Democratic Developmental States in Southern Africa:
A Study of Botswana and South Africa

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This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature:____________________  Date:____________________
**Abstract:**

In light of the growing consensus surrounding the need for the emergence of Democratic Developmental States in Africa, this thesis analyses the concept within the context of two Southern African states: Botswana and South Africa. In this regard, it critically analyses the extent to which Botswana and South Africa can be considered to be Democratic Developmental States by making use of five benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State. It does so by firstly exploring and defining the concept and theory of the Developmental State as well as the concept of the Democratic Developmental State. Secondly, the thesis surveys the contributions made by five key authors, namely, Richard Sklar, Adrian Leftwich, Mark Robinson, Gordon White and Omono Edigheji, to the topic of the Democratic Developmental State and outlines the following five benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State: Development-Oriented Political Leadership; Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy; Developmental Success; Consolidated Electoral Democracy; and Popular Participation in the Development and Governance Process.

Thirdly, the five benchmarks are used to critically analyse whether Botswana and South Africa can truly be regarded as Democratic Developmental States. In this regard, the thesis finds that neither state fully exhibits all five outlined benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State: While Botswana exemplifies most of the five outlined benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State, this thesis finds that South Africa still has a long to go before it can be regarded as a Democratic Developmental State. In this manner, this thesis provides possible recommendations which will assist both Botswana and South Africa towards becoming fully-fledged Democratic Developmental States.
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Acronyms:

ANC  African National Congress
BCP  Botswana Congress Party
BDP  Botswana Democratic Party
BMD  Botswana Movement for Democracy
BNF  Botswana National Front
BPP  Botswana People’s Party
DA   Democratic Alliance
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry
DDCs District Development Committees
EDD  Economic Development Department
EFF  Economic Freedom Fighters
EPB  Economic Planning Board
FPTP First-Past-The-Post
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GNP  Gross National Profit
HLCC High Level Consultative Conference
HDI  Human Development Index
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IEC  Independent Electoral Commission
IDB  Industrial Development Bureau
IPAP Industrial Policy Action Plan
IFP  Inkatha Freedom Party
IDP  Integrated Development Planning
IMF  International Monetary Fund
MPs Members of Parliament
MFDP Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NDPP</td>
<td>National Director of Public Prosecutions</td>
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<td>NEDLAC</td>
<td>National Economic Development and Labour Council</td>
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<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Planning Commission</td>
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<td>NGP</td>
<td>New Growth Plan</td>
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<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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<td>NIEs</td>
<td>Newly Industrialising Economies</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Parallel Progression</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
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<td>SMS</td>
<td>Senior Management Service</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<td>TNCs</td>
<td>Transnational Corporations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Umbrella for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>VDCs</td>
<td>Village Development Committees</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1. Background Statement

In light of the failure of neoliberalism in Africa, which took the form of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), African leaders have begun to turn towards the Democratic Developmental State model as a panacea for its democratic and developmental concerns (Edigheji, 2010: vii). Given Southern Africa’s over-reliance on extractive industries, its developmental failures as well as its democratic challenges, countries in Southern Africa are especially being drawn to the Democratic Developmental State model (Lawrence, 2013: 48). Such a model is viewed by these countries as having the potential to improve its democratic institutions as well as its competitive base (Lawrence, 2013: 48). However, given Southern Africa’s limited progress made in areas such as democratisation, the provision of civil and political rights as well as social development, only four out of the 15 Southern African Development Community (SADC) members are viewed as having the potential to establish Democratic Developmental States (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa [EISA], 2008: 12). Included in the four possible SADC member states are Botswana and South Africa, which this thesis will explicitly focus on, as well as Mauritius and Namibia (EISA, 2008: 12).

1.1.1. Botswana as an African Democratic Developmental State

In 1885, prior to its independence, Botswana was publically declared a British protectorate and went by the name of Bechuanaland (Mogalakwe, 2006: 66). In 1961, the British colonialists formally discarded their plans to incorporate Bechuanaland into the Union of South Africa and began the process of decolonisation by way of constitutional negotiations with key nationalist actors (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001: 14; Proctor, 1968: 61). Botswana’s first elections based on universal suffrage was held on 1 March 1965 and Botswana formally gained independence from Britain in September of 1966 (EISA, 2009).
Following its independence, Botswana’s economic growth has been more positive in contrast to other sub-Saharan African countries (Meyns, 2010: 44). Since independence, Botswana’s per capita income had risen from US$ 60 per year in 1966 to US$ 2583 in 1999 to an astonishing US$ 6470 in 2008 (Meyns, 2010: 44). From 1965 up until 1995, Botswana was regarded as, “the fastest growing country in the world” (Beaulier, 2003: 231). Additionally, while it was previously considered to be one of the poorest countries in Africa, Botswana was ranked by the World Bank as an Upper Middle Income Country (Meyns, 2010: 44). Coupled with Botswana’s exceptional growth rates was its commitment to democratic governance: In this regard, Botswana is often cited as, “the longest-surviving democracy in Africa” (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2010: 65). Furthermore, Botswana has been one of the few African countries which had not succumb to a military regime, war or political violence and was considered to be, “an election success story in Africa and beyond” (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2010: 65; Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2011: 33). For these reasons, Botswana is commonly depicted as “an African miracle”, an “African growth economy” as well as a successful African Democratic Developmental State (Routely, 2012: 11).

1.1.2. South Africa as an Emerging Democratic Developmental State

The Union of South Africa was formed in 1910 and comprised of four colonies: Orange Free State, Transvaal, Natal and the Cape Colony (The Presidency, 2015). Following a policy of racial ‘segregation’, the Union of South Africa passed several laws which denied black South Africans the opportunity to benefit from South Africa’s economic growth and development (Grenville, 2005: 764). South Africa’s policy of racial segregation and discrimination became institutionalised in 1948 with the coming into power of the National Party (NP) (Clark and Worger, 2013). The system of laws and policies of racial segregation came to be known as ‘Apartheid’ which lasted from 1948 until 1994 when it was dismantled following South Africa’s first democratic election (Clark and Worger, 2013).

Since its first democratic election in 1994, the concept of the Developmental State has received considerable attention by the South African government (Turok, 2008: 3).
The South African government’s commitment to pursuing a Democratic Developmental State has been constitutionally enshrined and articulated at the African National Congress (ANC) General National Council Meeting in 2005 as well as at its 52nd National Conference in Polokwane in 2007 (African National Congress [ANC], 2005; ANC, 2007). In 2009, the ANC publically declared its intention to pursue a developmental state in its 2009 Election Manifesto wherein it firmly stated that, “The developmental state will play a central and strategic role in the economy. We will ensure a more effective government; improve the coordination and planning efforts of the developmental state by means of a planning entity to ensure faster change” (ANC, 2009). In addition, Chapter 13 of the South African National Development Plan (NDP) 2030, titled ‘Building a Capable and Developmental State’, is dedicated to the pursuit of the Democratic Developmental State (Republic of South Africa, 2012). Therein it acknowledges the need for the state to assume both a developmental and transformative role in the pursuit of socio-economic development (Ayee, 2013: 262; Republic of South Africa, 2012: 407). In this regard, South Africa is exceptional in that few other countries have made a public commitment to the construction of a Democratic Developmental State (Ayee, 2013: 267). Commentators regard South Africa’s commitment to building a Democratic Developmental State as both ambitious and noble (Gumede, 2014: 3).

According to Vusi Gumede, there is currently an on-going debate concerning whether or not South Africa can be regarded as a Democratic Developmental State (Gumede, 2014: 4). Many scholars have offered the following views on the matter: Alan Hirsch (2013), for example, noted that one can only begin to assess the possibility of a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa once its democracy is fully matured (Gumede, 2014: 4). According to William Gumede (2009), the pursuit of a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa is “still a work in progress” (Gumede, 2014: 4). In addition, Ben Turok (2008) claims that while South Africa cannot yet be considered as a Democratic Developmental State, it has made several inroads in this regard (Gumede, 2014: 4). Given these views and its commitment towards establishing a Democratic Developmental State, South Africa has commonly been considered an emerging or aspirational Democratic Developmental State (Ayee, 2013: 263).
1.2. Relevance of the Study

Given the enormous amount of attention which the concept of the Developmental State has received in recent years and in light of the Democratic Developmental State being increasingly regarded as a solution to Africa’s democratic and developmental deficits, the thesis explores the applicability of the concept within Africa. Furthermore, as the title “Democratic Developmental States in Southern Africa: A Study of Botswana and South Africa” suggests, this thesis will focus on the Democratic Developmental State model in Southern Africa, by examining the Democratic Developmental State within the context of Botswana and South Africa.

1.3. Research Questions

The research undertaken in this thesis attempts to address the following two questions:

I. Is Botswana truly a Democratic Developmental State? and,

II. Has the Emerging/Aspirational Democratic Developmental State of South Africa been able to successfully construct a Democratic Developmental State?

1.4. Research Design and Methodology

In assessing the two research questions above, this thesis performs a critical analysis of Botswana and South Africa, and analysed is whether they are truly Democratic Developmental States. In so doing, this research study will survey the literature produced by key authors on the Democratic Developmental State in order to identify five benchmarks of such a state which the thesis will use to assess these two Southern African states. The methodological approach of this thesis is based on a qualitative analysis of the concept of the Democratic Developmental State. Therefore, the research component of this thesis draws on library resources and secondary sources which involves a desktop literature review on the body of literature that focuses
explicitly on the Democratic Developmental State as it relates to Botswana and South Africa.

1.5. Outline of the Chapters

The thesis is divided into six chapters: Chapter One defined in this chapter provides a background discussion that sets the framework of the thesis. Chapter Two provides the conceptual and theoretical framework of this thesis. This chapter begins by exploring and defining the concept of the Development State as found in East Asia. In this regard, it also discusses the accompanying theory of the Developmental State and outlines the model of the Developmental State. Secondly, Chapter Two briefly discusses the concept of the Democratic Developmental State by defining the concepts of democracy and development and exploring the relationship between these two concepts and thereafter defining the concept of the Democratic Developmental State. Chapter Three of the thesis provides a brief review of literature on the Democratic Developmental State and seeks to outline five benchmarks of such a state. It does so by assessing the contributions made by the following five key scholars: Richard Sklar, Adrian Leftwich, Mark Robinson, Gordon White and Omano Edigheji. In this regard, close attention is paid to the manner in which these authors have reconciled and incorporated both the concepts of democracy and development into their individual Democratic Developmental State models.

Chapter Four provides a critical analysis of Botswana by using the benchmarks outlined in Chapter Three and concludes by providing possible recommendations. Chapter Five also critically analyses the extent to which South Africa can be regarded as a Democratic Developmental State by making further use of the five benchmarks outlined in Chapter Three and concludes with possible recommendations. Finally, Chapter Six provides a substantive conclusion by summarising the main arguments and recommendations that emerged within the scope of the thesis study.
Chapter Two: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

2.1. The Developmental State as in East Asia

2.1.1. Definition of the Developmental State

The concept of the Developmental State has often been used as a generic term describing states that have achieved rapid economic growth and development through the intervention of strong, efficient bureaucracies (Kim, 2009a: 6; Stubbs, 2009: 5). The concept is founded on the assumption that there exists a mutually beneficial relationship between state actors (bureaucrats) and non-state actors (private business firms) where the state intervenes in the market to foster economic growth and development and pursue society-wide developmental goals (Woo-Cummings, 1999).

The concept of the Developmental State was first used by Chalmers Johnson (1982) to describe the role that the Japanese state assumed in its outstanding and unforeseen post-war economic recovery (Johnson, 1982). Since then, the concept of the Developmental State has been closely associated with the economic policies pursued by certain East Asian states in the twentieth century with the Japanese state being a prime example (Caldentey, 2008: 28). Furthermore, scholars have labelled Developmental States who have originated out of the East Asian experience during the period of the 1950s to the 1980s as ‘Classical Developmental States’ (Chang, 2010: 83). Classical Developmental States most closely ascribe to the ideal type of the Developmental State Model – that of industrial-based economies, high economic growth rates and professional and autonomous state bureaucracies (Routely, 2012: 11). Developmental States who fall under this category include Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Routely, 2012: 11).

This thesis will adopt the following operational definition of the Developmental State provided by Leftwich in which he argues that, “Developmental states may be defined as states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, or by organizing it directly, or a varying combination of
both” (Leftwich, 1995: 401). The Developmental State has been characterised by Leftwich as a “transitional form of the modern state” which is typically found in late industrialising countries (Leftwich, 2000: 167). This leads to Leftwich’s next point in which he asserts that Developmental States are not static: the successful pursuit of economic growth may in turn alter particular political forces which may bring about further political and economic change (Leftwich, 2000: 168).

2.1.2. The Theory of the Developmental State

The theory of the Developmental State was introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Gilpin, 2001: 316). According to Robert Wade, the theory underscores the importance of, “the idea of ‘a centralised state interacting with the private sector from a position of pre-eminence so as to secure development[al] objectives’” (Wade, 1990). The theory argues that the rapid economic growth and development that was experienced by certain East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, was a result of the role played by an active, interventionist state in directing development (Hundt, n.d.). The theory is positioned between a liberal open market economy and a centrally-planned model. Its unique position suggests that it is neither capitalist nor socialist in nature, but rather brings together private capital with state supervision (Woo-Cummings, 1999: 2).

- The Neoliberal Account of the East Asian Miracle

The theory of the Developmental State emerged as a critique of the neoliberal orthodoxy in accounting for the rapid industrialisation and economic development of the Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) in East Asia during the 1970s and 1980s (Bolesta, 2007: 105; Gilpin, 2001: 316). Broadly defined, neoliberal economists argued that the success of East Asia’s post-war industrialisation resulted from the ability of the market to function free of undue state interference (Gray, 2015: 4). In this manner neoliberals asserted that market forces through open trade, rather than government policies, were responsible for the rapid economic development in East Asia (Gilpin, 2001: 321). The East Asian experience of the 1970s and 1980s is often used by neoclassical economists as a further tribute to the neoclassical growth model (Gilpin,
2001: 321). The concept of ‘neoliberalism’ refers to a branch of neoclassical economics which asserts that economic growth and development can be best achieved through limited state intervention in the market (Wade, 1992: 271; McGowan and Nel, 2002: 353). A global consensus towards neoliberal policy prescriptions emerged in the 1970s in response to the failure of Keynesian economics to prevent recession following the oil crisis of 1973 (van Vuuren, 2013: 20). Consequently, following the demise of communism and centrally-planned economies at the end of the Cold War in 1989, neoliberalism became the dominant politico-economic orthodoxy globally (Tarc, 2009: 9).

According to Ha-Joon Chang, the underlying logic behind the neoliberalist argument is comprised of two closely-linked components: one being an ‘economic’ component and the other a ‘political’ one (Chang, 1999: 184). The ‘economic’ component proposes “wholesale market liberalisation” – this entails, ‘getting the prices right’ (Chang, 1999: 184). In this manner, ‘getting’ means allowing prices to determine their correct levels, and ‘right’ refers to the relative prices which are established in free domestic and international markets (Wade, 1992: 271). For neoliberals, ‘right prices’ are the prices which prevail in domestic and international markets, free of any state regulations (Chang, 1999: 185). According to Ray Kiely (1998), ‘Right prices’ can only come about when the market has reached a state of equilibrium, i.e. when supply and demand are balanced. Neoliberalism maintains that the global economy will reach a state of equilibrium only if the market is allowed to function without state interference (Kiely, 1998: 130). On the national level, ‘getting the prices right’ requires a domestic product to operate with little or no restraint or regulatory oversight from the state (Chang, 1999: 185).

At the international level, ‘getting the prices right’ requires opening up markets by removing barriers to trade such as trade protectionist policies, and exercising comparative advantage (Chang, 1999: 185). In this regard, a country’s particular factor endowments must determine its comparative advantage (Chang, 1999: 185). Neoliberalism claims that by exercising comparative advantage, states will specialise in producing goods where they have a lower opportunity cost and where they are most
efficient and competitive (Kiely, 1998: 130). Nation states can only exercise their comparative advantage under conditions of more or less open competition (Kiely, 1998: 130). For developing countries, neoliberalism suggests that by exercising comparative advantage in their abundance of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, their economies can grow (Chang, 1999: 185). Developing countries are therefore recommended to concentrate their production in labour-intensive industries while staying clear of capital-intensive sectors (Chang, 1999: 185).

