BORDER DIALOGUES: RACE, CLASS AND SPACE IN THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF
EAST LONDON, C1902-1963.

GARY MINKLEY

Thesis Presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History, University of
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March 1994
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ABSTRACT

Border dialogues: Race, Class and Space in the Industrialization of East London, c1902-1963

This dissertation explores the local path of industrialization in the port City of East London from its emergence as the urban commercial axis of the Border Region of the Eastern Cape, to the dominance of manufacturing capitalism in its material life. The trajectory of this process between c1902 and 1963 was hesitant, uneven and contradictory, and its local economy remained marginal within South Africa, if not within the Region it critically served to help define. From the space of this marginality, a profound edge on the multiple possible routes, and ambiguities to, and in industrialization are demonstrated, and a cautionary critique of dominant 'national' and 'Randcentric' explanations offered.

Employing concerns of spatiality, and of the analysis and local constructions of class and race, the separate, and inter-connected relations between the Workplaces, the Council and Municipal Administration and the Location/s are detailed. Framed within these concerns, local industrialization patterned a distinctive periodization that did not necessarily follow existing explanation, but neither did it determine all localized processes of continuity and change. These tensions between colonial, racial and class social and material spatialities and histories sedimented industrialization in a context that would remain simultaneously narrowly enabled, and dependently constrained. In this, local forms of power and knowledge, subaltern capacities and agency, and the distinct forms of space intersected in a complex web of relations of domination and subordination, and of solidarity and co-operation. These are traced through the four key periods highlighted.

The dissertation can be seen to fall into these four periods tracked across the three material and social terrains, and analysed through the combined, separate and uneven racial and class forces patterned, and re-shaped in East London's process of industrialization. It concludes with the period of its transition onto the national terrains of the apartheid state's secondary phase of systemic and inclusive
restructuring. Thereafter, local industrialization became integrated into a new 'national' dynamic of intervention and contradiction.
For Cheryl, Emma and Hannah
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<tr>
<td>AEU</td>
<td>Amalgamated Engineering Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AW&amp;D</td>
<td>Alpheus Williams and Dowse</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCI</td>
<td>Border Chamber of Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>BWIU</td>
<td>Building Workers Industrial Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNC</td>
<td>Chief Native Commissioner</td>
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<td>CNETU</td>
<td>Congress of Non-European Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>COC</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Communist Party of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>Consolidated Textile Mills</td>
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<tr>
<td>CYL</td>
<td>African National Congress Youth League</td>
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<tr>
<td>EL</td>
<td>East London</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELM</td>
<td>East London Municipality</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELNAC</td>
<td>East London Native Affairs Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELNVA</td>
<td>East London Native Vigilance Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Industrial and Commercial Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IICU</td>
<td>Independent Industrial and Commercial Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWT</td>
<td>King Williams Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>Location Advisory Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOH</td>
<td>Medical Officer of Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAD</td>
<td>Native Affairs Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCW</td>
<td>National Council for Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAAWU</td>
<td>South African Allied Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIRR</td>
<td>South African Institute for Race Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANAC</td>
<td>South African Native Affairs Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>South African Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR&amp;H</td>
<td>South African Railways and Harbours</td>
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<tr>
<td>SATLC</td>
<td>South African Trades and Labour Council</td>
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Preface and Acknowledgements

On the top floor of one of the South African Defence Force buildings in the City there is (or was? I prefer to think it still there) a 'trophy room'. It is filled with row upon row of T-shirts, some torn, faded, dirty and blood-splattered, others hardly worn. All were confiscated in Duncan Village, and in East London during the State of Emergency in the late 1980s. Most common in the 'collection' are red SAAWU shirts, expressing solidarities of class. I was struck in the course of my research by the differences between the contemporary universal slogans and meanings inscribed on these 'trophies' and the alternate meanings in the past history of East London. The thesis attempts to thread some of the earlier historical processes of racial, class and spatial formation and their 'narratives' together, in a way that remembers some of the power of different explanations, and some of the explanations of and in these different forms of power.

In the 'long-wave' of this thesis, I owe a number of people in various capacities a great deal. Firstly, my parents Gordon Minkley and Marie Minkley for their belief, encouragement and support. Secondly, the archivists, assistants and librarians at the Cape Archives, SA Library, in East London, and in particular a 'secretary' who shall remain much more than that - much would not have been possible without her, and them. Thirdly, Cuma Sangqu and Xola Nodikane, who, with undue dedication, responsibility and creativity made interviews and research in the Location possible and tangibly more rewarding and embracing.

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Chris Giffard was around when he needed to be (and for sometime not!), Carohn Cornell, Rosanne Hinds, Nicky Rousseau and Ciraj Rassool won some of the 'battles with the sentence and comma', and Kathy Erasmus with the computer.

The financial assistance of the Centre for Science Development (HSRC, South Africa) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed in this work, or conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not to be attributed to the Centre for Science Development.

This dissertation would not have been completed without the unwavering support of Ian Phimister. Not only did he assume the considerable responsibility of supervision halfway through, but thereafter curtailed the spaces of my rampant divergences with humour and with great historical sensitivity. His enormous energy, time, commitment and generosity, and his sustained intellectual and personal support and encouragement is deeply and warmly acknowledged - it had a profound impact on the dissertation.

And finally, Cheryl Emma and Hannah, and the experience of loneliness and support in this project. What they endured, and sustained goes beyond acknowledgement here. But for now the promise of spring and the cherry trees ...
INTRODUCTION
THE FRAMEWORK, THE PUBLIC HISTORY AND THE ACADEMIC

The period between c1920 and the 1960s is seen as the 'core' period of South Africa's 'industrial revolution'. While this is problematized at a general conceptional level, in its uneven spatial and structural manifestations, and in periodization, Freund's notion of a real 'dividing line' of 'structural transformation in the history of South African secondary industry' drawn in 1933, serves as a useful, and necessary starting point. While Freund is particularly concerned with the Witwatersrand, his study begins to explain the national importance of this region, as South Africa's 'Ruhr', dominating industrialization spatially, structurally, and integratively. His arguments make explicit the logic of Randcentrism translating for national interpretations, and for comparative indexes of success and failure in other regions, set according to this Witwatersrand framework. More widely, this has resulted in a number of research limitations and silences around the processes of regional industrialization which fall into two main categories.

The first has entailed the rather crude and uncritical acceptance and substitution of national studies and patterns of industrialization as explanatory for the Witwatersrand in particular. Not only does this mean a significant lack of detailed historical studies for specific industrialization processes in particular 'localities', and even more broadly for the Witwatersrand as a whole, but also must cast doubt over much of the base of microstudies in social history centred there. But, secondly, it has also meant that analyses of regions


3 This observation draws explicitly on the notions articulated through Wits History Workshop (WHW) that the material base, or the economic constitutes not the last, but the first, or starting point for historical investigation; and this economic is subsequently taken as given, largely through the 1970 revisionist 'national' studies. This can be seen in B. Bezold's still programmatic statement in the Introduction to Labour, Townships and Protest (Johannesburg, 1979), 5, and repeated in essence in B. Bezold and P. Delius, 'Radical History and South African Society' in J. Brown, et al. (eds.), History From South Africa: Alternative Visions and Practices (Philadelphia, 1991) in the Radical History Review, 40/41, 1991.
outside of the centre have been marginalized as fields of difference and importance, in their own right, and as separate and exclusive from inevitable Rand/national norms of industrial development. Both of these problems open, (as Saunders, an admitted non-economic specialist, has identified,) the increasingly widely held need for a more thorough and deeply historical regional and local analysis of industrialization processes.  

This emphasis on local knowledge of industrialization as a point of departure, for East London, needs to avoid routing research into the particularism of webs of cultural ‘thick description’, that marks much of social history. This dominant approach to South African historical studies tends to mark cultural and political local awareness and structured consciousness from largely assumed and typically ‘thin’ material considerations. Neither should this study entail the rather uncritical imposition of universal ‘determinations’ from hierarchical centres of ever more mature and ‘true’ industrialization located in Johannesburg, or London, or New York. The problems posed by a regional analysis of East London, centres on the inter-relationships between what could be called the thin material basis established around a loose framework of numbers, and a master narration of capitalist economic development that is simultaneously transformative and necessarily uneven and dependent.

Thus, to explain, and by implication, understand and realize the history of East London, its inhabitants and their daily lives, and how they are affected by industrialization, the potential structure of my thesis is guided by existing frameworks into the economy of industry, read through the power of the national statisticians and the models of the political economists and social scientists. In so doing, the locality is seldom explored


6 This has both historiographical and methodological foundations, represented on the one hand by the debates of economic dependency, related fractions of capital, state access and representative interventions, through to assumptions, and ‘comparative’ studies of the relationships of apartheid policy to industrialization distortions, and/or successes. For a useful summary and re-evaluation see D. Posel, Rethinking the “Race-Class Debate” in South African Historiography, Social Dynamics, 9, 1983, and B. Freund, ‘The Social Character’.
beyond its examination and testing in relation to 'national' generality. This is an important task, but it is also only partial as a history, and as an explanation.

Most importantly, there are two 'realities' which require attention and analysis. Their source lies in the dominant notions, well summarized in Fine (and Davis), which argues for 'enough of these figures lest they blind us and bore us to death. They point to great changes in South African capitalism as three key markers of modern capitalism were set - proletarianisation, urbanisation and industrialisation. The first, and this thread runs through much of the revisionist literature, is that, with secondary industrialization, read as the 'core', or second major structural transformation of South Africa's 'industrial revolution' comes, although varied in conception and emphasis, a unified broad picture of social and economic change, transition and periodization, to capitalism more properly understood. And with it also comes intensified capitalist subjection, over a more muted capitalist labour repression and colonial silencing; a more visible, but imputed racial domination; and more overtly classed resistance and the 'classed' politicization of the dominated and exploited. At the same time, though, the particular path of industrialization in South Africa is seen to be based on low-wage labour - abundant, disenfranchised and unskilled.

Ironically, this path and process is simultaneously identified with modernization, and progress. Most often these explanations are built on 'great narratives' of change and transition to capitalism. At its most blatant, the entry point to this narration is the foundation and maturation of class, and in particular the black working class. While at political and cultural moments, this class is seen as simultaneously making and made, it is economically composed by the general reality of transition and change to this capitalist mode of industrial or manufacturing production. Thus, at the same time as posing the black working class as the

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7 R. Fine (with D. Davis), Beyond Apartheid. Labour and Liberation in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1991), 15.
agent of 'fundamental change', its very construction in industrialization narrative explanations, rests on assertions that rely on its exclusion from making its own class and economic foundations. Not only has this silenced the 'subaltern' in the agency of productive change, but makes this class as the modernizing, and industrializing 'other', while at the same time asserting its systematic inclusivity. This is effected, and reinforced through the way the South African state asserts power and succeeds in excluding and silencing this working class. At the same time this is achieved through its apparent modernization. This, I would suggest is deeply problematic.

In a recent review article Belinda Bozzoli argues, in a manner I take to be representatively hegemonic of social history, that the South African state is not, by any notion, a colonial one. This is so because of the 'range of legitimating institutions' that have been developed, and because the South African state 'actually does modernise, and one of the chief features of modernisation is the process of the differentiation of social institutions. ... [which] surely affected the process of legitimation itself'.11 She suggests that by the late twentieth century, we are looking at 'something much more like the Gramscian state, with its multiple organs of hegemony and legitimacy'. What does this mean?, and why does it occur in South Africa? I think the answer is found in the narrative of a South African 'industrial revolution'. Although this is not explicitly stated, it is inferred, and this, in turn, means that '... the 'native' here, was not the 'other' at all, but a quite different type of category, a part of this wider systemic whole ... subsumed into 'system' by the legitimating ambitions of state and ruling group'.12 But what is this 'quite different type of category', or 'part' of this 'wider systemic whole'? A crude answer would provide the image of the South African worker, traced through the pattern and scale of the development of capitalism in South Africa, and in the emergence of an equally complex pattern of industrialization and class formation, in comparison to 'typical' colonial political economies, and colonial labourers.

But this is problematic, in many respects contradictory, and in others, evasive. Not only has recent analysis emphasized the complex nature of colonial states beyond notions of simple authoritarianism and

10 See the discussion of the discourse of differing 'economic models', and in particular, the language-concepts of its entry points, in Critical Inquiry, 1990.


repression, but also that colonial power was, at times, 'modernizing without being modern'. In the context of an emphatic non-colonial and modern assertion for the nature of the South African state that simultaneously essentially 'manages' a 'colonial' path to industrialization, the need to re-examine the colonial and 'modern' basis of South Africa, and its underlying assumptions, become apparent. In addition, though, this 'modern', and class-centred approach has tended to silence race, and the colonial aspects of 'modern' South African society, and thus the extent to which South Africa has 'nationally', spatially, or even materially and socially 'modernized without being modern'.

This has the central implication in relation to a local/regional study for the entry-points, and synthesis, of East London's industrialization process. The discursive practise of constituting classes 'economically' through the existing narratives of industrialization, which is itself uniformly explicable and entered through universal applications of these same class abstractions, has meant that local studies can be seen to economically mirror across time and space, and reflect in agency and structure, the pre-determined and the general, the abstract and the ahistorical.

What the study of East London illuminates is that there is no necessary master narrative of transition, but that economic change, as much as political, cultural, or social change is 'pluralized'. This, in turn, entails that industrialization needs to be plotted, and assessed as a series of local confrontations and differences, as well as in relation to wider synchronic periodizations of productive transition, and modernization. The argument, though, suggests more than that the 'changing spatial distribution of class relations is of particular importance' against the dominant assumption that 'classes are national', and capitalism 'uneven'. Rather, local studies need to assert that the 'universal' categories of 'capital' and 'labour' in Marx's thought require separate processes of historicizing, as does their interrelationship established


14 By this, I mean the low-waged, disenfranchised, and unskilled nature, and path of industrialization, as asserted by P. Bonner, et al, 'The Shaping of Apartheid', but also its racial basis, which is not asserted, or explored, except as implicit to class formation.


through the discourse of the 'necessary' unequal class relations and institutionalized power of industrializing capitalism.

In South African studies this discourse and history has been largely asserted, implicitly assumed, and foundationalized through the number, statistic, and table, institutionalized through the segregation/apartheid and capitalism debate, and canonized in endless working class resistances increasingly found on the margins of the industrial relations of production and their socialization. None of this, and in particular, and surprisingly, the social and culturalist perspectives, seriously developed understandings which centred or located the agency of productive structuration and change in the 'insurgent', but neither has much attempt been made to historicize the structures, or the experiences shaped in, and shaping and re-shaping 'capital' and 'labour', either 'nationally' or locally. 17

But we cannot stop there, for the conceptions outlined above contain a second dimension, directly applicable to local studies which has industrialization, and therefore class analysis, at its centre. As Chakrabarty (in a different, but applicable context) has persuasively argued, these 'universal' categories of Marxism, (like 'capital' and 'labour') considered in their interrelationship also 'offer us no master narrative of the history of "consciousness" or "culture" (and by extension, of "politics").' 18

To write "history" using these categories (of consciousness and culture) is to assume a double stance, for it is to interrogate the nature of these categories themselves, to question the project that stamps itself on their usage. There is thus no 'working class' or "working class consciousness" that, to speak with Foucault, "is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history." An analytic strategy that seeks to establish a "working class" as the "subject" of its history must also engage in the discursive formation that makes the emergence of such a subject-category possible. 19

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19 D. Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working Class History, 6; the extract from M. Foucault is from 'Truth and Power', in his Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1979, (trans. Colin Gordon) (Brighton, 1980), 117.
More concretely, the particular path of industrialization is centrally tied to the development of 'cheap labour' capitalism in South Africa. As Saunders has suggested, there is both a long 'tradition', but also conceptual and empirical unevenness reflecting this within the 'historiography of South African industrialization'.20 Conceptually, the 1870s-mineral revolution is considered as the transitional beginning of industrialization, a beginning that was discontinuous, sudden and rapid into 'the political economy of industrial South Africa'.21 This transition, and transformation, was 'captured', and maintained in both the great narratives of the emergence, and dominance of the capitalist mode of production, and of social history's capitalism/industrialization 'materiality'. Much of the enormous social, political, and economic impact of this transition, the 'past-present' interpretative debates that were generated, and the continued 'unearthing' of new materials and histories, all emphasized, and re-emphasize, the crucial 'foundations' of this period for industrial, capitalist and modern South Africa.

But industrialization 'proper', is located in the turning period after the First World War/1920s, when 'secondary', manufacturing industry 'pioneered' a 'significant take-off' into the later post-WW2 dominance in the national economy. Here industrialization is integrally tied to the conceptions of 'secondary' and 'manufacture', and ultimately to 'mass' and 'mechanized commodity production', but also one driven by 'import-substitution' and less overtly in discussion, 'dependence'. The continuities, and discontinuities between these two periods, are complex, and far from securely established or analysed, even in periodization, 22 but South Africa's 'industrial revolution' (if indeed there is such a thing) is increasingly

20 C. Saunders, 'The History and Historiography of South African Industrialization'.
21 See the titles of the S. Marks and A. Atmore, (eds.), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, and S. Marks and R. Rathbone, (eds.), Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa: African class formation, culture and consciousness 1870-1930, respectively, are key representative titles and texts of conceptualization, repeated thereafter in most periodizations.
seen to be synonymous with secondary manufacturing industrialization, and the related processes of urbanization and proletarianization, whether this is explicitly acknowledged or implicitly foundational.

The problem, though, is the 'translation' of this later 'industrial' period's dynamics from the earlier period's conceptual and historical categories and debates. Built out of the 'foundational' nature of the mineral revolution, most studies of industrialization have been overly shaped by generalized assumptions of the 'race-class' debate, and the 'cheap labour' basis, and thus with extending and re-constructing 'systems' of labour-repression, racial divisions of labour, state intervention, and international capital dependence within the processes of secondary industrialization. This scenario, and conception was, and continues to be reinforced from 'outside', through the additional discourses of 'radical' development and underdevelopment 'economic' theories, which emphasize Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) (or 'racial Fordism', for example), structural determinations and limitations, and sequential stages to 'model' industrialization and development. The structures of economic power in these frameworks are barely or minimally historically grounded in national 'measurement' and 'characteristic', in 'policy', and in 'model' abstraction and periodization. It is arguably these rational, modern, economicistic and technical frameworks of structure and

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23 Explicitly, this formulation is acknowledged in a diverse range of works (See Note 16 above) as well as but implicitly this notion underlines S. Greenberg, Race and State in Capitalist Development (Johannesburg, 1980), 133, n21, 176-178; D. Hobart Houghton, The South African Economy, ch. 1; in the 'political economy' analysis of A. Stadler, The Political Economy of Modern South Africa (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1987), and N. Nattrass and E. Ardington, (eds.), The Political Economy of South Africa (Cape Town, 1990); but also in the periodization of the major focuses of much recent social history, in the WHW collections B. Bozzi1, (ed.), including Labour, Townships and Protest (Johannesburg, 1979), Town and Countryside in the Transvaal (Johannesburg, 1983), and Class, Community and Conflict (Johannesburg, 1987), and in the S. Marks and R. Rathbone, (eds.), Industrialization and Social Change, and S. Marks and S. Trapido, (eds.), The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism. See the listings of the related conference proceedings in particular, which predominantly periodize studies between c1914 and c1990 as 'industrial'(or outside of 'pre-industrial', apartheid, and 'contemporary' studies).

24 See B. Freund, 'The Social Character of Secondary Industry', especially conclusion, 104-105, for a substantially similar set of propositions, and a counter argument that indicates the 'independent' rooting of a logic of accumulation and growth in secondary industry up to 1945 - around the profitability of available markets, and a heterogeneous labour force (race, ethnicity, gender, and age), while maintaining the importance of critical contributions from the perspectives of 'state nurturing', 'ultra-cheap labour', and 'dependency' interpretative frameworks.

change in South Africa's 'economic unconscious' that have limited and constrained regional (and national) studies into narrow and formal derivations and assertions.

On the other hand, much of social history, in a virulent anti-structuralism, has tended to simultaneously, and ironically, rest on these economic/industrialization assumptions, while largely ignoring and failing to engage with either their consequences, or elaborations beyond the metaphors of broad social and economic 'transition', 'change', and 'dislocation', amongst others. Much of the new social history does draw on the 'rich vein' of 'ordinary peoples experiences' of the 'transformation' through industrialization, of daily lives in family, community, identity, resistance and culture. In particular, culture has served as the inclusive and umbrella oppositional conception through which capitalism and class, as well as race, gender, region and ethnicity could be incorporated, against the 'backdrop' of social and economic change (i.e. industrialization).

In the explicitly Thompsonian formulation of paying attention to social reality and locating class in historical, social and cultural formation and context, 'culture', ironically became a way of reifying and evading industrialization and class; of romanticizing the agency of working people, and seeking change and identity at the level of individual behaviour, ideas, and values, rather than of enhancing, and complexly evaluating understandings of the old and new social and economic relationships of production and power. In result, social history lost the abrasiveness of class in the social relations of industrial formation and production, while the history of the working class became vapid and unthreatening as ordinary people, used, adapted, and 'shaped' their own lives, but not in relation to, or in conjunction with, the developing and developed structures and processes of industrialization and state formation. It would not be inappropriate to argue that the social history of the working class remains largely absent from industrialization historiography and explanation, beyond transcendent assertions and transparent romances. This is doubly ironic, given the extremely rich histories of 'community', culture, ethnicity and youth, and of rural and increasingly gender relations, amongst others, emanating from within this approach.

The dominant social historiography has tended, rather, to portray the complexity of class through these non-class dimensions. While gender, and ethnicity, generation, and 'community', as the most visible are all

26 For a related debate and critique of American labor historiography, see J. Carroll Moody and A. Kessler-Harris, (eds.), *Perspectives on American Labor History: The Problems of Synthesis* (DeKalb, 1990), and especially A. Kessler-Harris, 'A New Agenda for American Labor History: A Gendered Analysis and the Question of Class', 217-234.
critical to an understanding of South African society and it's regional dimensions, it is necessary to relate these, with the same sensitivity, to studies of working class structure and expression. The increasingly dominant tendency has been, however, to hold an extra-historical 'universal' notion of class, and seek the complexity of South African social reality in non-class elements and processes.27

This combination of a rather static and formal economic structuration of classes in South Africa, with their social and 'non-class' complexity has tended to cast the South African working class as simultaneously narrowly political in class terms, and potentially socially transformative in non-class nationalist or popular terms in this period. O'Meara's argument that the ANC was 'transformed' by its 'new class basis' of 'militant proletarian opposition' 28 still represents the most clearly articulated, and widely reproduced example of this process, despite Dunbar Moodie's stimulating critique of the strike, and his suggestive possibilities of a more nuanced and critical 'moral economy' approach.29 While 'organizational aspects' of the strengths and roles of both the CPSA and the ANC and it's CYL have been criticized and questioned, the acceptance of 'working class action' in the work places, and more strongly in the urban communities is not. It is rather acknowledged. Admittedly in the 'urban context', more recent analysis has tended to work with the notions of 'community' and 'differing' and at times 'multi' and 'popular' class configurations, but the mass, and the base has remained the working class. More pointedly however, whether in the so-called 'class conscious' trade union movement, or in the 'politics of subsistence' of the 1940s, the working class is already constituted out of abstract economic realities of industrialization, and statistics of urbanization and less thoroughly, employment, as indexes of proletarianization, and therefore of class.

This has meant, in turn, that the 'analysis of class', and in particular, the black working class, has seen an expected broad shaping on action and social relations, and a complex search for failure across the crucial 'shaping' decades of 'formation'. Hirson accounts for this in terms of workplace and community separation,

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27 This process is particularly apparent in the conceptual and experiential content of many of the papers at recent History Workshops, and in their published form around community, race, nation and culture, and in the focus on gender, race and ethnicity, crime, family, etc. In the 'absence of any satisfactory synthesis', the best is S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds.), The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism; B. Bozzioli, (ed.), Class, Community and Conflict; South African Perspectives (Johannesburg, 1987); and P. Bonner, et al (eds.) Holding Their Ground.


and through leadership 'failure', Friedman 30 points to the 'internal weaknesses' of the African trade unions, Lewis to SATLC divisions, and the majority of authors to state repression, restrictions, and 'bannings'. 31 Other historians, with somewhat differing focuses, have suggested that the working class developed 'new movements', and struggled for 'survival' in a multitude of non-class ways, ranging from squatting, transport and urban protests, to 'New Africa' co-operatives, brewing and shebeen cultures and gangsterism, amongst others. 32 While significantly broadening historical understanding of these crucial decades, these studies have not systematically deepened the 'conditions of knowledge' of the working class in class terms, but rather in their 'complex' internal and external relationships 'beyond class'. The sustained canvas is of an ever-present working class whose refusal to comply to accepted 'universal' norms of expression is sought in these increasingly diffuse moments of non-class representation and activity.

This critique of South African literature on industrialization then, highlights a number of tensions. Practically all approaches reflect an unhealthy teleological, and largely transposed historical basis in the tracing of capitalist development along hierarchical and synchronic paths and stages to maturity and modernity. The structural, developmentalist, and 'economic' interpretations operate with the 'realities' of 'fulfillment of criteria', 'economic growth patterns' and 'paths', 'typicality', 'costs' and 'benefits', and 'state policies'. 33 Essentially these frameworks are models of 'comparable modernity', and while recent 'revisions'...
by the self-styled 'Nattrass-Cambridge school' are important in revising structural, productivity, and state interventionist productive relationships, it remains to translate, localize, and critically historicize their more generalized conclusions, and people their 'economics'. In attempting to detail the flows of, and changes in economic power, and the nature of capital accumulation these approaches are unquestionably 'from above' - they ignore working people, relations, and agency, and abstract the society's history into a 'model' economic unreality - the 'political economy of growth/development', and 'micro- and macro-economic trends'. Even when this literature is underpinned with 'visions of economic justice', and directly concerned with poverty, unemployment, inequality, basic needs, just planning, etc, or cast in the bolder language of 'accumulation strategies' and 'hegemonic projects', as ways of conceptualizing roots, crises, and change in the economy, we are left with the same silences and metaphors of historical reality and change. For it is these analyses of economic trends and structural changes (narrowly defined) that explain the behaviour and consciousness of working people, through their poverty, employment and inequality, while marginalizing, and making peripheral, both their processes of contestation, and activities of social and economic change and explanation.

In regional/local studies of industrialization in South Africa, (of which there are very few) these dominant patterns of understanding 'the economic' often translate into the creation of the above structural frameworks, or entail a focus on industrialization through poverty, unemployment, and statistical inequality and division, as a reading of class (and consciousness), in particular. This militates against enabling local studies, on the one hand in the silences of historical and active processes of 'economic', and other

constructions and changes in structure and power, while simultaneously denying working people their centrality to industrialization, and promoting the incidentalness of their locality, on the other. Social history, in its almost reverse attention to the locality, has tended to work within similar 'economic' and structural frameworks, but then problematize agency through an individualizing 'culturalism' that has not provided a 'synthesis' into conceptualizing the locality, or local industrialization, or its re-drawing 'nationally'. Even the recent penetrating critique by Fine (and Davis), which offers many similar arguments around the weaknesses of the 'superlative' black working class formation, and radicalization of the post-1930 period thesis, offers an interpretation built on 'beginnings' and 'infancy', and on the 'limited' 'social weight' or 'social being' of the black working class in this period.37 Thus, while its importance lies in the necessary promotion of re-estimations of early industrialization, radicalization and organization, and in so doing, points to the very much more hesitant and uneven nature of South African industrialization, it does not fundamentally re-cast teleological and dominant frameworks of the 'givenness' of structural necessity and class formation from above.38

Local and regional studies are constrained by these frameworks evident in the literature, except where the local can be seen to reproduce, or fails to reproduce 'national' patterns. And these are centrally, in South African studies, tied to the conception that regional/local studies are built out of local capital and class relations, at their foundation, and then developed and explored in the 'tracing' of class conflict in everyday existence, and in periods of change. While Van Onselen seminally opened this way for putting people back into the class struggles in the Witwatersrand locality, it was a 'universally given' set of classes, whose locational differences were built out of culture and identity.39 This perspective is shared most explicitly in Nicol, who argues that it is the 'conditions of class struggle', and more particularly of the 'economic class struggle', that sets the 'pivot' for understanding the locality of Cape Town, and its history.40 To be fair, both Van Onselen, and Nicol, albeit differently, emphasize regionalism as a means of coming to grips with their material and its explanations,

37 R. Fine (with D. Davis), Beyond Apartheid, Part 1.
38 Some of this discussion is paralleled in T. Bauman, ‘Questioning the Crises: A Theoretical Review and Proposal for a Research Agenda’, unpublished paper, presented at UCT, Dept. of Economic History, September, 1990. In particular, he argues for the 'inadequate historical understanding' of the development of the South African economy, and especially its manufacturing sector, and points to the functional, and 'given' nature of much 'knowledge' around the developing process of capitalist production. He also points to the problematic conceptions of capital, class, power, and race/apartheid within South African studies.
and Freund has emphasized this importance, arguing that 'studies of South African industrial development need to avoid simply looking at the economy in the aggregate and to develop an improved sense of local regional consciousness'.

Isobel Hofmeyr has offered a somewhat isolated attempt to conceptualize regional historical analysis, and has argued that the 'idea of region is a slippery one, as we are told by a bewilderingly large interdisciplinary body of scholarship'. She argues that to '... clarify it ultimately requires a saturated social history that can 'fix' the region from the outside by specifying its relationships to a broader economic and political world, while suggesting its more intimate, inside meanings which give shape to the meandering 'life paths' of its various inhabitants.'

The dominant conception of the region, however, remains the 'uneven' manifestations of capitalist development in differentiated geographic and ethnic areas. Outside of the skilled hands of a Van Onselen or Nicol, and even to an extent in their hands, regions are read as economically prefigured and given, in relation to national, and ultimately Rand paths and patterns - and they either conform, or distort and disfigure according to this established index of their comparative success and/or failure. This holds, whether the regional analysis is located in the structural concerns of forms of capital and division of labour, or in the regional cultural identities of class, race, gender, and ethnicity.

In part, it is necessary to address the fashioning geography of South African industry, the forms of its spatial organization of production, and its regional unevenness and inequality, but equally critically, it is necessary to focus on its spatial, social and historical organization in locality, and the relation between 'the spatial', 'the historical', and 'the social' in regional analysis. Historically, much of local and regional studies have been 'distanceless and spatially undifferentiated', except at the level of contestation over 'illegal space' in

40 See M. Nicol, 'A History of Garment and Tailoring Workers in Cape Town', especially Introduction, and Ch. 2.
44 See D. Massey, Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production (Macmillan, 1984), chs. 1 and 2, for a useful summary of recent debates, as well as informative proposals.
local 'communities'. As Massey, and Cooper amongst others have suggested though, 'just as there are no purely spatial processes, neither are there any non-spatial social processes. Nothing much happens, bar angels dancing, on the head of a pin ... it is not just that 'space is socially constructed' ... but that social processes are constructed over space.' So, beyond the dominant notions of 'unevenness of industrialization' in regional studies, lies the need to, on the one side, develop analyses of these uneven spatial and temporal relations of production, and their local socialization and spatiality, but also, on the other, to acknowledge that local histories and local distinctiveness are integral to the social and spatial nature of these production relations. These are central to any attempt to 'characterize capital'. The constitution and definition of classed, and other subjects, identities and collectivities, out of, and through industrialization, occur spatially, in places. These historical processes have received little serious scholarly investigation, even at the level of geographical variation in national classes, beyond 'crude' and 'given' structuration, division of labour, and political assertion. And places, as Williams has argued, are 'neither automatic nor self-evident'; they have to be 'made materially and imaginatively' - they must have a 'shape economically, physically and imaginatively' to be seen as a region, as Hofmeyr, drawing on Raymond Williams, elaborates.

Industrialization is central to these processes of making and shaping, and re-making and re-shaping places and regions, but only through historically and complexly 'fixing' its more contested 'intimate inside meanings' - when the definitions, negotiations, and structurally determined applications of terms of ownership, property rights, and appropriation change, and inter-change spatially and socially. In short, we

45 P. Bonner, and T. Lodge, 'Introduction' in P. Bonner, et al. (eds.), Holding Their Ground: Class, 2-7. Their argument is that South African historians do account for 'the spatial', in the investigation of 'illegal space'. My argument (drawing on recent 'spatial theorists') is that this is only one aspect, and essentially reduces space to a stage, albeit an illegal one.


47 Essentially, we have general considerations on characterising capital, (monopoly versus competitive, international versus national), contrasts in ethnic and racial divisions of labour, especially for the Western Cape (coloured) and Natal (Indian), and projected differences in political capacity, as in the 'left' traditions in the Western Cape, and the 'working class politics' of the Eastern Cape. Much current work in progress is opening re-assessments of many of these national assertions of 'blatant' geographical difference. See J. Cherry, The Making of an African Working Class: Port Elizabeth, 1925-1963; B. Freund, 'It is my work'; I. Edwards and T. Nuttall, 'Seizing the Moment', on the working class in Durban/Natal; and P. Bonner and R. Lambert, 'Batons and Bare-Heads', as well as P. Bonner, 'The Politics of Black Squatter Movements' on the East Rand; and others, especially in the field of gender studies, including B. Bozoli (with M. Nkotsoe), Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life strategy and Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-1983 (Johannesburg, 1991); I. Berger, Threads of Solidarity; and C. Walker, (ed.) Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945 (Cape Town, 1990).

cannot continue to treat regions and places as extrinsic forces of culture and community, while simultaneously reproducing degrees of industrialization as external variables to ‘communities’ and their interiority.

A DIFFERENT TRACK

There was a man who kept the history of East London in a metal trunk. When faced with my explanations for a proposed interview/life-history, as part of my projected social and economic history of the City ‘from below’, he retrieved this carefully blanket-wrapped trunk from underneath his bed, and informed me that ‘everything you want to know, it is here’.\footnote{49 Interview, 3f, and 3ff, D.M., 10-11 December 1987; 26 June 1988.} It was, as I recall, an extraordinary moment of confusion, anticipation, expectancy, and of disbelief. As it turned out, it was history in personal, and public commodities and belongings, and was most visibly a ‘text for the city’. The individual, was not some quaint township figure who wandered around peddling or preaching this history, and while this history was personal and private in social terms, it was not simply individualized in content, vision and interrogation of the past, in many important respects. Traditionally, cities serve as the unstated context of the story, their role barely sketched as the participant of the drama. Not so in this case, where the diverse strands and contexts of the city experience and its ‘psychic and geographical contours’ of productions and representations of space in East London were particularly prominent. My ‘reading’, and his explanations of the ‘trunk of history’\footnote{50}, partially open an otherwise silenced subaltern representation of East London’s past. In particular, it is a representation marked by its ‘heterogeneous spaces of sites and relations’, of the many dimensions to the relationships between local space and time, in the constructions of identity, and over the multiplicity of relations of domination and difference.

But it also has a ‘common thread’, a ‘unity’, the expression of a singular dimension that holds the contents, and its variously represented social and spatial dimensions together. Not unsurprisingly, this common thread was race, and more particularly, a complexity of racisms. In content, they included what appeared to be title deeds to land in the Eastern Cape, a migrant contract to ERPM, a stevedore ‘working badge’, Location and lodgers permits, a Section 10 qualification, documentation of a pass arrest, and regular,
weekly pay slip envelopes, a Site Permit and family joined household captured in photograph, as well as a
series of earlier letters from his wife in the Keiskammahoek district, an ICU membership card, some
newspaper cuttings, A Std. 5 certificate, a letter of referral as a 'garden boy', and a Xhosa bible. Most
unexpectedly, though, was a series of self-penned, copied, and cut-out illustrations, reproductions, and
newspaper extracts of 'maps', ranging from that of South Africa (and the Rand), the Eastern Province and
Border, to those of the City, the docks, and the Location/s1, and of Group Areas, and Location removal
proposals, to one of the neighbourhood, and of his 'rural home'.52 His passionate concern with, and
elaboration of what he called the 'whiteman's journey of my life' 53 and the potential 'vernacular spatiality'
and 'indigenous voice' of his history, together with its racial certainty of determination, upset my own and a
wider revisionist interpretative framework.

As is apparent, class is inscribed onto this history - it contains a fairly classic story for the evolution of
'urban racial capitalism' and secondary industrialization - of dispossession, proletarianization through
migrancy and unskilled casual labour, to permanent, more stable and operative labour which was racially
controlled and regulated through segregated workplaces and communities of residence, and through the
pass laws and preserves of the apartheid reserve.54 Much of this remains important to this study, but in a

50 I suppose the comparisons to the recent UWC Mayibuye Centre - Cape Town Natural History Museum Robben
Island 'exhibition', known as the 'Apple Box Archive' might be inevitable, but the differences need to be asserted,
in terms of both its collection, and its public visibility, as well as in its potential of politics.

51 I use the term Location/s to denote the three Locations in East London, East Bank Location, which also
becomes known as Duncan Village in the 1950s, and the much smaller West Bank Location, and even smaller
Cambridge Location. Much of my focus is on the East Bank Location, but the similarities of various
interventions, conditions and the experiences of daily life reflect significant degrees of overlap. Thus the term
Location/s is meant to simultaneously convey the presence of these spatially distinct Locations, and that the one
Location - the East Bank - was the major Location in East London for the duration of the study.

52 Interview, 3f, and 3ff, D.M. 10-11 December, 1987; 26 June, 1988. The metal trunk history also contained a
miners helmet, a knife 'for sacrifices', a blanket, some eating utensils, an overall, some photographs, a suit, a hair-
cutting kit, a rugby jersey, a bag with a ring, a piece of ore, and a bicycle bell (all that remained of his brother's
war reward), and a tin tea-box full of train tickets, a hospital slip, birth certificate, and a one pound note, amongst
others.

53 Interview, 3f, and 3ff. This statement, initially made in Xhosa to Cuma Sangqu, who was my co-researcher, and
interpreter, and then repeated to me, was quoted with some hesitancy, irony, and amusement - I am after all a
white man. In my experiences of doing oral history in East London, the problems of race, age, gender and
language were immense, from both sides, and taken in the context of the 1980s crises and resistance, seldom
approached anything like Grele's advised contexts of 'conversational narratives'. See R. Grele, Envelopes of

Studies, 1, 1, 1972, although qualified; H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power: From Segregation to
Apartheid', Economy and Society, 1, 4, 1974; M. Lacey, Working for Boroko: The Origins of a Coercive Labour
System in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1981); and more recently D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961:
Conflict and Compromise (Oxford, 1991), although questioning the totality of an apartheid 'master-plan', still
largely retains the manufacturing productive and labour rationale behind the transition to apartheid.
context of the analysis of class, rather than the imposition of class analysis.\textsuperscript{55} Integral to this are the narrative implications of the contrariety of the metal trunk and its meanings, and their extended wider similarities contained in the oral histories collected.\textsuperscript{56}

What these narrative sources of history and of memory reflected, despite the recognition of their intensive past-present relationship, their constrained personal active creation and intervention, their problematic orality, and the attenuated contexts of 'revolutionary vigilance', and its opposite class and racial silence of subordination in the period of research, was the failure to treat race as a 'real' category of analysis.\textsuperscript{57}

Belinda Bozzoli and Mmantho Nkotsoe's seminal \textit{Women of Phokeng} has emphasized, despite the similarly reflected problems of oral history highlighted above, the enormous potential, and enabling possibilities of this method to maximize and shift the nature of interpretation over time, and the complexity, tenacity and longevity of deeply held ideologies and identities of race and gender which have generally been ignored, and which need to be at the centre of analysis.\textsuperscript{58}

This emphasis on race, and on the 'multiplicity of racisms'\textsuperscript{59} that structured, and in crucial ways, conditioned the subjective experiences of life in East London, also structured and conditioned local industrialization, as the divergent sources of 'subaltern' historical experience, memory, and 'biography'.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{56} R. Grele, \textit{Envelopes of Sound}, argues that oral history, (and the history contained in the metal trunk is primarily oral and textual, although obviously also symbolic), enables in its very structure, to maximize the shifting nature of interpretation over time, to judge the complexity, tenacity, longevity, and use of deeply held ideologies and identities, and so to gain access to the structures of continuity and change in unique ways - as a conversation of contrariety; as history in the imagination; and how it is represented in memory and identity.
  \item \textsuperscript{57} While this might be explicable in the context of liberal-radical debates, and of the pervasive sense in which race 'officially belongs' to the apartheid state to validate forms of white domination and economic power, race in revisionist literature has tended, with the exception of 'rural' studies, to be seen as alternatively false and/or ideological - a misrepresentation of the material and class real. What is even more surprising, is that in relation to the analysis of class, South African historiography has generated complex 'real' non-class discussions and contexts of identity provided around gender, 'family', nation, age and youth, rural dimensions, and of ethnicity, but generally not of race. See C. Crais, \textit{The Making of the Colonial Order} (Johannesburg, 1992); R. Greenstein, 'Racial Formation: Towards a Comparative Study of Collective Identitities in South Africa and the United States', forthcoming in \textit{Social Dynamics}, 19. 2. 1993, and my response, G. Minkley. 'A counter-raid into that other country of the racial past: comments on Greenstein's 'Racial Formation', forthcoming in \textit{Social Dynamics}, 19, 2, 1993.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} B. Bozzoli, (with M. Nkotsoe), \textit{Women of Phokeng}.
\end{itemize}
demonstrate. The fact that the ‘formation of racial orders’ is at the centre of practically all of the accounts, emphasized the need to take racial discourses, racial social practices, and racial institutional structures in their concrete and ‘independent’ processes of establishment seriously. Formed in the course of the historical process, Nduka’s biography, Nyagumba’s fleeting stop-over, Kadalie’s reminiscences, and the narratives of over a hundred residents and workers develop a profound sense in which race and racial formation were constantly framed between the vectors of similarity, continuity and difference. What became evident, though, was that racial identity, and racist intervention and ‘control and resistance’ was not self-evident, and neither was racial difference simply naturalized, or conclusively materially pre-determined.

The inter-connections between race and class, and industrialization were continuously apparent, ...

I was working in a shoe factory, cutting ‘uppers’, this was the fifth or sixth job of mine...[the others, recalled had been as a casual dockworker, municipal worker, a manual construction worker, and in a textile factory in the dyeing department, all in the space of about 8 years, and including periods of unemployment] As a very young man new to town it was hard work, but it was exciting... all so new and different to me then. I was earning, and living with the family of my brother, and I had freedom to do as I pleased... I remember buying my first ‘suit’, a jacket and a trousers, and a new hat and briefcase... Eh it felt good when the girls looked as I walked by... And then I got this work at CDA, making motor-cars and trucks... I worked first in the unpacking of body-stamping crates, and then in the assembly body shop as a welder, and then after a number of years, in the paint shop. This was a very good job, better wages, and a lot of responsibility, but it was very demanding and tiring. Still now if I smell paint I am reminded, ... how I spent nearly sixteen years trying to not think about work, because if I did before I went in each shift, I wouldn’t have made it every day... but that paint smell takes me right back into the factory... so I worked making these Mercedes, day and night for my lifetime, and still I cannot even dream of having one... it was a white man’s car I built with these hands ...63

Without suggesting T.N.s memory is either unique and exceptional, or alternatively, a generalized form of worker recollection in East London, it is an individual memory which, when cast in the wider collective of worker memories, threads East London’s industrialization process together in a way that potentially bears more humanity than the census officials, more ‘reality’ than the contemporary scholars, more dignity than the city councillors, and more experience than the industrialists. Their stories, and their memories, as does

60 N. Duka, From Shanty Town to Forest: Life Histories from the Revolution, South Africa ANC 1 (Richmond, 1974).
63 Interview, 3i, T.N., 22 July 1987.
T.N.'s, span the decades of East London's 'industrial revolution', as did his life and work. But it is also, more widely, a fragment in a series of recollections which warn against replacing class for race:

As I would say that gap which was causing conflict is sealed where black and white despises each other. It was an inborn thing something most of the people grow up with. ... The feeling was that the whites are dropping us one side so that when comes the time, they must find us on one planet and crush us easily. ... The township itself was a shanty town, almost ghetto, ... it was what the white man called the kaffir location and that is a good description ... it was very low ... the white mans squatter camp, we called it, ... and to be there you must have a pocketful of permits ... To avoid this [pass arrests] people would wake up early and hide in the nearby forests in the darkness and come back after the raid is over, some who were working but did not possess any passes would run in the direction of their workplace ... they hated the colour of our skin and so they kept us separate.

The apparent social spatial simultaneity of urban presence, labour demand and state regulation which enables a correspondence between race and class is brought into question then, raising the need for a more nuanced, but also more acknowledged and complexly 'independent' analysis of race. The landscape of East London was made in the image of differing forms of capital, but that was not it's sole image - as the landscapes of race attest.

When T.N. came to East London in 1931, as a nineteen year old youth who walked one of the many new 'proletarian byways' from Sandile Location in the Ciskei, he also walked a colonial and racial byway, and an age and gendered one. He remembers being overwhelmed by the size, despondent at the divisions of space, and excited by a Location still caught in the passions of its first major collective assertion of working, and then civil and local 'national' rights. And in 1931, he was joined by a couple of thousand more people, as he would have been the year before, or the year after. Their first legal stop in the city was, or should have been to 'Cook's Door' - the Location Superintendent's Office, but, for most, in and outside the law, a single overcrowded room, made from packing cases and discarded tin and wood, and 'hidden in location' was the more typical entry-point. Joining the queues of the unemployed on the segmented labour markets 'bordering' the town proper followed, and a stop 'inside a job' was next, if the lines of luck, need, and connection were kind. Otherwise the Location/s became the neighbourhood of daily routine. Space was pre-determined by the workplace, the marketplace, and the residence, and space was racial, from the

sidewalk to the suburb in East London in the 1930s. It was outlined in the Mayors Parlour, and in the sitting rooms of the Selborne enfranchised.

In official maps, the history of East London's growth is recorded in a manner that reflects the uneven transition to industrialization, as well as its periodization. East London was established in the middle of the nineteenth century, linked into the 'frontier wars', and the need to land 'troops and supplies', and to establish 'government and authority'. These maps demonstrate in clear detail this political-military role, as well as East London's relationship to the region, and subordinate economic position to King Williams Town before c1902. The transition, and emergence of East London into a commercial centre in the early twentieth century has been explored by Tankard, but what is clear from the mapping of space, was the changing relationship to both King Williams Town, and the region. The port, the wool trade, the railway, and the related 'new merchant princes' had, by c1902 defined the Town/City, and its white, and black allocations of space.

On the one side, and usually blank, except for bold perimeters, were the existent, and proposed Location sites. Dominated by the Duncan Village/East Bank Location, in size, area, and priority by the 1920s, the West Bank, and Cambridge Locations remain important in the definition of East London's space. All however, were drawn on the premise that 'no Native shall be allowed within the limits of the municipality after sunset, except servants...66, and their relative sizes, and existence, were influenced by the 'unplanned' rationale of an intensified economic growth along Oxford Street (the main road) from the port. This switch of the locus of the City to the East Bank, because of 'economies of commercial advantage', after c1890, ironically 'brought the native onto the doorstep', and prioritized the closest East Bank Location, at the same time as it was 'undesirable to have Natives living in the town'.67 Residential and social segregation were secured by c1902, in the interests of 'wealthier residents unpleasant closeness' (in Park Avenue/North End), through consolidating the East Bank Location with 'buffer zones', boundaries, and fences, and with an 1890 Council judgement for eviction. These spatial location-alities, 'protected' geographically (by hills), remained the site of Duncan Village/East Bank Location throughout the entire period of this study, (except


for some controlled growth westwards away from the city in the 1950s), while West Bank, and Cambridge Locations were contained until their removal in the 1960s.

Simultaneously, East London grew, within the municipal boundaries, into commercial, and residential suburbs which reflected their spatial distinctiveness from the Location/s, but which also increasingly ranked locality and proximity to the Location on class lines by the 1930s. Consciously reproducing an affinity of occupied space with British 'leaders', places, and streets, the naming of East London drew unambiguous parallels with race, culture, and 'civilization'. Legally, space was white and private, and ideologically, British and dominant. This mapping of the City changes after the 1930s, or more accurately intensifies, continues, as well as changes with the advent of 'industrial sitings' increasingly out of the city in Braelyn, Chiselhurst, the West Bank's Gately and Woodbrook Industrial Townships, and, after the 1960s, Wilsonia.68 These, and particularly Chiselhurst, and the West Bank after the 1940s were the spatial localities of manufacturing industry, while smaller workshop industries, and Wilson Rowntree, were located in the City centre.

But the 'colonial' space 69 of the City needed to be continually reaffirmed, and it took little for granted. As the morality of walking on the sidewalks generated an outrage of colour in potential physical contact, white East Londoners added a new statistic to the MOH records, the pedestrian fatality. In a letter of almost 'Death-race 2000' horror, an irate motorist described the hazards of town driving, and of the need to 'constantly brake and swerve to avoid ever growing gangs of indolent natives'. He further mused whether it would not be less reckless to civilized life and property if he simply 'ran them out of the way'.70 The reason why this brutal simplistic answer to the 'native question', which lay in legislatively forcing 'natives' onto the streets and then physically running them down, was not more popular, lies both inside, and outside of race and racism directly, in the collective sources of wealth, labour and leisure. Who indeed would wash the blood off the fender? But colonial dominance and difference, which would probably have run the 'indolents' over if there had been cars in the 1850s and 1860s, also had historically inter-connected emergences, and


69 See J. Noyes, Colonial Space (Cape Town, 1989), for a perplexing, but stimulating discussion of colonial spatiality that makes critical points about its distinctive inter-connections between race, class and spatiality.

70 Daily Dispatch, 12 July 1946.
translations into differing local historical forms of racial formation and of institutionalized, official, and white racism.

In this context, East London understands its past as more than an ‘unstated context’ to its urban story. On the contrary, its past is represented in an urban-ess of a ‘fictionalized’ and romantic colonial past, blended with a ‘trading’ mentality of comparative ‘riverport’ advantage, and a conservative social modernity, underlain by its own version of the ‘rich tapestry of empire’. Founded in the mid 19th century, it officially became a municipality in the 1870s, got its first mayor in 1881, and became a city in 1914, while its municipal size increased with the incorporation of the adjoining Cambridge municipality, and Amalinda and other ‘villages’ in the 1940s, and again in the 1970s, with the incorporation of Berlin, and ambiguously Mdantsane, East London became ‘greater’. The white mythology of its represented past is perceptible in the discourse built around these moments of official municipalization, their centenaries, and their individualization in appointments and retirements, and through an urban landscape detailed in the visual, archival, and narrative images of the frontier riverport.

Apart from the port itself, with its Kings Warehouse, Hely-Hutchinson Wharf (named after the Governor of the Cape Colony in 1902), the Malan Turning Basin (an exception), and the Princess Elizabeth Graving Dock, the dominant images can be catalogued in the ‘central market’ and Market Square, Oxford Street, the ‘Wool Exchange’, major banks, major ‘victorian style’ shops, the magistrate’s court (with Prince of Wales emblem of ‘three feathers representing peace’), the Baker styled post office, and ‘one of the finest railway stations in the colony’. Waterloo Square and the City Hall with its Victoria Tower, elaborate Methodist, Presbyterian, and other churches, the Lock Street Jail, the Orient beachfront and the ‘prestigious’ white suburbs of Southernwood, Belgravia, and Selborne, by no means complete the list. These ‘symbols’ were narrated into a constructed history reproduced in Council minutes, the Town Clerk’s ‘memories’, travel brochures, centenary publications, industrial publications, elite local histories, museum holdings, photographic displays, local newspaper celebrations, and in ‘academic’ studies, amongst others. In all of these, East London created a public history, through the 20th century, whose contours emphasized the pre-20th century in thick description of personality - the ‘courage and faith’, in building the ‘fighting

port', and thereafter a municipal, trading/commercial and public works history, correlated with a 'cultural modernity' of sport, circular drives, art galleries, theatres, tourists, and garden parties.

It was only in the 1940s that 'industry' found its positive way into public discourse, but then as a word synonymous with 'progress' and the 'modern', (but also within a discourse of 'hard work') forming part of the '... delightful City, combining Industry, Commerce and a Seaside Holiday resort'. Consider the following conclusion to a Council, but integrally wider representative dominant local discourse ...

East London, born in the turbulent days of the Kaffir Wars, has a most inspiring history. Since the time of its founding it has grown steadily, its recent development being particularly phenomenal [but silent in the text]. The Motto of East London, as incorporated in the City's Armorial Bearings is Animo-et-Fede" (By Courage and Faith). It has been by the exercise of these two virtues that East London has attained its present prosperous state. It was the courage of its people in the past and their unwavering faith in the future prosperity of their town that enabled them to successfully overcome the many natural [?] and economic [?] difficulties with which they were confronted, and have justified the appellation "The Fighting Port" which was given to East London in the "Eighteen Seventies" by the Commissioner of Crown Lands at that time, Mr John X Merriman. 73

It is a remarkably clear 'opening', as much for its silences, as for its assertions, and represents a foundational line of power, built on the eurocentric agency of white settler civilization. It has its explicit formulation, a constantly reminded and reinforced one, in the 19th century as the 'fighting port' in the eastern seaboard which is '... one of those few hemispherical seams along which these regions [world, western, commonwealth], and african [cape and eastern cape] have been fatally drawn to interact'. 74 It provides one example of that 'connecting tissue', as a power that is forcibly colonial in identifying, and representing these past 'facts', symbols, and texts themselves, and in their particular repeated interventions, (particularly municipal) as social, economic, and spatial knowledge and reality for East London and its history and 'progress'.

The importance of the periodization of this 'history', and its emphasis on the early 1900s as a moment of rupture or break, and enscribed in the confidence and implicit hegemonic consolidation in a colonial

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73 This particular version comes from H. Driffield, 'Memoirs of a Town Clerk', 19, but remarkably similar ones exist in East London (Johannesburg, 1968), Daily Dispatch Centenary Edition (East London, 1948), and other 'histories' in the Border Historical Society publication, The Coelacanth; and in the Publicity Association, and Municipal guide books, brochures, and publications.
discourse and explanation of the city thereafter, is only significantly recast after the 1960s. If the city is read in the sense of this visual, and awareness of this printed culture, (as I believe it can be), as representative of a social form in which the 'essential properties' of a larger system of Border colonial social relations are grossly concentrated and intensified in domination, this is only one aspect that needs to be engaged. It is also necessary to point to the processes of its extended reproduction over time and space in the city, a reproduction increasingly against the grain of its declining productive structure of finance and commerce, and its colonial political-military interventions. The obvious, but complexly particular colonial and racial 'physical and social mass' of the city, then, impacted on secondary industrialization and racial and class formation, in social, cultural and spatial ways as diverse as they were potentially determinant in the identities of the city. This dominant 'mapping' reflected a remarkably confident local hegemonic discourse of a white, colonial, and racist self-assertion, and power, which had a relational cultural materiality and meaning which needs to be taken seriously, and critically engaged.

This emphasis on distinction, and decision, to 'map the city for its own good', was legitimated with an 'ideology of sanitation' on the surface, but hegemonized the tenuous nature of control and domination in the 'black areas of the City map'. The same could be argued for the vocabulary of the architecture in East Bank Location, and Selborne. The 'Urban Trail' of recent publicity invention does not take the journey into the ghetto of Duncan Village, and its historic wood and iron shacks. It cannot. Those trails are far more likely to be traversed after work, and at night, for a very different historical process of change, not romance, of the colonial past.

But, if the space opened on the one side of this 'local history' is that of a 'colonial' hegemony, in and of the city, the other is the silence of 'invisibility' for the 'native' inhabitants of East London. This silence has a number of dimensions, most explicitly in the denial of 'native' agency in East London's 'inspiring history' and 'prosperous state', and in an 'otherness' to 'courage and faith', and as 'natural' and 'economic' difficulty to conquest and rule. This 'otherness' was spatially engineered as early as the 1850s, as a 'pretext for defence', and segregated 'locations' were established by the 1890s, including an attempt to segregate the

75 J. Watson, The Urban Trail (East London, 1989)
'menacing Asiatic coil' in this period. Isolated from sight, and space, this local discourse relied more intimately on a process of 'epistemic violence' to represent 'the native inhabitant', and 'his location'. This rested on 'mastering' the history of the locations, and 'their natives', through the reports, statements, and activities of its white administrative and official 'agents', while enabling 'it' to be seen, in 'reality', as dirty, filthy, squalid, overcrowded and threatening. This imaging, and 'reality' was constructed through these 'agents' and their reports, and more widely circulated through media, and personal correspondences. These processes served to 'domesticate' an 'invisibility' outside of the city and its history, while simultaneously extending this 'otherness' into the culture of the locations in very real, and contradictory ways.

These 'silences', the representations of 'native' historical, and human denial, and its self-legitimating colonial superiority, enabled spatial 'segregation' in this discourse to operate as the most 'visible' and 'factual reality' of 'reading' difference. Physical structures and cultural products identified as vibrant, modern, and civilized, implicated the uniquely frontier colonial social relations as creator, and differentiator of enemy 'contained' in 'native locations'. In all of this the relations of production, and their socialization are denied, except in material progress, and in the abstracted 'normality' of discursively translating 'native' into 'proletarian', for the 'assurance of labour requirements', but equally fundamentally as a key aspect of 'civilization'. Essentially to 'talk' of 'the native' and the Location was to 'talk' of 'his' and 'the' potential and capacity to, and for, labour, and not as a classed subject.

This expression of understanding 'native labour' in East London's local discourse had two central components. The first was in a 'technical' and 'development' framework, as part of the natural and economic difficulties, and later, transformed advantages, listed with water supply, harbour carrying capacities, electricity and infrastructure. The second, synonymously represented the 'natives' as 'stupid',


77 This notion of the Council, as 'agent for the native', is one recurring in the literature, as does the notion of 'the magistrate as agent'. See CA 3/ELN, Correspondence Files; and ELM, File 80/- in particular.

78 This notion of 'availability' and 'assurance' of native labour was elaborated into a regional dimension through the proximity of the reserves as well. In particular BCI, Box 15, Correspondence covering the 'native reserves' highlights this, as does the East London's Municipality and SAR&H brochures, including The manufacturing, farming and commercial facilities of East London and district (East London, 1911); East London, Border and Transkeian Territories (Cape Town, 1935); East London, gateway to the Transkei (East London, 1950) City of East London, Potential to the Industrialist (East London, 1961); Daily Dispatch Centenary Special 1948 (East London, 1948).

79 In addition to those listed above, see The City of East London (Johannesburg, 1968) 17-21.
'lazy', 'inferior', 'backward', 'insolent' and 'dirty'. It was these constructions of the city's black, and particularly African inhabitants, as technical, sexual and racial objects and as potentially aggregated units, that placed them 'outside' of social and spatial development, and invisible to economic change. Its impact on 'masking' local industrialization and class formation was profound, as much in the City, as in the Location, and the industrial site.

Local white histories, whether narrated in 'memoirs' and historical society 'factual minutiae', visualized in public space, or documented in Council and Industrial minutes and reports, cannot simply be dismissed and ignored for their blatant racist and controlling ideology, inaccuracy, and ignorance. In particular, in East London, as 'synchronic communities of discourse', they provide a telling entry point to domination and difference which is not simply, or easily reducible to the existing historical and largely functional determinacies of secondary industrialization, class formation, and state intervention, whether this is in terms of periodization, conception, or interpretation. But, they equally potentially elaborate on local contexts in which 'national' processes of industrialization, urbanization, and segregation and apartheid, were internalized and 'rooted', and why the apparent 'worlds' of proletarians, and 'strangers', and of 'whitemen' and 'native' take place in social and spatial localities and 'internalized' local histories.

This implies that the differences, processes, and struggles of black people to shape their lives and material and social conditions, so dramatically opened by social history, need an attendant white racial and class complexity, in dominance, but also in construction and creation, and in fragmentation and division. Not only will this point to the important determinations that lie in front of, and behind, and which intersect, shape,

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80 See in particular the Border Chamber of Industries Archive (hereafter BCI) of minutes, and other documents of meetings, correspondence, and reports, Boxes 12, 14, 16, Report of the BCI President, 12 October 1932, and attached correspondence; also ELM, File 80/- Mayor's Minutes, and the Daily Dispatch, especially letters, which appear with remarkable regularity on these issues, and in this language.


82 See D. Smith, (ed.), *The Apartheid City and Beyond: urbanization and social change in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1992); A. Lemon, (ed.), *Homes Apart: South Africa's Segregated Cities* (Cape Town, 1991); M. Swilling et al., (ed.), *Apartheid City in Transition* (Cape Town, 1991). Perhaps Lemon's introductory comment, one amongst many, captures the spirit of these volumes, when he suggests that it has 'taken 40 years for social and economic change to challenge the artificiality of apartheid cities', or Smith's that 'the rigid constraints on (apartheid) urbanization were inconsistent with economic efficiency ...', but the titles really say it all ...
and are shaped with the vibrant concerns and spaces of 'history from below', but begin to enable a more integrated and carefully demarcated history of divisions and connections.83

The academic representations of East London's history, economy and society, are more carefully and densely crafted. Most notable, perhaps, is P. and I. Mayer's Townsmen or Tribesmen, but the representations also consist of an inter-connected series of studies from the Institute of Social and Economic Research, at Rhodes University between the early 1950s and c1970, (and later, to a more limited extent), which are linked to a request for a 'comprehensive regional survey' from the 'The Buffalo Catchment Association'. Hobart Houghton described this as a 'non-statutory body representing agriculture, commerce, industry and various public bodies within the catchment area of the Buffalo River' and which had as its object the 'conservation and development of the resources of the area'.84 The survey had four main parts, 'a study of the natural environment and land use, an economic survey of the area, a sociological study of the Whites (of european descent) and Coloureds (of mixed parentage), and studies of the Xhosa-speaking Bantu peoples of the area', and was conducted by a team of economists, geographers, anthropologists, and sociologists, in the main.85 While relatively diverse in content and methodology, the differing studies draw on each other in important ways, and build a remarkably complex, if uneven picture of East London caught in social, economic, and cultural change in the period of the 1940s and 1950s.

This is not to suggest the Survey is unproblematic or comprehensive, however. Much of its methodology and conceptualization remains a product of its time, place, and intellectual, social, and political positioning, as is most explicit for the Mayers, as William Beinart elaborates.86 This context needs to be constantly borne in mind, as it does for the evaluation that follows. I would argue, though, that these studies have come to form the basis of academic (and political) knowledge for East London and its history, even in the

83 These conceptions dominate concerns of space, while social history has tended to over-emphasize 'black agency' in particular ways, and remain relatively silent on processes of domination, and of 'internalization' of dominant and hegemonic projects. One of these is around the conceptions of the 'colonial other', however problematic a formulation this might be, and of the issues of differences, and subjectivities, not as 'hidden transcripts', but in their inter-connections. See M. Vaughan, Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness (Cambridge, 1991); and L. White, 'Tsetse Visions', unpublished paper presented to UWC History Seminar Series, 1993; F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler, 'Tensions of Empire - Colonial Control and Visions of Rule', American Ethnologist, 16, 1989; F. Cooper, 'The Dialectics of Decolonization'; and A. Stoler, 'Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 13, 1989.


present, while their impact on the city's dominant self-conceptions remained profoundly ambiguous until the 1970s. The thrust of my introductory concern with these studies will centre on two inter-related 'readings', the one as primary source material, (related to the form, style, and content of presentation, while recognizing its existence as interpretation), and the other as an explanation, and analysis of local economic development, urbanization, and 'cultural' history and change. It is this second concern that I wish to pursue here, but I will comment on the first in a more limited manner as well.

Spiegel and McAllister suggest that 'Townsmen or Tribesmen' can be seen to show how 'cultural diversity' was itself the product of different experiences of, and different responses to, the constraints of migrant labour and existence in a town whose spatial and social architecture was the product of separatist-apartheid ideologies which were themselves driven by the demands of capitalist industrialism ... [and most importantly, 'Townsmen or Tribesmen'] showed how people with their varied experience of apartheid and industrial labour found ways to draw upon the variety of cultural resources at their disposal and to use these to adapt to the situation in which they found themselves. They were able thereby to resist, at least ideologically, the forces that had drawn them into a foreign system and were increasingly turning them into an oppressed and subordinated proletariat.

I have quoted this at length, because it contains, not just a particular reading of the Mayers, but of the survey taken as an uneven whole. At the same time, however, Lodge, Swilling, and others, have pointed, out of these wider studies, to the essential weaknesses in East London - of a largely 'stagnant' and flimsy economy of industrialization, to massive unemployment and poverty, and to the limited content of class consciousness formation in the 1950s. But, in the latter studies, this difference is largely a matter of degree, not of the overall conception drawn from the Regional Survey itself, which provides the building blocks to a revisionist master narrative that establishes the 'universality' of the capitalist mode of production, (and particularly its secondary phasing) turning 'native' into proletarian, 'tribesmen into


89 See T. Lodge, 'Political mobilization during the 1950s'. 
townersmen', and rural into urban society. In addition, all assert that this process is historically entrenched, and shaped, through the controls, and racist manipulations of 'segregation-apartheid'. That it is 'incomplete', (a process emphasized by all the studies) is fundamentally tied to the incomplete transition itself, as stressed in the weakness of local industrialization, and in class consciousness formation, in the imposition of migrancy, and its attached 'red' ideology and 'presence', in the forced occupation of the location in the City, and in the social and geographical attachment to the countryside (ie to pre-capitalism). Lodge claims it was these factors, all largely unexplored (except politically) and asserted through the Regional Survey studies, together with a 'repressive and vigilant local administration', (also sourced from the 'survey'), that provides the dimensions of East London's particular political 'locality' and forms of expression.90 These factors are said to give East London its specificity, which are simultaneously 'exceptionally problematic' for politicization, and, by implication, also 'unique' to the City.91 Ultimately, though, it is an analysis rooted in the 'response' to changes 'wrought by facets of the intrusion of capitalist modes and ideologies',92 that provides East London its sense of place and regional/local differentiation, and its 'inarticulate' political trajectories in the 1950s. That it was 'expressed usually in the terminology of race and nation rather than the solidarity of class' as Lodge concludes, was essentially conditioned by its incomplete and racist transition to capitalism.93

The Regional Survey advances a similar set of regional/local explanations, and parameters, and, I would argue, has shaped this sense of 'the local', even though race, and not class, operates as its organizing principle. In part, the translation from race to class in the recent studies is reflective of the tendency to collapse the two into the conceptual determinacy of 'racial capitalism' in 'revisionist inductive imagination',94 (at least on the surface), but it is also a case of selective 're-reading' without problematizing the underlying assumptions, and explanatory bases contained within the Survey itself.

90 T. Lodge also asserts that the lack of a vibrant, and integrated trade union movement with the local nationalist movement can be held, in part, responsible for the non-emergence of a dynamic, radical, and rooted political expression, and here he draws an explicit comparison to Port Elizabeth. Janet Cherry has, however, recently contested this 'working class radicalism' view of Port Elizabeth for the period of the 1940s and 1950s, See her M.A. thesis, 'The making of an African working class'.
91 T. Lodge, 'Political mobilisation during the 1950s', 331.
93 T. Lodge, 'Political mobilisation during the 1950s', 331.
94 See D. Posel, 'Rethinking the "Race-Class Debate"', T. Bauman, 'Questioning the Crises'.
The Survey's history periodizes East London (and the Border) into a 'pre-industrial' and 'industrial' phase, dated more-or-less at the turn of the century, although this periodization is not explicitly formulated with any systematic coherence. Hobart Houghton further identifies the Second World War as the 'take-off' point for manufacturing to become 'an important part of the economic activity' of the City, as do the Mayers from a more 'cultural' emphasis. While Houghton would lean towards manufacturing as defining industrialization (a term he does not use), there is the parallel, and dominant conception, that the 'industrial age', is one which has '... developed during the last hundred years by the capital and initiative of the dominant White group'. This forms part of the wider explanation, and periodization in the Survey which emphasizes changing colonial-racial relations, from 'insecure minority control' up to the 1860s, to its reverse and consolidation in the 'dictatorial tradition of settlement' in the post 1880s 'industrial phase' (corresponding to the mineral revolution).

While the Survey's 'internal' trilogy entitled 'Xhosa in Town' is less concerned with these historical processes, or at least the two 'anthropological' volumes in particular are not, they all fall into this larger framework, but in what Mayer would describe as the 'cultural urbanization process'. In particular, their analysis of the nature and changes in 'patterns of behaviour' of migrant (Mayers) and settled (Pauw) 'Xhosa East Londoners', relies on this largely Survey established 'change in the social universe' as the framework for their 'cultural' studies in the 1950s.

Overall then, it is 'westernization', and its implied superiority, and 'rational' economic and material advancement through the industrial age, that provides the core assumptions for explanation. Its distortions are essentially explicable through the emphasis on its pre-industrial and pre-modern phase of frontier conquest. This construction equally rests on 'Xhosa' and 'Bantu' responses, and denies their agency in central ways. Hobart Houghton sees the Xhosa as 'unskilled labour', and in 'population groups', and portrays their influence in statistical and structural marginality. Reader located their history and 'social

95 D. Hobart Houghton, (ed.) Economic Development, ch. 5, which is called 'Industry'.
98 The explanation is very similar to the one interrogated by M. Legassick in his 'The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography' in S. Marks and A. Atmore, (eds.), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa (London, 1981).
structural locality' in the municipal derived and shaped history of the Location/s, privileging the Council and Employee as social determinant in black historical experience. This both sustained the dichotomy between the 'thriving industrial and commercial centre of East London [as] a monument to the drive and initiative of the merchants who developed it, but a few miles away, elements of the pre-market subsistence economy of the Bantu tribesman may still be found in operation'.

This dichotomy is found throughout 'the labour market', and between City and Location, as a 'relationship of contact between Black and White' that is not just uneven, but also reflective of an absolute reality of difference between 'western' and 'traditional', as the objective reality of 'those who live and work in the area'.

The 'culturally' different, anthropological and Location centred studies of the Mayers in particular, but also of Pauw, are somewhat more complex. Both, although this refers to the Mayers, showed 'how and why social and cultural diversity occurred within a population that would otherwise have been regarded as culturally homogeneous', and also of how urbanization was shaped through migrancy, 'Red' and 'school' people and generations, state interventions, and much more, and was, as Beinart has argued,

an argument against a simplistic view of urbanisation, modernisation and Westernisation which was so prevalent in the social sciences at the time. The implications of Philip's findings for an understanding of the formation of urban African communities and the urban working classes in South Africa are only being fully understood now. (my emphasis)

I agree fundamentally with Beinart's assessments, and as will be demonstrated, the Mayers work (and Pauw) is indispensable at a number of levels for this study. It is an insightful and richly complex text, but, in language, density and construction, and in argument, it is ambivalent, and silent on wider social and economic structures and processes of change. And, for the historical agency of the Location inhabitants, and their relationships to, and influence on, these structures, it is essentially cast as responsive and bound by the processes of 'western' Location urbanization and settlement. In very significant, if more complex ways, then, it does not fall outside the general scope, and content of the Survey already suggested, and thus roots power, and change, in white society, and the 'orientation' to 'Western cultural patterns'.

100 W. Beinart, 'Speaking for Themselves', 22.
If these conceptions are linked to the over-arching concern that the Survey was about generating answers to the ‘... lack of knowledge of the real needs and aspirations of the local Bantu, and of those things that would most fully and felicitously satisfy them’ ¹⁰¹, the conditional answer lay in the explicit revision of the ‘whiteman’s power’, and in the acceptance that ‘if you scratch a townsman’ you may not ‘find a ‘primitive savage’. At the same time, however, the entire framework of the Survey ‘unconsciously’ established, and reproduced this power as resting on difference, and the construction of a tribal, primitive, and colonial ‘other’.¹⁰²

At first glance this might seem unfair, both for the level of detail, and for the complex cultural divisions established, but the Survey falls within a framework of the organizing principles of race, colonialism, and the ‘west’, and the strangeness and invisibility of ‘the native’, outside of labour source and numbered statistic, except in ‘his' own ‘legitimate’ and different domain of the countryside and the Location. The problems with sourcing the local/regional differences of East London into effects of economic weakness, and a related authoritarian local state set of interventions, on the one hand, and the uniqueness of the Locations, in terms of cultural and social differences and inadequacies on the other, has produced a conception of politics that is ‘community based’, inarticulate, inactive, and cast in the terminology of race and nation, although somehow expressive of as yet, unconsciousness of class.¹⁰³ But these conceptions are themselves under-lined by a deeper set of issues within current historiography that reproduce the thrust of the Survey, while apparently refuting its very foundations. The fact that the ‘masses’ or the ‘people’ did not talk, and express themselves in trans-historical ‘solidarities of class’, and expression was articulated, ‘from above’ in those categories of ‘race’, and ‘nation’, tells us little else except that an ‘elite’ interpretation, whether inside, or out the nationalist political movements, continues to deny ‘subaltern' historical agency and ‘consciousness’. To imply this political activity was driven by the ‘anger, fear and weakness’, of the community, while also indexing a ‘strong emotional community identity’, is part of the wider dominant political, and historical discourses, which in privileging these ‘inarticulations’, and ‘psychological’ individualizations, continues to not just privilege ‘race’ in a particular manner, but also maintains an

¹⁰¹ D. Reader, *The Black Man’s Portion*, 35.
¹⁰³ See T. Lodge, ‘Political mobilization during the 1950s’, 330-331. For Lodge, this is not just explanatory for East London, but conforms with the more general pattern he outlines, that of community based and articulated political processes as dominant over class based one’s.
'otherness' dictated by the 'elite'. In other words, this historical and political discourse assigns an objective psychological, material and historical 'immaturity' to local black inhabitants of East London, even through 'community' itself, which is determined by an abstracted and unsubstantiated non-subject positioning of class, and race, (further examples of immaturity) but which will be transcended by the 'mobilization' of this individual, and created state collective immaturity.

Returning to the urban, and the city, (within a region), as the space of place, and East London is an urban 'city' for the 'period' of this study, South African historiography seems fixated with levels, degrees, and efficacy of urbanisation, state intervention, and the contestation over 'illegal space' under segregation and apartheid. There are very sound reasons for this, and many exemplary, and exciting studies, but also many silences. It seems that outside of these concerns, though, 'urban history' in South Africa, and generally, has no 'theoretical centre'. It then becomes a question of tracking the relations between agency, power and social structure in an urban landscape that is important, but in their inter-relationships, not in the isolation of legislation, and its changing 'dualistic' implementation. And even if East London corresponds to an early process of 'social' imperative to segregation, and has a related concern to 'control' casual labour in particular, the dominant theme in South African urban literature is economic and restrictive: 'the securing of labour-power without labourers'.

Alan Mabin has similarly argued that it is necessary to place 'material issues at the core of a view of South African urbanization', and while usefully shifting the lens to include dispossession, he warns against a self-identified dominant emphasis on ideology and the state, (at the expense of economics and daily life), for the 'unique' 'mapping of white political power onto the country'. Significantly, though, these concerns are not as separate as Mabin suggests. Urban history is undercut with a revisionist formula of the capitalist nature of racial state interventions, contradictions, and contestations, and broadly follows a periodization of secondary industrialization (the capitalist mode of production shifting up a gear), post 1920s, as the key determinant in

104 See A.J. Christopher, *South Africa* (London, 1982); *Colonial Africa* (Beckenham, 1984); *The British Empire at its Zenith* (Beckenham, 1988), for this formulation.


the subsequent state struggles to regulate and shape internal racial divisions (of labour) socially and spatially. 107 The line of urban reasoning and explanation, as well as the 'imaging' of South African cities, then, has been hierarchical from the labour exploitation/industrialization base to segregationist/apartheid state superstructures, to divided social space in cities and their structures, to everyday life and organized resistances. The city, however, and here Mabin's argument holds, has been imaged out of the economics of workplace and production, into that of white suburb and black backyard, township or location. It has been separated by callousness, brutality and a 'world of strangers'; and legislated irrationally, humiliatingly, and racially, as the state 'carved up' city and country. This generated both poverty, misery, overcrowding; and 'conflict', 'resistance', and cohesive 'communities', in the apartheid 'struggle for the city'. 108 It is this image of racial division (from apartheid city to urban politics) that is most common, but also most consistently reduced to the illegitimate ideological, and quantitative and interventionist materiality of South African capital and labour demands and dynamics. For East London, this perspective is explicitly formulated in Nel's MA thesis, and conference papers, despite the wealth of local detail and argument provided. 109 Broadly, these processes militate against a complex inter-relationship between class and race, power, and social structure for urban East London (or elsewhere in South Africa) being established, and tend to reduce the City, ultimately, to the 'image', and the landscape of capital. Struggles in the cities, then, become class struggles, 'communities' expressions of class localities, and the spatiality of Cities, legal and illegal stages for class actors.

Instead, it may be argued that simultaneously present in any landscape are multiple enunciations of distinct forms of space - and while their simultaneity, particularly in respect of race and class, might tend to unify


108 All of these images can be found in practically any one of the recent books with 'apartheid city' in the titles, as well as in much of the historical literature on 'the urban' in South African studies. See G. Pirie, 'South African Urban History', Urban History Yearbook, 1985; and C. Saunders, Writing History: The South African Urban Past and Other Essays (Pretoria, 1992).

109 See E. Nel, 'The spatial planning of racial residential segregation'.
their form, the uniformities, and the distinctions of racial and classed spatialities need to be historically specified and traced. For space, too, is 'ambiguous, ambivalent, multi-faceted, duplicitous. Difficult.'

The thesis takes up these issues through a close periodization of the history of industrialization in East London. It begins, c1902 with the transition of East London from a political-military to a commercial centre in the Region, a process accelerated through the local impact of the South African War, and ends in c1963, with the local 'integration' of East London into the political, but also the social and economic terrains of the apartheid state and the 'nation'. Four periods are specified, and investigated within this broad time-frame - c1902-c1927; 1928-1936/7; 1937-1946/7; and 1947-1963. Each period, it is argued, has its own spatial and social dynamics, but the processes of change also carry significant threads of continuity. While it is necessary, then, to highlight these processes of change over time, and of the transitional nature entailed in local industrialization, the thesis also attempts, through the periodizations employed, to warn against the 'fitting out' of industrialization, simply in a linear chain of events, or in a direct chronology to animation. The thesis attempts to intersect the concerns of race, class and spatiality raised in this introduction, with those of periodization, and in particular the local periodizations of industrialization in this manner. Dislocation, as much as chronology, and overlapping as much as more singular time frames, pattern this process of industrialization into a series of processes that are explored across the proceeding chapters.

There are many gaps evident in the sources this thesis draws on. Attempts to fill these spaces, and contradict the chronologies that flatten them, in part, reflect on their nature. Much of their content will remain beyond historical reach. Hobart Houghton, writing in 1960, reported that

\[\text{[a]}\) the beginning of this survey a member of the team who was posted to East London to collect basic statistical information, reported that he had been sent to the wrong place to find out about the Border, and that he should have been sent to Pretoria!\]

While Pretoria did provide some statistical material, later found to be duplicated in the Cape Archives, the paucity of material there served more to contradict, than to affirm Houghton's observations. This highlights

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a rather more central point - that detailed industrialization studies rely more on the 'missing archive', on going to the 'wrong place' than is commonly assumed.

In part, the thesis has attempted to engage with Joan Scott's argument not to 'treat numbers as significantly different to words', and as 'particular understandings of social organization and political relationships', open to questioning and flexibility, rather than as fixed and absolute 'truths'. This re-opens statistical material to a 'more complicated conceptualization of the reality they represent, ... [and] problematizes and contextualizes their categories and conclusions'. 112 But, beyond this, and even within this statistical concern, the sources for any study of early industrialization remain sketchy and incomplete on the one hand, and volatile and immediate in their oral, and documentary collection, especially in the 1980s, on the other. There was little local documentation of industrialization, or on many aspects of it, and the local knowledge available was politically and socially formed in ways that have been little recognized by South African historiography. While the 'silences' might, in certain respects, also illuminate much, and I have attempted to draw on these at times, in other contexts they are crippling for a study such as this.

The other set of difficulties became apparent as I attempted to gain access to business archives, and to conduct interviews in the period of the mid- to late 1980s. Local industrialists were hostile to 'white liberal arts students', and black residents and workers to an 'oppressor white man' who was attempting to collect oral evidence, but could not even speak the language, let alone enter the barricaded no-go Location zones. I struggled with finding local research assistants, grappled with inadequate interviewing techniques, and became frustrated by 'non-conversational narratives', and polite, but closed doors and rooms. As is hopefully apparent, though, I did a number of important interviews, gained access for a limited period to the key, unsorted industrial and municipal archives in East London, and, in the end, visited practically every factory that mattered. This thesis is largely drawn from that material, and from the Cape Archives municipal collection. For the rest, the South African Library, other sources in the Cape Archives, UCT African Studies, and Manuscripts and Archives, as well as other archival holdings, were all extremely useful, and at times, indispensable.

CHAPTER ONE.

East London's local economy was dominated by large merchant and smaller commercial capital by the turn of the century, and by 1914 East London had become '... not only the port but also the focal point for the trading and commercial activities of the whole Border Region' even if this was interrupted by WW1. Two processes are important in tracing the context of these economic developments, the first that the 'great pioneering firms of the Border trade' were outgrowths from a Cape Town and Port Elizabeth centred mercantilism, which was itself integrally tied to metropolitan London 'establishments' 'agencies' and 'offices'. Many of these 'large commercial interests' had originally been located in King Williams Town (the administrative and military capital of British Kaffraria), but subsequently moved to the coast and the port, from the 1890s. The status of Baker King and Co., Malcomess and Co., Griffiths and Co., and Mosenthal and Co., the large 'wholesale general merchants', was, by the 1910s, unquestioned as the 'most influential of the local commercial undertakings', and represented 'in miniature the story of the commercial development of the Cape Colony within the last decades'. To speak commercially of East London is to speak of Messrs Malcomess and Co. [and the other great traders] argued the Eastern Districts Review in 1906, 'they deal in everything-rough goods, soft goods, hardware, provisions: and in fact, there is no article of commerce that is not to be found in their great stores and warehouses in the principal thoroughfares of the town' These large merchant companies not only dominated the economic landscape of East London, where the 'results of the enterprise and ability of the community in the stately wholesale warehouse', towered over the 'handsome retail establishment, and the 'well equipped factory' (small workshops), but this was paralleled in a social and political 'progress of public representation'. The Chamber of Commerce had been formed

3 'Commercial East London', 12-17.
4 East London Museum, East London's Chamber of Commerce Centenary, Miscellaneous Collection of Manuscripts and Notes, East London, including draft of centenary publication, 1977; and BCI, Box 16, containing a series of documents from the history of the Chamber of Commerce, including Reports, and contemporary evaluations written at various points through the 20th Century.
in 1877 to promote and encourage 'a friendly feeling and unanimity among Commercial men on all subjects relating to their common good, and to assist in promoting and protecting the general mercantile interest, ... and generally to assist in the development and welfare of the town'. By the early 1900s, this intent of the Chamber had consolidated into the 'voice' of the most 'highly respectable merchants' of the town, many of whom were also 'able members' of the town councils.

The second process relates to the 'Border', as a region. Hobart Houghton and the Regional Survey defined three different zones in placing East London's regional economy and 'sphere of influence' in the 1940s: the port and its immediate environs, the economic hinterland, and the competitive interior. For Hobart Houghton, the 'immediate environs' corresponded to the magisterial districts of East London and King Williams Town, an area of 1,547 square miles, with an official population of just over 200,000 people. In this area the city of East London dominated, with an official population of around 100,000, (half of the whole region), and was the 'major industrial centre and labour magnet: it dominates both the wholesale and retail trade of the area and provides the chief market for agricultural produce.' The 'economic hinterland' was essentially an area he identified as 'non-competitive', and covered 28,000 square miles, including large parts of the 'economically backward and depressed Native reserves' of Ciskei and Transkei. It had an official additional population of nearly 1,500,000, and was commercially dominated by East London. The 'competitive interior', is 'self-explanatory' and included the whole of southern Africa, excluding the 'non-competitive areas particular to the various rival ports', and its inclusion in the region's definition was based loosely on national 'market competition'. This descriptive breakdown, drawn in the 1940s around population, state geography, and commercial activity, does not account for the historical developments and changes to East London's centrality from the early 1900s, but does serve to highlight key features of its dominant position within the region. In particular, the use of Hobart Houghton's regional definition draws attention to the central role of urban East London's merchant and commercial capital, and of the

5 'East London Chamber of Commerce Centenary', Draft Notes.
6 CA, 3/ELN, Box 992, Ref. 1210, 'East London Chamber of Commerce', Annual Reports, Committee's Reports and Reviews of Years Work, June/July, 1905-1925, 12 July, 1922 and attached correspondence. Much of this material from the Chamber of Commerce is also found in BCI Boxes 15 and 16, and appears to have been an arrangement of storage entered into in the 1950s between James of the BCI and Snell of the COCo. See also K. Tankard, 'East London: The Creation and Development of a Frontier Community', M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1985.
establishment of money and commodity markets via this, in drawing not just academic, but also in re-designing fiscal, administrative, military and geographical boundaries of the Border. These in turn, came to 'inscribe themselves' both on a material soil and within forms of discourse, (including that of Hobart Houghton's) as the 'The Border Region'. With East London's subsequent emergence as the dominant commercial, populated and urban centre in this region, the colonial 'relations of power', in the administration and politics of knowledge of the region, become inscribed in its social and spatial materiality, and discursive formation as a City and, in turn, onto the region. Markets centred and depended, local and regional government presided, news was made, and archives accumulated in urban East London from c1900.

Merchant capital shaped the spatialization and social geography of the City after c1900 however, with a degree of ambiguity out of the regional past that made the City simultaneously more materially complex, and economically specific to its historical battlegrounds. As Tankard has argued, East London by the 1870s was an 'inferior' port of 'truncated growth', determined by its frontier political and military determinations of Empire, a position reproduced in its contradictory nature as Cape Colony, and as 'subordinate British Kaffraria's military port'. This birthright of economic 'inferiority' and neglect, he argues, was never transcended, and East London's transition from a port of 'camp-followers' and militarized civility, to the rationale of business, was fated to remain subordinate to the other already advantaged port economies of scale in southern Africa, if not internal to the port itself.

Tankard's study does not push this further but from the scattered studies available, the weave of East London's transition to the regional commercial centre of a 'frontier capitalism' is suggestively enabled.

A REGIONAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

From the 1850s, the Eastern Cape was grounded into a complexity of colonialism, and of conquest that was simultaneously, but not equally, military, politico-legal, socio-economic, geographic, and mental. Comaroff

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10 K. Tankard, 'East London: The Creation and Development', ch. 9; Conclusion.
has suggested three distinctions of colonial form in its South African making, through the state, settlers/entrepreneurs and missionaries, emphasizing 'the politico-legal aspects of British rule', 'the socioeconomic dimensions of race relations in a new agrarian society', and 'the signs and practices of bourgeois European culture', respectively. But, as he argues, 'the substance of the colonizing project, over the long term, was all of these things, in proportions determined on the battlegrounds of history-the bodies and societies, the territories and cultural terrains of South Africa, white and black'.

In East London, the proportions of this 'colonial mix' were significantly and dramatically displaced against the prevailing countryside, both before, and after c1900. As has been argued by Lewis, and others, the 'Ciskei' Eastern Cape, from the 1860s, reflected an established politico-legal colonial order. Here, the agency of the 'headmen' was particularly important, and the 'colonial native' came to be centrally shaped by the complex intersection between the 'hierarchical structure of social relations in the countryside' in both settler and household agrarian economies, and in its intersections with mining capitalism in the shape of migrant proletarianization.

Through the penetration of initially settler, and then mining capitalism, through the creation of markets and commodity exchanges, through entailed land alienations, and through labour demands, indigenous internal class, gender and generational relations were restructured. This 'provided' for a colonial subject that was re-shaped by the coincidence of impoverishment, proletarianization and dispossession as materially racial.

In Lewis's argument, the impact of these processes of capitalist development on indigenous household economic structure was profoundly transformative, but also critical in the very form elaborated - in the provision of 'the mechanics which facilitated the production and reproduction of the migrant proletariat on which South African capitalism was to depend for so long'.

By c1900, then, Lewis argues, the reality in the Eastern Cape was a 'transformed countryside' in which a semi-proletarianized rural population 'failed' to


'sustain their standard of living', and in their poverty and ragged necessity to labour, laid the foundation of a lowered and degraded '... material and so-called 'moral' value of a black person's labour power'.15

While this interpretation is sustainable, it is also limiting, in the sense that colonial policy in the Eastern Cape was never simply determined by the demands of capital accumulation, or the peculiarities of colonial labour recruitment. In the history of rural locations, and then the Ciskei (and Transkei) reserves, as well as on the settler farms, labour was, as Lewis' evidence equally indicates, 'the fly in the ointment' - with many unintended consequences.16 It is possible to suggest, then, that despite the attempts to exert the 'proper degree of terror and respect', even the military conquests, and the 'great millenarian movement' (of the late 1850s) and its cataclysmic consequences, as well as the related, and subsequent 'adventurism' of land and labour policies tied to settler and mining (at a distance) capitalism, the colonial state and its policies were regionally precariously balanced, makeshift, and fragile, at least in class terms of domination, regulation and power.17 An ambiguous capacity to re-constitute 'communal' and 'tribal' headmen and society, as the only real bases of local state power, let alone conserving the regional colonial order itself, reflected a decisively different possibility to the colonial state's agency as proletarianization determinant, and migrant functionalist in the Eastern Cape borderlands. East London internalized these contradictions, fragilities and hesitancies from the rural locations, 'white corridor farms, and 'reserves' into its Locations, workplaces, and streets. This served to refract an 'urban' reality which was far more complex than that of migrants of a modern and capitalist 'new age', as simply and primarily classed subjects.

Equally importantly, and in many respects more ambiguously so, the dramatic senses in which colonialism in the Eastern Cape was about the formation of racial identities not reducible to class determinations, was significant. Recent arguments have suggested that it was the discursive ordering, and non-discursive practices of British colonialism, where race became lived as ontology in the Eastern Cape, that was more marked in the regional formation of identities and the extension of power.18 Racial identities, then, need to

15 J. Lewis, 'Rural Contradictions and Class Consciousness', 19.
17 See Note 13 above, and B. MacLennan, A Proper Degree of Terror: John Graham and the Cape's Eastern Frontier (Johannesburg, 1986), especially Conclusion.
be more seriously assessed, and their intersections with class formation and identities problematized, not reduced, under colonialism in this period. However, even if the countryside was marked by a combination of legalistic and punitive forms of regulation, as colonial agents uneasily traversed the structural transformations to white settler agriculture, reserve 'traditionalism' and 'native' labour, East London remained a 'periphery'. It was inter-connected to the region through bureaucratic regulation and military supply, and not the 'civilization of trade', or 'demand for work' before c1902.19

With the transition to 'civilian' and commercial structure, after c1902, an image of the 'fused' social relations of class and race relations, of the colonial native as labourer did become prominent. It was simultaneously internalized from the countryside, through lines of settler capitalist trade, land occupation and infrastructure, colonial administration and labour control, reproduced from below, by the colonial subjects in 'moral', migrant and material necessities of rural 'reserve/location' contradiction, and extended into the local town discourses of racial and political exclusion of the 'native' as 'internal enemy'. This was entailed in the difference of civilization, 'fit work', and segregated locality. 'Natives' entered the city as the 'enemy', and were racially contained and segregated. This meant that they were defined in dominant politico-legal terms as different 'Other', despite an apparent 'friendliness of attitude', and a 'willingness to work' in East London.20 The 'native/kaffir' was subsequently collectively removed and isolated, and any individual or common civility, humanity, and capacity to build the port on any equal, or even participatory manner, denied, in all but transient moments of forced embarrassment.21 What was notably absent in this re-drawn colonial port, at least for 'colonial native' subjects increasingly drawn into the urban ambit of East London, remained the 'signs and practices of bourgeois European culture'. This entailed an exclusion and 'neglect' of 'the local native' in epic proportions of spatial, material and 'spiritual' 'undesirability', as

19 See K. Tankard, 'East London: The Creation and Development', but also East London Municipality (ELM), Mayors Minute, File 80/- for the 1890s.
20 ELM, Mayors Minute, File 80/-; CA, 3/ELN, Box 3, Report of Location Manager, 27 June 1905, and attached correspondence.
21 ELM, Mayors Minute, File 80/-, 16 August 1890 and attached correspondence, 1890-1910; CA, 3/ELN, Box 1092, Magistrate to Town Council, 18 August 1902.
'temporary' found expression in everything from massive housing shortages to the 'appalling lack of educational and religious instruction available'.

By 1909 only four African families were legally resident in the white areas of East London, work was scarce, demeaning, and rigidly contained in categories with 'no horizons', space was impermanent, and social mobility 'without civilized premise.' In meaning, and over time, East London's created theatres of everyday life drew distinctions that were not easily reducible to the needs of cheap labour and racial settler capitalism. Rather they reflected intersections of a colonially defined subalternity that did not foundationalize 'the native' in capitalist relations of production, or in their socialization. This was so, whether defined as civilized individuals, rational 'native wage labourers', or as free citizens with 'equal', or even imagined access to white labour and commodity markets and private property. Instead, the Locations became the sites of this exclusion in material and spatial realities.

These meanings, after c1900, and particularly into the second decade of the century, drew on, and were drawn out of East London's commercialization. The City itself increasingly began 'to determine the very nature' of the Eastern Cape Border region. From the port, East London's wheels of commerce isolated, and 'immobilized' the rural locations and Ciskei/southern Transkei reserves, in a trade of 'Redness', and privileged settler wool farming along a grid of rail, steam, and bulk cargo carriers. In so doing, existent patterns of frontier capitalism were visibly sustained in the city and in the countryside, in a period of their virtual productive disintegration and potential transformation. In the City, this

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22 ELM, Mayors Minute, File 80/1, Report for 1911, but see also E. Nel, 'The spatial planning of Racial Residential Segregation', Ch. 3.

23 CA, CCP, 11/1/56, List of Persons in Electoral District of Border, 1909, legally resident according to Cape Colonial franchise regulations.

24 ELM, Mayors Minute, File 80/1, Annual Reports, 1902-1917; Daily Dispatch, 16 March 1911; CA, 3/ELN, Box 12, Location Superintendent Reports, 1899-1903; Box 16, Report of Town Council, 4 January 1907; Box 624/5, Medical Officer of Health Annual Reports, 1911-1936; Box 960, Report to Native Welfare association by J.M. Orpen, 11 November 1921.

25 See R. Ross and G. Telkamp, 'Introduction', in R. Ross and G. Telkamp, (eds.), Colonial Cities: Essays on Urbanism in a Colonial Context (Dordrecht, 1985), 2. They argue that colonial cities were the 'very essence of colonial life'.


27 This argument is not meant to suggest that the market determines internal productive relationships, but that the dominant form of capital in the eastern Cape, concentrated through East London, was merchant capital. Located in the sphere of circulation, it was both revolutionary, and conservative at the same time, extending commodity relations, 'assisting' in breaking down/transforming 'non-capitalist' relations, but also existing, and reproducing its own power through the sustainable non-industrial, and 'bonded' forms of early frontier or settler agriculture - in this case wool settler farming, and significantly less importantly, peasant production, and rural household
commercialization, and the emergent dominance of wholesale merchant capital absorbed and reproduced a reality of casual 'native' labour instability. This was perhaps equally the most visible materiality of a political and ideological fusion of the alterity of 'native otherness' and 'pre-modern' and 'unfree kaffir labour' in the changed locality of urban East London - but in its locations.

This commercialization then, assumed domination and exclusion of the 'native' and 'his' access to the markets, properties, and progress of 'civilization'. This chapter seeks to explore and elaborate these dynamics, in the context of a problematized industrialization that does not rely on temporal identifications of linear economic displacement and determinism.  

THE MARKET, THE WOOL TRADE, AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF EAST LONDON.

The rise, and rapid dominance of a local 'mercantilism' is not surprising for a settler-colonial port, even a South African one with the politico-military frontier history of East London, as the 'swift-speeding vessels of commerce... from every quarter of the inhabited globe with the products of the torrid and frigid zones' provided the basis for local commodity introduction and exchange without a local manufacturing base by the early 1900s. 'A good market is an eminently desirable institution' suggested Mr J.E. Wilson, especially if 'severe competition' was curtailed in the institutional hands that controlled the 'desires and values' of local commerce. Unambiguously 'British' and Victorian, the commercial web of Empire, in taste and volume, and in capital and trade, provided 'daily sustenance' to this local commercial sector and its 'men of acumen and character'. This gave meaning to the desires, and ambitions of cultured leisure, and the hardened values of 'imperial trade' in wool, agricultural machinery, and the needs of 'that other class of people'.

This economic process of commercialization had become sufficiently pronounced by the early 1900s, such that 'East London need no longer consider herself military and administrative in character, ... trade now

markets which were themselves impoverished. Hence the distinctions of economic importance for East London's merchants, albeit contradictory ones. See the still convincing arguments of G. Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis (London, 1975).


See BCI, Box 15, private correspondence documents, Mosenthal and Co, and Malcolmess and Co., and correspondence with the Chamber of Commerce, 25 June 1918, and attached correspondence, 1918-54. Also 'Commercial East London', 1906; CA, Box 992, Ref 1210, and 1765, Chamber of Commerce Annual Reports, June 1917-1925.
performs this role, determining its emergence as a premier port.\(^{30}\) As Christopher (and many others) noted, the major arteries of settler colonial cities were often 'created' with 'close links' between military, civil administration and commerce to facilitate the underlying economic priorities of the 'redistribution of men, money, and goods', holding the Empire together.\(^{31}\) In East London this arterial pattern was noticeable, but also historically uneven and differentiated, as the military and administrative patterns came to reflect the 'system of commercial enterprises' as dominant. In the 'language of flowers', 'latest styled outfits', 'silks in all the colours of the rainbow from the far East, 'rare and exquisite laces from Lyons', and 'ecollines, serges, violes, crepes, grenadines, and other dress materials from the land of fashion-France', 'Moroccan leather bound books', in the 'beatwood chairs', 'Roessners and Broadwood celebrated pianos', 'German dark and light beer', 'Havana, Manilla, Indian and Continental cigars', 'Birmingham fire-arms and ammunition', and in the accumulated 'stocks of over 50 years colonial experience', the distinctiveness of East London's economy and society was recast into the commercial catalogue of the modern metropolitan 'west'.\(^{32}\) This was apparent, and was reproduced in East London's 'magnificent main thoroughfares', and in the 'reasonableness of people who collect them ... for the purpose of ornamentation, good taste, refinement and noteworthy ostentation in their homes'.\(^{33}\)

But if commercial capital dominated the city after c1900, and its elite male merchants, financiers, and wholesalers trod the 'soft yielding carpets on which one's footsteps are luxuriously hushed',\(^{34}\) the material world of profits, and power lay through the port, and potentially, in the 'crudities of the countryside'. In particular, this lay in the worlds of the 'Flying Dutchman Wheel Walking Gang' plow, 'Star' percussion drills, and 'Samson' windmills, the 'palatial warehouses' of wool storage and pressing, and in the 'transactions of colonial produce' and 'rough goods' (building materials, fencing, wool and grain bags,

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30 CA, 3/ELN, Box 992, Ref 1210, Annual Reports, 25 June, 1905 and more broadly for the period 1902-1907; BCI, Box 15, Chamber of Commerce Records and correspondence, containing the same statements, but in correspondence between Mayor and COC, 22 June 1907, and attached correspondence.

31 A.J. Christopher, *The British Empire at its Zenith*, Ch.4 and 5, and especially 72-73.

32 'Commercial East London', cataloguing the stocks of the local merchant houses, 1-52.

33 'Commercial East London', containing descriptions of stores and commodities for sale, and of the leading homes in the town. The language, and the content can also be found in the Daily Dispatch during the 1900s and 1910s, almost on a daily basis in social columns, advertising, letters, and profile stories; see also A.J. Christopher, *The British Empire*, for a more general commentary.

34 A description of the interior of Gibberd, Bryant and Co., but likened to the living rooms of many of East London's wealthy homes, see the 'Commercial East London, 43.
agricultural implements, etc), hardware, clothing, blankets, and 'cheap consumables'. In particular, white commercial sheep and wool farming and its export, was central to the growth of East London, and its mercantile and commercial class. Its success though, was equally vital for the extended commoditization and economic growth of commercial wool farming in the region itself, having established relatively secure settler colonial political bases in the countryside. This generated major tensions of 'social spatialization', inverting or recasting the temporal processes of commercial economic transition in the city to a more hesitant and decisively uneven local transition in the relations of production in the countryside. This occurred as the networks of markets, commerce, administration, and transport, regionally, and between centres, came to revolve around the structures, relations and representations of the urban port. East London became, then, part of the local internalization of a wider dominant colonial discourse of the 'urban conception of modern South African society', dragging the countryside into wider economies of Empire.

It also meant that the countryside 'penetrated' the town/city in the differential construction of markets, the uneven exchange of commodities, in the form of the sun-drenched wool farmer, and perhaps most centrally, through 'that other class of people'.

It is necessary, at the risk of certain repetition, to specify this aspect more closely. In East London, and the region, while not alone in experiencing a growing integration into world markets and a consequent commercialization of agriculture, this occurred in distinctive social and spatial contexts. Whilst debate has 'raged' over the processes of agricultural capitalization, and the structure, form and content of spatially and temporally differentiated transitions in the relations of settler agricultural production, scattered evidence suggests that sheep/wool farming dominated the settler countryside of the Border in new ways after c1890. The 'traditional' sheep farm reacted to new market and transportation forces (the port, rail transportation, rail agents and organizations) at the level of increased circulation, while continuing to rely

35 BCI, Box 15, Chamber of Commerce Records; CA, 3/ELN, Box 992, Ref 1210, Annual Reports; CA, H.1517, KAB, Chamber of Commerce Records, including a description, 14 August 1912, of main trading goods, and directions of trade.

36 This 'tense integration' between town and countryside is most notable in Chamber of Commerce records identified above, and in newspaper reports from the period, while the notions of the urban basis of colonial societies, and in South Africa are asserted across a number of disciplines. See A.J. Christopher, The British Empire, 94, for example.

37 I use the term town/city simply to designate its changing official status in this period.

38 See H. Bradford, 'Highways, By-ways and Cul-de-sacs' in J. Brown, et al. (eds.), History from South Africa. See also W. Beinart and P. Delius, 'Introduction' in W. Beinart, et al. (eds.), Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa 1850-1930 (Johannesburg, 1986).
on ‘non’-capitalist relations at the level of production. For as demand grew and communications improved, commercialization of wool farming entailed a ‘spirit of capitalism’ ethic that indicated, even if it did not create, the new economic circumstances in which rational pursuit of profit enjoyed vastly greater potential. This demanded a ‘hard frugality’ and a growing commitment to intensified production and competition.38 Given the nature of wool farming, with regard to both land and labour, though, increased production implied linear development and adaptation of production relations, with only sporadic technological improvements (in water irrigation, ploughing and tractors, and transportation, most notably in the 1950s). The patterns of African labour recruitment, tenancy and squatting, were juggled and modified, and only gradually eroded right up until the 1960s (and later).39 What was apparent was the extension and intensification of the ‘distinct social form’ of the ‘large owner-operated farm’, but in the context of a differentiated regional ‘miserable backwater of transition’, as the levels of internal settler differentiation intensified along, and beyond the processes identified by Ross and Bundy.40 If this was one side of the spatial and social equation of the Border countryside, the other was the ‘rise and fall’ of an Eastern Cape ‘peasantry’, which by c1900 (and certainly by the 1913 Land Act) had been impoverished and ‘trapped’ in various forms of migrant and ‘unfree’ labour in the reserves and on the ‘white corridor’ farms, even if ‘pockets of prosperity’ remained.41 But these processes also had an urban dimension.

By 1890, to re-situate the discussion, East London began to develop as a centre of the wool trade, and by 1904 it had become the premier wool port of southern Africa, a position held until 1934.42 The impact of the 1930s world depression, and a regionally severe drought (in the same period), effected a degree of ‘permanent switch away from wool production’ in the region. This structural shift to Port Elizabeth’s

38 See A. Knight, The Mexican Revolution (Cambridge, 1986), for the location of this argument, in a different context. The content though is supported in BCI, Box 15, Wool Board minutes in the COC records, which contains correspondence, and miscellaneous Reports on the wool trade, starting in 24 February 1908, and thereafter 22 February 1916, 20 February 1919, 21 February 1920, and February 1921; and in the personal papers of farmers in the region, including the Hartley Family Papers, and in Tennant family, and Bartlett family histories, unpublished.

39 BCI, Box 15, Wool Board and Wool Trade reports and correspondence. See also details in personal papers of the Hartley and Tennant family’s.


on 'non'-capitalist relations at the level of production. For as demand grew and communications improved, commercialization of wool farming entailed a 'spirit of capitalism' ethic that indicated, even if it did not create, the new economic circumstances in which rational pursuit of profit enjoyed vastly greater potential. This demanded a 'hard frugality' and a growing commitment to intensified production and competition.  

Given the nature of wool farming, with regard to both land and labour, though, increased production implied linear development and adaptation of production relations, with only sporadic technological improvements (in water irrigation, ploughing and tractors, and transportation, most notably in the 1950s). The patterns of African labour recruitment, tenancy and squatting, were juggled and modified, and only gradually eroded right up until the 1960s (and later).  

What was apparent was the extension and intensification of the 'distinct social form' of the 'large owner-operated farm', but in the context of a differentiated regional 'miserable backwater of transition', as the levels of internal settler differentiation intensified along, and beyond the processes identified by Ross and Bundy. If this was one side of the spatial and social equation of the Border countryside, the other was the 'rise and fall' of an Eastern Cape ' peasantry', which by c1900 (and certainly by the 1913 Land Act) had been impoverished and 'trapped' in various forms of migrant and 'unfree' labour in the reserves and on the 'white corridor' farms, even if 'pockets of prosperity' remained. But these processes also had an urban dimension.

By 1890, to re-situate the discussion, East London began to develop as a centre of the wool trade, and by 1904 it had become the premier wool port of southern Africa, a position held until 1934. The impact of the 1930s world depression, and a regionally severe drought (in the same period), effected a degree of 'permanent switch away from wool production' in the region. This structural shift to Port Elizabeth's

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38 See A. Knight, *The Mexican Revolution* (Cambridge, 1986), for the location of this argument, in a different context. The content though is supported in BCI, Box 15, Wool Board minutes in the COC records, which contains correspondence, and miscellaneous Reports on the wool trade, starting in 24 February 1908, and thereafter 22 February 1916, 20 February 1919, 21 February 1920, and February 1921; and in the personal papers of farmers in the region, including the Hartley Family Papers, and in Tennant family, and Bartlett family histories, unpublished.

39 BCI, Box 15, Wool Board and Wool Trade reports and correspondence. See also details in personal papers of the Hartley and Tennant family's.


dominance was equally linked to the failure to develop a local wool processing industry, however, and a related intervention from the local wool co-operatives.44

The local institutionalization of wool marketing developed out of the introduction of 'wool auction sales', under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce around 1910, and by the 1920s 'public auctions gained the day, ... and in this way prices were pushed up'.45 With the rationalization and differentiation of the large merchant houses, either into, or out of 'separate' wool buying and brokerage concerns, the local 'wool industry' had been more effectively established. With the formation and composition of the East London Produce Association, and the Wool and Mohair Buyers Association, both of which retained close ties with the Chamber of Commerce in this period, its institutionalization solidified. This process was also deepened with 'one of the most important developments' in the local 'wool trade', the establishment of the 'Farmers Co-operative Union', and the opening of a local branch of the 'Boere Samewerk Beperk' and significantly with the formation of the National Wool Growers Association in 1926, which was to 'control the trade' in the future.46 The establishment of a local 'Wool Exchange' in 1930 created the 'home of the whole trade ... where Buyers and Brokers, Farmers and Bankers, Shippers and Government officials used to meet regularly'. By the mid-1930s the Imperial Press Conference brochure claimed East London as the premier wool port, with 'the finest Wool Exchange, where sales are held regularly. Sometimes the excitement is intense, as the world registers its requirements in the bidding amongst the Buyers for the purchase of the Golden Fleece'.47

Wool, and the wool trade was centred into the local city's economy, and cemented into commercial discourse and identity by this period, then, in a manner which emphasized that if East London existed 'on the back of a sheep', the 'sundrenched [white] farmers' found access to the world through the local 'Wool Exchange' markets, 'earned good money and spent it in the city', and depended, as did the city, on this

45 BCI, Box 16, Chamber of Commerce Minutes, 4 August 1920. Statement by Mr. Hoffman, chairman of the Mohair Buyers Association, and managing director of Anelme Dewavrin Frere, and owner of the Buffalo Scouring Company.
47 BCI, Box 16, Imperial Press Conference Brochure, 1935.
'principal industry in the port'.\textsuperscript{47} This economic market and commodity structure, and its discourses and institutional and organizational practices simultaneously explicitly denied the need or purpose of secondary industrialization for the city's economic progress, or modernization, and rather cohered and rationalized progress and modernity through the notion of 'the wool industry'.\textsuperscript{48}

Ironically, it is from this period of the mid-1930s, amidst claims to its determinant status for 'prosperity, work and relaxation' in the city that the prominence of wool, and of commerce generally, began it's 'decline of trade' economically, if not also along the axis of political and social power. This decline had it sources in changing infrastructural and regional competitiveness, but also in the more significant internal dynamics as the 'Co-ops grew bigger and more powerful', and 'the trade' more specialized and concentrated. In particular, 'the large wholesale houses turned to other enterprises', outside of commerce, and others began to keep 'wool only as a small sideline'.\textsuperscript{49} While the 'wool business' flourished in the post-war period, with the opening of new wool stores, and the formation of Amalgamated Wool Brokers, out of 'old wholesalers and traders', which emphasized the continuing importance of 'the industry' right through to the late 1970s, it's decline was equally discernable in this post-war period. Port Elizabeth's nearly 60\% more 'wool handling' than East London by 1950, the re-location of major wool companies to Port Elizabeth, and the decline of the 'independent' brokering companies, absorbed by these 'Co-ops' were important. So too was the declining power of wool exchange on the local market. With the demise of 'the 1920 wool bodies' and the limited capacity of the NWGA to shape a local free market, the trade became increasingly dominated by the state and the co-operatives outside of East London. This signalled, most visibly, the fundamental structural decline of wool through the later 1950s-1970s period.\textsuperscript{50}

If wool dominated exports for much of the century, and its exportation dominated in economic determination of local 'growth' from 1904, 'three classes of goods predominated' in the classification of

\textsuperscript{47} BCI, Box 15, Report and Notes on Wool Trade, 23 July 1934; CA, 3/ELN, Box 992, Ref. 1210, Chamber of Commerce Annual Reports, 1931-1936.

\textsuperscript{48} CA, 3/ELN, Box 992, Ref. 1210, Chamber of Commerce Annual Reports; BCI, Box 15, 'Wool Trade' correspondence and Reports, 23 July 1934. See also E. Hirsekorn, 'History of the Wool Trade'; D. Hobart Houghton, \textit{Economic Development}, 107-110.

\textsuperscript{49} E. Hirsekorn, 'History of the Wool Trade'; also evident in BCI, Box 15, Report of the 'State of the Trade', 22 June 1936.

\textsuperscript{50} See E. Hirsekorn, 'History of the Wool Trade'; BCI, Box 16, File 13, miscellaneous correspondence on the 'wool industry', 1924-1979; \textit{Statistical Review of the S.A. wool clip}, S.A. Wool Disposals Organization, annual publication, (Cape Town) 1946-7 - 1963.
imports in East London, right through to the 1960s. These were clothing and textiles; foodstuffs and grains; and metals, metal manufactures and machinery. After 1915 oils, waxes, paints and varnishes was added. In particular, grains, clothing and textiles, and metals and machinery imports tied East London's commoditization into British imperialism on the one hand, and the regional economy and rural reserve, and settler agricultural markets on the other. Early metals and machinery imports were also determined by East London's connections to the Reef and the gold-mines engineering requirements. This equally determined the complex welding of metropolitan and imperial 'west', commercial city, and uneven countryside together, but also simultaneously created one of the major local economic structural constraints. This tension occurred between the provision of cheaper imported food, grains, clothing and textile goods and markets, which limited the creation of internal and local levels of productive investment or diversification. Local imports were also important in culturally constructing local markets and commodity relations.

The post 1900 period was one where the reserves/rural locations were at least dominated by poor people, and so the rural markets, for metals and machinery, (including motor vehicles), and thus for capitalization, and 'modernization' were increasingly white. For, as the smoking locomotives found old and new tracks that welded town and countryside together as the 'Cape eastern system' with a speed and luxury unavailable to the 'fleets' of commercial ox-wagons, the entire regional edifice was concentrated through the unsteady transformation of the river into a port capable of 'world trade' (via wool), and its regional commercialization by 'revolutionized inland transportation'. The port, that 'commonality of public spirit' that prevailed on its growth and development into the 'gateway to the Border and Transkei', and the various phases of its construction, provide an important index to East London's local economy, and its periodization into wider economies. In the period between the local internalizations of the South African War's 'treble banking' of up to '30 ships', through the ports massively expanded usage, and development in quayage, depth, and handling and bridging transport facilities, and the mid-1930s, when the Turning Basin,


52 This was initially completed by c1904, excluding the 'Transkeian Territories', and inclusive thereof by 1916. See H.H. Smith, 'Transport' in D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, 157-208.

53 H.H. Smith, 'Transport', 177-180. The wagon trade was almost completely regionally eliminated except in areas not served by railways, and in the reserves, by c1910.
approved via the central state in 1928, was completed, commercial interests pre-dominated. This parallel was more than incidental, and reflected the deep economic interdependence between the movement of goods and capital, and white public mobilization through a commercial ideology that tied the port to the economic ‘prosperity of the future’ of the city. Thus, the Chamber of Commerce was at the forefront of ‘the many schemes for the advancement and progress of East London’, and none ‘more significant’ than their successful ‘insistence and persistence over a long period in their representations to the Government as to the urgent necessity ...’ of harbour development in the late 1920s.

The port then, despite its flimsy and parochial infrastructure even by the mid-1930s, represented a local metropolitan progressivism and modernity around which the city was seen to flow. Merchant ships and oil tankers, the Union Castle fleet, and luxury Italian liners chequered its wharfage, and each milestone of its shaky development was celebrated in public monument and myth. Together they captured enormous ideological space in local media and white popular consciousness, in the affirmation of the ‘world in the port’, and the ‘worldliness of the city’. It was no coincidence that the ‘world of the port’ was named around colonial, British and royal figures and individuals, developments celebrated in the laying ‘as though in manner born’ of ‘foundation stones’ (itself not an innocent spatial metonym), and select ‘leading citizen’ luncheons and excursions. This gave an exclusively representative, and inclusive listing of lines of local power through the port, which included the civil commissioner and magistrate, the mayor, councillors, municipal officials, the chairman and members of the Chamber of Commerce, and of the Retailers Association. The crowds that gathered at some of these occasions, when permissible, gave public resonance to their growing commercialization of ‘comparative advantage’, but in the voices of muted, and outsider respectability, barred as much by the guest lists of distinction as by the customs and harbour officials.

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Invitations hide differences as much as they promote collective representations of white East London, and internal lines of division punctuate East London’s commercial political economy behind this movement of commodities and capital, and its built environment. Commercialization, itself, was divided between merchant, military-administrative, public and financial capital, and between wholesale, retail, ‘service’, and small manufacturing ‘industries’. While the period up until the 1880s was marked by the dominance of military-administrative patterns of infrastructural and ‘urban’ development and transportation, the ‘creation of free markets and trade was severely curtailed’ through the militarized nature of the port and its influence on investment and growth. The conflict between military-administrative and merchant capital over the port, local markets, state economic intervention, and the future, was resolved through the 1880s and 1890s with the more secure establishment of a regional frontier-settler capitalism, but also with the related extension of urban population growth and commodity relations, the regional impact of the mineral discoveries, and the localizing of ‘world trade’. In this, the Chamber of Commerce, and local state intervened, inter-connected, and ‘got the upper hand’ in ‘gearing’ municipal and port developments, and their spatialization to the ‘changing patterns and capabilities of import and export’. Differences and conflicts tended, broadly, from this period on, (to c1940s) to manifest between various forms of merchant and commercial capital, and between them and the central state at an infrastructural level, and the local state ‘somewhere in the middle’. These tensions concentrated around social and economic space and the inscription of these changing social relations of urbanization and commoditization. Local histories reflect these tensions, with a prevalent sense that ‘local initiative ... (and local companies) played a large part in the establishment of its institutions’, while relations with the colonial and union states were viewed as ‘confictual’ and ‘pressure-bearing’. This was so to the point in the 1930s where the ‘whole supply of funds for development [was] a matter of a Parliamentary vote which, apart from party loyalties and local jealousies’, depended on inefficient and parsimonious state departments, undergoing an ‘irresistible flow’ to ‘State Socialism’.


60 ELM, Mayors Minute, 1890-1904; BCI, Box 15, Report of ‘History of the Port’ for address to Retailers Association, 17 July 1917.


This period (and even up until the late 1940s), marked by the statistical and material dominance of an internally differentiated 'trade and commerce', needs to be further specified where the 'enterprise, ability, and energy' of 'wholesale interests' predominated.\(^{63}\) In order to illustrate this internal differentiation, but being forced to draw reliably on statistical material only, although comprehensively available for the late 1940s, my starting point is recognizably shaky, but as I will argue below, sufficiently accurate and representative. According to the Bureau of Census and Statistics, there were 1 007 establishments of commerce and trade in 1947, including 171 wholesalers with a trading revenue of 32 million pounds, 600 retailers with 12 million pounds revenue, and 236 service establishments, with a revenue of 3 million pounds.\(^{64}\) Amongst the wholesale sector, over 80 (of the 171) firms dealt in various forms of 'agricultural products', bringing the share of agriculture in East London's wholesale trade to 17 million pounds, 53% of the total. While dominated by wool, agricultural machinery and farm supplies were also significant in this total. The most profitable of the wholesale trades in East London was that of the builders merchants, followed by chemical products; vehicles, machinery and metals, and agricultural and pastoral products. The least profitable, and those showing noticeable decline, as expected in a phase of import substitution, were clothing and textile, food, and general wholesalers, who made a net loss of 3 300 pounds per firm p.a..

Of the 600 retail establishments, garages (45, subject to town planning regulations and car manufacturer licences) were responsible for 24% of retail trade, and 4 times the average retailer's profit, of 6 640 pounds, followed by bottle stores, furniture, jewellery, clothing, and chemists, while the largest group in food (222) was the least profitable, and smallest in scale.

In the service sector, East London had 62 hotels in 1947, with the 28 licenced hotels earning an average profit of 2 300 pounds per establishment, and the 34 private hotels averaging 1 100 pounds per establishment. But 60% of the revenue of hotels was derived from the supply of liquor to residents, bar and off-sales.

\(^{63}\) BCI, Box 17, Correspondence between COC, and the BCI, 16 January 1929, and attached correspondence. See also First Census of the Distribution and Service Establishments, 1946-7, Reports Nos 69 and 70, and unpublished related material for East London; Bureau of Census and Statistics, unpublished, 1952.

\(^{64}\) First Census of Distribution and Service Establishments, 1946-7, Report Nos 69 and 70; Unpublished material, Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1952. This is the first comprehensive survey available. See also H. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, ch. 3, and especially, 89-106.
To backtrack, these trends, while not statistically comprehensive for earlier periods, are sustainable, and if anything, more pronounced in the dominance of 'wholesale interests', and in the divisions between it, retail, and service sectors in the 1910s and 1920s. In particular, the connections to the countryside were stronger and more pronounced, while wholesalers also had a far stronger retail side and influence, and tended to dominate outside of food and other 'daily requirements'.

Describing the differences and periodization of a commercial body of enterprise does not explain, or even necessarily connect a commercial economic determination to the hows and why of an actualized 'native' subordination and surveillance in unskilled and excluded localities of ownership, work, and social life. Equally, the nature of commercial East London, and its relationships to a Cape colonial order, within which it was embedded, (but also helped structure and sustain), reflected, and helped create a colonial social and spatial reality that were local and particular (homespun) translations of European, and largely British, societies 'weeded' in the city and the region. The colonial society of East London (and the Border) was never a 'direct translation' of metropolitan society, despite its cultural, spatial and discursive representations, but neither was it 'monolithic or omnipotent'. Rather this construction of a localized 'mother-country' as 'imagined community', welded together by the 'wholesale empire-builders' needs to be forced open along diverse lines of unity and fragmentation, the processes of commoditization in the 'production of space' elaborated, and grids of power stretched.

Initially, I want to force open this process of an urban centred and intensified commercialization and commoditization in the region, into a rooting of industrialization that is seldom acknowledged - in the way this 'pre-history' sedimented class and social relations into a production system of local 'structured coherence'. The central creation of a region that 'depends on the money and the markets of the port' by the 1920s, and the emergent sense of the 'power of money to bridge distances', and its 'magical enlargement' of the radius of Europe to the Eastern Cape through commercial action and the flow of commodities, pulsed .


66 As F. Cooper and A. Stoler, 'Tensions of Empire' argue about the nature of colonial rule, that 'against their claim to racial, cultural, or technological dominance, closer investigation reveals competing agendas for using power, competing strategies for maintaining control, and doubts about the legitimacy of the venture'.
through City Hall as though newly elaborated by the ‘City Fathers’ as a ‘universal truth’.67 This process of the commoditization of everyday East London however, was not in dispute outside of the Locations and the home, present in the materiality of the social relations of commercial exchange and that of ‘workshop capital’ and artisanal labour. The ‘gaps’ that had existed between the border countryside, East London, and the ‘national’ economy, and Britain, as barriers to the circulation of commodities, (and capital) had largely been overcome, despite a sustained rhetoric of ‘local disadvantage’ and the need for constant ‘pressure, persuasion and cajoling’ to the Union state. Equally, while the town’s ‘corporate body’ had given way to ‘the dignity of the market’, and to ‘the citizens of labour’, they had become disconnected from the landscapes of everyday material life.68 In this ‘the production of space’ was central.

The context in which East London became the tie and reference point for a newly defined Border Region in the first decades of the twentieth century, is also one where it mediated the new social relations on which it depended. This period, as a distinctive ‘moment’ in the gathering, but also re-focused urbanness of frontier into commercial capitalism through East London, required a certain concept, organization, and administration of space, that built on, but also re-shaped the spatial categories of the fort, the country town, and the wagon-route. More broadly, the production of space as rurally, territorially, materially and racially contained locales or pockets of local order was transformed through the material spatial practices of infrastructural, transport, and built environment developments, and by emergent market and urban flows and hierarchies in the regional organization of social infrastructures through East London. At the same time, administrative, and state divisions of space in the ‘white corridor’ and the ‘reserve badlands’ were formalized and prioritized, from census report to physical locality, in the ‘city’ of the Border Region, through which ‘the Union interest would flow’.69

67 CA, 1/ELN, Council Minutes, June 1920-July 1923, in particular.
68 BCI, Box 32, ‘Facts about Municipal Development’, 17 August 1947, which is essentially a history of municipal development, and a series of observations and commentaries ranging from the 1910s, through to the 1940s. See also Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 35-36; and also Interviews, T. Walsh, 23 March 1987, and M. Phillips, 4 July 1987.
69 See East London and Frontier Red Book, 1903-1948; East London and Border Guide Books, 1911-1943; East London Official Handbook, 1923; and Howard and Co’s Border Directory, 1921-1934, as well as East London Municipality and SAR&H publications, 1911, 1923, 1935. See also the South African Railways and Harbour Magazine, 1916-1928; the Journal of the Institute of Municipal Engineering, 1928; and the South African Outlook, 1922-1937. The thrust of the argument, drawing on these records, lies in a profound temporal change in the relations of production in the region, emerging as ‘agent’ of industrial capitalism in locality, with the related establishment of far more unified and integrated (distanciated) commodity, money and property markets and relations, but also a spatial change to the centrality of urban East London in the production of local capitalist spatiality.
The emergence and production of a local capitalist spatiality that was territorially East London centred, needs to be situated as both 'outcome/embodiment and medium/presupposition' of changing social relations and social structures, as well as in their material structuration and as their referent. But in very particular, historical ways. If the emergence and development of the urban economy's built environment centred most visibly on the port, Market Square, City Hall, and lines of road and rail elaborated above, the material spaces of commodities and their administration and exchange, the spatiality which money and the capitalist market established in social relations, and its intersections with workshop relations of production, imbued distinctive class meanings and constitutions in local society and space.

Market Square/Oxford/Terminus Streets provided, up until the 1940s, the 'public centre of marketing activities' in the town, and affirmed, in the everyday, and 'within living memory', a spatial unity that simultaneously crystallized 'the meeting of men as equals', and the 'citizenship of the pound' into a stability and 'lived' universal uniformity of experience in the city. Hence, 'workingman, cap in hand, rubs shoulders with chief citizens and the khaki farmer', and onlookers searching for the 'true spirit of the town', need look no further than the 'community of Market Square on any normal day'. This was discernable in the 'eagerness with which all money changes hands', and was only offset by 'the amiability of social transaction and jocularity of sporting exchange'. The 'cabalistic sign' of the pound, and the spatiality of the 'market square' with a colloquial representation distinctive of 'town', teaded, in part, to homogenize individual experience into the imagined community of a 'global' East London. The reproduction of its social system across temporal and spatial distance also became the 'real' material space of commercial capitalism - 'universalized' and naturalized. Capable of 'six-figure turnovers', the material spaces of local exchange 'built' the prosperity of social life, and collected, in its net, the common material languages for linking everyone white (and male) into an identical system of 'British' market valuation.

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71 *Daily Dispatch Centenary Special*, 1948, 35.

72 Letters to the *Daily Dispatch*, 3 June 1919, 16 May 1920.

73 Correspondence, A Latimer, (Mayor in 1943), dated 14 March 1924, Personal Papers and notes (hereafter Latimer Papers).

74 See ELM, Municipal Records of Valuation rolls, and File 80/-, especially for 'the market' and trading patterns established; also *Daily Dispatch Centenary Special*, 1948.
At these economic intersections of everyday colonial life, the production of space was gradually and unevenly hegemonized. ‘[B]ehind the scenes in the official records, ... are contained the facts and figures for the attainment of the dignity of the city, ... most forcefully demonstrated in the jumps in valuation and extent of growth of immovable fixed property’.75 While official records, and settler publicity remained unremarkably silent on the expectable institutionalization of private property, this process rested on equal ‘behind the scenes’ and ‘forceful’ creation, drew on its frontier past with momentous regularity, and fashioned the abstract spaces of individual male ownership to a ‘verandahed house’, as a base-line that was seldom visible in contestation after the early 1900s. Tent-town, of the South African War and post-war period, and the ‘depressed 1930s’, when ‘the destitute lived on the hands of poverty’, and were found ‘camping’ on the ‘whites-only’ pavements, and most extremely ‘crossing the boundaries of civilization’ into the ‘free-for-all native slums’ because they could afford ‘no better place to live’,76 stand out as isolated moments when local ‘poor whiteism’ re-surfaced this hegemonic race-property spatial foundation and market dynamic of dominant stability and reproduction.

What was much more visible were the intersections of social and spatial distinction of locale and neighbourhood. When H.M. ‘visited’ his favourite location in the city in the 1930s and 40s as a young shoeworker who ‘cut uppers’ all day, he went on foot, and would absorb the necessary detail in a Sunday morning walkpast. The ‘object of his desire’, and destined to remain a dream in his ‘wood and iron semi’ in Tennyson Street, was ‘10 Garcia’77. In Herbert Baker architectural style, it included a curved driveway with two entrances, a croquet green and gravel tennis court, a kitchen garden and stables, a ‘boys room’, and a Union Cape Dutch gable-collonaded verandah and upper balcony. And it was ‘huge and majestic’.78 These thoughts and memories in the abstraction of spaces into commodities, ‘attainable’ as 10 Garcia Street, simultaneously represented this occupied space which emphasized social hierarchy, difference, and unrealizable possession, both materially in accumulated wealth, and socially in resident political status and

75 BCI, Box 32, ‘Facts About Municipal Development’, 17 August 1947; some of which is repeated in Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 1948.
76 Daily Dispatch, 14 April 1931, 29 November 1931, 11 February 1932.
77 The East London Magistrate’s Residency in Southerwood at No 10 Graham Road, Garcia was its previous name and that of the first magistrate. It was built in 1914.
symbol. It is this ‘acute tension’ between the commoditization of space, and its abstraction as ‘the way things are in the world’ to quote H.M. again, and the real material world of East London’s white class divided neighbourhoods by the 1920s, that was significant. It was the differences between these divisions and the world of racing pigeons, ramshackle backyard sheds of amateur craft, and vegetable gardens, where ‘each man was as good as the next’, able to ‘get on with our own fancies, the bloke next door, and down the road’, that white working class property ownership and material spatial relations translated simultaneously, and mutually reinforceably, into social privilege, and hegemonic conformities and unities.79 ‘The buggers on the other end of town, they can also make a duck, and I could get a ton, ... here or there, my money was as good as his’ (symbolic reference to failure and success in cricket)

The almost ‘paranoiac’ sense in which the market and money and commodities were to regulate economic and social life, was in part, determined by the ‘trafficking’ of the landscape of the colonial city, and the remarkably ‘clear’ manner in which a colonial city space contained within this urban landscape required ‘only a market’ for its created, but naturalized reproduction. The ‘non-record’ of any mapping, town planning, constructed neighbourhoods, or need to ‘draw boundaries’ was in marked distinction to the pre-1900 period when the signification and materialization of political space was created and represented in separate, but intersecting administrative, military and private economic locales.

The period between c1926 and the late 1940s, was one where space was re-politicized around industrialization, and this required ‘planning’ and intervention, argument, and political and social assertion. It was forced to acknowledge and legitimize the urban landscape, and served to politicize the market, while also forcing its re-abstraction in tourism, out of anticipated industrial mess and squalor, and the prevention of the breakdown of social order. But the intervening period of 1917-1927/8 was a key ‘moment’ of local ‘compression’ in which the spatio-temporal structuring of social life was materially re-constituted along lines of class far more dramatically in the city. In the process a ‘multiplicity’ of racisms became discursively and imaginatively more coherent.

What was apparent is that as a 'new' East London grew on the commercially dominated 'spirit of capitalism' in the 1900s to 1920s (and thereafter), the notions of a uniform 'civilizing modernity' that bound all 'Europeans' to the 'mother-country', and to each other, on this historic civilizing fault-line was extremely complex and contradictory in construction. Formal dress-codes, sumptuary laws, 'strolling' and tea-parties and picnics, the racecourse and the 'club of aristocratic value', and military display all did more than reiterate middle-class European visions and values as ideals. They created a local variant of what Benedict Anderson calls a 'tropical gothic', a 'middle-class aristocracy' that cultivated colonial difference, while also maintaining social distinctions within this 'invented' and 'imagined community' of 'British' East London.\(^{80}\)

The maintenance of social distinction 'from above' did not necessarily or neatly create or reproduce an urban settler society that rested evenly on distinctions and aspirations of status and mobility. What stands out in the historical archive, and in memory, is the 'silent' disjuncture of differentiated 'European' subject positions, between this commercially dominated and constructed rhetoric of unity, and the subjacent reality of artisanal and other 'operative' labour, 'poor whiteism', and women's subordination, in particular. These realities were, in turn, offset by the representations that contrasted yard-backrooms with kitchens and pantries, boots with barefeet, and waistcoats with sackclothes, entailing a far more complex construction of imagined, and subsequent materialized commonality.\(^{81}\)

At the same time, however, there are a series of connections, in the commercial archives of its local history that do suggestively make, albeit momentarily, these colonial marginalizations and exclusions visible. At its most obvious, a frustrated local industrialist argued that the central 'exercise' of local power lay in the increasing 'take over and control' of the city, 'above life's everyday possibilities' by a 'commercial coterie' whose silent agenda counterposed (white) respectability and progress against the 'obvious advantages of

\(^{80}\) South African studies has a large literature on aspects of white working class formation and political struggle/inclusion, as well as on ruling class divisions and fractionalized terrains of disputed economic, national and state power, but relatively little of this has found a grounding in local studies outside of the Reef, or Afrikaner Nationalist historiography. See S. Marks and S. Trapido, 'The politics of race, class and nationalism', 1-70, for a useful overview and assessment.

mass production.'82 ‘Our natives’, he continued, ‘remain trapped in poverty and ignorance, excluded from the benefits of industrial progress by this club of city fathers’.83 Williams was a rather lonely ‘industrial’ figure, and by all accounts ‘eccentric’ in his quest to transform East London into South Africa’s shipbuilding Glasgow on black-British labour exchange programmes, but his conclusions on the commercial locus of political power holds much more water as a starting point, and one equally isolated in its articulation, but for more astute reasons.84

It is, however, problematic to see power as possessed in East London in this way, and its exercise entailed complex changing relations of force upon which the commercial economy, the local modes of governing and decision-making, and the local forms of knowledge, were conditioned, as much as they each separately conditioned its form and content. For ‘commercial interests’ did not, as much as they were patterned by this ‘club’, correspond to the determinations of the local magistrate, the ‘proselytizing’ of local mayors, or the needs of labouring men, let alone differentiated identities of women in the imaginative unity of ‘victorian’ East London. These various sources of social power, and their existence through a wider network not reducible to any one of them, crossed differing spatial structures in East London, but also differing periodizations - but cohered in the Locations and their constructed realities and representations.

In particular, the differences between the local administrative structures, the field of local politics and the economic structures and interests was marked up until the late 1920s. The administrative structures grew out of the frontier colonial past, and after the early c1900s tended to assume a ‘dual structure’, concerned with political and social discipline, and knowledge of the ‘native’ and the consolidation of the Location, on the one hand, and the establishment of the ‘economic infrastructures’ of private property and white municipal development on the other.85 In this, the history and space of the Location, dominated, as the Location Administration grew more powerful, and ‘worked’ on the integrative relationships between local

82 BCI, Box 24, Letter from G Williams re role of merchants and City Council in preventing progress for those who recognize the advantages of ‘mass production’, 12 August 1928; See also Box 15 and 16 Chamber of Commerce Records, especially correspondence between E. Baker, and G. Baker, 18 July 1927, and attached correspondence.
83 BCI, Box 24, Correspondence from Williams, 12 August 1928.
84 BCI, Box 24, Correspondence from Williams, 12 August 1928.
85 ELM, Mayors Minute, File 80/1, Annual Reports, 1904–1921; also CA, 1/ELN, Minutes of Council Meetings, January 1905 and attached minutes; CA, 3/ELN, Report of Town Council, 4 January 1907, Box 16, Magistrate’s Report, 4 June 1907; and ELM, File 80/-, Location Superintendent, and local Magistrate correspondence, 20 November 1913, and attached correspondence.
and legislative and commission recommendations. The passage of SANAC was proclaimed with administrative cheer, and entailed local ideological repetition of the proposals with astute clarity and anticipation, while, if the written responses to the passage of the 1913 Land Act could have been translated into attendance at an administrative public meeting, the din of support from 'the entire community' would have been tumultuous.\(^{86}\) There were tensions and contradictions within the administrative structures, and their implementations,\(^{87}\) but, at a more general level, the administration 'ordered', and linked a differing and more formalized 'native' discourse, drawing out of the earlier (pre-1900) strategies and technologies of the 'colonial native enemy'. In so doing, the practices and institutional presences, and the material processes of a local regime of power were established, aligned and enmeshed within a re-definition of 'the Location' and its spatial distinctiveness in the City.

For, although the Locations of the City, and more generally in South Africa, spatially pre-date this period, their re-defined centrality was not reducible to locally developing and maturing commercially-led capitalist interests and relations. Rather, it was the 'habitus' of race and racial discourse that determined the re-workings from enemy and 'pollutant' to 'uniform subject race' in the local administration. Clearly informed within by SANAC, the Rand, Union, and the 'Native Question', and thus the cross-intersection of cheap, regulated and controllable native labour migrancy, the local administration patterned these issues into that of 'the industrious native worker' locally, but also distinctively into the site of the Location, and 'within line' of the needs of the 'average Native', for 'a blanket, iron pot, and Kafir hoe'.\(^{88}\) This tying together of 'teach[ing] him the dignity of labour', and making 'him in good working fettle', and 'instill[ing] general usefulness' would occur out of the Location/s, as an extension of the 'Gcaleka', 'Gaika', 'red Kafirs', and 'Fingos', and the Ciskei and Transkei tribal Reserves.\(^{89}\) This establishment of the Location/s as the urban locale of the Reserves, with a whole series of spatial demarcations and boundaries making it neither part of

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\(^{86}\) CA, 3/ELN, Box 453, Letter from Superintendent of Natives to East London magistrate, 20 November 1913; Box 17, Location Superintendent Report, 17 December 1918; see also the Daily Dispatch reports on the Land Act, and public response, August–October 1913.

\(^{87}\) See G. Minkley, 'To Keep in Your Hearts', ch. 2. This is explored in more detail below, and moves beyond the research, and historical scope of my Hons. thesis, and serves as a preliminary opening.


\(^{89}\) These descriptions are a few amongst a proliferation in the East London Municipal archives, articulated by 'native' inspectors, Location magistrates, and MOH, amongst others, and in form and content, they do not alter significantly throughout the period up until the 1930s; See CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 3–5, 12, 374, 1092, and 624/5 as a select example.
the city, but equally, materially and geographically, not part of the Reserves with their necessary 'rural' and pre-capitalist and uncivilized connotations, was enormously significant in both political and spatial relations of power, and in imaginative racial unities of community. In particular, this political re-centring of racial identity and of subaltern subjects as tribal, differentiated, and homogeneous Reserve proto-citizens, and as definitionally 'native' in labour capacities, demands, and expectations, was shaped in and through this racialized local administration, and its re-ordering of the Locations, as the intensive site of local social power and contradiction by the mid 1910s.

The distinctive coherence of a uniform, spatially confined, and separate set of Location/s (East and West Bank, and Cambridge), implied dislocation, displacement, and division from white East London. While 'the native' became 'accurately' represented as marginal and peripheral in terms of power and urban locational presence, this construction of the Location/s, and their representations went beyond administratively generated separation, enabling the bureaucratic and spatial grounding of white racial unity and community. The local administration, through the Location/s, constructed a public, and a popular, as well as a documentary, official, and political knowledge which placed these Location/s outside of the history, and the future of East London. In contradiction, it cast them in a racially separate subalternity of 'natural' pre-modern time, anarchic, primitive, and uncivilized 'urban-kraal' space, and in the franchise of chiefs, headmen, and 'redness'.90 Put more crudely, the local administration was responsible for the creation, and simultaneous homogenization and abstraction of the native as a subject race, and where the knowledge, and 'unseen'91 reality of the Location/s grounded this as the socio-spatial separate world of the city.

Economic interests, on the other hand, were not only concentrated, but also cohered 'outside' of the Location/s, in the modernization of British East London. But, unlike the more general conceptions which suggested the lack of political vocabulary within economic realities, in the commercial activities of East London the economic practices of exchange internalized colonial and racial conceptions, and

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91 CA, 3/ELN, Box 4, Reports to Native Economic Commission, 10-12 March 1931; Box 624/5, Annual MOH Reports. The local magistrate, and the MOH argued in the 1920s, and again later in the 1937 Thornton Commission, that practically all white people had never seen the 'inside' of the Locations, but were experts on its unsanitary, and dangerous state of affairs.
operationalized them as the 'habitus' of racism - as a central and 'given' foundation of their existence. By the early 1900s this was to be articulated through the Location/s, but with a differing socio-spatial emphasis and conception. In these 'new' terms, the Location/s in the early 1900s, provided a 'pitiful market', 'natives' contributed 'little to the economic welfare and prosperity of the town', and 'so long as they turn out in numbers every Monday' and 'are not drink-sodden', the Location/s fulfilled their purpose in the provision of 'native labour'.92 This also contained within its discourses, the definitions of 'native labour' as manual and unskilled, and where necessary, 'education up to a certain point' would be tolerated, but 'too much education spoils the native for labouring work' - and the Location/s should ensure this 'state of affairs'.93 This was to change in various ways after c1914, as I argue below.

However 'native' exclusion, difference and silencing invested in power relations occurred across three main fields of practice, including the merchant and commercial capitalization of East London's economy, as well as in the 'public spheres', and in the local city council and administration in this period, simultaneously making them possible, and utilizing their effects. While there were significant degrees of overlap, not only from the balding head-counts in company, club, and committee, to a relatively coherent discourse of the parameters of this localized commercial empire of 'Victorian East London', these fields of difference were significant in differentiated periodization and spatial formation.

In particular the spatial differences of the urban in East London against the rural, the regional against the Cape colony as a whole, metropolitanization and 'westernization' against the 'primitive' reserves and the commercialization and move from King Williams Town. and then as the centre in the Border as well as the fragmentation of the differing domains of spatialization which provided the context of tensions and changes that institutionalized new forms of space with old, were important. Together, they historically provided for what Foucault calls the 'points at which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power'.94 And the central site, or 'event', through which this focused, or re-connected, across these fields were the Location/s.

92 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1092, Magistrate to Town Council, 18 August 1902; Daily Dispatch, 11 May 1905, 16 July 1907.
93 ELM, Mayors Minute, File 80/-, 1901-1910; CA, 3/ELN, Box 374, Location Manager Correspondence, 25 November 1910, and attached correspondence.
94 See M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge.
I want to suggest that these fields drawn together through the Location/s, constituted a discursive formation wider than that of the local administration. In referring to the same objects of 'the native' and 'the location' as a 'subject race' in its urban space, in sharing the same styles of 'native/location' homogenization, and abstraction, and supported by a strategy, 'a common institutional ...or political drift or pattern' of 'true' regularized racial identities, the colonial foundations of race, initially drawn by the 1850s, and then in the pre-1900 period, were re-cast and re-formed for the 'imaginative community' of white East London. If nothing else, this serves as a necessary unfocusing of local hegemony and power from the material instrument of an elite merchant conspiracy, and begins to elaborate a social and spatial complexity of the intersections of class and race, that equally opens a divergent impact of 'sedimentation' for local industrialization.

WHITE LABOUR AND THE LOCAL DEFINITION OF CLASS.

As late as 1949, the President of the Border Chamber of Industries suggested that not only was East London 'not as industrialized as other towns', but that it cannot be described as 'an industrial area in the sense that the term can be applied to the other ports of the Union, which combine the commerce of the port with industrial activity'. He identified this as a 'glaring weakness'. But, he continued, 'certain industries do exist, though often small in comparison'. Whilst this 'glaring weakness' requires deeper explanation, a preliminary starting argument would settle comfortably into Freund's observations that despite the 'rooting' of industrialization in the 'diverse opportunities that emerged from the concentration of workers and their families in urban centres', ('the pattern of low-level import substitution in consumer goods'), the process was haphazard, lacked much internal or national integration, was spatially uneven, and concentrated on local markets and, most typically, their constraints. For East London, translation of these general observations is all too apparent - small in scale and operation, reliant on workshops and immigrant artisanal labour, built on local sources of credit and finance, and on small and highly differentiated local

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96 BCI, Box 17, Evidence Notes compiled by B. James(?), for evidence to Welsh Commission, 15 March 1949, 1.

97 BCI, Box 17, Evidence Notes for Welsh Commission, 2.

particular from the early 1890s. 102 This pattern was sustained well into the 1920s, where the majority of white labour was male, skilled, and ‘consistently immigrant’ in composition and outlook. 103 The subsequent development of a highly paid and skilled class of carpenters, fitters, electricians, builders, and metalworkers, even if less materially advantaged in the South African white spatial divisions of labour, cohered around a series of craft practices and structures in the town/city. In particular, the formation, or extension of British craft unionism into a number of local unions, the formation of a local Trades and Labour Council in 1903/4, and the re-formulation of this into a District Federation affiliated to the South African Industrial Federation during the First World War, was significant. So too, was the establishment of a local South African Labour Party branch, which became ‘very influential amongst East London’s men’ (my emphasis, referring, in one sense, to a crafted working class), and the spate of new and revitalized unionization that occurred at that time. 104

To some extent, craft and ‘industrial’ union tensions began to emerge in this later period, in particular amongst railway, carpenter, building, paint and tramway workers, around deskilling and substitution. More notable and significant, however, was the typical concern with creating, through the unions, a high wage, and ‘unilateral control’ of labour supply, and the rules and rates of the trade - ‘the rate for the job’ - in summary the ‘scarcity/skill value’ of white labour. 105 Generally then, East London’s early ‘industrialization’ tended to rely on skilled and highly paid white male labour, and unskilled black labour, but very little unskilled white male labour. On average, the size and percentage of white workers in selected industries, and their associated skill levels, represented 54% of all workers. In the late 1920s, and in summary, across 35 ‘establishments’, including all the largest, the percentage size of white workers in the workforce was

103 BCI, Box 20, File 225/6B, correspondence between Regional Inspector of Labour and President, 2 February 1933, and attached correspondence relating to the recent ‘native strike’, and the position, and ‘history’ of white labour. See also H.H. Smith, ‘Development of Labour Organization’, 112-137.
104 Daily Dispatch, 16 January 1914, 14 December 1918, 2 May 1921; Laweson Papers, (personal archive containing correspondence, minutes, notes, and drafts of documents, speeches and ‘observations’, both personal, of the Labour party, and of various local unions). Minutes of Meetings, and correspondence, which contains party membership figures for 1914, and for 1918-1925, and which are well over a thousand members between 1914 and 1922/3. See also H.H. Smith, ‘Development of Labour Organization’ ch. 6.
58%, with several as high as 80%. In addition, there were no recognized skilled Africans, and only 12 skilled 'Coloureds'.

The existence of white unskilled labour, outside of 'industry' was notable in the City during and after the South African war, and while this generated an East London variant of 'poor whiteism', the local commercial and public sectors, tended, over time, to absorb and allocate 'the hands of civilization' to the 'unfortunate souls of tent-town' and those 'dangerously close to losing their way to the inferior status of the native' in locality and culture. This was manifested most concretely when the Town Council retrenched African workers, and replaced them with unskilled 'white unemployed' in 1908, and where a 'number of reputable firms took in war refugees', and helped them to 'find their feet', at the cost of 'native servants', although a more individualized process along these lines also occurred in 'railway and harbourhirings', and in building and construction in this period. By 1911, white unemployment was 'unnoticed in the streets', and the 'poor white problem', a 'passing memory', at least in the visibility of local urban settler publicity.

Yet, this is only part of 'the picture of economic life', or, more accurately, a set of representations that both elaborated, and affirmed already made contemporary realities, simultaneously stabilizing white workers as functionally identifiable and relatively homogeneous, while decentring them as subordinate to their 'craft' and 'skill' in the process of colonial 'modernization'. This meant they were seen as 'categories' of productive activity in the labour market and the economy, but as moral, family men, concerned with the 'better life' of garden, house and suburb outside of this objective reality of money and markets. This occurred through Council and commercial relations, and in a constructed white settler public sphere and the daily newspaper, as well as within many of the oldest and 'most recognized' craft unions. The reality was both as neat, and a lot more messy.

In the first two decades workshops were, for the most, small and under-capitalized, competition fiercely parochial, and jobs unstable, back-breaking and fluctuant. The 'masters' were often 'raw', inexperienced,

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106 BCI, Box 12, File 221, Details of 'Statistics relating to white labour, 18 November 1929, and Box 20, File 225/6, 'Statistics on Industrial Employment', undated.
108 BCI, Box 15, COC Annual Reports, 1908-1911; D. Bettison, 'A Socio-Economic Study of East London', 85-86.
109 BCI, Box 15, COC Annual Reports, 1911; 1912. Daily Dispatch, 13 March 1912.
and rivalrous, 'money mattered more than men', workplace ritual and tradition was fluid, council and localized state employment 'uncaring', and unions, and their leaders, 'dependent' as often as not. The workingman in East London 'does not receive the treatment he is due' argued a 'disgruntled welder'\textsuperscript{111}, while Albert Lawson remembered as a 'daily grind' his early experiences as tailor, tramwayman, and finally metal fitter. It occurred in a self-descriptive 'primitive world', where 'your craft didn't mean much ... like dirt, really, ja, those days, my boy, the dirt of the craft'.\textsuperscript{112} Similarly, McKerrel, a tramway worker argued that he did not know of a more iniquitous condition of things ...[as] ... existed in any limited liability company or firm of any individual employer than existed in the East London Trammy Department ... how in the name of heaven could a man with a wife and children find the bread, let alone the butter.\textsuperscript{113}

This condition, he suggested, was more generalized for East London workers as a whole, where they were nothing but 'bottom dogs'.\textsuperscript{114}

Many of these contradictory tensions between privilege and poverty, and between skill, craft and trade, came to the fore in the 1914, and especially the 1918-1922 period in East London. This period was marked by a series of strikes and labour disputes involving engineering, building and construction workers, bank employees, painters, and tramway workers, and was, in Smith's words, the 'high point ... , [and] ... the end of white labour militancy in East London', with the exception of two 'minor' disputes during World War Two.\textsuperscript{115} What is also highlighted are these 'internal' hierarchies of difference, as well as between masters, employers and workers. In particular, significant differences of hierarchy emerged which tended to associate skill with respectability and age, while the 'creeping spread of bolshevism (sic)', the 'loud-mouthed ruffians' of 'socialistic unbelief' emerged out of the ranks of the semi-skilled and the 'least skilled of trades'.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Daily Dispatch}, 12 July 1913.
\textsuperscript{112} Interview, A. Lawson, 10 December 1986; 2 January 1990.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Daily Dispatch}, 11 December 1919.
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Daily Dispatch}, 11 December, 1919.
\textsuperscript{115} H.H. Smith, 'Development of Labour Organization', 74-75, and ch. 6 as a whole.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Daily Dispatch}, 16 January 1914; BCI Archives, Boxes 33-34 contain correspondence from Divisional Inspector of Labour, and information on white trade unions, including, surprisingly, scattered minutes of different union meetings from the 1910s and 1920s. Minutes of Engineering Union, 16 August 1914; East London Tramwaymens Union, 5 February 1920; and Building Workers Industrial Union, 18 January 1920, and of the East London executive of the S.A Industrial Federation, 10 December 1919, 24 March 1920, 27 April 1920.
Most struggles centred on 'rate-for-the job' contexts for higher wages, and improved working time and conditions, and were lengthy, (with the exception of the bank strike) negotiated, and at times abusive affairs of manipulation and struggle for control and 'material rewards'. The building workers/painters strike of 1919 and 1920 (in two instalments) highlighted these tensions, as did the tramway strike of 1920. Employers and masters were variously categorized as 'responsible for poor standards', 'victimizing' and 'browbeating', and 'manipulative' of individuals, circumstances and meetings in the labour markets. This made workers 'afraid for their jobs', working conditions 'prohibitive', and a conception that employers generally were responsible for these 'damnable times to be in that class of labour'.

At the same time, the masters, and employers suggested that many of these practices originated from within the unions, and that, according to the Master Builder's Association

we have made them fair and reasonable offers, which we confidently state the qualified and more enlightened members of the local union are one and all prepared to accept, but the incompetent, irresponsible and extremists being in the majority outvote the tradesmen every time, therefore we maintain that we are justified in asking for the support of the town against this tyranny of irresponsible labourites ...

This 'tyranny of labour' also found expression in the tramway strike, amongst the 'large majority of semi-skilled workers', (involving the Tramway Union, as well as the East London branch of the SAIF, and the City Council), the councillors argued that '... it was not the tramwaymen themselves who were disgruntled, but that they had been influenced by agitators "one of the greatest curses civilization has invented" ', and that the less skilled and educated, as in this (tramways) case, are 'easily prodded and led ... it is unfortunate there are so few men of trade in this industry'. Tyrants however abounded, with the union/SAIF identifying, in 'familiar red ink', the main antagonists as the '... tyrannical officials of the miserable crowd of councillors ... their interests are those of the employers'. And in the midst, was the 'political jobber' and local Labour Party mayor and MP, James Stewart, whose 'true colours' were that of 'party tyrant'.

Elected by a 'mere 18 votes', and supported by the only other Labour councillor, Stewart was central to the public circulation of these strikes, as manifestations of 'normally hidden and silent disagreements and

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116 Daily Dispatch, 11 December 1919, 25 March 1920; See also BCI Box 33, Minutes of Meeting, 15 May 1920, and 22 June 1924, between City Council and Employers.
117 Daily Dispatch, 17 February 1920.
118 Daily Dispatch, 26 March 1920, also CA, 1/ELN, Council Minutes, February-April 1920.
119 BCI Box 33, Minutes of Meeting, 10 December 1919, 15 May 1920; also Daily Dispatch, 10 December 1919.
resolutions between employers and labour', organizing public meetings, round table conferences, and continuously 'upsetting council uniformity', thus providing the public platforms for, as well as individually, 'attacking' local capital and state.

The interests of East London in the eyes of James Stewart are an entirely secondary consideration to the demands of the Labour Party. It is not often that James Stewart is so clear in his statements, but now we have it from his own lips that though he is Mayor of the City and supposed to do his best for its welfare, he places the interest of party and worker before those of East London. He is prepared to uphold what his party stands for 'no matter on what question'.121

Most unpopular with the employers of the town, he was equally unpopular in the Council which was 'bitterly opposed to labour as a whole'122.

What is striking, is that as fragments of a series of discourses about 'white' class relations at play at this time, conflict, difference, and opposition appeared within a thinly veiled veneer between white settler colonial cohesion and rupture in the city. While only involving a few hundred workers, and clearly contained within internal organizational and occupational division, these 'events' exposed the flaws in imagination, but simultaneously its differentiated spatial and social re-inventions and re-elaborations. They foundationalized industrialization difference into a 'grid' of class and race and gender which was different for workers and employers beyond the temporal, statistical and realizable positioning in the locality of East London.

Let me piece together a possibility which will, I hope, provide the context of a differing 'industrial grid', while highlighting the equally different framework and periodization trajectory in East London. This seems necessary in terms of Freund's 'extremely heterogeneous labour force', and 'variegated South African industrial working class' of racial, gender and social complexity markers in enabling '... a crucial and successful, if patchy, stage of industrial development to take place'.123 It is also necessary, however, in terms of wider conceptions of racism as a set of class (ultimately dominant class) strategies and practices to cohere capitalist social relations via this (racially) coherent and unified imagined community.124

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121 Daily Dispatch, 17 February 1920.
122 Laweson Papers, correspondence between W. Blake, and R. Laweson, 11 January 1920, and attached correspondence; See also CA 3/ELN, Boxes 1227 and 1637, Finances of East London Municipality, 1920-1938, and correspondence between City Engineer, and City Council, 16 February 1920.
124 A Stoler, 'Rethinking Colonial Categories', but a more generalized argument along these lines is contained in much South African historiography, from the nuanced treatment in S. Marks and S. Trapido, 'The Politics of
There are two aspects that require detail. As the struggles over wages, skill, and work developed, and concentrated into a pivotal 1918-1922 period, in which the consolidation of the labour market cohered in East London, it became clear that all those who were classed British or European locally, had varying, but also widely discrepant material, and potentially political, class interests. The defining presences, and 'necessary' reconciliations of these local class 'oppositions', rested on the capacity to 'see the interests of the employers and the men as one' by 1924, but this was more hesitant, more complex, and more contradictory than this common public acknowledgment suggestively asserted.125

For these 'real' class antagonisms were resolved within the City in its emergence as a historically different 'white power container'. A traditional explanation, and one sustainable for East London, is able to chart the dramatic impact the Rand Revolt defeats, and the subsequent Industrial Conciliaton Act of 1924 on the 'co-optation' and 'incorporation' of this white working class into a politically and ideologically quiescent 'non-class' within the local economy and state, and within the preservation of existing social relations.126 Put differently, the white working class in East London could be viewed as becoming historically 'bounded', creating 'pockets of privilege', and in which, despite concerns of class exploitation, these concerns were overshadowed by a materially induced strategy of political and ideological racism, which defensively and exclusively bound them more significantly to the interests of the dominant commercial racial order (and ultimately the dominant white commercial capitalist classes), and more broadly.127 This, in turn, is part of the wider set of revisionist arguments, locating modern racism as the critical ideological and political ingredient to the successful foundation of determinant industrial capitalism (after the mineral revolution).128


125 *Daily Dispatch*, 2 April 1921; BCI, Box 33, Minutes of Meeting between Council, Employers and Trade Union representatives, including W. Blake, 15 May 1920, 22 June 1924, 18 August 1924.


127 See S. Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development*, ch. 12; R Davies, et al, 'Class Struggle and the Periodization of the State in South Africa', 10-13, 19-20; R. Fine (with D. Davis), *Beyond Apartheid*, 80-85 despite pointing to internal differences. B. Hirson, *Yours for the Union*, 28-34, talks of white worker racism as 'parroting that of the ruling class, but was more virulent', 29, for example. By more broadly, I intend their inclusion, by extension, into the 'national' South African state, and into political parties and labour organizations, and ultimately in their emergence as a complicit petty-bourgeoisie.

128 I do recognize that the issues of segregation, and apartheid on the one hand, and white working class racism on the other, have received important new forms of analysis, and critical re-assessment, as in the work of S. Dubow, *Racial Segregation*, esp. ch.1; I. Berger, 'Solidarity Fragmented: garment workers of the Transvaal, 1930-1960' in S. Marks and S. Trapido, (eds.), *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism*, 124-155; E. Brink, "Maar 'n klomp
But even if I, locally for East London, 're-utilize' Freund's important qualification that '[t]here is little reason to ascribe the origins of the consequent disunity among workers to the machinations of capital ...', and that these divisions were '... probably widely internalized amongst workers'129, 'conditions of economic class struggle'/industrialization remains ultimately determinant of the sharpening, intensifying and institutionalization of white worker racism. This racism serves as the basis of material and political incorporation, differentiation and privileged inclusion amongst the dominant classes of East London, and more widely, and conversely the collapse of, dilution, and destruction and disintegration of real class interests as workers.130

The incorporation of this working class had little, in overt and conscious articulation, organization, and 'incorporation', to do with mobilizations of race. As culturally expressive moments, the strikes, and the 1921 May Day Parade created public spaces bordering on aspects of 'the carnival' in which discourses on class achieved an ambiguous space of alterity to those of 'the official' and 'the master'. Inseparably tied up with space, as a contingent period of distance, and proximity, white workers socially inverted the established colonial-settler power of community, but simultaneously reverted class to the 'rightful expression in order of the individual citizen'.131 It was precisely these processes which served to ground the space of labour within the material space of the city, and render, in their resolution, its abstraction into social backdrop and labour market 'stage'. 'Playing to the gallery', the languages of class became embroiled in local party and state politics and elections, and in defining 'the labouring man' in the image of the 'chief citizen' (the Labour Party mayor), the material struggles of white workers became centred on 'individual freedoms and rights' as 'citizens within labour'.132

129 B. Freund, 'Social Character', 86

130 See S. Marks and S. Trapido, 'The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism', 25, although I have altered, and added to the context and formulation of the original, I do not believe with significant detraction from their argument. I do recognize, as they do, the exceptions, differences and unevenness, especially in terms of ethnicity, gender, and skill in particular.

131 Daily Dispatch, 3 May 1921.

132 Daily Dispatch, 11 February 1919; Interview, 5e, B.B., 18 December 1990, who articulated this context of collective struggles about individual rights. This was part of a wider set of struggles and discourses, in which the repressive state actions of 1914, and earlier had emphasized the 'lack of freedoms' and the curtailment of the unions, in which the 'white was weakened as a defensive power', and peace and prosperity re-defined by working class access to the state, political freedoms, and material rewards.
An individual memory also pointed to the period as one where collective worker activity originating out of material conflicts, acquired a context for individuals to gain respect and power in the city and the community, while its ending reflected the 'acceptance' of labour as a social and political force. And so, in turn, the structure of the labour market and its translation 'into place' was effected within the working class' production of space.

Equally significantly, the 'collapse' of labour militancy had explanations in material and workplace stability, and 'advantages gained' out of the strikes, in the recognition of skill and rate-for-the-job, and in local Labour Party 'forced inclusion' definitions of white labour. The re-capture of the unions by a more 'traditional' and 'responsible' leadership, after 1922 and the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act, representing the 'real interests of the men' as complicit and non-confrontational also emerged, and scattered evidence suggests a similar pattern of impact on conservatism and individualism, as charted for the Western Cape/Cape Town by Nicol. These processes occurred within a contingent patterned logic of local class identities and historical foundations, however, that bound these white workers, and their leaders/organizations into the 'flight of privilege' and the 'journey of work to chief citizen'.

Against 'accepted' notions that the importance of skill and workplace 'made' working class identity and militancy, it was rather marginal paint and tramway workers that were most active, while craft, skill, and trade was cohesive 'in little groups' with practically 'no relation to one another' as workers. The proliferation of unions in these decades, and their parochialism in promoting a group-skill-trade ideology and support, breaks the threads of working class experience as causal for identification and formation. It sits rather more comfortably in the contradictory traces of similar needs and aspirations of individual freedoms, and in the distinctions of the masters, who are equally differentiated and fragmented.

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133 Interview, Se, B.B., 18 December 1990.
135 See M. Nicol, 'A History of the Garment and Tailoring Workers'.
136 See BCI, Box 20, File 225/62, Notes on 'White Labour', no date, but apparently compiled in the late 1920s, and a related letter to W. Blake, 16 May 1931, suggests, that it was compiled, with at least very close co-operation from some of the workers, and union leaders involved in the early 1920s, as well as on information collected from the Council and Employers.
137 See H.H. Smith, 'Development of Labour Organization', ch. 4.
138 See BCI, Box 20, Files 225/62, Notes on 'White Labour'.

of these more marginal worker groupings, and their struggles, 'under sway' of a group of individuals 'schooled' in the Labour Party, and on the Rand, class is given a particular conceptual meaning, and agency. A tenuous collective representation and articulation for this working class, that was materially elitist, socially entitling and empowering, hierarchical, globally British, and racially exclusive in the 'locales' of place, emerged. Simultaneously 'the class of labour' came to be read, represented, and realized as the inscriptions, realities and identities attached to the structures, practices and discourses of this class in locality.

Its impact as the first working class in the city, and its political 'emergence' in this period and in this manner, became socially, and spatially embedded in defining local class relations of power and subjectivity. And in the moments of transition from the labour conflicts to the 1921 May Day Parade, the 'tradesmen separated from the rabble', and the 'leaders of the workingman' and the 'rabble-rouser' were brought together, their interests 'conjoined in the festival of holiday', and in the words of Mayor Neale 'organized labour took on an identity in the affairs of the City that even Stewart and his propagators had failed to instigate'. But, he continued, '... it is a role that we should encourage ..., it has the countenance of reason, and the prospect of citizens of labour for peace and prosperity'.

What becomes apparent is that these working class identities in this period of heightened conflict, universalized political and social inclusions and individual freedoms, as an essential vehicle of imaginatively, and materially constructing East London as a modern city, and as a community. White workers occupied, and were equally centrally involved in the production of space in the city that diachronically refused the squalid city trenches and disorder of British urban industrialization. Thus while City Hall could 'echo to the ring of the Red Flag', and Oxford Street to the 'marching feet of Mayday', workers won the right to be 'under the British flag' in their daily lives, and in the 'service of suburban trams' that cohered neighbourhood and workplace into unities of individual places - shared, expected, 'righted', and experienced. By the mid-1920s these had become 'uniform securities' of social and spatial reproduction and representation; security of work and workplace, secure and defined labour markets, secure individual

140 Daily Dispatch, 19 December 1919, 21 March 1920.
'freedoms' - all patterned by these particular local class identities in the re-commoditization of labour - into, and as part of the production of local capitalist space.

The resolution of this period of 'concentrated passion', in which 'East London's workingman' forced class and division into 'the community', through the workplace and issues of skill, rates, wages, and overtime/benefits, and through the union, rested on its formalization and consolidation into a structured identity and discourse of class in daily life in East London. Worker neighbourhoods were re-modelled, 'greened' and upgraded, municipal elections and party politics 'entered every one of their streets', and workers 'found the Esplanade and the Orient to their liking ... in droves'.141 Sporting facilities and club leagues were re-structured with 'good coaching, good management, and good fellowship' that saw 'the workingman spectating, ... and participating with outstanding results' in rugby, cricket, and soccer. The Buffalo Club noted in 1925 that 'with more time for leisure', and 'no longer concerned with the politics of Labour', the club was 'forced to welcome the workingman on an unprecedented scale, and a good thing too.'142 In the workplaces language and negotiation re-affirmed skill, but in the changed context of employer and labour over master and men. Working conditions for labour 'improved dramatically', and, with 'mutual respect being found across industries', the 'previously narrow lines of vertical indifference' and 'horizontal isolation' were transcended.143 And in the writing and evidences of the archive, in public and private minutes, the discourses of work, labour and class changed from 'silent indifference', and hostility, to articulation and elaboration within a new framework of explicit community inclusion.

The transitions in the 'otherness' of white workers, from craft to intersections with working class identities were both hesitant and contradictory, as local space and labour was locally re-commoditized and fragmented, at the same time as it was universalized across East London. A new imaginative, and material unity was established, in part, precisely through the consolidation of a British and urban 'market capitalism'. This occurred spatially and socially, across and in differing, yet more mutually stable, class


142 Buffalo Club Archive, Annual Report, December 1925. This is not to suggest that sports clubs, which were in existence before the 1890s, (although it was this decade of the 1920s that formalized Border sporting unions), did not have working class membership and participation, including some clubs formed and dominated by particular craft and sectorial 'employees', as well as via educational/school club links, but the 1920s was a distinctive post-war period of change in terms of re-defining class and leisure for the white working class.

143 BCI, Box 20, Files 225/62, and 225/63, Notes on 'White Labour'. 
identities and localities, and its capacity to generate and accommodate individualism, 'freedom', and fragmentation in its abstraction was significant.

The working class in East London also became part of the re-generation of local power, and in the politics and representations of subaltern rule. For, to return to the labour struggles of the 1917-1921 period as a beginning, if 'native job competition' was not locally determinant in forcing these struggles, the Rand connections and processes 'implied [racism] in any industrial dispute' over this possibility. In East London, while I have argued this was far more muted and Rand 'distanced' in the actualization of labour conflicts and the related emergence of collective worker identities as racist, the social constructions of white worker racism were ever-present. The process of this race formation amongst white workers does share many of the assignations and inventions out of, and through the colonial past, but, as Stuart Hall argues, there are a 'multiplicity of racisms'. In tracking what this might entail for, and in, East London, the tensions between the voluntarism of specific forms of racial mobilization and the 'choiceless confines' of existing racist discourse echoed as much through City Hall as did the Red Flag, and hummed through the tram power-lines of divided neighbourhoods, in the formation of collective worker identities that were racist, and racialized. Importantly, though, these worker class identities simultaneously re-elaborated the politics and meaning of race and identity, spatially and socially.

It is both unstartling, and increasingly commonplace (if less so) to assert that as first and second generation immigrants, British workers brought with them the 'habitus' of racial identity and superiority, and of class combined with 'imperial' identification to the 'advantage of the latter'. In East London, these identities, bolstered by skill, trade, education, and 'civilized practices of association', were represented in cultural webs of signification that affirmed difference in 'body, language, attire and abode', to quote a newly arrived, and self-consciously, assertively superior 'tradesman'. This 'imperial racism' of class inter-penetrated with the locally prevalent colonial frontier identities of subaltern otherness. Shaped in the 'white-washing' crucibles

144 See L. Barrow, 'White Solidarity in 1914', in R. Samuel, (ed.), Patriotism, Volume 1 (London, 1989), but as s/he suggests this is part of a widely held interpretation in South African history.


146 Letter to Daily Dispatch, 27 July 1919.
of necessary military conquest, impurity and uncivilized salvation, and the separate 'strange and alien tribal world of the Reserve native' and in particular what this entailed in the objectives, performances and attitudes to labour in migrant, 'non-urban, and evasive comparisons, it did not take 'much imagination' to 'refuse brotherhood' with the 'backward native' and 'barefoot kaffir'- stereotypes of manual labour marshalled in the workplaces with utmost regularity in the first two decades in East London.\(^{147}\) They cannot ... [wrote Albert Lawson], be of the brethren of civilized labour, ... for then we are sunk into the devils care, overwhelmed by the sea of barbarity, ... losing the souls of our civilization, out trade'.\(^{148}\) While this 'civilizing mission' with a difference could be described as 'fanatical and lunatic' by Latimer, a more 'rational and cool-headed' response to the perceived 'transgression' of the classificatory categories of labour structure and activity by 'natives' was elaborated out of the white working class in these decades, and particularly in the 1920s.\(^{149}\)

In language, and argument remarkably similar to that of 'socialist groups' in South Africa in the 1930s,\(^{150}\) 'native' workers were 'backward and uneducated', 'tribal' and 'barbarous and naıve (sic)', they didn't conform to even the most basic 'civilized dress', 'smelt like an animal', and behaved as 'in the kraal, indolent and drunk' even when 'sober on the job'.\(^{151}\) And the local Labour Party, drawing on 'white Australia' policies and examples, reduced black labour to that of 'native boys', while maintaining an absolute world divide between labour and the 'shovelers of cow dung', even if more typically this was contained in a silence of accepted opposition and exclusion.\(^{152}\)

147 Evidence to South African Native Affairs Commission, Volume 2, 1904/5. These descriptions draw on the most regular representations which also included the equally regular use of 'dirty natives', 'native barbarity', 'natives of lower order', etc to depict, catalogue, and explain different places in the world of East London. See also BCI, Box 20, 225/62, Notes on 'White Labour', which contains reference to the primitive state of 'native labour', and CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 3-6, and 1092, in Location Superintendent Reports for the period.

148 Latimer Papers, Letter from Blake to Latimer, 7 June 1921, referring to the 1920 strike, Personal File 8, correspondence.

149 Latimer Personal Papers, correspondence between Latimer, and Neale (the mayor), and the resident magistrate, 24 September 1927, 15 May 1928.

150 See B Hirson, Yours for the Union, 10-14, for example. Hirson, expectedly, ascribes this to a 'failure compounded by theoretical poverty, an inability to analyse the nature of capitalist development in the country, and a difficulty in understanding the problems of the newly formed or forming African proletariat', 10. I think there are a lot more complex, and less deterministic possibilities opened by the East London example.

151 See in particular BCI, Box 20, File 225/65. Notes on 'White Labour', containing a series of anecdotes, observations, and 'views' of white workers on the 'differences of native labour', and revealingly sub-titled 'Differences Between natives and workingmen'.

152 Laweson Papers. Miscellaneous Minutes and correspondence of East London Labour Party, 22 May 1921, and attached correspondence. Although scattered and uneven in record, it is sufficiently detailed and consistent to enable the above reading.
Of course, this is revealing of the paucity, ideological crudity and vehemence of white worker racism below the surface, and the 'theoretical poverty' of Labour politics and trade union practices, but even more significant was the reworking of colonial/racial alterity and subaltern otherness within working class foundation and universality as white. Most obvious in the unions, and political organizations of the 1920s, skill and race kept 'the natives' out, in the name of progress and civilization. Informed as 'naturalized' constitutive elements of working class identity and politics, the evidences of workplace and daily experience were similarly divided and exclusive.

In the early 1900s, threatening to 'transgress' and 'pollute' the given colonial social order in 'native' urbanization, locality spread, and in work patterns and localities of labour, and faced with the post South African War 'poor whiteism' which did more than 'muddy' these 'threatened' social distanciations from 'the Other side', the local social order of the colonial port was re-invented - conceptually, spatially and socially. The underlying thread of the 'variety and vision' was one of 'running business'. This re-invention 'connected' the colonial discourse and material reality of the 'contained hostile heathen' to local economic interests, in the spread and dominance of commercial capitalism, in the 'fixed location' of 'impurity', tribalism, the bordering reserves and in 'migrant cheap labour'.

The 1920s, however, witnessed a further re-elaboration of a racialized discourse of rule, but in this case from a more detailed white working class connection, (itself in elaboration), and one that entailed the 'removal' of 'native' class identities and discourses, at the same time as rigidifying racial divisions of labour. In the 1920s the classificatory systems, orders and values, and the 'ways of seeing' the 'native' changed in East London. Its object to 'remove all doubt from the native mind', in the much admired and repeated words of Gen. Hertzog, had a local meaning and impetus. While Ashford's conclusions of the National

153 See Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 1948, which provides an overview of the 'received wisdom' of this period. Also BCI, Boxes 15 and 16, COC Records, and correspondence between Baker, and the City Council, Letters 22 November 1923, and 27 February 1926 in particular.

154 This point is taken up and elaborated in Chapter Two below.

155 J.B. Hertzog, 'The Segregation Problem', published in the Daily Dispatch, December, 1925, and found in the municipal, commerce, and industry archives, as well as in the 'labour movement' S.A. Labour Party archive in the Laweson Papers, and extensively commented on in the local unions and political organizations, which, it would appear, initiate its circulation, and determine its 'reading', given supplementary comments in local capital and administrative sources, BCI, Box 20, 225/64, Notes on 'White Labour'. More generally, see M. Lacey, Working for Boroko, and A. Ashford, The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth Century South Africa (Oxford, 1990), for discrepant interpretative comments which shaped my thinking.
Economic Commission’s ‘permanent cure for an economic evil’ in the ‘organicist’ and ‘scientific’ essentialist separation, and mechanical and abstract ‘contact’ of ‘Natives-Reserves-tribal’ and ‘Europeans-Union-civilization’\textsuperscript{156} cohered, and marked the ‘admiration’ and ‘practice’ of the social technologies and strategies of official administrative power in the 1930s and 1940s, its local ‘evolution’ relied on white workers.

This grew out of the old. The context of collectively defining class in terms of individual citizenship and freedom, paralleled the time that official discourse asserted, and implemented a Reserve and Location subalternity to ‘native labour’. In the early 1900s ‘native labour’ had been perceived as uncontrollable and the ‘natives’ as ‘masters of the situation’, and they had been ‘contained’. This same attitude and potential was seen to be emergent for dominant local representations towards white labour in the 1917-1922 period. The links were explicit, and vocal, and comparisons to the ‘tyranny of the British state’ to its workers made with random (and generalized vague) historical ease.\textsuperscript{157} Voiced in the rhetoric of denials - of speech, association, political representation, collective action, rights as citizens, freedoms, and facing the perceived ‘real threat of the army’, repression, and deportation, Stewart suggested workers ‘will be denied the Union, no better than the kaffirs in their mud-huts’\textsuperscript{158}. This was to become an extraordinary ‘parallelogram of force’ in local politics, etched into the mythology of memory of two generations of white workers,\textsuperscript{159} and more widely, as East London displayed its provincialism. In the subsequent ‘caution of militancy’, and ‘logic’ of denial in individualizing objectives, the fear of reversal became equally identifiable in white working class knowledge: that ‘natives’, according to authority and employers were, in significant part, defined, in the City, (as opposed to the Reserves), as labour. On the other hand, white labour mapped a route into local power through a linking of racial and working class identities that became mutually reinforceable in this period. The combination of re-affirmed skill, re-deployed and defined craft unionism with racial labour politics and identities meshed with the citizenship of class to abstract ‘the native’ from labour.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{156} A. Ashford, \textit{The Politics of Official Discourse}, ch. 2.
\textsuperscript{157} Daily Dispatch, November 1919; Laweson Papers, S.A. Labour Party Minutes, 16 August 1921, 25 June, 1924; BCI Box 20, File No. 225/64, Notes on ‘White Labour’.
\textsuperscript{158} Laweson Papers, S.A. Labour Party Minutes, 16 August 1921, 25 June 1924.
\textsuperscript{159} Interviews, 5a, 5e, 5f, 5k. December 1990.
\textsuperscript{160} Laweson Papers, S.A. Labour Party Minutes, 25 June 1924.
In particular, the First World War was important. The Kaffrarian Rifles, an infantry regiment of ‘about 1,000 strong’ was mobilized, first in the ‘desert campaigns’ of colonial Namibia, and after 1915, under the Defence Act ‘forced demobilization’, ‘practically all its members joined other wartime units, for service either in East Africa or in France’.\(^{161}\) Its impact, not without strenuous ideological justification, and relatively insignificant structural actuality, was to ‘open up jobs’ to the ‘best natives’, some of whom began to acquire ‘a certain degree of skill’.\(^ {162}\) In this post 1914 period, despite the sustained administrative material and ideological practices of racial difference and exclusion, the dominant agents of the local economy found themselves ‘in sympathy’ with the emergent administrative discourse that emphasized the ‘impermanence of the native in the city’, ‘here only to work so long as the whiteman desires’, and then expected to ‘beat a hasty retreat’ back into rural impoverishment in the ‘neighbouring reserves’.\(^ {163}\) But this was to force a contradiction, and a differentiation between the administrative and material socio-spatial networks of local power. White employers began to employ ‘permanent’ manual labour, but also an extremely thin layer of ‘skilled natives’ in administrative and clerical occupations, and in ‘the trades’, especially connected to construction. This practice began to break down the local connections between skill and racial identity, and was determined by this changing ‘market for labour’.\(^ {164}\) It occurred in the context of the war’s ‘we have no choice’ employer rationality, but also as sections of ‘native labour’ became commoditized, ‘stably urban’ and the ‘fracture of education between european and native’ comminuted across lines of race.\(^ {165}\)

These labour ‘substitutions’ and ‘permanences’ began, then, to suggest the possibility of an established ‘native’ material and labour market ‘skein of journeys’ winding inwards and upwards through East London's

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\(^{161}\) *Daily Dispatch Centenary Special*, 1948, Lt-Col L H Bailie, M.C., ‘Story of the Kaffrarian Rifles’, 36

\(^{162}\) BCI, Box 20. File No. 225/64, Notes on ‘White Labour’; CA 3/ELN, Box 24, Correspondence between Native Commissioner, and Local Magistrate, 23 September 1927.

\(^{163}\) CA, 3/ELN, Box 1092, Magistrate to Town Council, 1902; Box 115, Letter from Location Superintendent to Town Clerk, February 1924; Box 453, letter from Superintendent of Natives to Magistrate, 20 November 1913; Boxes 3, and 4, Report of the Location Superintendent, 5 November 1925, Public Health Department Report, 9 November 1927.

\(^{164}\) BCI, Box 15 and 16, which include Chamber of Commerce records for WW1, and the period until the early 1930s. In this case Minutes of Meeting, dated 12 June 1918.

\(^{165}\) BCI, Box 16, COC Records, Meeting, 4 January 1919; CA 3/ELN, 4, and 624, and 960, Magistrate's and MOH Reports, 1914-1923, and Report by J. Orpen, 11 November 1921.
colonial economic, and then social order. At least, this is how it appeared to the local administration, and then to white labour, at a later intersecting, but over-lapping period. Employers, on the other hand, were less equivocal, and individually more fragmented, over the socio-spatial relationships between location subalternity, racial identities, and the workplace, labour demand and puncturing labour markets.

Increasingly though, the marketplace for 'native labour' was defended as both 'necessary' and 'vital', while issues of 'their' skilling and differentiation, on, and through it, marginalized and avoided in the metaphor of 'temporary'. These local disputes over the intersections of race, class and subalternity, opened counterpositions of the analytics of social power between the workplace and the location, and their differing connections to the nearby Reserves, as the official spaces in the exercise of Union power. More specifically, this period opened up, and re-elaborated differing alignments of local forms of power, the 'fine links' running through the local social order, but emergent out of a changing historical system of global, and regional colonial power in urban form. In the case of East London this 'intensified' from below in a double sense of the importance of the dynamics of the local, and out of a 'site' of resistance and change through the white workers. This was generated as the colonial knowledges, methods and procedures that supported forms of East London's imaginative community, and in part, conditioned its existence, tended to break down, and overreach their connections of workplace and location. This actively involved the mobilizations of class and racial identities as 'unstable and decentred complexes' of social meaning.

While racial mobilizations did not feature overtly in the discourses of the labour disputes after the war, the 'mobbing' undercurrent, with its Rand sounding board, ran below the surface. Its threads contained the well-worn 'natural' metaphors of 'swamping', 'engulfed' by a 'sea of barbarous native labour' - part of the 'hostile environment' that needed social, and spatial resolution (and reflecting a profoundly important index of unresolved colonial spatiality as well). It potentially entailed the dual 'realities' of 'sinking' to 'drown' amidst the 'teeming hordes clambering at the gates of the city' in both workplace and residence, or the corollary, 'elevation' of native labour into civilization, and the breakdown of the existing social order.

166 To borrow a phrase, and re-utilize a conception developed by B. Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983), 105-111.
167 BCI, Box 16/ File No. 64, Minutes of Meeting between Employers and City Council, 13 October 1925.
168 Laweson Papers, Minutes of S.A. Labour Party, 12 November 1919; Daily Dispatch, 3 May 1920.
169 Laweson Papers, Meeting, 12 November 1919; CA 3/E LN, Box 3; Daily Dispatch, 12 July 1920.
And the City Council, and Employers of labour were responsible for 'opening the floodgates' to the ambiguities and contradictions of 'native' working class formation, not only on new, but the previously 'solid ground of the european workingman'.

'Natives labour', the Mayday committee suggested, 'must remain in his domain in the Kaffir territories, ... the status of his labour does not, and must not, in the future entitle requests of equal footing such as this ... we must ensure the native remains a native'. This was carried unanimously with no dissent, no transgression.

This concern to broaden and re-extend subalternity that defined and specified labour as 'native' distinct from 'european' as categories of fact, the 'heart of the matter' for East London, spread across, and re-configured its spatial and social and material understandings and interventions after the 1920s.

While misreading the representativeness of the local administration, the transgression of material socio-spatial relations reflected 'the belief of employers' in the spatiality of labour markets that assumed a political and cultural closing of 'native' class identities, but which, as white workers demonstrated, was not necessarily 'in the market'. White workers and their struggles, Union internalizations, and local re-formulations, were contingently crucial in 'closing them down', and (re)producing socio-spatial networks of racial AND class representations of local power.

The foundation of the local working class along intersecting lines of skill, race, and the individual, 'freed' a spatial division of labour that owed as much to the Location as it did to the unions and the workplace. It was, in fact, the Location that enabled white workers, the labour market and the workplace, and working class identities, a remarkably stable racial and spatial foundation. And it was through the Location, and the synchronic 'pushing back' of 'native labour' into that space, primarily through white worker struggles and re-definitions, that local capitalist space became abstracted and reproduced as simultaneously racial.

White working class racism in East London was a central ingredient in defining capitalism and class relations more broadly then, but did not originate or materialize according to some false or distorted

170 Laweson Papers, Labour Party Minutes, 7 May 1921, a perspective shared by the Mayday committee meeting of all major unions in East London. See also BCI, Box 33, correspondence, 27 April 1921. The issue arose out of a representation by the Native Vigilance Association, which was connected to the 1920 'native' strike (more below) to participate in the parade; Interview, A L, 2 January 1990.

171 BCI, Box 33, Mayday committee meeting, 27 April 1921.

172 BCI, Box 33, Mayday committee Meeting, and attached correspondence, 27 April 1921, to 3 November 1925.
ideology. It was rather grounded far more complexly within the logic of class formation and identity. The differentiated and uneven form and content of white working class racism did allow for, and intensify colonial and 'native' exclusions, through these very class struggles. Racial identities intersected with class, but in ways that suggest that through the elaboration of this local and particular working class ideology and politics (and conflict), race was re-hegemonized, and class naturalized as racially distinctive. Racial identities were not conscious or 'false' strategies derivative of class co-optation, but were imbedded historically, into class relations and pre-figured class foundations. Racism might have emphasized the whiteness of class, ideologically, but class carried within its very foundations and universalisms, the habitus and identities of race, from above and below. In other words, race also pre-figured, and determined in fundamental respects, not just the objective relations and realities of the ownership/non-ownership of land, labour and capital, but more significantly, who was, and who could be universalized and foundationalized in class relations in East London.

But, of course, East London was built equally, increasingly from the 1920s, on the sweat and the muscle of the 'barefoot brigades', the 'ragged and dispirited', and those consigned to the official and company 'scrapheap' of the 'unskilled'. Labour-power all, and massively dependent on some form of wage, these experiences of wage labour were naturalized, and hegemonized as other than, or outside of locally defined capitalist class relations, if not from particular contexts of 'the glow of money' and the processes of commoditization, including labour. This local conceptualization of the subaltern, outside of civilization, inferior, factually subject, and spatially distinct, entailed a hegemonic process of not class domination, but class silencing and exclusion in the discourses of domination, centred on race. The necessary, and naturalized components and conceptions of legitimate and visible, acceptable, and natural class relations, as reflected in a modern and civilized capitalist economy excluded 'the native'. To be 'native' was to be 'outside' of class, defined initially in terms of craft and skill, but then built on racial and european difference. This naturalized power through the exclusion of access to 'native' class discourses and identities, while simultaneously naturalizing race in class relations by the mid-1920s in East London.

173 BCI, Box 24, Correspondence, 'Native Labour', 13 April 1926, 2 February 1927.
CHAPTER TWO


In April 1925, amidst the new Pact government’s potential ‘national’ and ‘labour’ impacts for ‘relations with the mother-country’ contained at this point within the rumoured demise of imperial preference, 1 the local Chamber of Commerce met for what turned out to be an ‘extraordinary meeting’ in more than its nominal sense. 2 In one respect, the agenda returned the Chamber to discussions prominent in 1916/17 over ‘protection’ and free trade/preference for Britain. Then, as again in these 1925 discussions, the views of the large import-export wholesalers predominated, and a free trade policy of imperial preference was promoted as ‘in the best interests of East London’s development’. But the ‘discussion of opposition’, while framed in the context of ‘potentially cutting the most profitable ties’ with a more vociferous opposition against ‘this new government’s intended interference with our customers requirements’, and ‘... our ability to cater for them’, also explicitly refused a local ‘manufacturing replacement’ in ‘possibility or potential’ for the first time - at least as clearly articulated as this was - in a commerce-industry divide. 3 Another set of dividing lines also were newly drawn, which tended to intersect with this emphasized commerce-manufacturing division, and this was located within the ‘community of commerce’. 4 It became apparent at this meeting, though, that the Chamber contained small-scale manufacturers, and master workshoppers within its ranks, but also that the pressures of the ‘terrible slump of 1920 when the value of goods dropped

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1 Daily Dispatch, 17 July 1924, and 5 August 1924; This perspective, of course, resonates with the conceptual thrust of the ‘1924 Turning Point’/radical break perspective, in the context of a national capital/white worker/racism-state/(Afrikaner) urban nationalism, and against imperial/mining/commercial interests; see D. Yudelman, The Emergence of Modern South Africa, ch. 1, and ch. 7, in particular, for a sustained critique, and useful summary. But see also W.G. Martin, The Making of an Industrial South Africa, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 1990, and especially 74-75, for a commercial context.

2 BCI, Box 16, File A/62, correspondence between Baker and COC, 27 April 1925, and miscellaneous minutes of meetings, Chamber of Commerce, 1923-1929; and in particular those of 25 April 1925, 22 May 1925 and 19 June 1925.

3 BCI, Box 16, File 62A, Minutes of meetings of COC for 1925, including 25 April, 28 August 1925, and 23 February 1926.

4 BCI, Box 16, File 62A, Minutes of Meetings for 1925 and 1926. Again the meeting of the 25 April 1925 was particularly noteworthy in detail and dispute, which prompted extensive correspondence between W. Orpen, E. Baker, J. Wilson and others.
by half overnight and many a firm was forced into insolvency,\textsuperscript{5} together with the intervening insecurities of 'rumoured protective markets' in this period, opened a discursive route for 'merchants' (and smaller commercial capital) into the arena of the industrialist.\textsuperscript{6}

Martin has pointed importantly to the internal divisions of north/interior and south/coastal within ASSOCOM, and the 'commercial community', determined by the nature of their respective 'ties' to international (British/London) and domestic (South African/Reef) markets, and the 'increasing tendency for commercial operations to move into light manufacturing', with Chambers in the interior, having '... increasing numbers of manufacturers within their ranks', which served to '... limit the strength and unity of the voice of commercial capital'.\textsuperscript{7} The East London case suggests the need to extend, and problematize these spatial and material divisions suggested in Martin's work.

While the East London Chamber of Commerce was not to become as sharply divided into these 'national' spatial identifications, remaining 'coastal', three intersecting processes emerged out of the contexts of the 1925 Tariff Act, and the 1925-33 period of protection for local industry more generally,\textsuperscript{8} including its rumours, discussions, memoranda, and locally internalized reports. This served to weaken, and re-locate the voices of Wilson, Baker, Weir, Visbert Snell, Crawford MacKenzie and others in locally dominant commercial capital.

Firstly, by 1927, the Border Chamber of Industries (BCI) was formally established \textsuperscript{9} as a direct outgrowth of the stimulation of 'tariff re-orientations', and local 'industrial needs, ... ignored by the body of commerce

\textsuperscript{5} BCI, Box 16, File 62B, J W Weir, and Co., Records, and self-publicised document entitled 'Service to the Community' - a 'Company history', reflecting transitions in the 1920s, no date, 3-8.

\textsuperscript{6} BCI, Box 16, File No. 62A, Correspondence between E. Baker, J. Wilson and COC, 2 September 1925, and 10 January 1926.

\textsuperscript{7} W. Martin, 'The Making of an Industrial South Africa', 75. Martins arguments are enormously suggestive, but tend to be located within the parameters of his broader argument around the importance of the Customs Tariff Act of 1925, and are thus not opened out in more detail. For the rest of South African historians, commerce is reduced to marginal status, which would reinforce my contentions to a Randcentrism, simply drawing on Martins openings as explanation. For example M. Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid, includes brief discussions on 'commerce' in her chapter entitled 'The Interests of Manufacturing Capital', and S. Greenberg, Race and State in Capitalist Development, discussion of 'Manufacturing and Commerce in South Africa' as unified. The notable exceptions, but for the pre-20th century would be 'coastal' historians like V. Bickford-Smith, 'Commerce, Class and Ethnicity', and A. Mabin, 'The Making of Colonial Capitalism: Intensification and Expansion in the Economy of the Cape Colony, South Africa, 1854-1899', PhD thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1984.

\textsuperscript{8} W. Martin, 'The Making of an Industrial South Africa', 82-83.

\textsuperscript{9} BCI, Box 1, which contains an outline of its informal, and formal constitution between 1915 and 1927. The BCI was formally established in 1927, but had emerged as an informal body during the First World War, and was effectively operative from c1919.
ruling the city'. In a local variant, the fledgling collective of fourteen sector scattered and scale differentiated industrialists wished to put 'not just South Africa First, but East London First' within this Hertzog-ian political parallel so warmly emphasised by *Industrial South Africa*. While not empirically dramatic in impact on East London's economy, both the tariff/protection interventions and the formation of the BCI did have quantifiable and, more significantly, qualitative implications on local economic discourses and practises of power. In this Wilson-Rowntree was central.

Secondly, commerce became markedly internally differentiated around local industrialization. The wholesale merchant/commercial capital, and particularly the big commercial houses became, at least for a few of the 'more perceptive' 'splitters', an important source, and basis for expansion into local manufacturing. This had important shaping implications and historic spatial and social inter-connections.

Thirdly, the context of the protection period of 1925-33 generated a re-contextualization, and commoditization of tourism, and linked commercial interests into tourism as the social and material 'conservative' counter to manufacturing.

**WILSON ROWNTREE, AND THE MODEL FOR LOCAL INDUSTRIALIZATION**

To return to Wilson-Rowntree and the first process, this requires fairly extensive discussion. Established as a confectionery business in the 1880s, and as Wilson and Company in 1908 as an already functioning 'sweet

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10 BCI, Box 19, File 3A, Minutes of formal BCI meetings, 22 October, and 25 November 1927.

11 BCI, Box 19, File 3A, Minutes of Meeting of 25 November 1927; see also W.G. Martin, 'The Making of an Industrial South Africa', 78, for the context of the South Africa First - Hertzog connection.

12 It is interesting to note that this movement out of commerce into local manufacturing was labelled by the dominant commercial interests as responsible for instigating 'splits' in the commercial community, and its free trade policies and imperial trade patterns of import-export advantage. See BCI, Box 16, File 62A and 63A, Minutes of COC meetings, 11 May 1927, 12 April 1928, 14 November 1928.

13 Tourism became, explicitly, the recognized preserve of the 'conservative' (as opposed to the perceptive) interests in the majority of big commercial houses, who diversified investment into hotel, service, and the tourist trade. This identification of 'conservatism' was equal to 'split'-ing discourses, self consciously generated and derisively labelled onto big commerce by the smattering of industrialists, and the 'perceptive' commercial interests going into manufacturing, see BCI, Box 16, 62A, and 63A, Minutes of Meetings, 11 May 1927, 14 November 1928, and Box 19, BCI Minutes of Meetings, 22 June 1928, 18 October 1928.
factory' with a 'few dozen employees', it had a 'distinguished' and 'indispensable' role in the history of East London's economy. Active in the local Chamber of Commerce, and under the public banner of 'Support Colonial Industries', Wilson and Co. also had a long-standing opposition to the 'multitudinous duties levied on the component ingredients' entailed in 'quality sweet-making', over the 'far less onerous' duty implications for 'finished articles'. Arguing that it was the 'Home-made [ie British] article that gets protection against the Colonial [South African]', the company displayed at the 'great Empire Exhibition of 1924', with an attendant Mr Wilson seeking to anticipate, accommodate, and deflect the rumoured pending 'protective Customs tariff'.

For Wilson, the answer, in part generated by the favourable response to the display at the Exhibition, lay in the expansive Rowntree Company, which was busy spreading a chocolate web from Yorkshire, across the Empire (in Canada, Australia, and Ireland), in delayed response to their protective tariffs. The 'working arrangement' entailed a 'joint 50-50 ownership venture' as Rowntree-Wilsons in 1925/27, with separate marketing of Wilson and Rowntree's products. In addition certain Rowntree's products would be manufactured in the East London factory, and that 'all Rowntree's interests in South Africa would be looked after by Wilson's'. At the same time, the company would lend

unequivocal support to the new government's attempts to place Union Industries, ... like ourselves, on firmer footing' through protection and the Tariff Act. ... This is a measure we have long called for ... in taking steps ... against the Home-made advantage of the Import-Export firms ... reaping unparalleled benefits on Union markets.

The importance of Rowntree-Wilson, however, needs to be situated in a wider context in East London in this period. The 'magnitude of the industry' in scale and content in the built environment, in the high public profile of its directors and advisors, and through the localization of association with a 'manufacturing house of such world-wide fame' were all important in establishing this context. So too were its regional and sub-

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15 Company Archive, Wilson-Rowntree, 6-8 December 1986, for company details over the 1924 exhibition, the pending Tariff Act and the correspondence with Rowntree in the United Kingdom over a proposed merger, and nature of foreign investment. See also E. Rosenthal, 'Sweetmakers Story', 30-42.


17 BCI, Box 19, File 3A, Meeting of BCI, 22 October 1927.
continental (and 'world-wide') marketing networks, its publicized levels of investment, technology, turnover and profitability and the nature of company labour employment practice. All of this marked, and isolated its local spatial, social and economic singularity of influence.\(^{18}\) But it was also a series of influences that were both uneven, at best ambiguous, and in certain respects, profoundly contradictory. For, as the company drew on, and centrally promoted the local rooting of an 'implicit economic nationalism of protection' in the Chamber of Commerce divisions, and in and through the new BCI, in which the Wilsons were prominent,\(^{19}\) it practically enabled the beginnings of a local redefinition, but in no sense a repudiation, of the role of foreign investments and foreign trade within local economic and public meanings of Union industrialization as 'first'.

More generally, Rowntree-Wilson produced, and represented the well modulated, and articulate local example and voice of 'the vision of an alternative economic future' based on large-scale and localized industrial production. In many respects the Company became the local site of the internalization of the Pact governments 'alternative vision', entailed in 'the birth of a far more independent state capable of pursuing import substitution'. But, in countering, deflecting, and accommodating the ambiguities of a state directed economic nationalism of local industrialization with the 'irresistible needs' of 'world-wide foreign reputation, strength, and expansion capital', the Company and its directors, were above all political pragmatists and economic synthesizers.\(^{20}\) For, very rapidly, and at times, self-generatively, Rowntree-Wilson became 'the model' of local, and of localizing industrial development, providing the patterns, and the paths towards effecting and managing, but also simultaneously of defining import substitution in content and meaning. In particular, this model, or particular positive aspects and negative associations carried this overall content and meaning across discussions of opposition in the local Chamber of


\(^{19}\) See W. Martin, 'The Making of an Industrial South Africa', 78. He argues that 'manufacturers [in the period of the 1920s], sought to promote in the public arena the implicit economic nationalism of protection combined with the need to break with the invented tradition of South Africa as a primary producer under the British-led system of free trade', a role the state, 'independently', established, and implemented according to a 'vision of an alternative economic future for South Africa' in the localization of industrial production, or ISI, over primary export-led development. Despite R. Christie's response, and the 'debate', Martin's arguments remain convincing and important.

\(^{20}\) Company Records, 6-8 December, 1986; BCI, Box 19, File 3A and 3B, and Box 20, File 3A, and 3B, which charts, through meetings, decisions, and statements/policies recommended, the very powerful influence of Rowntree Wilson on both internal BCI thinking and strategies but also its wider impact in determining an industrial path for East London. Meeting of 22 October 1927, to 15 May 1936.
The inclusion of early Afrikaner nationalist discourse, via the Company's economic nationalist introduction of Afrikaans advertising, was also significant in elaborating this 'model'. In 1926, amidst the Rowntree merger, the Company, for example, suggested that the products of Rowntree-Wilson '... word gemaak in Suid-Afrika deur Suid-Afrikaners in Oos-Londen se model fabriek. Want .... Hulle is gelyk aan - indien nie beter as - Ingevoerde Produkte in waarde, smaak en suiverheid' with names like 'Fruit Bonbons and York Milk Chocolate'. But even if guileless in representation, and suspended in mythical Afrikaner ignorance, it resonated into 'Ons Land en Ons Volk' which, by the late 1920s, claimed

[G]edurende die afgelope paar jaar het die verwaardiging van lekkergoed in Suid-Afrika nogal 'n merkwaardige rigting ingeslaan en Wilson and Co. Bpk. het die voortou geneem om die naam van Afrikaanse lekkergoed en sjokolade - wat betref voortreklikheid - op dieselfde voet te plaas as ingevoerde produkte. ... [and continued that] ...die werk van die Welfaardepartement omvat alles wat betrekking het op die gesondheid, veiligheid en algemene welzyn van die werknemers, en op hierdie gebied neem die Wilson-Rowntree firma op Oos-Londen die voortou, ... deur 'n standaard te stel wat toegespas behoort te word op alle werkstoestande waar voedingstowwe berei word ... Hierdie nuwerwetse fabriek dwarsdeur die Unie van Suid-Afrika groot aftrek sal vind ...

