Change and the Nation-State in the European Union.

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MA Thesis in International Relations
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Dedication

This work is dedicated to Deji and Esther Hastrup my beloved parents. Thank you for letting me do what I want and for your constant emotional and financial support. I will always be indebted to you, but I hope this work reflects, at least, the person you have brought me up to be. Thank you for love.

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Abstract
The advent of the European Union has necessitated an adaptation on the part of governments, especially in those areas where the Community’s laws supersede the national laws. The process whereby the Union affects the state has been characterised as ‘Europeanisation.’ This paper examines the adaptation in certain policy areas, not of policy itself, but at changes in the decision-making mechanisms that accompany membership in Union. It focuses on change in foreign policy mechanisms in Britain and Sweden, both unique case studies because of their histories.

I argue that changes in foreign policy mechanisms reflect a change in the construct of the state itself given the delicacy of this particular policy area. Because foreign policy making remains within the ambit of respective member states, with the CFSP, the second pillar of the Maastricht treaty, encouraging, at best coordination by states, without imposing supranationality, foreign policy coordination in the European Union is mostly an intergovernmental affair.

The changes in decision-making mechanisms however, has jeopardised the accepted notion of sovereignty in EU states as Sweden battles to retain her neutrality identity and Britain struggles to keep its Atlantic alliance intact while being part of Europe. Moreover, although the present changes have not removed foreign policy within the Union from intergovernmental level, that position too is fast changing. It is too early to say that the CFSP or the CESDP will supersede national foreign policy, and possibly, for a long time it would not; however, the new mechanisms in place allow for change in this aspect of the Union. In essence, as national foreign policy mechanisms evolve to accommodate membership, the CFSP too is adapting to the influence of the states and in the final analysis has the most potential to shape the future of the Union.
INTRODUCTION

International Relations has predominantly studied the relations between nation states. Hans Morgenthau's seminal book, *Politics among Nations* (1973), effectively outlines this leading view of international politics. Indeed, Morgenthau is famous for the modern Realist theory of international relations; however, while many dispute his characterisation of motives for international politics, there has been a general acceptance of who the most relevant actor is: the state.

The state, according to Morgenthau, is "...the ultimate reference point of contemporary foreign policy." There is a measure of truth to this statement; therefore, any respectable study on foreign policy must examine the state. On a superficial level, the state is a fixed territory, which is legally and politically independent and has control over the citizenry in its territory. Daniel Papp specifically defines the state as "a geographically bounded entity, governed by a central authority that has the ability to make laws, rules and decisions and to enforce those laws and decisions within its boundaries." Of those laws and decisions, we may include external policies which include diplomatic, trade and security policies of one state vis-à-vis another.

Although the state retains critical relevance, emphasis must be placed on the fact that many theorists question the notion of the state as sole actor in the international system and are continually challenging its role as a predominant actor. Actors often regarded as effectual in the international system, include non-governmental, intergovernmental and transnational organisations. This study acknowledges the increased role of these entities in international relations. However, it seeks to examine another entity that may pose a challenge to the nation state in Europe: the European Union. The institutions of the European Union (EU) have been assigned some authority by member states to carry out their functions. This in effect, may change the traditional functions and role of the modern nation state to its citizens as well as to the international community. Specifically, the study seeks to examine institutional change within the state’s foreign policy structures, given the dynamics of the European Union, in the United Kingdom and Sweden.

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1 Other works in this tradition include Kenneth Waltz’s two books *Man, the State and War: a theoretical analysis* (1959) and *Theories of International Politics* (1979)
EU policy powers have already sparked debate as to how member states coordinate their policies to meet EU regulations. Here, the focus is not to test actual policy change, as many scholars have broached that subject in the past. Instead, the concern of this thesis will centre on how trade and defence and foreign policy bureaus in specific member states (Britain and Sweden) relate to European Union structures in implementing external policy for themselves as members of the Union. In essence, the state seems to be changing, given the new institutional mechanisms employed, to make external policies since joining the European Union.

Sweden is pertinent to this study as it provides another perspective of the possibility of change in a smaller state. Traditionally, foreign policy theory posits that smaller states tend to align their choices based on the system’s structure. By all accounts then, it is conceivable that after much resistance, Sweden agreed to join the Community as its expansion and function was shaping the international system too. Although Sweden joined the EU, she still maintains her national currency and non-alignment stance. Unlike the other larger drivers of the EU, such as France and Germany, Britain is often called the ‘awkward’ partner. Thus, I have considered Britain in this study because, unlike France or Germany, Britain’s alliance to the United States for instance, has precluded her from integration to the extent of other member states. It is much more interesting therefore, to test institutional change in Britain due to this seeming reluctance.

In choosing Britain and Sweden as primary case studies, the intent is not to predict the future of the EU as a whole or make conclusions that bind all member states. Instead, this study could shed new light on how change in state institutions can have different or similar consequences for some of IR’s theoretical tenets, like sovereignty.

Within the Europeanisation literature, many authors have attempted to explain how states adapt policies that conform to European Union laws. While this may be true, national

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identity is not of interest here even if it was synonymous with policy objectives. Moreover, as European states themselves continue to shape European foreign policy, this study cannot be characterised in terms of Europeanisation.

The goals of this thesis are relatively narrow. It will evaluate whether membership in the EU has affected the organisation of security objectives (external policies) in two very different member states. I argue that the EU case is something of a hybrid and an unfinished one at that. While other possible sources have been acknowledged for their contribution to the 'decline of the state', the main concern of this paper will be to highlight the new institutional mechanisms and bureaucratic arrangements being employed to make external policies. The paper examines the changing nature of the European state. The emphasis of this study is on institutional change not policy adaptation.

The study will mainly make use of qualitative research methods, with the inclusion of personal correspondence used in lieu of actual interviews, where applicable.

This thesis does not argue that the nation state is irrelevant. Instead, the study concludes that the institution of the European Union and its added powers in proportion to the possible decrease in state powers are not necessarily detrimental to the state itself. These states have employed new mechanisms or modify the existing ones to maintain their preponderance in this policy area.

*Change and the nation state in the European Union* is concerned primarily with high politics, i.e. external policy in terms of trade, defence and security and therefore excludes foreign development policy.

I hope that this dissertation will add to the body of work already bridging the extremes. On the one hand is one school of thought that argues that the state remains the most relevant participant in determining world politics through its foreign policies; and on the other is another school that views the state as weak in its ability to continue in that role of architect of the international system. Instead, this study will be looking at institutional change and what implications it may have for shaping the EU or the international system.
The first chapter will briefly examine the state itself, some of its traditional authority and expected responsibilities in general and especially in the study of international politics. In addition, this section will look at what makes the European Union a hybrid institution, neither a nation state, nor a complete intergovernmental organisation; neither a federal nor a complete confederal arrangement. Hence, for the purposes of this paper, the EU is a unique, unfinished institution of the international system.

The second and third chapters commence with a look at the European Union's formation, to give a background on European integration and its evolution. Given the aims and the functions of the Union, the study attempts to explain how member state bureaucracies function in relation to the European Union on matters of foreign policy objectives and implementation. In essence, this section will look at what duties they still have and which ones, if any, they have ceded to the Union. Particularly, it will examine how national interests are coordinated in Brussels, while accounting for membership in the Union. A general discussion of the EU's structures is necessary to justify why states are changing in general. The paper will not be looking at the EU/domestic policy functions of those bureaucracies, e.g. social welfare policies. The end of this section will reflect further on the state of the State in Western Europe. Through bureaucratic relations between the two states and their European Union counterparts in forming EU-wide and individual national foreign policies, one may draw conclusions about the EU as an institution.

The fourth chapter attempts to explain the implications of these changes. Particularly, these implications will reflect the irregularities of the system, due to membership in the EU. It will also argue that these implications must be viewed in the context of change in studying international politics. The paper will examine some aspects of sovereignty. The study of states in international relations often rests in the understanding of where sovereignty lies. This concept is too broad for the scope of a mini-dissertation; however, an analysis of the state's institutional change in foreign policy making since joining the EU, is useful for understanding some of the larger theoretical challenges of the concept. Sovereignty here is not a legal concept, but as package of attributes expected of a modern state, such as the ability to be in sole control of its external policy and the decision-making processes. In addition, this section will attempt a more in-depth assessment of the bid to produce a common foreign EU security and defence policy, as foreign policy decision-making changes within a state have an impact on this process. There are obvious advantages and disadvantages to a common EU policy and those will be covered here.
The conclusion will survey the issues that have been raised by the study and their implication for further study in this area.

Figure 1
CHAPTER ONE

International System and the State

What is the State?

The concept of states arose following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. After the Thirty Years War that ended the supreme political authority of the Roman Catholic Church and its Pope, 1648 thus began the process of establishing sovereign entities of states, as we know them today. As introduced earlier, the state consists of three main characteristics: territory, legitimacy, and sovereignty.

A fixed territory is a characteristic of the state established by international treaties during the course of the last 300 years. This means that a government is established over a group of people who live in a particular geographical area. This government has the right to tax and regulate entry and exit from the area it has authority of. This then leads to the other characteristic of legitimacy. While a government may lay claim to an area, it needs legitimacy; that is, it must be recognised by both the residents of that given area and other states that constitute the international system. Within this established, legitimate territory, the main function of the government is to provide public goods such as welfare and general infrastructure to the citizen. Above all, the onus is on the state to provide security for its citizenry from foreign invasion as well as internal disintegration. It must be pointed out that because a state claims a particular territory, it does not mean that it has legitimacy. This is particularly true when the people in that area do not recognise the governorship of the state or the international system does not recognise the state. For instance, while the Turkish Cypriots believe in the legitimacy of their territory, it is not a territory recognised as a state by the United Nations.

Gradually, the state is experiencing transformation. In "The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and its Contemporary Transformation", Roland Axtmann draws attention to this. Although we also acknowledge that the process by which states are established have been gradual, it still does not completely fulfill all the purported characteristics of the ideal state. The characteristic of sovereignty is one of such. Sovereignty as intended should mean that no geographical entity, the state, be subservient or directly accountable to another. Specifically, it should mean that no authority higher than the state exists. This, as

7 Papp, op. cit. p13
we will learn, has never truly been the case. As I mentioned earlier, sovereignty for the purposes of this paper will deviate from this standard understanding. The reason for this is that never has there been a time when the state has been completely free to do as it wished. In the first instance, the existence of alliances, treaties and the authority of international law limit this characteristic because states have the duty to fulfil these obligations to uphold peace. In the second instance, the Cold War era polarised the world to the extent that the United States and USSR had immense influence over many of their respective allies; in sum, no state is ever truly sovereign. Axtmann notes that the transformation of the nation state in regards to the 'loss' of sovereignty is affected by the internationalization of the state and democratic governance. By this, he implies that the nature of democratising a state is often subject to international scrutiny. It has now become difficult for governments to act simply for their interests as their interest may be tied to the perspective of the international community.10

In addition to the decrease of the so-called sovereign powers and the state's ability to provide the most important public good, security, is decreasing in many regions of the world. As one observer notes, the state's ability to absolutely secure its citizenry has long been eradicated by the existence of nuclear weapons.11 One could say that in this age, the constancy of the international threat of terrorism further proves this point. Therefore, the citizenry will find new ways to organise and protect themselves, usually through transnational organisations, thereby shrinking the sphere of authority of the nation state even more.12

Understanding International Politics and the State
As I indicated earlier, the study of international politics is often conceptualised in terms of states13 as the main actor. It is on this basis that Hans Morgenthau, deservedly the father of modern international politics, wrote Politics among Nations. Morgenthau asserts that international relations are the relation between states as each search to maximise their power.14 The reason for the search for power is quite plausible: interests. This is what

10 Axtmann, op. cit. pp268-272
12 Ibid.
13 The term state and nation-state in this context will be used interchangeable unless otherwise specified and they are used to mean government of a country.
14 Morgenthau, op. cit. p5. This is not the only claim Morgenthau makes to outline his modern Realist theory of international relations; however, this is the most pertinent for this paper.
defines the ideologies of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{15} As Papp explains however, 'national interest' is an “ambiguous” term that is never clearly defined.\textsuperscript{16} With each successive government within a particular country, interests are likely to change. If this is true, is this a viable concept to base the nature of international politics? National interest may be defined in the economic sense with the view that policy that enhances a country’s economy is of national interest. For example, while the Chinese government might not want to be involved with the Western democracies, they offer large markets and that seems to supersede other ideological disagreements. This way we can see that the claim that power is sought to attain or protect interests, is not sufficient and in fact can be confusing.

The point here is not to challenge the motives of state action per se; instead, the above explanation is necessary to understand how the state has attained and retained preponderance as the main actor in the field of international relations. In addition, it will help to demonstrate the flaws of this assumption, given the complexity of the international system and the rise of other institutions alongside national governments.

A classic Realist assumption of the state is that it acts as a unitary actor. Although various schools of thought dispute this argument, this assumption is still often implied when we speak of ‘the state’ in reference to the national government of a state. Indeed, this paper will refer to the state as the government of one country, acting in concert for the sake of simplicity. But when a member of a particular state acts, are they acting for self or for national interests? This is especially crucial when studying foreign policy, as it creates a problem with the level of analysis. In light of the European Union, where, as will be shown, some foreign policy aspects have been left to the discretion of the Union as a whole, the assumption of national interest could be redundant and the unitary actor thesis completely undermined.