The ‘political’ component of the neoliberal argument, on the other hand, calls for the removal of politics from the formulation and implementation of economic policy (Chang, 1999: 185). According to neoliberals, any political meddling within economic policy ultimately results in the formulation of economic policy that solely benefits elite minority interests to the detriment of the majority (Chang, 1999: 185). In this regard, neoliberals argue that socially harmful consequences will occur if the pursuit of self-interest by individuals is not wholly guided by market forces (Chang, 1999: 185).

According to neoliberals, economic growth is a natural product of capitalist economies (Wade, 1992: 271). In order to create an environment conducive for growth, the government is tasked with providing a list of selective public goods which include: infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, rule of law and education (Wade, 1992: 271). According to neoliberals, what accounted for the East Asian economic success was the provision of public goods and the adoption of the following three neoliberal policy prescriptions: Firstly, East Asian governments facilitated free trade by removing barriers to their markets (Gilpin, 2001: 317). Secondly, East Asian governments limited government intervention in the economy in order to allow the markets to operate efficiently (Gilpin, 2001: 317). Thirdly, East Asian governments implemented export-led growth policies (Gilpin, 2001: 317).

- **Developmental State Theory’s Criticism of the Neoliberal Account**

In comparison to the neoliberal school of thought, the theory of the Developmental State provides a markedly different account of the East Asia economic recovery (Kim,
Developmental State theorists challenged the neoliberalist’s framework by arguing that the economic success of the NIEs was a result of the central role played by the state in guiding economic development (Gilpin, 2001: 317; Krugman, 1994: 62). Therefore, contrary to advocates of neoliberalism, Developmental State theorists argue that it was the ‘visible hand’ of the state rather than the ‘invisible hand’ of the market which spurred on rapid economic growth in East Asia by channeling capital to selective sectors which it deemed would yield the most profits and bring about optimal social benefits (Movahed, 2014; Gilpin, 2001: 317).

The theory is based on the assumption that the economies of the NIEs suffered from the effects of “late, late industrialisation”, one of which is market failure (Gilpin, 2001: 318). For Developmental State theorists, the global market is not based on more or less open competition and therefore does not naturally tend towards equilibrium as neoliberalism suggests (Kiely, 1998: 130). According to the theory, the global market is founded on unequal competition as a result of unequal labour productivities between developing and developed countries (Kiely, 1998: 130). Unequal labour productivities has arisen due to the advantage which developed countries enjoy in terms of having well-functioning infrastructure, established markets and access to the latest research and development. As a result, developed countries are able to acquire the most efficient methods of large-scale production (Kiely, 1998: 130).

As a result, developing countries wishing to industrialise and develop face unequal competition both domestically (in terms of protecting their local products from cheaper imports) as well as internationally (where they face barriers to entry which inhibits them from breaking into the global market) (Kiely, 1998: 130). In practice, even when exercising their comparative advantage in abundant, cheap labour, developing countries cannot out-compete the advanced technology of developed countries (Kiely, 1998: 130). The preponderance of market failure among less developed economies, according to the theory, required a strong interventionist state to prevent such failures and facilitate economic development (Gilpin, 2001: 318). For this reason, Developmental State theorists insist that governments of developing countries should intervene in the markets by adopting industrial policies which supports local producers.
attempting to enter the global market and protects them at home in their domestic markets where they must compete against established transnational corporations (TNCs) (Kiely, 1998: 130).

Therefore, the theory argues that certain East Asian countries were able to rapidly industrialise and grow their economies precisely because they ignored the neoliberal policy prescriptions (Kim, 2009b: 384). Instead, they were able to achieve rapid economic growth and development by channeling capital into selective business industries and thereby ‘getting the relative prices wrong’. The allocation of subsidies by East Asian governments was also used as a tool to discipline these select industries. Consequently, close ties were formed between the state and the private sector (Kim, 2009b: 384; Öniş 1991: 112).

Subsidies were meant to compensate for the inability of national firms to compete in international markets (Wade, 1992: 286). It also sought to move the present industrial structure higher up the value-added chain to include more technologically advanced methods of production (Wade, 1992: 286). According to Developmental State theorists, subsidies can achieve economic growth faster than if it were left to free market forces alone (Wade, 1992: 286). Therefore, the theory suggests that the use of subsidies assisted in the creation of an industrial and economic structure which would have not otherwise occurred (Gilpin, 2001: 317). In this regard, certain East Asian states ignored the suggestion made by neoliberals that late developers should focus on production in labour-intensive sectors and instead used the state to subsidise selective industries to help develop and grow capital-intensive manufacturing sectors.

In this regard, the Developmental State adopted a “sticks and carrots” approach to its allocation of subsidies to firms whereby it outlined stringent performance standards and disciplined firms by rewarding firms that performed well with more subsidies and withholding subsidies from those that did not perform well (Öniş, 1991: 112). Furthermore, the use of performance criteria in the allocation of subsidies helped to
increase the level of productivity within business firms, thereby making it more attractive to potential investors (Amsden, 1989: 145).

The use of state subsidies also resulted in changing the process whereby relative prices were determined (Öniş, 1991: 112). By creating price distortions, the Developmental State could better channel economic activity towards greater investment (Öniş, 1991: 112). Therefore, in stark contrast to neoclassical development theory and its preoccupation with 'getting the prices right', Developmental States deliberately got the prices ‘wrong' in securing the correct amount of investment in strategic sectors (Öniş, 1991: 112). According to Alice Amsden, East Asian governments typically distorted the exchange rate as well as the real interest rate in order to bring about industrialisation (Amsden, 2000). With regard to the exchange rate, Amsden notes that late industrialisers desired a low exchange rate when exporting goods, and therefore opted to relatively devalue their currency in order to stimulate exports as part of their export-led growth strategy (Amsden, 1989: 144; Gala, 2005: 1). Furthermore, Amsden notes that governments of Developmental States were able to distort the real interest rate by controlling nationalised banks and financial institutions (Amsden, 2000). In this regard, the government established multiple prices for loans and allocated heavily subsidised rates of interest on long-term credit (also referred to as “policy loans”) to select industries (Amsden, 1989: 144).

2.1.3. The Developmental State Model

Leftwich’s Developmental State model is predicated on the assumption that political factors are the dominant variable which shapes both the concept and the potential success of Developmental States (Leftwich, 2000: 154). According to Leftwich, politics has been essential in providing the impetus for the emergence of such states as well in shaping its developmental trajectory (Leftwich, 2000: 154). Political factors which have prompted the emergence of Developmental States include, “nationalism, ideology and a wish to ‘catch up’ with the West” (Leftwich, 2000: 154). Leftwich’s Developmental State model is mainly founded on the experiences of East and South Asia countries but also incorporates the experiences of African countries, namely, Botswana and Mauritius (Musamba, 2010: 16).
According to Leftwich (2000) Developmental States share the following six key features: Firstly, they are led by incorrupt political and bureaucratic elites who are driven and committed to economic growth and transformation (Leftwich, 2000: 160). Furthermore, the political-administrative interface is unique in the Developmental State as it is characterised by one in which, “the politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule” (Johnson, 1981: 12). In this regard, politicians in the Developmental State give up their traditional policy-making role to the bureaucrats and only oversee that developmental policies are crafted in line with the needs of citizens on which the stability of the political system is based (Wade, 1990: 26). Politicians, therefore, are mainly tasked with maintaining the political stability and the relative autonomy of the state (Wade, 1990: 26).

The second feature of the Developmental State is that of autonomy. Leftwich argues that the key factor is for both the elites and for government institutions to operate with a high degree of autonomy (Leftwich, 2000: 161). Autonomy refers to the freedom of the state to pursue its national objectives without being overly controlled and dictated to by societal pressures (Leftwich, 2000: 161). While the Developmental State operates with a considerable degree of autonomy, it is not completely separated from society (Leftwich, 2000: 161). Peter Evans (1995) describes this autonomy as “embedded autonomy”, which is defined as the uniting of well-developed bureaucracies with the surrounding social structure, which includes both state and non-state actors (Leftwich, 2000: 162; Evans, 1995). These linkages and relationships between the bureaucracies and the society further assists and informs the Developmental State in shaping, defining and pursuing its developmental goals.

Thirdly, Developmental States are characterised by the presence of an effective and well-insulated bureaucracy (Leftwich, 2000: 162). An effective and well-insulated bureaucracy must have the necessary capacity to formulate and implement coherent developmental policies and in so doing should be shielded from pervasive political pressures (Johnson, 1987: 142). The presence of “pilot agencies” to oversee and coordinate the process of development is an important element in this regard.
Examples of pilot agencies include Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), South Korea’s Economic Planning Board (EPB), and Taiwan’s Industrial Development Bureau (IDB).

Fourthly, Developmental States are characterised by having typically weak and subordinate civil societies (Leftwich, 2000: 163). According to Leftwich, the experiences of East Asia have suggested that a weak civil society is a prerequisite in order for a Developmental State to emerge (Leftwich, 2000: 164). Fifthly, these states have the capacity to effectively manage private economic interests (Leftwich, 2000: 164). Consequently, they are able to control the effect that foreign and national capital has on the state’s development process (Leftwich, 2000: 164).

Sixthly, Developmental States for the most part are authoritarian in nature and are therefore characterised by an uneasy mix of legitimacy, performance, repression and poor human rights track records (Leftwich, 2000: 160). In this regard, Johnson argues that key conditions such as “political stability” and “predictability”, which are much needed for the success of any Developmental State, can only be achieved and maintained through an authoritarian form of government (Johnson, 1987). Consequently, Developmental States have been deemed unattractive by Western liberal standards due to their poor human rights records (Leftwich, 2000). Singapore, Malaysia and China, for example, have all been heavily criticised by human rights observers for withholding civil and political liberties from their citizens (Kim, n.d.: 3). However, irrespective of the poor human rights track records and the mishandling of certain individuals and organisations, Developmental States have been able to garner widespread support and legitimacy (Leftwich, 2000: 165). Legitimacy of the Developmental State is founded on the ability of the state to distribute the benefits of rapid economic development among the developmental elite and citizens alike (Leftwich, 2000: 165).

Furthermore, Leftwich argues that the ability of a country to achieve socio-economic development is not determined by its regime type but rather by the nature of the state
and its domestic politics (Leftwich, 1993: 614). It is for this reason that it is difficult to replicate the experiences of a successful Developmental State (Leftwich, 2000: 168). Furthermore, the particular political factors which shape the nature of the Developmental State also give rise to two categories of Developmental States: Non-Democratic and Democratic Developmental States (Leftwich, 2000: 168).

2.2. The Democratic Developmental State

The concept of the Democratic Developmental State is founded on the premise that not only is democracy consistent with development but that these two terms are complementary (Robinson and White, 1998: 1). The relationship between democracy and development has received significant attention and has been heavily debated throughout the latter part of the 20th century (Comparative Research Programme on Poverty [CROP]: 2014). However, before delving into the relationship between democracy and development, the conceptual and theoretical framework will first define these two concepts.

2.2.1. Defining Democracy and Development

The current conventional definition of democracy is defined as a set of established institutional procedures, which make provision for basic civil and political rights; regular free and fair elections and allows for inter-party competition (White, 1998: 19 – 20). Democracy in this form is also commonly referred to as a ‘formal/procedural democracy’ (EISA, 2008). However, this thesis will instead adopt the definition of substantive democracy which places emphasis on the promotion of equity, impartiality and inclusion of all people within the political process (Mair, 2011: 88). In this manner, substantive democracy emphasises the need for citizens to assume a more active and direct role in the formulation and execution of public policy (Robinson and White, 1998: 3). Substantive democracy is defined as particular, “institutional arrangements for arriving at political decisions which realises the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (Schumpeter, 1947: 250). Substantive democracy promotes popular
participation through the establishment of institutional participatory mechanisms and channels throughout all levels of government (Houston and Liebenberg, 2001: 3).

A narrow definition of development more generally associates it with economic growth and material wealth and is defined as, “a process of economic change involving the construction of more complex and productive economies capable of generating higher material standards of living” (White, 1998: 20; Robinson and White, 1998: 3). However, in line with Robinson and White, this thesis also conceives and defines development as being “more redistributive and inclusive” than other narrowly defined definitions and argues that the pursuit of development requires that states not only play a passive, regulatory, but also a more active and interventionist role in bringing about development (Robinson and White, 1998: 5; White, 1998: 20).

In order for development to be “redistributive and inclusive”, it should be accompanied by the promotion of the following social objectives: the reduction and mitigation of relative and absolute poverty; the reversal of stark social inequalities; the provision of individual safety and security; and addressing impending threats such as environmental degradation (White, 1998: 20). Because all of the above social objectives can be identified as public goods, state involvement is needed in making the necessary provision for them (White, 1998: 20). In this regard, White notes that democratic countries which are able to meet the above social objectives can be labeled as being, “developmentally successful” (White, 1998: 20).

2.2.2. The Democracy-Development Nexus

The dominant world view held from the 1960s to the 1980s maintained that democracy and development were inconsistent and that poor societies in Third World countries could only develop under the guidance of authoritarian governments (Robinson and White, 1998: 1). The authoritarian nature of the state was viewed as the key ingredient to achieving economic growth and was informed in part by the developmental success achieved by newly industrialised authoritarian regimes in Latin America and East Asia (Robinson and White, 1998: 1). Under this view, the concept of democracy was
regarded as a grandiose plan afforded only to countries which were already developmentally successful. Such countries had already achieved a certain degree of sustained economic growth and had substantially increased the standards of living in their society (Robinson and White, 1998: 1). According to this view, democracy was seen as a challenge to underdeveloped countries in achieving sustained development as democratic politics produced demands which surpassed the ability and capacity of existing political institutions to adequately address (Robinson and White, 1998: 1).

However, this perspective was challenged and lost its position as the dominant world viewpoint towards the end of the 1980s following three developments: Firstly, the emergence of a number of democracies (Botswana, Malaysia and Mauritius) who had achieved a high degree of developmental success proved that democracy and development are reconcilable concepts (Robinson and White, 1998: 1). Secondly, a vast number of authoritarian regimes in Africa (such as Cameroon and Togo) and Latin America (such as Argentina and Chile) failed to bring about development in their respective societies (Robinson and White, 1998: 1; Brown, 2001: 725; Smith, 1989; Pepinsky, 2009). Thirdly, following the ‘Third Wave’ of democratisation occurring during the 1970s and towards the end of the Cold War in 1989 (which resulted in the fall of communism), liberal democracy ascended as the dominant form of government (Robinson and White, 1998: 2). As a result of the above three developments, by the late end of the 1990s, authoritarianism was no longer viewed as a viable form of government for many developing countries (Robinson and White, 1998: 2).

Therefore, for White, the concepts of democracy and development are interconnected (Kieh, 2015: 3; White, 1998). According to White, “democracy, even in its procedural or minimalist form, is a massive developmental good in its own right” (White, 2006: 63). Democratic institutions, White argues, have the potential to tackle developmental challenges by allowing the state to play more of an active role in economic growth, redistribution of wealth and investing in social capital and physical infrastructure needed to facilitate and sustain economic growth and development (Kieh, 2015: 3; White, 1998). Ultimately, the task is to build a state which is regarded as both
democratic and developmental since the concepts of development and democracy are mutually reinforcing (Tostensen, 2008: 15).

2.2.3. Definition of the Democratic Developmental State

The concept of the Democratic Developmental State was initially introduced to incorporate elements of democracy into the original Developmental State model (Robinson and White, 1998: 5). Democratic Developmental States differ substantially from Classical Developmental States in that although certain countries in East Asia were regarded as developmentally successful, they were also inherently autocratic (Akokpari, 2012). Therefore, unlike the Classical Developmental States of East Asia, Democratic Developmental States are grounded in principles of democratic governance (Edigheji, 2010: vii). While Classical Developmental States mainly pursue economic development, Democratic Developmental States promote “holistic development” by pursuing both economic and democratic development (Akokpari, 2012).

