponents of the performing arts. "Dancing" can be a public performance, as when Maggie is compared to "some panting dancer of a difficult step who had capered, before the footlights of an empty theatre, to a spectator lounging in a box" (II, 222).

The theatre imagery is often used in conjunction with a whole range of metaphors which suggest playing a specific role. Maggie's role has many permutations as she changes from being a dancer to finding herself elevated to the position of leading lady:

she felt not unlike some young woman of the theatre who, engaged for a minor part in the play and having mastered her cues with anxious effort, should find herself suddenly promoted to leading lady and expected to appear in every act of the five. (II, 208)
This is a development of an image appearing earlier in psycho-narration where Maggie "reminded herself of an actress who had been studying a part and rehearsing it, but who suddenly, on the stage, before the footlights, had begun to improvise, to speak lines not in the text" (II, 33).

Adam's role has been established (by the narrator as opposed to by the character himself) in a telling complementary image:

his position ... [was that of] the back of the stage, of an almost visibly conscious want of affinity with the footlights. He would have figured less than anything the stage-manager or the author of the play, who must occupy the foreground; he might be at the best the financial "backer", watching his interests from the wing .... (I, 169-70)

This complex of imagery heightens the ambiguity of Adam's position in the novel. One is never sure whether as "financial backer" he leaves the management of the "scenario" entirely to Maggie, or whether he is indeed a form of deus ex machina, an éminence grise manipulating everything from the wings. The decision to "transport" Charlotte to America was obviously his own, although the scheme for their separation was first openly mooted by Maggie.

Maggie's dawning awareness of the complicity between Amerigo and Charlotte is also rendered in theatrical imagery. In a narrated monologue, she expresses her realisation that Amerigo "was acting in short on a cue, the cue given him by observation" (II, 39) - Maggie is only later to discover Charlotte's role in giving "cues". (The theatre imagery is also prominent in the card scene which will be examined in detail later).

The qualities suggested by the theatre imagery are closely linked to those evoked by imagery drawn from the circus world. Thus the mental agility and linguistic
dexterity which Maggie is increasingly obliged to develop is also expressed in terms of a comparison with the physical agility displayed by performers in the circus. At the dinner party for the Matcham set, Maggie, in a narrated monologue, considers that

Fanny Assingham might really have been there... like one of the assistants in the ring at the circus, to keep up the pace of the sleek revolving animal on whose back the lady in short spangled skirts should brilliantly caper and posture. (II, 71)

In her acquisition of the flexibility, resilience and supple sense of balance needed in her new role, Maggie is also depicted as an "overworked little trapezist girl" (II, 302). In learning to deploy a more sophisticated repertoire of roles, and to apply what Fanny calls "painting", Maggie is in effect learning to don what in "The Beast in the Jungle" is referred to as "a mask painted with a social simper" (p. 82). She is thus associated with Isabel Archer who had learnt to emulate Madame Merle in having recourse to wearing a mask; we recall too Eugenia (in The Europeans) who understood the advisability of being equipped with "a copious provision of the element of costume" which facilitates adaptability of manner. Role-playing, however, is not seen as synonymous with the meretricious and duplicitous. A consciously adopted role, Maggie discovers, can allow hitherto submerged aspects of the personality to assume useful prominence and can thus be a valuable means of self-discovery and self-preservation.

One of the significant aspects of role-playing, Maggie finds, is the acquisition of linguistic virtuosity. Successful role-playing demands not only flexibility of social manner and the use of costume as disguise, but it extends even further to the use of language itself as the most sophisticated form of camouflage. Linguistic dexterity is an important asset in the tangle of personal relationships making up the
social jungle. Through her new awareness of discrepancies between appearance and reality, and between the overtly expressed and the suppressed, Maggie learns that she can, by dexterous linguistic manipulation, exploit this discrepancy to her own advantage. She develops the ability to create convenient fictions or sustaining illusions as a means of adapting to or trying to control a difficult situation. Maggie, like Isabel, when disabused of her illusion that one can judge by appearances, learns to manipulate appearances. By the same token, when she perceives the depths of deceit lurking behind seemingly sincere words, she learns to exploit the potential of language as a weapon for deliberate obfuscation. Maggie joins the ranks of the sophisticated ("lions") who appreciate the value of sophistry as a finely honed social weapon. This idea is further developed through the military imagery.

Military Imagery

Military imagery forms another significant strand of iterative imagery deployed in the presentation of Maggie's cognitive development. In this first recognition scene, a military image suggests her awareness of the seriousness of the manoeuvres she is now indulging in— that life is not to be seen merely as an entertaining game: "this was what was before her, that she was no longer playing with blunt and idle tools, with weapons that did n't cut. There passed across her vision ten times a day the gleam of a bare blade ..." (II, 9). The military metaphors reinforce the idea of Maggie's gradually learning to deploy the weapons of the worldly in her fight for the preservation of her marriage. "There were hours truly when the Princess saw herself as not unarmed for battle if battle might only take place without spectators" (II, 106); she is described as having
"taken the field" (II, 35), being "under arms", (II, 158) and as a "small erect commander of a siege" (II, 214). She perceives her relations with Charlotte in terms of a military campaign, seeing her "mounting guard ... seeing her always on the rampart ... march to and fro" (II, 143-44); in her confrontation with Charlotte in the garden, "it was like holding a parley with a possible adversary" (II, 311).

**Animal imagery**

The animal imagery provides a good illustration of how a measure of the change taking place in Maggie is given through metaphor. In this recognition scene, predatory images, which usually cluster round Charlotte ("the sylvan head of a huntress" [I, 46]; "the splendid shining supple creature was out of the cage, was at large" (II, 239) are now applied to Maggie. In a narrated monologue, she likens herself to "a timid tigress" in "her little crouching posture" (II, 10). This image suggests that Maggie, though by nature ill-adjusted to jungle morality, is nevertheless learning to acquire the proclivities and strategies of the predatory as she responds to the imperative to save her marriage. The "timid tigress" grows in confidence and assurance of her strength as she learns to unsheath her defensive and offensive powers.

Another recurrent animal image, that of the lamb, first occurs in Fanny's ironical description of Amerigo as "a domesticated lamb tied up with pink ribbon" (I, 161). Maggie employs the same image when imagining what Adam is attempting to convey to her in an imputed speech: he seems, to her mind, to be "like some precious spotless exceptionally intelligent lamb [bleating] "Sacrifice me, my own love, do sacrifice me ... !" (II, 82-83). The idea of the inversion of roles is reinforced by the implicit analogy with the threatened sacrifice of the
offspring by the parent (Isaac by Abraham) as Maggie asks herself "if it were n't thinkable, from the perfectly practical point of view, that she should simply sacrifice him" (II, 82).

This in turn gives rise to the crucial image of the scapegoat, the "pharmakos", which is the role Maggie later sees herself as assuming. By encouraging Adam to go "into exile" with Charlotte, Maggie is in a sense to "sacrifice" him. (This issue will be further explored in the discussion of another significant recognition scene, that of the card game.)

Maggie herself is by implication seen in terms of the image of the lamb in Fanny's pronouncement that "no imagination's so lively, once it's started, as that of really agitated lambs. Lions are nothing to them, for lions are sophisticated, are blasés, are brought up from the start to prowling and mauling" (II, 128). Maggie, as a "really agitated lamb", demonstrates her "lively imagination" both in her method of coming to grips with the epistemological and ethical problems inherent in her situation and in the strategies she devises for coping.

In a further elaboration of the animal metaphor, Maggie conceives of both Charlotte and Amerigo as being in different ways "caged". Charlotte is imprisoned in the cage of ignorance forged by Amerigo and Maggie's refusal to enlighten her as to the extent of their own knowledge. Charlotte is increasingly tormented by her lack of knowledge, "cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd, bound in/To saucy doubts and fears", as she is incarcerated in "the cage [of] the deluded condition" (II, 229).

For Maggie, Amerigo too "struck her as caged" (II, 338) during his time of voluntary sequestration from her. She perceives that his is a state of penitential confinement; in a narrated monologue she expresses the view that "There was a difference ... between his captivity and Charlotte's — the difference, as it might be, of his lurking there by his own act and his own
choice" (II, 338); Maggie sees that Amerigo's "captivity" is a temporary self-imposed expiatory state undertaken in preparation for his later re-establishment of his relationship with her on a different basis.

Architectural imagery

Variations on the architectural imagery also occur in this recognition scene and recur throughout the novel. By contrast with the metaphor of the stately pagoda at the beginning of this scene, the image depicting Maggie's awareness of her previous instinctive postponement of analysis of her situation is one of apparently trivial domestic mismanagement or inefficiency: the image of a higgledy-piggledy lumber-room. Her procrastination or suppression of recognitions is depicted in terms of tossing awkward objects into a kind of mental store-room:

her accumulations of the unanswered ... were there ... they were like a roomful of confused objects, never as yet "sorted", which for some time now she had been passing and re-passing, along the corridor of her life.... So it was that she was getting things out of the way.... What she should never know about Charlotte's thought - she tossed that in. (II, 14-15) 11

When Maggie does at last undertake the mental spring-cleaning involved in sorting out "the accumulations of the unanswered" she subjects these unanswered questions to searching scrutiny. The image of domestic bustle reappears in a new guise to dramatise this process:

Ah when she began to recover piece by piece the process became lively; she might have been picking small shining diamonds out of the sweepings of her ordered house. She bent, in this pursuit, over her dust-bin; she challenged to the last grain the refuse of her innocent economy. (II, 42)
In her process of "recover[ing], piece by piece", her stored-away questions and impressions, she lights upon a telling perception that she had temporarily thrust aside, that of the expression of embarrassment on Amerigo's face on his return from Matcham. His reassuring reception had subsequently disposed of her misgivings, but, in a variation of the architectural image (again in its more domestic mode): "the prime impression had remained, in the manner of a spying servant, on the other side of the barred threshold; a witness availing himself in time of the lightest pretext to re-enter" (II, 43).