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22 In translation - 'are made in South Africa by South Africans in East London's model factory. They are comparable to - if not better than - imported products in value, taste and quality'.

23 Company Archive, 6-8 December 1986; which contained the copy of a 1926 advertisement and public announcement on the commitment of the company to SA First, and amidst a growing recognition, spelt out in discussion, of the need to capture the Afrikaner, 15 November 1926.

24 Company Archives, Cutting, no date, but c1929/30, and titled 'Ons Land en Ons Volk'. In translation, it reads 'During the past year the increased value of sweets production in South Africa achieved a further, and significant boost, and Wilson and Co. Ltd. took the lead in promoting the name of Afrikaans sweets and chocolates - which will place it on a par with imported products in the future', ...and continued that ...'the work of the Welfare Department [of Wilsons] consists of everything that matters with regard to health, safety and general well-being of the workers, and in this regard, the Wilson-Rowntree firm of East London takes the lead, in setting a standard that should be enforced in all work situations and conditions where foodstuffs are produced ... this new factory will find great recognition throughout the Union of South Africa'.

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This 'model', as much as the history of the Company, was represented and reproduced in the 'glowing publicity of the local (and national) press, in 'comparative' advertising from other companies likening themselves to Rowntree-Wilson (R-W), including in market success comparability and in the planned neutralization and idealization of the space of the factory in the city.

In particular, this abstraction of factory space was tied to productive relations within the Company, while also patterning them, and was achieved through the creation of a 'Welfare Section', which included club house, cafeteria, dining room, lounge, reading rooms, ping-pong and bagatelle tables and even a billiard room.25 But more expansively, and leaving aside R-W's paternal and gendered management of 'bringing their workers into the firm' for the moment, the 'homely atmosphere of the works', the 'cheeriness of the personnel, as at an 'informal party at a private house', its 'cleanliness' and 'high standard of excellence', and its 'tasteful' image, 'unobtrusive amidst long-standing residences', was more than descriptive rhetoric. For, when linked to the 'idyllic surroundings', of a 'delightful old-world garden with sunken goldfish pool, two tennis courts and shady arbors ... [N]o wonder the East London working girl values her job at Wilson's and works zealously to retain it ... what a refresher it is in this mean, pinching world to discover a commercial haven where industry and harmony are so firmly wed'26

These representations, debates, reports and realities of R-W created, or more accurately laid the basis of a local meaning and knowledge of industrialization that simultaneously rested on local initiative and 'rootedness' as a 'colonial industry', a reliance on forms of state intervention intersected with 'economic nationalism', and ambiguously, an equally necessary high level of 'national' and especially foreign capitalist integration for finance, skills, technology and a 'competitive edge'. Equally, it laid the basis for a framework of industrial labour that cut the employment of women, if not that of gender, but asserted the racial habitus of operative and factory work. For, as has been alluded, R-W built its factory on large-scale operative white female labour, into certainly the largest factory by a significant degree in East London after the early c1920s, and especially after the introduction of Rowntree connected 'modern machinery'. It was over 50% larger than any other local industry in the early 1930s in terms of plant size, employment figures, levels of

25 Company Archives, Welfare Section Minutes, 12 May 1932.
26 Rand Daily Mail, 15 September, 1933, and reproduced in Daily Dispatch.
capital and technology investment, marketing 'access' and strategy, turnover and profitability. By 1927/8 the labour force consisted of 510 workers, of which 346 were 'white girls', (half Afrikaans speaking) and 'about 50 Bantu unskilled workers'. I will return to these issues of work and labour below, but in dominant circles of representation, R-W concretized the 'whiteness' of labour, while extending a 'breaking' craft heterogeneity into potentially inclusive operative, sexual, and ethnic definitions.

If East London's industrialization was to be patterned along these lines of labour inclusion and racial and gender definition, as Wilson, the BCI, Crawford MacKenzie (Sec of Chamber of Commerce) and mayor Norton all independently asserted in the late 1920s, the 'jingo nationalism' (of the NP-Labour Party Pact) would not 'tear down' the 'free world of commerce' established in the city. For, not only was the ambivalence of R-W's claims to an economic nationalism in the localization of production dramatically offset by the simultaneous locally orchestrated penetration of British capital, but the 'very success' of this industrial strategy (of ISI) 'depends on the maintenance of British preference', and the 'goodwill of years of trade'. The visit of Mr B. Seebohm Rowntree, 'with a view to spying out the land with a view to future policy', was 'entertained in the style of the home-country', 'picnicking with the Wilson's', and 'touring the sites [of conquest] of the Eastern Cape countryside'. His decision to invest in East London, it was inferred, had as much to do with its British 'imaginative community', shaped by commercial interests, as it did with Wilsons, or a Quaker connection. The Wilson family, on the other hand, were no less 'British', educated, trained, militarized, paternalist, and retiring to the mother country. R-W was then 'more a British Company on Union soil', than a local industry promoting South Africa first, with British 'connections'.

A similar ideological impact of Empire, it was felt, would be experienced by these 'new' categories of labour within the factory, itself a vehicle for imaginatively extending the mother country's 'sphere of influence now under such attack'. At least the Chamber of Commerce saw it like this, and reconciled local
industrialization into this framework throughout the 1930s. More elaboratively, the point is that the 'model' was contradictory, and commercial interests were simultaneously both 'oppositional' and incorporative in a framework of British commercial dominance, which was 'managed', and over time, reconciled up until the 1940s. But both 'opposition', and parallel inclusions of similarity framed the R-W experience as 'the model industrial option' for the city from the 'side' of commerce.

These four necessarily inter-connected threads structured the local parameters of possible import substitution industrialization, they generated its local existing, and future framework into a rigidified 'code of acceptance' and desirability, and curtailed industrialization for at least the next two decades as the 'reputation' of R-W proved prospective undesirability for other investments. In addition to this patterning of local industrialization 'frameworks of possibility' from below exogenous determinations, its potential social and spatial implications were cast within the existing frameworks elaborated in the previous chapter, and reproduced in R-W's production and representations of industrial space as racial and British. In this the intersections with and between commercial, white worker, and 'native' spatiality, as well as the landscapes and spatiality of colonial, empire, and imperial placing was significant.

But, of course it took up and generated 'new' contexts of this spatiality, elaborated in its socio-spatial relations in the factory, and extended in the public sphere via the workplace - of 'South Africa (and East London) First', of gender, and of ethnic Afrikaner nationalism. This was also initially elaborated in discourses of machine production and 'industrial revolution' comparative consequences and implications for the city from R-W. The spatiality of the city thus was changed by the factory - by the introduction of women workers - as was the social relations and socio-spatial implications of defining 'the public' sphere in East London. Space and social access, determined, fought, and defined by white workers, in labour defining individual rights and freedoms in the 1917-c25 period, was also markedly gendered. But white male dominance of productive 'respectable work' was to be challenged, and changed by the 'female workforce' lead of R-W in recasting the 'manufacturing' labour preserves of the city.

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33 BCI, Box 21, Minutes of COC, and BCI representative, 11 April 1930, and attached minutes for the 1930s.
By 1927/8 the 'industrial' labour force of the city that was 'female' had jumped to 518 from the 1924/5 figure of 212 (including 40 'female' Wilsons workers).34 But, within the factory, the 'female workforce' was recast socially as 'our girls', not yet 'mature', 'married' or 'mothers' as R-W prided itself in employment practice and representation. It was thus able to both 'mould' a 'future welfare' of 'obedience', 'hard-work' and 'happiness' in marriage and home, and 'not interfere with the family unit' through factory labour. Spatially, this infringement into the factory entailed a representation of the factory floor likened to a 'domestic kitchen', the 'welfare' spaces to 'family visits', and neighbourhood 'private tea-parties' (with its Rest and Recreation Rooms equipped with 'easy chairs, rugs, a library of books, a piano, and a gramophone), and jointly, R-W was 'a large home', a 'Happy and Contented Factory', and a 'haven' of female domesticity.35 And women were paid much less.

With many of the 'female staff Afrikaans speaking' by the early 1930s, language was tied expediently to 'South Africa First'. Despite the advantages of tariff protections materially, the social implications of distinctively gendered 'Afrikaner' proletarianization 36 carried a more 'weighty' spatial implication, in 'the nation', and the necessary inscriptions on national soil and employment, material and welfare claims and practices. The Company dealt with this process socially, via advertising, and by promoting Afrikaner identities and identifications, represented as South African, as was the Company, while asserting the spatialness of W-R as South African, on South African soil and interests. It simultaneously extended and linked this materially and spatially to Britain, and British capital. And implicit in this linking difference and distinction of ownership and work, and of the relative ranking of British and South African spatial divisions of labour, the hierarchical placing of Afrikaners in industrialization, and the dependent spatiality of this form of local industrialization, was elaborated. The implications of this was the spatial and social inclusion of Afrikaners into a factory, and subsequent industrial reality (as this was extended beyond the factory into

35 Company Archives, Notes on Welfare Dept., including self-representations, 15 October 1932; Daily Dispatch, September 1933; Rand Daily Mail, 15 September 1933.
36 Company Archives, Welfare Dept. Minutes, 12 March 1932. See discussions below, but of the roughly 140 Afrikaans 'girls' employed in R-W by c1931/2, the vast majority were 'new to town', and the majority had found themselves at the receiving end of rural based 'poor white' dispossession and differentiation. Those originating from the Transkei (a large number, perhaps 50-60), for example, were described unhesitantly as 'ex-bywoners'. Also Interview, Sh, I.A., 18 January 1990.
an industrialization model) that denied, while ideologically asserting, a South African economic nation, and a continued ‘dependence’ on the British economy, in both old but also new ways.37

This contradiction was socially and spatially significant, in that it enabled ‘local production’ and marketing competition of previously imported sweets/chocolates, but tied a route of classic dependence 38 ‘from below’. This, I would argue, was fundamentally ‘determined’ by the pre-existing, but created abstractions of social spatialization, at the same time as becoming a central component in expanding its base-lines in ‘the home’, in public and private spaces, and in the containing introduction of national discourses and spatiality contexts through the 1930s and 1940s. Through technology upgrades; replacing local innovation and adaptability with foreign importations; through the provision of large sources of access to foreign capital, unavailable in the local economy, on which Wilsons became dependent; through entailed new and extensive marketing and packaging changes; through the reliance, and presence of overseas technical and managerial skills and permanent advisors; and through further agreements of international advantage from Macintosh in the 1930s, as opposed to local product innovation on which Wilsons ‘prided itself’ this ‘dependence’ was cemented. It became the ‘only route’ for success, and for the desired ‘state of [any] company affairs’ to do ‘good business’ in the City.39 This ‘model’ of example would probably enable the Wilson family qualification into economic nationalist compradors, but this misses the space of place, the place of space and the complex ‘rooting’ of industrialization ‘knowledge’ and production historically.

‘MANUFACTURING SPLITTERS’ AND ‘COMMERCIAL CONSERVATIVES’: COMMERCE, INTERVENTION, SURVIVAL AND DIVERSIFICATION.

Tariffs/state intervention were also contradictory in impact, however, as the BCI noted. The Tariff Act/protectionism did not necessarily and unambiguously reflect a ‘clear input from the manufacturers direct’, for the ‘Tariff Committee [Board], as we know, consists almost entirely of government appointees’:


It was, however, 'in sympathy' as it sought to 'foster the principles of local manufacturers', unlike the previous 'government failures to assistance' (intervention). In particular, tariffs were uneven and disproportionate in effect. In East London, where there 'is no local industrial replacement', and 'little in possibility', although commerce was limited in 'free trading practices', this was seldom 'very significant' in this period. For example, for one of the leading, and in fact, the largest wholesaler in East London, it continued to be reliant on imported British goods, up until the Second World War, and these 'overseas sources of supply' accounted for '... overwhelmingly the greater part of their trade', despite the beginning appearance of South African goods after the early 1920s. By 1939, the percentage of these South African goods was below 20%. These observations and patterns of trade were paralleled in other wholesaler comments, although made more generally for the pre-War period. In the case of East London, then, Tariffs/Protection did not seriously un hinge commerce from local dominance, and from import and foreign dominance before WW2, but it had a more diffuse impact. Apart from the R-W's significance of internalization and 'modelling' of future local industrialization, the Tariff Act was significant as part of the elaboration from 'the other side' - of new commercial divisions and dynamics which had previously been more muted and less significant and noticeable, if at all apparent.

Houghton suggested (writing in the 1950s) that

[s]ome of the more perceptive of the big commercial houses began, as early as the 1920's, to divert a portion of their resources to manufacturing, and to establish local factories in the Border for the production of goods for the Transkei market, which goods they had previously imported ... taking advantage of the new protective policy they set up [these] factories which have now become firmly established.

This internal process of wholesale commercial differentiation of selective, and relatively isolated and narrow 'perceptive diversion' into manufacturing needs to be situated in the 1925-33 period, and more widely the whole period up to 1937/8. It also needs to be focused locally through the 'manufacturing' option opened in this period of tariffs/protection, together with the 'internalization' of the 1930 Depression.

40 BCI, Box 19, File 2B, Minutes of Meeting, 18 February 1928.
41 BCI, Box 36, correspondence between BCI and various wholesale companies, concerned in particular with the impact of WW2, and the post-war period on trade, and imports, 14 August 1952 to 12 July 1956. See also D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, 282, whose arguments, and figures are directly correlative with details in the BCI.
42 BCI, Box 36, Correspondence, D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, 280-284.
Although quantitively narrow in localizing manufacturing, its impact was equally felt more extensively in 'industrial' direction and definition.

In the context of the local impact of the 'worst depression through which it has passed', commercial interests in East London faced a 'disastrous slump', felt by J.W. Weir and Co., Baker-King, Peacock Bros, Dreyfus Company and Malcomess Company as the 'most crucial period' of their history. Liquidations became the order and the consideration of the day, and Peacock Bros, Dreyfus and Malcomess liquidated the 'wholesale merchandising section of their companies', and began to diversify, in part, into tourism. While this opened the space for other big commercial houses to 'survive', and expand in areas of 'open-stock groceries' and other 'new' departments, as in the case of J W Weir, Baker King, and Bellgrove and Snell followed a different route. It was in the depression crisis period, but also tied to the impact of 'protection' that 'Messrs Baker King and Co., one of the oldest established general merchants on the Border, decided to enter the manufacturing side of business and formed the Beehive group of industries ... at Chiselhurst.

This 'Beehive Group' included Packers Ltd (the blending and packing of tea and coffee), Kowie Medicines (Pty) Ltd ('native medicines'), Saftex (Pty) Ltd (cotton blankets and sheeting), and Fomex (Pty) Ltd ('soap making'). Bellgrove and Snell, initially a paint, glass, and wallpaper merchant company followed a slightly different and exceptional route for local merchant/commercial capital, and had already begun paint manufacturing during the 1910s, but the post 1925 tariffs period, through until the early 1930s saw significant growth of paint production, as well as the expansion into glass and mirror production, initially through the take-over of an existing glass business.

A number of aspects stand out as significant from this very 'typically' descriptive import substitution process. The first was that the protection period, following Martin's periodization, was important in opening up a 'new' direction for an increasingly threatened and struggling big wholesale commercial sector, while the 'tentacles' of this state intervention simultaneously threatened, in the words of Crawford

44 Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 43; East London, 92-93.
45 Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 43; East London, 92-93.
46 Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 43.
47 BCI, Box 24, Correspondence between BCI and J.V. Snell, 12 March 1928, to 14 April 1935.
MacKenzie, to 'ensnare the port' and 'suck the merchant - the lifeblood of the city - dry'. 48 Few chose the 'untraveled industrial road', but Baker Kings' local substitution strategy split the ranks of big commerce in the city, and began to differentiate, and fragment a previously uniform discourse, practice, and institutional presence across the City Council, and in the Chamber of Commerce. Rapidly, what had been presented as a united front on the depression, of 'seeing each other through', and of the jointly articulated 'important deterrent' of individual liquidation and 'closure' because of the 'welfare of the staff, a large number who had been with the companies for many years, and the directors felt their responsibility towards them', both separated and divided, and imploded on commercial unity. 49 This unity became exposed as remarkably idealist, but also reflective agreement of imagined coherence, given the parallel discussions of crisis, liquidation, and panicked individualized and blatant eliminative competition of 'every man for himself' scenarios 'rampaging' through the Chamber of Commerce. 50

Oppositionally styled as 'conservative' by the 'new' industrializers (including King, Snell, Wilson), and self-styled as 'perceptive manufacturers' 51, the commercial 'clubbers' no longer appeared so neatly uniform, as Baker King's factories went up in the 'height of the depression', adding material visibility to prior discursive warnings. 52 Animosity and argument became widespread, and the 'split' between commercial importers and commercial manufacturer diversification hardened, in the early 1930s, into a far more 'absolutist' commerce-industry dichotomy, with the 'direct importer' houses of 'conservatism' finding 'splitting' a return label for substitution industrialists, like Baker King. 53 In much of this, the 'artificiality' of state intervention was cast as villain, in as much as it promoted 'unnecessary' and 'uncalled' for local diversification and an ideologically loaded 'necessary' 'decline of quality', 'lowering of standards', and an associated rise in the cost of living. Imported goods were 'better', 'cheaper', and 'more diverse' it was argued, and companies that

47 BCI, Box 24, Correspondence between BCI and J.V. Snell, 12 March 1928, to 14 April 1935.
48 BCI, Box 21, Minutes of COC, 24 October 1930.
49 BCI, Box 21, Minutes of COC, 24 October 1930, 23 May 1931, 23 July 1931, 25 April 1932.
50 BCI, Box 21, Minutes of COC, 23 May 1931, 23 July 1931, 24 November 1931, 23 March 1932.
51 The term 'perceptive' is used by D. Hobart Houghton, perhaps incidentally, given his source material, but was self-developed in this period, partly in response to a developing 'consciousness' of future economies, and hence of industrial time bound to the future, against the relatively closed time of commerce. But it also included those involved in the local economy with 'vision', prepared to 'take a chance', against the more narrow and unimaginative responses of the big commercial men. See BCI Box 21, Minutes of COC Meetings, and Box 24, correspondence between Snell, Baker, King and others, 5 June 1929 and attached correspondence.
52 BCI, Box 21, Minutes of COC Meeting, 25 April 1932.
53 BCI, Box 21, Minutes of COC Meeting, 23 July 1931.
followed the path of Baker King would 'discover this to their cost', once conditions 'normalized' after the 'slump'. 'Companies should not be misled' by its 'severity' into 'believing this will be the state of trade forever', suggested the COC Secretary in 1932, while the BCI president suggested in the same year that the large import trading companies 'seem set to halt all local industrial initiative and manufacturing developments that are not geared to service [and workshop] their trade'.\textsuperscript{54} The 'case of Baker King', he continued,

\begin{quote}

appears to have made irrational the most sensible of men, whose advice I would normally value. There has been the most unpleasant rankling of business this past year over this, ... and ... the separation [between commerce and industry] of the Tariff Act has widened considerably to include merchant companies at opposing ends of the table.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

Secondly, these divisions extended between commercial interests, previously structured into a 'competitive co-operation' of mutual economic power-brokerage in the city, and began, to the dismay of Weir, to 'break us apart, ... pitting commercial house against commercial house'.\textsuperscript{56} While these divisions were rather more uneven in favour of a sustained 'free-trade commercialism', with the big commercial houses on 'this side' in clear majority, the splits were over-emphasized and dramatized in local discussion, debate and intent, and did divide commercial interests beyond the Baker King 'split'.\textsuperscript{57} The Depression, and the changing political context of intervention and local industrialization, pushed forward wholesale commercial re-structurings, closures and investment re-directions from many of the large commercial houses. This simultaneously opened a period of far more 'bitter competition' between them over markets, turnover, and internal structure and profitability, as well as importation, and 'direct buying' and retailing.\textsuperscript{58} Overall, these splits, tensions, breaks and intensified competition, were all important in opening spaces of 'alternative' economic options, in disaggregating commercial interests, and in 'forcing' differing aspects of commercial limitations and constraints. They served, furthermore, to break a represented commercial political homogeneity, and were the earliest 'visible' signs of differentiated commercial decline and contradiction to industrialization in

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{54} BCI, Box 19, Draft Annual Report for 1932, 3.  \\
\textsuperscript{55} BCI, Box 19, Draft Report, 4.  \\
\textsuperscript{56} BCI, Box 19, Draft Report, 5-6.  \\
\textsuperscript{57} BCI, Box 21, COC Minutes, 23 May 1931, for example, and BCI, Box 19, Minutes of Meeting, 17 October 1931, and 22 June 1932, for internal BCI records which emphasized these debates.  \\
\textsuperscript{58} BCI, Box 19, Minutes of Meeting, 17 October 1931, and 28 April 1932.
\end{flushright}
the city. But, most significantly, these processes of 'internal conflict', opened a period from the early 1930s of, what Councillor King called, 'social paralysis', which was only resolved in the post-WW2 period. 59

While for King this 'social paralysis' was the logic of an outdating and increasingly desperate attempt to hold onto 'direct importation' as economic determinant of the city, and thus a refusal to 'move with the times', his entry-point to the nature of dominant commercial relations under threat and division as paralysing, was important. 60 For, while attempting to maintain the conditions for 'direct' wholesale commerce, in a growing contradictory situation of externalized influence of decline, restriction and transition, the power of locally dominant and (dis)organized commercial interests constrained industrialization into the framework of narrow space and widespread failure in transition. In particular the divisive events of the early 1930s hardened a traditional and conservative 'narrow-mindedness' and a series of deliberate and intentioned anti-industrial municipal policy decisions and evasions, economic interventions, and backroom closures. These all served to 'paralyse' the local economy through the 1930s and 1940s - between import/wholesale commercial decline and its local substitution. 61

The most significant of these was the context that 'East London might become a centre of a South African motor industry in much the same way as Port Elizabeth ...' 62. Discussions with General Motors to establish a motor assembly plant in East London were 'squashed' by the City Council, and the Chamber of Commerce, under a series of pretexts ranging from 'untidy industries', through the incompatibility of 'tourism' and 'such industry', through to the fact that 'heavy industry' would attract and transform the labour, through the introduction of a mass 'native' workforce, and commercial and 'natural' advantages of the port. 63 This was, I would suggest, the key potential moment for local industrialization, and for East London's economic future, a moment destroyed by a 'miserable bunch' of colonial commercial 'idiots', as Baker called them. The leading light in this refusal was 'more familiar with the interior of local bar-rooms',

59 BCI, Box 24, Correspondence between E. Baker and BCI, 13 March 1932.
60 BCI, Box 24, Correspondence between E. Baker and BCI, 13 March 1932 and attached correspondence to 1937.
62 See J. Ager-Hamilton, 'The Development of the Port', 31; but also BCI, Box 32, File 12B, 'New Industries', Report and correspondence on General Motors, 12 May 1931 and attached correspondence.
63 BCI, Box 32, File 12B, for details of discussion between GM, and the BCI, and of the 'short-sighted responses' of the COC, and the City Council, 12 May 1931, 2 July 1931, 10 January 1932.
and chose to celebrate in a 'euphoria' of the 'triumph' of the 'wholesale and tourist trade' where the 'march of industry will not be felt in our city' - the pathetic conclusion to a celebration of outright material stupidity and ideological inebriation which owed more to the 'flavour of imported whiskey', than a 'depth of local concern'.

GM representatives were reportedly 'baffled' by their cold-shouldering into 'staying at PE', while the wider and longer term impact cast East London 'outside of industry' as the 'popular' material and future investment scenario - as a cataloguing of attempted BCI investment and encouragement failures details for this period. In part, though, the context of 'rejection' of the motor industry for East London needs to also be highlighted in a slightly wider framework. It can also be traced to the American source of capital investment and influence, and the implications of 'mass production techniques of Ford and his competitors in the motor trade', as compared with the Wilson-Rowntree example. Put crudely, it was the wrong 'model', with the wrong source of capital and 'influence'.

These discussions, and localized refusals cleared a remarkably distinctive and articulate focus to the parameters of acceptable local industry. In particular, 'heavy industry' in any form would not be 'allowed' and local state and commercial intervention expressed a political confidence, elaborated over the 'motor affair', that it could influence industrial location and development in the City, even if this confidence was an expression of 'political paralysis'. In particular, though, 'heavy industry' acquired a twofold definition of exclusion - mass production (machinofacture), but coupled to 'native' (and 'male') operative labour, and its social implications.

This narrowing focus on the particular form of local industrialization meant that what had previously been commercial opposition, initially via the R-W case, but also more broadly, began to be necessarily and grudgingly acceptable. Thereafter, lines of argument in the COC began to pursue concerns of clean tourist-friendly industry, British connections, acceptable locations, desirable form and structure in factory design, and also within this, a structure that would enable employment for 'recognizable classes of labour'.

64 BCI, Box 32, File 12B, 10 January 1932.
65 BCI, Box 32, File 12/A, Minutes of Meeting, 23 March 1934.
66 BCI, Box 32, File 12B, 15 March 1932.
67 BCI, Box 21, Minutes of COC Meetings, 25 April 1932, and in the 1930s more generally, see also Box 32, File 12B.
68 BCI, Box 21, Minutes of COC Meeting, 23 July 1931, 25 April 1932.
generally the role of commerce was asserted, however, and making connections between acceptable forms of import substitution, and a relationship between these local industries and commercial structures and relations dominated discussion and publicity. The 1930s witnessed the emergence of a more mutually acceptable and co-operative commerce-industry 'divide' in the longer term. This occurred as long as industry (and ISI) was so narrowed, and intervention against localizing industry unheeded and 'unchallenged' by an industrial presence itself ambiguously 'modelled' and shaped within the confines of East London's imperial, colonial and racialized 'imaginative community' (as in R-W).69

Baker King was important in extending these 'model' and imaginative dynamics, but in a differing set of implications for ISI locally. In particular, its impact on splitting and fragmenting the 'community of commerce' more directly, but simultaneously, of 'tying' the interests of divided commerce and local industrialization intervention together, however ambiguously, was important for the path, opportunities, and constraints of local industrialization within the East London 'community'. Baker King also opened and generated debate on locality, and in so doing, of re-politicizing public space and industrial space, and in defining and elaborating substitution markets in parallel part, in the production for 'red native trade'. In particular the Baker King manufacturing diversification under the holding 'Beehive' Companies, and their 'creation' of the 'Chiselhurst Industrial Area' in 1930/31 was significant in locating an 'industrial site/township' in the city.70

This was the first unplanned but example-generative extension and isolation of industrial or manufacturing spatiality, and it provided the nucleus of the post-1938, and especially the post-1947/8 period of industrial zonings and planning initiated and extended by the City Council. But it was also significant, spatially, in that it generated a simultaneity of extending and configuring local industrial production on 'site' into the 'manufacture for sale - mostly to Natives' possibility that was previously 'unheard' (or unseen) in the City. This helped to define and shape local manufacturing substitution as inclusive of 'native commodities' production in textiles, blankets, and medicines for example, but within separate industrial 'townships'. This

69 BCI, Box 21, Minutes of COC Meetings, 1932-1938, and Box 25, BCI Minutes, 1932-1938; CA, 3/ELN, Box 992, Ref. 1210, COC Annual Reports, 1932-1938.

process thus served as a core spatial dynamic of industrial isolation, marginalized from the history and
dynamism of change and importance in the City and its commercial centre.\textsuperscript{71}

The City Centre, and its 'industries' (including R-W, but also furniture, engineering, paints, milling,
bottling, and textile 'manufacturers') had a different spatiality, but more importantly, a history and
representative dynamic of commercial and residential East London. These industries while situate virtually
in the central City area do not infringe upon the commercial or residential quarters' (my emphasis).\textsuperscript{72}

Those that would infringe and impinge - 'heavy industries', 'native manufacturers', and the 'untidy', would
face 'judicious planning' and socio-spatial realities to separate 'over the river', and into 'townships' after the
mid 1940s, if they were to be encouraged at all. But the 'power-geometry' of the City centre through the
1930s and the early 1940s, (despite the Chiselhurst locality), with its largely commercial brokers, outlawed
possible and probable 'infringements' through recourse to the 'financially adequate' and profitable
historical bases of commercial and tourist development and growth in the City. This was accompanied with
the refusal to allow inner-city industrialization, beyond the existent and R-W growth, or to 'develop'
serviced industrial areas elsewhere. This spatially closed the city down to industry, and by extension, to
import substitution, except in socially and spatially constrained 'model' options inside (and even alternative
industrial sites outside) the City's central lines of economic power. At the same time, these lines were
intersected into existing and expanding lines of tourism, commercial capital, and 'natural splendour' of
place, in an evolving direct contradiction to the place of industry.

\textsuperscript{71} Driffield Collection, Information Concerning Industrial Development'; see also BCI Box 33, File 13/1A on
'Industrial Townships', Report, 12 January 1936.

\textsuperscript{72} BCI, Box 33, on the industrial townships, and on debate refusing the granting of these sites in the 1930s, Minutes
of Meetings 22 February 1935, 3 August 1936.

Tourism by the mid-1930s became commercial East London’s ‘gospel’, and the tourist gaze, with the Orient Beach 73 ‘doorstep’, and ‘glorious bathing beach almost at the bottom of the main street’, its ‘blessings’ to be enshrined in natural and unspoilt city stasis. 74 On a significant scale, a tourist ‘industry’ was created in the post-1920 period, receiving much of its impetus from ‘existing commercial interests’. 75 It has proved exceptionally difficult to trace ownership, and levels of investment in this developing ‘sector’, but by the mid-1930s big commerce had a ‘decisive say’ in ‘holiday accommodation and leisure’. 76

This was identified as the ‘conservative’ route of commercial diversification, and reflected dominant patterns and interests in the city in this period. It was a route well-travelled by big commerce. In particular, investment and development of hotels boomed in this period, ‘under-written’ by commercial wholesale capital. The seafront, and main road/rail hotels (the Royal, the Windsor, the Kings, the Majestic) had long been vital cornerstones and embodiments of European and Victorian ‘community’ construction in East London, but their roles were dramatically extended to intersect with the cultural and economic meaning and reality of ‘the beachfront’ as a more complex and extensive recreational and leisureed social representation of place in the 1930s. In this period, then, the beachfront became an unevenly represented and symbolic dominant counter-space in the city. On the one hand it became an allied and aligned counter-space to the commercial City centre (‘town’), while, in the associated extension of the town-beachfront, a contrary counter-space to industrial space, but also to industrial production, and industrialization was created. This was self-evidently more ideological and political than material, but commercial interests held sway in its development, profited by this commercialization and spatial enlargement of the beachfront, and were able to ‘align’ leisure, tourist and commercial space with an anti-industrial and ‘natural’ series of representations that far outweighed economics, in the struggle for control of the City.

73 It is tempting to make a series of E. Said, Orientalism (London, 1978) influenced connections here, especially in the wake of the attempts to segregate ‘asian’ residential areas in the city, and protect it (the city? the west?) from the ‘menacing asiatic coals’, but also to create an orchestrated and controlled exotic ‘Othered’ location, in name, and ‘glamour’, but not in spatial and social reality. The ‘fact’ that the name came from a local European shipwreck simply reinforces this ‘self-other’ relationship, and gives it a global dimension.

74 Daily Dispatch, 14 July 1938.

75 BCI, Box 36, File 9/1A, entitled ‘Hotels 1927-46’, and containing miscellaneous correspondence, and two Reports on the hotel industry, 13 March 1934, and 17 November 1938.

76 BCI, Box 36, File 9/1A, Report, 13 March 1934.
While recent work has suggested, unsurprisingly, the importance of tourism as a 'capitalistically organized activity', in East London it was of minor economic importance relative to commerce, and even to industry, by the 1940s. Hobart Houghton estimated that by the 1950s the value of the tourist trade was 'something over 2 million pounds per annum', which was 'quite a substantial sum, but small in comparison with the total value of wholesale and retail trade, or with the value of output of East London's factories'. This assessment of the 'tourism industry' in the local economy was born out in the scattered evidence of the BCI, COC, and in municipal beachfront development rationale from the 1930s.

In this period the number of hotels 'more than doubled' (from 17 to 43 licenced and private hotels by c1939/40), which by 1947 numbered 56, with 21 licenced hotels (11 'tied houses' and 10 'free' [whatever that means]), as well as a further 36 'service and catering establishments'. Jointly the hotels employed 1,371 people by 1947, (approximately 950 in 1939/40), aggregate revenue/turnover amounted to 947,000 pounds, total assets of East London's hotels totalled 5.5 million pounds (land and buildings 3.5 million) and average profits of licenced hotels totalled 3,400 pounds per hotel and 970 pounds per annum for private hotels. The hotels were internally differentiated however, with licenced hotels dividing between the majority with a trading revenue of between 10-30,000 pounds, five between 40-50,000 pounds, and two over 50,000 pounds by c1947.80

The economic importance of the beachfront and the tourist trade extended beyond hotels, although they were the most directly linked, to include East London's retail sector and other services in the dominant tourist-service sector. In particular, cinemas, clothing shops, toys, entertainment, liquor and food, not only linked into an expanded sense of the importance of tourism economically, but many of these small establishments (an estimated quarter - 100 of about 420 retail establishments in c1939) relied on the holiday seasons for their existence. Hobart Houghton estimated, for the early 1950s, in a pattern suggested within

77 See D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, 120-124, where he suggests that, even if many service and retail 'establishments relied on seasonal tourism, it was not a major economic activity in the city.
79 See First Census of Distribution and Service Establishments, 1946-47, Report nos 1-71, and particularly, nos 2 and 3; but see also BCI, Box 24, File 9/A, Report on service industries in East London for the 1930s, 24 January 1938.
80 See First Census of Distribution and Service Establishments, Reports Nos. 2 and 3.
81 BCI, Box 24, File 9/A, Report on service industries, and correspondence, which provided a rough estimate of the value of the tourist trade, especially in between the City Council, Latimer, and the COC, 14 January 1939, and 12 March 1939.
the COC in the late 1930s, but without the statistics\(^{82}\), that while 75% of the aggregate revenue of the hotels was attributable to the tourist trade per annum, half of the total value of the tourist trade to East London, (approx. 1 million pounds) was generated 'in shopping' (ie outside of hotels, but within East London's retail and service sector more generally).\(^{83}\) In comparison to commerce, whether wholesale, or retail, and against industry, this service and tourist sector was economically over-estimated, at least in the rhetoric originating from the City Council, and from members of the Commercial chamber.

Tourism in East London in this period from the 1930s was, however, central in generating the social meanings and materiality of space and place, and for how these representations were both incorporated into, but also shaped commercial and service, and constrained industrial economic development in the city. In particular, in the 1920s, and especially the 1930s, East London came to represent, and reflect a transition from 'seaside resort' of 'elite coastal patronage' (identifiable as East London's and the Border's 'middle class aristocracy') to that of a 'mass' family seaside resort city.\(^{84}\) New market determined, patterned and re-appropriated social conceptions and identities of popular leisure associated with this transition emerged, and interacted with elite conceptions to significantly alter and enlarge the radius of imaginative 'middle-class community' inclusions.

While this process was partly influenced by the socio-spatial working class and political re-definitions of the early 1920s,\(^{85}\) the commoditization, and representations of East London as competitively the white worker and 'new' family holiday haven was generated simultaneously to new, current commercial diversification and the channeling of 'trade profits' into 'making the holiday trade the most important for the city'.\(^{86}\) And, in particular, the image of 'famous beaches, glorious sea coast drives, ideal camping sites, a scenically-endowed river and a reputation for keeping expenses within the limits available to the average wage-earner'  

\(^{82}\) BCI, Box 24, File 9/A, Report on service industries, for a rough estimate that suggested that the tourist trade was equally split between hotel accommodation and retail and service goods, in its value for the local economy.
\(^{84}\) See *Daily Dispatch Centenary Special*.
\(^{85}\) See Ch.1 above, especially in the context of white worker struggles for inclusion in East London's imaginative community, which re-defines its basis, and content in various spatial, racial and gender ways.
\(^{86}\) *Daily Dispatch*, 24 July 1934.
sight or sound of unnatural, dirty, and uncontrollable work and industry. In other words, tourism, and more widely 'the seaside', and the 'beachfront' as daily, weekend and internal recreation sites (as well as seasonal holiday one's), became centrally important as the 'leisure space' as well as in the 'purchase of a lifestyle' in this period. Thus, even though more generally in the city, leisure spaces were hierarchical and relational, lifestyles differentiated, and their purchase historically uneven, 'the seaside' and the 'beachfront', and the 'fusion' of tourism and leisure refracted these divisions in East London in this period. At the same time this refracted social velocity provided the altered public place for 'collective gazing' in this commoditization of the 'seaside/beachfront' place into a representation that stood for (and meant) East London more generally and spatially.

While this tourist and leisured meaning of East London was elaborated and became premised on the western and gendered male-centred relatively clear-cut distinctions between work and non-work as its local historical 'system of legitimation', the specifically East London centred consumption of 'the seaside' was also situated into the material commercial, and 'British' and racial imaginative social relations within which it was embedded. The beachfront, and access to and participation in its 'leisure', became a 'statement of taste' and demonstration of the possession of 'cultural and symbolic capital' and thus also of its importance representationally, for the naturalization of the power of commercial capital. The leisure of 'the beachfront' came to denote the consumption and collection of commodified and 'universally' accessible and amenable 'natural experiences', but also social networks and cultural values intended explicitly to demonstrate a relatively uniform, cross-class and local European, racialized and imaginative community of taste, judgement, style and status in and for East London. This cultural or social capital associated with

92 See H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, where he discusses the notion of leisure spaces, as sites from the park, to the seaside town, all of which are hierarchically important for the reproduction and reconstituting of 'human capital'.
93 For a fuller discussion on these issues, see S. Britton, 'Tourism, Capital and Place', and H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, for the senses in which the commodification of place involves both material and representational unities and fragmentations.
94 As opposed to other definitions of 'free time' and how it is spent, which varies amongst differentiated segments of society, as in the 'forced leisure' of the unemployed, the seeming inseparability of the labour of many women domestic workers with their 'nonwork' time, and the different ethnic and racial organization of nonwork compared to European/western conceptions, for example, are important. See J. Fabian, Time and the Other (New York, 1983).
95 See P. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Cambridge, 1990), 112-122; and also S. Britton, 'Tourism, Capital and Place', for a useful, if slight overview of the notions of cultural and symbolic capital.
96 Represented by a male dominated, and hotel-led series of leisured activities, which included, 'strolling', and the processes of collective gazing, and crowd identifications, which were self-generative, as well as notions of social
tourism, and the extension and definition of recreation and leisure through ‘the beachfront’, rested on the wider scaled interventions of commercial interests, particularly those connected with big commercial houses and their diversification. Its impact, and internalization, however, depended on the nature of embedded social relations extended and configured in this new beachfront spatiality.

More elaborately, the ‘seaside/beachfront’ (with its attendant meanings of holiday, leisure, and commercial-service consumption, as well as anti-industry) was generalized for East London as outside of time and spatially unchanging. As such, it was given meaning as the site of ‘natural advantage’ and of ‘fortuitous creation’ - ‘the lords paradise’. Importantly, as this conception was developed it was also enabled in the explicit associations between the commercial and the attributes of the non-commercially created, and natural public attractions of the seaside. This served to mask its commercially-led marketing, consumption, and collective gazing, which had become potentially much more apparent and visible in the robust ideological intervention in the post 1930s period highlighted above. This extension of the ‘naturalness’ of commerce, asserted by the imparted meaning to East London, via the specific place and sites of the coast and the seaside, connected commerce to abstract natural space, and thus to the extension and ‘implicit support’ of commercial commodity relations in East London.

What this also meant, was that the political management of East London became re-framed in a ‘tourist’ commercial-service ideology, directed against industrialization, and at putting a favourable tourist environment in place - as part of a civic ‘boosterism’ in commercial property and services, and the ‘rejuvenation’ and re-direction of commercial decline. Much of the claimed ‘profitability’ and ‘economic success’ of the holiday service and commercial sector was rhetorical for the big commercial houses, if not for the hotels, and many smaller (and some of the larger) retail ‘outlets’. But what it did serve was big commerce’s class interests in very direct wider material and social contexts. On the one hand, defining free-time, recreation and leisure, to tourism and holidays, to ‘the seaside/holiday resort’ tied a gendered white workforce in the city to the dominant ‘leisure space of the beachfront’. This created ‘discrete and categorized landscape’ of the beachfront, then, apart from coming to represent the central space of East

variety and display associated with this, but within a framework of ‘middle class aristocracy’. Interviews, 5a, 5e, 5f, December 1990.

97 See BCI, Box 36, File 9/1A, Hotels, 1927-1946, and Report, 17 November 1938.
London as a city, and therefore as vitally influencing its nature as a tourist city in locale and definition, also achieved a more political objective. Its spatiality occurred, and was patterned across classes in East London, and centrally this included the local white working class. It thus served to actively maintain and consolidate prevailing commercial and service economic relations, outside of and exclusive from industrialization (ISI); and prevailing gender relations outside of the residential suburb. For the beachfront and the associated 'experience of leisure', depended on the maintenance of commercial East London and on its 'male work-nonwork' assertions and relations.

The emergent links between commercial interests, and the gendered white working class in a spatial beachfront-leisure conservation, then, was extended to a 'casting of sides' between commerce-white workers and industry over the nature and future of the city. Industrialization would 'destroy' the primary 'leisure space', and by extension the City, and thus the basis of community identifications and upward 'middle class' status dreaming and, more importantly the routine cross-class and 'uniformed' male white spatial encounters and visibility of the Esplanade 'after work', (on the beach and 'in the breakers', in 'going for a stroll', and for the 'verandahed sundowners'). Of course, industrialization as represented by mass production ISI opened a number of threats and oppositions for white workers around skill, composition, security, and political affiliations in East London in this period, but their active support for tourist conceptions and implied economic options needs to be specified as the dominant alternative of inclusion and 'support'.

Tourism, and the extended identifications of the beachfront with popular white leisure, inclusive in re-formulated elite representations and relations in this period, was also significant in the wider class dynamics of big commercial capital's dominance. For the 'dualism' of tourism as the commercial 'agent' against

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98 'Tourism' here is used to denote its locally acquired and used and extended representative meaning - acquired within the parameters of local politics, where commerce played off tourism against industrialization. I would suggest, by the mid-1930s it could be taken as representative of commercial and 'traditional' white working class meanings of definitions of space, place, and of an anti-industrial ideology, as well as of a set of material practises under the auspices of the City Council, and the COC.

99 See H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space; and more particularly, BCI, Box 36, File 9/1A, Report, 17 November 1938.

100 See BCI, Box 24, File 9A, correspondence between Latimer, Snell and Baker, 15 January 1936, and attached correspondence, as well as Interviews, 5a, 5f, and 5k, December 1990, which makes this connection between 'old' and 'new' alliances and interests in the city, and in particular the connections between commerce, and 'traditional' white workers over the 'meeting place of the Esplanade'.
backdrop and 'natural' consequence for development - in East London. The temporal nodal points of Victorian, commercial and municipal historical developments entailed that the 'alternative' ISI spatial possibilities opened by R-W, and Baker-King were, of necessity, constructed in a difference that cast commerce against industry through dichotomous frameworks of Time and space respectively.\footnote{See D Massey, 'Politics and Space/Time', \textit{New Left Review}, 196, 1992, 71-76, for an illuminating discussion on the nature of time-space dichotomies.}

Resistant to change, commercial interests were able to draw on the 'natural order' that had developed over time into 'the modern city of East London' and define this positively against the anticipated negative, disruptive spatial impositions of industry. Primarily a spatial re-politicization out of the anticipated 'unsightly chaos' of industry developed, which dominant commercial interests could only present as disorder - spatially, and then socially and historically in scaled implication, and related subsequent opposition.\footnote{See BCI, Box 21, COC Minutes and correspondence with the BCI in the 1930s, especially 23 October 1935.}

The commercial (and tourist) order in East London constructed an ideological understanding of local society that rested on an order-disorder dichotomy to industrialization. This, in turn, rested on both positive Time and negative and absenced space in determining economic change as being 'naturally', 'logically', 'progressively' and 'orderly' aligned to commerce and tourism, while industrialization would produce economic 'decline', disorder, filth and disaster. (Where space was chaos, time was Order, and where time was dynamic and historical in direction and development, space needed to be stasis.)

This complex inter-connected dichotomy of the mutual exclusivity of commerce/tourism and mass industrialization for the city worked to the advantage of the dominant social construction of the city as 'imagined european/ Victorian community' elaborated in the post 1917 period. Commercial tourism in particular provided a remarkably and demonstrably resilient ideology of resistance to major industrial change - as 'disorder' - and re-affirmed a series of material, racial and gender dichotomies tied to time as constituent of both space and time in East London for the post-1930s period.\footnote{See D. Massey, 'Politics and Space/Time', and in particular, the argument, which draws on the work of N. Jay, G. Lloyd and E. Wilson, in which she argues that dichotomous ideologies including space-time one's, are both necessarily constrained in alternative choices, and extensively gendered. Much of this preceding paragraph and argument over the dualistic and the dichotomy in ideology, and space and time, relies on Massey, but in terms of my reading and application.} The tourism/holiday nature of East London, was cast in terms of order, and linked to its cultural and racialized imaginative terms, was a major constraint on both local industrialization, as well as in the emergence of a local...
knowledge and 'model' for future ISI. This meant that in the 1930s, the tourist/commercial path was represented, and more widely engaged, as simultaneously conserv-ing and progress-ive, and industrialization the path of 'short-sighted chaos', not 'perception'. What was affirmed through this commercial-time led dichotomy was the ideological and space-time dynamic of social and material developments as more than an internal and conservative 'paralysis', but one which also helps suggest why this should have been considered paralysing from the margins only. For, by c1938, industry was very much 'only in the margins' of the city's power-geometry and materiality.

108 BCI, Box 21, Minutes of Meeting between Council, COC and BCI, over allocation of industrial land, 16 September 1937, where discussion suggested the spatial closure for industrialization processes, as they would result in the 'disorder' feared.
CHAPTER THREE

This chapter seeks to run a parallel line through the period, marked at its opening with the emergent consolidation of 'casual labour', broken in c1918-20 with a series of strikes and new municipal interventions, and again in the late 1927/8 and the emergence of the IICU, and at its close with the Thornton Commission/Report on Native Locations in East London. This identification from the workplace, through 'industrial action', then the Union, to Location and housing is intentional. While I will argue below that it is also a misleading and simplistic characterization, the tensions between 'native labour', locality, and social order are central aspects in the wider explanation of industrialization and class formation. In particular, the IICU emphasized to employers, and to local Council administrative, social and 'controlling' officials, the limited and complacent knowledge held and instituted over 'native labour' by the early 1930s. The response, however, was to pursue, commission and inpanel knowledge through the Location/s, while the workplaces remained as 'anonymous' as ever.1 This had much to do with material conditions but, as I will argue, also to do with the power geometry of 'native policy', and with the invented traditions of 'temporary' and 'casual labour', and their constructed spatial simultaneity with the Location/s, through to the immensely detailed 'understanding' of IICU activity, and the contradictory responses conditioned by this 'knowledge'.2

Beinart and Bundy provide an important initial contextual springboard for these introductory assertions. They argue, in summary, that East London, by the late 1920s was marked by '... the fragmented nature of the urban labour force, the strong rural links, the economic hardships and pressures of township life, the

1 Fred Cooper's seminal book, On the African Waterfront, serves as a particularly important source for this, and subsequent arguments. I am, of course aware of the sharp differences between East and South Africa, and between Mombasa and East London, and do not wish to present a crude and easy comparison, although there are important comparative aspects that are not simply 'conceptual'.

2 CA 1/ELN, Box 86 File c3(1), and 87 File c3(2), which contain police reports from the 1920s to c1933 in massive detail, running to hundreds of pages of verbatim, and precis accounts of speeches, attendance, etc. For a description of the material see W Beinart and C Bundy, 'The Union, The Nation and the Talking Crow', 318-319. Their account of this period in East London's history, detailing the activities of the IICU heavily shapes aspects of my argument, and remains, together with their entire Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa collection, one of the most insightful and important examples of the social history approach worthy of the 'schools' current hegemony.
centrality of housing and brewing as popular concerns ...'. In addition they highlight the fact that life was a constant crisis of subsistence, policing and rapidly intensified overpopulation in the squalid slums of the two Locations in this period. It is from these aspects that I wish to begin, not as a point of substantive criticism, but of expansion and elaboration.

The growth of the African population in East London is difficult to detail with any degree of accuracy while that of labour and its expansion is almost impossible. The local state had not bothered to collect precise statistics and neither had the employers, seldom even indexing or becoming familiar with the names of those employed. The Bureau of Census and Statistics thought there were 7 638 Africans in East London in 1911; 12 210 (6 898 males) in 1921; 14 832 in 1926; 20 602 in 1931, and 24 388 (11 951 males) in 1936. On the other hand, the Location Superintendent, the MOH, and the Location elite all differed in their estimations. It would seem to be conservatively reasonable to suggest that the population was around 10-12 000 in 1921, 20-22 000 in 1931, and 24-26 000 in 1936. As Beinart and Bundy emphasize, the importance of the statistics, however unreliable, also lies in the changing and intensifying nature of movement to the city, where '[b]etween 1919 and 1928, the African population ... increased by 41.7 per cent; between 1925 and 1930 alone it rose by nearly 8,500 - or an increase in five years of over 50 per cent'. Their convincing explanation for this process of urbanization and in-migration in this period asserts as central an intensifying process of rural impoverishment, drought and harsher conditions and expulsions on white-owned farms in the region.

Beinart and Bundy argue, however, drawing on Bettison's divisions (who in turn drew on the Location Superintendent's) that the 'urban population comprised three overlapping categories [of rough-hewn and contemporary recognizable sociological division]: those who lived permanently in town and knew no other

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3 W. Beinart and C. Bundy, 'The Union, the Nation and the Talking Crow', 275.
4 This does not mean I have no disagreements. My disagreement with their analysis though, not simply as a matter of course, lies within a particular telos to class and consciousness formation. But this does not detract from a broader, although differentially emphasized agreement with the content, contradiction, and sensitive complexity of spatial, Location, rural and workplace 'identities' and practices present in their analysis.
5 Fourth to Sixth Census of the Population of the Union of South Africa, U.G. 37-24; ...; and 12-'42. The problem with Census statistics relates to 'seasonal' and migrant labour practices, the timing of the census, literacy, and the strong Location conception that these census officials were in fact, police, and needed to be avoided, and the information required kept evasive and 'safe'. More generally, though, these statistics tended to become locally official, and municipal officials tended, if anything to under remunerate estimates, which had much to do with administrativ and municipal parsimony and neglect.
6 W. Beinart and C. Bundy, 'The Union, the Nation and the Talking Crow', 273.
milieu than the city locations: those who regarded themselves as rural dwellers and were in the city on a strictly migrant basis; and a third or marginal category whose decreasing access to rural livelihood of any sort was impelling them firmly, if reluctantly, into the status of permanent urban proletarians. Following Lloyd's estimates, they suggest that 20 per cent of the city's Africans 'had lost touch with their tribes' in 1931, and by 1935 the estimate was 30 per cent 'urbanized', with another 30 per cent 'semi-urbanized' and 40 per cent 'rural'. These divisions of urbanized, semi-urbanized and wholly migrant, they argue, were 'the most significant cleavage' in a 'distinctly heterogeneous population. Monica Hunter, following an investigation into 213 households in the Location/s in the early 1930s, argued that 43 per cent were 'stated to be permanent', and 57 per cent to be 'temporary'.

These divisional categories are useful as a starting point, but it has become increasingly apparent that even as rough guesswork it is problematic to impose these categorical divisions. This is so for the determinant telos of class formation imposed on this categorization - the path of proletarianization to permanence, and because of the silencing of a range of other processes of division, fragmentation, but also relatively uniform and collective processes in formation. To designate determination to the 'complex nature of migrant-worker consciousness' dependent on these 'first' features of the African population in East London, I suggest, needs to be more carefully and critically explored. But there is another equally important reason, one that silences the contemporary basis of this representation as one about power, in the discourses of the administration, and in that of a Location elite and educated/intellectual leadership.

As Monica Hunter suggests, the patterns and conditions for urbanization and migration to East London were more complex and differentiated - between 'necessity' and 'preference', between 'temporary' and 'permanence', between conceptions of 'home', 'country', and of locality of 'civilization', 'education' and 'primitivity' and between men and women, age and generations. At one level she provides a particularly

7 W. Beinart and C. Bundy, 'The Union, the Nation and the Talking Crow', 274; also D.G. Bettison, 'A Socio-Economic Study of East London', 88.
9 M. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, 434-436. Beinart and Bundy explore many of these themes elsewhere, and they are implicated in their analysis of the IICU, but are not explicitly explored in any detail, beyond what they call the 'complex nature of migrant-worker consciousness'. I suspect that much of Hunter's work, albeit simultaneously informed by contemporary 'anthropological theory', has also been rejected for its racist and 'cultural adaptationist' and segregationist implications and influences, and for its problematic methodology. I believe it is an important 'archive' and 'text' because of these, as well as for other 'factual' reasons. There is no reason to
vivid context to the backdrop of rural impoverishment, dispossession and white farm capitalization suggested by Beinart and Bundy but together with its reverse central spatial importance of continued identification and desire. People dreamt of returning to 'the country' and continually attempted to reproduce existing attachments, create entry-points, sustain 'visits' and extend the possibilities of 'return' in whatever way possible. But they were also confronted with the fact that although many of the Location/s inhabitants' cosmology preferred the country, 'there is starvation there', 'in the country people starve, they eat inkobe (boiled maize), here we eat meat every day, and potatoes and rice'.

It is, however, also the very ambiguity of this statement, reflecting the tensions and differences between town and countryside, between 'necessity' and 'choice', that Hunter illuminates.

In this context, 'permanence' and 'temporary' are highlighted as categories of flux and instability, imposed as much then, as now, in an attempt to order the disorderly power of territoriality, 'civilization' and uneven settler capitalization and commoditization in East London, on the white farms, and rural locations and in the reserves. Thus, she concludes, '[t]here is constant coming and going between town and country. Of the temporary workers some stay in town only a few months. Many of those permanently resident in town, and some of those who come to work for long periods, visit relatives in the reserves.' She does however maintain the division between 'temporary workers', who 'come to town to earn the money to pay taxes, augment their food supply, buy cattle for ikhazi, and satisfy the new wants which contact with the Europeans has created', and the 'permanent residents' who 'work primarily to secure food and sheker, and pay taxes', but who have a 'very strong incentive to effort' for the 'paraphernalia of western civilization', wealth and lifestyle.

The distinction thus becomes one of urban and western against rural and traditional, and of the prestige of 'money' against 'blood' and 'kin'. This distinction and difference of permanence, and of urbanity, is effectively read from the 'image of the dressed native' against that of the 'uncivilized reserve'. Lloyd, and the municipal administration applied a similar visibility of identification, categorization of division, and a

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10 M. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, 435.
11 M. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, 435.
wider effacement of responsibility and voice of ambivalence with which the 'westernizing African' and 'his' attendant new 'urban' social problems were, in crucial ways, the product of maladjustment to western civilization, and of 'detrabilization'. This served on the one hand to reinforce the corresponding duality of this stereotype with that of the reserve as the natural 'home' of the 'native' but also, on the other, the need for policies and practises that sustained the 'temporary' status of the Location/s and its inhabitants. The Location/s and the workplace were represented and shaped in denial of the existence of a permanent class of urban workers, which the Location Superintendent called an 'undesirable class of men' in 1931. While the presence of this 'class' of 'dressed natives' served as explanation for the social problems of 'disruption' and conflict (most manifest in the IICU 'general strike'), the need to 're-tribalize' the Location/s as integrative to the reserves, and not the City, became more apparent, and more urgent.

It is not just that the reserves and Location/s were kept in 'close touch' through personal movements between the two, or even that there was a 'complex interpenetration' as discrete and differentiated urban and rural spatial entities, but that these spatialities were themselves incompletely structured and constructed in this period. In particular, the Location/s and the workplaces reproduced central aspects of the reserves, not just in terms of travelling consciousness of 'inherent ideologies', but that this telescoped 'urban' experience in 'specified quarters' was regulated and lived in terms not just 'temporary' but also 'rural' in many respects. Let me try and provide a more detailed content in order to fill in some of this context.

Hunter, in 1932 argued that the '... great majority of bantu in towns [as in East London in 1932] are wage earners employed by Europeans. Of these the bulk are engaged in 'unskilled labour'. This is clearly an unstartling assertion, but one that has problematically served to enable a basic definition of the working class nature of South African cities by this time. Clearly, wage labour had, by the 1930s, become more of a

13 CA, 3fELN, Boxes 4-6, and Box 364 contain much of this in Location Superintendent, and in MOH Reports for the period.

14 CA, 3fELN, Boxes, 4-6, 624-5, 960; and CA, 1/ELN, Box 453, and 68, all contain details of the policies, and concerns of the Location Superintendent, and the MOH. It should be noted that in all of the municipal files, and correspondence, as well as reports, the only two mentions of estimations of urbanization in East London are the two quoted above. The underlying policy, and assumption was one of temporary status and permanent problem - which needed to be 'used' as vehicle for re-affirming temporary status.

15 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 4-6, and 1092 which provide Location Superintendent Reports for this period, provide an entry point.

16 M. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, 439.
'necessity' and less of an option or choice, as migrancy came under considerable pressure and change in the rural white farmland and 'native reserve' areas. But if these rural areas were providing a much greater 'will to work' in urban areas, particularly for men, young and older, white East London only knew 'how they work or don't work' at a distanced daily basis. The material dependence of boys, and men in particular, on some form of wage was widespread, but it was also as widely a tenuous representation of work and labour as 'proletarian centred'.

Drawing on the MOH 'table of occupations', the following construction of the number employed by 'private Europeans' emerges: 'labourers' (8,572 males), 'stevedores' (462 males), 'wagon and lorry drivers' (148), 'general servants' (1,330 females), and 'char- and washerwomen' (1,785). The categories of 'more skilled' inclusive of fishermen, caretakers, messengers, chefs, plumbers, painters, policemen, clerks, teachers, ministers of religion, nurses, wool sorters and cooks, amongst others, totals 263 males and 87 females. Of the self-employed, or what Hunter calls 'independent enterprises', and 'mixed' ('some employed some independent'), there were 207 men, 71 women, inclusive of 'boarding-house keepers, eating-house keepers, fresh-produce dealers, woodsmen, tobacco sellers, tailors, carpenters, taxi drivers, bottle collectors, etc. Finally there were 1,560 females 'occupied' in 'domestic duties'.17 In addition, it was estimated by the Joint Council that there were '2,500 unemployed, (excluding dependents) in the location'.18 More detail can be derived from the Divisional Inspector of Labour Reports which provides approximate figures in the following terms in 1930: wholesale workers - 765, retail - 228 (or 9,5% of 'native labour as 'store boys'), industrial (inclusive of building, factory and general workers) - 1,350 (or 15,5 %), transport and communication (inclusive of SAR&H, stevedore, and oil company workers) - 2,400 (30%), municipal workers - 650 (6%), and domestic workers - 3218 women (39%), the only category recognized as employing women workers in this period. The Divisional Inspector estimated that there were approximately 600 unemployed, but this was pure guesswork.19

17 M. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, 439-440.
18 South African Outlook, January 1933, Joint Council Estimation.
19 CA, LIE, File 17, Details of the strike compiled by the Divisional Inspector of Labour, from 'urgent' correspondence, telephone communications, and hasty visits and correspondence, reflective of the 'lack of knowledge' of 'native labour', even to the extent of sector totals at the time. The percentage figures in brackets are also the Divisional Inspector of Labour figures, and while they do not precisely correlate to the figures provided, they are included as an index of his estimations, given that some of his totals were far from precise in the notes and additions in his notes.
The average rate of pay for a labourer was 3 - 4 pounds per month, that of a ‘female domestic’ 1 pound 5s - 1 pound 10s per month, and clerks, policemen, nurses, etc 5 - 6 pounds per month, and teachers and ministers 6 - 12/13 pounds per month. This meant that by c1930, the average daily wage was between 2/6 and 3/6, depending on ‘capability’, and this had risen marginally, in some cases, from those of c 1903, but in others not at all. In fact, wages had essentially remained static between c 1903 and the 1930s in nominal terms, and had declined considerably in real terms. These statistics acquire added weight when placed next to the estimated cost of living. The Special Committee on Wages/ Cost of Living estimated this to be 107s (or 5 pounds -6-11d) for a family of five per month. If this is taken as the minimum living wage in 1930-31, while the average wage was 72s per month, the issue of wages, work and poverty become more visible. Perhaps of more significance is that in 1929 the IICU had estimated an average ‘family budget’ of 7-13-10, over two pounds more than the Town Council’s estimate, and hardly surprisingly, argued:

... the present scale of wages has been proved too much inadequate to match with the daily necessities of life. the old contention of the europeans that the natives live very cheaply is absolutely void of truth, since our people prefer the urban life to the rural. This is caused by the fact that our people depend solely on wages to make a living. The primitive life which dominated over our people in the early advent of the european influence, has been abandoned by the present generation. The influence of christianity, education, and the western civilisation are undoubtedly inconsistent with the wages earned by our people nowadays. The natives being devoid of ammunition for fighting the bare needs of the day have become so poverty-stricken that they are exposed to all sorts of evil ways and thoughts ... Perhaps it may be inquired how the native workers manage to scrape through since the wages prevailing today are down below the above figures. The answer is simple. The natives are living a bankrupt life.

This bankruptcy was, for many, a daily occurrence, and for others, weekly; the percentage of daily paid workers still numbering ‘more than 50 per cent’ by the mid-1930s. With the exception of teachers, clerks, and a few others, no-one else was paid monthly. In addition, with the exception of perhaps these individual teachers, ministers, policemen, clerks, and those operating ‘eating houses’, and the like (inclusive of some

20 CA, 1/ELN, Box 74, Reports of Inspector of Native Locations, East London District, on Supply of Native Labour, 17 November 1930; and CA, 3/ELN, Box 374, Report of Commission on Native Wages/ Cost of Living, January 1931.
21 CA, 3/ELN, Box 374, Cost of Living Investigation, January 1931.
22 CA, 3/ELN, Box 374, letter from IICU to Location Superintendent re application for minimum wage, 13 August 1929. We do, of necessity, need to ‘read’ this letter as much as we do the council archive. The IICU is attempting to represent itself, and the Location residents, as fundamentally ‘modern’ and members of the working class. In fact, the extent to which the IICU is responsible for the discursive creation of a working class becomes much more significantly recast during the strike, where issues of race, the Location/s, and ‘traditional’ elements suggest a more differentiated, complex, and ambiguous transition in class terms.
'shebeen queens' and 'landlords') distinctions between 'educated' and 'raw' labourers, and between wage-earners and the self-employed were marginal in terms of income and 'prosperity', and in terms of access to, or the segmentation of the local job market. 24 '... I would not say educated men are given preference, in all work', the Location Superintendent suggested in 1931, as did the IICU at the same time, and as did the BCI in similar vein in 1935.25 Despite Hunter's assertions of a 'marked differentiation in wealth, carrying with it a differentiation in standard of living', and that 'status depends on wealth and education, and these entail Europeanization', these observations are qualified in her own discussion and detail, and in the municipal and industrial archives, with regard to both relative size and distinction.26 So, as she suggests, a 'Native earning 7 pounds a month is wealthy compared to his fellows', and while 'wealth and schooling mean differences in interests, and standards of living, there are none whom it is 'impossible to know'.27 In addition, though, this 'status group' formed a very small grouping in the Location/s, at least where wealth and education combined in a recognizable elite presence. The size of this 'elite', would have totalled around 200 educated and professional members, and approximately the same number of more 'traditional' members in the early 1930s.28 But even this would, with a handful of notable exceptions, have meant that ...

Second hand furniture is bought at sales, and in the house of a well-to-do tradesman [about 80 in total] or teacher [about 32] one finds the horsehair sofa, plush tablecloth, lace curtains, and elaborate frilled bed hangings of Victorian England. Only the aspidistra is lacking. It is often replaced by artificial flowers. In these surroundings a gramophone is a bizarre modern note. Only goatskins on the linoleum-covered floor remind one that the owner's father was a herdsman. Often the walls are papered with sheets of old magazines as the only available substitute for wall-paper, and photographs of members of the family or of school teams, and crude prints, usually representing Biblical scenes, are hung up. The crudity and ugliness often make one shiver, but the shabby European furniture is treasured, and most women take a housewife's pride in their rooms. Outside many of the better houses are borders of flowers or rows of pot-plant, or sometimes a small patch of vegetables. ... Contrasted with these Europeanized houses of the better-off people are the ramshackle warrens of rooms occupied by the poor in 'Gomora'. [as a section of the EB Location] Lacking both the pots, mats, and other utensils of the peasant, and the furniture of the Europeanized - dank, and dark, and small - the room of the poor is a very dismal place.29

24 CA, 3/ELN, Box 6, Location Reports, 1927-1935; Box 4, Location Superintendent Report to Native Economic Commission, 16-20 March 1931; BCI, Box 22, File N1, 'Report on native Wages', 13 July 1935.
26 M. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, 437, 464.
27 M. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, 465.
28 As is clear, I am using the distinction between educated and traditional in a way that has been designated by N. Poulantzas, and in South African studies by P. Bonner, as referenced to the petty-bourgeoisie of the Transvaal Locations. See P. Bonner, 'The Transvaal Native Congress 1917-1920', in S. Marks and R. Rathbone, (eds.), Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa, 270-272.
29 M. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, 446-447.
As Bonner has emphasized for the Rand, this social sector of what was nominally the 'black petty-bourgeoisie' was structurally insecure and ambivalent and, in particular, exhibited a 'colonized' and 'stunted and repressed' status. Importantly, this meant that, in the light of the limitations of the expansion of this stratum that, for the majority of Africans in the Location/s who saw themselves as 'educated' and as 'civilized', their role models were constrained, as were their aspirations and their 'flights of destiny' most commonly undifferentiated low-wage labour, struggles for survival, and the 'room of the poor'.

They had to face another constraint as well, however - this time in the form of the context and nature of the educated elite's politics. From the 1890s, East London had seen the existence of a quasi-official 'location committee' made up and dominated by the handful of black clergymen, teachers and clerks. Also members of the local Voters Association, and the local branches of the ANC and the Bantu Union, this strata gained official institutionalization with the formation of the Location Advisory Boards in 1921. 30 Between 1921 and the 1950s, these separate East and West Bank, and then the Joint Advisory Board operated as the sole Council recognized 'legitimate native voice' of the Locations. 31 Even from within the period before the creation of the Boards, but then importantly thereafter, a characteristic contradictory relationships of operation were established.

On one hand, this involved the attempt to act as representative of the Location/s as a whole, while on the other it sought the promotion of a more narrow elite set of interests, distant and distinct from the 'mass' of the Location/s populations. In the case of the first, formal channels were used, sometimes effectively, to urge revision of Council policy on such matters as rents, taxes, housing, wages, and recreational facilities. However, these concerns were most often subsumed in 'advisory requests' for separate housing space, control of the 'illicit liquor trade', through curfew, policing and sidewalk regulations affecting 'respectable

30 CA, 3/ELN, Box 106, Model Regulations, 1899-1948; and Boxes 933-938, Advisory Board Minutes between 1922 and 1942; Box 805, for 'Candidates and Elections', and Boxes 1169-1172, Advisory Board Minutes between 1949-1957. The Advisory Boards were legalized, and their 'powers extended' through the 1923 Urban Areas Act. The Boards consisted of a nominated white 'chairman' - the Location Superintendent, and nine 'native' members, six elected, and three nominated by the Council. The 'electorate' consisted of site-permit and lease-holders only, thereby excluding lodgers, and thus a restricted 'base' which numbered 1,555 'voters' in 1926, and 2,233 in 1937, and which had not increased substantially, to only 2,900 by c1947.

31 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1-4; 933-938, 986, and 1169-1172 which all contain details of the formation, and minutes of meetings of the Board between 1921 and 1957. They form part of an important body of material that awaits a planned future paper, but for the moment bald summary will have to suffice.
natives', to more active participation in the 'governance' of the Location/s themselves. Most often, and most typically, the second prevailed. In short, the Advisory Boards operated up until the 1940s, as vehicles attempting to create the space for the 'progress' of the small 'respectable', 'christian', and 'civilized' elite. Their constant but largely ineffective role in elaborating a 'grand tradition' liberal segregationist discourse for the Location/s, and within the Council faced a number of contradictions which will be discussed in a following chapter.

Most significant in this context for the moment, however, was that simply as an advisory board, it occupied a particularly powerless and dependent space within the Council, which also meant that as representative examples of a 'civilization' and detribalized 'native policy', their mimetic and 'dressed' performance was both periodically highly visible within the Location/s, and practically reproduced and sustained through the formalized regularity with which their advisory capacity was 'given voice'. Relatedly, when necessary, the Council was able to 'instruct', ignore and enforce a much more rigid and racist local 'native policy' through, as well as over, the top of the Board/s. This simultaneously reflected an ability of the Council to counterpose its policies to the 'read' failure for the 'civilizing mission' represented by the Board/s, while gaining forced acceptance for both Council policy within the Board/s through this 'civilization' rhetoric, and through relying on this ambiguity in promoting and maintaining the position, visibility and supposed representativeness of the Board/s within the Location/s.

At times this process was remarkably successful, especially in the late 1930s, and arguably, and certainly more ambiguously in the 1940s, but in the 1920s it was not. This was particularly so in the case of the 1923 Urban Areas Act, which entrenched the legality of the Board/s, the Council's planned municipal housing scheme started in the same year, and its responses to ICU demands for wage increases in 1925/26. The people in the Location, argued one Board member in 1924, 'were very dissatisfied with the members of the Board ... even calling us traitors ... the whole Location is up in arms against the members ...'. The ELNVA, and the ICU thereafter engineered much of this 'no more confidence' in the Board/s up to the

32 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 933-938, Advisory Board Minutes, 1922-1942.
33 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 933-938, Advisory Board Minutes, 1922-1942.
34 CA, 3/ELN, Box 2, Letters from the ELNVA to the Advisory Board, and its responses, 6 August 1924; letter to Town Clerk, 19 September 1924; and Box 933 and 934, Advisory Board Minutes, 1923-1927.
35 CA, 3/ELN, Box 2, and Box 934, Advisory Board Minutes, 21 July 1924.
strike in 1930, a sentiment the Location superintendent claimed to not understand (and which everyone believed, no doubt!), as the members had all been returned to the Board 'without opposition'. In the face of this opposition, the Board, unsurprisingly, followed a rapidly wearing path of detachment, arrogance and the 'illegality' of other channels of protest, distancing itself from both the ICU, and the East London Native Vigilance Association (ELNVA), while continuing to claim that 'this Board was really the representative of the People, ...': Few of the residents agreed, and certainly not those in the 'damp, dark holes of shackyard', educated or not.

The ELNVA, like the 'location committee', had existed since the 1890s. It was also headed by educated men but, as Beinart and Bundy argue, represented '... a broader social spectrum and (like its counterparts in the rural areas) tended to be more sensitive to popular issues'. As they note, the ELNVA and the Board had a 'fluctuating relationship', at times working in 'loose conjunction', at others in opposition. They point out its executive was elected by leaseholders and holders of lodgers permits, and was more vibrant and, through 'mass meetings', a more credible representative of the 'people's views', operating somewhat like a popular and age and gender open 'inkundla'. I have argued elsewhere that this needs to be a more qualified characterization, and that the ELNVA essentially represented the interests of a more 'traditional' and 'educated/informal sector petty-bourgeoisie'; the eating house owners, site-rentiers, brewers and the self-employed, although as I've suggested above, this class (and sector) characterization is somewhat problematic in the context of the Location/s at this time. Beinart's and Bundy's point that it was much more in tune with a grassroots constituency remains important however, and the implications of this identification can be glimpsed through the key prism of housing.

36 CA, 3/ELN, Box 374, Report of Location Superintendent, 26 March 1928.
37 CA, 3/ELN, Box 2, and Box 934, Advisory Board Minutes, 23 December 1925, 15 March 1928.
38 W. Beinart and C. Bundy, 'The Union, the Nation and the Talking Crow', 275.
39 W. Beinart and C. Bundy, 'The Union, the Nation and the Talking Crow', 275-276.
40 W. Beinart and C. Bundy, 'The Union, the Nation and the Talking Crow', 276.
41 G. Minkley, 'To Keep in Your Hearts', 68-75.
THE 'SPACE OF THE KRAAL' AND THE 'PACKING CASE LOCATIONS'  

The establishment of the new East Bank Location from the early 1900s was laid out in block sites of initially 40'x40' ft., and then 50'x50' ft. after 1924. The Town, and later the City Council, retained ownership of Location land, for which a hut-site tax and additional charges for water and sanitation were made. On these sites Africans erected and owned the houses built, in a relationship of occupied, but not owned space, but also under the supervision of the Council administration and the granting of building permits.42 Site and building permits were also only officially granted through 'proof of legal employment'.43 These 'controls' also extended to the attempt to implement and to grant monthly renewable 'lodging permits' through their issuing to only 'bona fide workers in the Municipality', and not to dependents or the unemployed. Every lodger was to occupy 300 cubic feet of space in 'private houses' and the renting of this space was regulated through a lodgers tax, which entailed a differential Council taxing system between single-roomed and other self-built housing. The implication was that if 'native residents' occupied, or even built, more than one roomed houses, they would be charged as if there were lodgers, and by extension that 'natives seldom used [or needed to use] more than a single room in the houses'.44 This was significantly an extension of the 'space of the kraal', and the 'mentality of the primitive' in a perceived and expected expression of 'communal', 'organic' and 'pre-civilized' lifestyles, coupled with the notion that rooms housed adult male workers only.

As the African population in East London increased, so did the extension of houses. Rooms were continually added, without additional rental costs to leaseholders, who stood '... to gain the most by having as many tenants as possible'. By 1925, according to the Location Superintendent, '... the sole aim of the majority of Native Leaseholders is ... to continue extending their building until the site is fully built upon, the object can be quite understood when considering that the letting of rooms is a good paying proposition'.45 A system of locally known 'rack-renting' emerged, which was conditioned by material survival on the one hand and, for some, more than this as this'good paying proposition'. In 1904 it was

42 South African Native Affairs Commission, Vol 2, 826-829; CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 4-6; and CA, PAS, 2/176; 2/177-2/183, L 26 A, Regulations and details of Council Policy, and changes, with reference to housing.
43 CA, PAS, 2/176; 2/177-2/183, L 26 A, Location Regulations.
44 CA, PAS, 2/176; 2/177-2/183, L 26 A, Location Regulations.
estimated that the site-leaseholders earned between 5 and 10 pounds per month on average, and by the late 1920s some earned up to 25 pounds, while the average was around 15 pounds.\(^{46}\) The self-built houses were mostly of wood and corrugated iron and were described in 1917 as consisting of 'tin-lining ... taken from packing cases' and 'poor quality galvanized iron'.\(^{47}\) The estimated cost of self-built housing was 30 pounds a room in new material, and 17 pounds a room in 'second-hand serviceable material', but was often cheaper and 'more ramshackle'.\(^{48}\) In 1945, an official valuation of the wood and iron properties in the East Bank Location ranged from 15 to 110 pounds, with an average of 51 pounds per house. Municipal constructed housing, on the other hand, ranged from 103 pounds (for single roomed houses) to 346 pounds (for the last built double roomed houses).\(^{49}\) In 1927, then, the Location superintendent argued that '... the Natives are building as fast as their financial circumstances will allow, and unfortunately for ourselves, they are able to build at much less than half what it costs the Municipality, and naturally will be able to let at half the amount of rent'.\(^{50}\) In 1926 there were 1,248 'private' houses in both Locations, as compared with 307 municipal provided houses; in 1931, 1,714 'private' houses against 389 municipal one's; and by 1937, 1,844 'private', while municipal housing remained static at 307.

Municipal housing, in what Reader calls the 'Older Municipal Housing Period' of 1918-1927, was in actuality only implemented between 1923-1927, and involved the construction of 168 single and two-roomed houses (106 single) in the East Bank, and 221 (181 single) in the West Bank Location. Three factors influenced this decision of intervention - firstly, the investigation, pending and passing of Natives Urban Areas Act of 1923 and the implication of local authority responsibility for 'native housing' contained therein; secondly, an associated 'health discourse' of 'insanitary', and 'overcrowded' and 'appalling' conditions and as a place of 'uncontrollable evils', emphasized by the 1918 influenza epidemic in particular; thirdly, the impact of wage struggles in 1918 leading up to the formation of the East London Native Employees Association in 1920, and connected into a series of deputations, correspondence, and strikes.
and into the Vigilance Association, where the issues of housing, wages, and cost of living were raised. This increasingly served to threaten the maintenance of a 'contented population', but also highlighted it as one getting 'out of control'.

The emergent Council response, centring on the twin structures of administration and health, emphasized the need to remove the East Bank Location, and energies were initially concentrated on the development of the West Bank Location as the site for the future 'entire native population'. However, after 1925, attention switched again to the East Bank, and between 1925 and 1927 housing development was located there. The wider intent of the Council's intervention, however, was very clear from the early 1920s. The provision of cheap municipal housing and model dwelling (and Location) plans, tied to demolition supervised by the Location Police acting as Building Inspectors, and the implementation of the pending Urban Areas Act legislation on 'temporary' access and the removal of 'uncontrollable evils', the Location Superintendent argued in a 'confidential report' that this would provide '... the means of the locations being denuded of its lodgers and the householders would find his building on his hands with nobody but himself living in it, therefore he must necessarily follow ...'. Those who qualified would 'follow' the Council 'urban trail' into municipal housing; the rest the 'rural trail' back to the reserves, both controlled through the spatiality of the Location/s generally, and 'proper housing' and 'policing' in particular.

Its implementation, however, although more successful in the much smaller West Bank Location was met with considerable resistance in the East Bank, described by Reader as a 'violent reaction from Bantu

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51 D.H. Reader, *The Black Man's Portion*, 14-15; CA, 3/ELN, Box 374, Letters from the ELNEA to Resident Magistrate, 14 February 1920; Boxes 4-8, MOH Reports, between 1918 and 1923; *Daily Dispatch*, 10 January 1920, August-September 1920.

52 Demolition of houses, the lack of remuneration for condemned and demolished buildings, the arbitrary and repressive intervention of the police acting as the housing inspectors, as well as the refusal by the Council to allow re-building, or renovate existing self-built housing and thus remove their demolition possibility, and the Council's refusal to supply material assistance were all issues raised and contested at this time, as well as the forced movement of 'home-owners' into municipal housing and its planned mass scale provides the context of what I have shorthanded into demolition. See CA, 3/ELN, Box 2.

53 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1, Confidential Report of the Location Superintendent to the Town Council, 19 May 1921.

54 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1, Confidential Report, 19 May 1921.
An ELNV A petition in 1925 was against Council intervention, as well as the principle of Council owned 'dwelling houses', which were seen for the purpose of competing with the Natives who own houses, as the Council has already ruined Natives who own property at the West Bank Location. In view of the prevailing unemployment, we firmly oppose such ownership for the simple reason that such house-owners make their living out of their houses which they are compelled by the Council to pull down.

Site-holder landlords/ladies materially lowered rents 'en masse', and demonstrations, and 'mass' protest meetings were held under the auspices of the ELNV A. Rents for municipal housing remained 'necessarily higher' than private 'rack-renting', and many of the municipal houses stood empty, as people 'avoided them at all cost'. In October 1933, five years after the last one was built, 181 out of 491 houses remained unlet (37%), with a significant number in the East Bank. In 1927, largely as a response to these pressures, and also the switch to the promotion of 'Coloured' housing in a separate area called Parkside, the municipal project was abandoned with a large percentage of the housing loan still available.

While there are a number of other dimensions that would index the poverty of the Location/s, and the parsimonious exclusivity of the Council and the local state more widely, the object is not to repeat details available elsewhere, and which local archival evidence broadly sustains. Health and 'sanitation', social, recreational and welfare conditions, and the subaltern culture of the Location/s all emphasized, and reproduced a simultaneity of 'neglect', difference and daily struggle for any form of decent survival in the

56 CA, 3/ELN, Box 2, Letters from the ELNVA to Advisory Board, 6 August 1924, and to the Town Clerk, 19 September 1924, See also D.H. Reader, The Black Man's Portion, 16.
57 CA, 3/ELN, Box 936, Advisory Board correspondence, 14 May 1927.
58 CA, 3/ELN, Box 5, Letter from Rotary Club to the Town Clerk, 27 October 1933. Although this needs to be situated in the context of the depression, and less populated nature of the Locations following the general strike, evidence suggests that they remained 'continuously unoccupied' to varying degrees between 1926/7 and 1933/34, and that there had been a large influx of natives in 1933 as the depression was felt most critically in the countryside. By the later 1930s, though, pressure on housing 'forced' their occupancy.
59 CA, 3/ELN, Box 960, Correspondence between Council and Housing Board, 1935-1937, and Council Reports for the period of 1933-1938 on 'Coloured Housing', which reflected the perceived need to differentiate coloureds from natives, and was, in turn, influenced by the applications of the civilized labour policy, and that of white labour within the City Council in this period, and elaborated in Chapter Two above.
Location/s. The total inadequacy of the local state's provision of 'the collective means of consumption'\textsuperscript{61}, and its self-generative 'bankruptcy', reinforced its slum-like, 'temporary' and essentially 'illegal' status. This, in turn, provided the rationale for not providing or developing 'location amenities', and for their prohibition in subaltern, or even 'elite' self-activity. In these Location/s, not even spatially differentiated by neighbourhood, and only marginally, if at all, by household locale, and where the 'wealth of wage labour' was essentially uniform, as was the access to commodities and the 'cost of living' and living conditions, and where passes and permits regularized an indiscriminate 'native policy', the social and material spatiality of a colonial and racial subalternity was homogenized and reproduced. The centrality of 'migrancy', and the complex and particular nature of local 'wage labour', tied this spatiality of the Location/s into a distinctively transitional status 'between' urban and rural.

I do not wish to imply, and indeed as I shall attempt to argue in a later chapter, that the Location/s in East London were simply peopled by an undifferentiated subaltern mass, but rather that similarity, and difference, division and detail, and the numerous maps of meaning were, if anything, at times more blatant and at others, more nuanced. I intend that this Chapter in one way, and the later Chapter in another, provide some sense of the locality of the Location/s as richly multiple and diverse in the history of East London. For the moment, however, the assertion of a prospective site-purchaser, in a letter of frustration to the Council, argued that 'there is more going on here than you can ever know. The Location is never silent and obedient, it does not only listen to you, and I see things you cannot.' Explicitly he was referring to the 'illegitimate' transfers of self built site-houses in the 1940s, but he could also have been referring to much more. My task at the moment is a lot more modest than his prospective vision; I am trying to tell what the Council, the Employer, and the labour market knew ... and sometimes did.

**CASUAL WORK, MIGRANCY AND THE 'TRADITION OF NATIVE LABOUR'**

Wage labour for Africans during the 1920s and the 1930s was predominantly migrant and casual. Apart from the 'store boys', and a core of Council and SAR&H workers, who were not necessarily not migrants,\

\textsuperscript{61} The term is from M. Castells, 'The Local State' in City, Class and Power (London, 1982) and I think is an extremely useful conceptualization for the context of unifying forces of exclusion and domination reproduced through the Location/s and the lack of forms of consumption.
employment in East London followed that 'established' in the context of British and other colonial ports. By the early 1900s, the African labour demands of the town were met in three main areas: day labourers on the docks and railways; daily and weekly workers in the commercial 'stores', workshops and the municipality; and as 'servants' - daily, weekly, and monthly - in domestic work. The nature of daily labour on the harbour and rail works, as the single largest employers of black labour, was structured in such a way as to mean that '... the labour supply varied considerably. ... At times we had abundance of labour, and in the course of a few days we were short. This is owing to the rushes of trade. At times a large number of Natives are employed at the wharf, and a few days later hundreds less are required. The casual basis of labour however also extended beyond the port companies, shippers and SAR&H and included both municipal and store workers in cleaning, packing, carrying, and other occupations. While there was a recognized 'core' of workers employed on a more continuous and regular weekly basis, the sale of labour-time remained predominantly daily, and all remained, with the exception of a small 'civilized elite' and the few serious about a life of labour in the town, robustly migrant on a seasonal and weekly basis.

The sale of labour time 'only in small units' not only had convenience for the employers (although this also provided an important early source of tension), but also for those 'offering their employment', in the maintenance of a worker-cultivator axis, and in short-term labour for cash wages significantly in immediate excess of reserve or squatter-tenant longer-term production rewards. The Inspector of Native Locations argued in the early 1900s that 'at present he [the native] is master of the situation', regulating wages (from 2s to 4s per day), labour-time (2-3 days a week), and in the characteristic 'worker consciousness' selectivity of the 'most remunerative markets', with an estimated shortage of 2,000 workers for existing jobs in 1903 the most visible example of this. For him this meant that 'native workers ... come and go daily ... for instance there may be a great many in the location this week, and next week hundreds of them have left for their homes, and then often when it rains, they remain at their homes to plough their lands'. The so-called 'extravagant wage' was the problem for both him and the administration because it enabled 'a man to work

66 See G. Stedman Jones, Outcast London (Oxford, 1971), and F. Cooper, On the African Waterfront, especially Ch.1
68 South African Native Affairs Commission, Volume 2, 14.
69 South African Native Affairs Commission, Volume 2, 14; also CA, I/ELN, Box 74, Report 16/3 by Inspector of Native Locations, East London District on 'Supply of Native Labour', 17 November 1913.
for a few days in the week, earning sufficient in those few days to lie idle at home for the rest of the week.\textsuperscript{71} In general terms, migration seldom entailed periods of longer than 3 months, and this typically involved ‘trips home’ for periods of ‘a week or so’, and ‘large numbers who leave on the Saturday, returning Sunday nights’, or frequently in the week.\textsuperscript{72}

The urban implications of this form of casual and migrant labour exploitation, and utility, was well expressed by the Town Clerk in 1900, who argued that

\begin{quote}
[t]he benefits accruing to the town from the establishment of the location are that we can compel Natives to leave the town and be in the location at a certain hour, thereby preventing a lot of undesirable characters about the streets. The chief point, however, is that it is undesirable to have Natives living in the town, as their presence invariably leads to the accumulation of filth and the generation of disease, besides being in other respects a great nuisance to the white population.\textsuperscript{73}
\end{quote}

A pattern and a municipal practise of administration was being established which simultaneously connected ‘casual labour’ with idleness, ‘undesirability’, criminality, filth, disease and the ‘inherent nuisance’ of the comparisons and connections between race, civilization, and the formation of a segregated territoriality in new urban form.\textsuperscript{74} Migrancy, casual labour and the ‘temporary’ nature of wage labour, ‘to work, but not to remain’, became conflated and representative of naming the ‘native’, not through the workplaces, but ‘the town’ and ‘the urban’. This was so because the ‘temporary’ nature of ‘native’ labour availability, and as ‘casual’ and migrant sellers of varying units of time suited and was integral to the economic well-being of the city as well as to the varying employers of labour. Few of the port companies, shippers, the SAR&H, stores or municipal requirements sought a transformed and universalized ‘native working class’, their interests served by a differing, and ‘temporary’ kind of transition. What this did not entail, though, was a ‘freedom’ of casual and migrant ‘native labour’, potentially able to reverse the colonial tables and be ‘masters of the situation’. The answer lay in the localities of the town, for it was in the town that the freedoms challenging the masters were constructed as identifiable and menacing.

\textsuperscript{71} South African Native Affairs Commission, Volume 2, 833, 822.
\textsuperscript{72} South African Native Affairs Commission, Volume 2, 834; CA, 3/ELN, Box 453, Report of Location Superintendent, March 1913.
\textsuperscript{73} ELM, File 80/-, Report, 18 August 1900, and also cited in D.H. Reader, The Black Man’s Portion, 13
\textsuperscript{74} Here I draw on the arguments of Fred Cooper, On the African Waterfront, who argues for a very similar process which occurred in Mombasa, albeit also differentiated by the transitions of slave emancipation, of regionally distinctive labour patterns and forms of its sale, and differences in the concerns, and practises of the colonial state, amongst others. See especially 21-37.
In 1903, the Location Superintendent argued that, with the establishment of the consolidated East Bank Location

"[t]he Native is very much more comprehensive and contented in every respect. Fracas and large fights are not practised nearly so frequently: whilst in carrying on their daily duties they are of very much more value, and better people in every form to manage and control."  

This is but one of a growing series of municipal statements, although the corollary attitudes of undesirability, disease, disorder and criminality were continually re-asserted. Two critical, long-term implications emerged out of these processes. Firstly, wage labour became represented as 'temporary' in nature, which also implied its casual and migrant status, and this became its tradition. Secondly, this 'temporary status' was transferred to that of the town, and in the formation of the Location/s, these became the 'temporary' site of 'native' management and control.

By the 1930s, migrancy had certainly become more pressing and, for many, longer-term, while the casual nature of employment had become increasingly contested. After c1911, some of the terms of the 'rewards of labour' had begun to change, and this was reflected in a series of rolling strikes over wages in September. It began with wharf-workers, and then rolled on to the municipal, railway workshop, goodshed, commercial sector and finally the stevedore, lighter and yard and baggage-room workers at the docks. This expressed 'dissatisfaction among all classes of Native labour in East London', although resulting in an increase for wharf-workers to 3/- per day, and stevedore workers to 3/6d per day. The municipal, railway and commercial workers suffered decreases and dismissals, leaving their wages at between 2/- and 2/3d per day. 'Lighter' dock workers remained the highest paid, at 4/- per completed trip and, capable of two to three trips in a day, the successful struggles by these, and the other higher paid wharf, docker and stevedore workers were important in maintaining the 'fair and equitable distribution of work and pay' that patterned the distinctive 'casual', but also dependent basis of dockwork as at the heart of East London's local economy.

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75 South African Native Affairs Commission, Volume 2, 53.
76 Daily Dispatch, 12 September 1911; H.H. Smith, 'Development of Labour organization', 147-151.
Between 1918 and the late 1920s, a series of strikes and agitation in 1918, 1920 and 1921 marked the moments of explicit conflict over static and, at times declining wages; the central position of dockwork as differentiated from municipal and railway labourers and gangers, 'store boys' and the workshop unskilled more generally; and, in the reality of a 'massive increase in the cost of living' (estimated at about 100% for Africans), a growing context of dependency, inadequacy and intensified migration. These wage conflicts also began to expose the vulnerability of migrant, casual and regular workers as labour supplies began to grow out of an increasing pace of rural impoverishment through the 1920s. In 1920, for example, there was a 'large influx', which tended to 'overcrowd the locations', at a time when the Location/s usually experienced a 'general falling off', to such an extent that the administration was 'continuously turning people away who are legitimate visitors because there is no further accommodation in the house wherein the person resides that the party is desirous of visiting'. For the first time, the local state began to talk of the emergence of 'unemployment', and the economic system of casual wage labour in the city began to find constraint in place of flexibility and short-term 'immediacy'. This had two key dimensions - a growing competition for certain jobs, particularly that of dockwork, and a downward pressure on wages, together with a growing vulnerability of wage dependency and the need to extend units of labour-time. By 1931, admittedly following the strike, and in the midst of the Depression, the Location Superintendent suggested that he was 'not aware of natives returning to their homes because they have received high wages', and that 'natives' come to the city now 'because they have to'.

In 1918 mass meetings were held in July and August, drawing up to 2,000 workers to each, and demands made were for 1/- a day increases. The Chamber of Commerce acceded, and recommended a 6d all-round increase, and did so again in 1920. This time, between January and March, the Chamber said they would not wait 'until they had a pistol levelled at their heads, to have that sixpence extorted from them', in part to

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79 ELM, File 80/8, Location Reports dated 3 May 1920; and 3 June 1920, and also cited in D.G. Bettison, 'A Socio-Economic Study of East London', 86.
80 BCI, Box 25, although compiled in the 1930s, a report on 'native labour' contains a six page summary of 'the history of native labour in the port' - the author is unknown. On the issue of 'unemployment', the earliest references I found were from the early 1920s, although reference was made, in 1919, to an unemployment problem.
81 CA, 3/ELN, Box 4, Evidence to Native Economic Commission by Location Superintendent, 10-12 March 1931.
disarm the consolidation of the newly emergent East London Native Employees Association (ELNEA). The ELNEA claimed a membership of 2,000 in 1920 and 4,000 by 1921, but its ability to mould itself into a trade union, based on 'trade union principles of operation' and workplace organization was markedly dismal in comparison to its ability to draw 'mass' support in the Location/s.

Thereafter, the ICU came to dominate local 'native labour' organizational discourse, but drew from the ELNEA presence before 1922. I have argued elsewhere that this meant that its dominant form of operation came to fit previous and existing methods which were educated, reasonable, respectful and lettered in negotiation. Weak on workplace organization, the occasional 'mass meeting' of bravado and rhetoric served a periodic rallying point of possibility, persuasion and identification, but, beyond these moments, popular support had to rely on the closed confines of an educated caution blanketed in 'civilized practise'.

Despite a claimed membership of nearly 4,000 in the East London region by 1925, the ICU remained predominantly 'anxious to avoid any industrial upheaval' and relied on the call for a 'reconsideration of attitude from the Employers of Labour', in an atmosphere of growing urban and material impoverishment and inadequacy. Calls for wage increases, and the threat of an economy wide strike, were thus seen as 'the threat of words' in 1925/26. In addition, the Location Superintendent illuminated a wider context of difficulty and division by 1926. He argued in untypical shorthand:

[w]hilst it is always safe to be prepared for any eventuality, I do not see how a strike can possibly be brought about, the ICU consists of about half the number of workers in the town, and they divided in their opinions, the maize and wool season is at an end, their crops are either a failure, or they have not ploughed owing to drought, which fact is borne out by the large number out of work, and still arriving in search of employment, and finally the non-cooperation of those outside the Union.

By November 1926, the local ICU was still demanding a 2/- a day increase, to meet 'this acute strangulation confronting the workers', while simultaneously demanding a 'round-table conference' with the Council and

82 *Daily Dispatch*, 10 January 1920; CA, 3/ELN, Box 1756, Report of Special Meeting of Chamber of Commerce, 9 January 1920; and Box 374, Letters from ELNEA to Resident Magistrate, 14 February 1920, January 1921, 26 October 1921.

83 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1756, and Box 374, comments from the Resident Magistrate, January 1920; also 1/ELN, Box 86, CID Report, 20 November 1922.

84 See G. Minkley, 'To Keep in Your Hearts', Ch. 3. The local committee of the ICU consisted of three clerks, one Standard Bank employee, a Baker, King and Co. head store-boy, and a Port merchant, and an SAR&H employee - you can draw your own conclusions about its social position and status.

85 CA, 3/ELN, Box 374, Letters from the executive of the ICU to the Town Clerk, Mayor, and the COC, 4 November 1925, 30 November 1925, 13 January 1926, 4 February 1926.

86 CA, 3/ELN, Box 374, letter from Lloyd to Ports Goods Superintendent, 4 December 1926.
Employers. The ICU had argued that 'Native life' had come to depend on wages more than anything else, and that this was not recognized or realized by East London's employers of labour, who still saw them as 'temporary workers', and wages as supplementary to rural existence and incomes. Against this, the ICU posed low wages as causing the inability of 'the Native and Coloured workman to enable himself to maintain his family in civilized comfort, Christian decency and citizenship, ...'.

Certainly while the ICU's assertion of a growing wage dependency, as well as the declining and intensifying 'low' value of wages that were pushing the sale of labour-power into longer units of time in the workplace and longer periods of migrancy in the Location/s, the civilized family 'workman' of the ICU was a 'universalist' construction that denied the particularity of the 1920s and the 1930s for all but a select few.

The emergence and the transition of the ICU to the IUCU reflects both this tension and the 'awareness' of this denial. Beinart and Bundy provide an excellent, and extensive analysis of the transitions, and the dynamics of the IUCU between 1928 and 1932, evocatively captured in the title 'The Union, the Nation and the Talking Crow', but more precisely specified by them in the following terms:

It moved away from an initial emphasis on organizational issues and from rather bureaucratic tactics to lay much more stress on three other elements: an explicitly Africanist position (strongly influenced by separatist Christianity); an articulation of specific urban underclass grievances (especially those of women); and an attempt to cobble together an alliance with popular forces in the city's rural hinterland.

The reproduction of their argument in more detail, or of aspects present in my Honours thesis and afforded less attention in their account, particularly around the 1930 SAR&H and then 'general strike', need not be repeated here. Beinart and Bundy do a far more capable job. I want rather, to explore two aspects of a single, more intentionally focused argument highlighted through the IICU, the strike itself and the period after the strike. My argument is relatively straightforward - the IICU, in its combination of 'structured' and 'derived' ideologies, in its increasingly local and particular popular organization and pressure, and in its 'invocation' of race and nation, as well as Location-al, and rural and 'traditionalist' concerns, served to

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87 CA, 3/ELN, Box 374, Letter to Council, 22 November 1926.
88 CA, 3/ELN, Box 374, Resolution of ICU mass meeting, 30 November 1925, communicated to the Town Clerk.
89 W. Beinart and C. Bundy, 'The Union, the Nation and the Talking Crow', 272.
‘invent’, in crucial aspects, for both the local state and for the African participants, this ‘tradition of native labour’, the ‘urban’ locality of its management and control, and the site of its future contestation.

How did the various structures of local power understand, and respond to the IICU in this period? From the detailed police reports, and their wide circulation, the IICU confirmed what had been known, and feared all along - that the uncontrolled mobility of labour brought with it disorder, and when placed in the hands of so-called ‘educated’ and ‘civilized’ natives, brought its organization into ‘strikes and mayhem’.90 Laidler, the Medical Officer of Health (MOH) after complaining that the East Bank Location was becoming a ‘retreat for the unwanted Natives of surrounding areas and provinces, gave the following causes for ‘recent troubles in this location’ (not itself an insignificant comment on the 1930 general strike): ‘the large number of casual labourers and unemployed’, and ‘[e]conomic unrest, due not so much to low wages as to the number of non-workers parasitic upon regular wage earners’.91

Casual and highly mobile migrant labour remained the most common form of wage labour, and dock, stevedore and transport workers, together with domestic workers, remained the most concentrated sectors of the ‘native’ workforce. The BCI estimated, in the mid 1930s, that between 60 and 70 per cent of the workforce remained casual, working for less than 15 days in a month.92 The ‘large reserve of casual labour’ - the dockworkers, stevedores, and SAR&H workers had, during the height of the Depression, force-worked an average of between one and two days a week. Increasingly thereafter, they had been ‘crowded in on’ by the ‘unemployed’, and this pressure, together with static wages, had significantly increased days worked, but also an internal ‘stabilization’ of casual work around a core and a rotating system.

This focused ‘core’ and a ‘rotating system’ of casual work organization was largely self-generative. Not only did the BCI suggest that a form of ‘their own work gang system’ had emerged by the 1930s, but that this

90 BCI, Box 12, which contains material on the 1930 strike, as does Box 24, File N1. Included in the material is a substantial number of the police reports, and Divisional Inspector of Labour reports, and a commentary from the BCI itself, dated 14 June 1932.
92 BCI, Box 24, File D/2/3, and N1, which contains an unofficial and ‘confidential’ report on the problems of native labour, and of wages, and appears to have been conducted in close co-operation with the Police Station Commander. It is dated 30 October 1937, but spans the period from the ending of the strike, and was an ongoing ‘investigation’.
In building, this turnover was over 200%; in municipal employment 180%; in hotel 160%; in commerce 120% and in transport 115%, while other industries varied between 52% and 148%. Of the over 220 employers surveyed, less than 5% had been in continuous employment for more than 5 years, while over 80% had been in employment for less than a year. Migrancy and the casual nature of employment accounted for a significant proportion of this labour mobility and turnover, but so too did changing jobs (30-40%) and dismissals (20-40%).

Wage labour was also fragmented by daily, weekly, monthly and seasonal variation, which shaped work and business cycles in the city. The pre-dominant form of wage labour in the city was, in addition to being daily and ‘casual’, seasonal and short-term, even by the 1930s. The BCI estimated from its 1930s survey that there were between 20 and 30 per cent of workers that were weekly and monthly migrants; between 40 and 50 per cent three monthly, and the rest between three and six monthly migrants, and ‘occasionally longer periods of up to a year’. The exception was the identified ‘location elite’, which the BCI suggested didn’t total more than 500 people in the early 1930s, and had visibly declined to a ‘few hundred’ by 1937. The forms and patterns of migrancy were more complex than this. The BCI provides little evidence of the length of ‘return visits’ to the rural areas, does not chart any length of work-cycle patterns and neither does it distinguish differing structural relations between the city and the rural areas. Thus it is impossible to know the rural end of these patterns, or to isolate ‘visits’ from structural patterns of necessary and voluntary migrancy. It does, however, give a sense of the highly mobile and real ‘temporary’, and ambiguously ‘self-controlled’ nature of East London’s workforce across divisions of age, education and ‘civilization’. In addition, the rough estimates help to open the door on the seasonality of work, wages and subsistence.

While the Location Superintendent had argued in the mid 1920s that ‘our position as compared to other municipalities considerably differs owing to our proximity to the Native Reserves. In case of a slump in trade there is no difficulty for Natives to get back to their homes, whereas in other centres, it is only those that have saved some money that can do so’, ‘getting back’ was more than an occasional response to

96 BCI, Box 24, File D/2/3, Confidential Report, 30 October 1937, 8-11, and in a lengthy appendix listing each firm, and the estimates of turnover.

97 BCI, Box 24, File D/2/3, Confidential Report, 11-13.

98 BCI, Box 24, File D/2/3, Confidential Report, 12.
irregular 'slump conditions'. The seasonal pattern of migrancy, well established by the 1930s showed the greatest influx in January, and then in February and March, a decline to June, an increase to August, a large decrease in September (and spring), an increase in November and December and then an 'emptying' for the Christmas holidays until early January. These seasonal patterns correspond to two integrally related spatial localities - the reserves and reserve agriculture; and the port and its trade fluctuations, particularly of wool exports, but also consumer goods imports. The high degrees of correspondence emphasize the nature of the city's dependence on the port, the centrality of dock work, and the patterns of migrancy determined by this, as well as in relationship to reserve production.

This relationship between 'seasonal' patterns of trade and 'business cycles', and its necessary 'casual' labour exploitation shaped the locally particular patterns of migrancy. Shaped in turn by the patterns of reserve production, subsistence and impoverishment, and by a continued high degree of workplace control of entry and occupation in migrancy, migrant mobility and an emphasized 'casual' determination simultaneously shaped the city's commercial and trading basis as cyclical and dominant. The implication, and the contradiction in wider terms, was that this particular form and 'mutual' reproduction of dependent casual and migrant 'native labour' production crucially determined and reproduced the commercial basis of the city, but also, simultaneously, its colonial basis. For, on the one hand, the social and spatial materiality of the workplace was temporary, fluctuating, mobile and unstable, and this enabled a commercial and trading viability in low wages, demand employment, no labour contracts, reproductive worker neglect, ease of dismissal, cyclical survival, and increased profitability. On the other hand, it also entailed disorder, the lack of work discipline, uncontrollable coming and going, theft, low productivity, and a host of workplace activities of organization, communication and identity that were unknown and unintelligible, which could

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99 Location Superintendent, in his report on the advisability of enforcing Section 12 of the 1923 Urban Areas Act, cited in D.G. Bettison, 'A Socio-Economic Study of East London', 85; and in ELM, File 80/-.  
100 BCI, Box 24, File D/2/3, Confidential Report, 13-15; CA, 3/ELN, Box 4, and 374, Location Superintendent Reports, which contain indexes of seasonal migrancy patterns for the 1920s and 1930s.  
101 The details of this are contained in BCI, Box 25, 'Report on the East London Harbour', 25 November 1938, which although concerned with Harbour Developments in this period, provides a rough index of import and export trade on a monthly basis. The wool trade dominates exports, and therefore labour demands between January and March, while the two key importation periods of consumer goods were June-July, and October-November, in turn reflecting seasonal and tourist, as well as reserve commodity and consumption patterns of 'subsistence' scarcity.
and did, culminate in protest and labour action. The tradition of native labour established, which was itself patterned from the Location/s and the reserves, also relied on these spatial localities to exercise and implement a related, but differing, racial and colonial form of control and discipline - as part of the local hegemonic dimensions of the project of re-tribalization and Location temporality.

This, in turn, entailed the establishment, back into the workplaces, of a "tradition" of 'native labour' that explained this kind of casual and migrant occupancy as racial - the behaviour of 'primitive labour', backward, not yet modern, simple - 'inferior boys'. This 'tradition' of work was enabled by the racial counterpoint of an artisan one of comparison and exclusion. This meant a terrain of work on which was constructed, established and extended not artisan traditions of skill, but 'native traditions' of age and kinship; not craft, but manual labour; not apprenticeship, but circulation; not stability, but daily turnovers; not wage differentials but similarities; not the 46 hour and 8 hour working week and day, but the 12 hour day once and twice a week, or two weeks in a month; not the steaming lathe, but the shovel of coal; and not the City, but the Location and the reserve, and not the trades union, but the mass meeting and the homeboy association.

This is not to suggest that the work of 'native labour' was an easy experience, and the workplace an uncomplicated terrain of migrant and casual control. It was not. This racial structuring of the tradition of the 'native' labour force as a whole, and its constructed material distance from artisan labour, saw the establishment by the 1930s of a practise of white supervision and control that was arbitrary, demeaning and often unbearably uniform in daily workplace 'regimes of [a form of] colonial despotism'. The working day was long and fraught with danger, humility and degradation, if also having at times aspects of autonomy and consent. 'Natives' worked, on average, 10 hours a day during the 1930s, according to the BCI, and some, on the docks, as much as 14 hours, although this meant higher pay and a greater 'freedom' on other days. The predominant stereotype was of the 'lazy and stupid kaffir', named as such, or in lighter moments, 'Dwana' (white boss) was based on the control of life outside work.

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102 BCI, Boxes 22-26 contain much of the episodic material for these generalizations, although others come from the municipal archive, and from Interviews, 3a, 3f, 3q, June 1987-December 1988; and 4f, and 4k, January 1989-December 1990.

103 The term is, of course, Michael Burroway's, *The Politics of Production* (London, 1985), 226-228 in particular. Burroway describes the production regime of colonial despotism, because force prevails over consent, and as colonial because one racial group dominates through political, legal and economic rights denied the other. Importantly, however, he also argues that the arbitrary power exercised by the dictatorial 'Dwana' (white boss) was based on the control of life outside work.
'boy', or 'Jim, John, or Jack'. Dismissals were instantaneous, and 'on the spot', for anything from 'sulking' to 'laughter', and daily wages depended on the recommendation of the 'umlungu's' (supervisors). Most typical in the force of 'native labour' was the memory of physical abuse - sjamboks and boots, the shove and the smack - discipline the 'boys', police the road-gangs and the wharves. Mondays were always the worst days 'after the weekend', avoid Mondays, don't work on Mondays, and then maybe you'd get away with a 'clap' on Tuesday, and then, maybe it would be OK. 'Abalungu ngo-damn!, Abalungu ngodoti' the refrain of the road-gang that might have echoed to the sound of picks in unison, 'white man be damned!, white man is dirt'.

By the late 1920s, the Council, and the administration had a less rosy view of matters than it had at the turn of the century. Exclusion, and surveillance had become the preoccupation of management and control, over that of civilization and development, and this intensified through the 1930s. Reader, for example, argued that the years 1930-35 were marked by '... the depths of dependency of the urban Bantu upon their white employers [in the widest sense of colonial relations]'. 'Native revenue' was practically nonexistent, social conditions deteriorated, housing became more 'racked', the cost of living escalated, and 'unemployment' emerged as a newly constant and sliding scale to recognizably over 2,000 by 1933. Simultaneously, the Council proclaimed Subsection 6 of Section 5 of the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act (and Act 25 Amendment of 1930), which prevented both residential, and work-seeking entry. Although only enforced until 1935, it remained enforceable at any point, and when taken together with the pass and permit system in place (from the late 1890s), curfew regulations from 1912 (Cape Municipal Ordinance, 10, 1912), appealed in 1930, but re-introduced in May 1931, the 1923 Urban Areas Act provisions, and the extension of Section 12 (of the

104 Interviews, 3f, T.L., and 3k, N.M., 6, and 8 January, 1988.
105 Interviews, 3f, and 3k; but also with two white supervisors in East London during the 1930s, 5b, H.M., and Sl, R.R, 12 and 15 June 1991.
106 Interviews, 3f, 3k, and 5b, Sl.
107 Interview, 3f, T.L. What is particularly interesting is that in C and M Legum, South Africa: crisis for the west (London, 1964), 187, they have a reference to this worksong, quoted, it appears, from Die Oosterlig, May 1961. Co-incidence, or the present in the past? I don't know, I stumbled on the reference in Legum quite accidentally, after the interview. A genealogy of South African worksongs suggests itself, and a fragment for an 'indigenous' history, along the lines opened by L. Vail and L. White's excellent Power and the Praise Poem: Southern African Voices in History (London, 1992).

108 'White employers' is here meant in the sense of East London's wider racial structure, and also reflecting D.H. Reader's, The Black Man's Portion prejudices in the conception that white's were simply employers, and blacks to work and to fulfill these labour needs. The point of 'dependency' remains a valid one, however, as descriptive of colonial relations of domination and exclusion, 18.
1923 Act) in 1937, the local methods for control in the 1930s acquire their potential segregationary imbalance in favour of repressive and bureaucratic paternalism over 'beneficial paternalism'.

In addition the 'headman system' was transformed after 1926, when the central state took over, extended and intensified the official policing of the Location/s, while the number of headmen were reduced and those who remained became clerks in the Native Administration Department, superseded by the policeman and the pick-up van. The pattern of 'native location policy' became typically the 'house to house' inspection, the street corner and roadway 'frisk', the 'extraordinary night inspection', and the 'pre-dawn raid'. The Location Superintendent was a central part of this process of surveillance, implementing 'house-to-house investigations', with the 'object of reducing the population to be more fitting with present day requirements ...

A pattern had been established and the connections made and followed with a remarkable degree of regularity. Conflicts located around the workplace, and the issues of low wages produced Council and administrative responses of Location intervention on an ever more repressive and controlling basis. It occurred in 1903 with housing projects, and the consolidation of the East Bank Location, and of locally existent passes and permits. It occurred in 1911/12 with the further construction of 'lodging houses' and the imposition of the curfew regulations. It occurred in the beginning of the 1920s with initially removal of the Location to the West Bank, and then the attempt to gain municipal control of housing and the imposition of the 1923 Urban Areas Act, asserting 'temporary' status and influx mechanisms. It occurred in 1926/1927 with the abandonment of the municipal housing scheme as a 'failure', the extension of Location policing and the effective disestablishment of the 'headmen' system. And in 1932, after the 1930 strike, influx control mechanisms were extended further, policing and surveillance intensified, and the Location/s deteriorated further into temporary slums. And through all of this, wages remained, with minimum exceptions, nominally static, 'native labour' earning in a day in the 1930s what white artisans earned in an hour.


110 ELM, File 80/-, Location Superintendent Report, 28 July 1932.
CHAPTER FOUR


In an East London municipal document entitled 'Information Concerning Industrial Development 1955', it was suggested that since the City Council in 1937 decided to enter seriously the sphere of industrial enterprise, East London has rapidly gained recognition as an ideal industrial centre, and with judicious planning this development has been achieved without detracting from, or in any way interfering with the tourist amenities of this picturesque and natural holiday centre.

More expansively, it was argued in the 'Annual of South Africa' for 1949-1950, that until 1937, no very positive steps had been taken to attract industries to East London, as there was some doubt as to whether the city could be developed both as a seaside resort and as an industrial centre, but subsequently it was felt that this aspect depended entirely on the soundness or otherwise of its town-planning scheme - in particular the relationship geographically of the industrial area to the tourist amenities and the degree and type of industrialisation on which it was intended to concentrate.

This public, self-advertised and 'officialized' notion of 1937 as East London's industrial turning point was far more widely representative, and dominated, (and continues to dominate) the periodization of its economic trajectory across a wide range of local structures, organizations and institutions from the early 1950s, including the COC, the BCI, and most notably the City Council. Presented as a series of logical and rational outcomes and interventions in a mutual spatial compromise between tourism and industry in the differentiated city, this 'turning-point' representation both masked intense conflicts between, and in-between these two 'options', as well as the extension of this conflict through the 1940s and into the 1950s. For it was from this vantage point of the early and mid-1950s, that the 1937 turning point was initially, and most rigorously asserted, as part of then current industrial location and local (and central) state intervention, mass production possibility, and labour transition struggles. It was also centrally, a crucial

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element in the construction of a settler nationalist discourse that sought to transcend narrower Afrikaner Nationalist contexts - to link and construct a white nation on new terms.

This does not deny the importance of 1937/38 in East London's history, but this chapter will elaborate a more qualified, and less mutually interventionist and collaborative periodization across economic structures and relations - as opposed to one which could only be welded back to this point in time, and onto space, through a necessary economic discourse of 'static continuity' - opened and resolved by this 1937 City Council 'change of heart' scenario. For by the 1950s this notion of a sea-change was equally contained in the synonymous presentation of the Council as following an 'enlightened and generous policy with a view to fostering industries ... after 1937'.

More particularly, the process of unifying and dating a local transition gave local state intervention, through the City Council, exclusive 'purchase' on managing industrialization, while this was portrayed as achievement-driven, rational, and individualized in the process of 'natural' economic and locally modern complexity. Its assertion through a single, if slightly delayed moment of progression, in comparison to other South African centres, enabled the emergence of a dominant modernist dualism to the sharply contrasted 'native tradition' in the Locations. This occurred in a process that underscored a 'harsh wedge between native cosmology and European history', and denied - at least on its white civilized veneer - a fracturing and differentiation within the local white 'makers' of history. This periodization was achieved then, through the 'unifying' re-politicization of differing temporalities as 'the stages' for differing spaces of social and natural enclosure, while denying their spatial constructions and inter-connections over this dominant, or any form, of time. In particular, social, location and industrial spaces were re-elaborated as distinctive and necessarily 'managed' aspects of natural, abstract city space. In so doing, the differing temporalities of economic and social class, gender, and racial modernities and histories were brought together under the same Council stage-management in new self-'enlightened' ways through this period. In this, an apparent uniformity of experience and structural process was achieved.


While it is necessary to identify the emergence of a consolidative trend towards a more rationalized stability of existence over a number of 'fly-by-night mushroom industries', that both 'popped up', and deliquesced in this period 10, the structural existence of the city's economy remained, with a few notable exceptions 11, industrially small-scale, fragmented, and workshop based.12 In addition, the position of a fledgling, but potentially vital engineering jobbing sector, which had serviced the mines (and farms), as well as local needs, was consolidated in this period, as it failed to make what Webster describes as the 'conversion' to mass production (rather than jobbing) in meeting wartime production needs.13 This was in marked contrast to the Rand, where the engineering industry acquired both 'absolute centrality' within the entire industrial structure of South Africa, and in its role in 'national industrial integration' in this period.14 For East London, though, wartime was to entail local marginality and 'dis'-integration, compounded by investment and performance distance from national mining and international attraction. Rather, East London's fortune-path became dependent on the protected success of import substitution of light consumer goods through, and within this exclusion from national Rand dynamics, while these policies were themselves essentially Rand beneficial, but locally 'national' and Rand state determined.

In process, I would suggest that protection/tariff ISI served as one of the central mechanisms in the local internalization of a Rand-centred structural dependence both reliant on, and isolated from the industrial effects of these 'national' state interventions. In other words, protection/tariffs were central to simultaneously determine local industrialization, and its 'weaknesses', precisely because its dynamics entailed and enabled a particular local racialized industrialization model that intersected with a conservative and commercial politics in a simultaneous 'artificiality' in location and investment 15, and

10 BCI, Box 23, File FC/2, Correspondence Files, wherein there is sketchy evidence that between 1941 and 1946, there were 39 closures by small factories, none employing more than 12 workers, and largely located in cheap substitution light consumer goods production.
11 These would include Rowntree-Wilsons, Consolidated Textiles, the Beehive Group, and Alpheus Dowse, as well as a few other food processing and smaller textile factories.
12 BCI, Boxes 25-27, which contain the most, albeit uneven and fragmented material in relation to the period of the war, mostly in the form of Correspondence, Drafts of Annual and Committee Reports, and a draft of a Report intended to be submitted to the Controller of Manpower, February 1945.
13 E. Webster, Cast in a Racial Mould, 55-59.
15 This is drawn from BCI, Box 16, Correspondence between James, and Snell, 12 March 1941 and attached correspondence; Report, 24 October 1945, which deals with the Second World War, but also highlights the considerable problems the lack of any industrial base posed for industrial development, as well as the 'artificial' nature of a state-led industrialization in East London.
lightness in scale, implication and contrast. The war period heightened and exemplified these contradictions in East London, entrenching a craft and workshop industrial pattern which simultaneously extended the atypical centrality of the Rand, and the uneven impact of wartime 'de-linking'.

FINDING THE SPACE FOR INDUSTRY

In 1937, the City Council began the process of allocating industrial space in the City. This marked a significant departure, but also a hesitant, and interrupted one. Chiselhurst, home of the Beehive Group in 'some of the most important industries in the City', became retrospectively demarcated in 1938 as an 'industrial area on 40 acres of ground, ... about 1 1/2 miles north of the City Hall'. This was followed, hereafter, with the 'intricate planning for the development of five new industrial townships' by the mid-1940s, with only Braelyn on the East Bank of the Buffalo River, and Gately, Gately Extension, Gately West, and Woodbrook on the West Bank. All were only 'established after the Second World War'. Braelyn was to be situated 'between the "North End" Suburb and the East London Native Location' as a 'small township for light industries', and reliant on 'unskilled natives' labour, including mineral water production, alcoholic bottling, motor body building, and toy, and light textile manufacturing. The West Bank, and the Gately Townships on 180 acres of land, and Woodbrook (an extension of the Gately area by 150 acres), on the other hand, was planned to become East London's 'heavy' industrial area, although only explicitly so after the post-War period. By the mid-1950s it contained manufacturing plants producing batteries, cementile products, canned fruit, pharmaceutical products, paints, textiles, metal goods, engineering tools and machinery, agricultural implements, and motor vehicles. In particular, Alpheus Dowse Engineering was prominent in recasting the development potential of this West Bank area, together with the wider impact of local understandings of 'wartime industrialization' in opening the Council to the importance of 'heavy' and

\footnote{16}{I would argue that this is part of a broader pattern of industrialization in the country which both highlights the Rand as the 'core' (SA's Ruhr), while also exemplifying the 'stypicality' of the Rand in comparison to the rest of the developed and emerging urban centres, while it was also the motor of local industrialization, and beneficiary of ISI strategies and tariffs, as well as the 1930s gold/fusion period, linked as it was, in and through the mines/engineering developments. This is part of the framework which I would argue makes ISI, and tariffs and protection Rand-specific and centred. Of course the explicit use of 'delinking' draws on aspects of 'dependency theory', but only representationally, as the thrust of my argument is that 'delinking' is regionally and spatially uneven.}

\footnote{17}{Driffield Papers, East London Museum, 'Information Concerning Industrial Development, 1955', 3.}

\footnote{18}{Driffield Papers, East London Museum, 'Information Concerning Industrial Development, 1955', 2-4.}

\footnote{19}{BCI, Box 25, File IM/A, Report on Braelyn Industrial Township, 16 August 1948, 2.}

\footnote{20}{BCI, Box 26, File WB/1, Report on West Bank Industries, 24 May 1955.
'dirty' industrial development, but in a context where the West Bank (and Alpheus Dowse) served as an avenue for its visible 'removal' from the 'tourist heart of the city'.

The discussions, and planning debates around industrial space in this early 1937-1947 period, and their post-war implementation, are illuminating for their degree of tension and contradiction within dominant circles of decision-making, and the degree of 'outside interference' in universalizing industrialization into the scale, content and structure of East London as a 'modern city'. While East London's planning contained a much more modest vision than Cape Town's garrisoning 'monumental approach', the visibility of Le Corbusier discourse of 'an elite capitalist city of administration and control', with garden cities for the workers, being sited, along with industry, beyond the 'security zone' of the green belt encompassing the city, was not. Whatever the route of arrival of Le Corbusier metropolitan 'monopoly capital' planning ideology, its differing accommodative resonances in fragmented local industrial, commercial, and municipal committees, all concerned with formalizing, managing, and controlling urban, colonial, and economic space, through 'surgical' and 'overall' 'standard' and 'geometrical' planning was central. A series of joint meetings chaired by the BCI in 1939, and 1940, and again in 1945, are particularly instructive. For the BCI, the Buffalo River 'blue-strip' provided the 'excellent barrier or buffer (beyond the inner city 'security zone') ... towards fitting [industrialization] into the general development of the city as a geometric whole'. The West Bank, was to be made the 'industrial satellite' of the city's

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22 BCI, Box 25, contains extensive Correspondence details of the needs and processes necessitated in planning East London as a modern city, as well as oppositions from within commerce, and the local Council and City Engineer. Municipal records, on the other hand, are remarkably silent in this period, despite occasional reference, see CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, as well as Box 1341, 22 June 1950.


25 While I don't necessarily agree with Pinnock's characterization of this as 'monopoly capitalist planning ideology', I have remained 'faithful' to his interpretation - it does carry the 'western', imperialist, and class spatial implications. Two identifiable routes were via Correspondence between the City Engineer in East London and Cape Town, CA, 3/ELN, Box 645, 77/27A, the attendance of 'at least one delegate' at the 1938 Town Planning Conference in Johannesburg, as well as Correspondence between the BCI, and the Cape Town City Council, BCI, Box 25, 22 November 1939. The more explicit Le Corbusier 'plans' for a geometric and standardized city was to become apparent with residential, suburban, and location slum-clearance in particular, a 'scum churning against the walls of the city' to be relocated to secure zones.

26 BCI, Box 25, File UP, Notes, and Minutes of Meetings between BCI, COC, and ELM, 1938-1946.

27 BCI, Box 25, File UP, Rough Minutes of Joint Meeting between BCI, COC, and ELM, 5 October 1940.
'necessary horizontal shape', and the construction of the two level iron Buffalo River Bridge by 1935, connected road and rail to the city, the suburb, and the interior, and interconnected the East and West Bank Locations as 'walker satellites' of necessary labour, and potential labour control while cutting existing and future 'native routes' off from the inner and white city. At the same time, the BCI proposed the 'use of light industry dependent on native boys' as a 'barrier zone between North End and the native location', which would 'proximate this industry to labour requirements', and 'isolate the location slum from further encroachment into North End (and the city centre)'.

These proposals correlated with the COC's similar 'considerations' in an equivocal approval. In particular a similar set of West Bank plans, seeming to resolve the tourist-industry question by retaining the city centre and beachfront as racially elite in gaze and structure, and in the displacement of contaminant industry 'out of sight', across the 'bluebelt river' were mutually reinforced. The Braelyn 'industry buffer' proposals were more hesitantly entertained, while acknowledging the potential to 'solve' the apparent North End decline into 'festering sore' in the city's heartland. The COC (or prominent members of the chamber) had a much more 'incisive' and 'drastic' solution however, to 'surgically' remove the [East Bank] native location to the vacant farmland between the proposed industrial townships, and the pineapple belt on the West Bank.

There, in a rapid satellite 'garden native township', perhaps cordoned by the Eastern Cape's 'bitter and

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28 This bridge was the replacement for the wooden 'temporary bridge', constructed between 1904 and 1907, and meant to 'take railway traffic', but essentially temporary in construction to facilitate the building of the new bridge, 27 years later. This new bridge significantly altered the economic status of the West Bank in planning, potential, and actual possibility.

29 BCI, Box 25, File UP, Minutes of Meeting, 3 August 1942. The notion of a 'walker satellite' was meant to encapsulate the close proximity of the East Bank Location to the West Bank industrial area, and was seen to significantly answer the 'rapid transport' problems inherent in the satellite, and horizontal planning implications proposed. The concern with strikes, and labour control, which informed BCI planning contexts, was directly linked to the experiences of the 1930 ICU General Strike, and the potential of the river, and the bridge to control the form and access of labour to industry. In later years, the BCI, and the City Council were to use the daily 'native traffic' across the bridge in the mornings and afternoons as a gauge of labour size and movement, but also for the regulation and implementation of influx controls, and the 'weeding out' of 'undesirables', See BCI, Box 26, Correspondence, 25 July 1948.

30 BCI, Box 25, File UP, Minutes, 6 March 1943.

31 BCI, Box 25, File UP, Special Meeting, 21 July 1938, attended by members of the COC and the BCI, although not in a 'formal' capacity. The views articulated were however those of the COC 'informally', and were linked to the recent 1937 Thornton Commission recommendations around conditions in the East Bank Location as 'shocking'. More detail and discussion on this Thornton Commission to follow below.

32 This was the only time I came across this notion of a 'garden native township' explicitly stated, and seems to be a particular contradictory inclusion of what D. Pinnock, 'Urban Planning and Ideology', calls 'First World planning ideology', 'English Garden City 'naturalistic' decentralization planning importations', probably via Pinelands, together with recent segregationist Urban Areas Act discourse, prominent in East London implementation in the late 1930s.
strange fruit\textsuperscript{33}, heavy industry would be able to 'bear the brunt of troubles that must accompany drawing the native mind through an unneeded industrial revolution in our riverport'.\textsuperscript{34} In addition, the COC proposed that the West Bank beaches would become the 'place of recreation of the native and coloured races', determined by proximity, and silencing the 'native presence' in, and on East London's white 'tourist' beachfront.\textsuperscript{35} A counter voice, however, was also much in evidence, in the context of its financial commitments within the self-built 'slums', but also itself diluted by the Council's desire and early implementation (after 1937) to 'clean the slums', and re-build, under municipal control and construction, and with national state intervention, a 'model township' on the present site.\textsuperscript{36}

The City Council was overwhelmingly concerned with rationalizing and legitimizing the uneven City and Location's administration and allocation of resources, in what Castells has called the 'provision of collective means of consumption'. In particular, in this period, the Locations, and especially the East Bank Location had been spotlighted through the Thornton Commission of Enquiry of 1937.\textsuperscript{37} A flurry of reports, proposals, and recommendations followed, linked to local, and 'national' state interventions via the Native Affairs Department. and the Dept. of Public Health, and available legislative frameworks, especially through the Urban Areas Act.\textsuperscript{38} The Council entered discussions with the COC, and the BCI with these 'location crises' agendas, and rapidly illustrated their major concern as the ordering, organization, and control of Location space. Industrial, or economic space more generally, remained secondary, and responsively shaped by the 'organization of the market in land and goods',\textsuperscript{39} with the Council 'content', (albeit of recent origin), to assign economic spatial status along pre-existing locational lines, as with Chiselhurst. By 1945-47, a differing, and far more expansive and integrated Council approach had emerged. The Council had simultaneously assumed a far wider social and economic spatial management responsibility (of land and varying 'urban' locational dynamics), and a discursive shift in the linking and

\textsuperscript{33} The explicit connection is drawn here to the Billie Holiday song, 'Strange Fruit', referring here to the pineapple industry dominated by 'colonial despotism', and extracted from an interview with a pineapple canning worker of the 1950s, Interview 4a, S.B. 12 July 1989.

\textsuperscript{34} Latimer Papers, Personal Correspondence between Latimer and Chairman of the COC, 10 March 1939.

\textsuperscript{35} BCI, Box 25, File UP, Minutes of Meeting, 19 August 1939.

\textsuperscript{36} BCI, Box 25, File UP, Minutes of Meetings, 1938-1946; but see also CA, 3/ELN, Box 880 to 884, which contains these plans, implementations and interventions re clearance, and housing developments.

\textsuperscript{37} CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Details of 1937 Thornton Investigation.

\textsuperscript{38} CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Thornton Investigation.

\textsuperscript{39} BCI, Box 25, File UP, Minutes of Meetings, 21 July 1938, and 19 August 1939.
planning of Location space with economic industrial space, had occurred. So too had a corresponding 'removal' from explicit commercial, and tourist spatial determinations.

What this involved was a discursive planning intervention that contained profound ambiguities for class formation in the city and in the Location/s. Beyond this re-shaping 'international' intervention, though, it was within the local modes of governing and decision-making, and through the spatiality of the Locations, that the discourses of class for 'natives' were elaborated. As the last chapter argued, this was not necessarily 'rooted' in a material class 'experience', but had much more to do with the domestication of oppositional discourses, especially those of the IICU, within existing discursive frameworks of colonial/racial power relations. In this process administrative 'native' definitions of regularity began to shift or disperse into new lines of spatiality and power.

As I will argue below, this was not a single subject re-positioning of worker replacing native, but that these inter-connected constructions became both stretched and more complex within, as well as between, previously more discrete spatial and uniform administrative, commercial and social spaces. Their prior unity, forged in the 1920s fragmented and differentiated.

Two processes were decisive in these changes: the one linked to the discursive interventions 'for the Locations' in re-shaping 'planning ideology' and its implementation, and the other to the wartime transition of the local commercially dominated economy. Both were formalized through the joint meetings as administrative problems, and were shifted to the local municipality and administration to 'assume responsibility' and 'acquire resolution' within an 'overall [metropolitan] plan of harmonious development'.

Framed in these narrowing terms, the wider 'colonial' political project changed ground in a number of 'effective' directions, and local forms of knowledge began to be re-conditioned. I want to turn initially to the transitions in the local economy in order to detail this.

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40 BCI Box 25, File UP, the correlations of language and expectation to the Cape Town Le Corbusier model and discourse are not incidental, but rather reflect the connections.
In the curt and bureaucratic-descriptive voice of Mr P Sommerville, the Divisional Inspector of Labour (and the Local Representative of the Controller of Industrial Manpower), the impact of the war (1939-1947) on the 'expansion of industry' was hardly transitional...

Two small clothing factories commenced operations in East London in 1940-41. Other new industries established were a cup and saucer factory, a box cutting mill, a bacon factory and a factory manufacturing rusks and breakfast foods. ... The SAR&H undertook the building of motor launches. No other ship building was done locally, though ship repair work increased enormously. ... The Textile Industry greatly increased its output and the two factories worked three shifts per day throughout the war. ... There was little conversion of existing factories necessary as most factories continued producing their pre-war type of article for the Defence Department, but at an increased rate. ... Several new Unions and Organizations were registered but the increase was not abnormal.41

Similarly, the Daily Dispatch's exuberant review of the spread of the 'name and fame' of East London's manufacturers argued that the 'outbreak of the last war brought the industrial wheel full circle, for between the years 1940 and 1944 ship repair work and shipbuilding again became East London's major industry'.42 In particular these identifications of the centrality of 'shipbuilding and engineering feats' connected to the harbour and the SAR&H related to their activities within the ambit of 'vital war work'.43 Its associated publicity of scale and visibility needs to be balanced against any material consideration or comparison within the City. This served to simultaneously highlight East London's role within metropolitan (British) discourse on the 'war effort', despite its spatial and resource marginality, but also to ideologically re-centre the city's 'colonial' status through the port and its spatial economies.

As a 'war-port city', experiencing a 'temporary breakdown on normal commerce', this was significant in maintaining the 'presence of decision ... of the commercial men', despite their noticeable material 'difficulty of long-term survival'.44 This had two inter-connected dimensions. The port was in the pre-war period, the 'preserve' of the wholesale 'warehouse kings', not untypically seen 'quay-pacing', 'raising a storm' with

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41 UCT, IMP/825, 'Civil History of the War', from Divisional Inspector of Labour, June 1948.
42 Daily Dispatch, 10 January 1948.
43 UCT, IMP/825, 'Ship Repairs' manuscript, 3a, and also 4, 5b, 7, 8; also Daily Dispatch, 10 January 1948.
44 BCI, Box 25, File IM/A in discussion Reports and Minutes of Meetings on 21 June 1942, and 13 August 1944
'cutter crew overseers', or periodically 'viewing [competitive] harbour traffic and wharfage'. This practice, if anything, became more regular during the war, as 'commerce-empty warehouses', and dwindling stocks found commercial 'delegates' distractedly tallying military operations with the absence of 'required cargo ships', and the harbour was re-emphasized as the driving force of the local market, and the key extension of 'local business'. That it failed to deliver commercially challenged, but did not alter the dominant political imprint of the port, controlled by commerce's men. The trading setbacks, and productive transition within the port were seen as temporary, as an artificial phase of local 'production for destruction'. At the same time alternative routes were opened up into the national and, in a limited sense the local economy, which was to further enhance the political and economic decline of wholesale commerce against direct and retail marketing and selling, as well as local and national production.

The 'war in the port' then, did not substantially transform the City, but became, for the duration of the war, its productive-exchange economic centre. This materiality in East London's colonial port entailed the 'hard fact of the war' in effect, if not as unambiguously in volume, a reality often glossed over in favour of a larger model of wartime substitution industrialization. These effects were driven through the port and manifested via the SAR&H, Alpheus Williams and Dowse in mechanical and construction engineering, and across the various stevedoring, shipping and warehousing firms in the city. They also resonated in the local construction, textile and food factories for defence production in particular, and within timber, local engineering firms, and 'service' industries outside this direct war ambit. As opposed to substitution, or new 'replacement' production of commercial shortages in the City, existing manufacture intensified and expanded to meet the 'controller demand' of the war. The explanation for what appears as a contradiction between a locally delinked commercial economy, which experienced a decline in manufactured supply from approximately 80% to around 30-35% of imported goods by the early 1940s because of the war, and a failure to boost and enable local city based 'replacement manufacture', accountable for only '15% of

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45 BCI, Box 28, File ELH, which contains material on the port and its developments and extensions through the 1930s and 1940s, including meetings with concerned parties, and a series of anecdotal descriptions of these processes, 10 January 1940 and attached correspondence.

46 BCI, Box 28, File ELH, Minutes of Meeting, 2 April 1943, and correspondence, 1941-1946.

47 BCI, Box 27, File, W/2, Draft Report to IMC, February 1945.
manufactured wholesale supplies' during the war, needs to be traced through a series of interrelated structural and internalized conjunctural dynamics.48

Of the 145 wholesale establishments in existence in East London in 1947, 88 had been established before 1939. Of these, 25 dated back to before Union in 1910, and 9 had their origins in the nineteenth century. Alternatively, of the 145, 18 had been in existence for less than a year (in 1947), and many of the other 39 were established in the latter part of the war.49 Furthermore, in 1947 East London's wholesalers made direct purchases to the value of 16.5 million pounds, with imports responsible for 36.5%, agriculture for 28.6%, and 'national' or South African factories 19%. In the 1937/38 period, 'direct purchasing' from South African factories was estimated at below 10%, while importation was 'close to half' for all wholesalers.50 Apart from these changes in the source of manufactured goods, the 'close links' between wholesale and local agriculture should be highlighted in its continued 'important position in the commercial life of the city', as compared with a national average of 16% in 1947. This emphasized the continued central role of the wool economy in particular. As indicated, in the 1947 and 1952 commercial and service census material, while 'agricultural and pastoral products' only accounted for 19% of all wholesale firms in East London, their sales amounted to 46% of all sales in 1952, and within this 13 million of the 14.5 million pounds was accounted for by wool. In addition, the content of trade from other sectors (notably machinery, food, and general) made East London's 'agriculturally linked trade' 53% of all wholesale trade in 1952. While figures for the pre-war period are vague and hesitant, given the dearth of statistical material for wholesale as an entity, a fairly uniform consensus from commercial and industrial archives suggest that for the 1930s, wool (and agriculture) accounted for approximately 35% of local trade. Equally importantly however, as I have argued above in Chapter Two, while wool and agriculture was re-inserted as the key local wholesale commercial sector after the war, the 'wool industry' itself was both relocated to Port Elizabeth, and underwent a fundamental regional structural decline from the late 1950s. The fact then that 'many merchants consider, from their experience, that the price of wool is the best single index of the general

48 BCI, Box 27, File W/1, Notes for a Report on the 'conditions of local industry during the war', and addressed specifically to the linkage failures in the East London economy, 24 March 1946, drawn from private correspondence, and draft census material provided by the Divisional Inspector of Labour.


50 First Census of Distribution and Service Establishments, Report No. 69; and BCI, Box 25, Minutes of Meeting, 17 July 1942.
commercial prosperity of East London' in the 1950s, indicated the narrowing and increasingly precarious structural position of wholesale commercial capital in the city, hammered home through the impact of the war itself.

At one level this was felt in the 'paucity of shipping at the port' by 1943, especially with regard to 'commercial shipping matters' and 'civilian goods'. But the Chamber, still unambiguously, and perhaps even more narrowly representative of large wholesale commercial capital in this period reflected the wider dynamics of the war period on 'the commercial man'. In particular, the war intensified the impact of the ... multiplicity of Control Boards and the innumerable regulations promulgated thereby and their complexity [which has] been the source of considerable worry to business people and the statistics called for by the Government Departments have harassed the merchant until he can hardly call his soul his own.

In particular the National Council of Supplies, the National Transportation Council, Price Controls, undesirable forms of government trading, the 'State encroachment' and 'government interference with private enterprise' through the 'customs tariff', and the 'difficulties being experienced in the matter of Import Control' were identified in 1943 as problematic, unwieldy, and responsible for a 'ruinous (sic) local state of affairs in the business community'. This promoted a need to 'bear our share of the burden philosophically'. Objections 'rained' across three inter-connected discursive levels, but all were framed by the silent assumption of a commercial body-snatching state power (despite a war rationality), interventionist in pacing merchants into a material straitjacket and leaving nothing but 'empty commercial shells ... in a formerly vibrant city of trade'.

In one sense, these objections were patterned by a discourse of structural political isolation, manifested as 'having regard to the manner in which control has been exercised ... with scant regard for the business

53 While the Chamber represented and had one hundred and eleven members, its executive, 'officers', and sub-committee's were dominated by the 'Big Seven' inclusive of wholesale and wool merchants and commercial companies, and three of them, currently in the executive and management committee had been in the 'chairman' position since 1929, see CA, 3/ELN, Box 1210, Ref. 992, Annual Reports, 1922-1943.
55 Latimer Papers, enclosed in private correspondence between Latimer, and Griffith, 'vice-chairman' and on the COC Management Committee, 16 August 1944.
community’s interests and inputs’ in both national forums, and across representation on a host of local bodies and committees to ‘assist’ and ‘advise’, including the Harbour Advisory Board, the Local Price Supervisor, the Council for Industrial Development, Local Petrol and Rubber Control, the Governor General’s War Fund, Social Security, Juvenile Affairs, the Labour Control Board, and the Directorate of Port and Shipping.66 Service on these local structures was seen as simultaneously time-consuming and time-wasting, ‘the directives come from above, the decisions foretold’ Kohler argued, and ‘practically all are against us’.57 Intersecting with these concerns of inclusive political silencing in ‘national decision-making bodies’ and committees, was a parallel discourse of bureaucratization and inefficiency. Thus the ...

chamber ungrudgingly gave its fullest support and cooperation to the Director of Supplies in the panel scheme, but after the appointment of a local representative of the Director, there was so much diversionary effort the Executive Committee felt constrained to advise the Director of supplies that until certain matters were clarified it must discontinue its activities.58

In-operation, lack of clarity, repetition, and confusion over the weight of controls, boards, functions and directives, lack of clarity and definition between different ‘departments’, coupled with ‘career opportunism’, ‘blindness’, and local ‘individual empires’ and power centres marked East London’s war progress and ‘participation’. But, in addition, the ‘over-concentration on manpower’, wartime production quotas and requirements, and engineering and construction development which ‘closed the harbour to commercial trade’ was seen to ‘preoccup[y] all government appointees and bodies of control’. As a result ‘decisions seldom acknowledged the commercial life that is this city’.59 Compounding these problems was one of ‘acute’ local personnel shortages, untrained replacements, and stop-gap cross-administrative functioning. These impacted in particular ways, as in the case of the Local Representative of the Controller of Industrial Manpower, who was also the Divisional Inspector of Labour, and required, as well, to operate as the Senior Employment Officer, the Inspector of Machinery, and the Inspector of Factories. All of this meant that apart from having to cope with ‘a large increase in work with a smaller and fluctuating staff’, ‘for practically the whole of the war period, it was found impossible to undertake routine inspections ... [which] ... had

56 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1210, Ref. 992, Sixty Third Annual Report, 4.
57 BCI, Box 26, File ID/1, Minutes of Meeting, 8 July 1943, between the BCI, and the COC over participation in the Council of Industrial Development.
58 BCI, Box 26, File ID/1, Minutes of Meeting, 8 July 1943; UCT, IMP/825, ‘Civil History of the War: East London’, June 1948.
59 BCI, Box 26, File ID/1, Minutes of meetings, 4 September 1943, 12 April 1944.
perforce to be restricted to the investigation of complaints, and these were subject to considerable delay.\textsuperscript{60} More significantly however, Sommerville found that 'towards the end of the period the administration of the war measure took at least 80% of the Divisional Inspector's time'.\textsuperscript{61} This had two profoundly significant, and deeply ambiguous implications for East London during the war, and reflected a third discursive elaboration on the 'tense path of development' in local terms, and on the structured relationships of opposition between local and 'national' dynamics.

On the one hand, commerce accurately understood this lack of administration at a level of local disadvantage, and of proportionate 'manufacturing gain', as it was perceived that local industry could build protective tariffs, without so much as 'a second glance' from those responsible at markets, product, levels of cost and quality and in terms of civilized labour practices. All it required, suggested a COC management committee member were 'a few words, a form and a signature'. 'And where does that leave us?' he asked rhetorically.\textsuperscript{62} Presumably, in answer, in the queue at the local Banks, seeking credit extensions, and rescheduling loan re-payments, in a practice that increasingly tied wholesale commerce to a less than sympathetic local financial sector looking towards industrialization and diversification away from an 'over-reliance on the wool trade' by the 1950s.\textsuperscript{63} Simultaneously, though, the COC recognized that this replacement industrialization, and the 'advantage' of state intervention, was not to be found in East London directly, but through the 'murmurs against the present form of distribution of commodities', and their productive heartland, the southern Transvaal.\textsuperscript{64} And herein lies the ambiguity and contradiction of this context of state interventionist policy against local practice, dependent not just on frameworks of qualification, but also bureaucratic administration and implementation.

The failures of Sommerville's department, and the over-administration of 'the war measure', meant that local industry was 'floated' between protection, qualification and participation in customs tariffs. The result

\textsuperscript{60} UCT, IMP/825, 'Civil History of the War: East London', June 1948, 1.
\textsuperscript{61} UCT, IMP/825, 'Civil History of the War: East London', June 1948, 2-4; see also CA, LIE Volume 1 and Volume 11, which contains reference to the impact of the war on administrative inefficiency and 'overwork'.
\textsuperscript{62} Latimer Papers, Letter, 16 August 1944 in correspondence with Griffith.
\textsuperscript{63} BCI, Box 31, File B/1, which details some correspondence between Standard and Barclays Banks and the BCI, over conditions of investment capital from c1944 into the 1950s; 2 June 1944 and attached correspondence. The correspondence is sporadic, and rather vague in 'promise form', but does suggest the war was particularly important in breaking a commercial dominance in the local banking sector.
\textsuperscript{64} CA, 3/ELN, Box 1210, Ref 992, East London Chamber of Commerce, Sixty Fourth Annual Report, 1944.
was, with the exception of the key large food, timber and textiles factories, and the war prioritized engineering and construction sectors, a self-defined 'paralysis' in opportunity and growth, accompanied by a necessary local retail and wholesale, as well as productive internalization of the 'southern Transvaal panacea'. Customs tariffs were sourced from within this 'panacea', and as the BCI noted, their intent was not to 'industrialize our city, ... but to bolster dependence on the development and expansion of the latter [southern Transvaal] - inland, and away from the ports'. Protective maladministration did not break a reliance on the 'national' state however, but articulated local industrialization strategies into a political reliance that led the BCI towards, and not away from, cooperation and tangible support. The local balance, ironically, had begun to tilt in favour of industry, precisely through a 'national' state presence of marginal spatial reproduction for investment and growth in manufacturing, while local commerce, no longer 'at play in the fields of the lord', and punctured by the war, sought 'national' integration into the 'great heritage in our soil and mineral resources to husband and it is in the careful conservation of the former, and the development and expansion of the latter on which the whole of our economic structure depends, and which must be fostered.

So armed with a last dose of 'inescapable' wartime philosophy, and having lost their free market soul, members thoughts turned to 'seeking concurrence' in planning a post-war voice of objection that 'will be loud and widespread' if 'the powers that be intend carrying on some forms of control to the same extent that they have done in the present time of emergency'.

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65 BCI Box 30, File W/2, which details the key role and failure of the war and state intervention to promote local industrialization. In addition, the argument, advanced by B. Freund, 'Social Character', in particular, with reference to the whole nature of a nationally integrated economy, centred on the southern Transvaal, and critically dependent on the mines, and the emergence of an engineering sector, seems to me to be necessarily re-cast in some aspects, when looked at from the margins. In this case, the role of the war, together with the nature and form of state intervention, via the Customs Tariff Act needs to be understood as a particularly spatial - and Witwatersrand centred - industrial strategy, especially in terms of its impact on smaller towns and 'cities', but also for Cape Town (see W. Dirk's MA thesis in preparation), and East London. The lack of administrative intervention, and the weaknesses in translating this policy locally, exacerbated, but did not determine the particular form and content to weak national integration and to a spatial unevenness.

66 BCI, Box 30, File W/2, Correspondence between BCI and Board of Trade and Industries, 16 March 1943, and attached correspondence; see also UCT, IMP, 'Confidential Report on a Tour of the Cape and Orange Free state Industries', F. Gill, 1943.

67 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1210, Ref. 992, Report of E.V. Kohler, 23 November 1943.

68 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1210, Ref. 992, Report of E.V. Kohler, 3-5.
In considering the impact of the war, apart from the dramatic decline in imported goods, and the related political and discursive implications of 'controls', materially, the 'shortage of shipping space affected chiefly the wool trade'.

During the war the South African wool clip was purchased by the British Government under an appraisement scheme controlled by the British Wool Commission. In particular they constructed a large wool store, not incidentally on the West Bank, and capable of holding 50,000 bales, at a cost of £70,000 pounds, and 'wool firms were forced to rent all available unused premises to store wool'. What this 'intervention to come to the aid of the farmers' (through the British Wool Commission) amounted to, though, was a depressed, over-supplied, and 'downright dangerous' decline in the material structural position of local wholesale capital as the war continued, while 'practically all our efforts are consumed by the need to survive in the wool game'. In contrast, the first five years after the war saw, with the 'revival of the open market and auction sales after September 1946', a 'fantastic increase in the value of wool', to a 'a pound for a pound', and the East London market received the 'benefit of wool hungry world's demand'.

Business flourished. Large new wool stores were built, ... Amalgamated Wool Brokers was started through the amalgamation of the old wholesalers and traders like Baker King, J W Weir and others, ... and because of the tremendous increase in income to the farmer, Broker and Buyers alike, wool industry and production seemed to have no limits.

Farmers and merchants 'no longer see wool on their sheep and in their bales, but pound notes in roughly equal proportions'. 'Green sheep?' commented Burnham King, wryly in response, 'if this is our secret, we better keep it well hidden from the rest of the world.'

Old, highly capitalized wholesale commercial capital found this material escape route in what Bagshawe-Smith somewhat more expansively called 'East London's golden fleece' through the 1950s, but their position had been structurally transformed in the process. The period of the later 1950s outlined the

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74 BCI, Box 31, Notes of Meeting, 8 September 1949, and one of the few moments of written 'conversational narrative' present in these records.
difficulties in 'pin[ning] your hopes on a mercurial sort of business', and of prioritizing the post-war wool industry market boom. Becoming dependent on a single commodity, priced and located increasingly out of local levels and degrees of organizational and market control, local commerce concentrated the post-war ride to prosperity outside of manufacturing diversification, and outside of direct local and national commercial and industrial linkages, except for the wool farm. At the same time the 'great native territories' and their market for 'kaffir truck' became a backdrop of 'safety valve' ignorance, and 'useless' neglect, as the large merchants complained of retail out-competitiveness through direct factory supply, the poverty of markets, and an impoverished rural existence 'outside of the ambit of modern commerce'. Two processes were important in this context, as is the implicated tension between them. On the one hand the trade in 'German prints, blankets, ochre, braid, and beads constituted the commodities of trade for the 'traditional tribal people', and this had remained 'practically unchanged' in focus by the 1940s, but was constrained by the 'wartime squeeze on supplies'; and by 'their productivity and therefore their incomes ... [which] ... are very low, particularly in the tribal reserves where primitive agricultural methods still prevail'. On the other hand, from the 1940s, a 'marked change' also became increasingly visible to commercial capital through internal trading ( invoiced) patterns of demand. This entailed, in their terms, a switch to 'current European fashions', especially in clothing, was signposted by changes in relationships, and structure of 'trading stores' as they became 'more western', and began to include not just 'urbanized dress natives', but also the rural areas, as well as that many 'reds are adopting European dress'.

75 BCI, Box 25, and Box 31 which contains details of the post-war wool boom, and a comment from 'The East London Wool Exchange' President on the fluctuations in what he termed 'the wool game', 4 May 1952.

76 BCI, Box 31, Wool Board Correspondence, 4 May 1952.

77 CA 3/ELN, Box 1210, Ref. 992, COC Annual Report for 1944; BCI, Box 25, Minutes of Meeting, 27 July 1945.

78 See D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, 286-287; BCI, Box 25, Minutes of Meeting, 27 July 1945 and attached correspondence. The 'primitiveness' of these productive methods and relations is contestable, at both a discursive level, and in terms of state and settler capital interventions and restructurings. As C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, has so dramatically pointed out, in an earlier periodization, 'primitive' peasant production was not only commercially viable, but outcompetitive of settler agriculture. Primitive has operated as a discursive formation that silences key forms of settler political and economic power. See also D. Hobart Houghton, et al. (eds.) Keiskammahoeck Rural Survey, (Pietermaritzburg, 1952), which both elaborate the impoverishment as significantly and dramatically intensified from the late 1930s and into the 1940s.

79 I will return to these issues of 'red' and 'dressed' or ' schooled natives' in some detail elsewhere, but for the moment simply need to assert the deeply problematic, but also deeply significant implications of these classificatory systems which emerge as part of regular colonial and 'academic' ethnographic discourse from the 1930s through to the 1960s. These could, I will suggest later, be read as significant signposts in a transition of 'universalisms'. It is also necessary to point to the earlier arguments over the reserves and processes of transition, and decline, which are critically determined by an engineered productive dissolution, and related political and materially impoverished conservation through significant levels of state intervention. See D. Hobart Houghton, et al. (eds.) Keiskammahoeck Rural Survey.
While I would acknowledge there are a number of 'rural' processes requiring further research that fall beyond the direct scope of my argument, the implications within commercial capital located within East London seem significantly clear. Large traditional wholesale capital, by-and-large, fails to make this transition, maintains 'red truck' on its books, sustains 'desperate quests' for 'luxury and imported commodities', and emphasizes the wool trade (and agricultural machinery) as counter-balanced priority. In the immediate post-war period of the 1946-1947 boom, 'traditional refusals' to make a difficult and forced transition to South African suppliers seemed justified. For, when the 'flood of imports' reversed the wartime impact, where 'many sources of foreign goods were cut off', and imports accounted for only 30-35% of trade, against the 65-70% of South African goods, the disproportionate Union/'national' concentration in 'new firms' became apparent through 'marked differences in quality and quantity again found in the reputable firm, now reaping the benefits of having sat out the war.' By 1947, the ratio of imported goods to Union-made goods was at the level of two-to-one, determined largely by the re-establishment of pre-war relations, infrastructures and agreements, and located in the 'valiant old guard merchant establishments' according to the Management Committee of the Chamber of Commerce. But this was to a be a short-lived euphoria. By 1948, the ratio had equalized, and by 1955 'Union-made goods were in the ascendancy of at least four to one, in some cases ten to one, and in others, imported goods had completely disappeared. No wholesaler, moreover, entertained any prospect of a return to the proportions of the pre-war years'. The main determinant, according to Hobart Houghton, was the context in which the '... operation of the system controlling imports was having a notable effect'. This was clearly significant in impact, as the commercial records indicate, but equally, and perhaps more decisively was the internal transitions dichotomized between wool and agricultural trade, and the alternative structures of integration into Union industries and systems of distribution. In 1947, however, dominant and old commercial capital still maintained that East London, and South Africa's proper destiny remained the formation of a '... primary planet circulating the bright if declining sun of Britain'.

80 BCI, Box 33, Correspondence Files, 28 November 1945 and attached correspondence; and Box 27, File W/2, Draft Report to IMC, February 1945.
81 BCI, Box 33, Correspondence Files, COC, 28 November 1945, and attached correspondence.
83 D. Hobart Houghton, Economic development, 325.
There were exceptions in the 'old guard', as in the case cited by Houghton, which reflected a 35% to 65% imported to South African stock value measurement during the war, but also a reversal after the war. By 1947, the proportions of this leading wholesaler was 51% imported against 49% local/SA, but by 1955 the predominance of South African goods had re-asserted itself in a 23% import to 77% local ratio. This was determined largely by a 'combination of tariffs, import control, and exchange restrictions, together with an improvement in the quality and range of some South African products'.

But, to return initially to the statistical composition of the wholesale trade in 1947, decline in certain other 'key' sectors help elaborate the twin processes of large-scale wholesale concentration, and simultaneous narrowing through wool, and of 'internal' processes of transition within commercial capital as a whole, and the more 'marginal' and newly established wholesale 'strata' in particular. Food represented only 4.5% of the total sales of wholesale commerce, (against a union average of 10%), and only 7.5% of all wholesale firms, and clothing and textiles only 5.1% (against a union average of 9%) and only 10% of all wholesale firms in 1952, which in addition to 'placing' the newer commercial firms into a position of relative marginality against this old guard, could also be seen to index their impoverished and subsistence base in the 'reserve hinterland'. Both the number and overall sales percentage of textiles and clothing, food, and general merchandise wholesalers decreased however, between 1947 and 1952, which would confirm a trend of light consumer goods substitution, but also the decline of the 'old guard' within these sectors. This transition, although apparent in the war through intensified levels of national integration, was more markedly noticeable through local manufacture only after the war, as industrialization 'took off', and attempted integration into a direct selling and retail function, as opposed to an 'over-reliance' on the local wholesale commercial sector became important.

While large wholesale capital focused its COC energies through the materiality of wool's post-war centrality, and a discursive elaboration on the political and economic representation of export-led and trade-based materiality of the future - only setback by the war, and an authoritarian state, commerce itself had fragmented along lines of establishment, markets, retail association, and in relation to spatial localities of production. In particular, the changing nature and compositional direction of retail trade, connected to

the nature of 'new' wholesale commerce, integrated into the Rand industries in particular, and the extension of tourism within dominant commercial circles require brief elaboration.

In 1947 there were 510 retail firms in East London, responsible for just over 8 million pounds in 'aggregate trading revenue, which had increased to 600, and an average of 12 million pounds by 1952. As a very crude base-line, the substantial increase in sales, against the much smaller percentage increase in the number of firms suggests the increasing importance and growth of this retail sector. This was accounted for by the post-war boom, but also a much closer integrative direct linkage into local and 'national' factories through this period. However, in comparison to wholesale capital, retail establishments remained much smaller, and their average sales were less than one ninth of the average sales of wholesalers per firm. Comparatively also, while wholesale capital remained 'completely in the hands of the white section of the population', retail at the lower margins included 'non-white (and largely Indian) entrepreneurs' - 28% of individual businesses (85 firms) and 16% of partnerships (12 firms) were in the hands of this 'non-white' sector. At the other extreme, though, all 'private' (numbering 60) and 'public' (numbering 38) companies were controlled by whites, who also controlled 209 individual, and 64 partnership businesses in the retail trade by 1947. Much of this was of recent origin, however. Of the 600 firms established by 1952, at least 246 firms (41%) had 'come into being since 1940'. In addition, the main groups in 1952 were 222 food firms (21.5% of sales), 113 general dealer firms (7.2% of sales), 86 clothing firms (17.5% of sales), 31 household furniture stores (7.5% of sales), and 45 garages (24% of sales).86

Two processes within this broad outline need specification. The first is the small scale, but equally vulnerable and 'short-lived' survival rates of many small firms, but also their location in the key distribution sectors associated with light consumer goods. The second is the close, and consequent integration into Union manufacturing capital, but also into new wholesale capital, especially at the smaller, more vulnerable end of structured existence in the East London economy. In particular, these small firms, undercapitalized and often indebted, found 'they preferred to deal through a local wholesaler than direct from the factory', because of the advantages in 'control over quantity and size of order', the 'easier credit terms allowed by

wholesalers', and because of 'smaller stock holdings'. In addition, as Houghton noted for the mid-1950s, indeed the financing of the smaller retailers is now a major function which the wholesaler is called upon to perform. The manager of one of the large wholesale establishments stated quite bluntly that his firm was able to carry on its wholesale trade only because it had turned itself into a banker for the retailers. 'We give them extended credit, and that is the reason why they continue to buy through us'. This pattern though, emerged in the 1940s, from within the new wholesale commercial establishments in particular, and clearly established 'close ties' between them and small retail capital in East London, and to 'Union manufacturers and their development' through them. On the other hand, large retailers, with adequate financial resources demonstrated a 'strong preference for buying direct from the factory'.

In this context, newly formed wholesale, and larger retail capital, alternatively 'embrace[d] the new demand', and established 'close working links' with South African clothing, textile, and food industries. Within the approximately 40 new 'wholesale establishments', formed between 1939 and 1947 (with the exception of 4 wool wholesalers established between 1946 and 1947), about three-quarters of their trade was in 'light consumables', and in clothing and textiles, 80% were 'from South African producers', for example, and for food the proportion was about 75%. In the retail sector, given its overall fragmentary scale, determined by the number of firms, and their differentiated sizes, it is not possible to detail interconnections to manufacturing beyond those already established, but a more general commentary provided by retail correspondence suggests that levels of direct, or indirect linkage, was most manifest and visible in its Union connections, and against wholesale importation. The role of retail capital, then, became materially important in the fragmentation of old wholesale commerce's importation/empire economy

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87 BCI, Box 33, File R/1, Correspondence between BCI and small retailers over problems in establishing factory links, 1941-48.
89 BCI, Box 33, File R/1, Copies of letters from BCI to small retailers, which simultaneously 'thanked' them for their local support of manufacturing, but also encouraging them to enter into 'direct purchasing' from these factories, May-June 1947.
90 BCI, Box 33, File R/2, Correspondence to retailers, but this time to those larger retail firms, outlining some of the local, and 'national' problems with direct supplies, linked to 'unbusinesslike practises' of 'supply over-extension', and in transportation and price controls, June 1947.
91 BCI, Box 33, File R/2, Correspondence between BCI and these 'new' wholesale and retail firms over the difficulties experienced in 'systems of distribution practised by South African factories', both during and after the war, and of both a local and 'national' dimension, June-July 1947.
92 BCI, Box 33, File R/1, and R/2, Correspondence, May-July 1947.
dominance, through 'switching allegiances', while the space of its political discourses and interventions ceased to be that of minor 'complicit supporter' as it had been before the war. This changed 'path of development' axis in East London, grounded in the war, elevated 'the retailer into the public eye', and laid the basis for a discursive identification, with new wholesale commerce, towards that of manufacturing.93

If wool became old commerce's standpoint materiality through, and particularly after the war, tourism remained its spatial and discursive one in this period, but was both more forceful, and more accommodative, in elaborating this materiality. In part, the war was particularly crucial, in both emphasizing East London's locality as a 'holiday resort' in the context of wartime shortages and 'hardships', but also that of limited horizons for travel and leisure. But what it also did in the context of blackouts and food-queues, crackling war radio broadcasts, movie re-runs, curtailed transport, allied troops, and of the war in the port, was to simultaneously make East London a regional 'leisure' enclosure and magnet.94

Farmers, and the regional country town inhabitants became its most frequent visitors, within a field of familiar wartime 'spectacle', somehow physically closer to the war, while also removed from its real daily impact, both militarily 'overseas', and economically and socially 'out' of its regional locational terms - on holiday.

I have suggested elsewhere that in comparative economic terms, tourism was relatively marginal to the East London economy, and the war only changed this slightly. What it did do, though, was to provide a cultural emphasis to the rural and agricultural basis of the city that was immediate, visible and current, reproducing and inscribing the tourist space of the city with the figures of the farmer, and by extension 'his' sheep and wool. This was particularly significant during the war, and the marketing crisis of the wool trade, maintaining links that might otherwise have eroded and been transformed, as was occurring elsewhere in commerce. 'We must stick by the farming community ... as they have stuck by us, ... their holidaying, ordering, and spending is a large measure of the chief source of money during these unusual and trying

93 BCI, Box 33. File R/1, and R/2, Correspondence, May-July 1947.
94 The Daily Dispatch, through the war, developed and sustained these images, and others, but also of East London as a more constrained 'holiday resort', which attracted the regional and farming population, Dec/Jan 1944/45 in particular reflected this. But see also Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 1948.
times', and similar statements from the COC became regular, if unsubstantiated claims. This tourist space was discursively also, then, the material and social space of old commerce, and of the colonial social life of the city. The war, however, elaborated its fundamentally rural, but simultaneously modern dimensions far more explicitly, and tied its existence to the integration of these aspects through this old commercial sector, making East London both more and less British. By implication, this had two critical dynamics in pushing through a colonial and imperial economic centrality to agricultural raw material production, and its 'trading arm' to the city, while ambiguously 'creating space' for local and urban 'messy' industrialization 'outside' of this site within the same city. Ironically, however, this centrality was also crucial for internal commercial differentiation and the presence of 'new commerce'. A corresponding fragmentation in local politics, and power, was also discursively significant in this process, linked to changing Locational, racial and class constructions and identities. This forms the story of the next chapter.

This contradiction between old commerce's wool/agriculture-'red'-importation prioritized triangle and its reproduction of the world trading port 'native labourer', and new commercial and divided retail capital seeking a modern and consuming stable local 'industrial base' and an urban population controlled, ghetto-ized and slum-cleared in order to generate local industrial 'native' consumers, was to significantly change the internal and external shape of the Location/s. In these spaces, urban and rural became more decisively cast and distinguished, and so too, differing 'native' labouring and colonial subjects.

THE COVERT ECONOMY AND THE NEW APPRENTICE

If commerce was central to the discursive elaborations of 'development' during the war, and to uneven paths of economic continuity and change, and the administration to re-elaborating and managing economic space, industry was central with regard to the changing 'ambiguities of labour dependence', both within and for these contexts in this period. In the period between 1937/8 and 1946/7, particular manufacturing locales became spatially representative of wider material and discursive practices, occupying differentiated sites in a transforming industrial landscape, gridded in land valuation, electric current, railway sidings, wharfage, and waterworks. Uneasily inter-connected by the constraints and interventions to local 'business practice'

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95 BCI, Boxes 25, and 31, Joint Meetings and correspondence from the COC between 1942 and 1945 in particular. This particular statement from Bagshawe-Smith, the Farmers Co-operative Wool and Produce Union, Ltd, representative on the Management Committee, at COC meeting, 12 November 1943.
from customs/tariffs and rail rates to raw material supplies, markets, and profitability, a local 'fierce competitiveness' became underscored by a series of splintering 'truths' between labour universality, native essentiality and masculine naturality.

Through the 1930s, and during the Second World War, the East London Buffalo Harbour was significantly enlarged and improved, with increased wharfage, sheds, cranes and pre-cooling facilities, a turning basin, (named the CW Malan Basin), extended breakwaters, and, during the war, the construction of a graving dock. While these were significant 'modernizations', with important economic implications for the 'increased circulation, and thus availability, of raw materials and finished goods', and for increased importation and exportation volumes, this was to be most markedly apparent in the post-war period. In particular, it was from within this 'modern' and 'vastly improved' harbour, and its advertised representations, after 1946/7, that one of the sources for national and international local investment, and for the local scale of the post-war commodities and wool boom became identifiable, realizable, and significant for future economic development more generally. Its natural constraints, though, as a riverport, were also to be crucial in constraining 'economic progress' by the mid-1950s, as its 'inherent trading limitations' became comparatively manifest. What became much more important, though, was the concentration of the war, and wartime production, however slight in material terms, in and through the port itself. In this engineering was central.

As is apparent through the Industrial Manpower Papers, next to, or perhaps even alongside the mining industry, the engineering sector was critical to South Africa's wartime economy and social relations. This has a number of obvious determinations: '[t]he engineering and munitions industries were the most vital in the prosecution of the war' in South Africa, as it became the 'base workshop of the Middle East'.

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96 H.H. Smith, 'Transport', 157-177. These processes are well documented therein, and will not be repeated here in any detail.
98 BCI, Box 36, Reports and correspondence: EL Harbour, 1945-1959, commenting in this case on the 1958 improvements/plans, tied to the changing size and scale of the shipping fleets, 12 December 1958.
100 UCT, IMP/825, 'Labour and Control of Industry', 3. The Report continues that 'M.E. spares and repairs to tanks and guns and to aircraft, the making of aircraft parts and spares for the training schools in the Union, the refitting of captured enemy weapons, and especially the ship repairs, all these required the professional skill of a trained artisan and the ingenuity and the improvisation for which SA was noted before the war.'
engineering industry was 'the only section of the South African economy in which a comparable degree of control [to Britain] was instituted'\textsuperscript{101} and thus was centralized through a range of state institutions, bodies and committees, especially the Controller of Industrial Manpower. In this context, other sectors of 'civilian production' were downplayed, and were 'of lesser importance' against the 'war-work of engineering'. Less explicitly, though, the engineering industry (and building, the other key controlled 'industry' after engineering) was critical, through 'wartime control', in re-defining, extending, and including the white trade unions within a conservative and bureaucratic 'national interest'. This entailed the establishment of the figure of the 'patriotic worker' and of 'loyalty' to the war in 'industrial peace' across a more generalized South African framework.\textsuperscript{102} But, as the Industrial Manpower papers demonstrate, this was a tension-filled, ambiguous, and at times conflictual process, but simultaneously one that was critical in relation to craft, apprenticeship, and race in defining the modern worker.

In East London, although very much on the margins of these processes outlined above, as the 'most junior' of the 'coastal wartime economies' focused through the ports, elaborate a complex pattern of continuity and change for white workers. The cross-intersections between the engineering and building industries, between craft, apprentice and colour-ed work and organization, and between state 'controlling' interventions and wartime production in 'ship repairs', and 'defence work' were critical in this process of elaboration. Alpheus, Williams Dowse, (AW&D) and the SAR&H articulated these processes most clearly, but also as 'representative of the state of engineering in the port as a whole',\textsuperscript{103} while the construction industry was fragmented into 'hundreds of contractors' represented through the Master Builders Association and the Industrial Council, as the only sources of any relative coherence.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{101} UCT, IMP/825, 'The Engineering Industry', 5.
\textsuperscript{102} UCT, IMP/825, 'The Engineering Industry', 5; 'Labour and Control of Industry'
\textsuperscript{103} BCI, Box 36, File ENG/1A, 'The East London Engineering Industry', which has a series of correspondences between 1934 and 1956, and a scattered series of Reports and Observations, especially from the 1940s, and seemingly linked to the unskilled wage Wage Board Investigation, and to post-war re-employment of returning soldiers.
\textsuperscript{104} CA, LIE, File 6, EL 4/3/12/2/4, and File 3, EL 4/3/9/7/2, Industrial Conciliation Acts and Correspondence, Building and Furniture, 1944-64.
AW&D was by 1940/41 the 'largest engineering firm in the Border', a position still 'held' by 1963. Established in 1935, its diverse production catalogue included the 'manufacture of railway ballast wagons and harbour cranes, to general structural engineering, mine headgears, bridges, blast furnaces and tanks'. In addition, during the war, and 'in close cooperation with the South African War Supplies Directorate', the firm produced armoured cars, Bellman Hangars, landing barges, Bailey bridges, petrol tanks, as well as 'carrying out repairs and refits to 180 of His majesty's ships and 90 merchant vessels'. It also constructed a floating dock 200 feet in length and 40 feet high, which was towed out to Trincomalee, Ceylon, and was also responsible for the construction of the new graving dock's 'floating caisson' in the 1940s. The 'whole thing was built in the East London works of the company and assembled on the bottom of the dock, before being flooded and moved into position'.

Comparatively, AW&D was one of at least nineteen engineering firms operating in East London in 1941/42. Of these, AW&D employed 103 unskilled ('native') workers, followed by Modern Engineering Works with 45 unskilled workers, and thereafter the largest unskilled employer was First National Battery with 14, Lloyds and Co. with 12, and the rest all employed under 10 'labourers'. Similarly, when it came to skilled and artisan 'European employees', AW&D employed 74 journeymen in 1942, and Modern Engineering Works 10, followed by McIntosh and Sons, and Hubert Davis and Co. each with 7 engineering artisans, while the large proportion of apprentices, numbering approximately 100 in 1943, were 'largely found in the employ of AW&D'. However, by the end of the war, the Divisional Inspector of Labour

105 Although established as E G Dowse and Co. in 1924, on the West Bank, on 17 acres of 'bare and windswept land', the company became Alpheus Williams and Dowse (hereafter AW&D) in 1934, and included a Johannesburg and the 'East London works'. The period of 1934/35 saw the establishment of 'new and fully equipped workshops' with 'several large machines and cranes,' and between 1935 and 1939 AW&D established themselves as the leading structural engineering firm in the city, responsible for, amongst others, the large flying boat base for the Imperial Airways in Durban, the extension and new boilerhouse for the EL Power Station, an aeroplane hanger in Lorenzo Marques, and several of the oil tanks on the West Bank. In December 1944 it became a public company, and in 1962 AW&D merged with Dorman Long (Africa) Ltd. After the war, it was also responsible for the construction of the Good Hope Textiles Mill, and other local industrial concerns, including CDA. Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 1948, 42; East London, 64-66; and BCI, Box 36, containing miscellaneous archives of AW&D.

106 East London, 64-66.

107 East London, 64-66; Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 42.


109 CA, LIE, File 17, Ref C28, Wage Board Investigation, Unskilled labour, 1940-1942.

110 UCT, IM/F825 Papers, Confidential, Controller of Manpower, Correspondence, 1943.

111 BCI, Box 38, File ENG/1B, 'The Engineering Industry', Correspondence with Williams, of AW&D, 23 November 1943, who, in typically industrialist evasive fashion, suggested the figure to be 'about 100, maybe a few more'.
reported that the 'withdrawal of ship repair work ... left the largest ship-repairing firm (AW&D) with three times the number of apprentices to journeymen in their employ', and that this was a much wider consequence across 'all skilled employ in the city by VE Day'. At the same time, journeymen numbers had not substantially declined in this period. In 1943, the local Industrial Controller estimated that there were between 192 and 214 journeymen engineers in East London, with the exclusion of those employed by the SAR&H. They mainly comprised boilermakers, fitters and turners, welders and electricians and were concentrated in AW&D, Modern Engineering, Wilson-Rowntree, and in the East London Municipality. This reflected an increase of 'some 30 odd men' over the immediate pre-war period, the increase largely accounted for by 'coastal placements', and 'transfers from inland' (said to be a regular flow), but also that 'a limited skilled intake from the city for the war' occurred. By 1946/7, this figure stood at 'around 220', but below this was an 'equally large pool of apprenticed and semi-skilled young lads', emergent in the 1942-1946 period as a consequence of dilution and the Industrial Manpower intervention 'ordering Engineering firms to engage extra apprentices ... for every 4th or 5th year existing apprentice'.

While the Industrial Manpower archive consistently reflects a context that it was only possible to dilute ship-building 'with apprentices up to 25% and women could be used very little', and that the resultant 'shortage of artisans in the ports was chronic', East London differed on both counts. Thus while it was argued that at the end of 1943, East London's ship repairs/engineering labour position was 124 journeymen and 26 apprentices, by the end of 1945 the local archive suggests there were 'slightly more' apprentices than journeymen in the local engineering industry, while the most 'chronic' labour shortages were experienced in 1942-43, with 'never more than 20 men needed'. This clearly had a lot to do with East

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112 UCT, IMP/825, 'Civil History of the War', 3; BCI Box 37, File 'Skilled Labour', Correspondence and Report, 1937-1946. Letter to A. Dowse, 12 May 1946.

113 UCT, IMP/825, Correspondence on 'the engineering industry', as part of a planned civil history document on the South African engineering sector; BCI, Box 37, and 38, on Skilled labour and Engineering Industry Correspondence between Sommerville and BCI, 11 October 1943, 13 January 1944, 25 January 1946, 13 March 1947.


115 This is somewhat complicated by the practice of recognizing fourth and fifth year artisans as journeymen, enabled by a 'corporatist' agreement between the Manpower Controller and the unions, centrally including the AEU and the IMS. See UCT, IMP/825, manuscripts entitled 'Some Trade Union Attitudes During the War', and 'The Engineering Industry'.

116 UCT, IMP/825, 'Some Trade Union Attitudes During the War'; BCI, Box 38, 'Skilled Labour', Report, 23 October 1946, 4-6.
London's economic role and smaller structural war integration in this period, but it also had to do with dynamics of local change in the economy.

In fact the 'labour shortages of artisans' experienced during the war, and resolved through 'controller allocations', and 'dilutions', was expected to re-emerge with the 'return of inland artisans back to the Rand'. This was materially insignificant in effect, though. Rather, ironically, by the late 1940s, East London was experiencing a contradictory 'marked shortage of skilled work' in the engineering industry, which was 'not temporary' or 'momentary', but which was much more structural and discursive. The 1948 Divisional Inspector of Labour report, for example, suggested that 'the Engineering Industry, however, presented a somewhat more difficult problem. This office had artisans registered throughout the year, and as East London is not a large industrial centre there was little hope of placing these men, especially as none were prepared to work in other centres'.

These comparative figures, which partly emphasize the prominence of AW&D, as the 'most efficient concern preoccupied with war work', and the associated 'concentration of production into this large jobbing workshop ... around which the smaller shops grouped as one unit' (albeit unevenly), needs also to be balanced against the SAR&H experience. Through the war the average total of '44 SAR&H artisans' employed 'whole-time' on ship repairs (more than Cape Town-36 per day, and Port Elizabeth-11 per day), as well as a fluctuating number of 'part-times' reaching as many as 50 on occasions, together with a growing body of 'apprentices' and 'semi-skilled' 'European' railway workers employed in ship repair war-work inclusive of between 30 and 40 women engineering 'apprentices', partly reflect this important, if less significant role for the SAR&H. In addition, AW&D were responsible for at least 270 of the 431 ships repaired in East London (known as the 'corvet' repair base in South Africa), and the SAR&H, for at least 115 of these.

117 BCI, Box 38, File 'Skilled Labour', Report, 23 October 1946, 5.
118 BCI, Box 37, File 'Skilled Labour 2', and detailing the decline in skilled artisan numbers in East London, connected to a general population (and wartime, lack of immigration, and declining white reproduction rates), and an emerging economic transition, which was, ironically, 'in advance' of other regional areas.
120 UCT, IMP/825, Document entitled 'Ship Repairs', no date, but apparently written after the war, 8.
121 BCI, Box 38, File 'Skilled labour 2', correspondence with the SAR&H, 15 August 1945.
122 UCT, IMP/825, 'Ship Repairs', 8.
The other major area of skill concentration and wartime impact occurred within the local 'building industry'. Also a controlled industry after July 1941, because of shortages of both building materials and artisans, together with the priority focused on defence work, it followed very similar lines to that of the engineering industry in terms of working hours, conditions, a ban on job advertisements and wage freezes, as well as transfer rights over 'men', particularly to the ports.\(^\text{123}\) In 1942 the East London 'building industry' consisted of 650 European artisans, 50 coloured artisans, and 1,170 'unskilled native labourers'.\(^\text{124}\) In addition, the artisan sector, dominated by white workers, and where coloured workers were 'for practical purposes' only theoretically included, consisted of 223 bricklayers and masons, 203 carpenters, 36 electricians, 102 painters, and 40 plumbers.\(^\text{125}\) While it has proved difficult to establish journeymen and apprentice statistical breakdowns, a differing route into internal difference and tension is offered through the development of a 'rank-and-file movement' amongst 'apprentices' in East London in the 1940s.\(^\text{126}\)

The local building industry was divided during the war, as it had been before, between large 'Defence Department contracts', principally the Collondale Aerodrome, and Harbour extensions/construction of the graving dock, Public Works and 'native' housing construction, and small 'private building', especially once the permit system was revised in 1942/3.\(^\text{127}\) The building industry in East London was almost entirely organized around 'small workshop contractors' that had 'grown up around one or two skilled men'\(^\text{128}\), and there were no apparent 'large' construction companies. As a result 'large jobs' in the industry were coordinated through public and private contract systems, and interests represented and 'unified' through

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\(^\text{123}\) UCT, IMP/825, Reports of Dept of Labour, 1941, 'Control' document detailing controller interventions during the war.

\(^\text{124}\) UCT, IMP/825, Secretary for Labour to Deputy Building Controller, 'Employees in the Building Trade', 18 September 1942.

\(^\text{125}\) UCT, IMP/825, Building Industry-Area Employment by Trades, 1942.

\(^\text{126}\) 'Rank and file' characterizations have recently been problematized via the recent British debate, which points to the problems of this conceptualization, but as an initial descriptive term it remains useful.

\(^\text{127}\) UCT, IMP/825, 'Civil History of the War'.

\(^\text{128}\) CA, LIE, File 17, The Wage Board Investigation into unskilled labour in East London in 1941/2 listed over 230 employers in the building industry, and this list included approximately 20 'companies', many of which were located in the commercial sector, but operating a 'building section'. The point is that East London did not have any 'large' construction companies - these were coordinated through municipal, state and private contracting, and through the organizations representing particular interests. But it is also necessary to point to the misleading nature of this total of 232 employers, as many were family and inter-connected small companies. The BCI, Box 35, File 'Building Industry', estimated there were around 50 building firms in East London in 1944/5, for example, but this did not include commercial companies.
the MBA, the Industrial Council, and through the local BWIU. Three relational elements within this structure manifested during the war with important changing consequences for the industry, and the form and content of white labour, however.

War-work, and large public and defence contracts were unusual in size, scale, and controlled implementation, and tended to concentrate spatially and occupationally the 'building industry' over lengthy periods. Inter-connected to this was the 'permit system ban' on private constructions not deemed 'vital' by the Control structures, and thus the curtailment of 'the small-scale normal business operations of the building industry'.

By 1943, with the completion and suspension of some of the large Council and Defence projects, the vulnerability of the local building industry in a period of 'labour demand' became visible. Skilled bricklayer and carpenter unemployment, the downscaling of 'factory requirements' with cheap replacements, in the context of wartime 'materials shortages', the fact that they were often 'erected without proper labour', together with a growing series of labour conflicts marked the building industry in East London as the arena for the most common, and 'the most serious disputes' for the period of the war. They also illustrate this wider context of vulnerability. But so too did the fact that 'on several Public Works Department contracts it was found necessary to suspend the civilized labour clause as the contractors were unable to obtain able-bodied Europeans and Coloureds to do the semi- and unskilled work'. In practice this meant not 'mixed work', but that the men agreed 'to raise no objection to the employment of non-European artisans, if the Contractor could arrange not to mix the gangs'. Separate construction gangs became the norm in these civilized labour suspensions, but identity and difference between skill, race and work were not so neatly resolved in this period.

Initially I want to illustrate this out of the Divisional Inspector of Labour's report, which described 'Disputes In Industry' for the war period in the following terms:

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130 BCI, Box 35, 'The Building Industry', Correspondence between MBA and the BCI, 116/421, 4 July 1944.
131 UCT, IMP/825, 'Civil History of the War', 4.
132 UCT, IMP/825, 1/44/3, Confidential Letter to the Controller of Industrial Manpower, on 'Building Works: Grahamstown and East London', 15 November 1941.
The most serious disputes were in the Building Industry. A deadlock arose in the Industrial Council following the expiration of the Agreement on 31.1.42 and as there was a possibility of this deadlock developing into a strike, the Minister appointed an Arbitrator under War Measure 9 of 1942. ... Again early in 1944, a deadlock arose in the Industrial Council and the Master Builders Association gave 3 months notice of withdrawal from the Industrial Council, which was later deregistered. ... The biggest strike was also in the Building Industry. About 80 out of 140 artisans struck work for 9 days following the dismissal of one of their number by the Director of Fortifications and Coastal Works. After the Controller of Industrial Man Power had a conference with the Trade Union executives in Johannesburg, the men agreed to return to work pending decision on the matters in dispute by the local Industrial Council.133

While illustrative of 'mechanisms of regulation' for wartime labour conflict, and of the related development of 'corporatist' relations between the Controller, the Union government, and the trade union leadership centred and 'bureaucratized' on the Rand flowlines of decision-making134, what is equally apparent was the extent to which the Divisional Inspector was discursively positioning himself within this spatial and locational framework, reproducing its formation as the regional 'archive' of local labour knowledge. What remains hidden or silenced was both a 'groundswelling of disquiet' from within the white labour movement, as well as 'disarming changes in the rank, and the status of the employees ... not witnessed since the 1920s' in East London. Both employers and employees, respectively 'complained' and 'protested', with 'bitterness' against war measure and industrial council 'negations', 'benefits', 'favouritism', 'arbitrary implementation' and 'manipulation'.135 The war 'produced a covert economy of labour that we ignore at our peril', the President of the BCI was told in late 1947, and 'I fear the next election will show this'.136

What was this covert economy of labour? The building strike highlights some of its underlying tensions. Of the 80 striking artisans, many were apprentices, some were Cape Town and particularly Johannesburg 'transferees', and all were disgruntled with 'their union', the Building Workers Union (presumably the BWIU). In particular, leadership was seen as 'too established', and 'unwilling' to 'look out for its members

133 UCT, IMP/825, 'Civil History of the War', 5.
134 And thus a critical ingredient in the 'manufactured' centrality of the Rand, and wherein, and from which, other regional dynamics became simultaneously represented, and created in various marginal, and 'disadvantaged' capacities.
135 BCI, Box 35, File 'Building Industry', in particular, contains Correspondence from the MBA, and the local BWIU, tied to the employees using Government arbitration over established Industrial Council machinery, negating the whole system, while the employers were seen as benefitting from war measures which controlled wages and dispute procedures by removing access to 'direct action' which would generate significant wage increases much more successfully than those determined by arbitration and agreement awards. See also UCT, IMP/825, 'Settlement of Labour Disputes', which contains a more widely given account of these processes.
136 BCI, Box 26, Correspondence between Latimer and BCI President, 13 November 1947, and related to a personal discussion that appears to have been conducted over United Party policies, and post-war 'african trade union recognitions'.
interests, rather than the wars', wages against rising living and building costs were 'unchanging', and control of the industry was identified as 'falling in the hands of a few [local] petty dictators'. But these issues went wider than the building strike.

The 1945 strike in the strategically important Durban ship repair industry, which, as Alexander has convincingly argued, reflected an expected eventuality from within the rising disillusionment and widening spread of engineering, and other oppositions to existing and threatened labour control extensions, resonated within East London (and elsewhere). Equally Alexander has demonstrated that this was part of a growing feeling of discontent amongst Controlled 'rank-and-file' artisans in particular, and that even amongst engineering craftsmen, 'support for the war effort was conditional' of a balance between wider loyalty and a more localized materiality. This was certainly the case within the membership of the East London branch of the AEU at the time of the strike, but also more widely of artisan membership in the post 1943 period in the engineering, but also the building, furniture (ASW), and sweet and printing trades. From a relative skilled shortages position of strength, issues of restrictions on movement, compulsory transfers, and wage freezes on the one hand, and rising costs of living and allowance inadequacies, 'living' shortages (of accommodation, foodstuffs, equipment), union bureaucratization, and threatened state interventions through 'arbitrary and responsive control' on the other, were prominent in what the DIL called a 'barrage of complaint from East London labour that is by-passing its elected representatives'. In particular, local union leadership said to be 'in the hand of the up-country unions, ... which were, in turn, in Smuts' pocket', were conservative, entrenched, and 'crafted' firmly within the imagined community of British East London by the late 1930s. Their ideological support for the war was 'practically unanimous from the start', and a suggested support for conscription was implied to have been 'significant' in the creation of skilled labour shortages, especially from within the 'prime ranks' of local


139 CA, LIE, File 3, EL 4/3/9/7/2, and File 5, EL 4/3/9/12/2; and BCI, Box 36, File TS/1, Correspondence on 'skilled trades' in the war and post-war period, DIL to BCI, 12 April 1944 and attached correspondence.

140 BCI, Box 36, File 23/5 B, Skilled Labour Report from BCI to the DIL, 2 January 1945; and return comments, 6 April 1945.

labour. By 1942/3 it no longer had this cohesion however, as, ironically, while perhaps partly responsible for creating skilled shortages, these were critical in simultaneously enabling 'relative strengths' in a local labour 'sellers market'. This both encouraged and necessitated a changing social composition, managed through Industry Manpower Controls at a local level, but also heightened differentiation within, and opposition to, the local union leadership and union organization tied into these control structures.

In this context, the growing 'corporatist' and 'Johannesburg managed' local unions 'patriotic' and 'loyal' 'national worker' became increasingly constructed, and locally translated as an 'allied British war worker', at precisely those moments through the 1943-45 period when those identities were identifiably fracturing through material grievances, perceived unrewarded sacrifice, as well as between this local union leadership and its artisanal membership calling this 'Britishness' into question. But tensions, and lines of differentiation went deeper, involving processes of the re-crafting of skill and re-articulation of divided identities. The craft unions might have visibly 'weathered' the war in East London, but so too was the war period responsible for the discursive strengthening of the position of skilled workers and craftsmen as definitional of labour, especially from within local employer and state administrative and regulative departments, and within the unions themselves. But the war also re-inserted white labour conflict and the workplace as a terrain of social difference. 'Skilled labour grew during the war in proportions much larger than was allowed by the trades union movement in peacetime', while the 'protective attitude to labour' that

142 Interviews, R. Laweson, 2 January 1990, and E. Kitson, 16 January 1988. While the role of the local trade union leadership in connection with the war and the mobilization of skilled labour into the armed forces is inadequately documented, the records do document the major gap created within skilled ranks, as well as suggest the detail of support as largely 'unanimous'. These trends in general terms, were also asserted by both the President of the BCI in 1940, Box 35, File 2(A); and by Representatives of the local trade unions at a 'joint' meeting, held on 12 June 1940.

143 This is remarkably clearly articulated in Meetings, and Correspondence between the BCI and the local unions, including the AEU, the BWU, and the Furniture Workers Union, in discussions which repeatedly emphasized the loyal, patriotic, and skilled and 'British' traditions from which they derived support, and within which they imagined, organized and operated. In addition, the union leadership argued that 'there is no doubt as to the weight behind the Allied war effort ... disagreements do not change the unqualified support', ... that 'labour' in East London 'is to practical intent totally behind the war effort, and perhaps more so than their British counterparts at home', etc. BCI, Box 35, File 2(B) Minutes of Meetings, 12 June 1940 and attached correspondence, and also 5 October 1942. This was, as argued, an extremely contestable series of representations.

144 This did not entail the emergence of, or transformation of the craft unions into 'pseudo-craft' one's, dependent upon colour bars to protect their positions as J. Lewis, Industrialization and Trade Union Organization, has argued, and P. Alexander, 'The General, His Manpower Controller' has persuasively questioned. As he argues this has a longer and more complex history, but neither did the craft unions simply remain intact. Change occurred within a more veneered continuity that contained critical skill, generational, and national differences. As the last chapter argued, these identities had been held together within a stabilized local hegemony of British imagined community, and white labour's incorporation at political and social access within a 'racially exclusive social democracy', and a workplace correlating skill, race and colonial identities and differences to the modernities of class and inclusion.
emerged in the war narrowed their base concerns into concerns of unemployment, dilution, and war-effort support.\textsuperscript{145} Sommerville concluded there was a ‘growing rift’ between differing strata of skilled labour and the Unions, because of these practices.\textsuperscript{146} ‘Bridging the gap’ between these representations of the constructed homologous British and skilled identity of ‘the men’, and the non-discursive materiality of the workplace, through its ‘men-to-be’ alterity of ‘disgruntlement’ was framed between the simultaneous vectors of similarity, continuity and difference.

Structurally, these workplaces became the unstable points of suture in the imaginative white community, and this was reflected in a number of ways affecting skill, wages and work. Apprenticeship training became less comprehensive, more restrictive, more rapid and ‘causal’, work more repetitive and uniform, and wages both less in total scale and in grade differentiation. While racial and gender dilution were more worrying in potential than actuality, internal dilution while maintaining a nominal craft structure was much more marked. In more detail, ‘4th and 5th year apprentices had been allowed to complete their training in shops where they had been regarded as journeymen and the vacancies so created had been filled with new apprentices’.\textsuperscript{147} A large number of these trainees and ‘apprenticed dilutees’ had received ‘specialized training on particular jobs on which they had been regarded as skilled artisans’, which entailed that ‘they could not be forced back into years of apprenticeship but they would need additional training to become artisans capable of fulfilling the more varied tasks that would be demanded of them in civil life’.\textsuperscript{148} In addition, the Regional Controller observed that a ‘practice of taking men off the streets’, and ‘lads from the classrooms’ and incorporating them into ‘operative’ and ‘semi-skilled’ positions, with minimal training ‘crowded into months’, was occurring with increasing regularity. Often, he argued, these untrained and young employees were ‘allowed to perform and pay at journeyman rates’.\textsuperscript{149} Equally, while the local COTT scheme, involving 250 fitter trainees, and 15 machine tool operators located in buildings on the Showgrounds, was not highly successful in the long-term, and was ‘shut down’ in 1942 because of the

\textsuperscript{145} BCI, Box 32, Correspondence between Sommerville, and the BCI, emerging from a letter requesting ‘explanations’ for growing ‘labour disquiet’, 5 May 1945.

\textsuperscript{146} BCI, Box 32, Sommerville to BCI, 5 May 1945.

\textsuperscript{147} BCI, Box 32, BCI to Sommerville, 22 June 1945.

\textsuperscript{148} UCT, IMP/825, ‘Labour and Control of Industry’ draft document, referring more generally to the position of labour in SA, but applicable to East London, as the BCI, and the Divisional Inspector of Labour Reports make clear, but with not quite such precision.

\textsuperscript{149} UCT, IMP/825, ‘Labour and Control of Industry’.
'decline in the number of personnel available for training', COTT's local impact should be placed in this wider transitional skill and labour context.\textsuperscript{150} Thus, while direct allocations to industry, as opposed to 'the forces' were officially only 23, it appears that many left 'for a job before completion', and by 1942 others were able to bypass the scheme entirely, as internal labour dilution became generationally and occupationally more reliant on the 'untrained'. But more significantly, its impact was discursively more intricate in diluting, and re-forming apprenticeship identity and necessity, and thus in exposing how a differing apprentice-artisan culture and practice was able to emerge with an ambiguous 'official sanction' (via COTT).

In COTT, what happened was it made a great difference to the getting of skill. It trained you much, much faster, but also it changed the factories [workshops] inside ... things like training happened much quicker, much faster ... six months and you could work the job you were given, ... no messing about, no masters slowly, slowly giving you one little bit at a time ... and you being his servant, his boy like a kaffir for years, like what happened to Madola [nickname for an older white leather craft worker, and later textile dyeing supervisor friend sitting opposite, and itself interesting in the transformation of skilled labour into operative supervision within a re-constructed craft discourse, and of its paternal dimensions of status permanency enabled by an industry racial formation] ... so what was going on was I became an artisan, but I wasn't really one, ... the 'greyheads' (pointing to his head and generating a round of laughter) - that's what we called them - the real one's with a proper skill - they wouldn't ... but me - and my (what's that word? ... ) [contemporaries?] ... yes, that's it, well ... us youngsters, we would go to the job and we would get a journeyman wage, and be hired like that (snaps fingers) ... cocksure, listen to nothing, ... knowing that they would not give us respect, but still ... by the end of the war I was a fitter-and-turner, with papers and all, but only knew one job.\textsuperscript{151}

Journeyman-ed without apprenticeship, apprenticed without artisan control, and skilled without craft then, was enabled through COTT in a way more widely than the impact of its placement programme, but also that its wider impact inter-connected into a discursive materiality within the skilled workplaces during the war, and in part gave it official sanction - a Control machinery desirability. On the other hand, the combination of these processes was seen as 'playing the game down to the last fraction'. With both industry, and labour organization getting 'more and more into the hands of the civil service' and into the hands of 'a great champion of bureaucratic and dictatorial legislation', to find 'a place to live' became increasingly vocal. The 'clamour to unbind the crown' originating from a 'surprisingly large movement of men', no

\textsuperscript{150} UCT, IMP/825, Box 6, Manuscript on the 'COTT'.

\textsuperscript{151} Interview, E. Kitson, 16 January 1988, together with 3 other friends, and fellow workers. They have lived (in a neighbourhood), worked, and recreated together on a weekly basis for over 50 years with little interruption. A paper detailing their lives exists 'in my head', and in interview format. The war, and post-war period is particularly detailed in memory and extensive conversational narratives.
through craft, now became occupationally smudged, and skill-accorded generational divisions potentially transient. Patriotism, national ‘Allied’ identity, and a male soldier-ing through war-work claimed the space of craft ‘men-to-be’, with a self-assertive, and visible youthfulness of maturity as ‘men’.157

This impacted on the workplaces, and opened a marked generational gap of inclusive re-affirmed skill identities from the ‘greyheads’, and a series of responses from the ‘new entrants’ that became equally generational within defining work, class, and ‘citizenship’ in counter-apprentice terms. These changing material and cultural differences intersected with a further critical dimension of change during the war, tied to the emergent representation of a differing and ambiguous South African national identity in construction. While East London remained relatively isolated from the discursive constructions of a more exclusive Afrikaner Nationalism through the 1930s, in terms of both social composition, and local differential imagination and identification, certain ‘similarities’ of influence and meaning were important. Linked to this, the changing ‘national’ development paths, and declining British ‘commercial orbit’ provided equally important local contextual stimuli. But of central significance was the manner in which the war in the port unravelled many of the continuities of the imagined community of the mother country - the British Nation in colonial and imperial displacement and re-creation. In particular, the impulses provided by the young ‘appy’ generation contested the narrative of the ‘old country’, its primordial nature, the inventiveness of its traditions of labour, and the ‘disarray’ within its foundational representations of community.

By the end of the war, this young generation of white workers identified themselves as much more republican South African, than they did as British South African, unlike the ‘greyheads’ who were more ambiguously ‘Smuts’ men’.158 In addition, the relationship between war support and loyalty, gradually gave way to a ‘more hostile’ view of the ‘ways in which Smuts used the war’ to control wages and oppositions, but more widely, that ‘Britain used South Africa’. For these young workers, the experience of the war in

157 Interview, H. Minkley, 28 December 1991; but also Interviews with other workers at this time, including those cited above, 5b, and 5h, and with E. Kitson; also BCI, Box 33, especially a draft commentary on the ‘generation gap’ now [1945] seen within East London, and drawn between the so-called ‘greyheads’, and the so-called ‘appys’, 4 May 1945.

158 BCI, Box 33, contained this notion of the ‘young’ generation as ‘republican’, as a result of a meeting between the Divisional Inspector of Labour, and a ‘delegation’ apparently of these ‘new’ strata within white East London’s labour force, self-styled as the ‘Republican delegation’, 22 November 1946. The DIL saw them as influenced by a combination of returned soldiers from the ‘underground resistance armies’, up-country transferee nationalists, a growing ‘Afrikaans nationalism’, tied to recently proletarianized ‘poor whites’, which intensified during the war, and the discontent of war-work, control, and the ‘entrenchment’ of their changing positions. Interviews confirm some of this, although more tentatively, and less formally.
opening workplaces, and asserting a new route of maturity, similarly gave way to static wages, cost of living shortages and demands, traditional labour organization and representative skill exclusion, and national political party, and state exclusions. In short, the war emphasized that their everyday lives were not only not served within a British national destiny, but was, more importantly, contradicted by its imposed local, and South African war effort dimensions.\textsuperscript{159} Equally, the contexts of a British craft tradition, and the timelessness of skill in defining access to Empire's imagined community in East London, became apparent in its inventiveness as a set of practices, and in its ritual and symbolic 'greyhead' nature, simultaneously highlighting (as did the war) the discursive nature of a British nation and Empire. Contesting skill and artisan culture in East London, meant contesting the imagined community, and the narratives and traditions of its Britishness. This was made visible through the war, and it broke the 'disciplinary' or 'productive' power of 'colonial' East London and its younger white subjects in particular.

Thus, while maintaining an appearance of skill continuity during the period of the war, this generational difference solidified and in so doing, extended newly constructed meanings of the skilled workplace as a contested terrain. This had a wider implication of possibility in terms of identity, status and social life in East London in this period. But that will have to wait for the moment!

\textsuperscript{159} BCI, Box 33, Meeting, 22 November 1946; Interviews, E. Kitson, and 5b, and 5h.
CHAPTER FIVE


In 1934 Consolidated Textile Mills, Ltd., 'began the manufacture of Kaffir sheeting and blankets'. From 1934 to 1941 'their activities were confined entirely to weaving from imported yarns, but in 1941 a cotton spinning plant was installed. ... In the same year the firm also started spinning their own blanket yarns, using South African-grown wool'. The newspaper noted that:

when Consolidated Textiles started in 1934, about 100 people were employed. This figure has steadily increased and today (1948) more than 500 persons are employed. ... A novel feature of this factory is that it affords non-Europeans an opportunity to learn and perform skilled work in both the spinning and weaving departments. A large number of Africans find profitable employment here under ideal conditions and it is worthy of note that the management has had very little trouble in carrying out this notable experiment.

Even for the 1939/40 period, though, the factory was remembered by Dr Oscar Wollheim, a local liberal activist as:

... a very big one. I can't tell you how many employees there were exactly, but there were many hundreds. The front part of the factory facing the street was the administrative offices and there was a door leading through into the factory itself which was an enormous open space under a steel structured roof. And there was row upon row upon row of clattering automatic weaving looms going at a fantastic pace. And there were women looking after the looms. Each women had one or two looms to look after or three or four. At the back of the factory was a door leading into another section where the raw materials which had been prepared were being spun into enormous hanks of yarn. And then between that section where the spinning took place and the front section where the weaving took place, there was another section on a wall, in which there were bobbins, driven by some kind of mechanism ... .

The outbreak of war, and the emergence of a local war economy entailed intensified production and massive war demand, albeit within particular sectors and unevenly spread and spatially concentrated

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1 Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 1948, Consolidated Textile Mills (CTM) was initially built by Mauberger in 1933, but was taken over by Philip Frame's CTM before it came into production. As A. Mager, 'Women textile workers in the East London-Dimbaza corridor, 1939-1986', Hons. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1987, notes, and Interviews 3a-v; and 4a-w confirm, CTM remains known as Maubergers amongst African inhabitants in East London.

2 Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 43. The cotton spinning plant was believed to be the first to be introduced into South Africa.

3 Daily Dispatch Centenary Special, 43

4 Dr O Wollheim, Interview with A Mager, and quoted in A. Mager, 'Women textile workers', 69-70.
outside of the coastal cities in South Africa. In East London, this process of intensified demand and subsequent need to intensify production was only significantly felt in clothing and textiles, and food production and in the particular case of CTM, centred on the demand for 'a million or more blankets wanted now, now, now'. Again, Wollheim provides an important context to this demand, remembering that at the same time '... the staff working at the factory were leaving the factory in droves to go and join the women's auxiliaries and the SAWA's and the menfolk to go and join the army. And so here was the factory faced with a labour shortage and the impossibility of finding more labour and the imperative need to supply blankets very very quickly for the army'.

Wollheim, struck with the 'magnificent opportunity to get Africans across a colour bar which was existing and which could be broken down through the fortuitous chance that we were at war', offered this racial 'very simple solution to this thing'. As Mager notes, Keiser, the managing director of CTM was less enthusiastic, concerned with established and potential problems of racial prejudice and skill training on a 'mixed' factory floor. This 'physical problem' where the African workers would have to '... go through a period of training and then eventually start to operate the machines next to - elbow to elbow, shoulder to shoulder - with white women' would raise objection from the white women in 'no uncertain terms'. This, Wollheim agreed, was a 'valid argument'. The 'idea of black and white people working side by side was completely foreign anywhere in South Africa and in the verkrampte conservative atmosphere of East London, it was totally unheard of.' Wollheim had other 'very simple solutions'; however, which involved moving fences and a dozen or so safety pins in a chain. While Mager provides additional detail, it is worth quoting at length from her interview with Wollheim to provide a greater 're-created' context from this man of many simple solutions:

I would suggest that you construct a corrugated iron fence say about two metres high or two-and-a-half metres high in sections so that you can move it. [he advised CTM management] And then you move all your white female textile workers to the front of the factory, nearest to the administrative offices, and then you separate so many of the looms as you have enough black workers for, further back from looms and you put up a fence between them. And as your black labour force increases and as your white labour force diminishes, so you move more of the looms a little further back and you move the fence further forward until eventually you have no more white workers and your total labour force is male blacks and then you will not need a fence anymore.

5 A. Mager, 'Women textile workers', 68; see also UCT, IMP/825, 'Memorandum on Labour and Sites for a Textile Industry, SAIRR, R.R. 170/45, 16 October 1945, 7.

6 A. Mager, 'Women textile workers', 69; UCT, IMP/825, 'SAIRR Memorandum, 6-7.
And, in the question of recruitment, he devised a 'scientifically validated' 'test', involving:

a dozen or so safety pins, ranging from a tiny little brass one to one of the very big ones, in graduated sizes. And they were all pinned together from the largest to the smallest one in a kind of chain. And to test finger dexterity and powers of observation, the applicants were told to look at the chain carefully and then when a bell was rung they had to start to undo all the safety pins, mix them up into a heap in a bowl and then redo them back into the chain, exactly as they were before. As far as we were concerned, the people who accomplished that within a certain specified time would have indicated their dexterity in their hands, their powers of observation and a certain degree of elementary basic intelligence.

But the re-placement of 'European girl operatives' with 'Native labour' was more intricate, ...

The factory decided to experiment with Native labour, and this Institute [SAIRR] set up an organization at East London in which an African Committee in the location sorted out the good from the bad recruits and a local High School for Africans in the Location (township) put the recruits through an aptitude test. This test consisted of finger operations with safety pins, screws, etc., to determine the powers of observation, the common sense and the finger dexterity of the subject. Over a period of 2 1/2 years this factory recruited an average of 10 per week in this manner. The recruits were put onto simple carding machines for elementary training, and if they could demonstrate at the end of the week that they were able to maintain the machine running to a satisfactory degree, they were kept on. This factory at present employs some 300 Native operatives working automatic looms, the latest spinning machines, and all the other machines needed for the manufacture, processing, and finishing of utility mixed cotton and wool blankets and kafti sheeting. The Management report enthusiastically on this labour force, and are satisfied that the production figures are up to standard.

I want to provide one more lengthy voice from within this experience, this time from one of the 'subjects'...

In the time of the war, I came to East London to avoid the 'war-thieves' [a reference to a perceived practise of forced army mobilization of African's in the reserves], and to hide with my family. My brother sent me to this man in North End in this white man's suit he had ... with a house full of everything, you could hardly move, ... and it was this man Kadalie. He made it so that if I joined his organization, with money, he found me a place to stay, and organized my papers - lodgers permit it was, and he gave me this card of ICU, and a letter, and he sent me to Welsh (High School), ... I gave in this letter, and then I was to be examined ... studied in a room with a string of pins (motions with hands) and nails and things, ... but I didn't know now what was going to happen ... In here (taps

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7 O. Wollheim consulted Rhodes academics, a school psychologist, and fellow teachers and friends in East London, giving the test an aura of authenticity and scientific basis.

8 A. Mager, 'Women textile workers', 70.

9 UCT, IMP/825, 'SAIRR Memorandum', 7. A. Mager provides important additional commentary on this recruiting process. Again, quoting Wollheim, she describes his role, as principal of Welsh High School, and how, through the school, 'subjects' were evaluated, after school hours, and assigned in weekly batches of 20, out of up to 50 weekly 'applicants'. At this point Keiser '... talked to them and examined them and interviewed them personally through the help of an interpreter. And then he picked out the 12 that he liked the most and he put them to work at a wage that was rather more than the ruling unskilled labourer's wage ... onto this little board where they had to keep a dozen bobbins spinning all the time, winding the yarn from the big hank onto the bobbins, ready for the machine. Out of those he would then pick out the number that he found were useful and could be used. He then put them through further courses of training and then put them onto the spinning machines and then moved them from the spinning machines into the weaving section. ... And in this way - I think in a period of about eight to ten months, the whole factory had changed over from white female labour to African male labour. He was then in a position to complete the contract with the government and provide them with all the blankets they required.'
his head) I was confused, and ah ... scared, you know, how did this have to do with getting the job at Maubergers. I was useless, ... my hands couldn't work, but they sent me to the factory, and I got the work. I think it was because of the Kadalie card, ... yes ... and this was for lots of us in there.10

So, with an ICU card in one pocket, and comparatively higher wages in another, the apparent 'powers' of observation, dexterity, and common sense were re-employed to create an operative male native 'subject' in CTM during the war. Initially enclosed behind the corrugated iron fence 'at the back' of the factory floor, this moving enclosure of difference became an important early symbol of contestation. As a represented space of the alterity of native labour, divided from the white girl operatives, race and gender was manifest and visible through, and within, this 'bit of iron fencing'. Initially, at least for a couple of the 'new' workers, the fenced division was neither unusual, or unexpected, but of how the 'white man's world' worked on a daily basis. But as the fence moved closer and closer to the front, and the 'back' got bigger, and spatially and numerically dominant, it became a space of representation that the declining white girls began to see as 'threatening' and isolating. The factory was 'being overrun by the kaffir boys', one of the machinists remembered, and so:

I decided to leave before that bloody fence put my machines onto the other side, ... before it swallowed where I stood, ... that way I left before they dismissed me like I was worthless. The funny thing was we didn't know it was going to be the whole factory to become kaffir until it was too late, and then finally we all just left when we saw this, and it became the first kaffir factory. Then I knew, I said to my father, the kaffirs will take all this work and he said I should join the auxiliaries, ... and then after the war I became a bank clerk until I got married.11

The 'frontier' of popular white mythology and settler publicity had finally moved into the factory. In a number of ways, the white side of the fence, which was run on paternal lines, became increasingly cramped into its own space of gendered alterity. Before the war, after which the 'girls' began to leave to join up and 'do their bit', and there were not enough young girls for the factory and 'all these changes happened', CTM was 'like a family'.12 Even Keiser, the manager, would come out and ask 'how's my girls', and talk and joke in breaks, and 'everyone knew everyone else and looked out for each other'. Supervisors and older workers were 'uncle' and 'auntie'. Sisters and relatives were, when the occasion demanded, employed on the basis that 'they were family'. Personal relationships and crises were accommodated and assisted and Keiser was

10 Interview, V. Madikane. 16 June 1989.
12 Interview, Sm, D.G., 29 January 1991.
apparently nicknamed 'Father Brazza'.

But, as was also momentarily apparent, this 'paternalism' was both recent in implantation, liable to fragmentation and, at times, transparent, with an underlying current of abuse and harassment, unlike that of Wilson Rowntree's, for example. Eileen recalls moments of 'unfair dismissals', of comparatively 'bad pay', of 'few facilities, ... nothing like that at Wilsons', and of 'lots of rumours about, you know, taking advantage of the pretty ones'.

Whatever the intricacies of a necessarily 'incomplete' paternal incorporation and tension, though, with the wartime labour shortages and increased productivity demands, this paternal discourse was eroded, and 'betrayed'. Nothing was communicated about the 'replacement' plans or their extent, the 'girls' became 'suspicious of each other' and, especially for those 'very dependent' on the job, co-operation gave way to acrimony and conflict 'within' this constructed family. As the fence moved, and more of the 'girls didn't arrive on the next Monday, ... it was always a Monday', increasingly the remaining white girls 'felt their dismissals coming' with a growing sense of management surveillance, distance and even hostility and opposition. In crucial ways, this had much to do with a management conception of the 'disposability of the girls'. This was legitimated by a wider settler and western patriarchy, and enabled through the 'temporary' employment status of the 'girls' as young, single, not yet married, and without the domestic responsibility of the private family. But this instability and disposability was intensified and heightened through the 'abnormality' of the war, in terms of the movement out of factory employment into wartime auxiliary alternatives, in female labour shortages within the factory, and in the possibilities of 'new' replacements. Equally, this had much to do with what was happening over the racial (and gender) fence, and in the reality that managements' 'good fence' had not made for good neighbours.

In that space of the native operative, initially made and re-made through the moving fence, a markedly differing subject was under construction in complex inter-connected ways. The roughly two-year period of replacement and substitution of natives for girls was crucial in a number of respects for the future representation of factory space and of productive social relations. Despite the fact that all workers within

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13 Interview, Sm, D.G., 29 January 1991.
16 Interviews, Sg, and Sm.
the factory were operative spinners and weavers, albeit in various stages of training, the fence divided white from black, and women from men in more than physical terms. Out of this, differing meanings and experiences of operative labour, 'management' and, more expansively, of class, emerged. In particular, the 'girls operatives', in an absolute distance and silence, of refusing:

> to have anything to do with them whatsoever, ... they were natives!, ... kaffirs! ... dirty and smelly, they wouldn't even wear proper clothes, ... ag no man! they're not like us, never, never, How can you ask me if we had anything to do together, no-one did, ... ever. We could just smell them, and hear them shouting and singing and all kinds of goings-on behind that wall (fence').

However junior in other respects within the factory, the ability of the girls operatives not only to demonstrate and voice these objections, but also the discursive racial constructions of difference as inclusive for native operative labour, was important. It extended and entrenched older racial discourses onto new terrains, that were both as narrow as the factory and the workers families and more widely in the white unions and in the new/younger generation of 'apprentice-workers'. The oppositions and 'viewpoints' of 'the girls' around replacement, and the potential challenge this 'experiment' posed to 'civilized standards and norms', were recorded by the Divisional Inspector of Labour and the BCI, as 'legitimate problems' for the future, which 'can not be seen to change the necessary inferior position of the native'. But it was an increasingly assertive 'liberal' discourse, and its range of local institutional presences, that appears to have most formatively re-articulated these racial and operative inter-connections. Of course, the liberal connection had already been established. It had been there in the interventions (via Wollheim, the Civil Rights League, the SAIRR and the 'Friends of Africa) which pre-empted the processes at CTM in advance of the later processes of industrialization grounded in 'native operative labour'. But CTM was more than pre-emptive, it was also 'the model', as it became represented in its novelty, its

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17 Interview, 5g, E.R. While this is a particularly virulently racist narrative, informed by 'the present in the past' in fairly acute ways, it is also not unrepresentative of the meanings other Interviews constructed of this period, and of this experience.

18 In particular this was recorded in BCI, Box 37, correspondence from the 'Regional Federation of Labour Unions', March-August 1943, expressing concern over the emergence of operative native labour, which was diluting 'civilized female labour' in particular, but would have wider implications after the war, with the return of able-bodied 'Europeans'. For the younger generation, Interview material, especially with H.M., 22 January 1989; 5g, R.R., 15 June 1991, and 5g, V.S., 17 June 1991, confirmed a real concern, but also close inter-connection in personal and social young white worker circles, evolving particularly around the 'beachfront', but also the sports clubs, the bioscope, and the neighbourhood.

19 BCI, Box 37, contains Meetings, Discussion Notes, Correspondence, and 'results of a questionnaire' dated 16 January 1943, given to the 'girls' at CTM, apparently while the process of 'replacement' had been going on for about a year. The results are very summarized, and the original questionnaire is not contained within the files, however.
experimentality, and its reports of 'enthusiastic success', its 'up-to-standard productivity' and in its 'eminent suitability'.

This 'liberal' discourse was also critical in shaping management practice and strategies of intervention, from the actual use of the fence in the first place, through to what happened either side of it and thereafter.

Concerned with elements of education, 'intelligence' and 'physicality' on the one hand and with subjectivity, 'tribal discipline and tradition' and 'proper management and proper recreational facilities as well as social, moral and health attention' on the other, the SAIRR argued for example, that 'there is no reason why an eminently suitable African worker should not be developed'.

This tension or, more accurately, contradiction, between a series of universalist class discourses, and particular colonial and racial ones marked its impact and extension as profoundly ambiguous. So, for example, and drawing on the CTM model, the SAIRR argued that 'the African [itself a new construction, used interchangeably with 'non-european' and with 'Native' less often] is able to profit from education, and that those who can afford it are able to benefit from secondary education. An increasing number proceed to higher education and take the same examinations as Europeans'. Simultaneously, however, they argued that 'the Standard IV qualification is suggested because at this stage ['evolutionary' and educationally] the scholar will have attained sufficient literacy for the purposes of the work (e.g. able to read printed instructions), and at the same time will have attained a sufficiently high standard to make him/her ambitious for further technical training'.

For the SAIRR, 'the majority of African children in the South Eastern Cape pass this standard at, roughly, the age of fifteen. The recruits would be young enough, and therefore, adaptable enough for training, and would still be amenable to discipline'. This suggestion of the generational and educational possibilities for creating a new industrial worker out of the 'native' was, however, constrained by more than the 'sufficient limits' of Std IV and of the youthfulness of recruits. The SAIRR proceeded:

[I]t would appear that whether or not their intelligence in the mass is equal to that of the mass of Europeans, they are at least capable of instruction and training in work requiring average intelligence. ... Individual industrialists ... have found Africans eminently suitable ... and easily and quickly trainable ... for operative work, especially that of a repetitive kind. They say that at this type of work, Africans show less impatience, and far less fatigue than the European, and do not so easily

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20 See UCT, IMP/825, 'SAIRR, Memorandum'; BCI, Box 37, correspondence from SAIRR, Friends of Africa, and the ICU, to BCI, 22 August 1941, 5 September 1941, and attached correspondence.

21 UCT, IMP/825, 'SAIRR Memorandum'; BCI, Box 37, Correspondence, 19 November 1941; 2 February 1942.

22 UCT, IMP/825, 'SAIRR Memorandum', 6, 8.
lose interest in their work. Their traditional songs are characterized by the unending repetition of
the same theme, and they use this music when they are working in groups.23

So, with education (but not too much), and youthfulness (although not an absolute, but an ideal), 'the
African becomes a regular worker'. But traditional 'mass intelligence' and 'group' identities, together with a
'repetitive' and 'enduring' racial 'strength', defined the 'suitability' of native labour to operative work much
more critically. This was tied to the necessary context that to a 'greater extent' native labour would be '...
subject to tribal discipline and tradition', but stabilized through increased wages, responsibility and
education. 'It' would then be able to work to 'its main power strength'.24 And finally, while the SAIRR
argued for the need to listen to the demands of 'public opinion and Government authorities ... [for] ...
proper housing on European lines for African industrial workers', their 'proper homes' to which 'the
majority of males would probably wish at frequent intervals to return to ... ', would be within the maintained
norm of the tribe and the reserve.25 Education, higher wages and more occupationally defined jobs would
make 'the African' into 'a regular worker', as would the ability to occupy European-styled housing (and
social and recreational facilities), but he would still remain tribal and traditional 'for a very long time', and
desirably and necessarily so. Capable of some carefully specified and delimited European standards and
comparisons, the liberal intervention would grant the making of a regular and stable new operative worker,
but in many other crucial respects, he would remain 'native', or even 'African'.

What this meant was the particular extension and re-formulation of a colonial racial formation in new ways,
which internalized operative and class discourse into the particular, the local and the racial in East London
in this period. But it also meant that particular racial characteristics were stamped onto the terrain of
operative labour. These tensions of trying to have it both ways - of 'reading' tradition in both positive and
negative ways and the attempts to turn the 'african worker' into industrial man, but simultaneously assert
this industrial man's native/african primitivity, meant that the potential universality of the new worker, and
the potential 'modernity' of a new terrain of labour, was continually undercut by the particularity of the old
boundaries of control. This was so for both the 'old model of the native worker', and of those old

22 UCT, IMP/825, 'SAIRR Memorandum', 6, 8.
23 UCT, IMP/825, 'SAIRR Memorandum', 5-6.
25 UCT, IMP/825, 'SAIRR Memorandum', 6-7; BCI, Box 37, Correspondence from SAIRR to BCI President, 23
May 1943.
boundaries of social, political, and cultural life drawn in and through the reserves, migrancy and locality.

The tension of creating the right kind of workforce, out of what was becoming increasingly apparent as the wrong kind, could not be accommodated without fracture, conflict and contradiction. It brought, through the ‘field of labour’ and the workplace, the unskilled and exclusive nature of local colonial and racial commercial power into play, as that of ‘dominance without hegemony’.26 It was to be similarly so, for a colonial liberalism, as a ‘new’ hegemonic project that became prominent in East London during the 1940s.

First let me indicate the widening terrain of ‘liberal presence’. In extension, this ‘liberal labour discourse’ found the BCI in a receptive mood and new factory management ‘drawn to persuasion’ by the late 1940s. It did receive significant extension, even if still a ‘novelty’ in public representation, by 1948. Initially and continuously this occurred through the experience of CTM. But by 1946/7, in the immediate post-war period, the BCI organized a series of committee meetings, discussions, and ‘talks’ around this document and its implications. In many respects, it became the BCI’s ‘policy source’ on the question of ‘native’ and operative labour.27 In addition, this discourse served as a central basis for the joint IDC-Calico Printers construction of the Good Hope Textile Corporation factory outside King Williams Town, in terms of both locality, labour policy and integration of factory and housing sites.28 And in the post-1948 period, it was these concerns, formalized as ‘model’ that shaped new, and older substitution industrialization practices, although critical changes, divergences and differences also occurred, patterned from above, and from below. But its ‘impact’ was not just restricted to ‘the matters of industry’, or the ‘field of labour’. Its concerns also cross-intersected into the municipal administration, into regional apparatuses of the ‘national state’, into the Locations and, more generally, into the social and spatial structures and relations patterning East London. I will return to this below.


27 BCI, Boxes 38-40, contain extensive details of these proceedings, including commentary, and details of this particular document in Meetings, on Agendas, and within the actual Memorandum itself. By June 1947 the BCI committed itself to promoting native operative labour for all new enterprises, as well as, and including the educational, housing, social, and wage implications and details. It did not, however, break with, or any way challenge, but rather reinforced ‘racial’ determinations, which in crucial ways contradicted the impulses to class universality implied within the parameters and implications of native operative labour.

28 BCI, Box 39, Correspondence Files, 1946-1948; but see also G. Minkley, ‘With Shouts of Afrika’: The 1952 Textile Strike at Good Hope Textiles, Social Dynamics, 1991.
Before doing that, however, the spaces of CTM's 'native worker' representations require attention.

Perhaps it was unfortunate that the workers organization was the ICU, and Kadalie its leader - his and the ICU's role was profoundly ambiguous. On the one hand, Kadalie had evolved into a local, conservative and parochial 'authoritarian populist' figure, exhibiting those characteristics so aptly described by Bonner of squatter leadership and their political style in this period. He was charismatic, outspoken and confrontational, but also manipulative, coercive and corrupt. His role, in person, and through a shopsteward and membership network of clientage, patronage, financial reward and costs, and a hierarchical self-centred authority of identification was significant. It extended into the City Council, the lower levels of the Location Administration and into wider more diffuse liberal circles, including circuitously into the CTM factory. He was, Malcolmess noted, a 'status quo leader, who appears to rock the city boat, but is much less dangerous than we thought in the past. ... We must encourage in whatever ways possible his moderate intent'. Remarkably astute at gauging the 'shifting centres of gravity' for workers in East London, however, as well as their exhaustion in what he described as 'personal back-stabbing', he was also a pragmatic and opportunistic shifter of bases and affinities. While in popular memory he remains first and foremost 'the crook', he is also widely remembered as the most prominent local trade unionist and Location leader from the past. This was due in no small manner to these shifting and over-lapping allegiances and connections.

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30 See P. Bonner, 'The Politics of Black Squatter Movements'.
31 Interviews, G.O., 25 January 1987, R.D., 15 June 1987, R. Stevens, 12 December 1990, and J. Taylor, 4 July 1988, thus including a member of the City Council, and the local administration, as well as a prominent liberal activist in the period. See also CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 877, No 1960, and Boxes 937 and 938 for the Advisory Board Minutes, 1936-1949; and Box 1075, and 918.32; and BCI, Box 41 and 42, which contains details and correspondence with, and about the ICU, and the discussion between CTM, the Divisional Inspector of Labour, and a BCI sub-committee, 3 July 1945, as well as other correspondence between Kadalie and the BCI, and SAIRR, and the Joint Council, 1941-1948.
32 BCI, Box 41, Minutes of Meeting, 3 July 1945.
33 BCI Box 42, Correspondence, Joint Council to BCI, 4 March 1944, Malcolmess to BCI, 6 May 1944, and from ICU, 23 January 1945.
34 BCI, Box 42, in Letter from Kadalie to president of BCI, 16 October 1945, and from Ballinger of the Friends of Africa, 22 April 1946, describing impressions of Kadalie, and presenting him as a liberal, and anti-communist, and as such would not be a hindrance, but a vital component for changing the position of Africans in the city - in moderate ways.
35 Interviews, 3a-v, and 4a-w, with older residents and workers, all of whom responded with this notion of him as a 'crook', but also as the most prominent leader, perhaps because of his 'crookery' as for other activities.
In the early 1940s, this base was rather more narrow than the 1930s had witnessed, and focused on a network of site-holders, single men and particularly women and 'new arrivals', squashing, desperately, for lodging and employment.\textsuperscript{36} But, the migratory, and forced 'urban paths' to the city in the 1940s were extremely varied, shaped by a combination of regional, educational, 'traditional', gender, and economic factors. 'Kadalie's captives', as the local commissioner of police called them, showed a particular set of qualificatory attributes - they were young, male, largely from the Ciskei, but, most significantly, were those who 'had some education', and saw themselves in variable, but important degrees, as 'western' or 'schooled'.\textsuperscript{37} While factory management didn't see it quite this way, arguing they were still 'basically raw', and 'red in outlook, if not in dress',\textsuperscript{38} and the white 'girls operatives' were in even less racial doubt, their place in the Location hierarchies was far more fluid and demanding. Driven, but also challenging the city's expansive Location-al 'ghost of a segmentary system',\textsuperscript{39} Kadalie and the ICU emphasized its potential role as 'udidi', as against the strongly rural-derived 'intanga' and 'inyuwana' networks and practices prevalent for 'red' migrants (and which drew on amakhaya, Inkundla, and abafana rural structures).\textsuperscript{40}

In fact, the ICU seems to have drawn on these practises, but within an alternative and 'modern' urban and 'union' framework, re-casting 'intanga' and 'inyuwana' practises into those of the union, while also emphasizing its 'modernity' in the localized mobility and status narratives encapsulated in its representations as oppositionally 'udidi'.\textsuperscript{41} In this way, as a particular organizational 'transmuting pot', it provided a series of support, integrative and authority structures important in providing a new source of collective identity, but also of manipulation, dependence and control through its generational, patriarchal and union elitist hierarchies.\textsuperscript{42} While it is difficult, if not impossible, to trace the wider impact of Kadalie's ICU 'network' in this period, I would argue it went far wider than has been previously acknowledged, and

\textsuperscript{36} Interviews, 3s, F.K, 22 July 1987; J. Kophi, 11 December 1988, S. Ramncana, 24 January 1989; but also BCI, Box 42, correspondence between Kadalie and the BCI, 23 January 1945.

\textsuperscript{37} BCI, Box 41, File F/1-5, Report from East London Commissioner of Police to BCI Sub-Committee, 10 December 1942, over an Investigation into 'native trade unions'. This is a critical series of Reports covering the period of the 1940s, and includes observations from detectives and special constables.

\textsuperscript{38} BCI, Box 42, Correspondence between Kaiser and BCI, 22 January 1943; see also File P/2, Police Report, 3 May 1943.

\textsuperscript{39} The term is P. Mayer's, \textit{Townsmen or Tribesmen}, 209.

\textsuperscript{40} See P. and I. Mayer, \textit{Townsmen of Tribesmen}, who provide local meanings to these terms for the 1950s.

\textsuperscript{41} BCI, Box 42, File F/2-3, Police Commissioner Reports, 26 June 1943, 24 October 1944, 23 May 1945.

\textsuperscript{42} BCI, Box 42, File P/2, Police Commissioner Report, 26 June 1943, 28 August 1946.
grew in scope through the 1940s. But, whatever its range, its importance in patterning the CTM labour force was significant, albeit far from total.

For CTM, the new concentration of African workers in the factory opened, in its concern with production and profit, the need to re-organize and manage this workforce, and to enforce discipline, reliability, and management structures which ensured ‘that these native workers behave in ways that support our capability to fulfill contracts, ... and reach required profit levels’.\(^{43}\) This entailed that new ways for the ‘management of meaning’, and for the management of ‘active surveillance’ to ensure compliance with the new requirements of factory work were of primary concern. Kadalie and the ICU ‘networks’ were central in both of these ‘concerns’. These ‘networks’ became apparent in CTM from the beginning, and the time of ‘replacement’ in important ways, and had critical implications for the management of meaning and surveillance in and from the factory floor. On the one hand, factory floor supervision and ‘control’ became patterned through ICU ‘authority’ networks, as the factory space initially ‘behind the fence’, and then in its entirety, ‘necessarily’ became racially uniform, from supervisor to ‘raw entrant’. On the other, while the majority of the workforce by 1942 ‘were ICU’, most of them were new recruits, and had not experienced, or even witnessed the ICU of the 1930 general strike, and its ‘huge presence’ in the Location.\(^{44}\) The ‘novelty’ of the experiment, then, not only relied on the ‘inexperienced’ for the creation of the ‘native operative’ to work the factory, but, at the level of factory-floor ‘management’ and supervision, on an inter-connected ‘boss-boy’ and ICU ‘shopsteward’ structure, with a relatively high degree of organizational visibility and autonomy, as well as ‘recruit control’. This made much of the factory floor appear racially uniform, with very little direct white supervision in early work design and productive strategy.\(^{45}\)

In the early period of the factory’s new labour design this relationship between the ICU, supervision and shopfloor management worked to secure what white management described as a form of ‘tribal discipline’\(^{46}\). The various ICU hierarchies operated as its invented vehicle of expression and

\(^{43}\) BCI, Box 38, CTM Records and Correspondence, 1939-1946, relating to the ‘novel’ experiment, and unusual level of interest, correspondence, and organizational investigation around CTM.

\(^{44}\) BCI, Box 38, CTM Records, especially Correspondence, 22 February 1944, and attached correspondence; also Interviews, J. Kopbi, and S. Nongwevu, 16 December 1987.

\(^{45}\) BCI, Box 38, CTM Correspondence Files; Interview, S. Nongwevu, 16 December 1987.

\(^{46}\) BCI, Box 38, Letter from CTM management to BCI, 12 March 1943.
institutionalization. The 'bossboys' and shopstewards were, as far as I can establish, practically synonymous, and their status was determined by age and affinity to Kadalie. They worked closely with white management, meeting 'regularly', and on the shopfloor were not unlike 'a factory policeman now, and just later a 'indoda' - an elder that has respect'. As long as 'you were fast', and the 'mistakes were little', however, elements of a cultural solidarity and similarity were possible, and indeed necessary. The operatives then became 'men together' and, inside the factory, 'yours for the union'. This offered collective reward and affiliation, and provided an ambiguous legitimacy to the context of subordination encapsulated in ironically remembered ICU rhetoric which repetitively encouraged workers to 'stand together and work for this white man ... he has given us this work and he treats us well ... things like that'. What made this 'legitimate', though, were the counter-explanations. It was the ICU which enabled both comparatively significantly higher material reward, and made the shopfloor a 'relatively free' terrain, and the white factory and management not just 'a good boss', but also a less racially distinctive and segmented locale. This ICU ranked the 'men standing together' differently, with different power and authority, and according to a re-worked 'tribal tradition' as its locus of similarity, continuity, difference and of collective meaning and shopfloor identity.

This had a number of dimensions. Operative workers were, depending on experience, age and 'ability', on four or eight machines, for example, known as the factory 'inyumana', or as a more senior 'umfana'. Various 'traditional' kinship terms served to demarcate rank and relationships in the factory and the union. The shopstewards and management's 'bossboys' were simultaneously represented as the 'mature men' ('indoda') from the factory floor, and this held little possibility of open challenge and disciplinary refusal, as they also had the power of dismissal and wage determination. If 'the ICU indoda's got their eye to you, it would start with your paypacket ... you would find reductions, and they would tell you that next you would be out, with no work'. While it isn't clear whether Keiser or Kadalie was self-appointed 'chief in/for the factory, both thought of themselves as potentially representative of this role. While factory

47 Interview, S. Mjiwi, 6 February 1989.
48 Interview, S. Mjiwi; the reference to 'yours for the union' goes back to the earlier period of the IICU, and the connection is mine, made as a descriptive device.
49 Interview, S. Nongwewu, 16 December 1987.
50 Interview, S. Mjiwi, 12 February 1989.
51 Interview, 4s, G.D., 28 June 1987.
management remained profoundly uneasy about the central role the ICU had come to play, and the potential threat of a ‘native union’ in bottom supervision/management of the factory, the combination of unique ‘wartime conditions’, the successfully generative patterns of work control and productivity achievement, put these on temporary hold. In addition, though, management, in discussion with a BCI sub-committee, and the Divisional Inspector of Labour (under pressure from the white unions) argued that the ICU ‘is only a trade union in the nominal sense’. ‘It operates’, Keiser contended, ‘very much like an effective tribal body, with Kadalie and his lieutenants (sic) like Tyamazashe at the head, practically fulfilling the role of their distant chiefs’. What the ensuing discussion highlighted was the simultaneous role of these ‘tribal traditions’ for management discipline and control outlined above, but also the capacity for these practices to conform, and entrench localized and particular conceptions of native labour as only possible within the ‘grouped common sense’ of ‘tribal’ unitization. It was through this context that a relatively unanimous acceptance amongst these ‘unhappy rulers’ was achieved for both CTM and for its possible wider implementation in East London.

In the workplace, if this ICU/tribal discourse was central in managing the experiences of work, there was another remembered experience that was critical. This focused around operative labour, comparatively advanced forms of technology for East London ‘native labour’, and what became the daily grind of mental and physical exertion and fatigue. In part this was shaped by the fact that this was a ‘new world’ for the young workers, unused to factory life. This meant that in many respects they brought ‘pre-industrial habits and moralities’ with them into the factory, such that management worriedly noted that ‘while the native recruits undoubtedly possess the dexterity, strength, and repetitive spirit ... they do not show the compliance, acquisitiveness, or the accustomation to work’. This was demonstrable in the lack of

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52 BCI, Box 38, Correspondence between CTM and the BCI, no date.
53 BCI, Box 41, Minutes of Meeting, 4 July 1945.
54 The term is Megan Vaughan’s, Curing Their Ills, and is, I think, an extremely important intervention about the tendencies and tensions between differing forms of power, and contexts of subjectivity and ‘unitization’ within colonial societies.
55 BCI, Box 38, Correspondence, CTM and BCI, 26 July 1945. The discussions and differences were reconciled fairly rapidly, and they centred on the fact that this new form of employment would not interfere with a dominant racism and imagined white ‘civilization’ and its labour and extended social and material implications. Put differently, this meant that the local universality of labour as civilized and white, and distinctive from forced, migratory and unskilled labour, rooted in the coloniality of the reserves and the ‘locations’ and thus in ‘racial stereotypes’ would not be disturbed.
56 BCI, Box 41, Minutes of Meeting, 3 July 1943.
punctuality, obedience, regularity and respect exhibited, but also in the sustained forms of 'traditional intercourse and behaviour', 'seen' in language, kinship, song, in labour turnover, 'superstition' and in 'age rituals of respect'. The inter-connections between these 'traits of natives common sense' to the ICU and management strategies were clearly articulated and implemented in the factory, but the emphasis on these 'traditions' constrained the development of a 'modern' habitus of factory life. This meant that, in the longer term, the universalizing tendencies of operative and semi-skilled wage labour, which became manifest through the 1940s, remained an uncaptured terrain, and a particularly challenging one for the traditions of the ICU, and for management and control at CTM.

What were these tendencies? On the one hand, the accumulative and acquisitive necessity of wage labour became increasingly important as definitionally dependent and 'inescapable'. In addition, levels of skill and ranked factory-floor occupations became part of this self-definition process. In addition, though, factory labour itself, the experience of this 'quick', 'repetitive', and 'dexterous' work of carding, spindle loading and machine weaving, became, at least in memory, soulless, depersonalized and disembodied within a short space of time. And it also became punctuated by hooters, regularized by machine and material speeds 'wave after wave', which meant a job of 'no stops', and the weight of responsibility for the 'oiling and maintenance of your own machines, ... if they got dirty then they would break and then there in front of you, and for everyone to see, the problem of your job'. So, recalls one of the textile workers, you would close your head ... just go silent in there (motions to his head), but at the same time - all the time you need to be watching and checking for breaks, and changes, all of problems so it can just run ... and so you couldn't close the head to the factory. In the process, the CTM factory floor became increasingly patterned like a checker-board of individual men with their machines, increasingly responsible to themselves first. If it didn't quite become 'all that mattered', each private locale of looms or spinning machines in the huge warehouse became, with stability and permanence, an arena of meaning and surveillance that was simultaneously

57 BCI, Box 41, Minutes of Meeting, 3 July 1943.
59 Interviews, S. Mjiwi, 6 February 1989; 4s, G.D., 28 June 1987
60 Interview, 4f, G.S., 6 January 1988.
common and individualized. Over time, these workers became less reliant on the older 'traditions' and these elements of a newer, and incomplete 'worker tradition' began to be established.61

Ironically, the union and liberal discursive elements also within the ICU, which cast these experiences as not just that of a 'novelty' and more that of a 'generality', in which wages, skill, and 'the factory' spelt the future of a more individuated 'native labour', was also important, not just within the factory, but in wider frameworks of signification as well. So too were the material processes that tied the job in the factory to 'wider horizons' of a stable Location existence, and to a self-owned and potentially newly built municipal house which enabled the equally stabilizing construction of a 'modern family'. It potentially went even wider than this, as Malcolmess forecasted - 'the import of these changes in the Location, and as the experiment at Consolidated Textile Mills gains ground will not stop there, the nation will follow'.62

'BY REASON OF ITS BEING INARTICULATE': THE LOCATION, THE LIBERAL, AND THE GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY EXERCISING THE MINDS OF EUROPEANS

The local state, and in particular municipal administration and intervention on the one hand and the nature of the City Council on the other, were significantly altered during the war. Important transitions centred on the re-emphasized need to manage but also re-order the space of the Locations and the previous chapter emphasized that this became part of a wider social and economic spatial management responsibility inclusive of economic industrial space. At this point, I want to develop, problematize and substantiate these initial, and somewhat suggestive contexts, but also broaden the discussion into a wider frame of reference.

In 1937 the Thornton Commission 63 had concluded its investigation with the following

It is necessary to sound a note of warning to those in public authority in East London as in other centres that unless these vast schemes (of re-planning for and re-housing and separate administration of one-half of the population of a community) are front-ranked in importance and

61 BCI, Box 38. The CTM management points to these processes occurring within the factory by 1946, suggesting, with concern, that the workers are rapidly becoming 'detribalised', and starting to think and behave like modern workers who will shortly make 'demands to be treated as such'. Correspondence between CTM, and the BCI's Labour Sub-Committee, 12, and 24 June 1946.

62 BCI, Box 38, Minutes of Meeting, 24 June 1946.

63 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240. At the time it was also known as the 'Jameson Commission', and was an investigation carried out at the instance of the Native Affairs Department and the Department of Public Health, and consisted of Dr P. Allan, Asst. Health officer; Mr. F. Rodseth, Inspector of Urban native Locations; and Mr F. Walton Jameson, of the Central Housing Board.
The Commission went further, however, and argued that it was 'essential to reconstruct the location'. It suggested two options, either an 'entirely new location on a new site', or 'the utilization of the present site with additions for a rebuilding scheme on town-planning lines'. The Commission preferred the second, for the 'practicable reasons' of wider City locational and transport 'advantage', and for the desirability to 'make use of the services which the present location already enjoys in the way of water, sewerage, schools, churches, clinic, light, offices, etc.' As I suggested in Chapter Three this representation of the existing Location/s, while 'accurate' in comparison to a nonexistent and future location, was also less a reflection of material and social realities, and more part of a language of legitimation, management and control (and of local forms of knowledge for power!). More broadly, though, the Thornton Commission was a critical vehicle in the changing history of the City Council. In outlining a self-reading of this history of the Council for an East Bank Location 'proposed extension' meeting in 1950, the Thornton report was given 'pride of place'. In particular, this Council version of the past argued that the 'long outstanding problem which has confronted the Council by reason of unsatisfactory and inadequate housing for Natives - a matter which was brought to a head by the Thornton report of 1937', also became 'the priority in terms of 'forcing' changes, and for the 'necessary' following of its recommendations through the 1940s.

The importance of these (Thornton Commission's) recommendations, however, lay in simultaneously opening the Location/s to equally 'necessary' town-planning discourses and interventions, both within the Location/s themselves, but also within the differing spatial 'communities' of the city as a whole. Bettison, the Council's welfare officer and Location social worker in East London in the 1940s, argued in c1950 that '[T]he matter of real significance in respect of earlier attempts [of Location development] was the change of heart towards the Africans ... [in 1937]. It marked the first acceptance by the Council of its responsibility to the African community.' So, too, did the City Council, the Manager of Native Administration and the Native Affairs and Public Health Committee emphasize this 'turning point in native affairs' and 'in the

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64 BCI, Box 25, File J1, Thornton Commission/Investigation Report, and copies of Evidence submitted, 1937.
65 BCI, Box 25, File J1, Thornton Commission, 1937.
City's attitudes to the location inhabitants' for 1937, as did the SAIRR, the Joint Council and the Welsh Commission in differing contexts. All emphasized the necessity to 'reconstruct' the Location/s as part of a more comprehensive 'town-planning' and within a wider policy of 'industrial development'.68

Opening the necessities for planning and re-ordering Location and City spatial possibilities, did not necessarily entail their implementation in coherent or even notable or undifferentiated dimensions, particularly for the Location/s. For, by 1948/49, the contradictory extent of this 'new responsibility' in Location intervention, the Thornton Commission and Council accepted 're-building scheme on town-planning lines' had to confront what the Welsh Commission identified as a 'vast slum', that '[W]ith the passage of years ... has become habituated and hardened to a demoralizing way of life'.69 In addition, the Joint Council, giving evidence to the Commission in 1949, argued that '[S]peaking generally, in the case of a crisis - for instance a similar crisis to the water shortage - the ratepayers of East London cannot stick to costs; and we are on the verge of a most catastrophic emergency or crisis so far as East London locations are concerned today: the conditions are appalling'.70

Mr Steer, the vice-chairman of the East London European-African Joint Council, however, also argued in 1949 that 'I would like to put it completely out of the minds of the Commission that this deputation is attaching blame to any council, past or present, or any municipal official, or the police. ... We are not. The City Council is a victim of circumstances and successive councils have been victims of circumstances'.71 On the other hand, Councillor E Taylor, the chairman of the Council's 'Native Affairs and Public Health Committee argued, also in 1949, that 'the Council knew the state of the location [from 1937, 'at least']; in spite of this knowledge it made things worse; ... it had been unwilling to face up to its obligations ... and must assume direct responsibility'.72 The Thornton Commission had recommended the need for

68 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877/878, Ref.1960, Council Minutes, City Engineer's Dept. Report, 13 January 1943; Notes of an interview between the Secretary for Native Affairs and Public Health and Native Affairs Committee, 11 November 1942, and Round Table Conference, 23 November 1942, involving the Public Health and Native Affairs Committee, and the East London Joint Council.
70 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, and also 877, Ref 1960, Joint Council submission to the Welsh Commission, 3 July 1949; see also Daily Dispatch, 9 July 1949, under heading 'Ratepayers Cannot Stick At Costs', Completed Questionnaire, 6 July 1949.
71 Daily Dispatch, 15 July 1949, evidence to the Welsh Commission.
72 Daily Dispatch, 14 July 1949; but also BCI, Box 25, File W1. Welsh Commission, including incomplete transcripts of evidence to Welsh Commission, 6-14 July 1949.
'rebuilding' the Location and incorporated in the recommendations was that if the Council did not undertake this responsibility, the NAD, in conjunction with the Public Health and Housing Departments, would 'do the job for the Council and the Council presented with the bill'.\(^73\) This, more than any other factor, 'changed the Council's heart' according, to Councillor Taylor. The prospect of 'spending money on the location ... was always uppermost in any decision' in this period. In addition, in a letter to the Welsh Commission, it was argued that 'the City Council introduced a policy of artificial expansion about ten years previously which it called industrial development and subsequent councils had continued to use public funds to subsidize industries, with the result that thousands of Natives had poured into the city, while industrialists had not been compelled to contribute in any way towards housing'. But neither did the Council, and the locations were only part of this plan 'through government pressure' and the Council had remained 'unresponsible' to Location development, adopting an 'out of sight, out of mind' attitude. In fact, it was strongly asserted that 'location funds', including the housing loan, had been channelled into this 'artificial expansion' of 'industry', in the development of industrial sites and of commercial interests in wool, but I have been unable to substantiate this beyond a few suggestive comments.

This repeatedly made 'change of heart' scenario for the City Council, (referred to earlier with respect to 'industrial policy'), to a more enlightened approach to industrialization, and to the Locations and their inhabitants, then, and its 'critique', made from the discursive vantage points of the 1940s, is suggestive of the contradictions between planning, policy, and intervention in the production of East London's spatiality in this period. In particular, these contradictory articulations emerged out of 'the shambles', the 'crisis', the 'neglect', the 'widespread dissatisfaction' and 'urgent calls' of local opposition, that were the Location spatial realities of the 1940s for the City Council. This also meant that the Location/s were patterned more in line with the oppositions and continuities between 'enlightenment' and 'ignorance' in its Location policies and interventions, than a simple 'change of heart' scenario enables or allows. These tensions between continuity and change contained a series of very significant differences and contradictions within the Council and from all sides outside of it. They go well beyond the circumstantial as legitimation for the extensive 'failed' change of heart implementations. In a number of complex inter-relational ways, the ambiguities of East London's dependencies were not replaced, but rather grew in visibility and presence.

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\(^73\) BCI, Box 25, File 11, Thornton Commission; see also Daily Dispatch, 14 July 1949.
want to detail this initially through the Council's Location housing and re-building plans more narrowly, and as representative of the central 'official' production of Location space more generally. In both contexts, the Thornton Commission was discursively, and materially central. But it was also contradictory, as differing elements came to pattern a range of interventions across differing labour, health, regulation, recreational and social and family localities - and across differing political terrains.

In the 1937-39 period, a number of new processes and 'possibilities' did cohere around 'the Location/s' in East London. Mr. Charles Lloyd, the Superintendent of Locations retired after more than 30 years of paternal 'service'. His retirement, and the delay in appointing Mr R.C. Cook as the newly instituted Manager of Native Administration, delayed 'consideration' and decision on the Thornton Report. At the same time (March 1938), the Council established the 'Public Health and Native Affairs Committee'. Also, directly linked to the Thornton Commission recommendations and to the availability of 'sub-economic funds' after 1936, which were long-term and of extremely low interest, the Council 'sought inclusion in the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923' (and Amendments of 1930 and 1937). Although the City Council locally resolved to 'qualify' in November 1937, East London was declared 'a proclaimed area in terms of Section 12 of Act No.21 of 1923 and registration of service contracts (for males) was introduced (Proclamation No. 97) in January 1939'.\(^74\) As Greenberg has observed, in a context applicable to East London, while the Act gave '... local authorities extensive "powers" to establish African locations, register employment contracts, and expel redundant Africans. ... [I]n practice, however, these measures were erratically implemented'.\(^75\) I will return to this below.

The Thornton Commissions recommendations for the East Bank Location re-development ran along two simultaneous lines of 'progress'. On the one hand it recommended the 'replacement of practically the whole of the existing wood and iron dwellings and redesign of layout site and dwellings for same', and on the other, the need for 'extensions of existing area and the amount of additional land required for such extensions, and the methods to be adopted in construction of new dwellings'.\(^76\) As I emphasized in Chapter

\(^74\) CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref. 1960, Public Health and Native Affairs Committee Report, 21 October 1943, 1 March 1945, 15 June 1946; Daily Dispatch, 8 January 1944.
\(^75\) S. Greenberg, Legitimating the Illegitimate (Berkeley, 1987), 33.
\(^76\) BCI, Box 25, File J1, Thornton Commission Report, 1937.
Three, the distinctions between 'brick' and 'tin' town in the East Bank Location, and over the actual siting of this Location had pre-occupied and shaped earlier Council responses or, more accurately, the lack thereof. Initial Council discussions over the implementation of the Thornton recommendations confronted these issues head-on yet again. An initial proposal, emanating from the COC, drew on the 'rejected' Thornton suggestion for 'a new location on an entirely new site'. It was sustained for some time into the 1940s, and argued for the removal of the East Bank Location, and more particularly of 'tin town', to the West Bank on the site of the old Collondale Aerodrome.77 But the divided Council majority, using the authoritative and 'rational' approach of the Thornton document and the legitimating voices of the Native Affairs Department, the Central Housing Board and the National Housing Commission, and the Urban Areas Act, settled ambiguously and, with much hesitation, on re-development and extension as its twin lines of re-modelling.

The details, delays, postponements, and problems encountered and enabled by the Council does not need extensive elaboration, although it was of overwhelming municipal and Council concern and activity, overriding all other forms of interventions, issues and debates in the late 1930s and in the 1940s. In brief, the period between 1936, when the loans were made available, and 1938/39 was taken up with internal council restructuring and appointments, and with 'reconciling debates' over the Thornton Commission. Thereafter, the need to 'draw up' a detailed contour map of the location area, 'from scratch' took six months, the City Engineer's 'lay-out plan' was forwarded, and then redrafted by the Central Housing Board, and a period of negotiation between the two followed. By the time the final plans were resubmitted, the Housing Board had allocated its funds for 1939-40, and funds were only allocated by 1940-41.78 In addition, the Council did not have access to enough land around the Location, for 'expansion' and 'extension', and a series of negotiations, surveys and lapsed options in the Amalinda village area, and the 'undetermined' status of Buffalo Flats constrained this planning, and its later implementation.

Two important aspects within this plan need additional specification and both originate from the Thornton Commission, and were then 'adopted' by the Council. The first concerned the recommendation to

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77 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref.1960, City Engineer Report, 24 March 1943, 12 July 1947; and also BCI, Box 25, File J1, Evidence to Thornton, and W1, to Welsh Commissions; Daily Dispatch, 9 January 1944.

78 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 877, 878, and 879, Ref. 1960, and 1960/1/2, Correspondence between Council and Central Housing Board, and Council Reports, 11 May 1943 and attached correspondence.
'demolish the wood and iron area'. The Council, with 'this in mind in 1937', resolved to prohibit 'the transfer of sites from one person to another until a settled policy for the Location had been decided on', and also to prohibit the 'building of additional rooms to existing huts'. While there is much local debate as to whether this decision was informed by a 'real' sense of commitment to demolition and 'rebuilding', or because of the desire to 'keep any possible compensation as low as possible', the Council answer, in practice through the 1940s confirmed the latter reason in no uncertain terms.

Secondly, the Council determined to follow the re-building recommendations on an 'urban basis', which included 'roads planned on the contour, curbed and guttered', sewerage (preferably to each house), water supply to each house, tap over concrete washing areas, electric lighting of streets, and of dwellings, fences, and gardens, etc. The final plan that emerged came to incorporate the twin processes outlined above. Initially, building would take place on the outskirts of 'tin town', and then, progressively, residents would be moved out of 'tin town' into the new municipal housing, their shacks demolished, and then re-built on 'urban lines' and the process repeated until all the 'wood and iron' houses had been replaced. In this way, it was argued, the Council would 'kill two birds with one stone', in the removal of the 'tin town slum' through demolition, and in the provision of a 'model township with minimum cost', through the constraint of development 'with minimum extensions of existing boundaries'. This was not to be, however.

By 1940-41, a sub-economic housing loan of 796 162 pounds had been secured from the Housing Board for the 'rebuilding' of the Location and the construction of 3 192 houses. By the end of 1944, 628 had been built, and by 1950 only one more house had been erected, making the 'grand total' 629. Another 100 were 'under construction' during 1950. All of these houses were built on the 'fringes' of the Location area, and

79 ELM, Town Clerks Department, File no 80/-, Rules and Regulations, 1941-1949; CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960, Native Affairs Committee, 1 March 1945.
80 Daily Dispatch, 14 July 1949.
81 BCI, Box 25, File J1, Thornton Commission; CA 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960/2, Report of City Engineer, 11 May 1943, 16 June 1943; Native Affairs Committee, 1 March 1945.
82 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960/2, City Engineer Report, 11 May 1943; Native Affairs Committee, 1 March 1945.
83 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960/2, City Engineer Report, 11 May 1943, and attached correspondence.
84 Daily Dispatch, 15 July 1949. Of these, 274 were two-roomed houses, 330 three-roomed houses, and 24 four-roomed houses. The total cost of the 628 houses was 165 712 pounds, to which needed to be added the cost of 'development work, provision of services, etc, amounting to 93 165 pounds, making a total expenditure of 258 337 pounds'.
through extending the Location boundaries and ‘no wood and iron houses were demolished to make way for the Municipal houses’. Housing, except in these recently built 629 ‘conventional type municipal houses’, in which ‘a very close watch was kept on urbanized Africans preferential entry’, was massively squalid and over-crowded. This was inclusive of the earlier municipal single and double-roomed ‘constructions’ despite the fact that they often housed ‘a better class of native’. The approximately 1850 wood and iron houses of the ‘tin town slum’ or shackyard, were estimated, in 1947, to have ‘at least 8 000 rooms’ attached to them,86 and:

some houses contained as many as 10 rooms [and more] leading off a single passage, ventilated only by a door at each end, and each of these rooms contained a household. Cooking, eating and sleeping all took place in the same room which might contain 4 or 5 adults, and 4 or 5 children.87

Of course, not all houses, or rooms were as densely occupied, regulated by gender, generational and material necessity in varying degrees. But by 1948 these shackyard ‘old houses’ were described as ‘not only full, but overflowing’, and as ‘wrongly sited, over-crowded and generally unsuitable for habitation’, or in the words of the MOH ‘rank slums ... essentially unlivable’.88 But these lived-in and owner-occupied, let, and sub-let rooms produced an intensified honeycombed poverty of ‘rackrenting’, indebtedness and dependency, coupled with powerlessness, forced publicity and violent inadequacy in the ‘warrens of illegality’ in the 1940s. The Council ban on transfer, sale, and ‘improvement’ of the shacks, and on the refusal to grant further ‘owner-occupier sites’ after 1937, marked the central determinant for this worsening and heightening of these slum conditions. Its effect was to ‘encourage [further] overcrowding, and the construction of illegal dwellings’, and, in the removal of control that the ‘Manager had over the design, size and general suitability of rooms’. This meant that ‘any type of structure - frequently with no window space whatsoever and containing many glaring insanitary features - was built’.89 Put differently, Councillor Taylor of the Public Health and Native Affairs Committee argued that ‘overcrowding was forced underground - instead of adding-on, rooms were added-in through sub-division, ... cramming the native into already

86 CA, 3fELN, Box 878, Ref 1960/1487/14/1, Letter 8 April 1947; BCI, Box 25, File WI, Welsh Commission Reports, and investigations carried out on behalf of the BCI from 1945 to 1949 by the MOH, Miscellaneous Report, July 1947.
87 BCI, Box 25, File WI, MOH Report, July 1947.
unsanitary and second hand houses with no regard to moral and human dignity'. In conclusion, like other 'liberal' commentators at this time, his was one of 'frank appall (sic)' and of 'council blame'.

When taken together with the fact that no new 'owner-built sites' had been allocated after 1937, that the majority of the residents of the Location lived in these houses, and that the extension, upgrading, and 'adding-on' of these self-built houses within 'tin town' had been prohibited and 'forced underground' after 1937, the 1940s multiplied, rather than resolved the crisis in the Location. When linked to the degree of population increase, and in-migration, estimated at over 10,000 for the 1940s, the implications were indeed 'explosive', as the new municipal housing provisions did not even 'keep pace', let alone resolve the 'threshold' of the Thornton Commission's 'lurking disaster'.

As the Council administration itself argued there were some persuasive reasons for the delays, and widespread failure to fulfill the housing contracts. In particular the City Engineer stated in 1942 that 'the delay is solely due to the difficulties of labour and supplies brought about by war time conditions', including lack of skilled labour, a general shortage of cement, bricks, asbestos roofing, hardware, sanitary, and fencing materials, all subject to restrictive supply controls, and part of 'frozen' stocks. These, and other similar descriptions of wartime impact over the following years, had a series of significant wider implications. Costs of the entire project escalated and constrained further development, and the City Council became involved in disputes, and in 'great delays that take place with the Government Section, the National Housing and Planning Commission and various Government departments and of plans being changed and re-changed'. But the crises, and the neglect in the Location/s went wider than these particular explanations of the impact of the war, and of the 'inept' interventions of central state agencies, for the failure to 'rebuild' the Location, or 're-house' the slum inhabitants was primarily locally determined.

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91 Official estimates put the figure for the East Bank Location as 22,000 in 628 new and 137 old (inclusive of 106 one-roomed) municipal houses, and in the approximately 1846 old 'privately owned' and 'self-built' wood and iron houses in 1946.
93 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960, City Engineer Report, 19 October 1942.
94 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Ref 1960/3, Informal Meeting, 19 August 1949. The City Engineer estimated that at 1948 costs, the remaining 2,564 houses to be built would cost 1,737,860 pounds, of which the City Council still had 537,825 pounds of the 'sanctioned loan'. In addition, the 1948 estimate was based not on the 'conventional type of house', but on 'a cheaper type'.

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It had much to do with the Council's 'reluctance to spend money on the location development', manifest through the 1940s. Between 1875 and 1940 the capital expenditure of 'location finances' was 'negligible', amounting to an aggregate amount of 133 213 pounds. Between 1941 and 1944 a 'substantial' amount (of approx. 258 000 pounds from the housing loan) was spent primarily on 'rehousing', and then between 1944 and c1950 capital expenditure fell to approximately 8 000 pounds per annum. In the same period, the Council spent approximately 92 000 pounds per annum on the 'European area of town'. But it also had much to do with the re-emphasized commercial 'body of opinion' which had come to dominate the Council again by 1944 and that 'was opposed to housing the Natives on the present West and East Bank sites'.

This position was centrally tied to the fact that the 'land on which the locations stood was too valuable for Natives to live on', and more widely to a 'town-planning ideology', emphasizing a spatial garrisoning of the racial city on the one hand, and the conception that the 'job' of rebuilding the Location was 'so difficult and so stupendous that no one could tackle it individually', as the Council, and Administration was expected to do, on the other. This, in turn, was linked to tensions within the Council over 'official native policy', and to restructuring within the local Administration, which relied, in this period of flux, on the older forms of control and 'neglect' through the surveillance and regulation of 'native' bodies, and the Location/s as 'removable' in a denial that they belonged in the city at all. Instead, East London's 'natives' were seen to have a relationship to the reserves and social difference was reproduced in these spatial terms. A new location, built out of the city would enable a correspondence between 'residents', and 'the local needs of labour' on a much more 'tightly controlled and populated basis', and thus an identity between 'native bodies', and the quantity of 'unskilled native labour' established. This re-emphasis on Stallardist principles not only denied the differing conceptions already patterning the earlier interventions of the decade but essentially heightened repression and policing, while withdrawing the Council from responsibility in the Location/s in all but the need to prevent 'unhealthy bodies' as cheaply as possible.

96 BCI, Box 32, Correspondence between Latimer and BCI, 22 May 1944; Daily Dispatch, 23 September 1944, with the election of Logan as Mayor.
97 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 877, and 878, Ref 1960, Native Affairs Committee Minutes, 1 March 1945; BCI, Box 32, Correspondence, Latimer and Fox, 23 June 1944 and attached correspondence.
themselves bundled together; the university student, the teacher, the parson, and the clerk were all inextricably mixed up with people who had no notion of the elementary requirements of hygiene or civilized usage in regard to public decorum or decency. Not only 'homologized' in terms of housing and locality, but also in the uniform policies of the administration and police, in their daily blanket of 'third degree' persecution irrespective of 'standing or civilization', the pervasive regularity of surveillance intervention further refused Location differentiation. The degree of these levels of intervention, across at least 25 passes and permits, made the practice inescapable, and served to not only criminalize individuals, but the entire Location population, emphasizing their vulnerability, inferior status, and racially and repetitively temporary dependence. This prompted the description in 1947 that 'relations between location police and township residents are explosive. It needs one little spark of leadership. ... These incidents are a festering sore and are the roots of the deep hatred of the police'. And the white police officers, the pick-up van, and the native constable symbolized the Location administration, the NAD, and the municipality as far as residents were concerned. There was, according to even the ICU, not a 'ghost of a chance ... that any location resident would be confused' by such an inter-classification.

The 'interested lay organizations' by the late 1940s, outlining 'the cause of widespread dissatisfaction with the Administration in the minds of responsible Africans', were in little doubt that the 'present Municipal policy and administration was responsible for the tension existing between Africans and the authorities'. The extensive list of problems and terms of reference for a 'full commission of enquiry into the administration of the native locations within the East London Municipal Area' that was proposed, included an investigation into the economic and financial management of the native revenue account and

Reports of the MOH, 18 January 1950, and of Location Superintendent 8 February 1950. See also BCI, Box 25, Files J1, and W1.

101 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, C. Kadalie to Welsh Commission, August 1949.
103 CA, 3/ELN, Box 938, and 1170, ICU statement on Location Administration, August 1947.
104 These principally included the East London Joint Council of Europeans and Africans, the SAIRR, the National Council of Women, the EL Branch of the SA Medical Association, and the Rotary Organization, but arguably would also include the Advisory Boards, the Vigilance Association, and the ICU, and the local Communist Party, even if membership of the latter was much more a case of 'commitment, courage and character', as C. Bundy usefully reminds in his review of 'Bunting and Banner', Southern African Review of Books, 5, 6, 28, November/December 1993.
105 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Correspondence from the SAIRR to the Council, suggesting terms of reference for a Commission of Enquiry, initially proposed on 28 October, and then on the 10 November 1947, in a eight page Memorandum, and finally receiving 'deputation' in May/June 1948.
whether it had been ‘applied ... and administered in the best interests of the location’, the ‘administration of
the Registration office under the Service Contract system, the application ‘by the Municipality of the Urban
Areas Act and the Location Regulations’, the ‘correctness or otherwise of the Council’s Native Policy in the
light of the industrial and other developments of East London’ and the ‘policing of the locations’.106 Three
wider concerns are highlighted out of this representation, culminating in the Welsh Commission, and a
fundamental, if continuously contradictory, shift in elected Council structure and in ‘native administration’
and ‘native policy’ beginning in 1948. Firstly, the nature of the administration, municipality, and Council, its
‘native policy’, and its links to industrial and other developments; secondly the role and nature of the
‘liberal voice’ and its ‘lay organization’ within the Location/s, as well as its capacity to talk for, intervene,
and shape ‘future policy in Native Administration to harmonize with possible future developments’;
especially on behalf of ‘responsible Africans’; and thirdly the clues, myths, and differing maps of meaning
‘held’ within the Location/s, including, but also beyond those cast as ‘responsible’.

The Manager of Native Administration, ably guided and influenced by the ‘ostrich council’, or as the ICU
suggested the ‘Small Bad Municipal Government’, and its conservatism, as has already been suggested,
became the ‘pole’ around which ‘native administration’ and the Location/s were ruled during the 1940s.
And Cook remained this small, bad Council’s ‘obedient servant’ in this rule. While nominally ‘joint
management’ (with Public Health, the Native Affairs Committee, the Police Native Commission and the
City Engineer) existed, in actuality the Manager ruled a so-called ‘water-tight administration’ from the
vantage point of his desk. This ‘water-tight’ administration and procedure rested on the ‘rational
justification for the continuation and entrenchment of a system which completely separates the control of
all matters concerning the African members of our community from that of the rest of the population’.107
In turn, this rested on the policing of that control to ensure its implementation and ‘reproduction of
difference on the one hand, and its bureaucratization and inefficiency from ‘behind the desk’ on the other.
Under Cook, ‘Native Administration’ became one of ‘inspection’, with his role the supervision of these
inspections through his agents, including the MOH and his Assistant and Department, and the Police, while
simultaneously allocating Location ‘supervisory’ responsibility to these departments. As is clear from the

106 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Deputation to Council, 28 October 1947.
107 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, MOH Reports, August 1949, and 18 January 1950.
municipal records, inefficiency, opposition, random and arbitrary procedures and practices became regular and commonplace.\textsuperscript{108}

In particular, the system of registration of service contracts and permits to seek work, and the operation of the Registration and Location Administration Office, which was the Managers 'key office', was inefficient, callous and bureaucratic, and its officials paternal, corrupt, and uncaring by turn.\textsuperscript{109} The 'liberal' deputation thus noted that 'serious complaints have been made concerning the present system whereby permits to seek work are issued' while, similarly, 'complaints have repeatedly been made ... of the manner in which available new sub-economic houses are allocated and permits to seek work and service contracts are issued by reason of the fact that there would appear to be no definite and clear system'. Memories of this 'administration' suggested it depended on 'how you looked', and whether the official 'liked your face'.\textsuperscript{110} In addition, the Location Administration Office, was 'overstaffed during the day when Africans are at work, but understaffed in the evenings which is the only opportunity they have attending'.\textsuperscript{111}

In this context, from the mid-1940s, the NA Manager had enlisted the District Commandant of Police and the Native Commissioner and their staff to 'facilitate the screening process', and to enforce the provisions of Section 10 and Section 29 of the Urban Areas Act. Again, while not comprehensively implemented, as demonstrated within the Welsh Commission proposals, which suggest the necessary extension of these relations, their 'help' significantly politicized and 'unified' the cross-intersection between policing and native administration. That they both, in differing, and in co-joined ways, were haphazard and inconsistent, but also harsh and indiscriminate, made the 'Location Native Administration' into 'a weapon of discrimination', enforcing, as much through the Location itself, as through the police and the pass, segregation, separation, and difference - a racial and spatial temporality.

\textsuperscript{108} See CA, 3/ELN, Box 1073-1075, 1351, 918, which all contain elements of this process, but especially Box 1240, evidence to Welsh Commission, 13 and 14 July 1949.

\textsuperscript{109} CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1073-1075, containing complaints and concerns in the running of the Office, Correspondence, 30 March 1943, and attached correspondence. This really only begins in 1940, and never runs at all efficiently or comprehensively for the entire decade. Indeed, by c1950 the Welsh Commission noted these failures with alarm.

\textsuperscript{110} Interview, I. Nkonza, 18 January 1989.

\textsuperscript{111} CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Memorandum on Native Administration submitted by 'Concerned' Deputation, 28 October 1947.
In fact, far from being dependent on 'ubiquitous policing', influx, pass and permit controls were instead possible, despite their haphazard implementation, because of this simultaneity of spatial and racial discrimination. What was enforced, then, was 'a feeling of bitterness towards the Police and the Administration generally ... rising African antagonism towards European administration to dangerous limits in the location'. At its root, these policies sought to sustain migrancy and the temporary status of the Location/s, and in the assertion and refusal that 'the African population is to be considered as part of the City and to be handled by the same administration and in the same manner', undercut the 'manner of pass laws and labour registration' or their necessary re-examination. Overall, 'native administration' was 'extremely defective', together with the 'need for a greater degree of toleration and sympathy in the conduct of the Administration'.

As early as 1937, it was noted by the Thornton Commission that '... staffing appears more than adequate, but is engaged almost entirely on clerical work and little or no notice is taken of actual location conditions'. Cook's appointment had been envisaged as 'addressing' this as a manager with a 'firm hand'. In effect, though, the NA under Cook extended 'bureaucratic control' (as Bettison called it) in the form of 'native' population surveillance, and in what was described as the 'endless writing of reports', inter-departmental correspondence, financial estimates, location plans, and Registration Office 'management', while the personal supervision of matters in the location, and the paternal tradition of Lloyd declined. Cook himself described his job in the following 'office duties' terms as comprising 'interviews, both with Europeans and Non-Europeans, of which there are some 200-300 per month - Preparation of Reports - Attending to correspondence with other Local Authorities and frequently conveying representatives of other municipalities or Government officials over the Locations - Attending meetings - Consultations with other municipal departments, The Native Commissioner and other Government officials, Etc.'

Increasingly then, as the Location/s became an arena to 'look over', 'Mr Cook [was hardly ever seen in the Location', and as a result his 'authoritative contact with the Native people' was not brought about in a

112 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1074; and 1240, MOH Report, August 1949.
113 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, MOH Report, 18 January 1950.
115 BCI, Box 25, Thornton Commission Evidence, 1937.
116 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Native Administration Department Report, 8 February 1950.
sphere where 'the personal influence of the administrator is paramount'. This failure extended to the lack of 'frequent contact and discussion between heads of municipal departments', especially Public Health, and the Native Affairs Committee of the Council. While the Joint Council argued it would be 'grossly unfair to pick out any Municipal or SA police officials to be scapegoats' the Location Advisory Board was far less cautious and 'correct', calling for Cook's dismissal in 1947. They argued that the Location, and the Council needed to 'dispense with his services', and that they had 'no confidence' in his management. Cook's position was closely allied to that of the City Council, which had continuously made 'changes in the policy pursued', and of the 'control of Native Administration', which, for the 1940s meant that it did not 'lend itself to the continued and unflagging effort necessary to remedy the evils at present evident at the East Bank Location'. But neither did it wish to!

But there were also two particular complaints about the 'manner in which Native Locations and the affairs of the Locations in general are being administered'. These involved the issues of demolition and compensation in the old parts of the location, and the control of 'additions' to self-built housing, also through demolition. The details of each of these municipal processes are lengthy and inter-connected, and need not be repeated in detail here. As has been suggested, the 'ban on additions' was passed in anticipation of future demolition of the East Bank shackyards. However, when the Council attempted to 'begin demolition', it drew on Section 18 of the Amendment Act, No. 25 of 1930, which empowered the Council to pay 'demolition value' (that of the materials after the dwelling had been pulled down), and to provide alternative accommodation on a site. The decision to pursue this legislative course opened a 'prolonged disagreement' with the Native Affairs Department, which argued for its 'standing value less the value of its usable materials' and a series of incurred costs from transportation to inconvenience. The Council considered this as 'founded more upon benevolent than equitable considerations', and proceeded with its own demolition and compensation scheme, despite the intervention of the Secretary for Native

117 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Welsh Commission Evidence, 13 July 1949; see also Box 1074, Report of Native Affairs Committee, 5 September 1949.
121 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Memorandum from Deputation, 28 October 1947.
Affairs. This resulted in the important ‘Njoli Case’, in which the magistrate ruled against the Council, stated they could only proceed ‘in pursuance of Section 3 of the Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945’, and argued:

[I]t is interesting to note that the general attitude of the Native owners has at all times been identical to that of the Secretary for Native Affairs, and it would seem that only the obstinate refusal of the Council to pay the slightest heed to any viewpoint but its own and its fixed determination to adhere to unilateral action in carrying out this undertaking has caused the widespread dissatisfaction now evident ... the attempt to perform that service [of demolition and reconstruction] using the machinery provided by Section 18 is merely a subterfuge to evade its responsibilities as to compensation.122

The demolition of ‘additions’ also involved a resident and a particular case, this time acquiring the title of ‘Madikane’s House’, and a ‘claim for damages’, which ended, after extensive disagreements in the lifting of the Council ban on shackyard ‘extensions to homes’. At this point, though, the Council had effectively resolved to ‘seek ways of building an entirely new location’.123

The point, however, is that both of these ‘cases’, apart from becoming representative of a Municipal mythology explanatory of its inability to demolish, afford and ‘rebuild’ the Location/s during and after these legal and departmental interventions and implications, expose much more the ‘evil intent’124 of the Council. While I do not wish to create a ‘manichean allegory’125 for the Council’s structuring of Location relations in East London as simply in essence, colonial in explanatory determination, these cases did highlight its racially manipulative, reactive, and its racially uncaring and ‘bad faith distrustworthiness’ in a visibly public manner. The ‘Njoli Case’ also served as a marker in a more deeply structured Council ‘native policy’ position ‘outside’ of the more ‘liberal’ Native Affairs Department. In addition, they both demonstrated, especially for Location residents, the nature of ‘native administration’, and the Council, as one ‘unresponsive to African opinion’, and that there was no ‘consultation whatsoever’, nevermind on those ‘many instances ... [when] ... important changes in the administration’ took place.126

122 CA, 3/ELN, Box 880, the ‘Njoli Case’ (Rex vs. Nosizwe Njoli) Material, and Judgement, 11 May 1946, and attached correspondence.

123 CA, 3/ELN, Box 881, containing details and Correspondence over the ‘Madikane House’ Affair, 23 April 1945 and attached correspondence.

124 CA, 3/ELN, Box 880, the Njoli Case, paraphrasing Todd, the magistrate in the case.


126 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, and Boxes 933-938, Advisory Board Minutes, for example, repeatedly in the mid-1940s emphasized this distance, and racially exclusive and interventionist state.
Contrary to existing interpretations implying municipal intervention as part of an implicit, albeit racially and colonially segregated modernity, the East London Council was much more interested in gaining knowledge for necessary control based on naturalizing the 'fact' that 'races ... differ so greatly from one another', and that they are at 'a stage when they have yet to master this lesson'. This entailed the need to assert, and extend the Location/s temporary status - from which the Council, and white East London were more than able to meet unskilled labour needs, but also reproduce the Location/s as extensions of the Ciskei and Transkei reserves. In this context, the Council, and 'native administration' discursively enabled and reproduced the 'mimesis of alterity', with control and intervention preventing a corresponding dislocation opposition, and crisis which would force the Location 'into sight' (and by extension into part) of the 'European'. The spatiality of the Location/s enabled this separation and difference, but so too did the materiality within them. In other words, the existing literature assumes there is a logic, or modernizing impulse behind Location and 'native' policy, towards 'civilization' and an ultimate western and individualized 'pervasive disciplinary power'. This was not so in this context of the dominant policies of the local state in East London during the 1940s. It was much more concerned with asserting and 'creating' difference, of 'looking (and doing) until it saw 'RED''

So what am I suggesting? In part that not only in terms of 'blame', but also of 'change of heart', the 1940s rather saw a dominant hardening of a localized colonial racism and a bureaucratization of this in spatial and surveillance 'native population' controls in the local state. This entailed the 'conscious neglect' of the Location/s, although this was tied to material Location/s land-values, and that the local state was 'hamstrung with contradictions' between spatial presence, control, and the consequences of refusal and

127 These comments are, of course, selective, but I would argue also representative of the more hidden meaning of 'location native policy' emanating from the dominant sectors of the local state in this period. In overall content, the conceptions of race developed in this period became much more essentialized on a 'natural, and factual difference, while tending to deny the possibilities of achieving civilization', and thus of reproducing a conception that relied less on the possibilities of 'stages' (primitive to civilized), and more that of permanence as tribal. In other words, Location policy relied on previous colonial constructions of race, but tended to refuse the possibility of their change. For brief expositions on 'native policy' CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, and 877 and 878, but this is much more a 'reading' of the archive as a whole, and the discursive re-formulations of race occurring in this period.

128 See M. Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (New York, 1993) Taussig argues that mimesis is the 'nature that culture uses to create second nature, the faculty to copy, imitate, make models, explore difference, yield into and become Other', xiii. I am imposing a differing emphasis, arguing for the Council's attempts to enable these processes as essential and natural.

129 'Red' is used here as it was by the ICU, and later popularized by P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, as definitive of rural and 'primitive' Africans, but of course it also carries the irony as a metaphor for Location conditions and interventions. CA, 3/ELN, Box 938, Ref 1575, LAB, ICU Newsletter, 1947.

130 See P. Maylam, 'The Rise and Decline of Urban Apartheid'.

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'structural and political inability' to bear any Location financial burden. It also had much to do with the
dominance of conservative commercial interests in the Council, their economic and labour continuities and
contexts of 'whiteness', tourism, trade, and of unskilled, temporary workforces, outlined above. But central
to the explanation lies the hegemonic project of 'native location removal' from colonial East London, and of
the creation of a new spatial and structured location which would rest on more than the historical
contradictions and stark tensions of existing dominance. And to be crudely assertive, this meant
simultaneously making the Location/s 'unlivable' and therefore necessarily removable, while also creating
the foundations of the new location as naturally and 'factually' racially distinct, through the example of the
old. In real terms this meant the making and enabling of difference in the Location/s through everything
from poverty to illegitimacy, and from mangy dogs to sluit-streets.

What I've already illustrated in the context of housing, could, for the 1940s be reproduced in any aspect of
Location life in East London. In 1942 there were 6 schools with 2,283 pupils in the East Bank Location, one
of which, with 246 pupils, was a High School. In addition, of the primary schools, only one was built for
'school purposes', the remainder housed in buildings 'of wood and iron, churches or church halls, not
divided into classrooms. ... None of the Primary Schools has latrines. Only one Primary School has water
laid on. No Primary School has playing fields where organized games can be conducted'. Even if the
conservative estimation of 25 000 is taken as the 'native population' at this point, the Native Affairs
Committee estimated that 5 000 pupils would need to be accommodated if 'education was made
compulsory'. With no educational facilities added to this seven years later, the Location was described in
1949 as having one 'Recreation Hall', fitted with a stage and piano, capable of seating 400 people, a 'library'
in the basement with about 100 books, the Rubusana Recreation Ground, which had 3 football grounds
(which looked more like an old construction site, grown over, and built on a downslope) and 2 tennis
courts, maintained by the 'Bantu Sports Board', and access to a 'non-european bioscope' in the North End.

With the exception of the bioscope, all had been in existence before 1937. In fact, the Council planned to
transfer access of Rubusana Recreation Grounds to 'the use of Asiatics and Coloured people only' in the

133 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Native Administration Commission of Enquiry Questionnaire, 6 July 1949.
late 1940s. The list of 'neglect' is indeed endless, and could include the completely inadequate provision of lighting, street names, numbers and street conditions, public stand-pipes, provision of 'general dealers' or any other shops. Let me illustrate this with one more short example.

The Council had 'one native passenger bus operated by the Transport Department' in the Location/s, driven by a 'European Driver', specially selected 'for his knowledge and handling of Natives'. It opposed the employment of 'non-european drivers' on the principles of necessary segregation costs, and because of the self-answered question whether 'Non-European Driver/Conductors could control and be expected to control Native passengers in the same way that control is exercised at present by European drivers.' But it was also asserted the Location/s did not need an enlarged bus service because they were in 'sufficiently close proximity to places of work for the majority to commute on foot ... their preferable mode of travel'.

Neglect, difference and control re-asserted, time after time, and time after time in racial 'fact' of exclusion, primitivity and temporary location, in East London only to fulfill/meet 'white' labour needs.

What was much more regular were the 5.00 am raids, and the 'Steam Disinfector Station', and the Registration Office, the police cell, the court, and the pick-up van, the spot fine, the spilled beer, the location permit, and up to 24 other 'bits of surveillance'. In particular periodical 'Post Commander Inspections', the objects of which were 'to locate and destroy illicit liquor, examine Government Tax Receipts, and to examine location permits and round up unauthorized natives', and which would normally result in a combination of admission of guilt spot fines, detention, and appearance in the Native Commissioners Court were 'imposed' on the landscape of the Location/s as the form and content of Council intervention. And these raids for passes and permits were compounded by the search for lice. In the pre-dawn activities, policemen inspected the petticoats of women and on finding a louse, the entire

134 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Native Administration Commission of Enquiry Questionnaire, 6 July 1949.
135 CA, 3/ELN, Box 878, Letter from C. Turner, Transport Manager and Engineer, to the Town Clerk, 17 June 1948. It should be noted that a private bus company did operate, albeit 'hopelessly inadequately' out of the East Bank Location, running 7 buses as the East Bank Location Bus Service, but the essential point remains re the Council
136 CA, 3/ELN, Box 878, Letter from Transport Manager to Town Clerk, 17 June 1948. Of course, 'preference' was determined by cost, and by inefficiency.
137 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960:80, Minutes of Public Health and Native Affairs Committee Meetings, addressing 'Raids in Locations', as on 8 December 1942, 15 March 1943, 4 June 1943.
household was conveyed to the 'dipping tank', where heads were shaved bodies sprayed and clothing boiled.\textsuperscript{138}

In 1949, then, a member of the Joint Council reflected on conditions in the Location in the following manner:

\begin{quote}
you cannot walk in the streets without getting your boots fouled by human detritus. That is not an abnormal circumstance ... it is a normal condition. The children of the location play on these streets: they have no proper playgrounds. The women of the location nurse European children. A good deal of washing and laundry goes out to the location to be washed in foul, utterly disgusting water. These are a few of the dreadful conditions of East London locations and the tackling of the problem has been put off for more than 50 years ... If the condition is neglected much longer, East London which has sown the wind will reap the whirlwind.\textsuperscript{139}
\end{quote}

He could, as he, and the municipal and public archives reflect, have been talking of any intervening year after 1937, and of decades before this. But, if anything, in the decade of the 1940s, conditions worsened, prompting the description of the Location as 'the worst in the Union, full of filth and squallor (sic), ... they are merely hovels for beggars, and poor beggars at that'.\textsuperscript{140} while an ICU newsletter in 1947 described it as 'a public scandal'.\textsuperscript{141}

Without labouring the point, let me quote from this ICU newsletter:

\begin{quote}
'There are about THIRTY communal sanitary blocks, each with three seats for males and four for females, so that the accommodation works out roughly at the rate of about 95 persons to a single seat, or 665 persons to a single block of 7 seats [conservatively]. Every morning these lavatories are choked, so that the very floors and bath-rooms are also used as lavatories. One native sanitary porter is allocated five blocks to clean every morning, and as the mess is regularly on such a gigantic scale, the poor Native porters - in most cases - cannot complete each block in less than an hour, so that even if he starts at the dark hours of 6 a. m. he cannot complete his work until eleven o'clock by which time many people have become so embarrassed by the calls of nature that they are compelled to go to the bush around the Location. Some use tins in the house and then surreptitiously empty the contents into the streets and gutters early in the morning, while others go to Panmure Railway Station - about half a mile from many location dwellings - where a similar choking of lavatory cisterns takes place'.\textsuperscript{142}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{138} Interview, M.D., 29 November 1989; CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, 1960:1918, Acting MOH Report on Steam Disinfector Station procedures, October 1943.

\textsuperscript{139} Daily Dispatch, 9 August 1949.

\textsuperscript{140} Sam Kahn, quoted in the Daily Dispatch, 24 July 1952.

\textsuperscript{141} CA, 3/ELN, Box 938, Ref 1575 LAB, ICU Newsletter, 16 September 1947.

\textsuperscript{142} CA, 3/ELN, Box 938, Ref 1575 LAB, ICU Newsletter, 16 September 1947.
While the Council had investigated, planned, and costed the building of further sanitation blocks, to add to those existent from the 1920s and in such 'shocking state' as to be a 'terrible situation indeed', by the early 1940s the Council had decided this was too costly, and, in the light of rebuilding, unnecessary. Even on the matter of doors for the 'communal lavatories', the Manager of Native Administration argued in 1942, and again in late 1943 that 'whilst the provision of doors to the compartments in the communal lavatories would be highly desirable in order to afford privacy to persons using them, the expenditure involved would be very considerable, and possibly not warranted in view of the fact that all new houses will have their own lavatories in future'. By 1948 the condition of the 'sanitary blocks' was unchanged, and they still did not even have doors. In effect, as the MOH noted, 'the policy in the past of regarding the provision of sanitation for Natives as of secondary consideration has had lamentable results and has created a reaction amongst the Natives ... This is hardly to be wondered at when one considers the state they are often in through over-use'. At the same time, while the Council could not 'see itself fit' to provide lavatory doors, let alone adequate 'sanitary blocks', the Council approved the construction of a 'new Disinfecting Station ... in the vicinity of the East Bank Location'. The problem was that the existing 'Steam Disinfector Station' was situated at North End and the 'delousing of persons, usually Natives (the exception was actual infectious cases amongst 'the Europeans', totalling 'not more than a dozen in the entire operation of the station') and disinfection of their personal effects' was complicated by the distance. The acting MOH argued it thus:

[1]he major proportion of the work performed is in connection with the Native population and it follows that the most desirable situation for the building would be near the Location. Besides simplifying the handling of persons, a saving in transport would be effected. At present the van has to travel the relatively long distance between North End and the Location.

This moment, I think, summarizes, as others could, the nature of the Council's attitude, and intervention in 'health', prepared to build structures and symbols of control, and of discipline and surveillance, which were nominally 'preventive of infectious diseases like Typhus', while refusing to address even the smallest aspects of existing sanitary conditions. Health, then, like other aspects of the Location, was a matter of indiscriminate policing of 'native bodies', routinely and publicly inspected, transported in a 'pick-up van',

143 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960, Public Health Meeting, 13 October 1942.
dipped, shaved, and marked, not even as 'infected individuals', but because of and re-affirmed as 'subject natives'.

The concerns of 'sanitation proper' (a MOH term), though, not only included the sanitary blocks, gutters and streets, and uncleared refuse, as the MOH emphasized, but more widely the 'burden of ill-health brought about by the existing slum environment'. Pulmonary tuberculosis death rates per 100 000 were 48 for 'europeans', and 880 for 'non-european' in 1947/48, in comparison to the 1938/39 figures of 30, and 580 respectively. Sinclair-Smith stated 'actually this can be considered an epidemic of tuberculosis ... with the highest rate in the Union'. More dramatic, however, is the statistic of 'Native infantile mortality'. In 1942 it stood at the appalling 675 per 1,000. Although it declines thereafter, falling to approximately 550 per 1,000 until 1945/46, and dropping to 350 per 1,000 by 1947/48, by the end of the decade, still one in every third child 'born' in the Location/s died, (with a mortality rate still over 300 per 1,000 by c1950). The unreliability of the statistics, coupled with MOH archival sources suggest, in addition, that these were not inflated, but 'extremely conservative' estimates. And to treat these 'ills' through the entire decade of the 1940s, Location residents had access to the Location clinic/s, and to 50 beds in the 'Isolation Hospital' controlled by the MOH, and 126 beds at the white Frere Hospital, whose occupancy was determined according to 'severity'. As a result, in 1943, as just one select example, the Assistant MOH argued that 'patients suffering from septic wounds, bronchitis, and other chest complications, malnutrition, eye diseases and similar potentially serious maladies should be treated in hospital and not merely return home with a bottle of medicine. ... [while] confinements requiring supervision for delayed progress or needing moderate instrumental interference, normal labours or urgent cases demanding immediate attention, especially at night, ... [cannot] ... be treated ... it is grievous to consider complicated child-birth occurring in an overcrowded room in an eight or ten-roomed slum'.

149 The statistics of birth and death rates in East London are problematic, (as they would be elsewhere in SA) because of a series of practices and relations connected to patterns and forms of age, gender and migrancy, rurally-connected birth practices, differing forms of 'western' and 'traditional' health care systems, and avoidance of registration and notification, many of which the MOH was aware of. In particular Dr P W Laidler outlined some of these issues in Annual Reports, ELM, File 80/20, 1930-1945.
150 ELM, File 80/20, MOH Annual Reports, 1943-1947. See also D. Bettison, 'A Socio-Economic Study of East London', 57, effectively quoting from the MOH Reports and correspondence for this period.
The Council, however, continually reasoned this 'undesirable state of affairs' to the 'illegitimacy factor' as the MOH called it, and thus, in his and the Council's logic of acceptance, to young girls, 'concubines', and the break-up of 'traditional social sanctions on immoral behaviour' as the major determinants of infant mortality in the Location/s. This, in turn, was apparently equally 'scientifically' demonstrable through the high incidence and high comparative prevalence of 'venereal disease' for an 'average town of the size', as well as through the infant mortality rates themselves. And these 'scientific explanations', linked to moral and cultural one's of difference and breakdown rapidly became part of an explanation that cohered 'family' and 'health' discourses to that of the need for a 'location community' in 'proper environmental surroundings'. This local discourse of a 'socio-medical system' as the 'root' of disease/ill-health explanation, and resolution for the East London Locations developed in the 1940s, and as a counter to the official Council policy position. It drew explicitly on the Thornton Commission, but also on the failures of what was described as the 'curative efforts of the Department which the Council encouraged ... to deal with the large numbers of patients presenting themselves' which were essentially 'transient and palliative'. Curative measures, he continued elsewhere, 'can render a person disease free but there is bound to be a relapse into ill-health in the vast majority of cases on return to their former conditions'. They could only be made 'permanent' with 'rehousing', 'improved living conditions', and the 'raising' of the 'general environmental standards'. But the 'concrete suggestions for increasing the medical services of which the inhabitants of the Locations are urgently in need', did not receive its wider 'permanence' in rebuilding, or even come close to the 'comprehensive nature required' in its Council implementation of increased medical services' by the late 1940s. This pitted the Health Department, and the Public Health and Native Affairs Committee against the 'ostrich council', dominated by commerce's city fathers.

While the Medical Officers of Health from the late 1920s had also emphasized the lack of facilities, and the nature of location life in denying maintenance of 'any sort of health in crowded urban conditions', this side of the explanation was both hesitant and intermittent through the 1930s. And any thought of expense, or investment on 'health', remained secondary to and initially resolvable through 'rebuilding'. The increased

152 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960, Joint Public Health and Native Affairs, 21 October 1943.
154 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960, MOH Report, October 1943.
scope of health matters, emphasized through the formation of the Council Public Health and Native Affairs Committee, and the impact, albeit delayed, of the Thornton Commission, however, together with deputations from the National Council of Women, the Joint Council, and notably the Medical Association in 1942, led to the drawing up of a 'report on adequate facilities for giving the necessary medical services to the inhabitants of the Locations' at the end of 1943. From this point, sanitation, and the 'health of the Location' became, (after the re-housing/ rebuilding Council withdrawal in 1944) the represented 'primary concern', as well as becoming the central, and indeed, the only form of significant 'positive' material intervention in the Location/s by the Council for the rest of the decade. But it also meant that improvements were only 'effected' from 1944, and despite extensive proposals for capital expenditure on hospital, clinic, and sanitary provisions, Council agreed 'reform' centred on improved particularly 'european' staffing, 'clinics', training and to 'maintain the Dispensary [and the clinic] open all morning for treatment of cases'. During, and especially after the war, a 'considerable' increase in staff and 'curative expenditure' was noticeable through the Public Health Department, and a second full-time medical officer was appointed at the Location Clinic in 1947. But there was still no hospital, no doctors, few 'home visits', no maternity care, inadequate nurses and health assistants, no 'follow ups', and the Location/s remained as unsanitary and unhealthy as ever. By 1949, the Chief Health Inspector, commenting on the Welsh Report proposals, and looking back at the provision of health services in the Location/s, argued that 'regimes have their periods, and false economy [of health services] has had its day in the locations.'

But the continuities of the Council's neglect in health provision and its material 'non'-intervention through the 1940s did not hold-off significant change in intent, desirability and pressure within internally differentiated 'camps' emergent and long-standing within the Council, and an increasingly fragmented local administration. If 'false economy' had 'had its day' in health and in other 'necessary requirements' in the Location/s by the end of the decade, the period of the 1940s simultaneously provided the basis for these recognitions. This involved a number of shifts, both complex and fragmentary within official administrative practises, and more widely across local spaces of representation and activity outside of the Council. By

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155 CA, 3/ELN, Box 880, MOH Report, June 1944.
1947/48, the officially acknowledged, and shaping visibility of 'health' which was significantly extended through the Welsh Commission, made the Public Health Department increasingly representative of a differing interpretation of Location space and 'its' spatial and social relations. This entailed that the MOH and his assistant (and Department) not only had 'the most comprehensive knowledge of Location life' by this time, but also the most comprehensive and focussed series of answers 'looking to the future'. The form, and content of the Welsh Commission reflected this, and by 1948/49, the 'policies of the health department' were effectively positioned to change Council, as well as Location administrative policy. In turn, though, this discursive position emerged out of a number of conflicts through the 1940s, which was critical in a number of ways for class formation, and for industrialization. In order to detail this, let me take us back to the beginning of the 1940s, and the emergence of East London's 'liberal intervention'.

Emerging out of the Thornton Commission and recommendations, influenced by the contexts provided above, and reliant on a small number of 'dedicated europeans', by the early 1940s a number of 'liberal lay organizations' had either revived or been locally formed. Primarily concerned with 'conditions in, ... and the welfare of the inhabitants of East London's Native Locations' these included the SAIRR, the Joint Council, the National Council of Women, the East London Branch of the SA Medical Association, as well as the East London Rotary Club, and a range of smaller charity and church groups like the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Boys Club, and included individuals like Wollheim, Steer, Fuller, Smyth, Welsh, Taylor, Evans, Razzell, Moeldwyn-Hughes and a few others (amongst whom I would also tentatively include Muller and Behr from the local Communist Party).

Nominally, they were all 'welfare organizations', and in differing ways provided a range of welfare services, facilities, and structures, including 'soup kitchens', 'food parcels', 'medical help', 'infant clinics', 'recreational facilities', children's 'clubs', and a host of talks, charity shows, 'bioscopes' and advice forums. In addition, assistance was provided in the 'finding of a job', in legal and location regulations advice, in attempting to raise funds and provide facilities and buildings, and as a series of forums through which pressure was mobilized against various departments and policies of the Council. Often, these

159 See numerous references in the Daily Dispatch in this period, especially 23 March 1947, 13 October 1948, 2 February 1949, 6 October 1949; and CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 877-881, 1240, 918, 1150-1156, 1353, 1073-1075, amongst others.
organizations and associations worked in close alliance with each other; membership, and office holders were often found on the boards or committees of more than one of the ‘organizations’ concurrently, and consultation, agreement and joint actions framed this grouping in East London in this period.\footnote{160} Equally significantly, the intersections of organizational expression had a social and cultural parallel of collective identity - as ‘liberal’ - in many important and self-conscious respects of participation and intervention.\footnote{161} As a result, two aspects of their relationship to the Location/s, and to the Council and ‘white’ East London became central. On the one hand, they became the self-proclaimed ‘legitimate’ voice for the Location/s, and on the other, the voice of opposition to the Council and ‘native administration’. This meant that the initial welfare and advisory roles were transformed into political, planning, and reformist interventionist one’s, acquiring a publicity and power that simultaneously relied on a mythologized Location base, and within institutions explicitly outside of their respective ambits of operation and shaping capacity. At the same time, their proposals, plans, and reforms, as well as their individual activities and Location welfare structures became models and proposals of possibility and Council and ‘departmental’ contestation.\footnote{162}

Two important moments, the 1942 Joint Council ‘Plan of Reform for the East London Urban Locations’, and the 1947 ‘Memorandum Submitted to His Worship The Mayor of East London in Connection with Location Administration ...’ by the Deputation of ‘Duly Appointed Representatives’ of the Joint Council, SAIRR, NCW, and the ELMA, and culminating in the Welsh Commission of October 1949 were significant in formalizing, and entrenching this liberal discourse in official and authoritative formation. The first (1942) saw its uneven extension into the Public Health Department, and the Public Health and Native Affairs Committee, and the second (1947-1950) equally unevenly into the Council, and ‘Native Administration’

\footnote{160}{\textit{Daily Dispatch}, 13 October 1948, 2 February 1949; CA, 3/ELN, Box 1150-1156, Correspondence, Location: General, 1947-1955.}

\footnote{161}{CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1150-1156, Correspondence, Location: General, 1947-1956; also Interviews, R.S., 12 December 1990, and A.L., 2 January 1990, and R.D., 15 June 1987. There were, as might be expected, many differences, implicit, and explicit, between individuals, and organizations, cutting across gender, age, and generational concerns, and arena’s of activity, welfare and organization in the Location/s, as well as in their wider social and cultural networks and relations. A liberal discourse, and practice, simultaneously enabled, and contained these tensions into a remarkably coherent ‘framework’ and series of ‘joint’ or collective terrains of participation and intervention.}

\footnote{162}{See especially, the extraordinary influence the 1942 and 1947 Reform Plans had on Council debate and discussion and division, NAD and other ‘national’ state interventions, on Council elections, and the emergence of the ‘workers Council’ in 1948, as well the resonances within the Torch Commando and UDF, and also in the acceptance of the Welsh Commission. I however do not wish to suggest it was the only reason - clearly struggles within the Location/s, and the crises therein remain central to any explanation, as do other explanations highlighted above.}
Department more generally. While there are a number of proposals and critical elements contained within this self-represented ‘liberal’ discursive formation, I want to concentrate on those central one's of 'internal coherence', and suggest important areas of continuity, but also of difference.

These 'liberal' organizations, and interventions highlighted the problems within the Native Administration, its lack of 'consultation', and of 'tolerance, sympathy and understanding'. Together with these criticisms, and that of the financial state and management of the Native Revenue Account, the 1947 Deputation had concluded that 'native policy' was not 'applied in the interests of the Locations or its residents'. This, they argued, was part of a wider 'incorrectness' of the Council's Native Policy 'in the light of the industrial and other developments' and the need for 'future policy in Native Administration to harmonize with possible future developments'. Underlying this critique, was the assumption that this future policy was explicitly, in formulation, and in 'necessary implementation', contained and provided by the liberal reform plans.

At one level, this meant the need for more thorough and comprehensive Council structures in, and for the Location/s, inclusive of a General Advisory Committee, an Advisory Housing Committee, a Location Grounds Committee, a Location Social Committee, a Housing Manager, Gardening Officers, and additional Health officials, as well as librarians, social workers and sports organizers. At a higher 'coordinating' level, these committee's and officials would be part of a 'joint management' structure, which would include the Manager of Native Administration, the MOH, as well as Council and 'Lay' representation. Running parallel to this was the necessity for significant material intervention, from the basic premise of rebuilding and housing, to the wider concern with reconstruction, under a Reconstruction Manager, inclusive of health and medical, recreational, social, and economic trading and commercial undertakings. At the same time, however, the planned restructuring and reform would need to include 'African opinion' and consultation.

It is here that the contradictory nature of the 'liberal' intervention begins to emerge. On the one hand, the reformist 'terms of reference' called for the implementation of a ward and headman system, which would enable

general supervision ... of the behaviour of his people, to warn and later to report persons guilty of continued drunkenness, to see that houses, pavements, gardens, etc are kept neat and tidy, to carry out any orders given him by the Manager of Native Administration, to make known to his people and explain the implications of any regulations, and to keep the manager generally informed of what is transpiring in his ward.165

On the other hand, it was proposed for the necessary 'gradual relinquishment of control and management of location matters to African committees, with gradually less and less supervision, so as to give Africans a civic consciousness and sense of responsibility. This must be a very gradual process which proceeds only as they show themselves ready for more responsibility.166 These visible tensions between tradition and modernity, and between control, responsibility, relinquishment and of surveillance, hierarchy and civic consciousness patterned this discourse as deeply ambiguous in terms of race, and class and gender for future 'native policy' in the City.

Let me outline some of these parameters, and anticipate some of the more significant aspects of local state intervention in the 1950s, although as I will argue, these are, in turn, re-shaped by national apartheid and local political and economic developments. The aspects of housing and 're-building' initially, and thereafter continuously looms large in the liberal elaborations. In 1943, the MOH argued to the National Health Services Commission, that:

[h]ousing needs are inseparable from the problems of industry and transport. Without the latter it is not possible to remove housing from unsuitable areas. The improvement of environment does not necessarily produce good citizens unless their mental [and material] needs are provided for. Organized excursions to see new housing have not yet produced examples of new people.167

Two elements, the need for an integrated industry, Location, and wider town-planning implementation and coherence, and the necessary possibility, and implication of creating 'new people' in mental and material capacity and needs, became central components of this new 'liberal' discourse and intervention through the 1940s.

With the exception of locality, and the 'favouring' of the existing East Bank Location site, by virtue of its already existent surveys, developments and 'rebuilding' plans, the local spatiality of the Location/s, or of

165 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960, Urban Reform Plan, 15 October 1942, 2.
166 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960, Urban Reform Plan, 15 October 1942, 4.
167 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960, MOH to City Engineer, commenting on housing developments, 15 June 1943.
segregation was not contested or challenged by the liberal intervention. The need to integrate this spatiality of social difference with the separate, but inter-connected and reliant economic, ‘white’ town, and municipal spatialities was asserted in new ways, however. In particular, industrialization, and the differing anticipated requirements of ‘factory labour’ which would be ‘native’ or ‘African’ in more self-reflexive terms, emerged out of, and shaped this liberal discourse. This required an acceptance of the permanence of an urban ‘native community’ in East London, that this ‘community’ would need to be responsible, and stable, would require ‘decent conditions of existence’, and that in crucial ways, these ‘communities’ would need to generate not just ‘new people’, but the ‘mentality’ of new workers.

Firstly, then, this entailed re-gaining acceptance for the need to ‘maintain the Location on the existing site’, to expand the Location to ‘take the population in excess of the capacity of the existing available area’ and to remove the ‘doubt of removal’.168 This was to prove a lot more difficult than at first anticipated, due in main to apartheid and Group Areas legislation, the mobilization of white Amalinda residents and the local ‘politics of resistance’ culminating in the 1952 riots. Secondly, the ‘reconstruction’ of the Location/s, and particularly the East Bank/ Duncan Village/ Duncan Bowl Location - a new name for a new era - involved the ‘most important’ re-establishment and ‘serious undertaking’ of the ‘sub-economic rehousing system for Africans’, in order to house ‘all the poor under decent conditions in reasonably healthy surroundings’.169 Thirdly this ‘rehousing system’ would entail much more than housing, but social, recreational, welfare, and a whole range of material improvements and developments, but also a ‘mental’ reconstruction. All of this could be achieved through emphasizing the principles of ‘community’s of legally recognized inhabitants of the urban area’ who must ‘each ... have a chance to lead a decent life’, through unequal but ‘harmonious cooperation’ and ‘harmony of future development’, through a ‘cultivated ... sense of responsibility ... by every inhabitant ... towards the community of which he is a member’, and the ‘regulation of contact between

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168 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, and 1240, Location Reform Plan of 1942, and the 1947 ‘Memorandum’, as well as correspondence between the liberal organizations and the Council and Manager of Native Administration. A Round Table Conference in November 1947 was also particularly important in this respect.

169 It is important to note that not only does the categorization change from that of ‘native’ to ‘African’ more often than not, but that another series of connections between ‘the poor’ as ‘natural entity’ in modern society, and between this and class and industrial labour emerged, which elaborated a connection between race, class and ‘industrial modernity’ that was economic, as opposed to previous political, or ‘cultural’ and territorial determinations. See CA, 3/ELN, of Reform Plans, Round Table Conferences, liberal correspondence, and the evidence to the Welsh Commission cited above.
persons with different ways of living and in different stages of development ... [which] ... must be adjusted to meet the situation as it exists from time to time'.

Working with this assumption of permanent residence, and that this creates the fact of community, (entailed in the Godley, Young-Barrett and Thornton Reports), this reflected the consequence of what was 'almost a truism that natural forces cannot be reversed by statute'.

Intensified 'native urbanization' in East London, and the ever-growing concentration of the 'native population' there through the 1930s and 1940s in particular, reflected the impact of 'natural phenomena', that were irreversible. The answer to this problem, it was argued with increasing regularity, lay within the need to 'transform the City into an industrial centre', and make 'native labour' an integral part of this industrialization. This 'native labour', then, was conceptualized, and its 'operative' basis envisaged, as distinctive from 'unskilled native labour'. It was this 'capacity to work in new ways', and as the new 'source of labour', while maintaining a racial functional and 'factual' position already established for 'native labour' generally, which critically differentiated, but also problematized this liberal intervention. By identifying, through operative labour potential, and through example on a much narrower scale by the late 1940s, the liberal voice began to articulate a new 'native' discursive identity - one that asserted the economic and functional basis of this labour in determining and modulating 'community' and 'qualification' within the productive machinery of East London as a whole. Their place, and participation within this would be determined, on the one hand, by successful levels of local industrialization, but on the other, that this industrialization, and also 'community' and 'harmony of future development' would depend on their material, and mental reconstruction in these terms. On this basis, the Location/s would be 'internally differentiated' from those outside this functionality of positioned labour, the 'unurbanized' and the unemployed, who would be regulated, excluded, and controlled. In this liberal context, a 'worker' began to entail something fundamentally different from 'the native', but also much more ambiguously, from 'native labour', while

170 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Welsh Commission Report, 43, and extremely favourably received and welcomed as the guiding premises which implicitly informed the liberal Joint Delegation of 1947; also see Latimer Papers, letter from B A Steer to R E Stevens, 12 January 1948, and confirmed in an Interview with the latter, a local school principal in East London for many years, and a prominent local 'liberal'.


172 BCI, Box 36, contains numerous Correspondence, and Minutes of Meetings between representatives of the liberal framework, and the Chamber, over the necessary parameters of industrial strategy, planning, and integrative native labour practises, as was the case with CTM explored above. Letter from Steer, 14 July 1947, and attached correspondence.
simultaneously part of this categorization - with profoundly contradictory implications as I will suggest below. The implication though, held the possibility of differentiation of the African in the Location/s of East London not as a 'native' but as 'labour'.

One of the major tensions confronting this liberal intervention in the re-definition of class remained the extremely narrow industrial base of the City by the 1940s. In this context, linked to the crises in the 'Native Administration', growing 'urban pressure', and mounting African opposition, it was in the terrain of the Location/s that this intervention was initially, and consistently directed. One key aspect was that:

rebuilding of the location would result in much better control of the residents. The building of new houses as quickly as possible in the existing location would tend to throw out a lot of people who should not be there. Illicit liquor traffic would also be better controlled. Regional planning for industry and native housing ... would be established as mutually reinforced by balancing movement between location and reserve areas.

So labour supplies would be more effectively controlled, and balanced by the building, and 'very close watch ... kept on persons entering', and occupying new houses, which would, in themselves be built as along the lines, and as for 'the modern conception of a workman's cottage'.

Equally critically, though, this 'labour' would be stabilized, and formed through:

the conscious and determined policy to urbanize the African population on a family basis and ... [in] collaboration with other Local Authorities in the Border Area, and the Native Affairs Department in particular to co-ordinate, inter alia, the policy towards African settlement and migration in both Urban and Rural Areas (including the Ciskci Reserve). Such measures only can possibly succeed in this regard [as stronger and more fruitful controlling forces of migratory forces than those imposed by legislation].

The necessity to create this 'internal differentiation' between a stable, urbanized, and modern western and 'workmen cottage-housed' family of 'labour' as the basis of East London's 'native locations' and the 'unurbanized' and reserve based inhabitants, had the added conception that this would reinforce the

173 This draws on Adam Ashforth's analysis of the Fagan Commission in *The Politics of Official Discourse*, but there are important differences, and I hope, a context that suggests a more mutual development of ideas and argument. See however 121-125 for a stimulating and insightful argument in a highly important new work, if simultaneously somewhat thin historically, and over-emphasized 'from above'.

174 *Daily Dispatch*, 15 July 1949, and in more detail, Evidence of Steer to Welsh Commission, BCI, Box 32, 14 July 1949.

175 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, MOH Report, 18 January 1950, reflecting on the Welsh Report, but see also correspondence between the liberal organizations and the Council, Box 1150, and 1151, and in evidence to the Welsh Commission for a fundamentally similar argument.

176 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1150, Letter from Joint Council, 22 May 1949, and attached correspondence.
separation and distinction between differing standards 'presupposed by a civilized state', and between 'advanced' and 'primitive' society. But, as the reminder of the archive, of the official document, and the evidence of experience constantly affirmed, the reality of the Location/s was to be found in 'the visit to the remaining slums' in the late 1940s. The majority of the inhabitants were not 'new people', and they were not likely to be in the near future. They were migrant, unskilled, living in corrugated iron rooms and in 'families', the least common of which was western, patriarchal and nuclear.

The Welsh Commission, represented as the culmination of, and as fundamentally the 'victory' of the 'liberal' intervention, and its reformist plans and visions 177, similarly contained these ambiguities. The Welsh Commission drew heavily on the 1948 Fagan Report, but also the 1932 Native Economic Commission, and the local 1937 Thornton Report (influenced by the Godley and Young-Barrett Reports more than Stallard). As such, and considering the content and focus, the Commission represents an amalgam of contradictory official and liberal discourses of civilization and control, and of development and protection. If I can crudely reflect on the extremely rich studies of Rich, Cell and Dubow, the Commission, and the 'liberal' intervention in East London at this period, contained strands of the two distinctive segregationist traditions, and on elements of 'benevolent paternalism' (consultation and accommodation of urban elite), a more purposeful bureaucratic apparatus (of exclusion, and domination rather than collaboration as its central motif) and on scientific racism, and 'cultural adaptationism' employed synonymously for both civilization and race at various times.178 But, as in the Fagan Commission, the Welsh Commission in East London accepted the 'racially based division of the state on purely administrative grounds, without resorting to any legitimating paraphernalia such as 'civilizing mission' or 'developmental responsibility'.179 It accepted, as did the 'liberals' in East London at the time, and who had so critically shaped the Commission, the 'obvious and unassailable fact of 'racial difference' as the fundamental principle of population differentiation, ...'180 This fact of racial difference in itself, meant that

177 This can be seen in BCI, and in Municipal responses, praises, and criticisms. So, for example the Manager of Native Administration saw the Welsh Commission as 'rubber-stamping' the Joint Councils earlier Reform Plans and viewpoint', CA, 3/ELN, Box 1241, Report, 13 March 1950, and Interviews R.S., and J.T., a couple of the City Councillors of the time confirmed this. In addition, though, the language, content, and proposals and criticisms make the case most explicitly.


segregation remained within its local 'consensual orbit' (as Dubow calls it) and thus the base of political differentiation was to remain 'unreformed' and 'in place'. The irony, and contradiction within this explanation, was thus captured in the 'fact' that the liberal interpretation, and the Welsh Commission, in presenting the sufficiency of race to explain the continued need for a racially differentiated administration, thus rested on, and was the result of the prior processes of administration which constituted 'Native' as territorially, civilizationally and developmentally subordinate. How would, and could, the 'new people' desired by this liberal intervention break this contradiction of the universal and the particular, of class dreams and race realities?
CHAPTER SIX

RUNNING COUNTER TO ‘THE BROAD EVER-FORWARD SWEEP OF HISTORY’?:
THE ‘OTHERWISE UNFITNESS OF THE NATIVE LABOUR MACHINE’,
THE OWNERSHIP OF THE MEN, AND THE ‘SPASMODIC WORKPLACE OF
UNSKILL’, C1937-1947

In 1943 and 1944, the BCI, the Divisional Inspector of Labour, ‘the representatives of native labour’, and the City Council met to discuss ‘native labour’. While drawing attention to the ‘unique experiment’ underway at Consolidated Textile Mills (CTM), and the possibilities this held for the future, a more immediate series of concerns held sway in the discussions - that of migrant labour, the promotion of labour efficiency and ‘the basis for Native urban settlement’.\(^1\) On the one hand, it was argued in an ‘address’ by the President of the BCI to the last meeting, that East London had already ‘witnessed the first instalment of Native entry into urban employment’\(^2\) but continued that a considerable influx of Natives into new urban occupations is imminent ... once the war ends and the example of CTM becomes the rule – there is little doubt in my mind that the local Native is useable, and will be used for machine work, a fact supported by the Social and Economic Planning Council. These prospective urban Native workers are even now growing up in the City.\(^3\)

In the meantime the ‘need to continue the rebuilding of the Locations to create the conditions of stability and a permanent basis for Native urban settlement’ needed to be sustained, as ‘[m]achine work can not (sic) be tribal work, and it cannot be on the migrant labour system on which this city depends’. Rather it needed to be on ‘modern lines’, which entailed the provision and extension of ‘essential services and amenities’, ‘improved housing’, ‘elementary education’, and ‘stable urban families’, as well as factories of ‘mechanized production, sub-division, and job simplification’.\(^4\) The President of the BCI completed his

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\(^1\) BCI, Box 33, which contains the minutes of eight meetings held between 23 August 1942, and 6 October 1944, and attended by those mentioned above, as well as ‘the representatives of native labour’ in East London, including the ICU, the Bantu Federated Labour Council, and members of the SATLC.

\(^2\) BCI, Box 33, Minutes of Meeting, 4 July 1943. The ‘address’ of the BCI president quoting Dr F J van Biljon, the Secretary Social and Economic Planning Council, 6 December 1944. The records of the BCI contain a summary of an address given to a Conference on Native Labour organized by the Pretoria Branch of the National Council of Women, 8 and 9 September 1944, in which much of the language, and basis of argument used by the BCI president originates, and is locally applied.

\(^3\) BCI, Box 33, Presidential Address, 6 December 1944.

\(^4\) BCI, Box 33, Presidential Address, 6 December 1944.
'address' by quoting van Biljon - 'These are essential and inevitable developments. No community can in modern times run counter to the broad ever-forward sweep of history'. This 'address' was favourably received by the labour representatives, and the ever present Joint Council, as well as the 'chairman of the local Native Affairs and Public Health Committee.

On the other hand, the City Council, representative of the larger interstices of local Commerce, the Native Administrator, present as Council 'obedient servant', and the Divisional Inspector of Labour, were, not unexpectedly, less than enthusiastic. Their arguments represented the interests of the majority of 'employers of native labour', as the Wage Board Investigation of 1941-42 emphasized. They repeatedly made at prior meetings, and did so again at this one, a set of counter arguments which can be summarized into three inter-related points. Firstly, the 'local native' was a 'temporary' resident of the city, and was 'tribal in outlook and behaviour', including in the workplace. Secondly, a common assertion, was that these were essentially 'primitive men who do not think', and only possess an 'extraordinary high physical labour capacity, probably higher than that of any other human race', and for which they are 'singularly well adjusted'. In this context it was argued that 'only a negligible percentage of native men perform productive work in accordance with European standards of regularity and efficiency'. And lastly they argued that 'the place of the native remained in unskilled and manual labour, and in the 'bordering reserves', as the place of 'his development'. The job of the Council, and the Labour Inspector was to 'enforce' these requirements, and continue to 'ensure' manual labour requirements were 'sufficient and satisfactory in the city - no more'.

The tensions between these two broadly competing discourses of labour exploitation, and 'attached' parallel racial discourses of segregation were continually resolved in favour of the latter during the 1940s, although the terrain of CTM and the liberal intervention was beginning to 'practically recast this dominance' in

5 BCI, Box 33. Presidential Address, 6 December 1944.
6 CA, LIE, Divisional Inspector of Labour Files, File 11, which contains details of the Wage Board Investigation, including a number of Inspection Reports of individual companies, and representative one's for those like building, including their own representative structures such as the Master Builders Association, 10-14 October 1941.
7 BCI, Box 33, Meetings, 23 August 1942, 4 July 1943, 2 September 1943, 6 October 1944. These quotes are drawn directly from the meetings themselves, and although stated in differing contexts, times, and by differing individuals, they are of a whole and representative of the groupings present, but also of the majority of employers as the Wage Board Investigation of 1941/42 emphasizes - see CA, LIE, File 11.
important racial and class ways. I want at this point to turn to the 'regular condition Native workers daily found themselves in' as the Communist Party somewhat clumsily put it in 1943, and try to pattern the sketchy evidence of an experience of work undergoing change in a framework of ossified racial and material continuity.

But this is also somewhat misleading, although relatively accurate of Council practice by 1944, for the employers of labour had become much more 'conscious of the need to form a new attitude to unskilled native labour'. What this entailed had much less to do with the transformation of racial and skilled segmented labour markets and conditions of exploitation though, and much more to do with the attempts to 'circularise', and to systematize, regularize and formalize existing unskilled conditions of 'native labour' into frameworks of 'definition', 'determination', 'contract', and 'permanence'. In other words, the target was not 'native labour', as much as the 'tradition' of this labour's casual, mobile, and 'temporary' basis, and thus its 'uncontrolled' nature - at least in part and in those sectors where its casual basis was not 'essential for it to continue'.

This need to gain control of 'native labour' in the workplace, came, in part, from the representations of the Council, and the 'Location Superintendent', which certainly returned to haunt them by c1947-1950. In part, central state intervention, through the Wage Board was also important, as were the unions and worker organizations, and more narrowly, its organizational representatives. And, in part, it was also shaped through the local impact of the war and changing needs of a more stable productivity of labour, and through an increasingly volatile and competitive labour market which was seen as becoming permanent, and permanently unstable and disordered in fulfilling labour needs. Workers had become 'habituated' in casual and temporary work, 'never lasting for longer than a couple of months', while at the same time these

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8 BCI, Box 34, containing correspondence between the BCI and the 'Employers Associations' and Employer Organizations, as well as individual employers over unskilled labour, connected to the Wage Board Investigation of 1941/42, 6 October 1941, and attached correspondence, but also through the 1940s as a whole.

9 CA, LIE File 11; BCI, Boxes 32-35; and Individual Company Archives, often sketchy, but sometimes useful, consulted in December/January 1986/87, and December/January 1987/88; Interviews in the same period, also contained a common narrative of intensified control and management of unskilled labour which occurred during the war - in the 1940s. Contrary to popular conceptions, then, much of the evidence suggested the war was not such a good time for 'native labour', despite an extension of trade unions. They, in fact, were part of this formalization, and extension of control at the place of work, which extended from wages to hours of work.

10 BCI, Boxes 32-35, Correspondence, and Chamber Reports for the period of the 1940s; CA, LIE, File 11, Wage Board Report, 1941/42, Interviews and Company Archives, December-January 1986/7.
workers were increasingly perceived and represented as urban and part of a 'permanent state of affairs' in the Location/s of the City.\textsuperscript{11}

The 1941/42 Wage Board Investigation and Report on Unskilled Labour in East London, and its impact on employers more widely, was a crucial document in condensing many of these part-ed aspects for the local history of 'native labour'. It affected at least 4,367 workers in 'different trades', ranging from brick and tiles, canvas, engineering, milling, printing and stevedoring, to woolwashing, building and the municipality; and at least 120 employers in these sectors and 'trades'.\textsuperscript{12} It recommended an increase in wages to 26/6d per week, and two weeks annual leave, public holidays, and 12 days sick leave per annum. The increase of this proposed minimum over the existing average wage was 3/11d per week, or 17.3 per cent, and when taken with holiday and sick leave, an increase of 30 per cent on existing wages. The Report estimated that the number of employees benefitting from this increase would be 93.7 per cent of the total, or 4,093 workers. Importantly, this figure excluded SAR&H, and other government unskilled and 'native labour' (approximately 1,640 workers in 1942/43), 'commercial and distributive trade' workers affected by the 1939 Determination (totalling 1,846 in commerce and finance, and 818 in hotels, boarding houses, clubs, cafes, etc, by 1945/46), and 'domestic servants' (approximately 8,000 in 1945/46). Only a minimum of these workers were considered 'skilled', well over 90 per cent classified as, and paid as unskilled and manual workers.\textsuperscript{13}

The basis of the Report, and its recommendations rested on two assumptions. The first was that East London was becoming increasingly 'dependent on permanent town dwellers for its unskilled labour supply', (while also recognizing that 'a number return periodically to the rural areas') to the extent that 'the majority of the unskilled workers, almost all being Natives, maintain their families in town and are gradually but unmistakably abandoning the customary Native standard of living and adopting that of

\textsuperscript{11} CA, Lie, File 11, Wage Board Reports and Investigation; BCI, Box 34, File CC/2, Correspondence between Neale, and BCI, 22 April 1942, and attached correspondence. There is a series of apparent contradictions here, not least of which in the connections between a series of statements that the local administration increasingly makes, especially for the late 1930s and early 1940s about the growing permanence of 'native labour', and their overwhelming attempt to recast the Location/s as temporary and removable. As I will suggest below, the connections, when linked to concerns of casual and migrant labour, and the 'dangers' of this permanence, make some 'sense', albeit ambiguously.

\textsuperscript{12} CA, Lie, File 11, Wage Board Report and Investigation, 1941/42. It needs to be pointed out that the Report is based on a 'general impression of the total number of employees, and on numbers in the different industries, as all employers did not submit returns, and were based, at times, on inaccurate and hastily compiled figures.

\textsuperscript{13} CA, LIE, File 11, Wage Board Report and Investigation; see also CA, 3/ELN, Box 1240, Welsh Commission Report, 1949/50, quoting figures derived from the Director of Census and Statistics, U.G. 51-'49., for May 1946.
Europeans'\textsuperscript{14} In this context, family housing was necessary, but 'unsatisfactory' until 1938, when the new housing scheme was introduced. The Report then made two inter-connected points - that this housing scheme was proving to be 'a great success' with its 'properly fenced in' plots, and where, in stable family conditions, 'Natives are devoting more and more time to gardening', a critical constructed index of family and western ideals; and secondly however, that the rents of 19/11d for a two roomed, and 23/3d a three roomed house per month were 'too high for the spending power of Natives', but remained a 'reasonable charge for the value received'.\textsuperscript{15} So, as opposed to dropping rents, wages needed to be increased to meet this necessary stabilizing cost of housing, and living.

The second was that, as largely 'town-dwellers' and thus dependent on wages, it was very 'clear that malnutrition still exists amongst Natives and that their income will have to be raised to enable them to purchase healthier and more food, and to obtain a more varied and better balanced diet'. In addition, the Report continued, in this context of low wages and spending power, '... married females are compelled to work to supplement the family income, thus frequently leaving the home and children without care, resulting in loitering ...'\textsuperscript{16}

The Report recognized, and was, in fact shaped, by the notion that the issues of labour were not confined within the working day, but extended to other dimensions of workers' lives. In particular, the combination of existing poverty and low wages (although not expressed as such, but as inadequate spending power, and inadequate family incomes) was connected to previous relations of migrancy and supplementary rural incomes, but which were now (the 1940s) becoming 'permanent' and materially, or even as a marginal subsistence basis, non-existent. Some form of urban and family stability needed to be given to the workforce, and wages needed to reflect this connection 'scientifically' through both costs (transport, housing, medical services, food, clothing,) and 'needs' (in particular of diet, but also 'leisure' - represented by annual leave, private and family space, patriarchy, and dress and physical appearance). The Council was doing this in the Location/s through 're-building' - the Wage Board would do it through re-shaping the

\textsuperscript{14} CA, LIE, File 11, Wage Board Report, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{15} CA, LIE, File 11, Wage Board report, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{16} CA, LIE, File 11, Wage Board Report, 7.
daily basis of the 'unskilled workplace', and through a scientific wage structure - a legal and technical set of determinations. The Report put it in the following terms

It is generally appreciated that this state of affairs (of insanitary conditions, lack of good protective foods and general poverty) is deplorable and that the first step to alleviate the position is an improvement in the earning capacity of the workers. ... an improvement in the standard of living inevitably results, in the long run, in greater efficiency and earning capacity. A higher wage, within limits, and a better standard of living are, therefore, justified, bearing in mind the existing low average level of remuneration and standard of living and therefore necessity for improvement. This principle applies particularly to the low paid unskilled worker, where the lack of sufficient healthy food reacts detrimentally on the efficiency of labour. An increase in the wage of this class will result in greater economic benefit to the community as a whole.

What this entailed was the determination of wages, based in part on costs of living, including housing, diet and consumption, and mechanisms to create a regular 'contract of employment' which would be on a weekly basis. This weekly rate would be lower than the cumulative daily one, in order to 'discourage the employment of daily workers', and 'dispense' with casual labour, except in the case of the 'true casual worker', who would be accommodated through the provision of the 'daily employee' category, and who would in 'his particularity', receive rates of pay 'higher than the weekly rate'. Thus while the Report argued that it was important to realize that 'the seasonal and casual nature of work in some trades is inevitable', it was also that this 'present[ed] a serious difficulty' for both the control of the 'influx of workers', and for the aim to de-casualize the workforce. In summary, though, the Report argued for the need to proceed with the creation of a stable, contracted, and weekly paid workforce, earning 'higher wages', and regulated through medical and annual leave periods into even longer term periods of labour. This would bring the workplace into line - it would correspond - to the municipal informed view that the 'bulk of the Natives in the location formed a stable community'. There was an equally clear, though unstated assumption - casual and daily, highly mobile and seasonal labour could not fit the re-housing project of the Council, and in the longer term would destabilize the 'stable community' of the location.

17 CA, LIE, File 11, Wage Board Report. See also the 1940 Wage Board Investigation for Port Elizabeth, (in LIE, File 11) to which the East London one refers, arguing that 'since the scope and nature of the investigation are very similar to those at Port Elizabeth, this report will accordingly be brief and for a fuller discussion of the main issues the reader is referred to the report on unskilled work, Port Elizabeth (August 1940)
Two aspects of the Report were particularly important for the longer term processes of local industrialization. The first was around the need to establish the changing parameters for the exploitation of ‘native labour’ in the 1940s and beyond this period onto the terrains of operative labour - as ‘cheap’, permanent, and ‘unlimited’. The other related to the contradictions and ‘oppositional differences’ of the Wage Board proposals against the ‘objective conditions’ formulated and widely internalized in Employer structures. These were located in representative ‘sectorial’ interests, as well as in a large number of the individual firms, and ironically, in aspects of the Council and in the Administration’s policies and public profiles.

After 1939 for commercial and distributive trade defined workers, and after 1942 for unskilled workers generally, and separately for the SAR&H workers, government policy became the major determinant of wages in East London. In doing so, wages came to be defined not just by the design of a racially defined suitability and worth in the workplaces, but also beyond the working day - in the ‘objective engineering of basic needs’ in ‘urban’ and ‘permanent’ location terms - at least in nominal and explicitly stated self-defined contexts. Practically, though, the wage determinations implemented a rather more well-worn and expected path, which primarily reflected the narrower interests of employers, and a deep-seated ‘factual’ racism. At one level the Report was forced to work with the starting premise that not all unskilled labour subjects were ‘Native’ - there were 69 European, 3 Asiatic, and 134 Coloured unskilled workers, totalling 5.6 per cent of the total. But this ‘recognition’ that unskilled labour in East London needed to be spoken of in class and occupational terms, was undercut by the overwhelming fact of race. The Report represented this fact by distinguishing between the explicit recognition of race in the ‘community’ of the Location/s and its social space, and the experience of unskilled wage labour and work as spatially and socially distinct, and definitionally patterned by local (and wider ‘national’) meanings of ‘class’. This was noticeable in its use of the language of ‘trades’, its studied refusal to apply racial categories when talking of labour and labourers (as opposed to ‘Native earning power’, Native Housing, Native diets and food, Native cost of living, and Natives generally in the Location/s, for example), and the use of skill, highly paid labour, artisan trade contracts, total labour staff, wage bills, and of employers and employees, and ‘this class’ (of unskilled labourers) more generally. Unsurprisingly, contradictions abounded.
Thus, while existing wages averaged between 15/- and 20/- per week, all 'employee' representatives argued for a minimum wage of 37/6d per week, which was still less than the family budget for five members of 2.3.5 pounds per week, submitted to the Investigation to justify these wage demands. At the same time, employers, showing a total 'lack of uniformity', submitted a range of proposals from 3/3d per day to 30/- per week, but on average, 'favoured' 24/- to 25/- per week (or 4/6d to 5/- per day). The Wage Board recommended 25/- rising to 26/6d after a year, but at the same time argued this was consistent for the creation of a better standard of living and for satisfying basic needs - that this represented a social wage, which incidentally also corresponded much more closely to the Council's cost of living estimations which the Wage Board took as 'more accurate' (as is evident in the records of the investigation, if not in the Report itself). One wonders, as did Fred Cooper for the Mombasa officials, whether McGregor, Botha, or Foley \(^{20}\) would have dreamt of living these wages and cost of living budgets themselves, but then these were not based on 'European standards', but those of 'mealie meal, beans, samp and meat twice a week', work overalls, and shackyard rents - the total 'real' cost of the social wage.\(^{21}\) What this meant was that new parameters of 'cheap labour', this time centred on a permanent and stable workforce, and on 'scientific' determinations of 'social fact' began to emerge. Simultaneously this was premised on the naturalization of race as difference, with different material needs and expectations, as reflective of all work involving black workers generally.\(^{22}\)

On the one hand, the construction of a basic social wage was dependent on the Location based and racially patterned 'lexicon of scientific wage determination', while real wage increases were dependent, and determined on the established racist 'tradition of native labour', and on employer practices of its material exploitation, availability, and interchangeability. This was reflected, for example, in the notion that the '[natives] present earning capacity does not merit a higher wage', and in the range of elements within this

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20 They are the Wage Board officials who sat on the 1942 Investigation and Report.


22 As is apparent from the BCI Records, Boxes 36-38, Correspondence with 'industrialists', and with the DIL, as well as the Location Superintendent, and with the Public Health and Native Affairs Committee for the 1942-1956 period; and Industry Reports of 1945, 1946, 1949, and 1953, in various Company Archives, December-January 1986/7, the 1942 Report, and its 'labourer' standard of living, and the Council's 'location cost of living' drawn up in 1939/40 were central documents that gave substantiation, and 'legality' to low wage practices in the 1940s. In addition, though, they also shaped wages significantly in new factories, and in operative labour practices in the 1950s, despite the new concerns and conceptions of 'semi-skilled' work against that of 'unskilled' and 'manual' labour.
constructed tradition. This meant that 'labourer wages' were determined by the implicit 'fact' of race, and thus that 'class' and skill/"unskill" was internally differentiated on the basis of racial difference in itself - and this had a corresponding material basis of difference. On the other hand there is a tangible undercurrent in the state's context of the Report, if not amongst local employers, that this unskilled, or labourer 'class' would become the source of 'industrial labour' in the secondary industrialization of the future. Whatever the case, however, the Report did contain the understanding that a 'permanent and stable community' in the 'town' was a reality, and that the need to control, manage, and improve the standard of living of this 'community' derived from the rationality of its material conditions of existence as labour. The necessity for its management and 'improvement' at a general, rather than small highly-paid level, was needed - for efficiency, stability and productivity, and for the 'greater economic [and social] benefit to the community'.

The thrust of the Report, while profoundly ambiguous and contradictory, was recognized, at least amongst liberal, and 'employee' organizations and representatives as containing the recognition of a different principle of identity - that of the worker. And once labourers attained that status through hard, stable, fit and willing work, on a regular and consistent basis, they would assume a rational and legitimate status within not just their community, but the society as a whole. Difference became one of function, and once that function became integrated and permanent as 'free' individuals, the entire basis of the particularity of segregation would be replaced by inclusion and an end to 'racial discrimination'. The emergence of elements of a universal class discourse, contained in the Wage Board Report, in the sense that 'natives' were potentially to be constituted primarily as a new source of labour-power, also contained the notion that they would be controlled as workers - because their bodies - as the source of labour-power - required it. At the same time, though, the Wage Board controlled the value of this labour-power as both welfarist - pushing up wages beyond existing employer levels, but also curtailing them within employer acceptable

23 BCI, Box 34, Correspondence Files over Wage Board Investigation, Box 36, Report of 1945; CA, LIE, File 11, Wage Board Report and Investigation. The extent to which this is a consistent, and generalized practise is reflected in the investigation, and the evidence given to the Wage Board. The consistently reproduced context was one where race, and the 'Native', and the 'invented tradition' of this labour, and not skill and 'class' patterned the workplace as 'fact'. The related stereotypes of lazy, good for nothing, and unreliable, to list a few, were discursively attached to physicality, lack of intelligence, and as constituent of 'units' 'Native' disposability and replacement.

24 CA, LIE, File 11; BCI, Box 34, Correspondence over Wage Board; Box 36, 'Industry Report', June 1944.

25 This section, and argument, draws, to an important extent on A. Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse, ch. 3, but also attempts to simultaneously develop, and localize his suggestive insights.
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boundaries. This made the state the centre, and the source of labour regulation on a racial basis of fact, identification and identity. And in practice, these racial facts became more regular, and more visible in the workplace and in the Location/s. And this had as much to do with local conditions, as the attempt to integrate the 'Native' into local urban economic life as a worker contained these wider contradictions. In this process, the 'stability' constructed in the workplaces emerged as particular, partial and uneven, and control hardened the old rather than implementing the possibility of the new.

In summary, then, the contradictions and tensions between the potential class discourse of the Wage Board, and its more typical resolution in favour of an Employer racial 'native labour' tradition and past did not leave the workplaces of East London unchanged during the 1940s. In particular, the relationships between, and in-between these workplaces and the Location/s and their 'communities', and between a constructed social wage and the material racism of actual determination, opened up new connections, and new possibilities. That they were closed down, narrowed, and reframed had much to do with the differences between local forms of knowledge and the material and social forms of local power, and between colonial and capitalist forms of domination and social organization. It was within these spaces of struggle between the workplaces, the administration, and the Location/s in East London, that the power geometry of the City began to change by the end of the 1940s.

One part of the local equation involved the local Council and municipal administration. Its continued, and after 1943/44, intensified attempt to control and ensure the correspondences between black bodies, labour needs and the temporary status of the Location/s, and the questionable source and nature of its so-called permanent, and stable basis, as well as that as a 'community' were particularly significant aspects. As I suggested in the preceding chapter, the nature of Location management and administration, connected to a Stallardist and repressively segregationist Council and its policy interventions, continued to identify the subject of urban labour control as unitized native and tribal bodies, which simultaneously provided the basis, and the justification for effecting such control and exclusion. This served to contradict the attempts to stabilize the workplace, and the premise of its permanence, and rather intensified labour mobility and circulation. And in the mid-decade abandonment of the housing-labour nexus entailed in the Thornton
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induced implementations between 1942 and 1944, the municipality had re-asserted the notions that the Location/s were 'reservoirs of Native labour', 'migrant' and temporary.

But the notions of the Location/s as 'stable communities', and as sources of unskilled worker family life and dependence, and of increasing 'European' standards of living also needs to be dissected for the extent to which it contradicted the premises for workplace stability. Migrancy is the initial route that I wish briefly to follow, to illustrate this. Two detailed 'labour histories' were carried out in East London at the end of the 1940s, one by the Public Health and Social Welfare Department, and one by the BCI 'Native Labour' sub-committee. While recognizably problematic for a number of methodological and empirical reasons, there are some useful and sustainable observations which do emerge out of these first local investigations into migrancy.

The BCI came to the self-professed 'startling' conclusion that not only did 'migration labour' dominate the local labour market, but that 'native adult males' were probably the 'least urban group in the location'. While their estimation that 'at least 70%' fell into this group, as 'seasonal, regular and casual migrants', two other groups - the 'educated', and what was referred to as the 'illegitimate group of women and children' formed what it identified as the 'permanent urban occupants of the City'. Amongst the group of migrant and casual labourers, the BCI estimated that there were '5,000 unurbanised families', while the percentage of 'urbanised families' only totalled about 1,000.

Admittedly the 1940s was a period of significant in-migration and movement to the City, even in official terms increasing from 24,388 in 1936, to 39,850 in 1951, while Reader, and the Border Regional Survey


27 CA, 3/ELN, Box 878, Ref 1960, 'African Migration Report', 15 March 1950; and BCI, Box 28, 'Report on Native Labour Migration', 28 October 1949. It is significant in itself, that in a City reliant on mobile, seasonal and migrant labour, it was only at the end of the 1940s that any systematic attempts were made to gain local knowledge of the patterns, forms, and dynamics of this migrancy. The significance of its timing in this period lies in issues of control, regulation, and power, and does correspond to a period when the local economy, and municipality were re-attempting to stabilize, and to 'universalize' black labour, and again re-build this through a housing-labour nexus in permanent semi-skilled and operative labour.

28 These are official census statistics, and include the figure of 32,656 in 1946, Seventh Census of the Population of the Union of South Africa, U.G. 51-49. While Simkins has argued that these are relatively reliable, although underenumerated by 3.8% in 1936, 7% in 1946, and 8.6% in 1951, following Sadie. He argues one needs to recognize its limitations, but not reject, or accept its statistics wholesale. The point though, is that in comparative
argued, that the population of the East London Location/s by 1955 was about 78,000, nearly double that of the 1951 census.\footnote{29} This complicated, and intensified the 'youth of the population' component in the Location/s during this period, as did the continuation of 'retirement to the country after the age of 55', making these BCI assessments little more than rough statistical guides, and the notions of family and urbanization figures essentially census-derived guesses. But the pattern of mobility and the temporary nature of male occupation in the Location/s is also sustained by Houghton and Reader, who suggest that of the African population in the City by the mid-1950s, only 12-14\% had been born in the City, while 22\% came to the City first before the war. After 1939, 22\% entered the City for the first time during the war, and 42\% came to East London first between 1946 and the mid-1950s.\footnote{30} Relatively, Houghton argued that by the mid-1950s, only 24.5\% of Native males were living in 'family status', 'with wife present', while 30.5\% were single, unmarried or widowed, and 45\% were married, but with their 'wife living elsewhere', while 80\% of all 'Native males' remitted wages to the rural areas in some form, including nearly 20\% of those living in 'family status'.\footnote{31}

Patterns of migrancy had begun to change by the late 1940s however. Periods had become longer, a typical worker described as one who had spent eight and half years 'away' (from the first migration), and of this time 60\% had been spent at work, and 40\% at 'home'. 'Home', typically for practically all East London workers was the Ciskei (60\% - including 36\% from the East London and 33\% from the King Williams Town districts therein), and from the southern Transkei (40\% - including 30\% from Kentani). The dominant age group of migrants was 25-30 years of age, and practically all had been working from the age of eighteen, while more than 50\% of workers in East London had initially gone to the Rand and worked on the mines at least once, but commonly twice, and then become regular migrants to East London. By the

\footnote{29}{D. Reader, The Black Man's Porition, 41-42. He argues that the problems of the 1951 census can be accounted for by the seasonal nature of work, the census occurring in May, a time when the population was considerably less than at other peak times, and was compounded by a particularly heavy police raid at the time of the Census. There was, he argues, a widely current view that the census was a ruse to determine the true number of registered lodgers in the Location/s for the purpose of imposing a per capita lodging tax.}

\footnote{30}{D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, 236.}

\footnote{31}{D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, 236-240.}
late 1940s, all migrants had spent at least five prolonged periods 'at home', excluding weekend, and 'short visits', which remained a regular occurrence, but patterns 'at work' had begun to become longer, averaging 6 month, as opposed to 3 month periods, as had worker-migrant life-cycles with 'the steadily increasing proportion ... in favour of the time spent working'.32 Thus wages, and more stable and permanent work had become more urgent and necessary, and the pressures of 1940s urbanization was being increasingly felt in the Registration Office and work permit queues of growing length, and in the emergence of the competitive employment 'market' of the congested factory gate.

For employers, though, the increased cost of unskilled labour imposed through the Wage Board, for some by as much as 75%, although, on average around 30%, together with the need to stabilize, and de-casualize the workplace entailed the need to, at least gain control of the working day, and wherever possible the working week. So, for the first time, employers began to establish a weekly wage contract that included information on the individuals employed, the use of lists and identity documents, and through this a system of regularization, and of performance evaluation, and exclusion emerged.33 The lists of Samson No 3568, Shortie No 1990, Jackson No 3908 on the docks, or 'Kenneth, 33, unmarried, reliable' and 'Jim - Site No 1761 - Kentani - good boy', in engineering, and steam milling records became practice after the early 1940s. From then on they increasingly included performance records, and estimations of their laziness, receptivity to discipline, surliness, physicality, and importantly their 'rawness', education, and ability to understand, and communicate in English. Companies began to establish 'blacklists' and exclusions. These were based, in part, on 'on the job' performance, but also daily, weekly, and longer term regularity, punctuality, and seasonal and migratory patterns.34 Increasingly, also, site and lodgers permits, as well as work permits began to be taken more seriously by employers, and the cases of workers being refused, or even dismissed from work for failing to produce the correct documents, or demonstrate their 'permanence' began to mount.35 Together with the far more active process of registration, the form and nature of the relationship

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33 BCI, Box 35, Company Correspondence, including engineering, food, distributive, port and stevedore companies, and even the Municipality engaged in this practice, dated 11 January 1945, 16 February 1945, 23 September 1945, 13 March 1946, and attached correspondence.

34 BCI, Box 35, Company Correspondence; also Company Archives, and Interviews, B.1-W.3, December 1986-January 1987.

35 BCI, Box 35, Company Correspondence between the Registration Office, and the BCI Secretary, 25 June 1946, provided an estimate of registrations, refusals, and 'complaints' and requests from 'native workers' between 1939
between labour and 'pass legislation' began to change, and expand into one between the workplace and job stability and the local state and its interventions. The 1945 Urban Areas Act extended these connections of not only regulating movement, migrancy and Location and Reserve spatiality, but also, ambiguously, of tying workers to their jobs and to the workplaces, and the Location/s in potentially long-term and permanently dependent ways.36

As one of the major thrusts of prior arguments has emphasized, in this period of flux and mutability, workers contested these transitions, as did many of the employers, and the workplaces became arenas of conflict - as the 'consent' of casual, seasonal, and mobility traditions of native labour came under threat. And these contestations became increasingly racial and racist. The inter-connections of the local state in the process assisted this, but in the workplaces the prior uncivilized notions of 'native labour', and of the conceptions of labour as route to civilization, became much more the accepted facts of difference, and of supervision and control. This served to harden attempted control and stabilization through intensified supervision, and regimentation of wage-labour 'productivity' levels, time-work impositions, and the daily constructions of the lazy and disciplined 'kaffir' stereotype.37

But the predominant nature of wage labour remained, through the 1940s, seasonal and 'unstable', periodically in three to six month periods, and then of 'going missing' and 'disappearing', able to re-appear elsewhere in the labour market on a continuous and manual/unskilled defined basis.38 While the Wage Board ensured initial, and thereafter marginal wage improvements, and began to de-casualize the and 1945. The figures of registration rose from 2,820 (in 1939) to 13,122 (in 1945), while the number of refusals and complaints rose from less than a 100, to 'approximately 3,000', although it is very unclear what refusals and complaints actually entailed, or signified beyond these statements.36

36 BCI, Box 35, Company Correspondence; see also CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1073-1075, Urban Areas Act Correspondence and Implementation, 1918-1950.

37 BCI, Box 35, Company Correspondence, in particular, between the Divisional Inspector of Labour, 8 September 1945, 13 May 1946, and the Native Commissioner, 22 October 1945, 13 December 1945, and 22 September 1947, reflects this in a commentary of growing complaint of what was seen as an alarming growth of 'hostility to Native labour', reflected in ever more common lodging of complaints of abuse, unfair dismissals, and 'physical attacks', to a reverse series of 'problems' and 'explanations' which had the common theme of insubordination, laziness, and 'cheek', of the 'kaffir becoming white'. Part of the explanation offered was that white supervisors were increasingly young and inexperienced and reflected the 'attitude of youth'. This, in itself, is interesting for its suggestive connection into the 'habitus' of race and difference as 'fact'.

38 CA, LIE File 11, Ref C28; and BCI Box 34, Company Reports, and Correspondence on Native Labour, 1939-1947. The Inspection Reports, and the correspondence in the BCI files reflects this commentary from firm to firm - with statements like 'sufficient but a lot of them useless', 'natives come and go', 'not very satisfactory', 'difficult to get good labourers', 'unreliable', 'requires constant supervision', 'big wastage'. Although there are also a series of comments that maintain native labour as 'satisfactory', the overall context is one of mobility, and that the 'type of labour' was 'not very good'.
workforce, by 1947/48 and the Welsh Commission, the combination of low wages, urban poverty, and the 'temporary' nature of wage labour remained the daily terrain of 'native labour'. The workforce had remained relatively homogeneous - grouped at the same end of unskilled wages (and in terms of race and ethnicity), and distinctions between these workers remained loose, ill-defined, and 'replaceable', and Location-ally similar. Despite the beginning emergence of 'a group who have reached economic standards' in CTM, and another, more permanent, and long-term 'stable group', in employment for longer than a year, and sometimes up to seven or eight years, especially in the commercial sector, and in the SAR&H, the large majority remained 'flexible' - as long as there was enough work, enough days, or months, and enough money. And in the Location/s this flexibility, and the 'internal' structuring and dynamics of its 'temporary' status reinforced the mobility and instability of 'native labour' as contradictory to European, family and settled permanence, and as a distinctively gendered process.

THE 'LOCATION' OF GENDER AND THE 'INDEPENDENCE' OF WOMEN.

As I have argued elsewhere, both separately, and with Anne Mager, the Location/s were sources of distinctive and gendered paths of urbanization, migration and occupancy. In particular, the origins, patterns, and changing basis of female migration to the City reflected a permanence and an 'independence' very different to, and often in opposition to those of male migrancy and rural and Reserve patriarchy. In the 1920s and the 1930s the East London Location/s had become known as the 'place for widows', and these 'widows', and 'deserted mothers' dominated female migration, and occupation of the Location/s, as opposed to 'married women', joining their husbands. By the 1940s, a further category, that of 'runaway girls' had also emerged, as had a much larger category of voluntary and patriarchal 'supported' migration and growing urban 'permanence'. Of central defining importance in patterning these changing dynamics was the

39 CA, LIE, File 11, Ref C28; and BCI, Box 34, Company Reports and Correspondence on Native Labour. See also 2/ELN, 2/1/2, Civil Cases, 1939-1948, which contain much material over issues of site, lodging, and 'hut' ownership, but also of the migrant, casual, and mobile nature of wage labour, and how this shaped the Location/s, and the position of women as men repetitively asserted a non-permanent basis of residence.

40 CA, 2/ELN, 2/1/2, Civil Cases, 1939-1948; BCI Box 35, Company Reports and Correspondence, Native Labour. The records reflect this context by the time of the Welsh Commission, with continued and consistent material of a generalized complaint of seasonal, mealie-planting, and periodic employment of 3-6 month periods. Report, 22 November 1948, 'Notes on Native Labour', 13 June 1948, and Minutes of Round Table Conference on Native Labour, 22 April 1950, reflect this in particular.

desire for some form of 'independence' and/or 'recovery' from varying, but massively intensifying, new and exacting dimensions of patriarchal controls linked to the productive and social disintegrations of the Reserves (and particularly the Ciskei) in this period.

These young, and older women, often with little else than a name, and perhaps a child, found their way into the Location/s, or into the backyards of East London, and into complexly differing relations of autonomy, dependence, and 'orders', free from the homestead, the brother, and the father, but also ruled by the madam, the master, the Location Manager, the policeman, and the differing categories of men in the Location/s to varying degrees. Whatever the ambiguities and forms of gender domination - and there were many, from the traditions of kinship and lineage, through male migrant 'liaisons', to the attempted western 'nuclear' impositions and family practices; from within the shackyard single rooms to the white suburbs; and in the 'extraordinary high' incidences of rape, infanticide and sexual abuse - there was also another side to gender in the location/s by the 1940s.42

It was this context, this other side of gender, that I suggest was critical in defining the Location/s as both permanent, and as a 'community' if anything did, although it was more accurately a locality of differentiated and heterogeneous 'communities' of varying 'stability'. For it was these younger (and older) single, and 'independent' women who were the dominant 'stable' occupants of especially the East Bank Location, and who regularized its temporary and maled migrant occupation, patterned its spatiality, and controlled its material and social life in fundamental ways. While I do not wish to over-extend these arguments into romance, or silence the very real, and often very violent nature and power of differing forms of Location and settler colonial patriarchy, neither do I wish to suggest that all women, and the experience of domestic labour - the most regular and for all intents and purposes, the only form of gendered wage labour up until the late 1940s for 'native girls'- was a marginal activity. In fact, during the 1940s it became the reverse.

By 1945 the MOH observed that 'daughters arriving in the City appear hungry and desperate ... they will do any work whatsoever, and most are obliged to join the overcrowding in tin-town in disgrace and debauchery

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42 CA, 2/ELN, 2/1/2, Civil Cases, Native Commissioners Court, 49/39; A. Mager and G. Minkley, 'Reaping the Whirlwind', 236-239.
... suffer[ing] humiliation, pregnancy and disease. ...43 So, by the 1940s, the gendered route to the City was largely determined ‘from above’, as necessity transformed choice into obligation, and with it acceptance into rebellion. Young women ran and ‘forced’ their way into East London in search of ‘freedom’ - from strict fathers and impoverishment, from traditional marriage and red-tradition, and for a room to yourself, for clothing, and for money’. ‘Girls’, in town, would tell this ‘story of crisis’ increasingly in the 1950s, a story of poverty, decline, and male desertion, and would come into town ‘in hordes’, a ‘mass movement of school girls into East London’ in its attempted resolution.44 And this was a route that had two ends in the 1940s, either the Location/s, or the domestic labour market.

Indeed, by the 1940s it had become the central waged source of ‘permanence’ for women, and an increasing source of necessity in stable and continuous employment as far as possible. And this dependence in the lowest paid of all ‘native work’ had little to envy, and even less to recommend - it was arduous and demeaning, paternal and racist.45 But it was also the central source of ‘food’ for the Location ‘natives living on scrap brought from houses’.46

This was an important, and basic ingredient in establishing a connection, and a relation of dependence in the largely migrant and ‘single’ male Location population, and in the shack-rooms and ‘families’, but these material needs of dependence extended beyond the poverty of daily food requirements. In particular, beer-brewing, and the ownership, and letting of rooms was dominated, and controlled by women, usually ‘single’.

This pattern emerged in the 1920s and the 1930s, and by the 1940s ‘every street was always busy with

43 BCI, Box 33, Letter from MOH, Sinclair-Smith to BCI President, 17 July 1945, in response to request for information on the extremely worrying presence of a growing ‘mass’ of detached and young girls in the city.


45 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1353, Correspondence re establishment of labour bureau for domestic servants, 1942-1947, and 1949-1952; BCI, Box 34, Investigation into ‘native labour’, which also contained material on ‘servant girls’ and their increasing occupational stability, and of numbers, and wages. By 1947, there were about 9-10,000 domestic workers, including about 2,000 ‘garden boys’, many who moved between 3 or 4 houses in a week. Interviews, 3a-v, and 4a-w, provided much of the context of the racist, and paternal nature of this work, and of life in the backyards, and work in the houses, albeit equally in very ‘typical’ terms, as described by J. Cock, Maids and Madams (Johannesburg, 1980), esp. Ch. 9.

46 CA, LIE, File 11, Report of United ICU, and of the Bantu Employees Association to the Wage Board, and Minutes of Discussion, no date, but sometime in October 1941, for example; but also Interviews, 3q, T.V. 16 September 1987, and 3t, S.G., 24 September 1987, as well as 4r, 15 August 1989, and 4u, D.R., 2 September 1989, independently affirmed this as one of the crucial determinants of domestic work, which became much more constrained after the 1950s.
drinking', controlled by an internally differentiated 'class of independent women'\(^{47}\), while between 60-70% of the 'springs that do not die' - the 'rackrented' shackhouses were owned by women, and managed by either themselves or by women relatives and friends.\(^{48}\) It was from these two bases, brewing and renting, that women in the Location/s established themselves, and together with the 'material rewards' of domestic labour, were able to secure an 'independent' and permanent means of existence. Their role in shaping the Location/s from these bases, not under 'somebody else's rule', and 'independent from Umlungu', also involved a freedom to 'do as you please', and to be 'both the head and the wife'.\(^{49}\)

It was in this combination of brewing and renting - 'womens business', that was central to the internal shaping of the Location/s. It ranged from the smaller and more contained locale's of 'womens work' in 'family' and domestic brewing, often within the migrant parameters of what Mayer calls the 'old Xhosa tradition', through room sub-letting and other 'informal' Location activities with the possibility of becoming 'husband and wife together as one person under the same roof' to that of becoming a woman, a mother, but single and not married - of finding a 'voice outside of orders'. By the 1950s, but also in the 1940s, what Pauw calls the 'matrifocal family' which 'dispenses with a husband/father from the very beginning' was dominant and tended to be the 'norm' in the Location/s. Running side by side was what he calls the 'patrifocal family', but he argues this 'very different type' was relatively limited in number and spread beyond the 'eminent udidi' - the Location elite, and the 'intermediate stratum of white-collar and better educated families'.\(^{50}\)

\(^{47}\) CA, 3/ELN Boxes 17 and 18 contain some of the detail on brewing in the Location/s, as do Boxes 1165, and 1348. As I argued in my paper, 'Married to the Beer', which also drew on Interview material, brewing was differentiated between domestic, small, and larger shebeen networks of production, which all catered to differing site, amakhaya, and generational clientele, and which had established and competitive differences of resources, profitability and evasion. The point however remains that it was practised by 'single' women on the whole, and that for many this was the major source of income and of 'independence', albeit in these differentiated contexts of scale and possibility.

\(^{48}\) CA, 2/ELN, Native Commissioners Court, 2/1/2, Civil Cases 1939-1948, 6/41; 25/43; 29/43; 07/47; 21/48, which provide selective details of this process; See also G. Minkley, 'Married to the Beer', 16-17.

\(^{49}\) P. and I. Mayer, *Townsmen or Tribemen*, 247-250; Interviews, 3q, 3t, 4r, and 4u in particular, but also 3i, F.S., 5 September 1987; 3o, A.S., 12 September 1987; and 4d, 10 September 1989. These women lived and worked in the East Bank Location from before the war, as well as during the 1940s and 1950s.

\(^{50}\) B. Pauw, *The Second Generation*, ch. 8 and 10. The terms of 'udidi', referring to an internal ranking of like kind, operates as an incipient internal class categorization, while those of matrifocal and patrifocal are used here in descriptive terms, and do not seek to pre-determine western nuclear family structures with categories of civilization and modernity.
As Anne Mager and I have argued, the emergence, and 'dominance' of these 'single families' in the Location/s were not coherent, collective or uniform, and neither were they havens free of violence, hardship and destruction, or fear, squalor, desertion and desperation. But it was single and variously 'independent' women, and their children and dependents, and through their largely migrant lovers, lodgers and 'patrons' who defined, and overlapped as the central constituents of permanence, stability and 'community'. 'East London is ours, with the men in it' was a perspective with significant echo, uttered on this particular occasion by a young woman in the midst of a quarrel with her lover's wife, as potentially different, vulnerable, but also 'independent', personal, 'family', and sexual structures and relations 'took root'.

While these independent and single women 'owned' the Location, and to varying degrees the men in it, these material, social and personal 'pockets' and localities were seldom consciously, or collectively public. Constantly under threat and transgression, the public face forged on the one hand in an inter-dependence of unmarried mothers and their sons and 'young girls [daughters] and their lovers', and on the other in the competing western and traditional 'family' and patriarchal discourses, was unified around 'illegitimacy'. This, of course, had profoundly ambiguous implications - for understanding the permanent and temporary nature of the Location/s, and for forms of intervention and organization - as well as for the dominant, and 'acceptable' representations of the Location/s. For the Council this 'illegitimacy', particularly from the 1930s, was reflected in the range of common metaphors from illicit drinking and illicit sex, through immorality, prostitution, wantonness, moral decay, to those of uncontrollable and permanent evils, in 'the presence of licentious and dangerously free females' - with fly-by-night lovers. This resulted in venereal disease, illegitimate children, infanticide, and ultimately rioting, crime, fighting, and juvenile delinquency.

The Location Advisory Board shared many of these categorizations, as did the Location 'liberal'

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51 Interview, S. Molobote, 20 June 1988; G. Minkley, 'Married to the Beer'; A. Mager and G. Minkley, 'Reaping the Whirlwind'; P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, 214. I do not wish to infer that Anne Mager would necessarily agree with all of this - our joint paper argued, and discussed aspects of this gendered and related youth 'sub-cultures' for the 1940s, however, and does continually qualify the position of single women into an over-arching patriarchy, and the central role of sons in muting, and creating spaces within these 'traditional' and more 'modern' forms of male dominance.

52 CA, 3/ELN, These 'commonalities' are drawn from a number of the municipal records, and correspondences, found in a number of files, inclusive of Boxes 17, 18, 918, 1073-1075, 1351, 1348, 1165, 933-938, 1169-1172, 1354, and 1240, amongst others.
organizations, and in the 1940s, the United ICU, the Communist Party, the Bantu Federation of Labour, and the Vigilance Association.53

In the Council, this 'illegitimacy' was counterposed to two 'ideal', and perceived stabilizing 'family' structures - a western and modern nuclear family, modelled on the colonial one, and an achievement of 'civilization'; and the 'traditional', tribal and 'rural' one, 'pre-modern' and 'polygamous'. In the early period of East London's history, the western family had been the model for achieving 'European standards' (and 'civilization'). In the 1930s, and again from the mid-1940s, the 'traditional family', located in the Reserves, and not the Location/s, became the dominant model, (through, and through which, the Council's Stallardist and 'temporary' segregationist policies were implemented), although the municipal housing 're-building' period (between 1938 and 1944) was partly, and ambiguously premised on the competing colonial/western model. These contradictory discourses reflected, and also shaped those of local segregation and spatiality - the temporality of the Location/s, affirmed through their non-western and pre-modern structures and relations, especially of 'illegitimacy' required the re-location of the stability of the family into 'traditional' and tribal structures, which, in turn, reinforced migrancy, temporary labour and 'illegitimacy' and non-western family structures.

Although perhaps not as neat, or as crudely distinctive as just suggested, the 'western' model ironically, had much stronger representation through the 'official voice of the location', the Advisory Board, and through liberal and political organizations, claiming to represent the interests of the residents (and occasionally workers) of the Location/s. They tended, though, to more narrowly represent the interests of a small elite on the one hand, and the settled, educated and permanent strata on the other, those typically found in Pauw's 'patrifocal family situation', at least up until the early 1940s. In many cases, they reproduced the discourse of moral panic and illegitimacy, reflecting the tensions of their own vulnerability in the 'location which refused to see them', and attempted to mimic, and live a white middle class distance from within the same streets that bred unrespectability, from alongside this dominant 'matrifocal family'.54 Thereafter, through the 1940s, this was to be contested in important ways.

53 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1240, 880, and 938, and 877. These statements can be found in Correspondence with the Municipality, as well as in Reports, Statements, Meeting resolutions, and Demands, and in Commission evidence through the 1940s.

Male migrants, red or schooled, shared much of this conception of moral outrage, but within the impact of 'white man's ways', destroying 'tradition', and denying respectability. It was also more contradictory, of active, if often unwilling participation in the processes of perceived urban degradation.55 This acknowledgement of dependence and simultaneous 'disassociation' marked, and made the Location/s particularly contested terrains of instability and suitability for migrants attempting to maintain rural links in increasingly 'bounded' and necessary urban wage and work dependencies.56 The 'independence' of single women, and their capacity to remain independent directly through the major provision of collective, and individual 'services', together with the refusal to 'respect' male options, prompted little settled internal migrant coherence in family or material permanence. So, while migrants might have shown scant regard for single women's domestic situations, their sexuality, and particularly their 'illegitimate' children, the assertion of private and individual power was constrained by their social and economic importance, dependence, and in many cases, the key to their mobility and migrancy.57 Lodging, drinking, eating, and living arrangements, under these 'single women', tended to enforce, and enable the 'isolation' of small groupings of workers in 'amakhaya', 'udidi', and other street, household and neighbourhood locales, that were self-reinforcing, closed, and narrow in social and cultural terms - cross-cut through age, education, rural bases, religion, and patterns of work. And what they enabled was a detachment from the City, and the 'white man', destabilizing, rather than rooting migrants in an urban, western, 'family' and class culture - more as windows to a romanticized past, than to an unwanted future.58 What did this mean for the Council, and for the workplace, and for the attempted creation of stability?

For the Council, the route to controlling 'illegitimacy' in the 1930s centred in particular around beer-brewing, and its criminalization, arrests, and raids. By 1938, though, the Council adopted the 'imported system from the north' - the municipalization of beer brewing and distribution, as sources of both revenue,

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55 Interview, S. Nongwevu, 16 December 1987.
56 BCI, Box 34, Observations on 'native labour', 1945/6, drawn in consultation with MOH, and Box 28, on 'native migrancy', 28 October 1949; also CA, 3/ELN, Box 878, Ref 1960, on 'African Migration' Report, March-April 1950; and importantly, P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, 214, 247-250, although referring to the 1950s.
57 Interviews, 3i, 3o, 3q, and 3t, and 4d, 4r, and 4u, as well as S. Molobote, 14 December 1988; P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, 237-241.
58 Interviews, 3o, 3q, and 4r, and S. Molobote, 20 June 1988, P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, 72-75.
and critically of control. Its coincidence with the Thornton Commission, and the subsequent planned 're-building' of the Location/s (outlined above) along a more stable and permanent family basis was not one of chance, but of recognition that the Location/s were 'uncontrollable' in large degree because of this emergent social base of 'single' and 'illegitimate' women and their activities. Protests, deputations, and boycotts marred every step for the Council, and 'shebeens' continued to 'flourish and prosper'. The beer-hall, on the other hand, was massively avoided, closed down in 1945 as a financial and moral failure, and burnt down during the 1952 'riots'. Its closure, initially proposed in 1944 and effected in 1945 was not incidental either, but formed part of the re-emergent hardening of a repressive segregationary policy on the part of the Council.

In fact, the Council's re-planned removal of the Location/s in this period was integrally tied into brewing, failed municipalization, and the 'awareness' in the Council of the 'immense problem' that not just management and control, but the actual basis of the 'illegitimacy' of the Location/s presented. It was demonstrated in health, infant mortality, and 'sexually transmitted' disease statistics and discourses, in the Njoli case around demolition and compensation, in the prevalence of 'domestic brewing' and the failure of municipalization, in the problems encountered in allocating new municipal houses to 'legitimate' applicants, and it was demonstrated through the more radical and more popular form and content of Location politics in this period.

Not only did the Council become aware of the prominence of 'single' women in the Location/s, but also that migrancy was much more common, and more integrated into the space of 'illegitimacy' than previously acknowledged or understood. The connections between the two were integral to the Location/s, enabling women's 'independent' permanence on the one side, while this autonomy was sustained by, and enabled through migrancy and temporary occupation on the other. This served to emphasize the 'illegitimate' space of the Location/s in general, and of distinguishing and controlling insider-outsider tensions and differences,

59 Umlindi We Nyanga., Vol 5, No.61, 15 June 1938; CA, 3/ELN, Box 18, Report on Beer Brewing, Council Minutes, 23 June 1938, Report, July 1943.
60 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, and 878, and BCI, Box 25, Thornton Commission, 1937/8.
61 ELM, File 2045/ 1960; and CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 17 and 18 on beer brewing and the municipalization issue, 1938-1945.
and in particular, through the housing-labour nexus. The remedy became removal, and the new construction of a model township, over existing or internal rebuilding (and extension), and expulsion, linked through the ‘recognized’ inability to separate casual, migrant, and permanent labour, and the ‘illegitimate’ social and gendered basis of ‘permanence’. This meant that not only was there something of an ‘idler’ and a ‘waster’, and of a migrant, a casual, and an undesirable in practically all unskilled and ‘native’ labour, but also that there was little of the town, or of urban economic life generally - at least as defined by citizenship, skill, and ownership, and by commodities and ‘European values’.

That the Location/s as ‘margins of tolerated illegality’, had become less tolerable to the Council was one thing - their internal ‘indispensable conditions of existence’ within these spaces, and the capacity to defend and protest them, another. It began in 1938, with the beer protests and a march to the City Hall, spread in the 1940s through the Location/s in mass meetings, protest marches, deputations, and petitions, and culminated in the radicalization of the Advisory Board, and the ‘paralysis’, and ultimate demise of the conservative Council in 1948.

A number of important distinctions in the nature of this protest need to be drawn, however, especially between workplace and union activities, Location politics, and differentiated bases, influences, and leadership roles within its ‘communities of resistance’ (and accommodation).

THE WORKPLACE AND THE LOCATION - ORGANIZATION AND ADVICE?

Within the workplaces, the period of the 1940s has been characterized as one of massive unionization for ‘native labour’. CNETU claimed to have 10 unions with 15,000 members organized between 1942 and 1945. This is simply not just an ‘overestimation’, but incorrect. Certainly, by this time, there is scattered evidence of a number of ‘non-european unions’, beginning with the SA Railways and Harbours Workers

63 See M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 82. He argues for eighteenth century France, that ‘[t]he least-favoured strata of the population did not have, in principle, any privileges: but they benefitted, within the margins of what was imposed on them by law and custom, from the space of tolerance, gained by force and obstinacy; and this space was for them so indispensable a condition of existence that they were often ready to rise up to defend it; the attempts that were made periodically to reduce it, by reviving old laws or by improving methods of apprehending, provoked popular disturbances .’

64 Umlindi We Nyanga, 5, 61, 15 June 1938; CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 877, 878, 918, 938, and 1240; BCI, Box 29, Reports on Labour Unrest for the 1940s, and Correspondence between the Police and the BCI, especially 12 March 1945, and 8 October 1948.

65 M. Horrell, South African Trade Unionism (Johannesburg, 1961), 70, in a letter from CNETU to SAIRR in mid-1940s, and in SAIRR Papers, University of the Witwatersrand, AD843, ‘African trade unions’, 4 May 1945.
Union in 1939 66, and followed by at least ten other unions.67 However, if the BCI investigation of ‘native labour’ of the 1940s can be believed, even if with a certain hesitancy, together with police, and employer commentaries, and the partial oral evidence collected, a more accurate figure would not have been much more than 3,000 members in 1942/43, which had declined to 1,000 in c1946, (with the exception of the short-lived Casual Labourers Union, of about 450 members), and about 500 in 1948/49, with the exclusion of the United ICU, whose union membership was also estimated at about 400 members in 1948 (although it drew more than a 1,000 to ‘mass meetings’ and its annual picnics).68 In addition, and despite a close relationship with the ‘Friends of Africa’, and with the local Communist Party, the Unions were small, membership fluctuant, leadership narrow and confined to ‘nine or ten’ individuals, including ‘four or five white communists and labour sympathizers’ 69, and issues focused on Wage Board, and wage levels, rates and arrears, often with limited success.70

The drive for unionization confronted a number of difficulties and problems. As largely unrecognized, and ‘unofficial’ unions, employer hostility was marked, and their leadership, and financial state and management haphazard and limited.71 The leadership, heavily influenced by the CPSA, and others, less widely by the ‘Friends of Africa’ in this period (with the exception of Kadalie’s United ICU), as has been argued elsewhere, curtailed and indeed prevented strike activity, and tended to rely on a widespread ‘legalism’ and on the Wage Board and its determinations as ‘replacement’ for union activity. It is further

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67 These included the African Workers Union, the African Commercial and Distributive Workers Union, the African Timber Workers Union, the African Building Workers Union, the African Engineering Workers Union, the EL Stevedoring and Dockworkers Union, a Municipal Employees Union, a Domestic Workers Union; as well as a Sweetworkers Union and a Printing Union.

68 BCI, Box 25, File on ‘Native Labour Organizations’, which contains estimates, rough Union memberships, and correspondence with the Police Superintendent during the period of the 1940s. Letter 3 November 1942, and attached correspondence; Company Archives, consulted in December/January 1986 and 1987; and Interviews, 3c, N.M., 18 August 1987, and 3m, S.R., 9 September 1987, members of the SA Railway Workers Union, and the Distributive Workers Union respectively in the early 1940s. Their impressions/memories were of difficulty and contained membership, members who left as fast as they first joined, as there were no wage increases within the first few months, and where employers refused to acknowledge the Unions to any degree.

69 Included in this group were Busakwe, Gununza, Solomon, Hoyi, Ndakuse, and Behr, Muller, Selby, Herman, and Taylor, plus Kadalie, Tyamzashe and Bungu from the ICU.


71 See BCI Box 25, File on ‘Native Labour Organizations’, where fairly extensive details record both the small and tenuous basis of the leadership, and of the financial base of the local unions, related particularly to small subscriptions/dues, and to the fact that people like Selby, Behr, and a few others, served as secretaries for differing unions at the same time. See Correspondence from Divisional Inspector of Labour, 22 January 1945, in particular.
argued, in a manner which resonates with the East London experience, that the related narrow and overlapping leadership cost workplace organization, and an internal growth, and organization through struggle, at a time of vast potential for industrial leverage, and in so doing, 'removed' the leadership from the workers.72 These explanations are important in elaborating the weak, and ultimately ineffective progress of African unionization in this period, but they are partial, and exhibit an unsubstantiated 'rank-and-file' class narrative of expectation and promise which contradicts the predominant evidence of experience for East London.

Membership was highly mobile, casual and temporary, and access to workplaces, and to the Location/s for white organizers, curtailed by surveillance, legislation and workplace practice, and avoided through internal union tradition, organizational method and political direction.73 On the one hand, this ranged from 'on the spot dismissals' for belonging to a union, to racist supervisory harassment and discrimination for present and past union activities, and from a circulated 'employee blacklist' to the 'ban' on any form of union meeting on 'factory premises'.74 On the other, this mixed handful of overextended and careerist leaders became increasingly to not only be positioned, but also to operate outside of the workplaces, in office-bound, legal, and 'skilled' control of resources, exclusive wage negotiation, and as the voices, and figures of 'representation'.75

As a result, workers saw little of 'their unions', and little by way of results, rapidly becoming 'disillusioned' and distanced from them. In addition not 'staying in one job or place' long enough to maintain, or afford constant or regular membership, in which the leaders 'spoke much but showed little', and seldom took on

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73 BCI, Boxes 32-35, Company Records and Correspondence, for the 1940s; Box 28, Reports on 'Native Labour', and Box 25, on 'Native Labour Organizations'. Much of this increasing repression, and the effect of 'the state' is also explored and offered in the secondary accounts listed in Note 72 above, as well as internal corruption as a further explanation. What is less explicitly taken on board are aspects of the nature of the workplace, and of supervision, as well as those of migrancy and mobility as structural explanations. They are, at best, reduced to the social weight of the working class explanation.

74 CA, LIE, Files 11, 17, and particularly written and recorded statements made to the 1941/42 Wage Board Investigation by some of the union representatives over dismissals, victimization, supervisory harassment, police 'interference', and the inability to achieve recognition and negotiate, or even 'force' the issues of wage increases, 23 September 1941, 8 October 1941, and attached Reports and correspondence

75 CA, LIE, File 11, and 17, Evidence to Wage Board from 'Native' Trade Unions, 7 October 1941, and 15 October 1941.
issues of racist and arbitrary supervision and workplace instability and dismissals. When linked with 'the showing' of limited wage gains, except indirectly through the Wage Board, and the union leaderships contradictory roles within these forums 76, there was little encouragement or promotion of collective solidarities, or the sustenance of trade union belonging.77 This latter aspect of union contradiction was not so much one of 'lagging behind' a mythologized worker radicalism, as distinctive from the workplaces, which were, in part, unstable from below, and mobile by intent, as much as by constraint. And the 'invented tradition of native labour' discussed earlier, was patterned by the absence, and denial of any 'internal' artisanal (or collective) leadership, while the small local leadership was essentially external, educated, elitist, and racial. They evolved a tradition of practice, organization and concern focused on permanence, stability and wage increases and determinations, which was simultaneously reliant on a past history of white artisan unionization and structure, and on its discourse and racial identification.78 In consequence, these unions were equally distant from the majority of the workers, but also, ambiguously, contained important elements for the extension of the 'structures of racial dominance', and of difference, in the workplaces. In this, the conceptions of labour as unskilled, manual, and 'native' was part of being able to talk, organize and manage the 'unprotected workers' from the outside. At the same time, they reproduced, and helped to sustain a discourse of the necessary creation of the 'protected worker' that was universal and general, serving to deny the local and the particular, except as manifest in low comparative wages. This was well captured by Taylor, one of the early 1940s union organizers, although suggested in evidence to the Welsh Commission, that

[...]The Natives were poor because they were not permitted to bargain [collectively] in the sale of the only commodity they had to offer - their capacity for work. If they were, there would be a tendency

76 CA, LIE, File 11. 15 October 1941. In evidence to the Wage Boards for example, the major concerns of the worker representatives, including Muller, Behr and Herman of the SATLC and the Sweptworkers Union, Ballinger of the Friends of Africa, Busakwe from the Bantu Federated Labour Council, Kadale and Tyamzashe from the ICU, and Gununza, Solomon and Hoyi from the African Engineering Union were of wage increases, costs of living, indebtedness, and crucially the issue of 'permanence' and stabilization in the workplaces, and in the 'community', as well as of 'restricting access' to imported labour', de-casualizing the workforce, and of ending casual labour practices. In addition they called for the tighter implementation of influx control measures, in order to protect 'permanent workers'. In overall direction and content, their evidence shaped the Wage Board, and its determination, and basis, as outlined above.


78 The central role of artisanal labour, and of its organizational role in the establishment of workplace and industrial unions is well documented in S. Kaplan and C. Koepp, (eds.), Work in France, and I. Katzenelson and A. Zolberg, (eds.), Working Class Formation (Princeton, 1986); while the racial particularity of the South African case is can be found in J. Lewis, Industrialization and Trade Union Organization, R. Davies, Capital, State and White Labour, E. Webster, Cast In a Racial Mould, and J. Simons and R. Simons, Class and Colour, amongst others.
to increase their incomes, not suddenly, but steadily. That bargaining, too, would not only teach them the value of money but it would also increase their importance in the eyes of the white man. ... Unless Native labour was allowed to bargain over its price in some controlled orderly manner, it would do so in some other uncontrolled and disorderly way.\(^{79}\)

In this, the African, and parallel union 'representatives' effectively operated as 'unwitting accomplices' to the stabilization of 'native labour' as cheap, but essentially exploitable members of the 'pick-and-shovel brigade', and in its external representation which operated more as this system of 'order and control' in legal and wage confined parameters of 'permanence'.

It was to be much more in the Location/s that political mobilization acquired a more dynamic and internally assertive basis. This was due, in ironic part to the interventions of the CPSA during the 1940s, and to the more prominent inter-connection by CP members into the Vigilance Association, but it was most decisively cast by the established connections between local political concerns, and those of single and independent women - around brewing, housing demolition and compensation, pass raids, and for facilities, and over rents.\(^{80}\) In summary form, three aspects need to be identified here.

Firstly, through the CPSA, and the Vigilance Association, and through the ICU, Advisory Board politics became more focused on issues that concerned not just site, but also lodgers, and on those that, however indirectly, reflected the concerns of the Location/s permanent and migrant residents, and especially those of 'single women'. This was reflected in the form and content of Advisory Board elections, with extremely high voter turnouts for almost the first time in its history, controversial electoral platforms, and the infusion of popular content, like brewing, compensation, and other issues into the process. In particular, it was claimed that women site-holders had voted 'in large numbers' for the first time, and 'all had voted for the communists'.\(^{81}\) In addition, the contest between the ICU, the communists, the Vigilance Association, and the 'established' members created a dynamic and interest in local politics that had last been witnessed in

\(^{79}\) *Daily Dispatch*, 14 July 1949.

\(^{80}\) CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, 1960; BCI, Box 26, which contains cursory notes on the activities of the CPSA and the Vigilance Association; *The Guardian*, 17 December 1942; Interviews, 4c, and 4f, January 1989. These concerns are explored further in a paper currently under review, which takes up the issues of Location 'politics' during the 1938-1963 period.

\(^{81}\) BCI, Box 26, and also Reports by the Police Superintendent, based on 'police informers' on this period; CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 935-938, 986, 805, contain Advisory Board details.
the early 1930s - but now with the added dimensions of liberal and Council 're-building' and control interventions and contradictions.

Secondly, despite this growing popularity, further extended through mass meetings - with attendances of up to 2,000 residents in the 1942-45 period - and the increasing focus on more popular concerns in comparison to earlier Advisory Board political activities, the inter-connections between the CPSA and the Vigilance Association, liberal discourse and the Joint Council, and into the Advisory Board on the one side, and the majority of single women and migrant males on the other, remained problematic and uneven. While it gave these organizations (the CP in particular), as well as the ICU, a 'lease of life' in the Location/s that had not been achieved in the workplaces, and as trade union/worker organizers, a fundamental tension occurred between this support and what remained as their central liberal, gendered and 'exclusive' universal basis of organizational expression, formulation and demand. This served to continually narrow, and control protest into ones of accommodation, deputation, a corresponding legalism, and of 'just and reasonable demands' for reform, which were 'well-thought out'. This process was particularly apparent in the 1938 Vigilance Association beer protests and the need to legalize 'family brewing', the 1943-44 Vigilance Association deputations to the Council and Native Commissioner over the 'sub-economic housing scheme' and the need for 'freehold tenure', and the 1945 CP mass meeting resolutions along similar lines of inadequate housing and 'inadequate compensation'.

Not only did these organizations come to 'think' and 'talk' for all residents, but did so in a way that reflected the interests of a male dominated elite (and often even more particularly seen as 'European led and controlled'), and of an envisaged stable urban and 're-built' community and a regular and reliable workforce, where the 'most intolerable conditions in which the people live will be removed'.

Thirdly, and lastly, as suggested above, the impact of these protests and deputations, served, in the short-term, not to extend the interests represented, but to harden, and tighten a repressive and segregationist Council response to a perceived disorder that began to 'take hold' in the Location/s. Ironically, this extended the scope, and continued the space of 'illegitimacy', and helped to create the possibilities for both

82 Umlindi We Nyanga, 5, 6, 15 June 1938; CA, 3/ELN, Box 16, 80/28, CPSA Minutes of Resolutions and explanations, 8 June 1938; Box 877, 1960: 1487/11/1, CPSA Resolution Minutes, 21 September 1944, 16 May 1945.
the more dramatic emergence of the ANC Youth League in 1948/49, and the related decline of organizations engaged in 'futile palavers with the Municipality'. This had two conflicting dimensions, with a recognition that existing structures, like the Advisory Board, but also the Vigilance Association and local communist and ICU participation within it was 'thoroughly ineffective' and overlooked at will, but also that these organizations had more restricted bases, and interests at variance with those they claimed to represent. The 1947, and the 1948 Advisory Board elections and activities demonstrated this, where, despite the denouncement of the 'Location Superintendent' (Native Commissioner), and the call for his resignation, this had more to do with re-establishing an 'official voice' and management-advisory and stable role for the location elite. But, after 1948, they became 'left behind' as the localization of a national movement plugged into the bases of the Location only touched through the 1940s.

In 1947 East London witnessed its first recorded 'industrial' strike by black semi-skilled workers - at CTM. The details of the strike are hazy, and the memory of two participants somewhat contradictory. It lasted for at least a few weeks, although one participant remembered it lasting three months, and ended in defeat. Wage increases were not implemented, there was a staggered return to work, and with the exception of the 'blacklisting' of those 'known to have fomented trouble' - effectively the ICU shopstewards - who were denied re-employment and dismissed, all the 300 striking workers were re-employed at pre-strike wage rates. During the strike, workers gathered daily outside the factory, where something of a carnival atmosphere prevailed, with numbers of ICU Womens Section members, hawkers, and even a daily musician providing sustenance and encouragement. Indian shopkeepers also provided strike relief 'food parcels', apparently coordinated by Kadalie.

Kadalie's role remained typically elusive and ambiguous. Whatever it had been in the lead-up to the strike, it is an unclear one, and appears to have been much more decisively orchestrated from within the factory.

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83 CA, 3/ELN, Box 877, Ref 1960: 1487/11/1, CPSA Resolution Minutes, 21 September 1944, and 16 May 1945, and attached correspondence.
84 Latimer Papers, Correspondence between Selby and Latimer, 23 September 1948.
85 CA, 3/ELN, Box 938, Ref 1575 LAB, Advisory Board Minutes, Elections, and attached correspondence, 1947.
86 H.H. Smith, 'Development of Labour Organization', 147, mentions the strike, and maintains Kadalie's influence in it through a system of agitation cells, based on the contention of the local Labour Dept. official. Oral evidence with an ICU shop-steward, and member at the time, (J.T. Kophi, 27 June 1989) suggest the wider context, although the shop-steward emphasized the aspects of a 'dummy' liaison committee, and of a growing racist form of control, while the 'ordinary member' highlighted the wages aspect; BCI, Box 32 also contains some of the
itself, on the first day of the actual strike he appeared in his characteristic 'Askari' white suit and polished shoes, and 'took over'. With the enlisted help of Malcolmess, the parliamentary 'native representative', Kadalie, attempted to negotiate with an increasingly intransigent management, which continued to assert that the recently established 'liaison committee' was the only legitimate forum for such negotiation. While unsuccessful, the strike became 'Kadalie's campaign', and he became the figurehead of 'worker re-awakening'. In fact, during the mid-1940s, as he extended, and broadened his influence through the Advisory Board, the Womens Section, and the creation of a newsletter, Labour Section, Advice Office, and an internally run 'labour placement scheme', Kadalie again became the focus of the Council and the police as an 'instigator' and 'organizer', which included the formation of 'underground cells' and 'contacts of trouble'.87 While this did not amount to the creation of a mass base or legitimate the self-proclaimed 'Askari' image and status as 'master organizer ever known in the annals of the Non-European population ...', the ICU did grow substantially in this period, and appeared to become more radical and popular. In particular, the claims to the ICU 'team's' instrumental role in the demolition, compensation and extension cases, of limiting 'Pick-up Vans' activities in the Location/s, and, simultaneously, of promoting a strong anti-tribal, and educated 'Africanist' politics, contrasted to the fact that the local Communist Party was 'lead (sic) and controlled by Europeans', were all significant aspects of this broadening process beyond the earlier job and organizational patterns of patronage.88 It is not unlikely that Kadalie would have seen the strike, potentially, as a further extension of this visibility and growth. In characteristic fashion, he would have wanted to outcompete the Communist Party, who had made Advisory Board political ground in 1946 through their attachment to the 'casual' dockstrike, and during which Kadalie had unsuccessfully claimed influence and prominence.

The strike centred around three inter-connected aspects - the evasion, and subsequent denial by management of granting a 'negotiated' wage increase (apparently of 1 pound per month); the attempt to create, and formally recognize a company implemented 'liaison committee' as the only legitimate voice of

87 BCI, Box 32, Police Superintendent Correspondence with BCI, 25 August 1947.
88 BCI, Box 32, Police Superintendent Correspondence, 25 August 1947, and 1 September 1947; CA, 3/ELN, Box 938, Ref 1575 LAB. of ICU Newsletters, and statement on Advisory Board elections for 1947.
the workers and, in the post-war period, the re-organization of supervision in the factory along racial lines. This combination of wage issues, with that of supervision, and new structures of controlled worker representation through the liaison committee, however, also reflected, in this change, a differing set of pressures on the ICU, and on workers within the factory. With the return of a number of 'white servicemen' and the pressures of re-employment after the war, together with pressure from the Divisional Inspector of Labour and the Council, CTM had engaged a number to serve as supervisors. Pressure had also been mounting from the same sources to curtail the activities of 'native unions', and management at CTM became particularly concerned with the 'activities' of Kadalie and the ICU. In this context of a more rigid and increasingly blatant racial re-organization of the factory floor, and of supervision in particular, mounting tension became manifest in a series of disputes inside the factory, ranging from wage payments through to the assault of a worker. The CTM workforce increasingly found itself at the short end of indiscriminate dismissals, wage deductions, and victimization, especially at the hands of two 'boer' supervisors. Their response, at the end of one night shift, was for a group of workers to 'physically confront' one of these supervisors, and 'beat him up with less hesitation'. And then, in 1947, with planned spinning plant extensions, and rumours of further re-organization and of retrenchments and the engagement of 'native girls', the strike, and the effective destruction of the ICU in the factory.

Through the strike, the space was opened, and a pattern of racial labour segmentation implemented, with a form of 'corporate management' and racial supervision that relied on more rigid and regularized racial work designs and hierarchies. Supervision effectively became one of the 'policing of white men', while workers found themselves 'requiring overseeing' in a way that reminded one of them as needing to be constantly on the alert for 'the pick-up vans of the factory'. In this process, the 'liaison committee' was firmly established, in a manner that, to extend the metaphor, was like the advisory board of the factory floor, a forum of agreement and the sanction of the status of operative labour as regimented, racial, and

89 BCI, Box 32, Police Superintendent Correspondence; CA, 3/ELN, Box 938, Ref 1575 LAB, ICU Newsletters, 1947.
90 CA, LIIE, File 10, 15, General Correspondence 1929-1945, and File 8, War Communication, 1945-47.
91 BCI, Box 32, Correspondence between CTM and BCI, 25 November 1947 and attached correspondence; Police Superintendent Reports, 3 June 1948, and 16 February 1948.
cheap. And in a number of important respects, CTM had come to parallel the experiences of the unskilled workplaces of East London in the 1940s, imposing the local and the particular over the general and the 'universal'.
CHAPTER SEVEN

INDUSTRIALIZATION, MIGRANCY, AND THE STRUGGLE OVER WORK,
C1947-1963

East London had an official population of 80,000 inhabitants in 1946, comprising 40,118 whites, and 39,087 blacks, although the size of the black (and particularly African) population was massively under-numerated in the census figures. These statistics also belie the size and composition of the black population in terms of locality and permanence of residence, however. Migrancy, illegality and shack-yard rack-renting, were as much, and more, patterns of 'native' residence and work, as were settled and permanent council occupants, and first generation workers. All were involved in various degrees of migration and permanence, and although they had become increasingly 'dependent' on the town and its labour through the 1930s and 1940s, this was also marked by its partial and contradictory terms. Workers were predominantly unskilled, highly mobile, and 'temporary'. In the 1950s these patterns intersected with, and were changed in the most significant phase of new industrial and labour growth centred on local manufacturing development.

In East London the number of manufacturing industries increased from 135 in 1945/6, to 223 in 1957/8. In the same period net output increased dramatically - by 211% in nominal and 92% in real terms - as did the value and extent of capital investment in land, buildings, and machinery. By the mid-1950s East London was dominated by four main sectors - food, textiles, chemicals, and construction. Together they accounted for 72% of net output in 1960, and totalled 102 firms. This was 46% of all firms, and of the 102 firms, 54 were construction, 31 food, 12 chemicals, and 5 textiles. Together they employed 68% of the industrial workforce in East London by 1956/7.

The total labour force in manufacturing industry increased from 6,325 (2,526 white) in 1946, to 13,002 (4,281 white) in 1957, although this had decreased to 11,923 by 1959/60. Over the same period the number of black workers had increased from 3,800 to 8,721, many of whom were located in operative and semi-skilled

1 These statistics that follow are drawn and compiled from the following sources: J.P. Barker, Industrial Development in a Border Area; D. Hobart Houghton, (ed.), Economic Development in a Plural Society; from unpublished census statistics, BCS, from Reports no. 70, and from Census U.G. 30-'54; from the Divisional Inspector of Labour LIE files, and from BCI and Company Archives.
jobs. Employment in commerce, while still significant, increased more slowly, from 2,730 to 4,450, and this decreased to 3,582 black workers by 1961/2. Black workers employed in the S.A.R.& H. totalled 2,310 in 1960, and those employed by the local state totalled 2,130, also in 1960. Both had remained relatively stable around these totals through the 1950s.

The design of manufacturing capital showed a further internal sectorial division of labour in the dominance of the four sectors, three of which (the exception being construction) demonstrated significant growth in the period up until 1957, but in different ways with different consequences.

The food industry, concerned more with processing than actual manufacture, with the notable exception of Wilson Rowntree and the milling companies, was the most stable, and the most long-standing. It had developed in the 1920s and 1930s. By 1946 it accounted for 27% of total net output, and in 1960, 30%. This period reflected processes of expansion amongst existing workshop factories, though, rather than significant new factory investments. The labour force increased from 1,715 (795 black) in 1946, to 3,932 (2,987 black) in the sector by c1960, and consisted largely of unskilled packers and 'labourers', but also operatives on sweet and other smaller processing production lines. In particular, the substitution of 'bantu males' for white female operatives at Wilson Rowntree during the 1950s was significant in this sector's labour recomposition and operative impact on re-defining 'native labour'.

The second key sector was the textile industry, whose output value equalled 23% of East London's total in 1960, from 9% in c1950. In this sector, the level of capital concentration was reflected in the presence of five large monopoly firms, as against the twenty eight smaller 'competitive' firms in food for example, as well as in its output and employment profile and importance. Three of the five firms developed in the post 1945 period, and all involved international capital investment, and relatively sophisticated and advanced technological capacity. This impacted on the nature of the labour force in this sector, which increased from 881 (570 black) in 1946, to 2,048 (1,559 black) in 1960, located essentially in semi-skilled operative positions.

2 The following section is drawn from the above sources, as well as BCI, Boxes 8, and 10, which contain miscellaneous statistical material relating to the 1950s in East London, in Occasional Reports, and in Correspondence. It is worth noting that, ironically, as East London enters its most sustained period of industrialization, the BCI sources become more scattered, diffuse, and in many respects, silent.
A similar pattern can be identified for the third important sector, chemicals. Geared more towards the consumer goods than the capital goods market, and centred on twelve concerns, but dominated by five, the sector was responsible for 15% of output in 1957/8. This importance needs to be situated in the context of two processes; the closure of an industrial chemical plant in 1956, and a drastic decline in productivity in the post 1957 period. By c1960 this sector only accounted for 8% of East London's net output. This was reflected in employment patterns, where in 1960 only 542 workers were employed (286 black), as compared to the 352 (181 black) of 1946. The early 1960s witnessed significant 'administrative changes and industrial restructurings', and productivity increased dramatically to pre-1956 levels by 1963/4, as did employment. This climbed to 952 in that year. Importantly, though, this was only one of two sectors where white and black employment remained relatively equal.

The construction sector on the other hand, while centrally related to the massive post-1947 boom, was dominated by over fifty small competitive and sub-contracting firms, and was extensively labour-intensive and vulnerable to economic fluctuation. Its percentage of net output declined from 16% in 1950, to 10% in 1960, reflecting the correlation of the sector to declining and stagnant growth in the industrial sector generally, as the 1950s progressed, and for the post 1957 period in particular. The number of workers engaged in heavy and demanding manual labour, very different from the textile and food sectors, increased from 1,115 in 1946, to 1,661 (1,137 black) in 1960.

A fifth major growth sector was that of 'transport', equally dominated by small-scale service competitors (forty-six establishments in 1954), except for Car Distributors Assembly (CDA), established in 1950, and later to become Mercedes Benz, (and John Brown Tractors). As a major automobile producer, it became one of East London's key manufacturing industries in the late 1950s, and by the 1970s, its determinant industry.

Lastly the weakness in the development of the engineering and metal industrial sector needs to be identified. Together the general engineering, dominated by electrical engineering and two battery companies, Raylite and Chloride, and the metal products industries contributed, only 13,6% of total net output in 1960. This reflected an increase of less than 1% from 1946, and in reality a significant decrease, given the importance of the two battery factories established in the 1950s. This absence of a local capital
base in engineering influenced East London's industrial and class structure in particular ways, as will be suggested below. These industries were important employers of labour however, with the 1946 figure of 865 workers (494 black) increasing to 1,631 (1,069 black) in 1960, many of them new semi-skilled operatives in the battery companies.

These sectorial, employment and wage statistics are the bare bones of this important process of manufacturing industrial development and 'dominance' in this period. In particular, the divisions of labour underwent significant change in racial and gender terms. A dramatic process of substitution and incorporation of black operative for white artisanal and operative labour took place. Male white workers moved into supervisory positions, increasingly through the 1950s and rapidly after 1956, and female white workers moved rapidly into (after 1947) and out of (from the mid 1950s) the productive labour force. The related impact was a very high percentage of black, almost exclusively male workers located in operative, skilled and semi-skilled positions by the end of the decade. These black worker percentages constituted a larger percentage of the industrial workforce than in other regions, and of the national average, but also became the dominant form of 'bantu labour' employment in East London by c1960.

Wages and wage levels in manufacturing industry were also starkly divided in racial terms. Black wage levels were lower than national averages by about 20%. This meant that wages, although significantly higher than 1947 levels by the mid 1950s, were still extremely low. Comparisons to white work and general white workers wages, made them glaringly inadequate and discriminatory, averaging between four and five times less than white workers.

Essentially, while this was the 'core' period of industrialization in East London, the manufacturing sector developed in uneven steps and starts. It did not clearly reflect a simple or linear progression from a declining commercial, or transition from a workshop based economy, to an emergent manufacturing capital, which then became increasingly concentrated and dominant in commercial and workshop

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3 The term of 'native labour', is systematically replaced with that of 'bantu labour' through the 1950s, and reflects the impact of the apartheid state on racial and class discourses. It will be used hereafter, except in cases where other forms of categorization were used, in order to illuminate what is one aspect of discursive and social change.

4 Although this gap narrowed in the 1955-1960 period, it again stabilized at the 20% level after 1963; See BCI, Box 10, Report on Wages, 12 November 1957, and Report on Bantu Wages, 24 November 1964.

5 BCI, Box 10, Report on Wages, 12 November 1957; and Report on Bantu Wages, 24 November 1964.
replacement. Instead, accompanying the decline of the 'vested wholesale interests', which had continually dominated in the 1930s, and less clearly in the 1940s, there was an intense and at times contradictory series of conflicts over the 'industrial' shape of the local economy in the 1950s.6

At much the same time, control of the local state became increasingly contested. This was important as the local 'merchants' had 'ruled against' large import substitution industries on any significant scale up until the 1940s, and thereafter. The textile, motor assembly, food, chemical and other industries which did locate in East London, did so despite a fragile local infrastructure, and basis of support. In particular these constraints were located in the oppositional, and then divided and ambiguous support of the politically organized dominant commercial class.7 Consequently, part of industry's necessary project of establishing the 'right conditions for modern business', became a political programme of re-drawing lines of class and ensuring that beyond the concerns of electricity, rail links, water, and industrial land - the landscape of manufacture - there was a 'sympathetic mayor...[and]...a council of industry.'8 Objectives, however, proved easier to write in reports and communicate in Board and Chamber meetings, than to create on public platforms and establish amongst the fragmented manufacturers, let alone the 'loyal citizens of [tourism and] trade'.9

Secondly, this particular trajectory of industrialization meant that East London was characterized by a highly uneven pattern of development in this period. Simultaneous to the investment of Rowntrees, C.D.A., Johnson and Johnson, and other largely British multi-nationals after 1947/8, was the emergence of a host of small workshop and individual manufacturing concerns in the food, footwear, clothing, wood, transport, electrical goods, and construction sectors.10 In-between, and ranging in size and productive capacity were the local, national and international factories, largely competitive in the textile, chemical, food, furniture,

6 BCI, Box 11, Files 11/2 and 11/3; Minutes of Executive Meeting, 23 July 1949, and attached correspondence and Meetings, 1949-1956.
7 BCI, Box 8, Correspondence between Chamber President and the Divisional Inspector of Labour (DIL), 2 June 1949, and reflected thereafter in Chamber Minutes for the late 1940's, time and again in Boxes 8-11 in particular.
8 BCI, Box 10, Correspondence between James (of the BCI), and Latimer, 12 May 1949, and attached correspondence.
9 BCI, Box 10, Correspondence between James and Latimer, 12 May 1949.
10 BCI, Box 9, and 10, which contains Correspondence, and a Report, and Notes on the size, scale, and content of local investment. Report, 22 July 1952, and attached Notes reflecting on the 1947-1952 period, and highlighting this 'combined' and 'uneven' pattern.
transport and engineering markets, and relatively labour intensive in production.\textsuperscript{11} While levels of local integration remained weak, it is important to locate the 'combined' nature of East London's industrialization process which provided the markets, labour-power, infrastructure and capital access for small manufacturers to mushroom in this post 1947 period. This process was facilitated through the growing organizational expression of the Chamber of Industries, and the emerging dominance of manufacturing influence in the local state by the mid-1950s.\textsuperscript{12} But it was also a process that was 'arrested', and constrained through this period, and after c1957, one that became dependent on the central state, against the relative degrees of local influence and intervention.

Hobart Houghton argued that 'the view was widely expressed in industrial and commercial circles that, marked though it was, the expansion between 1946 and 1953 was much less than it might have been but for a series of unfortunate circumstances.'\textsuperscript{13} He identifies five of these 'inhibiting circumstances', based on these views, and they summarily reproduce the extensive detail located in the industrial archive. Firstly, during the vital early post-war years, when 'rapid development was taking place in all the major industrial areas, the City Council failed to pursue a vigorous policy of attracting industry to the area.' While not opposed to industry as such, he argues the Council 'showed a tendency to be so discriminating in the type of industry it wished to have that East London did not attract all the concerns it might otherwise have drawn.'\textsuperscript{14} Secondly, and related to the first point, the Council also, in competitive relation to Port Elizabeth, had not 'adopted an enlightened policy to its non-White labour force.' These measures, he concludes 'had earned for Port Elizabeth the reputation of having a large and contented non-White labour force. East London, however, did not enjoy a similar reputation.'\textsuperscript{15}

The third and fourth factors, also outlined in the industrial records, centre on the 'infrastructure for industrial concerns', and in particular, the inadequate provision of water storage and supplies, and in the provision, and subsequent cost of electricity. The third, water, was emphasized by the drought of 1948/9,

\textsuperscript{11} BCI, Box 10, Report, 22 July 1952, and attached Notes for 1947-1952 period.
\textsuperscript{12} BCI, Box 12, Correspondence between James, and Latimer, 8 February 1952, and attached letters and communication; and between James and Councillor Fox, 3 April 1951, and related correspondence, makes this most explicit; but also Chamber Report, highlighting this developed role, 6 May 1957.
\textsuperscript{13} D. Hobart Houghton, \textit{Economic Development}, 141.
\textsuperscript{14} D. Hobart Houghton, \textit{Economic Development}, 141.
\textsuperscript{15} D. Hobart Houghton, \textit{Economic Development}, 141-142.
which was particularly severe, necessitating the importation of fresh water by tanker from Durban, and the use of salt water for sanitation. It had a profound short-term effect on industrial investment, with at least five major textile, clothing and food factories locating elsewhere. In 1951 the Laing Dam investment also increased costs, particularly for existing industries in the 1950s, giving a longer term effect to the drought and its repercussions. The fourth, electricity, had initially, in the early 1940s, been dependent on the supplies of the inadequate municipally owned power station. After 1947 the Electricity Supply Commission took over the supply of electricity to East London, but the high short-term capital costs involved in its enlargement and extension in 1951 and in 1953/4, dramatically increased supply costs, and ‘overheads’ to existing industrialists. This ‘discouraged expansion’, as it did also that of ‘initial investment’, in terms of both supply limitations, but also in subsequent ‘high costs’.

Fifthly, and finally, the impact of the 1952 riots were seen to have been a ‘psychological check’ on industrial development. While Houghton argues that this was ‘not possible to quantify’, they made East London into an ‘unstable’, and potentially ‘explosive’ investment site. They also reinforced the perceptions of its conservative Council, and unstable and ‘politically radical’ labour situation.

The impact of these factors was said, by Houghton, to account for the uneven and limiting pattern of industrial development. This was most apparent in the dramatic decline in the number of establishments, and in their particular nature, over the period c1947 to c1963. There are, however, two further aspects, the one ‘national’, and international, and the other local, that need to be elaborated. The major growth phase in East London’s industrial expansion, between c1947 and c1950/51 was integrally related to the

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16 BCI, Box 12, File 2/B, which contains details of the 1946-1956/7 period, (as do Boxes 8-10), and also Reports of, Correspondence, and Assessments of East London’s industrial performance in this period; in particular, Report and Notes, 7 September 1956. See also CA, PAS, 2/1181-1184, L27/L/T1, Water Supply Scheme, 1942-1951.

17 BCI, Box 12, Report and Notes, 7 September 1956, and in particular, Correspondence between BCI and Escom, 13 May 1951; and 22 June 1951 highlighted this earlier period in more detail. See also CA, PAS, 2/1181-1184, L27/L/T1, Water Supply Scheme, 1942-1951, and 2/1296, L27/L/T2, Water and Electricity Scheme.

18 BCI, Box 36, Reports on the ‘Native Riots and its Impact’, which detailed these ‘psychological’ aspects, and the ‘irreparable harm’ the riots had done to presenting an image of ‘stable’ and ‘cheap native labour’, rather ‘now massing in their hordes’ at the ‘gates of the town’, 12 November 1953. See also D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, 142.

19 BCI, Box 10, Reports on Wages, and Bantu Wages, 12 November 1957, and 24 November 1964, and Box 12, Report and Notes, 7 December 1956. In 1947/8 there were 55 new industrial establishments over the existing 150, and 1948/9 a further 38, making a total of 243 establishments. In 1949/50, the year of the drought, this dropped to 22 new establishments, and there were 21 new one’s in the following year, so that by 1950/51 there were 286 establishments. In 1951/2, however, the number of establishments in East London actually decreased by 6, the following year, that of the riots, an increase of 8 establishments occurred, and in 1953/4, a further decrease of 4 establishments, so that by 1953/4 there were 284 industrial establishments in East London.
post-war boom, and in the establishment of two of the largest industries, textile and automobile, which had significant investment 'multiplier effects' in East London. The 'decline' thereafter, was linked to the nationwide decline in economic activity, assisted by the collapse of a number of the boom's 'mushroom industries', and within the construction industry. The later, more visible decline of investment and establishment growth after c.1957, was also connected to the deterioration of South Africa's balance-of-payments situation, and a 'nation-wide' decline in overseas investments, and on which the local economy remained reliant for investment.20

Locally, though, the interventions of the City Council in shaping the pattern and content of industrial development and investment, needs to be broadened and specified. The continued opposition to any industry which might 'destroy the amenities' and the 'natural beauty' of the City, and its tourist, holiday centre status, was important in constraining industrial and infrastructural planning and development. But it was also important for the failure to 'actively encourage' and to 'sell the city to potential industrialists'.21 More importantly, though, despite the context of its 'popularity' and 'promotion' as a 'holiday resort', the growing recognition that it was 'largely to industry ... that East London must look for prosperity' had become widely recognized in the post-war period, but with a significant series of sub-determinations of 'discrimination' and 'preference'. This involved the need to attract 'light, clean industry', but also industry that would be 'likely to offer employment to Whites against those in which large numbers of Natives are likely to be employed'.22 'The first question the Council asks', argued a BCI Report, is 'what kind of labour will be in employ', and any factory 'dependent on masses of Native labour is actively discouraged ... the Council wishes to see all-White factories to encourage the growth of the White population against the Natives'.23 The Report suggests that this policy became apparent after the war, and had affected 'at least 10 major industries' in a five year period. If they had invested in East London, the Report continues, it would

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22 BCI, Box 12, File C1, Industrial Report, 25 June 1954; Latimer Papers, Correspondence between Latimer and James, 4 March 1953, and 9 August 1955 in particular. This parallels very closely D. Hobart Houghton, *Economic Development*, formulation on 141.
23 BCI, Box 12, File C1, Industrial Report, 25 June 1954.
have 'changed the face of this City, ... bringing it closer to Port Elizabeth ... instead of driving investment to it and the other ports'.

By c1963, though, a very different conception and direction to industrialization had been established in East London. It had become centred on 'Bantu labour', and on the active encouragement of mass production and on factory labour, irrespective of its 'weight' and 'cleanliness'. In this, the interventions of the central state, the emergence of a 'Border Industries Programme', and the crucial changes in the local state were significant, as was the emergence of a more articulate and organized grouping of industrialists. White labour, on the other hand, had become, simultaneously a constraint for operative labour production in overall size, skill, and identity, and transformed and divided, out of production and into the racism of supervision.

This served to internally hasten the process of transition from an attempted reliance on 'white labour' to an acceptance of 'bantu labour' as the basis of local industrialization. But, by then, the contradictory foundations had been laid, and the nature of 'bantu labour' forced back into the Ciskei reserve, and onto the terrains of ethnic 'stabilization'. This is explored in the final chapter below.

The earlier foundations, centred on the attempt to encourage 'white' industrialization, and retain the unskilled nature of 'native labour', and to shape industrialization within these parameters of 'light and clean factories', while dominant within the Council up until the mid-1950s, were not unchallenged within it, or without contradiction in the practices of industrial location and production. But the dominant impact of what I would like to shorthand as 'white industrialization', at least up until the mid-1950s (from c1947), shaped labour and investment processes of growth and development. White male workers in industry increased by 70%, against only 59% for black male workers in the same period. This can be seen as one index of this relatively successful 'discriminating policy of preference'.

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24 BCI, Box 12, File C1, Industrial Report, 25 June 1954; and Latimer Papers, Correspondence, 4 March 1953, affirms this.
26 BCI, Box 12, File C1, Industrial Reports, 25 June 1954-30 June 1964; See also Box 10, Wage Report, 12 November 1957, and Bantu Wages Report, 24 November 1964.
27 BCI, Box 12, File C1, Industrial Report, 30 June 1961 makes these processes most explicit, particularly noting the 'switch' to the acceptance and support for Bantu labour in industry; see also James Papers, which contains correspondence, and local observational notes, and drafts of reports and of Council and Chamber discussions, March 1954-December 1964.
28 White male workers increased from 1,794 in 1946/1 to 3,049 in the same period. The pattern for female workers was significantly different, white women in industry increased by 25%, from 1,067 to 1,330; while black female workers increased from 97 to 774 in the same period.
29 James Papers; this is what James called it in a letter to Latimer, 22 October 1956.
growing capital intensity within industry, and a reliance on skilled white labour, against the encouragement of labour intensive industries.

Barker, and census and industrial records material provide the basis for this argument, but also for the later interconnected processes of black operative replacement, substitution, and presence by the 1960s. Barker estimates that the 'more intensive use of capital in the production of manufactured commodities in the East London area' is evidenced in the faster rate of growth, and value of machinery, plant and tools, over both land and buildings, and over labour. The value of land and buildings rose from R1,318,000 in 1945/6 to R8.770,000 in 1959/60, while that of machinery, plant and tools from R688,000 in 1945/6 to R13,934,000 in 1959/60. The average value per establishment of land, buildings, and machinery, plant and tools increased by over 500 per cent in the same period, and the average value per establishment of net output was below that of comparative average values of physical assets from 1953/4 onwards. This suggestively demonstrates, and industrial records would sustain this argument, that a combination of a degree of over-capitalization, elaborated by Barker, together with diminishing capital investment returns in relation to scale occurred. More generally, however, it enhances the context of relatively highly capitalized industrial formation in this period.30 This is further emphasized by the fact that between 1945/6 and 1959/60, the 'growth index' for gross output had risen to 386 (with 1945/6 as the base year), while the employment index had risen to 189, indicating a faster rate of growth in output than in employment. Barker concludes that the 'general increase in the value of gross output per employee did not arise so much from an increase in the efficiency of the average labourer as from increased amounts of capital inputs during these years ... [and thus] a strong trend towards capital-intensive techniques of production.'31 He continues, that in this context of the majority of industries having increased their inputs of capital relative to their inputs of labour, 'the most substantial increases in capital assets were shown by the food, textile, chemical products, and electrical machinery industry groups - the same industries which showed themselves to be the most capital-intensive in 1959/60 - and it is precisely these groups which showed the greatest differences between the percentage increases in employment and

the percentage increases in capital. This had critical implications for the future skill, racial, and gender composition of the labour force, and for the tensions and contradictions between operative work, wages and migrancy between c1947 and c1963, as will be demonstrated below.

In the same period, the number of workers in the industrial sector increased by 88 per cent, with the number of white workers increasing by 41 per cent, and black workers by 120 per cent. This made the total of black workers in the industrial labour force 70 per cent, while white workers percentages had dropped to 30 per cent by the early 1960s. Per capita earnings for white workers increased from R624 p a in 1945/6 to R1,424 p a in 1959/60, while for black workers their per capita earnings rose from R202 to R338 in the same period, a ratio of 4.4:1. In fact, between 1945/6 and 1954/5, the ratio between white and black wage increases was 175:159, while the corresponding ratio in terms of employment was 49:79. While there was an increase in black wages thereafter, this needs to be balanced against the absolute decline in the level of white employment in industry after the mid-1950s.

This last aspect is particularly important. While white worker numbers increased from 2,526 in 1945/6 to 3,567 in 1959/60, this figure is considerably less than the total of white employment in 1950/51. There was, in fact, an absolute decline in the number of white industrial employees in East London during the latter part of the 1950s. The maximum level was in 1953/4, with 3,765 workers. When balanced against the 1959/60 figures, there was a numerical decrease of 115 people, while black employment figures had increased fairly dramatically. Linked to this pattern, was an associated gender one, where the total number of women employed in industry increased from 1,248 in 1945/6 to 3,149 in 1959/60, representing an increase of 152 per cent (while men, in total only increased by 67 per cent).

Within women's employment, it was the dramatic increase of black women, especially after 1953/4 that was notable. In 1945/6 there were 26 black women in industry, and by 1953/4, 356, but by 1956/7 this had risen to 1,541. White women workers, on the other hand, totalled 1,222 in 1945/6, and this had increased to 1,588 by 1952/3, but only to 1,608 by 1957/8, reflecting, as in the case of white men, an increasing movement out

of industrial labour employment from the mid-1950s. It was also in this period that the marked decline in white male employment, and the equally marked increase in black male employment occurred.  

What this entailed was the 'forced' transition to black operative labour, in a context of black structural unemployment and lack of skills, and of massive labour mobility and turnover. When assessed together with the emergence of an 'alarming degree of unemployment, and the exploitation of unregistered labour ... generating conditions of concealed unemployment' amongst black labour, the combined limitations and periodized processes and implications of 'bantu' replacement and substitution become apparent. This affected the terms and patterns of economic growth in East London. The manufacturing sector expanded significantly in the 1946-1956 period, but thereafter, in the 1957-1961/2 period, there was 'a decline in the average value of industrial output for establishments'. The stagnant nature of the manufacturing sector by 1956/57 was reflected in declining net outputs, marginal investments in plant and machinery, and a largely unsuccessful drive to expand consumer markets. But most important of all was the problematic and uncompetitive productivity of local labour transitions from white to black operative labour.  

So, as the regional market was 'rapidly saturated', and 'far too small' through the impoverishment and 'non-european attitude' to becoming 'consumers', despite the enormous potential market of 'the Bantu', the 'unwillingness of the native to secure a decent livelihood ... through industry's wide open doors' was continually, and repeatedly bemoaned. These were to be the entry points to struggles over the nature and meaning of work and labour productivity, and 'marketable' viability. The related issues of control, discipline and consent, and the creation of a 'universal' and 'native labour machine' were all pervasive in the discourse of the manufacturers as they struggled to cope with migrancy and mobility, regulate wages

36 BCI, Box 11, File C/A/1, Committee Minutes and Reports for the years 1956-1962; Company Archives, consulted in December 1986 and January 1987, at many of the 'industrial concerns' in East London, and particularly illuminating on Statistical information, and Company policy and 'problems' in the period of the 1950s, although also thin and uneven in content.
37 BCI, Box 10, Letter to the BCI from local textile manufacturer, 3 March 1948.
38 Which were contradictory, more than they were mutually reinforceable, as R. Guha 'Dominance Without Hegemony and Its Historiography' in R. Guha, (ed.), Subaltern Studies VI: Writings on South Asian History and Society (Delhi, 1989), 210-309, has emphasized in a wider context over the contradictory relationships between capitalism and colonialism.
and ensure increasing output, while simultaneously attempting to enlarge and ‘create’ textile, food, soap, furniture and glass product markets.39

‘WHITE INDUSTRIALIZATION’, TO OVERSEE THE FUTURE, AND THE SPOTLIGHTS OF MASS PRODUCTION

There exists at present [c1950] a class of non-white industrial labour which is cheap, hard-working, courteous and efficient. Present conditions indicate it is available in unlimited supplies and is a great boon to the economic attractiveness and growth of the city.40

Local investment and industrial expansion had followed the perceived advantages of a growing transport infrastructure and improved port, initiated ironically by ‘commercial interests’. Central to practically all the entrepreneurial spirit of ‘profit with progress’ expressed by big and small manufacturers alike, however, was the expectant exploitability and readiness of a ‘job hungry mass of cheap Native labour ..., who will learn to spend their earnings in the proper manner’.41 This presumption of docile, but willing black workers eagerly learning new skills and values, and thankfully taking home small pay packets, dominated industry and company consciousness between 1947 and 1956. In part this was shaped by the hard reality of the weakness of the white in numerical strength in East London ..., his attachment to his craft ..., and his unwillingness to work below his dignity .... The future of the white must lie in the overseeing of new kinds and a different form of labour.42

Equally significant, though, was the nature of ideological struggle amongst the varied brokers of differing industrial ‘camps’ about the form, meaning and ‘substitution’ of work in racial and occupational terms. Company records paint a picture of tension and contradiction in this period. While a few of the larger companies, and most of the new ones, attempted to implement mass production using ‘Native’, and then ‘Bantu’ labour (and occasionally some Coloured workers in the food sector) from the beginning, many of the smaller and longer established firms baulked at the idea of re-drawing racial lines of work. The issue

39 BCI, Box 10, problems reflected in Committee Minutes and Reports for the period under review, but see Committee Minutes of 3 March 1954, 16 August 1956, and 12 July 1957, in particular.
40 Industrial Brochure published by the City Council and the SAR&H Administration, 1950.
41 BCI, Box 9, Files 23 and 24, Executive Committee Minutes, 5 March 1947, and 23 September 1947.
42 BCI, Box 9, File 25, Executive Committee Minutes, 1948/49, and 12 June 1948, and 3 December 1948 in particular.
was that the `honest, hard-working craftsman will be no more', replaced by `a mob of no-works natives'.

At the same time, opposition and anger would emerge from unemployed, threatened and replaceable white workers. The process of `uplifting the native and giving him the basis to demand more and more' also opened the way for higher wages, unions, and `a stake in the city', all `undesirable' repercussions of employing `bantu labour'. In particular small capital, and skilled white workers were threatened by a desegregated job market, and a potential end to migrant labour. This was accompanied with a wider tension between stability and `cheapness' of labour for capital generally.

The ranks of industrial and manufacturing capital in East London were split between three broad positions, although not necessarily in exclusive and fixed ways. The grouping which supported and most actively articulated a free labour capitalist ideology, materialized around mass production and the labour of black workers, and was located in the new and larger textile, food, electrical goods and automobile factories. These factories were acutely sensitive to the form and need for low cost labour, despite their size and high comparative level of technology/investment. A second, less coherent grouping emerged around smaller firms concerned with competitive expansion and new market penetration, but constrained by lack of capital and white semi-skilled high wages, and by the weak `purchasing power' of `the natives'. A number of such spokesmen took the stage, arguing for substitution and the need for black labour, in almost the same breath as seeking to protect `jobs for whites' in strict racially hierarchical workplaces. Lastly, the small workshops and service industries, the artisanal preserve of East London, together with the construction industry, represented the most racist and exclusive, yet ambiguously, the most materially distilled position of defending the use of `native labour'. It was `cheap' and `ideally suited to dirty and hard manual work', and also in the context of white labour shortages, black workers could do the jobs of whites, but for lower wages and with far less workplace power.

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43 BCI, Box 9, File 24, Executive Committee 3 December 1948, responding to Correspondence and `Investigations' carried out, and complaints received by the BCI.
44 BCI, Box 9, File 24, Correspondence from DIL, 16 July 1949, and in Correspondence expressed, and Notes attached to Meeting of 3 December 1948.
45 BCI, Box 9, File 24, Executive Committee Minutes, 23 September 1947, and a host of Letters and Correspondence to the Committee over these issues.
46 BCI, Boxes 4-6, and Boxes 8-10; Correspondence and Committee and Executive Committee minutes, 1947-1957; Unnamed Report by the BCI, 25 February 1956; Company Archives, M.1, 11 December 1986, and F.1, 12 January 1987.
At the same time, the pressures for keeping the labour force white were historically rooted in the 1930s and sustained in the 1940s and early 1950s in East London. Conceptions about the advantages of, and pressures from white labour shaped the way management thought, initiated and organized production on a basis that continued to prioritize their role. The notion that white labour was best, was strongly and articulately held; it was more 'disciplined', 'intelligent', and responsive to management's needs, while black labour was the reverse for many industrialists. In particular, small, local, and transforming capital in manufacture sensed and argued that with white labour, relations were not only exploitative, but importantly 'filled with agreement and acceptance'. Consent and mutual benefits patterned production undertaken by white workers, craft and operative, in terms of higher wages, job protection and security, transport, canteen, and housing facilities, pensions and insurance. In return, the factory and the workplace where white labour dominated, was stable and productive, at least in the 1940s. But the consent of the 1940s, began to fragment on both sides in the 1950s, with the pressures of limited availability of white labour, workplace expansion and new production techniques, and with the need for new consumer markets, and the necessity of cutting production labour costs. These were all felt, and experienced to various degrees by the majority of local white workers in the workplaces as, increasingly, new faces and hands were to become black.

The question of the local labour market, and the necessary employment of black labour, was vital for mass production as it began to take shape. Its acceptance was however, only partial and incomplete at best, amongst the other two groupings. It was opposed, questioned and restricted around the issues of what constituted 'native' and 'bantu labour'. Employment and skill level, how to answer the problems of a limited white labour force, and the extent of moral obligation and productive value to protect 'poorer whites' and 'white work', as well as how divisions of labour in workplaces should be organized, were prominently on display. Viewed against rigidly hierarchical, entirely white or black factory floors, and supervisory and operative divisions, all were optionally debated and loudly proclaimed as solutions by local capitalists.

47 Company Archives, M.1, 11 December 1987, and K.S.2, 9 February 1987; BCI, Box 9, File 24, Correspondence, June-December 1948, to May 1954.
48 Company Archives, W.1, 6 December 1986, and C.1-4, 15-17 March 1987, Interviews with contemporary Company personnel, B.2, 18 March 1987, K.S.1, 8 February 1987, and R.1, 18 January 1987. (The Company Archives, made up of Records and Interviews, are a very uneven, but key series of documentary and personal accounts for this period, and which I have indexed alphabetically.)
49 Company Archives, B.2, C.1-4, K.S.2, M.1, and W.1-3, December 1986-March 1987; BCI Box 5, and Box 10, Committee Minutes, 1952-1957.
So too was the issue of white worker opposition, fear, and hostility. The power of union organization in the 1950s was influential in creating discord and preventing the emergence of a unified capitalist ideology and strategy in East London.\(^50\) Resignations based on the employment of 'kaffir labour' in firms, the threatened walkout if a newly hired black worker was not dismissed in an assembly plant, and actual physical assaults on African workers all indicated the way power flowed in the factories, as did the cross-racial threats, the sabotaging of black workers' machines, and the demands for segregated work-areas, toilets, breaks, and starting and ending times.\(^51\) This all made production, and control of the labour-process tense and demanding, and substitution explosive.

Black workers' fears were structured and articulated in broader political terms, momentarily expressed through the ANC, the Defiance Campaign, and in the impermanence of 'community' life in the townships. It was generally accepted by management, and within local state structures that 'East London was not a city of strikes and disputes'.\(^52\) Rather it was the question of migrancy that was of deeper concern, as it was recognized by the 'free labour capitalists' that

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\text{the full commitment of native labour to an industrial society as is developing in E.L. requires and demands a complete break with tribal affiliations and the system of migrant labour ... The presence and perpetuation of a dual society is an obstacle in the path of rapid development.}^53
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But the ideologues of mass production, who by 1952 dominated the Border Chamber of Industries, were not magicians and a statement of intent did not carry locally universal desires. For many firms migrancy was the 'most suitable form of native labour' throughout the 1950s, and as such defended 'tooth and nail' in chamber meetings, and at work.\(^54\) An equal number of 'industrialists', and in particular the small firms, were also opposed to 'permanent native residents', as were the commercial brokers. Migrancy was seen to

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\(^{50}\) Company Archives, F.1, M.1, W.1; BCI Box 9, File 38, 'Problems with White Labour', Draft Report on Meetings with DIL, 16 September 1955.
\(^{51}\) BCI, Box 9, Files 38-40 'Details of industrial conflict', minutes re executive meetings with DIL, 12 December 1953, and 8 June 1954 to 2 September 1958.
\(^{52}\) CA, LIE, File 17, EL 4/8/7/3, Divisional Inspector of Labour, Meeting of Sub-committee on Industrial Disputes, 1952-1961.
\(^{53}\) BCI, Box 10, File 27, Executive Committee Industrial Report, 26 June 1956, and reproduced in Box 12, File C1.
\(^{54}\) BCI Boxes 11, and 13, Unnamed Sub-Committee Minutes, 1952-1957, and particularly 7 May 1954, which appears to have concerned itself primarily with migrancy in the East London Region.
enable greater control, permit lower wages and displace reproduction costs. It also made for a 'clean and trouble-free city', as well as a 'more humble and obedient servant'.

On the factory floors of East London these debates and conceptions played themselves out in a different dynamic, supplying significant shaping pressures on the nature of local capitalism 'from below'. The broad acceptance of using and abusing 'cheap native labour', if in markedly different forms and dimensions amongst capitalists, did not mean black workers flocked through the gates, stabilized and skilled themselves, and got on with the job. Neither did it mean white workers felt secure and protected, simply 'going with the waves of change'.

For the white working class the whole nature and direction of struggle had assumed a different character. The 1920s and 1930s had seen the occupational and 'traditional' craft based working class 'opened up' by small-scale industrialization in East London. By the Second World War all skilled and semi-skilled work in industry was held by white workers. This was to change. A key process was the ability, often linked to necessity, of white workers to redefine their position in the workplaces of the 1950s. This meant that while some joiners, moulders, and cutters held onto their skills in food, engineering and clothing, others, increasingly, were forced to accept or initiate re-definitions which involved deskilling and the uneasy transition from artisan to industrial worker with different skills, responsibilities, and workplace experiences.

A different process of white working class formation centred around the movement of recently proletarianized, largely Afrikaans speakers, into East London. This occurred from the Transkei and Ciskei rural areas in particular. In desperation, many found themselves shoulder-to-shoulder 'like ants' with African manual workers in the construction of the new port facilities in the 1930s. Gradually this contact began to manifest itself in the manufacturing and commercial spheres, but as blatant competition and

55 BCI, Box 13, Migrancy Sub-Committee Minutes, 7 May 1954, and attached Notes and Correspondence.
56 CA, LIE, File 17, EL 4/8/7/3, Divisional Inspector of Labour Reports, 1952-1958, also found in BCI, Box 13.
57 D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, Ch. 10.
58 Company Archives, Annual Reports, and documentation, C.2, F.1, K.S.1, M.1, R.1, and W.1, as the most representative of a widely documented and articulated process; also H H. Smith, 'Development of Labour Organization', Chs. 1-3.
60 Daily Dispatch, 5 October 1937.
hostility for a place in the new labour markets. The fight for segregated workplaces and protected jobs voiced in the unions, in locally emergent Afrikaner Nationalist bodies, and in the homes, churches and clubs, pressed on pressurized craft workers, and on local capitalists in the 1940s and early 1950s. The transitional impact of the Second World War, and the emergence of both a reconstituted internal definition of skill and craft, together with an emergent generational 'republicanism' concretely made the connections between skill and work, and inter-connections between them and race and supervision. The gradual intersection of declining artisanal, generationally re-formulated white conceptions of skilled work, and rising manufacturing, service, and commercial terrains of white labour, redefined work expectations.

The implications of this re-making of the white working class in the 1950s meant that workers began to 'weigh the relative advantages of employment in commerce and unskilled work', in 'positions conveniently located in matters of wages, welfare, and employment policies, in security prospects, in attractiveness or otherwise of general working conditions, and in various social aspects attached to particular employments'. Centrally, factory employment became identified as 'beneath the dignity and standing' of both white male and female workers. To be an operative or a manual worker was to be black. The 'correct position' for white male workers was in 'the overseeing and supervising of native labour'. This was integrally related to the space in which, with the wartime transition in the 'meaning', and composition of craft in East London, white workers sought to translate the 'traditions' of craft into those of supervision, and out of those of skilled, and operative labour. This highlighted a major contradiction between 'white

61 Interviews F. Greakson, 30 June 1988, and R. Laweson, 5 July 1988; BCI Box 13, File 13/B, Correspondence to BCI re 'Native Labour', 10 August 1948 and attached correspondence.


64 D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, 219; BCI Box 13, File 13/B, contains the same information in correspondence, 1947-1955, and in Labour, and Industrial Reports, and Notes, and Correspondence with DIL.

65 CA, LIE, File 1, Annual Reports of DIL, 1946-1964, in particular, but the entire LIE archive contains the elements of this process.
industrialization', and the refusals, and resistances of younger white workers to be incorporated into this process at the working class end of wage packets and definitions.66

This increasing rigidity with which white work was being defined, from below, meant that employers have to face the fact that they are unable to entice white labour into such activities as sweetmaking, or the manufacture of clothing or textiles or shoes on the scale they would like and the decreasing numbers means adapting their production accordingly. White women are better, more industrious and self-disciplined than men, and are more reliable because they don't need supervision the way other races do. But they don't stay long in their jobs... In a word jobs are looking for workers rather than workers looking for jobs. The answer lies in native replacement.67

Significantly, though, this re-definition was uneven and far from complete by the mid-1950s. Workers, white men and women, continued to find themselves in food, chemical, clothing, and in engineering, paint and timber works as semi-skilled and operative labour.68 This meant that their workplaces often simmered with tension and conflict. Poor work quality and inefficiency, absenteeism and drunkenness, as well as open racial antagonism became expressions of deeper class frustrations of 'stagnation and immobility'.69 White workers forced into factories and operative/manual positions were often seen as 'the desperate and unintelligent... weak in head and spirit', entering into unwanted and lowly-defined jobs by their fellow workers, and this hurt and angered them.70 As they came increasingly under the varied strengths of capitals' spotlights in the mid-1950s, employers big and small began questioning the viability of unsuitable and untrained workers, and the fact that 'progressive upward movements of whites enabled less qualified white labour also to move upward'.71

66 BCI, Box 13, File 13A, Details re 'White Labour', 22 September 1950, and attached correspondence; CA, LIE, File 1, and File 9 and 10, DIL Reports, and Correspondence over unskilled white labour, and sheltered employment.
67 BCI Box 13, File 13/B, Details re 'Native Labour', correspondence from major sweet manufacturer, endorsed by BCI on letter, 28 May 1955.
68 CA, LIE, File 1, 1/13/3, Annual Reports of DIL, especially 1949-1955; BCI, Box 13, File 13/A, White Labour correspondence and Minutes of Meetings, 14 May 1952, and attached correspondence.
71 BCI, Box 13, File 13/A, 'White Labour' Correspondence and Committee Minutes, 12 August 1951.
'NOTHING WAGES', THE 'ISONKA' SYSTEM, AND THE TASTE OF MEMORY

The newly discovered black operative worker was, in the early 1950s, unresponsive to the moulds laid with so much difficulty by management's ideological brokers. There was no 'easy' second or third generation workforce, no pre-existing pattern and culture of capitalist work and skill, no clear-cut separation from the land, no unambiguous conception of private property, not even the necessary acceptance of alienated industrial time in East London in the 1950s.

This is best illustrated by taking the example of the Market Square Bus Terminus on any Friday afternoon in the early 1950s: jostling queues of people and parcels, overcrowded buses, the destinations of Kwelegha, Keiskamma-Strand, and Mount Frere reaffirming old and generating new contacts and unities, discussions and realities. Of these migrants, weekly, fortnightly, and monthly East London workers going 'home' to the Ciskei and Transkei for the weekend, many would return 'in time', but many would not be outside the factories and workshops on Monday mornings, taking advantage of 'our time, not the whiteman's'.

For many of these migrants, wage labour was an attempt to

... get enough to get back to what was important for me... I grew up on the land and then I worked here at different places to earn money to plant and build up my farm... later that all changed and I had to work here to earn a living and I lost sight of the land.

In this sense, wages, their value and their relationship to the nature of work, were constantly played off against not just the remembered, but the actual possibilities of rural production, making dipping-tanks as important as drive-shafts for still more than 50% of East London's workers in the 1950s. The imprecise, convoluted, and tenuous links that characterized the separation of about 85% of East London's workers from rural realities as 'partial', were felt directly in the workplace.

Ninety percent of the natives are worse than useless... they should be kicked out... their attachments in the Kaffir Territories, their concern with their fields... and ploughing holidays, as well as the

72 BCI, Box 10, Correspondence between City Engineer, and BCI, 13 February 1952.
73 Interviews with a number of workers of the 1950s. These interviews, conducted principally with black, but also some white workers, referenced according to initials, interview no. and date. In particular J.T. Kophi, V. Madikane, S. Mjiwi, and S. Ramacana, and F. Grearson, R. Laweson, and J. Taylor. See also BCI, Boxes 11 and 13, for the 'Migrancy Sub-committee' and Box 9, Files 38-40 including details of 'Industrial Conflict', Executive and DIL Meetings and Reports, 1953 and 1954-1958.
irregular and constant movement to and fro makes them the worst workers I've ever come across ... the respect held for a job in town is nothing compared to the worth shown their rural existence ... I cannot run my business like this and I am not alone, not by any means.76

The problem was not so much migrant labour itself, which suited many businesses in East London in wage and reproductive cost cutting, but in its unstable and uncontrollable nature. This was reflected in a massive labour turnover, where 25% of workers had been employed for less than three months and 56% for two years or less, in the dominant form of weekly migration out of the city,77 in 'absenteeism', and in that

the native has no understanding of modern time ... he will arrive late, leave early, not work on Mondays ... the time spent on work is probably only half of what it should be. 78

The contradictory nature of how the black working class in East London was made and made itself, was acutely felt in the fragility with which many black workers valued the workplace. Workers changed jobs for a myriad of undetectable personal reasons, but two broad processes emerge as major explanations: bad working conditions and low wages, and the sustaining [if declining] realities of rural life. Workers complained that work 'starts too early and coldly'; that work was too exacting and treatment was 'bad, like rubbish'; and of being paid 'nothing wages'. One worker left work because he became tired of riding a bicycle, another because of the 'language of the sjambok', a third because he 'needed a rest at home', and others because they had to plough, harvest or marry.79 These worlds of labour, the factory, the railway shed, the backyard, and their unsuitability and instability of occupation, meant that the pick and shovel railway worker was as likely as the engineering machine operator, the weaver as likely as the stevedore worker, to share the designs and engage in the patterns of resisting proletarianization and permanence. The perceived operative black working class did not materialize to fill even those factories where they were accepted and expected.

75 BCI, Box 10, File 27, Meetings re 'Native Employment', between DIL and Committee, 18 March 1952, 12 November 1952.
76 BCI, Box 10, File 28, Correspondence presented at meeting 12 November 1952.
77 BCI, Box 10, File 28, 28 November 1952, and 11 April 1953; also BCI, Box 13, 'Migrancy' Sub-Committee Minutes 1952/53.
78 BCI, Box 11, File 38, Letter dated 18 January 1951.
79 Interview 3g, N.D., 29 June 1987., Daily Dispatch, 23 February 1951. See also P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, 24-25.
The needs and expectations that significantly altered East London's economic development were the apparent availability of cheap and docile black labour. This appeared to hold out potential profitability and was the central locational and expansion factor for larger foreign and national industrialists in the 1946-1953/4 period. The 1950s proved though, that availability was not effort or output, and location not production or profit on any simple one to one basis. Black workers continued to struggle not only for wage increases and a political voice, but against their very entry into and expected routines and practices of exploitation in the workplaces of East London.

Pre-industrial work habits continued to have a profoundly contradictory effect on work and the factories of East London. While frequent job changes were seen as 'undignified, unmanly, and possibly displeasing to the spirits', the dominant nature of 'heavy, demanding, and lowly paid white work' emphasized necessary avoidance, evasion and opposition. Workers were caught in the tensions between traditional beliefs and new settings. Focused between the possibility of 'witch' attacks, targeted on a thriving family and herd (attacks via envy), and wage labour permanence, 'ancestor religion' was uneasily translated into successful wage labour. It was, in itself 'breaking tradition and entering an alien white man's world' and therefore opening oneself to attack more easily. There was less harm, and less possibility of attention, if one sustained labour mobility and changed jobs, while workers desperately clung to the rural areas in whatever way possible, as a satisfactory link to the ancestors, and as 'protection from harm'.

Work patterns were also different. The time, speed, and rhythm of seasons and ploughs, was replaced by the sweat, heat, tiredness and strain of mechanized and heavy, repetitive manual work, and it was resisted and evaded as far as possible. Complex arrangements of rest, slow work, managed machine faults and breakdowns, and 'looking for rests in the work' through constant job movement and regular migration, patterned experiences and reflected the alienated nature of 'white work'. The loss of 'managing one's own life' and of having to labour in 'the white man's world' was doubly felt as a removal of independent rural and personal control over work and production, and of having to increasingly rely on those 'who took my

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80 Based on Interviews, and Company Archives, conducted in 1987 and 1988; despite D. Hobart Houghton rather more diffuse conclusions, see Economic Development, 337-344.

81 P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, Ch. 9; Interviews, Zg, N.D., 29 June 1987.
life away in the first place and are now doing it again in spirit and manliness in work not fit for men.82 This equally affected the degree of incorporation and acceptance of wage labour in East London in the 1950s, and its avoidance, but also constrained the new routes of workers into operative labour in important ways.83

The way in which ‘the manliness’ of male workers was affected by wage labour, influenced a consciousness of work which was reflective of a deeper reality of the nature of ‘industrial’ work. No longer directed and controlled by the rural chiefs and elders, not only did the nature of work change but also the content. The African men, forced into wage labour, could no longer rely on the labour of wives and ‘juniors’, as in the rural areas, and found the pressures of long, continuous and seemingly never-ending shifts at the various points of production very different to the gender divided and male controlled tasks in the Ciskei and Transkei. More, ‘harder’ and different work, and diminishing control and ability to influence their own participation in it, engendered a hostility to ‘independent women’ and ‘tsotsi youth’ outside of the workplaces, but also to the instability of occupation inside. Migration, as often as possible, back to the rural areas, and wage labour as a re-entry mechanism to these ‘declining patchwork rural slums’ in the ‘reserves’, was also an attempt to control ‘the women’, on whom their power and access to the rural areas rested to a significant degree. Women were resented and bemoaned as they ‘made life more difficult’, made work more real, and increasingly they ‘refused to listen’.84 An answer seemingly lay in re-asserting patriarchal control, through wage labour, in order to re-assert financial control in the reserves, but ironically, also its avoidance, on a regular and systematic basis in order to retain ‘manliness’ and not become ‘urbanized’.

Expected work routines were also upset by the ‘iseti’ (home-sets) and ‘amakhaya’ (home-men) who would live, and work together as much as was possible. The solidarities of kinship extended into a food factory for example, where workers found a member of a rival kin group employed in the processing section and refused to work while he remained.85 More generally, kinship asserted and reinforced migrant attachments to particular rural areas, encouraged their continuance, and provided an identity that was not easily broken.

82 Daily Dispatch, 7 June 1956.
83 Interviews, 3e, K.M. 12 January 1987, V. Madikane, 7 December 1988, and S. Ramncana, 24 January 1989; BCI, Box 11, File 43, Correspondence between Employers and BCI, 23 March 1952 and attached communication.
85 Company Archives, W.1, 8 December 1986.
into by the demands of ‘stable and permanent native labour’ in East London. The amakhaya also ‘provided jobs’ as both employers and associated workers, adopted the practices of ‘encouraging family and close tribal connections’ amongst their workforces. This facilitated job selection, but also made it ‘easier to go home and return later and still have your job’.

It also meant that workers avoided ‘heavy work’ and ‘bad employers’, through the solidarities of kinship, when first arriving in East London, or in more desperate personal moments, and encouraged ‘the discretionary nature of the native job market on a significant scale’.

‘Bad employers feel their effects in particular... the message goes out and some factories are known to be avoided in some country areas.’

Low wages were a major issue affecting the workplace and the relations of work in the 1950s. Material work rewards simply did not correspond to effort, and the new factories were included on this list. Constant complaints and questioning of underpayment, and that wages were not enough to live on, meant a resistance to working that was expressed in as limited a participation as conditions allowed. But it went further. The dishonesty identified with low wages exemplified the differences in material and cultural life between white and black, and meant that

a white employer who pays his native employees a small wage is a very bad man; he is no better than a thief, because he takes advantage of the fact that if you refuse the pay there is another man who will take the job. With this fact in mind you accept the small wage. The thing to do then is to steal when the chance presents itself. It is not sinful to steal from another thief... You cannot force him to pay you a living wage; all you can do is get your own back somehow... Is it wrong to take that which belongs to you but which is being fraudulently retained by your employer.

The emergence of the ‘isonka’ system (of stealing to supplement wages) became widely prevalent in East London in the 1950s, was particularly concentrated within the new manufacturing companies, and was greatly admired. It also was not seen as illegal, as ‘the valuable things that have been taken are not those of anybody I know. They belong to a white man, whose only connection with me is employment’.

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87 BCI Boxes 6 and 7, Committee Minutes re ‘problems’ of employment, 2 May 1954, and attached Notes and Meetings.
88 P. and I. Mayer, *Townsmen or Tribesmen*, 145.
This pervasive sense that factory wage labour was fraudulent and illegal 'theft', and the racial and cultural visibility attached to this, afforded a stark illegitimacy to property and production in all industries. This partly reflected the ragged, uneven, and divided nature of industrialization, and its emerging segmented labour markets, and included operative labour. Black workers were also patently 'not equal before the law', and had little 'freedom' in haphazard and discriminatory 'contracts' of waged work. Workers were not, and did not contract and participate in wage labour as 'individual real people' in class terms, in the eyes of most industrialists and the local state, as much as within themselves.90 And this had its corollary in systems of factory supervision, whose dominant modes of organization did not 'insidiously objectify those on whom it was applied', but rather involved subjective and paternal racial and economic stereotypes that were variously assigned, internalized, rejected, and evaded, by black workers.91

Individual and collective economic identities were not determinate working class identities of expression and organization then, but involved symbolic and cultural constructions of class and work relations that were most frequently racially, socially and humanly affirmative. This was seldom explicit, and most typically subtle and diverse. It was built out of the meaningful bases located in the 'blind alleys' of rural social forms (in the historically salient categories from witchcraft to 'amakhaya'), embedded through regular migrancy, and cemented through the historically expressive oppositions and contrasts between town and countryside, and between work and labour. Most prominent were the economic representations of the alien and degrading 'whiteness' of the factories, and of wages and workplace relations. New manufacturers were unable, and often unwilling to counter these representations, and 'native labour' continued to avoid operative labour in the framework of 'white industrialization'. These identities and 'rhetorical contrasts' were all 'intrinsic' to shaping worker identities, and re-drawing individual factory's production relations, as well as the structure and process of this phase of local industrialization as a whole. Through attempting to sustain existing labour market 'racial segmentations', and changing relations of cheap labour exploitation and skilling, the pressures of creating an operative, but low-waged labour force became apparent. These


91 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 220; M. Vaughan, Curing Their Ills, Introduction.
identities and perceptions outlined above, were intrinsically mobilized to 'handle' and 'counter' the alienation and dislocation of a fragmented proletarianization, and the attempted homogenization, and extension of the existing parameters for black workers as a 'cheap native labour class' into operative labour in East London in this period. Capital could not conquer and transform the

... blue sky and the green field, this we took with us to the looms of the whiteman... you cannot wall and enclose people's heads, they are not stupid machines... 1234 push, 1234 pull, ... never, ... never more than a taste on these lips.92

These constituent elements, real, symbolic and rhetorical, derivative and distinctive of an emerging workplace culture amongst black workers in East London are not 'outside' of a new process of operative working class formation in this period. They are, rather, integral to its shape and composition as only a 'taste of memory'. In this context, their impact is long-lasting and profound, in explaining both the weakness, and fragmentary nature of a distinctly 'universal' working class outlook amongst 'bantu labour'. This points to the necessity, and capacity in East London in this 'core' period of industrialization, to historicize class relations in both structure and representation as intrinsic, but not dominant or always determinant in waged manual labour. It is this complex and contradictory 'dialogue of and about class' in East London, that signposts the problems of 'walling and enclosing' the universal thoroughfare of working class expectation from the local, historical and cultural alleys of its representations and identities.

Following the Comaroffs, these are all potentially poetical representations of an acute form of emerging class consciousness in East London.93 Equally, it should be argued that this consciousness does indeed correlate the ragged, uneven and explicitly local and weak economic structure and manufacturing labour base in emergence at this time. Very clearly, individualized and collective explanations were based on an experience of 'poetic' contrast between varying forms of work and labour, and of waged exploitation as alienated and demoralized 'theft', as well as in rhetorical constructs of town (harsh East London) and countryside (romanticized rural reserves). The realities of recent proletarianization, migrancy, and halting factory occupation and work all affirm however that this is a particular experience of generalized 'industrial' class formation that is neither exceptional or unique, historically. As such, contemporary South African

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93 J. and J. Comaroff, 'The Madman and the Migrant', 192-194, 205
historiography would typically see this as generative of relatively stable and new long-term class structures, and potentially associated universal practices and 'forms of consciousness'. In this period this is not the case. East London's workers begin to shape (and are shaped) into the collective and 'universal' racial consciousness of fragmentary class relations on existing patterns and practices of labour exploitation. It is not false, or backward-looking, and neither is it acute or inexplicable. It is simply the most apparent. Neither is it singular, or dominant, but rather forms into the older established patterns of evasion, mobility and movement, and the 'traditions of native labour' established in struggle in previous decades. It was these traditions which were translated into that diverse and untidy heap of new industrial structures and experiences, rhetorical and real.

Struggles around unskilled, low-waged, and operative work and labour, and their definition in East London in this period, generated actions and forms of 'consciousness' which at first glance appear to deny class at practically every level. Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the diverse and complex nature of class formation and consciousness, and also argued that there is the need to move beyond crude and deterministic formulations of these processes. In opening the space for non-universal and the less obvious and realistic to be identified as 'acute' forms of consciousness is significant, but also misleading. This universal nature does not simply arise from internal material contradictions and 'realities', somehow amenable to political and ideological 'articulation' easily or even necessarily. Rather, it is these 'acute' forms that are the realities of class formation, in their historical, regional and concrete expression. They are weak, fragmented, and profoundly non-universal in generalized class terms, structurally, and in consciousness. It is not a turning of backs, but a direct confrontation with shaping and expressing new manufacturing class relations in ways that do not simply collapse into automatic working class realities and identities for the participants, and thereby deny the past in the present. But of more significance was the explicit volume of racial contrast and antagonism that came 'universally' to dominate the workplace.

94 I have made this point in the Introduction, and will not repeat the range of references here. For a useful, albeit 'popularized' summary, however, see L. Callinicos, Working Life.


96 I refer here, in particular, to the work of J. and J. Comaroff, 'The Madman and the Migrant'.
East London's phase of 'rapid industrialization' (1945-1957), occurs in a period that marks the 'core' of South Africa's industrial revolution. It is also the comparative decade of 'structural change' to manufacturing industrial development in colonial Africa. The associated assumptions argue for the equally rapid emergence of a black manufacturing working class, which becomes politically central. This is supported by reference to urbanization and employment statistics in South Africa, and organizational statistics and expression in select areas of Africa. East London supports both these arguments as the local studies of the 1960s confirm.

The unifying thread to these spatially and structurally differentiated processes of industrialization and class formation is held to lie in the 'unskilled' and cheap basis of black and colonial labour forces in the phases of 'necessary' import substitution.

Historians have, in related arguments for South Africa, and for colonial Africa more broadly, suggested that the nature of this 'working class' remains problematic in terms of its 'populist' political nature, and in its resistance to proletarianization, expressed largely in its migrant and/or 'non-bounded' class realities of community and culture.

It is in the 'politics of (new manufacturing) production' in East London that are about class, before they are 'of class', where meaning was constructed around 'cheap, abundant labour', and its denial. In the factories, the dominant meaning of work by the early 1950s was constructed from above in terms of a definition of 'native labour'. This carried the primary concern of a low-waged worker, that was simultaneously legitimized through reference to the racial colonial past and forms of racial domination. This structural racial division of labour was beset with contradictions, and processes of change, however. Industrialists were divided over 'stabilization', requirement, and migrancy, white workers found themselves facing an

'inferior' definition in their meaning of work, against their social meaning of exclusivity, as they did the 'same kaffir jobs', and black workers refused, and resisted their apparent 'cheapness'. As white workers re-defined their meaning of work towards 'supervision', primarily through the extra-work social constructions of apartheid, and racism, black workers re-defined the value and notion of their social positions through the nature of their occupation of the workplaces.

The ways that East London's black workers invested meaning to their experience of cheap labour was through instability, the failure to 'take the job market seriously', and the 'unwillingness to seize job opportunity when it knocks'. The nature of wage labour was defined as 'theft', and its conception as fraudulent powerfully suggests the stark illegitimacy of production and property in industry, a conception reinforced in the recent and 'incomplete' forms of proletarianization, and through alienated and distinctive Location spatiality. There is a real sense in which the generalized nature of these failures to 'ideologically neuter' the realities of private property and the discriminatory labour markets in East London, pushed forward collective social identities for black workers and industrialists, that were not ones of determinate class expression and organization. Thus as workers symbolically constructed a meaning of class that was simultaneously socially affirmative in racial and human terms, and economically 'antagonistic' of cheapness, of 'not doing the work we were expected to do, and what I was capable of but couldn't', a more complex meaning of the social and economic value and 'ability' of industrial work emerged 'from below'.

In the same period, in the context of 'fluctuating' production and declining white worker availability, industry needed to consolidate semi-skilled work, extend 'stability', and also maintain and reproduce a low-wage structure. The instability of work had generated a conception of 'laziness' and 'cheekiness' that was reproduced from below, by the workers themselves. It was convenient in expectation, and it corresponded to an increasingly collective agreement to the reality inside work. For those 'looking forward'

102 Documents in Company Archives, December, 1987; and in BCI, Boxes 6 and 7, Committee Minutes re 'problems' of employment in the 1950s.

103 See the argument of P. Joyce, (ed.), The Historical Meaning of Work, 7-10, which although it focuses on the advanced capitalist countries, is enormously suggestive of a less 'universal' approach to the theoretical questions of 'work', and of the way work and class is historically and 'symbolically' constructed.


105 BCI, Boxes 6 and 7, Committee Minutes re 'problems' of employment in the 1950s, especially Minutes, 4 August 1956.
in industry however, it acted as a brake on 'progress'.106 Equally however alternatives to the 'inability of the native to work' were not apparent or successful, confined by the wage and skill structure to racial division, confused through gradations of migrancy and 'free', and constrained by shopfloor racist supervision and control. Labour, then, was not cheap, and work hostile in meaning, and ineffective in operation.

This ambiguity of class formation at the point of production, and expressed through the meaning of work in complex ways, can be well demonstrated in the way the 'language about class' was constructed in East London in this period. For industry, black workers were 'kaffirs', 'boys', and most commonly, 'natives'. For workers, management was 'master' or 'whiteman', and never 'boss'. Work was 'for the whiteman', who became 'master' on the floor, and 'by the boys', who became 'worthless kaffirs' if they refused to work as expected.107 But workers in their own everyday experiences amongst each other were 'Africans' and 'the men'. It was this mix of past and present, colonial dispossession, and factory 'inclusion', and the inabilities to transform and legitimize work as cheap and desirable, that meant 'rapid industrialization' did not entail an automatic constitution of a working class, even in structural terms. This reality was to become particularly apparent in the 1957-1963 period, when in the context of industrialization, East London entered a 'crisis of production', centred on 'inadequate' labour exploitation.

A CRISIS IN PRODUCTION, THE EAST LONDON WORKING CLASS AND APARTHEID.

In 1956/57 the growth of manufacturing capital slowed considerably and contemporary industrialists began to talk of a crisis of production. One industrial report suggested

the low quality of labour, a relatively recent development is being experienced by the majority of employers in the city ... The results on their economic performance is deeply disturbing ... The inability of many companies to reach targets can only have negative[sic] and far-reaching consequences for the future.108

106 BCI, Box 7, Minutes, 4 August 1956, 3 November 1956.
107 Interviews, with white and black workers, especially J.T. Kophi, V. Madikane, and with F. Grearson, and E. Kitson.
The flurry of consultations, studies and reports by 'production engineers' and 'efficiency experts' for a number of key manufacturing industries, reflected the need to increase and direct production. Apart from linking 'strong and effective management' to 'labour discipline and control' as the counters to low productivity, the generalized conclusion was the necessity to convince 'native and coloured labour' of the attractiveness and advantage of their conversion into 'efficient', 'stable', 'reliable', 'careful', and 'responsible' workers. Previously this practice had been reserved for 'white labour', but part of the crisis was that white labour was both 'drying up', as well as having 'set its sights on the better supervisory positions'.

Importantly, this does not mean that capital in general in East London responded to the crisis of 1956/57 with a cohesive and comprehensive process of transformation. Many of the smaller firms and workshops continued to rely on personalized, paternalistic, and arbitrary forms of attempted workplace domination. In these locales, the working day and its regularization and time extension mattered for black workers, and for the owners and their 'management team of family and supervisory help'. If these firms survived, and at least 30 didn't, they emerged little changed in capital structure, in use of technology and in productive capabilities by 1963. In terms of the workplace though, and the nature of its occupation and stability, 'native labour' was 'more strongly present, and more regularly so', by c1963. Importantly, however, it was the responses which saw the 'jelling' of mass production ideology with forced workplace substitution and practice which became the dominant one. Thereafter it was these relations which gave classes in East London their particular form.

It was these new manufacturing factories, whether dependent on 'the strength, skill, quickness, and sureness of touch of the individual worker', 'the brute strength and toil of the ganger', or the 'watchful, repetitive and mechanized regulations of the operative on the line', that came to dominate the industrial map of East London.

109 Company Archives, B.2, 18 March 1987, C.3, 17 March 1987, K.S.1, 8 February 1987, M.B.2, 4 February 1987, and W.2, 7 December 1986; also BCI, Box 15, File PE/1, which contains Company Correspondence, and Minutes of Meetings between the BCI, and a number of the local industrialists over capitalization and the related implications for labour employment practices, 25 July 1960, and 22 November 1962.

110 BCI, Box 21, File 12/D, Minutes of Meeting, 23 September 1957.

111 BCI, Box 21, Report, and Correspondence and Notes, sub-titled 'Family Businesses', details the issue of 'native labour', and that of the working day and weekly wage issues, evasions, and attempts at control, 3 July 1958. See also CA, LIE, Files 3-9, EL 4/3/6; 4/3/9; and 4/3/12, IC Acts and Correspondence, 1944-1964.

112 BCI, Box 21, BCI Report and Notes on the period between 1957 and c1963, described as a local slump for industrialists, 11 February 1964. This is sustained in Company Archives, examined in December 1986-March 1987.
London by 1963. 113 But the transitions from white to black labour, and from unskilled 'native labour' to operative 'bantu labour' were not only partial and incomplete, but also uneven and contradictory throughout the 1950s, and they accelerated in this period of crisis. Few achieved the transitions, or the implementations as effectively as those outlined for CTM, and conflict and struggle over labour-time, turnover, training, and 'management' of the factory floors were particularly pronounced. 114

The restraints of operative black labour engagement, and particular shortages of white labour experienced in East London through the 1950s were, according to the BCI, the 'two major elements in the local stagnation of industry'. While the BCI argued this had been 'resolved' by 1963/64 in the 'replacement of bantu labour', this requires some qualification. 115 In exploring this process the emergent nature of the possibilities of local class relations, their potential stabilization, and their practical socialization were key.

The most immediate and apparent response by manufacturing capital to the 'labour problems' of the 1950s, was the attempt to initiate 'new methods of organizing production' with new investment. In all the major sectors the level of capital intensity increased in the 1956-1963 period, in places marginally, but in other factories, dramatically. 116 While it was suggested that this involved 'sophisticated and modern machines, comparable to the rest of the world' 117 it was more accurately, and largely, second hand machinery, behind the rest of the 'advanced world' that was the more common pattern, but it was still significant in capitalizing local industry, and intensifying the need for semi-skilled labour. 118 Despite the relatively high levels of capital investment, whatever its nature and technological capabilities however, production, even in the international companies, was linked to the needs of large and cheap labour forces on a continuous basis. 119

114 BCI, Box 15, File PE/1, 2 November 1962 details this through Correspondence, and 'Investigation Reports', drawn together into a 'Substitution Report', and in particular contains correspondence from CDA, Raylite, Wilson-Rowntree, Berkshire, KSM, and others over these processes.
115 BCI, Box 21, Report, 11 February 1964.
116 BCI, Box 21, File 3/1/A, which contains Correspondence and Notes utilized to compile the February 1964 Report, and included estimations of, and the dimensions for increased capital and technology investments.
117 BCI, Box 15, File PE/1, 22 November 1962; and Box 21, Report, 11 February 1964.
118 James Papers, Correspondence between James and Saunders, 5 March 1964, commenting on the Cyril Lord factory, and listing related cases of the investment of redundant machinery in the 1950s period. Company Records, W.1, and C.1, confirm aspects of these observations.
119 BCI, Box 21, Report, and Notes, 11 February 1964.
The sustained need for such labour forces, and their productive incorporation and control was a necessity, and in the post 1957 period of crisis, a hard reality that needed solutions.

For the older established firms, and Wilson Rowntree is an excellent example, the 'artificial spaces' of labour shortage of white men and women, together with the growing pressure of 'competitive advantage', pushed through

the necessity to upgrade the factory, introduce labor-saving and modern equipment and become competitive on the national market. Modernization also has distinct advantages in our quest for good native labour... A modern factory will introduce modern and attractive conditions under which it will labour.\textsuperscript{120}

This captures an important dynamic linked to the mechanization and restructuring of labour-processes in factories in East London - as a response to black worker 'avoidance', and turnover mobility in mass production as much as it had, and continued to occur on 'unskilled native labour' terrains. The establishment of more capital intensive forms of production entailed not simply the deskilling of white workers, but also the acquisition and experience of new skills for black workers. And new skills, along with increased wages, benefits, better working conditions, and more systematized and regular hours would mean greater responsibility and a required 'sense of belonging in the life of the factory'.\textsuperscript{121}

The answers lay in the workplaces, although they appeared in the form of the councillor, the Location Superintendent, the magistrate, the policeman, and the labour bureau official. After 1955/56 the manufacturers, reaching for solutions, began to make contact, sometimes unintentionally, with the developing practices of the apartheid state in the region. The Ciskei and Transkei bantustans both experienced significant decline in the 1950s, and by 1957 were little short of 'rural slums'.

The importance of this is perhaps best highlighted in the changing language of African migrant and settled workers. The themes of 'country-rootedness and loyalty to old cultural standards', of cattle, kraals, drought and ploughs, wives and rural ceremonies, began to lose place to wages, work, and township life, of radios

\textsuperscript{120} Company Archives, W.1-3, 6-8 December 1986; See also Wilson Rowntree Centenary, 1890-1990 (Randburg, 1990), 49-58.
\textsuperscript{121} Company Archives, W.3, 8 December 1986, Annual Report, December 1963.
and lounge suites, the cinema, the dance-hall and the cricket club. Talk of changing needs, realities and commodities suggests a fundamental process and pressure on work stabilization. Jobs and wages became increasingly crucial to existence as the decade wore on and as the apartheid state increasingly ensured that alternative forms of access to rural means of production for 'commoners', disintegrated into dust, disease and death. Although migrancy remained central, it became, by the early 1960s, less regular, more demanding and essentially transformed. In Kwelegha, Keiskammahoek or Mount Frere although the work clothes of the week or month were discarded in favour of the 'red peasant blanket', the filth and squalor of the 'worst location in the whole union', together with the 7.00 am hooter were not that easily taken off, washed out, or deafened.

At the same time as the economic basis of local labour migration was disintegrating, the apartheid state sought to institutionalize migrancy, and 'limit' the permanently settled in East London. In effect, the local or district labour bureau, although established in 1952 under the 'Native Laws Amendment Act', only began to 'function' significantly in 1957. Until then, it seems, despite central directives, the 'underground' or 'at the door' practice enabled the employment of black labour from anywhere, not just the 'local Bantu locations of the East London district'. The weak functioning of the bureau was also apparent, with local official 'sanction', in the easy avoidance of unnecessarily 'closed' protection of 'indolent local labour at the expense of business efficiency'. After 1956/57, however, 'outside' or 'non-prescribed service contracts', largely applicable to Transkeian migrants in this instance, were dramatically tightened, and selectively enforced, possibly affecting up to 80% of cases arising.


Interviews S, Mjiwi, and I. Nkonza, as well as 3f and 3ff, S.G., 2 November 1987, and 13 February 1988, and 4t, I.D., 10 July 1990.


CA, CCK, Vol. 552, Ref N3/11/3, Pt.1, Report untitled, but identifying employment practises that had disabled the functioning of the Bureau between 1953 and 1958. See also BCI, Box 18, Correspondence Report of BCI, 24 February 1958, with Divisional Inspector of Labour.

BCI, Box 15, File PE/1, Report, 17 October 1959.

P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen of Tribesmen, 58; Daily Dispatch, 12, 14 December 1956; CA, CCK, Vol. No. 52, Labour Bureaux, 1953-59, reflects this process in some detail as well.
The processes of far more strictly 'administering' influx control in East London after 1957, together with the increasing ability to allocate labour to the 'heavy' and 'bad' industries, had the important effect of stabilizing, selecting and redirecting the migrant, and settled black labour market on a significant scale. 'Sex-ten' (Section 10 of the 1945 Natives Urban Areas Act), based on birth, residence, and continuous employment, and the pass system more generally, began to form the basis in East London of segmenting the labour market between temporary migrants and permanent residents, and securing the reproduction of differentiated forms of labour power. But what 'sex-ten' also did, was to reinforce the necessity for wage labour on a stabilized and continuous basis for black workers in East London, especially after 1956, in a manner that was distinctive and 'with far more effect than any previous attempt had achieved'. Section 10 was seen as the 'law that compels a man to remain in his job for at least 10 years', and the law that 'marries us to our employers'. For East London's migrants it also took away 'the little freedom we had in choice of job. Nowadays [1957/58] you are liable to be chased out of town if you don't stick to your job, so you have just got to stick to it, even if it is a bad one and underpaid.' The threat of 'endorsement out of town' within 14 days, once a 'work-seekers permit' had been acquired, also hastened employment, forcing migrants to take the first job offered, and to 'stick to it forever'. This perceived 'unholy alliance' between employers and authorities, served to both unify migrant and permanent workers in their antagonism to the pass system and to local capital, but also to differentiate them in terms of status, work, and their place in Location life.

In terms of this permanent/migrant unity, the popular local interpretation of the pass system, its origins, and its implementation, was significant. Seen as a 'white device to keep the amaXhosa down', and as the 'cruelty of white people ... making these laws specially for us ... I hate their way of oppressing us by these passes, permits, and regulations', influx control was interpreted as a deliberate punishment for the '1952

128 BCI, Box 15, File PE/1, Report, 22 November 1962.
129 BCI, Box 15, File PE/1, Report, 22 November 1962.
130 Interview, S. Mjiwi, 6 February 1989; ELM, Municipal Records, 16/17/5, Correspondence from Ctr. Malcomness to City Council, 12 March 1955, and from A Curren to Council, 3 August 1958; See also P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, 56-61.
131 P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, 56-61.
132 BCI, Box 21, Correspondence from A. Curren to BCI, 3 September 1957; Latimer papers, Letter from unspecified source to Latimer, 3 April 1958; and correspondence between Latimer and Curren, 2 February 1957 to 16 September 1959.
riots', as an outcome to them and to prevent any further political activity that would challenge 'whites'. In
the day to day realities of life in 'iMonti' (East London) the deportations, raids, the lines of thousands of
people outside 'the office' renewing their lodgers permits every month, and 'the queues' of arrested pass
and permit offenders, swollen by regular additions, forcefully marching behind the policeman to the police
station, all reinforced, continuously, the fact that 'you go to jail here for nothing at all ... it has made this
town a very bad place'. The extent of daily repression, where everyone 'knows someone who has been
arrested and fined, or expelled', if it was not a directly personal experience, meant that the pass system and
its enforcers, after 1952, but especially after 1956/57, when these intensified, under a more efficient and
stream-lined police and bureau, served to a significant extent to rapidly 'stabilize' black labour.

But it was contradictory, unifying a need to 'hold onto a job', while pushing migrants into unskilled and
unwanted jobs through harsher and more overt sanction, and bringing together a common opposition to
'white authority'. It also more systematically affected, discriminated, and led to the arrest of migrant, and
Transkeian 'temporary residents' over a growing strata of 'permanents'. These divisions suited the needs of
a fractionalized local capital in workshops and substitution manufacturing, and in commerce and the local
state, and related to and shaped a necessary fragmented local labour market and allocation of black labour
more coherently after 1957. But it did not necessarily, or even notably translate these divisions into much
more than divisions of convenience, at least 'from above'. Black workers, whether operative, or unskilled,
permanent of migrant, younger or older, educated or not, remained essentially as a whole, aggregated
within the 'tradition of native labour', interchangeable and 'uniform' in all but activity of work.

If people in Tsolo and Mekeni sections of Duncan Village Location had no problem in identifying that 'the
work of a policeman is to raid our homes late at night or early in the morning looking for permits, liquor,
passes, taxes, anything', there was a similar recognition of political and trade union activity promoting
equally widespread responses from the police and authorities. Activists were harassed, strikes declared

133 P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, 56-61; Interviews, J. T Kophi, and S. Mjiwi, confirmed this
interpretation.
134 Interview, J. T. Kophi, 27 June 1989; BCI, Box 21, Correspondence, DIL, and BCI, and Individual Companies, 15
April 1960, and attached correspondence.
135 N. Duka, From Shantytown to Forest, 24.
illegal, and strikers arrested in 1954, and in 1956, 1957, and 1958. Union activity was also severely curtailed under the Native Labour Act of 1953, which was ‘very actively pursued’ after 1956 in the East London Regional Native Labour Committees and the CNLB’s activities. Works and Liaison committees were formed in a number of factories, and in particular the ‘malpractices of agitators and ‘so-called union leaders’ were closely monitored, and stopped ‘at all costs, from serving their own selfish needs’ and from making trade unionism into ‘a profession ... and not a service’. The active pursuance of the education of ‘European employers’, and the ‘interpreting for the Board the desires and aspirations of native workers ... to settlement by negotiation... but not with strikers who were outside the provisions of the Act’, laid the basis for restricted union activity, but also large scale state interventions into the life of the factory. Wages were kept down, increases ‘negotiated’ through the NLC and the ‘works committees’ were minimal. Strikes were made illegitimate, involving prosecution, and more importantly, instant dismissal. In this context Mr. Godlo’s pronouncement, that ‘they were proud of the record of E.L. as compared with other towns and ports, E.L. being the centre where the workers achieved their ends peacefully’, was a biting comment on the effectivity of capital and the state to define ‘the ends’ for workers in the late 1950s and early 1960s. And it was a real reflection on how important, and how valued, jobs, and their maintenance had become by the 1960s, as is the memory of the time:

I sympathized with the union workers [ SACTU ] as did many, I think, they worked very hard, tirelessly, but they were too few and were always disappearing... To join - ha - no, no, that would have been the end ... no work, no money, and standing then, waving the book at the bosses for a job with hundreds of others ... too many people looking for jobs then ... If you had employment then you were ‘quick’ and kept on it... unless you had the assurance of one better ...

Unemployment, especially for the youth, but also more generally, became significant in promoting increasing job security and limiting labour turnover. Despite state intervention by the late 1950s, unemployment stood at ‘somewhere between 25% and 35%’. This massive presence of ‘so many

137 BCI, Box 21, Correspondence between RNLC, and the BCI President, 23 October 1959; see also Company Archives, B.2, C.1, F.1, J.1, K.S.1, M.B.1, M.1, R.1, and W.1.
workless' people kept wage levels low and 'tied' workers to the jobs. And this was borne out of a real fear of becoming, and realizing, like Norman Duka, that getting employed rested on 'luck', 'chance', and 'hoping to be seen by the white man with power', and thus on the arbitrary selective choice of the manager and his assistant. It was also an experience of helpless frustration to have to look for a job ...

Once I got the pass I began looking for a factory job. The first day I went to Standard Canners. I found hundreds of men, young boys, and women standing in front of the gates. It was very early and the factory hadn't opened yet... When the manager finally came out he chose people near the front. He couldn't even see those of us who stood and held up our passes at the back of the crowd. I left and ran to another factory. Again, no luck. Then to another, and another - I can't even remember how many. I began to realize how difficult it was to get a job; out all day, running from factory to factory and still no job. I returned home hungry and tired.143

These pressures and pulses from below placed on black workers to 'hold onto their jobs' were also felt and influenced out of Duka's 'shantytown'. The poverty of life in the East London Locations, and the very real material limits of low and inconsistent wages, placed enormous pressure on leisure and a lifestyle already straightjacketed by a local state concerned with control 'and nothing else'.144 The shack areas of Mekeni, Tsolo, and Thulandiville were overcrowded and squalid, places of 'great unhappiness and desperation' in this period.145 Home for a family was usually a single sub-let room, about 10-15 feet square.146 The municipal housing areas, although less congested, were also sub-let and squashed, earning for Duncan Village, the reputation of the 'worst home in the union'. Even the mining barracks were favourably compared to living in the shack areas of Duncan Village.147 But better, permanent and secure incomes could, after 1957, entail a movement out of the shack areas into the 'groups of plots in selected parts of the East Bank Location so that they may arise above the effluvium of slumdom'148. There, people could live in a house that 'whispers to you that it needs more furniture', and anticipate a partial removal from the curfews and controls of the tsotsis, the daily raids of 'the authorities and police', and the fear of dying children, the disgust of inadequate sanitation, and the instability of family and community life. Not all that

143 N. Duka, From Shantytown to Forest, 37.
144 Interview, S. Nongwevu, 16 December 1987.
145 Interview, S. Nongwevu, 16 December 1987.
146 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1240, and 877, Ref 1960, and also Box 1351, Native Urban Areas Act, and Correspondence, 1952-55, and 1165, General, 1950-1958; see also ELM, Municipal Records, 12/4/T; and Interviews, 3g, N.D., 29 June 1987, 3r, A.B., 15 October 1987, 3s, P.M., 14 October 1987; 4B, S.M., 17 February 1989, and 4k, S.V., 14 November 1990.
147 Interview, 3g, N.D., 29 June 1987.
148 BCI, Box 21, Correspondence from City Engineer, 12 October 1961.
many were successful, but an emergent ‘community desire’, as V. Madikane suggested in conversation, ‘became very strong, very strong’\textsuperscript{149}, and the openings provided by a secure job, and ‘respectable behaviour’ increasingly determinant of this possibility. After 1963 though, it was to be the lure of Mdantsane, the new Ciskei homeland township, to be ‘built’ by the central state, and not the responsibility of the local municipality, that would ensure movement out of the ‘ghetto’ that was Duncan Village.\textsuperscript{150}

The result for manufacturing industry in the 1960s was a ‘world of labour’ not made in the pre-determined and anticipated images of the 1940s. The factory floors were ‘teeming with native labour’ in semi-skilled and operative positions, as well as in the more expected unskilled and manual work. Job stability had been secured from outside the workplaces, not in the gratitude of material rewards, or so it seemed. The solid core of black workers, which numbered about 30% of the labour force in the early 1950s, had risen to close on 70% in the early 1960s\textsuperscript{151}. By 1962 labour turnover had correspondingly declined to approximately 60%.\textsuperscript{152} The great diversity in labour process organization which had produced a system of fragmented, localized, and unconnected labour markets in the 1940s and early 1950s, had equally given way to the mobilization and far more coherent operative labour markets of the early 1960s. Black workers and their jobs were increasingly defined and dominated by a ‘semi-skilled’ denominator. Although this process was also segmented by the continued importance and scale of manual work, and migrant-permanent, and educated-uneducated divisions, manufacturing employment practices and operative labour patterns began to dominate in the transformations in the historical meanings of ‘native work’.

Significantly though, what was happening inside the factories and workplaces of East London did not contradict the growing practices and interventions of the apartheid state in the region. The answer for capital to the question of how black workers were to ‘build’ the factories and workshops in East London, lay in the ideology of apartheid, which ‘corresponded’ to patterns already taking shape around the particular emergent racial divisions of labour of the 1950s. The structure of white supervisory and black operative and manual labour was elaborated, deepened, and legitimized through the language of ethnicity and colour.

\textsuperscript{149} Interview, V. Madikane, 16 June 1989.


\textsuperscript{151} BCI, Box 16, File 41, Confidential Report to DIL, and to the City Council, 3 June 1963.

\textsuperscript{152} BCI, Box 16, Files 41 and 42, Confidential Correspondence Report of BCI, in conjunction with the DIL, 23 September 1963.
Apartheid provided that framework in a number of ways, and did so, because in the 1950s it was still in the process of formation, ideologically and on the ground.

Manufacturers and managers latched onto the ideas of ethnic segregation and ethnic racial difference within apartheid and justified building the racial divisions of labour that characterized the workplaces, according to understood ‘correct occupational positions for the bantu in European owned cities’. At the same time capital was demanding ‘stronger supervision and control’ to ‘increase the quality of bantu labour’ and the ‘quantity of production’. Strong and clear racial and ethnic work divisions ensured jobs for whites, as supervisors, but it also began to acquire a spatial dimension. This meant that an exclusive and blatant racism from supervisors was not out of place, but in fact, became spatially demarcated by the ‘bantu’ locality of the Ciskei bantustan. ‘Kaffir’ and ‘baas’ made the workplace easier to control, through direct coercion and violence, and through a legitimation of characteristic stereotypes of black workers as ‘part of the bantu’, ‘lazy’, ‘cheeky’, and ‘too independent’, unreliable, careless and inefficient. But it also mattered that these practices and processes secured, reproduced, and in part, reflected, and ‘created’ manufacturing industry as part of the ‘white group’.

For capital, the institutional racism of apartheid, the proximity of ‘their own homelands’ increasingly realized in ‘Bantu Self Government’ and in Mdantsane, the notions of ‘temporary residents’ and the pass system, as well as wider political and ‘community exclusion’, all confirmed a ‘legitimate’ separateness of the ownership and control of white industry. In the workplaces this all had a base in the ways in which an ethnic racism patterned relations of production. ‘Working’ was for ‘the white man’, the ‘expectation’ of supervision and direction came from whites, ‘bantus’ did certain kinds of work, were paid differently, had different needs and goals in work, could deal with boring and repetitive work better, and were more suited to hard and manual work. This all meant that it was ‘bantu’ and ‘whiteman’, not worker and boss that punctuated the ‘objective’ class experiences of manufacture. Ethnic racial divisions and stereotypes served the interests

153 BCI, Box 16, Files 34 and 37, Correspondence Files, Letters to BCI, 22 July 1962, 3 October 1962, and File 42, Correspondence Report, 23 September 1963.
154 BCI, Box 16, File 42, Correspondence Report, 23 September 1963, and Investigation Reports, 1 May, and 16 May, as well as 23 July 1963; also Interviews, F. Grearson, 30 June 1988, and J. T. Kophi, 27 June 1989.
155 BCI, Box 16, Files 37-38, Correspondence File, especially from local manufacturers, 3 October 1962 and attached correspondence; see also File 42, Correspondence Report, 23 September 1963.
of profitability through lower wages, through being able to define operative labour as unskilled work, and through more actively 'displacing' and avoiding costs of labour reproduction. And it served to stabilize and control the workplaces for white owners and managers as the relations of exploitation were read in these racial terms, 'because of being bantu'.

At every level race informed, reinforced and effectively fused with class dispositions and practices. The nature and expectation of factory and other employment was pre-defined in racial terms, as were wage levels, working conditions, the content of supervision, the conditions of leisure, and the ability to organize. So too were the elements of shared and collective awareness, located initially in the workplace. In all of this, race predominated. Experience seemed to belie structure, as these processes promoted a racial consciousness largely devoid of tangible class content in the 1960s in East London.

The significance of this process of identification is that it was largely shaped, at least initially, in the places of work. It was extended, and more coherently 'interiorized' in local class relations 'from above', as a resolution of the inability of manufacturing capital to socialize its relations of production. But equally importantly, this process of the 'interiorization' of race in local class relations reflected, for East London's emerging working class, the modality in which manufacturing class relations were increasingly worked and lived. It was the way people, as workers, defined and shaped their own lives, in the struggle to give meaning to work in East London, especially after c1957. The experience of factory work, and the dominance of manufacturing capital, did not break down these racial realities and conceptions, it rather reinforced them. This had as much to do with the way workers made sense of their changed realities and imposed their conditions on the workplace, as it had to do with 'the desires' of capital, or the pressures of the apartheid state. So,

to be called 'kaffir', or 'bantu' was to be called a useless uncivilized and accepting worker;... but to call oneself an 'African' was to identify oneself with pride and assert one's rights and values as a working person.


157 Interviews, 3a-v, and 4a-w; Conducted between June 1987 and December 1990.

What this involved was the attempt to make the economic relations of industry in East London a human relationship through an assertion of the opposites of capital and state definitions. This took the form of an ethnic and at times national ‘African’ identity. It formed in practice and in consciousness, but in non-collective and non-organizational forms through the 1960s. Ways of expressing this, while ‘oppositional’ to the ‘temporary resident’ or ‘obedient bantu’ definition, were situational, assertive, and individualistic, but also in a wider frame of reference, accommodative and consensual. And they had to be, for the very relations of production to be accepted and socialized in East London in the 1960s. This can be seen in the recognitions of ‘respectability and security’ coming with ‘hard and reliable work’, as did higher wages and better working conditions, which were in turn a denial of ‘how the whites could only see you’. The ability to ‘prove the white employer’ and really ‘do the job better than any of them could’, the sense in which it became important to ‘stay with the job to get your rewards’, and recognition that you were not ‘lazy and unreliable’, as well as less agreeable dimensions of being punctual, of ‘working the system’ and of ‘holding your head up’ all reflected these tensions.

These processes, in turn, implied an internalization, an ‘acceptance’ of apartheid, out of the economic realities of the workplaces, beyond repression and control in East London by the 1960s. The wheels of industry, and of the state of the 1960s, turned on organizational and union bannings, trials and exiles, on forced removals out of Duncan Village, and on influx controls, pass arrests and ‘sex-ten’ denials. They turned on the voluntary and forced growth of Mdantsane, on Ciskei and Transkei ‘self government’, and on the Border Industries Programme as it secured and expanded capital’s base in the region and in the municipality. But underneath, they turned on the ‘silent’ consent of a working class that had made itself, as much as been made, in racial form, in the content of the workplaces of East London in the 1950s. This combination, rather than a single determination was the ‘... general illumination in which all other colours are plunged, and which modifies their specific tonalities. ... the special ether which defines the specific gravity of everything found in it.

159 Interviews, 3a-v, and 4a-w; Conducted between June 1987, and December 1990.
In considering the historical, and complex social, political, and economic construction of work, and class in East London, this chapter has suggested that before we can ask the questions of control and consent, as posed by Burawoy \footnote{162} and Joyce \footnote{163} we need to consider the ways in which proletarianization was or was not transformed, in an urban industrial and manufacturing setting. East London's rapid industrialization process, occurring as it does, at a time when both South Africa, and parts of colonial Africa are undergoing similar processes, suggests a need to take Fred Cooper's assertions 'about class' seriously. In part, I take this to mean that we cannot assume the nature of the African, or South African, or East London working class, before we know how that class was constructing and being constructed, in the economic, around work and labour, and in relation to race and space, as well as in relation to capital and the state.

Historians of South Africa have constructed an image of this period which assumes a rapidly emergent working class, and then attempts to understand why it failed to develop stronger forms of economic and political expression. \footnote{164} Similarly, the 'radicalization' of the ANC in the 1940s is ascribed largely to the influence of a more militant series of working class struggles from below. \footnote{165} The limited content of this chapter, though, suggests that a far more likely, and perhaps more historically accurate scenario, was the emergence of a popular and radical nationalism, precisely because the working class, structurally, economically, socially and politically, as well as spatially, was as weak and complexly constituted in the workplaces, as much as outside of them. When it did begin to 'stabilize' in the 1960s, the terrains had shifted onto the far more systemic 'second phase' of social and racial apartheid engineering. In East London this was the case. In addition, it was the struggles about not becoming a 'cheap and powerless' 'native', and 'bantu' working class that entailed a shared and collective identification out of work in racial, colonial and national, and not extra-historical class terms, in both the resistances of the early 1950s, the confusions, and crises of the later 1950s, and the 'acceptances' of the 1960s.

\footnote{162} In a different context, Michael Burawoy has argued that in 'reconstructing' an appreciation of the nature and role of the working class historically and politically, it is necessary to centrally examine the 'political and ideological as well as the purely economic moment of production'. And in attempting to expand the notion of 'the politics of production', Burawoy suggests that work, and the relations in production involve 'consent' as well as co-operation and conflict. See \textit{The Politics of Production}, 5-20.


Finally, this chapter suggests that a close focus on the nature of work, and its meaning in class terms, highlights an aspect of industrialization, that in South Africa, and parts of Africa has been labelled 'dependent'. Robert Brenner, in 1977, argued for the need to focus centrally on 'the productivity of labour' as the 'essence and key to economic development'.166 This conception has been much stated, but little investigated in South Africa, and more broadly in Africa. This case study of East London hopefully begins to probe this 'silence', and tentatively suggests a way forward. Importantly it is the 'internal class structure', and the nature of 'local class struggles' over 'productivity' that East London's experience supports. But this cannot be examined in isolation. The 'great unease' which permeated the industrial future, the instability of low-wage production in East London's factories, and the limited extent of re-investment, and technological advance, all combined with the over-riding sense of an inability to 'teach the native' even 'the basics' of industrialization. These are the origins, and the basis of 'dependent industrialization', in local class terms. The final chapter seeks to intersect these concerns with those of race and space, and with the activities of the local, and 'national' state, as well as with the Location/s in more detail. It also attempts to highlight the implications, and contradictory transitions from 'native' to 'bantu', from 'defiance' to 'removal', and from migrancy to 'stability'.


CHAPTER EIGHT:


On 17 May 1946, East London witnessed the start of its biggest strike in 15 years. 'Don't offload the ships' was the call, low wages the initial issue, and the key actors were about 400 'casual' dockworkers. On a piece of open ground overlooking the port, their 'union hall' for the next month, workers held day-long meetings, reinforcing and emphasizing solidarity and unity under the auspices of a flexible and dynamic strike committee. Loading and off-loading at the Buffalo Harbour was brought to a standstill.¹

During the course of the strike various attempts made to replace the striking workers with other locally employed South African Railway & Harbour workers all failed. These workers, who refused to act as 'scab labour' demonstrated a remarkable degree of collective identification and support for the strikers. They in turn were dismissed and joined the strike.² Harbour Administration attempts to divide and break the strike by offering regular employment to 80 of the strikers, were also rejected and defeated. The 21 May saw a march to the Systems Manager's office in town, extending the activities and action of the strike. In June, links between the strikers and the local Communist Party, and with the Congress of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU), were established.³ At a Communist Party (CP) meeting in the East Bank Location on the 9 June, bonds with the strikers were articulated, and thereafter meetings in the location called for 'solidarity with our comrades'. They also expressed a desire to extend the strike, and through it, worker organization in East London generally. Flyers calling on strike-breakers not to 'scab' were also issued by the C.P. ⁴

¹ Daily Dispatch, 17 May - 11 June 1946.
² Daily Dispatch, 20 May 1946.
⁴ H.H. Smith, Development of Labour Organization', 204.
Here are evident the 'classic' narrative ingredients of working class consciousness, action, and organization. And yet this event is neither repeated and sustained, nor extended and deepened. There is no other strike of its size, scope, or duration for 20 years in East London. The strike ended by the middle of June, with reinstatement and a limited wage increase. CNETU, despite its claims in 1946 of 10 unions and a 15,000 worker membership, appears never to grow beyond 'a few thousand'. By 1951, CNETU, together with the local C.P., had collapsed. Despite significant support for the ANC in the 1950-1952 period, it too suffered significant setbacks and massive decline in its organizational expression after the '1952 riots'.

As the previous chapter argued, the period between c1947 and c1963 was marked by the sustained transitionary nature of East London's economy. This process of change from a commercial and small workshop manufacturing centre before the Second World War, to a city reflecting the dominance of manufacturing capital was significant, as it was for processes of class formation. It was pointed out, this was a hesitant, halting, and tenuous process, that simultaneously opened the spaces for the emergence of an operative black working class, in particular, but also from without other spatialities, narrowed, and closed them down. By the 1960s this was reflected in a growing simultaneity of race, class and space that was patterned in the increasing systemacy and power geometry of apartheid in East London. This chapter, closely tied, and needing to be read in conjunction with these contexts, and Chapter Seven as a whole, seeks to extend, and elaborate on these processes and implications.

This process of secondary import industrialization was shared by many of the larger colonial towns in Africa. Wartime isolation from the metropole pushed forward consumer demand and local substitution supply of manufactured commodities, and this was extended in the post-war phase of imperialism. The pattern in South African centres - on the Rand, and in the ports, was similar, if somewhat more unevenly intense for the Rand and deeply rooted in a commercial and colonial past for the ports. The actual, and potentially transformative impact of these secondary industrialization processes on the diverse urban, and wider societal realities were not lost on many of the participants, be they from the docks of Mombasa, the

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5 This is reflected in Regional Inspector of Labour Reports for the 1945-1949 period, CA, LIE, File 17; in Industrial Reports for the same period, BCI, Box 35, Executive Committee Minutes, 12 May 1945; and in Interviews in June and December 1987, conducted with a number of contemporary workers, and particularly J.T. Kophi, 27 June 1989, and S. Nongwevu, 16 December 1987.

6 BCI, Box 35, File 26, Executive Committee Minutes, 7 July 1949.

7 See A. Mager, and G. Minkley, 'Reaping the Whirlwind'.
factories of Lagos, and the mines of the Witwatersrand, to the workplaces of East London. But while the colonial experience in Africa involved the attempt to create, and universalize and incorporate a newly ‘found’ modern African working class, in South Africa, and in East London, this possibility had been hegemonized into a project that sought to shift the contradictions of industrialization into the exclusions and particularities of bantustan ethnicity.


In 1948, the City Council saw the election of a majority group known as the ‘Workers Civic League’, headed by Councillor Taylor. By 1963, the white rate-payers elected National Party candidates as the main ‘opposition’ to the dominant United Party, and in 1956 East London had its first nationalist Mayor. The intervening decade was one of major crises and change, as the Council moved from being ‘enlightened’, characterized by Selby as ‘open’, ‘liberal’ and ‘caring’ between 1948 to the mid 1950s, to being ‘conservative’, ‘uncaring’ and ‘racist’, a ‘pawn of the nationalists’ after c1956. In response to a largely rhetorical self-posed question, he argued that the local Council had given in to the weight of the apartheid state, and that it no longer functioned, or cared to function with any degree of self-independence, or interest for its black inhabitants.

The period after 1948, beginning with the election of this white ‘Workers Civic League’ (or ‘Workers Group’ as it was also known), although only ‘in office’ until 1949, ushered in a process of change that began, systematically, to industrially re-order East London. As has already been argued at length, the Welsh Commission, which served to localize key aspects of the Fagan Report, was also central in this process, as

8 *Daily Dispatch*, 28, and 29 October 1956.
was the growing prominence of the BCI, and of ‘industrialists’\textsuperscript{11}, and the ‘liberal’ civil society organizations and individuals in Council and local politics. In particular, the inter-connections between white artisans, and unions, younger workers, war ‘veterans’, and organizations like the United Democratic Front, the Torch Commando (and its women’s wing, the Women’s Action Committee), the Civil Rights League, and the National Council of Women (and other existing, and smaller charity, church and welfare groups) which had grown dramatically in the post-war period, accounted for the composition, programme, and in part, for the support of the ‘Workers Civic League’ in 1948 as essentially social democratic, as opposed to a more narrow white and/or working class organization.\textsuperscript{12} But its support, and programme of social and industrial reform was also determined by the local, and ‘national’ disarray of the United Party (UP), its locally visible commercially dominated conservative and reactively ‘colonial’ nature, the recognized narrow ‘artisan’ basis of the local Labour Party, and the growing need to supersede ‘redundant party politics’, which did not serve the interests of the majority of East London’s citizens or its ‘future’.\textsuperscript{13} Although, thereafter the UP came to dominate the Council, it was, in response to the NP victory, a re-convened and more widely representative centrally aligned liberal and ‘industrial’ oriented organization through the 1950s.

The related emergence of a ‘liberal’ Council policy that ‘aimed’ at three interwoven goals through the 1950s became apparent by 1949/50 (and directly connected to the Welsh Commission Report, and its implementation). These were, firstly, the need for a town-plan that was ‘professional’, comprehensive, and integrative of industrial and labour needs and requirements; secondly, the resumption of the ‘internal redevelopment’ of the Location/s; and thirdly, the need to ‘incorporate’ the ‘community of the locations’ into the ‘life of the city’, and in order to do this, to commission and generate ‘sound scientific knowledge’ on them, and the ‘peoples’ within them.\textsuperscript{14} They constitute, despite the continued, and the new ‘national’ contradictions, a series of plans and policies that were attempting to ‘universalize’ Africans into different, 

\textsuperscript{11} BCI, Box 6, which contains Correspondence over the BCI itself, and its growing role in politics, and identifies the emergence of a new group of liberal politicians within factories and the thirty-five largest concerns in East London in the late 1940s, Letter, 22 March 1949, and attached correspondence.

\textsuperscript{12} Daily Dispatch, between 1945/6, and 1948/9 contains much of this on a regular basis, reporting on Meetings, Statements, Composition, etc. See 23 July 1948, and 17 September 1948.

\textsuperscript{13} Daily Dispatch, 5 September 1948, 1-8 January 1949.

\textsuperscript{14} CA, 3/ELN, Correspondence in Boxes 1150-1156 on Housing and Demolition, 1949-c1959; 1073-1075 and 1351 on Urban Areas Act to 1955; 877-881 on Improvements, general conditions, planning, etc; 1400-1403 on housing in the 1950s; 1348 on Beer, 1950-57; 1169-1172 on Advisory Board Minutes in this period; 1370-1371 on Group Areas, 1354, on 1953-55 Youth Investigation; and also ELM, NAD, and NAC Files.
but integral ‘cogs’ of the local labour machine, and ‘communities’ of its urban society in permanent, ‘family’, and ‘stabilized’ ways.

The correspondences between the commissioned Bowling and Floyd Town Plan which appeared in 1950, and the Welsh Commission, were marked. This was not unsurprising given the reliance of the former on the latter, as well as on Council drawn plans in the late 1940s. The new Town Plan, did however secure a planning legitimacy for the ‘new’ Council, and for the Welsh Commission’s implementation.15 Not only did the Bowling and Floyd Report provide a comprehensive assessment of existing industrial and ‘non-European residential areas’, but also urged for an approach which included ‘the whole of the implications arising thereon’, such as ‘the provision of railway services, power, light, road access, the disposal of sewage, trade wastes, etc., and also the very important one of housing for the workers, particularly that for Non-Europeans’.16 Basing itself on the racial ‘factual truth’ that ...

these people have little or no choice as to the area in which they can reside and are also unable for the greater part to provide themselves with living accommodation and unless such accommodation can be provided simultaneously with the establishment of industries and in such a position as to serve such industries any municipality pressing forward with industrial development is loading itself with a costly burden of trouble which it may not be able to surmount. ... The greatest difficulty is now to find land for housing within a reasonable distance from the place of work to prevent too great a fatigue in travelling with loss of efficiency and too great a strain upon the workers purse from cost of travelling whereby he is unable to provide a sufficiency of food to enable both himself and his family to live a normal healthy life. Industrialization which thus destroys its own labour force apart from humanitarian considerations is to be discouraged rather than otherwise.17

All of the above, and the ‘general development of the City as a whole’, Bowling and Floyd argued, must not be ‘by the way of small accretions as separate units but each addition must form part of an ultimate whole and the implications estimated and understood’. They observed that East London was predominantly a ‘residential city’, and that any encouragement of ‘national industries’, needed to take account of this spatiality, together with provision of its ‘local or service industries’, its past and continuing position as ‘commercial centre for a flourishing agricultural area and the large native areas’, and the fact that ‘with its

15 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, Ref. 50/665/3/2, which includes the Bowling and Floyd Report from March 1950. It is very interesting that Bowling, Richardson and Floyd are later, in 1953, contracted by the Council to report on the Group Areas. This sustains Mabin’s important arguments, in terms of both continuity, and inter-connections between town-planning and group areas planning, as key aspects of his wider argument. See A. Mabin, "Doom at the Stroke of a Pen": Planning and Group Areas, c1935-1955", paper presented at University of the Witwatersrand, History Workshop Conference, February 1990, 15-35.
attractive coast line and picturesque hinter land', it had a 'great future as a health resort'.

(In addition, in assessing the 'existing industrial sites', they provided an important index of industrial development for the c1940 - c1950 decade, through their evaluations of 'percentage development' of the West Bank (less than 50%), Chiselhurst (75%) and Braelyn (33%) industrial sites.)

Arising from this, they made a number of key proposals. Apart from the West Bank, the other future key industrial area should be located at Wilsonia (4-7 miles from the City centre), and that the 'Duncanville Location' (the East Bank Location, in which the new municipal housing scheme of the 1941-44 period was named Duncan Village after the Governor General) should be maintained, improved, and extended through the white farm and residentially occupied area of Amalinda, to connect to Wilsonia. They also proposed that the West Bank Location should not be removed, but improved and extended, and that a Coloured Location at Buffalo Flats (in addition to Parkside, established in the post-1937/8 Thornton Commission re-building period) should be established, to house coloureds out of the 'native locations', and from North End - which would become a general purposes and business zone, and would 'displace ... coloured persons residing there'. Finally, the establishment of 'family rural locations', close to East London, but in the reserves, and based on the extension of existing rural locations like Newlands, with attached hostels and 'boarding houses' constructed for the accommodation of the male weekly migrants from these locations was proposed for the City.

Two important aspects, already alluded to, informed the Report, and its impact on the Council and town-planning, the one racial, and the other in terms of class. All areas and sites were planned to be 'well separate from European residential areas', 'isolated' from them, and the possibility of inter-racial land occupation was 'not eminently desirable'. This also included separating 'coloureds' from 'natives', and all separations in this 'one large scheme' would use parks, natural valleys and 'other open spaces' and 'green belts' to 'divide the different types of development from each other', 'properly coordinated with a main backbone road leading from the harbour to the National Road near Wilsonia'. This use of roads, lines and plans, as controlling space extended to the 'new location' where 'the use of road-bays' as the central

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19 See also Daily Dispatch, 5 September 1950, 28 September 1950, 30 September 1950; in outlining the Council resolutions, acceptances and Amalinda Residents protests.
design 'assists the use of the "headman" system of administration and provides small open areas where natives may gather and chat or children may play' or where, more implicitly, police may strike, and residents may be 'surveilled'. At the same time 'natives', and less explicitly 'coloureds' were first workers, and then residents or members of communities, where their existence as labour would determine location, industry proximity, services and control. This was not new, except, in its integration into a total scheme, premised on permanent, stable, and serviced locations, which would maintain a 'reasonable standard of life', be based on 'family dwellings', and 'compounded' migrancy, and planned to prevent 'degeneration' into the 'squalid state of many of those now existing'. The Report was remarkably clear on this aspect:

[j]t is no longer sufficient to relegate the location to any odd area of land for which no other use can be found. If, as is necessary, the native must be considered as part of the industrial undertaking his housing site must have at least equal consideration as the industrial site and he cannot be pushed to the distant horizon.20

By the end of 1950, the Council argued that 'it is impossible ... to emphasize too strongly the importance of the recommendations now before us, or to further stress the important part they will play in the future development of this city.'21 Cllr. Taylor argued further that it was 'about time', as it 'brought the Native issue right into the foreground, where it should be'. In the past, he continued, it had been kept 'too much in the background', with the result that 'you only have to compare the area in which these people live with the area in which we live and compare the two populations to get an idea of the injustice of the position. They live in 1/18th of the area in which we live and their numbers compare with ours'. In addition, the 'expert proposals' had recommended that the Council needed to avoid letting 'the Native have to expend half his earnings in getting to and from his job', and thus the potential cost, and politicization of transport.22

These proposals became Council policy through the 1950s, and were increasingly pursued in the face of mounting central state intervention that contradicted crucial aspects of its 'integrative' basis, and local opposition from white Amalinda residents before 1952, and then more generally from white residents after the riots.

20 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, Ref. 50/665/3/2, Bowling and Floyd Report, 1950, 12.
21 Daily Dispatch, 26 August 1950, of Council Minutes.
22 Daily Dispatch, 26 August 1950; also CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, 50/665/3/2, Council Minutes, 18 August 1950.
We in the Eastern Province have practised an apartheid ever since we settled in the Eastern Cape. That is we have kept ourselves separate, be it Native, be it Asiatic or otherwise ... I am proud Amalinda has made a protest against setting up in its area something which, in time, must become objectionable. ... Stands there a man in this hall who can say he is not colour conscious, and becoming more so? But in our colour consciousness we do not want to lose sight of the fact that whatever the colour might be, we want to be fair to him, we want to give him the best opportunity we can for his progress and uplift. But it must not be at the expense of the European.23

Its acceptance by the Council had always been ambiguous - '[n]o one likes to have a Native location on their back doorstep, or to have the peaceful serenity of rural surroundings shattered by the babel of a thousand alien tongues'. This was qualified, however, by the 'considered opinions of experts', and Amalinda had become 'part and parcel of a developing city and it cannot have either pursuits or interests that run counter to the needs and welfare of the city. This may prove a hard and bitter lesson to learn, but it is none the less fact'.24

At the same time, though, much of it served as the basis of the Council's 'alternative' Group Area proposals of the mid-1950s, reflecting its already racially determined spatial planning basis. The concern, then, that the Group Areas Act 'boiled down to the racial planning of the town as a whole', and to its 'cutting up and division' was already present. What the intervention of the central state achieved was to make this explicit and comprehensive, where town planning and race zoning became visibly interlinked as a simultaneous process, but also to politicize, and shift the attention of the City Council from the Location/s and the 'native', to the 'groups' or 'communities' of Coloured, Indian, Malay, and Chinese City inhabitants and residents as the new 'defendable insiders'.25 The Location/s, and the 'bantu' increasingly became seen as the responsibility of the Native Affairs Department (NAD), and as 'outside' that of the Council, particularly after 1956/7.

These plans, however, emerged at a time when the Council had not only changed from within, but was also facing mounting pressure from the central state, through the Senior Urban Areas Commissioner (G I Nel), the NAD, the Dept. of Public Health, as well as from the Provincial Administration's Divisional Council over its Location 'crises', brought home by the Welsh Commission. These interventions, as Etienne Nel has

23 Daily Dispatch, 20 August 1953.
24 Daily Dispatch, 26 August 1950.
25 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1370 and 1371, 50/1148/9 Vol 1 and 2, The Group Areas Act. See also A. Mabin, 'Doom at the Stroke of a Pen', 34, for the context of this argument.
argued, provided significant impetus to resolving the question of the Location/s, especially on the East Bank, but were also contradictory over issues of Location extension and improvement, against additional re-siting of the Location into the Amalinda area, or of a completely new and 'removed' site. In particular, the Divisional Council and the NAD opposed extension into the Amalinda area, while Nel and the City Council argued, on the basis of the Bowling and Floyd Report, and on existing conditions, that this was necessary. At the same time, the City Council approved a 'block-by-block rehabilitation scheme, and the erection of 400 sub-economic houses within the existing precinct of the East Bank Location. These were completed in 1952, and in 1953/54 the local version of a planned site-and-service scheme of 1,500 houses in an NAD approved limited extension into the Amalinda area had resulted in the construction of a further 110 houses.

This 'limited' and 'restricted' NAD recommendation for the Location existence and Amalinda extension in 1952, however, contained two important aspects that were to prove decisive through the 1950s; the inter-connections between the Location and the local application of the Group Areas Act, (and thus also between apartheid discourses of race and ethnicity), and the attached proposal from the Minister of Native Affairs in 1952, via the Land Tenure Advisory Board recommendations, that the limited extension into Amalinda needed to be accompanied by an 'immediate search ... for a suitable site elsewhere which will absorb any further increase of the native population'.

26 E. Nel, 'The Spatial Planning', 129-158; see also D. Reader, The Black Man's Portion, 24-25; and D. Atkinson, 'Cities and Citizenship', ch. 8.
27 Daily Dispatch, 29 and 30 September 1950.
28 ELM, Mayors Minutes, 1951, City Engineers Report, also Cited in E. Nel, 'The Spatial Planning', 129-158, where the City Engineer argued that after the 400 sites, there were only sites for a further 184 new houses available within the existing area of Duncan Village.
29 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1341-1345 contains details of this process of housing developments in the early 1950s. Although nominally a site and service scheme, the procedure followed was of municipal construction, and sale of houses on a capital redemption basis, and did not give 'owners' the ownership of the land, while construction was uniform and 'shoddy'.
30 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1345, 25/3/3.N., Letter from the Secretary for Native Affairs to the Town Clerk, 18 September 1952. The process in which this limited extension of the Location into Amalinda was conflictual at a number of levels, involving white ratepayer opposition, the NAD, the Provincial Executive Committee, the Urban Commissioner, and the Land Tenure Advisory Board, was drawn into Group Areas proposals, raised in parliament, and when given limited and restricted extension by the Minister of Native Affairs, this acceptance carried a much more important proposal of a site elsewhere. As E. Nel, 'The Spatial Planning', has argued, though, what all this did was constrain any real re-development, or extension of the Location, and thus exacerbated the crises therein.
Nel and Atkinson provide detailed discussions of the implementation of the Group Areas Act in East London, and Mabin a wider context for aspects of continuity, and early 'conflict' between the state and the Council that emerged in the 1950s. The broad parameters of both Nel’s and Atkinson’s analyses point to these ‘oppositions’, delays and tensions, resulting in considerable drafting, ‘refusals’, and redrafting of the demarcated areas of ‘groups of difference’, and the particular controversy surrounding North End and Amalinda in particular, from both sides. Amalinda was declared a Group Area in 1955, with the white group ‘impressed upon its land’ to control ‘native penetration’. This effectively ‘closed-down’ the possibility of the Council’s larger Amalinda extension of the Location, as proposed by B and F, and in effect, opened a major contradiction between the entire Council housing re-development role in the Location, including, but also beyond those already agreed on and planned, and the issues of spatially new, additional and alternative ‘location’ sites, together with the issue of ‘removing’ the entire City-bound Location/s altogether.

With the exception of Amalinda, Group Areas planning and implementation staggered on through the 1950s, with opposition from ‘minority’ black organizations, and from the City Council, whose response was one of ‘unwitting’, and then of ‘defusing’ participation, through its own counter-proposals which were less ‘severe’ than those of the Government. By 1959 East London was ‘... one of the few major centres in the country where Group Areas Planning was not at an advanced stage ...’. Equally important however, was that ‘the delay ... had been due to the fact that the Board wished finality to be reached in the question of the new native location for this area before zoning the municipality’. By 1961/3 however, with the resolution of the spatiality of the Location/s, and the ‘removal’ to Mdantsane, mounting central state pressure from the Group Areas Board and the ‘Interior Ministry’ became apparent. This also included pressure from the NAD involving threatened blanket ‘over the head’ implementation, and restrictions on access to Native

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33 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1156. Between 1957 and 1960, the Council built a further 970 houses in Duncan Village extension, which effectively filled all sites in this area of extension, given that 400 of the original 1,500 had been removed due to pressure from Greenfields residents, who argued that the extension would fall, across the river, within their field of vision and be a source of noise - a source of ‘squeal and squall arising from the location’. In addition, 150 old shacks were demolished in this period, and a single 768 bed migrant hostel was built. Planned ‘general’ improvement were to total an investment of 40,000 pounds, and this would include 12 communal lavatories.
much more integrally informed by planning, construction, financial, transport and labour control costs and considerations, together with the implications of removals, and of the continued existence of Duncan Village, and its 'social ills' during its anticipated thirty year removal process, and for 'unrest', than any fundamental difference in political or racial terms. The 'wait-and see' Council remained, then, much more concerned with the potential 'upset' in the economic stability of the City, of additional white ratepayer costs, and that Mdantsane would be a 'rival city' as a labour reservoir, duplicating and competing as a permanent market for its own provision of goods and services, than any real sense of 'guardianship', responsibility, or commitment to the permanence of the Location 'community'.

In fact, in many important respects, by 1962/3 the Mdantsane plan, with the exception of the removal of the existing Location/s, corresponded, and extended the original Bowling and Floyd town-plan in the associated necessary development of Wilsonia industrial area, which would dovetail with the proposed 'border industries programme' while also providing the 'labour requirements' of industrial development in East London. 38 This labour, however, would be even more 'separate', 'buffered' in its locality as a 'Bantu township in a Bantu homeland' (and not as a residential Location in a white area), but still 'bordering' the key future industrial area. On the other hand, industrial expansion on the West Bank was to be 'discouraged', in favour of developments at Wilsonia. While these aspects accounted to a significant degree for the Council's 'acceptance' of what had effectively become a major vehicle of apartheid implementation in the locality, this process was underlined by a major contradiction between relocating the 'broad ever forward sweep of [industrial] history', and the 'integration' of the 'native labour machine' back into the reserves, migrancy, and into the central state's political foundations of labour control and signification.

Smuts, of the NAD, had effectively made the contradictory social and spatial implications of these developments visible in a 1956 meeting of the City's Native Affairs Committee. He maintained that the NAD

wished to give the native his right place in the sun. The native wished to enjoy the benefits of civilization to the same extent as the Europeans did, and therefore, the Department's opinion was that he be given every opportunity to develop to the fullest extent in those areas of South Africa which had from time immemorial been his homelands ... If the native residential area was placed adjacent to [and later on in the planning process inside] such a reserve, the residents were immediately in contact with their own people in their own reserve. There they had an outlet for

all their ambitions - they could establish themselves in the native reserves and also still retain employment in the City.  

It was this locality, adjacent to, and then within the Ciskei that had determined the siting of Mdantsane after 1956/7, and it was this forcing back, but also re-formulation - what Ashforth calls the process of 'discovering a different difference' - for the exploitation of 'bantu labour' in which all African labour was interpretable as being essentially migrant and alien, that was central. This process corresponded, and in crucial respects was centrally inter-linked to the emergence of the local 'crisis of production'. As the BCI emphasized, one of the central ingredients to the 'stagnation of industry' after c1957, were the 'restraints' of operative black labour engagement in industry. This occurred within the 'traditions of native labour', and the need for a productively integrated, stabilized, and controlled, but also low-wage operative labour force but also within the 'uncontrollable oppositions' between migrancy, Location 'autonomy', and local Council 'ineffective management'.

Much of the local formulation for this resolution derived from the Tomlinson Report, and its influence, and points of reference were readily apparent in the debates and discussions between the NAD and the City Council in the evolving and resolution of the 'location drama'. In effect this entailed the consolidation of the Ciskei 'Bantu area' with Mdantsane in it, the removal of all other 'Bantu Locations' in the City, and the industrialization of the 'European area' in close proximity, but in which the 'Bantu workers' would only be 'daily visitors to do the ordinary day's work'. This reduction of 'the Bantu' to an economic definition of labour power when in the 'European Area' of East London, this being the only legitimate reason for being in this 'European area' meant that, even if on a daily basis, 'bantu labour' would be defined as migrant and alien, and not permanent and within a community of the City. In this scheme, as Ashforth concludes in his

39 ELM, Minutes of Native Affairs Committee, 10 April 1956, emphasis in original, also cited in D. Atkinson, 'Cities and Citizenship', 327-328.
41 BCI, Box 21, Report, and Notes, 11 February 1964. For a more detailed discussion and context, which also ties this process to the related 'shortages' of white labour, and its transformation, as well as to forms of capital investments, and contradictions of migrancy, urban migration, and the 'traditions of native labour', see Chapter 7 above.
42 BCI, Box 21, Report, 11 February 1964; James Papers, correspondence between Malcolmess and James, 16 November 1961.
43 Details of these discussions, in relation to Group Areas can be found in CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1370 and 1371, while those around the Locations in Boxes 1341-1345; and in ELM, Reports of the Town Clerk, Native Affairs Committee, City and Water Engineer, and Public Health and Housing Committees, as well as in Mayors Minutes, 50/665/, and 665/.
discussion of this key aspect of the Tomlinson Report, and one applicable to the vision for East London, the migrant labourer 'is not only a worker with home and family left behind in the Reserves, but is a symbol of the proper place of the 'Bantu' within the order of things which is the South African state'.

This correspondence between the 'Xhosa Bantu race' (and the constructions of ethnicity), the Ciskei reserve and its 'internal self-sufficient' development, and migrant labour and its social and spatial control would produce an efficient and productive, but also recognizable and cheap labour force for industry. At least in apartheid theory, and in ambiguous Council acceptance this would be the case. Employers, and particularly the larger manufacturers, and their organizational representative, the BCI, remained less than convinced. They sustained, not surprisingly from their spatial locations in Chiselhurst, Braelyn, and the West Bank, that the existing Location/s should not be removed, and that the processes of stabilizing, rebuilding, and extending these Location/s along the Bowling and Floyd plan should be of 'singular concern' and 'urgent implementation'. These tensions in the Council and within local capital were to make East London's 'reliance' on the central state and its interventions, for both future economic and industrial development, and for the regulation and control, and symbolic construction of the migrancy of operative and unskilled 'Bantu labour' uneven and contradictory. For, as the power geometry of the City shifted onto the 'national' terrains of apartheid in the 1960s, the City was forced to confront the 'distant material, social and spatial horizons' of its own making in new ways. But in the 1950s, and up until c1963, while it fought, fermented, and increasingly favoured the systemacy of the new, it continued to rely on the ad hoc order and disorder of the old.

45 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1165, 1402, 1403, 1351; and ELM, Reports 50/665/ and 665/ all contain material on the continued development of Duncan Village, and in the correspondence this sense of ambiguity is readily apparent between the removal of responsibility and thus of issues of control, finance, and conflict for the Location/s and 'their inhabitants' on the one hand; and the Council's past history and attitudes; but also at the same time the implications, and extended context the new policy would generate, on the other. This was so, not just in terms of labour, but of removal management, together with an opposition to the overtly racist and unformulated nature of the removals, and the 'illogicality' of building Mdantsane on the worst site, simply to resolve a bigger political agenda of apartheid and 'Bantu Self-Government'.
46 BCI, Box 13, which contains material relating to the Group Areas Act and to the whole 'Location Drama' as it was called. When, in 1962/3 the Council had clearly come to accept both the GA proposals, and the Duncan Village/Location/s - Mdantsane removals, the BCI continued to express its great dismay, and vowed to oppose these measures in whatever way possible. Report, 8 August 1963.
47 See J. Lazar, 'Verwoerd versus the Visionaries': The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and Apartheid, 1948-1961' in P. Bonner, et al. (eds.), Apartheid's Genesis, 362-392, which provides the context, in this period of state centralization and restructuring, in particular of the NAD as a 'state within a state', which was also one of contradiction, conflict, and debate. He argues that, in the period of the 1950s, the NAD inaugurated an alternative 'solution', redefining all Africans as permanent inhabitants of ethnic homelands/bantustans, and
It is also apparent that the interventions of the NAD, and the central state more generally, were not only concerned with or determined by local labour needs and requirements. The hegemonic project contained a number of dimensions - symbolic and material - which were not simply reducible to those of labour. Thus, although the central interventions considered, and argued for the stabilization of 'bantu labour' in new ways, as the next sections will detail, it did not necessarily create the 'ideal' conditions of its exploitability. In many respects, these interventions contradicted its possibilities of universality. They were, after all, 'not apartheid', and that, suggested Clr. Fox is 'all that is likely to count'.

REAPING THE WHIRLWIND.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the City Council intervention had resulted in the re-establishment of the Location 'improvement' and re-building scheme. While this became increasingly constrained and closed through the differentiated interventions of the central state in the 1950s, the Council’s Location programmes continued, albeit on an equally increasing ad-hoc and crisis management basis. As indicated above, by 1952, 400 sub-economic houses had been completed, a ‘home ownership scheme of 210 sites was approved, and plans had been formulated for 1,500 ‘site-and-service scheme’ houses in the limited and controlled Amalinda extension. By 1956, the 210 home ownership houses had been completed, and between 1957 and 1960, a total of 970 sub-economic houses of the revised 1,100 planned had been built (reduced in the mid-1950s from the original 1,500 planned). Between 1951 and 1961, the Council had only built 1,236 houses in Duncan Village, as well as a hostel capable of accommodating ‘768 unattached males’. In addition 40,000 pounds had been spent on the ‘old shack area’ in ‘improvements’, and 12 communal lavatory blocks, and a Bantu Community Centre had been built. Lastly, 150 old shacks had been demolished in order to create a Location ‘buffer strip’.

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whose status in the urban areas was that of migrant workers, but that this did not occur without a major conflict between the SABRA ‘visionaries’, and the Broederbond.

48 BCI, Box 23, Correspondence between James of BCI, and Clr. Fox, 5 August 1958.

In effect, what these figures detail is one of growing desperation and crisis. By 1961 there were officially 44,295 people in Duncan Village, but estimated to be 55,000 by Reader in 1955, and likely to have been well over 60,000 by the early 1960s. They lived in 4,284 houses of various descriptions, still dominated by the ‘old shack area’ despite the recent municipal additions. There were also 4,784 people (Reader’s estimate for 1955 was 6,690) in 436 houses in the West Bank Location; and 724 people in 122 houses in Cambridge Location.\(^5\) In 1961, Duncan Village in particular, was described as ‘chaotically overcrowded’ by the Manager of Native Administration, who had claimed in 1957 that there was an ‘immediate backlog of 7,000 houses\(^5\).

The inability of the local state to cope with the Location/s was reflected in the attitude of allowing ‘organized squatting’, where lodgers permits were issued to people who were then left to their own devices to find accommodation, an effectively ‘impossible situation’\(^5\). In 1958, over a thousand ‘visiting permits’ were issued per month, while in 1957 5,700 women were ‘expelled’ back to the rural areas, with an equally large number (7,000 in 1959) living illegally in the East London Location/s in this period.\(^5\) The Manager stated that ‘... illegal accommodation is rife, ... illegal entrants have the free run of things, ... [they] live off others and generally cause a lot of trouble in backyards. The inspections now carried out are almost of no consequence.’\(^5\) In response to this, and reflective of the crisis situation, ‘3,500 temporary, one-roomed emergency dwellings’ were approved for construction by the Minister of Bantu Affairs and Development, and by the Bantu Housing Board and the National Housing Commission between February and May 1961, in what was described as an ‘administrative record’. The scheme was completed in March 1962, and was allowed to encroach on land in the Amalinda Group Areas buffer strip, despite opposition from the white Amalinda residents. The fact that the apartheid state approved these ‘emergency options’ as Nel calls them, at the same time as the formalization, and acceptance of the Mdantsane plan for the total existing Location/s removal, and the ‘accomplished undertaking’ for the ‘creation of a black city in the Ciskei’, the

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51 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1402; ELM, 665/1, Report of the Manager of Native Affairs Department to the Native Affairs Committee, 4 November 1957.
52 E. Nel, ‘The Spatial Planning’, 149.
53 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1403; ELM, 665/1 Manager of NAD to NAC, June 1958, Daily Dispatch, 11 March 1959; see D. Atkinson, ‘Cities and Citizenship’, 357-362, for similar observations.
54 ELM, 665/1, Memorandum to NAC, 16 October 1957.
'first of its kind' under apartheid social and spatial engineering, does serve to index the 'bulk' of the perceived crisis, and the crucial issues of the continued management, 'stability' and control of the existing Location/s. The Council and the central state were in little doubt that these were 'out of hand'. They had been for the entire decade, and this had entailed that the tensions between 'development' and 'welfare' on the one hand, and repression and control on the other, had, after the 1952 riots, and again after the 1956/7 period, tilted in favour of the latter.

Much of the context and detail of the riots of 1952 have been explored elsewhere, and will not be repeated in any detail here. Importantly, though, as the previous chapter emphasized, this was the period of rapid industrial expansion in East London, and it was accompanied by an intensified process of African urbanization and Location concentration. By the early 1950s, of the well over 60,000 people ever more forcefully located in increasingly squalid and overcrowded conditions, approximately 40 per cent were unemployed. In the spaces opened in a changing, and growing system of new, and older forms of wage labour, the parameters of its local dictates and disciplines were contested. This, together with the sustained chronic shortages of formal employment opportunities, and the haphazard forms of urban control in the Location/s, meant, as Chapter 7 emphasizes, that patterns of migrancy, work, and employment/unemployment fractured this period of industrialization into one of accelerated instability and change. The '1952 Riots' demonstrated these inter-connections between fracture and rapid industrial expansion most dramatically.

Drawing on a series of events in early November 1952, which resulted in the deaths of nine people including two whites - an insurance salesman and a Dominican nun - and a number of people wounded by gunshot, three policemen injured, and the destruction of all buildings associated with whites in the Duncan Village Location, and then the West Bank Location, Anne Mager and I have argued that as a semi-political riot, the key roles of single women, and of youth, as an increasingly visible and volatile social constituency, simultaneously galvanized and disorganized an ANC and Youth League inspired popular struggle.

55 Daily Dispatch, 7 December 1962. See also T. Gordon, 'Mdantsane: the evolution of a dependency' in G. Cook and J. Opland, (eds.), Mdantsane; Transitional City (Grahamstown, 1980); 1-10; and E. Nel, 'The Spatial Planning', Chs. 6 and 7.

Publicly identifiable as ‘tsotsis’ (and ‘amatsotsikazi’ (female tsotsi) to a lesser extent) these Location youth and their ‘single’ mothers filled the interstices between the dominant interests and mechanisms of control, and refused the dictates of wage labour, and of ‘traditional patriarchy’. Fiercely anti-white, and anti- the Location elite and its style of politics, and criminalized by the local state and the police, as well as through brewing and gang-related activities, the political engagement of the youth was intermittent and unstructured, and closely allied to the more vaguely oppositional and subversive modes of daily life. For the single women, the ANCYL provided a vehicle through which local grievances of beer-brewing, lodgers’ levies, registration of domestic service contracts and police raids could be independently contested; for the youth it provided a more volatile, and potentially violent space, defiant of authority in an assertion of a new masculinity and ‘invented’ Africanist past and present, of which they were an integral part.

The ‘spark of leadership’ that Wollheim had claimed was all that was missing between the crisis in the Location/s and the ‘disorder’ of popular resistance had been largely absent through the 1940s. The ICU had ‘got stuck’ in an authoritarian and charismatic populism that vacillated between popular rhetoric and Council compliance; the CP had been torn between legalist and economic trade unionism, Location grievance mobilization and white liberal stigmatization; CNETU, and the other ‘native unions’, (including the SATLC parallel unions) had failed to organize, or deliver. In addition, the Native Advisory Board, on which prominent ANC, CP, and ICU members served through the 1940s, although ‘radicalized’ to some extent, was rendered effectively useless by its narrow base, its perceived ‘white’ elitism of ‘talk, talk, talk’, its failure to secure popular interests, and by the Council’s unwillingness to consult.57 But in 1949, with the formation of a branch of the ANC Youth League in East London, a new leadership began to emerge.

In contrast to the Non-European Unity Movement, which was reputed to require a ‘minimum of JC for membership’, the Youth League was comprised of young men ‘who had not completed JC’ - such as J.Z. Fazzie, Joel Lengizi, J.J. Matoti and the powerful and charismatic Skei Gwentshe (orphaned as a result of the Bulhoek massacre and leader of the Hot Shots musical band).58 The Youth League spurned the

57 For example, Mr Lewis Reynolds, Clerk in Charge of Municipal Native Registration was confronted by members of the Welsh Commission and asked to account for ‘autocratic’ behaviour and tearing up requests for workseeker permits submitted by the ICU. Daily Dispatch, 13 July 1949; see also UCT, Wollheim Papers, BC 627 N4, memorandum of Dr. O. Wollheim to Welsh Commission, 1949.

58 Interview, PAC activist, M.D., 30 November 1989.
fruitless efforts of the old guard (ANC A) and introduced a new popular activism. They had built up a strong following through the 1950 Stayaway in protest against the Suppression of Communism Bill (in spite of strife between the ANC branch and the Youth League at the time) and in April 1951 sought confrontation with the Council over its attempt to impose a two shilling levy on all lodgers.

A mass demonstration against the lodgers' levy took place in the city centre. Permission for the route was given by the police. Four thousand Africans marched in orderly procession along the seven mile route. In silence they passed the hospital; then, taking twenty minutes to pass the City Hall, they sang Nkosi Sikeleli Afrika, their voices rising to crescendo at the silent, closed building. African Youth Leaguers led the procession bearing a huge banner demanding, 'Stop further taxation'. Other banners articulated more demands: 'Down with lodgers fees', 'Our children need bread' and, a banner carried by women domestic workers, 'We earn the least'. Youth League marshalls 'walked on either side of the column, preventing it from straggling, bunching or spreading'. Motorists courteously gave way to the marchers who wore ANC rosettes and gave the ANC thumbs-up salute. Back in Duncan Village, a meeting elected a delegation of Africans to meet with the mayor. But their suggestions - including the proposal that employers pay the two shilling levy - were spurned.

Tension mounted in the locations. Lines were drawn between the Vigilance Association and ANC A on the one hand and the young militants, now known as ANC B, on the other. The Youth Leaguers accused the old guard of betrayal: 'The two shillings must not be paid. The Council must demand the two shillings from Kwinana and Mngqikana, who have betrayed the orphans of Africa. Let Afrika return. Moreover, they threatened to oust them: 'It is high time we got rid of you. You are a traitor to the people for it was you who introduced the lodgers fee', they yelled at V.M. Kwinana.

Defeat in the struggle against the lodgers' levy was finally conceded when the residents lost their test case. The crowd overflowed the courtroom and held up the traffic outside as thirty-four year old Lillian Zweni was fined ten shillings or five days with hard labour for refusal to pay the lodgers' fee. Defeat was a

59  Daily Dispatch, 16 April 1951.
60  Daily Dispatch, 19 December 1951.
61  Daily Dispatch, 2 August 1951.
62  Daily Dispatch, 30 August 1951.
temporary setback. The Youth League remained committed to a path of radical politics. Heated debate within the League itself was part of this process. Thus, for example, individuals who regarded ‘all those who never schooled at Roma’ as less educated were opposed to those who identified Catholic missions as centres of exploitation, occupying vast areas of fertile land on which ‘many Africans were reduced to slaves’ in the service of white Catholic fathers.63 But the Youth League’s radicalism strained to evolve a political discourse that would simultaneously encapsulate the aspirations of recently proletarianised workers, a small but articulate urban elite - clerks, interpreters, entertainers, shopkeepers - and a steady influx of rurally oriented men and women.64 In the area of Duncan Village where the more fully proletarianised Africans lived, Sunday Youth League meetings rivalled church services in popularity. The ANC flag was flown, rosettes worn, the thumbs up salute made and the public speaking talents of the Youth Leaguers practised. At the rural end of Duncan Village, livestock roamed the streets and men who ‘carried their hats in their hands and dreamed of the fields’ dominated social life. While ANC elders envisaged a society which would ‘restore our chiefs to their rightful place, where we as the most advanced will take our place alongside them to guide and assist in building our nation’, the Youth Leaguers came under the radical Africanist influence of young intellectuals at Fort Hare, such as Mda and Sobukwe who visited East London at weekends.65 Africans, they argued, had ‘been suffering for three hundred years under European rule’ and that ‘the time has now come to make a determined bid for freedom’ from white domination, oppression and exploitation. Nationalist movements and their leaders in Africa - notably Nkrumah - were both an inspiration and an omen.66

The Youth Leaguers both drew on and enhanced the growing culture of nationalism and resistance as they built on their experience in the lodgers’ campaign. Early in 1950, the Youth League backed a deputation of five thousand angry women to the Native Commissioner in protest against the threat of passes for women.67

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63 Interview, PAC activist, M.D., 29 November 1989; Inkundla ya Bantu, 10 September 1949.
64 The total number of Africans in wage employment in 1951 was a little over 20 000; a quarter were women in domestic service. 3 in 4 African men were migrants who returned to the rural areas at least once a month. 68.6% were employed as unskilled labour; 19.4% in semi-skilled jobs and 1.6% were professional. See D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development, 225-226. Of the 15 000 self-employed Africans, three quarters were women. See D.H. Reader, The Black Man’s Portion, 62-63.
65 BCI, Box 15, Letter to City Council from East London Branch of the ANC, 12 December 1949, ‘Correspondence between the Chamber and the Council’.
67 Proceedings of Ciskeian General Council, Department of Native Affairs, 20th October 1950, Minute No 29, 60.
They organized a boycott of the van Riebeeck festival in 1951 and in February 1952, Youth League protest meetings against the registration of domestic servants' contracts drew massive support. Before a 'packed crowd' at Bantu Square in September 1952, two hundred volunteers in khaki uniform formed a guard of honour for the League's National President, Nelson Mandela. And the turnout in the Defiance Campaign made East London the second most militant centre of ANC organization in the country.

Hundreds responded to Gwentshe's appeal:

Speak in one voice, throw away your disputes, forgive each others sins, pray to God of Africa for your country. Cry day and night for Africa. Go to gaols for the sake of Africa. Be expelled from places where you stay for the sake of Africa. Die in gaols and be hanged for the sake of Africa. This is the time of heroes. We appeal to you our heroes.

Men and women clad in khaki uniform and wearing ANC rosettes turned out in their hundreds to defy curfew regulations. The thumbs up salute and the i'Afrika cry represented not only a political affiliation but also a broader opposition to whites and their society. Youth - young men and women - and older, single women were frequently the most ardent participants.

Identification with the radicals was at once more demonstrative and more volatile among the young men and women of the shackyards - areas of petty crime, family instability, shebeens, tsotsis and unemployment. The Youth League gave organizational expression to the belief in their own power to resolve problems through direct action against the enemy, white oppressors. The concerns of lodgers' levies, police raids, homelessness, unemployment and poverty informed their everyday lives and decided their political participation. Moreover, for youth who 'did not know their fathers', Africanism provided an acceptable and essentially 'invented' past and present of which they were an integral part.

68 Daily Dispatch, 11 February 1952.
69 Imvo Zabantsundu, 14 September 1952.
70 T. Lodge, Black Politics, 55-60.
71 CA, Grahamstown Supreme Court, GSC, 388/53.
72 N. Duka, From Shanty Town to Forest, 24-25.
73 Eric Hobsbawm defines 'invented tradition' as 'a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition which automatically implies continuity with the past.' E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, 1.
Xhosa nationalism frequently embraced by migrants who, secure in their Xhosa patrilineage, frowned upon the 'sons of Mary's and Joyce's' who called themselves men.74

But this reworking of patriarchal values in the politics of East London's radical Africanism went further, embracing, at least in part, the 'Mary's and Joyce's' themselves. For hundreds of wives, independent mothers and single women, the campaigns against the lodgers' levy and registration of domestic service contracts had transformed their private and domestic lives, albeit momentarily, as they entered the public arena of politics. Nor was their political action merely symbolic; it impacted on male authority in both urban and rural contexts. When the traditionalist councillors of the Ciskei Bunga requested stricter controls on women and juveniles running away to town, they were warned by the Native Commissioner who had received the five thousand strong women's delegation, not to make themselves 'unpopular with women'.75

While young men in the League urged women to 'sound your partner for his political depth and if you discover that he is politically bankrupt, discard him', it was left to the women to determine an active role for themselves.76 The traditional women's exhortation to weak-kneed men - 'Give us your pants, the women will wear them!' - assumed a new meaning as women emerged as independent actors in daily political life and at key moments in political struggle. While old guard ANC men embraced the participation of women at certain specified moments such as the Defiance Campaign, men in the Youth League were confronted with women whose daring broke all the boundaries of customary respect for men and acquiescence to male control. Not surprisingly, there was a constant threat of patriarchal nationalism re-asserting itself within the ANC.

Responses of male, predominantly migrant, workers to the Youth League were more cautious. While the educated leaders of the ANC old guard may have held some appeal for migrant workers - due to their respectability and stress on age, stature and male control - the youthfulness of the new radicals held little. Patriarchs with some standing in rural society and seasoned by many work contracts were not about to

74 In an area where almost all Africans spoke the same language, African nationalism was easily perceived as an extension of Xhosa nationalism. As long as ethnic nationalism emphasized the issues of land, male authority and respect for age rather than narrow chauvinistic concerns, this perception was seldom challenged by older, educated African nationalists; Interview M.D., 29 November 1989, and J.T. Kopki, 11 December 1989.

75 Proceedings of Ciskeian General Council, 20th October 1950, Minute No 29, 60. The Native Commissioner of East London warned that thousands of women had recently staged a march against precisely such controls.

76 Inkundla ya Bantu, 4 December 1952.
follow youngsters. Moreover, 'urbanized' workers had found the appeals of the ANC before 1949 both alienating and inadequate. As Chapter 7 emphasized, workers experiencing the denial of skills, wages and benefits on the shop floor as well as acute job insecurity saw white domination as the cause. Outside the workplace, the concerns of the workers were housing, rents, passes, crime and social disorder. Like their employers, the Council had scant regard for their conditions of existence. For Location dwellers there was no confusion as to the reason - it was because they were black, or more specifically, African. Many workers lent an ear to the speeches and responded to the calls of the Youth League but few joined. This was left to those who 'liked to argue and talk politics' - the more literate, articulate urbanites.

By the end of the Defiance Campaign, the Youth League was no longer able to contain the divisions within its own ranks and its appeals to the broader 'community' were frequently met with impatience. Struggles led by the League had achieved great moral victories and a massive show of strength on occasion but material gains were few. The Defiance Campaign itself had held little appeal for one section of supporters - those who spent their lives avoiding the police and the jail. Tsotsis whose everyday life was characterized by violent action were growing intolerant of the tactics of passive resistance in the teeth of state aggression.

This frustration and growing militancy began to find independent expression within the slum areas of Duncan Village. Thus, for example, when a shack fire on the 4th August 1952 destroyed a lodging house and left forty one people homeless, the crowd greeted the arrival of two fire engines with the thumbs up salute and the cry of 'Afrika!'. From a Coca-cola box podium a youth displaying an ANC badge made an impassioned and angry speech calling for direct confrontation with the Council. But the tsotsi following of the Youth League was not content with substituting for the leaders on impromptu platforms. They strained for the moment to make their own calls to action.

77 For migrants and many in the ANC, the notion of 'youth' was tied to a concept of 'manhood' and the role of men in patriarchal society rather than to age alone. Key leaders of the Youth League were hardly 'youngsters' - Skei Gwentshe, President of the East London Branch was thirty-eight years old and married; J.J. Matoti was forty and Million Manana, forty-two - but since they were not fully-fledged 'homestead heads', they could still be considered 'youth'.


79 N. Duka, From Shanty Town to Forest, Ch. 2.


82 Daily Dispatch, 5 August 1952.
By the end of 1952, the Youth League’s leadership was in crisis. Gwentshe and Lengisi were banned under the Suppression of Communism Act in October and it was rumored that political rivals within the League were responsible for ‘selling’ them to the Location Manager.\(^83\) Nationally, the intransigence of the Nationalist Government, the ban on meetings and the restriction of key leaders had created a crisis of strategy and tactics for the ANC. Walter Sisulu, General Secretary, was on a national tour of ANC branches to discuss this issue and in East London, to investigate the tensions within the organization. At the very moment of the riot, Sisulu and the ANC Youth League leaders were in closed conference in a house in Duncan Village.

The meeting at Bantu Square was in the hands of inexperienced, aspirant leaders and lay preachers. They addressed a crowd which had infused its main concerns into an Africanism that broke both the conventions of the conservative patriarchs and of the educated, cautious old guard. The destiny of Africans was in their own hands; they had but to seize the moment. Thus the period immediately prior to the riots marked a widening gap between the masses and the ANC and between alienated youth and a Youth League Branch pre-occupied with its own problems.

‘IN A FIELD OF THORNS’: ‘SEX-TEN’, THE APARTHEID STATE, AND THE ‘XHOSA IN TOWN’

In the wake of the riots, the balance of power shifted. The ANC held the state responsible for precipitating the events of ‘Black Sunday’ but was at pains to distance itself from the rioting and the rioters.\(^84\) Skei Gwentshe, President of the Youth League, attributed the riotous behaviour of the crowd to the fact that responsible leadership had been restricted and prevented from attending the meeting. ‘The people had no leaders and no one to exercise a restraining influence ... I have no option but to lay the whole blame in this matter on the police.\(^85\) He also condemned the excesses of ‘irresponsible elements’ and called upon people to ‘exercise restraint even in the teeth of police provocation’.\(^86\) Others were less compromising and urged Africans to continue the fight against unjust laws ‘unflinchingly’, undeterred by the ‘police state where

\(^{83}\) Interview, PAC activist, Interview M.D., 29 November 1989.

\(^{84}\) Interview S.M., 11 December 1988.

\(^{85}\) Daily Dispatch, 11 November 1952.

\(^{86}\) Daily Dispatch, 11 November 1952. See also Dr A.B. Xuma’s statement in Invo Zabantshundu, 22 November 1952 and the statement of the Interdenominational African Ministers Federation submitted by Rev James Calata, in Invo Zabantshundu, 6 December 1952.
shooting of the African by the police is indiscriminate'. While the ANC called upon the Minister of Justice 'to institute a judicial inquiry into the disturbances of East London immediately', the East London branch of the Youth League, horrified at the carnage and struggling to fend off the new state onslaught, turned their backs on the women and tsotsis.

The Council, perhaps in a move to shift culpability onto the central state, claimed that the Riotous Assemblies Act invoked by the Minister of Justice was 'the spark which set off the gunpowder'. In their view, the Defiance Campaign had been 'dying out' and the way forward was to 'now meet with responsible Native elements, especially the ANC' and seek to 'have the application of the Riotous Assemblies Act revoked if the Natives in their turn would give assurance that they would bring the situation back to normal'.

But these liberal sentiments were shortlived as the central state tightened control and pressurized the local Council to distance itself from the ANC and extend authority to the headmen. The state urged the strict application of the Native Urban Areas Act by the Council; Location Advisory Boards were informed that 'Natives should be held communally responsible for the damage caused in the riots'; and the Nationalist Party was quick to exploit the panic of whites, whipping up 'swart gevaar' fears at several rallies in the region.

Still reeling from the shock of the riots and in a bid to reclaim initiative from the central state, the liberal elements in the Council convened two conferences on the 'tsotsi' problem - the first, all-white, the second, 'consultative'. The conferences centred on appropriate methods of control over African urban juveniles. African delegates voiced strong opposition to the idea of labour camps which 'might develop into miniature gaols for juveniles who have not committed crimes but are unemployed for reasons beyond their control'. They wished to avoid state intervention in the socialization of their youth. Instead they sought increased

87 Daily Dispatch, 11 November 1952.
88 Daily Dispatch, 11 November 1952.
89 Daily Dispatch, 11 November 1952.
90 Daily Dispatch, 11 November 1952; See also CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, 1952 Riots, Minutes of Special Meetings, November-December 1952.
91 Daily Representative, 26 November 1952, 17 November 1952; Daily Dispatch, 13 January 1953.
92 Daily Dispatch, 15 August 1953; CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, Riots, 1952-1954, and Box 1354, Mayors Conferences on Juveniles, 1953-1955
power for older men in the Location/s and requested that Headmen - the official male representatives of tradition in the urban community - be given greater powers to discipline juveniles. Unmarried mothers might be assisted to live more decently by health visitors teaching them better 'management of their homes'. African delegates also requested greater controls over the major livelihood of independent women - the brewing and selling of beer.\(^\text{93}\)

By excluding the ANC and the ANCYL, and worker representatives, the increasingly divided Council had sought - and found - a cohort of allies in the Location 'community' who wished to nurture the development of an African middle class, a reflection of themselves. The vision was of a Location populated with temperate, Christian, nuclear families, educating their children to live clean and work hard. And this was to be achieved with as little investment from white ratepayers as possible. Any new amenities were to be built on an 'austerity basis' and Africans were to be asked to contribute free labour in return for membership of the Duncan Bowl Recreation Centre.\(^\text{94}\)

Several months later the Council reported that the Location/s were 'no longer loathsome' and that, since the riots, the tsotsis have been rounded up and sent to their homes in the country. Those whose homes were in town were given jobs and if they did not settle down after the third time of being placed in employment, steps were taken to have them committed to an institution.\(^\text{95}\)

The short term resolution of the tsotsi problem - and the moral panic it created - was thus achieved by increased state repression, the shoring up of patriarchal power through local Bantu Authorities and the collusion of a narrow African Nationalism with patriarchal control. But neither the broader Location/s crisis, nor the problems of urban African women and youth were ended. As a Youth Leaguer observed,

> The present government repatriates to their places of origin in the reserves all whom it calls 'redundant Africans', under the pretext of removing criminals from African locations. What we find is that innocent persons are being removed to places where once their homes were, but family ties cannot in many cases be properly traced. What aggravates the position is the fact that these people are being dumped into overcrowded areas.\(^\text{96}\)


\(^\text{94}\) Daily Dispatch, 25 June 1954; CA, 3/ELN, Box 1354, Juvenile Conferences, containing Correspondence, Proceedings, and Minutes of Meetings, 1953-1955.


\(^\text{96}\) Letter from J.J. Matoti of the ANC Youth League to the Daily Dispatch, 23 June 1953.
Not surprisingly, many of those who were deported, surreptitiously made their way back to town and six years after the riots, the ‘tsotsi’ problem erupted again. This time, the older men of the locations took matters into their own hands and unleashed their anger on the urban youth. Again, women took sides with their sons. But, by then the structures of urban social control, and the Location/s were sliding out of the hands of the local authorities and its tenuously constructed Location allies, and into those of the NAD, and a more subordinate and directed form of municipal control. In the spaces opened in these processes of encroachment and conflict over local autonomy and centralized incorporation, the Location/s after the mid-1950s remained caught between control, neglect, and removal, between the intensification, restructuring and laxity of municipal and central state interventions, and between de- and re-tribalization visions and practises.

On the one hand, the impact of the riots pushed forward the liberal response from within the divided City Council, which centred on consultation, conferral, and alliance-building, via the ‘native delinquent youth problem’, with the ‘responsible’ and educated elite of the Location/s. On the other, the riots served more widely to inflame and politicize white racism in the City. The City Council generally (including, if somewhat more ambiguously its liberal representatives), and a wider ‘settler publicity’ in the City and the Region understood the riots as the Mayor did, as a purely anti-white demonstration, attended by brutal savagry (sic) and even cannibalism, and was but an indication of the underground work that has been going on for a long time by subversive elements amongst people who in many cases are uneducated, and whose civilization is but a veneer laid over a solid background of barbarism.97

While the Council, of necessity, had, in the longer term, to draw lines and provide explanations that excluded itself, or the Native Administration from responsibility, arguing vociferously that the riot was not directed against them (the Council or Administration), it provided, and enabled a contradictory series of responses that did little to narrow the wider discourse of ‘panic-stricken’ racism. Thus, while the Council constructed an explanation that isolated the ‘responsible majority’ from the ‘younger irresponsible members of the ANC or Youth League’, and those irresponsible ‘wont-works’ who will ‘take any given opportunity as a heaven sent chance to commit loot and plunder, and even murder’, it simultaneously argued that ‘our

97 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, 50/665/3/1, Memorandum from Mayor to City Council over refusal to institute a commission of enquiry into the riots, no date but sometime in 1953.
natives are being incited to create (sic) trouble' in a manner that was 'not a local matter, it was something which has developed on a national scale'. The Mayor provided the details of what this meant:

\[\text{we have strong evidence that communism is behind it all. We know that the native is already speaking openly of a black republic. He is being so misled as to believe that he can take over the government of this country, yet he has not learned even the minimum demands of organized society in time of stress, but reverts to type under the least provocation. (I am speaking of course of the masses.) ... If we take the charitable view, and omit the charge of communism, we would say it is nationalism, that is inspiring them. Whatever it is, it constitutes an extreme threat to European civilization in South Africa. The future of the white man is at stake, but the average European, perhaps fortunately for his peace of mind, is unaware of this. ... It is because the government is aware of this position that they have taken the steps they have recently. They know the position far better than we do ... Again I say it is a national matter, and Cr. Addleson, in proposing his commission, is completely unrealistic in his outlook, for he seeks to enter a field to find a thorn, not realizing that the whole field is covered with thorns.}\]

The sense in which the Council sought to detach itself from the riots, and to pass responsibility of urban social disorder to the police, and onto the arena of 'national' politics and central state interventions, served to open the Location/s to increasingly 'national' solutions. The Council, meanwhile, began to narrow its responsibilities to that, which 'in common with other councils', would do 'its utmost to provide Housing, health and social service for a native population four or five times as great as the people who are called upon to provide these services'. This was accompanied, and in part, shaped by the changing form and nature of the new apartheid state, seeking segregationist continuity, racial systemacy, and paths to social and economic restructuring, but also by the local politicization of racism, given a 'national' context through the riots, and the Council and state explanations, and subsequent 'resolutions' in the City, and for the Location/s. East London's white residents had 'no doubt that all the "gunpowder" is manufactured at the meetings where mob-feeling is swept up ...' and that 'people who feel sorry for these heathens will find

\[\text{CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, 50/665/3/1; See also Special Meetings on Rioting in Locations, 10 and 11 November 1952, and Minutes of Public Health and Native/Non-European Affairs Committee, 1953 and 1954.}\]

\[\text{CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, 50/665/3/1, Memo from Mayor, 3-4.}\]

\[\text{CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, 50/665/3/1, Memo from Mayor. See also CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 877-881; 1354 on the Mayors Conferences for juvenile adults; 1370-1371 on Group Areas; 1400-1404 on Housing; 1150-1151 on Health; 1348 on Beer; as well as 1/ELN Council Minutes for the 1950s; and ELM Records, all of which contain the elements of this process of narrowing, declining, and weliflar roles, at the same time as central and NAD intervention grows through Group Areas, policing, the ever more systematic implementations of state restructurings of urban labour preference, and then removals, and in the revision of 'native administration under the Buitendag Report of 1960/61. All effectively shifted the terrain of the East London Location/s into the NAD and the central state, albeit with much continued failure, conflict and contradiction.}\]

\[\text{See D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid, and J. Lazar, 'Conformity and Conflict', in particular, who have both provided critical revisions to the earlier monolithic notions of apartheid restructurings.}\]
too late that they will not have the compliment returned when they in turn get their throats cut'.

This general hardening of white racism was reflected in the waning support, and erosion of the bases of the UDF, the Torch Commando, and the Civil Rights League, and a growing support, especially amongst white workers, for the National Party.

The preoccupations with racial swamping and racial mixing also reflected this hardening and politicization of white racism. 'You cannot have Europeans and Natives living cheek by jowl', and, as in the case of the Location extension, it would result in the 'rape of Amalinda'. Initially, after the riots, this followed the not unexpected responses of barbarism, heathenism and outrage, and of 'mobbing' and 'swamping' terror' highlighted above, and of the associated necessity for 'law and order', 'exclusion', and for 'separation' and 'control'. But then, with the extension of Group Areas proposals, and the Location extension and planning 'debates' after 1953, this politicization settled into a discourse of 'groups of racial difference', the 'clearing up' of 'penetrated areas', the control of 'penetration', the racial basis of 'disqualification', and 'displacement', and the absolute boundaries and buffers of racial cohesion and separation, and of the 'legitimate' basis for these to be established. While the Council contested aspects of the Group Areas Act through the 1950s, it did not contest racial groups, and rather sustained their ethnic-racial extensions in the discovery, and 'support' of 'groups' of Coloured, Indian, Malay, and Chinese in residential and business protests and 'community inclusions'. In fact, the pre-occupation with these 'groups' in Council policy and planning after 1953, and the localities of North End and Amalinda, tended to displace the Location/s and the 'Native' into a far more rigid and increasingly administratively, spatially and racially separated and 'culturally' distinctive locality.

102 Daily Dispatch, 17 November 1952.
104 Although these sentiments first surfaced in the 1950 meetings, via Cllr De Lange, (see also Interview, 15 June 1987), they became far more strident and repetitive in the post riots period in East London. See the Daily Dispatch, 5 September 1950; and then CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, which contains Newspaper correspondence, and meetings on these issues, and also Boxes 1370 and 1371 on Group Areas. The sexual connotations of this description should not be dismissed, as the work of A. Stoler, 'Making Empire Respectable', 634-660; and 'Rethinking Colonial Categories', 134-161, focusing on Malaysian colonial society, has emphasized.
105 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1343, Newspaper correspondence and Minutes of Meetings, 1952-1954, and Boxes 1370, and 1371 on Group Areas.
By 1955, the Duncan Village Extension Programme included, at the insistence of Venter, the Manager of Native Administration, 'ethnic group planning', based on an 'analysis of the nationalities of the natives who will be housed ... under the site-and-service scheme'. Within this, it was further 'desirous to keep even their [Nguni] tribes separate, for instance, the Zulu, and an indication on the plan as to where the Zulu will be housed within the Nguni group, should, I think, be indicated'. Thereafter, ethnic group planning was replaced by Native Location/s ‘Group Removal’, and after 1957/8 that of the Ciskei, and Xhosa Bantu identity, and racial and cultural separation on this 'national' ethnic basis of 'stability' in the spatially distinct new township of Mdantsane. In the meantime, though, the Manager of Native Affairs, and the local Council's 'Bantu Affairs Committee' became obsessed with sorting out the ethnic, and the Ciskei and Transkei basis of the Location/s, and of establishing its Ciskeian 'nationality' and Transkeian 'exclusion'. This administrative obsession did not unscramble the regional ethnicity of the Location/s however, and the social composition of the Location/s became, if anything, more complex and concentrated through intensified urban migrations of men and women from the Ciskei, and increasingly the Transkei as well. The contradictions, and failures between the central state's 'urban labour preference policy', its local administrative capability and regulation of influx controls, and the paths of migration, and differentiated employment practices became increasingly apparent by the latter part of the decade.

The Department of Native Affairs, after the riots, refused to entertain discussion of the tsotsi or youth problem, which the Council, and the African delegates at the 'Native Local Authorities' Conference wished to highlight. Instead they blamed employers for preferring 'raw natives' from rural areas to the 'semi-educated natives' of the urban areas for the creation of the tsotsi problem. This became a common

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106 CA, 3/ELN, Box 1348, 50/665/3/2, Letter from Manager of Native Administration to City and Water Engineer, 23 March 1955. This is the first time I came across 'ethnicity' within apartheid era Location planning in East London. Thereafter, it becomes integral, and then prioritized into Ciskei, and Xhosa identity, and racial and cultural separation.

107 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1156, 1354, and 1165; CCK, Vol Nos 52-59, Ref N3/11/3, Labour Bureaux, 1953-1963; and ELM, 665/1/2, Minutes of local NA and Bantu Affairs Committee, and Manager's Reports and correspondence for the 1950s. The notion of 'nationality' is one not yet established in the context that it assumes through the 1960s, and thereafter, but it does trace to ethnic and reserve separated, and re-tribalized 'nations'.

108 ELM, NAC Records, Memorandum from Sobey, 5 August 1959, Managers Report to NAC, June 1958; Daily Dispatch, 11 March 1959, 6 May 1961; and in particular, CCK, Vol Nos 52-59, Ref N3/11/3, Labour Bureaux, 1953-1963, and CA, 3/ELN, Box 1353, Labour Bureau for Domestic Servants, 1950-1956, and 1957-1958, contain details of this influx which cannot be detailed with any accuracy, but a pattern of massive in-migration is demonstrated, resulting in 'illegality', and unemployment, which consistently increased through the decade. So, for example, during 1957 over 5,000 women were sent back to the rural areas, and by 1961, the number of Africans unsuccessfully seeking work had increased by roughly 50%.

109 Daily Dispatch, 13 January 1953.
theme, concern, and necessity of regulation expressed within the Council from the Manager of Native Administration, in order to stabilize urban workers as 'insiders'. By the mid-1950s, the local administration began to intensify influx controls, and the number of pass raids, and deportations increased dramatically. In 1956/7 this took on an added dimension, as 80% of Transkeian migrants, whose service contracts expired were 'endorsed' out of East London, and thereafter it was to be 'transkeians' in particular, who were to bear the brunt of the 'permit queues', the pick-up vans, the three a.m. raids, and the criminalization of their search, and maintenance of work and Location residence.\textsuperscript{110} The problem, though, was also one of attempting to implement a bureaucratic and repressive pass system in the face of Administrative incapacity and massive 'overwork';\textsuperscript{111} a limited municipal police force, and the possibility and actuality of migrant and worker, as well as employer evasion and non-compliance. In this context male and female migrants, and 'illegals' constantly followed the 'well-trodden routes ... marked out by informal networks which protected their niches in the labour market'\textsuperscript{112} and sustained their spaces in the Location/s, a process thoroughly and perceptively detailed by P. and I. Mayer for East London in this period.\textsuperscript{113}

At the same time, the central state began to intervene much more significantly in the policing and required implementation of influx controls, asserting a much closer co-operation, and, in effect, attempted control over these processes. While Chapter 7 provided a labour and workplace context within the wider parameters of local industrialization, and the 'crisis of production' after c1957, these were integrally related to the wider strains of urban social control, and the impulses towards apartheid social engineering and political control in the region. In this, the creation of a local labour bureau which was established in 1952/3, but significantly only began to function 'with some effect' after 1957 was important. By 1963, however, the Regional Employment Commissioner identified the inadequacy of influx control administration and referred to the 'impossible position which had been allowed to develop in East London and to the explosive

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} ELM, Manager of Native Administration Reports, 1956-1963, see also P. and I. Mayer, \textit{Townsmen or Tribesmen}, 58.
\item \textsuperscript{111} ELM, Manager of NA Reports for the 1950s. The three superintendents at Duncan Village interviewed on average 2,300 persons per month, about 500 per month were contacted for arrears rentals, on site inspections were limited to one afternoon per week, and in general, as the Buitendag Report illustrated, the system simply did not, and could not 'manage' urban labour preference, let alone the pass system as a whole. See also D. Atkinson, 'Cities and Citizenship', Ch. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{112} P. Bonner, et al., 'The Shaping of Apartheid: Contradiction, Continuity and Popular Struggle', Introduction to \textit{Apartheid's Genesis}, 27.
\item \textsuperscript{113} P. and I. Mayer, \textit{Townsmen or Tribesmen}, 56-61.
\end{itemize}
conditions caused, especially in Duncan Village.' There were 15,000 'illegal Bantu' in the City, and he argued that a 'contributory cause of the chaotic position ... is the case with which countless numbers of natives had in the past been imported into the urban area'. In particular, the 'desire to please and to accommodate employers' on the part of the Registering Officer had meant that only 'cursory efforts at filling reported vacancies from local sources' had been implemented. 114

In effect, what this entailed was that the local urban labour preference policy had been, and continued to be ineffective, while it had simultaneously served to reproduce the mobility and migrant nature of the local labour force. In particular this was apparent in the fact that influx control had made migrancy, and especially Transkeian migrants a more precarious, but also a more desirable and sustainable state of affairs for Employers. They were 'cheaper', they worked 'harder', and they were more willing to do 'heavy manual work'. But over and above this, 'migrants' were to remain the dominant form of local labour, and their planned Reserve mobility from the future Mdantsane, but spatially wider existing 'instability' and circulation continued to contradict the state's Location/s urban preference demands to the extent that implementation, and more particularly, its failure locally reflected and acknowledged this reality in practice. Three aspects were particularly prominent in the inability to define local labour as Location-al and from the East London-Ciskei Region. They were inter-connected, and included the migrant-regional context, the Location-labour context, and a context of gender which requires brief elaboration.

In particular, the inability to control the movement of women into (and out of) the East London Location/s was notable through the 1950s. Although having the basis from 1952, through the Native Laws Amendment Act, and initially attempted through the 'domestic servants labour bureau' from 1953, the pass laws were only extended to women in 1957/8, again under heavy central state NAD pressure. Initially this was 'remarkably successful', with 12,000 reference books issued by September 1958, and a further 3,500 by the end of the year. At the same time, the system was used to 'endorse out' 5,700 'illegal women', whom it was claimed were 'mostly Transkeian'. The early 'success' of extending the pass system, though, was premised

114 ELM, NAC Minutes, 4/4/1962, DBAD Correspondence, Letter from Regional Employment Commissioner to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 1 November 1963.

115 In this period, what was formerly the East London Region within the Border-Eastern Cape-Transkei Region became identified as having an 'attachment' to the bordering Ciskei reserve, which would be the East London local labour definitional area, as distinct from the KWT, wider Ciskei, or the southern Transkei.
on the 'lenient way in which the Native Administration Department had accepted residency from native women'. Thereafter, however, the targets became unemployed and 'illegal' women, which reportedly totalled 3,400 'unemployed concubines', and at least 4,000 'young girls' in 1958. Increasingly, raids, haphazard administrative refusals, non-renewals, and indiscriminate refusals to even 'legitimate wives' hardened the early enthusiasm, and the Native Administration began to tie planned removals, and the granting of reference books to women to the transferral to Mdantsane. The targets after c1963 were the women of the shack-yards in particular, who were either 'endorsed out', or granted 'permits' on the basis of transferral. But, from c1960, influx of women to the Location/s had also been tightened from above, and politicized from within the white community and the Council. '[T]he flow of surplus people - particularly women - has to be controlled, or the area will be swamped, and the position would get completely out of control' was how a memorandum to the NAC argued the issue, while increasingly white public opinion demanded 'registers of control for domestics', the 'expulsion of masses of young native girls', and an entire re-surfaced 'moral panic' around illegitimacy, prostitution, and a host of 'attendant social ills' derivative from 'loose', 'unattached' and 'passless' women in the Location/s and the City, and over whom the Council, and the police had 'no control'. After 1961 only women from the rural hinterland of the East London-Ciskei district were permitted entry, and 'illegal entry' which was still of 'alarming proportions' received the added impetus in 1962, of four road barriers at the entrances to the Location, manned by Bantu municipal police, to prevent 'deliberate' illegal entry, as well as to 'catch' existing offenders.

This dovetailed with the demands of the Regional Employment Commissioner for action against the unemployed, intensified police activity, migrant expulsions on completion of existing contracts, and the sustained surveillance of endorsements being practically implemented with actual expulsions. At the same time, investigative pressure revealed, and demanded a local labour policy to be implemented, not by-passed through Registration maladministration. But what had also become apparent to the Department of Bantu Affairs and Development (DBAD), and the Regional Labour Bureau, was that the content and thrust of

the Buitendag Report\textsuperscript{119}, and of local influx control administration, including an urban local labour preference was 'unimplementable so long as the existing locations exist', for they, and especially Duncan Village, were uncontrollable without massive restructuring and removal.\textsuperscript{120}

Not unsurprisingly, the potential middle class alliances offered in the post-riot period crumbled as the 1950s wound down into the spaces dominated by the apartheid state. In part its possibilities had been influenced by the dramatic decline in the organizational presence of the ANC in the Location/s after 1952, but this process had simultaneously narrowed alternative political forums back into the Joint Advisory Board. While this did serve to ' politicize' the Board in a pattern somewhat similar to that of the 1940s, in the 1950s this happened essentially 'from above', under the brokerage of the educated elite, which included not only the conservative ANC grouping (of Kwinana, Godlo, and others), but also Fazzie and others from the Youth League.\textsuperscript{121} Through the 1950s, the Board increasingly engaged not just local 'welfare' issues, but also local, and 'national' political concerns, ranging from influx controls to Bantu education, and from wages, passes for women, rentals and housing, to the issues of political rights and 'freedoms', including citizenship, property, association, and speech.\textsuperscript{122} The problems, though, were two-fold. On the one hand, they remained the ' only Government recognized mouthpiece the native has', while simultaneously serving as a 'useful body insofar as Urban Native Administration is concerned'. In effect, this meant that the Board operated, and ultimately 'represented' the interests of the Administration, and the Council, and Location residents recognized this as the case. On the other, the base of the Board remained site-holders, which entitled less than one-tenth of residents access, and the majority of those who did participate from within this restricted base were the educated elite and privileged Section 10 residents. While they claimed, from a growing

\textsuperscript{119} D. Atkinson, 'Cities and Citizenship', 369-381, provides a context to, and details of the Buitendag report, which was commissioned by the City Council to investigate the functioning of the Native Administration Department. Buitendag was the Manager of Non-European Affairs of the Germiston City Council, and Atkinson argues, that in form, and content, the Report depicts a criticism, and transition from what she calls 'the patriarchal to the Verwoerden conceptions of city administration', which essentially meant the need to structure and impose, after Foucault, 'social discipline', and thus the partitioning of time, space, and movement codification in the processes of the administrative activity, rather than its expected results. The point though, was that in the context of East London at the time, this process not only ran counter to an ethnic re-unitization of 'the native' into that of the 'Xhosa Ciskeian Bantu', but that this had a corresponding social and spatial process of 'total' removal, and 'group' specification on the one hand, and an administrative, Location-al and migrant labour mobility of contradiction, on the other.

\textsuperscript{120} ELM, Managers Reports, and correspondence between BAC, RLB, and DBAD, 1963-1965. Interviews with A.C., and J.S., members of the Council's Bantu Affairs Committee in the 1960s.

\textsuperscript{121} CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1170-1173, Advisory Board Minutes, 1951-1958.

\textsuperscript{122} CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1170-1173, Advisory Board Minutes, 1951-1958.
position that was 'commingled with the common dust', to represent all residents, it was equally visible to residents that it was the rather more narrow process underway, which again 'mingled them with the commonality', the erosion of their status as 'detrubialized insiders', that was being contested and articulated.123

As a consequence, Board elections were non-events, with seldom more than ten percent of the electorate voting, and despite a growing antagonism between the Council and the Board, popular perceptions remained rooted in understanding its politics as that of concession and compromise, in Council dominance, and in the legitimation of racial exclusion and rule. The Council's attempt, under pressure from the central state over the gendered and 'uncontrollable' basis of 'illegal brewing' and its 'social ills', and of a growing financial deficit in the Native Revenue Account, to re-introduce a beer monopoly, is instructive of these relationships, and of the nature of the Advisory Board's middle class 'politics of exclusion'.124 Increasingly the Board came to 'talk' for the Location/s, and thus to define, and reproduce the 'essence' of 'native customs' and 'cultural differences' through the 'beerhall dispute', arguing that beerhalls were 'against African custom and tradition, ... were nurseries of crime, ... [and would destroy] the right to domestic brewing'. While the Council's chairman of the Advisory Board ultimately charged that the Board's opposition was based on 'very weak and specious reasons ... [with] heavy pressure by the well organized shebeen queens and their gangs', the prevalence of a 'liberal' and 'civilized' voice was critical in a wider sense for the Council, and for the elected Board members. For, in defining, and representing themselves as the more general 'ourselves (all Africans) and what is good for us' in the Location/s, they tended to simultaneously homogenize 'native custom' as 'cultural' and racial difference, and individualize and inclusively separate themselves within this process. This was ineffective in the Location/s, as the index of support suggests, but not in the Council, where this whole episode was enormously significant in the local development of the discourse of re-tribalized, ethnic, and Reserve based racial difference.

It was but a short step for the Council to translate these connections into the search for a new set of alliances with 'traditional figures of authority' in the Location/s, a process influenced by the Board's further

123 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1170-1173. See also Box 1348, 50/665/3/2; and ELM, NAC Minutes from the 1950s; and BCI, Box 22, Correspondence between Manager of NA on Location Advisory Board, related to the 'wage issue' in 1957/8; Interviews, Dec/Jan 1987.
124 CA, 3/ELN, Boxes 1172/3, 1348, 1169, JLAB Minutes, and Beer Files for the 1950s.
decline after c1957/8, and the inter-connections between the Location/s, removals, and the more systematic interventions of the NAD in all aspects of decision-making, policy and legislative, as well as material, social, and welfare implementations. In particular, the Council's attempts to shift delaying wage demand increases, and proposed rents increases onto the Advisory Board between 1958 and 1961 were important in the ultimate disintegration of them, as they became 'laughing stock' bodies. 125

In addition, the Council sought to use the Board against 'sectional or party-based activities' of the ANC, and the PAC, and to use its 'influence' to discourage people attending mass meetings, or mobilizing against wages, passes and rents. At the time, the ANC, but particularly the PAC, with input from earlier Youth League members, had begun to emerge and organize in the Location/s, although this was still on a very limited scale, and largely located around an 'experienced' educated leadership, those from a relatively privileged social background, and amongst elements of the youth, and some manual and factory workers. 126

While the wage demands, initiated through the ANC in close alliance with Curren, the Native Representative MP in 1957, resulted in delays and Wage Board promises, 'communicated' via the Advisory Board 127, the rent increases followed a different course.

Initiated via the DBAD, and linked to the Native Revenue Account deficits (of over 50 000 pounds p.a. by 1957, and thereafter), and despite Council attempts at postponements, delays, and 'sympathy' in that 'the raising of rentals will not only cause further hardship but dissatisfaction amongst hitherto well behaved Bantu population of the City', site rentals were increased, and lodgers and visitors fees were to be more thoroughly collected by the end of 1960. As the DBAD 'used' the Council to implement greater control, it, in turn, 'used' the Advisory Board to support the increases. In response, almost the entire Board, with their 'dignity, prestige and integrity ... strongly jeopardized', votes of 'no confidence' in the 'dummy members of the Board' passed at a public meeting over the issue, and amidst lost reputations, the 'calling of names' and having been 'threatened to lose our lives', resigned. 128 Without a Board to approve the rent increases, the

126 CA, 2/ELN, Civil Cases, District Commissioner's Court Records, involving PAC members from the late 1950s/early 1960; See also T. Lodge, Black Politics, 324-331, who describes the narrow, youthful, and conspiratorial, if surprisingly resilient basis of the PAC, and of the sociologically very similar picture of an educated, and youthful small grouping after c1960.
Council manufactured and appointed a Board, which approved the rent increases from its necessary new venue in the City Hall, but there were no nominations received for most of the wards in the 1962 elections, and thereafter as 'the people today do not wish to be represented on this Board', it effectively collapsed, and with it, the remnants of a locally 'supportive' middle class.¹²⁹

Neither was it surprising, that as the potential middle class 'alliances' crumbled, and repression and control became 'massively overburdened', and 'patently ineffective' under the comprehension desired by the NAD, the Location/s turned, briefly, and internally, to the recreated structures of tradition in the 'headmen' and elder male migrants. Ironically, this served to strengthen the central state's emerging emphasis on the Reserves and the new Mdantsane township as the basis of stability - a recognition not lost within the Council and its acceptance and 'support' for removals after the late 1950s.

Towards the end of November, 1958, tension in the East Bank location was beginning to mount as the incidents of murder, robbery and tsotsi attacks on residents increased.¹³⁰ A fifty year old member of the Amalinda Headman's Committee called the men to a mass meeting. The large crowd of conservative and traditionalist men quickly agreed that the only remedy was for the tsotis to be beaten. Word spread that 'the men have declared war on the boys' as men armed with sticks - carried both as weapons and as symbols of manhood and male power - chased and whipped boys all over the Location.¹³¹ Initially 'actual tsotis and delinquent boys' were the targets of the men but after a gang leader was said to have escaped disguised as a woman, women too were beaten. Resentment began to mount among the women who threatened to sue indiscriminate stick-wielders whose own sons were 'away in the country'. After several days of intense conflict, the police intervened. With the help of an African Baptist preacher, the police appealed to the men to turn in their sticks and put an end to the vengeance.

While the Location/s were able to enjoy a quiet Christmas, the migrant's antipathy for urban youth and single mothers had not ended. Their reliance on the power of 'the stick', both physically and symbolically,

¹³⁰ P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, 83-89.
¹³¹ P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, 84.
had only served to deepen the antagonisms in the Location/s. Conflict escalated as the youth and independent women closed ranks and the migrants attempted to form organizations to protect themselves.

These conflicts brought out not only moral dissension between urban and migrant men, men and boys, migrant men and urban women, but also revealed the pressures on patriarchal relations in the fragmented 'communities' of the Location/s. While women continually defended their right to head independent households and to make their own choices through the 1950s, their sons were hacking out a new path to manhood in hostile urban terrain and in the face of aggressive patriarchal resistance. If young men defended their mothers' independence, they sought control over their girlfriends. Marginalised and interdependent, both materially and in the face of continuous onslaughts from above, single women and urban youth were thrown together in mutual support. Although struggling for somewhat divergent ends, in the short term their defensive interests converged. As a consequence, the Location/s remained unstable, divided, and fragmented, and the chances for cohesion, and local labour stability, remote. The patriarchal repression of the migrant men (and their headmen) was no more effective than the state's repressive measures six years earlier. The crisis in the Location/s was to deepen in the next decade, but also to shift yet again to the central state, and the relocation to Mdantsane.

The tensions, contradictions and implications between the creation of the Ciskeian reserve township of Mdantsane, its planned mobile and commuter-migrant ethnic labour basis, its supposed locality for the expression of the local and urban labour preference policy, and the spatial proximity and 'informal routes' of wider reserve migrancy into the 'white corridor' between the Ciskei and Transkei, and ultimately into the Duncan Village Location of East London which was 'ineffectively removed' through the 1960s (and thereafter), patterned industrialization and definitional labour struggles through the following decades. From the beginning, in c1963, however, the terrain had shifted, not just to the apartheid state over the municipal one, but to apartheid's 'second phase' of ethnic restructuring which contradicted and constrained the universalities of class desired by many industrialists.

Furthermore, these tensions and contradictions between a local and a 'national' explanation and 'course of action' had both found Council expression through the 1950s. While on the surface, the local one seemed to
dominate increasingly through the period, it was the varying contexts of the ‘national’ that was to be more decisive and important. In late 1963, the DBAD introduced Proclamation No 293 of 1962, which claimed that housing in Mdantsane would not be allocated to any residents of Duncan Village who owned and continued to own land and kraalsites in their original rural areas of domicile. This carried two implications. The first was that of labour stabilization and urban preference, which would simultaneously ‘eradicate’ East London’s highly mobile and migrant labour force, and create a commuter-migrant, but ‘permanent’ Ciskei ‘urbanized’ labour force - in effect an answer to the problems of Duncan Village’s ‘instability’, and to a new labour stability within an apartheid and ethnic-particular framework. The second, however, was that it opened the question of what would happen to those ‘permanent location residents’, who were, and continued to be, migrant, retain access to land and ‘kraals’, but also qualified under Section 10.

‘Are these people not to live at Mdantsane? If that is so, how can Duncan Village and West Bank shanties and the Emergency Scheme be removed?’ asked the Township Manager in 1963. The DBAD however, blamed the Council and Manager for not using the ‘pruning knife’ effectively in the implementation of local influx controls, and adamantly persisted that

[[the] lodger must make up his mind whether he was going to remain in the rural area or whether he was going to forfeit his rights in the rural area and take up permanent residence in the urban area ... [he] cannot walk with one leg in East London and the other leg in Umtata.]

Rather, he needed to put both legs firmly in Mdantsane, or in the rural areas of the reserves. But the problem of those ‘Bantu residents who would not move, or give up land, ... and there are many who will adopt this attitude’, would make the ‘orderly and planned disestablishment [demolishing all residences in the block without leaving isolated structures in between them] of such locations extremely complicated’, argued the local administration in return. This new regulation would produce ‘Bantu housing pockets’ in the Location/s, and create a ‘horrible spotty mess’ in East London. The result of this Council opposition to the DBAD regulation, ironically, served to cement the necessity for the existing Location/s total removal

133 ELM, Minutes of BAC, 25 November 1963.
within the Council, and the associated need to relocate the labour force, and the implications of its 'community life ... beyond our borders'.

The Department was adamant. Mdantsane, as a 'bantu township' would ...

draw off the surplus population in the reserves, and at the same time, ... provide housing on a family basis to Bantu within commuting distance from their work. Experience has taught that where Bantu have dual residential rights the tendency id for them to leave their wives and families in the rural locations and to enter into illicit associations with older women with a consequent attenuation of an already serious social problem.

The Council came to accept the contradictions this might entail for the existing Location/s 'orderly removal', but they also came to support the spatial and social implications of a hegemonic project that would attempt to stabilize, and restructure the City's urban labour force, and its 'family basis' on the foregrounded systemacy of race and ethnicity. While the apartheid state provided the theory and the power of intervention, and the political struggles and historic continuities their local resonance and acceptance, the local 'authoritative knowledge' for this derived from the Border Regional Survey. It described, or more accurately was seen to describe the 'real' economic, and social and material conditions, experiences, and identities for the Location/s. What it found, and highlighted for the Council was the 'otherness', and the alterity of the 'Xhosa In Town', at the same time as constructing, and re-creating its ethnic or tribal basis.

The Border Regional Survey had been commissioned, in part, as an attempt to generate local knowledge which would sustain the continued existence of particularly Duncan Village as an integral stable 'community' of the City, and thus as a defence against apartheid Group Areas planning, and later, to highlight the social and economic cost for its removal. Ironically, in the end, it served to sustain its removal, as the 'facts of the matter' identified for the Council an unstable, migrant, matrifocal and 'tsotsi', racially hostile and spatially unintegrated series of fragmented 'communities', and a volatile, highly mobile, and

134 BCI, Box 16, Correspondence between BCI and Clr. van den Bost, 16 February 1964.
136 The Xhosa In Town series. Very significantly, I wish to emphasize that this is the way the series was locally received within Industrial, Commercial, the Council, and more broadly white East London, and not necessarily the intention of the authors, or even the remarkably detailed and complex content of the Mayers, and Pauw books in particular.
essentially colonial and partially commoditized labour force. It was, more than anything else, a different difference that was spatially and culturally tribal - 'Xhosa' and 'Bantu'.
CONCLUSION

In December 1958, East London was alerted to a series of security ‘warnings’, originating from the local police, under the headings of ‘Red Alert’. In the 1980s a security firm which enforced and patrolled East London’s factories drew again on the name of ‘Red Alert’. This linking of the ‘naming’ of two different ‘security’ related processes involving East London’s black workers opens a series of historically comparative questions. The ‘Red’ alert of the 1950s, was a concern with ‘blanket clad’ Transkeian and Ciskeian migrants, and their economic, and social impact on the local labour market, and on Location ‘strife’, in ‘factional’, generational, and ‘red - schooled’ conflicts. The security firm of the 1980s was concerned with strikes, union organization regulation, and ‘protection of company property’, from a militant, and increasingly offensive working class in the City. The comparison, however tenuous, enables a shift of focus across time, and draws attention to the historical and spatial processes of class and racial formation, as much through ‘modes of social/ security expression’, as in forms of political culture.

These differing conceptions of ‘Red Alert’ can be extended though, in the sense that it was possible for the same workers in East London to have posed very different possibilities of collective ‘threat’ in the late 1950s and in the 1980s, while still being seen as constituting part of the same working class under the extended beginning and the mature, but crises-ridden phases of local import substitution industrialization (ISI). And it was not impossible, that at least a few of the same individuals were part of a generational ‘riot’ in the 1950s, and two decades later part of SAAWUs ‘community unionism’ The comparison, in itself, is not necessarily surprising, or inexplicable. Proletarianization, class formation, and related class consciousness is seen as processual, and historical, but also universal in content and direction.

In current South African historiography these are fragments of a linear, and ‘unitary’ explanation of working class formation, critically ‘made’ in the 1930-1960 period, and deepened, and matured (albeit also transformed) by the 1980s. This understanding and periodization is directly related to Import Substitution


2 This is the dominant interpretation offered through social history analysis of South African class formation, and includes studies ranging from R. Fine (with D. Davis), Beyond Apartheid, through B. Hirson, Yours for the Union;
Industrialization in South Africa, and its periodization, as the key phase of the industrialization process, and hence of class formation. But it is also related to the dominance of a relatively problematic and essentially ahistorical and 'imported' universal conception of class. As a result, a surprising lacunae, around the social and historical constructions of industrialization and class, exists within the new social history.

Here the irony of 'Red Alert' as a potentially 'revolutionary' working class metaphor becomes apparent. It is the period of the 1930s to the 1950s that is held to critically define the 'making of the African working class', with its first 'revolutionary' impulse. The perspectives on this process are rich and varied, adopting a range of political, labour, and cultural dimensions, and these studies have dramatically expanded our past. But, we are also left with a largely assumptive explanation of the South African working class' structural presence, and transformative potential. So, typically armed with urbanization and manufacturing employment statistics, and with descriptive statistical detail of Africans living in 'family circumstances' as the conventional index of proletarianization, and supported by a rapidly growing, and visibly dominant capitalist mode of production, the black South African urban working class 'appears' as a major actor. This is then demonstrable through labour and 'community' struggles, which are seen to reflect, and sociologically index a growing class 'consciousness'. These identities and actions sound the political alarms, and then, depending on political affiliation, either fail or succeed, in the radicalizing, merging and ultimately

...to the summary Introductions of the Wits History Workshop edited collections, to the more popular synthesis in L. Callinicos, People's History Series.

3 These conceptualizations are widespread, whether argued for in terms of 'racial fordism', 'racial capitalism', as South Africa's 'Industrial Revolution', or even simply as the development of manufacturing capital. They all hold this period as critical to the shaping of the political economy, and for the structure, practise, and composition of the working class. For a useful summary, see B. Freund, in both The African Worker, and in The Making of Contemporary Africa, as well as in the 'The Social Character', 78-80; See also S. Gelb, 'South Africa's economic crisis: an overview' in S. Gelb (ed.), South Africa's Economic Crisis, 1-32; and S. Terreblanche and N. Nattrass, 'A periodization of the political economy from 1910' in N. Nattrass and E. Ardington (eds.), The Political Economy of South Africa, 6-23; M. Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid, South Africa, 1910-1986,138-182; and I. Berger, Threads of Solidarity, Women in South African Industry, 1900-1980, Part III, and Epilogue.


5 This trend of ascribing 'class' to numbers in cities and in employment, while important, tends to rely on assumptions that crudely correlate urban 'factory' work with a necessary class existence, and this is exemplified in general/ overview literature, but also in much social history, where it operates as a springboard into 'cultural' aspects. See the Introduction, and below for more detail and discussion.
submerging of 'national' to class concerns. All this, however seems far more convincing an argument for the 1980s, and the 'Red Alert' of East London in the 1950s holds more to contradict than to support working class formation in this original, systematic, and conclusive manner.

It might be argued that the moment of 'Red Alert' in the 1950s is an unrepresentative one for East London, and that elsewhere, and even within this visibly generational conflict lie the fragments of wider determinacies of class. The argument of the thesis questions this view, arguing against an a priori, and an abstract and necessarily 'universal' reading of these processes. There is much to support a growing determinacy of class in East London by the 1960s, but in historical and local terms of construction and contradiction. Through the period under examination, this social construction of classes, within, and between dominant and dominated, was 'about the classes' of industrialization, much more than it was 'of these classes'.

In part, this was determined by the particular, and contradictory path to industrialization in East London. To conclude that it was weak, dependent, and dominated by light consumer goods substitution is important, as was its spatial and productive marginality in the 'national' economy by the 1960s. Its comparative unevenness in limited local and distanced prospective wealthy markets, weak raw material base, poorly developed infrastructure, and flimsy local capital, and capital-goods base, were also significant in curtailing, and in constraining local industrialization, and this thesis attempts to assess these processual implications at various points. In detailing their contradictory internalization, however, the thesis also calls aspects of this narrative into question, and suggests there are multiple, as opposed to this rather singular path of explanation. To a significant degree, the thesis is about these multiple, fragmentary, and uneven paths; paths which enable an inclusive, rather than an anachronistic view of 'Red Alert'. I want to draw on each of the three aspects of the title - space, race, and class, and attempt to highlight this argument.

Implicit in Charles van Onselen's seminal studies of the Witwatersrand is the legitimation of a regional focus via two central processes; those of the nature of capital accumulation, and those of the locally specific nature of class formation.6 Regions then, for Van Onselen, are not pre-given to analysis, nor are they unchanging, but are continually reproduced in changing form, with the historical basis and construction of

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6 C. Van Onselen, Studies in the Social History of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914.
capital and class at their centre. While this is not unproblematic in itself, as I will suggest below, the
tendency in much South African historical literature has been to engage in two inter-linked dynamics which
have embedded black working class formation in a stasis of dubious Witwatersrand origin, and in so doing,
gloss over this central aspect of Van Onselen's thesis, and dynamic historical example. The translation of
the Rand's periodization and process of industrialization and working class formation into the other regions
of South Africa, together with a strong impulse to treat regions geographically and ethnically, has tended to
impose a 'national' sense of capitalist and the working class historical formation which is seldom regionally
specific. In part, the apparent historically coterminous incidence of 'national' and related regional
industrialization and proletarianization processes, have enabled assumptive generalization, and
Witwatersrand legitimating importation, of key class and industrialization processes as regionally
representative. To an extent, East London shares a similar comparative process - in periodization, in
investment transition, in urbanization, and in proletarianization indexes. But East London is not made in
the image of the Witwatersrand, or simply in the image of 'national' (and international) capital.

The problem, similar to the issue, is a complex one, especially as the regions refuse to comply to neat
'randcentric' capital and class formula. This material unevenness, however, not only has a spatial
dimension, but the spatiality of the Border Region and the City, is central to the argument advanced in
outlining both a distinctive regional path to industrialization, as well as its internal complexity. When 'space'
in this sense comes into play, the social and material locality of East London ‘unpacks’ these situated knowledges of industrialization in important ways.

Drawing on aspects of contemporary spatial theory, the thesis argues that social and material relations have a spatial form and relative spatial location, but these are simultaneously socially and materially constituted.9 In particular, the differing spatial forms of, and within, the City, the Location/s, and the Workplaces are highlighted, and their distinctive, yet inter-connected locales of simultaneity and difference examined through related periodizations. At the same time, though, the changing intricacies and networks of colonial, racial, class, and economic relations ‘created’ these locales as separate, though overlapping localities of differentiated and hierarchical relations of domination and subordination, and of solidarity and cooperation. The visibility of the racialness of the Location/s, the whiteness of the City, and the labour of the Workplaces drawn in a changing local ‘power-geometry’ of administrative, bureaucratic, repressive and productive representation and intervention, demarcated, divided, and differentiated urban East London through a fissured, and a fractured industrialization process.

When these became ‘submerged’ in the 1960s, in a power that was centred, marshalled, and systemic, it was to be through the apartheid state, and not the local ‘interests of capital’ or the formations and conflicts of class that this occurred. The ‘correspondences’ between the Location/s, their ‘management’, control, and removal, and their existing, and future social and spatial localities of difference, and changing forms of racial power became apparent. The region, and the city were to be socially and spatially re-drawn, and industrialization’s locally asserted low-waged and ethnically distinctive racial path, to open a new phase of conflict and contradiction in East London’s economic and social development, thereafter.

In this context, the thesis argues that the local configurations, and social constructions of capital and class were significant in defining the landscape of the city over time, but not uniformly determinant of all localities, topographies and glossaries - of the multiple voices that animated everyday life from different

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localities in East London. While many of those 'voices' are absent from this thesis, and others only make momentary, and occasionally more forceful and consistent entry, as in the case of white workers, urban youth, and Location women, the thesis does begin to develop the relations between the visible and the articulable as one of uneven edges and awkward topographies - of unequal 'worlds' in East London. These relate to, are shaped, but also shape local industrialization as a multiple spatial and social process.

The role of the local state, itself a condensation of contradictory social forces, relations, and institutional structures, shaped what Lefebvre calls the 'real spaces of representation' in East London in critical racial respects. Through town-planning, and mapping of urban forms, through legislation and repression, and through the uneven allocation of the 'collective means of consumption', the 'imagined', but internally divided 'white community' of settler East London drew on, and extended a range of segregationist, colonial and racist repertoires into the life of the city. These discourses, and the Council's colonial-racist 'representation of space' were central for the attendant historically complex 'racial formation' that emerged in East London. The thesis argues, though, that this was not simply an expression of a deeper material context, or a masking of this 'deeper reality', but a lived social and spatial reality in itself. At times, and in distinctive spaces, it proved to be crucially determinant for both the city, and for industrialization. And it did not only emerge from above - 'subaltern' racial identities and actions continually intersected, and periodically forced and shaped the re-drawing of lines of race, and of class and space.

But, like spatiality, race had its 'own' history, ambiguity, and contradiction - in South Africa, in the Eastern Cape and Border, and in the urban locality of East London. In tracing these for East London, the thesis argues that the civilizationaI, eugenist, 'cultural', territorial and 'factual' dimensions of segregationist and racial discourses, changed over time, were influenced at key moments by wider institutional presences,

10 See D. Gregory, 'The Historical Geography of Modernity', in J. Duncan and D. Ley (eds.), Place/Culture/Representation, 303.
11 H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space.
and were patterned by local social practices. It concludes with an investigation of the apartheid state's local re-assertion of a dogmatic, rigid, and ethnic racism - the extension of 'a different difference', although drawing on, but also 'politicizing' the prior and existing terrains of racial formation.

Thus, while the thesis does engage, and in part, sustain the argument that the 'particular path of industrialization in South Africa is attributable in large measure to an abundant supply of disenfranchised, low-wage, unskilled black labour', it is not enough, albeit important, to point to its 'inherent contradictoriness', as primarily manifest, particularly for manufacturing, in high labour turnovers and low productivity. For, not only is labour turnover and the low levels of productivity caught up in a more complex web of migrancy, mobility and temporality in East London, but the 'invention' and construction of 'kaffir', 'native' and 'bantu labour', as the 'cheap labour' basis of this path, was enormously complex and contradictory in itself. In broad assertion, the thesis argues that, in relation to white, and artisan labour in particular, and in the sedimentation of a series of locally specific 'colonial' and racial 'hegemonic projects', 'native labour' was not 'universalized', and was essentially constituted 'outside' of class relations. While this was in the process of change by the 1950s, the apartheid state pushed labour back into the local and the particular, even if also simultaneously beginning to stabilize and to rigidify 'bantu labour' as operative and semi-skilled. Thus, while the majority of Africans were disenfranchised, and low-waged, and unskilled as labour in East London, 'cheap labour' and its attached 'high profitability' was not the over-riding determinant of its industrialization pattern - at least as typically understood. If anything, in East London, it worked in reverse - 'native labour' was cheap, but this was determined more by the 'native' in the equation, than by the 'labour' - by the processes of racial formation shaping a particularly volatile, casual, but also excluded, unintegrated, and essentially unproductive and 'marginal' black labour force, from above and from below.

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15 A. Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse, Ch. 5.
16 The idea of the 'politicization of race' is developed by S. Marks, 'The Nursing Profession and the Making of Apartheid', in P. Bonner, et al. (eds.) Apartheid's Genesis, 1935-1962 (Johannesburg, 1993)
The connecting tissue, and the many lines that connected top to bottom, segregation to labour, and the
Location/s to the Workplaces, problematize this view though, and the thesis attempts to develop a more
'subtle interplay of cooperation and critique, of appropriation and denial' for the complex relations between
the constructions of race and class, and between dominant and subordinate. The tensions running
between an overarching and reproduced racial difference, and the shifting and at times contradictory
terrains of this difference, impacted on industrialization, as the 'unitized' and then aggregated peculiarity of
the 'native' denied the 'universality' of the worker. The invention of a 'tradition of native labour' relied on a
model of the worker as male, migrant and temporary, and as culturally and politically distinct. And these
male migrants not only dominated the labour force, but lived these contradictions, often with a creativity
and an agency, but also with a frustration and a growing desperation that restrained, and at times, refused
to submerge difference into dominance, Location space into abstract City space, and work into 'native
labour'.

The drive to turn the disorderly, unruly and by the 1940s 'factually primitive' native labourer into 'industrial
man' was entertained, initially with hesitancy and caution, but then with growing urgency, but also growing
contradiction. As it bumped, prodded, and finally articulated a hegemonic project 'couched in universalistic
language' of class, it ran up against the doubly politicized nationalisms of race - in the local ANC, and in
the entryism of 'race-mad apartheid social engineering'. The 1952 'Riots' were a central turning point and
highlight, through the intersections of gender and age, with those of race and class, the intertwined pattern
not just to local politics, but in its extensions to local industrialization as well. In important respects the
'Riots' condensed, over the period of the 1950s, a politics, and a process that was to find currency with
apartheid, and retract industrial man into ethnic/tribal man, retrace the Locations back into the Ciskei
Reserve, and reform the City into the systemacy of engineered tradition and dominance.

The dissertation argues that the need to historically analyse the way the 'interiorization of race' changed,
'held', and shaped classes and class formations in particular localities in East London - occurred in a

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18 See F. Cooper, 'The Dialectics of Decolonization: Nationalism and Labor Movements in Post-War Africa'. These
observations draw on Cooper's analysis of colonial 'hegemonic projects', and of the problematic constructions of
'subalternity', and his critique of James Scott's resistance scenarios.

19 F. Cooper, 'The Dialectics of Decolonization', 8-11.

20 P. Bonner, et al., 'The Shaping of Apartheid', 28, quoting S. Marks, 'The Nursing Profession'.

context, and a manner in which the potential 'universality' of capital and class industrialization was not historically assumed, but rather needed to be constructed, and struggled over. As a result, in crucial ways, this 'universality' was fundamentally contradicted, constrained, and racially demarcated, including white, and excluding black workers. The nature and 'consciousness' of workers in East London was not, and could not be exogenous to these historical and spatial developments, or social and material 'constructions'. In relation to the arguments outlined for South African historiography, the thesis attempts to detail, and to capture these material, social, and spatial processes through the altered focus of this local 'analysis of class' - one that the evidence from East London demonstrably sustains.

In East London there was a pervasive sense that wage labour did involve fraudulent and illegal 'theft' by the 1950s, and a stark illegitimacy, and differentiation between the 'white mans' control of property, and industrial production was apparent. The generalized failure to 'ideologically neuter' the racial and spatial realities of private property and the discriminatory labour markets, or even draw 'native labour' into the orbits of local commoditization to any significant degree, however, was crucially important in shaping local industrialization as racially differentiated in form and content. And where black workers were patently 'not equal before the law', this meant there was little 'freedom', and little benefit in the wage contract.21

Workers were not, and did not contract and participate in wage labour in East London as 'individual real people', or as classed subjects, in the eyes of industrialists and employers, through the local state, as well as within themselves. And this had its corollary in a system of supervision that did not 'insidiously objectify those on whom it was applied', but rather involved racial and associated economic stereotypes of 'uniformity' that were assigned, absorbed, rejected and evaded, by black workers.22 This meant that


22 See M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (Hammondsworth, 1979). As M. Vaughan, Curing Their Ills (Cambridge, 1991) has argued, the application of Foucault to Africa, and in this case to production relations, is problematic for the extent 'productive' over 'repressive' power was exercised, and for the extent to which 'subjectivities' over 'objectifications' of 'unitized' power occurred. F. Cooper, 'The Dialectics of Decolonization', 23, note 19, suggests that, in Foucault's terms, one cannot call colonial power 'capillary'. He says, '[i]t was, at times, modernizing without being modern, but when it was more self-consciously modernizing, ... the nonmodem character of colonial power became a frustrating and confusing problem for colonial officials'. I think, despite acknowledging the assertions that the South African state was more of a 'systemic whole', which 'modernized' much more into a 'Gramscian state, with its multiple organs of hegemony and legitimacy' than a simple colonial one, this needs, as this thesis asserts, debates and, at least, in part, contests and contradicts, to take account of the ways these processes occur across differentiated social and spatial localities. See B. Bozzoli's review, 'The Discourses of Myth and the Myth of Discourse', South African Historical Journal, 26, 1992, 193-194, for an assertion of this modern and non-colonial status of the South African state, and one which essentially ascribes this to the impact.
collective social identities were seldom determinate in class terms of expression and organization. The related ‘symbolic’, or what the Comaroffs 23 call the ‘poetic’ constructions of class and work, formed part of the patterns and dimensions of local ‘racial formation’, as much as they tended to contradict ‘universal’ class formation from below.

Forms of authority, and power, in the workplaces, as much as elsewhere, involved these processes of historical and cultural formation - of lived experience. The evidence of this experience, shaped by industrialists and the state, but also by the workers themselves, included the nature of authority, and the meaning of work, and of class and race. It tended to accurately ‘represent the real’ in racial and gender terms. From a slightly differing ambit, it was, primarily, ‘racial inequality before the law’ which was an essential ingredient of the culture with which East London’s black workers entered and handled its experience of industrialization.24 This mattered, not just for ‘cheap labour’, though, but also for the very construction of class identities and relations. It emphasized and sustained the common interiorization of the workplace as local and particular, and as contradictory for, and indeed to, industrialization.

This implied that racial ‘domination’ was rooted as much in the factories and workplaces, as in the local state, but also in the culture of the workers, and into their process of working class formation. Workers in East London did not experience capitalist industrialization passively, but neither did they experience it ‘typically’ or ‘universally’. The trade unions, communist, and worker organizers in East London were unsuccessful in the 1940s and 1950s for a number of reasons, but a large part of the explanation can be traced to this dichotomy between worker ‘realities’ and classic and universal working class expectations of consciousness and organization. The limited wider content of this East London example also suggests that the emergence of an ‘Africanist’ and ‘popular’ nationalism, was integrally related to the weak, local, and complex constitution of the ‘native worker’ in class terms, and the nature of its ‘symbolic’ construction,

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24 This borrows, and in the process certainly critically disfigures the ‘classic’ formulation, and argument of E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Hammondsworth, 1968). See D. Chakrabarty, *Rethinking Working Class History*, Introduction, for an informative, and original assertion of these contexts.
materially and socially. There was no 'unbreakable thread' of non-racialism, and the notion that a working
class provided either an impetus to this, or to radicalization, represents, for East London, a mythology.

In examining East London during this crucial 'formative' period, it is even difficult to talk 'about class'
behind very uneven and complex realities. To lay the blame for its weakness on a lack of historical
traditions and unities, on internal leadership splits and divisions, on racial and national deviations, or on the
exclusive and repressive state, also misses the central dynamic. The processes of industrialization in
'dependent' societies and localities like East London does not necessarily generate an equally rapid process
of 'universal' class formation. Neither does it generate an extra-historical consciousness of class.

Questions from the 'border' often enable a closer look at the centre. The attempts to regionally explore
East London's patterns and paths to industrialization shift the points of suture to a problematized
periodization and spatiality that makes for a multi-dimensional jigsaw puzzle of the more common two
dimensional, and Rand-centred processes of 'national' and local industrialization. There is not an idealized
one-to-one correspondence between industries, 'urbanization', 'family situations' and class. The evidence
from East London, of a kind that I increasingly think holds for much of South Africa, suggests that the
process of transitional industrialization is much more profoundly complex than has been allowed for in the
past.

In November of 1958, the warned 'Red Alert' became a reality in an apparent, and real generational
conflict between the 'men' (migrants and 'mature family men') and the 'boys' who 'rub against one', the
independent and tsotsi youth. Amidst a climate of increasing Location violence and crime, and ineffective
policing, sides began to be drawn and organized. The tsotsi youth attempted to impose their own curfews
on location inhabitants, and 'beer-drinks' became rallying points for 'the men'. 'Maka Betwa' (they must be
beaten) turned into a search and destroy mission in the 'bad shack areas' of Duncan Village as first
'gangsters' and then any youth, were hunted and beaten. The beatings, and the attempted escapes went on
day by day, and gradually it became apparent that conflict was taking on a new dynamic between migrant
and permanent workers, and residents, and between these 'traditional' men and single independent women,
around accepted 'norms and morals of behaviour', and the superiority of the 'real Xhosa' against that of 'white man's town' 25

Behind this apparent 'riot' lies a series of spatial, gender, ethnic-racial and labour issues, tied into a recently nationally eclipsed local state, and a local industrial production crisis. It emphasizes the range of social identities, collective and individual, beyond and within industrialization in East London. It reiterates ideas about becoming or not becoming a working class, and in related ways, the indistinct, weak and diverse world of local class and complex racial formations and relations. And it is this pattern that is more likely characteristic of South Africa in the 1940s and 1950s, than the 'thirty one workers [who] ... want[ed] to form a union'.26

25 See P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, 81-89; Daily Dispatch, November-December, 1958.
26 B. Hirson, Yours for the Union, cover page.
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'Political Unionism in South Africa: The South African Congress of Trade Unions, 1955-65', PhD, University of the Witwatersrand, 1988

Lazar, J.

Mager, A.


Minkley, G.


Nel. E.


Nicol, M.

‘A History of the Garment and Tailoring Workers in Cape Town, 1900-1939’, PhD, University of Cape Town, 1984

Robinson, J.


Sapire, H.


Smith, H.H.


Tankard, K.P.T.


Walker, A.

IV. INTERVIEWS

A. INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED AND HELD BY THE AUTHOR

(i) INDUSTRIALISTS AND COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES
(By Firm unless otherwise stated)

Becketts
(B.1-M.Hawkes) 16 January, 1987

Berkshire
(B.1-M.S.) 18 March, 1987

Consolidated Textile Mills
(C.1-4) 15-17 March, 1987

Da Gama (formerly Cyril Lord and Good Hope Textiles)
(D.1-V.Lawson; D.2-C.Bertwhistle; D.3-H.P.) 22-24 January, 1987

East London City Council
(C.C.1-5) 10-15 July 1987

East London Furniture Industry
(F.1-P.Mackie) 14 December, 1986

Federated Timbers
(F.1) 12 January, 1987

Johnson and Johnson
(J.1-R.L.Cook) 6 January, 1987

Kaffrarian Steam Mills
(K.S.1-G.Minkley; K.S.2-J.James) 8-9 February, 1987

Kohler Industries
(K.1-P.Tomalin) 20 January, 1987

Mercedes Benz (formerly C.D.A.)
(M.B.1-G.Kamuf; M.B.2-W.G.) 2-5 February, 1987

Modern Engineering Works
(M.1-B.H.Smith; M.2-S.Smith) 11-12 December, 1986

Premier Milling
(P.1) 7 February, 1987

Raylite Batteries
(R.1-D.G.Saunders) 18 January, 1987

Western Province Preserving Company
(W.P.1) 8 January, 1987

Wilson Rowntree and Company
(W.1-C.W.Ware; W.2-G.Thompson; W.3-M.Pollard) 6-8 December, 1986

(ii) INDIVIDUALS

G Orsmond (East London Harbour Manager)
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(K.1-P.Tomalin) 20 January, 1987

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Modern Engineering Works
(M.1-B.H.Smith; M.2-S.Smith) 11-12 December, 1986

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(W.P.1) 8 January, 1987

Wilson Rowntree and Company
(W.1-C.W.Ware; W.2-G.Thompson; W.3-M.Pollard) 6-8 December, 1986

(ii) INDIVIDUALS

G Orsmond (East London Harbour Manager)
(2a) 25 January, 1987

J. Rich (President of Border Chamber of Industries)
(2b) 21 March, 1987

T. Walsh (Border Metropolitan Development Corporation)
(2c and 2d) 23; 25 March, 1987

R. De Lange (National Party City Councillor and Mayor in 1950s)
(2e) 15 June, 1987

R. Howe (East London Technical College)
(2f) 16 June, 1987

G. Marr (Pineapple Industrialist)
(2g) 18 June, 1987

E. Spring (City Councillor and Bomedco chairman)
(2h) 20 June, 1987

W. van der Nest (Wool Board)
(2i) 21 June, 1987

M. Strong (Berkshire International)
(2j) 22 June, 1987

D. Card (ex-SA Police)
(2k) 24 June, 1991

M. Phillips (Border Planning Official)
(2l and 2m) 2; 4 July, 1987

T. Bryceland (Daily Dispatch)
(2n) 6 July, 1987

(iii) RESIDENTS AND WORKERS
The majority of Interviews are, on request for anonymity, referenced according to this convention in the text. They are organized according to Reference Interview Number, Initials, and Date of Interview.

(i) 3 a-v (and double letters e.g. 3aa represent follow up Interviews) Conducted with Cuma Sangqu, and Xola Nodikane
Conducted Between June 1987 and December 1988, Duncan Village, and Mdantsane, and at Vincent, East London. (20 Interviews, and 8 follow-up Interviews)

(ii) 4 a-w
Conducted Between January 1989 and December 1990, Duncan Village, Mdantsane, and Vincent, East London. (21 Interviews)

(iii) Kophi, J.T.
20 November, 1988, English, Mdantsane
11 December, 1988, Vincent
27 June, 1989, Vincent
Madikane, V.  
7 December, 1988, English, Duncan Village  
16 June, 1989, English, Vincent  

Mjiwi, S.  
6 February, 1989, English, Vincent  
12 February, 1989, Vincent  

Molobote, S.  
20 June, 1988, English, Duncan Village  
14 December, 1988, English, Duncan Village  

Nkonza, I.  
18 January, 1989, English, Vincent  

Nongwevu, S.  
16 December, 1987, English, Vincent  

Ramncana, S.  
24 January, 1989, English, Vincent  

(iv)  
Grearson, F.  
30 June, 1988  

Kitson, E.  
16 January, 1988  

Latimer, A.  
16 December, 1990  

Laweson, R.  
12 January, 1988  
5 July, 1988  

Minkley, H.  
15 July, 1987  
22 January, 1989,  
28 December, 1991  

Stevens, R.  
12 December, 1990  

Taylor, J.  
26 June, 1988  
4 July, 1988  

(v)  
5 a-n  

Interviews conducted between December 1990 and June 1991 with White residents and workers in East London in the 1940s and 1950s (14 Interviews)
### TABLE ONE: POPULATION: OFFICIAL AND OTHER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Official (Simkins Calculation)</th>
<th>Africans (Reader Estimation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>21,010</td>
<td>12,210</td>
<td>2,053</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>31,311</td>
<td>24,388</td>
<td>5,193</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>25,484</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>40,118</td>
<td>32,656</td>
<td>5,920</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>35,225</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>43,946</td>
<td>39,850</td>
<td>8,316</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td>47,816</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>47,830</td>
<td>55,878</td>
<td>8,316</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE TWO: PRINCIPAL STATISTICS: EAST LONDON (IN RANDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No of Est</th>
<th>Value-L&amp;B</th>
<th>Value -mach</th>
<th>Value -white</th>
<th>Labour -white</th>
<th>Labour -black</th>
<th>Wages -white</th>
<th>Wages -black</th>
<th>Value of Gross Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945/6</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>2,526</td>
<td>3,798</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>9,162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947/8</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>2,928</td>
<td>4,165</td>
<td>2,006</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>12,116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952/3</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>5,498</td>
<td>4,756</td>
<td>3,761</td>
<td>6,063</td>
<td>3,690</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>26,498</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959/60</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>8,770</td>
<td>13,394</td>
<td>3,567</td>
<td>8,356</td>
<td>5,076</td>
<td>2,820</td>
<td>35,376</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE THREE: RACIAL COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT WITHIN MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUPS - 1946/7 TO 1959/60

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Coloured and Indian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946/7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953/4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959/60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>2,579</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE FOUR: BREAKDOWN OF WORKFORCE, 1951 AND 1959/60

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Africans (1959/60)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing (Male)</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>2,118 (4,163)</td>
<td>4,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(female)</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction (male)</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,371 (1,071)</td>
<td>2,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce (male)</td>
<td>2,624</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>2,205 (3,582)</td>
<td>5,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(female)</td>
<td>1,753</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (male)</td>
<td>3,005</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>2,009 (2,313)</td>
<td>5,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(female)</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Services' (male)</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>3,528 (3,455)</td>
<td>6,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(female)</td>
<td>1,537</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>8,237</td>
<td>10,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Housewives'</td>
<td>9,701</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>4,655</td>
<td>15,436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE FIVE: INDUSTRY IN EAST LONDON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Establishments</th>
<th>Employees (000 Pounds)</th>
<th>Wages (000 Pounds)</th>
<th>Gross Value (000 Pounds)</th>
<th>Net Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928/9</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>3,525</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>1,331</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938/9</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>5,182</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>2,273</td>
<td>1,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945/6</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>6,673</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>4,762</td>
<td>2,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947/8</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>7,665</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>6,396</td>
<td>3,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953/4</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>11,299</td>
<td>3,505</td>
<td>16,609</td>
<td>7,169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE SIX: NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS: MAJOR GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>1946/7</th>
<th>1951/2</th>
<th>1959/60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>food</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>textiles</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wood</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paper and printing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chemicals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>engineering</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brick and cement</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE SEVEN: WHOLESALE TRADE, 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Wages (000 Pounds)</th>
<th>% Sales Profit Per Firm</th>
<th>Avg Net (Pounds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles and Machinery</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing and Textiles</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>7,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>3,798</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE EIGHT: AFRICANS IN WAGE EMPLOYMENT - EAST LONDON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1945/6 (55 Women)</th>
<th>1951/2</th>
<th>1959/60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>3,721</td>
<td>5,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Transport</td>
<td>1,820</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>2,009</td>
<td>2,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Transport</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Transport</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>308(excluding casual)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Docks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>1,908 (62 Women)</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>3,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(includes some service workers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>818 (383 Women)</td>
<td>11,765</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public And Municipal</td>
<td>3,218</td>
<td>7,910 (6,380 Women)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>1,608 (745 Women)</td>
<td>3,758 (off.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE NINE: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, UNSKILLED; SECTOR AND RACE (excluding SAR&H, Commerce/Service and Domestic Workers): 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Coloured (and Indian)</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brick and Tiles</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvas and Ropes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish Packing</td>
<td>2</td>
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THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF EAST LONDON, 1848 - 1983.

THE EVOLUTION OF SEGREGATION IN EAST LONDON, 1848-1948.


N.B. Unless otherwise stated, all shaded areas represent African locations.
Development of East Bank location 1889-1951.
[This diagram has been substituted for an original air photograph.]
East London's hinterland showing 'Native reserves' and communications.
Place of birth distribution of the East London male labour force sample
Relative Black and White population densities in East London and King William's Town magisterial districts, 1946 census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Bantu'</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Persons per sq. mile</th>
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<tr>
<td>O</td>
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Territory for 'Bantu' occupation