STATE CONTROL AND STREET GANGS IN CAPE TOWN

Towards an understanding of social and spatial development

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BY WAY OF AN INTRODUCTION

Despite the facade of shuttered concrete and glass in the commercial centre and the urbanity of its wealthy, Cape Town is very much an African city. Geographically it is characterised by a mountain masiff forming a peninsula which is the division point between the Atlantic and Indian oceans. Clustered around the wooded slopes, along the mountain seaboard, and beside the transport arteries fanning outwards, are the residences and offices of the wealthy. They have property, capital and access to First World technology and skills. They are almost exclusively descendants of 300 years of European colonization, and their dominant position is protected by law and custom.

Between the peninsula and the next range of mountains to the east, a distance of some 30 kilometres, are the Cape Flats; low-lying, sandy and wind-swept table land that was once sea-bed. It is here that the coloured and African working class and the unemployed have been relocated by massive population removals from the inner city. Here one finds the squatters, the overcrowding and the poverty of Africa. Here the rich fear to go. Most people on the Cape Flats do not own property or capital, and the majority are unskilled or semi-skilled labourers.

From time to time newspapers serving white residents have reflected alarm at the violence and disorderliness on the 'Flats'. The unspoken fear is that it will spill over into the white suburbs and the city centre, a sentiment reinforced by reports of 'muggings', housebreaking, rape, theft and occasional political protest marches which break out of their racial ghettos. The response is characteristic: a call for more police action and an escalation in white gun sales.

I HAVE CHosen NOT TO SPELL 'COLOURED' In CAPITALS
But this local fear cannot be disconnected from a larger one. In the terminology of the government, South Africa is the victim of a 'total onslaught' against law and order. This is seen to come from any number of fronts - Russia, Cuba, communists, infiltrators, trade unions, striking workers, black students or white marxists. The response has been the evolvement of an ideology of national preparedness (by whites) called Total Strategy, which has virtually placed both civil and political society on a war footing.

In this climate 'street crime' is increasingly being blurred into white perceptions of Total Onslaught, particularly when it seems to be organized and efficient. In the 1981 Parliamentary Justice debate, during a discussion about the 'alarming' incidence of rape, a Member reasoned it this way:

What I find particularly disturbing in connexion with the occurrence of the crime of rape is that the incidence across the colour line is on the increase. It appears to me as if it is a new form of terrorism ... In conclusion I want to allege that we in South Africa are steeling ourselves against the onslaughts of enemies outside. We are preaching spiritual preparedness, and we are doing this with complete conviction and without restraint.¹

Made explicit here is the link between the terror without and the terror within. Implicit in such thinking is the fear that there is a connection between the bush war-sabotage-strikes equation and rising crime rates in the urban areas. For the white urban dweller, beset from the early 1970s
by recession in the economy and teargas in the streets, the sum adds up to a 'time of troubles', a time when tough state action is seen as being justified for the maintenance of law and order.

If the daily Press is any indication, most crime in Cape Town is carried out by gangs. One of the more speculative tasks of this book is to assess what impact those gangs are likely to have on the changes urban South Africa will undergo in the last two decades of the 20th Century, be it peaceful, reactionary or revolutionary. A rather more immediate task, and a necessary precursor, is to explore the functions of these gangs and the causes of their existence. But this immediately leads us into wider and deeper areas, to poverty, social dislocation and strategies of class defense. And within and beyond these conditions can be found an ongoing struggle for survival, a class struggle, and the outline of the state itself. (It is here that one encounters a strange paradox: a system which upholds law and order while at the same time creating the preconditions for its breakdown.) But we must start with the street gangs.

A count in 30 areas on the Cape Flats during 1982 found in daily existence 280 groups who identified themselves as gangs. Nearly 80 per cent of the gang members interviewed for this study said their group was more than 100 strong, 54 per cent put the figure at 200 and several as high as 2000. An extremely rough estimate gives a figure of 80,000 youths who would define themselves as gang members, or about five per cent of the city's total population. But of course this begs the question: What is a gang?
Eureka Estate, Cape Flats, 1980
In his work on Chicago in the 1920s, Frederick Thrasher defined a gang rather vaguely as:

... an interstitial group originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated through conflict.

He found the Chicago gangs to be characterised by face to face meeting, street-corner 'milling', by movement through space as a unit, by conflict and by planning. This collective behaviour led to 'the development of tradition, unreflective internal structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attachment to a local territory'.

Street gangs in Cape Town do not easily accommodate such definition. They are not all 'interstitial', in the sense of filling a space between larger social bodies. And they are not all integrated through conflict, although their activity carries a certain level of conflict. In fact it is necessary to view the term 'gangster' with suspicion; a noun far too easily attached to any youth whose activity is considered beyond the threshold of societal tolerance.

As soon as the concept of gang is questioned, however, the study of gangs becomes diffuse. One solution is to consider only those groups which define themselves as gangs. But this self-definition carries about as much legitimacy as the view of the Press, which probably labelled them as that in the first place. The route I have chosen is rather to side-step the issue and to begin by looking at the cluster of ghetto organizations which exist both beyond the border-line of juridical legality and in the area causing 'public concern'.
Justification for connecting them is that they cause this concern, that they interact with each other, that this interaction is often in undertakings which are illegal in terms of South African law, and that because many of these activities are illegal they provide a source of income which is protected from the competition of wealthy or powerful traders or corporations.

If this approach is less than precise, it will at least serve to map out the social environment in which gang-type activity takes place in the poorer areas of the city.

**THE CORNER KIDS**

Any day of the week the most noticeable social feature of the Cape Flats is the many young people on the streets. Under the inevitable flapping washing strung between blocks of flats are toddlers in the sand, youngsters chasing each other about, youths of ten and older clustered together on the corners, and small groups of young men in their late teens and twenties talking earnestly or playing kemrim.

Except on really hot summer days there is always a sense of busyness. If anything this is a tribute to human inventiveness: the action generally fills a vacuum of boredom and limited choices. It also hides much heartbreak. Almost every family on the Cape Flats is new to the area, having been relocated there (through decree or necessity) from the inner city areas, from squatter camps or from the countryside. Many of the families have broken up (for reasons which will be discussed later), most of the houses and flats are overcrowded, and the schools are packed to bursting point. Street life is mostly the spill from families, schools, jobs and overcrowding.
In the blocks of flats, particularly, youths are exposed to a harsh dichotomy: either inside the flat, shut off, cramped, with no private space from the family; or outside, in the courtyard or the street. There is no intermediate space on either side of the door, no private or semi-private space. Every action except defecating is a public action and street life becomes the only life possible. It is also a relief from the physical and emotional pressures in which kids find themselves, and it is where their friends are.

One result is a constant forming and re-forming of playgroups. These are intensely important to youngsters and tightly area-bound. In Hanover Park, for example, playgroups tend to be formed by the kids who live in a certain block of flats or around a particular open court. Like their older brothers, they usually give their group a name... the Como Kids (of Como Court) or the Third Street Kids. Generally these playgroups are boys' business; girls are not included. And their heroes are the older youths who often use them to run errands. In return they may be offered a cigarette or even a puff of 'zol' (marijuana).

This pattern of peer-group formation is not, of course, inevitable. Some parents go so far as to lock their young children in a flat, unsupervised, all day to prevent contact with street 'skollies'. But it is the most pervasive pattern in the poorer areas of this city, as in many others. Playgroups are substitute families, sites of entertainment and a source of protection from the dangers of being alone.
THE DEFENCE GANGS

The distinction between types of youth culture is blurred, but perhaps the most determining factor is age. Most people spoken to on the Cape Flats agreed that 'the gangsters are getting younger'. The lower age limit of what can be termed 'defence gangs' is presently about ten. Apart from their age group, however, these gangs can be distinguished from playgroups on two counts: a hardening need for physical defence and a growing demand for certain commodities.

There is also another group which can be classed as a defence gang: the vigilantes. These, where they exist, tend to be older men who patrol their residential areas at night to supplement the sparse police patrols. Both groups, the younger and the older, arise out of the growing violence on the Cape Flats following 'group areas' removals, the rising cost of living and growing unemployment.

Young defence gangs are probably the most widespread gang phenomenon in Cape Town. As their name implies, they are formed to defend both themselves and their territory from other gangs. Although these 'other gangs' are often similar groups formed for the same purpose, the impetus for the spread of these groups comes from the sharp rise during the 1970s of reformatory and prison-based gangs, adding to the family mafias, which have been muscling in on the war for 'turf'.

The result of territorial struggles has been a 'parcelling up' of the Cape Flats into gang territories, as this map of one area, Hanover Park, shows.
1. Vultures
2. Genuine School Boys (GSB)
3. Fancy Boys
4. Gipsy Kids
5. Sexy Boys
6. Mafias
7. Wild Ones
8. Nice Time Kids/Mojos/GSB
9. Fancy Boys
10. Mongrels
11. Laughing Boys
12. New York Yankees
13. Cape Town Scorpions
14. Three Bob Kids
15. Sexy Rexies
16. Dynamite Kids

A. "Society" people - no gang affiliation.
B. Bus terminus and shops - raided by all gangs but largely controlled, through the street hawkers, by the Fancy Boys.
When studied in 1982 the township was divided up between 16 groups, which had established their borders by shooting wars and constant skirmishes. If a member from one group wandered into an enemy territory he stood to be beaten up or even killed.

Violence is, for this reason among many, a constant shadow across the Cape Flats. During 1981 nearly 16,000 assaults were reported to the police, but during that year the Ambulance Service conveyed nearly twice that many assault victims. An average of two murders a day took place. Much of this violence is inter-gang, between groups jostling for influence and 'their' place in the social environment.

Although territorial and personal protection is an important factor in the formation of defence gangs, it is not their sole interest. Any gang strong enough to defend a territory is also organised enough to run 'rackets', and among impoverished youths this connection is seldom missed. Defence gangs are most feared for pay-packet robbery. They are generally armed, often with sophisticated stolen weaponry. They frequently break into cars in search of tape recorders and guns. They also organize housebreaking, often pushing a young playgroup kid through the window and thus minimise their chances of arrest. Two defence gangs which terrorise even the mafias - the Sicilians in Elsies River and the Hobos in Manenberg - were formed by youths who left school after the 1980 school boycotts in the city.

In Hanover Park I found a strong reformatory gang, the Cape Town Scorpions, and two family mafias, the Mongrels and the Fancy Boys. The other groups, although they contained youths with prison or reformatory experience, were
largely defence gangs. All were serving to force a brutal level of social coherence onto a 'new town' which had not yet found its cultural roots.

THE REFORM GANGS

The Cape Town Scorpions (CTS) and the Born Free Kids (BFK) are the fierce, hard centre of the street gang culture in Cape Town. They are the super-gangs. While they share many of the attributes of defence gangs, it is not on the streets that they are formed but in the reformatories and schools of industry. An extraordinarily high number of coloured youths share the 'brotherhood' of detention. During the last 10 years about 6,000 youths have passed through these institutions in Cape Town alone. Immediately a boy enters 'reform' he is claimed by one of the gangs. A survey of institution gangs in one reformatory found 52 per cent to be Scorpions, 27 per cent to be BFKs and the remainder to be 'Kaffir slagters'. Gang membership, however, was 100 per cent. On leaving the institution the youths gather in their home areas on the basis of their 'reform' allegiances. These allegiances give them access to 'fighting power' from gang brothers in other areas.

The development of reformatory gangs laid the foundations of an explosion of CTS and BFK influence across the Cape Flats in the 1970s. A gang count in 30 areas found CTS cells in 24 of them and the BFK in 22. The highest number of defence gang cells in these areas was a mere four.
The survey of reformatories showed certain distinct trends in the background of the youths. The families of 83 per cent were larger than the average of 5.6 for the Cape Flats and 40 per cent had more than 10 people staying in the house. However 70 per cent lived in a house with two or less rooms. To add to their troubles, 44 per cent had lodgers in their homes and 40 per cent had been moved under the Group Areas Act. Not surprisingly, although 91 per cent had attended school, only 30 per cent had got beyond standard two and a mere 4 per cent beyond standard four. Nearly all the youths said they had spent most of their time hanging around with friends. Only 7 per cent said they had a good relationship with their fathers.

Before being committed to an institution most of the youths had been in gang-type groups ... 97 per cent said they had fought a gang war and 39 per cent had been stabbed. A relatively high number, 19 per cent, had fathers who had
been in gangs. The majority of youths said they had joined the 'reform' gang for friendship reasons and only 19 per cent felt it was out of a need for protection. But when asked whether they had been forced to join the gang 97 per cent refused to answer.

Inside the institutions the major gang preoccupation aside from power and privileges appears to be the smuggling of dagga (83 per cent held this to be the case). But on the streets the main focus of the CTS and BFKs is housebreaking and robbery. Their base is usually a shebeen or illicit drinking house, which they also 'protect'. The age group of the two gangs is from about 12 to 20, although the leader is often an older man with prison experience. However 35 per cent of those interviewed said the gang was led by a group and not a single individual.

The focus of most gang life outside the institutions is usually a back yard surrounded by high stockading of salvaged corrugated iron. Here youths can smoke 'white pipe' (a mixture of dagga, tobacco and mandrax) undisturbed. The gang headquarters is a social meeting place, an information centre and a fort in time of attack. Its members are always on the alert. Scouts are posted to warn of a police visit or an opposition attack, and an 'unknown' youth will be escorted in and interrogated to establish his identity, purpose and 'connexion'. From the headquarters gang members will range in groups of two or more looking for a 'chance' ... things to 'jep' (steal), people to rob or customers for dagga or mandrax.

Not infrequently the headquarters is the site of an all-out attack from an 'enemy' group. During 1980, for example, one gang which I spoke to, the Mongrels, were involved in a three hour gun battle with the Fancy Boys during which an assortment of firearms were used. The Mongrels, who
included a woman and two children, holed up in a house and pressed furniture and mattresses against the windows and doors, keeping up continuous sidearm fire on the invaders. The police, when they finally arrived, had to reverse their van onto the verandah of the house to get the occupants out without them being shot.

The number of illegal arms available on the Cape Flats is extremely high. During 1981 nearly 1,000 handguns were reported stolen by white owners in Cape Town.\(^{11}\) Street information also suggests that arms are being smuggled into the city by men returning from army service. It is, of course, difficult to confirm such reports. But during research for this book I was frequently shown handguns for sale. When I feigned an interest in heavier weaponry, shotguns and Russian-made AK47s were offered. People classified as 'non-white' in South Africa may own a firearm only under exceptional circumstances. But for whites such ownership is easy. In the climate of fear out of which Total Strategy was born, the level of white domestic armaments is alarmingly high. In 1979 an average of one white person in three owned a licenced gun.\(^{12}\) In that year 4,725 firearms were reported stolen.\(^{13}\)

Virtually all guns owned by gang members are stolen. But despite heavy penalties if these guns are found by police, the boast of a 50-strong gang in Bonteheuwel is that every member owns a handgun. (The average age in this gang is about 16.) With this availability of firearms, street skirmishes become brutal and dangerous. The only breathing space, according to one policeman is that the gang members are such bad shots!\(^{14}\)
The Reformatory gangs, then, are groomed into gang life in the state institutions. On release they are usually unable to find work because of their records or gang tattoos on their necks or faces. Often, after years in a reformatory, they are rejected by their parents. They have no family, no education, no jobs and nothing to do. The gang becomes their 'pseudo-kin', offering them a place to sleep, a job, a context, and a sense of pride. A member of a reformatory gang called Aapie put it this way:

I was very small, you see, when my mother and my father they threw me away. There was no more money. And so okay while the years and months passed by, you see, I found myself in a stony place of sadness and madness where each dog was hustling for his own bone, you see. That's why I realised that there's only one thing for me: If I will survive I must play dirty you see. So that's why I became a gangster.  

THE MAFIAS

At a level of organization more complex than the reformatory gangs are what can be termed the family mafias. The word mafia is meant here, not in the popular sense, but in the more precise way used by Eric Hobsbawm in Primitive Rebels:

The mafia was never a single secret society, centrally organised. It was, rather, a network of local gangs (cosche - today they seem to be called families) sometimes two or three strong, sometimes much larger, each controlling a certain territory, normally a commune or latifundium, and linked with one another in various ways.
In Cape Town the mafias are perhaps the most interesting ghetto racketeers. They are the remains of an earlier form of social organization, of a time when large extended families operated a wide range of 'informal sector' activities in the old working-class areas of the city. This period (discussed in Chapter 3), was a time when the trust and the labour within extended families was essential for their survival. Powerful families could call on the contacts, capital and physical strength of their kin in any undertaking. But after the massive population relocations from the inner city, most extended families fell apart. Others were crammed into small dwellings to a degree that social relationships broke down. Certain families, with influence and no qualms about the use of illegal methods, transformed themselves into the mafias of the Cape Flats.

The older mafias include such groups as the Cisco Yakis, Stalag 17 and the Mongrels. However new mafias have been growing in influence, groups such as the Fancy Boys and certain cells within the Cape Town Scorpions. This generation of new mafias follows the old pattern. Firstly, kinfolk can be trusted if for no other reason than that pressure can be brought to bear on recalcitrant members through the family. Power-nuclei, therefore, tend to generate around brothers and cousins rather than around friends. Secondly, young toughs who cannot solve the problems of life through working - for there is no work - find that the older generation of the mafiosi have the lucrative rackets under their control and are reluctant to make way for the younger men. These newcomers therefore organise rival gangs, generally along the same lines as those they oppose.

The mafias, because of their type of influence and historical development, tend to be involved in extortion rackets - extracting 'protection' money from established businesses and individuals. And because of their
organization they tend to handle bigger undertakings, big payroll jobs rather than simple armed robbery, large-scale warehouse or shop thefts rather than housebreaking. And if the street gangs are the retailers of drugs the mafias are the wholesalers - buying in bulk (which demands a large capital outlay) and reselling in measured portion.

But although the mafias have considerable influence and power among a class which has none, they tend towards social stability, towards the maintenance of the status quo. They do this for the simple reason that in the absence of a conscious ideology they are unable to evolve an apparatus for physical force which is not at the same time an apparatus for crime and private enrichment. In other words, they inevitably tend to operate through gangsters because they are incapable of producing professional revolutionaries. But gangsters have a vested interest in private property, as pirates have a vested interest in legitimate commerce, being parasitic upon it. This is true of all the Cape gangs, but it is particularly true of the mafias. They are in a sense defensive class organizations within capitalist social relations.

A mafia of particular interest are the Mongrels, for although they operate under the leadership of a single family, they reproduce and grow as a street version of the 26s, a prison gang. (The origin of such prison gangs is discussed in Chapter 7.) The Mongrels - the name is a corruption of the film title The Moguls - began in the inner city area known as District 6. They are remembered as the men of Bungalow 13 (the address of their headquarters) and were led by the April family. The group was originally involved in legitimate activities such as hawking and factory work, although several bitter fights with rival gangs took place as well. In the early 1970s the entire group was moved to the Cape Flats under the Group Areas Act. Initially the Mongrels occupied themselves with organizing a soccer
team. But, increasingly, the games ended in a fight with youths from other gangs. Out of the need for defence and income possibilities the Aprils built around themselves a formidable fighting machine.

The connexion to the 26s occurred when several of the leaders received jail sentences, and attained rank within the prison gang. Back on the streets the organization and ideology of the 26s was adopted, with exacting initiation rites and a code of ethics which had to be memorised by each member. This prison link gave the Mongrels almost unlimited access to 'prison graduates' schooled in gang dynamics. For this reason the Mongrels are the only mafia with a large number of cells throughout the Cape. Of 30 areas surveyed on the Cape Flats, Mongrels were found in 18 of them, as opposed to four groups of Fancy Boys and three of Cisco Yakis.

SYNDICATES

The most profitable of ghetto organizations on the Cape Flats are the illegal syndicates. Some sell commodities which are prohibited in this country (like dagga or mandrax), some sell legal goods in an illegal manner (like the liquor networks) and others sell stolen commodities (like cars). Syndicates can best be described as associations of merchants organised for the purpose of securing the supply or monopoly of some commodity. Of course this description covers much legitimate commercial activity as well. It must be remembered that legality is an ideological term which, in the area of trade, has often been defined by monopoly companies to protect their own interests. What the outlawing of certain activities and commodities has done is simply to remove some operations from the competitive sphere of 'legitimate' capitalist activity which is almost exclusively 'white'. This acts as a form of protection which has tended to place these activities
in the hands of ghetto entrepreneurs. Their markets, too, are almost entirely in 'black' urban areas. By far the biggest money-makers among these operators are the drug syndicates. Their influence on the lifestyles of street-corner youths is considerable, and on the Cape Flats dagga, mandrax and liquor are consumed in extraordinary quantities.

**Dagga runners and corner merchants**

Dagga (the local name for marijuana) has a usage in South Africa long predating European colonization. Its sale, possession or use is prohibited under the Abuse of Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act of 1971. Mere usage carries a maximum penalty for first conviction of up to 10 years and dealing up to 15 years.

South Africa produces some of the best quality dagga in the world. It is grown illegally, mainly in Natal and the Transkei, by black peasant cultivators. The use of dagga is widespread. In the five years following the implementation of the above Act about 80,000 people were sent to jail for dagga offenses. During 1977/78 an average of 43 people were convicted every day for possession of dagga and 10 a day for dealing. However this merely scratches the surface. In 1977, for example, Colonel A.P. van der Heever of the Western Police Division estimated that only one out of every 10 dealers was arrested. In 1982 the head of the Narcotics Bureau in Cape Town said the number of street merchants was 'absolutely uncountable... they're on nearly every corner in this city'.

Predictably the dagga trade has not escaped the notice of some 'total strategists'. In 1982 the MP for Schweizer-Reneke, Willie Lemmer, called on the government to institute the death penalty for drug dealers. This was, he said, because the use of dagga and drugs was an evil which was playing into the hands of the enemy:
It is a well-known fact that the psychological onslaught against South Africa is aimed at totally crippling the spirit of the people. Drug dealers are therefore also deliberately planted among our people to make certain members of our community so dependent on these drugs that it later has an influence on the spiritual and psychological condition of the nation . . .

(Cape Times 21.4.82)

The Member had good reason to snipe at the drug laws . . . they are virtually unenforceable. One of the reasons is the dynamics of supply in the 'independent' black homelands. The Transkei, for example, has a predominantly rural population and is deeply impoverished. Dagga selling is probably the region's highest single income earner other than labour. The income of many of its chiefs is also dependent on the plant, which brings into the region up to a million rand a month. In a sense the dagga trade operates under the protection of its illegality. The plant is grown almost exclusively by black peasant farmers whose survival is dependent on the fact that the plant is illegal and is therefore not grown by commercial agriculture (heavily capitalized farmers would stand to lose too much if discovered). For the peasant farmer without equipment, security of tenure or easy access to markets, dagga growing is more than a means of supplementing a family wage: it is a survival technique.

The black city syndicate links the growers with the consumers, and also operates in a relatively protected market. For white entrepreneurs the risk is too high, given a wide range of alternative choices. In addition the growers and the majority of the users are black, which makes white operators conspicuous. Black entrepreneurs buy in the growing areas and run the gauntlet of police roadblocks to the urban areas. Although there is some competition at the dagga sales it appears that a sort of buying
cartel exists which keeps prices to the primary producers standard and uniformly low. The greatest dangers are in transporting the drug. During 1981 the police confiscated 245,000kg of dagga with a street price of R245 million, but many times that amount still gets through. The transporters are highly organized, using pantechnicons, buses, hired trucks or convoys of fast cars with scouts up ahead. Citizen Band radios are used to communicate a 'clear' passage. It has been estimated that between R10 million and R20 million worth of dagga is being marketed in South Africa every month.

Huge profits are made 'down the line'. Dagga runners take about a 10 per cent cut. The syndicate bosses never handle the sacks when they arrive, simply organising their storage and sale. In the Bantustans a sack of dagga costs from R300 to R600 a bag, depending on the quality. In the city the syndicate will sell it in bulk for between R1,000 and R2,000. If delivered to Europe or the United States this sackful could fetch R20,000. The big urban dealer who buys the sack will generally break it down into 'arms' (packs about the size of a forearm) and will resell it in this form, making about R1,000 profit. The street merchant will re-pack the arm into 'zols' or 'pencils' for sale. The arm would have cost him (at 1982 street prices) about R15, and by breaking it down his return is R30. On a good evening a merchant on a popular corner can make up to R300.

The demand for the drug is so great that even inter-syndicate competition is minimal. And the network also provides a relatively lucrative income for thousands of street merchants. As one dealer told me:
If I sell 50 sticks a day it's still okay. A boss won't give me 50 bucks a day . . . and I only work from 4 o'clock to 10 p.m.

This informal street economy doesn't end there, however. Busy dealers and mafias act as retailers for smaller dealers and members of defence and reformatory gangs. These, in turn, may take in youths to help them sell, paying them anything from R50 a week to 20c for the sale of each 'zol'.

The dagga network is therefore an industry with vast profits - sometimes up to 3,000 per cent on the farm price. It employs perhaps hundreds of thousands of ghetto youths throughout the country and is a major component in the back-yard white-pipe culture which blossomed on the Cape Flats in the late 1970s.

Buttons and the Bottle-neck

The other component of the white-pipe culture is mandrax, the central commodity in a network stretching across the world. Mandrax or methaqualone is a sleeping tablet which was available over the counter in South Africa until it was found to be harmful and banned in the mid-1970s. Until that time it was increasingly being used by youths to give an added 'kick' to alcohol. About the time it was banned, however, some 'smokers' discovered that its effect was greatly increased if it was crushed and taken in a pipe with dagga. Its use, after prohibition, spread like wildfire.

While still legal, mandrax cost about 5c a tablet. By the 1980s it was selling for up to R15. The profits to be made by its importation from the East (where the price is low) are therefore enormous, aided by the fact that it is both physically and psychologically addictive. Within
five years of its prohibition, mandrax-taking in the form of a 'white pipe' was the central ritual of the city's street-corner life.

Unlike the dagga syndicates, which are run mainly by blacks, the mandrax merchants are mostly from the group defined as Asian. This is for good reason. The main supply of mandrax comes from India and Pakistan, which are among the few countries which continue to manufacture the drug legally. Mandrax was first made in Ludhiana, India, and used as a non-barbiturate hypnotic for insomniacs. Although domestic use of mandrax in India amounted to nine tons during 1980, factories there produced several hundred tons, most of this going to countries in which the drug was banned.

In Bombay the tablets can be bought in bulk for as little as 5c each. Consignments may be as high as 500,000 pills which are paid for in cash by couriers. These couriers, who may simply transport the drug into South Africa in the false bottom of a suitcase, make large amounts of money. A consignment of 300,000 tablets destined for South Africa, worth about R2m was to have put R65,000 in the courier's pocket, but it was discovered by police. During 1981 Cape Town newspapers reported the seizure of 370,000 pills worth R2.2 million at street prices. However Narcotics Bureau detectives say this is only a fraction of the quantity that goes undetected. As one pointed out:

If you come in with 1,000 mandrax its worth a lot of money. Work it out. But 1,000 mandrax is just a handful, you can hardly see it.
The Cape Town Narcotics Bureau has a staff of 36 men who have a reputation among dealers as being ruthless. But as its captain lamented, with no control over the supply, and profits of up to 30,000 per cent, the police have no chance of stopping the flow. Syndicate bosses are wealthy and can pay well for their protection. Like the owners of illicit liquor outlets, they often hire a defence or reform gang to police their homes, storage areas or transactions, paying them in mandrax tablets, called 'buttons'. The syndicates never touch the drug, simply organizing its importation and distribution. The demand is such that a syndicate, selling in bulk, can get rid of a quarter of a million tablets in a single day. Usually the mafias or the reformatory gangs act as the middle-men, redistributing again to street merchants. They are all linked in an enterprise which counts police payoff, arrest and seizure merely as an unwelcome tax on a profitable business.

SHEBEENS AND THE LIQUOR MERCHANTS
The third and most problematical drug which influences ghetto life is liquor. Its consumption has a history going back as far as colonialism, and in the Western Cape this has been sharpened by the fact that the area is the centre of the country's wine and brandy industry. Liquor was initially a lure for manual labour, and the way in which it was used is discussed in the following chapter. Farm labourers in the Cape were given wine as part-payment for their services, a practice which continues to this day. However on the Rand mines drunkenness led to accidents and absenteeism, and liquor consumption and distribution by Africans was prohibited between 1896 and 1962. This merely drove production and distribution underground - into the skokiaan shops of the squatter'yard' culture.
Liquor prohibition ended in terms of the Liquor Amendment Act of 1961. In that year it was estimated that 30,000 people defined as coloured in the Peninsula alone were exclusively involved in the illegal liquor trade. The Act allowed all races purchasing rights at bottle stores, and it was hoped that this would undermine shebeen distribution. It also allowed Coloured and Asian people sharehold rights in bottle stores in their own group areas.

However the shebeens refused to die for several reasons. By then illegal liquor sales had become the sole income of a large number of people too poor to invest in bottle stores. Secondly the scarcity of ghetto bottle stores, their hours of trading and their refusal to extend credit operated against them. Thirdly shebeens were more than distribution points. They were social meeting places, they extended credit to Fridays and they were nearby (the latter being important in dangerous areas). Fourthly, by legalising over-the-counter liquor sales, its procurement for shebeen distribution was simply made less hazardous. A survey of Elsies River done in 1981 by Wilfried Schärf found there to be five coloured-owned bottle stores in the area, four of which were supplying an estimated 400 shebeens.

Another reason for the survival of shebeens is the pressure of the liquor-producing monopolies. Under agreement wine farmers in the Cape are guaranteed purchase of their grapes by the co-operatives. By 1981 this situation had resulted in a surplus wine lake of 400 million litres - over half the annual crop. Quite apart from the loss of revenue from unsold liquor, this enormous surplus leads to a crisis of storage. Particularly during the recessionary period in the 1970s, the wine lake led to problems of profitability within the industry. An attempt to rationalise the situation was the so-called 1979 Agreement, which divided the liquor industry between
two monopolies: the Anglo-American-controlled South African Breweries (beer) and a new conglomerate, the Cape Wine Distillers (wine and spirits).

Shares in CWD were held by S.A.B. (30%), K.W.V. Co-operative (30%), and the Rembrandt tobacco group (30%). The effect of the ownership shuffle was to minimise competition through the creation of monopoly interests.

The second strategy of the liquor producers was to influence liquor sales. Under pressure from these monopolies the government is to legalise African shebeens subject to certain conditions. However this has not been contemplated for coloured shebeens, for the simple reason that the monopolies are not yet in a position to penetrate or influence the fierce syndicate control of the Cape shebeens. The operations of these shebeens is best captured in the biography of a single shebeener who opened for business in 1980.

Joker joined the 'Terrible Josters' (TJs) at the age of nine. It was, according to him, the only way to grow up if you live in a dangerous township on the Cape Flats. Most of his friends in Heideveld and Bonteheuwel had joined, so he also had TJ tattooed on his shoulder. Twenty years later, after spending sporadic periods in prison on charges such as theft, house-breaking and robbery, he decided to make a living by less dangerous means. His last prison term was the result of a 'job' which made him R300. A friend kept the money in a savings account for him until he had served his sentence. Joker however was not keen on working for the 'boere'. The jobs available in factories or retail stores were too humiliating for him and not lucrative enough. He like being the 'lani' and wanted to make big money. On his release from prison he moved to an area outside his former gang territory to avoid being drawn into their operations yet again. With the saved money he opened a shebeen at his rented semi-detached council house in Elsies River. Competition existed in the form of numerous small-time shebeens and one big buyer, and they all constituted a threat, not only to his livelihood, the
shebeen, but to his physical safety. Shebeeners hire gangs to raid, harass or eradicate opposition, or pass on information about illicit dealings to some policeman in the hope of safeguarding their own business operation.

Joker's only contact with the legal liquor industry was through his suppliers, the bottle stores. Unlike shebeeners in Black areas, those in Coloured areas are not frequented by the big liquor companies with their promotion campaigns and advertising paraphernalia. Joker selected his suppliers on the strength of price and security considerations. Credit was not available to him although he eventually bought in large quantities regularly. The illegality of Joker's operation was most visible during his supply runs.

At the point of purchase, the bottle stores, the nature of his business could hardly be disguised. In working class areas such as Elsies River, where bottle stores depended on shebeens for most of their custom, it was essential that customers were not harassed by over-conscientious policemen. Bottle stores that acquired a reputation for intervention-free liquor purchases were amply rewarded by increased patronage. Unfortunately the provisions of the Police Act No. 8 of 1959 criminalise any further discussion on how some bottle stores achieved this status. One can simply say that shebeens can only function if their suppliers are guaranteed, and this requires the active collusion of part of the formal liquor industry, in this case the retail sector.

The initial illegality of selling liquor however creates an amplification spiral of illegal means by which the business perpetuates itself. Next to the fear of detection, the most tenuous aspect of an illegal business operation is the unenforceability of contracts through the conventional State-run institutions (i.e. police, lawyers, courts and prisons). A shebeencr
characteristically achieves contractual compliance by means of force, or threats of force. Shebeeners either partner a number of 'private policemen' (i.e. a gang) in order to safeguard his interests, or alternatively employ the gangsters as wage labour. The power that a private police force affords a shebeener may encourage him to seek market expansion into other illicit business possibilities, e.g. drug trading.

Joker's scale of operation soon reached the stage where he needed to employ 'guards' to assist and protect him against predatory raids of rival gangs. A forceful presence of guards also ensured the orderly behaviour of customers indulging under the tarpaulin in his back yard and facilitated the collection of outstanding credit.

The guards he hired were mostly reformatory graduates belonging to one of two gangs, the Dobermans or Born Free Kids, aged between 15 and 18. On release they found the familiar environment of their former 'beat' and the safety of a shebeener's protection to be acceptable alternative employment. The temporary absence of their imprisoned leader had weakened their solidarity, so working for the shebeener of an opposing gang was excusable.

A year after his release Joker bought a car which increased the volume of his sales capacity. The resulting increase in business eased his move into money-lending within the community at the usurious rate of 30 per cent a week, duly collected by his strong-arm contingent.

Continuous harrassment of the smaller shebeeners in the area ensured that their liquor involvement became increasingly hazardous, and they slowly withdrew their opposition to Joker, who acquired their customers. He then extended his business into drug peddling by taking an ex-prison inmate into partnership. He and his new partner, Scarface, established five outposts at strategic street corners, where his gangster-guards sold sticks of dagga to the community. Within three months of starting the
new venture they bought a second car. With 15 guards in their service they gradually strengthened their control over their beat, an area of six blocks, housing an estimated 500 people.

Once the danga-trading was running smoothly, they expanded into an 'agency' for stolen goods. They neither purchased nor handled the goods but simply acted as go-betweens. With their wide-ranging contacts in the underworld and the community, together with their own credit facilities the agency prospered.

Two years after his release from prison Joker had become one of the wealthiest members of his neighbourhood. He was envied by many for his rapidly acquired wealth, his shrewdness, and for being his own master. Nonetheless he was also feared by many for his unscrupulous exploitation of particularly the poorer members of his community. They had become dependent not only on his liquor, dagga and credit, but also on his goodwill. His private police force was capable of executing any threats at his command. It was thus in the interests of most people in the 'beat' to stay on the right side of him.

Becoming good customers, supplying information, granting favours, remaining silent where necessary, were means of reaffirming his power and securing their own safety. Joker's commands became norms that had to be heeded. When he decreed that people were ill-advised to frequent the other shebeen in the area, they did so at their own risk. In this manner he succeeded in closing it down.

Joker had consciously chosen youngsters as his guards because they were more dependent on him and consequently easier to control. Their lack of big-time gang experiences and bleak alternative employment opportunities gave them little option but to settle for the R45 a week that he paid them. And they had to bear the brunt of frontline contact with the police.

In this sense the partnership with Scarface was an extremely well-planned strategy. Scarface was a 'pumulanga' of the BFKs, and
the guards owed him allegiances and obedience which superceded anything Joker could have won from them. The business operated better with Scarface in joint command.

The gang did not only function as the private police force of the extended shebeen enterprise. Outside of their employment their relative autonomy was bolstered by their unemployed gang-brothers, also numbering about 15, whose means of survival had a quite different impact on the community. Not controlled by Scarface as tightly as the guards, the gangsters 'lived off' the community in an even more predatory fashion than the shebeen. For these gangsters the transaction involved strictly only 'take'. They pilfered, pickpocketed, stole, robbed, broke into houses and sold their spoils through the shebeen's stolen goods agency. Occasionally they intimidated by assaulting, stabbing and raping occupants of their beat. Their closely defined territory prevented them from 'working' in the opposition gang's beat. As long as it didn't adversely affect business, the shebeen partnership tacitly approved of these activities, for it strengthened their control of the community. Wronged members sometimes appealed to Joker to intercede on their behalf, which he would if he considered it in his interests. The guards thus also supplemented their earnings with the spoils of their predation.

For the community the gang's activities constituted an irritation. Everyone was exposed to possible attack or intimidation by the gangsters/guards, especially when they were out of their houses or flats.

Movement in the township after dark was severely constrained by the gang, who patrolled the streets well armed. It is conceivable that more indoor recreation, including drinking and smoking dagga, was forced upon the community by the presence of the gang. And the gang's actions improved business for the shebeen, protecting those community members who were good customers.
The shebeen and its 'police force' thus substantially restricted mobility and activities of inhabitants in the area, be they educational, recreational, political or criminal.

This, then, is a rough topography of gang culture on the Cape Flats. It is a necessary starting point in any attempt to understand youth culture in the new ghettos. For those on the 'white' side of town, gang activity is seen either as an index of anarchy or social degeneration or, alternatively, as a planned conspiracy. Certainly it is beyond the level of societal tolerance and is definitely a source of mounting anxiety. You burglar-bar your windows, don't walk alone at night, never venture into 'non-white' areas and perhaps you carry a gun. On the other side of town gang activity is seen, at uncomfortably close range, as a fight among groups who have sufficient organization and weapons to wield power. In a house with thin doors, among neighbours you hardly know, you slide the bolts when evening falls, trying to ignore the shouts and thumps in a fierce world outside that begins right at your doorstep. In each case, between rich and poor, age and youth, neighbour and neighbour, fear mans the boundary - a fear often greater than the threat.

How did it come to this in the Cape of Good Hope, known to ancient voyagers as The Fairest Cape in all the World? Why did hunger and fear visit the Tavern of the Seas, one of the most beautifully-positioned cities in the world?

Part of the answer can be found in the astounding exercise in social engineering which took place in Cape Town during the 1960s - the forced movement of thousands of families in what one newspaper described as the unscrambling of an omelette. Within that action can be found another part of the answer - the ideology underpinning the daily reproduction of
fear ... fear of dispossession, violence and death. Both are apparatuses of control, and they are the two main threads which run through this book. But around this is a broader tapestry, involving the process of urbanisation, the growth of the city, the movement of people and their changing relationships ... subjects too vast to deal with in a single study.

For reasons of clarity, therefore, I have focussed on only a narrow range of forces and relationships which impinge on underclass youths and their families. Indeed I believe the changing role of the family is a key to the understanding of life in both the newly-built and the bulldozed ghettos of the city. For this reason it is necessary to trace the effects of proletarianisation on this fragile social organism ... the 'schooling' of its members into the discipline of wage labour.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1

1. Mr F J le Roux Hansard Wednesday September 16 1981 col 3952/3954.

2. Survey 1: 100 gang members interviewed during 1981. The information for most of this chapter comes from this survey and from several hundred hours of taped interviews done with gang members and officers of the South African Police during 1980, 1981 and 1982. Information on the various groups of youths was obtained in the following manner:

   Playgroups: Survey 2 of mothers, taped interviews, participant observation.

   Defence Gangs: Taped interviews and participant observation.

   Reformatory Gangs: Survey 1 of gang members and participant observation.

   Mafias: Taped interviews, video film and participant observation.

   Dagga Syndicates: Taped interviews, participant observation, Narcotics Bureau, newspapers, court cases.

   Mandrax Syndicates: Participant observation, Narcotics Bureau, court cases and newspapers.

   Liquor Syndicates: Participant observation, commissioned study, official figures Stellenbosch Farmers Winery.


4. Ibid p 57.

5. Thrasher distinguishes between gangs in this way:

   The diffuse type
   The solidified type
   The conventionalised type
   The criminal type
   Secret Society
   pp 59-69.

5. It should be made clear that this 'line' between what is legal and what is not is a daily disputed frontier: in the courts and in Parliament. It is also a product of a specific historical development of a particular social formation. It is in large measure, therefore, and ideological frontier. In terms of this study words such as 'illegal' and 'crime' are for this reason used with caution and only in relation to the ideological context.
6. Kerrim is similar to snooker, except it is played on a small portable board with flat discs instead of balls.

7. Taken from police returns for 1981.

8. Figures from Cape Metropolitan Ambulance Service.

9. These institutions are known as Children's Act Schools. According to the Department of Internal Affairs (Coloured Affairs) the number of youths in these Schools in the Cape area in December 1980 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faure school for girls</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faure school for boys</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington school of industries (girls)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottery school of industries (boys)</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter Reformatory</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1202</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the last 10 years the average number at Porter Reformatory was 600. The duration of stay at these institutions is usually 2 years.


12. In that year there were 1,457,397 valid firearm licences in South Africa for a population of 4,408,000 whites. Hansard 1980 Col.123 and 540.

13. Ibid.


15. Recorded in Hanover Park in October 1980.


17. See Hobsbawm, Ibid. p. 53.

18. 1978 House of Assembly debates, Col. 6328


20. Interview with Captain B. Uytenbogaardt, head of the Narcotics Bureau in Cape Town, June 1982.


22. Ibid. p. 249.

24. Ibid. 12-10-80. In the report a CID spokesman complained 'There's so much money in it (dagga running) we'll never stop it altogether'. The report said: 'A pilot car with either a CB or two-way radio would travel in front of the shipment and would notify the vehicle carrying the contraband of police activity or roadblocks. The vehicle would then change its course.' Alternatively, 'the driver in the pilot car telephones back to pre-arranged telephone boxes along the road to warn the vehicle carrying dagga, which either lies low or takes another route'.


26. Ibid. p. 246.

27. Interview with dealer Cliff, Cape Town, February 1981.

28. Cape Times 2-10-81. One hundred tons entered the United States that year for illegal use.

29. Ibid.

30. This is calculated at the wholesale price of R6 a tablet. Retail street prices are as high as R15, which would push the value if sold to R5.6 million.

31. Interview with Captain B. Uyttenbogaardt of the Narcotics Bureau, Cape Town, June 1982.

32. Ibid. Uyttenbogaardt's comment on the mandrax flow was: 'I'm worried, really worried'.

33. Conversation with syndicate boss.


36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. This case study was commissioned for this book from W. Schärf, who undertook the research by participant observation during 1982.
40. A ficticious gang nickname.

41. Two Coloured townships on the Cape flats.

42. Usually means Afrikaners, or police but here it means Whites.

43. From Larney - Big Shot.

44. Both gangs belong to the same gang alliance.

45. Joker's original gang; the TJs belong to a gang alliance antagonistic to the BFKs-Dobermans.

46. This was at the time the equivalent of a builder's labourer's wage.

47. A leader. Although Joker and Scarface belonged to different street gangs, they had joined the same prison gang, which supercedes any other allegiances.
WORKER FAMILIES AND THE MOVE TO TOWN

Urbanisation and unemployment are bound together with hoops of steel. People move to the towns because they lose their stock, their land, their jobs on farms, or simply because poverty in the city holds out more chances of survival than poverty in the countryside.

Throughout the colonial history of the Cape, the central issue for the colonists continued to be the extraction of labour at least cost to themselves. The initial drive was to acquire a supply of farm workers. The period up to about 1830 was one in which the indigenous people were forced into labour. It was also a period of slavery and of rapidly expanding frontiers within which private ownership of land was recognised. During this time the products, the land and the labour of Khoisan families were taken by decree and force of arms. The second period, following the 1830s, could be described as the phase of growing urbanisation following the unbinding of slaves and the Khoisan, and the incorporation of the latter under the rule of law.

As the floodgates of proletarianisation gradually opened, more and more families migrated to towns and, finally, to the city. By 1900 there were large squatter camps in Cape Town and overcrowding in urban tenaments. By the 1920s serious attempts were being made to stem the flood, and by the 1940s it had reached crisis proportions for the urban managers and the state.
FORCED LABOUR AND THE FARMS

The early period was extremely brutal, as it was wherever a finger of colonial capitalism encountered a precapitalist people. The initial reason for the settlement of Europeans at the Cape was to supply foodstuffs to ships on the spice routes to the East. The trade with Khoisan pastoralists soon became violent when the demand for cattle exceeded levels which Khoisan families found acceptable. Amid the skirmishes and plunder which followed, Dutch farmers (free-burghers) settled on Khoisan land to take advantage of the growing demand for supplies. Two small wars were fought within the first 25 years of European settlement, but the Khoisan bands were no match for the fire power of the Boers. At the outer edge of the expanding European area of influence, the indigenous families were hunted like vermin by commandos of Boers and 'Bastards' (people of mixed Boer and Khoisan ancestry). Their cattle were plundered, their networks of interdependence broken and they were either killed or taken to labour on Boer farms.

Labour was an ever-present concern for the Boers. The first of a number of organised labour-catching expeditions was mounted in 1774 when a Boer Commandant was appointed to protect the 300 mile northern frontier between Piketberg and Sneeuberg. A force under him, consisting of Boers, 'Bastards' and 'loyal' Khoisan killed 503 Khoisan and captured 239 men, women and children. 1

The Graaff Reinet Drosdy reported that between 1786 and 1795 on the Graaff Reinet frontier alone more than 2,500 Khoisan were killed and 699 captured. A traveller, G. Thompson, was told that between 1790 and 1820 there had been 32 commandos against the Khoisan, and that in the six years between 1815 and
1821, 3,200 had been killed and a great number of children carried into the Colony.\(^2\) Indeed there were many allegations, probably true, that the commandos went out expressly in order to capture Khoisan *inboekselings* (apprentices) for labour on their farms.\(^3\) These children were indentured to Boer families for up to 25 years, becoming in reality little better than slaves. The theft of these children also hit at the ability of families to stay together and to expand, and carried the possibility that parents who were not killed would follow their children into labour.

The process of proletarianisation was further 'assisted' by three devastating smallpox epidemics: in 1713, 1755 and 1767. Following these epidemics, Khoisan families within the Colony and many beyond it 'sank into the position of a landless proletariat — labourers or vagrants on the lands of their ancestors'.\(^4\)

Another inducement to labour was the introduction of liquor, that old ally of colonial penetration. Brandy and arrack were high among the inducements offered to make the Khoisan part with their cattle. As late as 1774 the Landdrost of Swellendam was asking the government in Cape Town for '388 cans of arrack to be used in the Hottentot trade'.\(^5\) And on the farms the masters supplied liquor to their servants 'in part payment of wages ... according to the usual practice of the country'.\(^6\)

It should not be thought, however, that these assaults on Khoisan freedom met with little resistance. The Drostdy at Graaff Reinet reported that in the nine years following 1768 more than 720 colonists were killed in reprisal raids. Not long afterwards the town of Algoa Bay (later known as Port Elizabeth) came within a hair's breadth of being taken in a Khoisan uprising.\(^7\)
Even in 1930 the Torch newspaper could report peasant resistance led by one Abel Simpi in the de Doorns mountains. It took police 10 weeks of 'running battle' to subdue the rebels. There were numerous such outbreaks of 'social banditry' or peasant resistance throughout the 19th Century which deserve study. They were usually passed off in the Press (if they were ever mentioned) as criminal or irrational gang activities.

But along the expanding northern fringe of the Colony trek parties of Griquas - people of mixed Boer/Khoisan ancestry - continued to force Khoisan family bands either northwards or into their service. The Reverend J. Campbell, who made two trips into Khoisan territory, noted that by 1820 the Khoisan between the Orange and Vaal rivers had become pastoralists on a considerable scale. But within a few years 'the advancing Boers put an end to this incipient progress south of the Orange, the Griquas and others to the north of it'. By the end of the 18th Century the Boers had occupied all the favourable parts of the Colony and 'most of (the Khoisan) in the Colony were in the more or less regular service of Europeans or half-breeds'. Those Khoisan families who were not proletarianised had either fled north or taken refuge as peasants on mission land. (Mission settlers were able to delay full proletarianisation for a further two centuries.)

Those within the Colony had become tied to the needs of capital by the tightest of laws. A study of labour contracts for Tulbagh and Graaff Reinet in 1805 and 1823 respectively showed that nearly half the Khoisan on the farms worked for nothing more than food and clothing.
The repressive measures against Khoisan families culminated in a Proclamation by Governor Caledon on November 1 1790 which stated that each Khoisan was to have a fixed place of abode and be registered at the nearest landdrost's office. He could not move from this place without a pass signed by his master. It also decreed that labour contracts between Khoi and Boer for over three months had to be registered. In this way labour was immobilised in the place where it was needed.

In the 1820s it had become 'received opinion that a (Khoisan) found anywhere without a pass was a vagrant'. It was considered competent for any European to stop him (Proclamation of 1809, Clause 6) and, if he had no pass,

to apprehend and lodge him in goal. There he would have to stay until his master claimed him, or if he had no master, until one could be found for him. In either case the expenses of his keep would be debited against his future wages.

And no Khoisan in the Colony was exempted from carrying a pass.

A second wave of 'incorporations' into the capitalist economy took place in the 19th Century when Boer farmers, short of both land and labour, claimed the Griqua lands as their own. The Griquas resisted fiercely, but were gradually absorbed as labour... or trekked northwards or eastwards over the Drakensburg mountains to found Kokstad.

A feature of this phase of labour catching and plunder was that large families were being proletarianised. Women were in demand as domestic labour and both men, women and children were used in the fields (the
A Khoisan tramp in Newlands Forest, pre-1910
(Cape Archives)
average Boer family had five Khoisan servants for every two slaves. What is important for this study is the relatively rapid and complete incorporation of these Khoisan families into the agricultural labour force. Together with the mission peasants, they were to form the rural base from which, after Ordinance 50 in 1828, the urban migrations were to begin. But before considering the effects of this Ordinance it is necessary to look briefly at the second root of working-class Cape Town: the slaves.

In 1834 there were 35,300 slaves in the Cape Colony. Most of them had been brought from the East to work on Boer farms because of Khoisan resistance to inclusion in the labour force. In 1685 the Cape government passed a law prohibiting marriages between slaves and Europeans. Most slaves in the Colony were unskilled farm labourers with a few being used to hawk their masters' wares in Cape Town or work on the docks. Those with skills were mainly urbanised, and included tailors, cobblers, carpenters, cabinet-makers, painters, wagon-makers, brick-layers, smiths, harness-makers and skilled cooks for the rich Burghers. Most female slaves did domestic work, with a few being skilled seamstresses or hired out to European families as wet-nurses. From 1760 every slave moving from town to the country or from farms to town had to carry a pass signed by his or her master which any 'passers-by' might ask them to show.

In 1807 the British government abolished the slave trade for reasons unconnected to the Cape labour situation, and patrolled the seas to enforce the ban. As a result, between 1808 and 1816, about 2,000 'prize negroes' (blacks 'liberated' from slave ships) were landed at Simonstown. Due to the labour shortage and fears surrounding abolition they were immediately 'indentured' to European masters and often reduced to the level of slaves.
THE URBAN MIGRATIONS

In the early 19th Century two pieces of legislation were passed that were to drastically alter the labour position on Cape farms. The first was Cape Ordinance 50 of 1828 which abolished the need for the Khoisan to carry passes. Its passage was mainly due to the agitation conducted in Britain by the London Missionary Society. It also regulated relations between master and servant, repealed sections of Caledon's law on contracts and stated that Khoisan children could only be apprenticed to masters with their parents' consent.

The second piece of legislation was the British Act 73 of 1833 which abolished slavery throughout the British empire as from December 1834. Both these measures, coming within six years of each other, were imposed from the outside upon a hostile colony, and their effect was to loosen the hold masters had over their labour. The immediate result was, predictably, a chronic labour shortage on European farms. Boer fears were further heightened by a Cape Government decree commanding colonists to dismiss all Xhosa and Gonaqua servants preparatory to the expulsion of all 'kaffirs' beyond the Fish River.18 These attacks on existing labour relationships were central to the 'Great Trek' of disgruntled Boers into the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. But another result was a dramatic increase in casual labour. After 1828 a sharp incline was noted in the practice of hiring labourers by the day, at relatively high wages, for occasional services such as harvesting (this practice is still widespread in the Western Cape today).19 Although it may be argued that casual labourers lost job security (for what it was worth) they could be said to have gained the freedom to choose their employment and, in a labour scarce market, they could exert a measure of bargaining pressure over wages.
A newspaper cartoon suggesting the effect on the Khoisan of the passing of Ordinance 50
(Cape Archives)
The more general response of individuals and families however, was to move into the towns. As early as the 1820s Commissions of Inquiry found 'free blacks' to constitute 'a large portion of the lower class of tradesmen, fishermen and (wagon) mechanics' of Cape Town. 'Their large families', they noted, 'congregate in small and inconvenient houses ... for which they pay extravagant rates to the owners'. And after 1838, when the Cape slaves were finally freed of an extra five-year bondage to their masters, many also left their employment and began (in the words of an angry farmer) to 'crowd into the towns and villages'.

Along with the slaves, migrating Khoisan families formed the nucleus of the growing proletariat of Cape Town and surrounding villages. Old social patterns of organisation in the countryside began to break down. A Civil Commissioner observed in 1904 that,

> the Griquas as a tribe are practically extinct, and the few who are alive are paupers and their children are common labourers or in the towns.

It is clear that the 1828 and 1833 legislation was bitterly resented by most European farmers ... especially after the Colonial Office vetoed the 1834 Vagrant Ordinance, which had allowed Khoisan to be charged for vagrancy and sent to labour without the necessity of having to procure proof of any crime being committed. War was one 'legitimate' method of labour catching and after the first Koranan war in 1868 it became the practice of police to arrest all Khoisan families in the area who had no visible means of subsistence and send them to different villages in the Colony to be apprenticed to farmers. During the second Koranan war in 1879 'as many of
the enemy as it had been able to capture ... men, women and children, over 800 in all ... were apprenticed as servants to Colonial farmers'. Korananland, according to a government report, was left derelict. 25

Farmers also turned their gaze to the mission reserves. From the 1880s the breaking up of these reserves to 'free' labour was under constant discussion. A government official investigating the proposals, Melville, advocated

the division of the garden and corn lands among the people, who should in future have the right of sale 26

In other words he proposed full individual ownership of agricultural land among Khoisan families. It was generally realised that under such a system most of the occupants would soon lose their land to the few who had capital, and it was on this ground that the missionaries opposed the recommendation. On the same grounds the European farmers in the vicinity of the reserves 'enthusiastically urged individual tenure'. 27

THE LURE OF LIQUOR

Another tactic used to obtain labour, one that hit at the roots of family cohesion, was to offer liquor in addition to housing. A government inquiry in 1849 observed that

some farmers have adopted the expedient of giving huts on their farms to families on condition that they should turn out to work when required at stipulated wages. Many farmers [it noted] were finding it necessary to give more liquor to their labourers than had been the custom before emancipation. 28
The fact was that after 1828 the 'tot system' - more than being a means by which farmers could dispose of cheap surplus wine instead of wages - rapidly became a labour-catching practice. From the early days of vine growing wine had been regularly supplied to labourers in agricultural districts to 'encourage' them in their work and in effect addict them to the labour arrangements.

By the 1820s government reports could complain that

both slaves and Hottentots have readily taken to liquor (preferring brandy to wine if they can get it) and eye-witnesses frequently complain of over-indulgence on the part of slaves.\(^{29}\)

But despite these measures the wine industry began to buckle, weighed down by labour problems, international competition and finally a disastrous attack of vine disease.\(^{30}\) In an attempt to bolster the increasingly ailing industry the wine merchants cast their eyes to the growing urban proletariat. As a result of a change in the licencing system which became effective in October 1846, the number of canteens increased rapidly, especially in Cape Town.\(^{31}\) Many Khoisan and slaves in the towns 'succumbed to the temptation of the strong drink which (these) canteens were only too ready to sell them'.\(^{32}\) This was brandy of an extremely dubious quality known as Cape Smoke. Even before the change in legislation on licencing, the Civil Commissioner of the Cape District could observe that

during the winter immediately following the promulgation of the 50th Ordinance (Khoisan) of both sexes were seen in numbers, at all hours of the day and night, in a state
A street-corner group in District Six, probably 1906
(Cape Archives)
drunkenness and entire nakedness in the vicinity of Cape Town and along the Wynberg and Simonstown roads... and the lives of many of them were actually sacrificed from exposure, in a state of insensibility from drunkenness, to the inclemency of the weather. 33

Even in the mid-20th Century government Blue Books were still noting a general increase of drunkenness among the urban proletariat of the Western Cape.
A District Six hawker in about 1900
(Cape Archives)
From the early 19th Century, then, individuals and whole families had been moving off the land into the villages, larger towns and the city. In Cape Town they found slums, overcrowded and relatively expensive housing and a lack of formal employment. But they measured their progress from where they had begun, and conditions in the rural areas, with harsh 'white' bosses, droughts and layoffs through mechanisation, were considered far worse by many.

In the ghettos a pattern of existence began to emerge from the mid-19th Century that was to continue until the 1970s. Like the Afrikaners in early Johannesburg, the Cape rural families were not immediately absorbed into the city workforce. But unlike the Afrikaners, people labelled 'coloured' did not have the political clout to ensure an increasing share of the expanding profits of urban industrialisation. The outcome was what may he termed a ghetto culture, linked into the city on all sides and penetrated by it, but yet different from it. The central life force of this urban ghetto development was the extended family. People moving into the city sought out their kinfolk as beacons of support in the new, hostile environment. With them and through them they found accommodation and, later, employment. Usually this employment was in the crevices of economic activity: in an extension of regular household duties and in micro-commerce and hawking - all with extremely limited access to capital. But the redistribution of wealth that this penny-capitalism ensured allowed for the reproduction of the workforce in adverse conditions. For many (unskilled as they were in urban occupations) these activities were often in areas considered illegal by the state. In the urban explosion however they flourished. But it would be incorrect to consider, as the middle class
of the city did, that the poor quarters were lawless in an anarchical sense. In the urban culture which emerged, based on extended families, a sense of place and the shared problems of poverty, the working class policed itself. An example of this internal control, to which I will now turn, is that which existed in the inner-city area known as District Six.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2


5. Quoted in Marais, p. 8.


9. Eric Hobsbawm describes the form as such: 'Social banditry, a universal and virtually unchanging phenomenon, is little more than endemic peasant protest against oppression and poverty: a cry for vengence on the rich and the oppressors. A vague dream of some curb upon them, a righting of individual wrongs (p 3). He adds that 'a Man becomes a bandit because he does something which is not regarded as criminal by his local conventions, but is so regarded by the State or local rulers' (p 13) - *Primitive Rebels* (Manchester University Press, 1959).

10. Quoted in Marais p. 23.


16. Records XXXV p. 373-4


18. The Cape government came under tremendous pressure over the Black Labour issue. In 1828 the earlier decree was reversed by Ordinance 49, which itself was suspended in 1829. However Nguni people continued to enter the colony across the Fish River.


21. The quote is from a farmer named Cloete in Marais p. 190. Marais
considered Cloete's statement to be an exaggeration, but concedes
that 'a migration of some importance (among former slaves) did
take place'.


24. UG 41, 1926, p. 29.

25. Ibid.


27. Marais p. 83.


29. Records XXXV p. 330, 373

30. See Mary Rayner's Doctoral thesis on the subject,
(unpublished) Duke University, North Carolina, USA.

p. 31, 204 (1915).


34. See C. van Onselen: The Main Reef Road into the working class:
proletarianisation, unemployment and class consciousness amongst
Johannesburg's Afrikaner poor, 1890 - 1914: University of the
Witwatersrand History Workshop, 1981.
District Six on the slopes of Table Mountain was originally farm land. It was settled on by Europeans attached to the Castle in the 18th Century. Rapid expansion took place in the early 19th Century when members of the city’s multiplying settler middle-class began to build modest homes for themselves within easy reach of the central area. The wealthier merchants and officials already had houses closer to Cape Town on land which their clerks and assistants could not afford. So on the outskirts of town a middle-income community began to grow in District Six. The houses were unpretentious, mostly two-storeyed and built in terraces in the style which has come to be accepted as typical of the Cape under Georgian and Victorian rule. Narrow blocks were laid out parallel to Hanover Street and small semi-detached houses with long service lanes were built. From the 1880s skilled artisans, drawn to South Africa by the mining boom after the discovery of gold, began moving into Cape Town.

After the outbreak of the Boer War the town’s population was swollen by an influx of troops and refugees from the Transvaal. From 1894 to 1900 the population jumped from 79,000 to 174,000, dropping back to 167,000 in 1911 after people moved back north. Great building activity took place in District Six during the War and the old two-storeyed buildings and flat-roofed houses with stoops were penetrated by bigger two and three-storeyed blocks in a variety of architectural styles. Most of the properties in the area were owned by descendants of the European settlers and a few by Asians.
No homes were provided for workers and houses available to them were filled and then overcrowded, the remaining numbers being forced to squat on any available land. But after the Boer War a large number of businesses and offices were transferred back to the Rand. The tenements in District Six were vacated (but not transferred out of settler hands) as tradesmen, artisans and soldiers moved North and, through a filtering-down process, working class families moved in. By leap-frog movements of population the middle-income Europeans shifted out, first to Woodstock, then to Observatory, Mowbray and beyond.

Throughout the 19th Century, as we have seen, working people had been moving into Cape Town as well. Initially this migration would be a circular one undertaken mainly by young job-seekers. But as the transition from an agrarian economy to an industrial one gathered pace it became a one-way flow of whole families. By the 1920s the march of the poor into Cape Town was being described by city administrators as 'formidable'. Between 1904 and 1960 the population in all towns in South Africa had increased by 83.2%. But the population increase in the nine principal urban areas between 1921 and 1968 was no less than 420%. From 1936 to 1970 the percentage of urbanised people in the Cape described as 'coloured' rose from 55% to 72%.

As far back as 1867 District Six was considered as being overcrowded, and for the next 100 years migration into the area continued almost unabated. In 1936 the official census put the population of the District at 22,440 and in 1946 at 28,377. But by 1950 it was nearly double, at about 40,000. This growth in population reflected massive industrial expansion during and after World War II. Between 1955 and 1958 alone, the number of private industries in South Africa was to rise from 1,189 to 13,332.
Many families in the area were extremely poor, living for generations by working at odd jobs here and there, scratching out a living by economic enterprise which counted its profits in halfpennies and farthings.

Various types of employment at these levels are reflected in court records:

Tom Kalosa came to Cape Town from Queenstown. In 1907 he was working as a carter, with his own horse and cart. He supplemented his income by selling yeast to denti-brewers in the Ndabeni location. He himself lived in Maitland. He made about £2 a week, but had to set aside 2/- for yeast and 3/- for his horse’s stable.

Alfred Boois or Boyse, born in Basutoland about 1889, was in East London in 1907. In 1911 he was earning his living as an egg hawker in Cape Town selling eggs at 2/- a dozen to large houses in Sea Point and the Gardens.

Sayid Kahn was an Afghan who came to Cape Town about 1901. He set up as a mattress-maker in Dorp Street, employing six or seven workmen who slept on the premises and were liable to dismissal if they did not return to their rooms by ten at night. He later also acquired a small soda-water factory. He was suspected of receiving stolen property. 7

Throughout the migrations into Cape Town, the extended family was the catch-net of the urban poor. Within it were people who could be trusted implicitly, those who would give assistance willingly, immediately, and without counting the cost. Viewing a similar situation in Soweto, David Webster concluded that:
in major calamities, like losing one's job, or a death in the family, it is one's kinfolk who rally to support first, and those whose support lasts longest. Kin are also the people who help find employment, accommodation, and who bribe or bail one out of the clutches of the law. They are, in short, indispensible.

In a hostile and uncaring world the extended families in the city were also the domain within which the strategies of survival were worked out. They were the primary sites for the reproduction of the labour force.
District Six before its destruction
Central to the health of the family, of course, was working class wages. South Africa, like most Third World countries, paid its workers an extremely low wage, which had to be conserved and stretched. The poor would respond to this situation, as David Webster has shown, in typical fashion:

They create systems of redistribution, which help meagre incomes extend to the limits of their elasticity. These patterns of redistribution percolate through social networks to finally find their way into the pockets of those who are unable to find wage employment; it is above all a social form of redistribution, operating among friends, neighbours, workmates, acquaintances and friends of friends. 

A wage is simply a money expression of the value of labour power, and can be exchanged for food and other commodities necessary to reproduce the worker and his family on a daily basis. It is of course in the interests of capital to prevent wages from rising relative to profits. This can be done in at least three ways: Firstly by ensuring a labour supply greater than its needs in order to increase competition for jobs and drive down wages; secondly, as we have seen, by replacing workers with machinery leading to an overall reduction of the workforce; and thirdly, by raising the cost of essential commodities which - even if wages increase - leads to a decline in the real wage. All these trends could be found in Cape Town from the 1930s, with a particularly steep rise after the outbreak of World War II. During the war rapid industrialization took place, coinciding with an influx of labour to the city and an increase in the cost of essentials like mealie meal (20%), paraffin (25%) and coal (50%).
However the actual level of wages was not the absolute base-line of working class living standards. In an important paper on 'informal sector' economic activity Wilkinson and Webster have pointed out that the reproduction of the working class is mediated by certain other factors, depending on both the historical context and the type of culture. Three such factors are:

(1) The sphere of 'domestic reproduction', in which the structure of a family or household unit and the commitment of labour power to domestic labour (housework, child-minding, maintenance, etc.) can have a marked effect on the standard of living of the individuals within it, in terms of the quality and quantity of use values they consume. In addition, the question of the 'family wage' (whether or not the wage is sufficient to cover the costs of reproduction of the individual worker's family in addition to the costs of his or her daily subsistence) clearly arises and comes to bear on the process of reproduction of the labour force within this context.

(2) State provision of those social services or aspects of 'collective consumption' which complement or substitute for individual consumption within the sphere of 'domestic reproduction', i.e. the provision of subsidized state housing, health or child care facilities, education, etc. which constitute the 'social' or 'indirect' wage.

(3) Income (in cash or kind) derived from 'informal' activities or relationships not directly subject to the 'laws of motion' of
capitalist commodity production and exchange which either replaces or supplements income derived from 'formal' wage employment.\textsuperscript{15}

In District Six state-provided services and subsidies were notably absent. So it was through informal economic strategies and a sharing of the family wage that the poor survived.

Informal business in District Six arose simply from the obstinate desire of people in the urban area to stay alive. It acted as a buffer against unemployment and counterbalanced, for a time, the full effects of increasing urbanization, low wages and unemployment. And the ground floor of these small-scale economic activities was the extended family. In 1937 a Commission of Inquiry found that:

the entire Cape coloured family in the urban areas very often forms the earning unit, the income of the parents and one or more of the children being pooled to meet household needs.\textsuperscript{16}

Table 3A lists some of the types and categories of income opportunities open to people in Cape Town at the time.\textsuperscript{17} District Six, particularly, became known for the ingenuity, novelty and enterprise of its residents engaged in this small-scale production and services. By day it hummed with trade, barter and manufacture, and by night it offered the 'various pleasures of conviviality or forgetfulness'.

The place has more barber shops to the acre than anywhere else in Africa (wrote Brian Barrow in 1966) some of them with great-sounding names like the Rio Grande Hairdressers. There are all sorts of alleys and lanes with names like Rotten Row, Drury Lane and Lavender Hill. There are tailors by the score, herbalists,
TABLE 3. INCOME OPPORTUNITIES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN DISTRICT SIX, CAPE TOWN IN THE 1950s

FORMAL income opportunities

(a) Public sector wages

(b) Private firms (wages, dividends, etc.)

(c) Transfer payments - pensions, unemployment, benefits, workmen's compensation.

SEMI-FORMAL income opportunities: legitimate

(a) Domestic labour - wages, payment in kind.

INFORMAL income opportunities: legitimate

(a) Productive and secondary activities - building contractors and associated activities, self-employed artisans, shoe-makers, tailors, knitters, carvers, artists, sweetmeats, samoosas, lace makers.

(b) Transporters - taxis, trucks, carts, bicycles.

(c) Distribution enterprises - rooming, commodity speculation, rentier activities.

(d) Small-scale distribution - market operatives, petty traders, street hawkers, caterers in food and drink, jumble sellers, legal lending, wood sellers.

(e) Other services - musicians, launderers, shoeshiners, hairdressers, photographers, vehicle repair and other maintenance workers, tinkers, ritual services, magic and medicine, scrap collectors.

(f) Small-scale renting

(g) Private transfer payments - gifts and similar flows of money and goods between persons, borrowing, begging, inheritance, lobola.

INFORMAL semi-legal

(a) Protection rackets, shebeens, begging, scrap recycling, pawnbroking.

INFORMAL income opportunities: illegal

(a) Production - liquor

(b) Services - hustlers and spivs in general, receivers of stolen goods, usury, drug pushing, prostitution, poncing, pilot boy, smuggling, bribery, political corruption, protection rackets, touts for courts, pickpockets.

(c) Transfers - petty thefts, pickpocketing, bag snatchers, burglary, armed robbery, speculation and embezzlement, confidence tricksters, gambling, fahfee.
butchers, grocers, tattoo artists, cinemas, bars, hotels, a public bath house, rows of quaint little houses with names like "Buzz Off" and "Wy Wurry" and there is a magnificent range of spicy smells from the curry shops. The vitality and variety in the place seem endless and the good-humour of the people inexhaustable.

Go into one of the fruit and vegetable shops and you soon realize how the very poor manage to live. In these shops people can still buy something useful for 1c. They can buy one potato if that is all they can afford at the moment, or one cigarette. You can hear them ask for an "olap patisellie" (a penny's worth of parsley), a "tikkie tanaties" or a "tikkie swart bekkies" (black-eyed beans), a "sixpense soup-greens", an "olap knofelok" (garlic) or an "olap broos", which means a penny's worth of bruised fruit.

It would be incorrect, however, to suggest that these economic activities were in some way outside 'formal' capitalist relations. On the lowest rung, hawkers, peddlers and shebeens usually bought from retail outlets, and those in the cloth and shoe trade from local factories and tanneries. Perishable foodstuffs could only be bought in small quantities, negating the cost saving of bulk buying. Hawkers and shebeens also ran high risk or penalty costs. But what these small operators did was to take commodities into the far corners of the market, into areas inaccessible to the larger firms. In fact their activity was simply one aspect of the 'overall reproduction of the social totality', and their 'independence' was, in the final analysis, an illusion.
But through all this the extended families maintained the vital relationships in the struggle for survival in the District and other similar areas. They provided accommodation, limited capital and labour for small-scale production and services, as well as maps of meaning for migrants from the countryside. But they provided more than this: they reproduced the relationships of social control. The powerful families 'ordered' the urban ghettos through their connexions, inter-marriages, agreements, 'respect' and, at base, their force and access to violence. In the absence of effective police protection this control was seen as beneficial, even essential, to life in the ghetto. It kept things 'safe'.

**Skollies and the Globe**

In the 1940s this community control came to be tested in a particular way. Easy penetration into the 'informal sector' was as much its weakness as its strength. During the Second World War massive urban migrations took place in South Africa.

The most obvious manifestation of this problem was the squatter camps. In January 1947 the Johannesburg Municipality estimated the number of squatters at 63,000. In Cape Town there were more ... as early as 1942 a Committee of Inquiry into conditions on the Cape Flats estimated there to be 82,000 people awaiting housing. The same year 25 squatter sites were counted, and by 1948 the number had risen to 30. Estimates of squatter numbers are imprecise, but Dr. Oscar Wollheim, who was actively involved with the squatter communities at the time, estimated it to be over 50,000 in 1939. By 1948 the City Council found the figure had trebled to about 150,000. By the end of the decade city officials
were signalling a situation beyond their control. The Housing Supervisor of the Cape Town Municipality told the *Cape Times* in 1950:

Almost every house in the district where the Coloured people live is packed tight. Children grow up and marry and in turn have children and are unable to find a place of their own. A family is turned out of an overcrowded house and finds shelter with friends for a few days - which grow into weeks, months, years. They sleep in living rooms, in kitchens, in passages, in garages, on stoeps, married couples share rooms with other married couples . . . waiting lists for accommodation grow longer and longer . . . families wait anything from six months to ten years before they can be re-housed.²⁴

The squatters were also becoming increasingly politicised. In his work on the Johannesburg squatter movements, Alf Stadler has shown how clashes with officials and the police taught squatter leaders the tactics of political challenge . . . 'not as a political party, but directly as a pressure group mounted on the basis of popular action'.²⁵ However the United Party government was unwilling or unable to act against the squatters with too much force, because of the considerable influence over it of interests intent on the supply of cheap and available labour.
In District Six, apart from the hundreds of *bergies* (tramps) in the years following World War I, there were groups of youths who came to be known as 'skollies'. The word probably comes from the old Dutch *schoeljie* meaning 'scavenger'. Dutch sailors, so the tradition goes, shouted *schoeljie* at the seagulls which swooped to snatch up ships' offal from the waters of Table Bay, and the word came to be used for vagrants who picked at city refuse dumps or begged on the streets. Skollies were considered by residents of District Six as being people from 'outside' the area. Many of these youths had prison experience or had spent time at Porter Reformatory.

A Commission of Inquiry, looking at the period from 1928 to 1935, found the incidence of juvenile delinquency among coloureds to be 'very high'. There was an average of 2,600 such youths in prison for each of those years in South Africa, most of them in Cape Town.

Until the 1940s these youths were a presence but not a problem, operating alone or in groups of two or three, but not in gangs. According to a policeman who worked in District Six before the war, there weren't actual gangs consisting of youngsters and so on, it was just individuals, or a cluster of blokes together. But soon, due to their idleness and way of life, gangs started to form. Shebeens and gambling-houses started developing and these small gangs started robbing honest hard-working people, and in this way, a lot of decent people were just about forced to become gangsters for protection too. When the peoples' involvement with the Cape Corps ended in 1945 gangs started and crime escalated. This was because there were very few jobs available after the War. The gangs sprang up all over the place and they all had their different territories. Before, as policemen, we never wore firearms and we were
posted one by one on foot. But later when you arrested someone you had to fight with him from the time you picked him up until you reached the police station. It was very dangerous alone, I mean they'd pelt you with stones or anything they could get.29

It was then that such names as the Red Cats, the Jesters, the Goofies and the Kettang Gang found their way into the streets of District Six and the pages of newspapers. From 1939 the police were armed for the first time and they patrolled the District in pairs.

Until the 1940s, as we have seen, the industrial reserve army of labour in Cape Town was supported by household production within the extended family. But growing industrialisation in that decade, coupled with the rapid development of capitalist farming, led to a meteoric rise in the numbers of the urban underclass.

In District Six the street corners seemed to fill up overnight and the sight of people or whole families sleeping on stair landings and in doorways became common. Pressure began to build up over territory for hawking, shebeening, prostitution or for just standing in. Youths from the 'outside' began hanging together with empty stomachs and nothing much to do. They started hustling, picking up this and that from shops, leaning
on a few people for cash or favours and living by 'shifts and ruses' of all kinds. Police methods of dealing with these groups were simple, direct and simply locked them more firmly into their way of life:

We would pick them up and fine them, and they could be hired out for some work while under sentence, usually to farms. These kind of people were just idle loiterers who took part in illegal activities now and then. \(^{33}\)

The time of street gangs had arrived.

Two groups viewed these developments in the District with alarm. One was the police. In 1946 a Special Squad with wide powers of arrest was set up expressly to deal with the skollies in District Six. It was led by a tough up-country policeman, Sergeant Willem Nel, and as he put it:

I really worked them. \(^{34}\)

But police pressure tended to be indiscriminate, arresting 'family' members and 'outsider' alike, and raised a howl of protest from the petty bourgeoisie in the District. The Torch, the mouthpiece of the Non-European Unity Movement, was shrill on the matter:

The police in this country, in the sadistic fury and depraved bestiality which characterises their manhandling of non-europeans, innocent or guilty, can be compared only with Nazi storm-troopers who terrorised Germany and occupied Europe. Invariably they are recruited from the poorest layers of the Herrenvolk, ruined peasants, bywooners and poor whites; the semi-literacy and general coarseness of the majority of them is notorious. With a grudge against the world which has forced
to power of the Globe Gang, although, in its early stages, it could be better described as a vigilante group.

Among the gang leaders were bricklayers, hawkers and painters. Its chief, Mikey Ismail, was a plasterer. They came from a class of artisans and shopkeepers. At its centre was the Ismail family, one member of which, A. Ismail, was a City Councillor. Several of his brothers controlled the morning vegetable market of the District, one ran a bus service and four had general dealers' shops. It was the sons of these vegetable sellers, particularly Mikey, who built the gang around themselves. 'They were not criminals', according to a tailor who made their clothes. 'They started to control the Jesters of Constitution Street who were beginning to "maak soos hulle wil" (do what they like). Their aim was eventually to break all gangs, to clean up the District'. According to a member of the gang:

The Globe hated the skollie element in town, like the people who robbed the crowds on (celebrations) or when there were those marches in town with the Torch Commando or Cissy Gool's sing song (demonstration) outside Parliament buildings. Mikey and the boys would really bomb out the skollie element when they robbed the people then. They tore them to ribbons.

In the Press confusion began to grow around the Globe, and with it an inclination to describe 'gang wars' simply as 'crime'. Although police spokesmen insisted that organised crime in the District could not be ascribed to gangs, the Press began to fuel a 'moral panic', insisting in 1947 that there was a 'crime wave' and a 'reign of terror by killer gangs'. However the same year a reporter considered with some surprise that 'about 75% of skollies are well educated' . . . obviously having 'discovered' the Globe. But people of District Six were under no illusions about the differences between the gangs:
The skollie is a rubbish in the gangster's mind. I remember once a judge told a gangster: "You're a rubbish, you're a low class, you're a skollie!" and the gangster said: "Eskies Oubaas. Fk is nie 'n skollie nie. Moenie my insult nie".40

In a community coming under increasing pressure from waves of migration, the Globe was an organisation seeking to assert and maintain the control of the more wealthy families and the hawkers over the 'outsiders'. A member of the Globe insisted the distinction was that other gangsters didn't care a thing for their families. The Globe ... respected each other and their families and so on. There were only a few who smoked pot and really got gesuip (drunk), but never the top dogs ... they always tried to do things that wouldn't bring a scratch to their good family name. You know all these people I'm talking about are wealthy businessmen today - except of course Mikey is dead now. The Globe were the most decent and well-bred gangsters ever. All their parents were well-to-do businessmen with flashy cars and good clothes. The gang (leaders) were always beautifully dressed ... Mikey had silk shirts specially made for him. And he drove around in lovely cars. And the women! Mikey always had the best women around him.41

The gang's connection with the police was one of wary mutual assistance.42 The leader of the Special Squad, Willem Nel, considered them to be 'very decent blokes'. Gang members would visit his house socially or to ask advice or favours. The police, in turn, would request gang control of the skollies.
A Globe man remembers that:

The police never busted the Globe Gang. They used to call on Mikey and the boys if they were having some trouble with another gang somewhere else, because they knew the Globe would be able to control the scene - especially with gangs like the Jesters or the Goofies. Mikey was so well known to the police, and so respected, that he could stop a police van and release anybody he wanted to from it. But him and the boys helped the police. If they heard of a robbery somewhere, like at a liquor store, they'd take the liquor away from the skollies who stole it and then invite the police around. They nearly got the whole of Caledon Square (police station) drunk that way one night. 43

When the Globe confronted the gangs it was always violent and often bloody. A study on the district describes such a battle:

On Saturday December 19, 1951, gang war burst in District Six. For weeks before tension had been rising in the District. When the Globe and Killer armies confronted each other in Hanover Street shopkeepers closed their stores, shebeen queens stopped serving liquor, prostitutes abandoned their beats and respectable citizens bolted their doors and barred their windows. In a running battle the two gangs, with the combined strength of some 300 members, swept through the District firing stolen pistols and leaving a trail of destruction. The showdown came in a house belonging to one of the gang members which was taken apart in the process. The police were notably absent. 44

However, the Globe soon began to control more than the gangs. Any group in its territory had, quite literally, to pay allegiance. And the Globe was up for hire as a political hit force as well. Radical teacher organisations and the Communist Party were occasionally roughed up. A teacher would be 'told to go or we'd slaughter him' and members of the Communist Party would
be 'visited' by Globe members who would pretend to be drunk and:

empty the fish bowl, drink all the wine and beer, and
those that didn't sip would just pour it out on the floor.
And they'd say: 'come on, we're the people and your're
supposed to be communist. Play us music and drink with us'.

City Councillors found their meetings broken up by the Globe which had been
hired by their electoral opponents. And political parties were not exempt
either. In 1951 a Nationalist Member of Parliament complained in Parliament
that:

On the evening I joined the Nationalist Party, I held a
meeting in the Cathedral Hall here (in Cape Town). They
(the United Party) took the Globe Gang from District Six
there in taxis and before they could go into the meeting
each one received about half a glass of brandy and a 10/-
ote and he went into the meeting with a razor blade.

Mikey's brother, 'God', was only peripherally involved with the group, but
was not interested in the family trade. 'Haas (rabbit) money', he told
people 'was quicker than honest money', and his line was smuggling and
blackmail. His group of toughs operated with the blessing of the Globe
which, increasingly, seems to have assisted God in his operations.
Certainly while Mikey was in jail for two years (members claim on a
trumped-up charge of manslaughter) God increased his influence over the
'boys'. And in step with the ideology of their class, Globe members sought
to increase their income by whatever means at their disposal. At the gang's
height these means were considerable.
By 1950 the Globe was controlling extortion, blackmail, illicit buying of every kind, smuggling, shebeens, gambling and political movements in the District. Mikey's image had gradually shifted from 'keeper of the peace' to that of 'Robin Hood', and gang members were taking in large weekly doses of American gangland ideology at the cinemas in the District. In 1949 the Press noted that '1,000 lbs of dagga in the last four months has been traced to large traffickers in District Six where it is controlled by well organised big-time skollies in well-organised gangs. These are usually smartly-dressed and their families are usually well-to-do'. (Argus December 8).

In 1950 the newspaper was to expand on the cannabis network:

Around dagga has grown up an infamous traffic, earning its principals many thousands of pounds a year. It is believed to be brought into Cape Town by Natives from the Trasvaal and the Protectorates. In Cape Town the dagga is taken over by wholesalers, and then distributed by countless 'runners', mostly in the form of kaartjies, which cost only sixpence. (January 25)

A member of the Globe claims the plant was being moved in bales by the truckload. In 1958 the same newspaper noted that the drug was still being sold in large quantities - by smartly dressed men in flashy cars (November 26).

Collecting 'protection' money was almost a natural outcome of the Globe's original function. But the line between 'protection' and straight extortion is a fine one. 'Shops, clubs, cinemas, Indians, Jews, they all
came to Mikey', remembered a gang member. But the truth of the matter was that Mikey came to them, as a letter to the newspaper from a shop-keeper in 1952 testifies:

I came to this country from Australia a little more than a year ago, I started my Hanover Street shop almost immediately. I had not been there two weeks when two well-dressed young coloured men walked in and asked me to join their 'Shopkeepers Protection Racket'. They said it would ensure that my shop would never be robbed or, if goods were stolen, they would be returned. All this, I was told, would be done for a 'small fee'. This trifling sum turned out to be £1 a week. I ordered them out. A week later my shop was entered at night and ransacked... I have had several thefts and attempted robberies since then. [The gangsters had worn] black hats and brown suits. 47

A member of the gang elaborated on this system:

The Globe really made some businessmen, because they protected them and did their work for a certain price... if somebody approached Mikey and said he'd give him £15 to bust some shop owner or whatever, Mikey would first ask for more money, say £25, then he would tell the shopowner. So the shopowner would pay Mikey not to bomb him out. And so the Globe gang were rich. Sometimes they'd even bandage the people up themselves and take them to hospital just to satisfy the guys who wanted somebody to be fucked up. Then the Globe would get paid even more. 48

The gang also organised or 'protected' shebeens and gambling dens.
A Coon Troupe in Hanover Street, District Six
Slowly, however, its influence began to wane. There are a number of reasons for this. The leader, Mikey, was killed; stabbed with a kitchen knife by the brother of a girl who thought he was molesting her. God was jailed for blackmail. And as the gang's rackets increased it lost the support of the class which gave it birth. Gradually prison elements infiltrated the Globe, making it indistinguishable from the street gangs around it only in size. A member describes the process:

Slowly there came the skollie element. A guy from Porter Reformatory joined them: Chicken. Then prisoners from up-country who'd never been in the cities. They raped and had tattoos on their faces and necks and they killed anybody, for nothing. Young boys arrived, and carried guns for no reason. More gangs were formed, like the Bun'Boys, the Stalag 17, the Doolans, the Mongrels, the Born Frees. These tapes were really just a jail element: snot-nosed young boys. Then one day somebody interfered with a gang in the District and this gang thought it was the Globe but it wasn't. They attacked us and this set off the most terrible war. People were killed and the Globe decided to bust every gang everywhere. They couldn't stop. And that was the start of the Globe's bad name.49

What I have suggested here is that with the large migrations into District Six in the 1940s the shopkeepers and hawkers were threatened by both competition and theft, and the city perceived a threat to law and order. A two-pronged attack on the gangs which began forming was made by both the police (the Special Squad made 8,000 arrests in its first year of existence) and by the petty bourgeoisie. The affect was to allow the Globe Gang to win control in the District, but it soon turned this to its own ends. For the
police, though, this was a temporary respite. Gang control is a form of policing. Reviewing the previous nine years in 1959, the Cape Town Police Chief considered District Six to have been 'quiet'.

Then in 1961 large areas of the city were declared 'white group areas' and coloureds were given notice to vacate. Working class culture in the declared areas began to crumble. People displaced by the Group Areas Act moved into District Six and overcrowding worsened. In 1965 the Minister of Community Development, P.W. Botha, called the District a 'blighted area' and talked of slum clearance... setting the scene for events to follow. Newspapers began reporting an 'alarming' rise in stabbings, assaults, drunkenness and child desertions. The Society for the Protection of Child Life doubled its number of social workers in the District. In the insecurity the informal economy began to collapse and landlords allowed buildings to go unrepaired. By the time the first evictions began the more subtle forms of social control in the ghetto had fallen apart. The gangs now ruled the streets.

COLOURED POLITICS AND DISTRICT SIX

My account would be very one-sided if it gave the impression that gangs controlled all levels of social activity in the District. Indeed they were only part of the rich and complex web of relationships in the area. People with much higher profile were the political activists. There was no shortage of political groups in District Six. In fact their numbers, their affiliations and their mergers were, to an outsider, bewildering in their complexity (see Tables 3b and 3c). And underlying the organisations which sprang up was a sea of conflicting class interests, nationalist groups, union struggles, liberation movements and even family feuds.
TABLE 38: 'COLOURED' POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN CAPE TOWN UP/TO 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.A.C.</td>
<td>All African Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.N.B.</td>
<td>African National Bond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.N.C.</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTI-C.A.D.</td>
<td>National Anti-Coloured Affairs Department (Advisory Council) Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APDUSA</td>
<td>African Peoples Democratic Union of Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.P.O.</td>
<td>African Political (Peoples) Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.T.A.</td>
<td>Cape African Teachers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P.N.U.</td>
<td>Coloured Peoples National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P.S.A.</td>
<td>Communist Party of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.R.A.C.</td>
<td>Franchise Action Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.C.U.</td>
<td>Industrial and Commercial Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.C.P.P.</td>
<td>National Coloured Peoples Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.L.L.</td>
<td>National Liberation League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.L.F.</td>
<td>National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.E.F.</td>
<td>New Era Fellowship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.E.U.M.</td>
<td>Non-European Unity Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.A.C.</td>
<td>Pan African Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.C.P.C.</td>
<td>South African Coloured Peoples Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.C.P.O.</td>
<td>South African Coloured Peoples Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.P.</td>
<td>South African Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.S.O.</td>
<td>South African Students Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.O.Y.A.</td>
<td>Sons of Young Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.E.P.A.</td>
<td>Teachers Education and Professional Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.L.S.A.</td>
<td>Teachers League of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.A.R.C.</td>
<td>Train Apartheid Resistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.A.L.</td>
<td>United Afrikaner League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y.C.C.C.</td>
<td>Yui Chui Chan Club</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mary Simons - Organised Coloured Political Movements*
**TABLE 3C**

**LINES OF INFLUENCE BETWEEN 'COLOURED' POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS IN CAPE TOWN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grassroots Community organisations</th>
<th>Labour Party (1965)</th>
<th>CPRC and some Presidents Council members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIBERALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>CONSERVATIVES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APO (1905)</td>
<td>APO (1905)</td>
<td>Conservative members of other 'coloured' organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLSA (1913)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSA (1921)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AAC (1927)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLL (1935)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEUF (1938)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTI-CAD (1943)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft Unions</td>
<td>TARC (1948)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOYA (1963)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NEUM (1943)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NLF (1963)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APDUSA (1963)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAAL (1950)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FRAC (1951)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PEOPLE'S CONVENTION (1953)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SACPO (1953)</td>
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</table>
| *The dates in parenthesis are the year in which the organisations were formed.*
But if one was to focus on group area relocations - state moves which were to destroy the District - what is astonishing is the silence with which they were met. Admittedly when the time came, the Torch (the mouthpiece of the Non-European Unity Movement), complained about property agents moving in for the kill. And a Group Areas Action Committee was set up by people outside the NEUM. But the committee's effect was small, and in The Torch several reports even considered that the Group Areas Act might be beneficial to better-off coloureds as it would move the skollies and poorer up-country people to the Cape Flats. Clearly the Globe gang and some Unity Movement teachers were having similar problems. But the truth is that when the blow came that was to kill the heartland of working-class culture in the city, the coloured political leaders were elsewhere - distracted by all-important franchise issues and beset by organizational difficulties. They were to pay dearly for this distraction.

What is important for this study (and the most one can do, given the complexity of the subject) is to pull out some threads in this political activity; to ask why these activists failed to block the massive social engineering which was to follow. Parts of an answer can be found in their increasing acceptance of a racially-based ideology, the class base of the leadership which tended to open a gulf between the movements and unskilled workers, the disunity within the leadership itself, and the crushing power of the post-war state.

**Abdurahman and the African People's Organization**

The District Six political groups were the product of a history of resistance to colonialism - often muted but ever present. Two slave revolts took place in the Cape in 1808 and 1825. Then in 1892 the Cape Franchise Ballot Act
raised the qualifications necessary to gain a municipal vote, a right which had been open to all men irrespective of colour since 1836.

The Coloured Peoples Association was formed to oppose the Act, and it attempted to vote a Malay into the Cape Parliament. But the move was blocked at the last minute by Cecil Rhodes, who secured an amendment to abolish plural voting, instituting instead a one man one vote system. This swung voting in favour of the white electorate.

In 1902 The African Political Organisation (later re-named the African People's Organisation) was formed by two craft-workers. It based its political hopes on an emerging cultural identity among skilled workers, rather than on strictly racial distinction. However it concentrated initially on the promotion of coloured cultural interests in the Transvaal, The Orange Free State and Natal in the face of growing racism from whites in these territories. The APO was considerably weakened by setbacks to its ambitions suffered in the 1904 elections.

Leadership of the organisation was then taken over by a District Six medical practitioner, Dr. A. Abdurahman, who began organising around the failure of the British to meet black expectations after the Anglo-Boer War.

The APO spread its influence rapidly with its campaign against the attack on the coloured franchise posed by the South African Act of 1909. By 1912 it was a well-established national movement with centres throughout the country and with its own weekly newspaper, the APO Journal.

But increasingly Abdurahman's position reflected the growing dilemma of coloured political movements in Cape Town: whether to struggle for broad working class interests or the narrower interests of the coloured workers
(or more specifically the interests of coloured skilled workers and the petty-bourgeoisie). On this Abdurahman compromised, almost daily, depending on his audience.

But circumstances rapidly propelled the District Six doctor into a pro-British position. This resulted from his firm alliance to General Smuts' white South African Party, the party of British capitalism, which Abdurahman hoped would champion an unrestricted franchise. Also, large numbers of APO members in the city were drawn from 'English' churches and from temperance movements. These were opposed to the Afrikaner Bond, a coloured party with a largely rural following. The APO associated the Bond with the number of rural workers moving into Cape Town and with the Western Cape wine and brandy farmers and the tot system.

Abdurahman's organisation was largely a party of skilled workers and teachers. So although he had originally placed his hope for coloured South Africans in an alliance with Africans, he rapidly retreated from this position when erosion of the coloured franchise began to demote this group to political parity with blacks. And unskilled Africans, quite as much as unskilled coloureds, were a threat to the urban artisans. For coloured intellectuals the fight now became one to distance themselves from Africans by claiming allegiance to white cultural standards. The APO therefore never encouraged the joint organisation of African and coloured workers, and concentrated on drawing coloured workers from existing trade unions.56

By the end of the First World War Abdurahman, although calling for a united working class, was bitterly opposed to the S.A. Labour Party because of the racism of its white members, to the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union because of its mass based and largely rural organisation, and to the SA Communist Party for its organisation of unskilled workers in the Cape.
Increasingly the APO narrowed its focus to the coloured franchise question. Trade unionist David Lewis describes the organisation as a liberal civil rights body. Its method was that of:

parliamentary lobbying and (it) never attempted to engage in the mass co-ordinated pressurisation associated with working class organisations, but chose to dissipate (its) energies in forming and breaking alliances with dominant political parties.\(^5\)

The APO was a body articulating the interests of coloured skilled artisans and a petty-bourgeoisie packed tightly with teachers. Ever hopeful of eventual 'equality' of coloureds with whites, and compromised by his position on the Cape Town City Council, Abdurahman was forced into a position of support for the Smuts Government - even through its excesses during the Bulhoek massacre in Queenstown and the 1922 Rand Rebellion.

By the early 1930s the APO was markedly conservative with little support outside teacher organisations. But to understand the split which formed between Cape artisans and unskilled workers, a split which was to be a major factor in coloured political response to group areas, we must look more closely at the composition of labour organisations in the City.

**The Cape Unions**

For more than a hundred years skilled artisans in the Western Cape had been predominantly people of 'colour'. This dated back to the importation and training of skilled slaves to the region, coupled with marginally more relaxed racial attitudes among colonists in the area than in the northern provinces.
By the 1920s most trade union members in Cape Town were skilled craftsmen and would be defined as coloured. Among unionised painters, plasterers and furniture workers in 1930, about 90% were coloured, as were 50% of the bricklayers, 40% of the carpenters and 60% of the leather workers.\(^58\)

The organisation of unskilled workers did take place as well. In the Depression years of the early 1930s widespread labour action took place in Cape Town, its focus being through the Coloured Unemployment League. At its height the League, which was led by Dr. Goolam Gool and members of the Lenin Club, could boast a membership of 30,000 workers. And during this period the Communist Party was particularly active in organising unskilled workers. A number of unions were formed, such as the S.A. Railways and Harbours Workers Union and, later, the Food and Canning Workers Union.

But generally these organisations of the unskilled were isolated from the mainstream of trade union activity in the city. Their leaders were harassed and imprisoned and they came under severe criticism from the established unions, from their co-ordinating bodies and from their political fellow-travellers such as the APO.

The reason for this is not difficult to understand. The Cape organisations were mostly craft unions and they feared the process of job fragmentation and dilution which would follow the inclusion of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. It was simply not in their interest to admit such workers, or to support broad-based labour organisations.
For this reason Africans were generally not admitted to the Cape unions, and anyway most of them were prevented from joining registered unions in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. Unskilled coloured workers - 'moegoes' from the countryside - were discouraged from joining or prevented outright.

Parallels between the Cape unions and the APO are marked - probably due to a high degree of interaction of personnel between city unions and coloured political bodies. They often exchanged or shared leadership. But teachers tended to dominate the political movements. Both groups, teachers and skilled workers, saw little to gain from the organisation of people who were unskilled and largely recent migrants. Undoubtedly these people had their place as crowds and demonstrators, such as in the huge and successful protest against segregated transport in 1939. But generally they were a problem for the urban coloured elite, more than a few of whom must have wished for their relocation from the crowded inner city suburbs to the Cape Flats.

What must now be considered are the movements which took up the baton in the late 1940s and the 1950s, for it is they which were to be confronted with the Group Areas Act.

Resistance and the Franchise issue

When the Nationalist Party won the election in 1948 it gained power by a very slim margin. The coloured group which still had the vote could conceivably have swung the next election. By virtue of their language, coloureds were Afrikaners. But there was a long, almost traditional allegiance of the APO to the 'English' parties. Coupled with this was
competition between the coloured urban proletariat and recently-urbanised and unskilled white Afrikaners. The path of the National Party was therefore not to woo the coloured electorate, but to abolish its voting rights for a central Parliament.

This issue wholly occupied coloured political movements in Cape Town and elsewhere. At the centre of this struggle was the Non-European Unity Movement, which was a broad front of several organisations. It was a child of the APO in more than metaphor, many of its top members being the offspring of APO leaders. But to understand the movement we must consider its parts.

The All African Convention (AAC)
This was formed in Cape Town after a split between radical and conservative members of the African National Congress (ANC). The AAC saw itself as an umbrella body of black resistance. But in 1937 the ANC withdrew from the Convention in a move towards a black nationalist stance. After this the AAC gradually declined in influence until 1943 when it was revived in the form of the Unity Movement.

The National Liberation League (NLL)
In 1935 the NLL was founded in Cape Town by La Guma, 'Cissie' Gool (who was a member of the SA Communist Party and Abdurahman's daughter) and her brother-in-law, Dr. Goolam Gool (a Trotskyist). The NLL hoped publicly to be a united front of all race groups. But in fact it campaigned for independent coloured organisation, centering on the goal of obtaining for coloureds social, political and economic parity with whites.
The League eventually broke up over a policy dispute, 'Cissie' Gool championing a non-racial body while Goolam Gool and La Guma sought to prevent white membership. The split ended in a civil court action to decide which faction was indeed the NLL, the decision being made in favour of 'Cissie' Gool.

The Non-European United Front (NEUF)

The nationalist group within the NLL, led by Goolam Gool and La Guma, split to form the NEUF. When the Cape Provincial Council drew up a Bill in 1939 which would enable municipal councils to introduce segregatory measures in transport and amenities, the NEUF organised a series of meetings and demonstrations on the Grand Parade and outside Parliament. The protests were effective and the measure was vetoed by the Government (to be reintroduced nine years later). It was from this point that city policemen on the beat began carrying firearms.

Anti-Cad

The NEUF languished during the war years, but in 1943 there was a dramatic revival of political feeling among the coloured population in Cape Town. In its preparations for a general election, the Government passed various measures designed to raise its prestige with the white electorate. One of these was to set up a Coloured Advisory Department which would 'care for the welfare of the coloured people'. This followed a recommendation in the 1937 Commission Regarding the Cape Coloureds, which expressed concern over the proximity of coloured ghettos to Cape Town.

A storm of protest arose. The new body was too similar to the Native Affairs Department, and it was seen as a further move in the differentiation between coloureds and whites and another step down the road to segregation.
The Government hastily changed the name to the Coloured Affairs Council. It sought legitimacy for the CAC in the coloured community and found it in nooks and crannies. Bodies which gave their approval were the Kleurlingvolksverbond, the Cristus Zy Zeningskerk, the Coloured Vigilance Society of Gordonia and Kenhardt, the Cape Malay Vigilance Society, the Cape Malay League and the Griqua National Conference of South Africa. A coloured music teacher, Dr. H. Gow, was persuaded to accept chairmanship, and the Council was established in law.

But a young and militant group within the NEUF - the New Era Fellowship (NEF) - formed the Anti-CAD movement under the leadership of Goolam Gool. It pledged to fight the new Government move by boycott, protest and non-collaboration.

Anti-CAD was joined by more militant members of the APO and the Teachers League of South Africa. The leadership was made up largely of teachers, fighting against the erosion of their franchise rights.

The Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM)
In May 1943 the Anti-CAD movement called a conference at which it was decided to set up a broad front organisation. The result was the NEUM, which was made up of members from the TLSA, APO, NEUF, Anti-CAD and a revived AAC.

Goolam Gool took chairmanship and a 10-point Programme was published. Its first point was a demand for full franchise for all irrespective of colour, and its second was for compulsory education for every child up to the age of 16.
But despite its militant language it is clear that from the start the NEUM was a coloured civil rights movement with only occasional interest in working class issues. This is because, more than all other movements, it was an organisation of teachers. Although teachers had skills which made them the natural leaders of the community, their professions set severe limits on their political action. Mary Simons makes the point that teachers were dependent on state salaries and had no leverage on white political organisations:

... they could either support the government or express their political frustration in militant language and political inaction. The tactics of boycott and non-collaboration, and insistence on adherence to the 10-point Programme as a matter of principle fulfilled these requirements.

But this activity had little effect on the government, which found willing supporters for its apartheid institutions elsewhere in the community.

Another weakness of the NEUM, as it had been in teacher-led movements in the past, was its lack of support from unskilled and semi-skilled workers who formed the bulk of the labour force in Cape Town. The Unity Movement was bitterly antagonistic towards the Communist Party for its organisation of unskilled workers as much as for its theoretical position. There is also a strong possibility that it was opposed to 'non-coloured' or 'mixed' unions. The result was that it could not base its campaigns on the support of workers - the only people who could challenge capital in the workplace. Nor could the movement call on coloured artisans who, when the chips were down, were unlikely to jeopardise their relatively privileged position over the franchise issue.
The result was a good deal of noise and little lasting action. However this did not shield NEUM members from state reprisals. They were often harrassed by police and some of the leaders were served with banning orders.

The movement also came under attack from the right in the form of the Coloured People's National Union (CPNU) which was formed in 1944 by rightwing members expelled from the APD. Their platform was one of support for the Coloured Advisory Council. This opened up a split in coloured politics (which continues to this day) between collaborators and non-collaborators with the institutions of apartheid.

In 1950, when the Group Areas Act was passed, the NEUM was simply not in a position, politically or ideologically, to do anything about it but complain. The viewpoint of the movement's newspaper, the Torch, during that year is interesting for what it fails to say. The Act was initially seen as an attempt to restrict Asian trading and residency. Considering the history of urban zoning in other cities in South Africa this view was understandable. And as this had little to do with the coloured franchise it was seen to be of only passing importance. When it became clear that the Act was to be applied to coloureds it was still not grasped as being altogether serious. It was seen simply as a tactic to shift coloured voters out of the inner-city wards. But after the urban migrations of the 1940s into inner areas like District Six, the coloured petty-bourgeoisie had gradually moved further out of town anyway. The Act was seen to have the potential to 'clean up' the crowded ghettos of unskilled and unemployed workers. A prominent member of the NEUM at the time comments:
In 1950 the Unity Movement bungled. They reckoned that the Group Areas Act affected only a small group of property owners. The Anti-CAD did nothing except maintain non-collaboration.63

The NEUM was in fact too busy fighting the franchise issue to take on group areas as well. The same year the Group Areas Act was passed, the coloured vote was restricted in Natal and the Transvaal - a hint of things to come. In 1951 a constitutional struggle began to remove coloured voters names in the Cape from rolls for the House of Assembly and the Provincial Council. The outcome was the Separate Registration of Voters Act in 1956 by which coloureds were placed on a separate voters list. At the core of this move was the fear by the National Party - a very real one - that the coloured vote could swing the next election in favour of the United Party which had considerable coloured support and trailed the 'Nats' by only a slim margin.

The beginning of the franchise issue in 1951 saw a strike in Cape Town on May 7 which was co-ordinated by The Franchise Action Committee (FRAC). This was not a NEUM committee, and in the decisive moment of the franchise struggle it decided not to support FRAC. It also took an antagonistic stance towards the Train Apartheid Resistance Committee, the Group Areas Action Committee and the South African Coloured People's Organisation (SACPO). At times, more energy seems to have gone into denouncing doctrinal deviations than into challenging the wagon of apartheid. One suspects that this antagonism was directed at the organiser of these movements, R.E. van der Ross, who Unity leaders considered to be a collaborator with apartheid.64
One of these bodies, SACPO, was extremely active between 1953 and 1956. It joined the Congress of the People Alliance and in 1955 accepted the Freedom Charter as its baseline. However its leaders were charged with high treason in 1956 in a trial which was to drag on for five years. Although all the accused were eventually acquitted, they were effectively prevented from organising during the trial. Mary Simons comments that

the inability of (coloureds) to prevent the enactment of the Separate Registration of Voters Bill in 1956 and a lack of political direction caused by the arrest and detention of SACPO leaders and the organisation’s consequent involvement in the Treason Trial left (coloureds) in a political wilderness which persisted, except for short bursts of activity . . . , until the CPRC Council Act was passed (1964). 65

An activist during the period, Eddie Roux, observed that

each (coloured) group tried independently, and by its own special methods, to obtain more rights for itself or, more often, merely ward off attempts to restrict its civil liberties. 66

Considering group areas legislation, a former leading member of the NEUM, 'Ossie' Osman, concludes that:

up until 1948 the coloured man really believed he would be made white because we share the same language, religion, culture. It was the ideal of the coloured people to absorb white culture - and anti-culture. Their ambitions were very often that their daughters should marry whites. Afterwards (after group areas) they became completely demoralised. There
was a general sort of malaise. Then came Sharpville (1960) - and the Unity Movement stood on the sideline and feared.  

Some members of the coloured movements - better off financially and better educated - were also able to appraise the situation and manipulate it to their own advantage:

In the 1950s we were told to boycott Group Areas, identity cards, etc... so we did. Meanwhile our leaders, Marxists!, went out and bought up land, especially on the Cape Flats. This is where part of our bitterness comes from.  

From this brief tour of 'coloured' politics it can be seen why the movements - undergoing a crisis of leadership, unable to form a popular base, and with their leaders increasingly detained or banned - were in no position to effectively challenge the group areas removals which took place in Cape Town from 1961. The trade unions, mainly craft oriented and with a predominant membership of skilled artisans, could only challenge the state at cost to the privileged status of their members. But both these groups presented themselves as champions of the working class. And by their presence they often actually inhibited true working class organisation.

The other side of the coin, of course, was that the form in which group areas removals were presented and undertaken defused any political challenge:

The government had worked very well (says Osman). They didn't do their work on masse, but in small pockets under the guise of urban removals. They had already removed 'undesirables' to Robben Island (prison) and had a well-established reign of terror which silenced the rest of us. Hundreds were banned. Our leadership was underground. It was at this time that the CPRC collaborators and the Labour Party stepped in.  

In 1963 the Torch, the mouthpiece of the NEUM, closed down after arrest and banning orders served on Unity leaders. The movement began to splinter. Young blacks, disillusioned with NEUM inactivity and influenced by the Pan Africanist Congress, broke away to form the African Peoples Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA). Its aim was to 'organise the peasantry and the workers'.

The same year a group of militant coloured intellectuals formed the Yui Chui Chan Club (later called the National Liberation Front) with the aim of preparing for guerilla warfare. They were subsequently sentenced to many years imprisonment.

A less militant group within the NEUM, mainly members from the TLSA and Anti-CAD, joined the Sons of Young Africa movement to 'struggle for equality' along less militant lines. This group gradually became inactive.

By 1966, when District Six was declared a white group area, resistance to the move was left to white liberals, a handful of aggrieved individuals, and, curiously, the City Council.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3


3. These figures are given in the Theron Commission. The term 'coloured' is defined in the Population Registration Act and Group Areas Act of 1950 as containing the 'racial groups' Malay, Griqua, Cape Coloured and Other Coloured. Although these categories refer to the generic origins of many of the Cape working class they are also used with reference to other classes as well - in fact to anyone who is deemed to have 'coloured blood' as seen by skin pigmentation. The term 'coloured' is primarily used as an ideological subdivision of 'race' in South Africa and is a term objected to by many people so defined. It is also theoretically a confusing classification. It will be used only where it is unavoidable, as in official statistics and pronouncements.

4. D. Pinnock: Argie boys to skollie gangsters; the lumpenproletarian challenge of the street-corner armies of District Six, 1900-1951. History Workshop Papers 3, University of Cape Town.


10. D. Webster, Ibid. p. 16.


12. University of the Witwatersrand Survey, reported in SA Outlook July 1941 p. 139.


18. Brian Barrow: *Behind the Dark Doors of District Six*, undated article in the Wollheim Collection, University of Cape Town, probably 1966.


21. J. Maree et. al.: *The squatter problem in the Western Cape* - SAIRR.


23. Ibid. p. 58.


25. Stadler, op.cit. p. 42. In Johannesburg Mpanza formed the Scfasonke party, getting his lieutenants to swear an oath of allegiance to 'die where you die', calling him their chief and them his soldiers.

26. There are various versions of the origins of the word of which this one is the most likely. It is given in L.F. Freed: *Crime in South Africa* (Cape Town 1963)

27. This is a recurring comment in the many interviews with people who lived in District Six before World War II.


29. Interview with Sergeant Willem Nel, former head of the Special Squad in District Six.
33. Interview with Sgt. Willem Nel, leader of the Police Special Squad in District Six.

34. Interview with Sgt. Willem Nel.

35. This information is from interviews with members of the Globe, shopkeepers and skilled craftsmen in District Six.

36. Interview with Hadji Ahmad Levy (Cappie), District Six tailor.

37. Interview with Dave (his real name is withheld at his request), a 'core' member of the Globe.

38. The Argus August 19 and September 6 1947.


40. Interview with George Manuel, journalist, 1980.

41. Interview with Dave, a Globe member.

42. Interview with Hadji Levy.

43. Interview with Dave, a Globe member.

44. Rewritten from Cape Times and Argus reports of December 21 1951. in D. Pinnock: Argie boys to skollie gangsters, History Workshop 3.

45. Interview with Dave, a Globe member.


47. The Argus May 22 1952.

48. Interview with 'Gums', a Globe member.

49. Interview with Dave, a Globe member.


52. The Argus May 24 and October 6 1967.


56. David Lewis: Trade Unions and Class Stratification: A preliminary analysis of the role of working class organisations in the Western Cape, in Van Der Merwe & Groenewald, op cit.

57. Lewis p. 194.


60. Theron Commission p. 440.


63. Interview with 'Ossie' Osman 1981

64. Simons p. 227.


67. Osman

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.
THE CRISIS OF THE 1940s

The crisis of class defence was not confined to the harassed traders of District Six. It was part of something much larger. When the soldiers came back from war in 1945 they were to find a country transformed by an industrial boom of unprecedented proportions. Between 1939 (when the war began) and 1946, the gross national income rose by 68.4 percent while the net output in manufacture went up by 81.6 percent. The confident mood of the period is captured by AJ Norval:

When the Second World War broke out in 1939, South Africa was by no means equipped to meet the exacting demands of the civilian requirements, let alone the requirements of participating in a global war... The Government did not wait to consider the costs. Factory buildings were built in the shortest time and plants installed to manufacture war equipment and ammunition for the forces leaving for the front; large contracts on the most remunerative basis were entered into with private manufacturers for clothing, footwear and food. Manufacturers in general were encouraged to manufacture whatever possible to make the country independent of outside sources should the war drag on for many years as was anticipated, and should the world supply routes be cut off. No efforts were spared, nor funds for the equipment of industries... The remarkable phenomenon was that there was no lack of capital... a new era had dawned in the industrial progress of South Africa. The country went from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive basis of its manufacturing industries. Over the next 20 years a complete transformation took place in the plant set-up of secondary industry which was revolutionary in scope.

But if the war was good for business it was also a painful forcing-house for the political bureaucracy. Under pressure from the demands generated by rapid
industrialisation, urban migrations, worker militancy and wage demands, the ruling class alliance would be forced to make deep, formative changes to its own structure and to the fabric of the State. Indeed the 1940s were exceptional years, a time when many papered-over and clogged social contradictions burst open, sending shock-waves through the State.

The effects on the city of Cape Town were to be profound. Cities are, if anything, concrete manifestations of the dominant forces in the society. In the post-war years Cape Town was to become a symbol of the rise of monopoly capital, merging the commercial, industrial and military town into a rapidly expanding metropolis. The merchant port of the Cape sea route was to be torn apart and rebuilt to the specifications of industry. It would be cut off from the sea by raised highways connecting the new inner-city office park to the factories and to the white suburbs of the managers. Troublesome elements — workers with brown skins — were to be issued out of town, beyond the white frontier to the new factory estates on the Cape Flats. Over proposals for garden cities and green belts, planners talked of 'machine-gun' zones, 'buffer strips', 'military' roads and 'policeability'.³ (In peripheral States, capital feels safer inside a defensive city, even if the walls are horizontal and the gates are juridical.)

**MONOPOLY GROWTH IN THE GREENHOUSE OF WAR**

The wartime industrial expansion in Cape Town was initially through the extension of existing factories geared for increased production. Much of this industry was small-scale and labour-intensive. In textile production, for example, more than half the firms had plant and machinery worth less than £100, and 75 percent of all manufacturing in the early 1940s had equipment valued at under £1000.⁴ When the war ended in 1945 the boom conditions, as Norval indicated, were to continue. In the five years which followed, the number of industrial establishments in the Western Cape increased by 33 percent from 1446 to 1928, and the labour force by 36 percent.⁵
In 1946 the giant Rex Trueform clothing factory opened in Salt River, which was rapidly becoming the clothing belt of the city. Of the 102 industries investigated by John Shorten in his history of capitalist development in Cape Town, 95 percent were either started or experienced rapid growth between 1945 and 1951.  

However amid the halcyon days other forces were at work. The Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission of 1941 put it this way:  

... industrial production has to be organised on mass production lines to be economical. This enables the work to be divided into such simple processes that, with the aid of labour saving devices such as the belt system, an efficient and economical use can be made of semi-skilled workers and unit costs can be reduced to a minimum.  

This was echoed four years later by the Board of Trade and Industries, which was arguing for a reorganisation and combination of the many small industrial concerns to encourage efficient production:  

The object of combination (it said) is not only to reduce output and to control prices, but also to facilitate plant specialisation and standardisation as a means of reducing costs. (BTI Report 282, 1945)  

What was being called for here was a decrease in local competition and a rationalisation of production. Because local production grew on import substitution during the greenhouse effect of wartime isolation, producers were under pressure to reproduce both the processes of production and the relations of the advanced capitalist centres. This set the scene for the rapid development of monopoly companies, with a corresponding growth of industrial technology and the post-war penetration of foreign capital.
Between 1946 and 1954 fixed capital stock rose to an all-time high of 6.9 percent per annum. During roughly the same period the average value of plant/machinery and tools per establishment grew by about 40 percent, and the average value of mechanical power per worker by 33 percent, suggesting a massive increase in mechanisation. Both the capital and the industrial technology which flooded the country was predominantly from Europe and the United States. Increasingly production became centralised in large firms which could undertake research, afford the expensive machinery and take risks which would ruin smaller producers. Virtually all plant was imported. And within this process, capital tended to become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.

Under State measures designed to encourage the 'more efficient' producers, international capital flowed in. At least 60 percent of the Cape Town textile plants in the 1940s surveyed by Shorten were fully-owned subsidiaries of foreign trans-nationals. Other firms became sub-contractors for First World technology and skills. The concentration and centralisation of capital could be found as early as 1941 when, despite the numerical preponderance of small unit production, a mere 9 percent of producers were responsible for 73 percent of industrial output. A rough idea of the degree of concentration can be gained from this table:

Table 4a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Percentage establishments producing at least half of output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food &amp; drink</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal &amp; Engineering</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing &amp; textiles</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Cape Town these trends resulted in an actual overall decrease in industrial establishments, despite an increase in productive output. An indication of this is the decline in the number of clothing and textile plants, the city's major industry.

Table 4b

Number of clothing/woolens factories in the Western Cape 1925 - 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Factories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: J. Whittingdale)

For workers the initial result of the war boom was an increase in wage labour. In Cape Town's three main industries the employment figures between 1920 and 1960 increased dramatically: 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Percentage labour increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothing/textiles</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food/beverages</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During the labour-hungry war years influx control of migrant workers was virtually dropped, resulting in a large-scale movement of Africans to the towns from white rural areas and the Reserves. Between 1937 and 1948 the ratio of blacks to whites employed in manufacturing increased steadily:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>2.5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>2.5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2.5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2.7:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2.8:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>3.0:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>3.1:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>3.2:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3.2:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>3.1:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>3.1:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>3.1:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Western Cape the industrial employment between 1939/40 and 1944/45 showed a dramatic upward swing among people defined as 'non-white', particularly among women:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Groups</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All races</td>
<td>+27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White male</td>
<td>+ 2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White female</td>
<td>- 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total</td>
<td>+ 1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white male</td>
<td>+36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white female</td>
<td>+43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white total</td>
<td>+38.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rapid increase in the use of black and coloured labour was because it was both cheaper than white labour and because skilled labour was scarce as many whites were involved in the war. Skilled jobs tended to be fragmented and divided among semi-skilled operators. This fitted in with the new machine production, as a 1945 Board of Trade and Industries Report underlined:

The central problem of organisation has been to integrate specialised equipment and processes in order to obtain the optimum results in terms of a smooth, even and continuous flow of work. Complex operations have been broken up into their constituent parts, and these taken over by specialised
machines. This co-ordination of machinery and labour into a continuous chain of operations has had the effect of transforming the entire establishment into a semi-automatic and homogeneous unit... workers and machines are... placed in the sequence of the functions they perform... As each machine must be temporally and spatially adjusted to every other machine, so must every shop and department be timed and adjusted in the rate and intervals at which it contributes its lot to the main stream. 16

It was not only the tasks that were being simplified in the new production lines, however. In Cape Town a whole stratum of self-employed workers and crafts-people was being wiped out by factory production, which could do their jobs more cheaply. A good example is the clothing industry.

Factory production of clothing began in Cape Town in 1907, although rubber waterproofs had been produced since 1889. 17 Before that all clothing was made by private tailors and seamstresses. Most of them were Malay, with skills handed down from parent to child since the early days of slavery. They formed an important source of income for areas such as District Six and the Malay Quarter. In the early 20th century these producers began experiencing competition from recent immigrants from Central Europe. Because these new arrivals were white, they tended to have better access to capital and were able to expand out of family business into factory production. By 1930 there were 135 clothing factories in the city and by 1952 clothing was the third largest industry in South Africa. 18 By 1965 there were about 30 000 employees in the industry comprising a third of Cape Town's labour force. Small tailors were being ruined by off-the-peg clothing and were increasingly incorporated into the factories as cutters - a department which today remains a male enclave in a female-dominated industry.
A survival tactic in the face of large but standardised opposition was the production of uniforms for the Coon Carnival, uniforms so gaudy, varied and cheap that no factory would consider their production. The origins of the Carnival are obscure. One tradition has it that it began as a celebration of slave emancipation, another that it was started by American negroes from a sailing ship which docked at Cape Town. The occasion still has an American Deep South flavour about it. The word 'coon' probably comes from 'raccoon' and troupe members still paint their faces to look like the animal.

The annual reproduction of the carnival owed more to the tradition of the city's working class than to anything else. Troupe members got nothing out of it but fun and a sense that it was 'their thing'. But it is significant that the rise in popularity of the carnival coincided with the growth of clothing factories in Cape Town. The Carnival was, and still is, run by several 'boards' which, importantly, were very often tailor-dominated. These advanced money to various 'captains', who more often than not were shebeen owners or gang leaders. Throughout the year troupe members would lodge an amount of money with a tailor who would undertake to make their uniform for the big occasion on New Year's day. In about October the practices would begin, the captain having a ready troupe of shebeen regulars or gang members. After Christmas the uniforms would arrive in the troupe's colours. Often these were made of Japanese satin in purples, yellows, greens and gold: frock coats, pin-striped trousers with top hats, white gloves and bow-ties. In 1940 the required five yards of satin could be bought for 1/11d. The tailor would sell the uniform for 5/6d. Today a uniform costs R13 and is sold for R25.19

The first three days of each new year would afford the sight of thousands of hardened toughs in top hats and tails, faces painted black with large white lips, high stepping through the streets behind a banjo, bass and drum singing 'moppies' to admiring crowds. The celebration would end with huge drink and dagga parties which would start everyone off on the new year with a terrible headache.
Men at a Coon troupe practice.
The Carnival reached its height in the mid-1960s (a time when there were more than 200 clothing factories in the city). But by the 1970s it was on the decline. Because of the latent violence of the gang troupes and their illicit activities (and not without pressure from the City Council) the Carnival was driven off the streets and into stadiums. There it lost much of its spontaneity and popular support. It also came under bitter attack from the Unity Movement and the coloured petty-bourgeoisie who felt it 'reflected the people in a bad light'.

More importantly, perhaps, was that the family tailors, who were responsible for re-generating the event each year, were being moved out of the reach of their customers by urban relocations. Their businesses collapsed and they were unable to exist on the Carnival alone or raise the money to forward to the captains. And fierce competition between the boards split the Carnival into smaller fractions and decreased profits. The result was the elimination of a whole stratum of small-scale family enterprise and its absorption into the factory system or its eviction into unemployment.

In many ways the history of women clothing workers parallels that of the men, but there are important differences. Since slave days Malay women had been skilled seamstresses. Until about 1900 they were the major manufacturers of women's clothing in the city. The growth of factories drove these women out of home production and into wage employment alongside the tailors. But another avenue for working class women was to take in laundry. This tradition went back to the early days of the colony, with washing done first on the slopes of Table Mountain and later in public wash-houses.

This was clearly a profitable line of work and capital, taking the situation as it found it, was soon muscling in on the market. By 1912 there were 45 steam laundries in the city, most of them run by Chinese. A boom for laundries came during the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 when white customers feared contamination of their washing in the ghetto wash houses.
The number of washerwomen was inversely proportional to the number of laundries which averaged at around 45 until 1961. A change which did occur during this period was the eclipse of Chinese laundries by larger enterprises spearheaded by Nannucci. In 1961 population removals moved the washerwomen away from both the wash-houses and their customers in the white suburbs, and the number of steam laundries increased dramatically. Thousands of women lost their jobs, and while some maintained their independence by becoming day-chars, many others turned to the factories for employment.
In 1936 only about one third of the coloured women in Cape Town worked outside their homes. Twelve years later (by 1948) the number of women in factories had increased by 138 percent. In that year women comprised 79 percent of textile workers in the city, 43 percent of the food processing workers and 49 percent of book and printing workers. The early post-war period in District Six is described by a textile worker, Elizabeth Weeder:

My daddy came from Malmesbury during the war. He was in the Cape Corps so we came to live in District Six. Everything was going there! Hundreds of shops up Hanover Street and flower sellers, tailors, coal merchants, wood sellers and so many hawkers. And barber shops. Where can you get a good barber shop today? Or a shoemaker?

I went to work in a factory after I got married. We needed money. Lots of women worked in factories all along Sir Lowry Road - there was Bucannans sweets and Fairweather clothing and Baumanns Biscuits and the fez factory. First I worked at Cork and Crown as a machine operator, doing man's work on the oak shive, making fishing net cork floats. Then I did beer-bottle tops. There was more money in factories than in service, though lots of women did washing at the Wash House in Hanover Street. Then I went to Fairweather. I was sewing shoulder pads on men's suits. Everything by hand. There were thousands of girls in that place, with supervisors to help or see we didn't talk.

It was hard work - especially with that production business. You see if you made five garments an hour normally, and then you made 10, they would pay you more. Towards Christmas you would work, work to get more money - the whole day Saturday and half of Sunday too. It was tiring - but every penny counts. There were big families and they could look after the children. Today these are no more and women must give up work for the children. Or they just leave the children.

The cutters were always men. They had been tailors usually. There were plenty of tailors before, but then they became less. You would buy your own cloth and they would make a suit. Also with the Coon Carnival... every week you would give a bit of money to the tailor and when you need your suit for the Carnival its paid for. The Carnival is how the tailors could live.
In the factory the girls would see how the work is done and then leave and start a business making clothes. They would steal with their eyes. The factory was good, though, because they would have sales for the staff and we got clothes cheap. Also the girls made big business there. They would make cakes or konfyt or rooti or curry or knitted things and sell them at lunchtime. Then on Friday evening payday you would pay them. They sold everything there, even shoes.

Most of the women who worked in the District were in factories. It cost me 8c to take a bus from Fairweather to home. Now think how much it costs from Mitchells Plain! (Interview: December 1981)

In the post-war boom working class women in the city were able to take up factory work because of the supportive structure of extended families, which allowed child care to continue despite the absence of mothers. Clothing factory owners exploited this fact to secure cheap female labour. In the poorer communities women came to be relied upon as a source of income and the whole orientation of the culture began to swing around this fact. Often women became the key breadwinners. But with the urban relocations of the 1960s extended families were broken up and working mothers were faced with the choice of giving up work or abandoning their children to neighbours, older children or the streets. In 1973 a report on the causes of absenteeism among coloured industrial workers concluded that:

when the coloured people lived in their old residential communities, a considerable degree of co-operation existed between them in minding children when women were at work.

In the clothing industry alone there are about 40 000 actively employed females.

The communities were broken-up when the coloureds were resettled. They found themselves among strangers. The same degree of co-operation in looking after children has not yet developed. This has no doubt increased absenteeism and unpunctuality.23
A solution called for by the report was that the State should take over the role of parenting:

The school class in modern society performs many of the functions for the developing personality of the child which under pre-industrial conditions had been performed by the family and kinship system. An extensive system of compulsory education for the Coloured population has simply become a sine qua non. 24

**WORKER RESISTANCE AND THE CRISIS OF CONTROL**

As can be expected, the widespread urban migrations, poor living conditions, low wages and factory experiences led to increasing militancy on the part of workers. Not least among their grievances was the highly visible differences in consumption levels in the cities. Here the sheer concentration of population presaged a form of proletarianisation that was to place unprecedented pressure on capitalist relations. These pressures are catalogued by Graeme Bloch in his study of industrialisation between 1939 and 1969:

There were indications of widespread social unrest and ferment (during the war years), finding expression particularly in agitation over housing and the growth of squatter movements. Pass laws, transport, food, liquor raids, all provided a focus for friction and threatened to coalesce in a linking of demands into a generalised assault on the State and the existing forms of social relations. For example, squatters' movements, representing a grassroots organisation of spontaneous unrest, began to show signs of co-ordination.

Leftwing organisations and individuals were active. The Communist Party anti-pass campaign in 1944 won support from the ANC and Natal Indian Congress. The famous 'doctors' agreement' presaged an era of formal co-operation between the various Congress movements. Within the ANC a more radical current was to emerge with the Youth League in 1943 and its calls for direct action based on mass support. It increasingly gained influence within the ANC as a whole. 25
In Cape Town there was a huge anti-apartheid rally in 1939, several campaigns against the formation of a Coloured Affairs Department once the Leftwing Non-European Unity Movement was formed. By 1945 about 40 percent of the black industrial labour force was unionised. During the war labour unrest had forced African wages to rise by more than 50 percent while white wages showed a slight decline. The level of strike action can be seen in the number of strikes and the man-hours lost during this period. (See Table 4d)

The struggles reached a peak in 1946 on the Rand mines with a strike by 60,000 black migrant workers. Although it was suppressed, the strike rocked the South African ruling classes.

By the late 1940s the State was facing mounting contradictions. In this situation could be detected what Antonio Gramsci termed an 'organic crisis':

A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves... and that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making efforts to cure them from within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts... form the terrain that the forces of opposition organise.

Gramsci locates this crisis within the complex relations between the infrastructure (economic relationships) and the superstructures (the arena of political and ideological relationships) at a particular period of history. In attempting to understand how the ruling classes maintain control of the State, however, it is necessary to distinguish further between civil society and political society, between:

1. the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent
Industriels disputes in South Africa 1940 - 1950
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because its position and function in the world of production;

2. the apparatus of State coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed.32

The State - the 'site or level of social formation with specific tasks' - can be seen as comprising dictatorship plus hegemony; not only as the apparatus of government, but also the 'private' apparatus of civil society (churches, clubs, political parties, trade unions etc.).33 The art of hegemony is therefore the balance between force and coercion, political structures and private structures, law and convention, threat and ideology.

It is, of course, impractical for a dominant social class to rule by force alone for any length of time. The stability of a State is less at threat when this class can gain an upper hand in both political and civil society, imposing its perspective on subordinate classes as a 'universal' understanding via the apparatuses of civil society. It is easier if the ruled consent to be ruled - this is the basis of liberal democracy. To do this the State must appear to stand above the class struggle, 'moderating' it and performing reproductive work on behalf of capital while appearing to be neutral.34 In this way the State 'comes to be the structure which enables a ruling class alliance to give its ideas the form of universality...'.35 To quote Hall et al:

When a ruling-class alliance has achieved an indisputed authority and sway over all... levels of its organisation - when it masters the political struggle, protects and extends the needs of capital, leads authoritatively in the civil and ideological spheres, and commands the restraining forces of the coercive apparatuses of the State in its defence. When it achieves all this on the basis of consent, i.e. with
the support of 'the consensus', we can speak of the establishment of a period of hegemony or hegemonic domination.36

The coercive element is not merely punitive, it does not merely struggle against 'dangerousness' and punish. It must also 'educate' when consent has failed, prodding the dominated classes towards a 'new type or level of civilisation'.37 The State operates according to a plan, urges, incites, solicits and 'punishes' ... The Law is the repressive and negative aspect of the entire positive, civilising activity undertaken by the State.38

Here the State performs its work on behalf of the capitalist system, 'first, by destroying those structures, relations, customs, traditions which, deriving from the past, from past modes of life, stand in the way, fetter and constrain capital's "free development"; second, it performs the work of actively tutoring, forming, shaping, cultivating, soliciting and educating the emergent classes to the new social relations - which enable capitalist accumulation and production to begin 'freely' to unroll'.39

Hegemonic 'balance', however, is a condition seldom, if ever, attained - particularly in peripheral States under First World capitalist domination. Within the ranks of the urban proletariat opposition to the regime is ever-present, leading to a struggle which, in gramscian terms, can be seen as a 'war of fixed position'. It's challenge is not necessarily decisive, but simply ties down the State's resources, 'immobilising hegemony' within civil society. (A further stage is reached when these positions lose their value, and only decisive positions are at stake. The struggle is then set to pass over into siege warfare: a war of movement.)40)
A hegemonic crisis comes about

either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses (war, for example), or because huge masses... have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, add up to revolution. 41

There can be two 'moments' in this crisis - conjunctural and organic. Conjunctural movements tend to be superstructural and do not have far-reaching historical significance... 'they give rise to political criticism of a minor, day-to-day character, which has as its subject top political leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities.' 42

However organic phenomena are deeper. They involve wider groupings, are more permanent and go beyond public figures. Efforts by the State to solve an organic crisis cannot merely be to conserve or defend a position. They will be formative:

a new balance of forces, the emergence of new elements, the attempt to put together a new 'historical bloc', new political configurations and 'philosophies', a profound restructuring of the State and the ideological discourse which construct the crisis and represent it as it is 'lived' as a practical reality; new programs and policies, pointing to a new result, a new sort of 'settlement' - 'within certain limits'. These do not emerge: they have to be constructed... The 'swing to the right' is not a reflection of the crisis: it is itself a response to the crisis. 43

The outcome of such a struggle will depend on conditions particular to each State at its precise moment in history. But a loss of hegemony by the dominant classes is by no means assured. This is only one possible outcome. Another can be that the traditional ruling class retains power in an altered form.
It has, after all 'numerous trained cadres, (it) changes men and programmes and, with greater speed than is achieved by the subordinate classes, (it) reabsorbs the control that was slipping from its grasp. Perhaps it may make sacrifices, and expose itself to an uncertain future by demagogic promises; but it retains power, reinforces it for the time being, and uses it to crush its adversary and disperse his leading cadres.'

Another possible outcome is what Gramsci calls 'Caesarism': a balance of the forces of opposition which allows the rise of a single powerful individual. (This was a path recommended by the State-appointed President's Council in 1982 when faced with splits in the ruling National Party.)

It was fears of a movement towards liberalization by the State in the late 1940s - a State facing seemingly incurable contradictions - that was to break up the ruling class alliance represented by the United Party. In order that capital accumulation could freely unroll a new balance of forces was necessary, a restructuring of the State 'within limits'. The ideological labour necessary to rework the ruling class alliance into a new configuration had been going on within the Broederbond since 1919. The National Party victory in 1948 and the subsequent swing to the right into 'law and order' was a political response to the crisis. Immediately new policies and directives began to be hammered out.

These emerged, among other things, as the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), the Registration Act (1950) to classify South Africans into racial categories, the Immorality Act (1950) the tough Criminal Law Amendment and Public Safety Acts (1952), the Group Areas Act (1950), the Rent Control Act (1950) and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (1951). The degree of force implicit in these directives was not without its dangers - particularly because of the massive restructuring of civil society that they entailed. And the hard line was merely sweeping under the rug - albeit with a very stiff and effective broom - the structural problems of the urban proletariat and of the declining
reserves. But it was effective in the short run, putting a lid on rising African political demands (a process which had culminated, by the early 1960s, in the banning of the leading African nationalist organisations) and, most important, disorganising the African working class while driving down the wage bill. This also meant rising profits, and on this basis the South African economy settled into a long-term expansion, muting potential contradictions within capital and smoothing the way for monopoly holdings. After 1940, capital found that apartheid worked; and the bill would not come due for two decades. One of the cornerstones of the new hard line was the garrisoning of racial groups into separate spatial areas - into rural Bantustans or urban group areas. These initiatives were merely reworkings of older ideas, but with a sharper juridical edge. In the end they were to serve capital well.

**THE ORIGINS OF URBAN RACIAL SEGREGATION**

It is necessary to backtrack slightly at this point. From the beginnings of urban growth after the discovery of gold, voices could be heard in South Africa clamouring for urban land separation and economic protection from people of 'colour'. Until the 1940s these pressure groups - mainly traders and workers of European origin - were given only passing attention by governments dominated by mining or agricultural interests. The main focus for these pressure groups - constituted as town councils, tenants associations and chambers of commerce - was in Natal. Here people from India, brought to the country in 1860 as indentured labour for the sugar plantations, were coming to dominate the strata of small traders and shopkeepers.

As far back as 1884, evidence to the Wragg Commission had called for repatriation of Indians as well as trade and residential segregation - 'preferably outside the limits of the city'. In 1893 Natal was granted responsible government and three years later the Natal Parliament deprived Indians of the franchise. In 1897 the Natal Witness, representing white business interests, urged that separate locations be established for Indians.
The same year the mayors of Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Newcastle petitioned the Colonial Secretary to stop the acquisition of land by Indians, but this was refused. In 1906 Indians were obliged to carry signed Passes, a measure designed to inhibit their movements. This measure was fought by way of widespread passive resistance campaigns. In 1908 the Powell Committee submitted its report which included claims by white shopkeepers that they were being undercut by Indian shopkeepers. They declared that:

the Indian represents a lower standard of civilisation than their own; that he lives negatively; is poorly housed; pays his staff (generally his family) at a rate at which Europeans could not live; and consequently compels European competitors to close their doors.

In essence, white shopkeepers were unable to compete with the lower cost of living and extensive labour available within large Indian extended families.

In 1909 the Clayton Commission into Indian immigration found that 'in the interests of the superior races of South Africa, it will never be possible to have white and black races labouring side by side upon the same class of work'. In 1922 the Durban Council restricted the sale of property under its jurisdiction to whites only (Ordinance 14) and the following year this was extended to all Natal towns by Ordinance 15.

In the Transvaal a parallel to the Natal Wragg Commission was Law 3 of 1885 (the Gold Law). It sought to implement trade protection from Asians by ordering that they could only own property in special streets and locations. This gave rise to a system of 'Asian bazaars' in Transvaal towns. The stated reason for the law was 'to preserve adequate standards of sanitation'. In the Orange Free State legislation was passed in 1885 preventing Indians from owning any property or conducting business. However within the Cape Colony Asians were not restricted from property apart from within the borders of the Transkei and Griqualand, within the area of the East London municipality.
The culmination of white trader pressure against Asians in the early period was contained in the Lange Commission of 1921 (UG/4). In its findings it:

strongly recommended that some system of separate areas should be introduced both in the Transvaal and Natal...

Such a scheme will tend to ensure the removal of Asians from the immediate vicinity of European traders.

The Commission received complaints that Asians depreciated the value of an area by their presence, and that Asian assistants in shops were 'paid so little that the costs of produce sold is lowered'. The suggestion of the Commission was to institute a minimum wage for assistants.

These findings were incorporated into the Class Areas Bill which was tabled in 1924, but failed to become law. The full title of the Bill made its intentions clear: 'To make provision for the segregation of residential and trading areas in urban areas for persons, other than "Natives", having racial characteristics in common'. By 'class', the Bill meant:

any person having, in the opinion of the Minister, common racial characteristics, but does not include European persons, persons commonly described as Cape coloured persons and natives as that term is defined in Section 29 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, 1923 (paragraph 18).

It sought to give local authorities the right to declare certain urban areas closed to certain races for residential or trading rights. And it suggested a 'freeze' on the sale of properties in such an area pending the outcome of a Government Commission decision on the application.

The Bill gave rise to a storm of protest from Indians in Natal and elsewhere. Within a few months of the Bill's appearance the government changed hands in an election, and it failed to reach the Statute Book. The following year the Bill reappeared in slightly altered form in the Areas' Reservation Bill, but this was not passed either.
The reasons given for the failure of both Bills to become law was that between the governments of South Africa and India an agreement had been reached leading to a conference on the 'Indian question'. This amounted to an Imperial veto of the Bills because the agreement drawn up at the conference in 1926 did little more than confirm the status quo.

In fact, however, the class fraction clamouring for protection from Asians had neither sufficient economic strength nor political clout in the new Pact government to force its position. The result was that the two Bills were shelved - but not forgotten.

**'PENETRATION' AND THE Ghetto ACT**

The next phase in the fight for the racial partition of land took place between 1924 and 1946, the year in which the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act was passed. During this period the economic struggle of the traders was broadened by the crisis of falling property rates in the inner cities and an ideological assault on people not considered 'European'. The effect was to include white workers under the banner of urban land segregation, deflecting their grievances from the structures of capitalist exploitation towards the 'black threat' of migration into the cities.

Between 1924 and 1946, as we have seen, great social changes took place in the country. Following a five-year drought and an economic depression in 1930, thousands of workers and farmers were driven off the land and into towns. This period marks the transition of the composition of District Six from a largely Central European population to one comprised mainly of an indigenous proletariat.

Alongside rising inner-city population numbers were opportunities for 'informal sector' activities. This drastically increased competition for white traders, particularly in Durban and on the Reef. So while the industrialists prospered, small traders faced shrinking incomes. Their elected local authorities, meanwhile,
were confronted with the spectre of rising costs of services in the ghettos. The demand for urban racial segregation began to grow.

In 1930 a Select Commission, with witnesses drawn from small white businesses, white tenants and city councils, favoured the segregation of Asians in the Transvaal. These findings led to the drafting of a Bill, but this was again vetoed by Imperial intervention in the form of the Round Table Conference in 1932. However the same year in which the Commission sat, white women were given the vote. This rendered ineffective the vote of people defined as coloureds who were later disenfranchised, and consolidated in 1971 when they were removed from the municipal voting rolls. Following the Round Table Conference there were five Commissions of Inquiry on the 'penetration' of people of colour into white areas. All but one recommended curbs on Asian or coloured land ownership and racial segregation. In addition there were three Select Committees on the issue, all favouring land segregation.

What is notable about these inquiries is the sources from which their information came. Submissions were drawn mainly from city and town councils (their members generally representing small business or white ratepayers), white tenants and ratepayers associations, chambers of commerce, provisional councils, licencing boards, and 'ministers (of a church) in charge of coloured labour'. In 1937 the Commission Regarding the Cape Coloured Population suggested that coloureds should be provided with segregated townships. In 1939 the Afrikaner Peoples' Economic Congress met to seek solutions for the protection of poor Afrikaners and small Afrikaner businessmen. Its findings were fed back into its umbrella organisation, the Broederbond, and disseminated through the Bond's numerous ideological outlets. The same year (1939) the Prime Minister, General Hertzog, referred to the possibility of introducing legislation to enforce compulsory segregation between coloureds and whites. In 1944 a Commission met to consider 'mixed' marriages between whites and other races.
This was to have wider consequences two years later. In 1947 the Fagan Commission into migrant labour and influx control was presented. Its position was ambivalent, reflecting the crisis of hegemony within the ruling class alliance - urban migration had to be halted, and yet the mines and industry needed black labour. By bowing to both industry and to white workers it satisfied neither, and cost the government the confidence of white agriculture. This, together with white worker and trader dissatisfaction over the Ghetto Act, lost the 1948 election for the United Party, with critical defections in 36 seats.

The election won political power for 'Afrikaner' workers, farmers and the shopkeeper class. The result was that after 1948 the struggle over urban space took on an overtly political form, with powerful weapons drawn from an armoury of Parliamentary Acts, from the police and from the courts.

AFRIKANER HEGEMONY AND THE GROUP AREAS ACT

In 1942 the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut was formed, representing small-scale capital. Two years later its chairman was warning about the dangers of monopoly involvement, and by the end of the war the strategy of Afrikaner upliftment via the expansion of small-scale business (volkskapitalisme) had begun to founder. The petty-bourgeois vision of large-scale advance through the development of small undertakings was beginning to look like a utopian dream. Smaller businesses were in no position to challenge Imperial Capital directly, they had to travel by an alternative, more political way.

One route was to intensify exploitation of the black proletariat, ensuring a degree of competitive survival in the face of monopoly capital. It is notable that in the post-war period the only time black wages in manufacturing declined was immediately after the Nationalist Party victory - a reduction of 5 percent between 1948 and 1952.
COLOURED
GROUP AREAS

LAY QUARTER
LIMER ESTATE
SINGTON
ENGEL
LOME
GETTOWN, NEW TOWN,
VERTOWN
GRAVIA & SUNRYSIDE
LIVILE SOUTH
FIELDS
LYN
NOVER PARK
WINDOWNS
GUARD
REY ESTATE
VENBERG
ERNWOOD PARK
IDEVELED
CENTEUWEL
SIE RIVER
ATROSFONTEIN
SHOP LAVIS
DITGEDACHT
LHAR

BLOUBERSSTRAAT
CAPE TOWN
KAAPSTAD
TABLE BAY
TAALBAAL

SEAL ISLAND

24 RUIJSRIVER
25 WYNBERG
26 PARKWOOD
27 GRASSY PARK Ext.
& LOTUS RIVER
28 GRASSY PARK
29 HEATHFIELD
30 RETREAT NORTH
31 RETREAT SOUTH
32 STEENBERG
33 HOUT BAY
34 OCEAN VIEW
35 DURBANVILLE
36 SCOTTSVILLE
37 SCOTSDENE
38 CLOATESVILLE
39 IDASVALLEY
40 EERSTE RIVER
41 MITCHELLS PLAIN
42 MACASSAN
43 FIREROVE
44 STRAND
45 RAVENSMED
Another route was to remove the possibility of competition from Asian and Coloured entrepreneurs. Indeed the physical removal of all 'non-white' people from the cities would serve the interest of both white entrepreneurs and workers, the class base of the new coalition government.

In a narrow economic sense, this called for direct coercion from the State in order to maintain conditions which would ensure the survival of the Afrikaner 'volk'. This situation ensured, also, that these functions of the State remained close to the surface in every struggle over wages.

The first actions of the new government in 1948 were therefore to tighten the Pass Laws and to announce an inquiry into the Ghetto Act. The result of this inquiry was the Joint Report of the Asiatic Land Tenure Laws Amendments Committee and the Land Tenure Act Amendments Committee (UG 49, 1950).

The first three chapters of the report were never made public, but in the final two chapters can be found the keystone of spatial apartheid. They were drafted by D S van der Merwe and Gabriel de Vos Hugo, assisted by the Attorney-General of Natal (WJ McKenzie) and the Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg (Ryle Masson). Of van der Merwe little information is available other than that he was chairman of the Group Areas Board, from which he resigned in 1951. De Vos Hugo had an impeccable Afrikaner background. He graduated from Stellenbosch University and studied religion in Amsterdam. Before the war he was a Nationalist Party organiser on the Witwatersrand and fought against dual-medium (English/Afrikaans) schools. He became chairman of the Krugergenootskap and of the Instituut vir Christelike Nationale Onderwys, an offshoot of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuur, a Broederbond organisation. His work was strongly influenced by the Sauer Report on the 'colour question'.

In its recommendations the Joint Report ignored the smaller issue of Asian rights, claiming that the 'problem' was a national one and should be dealt with uniformly.
throughout the country. Reviewing preceding Commissions and Reports, it concluded that the demands for territorial racial segregation had for too long been ignored. It is interesting that it grounded its decision to include all coloureds in its recommendations on the basis of 'widespread suggestions that coloureds should be brought within the control of the Act... in Natal'. Inter-racial 'tension and strife' were seen as the basis of racial separation:

We see no way of attaining (the avoidance of civil commotions) except to legislate for total territorial segregation of the different racial groups, so that in the course of time homogenous racial group areas are brought about' (paragraph 333).

On the type of group areas there were two possible solutions:

One is that there should be total segregation of the various racial groups into fairly large areas of the Union with the possibility that eventually these large areas will become separate non-European States under the suzerainty of the Union. The other is that there should be total territorial segregation on a small scale, particularly in the urban areas. This means that the penetrated areas should be cleared up by uprooting non-European ownership and occupation segregating such ownership and occupation into the various non-European racial group areas... These two points of view are not mutually inconsistent and the one may be regarded as the ultimate aim and possible outcome of the other. (paragraph 334).

The sensitive issue of 'Bantustan' partition, however, was not yet within reach of the new government, given rising black aspirations and the narrow parliamentary majority of the late 1940s:

In the evidence received we can find no substantial support for the view that what is now desired is few and large areas. Public opinion has not yet progressed to this stage. In our opinion, however, there is ample support of the view that there should be more and smaller racial group areas. (paragraph 335. Emphasis added)
"DISTRICT SIX is gone. Will Bo-Kaap be next?"

This is what Schotcheskloof residents are asking. They are asking this because they are seeing all the signs of a plan that will force them to move.

Home owners have already been forced to sell their homes to the council. No improvements are being made in the area.

Again and again, the council refuses to allow people to buy houses and vacant land. Even providing a rent office is too big an effort for the council — the people pay their rent through the caretaker's bedroom window.

The council says they have no money for Schotcheskloof.

The people do not believe the council. They say the council wants to move them into the bush because they cannot move them further up the hill.

“Our forefathers lived in the centre of town,” they say. “Keerom Street, Loop Street and Long Street were where we used to live. But then the Supreme Court and other businesses took over the land.” The people had to move up to Signal Hill.

In the fifties, a section of Bo-Kaap was declared white. More than 100 families were forced to move elsewhere in Bo-Kaap or out to the Cape Flats. At the time, the people had no strong organisation through which they could organise resistance.

Today, the Schotcheskloof Civic Association, leads the people in their struggle for the right to live in the area.

At a public meeting recently, more than 300 people decided that they would have no further dealings with the city council.

The people clearly have no confidence in the council. They have resolved to have meetings with other residents before any approach be made to council.
Racial divisions were to be made merely for reasons of bureaucratic necessity:

The population of the Union should, for the purposes of the proposed legislation, be classified into racial groups and the lines of demarcation between the different groups should be clearly drawn in order to minimise administrative difficulties. We visualise the following groups, namely; the white group and the non-European groups of Natives (with sub-groups, if necessary), Coloureds and Asiatics, and perhaps the Malay Group. (paragraph 336).

Virtually all recommendations within the Report were translated into the Group Areas Act of 1950.59 A feature of the parliamentary debate on the Group Areas Bill was the unanimity with which the opposition parties - the United Party and the Labour Party - approached racial segregation. Their only objection was over the method of application. The mayor of Durban, Percy Osborn, said the Act 'fitted very nicely with the city's plans'.60

The older inner-city ghettos with their maze of narrow alleys which adjoined white residential or business areas were to be systematically razed. Among their sins was that of being military hazards. In the words of Pierre van den Berghe they were to be replaced with

model townships with unobstructed, rectilinear fields of fire, and wide streets for the passage of police vans and armoured cars. The new ghettos are typically situated several miles from white towns, with a buffer zone in between; they are sprinkled with strategically located police stations, and often enclosed by barbed wire.61

The legislative foundations for the construction of defensive cities had been laid.
CHAPTER 4 : NOTES


3. See particularly the Beaudouin Report for the Foreshore, City Council, 1940.


7. UG 40/41 par. 37 Quoted in Bloch, op cit p 85.


15. Whittingdale, op cit p 150.


18. Ibid p 2
20. These figures come from available Cape Peninsula directories from 1912 to 1973.
21. From the Coloured People, p 17, in the Wollheim collection, University of Cape Town BC 627 Fl-4-11. Probably written by Dr O Wollheim.
22. Ibid p 17.
23. The Efficacy of Coloured labour. In: Long term development of Western Cape, N.D.M.F. Cape Western Region seminar, Cape Town May 16 and 17 1973 p 36. Divisional Council Data Bank. The high levels of absenteeism and resignations - almost half the total clothing industry every six months or 200 a month - was one of the major reasons given by the industry for mechanisation.
31. Ibid p 177
32. Ibid p 12
33. Ibid p 239
34. Stuart Hall et al: Policing the Crisis p 198.
35. Hall, Ibid p 197
38. Ibid p 247.
39. Hall p 208
40. Gramsci p 239.
41. Gramsci, Ibid p 210
42. Gramsci Ibid p 177
45. Reported on page 5 of UG 49-50.
47. Select Committee on Asiatic Grievances, Al6 1908.
49. Feetham Commission (1932), Commission regarding the Cape Coloured Population (1937). Murray Commission(1939), Broome Commission (1942). Post-war works and reconstruction commission (1943). Only the 1939 Commission (Transvaal) found no need for curbs. However the same year the Cape Municipal Congress favoured the segregation of racial areas.
50. The Select Committees of 1936 and 1937 as well as the Select Committee of Natal Provincial Council in 1943.
51. The submission of this last category was notable in the Feetham Commission.
52. See Maasdorp and Pillay, op cit, p 91.
53. Trading and Occupation of Land (Transvaal and Natal) Restriction Act, 1943.
54. Maasdorp and Pillay, op cit, p 91.
55. See Bloch, op cit p 96.

59. The same year the Afrikaner People's Economic Congress met amid 'optimism and confidence' - Maasdorp and Pillay p 95.

60. The Torch, April 24 1951.

If the developments of the 1940s were to provide the framework necessary to turn a city into a garrison, it was left to the local boys to fill in the details. They, in turn, drew heavily on 'overseas' precedents and planning ideologies. What is of interest here is why they chose the plans they did, when they did, and what their priorities were. A good starting point is the Foreshore reclamation scheme. Although it was not the first of the imported urban dreams, it certainly informed the 'urban renewal' schemes which were to follow.

THE GREU LE CORBUSIAN DISASTER

In 1935 the South African Railways announced a plan to construct the Duncan Dock, a project that would reclaim from the Sea 480 acres adjacent to the inner city. The area was offered to the City Council for development. Dredging began in 1938 and the Council planners submitted their scheme for consideration. The Railways were not satisfied with the plan, which had to site the new station and goods yards in the area as well, and appointed two advisers, F Longstreth Thompson from London and LW Thornton White of the University of Cape Town. The City Council, from its side, engaged the services of no less than the chief architect to the French government, Eugene Beaudouin. Both parties submitted their proposals in mid-1940. The main objectives of both plans, apart from the siting of the station and the provision of roads and parks, were

(a) the construction of a Monumental Approach from the Harbour to the heart of the city. This is an essential component in the conception of Cape Town as the 'Gateway of South Africa'.
DIAGRAM SHOWING RELATION BETWEEN FORESHORE AREA AND CITY 1947

THE MOUNTAIN AMPHITHEATRE

RECLAIMED AREA
BUILT-UP AREA
RELEASED AREA
CENTRAL BUSINESS AREA
1940 Railways plan for Central Cape Town

POINT PON

DUNCAN DOCK

TABLE
1940 proposals for the Cape Town Foreshore by Longstreth-Thompson and Thornton-White
Perspective of the Grand Boulevard
Cape Town Foreshore Scheme 1940
Baudouin's report, which was never made public, included several considerations not mentioned in the Railways proposal:

The scheme will... affect the following sites: The spaces involved in the following proposed Slum Clearance Projects:

(a) District Six
(b) Malay Quarters
(c) Docks Area...

The replanning of District Six will present an opportune occasion for (the extension of a freeway towards the Cape Flats) which in no way interferes with the activity of Sir Lowry Road. On the west... it will be possible, at the right time, to undertake the planning of the slums of the Malay Quarters and the Docks...

Having fixed the position of the town from the geographic and economic points of view, its defence is now the important matter for consideration. Its protection against external and internal attack must be planned for. This has been taken into account and two large rectilinear open spaces are proposed in the layout, with due regard to the dominant positions surrounding them. This question has been carefully examined and studied...

The Castle... represents a historical monument of the highest order. It is a symbolic witness that must be carefully preserved in the new layout...

The fate of District Six had thus been planned 26 years before it was publicly announced! A dispute then ensued between the Railways and the Council over the siting of the new station. It was finally resolved when the Railways agreed to sink the station below ground to avoid restricting the Monumental Approach. The agreed-upon plans were published in 1947, and building began.
Great blocks of curtain-wall glass offices, what Lewis Mumford calls 'vertical filing cabinets', began to appear. By 1951 the plan had run into problems and changes were recommended by the City Engineer. In 1962 the Shand Committee, appointed by the Administrator as consultants for road and traffic planning, recommended that a solution to the growing traffic problem would be the construction of elevated roads across the Foreshore between the city and the sea. These were duly constructed, slicing through what remained of the Monumental Approach and cutting off central Cape Town from the ocean. (The hangover of the enormous costs involved remains today, with bits of half-constructed elevated freeway dangling in the air and blocked off by barrels.)

In his analysis of the Foreshore in 1966, Roelof Uyttenbogaardt observed that 'the impossibility of reconciling the requisites of a Monumental Approach with actual demands is demonstrated very clearly by the departures that have been made from the 1947 plan and by the urgent problems at hand which cannot be solved within its framework'.

These problems were not simply architectural. By the 1960s Cape Town was declining in relation to other economic regions, especially the Witwatersrand, with a relative fall-off of productive output. By the 1980s the city was also experiencing a slump in tourist trade and shipping. Writing in the Cape Times in August 1982, Brian Barrow observed that Table Bay harbour, one of South Africa's major ports and once a lively Tavern of the Seas of international repute on one of the busiest ocean routes, has been reduced to a ghost of its former self by radically-changed trends in shipping and cargo operations and by depressed economies around the globe. The effects of long spells of near-emptiness in a large part of the harbour that once bustled with the colourful comings and goings of passengers and cargo liners from all parts of the world have been felt throughout the economy of the Western Cape.
Final report of the Cape Town Foreshore Joint Technical Committee, June 1947
Passed in May 1946
An artist's impression of Cape Town from the Maritime Terminal based on the 1947 Plan (B.S. Cooke)
An artist's impression of the intersection of the Grand Boulevard and the Monumental Approach based on the 1947 Plan (B.S. Cooke)
Between 1972 and 1982 the number of ocean-going vessels using the harbour decreased by 50 percent. And between 1977 and 1982 the annual gross tonnage of ships handled by the port fell by 20 million as containerisation grew.\(^6\) Williams complained that 'the general public is becoming less and less a part of the harbour scene and... no move has been made by the authorities to return to the public of Cape Town some of the considerable expanse of Table Bay shoreline that has been devoured by harbour developments...'.\(^7\)

What is of interest to this study, however, is not so much that the great Foreshore scheme went awry but that it was the product of a particular planning ideology. It was this, in the end, which was to have far more impact on the city than the dredging of Table Bay. One of the features of the Foreshore plan was the unquestioning acceptance of the ideas of the Swiss planner Le Corbusier. Above all other things, Le Corbusier was the urban planner of monopoly capital, and was feted by the emerging Modern Movement in the architecture of the 1930s. His plans were the most advanced and formally elevated hypotheses of bourgeois culture in the field of architectural design. (In Paris, where he worked, his formalism was rejected by French marxists as the 'spatial expression of the bourgeoisie'.\(^8\) The house, for Le Corbusier was a machine for living in, to be mass-produced like a tool.

The city of today is dying (he wrote in 1929) because it is not constructed geometrically. To build on a clear site is to replace the 'accidental' layout of the ground, the only one that exists today, by the formal layout. Otherwise nothing can save us. And the consequence of geometrical plans is Repetition and Mass-production. And as a consequence of repetition, the standard is created, and so perfection (the creation of types). Repetition dominates everything. We are unable to produce industrially at normal prices without it... my 'cellular' system for dwellings anticipates the problem of mass-production. If only the captains of industry would examine these plans they would see immense scope in these suggestions.'\(^9\)
For these captains Le Corbusier designed huge free-standing mushroom-construction flats surrounded by manicured greenery.

In terms of town planning (he wrote with candid honesty) the flat may be considered as a cell. Cells, as a consequence of our social order, are subject to various forms of grouping, to co-optations or to antagonisms which are an essential part of the urban phenomenon... It is possible by a logically conceived ordering of these cells to attain freedom through order. 10

With tireless energy Le Corbusier engaged in a seamless web of total design from wristwatch to region. He planned bombable blocks of flats, the minimum living cell for workers (14m²), the Volkswagen beetle, vast running constructions which incorporated worker housing under freeways and in bridges, and grands ensembles of 'graph paper' flats. In 1939 he was active in founding the Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM) which was to determine a minimum standard for worker dwellings. His Ville Contemporaine is described by Kenneth Frampton in Modern Architecture as 'an elite capitalist city of administration and control, with garden cities for the workers being sited, along with industry, beyond the "security zone" of green belt encompassing the city'. 11 The Indian capital of Chandigarh, which Le Corbusier designed and built, came to be seen as 'a tragedy... a city designed for automobiles in a country where many, as yet, still lack a bicycle'. 12

In the Athens Charter, put together by the CIAM conference held in 1933 under Le Corbusier's tutelage, the means was documented by which the planners' grand design could be put into effect:

The ruthless violence of private interests provokes a disastrous upset in the balance between the thrust of economic forces on the one hand and the weakness of administrative control and the powerlessness of social security on the other.

The suburb... is a kind of scum churning against the walls of the city. The abode of an unsettled population enmeshed in numerous afflictions.
To ensure the city the means of a harmonious development, the Administration must take responsibility for the management of the land surrounding the city before the suburbs spring up.

(What is needed is) a political power... clear sighted, with earnest conviction, and determined to achieve those improved living conditions that have been worked out and set down on paper; an enlightened population that will understand, desire, and demand what the specialists have envisaged for it...

The city will take on the character of an enterprise that has been carefully studied in advance and subjected to the rigor of an overall plan. Intelligent forecasts will have sketched its future...

Le Corbusier's central directive for city development must have a familiar ring about it for those who witnessed the destruction of District Six:

Surgery must be applied to the city's centre. Physic must be used elsewhere. We must use the knife...

Le Corbusian town planning emerged in South Africa with a bang at the Town Planning Congress held in Escom House, Johannesburg, in 1938. Of the six exhibits on display, four were Le Corbusier's (he sent a letter of encouragement to the Congress), one was of a 'Native Township' and the sixth was a model for the replanning of central Cape Town.

'At this congress,' said speaker Norman Hanson, 'we pay a tribute to the colossal achievements in creative thought of Le Corbusier, from whose expositions and guiding principles we have taken our line of attack.' The designs for Cape Town showed huge free-standing slab-constructions marching from the docks towards the mountain. District Six was planned out of existence, replaced by a single hotel surrounded by a vast acreage of greenery. The whole of Woodstock and Salt River had disappeared under huge Le Corbusian 'redant' blocks of worker 'cells'.
Adderley Street: A perspective view of the 1938 Congress Scheme
Part of the 1938 Congress Scheme for central Cape Town
It is the task of the architect (said W Gordon McIntosch in the spirit of the Congress) to sweep aside the clogging forces preventing growth.  

The spirit of the congress was unambiguously colonialist. Introducing the Cape Town plans, Norman Hanson observed that

National sentiment fixes Cape Town as the focal point of South African history and character. White civilisation gained its first hazardous foothold on that southern peninsula, and from there it has spread in successive waves into the great hinterland. The atmosphere and character that time alone can create can be sensed where man has established himself along the sculpturalsque lower slopes of Table Mountain.

In true Le Corbusian style, the planning was to be uncompromising. There are, he said

two possible methods to the replanning of the centres of cities. The first of these ruthlessly imposes a plan on what exists, the second allows the inherited plan to dictate the form and arrangement of any projected scheme. The latter - the plan of perpetual compromise - is choked in itself by the ever-present forces of sentiment, insularity or parochialism and short-sightedness... we have named this the Palliative Method. When however the life and future greatness of a town is to be considered we must concentrate our first activities at the city's centre, so that freedom of movement, accessibility and breathing space can be restored where they are vital. It is possible to achieve this radical re-organisation by drastic methods only, by a fresh start on cleared ground. This ruthless eradication directed towards a re-vitalising process we have, following Le Corbusier's lead, named the Surgical Method... through surgery we must create order, through organisation we must make manifest the spirit of a new age... with the calm and balance established by ordered planning, significant advances in the nation's welfare are possible - material things, industry, commerce....
Of course, in an economy based on the private ownership of property, the problem of ploughing up cities in the name of good planning would give rise to problems over who would exercise the authority. 'If town planning is to consist in the direction and control of the ecological organisation and location of urban communities,' asked a sociologist at the Congress, BA Farrell, 'who is to do the directing and controlling? It may, for example, be the case that town planning, at least on any extensive scale, is incompatible with every form of governmental organisation except Facist regimentation'. He answered his own question, however, by suggesting the formation of a State Planning Department and 'the compulsory purchase of the land by public authorities'.

Professor Thornton-White, who was later to become part of the Foreshore planning tribunal, suggested a combination of two possible solutions to the ordering of urban space - a centralised 'vertical town' on Le Corbusian lines with roof gardens, and a 'horizontal town', 'a ring of satellite towns or communities of 40 000 people, several miles apart, interconnected by planned rapid transport and centred about a cultural or civic centre...'

Between the planning of the Foreshore, the destruction of inner-city working class communities and the construction of housing estates was a clear straight line.

Two years later Thornton-White was to co-submit proposals for the Foreshore based on aggressive Le Corbusian lines, incorporating many of the ideas of the Congress, with a Monumental Approach and a Grand Boulevard so wide that in a stiff southeaster it could take five minutes to cross the road on foot. In 1948 he was to produce Nairobi: master plan for a colonial city on the lines of Paris, Washington and Canberra. Each road would have served as an aircraft runway... in a country where many considered a motor car with awe.
NAIROBI: Master plan for a colonial capital by L.W. Thornton-White, L Liberman, P.K. Anderson (1948)
THE GARDEN CITIES THAT WENT WRONG

The above detour into the Foreshore scheme has been necessary to underline the fact that post-war urban re-planning was not merely 'Afrikaner racism' and a 'frontier mentality', as many liberal writers have suggested. It was rather a spatial response to the development of monopoly capital on a world scale. Because of this, First World planning ideology could be swallowed, undigested, in the re-development of a colonial city on the southern tip of Africa, without much more than a blink. However, the sterilisation of the inner city on the scale envisaged by the Group Areas Act was to lead to immense problems over where to house the thousands of people it was to displace. Added to this was the post-war crisis of urbanward migration. In an attempt to solve the problem, both State and local authority planners again turned to the industrialised nations for a solution. Again, local conditions were to give this solution a vicious twist. The template for the new working class ghettos was, ironically, to be the English garden city, or in Professor Thornton-White's words, a 'ring of satellite towns served by a rapid transport network'.

On reflection it is obvious why the garden city or ex-urban cluster became the predominant township form in South Africa. As early as the Bronze Age, clusters were built outside cosmological cities, marking the division between the priests and 'other people'. In the second millennium BC Assyrian traders had to stay outside the city walls in 'karum' clusters because they were 'foreigners' bound by no local loyalty oath. Satellite clusters developed faster during Roman world domination because, in the words of Sibyl Moholy-Nagy in Matrix of Man, 'the more stratified an urban society, the more rigid are its discriminatory laws'. The cives 'a strictly nationalistic hierarchy of military and administrative delegates from the capital', were not prepared to share the city they governed with the native inhabitants (incolae) who were expelled to the vicus canaborn or land belt.
A Roman ex-urban cluster outside the city walls where travellers and workmen were forced to live.

A development of the Roman town: St Gallen, Switzerland, in the 5th century AD with the monastic town (left) clearly separated from the merchant/artisan town (right).

(Source: S Moholy-Nagy: Matrix of Man)
The Christians and Moslems were to inherit from Rome not only Roman Law and the influence of 'Romanesque' architecture, but many of the prejudices of imperialism, tolerating people of other races and other faiths, but excluding them from all civil rights. The social stigma attached to the cluster, whether outside the city gates or inside, found its strongest expression in the Jewish ghetto of the medieval city. In 1555 a papal bull proscribed any proximity between Jews and gentiles, creating the ghetto as an outcast community enclosed by walls, the gates of which were locked at night and on Christian holidays.26

The exclusion of the 'unclean' was to affect other groups as well. In 1514 the wealthy banking and trading house of Fuggers built a 'charity cluster' in Augsburg. It was surrounded by a wall and closed off from the city, by three locked gates. Christopher Wren constructed a similar establishment in London in 1680 to house the widows and orphans of seamen.27 Gradually, however, the poor were being let into the inner city. During the Industrial Revolution the cluster concept came to be applied mainly to industry. The dirtiest and noisiest industries were required to move to the city outskirts, as had the tanners and stonemasons of the Middle Ages, laying the foundations of the industrial cluster. An exception was the company housing scheme. Probably the earliest example of this was Port Sunlight, built in 1887 outside Liverpool by the Lever family.28 The street system was completely unrelated to the buildings, and the houses formed independent insulae, with no orientation towards each other or towards the city centre. This idea was followed by the Krupps ammunition dynasty which built two employee clusters in Essen, and the Pullman's Palace Car Company which built Pullman near Chicago in the 1880s.29 These company clusters were seen, at the time, as 'prefect societies in the service of industry', an integration of town and factory with the aim of maximum productive efficiency. However they often failed because of the politicising effect on workers of the massive control centralised in the
company bosses. In 1894 Pullman's factory ground to a halt in a sustained strike that was to collapse the very concept of the company town. More subtle methods of spatial control were clearly necessary. Indeed the future of the ex-urban cluster belonged to the more complex cosmological schemes of a man called Ebenezer Howard.

Reacting in fear against the rapid growth of an urban proletariat in the London inner-city of the late 19th Century, Howard developed the romantic, naturalistic notion of the Garden City. It was essentially decentralist and strictly controlled in terms of size and layout. In the words of a supporter it was 'a marriage of town and country, of rustic health and sanity and activity and urban knowledge, urban technical facility, urban political co-operation'. The urban historian Lewis Mumford describes Howard's plan as an attempt to 'canalize the flow of population, directing it from the existing centres to new centres... decentralising industry and setting up both city and industry within a rural matrix' surrounded by a belt of green vegetation. Mumford considered the Garden City to be one of the 'two great new inventions' of the early 20th Century, the other being the aeroplane. Howard's plans were taken up by a wealthy London architect, Raymond Unwin, who planned and built Letchworth and Welwyn Garden City – both medium-density areas made up of tiny medieval farmhouses around dead-end lanes. But to the dismay of its more purist adherents, the garden city dream was soon to be co-opted by suburbia.

The early European and American suburbs had been a form of romantic middle-class escape, a sort of asylum for the preservation of an illusion and a nursery for children.

There is no police so effective (wrote Emerson in 1865) as a good hill and wide pasture in the neighbourhood of a village, where the boys can run and play and dispose of their superfluous strength and spirits.
Howard and Unwin had showed, however, that the ex-urban cluster need not be an upper-class luxury, a lesson which was not lost on the British government of the 1930s. In 1938 the Green Belt Act was passed, and on its principles the Bressy-Lutyens Report proposed a complete set of rings and radials for London. In 1944 a White Paper provided for the State control of land to enable post-war reconstruction. The theoretical underpinnings were straight

Howard:

...hold the great city at its present limits by a wide green moat, and move out beyond it the constricted industries and their slum-housed workers into self-contained industrial towns...35

In 1946, under the direct influence of Letchworth and Welwyn, the New Towns Act was passed, seeking to decongest London by projecting a ring of new towns to be built around the city and in other parts of England.36 The outcome of the construction of these satellite towns has been all too familiar. In the words of the president of the Royal Institute of British Architects Lionel Esher

In the new ideology, those parts of cities that to the planner, had seemed the worst, the 'grey areas', the run-down multi-purpose semi-commercial semi-residential low-rental inner rings, were the most fully humanised. And they were the safest. These hard-won parks and play spaces (of the new areas) whose soft green shapes diversified the geometry of new housing areas were death-traps, patrolled by gangs and addicts. Children rightly preferred to play in the street (of the old areas) and on the street, overlooked by the invisible eyes of residents, all of us were safe... Having childishly overlooked the pattern (of real social movement) planners had set about transforming the city into their simplistic image, stamping with hobnailed boots on the intricate urban ecology. And for what? For 'prim dreams of pure order' that were neither desirable nor affordable.37
No. 5.

Diagram

Illustrating correct principle of a city's growth—open country ever near at hand, and rapid communication between off-shoots.

From E. Howard: Garden Cities of Tomorrow
PLAN OF LETCHWORTH

PLAN OF LETCHWORTH
Plans from the Bressy-Luytens Report for London, 1938
Eighteen years after the building of Letchworth, the idea of the garden city was to flower in South Africa. While in Britain, Richard Stuttaford, the director of a large retailing shop in Cape Town, had become 'an avid supporter of the principles outlined in Howard's *Garden Cities of Tomorrow* - a book which endowed all modern languages with the term "garden city"'.

In 1919 he wrote to the Acting Prime Minister, saying that:

> for some time in the past, and more particularly since the influenza epidemic, I have given a good deal of thought to the question of better housing accommodation for the people in our larger cities. I should like to put before you a proposal with regard to this matter, which I am prepared to support with my own money.

> ... Will you give me a quarter of an hour to discuss it with you... 39

On June 16, 1919, the House of Assembly requested of the Senate

> the withdrawal from the Uitvlugt Demarcated Forest Reserve a portion thereof, in extent 272 morgen, and grant thereof, together with a further portion, in extent 95 morgen, to the Trustees of the Garden Cities Trust, for the purpose of establishing thereon a Garden City... 40

Local designs for the scheme were submitted to Raymond Unwin, who rejected them all. A London architect was then engaged for the purposes, and the first house in the new township of Pinelands was completed in 1922.

The Trust was later to construct five other garden suburbs in the city, and their initiative instigated the Cape Ordinance for the Control of Townships (No 13 1927) which gave the Surveyor General control over township planning. According to the Trust, Pinelands
Developments along these lines have given rise to what Mumford describes as the 'motor-car culture'. The luxury was to become a necessity. 'With the destruction of walking distances', say Mumford, 'has gone the destruction of walking as a normal means of human circulation: the motor car has made it unsafe and the extension of the suburb has made it impossible'.

For those who could not afford vehicular transport, however, the distant township was to become a trap. They were imprisoned by their poverty in environments hostile to human locomotion.

This imprisonment is more real than one would imagine. In the new towns (the products of what some commentators call 'crashed train' planning because of their layout), the roads constantly looped back on each other. The idea of this was to create a 'sense of identity' among residents, a 'village effect' without through-traffic, and an 'interesting' visual experience. The Cape garden city plans were to provide a minimum of access roads to main highways - and anyway these linkages all ran across a buffer strip. In this they differed dramatically from the older suburbs. In Cape Town, for example, the old suburbs of Claremont, Wynberg and Rondebosch have, respectively 43, 52 and 38 access roads. A contrast is these new townships:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Township/area</th>
<th>No. of access roads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mitchells Plain</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manenberg</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonteheuwel</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heideveld</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinelands</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop Lavis</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guguletu/Nyanga/New Crossroads</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langa</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgetown</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Riot Policeman I spoke to was uninterested in the village effect: 'We can seal these places off in a few minutes, we know all the roads that go in'. This creation of 'policable architecture' has parallels with recent developments in Belfast, which include the 'creation of open space (free-fire zones) by the army and the 'physical removal' of modern blocks (designed by architects to make the streets 'more interesting') by the Provisional IRA, which feared they would become convenient observation posts for the army.\(^{47}\)

The overall effect of garden city planning, when applied to working class areas in Cape Town, was therefore to enclose people in hostile environments at all times, and to keep them there in times of social unrest. Attempts to 're-tribalise' coloured people in these areas crystallised in their elimination from the voters rolls and the setting up of 'local self-governmenr' in each 'new town' or 'non-white' region. By 1970 at least 208 new towns for coloureds and 76 for Asians had been proclaimed in the name of decreasing 'further friction and deterioration of human relationships' between blacks and whites.\(^{48}\) Almost all were on the outer fringes of the now 'white' cities.

**CITY COUNCIL RESISTANCE TO GROUP AREAS**

We must consider now what seems to be a paradox. The Cape Town City Council, seemingly the architects of population removals and satellite cluster development, were to take a political line opposed to group areas removals. For two decades the Council refused to draw racial area maps to facilitate group areas partition and continually refused to attend Group Area Board hearings on racial partition unless subpoenaed to do so. When pressed, Councillors pointed out that the Council had its own, less drastic, slum clearance scheme under the Slums Act and did not need the State to teach it how to do its job. In truth, of course, 'less drastic' simply meant less. The first problem of the Council, which was in principle quite willing to countenance mass removals, was simply the costs involved.
For this reason the Council had a long history of reluctance to provide worker housing on any scale, and had taken up the tasks only when driven to by some or other epidemic. The reason was that housing cost the ratepayers money, and most ratepayers with any clout were white voters. It took an epidemic that threatened to break out of the ghettos to justify expense on the working classes. With its necessarily longer view of the threat to cities from the urban poor, the State tried by carrot and stick, throughout the 1950s, to force the Cape Town City Council to undertake the housing of coloured workers moved from white group areas. Even when State funds were provided the Council resisted, because when the sums were done it was clear that the Council would be obliged to administer the housing schemes - collect the rent, maintain the estates and repay the loan to the State over a fixed period.

Another problem for councillors was the threat of the State 'stick': if the Council refused to comply with government demands, the State would usurp it power. This was the second horn of a dilemma for a council traditionally opposed to interference from 'up north', and the oldest one in existence. The fears were justified when the State began to hack away at the powers of the Council by means of legislation.

In the area of housing, the warning shots were fired in 1959 with the tabling of the Group Areas Development Bill. It contained a clause allowing the State's Development Board to appropriate properly outside a declared group area 'for the attainments of any of its objects'. This would mean the State could claim property within the Council boundary for worker housing - and then hand it over to a Management Committee under the Coloured Affairs Department. The clause was withdrawn after a howl of protest from local authorities who saw their areas of jurisdiction being chipped away by Presidential decree. But they were warned by the Minister that the clause would be re-inserted if local authorities (and particularly Cape Town) refused to fall in line with State planning.
In part, the clause was re-inserted in the Group Areas Amendment Act by a conflict-toughened government in 1963, and completed in the Community Development Act of 1964. By then the first group areas in the city had been declared.

Councillors and the Vote

The problems of finance and State penetration had the tendency to split the City Council between councillors and paid administrators. The political composition of the Council in the 1950s was mainly professional people (particularly lawyers), landlords and small businessmen. In the main, their party allegiance at State level was towards the United Party, the official Opposition. A notable absence were members representing industry, Afrikaner workers or professionals, and the big local finance houses like Sanlam and SANTAM. While the manufacturers wanted industrial peace and cheap labour, the Afrikaner group's position was expressed as a fear that coloureds would gain control of certain Cape wards and town councils unless they were deprived of their municipal voting rights. They would, it was feared, also out-bid white workers in the labour market, accepting lower wages for the same jobs. Concern was voiced in Parliament that the Cape would become a 'coloured province'.

The 1951 census increased such fears when it showed a white migration out of central Cape Town and a 'non-white' increase of 22 000. In 1962 the secretary of the Cape Nationalist Party, Piet Marais, told Parliament that:

- the United Party dominated municipalities are mercilessly manipulating the coloured vote on the municipal voters rolls by a skillful way of handling the ward system... keeping them in sub-economic houses so as not to have the municipal vote.

But he warned that in the long run it would
not be possible to keep their numbers of votes down by manipulating. In Cape Town, for instance, the coloured population has increased by 30 percent since 1951 while the whites have increased by only 15 percent. If the position is allowed to continue as it exists today, many municipalities in the Western Cape Province will eventually become over-ruled by coloured majorities, because the coloured people are steadily advancing (in numbers). Many towns in the Boland will soon be controlled by the coloured people. 51

White councillors were, on the whole, not champions of the coloured vote. As far back as 1945, following an application by the City Council, the Supreme Court ruled that weekly tenants were not eligible to a municipal vote. A newspaper, reviewing the position 19 years later, claimed that since this judgement, the council had been transferring coloured people onto weekly tenancy in order to disenfranchise them. 52 And in 1961 the council accepted the recommendations of its Starke Committee to segregate the city's population on beaches, pavilions, forests, parks and gardens. The Torch commented dryly that:

The City Council are, of course, past masters in the matter of apartheid in civic affairs and in discrimination against non-whites. When the present Administrator was still running about in the backveld in short trousers, the City Council was already erecting segregated housing schemes (locations) and chasing non-whites from swimming baths and other amenities reserved for whites only. 53 

However, although national disenfranchisement of coloureds took place in 1951 and Provincial Council membership was denied them in 1961, their municipal vote in the Cape continued until 1971 (when it was abolished by Ordinance 14). So throughout the 1950s and 1960s city councillors were to remain answerable to a sector of the population which was denied the vote at higher level. The muting of council objections to the coloured vote probably came about for several reasons outside the much-acclaimed Cape liberal tradition.
Many white voters, and even some councillors, had incomes directly based on services and trade within the city's ghettos. One such group was the property owners. A considerable number of councillors, and even more of their electorate in the inner-city wards, owned slum property. To slum landlords the threat of Group Areas removals and council housing was a threat to this income, a point which will be taken up presently.

Another group which profited from the ghettos were the traders, who represented a considerable fraction of the council. An example is AZ Berman, who swayed the council by oratory and intrigue for more than 30 years. He was an accountant who began his political life in District Six as a street-corner socialist. By 1960 he was chairman of the Council's Health and Housing Committee and, in addition to slum property, he owned a string of ghetto liquor outlets throughout Cape Town. His objection to State housing was long and bitter, and he swung many council meetings during the crucial deliberations over the fate of District Six.

The objections of the white city traders to group areas was that, unlike their counterparts in Durban and Johannesburg, they held the dominant trading position in the working class ghettos. Their low point came in 1961 when the Group Areas Board began investigating the possibility of declaring District Six coloured, a move which would deprive them of their trading rights. In a petition in 1962 they asked the Group Areas Board to leave Hanover Street - the centre of District Six - as a 'non-racial island'. They pointed out that there were about 200 white businessmen in the District employing 2 000 people. The property they held was valued at R2 million and their annual turnover was R4.5 million (Argus 17.1.62).

However, the traders' concern began to lessen when in 1963 the old Malay area of Pageview in Johannesburg and the predominantly Indian area of Isipingo Beach in Natal were declared white. It began to be clear that group areas were being declared on the basis of land ownership and not residency - and most of
District Six, was owned by white absentee landlords.

In 1965, when the Committee for the Rehabilitation of Depressed Areas (Corda) was set up by the State, its chairman spoke of a future District Six as being a 'residential area for high-class development' catering for 'middle class people such as office workers and shop assistants'. The plan was warmly supported by the District's white traders, who foresaw a 'new Hillbrow'. Corda was also given the public backing of the City Council, the Cape Provincial Administration, The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Industries, the Coloured Chamber of Commerce (whose members were being offered control of the new coloured areas), the Institute of South African Architects, the University of Cape Town, the Afrikaanse Sakekamer and Syfrets Trust Company. The Chairman of Corda gave the assurance that only slum areas in the District would be eliminated. 'Good buildings will remain and the whole area will not be razed'. The promise was never kept.

By 1965 more than 300 000 coloured people had been resettled in State housing schemes on the Cape Flats, leading to a massive drop in the number of coloured people with the municipal vote. Their threat to white councillors was thus considerably lessened. And on an individual level, white traders looked forward to the urban renewal of District Six while property developers awaited a housing boom. But neither of these was to occur.

Bureaucrats and the Rates Crisis

Another group within the council were the paid city administrators. They were, by training, businessmen and were employers of labour answerable to their directors in council and to the electorate, the 'shareholders' of the city. As can be expected the most powerful department was the City Engineers - a formidable force when coupled with the city Health Department.
With the rise of manufacturing, the council was increasingly called upon to
foot the bill for the creation and maintenance of the urban infrastructure
- particularly for roads, services and working class housing. The source of
capital was therefore a constant concern, and the basis of city income was
from rates levied on property. These rates were set on the value of a
property, and this was calculated by the estimated cost of construction at
the time of valuation, less an allowance for structural depreciation and
obsolescence or change in the nature of the area since it was erected.
Because of a need to attract industry to the city, competitive industrial
rates were offered. But this threw the burden of city costs onto home-owners.

From the 1940s the inner city was increasingly becoming an ethnic reservation
as waves of impoverished workers moved in seeking work. As buildings in the
city began to be overcrowded and neglected, the council fell into a gap between
shrinking property tax and expanding expenditures on services. This amounted
to a revenue flow out of the wealthy suburbs and into the inner city and the
poor townships. Pressure to ease the demand on the suburban rich was put
on the administrators by councillors who had to answer to their electorate.
And from the other side, a decrease of services to the poor, a decrease in
workers wages or a rise in transport costs raised the spectre of rioting by the
poor and the destabilisation of the central business district. Urban rezoning
under the Group Areas Act was therefore, on the face of it, a heaven-sent solution
to the crisis of city financing for the city administrators. If District Six
could be upgraded into a middle class high-rise residential area rates would
more than double (as has happened in the Loader Street area across town).
Initial resistance to the Act by administrators can therefore be traced to two
sources.

The first was, as I have said, over housing administration and costs. The early
demands by the State was that local authorities finance new housing schemes.
However, in the face of strong resistance to this by city councils, the State undertook to pay for them out of loans from the National Housing Fund. But these were still loans, and they were not always granted in full. In 1959 the Council dug in and refused to rehouse people disqualified under the Group Areas Act unless the State Housing Commission funded 1 000 new houses a year. At that stage the housing backlog was 12 000, and on top of it the council found itself with a secondary crisis of housing administration.

The second problem was the belief that District Six would be declared coloured. From the point of view of the administrators this would have been a financial disaster. However in 1964 the Group Areas Board declared central Cape Town white. And the same year information was leaked to the Council by the Department of Community Development that District Six was to go the same way. The Council then consented to take part in the Group Areas inquiry into the District and in 1965 the City Engineer agreed to serve on Corda to advise on its replanning.

The problems of city politicians and administrators did not end with the declaration of District Six as a white area. Indeed it signalled a defeat of the local authority by the State. In his book on the economic and legal aspects of real estate in South Africa, Peter Penny observes that urban renewal has become a central government rather than a local government function, and 'the participation of private enterprise was not discussed when the (Group Areas Development) Bill was debated in Parliament'.

Planning objectives (he says) are increasingly being attained not merely through the use of the police power of the State by means of zoning, but through the use of the State's power of expropriation... Central government powers in urban renewal include right of expropriation, right to freeze development, right of pre-emption, right to control usage, right to over-ride town planning schemes and ordinances passed by provincial administrations and by-laws by municipalities, the right to make ex gratia grants...
Within the space of about a decade the City Council was to find its control over an expanding industrial city to be rapidly declining. In order to curb the profiteering which took place in the Southern Suburbs, following the 1961 declarations, the State took the initiative away from property developers and created the machinery of State purchase of property in District Six. In the uncertainty which followed property was neglected, vandalised and left to collapse. Gangs spread and the area became wracked with violence and crime. This was used as an excuse to consider the whole District as a slum, and the entire area was torn down. The dream of a middle class boom suburb turned sour on the traders, and by the 1970s even the nearby CBD trade began to die as it gradually changed from a shopping area to an office park. Valuations began to drop.

For the city administrators another crises began building up. Government property in the city was exempted from rates. So far from being a new source of revenue, District Six under State ownership became a massive rates drain on city finances, running to hundreds of thousands of rands a year. Urgent appeals by the council to rectify the position continued to meet with no success. Furthermore capital was being drawn out of the city through State control of certain duties, taxes and licences, and re-introduced as grants - with strings attached. The city fathers were to pay dearly for their initial reluctance to implement the Group Areas Act. By the 1970s Cape Town was, effectively, under new management.

STATE HOUSING AND THE LANDLORDS

Until now I have been looking at the ideology of urban spatial planning in Cape Town. But there is another angle from which the massive relocation must be viewed: the ownership transfer of worker housing from landlords to the State. By 1990 the State would be forwarding up to R560 000 000 a year for housing development, and a large proportion of this would go towards urban development on the Cape Flats.63
One hundred and fifty thousand people defined as coloured were to be moved in the Peninsula alone within 20 years. Group Areas legislation was clearly a control measure, reshaping cities in the new image of racial capitalism, irrespective of the occasional cries of local authorities and some fractions of capital. Together with the political repression of the 1950s and early 1960s it was often an excellent control measure, tutoring some of the working class in the 'separate but equal' management committee system and a toothless Coloured Representative Council... despite opposition.

But the Act, together with the National Housing Fund, did facilitate the provision of worker housing on a massive scale. Eventually, of course, the tenants would pay for it over a period of 30 or 40 years plus interest. But the setting of minimum building standards and the provision of cheap loans to local authorities housed the working class in disease-free dwellings at relatively low rents at a time when this was desperately needed. And although transport costs rose sharply, so did the average working class wage during the 1960s while rents remained relatively stable. It has been suggested that in a time of crisis real concessions may be won by the dominated classes. But concessions by the ruling class tend to be granted within the ruling ideological framework. The South African working class was demanding housing in a crisis of hegemony and it got it... but in a form that was beneficial to capitalist production.

Manuel Castells terms this State provision of housing and social services collective consumption what Marxists call the organisation of the collective means of reproduction of labour power. That is to say means of consumption objectively socialised which, for specific historical reasons, are essentially dependent for their production, distribution and administration on the intervention of the State. 64
Around this perspective has grown a debate which is mostly centred on the metropoles of the First World and cannot, therefore, simply be transplanted to the southern tip of Africa. However certain key issues are useful here. These can be stated fairly briefly.

We must keep in mind two earlier points. The first is Poulantzas' contention that the State can act with relative autonomy 'in a positive fashion, creating, transforming and making reality'. And the second is Stuart Hall's assertion that the State performs its work on behalf of the capitalist system in two ways: 'by destroying those structures, relations, customs, traditions which, deriving from the past... fetter and constrain capital's free development'; and by performing the work of 'actively tutoring, forming shaping' the emergent classes to new social relations which enable capitalist accumulation to 'freely unroll'. These old 'structures, relations, customs' of the working class are part of ways of coping with the city in the early days of industrialisation - supportive extended families, migrants with rural ties - structures with a certain amount of resistance to urban control. Urban workers, as Sharon Zukin points out, 'develop their own associational resources and forms of entertainment which make up an oppositional culture - a working class culture or an urban sub-culture - that sustains resistance to labour discipline'. This oppositional culture requires leeway, social and cultural space, as well as a portion of the agricultural surplus, to survive. Much of its activities are 'irrational' to the logic of monopoly capital. Household production locks up both labour and capital in 'unproductive' ways, away from the generalised investment structure. This working class culture is also the ground in which an oppositional political structures can grow. With the rising stakes of capital accumulation in the city and the need for industrial peace this leeway is progressively under attack from monopoly capital, from urban institutions and from the forces of control.
The logic of Capital is that this 'semi-proletariat' must be pulled not only into the production process but into the consumption of commodities as well. This cycle, after all, is what the expansion of profit is all about. The search for new markets for capital and commodities, says Castells,

is not achieved simply by the penetration into countries under imperialist domination, but by its penetration into pre-capitalist or semi-capitalist sectors of the economy of 'metropolitan' countries... through the dissolving of the social and economic relationships which exist there. Such is the case particularly in the sector of the production of means of consumption for the popular classes, a sector until recently differing from country to country, and largely dominated by (small) competitive capital. 59

As the city industrialises the proletariat is progressively 'schooled' in 'rational' consumption patterns. But this leads to serious social contradictions. Technological progress requires the smooth functioning of conditions within which labour power is collectively reproduced. It needs a docile workforce that presents itself daily in a peaceful city and does not demand high wages. In Cape Town of the 1940s, however, industry was faced with a labour force which could 'hold out' against capital through its connection with household production. Also, although the city's population was expanding at an alarming rate, private capital was unwilling to underwrite the urban infrastructure and services necessary to support it. And as household enterprise began to buckle under the mounting pressures, so both lawlessness and political activity increased. This urban infrastructure and services is what Castells terms the collective means of consumption. It is explained as an attempt to 'regulate the process of reproduction of labour-power, and/or to buy off working class political pressure'. 70

In the organic crisis of the 1940s, as we have seen, the State was being called on to solve grinding contradictions between capitalist production and an urban crisis.
It was forced to intervene,

in a massive, systematic, permanent and structurally necessary way in the process of consumption... Thus we... witness a takeover by the State of vast sectors of the production of means essential to the reproduction of labour power: health, education, housing, collective amenities etc. It is here that the 'urban problematic' sends down its roots... The State becomes the veritable arranger of the process of consumption as a whole...71

The effects of such intervention are clearly 'political', in the sense that they extend the political control of the ruling class alliance over the dominated classes. And the consequence of this approach to the problem by the State is that the solution to the conflicts and contradictions become technical, not political. As Castells points out: 'Planning (rational, neutral and scientific) replaces social and political debate about the decisions which are the basis of the concrete manifestations of these problems.'72

The technical functions of the State in the metropolitan areas of monopoly capitalism are usefully listed by Peter Saunders in his book Urban Politics:

1. Sustenance of private production and capital accumulation
   (a) through the provision of necessary non-productive urban infrastructure (roads etc);
   (b) by aiding the reorganisation and restructuring of production in space (e.g. planning and urban renewal, group areas);
   (c) through the provision of investment in 'human capital' (e.g. education in general);
   (d) through 'demand orchestration' (local authority public works contracts, etc).
2. **Reproduction of labour-power through collective consumption**
   (a) by means of the material conditions of existence (e.g. low rent local authority housing);
   (b) by means of the cultural conditions of existence (e.g. libraries, museums, parks, recreation areas).

3. **Maintenance of order and social cohesion**
   (a) through the means of coercion (e.g. police, courts, prisons);
   (b) through the support of the 'relative surplus population' (e.g. social services and other welfare support services);
   (c) through support of the agencies of legitimation in civil society (schools, social work, foundations, funding etc).

The process of intervention is also **ideological**, and the integration of the working class within the dominant ideology goes alongside the separation of the activities of work, residence and leisure, a separation which is **at the root of city zoning**. Castells suggests that the value which comes to be placed on the nuclear family, the importance of the mass media and the dominance of an individualist ideology react in the direction of an atomization of relationships and a segmenting of interests in terms of individual aspirations which, in spatial terms, is translated into the dispersion of individual residences, be it in the isolation of the suburban home or the solitude of the big housing projects. 73

With the transition of the productive base of the State to monopoly capital the long-run interests of the system, as we have seen, tend to gradually eliminate local urban characteristics, cutting them up into significant spatial units based on networks of interdependencies of the productive system. 74 In Cape Town a local characteristic singled out for particular attack in the old ghettos was private landlordism, the form in which most worker housing was available.
This landlordism was essentially a relationship from an earlier phase of capital accumulation. It was uncontrolled, it led to overcrowding and disease, and it allowed every form of occupation and activity to be carried out on its premises so long as the rent was paid every month. It arose in the old quarters out of a growing working-class need for housing - spurred on by large numbers of impoverished people moving into the urban areas. In 1926 the census showed that of the 70 000 'non-europeans' in Cape Town, 77.5 percent of them were living in overcrowded dwellings. By the 1940s 'tenant farming' was firmly established in the poorer sections of Cape Town - District Six housing being 90 percent landlord-owned. There was little construction in these areas. It was more profitable to buy existing housing stock and rent it out at high levels of density. A policeman who worked in District Six recalls:

Very few of the properties in District Six belonged to the coloured people, it was mostly the Indians and the Europeans that owned property there. Some of these flats in Vredehoek (a white suburb) were built from money made in District Six by landlords and shopkeepers. That's why white people complain today (about the destruction of District Six), it was because they were making money there. At the end of the month, if those people didn't pay their rent, the landlords had rent collectors and they would chuck them out, lock, stock and barrel. I've come across 40 to 50 people sitting in the rain out on the pavement. I've bought food out of my pocket for the children.

In a scarce market the landlords were in a position to force up rents. Overcrowding was used as a way of realising a maximum rent from low-income tenants, and rents were often paid individually or by floor-space occupied. In 1947 a newspaper complained that:
families in the poorer quarters of Cape Town are large, so that may mean anything up to 80 people or more living in a house built to house five or six... with one tap and one lavatory.\textsuperscript{77}

Many of these families, often new arrivals in the city, were on the brink of starvation. In 1946 a study by the Institute of Race Relations found that 57 percent of coloured children and 71.4 percent of black children in Cape Town were suffering from malnutrition. The same year the city's Medical Officer of Health found that infant death rates within the first year of life to be 119.9 per 1000 for coloureds as against 33.84 per 1000 for whites.

This rack-renting was causing both a wage and a health problem for the white urban bourgeoisie. White residents were faced with the spectre of epidemics in their midst, and employers were increasingly confronted with demands for higher wages to meet workers' rents. This led to a contradiction between capital accumulation by landlords and a cheap labour force demanded by the growing number of small labour-intensive industries in the 1940s. In Cape Town the slum landlords were clearly identified as a contributing factor towards the increasing pressure on employers for increased wages as well as towards squatting and crime.\textsuperscript{78} They came under fire both from the State and from finance capital.

The Rise of State Housing

A number of moves were to back city landlords into a corner. One of significance was building society interest rates on housing bond repayments, which began to rise after a 'low' in 1943 (to stimulate war-time borrowing), making it increasingly uneconomical to buy housing for rental purposes.
The interest rates depended on money supply and were (and still are) fixed by a cartel responsive to the State Treasury. But there is also evidence of 'redlining' by these societies in Cape Town with respect to working class areas.\(^9\)

A second move against landlordism was the Rents Act, passed in 1951, which empowered the formation of Rent Boards and harshly curbed rent increases.\(^80\)

The effect of the developments was to halt the purchase by landlords of housing in working-class areas. Coupled with the uncertainty surrounding group areas legislation, this led to a rapid deterioration of housing stock in coloured suburbs.
There is an interesting link (observes Peter Penny) between the State's interference with the price mechanism in imposing rent control and its subsequent action in attempting to remedy the defects in the operation of the price mechanism through urban renewal. It is to be wondered how often the need for urban renewal would not have arisen if rent control had not been imposed. 81

A third move was of course the Group Areas Act, by which the State forced massive evictions, involving whole suburbs of the city. And the passing of the Illegal Squatting Act in 1951 completed the legislation necessary to effect the transfer of worker housing to the State. It made provision for the control of urban squatting and froze the number of shacks at the existing number. The location of every squatter dwelling in the country was to be noted and numbered.

It would, however, be misleading to assume that the State was eager to become the landlord of the working-class. As I have suggested, the State is generally drawn into the provision of housing and collective services in order to 'manage' crises which threaten the general conditions of capitalist production. The financing of housing, an unprofitable item of collective consumption, was to become the terrain of a struggle between the State and employers on a broad front. In 1948 the new Minister of Native Affairs said the task of providing houses for the massive numbers of urbanising blacks was becoming 'intolerable' and that:

... the time will come - and the matter has been enquired into - when employers will have to assume responsibility for their native employees, responsibility with regard to their housing (emphasis added). 82

Industry was quick to reply:
Prominent industrialists and financial authorities in Johannesburg are unanimously of the opinion that it is wholly impossible for industry to be saddled with an additional burden of making provision... for the housing of their Native employees, and yet retain their markets. 83

The struggle over housing was only resolved in industry's favour in the early 1950s (the State picking up the bill) following widespread political mobilisation of the working-class and the necessity of large building programmes following Group Areas Act evictions. 84 Many coloured families, however, were to lose heavily. A newspaper reporter noted that:

Over a lifetime of rent paying, many of them have paid the landlord many times over what the actual properties are are worth. I was told of a home-ownership scheme (R200 down and R20 a month) in which one property is divided into five different houses. These are sold to five different people. But ownership is not transferred to them till all have paid the amounts in full. Should one buyer default the others cannot take ownership till the new buyer completes all his payments. The result is that they are still not the registered owners and when their turn comes to leave District Six any compensation given for the property will not be theirs. 85

Housing and Family Structure

I must now backtrack slightly. It has been suggested that in part at least, the provision of subsidised State housing was a victory for the working-class, or at least a concession coming out of the struggles of the 1940s. But it was a concession which had built into it an ideological factor which was to cause extreme hardship for the new tenants. This was the depiction of the basic working class social unit as a nuclear family. This idea was based in the logic of capitalist production and reproduction, and it entered the new townships through the ideology of the planners. The fact that the basic social unit of the working-class was the extended family was simply ignored.
In 1946 the National Building Research Institute (NBRI) had been set up by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to research the provision of low cost urban housing. Following the lead of CIAM in Europe, the NBRI set up a Research Committee on Minimum Standards of Accommodation in South Africa the following year to 'examine critically the tentative proposals suggested for minimum standards below which no dwellings should be erected'. The committee's brief was to develop criteria, based on 'the best available information on the living patterns of the low income groups in South Africa', which could be 'taken by the planner and translated on the drawing board into a house plan'. The minimum standards arrived at, were crystallised in the Department of Community Development's Housing Code, which is now a template for all State housing in South Africa.

From whence was this 'best available information' gained? An influential source was a guide book on the subject, Native Housing, written in 1939 by PH Connell and several other Rand academics. It held that:

> the modern (urban) family is liberal and democratic in its outlook, and loose in its structure... so if a family of this kind is the general rule, flat life would be a definite advantage. (It also observed that) owing to the extremely low income of the Native worker, women must go to work too. Some provision, therefore, must be made for babies and small children, so that they should not constitute an undue hindering of the extremely necessary work of their mothers...

The authors, using Marxist tools of analysis, clearly sketched out the needs of capital: a nuclear family as the basic reproductive unit, and the need to allow women to work in order to create a potential reserve army of labour to drive down wages. Eight years later Connell emerged as a key ideologue of the NBRI. Drawing on 'standards adopted at some arbitrary point and... amended from time to time', he produced a paper in 1947 which was to become the guiding principle for the Minimum Standards Committee. The key observations are worth quoting in full:
There is a tendency of the Native to imitate the white man's form of dwelling when he comes into permanent proximity with European settlements. A general trend such as this would seem to indicate a distinct preference on the Native's part for the type of house characteristic of the more advanced culture. (emphasis added).

Up to the present, the form of dwelling universally preferred by Europeans in this country has been the single-storey detached house standing in its separate plot, each with a front garden, back garden or backyard and two narrow strips of ground on either side giving access from front to back is the picture which the Native has in his mind when he thinks of 'progress' in terms of his dwelling. Second, there remains the old tradition of the separate hut which is the typical Native form of building... the traditions of the isolated structure remains, and tends to reinforce rather than retard the observed preference for the typical European style of home. [89]

From the foregoing it will be seen that the action of the local authorities in casting the location in the same mould as the European suburb is reasonably in accordance with the observed tendencies and preferences of the urban Native... 90

The family conceived of, dreamed into existence by these planners, consisted of 'father or wage earner, mother or housekeeper, high school, primary school and kindergarten children'.

Thus the State-provided house for the urbanised African family was to be for a nuclear family in the image of the bourgeoisie. But by dividing the working classes into nuclear units, not only was a housing shortage to be created (which served as an influx control) but the endless creation of single units led to an increased demand for industrially manufactured household commodities.

Industry was not unaware of its part in the new housing formula:
To commence the credit is due for the formation of the concept of the economic Native house, advanced many years ago in the face of considerable opposition from local authorities, which principle is now one of the cornerstones of accepted policy on Native housing. (SA Builder 31.8.1953).

This was to be the type of housing imported into Cape Town to house large Coloured and African extended families on the Cape Flats. And to compound the problem, families from the same 'old' area, and even the same household, were often rehoused in different townships - often far apart.

One of the formative actions of the new ruling class alliance which confronted the organic crisis of the 1940s was thus the creation of worker townships which would provide the minimum needs of reproduction of labour power. An important factor in the crisis was the political pressure which accompanied the high rate of urbanisation and rising unemployment among the black and coloured proletariat. The transition to State housing on a massive scale was part of the strategy of the new government to defend and conserve its position. The battle for hegemony was largely won under the banner of 'law and order'. Whole cities were re-shaped and harsh restrictions were placed on the rate and conditions of urbanisation.

The working class got housing, but not the form it wanted under conditions it desired. And if the landlords lost on the deal, a fraction of capital - the construction companies - was to gain immensely from the State moves. It was they, and not the landlords, which had the capital and experience to build houses on the scale required by the Department of Community Development. And contracts were awarded selectively. Of the nine big contractors handling Cape Flats construction by 1980, for example, it is significant that five were multinationals (one of them British and one Dutch), two were owned by Anglo American, and two (the largest) were Afrikaner capital. Of these last two companies, one of them, Besterecta, handled 42 percent of all Cape Flats contracts over R100 000 during the first six months of 1981 - worth R12.8 million. 91
In the end the old city, the city of merchant capital, was destroyed and rebuilt to a different rhythm. In bourgeois ideology this has been depicted as quite natural, as the inevitable outcome of modern life. But it was only as natural as the rise of monopoly capital in a peripheral State, as natural as colonialism. John Keynes once suggested that the way to handle the opposition was to absorb it at an always new level. Le Corbusier's solution was to write it into a spatial utopia. Finally, though, the hidden agendas of both men was always that of control. When the citadel's wall disappeared, a network of organised controls - legal, spatial and electronic - replaced it. Just to the extent that the new powers were shadowy, hard to pin down, they performed the old functions more effectively. 'One might breach a city wall or kill a king' writes Mumford, 'but how could one assault an international cartel or break a wall of isolation'.92 By the end of the 1960s the working class in Cape Town were like a routed, scattered army, dotted in confusion about the land of their birth. The division of labour was extreme, and the high priests of the new regime held the monopoly on knowledge and skills.

Even the drabbest industrial town has educational possibilities the suburb lacks. In the lonely crowd of the satellite clusters, with no control over communication networks, life tended to become reduced to what came through official channels and the ghetto grapevine. And with rising rates of violence in these areas the township became an increasingly difficult place to meet people after work - favouring silent conformity and not rebellion. De Tocqueville noted, rather dramatically, the same threads in the growth of American suburbs many years earlier:
The first thing that strikes observation (he says) is an uncountable number of men, all equal and alike, incessantly endeavouring to produce the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives. Each of them living apart, is a stranger to the fate of all the rest - his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind; as for the rest of his fellow-citizens, he is close to them, but he sees them not; he touches them, but he feels them not, he exists but in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country. 93

The ultimate losers in this type of clastrophobic atmosphere were the working class families, torn out of the areas they knew and scattered across the Cape Flats. The emotional brutality dealt out to them in the name of rational urban planning is incalculable. The only defence youths had was to build something coherent out of the only thing they had left - each other.
CHAPTER 5 : NOTES


2. Outline of Scheme (Foreshore) for Cape Town (South Africa) E E Beaudouin Cape Town, June 1940 pp 5, 26, 24, 7.


5. Cape Times 28.8.82.

6. Ibid

7. Ibid


10. Ibid p 211.


15. The Congress papers are published in Town Planning: Proceedings of a congress devoted to town planning held at Escom House by the Architectural Students Society, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 1938. Together with Gordon McIntosh, Hanson was instrumental in forming the Zero Hour Group which in 1933 began publishing Zero Hour, a journal putting forward ideas of the Modern Movement and particularly of Le Corbusier.
They, in turn, were part of the Modernist 'Transvaal Group', which included Rex Martienssen, who was a personal friend of Le Corbusier, and R Kantorowich, who was to do the drafts and sketches for the Cape Town Foreshore plan.

16. Congress papers.
17. Ibid
18. Ibid
20. Ibid
23. That they never did solve the problem could be seen from the undiminishing number of homeless in Cape Town throughout the next 30 years. As recent as October 1 1982 the Cape Times could report 19 200 families on the City Council's housing waiting list, with only enough money to build 4878 new homes. This figure excludes those on Divisional Council waiting lists and those who didn't bother to place their names on housing lists and either put up shacks or lived with friends or relations.
25. Ibid p 245.
27. Ibid p 250.

30. Ibid p 199


32. Ibid p 38.

33. Ibid p 29

34. Quoted by Mumford: The city in history, op cit p 564.


37. Esher, op cit p 79, 80.


40. Ibid p 7

41. Ibid p 95

42. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1954-55 p 84.


44. Le Corbusier: The City of Tomorrow, op cit p 166 (emphasis added).

45. Le Corbusier: The Radiant City, op cit p 119.

47. See Brian Anson: Architecture as Colonialism, op cit p 70.

48. This is the reason for group areas removals given by CJ Jooste in the
Standard Encyclopaedia of South Africa.

49. By then the State owned property in Cape Town worth R1 820 000. In
1968 the State allocated R100 million for urban renewal schemes, and
by then it had spent R20 million on the purchase of urban properties.

50. And of the 45 councillors in 1962, six were classed as coloured.


52. The Argus, March 6 1964.


54. Interview with Oscar Wollheim, former head of the Cape Flats Distress
Association and member of the Provincial Council.

55. The Argus April 1 1965.

56. The Argus April 3 1965.

57. TH Niemand to the Argus, June 3 1965. Dr Oscar Wollheim, Warden of the
Cape Flats Distress Association at the time, has estimated that the
number of good houses in District Six in 1966 was in excess of 60 percent.

58. In 1979 the city income from rates was 54 percent.

59. For an excellent evaluation of this contradiction see E Castells:
Wild City, in Kapitalstate No 4, 5 Summer 1976.

60. The letter 'requested the lease of two sports fields in District Six
for coloureds in view of the fact that it is doubtful whether any areas
(in inner-Cape Town) will be proclaimed for the Coloured group'. Argus
June 3 1964.

61. Peter Penny: Economic and Legal Aspects of Real Estate in South Africa,
(Juta, Cape Town, 1970) p 127.

62. Ibid pp 35, 42
63. See BA van der Vyver: An approach to losses on housing projects financed by the State, a report by the Committee of Enquiry into alleged operating losses on Housing, April 1981.


68. A particularly useful article on this process is by David Harvey: Labour, capital and class struggle around the built environment in advanced capitalist societies, in Conditions for Conflict in Market Societies.

69. E Castells: City, Class and Power.


71. Castells: The Urban Question, p 459.


75. Between 1938 and 1943 the interest rates on bond repayments dropped from 6 percent to 4.5 percent. Returns on rented space were between 8 percent and 10 percent - U.B.S. archives.

76. Interview with Sgt. Willem Nel of the Police Special Squad which operated in District Six in the late 1940s.
77. The Argus April 19 1947.

78. Interview with head of the Rent Board, Cape Town, 5.10.81.

79. 'Redlining' is an unwritten agreement by building societies not to issue loans in certain (usually working class) areas when they perceive the investment risk too high. My information is based on interviews with several District Six landlords of the pre-1966 period.

80. It is interesting that the CT Rent Board handled many cases in squatter camps around the city, making the letting of squatter shacks uneconomical.

81. Peter Penny, op cit p 127.


84. However for many years the Department of Community 'earmarked' percentages of existing municipal building schemes to house people moved by the Group Areas Act. In the mid-1960s this rose to as high as 80 percent in Cape Town.

85. Brian Barrow: Behind the dark doors of the District: Cape Times (probably 1966) in Wollheim Collection UCT.

86. This information is from Wilkinson 1981 op cit p 33.

87. Ibid p 34.


89. The single hut system was of course based on the level of roof technology and not the social structure. In any event the single hut was merely a 'room' in the cluster of huts comprising an extended family.


91. Much work still has to be undertaken in this area. The information was supplied by the Master Builders and Allied Traders' Association.


Given the political, ideological and economic framework within which group areas removals took place in Cape Town, a social disaster was inevitable. As the familiar social landmarks in the closely-grained working class communities of the old city were ripped up a whole culture began to disintegrate.

'Culture' is defined by John Clarke et al in Resistance through Rituals as 'the practice which realises or objectivates group-life in meaningful shape or form'. A culture includes 'maps of meaning' which make life intelligible to its members. These 'maps' are not simply carried around in the head, they are 'objectivated in the patterns of social organisation and relationship through which the individual becomes a social individual'.

In a study of the East End of London, Phil Cohen found these patterns to rest on three structures:

1. the extended kinship network, which provides mutual aid and support while at the same time creating cultural continuity and stability;

2. the ecological setting of the working class neighbourhood. This dense socio-cultural space helped to shape and support the close textures of traditional working class life, its sense of solidarity, its local loyalties and traditions, and provided support in the day to day struggle for survival.

3. The structure of the local economy, which was both diverse and on the spot providing income for a large number of people although at a low level of income.
Culture, however, is not merely the way in which events are experienced. It is also a history. Cultural patterns form a sort of historical reservoir, a field of possibilities which groups take up, transform, develop. 'Men make their own history', said Marx, 'but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.' It is the way in which groups combine the past with the raw materials of the present that could be said to constitute a culture. And in any social formation there is not necessarily one culture, but many, linked to productive relations and differently ranked in relations of domination and subordination.

This is, of course, because there is more than one fundamental class in society and therefore there will be more than one cultural configuration in play at a particular historical moment. However, it is those structures and meanings which reflect the position and interests of most powerful class that will 'stand, in relation to the others, as a dominant social-cultural order. The dominant culture represents itself as the culture.' This struggle for class-cultural domination takes place most sharply in the working class areas of the city.

In Cape Town, although these neighbourhoods were geographically bounded by outside forces and penetrated by them (in the form of schools, police etc.) they were places in which different strata of the working class had won space for their own forms of life. These spaces were both physical (the networks of streets, houses, corner shops and shebeens) and social (the networks of kin, friendships, neighbourhood and work). They were a weave of rights and obligations, intimacies and distances embodying...
sense of solidarity, local loyalties and traditions. The former warden of the Cape Flats Distress Association, Dr. Oscar Wollheim, describes this as a 'web of interlocking mutual interest':

The rings closest to the centre are represented by the man's immediate and extended family and his closest friends. The next would represent his acquaintances, his church, his school and the clubs he frequents. Other rings represent his employer, his transport and communications, the shops he frequents, the municipal and other officials he meets, his doctor, the police, the postman, the tax official. The anchors of the web represent the customs, habits and moral concepts of the community in which he lives.

Each individual has his own personal web which varies in size and complexity according to the impact he makes on those around him and the influence he wields in the community. His usefulness to and within the community is determined entirely by the freedom with which he is able to move in and about his web, his knowledge of its structure and the facility with which he is able to make contact with the correct position of the web at the correct time.

Above all, what was unsettled by group areas inroads into the defensive class culture was the precise position and role of the working class family. With it was ploughed up a concrete set of relations, a network of knowledge, things, experiences: the supports of a class culture. The effects of group areas removals (to pursue Wollheim's analogy) were:

Like a man with a stick breaking spiderwebs in a forest. The spider may survive the fall, but he can't survive without his web. When he comes to build it again he finds the anchors are gone, the people are all over and the fabric
of generations is lost. Before, there was always something that kept the community ticking over and operating correctly. . . . There was the extended family, the granny and grandpa were at home, doing the household chores and looking after the kids. Now, the family is taken out of this environment where everything is safe and known. It is put in a matchbox in a strange place. All social norms have suddenly been abolished. Before, the children who got up to mischief in the streets were reprimanded by neighbours. Now there's nobody and they join gangs because that's the only way to find friends.

What mattered here was not so much the re-moulding of the working class in the image of a consumer society (which occurred), but the dislocations this produced — and the responses it provoked. One of the major problems facing the working class as their culture began to buckle in both rural and inner city areas was a collapse of social control over youths. This informal control was described to John Western during his work on the suburb of Mowbray:

When I was 15 or 16 if we did anything rude, offhanded in the street — like going to bars or smoking or taking a dame out — you'd get a pak (Slap) at night at home, they (parents) knew about it right away . . . It was the old men who used to stand at the corners chatting or sit on the stoops; they'd pretend to be reading the Koran or a comic or playing kerrem or whatever, but out of the corner of their eye they were really watching you.

It was this almost intangible but very real cement which held together the class culture, and one of the greatest complaints of group areas removals continues to be that individual people were moved to the Cape Flats and not whole neighbourhoods.
The stresses resulting from these changes brought with them psychological difficulties and skewed 'coping' behaviour. Marital relations were upset and the divorce and desertion rate rose; parent/child relationships were made difficult - often because the father's sense of inadequacy in his new environment.

Between 1961 and 1965, years which saw both rising industrial prosperity and mass relocations of people, there was a coloured baby boom. One can only speculate about its causes, but the relationship between crisis and a high level of childbirth is a well-known phenomenon.

Table 6a
Population pyramid by sex and five-year age-group intervals for Coloured people in the Greater Cape Town region 1970 - 1980

(Source: Cape Town, Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health 1981.)
By 1980, as Table 6A illustrates, the effects of the boom could be felt in the 15-19 year old age group - the core age of the street gangs. Another indicator of rapid social change is the coloured illegitimacy rate, which nearly doubled between 1956 and 1981 (see Table 6B). What is notable is that this rate declined during the 1950s, began rising in 1961 (when the first group areas were declared in the city), peaked in 1967 (after coloureds were told to vacate District Six), and climbed alarmingly between then and 1976 (the period of the greatest evictions). In 1974 the Theron Commission found that more than 82% of all births to coloured women under the age of 20 were illegitimate. The findings of the Commission bear stark testimony to the breakdown of extended families which followed. It found a sharp decrease in what it called ‘non-members’ of nuclear families between 1960 and 1970 and a marked increase in single-parent families in the urban area. It was pointed out to the Commission that:

it was very difficult indeed for parents with children of different sexes living in a house with only two or three rooms in a neighbourhood with few, if any, community amenities, to give their children a decent upbringing.
TABLE 6B
ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS IN CAPE TOWN AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIVE BIRTHS: 1956 TO 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIODS</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>COLOURED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cape Town, Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health, 1981
Graphic representation of Table 6b for the Coloured population only

Source: Cape Town M.O.H. Report, 1981
And the Commission concluded that:

no other statutory measure had evoked so much bitterness, mistrust and hostility on the part of the coloured people as the Group Areas Act.\(^{10}\)

This statement merely echoed that of Wollheim, who in 1960 had warned that 'we can look forward to a period of increasing social dislocation which will have its roots in no other causes but in the application of the (Group Areas) Act'.\(^{11}\)

The numbers that this Act affected can be judged from the combined figure of three separate surveys of the Cape Flats done in 1981: an average of 43% of the people interviewed had been moved by group areas legislation.\(^{12}\)

As part of this study, a survey was done comparing family life and working class culture in an existing 'inner city' area and on the Cape Flats to which people had been relocated by group areas removals. The 'old' area chosen was Harfield Village, a section of Claremont.

At the time of the survey Harfield was a suburb 'in transition' to a white group area, and only about 100 coloured families remained. The average period of residence was 19 years, although more than 10% had been there 50 years or longer. The average number of people in each house was 5.1. What was significant about the area was the high number of people available for what might be described as 'crisis support'. Eighty per cent of the people interviewed had relations in Harfield and 82% had close friends in the area - this despite the fact that 65% had seen related families moved

*All these families were interviewed*
from the village by Group Areas. There was no creche in Harfield. Of those interviewed 68% looked after their own children and 27% relied on relations to do this. In total 95% of children under 16 were taken care of within extended families, the remaining 5% being minded by friends. In comparison with the Cape Flats this shows an extremely high level of family-based child care, as can be seen from Table 6C.

**Table 6C**

A comparison of child care in Harfield Village and on the Cape Flats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children looked after</th>
<th>Harfield</th>
<th>Cape Flats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>by mother</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by relations</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by older child</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by friends</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by creche</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by nobody</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen that on the Cape Flats a high percentage of children under 16 received no parental care during the day, while about 16% were placed in creches. Harfield had all the benchmarks of a stable supportive community. This was also the case in Mowbray, where John Western found an average residency of 33 years and where 70% of his interviewees were related to at least one other physically separate household.13
Houses being broken down for 'gentrification' in Harfield Village, 1981
A corner group in Harfield Village
The people of Harfield were well aware of what was in store for them under the Group Areas Act. The probability of moving to the Cape Flats was fearful or extremely unsettling to 94% of those interviewed, and during the survey two elderly women died and another had a severe heart attack after receiving eviction notices. Most people (96%) saw the cost and time of transport as the main problem ahead of them, and 46% were worried about the effects on their children of transfer to a Cape Flats school.

The Cape Flats survey was specifically of mothers living in 35 different housing estates. The types of dwellings in which they lived were:

- house 56%
- flat 19%
- shanty 14%
- rented room 11%

The average number in each dwelling was 7.3 and the average length of residency was a mere 4 years.

Of the sample 44% were working and 25% were raising a family without a husband. In order to draw out changes in living patterns, they were asked about their own childhoods and then about their children. The figures showed a marked historical fall-off in access to family networks of child care:
When asked about any problems they were having, the largest number of mothers said it was fear of gangs and lack of police protection:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>INTERVIEWEE AS CHILD</th>
<th>INTERVIEWEE'S OWN CHILDREN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relations living in same house</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy walking access to relations</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looked after by mother or relations</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Problems with skollies/police/crime 33%
Problems with housing 32%
Problems with income/cost of living 20%
Problems with facilities/recreation 6%
Problems with transport 2.5%
Problems with liquor 0.5%
Problems with other 6%

Comments included:

*I am unhappy in the area because of skollies. I would like to move to a safer area.

*Police should do something about gangsters for our safety.

*Send all the skollies to reformatory.

*Start vigilante groups or stop indiscriminate moving of people from different backgrounds into the same area.

*Gangs and group areas must be abolished.

*Stop association of police with shebeens.
The first effect of the removals into the high-rise schemes on the Cape Flats was to destroy the function of the street, the corner shop and the shebeens as articulations of communal space. As Cohen noted, following similar removals from the East End, the new areas contained only the privatized space of family units, stacked on top of each other in total isolation, juxtaposed with the totally public space which surrounded them, a space which lacked any of the informal social controls generated by the neighbourhood.  

The destruction of the neighbourhood street also blew out the candle of household production, craft industries and services. The result was a gradual polarization of the labour force - into those with more specialized, skilled and better paid jobs, and those with the dead-end, low paid jobs and unemployment. And as the distribution pattern of new housing dispersed the kinship network, the isolated family could no longer call on the resources of the extended family or the neighbourhood.

The family itself became the sole focus of solidarity:

This meant that any problems were bottled up within the immediate interpersonal context which produced them; and at the same time family relationships were invested with a new intensity to compensate for the diversity of relationships previously generated through neighbours and wider kin. The trouble was that although the traditional kinship system which corresponded to it had broken down, the traditional patterns of socialization (of communication and control) continued to reproduce themselves in the interior of the family. The working class family was thus not only isolated from the outside but also undermined from within.
The main - and understandable - product of this isolation was fear - fear of neighbours, fear of unknown people, fear of gangs and fear of the strange noises in the new place.

These pressures on the Cape Flats weighed heavily on the housebound mother. The street was no longer a safe place to play and there were no longer neighbours or kin to supervise children. The only playspace that felt safe was 'the home', usually a tiny flat. As pressures began to mount within the nucleated working class family, what had once been a base for support and security now tended to become a battleground, a major focus of all the anxieties created by the disintegration of community structures.

One route out of the claustrophobic tensions of family life was through the use of alcohol and drugs, vast amounts of which are consumed on the Cape Flats. This became the standard path of the men. Children were shaken loose in different ways. One was through early sexual relationships and perhaps marriage. Another was the emergence of youth subcultures on the streets - often in opposition to the parent culture. An attempted resolution of the problem of the working class family became ritualized in the violent youth gang culture on the streets, a consequence which simply reinforced the climate of fear. The situation was to be compounded by rising unemployment at the younger end of the potential labour force.

WORK AND WORKLESSNESS IN A DIVIDED CITY

In the previous section the focus has been on the social effects of relocation on the working class in Cape Town - a breakdown of family control and the collapse of a specific ghetto culture. In part, this forced
the control of youth out of the hands of the working class culture and into the state institutions. But a parallel phenomenon was taking place over employment. With the elimination of a wide range of jobs in the domestic sphere, more and more people were compelled to rely on employment in formal wage labour. For many workers this completed a process of proletarianization and forced a dependency on white employers. In the boom years this was not unduly problematical as factories sprang up in the city alongside their support industries and services. Between 1961 and 1974 production in South Africa grew at an average rate of 5.5% a year.

But these conditions were not to last. Although the country's exports increased four times over this period, its imports increased six times. This trade imbalance was compensated by foreign loans, and their interest alone increased from R28 million in 1966 to R759 million in 1979. Its dependent industrialization, linking it into the world system forced South Africa to catch the disease of recession in the early 1970s, causing industry to alter its optimistic estimates. By 1975 the country's growth rate fell to 2%. By 1977 it was lower, and by 1978 there was an absolute drop in production of some 25%.

South Africa's dependent status in the world economy occurred mainly because its industrial revolution took place in the 1940s, a time when the world system was already at an advanced stage of development. The international market was by then largely under the domination of monopoly capital. This position precluded the evolution in South Africa of a fully autonomous 'national economy'. To accumulate wealth, therefore, South African industrialists and commodity producers had the choice of producing for an extremely small white or extremely poor black local market,
or submitting themselves to terms laid down in a competitive world market over which they had little influence. On the world market furthermore, effective competition increasingly required economies of scale - huge concentrations of investment using advanced machinery and techniques to produce cheaply for mass markets. Only the giant monopolies were able to afford this level of investment.

However, South Africa maintained a favoured access to world markets through its natural resources - mainly gold and diamonds. On the basis of this wealth the state was able to enter areas vital to the growth of industry, such as electricity, iron, steel, fuel, and transport, areas involving enormous outlays that no individual industrialist could afford. The state is presently the largest single investor and employer, and 57% of all plant and machinery is under its control.

But these developments have in fact resulted in an even closer integration of the national economy with the world economy, subjecting it more directly to upswings and downswings in world capitalism. For instance South Africa imports 90% of the machinery needed for production. Exports consist mainly of raw materials or agricultural products, and about three quarters of total export sales in 1980 consisted only of minerals or mineral products.

In world terms, therefore, manufacturing is a poor relation to mining. It must rely on local markets; even its natural markets to the north have been largely closed off for political reasons. But here a paradox arises. In order to keep the costs of products competitively low industry must rely on the availability of cheap labour. Yet cheap labour means low
wages. And as the greatest market for commodities is the working class, this means low purchasing power. One way out of this problem has been an almost endless extension of credit by way of hire-purchase agreements. But eventually the bill must become due, and the poor remain a poor market.

In the recession of the 1970s manufacturers had two choices to maintain viability - to lower real wages or to mechanise, prune products and fire workers. Both these alternatives they set about doing. Between 1978 and 1980 alone real wages declined 20% through inflation. A rand in 1970 was worth 36c in 1981 (Cape Times 2.4.81). Between 1977 and 1979 unemployment rose by an estimated half a million to around two million. In Cape Town in the 1970s these developments were to compound older employment problems for the city's workers, problems related to labour preference policies and the destruction of the domestic economy.

Coloured labour preference

Almost un-noticed amid the political events of 1961 was the drawing of a boundary line between Mossel Bay and the Karoo railway junction town of De Aar. The area on the Cape Town side of the line - known as the Eiselen Line - was to become a 'Coloured labour preference area'. The 200,000 Africans in this new 'Colouredstan' were to be endorsed out at a rate of five per cent a year . . . 'forced out of towns and factories and off farms and businesses to work on the mines and the Orange River Development Scheme'.

The purpose of the line, according to The Torch newspaper, was to:

squeeze more labour, cheap labour, out of the coloured people. Through swallowing more areas in the rural districts, through increased regimentation by the Coloured Affairs Department (CAD),
ABOUT 500 people attended a meeting in GuguJetu recently to protest against the high bread price.

The people were angry. They said they were tired of the Government's attacks.

"We must take action," they said.

The meeting decided to call for a protest boycott in the week of November 22 to 29. The people elected a Food Committee to talk to other organisations about supporting the boycott.

This meeting followed an assessment of the Bread Campaign by the UWO. They organised a "rag" procession to "parade" through the streets of the township, announcing the meeting. The Branch borrowed a van. They covered the van with banners and posters. The banners were painted with slogans: BRING DOWN PRICES, WE ARE HUNGRY! WE WANT BREAD, BUT THE GOVERNMENT BUYS GUNS! BREAD FOR PEOPLE, NOT FOR PROFITS!

Women stood on the van, using a loudspeaker to talk to the people in the streets. People came out of their houses. They came out of the beerhalls and they stepped off the buses to hear what the "rag" had to say.

The procession moved slowly from street to street, from Section 1 across to Nyanga, New Cross Roads and the Nyanga Bush settlement.

The women handed out pamphlets from house to house as they went along. They talked to the people about the meeting. They urged them to attend.

"Imbila yaswela umsila ngekuyalezela" they said. (Come and hear for yourself so that you hear the true story.)

Children crammed on to the back of the van, eating bread. "It may be the last time we eat bread. Bring down prices, we are hungry," they said.

The "rag" procession was harasued a number of times by vans and uniformed men, but the women went on regardless.

75,000 sign petition

IN ABOUT four weeks more than 75 000 people have already signed a petition in Durban to protest against the bread price increase.

Durban's Bread Committee say they aim to hand in 250 000 to the Government.

At a meeting in Newlands East recently, more than 200 agreed that the price of bread should not go up.

However, they rejected the call by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of Inkatha and the SA Black Alliance, for a boycott of white bread.

The meeting was organised by the Bread Committee. The committee represents political, worker, community, student and church bodies.

The demands of the petition are:

- The increase is totally unjust;
- The Government subsidy is too low;
- None shall go hungry in our society.
by the take-over of the housing schemes by the C.A.D., by C.A.D.
control of schooling and through the "rehabilitation" scheme in
the rural areas they hope to force more coloureds onto the labour
market. 17

While Africans were to be 'migrantized', rural coloureds were urged to sell
their labour in the city. According to the Prime Minister of the time,
Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, those who wanted to continue to live in the area in
which they had grown up 'were selfish because they stand in the way of
the wonderful opportunities that the Group Areas offers to the coloured
people'. 18

What the Eiselen Line policy attempted to do was to split the labour
force in the Western Cape along racial lines. It was to do this by restricting
African access to residence and employment and by cementing coloured labour
into a position between black and white workers. On the other side of the
employment coin were those who could not find work at all. Many local
factors increased joblessness, among them:

(1) population growth and urban migrations;
(2) a low level of industrial skills among workers;
(3) mechanisation in the factories;
(4) the erosion of ghetto enterprise by factory competition and group
areas removals;
(5) the unstable fortunes of the building industry in which most male
labourers were employed;
(6) the preference given to women in the major industry - textiles, and
(7) a slowdown in the Western Cape economy relative to the Witwatersrand,
the industrial core of the country.
Official figures on unemployment - and particularly on under-employment - contain built-in problems which limits their usefulness. Among economically active people in South Africa, Charles Simkins found the unemployment figure in 1979 to be two million. But Government figures for the same year put unemployment at a little under half a million. Usually discrepancies arise over definitions of non-employment, leading to what is called 'hidden unemployment' (hidden, that is, to statisticians but very visible in the housing estates). An attempt to think through these discrepancies was made in a study of the Cape Flats housing estate, Bishop Lavis, by James Thomas and Andrea Blau. They found the official statistics to be unhelpful because of their very narrow definition of unemployment. The definition used in the monthly Current Population Survey, holds that a person is unemployed if he or she is potentially economically active and:

1. desires to work;
2. does not work (has worked less than five hours in the past seven days);
3. has attempted to find work during the previous month;
4. is able to accept a position within one week;
5. is between the ages of 15 and 64 if male, and 15 and 59 if female.

On this basis the unemployment rate for Bishop Lavis in 1981 was 9.5% of the economically active population. But several questions arise. If a person does not fill all the above conditions and is not working, he or she is classed not economically active and therefore not part of an unemployment statistic. However what about:
A person who no longer desires to work because he or she has given up trying.

A person who has worked for six hours during the previous week (they could hardly be classed as employed).

A migrant worker who desires work but because of technical requirements cannot accept a position within one week.

A child under 15 years old who is not at school and desperately needs employment in order to stay alive.

A person who says they are at school but is not.

Thomas and Blau therefore expanded their definition of unemployment to include:

any member of the economically active population who was not working and wanted to work, regardless of whether they were looking for work or not. 23

The only people excluded from the category of economically active were:

full-time students, those permanently medically unfit to work, those voluntarily retired and housewives not desiring work. 24

With this definition the unemployment rate was found to be 13.9%. More than 63% of a sample of 2086 people in Bishop Lavis were found to have an income of R9 a week or less. Just over 60% of the sample group had not worked during the previous 12 months. This correlates with a survey of gang members done for this book. It found that 66% of the fathers of the youths had been out of work for the previous 12 months and 11% had
been without work for two years or more. Nearly 18% of those questioned in Bishop Lavis were found to be children who were not working but were not at school - almost as many as were in full-time study (21%). The ways in which the unemployed survived can be seen in Table 6D.

**TABLE 6D**

WAYS IN WHICH UNEMPLOYED IN BISHOP LAVIS SURVIVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>METHOD</th>
<th>MEN PERCENTAGE</th>
<th>WOMEN PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Odd Jobs</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family help</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends help</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Benefit</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thomas and Blau

Under-employment is more difficult to measure. This is because it must often be based on people's subjective assessment of their work potential. Thomas and Blau used the following definition:

1. people who wish to work for more hours for more pay, whether they are actually looking for more work or not;
2. people whose present job is below their level of qualifications;
3. people who have been economically active over the past 12 months, but who have been unemployed for some of that time;
people who have been less than fully employed (involuntarily), based on the number of hours worked in the past week. Using this definition they found the number of economically active people who were under-employed to be as high as 68%. This gives a combined figure for the underutilization of labour of just under 82%. As Bishop Lavis is a fairly representative Cape Flats housing estate, as Table 6E shows, these results can be generalised for much of the Cape Flats population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Township</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Medium income per wage earner/year</th>
<th>Percentage of population earning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tierveli</td>
<td>22 276</td>
<td>R568</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop Lavis</td>
<td>26 309</td>
<td>R585</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsies River</td>
<td>63 723</td>
<td>R589</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manenberg</td>
<td>36 919</td>
<td>R594</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retreat</td>
<td>37 971</td>
<td>R616</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonteheuwel</td>
<td>40 648</td>
<td>R619</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassy Park</td>
<td>31 555</td>
<td>R640</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heideveld</td>
<td>17 484</td>
<td>R693</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athlone</td>
<td>62 595</td>
<td>R692</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan area of Cape Town</td>
<td>606 075</td>
<td>R604</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thomas and Blau

As can be expected, a particular feature of the army of unemployed is its youthfulness. One study in the Transvaal metropolitan area found that two-thirds of the black unemployed fell in the 15-24 age group. Another
found that a quarter of the workseekers in Johannesburg and Durban, and two-thirds in Pietermaritzburg, had never been employed.²⁸ Petrus, a boy who had to leave school as a result of the 1980 education boycott, talks about the problems of finding a job in Cape Town:

I've been out of work for the last 14 months. I have been trying to get a job at some firms and big companies but haven't been successful. I was offered some jobs, but the wages were so low I didn't accept. I'm not choosy about the work, but at least I want to get a wage I can survive on. I used to spend about R4 a week on travelling to find a job. I used to think it would be easy because I've got my Junior Certificate, but now I realise that isn't the case. All they want is cheap black labour so they can get rich and take the money out of the country before the revolution comes.

I worked in one place for a couple of days. But they tried to bullshit me around so I resigned. My mother was upset but she tried to understand. I often hear them telling me how lazy I am when I don't accept just any job. I hope their eyes will soon see things in a better way instead of what TV and the newspapers feed them. My dad just about earns enough for us to live on. He is a heavy-duty driver. I think one day I also want to become a heavy-duty driver, then perhaps I get a job much better.

There's such a lot of jobs advertised in the Argus, but when you go you find a queue of 30 people for just the one job. And chances are you won't get it. Perhaps they'll advertise for a messenger with Standard 6, but you'll find people there with matric certificates. You and your Junior Certificate can just turn around and leave again.

One of the best ways of getting a job is having a connection, maybe an uncle or someone to bring you to the boss. I know of people who got jobs that way. But unemployment bureaus don't do
much to help. They just want qualified people like electricians. And they would rather employ blacks who they can fuck around and who they can't really communicate with so the worker can't argue back. I prefer stealing to working for someone who exploits you like that.

I have been around with some gangs here. Most of the members I know as childhood friends and we often do things together. They are also unemployed. Like me they don't want to work for someone who calls them 'boys' or 'hotnobs'. People say gangs are bad. Perhaps they are, but they are still from our people. Perhaps they sometimes do things that isn't what I would agree with. But so does Botha and Vorster. Perhaps less obviously. If my own people have money I will take it from them, but I won't kill them for it, never. I just want to have enough to survive.

I've been locked up overnight in a cell once, just because I was waiting on the stoep of the shop for my mother to come home with the bus. I had to help her with the groceries. One can't trust a white man anymore. He'll stab you in the back if you don't look.

I have made my girlfriend pregnant. I'll have to find a way of getting a job soon. Perhaps I can go to Jo'burg to work at Sasol. That's what some of my friends do, then they come back and lie still for a while. But I'd rather stand on my legs fighting than go on my knees for the 'boere' and be used as a piece of machinery that gets replaced.

Quite apart from the frustrations generated by unemployment and the under-use of human potential, the sharp rise of the cost of living from the late 1970s was to create a crisis of survival in Cape Town. In 1942 more than 50% of people defined as coloured fell below the Poverty Datum Line - a calculated minimum income level for the survival of a family of five. In 1959 it was still as high as one third. The Theron Commission found
in 1975 that about 40% of the coloured population were living in need, many in an 'acute state of poverty'. By the early 1970s South Africa was experiencing double-figure inflation. Between 1971 and 1980 the average wage for coloured people rose by 36% But during the same period the cost of bread went up 147%, sugar 132%, potatoes 147% and mealie meal 185%. Between 1975 and 1980 the consumer price index rose 82.8% on all items, and 94.8% on food items. So despite a money increase in wages in Cape Town, the real wage decreased - and with it the standard of living of the working class.

This coincided with a rise in black trade union militancy, and 1981 saw the greatest number of workers involved in strikes in the history of South Africa. In May that year the Cape Times observed that:

rising prices, particularly in foodstuffs, would mean constant pressure from black trade unions for wage adjustments. It would also mean that a climate vulnerable to strikes and threats of strikes would have to be tolerated.

And as the economic slowdown of 1981 deepened, a newspaper noted:

a steady migration of skilled coloured workers (from Cape Town) to the Transvaal and abroad (while) at the same time, paradoxically, the region has a serious unemployment problem.

The danger signals were even being emitted by City Hall, with the mayor warning of severe unemployment up ahead and an escalation of the crime rate.
MIGRATION FROM THE RURAL HINTERLAND

The slowdown also coincided with the migration into the city of a large number of people from the rural areas. This migration, as we have seen, was based more on rural push than on urban pull. It is better understood as the decomposition of rural society than as an expression of the dynamism of urban society, and was (and still is) often a move from rural under-employment to urban unemployment. In the decade from 1960 to 1970 between 30,000 and 40,000 coloured workers were made redundant in 36 districts surrounding Cape Town. This led to increasing migration into the city . . . at precisely the time that group areas removals were accelerating the need for Cape Flats housing. During these 10 years the 'coloured' population in the Peninsula was recorded as increasing by no less than 43 per cent. This coincided with a concentration of land ownership and increasing agricultural mechanization. Between 1952 and 1981 the number of white-owned farms in South Africa dropped from 120,000 to around 70,000. However between 1937 and 1976 the number of tractors used on these farms - a sensitive index of mechanization - increased from 6,000 to 174,000. Indeed South Africa has 40% more tractors than the rest of Africa. The effects of these changes can be seen in a 43 per cent population increase in Cape Town between 1960 and 1970.

In the city's hinterland the farm labour situation is extremely complex, with workers coming in from the Transkei on contract, cycles of migration between urban and rural areas and a movement towards smaller and less 'controlled' farms. A trend in the last two decades has been a change in property ownership from smaller independent farmers to the giant national wine conglomerates and even bigger food multinationals. These large agri-businesses tend to be capital-intensive, replacing farm labourers with
technological equipment and demanding higher skills from workers. Conditions for labour on these estates have been improving. But they have also tended to flush out 'unproductive' workers, and smaller farms in the area are finding themselves becoming dumping grounds for the resulting 'surplus' population.

Among this hidden group in the farm 'volkshuise' are those that cannot find work, together with the old, the maimed, the jobless youth and the alcoholic wake of the notorious tot system. As the real wages sink lower relative to the cost of living and are spread more and more thinly over a growing population, so petty trade and services spread: food stalls, shebeens and prostitution. Alongside these grow theft, violence and an abuse of alcohol born of desperation.

To gather statistics on these developments is virtually impossible and farmers tend to be extremely hostile to 'outsiders' interviewing their labourers. It was therefore decided to focus on one farm, to which I had unlimited access by acting as an 'overseer' for a month. The farm was a medium sized stand backing into the Klein Drakenstein mountains near Wellington, about 50km from Cape Town. It was privately owned, and had plum and apricot orchards together with smallish fields of youngberries, strawberries and granadillas. There was an olive orchard (which was not yet producing at the time of the study), a small dairy herd and some pigs.

The aim of the study was to gather worker biographies and to assess the effects, rather than the degree, of migrancy and job security among labourers in the area. The four job histories below were chosen, not because they were exceptional, but because they were typical of so many workers' experiences in the area.
DANIEL TENKWAN (23 years old)

Born in De Aar, he reached Std. 8 before joining the Railway offices there as a clerk. However he met a girl from Wellington and they decided to settle near her home and marry. The only work available to him there, he found, was farm labour and he managed to find work on the above farm in 1976. He was taken on at R10,00 a week and in four years it had risen to R13,00. He received a free house, firewood and half a bag of coarse meal a month, in addition to a large beaker of wine every weekday and two on Saturdays and Sundays. The two workers' toilets were communal and water was from an external tap. The house had no ceilings and a concrete floor. It was intolerably hot in summer and cold in winter.

His hours of work were from 5.30 a.m. to 7.15 a.m., 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 4 p.m. to 6.15 p.m. on weekdays. Work at weekends consisted of milking at 5.30 a.m. to 7 a.m. and again from 6.15 p.m. to about 7.15 p.m. He was also required to feed the stock at weekends and light the fire for hot water in the farm house in the mornings. Total hours worked came to about 50 hours a week, but he was on call at all times. Tenkwan was the 'boss boy' and organised milking and feeding of stock, fencing, tree felling and planting, all tractor work and was a skilled power mower driver. He undertook all minor mechanical repairs on the farm.

On R13,00 a week Tenkwan supported a wife and two small children. Wages were paid every two weeks. Most food purchases were made at the farm 'shop' - and at the end of the two-week period were deducted from his pay. During the month under review the 'credit' of two of the workers interviewed exceeded their wages and a third worker's debts equalled his pay. A constant preoccupation of all three older workers interviewed was the cancellation of their debts. But looking back in their credit books for the previous six months showed they had never succeeded in doing this. Tenkwan said this credit system was general on all farms in the Paarl/Wellington district. He considered his wage as being about average, R15,00 being 'high' and R20,00 exceptional. His wife occasionally added to their income by doing 'stukwerk' or casual labour in certain seasons when she could get it.
Shortly after the initial interview was done Tenkwan resigned. The farmer was not sure where he or his dependents had gone, but had been told they had gone 'to town' (meaning Cape Town) to look for work.

As far back as 1876 Marx observed that when capitalist production takes possession of agriculture the demand for an agricultural population falls absolutely. 'Part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat, and on the lookout for circumstances favourable to this transformation.'

The Western Cape fruit farming area remains fairly labour-intensive, despite the use of machinery and chemical sprays. This is because there is no present substitute for picking, typing, packing and planting operations. Yet there has been a marked fall-off of coloured male labour on these farms. Brian Levy, in a study of labour migration in the area concluded that this was because there had been a trend towards the substitution of African migrant workers for 'coloured' workers in both permanent and seasonal employment. According to farmers he spoke to the supply of male 'coloured' labour had become increasingly scarce over time, relative to demand. Another trend has been towards the use of women and children as labour 'commuters' from nearby areas. Levy found the major change that had taken place in the organisation of the non-resident seasonal labour market had been an inevitable consequence of the depopulation of many deeper rural areas:

Until the relatively recent past many farmers in the Hex River Valley (near Worcester) used to travel to the Karoo from where they would recruit workers who remained on their farms for the entire season (November to May). Some farmers interviewed were using this system only three years ago (about 1973)... As the 'coloured' population of the Karoo migrated to the (fruit growing) Boland... the system was transformed into (a) daily commuting operation.
In the Paarl-Wellington area farmers confirmed that building contractors had been bringing in gangs of coloured labourers from De Aar in the Karoo and had been refusing to repatriate them when their contracts ended. They also said that although workers used to be seasonal, they were no predominantly daily commuters.

What we find, therefore, is a buildup of coloured men in Cape Town's rural hinterland who are unwilling to work as farm labourers. Considering Daniel Tenkwan's wages and the amount of work he was expected to do this is not surprising. With his experience it is probable that in time he would manage to secure a steady job. For him, as for many others from inland areas, the rural hinterland was used as a springboard into Cape Town. Another worker I interviewed, Petrus Zammana, was not able to use farm labour in this way to his own advantage, being forced into a trajectory different to that of Tenkwan:

PETERUS ZAMMANA (35 years old)

When interviewed Zammana had been working on the farm for a week. He had been fired by his previous employer for demanding a half-day holiday on Christmas Day. The employer's version was that Zammana was drunk and that: 'Daar is iets snaaks met hom, hy's 'n slim een' (there is something funny about him, he's a clever one) and because the farmer's wife was nervous in his presence.

Zammana was born in Wellington and got several jobs in the town before being forced to do farm work. He moved from farm to farm between Stellenbosch and Wellington, being fired often or leaving after coming into conflict with the farmer. When interviewed he was extremely bitter about his situation. He had a wife and four young children to support on a wage of R11,00 a week. His temperament (and no doubt his quick tongue) obviously did not endear him to employers, nor would his increasing alcohol intake and a tendency to be violent when drunk.
He had thus not been favoured in the training of skills, although obviously intelligent. He claimed to have been replaced in his job several times by black migrant labour from the Transkei, and expressed intense dislike for 'dom kaffirs'. It was apparent that since entering the labour market his living standards had deteriorated.

Three months after being employed on the farm on which he was interviewed he was fired for insolence. He was said to be working on another farm 'on the other side of Wellington somewhere'.

This labour biography leads us into a further speculation. In addition to permanent employment on farms in the Western Cape, Levy identifies three types of labour:

*Casual Labour, in which the worker is hired purely on a daily basis - either as in the case of women and children living on the farm and undertaking odd jobs, or in the case of a worker hired for a specific task for which he is paid on completion.

*Workers employed on a daily basis to perform a seasonal task.

*Workers seasonally employed but on a regular rather than a casual basis, as in the case of migrant workers on short-term contracts.

Although Zammana's wife and children fit into the first category, it can be seen that he fitted into none of them. Although a quick survey may locate Zammana as a permanent worker - and the farmer would have identified him as such - his job history shows that he was in a slow migration across the rural areas of the Western Cape.
Because of the high relative surplus population and the low level of skill demanded on the smaller farms there is tremendous job insecurity - dismissals often being for 'cheek' or 'making a noise'. This had embittered Zammana, who was above average intelligence, and his attitude made farmers unwilling to teach him the skills that would give him a toe-hold of bargaining power in a conflict, allow him to land a more skilled job on the large agri-business estates, or to make the leap into the city.

His job insecurity was also increased by the threat of replacement by black contract labourers from the Transkei. Although the Western Cape is theoretically a 'coloured labour preference area', large numbers of black migrants are brought in on a continuous basis on six, nine and eleven month contracts. They are cheaper and more politically 'docile' than coloured labourers. Also, in the absence of a historical link with wine and perhaps with a slightly lower frustration level over social mobility, black migrants tend to have a lower alcohol intake and fewer 'babelaas' (hangover) Mondays. Recruiters of black labour in the Western Cape include the following:

- Hex River Boeregroep
- Berg River Farmers
- Krom River Apple Farmers
- Appelwaite
- Cape Flats and Peninsula Farmers
- Elgin Farmers Group
- Stellenbosch Farmers Group
- Grabouw Farmers Group
- Philadelphia Farmers Group
- Westelike Graan Boere
- Kromvlei Farmers
- Oak River Farmers
- Owendale Farmers
- Pandekloof Landgroep
- Ceres Farmers Group
- Landeshoff
In addition, many independent farmers appear to be able to recruit labour independently of these groups, although this is technically illegal. Others, until fairly recently, recruited teams of workers from the Karoo through team gang leaders who, although also labourers, were paid a higher wage. Further threats to male coloured farm labour is the use of children and builders' labourers from the towns during the grape-picking season (their holidays coincide with this activity) as well as women both from towns and farms who are hired at a lower wage.

Because Zammana was unwilling or felt he was unable to seek work in Cape Town he faced constant migration, a declining standard of living and the disruptions to social and family life resulting from continuous changes of abode.

LAFINA KAMMIES (about 50 years old)

When interviewed she had been working for the same employer for four years. In that time her wage had risen by 50c to R7.50 a week. In her previous job she, together with her 9-year-old son and older daughter, had worked as a team on a fruit farm near Elgin. They appear to have been employed both casually and seasonally, but were paid per task (for every load picked or tray sliced or de-pitted). Their combined wage came to R18.00 a week and no food was given. Evidently during the day tea was served with vetkoek, but cost 15c.

Kammies was born in De Aar and was brought to the Paarl-Wellington area by her father, who worked for the Post Office. After marriage she did seasonal work on or around the farms on which her husband was employed. She bore nine children. However her husband became an alcoholic and was unable to support the family. She was forced to use her family as a work team doing casual and seasonal work, acting as a char in the towns between seasons. Her position, when interviewed, was complicated by several factors.
During her previous employment on another farm she had lost all her 'papers' when she burned down her house while drunk. She had never been to school and was illiterate. She was terrified that the loss of her documents would be found out by the 'government'. Her fear was increased by demands, lawyers' letters and visits from debt collectors of a Wellington clothing store to which she owed money (these were all seen as 'government' demands). She had bought clothes at the shop two years previously, and although she was repaying at R2.00 a week she was required to pay at a rate of R7.00. The store was evidently not prepared to compromise.

Kammies was supporting her husband and five of her nine children, including a daughter over the age of 20 who occasionally procured casual farm work. Also sharing part of their house was a couple - the man worked in a piano factory in Wellington while the woman ran a shebeen at weekends. This led to tension with the farmer due to the noise, and both families were subsequently evicted from the house, Kammies being fired.

Kammies worked the same hours as Tenkwana and Zammana. Her duties were domestic - washing, ironing, cleaning four houses and attending to the sterilisation of milk equipment - as well as watering and weeding the large vegetable garden. In addition she had to tend the youngberries, strawberries and granadillas.

After being fired, Kammies was thought to be working at 'another farm down the valley'. It was not possible to find if she had obtained a house there.

This job history provides us with another view of the complex rural labour process. Within the larger cycle of slumps and booms in the capitalist economy, which cause the ejection and re-employment of the 'surplus' population, are also smaller seasonal cycles. These are particularly linked to agriculture. Workers like Kammies, caught in these smaller cycles, tend to oscillate between casual labour in both rural and urban areas and periods of worklessness in their search for
permanent employment. Others, higher up on the scale, supplement their urban wages with seasonal spells of farm work during holidays and between jobs. In the Western Cape it is women and children, particularly, who are involved in this cycle. Women form a large proportion of the seasonal labour force, and are drawn from three sources:

*Dependents of men working on farms.

*Women commuting daily from towns during certain seasonal activities on the farms. Between seasons they form part of the reserve army of labour in the towns, work as chars or undertake activities in the 'informal sector'.

*Women in a similar position to the above, but who actually migrate between town and country, living on farms during the thinning, picking and packing seasons, and in back yards or townships for the rest of the year. Levy had estimated that these women work an average of eight months a year on farms in the Western Cape. Farmers interviewed by him thought that for the rest of the year women were either unemployed, worked in domestic labour or in fruit processing factories, or in the West Coast fishing industry.43

During her life Kammies operated in the first and third of these categories. Her position when interviewed, however, was that of Zammana, possibly because of the need for adequate accommodation for her large family which only a farm would provide. However, in the absence of farm work it was likely that she would sign up at the rural fruit or fish factories, or be forced into a town and into a rural/urban oscillation.

The situation of Kammies shows several other aspects of farm labour in the area. Apart from her children, she was supporting an alcoholic husband and an out-of-work older daughter, both fully 'marginalized' and both in a sense casualties of monopoly capitalist penetration into agriculture. Furthermore she shared her house with a couple who stood in an entirely different relationship to capital: the man a permanent labourer in a factory, and his wife engaged in a small-scale commodity service — running a shebeen. Although the latter two were evicted from
their abode, they would have no trouble in obtaining other accommodation through their ability to pay rent. They were simply part of the urban proletariat, the difference being that part of their income was derived from farm labourers' wages.

Another consideration is the way in which farm labourers are tied into labour by poverty and addiction to alcohol. A breakdown of the purchases from the farm store by two of the labourers, Daniel Tenkwan and Lefina Kammies, was made over a two-week period. (see Table 6F)

Apart from some tobacco, condensed milk and radio batteries, the income was found to cover only essentials. Loans had to be made for unexpected outlays, one to bail a wife out of jail after a drunken brawl in Wellington, the other to honour HP demands for purchases of clothing and blankets. The workers were constantly beleagured with final demands and lawyers letters from retail firms in Wellington which offered goods on easy terms. In addition to these loans the other major outlay was on meat – usually cheap cuts such as sheep or cow heads and trotters or offal. In Tenkwan's case it can be seen that the largest cash outflow was an unexpected R10 which he did not have savings to cope with. He came into the two-week period with a debt of R13, pushed this up to R43 during the next 14 days, paid off R20 of this and was left with R6 in cash. Had it not been for the R10 fine, his eventual debt would have again been R13, suggesting careful budgeting on his part. What actually occurred was that Tenkwan received a minimum amount of food in order to reproduce himself and his family plus R3 a week to buy clothes, non-food essentials and to cope with unexpected demands. It is likely, however, that much of this cash went to the purchase of wine for the weekly Saturday night party.
### TABLE 6F

**PURCHASES BY TWO FARM WORKERS DURING A 2-WEEK PERIOD IN 1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DANIEL TENKWAH</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debt brought forward</td>
<td>13.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 g tobacco</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>750ml cooking oil</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bread</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matches</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cheese</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corned ox lung (tin)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1kg potatoes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 cake soap</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ox lung</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 eggs</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1kg sugar</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2kg peanuts</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cow head</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tobacco</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cigarette papers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matches</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matches</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ox lung</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2kg sugar</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 pkts. yeast</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100gm rooibos tea</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bag of meal</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loan to pay HP debt</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loan to bail out wife</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>margarine</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ox lung</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>candles</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 cake soap</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matches</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>margarine</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1kg sugar</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 kg potatoes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peanuts</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>writing pad</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1kg sugar</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plums</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL OWED</td>
<td>43.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay for 2 weeks</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt paid off</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASH WAGE for 2 weeks</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Still owes</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEFINA KAMMIES</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debt brought forward</td>
<td>10.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooking oil</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tomato paste</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sunflower oil</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2kg sugar</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2kg maize rice</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corned ox lung</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1kg potatoes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tomato paste</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cow head</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2kg sugar</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tomato paste</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500g margarine</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>onions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stamped mealies, 2.5kg</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>split beans</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 cake soap</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ox lung</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bag of meal</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200g tea</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radio battery</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2kg. potatoes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>condensed milk</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>margarine</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2kg. sugar</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tobacco</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL OWED</td>
<td>27.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay for 2 weeks</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASH WAGE for 2 weeks</td>
<td>00.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Still owes</td>
<td>12.35</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Given the extremely sparse conditions on the farm it was interesting to discover why the workers stayed there for the length of time they did. The reasons they gave included:

*Free house for them and their family and an absence of such accommodation in the towns.

*No jobs in the towns.

*Fear of 'the city'.

*Because their family and relations were on surrounding farms.

*Guarantee of free wine.

The last factor was stressed by all workers interviewed in the district. In the four weeks of June 1979 the two male labourers on the farm drank more than 40 litres of cheap white wine dispensed free from the farm store at the end of each day. Much of what little cash they received was also spent on wine. The farm wine is given in smaller measures during the week when labour is required, and doubled at weekends. This consumption of wine is reflected in the high level of violence among coloured labourers in the Western Cape which peaks on Saturdays. During this time the roads between the towns and the farms become littered with drunken men and women either staggering along the verges or lying in heaps, unable to move. Admissions to the casualty ward of the Paarl Coloured Hospital near Wellington during the hour I spent there on the third Saturday in June 1979 included a man with his throat cut, one stabbed just below his heart, about 30 men and women with concussion, cuts or breaks sustained in drunken brawls in the area, and many children with wounds in advanced stages of sepsis.
The provision of housing and the issue of alcohol is clearly being used in the Western Cape in an attempt to bind the coloured labour force to the land at a time when almost any labour in the city, legal or illegal, provides better wages. However it is among the youth on the farms that this bond is most easily broken:

TOLLIES KAMMIES (13 years old)

The boy, who was born in the Wellington area, had been used as an assistant by his mother, Lefina, since he could walk. When interviewed in mid-1979 he was 13 and attending school in the mornings. In the afternoons he was required to work on the farm, for which he was paid R2.50 a week together with a piece of available fruit each day. His entire wage apparently went to his mother, who occasionally allowed him a few cents for a treat. All younger children on the farm assisted their elders and were paid only with a small amount of fruit each day.

During the year Tollies had begun dropping out of school for days, then weeks at a time. On several occasions he made trips to Cape Town accompanied by other youths of his age. About the time his mother was fired he had apparently passed beyond her control. He was not sleeping at home or attending school, and was constantly in the company of a group of youths roaming the farms, working where they could and probably living on stolen fruit and chickens, about which there was much complaint from farmers.

Child labour is common on Western Cape farms. Levy has shown that during school holidays children from coloured schools are often formed into agricultural work teams under a (well-paid) teacher for the purpose of fruit thinning or picking. He found that the seasonal thinning work
force in the Hex River Valley comprised 51 per cent school children, 38 per cent women and 11 per cent adult men during his period of study (1977) and that children were drawn from as far afield as Cape Town. By the time Tollies was ten he was a fully-fledged labourer being paid a derisive wage or simply fruit 'gesondheid' while having to attend school seven kilometres from his home. He had no time for homework in the afternoons and no space for it in his crowded, candle-lit house at night. By the age of twelve he was milking, hay-baling and cutting, digging holes and planting, fruit picking and preparing, and able to drive a tractor, for which he effectively earned nothing. His rebellion at the age of thirteen is hardly surprising, and his movement into a peer-group gang of roaming minors suggests that other youths found themselves in the same position.

The job history of Tollies is important for this study because it parallels that of at least a third of the youths found in the City's street gangs. During my study the boy made several trips to Cape Town. If things got 'hot' for him on the farms, as they probably would, he could contact friends in the city and move in with them. More than likely they would be from a gang. But a more common route to Cape Town is described by Patrick, a senior member of the Mongrels, one of the biggest gangs on the Cape Flats:

Many of the gang are BJs (boere jongs - farm youths) but you'll see the leader is always a local person. He's got a house, a headquarters, a pad to sleep. These upcountry guys get arrested and they're sent to Tokyo (Porter Reformatory, situated in Tokai). There they stay maybe two years and they meet guys there who say "we'll fix you up when you come out". Maybe they join a gang in reform. When their time comes they don't want to go back home now. There's nothing for them to do there and now they've got
gedagtes (understanding) and they want to stay in town. So a gang leader he says to them: "you can stay here by me and get to know the place. I can find you work". So there he starts, you see. Little jobs - go get some sweets or milk from the shop, sell a little garu (dagga) and maybe some buttons (mandrax). Maybe after a time he can be trusted to pull a job.

This guy he sees the gangsters are making more money every day than his father makes a month. So he moves with them. After two years or something he will get stamped (tattooed) but he must be able to pull weight. Then he's full blast. This is how it happens: the kring (circle) sits, the main ouens, the top guys. These are guys who are in the various areas, they're pulling a lot of guys. One day the leaders of these branches (of the same gang) come together and decide to stamp their lighties. The new ones don't know about all this. Maybe they decide to leave one lightie out they're not sure of - he's not pulling weight - so then it will make him work harder and he'll become more brave.

There's a tattoo master in each gang, they use a needle and indian ink or a zombie (the black rubber seal in food jars) ... they burn it down and mix it with water. Then they get called in, but before their badge they must remember the laws - they will be asked. For the Mongrels its 26 because they're 26s. So they get their tshappie (tattoo). Afterwards when they're initiated they're like brothers - there's a law among them. And they won't be treated as lighties, it's no more "get this, do that". They can sit and smoke together.

You see this happens in the big gangs where there's discipline. There's very strict discipline, the leader just uses his eyes. But in the younger gangs, like The Hobos in Bonteheuwel or the Sicilians in Elsies River there's no discipline. It's frightening man! These young lighties with guns and they're 15. They hit merchants (drug salesmen), rob anyone. There's no thought. It's getting worse all the time.
What is being suggested here is that arrest, conviction and sentencing to a reformatory have become a ticket to the city for many farm youths. Here they join the unemployed and the gangs, urban hunters for the means to stay alive. What these gangs have done to survive in the face of tremendous odds is to rebuild a form of domestic economy in the new housing estate. This time, however, their customers are often their victims and their work is a crime.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6


2. Ibid. p. 10.


5. Clarke, op cit, p. 12.

6. O.D. Wollheim: article for Africa South on group areas. Wollheim Collection, Manuscripts Department, University of Cape Town.


8. Interview with Wollheim 24.3.81.


10. Theron Commission p. 261 and p. 27


Survey of gang members (sample of 100). ¶ 2


13. Western, op cit p. 312.


15. Ibid. p. 79.


22. Statistical news releases, Department of Statistics - a sample of 3000 dwellings a month over 12 months is used.


25. Ibid. p.15, 16.

26. Ibid. p. 4.


29. Wollheim, op.cit. p. 23.


31. Theron Commission p. 469.

32. Argus 1.6.81.

33. Cape Times 2.4.81.

34. Cape Times 18.5.81.

35. Argus 29.10.81.

36. Louis Kreiner in the Cape Times 30.7.81.


38. Theron Commission, op. cit.

39. Ibid.


42. Ibid. p. 101.

43. Levy, p. 98.

44. Ibid. p. 97.