Analysis of this prior impression now aids Maggie in her discovery of the complicity between Amerigo and Charlotte. The architectural image takes on more menacing overtones in Maggie's realisation, in a narrated monologue, that

They had built her in with their purpose – which was why, above her, a vault seemed more heavily to arch; so that she sat there in the solid chamber of her helplessness as in a bath of benevolence artfully prepared for her, over the brim of which she could but just manage to see by stretching her neck. (II, 43-44)

This image of claustrophobic confinement and curtailed liberty is a development of an earlier perception: "it now arched over the Princess's head like a vault of bold span that important communication between them [Amerigo and Charlotte] could n't have failed of being immediate" (II, 42).

The realisation of the complicity between Amerigo and Charlotte and her concomitant exclusion takes on new permutations in Maggie's image of the "bath of benevolence", with its connotations of being immersed in a soothing, protective, all-enveloping but stifling medium. This image succinctly conveys Maggie's feeling that she is being treated as a special case – if not
positively moronic, at least suffering a degree of mental 
retardation and thus in need of benevolent protection 
(for her own good).

In a continuation of her narrated monologue, the 
arrestical image is employed in conjunction with that 
of the cage to reinforce her sense of entrapment: "She 
had flapped her little wings as a symbol of desired 
flight, not merely as a plea for a more gilded cage and 
an extra allowance of lumps of sugar" (II, 44).

Maggie's image of the "bath of benevolence" 
contrasts with the sea imagery with its connotations of 
freedom of movement and possibilities of exploring an 
unlimited expanse; it also recalls the Prince's image of 
luxuriating (rather than being confined) in the Ververs' 
aureate aromatic bath. Later, near the end of the novel, 
Maggie conceives of the situation in which they are all 
embroiled in terms recalling both the image of the bath 
and architectural imagery, employed now in conjunction 
with that of the circus. She sees that the Verver party 
at Fawns are taking refuge in the "forms" of harmonious 
sociability and preserving appearances:

Maggie grew to think again of this large element of 
"company" as of a kind of renewed water-supply for 
the tank in which, like a party of panting goldfish, 
they kept afloat .... They learned fairly to live in 
the perfunctory; ... it took on finally the likeness 
of some spacious chamber in a haunted house, a great 
overarched and overglazed rotunda where gaiety might 
reign, but the doors of which opened into sinister 
circular passages .... here they closed numerous 
doors carefully behind them - all save the door that 
connected the place, as by a straight tented 
corridor, with the outer world, and, encouraging 
thus the irruption of society, imitated the aperture 
through which the bedizened performers of the circus 
are poured into the ring. (II, 288-89)

Maggie's growing awareness of the precarious nature 
of human relationships and the relatively small area of 
conquered security in which one can live and move and 
have one's being is conveyed in this complex of imagery.
She perceives that they are all enclosed together, under the protection of "the perfunctory", suppressing acknowledgement of the darker depths of their relations: instead of enjoying the intimacy of their domestic circle, as before, they rely on fresh supplies of "company" to dilute the intensity and provide lubrication for their potentially abrasive proximity.¹²

Permutations of the architectural imagery illustrate the many facets of Maggie's cognitive activity which ranges from vividly imagistic representation of her situation in elaborate psycho-analogies (the pagoda, for example) to meticulous analysis of domestic "debris" to pick up clues.

Threats to her cognitive progress are at times conveyed through sea imagery, which, as has been seen, is also employed, usually in psycho-narration, to evoke subliminal areas of experience such as erotic passion. Like the light imagery, the sea imagery is often charged with ambiguity.

**Sea Imagery**

The sea imagery often conveys Maggie's experience of the warm reassurance generated by Amerigo's displays of physical passion. On Amerigo's return from Matcham, her initial misgivings are dispelled by his "holding out his arms" and "It was for hours and hours later on as if she had somehow been lifted aloft, were floated and carried on some warm high tide beneath which stumbling blocks had sunk out of sight" (II, 24-25). Here the water imagery obliquely links Amerigo's conduct to the "treatment" associated with "the bath of benevolence", a policy designed to allay her suspicions.

When analysing, in retrospect, the scene of Amerigo's return, Maggie realises that her initial suspicions had been stifled by the experience of passion
and the "plenitude of his presence" (II, 42): "the warmly-washing wave had travelled far up the strand. She had subsequently lived ... under the dizzying smothering welter – positively in submarine depths where everything came to her through walls of emerald and mother-of-pearl" (II, 43).

Maggie gradually becomes conscious of the threat posed by Amerigo's "sovereign personal power" (II, 139), his ability to reduce her to "passive pulp" as he uses his sexual magnetism as a substitute for more exacting modes of communication: "the act operated with him instead of the words he had n't uttered – operated in his view as probably better than any words, as always better in fact at any time than anything" (II, 29). Maggie's process of attaining insight is under threat; her intuitively registered doubts are subtly deflected as she feels herself "held ... and as she could but too intimately feel, exquisitely solicited ... she was in his exerted grasp". This is clearly a form of sexual manipulation:

what her husband's grasp really meant ... was that she should give it up: it was exactly for this that he had resorted to unfailing magic. He knew how to resort to it .... To this [capitulation] every throb of her consciousness prompted her – every throb, that is, but one, the throb of her deeper need to know where she "really" was. (II, 56-57)

Maggie clings courageously to her need to "know where she was going. Knowledge, knowledge, was a fascination as well as a fear" (II, 140).

Paradoxically, the sea image recurs to portray the sudden access of insight with which Maggie becomes aware of Amerigo and Charlotte's complicity. In a narrated monologue she expresses her realisation that "Ah! Amerigo and Charlotte were arranged together, but she – to confine the matter only to herself – was arranged apart", and then the sea imagery is incorporated in the shift to
psycho-narration: "It rushed over her, the full sense of all this, with quite another rush from that of the breaking wave of ten days before" (II, 45). Here, the image of the sea as representing in this context the overwhelming onrush of insight displaces the sea of erotic passion.

Maggie also experiences knowledge in the form of a rushing torrent when she achieves an access of insight into her father's motives for marrying Charlotte: she feels the impact of "the confounding, the overwhelming wave of the knowledge of his reason. 'He did it for me, he did it for me..." (II, 81). She then feels "the wonderments involved in these recognitions flash at her with their customary effect of making her blink" as though to clear her vision.

As illustrated in this extract, insights are often conveyed through a conjunction of different images; in this instance, metaphors concerning the sea and light.

Light Imagery

A short while after her fireside vigil, when Maggie has had the opportunity to observe Amerigo and Charlotte together, she attains new insight which is corroborated by the revived memory of Amerigo's expression on his return from Matcham:

[This] prompted in Maggie a final reflexion, a reflexion out of the heart of which a light flashed for her like a great flower grown in a night. As soon as this light had spread a little it produced in some quarters a surprising distinctness.... The word for it, the word that flashed the light, was that they were treating her, that they were proceeding with her ... by a plan that was the exact counterpart of her own. (II, 41)

As in the case of Adam, Amerigo and Charlotte, the "word" is invested here with revelatory power, but in Maggie's
case the insight yielded seems to be genuine rather than spurious.

During her fireside vigil, when Maggie is pondering the implications of her situation, she is described as "one for whom a strong light has suddenly broken" as she responds to the implications of her image of the "family coach". Maggie "found in this image a repeated challenge" (II, 23-24) which precipitates new insight. In a passage of narrated monologue and psycho-narration, Maggie, in retracing events leading up to the present situation, finds that retrospective illumination now enables her to see her father's marriage in a new light. She perceives with new clarity that she and Adam have shamelessly exploited Charlotte and Amerigo, using them both as a "domestic resource" and being content to have them "living always in harness" (II, 22). This colloquialism is invested with fresh force as it sparks off an important train of imagery in Maggie's mind:

what perhaps most came out in the light of these concatenations was that it had been for all the world as if Charlotte had been "had in", as the servants always said of extra help, because they had thus suffered it to be pointed out to them that if their family coach lumbered and stuck the fault was in its lacking its complement of wheels. Having but three, as they might say, it had wanted another, and what had Charlotte done from the first but begin to act ... ever so smoothly and beautifully, as a fourth? ... She might have been watching the family coach pass and noting that somehow Amerigo and Charlotte were pulling it while she and her father ... were seated inside together ... so that the exertion was all with the others. (II, 23-24)

This elaborate psycho-analogy is comparable with that of the pagoda in that through imagistic representation both the present situation and Maggie's response to it (a tap on the surface of the pagoda, a jump from the coach) are figured:

Maggie found in this image a repeated challenge; again and yet again she paused before the fire:
after which, each time, in the manner of one for whom a strong light has suddenly broken, she gave herself to livelier movement. She had seen herself at last, in the picture she was studying, suddenly jump from the coach. (II, 24)

In this vivid pictorial image Maggie represents to herself that she "had taken a decision" (II, 24). In her "projected vision", her jump from the family coach represents her dissociating herself from their present way of "going about" and instead taking independent action. The insight attained when "the strong light had suddenly broken" is clarified when the "jump" is rendered in more concrete terms. Her plan of action, which "consisted of the light that, suddenly breaking into her restless reverie, had marked the climax of that vigil" (II, 25), entails greater participation and a re-alignment with Amerigo.

Later, having re-established a "community of interest" with Amerigo, Maggie perceives, in a narrated monologue, that "They were together thus, he and she... whereas Charlotte, though rising there radiantly before her, was really off in some darkness of space that would steep her in solitude..." (II, 250). This image takes on even more harrowing overtones in a later narrated monologue inserted in a conversation between Maggie and Adam:

There was his idea, the clearness of which for an instant almost dazzled her. It was a blur of light, in the midst of which she saw Charlotte like some object marked by contrast in blackness, saw her waver in the field of vision, saw her removed, transported, doomed. (II, 271)

Maggie's conception of Adam's "idea" evinces deep compassion for Charlotte. The imagery here, and the repetition of "she saw", provide an ironic parallel with the hallucinatory vision with which Adam had initially conceived of — and justified — his "idea" of using
Charlotte as a "remedy". His new "idea" is to ship her off as she has proved to be a liability rather than a solution.