In spite of some of these flaws, we find that most policies that affect the international order are still made inside states and between states, and this is why Morgenthau is not entirely wrong in some of his assertions. But again, given the existence of the EU, perhaps Realism needs to be revisited in its entirety, not simply modified.

\textsuperscript{15} Morgenthau, \textit{op. cit.} chpt. 7
\textsuperscript{16} Papp, \textit{op. cit.} p23
Theoretical Perspectives on the Changing International System of States

It stems from the theoretical perspective of IR that states are the central sphere of authority (SOA)\(^{17}\) in determining foreign policy and consequently political world affairs. In the years before the Second World War and during the Cold War, there seemed to be ease and accuracy in evaluating IR theory with states playing the feature role. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the new system of functionality however, created anomalies in the general understanding of international system. These changes in the international system create a problem of theoretically analysing governance since, as we will see later, they challenge the notions of sovereignty for instance which is key to the primacy of the state as the central SOA in the evaluation of world politics. It must be reiterated however, that "...[there are] subtle ways in which states continue to be the primary actors on the world stage even as their control erodes with the widening of the Frontier."\(^{18}\)

Rosenau explains the Frontier as the linking of those spheres of analysis that formerly delineated between foreign and domestic affairs, to theorise about world politics. This Frontier is critical to the understanding of shifts in the SOA from the state to other avenues. Those avenues are discussed in the next section as to how the practical functions of entities in the international system "shrink" the SOA of the state.\(^{19}\) Given this, Rosenau writes "...few, if any states remain static and most have adapted a capacity to adapt to a transforming world."\(^{20}\) This is true of this study, as we consider the mechanisms used to determine foreign policy; they reflect change. Having acknowledged that the world is transforming, we must ask what is it transforming from and to what is it transforming? The theoretical aspects of IR often assessed in terms of a state-centric world system where states have the powers they should have and are the primary decision makers. Rosenau argues that currently there is not one centric model for the world as it transforms. Because fragmentation is taking place, several systems exist next to each other particularly the state-centric and the multi-centric that have a variety of actors (refugee groups, weak states etc) with no central locus, existing together with a role to play in shaping the structure of the system.\(^{21}\)

\(^{17}\) This term is derived from its use by James N. Rosenau; SOA is the avenue where authority is constituted.

\(^{18}\) Rosenau, 1997, op. cit. p342

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p343

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p346

The Problematic of States: Practical Challenges to the State Centric Model

In recent years, various pundits have claimed that the state is declining and this has implications for theorising in the field and in the area of foreign policy. By this decline, they generally indicate that the power of states (in the context of International Relations) to determine the fate of the international system, is eroding for several reasons as already alluded to by James Rosenau. More specific reasons attributing to this decline are: economic interdependence, trans-national movements, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, growing power of multinational corporations and technology.

By economic interdependence, we mean that states, for the most part, have moved away from earlier mercantilist tendencies for political reasons, to more economic integration with the global system with the hopes of further economic growth. This, in essence, limits the capacities of states, as it becomes necessary to take decisions in concert with other parties, or at least with consideration for other parties as opposed to a strictly self-interested decision-making approach. In this era of globalisation, this logic is especially true.

Multinational corporations (MNCs) probably have the most negative reputation for their contribution to the decline of the state. MNCs are important because of how much they contribute to the international political economy. Inadvertently, they have become a deeply political tool of foreign policy. Particularly, it has been argued that the existence of MNCs have resulted in a loss of sovereignty for the host states. Daniel Papp notes, for example those decisions taken in the corporate headquarters of a particular MNC can determine the employment rates of a host country.

Although this is true, states also try to reassert control over their domains with some measure of success. One way in which this has been done, is by preventing repatriation of profits as a condition for operation within a state, as some Latin American countries have done. In these countries, the state stipulates that all profits must remain in the country for a specific period and after that time expires, a certain percentage may leave.

In terms of transnational movements, people have become mobile, ignoring the limits of physical boundaries. Today, approximately 1.4 billion email messages cross national borders.

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23 This was proposed in Raymond Vernon’s 1971 book, Sovereignty at Bay: the Multinational Spread of US Enterprises London: Longman
24 Papp, op. cit. pp68-69
25 Ibid., p69
daily and a large number of people travel for tourist as well permanent immigration purposes.\textsuperscript{26} In some cases it is not voluntary, as many people leave their lives of poverty and war torn societies behind, especially in terms of permanent immigration. This too speaks to the inability of states to deliver primary political goods, and therefore its perceived decline.

Another way in which states have been deemed to lose a measure of their power is through \textit{international intergovernmental} and \textit{non-governmental organisations}. International non-governmental organisations or NGOs are those organisations that work outside the influence of national governments, whose aims are usually to influence policy change or protect and promote the interests of its members.\textsuperscript{27} It should be noted that multinational corporations technically fall within this group, but they have been separately designated in this study. All these processes are said to be driven by the processes of globalisation, for better or for worse.

In order to keep a measure of authority within their SOA, states have responded to the system’s transformation by channelling their authority of decision making into other entities. \textbf{Intergovernmental organisations} or IGOs are those organisations formed by two or more states who "...\textit{work to promote voluntary cooperation among those governments on matters of shared interest.}"\textsuperscript{28} A critical point about IGOs is that they do not have autonomy in decision making, as they exist based on the mandate of member states. Therefore, in theory, they cannot challenge states or their 'sovereignty.' Yet they do. If one looks at some of the functions of the European Union in particular, which will be examined shortly in detail, we find that it is an IGO in some areas. However, because it has surrendered some of its decision-making capabilities, a recurrent theme of this study, it does challenge the prevailing norm of IGOs. For this reason, the next section seeks to understand, at least on a basic level, the present construct of the European Union.

\textbf{Hybrid Nation – The European Union}

The EU, as an institution of order and governance, must be examined \textit{vis-à-vis} the state as an indication or representation of change in the international political system. Change, in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Rosenau, (2002), p20
\item \textsuperscript{27} McCormick, op, cit. p5
\item \textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the study of international relations, is a concept that is not often considered. Yet it is a pertinent issue, especially when looking at post-Cold War order and governance.29

Categorising or conceptualising the institution of the European Union can be quite a difficult task, given its ever expanding nature and the constant changes experienced in the way decisions are made. Furthermore, it has evolved greatly from its inception, so, even that cannot serve as an adequate reference point for definition. In spite of these difficulties, this section will attempt to draw a picture.

The EU seems very much like a conventional inter-governmental organisation. Members apply to join voluntarily, based on what they deem as shared visions; and in most instances, the EU cannot make arbitrary decisions without the consent of its members. Still, the EU exceeds what we know of the standard IGO. In those areas where the EU has been delegated authority by the states30 EU, laws override national laws and the so-called national interest for the interest of the Union as a whole.31 One of the areas of delegated authority is perhaps one of the most important in external policy making: trade. The EU negotiates as one bloc on behalf of member states. McCormick suggests that this sort of cooperation is akin to supranationalism, which creates a new level of authority above the state with powers to make the state act.32

The debate has ensued as to whether the EU, given its powers, is a supranational institution or an intergovernmental one and this discussion is ongoing. We have established that it is more than the typical IGO, because of its mandate and the authority it has to fulfil that mandate. Yet, can we say it is a supranational institution or state?

When explaining the 'demise' of the state, supranationalism is often highlighted as another cause of this collapse in addition to those already explored above. The EU is often defined by these established concepts. The current literature in the field is lacking in its provision for the possibility of a hybrid institution, an institution that one could say challenges the traditional functions of the nation state as have long been defined in international relations theories as well as those of IGOs. Its ability to challenge the state however does not mean it

30 New states accept that the EU has certain authority as a condition of joining
31 McCormick, op. cit. p4
32 Ibid., p5
is detrimental to the state. To be sure, the European Union does not fully exercise the powers of a supranational authority. In categorising the European Union, a new IR rubric is necessary. Because the EU is the first of its kind, there can be no standard set of characteristics for this sort of institution. For this reason, it is critical that we do not base our definitions on the known, especially since the EU is still evolving, a moving target one might say. In it, we see at least two or three sorts of institutions in one entity.

Aside from the EU not being just a supranational institution or an intergovernmental one, it is not a state, i.e. it is neither a federal state nor a confederal one and given the probability of expansion, it is not static either. The structure of this complex system, therefore has consequences for why certain policies have formed and others not.

There are certain options of cooperation usually ascribed to the structure of the Union, stemming from the perception of where power and authority lie or how they are shared (in the state and by default the Union). The European Union exhibits aspects of confederalism in that its citizens still relate directly to the member-state as opposed to the Union; for the most part, the nations can still act on their own in many areas of foreign policy and there is no central government for the Union.33 Furthermore, there is no common defence policy and the idea of being “European” as opposed to French or Danish is still in the starting phase. On the other hand, it also exhibits certain characteristics of a federal system. Two levels of governance in the traditional state sense, typifies this system: the national and the local. These two levels may exist with separate or shared powers; however, one authority does not supersede the other in certain areas of governance.34 In the case of the EU we now ascribe local to national and the second level is still indeterminate. Usually a federal system consists of an elected government, common monetary policy, a national set of laws, an intricate bureaucracy and the ability to make treaties and a defence policy. Largely then, the European Union is not a federal entity, and yet, it has certain characteristics of such a state. It has a set of laws and treaties, which bind member states and citizens. On matters of intra-European trade, agriculture, the environment and social policy, EU law takes precedence as per the agreement of member states. The EU Parliament accounts for direct representation and it has its own currency, even if not all member states are part of the monetary system.35

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33 Ibid., pp8-9
34 Ibid., p9
35 Ibid.
Recently, a new term has come to describe how governance functions in relation to the European Union. Multi-level governance is "characterised by co-decision-making across several nested tiers of government, ill-defined and shifting spheres of competence (creating a consequential potential for conflicts about competences) and an ongoing search for principles of decisional distribution that might be applied to this emerging polity." Given this definition, one may conclude that attempts to pigeon-hole the complexities of the EU's governance system are inadequate for European policy studies, instead we could perhaps try to sort through the complexities as best as we can.

From this explanation, we see that the EU is not an institution that fits into our usual rubrics. Instead, the EU must be viewed as a hybrid institution with no precise definition, and with operation on multiple levels. This institution may seem to challenge the notion of sovereignty in the traditional sense. Yet, if sovereignty has never actually reached its ideal potential, can we truly say the EU is challenging the roles of its member European states?

Despite this, the changes that the advent of the European Union has caused to the member states and the way International Relations is studied cannot be ignored. This is the motivation for this study. Instead of adopting the attitude that the state is losing its authority, I argue that the state, in the EU, is changing and that change may not be as detrimental to the state although this seems to be the prevailing perception. State change is being examined by one of the most defining responsibilities of states, which is the ability to make their own foreign policies.

Conclusions

The state is considered the core of international relations, especially when accounting for foreign policies. Despite many challenges to the state's authority, this assumption has remained true. The European Union, given some of its characteristics, is seen as one such challenge to the state. And because of those characteristics, it is critical to study within the field of International Relations, change and what it means for our understanding of the state and the international system with a new sort of institution. This institution is a hybrid institution one with new governance structures on multiple levels. While the implication has often been that any challenge to the state is harmful, the nature of the EU as it currently exists does not imply state erosion per se, but a change that necessitates adjustment while creating new relations, again, within the system, between each member state and Brussels.

The outcome of policy relations between EU and member states will delineate what mode of cooperation the Union may practice while elucidating the possibility of further change.

To understand these better with regard to the European Union, the next section will consider the creation and the functions of the Union, i.e. its structures.
CHAPTER TWO

Creating the European Union

The Inception of the European Union: A Historical Trajectory

The European Union had its formative years following the Second World War. In those early years, it is arguable that the most prominent proponent of some sort of European integration was British wartime leader, Winston Churchill. In his 1946 speech, he asserted that integration was a condition necessary to prevent war on the continent, although he implied at the same time that Britain was not to be part of that integration.37 In May 1948, delegates from 16 European states, with American and Canadian observers, attended a conference at The Hague, called the Congress of Europe.38 It is from this gathering that the Council of Europe was conceived, and in the next year the statute founding this body was signed in London by 10 European states. The Council had its headquarters in Strasbourg where it had a sizable bureaucratic structure. This Council had some successes at cooperation, but did not fulfil the dreams of integration that the European federalists desired; at its best, it was a typical intergovernmental organisation.

Stemming from the dissatisfaction with the Council, the idea to form a coal and steel community, linking Germany and France, was conceived. With these two countries tied together, there was the political hope that the arrangement would prevent the outbreak of future wars with the economic motivation that the cross-national merger of these two nations will do a great deal to boost the decimated economies of both countries. It was the brainchild of Jean Monnet (1888-1979) and Robert Schuman (1880-1963) French businessman and statesman respectively. On 9 May 1950, Schuman outlined the plan for the common coal and steel industries in a statement. In his speech he said, "World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it."39 Supposedly then, this cooperation was needed to guarantee peace.