The pursuit of economic and democratic development on the part of the Democratic Developmental State should first and foremost address the needs of the impoverished and marginalised groups of society (Robinson and White, 1998: 6). In this manner, a Democratic Developmental State is defined as one which aims to not only pursue rapid economic growth, but one which also seeks to uplift its citizens out of poverty through the formulation and implementation of pro-poor policies (Robinson and White, 1998: 6). Therefore, the introduction of the Democratic Developmental State signals a sharp departure from traditional notions of the Developmental State in which the state remained oppressive and unresponsive to its citizenry, in spite of its claims of reducing poverty and increasing living standards (Robinson and White, 1998: 6).

Khabele Matlosa defines the Democratic Developmental State as being, “marked by mutually reinforcing state-society relations on one hand and the complementarity of state interventionism and market forces on the other” (Matlosa, 2005: 4). In this regard, a Democratic Developmental State functions in such a manner as to allow for the
active participation and involvement of non-state actors within the developmental agenda-setting phase and democratisation process (Matlosa, 2005: 2). However, state-society relations in Democratic Developmental States differ from that found in Classical Developmental States in that they are not restricted to government-private sector alliances (Edigheji, 2005). Therefore, within the context of the Democratic Developmental State, the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ associated with the Classical Developmental State is widened to accommodate not only the interests and views of the private sector, but also that of other key social actors (Edigheji, 2005; Green, 2011/12: 41).

White refers to this concept as ‘inclusive embeddedness’ and argues that it is the ability of the Democratic Developmental State to promote and establish horizontal relationships between the state and society, elected officials and the electorate and political parties and its supporters (Edigheji, 2005). In this manner, a Democratic Developmental State is also defined as, “one that forges broad-based alliances with society and ensures popular participation in the governance and transformation processes” (Edigheji, 2005). Therefore, in order for a Developmental State to be regarded as truly democratic it ought to incorporate the values, interests and aspirations of the majority of its citizens within its developmental policies (Robinson and White, 1998: 6).

According to Richard Sandbrook, the concept of the Democratic Developmental State is viewed as superior to that of the Developmental State in at least three ways: Firstly, democracy encourages leaders to pursue developmental strategies in order to improve growth and equity (Sandbrook, 2005: 552). Furthermore, the accomplishment thereof will assist in strengthening democratic institutions (Sandbrook, 2005: 552). Secondly, by holding leaders accountable, democratic politics strengthens the government’s capacity to garner legitimacy and improve administrative efficiency (Sandbrook, 2005: 552). Thirdly, the presence of democratic institutions allows for bureaucratic and political elite to act independently of the interests of the private sector, thereby making them better able to pursue equitable socio-economic development (Sandbrook, 2005: 552). However, Sandbrook further notes that
Democratic Developmental States are a rarity precisely because the prerequisites needed to construct a successful one are considerably “stringent” (Sandbrook, 2005: 553).
3.1. Richard Sklar and ‘Developmental Democracy’

Various authors who have contributed to the growing debate on the Democratic Developmental State have been influenced by Sklar’s concept and theory of ‘developmental democracy’. The concept of ‘developmental democracy’ was first coined by C. B. Macpherson to describe a new liberal democratic model which developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which shifted emphasis away from private property rights to “individual self-development’ as an universal right” (Macpherson, 1977: 44 – 76; Held, 1996: 75; Levine, 1992: 342; Sklar, 1996: 35). In 1982, Sklar used the term ‘developmental democracy’ to denote an “ends-means relationship” in which democracy is regarded as the means to which national development is achieved (Sklar, 1996: 25; Sklar, 1996: 40).

Sklar’s theory of developmental democracy seeks to outline the usefulness of democracy as a means of national development (Sklar, 1996: 26). In his theory, Sklar highlights the deepening of democracy as an important prerequisite for the emergence a Democratic Developmental State (Sklar, 1996; Omoweh, 2012: 10). Furthermore, his theory asserts that small, gradual moves made towards democracy by nation-states will most likely generate positive developmental spinoffs (Sklar, 1996: 28). In so doing, Sklar argues that no one government can be exclusively classified as wholly democratic: each system of government is a combination of “democracy (power of the people) and oligarchy (rule of the few)” (Sklar, 1996: 27). According to Sklar, whole-system classifications of governments are inaccurate (Sklar, 1996: 37 & 40). For Sklar, partial elements of the democratic model gradually emerge in different variations in different countries, with each element motivating the acquisition of another, with the realisation of the Democratic Developmental State being regarded as the end goal (Sklar, 1996; Omoweh, 2012: 10).

Sklar’s conception of democracy has been encapsulated in the phrase ‘democracy in parts’ and was used in the 1980s by Sklar to describe authoritarian and military
regimes which exhibited important democratic features (Sklar, 1983; Luckham and Hutchful, 2010: 51). Similarly, the phrase, ‘democracy in parts’ has also been used to refer to formal democracies who are constrained by serious democratic deficits (Sklar, 1983; Luckham and Hutchful, 2010: 51). In this regard, Sklar asserts that “fragments” of democracy become integrated into social, economic and state institutions over a period of time (Sklar, 1996: 40). These democratic elements include provision of welfare services, judicial independence, equal application of the law, as well as features of electoral democracy (such as freedom of speech and association) and industrial democracy (such as the establishment of trade unions) (Sklar, 1996: 40).

Therefore, Sklar proposes an incremental approach to the construction of a Democratic Developmental State (Sklar, 1996; Omoweh, 2012: 10). Such an approach requires a considerable degree of ingenuity on the part of bureaucrats and politicians in the development of key democratic institutions geared at tackling developmental challenges (Sklar, 1987: 714; White, 2006: 63). Consequently, the present-day developmental democrat is viewed by Sklar as a “modern Machiavelli” who attempts to bring together the two seemingly inconsistent terms of democracy and development through deliberate and gradual institutional alterations (White, 2006: 65; Sklar, 1996).

3.2. Adrian Leftwich and ‘The Primacy of Politics’

Similarly to Leftwich’s work on the Classical Developmental State, his further contributions to the Democratic Developmental State also focuses on the role of politics in the emergence and success of such states. For Leftwich, institutional design alone cannot bring about a Democratic Developmental State in a particular country – what is further needed is the correct mix of democratic politics to support and sustain the Democratic Developmental State model (Leftwich, 1998: 55). While Leftwich refers to Democratic Developmental States as ‘developmental democracies’, for clarity and continuity sake, this chapter will use the term Democratic Developmental States.

3.2.1 Democratic Developmental States
According to Leftwich, six key features make up a Developmental State model (as outlined in the previous chapter) and is shared by both Democratic and Non-Democratic States (Leftwich, 1996: 290). In addition to these six features, Democratic Developmental States must meet two preconditions if they are to be regarded as equally democratic and developmental (Leftwich, 1998: 55). Firstly, Leftwich argues that such states must achieve a four per cent annual increase in its Gross National Profit (GNP) for a period of 25 to 35 years (Leftwich, 1998: 55). Secondly, what differentiates Democratic from Non-Democratic Developmental States is the presence of democracy (Leftwich, 1996: 290). Here, Leftwich uses a minimalist Schumpeterian definition of democracy (Leftwich, 1998: 55). Therefore, to qualify as a democracy, Leftwich argues that such states must hold regular, free and fair elections; encourage political participation; uphold civil and political rights; and allow for peaceful succession in the event of regime change (Leftwich, 1998: 55).

For Leftwich, Democratic Developmental States are difficult to construct and maintain because they must satisfy the two seemingly contradictory criteria of democracy and development (Leftwich, 1998: 56). Concerning democracy, on the one hand, Leftwich argues that democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the construction of a Democratic Developmental State (Leftwich, 1998: 55). A Democratic Developmental State is viewed as incomplete without the consolidation of democracy. Unstable and unconsolidated democracies have the potential to hinder and constrain the developmental capacity of the state (Leftwich, 1998: 57). Leftwich defines democratic consolidation as occurring firstly, when political parties place a higher premium on democratic institutions and processes than on outcomes. Secondly, when the probability of an opposing party replacing the ruling party through elections is high (Leftwich, 1998: 58; Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Valenzuela, 1992: 3; Welsh, 2004: 14). Democratic consolidation, therefore, presupposes governmental renewal through elections (Welsh, 2004: 14).

However, the political conditions essential for democratic consolidation simultaneously limits the state’s capacity and its ability to pursue developmental strategies autonomously (Leftwich, 1998: 77). This is due to the political conditions for
democratic consolidation that dictates policy-makers practice restraint in policy-making and acknowledge and accept the constitutional restraints placed on their newly-found authority and power (Leftwich, 1998: 59). Therefore, when formulating policy, policy-makers must opt for small, gradual shifts in policy (Leftwich, 1998: 56).

On the other hand, for a country to be developmentally successful, policy-makers need to be given discretion in policy-making: This is primarily due to the changing nature of policy-making in Developmental States which tends to be characterised by drastic changes in policy that fundamentally transforms the economic and social structure within a society (Leftwich, 1998: 56). Ultimately, the emergence of successful Democratic Developmental States depends on the state’s ability to effectively reconcile the conservative prerequisites of democratic consolidation within the radical logic that necessitates rapid economic growth and development (Leftwich, 1998: 56 – 57).

3.2.2. Classification of Democratic Developmental States

According to Leftwich, each democratic state exhibits various configurations of democratic politics which determine not only the type of democracy but also the developmental capacity and trajectory of the particular democratic state (Leftwich, 1998: 55). In this respect, Leftwich distinguishes between two forms of Democratic Developmental States: Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental States and Coalitional Democratic Developmental States (Leftwich, 1998: 63).

- **Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental States**

The Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental State ascribes most closely to the Classical Developmental State in that power and authority is centralised within a relatively unchallenged hegemonic party (Leftwich, 1998: 64). Out of the two categories, the Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental State exhibits a greater developmental capacity (Leftwich, 1998: 63). This is primarily because dominant-party democracies are able to exude the required, “power, authority, autonomy, continuity
and political capacity” needed by Developmental States to accomplish and maintain rapid economic growth and development (Leftwich, 1996: 290).

Therefore, in the same manner in which authoritarian regimes have been able to guide growth and development in Classical Developmental States, so too do dominant-parties direct and shape the developmental trajectory in the Democratic Developmental State (Leftwich, 1996: 291). Examples of Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental States provided by Leftwich include Botswana and Singapore (Leftwich, 1998: 63). Furthermore, Leftwich notes that the formal requirements of democratic politics have not in any way worked against the developmental capacity within a Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental State but have helped to strengthen and produce a considerable measure of legitimacy (Leftwich, 1998: 67). Ultimately, the success of Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental States has been its ability to reconcile the conditions of democracy with that of economic growth by giving preference to economic growth (Leftwich, 1998: 68).

- **Coalitional Democratic Developmental States**

Coalitional democratic states arise typically during a political or economic crisis when a number of political parties demonstrate that they can play an important role in resolving such a crisis (Leftwich, 1998: 67). These parties are inclined to formulate new rules governing domestic politics and work towards reaching an agreement concerning development policy (Leftwich, 1998: 67). Leftwich cites Mauritius and Malaysia as key examples of Coalitional Democratic Developmental States (Leftwich, 1998: 63).

Unlike Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental States, the developmental autonomy and capacity within a Coalitional Democratic Developmental State is substantially less (Leftwich, 1998: 66). In order to build any developmental capacity within a Coalitional Democratic Developmental State, a consensus needs to be reached among all the key political parties concerning the developmental trajectory of the state (Leftwich, 1998: 66). Consequently, Coalitional Democratic Developmental
States manage to reconcile the conditions of consolidated democracy with that of economic growth through consensus and co-operation by favouring the former (Leftwich, 1998: 69). In this manner, agreed upon developmental strategies will persist regardless of any changes in the political coalition (Leftwich, 1998: 66). Although state autonomy is more restrained in this instance than in a dominant-party model, Coalitional Democratic Developmental States benefit more from creating a stable, consolidated democracy which may prove more lasting than a dominant-party model (Leftwich, 1998: 70).

3.2.3. Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, Leftwich notes that Democratic Developmental States which have been most effective at achieving economic growth and development have been those states whose autonomy has not been limited by political factors (Leftwich, 1998: 78). Consequently, Leftwich refers to Democratic Developmental States as “authoritarian democracies” or “low intensity democracies”, precisely because their political characteristics locate them between a democratic and authoritarian system of government (Leftwich, 1996: 290; Leftwich, 1998: 78). Such states are described as having low rates of popular sovereignty and participation, as well as poor human rights records (Leftwich, 1998: 78).

Leftwich therefore asserts that developmentally successful democracies are democracies which have focused more on satisfying the conditions prevalent for democratic consolidation than on public participation and greater political equality (Leftwich, 1998: 78). Such democracies may not meet all the requirements of liberal or social democracy but are more desirable than autocracies (Leftwich, 1996: 292). By distinguishing between the two forms of Democratic Developmental States, Leftwich shows that it is not simply the case of whether democracy is needed for development or even if development is consistent with democracy that matters when deliberating Democratic Developmental States, but rather the particular configuration of politics within a state that is important (Leftwich, 1998: 78).
3.3. Gordon White and Mark Robinson and ‘The Political and Institutional Design of a Democratic Developmental State’

In *The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design* White and Robinson argue that particular political conditions and democratic institutions are two essential ingredients required to build successful Democratic Developmental States. Taken together, White and Robinson argue that both have the ability to deepen democracy and achieve “productive and equitable” developmental results (Robinson and White, 1998: 5). White and Robinson note that while particular political conditions cannot be spontaneously engineered, state and non-state actors can intervene by designing and creating democratic institutions which could have the potential to influence a state-led development trajectory and policy environment (Robinson and White, 1998: 5).

White and Robinson’s central thesis is informed primarily by issues concerning the relationship between democratic consolidation and developmental efficacy which emerges in the long-term. In this manner, White and Robinson note that the ability of newly democratic regimes in poor countries to sustain and consolidate democracy depends largely on their capacity to direct and sustain socio-economic development (White, 1998: 28). Ultimately, insufficient progress in socio-economic development undermines democracy by marginalising impoverished groups from the political process. Denying impoverished and marginalised groups access to political processes will then in turn produce a discontented society which may erupt in political violence (White, 1998: 28). Furthermore, over time, democratic regimes will face increasing difficulty in reconciling society-wide welfare demands against coherent economic principles for growth (White, 1998: 29).

However, White and Robinson argue that there exists a “virtuous spiral” between socioeconomic development and political development which can only come about through conscious institutional alterations of the state apparatus (White and Robinson, 1998). In this regard, they argue that the concepts of democracy and development can be reconciled and made compatible in the long-run through constructing an effective Democratic Developmental State (Robinson and White, 1998: 5). According to White,
any moves made towards democratisation will be futile if they are not accompanied by initiatives to reform and strengthen the state apparatus (White, 2006: 34). In other words, any hopes of achieving developmental success on the part of democratic regimes relies to a greater extent on the ability of the state to construct and maintain an effective Democratic Developmental State (White, 1998: 20).

### 3.3.1. Key Features of a Democratic Developmental State

According to White, Democratic Developmental States are characterised by the following five key features: consensual autonomy, social embeddedness, inclusive embeddedness, institutional coherence and authoritative penetration (White, 1998: 30 – 31). White’s model of a Democratic Developmental State retains two of the main features of the Developmental State model, namely, that of ‘autonomy’ and ‘social embeddedness’ (otherwise referred to by Evans as ‘embedded autonomy’). As stated earlier in Chapter Two, literature on the Classical Developmental State has highlighted the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ as an essential feature of the Developmental State model. However, as also noted in the Chapter Two, the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ as displayed in East Asian autocratic states will be less transferable to democratic regimes which are “more porous” and responsive to societal pressures (White, 1998: 30). Therefore, White has broadened the concepts of ‘autonomy’ and ‘embeddedness’ in order to make it more applicable within a democratic context. In so doing, White’s Democratic Developmental State model promotes a more inclusive approach to the formulation and implementation of developmental policy (White, 1998; Edigheji, 2005: 14).