**Flower imagery**

In another complex of imagery which includes both the light and the flower image, Maggie is depicted as "plucking [her plan] in the garden of thought, as if it had been some full-blown flower that she could present to him on the spot. Well, it was the flower of participation" (II, 26). Later, the realisation that Amerigo and Charlotte were "treating" her is also evoked in terms of this combination of light and flower imagery, as it comes in the form of "a reflection out of the heart of which a light flashed for her like a great flower grown in a night" (II, 41). This "flower" then, has the effect of annulling or blighting her proffered "flower of participation".

The image recalls, ironically, Amerigo's experience at Matcham where "the exquisite day bloomed there like a large fragrant flower that he had only to gather. But it was to Charlotte he wished to make the offering" (I, 355). In the scene where Maggie offers Charlotte her saving fiction - the assurance that she "accused her [Charlotte] of nothing", which later even includes Maggie's taking the blame herself for any problems in Charlotte's marriage - a narrated monologue expresses her view that "she had kept in tune with the right, and something, certainly, something that might be like a rare flower snatched from an impossible ledge, would, and possibly soon, come of it for her" (II, 250). The image here recalls the elusive flower (symbolising happiness) that Roderick attempts to snatch from the "impossible ledge" of the Coliseum for Christina, and that Rowland
plucks from the Alpine ledge for Mary. What was physically enacted in James's early novel, *Roderick Hudson* - a physical effort to snatch a real flower from a dangerous ledge - is transposed to the symbolic plane in his last completed novel. In a modulation of this image in the last scene of the novel, Maggie is to be rewarded with the "golden fruit" (II, 367) of her endeavours.

Maggie's "process of vision", like Isabel's, is accomplished partly through a gradual accretion of insights and partly through a succession of more clearly demarcated recognition scenes. One of the other significant recognition scenes is that of the card game at Matcham which Maggie observes. Here she is exposed successively to the onslaughts of temptation (the temptation to succumb to "the straight vindictive view, the rights of resentment" (II, 236) and "sound out their doom in a single sentence" (II, 233) and then to the "assault" of Charlotte herself.

The fusion of the literal and the figurative in this scene has great dramatic impact, as the iterative image of the card game, reinforcing the idea of life as a battlefield where tactical ability is a determinate factor, takes on new force. Maggie has been conscious for some time that, as experienced in a narrated monologue,

> there was a card she could play, but there was only one, and to play it would be to end the game. She felt herself - as at the small green table, between the tall old silver candlesticks and the neatly arranged counters - her father's playmate and partner; and what it constantly came back to, in her mind, was that for her to ask a question, to raise a doubt, to reflect in any degree on the play of the others, would be to break the charm. (II, 34)

Now that Maggie's suspicions have been confirmed by the disclosures afforded by the golden bowl, the temptation to play the trump card must be even more
insistent. Maggie's prime motive for desisting had been established in a narrated monologue before the purchase of the bowl:

That hideous card [revealing her suspicions to her father] she might in mere logic play — being by this time ... intimately familiar with all the fingered pasteboard in her pack. But she could play it only on the forbidden issue of sacrificing him. (II, 107)

Now, moving from the realm of the figurative to the literal, Maggie finds herself observing a real card game in which the others are participants. She is no longer depicted as Adam's "playmate and partner" — indeed, Adam has scant respect for her "cardmanship", her ability to hold her own when engaged in the game. His own skill is that of the "high adept" (II, 233), just as behind his poker-faced exterior he is a "high adept" at the tactical strategies of life. Maggie is to demonstrate that her mode of understanding and moral action, informed as it is by the sympathetic imagination rather than shrewd intelligence, transcends that of the card sharp mentality.

Various strands of imagery converge in this climactic scene. In the theatre imagery, Maggie is initially depicted as a "tired actress who has the good fortune to be 'off', while her mates are on" (II, 231), but when she moves out on to the terrace and sees the scene framed in the lit window, psycho-narration shifts to narrated monologue as she sees that her companions "might have been figures rehearsing some play of which she herself was the author" (II, 235). Maggie recognises the power and responsibility inhering in her new role; no longer a mere participant, she is responsible for the future scenario of their lives. This perception is analogous to her feeling that she might be conceived of as "holding them in her hand" as they hold their cards.
and she held the pieces of the shattered golden bowl. The potentiality for reconstruction or for destructive dénouement is hers. She looks into the drawing-room lighted also, but empty now, and seeming to speak the more in its own voice of all the possibilities she controlled. Spacious and splendid, like a stage again awaiting a drama, it was a scene she might people, by the press of her spring, either with serenities and decencies and dignities, or with terrors and shames and ruins, things as ugly as those formless fragments of her golden bowl she was trying so hard to pick up. (II, 236)

In this extract narrated perception modulates into narrated monologue to render her interpretation which is animated by imagery drawn from the theatre in conjunction with that of the "spring".

The nature of this crucial recognition scene makes it reminiscent both of Maggie's earlier fireside vigil and of Isabel's "motionlessly seeing" during her midnight meditation. Conceiving of a situation in a visual image, rendering it as a picture or a scene, frames it for more searching scrutiny than would be possible by merely balancing abstract concepts. The greater involvement of the imagination makes possible access to a more profound level of understanding.13

It is while watching her companions ostensibly absorbed in their innocuous pursuit that Maggie is assailed by the temptation to give way to the urge for denunciation and revenge. Maggie successfully withstands the irruption of this destructive impulse to "sound out their doom in a single sentence"; she "faced that blinding light and felt it turn to blackness" (II, 233-34). Here the "blinding light" of the illuminating flash of recognition of her power to avenge herself turns to the blackness of futility as Maggie rejects "the straight vindictive view, the rights of resentment" (II, 236).
As she moves on to the terrace, she carries with her the impression of the appeal emanating from "the four pairs of eyes", the appeal which Maggie interprets as a plea to assume the burden of "the whole complexity of their peril" (II, 234). As Fanny had predicted, she assumes the responsibility to "charge herself with it as the scapegoat of old, of whom she had once seen a terrible picture, had been charged with the sins of the people and had gone forth into the desert to sink under his burden and die" (II, 234).

Although Charlotte can also be seen later as enacting the role of scapegoat (or rather, of having the role thrust upon her) as she is "doomed" to go forth into the "desert" of America, the reader is presumably meant to feel that it is largely in expiation of her own sins that she goes. Maggie, on the other hand, sees herself as assuming the burden of the sins of them all, as subsuming her own "sins" under those of the others.

The temptation depicted here as a "blinding light" is soon after rendered, retrospectively, in terms associating it more closely with the primitive passions. The animal imagery reinforces this. In Maggie's narrated monologue as she moves out of the lighted room into the darkness of the terrace, she feels that "the air was heavy and still ... she ... could get away, in the outer darkness, from that provocation of opportunity which had assaulted her, within[,] on her sofa, as a beast might have leaped at her throat" (II, 235). The subtly ambiguous phrasing here suggests that "the assault ... within" took place not only literally within the house and within the complex of relations in which Maggie is involved, but also — most devastatingly — "within" herself. Maggie, like Amerigo, has to withstand the assault of "dangers from within" (I, 16). (The suppression of the comma after "within", in the New York Edition, blurs the ambiguity here.)
This intense awareness of a latent "other self", "shadow" personality or doppelgänger which would revel in the unleashing of the more destructive passions such as vengeance, "the rages of jealousy, the protests of passion" (II, 236) links Maggie with characters such as Spencer Brydon in "The Jolly Corner", one of several Jamesian characters who are brought to recognition of the darker aspects of their personality.

Having abjured the temptation of denunciation and revenge, Maggie's recognition of her motives for doing so are rendered in the imagistic mode, with visual images predominating:

it was as if the recognition had of itself arrested her — she saw as in a picture, with the temptation she had fled from quite distinct, why it was she had been able to give herself from the first so little to the vulgar heat of her wrong .... [she had rejected] a range of feelings which for many women would have meant so much, but which for her husband's wife, for her father's daughter, figured nothing nearer to experience than a wild eastern caravan, looming into view with crude colours in the sun, fierce pipes in the air, high spears against the sky, all a thrill, a natural joy to mingle with, but turning off short before it reached her and plunging into other defiles. (II, 236-37)

Here it is difficult to determine if and when psycho-narration modulates into narrated monologue. The emphasis on "her husband's wife ..." seems to suggest that Maggie's own thought is being reflected, or that it represents at least an instance of stylistic contagion. Either way, imagistic representation helps to clarify Maggie's reasons for not succumbing to what she sees as the lure of "the wild eastern caravan", which contrasts with the tame domestic familiarity of the "family coach". She feels constrained to conduct herself in a manner befitting the dignity of "her husband's wife ... her father's daughter", and the reader notes that her gradually developing new priorities are reflected in the order in which she mentions these two vital connections.
or restraining obligations. Maggie's initial motive, that of protecting her father from knowledge, has been displaced by her desire to preserve rather than to rend the complex fabric of their connection. (There are, in any case, indications that Maggie intuitively realises that his knowledge probably matches hers.)

Maggie's revelatory encounter with evil is another recognition couched in vividly imagistic terms. It was presaged by Fanny when she told Bob that Maggie's "sense will have to open .... To what's called Evil — with a very big E" (I, 385). However, it is rendered here as an encounter with a concrete presence rather than an abstract entity "with a very big E".

the horror of finding evil seated all at its ease where she had only dreamed of good; the horror of the thing hideously behind, behind so much trusted, so much pretended, nobleness, cleverness, tenderness. It was the first sharp falsity she had known in her life, to touch at all, or be touched by; it had met her like some bad-faced stranger surprised in one of the thick-carpeted corridors of a house of quiet on a Sunday afternoon. (II, 234)

Fanny had spoken of "the harsh, bewildering brush, the daily chilling breath" of contact with evil (I, 385). Here evil is imaged as a sinister presence insidiously pervading the intimacy of tranquil domesticity, "seated, all at its ease" at the dinner table - or the card table. When caught off guard, its presence is manifested as that of a "bad-faced stranger" lurking behind trusted faces in the warm security of the home.15

The animal imagery takes on new resonances when, having withstood "the provocation of opportunity which had assaulted her ... as a beast might have leaped at her throat", Maggie is subsequently obliged to confront Charlotte, who is implicated in the same kind of "assault" by being compared to "a splendid shining supple creature ... out of the cage [and] at large" (II, 239).
Maggie feels the effect of Charlotte's presence as that of "having been thrown on her back ... her helpless face staring up" (II, 242). Nevertheless, Maggie manages to go through with the role she has assumed. She dexterously deploys language as a form of camouflage as she deals in assumed ignorance, verbal evasions and half-truths, creating "saving lies" and proving that she has become as proficient as Charlotte in manipulating one of the most powerful weapons of the worldly. She even tries to compose her features into the appropriate "blank blurred surface" (II, 247) which is commensurate with her former "blurred absent eyes" (I, 187), but finds it difficult to prevent her eyes from revealing a meaning which contradicts her spoken words.