Scholars have asserted that the theoretical tenets of EU integration lie in functionalism;40 the extent to which this is true may help with the understanding of the logic of integration, as well as the supposed function of the Union. The aim of functionalism was to find an

38 McCormick, op. cit. pp63-4
ordering for international society that would end wars and create prolonged peace. Mitrany’s functionalism had a “technocratic vision of human governance.”^41 Ben Rosamond supports the argument that Mitrany’s conception stemmed from his scepticism of the state as an agent of social change.^42 Jean Monnet, the father of Europe, subscribed to the functionalism of David Mitrany (1888-1975).^43 Monnet was calling for a change that needs to be central in our understanding of the EU. He was calling for something that had not existed because "...one had to go beyond the nation and the conception of national interest."^44 For him, like Mitrany, transnational institutions might fare better where national governments had failed.

A part of that hope was fulfilled in 1951. On 18 April 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established when the Treaty of Paris was signed and the community began to function in August of the following year. The original membership consisted of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. While the establishment of ECSC was just a small step towards supranational integration, it was a huge step that, for the first time, states (both the people and the government) willingly ceded some of their authority and a measure of sovereignty to an institution that is not a traditional government, whose authority is not confined to any particular state.^45

This initial step encouraged the formation of two additional bodies, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). These new communities were formed in 1957 under the Two Treaties of Rome. The aim of the EEC was to form a common market area between the initial six member states of the ECSC, reducing and then eliminating internal trade barriers and then forming a common external tariff; this then tied the fates of these countries together. In addition, it would encourage the free movement of people, capital and goods within the treaty area. From here, the European Community took on more social and political responsibilities.^46

Despite its achievements, the Community did not include Britain, a former superpower, whose membership would lend greater legitimacy to the body. McCormick maintains that Britain was not opposed to cooperation, but was opposed to a cooperation that might create

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41 Rosamond, op. cit. p33  
42 Ibid.  
44 Ibid., p  
45 McCormick, op. cit. p67  
46 Ibid., p67
a strong supra-nation above the British state. In 1960, under the aegis of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), she was able to cooperate in and integrate with Europe to a minimal degree.\footnote{McCormick, \textit{op. cit.} p69} It must be noted that Britain was not the only country hesitant to follow the path of supranationality. France, a founding member of the European Community exhibited similar fears under General De Gaulle. Charles de Gaulle argued that each country had its own national personality that had to be preserved. By implication then, a supranational institution might tend to erode this personality. He added that cooperation could still take place at an intergovernmental level for the common good, through negotiations.\footnote{De Gaulle, Charles. (1994). "A Concert of European States" in \textit{The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration}, eds. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp25-41}

In 1965 the three communities merged through the establishment of a single Council of Ministers under the Merger Treaty.\footnote{Nugent, Neill. (2000) \textit{The Government and Politics of the European Community}. 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. Hampshire and London: Macmillan p47} By 1986, the EC had its own distinct administrative structure, a body of laws and a responsive citizenry via the parliament,\footnote{McCormick, \textit{op. cit.} p72} and a common market, created to decrease and eventually eradicate tariffs and customs duties within the EC zone. The Single European Act (SEA) Treaty was signed in February of that year and it created the framework for the European Monetary System, and an internal border and passport control where restrictions were to be lifted. It also made provisions for states to coordinate foreign policy initiatives that are more "European" than exclusively national in nature. In addition, a judicial branch was empowered to override national judicial powers in certain instances. The treaty came to force in July 1987 after ratification by national legislatures of member countries.

The SEA consolidated prior treaties of the community and added new provisions, especially with regards to the decision-making procedures of the Community. First, it allowed for the community to make regional policies pertaining to science and technology, where policies concerning the environment and economics were more explicitly stated. Laws within this policy sphere are therefore subject to community law, as states have relinquished these areas of policy to Brussels. In the second instance, the Treaty undertook to complete the creation of an internal market by 1992. The internal market would include the free movement of people and capital as a customs union had functioned within the member countries for sometime. Thirdly, it gave the Court of Justice more power. The Treaty
reprioritised political cooperation by giving legal status to the European Political Cooperation, a forum where member states can cooperate to form EU-wide policy as well as coordinate more on their national security and defence policies.\(^5\) As part of the new powers gained by the Community, national law in the area of social welfare also had to be adapted to that of the community. This reflects again both the evolution of the community as well as that of the member state.\(^2\)

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty followed the SEA.\(^3\) This treaty changed the European Community to the European Union (EU); it paved the path for a single currency zone, and allowed further integration to include more countries.\(^4\) Like SEA before it, Maastricht went further in tying the fates of member countries together. Defined under three pillars, the first pillar of European Communities reiterated the areas of cooperation already established at intergovernmental and supranational levels. Under the headings of institutional and policy changes, new procedures were instituted. The legislative procedure under SEA reconfigures how decisions are made between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council.\(^5\) It is through Maastricht that the Economic and Monetary Union are outlined and the formation of the "timetable for establishing the EMU is specified."\(^6\) Here also, the European Central Bank is established as well as a European System of Central Banks to which member state banks, as well as some of those countries that have not adopted the Euro such as Iceland and Norway, are members.

The second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty is the Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP. SEA expected that through the formalisation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), a mechanism would be employed to ensure all member states followed closely, coordinated foreign policy patterns even if security issues were not going beyond the intergovernmental level yet. In Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, however, the EPC formalised by SEA, was replaced. Further revisions were made to this pillar in the Treaty of Amsterdam, including the creation of an office for a High Representative, currently held by Javier Solana. This pillar would be examined in further detail in subsequent chapters as it is the most pertinent to this study.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., p75
\(^{52}\) It should be noted that in most cases, given the democratic nature of member states and the system of welfare in most European states, these changes were probably not momentous enough to indicate a "shake-up" of states.
\(^{53}\) The Maastricht Treaty is formally called Treaty on the European Union.
\(^{54}\) Ibid., p78
\(^{55}\) Nugent highlights the precise procedures.
\(^{56}\) Nugent, op. cit. p402
The third pillar entitled “Cooperation in the Spheres of Justice and Home Affairs” or “Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters” delineates what areas of internal security policies member states must regard, not just as a national concern, but as a concern of the Union. They include areas of immigration, police and judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters among other policy areas. These measures must comply with the limits of the European Convention of Human Rights.

Subsequent to the Maastricht Treaty, were the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and the Treaty of Nice. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, some of the responsibilities of the third pillar, such as free movement of people, were moved to the first pillar.\(^{57}\) The Treaty of Nice, which came into force in 2003, was instituted to amend all previous treaties, and its main aim was institutional reform within the Union. Like many prior treaties, it drew rancour among members but this was settled to make the agreement effectual. The Treaty of Nice is the latest ‘law’ of the Union.

Despite many achievements in cooperation that the current EU has gained to date, some of its unsuccessful attempts must be considered as they still have resonance. The success of the ECSC prompted those European federalists to seek further political integration between the countries through the creation of the European Defence Community (EDC). Initially, Rene Pleven, then French Prime Minister, suggested a common defence in what is known as the Pleven Plan. Eventually, he put forth a proposal for the EDC and the draft treaty that was signed in 1952. It proposed “a Joint Defence Commission, a Council of Ministers, an advisory Assembly and a Court of Justice.”\(^{58}\) This bureaucratic structure was similar to that of the ECSC. Despite the intention, this community was never formed for many reasons. One of those usually cited was the French’s discomfort about fully rearming Germany. For this reason, the French parliament failed to ratify the treaty. There were also concerns over the loss of control of the national armies, and the failure of the British to participate would have rendered the community relatively weak.\(^{59}\) In addition, the formation of the EDC foresaw a federalist Europe, an idea many were yet to accept. Although the EDC failed, seven European countries, France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Benelux had instituted an arrangement known as the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948. The WEU, according to Nugent, was an arrangement that was “loosely structured, essentially

\(^{57}\) “Pillars of Europe” EUROPA Glossary http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/glossary/eu_pillars_en.htm
\(^{58}\) Nugent, op. cit. pp39-40
\(^{59}\) Ibid., p40
consultative, primarily defence-oriented... [and] amongst other things, permitted West Germany rearmament subject to various conditions.\textsuperscript{60}

The failure to form the EDC anticipated the continued difficulty that would be faced in adopting a common security or defence policy. The fears of the loss of sovereignty, if sovereignty is considered the ability to have control of one's security policy, is especially worth noting as it is a recurrent theme even now as scholars and other experts consider the future of the EU and its CFSP. Notwithstanding this failure, the signing of the draft treaty as well as the existence of the WEU, clearly illustrates that the state in Europe was evolving even within this sensitive policy arena.

Of recent, another instance of failure was through the ratification process of a formal constitution for the Union. In an effort to address the democratic deficit so often criticised, a constitution was drafted to further entrench the powers of the EU. Unfortunately, in those states that held a national referendum, it was defeated much to the consternation of the countries' leaders. Despite progress made in the area of integration, many see this as backward step in the process of integration. Whether this is true is inconsequential especially for this study, as the author does not believe that the constitution would have made any effectual institutional changes.\textsuperscript{61} The defeat of the constitution was a statement of the people for their respective governments to respond to their needs and alienation such as high unemployment, which gripped both France and Germany - both considered the EU's core members.

The policy areas outlined in the various treaties that serve as the 'constitution' of the EU have necessitated the creation of bureaucratic agencies. The European Union's bureaucratic structure is quite visible with its main headquarters in Brussels. The next section will look at the core structures of the Union, as they affect certain areas of function in member states.

**The Structure of the European Union**

At least one consensus that can be reached about EU structures, is that they are quite complex. For instance, it is not easy to find out what particular structure is responsible for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), even if we immediately eliminate the judiciary. The

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{61} In spite of the Constitution, the areas of CFSP and Defence and Security would have remained as they had been under the last treaty, the Treaty of Nice.
EU does not have corresponding sectors to member states although as we will see, when looking at country diplomats in Brussels, there is certain coherence to their function.

There are five central institutional structures, often highlighted as the heart of the European Union, although they have various other attachments to them. This section will attempt to explain their basic functions and how those may relate to foreign policy coordination if there is any such link.

**The European Commission**
The European Commission is a college of 20 members in charge of different portfolios such as institutional reform, regional policy, external relations, etc.\(^{62}\) This body represents the executive and bureaucratic section of the EU. Unlike most national government structures, it does not necessarily have the power its description implies. In contrast to national executive counterparts, it has little power of implementation and in fact, according to Nugent, member states have the charge of most daily administrative duties of the Union.\(^{63}\) The members of the Commission are unelected but selected through a thorough process from a pool of highly qualified professionals. The task of this body is to "develop proposals for new laws and policies. [It] represents the interests of the European Union."\(^{64}\) There is the assumption that this body is neutral, or at least more so than some of the other sections of the EU, since Commissioners do not represent their home states but particular portfolios on which the welfare of the entire Union depends.

In actuality however, every diplomat probably works to maximise the benefits for his or her own country and this is certainly a consideration if one takes into account the fact that each member country suggests a nominee from a pool of their top technocrats in a portfolio or portfolios they deem important to their interests. The Commissioners each serve five-year terms and their main responsibility is to make new policies based on EU laws as well as take the final decisions on externally initiated law and policy proposals that may be forwarded to the Council of Ministers. In addition, it is charged with the management of EU finances and has the authority to externally represent the EU in the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation, for instance through the relevant directorate and its director general. Those representations of the EU, in several countries, come under the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission has the authority to initiate laws, a power usually reserved

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\(^{62}\) McCormick, *op. cit.* p91  
^{63} Nugent, *op. cit.* p61  
^{64} McCormick, *op. cit.* p86
for the legislative arm of a governmental structure and it also shares decision-making powers with the Council of European Union.

**The Council of European Union**

The Council of European Union is the most powerful structure within the EU. Most of the policy decisions come from this body and it primarily champions the interests of the member states. Ministers that make up the Council are appointed from the governments of member states, i.e. all ministers from member states are automatically members. For instance, Jack Straw represents Britain in matters of Foreign Policy in the European Union within this council. In addition, the Council is the final decision making body in the Union, over and above the Commission and Parliament. The Presidency of this Council is held for six months by each member state on a rotational basis. Members reach decisions through unanimity or qualified majority voting.

About 24 technical councils make up the Council, the most important of which is the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). This is because the GAERC consists of member states foreign ministers to discuss those internal and external relations as well as other politically sensitive issues that will be the focus of this paper. Within the Council, the relevant Commissioner acts as an conciliator in between EU and state interests to state ministers so that each may consider EU interests in addition to national ones, chairs. It must be noted that it is not only this council that lobbies on behalf of their home governments. Indeed, many countries have permanent representatives in Brussels, such as the UKRep with his other assistants. These permanent representatives meet weekly in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which is under the jurisdiction of the Council. One criticism often levied against the Council, is that for the main decision-making body of the Union, it is too secretive, lacking the transparency expected of democratic establishments.