In this regard, White introduces the concept of ‘consensual autonomy’ and ‘inclusive embeddedness’: ‘Consensual autonomy’ refers firstly to the ability of political leaders (who are held accountable by state institutions) to pursue policies geared towards socio-economic development (White, 1998: 30). Secondly, it also refers to the discretion given to administrative agencies to implement these policies under the guidance of political officials (White, 1998: 30). In this manner, consensual autonomy refers to the ability of democratic institutions to increase the autonomy of political and bureaucratic elites in relation to private sector interests in their pursuit of
developmental goals (Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller and Teichman, 2007: 24). By holding political and bureaucratic elite institutionally accountable, the Democratic Developmental State is further able to garner legitimacy and popular support for its developmental policies (Sandbrook et al., 2007: 24).

In order for consensual autonomy to operate fairly within a Democratic Developmental State, White argues that political and bureaucratic elites need to be “inclusively embedded” within the society (White, 1998: 31; Sandbrook et al., 2007: 24). ‘Inclusive embeddedness” refers to the forging of relationships and alliances with broader sections of society and therefore not limiting alliances to the private sector solely (White, 1998: 31). In this manner, Democratic Developmental States can better ensure equitable development because political elites are held accountable by a wider section of society who are also included in the developmental process (White, 1998: 31).

The ability of a Democratic Developmental State to act autonomously in any capacity depends on the level of its ‘institutional coherence’ (White, 1998: 30). A high degree of institutional coherence is required in the allocation and exercise of power throughout various parts of the bureaucracy (White, 1998: 30). In addition, White asserts that Democratic Developmental States should be grounded in ‘authoritative penetration’ (White, 1998: 30). ‘Authoritative penetration’ refers to the ability of the bureaucracy to guide the economy by enforcing economic regulations (White, 1998: 30). Such regulations seek to penetrate society with the aim of expropriating resources for the implementation of developmental policies (Bernstein and Lü, 2003: 5). Examples of these include: designing and enforcing sophisticated systems of economic regulation or broadening of the tax revenue base (White, 1998: 31).

### 3.3.2. Concluding Remarks

In concluding, White notes that Democratic Developmental States are not common precisely because of the manner in which they have been defined (White, 1998: 44). Democratic Developmental States which White envisages have been defined in conflicting terms which are difficult to reconcile in reality (White, 1998: 44). As
discussed in this chapter, White’s conception of a Democratic Developmental State encompasses contradictory elements of “autonomy and accountability; growth and redistribution; [and] consensus and inclusiveness” (White, 1998: 44). For this reason, White notes that the construction of a Democratic Developmental State will most likely involve a process of repeated, varied attempts (White, 1998: 46). Depending on the country’s ability to achieve these contradictory elements, White argues that the particular form in which the Democratic Developmental State will emerge will differ from country to country (White, 1998: 46).

3.4. Omano Edigheji and a Democratic Developmental State Model for Africa

Edigheji is primarily concerned with crafting a model of the Democratic Developmental State that may be made applicable to the African context (Edigheji, 2005: 1). According to Edigheji, the majority of post-independent African States suffer from severe democratic and developmental issues (Edigheji, 2005: 1). On the economic front, African states have been characterised by: an overreliance on its extractive industries, high rates of unemployment, an overreliance on foreign aid, high levels of foreign debt, decreasing levels of foreign direct investment and low domestic capital accumulation (Edigheji, 2005: 1). On the political front, most African states have been plagued by dictatorships, unstable political regimes and intrastate conflict (Edigheji, 2005: 1). Therefore, Edigheji advocates for the adoption of the Democratic Developmental State model by African leaders which he believes is the most suitable response to the issue of Africa’s weak economies and democratic concerns.

In defining and constructing a model of a Democratic Developmental State, Edigheji assessed the particular institutional characteristics and key objectives of such states. Key to Edigheji’s assessment is the examination of two important dimensions which make up Democratic Developmental States: the democratic and the developmental dimension (Kieh, 2015: 3; Edigheji, 2005). Firstly, the democratic dimension should exhibit the basic features of procedural democracy whereby political leaders are elected through regular, free and fair elections in which individuals are allowed to run for political office and where universal suffrage is provided for (Edigheji, 2005: 18; Huntington, 1991: 7).
In addition to the basic features of procedural democracy, Democratic Developmental States should encourage the involvement of citizens within areas of governance and development (Edigheji, 2005: 5). For Edigheji, an African Democratic Developmental State is primarily concerned with bringing, “citizenship back into politics” (Edigheji, 2005: 5). Such a state should seek to unite people, irrespective of their social, political, religious or ethnic divisions, around a “common good” (Edigheji, 2005: 5). In this manner, Edigheji’s conception of the African Democratic Developmental State seeks to find ways in which ‘participatory democracy’ can supplement procedural democracy (Edigheji, 2005: 5).

Secondly, regarding the developmental dimension, Edigheji argues that a Democratic Developmental State should have the necessary capacity to pursue development and economic growth (Edigheji, 2005: 18). This requires that the state transforms its economic base by pursuing economic activities which are highly profitable (Edigheji, 2005: 5 – 6). Furthermore, Edigheji stipulates that the economic growth experienced by the Democratic Developmental State needs to produce improved living standards for the majority of its citizens (Edigheji, 2005: 6). As stated by White in the previous chapter, Edigheji also notes that Democratic Developmental States pursue a number of socio-economic objectives such as the eradication of poverty and social inequalities, ensuring individual safety and addressing the deterioration of the environment (Edigheji, 2005: 6).

In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the Democratic Developmental State needs to exhibit particular institutional features (Edigheji, 2005: 7). While the institutional characteristics of the Democratic Developmental State are similar to that of the Developmental State in that they facilitate the state in pursuing and obtaining economic growth, they differ in that they are also tailored to pursue its socio-economic objectives (Edigheji, 2005: 6). In this regard, Edigheji draws on the work of White and argues that Democratic Developmental States should exhibit the institutional features of autonomy, social embeddedness, inclusive embeddedness and institutional coherence (Edigheji, 2005: 10). In conclusion, Edigheji notes that although particular
institutional arrangements may differ from one Democratic Developmental State to another, the underlying logic and purpose of these institutional arrangements remains the same; which is to ensure inclusivity and broad participation within the democratic process as well as decisive governance, accountable leadership and political stability (Edigheji, 2005: 13).

3.5. Five Benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State

Having surveyed the contributions made by five key authors on the topic of the Democratic Developmental State, this chapter will now outline five important benchmarks which will be used to assess Botswana and South Africa within the Democratic Developmental State framework. As noted by Leftwich, White, Robinson and Edigheji, Democratic Developmental States will most likely retain some of the features of the original Developmental State model, however these features will be adjusted slightly to fit the context of a democratic state. For this reason, the first benchmark that this chapter has arrived at is the presence of Development-Oriented Political Leadership. As stated in the previous chapter, this refers to the determined and incorrupt developmental elite who are dedicated to economic growth and transformation and who possess the capacity to realise this vision (Leftwich, 2000: 160).

The presence of an Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy will be used as the second benchmark. This chapter has chosen to focus on this part of the bureaucracy primarily because it is most responsible for economic coordination and development (Leftwich, 1995: 411). Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracies are those that: Firstly, have a pilot agency that exercises immense power and authority needed to coordinate the activities of individual economic agencies as to ensure a high degree of internal bureaucratic cohesion and centralisation (Johnson, 1982: 26; Kim, 2009a: 8). Secondly, protects technocrats/economic planners within the economic bureaucracy from external influences in such a way as to prevent political pressures from having an excessive bearing on or potentially overturning the developmental project (Edigheji, 2010: 7). Thirdly, forms broad alliances with the private sector as to achieve a high level of
embedded autonomy, or, as White puts it, social embeddedness. In this manner, the Economic Bureaucracy forms close ties with industrialists and the business sector which will aid it in the formulation and implementation of developmental policies. Lastly, appoints the most technically competent and highly trained individuals, recruits and promotes them on the basis of merit and compensates according to similar rates found in the private sector (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Court, Kristen and Weder, 1999: 3).

In order for the Economic Bureaucracy to operate optimally it will need to cultivate a considerable degree of what White termed institutional coherence. Furthermore, state agencies within the Economic Bureaucracy need to ground in what White referred to as authoritative penetration if they are to effectively pursue the needed developmental policies. However, in order to make these two features more reflective of the realities of the Democratic Developmental State, this thesis will draw on White in arguing that both the Development-Oriented Political Leadership and the Economic Bureaucracy operate with a considerable degree of consensual autonomy. In this regard, while the political leadership acts with autonomy in their pursuit of socio-economic development, they are held “institutionally accountable” (White, 1998: 30). Likewise, while the administrative agencies of the Economic Bureaucracy are given much discretion in the formulation and implementation of developmental policies, they are still held accountable by the elected officials.

Thirdly, in order to qualify as a Developmental State (democratic or otherwise) the particular state needs to have achieved a degree of Developmental Success. As noted above by Leftwich, White and Edigheji, this refers to the ability of the state to achieve high growth rates, redistribute wealth and improve the overall standard of living for the majority of the population. In this regard, economic growth will be measured using the annual percentage growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Broadly speaking, GDP refers to, “the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products” (World Bank, 2015a). This chapter has chosen to measure economic growth in terms
of GDP because it is the most common indicator used by economists when assessing, the strength of domestic and international economies (Callen, 2012).

However, because the GDP of a country does not reveal the general well-being of the population, this thesis will use the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to assess the overall standard of living of the population (Callen, 2012). In this regard, the HDI assesses improvement in human development by bringing together indicators such as per capita income, life expectancy and educational fulfillment and rating countries between 1 (best) and 160 (worst) (Leftwich, 1996: 289). In addition, the HDI also scores countries between 1 and 0: Countries that are awarded a score less than 0.5 are regarded as having a low level of human development, those rated between 0.5 and 0.79 are regarded as achieving an average level of human development and countries awarded a value of or exceeding 0.8 are viewed as having attained exceptional standards of human development (Prinsloo, 2014). Furthermore, the country’s ability to redistribute wealth will be measured using the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is the most common indicator used to assess inequality within a country and rates countries between 0 and 1 where 0 signifies “complete equality” and 1 represents “complete inequality” (Statistics South Africa, 2014: 35).

As noted above by Sklar and Leftwich, the presence of a consolidated democracy is a key characteristic which sets Democratic Developmental States apart from Non-Democratic ones. For this reason, the presence of a Consolidated Electoral Democracy will be used as the fourth benchmark. As argued above by Leftwich and Edigheji, a Democratic Developmental State should exhibit the basic features of democracy such as regular, free and fair elections; political participation; civil and political rights; and peaceful succession in the event of regime change.

While exhibiting the basic features of procedural elements of democracy, as argued by White and Edigheji, a Democratic Developmental State should also include elements of participatory democracy. For this reason, Popular Participation in the
Development and Governance Process is flagged as the fifth and final benchmark. This benchmark will specifically assess the extent to which the two countries under review have effectively been able to establish mechanisms which facilitate the inclusion of citizens within the development and governance process. In this manner, participatory mechanisms established should be made accessible to the entire population (especially marginalised and minority groups) (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 101). By incorporating broad segments of the population within the development and governance process, the state will be most likely to achieve what White referred to as inclusive embeddedness.
Chapter Four: Botswana, an African Democratic Developmental State?

4.1. Critical Analysis of the Botswanan Democratic Developmental State

4.1.1. Development-Oriented Political Leadership

Political leadership of Botswana’s presidents and political elite has been widely regarded as one of the main reasons for its positive transformation and developmental success (Meyns, 2010: 46). Since independence in 1966, Botswana’s political leaders have managed to play a significant role in defining its developmental trajectory (Sebudubudu and Bothomilwe, 2011: 29). Botswana’s political elites have done so by pursuing various policies geared at economic growth and development (Tsie, 1996: 601). For this reason political elites in Botswana are said to have, “acquired a developmental orientation” (Tsie, 1996: 601). According to Penelope Hartland-Thunberg, Botswana is viewed as a prime example of how an underdeveloped country can drastically improve its socio-economic situation under the guidance of a committed and determined political leadership (Hartland-Thunberg, 1978: 79).

Key political leaders in this regard have been Seretse Khama (the first President 1965 – 80), Quett Masire (Vice President 1965 – 80 and second President 1980 – 98), Festus Mogae (third President 1998 – 2008) and Ian Khama (Vice President 1980 – 2008 and also the current President since 2008) (Sebudubudu and Bothomilwe, 2011: 29). Under the guidance of strong leadership (particularly that of the founding leaders, Seretse Khama and Quett Masire), Botswana was able to adopt a “two-pronged strategy of democratization and economic development” which has ultimately resulted its economic and democratic success (Sebudubudu and Bothomilwe, 2011: 33).

Under the leadership of Seretse Khama, the government curbed all forms of corruption (Sebudubudu and Bothomilwe, 2011: 37). In this regard, Botswana’s founding leaders of Botswana went to great lengths to stamp out wastefulness and corruption in public office (Sebudubudu, and Bothomilwe, 2011: 37). Furthermore, because they were already wealthy by the time they entered public office (having owned vast amounts of cattle), political leaders used public office as a means of gaining support and not wealth (Sebudubudu and Bothomilwe, 2011: 37). Ultimately, the goal of political
leaders in Botswana was not the pursuit of self-enrichment, but rather the elevation of their people and the country out of poverty (Sebudubudu and Bothhomilwe, 2011: 37; Tsie, 1998).

The Constitution of Botswana confers a large amount of power in its presidency and hence, the president “acts with little review” (Bodilenyane, 2012: 188). In this manner, the Constitution of Botswana stipulates that all executive powers reside within the presidency (Sebudubudu, 2010: 8). Included in these powers is the power of the president to appoint and dismiss cabinet members, the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court of Appeal (Good, 2008: 28; Sebudubudu, 2010: 8; Republic of Botswana, 1966). Furthermore, the president also has the power to prolong, dissolve or recall parliament at any point (Good, 2008: 28; Sebudubudu, 2010: 8).

It has been argued by opposition parties that the appointment of judges by the president has remained a largely closed and secretive process (Saleshando, 2012). In this regard, there have been concerns raised that the appointment of these judges in Botswana are not divorced from, but linked to the ruling party. Thus, the ability of the Botswanan judiciary to preside over matters impartially may be compromised (Saleshando, 2012). Furthermore, Dumelang Saleshando argues that Botswana can only truly be said to have judicial independence once the appointment of members in the justice system are not dominated by the executive within the ruling party (Saleshando, 2012).

In addition to the powers bestowed on the presidency, John Holm notes that Botswana’s presidents have succeeded in holding the “dominant power position” because their political party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) repeatedly enjoys an overwhelming majority in parliament (Holm, 1996: 101). Consequently, Members of Parliament (MPs) are given no choice but to rubber stamp developmental policies crafted by the bureaucrats (Holm, 1996: 102). In this regard, most MPs lack the knowledge and expertise to effectively evaluate and (where necessary) criticise these policies (Holm, 1996: 102). The MPs also lack staff support which makes them
ineffective to the task (Holm, 1996: 102). However, where they do manage to contest a policy supported by the president and the permanent secretaries, they are met with strong pressure from the BDP MPs (Holm, 1996: 102).

Botswana presidents manage to assume complete control of their cabinets because they are careful in their appointment of cabinet ministers (Holm, 1996: 101). Cabinet ministers appointed by the president are those who mainly come from a civil service background and do not have many political supporters (Holm, 1996: 101). Such cabinet minister appointees mainly serve to defend and support the positions taken by economic planners within the cabinet and parliament (Holm, 1996: 101). Furthermore, they also assist the president in coherently expressing and supporting the various economic plans outlined by the planners (Holm, 1996: 102).