Because the reader is restricted to Maggie's consciousness, it is difficult to determine to what degree Charlotte is taken in by Maggie's performance and to what extent she simply finds it expedient to "believe" Maggie's proffered version of events in which she, Charlotte, is exculpated.

In the course of her "process of vision", as we have seen, Maggie attains insight into Charlotte, Amerigo and Adam. Whereas she at first sees only Amerigo's "public" self and has to learn to understand his private, personal self, in her relations with Adam the opposite process obtains. The light imagery animates the portrayal of her acquisition of new insight into his character: "she saw him during these moments in a light of recognition which ... had never been so intense and so almost admonitory" (II, 273). Adam is seen by his daughter in a new capacity as a "personage", "above and beyond his being her perfect little father". She sees him now as a highly competent, managing, "public" character who has the capacity to succeed in maintaining his marriage as he has succeeded in all his other enterprises — in part, perhaps, through his "rare power of purchase".
By the end of the novel, Maggie has demonstrated her capacity for independent thought and action. Just as she no longer relies on Adam for guidance, so she resists more elevated forms of tutelage as represented by Father Mitchell's offer of assistance. Her attitude is expressed in terms of the cup image. Earlier, the cup image was deployed to depict the possibilities of happiness and passionate fulfilment, as at Matcham where "it passed between them [Amerigo and Charlotte] that their cup was full; which cup their very eyes, holding it fast, carried and steadied and began, as they tasted it, to praise" (I, 356).

The image recurs here with different connotations. Maggie, in an imagined discourse, had attributed to Charlotte the concept of a cup "filled to the brim with the wine of consciousness" (II, 329), an image whose Biblical resonances ("my cup runneth over") link it with that portraying the combined consciousness of Charlotte and Amerigo at Matcham. (Associations with the traditional "loving cup" and, proleptically, with the cup of Christ's betrayal, could also be pertinent here).

The image now takes on new permutations as Maggie conceives of herself in a narrated monologue as "carrying in her weak, stiffened hand a glass filled to the brim, as to which she had recorded a vow that no drop should overflow. She feared the very breath of a better wisdom, the jostle of the higher light, of heavenly help itself" (II, 298). Maggie, in demonstrating that she is indeed eminently "accessible to knowledge", is determined to bear the cup of knowledge without interference and to shun external sources of insight (albeit beneficent and comforting) which entail diminished responsibility. In rejecting all external luminaries Maggie displays her aspiration to do her best according to her own lights, relying only on her own "heroic lucidity".

The nature and extent of Maggie's "heroic lucidity" (and the forms of expression it takes) has been hotly
debated. Two extremes are posited in a study entitled "Maggie Verver: Neither Saint nor Witch". A fair number of critics, succumbing to the temptation of easy oversimplification, do indeed tend to categorize Maggie as either "saint" or "witch". Early proponents of the view that Maggie is a "saintly" embodiment of "innocence outraged" (II, 237) and that Charlotte is guilty of villainous treachery include, for example, R.p. Blackmur, Jacques Barzun and Quentin Anderson. Dorothea Krock and Frederick Crews emphasize the "redemptive" nature of Maggie's love and the importance of Christian imagery conveying this idea.

Also amongst early critics — in the opposing camp — it is held that "Maggie is an all but unmitigated tyrant.... Life terrifies this Machiavellian creature not at all. She manipulates it to her purposes". This view is supported in essence by, inter alia, Maxwell Geismar, Jean Kimball, Leavis, and Matthiessen.

Indeed, Geismar has averred that Maggie is representative of all Jamesian characters, who have a limited range of emotions.... [They are] without the capacity for love, fearful even of friendship as another trap of the human spirit ... controlled only by the yearnings and demands of an immaculate egotism which eschewed all the ordinary solaces, rewards and supports of human existence.

The claim has even been made that the liaison between Charlotte and Amerigo is merely a figment of Maggie's over-active imagination and that "Outside of Maggie's suspicions and accusations, there is no proof that either Charlotte or the Prince have lied about anything". The exponent of this ingenious theory, John Clair, supports the view, attributed to Jean Kimball, that "the illicit alliance is entirely fictive and that Charlotte Stant is the innocent victim of Maggie Verver's viciousness" (The Ironic Dimension in the Fiction of Henry James, p. 80).
A more careful reading of the novel would refute this view of Maggie, and due consideration given to the contents of Maggie's consciousness would confirm that she is indeed capable of a spectrum of emotions ranging from love, friendship and compassion to jealousy and a "selfish" determination to promote her own possibilities for happiness while inflicting the minimum of pain on others; in effect, being "neither saint nor witch" makes her a more plausible character.23

More recent critics, responding from a post-Freudian, post-structuralist perspective, and with different assumptions about the nature of fiction and unitary character, tend to avoid dichotomies such as that of saint/witch, noting instead the complexity of a character who is herself aware that "there was honestly an awful mixture in things" (II, 292). According to Donna Przybylowicz,

James does not perceive the individual as an integrated ego ideal but as prone to ambivalence and self-division. The totalising tendencies and binary oppositions underlying nineteenth-century realistic fiction are dismantled and shown as problematic in this ambiguous world of the fragmented subject.24

Irrespective of one's theoretical framework, interpretation of Maggie's character and motives is dependent on the crucial recognition of the difference between a specific image emanating from the narrator or being generated in the imagination of the character concerned; as Donald Mull observes,

The cruelty of Charlotte's predicament has been seen as the crowning touch in the case for the Ververs' villainy; and surely James — or should we say Maggie? — takes great pains to insure that we shall not miss the extent of Mrs Verver's suffering. For it is Maggie, after all, who is the measure of Charlotte's pain, as in the image of the invisible leash with which she figures Adam's power to control Charlotte. F.O. Mathiessen's [sic] comment that 'James's neglect of the cruelty in such a cord, silken though it be, is nothing short of obscene',


certainly goes far astray. Maggie totally realises the cruelty of the figure, for the figure is of her own making.25

It is clear that the judicious application of Cohn's categories (psycho-narration and narrated monologue) could contribute to a clarification of these issues and obviate misreadings such as that evinced in MacNaughton's claim that "One notes that this halter image is introduced by the narrator, who discerns the new element of somewhat sinister control exercised subtly but unmistakably by Adam" (Henry James: The Later Novels, p. 117-18). On the contrary, the image is indeed conjured up by Maggie herself and thus marks an important stage in her cognitive development — her ability to view her father with a more critical eye.

A certain degree of critical dissension is inevitable, however, as the presentation of Maggie is indubitably fraught with ambiguity. As has been indicated, it is in Maggie's relations with Adam at the conclusion of the novel that ambiguity is most in evidence. Although Maggie is clearly aware of Adam's latent sadism (revealed in the silken halter image), the reader is unsure whether Maggie condemns him sufficiently or even allows her "lucidity" fully to illuminate his defects. What does seem indisputable is that in the course of the novel she indeed manages largely to dissociate herself from his point of view. When, in the parting scene, Adam and Maggie survey the "picture" comprising all the "important pieces" in their lives, it seems clear that although "their eyes moved together" over the scene, the convergence of vision between them is now merely superficial or "perfunctory":

Their eyes moved together from piece to piece, taking in the whole nobleness — quite as if for him to measure the wisdom of old ideas. The two noble persons seated in conversation and at tea fell thus into the splendid effect and the general harmony:
Mrs. Verver and the Prince fairly "placed" themselves, however unwittingly, as high expressions of the kind of human furniture required, aesthetically, by such a scene. The fusion of their presence with the decorative elements, their contribution to the triumph of selection, was complete and admirable; though to a lingering view, a view more penetrating than the occasion really demanded, they also might have figured as concrete attestations of a rare power of purchase. There was much indeed in the tone in which Adam Verver spoke again, and who shall say where his thought stopped? "Le compte y est. You 've got some good things."

(II, 360)

Because Maggie's "telescope has gained in range", as she formulated it in a narrated monologue (II, 207), she now sees further than Adam; it is subtly conveyed that, although ostensibly acquiescing in her father's view, Maggie really dissociates herself from it. This divergence between the perspectives of Maggie and Adam is highlighted by the interpolated phrase, "to a lingering view, a view more penetrating than the occasion really demanded", which implies a bifocal or binary vision and holds the preceding and succeeding sections of the sentence in an interpretive suspension. Thus, when confronted with the view that the Prince and Charlotte "might have figured as concrete attestations of a rare power of purchase", the reader realises that this is so in Adam's eyes, and that Maggie is probably aware of it. She has the insight to perceive that their respective "sposi" represent for Adam "the triumph of selection" and a "rare power of purchase", but that the occasion, which dictated the necessity to preserve "the splendid effect and the general harmony" at all costs, could not stand up to "a more penetrating view": "the occasion, socially and psychologically, also demands the turning of a blind eye". A pose of "bandaged eyes" and blurred vision (II, 182) is thus adopted to avoid probing beneath the surface of achieved harmony and "so complete a conquest of appearances" (II, 233).
The impression of Adam's abiding aestheticism — from the sterility of which Maggie has dissociated herself — is confirmed by what follows the reference to a "rare power of purchase": "There was much indeed in the tone in which Adam Verver spoke again, and who shall say where his thought stopped? 'Le compte y est. You've got some good things'" (II, 360).

The parenthetical question "who shall say where his thought stopped?" could arouse the response "not the narrator, certainly!" No narratorial guidance is afforded to enlighten one as to Adam's feelings or thoughts. The reader is restricted to Maggie's interpretation.