**The European Parliament**

The European Parliament (EP) is supposedly the voice of the people and its aim is to address the so-called democratic deficit, at least in part. European voters directly elect members and they work closely with the aforementioned Council of European Union. Although it is the official legislative branch of the European Union, the EP cannot propose

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65 Ibid., p95
67 Ibid., p96
new laws, and is thereby lacking a major power of a legislative body. Currently, the Parliament consists of 732 MEPs and is headed by Josep Borrell Fontelles who serves as President of the Parliament. The responsibility of the president is to chair debates and act as representative of the parliament to all the other core institutions in the Union. It has a single chamber and is elected by universal suffrage for a fixed five-year term. The last elections took place in June 2004. Unfortunately, the European Parliament has yet to find a niche with the people they represent and perhaps that would explain why it has not been too successful in garnering more power for itself. Most Europeans would hold the Commission responsible for grievances against the EU, whereas in most national settings with parliamentary democracies, the legislature is largely held responsible for detrimental actions, along with the executive. The discussion of the European Parliament here is for introductory purposes to the structures that form the EU. However, one could argue that the limited role the EP plays in ensuring full accountability to the citizens of the Union translates to the non-committed nature of the current CFSP as will be addressed later.

EU Legal Structure

The legal structure of the European Union consists of the Court of Justice, which seeks to clarify the meaning of European law. It comprises 25 Judges and 8 Advocate-Generals. The number of AG may be increased if the Court requests this from the Council. This court is headed by one of the Judges who is elected to the position of President for a renewable term of three years. The Court of First Instance was formed to relieve the Court of Justice of some of its burdens. It has 25 Judges who should be from each member state; they are elected for six years, which is renewable. With cases heard in the Court of First Instance, they may only be appealed in the Court of Justice on the points of law that may have affected the outcome. In November 2004, the Civil Service Tribunal was established as the first point of judicial contact when disputes in the European civil service arise. This tribunal consists of 7 Judges and follows the same review process as the Court of First Instance in which appeals can only heard by the aforementioned Court on matters of Law. These are the three main judicial structures of the Union, although there is a Court of Auditors. The purpose of this entity is to hold the EU administrations accountable in spending; i.e. it

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68 Ibid., pp104-105
70 The Court of Justice of the European Communities The Court of Justice Website http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/index_cje.htm accessed 20 Dec 2005
71 Ibid.
72 "The Court of First Instance" The Court of Justice Website http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/index_cje.htm
73 Ibid.
gauges how the revenues of the community are spent and from what sources those revenues are derived; indeed it is "the 'financial conscience of the European Union."\textsuperscript{74}

The European Council\textsuperscript{75}

The European Council, for its part, consists of "the head of states of member states, their foreign ministers and the president and vice-presidents of the Commission."\textsuperscript{76} It was created in 1974 and serves like a board of directors to the EU. It was given formal status under the SEA.\textsuperscript{77} The European Council is headed by the Head of the government of the state that holds the Presidency of the Council of European Union. He holds this office for six months.\textsuperscript{78} Specifically,

"...the European Council provides the impetus for the major political issues relating to European integration: amendments to the Treaties and changes to the institutions, declarations on external relations in the context of the common foreign and security policy, etc. It also serves as a forum for top-level political discussion in crisis situations and it endeavours to resolve disagreements between Member States."\textsuperscript{79}

Debates and opinions in the European Council often influence the policy processes in the Council of the European Union, since they have many of the same members and champion the same interests.

In addition to these core structures, there are other 'attachments' or specialised institutions within the Union. These include the Committee of Regions, headquartered in Brussels, which allows local government officials from member states to meet and discuss matters relating to their citizenry. There is also the European Central Bank or ECB, which controls the economics and monetary policy of the Union.\textsuperscript{80} There are other bodies such as the European Police Office (Europol) and the European Environmental Agency etc. These institutions, in addition to the five core ones, make up the complex bureaucratic structure of the European Union.

\textsuperscript{74} "European Court of Auditors" http://www.eca.eu.int/index_en.htm

\textsuperscript{75} The European Council is not the same as the Council of Ministers, now called the Council of the European Union and should therefore not be confused. These institutions are also distinct from the Council of Europe which consists of states in the EU but is an external institution with 46 members including non-EU members

\textsuperscript{76} Nugent, op. cit. p193

\textsuperscript{77} "European Council" http://www.eu.int/european_council/index_en.htm

\textsuperscript{78} At the time of writing, Presidency of the Council of Ministers and European Council was initially held by the United Kingdom's Mr. Jack Straw and Mr. Tony Blair respectively (July-December 2005); Leadership of the Union was subsequently transferred to Austria on 1 Jan 2006.

\textsuperscript{79} "European Council" http://www.eu.int/european_council/index_en.htm

\textsuperscript{80} McCormick, op. cit. 97
We see from the history of the EU, as well as the core institution, that it is quite a complex entity that has had some failure and successes in its formation. The success is categorised by the fact that the EU exists, although the initial failure of the EDC diminished the willingness to form a common defence policy for Europe. Most importantly, it is not an institution that can be relegated to the shadows of international politics, as many of its autonomous institutions have powers conferred to them by the member states and their citizens. The Union is currently 25 members strong, including former great powers, and other states are set to join in the coming years.

The core entities of the EU play some role in the Union’s external policy formation, with the European Council and the Council of Ministers (or Council of European Union) being the most influential in this regard. Within the Council of Ministers, especially the GAREC, Foreign Ministers negotiate a position for EU policy as a whole and reiterate their individual preferences for foreign policy within the international system. Members of this committee and their staff, form the networks within which pre-negotiations or informal negotiations take place, before the Council communicates a formal position at official meetings.

A general background to the history of the Union and that of its most important structures is critical to understanding how the European Union interacts with member states. These daily interactions help member states determine what adaptations they need to make within national structures. In addition, it illustrates why institutional changes are necessary to maximise a state’s benefits within the complexities of the Union’s bureaucratic structure.

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81 External Policies incorporate general foreign relations with defence and security policies; they are considered two distinct realms of policy.
PART 2: INTRODUCTION

External Policy Making Within the EU – Trade, Foreign and Security Policies

Cooperation in the EU

While the EU was not established to replace its member states, it has assumed many functions of a state, supplementing some of the daily functions of individual states. On policy issues such as social welfare and macro economic policy, there is cooperation among states with the necessary round of intergovernmental alliances and negotiations within the various structures. When it comes to the idea of political cooperation, however, member states often lack consensus because this is a sensitive area of cooperation, as will be shown later. The significance of this type of cooperation is important however, as the Union enlarges and the other aspects of daily life become more fused. Taking for granted that there is one Frontier for international affairs, political cooperation is necessary for the ultimate success of the Union. While the Union members do attempt to form common political policies and decisions in some instances, the EU does not bind members. Sections within the various treaties governing political cooperation tend to be ambiguous and look to the future as a time when the EU will find a common foreign policy.

Although states give the European Union some of its powers and various aspects of their authority, they are unwilling to give up political authority. Political authority is often synonymous with the ability to provide security and defence within a particular political entity; it is a sovereign right. States would rather not cede this authority area to the Union, as this has implications for the exercise of sovereignty. Yet, further coherence is unavoidable if the European Union, as a whole, is to succeed. Within the structure, member states are looking at ways in which they can maintain authority while abiding by EU guidelines and functioning as part of the EU body.

The state of literature, addressing these EU-State relations, has termed the phenomenon Europeanisation, as suggested in the introduction. Essentially, Europeanisation means "the institutional manifestation of the EU integration process in the form of decision-making processes and structures and administrative apparatus designed to formulate, implement and monitor policy and legal frameworks."\(^{82}\) This is a two way process whereby states affect EU level policy and vice versa, although the way in which states influence EU level policy as a whole is typically not clear in the literature. It is true that the

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\(^{82}\) Major, Claudia. (2005). "Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?" Politics Vol. 25 No. 3 p176 (emphasis mine)
current literature addresses the role of a particular country, in shaping a particular policy or issue.\(^83\) Yet, there is little literature dedicated to how the state’s adaptation to the Union continues to shape the Union, especially in terms of foreign policy. Claudia Major’s definition, especially the highlighted part, adequately represents that change has occurred in various governmental structures, especially since current member states ascended to the European Union, and this will be a starting point of analysis. In essence, states are obliged to Europeanise because they have no choice. One assumption implied by Europeanisation literature is that these new structures are established to specifically preserve the national interest. Although this tends to be the goal of any state at any given time, it is not necessarily the crux of Europeanising. Having signed up for membership, several policy areas have been ceded to the Union and therefore, in those areas where Union laws take precedence over national ones, the policies have to be matched domestically to the preferences of Brussels.

One cannot say the same for external policies, especially high politics and this is why this study is critical. To expect the same results of other policy areas treated by the Europeanisation literature will grossly misrepresent the facts since, in the first instance, external relations policy in the EU is one area that is quite different and is acknowledged as so. In addition, Europeanisation does not do enough to address state structures and coordination within those structures, even before those structures coordinate with Brussels and therefore cannot give a full picture of change vis-à-vis foreign policy analysis.

The second pillar of the Maastricht treaty, the CFSP, regulates the Foreign and Security policy of European Union and coordination of such policy amongst members. This pillar of informs foreign policy within the European Union by referring all matters of this nature to the Council for vote.\(^84\) It leaves NATO the responsibility to defend Europe.\(^85\) The aims of the CFSP are listed in Article J of the Maastricht.\(^86\) Member states may also come to a joint agreement on specific issues, which are binding only through a unanimity vote.\(^87\) It is very important to understand that the CFSP structure is intergovernmental in nature. One obvious fact therefore is that this area of policy is still within the ambit of the state. Despite

\(^{87}\) Ibid.
this, the second pillar has empowered the Union for political action much more than the previous Political Union did. "There is clear emphasis on information, cooperation and arriving at a common position ... Special institutional arrangements have been made especially for this pillar, the most important of which is the Political Committee."

Therefore, the very nature of the CFSP jeopardises a structure of security for the EU that may be similar to the common trade policy structure.

On a practical level, war in Iraq epitomises the shortcomings of the current policy. Indeed, the failure of the European Union to come up as a united community, shook the confidence of many regarding the future of the Union. At the time of invasion, the Council of Ministers had only 15 members, and only two of them were willing to support the United States in her bid to go to war against Iraq.

Who Makes External Policies in the EU?
To understand who makes foreign policy within the EU, perhaps it is useful to define foreign policy within this context. Brian White defines foreign policy as the "...actions taken by governments which are directed at the environment external to their state with the objective of sustaining or changing that environment..." This is a significant deviation from the Realist definition that simply categorises foreign policy as power relations between states. Within this definition, even those relations that member states undertake to influence the institution of the EU, is an instance of foreign policy and methods employed to achieve such aims will be termed foreign policy mechanisms. Indeed, states in Europe are still integral to foreign policy formation; however, it would be negligent not to examine the extent to which the existence of the European Union itself has altered the institutional foreign policy mechanisms of the states.

Therefore, to answer the titular question, we maintain that states make foreign policy in the international system. "How", becomes the next logical question. How do 'they', who make external policy, achieve that aim? This is a more complex question when looking at the European case given the institution of the European Union. The following section will look first at who makes trade and foreign security or defence policies in the EU institution itself.

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88 Ibid.
and in EU member states. Subsequently, we will examine those departments or bureaucratic sections of Britain and Sweden that make trade and foreign security policy for their respective states. In addition, this section will consider how those respective member states now function because of membership in the EU looking at trade and foreign policy decision-making. This part will also be looking at how they relate to Brussels and what they do there to make sure they are well represented as individual nations and as members of the Union. In employing new mechanisms to carry out foreign policy objectives, this thesis argues that the state in these cases has changed and is changing.

This section, as already implied, will attempt to use foreign policy analysis tools where appropriate. These may deviate from the traditional national-foreign policy analysis tools because we must consider that not only have states changed on a practical level, but that this change presents certain intellectual challenges as well.

**European Union External Policy Making**

The Treaty of Europe or the Maastricht Treaty defines which areas of policy the European Union has jurisdiction over and how policy is to be decided in each of those areas. In the EU, the Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament (to a very small extent) take central part in the decision-making processes governing external policies of trade, diplomacy, security and defence. One European Commission publication notes that, due to the fact that the Union consists of over 450 million people and contributes a sizable portion of the world’s capital resources, it is a significant force in international relations and therefore, its external policy is important.\(^9\)

Because EU policies are the amalgamation of the interests of member states, these actors are very important in decision-making processes (plural?). For this reason, one may assume that the Council of the European Union (formerly Council of Ministers) has a very prominent role in the formation of European Union external policy. The procedure of general EU policy formation consists of three main mechanisms: co-decision, assent and consultation as established by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The first ensures that the Council and the Parliament have the same powers in certain policy areas such as education. However, the external policy mostly uses the mechanism of consultation. The consultation mechanism necessitates that the Council of Europe inquire about the Parliament’s views on a particular policy decision but they are not bound by the Parliament’s opinion.

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First, the Commission recommends a text to the Council and the Council sends it to the EP. When the proposal reaches the legislative office, it is taken to the legislative coordination unit, who then decides which of the Parliamentary committees the proposal should be taken to. Concerning the subject at hand, proposals concerning external relations would be under the jurisdiction of three committees: foreign affairs, international trade, and security and defence. Within each committee, the proposal is carefully scrutinised and a report is written asserting the position of the committee. More often than not, the Parliament adopts the position of the committee and this is relayed to the Council.

