THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND REALITY

IN GRISEBACH'S THOUGHT

by

G.A. BAUCHE

Thesis presented for the Degree of

Doctor of Literature

at the University of Cape Town

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I

Grisebach sceptical as result of time

NB

His thesis, philosophy as continual criticism - i.e. all is contingency

Experience is tensions - not ideologies

Thus: anti-dogmatic education

i.e. the problem of truth and reality

Sciences, arts, philosophy, technology - are of a merely technical or theoretical quality

Summary:

p. 1 (a) Philosophy turns against itself - cancels theoretical systems - and by its criticism brings man to see the contingent nature of reality - this contingent nature is man's fellowmen.

p. 1 (b) Gr's criticism: (a) Gr. is dualistic in the way he divides our expression into a theoretical world of unity and a real world of contingency.

(b) men's self of ascent: the real world beyond men's experience

(c) Gr. merely conceptualises contingent experience.

A. Phil systems cycles of the self - separating him from the real

Criticism of this: in fact in these cycles historically self and reality meet.

p. 4 B: Gr. separates - truth and reality more fully - in fact the fact of faith is rationalised.
(b) Plato's political doctrine is based on the idea that only when philosophers will be kings will the city see the light. That is to say only when reason will govern will there peace happen. A unity in the universe.

In his ideal state in which the guardians, i.e. reason, govern, a social class or citizens performs his function in society. A conflict between the competition between individuals or classes will be illuminated and peace unity will be promoted.

The Hobbesian state also

Hobbes' view is also a certain unity but unity through force. Not through reason as man is being 'rational natural' as Hobbes' point no. But this man is not a unified man who is governed by reason but a man governed by desires, a man whose by his noble nature an against a self centered a man whose the desires are all important. Thus according to this concept of man the only way of establishing peace of men whose are in constant fear of one another is through men their to abstain from their natural rights and put under the guardians.
A second concept is that of surplus profit. According to Marx, the capitalist system of wages is a subsistence one. The labourer is not paid as much as he needs, but more, irrespective of the value of the article produced. Wages are paid per hour, not according to standard of living. Labour is hired on the open market system, and this wage is fierce competition.

The result of all this is that the labourer may produce more than what he is paid for and this goes into the pocket of the capitalist. It is small to owner and disappears.

This theory is also criticised for surplus profit. Labour is necessary for progress. Very little surplus profit actually goes into the pocket of the capitalist. It is mostly reabsorbed into the machinery and other capital for repairs and for expansion.

The labourer is not exploited because he has gains by the expansion. The labourer is removed from the task of production and therefore his surplus profit goes to the capitalist. Because he owns all value produced he may pay the labourer over subsistence level and still remain completely dependent on him.

The third concept discussed in Das Kapital is that of Capital. Capital is not value, according to Lenin and Marx, for labour does not capital in its production.

Capital operates on two levels: constant and variable. Capital - constant capital is the upkeep of machinery and the general
The law of contradiction (as e.g. in dialectic) creates a real negative in the universe.

But, says Hauche, Gr. indites the Law of Contr. in his theory, and this places man again in relation to reality.

Note: I am much impressed by some of R's criticisms of development of Gr.

P. 6 (of summary) By shrinking philosophy Gr has simply created another reality or transcendent world (of Crises, or Faith).

P. 8 Criticism of Gr, dualism between truth and reality, knowledge and experience is untenable.

R's own argument: Nothing new, but well-argued
(a) that mind and matter do meet
(b) through reason we experience the real.
I hereby declare that the presented thesis: The Problem of Truth and Reality in Grisebach's Thought is my own work and has not been submitted for a degree of another university.

Fort Hare,
15th September, 1966

[Signature]
In presenting my two works: *The Problem of Truth and Reality in Grisebach's Thought* and *Truth and Reality in Actuality* to the University of Cape Town for the degree of Doctor of Literature, I should like to express my great appreciation to my promoter, Professor A. Murray.

In the first place, I wish to thank him for his valuable suggestions in regard to the first mentioned work, which contributed to making it eligible for publication by the National Council for Social Research.

As far as the second work is concerned, I wish to place it on record that I wrote this work on the inspiration and with the support of Prof. Murray, who, on reading my first work, pointed out to me that certain salient problems raised in it deserved a more detailed investigation. It was this valuable advice on the part of Prof. Murray that encouraged me to write *Truth and Reality in Actuality*.

G.A. Rauche

Fort Hare,
18th, September, 1966
THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND REALITY

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by

G.A. RAUCHE
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FOREWORD

In writing this book about Grisebach's philosophy the difficulties that had to be overcome were considerable. In order to gain a full picture of the development of his thought, it was necessary to consult all his writings, from his philosophical beginnings to his final works. Grisebach, unlike Schopenhauer, for example, is one of those writers whose ideas were in constant flux and change. It is this very flux and change, however, that gives his works such a sincere ring and that show him up as a genuine searcher for truth and reality.

Grisebach's works, particularly those of the earlier period, and his articles, were not readily obtainable, some of his articles not being available at all. Some of his writings to be dug up from his publishers. It is now with the greatest appreciation and with the most sincere gratitude that I wish to mention of the invaluable help extented to me by Eberhard Grisebach's son, Dr. Lothar Grisebach, residing at Hilchenbach in West Germany. Dr. Grisebach not only approached his father's publishers for works that had been sold out, but he also placed at my disposal articles and even unpublished material of Eberhard Grisebach that were either in his own or in his mother's, Mrs. L. Grisebach's, possession. He also provided me with his father's curriculum vitae, with a complete list of his publications and gave me valuable hints as to the true meaning of his father's philosophy, which was so often misunderstood.

In addition, I also want to give thanks to my wife, Mrs. Ursula Rauche, who typed the manuscript and helped correct it.

Finally, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the Department of Education, Arts and Science and the National Council for Social Research for publishing my book in their own Publication Series and for defraying the cost of publication.

G.A. Rauche

Fort Hare
January, 1966
THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND REALITY IN GRISEBACH’S THOUGHT

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G.A. RAUCHE

Introduction

It is the purpose of this work to give a critical assessment of the lifelong struggle about the problem of truth and reality by a man who has nearly been forgotten, Eberhard GRISEBACH. Particularly in our time, however, a time ruled by "isms" and ideologies, that are passed off on gullible man as the truth, and that are hung before his eyes like veils preventing him from ever experiencing the "real" and coming face to face with it, Grisebach’s teaching deserves the closest attention. This work is thus meant to pave the way for a further study of his philosophy, which may help man to adopt an attitude towards life, which is more suited than the present one is to coping with the problem and the difficulties of the actual situation. The first lesson we learn when studying Grisebach is from his refusal to placate any doctrine, ideology, creed, etc. from the courage with which he puts in question man’s sacrosanct truths, values and beliefs, and from the inexorable and uncompromising honesty and sober reflection exhibited by him in his search for the real. This undoubtedly great thinker, whose search for truth and the real was inspired by a genuine need, and in his later years by a great distress, passed his formative years at a period, when a young generation in a young striving German Empire was hopefully and confidently searching for new values that corresponded with reality more than the idealistic past of an a priori metaphysics did. In all walks of life - the sciences, the arts, technology, and economy - unheard of possibilities seemed to present themselves. The new, rapidly developing Empire certainly was a challenge. The full-blooded deed, the creative act were what the young generation called for. Hopefully and expectantly they turned away from the past and enthusiastically tackled the task of building a new future. But soon their hopes lay shattered on the battle fields of France and Poland; a period of chaos and confusion followed that was filled with the weird battle-cries of ruthless
and unscrupulous political parties, seeking to destroy each other, until one party emerged victoriously. But, again, the hopes and expectations that were roused in the German youth were foiled by another war, more terrible even than the previous one, which ended in total defeat. It was during this eventful period that Grisebach spent his more mature years and that his thinking underwent a decided change, after, in his formative years, he had fallen in step with his time by exhibiting a desire for the creative act as the real act.

Grisebach was born in 1880 in Hanover, the son of a Prussian official, who finally held the post of Vize-Regierungsrat in the Prussian province of Schleswig, and who, since 1890, was Kammerpräsident of the Prince of Stolberg-Wernigerode. Grisebach's mother, Marline born von Harnier, died in Frankfurt (Oder), when he was still a child.

Grisebach spent his early years at school in Frankfurt (Oder), later in Schleswig and Stargard (Pomerania). He attended the Gymnasium at Wernigerode. Grisebach's architectural and creative vein, which is so clearly traceable throughout his thinking, even later when it had turned critical and postulated the dismantling of the system, caused him to take up the study of architecture in 1900 at the Technical University in Darmstadt (Hesse). After having served his compulsory period of training as a soldier from 1900 - 1901 in Darmstadt, Grisebach continued his studies in architecture in Berlin from 1902-1904, during which period he also performed practical work on the Kobelnick palace in Posen.

In accordance with the migratory habits of German students and artisans of the time, Grisebach hiked through Southern Germany, and finally studied for a while in Stuttgart, Württemberg. His health seems not to have been very good at that time, for from 1904 - 1908 we find him at the Swiss health-resort of Davos.

In 1907, Grisebach had commenced his studies in philosophy at the University of Zürich in Switzerland. In his book Die Schicksalfrage des Abendlandes, he describes ..................
he describes the devious paths he travelled in his quest for truth. From the lofty idealism of Plato and the crusading, sacrificial spirit of Socrates and Giordano Bruno, Grisebach passed on to the critical analytic thought of Descartes and Kant. The doctrine of the eternal logos of the Kantians, especially Rickert and Windelband, made a tremendous impression on him. We shall see that it forced the core of his idealistic writings, but even in that his critical works the logos is retained, at first as a dialectical principle that is reflected in the world, and later as a multiple logos that leads us to the discussion of the existing crisis with one's fellowman.

Afraid of getting stuck in a mere logical formalism, Grisebach declined Rickert's invitation to attend his seminar at Freiburg and, instead, made his way to Corpus Christi College, Oxford, where he resided in 1909. There he was greatly attracted by the psychologico-genetic method of the pragmatist school of thought: the idea of the realization of all values through social life and the doctrine that the value of truth should stand the test of experience. The analytic method of the pragmatist school seemed to him the answer to all verbalism. But soon he began to realize its flaws. He was dissatisfied with the reflective character of truth, the aesthetic nature/the act of thinking, and the mere psychological interpretation of historical-social processes. Was it true that all values depended on the contingent assent of society, its tastes and judgment? There was something missing there. If truth was to be a truth of real experience, it could not be only reflective. It had to find its ground in which, real action/ in turn, had to be rational or meaningful action, and was it not by the cultural act that man created values?

Driven by such doubt, Grisebach returned to Germany, looking for a synthesis between the psychologism of the pragmatist school and the rationalism of the neo-Kantians. In the Tatphilosophie of Rudolf Eucken, he believed that he had found what he had been searching for. In the cultural act, at which Eucken had arrived by his noological method, science and history, logic and feeling, the rational and the empirical, the finite and the infinite, subject and object seemed ...

1) Pp. 176-185
seemed to be conjoined. In short, the problems of freedom and infinity seemed to have been solved in the rational-irrational world-spirit which also gratified man's religious feeling. Through Dilthey, Simmel, Rickert, Windelband, and Eucken, Grisebach's thinking was focussed on the phenomenon of culture. The problem of its relationship with the absolute and the value and meaning it had for man's existence were to occupy Grisebach for the rest of his life. During his time of study at the University of Jena in 1909 and 1910 under Rudolf Eucken, he, in accordance with the spirit of the new epoch that seemed to have dawned for Germany, conceived man's creative act or the cultural deed as a manifestation of the absolute. His marriage with Lotte Spengler in 1909 fits in well into this picture of a new vigorous creative beginning. In 1910, as a first award for his constructive labour, Grisebach received his degree of Doctor of Philosophy on a dissertation called: *Kultur als Formbildung*, and in 1913 he became a Privat-Dozent on a thesis entitled: *Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart* with Rudolf Eucken as his promoter.

Grisebach was however not the man to content himself with the results so far achieved in connection with his enquiry into the vexed and complicated problem of truth and reality. A comparison between the vague psychologico-genetic method of Dilthey's, Eucken's, Bergson's, and Simmel's *Lebensphilosophy* (which led to a relativism and historicism) and the strictly scientific and logistic method of the neo-Kantians, seemed to establish the decided superiority of the latter. Yet it would perhaps be unwise for him to commit himself before having consulted the masters, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, directly, from whom, after all, these new methods had originated. But did not the new phenomenological method of thinkers like Bolzano and Brentano suggest a possible synthesis between the followers of Kant on the one hand and Eucken and Dilthey on the other? Did the phenomenologists not move into the foreground the problem of ontologism again, and did their method not open the possibility of proceeding from the understanding of the historical world to an understanding of the creative act of the mind?

The attempt ..................
The attempt at synthesis between Kantians and the followers of Eucken and Dilthey, according to the phenomenological method, seems to have been made by Grisebach in *Die Schule des Geistes*. The question mark which he began to put behind the Tat philosophie and the creative act, as the act that solves man's problem of real existence, coincided with the question mark that the years immediately after the First World War had put behind man's cultural activity. In *Die Schule des Geistes* the creative deed no longer embraces the cosmos, as it did in the works preceding it. It is now reason that is the creative subject, and as such bestows reality on the world. The universal rational principle brings forth the cultural act, thus restricting man to the sphere of becoming. It is through this principle that the historic and scientific world, life and knowledge are one. The principle of reason clearly delineates the boundary of the real world, i.e., the world of becoming or man's perpetual cultural activity and marks it off against the metaphysical world of being, i.e., the world of faith. Man's permanent cultural activity results from the eternal question of theology about the absolute. In other words, the reply that philosophy gives to this question never reaches up to the absolute. The latter always contradicts man's creative effort, so that he has to rebuild his systems of culture over and over again. The putting in question of man's existence by the absolute clearly reveals the note of insecurity and uncertainty that has crept into man's cultural and creative activity in Germany after the war, which stands in striking contrast to the unbounded confidence the young generation had in its creative powers and faculties in the years before the war. But the collapse of the promising young Empire had definitely been a severe shock, which could not fail to disillusion so zealous a searcher for truth and reality as Grisebach, and in *Die Schule des Geistes* the swing from a more idealistic towards more critical philosophy is already obvious. Grisebach, probably due to his precarious condition of health, had spent the war years in garrison at Ulm (Württemberg). In 1922, he was appointed Professor Extra-ordinary at Jena, and in 1931 was offered a chair by both the University of Basel and Zürich. He elected the chair of philosophy, education, and psychology at Zürich.

Conditions ......................
Conditions in Germany, during the first decade after the First World War, were desperate and thoroughly frustrating. Economic and political conditions were chaotic. Each of the great number of political parties that had sprung up after the war preached an ideology which it offered as the truth guaranteeing an existence in peace and security. The more or less dogmatic character of the doctrines of these various parties, which was particularly rigid in the parties of the extreme left and the extreme right, brought about a head-on collision that made cooperation impossible. But the same picture presented itself in the European scene in general. It was only a question of time till the oppressive and repressive treatment of the defeated Germany by the victor nations would bring about a sharp reaction in Germany and till the communist creed of the East would develop into a substantial threat to the existence of the western way of life. In the fields of education and philosophy similar chaotic conditions prevailed. Dogmatic ideological views, party-politics, and religious denominations vied with each other in their attempts to gain control over the young generation.

In view of the above, it was not surprising that all the existing philosophical methods and currents of the age, Idealism, Materialism, Scientism and Thomism began to become suspect to Grisebach. Their self-constituted real grounds as well as their historicity could not but cause man to miss his real existence. In all these cases, he would be estranged from real experience and would be neatly and ingeniously blended into some absolute, which represented nothing but the making of his own self absolute, so that, by the construction of all these various methods, he really kept moving within the circle of the self. The newly arisen Philosophy of Existence, with which Grisebach no doubt was well acquainted and which also influenced his own thinking, was no exception to this. Its historicity, as the result of the inclusion in man's existence of the nothing or death, represents to Grisebach, as much a defection from real existence and an artificially constructed circle of the self as any other system.

The conclusion.................
The conclusion Grisebach draws from the above is that, in order to guide man towards the experience of the real, philosophy must abandon its constitutive efforts entirely and must turn totally critical. It must reveal the purely academic, theoretical character of the humanistic world, and from the historic sphere of the past (all systems are historic in that they represent not that which is becoming, but that which has become), i.e., from the immanent world of human truth or knowledge, which rests on memory, must seek to push through to the real sphere of contingent experience, i.e., the emmanent, which it encounters in the foreign other, one's fellowman. By this contradiction he puts in question the truth and self of man, who at the moment of bearing this contradiction in passion is enabled to lead an ethical existence, and experiences this experience of peace, is, however, completely contingent. In it all knowledge, virtue, attitude on the part of man, of whatever kind and however modest, have been contradicted; man's self has been terminated and historical time and continuity have been absorbed by real time, i.e., pure contingent experience.

Naturally, Grisebach arrived at this conception of the real, which was the very opposite of the humanistic world truth, only gradually. It was fully developed only in his chief work Gegenwart, published in 1928, and was further elaborated upon in Freiheit und Zucht (1936), Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes (1942), and Jacob Burckhardt als Denker (1943). In his earlier critical writings Erkenntnis und Glaube (1922) and Die Grenzen des Erziehers und seine Verantwortung (1924), Grisebach is still influenced by the method of dialectical theology, which he later repudiates as yet another attempt at bringing back within the human grasp the absolute, so that, again, it becomes an immanent truth of which man disposes, thereby missing real experience.

Whether we now agree with Grisebach or not (and we certainly do not agree with him in regard to his conception of truth and reality), it cannot be denied that his philosophy is of the utmost importance today. The outbreak of the Second World War once more confirmed the necessity for man to break down his ideological barriers and to face reality. It was the very catastrophe, therefore ..................
therefore, into which man had plunged himself, that fully justified Grisebach's mistrust in human truth and that led to his attempt to break through to real experience in its purest contingency. If in so doing he went too far, calling man's truth evil or untruths and lies,¹ which must be broken down altogether, this must be explained from the acuteness of the crisis in which Grisebach wrote. But he must be given the credit of sounding a clear warning to us, of opening our eyes to the dangers of the dogmatic character of our truths, ideologies and beliefs, which, so often, cause man to be intolerant of his fellowman and intrasistent to his views and interest. Naturally, Grisebach's bugle call was drowned in the hubbub of the voices of all kinds of "leaders of humanity", pretending to know the truth, outshouting each other in offering to their fellowmen their "infallible solution" of the crisis, and inviting them to follow their lead into the promised land. But even, then, when the inevitable disaster had come, in the midst of the greatest catastrophe that had ever befallen mankind, Grisebach relentlessly and indefatigably continued his efforts to bring man to his senses. In *Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes*, which he wrote in the middle of the Second World War, he showed man that, by his blind trust in some homogeneous universal logos and some rational purpose of the historical process, he had been chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. He referred man to his fellowman, in cooperation with whom he had to carry on his work on the components of culture, in the face of contradiction and the permanent crisis. The logos is thus not a homogeneous logos offering certainty and security, but a multiple heterogeneous logos causing pain and suffering. But the reward of the workman, who, in the field of the crisis, i.e., in the face of contradiction with his fellowman, was peace. Peace, by accepting the permanent crisis between man and his fellowman as inevitable, was the call Grisebach sounded in 1942 to a war-ridden Europe, which, as a result of a misconception of truth, reality, knowledge, history and from a false appreciation and overrating of human reason, culture, and civilisation, was bleeding from a thousand wounds. And even after the most terrible of all wars, Grisebach kept pursuing his labour of bringing man around ..........

¹ Cf. chapter X in *Gegenwart*, entitled *Satanie und Humanität*, as well as *Was ist Wahrheit in Wirklichkeit*, p.30 and *Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes*, p.43.
Why? There were two reasons. Either the true impact of his teaching was not understood, or it was uncomfortable to those that preferred to live in the false security of their self-constituted truth, ideology, or belief, and was consequently rejected, in spite of the fact that his assessment of the situation into which man had manoeuvred himself on account of the absolute nature of his truths, ideologies, and beliefs had been proved correct by current events. And at the present stage the situation has even deteriorated. There has hardly been an age in which man was further removed from reality that to-day in the so-called realistic age, when he constantly talks about it. There has hardly been a time in which, supported by scientific and technological implements and apparatus, public opinion, mob-thinking, automatisation, and standardisation, ideologies have played a bigger part. In the face of all this, the critical philosophy of Grisebach and the question about what is truth and reality as bound up with human existence have never been as important as they are to-day, and this is the reason why, in this work, we treat this problem in reference to Grisebach's thought.

The method we apply in debating this problem is the analytical one. By the critical discussion of Grisebach's major works mainly in their chronological order and in relation to their respective historical background, we become the witness of Grisebach's tenacious struggle for truth and reality, and his consistent movement from the construction of the essential world of the mind to the world of contingent experience, from the immanent to the emanent. The cleavage between truth and reality in which Grisebach's movement from mental construction to contingent experience results, which also halves man and puts an end to all his cultural activity, raises the problem of the relation and value to human existence of the sciences, the arts, philosophy and theology.

Are they of a mere technical, academic, or theoretical quality, as Grisebach holds, or do they also possess real characteristics? In short, do they belong to the world of truth only and have they nothing to do with the real
the real world, as Grisebach argues, or do they also belong to the real world? It is this question that this work seeks to answer, for it is obvious that the attitude man is to take up towards life and his fellowman depends on it. We can thus form our principal question as follows: Is Grisebach correct in saying that the real is the \textit{emmanent} only, i.e., that which accidentally encounters us from the outside, thereby putting in question all our constructed truths, ending all our egoism thus leading us to an \textit{ethical existence}? Or must we, if we wish to stay within the bounds of the real, include the \textit{immanent}, i.e., our constructed truths?

All in all the purpose of this work may be described as follows:

1. To show the significance for us to-day of Grisebach's struggle for truth and reality by presenting a critical discussion of this problem, as it develops throughout his major works.

2. To discuss the implications of Grisebach's conception of truth and reality and to show where and how, in his attempt to push through from truth to real experience, he, in our opinion, himself transgresses the bounds of real experience.

3. To stake out the bounds of true reality afresh in terms of human existence, with the object of preventing man from transgressing his limit in the future.
In this chapter, I intend to investigate in very broad outline the philosophical systems of the past in regard to the problem of truth in reality. I shall make the attempt to show their egocentric and purely technical nature. In other words, I shall endeavour to show the philosophical systems of the past from Greek to Existentialist thought invariably represent a cycle of the self and that as a result of this they miss true reality as a contingent encounter and arrive at a self-constructed essential or technical real. The necessity of showing the purely academic or rational value of truth and reality in the philosophical systems of the past arises from the fact that this is Grisebach's central argument. It is this insight that caused him to set out in search of a real which he actually experienced. But the way from the academic to the actual real was a slow, laborious journey. Grisebach in his early "idealistic" writings was himself strongly under the influence of those who, according to his later works, had built up mere technical or academic dream-worlds. In these late writings, especially in Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, he points out that the historical continuity of our thinking from the time of ancient philosophy as a rationalistic philosophia perennis, which was used to show not only the rational character of Christianity in the Middle Ages, but which survived till the present, is the cause of our present plight and dilemma. According to Grisebach it is this thinking in historical time and continuity, which caused us not only to miss the actual real, but also to estrange ourselves from our real nature.

It is therefore very important for the understanding of Grisebach's central argument that we investigate the nature of the philosophical systems of the past in respect to the problem of truth and reality, which, after all, are the starting point of Grisebach's thought and from whose constitutive nature he gradually moved into a position diametrically opposed to theirs. He himself acknowledges (as I said in the Introduction) that before committing himself as to the nature of truth and reality he at first decided ..............
significance of Grisebach's break through to contingent reality and thereby to come to the realisation that this break through, whereby the true meaning of man's constitutive nature for the experience of the real is missed, is too radical.

H.J. de Vleeschauwer has contended that metaphysics ought not to constitute a separate discipline of philosophy, but that they are synonymous. It is our opinion that this view can be supported very well, indeed. If we ask the question: What is man's chief business in life? We could answer: The attempt to discover the truth, i.e., the absolute. Why now should man, in spite of the many failures he has experienced in his striving throughout the generations, keep up a struggle and search that appear to be hopeless? Is it only wonder and curiosity? We believe that it is much more. It is the permanency of change and becoming that causes man to stretch out his hands for a firm anchor, namely, absolute truth. The unstable and unreliable character of his environment rouses in man the feeling of uncertainty, insecurity, and anxiety. It is experienced by him as a menace to his identity, his self and his existence, unless he can master it by knowing it and bringing it within the grasp of his understanding. Ever since his consciousness emerged during the evolutionary process of nature, man realised the need of mastering and taming his environment, if he was to survive; for his chief weapon in the struggle of life was not instinct, swiftness, or brutal force, as was the case with animals, but his rational power. It was this faculty that enabled him to tame, cultivate, and civilise his environment, to press on it his stamp, and it was through his cultural activity that he was able to look at himself as in a mirror, that he realised that he existed apart from his environment and yet was one with it. From the very beginning, therefore, at the primitive stage, man, to speak with U.A. van Peursen, knew that there was something other than himself, and he attempted to influence it by magic, so that it would conform with his wishes and satisfy his needs. Later, when man's consciousness had become brighter still, man began to enquire
into what that something was by which he was surrounded and in which he seemed to be embedded. In other words, he now enquired into its substance or essence. In our contemporary age, man no longer looks for what is hidden behind the phenomena, but he realises that his environment constitutes a field of his orientation. Man is intended towards his environment in a perspectivistic manner, in which the question what a thing is has been superseded by the question how a thing is, i.e., how I am related to it. The absolute is shrouded in mystery. It speaks to me only through my being-there, or the situation in which I am, or the manner in which I communicate with my environment. In short, though I no longer know the absolute, I border on it in my situation, as each field of orientation and communication is a meaningful field, not only in the sense of a logical or logically arranged field, but in the sense of pointing beyond itself. In other words, it possesses a meaningful horizon on which the absolute dawns.

Thus no matter what method man applies, the primitive magic, the rationalistic, or the functional, they all represent his cultural activity, the common aim of which is to move from the finite world of becoming and change to truth and reality as such. For only if man knows the absolute (or the real ground of the world) or at least borders on knowing it, so that it gives meaning and value to his activity, does he know himself. Only then does he really exist, can he have confidence in himself, and is life meaningful. It may thus be said that man's cultural activity springs from the characteristic of change, perishability, and contradiction of the finite world, which he seeks to overcome, only to find that his cultural system or the truth he has constituted is put in question again by the contradiction of his fellowman, i.e., by other cultural systems that were built by different people in a different situation. Man's cultural activity, which appears to have been set to him as his permanent task by a permanent crisis and which therefore is itself becoming, we have designated by the term of actuality. But man has not realised the limitations, imposed upon him by the contradiction of his fellowman. Instead of accepting.................
accepting the crisis and, in the face of it, working together with his fellowman, to whom he is related by the very crisis or contradictory relation, man, through the cultural act, has always sought to arrive at truth or the absolute. By so doing, however, he transcended the bounds of actuality and himself, or, to put it differently, he posited himself as absolute. There is an inherent contradiction, however, between actuality and truth: Whereas actuality is dynamic, changeable, relative, and contradictory, truth is static, immutable, absolute and self-contained. It is reality in its pure form or the real ground to which the finite world, including man, owes its existence. But this contradiction is overcome by man's self-transcendence. What happens is that man thinks of the relationship of the real ground to man, as a dialectical principle. By the rational act of comprehending the dialectical relationship between man and the real ground, therefore, the contradiction, as known and understood, has virtually been suspended. Man is now rationally merged with the absolute. It manifests itself in his actions, and he, in turn, can contemplate it intellectually, or merge with it ecstatically. It, therefore, stands to reason that the knowledge or the consciousness of the absolute or the real ground by man, in whatever form, represents nothing but its constitution by man or man's self-transcendence. In other words, the real ground is immanent, even there, where it is supposed to be emanent; for in every case, it is man's self-constituted goal, his haven of refuge by which he orientates himself in his situation of uncertainty and insecurity, and by which his life becomes meaningful and his existence real and ethical. It is for this reason that man stretches his rational powers beyond the empirical province, thereby really absolutising or transcending himself.

C.A. van Peursen says:

Die Trennung zwischen Transzendenz und Immanenz, wenn Transzendenz nicht mehr als Dimension der Immanenz erweist, ist eine Sicherstellung, eine Camouflage der tiefen Unruhe des Daseins; denn die Höhe des Seins und der Abgrund des Menschen hängen aufs engste zusammen. 1)

In the ......................

1) Cf. C.A. van Peursen, Martin Heidegger zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, p. 51
In the previously mentioned primitive that stage, it was magic by which man humanised the deity. In ancient Greek thought the real ground or absolute was arrived at by rational powers. This applies to the Apeiron of the Ionians just as well as to the Logos of Heraclitus, the One of Xenophanes, the Truth of Parmenides, the Good of Plato, and the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle. By abstraction the real ground is discovered behind the phenomena of opposites (Ionians). Next, change or becoming, by rationalisation, is structuralised and becomes the law or nomos of the cosmos (Heraclitus). Again, the real ground is found by the identification of thinking and being (Parmenides). At last, it is found in the speculative ideas or universals of Plato, and in the purely abstract first cause, the actus purus of Aristotle, which causes potentiality (matter) to become actualised (form). It is interesting to note that, in Plato's case, philosophy is the messenger of the Gods and ends beyond that which exists, in wonder about divine exaggeration (σειμωνίας ἴμπροβορίας). ¹ Here we have already the beginning of a meaningful horizon on which the absolute dawns, which man cannot entirely grasp by his rational effort. But it is precisely the realisation of the not-understanding of the absolute upon which the dialectical relation between man and the absolute depends and by which this relation is understood, and it is this very docta ignorantia that causes man to keep striving for the absolute.

It is thus obvious that, in ancient Greek thought, the real ground or the absolute is man's own constitution. The absolute is therefore always immanent and represents the cycle of the human self or its absolutisation, even there where, as in Plato's case, it is supposed to be emmanent. For there, the absolute is brought within reach of the human mind by the dialectical method.

In the Middle Ages, it is rationalised faith that makes us become certain of the real ground as either God's word, i.e. wisdom, intellect (Thomas Aquinas) or God's will, i.e., love (Duns Scotus, William Occam). Whether

I start ......................

¹ Cf. C.A. van Peursen, Martin Heidegger zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, p. 50.
I start from faith to arrive at the understanding (Anselm) or whether I begin with the understanding to proceed to faith (Abelard and, in High Scholasticism, Bonaventura, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas), in both cases God's word of creation is a rational, i.e., logical and ontological word. Through God's creative word, truth and reality, faith and reason are really one. Divine illumination cannot fail to orientate the lumen naturale towards God and thus, to a certain extent, grasp Him, even though the perfect union with God is achieved by an act of the will (love). This is the doctrine of ideation plus assent, already taught by Augustine and retained by Thomas Aquinas. In some cases, Thomas or Cusanus for instance, love for God is a highly intellectual love. It is the intellectual contemplation or intuition of the deity, which sets in after the scientific enquiry of the understanding into the deity has exhausted itself and God remains hidden. In mysticism, too, at least the intellectualistic kind of Master Eckhart, the fusion between God and man takes place by pure intellectual vision of the deity. The opposition between intellect (God as pure thought) and the world of being (the whole created world both conceptual and physical) is overcome by man's complete withdrawal into the inner fortress of his soul, the indestructible, uncreated divine spark. If man has succeeded in retiring from the world, and his own self to this fortress of the divine in himself, he then is merged with God in ecstasy. In this state, he has lost all desire for anything, even for God; for what I already possess I need no longer desire.

But even where, in the case of Duns Scotus and William Occam, the irrational will or the love of God has been declared the real ground of the world, it is yet a self-constituted ground. In the first place both thinkers arrived at their view by a critical analysis of reason and will. As it appeared to them that reason was bound up with necessity, they argued that God's omnipotence would be impaired if, as was thought by Thomas Aquinas, truth, reality, and the good depended upon God's wisdom. If God was to be omnipotent and free, the will must not be subordinated to reason, but reason to the will.
to the will. For only the irrational will was free from all limiting necessity. But as some thinkers pointed out, e.g., Hermann Glockner in Die europäische Philosophie, p. 356, Duns Scotus merely completed what Augustine had begun, namely: "die voluntaristisch-dynamische Individualisierung der Schöpfung, ihre Durchgottung mit unendlich-mannigfältiger möglicher Freiheit ". Divine illumination as rational (predestination, gratia irresistibilis). What is stressed by him is the irrational nature of divine illumination, which as the divine free will, takes effect everywhere and at all times (hic et nunc), It is reflected in man’s free will as a sign of God’s grace, i.e., permanent assistance to man. Through man’s free will, God’s love for him can be reciprocated by him. In taking a decision for the good or God, man is merged with Him just as he is merged with Him by the divine spark of Master Eckhart. R. Glockner writes:

In der von Gott geschaffenen, als Tatsache ebenso unlehgbaren wie unbeweisbaren ' haecceitas ' dieser ' christlichen Scele besteht jeweils zwischen dem ' natürlichen Licht ' und dem ' göttlichen Licht ' die nämliche Ununterscheidbarkeit wie in dem ' Funken ' Meister Eckharts und Dietrichs von Freiberg. 1)

In the teaching of Duns Scotus and William Occam, in spite of all irrationalism, faith is still rationalised, in as much as the will, urging towards the good and the divine, still requires reason to illumine the way. Without reason, the will would keep groping in the dark. Reason enlightens it as to the decision it must take, if it wishes to be one with God. It is reason that, on the grounds of its own inadequacy to know anything apart from the outside world towards which it is intended, tells the will that the good or God can be reached through love only. In the case of Duns Scotus and William Occam, therefore, love is based not on knowledge but on faith, but this faith is founded in the consciousness of the inadequacy of our reason to know God, hence it is rational. In any case, by a decision of the will, we again are able to possess God and are one with him.

The various..............

1) Die Europäische Philosophie, p. 358

/illumination is rejected by Duns only because of its character of necessity
The various forms of dialectical relationship between the divine and man in the Middle Ages as well as their respective form of the dialectical process of their fusion have been admirably described by Heinz Heimsoeth in *Die sechs grossen Themen der abendländischen Metaphysik* and Walter Schulz *Der Gott der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik*. Both authors, in the metaphysics of the late Middle Ages, see the beginning of modern metaphysics.

From the above, it becomes obvious that, irrespective of whether we consider the rationalistic, mystic, or voluntaristic theology of the Middle Ages, the fact remains that man takes part in the real ground by the presence in him of the divine. He is *analogia entis*, and the divine power in him enables him to know the truth and to experience the real, at least to a considerable extent. It is through this knowledge and experience that he is fused with the absolute, even though, to embrace it entirely, he will have to resort to faith, which is nevertheless founded upon reason, i.e., the realisation of ultimate not-knowing. As this process is entirely logical and consistent, it stands to reason that there is no real contradiction between man or the absolute, or, to put it differently, by comprehending the contradiction as a dialectical principle, the contradiction has virtually been suspended. The fact that the real ground can be thought by man only as a creative subject in whose creative act he is included, makes him realise why the real ground remains hidden to him. It is not true that he merely accepts God on the ground of the Bible and follows Him in absolute obedience, but he moulds and shapes Him according to his own faculties, by which he also determines His relation to the world. The real ground, in the Middle Ages, in spite of all the talk about God's transcendency, than any other real ground. That this is the case is already proved by the fact of the varying nature of the great number of real grounds that have been constituted. In Thomas's case, for instance, *wisdom* may be called the real ground of the universe, in Eckhart's case it was *intellection*, and in the case of Scotus and Occam it was the *will*. It is easy to see that these real grounds merely constitute an absolutisation of various human faculties. Therefore, in constituting these grounds, man keeps moving within ……………

*Its* Christian trappings, is no less a self-constituted ground on the part of man and therefore no less immanent, in spite of …….
within the circle of the self. Truth and reality are what he determines them to be, and after he has determined them, he strives towards them by means of a philosophical or a theological doctrine or system, and it is in this act of striving that reason and faith, philosophy and theology are dialectically referred to each other. Actuality, in this case, consists in man's striving towards the absolute, but it is overcome by man's embracing the deity in faith. As, however, the real ground is a self-constituted ground, it follows that man's merging with it is nothing but an act of self-transcendence, by which the experience of the real has been missed, because the bounds of actuality have been transgressed.

In more recent times, i.e., during the period of Enlightenment, which covered the 17th and 18th century, philosophy split into a rationalistic metaphysics on the one hand and an empiricism on the other. The first school discovered the real ground in man's mind, either in the form of innate ideas (Descartes) or analytical judgments (Christian Wolff). In both cases, the deductive method was applied. That is, the rational structure of the sense world was worked out by the application to it of the clear (mathematical) ideas in the mind. In this way, Descartes arrived at his metaphysical concept of res extensa, which he contrasted with the res cogitans, the thinking mind. Wolff found the logical structure of the sense-world by analytical judgments. He judged the phenomena in the light of the laws of identity and contradiction. By so doing, he conceived the ground of the essence (ratio sufficiens) and of the real existence of the sense world as being lodged in the mind. In both cases, therefore, in that of Descartes and Wolff, truth and reality were immanent, for even Descartes's ontological proof of God's existence started from the idea of God in man's mind. The contingent sense world was rationalised and brought in line with reason. In this way, man was believed to be in possession of certain unfailing knowledge. But as he again found the metaphysical ground in himself, he again kept moving within the circle of his self and again missed the experience of the real by identifying the real with his self-constituted truth.
In the empirical school (Locke, Hume) the inductive method is followed. The real ground is now found in the world of experience, which it is the task of reason to make intelligible. In Locke's case, therefore, substance and causality are proved from sensation and reflection, i.e., outer and inner experience. Through sense-perception, we obtain the idea of potentiality in matter, i.e., inert bodies are set in motion by the impact of other bodies, e.g., the sun melts wax, but all these motions must have their ultimate cause in mind, e.g., man's mind (his thinking and willing) directs the movements of his own body, which movements set other bodies in motion. An example is the man who, by the movements of his hands, conducts the queue and gives a shove to the billiard ball, which in turn might set in motion another ball, etc. Hence Locke's idea of the potentiality of body is supplemented by the actuality of mind. The idea of power, therefore, both as a passive and active phenomenon, gives Locke the idea of substance and causality. These complex ideas have thus no direct underlying sense-impressions. They are abstractions from sensation and reflection. They follow from the logical consideration that the changes effected in body and caused by mind reveal an underlying substance, namely, something that is changed and something causing change. In this way, Locke arrives at the notions of material and immaterial substance. The ideas of reflection give us more certainty than those of sensation. Through our inner operation of thinking and willing only, do we get the idea of the beginning of motion, i.e., first cause. Thus Locke, by demonstrative proof, i.e., by abstraction from himself, arrives at the ideas of substance and causality, and from the idea of pure potentiality (matter) advances towards man as representing both potentiality and actuality, until he finally arrives at the idea of actus purus or first cause, i.e., God.

The circle of the self is thus clear. Locke builds up the cosmos from his own experience, sensation and reflection. The real ground is found in man's reason; for it is the mind, i.e., demonstrative proof, that makes sense-knowledge .................
sense-knowledge certain, which Locke designates as probable knowledge, while he agrees with Descartes that we have intuitive knowledge only of ourselves. The self is thus the pivot of the universe. Through it, i.e., from our sensory and reflective acts, we again constitute the cosmos (reality), which is intelligible and rational (truth). Again we see, therefore, that, in spite of starting from experience, instead of from the mind, Locke also merely absolutises his own self, thereby side-stepping the actual experience of the real.

Hume, too, in spite of criticising the metaphysical character of Locke's substance and causality and declaring the self to constitute nothing but a bundle of feelings that are habitually found together nevertheless starts from men in his search for knowledge. He makes the sense impressions the only source of certain knowledge. Ideas are merely the reproductions of our sense impressions and possess a greater or lesser degree of vivacity. Only those ideas are true ideas that can be traced to an underlying sense-impression. Ideas of substance and causality cannot be traced to such sense-impressions. They rest on the frequent togetherness of certain phenomena that follow each other in succession, e.g., lightning is usually followed by thunder. The ideas of substance and causality are logical chimera. They emerge in the mind through the psychological act of association, according to the four laws of association, namely, resemblance, contrast, contiguity, and cause and effect. It is habit, i.e., the constant observation and experience of the togetherness of the same phenomena and feelings, that makes us believe in a material and immaterial substance (the self), and the regular succession of these phenomena gives us the idea of their necessarily being connected with each other, causality. Thus Hume concludes that science can only afford us probable knowledge, i.e., the more frequently natural phenomena are observed together, the more probable it is that they belong together. Science is therefore in constant need of revision. Only mathematics, on account of its analytical or tautological character, can give us certain knowledge.
This division is very important and reveals Hume's greatness. He has made the important discovery that we do not know for certain anything that we have not constituted ourselves. In other words, we cannot prove anything but ourselves, i.e., that which we have ourselves constituted. Hume has therefore discovered that certain knowledge constitutes nothing but the cycle of the self. In this discovery lies, in our opinion, the great importance of Hume's division of truth into truth of reason and truth of fact. But the latter, too, is constituted by man, for its real ground or source of verification is not the outside world, but man's impressions of the world of things, so that it, too, depends on the circle of the self, even though Hume has dissolved the self into a mere bundle of feelings. But this definition of the self, by which the concept of immaterial substance is deprived of its empirical source, is only the result of an analysis which itself is made within the circle of the self. In other words, this analysis starts from man, i.e., his feelings, and ends with man, i.e., the experience by man of the constant togetherness of these feelings in himself. It may also be said that this investigation of the self is made by the self from its existential hunger for truth and certainty. With Hume the true state of affairs is that, apart from mathematics, demonstrative truth is impossible. Man can thus have no demonstrative knowledge about the outside world, but common sense and the practical needs and interests of life make habit and belief the foundation of human existence.

Hume's is also the merit of having made the attempt at a clear separation of the scientific from the metaphysical sphere. By doing this he became the forerunner of Kant. Like Kant, he argues that God cannot be known, but must be believed. Belief for Hume, as for Kant, has a practical significance. It determines man's actions, his attitude towards life and his fellowman. With Hume, just as with Kant, faith follows from the limit of our knowledge, and, in this sense, has a rational, pragmatic, and common sense quality. In the end, therefore, Hume may be said to arrive at absolute truth by faith, which, by its practical nature, gives it the character of reality. In faith, again truth and reality appear to be combined, and by ........................
and by the act of striving faith man seems to be merged with it.