Consequently, due to the dominant position of Botswana’s ruling party and with the huge amount of power bestowed on it by the constitution, the president of Botswana is able to exert considerable influence over the executive, legislature and judiciary (Fakir, 2009: 6). In this manner, the president’s powers straddles all three branches of government and ultimately undermines the principle of the separation of powers designed check and balance out the presidential powers and hold the president accountable (Molomo, 2000, 97; Fakir, 2009: 6). As a result, because the president in Botswana is not held sufficiently accountable by state institutions, the Development-Oriented Political Leadership within Botswana does not exhibit the first element of consensual autonomy, namely that of “institutionally accountable” political leadership.

### 4.1.2. Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy

An important factor in explaining the success of Botswana has been the establishment of an effective and well-insulated economic bureaucracy (Sebudubudu, 2010: 12). The demise of British colonialism within Botswana saw the emergence of a bureaucratic state in which powerful bureaucratic elites have been responsible for the formulation and implementation of developmental policy (Holm, 1996: 97; Tsie, 1996: 601).
• Presence of a Pilot Agency

A high degree of internal bureaucratic cohesion and centralisation within Botswana’s economic bureaucracy has been ensured through its pilot agency, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP). The MFDP has been referred to as the, “institutional nerve centre of the Botswana state”, and has been able to assume a strong leadership role in Botswana’s development (Sebudubudu, 2005: 83). This has largely been due to the necessary clout given to the MFDP by the executive to dominate other ministries: In this regard, planning units in other ministries are held directly accountable by the director of Economic Affairs within the MFDP (Thovoethin, 2014: 263; Samatar, 1999: 85; Sebudubudu, 2005: 83).

The MFDP is responsible for (among other tasks) the formulation and implementation of fiscal and economic policies, taxation policy, regulating non-bank financial institutions and formulating and coordinating the government’s budget (Raphaeli, Roumani and MacKellar, 1984: 18; Republic of Botswana, 2013: 30). As can be seen, the MFDP is a powerful pilot agency precisely because it combines planning, budgetary, regulatory and taxation powers within one institution, which has further enabled it to assume an “aggressive role in planning investment” and authoritatively penetrate both the Botswanan society and the economy (Holm, 1988: 187 – 197; Leftwich, 1995: 412).

In this regard, one of the most important tasks assigned to the MFDP is the coordinating and steering of the government’s NDP (Sebudubudu, 2010: 12). The NDP is a strategic document containing and outlining all of Botswana’s development projects that are to be carried out in the medium term (usually over a period of six years) (Sebudubudu, 2010: 12; Republic of Botswana, 2014). Included as well in the NDP is the anticipated revenue and expenditure for the six-year period (Republic of Botswana, 2014). The NDP functions as a “blueprint for government policy” and is compiled by technocrats and approved by politicians (Taylor, 2005: 48). In this manner, the NDPs have an additional benefit of placing the necessary distance...
between technocrats and politicians particularly in the implementation of developmental plans (Taylor, 2005: 48). Therefore, Botswana’s economic bureaucracy operates with White’s second component of consensual autonomy in that although the technocrats are given much discretion in the formulation of the NDPs, these plans need to be approved by elected officials prior to them being implemented. Therefore, the economic bureaucracy is held to account and operates under the supervision of the politicians.

- **Insulation of Economic Bureaucrats**

The ability of Botswana to effectively insulate and shield its economic bureaucracy from any societal and political pressures has also been central to its developmental success (Holm, 1996: 98). This has been made possible primarily because the MFDP has been traditionally housed in the office of the Vice President and led by the Vice President himself (Thovoethin, 2014: 263). Economic planners in Botswana are shielded from external pressures and given considerable leeway in the formulation and implementation of their plans because they have the backing of the executive (Holm, 1996: 100).

- **Social Embeddedness**

The relative and consensual autonomy of Botswana’s economic bureaucracy has been further “socially embedded” in a network which brings key businesses and cattle ranchers together with politicians and bureaucrats (Taylor, 2003: 23). Botswana’s ability to form state-society alliances characterised by social embeddedness has been cited as an additional factor which has led to its success (Mogalakwe, 2003: 87). The Botswana government has regarded the private sector and other social actors as important players in the country’s economic development and consults with them regularly through the High Level Consultative Conference (HLCC) and the National Business Conference (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). These conferences have subsequently informed many of Botswana’s developmental policies, which have been favourable not only to the private sector, but also to national development (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015; Taylor, 2003: 43).
In order to ensure a high degree of efficiency within Botswana’s economic bureaucracy, only highly competent economic cadre are recruited (Wallis, 1989: 52). Botswana’s use of meritocratic recruitment as a means of staffing its economic bureaucracy therefore began at the onset of independence (Thovoethin, 2014: 260). During the 1960s, Botswana suffered from a shortage of trained civil servants and could not initially run its civil service independently (Wallis, 1989: 52). However, unlike other African countries in similar situations, Botswana did not choose to localise its bureaucracy immediately to the detriment of meritocracy (Thovoethin, 2014: 260). Botswana instead decided to localise its bureaucracy gradually while relying extensively on the use of expatriates (Wallis, 1989: 52). Much of the expatriates were retained in the Botswana Public Service and assisted in the training of the local cadre of bureaucrats (Thovoethin, 2014: 260). Only once local bureaucrats were trained, did they assume the positions held by the expatriates (Thovoethin, 2014: 260). In this manner, expatriates played a significant role in maintaining the “technical (and technocratic) standards of efficiency and effectiveness” and building a competent and largely-incorrupt economic bureaucracy (Du Toit, 1995; Thovoethin, 2014: 260; Wallis, 1989: 52).

Furthermore, Botswana’s economic bureaucracy is able to attract and retain a pool of the most talented officials through its Parallel Progression (PP) framework (Adamolekun, 1999; Hope, 1995; Thovoethin, 2014: 261). The PP framework is aimed at expanding career opportunities for bureaucrats in the technical and professional fields by allowing them to advance to higher positions within the civil service along a professional, as oppose to an administrative route (Corkery, Ould Daddah, O’Nuallain and Land, 1998: 91). The PP framework promotes civil servants on the basis of merit and offers them an accompanying 45 per cent salary increase (Corkery et al., 1998: 92; Thovoethin, 2014: 261). The PP framework also incentivises civil servants to stay in their current positions for a period of six to nine years (Corkery et al., 1998: 92). In so doing, Botswana’s economic bureaucracy outlines clear career paths for its bureaucrats (Tsie, 1998: 13). The PP framework has therefore been successful in
attracting and retaining economic bureaucrats despite the steady growth of the private sector (Thovoethin, 2014: 261). This is primarily due to bureaucrats being paid the equivalent as their counterparts in the private sector (Thovoethin, 2014: 261).

4.1.3. Developmental Success

Botswana has experienced high economic growth rates since its independence in 1966 up until today (Fibæk, 2010: 10). Between 1965 and 1974, Botswana’s GDP increased from 10 to 22 per cent (Harvey and Lewis, 1990). Rapid economic growth during these early years was attributed to a low starting point, the end of a multiyear drought in 1965, donor aid and the discovery of diamonds in 1967 and copper-nickel in the 1970s (Fibæk, 2010: 5; African Mining, n.d.; Nocera, 2008). Botswana’s economic growth thereafter declined slightly between 1975 and 1987 with its GDP dropping by eight per cent (Fibæk, 2010: 6). However, it picked up again between 1978 and 1989 with its GDP increasing by 13 per cent each year (Fibæk, 2010: 6). High economic growth rates during that period was attributed to the growth of the mining sector as well as the active role which the state assumed in the promotion of economic growth and development (Fibæk, 2010: 6).

Botswana’s economic growth from the 1990s up until 2010 can best be described as moderate (Fibæk, 2010: 8). The average GDP growth rate between 1990 and 2011 was 3.4 per cent (United Nations Data [UN Data], 2015). According to Maria Fibæk, Botswana’s moderate growth rate was attributed to the 2008/9 global economic crisis as well as the change in its economic development strategy, which began focusing more on private sector-led development (Fibæk, 2010: 8). Botswana’s economic growth rate improved slightly from 2011 to 2014, with an average GDP growth rate of 4.53 per cent (Trading Economics, 2015a; Kariuki, Abraha and Obuseng, 2014: 2). Botswana’s slight increase in its average GDP growth rate was attributed to its service-oriented industries (Kariuki et al., 2014: 2).

However, Botswana’s over-reliance on its natural resources of diamonds and copper nickel and the inability of the country to diversify its economy are presented as threats to the continued growth of its economy (Hillbom, 2011: 67; Kariuki et al., 2014: 2).
Presently, Botswana’s mining industry constitutes 30 per cent of its GDP and a further 70 to 80 per cent of its export earnings (Fibæk, 2010: 8). Given that the price of diamonds are extremely sensitive to fluctuations in the global market, slight decreases in global demand for diamonds have a massive impact on Botswana’s economy (Orenstein, 2009: 4). This could be seen in March 2009 when the price of diamonds dropped resulting in a negative GDP annual growth rate of 7.9 per cent for the first time in Botswana in 40 years (Fibæk, 2010: 8; Daddi, 2013: 13). Compounding this problem is the prediction made by experts that Botswana’s diamond reserves are expected to depleted by the year 2030 which will result in the GDP per capita falling by half by 2050 (The Economist, 2014; The Economist, 2009).

Since its independence, Botswana has made significant strides towards improving the overall standards of living of the population (Hillbom, 2011: 84). In this regard, Botswana has taken a substantial portion of its mining revenue (a total of 40 per cent of its GDP) and invested it in social development (Hillbom, 2011: 84; Fibæk, 2010: 1). However, although Botswana is regarded as a middle-income country and in spite of its improvements in the social welfare of its population, it scores relatively low in terms of its HDI value (Kariuki et al., 2014: 2). As of 2013, Botswana scored 0.683 which placed it at 109 out of 187 countries (CountryEconomy.com, 2015). Botswana’s relatively poor HDI value is partially a result of the high rate of persons infected with HIV/AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) in Botswana which has had a negative bearing on its life expectancy score (Kariuki et al., 2014: 2).

The inability of Botswana to redistribute wealth within its country is presented as an additional significant social challenge (Hillbom, 2011: 67). Botswana is considered one of the most unequal countries in the world, with a national Gini Coefficient of 0.61 last measured in 2009 (World Bank, 2015b). Consequently, Ellen Hillbom notes that Botswana’s extraordinary economic growth rates accompanied by its growing wealth divisions has led to the emergence of a dual society in Botswana in which those staying in urban areas tend to benefit from the wealth generated from the mining sector, while those living in rural areas, who survive on subsistence farming, are marginalised and do not enjoy the same wealth (Hillbom, 2011: 84 – 83).
4.1.4. Consolidated Electoral Democracy

- Regular, Free and Fair Elections

“Against all odds”, Kenneth Good and Ian Taylor argue that Botswana has managed to establish an electoral democracy at a time in which much of the African continent was under authoritarian rule (Good and Taylor, 2008: 750). Since its first national election in 1965, it has held 11 peaceful and successful elections, the latest one was conducted in October 2014 (Sebudubudu and Bothomilwe, 2010: 65; Potelwa, 2014). Botswana has a multi-party political system which has been completely dominated by one party, the BDP, having been re-elected into power every election since Botswana’s 1965 pre-independence elections (Bauer and Taylor, 2011: 107). In line with its constitution, Botswana has conducted regular multi-party elections every five years which have been described by observers as “successful” (Sebudubudu, 2010: 7). In this manner, Botswana has experienced peaceful succession and handover from each of the four presidents elected to date (Sebudubudu, 2010: 7).

Although Botswana’s elections have been widely labelled as ‘free’ and peaceful, the ‘fairness’ of these elections has been questioned by the opposition and has served as a contentious issue for both the political opposition in Botswana and analysts alike (Sebudubudu and Bothomilwe, 2010: 75). The first concern relates to the monopoly that the ruling party has over state media (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). The BDP has assumed complete control over state media (such as the “Daily News” newspaper, two FM radio stations and “Botswana Television”) through the state-owned Botswana Press Agency which it uses to further bolster its image and serve as a mouthpiece during election time (World Audit, 2001; Mfundisi, 2005: 175). Opposition parties and government critics, however, are not given fair media coverage during the election period (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). Additionally, although privately-owned media outlets have emerged since the mid-1980s, they do not have as much of a broad reach as state-owned media, particularly within rural areas, and are heavily censored by the government (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000: 107; Freedom House, 2014).

Secondly, opposition parties and government critics argue that the BDP’s ability to better attract funding for its election campaigns has further “created an uneven political playing field” and has disadvantaged prospective candidates and opposition parties...
(Ntib, 2012). This is primarily as a result of the absence of public funding for political parties. Botswana’s political parties must therefore rely on their ability to attract private funding for their electoral campaign activities (de Jager and Meintjes, 2013: 239). The BDP has experienced no difficulty in attracting the needed funding for its electoral campaigns from private companies such as De Beers who enthusiastically offer up large donations in order to be in the ruling party’s good favour given its diamond mining interests with the Botswana government (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). Further compounding the situation is the fact there are no laws compelling political parties to publically reveal their beneficiaries (Mokgosi, 2012: 40; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015).

Thirdly, it has been argued that the adoption of the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) electoral system implemented by Botswana has further advantaged the BDP (Maundeni, Mpabanga, Mfundisi and Sebudubudu, 2007: xvii). The FPTP electoral system tends to distort electoral outcomes by favouring established ruling parties (such as the BDP), while excluding and marginalising opposition parties within parliament (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000: 108; Molomo, 2004: 63). For example, in Botswana’s 1999 general elections, three out of the 12 political parties that ran in the elections were represented in parliament (Maundeni et al., 2007: 15). Likewise, in 2014, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC), a coalition formed between the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD), Botswana National Front (BNF) and the Botswana People’s Party (BPP), won 30.9 per cent of the vote but only received 14 seats in parliament (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2014).

- Civil and Political Rights
According to David Sebudubudu, the protection of individual freedoms and rights has been enshrined in Botswana’s constitution (Sebudubudu, 2010: 6). Included in these rights is the right of freedom of political association and assembly and the right to vote which have been granted to all of Botswana’s citizens since its independence (Sebudubudu, 2010: 6 – 7).

- Political Participation
Due to the provision made for civil and political rights in its constitution, Botswana encourages political participation by allowing any person to vote for, form or join a political party of their choosing without any hindrance on the part of the state (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). Despite this, Botswana’s opposition parties have generally been described as weak and have not posed a formidable threat to the ruling party by either challenging it at election times or winning enough seats in parliament to hold it accountable (Lotshwao, 2011: 103; Osei-Hwedie, 2001: 57). The leading opposition parties in Botswana include the BNF, Botswana Congress Party (BCP) and BMD (de Jager and Meintjes, 2013: 238). In comparison to the ruling party, opposition parties have generally been smaller and lacked the necessary resources and capacity to operate and campaign outside of their regional base (Somolekae, 1998: 9). Other factors that have contributed to the weakness of Botswana’s opposition parties include: their persistence of radical policies at the expense of winning support from the large traditional population; their tendency towards factionalism and divisions; and their inability to successfully form lasting alliances with each other (Mtimkulu, 2006; de Jager and Meintjes, n.d.: 4).

Despite the fact that Botswana’s constitution provides all persons over the age of 18 with the right to vote, voter apathy (particularly among the youth) has been an enduring characteristic of Botswana’s electoral behaviour since its first election (Selolwane: 2003). While most people register to vote, they do not end up going to vote at the polling stations on the day of elections (Makgekgenene, 2014). For example, in the 1999 general elections, of the 53 per cent eligible and registered to vote, only 41 per cent casted their vote (Makgekgenene, 2014). More recently, in the 2014 general elections, while the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) anticipated 1.2 million people to register to vote, of the 824 073 people registered, 698 409 actually voted (Makgekgenene, 2014; Election Guide, 2015). While an 85 per cent voter turnout is an improvement than that of previous years it is important to note that only 55 per cent of the voting population actually voted (International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance [IDEA], 2014a).