**Member States in the Making of EU External Policies**

In the European Union, the member states retain the authority to make foreign policy for their respective country. Due to the construct of the CFSP, they are the prominent actors in making external policies for the Union. I argue that the reason for this is that, in the final analysis, the notion of national interest still pervades the national representatives’ understanding of how foreign policy should work, even for the common good and even when it is not completely clear what the national interest is – the idea is what appeals? In other words, while the Council attempts to carve out a policy for the Union, the foremost thought for the members of GAERC and COREPER is that their individual countries’ views are represented. Of course, the democratic nature of the member states means that most of these countries would have similar, if not identical, views on issues of human rights - for instance even if the implementation of this consensus differs. However, when it comes to matters of foreign affairs, including security and defence, states find it difficult to compromise.

The Council comes about its decisions through unanimity, a simple majority or a qualified majority voting system, where each member state’s vote is weighed according to the population of that country; i.e. Britain has a higher consideration in votes (29) than Sweden (10) if a decision necessitates a qualified majority.  

Security, defence and diplomatic policy making in GAREC is conducted through intergovernmental bargaining. Therefore, in these areas of foreign policy, decision-making in the Union is determined by negotiations and coalition patterns among member nations in order that their preferences are continually represented. It is particularly interesting that

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92 Britain’s population is larger than that of Sweden
while international trade is considered a foreign policy appendage, it is an area that has been ceded to the supranationality of the Union. We will try to examine how this has happened and why this is so. Subsequently, using Britain and Sweden as case studies, we will look at foreign policy conduct in these states since joining the Union. Changes in mechanisms as well as new creations to accommodate for membership in the EU will reflect state change in the 21st century.

We accept that, in general, the EU and its member states share foreign policy powers. But if states make foreign policy, what is the purpose or duty of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy?

**HR-CFSP**

Javier Solana, who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the EU, currently holds this office. The High Representative coordinates foreign policy in the European Union and is the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, as well as Secretary General for Western European Union (WEU). He is also the President of the European Defence Agency. The HR-CFSP presides over the Political and Security Committee of the Council of Ministers, with members consisting of political directors from member states’ foreign ministries. The EU Foreign Policy chief’s main role is to help construct and implement the Union’s foreign policy. In some instances, he is allowed to conduct foreign policy negotiations with third countries with the permission of the presiding Union president. The existence of this post in the European Union is indicative of how states must have reconfigured their foreign offices to accommodate Mr. Solana’s position; in essence, some duties in member states’ foreign offices need to be coordinated with Mr. Solana in order that the CFSP is functional and effective.

As will be reiterated throughout this study, the office of the High Representative is marred by the fact that the CFSP is not binding, as was evident in the decision to invade Iraq. Mr Solana has described some of the more difficult moments of this job as those times when member states do not agree with each other on how foreign policy must be conducted as was the case when Britain and France did not agree on Iraq.

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93 This section is based on Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia “Javier Solana” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Javier_Solana accessed on 20 Mar 2006
External Trade in the European Union

Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner, currently directs the European Union external trade policy. The Commission has a Director-General for Trade, currently David O’Sullivan, who makes the proposals concerning external economic relations to the Council and Parliament. Together, the secretariat is called the Directorate General Trade and they are responsible for conducting trade negotiations, act as enforcers, and they are responsible for ensuring compliance by third countries in accordance to international trade accords. In the Parliament, trade concerns the Committee of International trade. As with most foreign policies, the "role of the Commission as defined in the Treaty, especially Title IX, covers the initiation, negotiation and implementation of [trade policies, with] final decisions being a matter for the Council." In general, External Trade policy takes the form of consultation.

Trade in the European Union is made up of several arrangements, including bilateral ones between the EU as a whole and non-member countries in Europe as well as in Africa (in places such as South Africa). However, EU trade roles are probably the most prominent, as they vote as one bloc in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), because a common trade policy is in place. Because of this, it is critical that the trade ministers, from each member state, assert their preferences before Commissioner Mandelson puts his bargaining chips on the table for other states.

The legal basis of EU’s trade policy is Article 133 of the European Community Treaty. From this the Commission has the mandate to negotiate for the Union in consultation with a special committee, 'the Article 133 Committee', which is composed of representatives from all member countries as well as the European Commission. This Committee meets on a weekly basis in Brussels, usually Friday mornings, discussing a wide range of issues concerning trade and economics of the Union and its member states, as well as negotiating a strategy for the Union in organisations like the WTO. It is within this Committee, a semi-informal one, that the Commission secures endorsement from member states. Then, officials from the Directorate General for Trade go on to the Council of Ministers to secure

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96 Source: Mrs. EA Lalley, British Department of Trade and Industry through personal correspondence  
97 European Commission, External Trade, "What we do"  
http://www.eu.int/comm/trade/whatwedo/work/index_en.htm accessed 29 Dec. 05  
98 As explained previously, this decision making procedure necessities consultation with the Parliament. There, the corresponding committee writes a report and its recommendation on behalf of parliament to the Council.  
99 European Commission, External Trade "Trade Issues: Bilateral Trade Relations, South Africa"  
http://www.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/southafrica/index_en.htm
formal approval before the Commission goes on to negotiate the EU position wherever necessary.\textsuperscript{100}

The 133 Committee meets at both full committee or titulaire level, and the level of deputies. Of those in the first category, they meet monthly except in August and they are responsible for the overall trade policy. Members of this committee are drawn from national ministries of trade, industry, finance and foreign affairs. Because the Committee is not technically a formal one, while votes are recorded, deliberations are not published.\textsuperscript{101}

Other policies within the Union are determined during the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) which occur every four years (the last being 2004), usually within the framework of Treaties. The function of these processes will be examined as we now look towards Britain and Sweden. There are loopholes in CFSP, which create a situation where Europeanisation cannot truly apply, but changes are occurring too and we see this in two states. Those loopholes help the CFSP maintain its intergovernmental organisational nature where the only obligation it demands of the member states is that they will attempt to have a common stance on foreign policy. Observing from the failure of the Union to come up a definitive stance on Iraq prior to the American led invasion, the CFSP is lacking in enforceability and reforms will be needed for the second pillar to truly ensure it is indeed a legitimate institution of governance within the European Union.

\textsuperscript{100} European Commission, External Trade "Trade Issues: EU and WTO" http://www.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/newround/index_en.htm
\textsuperscript{101} Supra note 88
CHAPTER 3

BRITAIN

Whitehall in Brussels: External Policy Making since SEA

On joining the European Community in 1973, foreign policy in Britain was set to change. One must keep in mind that Britain was initially reluctant to join the Union, and then joining was delayed by French antipathy. As mentioned previously, foreign policy is one area of policy in which states are most unwilling to compromise. To surrender this to any other entity, including one such as the EU would imply that the security of the state is inevitably compromised. In 1973 however, Britain acceded to the Union. If the rationale of liberal inter-governmentalism is accepted, Britain joined the European Union to further her present national interests. For this reason, Britain’s position as a large state has been detrimental in the formation of an effectual CFSP. A concrete CFSP can be seen as a step towards complete integration. Even before the second pillar came into existence, former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher’s speech of September 1988 (barely two years after the SEA) clearly elucidates the Britons’ position. In the speech, the then British Prime Minister reiterated that the British government would resist any attempt to cede British powers to a “superstate.” Because of the British reluctance, despite identifying the benefits of membership, it is said that Britain is an “awkward partner” who has an “uneasy relationship” with the rest of Europe.

The British state possesses certain characteristics that would justify its reluctance to cede certain powers. The British have a very close relationship with their former colonies. These colonies are mostly poor countries and arguably require resources, a bulk of which the British government provides. That very relationship that ties Britain to these (mostly poor) countries, also ties her to another former colony who just happens to be the most powerful nation in the international system – the United States of America. These relationships form a significant portion of British foreign policy priorities that could explain reluctance at a concrete CFSP. Britain’s foreign policy has a tradition of supporting the Atlantic alliance even when most of Europe would not, as is evidenced in the decision to go to war in Iraq. One
other characteristic of Britain is that it is a large state in terms of population, economy, political influence etc. Indeed, it is a former great power and although not deluded by the glory of past grandeur, she is nevertheless hopeful that Britain can be a formidable leader in Europe. In addition, Britain holds a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council with the power to veto. At present, the United Kingdom does wield a considerable amount of power. Therefore, to lose a permanent hold on foreign policy is to jeopardise the power and authority accumulated thus far. Unfortunately, as an influential state, the British also realise that being out of the EU structure is probably even more harmful to their goals.106 Therefore, in the 2005 introduction to "The Guide to the European Union" Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote "...given the importance of the EU to our interests it is vital that Britain is a leading power in Europe – so that we can seek to shape Europe in our interests, as vigorously as do the EU's other sovereign nations."107 The second section of Mr Straw's statement clearly indicates the aspirations of Britain to mould EU in its image as opposed to the other way round.

Membership in the Union, however, precludes not acquiescing to the demands of integration of which the CFSP is a part. Consequently, the foreign policy mechanisms of the United Kingdom have changed as the state makes its policy as a member of the Union. Even as they make policy without consideration for their membership in the Union to their other commitments, such as those former colonies and the United States, membership in the Union must take precedence in decision-making but again, as we saw with Iraq, there is difficulty in coordinating an inter-governmental common stance concerning foreign security policy.

Before we come to that however, we find that the Blair government in particular has launched the most progressive changes to the British institutional composition. The 1997 manifesto of the current British administration promised to change the institutions of the nations in how they relate to their EU partners by fusing correspondences between Westminster and Whitehall as well as devolving powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The culmination of these proposals would be a massive decentralisation of the British government.108 It is critical to understand that while devolution is an internal action

107 Ibid.
undertaken by the British government. However, the interactions of devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales to the EU add an extra element to British foreign policy institutions. The FCO must now coordinate with those devolved administration since some authority have been transferred from London to Edinburgh and Cardiff respectively.

In the field of international relations, the rigid division between the domestic and the international is no longer necessary, in some cases almost impossible. This is especially so in the case of the European Union, where the two converge i.e. domestic, is now international and vice-versa. Representatives from the Treasury, the Foreign Office as well as the Prime Minister’s office and the Permanent Representation to the EU (the UKRep), formed the first hub of UK-EC/EU partnership. The initial change represented those ministries directly affected by membership in the community and this was the trend that was adopted with each successive treaty that assumed more supranational powers.109

Overall however, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Britain (FCO) now has the responsibility for communication between London and Brussels under whom the office of the UKRep, who conducts inter-governmental foreign policy cooperation and EU developments functions. The UKRep is the core foundation of UK EU Foreign Policy, feeding intelligence and policy advice to Whitehall to communicate to the other cabinet offices.110 The current UKRep is Sir John Grant and he represents Britain in COREPER II. The Deputy Representative, the Representative to the Political and Security Committee and the Military Representative to the EU, assists him in managing his duties. The office of the UKRep has eight sections, the one most pertinent to this study being the External Relations, Development and Trade Policy.

Given the nature of this study - we are dealing primarily with high politics and thus, excluding development policy. The following sections will endeavour to tackle the Department of Trade, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Prime Minster’s Office, and changes111 that have occurred since joining the EU, indicating change in the British state.

109 Ibid., p6
111 One obvious indication of change is the slight amalgamation of these departments under the FCO
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)

Ian Pearson is Britain’s current Minister of State for Trade, a position he holds jointly within the DTI and the FCO. His responsibilities include Europe and world trade policy as well as UK trade and investment. In this context his office, along with the UKRep’s office, organise expert bureaucrats to represent the United Kingdom at the Article 133 Committee gatherings. The first position for a Minister of State in the DTI was created in 1995 in response to the enlargement of the Union and continued necessity for coherence between departments on behalf of Britain in spite of the EU. However, it was not until the appointment of the current Minister that the position officially meant a joint appointment with FCO and DTI. One obvious implication of this is that European control of trade, as an aspect of external policy, is important enough to be overseen by the FCO, along with security and defence. While Trade concerns might not be as important as security issues, which concern the FCO, its position within this ministry demands considerable attention.

The DTI as a whole has changed significantly in the manner in which business is now conducted. The fact that trade is now conducted on behalf of the Union as a whole, is the primary reason for that change, and therefore, the duties of Mr. Pearson are justified. A question that arises from this is: why has this particular foreign policy area ceded to the Union while most security and defence options remain under the aegis of national governments? The British government, for its part, has defended this arrangement as essential to the state’s “interest.” In this case, it is believed that a larger voting bloc such as the EU will adequately represent the interest of the state than if the state were apart from the Union when it comes to world trade.

Ministry of Defence

The British Ministry of Defence or MoD also works in conjunction with the FCO, now even more so since the establishment of the EU European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was added to the CFSP. The ESDP supposedly strengthens the CFSP to aid the EU in playing a more comprehensive role in crisis management as one bloc in the international system. It does not create a standing army, as the decision to deploy units is still the prerogative of each nation.

112 Department of Trade and Industry. Ministerial Team: Ian Pearson
113 In actuality regarding the strength of the ESDP, under the Helsinki Headline Goal, deployment of troops is voluntary
Interestingly, although not surprisingly, the MoD seems to have preference for a close NATO alliance, on the condition that the role of European stakeholders is strengthened. This is much more than it does to the ESDP; a reflection of Britain's other foreign policy commitment that precludes it from wholeheartedly accepting a CFSP. Indeed, a MoD report of 2003 puts more emphasis on strengthening NATO – certainly, the ESDP will not be an alternative as long as this is the British stance. In spite of the changes that MoD has endured then, in respect to closer coordination with the FCO, the institution has not seen significant change despite membership in the EU. Without a doubt, its changes are not comparable to that of the DTI for instance. At the risk of redundancy, it is important to note that this again reflects the jealous nature of Britain or any large state for that matter, regarding the control of its external security policy and the avenue that carries out that policy.

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Prime Minister's Office**

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw currently heads the FCO. As already mentioned, it has the overall coordination of British EU policy through its European Union Department, which liaises with the UKRep office as well as the Prime Minister’s office, where the Cabinet Office European Secretariat (COES) deals with British EU affairs. In the EU structure the Foreign Secretary represents the British government in GAERC as well as in the Council of Ministers and the European Union Council.114

While initial membership in the EU added more responsibility to the FCO’s portfolio, some argue that the FCO’s power is waning specifically because of the EU.115 The establishment of other external policy advisory bodies, as well as seeking information towards other informal networks, have contributed to this.116 While it may be true that there are other organs emerging, this only lends credence to the far-reaching effects of membership, and how this reflects change in the state. We see that the FCO still takes lead in the coordination of IGCs, where most external policy preferences are negotiated. Within the FCO is the European Policy Committee, a ministerial committee representing most aspects of government, with the view to address whatever policy area is affected by the UK’s EU membership; it is chaired by the Foreign Secretary. The representatives from this committee coordinate with the Cabinet’s Ministerial Committee on European Strategy, chaired by the Prime Minister

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114 In the European Union Council, each state is also represented by its President or Prime Ministers and his or her deputy.
116 Ibid.
where its goal is to "oversee the Government's European strategy and the presentation of the Government's European policy." In these two ministerial committees, although not officially a member, the UKRep is often in attendance. In this way, the UKRep is kept abreast of almost all aspects of the UK bureaucratic function, including foreign policy preferences.

Within the ambit of the office of the Prime Minister, the European Secretariat exists - currently headed by Kim Darroch; she serves as primary advisor on the EU to the Prime Minister. Through weekly meetings with the Prime Minister and senior officials from Whitehall, Britain’s EU policy is coordinated. (Note: the UKRep is considered a senior Whitehall official).

**Office of the UKRep**

The United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the European Union is perhaps the most visible form of change in the British government. The UKRep is formed by a wide variety of civil servants from different departments in the British Cabinet. Of particular importance to this study are the following portfolios: representative to the political and security committee, the military representative and the external relations representative to the EU. These representatives are attached to the FCO, including the military representative (although possibly in a joint capacity with the MoD).

Within the UKRep’s office, there are different geographical representatives, that is, persons who are career experts in different regions of the world. The presence of these experts leads one to believe that the representatives not only work in the UKRep to determine EU policy from the British perspective, but to determine British external policy from an EU perspective. This is the crux of change within foreign policy making in Britain. To what extent this is done is quite questionable, but the consideration cannot be ignored.

**Devolution in the United Kingdom: What does this mean for external relations to the EU?**

Devolution means that certain autonomous powers have been given or "devolved" to certain regions in a particular state, in this case, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Although devolution was an internal structural change, it was to an extent prompted by further integration and it has in turn affected external relations of Britain to the EU.

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117 Ministerial Committee on European Union Strategy. *The Cabinet Office*  
In "Britain and Europe: Devolution and Foreign Policy" Keith Robbins discusses the effects of devolution on Foreign Policy. He argues that although the initial effects of devolution might not be felt, there are certain long-term implications for this new form of government. As Robbins points out, British foreign policy is often concerned about "British interests" a phrase that is often disputed, due to the ambiguity of interest. In spite of this, there has been no dispute as to the "Britishness" of foreign policy from the three nations within Britain itself. The establishment of devolution might change this however.

Since legally, there is still a United Kingdom, Scotland, as a devolved nation cannot have seats in the EU, but it can be influential in foreign policy decisions taken by Britain in relation to the EU. For instance, if the EU did not exist as an entity, it is not far-fetched to assume that there would be no argument as to London being solely in charge of foreign policy.

Currently however, as the devolved powers' representation in Brussels shows, foreign diplomatic and security policy is still an area rigidly within the control of the British national government.

Conclusions: State Change in Foreign Policy Mechanisms of the British Government

Foreign policy mechanisms in the British government have changed due to institutional adjustments necessitated by membership in the EU. Particularly, the bureaucratic structure of the government in the last ten to fifteen years has encountered a notable metamorphosis especially within the executive, the Prime Minister's office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The foreign policy decision-making procedures that have been employed since accession to the European Union, have initiated processes within the Executive - such that organisation and routine have had to change. For instance, once weekly, it is necessary for senior members of the FCO to meet with the COES, concerned representatives from the UKRep's office (in this case possibly the representatives to the Political and Security Committee), the Military Representative, External Relations representative concerning the ESDP and others. At these meetings, the UK reaches a preliminary position. This position is then

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119 Ibid., p106
120 Ibid.
121 Gomez et al. op. cit
communicated to Europe to aid in forming a common EU policy, but not only that; it is communicated to inform the other countries on the general position of the state.

In the past, many of the officials that arrived at these meetings came from the various departments within the already established British executive. In the last 15 years however, it was decided that it was necessary to have a strong diplomatic presence in Brussels, which was done by strengthening the UKRep’s office. This has meant the creation of a European Staffing Unit that recruits for the purpose of British policy coordination with the EU. Further expertise is now demanded by membership, especially within those areas of foreign security, diplomatic and trade policies. These people do not work solely within the representative’s office but within the EU structure itself. For instance, Peter Mandelson is the EU commissioner in charge of Trade and he is British - while his portfolio is for that of the entire Union, as mentioned when considering the Commission, Britain’s interest cannot be far at heart.

One interesting element of these meetings is that given the structure of the UKRep’s office where the officials, although British nationals, can be divided into those that represent Britain and those that represent Britain within the EU mandate, membership in the Union is a priority consideration. This is the case even on those matters where the Prime Minister’s office has more or less agreed to go it alone. As was the case with the War in Iraq, Prime Minister Tony Blair did indeed attempt to convince the other member nations of the European Union that it was in their interest to be allied with the United States invasion and ousting of Saddam Hussein; this was his attempt to influence EU wide policy from a British standpoint. Because the CFSP is only a tool to encourage coordination in foreign security affairs, the UK was able to ally with the United States without any repercussions per se from the EU as an institution, although relations soured with certain member states such as France.

British embassies have taken a more proactive role in policy formation, including foreign security, leaving their traditional role of diplomacy to inform corresponding domestic foreign ministries while reinforcing the British position on whatever is on the country’s agenda.

The most important implication of change in the British state is the tremendous devotion of many ministries to ensure the interests of Britain are met; and in no other sector, but foreign security and defence policy is this most emphasised. In addition, the time pressure
necessitated by European Union structures mean that the FCO starting point of negotiation is not necessarily the beginning of the entire process, which is now preceded by a pre-negotiated stance in the UKRep's office for instance.122

SWEDEN
Non-alignment and Foreign Policy in the EU

When Sweden applied for membership in the Union, it became internationally newsworthy, especially in the realm of foreign relations because it is generally characterised by her non-alignment policy; it is part of her national identity. The Swedes were quick to clarify any implication of compromising this national identity by reiterating the fact that this non-alignment policy applies particularly to military action, a point that was noted by the Swedish permanent representation in Brussels.123 Specifically, he argued that the initial rejection of membership in the EU back when it was still the EC, went to the perception that that the institution was similar to NATO.124 Two observations arise from this perception. The one is that like every state, Sweden is very protective of its external security relations. The second observation is linked to one of the main reasons for the Swedish study – it is a small state. Through casual observation, we can say, the United States of America is in charge in NATO, due to its position as a large state and its military and economic might among other reasons; it therefore tends to dominate the influence of other member states. Likewise, for Sweden to join the EC, the possibility was that it could be obliterated from the international scene by larger states like the UK, France and Germany.

As aforementioned, Sweden is pertinent to this study because it provides another perspective of the possibility of change, this time in a smaller state. Traditionally, foreign policy theory argued that smaller states tend to align their choices based on the system’s structure. By all accounts then, it is conceivable that after much resistance, Sweden acquiesced to joining the Community as its expansion and function was shaping the international system too.125 Membership in the EU has necessitated changes in the structure of government marking a change in the governorship of the state in the area of external policy relations of diplomacy, security, trade and defence. The subsequent sections will look at how those changes have occurred. Furthermore, we will look at how changes have

122 Blair b, op, cit. p207
124 Ibid.
affected Sweden as a small state and what implications those have for the Swedish state and its external relations.

**Dilemmas of a Small State**

Amry Vandenbosch defines a small state as a state that "is unable to contend wars with the Great Powers on anything like equal terms." He further asserts that those considered weak states play an insignificant role in world politics. Indeed, one could say the small states themselves accept this definition. If one looks at Sweden, it could be argued that she chose her military non-alignment position not to have to face the humiliation of being usurped by a great power such as Russia or Germany. Furthermore, we find that even within the European Union, Sweden specifically strives for secondary areas of foreign policy primarily, development aid and human rights justice. This is not to say she too is not concerned about the security aspect of external relations, as we will see later. Nevertheless, one can conclude that, that area of policy Sweden believes it can influence, and where most of its efforts are positioned, is not necessarily security.

Size has always been an integral part in the study of international politics. It is "one of three 'genotypic' variables assumed to exert major influence in foreign policy." As we have already alluded to, there are certain general assumptions made of small states when it comes to foreign policy formation. They include: low levels of participation in international affairs; high levels of involvement in IGOs; support for international law norms; avoiding the use of force; continued attempt to not alienate greater powers; narrow geographical range of function in foreign policy; and habitually the moral conscience of the other states in the international system. As Maurice East points out however, this is often the assumption if one believes that small states utilise the same decision making mechanisms as do large ones. He challenges the prevailing belief that a small state is not different from a larger one, it is just smaller but its functions are essentially the same.

Although East adds valuable insight to reconsidering small states, his conclusions are not satisfactory. One reason for this is that the assertion that small states are not much attuned to warning signals that call for action in the international system is not wholly true. He

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127 Weak states in this context means small states as opposed to collapsing or failing states


129 Ibid., p557
justifies this claim to explain why their range of function is much narrower than that of large states.\textsuperscript{130}

The initial decision of Sweden not to join the EU was not because it was not attuned to the benefits of the system but it might well have been the opposite; Sweden was acutely aware of the possible disadvantage of joining initially. However, by the 1990s, the state reassessed the situation and the benefits of membership outweighed the possible disadvantages. To mitigate the disadvantages that may accompany membership in the Union, the Swedish state has had to endure change in the governance of its foreign policy structures since membership in the European. Let us now examine how.

**Understanding External Security Relations in Sweden**

It would be a grave mistake to assume that the role of small states like Sweden in international security affairs is non-effectual in comparison to that of larger states; to be sure their roles are smaller but hardly inconsequential. In "EU’s External Policy: Are Lilliputians Impotent or Potent – the case of crisis management in the Amsterdam treaty?" Borge Romsloe assumes that states, including small ones, are quite rational and their ability to act, not only in interest but also with the ability to justify their position, makes them effectual in security policy making.\textsuperscript{131}

In this paper, Romsloe studies the roles that Sweden and Finland played in strengthening the CFSP in the Amsterdam treaty, by instigating a crisis management command for the WEU but leaving territorial defence out of the European Union framework. It is interesting that the Swedes would pursue a security agenda for the EU, contrary to that of big states for fear of isolation if one assumes the conventional explanations of big state – small state action. Why did they do it then? Moreover, why did the other countries accede during the IGC? One can deduce from this instance that traditional foreign policy norms that assume that smaller states will always bend to the will of the system can be proven wrong. In the new era of the European Union, under which the European System exists, changes are occurring that challenge our understanding of state behaviour.

All things being equal, it is conceivable that the Swedish and Finnish government threatened to veto a policy proposal within the WEU framework that would be similar to NATO’s to the

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Romsloe, op. cit.
effect that mutual assistance must be guaranteed if any member of the EU is attacked. To conclude then, Sweden’s alliance with Finland to attain favourable concessions in the Treaty of Amsterdam, nullifies the conventional belief that small states do not play a large role in foreign politics. Indeed, this case shows that new constructions in the international system, such as the existence of the European Union and membership in the institution, require change and adaptability that is beneficial to the foreign policy objectives of the state, even a small state. In addition, it seems that Sweden is garnering more influence for itself in the realm of “high” politics and this requires that the state make arrangements in its bureaucracy to accommodate this.

Sweden, guards her non-alignment policy jealously. As to whether this policy is actually an accurate reflection of the Swedish state, since joining the EU is an interesting point for discussion. Also, can this be compatible with the added influence from membership in the Union?

Despite Sweden’s non-alignment policy, its Ministry of Defence has embarked on some changes since ascension to the EU. One significant instance of such change is the inclusion of Sweden in a rapid response team as part of the ESDP. Sweden has an important role to play within the European Security strategy as a member of the Nordic Battle Group (NBG), a rapid response team with three other nations. The NBG is made up of Estonia, Norway and Finland. By formation then, Sweden has already aligned itself, albeit with one EU member state. It is important to note that Finland also has a similar non-alignment policy to that of Sweden. Within this alliance, Sweden is known as the “framework nation” which translates to leader. It has been argued that the creation of the NBG was to delay or avoid active participation in the ESDP and at the same time not forsaking the security of the Nordic countries.

The conservative parties see the changes in Sweden’s foreign policy, as a member of the EU, as a natural progression of integration, while the more liberal ones are certain it will erode their national identity of neutrality. Sweden’s foreign policy decision-making is complicated by the fact that the parliament seems to have just as much input, if not more as the executive in this area. To this, government has to submit proposals to the legislature

132 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
before decisions can be arrived at.\textsuperscript{135} There is a potential for fluctuation of foreign policy preferences, more so now, depending on which side of the political spectrum holds the most seats in parliament. In addition to those changes brought on by the NBG, the process with foreign policy has changed parliament as they become more institutionalised with more bureaucratic committees such as the Swedish EU Committee, which consists of representatives from all political parties represented in parliament.\textsuperscript{136}

Whereas the Swedish state has been able to garner some power as a member of the European Union with that however, it has had to forfeit its non-alliance stance. Although Sweden often participates in UN humanitarian peacekeeping relief, new arrangements between the European Union and the United Nations means that the security council does not need to be consulted for the Swedish forces to be used in common security and defence initiatives. This is contingent on adherence to the UN Charter. What this means is that Sweden cannot always choose to be neutral.\textsuperscript{137} There is justified fear that in allowing this area of policy (even a small area) to be under the control of the EU, there is a chance that Sweden encounters all that she had avoided by not joining NATO - being overshadowed by the larger states.

In Sweden, EU policy-making is within the ambit of the Prime Minister’s office, governed by the State Secretary and the European Policy Coordination Unit. Regarding foreign policy, the state decides its position in concert with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Trade, where the Ministry for Foreign Affairs European Union Department carries out the day-to-day activities of Swedish priorities within the EU. In addition, there is also a Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, which is considered an extended arm of the Swedish government. This mission is considered Sweden’s largest abroad, with 8 attaches representing the Ministry of Defence alone.

Swedish operations, as a member of the EU, are considered governance within a multi-level continuum.\textsuperscript{138} Within Sweden, as with possibly all member states, the organisational dynamics, that now function between Stockholm and Brussels, necessitates a “decision-

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} Supra note 131; the significance of this step is that the EU now has a crisis management capacity if not in practicality in principle, usurping some of the decision-making powers of the state.
making [system] through a complex web of EU committees, the system of seconded civil servants, through embassies, as well as multi-level networks of civil servants.\textsuperscript{139}

**Trade in Sweden**

Trade in Sweden is coordinated in the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication. Here there are three Ministers for Industry and Trade, Communications and Regional Policy and Employment. The current Minister for Industry and Trade is Mr. Thomas Östros who also heads the entire ministry. A total of six officials from the Ministry are stationed at the permanent representation in Brussels, where they coordinate day-to-day EU demands with the Ministry in Stockholm.\textsuperscript{140} Together with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, they coordinate Sweden’s stance on trade and competitiveness within the EU since most external trade policies are now the responsibility of the EU Commission.\textsuperscript{141} This sort of intra-governmental cooperation, between foreign affairs and the ministry of industry, is a product of membership in the Union.

**The Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union**

Accommodating the European Union in the Swedish state has necessitated, like other states, a Swedish permanent representation to the European Union.

Sven-Olof Petersson heads the office of the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, where he bears the title of Ambassador, although there is an Ambassador who represents Sweden in Brussels as the Swedish representation to Belgium. This office is attached to the Foreign ministry with Counsellors coordinating Swedish position in the GAERC, COREPER I and II, and the European Council. Within this office, there is a special Foreign and Security Policy department with an Ambassador for Sweden to the PSC and a counsellor in charge of external relations.

Within this arm of the Swedish government, EU policy is coordinated. In addition, similar to almost any permanent representation, the office plays an integral role in the formation of other Swedish foreign policy, which used to be largely the domain of the Ministry for Foreign

\hfill http://www.arena.uio.no
\textsuperscript{140} Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication "EU Work"
\hfill http://www.sweden.gov.se/sh/d/2067/a/20589 accessed on 6 March 2006
\textsuperscript{141} The larger international trade policies such as positions in the WTO has been delegated to the EU, however, many developmental aid policies, that fall within this ministry is still within the control of the Swedish state, within the laws of the European Union.
Affairs. Membership in the European Union has demanded this restructuring of the Swedish state.

**Ministry of Defence**

The Swedish Ministry of Defence has a moderate representation in Brussels also through the office of the Permanent Representative. It is with the help of this representation that Sweden became the framework nation for the NBG. It must be noted that this Ministry in particular is evolving its armed forces from a strictly defence force due to its non-alignment policy to "a mobile, flexible operational defence, which can both defend Sweden and take part in international operations." The department website specifically notes that changes have occurred within the ambit of the ministry in relation to the European Union, especially concerning crisis management. That a government department, while it tries to preserve its status as an independent state, is bold to proclaim the changes effected by accession to another institution, is a reflection that the state-centric model of international relations and cooperation is under duress and may be continually challenged with no apparent detrimental side-effect from the perspective of the state itself. One could argue that the state of Sweden, for its part, is welcoming of this change. Other administrative changes that have occurred in the Ministry of Defence are not simply a reflection on that Ministry but on the bureaucratic structure and decision-making mechanisms of the Swedish government as a whole. One of such obvious ones is the greater coordination of affairs between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the extent that there seems to be an overlap.

**Ministry for Foreign Affairs**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the office of the Prime Minister represents Sweden at the EU. This office also governs the permanent representation in Brussels and is the largest ministerial administration in Sweden, signifying the importance of foreign policy decision-making to the state. An event that crystallises evolution in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was Sweden's EU Presidency in the first half of 2001. For six months at a time, each member state has the honour of leading the European Union regardless of population size.

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143 Ibid.
This was Sweden's moment to shine and influence as many policies as possible. During this period, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs expanded in number as it employed new delegates to represent Sweden unofficially, while representing the EU officially in various regions of the world. Membership in the European Union has forced Sweden to improve coordination within the state between different ministerial portfolios. Each of the ministerial positions tended to focus strictly on their own sectors, and only ventured out during rear occasions. Given the nature of the Council of Ministers however, which expected that states must hold a common position across many policy areas, the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have had to make a concerted effort in terms of cooperation.

Political scientists and other foreign policy scholars make the constant effort to understand how those ministries, concerned with foreign policy decision-making, formulate such policies in light of the EU. During the course of this research, one observation drawn from a similar attempt is that it is virtually impossible to delineate exactly how negotiations and compromises take place, given the informal nature of coordination. In coordinating Swedish EU business, civil servants and other bureaucrats often rely on these contacts - not "formal meetings, memos or agendas."

In light of these facts, we see that membership in the EU is an integral part in the daily function of the Swedish state.

**The Evolution of a Small State in the EU**

Sweden was critical to this study, in that it is a small state and in so being, several assumptions about its role in the international system and as a member of an organisation of states are assumed. In general, small states do not play a large role as security actor, however, membership in the European Union has afforded for change in the status-quo, forcing a state like Sweden to devote more resources and capacity to shaping its foreign and security policy.

The change in strategy of the Ministry of Defence in Sweden is indicative of the institutional changes caused by EU membership. Not everyone finds change favourable, arguing that

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145 Larsson and Trondal, op. cit. p21
146 Ibid., p22
membership has and will continue to erode the identity of military non-alignment, for instance. In this instance, one challenge to sovereignty concerning institutional change is apparent. As I stated earlier, the formation of a NBG commits the Swedish military to an alliance at the very least. As a whole, the Swedish state has changed since accession. These changes have occurred in various areas and have included a constitutional amendment, transferring certain decision-making powers to the European Union’s first pillar.\textsuperscript{147}

With the Prime Minister’s office taking primary responsibility for EU and foreign policy coordination (aided by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Sweden is able to assert her preferences within the complexities of the European Union. As one author notes, Swedish membership in the EU has shifted the state from a majoritarian democracy to one in which there is a vertical separation of powers.\textsuperscript{148} Overall, policy change is reflected more in the area of foreign affairs than institutional change. Except for the growth in the concerned department and the Swedish permanent representation, the NBG as a policy itself is most indicative of change. Sweden’s change in policy is what reflects institutional change, where the Ministry of Defence has been overhauled to accommodate this commitment.

Conclusions

Change has occurred in those state structures that specifically governed foreign policy, in considering membership in the European Union. Change has taken place in other policy areas, as various government departments must attempt to coordinate European policy with the foreign office since European for better or worse are still considered a part of foreign affairs. The very nature of these bureaucratic changes in member states further reflects the hybrid nature of the Union as it tethers continuously on the edge of supranationalism and yet retains intergovernmental characteristics as coordination between the different areas of government continue to occur to ensure a coherent and united political stance.

Concerning foreign policy, there are obvious differences between the British and Swedish outlook as the latter has sought to adapt to its idea of what European foreign policy should look like while the former prefers to maintain the intergovernmental nature of decision-making. In addition, while both countries have created new mechanisms and re-tailored old ones to account for their membership, Sweden’s policies reflect the European Union better

\textsuperscript{147} "Sweden in the EU" (2005), Fact Sheet no. 4 http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/upload/Dokument/Trycksaker-pdf/eeu_faktablad_4_eng.pdf


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than Britain does; i.e. national policies in Britain have only changed moderately in comparison to Sweden’s for instance.\textsuperscript{149} The reason for this may be attributed to the sizes in both states. This is not specifically in the area of foreign policy alone, but it certainly reflects the institutional attitudes of both states.

Britain does have the advantage of being a large state that wields considerable power in the international system, through membership in NATO and the Security Council, as well as its seemingly unwavering alliance with the United States. Given this, policy in Britain has not seen considerable change, as she is able to exert influence within and without the EU. Institutionally however, within the departments of the British state as well as in her devolved administration, change, through the establishment of new offices and coordination mechanisms, have occurred to meet the demands of membership in the European Union.

A similar point in both of these cases is the extent to which the trade section of foreign policy has adapted to the EU mode of operation, while security and defence lag behind despite the changes that have been observed. As the next section should show, there are advantages and disadvantages to membership from a foreign security policy perspective, and how each state is affected will differ. In any case, this will inform the future strength of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as an institutional mechanism, and the European Union as a viable security actor.\textsuperscript{150}


\textsuperscript{150} Most foreign security initiatives still tend to be left to member states and NATO in certain instances
CHAPTER FOUR
Change, Foreign Policy and the State in the European Union

The two case studies of membership in the EU, that of Britain, a large state; and Sweden, a small one with a persistent military non-alignment policy, indicate some of the changes that have taken place in the state through the employment of adjusted bureaucratic structures to address trade, diplomatic, security and defence policies.

Through the manner in which Britain functions via Whitehall, there is a reluctance to change and indeed, an adaptation of Europe to Britain seems a better preference as evidence shows through Britain’s informal negotiations on the eve of the second Gulf War. The decision-makers are aware that the EU cannot be moulded to Britain and so, they try as much as they can to work for Britain within Europe. In Sweden’s case, institutional changes are embraced for the most part. These changes give a small state greater space to assert more prominence in high politics, both in regional and international security issues. Through careful coordination, and sometimes a complete institutional shift is the case with the Ministry of Defence, Sweden has the potential to now effect change in determining the future of the CFSP. Sweden’s military non-alignment policy cannot stand in practice given the NBG; the Swedes protect their interests during the IGCs and through the informal network of alliances formed by those members of the Swedish government seconded to the office of the Permanent Representative in Brussels, and those within the EU’s supranational structures.

Foreign policy making mechanisms, however, do not necessarily sit in isolation, of other policy mechanisms such as social policy, especially in regards to how decision making changes the state in general; they both call for greater coordination and that is the nature of membership in a new sort of institution like the European Union. The relevance or the uniqueness of new structures in terms of change is attached to the fact that in the area of foreign policy both international relations theory and practice barely provide for change.

In the case of Europe, the concept of Europeanisation has been used to describe any change that occurs within the Union. I have argued that Europeanisation is not able to explain the employment of new foreign policy mechanisms however, as it does not give adequate concern to the influence of state structure in moulding what becomes EU policy. The complexities of foreign policy studies, within the specific context of a hybrid institution such

151 Blair a, op. cit. p585
as the European Union, therefore cannot fit within an already designated rubric, such as Europeanisation.

As was initially asserted, foreign policy is an area where states are unwilling to compromise on, despite the inevitability that the EU seems to present, for one crucial reason: sovereignty. While this study has adapted a specific meaning to sovereignty, it is still important to elucidate a cursory understanding of the legal or philosophical notion of sovereignty, because this understanding dictates the actions of most state actors. Finally, the examination of sovereignty, as it pertains to the state’s foreign relations, warrants a redefinition or at least a re-examination in light of the EU. In understanding sovereignty, one might gauge the implications for the success of the CFSP through the possibility of further evolution of current emergent foreign policy mechanisms.

**What is Sovereignty?**

Given the manner in which sovereignty was redefined for this study, one might assume that its definition is malleable and cannot be taken for granted. If this is the case, the answer to the question “what is sovereignty?” is either rhetorical or needs further examination. Many assumed the opposite of the concept i.e. sovereignty was deemed as unchanging with a specific definition. In recent years, several political scientists have published a spate of literature addressing the question of the nature of sovereignty, especially in Europe. Georg Sørensen links this newfound interest in sovereignty to change as scholars try to decide if the concept of sovereignty is static or changing within the international system. The initial concept of sovereignty was that, the authority governing each state was the one and final one. There was no higher power to report to, and every other state was obliged to respect this arrangement, otherwise commence a war. This understanding of sovereignty, ‘unitary’ or indivisible sovereignty, was established in European political discourse through the work of Jean Bodin in 1577. This conception of sovereignty informed Thomas Hobbes’ creation of the sovereign in *Leviathan*, one of the primary antecedents to Morgenthau’s *Politics among Nations*. This classic understanding of sovereignty proposes that it is

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154 Bull, Hedley cited in Keohane, op. cit p746

155 Ibid.
indivisible and therefore unchanging.\textsuperscript{156} In this way, our understanding of states and their roles and limitations was informed in the field of International Relations.

The constructivists who say sovereignty is "a socially constructed trait" elucidate the problem with this explanation of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{157} The state's authority has never stood alone without some sort of interdependence, whether it was through trade, alliances or treaties that create obligations. This does not imply that states or their leaders did not act as they wished, but it was only to an extent.\textsuperscript{158} So, despite the problem posed by the traditional understanding of the concept, the state had a measure of 'sovereignty' in that the government of a particular state was the last authority on any decision. This is the intrinsic nature of the state system.

From the perspective of this thesis, which sees institutional change within the state as a consequence of the European Union, sovereignty tends to be problematic. First, the indivisible nature of sovereignty is called to question. State structures must adapt precisely because authority centres are shifting or have the potential to shift. If the cohesive authority of one entity (the state) determines sovereignty, one can argue that the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty is insufficient and indeed affected by the change processes.

Sovereignty itself, as an institution of the state, is undergoing major changes as authority is being delegated to the EU. The delegation of authority between member states and the EU entity has been termed multi-level governance, as the Frontier becomes more evident in the relations that now define European states.

Sovereignty in Multi-Level Governance

Resurgence in the study of sovereignty is occurring because of change, which is crystallised by the advent of multi-level governance. Examining sovereignty in terms of multi-level governance is a consequence of the European Union, in two critical ways: on a general level, states have even less control over every aspect of their domestic policy following membership in the Union. On a more particular level, the area of external policy where


\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., p308

\textsuperscript{158} In "Alienable Sovereignty in Rousseau: A Further Look" (1967) Ali Mazrui noted that the sovereign in whom sovereignty is constituted is limited by the basic fact that he is human and therefore his exercise of sovereignty is limited. p107-108
states are assumed to retain sovereignty is changing. Just as foreign policy state structures have changed, those changes are now informing the future of the CFSP. At its current strength and with further changes within the state, the CFSP has the potential to supersede any individual state's policy preferences.\textsuperscript{159}

Sovereignty in the European Union, as either an intergovernmental organisation or a supranational institution, is unique; in this sense, many scholars have termed sovereignty in the function of the EU as "pooled."\textsuperscript{160} Stanley Hoffmann argues that, although this seems to be a deviation from the traditional sovereignty, pooled sovereignty does not take power away from the state, but strengthens state power, while allowing the state to adjust to the international system. As explained, sovereignty is not lost but "redistributed,"\textsuperscript{161} an exercise that cannot be conceived given the original definition of sovereignty. This sort of sovereignty is also known as cooperative sovereignty.\textsuperscript{162} Our current understanding of foreign policy as a function of the European Union proves this point, somewhat, as power to make external trade policy is delegated to the Union while states still decide on their own security and defence. Hoffmann's argument heavily rests on the belief that the EU is more or less an intergovernmental institution not a supranational one.\textsuperscript{163} Although the CFSP functions for the most part at an intergovernmental level, one must be careful not to attribute this to the entire institution; the EU is a hybrid.

"Multi-level governance presents a depiction of contemporary structures in EU Europe as consisting of overlapping authorities and competing competencies."\textsuperscript{164} The EU, in essence, challenges one of the basic tenets of the international system. If one considers sovereignty as a set of institutional attributes however, not in a theoretical or philosophical sense, its engagement in the EU may be better understood.

While this paper does not dedicate complete attention to the notion of sovereignty, attempting to understand the concept in the context of multi-level governance helps to understand the institution that is the Union. It also helps to understand why or how the CFSP and the CESDP remain largely an intergovernmental effort. As alluded to much earlier

\textsuperscript{159} On Iraq, the CFSP seemed to fail dismally; currently however, there seems to be consensus on how Iran's quest for nuclear power should be handled, giving hope to the revival of the CFSP.
\textsuperscript{160} Supra note 131;
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{163} Stanley Hoffmann cited in Bulmer, Simon and Lequesne, Christian. (2002). "New Perspectives on EU-Member State Relationships" Centre d'études et de Recherches Internationale, Questions de Recherche, No. 4
\textsuperscript{164} AAlberts, op.cit. p23
in this paper, the second pillar of Maastricht established the CFSP to help member states coordinate foreign policies. The construct of the pillar is quite ambiguous as it currently stands, if one considers like many integrationists that the CFSP should be the official foreign policy mechanism of all member states. Certainly, states would still state their preferences, but not one state should be able to act alone. For now, states technically have control of their foreign policy but coordinate in certain areas, as evidenced by the office of the High Representative and the newly employed institutional mechanisms. Given that our current understanding of the different foreign policy mechanisms of Britain and Sweden tell us there has been some change, we now turn to how that change can be used in practice through the CFSP.

The next section examines the effect the state’s institutional changes made on the formation of a common foreign policy in the EU. It will look at the current structures assessing their current strength, their potential and the advantages and disadvantages that may come with that potential. It will look to the future of the foreign policy making within the European Union. It views the implications, as the traditional understanding of sovereignty seems to lose its last hold on the state-centric system.

From CFSP to CESDP – Europe as an independent security policy actor?

Although the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union are now considered quite progressive, it was initially weak in the Maastricht treaty. The CFSP was nominally effective especially in regards to development policy and it created the basis for a security policy. For one, the EU became much more recognised worldwide as one political entity with just as much presence as the United States or some of its larger member states, headed by Javier Solana. However, within the EU itself, the intent of how the CFSP should function was better than its actual function and so, in 1999, the Union took more steps towards a future many integrationists believe is possible for the European Union.

At the end of 1999, the “institutional structures for the CESDP” were established. The CESDP stands for the Common European Security and Defence Policy, which replaced the European Security and Defence Policy.¹⁶⁵ It is not clear if the CESDP is a separate foreign policy area from the CFSP or a sector within it; in any case, the CESDP further institutionalised the European Union’s high politics, and in so doing the Political and Security

Committee (PSC) was established in the Treaty of Nice.\textsuperscript{166} Although the mechanisms of the CESDP present, in theory, a stronger and united European capability, the actual strength of the CESDP as a supra-national security entity is tarnished because of its relationship to NATO. In short, the CESDP seems more like a tactical unit to support NATO where the North Atlantic alliance, particularly the United States is unwilling to be involved as was the case during the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia. This may be interpreted to mean that CESDP is operational only when the Americans are disinterested in a particular issue, and this is the position of the British involvement in the CESDP.

This is reflected in the fact that primary role of European Defence is still reliant on NATO, not the CESDP. Indeed, given the youth of this European endeavour at security, perhaps it is wiser that NATO does retain the primary role, but for the CESDP to attain any significance worthy of its name, its relationship with NATO will need redefinition. There is the fear that a strong European defence force would undermine NATO, although to what detriment that would be, is not clearly articulated. Since NATO was created as a response to the threat of communism and strong USSR, the non-existence of these two threats should mean a restructuring of NATO at the very least. At present, the activities of the CESDP are restricted to interventions in those cases where the Americans are reluctant to get involved, i.e. ESDP forces are more likely to be found in Africa than NATO’s.

Thus, on the one hand a major obstacle to the progression of a European common foreign policy is the reluctance of the states themselves, and on the other is the existence of NATO, to which Britain especially is reluctant to forsake. From the foregoing, we note that although institutions are changing, actual policies are much slower to change. In addition, sovereignty is not declined, although a change in our understanding of the concept is necessitated by EU developments.

The consequence of these obstacles is that the CESDP is stalled. In principle, many of the EU nations have agreed to contributing the manpower to rotational battle groups that can deploy within 60 days to anywhere in the world where they are needed. There is a problem however with fulfilling that agreement as evidenced by the current debate to deploy EU troops to the Congo. Because the CFSP is not binding as the first pillar or parts of the third, there is no compulsion on the part of Germany, for instance, to deploy troops to the Congo.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
even when the United Nations have asked the European Union for help.\textsuperscript{167} Most problematic
is the inability of member states to decide on who should lead the project.\textsuperscript{168} There is very
little political will to cede decision-making concerning foreign policy to the Union. Even
within the two countries that constitute the focus of this paper, the CESDP should rather
remain an intergovernmental effort. This would be in order for Sweden to maintain its
sovereignty and therefore neutrality, while allowing Britain the freedom to maintain her
Atlantic alliance. There are benefits of CESDP in terms of further integration as well as the
image of the EU projected outside of Europe, but the issue of sovereignty is hindering so
where do we go from here?

Certainly, there are disadvantages to strengthening the second pillar above the
intergovernmental level as this paper has explored; it explains why the common policy
mechanism seems to have come to a standstill. Nevertheless, the policy analysts especially,
are not broaching the positive where they should be. Using Helen Sjursen’s paper as a
starting point, the CFSP could be strengthened through an institutional arrangement that
would be binding on all members of the Union using a \textit{rights-based} foreign policy
approach.\textsuperscript{169} Effectively, a rights-based foreign policy would stem from the need that the
members signing on have the same concerns, want to solve the same problems and are
adherent to the rule of law. It is not incomprehensible to suppose that the EU’s CFSP is
capable of this, since certain common interests breed intergovernmental organisations
initially. The one advantage of this approach is that it would reinforce legitimacy of the
Union and its members’ action in the international system. Its inability to act for lack of
consensus will inevitably tarnish the legitimacy of the EU as an institution – and perhaps
that of member states who have built their reputation on membership – in the international
community.

The future of the CFSP will depend on how the fear of losing sovereignty, and the
responsibility to help shape the international system measure against each other in the
opinion of member states.

\textsuperscript{167} CNN World. (7/3/2006) “EU Can’t Agree on Congo Force: Germany France Pressured to Take Lead”
to the initial report, Germany has agreed in principle to lead on certain conditions.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{169} Sjursen, Helen. “Towards a Post-national Foreign and Security Policy” Arena Working Papers 04/12
Conclusion: Is the state diminishing as an agent of international relations?

Although foreign policy bureaucratic mechanisms have changed in at least two states owing to membership in the European Union, states continue to be the driving force behind foreign policy agenda on the continent for the present. They are still protective of their national security identity and are intent on retaining sovereignty. The changes, however, suggest that we pay attention to what the future might hold for both the state and the European Union as institutions in the international system, especially as states themselves, have the most important role to play in this process from the perspective of the CFSP.

The international state system is beset by challenges to its state-centric mentality, one of which is the European Union. States in Europe, particularly member states of the Union as illustrated by Britain and Sweden, have had to re-orient many aspects of their policies, but more importantly, they have had to change the ways in which they arrive at policy since joining the EU. This has been done through the establishment of new offices, representation in Brussels and the employment of new strategies. There is greater coordination between national government departments and ministries who, through negotiations and bargaining states, are able to convey their preferences within the institution of the EU. Indeed, some have better luck at getting their preferences through, but in the final analysis, when compromise has been reached in the Council of Ministers; the decision is binding and carried out by the Commission, unless it concerns foreign policy.

Within states, foreign-policy mechanisms have also had to be re-oriented. Change in this area of policy however had the most impact on the state because it touches on the core definition of a state in the international system - sovereignty. To this, the change in foreign policy mechanisms, where Britain and Sweden must account for membership in the Union, has resulted in a change for the state from an international relations perspective. Admittedly, the change is ongoing and to some extent, reluctant. Nonetheless, it is happening.

There is potential for further change, which is contingent on the further evolution of foreign policy mechanisms. The future of the state and the EU will depend on these mechanisms as a permanent decision is reached about a common foreign and security policy. Sovereignty may be dear to states but so is legitimacy, which makes having a CFSP and the CEDSP critical to the future of the European Union as a security policy actor. In principle the CFSP
has been strengthened since the Maastricht treaty, but repeatedly, when coherence and effectiveness are put to the test, the CFSP's attempt at one voice for Europe tends to fail.

As noted above, there are advantages and disadvantages to the evolution of foreign policy mechanisms that would encourage a stronger supranational European security and defence policy. Yet, is the EU willing to risk all the benefits of integration if it does not consider other alternatives to strict intergovernmentalism at this level?

Sjursen notes that although supranationality might be a huge leap, there are changes reflected in the mechanisms employed now to suggest a move beyond intergovernmental arrangements.\textsuperscript{170} Perhaps then, even a changed CFSP cannot fit within the rubrics of defined international relations' terms. At present, it is sufficient to note that foreign policy institutions within states have changed and continue to change as a result of the EU. This, in turn, informs the CFSP. Only time will tell whether the CFSP, and therefore the CESDP, will emerge as a viable policy mechanism in the European Union as well as in the international system.

\textsuperscript{170} Sjursen, supra note 162
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