After these few remarks, which, we hope, have revealed man's untiring search for truth and reality, this striving manifesting itself in his continual effort of transforming becoming into being, the contingent into the essential, the changing into the lasting, the multiple into the general, so that truth is man-made and immanent, we shall proceed to a brief discussion of the problem of truth, reality, and actuality in Kant's and Hegel's thought as well as in the philosophy of Existentialism. We have already noticed in our discussion of the development of Grisebach's thought in our introductory chapter that Grisebach was fundamentally influenced by the two masters, by their epigones, and by Existentialism.
A. Kant's Transcendental Reality as the Foundation of Truth

(Metaphysics)

The controversy that was going on in the 17th and 18th century between dogmatism (rationalistic metaphysics resting on analytic judgments) and empiricism (stating categorically that all knowledge originates in experience) called for criticism to unite the two opposite "truths". Kant accomplished this unification by this transcendental method, which consists in prescribing to nature, the "Stoff .... der aus der Erfahrung zu uns quillt"¹), the laws of the understanding (categories). Thus nature becomes transcendental reality, i.e., it receives the character of functional laws, which possess universal validity. This transcendental reality must however not be confused with actuality, which is becoming and therefore dynamic. The former, however, is static and scientific. It is only part of actuality or else systematised actuality, in as much as Kant constructs it in his attempt to reconcile the warring factions of dogmatism and empiricism.

On the other hand, Kant's transcendental reality, though intelligible in character, is not the truth either. Here the nature of the concepts of the understanding as being composed of opposites is clearly revealed by the dialectical nature of the list of categories. Transcendental reality thus indicates the limit of human understanding or knowledge.

Kant, apart from the functional character of the mind, also realises the dynamic nature of man, his striving for the truth, which is an indispensable factor of actuality, i.e., of man's self-realisation in the form of continual cultural activity, which, as we have already pointed out, occurs in the face of contradiction on the part of his fellowman, and, on account of this conflict, is in a permanent stage of becoming. By actuality is thus meant the sphere of man's continual action on the grounds of the permanent crisis. It is the sphere of "Wirklichkeit" and "Geschehen" in the literal sense of these German words. In Kant's transcendental dialectics, the existential factor of self-realisation is accounted for by

by ascribing ........................

¹) O. Külpe, *Immanuel Kant*, p. 29
ascribing to the understanding not only an analytic, but also a dynamic quality. This latter quality causes the understanding to strive beyond itself in its attempt to conceive the conditions that determine the relations between phenomena in their totality, i.e., to comprehend the un-conditioned. In this act of striving, the understanding changes into reason as a higher form of the mind, and thus forms the noumena or ideas, which, according as they are outside the two perceptual forms of space and time through which the world of knowledge is constituted, so that they cannot represent knowledge.

By showing the dialectical character of the concepts of the understanding (categories) as well as the contradiction in which reason gets involved when pushing beyond the limit of the understanding (antinomies, which clearly reveal that the mind makes that its object of thinking which it has itself constituted, and then takes that for real which can in no way be verified by experience, which error Kant calls transcendental illusion), Kant has clearly pointed out the inaccessibility of the truth to the human mind, and, in accordance with the transcendental method, has confined philosophy (knowledge) not to actuality, but to transcendental reality.

But this solution of the Critique was not a final one. Kant clearly realised that man's striving for the absolute, the Ding-an-sich, was a fact, and that man would be satisfied only after he had found it. For only then would he get to know himself, his purpose, and the meaning of his existence, as Plato had already shown. Thus the search had to be continued, and The Critique of Pure Reason must be regarded as the pathfinder for The Critique of Practical Reason. Because Kant was unable to find the Ding-an-sich in the outside world, and by applying to the latter his mind found only the phenomena, which, however, pointed towards the Ding-an-sich, he began to analyse himself. There, beside reason, he found the will. Now this will did not fit into his functional scheme of the categories. In fact, it represented a category all by itself, in as much as it was

\[ \text{to Kant, have no constitutive, but merely regulative character} \]
as it was an initiating cause that could produce various effects. It, naturally, in the first instance, was directed towards the objects of the outside world and spontaneously aimed at happiness. In British thought, for example in the philosophy of John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, etc., the achievement of happiness is regarded as man's chief purpose. The German popular philosophers of the 18th century, too, notably Moses Mendelssohn, proclaimed that "The last desire of all creatures is joy". Kant, however, considers man's pursuit of happiness to be below his dignity as an autonomous being. To make happiness the goal of man's striving is for Kant the enslavement of man by the material world and by material values. Reason enabled man to become free, therefore it was in reason that man's autonomy consisted. And since man was able to free himself from material bondage, it was his duty to take a decision in this situation to be free and autonomous. This free act of the will, this choice of freedom would consist in the subjection of his will to his reason, or else in the rejection of all material aims towards which the will was previously intended. By this free act, the will became formalised and its previously material content was substituted by a rational one. In this way man from a world of experience would proceed to a rational world of form. As man was able to free himself from the material world if he so wished, it followed that he ought to do so. In other words, man could move from the world as it is to the world as it ought to be. In this ought, i.e., the subjection of the will to reason, consists Kant's categorical imperative, or the fulfilment of his duty, which puts man in a position to live up to the moral law and to standardise his actions in such a way that each of them could represent a universal law of action. The world of the ought was the new category which Kant had found by the subjection to reason of the will. Through this category, the universal law of action, i.e., the Ding-an-sich had been found. But the execution of duty and the living up to the moral law depended not only on reason, but just as much on faith. Kant's principle of performing one's duty for the sake of duty and of acting virtuously for the sake of virtue and not for the sake of any material or selfish ..............
selfish gain rests on the proposition "Thou oughtest, for thou canst". This proposition implies confidence in oneself and one's rational powers. In Kant's categorical imperative, therefore, faith and reason are combined, and in faith the categorical imperative links up with God's commandment. According to Kant, God desires man to be free, in fact, he has commanded him to be autonomous, but, as He also knows how weak man is, He has sent His Son to support man in his struggle for moral autonomy. What he fails to do by the rational act, he can complete through faith in Christ.

The above mentioned made it clear that Kant found the Ding-an-sich in the act of subjection of the will to reason. Here truth and reality fell together. In other words, in the formal ethical principle of duty, man was one with God. In performing his duty, he was simultaneously obeying God's commandment. Thus Kant believed that he had found the truth in the principle of duty, whereby he had overstepped actuality, because in this principle, all tension, conflict, and contradiction, on which all action depended, had been eliminated. This truth, therefore, stands in flagrant contradiction to Kant's transcendental reality, and yet the antithetical relation and mutual reference between the two can easily be recognised, for the moral law and freedom would be meaningless without the deterministic world of experience. The latter, therefore, serves as a foundation of truth. The moral impulse of man, which causes him to push beyond the deterministic, mechanistic world of experience and which, to Kant, was more certain and real than the existence of the outside world, leads him to his metaphysical postulates of freedom, immortality, and God, which do not represent knowledge, but a rational belief. Faith, therefore, and not knowledge, leads Kant to the truth. But in as much as Kant's faith is based on rational willing and not on experience, it is apriori faith. In other words, by formalising the will and making reason its content, Kant carries philosophy into the sphere of faith, or we may also say, he has rationalised theology.

From the above, it thus becomes clear that, according to Kant, truth and reality originally are separated and stand in an antithetical relation to one another.
one another. Reality, i.e., transcendental reality, is the result of the constitution by the mind of the world of experience. It is the limited functional world of man's understanding and knowledge. Truth, on the other hand, is the a priori world of rational faith. It is the result of man's dynamic striving beyond the mechanistic world of knowledge. It regulates man's life and makes it possible for him to free his will from the material world and direct it towards reason. Actuality is the process of man's striving towards truth, by which process man is led to take a decision and to move from the material world and direct it towards reason. Actuality is the process of man's striving towards truth, by which process man is led to take a decision and to move from the world as it is, i.e., from transcendental reality or the world as it appears to him, to the world as it ought to be, in which the Ding-an-sich reveals itself and in which true reality is found. In this moral world, as which is the world of moral duty and of moral faith, man at the same time obeys God's commandment. It follows that, in this world, where truth and reality fall together, actuality has been transcended.

Though Kant's merit in drawing a clear line between knowledge and faith, the finite and the absolute, cannot be denied, it is a pity that he moves morality into the sphere of the metaphysical, thereby separating it from the province of experience and knowledge to which it, in our opinion, belongs. We believe that he overestimates man's rational capacity, and, in requiring man to perform a purely formal act, the imperative of which consists solely in man's ability for rational autonomy and which lacks any material content, he imposes on man a task that is beyond his power. Man, as we shall yet see, cannot be autonomous in Kant's sense of the word, but is inextricably bound up with actuality or becoming. By the separation of morality from the sphere of knowledge and experience and by making the moral and metaphysical almost synonymous, so that the former links up with the absolute, Kant has induced the philosophers following him to reintegrate the absolute into the sphere of human knowledge. When this happens, truth ......................
truth and knowledge again become identical, and man virtually becomes God. The disastrous effects that flowed from such thinking are too well known to need retelling here.
B. Truth qua Reality as Knowledge (Hegel)

Kant had restricted knowledge to rationalised experience (transcendental reality), and truth was accessible only through rational apriori faith. But Kant's harsh metaphysics of duty and the struggle for freedom based on man's capability of being autonomous stretched man's resources to breaking point. Man yearned again for a rounded-off picture of the universe in which his part was more clearly determined and by which he was able to know the truth with certainty, and not only by a decision in favour of duty based on the faith in his ability to be autonomous. For this purpose, it was necessary to overcome Kant's dualism between functional mechanism and teleological dynamism, rationality and irrationality, knowledge and faith, subject and object.

To achieve the coincidentia oppositorum, Kant's dynamic reason or rationalised will in the new metaphysics became the absolute, i.e., the real ground and the essence of the universe. In this way Kant's personal moral God was converted into a pantheistic one, and truth manifested itself in the act of self-realisation or self-creation as a meaningful or rational act of purpose, i.e., the blending of man with the absolute. As, however, and act presupposes something on which to act, truth needed a counter-pole, which was posited by the subject, i.e., the absolute, as an object for the purpose of self-realisation. The subject constitutes the object in its act of externalisation or self-estrangement, which is the real world of opposites. Actuality takes its origin in the antithetical tension or contradiction existing between subject and object, which tension is finally overcome by the process of the subject's returning to itself, i.e., its original self-contained state. By this dialectical process of the absolute's returning to itself, which follows the pattern-thesis, antithesis, synthesis—the real world or the object is gradually overcome and is merged with the subject. Thereby actuality has been transcended and therefore ceases.

Whereas Fichte deduced the object or reality from the ego, i.e., by positing itself, the ego, via the individual selves of man, simultaneously

posits .................
posits the non-ego (which it is necessary for the ego to do, if it wishes to know itself as an ego and if it desires to overcome the non-ego as its limitation in order to be free), Schelling breaks through to reality by declaring that the universe is a subject-object which dialectically (on the pattern thesis-antithesis-synthesis) struggles towards self-consciousness in the human mind. In this creative process, Schelling recognises the self-realisation of the Indifferentiated Absolute, which is known by man through intellectual intuition. In other words, Schelling really breaks through to actuality (in the sense of the creative productivity or processes in nature), which reveals itself by a hierarchy of natural powers. This dialectical teleological process becomes conscious of itself in man's mind. When understood, however, subject and object, the ideal and the real, spirit and nature merge in man's consciousness. In Fichte's as well as in Schelling's case, actuality really ceases in man's mind in the event of his comprehending the dialectical relationship between subject and object as a rational principle. And when, by intellectual intuition, Fichte arrives at the Pure Ego and Schelling at his Indifferentiated Absolute, in which the breach of truth and reality, subject and object, the one and the many, has been healed, this act of intuition is nothing but the absolutisation of the human self, by which the absolute has become immanent and identical with man, and actuality has been transcended.

Hegel objects to the intellectual contemplation of both Fichte's Pure Ego and Schelling's Indifferentiated Absolute. But he returns to Fichte in as far as he insists on the logical method and the rational character of the absolute. He, however, rejects Fichte's ethical metaphysics, which in the non-ego only sees the training ground for duty that enables the self to free itself from material knowledge and to strive for virtue for virtue's sake, i.e., to be autonomous, and identifies logic with ontology, thinking with being. Not a Pure Ego or Indifferentiated Absolute, which man "intuits" in pure contemplation and which realises itself in a more or less

1) In connection with the above, cf. F. Schelling, System des transzendentalen Idealismus, esp. the 3rd main-chapter entitled, System der theoretischen Philosophie nach Grundsätzen des transzendentalen Idealismus, and the chapter on the Deduktion der produktiven Anschauung.
less rational manner, but reason itself is the truth and the real ground of the world. The absolute cannot be a Pure Ego, which it is only in terms of a non-ego and therefore is really nothing, because it has overcome the object, which is the presupposition for Fichte's subject, nor can it be a mere indiffereniated something, "a black cow in a black night" (as Hegel called it), for nothing definite could possibly come from it. But it is reason itself that differentiates and externalises itself, thus bringing about the external world, which, therefore, is subject to the dictates of reason and only in so far, i.e., in the form of notions and concepts, constitutes reality. That is why, for Hegel: that is reasonable is real; what is real is reasonable. It becomes clear, therefore, that reality is identical with knowledge; for the concept is the true object, which in man's mind is identical with the subject. Man, therefore, is the mysterious subject-object being in whose mind God (truth and reality) inhabits. 1)

As the Absolute Spirit (reason) aims at self-emancipation from its state or self-estrangement, externalisation or otherness, which state consists in nature (science) and history and in which process the Spirit passes through various phases each representing a greater measure of rationality or freedom (in science, these phases are represented by the mechanical physical and organic stage, in history the Spirit moves from the oriental period via the classical epoch, from Thales to Proclus, to the Christian era), it follows that in this process of the Spirit's returning to itself, objectivation (limitation) must be overcome by the dialectical method. By the triad thesis, antithesis, synthesis, the Spirit finally combines all antithetical concepts in the Pure-Concept. Here form and content, finite and infinite, subject and object are merged. The Pure Concept in its logical form is Truth, in its ontological form Being, in its ethical form Goodness, in its aesthetic form Beauty, and in its religious form God. It is in the dialectical movement of the Spirit, as it becomes conscious of itself in man's mind, that Hegel's actuality consists. But again it is terminated in man's consciousness when the movement of the spirit is comprehended as a dialectical principle and is transcended by the self-transcendence of man in the form of the universal concept.

In the

1) Cf. J. Hommes, Kommunistische Ideologie und christliche Philosophie, p.16
In the ethical sphere, we find the objective spirit, i.e., the Spirit returning to itself in the form of history. There the individual is linked with the absolute through the state, which, through individual states come and go and are superseded by others, is an ethical idea, the spirit of the people having become visible, and its only true and full realisation is universal history.\(^1\) It follows that the moral act consists in man’s subordinating his own will to the general will of the people as an expression of reason. The state, therefore, represents a moral order resting on the general will of the people. Man is free only by the reasonable act of blending his own will into the general will, thereby fusing with the moral order of the state, which we saw, represented an ethical idea. Through reason, which, as an ethical idea, merges with the Spirit.

As it is man who becomes conscious of the process of the self-realisation of the absolute through the act of externalisation and return to itself, it follows that, through his mind, man becomes God, for God, or the Spirit, inhabits in his mind, and by the rational act of blending himself into the Spirit, i.e., comprehending the antithetical nature of the concepts by the Pure or Universal Concept, man virtually elevates himself to the deity.

Through man’s ability to arrive at the Pure Concept by abstraction, the coincidentia oppositorum is realised and reality and truth (which before had been separated in that the real world represented the self-estrangement of truth in the form of antithetical concepts) fall together. But as this was the case, nature had been subordinated to reason from the very start, and the more rational a notion or concept was, the more real it was. It follows that the Pure Concept, which is the most rational, must also be the most real, and hence constitutes absolute knowledge.

By this deductive method, i.e., the deduction of actuality from reason, Hegel has caused man to transcend himself and actuality. By making reason the real ground of the universe in its dynamic form, all worldly processes and events were reasonable processes and events representing knowledge; for reason had to be everywhere and everytime identical with itself. It followed that ......................

\(^1\) Cf. \textit{W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy}, pp.613-614

\(\therefore\) therefore, man’s individual self is blended into the general self, the state,
that man's mind, being of a rational character, was likewise identical with reason, and, as the reasonable was the real, with nature.

From the above discussion is becomes clear that speculative metaphysics was founded on the law of identity or the immanence in the human mind of the absolute principle. It was in this way that, by self-realisation, man was able to fuse with the absolute, but as this absolute was an absolute constituted by man's mind, it follows that this fusion represented a circle of the self. We also observed that, if the absolute is identical with the Christian God, religion, too, is rationalised. It, too, becomes only one of the cultural goods constituted by the human mind, and becomes level with the other aspects of the absolute: science (Truth), history (Reality), arts (Beauty). In this way, the Christian faith is converted into a Christian culture.
C. Truth qua Self-Creation in the Face of the Existential Situation

According to the Philosophy of Existence, Dasein or existence is a mode of being. It is therefore of ontological significance from the very start, even there where, as in the case of Jaspers and Sartre, it does not represent a fundamental ontology, as in the case of Heidegger, but could be described as phenomenological. For in both cases, the analysis and elucidation of the phenomenon of Dasein or being-there, which is called by JaspersExistenzerhellung, reveals the real structure of human existence. We may thus say with impunity, that, in this real structure of existence, truth and reality, subject and object fall together. It does not matter that in each case we do not understand or comprehend the absolute, but that it encounters us in the failure we experience in the Grenzsituation or border-situation (Jaspers); in the Seinsgeschickte of our ex-sistence or that which is imposed upon man by being as his destiny, namely, to be the Hüter des Seins or the guardian of being, which is the raison d'être of our ex-sistence, which latter is therefore the Lichtung des Seins or clearance of being (Heidegger); or in the failure of the Pour-Soi, i.e., human mind or consciousness (natura naturans) to become an En-Soi, i.e., thing (natura naturata), by which failure the mind is condemned to be nothing, i.e., free from the nauseating obtrusiveness of the material object or dull, solid, unconscious nature in general, so that the nothing becomes identical with truth (Sartre).

In all three cases, the existing individual is a bridge to the absolute, no matter whether this existence is regarded as an orientation of the individual towards the absolute by the rational acceptance of the irrational occurring in the real world and regarding it as the source of a better reasonableness, by which the Sprung zur Transzendenz or jump to the transcendent takes place (Jaspers); as ex-sistence, i.e., human existence as the clearance of being or the standing-out of the self towards the absolute (Heidegger); or as the turning away of the individual from the world of things, the En-Soi as a result of nausea, i.e., the continual failure of the ..................
of the mind to gain a foothold in the world of things and so to overcome its nothingness and become something, only to experience its condemnation to freedom and nothingness, so that, in order to obtain peace, the mind plunges into the nothing; thereby bringing the Pour-Soi of the mind to its natural fulfilment (Sartre).

In all three cases, therefore, actuality consists in man's decision in favour of freedom, i.e., in favour of his true self as a bridge to the absolute. Man has been thrown into a situation in which he must wrest himself free from what Heidegger has called the Man or the anonymous id, (i.e., the objective world of the intellect, the sciences, logic, and idealist metaphysics), and must come to face himself as real self (Selbstsein), as that which he really is in his peculiar situation, namely, perishable, periodic, becoming, i.e., being and nothing, existing and non-existing at the same time. Hence the self is a relative intended towards the absolute, a bridge between the finite and the infinite, even though the absolute might be death as the natural fulfilment of man's life (Heidegger) or infinite nothing (Sartre).

It is true that the realisation by man of being thrown into the nothing, das Hineingeworfensein in das Nichts, will result in the experience of Angst or anxiety, but at the same time this anxiety, which leads to Sorge or care (Heidegger), has a purging effect. The resolution of being oneself in the above sense, Entschlossenheit, i.e., being determined to keep oneself open to one's real self, would constitute Treue or fidelity to real existence or the true nature of the self. It leads to freedom from the fetters and chains of the intellect and the material world, and allows us to perform our true function, namely, to enter into communication with the absolute through our very being-there, in which the absolute in some form or other reveals itself.

By the existential choice of freedom in the above sense, however (i.e., the turning away from the outside world towards some absolute, the existence of which can be known only through a No, i.e., the very limitedness, periodicity, and perishableness of man's existence and accordingly can only be described .....

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described in negative terms in compliance with man's respective experience, e.g., Kierkegaard's "objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the passionate inwardness"; Marcel's "ontological mystery"; Heidegger's "being-to-death"; Jasper's "truth or being evidenced through failure" (Das Scheitern ist das Letzte); Sartre's "Nothing qua Truth"), actuality has been overcome. The act of turning away from the outside world, seeking real existence in man's very being-there, has thrown man entirely upon himself. The objective world no longer represents for man a pole of communication, but is merely instrumental to his world orientation (Jaspers), i.e., to finding his own essence or meaning in the real structure of his Dasein or being-there. Instead of communication with other existents (natural objects), man experiences the latter only as Zeug or stuff. They are no longer vorhanden (existing in themselves), but they become zuhanden (man's instruments of orientation). In other words, they are merely instrumental in revealing the subject's real structure of existence. As now this real structure of existence forms the bridge to the absolute, so that, through it, the latter's existence is revealed, we are justified in saying that, in it, truth and reality, subject and object fall together. As we know nothing about the absolute, except its No (which at the same time is a Yes in that through our limitedness, finiteness, perishability, etc., we are conscious not only of that which limits and terminates us, but also of ourselves as a self) as revealed to us in the real structure of our existence, it stands to reason that man (or the subject) really communicates only with himself, thereby arriving eventually at the nothing as it manifests itself in particular in Sartre's philosophy. Without outside communication, however, man is really nothing, so that Sartre's thought may be regarded as the consistent outcome of the Philosophy of Existence. As Heimann puts it in his book Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, the Existo, ergo sum, which represented a protest against the Cogito, ergo sum, from man-with-the-world-himself, has changed into man-against-the-world and man-against-himself. Again, as in all previous cases, man has been led not only to alienation from the world, but to self-estrangement as well. Whether, to come back to
C.A. van Peursen's division we mentioned previously, we take man in the mythological that period, the rationalistic what period, or the contemporary functional how period makes no difference at all, in all these cases man keeps moving within the circle of the self, thus missing real experience.

In Existential thought, now, man may be said to have become mere function without a real content. Or, as Heinemann puts it in Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, the attempt has been made to systematise the principle of life itself, which defies systematisation. Existentialism makes the mistake of assuming that natura naturans (mind) can exist without natura naturata (thing), thereby reducing mind to nothingness in the sense of being orientated to something which it cannot think. It follows that the relation to the absolute is not a relation to a really existing absolute either; for all the so-called existentials (which are according to Heidegger: anxiety, being-in-the-world, care, understanding, mood, the being-thrown-into-the-world, according to Jaspers: existence as self, communication with others, love, anxiety, loneliness, the border-situation, the possibility to push through to the absolute, self-deification, play, shame, awareness of historicity, and according to Sartre: anxiety and the meaninglessness of life) are really imminent, i.e., modes of human existence through the absolute reveals itself as the unknown or the nothing. It follows that the absolute in this form, too, is one constituted by man, but on account of its negative character, man's relation to it really turns out to be an imminent relation of man's contradictoriness, i.e., a relation of man's own fluctuation between being and nothing, existence and non-existence, wanting-to-know and not-knowing, wanting-to-have and not-having. It is this idea of man's broken nature causing him to suffer that has greatly influenced Grisebach's critical writings; but realising the danger of side-stepping the eminent again if it were conceived as a dialectical principle in which the absolute was reflected, he ultimately sought real experience in the very moment of man's bearing in passion the contradiction on the part of his fellowman, through which his self would be terminated, and he would experience peace.

The relation.................
The relation between man and the absolute in Existentialist thought having been exposed as an immanent principle resulting from man's inner broken and contradictory nature, it stands to reason that this relation is really void of all content in the sense that it does not really connect man's mind with an object that is not constituted by the mind itself and exists independently of it. On the contrary, man becomes his own object in the sense that the principle of human existence is systematised and transcended. This systematisation, no less than the systematisation of the self in Kant's and Hegel's philosophy, represents an act of self-transcendence, in which truth and reality, essence and existence are again merged, and actuality has been overstepped.
Chapter II

IN SEARCH OF A PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION

In the preceding historical survey, it became clearer that man's activity, in the search for truth and reality, was always in the end transcended by the constitution of some real ground on which truth and reality fell together.

In the age of primitive man, the deity was brought into man's reach by means of magic. In ancient Greek philosophy, the real ground or the absolute was constituted by rational, speculative thought. In the Middle Ages, it was rationalised faith by which the real ground (the Christian God) was embraced. During the period of Enlightenment, the rationalistic school of thought discovered the real ground in the a priori character of man's mind, while the empirical school found it in human experience, which it was the task of reason to analyse, thus arriving at knowledge or truth.

We observe further that it was Kant, who, by his transcendental method, combined the two truths of the rational and empirical school. By the prescription to nature of the laws of the understanding, it becomes transcendental reality, which at the same time constitutes the limit of man's knowledge and understanding. It represents the real world. Unfortunately, Kant does not include in it the moral world. The latter is relegated to the sphere of reason, so that it is deprived of any material content, merely representing a rational formal principle, the categorical imperative. Through a free act of the will, man can live up to the moral law. Through the act of subordinating his will to reason, thus freeing it from material bonds and so becoming autonomous, man links up with the absolute. This act, therefore, constitutes man's self-transcendence in which truth and reality fall together.

The separation of the world of knowledge or understanding from the world of reason and the relegation to the latter of the moral/induced Kant's successors to reintegrate into the sphere of human knowledge the absolute, so that the real world and the world of truth again formed one inseparable whole in the sense that both could be known. This could, however, be the case only if the real ground or the absolute was in some form or other immanent in man's mind. Not that it was less immanent in Kant's case, but
there it was actually rationalised faith and not knowledge that caused man to merge with it. Kant's successors, no less than Kant, kept moving within the circle of the self. They have that in common with Kant that they use the outside world as a stepping stone for the constitution of a rational self in which the absolute is mirrored.

Fichte uses the world (non-ego) as gymnasium or moral training ground for the constitution of his rational ought, through which the individual self links up with the Pure Ego. Schelling makes the world or nature struggle through to man's consciousness, which, as a product of nature, is in a position to grasp the purpose of the natural process as consisting in returning to its real ground. Thereby man's purpose has also been disclosed. It consists in being free, i.e., in overcoming his selfish interests, which separate him from the whole. In this rational act, the self merges with the natural process and through it with the absolute. Hegel constitutes the self through recognising in the mind the abode of absolute reason. The will is subordinated to reason, so that reality is constituted by antithetical rational concepts, which, in the mind, are dialectically merged in the Pure Concept or reason as such. It is this dialectical process which, by Hegel, is called the self-creation of man, by which nature, in the sense of the irrational, has been entirely overcome, and man is free, or one with truth and reality.

In Existentialist thought, the self is constituted from man's very existence as an existence towards the transcendent. This transcendent itself is however constituted from man's very being-there, which, as an existence to the nothing, reflects the negative character of the absolute. Man's existence as being intended towards the absolute, therefore, represents an act of self-transcendence, in which truth and reality fall together.

It is thus easy to see that all these processes of man's merging with a self-constituted absolute estrange man from himself and from the world. They represent nothing but man's self-transcendence or the absolutisation of the human self. They turn man into a god, which causes him to become dogmatic and self.
and self-righteous. By starting from the law of identity, thus making the world conformant with man's mind, which, as we saw, estranges man from the actual world and thereby also from himself, philosophy has led man into isolation, in which he is completely inactive. By overcoming all resistance, conflict, and contradiction, man is levelled with and absorbed by some impersonal something, a material or ideal id, so that he is really nothing any more.

In the light of this result, it becomes clear that man can never overcome the world, nor is this desirable. Man's very existence depends on his incessant activity in a world of everlasting change and becoming; and this world is no homogeneous world of reason, but one of conflict and contradiction. This conflict and contradiction man experiences in all spheres of life, in his feelings, his reasoning, his judgments, and his concepts. There is not a single field of human activity where this state of affairs does not prevail, where the irrational does not play a part, no matter whether it concerns man's private outlook, the arts or the sciences - mathematics and logic included.

It follows that reality cannot be deduced from a presumed real ground of a priori nature. The question arises: Is the truth or the real ground accessible at all to the human mind, or must it be sought in the human constitutive activity itself? For are not the rational and irrational combined in man's very activity of constantly moulding the raw material as given in his experience, and do not the various historical forms of culture come into being through this activity?

To enquire into this problem was the first task the young disciple of philosophy, Eberhard Grisebach, set himself. The results of this research are recorded in the form of his Doctor's dissertation entitled: Kultur als Formbildung. This piece of work shows us that he was wide awake to the hollowness and emptiness of the prevailing cultural values of the Bourgeois society during the last decade before the outbreak of the First World War. Together with the younger generation of his time, he felt the urgent need for a change. ............

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a change. This generation was no longer content with the discussion of theoretical and methodological questions and problems that were still in full swing within the school of neo-Kantianism. It clamoured for action. In Rudolf Eucken's *Tatphilosophie*, he recognised the possibility of identifying philosophy with the creative cultural act, without having to discard altogether the rationalism of the neo-Kantians. It furnished him with a method for his own first independent enquiry, the results of which, in the form of his doctoral dissertation, were published in 1910.

In this dissertation all of Grisebach's previous philosophical impressions are combined. In it are reflected the idea of the neo-Kantians (Fichte, Windelband), of the *eternal logos* that reveals itself in history, the doctrine of the pragmatists that truth must harmonise with the prevailing social conditions, and Eucken's philosophy of the spirit, according to which the task of man, in whose consciousness the natural and historical process realises itself, is clearly outlined. This task is to participate in the construction of the specific cultural structure of his time, by which cultural act man blends himself into the ever-changing-and becoming-spirit. This philosophy could be said to constitute a synthesis between William James's personalism, the doctrine of the multiversum as a *clash of wills*, and the idealism of the neo-Kantians, i.e., their doctrine of the *eternal logos*. But perhaps the most remarkable feature that we encounter in this work is Grisebach's constructivist and creative disposition, his urge to build, which never gets lost, not even later, when his philosophy has turned radically critical. Doubtlessly, Grisebach's architectural and artistic inclination is one of his most pronounced characteristics. It is perhaps because of this strong urge in him that he realised so keenly its temptations and that, in the course of his untiring search for the truth, as we shall see later, he eventually came to react so sharply against man's constitutive activity. That the urge to build is traceable throughout all his works and never entirely left him is proved by the part of his book: *Die Schicksalsfrage des Aband­landes*, entitled: *Aufbauge danken*.

It is thus not surprising that Grisebach finds, in the creative activity of the ..........
of the artist, a model for a Philosophy of Action, which, though rooted in individual experience, i.e., the constant creative and forming activity of man in a peculiar situation, nevertheless expresses and interminable timeless series of possibilities for man to mould new cultural forms, thereby widening his consciousness more and more. This shows that, besides the influence of the neo-Kantians, the Pragmatists, and Rudolf Eucken, there is definitely also the influence on this first work of Grisebach's of Wilhelm Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie, to which he devotes a considerable part in his thesis of habilitation as a university lecturer, entitled: Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart.

In Kultur als Formbildung, Grisebach's search for a Philosophy of Action is clearly shown by the formulation of his aim, which reads as follows:


Grisebach, referring to the mural paintings of Ferdinand Hodler (which in their monumentality are accessible not only to the connoisseur, but to everyone) links up with the creative act and seeks to demonstrate the meaning of philosophy for the common active man. In order to have meaning for everyone, philosophy must make the attempt to extract from man's cultural activity the fundamental elements, general features and units. For this reason:

"Die Philosophie strebt nach Monumentalität, die ohne Vereinfachung nicht möglich ist. 2)

By the identification of philosophy with the cultural act of man, i.e., the act of giving form to some raw material of whatever nature, Grisebach turns from the mere,.............

1) p. 8
2) Kultur als Formbildung, p. 9
from the mere theoreticians, the "thinkers of thinking" 1) (who sharpen the tool and instruct us in their use, but who easily lose contact with life and keep on sharpening their tools, without ever appearing on the building site) to practical productive man. Philosophy thus means the re-thinking of the cultural act as such. In this forming activity of man, therefore, nature is no longer subordinated to the spirit, but is equivalent to it.

With the German poet and thinker Goethe we could say that spirit is nature and nature is spirit. From this it follows that the real ground is no longer regarded as existing outside man's mind in the sense that man strives towards it by trying to overcome nature and his individuality, but it is found in the very cultural activity of man himself. In man nature contemplates itself. This self-contemplation is its real aim. That is why from our contemplation of nature we are able to construct its evolution. Nature, already, contains a spiritual element, namely, the organism, which constitutes a conceptual unit. The spirit now seems to surpass the organic forms becomes evident for instance, in the work of art. The artistic form has no immediate connection with the natural form. It is the continuation of the phenomenal form in the spirit. The artistic form represents the infinite; that is why the artist, in his creative work, experiences such bliss, which has nothing to do with pragmatic happiness as it occurs in English philosophy.

From the above description we observe that Grisebach distinguishes three stages in the evolution of artistic and moral forms as the picture of outer and inner perception: Chaos, the possession of form, and the original form. The latter is the living element, the dynamic factor, which keeps going the creative process, i.e., the emergence of new cultural forms. The original form, which separates the dead from the living, the genuine, original new creation from mere imitation, carries us away from the past and causes us to strive beyond the present, thus turning towards the future.

In the field of outer perception, it is what Grisebach calls Sichtbarkeit or visibility that constitutes a common element in the enormous number of forms. Sichtbarkeit Grisebach calls the object of seeing. It is a modality of reality and constitutes the process of moulding the various points of representation into one coherent intelligible whole:

1) Kultur als Formbildung, p.8
Die Sichtbarkeit also wird im Geiste geformt, das Auge ist nur das vermittelndes Organ, das nach dem geistigen Vorbild eine Verknüpfung von punktuellen Vorstellungen zu einer Form vollzieht. 

The spirit, now, has the unlimited capability of creating such forms, but as the concept of visibility is applicable only to a finite historical development, each new shaping of form means a widening of form and of consciousness in the direction of the infinite. It is this expansion that is the action of the spirit, and it is especially the analysis and synthesis of visibility by art that has produced a concrete picture of intensive infinity. In other words, visibility is the process of converting the chaotic content of consciousness into general forms of perception, forms of space and time, under the same characteristics of position and light as they have when they become the common possession of men. This second stage is followed up by the historical norms of visibility, which constitute the transition stage to the third one, namely, that of the newly created original forms, Eigenformen.

It is in connection with the historical stage of visibility that we observe how, each year, the crown of each tree (new creations of the spirit), from the atmosphere (the spirit as such) carries fresh vital forces to the trunk of the tree (visibility with all historical variations of form), thus widening its girth (man's consciousness), which in turn supplies the leaves with the stuff that the stem with its roots draws from the earth. By this picture it becomes obvious that there exists an organic connection between the new creations of the spirit (Eigenformen) with the older forms. The former are unthinkable without the latter. It follows that the evolution of nature becomes real in man's mind, and that the widening of man's consciousness or the growth of man's mind occurs through the evolution of nature. This reciprocal process becomes perceptible by the succession of various cultural forms and epochs.

It is thus obvious that Grisebach rejects Kant's transcendental realism as well as his transcendental idealism. For the thing-in-itself lies in the

very .................................. 

1) Op. cit., p. 25
very movement of the spirit from chaos to form and from form to form. Form, therefore, cannot be something static, but is something that has become and is in turn superceded, by something new. This new original form (Eigenform) will be created by a few outstanding minds, whereas the more average minds will have to content themselves with the limitation of a foreign form, that is, a form that was not created by themselves, but by someone else in the past.

At this stage already the meaning of Grisebach's organic philosophy becomes clear to us. By his demand for a new form, he betrays the strong need for creative action and change by the young generation at the opening of the 20th century. This demand implies that there was too much imitation of older forms. Perhaps this was a dig against the still powerful Hegelianism, which, at the beginning of the 20th century had received a new impetus in the form of neo-Hegelianism (Freyer, Glockner, Naering, Litt, Bosanquet, Bradley, Croce, Royce, Bolland, Mc Taggart), and, certainly, it was also directed against the one-sided rationalism of the neo-Kantians. Nevertheless, even though Grisebach knows no other transcendent than infinity, the infinite action of the spirit of producing the intelligible form shows that Grisebach's now original form has grown upon the forms of the past, namely, those of both Hegel and the neo-Kantians combined. Even though he absolute is regarded as outside man's reach, it is inherent in man's cultural activity, thus causing him to move in its direction. In other words, in man's cultural activity the eternal intelligent activity of the spirit is reflected, so that, again, the absolute is really immanent and, again, man, as an agent of the spirit, creates himself. He lends form to his chaotic sensations, distinguishes forms in their historical order and develops a new form of visibility, which sets him apart from all other forms and gives him the impression of progress.

There is no doubt that Grisebach's first philosophical work joins thinkers such as Rudolf Eucken and Wilhelm Dilthey in their attempt to bring philosophy down.

1) Kultur als Formbildung, p. 28
sophy down to earth from its metaphysical and rationalistic sublimity. It, above all, gains value by giving expression to the need for action of a generation, which keenly felt the hollowness and emptiness of the prevalent cultural values of the time, which no longer coincided with the interests of the new age. Seen in this light, Grisebach proves a typical representative of a generation that was soon to go to war with lofty ideals and was to die on the battle-fields of Poland, Flanders, and northern France. Grisebach's first philosophical work may thus be called a typical example of the spirit of the new age, the dawning 20th century, which was alive with bustling activity. The young German Emperor himself seemed to have taken up a new, more realistic course, his highest ambition being to win over the working class from the Marxist doctrine. In the reform of German education, too, the Emperor took a lively interest. At the celebrated Berlin School Conference of 1890, the reigning emperor stated the new view admirably.

"First of all, a national basis is wanting in the Gymnasien. Their foundation must be German. It is our duty to educate men to become young Germans and not young Greeks and Romans.

1) The young Empire provided innumerable opportunities for man's creative action. In science, industry, commerce, but in the various fields of art, too, the new creative spirit seemed to break through everywhere. It is not surprising, therefore, that the young generation glowed with enthusiasm and that the cry for creative action was heard throughout the land. The identification of philosophy with man's creative cultural activity was thus in full agreement with the needs and interests of the new age. Only such a Philosophy of Action could restore the lowered prestige of philosophy, which had been largely superceded by the sciences. And yet there were dangerous pitfalls and delusion in this new philosophy as well.

In the first place, in spite of the attempt to restrict Philosophy to man's creative act, it was still far too idealistic. It was still, as we have shown, based on the law of identity, i.e., on the identity of nature and spirit. And though allowance was made for a struggle of forms, in which the

most ...........................................

1) Quoted from S.P. Duggen, A Student's Textbook in the History of Education, p. 376
most original forms would prove victorious, yet, in the end, the spirit, at least for a while, overcame the conflict, and, always, this process took place in man's mind. Only through the creative process or through visibility did nature become real, i.e., only through the mind did it receive its form, and only through the mind were new forms created. The spirit, therefore, manifested itself in an everchanging and becoming consciousness, which was continually widening, i.e., moving in the direction of the absolute. That this must be so, becomes evident by the uncritical assumption of a productive or creative spirit, which causes the whole process of the evolution of new forms to go on infinitely:

Die Entwicklung der Anschauungsweise ist zugleich die Formbildung im Geist. 1)

or

Erst wenn eine junge Generation einen neuen Lebensquell im Geiste erschliesst und aus der Unendlichkeit eine neue Erkenntnis der Sichtbarkeit aufbaut, erst dann vermag sich die Kultur zu erneuern und den Reichtum des Lebendigen zu nutzen. 2)

It is evident that such a philosophy contains in itself great dangers. The doctrine that only a few minds will keep in step with the spirit (which is a modification of Plato's idea of natural selection, i.e., the natural capability of gaining rational insight into the Good of only a few sages) inevitably will produce an elite that will consider itself the messengers and torchbearers of the spirit. There is the danger that it transcends actuality, which (as we shall yet see) consists in conflict and contradiction, thereby transcending itself. This new elite, which hearkens to something that is a bare assumption, i.e., the spirit, may, in keeping its gaze fixed upon the absolute, ignore the interests and needs of the majority, that is, of the more average ones, and it may, therefore, fail to understand and completely misjudge the actual situation. And was this not what happened to German academic youth? Doubtlessly spurred on by high ideals and the most noble intentions, it nevertheless increasingly lost contact with actual life. Not only did the gulf between the academicians and the working men become wider and wider, so that the plain

1) Kultur als Formbildung, p. 19
2) Op. cit., p. 33
form through it. It follows that the absolute is inherent in man's creative activity, so that, through it, man is drawn to the whole. 1) The absolute always directs beyond the existing form and leads to the creation of new forms, whereby the creation of nature takes place before our very eyes. The universe is thus in us, and we are in the universe. As, however, the creation of new forms is brought about by only a few and the average majority is left behind, it follows that, strictly speaking, only these few are in step with the spirit and therefore with truth and reality. And does it not also follow that, strictly speaking, only the really creative minds are free and virtuous? For if the cultural form is synonymous with the ethical form in that both are developed by the creative act, the only difference being that the former is outer perception, (i.e., the concretion of the spirit in the cultural system), while the latter is inner perception (i.e., self-contemplation of the spirit in the form of man's consciousness or sameness), it follows that the authentic creative act of producing new original forms at the same time is a moral act. It must therefore be concluded that only original minds possess true insight and virtue. For even though their new creations depend upon the forms of the past and constitute only a widening of the whole, the past is dead; and only in the creative activity of the present, which directs our attention to the future, i.e., the emergence of new forms, the spirit manifests itself again. The imitators of the past handle the dead branches of the ever-growing tree of life. But they, according to Grisebach, represent the majority. How can there ever be harmony between the few originators and the average imitative majority? And what if the original minds pursue an aim that is a phantom and that is based on a mere assumption, such as the creative spirit, for instance? What if in reality they move only within the cycle of the self, and the creative act proves no more than the creation of the self by the self? For what else is the creative act but the projection of the self into nature, whereby nature is adjusted to the self, becomes identical with it, and, finally, by

the basic ..................