Maggie's reply, "Ah, don't they look well?" is ambiguous on several counts. "They" presumably refers to the amassed "good things" on display, but in the context the term embraces their respective spouses (and specifically, Adam's view of them) who are accorded the same appreciative scrutiny and who attest to "the triumph of selection" on the same level. (This impression is confirmed by talk during the parting scene of the emptiness of a house "with half of its best things removed" (II, 362).) The implication could also be that so long as they (Charlotte and Amerigo) "look" well, their real feelings don't matter; the preservation of appearances has been maintained. The ironic term "human furniture" reinforces the idea that these "representative precious objects" (I, 140) too can be restored, re-polished when their lustre becomes unaesthetically tarnished, and re-arranged in new configurations to preserve the harmonious appearance of the refurbished domestic sanctum.

The serenely harmonious "picture" viewed here indeed seems to vindicate Maggie's decision (dramatised during the card-playing scene where she and Charlotte "side by side ... fixed this picture of quiet harmonies" (II, 243-4)) to eschew exposure and revenge — "terrors and
shames and ruins, things as ugly as those formless fragments of the golden bowl" (II, 236) — and preserve the "serenities and dignities and decencies". The verbal echoes recall too Maggie's intention to make "her care for [Adam's] serenity, or at any rate for the firm outer shell of his dignity, all marvellous enamel, her paramount law" (II, 202-03).

The imagery here alerts us to the fact that in preserving intact the "magnificent form" of the marriages, Maggie is acting in accordance with her aspiration to realise what is represented by "the golden bowl as it was to have been ... the bowl without the crack" (II, 216-17). This suggests perhaps the vestigial romanticism (imaged by the "white curtain" earlier) of a grail-like quest for impossible perfection. The illusory nature of the quest is underscored by the resonances of both Blake's "Can wisdom be kept in a silver rod/Or love in a golden bowl?" and the allusion to the passage in Ecclesiastes suggesting "mortality and evanescent perfection" (MacNaughton, p. 102) — "the silver cord be(ing) loosed, or the golden bowl be(ing) broken". It has also been noted that "the fact that the bowl is a flawed crystal, and the repeated allusions to the perfect simplicity of crystal elsewhere ... may very well have an allusion to the well-known symbolism of [the] great love legend" of Tristan, "whose praise of love's crystalline simplicity James very likely had in view".27 (The conceit of the flawed crystal representing Amerigo might also be pertinent here).

According to another recent critic, "Maggie Verver restores harmony and balance to her world by putting back together a dialogic relation with her husband, which ultimately becomes a triumphant feminine 'utterance'".28 Although this is a valid interpretation, it is followed by the more problematic contention that "The bowl is not a phallic symbol, unlike the ornate pagoda image.... it
is decidedly maternal". This is an irresponsibly simplistic reduction of the complex symbols of pagoda and bowl.

Maggie could also be seen as motivated primarily by the more practical and worldly consideration that the preservation of the form of the marriages is necessary to foster restitution of their substance. "Restitution and new growth will be possible only if feelings are harnessed into shapes, into the articulate elisions of mannered behaviour, mannered language..." (Kenneth Graham, p. 77) — "a brilliant surface — to begin with, at least" (II, 216), as Fanny put it.

Maggie's residual romanticism and her shying away from "a view more penetrating ..." could be seen as being in accordance with the view that "Human kind/Cannot bear very much reality".29 Initiated into as much knowledge as she is capable of "bearing", Maggie finds it imperative to part not only on "Charlotte's 'value'" (II, 365) but on Adam's, to retain the "saving illusion" without which their precariously balanced equilibrium would totter. Just as she has vouchsafed to Charlotte her "saving lie" (thus enabling her to preserve her brazen facade), so she needs to cling to hers.

Ironically, this links Maggie with Charlotte's own admission to Amerigo that "for things I may n't want to know I promise you shall find me stupid" (I, 363). Maggie has demonstrated that she was erroneously classified as "constitutionally inaccessible to knowledge"; but just as Charlotte opts for selective inaccessibility to knowledge by refusing to recognise anything detrimental to her own interests, so Maggie is reluctant to acknowledge flaws in Adam which could damage her faith in him. Perhaps Fanny's observation that "Stupidity pushed to a certain point is, you know, immorality" (I, 88) is apposite here.

An ironic tension between the trivialities that are expressed and the truths that are stifled pervades this
parting scene. In a narrated monologue, Maggie perceives, without overtly acknowledging, "how impossible such a passage would have been, how it would have torn them to pieces, if they had so much as suffered its suppressed relations to peep out of their eyes" (II, 362).

In accordance with the structuring principle of the novel, access is given only to Maggie's consciousness in the last scene. Amerigo's feelings must be gauged from his words, facial expression, gestures and Maggie's response to them. In the representation of Maggie's consciousness, the metaphoric mode is manifested in a convergence of various recurrent strands of imagery. In a narrated monologue, Maggie conceives of her "reward" in terms of the "golden fruit" or "money-bags" to be presented to her on the successful coming to fruition of her plan — or, as the more cynical would say, the triumphant conclusion of her strategy. In a narrated monologue, light imagery — "a sudden blinding light" — in conjunction with that of gamesmanship or gambling dramatises her insight that the form her "reward" is to take is still uncertain: "She had thrown the dice, but his hand was over the cast" (II, 367).

Amerigo's response is a demonstration of unstinting devotion and commitment expressed in his tenderly solicitous gesture — "his whole act enclosing her" and his declaration "I see nothing but you". No longer dependent on Fanny or Charlotte, Amerigo, in response to Maggie's exhortation to "Find out for yourself!" (II, 203) has indeed seen for himself and now understands and appreciates Maggie's real worth — measured not merely in monetary terms. Maggie is intensely moved: "And the truth of it had, with this force ... so strangely lighted his eyes that, as for pity and dread of them, she buried her own in his breast" (II, 369).

It has been suggested that "Maggie buries her head in the Prince's breast ... in knowledge that she has had
to become a predator and he her prey" (Pearson, p. 351). Furthermore, according to Blackmur, "Maggie 'pities' the Prince because she knows that this moment marks his final subjugation to her moral tyranny". By implication, Amerigo is thus seen as having exchanged his "pink ribbon" if not for a silken halter at least for "the steel hoop of an intimacy ..." (II, 141). As a more recent critic, Mark Seltzer, would have it, Maggie's attitude exemplifies "an imperialism of sympathy and care ... what operates on one level as a form of economic and cultural imperialism is discreetly reinvented on another, in the form of Maggie's domestic colonialism".

A different emphasis, which seems to be reinforced by the understanding afforded the reader through being given access to Maggie's inner world, is given by Krook's statement that "the pity and the dread in the last lines may surely be taken to refer to ... the confession and repentance implied in his 'I see nothing but you' (no longer Charlotte but only you, Maggie)" (Krook, p. 318). Maggie has certainly superseded Charlotte in Amerigo's affections (the cliché "having eyes only for her" takes on new relevance here), and his "touchstone of taste" has been largely discredited, but his espousal (literally and figuratively) of a new form of moral consciousness is surely not to be equated so simplistically with "subjugation to moral tyranny". The cynic would probably agree with Bob Assingham that in their world "life [is], for far the greater part, a matter of pecuniary arrangement" (I, 67) but it seems evident that Maggie's securing Amerigo's allegiance represents more than "a rare power of purchase". Maggie and Amerigo should probably be regarded henceforth as "seeing their way together" (II, 30) — as Charlotte and Amerigo had previously done.

Maggie could well echo the words spoken by Kate Croy to Merton Densher at the conclusion of *The Wings of the Dove*: "We shall never be again as we were"; but whereas
Kate's realisation is an expression of despair at their blighted prospects of happiness, the relationship between Amerigo and Maggie, undergoing a comparably drastic transformation, is suffused with hope and promise. In each case the perhaps culpably passive consort has changed his allegiance from the woman subscribing to a code of opportunism and expediency to the one representing a finer moral consciousness.

Maggie represents a new departure for the Jamesian protagonist – she does not emulate earlier disillusioned innocents like Isabel, Catherine Sloper, Milly Theale and Fleda Vetch by opting for resignation or renunciation. Nevertheless, one of the questions besetting some readers seems to be whether Maggie's is a Pyrrhic victory, whether she sacrifices her moral integrity in "stooping to conquer" and employing the weapons of the worldly; the implication in James's last completed novel seems to be, however, that the world cannot be evaded and must be fought with its own weapons. In The Golden Bowl compromise appears finally to be accepted as a viable alternative to the renunciation or stoical resignation espoused by more inveterately idealistic heroines such as Isabel, who feels impelled to return to her sterile marriage.

The reader is thus probably meant to condone Maggie's resorting to "humbugging" and other distortions of the truth which are conventionally regarded as morally reprehensible. As Pearson opines, "The lie in James is sanctified by what it salvages and the disaster it postpones" (The Novel to End All Novels: The Golden Bowl", p. 302). One could say that the purpose for which Maggie perpetrates her "humbugging" transforms it into a form of hallowed hypocrisy. To venture a variation on Blake's aphorism that "A Truth that's told with bad intent/Beats all the lies you can invent", one could say that "A Lie that's told with good intent/Beats all the Truths you can't invent". Harmonious relationships
are in some cases as dependent on a "salvaging lie" as on a "saving truth" (II, 255). Maggie thus attains the insight that, paradoxically, lying can in certain circumstances be seen as a creative and life-enhancing activity. As a representative of "civilised" society, Maggie would seem to illustrate the view that "Civilized society needs fiction, as well as legislation, to make its veiled intersubjective worlds intelligible" (Freadman, p. 176). This would accord with James's own observation that "there are decencies that in the name of the general self-respect we must take for granted, there's a kind of rudimentary intellectual honour to which we must, in the interest of civilisation, at least pretend" (AN, p. 222).

As we have seen, the reader has little direct narratorial guidance on these and other fundamental issues of interpretation. Like the Prince, the reader is enjoined to "find out for [her]/himself!", and probably finds, like Charlotte on receiving the Prince's telegram, that "the message had remained ambiguous; she had read it in more lights than one" (I, 290), or that, as in Maggie's experience, "the intention remained ... subject to varieties of interpretation" (II, 345). The reader has to rely on insights gleaned through exposure to the inner world of the characters; here the subtle deployment in the representation of consciousness of devices such as a complex imagistic mode and hypothetical discourse offer significant guidelines.