- **Consolidation of Democracy and Peaceful Succession of Power**
The above analysis shows that Botswana meets the basic requirements of an electoral
democracy. However, democracy in Botswana is “shallow in substance” as it has yet
to be consolidated through alternations in political leadership by way of elections
(Good and Taylor, 2008: 759). Factors which currently pose a challenge to the
consolidation of democracy in Botswana (as discussed above) include: an overly-
powerful president, weak opposition parties, voter apathy (particularly among the
youth), weak independent media outlets, the absence of state funding for political
parties and an electoral system which distorts the electoral outcome (Good and Taylor,
2008: 752; Maundeni et al., 2007; Somolekae, 1998). Consequently, Botswana’s
democracy must still prove itself capable of surviving “genuine political change”
(Brown and Kaiser, 2007).

4.1.5. Popular Participation in the Development and Governance Process
Since independence, the Botswana government began a process of decentralisation
of power and responsibilities from central government to local government in an effort
to enhance good governance (African Development Bank [AfDB], 2009: 11). The main
objective of Botswana’s decentralised approach was the promotion of popular
participation within Botswana’s development and governance process (Sharma, 2010:
135; AfDB, 2009: 11). In this regard, the Botswana government made use of a pre-
existing consultative structure, the ‘kgotla’, as a mechanism to promote popular
participation (AfDB, 2009:12). The ‘kgotla’ is a traditional court of law within a
Botswana village where the formulation and implementation of public policies are
deliberated and all villagers are invited to attend and participate in these discussions
(AfDB, 2009: 12; Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 11). Botswana’s kgotla system seeks to
enhance citizen engagement by hosting public meetings which provide a platform for
debate and questions and answer sessions (Obasi and Lekorwe, 2014: 6). Ministers
use public meetings as a forum to inform village members of public policies as well as
the implementation plan (Obasi and Lekorwe, 2014: 6). Therefore, public meetings
form an important part of Botswana’s policy-making processes as they are used for
consultation purposes (Obasi and Lekorwe, 2014: 6).
In this manner, the traditional authorities/chiefs, who lead the kgotla, are incorporated into local governance structures (Sharma, 2010: 137). They are therefore responsible for tribal administration and are tasked with administering justice via the customary courts (Obasi and Lekorwe, 2014: 5). According to Keshav Sharma, over 80 per cent of Botswana’s cases are tried in customary courts (Sharma, 2009). This is primarily because community members prefer to have their disputes settled in customary courts where they are more familiar with the manner in which these courts operate (Sharma, 2010: 137). Chiefs are also tasked with upholding traditional norms and values of their people, resolving disagreements, carrying out their ceremonial functions and representing their people on matters relating to their culture and traditions at a national level (Obasi and Lekorwe, 2014: 5 – 6).

An important improvement within the process of decentralisation was the creation of the District Development Committees (DDCs) and the Village Development Committees (VDCs) in 1970 (AfDB, 2009: 11). The establishment of the VDCs greatly contributed to decentralised local development planning, since it represents the main mechanism through which citizens can actively participate in the formulation and implementation of village development plans (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 14). The village development plans form the building blocks of the district development plans which ultimately informs Botswana’s NDPs (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 12 – 13). In this manner, individuals at the local level are said to play an active role in Botswana’s development process by articulating and agreeing upon their particular village development priorities (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 14). The VDCs also function according to the pre-existing kgotla system (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 14). The kgotla therefore serves as a platform to bring together VDC members, village representatives, traditional authorities, district and (where necessary) national government officials (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 14). The VDCs also provide a forum for members of the village to discuss issues relating to development and raise funds that benefits the whole village (Obasi and Lekorwe, 2014: 6).

However, while these mechanisms established are meant to enhance popular participation within the Botswana’s development and governance process, they have
been described as superficial. According to Lebogang Mokwena and Ebrahim Fakir, the channels used to facilitate popular participation in Botswana were not intended to promote substantive participation but were rather intended to legitimise development planning and governance processes (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 19). For example, Mokwena and Fakir argue that the kgotla system fails to fully facilitate broad participation because it is prone to elite capture (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 19). In this manner, the kgotla systems tends to promote the participation of the privileged segments of the village (such as the chief, his advisors and majority ethnic groups like the Bakgatla, Barolong and Bakwena) within meetings (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 15 – 19). Conversely, impoverished villagers, such as women and minority ethnic groups (like the Basarwa and the Bakgalagadi), are not given any opportunity to contribute to discussions within the kgotla and are consequently marginalised from the consultation processes (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 15).

Additionally, members of the village often feel disconnected from local officials: In this instance, villagers often complain that their relationship with their elected representatives are weak because representatives are often absent during the kgotla meetings and do not make an effort to ensure that villagers are included in government’s decisions (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 19 – 20). Related to this issue is the fact that members of the village often do not know what precisely the roles and responsibilities of their elected representatives are (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 20). This lack of knowledge on the part of the villagers, significantly detracts from their ability to fully engage with the representatives and to effectively contribute to the development process (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 20).

Therefore, while there are mechanisms put in place to facilitate popular participation within Botswana’s development and governance processes, more needs to be done to make these mechanisms more inclusive. It is for this reason that the Botswana Democratic Developmental State has not fully achieved inclusive embeddedness.

4.2. Concluding Remarks and Possible Recommendations
As shown in the analysis in this chapter, the combination of Botswana’s Development-Oriented Political Leadership, Effective and Well-Insulated Bureaucracy, Developmental Success (in terms of its economic growth and social development) as well as its ability to establish a functioning Electoral Democracy has led many observers and scholars to label Botswana as a successful African Democratic Developmental State. However, with respect to the five outlined benchmarks, Botswana’s Democratic Developmental State suffers from several pitfalls: Firstly, while it can be said that Botswana is in possession of Development-Oriented Political Leadership, due to the enormous power concentrated within the presidency and subsequently the inability of state institutions to hold the president accountable, it cannot be said that the Botswana’s political leaders act with consensual autonomy.

Secondly, with respect to Botswana’s Developmental Success, although Botswana has achieved high economic growth rates coupled with a reduction in poverty and an improvement in social welfare, its inability to redistribute the wealth generated (particularly to those living in rural areas) has broadened existing inequalities within the society. In addition, the spread of HIV/AIDS within Botswana poses another challenge to it achieving Developmental Success. The spread of HIV/AIDS has further undermined much of the progress which Botswana has made in terms of its health indicators and has consequently resulted in a substantial decrease in productivity levels (Lewin, 2011: 88). Furthermore, as stated above in this chapter, Botswana’s over-reliance in mining and its inability to diversify its economy both pose a significant challenge to the continuation of Botswana’s extraordinary economic growth. It has therefore been suggested that Botswana grows and develops its other productive industries not only to reduce its dependency on mining, but also to facilitate job creation and the reduction in social inequality (Meyns, 2010: 56).

Thirdly, while Botswana meets the basic requirements of an electoral democracy, this chapter has indicated several challenges which hinders its ability to consolidate democracy. Several scholars have provided the following suggestions which may aid Botswana in consolidating its democracy. Given the sweeping powers which the president enjoys, Mpho Molomo suggests that Botswana should introduce presidential
elections in order to make the president more accountable to the electorate (Molomo, 2000). In order to level the political playing field, Molomo and Gloria Somolekae have also suggested that Botswana reform its electoral system to allow for a greater number of opposition parties in parliament, provide state funding for political parties, draw up legislation which compels political parties to publically declare their donors and create an Independent Broadcasting Authority to regulate the media (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000: 123). In addition, Dorothy Mpabanga also notes that voter apathy can be curtailed through voter education (Mpabanga, 2000: 57).

Lastly, in order to make popular participation mechanisms more effective, both Mokwena and Fakir suggest that the kgotla system be transformed so that it is more inclusive of minority groups (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 21). Additionally, in order to strengthen the relationship between local elected representatives and their constituents, Sharma suggests that local leaders undergo training in order to strengthen their leadership skills so that they are better equipped and provided with a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities (Sharma, 2010: 140). In order to perform their functions effectively, local leaders need to form a closer relationship with the community that they serve so that they have a better understanding of the community’s needs and expectations (Sharma, 2010: 140). Similarly, members of the village need to be better informed of the roles and responsibilities of their local elected representatives so that they can be better equipped to participate in development and governance processes (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009).

Having evaluated Botswana according to the five benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State, it has become apparent that Botswana resembles what Leftwich in Chapter Three referred to as an “authoritarian democracy” or a “low intensity democracy”: In this regard, Botswana has been more focused on meeting the formal criteria of democracy than on ensuring greater public participation and political equality (Leftwich, 1998: 66). Similar then to the Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental State outlined by Leftwich in the previous chapter, Botswana’s BDP-led government, being free from political and social pressures, has had the necessary power and autonomy to decisively shape Botswana’s developmental trajectory.
Chapter Five: South Africa - Towards a Democratic Developmental State

5.1. Critical Analysis of South Africa as a Democratic Developmental State

5.1.1. Development-Oriented Political Leadership

According to Joseph Ayee, South Africa’s first democratic leader, Nelson Mandela, was considered a “Development-Oriented” leader (Ayee, 2013: 265). In this regard, Mandela was both committed to socio-economic development and possessed a strong developmentalist ideology (Ayee, 2013: 265). However, since Mandela’s term in office, South Africa has lacked Development-Oriented Leaders and appears to suffer from, “a transformational leadership deficit” (Ayee, 2013: 266). While Mandela’s predecessors have claimed to be dedicated to national development, these claims have been viewed as a “public relations hoax” which has been used to legitimise and further entrench their leadership positions (Ayee, 2013: 266). South Africa’s inability to produce Development-Oriented Leaders is related to the following factors as defined by Ayee: Firstly, South Africa’s political leadership has often failed to take a hard stance on certain unpopular political issues, even though such policy choices may have proven to be more practical (Ayee, 2013: 266). For example, South Africa’s policy of transformation within government opted for a rapid replacement of white employee workers with black employee workers – who lacked the necessary expertise (Ayee, 2013: 266).

Secondly, the systemic corruption within government is an additional factor that limits the emergence of a Development-Oriented Leadership within South Africa (Ayee, 2013: 266). While South Africa has established laws and institutions to deal with issues of corruption at a national level, the South African government is criticised by its citizens for not adequately addressing the challenges of corruption within government (Ayee, 2013: 266). The current levels of corruption within the South African government are arguably at an all-time high since the end of apartheid (van Vuuren, 2014: 1). In addition, the current president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, has been embroiled in a number of corruption scandals, for which he has managed to avoid taking responsibility for (George, 2014). These corruption scandals have included among others, the “Nkandlagate” in which President Zuma is alleged to have made use of taxpayers’ money for non-security upgrades at his personal home in Nkandla.
that amounted to R52.9 million; and the “Guptagate” in which permission for a commercial plane carrying close friends of President Zuma to land at Waterkloof Air Force Base (a military base only and not for commercial landing of aeroplanes) in April 2013 was allowed (Harding, 2015; George, 2014).

Thirdly, the promotion of patronage on the part of South African political leaders has further inhibited the country’s ability to produce Development-Oriented Leadership (Ayee, 2013: 267). In this regard, the President’s Office has become, “a conduit for patronage”, in which a number of patronage appointments have been made in order to grow the size and scope of the presidency (Ayee, 2013: 267). President Zuma, for example, has reshuffled his cabinet numerous times over the past years while being in office, further expanding the size of his Cabinet with each reshuffle with new appointments made on the basis of patronage (Zille, 2012; February, 2014).

Fourthly, political leaders are not able to manage the economy effectively (Ayee, 2013: 267). For example, the macroeconomic advances made by South Africa has been reversed by wasteful spending on the part of political leader’s especially during the periods leading up to elections (Ayee, 2013: 267). Wasteful spending has given rise to high public debt in South Africa, which the government is finding great difficulty in managing (Ayee, 2013: 27). For example, South Africa’s debt-to-GDP ratio has steadily risen from 27.8 per cent in 2009 to 46.1 per cent in 2014 (Trading Economics, 2015c). Linked to these factors is the persistent waste and misuse of state resources, which Ayee lists as the fifth factor (Ayee, 2013: 267). The misuse of state resources is compounded by the inability of state institutions to hold the offenders to account (Ayee, 2013: 267).

The failure of state institutions to hold politicians accountable also extends to that of the South Africa president. Although, state institutions and structures in South Africa are designed to hold the president accountable (such as parliament, the judiciary, the public protector and other commissions), these institutions have been placed under immense political pressure due to the politicised manner in which appointments are
made resulting in a lack of and an inability to adequately perform their roles and functions (Butler, 2011: 5). Given the power that resides within the presidency, granted by the South African Constitution, the president is allowed to make a number of appointments. These presidential appointments compromise the main functions of these key institutions because staff are accountable to the president. Consequently, presidential appointments hampers the impartiality mechanisms of these institutions to act independently (Gumede, 2015). In particular, the president has the power to appoint and also to dismiss (on specified grounds) the heads of key institutions, agencies and offices such as those of the Chief and Deputy Chief Justice, the Public Protector and the Auditor-General of the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), the NDPP as well as the commissioners of the IEC (Gumede, 2015; Maimane, 2014).

In addition, the inability of parliament to hold the executive branch accountable has further compounded the issue and constrained impartiality. The failure of parliament to hold the cabinet members and the president individually accountable stems from the overwhelming majority of seats which the ANC has in the National Assembly (Butler, 2011: 6). The ANC leaders have effectively subjected parliament to the whims of the executive, ultimately compromising the separation of powers within the South African government (Butler, 2011: 6; Dube, 2015). Consequently, due to the weak nature of horizontal accountability, South Africa’s presidents are not held institutionally accountable and do not fully operate with the first element of consensual autonomy.

For these reasons, South Africa does not yet have the Development-Oriented Leadership necessary for it to effectively pursue the Democratic Developmental State model (Ayee, 2013: 267). Consequently, political leadership within South Africa has been described by Ayee as “transactional leadership” in which leaders seek to hold office with the objective of using state resources to further their individual interests and not that of national development (Ayee, 2013: 267).

5.1.2. Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy

- Presence of a Pilot Agency
Post 1994, the new South African government inherited an economic bureaucracy which was highly fragmented, unrepresentative and plagued with a tradition of departmental autonomy (Makgetla, 2008: 151). Due to the absence of a single central planning agency with the power to control departments, the challenges of fragmentation and departmental autonomy within the bureaucracy persisted under both the Mandela and Thabo Mbeki administrations (Makgetla, 2008: 151). The coming into power of the Zuma administration in 2009, however, brought with it new developments with regard to planning and coordination within government, one of these key developments being the establishment of a National Planning Commission (NPC) in 2010 (Kraak, 2011: 350 & 355).

The NPC is a central planning agency housed within the Office of the president (Kraak, 2011: 356). The NPC represents an advisory body comprising of 26 people appointed by the President who largely emanate from outside of the government (Ayee, 2013: 274; Zarenda, 2013: 2). These 26 people are policy experts who are selected for their knowledge in key areas such as finance, industry and rural development, to name but a few (National Planning Commission [NPC], 2011: 15). The NPC is responsible for development planning, budgeting and public-sector spending, all of which have previously been under the jurisdiction of the National Treasury (Besharati, 2013: 12). In this regard, the NPC heads South Africa’s medium-term national strategic plan, titled, “South Africa Vision 2025” and its comprehensive long-term plan, the National Development Plan (NDP) (Kraak, 2011: 356; Besharati, 2013: 13). The NDP was endorsed by Cabinet members and adopted by the South African government in 2012/2013 and includes the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) latest Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) as well as the Economic Development Department’s (EDD) New Growth Plan (NGP) (Zarenda, 2013: 1; SouthAfrica.info; 2012).

Clearly then, although not explicitly articulated in the literature, the NPC is in a unique position to assume the role of the “pilot agency” within South Africa’s Democratic Developmental State. The NPC’s position within the presidency coupled with its long-term economic planning and coordination and budgetary powers allows the NPC with the necessary leverage over line departments, and the ability to potentially garner a
high degree of internal bureaucratic cohesion and centralisation within South Africa’s
economic bureaucracy. The NPC is therefore afforded the necessary clout to
authoritatively penetrate the South African economy and society.