1) Kultur und Formbildung, p.62
the basic assumption of an infinite spirit, the self evolves into a general self? Already in our discussion of external perception or the cultural form, we pointed out the disastrous consequences of such a philosophy.

In terms of our chief enquiry, namely, our investigation of the problem of truth and reality, we are justified in stating that, in Grisebach's *Philosophy of Actuality* or *Philosophy of the Cultural Form*, both truth and reality are combined in man's original creative act. This act may be regarded as the link between the chaotic material world and the purposive intelligible world. For through this act, the chaotic material world (which may be compared with non-existence) becomes real in the sense that it receives form, thus becoming an intelligible something. And as it may be said to receive its intelligible character from the true or the absolute (the active spirit), it follows that, by the creative act (the result of which is the cultural and ethical form) subject and object, reality and truth become one. Put forward in a formula, Grisebach's *Philosophy of Action* may be described as *Actuality qua Truth—Reality*, in the sense that in actuality the absolute is reflected in a relative form.

But even though Grisebach, in his first enquiry into a *Philosophy of Action*, is still very idealistic, in spite of all the realistic trappings, it must be conceded that it is a commendable attempt to bring philosophy down to actuality. Unfortunately, man's activity concerning the cultural goods is still seen against a rather Utopian and mythological background, which tends to lead man in a direction where he must needs land himself in isolation and estrange himself from the world again. But Grisebach did not let up in his praiseworthy effort of bringing philosophy down to earth and relentlessly continued his research into the problem of truth and reality. His whole life may be said to have been consecrated to the task of tracing a real that was not merely an assumption in the form of a self-constituted real ground, something of which man disposed, but something that disposed man, determined his activity, and gave a steady course to his life. Again and again Grisebach tried. If we study his works in their chronological succession, we find that each .................
that each of them constitutes an attempt to come nearer to the real in the above sense. Thus even though in his Philosophy of the Cultural Forms the real definitely is still immanent in the sense that it is contained in man's creative act as a rational act, this work should be seen in context with his other works. It then becomes clear that it is the first stepping stone on the long way to a Philosophy of Action in which the real is no longer within man's reach, but, on the contrary, is that which puts in question all his constitutive activity, his efforts, and his striving. In short, it is then, that which terminates his self.
CHAPTER III

TRUTH AS THE CREATION OF CULTURE

Grisebach's thesis of habilitation entitled: *Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart* is the continuation of his doctoral dissertation in the sense that it is a step forward in the direction of a Philosophy of Action. In this work the irrational is definitely included in the real. It is no longer regarded as merely chaotic. The psychological experience of becoming is the foundation of a meaningful and intelligible world. The spirit no longer simply manifests itself in the mere act of creating form, one rising out of the other, but it does much more: It weaves psychological experience into the meaningful web of man's cultural activity, in which the past is still alive in man's present experience and causes man to work in the direction of the future. Spirit, much more clearly than in Grisebach's preceding work, is separated from mere intellect.

In *Kultur und Formbildung* Grisebach still observed an identity between art and philosophy, which chiefly rested on the doctrine of visibility. We remember that it was by visibility that the artistic form was produced, while the ethical rested on the sameness of consciousness. By the identification of the spirit with the forming spirit, the rational element is still predominant in this work.

Moreover, in the form, science and art merged, for both, scientific and artistic form, rest on visibility, which knits the chaotic into an intelligible whole. But as it was the artistic form that represented the infinite, it was superior to the natural form. It alone reached up to the absolute.

Thus, though visibility in both cases, i.e., in the case of the natural as well as the artistic form, represents the chief instrument of knowledge, the visibility of the artistic form is vastly superior, in that, through it, we gain some knowledge of the absolute.

But now Grisebach encounters certain difficulties. It is true that, in the artistic form, the gulf between subject and object has been overcome, but how do the manifold forms, which inevitably emerge, permit an expansion to the ..................
to the general, except by abstraction? In this connection it becomes clear that Grisebach was not satisfied with the result achieved in *Kultur und Formbildung*; for there the artistic form was only an abstraction from the manifold forms of the multiple artistic creations. He thus seeks new ways of expanding towards the general in a less rational and more real manner.

In science, whose method Grisebach conceives to be nearer to that of philosophy than the artistic method, the difficulty presents itself in precisely the opposite way, namely, in penetrating from the general to the concrete individual.

The realisation of these difficulties by Grisebach shows that he was aware of the still abstract nature of his form in *Kultur und Formbildung* and its lacking a link with the concrete individual.

From the above it follows that in both attempts, to reach the general from concrete spiritual life (aesthetic disposition) or to penetrate from the general (rational) to the concrete individual (empirical) (scientific disposition), Grisebach, together with Rudolf Eucken, sees only two individual processes. It is possible for philosophy to lift itself above these processes by seeking to carve out general fundamental features from its own history, the becoming of a general world. In the History of Philosophy, therefore, the arts, science, and also religion represent only specific functions of an all-embracing spiritual life. They now furnish philosophy with the material of spiritual moulding from which it works out the general, thereby overcoming the subject-object relation.

It is in this way that Grisebach hopes to arrive at a general philosophical method independent of the individual philosophical thinker, a method that comprises all individual methods.

At this stage already, it can be seen that all these individual philosophical methods, in their ultimate meaning, must point to the all-embracing creative activity of the spirit, the cultural act as such. But now this .................
now this cultural act is much more than the creation of new forms. It now represents the Volltat, the full-blooded deed, which is valued by a timological Good, i.e., a value in terms of which the creative activity of the spirit is good. The cultural act, though firmly rooted in psychological experience, is identical with the activity of the all-embracing spirit that weaves the carpet of cultural history. Its form is no longer an abstraction from other individual forms, but is inherent in the spirit's endless creative activity, which increases life and through which man receives its everlasting but meaningful and purposive task of deploying all his spiritual and creative powers in building in the direction of the absolute.

In order to show how all the various individual philosophical methods have a common ground in that they all point to one superpersonal method, whereby philosophy loses its confusing character and attains to clarity, Grisebach makes use of the systems of Wilhelm Dilthey, Georg Simmel, Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Windelband and Rudolf Eucken. In Dilthey and Simmel, he recognises the aesthetic and in Rickert and Windelband the scientific approach. In Eucken, he finds the synthesis of these two antithetical approaches, where science and art are encompassed by the religious sphere, the above mentioned all-embracing activity of the spirit in which the irrational and the rational are combined.

Both Dilthey and Simmel start from the experience of the concrete individual, and from there seek to arrive at objective relations. According to them, the scientific method can never break through to reality. By trying to subject nature to self-constituted rational forms and elements, natural science, more and more, moves away from reality. It cannot explain the real character of the outside world. Nature remains foreign to the spirit. It is therefore by the historical method that we gain access to reality.

Accordingly, Dilthey seeks the common elements in the different perspectives and Weltanschauungen of man. He analyses man's consciousness and, by the description .....................
description of the mind's psychological processes, endeavours to carve out a homogeneous structural connection of all teleological systems. This structure is called by Dilthey the Objective Spirit, which embedded in the totality of spiritual life, gains in circumference: "In diesem objectiven Geiste sind die Vergangenheiten, in denen sich die grossen Tatkrafte der Geschichte gebildet haben, Gegenwart." 1)

This is not the occasion of discussing Dilthey at great length and in great detail, but Dilthey's concept of the Objective Spirit clearly shows how the objective sphere separates itself from the psychological process of individual experience. Grisebach writes in reference to Dilthey:

Das Objektive kleidet sich überall in das Gewand der Wirklichkeit, offenbart sich in den Gemeinschaften, ihren Gebrüchen, Künsten, und Sitten, ja selbst in den Gebern (Gebarden) und Werkzeugen der Menschen findet es seinen Ausdruck, wie in der Totalitat des Lebens überhaupt. 2)

In this connection, it is important to note that the Objective Spirit, though firmly rooted in man's psychological experience, points to the homogeneity of a general self or consciousness and a general truth that seem to be independent of reality in the sense of concrete individual experience. This seems to have been the result of Dilthey's genetic method, i.e., the analysis of the cultural systems as man's objectivisation and self-realisation, which at the same time afford a description of the mind's psychological processes, which seem to have the common aim of comprehending the teleological value-connection of the whole. In short, the cultural systems of man all seemed to point to a truth independent of reality in the above mentioned sense. What is important for Grisebach is that this philosophy lays the foundation of a general world.

Solange die Philosophie in der Wirklichkeit des historischen Lebens verharrt und die Totalität des Stoffes nachzuerleben versucht, solange baut sie an den Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Welt. 3)

Dilthey and ....................

1) W. Dilthey, Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, p. 33

2) Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart, p. 41

3) Op.Cit., p.44
Dilthey and Simmel both revel in the multicoloured variety of life, the multiplicity, the variegated meaning and change of the views of the world throughout history, and take delight in the many possibilities of their construction. But, according to Grisebach, with Simmel much more than with Dilthey, the accent lies on the understanding of concrete experience, i.e., on the subjective rather than the objective side. While in Dilthey experience and understanding were immediately connected, while science moulded as form the material of reality in the historical process, Simmel does not recognise history or the spiritual science (Geisteswissenschaft) itself in these teleological systems structural forms, as they appear in the structural relations of the teleological systems; but the stuff of history, the Material der Geschichte, requires a special determination.

By this distinction between the dynamic field of the psychological process and the logical comprehension of this inner experience by the historian, the science of history is separated from psychology. It now comprises a different material as the presupposition for all historical understanding. This material consists in the pragmatic events, i.e., the comprehension of the objective conditions, the Sachverhalte. But this very transformation of the material presupposes the categories of understanding, which distinguish themselves from Kant's in that they do not possess a purely logical character, but perform a real task in as much as, through them, we become aware of the real structure of the historical world. Unlike Kant's categories, Simmel's categories of the understanding of the historical world are not brought to the material from the outside, but they arrange themselves from the world of psychological experience. From the highest or most general psychological propositions, as they emerge from the experience of a homogeneouse whole, we advance to the category of Personality, the homogeneous social soul, the Sozialseele, and the category of copying or the constructibility of psychical connections, Nachbildbarkeit and Konstruierbarkeit, in which Simmel finds the fundamental category of history as such. By this category as selection of the historical material from psychological processes in persons....
in persons and groups, which processes as such are not part of history in its entirety, takes place. This selection occurs by objective standards, the so-called Objective Idea.

Die Kategorie, nach der das Zusammenhängende ausgewählt und der Zusammenhang hergestellt wird, liegt jenseits seines Ursprungs als seelischer Wirklichkeit in einer darüber gestellten objektiven Idee—so sehr jene Wirklichkeit der Träger ist, ohne den diese Zusammenhänge keine 'Geschichte' ergeben würden.¹)

It becomes thus clear that the category of constructibility forms the bridge between the world of experience and the world of understanding. It rises above the individual to the sphere of intersubjective validity. Thereby the gulf between subject and object is closed, though at the same time the distinction between the particular and the general is emphasised. The process of objective selection points to a feeling of Interestedness, but this feeling may refer to sagas and poetry as well as to the material of history. Hence Interestedness, as historical interest, presupposes the category, of being or reality, Sein or Wirklichkeit. The categories of Historical Interest and Being (which latter finds its application not in natural but only in historical science) Simmel designates as Supertheoretical Facts by which theory is motivated. The whole world of categories, as it groups itself into Important, Extreme, Typical, is subordinated to them. It is now the task of philosophy to prove the objectivity of all the various views of history.

Although Simmel has ascended to the category of Being by a logical process, he is justified in claiming the category as a supertheoretical fact, as the being of the cognizant subject is given as immediate and certain in the latter's experience. By approaching the object (the historical material) through the category of Being, thus recognising it as an existing object, as a fact of being, the subject enters into the historical material. In this way, through the spiritual energy of the individual soul, whose existence and homogeneity was given as certain in experience, the category of Being expands itself into a Soul of History. Through the category of Being, therefore ..................

¹) G. Simmel, Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, pp. 47-48
therefore, the historic material receives its living soul, and by its living substance the transcendent meaning of history as Eternal Truth and Objective Validity is revealed. It follows that these two concepts have been gained not by the irruption of some transcendent power, but by a logical analysis of real experience. Grisebach says in this connection:

Das Ziel des Erkennens, die Idee der Geschichte überhaupt, erwächst aus dem Prozess des Erkennens, wird von dem Erkennenden geschaffen, sie ist der Gegenstand geschichtswissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis, nicht die Wirklichkeit des objectiven Materials, das sie nachgebildet werden kann...... Der Relativismus wird damit zur absoluten Kategorie erhoben und an Stelle des Skeptizismus tritt hier ein metaphysischer Relativismus. 1)

It is thus by the cognitive process, which reveals the real structure of history, its significance and meaning, that Simmel goes beyond Dilthey. It is by the recognition of presuppositions and aims distinct from reality in the sense of concrete psychological experience, (i.e., by the categorical understanding of the historical process) that Simmel is able to point to general spheres. He refers to them, Grisebach writes, in order to evade the arbitrariness and subjectivity of the phenomenal sphere in which he nevertheless remains firmly anchored.

In reference to Dilthey and Simmel we observed the difficulties that presented themselves to these thinkers in their attempt to advance from concrete individual experience to the sphere of the common logos, without giving up the world of experience. We noticed that in both cases the general was in reality no more than the expansion of man's consciousness into a superconsciousness, which comprehended all of man's experience and cultural activities of the past and, by knitting them into a coherent whole, attempted to make out from them the sense and meaning of history. By this, in turn, man hoped to learn the purpose and meaning of his own life. It is true that Simmel distinguished himself from Dilthey in that, by shifting the accent on man's rational activity, he touched upon some sphere of general validity, but he, too, like Dilthey, remained rooted in the sphere of relativity. His category of constructibility especially is highly artificial...........

1) Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart, p. 66
ficial and abstract. It cannot have a possible content, as constructibility is a mere rational form of the various possibilities by which man could construct his psychological processes. The intersubjective validity of the historical views, therefore, which was gained by the selection of the historical material in the light of the Objective Idea, is only a logical chimera, which can never claim to lend an a priori character of value to the various historical or cultural systems. This character of value or of truth of any system constructed by man is received from elsewhere, as we shall see later on.

In Rickert and in Windelband, Grisebach sees the representatives of the scientific, viz., the rational approach. To them it is impossible to base the validity of the general on given existence. The universal sense and meaning of man's cultural acts must be obtained from a different sphere, in which the various forms of nature find their rule or their norm. This sphere is between the world of experience and the transcendental world. It is the logical transcendental world of values in the light of which our psychological acts are valued and normed. Nature, for Rickert, is that which is void of values; culture is that which, through man's mind, is normed or valued activity. In as much as the work of natural scientists, just as any other cultural activity of man, takes place in the light of universal truth, it follows that the natural sciences become part and parcel of man's cultural work as such. This becomes particularly clear if they are studied in their historical development. The natural sciences, so to speak, supply historical science with a method. History no longer consists in reliving concrete reality, but in a methodology through which reality is steeped in reason and moved into the light of the logical concept. In this way, all human action takes place under the Eternal Logos. Rickert's philosophy, clearly, is a philosophia perennis. In his thinking the historical method is supplementary to the scientific method. Where science has subjected everything to concepts from which all concrete contemplation has disappeared, thereby leaving concrete life far behind and dissolving everything ...............
everything into relational concepts, historical science sets in. If the
nomothetical science (natural science) seeks the universal and subjects
individual things to types and laws, history, as the ideographic science, is
interested in the individual. In other words, history selects the individual according to its significance for the creation of the components of
culture. It draws forth series of evolution, which have been determined by
these components. Consequently, it is not the historian that values, for
he encounters these components (state, economy, art, religion) as already
valued and makes them the foundation of his historical reflection.

Science and history have that in common that they operate under determining
values or logical norms. These values, therefore, do not constitute being,
but represent the eternally and universally valid. They give purpose and
value to our psychological acts and state how we shall think. In other words,
they do not represent a transcendent being, but a transcendent ought, an
ideal of which we are conscious, a consciousness of norm.

In accordance with this, it is the final task of philosophy to understand
culture. Man is more than a natural organism. He creates culture, which
according to Rickert, means thinking and acting in the light of norms or
challenging, determining (not compelling—ought is not must, but, rather,
presupposes freedom) universal values. It is the most important function
of philosophy to present systematically these values, which regulate and
order our cultural life. The evolutionary or dynamic factor of life and
history is provided for by the fact that the presentation of these values
is given in the form of an open system.

We wish to make it very clear that these determining values, truth, beauty,
morality, holiness, happiness, 1) possess an a priori character and are out-
side space and time. They are, however, experienced in the acts existing
in the soul, by which we are turned towards them. In the logical light of
these values, we create the spiritual reality of the components of culture,
or, to put it otherwise, in the creation of these components, such values
as those...............

1) Note that, with Rickert, happiness is not an experience, but a value.
Happiness is not pleasure, but the spiritual aim towards which our
erotic striving is intended. It is, for instance, realised in marriage
or family life.
as those of science, art, the community of free, willing men, God or
gods, the community of love are realised independently of our doing.

Windelband, even more than Rickert, seeks to gain the logical sphere of
values from the historical processes. As Grisebach puts it:

Die Geschichte der Philosophie ist nicht bloss Historie,
sondern das Organon der Philosophie, das empirische Ma­
terial, welches das Auffinden geltender Normen ermöglicht,
ohne ihre Geltung zu begründen. D

Windelband, by the principle of Normalbewusstsein, i.e., consciousness
of norm, seeks to gain a homogeneous conception of historical multipli­
city. This principle Windelband formulated by means of Kant's philoso­
phy, he likes to compare his own time with a broad valley. Shallow waters
flow through it, which separate us from the opposite bank on which, like
towering cities and castles, the system of Idealism rise. The spires
and pinnacles of the idealistic cities and strongholds rise above the
wide mountain ranges of history situated behind them. Contemporary his­
torians, artists, and philosophers all gaze at the cities and castles
and, in the midst of rubble and debris, seek to discover old forms which
they can use in building up a new city on this side of the valley. Like
a strong fortress, guarding the entrance to this world of mountains and
towering cities, Kant's philosophy is situated before them. It throws its
bright shining light on them, so that, suddenly, order and meaning are
established in this bewildering maze of mountains and cities. Windelband,
says Grisebach, conceived Kant's philosophy as being directed against the
method of Greek and Mediaeval thought, which consisted in building up a
true and real world from either an existing world or from rational
ideas, whereby soul and thing were always confronted with one another, the ques­
tion merely being the how of their connection. All these metaphysical
concepts were rejected by Kant. The common factor of the concepts consisted
not in their content, but in their form. Their connection pointed to a
universally valid rule independent of being. Universally valid and neces­
sary judgments were made possible by a transcendental synthesis which is
operative in empirical associations and apperceptions. According to Windel­
band, this is thus the task of philosophy "diese höchsten Normen des nach­
ähnhrheit trachtenden Denkens zum Bewusstsein zu bringen". 2

1) Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart, p.88
Truth, therefore, consists in living up to these universally valid rules, the consciousness of norm, which determines our actions and attitude towards life. And all scientific thought rests on the constant application of these general principles. But not only in the sphere of knowledge do we find this ought, but in ethics and aesthetics as well the spiritual ought is valid. The genetic approach to history, which has to follow the versatile historical systems of thought, can only establish facts and state what is valid to-day. It has no norm to recognise the universally valid. In order to arrive at a true assessment of the evolution of the spirit, general norms and values, which direct our action and give them value, meaning, and purpose, are presupposed. The universal values are Truth in thinking, Goodness in willing, and Beauty in feeling.

Grisebach points out that, by understanding Kant's philosophy as a philosophy of universal values, Windelband has transformed it into a Philosophy of Culture. He now proceeds to apply this conception of Kant's philosophy to the History of Philosophy. By so doing, the spires and tall, slender towers we observed on the opposite side of the valley are all bathed in the same light of highest reason as the prerequisite for all cultural activity. The manifold and versatile historical and cultural systems are given a general rational principle. They are all attempts to live up to the Eternal Logos, manifesting itself in a consciousness of norm; and it is now upon this foundation that a new city can be built on this side of the valley. And although life according to the norm does not completely merge into the concept of value, Windelband sees in it the building organ. "Die intellektuelle Kraft des Denkens wandelt und schafft beständig am Ganzen, es scheint als ewige Aufgabe, als werdende Wahrheit, als Streben nach dem Ideal, dessen Saum es nur zu berühren vermag ", says Grisebach. 1)

This ideal is Objective Truth, the realm of which rises above the sphere of the systems of values. It is the ideal the concept seeks to comprehend, the eternal goal of man's striving. Objective Truth makes it possible..............

1) Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart, pp. 94-95
possible for Windelband to prove the validity of norms, without having to resort to the actual life of the soul. We are thus justified in saying that Windelband presupposes a logistic concept of reason determining the totality of life, so that, in this way, life becomes a logical structure of meaning.

If in the case of Dilthey and Simmel, we observed the difficulties that arose in their attempt to advance from concrete individual experience to the sphere of the general, we became aware of Rickert's and Windelband's failure to base the general world on experience. In fact, both, Rickert and Windelband, thoroughly overcome the world of concrete experience, to such an extent that their logical sphere may be said to hover in the air. They separate truth from reality by causing man to strive for the norms. It is true that they "know" the norms from their psychological processes, the acts; but without the norms these acts could not be meaningful, nor would they occur; for there would be nothing to strive for. The values, therefore, exist independently of man's experiencing them in his acts. It is for this reason that Windelband can state that it is not the individual that creates values, but the values that create the individual. But how can these values exist, if they do not represent being, but only validity? Is this purely logical a priori not a mere abstraction? How can we "know" the norms from the acts, if they are presupposition for these acts? Must we then not know the universal values first, if they are supposed to be more than an abstraction? But on what grounds can we know them, if they represent mere form? Moreover, being mere form, they also formalise our acts, which have no concrete content whatsoever. In this way, we move in an anaemic formal world of the ought, and the cultural act becomes a mere process of rational selection from life by the norm, Normalleben, which Windelband admitted, did not merge completely into the concept of value.

Having shown the difficulties of the aesthetic school of thought (Dilthey, Simmel) and the rational school of thought (Rickert, Windelband) as regards the relation between the particular and the general, the concrete and the ..................
and the abstract, content and form, irrational and rational, Grisebach seeks to reconcile and to weld together again the loose parts by resorting to Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Action or Tatphilosophie. In so doing, Grisebach joins the representatives of the young generation, which, at the dawn of the century, clamoured for the creative act. In the light of this new spirit of the epoch, it was not satisfactory to see the foundation of man's cultural activity exclusively in either man's concrete experience or based on formal axiological grounds, the rational sphere of values. In the first instance, it remained, so to speak, too pedestrian and too much rooted in those grounds, in the second case, it was drained of all lifeblood. It became normalised in the literal sense of the word. What was lacking in the cultural act was original inspiration and a certain religious feeling, a sublime elation. The philosophy that seemed to satisfy these demands was Eucken's Tatphilosophy.

Here man in the cultural deed itself experienced the unfolding of his fullblooded self and the deployment of all its powers, rational, aesthetic, ethical, and religious. By the identification of consciousness and cultural act, man experienced a rational-irrational power at work, the spirit, which transformed the whole world into an interminable activity, an endless process of becoming, in which man participated with the full weight of his rational-irrational personality.

Although nature and spirit form one inextricable whole and belong together like body and soul, spiritual nature must be distinguished from physical nature. It is the former that constitutes the world of action, the Tatwelt and as an inner experience, Innengeschohen links up with a coherent and meaningful constructive process, the Arbeitswelt, which rises above the change and the perishability of the multiple material world. By a selective process the valuable is separated from the valueless, which, at first, exist side by side.

But now .....................

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But now this value is no longer of a logical, formal character, but is an operative value of which the individual is the expression. In other words, by the movement from the external world of phenomena to the inner act, individual life merges into general action, which, as a whole, puts forward its claim to the individual. It is in this way that the universal ground of life is found in the individual, and we see here how Eucken links up closely with Dilthey. But he goes beyond him by trying to determine the nature of this inner view, which was won by an analysis of the external material world.

By this first step, which Eucken calls reduction, all individual accomplishments are, so to speak, dissolved in a huge crucible, and, just as in Dilthey's case, are reduced to their process of becoming, so that the spiritual powers must eventually emerge. But the life won by the method of reduction is still connected with concrete psychological becoming, beyond which Eucken strives. In order to carve out the pure meaningfulness of the cultural act, its lasting value, Eucken goes beyond Dilthey and follows up the method of reduction by that of diremption.

In this connection, Eucken comes very near to Windelband in that both seek to show a life of reason independent of psychological reality. The difference is, however, that Windelband recognises a logical formal sphere of values as regulatives of our life, whereas Eucken's diremption signifies the meaningfulness and rationality of the cultural act as such. In other words, in the case of Eucken's diremption, the object of knowledge is combined with a function or power lending reality to it and pointing to the homogeneity of the constructive process, the Arbeitswelt. For this reason the analytical part of the method of diremption must be supplemented by a synthetical part. The material of the world of spiritual activity reveals various fields of action, Arbeitskreise, which are connected with one another. These fields of action are the beginning of coherent wholes, complexes of spiritual activities linking up with each other by a common meaning, thereby revealing the unity of the pragmatic. These meaningful ..................
meaningful fields of action connecting up with one another, Eucken designates by the fitting name of syntagmas (Syntagmen). If now these syntagmas reveal the same spiritual activity, which Eucken calls Sachleben, i.e., objective or real life, we may draw the conclusion that such a result shows objective life no longer in punctual form, but in actual connection. The nature of this inner idea (which encloses object and function) could then be determined more minutely.

Eucken distinguishes two great syntagmas, namely, naturalism on the one hand and intellectualism on the other. But by the application of the logical method, i.e., reduction and diremption, he shows that both syntagmas are spiritual processes. The analysis of the concept of natural science shows that the mechanistic view was not there from the beginning, but was developed in the course of human history. It revealed moreover that natural science does not copy reality and that nature, as a product of science, differs from the manifoldness perceived by the senses. Even though, as a result of mechanisation, everything spiritual has been eliminated from nature as an accomplished act, it nevertheless clearly reveals the spirit. Any constitution and transcendentalisation of the material of nature presupposes unity, definite concepts and principles by which the multiple world of concrete nature can be ordered and arranged. "Eine begriffliche Realität geht somit der Erkenntnis der Natur voran, alle Tatsachen sind schon Theorie." 1) It becomes thus clear that the spirit is not mere appendix of nature as Positivism would have it, but that, even in the scientific process, an independent intellectual world rises from the concrete world of psychological experience, as has already been shown by Rickert and Windelband. But as the noological method of Eucken revealed the construction of the world of natural science as a process or an accomplished act, it follows that the operation of the intellect widens itself into a life of the spirit as such.

The reduction

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1) E. Grisebach, Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart, p. 113
The reduction of the concept of nature having led to the liberation of the spirit from mechanism and the revelation of the autonomy of the spirit, the universe now appears as an act of the spirit. In spiritual activity, all-embracing life seems to manifest itself, and logically it precedes psychological experience and is independent of individual existence. All spiritual activity thus points beyond itself, not, as was the case with Rickert and Windelband, to a mere form, but to some transcendent, which, in the form of the idea, begets art, society, and law.

On the other hand, the application of the noological method to the concepts of intellectualism and noetism reveals the inadequacy of these concepts as regards reality and substantiality. We saw in our discussion of Rickert and Windelband that they ended in a mere formalism, and that they could not do justice to concrete individual experience, whether psychological, ethical or religious. Natural science, by means of its concepts, might be able to convert the real world of the particulars into a world of the general, but the particular perseveres. Even in one's own nature, some natural element remains, which is in permanent conflict with the rational. Nature retains a positive character. It, therefore, must be confronted with some real that is more than the concept, namely, the constructive act on which the concept depends. In this way the transcendental sphere approaches the metaphysical. If the world of concepts claims to be the world of reason, values, and goods, it lacks the last, the operative power of creative activity, the unity that determines not only thinking, but all other spiritual activity. The deed is rooted in an ought, and, by one's intentional attitude or Gesinnung reaches beyond the logical sphere and points to some last ground. It follows that in any spiritual act of the individual as a creative, cultural deed the particular and the general ...............

1) E. Grisebach, Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart, p. 113

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the general, the coherent and the abstract, content and form, the irrational and the rational are conjoined.

We have seen that the application of the noological method to the concepts of natural science and intellectualism revealed their common nature. Both were accomplished acts and therefore represented creative processes. As such they led us to the conception of an independent spirit as the presupposition for all our meaningful or cultural acts, the unifying activity of which we discovered in all cultural structures and edifices, which appeared to us to be woven together like a carpet.

In view of the above, history, too, in spite of all contradictions and multiplicity, no longer conceals its fundamental unity. Through the noological method, the meaningful oneness of the individual historical epochs and forms has been clearly revealed. History, too, becomes an inner process the purpose of which is comprehended from the individual's own life, and it is the individual that gives expression to the historical process in ever new forms.

The origin of the contradictory and the multiple having been traced to the common ground of life, history suddenly reveals itself as an operative power, which, as a whole, rises above the subjective. Its objectivity, however, is no longer, as with Simmel, mere rational constructibility, but an active creative power carrying man along. Nor is it a tyrant, which, in the form of an inexorable destiny, makes use of us as mere instruments, and then mercilessly discards us when we have played our part as historical dummies. On the contrary, it is now the ontological ground, which we experience in us as an inner process, which carries when, in our cultural creative activity, we experience the freedom of self-determination. In this way, history enables us to recognise the creative act as an inner idea, by which the creative act becomes a cosmic experience. Although planted in psychological experience, this inner idea reveals a new reality.

Here Eucken, too, approaches Windelband, with this difference, that his
new reality has not merely logical but also metaphysical significance, though not in an ontological but in a timological sense. The inner idea of creative act as such is more than function and more than object. It is the absolute subject, the super-self which as the Good represents the being-for-itself of the spirit.

Again we bear witness to the fact that reality and truth fall together in consciousness and thus are immanent. In Dilthey's case it was the Objective Spirit that, as a general idea, had separated itself from the psychological process. It pointed to the homogeneity of a general self or consciousness, a general truth that, nevertheless, was rooted in man's psychological experience. This idea comprised the totality of spiritual life. It was arrived at by the genetic method, i.e., the analysis of the cultural systems in which the teleological nature of man's psychological processes is reflected and the description of these processes themselves as striving to comprehend the teleological value-connection of the whole.

Grisebach sees in Dilthey's attempt to work out the rational structure of man's psychological experience the foundation on which the edifice must be reared, which is to culminate in a philosophical method that comprises all other methods, so that all particularity, subjectivity, contradictoriness would disappear. He believes that if such an independent general method, under which all individual methods are subsumed, to which they all point, and in the light of which they are all meaningful, can be found, then objective truth has been discovered. Philosophy could then no longer be accused of being unable to arrive at a fundamental principle of universal validity, from which all methods applied by philosophy could be explained and to which all philosophers would therefore basically agree. In the event of the discovery of such a principle, therefore, the scandal of philosophy, which consists in the very fact that philosophy is unable to find a common premise accepted by all philosophers as a starting-point, will no longer exist. The constitution of such a principle or method is actually the aim of Grisebach's thesis of habilitation, Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart.
The second step in the direction of the above aim, Grisebach recognised in Simmel's process of cognition, which revealed the real structure of history as well as the significance of the historical process. By the logical categorical conception of this process, which separated the science of history from psychology, Simmel arrived at the sphere of the general. We remember that, through the category of Being, the historical material was entered by the individual subject. In this way, the individual homogeneous soul, through its spiritual energy, imbues the historical material (pragmatic events) with a living soul, thus giving history a transcendent meaning as eternal truth and objective validity.

If Simmel had already laid emphasis on the cognitive nature of man's mind, Rickert definitely proceeded to work out a logical region above the psychological acts. By the application of the logical method to our inner acts, he saw them all in the light of a transcendental ought. All acts were meaningful and valid only, if committed under a norm, i.e., universal values. It was these that regulated and ordered our manifold cultural activities. In this way, the historical process assumed a homogeneous and rational character of value. Reason in the sense of absolute value, therefore, revealed to us the general truth of history in the form of man's cultural acts, scientific, ethical, aesthetical, religious, by conferring value upon these experiences.

Windelband, even more than Rickert, sees the organ of philosophy in the history of philosophy. By the conception of Kant's philosophy as a philosophy of universal values, he is able to regard all systems, in fact, all cultural activities of man, as occurring under a consciousness of norm, in the light of which we are able to continue our building activity, which, as a growing truth, moves in the direction of objective truth. As in the case of Rickert, the homogeneous character of history has been logically established. That is why we said before that Windelband presupposed a logistic concept of reason determining the totality of life, which thereby becomes a logical structure of meaning.

In his ..................................

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In his attempt to arrive at some objective method in the light of which all other methods assume meaning and purpose, Grisebach now recognises that the above mentioned methods all point in one direction, namely, in the direction of an objective general truth. They are therefore all parts of this truth which must be synthetically combined. Grisebach sees in their inability to account equally well for concrete psychological experience on the one side, and logical form on the other their failure to reach this general truth. They all, more or less, in moving to the rational region, bracket irrational experience. They all seek to transcend man's creative act by explaining it in terms of objective presuppositions: Dilthey's Objective Spirit, Simmel's Objective Idea, Rickert's and Windelband's Universal Values. But what about the act itself? Are not all these methods combined in it? In Eucken's synthetical method, therefore, Grisebach seeks the key for his universal method into which all the other methods merge in the light of which their purpose and meaning is understood. If the act itself is taken as an object of enquiry, without any bracketing and without any "objective" presuppositions, then, all previously mentioned methods are suddenly realised to take their place in it. They now become the material or organs of a method through which they are all united, the noological method of Rudolf Eucken. This method, by reduction and redemption, revealed to us that in all processes of human creativity the spiritual basis manifested itself and it, as a timological ground, was the presupposition for our cultural acts. In this way, history became an operative power, which, as a whole, rose above the subjective. It became the supporting ground on which we stood, while determining ourselves afresh through our cultural activity. As an inner idea, now, this creative activity widens itself into a cosmic experience. In the cultural act, therefore, the whole cosmos was reflected as the concrete expression of the spirit. Here particular experience was merged with the totality of life, the dark urge towards self-determination was coupled with purposeful activity, producing cultural forms in which general truth......
universal truth was reflected. In short, each individual act in which man gave himself as a whole living organism and not merely as a mind, simultaneously represented a universal act, in the sense that each individual act was an expression of the spirit. Man, through his act, was thus blended into the whole; and as this act represented a cosmic experience, it filled man with religious awe and a feeling of exaltation.

The conception of an independent spirit permeating the whole cosmos was possible only by the inner idea of the creative act as such. By this idea, in which the methods of Dilthey, Simmel, Rickert, and Windelband are combined, reality is therefore again consigned to the region of the immanent. In this respect nothing has changed. This time it is by the inner creative act as a cosmic experience that truth and reality are one. For this act does not only show the real ground as the source of life or the source of the spirit, but it also represents the method of methods, in which all other methods are merged, and in which, therefore, all differences and contradictions have been removed.

It is thus by the creative act that Grisebach seeks to answer the question about the possibility of absolute truth or universality and the question about the purpose and meaning of history. The creative act in Eucken's sense, according to Grisebach, reveals three layers: reality (concrete psychological experience), totality of life (the totality of all concrete psychological experiences), and universality. It is of course easy to see how this triad represents the methods of Dilthey, Simmel, Rickert and Windelband. These layers stand to each other in a double relation. The concrete psychological experiences point to the totality of life and vice versa; totality, in turn, points to universality and vice versa. Here we already observe the synthetical character of Grisebach's argument. Each layer is interwoven with the other. They, therefore, must not be separated by means of discursive thinking. If the totality of life is transformed into universality by mere logical thought, concrete experience, of which after all the totality of life is the expression, has been conveniently excluded.
excluded. Universality must thus not be the logical presupposition from which mere formal acts are deduced, but in order to have a content, universality must be concluded from life’s totality, which, in turn, points to concrete individual experiences. Seen in this way, universality becomes a truth infinitely remote, towards which we never cease striving, and which causes us to carry on our constructive, cultural activity. In other words, by its relation to the idea of universality, the general world participates in truth, so that its incessant activity and continual development represents a becoming truth or a life in truth, Wahrheitsebenen.

In other words, Grisebach, as regards the interpretation of history, rejects all absolute truth. All historical systems remain relative, absolute truth cannot be reached. It remains the constituent factor that is infinitely remote from us. Nevertheless, by striving for it, all systems and methods form part of the life in truth, the Wahrheitsebenen. The purpose and meaning of history have thus been explained: They consist in working towards absolute truth or universality, which, as a living unit ( the act as such ) constitutes the general world and precludes all arbitrariness in its construction. Universality thus brings about the unity of life, which is more than logical presupposition and less than metaphysical substance, as it reveals itself as a real unit in the synthesis of interpretation. In other words, it represents the universal method, which constitutes the synthesis of all historical methods.

The systematic significance of the History of Philosophy has thereby been clearly demonstrated. Its task is to show the general significance of the various systems and methods in the light of pure unity, independent of a temporal content. The concept of philosophy is the realisation of the idea in one’s own existence. We can also say philosophy is the idea of the cultural act as such, which, as essential life, combines concrete experience with the general world and infinity. In this, the self, through its constructive activity, is harmoniously blended into the unity of life:

Darum..........................
Darum ist die Anleitung zum wesentlichen Leben als Pädagogik und Ethik im weitesten Sinn die vornehmste Aufgabe der Philosophie, sie weist uns das Ziel: Die Verwirklichung eines vollständigen und vollkommenen Menschen gemäß der Idee der Universalität. 1)

At the beginning of this chapter, we have already pointed out that Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart was supposed to give a more satisfactory account of the real nature of philosophy in terms of man's creative and cultural activity. We saw that in Kultur und Formbildung man's constitutive activity was still regarded as consisting chiefly in bestowing form on chaotic nature by outer and inner perception (natural and ethical form). We observed further that form really represented an abstraction from the world of multiple artistic creation, so that emphasis lay too much on the rationalistic side. We bore witness to the difficulties that arose from such a view, the problem of breaking through to the general. On the other hand, if we established the general through discursive thinking (viz., rational abstraction), then the difficulty of including concrete experience presented itself. To regard the spirit as bestowing form, therefore, meant to include all these difficulties. The question arises: What then is the spirit, pure form? But form is something that has become, at least in the world of objects. But if the pure form has not become, where does it come from? Is it only a logical construction? But this cannot be; for it confers form upon nature. It seems then that it does so by its mere existence, i.e., similar to Aristotle's Unmoved Mover it draws natural and ethical forms in its direction. In any case by these few questions we become aware of the difficulty of imagining how pure form can be active creative spirit; for is it not rather an end than a cause? Pure form, however, must be both cause and purpose. We realise thus the difficulties of establishing a concrete relation between the spirit (pure forming activity) and the relative world of forms. This relation really rests on the principle of identity; in this case on the act of abstraction from the multiple forms of the form which gives Grisebach's Kultur und Formbildung a rather theoretical look.

It may .................

1) E. Grisebach, Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart, p. 133
It may now be said that Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart is an attempt to overcome the rationalism in the previous work and to plant philosophy more firmly in the real world of man's creative activity. Hence the principle of identity no longer consists in the act of abstracting the pure form from the relative forms, but in the full-blooded cultural act itself. The inner idea of this act, which converts it into a cosmic experience, is nothing else but the absolutisation of this act. Granted the act includes irrational as well as rational elements, it, nevertheless, represents an infinite super-self-comprising all of man's creative acts, scientific, artistic, ethical, religious, of the past, the present, and the future. It is by regarding man's creative activity in terms of cosmic life that discursive thinking (rational abstraction) has been superceded by coherent organic thinking and that thought and action, truth and reality become one. It is through the view of eternal becoming in the sense of an eternal movement in the direction of the absolute that life is being elevated to an even higher level, viz., that its potency and value increase, and that man, by taking up an appropriate intentional attitude (Gesinnung) becomes more moral in the sense of becoming more cultured. If in Kultur und Formbildung the in-such manifested itself in the act of bestowing form, it now finds expression in man's full-blooded cultural act, in which he determines himself as a cultural being and in which truth discloses itself as the Creation of Culture.

Again Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart, just as Kultur als Formbildung, reveals the spirit of the time, the Zeitgeist. Here, too, the yearning of the young generation of the young German Empire for the creative act reveals itself, with this difference that Grisebach, even more than in his doctoral dissertation, appealed to the creative impulse and energy of the whole man. But here, too, the same dangers prevail that we have already pointed out in connection with Kultur und Formbildung. We observe the same high-spirited, idealistic optimism of a man that contributes his share to the building up of a better world and that takes part in the .................
in the march into a happier future. In addition, there is this difference that now the cultural act, as the expression of the spirit or the absolute, rouses man's religious sentiment. The sublime feeling that he experiences in the creation of culture fills him with glowing enthusiasm, unbounded confidence, and ardent faith. It now appears, contrary to Kultur und Formbildung, as though the creative act is no longer the prerogative of a few original minds selected by nature. The impression is now created, as though, by the right moral attitude or Gesinnung, any creative individual blends itself harmoniously into the whole. In this way, a community of creative individuals is established by man's cultural activity, each individual member contributing its share to the construction of a better world.

But we must not be overhasty and too gullible in accepting a view that appears to be promising us the end of our difficulties by purporting to show us the way to absolute truth. Too much is at stake, our task and purpose in life, our very existence. What if Grisebach's teleological view proves an illusion? What if, again, he has by-passed the real? Is Grisebach not still moving within the cycle of the self when he seeks the real in man's creative activity, in spite of including the irrational? Is the real not still immanent if we consider that, without the inner idea of the cultural act, man's creative activity of the spirit, which gives reality a homogeneous structure, would not be comprehended? From the consciousness of our own self, therefore, we conclude the spirit's creative activity, in the light of which we determine the meaning of our own life, our own existence. It is thus by the projection into an absolute dimension of our own self that we make the attempt to determine our own nature. It is true that the irrational and the contradictory are included, but by the synthetic method everything converges in the act as such, which, nevertheless, remains an abstraction of the particular acts. Only by discursive thinking, therefore, which he has rejected, could Grisebach declare universality to be the constituent factor of the actual world, i.e., the historic world of the cultural systems; and only in this way could he proclaim the identity of the pure act, or the act as such, with the individual act. In other words .................
words, the act as such is a mere construction whose real existence, similar to the existence of the forming act in Grisebach's previous work, could never be empirically verified. And it is this very impossibility that constitutes the gap between the particular and the general act; but just because of this gap Grisebach was able to restrict us to the sphere of actuality, i.e., to our contingent cultural systems, which, though relative, nevertheless reflect the absolute. This means, therefore, that they gain the qualities of truth and reality on the grounds of an assumption or presupposition that defies empirical verification. All that remains empirically verifiable is the contingent cultural act. Grisebach is not yet prepared to draw this conclusion. He is still too much imbued with idealistic thinking in order to be able to find the real independently of rational constitution by the mind, even though the mere static intellect, the mere concept, has been changed into the dynamic activity of the spirit, which reveals the meaning and purpose of the cultural act. But the question arises whether the inner idea of this act is nothing but a concept as well?