4 According to Dorrit Cohn, this "is probably the most direct allusion to the sexual act in [James's] entire oeuvre" (p. 114). I feel, however, that this is too literal an interpretation of James's comment.


6 According to Arlene Young, "the tag ["she seemed to see him hear her say"] indicates that Maggie is the object being interpreted, not the subject doing the interpreting" and that "the words appear to be the narrator's formulation of Maggie's assessment of Amerigo's silent response to her". "Hypothetical Discourse in The Golden Bowl", *American Literature* 61.3 (October 1989): p. 393. On the contrary, as I have suggested, the context, and specifically the recognition that the extract is embedded in a passage of narrated monologue, indicates that Maggie is indeed doing the interpreting.

7 A comparable image occurs in "The Beast in the Jungle", where Marcher is deprived of "the lost stuff of consciousness [which] became for him as a strayed or stolen child to an unappeasable father" (p. 117).

8 James had read and commented on the novels of Dickens, and one could speculate as to whether Dickens's identification of the circus with the suppleness and vitality of the imaginative life in a novel such as *Hard Times* might have influenced James's choice of image here. He was probably also familiar with George Seurat's painting *Le Cirque* (1891), which is virtually a visual embodiment of this image.

10 Macbeth, III, iv, 24.

11 Maggie's proleptic observation - "Yes, it was one of the things she should go down to her grave without having known - how Charlotte ... really thought her stepmother looked" (p. 307) - which is expressed in narrated monologue, makes an interesting comparison with a comparable proleptic comment in The Ambassadors. When Strether is pressed by Maria Gostrey to divulge the identity of the object manufactured at Woollett, the narrator comments "But it may even now frankly be mentioned that he in the sequel never was to tell her" (I, 61). In the latter novel, the proleptic comment emanates from the narrator; here, in The Golden Bowl, it proceeds from the reflector, in narrated monologue. The reader feels that it has the same authority - that Maggie will indeed never know what Charlotte feels about her - which is another indication of the way in which the narrator's insights have been superseded by those of the reflector.

12 This image recalls Maisie's experience of the mysterious insecurity and hidden menace of life: "Everything had something behind it: life was like a long, long corridor with rows of closed doors. She had learned that at these doors it was wise not to knock" (What Maisie Knew, pp. 33-34).

13 This is also evident in The Ambassadors where, in the riverside scene, Strether, "a man of imagination", experiences his situation in strongly visual or pictorial terms and acquires new insight, also undergoing a modification of earlier assumptions.

14 In his Autobiography, James recalls seeing the picture of "The Scapegoat" by Holman Hunt in 1858. He describes it as "so charged with the awful glad I saw it in company" (A Small Boy and Others, pp. 178-79).

15 In "The Jolly Corner" (1906) the portrayal is not in metaphysical but in concrete physical terms. Whereas evil is experienced by Maggie as being "like some bad­faced stranger", Spencer Brydon, in his "house of quiet" on the Jolly Corner, confronts this "bad-faced stranger" in the flesh and recognises a distorted version of his own features in the "stranger's" face. The "stranger" is an embodiment of less desirable proclivities in his own nature.

16 Walter Wright, in Henry James: Modern Judgements, ed. Tony Tanner (Bristol: Macmillan, 1968.)

17 See Blackmur's Introduction to The Golden Bowl and Barzun's "Henry James, Melodramatist", in The Question

18 Krook, The Ordeal of Consciousness; Crews, The Tragedy of Manners (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1957)


23 The view that Maggie is "neither saint nor witch" is implicit in the observations of critics such as Oscar Cargill, The Novels of Henry James (New York: Macmillan, 1961) and Sallie Sears, The Negative Imagination: Form and Perspective in the Novels of Henry James (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1968). Sears highlights the paradoxical nature of Maggie's position in her contention that "Maggie's consciousness is the consciousness of the martyr and saint, in which personal sacrifice is the paradoxical measure of personal triumph" (pp. 219-20).


Arbor, 1989), p. 86.

29 T.S. Eliot, *Four Quartets*, "Burnt Norton".

30 Cited by Dorothea Krook, p. 323.


32 "Auguries of Innocence".
CHAPTER 7:
CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters I have endeavoured to demonstrate how the application of Dorrit Cohn's model for the representation of consciousness in fiction can contribute clarity and precision to the discussion of crucial thematic and stylistic issues in the novels of Henry James. Using Cohn's typology, it was possible to make significant discoveries concerning aspects of James's narrative strategies in the representation of consciousness. This study has also moved beyond Cohn's theoretical framework, demonstrating that certain adjustments are necessary in applying Cohn's paradigm to the novels of James. Thus, while basing my approach to James's novels on Cohn's categories, I hope to have made some original contribution in this field.

Although Cohn makes passing reference to several of James's novels (including The Portrait) in Transparent Minds, the references are necessarily fairly cursory, and no mention is made of either Roderick Hudson or The Golden Bowl. In discussing these novels in the light of Cohn's model, I have endeavoured to show how new insights into the development of James's narrative strategies in the representation of consciousness can be generated through the application of her taxonomy.

Representative novels from the early, middle and late phases were selected to illustrate the increasing tendency to refract the action of the novel through the consciousness of the central reflectors, a modulation which is reflected in the increasing predominance of the mode of narrated monologue. This movement corresponds to the shift from a more "realist" mode in Roderick to a symbolist mode in The Golden Bowl. The latter represents the culmination of the process adumbrated in the other late novels of embodying "external reality" in the consciousness of the reflectors or the figural medium.
Thus _The Golden Bowl_ can be seen as representing the final working out of James's narrative positions. In his last completed novel James most fully implements his conception of the novel's primary focus — "for its subject, magnificently, it has the whole human consciousness".

The application of Cohn's model has also facilitated the exposure of certain misconceptions held by earlier theorists, such as Stanzel. In examining the distribution and deployment of inner views in the light of Cohn's paradigm, it was possible to refute Stanzel's claim that interiorisation necessarily creates sympathy. Just as vouchsafing an inside view of Osmond demonstrably fails to enlist sympathy for him (and indeed, is not calculated to do so), so too in _The Golden Bowl_ inner views of characters such as Charlotte, Adam and Amerigo tend to alienate rather than enlist the reader's sympathy.

Stanzel's claim that James's Strether in _The Ambassadors_ is one of the earliest representatives of figural narration is also questionable, as he fails to take cognisance of James's earlier novel, _Roderick Hudson_. I have shown, in fact, that _Roderick_ conforms more closely to the pattern of the figural novel than _The Portrait_ in that no access is given to the consciousness of the other characters and the central character is "on stage" throughout, whereas Isabel is absent from certain crucial scenes. In both these works the vocal narrator is still in evidence, but more so in the early sections of the novel. In the later, more consistently figural novel employing a central reflector, _The Ambassadors_, greater conformity to the figural mode is displayed in that the narratorial presence is relatively invisible — or inaudible — the central character is not excluded from any scenes and no access is given to the consciousness of any other character in the novel. The subject in
presented far more consistently through the consciousness of the central focalizer.

Cohn's more sharply defined taxonomy also makes it possible to replace potentially misleading statements such as "James allows himself to be displaced in the compositional process by Maggie" with more accurate formulations conveying the recognition that the displacement of the narrator (rather than the author) by the reflector is implicit in the increasing predominance of the figural mode. This is implemented in the later novels through the displacement of the narrator-dominated psycho-narration by narrated monologue in which the reflector's voice generally enjoys ascendancy, although the narrator's voice is still implicit in a qualifying capacity.

In the discussion of the conflicting interpretations of *The Golden Bowl*, I demonstrated that misinterpretations often stem from the failure to distinguish the voice of the narrator from that of the reflector. A clear understanding and application of Cohn's categories, particularly psycho-narration and narrated monologue, could assist in obviating such misinterpretation. It is essential, however, that when determining which mode is being used in a particular passage of discourse, one should consider the extract in context. Hence one could avoid misapplication of Cohn's terminology as evinced in a rare example of criticism making use of her model: a recent critic claims, when discussing the pagoda image in *The Golden Bowl*, that "the analogy is the narrator's and not Maggie's.... The figure is an example of what Dorrit Cohn calls "psycho-narration". As I have shown in the exploration of this image in the context of the whole section in which it occurs, the image in fact is Maggie's own, as is illustrated where it occurs in narrated monologue.

Another feature of James's narrative technique which can be seen in a new light when elucidated by Cohn's
paradigm is that of ambiguity. The model elaborated in Transparent Minds can contribute more finely nuanced discriminations to Ruth Yeazell's perception that James's use of free indirect discourse (narrated monologue) creates a world where the boundaries between unconscious suspicion and certain knowledge, between pretence and reality, are continually shifting—a world in which the power of language to transform facts and even to create them seems matched only by the stubborn resistance of the facts themselves.  

This is instantiated with particular force in The Golden Bowl, where the mode of narrated monologue foregrounds not only equivocation and the evasion of unpleasant truths but also the recasting of those "truths" through a process of linguistic transmutation. So we find the Prince, at Matcham, immediately prior to the consummation of his renewed liaison with Charlotte, thinking

> It had all been just in order that his—well, what on earth should he call it but his freedom?—should at present be as perfect and rounded and lustrous as some huge precious pearl. He had n't struggled nor snatched; he was taking but what had been given him. (I, 358)

Maggie's spouse has indeed an egregious conception of "freedom". In the course of the novel, other concepts such as "[the] sacred", "good faith" and "decency" are distorted and invested with new meanings. A radical subversion of moral concepts is illustrated in Amerigo's transformation of his renewed liaison with Charlotte into a "sacred trust". The capacity to employ euphemistic terms to ensure the smooth operation of one's schemes is exemplified in Adam as well as Amerigo and Charlotte. Maggie too discovers "the power of language to transform facts"; she learns to deploy linguistic engineering in
the course of the novel and dexterously uses language as a form of camouflage in the later scenes.

Cohn also foregrounds the recognition that ambiguity is an inherent aspect of figural narration. As we have seen, this ambiguity is more prevalent in *The Golden Bowl* than in the earlier novels: whereas in *Roderick* one finds a reversion to the didactic mechanism of the adjudicating narratorial voice when moral issues are at play, *The Golden Bowl* is devoid of such intrusive authorial guidance. The ambiguity arising from the abdication of the narrator as "cognitive cicerone" is reinforced by the absence of a reliable subsidiary commentator or "touchstone" such as Ralph Touchett in *The Portrait*.

The nature and function of that metaphorical *persona*, the narrator, undergoes a crucial change in the course of James's œuvre. The stance of biographer or historian objectively presenting "facts" about his characters is abandoned. The reader is restricted to the perspective of the characters and no longer shares the cognitive privilege of the narrator. The frequent allusions made by the narrator of *The Golden Bowl* to a hypothetical observer serve to imply that the narrator is simply a marginally more cognitively advantaged version of the reader.

Furthermore, the narratorial stance in later novels is fraught with uncertainty. Gnomic utterances, for example, are not as straightforward in *The Golden Bowl* as in the earlier novels, and are not necessarily to be taken at face value. Thus the narratorial comment describing Maggie as "More and more magnificent now in her blameless egoism" (II, 145) converts irony into ambiguity. This applies also to various other ostensibly honorific epithets such as "wonderful", which in the context of the novel are often problematic terms; these cast an ironic light on seemingly sympathetic narratorial observations. Thus the narrator's gnomic utterance concerning Adam, "Amiabiliy, of a truth, is an aid to
success; it has even been known to be the principle of large accumulations" (I, 128), infuses the concept of " amiability" with suspect connotations implying that the quality (as embodied in Adam) is of dubious merit. As Cheryl B. Torsney has observed, "everyone tolerates [Adam's] power only because he does not flaunt it, or, [in] Foucault's [terms], 'its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms' under a veneer of much-vaunted amiability.

At times the narrator himself seems to be participating in an ironic game of "naming of parts", or at least ostensibly experiencing the difficulties of naming:

Deep at the heart of that roused unrest in our young man which we have had to content ourselves with calling his irritation — deep in the bosom of this falsity of position glowed the red spark of his inextinguishable sense of a higher and braver propriety. (I, 334)

The latter section of this quotation is coloured by what one could call lexical contagion, as opposed to stylistic contagion, as the voice is unmistakably that of the narrator but he seems to be echoing the formulation of the character himself.

A further significant feature to emerge from this study is the recognition of discrepancies between James's theoretical perspective, as formulated in his Prefaces, and his novelistic practice. This too is an aspect of James's narrative practice that does not appear to have been explored by previous commentators.

Since drafting this thesis, I have come across a paper by David B. McWhirter, published in a recent edition of The Henry James Review, in which he touches on this issue — without, however, exploring it fully. According to McWhirter,

while the prefaces have often been treated as "authorized" interpretations, they are in fact
notoriously problematic, and sometimes plainly inaccurate, in relation to the texts which they discuss.... For all their apparent emphasis on origins and intentions, the prefaces frequently focus on the ways in which James's fictions escaped and continue to escape their creator's original binding intentions. Typically, James seems less concerned with closing in on a formal, definitive analysis of a completed text than with opening up new readings through the discovery of unanticipated sites for further interpretive play. And if the prefaces purport to provide a unified, systematic guide to the Jamesian aesthetic, they also enact a whole array of continuing dialogues, between author and critic or between writer and reader, for example...."  

In spite of the observation that "the prefaces are... sometimes plainly inaccurate in relation to the texts which they discuss", McWhirter does not examine the discrepancies between James's theoretical perspective and novelistic practice which are noted in this thesis. He is instead preoccupied with the gap between the Prefaces as statements of aesthetic practice, and the novels which they introduce, in which socio-political realities not present in the Prefaces become significant. McWhirter's emphasis thus differs from that of Cohn which underplays the issue of the reader's cultural formation. (Objections to Cohn on these grounds will be discussed later.)

Another recent critical study, William R. Goetz's *Henry James and the Darkest Abyss of Romance*, notes that the Prefaces "use the novelistic techniques of a first-person narrator, invented dialogue and figurative language, and thus take the form of literary narrative rather than metacriticism". The implication here is: why should one expect authorially "placed" statements to be more reliable than fiction? This raises the slippery issue of the parameters of the fictional world which was discussed in Chapter 1; space does not permit further elaboration of this issue here.
In *Roderick* and *The Portrait*, I have shown that the principle of employing a central reflector is not implemented with the degree of consistency that remarks in the relevant Prefaces would lead one to expect. In *The Golden Bowl*, multiple focalization is employed whereas the Preface creates expectations that the organizing principle would be that of dual focalization. Furthermore, the multiple focalization is only partly figural; although there are multiple figural perspectives, the authorial mode is still sporadically manifested in narratorial mediation, albeit muted.

Using Cohn's framework, I have noted in this study that the change of perspective from authorial (or "quasi-figural") to more fully figural narration is accompanied by — or implemented through — a shift from narrator's report or psycho-narration to more extended and complex passages of narrated monologue. In *The Portrait*, extended passages of narrated monologue interspersed with psycho-narration predominate in the evocation of Isabel's retrospective midnight vigil (chapter XLII) and recur intermittently, particularly in the latter section of the novel; in *The Golden Bowl*, the entire Volume II is dominated by excursions into Maggie's consciousness in which narrated monologue is the prevailing mode.

Indeed, analeptic excursions (in the figural as opposed to the authorial mode) constitute an increasingly major proportion of the "action" of the late novels. The events of the novel are refracted far more consistently through the consciousness — and specifically, through the memory — of the reflector, and "backward speculation" as a means of extracting or imposing meaning acquires new impetus.

I have also emphasised the significant shift in the incidence and deployment of Cohn's three modes for the representation of consciousness: the tendency in the later novels is for narrated monologue rather than psycho-narration to be the dominant mode. Also
noteworthy is the high incidence of stylistic contagion, especially in Volume II of *The Golden Bowl*, where it is often impossible to distinguish narrated monologue from psycho-narration and determine whether the voice is that of the reflector or the narrator. (This device, as has been noted, contributes to the ambiguity in the novel).

Furthermore, conventional quoted monologue is proportionately less prevalent in the later than the earlier novels. A significant development here—which appears to have largely eluded critical comment—is the emergence of a mode of discourse not adequately catered for in Cohn's taxonomy, a mode of discourse for which I have coined the neologism "imputed monologue". In *The Golden Bowl*, particularly, we have seen how traditional quoted monologue takes on these new permutations as it modulates towards imagined, hypothetical or imputed discourse: discourse ostensibly formulated in the consciousness of a specific character but in effect attributed to that character by another character (the reflector) rather than by the narrator.

An article investigating this device has come to my attention subsequent to the drafting of the chapter on *The Golden Bowl*. In the article, "Hypothetical Discourse as Ficelle in *The Golden Bowl*", Arlene Young defines hypothetical discourse as "dialogues or monologues which are presented as quoted speech on the page, though not in fact (or fiction) ever verbalised" (p. 383). In fact, and in James's fiction, these "speeches" are by definition verbalised, if not articulated, but not by the character to whom they are attributed: they are verbalised by the figural medium or reflector.

Furthermore, the concept of "hypothetical discourse as ficelle" is problematic: although "ficelle" is not necessarily synonymous with confidante, it does have inescapably anthropomorphic connotations. Hypothetical or imputed discourse can more usefully be regarded as a
supplementary or ancillary mode in the representation of consciousness, or, in some instances, a variation of quoted monologue.

Arlene Young rightly queries the claim made by Carren Kaston that "imagined speech [is] an 'instrument' used by Maggie to discharge her suppressed emotions", but her reservations concern the restriction of this device to Maggie's consciousness rather than the restriction of its function to that of emotional discharge. She observes that "hypothetical discourse has an important place not only in the development of Maggie but also in the development of all the major characters in the novel" (p. 383), but does not explore the cognitive as opposed to the emotive function of the device. As I demonstrated in chapter 6, the cognitive function of imputed monologue or hypothetical discourse is of paramount importance.

In a recent study, the term "interior dialogue" is used to designate a comparable device: "the depiction of a private thought process by means of a discussion or debate between a number of clearly distinguishable voices". Drawing on examples of this procedure in *Jane Eyre*, Hawthorn illustrates his contention that "the mature adult - especially the literate and educated adult - reverts to a dialogic form of thinking when presented with problems which cannot be discussed publicly" (p. 89). It would seem that "interior dialogue" could have similarities with the kind of hypothetical discourse in *The Golden Bowl* in which Maggie not only imputes "monologues" to other characters but also projects imaginary dialogues, for example between herself and Adam, in which suppressed feelings are communicated.

However, a major difference between the device of "interior dialogue" as illustrated by Hawthorn and that deployed in *The Golden Bowl* is that in *Jane Eyre* the contending voices represent different aspects of her own consciousness (for example, passion vs. conscience) or
various voices in the community, voices whose injunctions are often at variance with personal inclinations. As Hawthorn notes,

The educated person will possess something like a "cast" of characters or voices which have their origins outside the individual, in ordinary social intercourse, but which will have fused with inner experience and will compose a means whereby the drama of one's own inner life can be acted out. Such a person will be able to recruit social forces to solve personal problems through a simulated social discussion rendered possible by the "verbal importation" of other people. (p. 91)

In *The Golden Bowl*, on the other hand, the "verbal importation" is not that of voices representing the interests of society - voices "created from public attitudes, ideologies, institutions" (p. 91-92) - but that of specific individuals whose shifting relations to herself Maggie is striving to comprehend and control. Nevertheless, the cognitive force of this projected or hypothetical discourse is in each case a primary function; it provides the means whereby the characters concerned attain understanding and independent selfhood: "We learn a self by, among other things, internalizing the behaviour, the opinions, and, importantly, the language of others" (Hawthorn, p. 91).

Arguably the most valuable findings to emerge from my study concern the deployment of the imagistic mode in the representation of consciousness. Although it has been generally recognised that the "imagistic density" of James's œuvre increased substantially in the late novels, the significance of the proportional distribution of the imagery - the mode in which the imagery is incorporated - does not seem to have been hitherto appreciated. I hope to have demonstrated that the metaphoric mode shifts progressively from narratorial comment and dialogue in *Roderick Hudson*, to being deployed more frequently in psycho-narration in *The
Portrait and then in narrated monologue in *The Golden Bowl*. Thus in the later novels the metaphoric mode is far more closely interfused with the modes for representing consciousness, and particularly that of narrated monologue.

I have furthermore attempted to establish the connection between the effacement of the intrusive adjudicating narratorial voice and the prevalence of a complex metaphorical mode. The imagistic mode in a sense "fills the gap" left by the absent (or absenting) narrator, and is an indispensable guide to the reader in interpreting the novel.

The nature and function of the complex patterns of imagery change in the course of James's oeuvre. An early work such as *Roderick* does employ complex clusters of imagery, but it is only in the late novels that the significance of emblematic images (reminiscent of metaphysical conceits) which are conjured up in the figural consciousness is fully exploited. Thus a crucial emphasis in this study has been on the cognitive function of metaphors — their role of representing the world. *The Golden Bowl* most vividly illustrates this cognitive function of metaphor.

Implicit in this function is the constitutive power of the creative imagination. The way a character "images" reality is determined largely by the conceptions of the image-making faculty, the imagination. The function of the creative imagination is manifested in the way both the figural and the narrating consciousness employ metaphor to define ideas and analyse situations in concrete terms. Conceiving of a situation in a visual image, rendering it as, for example, a picture, a scene, an exotic construction or a mode of conveyance (the "family coach") frames it for more searching scrutiny than would be possible by merely balancing abstract concepts.
A comparison between James's management of the metaphoric mode in, respectively, Roderick, The Portrait and The Golden Bowl has revealed a significant development in his method of presentation: whereas in the early novel the metaphoric mode occurs most frequently in dialogue, narratorial comment and psycho-narration, a progressive shift towards a greater imagistic density in narrated monologue has been discerned. I have demonstrated that the midnight vigil in The Portrait, which exemplifies the presentation of the reflector engaged in the process of "motionlessly seeing", foreshadows the more extensive use of this device in The Golden Bowl where it culminates in extensive explorations of the figural consciousness. Thus the increasing "inwardness" in the presentation of consciousness entails a shift of the imagistic mode from passages of psycho-narration to those (increasingly extensive) of narrated monologue.

This appropriation of the imagistic mode by the figural as opposed to the narrating consciousness reflects the increasing capacity of the central reflector to "think for herself" instead of having the cognitive process managed by the narrator on the character's behalf. As we have seen, the locus of the image indicates who is responsible for the generation or formulation of meaning. Increasingly it is the figural rather than the narrating consciousness which is empowered through being conceded control over the deployment of metaphor.

The constitutive power of the consciousness or creative imagination is primarily manifested in the capacity to "image" experience, but another important aspect of the activity of the creative imagination is its capacity to project the unvoiced discourse of an interlocutor. This feature — the ability to conjure up in the imagination "imputed monologue" or hypothetical discourse — has been shown to be another significant and
related aspect of cognitive activity and complements that of imagistic representation. Maggie's deployment of imagined or projected discourse marks stages in her cognitive progress as she demonstrates her increasing ability to project or enter into the feelings and experience of others. Thus imagined discourse works in conjunction with imagistic representation in facilitating the reflector's cognitive progress.

A number of influential critics have praised Cohn's Transparent Minds for its "commendably simple typology", for "the clarity and definition ... brought to hitherto nebulous areas of our poetics of prose" and for being "a definitive treatise on a special sector of narrative technique". Some reservations have been expressed, however, which echo those of McWhirter mentioned earlier. Paul Armstrong and Roy Pascal have drawn attention to an aspect largely ignored by Dorrit Cohn — or tacitly acknowledged as lying beyond the ambit of her study: that of the reader's response to the devices employed for the representation of consciousness. In discussing "style indirect libre" (narrated monologue), for example, Pascal comments:

what processes take place in the reader when he reads a passage of SIL, or a page in which it alternates with other forms? In what way, in what order, does he apprehend the double presence of character and narrator? Is it accurate to say that he momentarily slips into the skin of the character?.... These and other questions can only be answered by the examination of texts. (The Dual Voice, p. 21)

One could counter this by pointing out that in Cohn's examination of selected texts she does, in effect, implicitly address these issues without foregrounding them. However, Pascal's view is also supported by Paul Hernadi who observes that "a more profound kind of attention to the implied and actual readers of modern
prose fiction would have strengthened the theoretical fiber of this circumspect study of texts". Paul Hernadi has furthermore queried Cohn's formulation "Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction" (my emphasis), pointing out that the literary evocation of non-verbal phenomena (and consciousness includes the non-verbal "mind stuff") can only be representation (diegesis) rather than direct presentation (mimesis). Another commentator, John Ellis, contends that Cohn's claim that "fiction alone among the major genres makes minds transparent" should be qualified; "Cohn does not discuss the obvious issues one would want discussed here - for example, how interior monologue differs in this respect from dramatic soliloquy or from certain kinds of lyric poetry" which would seem to perform a comparable function. Perhaps, in entitling her study "modes for presenting consciousness" as opposed to "re-presenting consciousness" Cohn does not fully take cognizance of the fact that narrative fiction as a genre adopts different conventions or strategies for representing consciousness from those adopted with equal validity by the aforementioned genres. As John Auchard has demonstrated in his study Silence in Henry James, even silence can, paradoxically, be effectively exploited as a means of representing the consciousness of a character. Different conventions are adopted by the different genres and the claim that any one genre has more validity or inherent "verisimilitude" should perhaps be queried. Ellis contends that Cohn "casually allows one characteristic opportunity in fiction to become the most important characteristic of fiction and even the defining characteristic of fiction" (p. 309). Although this is a valid objection, it could certainly be claimed that as far as the (later) fiction of Henry James is concerned the presentation of consciousness is indeed a "defining characteristic".
Some critics feel that the phenomenon of narrated perception as opposed to narrated monologue has been inadequately analysed by Cohn. Brian McHale has noted that "Cohn's treatment of the border area between consciousness and perception could have profited from the consideration of two recent approaches which are, perhaps, complementary: first ... the Genette model of focalization" (Genette, 1972) which was subsequently modified by Bal, and secondly, "Ann Banfield's study ... of non-reflective consciousness" ("Islands in the Stream of Consciousness", p. 187). However, I feel that although representation of perception, the zone where consciousness shades off into extra-mental description, has not been exhaustively examined by Cohn, it perhaps falls beyond the scope of her study; this does not in any event seriously impede the elucidation of James's oeuvre in the light of the insights afforded by her model.

The usefulness of Cohn's model in illuminating James's narrative strategies has, I hope, been sufficiently established. Although I would dispute Ellis's contention that Cohn's typology is "confusing and unconvincing" (p. 309), there is nevertheless an area in which I feel that further precision could be attained, and which commentators appear to have neglected: the concepts of dissonance and consonance, which establish modal differentiation (dissonant: authorial, narrator-dominated; consonant: figural, reflector-dominated) need further qualification or supplementation.

In The Portrait, for example, where a modal shift from dissonant to consonant narration was observed in the course of the novel, a different kind of consonance between narrator and reflector is apparent from the outset and persists throughout the novel. This consonance could be classified as empathetic or ethical and exists independently of the mode of narration. Similarly, although cognitive dissonance obtains between the narrator and the central reflector at the outset and
is gradually dissolved in the course of the novel, this
does not seem to affect the empathetic consonance
(throughout, the narrator's attitude towards his
protagonist, as he himself points out, is one of tender
concern and understanding).

A comparable phenomenon can be observed in The
Golden Bowl. In Volume I, modal consonance obtains when
Adam or Amerigo function as figural medium, but cognitive
and ethical dissonance prevails in these sections as
there is no identification between the perspective (in
the widest sense of the term) of the narrator and that of
the reflector. Volume II is dominated by figural
narration which is reinforced by empathetic and ethical
consonance. This is in evidence even before Maggie is
enlightened as to the true state of affairs —
particularly that of Charlotte and Amerigo — thus
attaining greater cognitive consonance with the narrator.
Because of the potential confusion or lack of clarity in
differentiating between modal consonance and ethical,
empathetic and cognitive consonance, the terminology here
could be more finely honed.

One could argue that the narrating consciousness by
its very nature and function has a cognitive advantage
over the experiencing consciousness, and that no complete
cognitive consonance is possible. Ethical or empathetic
consonance is less problematic, as evidenced by the
apparent identity (or identification) between the ethical
perspective of the narrating and the figural
consciousness in Volume II of The Golden Bowl. This
contrasts with the subtle, oblique manner in which the
narrator, employing devices such as irony, dissociates
himself more conclusively from the assumptions of Adam,
Charlotte and Amerigo.

The admirable model produced by Cohn no doubt
displays some inadequacies: in addition to the
reservations mentioned above, I have already noted that
Cohn's terminology also needs to be supplemented or adjusted to accommodate phenomena such as "attributed monologue" or imagined discourse.

In spite of these relatively minor reservations, I hope that this dissertation has established the usefulness of Cohn's typology in exploring the progressive modification of James's narrative strategies for the presentation of consciousness. The use of Cohn's model should indeed facilitate the reader's concurrence in Armstrong's claim that "the discoveries that James, Conrad and Ford make possible constitute a challenge to the reader to develop greater self-consciousness about the workings of consciousness in representation and interpretation". 18

As Genette has noted (see Chapter 1), no arsenal of critical terms can be completely definitive, but in view of the contribution made by Cohn's model in facilitating the clarification of hitherto unexplored aspects of James's technique in the presentation of consciousness in fiction, it is to be hoped that the insights conveyed — if not necessarily the terminology conveying them — will have an appreciable influence on future literary scholarship in this field.


4 Maria Gostrey's term for her function in *The Ambassadors*.


7 This emphasis is clearly evinced in the following statement:

> the privileged status of the prefaces as "pure" aesthetic document needs to be reexamined in light of the ways in which surrounding social and cultural discourses (including historically determined political, class, and gender assumptions) are necessarily woven into James's text. (p. 139)


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