However, due to the inability of the NPC to coordinate the work produced by the EDD
and the DTI, it has not been able to bring about a high degree of institutional coherence
within South Africa’s economic bureaucracy. More specifically, the NPC has not been
able to eliminate the inconsistencies among the NGP, IPAP and the NDP (Khuzwayo,
2013). One such inconsistency relates to the issue of job creation in which all three
economic policies disagree on the reasons for South Africa’s dismal unemployment
rates and how best to remedy the issue of unemployment (Centre for Development
and Enterprise [CDE], 2013a). Inconsistencies among South Africa’s economic growth
plans reflect greater divisions and fragmentations within South Africa’s economic
bureaucracy among its economic departments (Khuzwayo, 2013).

- **Insulation of Economic Bureaucrats**

Additionally, the decision to choose commission members for the NPC who (for the
most part) originate from outside of government has been positive as it has allowed
commissioners to be effectively shielded from political pressures when formulating the
long-term economic plans. In this regard, the commissioners are free to make
decisions not based on political considerations, but rather in pursuit of genuine
Furthermore, the commissioners within the NPC act with consensual autonomy in the
formulation of long-term economic plans - in that their work is overseen by the
president and deputy president who are both ex-officio members on the commission
(Kraak, 2011: 356). In addition, the long-term plans are presented to the Ministerial
Committee on Planning as well as endorsed by the Cabinet before they can be put
into effect (Kraak, 2011: 356).

- **Social Embeddedness**
The relative and consensual autonomy of South Africa’s economic bureaucracy is further “socially embedded” in a dense network which brings together government, organised labour, business and civil society organisations at a national level in the form of a collaborative body, namely: the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) (Houston, Liebenberg and Dichaba, 2001: 17). NEDLAC brings all these important actors together in order to consult and deliberate economic and social policy (Ayee, 2013: 269). In this manner, NEDLAC has formed a close bond with the economic bureaucracy through its relationship particularly with the National Treasury and has acted as an important channel linking government with other non-state actors in the formulation and coordination of developmental policy (Ayee, 2013: 269).

- **Meritocratic Recruitment and Compensation of Economic Bureaucrats**

Since 1994, the South African government has sought to transform the civil service by reinstituting the key principal of merit (Naidoo, 2013: 261). In an effort to promote “merit and efficiency” within the public service, the South African civil service introduced a series of New Public Management (NPM) reforms which included the creation of a Senior Management Service (SMS) in 2001 (Ayee, 2013: 270). The SMS comprises of civil servants from the four highest employment bracket in the civil services sector, which seeks to improve the performance of the civil service by: attracting senior managers from outside of the public sector; improving the methods by which candidates are recruited, and developing a “service-wide pool of managers” that can be placed in any area of the civil service (Cameron, 2010: 686). However, the SMS has so far failed to improve the quality of senior managers within South Africa’s civil service as many senior managers are still lacking in basic communication and team work skills (Cameron, 2010: 686; Naidoo, 2015: 33).

Furthermore, the SMS has been unsuccessful in attracting and retaining senior managers due to the large number of vacant senior management positions (Naidoo, 2008: 122; Naidoo, 2015: 33). High vacancy rates particularly at the SMS level within key economic departments such as the National Treasury, EDD and DTI demonstrate that this trend is evident within South Africa’s economic bureaucracy. In 2013, the vacancy rate within the National Treasury stood at 11.1 per cent and 14 per cent within
the EDD (Republic of South Africa. Parliament. Public Service and Administration and Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Committees, 2013; South African Press Association [SAPA], 2013; Republic of South Africa. Parliament. National Council of Provinces [NCOP] Economic and Business Development Committee, 2013). Similarly vacancy rates within the DTI stood at 9.4 per cent in 2014 (Department of Trade and Industry [DTI], 2014: 41). According to Edigheji, the high rates of vacancies and staff turnover within economic departments can be attributed to the inability of the South African economic bureaucracy to adequately compensate senior managers according to private sector rates (Edigheji, 2007: 24). Following the introduction of the Employment Equity Act, Edigheji argues that black senior managers have often been drawn to the private sector where they can manage to obtain a higher salary (Edigheji, 2007: 24).

Despite ushering in a series of reforms designed to promote the values of merit and efficiency, South Africa’s civil service is still viewed as being “highly politicised” (Naidoo, 2013: 271). The politicisation of the South African bureaucracy post-1994 has occurred largely as result of pressures placed on the newly-democratic ANC government to transform the bureaucracy from one which was previously heavily dominated by white civil servants under the apartheid regime, to one which reflects the demographics of a non-racial and democratic society (Cameron, 2010: 687; Naidoo, 2013: 265). Moreover, the politicisation of the South African bureaucracy has largely been owed to the introduction of the ANC’s Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy in 1997, which strongly advocated for the appointment of senior civil servants from within the ANC’s sphere of influence (Cameron, 2010: 687).

The ANC has justified its use of cadre deployment on the basis that they need “loyal party hands” in the top echelons of the civil service (Twala, 2014: 159). In this manner, the ANC’s cadre deployment strategy has ultimately replaced the principle of merit with that of “party” loyalty (Naidoo, 2013: 266). Additionally, because the ANC’s cadre deployment strategy failed to incorporate administrative competence within its recruitment criteria, many of the cadre appointees lack the necessary managerial skills and experience (Cameron, 2010: 687).
5.1.3. Developmental Success

In 1994, South Africa’s newly-elected democratic government inherited a weak economy, which suffered from deeply-embedded structural weaknesses evident in its declining growth rate, rising inflation and decreasing investment from the previous decade (Faulkner and Loewald, 2008; Goldman Sachs, 2014; Knight, 2004). However, since 1994, South Africa’s economy has experienced moderate economic growth and has been classified by the World Bank as an upper middle-income country (Nnadozie, 2013: 81). Between the period 1994 to 2014, its average GDP growth rate was 3.15 per cent, which showed a marked improvement from the average growth rate of 1.4 per cent achieved from 1980 to 1994 (Industrial Development Corporation [IDC], 2013: 1; World Bank, 2015a). In particular, from 2005 to 2007 South Africa’s total GDP growth rate exceeded 5 per cent year-on-year (Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbur and Ncube, 2014: 2). This three-year period (2005, 2006 and 2007) was the most impressive growth experienced since 1994, when the ANC took over the reins as the new government (Bhorat et al., 2014: 2). The moderate economic growth is a result of the structural transformation which the economy was subjected to (Bhorat et al., 2014: 3). In this regard, the South African economy was transformed from a previously resource-dependent economy to one which is characterised by a vibrant and globally competitive financial and business services sector (Bhorat et al., 2014: 3).

However, following the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, South Africa’s GDP growth rate fell to an all-time low of -6.10 per cent in the first quarter of 2009 (Bhorat et al., 2014: 2; Trading Economics, 2015b). Due to the after-effects of the 2008/2009 global financial crisis compounded with the South African government’s inability to address structural problems (such as widening inequalities, unemployment, crime, corruption and a lack of infrastructure), South Africa has experienced mediocre economic growth with an average GDP growth of 2.05 per cent from 2008 to 2013 (Trading Economics, 2015b; World Bank, 2015a).
Since 1994, the South African government has gone to great lengths to improve the quality of life for all of its citizens (Ngcaweni, 2013). However, in spite of the achievements made with respect to the provision of basic services, South Africa has been unable to redistribute the wealth generated equally among the population. In this manner, gross inequality, particularly across racial boundaries, has been cited as an enduring feature of South Africa’s new democratic dispensation (Bhorat et al., 2014: 13). South Africa has one of the highest Gini Coefficients in the world: In 2006, South Africa’s Gini Coefficient measured at 0.67, decreasing slightly to 0.65 in 2009 and remaining there through to 2011 (Statistics South Africa, 2014: 35).

South Africa’s HDI value for 2013 was 0.658 which located it at 118 out of 187 countries and placed it within the medium development category (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2014). South Africa’s HDI score has increased slightly from 0.569 in 1980 to 0.658 in 2013 which represents an overall 15.6 per cent increase (UNDP, 2014). However, South Africa’s progress within the area of human development over recent years has been minimal. For example, South Africa’s HDI value only increased by 2.4 per cent between 2010 and 2013 (Gumede, 2014: 13; UNDP, 2014).

5.1.4. Consolidated Electoral Democracy

Despite being on the verge of a civil war and the possible outbreak of an intractable racial conflict in 1993, South Africa managed to successfully transition from apartheid to a non-racial multiparty democracy (Maphunye, 2014: 140; Hart, 2013; Inman and Rubinfeld, 2013: 1). South Africa’s remarkable political transition to democracy has been heralded as one of the most important political occurrences of the last century (Inman and Rubinfeld, 2013: 1). South Africa’s political transition to democracy brought with it the end of an apartheid system of racial discrimination, which excluded the black majority people from participating in political life and granted democratic rights to all persons of colour (Brooks, 2004: 4). The success of South Africa’s transition lay in the fact that it was peacefully negotiated between all three key actors (the NP, ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP]) and that the democratic pact forged between them is still being honoured today (Inman and Rubinfeld, 2013: 1 – 2).
South Africa’s first national elections, based on universal franchise, was held on 27 April 1994 (Glaser, 2001: 223). The ANC walked away from the first National Assembly election as the clear takers, and won 62.65 per cent of the vote and used their victory to solidify and anchor their position as the dominant party within South Africa’s new multi-party democracy (Glaser, 2001: 223; Wieczorek, 2012: 27). Since 1994, South Africa has conducted regular national elections every five years (in years 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014) (Africa, 2013: 2). In contrast to much of Africa where legitimate elections are rare, South Africa stands out for conducting regular, free and fair elections at the polls, which has been supervised by the IEC (Africa, 2013: 1; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014a: 1).

Following the ANC’s rise to power in the 1994 general elections, the ANC has dominated elections having received the majority of votes irrespective of the party’s performance (Wieczorek, 2012: 30). National elections have therefore been seen within South Africa’s democratic dispensation as “entirely predictable” with the ANC facing no serious opposition or threat at the polls. The ANC was able to win 66.4 per cent of the votes in 1999, 69.7 per cent in 2004, 65.9 per cent in 2009 and 62.2 per cent in 2014 (Wieczorek, 2012: 30; de Kadt and Hudson, 2014: 7; Media Club South Africa, 2014; Freedom House, 2015; McGroarty and Maylie, 2014).

The Constitution of South Africa makes provision for both civil and political rights within the Bill of Rights (Mbazira, 2006: 1). The Bill of Rights is regarded as the “cornerstone” of South Africa’s democracy and emphasises, “the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom” (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: chap2). Civil liberties outlined in the Bill of Rights include, among others, the right to life, personal autonomy and individual rights, freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of expression and beliefs (Mbazira, 2006: 1; Freedom House, 2015). According to the Bill of Rights, political rights refer firstly to the freedom of
individuals and to make political choices which includes: “the right to form a political party; to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for a political party; and to campaign for a political party or cause” (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: chap2). Secondly, the Bill of Rights encompasses the right of every South African to regular, free and fair elections (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: chap2). Thirdly, the Bill of Rights provides every South African over the age of 18 with the right to a secret vote and to run and stand for public office (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: chap2).

- **Political Participation**

Since South Africa’s advent of democracy, it has experienced very good electoral participation rates (Africa Governance, Monitoring and Advocacy Project [AfriMAP] and Open Society Foundation for South Africa [OSF], 2006: 7). Voter turnouts for South Africa’s past general elections have been on par with those countries in Western Europe and considerably higher than other African countries (AfriMAP and OSF, 2006: 7). Voter turnout for South Africa’s general elections have been as follows: 86.87 per cent in 1994, 89.28 per cent in 1999, 76.73 per cent in 2004, 77.30 per cent in 2009 and 73.48 per cent in 2014 (IDEA, 2014b). According to Collette Schulz-Herzenberg, assessing the percentage of voter turnout over the past 20 years in terms of the proportion of eligible voters reveals a more accurate reflection of electoral participation in South Africa (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014b: 2). In this manner, statistics indicate that voter turnout has decreased from 86 per cent in 1994 to 57 per cent in 2014 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014b: 2). These results therefore indicate a growing number of eligible voters within South Africa who do not participate during elections (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014b: 2).

According to Meshay Moses, the use of the Proportional Representation (PR) system by South Africa allows for the promotion of healthy electoral competition by aiding the establishment of political parties (Moses, 2012: 1). The number of registered political parties in South Africa has grown over the years from 70 in the late 1990s to 152 in 2014 (Booysen and Masterson, 2009; Moses, 2012: 1; Freedom House, 2015). The substantial increase in the number of registered and contesting political parties shows
that South Africans’ right to form political parties and run for elections has been exercised (Moses, 2012: 1). Currently, South Africa’s main opposition party is the Democratic Alliance (DA), followed by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the IFP having each won 22.23, 6.35 and 2.40 per cent of the vote in the 2014 general elections, respectively (Freedom House, 2015; Independent Electoral Commission [IEC], 2015).

However, despite the proliferation of political parties within the new democratic dispensation, opposition parties in South Africa have been characterised as weak and fragmented (Moses, 2012: 1). Overall, opposition parties have underperformed during election time and have been unable to effectively challenge the ruling party (Moses, 2012: 2). Reasons for the weakness of opposition parties in South Africa include: “a lack of strategy, ideological weaknesses, insufficient funding and low campaign resources, and poor party image and leadership” (Moses, 2012: 3). Due to these challenges, Moses notes that it is unlikely that any one opposition party will replace the ruling party in the near future (Moses, 2012: 1).

- **Consolidation of Democracy and Peaceful Succession of Power**

As can been seen, then, while South Africa meets the basic requirements of an electoral democracy, it has yet to undergo changes in government by way of elections (Welsh, 2004:14). While the ANC’s single-party dominance has managed to secure political stability during its tricky transition period to democracy in 1994, its dominance in parliament coupled with a weak and fragmented opposition are presented as two major challenges to the achievement of true democratic consolidation in South Africa (Welsh, 2004; Kearsey, 2007).

5.1.5. Popular Participation in the Development and Governance Process

The increase in popular participation and the growing number of interest groups involved in development and governance processes as well as the establishment of institutional mechanisms and channels for popular participation since 1994
demonstrates the promotion of participatory democracy within South Africa’s new democratic dispensation (Houston and Liebenberg, 2001: 1). South Africa’s vast range of institutional mechanisms further illustrates its commitment to participatory processes, which transcends regular elections (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 1). Key institutional mechanisms and channels for popular participation which have been created since 1994 include: public hearings, petitions, “Izimbizo”, Green and White Paper processes, public access to parliamentary portfolio committee meetings, integrated development planning (IDP) processes and ward committees (Houston and Liebenberg, 2001: 1; The Presidency, 2008: 7 – 9; Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 105 – 110).

Firstly, concerning public hearings, Imraan Buccus and Janine Hicks note that the public is invited to public hearings in which they are encouraged to provide formal input necessary to refine bills and public policy (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 105). However, it has been noted that participation at public hearings has been minimal, with many community members not attending meetings (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 105 – 106).

Secondly, the use of petitions as a mechanism for participation involves the submission of petitions by members of the community to a petition-standing committee (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 108). The committee is then tasked with assessing the petition and, where necessary, petitions are forwarded to the appropriate government departments (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 108). However, the committee has been regarded as being negligent in its response to forwarding petitions, particularly petitions on issues concerning the most vulnerable such as HIV/AIDS, youth and women groups (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 108),

Thirdly, the “izimbizo” is another form of public gathering which was launched in 2001 (The Presidency, 2008: 8). The izimbizo usually convenes at the provincial and local level of governments (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109). It is led by the premier and seeks to bring together several thousand community members with representatives from governmental departments (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109). Members of the
community are then invited to raise questions pertaining to service delivery, the formulation of by-laws and the budget to which departmental representatives are obliged to respond and resolve (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109; Hicks, 2009: 6). While popular during Mbeki’s term as president, the number of convened izimbizo-style gatherings has decreased over the years as a result of poor organisation (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 108). Additionally, due to the sheer size of these gatherings, the izimbizo has been criticised for being too large to facilitate meaningful deliberations (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109).