It can, however, but be denied that, in Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart, Grisebach has already realised the importance of the contingent and the irrational. He has already become aware of the mutability, relativity, and contradictoriness of our own methods, systems, and constructions, which, all too often, lay claim to absoluteness. Their contingent, relative, and contradictory nature is overcome by declaring them parts of a universal method and, as cultural acts, by regarding them as the peculiar and particular expression of the absolute spirit, i.e., a cosmic life or act that comprises them all. But let us not forget that this universal truth is not an ontological but a timological ground, which truth, as we saw, is pointed out by the totality of life and towards which man keeps striving. He is thus restricted to the actual region in which the cultural goods are constantly being improved. As, however, each individual cultural act reflects the cultural act as such, we are justified in saying that, in Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart, Grisebach...
regards truth as consisting in the creation of culture, which, as an act, is also the real. The cultural act as an immanent idea thus still means the constitution of the absolute in our mind. Just as in the case of Kultur als Formbildung therefore, Grisebach's philosophy expressed in the form of a formula would still read: Actuality qua Truth + Reality.
CHAPTER IV

PHILOSOPHY (REALITY) AS THE REPLY TO THE THEOLOGICAL QUESTION ABOUT TRUTH

Eight eventful years had elapsed before Grisebach published his next major work: Die Schule des Geistes. The First World War had been fought, which although this was not universally recognised at the time really denoted the end of an age. The lofty ideals of German youth burst like soap bubbles in the vast battles of materialism on the western front. The Empire collapsed and gave way to a Republic stained with defeat. The creative enthusiasm, the optimism of building a better world and the belief of conquering the cosmos by the full-blooded deed had suffered a severe set-back. Naturally, one could not just sit back in despair bemoaning one's fate, but one had to get on one's feet again reconstructing a war-battered Germany. It was however impossible to overlook the question mark that had appeared behind all our constructive activity. The uncertainty of our existence could no longer be ignored; this was the lesson of the war.

It is thus not surprising that Grisebach was driven to make new deliberations about the problem of truth and reality and to arrive at a new philosophical position. As in his previous works, the real remains the actual or becoming, but for the first time this actual is clearly separated from truth or the absolute. The real, now, stands in a dialectical relation to the absolute. The absolute is no longer the constitutive real ground, but causes the becoming of the real world, i.e., the actual world, by constantly contradicting it and putting it in question. In this way, the real or rather the actual, already here, assumes a distinct existential character in as much as, in its permanent quest for truth or the absolute, it inevitably experiences failure and therefore determines and orientates itself over and over again. The real actual (viz., the cultural) world of man, as becoming, includes both existence and non-existence. Man becomes a split being, ruled no longer by the law of identity, but by the law of contradiction. Apart from the influence of dialectical theology, which in
his later works: Erkenntnis und Glaube and Die Grenzen des Erziehers, become clearer still, we cannot help noticing in Die Schule des Geistes an influence of Jaspers's work: Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. In the third chapter, section II entitled: Grenzsituation, we read for instance:

Admittedly, Grisebach is still too much under the spell of Eucken's Tatphilosophie and the Eternal Logos of the neo-Kantians in order to experience the negation as naked annihilation and **as** an omnipresent limit experienced as contingency, death, or guilt. Despite the relativity and inconstancy of our cultural structures, reason is still the homogeneous, constitutive law of man's cultural activity. The historicity and periodicity of man have not yet assumed the radical character as in the Philosophy of Existence, where the individual, so to speak, is an event, but reason in Die Schule des Geistes still constitutes the uniting bond between the historical cultural systems and institutions of man.

In the above mentioned work, Grisebach applies the critical analytic method. He starts from experience and includes experience of rational thought. In connection with our constructive or constitutive activity three fields or layers may be distinguished. There is in the first place passive, receptive experience. This is uncritical experience and refers to non-existence, i.e., matter as the accidental multiplicity of experiencing. This first layer can therefore be compared with chaos or unformed matter. It gains reality through rational actualisation in the form of the concept. This brings us to the second layer, the real world of concepts as concepts of experience. In the concept of experience the active element or being ..................

1) Pp. 230-231
or being is added to that of passivity or non-being. From this it follows that the concept represents a rational act, whereby the real world is unfolded. The concept, therefore, is dialectical and always includes its opposite. As it represents an act, becoming and not being is the real ground of philosophy. The real world of man is thus the world of man's constitutive activity, which by necessity, is relative and contradictory, man's cultural and rational structures always being put in question again. The contradictoriness and dialectical quality of the concept, therefore, reveals as dialectical man's nature as well. It clearly indicates the limit of man's knowledge, which is restricted to the region of actuality, i.e., the sphere of becoming in the form of man's conceptual activity. Knowledge being restricted to the province of experience in the above sense of the word, it follows that philosophy is confined to the same sphere as well. Yet man's infinite cultural activity, which results from the permanent question of theology about the absolute, points to some universal principle in which philosophy recognises the universal activity of the spirit. From the creative cultural activity of man as human experience, it comes to the conclusion that spirit must be more than the manifestation of a highest natural power. Otherwise spirit would not be free, i.e., would not be creative activity, and thus would be mere fiction. The world, however, becomes real only by reason. Reason is the law by which things receive form and are known to exist. Thus reason can only be thought of as a creative subject, as selfhood. The reality of nature is not the passive form in which things are passively known to exist, but the active form of the idea. The ideal universal principle, therefore, is identical with the archetype of the creative subject. Freedom consists in the comprehension of an the subordination to this principle.

From the above it follows that, in the creative subject or principle, nature and spirit or nature and history are one. By concepts, relations, and judgments we seek to determine the reality of nature, state and right are forms of order of history. The nature of the spirit is nothing else but the succession of rational ideas that are clearly understood and systematically arranged, so that these ideas represent a succession of knowable realities. The interminable and infinite activity of man in the construction...........
struction of these various concepts of nature points beyond space and
time:

Diese Vernunft als System aller Begriffe der Natur steht
außerhalb der Geschichte, nur die Beschaffenheit um diese
Vernunft zeigen einen Wechsel, je nach der Klarheit und
der Intensität des Bogreifens in der Geschichte, sie
sind Begriffe des Lebens im Bewusstsein der Menschen als
Geschichte des Geistes. 1)

We see thus that, at this stage, Grisebach conceives actuality as con-
sisting in man's permanent effort about the absolute, which he never
reaches, but which, nevertheless, regulates and determines his whole
activity. It remains hidden and contradicts man's attempt at building
in its direction by terminating and destroying man's systems of culture.

It is in this way that man is restricted to actuality, i.e., becoming,
which on account of the yes and no of the spirit makes man participate
in the spirit in its broken form, i.e., in the endless succession of
cultural activity, which is the result of man’s incessant questioning
about the absolute. On the other hand, by bidding a halt to man’s acti-
vity, the absolute puts an end to him and erects a barrier that cannot
be overcome by dialectical means. Man may thus be said to exist in the
cultural act. He, so to speak, is a cultural animal, and it is this cri-
terion that most clearly distinguishes him from the animal and lifts him
infinitely above it; for we have seen that man’s cultural activity is of
the spirit. In this full-blooded act knowledge and life are one.

From the above, it becomes obvious that philosophy is clearly restricted
to the finite world of actuality. This limit reminds us of Kant, with this
difference, that Kant’s scientific world is constituted by the functional,
mechanistic categories; this scientific world is transcended by man’s
desire for the absolute, the noumena. Grisebach’s world of knowledge is
the cultural act, in which the dynamic and the rational, will and intel-
lect, acting and thinking, living and knowing are one. It is the duty of
philosophy to observe and accept its limitation to the region of actuali-
ty as well as its rôle as the dialectical science of becoming. By this
self-restraint, it at the same time manifests the virtue of humility.

Philosophy no longer deals with the metaphysical. It has turned critical
as well ............

1) E. Grisebach, Die Schule des Geistes, p. 13
as well as self-critical; and although it has this in common with the individual sciences that its efforts are directed towards universality, it must, in being aware of its own limits, also point out the limitations of the various methods of the sciences. 

The metaphysical field is left to theology, which, on the basis of faith and not of knowledge, keeps asking about the absolute (God). Theology is not the science of God (there is no knowledge of God, but only faith in God), but the science of the various forms of faith. It is conceived by Grisebach as education for belief. Theology and philosophy have this in common that they both deal with a thing that lies at the root of all individual sciences, but they differ in that philosophy seeks the immanent idea that unfolds itself in the direction of this absolute ground, whereas theology experiences the living relation to this transcendent ground in faith. But just because the absolute cannot be known, but only believed, theology is more important than the science. It, together with philosophy, sees to it that the sciences do not unduly inflate themselves, and its subscription to faith is at the same time a subscription to humility. As theology deals with faith only, it is the task of philosophy to establish the scientific basis for a relation with the divine. Since this relation is one of contradiction, it follows that faith and knowledge are also contradictions and are supplementary to each other. Faith puts the question about the absolute, and philosophy gives the answer in the form of knowledge, which, however, is only patchwork and, as such, betrays man's limitedness, imperfection, and contradictoriness. Religion is thus the prerequisite for all cultural activity. It is the substance of philosophy.

On the basis of the above world-view, Grisebach has put forward a concept of the university that is firmly rooted in actuality and yet is conscious of receiving its task from the spirit. In contrast to the existing universities, which, often, are not much more than higher vocational schools training skilled specialists in the various methods and techniques of their respective field of research, Grisebach designs the picture of a university that aims............
that aims at full-blooded cultural education, in German, *Bildung*. Within its walls, the young student is to acquire the ability of hearkening to the message of the spirit as well as living and experiencing the richness of the creative cultural act. But this can only happen, if the university itself becomes the universal instrument of the spirit and mediates between the opposites, e.g., the sciences and the humanities (history) (i.e., intellect and spirit), experience and reason, knowledge and faith, the finite and the infinite. And it can fulfill this task only, if it subordinates itself to the law of the spirit or the metaphysical, instead of offering to the hopeful and expectant student a host of confusing methods and techniques competing with each other for domination and apparently having no connection with each other at all. If the university subordinated itself to the law of the spirit, then faith would become the presupposition for all scientific and cultural work. It would constitute a uniting bond, for it would fire the scientific and cultural worker with the enthusiasm he needs for his activity as an activity of the spirit. The realisation that his work is in the end based on faith would also establish in the scholar's or the scientist's mind a right sense of proportion as to the importance of his subject. It would prevent him from assuming an overbearing or condescending attitude towards his colleague, and would cultivate in him the virtues of self-control and humility. At this stage, philosophy may step in and point out the direction in which to work, the direction of universality.

From the above it follows that Grisebach's universality as an institution of culture and universal education, i.e., a *Bildungsinstitut* that is placed right within the dialectical relationship existing between theology and philosophy, faith and knowledge, receives its cultural task from the spirit which as a universal world of action, die universelle Tatwelt, is the true school of man, so that

\[\text{In der Schule des Geistes sind beide, Universität und Kultur, aufgehoben und zusammengefasst. Ihre Aufgaben und Ziele sind ein und dieselben, beide sollen realisieren und dem Werdenden Raum geben.} \]

\[1)\text{E. Grisebach, Die Schule des Geistes, p. 151} \]
As it is however, philosophy, which in the spirit recognizes the universal law of cultural education (Bildung) (theology being restricted to the sphere of faith) Grisebach starts his discussion with the task of philosophy at the university, after he has sketched out the foundation of cultural education. In the five aspects of the concept of culture: The idea of culture as the object of philosophy, the realisation of this idea in cultural activity, the objectivisation and the accomplishment of this activity in the world of forms as real culture, its reflection in the works of culture and, finally, the evolution of the cosmic forms of the history of culture, we realize the common ground that the sciences, the fine arts, and the state possess in the cultural act as an act of the spirit. They are all guided by philosophy in their struggle towards the universal, which striving each of the above mentioned fields of human action betrays in its own peculiar way: science by overcoming the chaotic multitude, an essential order of beautiful forms as a system of culture, each form representing the harmonious fusion between subject and object; jurisprudence by regarding the positive act of law as a self-imposed curtailing of freedom (self-restriction-in-freedom) in order to make possible as a common task the work on the goods of mankind; the philosophy of state, by recognising the state as an ethical phenomenon of the real world, owing its existence to an act of freedom on the part of the individual (i.e., the voluntary renunciation of absolute freedom in the interest of the whole), and as a historic phenomenon the evolutionary character of which must be understood as a dialectic of faith and action.

From the above, the task of philosophy clearly outlines itself: it seeks truth. Idea and reality are one in that philosophy, on the ground of the experience of willing, strives for a universal school with reference to culture. Such a university, therefore, is real, even if desired by only a few, simply because it is reasonable to desire it. The object of philosophy is universality. In propaedeutics Grisebach proposes to proceed from experienced reality (the experience of reality as a problem) to critical experience, i.e., reason. He thus anchors philosophy in reality and by...
Selbstbesinnung (critical-self-reflection) believes it possible to push through to the creative act of the spirit. Freedom and self-education consist in this act. Propaedeutics has thus the purpose of making man conscious of the Bildungsgesetz (law of cultural education), which is equivalent to introducing him to philosophy and its history.

The History of Philosophy is the presentation of the history of thinking. It must show how man advances from stage to stage in the recognition of pure truth as creative reason in himself and the world. Systems of the past determine only temporal existence. They make sense only as a mirror of one's own soul striving for truth. History is thus the realization of one's self in the act of striving for truth. Absolute unity means the overcoming of the object by the subject (the spirit or the absolute). Each historical epoch must develop from its own life the concept that determines its own being. Philosophy is always reality. There is, however, only one truth, which remains the aim of all times, and reason is independent of time.

The systematic task of philosophy consists in comprehending the whole at one glance. This dialectical system is reason externalising itself as a result of critical self-reflection. The experience of a homogeneous ground of the world is only an intention that should not be mentioned. Its concepts must change the world. Systematic Philosophy reflects the individual sciences. It is, however, more than they, in that it looks beyond their theoretical foundation. The aim of all methods must be clearly recognised.

Systematic Philosophy must thus fight any presumption on the part of the individual sciences and warn against the absolutisation of their theoretical grounds. Systematic Philosophy treats the function of reason in its pure form, and then again, in its realisation or objectivisation, it shows what understanding, sensation, and will are. By so doing, it puts a limit and a purpose to these spiritual functions as they appear in cultural activity.

After philosophy, Grisebach discusses theology as the science of the forms of faith, the denominational forms which...
which philosophy seeks to answer, thereby recognizing the relation between
the real world and the absolute. Through critical self-analysis, it ex-
periences its limitation and its being restricted to the world of becoming
in the form of the cultural act. As this act is, however, a reasonable
act, it follows that pure reason, i.e., the law of the spirit as it mani-
fests itself in man's various cultural activities, is outside space and
time. It can, so to speak, be only intuitively comprehended from man's
striving for the absolute and from the rational form which he gives to
this striving by his cultural structures and their components. As man's
cultural forms reveal both reason and will, or, more accurately, a will
that is controlled and directed by reason or critical insight, giving pur-
pose and meaning to man's cultural acts, it follows that the absolute
must be rationalized will and therefore dynamic from the start. It is thus
the spirit that imposes its law on man's cultural activities, restricts
him to becoming or actuality, and gives man's cultural acts purpose and
meaning.

The absolute
If, however, philosophy intuitively comprehends from man's cultural ac-
tivity, this does not mean that it knows it. We have seen that it is
outside actuality, the imposition of its law representing a clear no to
man, which prevents him from comprehending, possessing, or disposing of
it. On the contrary, it controls and directs him, because it is regarded
not as immanent, but as emanent, thus negating and terminating all his
efforts of grasping it through his understanding. It follows that it
stands in contradiction to the real world of actuality, and this contra-
diction is reflected in man's oscillating movement between not-knowing
and wanting-to-know, not having and wanting-to-have, the nothing and
being, non-existence and existence. It is thus obvious that faith in the
absolute becomes an indispensable prerequisite for philosophy, knowledge,
the cultural goods, being, and existence; for without faith there would
be nothing, and man would be unable to go on living, because in faith
living, willing, acting, thinking and knowing are all aspects of one and
the same basic desire, the desire for the absolute. Faith, therefore, can

never......................
never be replaced by knowledge, and philosophy can never become a substitute for theology. For this very reason, it is only sensible if philosophy practises self-restraint and humility. At the same time, it is only reasonable to believe, because the absolute cannot be known. The reasonableness of belief thus follows from the contradictory relationship between the absolute and the world of becoming, which contradiction cannot be bridged by the dialectical method because of the unknowability of the absolute.

In this way, Grisebach has supplied rational proof of the necessity for belief. The importance of theology has thereby been demonstrated, and the necessity of the church's existence has been clearly shown:

Die Philosophie kann die Erscheinung der Kirche und der Religion innerhalb der Kulturentwicklung als denknotwendig begründen. Sie gibt uns ihren Begriff, der uns sagt, wie die Erscheinung sein sollte. Die Kirche ist danach die Vereinigung aller derjenigen, welche in ihrer lebendigen Arbeit durch den Glauben eine Beziehung besitzen zum Absoluten und in diesem gemeinsamen Glauben tätig sein wollen. In ihr sind alle Gläubigen geist, die durch den gleichen Vorsatz verwandten Streben ihrer Arbeit beständig Ansporn geben, sich der Vollkommenheit anzunähern.1)

This shows the relationship between religion and culture as a relationship between faith and acting, Glaube und Tun. Seen in this way, faith becomes the substance of the world, of philosophy, and of culture. The virtue of humility (which is shared by philosophy and theology together and which flows from the restriction of each of the two disciplines to its own peculiar region, philosophy to that of actuality and theology to that of faith) becomes the chief pillar of the universe.

Grisebach's Schule des Geistes, therefore, breathes a distant ethical atmosphere. By presenting the rational, aesthetic, ethical, and divine aspects of the cultural act, Grisebach aims at educating a man of universal culture rather than a skilled specialist. Just as in the cultural act, truth, beauty, goodness, and God are all present, so an educated person cultivates the sciences, the fine arts, the humanities, and religion. And as, according to Grisebach, this kind of education means the subordination of the individual to the cultural law of the spirit as a reasonable .................

1) E. Grisebach, Die Schule des Geistes, p. 61
reasonable act and an act of freedom, it follows that such a person must be virtuous by practising self-restraint and by manifesting humility. The truly educated person will thus be wise, just, self-controlled, and balanced. His faith will give him the courage of throwing in his full weight with his fellowman in building up a new culture at the time when old values have been destroyed and new ones have to be found. Such was exactly the time immediately after World War I, so that Die Schule des Geistes must be regarded as Grisebach's contribution to the reconstruction of a culture, after the old had been devalued by current events.

After Grisebach, in this work, has discussed the task of philosophy and theology in terms of their contradictory relationship, he proceeds to discuss, in the light of this relationship, the other faculties, the sociological and juridical faculty, the moral faculty, the faculty of the sciences and medicine, and the faculty of fine arts. Naturally, we cannot go into detail here, our object of discussion being the problem of truth and reality. We shall, therefore, content ourselves with taking a bird's-eye view of the more specialised activities in the above-mentioned faculties, endeavouring thereby to show that the cultural work of the university as an actual task is both real action and action within the real, the real meaning becoming or the actual.

On account of the contradictory relationship between the absolute and the real, the task imposed upon the university by the spirit is that of mediation between opposites. The university is thus the mediator between church and state. The church knows the concept of absolute equality of all human beings before God. In God, they are infinitely free. In the state, on the other hand, there are differences and distinctions. Each individual, in the place assigned to him, must serve the whole. He must sacrifice part of his freedom in the interest of the community. Therein consists right or the law. It, too, is subordinated to an idea. Freedom of the individual, therefore, consists in the voluntary renunciation of absolute freedom in the interest of the whole. The state is thus an ethical as well as a historical phenomenon of reality. Its historical development must be understood...
stood as the dialectical process of faith and acting, *Glaube und Tun.* It represents the renewal of faith through the deed. This renewal of faith is the substance of the historical world. Religion, personality, e.g., Jesus Christ, Martin Luther, and the community determine the inner life of history. It moves in the direction of the absolute, without ever reaching it. For this reason the historian in his description of the political struggles of the past must not seek to increase our knowledge, but rather to strengthen our rational will by merging it with the past, whereby we experience history.

In connection with his discussion of the moral faculty, Grisebach stresses the education of the student for true freedom by which the conflict of individual versus community loses its damaging character. This education for true freedom is to grow from academic freedom and consists in the responsible and free act on the part of the student of subordinating himself to the community, which act is at the time a reasonable act.

As regards the faculty of the sciences and medicine, Grisebach shows the dialectical relation between the absolute and nature, which lifts the scientist above a shallow positivism and scientism. It did happen, Grisebach points out, that new discoveries of science forced religion out of its complacency and isolation into fresh lively argument and debate, resulting in the review and revision of its concept of God. But we must clearly realise that by such discoveries faith in God could never be destroyed. The scientist faces nature as an object and enquires into its laws as natural laws. As soon as he starts thinking, however, about the nature of his concepts and methods, he discovers the grounds for the general validity of its laws and therefore for reality in his own mind, in the law of his own being. Thereby the grounds for reality have been shifted from the outside world to transcendental consciousness and these transcendental facts, as living concepts of reason, reveal to the scientist - he may oppose it as much as he likes - a transcendent region of absolute being as a theoretical postulate.¹

¹) Cf. E. Grisebach, *Die Schule des Geistes,* p. 114
In the chapter on the success of the sciences, Grisebach distinguishes between those scientists that emphasise the art of the understanding and those that aim at knowledge. The former are in a hurry to develop techniques, skills, and methods in order to dominate nature and use it for material gain. They strive for utility, instead of true culture. They are loud and overbearing, competing with other scientists of their own calibre in offering to the world their newly invented skills, techniques, and methods. The latter kind are the quiet and humble scientists that enquire into nature for the sake of finding its universal law. True natural science, says Grisebach, will not train slaves of success and material advantage, but free research workers of truth.

Die Naturwissenschaft sucht gemäß dem Gesetz der Universalität die Natur in Beziehung zum Absoluten als seierend zu erkennen und so die Welt ins klare Licht der Vernunft zu stellen, damit jeder an solcher Aufklärung teilnehmen kann.¹)

The genuine scientist, therefore, realises his limitations as well as the common ground the sciences share with the humanities. The importance of this discussion for our own time, when truth and reality are only too often confused with utility, and when we have become the victim of an empty technical functionalism, cannot be emphasised enough.

There is an equally great danger in the isolation of the medical student. To be a great scientist is not to be a great doctor. Even a skilled surgeon is a bad doctor, unless he also takes into consideration the spiritual form, i.e., the life of the soul inhabiting the human body. But not only the spiritual life of the individual needs the attention of the good doctor, but the spirit of the community, family relationships, and the economic conditions of the family, for instance, are equally his concern. This goes to show that the doctor, too, should be a man of universal education.

As far as the fine arts are concerned, Grisebach sees their educational value in overcoming the contradiction between subject and object by the artist's free and reasonable act of restricting himself to an artistic form in which understanding and will are proportionally distributed. The reality resulting ..............

¹) E. Grisebach, Die Schule des Geistes, p. 117
resulting from this synthesis is neither subjective nor objective. It is a new way of intuitively comprehending the absolute, and its aim is to realise another aspect of it, namely, that of beauty. In it, free will in free self-restraint is to be in harmony with the principle of nature. It is obvious that the limitation of the aesthetic view to the individual work of art just like the limitation and self-restraint in any real cultural activity of man, whether scientific, historical or otherwise, occurs on the grounds of faith in the absolute.

The self-control and self-restriction at which scientists, historians, artists, and art-students arrive by critical self-reflection, which causes them to realise the limitation and the limit of their methods and acts, lead them to the virtue of humility as the chief criterion of the universally educated man. Grisebach nowhere in his works has propounded a distinct systematic doctrine of ethics. All his works are at bottom ethical. A real existence and an ethical existence are synonymous for Grisebach.

Man's moral attitude arises from his very life, in this case from the consciousness of his limits and his being restricted to actuality, by which experience he realises that he cannot hope to embrace the absolute by knowledge but only in faith. The act of self-limitation, which frees him from false idols, e.g., the dream of gaining absolute mastery over the absolute thus disposing of it and the world to his own advantage, leads him to an attitude of modesty and humility both towards God and his fellowman, and makes room for faith.

We see thus all cultural and creative activity of man is grounded in the metaphysical world, but always ends up in the becoming and passing away of the finite. The positing subject, viz., the not-yet-existent, or the absolute, gives itself as the as-yet-unposited-rational, i.e., as the task of the as-yet-unposited-rational to be set. The second step is the Entschluss des Geistes, which means the spirit unlocks or reveals itself by imposing itself as a task. The will overcomes it by the finite concept, which means the realisation of the chaotic world of matter (the nothing) by reason in form .............
in form of the concept. This nothing or chaos, therefore, is no illusion, but the real presupposition for the mind to overcome it.

In a similar way and in a genuine Augustinian spirit, Grisebach conceives the process of education. Education has its own concrete field, which cannot be occupied by philosophy or theology. While philosophy can only present universality as an immanent concept and while theology can only embrace the absolute in the absolute in faith, education guides the pupil in the direction of universality and the absolute by letting him struggle right through the mill in the concrete situation of becoming. By the experience of conflict and contradiction, he becomes critical as well as self-critical, and he himself finds the way to reason. Education does thus not impose an absolute goal on the pupil but makes him strive for it. It is passive rather than active and guides the pupil by letting him participate in the process of becoming. He has to go through the quagmire of the sensual, he has to indulge in physical and material pleasure, he has to experience temptation; for has not even Christ had to do the same? Only in this way, he will also experience sin, doubt, despair, and frustration, and through suffering will be led in the direction of the spirit.

Satan and death, says Grisebach, are as necessary as God.

It becomes thus clear that, although man's constitutive and cultural activity, his untiring effort to overcome the sensual and to lift himself up to the rational have their ground in the metaphysical, the latter is the realm of faith and religion, which cannot be overcome dialectically.

1) E. Grisebach, Die Schule des Geistes, p. 148
The sciences and philosophy must bow to faith. The metaphysical Weltanschauung needs the idea of *serving*. Its very humility will be its elevation. Religion and philosophy are distinctly separated. The latter knows no irrational. In the realisation of its limits, it keeps a modest silence about that which it receives as a task in passion. In this way, the will is subordinated to reason. The rational will is called *humility*, which makes us hearken to the inner law. Reason guides us to faith as the only way to the absolute, so that our will is directed towards the deed and not towards the attempt to grasp the absolute. Truth can be embraced in faith only, reality can be comprehended by reason.

From the above, it follows that the formula we constituted in connection with Grisebach's two previous works, *Kultur als Formbildung* and *Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart*: *Actuality qua Truth + Reality* has been broken asunder. In these two works the creative act as universal act, into which all of man's creative activities were merged, was the spirit as absolute rational willing, which was reflected in the infinite number of man's cultural acts, all these acts being modifications of the spirit as the act. Hence each cultural act of man was *true* and *real* in as much as it participated in the truth and the reality of the universal act. The cultural act, therefore, in which the universe was embedded, constituted the real and rational ground of the world. In this way, man's cultural acts were brought to coincide with the absolute, which, of course, amounted to not much more than the absolutisation of man's creative act. But in this fashion the law of identity had been observed, and truth and reality were both known and possessed by man. God could also be known and could be reached through the creative act. The idea of God sprang from the feeling of exaltation and awe as a religious experience, which is closely linked with our cultural and creative activity. To carry our point we quote Rudolf Eucken under whose philosophical influence Grisebach wrote his *Kultur als Formbildung und Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart*. In *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* Eucken writes that the idea of God bedeutet ............

1) E. Grisebach, *Die Schule des Geistes*, p. 160
In *Die Schule des Geistes*, however, not identity but contradiction becomes the very principle of the world. Thereby truth is clearly separated from reality and is opposed to it. It, therefore, can no longer be known or possessed by man, but it is regarded as the emanent law that puts a stop to man's effort and striving, thus limiting him to the sphere of the real, viz., the region of becoming or acuality. In this way, absolute truth is opposed to the real, i.e., the actual. This does not mean, however, that there is no truth in the real world, or that absolute truth is not real. It means that the truth of the real world is revealed by its very cultural forms as rational forms. In other words, the rational form, as a necessary form, constitutes the very limit of human truth. On the other hand, the reality of absolute truth can be experienced by the very limitation imposed upon the truths or the *logoi* of man. By its contradiction the absolute represents both the *yes* and the *no* to man. The *yes* confirms him as an individual separate from other individuals and the *no* flowing from this very separatedness refers him to his fellowman. It prevents him from overshooting his mark, from positing as absolute himself and his truth, and causes him to practise self-restraint, thereby exhibiting modesty and humility. The absolute's *no* explains the nothing, viz., the historicity and perishability of man's truths as well as his oscillation between not-knowing and wanting-to-know, not-having and wanting-to-have, in brief, between existence and non-existence.

For the first time we notice in Grisebach's thinking an existential problem in the sense of Existentialist Philosophy, which results from the uncertain and doubtful position of his truth. But Grisebach, under the influence of dialectical theology, has still a solution for this problem. He still provides a firm anchor, not in the form of reason, but in the form of faith. The very contradiction of the absolute, its very *no*, which compels .................

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compels man to restrict himself to the region of actuality, proves a grace to him; for the modesty and humility to which he now subscribes as regards his own rational labour direct him to faith, the reasonableness of which follows from the very limitation of his own understanding. In this way, the necessity of faith is demonstrated by reason, and theology and religion are founded upon a rational basis, namely, upon the reasonableness of faith as a result of the limitation of man's understanding. It may thus be argued that, by the dialectical method, faith, theology and religion have been brought within the grasp of human reason, even though this has occurred in a negative way, namely, by the realisation of the limitedness of the human understanding and the conclusion drawn therefrom that the absolute cannot be known but must be believed. It is at this juncture that we have arrived at what Karl Barth has termed the sacrificium intellectus. But Karl Barth, at least in his earlier writings, stressed too much the otherworldliness of God or His no, which Grisebach does in particular in his Die Grenzen des Erziehers, as we shall see later. It was Rudolf Bultmann and Friedrich Gogarten who also pointed to the yes, i.e., God's revelation in the world and in history. We observe thus that by recognising the spirit in man's cultural activities, Grisebach, in Die Schule des Geistes, comes nearer to the thought of Bultmann and Gogarten than that of Barth, at least the Barth in his earlier phase. But in this work the influence of Hegel, the neo-Kantians, Eucken (and perhaps even Jaspers) is still strong, so that here Grisebach's thought still reveals idealist features.

Because of the dialectical relation between the world and God, philosophy and religion, knowledge and faith, which relation is understood, it can still be argued that God is reached by human reason. Grisebach himself will later argue, as we shall yet see, that as long as a contradictory relation is conceived as a dialectical principle, instead of being experienced as a contingent event, there is no real contradiction, but only a theoretical one; for by comprehending or rationalising it, human reason has reconciled it with the law of identity. The dialectical method applied..............
applied by theology and philosophy might thus give the impression as though
man no longer disposes of God or the absolute, but that God or the abso­
lute disposes of him. This is however an illusion. By the rational con­
ception of the relation between the absolute and the world as a dialecti­
cal principle, there is no longer a real contradiction of the two. The
absolute by being brought in this way within reach of reason has become
immanent, and man has again completed his movement within the cycle of
the self. He again disposes of the absolute; all that has changed is his
method. The moment Grisebach became aware of this state of affairs and
with might and main sought to break through all human methods and con­
structions and to push through to contingent reality, the breach with the
dialectical theology was inevitable. For the time being, however, he seems
to be under its spell and is himself the captive of the dialectical me­
thod, so that on account of his rationalisation of the contradictory re­
lation between the absolute and the world, we are still in a position to
provide a formula for the relation between truth and reality. If the
formula we constituted in connection with his two previous works read:
Actuality qua Truth = Reality, the new dialectical formula we can set up
in reference to Die Schule des Geistes reads: Actuality qua polarity
between Truth and Reality, Faith and Knowledge, Religion and Philosophy.

Truth as .................
CHAPTER V

TRUTH AS REFLECTION IN REALITY

In the preface to *Erkenntnis und Glaube* Grisebach writes:

Diese Arbeit schliesst unmittelbar an / Die Schule des Geistes' (Niemeyer 1921) an und sucht die dort gewonnene Sphäre des Widerspruchs auszubauen.

The chaotic conditions in Germany after the First World War did not permit a serious and responsible thinker like Eberhard Grisebach to rest on his laurels. His genuine concern for human existence, his diligent search for truth, and his anxious questions about reality are revealed in the fact that he did not hesitate to revoke his own writings if circumstances compelled him to give an answer different from that given in his previous works. It may be said that it was the actual circumstances that led Grisebach to the eventual dismantling and scrapping of his constructive rational apparatus. Step by step his philosophical structure was broken down, until he stood on the real ground of everyday life and activity. At first, the form as a principle of culture had to give way to the universal cultural act. But already in *Die Schule des Geistes*, this act was a broken act, an answer to the permanent question of religion about the absolute, which answer, by its failure to reach the absolute, made clear the inaccessibility of the latter to the human mind. Thereby man was restricted to the sphere of becoming or actuality, while the absolute remained transcendent and could only be embraced in faith. Nevertheless, in *Die Schule des Geistes*, man, in spite of constant failure, was still idealistic enough to believe that the world gained reality through the actualisation of matter by reason in form of the concept. He still in his continued cultural activity saw the universal law of reason, and again, it was reason that, because of man's failure to comprehend the absolute, demonstrated to him the rationality of faith. The dialectical relation between the absolute and the world was thus understood as a rational principle. By the rationalisation of the contradictory relation between the absolute and the world, however, this contradiction became something immanent in man's mind, thus being no longer real contradiction but, as a rational principle, corresponding again with the law of identity.

But was ..................
But was there still room for an idealistic rationalism as expounded in *Die Schule des Geistes*? Had not the actual situation considerably changed in the Germany of the early nineteen-twenties? Did not the various ideologies clash with each other by the full impact of their respective claim to absoluteness? There was still the unbridgeable contrast between a shallow positivistic scientism on the one hand and an unreal idealistic metaphysics on the other, which had already left the Germany of the 19th century and which the young generation attempted to overcome by *Selbstbesinnung*, that is, a reflection upon one's own self which led to a new *Innerlichkeit*, viz., the evolution of the universe from the experience of one's own spiritual life as it manifests itself in the creative act. Grisebach's *Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart* in particular was an example of this. There was further the head-on collision between the materialist world-view of the socialists of all shades and the more or less idealistic Weltanschauung of the nationalists of all shades, while the parties in the centre subscribed to a rationalist or Christian world-view. It was obvious that in such chaotic circumstances, when parties no longer merely differed in views, but were definitely bent on each other's destruction, it was no longer possible to find behind man's activities a universal principle of reason. Thus Grisebach was forced to put afresh the question about the real. In many discussions with his friend, the theologian Friedrich Gogarten, the distinction between theology and philosophy was again thoroughly investigated and a clear limit was to be drawn between knowledge and faith. In *Erkenntnis und Glaube* the province of knowledge is outlined to the point where the theologian must take over. Friedrich Gogarten has dealt with the realm of faith in his treatise *Von Glaube und Offenbarung* (Eugen Diedrichs, 1922) and in his essay *Entscheidung* in the quarterly *Zwischen den Zeiten* (Kayser in Munich).

Grisebach's whole philosophical career may be conceived as the gradual de-mythologisation of philosophy, by which is meant his gradual turning away from the constructive cultural task of philosophy and his eventual concentration on its purely critical and finally mere warning function. In other words...
words, Grisebach makes use of philosophy as a critical instrument in order to abolish philosophy itself, by which reduction man rests on the actual foundation of contingent experience, that is, the real conflict and contradiction of everyday life. Unlike Marx, Grisebach, by the nullification of philosophy, does not merely mean that the having-become-philosophical of the world requires an as complete becoming-worldly of philosophy, which would only amount to turning away from idealism and reading a philosophical or rational structure into the real, i.e., the material world. Grisebach wants to push through to the real contradictory situation in which I find myself with my fellowman now and then. He wants to end all individualism, viz. allmegoistic unilateral positing and postulates on the part of the individual, who offers his self-constituted projects, methods, systems to the world as a means for solving man's conflicts, problems, and difficulties, who pretends to know the truth and the real, thus posing as a leader. Instead, Grisebach points to the actual contradiction existing between man and his fellowman, and shows that it is by this very contradiction, that they are referred to one another. Man is thus a communal being and cannot afford to be an individualist, which inevitably means living in isolation, away from his fellowman, and, therefore, away from reality. Man lives not in oneness but in twoness, and only in reference to his fellowman and by a common effort in a situation of conflict and contradiction real work is being done. All projects, systems, plans, methods, constructions by scientists, philosophers, educationists, artists, politicians, or any other individuals that lay claim to lead man into reality or ethical existence, are thus rejected by Grisebach. It is not surprising, then, that philosophy must stop pretending that it derives reality and ethical existence from a presupposed real grounds of whatever nature, whether material or ideal, constituted by itself. This, Grisebach argues, is just to keep moving within the circle of the self. No real question is asked, because nothing is really in question or uncertain. The question is answered by the presupposed real grounds of philosophy, which as grounds that are either understood, comprehended intuitively, or embraced in faith, are always immanent, even though they are often declared to be emmanent. By the comprehension................
the comprehension of the dialectical process in a system like that of Hegel or Marx, for instance, contradiction has lost its real character. It has been dissolved into a rational law and as such corresponds to the law of identity. The myths of philosophy, i.e., its self-constituted and presumed "real" grounds of whatever nature, material or ideal, empirical, or rational must be destroyed. Only by this demythologisation can we hope to penetrate to the real, i.e., the really emmanent. This really emmanent, however, is not something that is understood to be emmanent, for in that case it would, as we have observed, really be immanent, but something that is experienced as that which puts in question the truth posited by me, of whatever nature this truth may be, private, scientific, ethical, philosophical, or aesthetical. It is that which puts me in question as a self, which restricts me to the communal relationship with my fellowman. In short, it is that which cries halt to me by contradicting me, teaching me modesty and humility, and perhaps even teaching me to bear this contradiction in silent suffering, at which moment I should be leading an ethical existence. It is clear from the very start that that something affording me real experience can only be my fellowman.

Small wonder, then, that Grisebach consistently demythologises his own philosophy and destroys his own real grounds one after the other, no matter whether they are called cultural form, cultural act, or principle of reason, etc. Grisebach's work Erkenntnis und Glaube is a first attempt to establish the real emmanence of the real ground in the above mentioned sense of the word. It no longer is understood, even as standing in a dialectical relation to the world, nor can it be embraced by faith any longer, as was still the case in Die Schule des Geistes. In Erkenntnis und Glaube, the real ground is merely reflected in the Beziehungsgesetzlichkeit, i.e., in the law of relatedness which consists in the indissoluble and irremovable contrast and contradiction between subject and object.

Accordingly, Grisebach, at first, shows that the subject can never be identical with the object. The law of identity is inapplicable, and we experience the tension or conflict between subject and object. The will,
too, belongs to self-conscious existence. It is constituted by subjective and objective factors as well as by purpose. From this it follows that the will cannot be traced to some rational or irrational origin. It manifests itself in the permanence of man's fluctuating movement between not-knowing and wanting-to-know, not-having and wanting-to-have. The real ground of distinction cannot be included in the law of relatedness, i.e., the law of contradiction, by which the relation between subject and object is governed. It no longer is in any way at man's disposal, neither through reason nor through faith, and it does not contradict man directly either. In fact, Grisebach points out, man could not bear direct contradiction by the absolute. It is thus completely emanent. From this it becomes clear that the absolute, in contrast to Die Schule des Geistes, does not set itself as a task either. My willing has its cause in the polarity between subject and object, and it is this polarity that sets my self-consciousness its task. It is in the oscillation between wanting-to-know and not-knowing, wanting-to-have and not-having that the law of action consists. In other words, man moves between the law of contradiction as his real ground and the concealed absolute. The latter is reflected in the rapture between subject and object. As a fourth factor or principle it causes the tension between the elements which we call the will, without being the ground of our willing.

Das vierte Prinzip begründet eine Spannung zwischen den Elementen, die wir als Willen ansprechen, ohne dass wir im Wollen diesen Grund besitzen. So macht sich das vierte Moment im Willen geltend .... Die Haltung des wollenden Menschen wird durch ein Gesetz bestimmt, das uns in Spannung hält, weil wir von jeder Identität ausgeschlossen sind. Wir gewinnen so im Reflex, oder wir können auch sagen spekulativ im Spiegel unseres denkbaren Sinngefuges das Ergebnis der Spannung.1) The law of contradiction, in the first place, refers us to the real goods and values, i.e., to a content that manifests itself as becoming. Everything is constantly being put in question, and history moves between question and relative reality. The difference from Positivism is the real ground, the relationship of which we do not know. It is only mirrored in our reflection as docta ignorantia.

1) E. Grisebach, Erkenntnis und Glaube, p. 17
The most intensified reality or the law of relatedness in its most acute form is experienced in the relation between man and fellowman. If it can still be said in the case of man's relation to nature that, through the application of his technological methods, man (the subject) masters nature (object), at least to a certain extent, his fellowman cannot be subjected to such a treatment. He opposes, contradicts, and bids man halt. His opposition is experienced as man's limit. It is thus not a known opposition in a rational sense, an opposition that is comprehended and therefore immanent, but it is an encounter with the eminent, viz., real contradiction that causes conflict and creates a crisis between man and his fellowman. From the epistemological point of view it could only be stated that the broken nature of our own self and the crisis-situation between man and his fellowman lead to a not-knowing of the absolute. This docta ignorantia, in turn, restricts us to the situation of conflict existing between man and his fellowman. It, therefore, points to an ought, i.e., the duty of accepting one's fellowman's contradiction and the obligation to bear it. It is by this encounter with the real or the eminent, that is, one's fellowman, that man's existence becomes ethical existence, and this ethical existence is one in faith. But, now, in accordance with docta ignorantia, which concept we gained from the experience of the brokeness of our own self and the contradictory relation between man and his fellowman, faith is no longer founded upon reason or philosophy. It no longer embraces anything. On the contrary, faith now means: delivering oneself up to the actual crisis itself and bearing one's suffering obediently and in silence. In order to realise clearly the importance of the change that has taken place in Grisebach's philosophy that sets the pattern for all his future thought, we deem it necessary to quote him here in full:

Ich hüte mich nun wohl, über den Glauben als Erkennender etwas Direktes zu sagen. Die Philosophie hat ja nur die Aufgabe, der Erkenntnis die Grenzen zu weisen, kritischer noch als der Kritizismus den Glauben, d.h., die Verleibung des Ursprungscharakters und seines absoluten Akzentes, für sich abzulehnen.........

Die Philosophie als Erkenntnis aller das Sein konstituierenden Prinzipien endet mit absoluter Ohnmachtigkeit. Die dialektische Beziehungsgesetzlichkeit ist ohne die absolute Macht des Ursprungs, ohne Einheit und Identität. Sie ist ein mit Bezug auf jedes Moment zweispaltiges System von Beziehungen, das für den Widerspruch offen bleibt und somit weder Glauben beanspruchen darf......
Here the limit of philosophy is clearly indicated. It is confined to the broken world of man, to his cultural goods, which, whether scientific or aesthetic, result from man's contradictory activity. Where everything is in question, philosophy can only continue cultivating the loyalty of questioning. There is no answer in the sense of a solution, but only the permanency of the crisis, which philosophy must learn to accept as inevitable.

In the common task of creating the goods, therefore, in which the fellow-man's claim and challenge are keenly experienced, lies the source of faith, der Ort des Glaubens. Faith no longer represents a human effort, but is the share of the origin, which confers upon the goods of the community possible concrete value.

From this it follows that philosophy has no concept of the revelation of the real ground as it occurs in the very conflict and contradiction, when all human knowledge is questionable and only our ignorance is real. It is thus absolutely incompetent to talk about faith, grace, redemption, resurrection, and the kingdom of God. This is the exclusive business of the theologian. Philosophy can only participate in the prime process of real dialectic, the Urgeschehen der realen Dialektik; it has no concept of it.

This real dialectic always remains a miracle, in the sense of always being .

1) Erkenntnis und Glaube, pp.38-39
being problematic. The theologian, now, values the real ground differently from the philosopher, who is confined to the problematic occurrence of the actual world. To him it is the absolute no, which puts an end to our logic and to our historical knowledge, causing us to question again, only to realize once more our ignorance because of the problematic character of reality, i.e., the contradictoriness and brokenness of all our principles, methods, systems, views — in brief, our constitutive activity.

We are thus aware that the truth is no longer found by the constitution on our part of logical or rational systems of knowledge pointing towards some intelligible universal principle or rational ground which is identical with our own rational nature. Truth is now the very opposite. It is no longer accessible to our reason nor embraceable by rational faith. It is, on the contrary, the totally incomprehensible, which is only reflected in the broken nature of our self, the contradiction between subject and object, the crisis between man and his fellowman, and the rupture of the community.

Truth, paradoxically enough, as the reflection in the crisis, i.e., as the law of contradiction, leads us to true reality, which is no longer derived from a self-constituted real ground and therefore is no longer homogeneous, but it has become heterogeneous and problematic. It is experienced by the contradiction on the part of the fellowman. The real situation, therefore, is the actual crisis in which I find myself with my fellowman, which it is my duty to accept, and which I am obliged to bear. This crisis Grisebach himself acutely experienced in a war-battered Germany. It manifested itself in the field of human knowledge, in the fine arts, but above all as a crisis of man's very existence in a world whose accepted values, standards, and traditions had become highly questionable. Their universal and absolute claim caused man to overreach and overestimate himself. His immense pride in his culture and civilisation and the vainglory he exhibited in connection with his scientific and technological success boosted his ego to such an extent that he lost all sense of proportion and deemed himself infallible and capable of anything. The catastrophe that in the form of the First World War followed as the inevitable anti-climax had exposed as an illusion the claim of science, philosophy, the humanities, and the fine arts to being
able to find the truth, to lead man to a better life, and to enable him to lead an ethical existence. Small wonder, then, that Grisebach cast a vote of no confidence in human reason and that he made it one of his principal tasks to expose the futility of a reality based on the self-realisation of man, a reality that was self-constructed and immanent, and therefore, no true reality.

But the question will immediately be asked: What about Grisebach? Has he succeeded in penetrating to the real? If he draws our attention to the contradictoriness of man's truths, i.e., man's cultural goods, is he justified in declaring this contradictoriness to be the very structure of reality, and has he thereby not himself constituted another principle, especially when he insists that in contradictoriness the real ground is reflected? Does, in fact, Grisebach's argument not show some logical systematic procedure, a certain method based on concepts? We are afraid that these questions point to a very serious deficiency, and that Grisebach would find it hard to answer them satisfactorily.

First in the place, Grisebach would point out that the problematic nature of reality is not so much a matter of cognition as of contingent experience. Contradiction on the part of my fellowman is something I experience in actuality now and then. Only when I am directly participating in the prime process of real dialectics, viz., directly experiencing the conflict between subject and object and the inner brokenness of my nature as a result of my oscillation between contradiction and the real ground of contradiction, am I in the real situation, but I am not when I merely reflect upon it. Reflection merely makes me realise the problematic nature of all cognition and knowledge. It causes me to become conscious of the law of relatedness as the law of contradiction, which governs the relation between subject and object as well as between the world and the absolute. For this reason the latter cannot be included, but remains emmanent. Nevertheless, Grisebach still speaks about the law of contradiction, which is applicable everywhere, to the real cultural components of man, to man as an individual, to man and his fellowman, and to the world and the absolute. The law of contradiction is thus still conceived as a universal law, which logically and systematically

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to the concept of docta ignorantia or absolute not-knowing, it becomes immanent. If this were not so, one could not talk about an absolute at all, not even about its absolute transcendence or emanence.

From the above, it follows that faith, too, is not really separated from reason, as it would appear at first sight, and as Grisebach would want it to be. On closer analysis, we find that it depends on the law of contradiction as a universal law. It is by being conscious of absolute not-knowing or by the docta ignorantia that man becomes aware of and thus understands the ought, i.e., the obligation to his fellowman with whom he stands in a contradictory relation. It is by the docta ignorantia, therefore, that I am led to an ethical existence, i.e., to being enabled to suffer my fellowman's contradiction, thus being in faith.

It becomes clear that Grisebach has not escaped systematic construction. By the systematic application of the law of contradiction, he has merged with contradictory reality, which is true because it rests on the rational concept of docta ignorantia. Grisebach's method is simply the inversion of the "constructive method." Instead of building up the world by man's will and reason and thus arriving at the absolute by his own effort, he permits man's striving and knowledge to be contradicted, so that, by total ignorance, he falls in line with the universal law of contradiction. By allowing his ego to be shrunk by contradiction, Grisebach hopes to/led to true ethical existence, i.e., true faith, by which, however indirectly, a relation is established to the absolute. Thus by the inverted or indirect method, man has again been fused with the absolute. The difference between Grisebach's previous works and Erkenntnis und Glaube is that in the former this fusion constitutes the transcendence of actuality, i.e., the finite world of man's activity, whereas in Erkenntnis und Glaube actuality is rather "subascended" or sidestepped in a negative manner, instead of transcended or overstepped. Communication with the real ground no longer occurs through man's own effort, but through the opposite, namely, man's delivering himself up to the actual situation, by bearing in passion the contradiction on the part of his fellowman, in which contingent experience man encounters the real and his existence becomes an ethical existence, i.e., an existence in faith.

If, in .................
If, in Erkenntnis und Glaube, sought to lay down the limits of philosophy and knowledge and to effect its clear separation from theology, religion, and faith, he, in Die Grenzen des Erziehers und seine Verantwortung, in a more detailed manner, attempts to stake out the limits of man’s activities, and above all investigates the educational problems resulting from them. He subjects to a critical examination the pedagogical and educational claim of man’s constitutive activity, puts the question about the possibility of education, and seeks to define the limits of the educationist. The discussion revolves around the constant danger of individualism and historicism, i.e., the evolution of a Weltanschauung from the individual self, respectively the universal subject, viz., a Weltanschauung based on the scientific examination of man’s activity in the past, which activity is known precisely because it is a product of the past, something that has become, instead of is becoming. Such a Weltanschauung, therefore, has its starting-point in the past and not the present. It thus stands to reason that the constitution of that which has become and which represents that which we call knowledge, no matter whether scientific, ethical, aesthetical, or divine knowledge is concerned, misses the real and keeps moving within the circle of the self. The real, according to Grisebach, is not that which has become, but that which is becoming. It is, however, precisely that which in defies all constitution and puts question our knowledge, viz., the constitution of the past in the above sense, but it can only be received as a gift, if we completely abandon ourselves to contingent experience.

In the above mentioned discussion, Grisebach may now be said in some sense to apply the method of Socrates, whom he regards in any case as the conscience of man. He sees in him a disturbing and alarming element, which shakes man from his apathy, lethargy, complacency, and self-contentment, which ruthlessly and inexorably destroys his self-constituted dream-world, and in which he experiences an illusory feeling of security and imagines himself to be one with nature or reality, and plunges him into true reality, namely, the contradictory, actual world of practical life. Die Grenzen des Erziehers constitutes a collection of addresses to philosophical friends in Zürich and Wiesbaden as well as lectures delivered to the students of the University of Jena. Each of these addresses is a rounded off piece in itself, in that ...............
the real, which is always actual event or occurrence, because they deal with something that has happened, something that occurred in the past. And only because the material dealt with by the sciences and by history is dead material in the sense that, as that which has become it does not contradict, it is possible to make it comply with the applied method. It is in this way that man gains mastery over the "objective" world.

No such mastery is possible, however, in connection with one's fellowman. Here I encounter someone who defies my method, my opinion, and my Weltanschauung. He puts them in question, criticizes them, disagrees, and puts another method, opinion, and Weltanschauung against my own. Which of us is right? Whose method, system, concept represents reality? Neither, Grisebach answers, represents reality as such; for both are mere segments of it. In other words, the real is the actual encounter taking place between myself and my fellowman. This encounter brings about the Entscheid, by which Grisebach means that man never lives in oneness, which tempts him to absolutise his own self, but is intended to live in twoness, i.e., in the contradictory relation with his fellowman. The equality of all men is an illusion that rests on the previously mentioned self-constituted general premises or real grounds. In reality, we experience the inequality of men, that is, their differences, conflicts, contradictions, which cause a great deal of suffering and grief. In other words, reality is never found in the rational structure of a scientific method of whatever nature; it is never found in the past; but only in Gegenwart, i.e., in the actual contradiction between man and his fellowman. This contradiction is revealed in all walks of life, in man's cultural goods and values, as the manifestation of the contradictory nature of human existence. It follows that it is this very contradiction, the Entscheid, that leads man to Bescheidung, which could be translated by self-control or self-restraint, and lastly to Bescheidenheit, i.e., humility. And if peradventure we learn to live with the contradiction on the part of our fellowman, instead of trying to conquer and repress him, we might eventually come to be blessed by being enabled to suffer and bear this contradiction. In so doing, we should then lead an ethical existence and should have found peace in faith.
Just like in Erkenntnis und Glaube in Die Grenzen des Erziehers, too, "Der Riss in der Gemeinschaft ist der Reflex des Realgrundes." The brokeness of our nature also determines the brokeness of the real goods. The law of contradiction is a clearly formulated. On closer observation, we might even say that its forcefulness has been increased by stripping it of any historical colouring it might still have possesses in Erkenntnis und Glaube, where the real goods still represented the relative answer to the continual question about the absolute, so that history moved between question and relative reality. In Grenzen des Erziehers, now, it may be said that Grisebach proceeds further in the direction of a dualism, namely, the separation of truth and reality, truth being of a theoretical, systematic, and scientific nature dealing with the past, and reality being of a practical, contingent, problematic, and incomprehensible nature, occurring and being experienced in the present. However, in Grenzen des Erziehers man's theoretical perspectives are still recognised as representing segments of the real in their contradictoriness, so that any scientific or scholarly work and any kind of constitutive or cultural work for that matter represent a common task. Hence the cultural goods are not a product of some real ground, some universal values constituted by one or the other thinker, but they are the fruit of the community. Their contradictory nature keeps man questioning. The common task concerning the goods is thus set by the permanent crisis. But here in Grenzen des Erziehers, Grisebach makes it very clear that this actual work concerning the goods, which is occuring the the present, must be clearly distinguished from the scientific and scholarly work about the goods of the past, which goods possessed practical or real meaning only in their time, when being produced and used in a particular situation. From this it follows that history is alive only in as much as we have to-day determined its law by the brokeness of our nature, i.e., the antagonism existing between the "I" and the "Thou". By Grisebach's law of history, a clear separation has thus been established between the remembered past and experienced actuality. This separation seems to be the new development since Erkenntnis und Glaube, where history still appears to have been ............
have been conceived as the contradictory and broken series of man's cultural systems. In Grenzen des Erziehers, Grisebach makes it clear that history is being experienced in the present by the law of the community (contradiction between him and his fellowman). In this way, by the law of history, which is synonymous with the law of the community, man from the present is referred to the future, that is, to his eventually being enabled to bear the antagonism on the part of his fellowman. The experience of history in this contingent manner strips it of historicism, viz., being the mere science of past events and occurrences, and, therefore, of that which has become, which can never hope to touch the real. The experience of history as contingent experience causes it, so to speak, to become anti-historical and merges it with the actual event. This event being the antagonistic relation between man and his fellowman, by which everything becomes questionable and uncertain. The law of history, too, points to faith, and as in the contradictory relation between man and his fellowman the real ground is reflected, and refers man to the absolute in the same indirect way and by the same inverted method that we observed in Erkenntnis und Glaube.

Before leading ad absurdum man's attempt to arrive at real or ethical existence by some self-constituted real grounds, whether material or ideal, empirical or rational, Grisebach discusses the position in respect to the real of the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard. He argues that Kierkegaard's thinking can be called concrete only where he actually contradicts Hegel's philosophy, i.e., where he really enters the historical world of conflict and limitation and directly participates in it by denying that Hegel has reached absolute truth. By raising the problem of religious existence in contradiction to Hegel's rational theology, Kierkegaard has entered into an actual relation with his fellowman, a condition he postulated himself in his book Either / Or. The moment, however, that Kierkegaard begins to reflect upon this problem as an individual religious thinker, he leaves real dialectic, i.e., actual contradiction, behind again in favour of theoretical dialectic, i.e., the rational comprehension of the paradoxical relationship between God and himself. By the rational constitution of this relation, therefore, he moves from the practical world of communal life or reality to the individualistic, isolated world of theory or truth.

In the ....................
In the first address contained in *Grenzen des Erziehers*, which bears the same title as the book, Grisebach at first lashes out against the general mania and obsession to educate. It is not surprising that the same theme occurs twelve years later, after the second defeat of Germany, in a series of yet unpublished lectures delivered to students of education at the University of Zürich, shortly before his death; for in both cases this mania for education is the result of a feeling of decadence of the Bourgeois culture, values, and way of life. Man appears sick and has lost his balance. Already Strindberg, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky, Grisebach points out, had treated the theme of decadence and disintegration. Hence the imperious demand for more and better education, for new leaders to point the way out of our dilemma. But in connection with the demand for new ways in education, the question of its possibilities has also been raised. According to what principle and for what goal should man be educated? In the existing crisis, therefore, education had become quite problematic and had touched the practical sphere of the real; but as soon as the question is asked about the goal of education, it is shoved back into the sphere of the theoretical, for now history 1) and the sciences resume their competition of pointing out to man the goal of education. Thus Grisebach dedicates a lengthier discussion to the attempt of history to understand the nature or essence of man and reality from the past with the aid of the positivistic method as it was also applied by the sciences. Thus Grisebach says about Dilthey:

Auch Diltheys Leben war dieser Aufgabe gewidmet, Vergangenheit zu verstehen: in der Asche der Toten die Seele lebendig zu machen. Ich möchte das Problem des historischen Verstehens dazu benutzen, nach Ablehnung der individualistischen Geschichtenauffassung in eine dialektische Geschichtsphilosophie einzuführen. 2)

Thus Grisebach rejects as futile any attempt to revive the past. It cannot show us the way to truth and reality, because it is irrevocably dead. It only lends itself to theoretical and academic discussion. and, as such, affords us theoretical knowledge. Only when we question the philosophical systems

1) History and historian are used by Grisebach in a wide sense. Often by history he means more the history of culture or the philosophy of history than history proper which seeks to arrange and interpret the mass of historical data.

2) *Die Grenzen des Erziehers*, p.20
systems of the past, e.g., that of Spinoza, Leibniz, or Kant, shall we realise their unilateral and contradictory character, shall we conceive their attempts as relative errors, and only at this moment of questioning, the past becomes the present, because, now, we ourselves directly participate in the real work about the truth. Thus history is real only in so far as it is questioned by us to-day.

Durch die Auseinandersetzung mit der Vergangenheit, im Widerspruche zu ihren Leistungen wird allein die 'Kontinuität' gewahrt. 1)

To be real, history must merge with the actual, the common struggle and work concerned with the components of culture. Instead of being something that is remembered, something that has happened or become, it is now something that is happening or becoming. It, too, just like the sciences, is subject to the law of the community, the permanent crisis. For this reason, no single person, no individual thinker is able to refer us to the origin or ground of the world, only the community is referred to the real ground, i.e., the real is reflected in its rupture:

Wir suchen nach der Gesetzmässigkeit der historischen Welt, der auch die Naturkenntnis, als historische Arbeit gefasst, untersteht. Diese Gesetzmässigkeit als dialektischer Begriff ist das Gesetz unserer widersprechenden, ursprungsbezogenen Gemeinschaft, an der wir teilnehmen ............ In der dialektischen Gesetzmässigkeit aller Prinzipien ist das transzendentele Subjekt und das in einer ganz anderen Sphäre liegende Objekt als materieller Grund mitgefasst. Aber weder das eine noch das andere hat einen direkten Anteil oder eine Beziehung zum Realgrunde, der nur dadurch als ausgeschlossener Grund berücksichtigt wird, dass wir innerhalb der Bindung bleiben und unsere Grenze nicht durch Übergebung des Widersprechenden überschreiten. 2)

Being, character, and personality are thus no longer founded upon one principle, whether materialistic or idealistic, empirical or rational. To possess being, now, means to break through the wall of isolation with which the individual has surrounded himself. It means to be in actual traffic with his fellowman, by which man takes part directly in the real dialectics of life. Being in actual traffic with his fellowman, however, means an encounter in contradiction, whereby man experiences his limitation by his fellowman

1) Die Grenzen des Erziehers, p. 22
2) Quaestio, pp. 24-25
fellowman, who thus forewarns man not to exceed his limits by escaping into the world of theory and rationalisation, i.e., the world of the self. Man's personality thus remains split. It reflects the rupture or the law of the community. It follows that neither the idealistic nor materialistic or socialist goal of education is acceptable to Grisebach. In both the individualistic and the collectivistic world-view man transcends himself and projects his own consciousness into the idea or society, so that in both cases he becomes Greater Man, i.e., an ideal universal self or a material collective self. Jacob Hommes in comparing Hegel with Marx says for instance:

Gegenüber dem bürgerlichen 'Gott' steigt nun der proletarische auf; die Gesellschaft in ihrer unbedingt gesellschaftlichen oder kommunistischen Verfassung.

Both views are equally theoretical and egocentric, and in this sense individualistic, i.e., their dialectics has been understood as a logical principle blending man rationally into the historical process whose goal is known and comprehended, because it is a self-constituted goal. In both cases, in spite of opposite starting-points, the circle of the self has been completed. Man no longer exists in historical causality in Grisebach's sense of the word, viz., in the actual work, traffic, and exchange with his fellowman concerning the components of culture, but has given up the world of real dialectic for a theoretical dream-world. Reality, however, consists in the permanent crisis between man and his fellowman concerning these components. It is by the common effort to create these goods in the midst of the crisis that man is referred to his fellowman in contradiction, which he ought to bear in passion; and it is in this contradiction that the real ground is reflected, taking care that man does not transcend his limit, but remains restricted to the actual task of the community. It follows that man can never achieve real or ethical existence by pursuing absolute values, but will experience it only by taking an active part in the work concerning the components of culture.

By the .................

1) Kommunistische Ideologie und christliche Philosophie, p.25
By the identification of history and actuality in the sense of an actual common task between man and his fellowman concerning the material and spiritual components of culture, individualistic education in the above sense has become an impossibility. Such education is bound to mislead the pupil, no matter whether it takes its starting-point from nature or from the idea. There is no originality in such a self-constructed method, because, as has been abundantly shown before, no individual is referred to the origin, but only the community is, in whose rupture the absolute is reflected.

There can thus be no enlightened leader carrying the torch of culture in front of us. The illusionary and fallacious character of these egocentric and presumptuous claims must be clearly and mercilessly exposed, and the educator must enter the actual work concerning the components of culture together with his pupil. Instead of imagining that he knows the aims (thus being condescending and intolerant of contradiction on the part of his pupil), he should confess to his ignorance, which would cause him to be modest and humble. He should set a living example by accepting his natural limitation by his fellowman and enter into an actual mutual traffic with his pupil consisting of question and answer. It is in this way that the pupil is introduced to active participation in the common task concerning the components of culture and that it is in this way that the problematic nature of all our knowledge becomes evident. Critical education thus discusses the real dialectics of events in history and in the community. It is its task "dem Menschen in allgemeinen und dem Erzieher im besonderen seine Grenze zu weisen. Sie hat ihm zu sagen, was die Teilnahme an wirklichen Sein bedeutet ".

The other addresses and essays contained in the book Die Grenzen des Erziehers have all the same aim, namely, to expose the unrealistic and theoretical nature of man's rational constructions, systems, methods, principles, and ideologies as well as their contradictions and to show that, because they are constituted in an absolute manner, all claiming to know the truth and reality, it is inevitable that they are bent upon destroying each other.

As long as man constitutes his truth in an absolute manner and in an individualistic

1) E. Grisebach, Die Grenzen des Erziehers, p.37
dualistic way, therefore, it is impossible for him to work together with his fellowman for the common weal. On the contrary, he is then inclined to be self-righteous, dogmatic, and intolerant. Instead of making a common effort with his fellowman in the interest of the community as a whole, he endeavours to annihilate his rival. The result is not the struggle about the goods by which man is referred to his fellowman, but the desire to wipe out the other by force. Instead of humility, there is pride; instead of love, hatred; instead of peace, war and total destruction. As Grisebach had seen too much of this, he devoted his life to showing man the problematic nature of the real and the questionability of all our knowledge. He makes the attempt to refer him to the practical region of the actual event, to the task he has in common with his fellowman, namely, to work on the goods in accordance with the brokeness of his nature under the law of contradiction and the community, in whose rupture only the real ground is reflected. The absolute is therefore emmanent and its relation to the world cannot be comprehended. Again it is thus by the permanency of the question, the docta ignorantia, that we are led to an ethical existence and to faith. Like in Erkenntnis und Glaube, therefore, philosophy is restricted to the field of experience as an experience of contradiction, which puts in question all our cognition and renders problematic all our knowledge. Again the docta ignorantia is the result of the total rupture between the world and the absolute, the result, therefore, of the absolute Entscheid. It follows that religion is no longer a system or doctrine that is founded upon philosophy or rational insight, but it, too, is the result of the Entscheid. Religion thus bedeutet das Ende jeder ins Unendliche schweifenden Erklärung und Erkenntnis, die entzieht sich jedem Begriff und jeder Deutung als die Krise der Erkenntnis, als Anlaß ihres unaufhebbaren Widerspruchs...... Nur in der Wirklichkeit des historischen Geschehens kann der Gegenstand der Religion geglaubt und der Bezug ange- nommen worden. 1)

Again we witness how, by the scrapping of all theoretical methods, the field of actual events merges with the region of faith, in that religion: "aller wissenschaftlichen Arbeit erst ihre Substanz und Fragestellung gibt." 2) And this also holds true of theology as the science of the religious......

1) E. Grisebach, Die Grenzen des Erkennens, pp.221-223
religious good. As such it is also part of the actual world, the world of the sciences and humanities and operates by the question, i.e., in obedience to the Entschied or in faith.

As in Erkenntnis und Glaube, the inverted method is so obvious in Die Grenzen des Erziehers as well. Again the docta ignorantia as absolute not-knowing consistently leads man to faith. Therefore he can no longer be said to have faith in nothing, but in the absolute. What remains a puzzle to us is how Grisebach, as a philosopher, and he speaks to us as such, can know that the absolute is reflected in the rupture of the community, if it is supposed to be eminent or completely transcendent. How does he know that it exists at all? From the last chapter entitled Verantwortung, it becomes evident that Grisebach does not like such questions of doubt. They fling us back, he argues, into the reflective and theoretical sphere. In questions such as: Warum ist es gerade das Verhältnis zum Nächsten, das die Ursprungsbezogenheit reflektiert und unsere Grenze bezeichnet? we are, according to Grisebach, no longer really responsible to our fellowman as we are in real dialectic (the actual relation of contradiction between man and his fellowman), as doubt seeks to remove this dialectic. Is it not Grisebach who by this argument evades the issue? Can it be regarded as a welcome excuse to dismiss any reflection by declaring that thereby we have relapsed into mere theory? Is this really so? Does the above question not constitute a real problem, especially if the question read: Why should anything at all be reflected in the relation between man and his fellowman? If Grisebach answers, as he does in Erkenntnis und Glaube, which answer still appears in Die Grenzen des Erziehers: "Liesse die fragende Erkenntnis den Widerspruch des Realgrundes nicht gelten, so wäre sie nur Schein, ohne Widerschein zu sein"; this means then that, without the real ground, man's activity concerning the components of culture and the real dialectic between man and his fellowman, arising from this common task, would not be real. As this reality is extremely problematic, so that the absolute cannot be known, it follows that the reality of the world depends on faith in the absolute.

It is ..................

1) E. Grisebach, Die Grenzen des Erziehers, p. 275
2) Erkenntnis und Glaube, p. 38
It is to faith, then, that we are referred by the philosopher Grisebach. Is this still philosophy or is it theology? Faith as the result of our absolute ignorance (docta ignorantia) becomes the substance of the world and constitutes it. Grisebach's inverted method, which we have already recognised in Erkenntnis und Glaube, is again fully revealed to us. Grisebach has thus failed to escape the system. The only difference from other systematic thinkers is that, whereas the latter start from the law of identity, Grisebach starts from the law of contradiction, which causes him to operate with inverted signs. All that is positive in other systems, striving, effort, homogeneity, identity,essentiality, knowledge, becomes negative, and what is negative in other systems, surrender, suffering, heterogeneity, contradiction, contingency and ignorance, becomes positive in Grisebach's system. He has also failed to separate knowledge and faith in as much as faith is still founded upon knowledge as the knowledge of not-knowing. In this way, knowledge and faith, the sciences and religion, philosophy and theology are really one. The whole world is steeped in faith. And as in faith we, according to Grisebach, experience peace, it stands to reason that, in faith, the crisis has been mastered. In this way actuality has been transcended by a negative method, and we have been fused with the absolute.

What Grisebach intended to avoid, namely, man's absolutisation by fusing with the absolute has taken place in a negative form by his inverted method based on the law of contradiction. Naturally, we realise that in Die Grenzen des Erziehung, Grisebach might still argue that his philosophy was not directed against man's communication with the absolute, but merely sought to show that such communication could not be brought about by man's constructive effort, but solely and exclusively by the absolute itself, which by shrinking man's ego to the sphere of contradiction and conflict causes man to suffer and experience pain. Through pain and suffering, then, man might be led to faith, at which stage he would experience peace. But does not the experience of peace, which Grisebach has designated as transcending..............
cending reason, signify the termination of conflict and being one with the absolute? In our opinion, this is the way Grisebach should argue, for certainly the existence of the absolute as an opus externum is the very prerequisite for man's ethical existence in faith. But whether man transcends himself by his own striving or is transcended by the contradiction of his fellowman it does in the end result in the same thing, namely, the transgression of man's limits, the movement from the actual world of experience to the metaphysical region of faith. And as faith is still founded upon reason in the sense that it is the result of the realisation by man of his absolute not-knowing, so that it is only reasonable to believe, it could still be argued that the absolute is embraced by rational faith, and, therefore, is immanent.

As to Grisebach's view of history, we agree that no goal or structure should be read into the historical process, but we disagree with the dualism Grisebach carries into history when he argues that any attempt to understand man's nature from history leads away from actuality and that history is only real the moment we question the systems of the past are no longer actual, but they certainly are exercising an influence on the actual. They are definitely real in that they exist, and they are facts even though they might have been errors. They have arisen in answer or contradiction to other systems existing before them, and they were in turn contradicted. Although they represent a real in their own right, they determine our position in the present. Who would deny, for instance, that, in spite of all modifications, the western way of life has been fundamentally shaped by the ideas of Enlightenment or that Russian Marxism, in whatever form, Leninist, Stalinist, neo-Stalinist, has married itself to the Russian Messianism of the past? Nothing is more obvious than the determination of contemporary French life by the French Revolution or of contemporary English life by the Glorious Revolution in 1688, etc. Without the systems and events of the past, our position to-day would not be what it is; and even when opposing these systems, we thereby acknowledge our own dependence upon them.

and expose them as "relative errors". Naturally, Grisebach

the systems of the past...
Grisebach would never have written his books, if he had not experienced acutely a crisis which was, as he acknowledged himself, the fruit of human error in the form of unilateral philosophical or cultural systems of the past. 1) Is not his own philosophy an answer to these systems? Is his polemic against the egocentrism and isolationism of individual thinkers in Die Grenzen des Erziehens not a warning against another catastrophe, perhaps even greater than the one just experienced, which was to overtake the world 15 years after the publication of this work? In other words, Grisebach's position from which he operated was determined by the systems of the past. It was their absolute and dogmatic nature that gave him the sensation of an acute crisis and that aroused in him the feeling that man's very existence was at stake. He understood their menacing character and the precarious position into which man had been manoeuvred by them. Reflection thus played a tremendous part, if Grisebach wished to answer and contradict the systems of the past intelligibly and convincingly; for only in this way could he hope to show man the way out of his predicament.

This shows that if we refrain from organising the historical material, but accept it as we find it, we shall then realise that life has always been a crisis, which was at times perhaps felt in a more or less acute degree, but which has always been there, and will probably continue to exist as long as there are thinking and acting beings in this world. Again and again, man will want to built up a meaningful world, only to encounter fresh contradiction on the part of his fellowman. In believing that man is capable of having his self virtually destroyed, Grisebach is himself unrealistic. It is man's very nature to posit himself as a self in his own particular situation, i.e., to arrange his surroundings in such a way that they are meaningful and familiar to him, and only if he continues to do so, will he continue to exist. It is true that, in so doing, he is referred to his fellowman in contradiction, but contradiction is not only that which limits man, negates him, and terminates his striving and his self, but also that which affirms him as an individual, as a self separate from the other. A true community is not one that terminates all individuality. If it did, there

1) In this connection, cf. Was ist Wahrheit in Wirklichkeit? and Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes.
there would be no community left, for it consists of individuals. It, on the contrary, supports the individual, because it realises that it is by his individuality that he is referred to his fellowman. In other words, the crisis is not only Entscheid, as Grisebach argues, but it is much more mutual reference of the individual parts. These individuals, because of the crisis that refers them to each other, cooperate by considering each other's needs and interests. These, however, have their roots in the past, e.g., the system of education by which a person or group of persons have formed the social habits, values, and traditions by which a man or a group of people have been brought up. To understand one's fellowman's position, therefore, means to understand the past, but once that position is clearly understood, it will also be realised that the inevitable contradiction between my own position and that of my fellowman is the very moral foundation on which man and his fellowman are obliged to work together in their common interest, instead of seeking to destroy each other. It is the crisis that will make them realise that they constitute each other's limits, but also that they are a self, each in its own right. If man's self as the very bridge to the fellowman is preserved, it is impossible to either overstep or sidestep the actual world of experience.

We shall not say more about the importance of the self in actual life at this stage, for this topic will have to be resumed at a later stage. In this brief discussion, it was our purpose only to show that man is by nature historical in the sense that he cannot exist apart from the past. His understanding, memory, and power of reflection cannot be separated from experience, as without them, he would not experience anything, for to experience something means to be conscious of something. Any attempt, therefore, to pin man down to pure contingency is unrealistic and even fantastic. Perhaps this attempt has not yet been made in Die Grenzen des Erziehers in its radical consistency: the splitting of the real and the true by distinguishing the practical world of actuality from the theoretical world of truth, yet the beginnings are these as is proved by Grisebach's dualism. In Grisebach's main work Gegenwart, however, the dualism between the world of contingent experience and the world of essential knowledge is complete.
As our critical discussion of *Die Grenzen des Erziehers* revolved about Grisebach's central thesis propounded in this work, a detailed discussion of the individual chapters would be a needless repetition. We shall therefore content ourselves with stating the theme of each chapter.

In *Führung und Erziehung*, Grisebach, in terms of his philosophy, seeks to show the impossibility of any leadership in education. After having turned critical, education encourages the pupil to take an active part in the common task concerning components of culture.

In *Charakter und Persönlichkeit*, Grisebach rejects the view that the man who orientates his life and conduct by some goal, no matter whether his goal is of an empirical or rational nature, possesses character, or that personality is the real man. In accordance with his philosophy, Grisebach leads ad absurdum the categorical conception of character and personality (thereby criticizing sociology), and subordinates both to his law of contradiction.

In *Lehrer und Erzieher*, Grisebach attempts to show that no teacher is able to educate in the sense of leading his pupil to truth or reality. No theory can really educate anyone, for it misses the real dialectic between man and his fellowmen in everyday life. The strictly scientific or methodical teacher, as one type of teacher, more than the less pedantic and therefore more inspiring type of teacher, is in danger of overrating his knowledge and regarding it as being founded upon some scientific or rational ground that lends certainty. The very pedagogical claim to knowledge, which results from the very crisis of this knowledge, indicates the limitations of education, and lays down its task as introducing the pupil to the traffic within the community.

In *Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung*, the contradictory concepts of state and party ideologies are shown, from which the conclusion is drawn that the state cannot educate. In accordance with Grisebach's philosophy, a picture of the real community is outlined.

Der Wert ..............................

- 129.-
Der Wert der Geschichte für die Erziehung, which constitutes the 6th chapter of Die Grenzen des Erziehers, becomes obvious from our discussion of Grisebach's view of history.

In Kunst und Gemeinschaft, Grisebach exposes the egoism and idiosyncrasies of the artist as a result of pampering on the part of the aesthetic, who believes the artist to be directly inspired by the absolute or the divine, so that, as a genius, he is above the moral standards of the ordinary man. Grisebach seeks to place the artist within the real community, which he is supposed to serve. Only in this way can he create real and genuine art. The ideas of the last three chapters, Philosophie und Religion, Philosophie und Leben, and Verantwortung, have been abundantly debated in our discussions of Die Grenzen des Erziehers as a whole.
CHAPTER VI

THE UNTUTH AND THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF REALITY

One would think that by having discovered the utterly problematic nature of knowledge and the real, which points to the total eminence or transcendence of the real ground or the absolute, Grisebach would have rounded off his work with Die Grenzen des Erziehers. For in this work Grisebach's attempt to overcome the purely academic and theoretical character of philosophy and to merge with the real and the practical, which attempt we traced throughout the preceding works, appears to have come to its logical conclusion. The eminence of all real experience (i.e., the restriction of man to the field of real dialectic by his fellowman's contradiction), which pointed to the no of the absolute (that is, to its being in no way at man's disposal, neither in the form of knowledge nor of rational or embracing faith, but which, on the contrary, disposed of man by causing his oscillation between not-knowing and wanting-to-know, not-having and wanting-to-have), led him to an ethical existence and to faith in the midst of conflict, suffering, and pain.

The docta ignorantia, which as the knowledge of absolute not-knowing separated philosophy from theology, referred man to the practical field of the components of culture. It was there that his task, which he had to perform in conjunction with his fellowman, lay. Here, on the grounds of the very brokeness of their nature, the very conflict and contradiction, they were united. Accordingly, whereas philosophy recorded the problematic character of all human knowledge and all human activity, theology became/practical guardian of faith, which, as we observed, was the result of our not-knowing. It did not therefore possess its ground in knowledge, i.e., it could not be constituted by philosophy and was not founded upon it, nor did it itself constitute faith, but it itself performed its practical task of encouraging faith in man through faith, and in this way, just like philosophy, constituted one of the cultural goods. However, as faith was the substance of man's entire practical activity, it follows that, as we have already shown, theology could be seen as being grounded in man's knowledge, namely, in the knowledge of his not-knowing; and as philosophy may now be described as the...
knowledge of our not-knowing, theology may be said to be founded upon philosophy. Thereby faith would also assume a rational character again; for from the knowledge of our not-knowing it is reasonable to believe.

Seen in this way, it becomes doubtful whether Grisebach has accomplished a separation between philosophy and theology, science and religion, since faith, as Grisebach says himself, is the substance of the world. We are thus not surprised that such a world-view was acceptable to dialectical theologians such as Brunner, Gogarten, and Bultmann, who supplemented Barth's unilateral emphasis of God's otherworldliness by His omnipresence in the world. The moment, however, that Grisebach omitted the reflection of the absolute in the rupture of the community (which lent to it the status of a dialectical law, designated by Grisebach as the law of relatedness, contradiction, history, or the community) the breach with dialectical theology was inevitable. Dialectical theology cannot give up the omnipresence of God in the world if it wished to describe God's relation to the world, however paradoxically this relationship may be conceived, and Barth, too, in his later years, had to make concessions in this respect. If, however, the relation between God and the world is understood, even as a paradox, the constitution by theology of a theologoumenon is inevitable, and God's esmanence or transcendence has really been converted again into an immanent concept. It does not matter whether this theologoumenon is based on a theologia naturalis, i.e., a natural psychological open-mindedness on the part of man to make it possible for God to communicate with him (Emil Brunner); a theologia verbalis, i.e., that the word of the gospel reaches us as the word of God, and as such may not be questioned (Rudolf Bultmann); a theology of the analogia spiritus, i.e., man is related to God by the spiritual and the meaningful, which gives substance to the word. This intelligible and meaningful word does not originate in man, but comes to him from the transcendent as grace (Karl Barth); a theology of analogia entis, i.e., the floating tension throughout history existing between the cause of the whole and its multiple effects, between creator and creature, in which the structure of the man-God relation: transcendent immanence and immanent transcendence (i.e., man's orientation...
tation towards God and God's voluntary revelation) establishes room once and for all for one catholic church (Erich Przywara), for in all these cases the absolute is in reality constituted by the theologian and therefore immanent.

In **zwei Vorkämpfer Kirchlicher Theologie**, contained in Freiheit und Zucht, (Zürich, 1936), Grisebach contrasts Karl Barth's *analogia spiritus* with Erich Przywara's *analogia entis*. He finds that "der Unterschied liegt nur in der systematischen Fassung der Tradition, in der prinzipiellen Grundfrage der Analogie" 1), and comes to the conclusion that, in spite of the different principles or theologoumena and in spite of all paradox as regards the relation between man and God, they have this in common that they structuralise this relation. By giving it an essential structure, the theologian comprehends it, it becomes theory, and the real relation between God and man no longer exists. This, of course, also applies to the theist theologoumena of Emil Brunner, Rudolf Bultmann, and Friedrich Gogarten. 2)

The absolute theologoumena of the theologians, Grisebach points out, virtually transform their struggle against each other into a struggle for power. He also likens it to the struggle of various gods against each other, whereby we have reverted to polytheism.

In the light of the above, it becomes understandable why Grisebach could not end his search for the real with Die Grenzen des Erzichers. The very fact that he continued this quest proves that he was not yet satisfied with the result achieved, that he realised the still rational and systematic character ..............

1) P. 333


3) E. Grisebach, Zwei Vorkämpfer Kirchlicher Theologie, in: Freiheit und Zucht, pp. 333-334
of his real. The inclusion of the absolute, even in an indirect way, as a reflection in the conflict between man and his fellowman, constituted this contradiction as a universal principle from which the emanence, transcendence, and contradiction to the world of the absolute were concluded. In order to save experience as contingent experience, in the sense of experience in actual contradiction, Grisbach had to rule out the absolute altogether, even as a reflection in the rift of the community. He had to go even further, and had to deprive of any semblance of reality any kind of system constituted by man, any construction, reflection, law, principle, attitude, emotion, which means all these factors that assisted in the creation of the components of culture, may, he had to eliminate these components themselves from the region of real experience, whereas in Die Grenzen des Erziehers the components of culture had still represented segments of the real. Any relapse into historical time, continuity, or the past, which were indispensable for the construction of the components, was a defection from reality. No matter how brief a relapse it was, it prevented man from experiencing the real as real contradiction or real encounter. By this is meant the very moment (real time) at which everything, even the most humble attitude of philosophy resulting from its not-knowing, the self-restraint and humility of man as well as his willingness to bear his fellowman's contradiction is at stake. All these virtues, which depend on insight and attitude, are now declared by Grisbach as still belonging to the world of the components of culture, i.e., the world of the self, the technical world of the sciences and the humanities, the fine arts, and the theologoumena. But at the moment of actuality experiencing contradiction in passion, all these human constituents are put in question, and historical time and continuity have ceased to be and have been pierced by real time, i.e., the very dimensionless and contingent experience, in which alone man enjoys an ethical existence and experiences faith. In other words, by this experience all human aspirations and the effort on which our human world depends have been terminated. I can therefore not strive for such an experience, but it comes to me as a gift. I can never dispose of it, but it disposes of me. By the termination of all human truths in the above sense, I experience perfect peace that transcends all reason.

It is ....................
It is evident that the dualism between man's knowledge and experience constructive activity and passive suffering, theory and practice, essentiality and contingency is now complete. This splitting of the world into a theoretical, technical world of truth or knowledge and a practical, ethical world of reality or experience was of course unacceptable to dialectical theology. The appearance, therefore, in 1927 of Grisebach's main work Gegenwart, in which the new view is fully expounded, meant the breach between Grisebach and dialectical theology, and ended his friendship with Friedrich Gogarten.

But even Gegenwart was not Grisebach's last word. It was followed by Freiheit und Zucht in 1936, which, for the most part, contains a collection of essays or articles published in various newspapers or periodicals on such subjects as: The Battle-Field of the Minda, Lecturer and Student, The Problem of Generation, The Spell of Language, War and Peace, Community and Responsibility, The Object of Education, Philosophy as a Profession, and others.

This work was followed by Das Moderne an der Kunst (Zürich 1941), which represents a lecture delivered to the university study group for contemporary arts, which Grisebach gives a keen analysis of the word modern, tracing it to the Latin word modus, which may be translated by fashion, manner, habit, custom. In this way, he is able to point to the technical, individualistic, and historical nature of modern art, which stands outside the community in Grisebach's sense of the word, and accords to the artist a special position, placing him outside the community as well. Grisebach draws our attention to the dangers of this state of affairs and postulates the inclusion of the arts and the artist in the community. They must serve it by presenting in their respective field of the arts the situation of conflict in which man finds himself with his fellowman. In performing this function, the arts leave the mere technical world of the modern behind and enter the practical world of the real. In this way, the artist also contributes his share to the actual situation.
In 1941, another lecture was published, which Grisebach had given to the Swiss Philosophical Association in Bern on 23rd October 1939, entitled *Was ist Wahrheit in Wirklichkeit?* This lecture appears to be the foundation of his book *Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes* (Bern, 1942). In both works Grisebach discusses the crisis of the contemporary concept of truth, which at the time, when the head-on-collision of certain powerful ideologies had brought about the conflagration of the Second World War, could no longer be concealed or patched up by any philosophy. By a keen critical analysis, Grisebach shows how the individualistic and historical character of self-constituted human truth had presented itself as an untruth or lie, and we can only admire his courage and outspokenness when he admonishes his colleagues and fellow-philosophers in Bern as follows:

Wir haben uns an den Enthüllungen der Unwahrheiten mutig zu beteiligen und dabei tapfer bei uns selbst zu beginnen. Alle grossen und schönen Lügen sind aufzuziehen und, soweit wir daran nitzschuldig sind, zu beeitigen: Der Mythos vom Übermenschen, der Mythos vom absoluten Geist, ein mythisch gestalteter historischer Bewusstsein und der Kult der 'göttlichen' Verum. Alle überschätzten Schulmeinungen sind beiseite zu legen. Das Gewissen meldet den radikalen Protest an gegen alle 'wahren Lügen', die wir aus dem Mittelalter ererbt oder innerhalb der Protestantismus neu gedichtet und wieder belebt haben.1)

Both the sciences and the humanities, in brief, the whole western Bourgeois culture and civilisation, had revealed themselves as a mere technical and individualistic world of the human self, which had completely misguided man. They had given him the idea of one universal logos, manifesting itself throughout world history, gradually lifting man up to itself, causing him to become more rational, humanised, and civilised, thus overcoming in an increasing measure his difficulties, conflicts, and problems. Some day, man would be thoroughly rational and act only reasonably, i.e., in the interest of the rational whole. When this day came, perfect harmony would reign; man would be perfect, in the sense of absolutely rational; he would be highly cultured; in short, a Golden Age, for which he has ever been yearning, would have returned. The Christian religion, too, was integrated in this historical process as Christian theology at about the time St. Augustine started .................

1) *Was ist Wahrheit in Wirklichkeit?*, p. 30
started to use Greek philosophy as a rational foundation and buttress of faith. This rationalisation of faith became very clear in our brief discussion of truth and reality in connection with mediaeval philosophy. By this rationalisation by the aid of Greek philosophy, Christianity was converted into a Christian culture. This Christian humanism may be said to reach its culminating point in Hegel's rationalised theology or christianised philosophy.

Grisebach, not from an idea of knowing better, but from genuine concern about the destiny of the West, now unmasks the fantastic nature of man's self-constituted truth, his naive acceptance of reason as the panacea for all his problems, and his gullible and sometimes even fanatical scientism and historicism. Not only does Grisebach show that, by chasing after a self-constituted rational or real ground, man is led away from reality and practical life and keeps moving in the circle of the self, but he does not hesitate to call man's self-constituted truth evil (cf. his chapter on Satanism in Gegenwart, pp. 461-487) for the simple reason that he sees in it nothing but man's egoism and lust for power. And if we look at the result of man's intiring effort to reestablish on earth the lost paradise by the same means by which he lost it, namely, the inflation into an absolute or God of his own self, then we cannot altogether blame Grisebach if he draws our attention to the evil nature of human truth. We may not agree with Grisebach's version of reality and the splitting asunder of the theoretical world of truth and the practical world of reality, but in the light of the catastrophe into which human truth plunged us, it is not surprising that, to Grisebach, all constitutive mffs and constructive efforts of man became suspect. If it appeared impossible to grasp reality by the human mind, and if all efforts to that effect invariably failed and even ended in disaster, was it not plausible to look for the real elsewhere, outside man's reach? Was it not sensible to scrap all human aspirations to understand and comprehend and to focus one's attention on that which one really experiences, namely, the contradiction of one's fellowman and his challenge to look reality in the face, instead of trying to evade it by the constitution...
tution of a unilateral truth? One could try to fool oneself for a while by plunging head over heels into one's own world and being so busy and preoccupied with one's work that one would take one's own world for the only reality, but one could not deceive oneself forever. There are moments in the life of the family, for instance, or even at work, when the other, the wife, the child, the friend, or the colleague, encroaches upon one's world, claims his due, the consideration on one's part of his needs and interests, and reminds one that one is not alone in this world, but that one's needs, interests, actions, etc. always affect those of others and vice versa. In reality, therefore, one is always referred to one's fellowman and vice versa. 1)

What man readily realises, when he looks at the world of his truth, is the fact that there is not one truth, but a multitude of truths, principles, stand-points, each contradicting the other. The reflection on this state of affairs Grisebach, in his book Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, calls Grundlagenbesinnung, the reflection upon the foundations of the human truths or logoi of the West. Already their contradictoriness points towards the crisis of human truth. This crisis, therefore, leads us away from a homogeneous to a multiple logos. Through this multiple logos we realise the questionability of our truths. We have now turned critical and accept the crisis as a radical one, which can no longer be overcome by some dialectical existis principle. The crisis refers man to his fellowman. It is what they experience together as their common distress. It is the very field in which they must work together, without hoping or expecting to overcome it. Only on the basis of criticism, therefore, is a new spiritual reconstruction in Europe possible, Grisebach argues in the third part of Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, entitled Aufbaugedanken. But this reconstruction no longer rests on human effort to overcome the crisis. It is, on the contrary, a new critical orientation, resulting in self-restraint on the part of man to prevent himself from overstepping the boundary and to remain on the soil of real experience, the crisis in which he finds himself with his fellowman and the endurance of which might bring him peace.

Accordingly.............

1) In this connection, cf. E. Grisebach, Gegenwart, pp. 256-257
Accordingly, the permanent task of man and his fellowman consists in retaining their critical orientation, so as not by any ever-so-slight assertion of the self to defect from the foundation of the real, the crisis. That is why Grisebach remarks "Kritik und Aufbau bleiben für uns miteinander verbunden". 1)

The sciences, the humanities, the fine arts, jurisprudence, and theology all have their natural source in the field of crisis, conflict, and contradiction. Only if we realise their questionable character, live up this natural state, and restrict ourselves to actuality in the above sense, without having at the nack of our mind some universal, homogeneous law, norm, or value, some teleological goal or principle, do they serve the community. For Grisebach, the cultural goods should not be objectivized in the sense of being regarded as separate from man and pointing towards some universal truth or real ground, but they are part and parcel of man's contradictory activity through which he is referred to his fellowman, and man, too, is an integral part of them, in that, through them, he contradicts. It is thus the function of philosophy to refer man to actuality or the common task of the community being performed in the present and to warn against any transgression or transcendence of it.

When Grisebach rings the death-knell for the contemporary culture of the West, this is not done in the spirit of Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West. It does not mean that western culture has exhausted itself and has deteriorated into a mere technical civilisation. Grisebach's philosophy does not represent a historical destiny which can be traced throughout the various cultural epochs of the past. It is no cyclic theory of history, according to which some other nation or people gathers up the loose threads again and again and carries on the destiny or spirit of history. On the contrary, it is a critical analysis of the human logoi. It puts in question all self-constituted views and historical laws and refers us to the problematic nature of reality. It is absolutely anti-historical.

1) Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, p. 200
It has merged with the region of actual becoming and takes part directly in the real dialectic of everyday life. Any reflection of the past as well as historical continuity is regarded by it as a purely academic matter, which has nothing to do with the actual experience of the existing crisis. Unfortunately, these academic truths are often offered to man as the real truth which he blindly follows, but as they are defections from the real, they are the very cause of the crisis developing into a catastrophe. They mislead man, tempting him to regard himself as absolute and infallible. The result is that he is self-righteous, dogmatic, and intolerant of his fellow-man, and is prepared to repress and even destroy anybody disagreeing with him.

Grisebach's philosophy propounded in Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes is thus a keen analysis of the acute crisis-situation in which the West found itself at the time and the catastrophe by which it had been overtaken as a result of the untruth of its truth. This state of affairs was the result of the unilateral attempts on the part of western scientists, philosophers, theologians, politicians, and statesman to solve the crisis. But Grisebach shows that the crisis cannot be solved. It is inevitable and permanent; it is the very real. Grisebach is thus not a pessimist in the sense of Spengler, who is overpowered by the feeling of inevitable disaster. To him the crisis as such does not represent decadence. His philosophy must thus be clearly distinguished from the many prophecies of inevitable disaster, which we get to hear everyday. He does not practise a cult of crisis because to do so seems to be fashionable, but by the application of an exact scientific method, investigates the fact of the crisis and seeks to establish in an unbiased way, for which he deserves only praise, the cause of the crisis of truth, which had exploded into disaster. He finds this cause in the erroneous belief of certain scholars and statesmen that the truth expounded by them was the real truth and could solve the crisis. This does not mean that the catastrophe and the downfall of the West are inevitable. All that is inevitable is the crisis, which is nothing new, but has always existed and will always exist as long as men live together in this world. Grisebach is thus a pessimist only as regards the claim of the human logos to constitute reality and to lead us to real existence. Otherwise he is not pessimistic at all.
at all. On the contrary, by referring us to the crisis as our natural field of existence and by urging us to accept it, we are freed from the apocalyptic feeling of impending disaster. The conflict loses its menacing character and becomes the most natural thing in the world. It is now the very field in which the real encounter takes place with one's fellowman, in which man and his fellowman can work calmly and silently, not driven on by time, without uneasiness and fear.

By pointing out the artificiality of our civilized and cultural activities, which usually seem so important to us, but do not touch the real at all (e.g., our feverish hunting after material success, our ambitious scientific and technological projects, our mania for high speed and the breaking of records in sports, our superficial and hasty kind of entertainment and amusement, our enslavement to time (in the connection, cf. Grisebach's admirable paragraph on Zeit und Zeitung in the 12th chapter of Gegenwart, pp. 534-547)), Grisebach refers us to the field of crisis as the real field of man's activity, which contains the promise of true recuperation, quietness and peace. It is this field, therefore, and not the loud and boisterous places of entertainment, that represents the true field of recovery and reconstitution in this sense of a convalescent western spirit which has been sick. The field of crisis is the very ground on which the western nations must find each other in the performance of a common task. If the crisis were accepted by them in this spirit, a quiet peaceful cooperation would become possible. On the foundation of the crisis, a discussion of the western nations would be real and in the interest of everyone concerned.

We see thus that if we turn away from our dream-worlds, in the name of which we destroy each other, to our actual common task which is imposed upon us by the very conflict, there is no need to talk about the decadence, disintegration, and degeneration of the West. Again it becomes obvious that not knowledge but faith, i.e., confidence in our fellow-nation and trust............
and trust in our fellowman in the midst of the very crisis, is the substance of the world. It is faith that brings peace to the workman as his reward.

The question about the destiny of the West, "Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes," which has moved and preoccupied so many statesmen, historians, and philosophers, is answered by Grisebach in a very simple way: Accept the crisis as your native element, which joins you in a common task. The performance of this common task is your destiny which you cannot escape. It requires you to make sacrifices, but peace is the reward for the workman, who conscientiously and responsibly undertakes his share of the task imposed by the crisis, i.e., the contradiction of the fellowman:

Frieden ist der wirkliche profane Lohn des Arbeiters, der sein Werk auf gewissenhafter und verantwortlicher Arbeit aufbaut. Frieden wird in Abendlande durch Bereitschaft zum Opfer vorbereitet. Er ist im Schwanze. Es gilt die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes recht zu vernehmen und die in ihr hörbaren Anspriiche als Fragen zu beantworten durch ein handelndes Denken, das alle Grundkräfte: das Gewissen, den Glauben und das Gehör für zukünftige Aufgaben wachruft. 1)

Judging by the third part of Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, entitled Aufbaudanken, i.e., thought of reconstruction, we are under the impression that Grisebach's philosophy ends in a perfectly profane or secular note. Any metaphysical or religious vestiges, which we still encountered in Die Grenzen des Erzählers, appear to have been excluded. The absolute (as the real ground of distinction) is no longer reflected in the conflict between man and fellowman, the rupture of the community. The conflict is no longer in any sense a law or principle, such as the law of contradiction, the law of history, or the law of the community. Conflict is now the actual contingent crisis and no more, for we remember that any reflection on it or attitude towards it is put in question again, so that only contingent experience is left. This contingent experience Grisebach, in his main-work Gegenwart, designates as real time, i.e., the very contradiction of historical or continuous time, pure contingency if one so wills. Faith, therefore, now means trust in one's fellowman and confidence in one's task imposed by the very conflict, and no more.

Yet we ............................

1) E. Grisebach, Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, p. 332
Yet we must ask the question whether the metaphysical has really been eliminated and whether in pure contingent experience we can still be said to be within the bounds of the actual? We intend discussing these problems more fully later, after having treated Grisebach's concepts of truth and reality in reference to his main work, Gegenwart. But we cannot, in connection with our discussion of Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, pass over the position Grisebach, in this work, accords to the event of the Cross, as this is of the utmost importance to his philosophy, which, if it were regarded in the light of this event, would assume a definite eschatological character. The word eschatological must here be understood to mean man's passage from the suffering of conflict, agony, and pain to an experience of perfect peace of mind, which, as Grisebach states repeatedly, transcends all reason. This definition is necessary, as Grisebach himself seeks to strip the event of the Cross of all eschatological meaning, which is of course unacceptable to most theologians. No theory and myths that gratify the human self must be read into this event, as the Cross is the absolute contradiction of all human striving, knowledge, and activity. The event of the Cross is not matter of reflection or theory. By reflection upon it, its practical significance is always missed. According to Grisebach, the event of the Cross represents the eternal situation of man, his conflict, suffering, and pain. It means absolute contradiction to man, and puts a stop to his ego. The crucified Jesus is a living example of perfect obedience and faith in the midst of total suffering and agony. The practical character of the event of the Cross is emphasised by Grisebach in the following:

Wir haben deshalb hier alle psychologischen Taktlosigkeiten, alle eschatologischen Deutungen des Gottessohnes oder Gottesknechtes zu unterlassen. Sie verkehren die Situation. Keine Idee vom Menschensohn und Gottessohn, die wir aus der Philosophie oder einem mythischen Denken mitbringen, ist hier zustattig. Wir bringen allein die Erfahrung unserer Notlagen mit, an der wir durch unsere Herrschaftsacht schuld sind. Deshalb widerspricht uns Christus am Kreuz. Theoretische Kontemplationen und Gespräche haben die Stunden in Gethsemane nicht ausgefüllt, sondern das einsame Ringen um die Erhaltung derjenigen Kraft, die sich bisher...... als Glaubenskraft und Leidfähigkeit bewährt hatte. Es gilt am Ende den Leidenskelch auszutrinken ...... Der Opfertod war kein theoretischer Vorsatz, kein Mysterium..............
It becomes thus obvious that Grisebach secularises the Cross. It is merged with the crisis-situation of man, and man is fused with it in his situation of conflict. As the Cross reveals man's eternal situation, the question about the metaphysical significance of man's existence is not amiss here. In the light of the Cross man's suffering as well as his obedience in bearing his cross, i.e., his fellowman's contradiction, now gain an absolute dimension, so does man's ethical existence as an existence in faith. Through Christ's absolute obedience on the Cross, His unbounded love, His total sacrifice, and His unconditional faith in bitter agony, where everything was at stake, God's promise was fulfilled. The reality of Christ's faith conquered death. In this last trial God's will was revealed.

From the above the practical meaning of the Cross for human existence becomes quite clear. If man is able to accept the Cross in faith, i.e., as the absolute contradiction of all his efforts, desires, activities, in short, as the absolute contradiction of his self, he will have been merged with the real ground, in which all suffering and pain is overcome, and in

1) "Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes," pp. 109-110
2) E. Grisebach, op. cit., pp. 114-115
and in perfect peace reigns. It is in this sense, in the expectation of an existence in peace through faith, which comes to man not through his own effort, but through God's grace, that we spoke of Grisebach's eschatological philosophy, in that man from a world of conflict has been carried over into a world of peace.

If we consider Grisebach's philosophy in the light of the Cross we, again, must ask the question: Has he not "subcended" or transcended in a negative way the actual world of suffering and conflict by allowing his self to be shrunk to such an extent that it is merged with the Cross? Does he still speak as a philosopher or as a theologian? Guido Schmidt, for instance, in Der Ausgang neuprotestantischer Theologie aus der kritischen Philosophie Eberhard Grisebachs sees in Grisebach's thought a theologie crucis. This interpretation, which is the result of the specific task Schmidt set himself, namely, to enquire into the theological implications of Grisebach's thought, does, however, not do justice to Grisebach's philosophy. Grisebach, it must be emphasised again, is interested in man's active participation in the permanent common task of men to listen to each other, to heed each other's challenge with a view towards being enabled to suffer the crisis in silent passion, thereby experiencing peace; for it is the crisis in the community that imposes upon man his permanent task.

Grisebach's philosophy, therefore, is of a purely practical nature. Thinking has lost all theoretical meaning, but is now silent action in the common experience of the crisis, which brings peace. If Grisebach's philosophy is seen as a philosophia crucis, then, we must not forget that he regards the event of the Cross from the purely practical point of view, i.e., the significance it has for everyday human relations. It is in this sense that we spoke of its secularisation.

In spite of all this, the question remains: Does Grisebach, by accepting as real only contingent experience, i.e., the moment of man's self being terminated by his fellowman's contradiction, remain within the sphere of conflict, suffering, and contradiction: in short, within the actual, or does he leave...........
he leave it behind again? Even if Grisebach would answer (we are not sure whether he would) that, as long as we live, our self, on account of the sinfulness of our nature, could not be absolutely shrunk away, so that we would be capable of absolute faith, but would always relapse into doubt, would not the very fact of orientating ourselves by the Grisebachean event of the Cross direct us towards an absolute, and should we not in the moments, however brief, of actually bearing the conflict be linked with it in faith, even though we might relapse into the world of the human self? For there can be no doubt, for Grisebach the experience of faith constitutes the experience of the real, but surely thereby the problematic nature of the real, i.e., our questionable human truths, have been overcome because faith is not questionable but certain, i.e., both true and real. We can also formulate it in this way: the moment conflict or contradiction is being borne, it ceases to be conflict or contradiction, man is no longer in doubt, he is no longer broken, but he exists in peace. Thus, in spite of the ruling out of the absolute as a reflection in the conflict of the community, Grisebach, even without the Cross, does not seem to get away from some metaphysical ground into which man is being merged through the contradiction of his fellowman. It is true that this ground is not known but experienced through faith, but this hardly saves Grisebach from transcending, even though in a negative manner, the actual world of suffering and contradiction. The difference between the positive method of constituting the real ground, as we described it in our historical discussion of truth and reality from Greek thought to contemporary Existentialist Philosophy in the first chapter of this work, and Grisebach's negative or inverted method of gradually merging our thought with practical or contingent experience is that by the former man adjusts himself to his self-constituted real ground while by the latter man is being adjusted to it. Stated in theological terms, therefore, Grisebach's philosophy does remind us of Luther's doctrine of justification by faith; and although the interpretation of Grisebach's philosophy as a philosophia crucis would certainly not do justice to its true purpose, it must be admitted that by .................
CHAPTER VII

THE PROBLEM OF GEHENWART (ACTUALITY)

From our discussion in the previous chapter, it becomes clear that Grisebach's critical search for the real ended in pure contingent experience. The real was in no way reached, approached, or contained in man's own effort, reflection, or attitude, nor was it even reflected further in man's relation with his fellowman. It had now become the very incomprehensible, irretrievable, dimensionless experience of bearing in passion his fellowman's contradiction by which all historical duration and continuity were terminated. Gegenwart or the actual situation in the above sense was all-important. It was in this situation that man led an ethical existence. Hence the past was dead. Only the common task with his fellowman on the basis of the actual crisis was a real task directing man towards the future, in the sense of a possible experience of peace. To live in Gegenwart, therefore, i.e., to give oneself completely to the actual situation of crisis between man and his fellowman, was Grisebach's principal postulate. His whole main-work Gegenwart may be conceived as an urgent appeal to man to exchange living in a self-constituted historical dream-world, or the past, for living in the present in the above sense. Although Grisebach's main-work was not his last work, we deal with it last, because in it the problem of "Gegenwart" has been formulated best and because the works following it did not add anything new, but applied the problem to various fields of life. In Gegenwart the movement of Grisebach's thought from immanence to emanence, from essentiality to pure contingency has been completed. It is therefore necessary to discuss the problem of Gegenwart, as it is stated in Grisebach's main-work, in greater detail, before we attempt to make a positive reply of our own to Grisebach's conception of truth and reality. We shall do so by referring chiefly to Gegenwart, but also, if necessary, to the works succeeding it, as they do not fundamentally differ from it.

It is no mere coincidence that we translated Grisebach's terms of Gegenwart by actuality. This at ones moves it into a sphere of its own, merely, the region.................
region of actual occurrence, where man happens to encounter his fellowman and through his experiences contradiction and his limitation, which cause him to suffer. In other words, by Gegenwart Grisebach means the now and then experience of the termination of his self, his knowledge, his views, his principles, etc., in which experience all continuity, historical time, reflection as well as all human efforts and attitudes, in short, any reassertion of the self in whatever form, are contradicted by real time, i.e., actual contingent experience. By Gegenwart, therefore, Grisebach means the contingent world of everyday conflict, where no self-constituted law or principle or real grounds exist, but where, on the contrary, all laws principles or metaphysical grounds are questioned and negated in the experience of one's fellowman's contradiction.

It follows that the field of contingent experience must be clearly separated from the technical, scientific, or historical world, which is but an illusory dream world of the past, i.e., that which has been understood and therefore has become, instead of being subject to question and therefore becoming. It can thus never claim to lead man to real existence.

It becomes so obvious that Grisebach makes a sharp distinction between the real world, which as the actual (problématic) world of experience is the only legitimate legitimate field of ethics and the theoretical (essential) world of truth or knowledge, which is constituted in man's mind from some self-constituted real ground or universal principle. It, therefore, bypasses Gegenwart or actuality, avoids all real conflict in the sense of actually experienced conflict, and represents nothing but man's self-realisation or the circle of the self (Wesenszirkel). We shall now discuss these two regions separately, beginning with the world of truth and then considering the various aspects of the world of Gegenwart or actuality.

A. The World of Truth

In the beginning of his chief-work, Gegenwart, Grisebach argues that our usual conception of Gegenwart or Wirklichkeit (the two may be said to be identical...
identical as is evident from the word actuality) rests on the confusion of the essential world of truth with the contingent world of experience. In other words, the taking as real of a self-constructed world as the fundamental error, not only of philosophy but of theology, the humanities, the sciences, and technology as well. All these fields of human activity can, according to Grisebach, never attain to reality, for the simple reason that they constitute their own fundamental premises, which they develop methodologically. In other words, the answers or results arrived at are already implicit in the way in which the question is asked and depend upon the premise or hypothesis adopted and its methodological development. In this way, the world is humanised in the sense that it is adjusted to man's rational disposition or perspective and in this way brought under the control of his mind. In the scientific, humanistic, artistic and theological world, therefore, man keeps moving within the cycle of his own self.

If this be granted, however, then the world of truth, as the essential world of man, i.e., the unfolding of his self, cannot be real in the sense of existing outside himself, for the real grounds, from which such reality is borrowed, are themselves self-constituted grounds. It follows that all human truths, scientific perspectives, humanistic systems, aesthetic views and sentiments as well as all theological doctrines are immanent and in a certain sense dogmatic. This applies of course no less to all philosophical systems, no matter whether they have been constructed from a material or ideal premise, whether their starting-point is empirical or rational and their method inductive or deductive, synthetical or analytical. In each case, their real ground is a self-constituted ground, so that their epistemological, ethical and metaphysical doctrines are of mere theoretical value and possess no practical significance whatsoever. The world of human truth is thus for Grisebach a mere academic or technical world from which man's ethical existence can never be derived. It is known in the sense of having been constructed by man himself and his thus controlled and possessed by him. It is a world which always answers to the principle of identity.
of identity, in which the subject is merged with the object or the subject-object relation is comprehended as a dialectical principle, in which the real crisis or conflict is reflected upon, instead of being actually experienced. It thus becomes a remembered object of the past, and because it is grasped by the subject through a rational act of understanding no longer represents an actually experienced conflict.

For this reason Grisebach, in Gegenwart, wishes to bring about a clear separation between the internal world of man's truth and the external world of real contingency as represented by one's fellowman. As the foreign other he cannot be brought under man's methodological control, but remains in contradiction to man, which the latter experiences as the limitation of his own truth or his own self. Man's fellowman is the real, existing outside man's grasp and disposition, he is the emmanent which man experiences as a stumbling block.

As Grisebach, in the human world of truth, sees only a dream-world, which leads man away from the actual world of experience into a self-constructed world, it is not surprising that he does not see an essential difference between myth and science. Both are the heritage of Greek thinking. Both represent a cycle of the self, the former in symbolic, the latter in rational form; both ways of human thinking constitute worlds of reflection (and therefore of the past) and historical continuity.

In connection with the separation of the immanent world of human truth from the emmanent world of actual contingent experience, Grisebach, in the second paragraph of the second chapter in Gegenwart, discusses the pure method. If, he says, the human world is to constitute a world of truth in the sense of the essential world of human reason, then it must be purged of all semblance to the real world. It must not falsely claim to have anything to do with reality in the sense of the actual experience of an emmanent. Once we have, through the pure method, recognized the self-constitutive nature of all our scientific systems, viz., scientific principles or formulae

philosophoumena..............

1) Cf. Gegenwart, chapter I
philosophoumena and theologoumena, even there where they claim to be transcendent, which, according to Grisebach, means nothing but self-transcendence or the absolutisation of the self, we shall come to realise the absolute Leere (the absolute emptiness) of our self-constituted systems. Through self-reflection the pure method leads to an attack upon one's own self and to a critical defense against any unjustifiable application of the systems.

In its critical stage, therefore, the pure method makes man realise that what he values the most, originality, autonomy, good will, spirit of enterprise and reason, is being put in question, and the crisis into which these highest values have now entered, as a result of self-reflection, Grisebach calls the Schwere (heavy impact) of the pure method.

In order to arrive at this ethical world, therefore, the pure method is a necessary presupposition. When, through it, the systems of the humanistic world have been exposed as those which they really are, namely, so many cycles of the self, it induces man to start breaking down the systems, or, what amounts to the same thing, it guides the self in eventually allowing itself to be shrunk to the point where it becomes open to and ready for the actual encounter with the emmanent, i.e., the actual experience of the termination of the self by one's fellowman.

In reference to the world of truth, therefore, the moral act consists in man's decision for the world of actual experience. It is by this unpromising call for an Either-Or that Grisebach links up with Kierkegaard and, like the latter, attempts to break through the anonymous, theoretical world of human reason to the practical world of the contingent encounter, except that (as we have already pointed out in chapter V) Grisebach, in Kierkegaard's paradoxical relation with God, sees another reflective dialectical.
dialectical principle or theologoumenon.

If, however, the systems of human truth represent nothing but the unfolding and even the transcendence of the individual self, it is understandable that Grisebach regards them as basically evil, as is shown in the chapter on Satanism in Gegenwart. 1) Their egocentric origin reveals man's dogmatic inclination and his desire for power and authority. Hence Grisebach's uncompromising stand against man's tendency to admire genius, originality, spirit of enterprise, etc. What is commonly called great by man is to Grisebach great vice. It follows that what are commonly called cardinal virtues, such as wisdom, strength of mind, temperance and justice, are to him splendid vices, which by their sublime look deceive man and make him believe that, in their light, he is leading an ethical existence. Grisebach says:

Die Natur des Menschen ist nicht gut, sie ist böse .......
In der Welt, in der die menschliche Natur herrscht, geht es böse zu. Die unbekannte Bosheit ist vorherrschend. Jeder andere, der sich der Ausweitung eines Ichkreises widersetzt wird verneint und vernichtet. Diese Vernichtung geschieht mit Fleiss und Besonnenheit, d.h., mit aller Tugend. Das Ich betätigt sich in einem absolut negativen Urteil, w in es sich entfaltet. 2)

It stands to reason that Grisebach's conception of human truth as basically evil is the result of the experience of his own time, when the crisis of western civilization, which had already been aptly described by Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, had exploded into two devastating world wars, and when after these wars, ideological warfare continued with unabated vehemence. Is it surprising, then, that Grisebach, as we pointed out in the previous chapter, saw the untruth in human truth, that he declared the bankruptcy of the Bourgeois world and that he was suspicious of all human reflection, of all historical continuity and teleological aims in history constituted by man, because they misled man and prevented him from experiencing the actual encounter with his fellowman in real time, by which all historical time is terminated? We believe that he went too far when he judged the systems of human truth as evil (as we hope, we shall be able to show later), but in view of the situation from which he philosophised such judgment is understandable. In Was ist Wahrheit in Wirklichkeit and Die Schicksalsfrage ...............

1) Pp. 467-472
Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, Grisebach's main purpose is to show that the prevailing crisis of truth in the western world has its origin in the egocentric and dogmatic nature of this truth, which must needs lead to mutual destruction, and that peace can only be achieved by man's turning from himself, from his own truth, system, doctrine, principle, etc., to his fellowman and accepting the natural crisis, which man and fellowman experience in common, and on the grounds of which they must actually work together, as permanent and inevitable, instead of trying to overcome it by systematic reflection. The following are a few statements on the part of Grisebach concerning the crisis of truth in the Bourgeois world:

Die Weltkrise als Folge der Wahrheitskrise offenbart sich in der Gegenwart als wirkliche Infragestellung unserer ideologisch gefassten Welt, die wir als 'bürgerliche Welt' zu bezeichnen pflegen.... Die neue Lage ist tatsächlich erschreckend. Die Geborgenheit und Sicherheit enthüllt sich als Selbsttäuschung, die Herrschaft des Geistes als eitler Anspruch. Der Charakter der neuen wirklichen Situation ist kritisch. Ihr Kennzeichen, ihre neue Wahrheit, ist der kritische Zustand selbst, die ewig durchbrechende Zwietracht der Vernunft. Die Weltkrise als Folge der Wahrheitskrise offenbart sich in der Gegenwart als wirkliche Bedrohung und Infragestellung, als Schicksalsfrage des europäischen Bürgers, als europäischer Krieg.1)

B. The World Gegenwart ( Actuality )
( i ) Epistemological View

The knowledge of the world of Gegenwart or actuality means the cognition of the questionability and uncertainty of our own knowledge and the problematic and contingent character of the real or ethical world. As knowledge, such cognition is, however, reflective and belongs to the theoretical, immanent and not to the practical, emanent and contingent world of experience. Such a world can no longer be known, but is the end of all one's knowledge and expectations. From the critical nature of the pure method, by which through self-reflection, man became conscious of the inner emptiness of the self-constituted systems, the task of philosophy follows. It is no longer constitutive, but critical and consists in the gradual abolition or rejection of itself. By self-restraint and critical insight, philosophy becomes conscious of its own crisis and questionability. By exposing the emptiness.

1) Was ist Wahrheit in Wirklichkeit, pp. 18-19
emptiness, dogmatism, contradictoriness of the human truths and systems, whether which, in spite of their different starting-points, no matter/material or ideal, empirical or rational, represent nothing but so many cycles of the self containing in themselves their own respective logos, it arrives at a multiple logos. This is however no longer a systematic unfolding of a universally valid logos, as is the case in dialectical metaphysics, but, as Grisebach puts it in Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, it is the actual struggle of man against man, word against word, speech against speech, reason against rationality. In other words, the multiple logos reveals the actual crisis in which man and his fellowman find themselves. It is the task of critical philosophy to make these various modes of speech intelligible to each other. What this actual, broken logos reveals is the common distress whereby we are all linked and in the actual experience of which we must work together in the interest of the common good.

In other words, the multiple logos, discovered by philosophy through critical insight into itself and its own systems, is to serve as a foundation for a positive task, which springs from the very experience of the common distress as a result of the crisis between man and his fellowman, namely, the task of making man and his fellowman realise that the crisis is the very basis on which they are referred to each other and on which they must work together in the creation of the material and spiritual components of culture. In this way, the crisis becomes an ethical ground for man and his fellowman and the contradictory relation in which they stand to one another an ethical relation.

1) Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, p. 294
We must however remember that this reflective activity of philosophy, however self-critical it may be, does not mean that we have already arrived at the world of actual experience, which is the ethical world. As long as we reflect or take up an attitude of whatever nature, we keep moving within the cycle of the self. Therefore even the most critical reflection and the keenest awareness of the questionability and critical state of our truth, in short, even the knowledge of our not-knowing or the very act of self-rejection by philosophy, still belong to the sphere of the human self and are finally terminated by the actual encounter in real time with the eminent or really transcendent, namely, one's fellowman, by which experience (as we have repeatedly shown) all reflective continuity in historical time is pierced through and we are in the real world.

Thus Grisebach holds that critical reflection upon the questionability of our knowledge is only a technical, critical virtue.

As long, therefore, as we move in the sphere of knowledge, including critical self-knowledge, we cannot really speak of an external. All that happens is that such an external is constituted dialectically and therefore understood, so that it is really an internal.

In other words, the external is that which puts our knowledge in question and finally terminates it. It is the eminent which is not at our disposal, in the sense of having been self-constituted. It is by its contradiction that we encounter the world of actual experience and contingency. This world, however, is a totally different sphere in which reasoning, planning, calculation,.............

1) Gegenwart, p. 479
calculation, attitude and sentiment no longer have any meaning. By experiencing the real or ethical world through the contradiction of the foreign other, one's fellowman, so that it is no longer within our rational grasp and thus at our disposal, we can by critical insight

nur indirekt von der Krise der Gegenwart als Krise der Erkenntnis reden und müssen die lösbarren Aufgaben der Erkenntnis kritisch als Hinweis auf das unlösbare Problem der Gegenwart entwickeln..............

Es bleibt demnach das Denken zwar auf sich selbst gerichtet, es bereitet sich aber auf die Erfahrung vor, die allen seinen Begriffen widerspricht.\textsuperscript{1)}

(ii) Practical Consequences

In conformance with the above it is obvious that what applies to knowledge and thinking likewise applies to ethics and the virtues. The inevitable crisis of human knowledge and truth breeds in man a Reife (maturity of the thought), and our critical insight, which revealed the critical and questionable state of our self-constituted knowledge in whatever form, scientific, humanistic, theological, leads us to the expectation of an Ansprechende (one that addresses himself to us). In consequence of this expectation, man is led to practise the virtue of Bescheidenheit (self-restraint), which, as a technical virtue, belongs to the humanistic world of truth and can easily become evil, when laying claim to ethical reality, with which it has nothing to do. It can only be preparatory to our experiencing it. What may happen is that Bescheidung (limitation) may occur and affect it from the outside. If this happens, it then receives a Bescheid (communication). But it must be clearly understood that Bescheidung, unlike Bescheidenheit, belongs to the external, contingent and real world of actual experience and, in the last instance terminates the humanistic virtue of Bescheidenheit by actual contradiction. Bescheidung therefore not be known, but only experienced. The same difference exists between the virtue of Hörigkeit, which means keeping oneself open to the contradiction of one's fellowman in self-restraint, and Gehorsam (obedience); for by Gehorsam Griesbach does not mean being true to one's own nature or essence (which would lead to an unfolding of the self), but endurance in passion....................

\textsuperscript{1)} Gegenwart, p.169
passion of the Bescheid (communication), which comes to me from the external world and thus is beyond my disposal.

It follows that Grisebach's technical virtues represent the border of our knowledge or truth, which has become critical of itself. These virtues are necessary in that they prepare us for the experience of an actual encounter with the external, i.e., the endurance in passion of one's fellow-man's contradiction in real time through which all our truths and virtues, even the most self-critical ones, are terminated and we lead an ethical existence, the peace of which transcends all understanding.

The conclusion drawn from the above is that the virtue of self-restraint exercised by the individual, the sciences, the humanities, philosophy, and theology in recognition of the crisis is a responsible attitude, which is terminated by the actual encounter with the emanent, i.e., the responsibility through the other, by which Grisebach means the obedient endurance in passion of the communication from the outside. This also applies to the state and the maturation of a people or nation through the crisis.

Das Reifen eines Volkes und der in ihm tätigen Wissenschaft hängt von ihrer Zurückhaltung ab. Denn nur das bescheidene und hörige Volk kann in manhaft zu ertragender Verantwortung seine Zukunft und seine Reife erwarten. Diese wird nun nicht mehr in einer theoretischen Lehre oder in einem kirchlichen Dogma begründet. Sie wird nur durch die Erfahrung und das Leid im Leben gewährt. 1)

The practical implications of Grisebach's conception of the ethical world as opposed to the world of human reason are that they overthrow man's cherished notions and ideals of creating a better world through his own analytical and creative effort. They require a total break with his customary way of thinking and the attitude he ordinarily takes up towards life: Grisebach's conception of the ethical world means a radical turning away from the world of memory and yesterday towards the world of actuality or to-day in expectation of a Zukommcnde (a future coming), namely, an ethical existence. This has decisive consequences for all fields of human activities, private dealings and negotiations between individual and individual, the sciences, the humanities, politics, education, the fine arts and theology. All these activities, according to Grisebach, take place on the false ..................
the false presumption of an eternally valid logos. They all betray man's boundless ambition to reach the promised land where milk and honey flow, where there is a minimum of conflict and a maximum of peace and harmony. They all bear witness to man's egocentricity and his desire for power. Small wonder, then, that man has been travelling the wrong way and has landed himself in deeper conflicts and contradictions, that he has become ever more dogmatic and intransigent in his outlook on life and the world, so that the catastrophe became inevitable, and it is from this experience that Grisebach philosophises. It is from this experience that he polemises against man's mania for education, which can only mean educating the young for a self-constituted goal or logos which opposes other such goals or logoi, constituted by a different method. This, to Grisebach, means erecting walls of separation and misunderstanding, causing a war of the logoi, in which one system is bent at the total destruction of the other. In a yet unpublished series of lectures on education entitled Introduction to Education, which he delivered while yet in the shadow of the Second World War and shortly before his death, namely, during the summer semester of 1945 at the University of Zurich, he says:

Alle Erzieher wollen ihre Völker zur Freiheit führen. Diese Freiheit enthüllt sich im Verlaufe des Experiments in jedem Falle als Unfreiheit der Völker, denn alle erwarten die Entscheidung über die wahre Freiheit von dem mechanischen Erfolg, von der Vorherrschaft einer Macht über eine andere, die als human vorgestellt wird, aber an sich satanisch ist ....

Man wird Mühe haben, heute zu verstehen, wie diese klassische Elementarbildungsmethode sich so verhängnisvoll entwickelt und in der Praxis zu solchen katastrophalen Folgen führen konnte. 1)

In this way, Grisebach unmasks the classical humanistic ideal of education as actually inhuman, in the sense that it prevents man from experiencing the actual encounter with his fellowman and thus from partaking of an ethical existence and causing him to be egocentric to such a degree that he aims at the annihilation of his fellowman.

In Was ist .................

1) Lecture on Die Menschlichkeit
In Was ist Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit, Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, Jacob Burckhardt als Denker as well as in other works, Grisebach takes a stand against the false presumption of an unfolding spirit or a continuum of the spirit in history. It is this underlying assumption of an eternal logos in history, which misguides man and makes him believe that by remembering the past he is one with the spirit and thus with the real. By remembering the ever present as the continuum in the rise and decay of the cultural systems, the historian believes that man takes part in the process of fresh creation through the spirit. He forgets that it is man himself, who constitutes the logos of history of whatever nature, and it is by this very assumption that he finds it in the process of historic events. By comprehending the process of history in this way, he really disposes of it. He feels that he is the torchbearer of the spirit. Especially the young generation feels that it must be in step with it, which leads to conflict with the older generation, which is regarded as being out of step. Through the self-fulfilment of the logos man hopes to reach his ideals - human perfection, harmony, happiness, etc. - whether the projection of the self into history takes place on an ideal premise, as is the case with Hegel, or a material premise, as is the case with Marx, makes no difference. In both cases, as in all such cases, the cycle of the self has been completed. At the end of his book on Burckhardt's historical thinking, Grisebach comes to the following general conclusion with regard to the historical logos

Das künftige Europa lässt sich nicht theoretisch entwerfen oder stiften; es ist im Aufbau begriffen, aber nicht entsprechend dem Kanon der Klassik, nicht nach Massgabe eines kanonischen Rechts, nicht nach dem Beispiel irgendeiner programmatischen Renaissance oder Aufklärung, nicht im Sinne der erneuerten gothischen Welt oder im Vollzug eines romantischen Logos, - es ist viel mehr dort zu erwarten, wo nach freier Feststellung der klassischen Irrtümer die Korrektur des europäischen Selbstbewusstseins begonnen hat.1)

In this connection we wish to make only brief mention of Grisebach's argument that the Christian religion, too, has been buttressed by the canon of the classical ................

1) Jacob Burckhardt als Denker, p. 344

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the classical logos, whereby it lost its practical and anti-historical character. Both philosophy and Christian theology rationalised and histori-
cised Christianity, converting it into a Christian humanism and a Christian
culture. This process may be said to have begun with Augustine and to have
found its consistent conclusion in Hegel's philosophy, where the spirit had
returned to itself and thus was fully emancipated, so that philosophy and
theology had been merged. As this process takes place in man's conscious-
ness, it follows that the self-emancipation of the spirit is at the same
time the self-creation of man in freedom. 1)

It cannot be denied that this reading by man of an ever present logos into
historical events and the rise and decay of the cultural systems has led to
dire consequences. Not so long ago, as a result of the inflation of the
human self into absolute dimensions, which led to a growing and a more and
more unyielding ideological dogmatism and which erected insurmountable
walls between men and nations, we experienced the horrors of the world wars
as well as their dreadful aftermath. But man seems to have learned nothing,
for again he seeks to patch up the crisis with various ideologies, each
one bent upon the other's destruction. The clash of wills, as a result of
man's continued self-transcendence has spread the conflict all over the
world (over Europe, Asia and Africa) and, in the shadow of nuclear wea-
pons, takes on a particularly sinister look. Thus we see that the situation
has not changed much since Grisebach's time, but that it has grown worse.
We can thus appreciate his distrust in human reason and any self-constitut-
ed human truth. We understand his warning against a conceited pedagogism
and his urgent appeal to teachers to guide the pupils with regard to the
actual problems of the day, so that, on the basis of the actual crisis, they
will be able to participate in the discussion arising from the crisis ex-
perienced by all, instead of making them follow some self-constituted edu-
cational ideal, principle or goal. We may not agree with Grisebach in his
judgment of the nature of human truth, but we can understand why he put
such distrust in human nature and why he looked for a real or ethical world
that was outside man's control and disposition. This ethical world of

1) G.A.Rauche, The Philosophy of Actuality, p.155
Grisebach's is transcendent in the real sense of the word, in as much as, through the contradiction of our fellowman, it controls us by putting a stop to the expansion of our ego and questions our worlds constructed from nature or mind in time and memory as well as our historical continua. We learn thus that the crisis between man and his fellowman is something natural or something given, which sets man a permanent task. It cannot be overcome by new ideologies, theories or systems, but only by the acknowledgment of the actually existing permanent crisis. 1) The virtues of Rescheidenheit (self-restraint) and Hörigkeit (keeping oneself open to the contradiction of the fellowman in self-restraint) may prepare me for the real encounter, i.e., the complete negation of my self by my fellowman, which Zukommende (future coming) I might be enabled to bear in passion.

Auf dieser Grenzscheide der Entscheidung (the decision, which is not taken by me, but comes to me from outside) wird das Unerwartete vielleicht Ereignis, was wir Zukunft nennen. 2)

It is in this real encounter, which takes place in real time and terminates all reflection, attitude and historical time, that I lead an ethical existence.

Es ist eine ganz neue Situation geschaffen, in welcher das Ich nicht mehr im Mittelpunkt steht. Der Wesenszirkel nützt uns nichts mehr, das Wesen kann sich deshalb nicht dieser kritischen Situation entziehen, indem es wieder über dieses Heute reflektiert. Im Heute ist alle Reflexion selbst in Anspruch genommen und allen Wissen von Zeit und Zeiten widersprochen. 3)

(iii) Metaphysical Conclusions

Is there a metaphysical aspect to Grisebach's ethical world, which is the world of contingent experience? We believe that there is. The metaphysical region, in Grisebach's approach, is no longer reached by self-transcendence or the absolutisation of the self, as happens in the philosophical systems, but by the self allowing itself to be shrunk to the point that it is ready for the real encounter with the transcendent, i.e., man's fellowman. Hence the metaphysical.........

Cf.
1) Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, p. 317
2) Gegenwart, p. 579
the metaphysical world as the real world that terminates my self is no longer known in that it is constructed by the dialectical method, but is experienced in the very crisis, as the emmanent which keeps contradicting me, my truth and my knowledge. Critical philosophy, by becoming conscious of its questionable character, makes us become aware of the problematic nature of the real, the contingent character of which does not enable us to form a concept of it and so grasp it by a rational act of understanding, which would have swept it back into the world of memory and the past. In fact, this was what was done by dialectical philosophy and theology. In Griseebuch's case, however, the transcendent, so to speak, takes the initiative. It terminates man's self, his self-constituted truths, even the knowledge of his not-knowing, as well as his sentiments and attitudes, even his expectation through self-restraint of a future coming. Thereby the problem of the transcendent has been moved from the grasp of cognition, but at the same time has only now come absolutely close to it. 1)

It follows that neither philosophy nor theology can constitute reality and therefore metaphysics. Both disciplines have to exercise self-restraint. With the description of the crisis between man and his fellowman, philosophy has exhausted itself. From now on the philosopher leaves the field to the theologian. Theology, in its turn, must see to it that it does not make the mistake of evolving the real world from faith, because it operates itself under faith and can only report what happened in the field of experience through the transcendent (man's fellowman) by reference to the philosopher. The field of the theologian lies there where suffering (experience), inflicted by the transcendent, is being borne in faith. In other words, theology has to do with the Entscheidung (decision), which, we noticed, is not man's, but comes to him from the outside as the Zukomende (the future coming). This decision can only come to man in the Scheidung (separation) of unequal men, i.e., the crisis between man and his fellowman. This Scheidung (separation), therefore, is the ground on which the transcendent is experienced. It is at the same time an ethical ground on which suffering is being endured in faith. As, through it, all human ........................

1) Cf. Gegenwart, p. 482
human knowledge, attitudes and sentiments are put in question, it, at the same time, separates the theoretical and technical world of human knowledge from the real, practical and contingent world of faith, which can never be known or disposed of, but which rather disposes of man. That is why Grisebach repeatedly states that the peace of ethical existence transcends all reason. 1) and theology

Both philosophy/exercise the function of guardians. They wage a defensive struggle against metaphysical presumptions in order to keep the path clear for the actual experience of the real in the encounter between man and his fellowman. The technical virtue of the theologian, displayed in this defensive struggle in faith, i.e., in the field of suffering, Grisebach calls Mannhaftigkeit (manliness or manly fortitude).

Again, as in the previous chapter, where we discussed in the main Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, we are driven to the conclusion that faith is the real substance of the world. It is no longer a belief in the self, the system, method, principle or dogma. It is not an attitude that one takes up in the crisis either, but it comes to man in the event of his being enabled to bear his fellowman's contradiction in passion, whereby man is being transcended in that he is in touch with the real emanent and thus is moved from the world of the self to the world of ethical existence. It is by this termination of man's world and the advent of another that we described Grisebach's critical philosophy as eschatological; and we have already shown in the previous chapter that this is particularly true, if we regard it in the light of the event of the Cross, which, in Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, Grisebach has described as the absolute contradiction and termination of the essential world of the human self. 2) Again the question arises: Does man in this experience of his self being terminated by the transcendent remain in the actual world or has he been merged with the absolute, thus having been made to transcend again the actual world of suffering and conflict, even though in a negative manner?

1) Cf. Gegenwart, p.482
2) Cf. Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, p.110
In the preceding chapters, we followed Grisebach's untiring search and struggle for the real. We tested each answer he gave us as to what real experience was against his own ultimate postulate, namely, that real existence must not be derived from self-constituted real grounds, but meant something that man accidentally encountered, something that was transcendent. We have already observed the difficulties that presented themselves from such a view, and we have already asked the question: Is Grisebach's thesis, that man leads a real or ethical existence in pure contingent experience only, tenable? Is such experience possible or has the practical world of man's actual experience thereby been transcended again, even though this transcendence took place in an opposite direction to that in which it took place in other philosophical systems? We observed that Grisebach arrived at the field of reality or actuality by the eventual dismantling of truth or theory in the sense of self-constitution. But can exist at all without constituting himself? Can he exist in utter contingency? In other words, do I in fact arrive at reality only at the expense of truth? In short, it is now the time to put the central question raised by Grisebach's inverted method, which we said in our Introduction we would eventually ask, namely: Is it justifiable to say that the real is only the emmanent or transcendent, i.e., that which accidentally encounters us from the outside, thereby putting in question all our constructed truths, ending our egocentricity, and leading us to real existence? Or must we include in the real the immanent, i.e., even these self-constructed truths? We have already pointed out that the part philosophy, the sciences, and theology are going to play as well as their value and importance for man's real existence depend upon how this question is answered. To give a clear answer to this problem is of vital interest as man's fate thereby decided, because upon the attitude he is going to take up towards life and his fellowman in the future, may depend the destiny of all mankind.
A. Epistemological Considerations

We observed that, according to Grisebach, the world of knowledge must be clearly separated from the world of experience. The former is the world of the past, an unrealistic dream-world of purely academic and technical significance. In fact, it is the world of the self, which in the form of scientific formulae and concepts, ethical and aesthetical values as well as religious dogmas keeps moving within the circle of the self, thereby bypassing and missing the real world of conflict, contradiction, and passion, which, as the practical world of contingency, will alone enable man to lead an ethical existence. As ethical existence is Grisebach's aim, the world of knowledge as man's essential world, i.e., the field of self-realisation, must be overcome; for only by overcoming it, contingent experience, i.e., the experience of the antagonistic relation between man and his fellowman, is possible. The paradox now is that Grisebach, in order to overcome the world of knowledge or the world of the self, has to apply a strictly scientific method, which he calls the critical method. Step by step, from the keen analysis of his truth and knowledge and the exposure of their contradictory natures, man is led to the understanding and consciousness of his not-knowing. His attitude to life is thereby changed. Instead of continuing to realise himself in the direction of his self-constituted ideals, man now is orientated towards his fellowman. He practises humility and self-restraint, which philosophy recognises as the last bulwark of the technical world in the form of man's virtues on the border of real experience, in expectation of which man now lives and which, when it comes, negates even this virtuous attitude, putting a stop to all philosophy, even self-restrained critical philosophy, i.e., man's realisation of his not-knowing. The paradox thus arises that Grisebach proceeds systematically to end all systems, and in his epistemological turn from knowledge to experience, essentiality to contingency conceptualises the latter by calling it real time, i.e., the time to terminate all time or pure contingency. By his inverted method, therefore, he has transcended in a negative manner the problematic nature of the real world and by so doing has again merged reality .................
reality with truth. But in accordance with Grisebach’s inverted method, truth and reality have a completely negative character. As absolute not-knowing or pure contingency they can only be represented in thought as the absolute nothing, if the thought of nothing can be said to be possible at all.

This suffices to show that, if we wish to remain in the world of actuality as the world of becoming, the positing of ourselves as a self or, to put it otherwise, the constitution of knowledge is to a certain extent a necessity. This inevitable act of constitution occurs from man’s existential situation, i.e., the feeling of uncertainty and insecurity which man experiences in relation to the outside world and in relation to his fellow-man. The immediate experience of the stream of life in the form of the changing opposites impels man to order and systematise his sense-impressions and feelings in such a way that the chaotic nature of his surroundings is changed into a meaningful whole, which not only lends meaning to his existence, but at the same time gives it reality and substance, in the sense of man being the articulator of his surroundings. It is by the constitution of his environment into a rational field of existence that man knows himself, because it now reflects himself, i.e., his stand-point, his needs, his interests, and his aspirations. This rationally ordered field at the same time offers him a certain measure of certainty and security. It is his abode or his house, so to speak, with which he is familiar because he has made it himself.

But as philosophers we must refrain from jumping to any metaphysical conclusions in connection with this house. Many such houses or perspectives are built, but we object to certain philosophers who behind these perspectives or fields of order see "something" which they call the truth. If the theologian does so on the basis of faith that is a different thing, but the philosopher must refrain from talking about a vague thing called "something", which he then decides to call the truth. The word "something" betrays his embarrassment and his ignorance. It is a concept that causes him to transcend the boundaries of philosophy, the ought which arises from its very restric-

tion to actuality by the contradictory nature of the variegated fields of order man builds. In this way, philosophy becomes absolute again, and man, in imagining himself able to communicate with the absolute directly, oversteps his boundaries and abandons his position of humility and self-restraint. Philosophy and Theology merge, and man again disposes of the deity. We make those remarks and sound this warning because the "failure" on our part to recognise the truth or the absolute in the multiple human logoi (except the truth of our not-knowing) is one criticism which has been brought forward against our philosophy, which aims at restraining man from going beyond empirical knowledge, thereby keeping him within the real practical field of the actual. This field is, however, one of conflict and contradiction. To say that the human perspectives mean communication with the truth "n sig inlaat met die waarheid" 1) is thus pure speculation. We never denied that these perspectives are built from the same fundamental experience and in this sense are rooted in a "something", but this "something" is a finite and contingent world verified by our experience. It is the world of becoming and change, namely, the ever-changing concrete objects, which represent man's environment, causing him to feel uncertain and insecure, so that he is impelled to order it rationally. It is thus not a vague abstract "something" towards which we direct our intent, but it is a concrete situation that causes us to build our world, which in its stage of constitution must needs be peculiar, different, and in this sense contradictory to the constituted world of our fellowman. Communication among men is not possible because of a vague "something" arrived at by abstraction on the part of certain philosophers, but by the very contradiction of their perspectives. In the very crisis, which they all experience in common, they are referred to each other, and it is because of this concrete experience, therefore, and not because of a vague "something" abstracted from the real by certain philosophers that they communicate with each other. The crisis is thus not only an epistemological ground, but also an ethical ground. The accusation made against us that, according to our philosophy,

man's highest ethical vocation lay in mutual toleration and that there was no ethical truth which can be realised \(^1\) was therefore absolutely unjustified. My fellowman and his truth in the above sense constitute my *ought*, which leads me to *love* (in the sense of sacrifice) of my fellowman, *respect* (for my fellowman's interests, needs, views, etc.) *self-control* and *humility*. If this is not an ethical truth which we gain on the grounds of *experience*, i.e., our limitation on the part of our fellowman, and not on the grounds of speculation as to the truth, which we can never know or experience, then we do not know what is.

These few explanatory remarks as regards the constitution of man's surroundings in reference to his own peculiar situation were necessary lest the empirical and practical character of our philosophy again be misunderstood. Once more we wish to state it unambiguously and unequivocally: we do not deny the existence of an absolute, but we do deny its comprehensibility by and accessibility to man, in whatever way, direct or indirect. It can only be reached through pure faith, completely independent of knowledge, whether direct or indirect. We hold, therefore, that, as philosophers, we should not even assume its existence, but restrict ourselves completely to the world of experience. It is of course a fact that man again and again has sought to transcend the act of constituting his own meaningful field by searching for the general factors which these constituted fields have in common, because he has always felt that these particular outlooks were not certain enough, but this is where he has always blundered. By artificial abstraction, he has constituted an essential region of general *factual* features in which all conflict and contradiction are overcome. But he has thereby lost sight of the really real, namely, the very conflict itself as the common concrete experience of all men by which they are referred to each other, as we shall yet see. It is in man's urge for absolute certainty and security concerning his existence that we see the driving factor for man's continual effort to know absolute truth and reality. It is the natural drive for self-assertion that causes man to strive for absolute truth.

truth and reality, which striving is revealed in all human disciplines, the sciences, the humanities, the arts as well as religion. All these disciplines search for general laws, functions and principles; and it stands to reason that, if I know the natural law, then, I understand man's actions throughout history, and that then I also know the Good, the Beautiful, and even perhaps the Divine as well.

The fact is, however, that scientists, historians, aestheticians, and theologians do not agree about their general principles, but contradict each other. This again must be explained in the light of the existential nature of all truths constituted by man. He cannot and does not really overcome his particularistic and individualistic starting-point, which is existential and situation-bound, but is generalised by abstraction. What happens is that man universalises or absolutises his own view, perspective, or theory, which he has developed under particular circumstances, i.e., under the influence of his particular teachers, his social environment and conventions, or from the specific stage of research at which a field of scholarly or scientific enquiry has arrived, etc. But the most important fact is that he develops it in contradiction to other existing theories, doctrines, and views on the same subject. Thus wherever we look, man's cultural activity as a whole seems to have its origin in man's contradictory nature, i.e., the very fact that the truth and reality as such are inaccessible to him, so that his self-constituted truths are all related to the peculiar situation in which he finds himself. It is the observation of man's positing his truth in contradiction to others and his own truth being in turn a challenge to others that causes us to say that all human logoi are rooted in man's existential situation.

If we wish to understand man, we must study the philosophical systems man has been busy constructing throughout history. In them man's wants, needs, aspirations, and failures are reflected. It is in this sense that they are real. They have not dropped from the blue sky nor do they hover in the air, but each of them reflects a particular situation, in which man has found himself.
himself at a certain stage, or a particular form of conflict existing at a certain time. They may all be said to deal with this conflict, or they may even be regarded as an attempt to overcome it. To give a few examples: Homer's epic poems reflect the struggle in which the emigrant Greeks were engaged against other Greeks, so that the hero, at that particular period, was of the greatest significance, and one whose greatest virtue was areté in the sense of bravery or excellence in battle. Hesiod's didactic poems were directed against Homer, because the situation had changed. It now reflected the acute crisis between the lower classes and the aristocrat in the polis. This conflict had resulted from the changed character of the polis. From a more rural and agricultural centre it had changed into a trading or commercial community, in which the newly rich and economically powerful middle-class threatened the old position of power of the aristocracy. They reacted by sharper oppression and especially by exploiting the peasants to secure a livelihood for themselves. As a result, Hesiod called for diké or justice in the sense of balance or harmony, just as he observed it to be brought about by time, viz., the regular rise and decay in nature. Time would therefore remove all injustice which lay in redundance and restore the balance, when diké would rule.

When the Sophists in the 5th century, the heyday of Athenian Democracy, had declared that there was no truth but merely opinion, Socrates reacted sharply by pointing out that truth could be found in man himself, if only he knew himself.

When Thomas Aquinas by the aid of Aristotle's philosophy rationalised faith by recognising the real ground of the world in God's wisdom, he was countered by Duns Scotus and William Occam's polemic that God's will must be regarded as the real ground of the world. This argument, by which theology was restricted to the practical sphere of faith and which helped to free the sciences from the predominance of theology, contributed a great deal towards the changing of the situation and the development of a more scientific conception of the world.

As a result..................

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As a result of the initial undermining of scholastic philosophy, Descartes felt no longer certain and secure in the syllogistic thinking of scholasticism. He began to doubt everything, only to find truth or his own self in the very act of doubting. This *Cogito, ergo sum*, which later was to culminate in Hegel's absolute philosophy and which gave rise to a splendid humanistic culture that had even transformed Christian faith into a rational Christian humanism, was vehemently contradicted by Realists and Existentialists, such as Feuerbach, Marx, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche. Especially after the two World Wars had virtually destroyed the cultural values based on the *Cogito, ergo sum* philosophy, Existentialists such as Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre posited their *Existo, ergo sum* argument. Unfortunately, these critics and opponents of Hegel were often as absolute in their pronouncements as Hegel himself, but nevertheless led man away from the real situation of conflict by seeking to overcome it by some theoretical assumption, premise, or principle.

This brief historical sketch indicates that, if we wish to remain based on the foundation of the real, we must not absolutise our man-made systems and self-coconstituted truths, but we must realise that these systems are built from a situation of conflict, which they reflect. They are the answer to some other system and provoke in turn contradiction. Man's systems or truths are therefore determined by a situation, and in turn determine the situation afresh. They are the result of conflict, reflect conflict, and are the cause of new conflict by which actuality is carried on. From this it follows that the human logoi are part and parcel of the actual situation and, therefore, an integral part of the real; without them all activity of man, i.e., all actuality would cease. They cannot, therefore, as Grisebach would have it, be separated from it. It is on account of their very contradictory nature, which results from the actual situation from which they have emerged, that we realise the inaccessibility to man of absolute truth and reality. It is because of their being rooted in man's actual situation and particular circumstances that we are conscious of their relative character. But this relative human knowledge is absolutely necessary, if we wish not only ...............
not only to know the real but also to experience it. If it was not for these human truths, there would be no human action, and, therefore, no real experience would be possible. This experience is the experience or contradiction, which always puts our knowledge in question through further knowledge. Thereby the limitation of our knowledge is clearly indicated and the restriction of it to the field of actuality is clearly shown.

In the light of the above, it becomes clear that knowledge does not exist without experience, nor would experience be possible without knowledge. Grisebach's separation of the two cannot be upheld. Both are intrinsically interwoven and thus inseparable. We can, therefore, know nothing about the absolute, not even that it is absolutely transcendent, for this would imply knowledge of its existence. Such knowledge would, however, now mean that we have transcended the bounds of knowledge, which, as we have just seen, is based on conflict and is/fruit of the crisis-situation between man and his fellowman, for in the absolute the conflict is resolved. We must thus come to the conclusion that either the self-constituted absolutes of man are no absolutes, or that knowledge of them is no knowledge. Consequently, the absolute cannot be within man's reach. Science and the humanities should therefore restrict themselves to the sphere of actuality. They are no longer in any way concerned with faith, for they know nothing at all about the absolute. They do not have it in mind at all, as Grisebach seems to have had; and even though he regarded it as transcendent, it virtually becomes the presupposition for the world because of its transcendence. By not having it in mind at all, not even as transcendent, we do not make faith the substance of the world. The world as we know it (i.e., consisting of the components of culture) is the result of man's peculiar existential situation, in which he must realise himself as an act of self-assertion in the face of the challenge, the negation, and the contradiction on the part of his fellowman.

From the above epistemological considerations, it follows that we cannot subscribe to Grisebach's teaching that the real is only the eminent, i.e., that which.
that which accidentally encounters us from outside, thus terminating all our constructed truths. We observed that this pure contingency appeared to have ended all actuality and was strongly reminiscent of the nothing. We, therefore, hold the view that the immanent cannot be excluded from actuality. Both are equally constituents of actuality, i.e., man's existential situation. All contradiction coming from an emmanent becomes immanent when experienced, and such immanent experience in turn impels man to react by positing himself afresh, thus incurring the contradiction of another emmanent, etc. It may thus be stated that there would be no knowledge without experience and there would be no experience without knowledge (consciousness). Truth and reality or knowledge and experience, therefore, cannot be separated. Man's constitutive nature is an indispensable part of reality, and only if this fact is acknowledged do we stay within the bounds of actuality, so clearly staked out by the conflict and contradiction of the human logoi. Only then do we avoid a transgression of the real in the direction of the nothing, which Grisebach's abstract concept of real time, i.e., pure contingency, appears to us to be.

B. Practical Reflections

We observed that, for Grisebach, morality consisted in man's ethical existence. By this was meant an existential existence in faith, which would bring peace. By ethical existence Grisebach did not mean moral conduct; for this would imply a moral effort on the part of man. Any such effort or attitude, even for Grisebach, were still technical manifestations of the self and as such were outside the sphere of real experience. Their value consisted in man's turning away from himself towards his fellowman and living in preparedness and expectation of a future coming that would address itself to him, namely, the experience of passion, which might bring about an existence in peace in the event of bearing the fellowman's contradiction with equanimity, in which experience any ever so slight assertion of the self in historical time would have been terminated. As this contingent experience, which Grisebach called real time, was an experience of faith, bringing peace to man, it may be said that peace constitutes the practical aim of Grisebach's .........................
bach's ethics. But once more we wish to emphasise that it was not a peace that was achieved by man's own effort, but one that came to him after man's expectation was terminated in self-restraint (Bescheidenheit) by the experience of limitation (Bescheidung), through which our self-restraint (Bescheidenheit) receives a communication from outside (Bescheid). The decision (Entscheidung) is thus not mine, but occurs through the separation and inequality of men, or through the contradiction between man and his fellowman (Entscheidung). In this crisis, I might be enabled to bear the contradiction by my fellowman in passion, and, as a reward of this real obedience (Gehorsam), the experience of peace might befall me. It is thus obvious that the ethical sphere, just like the epistemological province, is halved. While self-restraint belongs to the immanent essential world, limitation, as a communication from the outside, belongs to the emmanent, contingent world. While separation (Scheidung) represents the clash of theoretical selves, decision (Entscheidung) shrinks the selves to the point where they experience peace through passion, i.e., bearing the pain of the conflict with equanimity.

We now hold that by the experience of peace in Grisebach's sense of the word all suffering has virtually been ended. Once suffering is being borne, there is really no more suffering, because there is no longer conflict or contradiction. As long as I still smart under the contradiction of my fellowman, my self cannot yet have been shrunk to naught, and as long as this is not the case, I, according to Grisebach, am not yet in the world of practical experience. The moment, however, the experience of peace comes to me, my self ceases to exist. This does not mean that I am dead. Death, according to Grisebach, lies outside the precincts of actual experience. The encounter with death is no genuine or real encounter but "thought of" in advance. "Die Begegnung mit dem Tode ist .... keine Begegnung in Wirklichkeit, sondern eine ständig voreilende, gedachte Begegnung". 1) Nevertheless, Grisebach's existence in peace must mean that I am no longer myself, but have been entirely claimed and am completely possessed by the emmanent or transcendent. In this way, actuality again has been side-stopped, because............................

1) E. Grisebach, Gegenwart, p. 556
because at this moment I could no longer possibly experience conflict and thus the conclusion forces itself upon us that the experience of peace, in Grisebach's sense of the word, is really no real experience at all any longer and therefore is nothing.

We thus venture to point out that if the selves of man and his fellowman are the very presupposition for conflict and suffering, the bearing of the conflict in Grisebach's sense, i.e., the shrinking of the self to naught and the pin-pointing of experience to real time or pure contingency, remove this very presupposition and thus the crisis. We would argue, however, that conflict or crisis, in the sense of conflicting selves, be accepted, instead of either merging the selves into an absolute self by the dialectical method, as did for instance Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, but also Comte and Marx, or of sidestepping it by having your self virtually shrunk to nothing through the experience of real time or pure contingency, which experience looks rather like an abstract concept and is thus really empty or no experience at all. The conflict brought about by the contradicting selves is regarded by us as the very moral foundation on which man and his fellowman ought to work together. It is through the very conflict that they are referred to each other. The conflict, contradiction, or the crisis-situation existing between man and his fellowman are all too often seen as barriers that separate men and prevent them from living together in harmony. The conflict between man and his fellowman, however, does not only separate, it also unites. By contradiction his fellowman limits and expands man's self, affirms and negates him, makes him feel an individual, and just in so doing refers him to himself. Without his fellowman man would not know and experience himself as a self. His fellowman, therefore, constitutes man's limit, which man ought to heed. He cries out halt to him, and this cry he should listen. It is thus through his fellowman that man should lead an ethical existence, that he should have an open ear and mind for his fellowman's truth, i.e., his viewpoint, needs, and vital interest, arising from his peculiar situation. This situation must needs differ between man and his fellowman, but it is this very difference that should bring.
bring man and his fellowman together. In mutual self-restraint, one having the other's interest at heart, they ought to cooperate in contradiction. This is the ethical command or categorical imperative of the actual crisis-situation existing between man and his fellowman. The common task of working together in the situation, of constantly adjusting each other's views and interests in the creation of the components of culture may thus be said to be set by actuality. Man and his fellowman together determine their lot and destiny by the way they shape actuality, i.e., the situation which they create together, and they are in turn determined by that situation. Any attempt, therefore, to overstep or sidestep the constantly changing situation between man and his fellowman, one group of interest and the other, nation and nation is an attempt to over- or sidestep actuality. No absolute ideology, scientific system, philosophical theory, or theological dogma will over solve the crisis. On the contrary, any such absolute will only sharpen it. It transcends the boundary of actuality and seeks to make the other conform. The other is then tempted to react in such a radical manner or by such an extreme counter-truth, because he feels his own individuality threatened and his identity in peril, that no understanding and cooperation are possible any longer. We should, therefore, heed the real limit set to us by our fellowman, this limit being one of experience, namely, the experience of the limitation of our knowledge by the contradiction of our fellowman. It is this very limit drawn to me by my fellowman's existential truth that constitutes the moral ought by which I am judged. It is thus not for man to judge, for to do so presumes the knowledge of right and wrong, good and evil, i.e., absolute truth, which is exactly what we do not know. The only way in which we might be said to know right and wrong, good and evil, is in terms of our constituted truth, system, or ideology, i.e., in a relative way, because our truth, systems, ideologies, etc. are, as we have observed, relative or situation-bound. We should not, therefore, judge others and stick labels of good or evil on them, but we should realise that we are judged by the limit. If we transcend it, we shall inevitably incur punishment by arousing such contradiction that we fly at each other's throats.
throats, seeking to destroy each other. The positing of ourselves as absolute, therefore, invites catastrophe, which we could have avoided, had we heeded the limit and allowed ourselves to be restricted to actuality.

Again we observe that man's/himself and the constitution of the human truths as an act of man's self-realisation in the existential situation are a natural must and the very presupposition for the ethical existence of man, i.e., an existence of self-restraint or self-control in terms of the limit, the contradiction on the part of one's fellowman. The self is not merely selfish, it is also communal, for it is the very gateway to one's fellowman. If we curb the self and recognise it as the bridge to our fellowman, it can no longer be evil, as Grisebach sees the self. We then have no need, as had Grisebach, to regard the self only as that which prevents us from leading an ethical existence and having the experience of peace. Then we do not have to wait for an experience from outside to terminate it, thereby terminating all actuality. We do not have to estrange man from his natural need to posit himself as a self and make him live in utter contingency, a condition he could never bear, because it is unnatural. Or is it no condition at all, but simply nothing? If we stay within the world of man, which is the world of the permanent conflict and the constant struggle about the components of culture, and neither overstep nor sidestep our boundaries drawn to man by his fellowman's truth that enables him to lead an ethical existence.

In the ethical or practical field, too, therefore, the emanent cannot do without the immanent and vice versa. If no truth were built, no challenge would exist to induce one's fellowman to contradict it. If no truth were contradicted, no new truth would be built. There would thus be no conflict, which, as the result of man's contradictory actions (the latter being in turn determined by even this conflict) represents actuality, the native soil or workshop of man.

Only by voluntarily restricting himself to actuality, is man free; for only in this event is he safe from becoming the slave of his own truth, which happens as soon as he absolutises it and proclaims it to be the only truth. There are ...............
There are at present examples in abundance to demonstrate man's enslavement to certain ideologies and dogmas, and the absolutisation of any human truth always represents a threat to man's very existence; and let us mark well: the kind of human truth that is absolutised does not matter. Whether man worships science or history, or whatever ideology or philosophy he makes his god and fetish, any absolutisation of any truth enslaves man, estranges him from himself, and deprives him of the opportunity of leading a real ethical existence.

In Grisebach's ethics, too, man is not free. He can take no real choice, as the decision (Entscheidung) is not his, but comes from the transcendent, so that he is determined by the latter. In our opinion, man's freedom consists in the acceptance of the conflict or the crisis as a natural premise, as the very ground on which he should work together with his fellowman in the common interest. He should enter the field of actual occurrence with an open heart and mind, without being bothered and burdened by any absolute for which he has to strive or to which he has to listen. It is thus only within the field of actuality that man acts responsibly in the sense of responding to his fellowman within the limits set by the latter's contradiction. Responsible action consists in man's considering, heeding, and respecting the views, needs, and interests of his fellowman by putting forward his own views and interests in a moderate way, always taking into account possible contradiction, and being willing to modify and sometimes even abandon his own views and wishes if this lies in the common interest. Never ought man simply to ignore and override the view-point and interest of his fellowman.

It becomes thus evident that, contrary to Grisebach's view, human truth is no bogey that must be kept at bay at all cost, but the very presupposition for reality, i.e., actuality within the limits of which alone man is free and responsible and leads a real ethical existence.
C. Metaphysical Implications

We have borne witness to the fact that, in the positive philosophical systems, the metaphysical grounds were self-constituted grounds, from which in turn man's real and ethical existence was derived. As these real grounds were not based on experience in Grisebach's sense of the word, i.e., the experience of an emanent, but were an immanent construction on the part of man, Grisebach relegated the metaphysical grounds of all philosophical systems to the mythological sphere. 1) It did not matter, whether, in constituting himself, man started from matter or from mind; in both cases the real grounds were posited by man as a logical or ontological premise, from which the world could be constituted and in the light of which man's position in the world could be determined. The imaginary and arbitrary character of the man-made worlds and man-shaped reality as well as the contradictoriness of the various metaphysical points of view revealed to Grisebach the vanity of all human striving and constitutive efforts. These self-constituted immanent truths led us away from reality in the sense of a really transcendent or emanent. Even there where the absolute was supposed to be emanent, it was really immanent, in that the dialectical relation in which it stood to the world was clearly comprehended. Whether we take the absolute of Cusanus, Descartes, Hegel or Heidegger, in each case it is the dialectical other of human subjectivity with which this other is reconciled through thinking, because thinking possesses an object or is directed towards a something that is always the other of thinking. 2) The same dialectical relationship between man and God, Grisebach observed in the method of the paradox of Kierkegaard's theology and modern dialectical theology (Gogarten, Brunner, Barth, Przywara), so that God was again included in the human sphere, thus being at man's disposal.

Grisebach, in order to penetrate to real experience, scrapped all systematic, dialectical, and paradoxical constitutions on the part of man, which to him meant nothing else but the constitution of the human self in an absolute manner, and sought to keep himself open for the experience of the emanent by allowing his knowledge and his self to be terminated through the contradiction.

1) Cf. E. Grisebach, Gegenwart, 3rd chapter, pp. 88-126
2) In connection with the problem of the relationship between man and the absolute, cf. W. Schulz, Der Gott der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik, 1957
dition of his fellowman. To Grisebach our self-constituted knowledge, in whatever form, represented an obstacle to real experience, i.e., the experience of the eminent in the form of contradiction on the part of one's fellowman. This contradiction ended all our knowledge of the transcendent, so that theoretical metaphysics had become an impossibility. But by the removal of the transcendent from the sphere of human knowledge, the problematic nature of the transcendent and its inaccessibility to human knowledge has become so obvious that, in this way, the transcendent has moved into the absolute proximity of our knowledge. In the last resort, however, the emnance of the transcendent for Grisebach means that it can no longer be known but only experienced in the form of one's fellowman's contradiction, which terminates my knowledge, my virtue, and myself my self. If this contradiction is being borne in passion, I am enabled to lead an ethical existence, i.e., an existence of obedience or faith that might bring me peace. Human effort ends with the defensive act of self-restraint, i.e., of refraining from positing one's self in the form of some self-constituted truth or other and instead keeping oneself open to the real experience of bearing in passion one's fellowman's contradiction, which, as we have observed, would come to us as the decision (Entscheidung), resulting from the inequality of men (Scheidung), i.e., man as separate from the foreign other.

With the description of actual experience, viz., the limitation of the self in passion, philosophy has exhausted itself. From now on the theologian takes over, but he can only warn and report what has happened to the philosopher. His true field of care is human passion as a result of contradiction, which experience ends all human striving and knowledge. He is concerned about faith that comes to us in the decision (Entscheidung), in which man is completely delivered up to the contingent actual experience of suffering, by which alone the experience of peace may come to us, a peace which transcends all reason. In man's being delivered up to the contradiction of his fellowman, by which man's self-constituted world collapses and his self is terminated, the theologian resorts to the last virtue.  

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virtue as a self-defense against man's understandable tendency to relapse into the certainty and security of his own truth, namely, the virtue of Mannhaftigkeit or manliness. Otherwise the theologian, too, stands in the expectation of the coming, the Entscheidung or decision, thereby living by faith. Consequently, philosophy and theology have this in common that they are both terminated in the event of man's bearing in passion the contradiction of the transcendent (his fellowman), which, as we have seen, is an experience in real time, which means the termination of all historical time and continuity.

It is now in this contingent experience that man might be said to experience the absolute; for this experience brings to man peace transcending all reason. It is thus clear that absolute ignorance and transcendence of the absolute are the very presupposition for its experience by man; and it is by this very ignorance and transcendence that we are led onto the terrain of faith. Faith is, however, no longer founded in our knowledge or our reason, as is the case with Kant or Fichte, for instance, but it is on the contrary that which comes to us through the transcendent after all our knowledge and efforts have been terminated. Faith is no longer the result of systematic knowledge, but comes to man as an experience that contradicts all knowledge.

The question now is: Can it still be said that by the termination of all human knowledge and efforts man still moves in the sphere of the real or is he again outside it? Naturally, Grisebach would reply that the absolute contradiction of man's self-constituted world and efforts by the transcendent is a real contradiction in real time, but, by this absolute contradiction man not dehumanised or absorbed into the absolute, thereby "descending" or sidestepping the real world? Is not man thereby estranged from himself again? Could he bear the utter contingency in which he would have to be living, and does this contingency not come close to living in the nothing, if man is capable of living in that at all? It is true that Grisebach talks about peace that transcends all reason, but what kind of experience is that? It cannot be recorded, for at the moment of being recorded
recorded it is no longer real, but belongs to the past, to the world of historical time and continuity. But surely Grisebach would not deny that having an experience means being conscious of something; but does being conscious of something not mean that I realise and therefore know it? It is thus difficult to see how Grisebach can do without understanding and memory, which at once moves an event or experience into historical time, continuity, and, therefore, into the past. If, however, the human mind or consciousness is deleted, then, everything sinks into the nothing.

Although it is Grisebach's intention to lead us to the contingent experience of the real by which all of man's systematic efforts have come to an end, it cannot be denied that he does so as a philosopher in a most systematic way, namely, by what we have called the inverted method, which may be regarded as the method to end all methods. This method causes him to break down all man-made absolutes based on human reason or human effort; but this does not prevent him from making a transcendent absolute the presupposition for man's experience of the real. For without the existence or the contradiction of an absolute, it is hard to see how man's world is broken down and how man is eventually led thereby into an ethical existence as an existence of faith in which he experiences peace. The difference between Grisebach's method and that of the "positive" metaphysical systems (where the absolute depends on man's reason or effort, or stands in a dialectical relation with man) is that, for Grisebach, man no longer fuses with the transcendent through thinking it as the other, but through experiencing it as the other, and this experience might eventually bring peace transcending all reason. Transcendent now means that which cannot be thought at all, but, on the contrary, embarrasses all thinking and finally terminates it. But this does not remove the fact that an absolute is assumed by Grisebach, and it is hard to see how an absolutely transcendent that is beyond man's reach can be assumed. Does this not imply knowledge of its existence? Grisebach would probably reply that it can be assumed on the ground of faith, so that again faith must be regarded.
be regarded as the substance of the world. If this interpretation is cor-
rect, however, then no real separation has taken place between knowledge
and faith, philosophy and theology, as Grisebach purports to bring about.

Seen in the light of the transcendent or in the light of faith, knowledge
points to faith by becoming the knowledge of not-knowing (docta ignorantia),
and philosophy merges with theology on the common ground of warning not
to relapse into self-made human truth, but to live in expectation of that
which may be coming, namely, the suffering of contradiction in passion,
which would bring peace.

Our thesis that faith becomes the substance of the world is borne out by
the position Grisebach assigns to the Cross. In Die Schicksalsfrage des
Abendlandes, he seeks to show the practical significance of the Cross by
conceiving the Cross as the absolute contradiction of the humanistic world.
Here, where all human hope and wisdom had been shattered, in the midst of
utter darkness and despair, in the greatest suffering or passion, Christ
lived the perfect example of obedience. His total sacrifice represented
consummate love and occurred in absolute faith. The absolute passion of
Christ brought about perfect peace, in which God's word and promise were
fulfilled. It is obvious that man's bearing the conflict with his fellow-
man in passion dovetails with the event of the Cross and in its shadow
assumes an absolute dimension.

Even though Grisebach does not conclude Gegenwart with the event of the
Cross, but with the accidental or contingent encounter between man and his
fellowman, in which the conflict or the crisis might be borne, and even
though in Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes he ends with the reconstruc-
tion of a bankrupt world in the new spirit of cooperation with one's
fellowman on the actual basis of the crisis, both endings ring a distinct
Christian note and merge into the event of the Cross, which Grisebach has
included in his thinking. In Gegenwart, he writes:

Liebe ist..................
Lieber ist die Tragbarkeit des Leidens in der Gebundenheit der unausweichlichen Gemeinschaft. Die Liebe, welche die Haltung der Gegenwärtigen ist, beschreibt ein Verhältnis verschiedener Personen in einer Gemeinschaft, das den Anspruch des fremden Menschen im Konfliktfall trägt. Diese Liebe ist keine Forderung, als solche wäre sie in Wahrheit unerfüllbar, sie ist kein Ideal, kein Gedanke, sondern sie enthält eine wirkliche Leidenschaft in der erfahrenen zusätzlichen Begegnung. 1)

In Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, Grisebach ends with the problem of peace. Peace, he holds, cannot be achieved by some lofty, liberating idea or noble attitude of man, but it is, just as truth and freedom, a modality of reality, i.e., it comes to man in the actual experience and suffering of the crisis, as a reward, as we have already observed, for the untiring labour of man together with his fellowman on the common ground of the permanent crisis.

Frieden, says Grisebach, "ist eine Modalität der Wirklichkeit, wie die Wahrheit und die Freiheit; er ist der Gegenstand der Hoffnung in Erkenntnis und Glauben. 2)

In fairness to Grisebach, it must be emphasised that in both Gegenwart and Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes he intends to stop in the sphere of contingent, actual experience, as is shown by the above two quotations. The fact, however, that this experience represents pure contingency, or, to put it differently, absolute contradiction on the part of the transcendent, when humanly speaking no experience is possible any longer, forces us to the conclusion that Grisebach has transcended actuality and has again merged man with the absolute, which now does not represent a truth of reason, but a truth of faith based on the problematic nature and our very ignorance of the absolute. Moreover, in the light of the event of the Cross, as stated by Grisebach, the above two quotations assume a definite Christian colouring, so that Grisebach's real ground may be seen to consist in the event of the Cross.

In the light of the above, it must be stated that Grisebach's attempt to separate the human world of truth from the contingent world of reality has failed.

1) Gegenwart, p. 594
2) Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, p. 331
has failed. By presupposing a transcendent absolute as the absolute contradiction of the world of human truth, man, instead of transcending himself, has now been transcended. He no longer fuses with the absolute through his own effort, but is fused with it by the absolute's contradiction. It is true that this contradiction occurs indirectly, through man's fellowman, so that, indeed, Grisebach moves for a time within the precincts of actuality, i.e., the contradiction between man and his fellowman.

The moment, however, this conflict is being borne in passion and man has been moved into real time, i.e., pure contingency, it is difficult to see how man still moves within the sphere of actual experience. He now seems to have been absorbed by truth again, which, as we have already stated, is a truth of faith and no longer a truth of knowledge. The conclusion cannot be avoided, therefore, that the transcendency of man by the contradiction of the absolute means the termination of all actuality. The assumption of it any absolute in whatever way, as the dialectical other emerges from man's thought, causes man somehow to fuse with it, whether directly or indirectly, by reason or by faith, whereby the actual world is either overstepped or sidestepped, depending on how the absolute is posited by man.

In other words, it becomes clear to us that Grisebach's transcendent absolute is no less man-made than the absolutes of other philosophical systems; for only by making absolute contradiction the presupposition for the world, was he able to put man in the position of allowing his truth and the world of his self to be terminated and to bear the contradiction, in silence and in passion, in order to experience peace. But whether this aim is in accordance with human nature, whether man is capable of such an experience in pure contingency and whether such an experience is an experience at all, are all important questions from the standpoint of truth and reality as well as that of practicality.

The event of the Cross, too, as the absolute contradiction of man's hopes, efforts, and aspirations, is man-made in the sense that it represents Grisebach's interpretation of this event. There are definitely passages in Holy Scripture that justify different interpretations of Christ's passion.
passion. Be that as it may, it should be taken into account that this event is after all so unique that it defies man's interpretation and thus cannot be exhausted by human reflection. The interpretation Grisebach gives of the event of the Cross sees the world in its very shadow, and its absolute No creates a distinct eschatological atmosphere.

Again it is borne home to us that the splitting of the world by Grisebach into a dimension of theoretical truth and practical reality, knowledge and experience, immanence and emanence is impossible, if the aim is an existence in the sphere of contingent experience. Both these dimensions are really one; but in order to realise this, we must regard the world without any presuppositions and aims on our part. If we refrain from looking at it as an aspect of any absolute in whatever form, man's constitutive activity that does not assume the sinister character ascribed to it by Grisebach.

If we look at the world of man's constructive activity without any presuppositions, assumptions, or prejudice, we shall not, as does Grisebach, regard it as evil or as an obstacle to real experience, which man must allow to be destroyed or terminated by his fellowman, but we shall find that it is the very prerequisite for such real experience. Without man's truths, which, as we have already observed, he must needs posit from his own particular situation, there would be no actuality; nay, there would be no human life possible at all. It is these very contradictory truths that determine his situation and they, in turn determined by the peculiarity of this situation. By being contradicted, man is in turn challenged to contradict, as he is only himself by being contradicted and he in turn represents his fellowman's yes and no.

It follows that man's constitutive truths form an inextricable part of the crisis-situation between man and his fellowman and that through them man and his fellowman together shape the situation, which, for this reason, is their common situation, in which they are referred to each other and in which they live and work together. Truth and reality, knowledge and experience, the immanent and the emmanent, the essential and the existential, the general.
the general and the particular are therefore inseparable. They are linked not by a theoretical self-constituted dialectic, but by a real, practical one, in that the one is impossible without the other. They can be separated only by a theoretical analysis of actuality. Human truth, therefore, as it has sprung up from man's actual situation, can never be absolute. It constitutes the positing of man's self in the face of the truth of his fellowman. This truth is known to man because he has built it himself. It is constituted by arranging his environmental impressions into a meaningful field of order, an outlook on life, a world-view, a philosophical system, a scientific theory, an ethical doctrine, or a religious view. These meaningful fields of man's constitutive activity, on account of their familiarity to man, simultaneously represent to him an abode or shelter in which he finds a measure of peace and security. At the same time, however, they are constantly threatened by the contradiction of his fellowman, which experience compels man to reassert his truth or posit it afresh in a modified form. In this way, the world of the components of culture is in a state of permanent becoming and represents the actual field of man's permanent cultural activity, taking place on the basis of the permanent crisis as the common experience of all. That is the reason why the sciences, the humanities, ethics, and the fine arts are in constant motion and change, and that their attempt to know the unconditional and embrace the absolute is inevitably doomed to failure and to end in contradiction. We regard it therefore as a categorical imperative that man ought to observe his limit as he experiences it by his limitation on the part of his fellowman, instead of vainly trying to transcend himself or of allowing himself to be transcended. If he heeds his limit, which he is constantly experiencing in the person of his fellowman, he will then restrict himself to the sphere of actuality as his natural sphere. He will then no longer run the risk of being the slave of his own truth, of estranging himself from reality or from himself, but he will then be free in the sense that he can now wholeheartedly work in the actual crisis-situation together with his fellowman for a better mutual understanding and relationship. In Grisebach's case such fruitful cooperation.............
coperation is made impossible, for the simple reason that, by the shrinking of the self to virtually nil or the complete destruction of the human logos, the crisis has disappeared and actuality ceases. By presupposing an absolute, not as an absolute knowledge but of faith, Grisebach, like other metaphysical thinkers, causes man to merge with the absolute, the only difference being that man does not transcend himself but is being transcended.

From the above it follows that, as philosophers, we should not speak about the absolute in whatever form, neither as the foundation on which the world is based nor as the grounds of its termination, because in both cases the actual field of the real has been abandoned. We cannot, therefore, agree with Grisebach, much as we respect his attempt to show man that by absolutising himself he invites his own destruction, and to make him become conscious of his natural limitation referred him to his fellowman as the real emanent. Had he done so by leaving out the absolute altogether, instead of including it in a negative form, namely, as absolute negation, termination, and contradiction, he might have arrived at a different appreciation of man's constructive and constitutive activity. As it is, he failed to see that man's self is not only a barrier to his fellowman (although it can be that of course), but rather the very gateway to his fellowman. The exclusion of the absolute by Grisebach in this negative form (which, as we have seen, steeped the world in an atmosphere of faith) and the identification of this absolute contradiction to the world with the event of the Cross as interpreted by Grisebach, cause it to assume an eschatological colouring, and change his whole thinking into a religion. As philosophers, therefore, we cannot accept the result of Grisebach's thinking, for as such we have in our opinion, to restrict ourselves to the world of actual experience, which Grisebach purports to do, but, on account of his metaphysical presupposition and one-sided interpretation of man's constitutive activity, fails to do. And should the argument be raised against us that we see Grisebach's philosophy too much as a system, which it is his very purpose to overcome in order to push through to practical contingent...
contingent experience, our answer is that we are well aware of his intention, but that we are compelled to do so, as he speaks to us as an analytical thinker, in philosophical terms and concepts, giving a highly systematic account of the process of terminating the system. In fact, Grisebach's whole systematic procedure implies that the system is the very presupposition for arriving at the sphere of actual, contingent experience. This in turn suggests that man cannot really do without the system and that after its termination he is no longer within the precincts of real experience, but has understepped it.

In order to keep within the bounds of actuality (i.e., the field of crisis brought about by man's contradictory constitutive activities and conflicting truths) as any thinker ought to do, the philosopher should study actuality without any reference to any absolute, whether this reference be a direct or indirect one. To avoid the danger of making it the presupposition for the world in whatever indirect way, the philosopher should ban it from his mind altogether. It is then that philosophy confines itself to its proper field, namely, the field of possible human knowledge and experience, which as change and becoming represents the field of actuality. If philosophy confines itself to this sphere, it may then be called the science of actuality. By that is meant that its task is twofold: In the first place, it has to make an analytical study of the actual situation in which men find themselves in connection with their common task of producing the components of culture. Secondly, it has to act as the guardian of freedom, i.e., by a critical analysis of man's activities, it has to see to it that he observes the bounds as drawn for him by his fellowman. This means that philosophy leaves the absolute entirely in the hands of the theologian. It is he who, on the basis of faith and on the basis of faith alone, refers man to it. In this way a clear-cut separation has been effected between philosophy and theology. The two disciplines are no longer dialectically referred to each other, nor are they any more dependent upon each other. Philosophy, by an act of freedom, restricts itself to the sphere of actuality or becoming, i.e., the world of human knowledge and experience as described above. This voluntary...
voluntary act of self-restraint or self-control represents a moral act corresponding to man's voluntary acceptance of the limit set to him by his fellowman. By this voluntary act of philosophy of confining itself to the sphere of actuality or becoming, the danger of mixing faith with knowledge by the self-transcendence of philosophy has been eliminated. The same act of freedom should be performed by theology, which should restrict itself to the revealed truth, which it accepts on the ground of faith alone. By these respective acts of humility on the part of philosophy and theology, therefore, each discipline becomes free and independent of the other, thereby guaranteeing the purity of knowledge and of faith respectively.

We must, however, not be under the impression that there are now two truths, namely, a truth of philosophy and a truth of theology, as was the case with Christian Avrorioists, e.g., Siger of Brabant. On the contrary, the very separation between knowledge and faith by an act of freedom and humility, makes the truth of knowledge and the truth of faith one. What man in the practical, relative field of becoming ought to do every day and at every hour, namely, to heed and respect the limit as he experiences it by the contradiction of his fellowman (which experience causes him to exercise self-restraint and in the common task of working on the cultural goods induces him to consider the views, needs, and interests of his fellowman before thinking of his own), the believer is commanded to do by God and by Christ, whose teaching may be summed up in: Love thy neighbour as thyself, if thou dost, then thou lovest God.

Instead of inactively awaiting the termination of his self by his fellowman in order to experience faith, which is not only unnatural, but humanly speaking seems impossible, man, by his very constitutive activity and his very self, is referred to his fellowman in love and humility just because he does not presume an absolute. And just because he does not in any way presume an absolute in the sphere of knowledge, but seeks it only in the realm of faith, he finds that in faith he is referred to his fellowman in love and humility as well. By the voluntary act of self-restraint, therefore, philosophy...
philosophy and theology have freed man from the danger of absolutizing his own self at the expense of his fellowman, in which he became the slave of his own truth. In other words, by freeing themselves from each other by a voluntary act of self-restraint, philosophy and theology have set man free also. Both disciplines are now of an equally sober and practical nature, as they have both been thoroughly demythologised. Philosophy is no longer in danger of being a mere academic "subject" or an exercise in logical acrobatics, nor does it any longer shape reality from a self-constituted real ground or absolute, which, whether material or ideal, cannot be anything else but a myth. Theology, on the other hand, would no longer run the risk of constituting the relationship between man and God in the form of a dialectical principle as the presupposition of faith, which virtually closes the gap between man and God and converts pistis into gnosis. From now on, philosophy and theology are one only in their humility manifesting itself in their mutual act of self-control and in the practical nature of their mutual function, namely, to refer man to his fellowman. This task is undertaken by philosophy on the strength of experience, i.e., the experience of the limit, while theology tackles the same task on the basis of faith, i.e., by obeying the word of God and the teachings of Christ.

Conclusion

From the above discussion the conclusion must be drawn that the truth is inaccessible to man's understanding and reason. All principles, laws, systems, and worlds constituted by man are relative and contradictory, no matter whether they concern the natural sciences, the humanities, or the various cultural systems and Weltanschauungen in general. So far we agree with Grisebach, but we disagree with the value he attaches to these man-made truths. To Grisebach these truths are of a merely theoretical or academic nature that lead man astray and prevent him from the real encounter with his fellowman. In fact, man's constitutive efforts are nothing but a vainglorious realisation of the self, leading to an extreme individualism and egoism. They isolate man from his fellowman and tend to make him elevate himself over and above his fellowman, and hence they are evil. The
humanistic world of truth as a truth in historic time and continuity must therefore be destroyed by man's adopting an attitude of self-restraint while awaiting the real encounter to occur to him in the form of being enabled to bear the contradiction on the part of his fellowman in passion, and thus experiencing peace. In this experience, man's self has been terminated and historical time has been replaced by real time.

We see thus that man's positing himself as a self through his constructive and systematic efforts is looked upon by Grisebach in a purely negative way, i.e., man's constitutive efforts are merely a stumbling block and an obstacle in the way to real experience. Grisebach fails to appreciate sufficiently the necessity to our existence of our human truths, otherwise he would not have declared the human world of truth to be of purely theoretical or academizzi value. How could he possibly have overlooked the practical significance of the human truths, if, in order to live a meaningful or purposeful life, every child, every ordinary individual builds his own world, thus establishing his own field of order, even though, as in a child's world, this field of order is often fantastic? But the world of adults is not always logical or based on facts either, and this includes even the scientific world, and the academic world as such. No matter how logical or mythological an individual's self-constructed world may be, to him it is meaningful and true. But what is important is that the meaningful arrangement and ordering by man of his surroundings and impressions into a coherent whole seems to be an indispensable must for human existence. The field of order he establishes in accordance with his peculiar situation may be said to represent his home, offering him a certain measure of security and certainty. At the same time, however, he feels his world invaded by the worlds and truths of his fellowman, which contradict his own, thus putting it in question, thereby inducing him to reassert himself by positing his truth afresh in accordance with the new situation. The meaningful arrangement by man of his surroundings, therefore, occurs from a contingent existential situation, i.e., in the face of the truths put forward by his fellowman. This does not apply to the truth of the private individual only, but to academic truth and ideologies as well. If, however, the existential root

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root of all human truths in the above sense of the word is conceded, we
must then accept these truths as parts of the real, i.e., parts of the ac-
tual sphere of crisis brought on by themselves on account of their contra-
dictoriness. It follows that no human truth can ever be absolute, but is
always relative in the sense that one field of order is questioned by an-
other. But it is nevertheless real and cannot, as is done by Grisebach, be
dismissed as something purely theoretical or something that is evil in the
sense that it blocks the way for man to the leading of an ethical existence.

From the above it follows that the opposite is true. Instead of being man's
stumbling block in the way to the leading of an ethical existence, all hu-
man truths, whether individual, ideological, or academic, on the very ground
of their contradictoriness, are the very prerequisite to the leading of an
ethical existence. For it is in their very contradictoriness or else in
the permanent crisis brought about by the conflicting human logoi, which
in turn induces man to build his truths afresh, that man's limit lies,
 i.e., the limit of all that is constituted by man, his knowledge and his
striving as they disclose themselves in the arts, the sciences, and techno-
logy. This limit, therefore, is of practical or ethical significance; for
it clearly refers us to our fellowman. It represents the ought, commanding
us to observe the limit experienced by us in the form of contradiction on
the part of our fellowman and warning us not to transcend ourselves by
positing as absolute our truths, no matter whether they are of a scientific,
technological, ethical, or aesthetic nature. The communication man receives
through this limit leads him to real self-restraint and humility. At this
stage, the contradiction of his fellowman proves a blessing to man. It sets
all men a common permanent task, namely, to attune their mutual needs and
interests to each other, from which task a cooperation in contradiction,
leading to a natural real community results.

From the above, it becomes clear why we cannot endorse Grisebach's dualism
between the immanent humanistic world of truth and the emmanent problematic
world of the real. On existential grounds we cannot rule out man's consti-
tutive activity from the real world. Springing from man's peculiar existential
situation ................
situation, the human logoi are part and parcel of the sphere of man's action, which, on account of the contradictoriness of the human truths, is the field of man's interminable cultural activity and therefore of becoming. In other words, it is through his very self-constituted contradictory truths, through which he posits himself as a self, that man is inextricably interwoven with actuality. The contradictory relation in which man stands with his fellowman causes his immanent self-constituted truth (knowledge) to become an emanent to his fellowman, who experiences it as a contradiction to his own truth; and as he feels that this contradiction constitutes a threat to his own existence, i.e., his opinions, needs, and interests, he reacts by modifying his own truth or positing it afresh, in accordance with the new situation. It is in this way that the immanent becomes an emanent and the emanent an immanent again. Thus knowledge and experience, the internal and the external, the necessary and the contingent, the essential and the existential are inseparable; they are integrated in the contradictory relation between man and his fellowman, as it manifests itself in their common task, the creation of the components of culture.

If we regard actuality as consisting in the interminable activity of man, it follows that we cannot subscribe to Grisebach's view that the real can only be encountered if man allows the humanistic world, i.e., the sciences, philosophy, and theology, to be terminated by his fellowman's contradiction. On the contrary, man's cultural activity, now, constitutes the very field in which man and his fellowman ought to find each other; and as the contradictory nature of man's cultural activity constitutes a permanent crisis, it follows that this conflict-situation represents the very moral basis on which man and his fellowman should work together in mutual respect and love and in acknowledgement and consideration of each other's particular vital needs and interests. This is the practical task set to man by the permanent crisis, which he cannot overcome without inviting disaster, and which, therefore, he should accept as his natural sphere in which a natural and real community with his fellowman is possible. For by the very crisis that has always reigned and will continue to reign in the sciences, the humanities and theology, man is constantly referred to his fellowman. The moral ought, as the limit...
as the limit laid down to man by his fellowman, is thus also the boundary of man's cultural activity. If heeded, the ought prevents man from transcending his natural field of action and lends his life purpose and meaning by directing him to his permanent task of bringing about in the very field of crisis and conflict provided by man's cultural activity, a real encounter with his fellowman in the spirit of mutual love, respect, and good will.

The actual crisis between man and his fellowman as it manifests itself in man's cultural activity, also sets a new task for philosophy. Instead of playing the part of Cinderella (which part was allocated to it by Grisebach) so that, hidden in the dark recess, it unobtrusively excercises a mere warning function, until even this function is terminated by man's being enabled to bear in passion his fellowman's contradiction, man's interminable cultural activity allots a very important part to philosophy.

We have already mentioned that by investigating the nature of this activity, philosophy becomes the science of actuality, i.e., the science of the contradictory relationship between man and his fellowman arising from their different aims, views, needs and interests, by which man's cultural and civilising activity is stimulated. This thinking from the actual crisis accords a new function to philosophy. It is no longer exclusively constitutive, but above all critical and regulative, in the sense that it exposes and denounces all dogmatism and any kind of absolutisation of man's constituted truths and refers us to our limit (the actual relation between me and my fellowman) by which the field of reality, i.e., human knowledge and experience, is clearly circumscribed. In this way, philosophy becomes the guardian of a free, genuine community and points out to man the way to an ethical existence. By being aware of the absolute's inaccessibility to reason or the understanding, it is itself led to practising self-restraint, thus leaving the region of the metaphysical to the theologian, who, on the basis of faith, refers us to Revelation.

In other words, philosophy confines us to the world of human knowledge and experience, which as the region of actual human existence is a world of becoming ...............

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becoming and, because it is both experienced and known, is both real and true. Truth and reality as such, that is, the absolute, cannot be known to the philosopher in any way, neither directly nor indirectly. For him the absolute does not exist. For this reason, he can make no statement whatsoever about it, not even that it is absolutely transcendent. We have observed that the inclusion of the absolute in an absolutely negative form by Grisebach, as of an absolutely problematic nature or absolute not-knowing, nevertheless, makes the absolute the presupposition for the world. Through man's fellowman it terminates the humanistic world, and, in this way, makes man encounter the real as an emmanent, that is, man's fellowman as the foreign other or the transcendent. Through his fellowman's contradiction, therefore, the absolute enables man to bear the crisis in passion, thus leading an ethical existence, i.e., experiencing faith that brings peace transcending all reason. In this way, we cannot help concluding that faith becomes the substance of the world, whereby human existence assumes an eschatological meaning. The world thus lies in the shadow of the absolute and by its absolute contradiction, man is caused to merge with it. This is particularly true if the event of the Cross is conceived as an absolute contradiction of the world. It is thus hard to see how Grisebach has excluded the absolute from the region of actual human experience. On the contrary, it is its very prerequisite, that man would not experience faith without this contradiction, by which real experience he is one with the absolute.

The metaphysical character of Grisebach's sphere of the real, as the sphere of contingent experience in real time (a time ending all historical time and continuity), is therefore obvious. In this connection the question arises: Is not the basic assumption by Grisebach of an absolute, in however indirect or negative a form, as much an arbitrary act of self-constitution on the part of man, and for this reason as fictional and mythological, as are the self-constituted absolutes of the positive systems? The only difference seems to be that, in the latter, man merges with the absolute or the real ground through his own effort or a self-constituted dialectical process.
process rationally comprehended, whereas in Grisebach's inverted method man is merged with the absolute or the real ground by an act of negation on the part of the absolute, which consistently follows from its absolutely negative character, that is, its absolute transcendence. But is the ascribing to the absolute of an absolutely negative character by Grisebach not as arbitrary, rational and humanistic as is the ascribing to it of an absolutely rational character, say, by Hegel?

Again we are faced with the unavoidable conclusion that Grisebach's termination of the humanistic world as the presupposition for a real experience of faith transcends the bounds of the world of becoming just as much as happens by the act of man's self-transcendence, for instance, in Hegel's dialectical system, except that Grisebach's and Hegel's conceptions of truth stand diagonally opposed to each other. While Hegel's truth represents the making of human reason absolute in the form of the absolute spirit or the completion of the historical process in universal history, Grisebach's truth represents the making of human experience absolute in the form of pure contingency, or the termination of all history and continuity by real time.

It follows that, if we intend to stay within the sphere of becoming as the true sphere of the real, the self-constituted human truths cannot be ruled out, for man's cultural activity is, as we have seen, an indispensable necessity for man's existence. The only thing we must constantly keep in mind is the relative and contradictory nature of these truths, which we are referred to our fellowman as our limit, which we ought to heed. In this way, the boundaries of actuality will not be transgressed in either direction, neither will they be overstepped by man's self-transcendence nor side-steps by man's transcended by some absolute, his fellowman, or the event of the Cross. Grisebach's idea of the absolute's total contradiction to man, tends to regard the nature and function of the absolute, man's fellowman and the Cross, in a particular, in a onesided way. Why should the absolute or the Cross only stand in contradiction to man? Is this not an observation on mere logical grounds, namely, on the grounds of man's incapability of comprehending their nature, so that their negative and negating character is nothing.
is nothing but a rational conclusion on man's part on these very logical grounds? By such a view, therefore, all that has been demonstrated is man's absolute ignorance concerning the absolute, the real ground of the world or the Cross. Hence, knowing nothing about the absolute, we should, as philosophers, refrain from making any statements about it at all, not even about its absolute transcendence which, in turn, induces us to ascribe to it a purely negative quality and a negating function. Concerning the event of the Cross, for example, which Grisebach appeared to regard as the real ground of the actual world, the Bible definitely admits other interpretations than mere contradiction, e.g., absolute triumph and victory over pain and death, so that not despair, agony and suffering, but boundless rejoicing and utmost bliss prevail in the end. And certainly his fellowman is not only man's contradiction terminating all individuality, but his fellowman also, by this very contradiction, confirms him as a self. His individuality or his self is not, therefore, merely a barrier keeping him apart from his fellowman, but also represents a gateway to his fellowman. Without the self and man's self-constituted truths, there would be no real world.

It is thus obvious that, as philosophers, we must be modest and unassuming, exercising self-restraint by confining ourselves to human knowledge and experience, lest we become spurious. The philosopher can thus not have anything to do with faith. It is the very inclusion of faith in philosophy by Grisebach that compels him to assume an absolute and to make it, however negatively, the premise of his thought. By the inclusion of the absolute, however, he finds himself outside the bounds of the real and on fictional ground again. In order to avoid the danger of putting himself outside the precincts of actuality, thus ending in a myth again, the philosopher should not even think of an absolute. Human knowledge is his only field of enquiry, the validity of which knowledge is tested by the experience of its limit: the contradictory views or truths of his fellowman. The experience of this limit verifies all human truths as real truths, i.e.,

"as having..."
as having sprung from an existential situation brought about by his fellowman's contradiction. The transgression of this limit on any one's part, private individual, scientist, humanist, or artist, should not be tolerated by the philosopher, because by such transgression man is no longer referred to his fellowman, but has posited himself as absolute, thereby being set on the absolute destruction of his fellowman's truth, i.e., forcing him to conform and surrender his needs and interests to his own. By this violation of the natural crisis, therefore, cooperation becomes impossible; thereby his fellowman is provoked to react in as absolute a manner, so that now both man and his fellowman are intent on bringing about their own destruction, thus inviting disaster. It follows that it is on the grounds of the natural crisis created by man's contradictory existential truths, needs, and interests, or, to put it otherwise, on the grounds of relative human knowledge and experience, and not on the basis of faith, that the philosopher refers man to his fellowman. It is in the latter that philosophy recognises the limit of all human aspirations and hence the moral ought which man should heed and obey. By this voluntary act of subordination or self-restriction, man frees himself from the chains of a self-imposed absolute and proceeds with his cultural activity in close consultation and cooperation with his fellowman. By a purely scientific analysis of the crisis, therefore, the philosopher guides man to his fellowman as the ought by which he should live and by which peace, happiness, and the future existence of man are best assured.

The discussion of faith and the absolute is left entirely to the theologian. But faith is no longer a vehicle through which man either fuses with the absolute, as in the case of Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, or the dialectical theologians, or is made to fuse with it as in the case of Grisebach. Faith has become the result of the very act of self-restriction on the part of the theologian. By this act, the believer frees himself from the world of actuality and becoming, and obediently subordinates himself to the absolute, accepting its secrets and mysteries without question (with which he is nevertheless joined in the act of thinking). Thus he refrains from...
from the temptations of embracing these mysteries through an illusory
feeling of love, by which he would again pretend to possess them and thus
fuse with the divine in ecstasy or think of them and the deity as the
incomprehensible, or the totally other. Love of God does not mean the de-
sire to possess Him; indeed this desire is blasphemous and the possession
of God by ecstatic feeling and thinking or by dialectical reasoning detracts
from His holiness, but it means to obey His word and command unconditionally
and in all humility. True love of God, therefore, can grow only on the
basis of unconditional faith. In being capacitated for renouncing all attempts
to know God, or become one with him by an emotional or intellectual act of
fusion, and in being enabled to accept the revealed truth by unconditional
trust and obedience, I am in the state of grace, which state is not my own
merit, but entirely that of God. Because of my human weakness, however, I
am not capable of such unconditional faith, but am always tempted by my
reason to doubt the revealed truth. It is for this reason that God sent His
Son, Who by sacrificing Himself on my behalf, interceded for me, making
absolute faith a reality, so that, by His vicarious love and sacrifice, man
is already redeemed.

In the light of the above, all attempts to embrace the absolute emotionally
or intellectually are presumptive and really the expression of man's vain-
gloriousness. All these attempts somehow constitute the absolute from the
human point of view, so that, again, it is at man's disposal and the bound-
dary between faith, on the one hand, and knowledge and experience on the
other, is again wiped out. In order to prevaricate the danger of the abso-
lute's becoming a known truth again, we must seek it outside the bounds of
human knowledge and experience only. Absolute truth cannot be a known or
experienced truth if we accept that human knowledge and experience are re-
stricted to the contradictory relationship between man and his fellowman.
Absolute truth is solely and exclusively accessible to the believer, but
not, as Grisebach would have it, on the grounds of the ignorance of man or
at once the philosopher, for that would place it again in a dialectical relation-
ship with man, but only on the grounds of revelation. Only on the grounds
of revelation
of revelation can truth be absolute; for we have seen that all self-constituted absolutes of the scientists, philosophers, and theologians are no real absolutes, as is shown by the fact that they contradict each other and are changed as soon as factual circumstances or the conditions of life change, but constitute man's self-transcendence, the dangers of which we hope to have pointed out sufficiently.

Faith, as based on the voluntary act of self-restriction on the part of the theologian and the believer, is therefore the humble and obedient acceptance of the absolute truth as it has been revealed in the Bible. The Christian believer will thus listen to the Word of God and the teachings of Christ and will endeavour to obey them; and we have already mentioned that in the Old as well as in the New Testament man is referred to his fellow-man as the presupposition for his salvation.

To us it seems preposterous that we should try to come into contact with the absolute by striving for it by living in expectation of it, i.e., the termination of our self by it. To us the Christian message has a very sober and practical ring. As conflict and suffering are factual events in this world, these events being the result of the natural relationship between man and his fellowman, it is no use evading them in the direction of self-constituted havens of refuge; for man's obedience to the Word consists in the acceptance of conflict and suffering in the face of which humility, real love of our fellowman, and the sacrifice of our interests in favour of those of our fellowman become possible. To us the life of the Christian believer is a trial, which he should undergo willingly and obediently. It is, therefore, a life of practical cooperation and collaboration with his fellowman, which proves itself in the common task of producing the cultural goods. If man acquits himself well of this trial, then, on the grounds of faith again, he may hope for the fulfilment of God's promise. But when and to whom redemption comes, as a gift of grace on the part of God, remains God's secret into which it is useless to enquire, for, in so doing, we will inevitably hopelessly entangle ourselves in controversy and contradiction. God's promise to man of his salvation from suffering and conflict, in our opinion...
opinion, is the most important part and the principal purpose of revealed truth, and it is this purpose that most clearly distinguishes it from known experienced truth, thus presenting it as absolute.

From the above it becomes clear that, if we accept man's cultural activity as manifested by the sciences, the humanities, the fine arts, and theology, as an existential must, which establishes order and meaning in man's situation, at the same time affording him a limited measure of certainty and security, we cannot possibly subscribe to Grisebach's thesis that this activity constitutes a purely theoretical or technical world, which induces man to miss actual experience. On the contrary, man's cultural activity of all kinds and variety now forms an essential and indispensable part of the actual world. It is through this activity that man is referred to his fellowman with whom, on the soil of the natural crisis, he ought to cooperate in the spirit of mutual regard, respect, and good will. Philosophy, as the science of actuality, clearly stakes out man's limits and, by the voluntary act of restricting itself to the field of human experience and knowledge as delineated by these limits, confines him to the region of human action in the interest of a genuine and free human community. Through this voluntary act of self-restriction, it remains itself free from a self-constituted absolute which inevitably defects us from actuality, i.e., the field of true knowledge and real experience as described above. Theology, by a similar act of self-restriction to the realm of faith, by which faith as faith in absolute as revealed truth is protected from adulteration by human knowledge and experience, cooperates with philosophy in referring man to the region of suffering and conflict on the basis of faith, i.e., in the light of God's Word and the event of the Cross, by which love of one's neighbour and sacrifice in the interest of the neighbour may become a reality.

Having come to end of our enquiry into the problem of truth and reality as it arose from Grisebach's works, we express the hope that we have succeeded in making clear where we do not agree with Grisebach and why. We hope to have answered the questions we put at the beginning of this work and to have clearly circumscribed the position the sciences, the humanities........................
humanities, philosophy, and theology occupy in human life. We trust, moreover, that we have shown to what extent these human activities belong to the field of the real, as the field of the actual, and that we have pointed out their ultimately practical value and purpose. In short, we hope to have given a clear answer to the question: What attitude ought man to take up towards life and towards his fellowman. We found that Grisebach's central thesis, namely, the dualism and incompatibility between truth and reality is untenable and that, on account of the existential nature of man's cultural activity, truth and reality are one in actuality and becoming and therefore relative. Absolute truth can only be revealed truth, and faith does not mean embracing this truth emotionally or intellectually, but accepting it obediently and unconditionally. Yet, relative humanistic truth and absolute revealed truth have this in common that they both refer man to the region of the crisis as the moral foundation of cooperation and collaboration between man and his fellowman. However, whereas the former does so exclusively on the ground of human experience and knowledge founded on such experience, the latter does so solely on the grounds of unconditional obedience to and faith in God's Word and the event of the Cross.
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THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND REALITY IN GRİSEBACH'S THOUGHT

SUMMARY

By tracing the development of Grisebach's philosophical thought throughout his works, from his first philosophical attempts to his later mature writings, this thesis seeks to show Grisebach's relentless struggle to achieve a final break through to the contingent experience of the real, i.e., a real transcendent or a real emmanent. It thus concentrates on a critical discussion of Grisebach's central problem, namely, that of truth and reality. It shows how Grisebach eventually turns against himself or his former systematic or constitutive philosophy and gradually arrives at a critical position, which is totally opposed to his former position. In other words, this thesis shows how the process of philosophy's turning against itself in a critical manner, thus eventually cancelling itself as a theoretical system and in this way guiding man to the practical, contingent experience of the real transcendent in the form of his fellowman as the foreign other or man's permanent stumbling block (which process Grisebach teaches as the presupposition for arriving at an ethical existence in his later more mature works), is actually traceable throughout Grisebach's works, when they are studied in chronological order.

The division of the world into a sphere of theoretically constructed truth of purely academic value and a sphere of practical experience of the real as the ethical sphere, which tears apart knowledge and experience, is unacceptable to us. It splits man's mind into two halves as well. By the elimination of man's constructive activity and the humanistic world as a result of it, Grisebach seeks to penetrate into a world of pure contingent experience, which he sees in the pin-pointed moment of man's being enabled/....
that these cycles of the self represent man's estrangement from actual contingent experience, which prevents him from leading a real and thus an ethical existence.

The necessity of showing this arises from the fact that Grisebach explained all evil in the world from the totally egoistical nature of these absolute cycles of the self, and that it was this fundamental insight that caused him to set out in search of a real that was actually experienced as a real emanent, instead of being constituted as an immanent theoretical truth. In other words, Grisebach was in search of a real of which man no longer disposed by rational constitution, but one that disposed of him. In this investigation we concentrate above all on those systems, namely, those of Kant, Hegel and the Philosophy of Existence, which have influenced Grisebach's thought directly. As in each of those systems we find that reality is rationally constituted, it stands to reason that there truth and reality are merged in the constitutive or comprehensive act, in spite of the different methodological character of this act.

Subsequently, we deal with the problem of truth and reality as it presents itself throughout Grisebach's works and during his long journey from the methodological construction of reality as an immanent truth to the contingent experience of the real as a real emanent and its total separation from the humanistic or historical world of memory and the past, which, according to Grisebach, has no practical but only academic significance. In this connection we can distinguish the following stages:

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF REAL EXPERIENCE IN THE FORM OF THE CULTURAL ACT AS AN ACT OF THE SPIRIT

By the abstraction of this act from individual
cultural acts, the multiple is merged with the one, the particular with the general, matter with form, experience with reason, the contingent with the necessary, the scientific with the historical, becoming with being, the finite with the infinite, the subject with the object.

In *Kultur als Formbildung* the rational is still very much emphasized. There the cultural act as an act of the spirit is seen as the forgiving act of the artist. Form is bestowed on nature through visibility. By the forgiving act as the creative act, the chaotic is overcome, so that form is regarded as the principle of culture as such.

In *Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart* the real is constituted by the abstraction of the creative cultural act as such (i.e., the act of the spirit) from the contingent individual cultural acts, which merge into the former. In this way, the historical philosophical systems become the organon of the philosophical method as such as the pure method. In this work, Grisebach realizes, even more than in the previous work, the importance of the irrational and of contingent experience as well as the relative nature of human truth, although this relativity is in the end overcome by a last abstraction. *Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart*, however, is a definite step forward in the direction of contingent experience.

2. **THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DIALECTICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUTH AND REALITY IN: "DIE SCHULE DES GEISTES"**

In this work, truth and reality are for the first time separated. Truth is seen as the permanent theological question about the absolute and reality is regarded as philosophy's continual reply to it by the rationalization of sense-experience, in which consists the cultural act.
For the first time, this act is a broken act. Since man's constructive efforts are always put in question by the theologian again, it follows that philosophy is no longer based on being, but is founded on becoming. Although the rational nature of man's cultural acts points to a universal principle of reason, the truth is no longer accessible to man by reason, but only by faith. As, however, the relation between philosophy and theology is clearly comprehended as a rational dialectical principle, it follows that these two disciplines are still combined in the act of comprehension and that faith (under which all human constitutive activity is now subsumed) is rationalized.

3. THE CONSTITUTION OF REALITY BY THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION AS A REFLECTION OF THE ABSOLUTE

This step, which Grisebach takes in Erkenntnis und Glaube and in Die Grenzen des Erziehens no longer places man (respectively man's rationally constituted world of culture) in a dialectical relationship with the absolute, but finds it in a negative manner, namely, as a reflection in the Urschehen der realen Dialektik (primeval event of real dialectic), i.e., the law of contradiction that governs the relationship between man and his fellowman, thus constituting a permanent rupture in the community. It is from this law that all cultural activity of man springs, and this causes all our knowledge to be rendered problematic; and it is by the observation of this law that man is led to lead an ethical existence.

By regarding the absolute as reflected in the law of contradiction, which governs the relationship between man and his fellowman, Grisebach arrives at a docta ignorantia, by which he hopes to show the real transcendence of the absolute as absolute transcendence. However, by including
it in his reflection, even though in a negative manner, he cannot avoid placing men again, indirectly this time and by an inverted method, into a dialectical relation with it, which is rationally comprehended. In this way, he rationalizes faith in the light of which the world is steeped, because it flows logically from our not-knowing. He has thus not only failed in delineating the boundary between philosophy and theology, but he has moreover arrived at the absurd position of knowing the absolute by his not-knowing it.

4. THE SEPARATION OF TRUTH FROM REALITY BY THE SEPARATION OF ESSENCE AND CONTINGENCE

In this regard, we first treat the works Grisebach wrote after his chief-work Gegenwart. In reference to these works, we seek to show that Grisebach was very intent to make us realize the untruth of our self-constituted truth, i.e., our self-constituted scientific theories, historical logoi, philosophical systems and theologoumena. In his opinion, they mislead us and estrange us from actual experience. They are egoistical and evil and their positing them as absolute caused the European catastrophe. If Europe is to recover, it behoves men to reorientate himself and to accept the permanent crisis that is experienced by him and his fellowmen in common on account of the multiple logoi, which causes our knowledge to be problematic and to dwell in a critical state. But unlike in Erkenntnis und Glaube and Die Grenzen des Erziehers, this crisis is no longer seen as a dialectical law in which the absolute is reflected, but as a purely contingent experience, namely, the termination of man's truth and self by the contradiction of his fellowmen. This experience, when being borne in silent passion, leads to an ethical existence and to peace that transcends/.....
transcends all understanding.

It is this teaching of Grisebach's that makes us ask whether Grisebach, by his negative method (i.e., the systematic shrinking of philosophy as a system, to which corresponds the shrinking of all human truth and the human self, eventually causing philosophy to turn against itself in a critical manner) has not arrived at a transcendent world again, which is beyond man's experience and which has been constituted by an inverted method by which the self eventually cancels itself. Especially when he subsumes the termination of the self by the contradiction of the other under the event of the Cross (as he appears to do in the Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes), the bearing of his fellowman's contradiction in passion by man, which brings him peace that transcends all understanding, assumes eschatological significance.

In reference to his chief-work Gegenwart and some of his other works, we show how Grisebach, in order to arrive at a real ethical existence, separates the world of actual contingent experience from the essential world of reason, which latter is to him a mere academic or technical dream-world, which is individualistic and egocentric, and which (if it is confused with the real world) is evil.

The real world, for Grisebach, consists in actual contingent experience, which we discuss from the epistemological, ethical and metaphysical point of view. This actual contingent experience as the experience of the actual crisis that exists between man and his fellowman on account of their mutual contradiction terminates the world of the human self in the form of human attitude, sentiment and the humanistic world of theoretical construction in the
event of this contradiction being borne in silent passion.
From the epistemological point of view this experience puts
in question all human knowledge and renders it problematic,
and, as real time, it puts an end to all historical time and
continuity, which is based on memory and the past. Ethically
speaking, it means that, at the pin-pointed moment of
bearing the contradiction on the part of my fellowman in
silent passion, I am enabled to lead a real ethical
existence, when any kind of moral attitude, any kind of
technical virtue has been shrunk away. Metaphysically
speaking, this experience leads man to an encounter with
the real transcendent, namely, his fellowman, by which he
is moved into a transcendent world, which is the opposite
of our ordinary humanistic world and in which he experiences
a peace that transcends all understanding.

In the last chapter of this thesis, we seek to show
that, from the epistemological, ethical and metaphysical
point of view, Grisebach's dualism, i.e., his arbitrary
separation of truth and reality, knowledge and experience,
becomes untenable. There are no two separate spheres, but
truth and reality, knowledge and experience mutually
presuppose each other. We thus oppose our own point of
view as against that of Grisebach. We contend that there
can be no experience without mind and vice versa, that there
can be no ethical existence without the consciousness of
the empirical limit of one's own truth and one's own self
and that there can be no experience of a real transcendent
unless this transcendent is actually experienced as a real
emanent in the form of another self. We cannot, therefore,
accept Grisebach's teaching that real and therefore ethical
existence consists in the pin-pointed moment of the absolute
termination of our constituted truths or of our self, i.e.,
in Grisebach's real time, which terminates all historical continuity. We believe that this notion is a pure abstract and means pure contingency, which, in our opinion, cannot be experienced by man. This idea denotes the absolute termination of man and the historical world of man's truth as a world of becoming, so that, by their termination, the very presupposition is removed on the grounds of which man can possibly arrive at ethical existence. It is our contention, therefore, that the humanistic world of truth must not be seen as negative only (as the mere theoretical world of man's knowledge, which, because of its egoistical nature, is evil and keeps man from the actual experience of the real), but, rather, in a positive way. We thus contend that the contradictory human logoi, which are referred to each other by the controversial relation in which they stand to each other, are fields of reality, in that they are posited from a particular existential situation, in which man happens to find himself and on the grounds of which he is impelled to arrange his environment in a meaningful way, as an act of self-realisation.

In this way, it becomes clear that the human logoi form an integral part of the actual situation in which man finds himself. They are determined by it and they determine it in their own turn. From the epistemological point of view, it may be said that these relative logoi are the presupposition for the real to be experienced by the controversial relation that obtains between these human logoi, in the sense that this relation outlines the empirical limit of human knowledge.

From the ethical point of view, this empirical limit implies an empirical moral ought. In other words, by the controversial relation obtaining between the human logoi,
man and his fellowmen are referred to each other under the obligation of mutual self-restraint and humility, i.e., this empirical relation is at the same time an ethical relation. It causes man to break through the cycle of his self (which his self-constituted truth really forms) and thus to orientate himself by his fellowmen. It prevents him from positing his own truth as an act of absolute self-transcendence and leads him to close co-operation with his fellowman in regard to their vital common task, namely, the constant creation and recreation of the goods of culture and civilization on the grounds of their mutually experienced crisis in mutual self-restraint, understanding, respect and tolerance, i.e., in the spirit of mutual humility.

From the metaphysical point of view, too, the existence of the human logoi is the presupposition for the experience of the real, not as a rationally constituted real or rather a rationally conceived Real Ground, from which the real structure of the world is evolved (which is nothing but self-transcendence, as it is observed, for example, in transcendent metaphysics, where the real is an immanent truth and therefore known), but as the experience of a real emmanent in the form of my fellowman. I cannot know my fellowman as a result of rational or methodological constitution, as I know an object in physics, for instance, but he escapes my rational control and puts my truth and myself in question. By so doing he restricts me to the empirical limit of my truth, i.e., the field of the actual experience of the crisis, which I share with my fellowmen. This field is the reason and the natural source of man's creative activity, and the actual experience of the crisis is man's natural incentive for the permanent production of the goods of culture and civilization in an ever new form.