Fourthly, South Africans are also encouraged to engage in policy making processes by commenting on green and white papers (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109). Green and White Papers are published in the government gazettes and distributed among important interest groups and stakeholders for input and comment (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109). However, Green and White Papers are riddled with technical and legal terms which make it difficult for a layperson to read and understand (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109). They are also not available to all citizens in their local languages and are not widely distributed among the communities, but only reserved for certain stakeholders and groups (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109 - 110).

Fifthly, citizens are also invited to attend national and provincial parliamentary portfolio committee meetings (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 106). However, while the invitation has been extended to the public, they are not overtly encouraged by government to attend and participate within portfolio committee meetings because the details (such as the time, date and venue) and records of these meetings are not always been made available to the public timeously (Buccus and Hick, 2011: 106).

Sixthly, the IDP is one of the main participatory mechanisms which operate at the level of local government (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110). IDPs are drawn up every five years and are used by municipalities as a planning method to formulate and coordinate area-wide, long-term development plans (Lewis, Ochola, Singh and Dlamini, 2014: 23). According to local government legislation, each municipality is required to interact
directly with their constituents in the formulation of IDPs (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110). However, the manner in which municipalities are required to consult with members of the community in the formulation of IDPs is not explicitly outlined in the legislature and therefore various approaches are adopted across the board with varying degrees of success being achieved (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110).

Lastly, ward committees are another key participatory mechanism which has been introduced at the local level since 1999 (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110; The Presidency, 2008). Ward committees have been created with the aim of connecting community members with municipal representatives and involving them within municipal processes such as the formulation of a ward IDP and municipal decision-making (Hicks, 2009: 5; Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110). Ward committees are headed by a ward councillor and comprise of a diverse group of ten people who serve an advisory function to the ward councillors. (Hicks, 2009: 6). However, ward committees are constrained by numerous barriers: they are often susceptible to political influence and manipulation, lack the capacity and resources to effectively carry out their roles and do not convene regularly for meetings (Hicks, 2009: 7). Furthermore, there is a lack of clarity as to how the work of ward committees is meant to inform development planning and decision-making within municipalities (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110). In this manner, ward committees are generally used by ambitious members of the community to spring-board into lucrative careers in politics (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110).

As has been shown, since South Africa’s advent of democracy in 1994, it has radically transformed itself from one which was previously “secretive and authoritarian” to one which welcomes popular participation within its development and governance processes (Houston, Liebenberg and Dichaba, 2001: 71). While South Africa’s participatory mechanisms suffer from several limitations, South Africa’s commitment to popular participation is entrenched in its constitution and is further evident in the various institutional mechanisms which shows that the South African government has to a certain extent achieved inclusive embeddedness.
5.2. Concluding Remarks and Possible Recommendations

The above critical analysis of South Africa’s Emerging Democratic Developmental State has outlined that, firstly, since Mandela’s term in office, South Africa has been unable to produce Development-Oriented Leaders. While political leaders have publicly asserted their commitment to socio-economic development, they have been corrupt, wasteful and have used their positions to further parochial interests. Furthermore, due to a heavily ANC-dominated parliament with an immense amount of power concentrated in the presidency, the president has acted with little consensual autonomy. According to the Deputy Chief Justice of South Africa, Dikgang Moseneke, the drafters of the Constitution, with the euphoria of the moment, eagerly gave former president Nelson Mandela sweeping powers that allowed him to make appointments without constraints in the presidency and justified these actions by arguing that, “He (Mandela), after all, will do the right thing” (Gumede, 2015). The drafters of the Constitutions, according to Gumede, naively believed that Mandela’s predecessors would not abuse or misuse their powers and also act and take on the same attributes as their predecessor and always “do the right thing” (Gumede, 2015). However, given the systemic corruption within government as well as the number of patronage appointments made to grow the size and scope of the presidency, this has not been the case. In an effort to make the president more accountable to democratic institutions, Moseneke has called for the review of presidential powers (SAPA, 2014). While Moseneke acknowledges that curbing executive powers will be a challenging task, he argues that it must be undertaken over the next 20 years in order to safeguard South Africa’s democratic project (SAPA, 2014).

Secondly, while South Africa’s economic bureaucracy has achieved consensual autonomy, authoritative penetration and social embeddedness, it lacks institutional coherence and is highly politicised. In order to produce greater institutional coherence within the economic bureaucracy, Anthony Butler suggests that more power needs to be centralised within the NPC and in the presidency to allow for improved decision-making and to more adequately guide South Africa’s developmental trajectory (Butler, 2014). In so doing, Butler notes that the present power and autonomy of Cabinet
members and director-generals needs to be curbed as to allow for the NDP, through the NPC, to take centre stage in South Africa’s developmental project (Butler, 2014).

Furthermore, the South African government has recently emphasised the need to address the political-administrative interface by depoliticising the civil service (Ayee, 2013: 272). In this regard, the South African government has acknowledged that progress towards the establishment of a Democratic Developmental State can only be achieved once the economic bureaucracy is able to operate autonomously outside the purview of politics (Ayee, 2013: 272). This point has been raised in the NDP which argues that, “political deployment needs to be replaced by a focus on building a professional public service that serves government, but one that is also sufficiently autonomous and sufficiently insulated from political patronage” (Republic of South Africa, 2011: 365).

Thirdly, while South Africa has taken great strides since 1994 to structurally transform its economy, rampant unemployment, crime, corruption, a lack of infrastructure (such as hospitals, school buildings, power, efficient transport systems and water) and the inability of the government to redistribute wealth generated from its moderate economic growth are major obstacles that South Africa has yet to overcome if it is to truly achieve Developmental Success.

Fourthly, although South Africa has successfully transitioned into a democracy by meeting all the requirements of an electoral democracy, it has yet to be consolidated through changes in political leadership achieved via the ballot box. Given the ANC’s single-party dominance coupled with a weak and fragmented opposition, scholars such as Roger Southall have characterised South Africa as a “low intensity democracy” (Southall, 2003: 74).

Fifthly, despite the numerous obstacles affecting participatory mechanisms, this chapter has demonstrated that great strides have been taken by the South African
government in order to entrench participatory democracy in South Africa. However, the mechanisms for popular participation in South Africa’s development and governance processes need further strengthening so that the government can be more effective. In this regard, this chapter observes that South Africa has to a certain extent achieved inclusive embeddedness.

Despite South Africa’s intention to construct a Democratic Developmental State, this chapter has also shown that after just over two decades (between 1994 and 2015) South Africa has made little progress in achieving a Democratic Developmental State. Therefore, while South Africa’s dominant-party democracy arguably has the necessary “power, authority, autonomy, continuity and political capacity” to pursue socio-economic development, its lack of Development-Oriented Political Leadership since Mandela’s term in office as well as its inability to establish an Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy has meant that the South African state has not been able to successfully guide its developmental trajectory (Leftwich, 1996; 290). As a result, South Africa has a long road ahead of it if it is to successfully transition from an Emerging/Aspirational into a fully-fledged Democratic Developmental State.
Chapter Six – Conclusion:

In light of the growing consensus around the need for the emergence of Democratic Developmental States in Africa, this thesis sought to assess the concept within two Southern African countries: Botswana and South Africa. Given Botswana’s depiction of and South Africa’s public commitment to the establishment of a Democratic Developmental State, this thesis has done so by highlighting five key benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State and thereafter analysing the extent to which Botswana and South Africa have exhibited these benchmarks.

Firstly, in setting out the conceptual and theoretical framework, Chapter Two noted that the concept of the Developmental State was coined by Johnson 1982 and has been used to refer to states that have achieved rapid economic growth and development through the intervention of strong, efficient bureaucracies. In this manner, this thesis has drawn on the work of Leftwich in defining the Developmental State as one which has the necessary power, autonomy and capacity to guide and pursue developmental goals. Thereafter, Chapter Two discussed the accompanying theory of the Developmental State. In so doing, it noted that the theory of the Developmental State emerged during the late 1980s and early 1990s as a critique of the neoliberal account of the East Asian Miracle. In this regard, Chapter Two showed that while neoliberal economists argued that the success of East Asia’s post-war industrialisation resulted from the ability of the market to function free of undue state interference, developmental theorists claimed that it was precisely the role of the played by an active, interventionist state in directing development which accounted for its economic success. Furthermore, Chapter Two drew again from the work of Leftwich (2000) in outlining the following six features of the Developmental State model: incorrupt political and bureaucratic elite; embedded autonomy; effective and well-insulated bureaucracy; weak and subordinated civil societies; the capacity to effectively manage private economic interests; and a compilation of repression, poor human rights track records, legitimacy and performance.

Secondly, Chapter Two addressed the concept of the Democratic Developmental State by noting that it is founded on the premise that the concepts of democracy and
development are complementary. In this regard, it has adopted the definition of substantive democracy defined as a set of institutional procedures which aim to include citizens within the political process. Development has been defined in Chapter Two as not only the pursuit of material wealth but also that of social objectives, such as the reduction in inequalities and poverty as well as the provision of individual safety, which all necessitate state involvement.

Thereafter, Chapter Two discussed the relationship between democracy and development and showed that while democracy was considered to be inconsistent with development during the 1960s up until the 1980s, this world view was replaced, following the decline of authoritarianism, with the notion that democracy is not only compatible with development, but also with the Developmental State model. Lastly, Chapter Two defined the Democratic Developmental State as one type of Developmental State which promotes “holistic development” by simultaneously pursuing both economic and democratic development. Furthermore, this chapter has noted that Democratic Developmental States seek to uplift its citizens out of poverty by forming alliances not only with private sector interests (as in the case of the Developmental State) but that of the entire society within the developmental process.

Chapter Three briefly surveyed the literature produced on the Democratic Developmental State and outlined five benchmarks of such a model. The chapter began firstly by assessing Sklar's concept of ‘developmental democracy’. In reconciling the concepts of democracy and development, this chapter has noted that Sklar's concept of ‘developmental democracy’ regards democracy as a means by which national development is to be achieved. Furthermore, it has noted that Sklar's ‘democracy in parts’ argument advocates for an incremental approach to the adoption of democracy with the realisation of a Democratic Developmental State being the end goal.

Secondly, this chapter considered Leftwich’s contribution to the topic whereby he asserts that the success of any Democratic Developmental State lies in its ability to
effectively reconcile the conservative prerequisites of democratic consolidation within the radical logic that necessitates rapid economic growth and development. The manner in which a Democratic Developmental State is able to reconcile democratic consolidation with the logic of economic growth, Leftwich argues, gives rise to two broad categories of Democratic Developmental States: Dominant-Party and Coalitional Democratic Developmental States. In a Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental State, preference is given to economic growth, while in Coalitional Democratic Developmental State conditions of consolidated democracy is favoured above that of economic growth.

Thirdly, Chapter Three noted that White and Robinson’s contribution to the literature on the Democratic Developmental State argues that the only way in which the concepts of democracy and development can be made compatible in the long-term is through the construction of an effective Democratic Developmental State. Such a state model, they argue, has the ability to create a “virtuous spiral” between socio-economic development and political development and can only be realised through conscious institutional alterations to the state apparatus. Thereafter, this chapter has outlined and discussed White’s five key features of a Democratic Developmental State, namely; consensual autonomy, social embeddedness, inclusive embeddedness, institutional coherence and authoritative penetration.

Fourthly, Chapter Three assessed Edigheji’s contribution to the literature on the Democratic Developmental State in which he advocates for the adoption of such a model in Africa. The Democratic Developmental State model is viewed by him as having the potential to address Africa’s severe democratic and developmental issues. For Edigheji, a Democratic Developmental State should incorporate elements of both procedural and participatory democracy and pursue socio-economic objectives such as the eradication of poverty and social inequalities, provision of individual safety and the reversal of environmental degradation.
Having surveyed the contributions made by the five key authors, Chapter Three arrived at the following five benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State: Development-Oriented Political Leadership; Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy; Developmental Success; Consolidated Electoral Democracy; and Popular Participation in the Development and Governance Process. The remainder of the thesis (Chapter Four and Five) has been dedicated to the critical analysis of Botswana and South Africa as Democratic Developmental States by using the five benchmarks outlined in Chapter Three. In this regard, this thesis found that neither Botswana nor South Africa exhibit all five benchmarks of the Democratic Developmental State model as outlined.

In critically analysing the extent to which Botswana can be regarded as a Democratic Developmental State, Chapter Four found that while Botswana exhibits the features of Development-Oriented Political Leadership, an Effective and Well-Insulated Bureaucracy, Developmental Success (in terms of its economic growth and social development) and a functioning Electoral Democracy, it suffers from several pitfalls: Firstly, its presidents are not held institutionally accountable. Secondly, it has been unable to diversify its economy, redistribute wealth and curb the spread of HIV/AIDS. Thirdly, it has been unable to consolidate its democracy. Fourthly, Botswana’s popular participation mechanism in the form of the kgotla system has marginalised impoverished groups from its development and governance processes.

In order for Botswana to meet all five of the outlined benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State, Chapter Four made the following recommendations: Firstly, it has suggested that Botswana diversify its economy in order to reduce its dependency on mining and facilitate job creation and the reduction in social inequality. Secondly, in order for democracy to be consolidated and for Botswana’s parliament to pay a more effective role in holding the president accountable, it has suggested that presidential elections be introduced, that the political playing field be levelled in order to afford equal opportunity for all parties contesting in elections and that voter apathy be reduced through voter education. Thirdly, in order to enhance popular participation mechanisms, the chapter suggested that the kgotla system be transformed, that local
leaders undergo training in order to strengthen their leadership skills and form closer bonds with their constituents, and that members of the village be better informed of the roles and responsibilities of their local elected representatives.

In critically analysing the extent to which South Africa has successfully been able to construct a Democratic Developmental State, Chapter Five found that South Africa has made very little progress in this regard: Out of the five benchmarks, this chapter showed that South Africa only partially exhibits the features of an Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy, Developmental Success, Electoral Democracy and Popular Participation in the Development and Governance Process. In this manner, this chapter showed that factors which have inhibited South Africa’s realisation of a Democratic Developmental State have been: an absence of Development-Oriented Political Leadership coupled with an overly-powerful president; a weak pilot agency and a highly-politicised economic bureaucracy; its inability to address structural problems such as widening inequalities, unemployment, crime, corruption and a lack of infrastructure; its inability to consolidate its democracy; and a need to strengthen its existing popular participation mechanisms.

Furthermore, Chapter Five made the following recommendations which South Africa can adopt in its effort towards constructing a Democratic Developmental State: Firstly, in order to hold the president institutionally accountable, this chapter has suggested that the president’s powers be reviewed and, where possible, curbed. Secondly, in order to ensure greater institutional coherence within the economic bureaucracy, this chapter has suggested that more power be centralised within the NPC so that it can better coordinate the work of other economic departments and guide South Africa’s developmental trajectory. Thirdly, the chapter recommended that political deployment within the economic bureaucracy be replaced by meritocratic recruitment in order to build an autonomous, professional and effective economic bureaucracy which is insulated from political patronage. Fourthly, the chapter suggested that South Africa address its structural challenges of widening inequalities, unemployment, crime, corruption and a lack of infrastructure in order to generate high economic growth. Fifthly, Chapter Five recommended that South Africa address the weaknesses inherit
in its popular participation mechanisms in order for it to fully achieve the feature of inclusive embeddedness.

In conclusion, this thesis has shown that while Botswana exemplifies most of the five outlined benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State, South Africa still has a long to go if it is to transition from an Emerging/Aspirational into a fully-fledged Democratic Developmental State. In this manner, both Botswana and South Africa can take comfort in Sklar and White’s assertion, noted in this thesis, that the successful construction of a Democratic Developmental State will occur gradually, over a period of time and will most likely require a series of repeated and varied attempts.
References:


