

# THE BROADCASTING OF POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA

by

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## THE BROADCASTING OF POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

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This dissertation studies the broadcasting of politics in South Africa from 1920 to the end of the P. W. Botha era in 1989; that is, the reaction of radio and television to the changing political environment. Since 1948 South Africa's broadcasting system has increasingly been influenced by the ruling National Party as they strengthened their authority. This follows the **Lasswell** communications model which emphasizes the role of the controller in the communications flow as well as **Fagen's** and **Siebert's** description of authoritarianism as a national political system.

A study of the historical legacy of broadcasting in South Africa clearly shows an authoritarian orientation. This is accomplished through an investigation utilizing historical material including **Tomaselli** as well as press reports and **Hansard**. The advent of television has seen this maintained in a variety of forms.

The key question confronting the reader is whether or not there exists change away from the authoritarian model to a more liberalistic trend. The author details a number of visible inconsistencies and anomalies that are present both within radio and television. These are shown to markedly contradict with the control model of the past and highlight fundamental shifts in the media orientation.

These contradictions are a reflection of the socio-political pressures that have recently emerged to influence the National Party. This is a function of the reforming of their past ideology as well as of internal economic advances and political upheavals which increase

the influence of non-State elements upon the electronic media as depicted in the **De Fleur** model.

The broadcasting system is increasingly shown to reflect an inclusive picture adapting to the political and economic realities in which it operates. The emerging trend moves away from authoritarianism in a more liberal and pluralistic direction.

## DEDICATION

In memory of my father

Aubrey Samuel Silke

1922-1983

whose inspiration remains a guiding light.

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## **PREFACE**

This thesis is a direct result of my lifelong interest in and exposure to radio and television. Within South Africa, broadcasting is increasingly adapting to the ever changing macro environment making such a study exciting and dynamic. This change in the South African political scene is playing itself out before the eyes and ears of millions of South Africans on a daily basis on both radio and television. It is for these reasons that the study of broadcasting fascinates and intrigues.

I would particularly like to thank my supervisors for their considerable assistance in the completion of this work. Dr. Alan A. Cooper (University of Bophuthatswana) has been a wonderful inspiration whose advice and help has been unparalleled. Professor Robert Schrire (University of Cape Town) has been sympathetic and understanding and has provided indispensable assistance. Both have furnished me with the necessary guidance and have always been informative, motivating and cooperative.

It is also necessary to thank the entire Department of Political Studies for their faith and interest in me and to all my friends whose encouragement is appreciated. Gwen Zeller has been invaluable in allowing her press clippings to be monopolized. Leigh Mukheiber, Dale Kaplan and Andy Scholtz have kindly provided much needed computer assistance. I would lastly like to thank my mother, Mrs. Freda Silke, for her valued help and tolerance during the writing of this dissertation!

**August 1989**

**Daniel Silke**

## **GLOSSARY**

## GLOSSARY:

**Authoritarianism.** Policy of strict governmental control of broadcasting with little regard for popular taste. [Head, 1985:404].

**BBC** (British Broadcasting Corporation). Nonprofit statutory corporation that conducts Britain's public service broadcasting. [Head, 1985:404].

**Bop-TV.** Independent television channel based in Bophuthatswana.

**Broadcast Media.** Radio and Television. Interchangeable with **Broadcasting.**

**Broadcasting.** Communication of sound and pictures to the general public by means of radio waves in space. [Head, 1985:405].

**Broadcasting System.** All the legal broadcasting services in a country or territory. [Head, 1985:11].

**Cable TV.** System for delivering television programmes to subscribers over cables rather than by means of over-the-air TV stations. [Head, 1985:405].

**Capital Radio.** Independent FM, MW and SW radio station based in the Transkei.

**Channel.** (1) Group of frequencies designated for the use of a single station. (2) The station using a particular channel. (3) The programming available on a particular cable TV channel, as "Sports Channel." (4) A network such as TV1. [Head, 1985:406].

**Clandestine.** Applied to secretive, unauthorized stations having political motives. [Head, 1985:405].

**Control Paradigm.** Strictly organized and regulated media usually operating under monopoly State-run domination. Also see **Authoritarianism.**

**DBS (Direct Broadcast Satellite).** A satellite with sufficient power to be receivable by small antennas suitable for individual home use.[Head, 1985: 406].

**Development Media Theory.** Media Policies employed in the light of common circumstances of developing countries. Acceptance of economic development (thus social change) and often the correlated 'nation building' as an overriding objective. [McQuail, 1987:120-121].

**Electronic Media.** Media utilizing a particular technology of microcircuits and microchips.

**External Service.** A government broadcasting service openly aimed at foreign countries as an official arm of international diplomacy. External services make extensive use of short-wave radio.[Head, 1985:408].

**First World.** The industrialized, democratic nations, referred to loosely as 'the West'. Compare with **Third World**. [Head, 1985:408].

**Free Press Theory.** Policy that prescribes that an individual should be free to publish what he or she likes and is thus an extension of other rights - to hold opinions freely, to express them, to assemble and organize others.[McQuail, 1987:113].

**IBA (Independent Broadcasting Authority).** British nonprofit public corporation set up to authorize and supervise commercial radio and television operations.[Head, 1985:409].

**Independent Radio Stations.** Non-SABC commercial radio stations operating to South African audiences. Usually based in 'homelands'.

**Interference.** In telecommunications services, radio energy that conflicts with intended signals, causing distortion and loss of intelligibility. Conflicts come from other transmitters and from such natural causes such as electrical storms. **Jamming** is intentional interference.[Head, 1985:410].

**Jamming.** Creation of deliberate **interference** to prevent domestic reception of programmes, usually aimed at external services coming from foreign countries.[Head, 1985:410].

**License Fee, Receiver.** A fee paid by users for the right to operate receiving sets.[Head, 1985:411].

**Mass Electronic Media.** Radio and Television. An element of **Electronic Media**. Interchangeable with **Broadcast Media**.

**Mass Media.** A combination of elements of the **Electronic Media** and the **Print Media**. [Marchant, 1988:9].

**Media Imperialism.** Alleged cultural domination of Third World countries by Western nations through control over communication media, notably by means of international news agencies and programme syndication.[Head, 1985:411].

**Mixed System.** A broadcasting system in which two or more entities with contrasting programming motives compete, typically pitting a public service component against a commercial component.[Head, 1985:411].

**M-NET.** South African independent subscription television (STV) service.

**MW (Medium Wave).** Adjective often used to designate standard or AM broadcasting.[Head, 1985:411].

**PAL (Phase Alternate Line).** West German colour TV system, generally used in Europe.[Head, 1985:413].

**Paternalism.** A policy halfway between **authoritarianism** and **permissivism**, generally eschewing censorship but not entirely subservient to the lowest common denominator of audience preferences.[Head, 1985:413].

**Permissivism.** Policy of imposing minimal governmental controls over the free play of marketplace demands, characteristic of highly commercial broadcast services. Emphasizes audience wants as indicated by tuning behaviour. Compare with **authoritarianism** and **paternalism**. [Head, 1985:413].

**Pluralism.** Condition obtaining when a broadcast system has several competing components animated by differing motivations for programming. See also **Mixed System**. [Head, 1985:413].

**Print Media.** Newspapers, magazines, books, pamphlets, direct mail, circulars and billboards. [Marchant, 1988:9]. Compared with **Electronic Media**.

**PWV** (Pretoria Witwatersrand Vereniging). Refers to this given high population and industry area of the Transvaal.

**Radio Bop.** Independent MW and FM radio station based in Bophuthatswana.

**Radio Five.** National FM Stereo radio station operated by the **SABC**.

**Radio Metro.** MW Transvaal based Radio station aimed at urban Blacks broadcasting in English. Operated by the **SABC**.

**Radio Moscow.** The official external service of the Soviet Union.

**Radio RSA.** The official external service of South Africa. Operated by the **SABC**

**Radio 702.** Independent MW radio station based in Bophuthatswana.

**SABC** (South African Broadcasting Corporation). South Africa's state-run broadcasting service.

- Service.** The programming of any broadcasting network or station that makes up a part of of a national broadcasting system.[Head, 1985:417].
- Social Responsibility Theory.** Theory that reconciles independence with obligation to society. Media has obligation to serve the democratic politics of a country.[McQuail, 1987:116].
- Soviet Media Theory.** Policy that all media should be subject to control by agencies of the working class - primarily the Communist Party.[McQuail, 1987:118].
- Spill-over.** Domestic signals that inadvertently cross national boundaries.[Head, 1985:417].
- System.** A nation's broadcasting services and their organizational structure considered in the aggregate.[Head, 1985:417].
- STV (Subscription Television).** Coded(scrambled over-the-air(broadcast) television service for which audiences pay a subscription fee.[Head, 1985:417].
- Telematic Media.** New Media at the core of which is a visual display unit(television screen) linked to a computer network. [McQuail, 1987:16].
- Third World.** The less developed countries of the world, numbering about a hundred. Compare with **First World**.[Head, 1985:418].
- TV1.** Premier television channel operated by the **SABC**. Broadcasts in English and Afrikaans on a shared basis.
- TV2 & TV3.** Television channels operated by the **SABC**. Broadcasts in several Black languages.
- TV4.** Television channel operated by the **SABC**. Utilizes transmitters of **TV2/3** broadcasting in English and Afrikaans.
- VOA.** (Voice of America). The official **external service** of the United States of America.

**WHO.** An element of Lasswell's communication model[see Chapter Two].

Refers to WHO says WHAT in WHICH CHANNEL.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Throughout the world, broadcasting has become a vital feature of common life. From highly industrialized nations to newly developing countries, both radio and television, have established themselves over a remarkably short period of time as purveyors of education, entertainment and political instruction for their respective citizenry. Broadcasting in the modern society is increasingly becoming an integral part of the social values and culture of states as well as of the political institutions and systems of these societies.

This thesis will focus on the political characteristics of broadcasting in South Africa. As shall be discussed, the broadcasting institutions of a particular country often mirror the dominating political system resulting in broadcasting systems being categorized according to government policy and ideology. The consequent dynamics of the politics of South Africa will therefore be of major importance in analyzing the broadcast media.

The effect of such national political systems on the mass media has led to these systems being neatly defined into normative theories of the press. These theories range from the Authoritarian/control paradigm through the Development and Third World model to the Free Press classification. Mixed (pluralistic) trends are also discernible where characteristics overlap.

The task of this thesis will be to investigate empirically the broadcast media in South Africa from its beginnings in the 1920's to the end of the PW Botha era in 1989. This investigation will therefore examine the dynamic nature of the characteristics of radio and television as a function of its changing relationship with the state. This will be undertaken with a view to gauging whether the

attributes of broadcasting evident in the contemporary period enable a classification within any one, or within a combination of the normative theories as outlined.

Initially, it will be necessary to broadly define the terms that shall be extensively used in this thesis. This will be useful as much of the terminology is specific to the study of broadcasting and should be related to their definitions. This shall be accomplished in Chapter One.

Chapter Two will discuss the normative authoritarian theory as the basis for the discussion relating to the politics of broadcasting in South Africa. This analysis of a control paradigm theory will be illustrated utilizing the contribution of Harold Lasswell whose seminal study highlighted the importance of the controllers of the mass media. This is further enhanced by Melvin De Fleur who has detailed the mass media as a social system containing many component elements such as the audience, producers and advertisers which may influence the media.

The role of the controllers and component elements will be guided by an investigation of the characteristics of the national political systems outlined by Richard Fagen. Special attention will be focused on the control paradigm of Authoritarian theory as it is essential to the understanding of the South African broadcasting culture. Here, the works of Siebert and Schramm as well as McQuail have been useful.

The Authoritarian theory will be examined in relation to the alternative theories of communication such as the permutations of the democratic model. The development of such normative permutations has lead to considerable over-lapping and mitigates against easy categorizations. However, the control paradigm is of particular

relevance in explaining the historical development of broadcasting in South Africa which has occurred according to the authoritarian model and still retains elements thereof.

Having discussed the fundamental tenets of authoritarianism within communications, Chapter Three will highlight the historical development of broadcasting in South Africa. This analysis will show the broadening of the radio network from its inception in the 1920's through to the debates regarding the merits and demerits of the introduction of television in the late 1960's. This will be accomplished using available source material including academic works, the articulation of policy in Hansard Parliamentary Debates and newspaper reports.

The historical development of broadcasting in South Africa has largely coincided with the advent of National Party rule since 1948. The emerging technological advancements have continuously been harnessed by the ruling group in its quest to solidify and maintain voter support. This has seen the broadcasting paradigm increasingly take on the authoritarian characteristics of minority policed and controlled political activity which restricts personal freedoms, emasculates undesirable opposition and imposes media censorship.

However, the nature of authoritarian control is that it remains imperfect with varying degrees of cultural and economic freedoms which contrasts with the more rigid and omnipotent totalitarian example. This may allow a greater propensity for the creation of a less subservient media which will be particularly evident in times of a transition from an authoritarian state to a more liberal orientation. Whilst historically classified as authoritarian, the South African regime under a process of democratization may well find

its control and usage of the media diminished and fundamentally altered.

The State monopoly of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) has meant that those in control of the broadcast media have largely been National Party sympathizers who, in many cases, are directly appointed by their respective controlling and responsible political superiors.

A feature of the historical development of broadcasting therefore, is the influence of personalities. As Chapter Three will indicate, the views of Gideon Roos, Dr. Jan Schutte and above all, Dr. Albert Hertzog, played an enormous role in formulating broadcasting policy. Hertzog's views on television, contained in this Chapter, will also indicate the gross authoritarian paradigm which dominated the broadcast media.

The introduction of television, as outlined in Chapter Four marked a turning point in the broadcasting history of South Africa. As shall be seen, the authoritarian (and largely ethnocentric) legacy of Hertzog, Schutte and the Broederbond provided the ruling National Party with the ideological foundation to utilize this new medium to promote itself as the only legitimate political force within the country.

Chapter Four deals in depth with the various techniques in which the State-run SABC is able to manipulate the broadcast hours in order to ensure compliance from its broadcast services. This is achieved through an effective monopoly of formal television newscasts which favors the National Party over the other political actors in South Africa.

Detailed reference will be made to authoritarian guidelines in formal newscasts/Public Affairs, documentary and general programme production, as well as to research undertaken during the past four general election/referenda campaigns which statistically prove favoritism towards the ruling National Party. Mention will also be made of the overt governmental interference in broadcasting employing available documented evidence and interviews. In this regard, particular attention will be paid to the authoritarian nature of the PW Botha presidency and the resulting dismissal of Director-General Riaan Eksteen as a function of this.

From this discussion of the authoritarian characteristics of broadcasting, Chapter Five moves to the numerous and compelling anomalies, contradictions and inconsistencies that exist within the broad spectrum of the broadcasting of politics in South Africa.

It is the contention of this thesis that whilst acknowledging the manifest overt support for the National Party on the part of the SABC, the socio economic pressures and political realities and dynamics of South African society have resulted in the movement of the broadcasting system towards a less controlled media culture deviating from the Verwoerdian sponsored extremism of the Albert Hertzog period.

Chapter Five discusses the latest trends in the broadcast media with special reference to internal programme changes in both radio and television on the part of the SABC. Here, programme subject matter will be analyzed to show a marked shift away from the past promotion of Apartheid to the transmission of 'integrationist' programming and advertising. This is coupled with the movement towards English language domination compared with the language parity ideals of the

past.

The key contradictions are the recently established 'independent' radio and television channels of Capital, 702, Bop and M-NET. Considerable attention shall be focused on the way these operators contradict with the authoritarian legacy of the past and provide competition as well as an alternative media culture to that of the State-run enterprise. This has resulted in the SABC react to and compete with these services. The mix of public and private ownership therefore, considerably reduces the authoritarian content within the South African broadcast media.

These contradictions are vital in the progression towards formulating a conclusionary analysis of the Broadcasting of Politics in South Africa. The historical legacy is vital in articulating the shifts in the contemporary era. The conclusion in Chapter Six will attempt to reconcile the contradictions inherent in the Eighties with the authoritarian heritage and continuing authoritarian nature of the formal news bulletins and public affairs programming of the SABC. This is necessary in order to clarify whether it is still possible to categorize South Africa's broadcasting system mainly within the authoritarian models or whether a more pluralistic classification is applicable.

The authorities have been motivated to liberalize for a number of contending reasons. These range from the increasing influence of the internal components of the mass media like the audience, advertisers and producers to internal political changes such as the reform policy of the National Party as well as the influence of the external political environment on South Africa. Both financial motivations as well as genuine political policy shifts are important in

understanding the reasons behind such liberalization.

Whilst much of this thesis concentrates on the legacy of control of the broadcast media, the anomalies and disparities highlighted in Chapter Five will show the broadcasting culture liberalizing. In so doing, it is moving away from an authoritarian pattern towards a more pluralistic approach whilst still retaining key elements of ruling elite control particularly under a State of Emergency.

It shall be the view of this thesis however, that broadcasting has a critical role to play in creating a more peaceful post-Apartheid South African society. As shall be shown, it is tentatively beginning to play this role for any number of motivating reasons and will therefore tackle the South African socio-political realities from a more pluralistic rather than authoritarian approach.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

# **THE BROADCASTING ENVIRONMENT**

Broadcasting represents constantly changing and adapting technological developments and innovations. These dynamics lead man to continually experiment and adapt to find comfortable media forms. The media may be seen as reflecting human society in a packaged product. Indeed, the popularity of mass forms of media such as television has seen much of the world's tastes converge in approval of uniform programmes and has led to the creation of a "Global Village". [McLuhan in Marchant, 1988:6].

Broadcasting should be seen as one of the participating aspects of mass communications and follows upon previous examples such as print media (books); the press (newspapers) and film. It is, in turn being followed by new forms of electronic media such as cable; satellite; computer; telematic and video based transmissions [see McQuail, 1987:8-17].

In a discussion relating to broadcasting, it will be necessary to define the terms used. The ever changing technology and increasing multiplicity of services and channels demand that clarity be secured in the language used.

This thesis will analyze the political characteristics of the broadcast media in South Africa. The mass media is all important, according to Ranney, as it is "the basic medium through which political groups are formed and seek to influence public policy. Communication, in short, is therefore seen as the main catalytic agent by which the social and psychological characteristics of men are applied to the dynamic processes of political conflict". [Ranney, 1971:246-247].

### Communication Versus Political Communication:

Having noted Ranney's reference to the importance of communication and therefore that of the media (including broadcast), it is necessary to seek clarity as to the differences in definition of 'communication' as opposed to 'political communication'. Ithiel de Sola Pool defines communication as "any transmission of signs, signals, or symbols between persons". [Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 1968:91].

In contrast, de Sola Pool's definition of political communication, is directly relevant. He defines it as "the activity of certain specialized institutions that have been set up to disseminate information, ideas, and attitudes about governmental affairs". [Encyclopedia of Social Sciences:91].

Marchant [1988:1] refers to communication as a "key element in enabling man to influence and control his environment" thus indicating the considerable scope for control. It is therefore the influence of the ruling elite on the broadcasting services in their dissemination of political/governmental news that is characteristic of broadcasting in South Africa.

### Broadcasting Defined:

It is necessary, however, to define quite clearly what is meant by broadcasting. Sydney W. Head [1985:11] has derived his definition from that contained within the legal system of the United States. He quotes the definition of broadcasting as being the "dissemination of radio communications intended to be received by the public, directly or indirectly by the intermediary of relay stations".

Head [1985:11] suggests that "the term radio in the above definition refers to the electromagnetic radiations used by both sound ('radio') and vision ('television')". This refers to the combination of these two forms of mass media under the umbrella term of broadcasting or broadcast media.

McQuail [1987:15] confirms that "despite their obvious differences and now wide discrepancies in content and use, radio and television can be treated together". Indeed, August Ranney [1971:248] classes Radio and Television as part of the "media of political communication".

It should be stressed that there are clear differences between radio and television. McLuhan details radio as a "hot" medium that enriches creativity, encourages communalism and has a direct one sense orientation that lends itself to instruction rather than to broad participation.

McLuhan[1964:317] sees television as a "cool" medium which is of "low intensity or definition, and, therefore unlike film, it does not afford detailed information about objects". The television medium is also far less instructive and allows for greater viewer participation. Television is seen as blurring specialist knowledge leading to "myopia"[1964:335] and does not "excite agitate or arouse"[1964:337] but rather encourages indifference.

Such a discussion implies differing uses of these two mediums for differing effects. Here controllers and governments would be able to judge which medium would be most suited to which message in relation to the desired and achievable effects.

Whilst these differences must be acknowledged, they manifest in the analysis of the effects of these two media forms. This dissertation does not cover the effects of the mass media upon society which may indeed be different depending on the media form utilized. This analysis rather discusses the broadcasting system which includes the radio and television services(channels) as the key components thereof. The issue in this dissertation is clearly the dynamic characteristics and relationship of the broadcasting system(radio and television) with the state.

The Head definition referring to broadcasting as AM, FM and SW radio as well as television describes this aspect of the mass media in an unbiased, unemotional and unambiguous fashion and directly relates to the topic of analyzing South Africa's broadcasting system. This also clearly confines this thesis to a discussion of radio and television (the broadcast media) rather than the other forms of mass media (print). [see Appendix C: Figure 2].

#### **The Broadcasting System and its Parameters:**

Having defined broadcasting, it is necessary to look at the meaning given to the classificatory term, "Broadcasting System". Head [1985:11] defines this as "all the legal broadcasting services in a given country or territory". This includes all services whether government or privately owned as well as the state operated external services.

It is here that the South African case study presents a unique problem. Within South Africa, the most dominant purveyor of broadcasting services is the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). However, other important broadcast media actors exist with many located in the nominally independent homelands and self-

governing territories.

This thesis will accept the internationally acceptable description of the territory of South Africa as recognized by the United Nations - namely that where the homelands (independent or otherwise) are seen as being part of the land mass of South Africa and not as separate independent nations as defined by the South African government. Furthermore, all the radio and television services of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda are listed in the authoritative "World Radio and TV Handbook" [1987:167-170 and 401-402] as being "regions" of South Africa just as Georgia or Kazakhstan are regions of the Soviet Union.

Apart from these services depending upon a largely South African listenership and viewership, they also receive most of their advertising revenue from South African companies thus making them doubly dependent. It is for these reasons that reference shall be made to all broadcasting services of South Africa and the homelands as an integral whole.

This obviously contradicts the official South African government policy which is enforced by legal codes granting independence to many of these territories. However, it is important to note that the major broadcasting services that do operate or transmit from the homelands are largely independent commercial radio stations that compete for the same market as that of the SABC and will be analyzed equally and concurrently with the non-homeland (SABC and M-NET) services.

Whilst mention shall be made of services aimed at Black audiences, particular attention will be focused on the broadcast media serving

mainly White viewers. The focus of this thesis is the political control of broadcasting by the National Party, itself a function of White political expression. It is evident that the White electorate has the final say regarding constitutional matters as a result of the Constitution Act of 1983 thus pointing towards the use of the media to influence this sector of the populace.

It should also be noted that the broadcasting system is to be analyzed according to its historical development. The system itself has changed and continues to be dynamic since the monopoly of the SABC has been broken allowing new participants to broadcast. The investigation of this thesis will focus from the inception of broadcasting in the early 1920's to the system that has developed during the premiership of PW Botha.

#### **The Attributes of Broadcasting:**

Having clarified some of the terminology that is to be used, it is important to note some of the salient features of the broadcasting medium for it is these very distinct and unique attributes that influence the political environment in which the broadcasting systems operate.

Sydney W. Head [1985:4-6] distinguishes seven attributes of broadcasting that are vital in this discussion.

1. The "ubiquitous" nature of broadcasting. Here, "broadcasting has a unique ability to instantaneously surmount both natural and artificial barriers, both physical and human obstacles to communication". [1985:4]. Head goes onto explain the ability of broadcasting to enter every home and so reach an exceptionally wide audience which is likely to encourage political intervention and

control.

2. Head [1985:5] highlights the "immediate" nature of broadcasting where it can be continuously available and has "the potential to always be there, immediately on tap whenever needed". An extension of this attribute is explained by McQuail [1987:15] who sees "the main genre innovation common to both radio and television as being their direct account or observation of events as they happen".

Marshall McLuhan [1964:298] also refers to this characteristic of the broadcast medium as being "a kind of nervous information system where news bulletins, time signals, traffic data, and, above all, weather reports now serve to enhance the native power of radio (and now television) to involve people in one another".

3. Head [1985:5] mentions the "continuousness or voracity that gives broadcasting a voracious appetite" necessitating a considerable programme production output to fill broadcast hours at considerable cost. This means that much of the programming emanates from the wealthier industrialized states as they have the markets and therefore the financial backing with which to produce.

McQuail argues that this has seen a "centre-periphery" distribution pattern emerging as well as "the association of national television with political life and the power centres of society, as it has become established as both popular and political in its functions". This highlights not only the existence of possible governmental control, but also the debate surrounding 'media imperialism'.

4. The "flexibility" of the transmitter networks that can either be used for centralized relay (national programming) or can transmit varied regional services are also an important characteristic.

5. Another vital feature is the "voluntariness" on the part of the public to share in the broadcast medium by purchasing themselves, part of the equipment needed to receive the appropriate messages. Head [1985:6] suggests that because the public share so directly in the software of reception, "they feel a sense of entitlement that they do not feel about newspapers, magazines or films and politicians and bureaucrats who violate what audiences consider their rights, do so at their peril". This encourages a greater degree of participation on the part of the public in voicing their opinions of the broadcast medium.

6. An important characteristic which is very relevant to this thesis is the need for regulation affecting broadcasting as stations have the ability in terms of their technological characteristics to interfere with one another. It is not only for this reason that governmental interference takes place as official intrusion may be for "social as well as political reasons". [Head, 1985:6].

Mc Quail [1987:16] succinctly explains this feature by suggesting that the "high degree of regulation, control or licensing by public authority was initially out of technical necessity, but later from a mixture of democratic choice, state self-interest, economic convenience and sheer institutional custom". This particular aspect shall be discussed in the chapters to come.

7. Head's final point is the most relevant to this discussion. Here, he sees the combination of all the previous attributes outlined which are in themselves unique within mass communications as enabling the broadcast medium to exert "social control". This has been exploited by government and Head argues that "it is enough, however, that governments perceive broadcasting as being able to exert social

control. They regard it as potentially too powerful to be left unregulated". [Head, 1985:6].

McQuail [1987:20] goes on to explain this relationship between the mass media and the power structures of a country and differentiates between "political factors (power-related) and normative factors" (having to do with social and cultural values)" which also provides judgment as to the moral quality of programme content. [see McQuail, 1987:20-21].

In dealing with the category of political factors , one is looking at characteristics of the mass media that are directly applicable to the South African case study - namely the existence of outside governmental interference and regulation of the media as well as a more covert propensity on the part of the media body itself to self-regulate and control from within. The broadcast medium's relationship with power is also important when assessing the political domain in which it operates. McQuail suggests [1987:20] that "the more the medium operates in the political sphere, the more centrally it is of interest to power holders or contenders".

#### **National Broadcasting Orientations and Systems:**

Importantly, for this study, is the categorizations of national broadcasting systems as formulated by Head and Stirling [1982:3]. They quote Anthony Smith as saying, "every society has to reinvent broadcasting in its own image, as a means of containing and suppressing because broadcasting can be a very dangerous force, especially to governments that want to control what their citizens hear and see".

With this in mind, it is possible to see the rationale behind the very definite link between broadcasting and the character of the political system operational within a given country. Head and Stirling have, in addition, formulated broad categorizations into which national broadcasting systems fall. These categorizations are vitally important in gauging, in broad terms, the overall characteristics of different broadcasting systems. Head and Stirling [1987:8] argue for the existence of three basic "orientations" - namely the "permissive, the paternalistic and the authoritarian".

#### The Permissive Orientation:

The permissive orientation (the United States is used as an example) implies minimal governmental interference that is not dissimilar to the free-market system that is the mainstay of the United States economy and involves "voting with the dial (with) consumer autonomy, emphasizing what people want rather than what some may think they need". [Head, 1985:59].

This American broadcast media are dominated by private operators reliant upon advertising for funding and are therefore driven by a profit/free-enterprise motive. Unlimited freedom is constrained by the acceptable social norms operational in that society and laws prohibiting the screening of offensive material are upheld by the Supreme Court. The use of public air-waves by broadcasters also demands regulation resulting in all stations requiring a broadcast license from the federal government. The key to the permissive approach in this system, remains the First Amendment to the Constitution which guarantees "the freedom of speech and the press". [Wright, 1975:49 also see 48-57 and Head and Stirling, 1987:8].

### The Paternalistic Orientation:

The paternalistic orientation of the British system, by comparison, suggests that while the popular needs of the population can, and will be catered for, there is a distinct need for "programming of a more cultivated nature". [Head, 1982:5]. In Britain, the BBC have historically undertaken to broadcast a significant proportion of its broadcast hours at a mental level above that of its average listener. Such a policy has been encapsulated in the words of the first Director General of the BBC, Lord John Reith, who stated that "few knew what they wanted (referring to the listeners), fewer what they needed". [Head, 1982:5].

Head quotes Sir Brian Young, former director-general of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) as saying, "it (paternalism) makes services generally available, paid for equally by all consumers; not all programs pay their way; the system is used impartially, exercising some control over what may give offense; it encourages native writers and producers; it prevents domination by either government or advertisers; and it regulates both the amount and the content of advertising". [Head, 1985:59].

In Britain, the public service BBC is financed entirely by license fees as no advertising is carried. The BBC competes with the IBA which itself operates two television networks (ITV and Channel 4) as well as a multitude of local radio stations. The BBC may well provide special interest and minority groups with programming as this is in line with its mission to provide a public service. Comments Halloran and Croll [Wright, 1975:44], "The BBC is a public service institution. Independent Television would claim to be both public service and commercial".

Both these examples of permissive and paternal systems may be seen within the normative categorizations of the Free press or libertarian theory which are hallmarks of democratic nations. [see Chapter Two].

### The Authoritarian Orientation:

Head and Stirling's third category is most important for this study. It is that of the authoritarian orientation. Broadly speaking, both the Soviet Union and newly developing third-world nations fall into this category [see Chapter Two].

Head [1985:59] broadly categorizes all systems authoritarian that have as their fundamental tenet, "still more insulation from both consumer preferences and market forces, with arbitrary government regulation exercised in the name of the people but with little concern for individual preferences that do not coincide with official doctrines". Head [1987:11] also argues that in this orientation, governments "harness the communication services directly to implement their policies". This represents a broad categorization of authoritarianism.

Indeed, the control of the media by respective governments is the key to classification. Whilst authoritarianism pertaining to this thesis is explained in detail in Chapter Two, it is necessary to add that all control systems can be roughly classified under this category. The evidence presented in this thesis indicates a considerable degree of control on the part of the ruling government over the broadcasting services of South Africa. It is therefore from this paradigm that the question of broadcasting in South Africa will be tackled.

However, a detailed analysis may discover permutations of these orientations resulting in the necessity to look for other sets of

classification. An example of this are the disparities in Soviet authoritarianism as opposed to that presented in the Third World.

Head's analysis also fails to differentiate between authoritarianism and that of the more extreme totalitarian example. This category would attempt to control in almost every detail the broadcasting system of its respective nation. An authoritarian regime may leave the door open for certain freedoms in particular those associated with market and economic forces. [see Curtis, 1978:61-72]. A regime may also desire to control totally but may be prevented from doing so if its administration is inconsistent and its finances irregular. This may see a state impose authoritarian controls rather than totalitarian.

Where necessary, attention has been drawn to variations of the authoritarian paradigm in order to clarify national broadcasting orientations as they pertain to national political systems. In Chapter Two, a normative authoritarian model will be proposed as a basis for this study.

#### The Pluralistic and Mixed System Trends:

Head [1987:13] has himself stated that the three orientations outlined "exist nowhere in the world in pure form. Permissive systems impose some regulations, paternalism bows at times to popular demand, and even authoritarianism finds it expedient to conduct audience research to find out what people really want". In Chapters Two and Five, these disparities will be highlighted.

The classificatory difficulties highlight the Pluralistic Trend in Broadcasting [Head and Stirling, 1987:13-15]. Although Head argues

that "relatively few countries have truly pluralistic systems", the characteristics of such a model remains crucial to this thesis.

Pluralism means that coupled with competing broadcasting services that are an established norm, "there is an existence of multiple motives as driving forces with a national system (including) usually the profit motive (commercial component of the system) and the public service motive (non-commercial component)". In particular, "all audiences must be drawn from the same finite population; and, whether large or small, each subaudience captured by one service becomes, momentarily at least, unavailable to other services". [Head, 1985:90-91].

It should also be noted that this system may also be related to the "mixed" system where "two or more entities with contrasting programme motives compete, typically pitting a public service component against a commercial component". [Head, 1985:86], These terms are of vital importance in analyzing the South African broadcasting system.

Within this paradigm, competition is the norm with differing media actors or institutions having differing motives in promoting themselves to a particular audience. Examples of the pluralistic and mixed trends may be found within the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and Australia and their close relationship coupled with the dynamics of South Africa make these terms largely interchangeable.

Head's analysis and categorizations are a vital element of this thesis. They not only identify the relationship between the broadcast media and the respective national political system, they also provide a broad framework from which this study can be approached. The Head analysis forms the backbone of broadcasting classification whilst the

Fagen, Siebert/Schramm and McQuail contributions outlined in Chapter Two crystallizes the analysis further.

As indicated, the national political system tends to dictate broadcasting policy. Indeed, South Africa, with its strong centrality of government and tense political situation finds its broadcast medium of great interest to the power holders within the country and subject to covert and overt forms of control.

### The "Gatekeeper" Concept:

This political culture of a particular country may be exposed by the actions of the mass media and more specifically, the broadcast media. As indicated, government intervention will be at the heart of this thesis when the symbiotic relationship between the South African administration and that of the State-run broadcasting service, the SABC, is discussed.

Characteristic of broadcasting, the mass media in general and specifically applicable to South Africa must be the "Gatekeeper" concept formulated by Austrian psychologist Kurt Lewin. This referred to "individuals or groups of persons who govern the travels of news items in the communication channel". [Bittner, 1977:10].

Bittner expands upon this definition and defines this concept as "any person or formally organized group directly involved in relaying or transferring information from one individual to another through a mass medium". [1977:10]. This theory will be utilized when discussing the controllers of South Africa broadcasting where selected individuals strongly influence the message of the broadcast media.

In terms of the characteristics of broadcasting, Lewin's "Gatekeeper" concept is also useful in highlighting the ability of a gatekeeper to

not only limit information but also expand on otherwise unheard of sets of information. Similarly, "information may be reorganized or reinterpreted to provide a new slant" and it is precisely these characteristics that will influence the discussion surrounding the broadcast medium in South Africa. [see Bittner, 1977:10].

This importance of the "gatekeeper" in regulating the flow of information within a particular society can be further related to the system functions in the Almond and Powell [1980:8-10] model of the political system. Here it is suggested that political communication (and the media through "political socialization") are regarded as an important determinant of "whether or not the system (political) will change or be maintained over time, whether competitive parties and the legislature will be predominant in policy making, or whether they will be replaced by a single authoritarian party or a military council". [1980:10]. The role of the "gatekeeper" is therefore of paramount importance in gauging the extent of control within a particular broadcasting system.

The broadcast medium in South Africa enjoys similar characteristics or attributes to those outlined earlier in this chapter. However, the broadcast medium is largely the area where most of the population (the White sector) receive their political information. Broadcasting, therefore encourages "the political socialization of a people, in helping to shape people's political attitudes, beliefs and behaviour - in short, therefore, a nation's political culture". [Kuhn, 1985:2].

The object of this thesis is one of placing South Africa's broadcasting system in the context of normative theories of the mass media and broadcasting through a detailed assessment of the

characteristics of broadcasting in South Africa. This will be followed by an in depth case study of the South African situation with an analysis of the special features that contribute towards its own dynamic orientation.

The function of this chapter has been to clarify some of the terminology that shall be used as well as highlight the attributes of broadcasting which makes it such a unique and politically sought after institution. After all, throughout the Third World where a coup d'Etat is a means of changing government, one of the first state structures to be captured is the means of mass communication - whether radio or television.

As shall be seen, these generalized attributes or characteristics of broadcasting are as applicable to South Africa, as they are to broadcasting systems the world over. From the Third to the First Worlds, broadcasting systems encounter similar attributes that are dealt with in varying ways depending on the political orientation of their respective leadership. This leadership will define in a given country (and South Africa is no exception) the terms of regulation of the services offered and in detail, the extent and nature of the services in question. It is this dynamic matrix that will be investigated.

**CHAPTER TWO**  
**COMMUNICATION THEORIES**

In order to understand the features of broadcasting in South Africa as a function of the national political system, it will be necessary to look at some generalized theories of mass communications and the press that can be applied to ideologically bound sets of nations or states. This is to be undertaken with the express view of highlighting the theoretical paradigm from which the South African case study will emerge.

The emphasis in this chapter shall be on the role of authority in the domain of the mass media. It is important to understand the essential key elements of the authoritarian communications orientation as it is this paradigm that has been the most influential in determining the characteristics of the South African political dynamic since 1948.

In Chapter One, the characteristics of broadcasting and particularly the potential for control and manipulation of this form of mass media through a 'gatekeeper' was stressed. This is all important in dealing with the South African situation as it is essentially the 'gatekeeper' or 'communicator' that will be analyzed through an empirical study of the South African broadcasting system. Over the past forty years there has been a marked move towards centralized political control. This is a function of the domination of the institutions of power by the National Party which has increasingly taken on the role of 'gatekeeper'.

However, the question to be asked is whether it is possible to classify the South African example into a clearly definable set of characteristics that exemplify centralized control or whether too many contradictions and inconsistencies exist which mitigate against the categorization within one paradigm?

### Harold Lasswell - The Importance of the "WHO":

Cassata and Asante [1979:65-75] clearly explain the four key "components of the communications process" namely, the "source (communicator), message, channel, receiver (audience) and the effect or consequence component". Related to this is the key communication model of Harold D. Lasswell [Schramm and Roberts, 1974:84-99] whose "WHO says WHAT, in which CHANNEL, to WHOM and with what EFFECT" is perhaps the most widely referred to model.

Lasswell's model looks at the WHO representing "communicating organizations - their natures and functions; the WHAT representing the nature of the content of the message whether it be informative, educative or entertaining; the CHANNEL representing print media, audiovisual media or automatic data processing; the WHOM representing the nature and receptivity of the audience and the EFFECT representing the nature of the effect or response of the audience and the ways in which it affects the communicator". [Cassata and Asante, 1979:65].

This model, therefore, reflects a whole process - one that Lasswell himself preferred to view "as a whole in relation to the entire social process". [Lasswell in Schramm and Roberts, 1974:85]. Certainly, it can be stated that if the WHO has a particular goal in mind this will affect what he says, the medium he uses, as well as the selection of a particular audience with upon which he wishes to impact. Whilst within the broadcasting medium it is the characteristics of the WHO that are important, the means and methods utilized bear equal study.

With broadcasting's propensity for centralized control, manipulation and regulation, it is the communicators (the ruling National Party within South Africa) that enjoy power as "the modern instruments of mass communication give an enormous advantage to the controllers of printing plants, broadcasting equipment and other forms of fixed and specialized capital". [Schramm and Roberts, 1974:89].

Lasswell [Schramm and Roberts, 1974:98] lists three distinct social functions of communication and whilst he does not directly relate these to the political development of states, these factors can nevertheless be extended and looked at within the political context. Lasswell explains firstly that there must be a "surveillance of the environment (which) discloses threats and opportunities affecting the value position of the community and the component parts within it".

Lasswell [Schramm and Roberts, 1974:87] sees "diplomats, attaches, and foreign correspondents as being representative of those who specialize in the environment". This function essentially "informs and provides news" detailing essential news and dangers pertaining to everyday lives. [see Severin, 1976:213]. Broadcasting's close relationship with its respective controllers clearly suggests that the 'surveillance of the environment' will be conducted by the regime at hand.

It is also important to note the contribution of Lazarsfeld and Merton who suggest that mass communications can encourage "status conferral" where "news reports about individuals often enhance their prestige. By focusing the power of the mass media upon certain people, society confers upon them a high public status". [Wright, 1975:15].

Within the realm of broadcasting such "status conferral" will depend upon the permissive or authoritarian characteristics of the WHO that defines the benefit from such exposure. Head [1985:101] suggests that within authoritarian societies, "leaders enjoy access limited only by their own appetites for public appearance and can exploit broadcasting to create personality cults, magnifying their images to heroic if not supernatural dimensions".

Lasswell [Schramm and Roberts, 1974:87] secondly states that "there will be a correlation of the components of society in making a response to the environment" which is undertaken by "editors, journalists, and speakers". This essentially refers to the "selection and interpretation of information about the environment" and includes "the editorial and propaganda content of the media". [Severin and Tankard, 1976:213]. Here too, if the editors and journalists of the broadcast medium are either directly appointed by or sympathetic to the state, their orientation will be that of the regime in question.

The third function of communication is most relevant to this study. Lasswell [Schramm and Roberts, 1974:87] states that there is a "transmission of the social heritage from one generation to the next" where those involved in this process are the "educators in family and in school". Here the media "increases social cohesion by widening the base of common experience". [Severin and Tankard, 1976:213].

This can be extended to South Africa where the dominant ideology of the ruling National Party is exercised through the influence of Christian National Education. This has been strongly criticized for providing school children with a world view that represents that of the ruling elite. This may be coupled with the ideology promoted through the broadcast medium which does not contradict that which has

been historically taught in White schools and serves to reinforce the component elements of the educational syllabus.

Schramm [1973:29] succinctly clarifies this point by saying that "in our time, much of the task of surveillance is taken over by the news media; much of the co-ordination by government, political leaders, political reporters and analysts, and pressure groups; and much of the transmission of heritage by the schools". Acknowledging this central role played by government institutions, this factor becomes even more outstanding when "the ruling element is afraid of the internal as well as the external environment" resulting in even further centralized control". [Lasswell in Schramm and Roberts, 1974:99].

Lasswell himself has stated that "in every society, values are shaped and distributed which are the ideology in support of the network as a whole. The ruling elites view one another as potential enemies (with) one ruling element especially alert to the other, and relies upon communication as a means of preserving power". [Severin and Tankard, 1979:214].

It is important to stress that this process through its particular regime, will inevitably affect the world and domestic view of the political environment that is all important in the communications process. A ruling elite that feels threatened and is therefore unstable will take a particular course of action in attempting to maintain its position of control and authority.

The elite's interpretation of the political environment may be such that it acts upon its own irrational or rational fears and perpetuates this through its domination of the mass media and

specifically, the broadcast medium. This can be directly related to the South African case study where the broadcasting institutions created, maintained and supported by the ruling elites (the WHO - the National Party) disseminate a particular message.

In addition to Lasswell's basic model, Charles Wright [1985:20] has added a fourth function of communication; namely that of "entertainment". Wright particularly highlights the "dysfunctional" effects of popular culture and states that the transmission of this "fails to raise public taste to the level that might be achieved by less extensive forms of entertainment such as the theatre, classic books or opera".

#### **Criticisms of the Lasswell Model:**

There exist considerable criticisms of the formal Lasswellian model. Fauconnier [1975:43] sites Westley, Maclean and Gerbner as saying that the Lasswell model "takes insufficient account of the interdependence of, and the interaction among the basic factors he lists".

Marchant [1988:55] argues that the "process of communication is still one-way and although the elements are described, no attempt is made to identify their dynamic relationship". Marchant adds that "the importance of situational variables is ignored (for example in what situation?) as is the intention of the communicator (for example with what purpose?)". Indeed, the intention of the communicator is vitally important and will be articulated according to the political orientation of the WHO.

Lasswell's theory of the "WHOM" in his model has also been adapted according to Martin [Agee, Ault and Emery, 1986:50], in that "no

longer were communication specialists concerned about who says what to whom, since this is immaterial if the 'whom' in the paradigm is unable or unwilling to receive the message. The question that is now asked is, 'Who needs to receive what messages from whom?' and answers dealt with the seeking and avoiding of information rather than the transmission of instruction or urging of opinion change".

However, within South African broadcasting, the WHOM (the White audience) are all largely able to receive the message although not necessarily the content. With the existence of a virtual formal news/public affairs monopoly in broadcasting, there is therefore little chance of avoiding state interpreted information even for those who do not wish to receive it. Whilst some may attempt to avoid or ignore the broadcast message, there remains a potential effect on the political system (positive or negative) that is initiated by the WHO.

The real merit of the Lasswellian model is according to Fauconnier[1975:43] to be found in its "brevity, or to put it more strongly, its degree of concentration". The Lasswell model precipitated the development of further models which often contained reference to the WHO (or the Source or the Communicator) as the starting point from which to proceed. These included the more detailed Gerbner model (1956); Bruce Westley and Malcolm MacLean (1957); Berlo (1960) and that of Melvin De Fleur (1966). Other important models include those of Shannon and Weaver; Riley and Riley and Vora. [see Cassata and Asante, 1979:66-71; Marchant, 1988:55-57 and Fauconnier, 1975:43-49].

### De Fleur - Media as an Elements of the Social System:

De Fleur's contribution fills many of the gaps identified in the Lasswell model. De Fleur [Fauconnier, 1975:108] sees the mass media as "social systems, that is a complex of stable repetitive and patterned action that is in part a manifestation of the culture shared by the actors, and in part a manifestation of the psychological orientations of the actors".

De Fleur [Schramm and Porter, 1982:27] also suggests that the "communication act is the means by which a group's norms are expressed, by means of which social control is exerted, roles are allocated, co-ordination of effort is achieved, expectations are made manifest, and the entire social process is carried on". This indicates the all pervasive nature of the communications process and the essential link between the characteristics of Lasswell's WHO which enables a ruling elite to define the social system as they see fit.

De Fleur [Fauconnier, 1975:109] refers to the "low taste content of the media" which includes dramas and films of a pornographic, violent and suggestive nature which "contribute to a lowering of taste, a disruption of morals or a stimulation of socially unacceptable conduct".

De Fleur has argued that the "mass media were social systems when seen in relation to a specific external system, namely, the totality of the social and cultural components of American society... and contain elements that recur so often that they may be regarded as repetitive phenomena, the function of which is to ensure stability, the balance of the social system". [Fauconnier, 1975:108 also see De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:172-181].

However, it is important to note De Fleur's identification of the "components of the social system" that effect upon the media. These components are structurally linked in relation to one another and have a direct influence on the media orientation. De Fleur's [1982:174] components are:

- (a) Audiences
- (b) Research organizations
- (c) Distributors
- (d) Producers and Their Sponsors
- (e) Advertising Agencies
- (f) Control Subsystems (legislative bodies)

De Fleur [1982:176] also highlights the wider "external" factors which will also influence the media. Here "the general social, political, economic and cultural conditions" remain important.

The influence and function of these component elements, according to De Fleur results in the move towards the broadcast of "low-taste content programming appealing to 'what the audience wants' rather than 'what the audience should have', determining the financial motivation as paramount. [see De Fleur in Fauconnier, 1975:111].

The key issue here is the tolerance by the WHO of these conditions in the influence on the mass media and on broadcasting in particular. It may be assumed that within a permissive broadcasting system, such components have the upper hand. This is clearly shown in De Fleur's explanation of the American model where the function of the low-taste content in the media is "to maintain the financial stability of a deeply institutionalized social system that is tightly integrated with the whole of the American economic institution". [De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:180]. However, within the broadcasting

authoritarian paradigm the centralized control of the State may limit the influences of such participants and result in increasing 'gatekeeping'. Alternatively, the dominant ideology of the State may clash with the profit motivations of the aforesaid components leading to contradictions within the broadcasting system. Anomalies may also emerge as a result of the authorities tolerance of the increasing influence of such component elements as independent from the ruling elites.

With this in mind, there can be little doubt that the values articulated through the promotion of a particular social system will be transported to other countries through the internationalization of the mass media. With American programming dominant, values of free enterprise beliefs, the legitimacy of the profit motive, the virtues of controlled capitalism and the values concerning freedom of speech are carried in such programming. [see De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:178].

These issues are directly relevant to the South African case study where the increasing influence of these component elements on the electronic broadcast media highlight the permutations of the South African model. Again this analysis necessitates a returns to an attempt at classifying national systems from where the influence of variables may contradict with the accepted models.

#### **The Role and Effects of Political Communication:**

Richard Fagen [1966:17] has redefined the Lasswellian model by theorizing that "every act of human communication involves a SOURCE generating a MESSAGE which travels through a CHANNEL to an AUDIENCE". It is precisely these factors that together form part of the

communications process.

Fagen has criticized Lasswell for not clearly differentiating between communication in general and "political communication". Fagen's [1966:20] point of departure is that "communicatory activity is considered political by virtue of the (political) consequences, actual and potential, that it has for the functioning of the political system". The key question to therefore ask is what is the character or nature of the political system? An answer will clarify both the characteristics of political communication and that of the WHO pertaining to their control over broadcasting.

What is important about Fagen's definition is that even if the political consequences are not fulfilled, there remains the initial intention on the part of the communicator to initiate some sort of response whether active or passive indicating the wide parameters of political communication in the broadcast medium. Fagen's definition of political communication touches upon the cornerstone of this discussion; namely the nature of the political system as key to the functioning of the communications process.

Similarly, Fagen [1966:20-21] agrees with Hyman that "the package of manifestly non-political mass communication presented to audiences in the less developed countries nevertheless has important consequences for political change" and goes on to suggest that "by watching even such vulgar fare as the English-language horror, love and adventure films widely circulated in Asia and Africa, the new citizens of these nations come to develop skills and attitudes of political relevance".

Importantly, Fagen [1961:21] goes on to add that "the possible consequences of manifestly nonpolitical artistic communication are well understood by absolutist rulers who strive to control cultural

life lest the tastes and habits of independence and self-expression formed there carry over into political life".

Here again, it is the use of the communication media by the rulers as well as their ideological orientation that is of importance. In the South African case, the question to be asked is whether the rulers and their ideology engage in such activities or do they allow an element of conflicting ideology and the promotion of an alternative social system to be broadcast? [see De Fleur, 1982, 178-181].

Related to broadcasting, this discussion suggests that the controllers of the broadcast media in all countries (communicators) have some strategy in order to influence their populace. If the authorities wish to maintain the political status quo whether it be within the realm of a democracy or dictatorship, they will do so by making sure that their dominant ideological values are those predominant in their broadcast medium.

There are however, important variables that would indicate that some societies may find it particularly difficult to maintain such a rigid ideological orientation and may have to submit to popular demand, financial considerations or simple practicability thus tolerating a degree of alternative views within a society.

The theories of Fagen and De Fleur could explain the use of a strong moral ideology present in American situation comedies where bad language and immoral behavior is expressly shunned. This would seem an indication of a society using one of the most powerful forms of media to maintain certain set norms and values. Head [1985:299] has also affirmed the value of this notion by saying that "even the flimsiest entertainment may convey information and implicit

endorsement of values".

Similarly, the extensive coverage given to sport (particularly in Eastern Europe) may provide an almost hypnotic form of programming providing viewers with an outlet to counter the ideologically isolated position many of these countries adopt. This may also be true for South Africa where the expense undertaken in live sports broadcasts may indicate a desire on the part of the authorities to satisfy in entertainment the needs of a politically dissatisfied population.

This would concur with the views of Lazarsfeld and Merton [Severin and Tankard, 1976:217] who have described the "narcotizing" of the viewer or listener where "the mass media are among the most respectable and efficient of social narcotics, and increasing dosages may be transforming our energies from active participation to passive knowledge".

It is important at this stage to emphasize that one should not overestimate the effects of the mass media on society as this study contains many contradictions. In terms of the aforesaid models which concentrate upon the communicator as provider of information or 'the message', one should be wary of extending too much credit to the manipulators in their success in the effects that they wish to achieve through the media.

In this regard note should be made of McQuail's [1987:252] "three phase" approach to the "history of media effect research and theory". McQuail sees the aforementioned research as going through three distinct phases leading from "all powerful media" (1900-1930) where the media was thought to have extensive influence to the Katz, Lazarsfeld and Klapper pronouncement (1930-1960) of a "minimal" effect

of the media which decreased its importance. The third contemporary phase argues that the media may indeed still have an important effects and "be an instrument for exercising social and political power". [McQuail, 1987:254].

These phases suggest a very definite shifting nature of the study showing much uncertainty regarding the effects of the mass media [see McQuail, 1982:254-255]. For the purposes of this study, it is important not to be too dogmatic surrounding the effects of mass communication. It is not the intention of this particular work to make a judgment on this question (indeed, it would be almost impossible), suffice to highlight the difficulties in drawing a testable conclusion.

It should be noted that with reference to South Africa, the effects of mass communication remain untested. The key element to emphasize is that effort is continually made to influence through the media and in particular through the centrally controlled broadcasting institutions. Whether this has any effect as in the case with influencing voter trends is yet to be measured effectively. All that is possible in the South African case is to empirically study examples of bias and propaganda and hypothesize on their intended and unintended effects.

In accepting Fagen's definition of political communication and subsequent discussion, one can agree with Gabriel Almond [Fagen, 1966:22] that "everything in politics is communication. All of the functions performed in the political system - political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication - are performed by means of communication. Political communication is the way in which

information flows through the society and through the various structures that make up the political system". Almond highlights the mass media (and therefore broadcasting) as an influential component element of the communication structures. [see Almond, 1966:169-170].

This suggests that the broadcast medium particularly within authoritarian societies is constantly emitting a political message due to the usage of semiotics (the science of signs). This relates to public affairs or news type programmes where codes ("highly complex patterns of associations we all learn in a given society and culture") help us to interpret the world around us. Umberto Eco has suggested that "codes and subcodes are applied to the message in the light of a general framework of cultural references, which constitute the receiver's patrimony of knowledge: his ideological, ethical, religious standpoints, his psychological attitudes, his tastes, his value systems, etc.". [see in Boyd-Barrat and Braham, 1987:149].

Furthermore, Berger has classed political ideology as one of the main areas where codes are used for specific purposes. [see Boyd-Barrat and Braham, 1987:150] In the South African case, codes may be used to reinforce the status quo where a regime feels threatened or under pressure. It is not however, the intention of this thesis to delve into this area of study; suffice to emphasize the possible methods employed in political communication.

The key element here and in the South African case study is the political orientation of the regime in question. There would seem little doubt that the more centralized the political system is, the more likely the regime will control the broadcast medium. This study reflects upon the characteristics of broadcasting in South Africa as a function of the nature of the national political system and it is

for this reason that the communicator (the WHO) is all important.

### The Government and the Media:

The relationship between the government and the communications media is of direct relevance to the South African case study. Through this relationship, one can study the normative delineation of communication and test the characteristics of broadcasting against that of the political system with a view to discovering the extent of control within the broadcast medium in South Africa.

Siebert [Schramm, 1949:138-144] suggests that the government has four neutral roles or "activities" within the communications media. Firstly, the government can act as a restrictive agency preventing the spread of "obscenity, libels on persons or of material tending to produce internal disorder". Secondly, it can act in a regulatory capacity that encourages all involved in the broadcasting free market to "act as gentlemen" enabling competition to enjoy a fair hearing and "obeying minimum rules of conduct and do not engage in subterfuge".

The government can thirdly "act as a facilitating agency that encourages and provides information to the public and importantly, funds the communications media". The fourth role of government as exemplified through the example of public broadcasting in the United States, encourages government participation alongside private broadcasting stations for the benefit of providing "additional information and ideas for the public". [Schramm, 1949:138-144]. It may be said that these roles of government are ideal and largely regulatory and should rather be seen as a model for government intervention in the media.

Such a scenario makes a comparison and analysis of the characteristics of respective governments necessary. Wilbur Schramm [1973:152-153] succinctly explains the differing values and perceptions perceived on this issue by explaining that "it is evident that different societies are defining freedom differently. The United States is concerned with political freedom from the hand of government. The Soviet Union is concerned from certain economic and social class controls, and freedom within a set body of doctrine".

The key issue, as Schramm [1973:152] mentions, is that of "control" where "every nation promises its people freedom of expression, yet each one controls its mass media to a greater or lesser extent as, it controls all its social institutions". This will affect the neutral posits outlined by Siebert and turn them into subjective tenets in which the ruling elites appropriate the broadcast media for their own ends.

The nature of "control" necessitates an analysis of the characteristics of the Laswellian "WHO" to gauge the differing national systems pertaining to broadcasting. Rogers [1986:100] cites Czitrom as saying that "mass communication in the decades since Lasswell's sentence (model) has largely ignored the "who", that is the investigation of which individuals and institutions own and control the mass media". It is precisely this aspect of communications study that is relevant to the discussion of a national broadcasting system in South Africa.

#### **The National Political System:**

With the political communications system and flow dictated to by the source (WHO), it is important to view the role of the dominant

rulers in defining the characteristics of the national political system. Fagen's [1966:23-24] examination of "the comparative study of national political systems" is vitally relevant to this discussion as "organizing communications and political life" take place within the paradigm of a national political system.

Fagen [1966] has extensively investigated the "WHO" behind communications policy. Once the "WHO" has been defined through understanding HOW the WHO gets to be the WHO, one is able to differentiate the actions of different WHO's in formulation of policy. Furthermore, by reformulating the Laswellian question to read "Who should be able to say what, in which channels, to whom, for what purposes?", Fagen calls for an explanation of the national political system which will answer the above question. Fagen asks six key questions which defines the characteristics of the four main classification paradigms - namely Classical Democracy, Compromise Democracy, Autocracy and Totalitarianism.

The six questions to establish a working model formulated by Fagen are:

1. How are the Leaders Chosen and Changed?
2. Who Defines Political Problems and Alternatives?
3. Who Participates in Making Public Policy?
4. What is the Scope of Allowable Criticism?
5. How do Citizens Become Informed about the Politically Relevant World?
6. Who May Choose to Isolate Himself from Politics?

[Fagen, 1966:24].

The analysis of these six questions is vital to the understanding of the concept of a controlled mass media within the permutations of

Fagen's categorizations, namely - Autocracy and Totalitarianism as opposed to Classical and Compromise Democracy. It shall be necessary to look at the answers to the above questions in some detail to provide a foundation upon which to categorize broadcasting within South Africa.

Essentially, within an autocracy, the leadership or the WHO is appointed "without the masses being brought into the process of choice in any standardized way". This may be done through "coup, assassination or forced retirement" and is an irregular occurrence largely "precipitated by death, schism, or other unscheduled events". [Fagen, 1966:28-29]. Similarly, the totalitarian choice of leadership is "perpetuated without reference either to the wishes of the citizenry or to a prearranged schedule of replacement in office". [Fagen, 1966:31]. In essence this contrasts with "free and periodic elections" that characterize both Fagen's compromise and classical democracy.

Needless to say, the characteristics of those chosen to control indicates "who defines the political problems and alternatives". Within the authoritarian model it is the task of the elite and is that of the ruling party in the totalitarian system. Fagen suggests that within the compromise democracy, groups acting in unison can have some influence in this area whereas within the classical democracy, every citizen may participate.

The answer to Fagen's third question in the controlled paradigms falls again within the ambit of the appointed elite or bureaucratic officials who will rarely submit to formal public participation. Within a classical democracy, issues can be regularly voted upon in a "one man one vote" election or referendum and the compromise

democracy would indicate that again it is groups that have some power to influence authority.

The scope for criticism varies in the paradigms before us. Within the autocracy, there is little room for critical remarks with the ultimate sanction being physical punishment and fear. In a totalitarian society the available scope is virtually non-existent but within the democracy categories a wide degree of criticism is tolerated. The compromise variation, relying as it does upon group effectiveness in challenging authority, utilizes the press as "a fourth branch of government" and a "watchdog" which by implication, according to Fagen enables "the media to be as well insulated from government as possible". [Fagen, 1966:28].

Information within the classical democracy is found through the interaction of the citizen and his environment. Within the "complex" compromise category, information should be made available to those who seek it by the government but, to a greater extent is provided by the mass media. The controlled categories differ importantly. Within the autocracy it is the government's role to provide what it deems necessary with the mass media controlled through censorship and restriction ensuring subordination and compliance.

The totalitarian model indicates a willingness on the part of the authorities to provide every citizen with as many details regarding their predetermined role in society as possible. The media in these models are tightly controlled to provide the necessary information or lack thereof in the pursuit of their ultimate ideologies. The citizen is indoctrinated to believe and inculcate the state ideology with little or no alternative source of information.

The answer to Fagen's final question indicates that within the classical democracy, the society is tailored to the individual needs of the citizens where they are expected to participate to their fullest extent but do not suffer any sanction upon withdrawal. The compromise variation allows unquestioned opting out whereas within the autocracy, the citizen is not expected to become actively involved on a challenging basis in the first place and therefore will be left to do as he pleases "as long as he causes no trouble for the regime". [Fagen, 1966:30].

What then is the link that Fagen provides between these categorizations and the discussion relating to authoritarianism within the broadcast media? Important in Fagen's approach is his explanation of the source of the flow of communications that can vary from society to society. The WHO in the society - namely the answer to Fagen's first question sets the scene for the development of various national characteristics in the information flow process. As can be seen, the WHO is most dominant in the autocratic and totalitarian models outlined.

Fagen's importance is in highlighting the permutations between democratic and non-democratic systems and in presenting an uncomplicated and clearly defined structure of four models. However, these models can only be rough guidelines for classifying such systems as considerable overlapping exists.

For the purposes of this argument we must see authoritarianism as a category where regimes are categorized by "repression, intolerance, encroachment on the private rights and freedoms of citizens and limited autonomy for nonstatist interest groups. It is the predominance of certain types of political institutions and

procedures and the distinctive behavior of their rulers that distinguishes authoritarian from democratic regimes". [Perlmutter, 1981:8].

Within the spectrum of political authoritarianism as related to communication, Fagen [1966:66-67] sees the vital factor as "implying some limiting of the scope of communication (where) there are always channels, both horizontal and vertical, which are purposely closed to certain groups, individuals, and types of content".

These categorizations of Fagen have been added to by many authors. McQuail [1987] analyses the control theories under the headings of "Authoritarianism" and "Soviet Media Theory" whilst the democracies are termed the "Free Press Theory". The emergence of newly developing countries particularly post-colonial in the third-world has seen the emergence of the Social Responsibility Theory which attempts to "reconcile independence with obligation to society". [see McQuail, 1987:116).

Further theories outlined by McQuail include the new "Democratic-participant" theory [1987:121-122] and the "Development" [1987: 119-121] media theory which has arisen out of the "varying inapplicability" of the older more established theories thus indicating a need to combine the tenets of these theories to explain diversity, contradictions and inconsistencies that may exist in a dynamic political sphere. This should be noted with reference to the South African discussion later in this chapter.

### **The Authoritarian Media Theory:**

Having spoken about the communicator as an all-important figure in determining the characteristics of the communications and therefore

the broadcasting system, it is necessary to spell out the authoritarian concept of the media and relate it to the other political genres of media culture. In terms of the case study relating to South Africa, it is necessary to highlight the given characteristics or tenets of media authoritarianism in order to find an acceptable model pertaining to broadcasting in South Africa.

Siebert, in his classic contribution to "Four Theories of the Press" [Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1963:9-37] has stated that the authoritarian model is one that has been followed, and is still followed in many societies, "even where it has been abandoned (as) it continues to influence the practices of a number of governments which theoretically adhere to libertarian principles". [1963:9]. According to Siebert, this concept has "determined the mass communication pattern for more people over a longer time than any other theory of press control". [1963:10].

Siebert [1963:10] sees this model as one "under which the press, as an institution, is controlled in its functions and operation by organized society through another institution, government" which again emphasizes the importance of the WHO in defining the respective models.

Both Siebert [1963] and Schramm [1973] have quoted Plato on authoritarian theory. Schramm [1973:153] refers to Plato's basic tenet that "the state was only considered safe under the guidance of wise men". Siebert [1963:12] says that "Plato conceived the ideal society as one in which the state established and enforced the unity of political and cultural goals (which meant) rigorous control of opinion and discussion". Siebert goes further to state that "Plato wanted to 'co-ordinate' the life of the citizens under a strict

cultural code that banned all modes of art and even of opinion not in accord with his own gospel". This can be seen as a basis in the formation of authoritarian theory as it is the WHO - namely the STATE that acts to control.

Siebert [1963:13] also talks about the Hobbes view that "the power to check the individual in the interest of all was essential". Siebert claims that the ideas of Hobbes has been instrumental in the implementation of authoritarian theory in many societies.

Indeed, the Hobbes contribution can be seen as a very persuasive justification for the execution of the authoritarian model. To repeat, the state is seen as the crucial element within the organization of human-kind where according to Hegel "freedom meant freedom of the individual to know that he is not free but that his actions are determined by history, by society and above all by the Absolute Idea which finds its highest manifestation in the state". [Siebert, 1963:14].

The views of Hegel, Hobbes and Plato all set the scene for the characteristics of authoritarianism to emerge within modern society. The ascent of Fascist authoritarianism in Italy and Germany in the 1930's saw the State again playing the pivotal role. The definition of the state in terms of the ideological precepts and designs of the human rulers at the helm (the WHO) dictated the characteristics of the truth that was to be propagated to the masses in the mass media.

Having looked broadly at the philosophy behind authoritarian society and media's role therein, it is necessary to look in greater depth at the controlled operation of the media within such systems. Siebert [1963:18] suggests that it is the WHO that have defined

within their own logic, the effect they wish to achieve in "the accomplishment of predetermined objectives". The essential idea is that the state would control any condition that hampered the "the attainment of national ends" and would aggressively appropriate the media for achieving its ends. [1963:18-19].

McQuail [1987:112] suggests that authoritarian theory "offers a justification for submitting the media to those who hold power in society, whether legitimately or not". Succinctly put, Hachten [1987:16] states that "the basic principle of authoritarianism is quite simple: the press is always subject to the direct or implied control of the state or sovereign".

Authoritarian theory is also related in some ways to other theories of the press. Whilst it is not the object of this thesis to cover all the available permutations of world press theory, it should be noted that classic authoritarianism should not be confused with the Soviet Theory of the press.

Whilst centralized control makes this theory the closest alternative to authoritarianism, the Soviet system encourages the media to be used in "agitation for the accomplishment of a world revolution" and retains a perfect monopoly over the media. This, most importantly, conflicts with a certain amount of privatisation of the media within other authoritarian countries where the press can theoretically remain outside of government [Siebert, 1965:27-29 also see Cassata & Asante, 1979:78].

Schramm [1963:140] states that "in authoritarian systems outside the Soviet countries, the media are typically part of the business system, and, to that extent, less exclusively an instrument of the government. The older authoritarian media were in bondage to the

state, whereas the Soviet media are in and of the state". Schramm [1963:139-144] further suggests that in typical authoritarian countries, the press is restricted negatively to retain the status quo whilst within the Soviet model, it is given a positive role to pursue change.

Finally, Schramm [1963:141] states that "the Soviet mass communications are integrated into the total communication system and into the total government, in a way that authoritarian systems never were. The Soviet system is a planned system; the older ones, controlled systems". It should also be noted that the Soviet and authoritarian models exclude as far as possible the infiltration of foreign news/political media.

In terms of the discussion relating to broadcasting, it must be clearly stated that the characteristics of the USSR broadcasting system must make it authoritarian along with other totalitarian, dictatorship or third-world regimes. Schramm [1963:139] has stated that "from our point of view, at least, the Soviet system is an authoritarian one - indeed, one of the most closely controlled systems in history". Hachten [1983:63] states that the Soviet/Communist model should be seen as a "variation of traditional authoritarianism" precisely because of its strong centralized control characteristic.

Siebert [1963:29] fairly obviously states that the theory furthest from authoritarianism is that of the Libertarian model. A similarity does exist with the newly developed Social Responsibility theory of the press. Here, "both agree that the press should not be permitted to degrade the culture of a nation, and both postulate that when definite goals for society are determined (by different methods,

however), the mass media should not be permitted to interfere irresponsibly with the accomplishment of these objectives".

The key difference between the aforementioned theories highlights one of the fundamental concepts of authoritarianism. Within this theory, it is argued that the press does not have a responsibility in deciding the designs of the state which necessarily means that it is the authorities' duty themselves, and not that of the press, to accomplish this. Social Responsibility on the other hand, does advocate that the press must continue to inform the public to the best of its ability as it is still "the public who make the ultimate decisions". [Siebert, 1963:29].

Siebert [1963:35] also relates modern day authoritarianism to the control of the broadcast media. He suggests that two factors that dictate state media policy. Firstly, "the general principles of authoritarianism provide a solid basis for regulation. Radio and television must further the interests of government and must help to advance the cultural and political objectives of the central authority". The second factor, according to Siebert, is the need for governmental or central intervention in the allocation of electromagnetic waves "of which the supply was limited and were the property of the state" thus obliging the state to manage".

In relation to broadcasting, Siebert [1963:53] continues to add that a key characteristic of an authoritarian state is a state monopoly of broadcasting where "the operation and programming of both radio and television rest with an official government agency which is responsible for carrying out government objectives".

Further control of the air-waves is also necessary as broadcasting is not determined by national boundaries and there remains a potential on the part of authoritarian nations to regulate and control by either "jamming" incoming broadcasts or regulating the possession of receiver equipment". [see Siebert, 1963:36].

McQuail [1987:111] sees the authoritarian theory of the press as one where "the press is subordinated to state power and the interests of a ruling class". He states that this theory "can also refer to a much larger set of contemporary press arrangements, ranging from those in which support or neutrality is expected from the press in respect of government and state, to those in which the press is deliberately and directly used as a vehicle for repressive state power". Here one can see the vast range of national systems that could contain a range of weak to strong authoritarian characteristics within their communications or media systems.

These comments should be read with the six main principles of the authoritarian theory of the press as outlined by McQuail [1987:112].

They are:

1. Media should do nothing which could undermine established authority or disturb order.
2. Media should always (or ultimately) be subordinate to established authority.
3. Media should avoid offense to majority, or dominant, moral and political values.
4. Censorship can be justified to enforce these principles.
5. Unacceptable attacks on authority, deviations from official policy or offenses against moral codes should be criminal offenses.
6. Journalists or other media professionals have no independence within their media organization.

From these tenets it is apparent that the "established authority" of the state is of paramount importance; but that it is ultimately the respective rulers that define the subjective parameters of the state that must be upheld without fail. There exists a distinct effort on the part of the authorities to stem criticism of their regime resulting in close control over the broadcast media.

Hachten [1987:63] states that whilst the press usually operates outside the ambit of the government, "under the Authoritarian concept, there is always the constraint of potential censorship, if not actual prior restraint itself. Editors and reporters never know for sure just how far they can go without triggering official disfavor and intervention. They must maintain the status quo and not advocate change or alternate leadership".

#### Problems with the Classificatory Approach:

As shown, the broadcast media lends itself to some form of governmental interference. Even within so-called "Libertarian" societies there exists governmental control of the airwaves and as Siebert [1963:65] suggests in relation to radio, "obviously not everyone could establish a radio broadcasting station without producing complete chaos on the air-waves. Regulation was necessary if only for the allocation of frequencies".

Any tendency to regulate must have an inhibiting effect on the services provided as it is the WHO who remains sole arbiter. This brings the broadcast media under governmental influence in some of the recognized libertarian societies like France (RTF), West Germany (ARD & ZDF) and Australia (ABC) although there is now a movement towards privatisation resulting in these "public" services

encountering new threats to their continued viable existence. [see Raymond Kuhn, 1985:1-14].

Siebert [1963:67] himself questions libertarian influences on broadcasting by citing examples of democratic governments subsidizing broadcasting institutions directly. This is done primarily because of the tremendous financial outlay that is needed to finance these media forms. Siebert therefore asks the crucial question, "How can a medium dependent on state funds remain immune to government influence?".

McQuail [1987:112] has also raised the important issue of clarifying exactly where authoritarian characteristics are to be found. He states that it is fairly obvious to determine authoritarian elements within repressive or dictatorial societies. However, McQuail states that "it would be a mistake to ignore the existence of authoritarian tendencies in relation to the media in societies that are not generally or openly totalitarian". He adds that there are instances in all societies where media freedom may need to be curbed such as in cases of "terrorist insurgency or threat of war". [1987:112]. This again highlights the adaptability of authoritarian techniques to many differing situations for a multitude of reasons.

These deviations become a crucially important issue in an attempt at judging the viability of such national classifications. Kraus and Davis [1980:113] suggest that the categorizations discussed earlier are "inadequate for several reasons". They feel that these categories "assume that it is possible to anticipate the social consequences of the transmission of any form of information (and) unless totalitarian or authoritarian governments can anticipate all such consequences, it is not possible for them to plan and to administer

communication systems effectively". To prove their point these authors quote a study of the Soviet communications system undertaken by Markham which "indicates that it is hardly as efficient in mobilizing citizen support as was implied by early theorists". [1980:113].

Kraus and Davis [1980:114] argue further that most mass communication systems are increasingly controlled by a "centralized media bureaucracy" because of the expansion of new technology resulting in excessive financial outlay requiring specialized operators. This "severely limits access to the media by non-professionals" which would in even "traditionally libertarian or social responsibility systems be viewed as threatening to the efficient operation of the media bureaucracies".

This argument suggests that within the idealistic and theoretically pure definitions of Fagen, Schramm, Siebert and McQuail, centralization of control is evident even in libertarian categories resulting in some similarities with authoritarian societies. Where controls already exist "centralization of facilities and professionalization of personnel can increase the ability of government to monitor and control the media system". [Kraus and Davies, 1980:114].

Kraus and Davis [1980:114] suggest that a pure libertarian communications system currently does not exist. They cite the libertarian example of the United States where "the Radio Act of 1934, which instituted the Federal Communications Commission, established the government's right to ensure that the broadcast media are operated in the public interest" and that "codes of ethics adopted by American journalists recognize the 'social responsibility'

of the press".

Altschull [1984:108] believes that in terms of Schramm's labeling the Soviet press as an 'instrument' and the American press as a 'service', Schramm is "minimizing the similarities between the two systems and exaggerating the differences". He finds a broad spectrum of common ground when he says, "In truth, the media of both the Soviet Union and the United States are instruments, supporting the interests of those who publish them. It is equally true that in both countries the media represent a service to those who read newspapers and magazines and tune into radio and television". [1984:108]. Indeed, Altschull highlights considerable cross-cutting journalistic similarities which occur in the media emphasizing the difficulty of dogmatically adhering to normative categorizations. [see McQuail, 1987:123-124].

In dealing with the question of authoritarianism, it is important to remember the McQuail provisos as mentioned earlier. Fagen too [1966:33], argues that "typologies such as this (his four major categorizations) prove to be of limited usefulness when fine distinctions between real systems must be drawn" and is indeed true within the authoritarian paradigm.

It is important to take note of the criticism of the labeling process of Schramm, Siebert and Peterson. However, as has been noted earlier in this chapter, no attempt has been made to dogmatically declare that these theories are perfect or absolutely consistent. Indeed, as has been acknowledged, considerable overlapping occurs between the theories as even Siebert [1963:67] will concede.

What is essentially forgotten in the aforementioned criticisms is the basic thesis of Schramm, Siebert and Peterson [1963:2] outlined

in the introduction to their volume. They state, "The thesis of this volume is that the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates".

Here the political structures themselves cannot follow their normative description perfectly due to internal dynamics due to the elements of political development that cause considerable societal dynamics.[see Fagen, 1966:119-135]. The WHO defines the "political rules of the game" [Fagen, 1966:66] which in turn, affects political communication and the broadcast media.

Indeed, the justification for any system by the WHO of the model will be biased in favor of himself at the expense of any alternatives. It is also true that the bias of the WHO will tend to cloud his perception and understanding of not only his alternatives; but of his very own system.

The WHO in a society may regard their system as the only available option and may perceive the alternatives as 'too ghastly to contemplate'. Similarly, an alternative WHO operating from a different political paradigm and therefore a differing media system will take a contrary view. It may be obvious to highlight these aspects of the study; but the need to understand different perspectives of application of a political and communications system where more than one WHO or actor may be right in terms of his definition remains an important addendum to the aforesaid arguments.

There can be no harm in attempting to categorize theories of the press through respective national political systems especially since one is analyzing basic political philosophy as a departure point for separating the function of the press in particular societies. It is

however, vitally important to acknowledge the imperfections that this analysis highlights but at the same time attempt to resolve these imperfections.

These imperfections may be explained in part by Kraus and Davis [1980:114]. They state, "Recently, economic theorists have noted a convergence of communist, socialist and capitalist economic systems. Not surprisingly, this convergence can be found to extend to communication systems, particularly if only the technological features of these systems are compared. We are faced with the problem of understanding media systems which appear to be developing in accord with the evolution of the technologies that underlie them. This is a problem faced by those who seek to understand communication systems, no matter what the historical or ideological origins of those systems. We are repelled by and yet resigned to the thought of our technology 'running wild', propelling us into an uncertain future such as that envisioned by Orwell for 1984".

Kraus and Davis [1980:114] highlight two other important points. The "convergence of communist, socialist and capitalist economic systems" by implication necessitates a mixed economy and results in the infusion of a multitude of philosophies under one national political system thus reflecting upon the communications system. This means that the clearly identified parameters of Siebert/Schramm (originally published in 1956) must be adapted to take into account subsequent global changes of decolonization, the emergence of new nation-states and the ongoing transformation of political control within many third-world countries.

Similarly, the reaction to expanding technology and resulting new forms of media and media penetration by the four groups of theories

in Siebert/Schramm is also admittedly limited due to the date of completion of their work. [Kraus and Davies, 1986:114].

However, in defence of Siebert/Schramm it must be noted that their basic philosophy of the four theories remains useful. Their work should be seen as a basis for modern day classification and categorization. These categories should be regarded as starting points for further investigation into particular national communication systems rather than being an end goal.

It is necessary to build upon the basic characteristics as outlined by Siebert/Schramm to include new variations (as McQuail has done) in attempting to understand a particular national broadcasting system where it coincides or differs with the existing models. However, even these permutations of models may be insufficient in attempting a classificatory exercise. The models themselves may be flawed as soon as they are confronted with empirical reality suggesting that an integrative approach utilizing many tenets from differing models may be the most useful method to such an analysis.

#### **Theoretical Paradigms and the South African Case Study:**

These criticisms are of paramount importance in defining a model that relates to the politics of broadcasting in South Africa. Extensive emphasis has already been placed on the inconsistencies that do exist when trying to define models within national political systems. It is therefore important to highlight that national broadcasting systems may exhibit a definite mix of characteristic elements of the authoritarian as well as of other systems.

Fagen [1966] and McQuail [1987] are useful in providing the key issues with which to work. Whilst Fagen's six questions are dealt

with in Chapter Five, McQuail provides a clear assessment of the normative authoritarian theory which should be applied to South Africa.

The South African model contains a diverse variety of component elements. This is largely due to the existence of alternative media cultures and structures. It is vitally important to acknowledge that whilst the state run and supportive broadcasting network may well dominate the broadcast media within South Africa, strong elements of the press (print media) are highly critical and are often supportive of policies and initiatives of political organizations such as the banned African National Congress (ANC).

Therefore, contrary to the authoritarian orientation, the media (specifically the print media) may well engage in activities that may "undermine the established authority" [McQuail, 1987:112] of the ruling National Party (the WHO in Lasswell's model). This occurs in spite of considerable press restrictions which are further enhanced during times of a State of Emergency.

Whilst restrictions placed on the media may well be authoritarian in nature, the print media's operations would indicate continued opposition to the ruling elite thus flouting authoritarian theory. This could classify South Africa as working towards Apter and Rosberg's "consociational" paradigm indicating a certain degree of political competitiveness within the body politic. [see Fagen, 1966:66].

This characteristic indicates a contradictory situation. Whilst the ruling elite have often accused the press of undermining the established authority, the State controlled electronic broadcast media (the SABC) largely reflects the thinking of the ruling elite

and is indeed politically subordinate to it.

Historically, the control over the broadcasting media has seen this sector of the media clearly comply with the "dominant, moral and political values" [McQuail, 1987:112] albeit amidst controversy and some inconsistency dependent upon the prevailing political and ideological orientation of the ruling elite at the time.

The State enjoys considerable centralized control of broadcasting and almost unlimited access to it. The broadcasting service of the SABC retains a tight control over the available criticism of the authorities through news reporting that clearly favours the ruling National Party. This is enhanced by the monopoly granted to the SABC in respect of formal television news. The apparent control of broadcasting has increased since the National Party victory in 1948 although prior to this, the United Party also used the broadcasting media (radio) to further their own ends. These controls can be equated with the tenets of the authoritarian model.

However, it is apparent that not all criticism is stifled although this is limited to that approved by the broadcasting gatekeepers. Here too, the tolerance level of criticism is unpredictable and the threat of sanction through the disruption of career prospects is constantly prevalent.

It should also be noted that although such controls remain, recent additions to South Africa's broadcasting culture has been the emergence of 'independent' broadcasters utilizing both the radio and television mediums. This allows for considerable competition and an increase in De Fleur's "Low-taste content" programming in order to satisfy as broad an audience as possible as this programming "sells

big" financially and in viewership. [De Fleur and Rokeach, 1982:178-179].

These factors are further complicated by the existence of financial rewards which when submitted to through high advertising revenue from popular programmes, conflict with the dominant ideology of the ruling elite. These variables must be related to the De Fleur [1982:173-176] social system components that clearly affect the media orientation.

The ascendancy of the profit motive allows De Fleur's component elements to increasingly influence broadcasting as advertisers, producers, distributors and audiences become paramount. The toleration on the part of the WHO to this scenario may also indicate a genuine liberalization albeit for mixed (profit and political policy) motivations.

This may result in the broadcast of alternative political orientations (albeit within the confines of a multitude of regulations) to appear thus heavily contradicting with the aforementioned authoritarian theory which subordinates the medium to the dominant elite.

This also enables programming representing alternative social systems [see De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:172-176] to be shown. Such programming (predominantly American) may well conflict with the dominant ideology of the WHO representing a break from the historical subordination of the media within the authoritarian model.

It is fairly clear within the authoritarian model that journalists themselves have little or no independence within their media institution. However, the South African model suggests that some freedoms would occur as long as they do not conflict in any

substantial way with the dominant ideology. In this respect, broadcasting in South Africa may rather follow the Development Media and Social Responsibility Theory which suggests that "journalists and other media workers have responsibilities as well as freedoms in their information-gathering and dissemination tasks". [McQuail, 1987:121].

Here, journalists are bound by their responsibility not to promote the aims or policies of banned organizations yet are increasingly free to discuss issues without advancing the particular views of any political party or movement other than the ruling National Party. The South African authorities have historically argued that such responsibilities are justified in maintaining law and order, preventing perceived undemocratic Black majority rule and preventing a Communist take-over or "Total Onslaught". Nevertheless, the existence of broadcasting competition has enabled journalists to broaden their scale of reporting and tackle issues that have been historically taboo.

It may also be argued that the broadcast media also carries out the development media tenet that "accepts and carries out positive development tasks in line with nationally established policy". [McQuail, 1987:121]. Within the South African context, the "positive" and "policy" principles are clearly subjectively defined by the ruling National Party who, through their right of intervention, are able to use the media to support particular socio-political initiatives whether they be reform or repression oriented.

Similarly, so, the SABC may be seen as historically "giving priority in their content to the national culture and language". [McQuail, 1987:121]. Again this refers to the National Party's definite

ideological bias in favor of Apartheid and its derivative forms. Indeed, the Mission of the SABC states that (a) "the SABC operates a quality broadcasting service which takes into account the wishes and needs of the various language and cultural groups in South Africa in order to inform, educate and entertain them constructively" and (b) "disseminates a positive message about South Africa and its peoples". [SABC Annual Report, 1988:1].

This conflation of systems is born out by McQuail [1987:109] He states that his analysis is one of "a set (or sets) of more general principles that can be used to classify different national cases (whilst) each national society is likely to have a detailed or distinctive version of normative theory". McQuail sees this as "ideas of how media ought to or are expected to operate".

In a similar vein, McQuail states that "it should be emphasized that virtually no actual media system is governed by any one 'pure' theory of the press, nor does practice always follow what seems the appropriate theory very closely. Most systems reflect the working of different (even inconsistent) elements from different theories". [1987:110]. This point is vitally important when attempting to analyze South Africa's adaptation to a particular paradigm or classification.

Again it is important to stress that the South African case study needs to be analyzed in terms of Head and Stirling's [1987:8-15] broad categorizations of "permissive, paternalistic, authoritarian or pluralistic (mixed) theory". [see Chapter One]. However, whilst the authoritarian categorizations discussed in this chapter clearly correspond with Head, Head's pluralistic and mixed models which contain a mix of public and private ownership should be emphasized

when looking at South Africa due to the emerging diversity of broadcast media ownership recently established.

From this discussion, it is therefore evident that the definite characteristics put forward by the theorists mentioned are but guidelines in defining key elements of national broadcasting systems. Within the South African broadcasting system, it can be seen that the inconsistencies that occur leads to a conflation of the theoretical paradigms which could see the broadcasting system as moving from the historically defined authoritarian realm [see Chapter Three] to an increasingly liberalistic model involving some developmental tendencies mitigated by an overriding minority ideology. Fagen [1966:67] has argued that "the mix of channel 'openness' and 'closedness' in any real system is so complex that it is difficult to characterize in unilinear fashion". Indeed, this would highlight the South African broadcasting system example.

The South African example would suggest that whilst the centralized authoritarian control remains powerful, it is increasingly being influenced by emerging component elements of the social system as outlined by De Fleur [1987:173-176]. The WHO continues to define and set the media agenda but is increasingly faced with internal and external factors that diminish his importance. The mixture of models operating within South Africa indicates a distinct move away from the normative authoritarian model.

An argument may be presented that would allow such a pluralistic model to develop within the parameters set by the State and ultimately controlled by the State. This may be seen as merely a perpetuation of authoritarianism under a liberalistic guise and may be articulated by Postman who would suggest that television is used

to "distract, delude, amuse and insulate us from society". [Marchant, 1988:49].

However, this thesis reveals the move from gross authoritarianism as outlined theoretically within this chapter to a more pluralistic approach where the power of the state is genuinely diminishing in line with the contradictions presented to the aforementioned McQuail tenets.

Having gained a theoretical knowledge of the functions of the media and authoritarian press theory as applicable to communication systems, it shall now be necessary to apply this knowledge in more detail to the case study of South Africa. The historical legacy of authoritarianism will be clearly detailed in Chapter Three with a view to later assessing possible variations upon this paradigm which may move broadcasting to a more pluralistic and therefore liberal orientation.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THE HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1920-1976**

Broadcasting in South Africa has developed over a number of clearly defined stages. With the development and utilization of new technology it was soon realized that broadcasting would be of great value to those who were able to control and harness its power.

This chapter outlines the historical development of broadcasting in South Africa. This is discernible from four clearly defined periods that move broadcasting from its primitive origins to being used by the ruling National Party as an adjunct to their policies. This chapter highlights the creeping control and eventual domination of gross authoritarian characteristics of the broadcast radio medium. The analysis of this historical legacy clearly shows considerable authoritarian influences from which the contemporary era should be discussed.

Politically, South Africa has seen the racial legacy of the past transposed into the governmental actions of the twentieth century. Broadcasting was used by Jan Smuts during the Second World War and was later to be a battle ground in the National Party's bid to secure control over South Africa and extend its authoritarian influence over the institutions of the State.

The development of broadcasting should be seen within the historical legacy of South Africa and in particular, the development of the Afrikaner as a cohesive political force. The Great Trek was the culmination of conflict with the British missionaries at the Cape and led to "the self image of the Boers as a chosen people like the ancient Israelites - with England in the role of the Pharaoh, the highveld as the promised land, and the Africans as the Canaanites". [Fredericksen, 1981:173]. Orlik [1978:55] refers to this set of historical events as the emergence of "the intense racial-ethnic

struggle which had begun between the descendants of the Dutch - the Boers or Afrikaners - and the English settlers".

The conflict with the British culminated in the Anglo-Boer War which served to "sharpen Afrikaner/English polarities and stimulated a national consciousness among the Afrikaners" [Giliomee and Adam, 1979:83]. This was further enhanced by the rapid industrialization after the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly and gold on the Witwatersrand which apart from seeing an "elaboration of the racial order and the development of the state racial apparatus" [Greenberg, 1980:392] also saw the subsequent control and exploitation thereof by largely English speaking interests coupled with a considerable demographic shift of poor Afrikaners to the cities.

Broadcasting developed within this unique historical context. Radio broadcasting had begun in the early decades of the twentieth century with invention spurred on by the needs for expanding communications as a vital necessity in the First World War. Radio communications were beginning to augment and in some cases replace traditional modes of communication like the press and the written word (postage) as an effective means of communication. It should also be noted that the infant motion picture also played a role in early forms of mass communication.

In particular though, broadcasting developed due to "the emergence of social conditions favourable to the development of mass communications, leading to the habit media consumption." [Head and Stirling, 1987:39]. This included increases in audience sizes through urbanization and the resultant growth of cities as well as the availability of electricity and other scientific inventions.

Another important factor was the increase in business activity as a function of industrialization which resulted in greater wealth accumulation and the ability of growing sectors of the public to purchase consumer goods. There can be little doubt that these features and those presented in Chapter One meant that the need to convey information and advertise through broadcasting encouraged its development. [see Head and Stirling. 1987:39].

### **3.1 FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF BROADCASTING TO NATIONALIST CONTROL - 1924 - 1948:**

#### **The Emergence of the African Broadcasting Corporation:**

The dominance of the English speaking sector of the population was already apparent in early reports surrounding broadcasting in South Africa. Whilst it was initially amateurs who were the operators of radio in South Africa, it was the Johannesburg based Associated Scientific Technical Societies, who first applied for a license and then launched the first professional broadcasting company in South Africa known as "JB Calling" on July 01, 1924. [Indaba, August 1986:8]. This was closely followed by stations in both Cape Town and in Durban.

Programme content was innocuous with live broadcasts comprising "a couple of announcers, an engineer and a station orchestra" [Indaba, August 1986:8]. All three services also carried advertisements. However, the success of these three pioneering stations was short lived.

This was largely due to license piracy which resulted from legislation being "inadequate in enforcing the payment of listeners

social and political control resulting in his requests being turned down.

Schlesinger ran into further difficulties with the existing low power transmitters which operated the original radio stations thus preventing rural listeners from receiving his transmissions. The most vehement objections to the service of the ABC came from the Afrikaans speaking community. They objected to the largely English programme content which tended to reinforce the cultural values of the British and American model upon which the Schlesinger service was based. Objections were also directed at the news bias which reflected the views of the English press. [see Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:29]. Already at this early stage in the broadcasting history of South Africa problems arose as a result of the existing linguistic pluralism.

These events took place within the period of the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism and the ensuing Afrikaner ethnic mobilization. Here considerable emphasis was placed on the economic inferiority of the Afrikaner or Poor Whites who were moving in their thousands away from the rural areas to the towns and cities. Giliomee [1979:151] states that Hertzog and the National Party saw these events as a basis for their "civilized labor policy" which resulted in the employment of thousands of Afrikaners in the public service.

This period also saw the resulting creation of the "Afrikaner Economic Movement" which established distinctive Afrikaner financial institutions and interest groups with a view to promoting their welfare. Importantly, these events resulted in the Afrikaner leadership realizing that "ultimately only political power would effectively enhance the Afrikaner's economic position" which saw the

National Party emerge out of the Pact Government and Fusion as a political force. [see Giliomee, 1979:159 and O'Meara, 1983:1-17].

The climate of heightened ethnic awareness saw any institution that favoured one sector of the White population against the other become an easy target for criticism. The ABC was visible as "an unabashadly profit-seeking monopoly which catered almost exclusively to the monied and largely English speaking populace of a few large cities". [Orlik, 1978:56]. Such dissatisfaction became apparent during the process of urbanization where the urban centers were largely the power domain of the English speakers thus relegating and alienating the rural Afrikaans listener.

It was therefore under pressure from the Broederbond in 1931 that the ABC introduced an hour per week of Afrikaans programming. [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:29]. However, by 1936 Afrikaans language programming amounted to only 6% of total programming with 80% of listeners being English speaking. [Dewar McKormack in SABC 50th Anniversary Television programme, August 1986 also see Indaba, August, 1986:9].

#### **Dissatisfaction with Broadcasting - The Reith Report and the SABC:**

Giliomee [1983:88] cites the rise of the Afrikaner Nationalist movement coupled with the accompanying psychological message of "save the poor whites and assure the future of the Afrikaner nation and the white civilization". This can be related to the feeling on the part of Afrikaners that their language was in some way threatened and needed to be kept separate from English until it had reached some form of equality in protection and status. [see Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:29-30].

In terms of broadcasting therefore, it was felt that some form of state regulation and control was necessary in order to redress the language inequalities of the English and Afrikaans services as well as allow an Afrikaans service (unique and locally self-created) to develop while not being threatened by broad financial/commercial considerations. This feeling existed even though Schlesinger had managed to dramatically increase listenership and turn the service into a "commercial success". [Hachten and Giffard, 1974:202 also see Indaba, 1986:8].

However, it was not only Afrikaners that sought more substantial state control at this juncture. English speakers also sought some form of governmental regulation that would permit the broadcasting of high cultural content programmes which ordinarily would not form part of a commercial radio station. Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:30] suggest that "the English fraction was motivated towards this change by the assumptions of liberal idealism, which placed control through government above control via capital; whereas the Afrikaans fraction was motivated by a desire for greater control over and access to broadcasting than they had hitherto enjoyed".

The resulting pressure from all sides culminated in 1934 with Prime Minister Hertzog appointing Sir John Reith the Director General of the British Broadcasting Corporation, to (in the words of Reith) "look over the situation in this country respecting broadcasting and have conversations with my Government as to policy for its future development". [Orlik, 1978:56].

Reith was acutely aware of the power of broadcasting and endeavoured to highlight the strength of its applied power for humanitarian purposes as well as tactfully highlight its equal power if used for

non-altruistic endeavours. He stated in his report that "as the assegai is to the native hand, so the rifle is to the assegai and even more so is Broadcast, rightly institutionalized, rightly inspired, rightly controlled, to any other instrument of power - but in the sureness of Wisdom and Beauty and Peace". [Rosenthal, 1974:154].

The essence of Reith's recommendations were that "the service should be taken over and developed by a public corporation established by statute, and that the State ownership implicit therein should not entail State control or intervention in any way other than in accordance with the terms of the Statute. It is essential to the system that it is not controlled by the Government and that members elected to the board should have no definite or active political associations". [Morris, 1976:84].

Reith had therefore proposed a model that was largely based upon the British experience which resulted in criticism from Nationalist parliamentarian, Paul Sauer, who objected to "the insufficiently South African flavour of the existing undertaking, and to its excessive subservience to the BBC as a precedent". [Rosenthal, 1974:156]. This type of criticism bade ill for the fledgling South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) that came into existence on 1 August 1936, the day the Broadcasting Act, No. 22 of 1936 was passed in parliament and commensurate with the dissolving of the ABC.

Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:31] suggest that Reith's report contained fundamental flaws. By basing his model on the British example, he failed to take into account the domestic political conditions that were developing over that particular period. His report was formulated virtually within a vacuum indicating that he

was not fully aware of the emerging and apparent antagonisms developing between the English and Afrikaans language groups.

This oversight resulted in difficulties surrounding the equal programme distribution of English and Afrikaans and the resulting conflict over allocation of transmitters for a separate Afrikaans station. This problem had emerged out of the unworkable and cumbersome bi-lingualism that Reith had suggested for the existing service due to the lack of available funds for a distinct Afrikaans service. [see Orlik, 1978:56].

These difficulties were further exacerbated (unintentionally) by the utilization of two short-wave transmitters to relay Afrikaans programmes. However, poor sound quality hampered enjoyment of these services resulting in Afrikaans listeners who preferred not to struggle to receive adequate reception (and those thousands who were moving to the cities), being forced to return to the existing medium-wave transmissions that retained the characteristics of the old ABC.

The lack of change within the new SABC was due to the fact that most of the "ABC's staff members had become part of the new organization and the character of the programmes had not been altered" [Orlik, 1978:56] with as much as 80% of the programmes on this station being broadcast in English. [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:37]. Indeed, this conflict was articulated during this period by the Schoch Commission Report investigating the broadcasting services which "severely reprimanded the SABC management for not paying sufficient attention to the needs of the Afrikaans group". [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:42. see also 41-46].

### Broadcasting under Jan Smuts - The Second World War:

These events brought to the fore fresh and more vehement criticisms from the Afrikaners who at the time had been culturally stimulated by the re-enactment of the Great Trek in 1938 in which radio had played an important narrative role. [see Indaba, August 1986:9]. Publicly, this dissatisfaction was articulated in parliament through the National Party who complained in 1939 about "the political speeches of British statesmen". [Orlik, 1978:57].

The ruling United Party defended the use of such material "due to their intrinsic international importance (whereas) pronouncements by domestic politicians were largely vehicles of local and partisan interest and broadcasting of these would inject an unwanted element of Party propaganda into the transmissions". [Orlik, 1978:57]. This explanation is important in that the National Party was to use similar justifications against attacks on its own use of the media. This highlights a degree of control continuity that later saw United Party influence replaced by that of the National Party.

The difference of attitudes between these two parties is clearly apparent. Smuts regarded South Africa in a macro perspective as playing a pivotal role within the Commonwealth compared with the more isolationist (micro) approach of Malan who believed Afrikaner interests to be of paramount importance. [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:37-38].

This highlighted important 'weltanschauung' disparities which caused considerable tension in the taking of sides during World War Two. With the Afrikaner orientation was towards Germany and the English towards Britain, this eventually "provoked a realignment of various

sections of the hegemonic alliance, culminating in a change of government in 1948". [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:40].

An indication of the polarization that existed is visible from an incident on September 4 1939. The Afrikaans staff at the SABC had expected General Hertzog to declare neutrality in the war but was later outvoted in parliament. These staff members had all come to work at Broadcasting House with some kind of weapon (mostly revolvers) expecting that if the sign was going to be given by one of the Afrikaner Nationalist cabinet ministers, they would take up arms and take over the entire service. [Dewar McCormack in TV1 programme commemorating the SABC's 50th anniversary relayed on 26 August 1986.]

During the war years broadcasting again reflected the political climate of the day and the orientation of the dominant political party causing continued dissatisfaction amongst the Afrikaans speaking SABC staff members. [see Orlik, 1978:57].

Major reasons for this was "Jan Smuts's use of the SABC to push the Allied cause, employing radio campaigns to sign up soldiers for a South African army that had lost many men at the battle of Tobruk in 1942" [Pollak, 1981:71]; the broadcasting of "political speeches of British statesmen" [Orlik, 1978:57] and general government announcements which many Afrikaans announcers (who were not sympathetic to the Allies) saw as "distasteful". [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:38].

This resulted in much discontent and a contrary reaction on the part of certain pro-British factions who established a quasi-clandestine pirate radio station, Radio Freedom, to broadcast anti-Nationalist sentiments. This in turn, was countered by Zeesen Radio broadcasting from Germany whose pro-Nationalist broadcasts were promoted by a

South African, Erich Holm [see Orlik, 1978:58 and Orlik, 1974:142] as well as a pro-Nationalist station broadcasting from Vryburg. [see Indaba, August 1986:9].

Ironically though, recruitment largely affected the English speaking staff members who heeded the call to the frontiers only to be replaced by Afrikaners who were determined to restore the language inequalities between the English and Afrikaans radio services. This resulted in "the ground being thoroughly prepared for an Afrikaner take-over in Broadcasting". [Orlik, 1978:58 see also Orlik, 1974:142].

### 3.2 THE EARLY YEARS OF NATIONAL PARTY RULE - 1948-1958:

Giliomee [1983:95] cites a number of conditions that made the National Party victory in 1948. He suggests that "the successful development of an ethnic strategy" resulted from "demonstrations of South Africa's (and the Afrikaners) subordinate political status, economic conflict, the spread of communications, innovative leadership and ideological elaboration". Indeed, to a degree, the political development of broadcasting as outlined has been a reflection of some of these characteristics and would indicate the close correlation that broadcasting has with the politics of the day.

With the Afrikanerization of the ruling elite in 1948, at a time when the SABC was already largely Afrikanerized, the scene was set for "the Nationalist bureaucratization of the SABC" resulting in an extension of the control of the country to that of the broadcasting services. [Pollak, 1981:71].

This watershed saw the beginning (albeit somewhat tentative initially) of a new brand of authoritarian cultural intervention

spearheaded by the Broederbond. One of their main aims was "the taking control of such a powerful propaganda medium" (the SABC) which was already characterized by its "monopolistic authority" resulting in the replacing of the Smuts ideological bias with another. [Wilkins and Strydom, 1978:126].

### **Emerging Broederbond Control:**

It is also important at this juncture to highlight the importance of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond. Thompson and Prior [1982:150] describe this organization as existing to "ensure Afrikaner solidarity and group cohesion in all aspects of Afrikaans social life". Members of the organization infiltrated state institutions and ideologically guided them the way of the brotherhood.

With this in mind, the Broederbond may be seen as "a self-perpetuating association of Afrikaner elite" which "places zealous Afrikaner Nationalists in key positions" [Thompson and Prior, 1982:151] such as within the SABC for the purpose of ideologically guiding such corporations in the Nationalistic mould.

With a predominantly Afrikaner government installed, it was not long before the Board of Governors of the SABC changed its socio-political nature. Broederbond control was difficult at first with the new chairman of the SABC Board, Dr. S.H. Pelliser (also a senior Broederbonder) encountering difficulties in finding an appointee for the position of Director General. As Wilkins and Strydom [1978:126] state, this position was the only position of real power and to find a fellow Broeder qualified on merit for the job was difficult. [see also Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli 1989:46].

### Expansion at the SABC - The Gideon Roos Era:

This resulted in the appointment of Gideon Roos as Director General of the SABC in 1949. Roos had considerable experience in broadcasting and was highly respected for his radio coverage of the symbolic Great Trek of 1938. Indeed, Roos did not adhere to the political line of his superiors and "insisted on scrupulously fair reports and comment, not favouring one party over another". [Wilkins and Strydom, 1978:127].

Although he was an ardent Nationalist he nevertheless saw the role of the broadcaster as "a reporter, and not a propagandist". [Harrison, 1981:207]. Roos's stand on neutrality was such that "he would not allow the SABC to be used as a propaganda machine for the National Party". [Wilkins and Strydom, 1978:127].

The emerging control exercised over the SABC was clearly based on the need to further strengthen the fledgling Afrikaner state. In broadcasting, the transmitter network was extended to provide more adequate short-wave coverage for rural, largely Afrikaans speaking listeners. Other key elements of the broadcasting network (i.e. studios and carrier links) were also expanded to "enable the SABC to develop in several directions, matching the ideological needs of the hegemonic group which was now becoming dominated by the Afrikaner fraction". [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:49].

These developments are of crucial importance in their relevance to the structure of SABC broadcasting today. The SABC began to embark on a plan to manage, control and above all centralize its programming from Johannesburg. Secondly, a degree of regionalism was cultivated although still within the bounds of the central administration in

Johannesburg and thirdly, a more substantial choice of programmes was offered to listeners of differing racial and language groups. These factors combined to characterize the dominant ideology of the time which had as its aims, "to cement Afrikaner unity, and achieve parity with the English group and to 'divide and rule' the black population". [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:49].

The National Party victory had thus provided the necessary ideological backing in order to justify an adaptation of broadcasting policy according to these aforementioned principles. Multi-lingual regional services were able for the first time to place Afrikaans as a language on an equal footing with that of English as most mass communication within South Africa had historically been in the English language medium. Such a national broadcasting network may have gone some way in alleviating Afrikaner fears of English dominance over the air-waves and of society in general.

Changes were manifold during this period. These included the cessation of relaying BBC news in 1950 and the subsequent establishment of an in-house (and regional) news gathering service that came into being in the latter half of the fifties. A major change for financial reasons as well as being an attempt to redress the major language disparities was made through the introduction of the commercial Springbok Radio in 1950 where greater parity in English and Afrikaans language broadcasts was sought.

Another important development was the passing of the Broadcasting Amendment Act of 1951 which "empowered the SABC to supply programmes over wires as well as by radio, and thus to introduce a re-diffusion service for Africans". [Survey of Race Relations, 1951-52:75]. This resulted in a cable/subscriber service being successfully launched in

Orlando, Johannesburg. [see also Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:51-52 and Hachten and Giffard, 1974:202-203].

This was coupled with an expanded black language service on other channels as a forerunner to a more permanent and audible Black radio channel. This development was described by the then Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, JFT Naude, as "being a very good thing, when we would be able to broadcast the rediffusion services to the larger locations throughout the country; then one can enlighten the Natives there; then one can tell him what is being done for his benefit and what is going on in the country". [Hansard, 1954:4986].

Such sentiments were echoed by Nationalist politicians suggesting that "more use of the radio should be made in combating Communist propaganda amongst the natives". [Hansard, 1954:4976]. This need was further emphasized through the development of audible short-wave broadcasts to South Africa of anti-Nationalist stations such as "the Voice of Free Africa" and broadcasts from Radio Cairo and Moscow. [see the "Propaganda Debate" in Hansard, 1958:2394-2399 and Hansard, 1958:3540].

During this period there was a considerable expansion in programming for the Afrikaans service. New music programmes were created and ethnic identification and unity was promoted through SABC coverage of major symbolic events like the opening of the Voortrekker Monument and the Day of the Covenant observances. These broadcasts therefore, enabled the SABC to "counteract the tendency for the regional and class divisions in Afrikanerdom to make themselves felt, in a time of rapid economic development". [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:55].

Debates in parliament also highlighted the importance attached to the inclusion of English speakers in the ruling Afrikaner elite.

Nationalist parliamentarian, Mr. B. Coetzee, highlighted the fact that whereas unilingual English speakers "receive their political information only from that point of view (English newspapers)", bilingual Afrikaans speakers receive their information from both English and Afrikaans newspapers. He suggested that "the only way to break down this political iron curtain is by means of radio". [Hansard, 1955:7478].

During this period the SABC came in for considerable criticism from the opposition United Party (UP). Although there was muted criticism of the mounting political bias, the UP observed in 1955 that "the news service is not as good now as it was when we had the BBC service" and went on to explain the prominence given to the speeches of cabinet ministers. This admonishment concluded by adding that "a good deal of the news we get is not reliable". [Mr. P.A. Moore in Hansard, 1955:7470].

This anger was instrumental in the revival of the anti-Nationalist "Freedom Radio" in 1956 which in turn led to Nationalist attempts at jamming its reception. [see Hansard, 1956:6461]. Orlik [1978:60] quotes a source describing the rebirth of Freedom Radio as a "stir of hope" with "many thinking people clinging to the Freedom Radio as a possible but inevitably-to-be-hunted-down-and-suppressed hope of emancipation".

In parliament, there was much censure of the technical quality of the radio transmissions with the United Party again suggesting that "our radio system at the moment is possibly the worst equipped in the world, at any rate the worst equipped on the continent of Africa" as a result of "trying to run the corporation on a shoestring". [Mr. H.O Frielinghaus in Hansard, 1956:6399].

This was possibly due to the philosophy of Director General Roos, whose adherence to the "Reithian ideal of the independence of broadcasting from the government of the day" resulted in an estrangement with the government. In Roos's efforts at impartiality, he attempted to make the SABC as financially independent as possible. This manifested itself in reduced governmental assistance for the SABC, considerable financial difficulty and an increasingly tenuous position for Roos himself. [see Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:56-57].

The circumstances were to herald major changes in the management of the SABC in the late 1950's. These changes were to influence all aspects of the broadcasting mass media into the next two decades and highlight the importance of personalities in defining and carrying through, broadcasting policy. The influence of these personalities should be seen against the emerging authoritarian policies adopted by the then Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, who articulated the Apartheid policy and implemented much of the apartheid legislation.

### **3.3 CHANGE AT THE SABC: CREEPING AUTHORITARIANISM - 1958-1968:**

#### **The Rise of Albert Hertzog and Piet Meyer:**

In 1958, Albert Hertzog became the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs and a year later invited his close friend Dr. Piet Meyer who was also simultaneously Chairman of the Broederbond from 1960-1972, to become Chairman of the SABC Board. [see Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:130; and Hansard, 1962:7388].

Meyer is described in Giliomee and Schlemmer [1989:45-46] as one of a group of young Afrikaners who adapted the neo-Calvinist ideal of Kuyper which sought the "mobilization of Afrikaners on the basis of

race and culture and tried to bring the Afrikaners together in ethnic institutions regardless of their religious beliefs and world-views". Pottinger[1988:419] also refers to Meyer as a "Nazi sympathizer".

Both these men were seen as right-wing or 'verkramp' [see Serfontein 1970:29-30 and Davies, 1984:417] which indicated the ideological onslaught the SABC would face. Until now, this had been resisted as far as possible by Gideon Roos.

It was evident that with the conflict that had emerged between Gideon Roos and the government in the pre-Hertzog/Meyer days, the atmosphere could only deteriorate further under these new personalities. This became even more apparent in attempts by Meyer to extend his influence beyond that of his official position through a two-pronged attack that had as its aim, increased authority for the chairman and the removal of Roos as Director General. In 1959, Meyer created a new post of "executive chairman" which gave him "not only control of legislation in the corporation, but overriding administrative and executive powers". [Wilkins and Strydom, 1978:128].

#### **The Broadcasting Act of 1960:**

These events were coupled with the introduction of the Broadcasting Amendment Act, No.49 of 1960 that "gave the Board of Governors of the SABC increased powers of control of its affairs and of the interpretation of its function" [Survey of Race Relations, 1959-1960:260] through "the appointment of advisory councils and committees. The board was given a free hand to do any such thing which in the opinion of the board may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of its objects". [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:59-60].

Governmental justification for the introduction of these amendments were based on a subjective interpretation of the Reithian philosophy to the effect that "Lord Reith had recommended that that the Board be placed in such a strong position... because he (Reith) felt that it should be a strong organization which could discharge heavy responsibilities resting upon it in a responsible manner". [Mr. M.C. Botha in Hansard, 1960:5000. See also Hertzog in Hansard, 1960:7582]. Whilst Reith had accepted the considerable influence of broadcasting and warned against its misuse, he nevertheless would not have approved of the development of such a close relationship between the SABC and the ruling elite.

However, the key point to note in this legislation is the authoritarian power held by the Minister (Albert Hertzog) "to make all the executive appointments in the corporation and that in terms of the Act, the Governor-General, acting of course on the advise of the Minister, may remove from office any Governor who has not complied with the conditions of his appointment". [Mr. D. Waterson, United Party MP in Hansard, 1960:4989].

This legislation therefore, would indicate the increasingly symbiotic relationship between the Government and the Board as well as their close relationship with the Broederbond. Here, increased power to the SABC Board simply reflected greater and more direct control by the responsible Minister thus initiating 'self-policing' and internal 'gatekeeping' within the SABC which saw government policy merge with that implemented by the SABC. [see Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:60. See also Hansard, 1960:4982-5011].

In practical terms though, the legislation of 1960 was largely aimed at establishing a Bantu Programme Control Board to administer the

African language services. This was seen by Albert Hertzog as a "sensible policy to establish a service for the Native in South Africa which will inspire him, which will link him to our civilization, and which will make him favourably disposed towards the White man who is living with him in South Africa". [Hansard, 1959:7221].

### The Emasculation of Gideon Roos:

With this legislation in place, it was evident that the Government had the fullest confidence in Piet Meyer as Chairman of the Board and were able to support him financially which later resulted in a dramatic improvement in the finances of the SABC. Meanwhile, the position of Gideon Roos was being further emasculated as was any political independence the corporation may have had by Meyer who had subsequently become Chairman of the Broederbond.

In 1961, Meyer appointed J.J. Kruger, a Broederbonder and confidant of Prime Minister Verwoerd, to the position of "cultural advisor". His duties included "the writing of weekly political commentaries" [Orlik, 1978:60] under the title "The South African Scene" which "provoked a public and parliamentary outcry against the slanting in the SABC". [Strydom and Wilkens, 1978:129. Also see Hoagland, 1973:48-50 for detailed description of Kruger.]

Perhaps the most sinister description of Kruger's function within the SABC was that provided in parliament by Dr. Wilson of the United Party. He described Kruger's role as "apparently there to sift broadcasts and news-services, so that they should have a pro-Government and pro-republican slant" resulting in "pure and unadulterated Nationalist Party propaganda". [Hansard, 1960:7568].

Wilson [Hansard, 1960:7521] went on to highlight examples of pro-Nationalist propaganda emphasizing the emerging shift away from impartiality and the use of a multitude of daily newscasts as "an opportunity for mass indoctrination and the slanting of news". When faced with criticism of this programme, Director of Programmes, Douglas Fuchs said, "I think it needs to be made clear that impartiality is a fine thing, but are there no limits to its application"? [Argus, 21/10/1963].

Kruger's views were unconvincingly defended by Gideon Roos [see Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:129] by saying "just as in World War II, the duty to support authority transcends the confines of party politics...the SABC is not involving itself in party politics, but is doing what is undoubtedly a duty". [Survey of Race Relations, 1959-1960:262]. Indeed this shows Roos's loyalty to his position within the organization although as events were to unfold, his loyalty was insufficient for the ruling National Party.

Roos had to suffer the further indignity of having much of his duties redistributed to new specialist appointees, the majority of which were Broederbonders such as Mr. J.N. van der Walt in administration, Mr. J.N. Swanepoel in finance and Mr C.D. Fuchs in programmes. [see Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:129]. This resulted in "Roos's position being gradually whittled away to the point where it was the Board of Governors that held the real power with its chairman, rather than the apolitical Director-General, the real head of Broadcasting". [Orlik, 1978:61].

Roos resigned from the SABC - his position falling away with Meyer assuming ultimate responsibility - on Republic Day 1961. He had been in charge of only the commercial and external services which were of

secondary importance due to the lack of development of a FM service. Upon resigning, Roos is quoted (in his own words) to have told Piet Meyer that "he (Meyer) would destroy all I had built up, I did not want to be a member of a demolition squad. The SABC should serve all the people. It should have no editorial policy of its own". [Harrison, 1981:207].

The Sunday Times of April 16 1961, in commenting on Roos's resignation stated that "the Government and the Broederbond have won their four year struggle to get rid of Mr. Gideon Roos. With his departure, the last obstacle has been removed for the control of broadcasting in South Africa to fall completely into political hands". [Wilkins and Strydom, 1978:128. See also Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:62].

It was an ironic choice of day to resign as it had been the Republic referendum that had exacerbated National Party control of broadcasting. The establishment of the Republic on 31 May 1961 saw yet further reason on the part of the Nationalists to use broadcasting for their own ends and is admitted in a speech in parliament by Nationalist MP, Andries Treurnicht who stated that "our new system of government will definitely make its mark on the SABC...and we should like to see the SABC propagating that concept (a republic) in South Africa and in our whole national life". [Hansard, 1961:5723].

It should be noted that in this time period there were a considerable amount of other senior staff resignations from the SABC that included Colin Neilson, Percy Baneshik and Frank Douglas with the Jan Burger column in the Cape Times [31/10/1961] concluding that "in the process of deciding what is good for South Africa, the SABC has lost its

Director General, several senior administrative men as well as a whole corps of announcers and programme makers".

Burger goes on to ask "if the SABC is impartial, why were all these men of one political persuasion? Why did the great smelling out start immediately after the Nationalists had appointed a propaganda chief (Kruger) for the SABC?" Indeed, E.G. Malan quotes Michael Fox on his resignation as saying, "I am distressed at the trend of staff administration and the manner in which news is presented". [Hansard, 1962:7310].

### The Practice of Gross Authoritarianism:

There can be little doubt that the demise of Roos coupled with the aforementioned resignations paved the way for the ruling elite to assert their own ideology to a considerably greater degree. With Verwoerd as Prime Minister, it was obvious that the ideology would filter through the state controlled mass communications system.

Indeed, the late fifties through to the middle sixties was a time of the concretization of the Afrikaner Nationalist's policies which included the development and demarcation of the Homelands as well as the practical application of separate development. Verwoerd's authoritarian style of governing was therefore certain to extend to the powerful mass medium of broadcasting. However, this was not without some protest from the public with the Black Sash launching a petition campaign aimed at highlighting the emerging political bias. [see Hertzog in Hansard, 1962:7389 and Orlik, 1978:62].

News policy best highlighted this new shift with official SABC directives that "the broadcasts of messages likely to cause despondence and alarm should not be broadcast" nor should news that

"is likely to incite or inflame public opinion". [Cape Times, 31/10/1961].

The head of the SABC news services, Mr. Gert Fourie stated "we do not broadcast threats to protest, strike or boycott. Such news as there will be a general strike by Natives in a week's time must not be broadcast. We would be helping in the commission of a crime". [Cape Times, 31/10/1961]. These sentiments further highlighted the control paradigm into which the news programmes of the SABC were increasingly falling.

In further highlighting SABC news policy, Harvey Tyson [Argus, 14/10/1963] quotes Piet Meyer as saying "that news was being presented objectively, impartially and fully, always bearing in mind that it must show a South African character. We feel that it is our duty to keep the public informed of the dangers that beset us from inside and outside our borders". Tyson argues that these statements suggest that "the news is not to be broadcast as news. It is shaped to show a South African character. It is selected dutifully to inform us of the dangers that beset us". [see also Race Relations Survey, 1962:49 for the SABC attitude to Helen Joseph as example].

Harvey Tyson articulated the very definite ideological shift within the SABC when he stated that "an actual change in principles; in policy, and in practice can be noted clearly and more or less objectively. And the SABC certainly has changed! How much in the space of five years will surprise most of us - for we have unconsciously leant over to accommodate a new kind of broadcasting done in the name of "patriotism" but for the sake of a political cause". [Argus, 07/10/1963].

Tyson's remarks mainly applied to news broadcasts and those of the aforementioned J.J. Kruger. However, programmes entitled, "The Infiltration of Communist Doctrines in South Africa and its Subversive Activities"; "The Challenge of our Time" which according to the SABC would deal with "values which distinguish our way of life and set it above that presented by communism" and a later series called "Know Your Enemy" all contained similar characteristics. News commentaries presented by Ivor Benson [see SABC Annual Report, 1963:6] were also slated with Benson being accused in the press of "misrepresentation and of using the medium for propaganda purposes". [Survey of Race Relations, 1963:280 and 1965:49].

The SABC justified these programmes as being an essential element of "promoting and encouraging the survival and heritage of our Republic" and saw them as "exhaustive, balanced and truthful" and ensuring that "broadcasting is not abused to undermine the safety of the country or to promote the revolutionary intentions inside or outside the country's borders". [Survey of Race Relations, 1963:279]. Indeed, if such a justification exists for the aforementioned programmes, it is clear to see the close relationship between the defining of the enemy of the State and that propagated by the SABC indicating the extent of the symbiotic relationship that existed.

This shift in news policy away from the attempted neutrality of Roos should be seen as the real beginnings of the autocratic categorization of the formal news broadcasts by the SABC. The manipulation and interpretation of the news as per the ruling elite was put into motion in this era and continues in the contemporary era.

In particular, this shift may be seen as the awakening of the ruling elite to the fact that a medium as powerful as that of broadcasting was able to a large extent to provide the electorate and specifically the English speakers with a clear alternative and counter to the views propagated by the liberal English press. This occurred at a time of increased political tensions caused by the aforementioned Verwoerdian policies.

In particular, the continued attempts to win over new English speaking converts to the the Nationalist cause seemed a priority for Meyer. In the 1963 SABC Annual Report, Meyer reports that "the chief attribute of the SABC's programmes throughout the year... was the rapid elimination of previous tensions between the English and Afrikaans speaking groups... with the SABC reflecting in its programmes the increased parity of thought, action and sentiment of these two equal cultural components of one White Christian-Western African nation, bound together by the same loyalty, outlook, aims, ideals and aspirations, in respect of their only fatherland, the Republic of South Africa". [1963:5].

Meyer's speeches to the Broederbond [Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:134] held in secret further emphasized the need for the "complete political nationalizing and eventual cultural Afrikanerizing of our English-speaking co-citizens" with the objective being "politically of permanent value, ensuring the continued existence of the Afrikaner, only if it is coupled with the Afrikanerizing of the economy".

Indeed, according to Lipton [1985:304], Meyer argued that "the Afrikaners were the only true South Africans, and that the English must be Afrikanerized before they can be accepted as equals". These

sentiments highlighted the world view of Meyer as ethnocentric in the extreme. This necessitates authoritarian controls in order to bolster and maintain ideological dominance.

### Technological Developments:

The middle sixties also saw an important technical shift in the services offered by the SABC. Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:64-65] reports that for some time "there had been a perceived need to disseminate the dominant ideology in selective 'discourses' through separate channels for various language groups (with a system) which could segregate the audience according to the categorizations of race, ethnic group and language which characterized the apartheid ideology". It was therefore timeous that such political goals could be achieved with the utilization of new technology such as the development of high clarity but localized Very High Frequency (VHF)/Frequency Modulation (FM) broadcasts. [see Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:64-67 and Orlik, 1974:143-145].

With the introduction of FM broadcasts that encompassed not only regionalized multiple Black language services such as Radio Xhosa in the Cape and North Sotho in the Transvaal, but also regional services for Whites such as Radio Good Hope (Cape) and Highveld (Transvaal), the authorities were able to "provide South Africa's Black population with multicultural and pervasive programming via low-cost transistorized FM portables". [Orlik, 1974:144].

This new technology which was characterized by low operational costs, battery power as opposed to electricity and lack of short-wave capabilities resulting in listeners being prevented from receiving many short-wave broadcasts that were increasingly broadcasting anti-

Nationalist programmes. This enabled the Nationalists to pursue their double intentions of promoting Apartheid and preventing the audibility of foreign short-wave broadcasts. [see Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:65].

Radio Bantu and the other Black services were established throughout the 1960's and were administered by a "Bantu Advisory Board" that consisted of prominent Broeders [Morris, 1976:86]. This was seen by Heribert Adam [1971:106] as "one of the most powerful tools of social control over the urban African apart from legal impositions" which even resulted in the SABC establishing a number of additional services to "remote groups in South West Africa".

It should also be noted that the political content of these services were mainly directed at promoting the 'homelands' concept and entailed broadcasting programmes like "Today in the Transkeian Parliament" as well as programmes that "demonstrate the 'might of the White man' as in space flights and moon landings". [Adam, 1971:107-108].

However, whilst these services largely concentrated on entertainment programming, the political views presented were those of the government. Butler [1977:82] found that even though there is a strong pro-'homeland' bias, the service was, and is so tightly controlled that even homeland leaders were rarely themselves interviewed.

It was therefore apparent that with the positioning of sympathetic staff, the adaptation of new technology and the differentiation of channels, the SABC was well on its way to furthering the policies and ideology of the ruling elite.

Indeed, it had become more public in its objectives as its 1965 Annual Report stated, "To a neutrality urge which could jeopardize the security and well considered interests of the country and the people, the Board of Governors conceded nothing more than might be expected from a South African institution occupying the strategic position of the SABC. It is firmly convinced that the Corporation is obliged to serve this country and its population groups in spite of limited but vociferous movements serving aims that undermine and ultimately destroy the happiness, prosperity and future of our country". [1965:4].

#### The "Current Affairs" Programme:

The above view was perhaps most pervasively argued through the "Current Affairs" programmes of the SABC that had been broadcasting since the early sixties. The programme was of five minutes duration; was presented by "an anonymous speaker" [Survey of Race Relations, 1966:32] and was broadcast during the prime-time early evening and morning hours on both the English and Afrikaans radio services.

Written by the Editor of the pro-Nationalist Vaderland newspaper, this programme is described as "indulging in personal abuse of opponents of apartheid both in South Africa and abroad" [Ainslie, 1966:164] and engaging in "deliberate distortion and an actual untruth". [Mr. E.G. Malan in Hansard, 1966:2410 and 2408-2410].

The SABC, in its Annual Report of 1965, referred to this programme as the "leading article of the air" and justified its existence by claiming that "it stands to reason that in the same way as newspapers have the right and the duty to reflect everything that goes on in the radio world, and to do so critically, so also the radio has the right and the duty to reflect everything that happens in the newspaper

world and to do so critically". [1965:35].

This obvious reference to the South African English language press was clarified in a debate in parliament where Albert Hertzog suggested that these newspapers "had over the years published slanted news... and the 'Current Affairs' programme could bring home to the English-speaking people of South Africa the true facts in regard to the news". [Survey of Race Relations, 1966:63. See also Hansard, 1966:2477-2480 for text of Hertzog's speech.].

These sentiments clearly indicated the admission on the part of the ruling elite to use broadcasting in combating the English press. Indeed, the use of the "Current Affairs" programme may be seen as the most outstanding example of the creeping authoritarianism that was pervading the SABC. The "Comment" programme reflected purely the views of the ruling party and allowed no right to reply thus highlighting the development of the "top down" approach to news and public affairs broadcasting.

#### **External Broadcasting - Radio RSA:**

It should also be noted that the broadcasting controllers did not just stop with domestic programming. Although engaging in somewhat primitive "external" short-wave broadcasts in the early sixties, 1966 saw the launching of a full external service known as "The Voice of South Africa". [see Indaba, August 1986:14].

There had already been speculation in 1965 that the service would be another pro-Nationalist vehicle with the United Party highlighting this in parliament. [see Hansard, 1965:6477]. Ainslie [1966:163] also predicted that this service "is unlikely to contribute to peace in Africa, for the SABC is now an unashamed mouthpiece of the extremist

Nationalist Secret Society, the Broederbond".

However, it should be noted according to Orlik [1974:146], that at this juncture, "Radio RSA's offerings remain largely apolitical save for the clearly labeled 'Comment'" and pro-Western/anti East Block stories". Julian Hale also remarked on the discrepancy between the biased radio coverage within South Africa as opposed to the more "moderate" tone of the external service. He explains this apparent contradiction by saying, "internally the racist line must not be allowed to flag. Externally, the best impression to give is one of sweet reasonableness... a tactical opportunistic policy of soft-sell". [Hale, 1975:87].

By the late sixties, Piet Meyer had been able to install many of his close confidants (all Broederbond members) to positions of authority at the SABC. Especially prominent were the past Directors General, Jan Swanepoel, Dr. Jan Schutte and Steve De Villiers which further entrenched Broederbond control.

Indeed, the Broederbond already had considerable direct influence over the SABC as was highlighted through the public defence of the secret organization over the airwaves in 1963 following press criticisms. The Broederbond and above all, right-wing Afrikaner Nationalists had succeeded in whittling away any vestiges of neutrality from the Roos era and had replaced this with an authoritarian style that purely promoted the ruling ideology. [see Serfontein, 1979:215 and Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:276-277].

#### **3.4 THE TELEVISION DEBATE: THE END OF THE HERTZOG ERA - 1968-1976**

It is important to note that the late sixties was a period of intense in-fighting within the ruling National Party. With the battle of the

'verligtes' and 'verkrampes' gaining momentum, political change seemed forthcoming. Indeed, as has been shown; when political change occurs, it is filtered through to the broadcasting institutions due to the symbiotic relationship between them.

### **Objections to the Introduction of Television:**

Therefore, with the SABC described as containing the "most reactionary elements of the NP" and being "a major base for the extreme right in the Afrikaner Nationalist class alliance" [Davies, 1974:416], it is not surprising that objections to the introduction of television were motivated by ideological considerations. Indeed, other than the broad characteristics of the corporation as highlighted, the key issue that emphasized the role of the personality and his world view within the SABC (and the resulting authoritarian broadcasting orientation) was that pertaining to the introduction of television.

Debates in parliament in the early fifties note that there was already at this stage considerable resistance to the introduction of television. Hertzog's predecessor, JFJ Serfontein stated in 1954 that "television in the union cannot be regarded as a necessity and the view is held that its introduction should be postponed until capital that is at present required for more urgent works of national importance, can be made available for the undertaking". [Hansard, 1954:4983].

However, in 1963, Albert Hertzog's objections [Hansard, 1963:6525] were based on his views that "the child who looks at television throughout the day gradually becomes retarded (and) no longer is the leader in his area; he feels inferior and at best is only a follower.

It is very important to us in South Africa that the White nation should be the leaders and remain the leaders".

Hertzog also feared that the Bantu would "crowd around the few sets which there are and they will witness the commission of crimes; they will learn how to evade the police" [Hansard, 1963:6526] and that "television has become, in the Western world, the greatest destroyer of the family". [Hansard, 1964:6611].

The question of the introduction of television dominated parliamentary debates on broadcasting during the latter half of the sixties. Indeed, television became one of the most polarized political issues in debates between the National Party and the United Party that even led to the the UP using as a slogan on one of its election posters, "If you want TV, Vote UP.". [Hansard, 1966:2468].

Governmental resistance continued with television being referred "in its present form (as) a threat to religion" [H.D.K. Van Der Merwe, in Hansard, 1967:5279]. Albert Hertzog [Hansard, 1967:5296] even invoked his fear of the effect of Blacks viewing commercials as this would "create a situation...where the Black man is going to be dissatisfied and is going to blame the White man for his dissatisfaction...that will make the position of the White man in South Africa extremely difficult" and would "mean the end of the White man in Africa". [Hertzog in Adam, 1971:108].

Hachten [1979:62] therefore states that there were three main reasons for the delay and resistance to the introduction of television. These were "a threat to the Afrikaans language and culture because of the expected heavy dependence on American and British-produced programs; the potential psychological and political impact of television on urbanized blacks...and the possible undermining of traditional values

and morals of Afrikanerdom and its Dutch Reformed Church". Similarly, Heribert Adam [1971:106] succinctly argues that the delay of television was "an attempt to preserve an isolationist puritan Afrikaner way of life in the cultural sense, but to maintain the lag in political information on which its domination largely rests".

It should also be noted that whilst the Calvinistic 'Weltanschauung' [see the McCrone's isolationist 'Frontier' theory, 1957] predominated in providing anti-television motivations, Hachten [1979:62] importantly points out that existing technology was insufficient and only with the establishment of microwave relays and an FM network in the 1960's did South Africa "have the telecommunications infrastructure to broadcast nationally". This saw a lack of technology quite timeously complementing ideological reasoning.

#### **The National Party Split - Hertzog's Resignation:**

Given these facts, it was evident that with the downfall of Hertzog resulting from the split in Afrikanerdom in 1969, change was in the air. Not only did arch right-winger Hertzog resign from the National Party and the SABC; he also went on to form the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) with a number of other right-wingers who were expelled from the National Party in opposition to the limited reform of certain areas of petty-Apartheid legislation. His insistence over the previous decade that television should not be introduced in South Africa went with him.

What was surprising, in view of the apparent close bond between Hertzog and Piet Meyer, is that Meyer himself, remained in his position of SABC Director General. Indeed, it would seem that Prime Minister Vorster concluded a number of deals with both the

Broederbond and Meyer with Davies [1984:418] suggesting that the deal would be aimed at "skillfully using the arch-verkramppte Meyer and the SABC in an extended witch-hunt against the HNP" which in turn could have resulted in Vorster returning the favour by allowing Meyer to stay on in his position.

It should also be emphasized that at this time, Meyer had "entrenched himself with yes-men and Broeders...leaving nothing undone to secure the Broederbond's position for ever and ever in the SABC" [Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:131-132] which left E.G. Malan of the United Party to comment in parliament that "the SABC is an organization which is dominated by the Broederbond hierarchy. It is heedless of control. It is reckless in its irresponsibility. It is a gross example of a monopoly gone berserk". [Hansard, 1969:2836].

#### **Television Approved - The Meyer Commission:**

With the downfall of Albert Hertzog, public pressure on the government for the introduction of television continued to mount. This was precipitated by the fact that about 600 million viewers (outside South Africa) watched the moon landing in 1969 [Argus:28/07/1969] as television had become an established norm in more than 100 countries world. [see Hansard, 1971:8245].

Threats that the United Party would use this issue in the 1971 General Election [Argus:28/07/1969] may have also influenced government thinking. Hachten, however, states that the about-turn came as a result of "the Nationalist government and the SABC becoming convinced that they could control the new medium for their own purposes, both by avoiding its negative features and by using it as a political tool". [Hachten and Giffard, 1984:209].

Piet Meyer was appointed by the State President as Chairman of the Commission to look into the feasibility of the introduction of television. Meyer was naturally also party to current Broederbond thinking that the introduction of television would be useful "if a sympathetic Nationalist Government introduces such a service (rather) than to leave it over for a possible, later non-National Government". [Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:281]. This realization was also prompted by pressure from the Afrikaans press and prominent Afrikaners like Professor J.B. Du Toit and Dr. D.W. de Villiers who felt that the introduction of television was necessary. [see Argus:27/07/1969].

The fundamental belief of the Meyer Commission's report was that "Communication between people is essentially a fourfold process embracing entertainment, information, enculturation and creative enrichment of the mind in a variety of forms".[1971:8]. Importantly, the Commission saw communication as a process of "education and instruction".[1971:8]. This implied an authoritarian media orientation where instruction would follow a 'top - down' approach based upon the ideology of the ruling elite.

The Meyer Report dispelled many of the earlier Herzog objections to the introduction of television. This was accomplished by the emphasis of controlling the television service just as was done regarding radio. The Commission believed that "the main concern is not the medium but the way in which the medium is used and controlled by man".[1971:15]. In a further clause, the commission stated that "television can be controlled just as effectively as and as easily as radio, for example. It all depends on whether society institutes effective control measures and always accepts responsibility for the exercise of such control.[1971:15]

With such control as the vital incentive behind the introduction of television, the Commission argued for the positive roles as reasons for the introduction of television. In the report, Piet Meyer suggested that "South Africa must have its own television service in order to nurture and strengthen its own spiritual roots, to foster respect and love for its own spiritual heritage and to protect and project the South African way of life as it has developed here in its historical context". [1971:17]. These sentiments may be read as serving that of the ruling elite.

The Meyer Commission [1971:17] further believed that television would "develop into a positive force in the religious, spiritual, cultural, social and economic life of the country and all its peoples". Television was also seen as a vital enhancement of education in both a school and tertiary environment. This would be applied within the environment of "a multi-national and multi-lingual country like South Africa to advance the self-development of all its peoples and to foster their pride in their own identity and culture". Again, whilst public and technological pressures promoted the introduction of television, the Meyer Commission clearly highlights the possible uses of this media form to strengthen the prevailing apartheid ideology.

The Commission states in this regard that "the television service should be founded on such principles as will ensure the Christian system of values of the country, the national identity and the social structure of its various communities will be respected, preserved, strengthened and enriched".[1971:15].

The desire to control this 'new' form of broadcast media was echoed by the Broederbond who were far-sighted in their vision for a

television service that could be manipulated and restricted. The Broederbond placed an emphasis on controlling this new service to the benefit of "our Christian national outlook and lifestyle". [Wilkins and Strydom, 1978:281]. The influence and power of the Broederbond is further highlighted by the fact that it was Meyer himself who reported back to the Broederbond before he reported to the Government or Parliament which is completely contradictory to established and accepted parliamentary procedures. [see Wilkins and Strydom, 1978:281].

The question of television and the conditions for its implementation [see Wilkins and Strydom, 1978:279-280 and Hachten and Giffard, 1984:209] that the then Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, Mr. M.C. Van Rensburg laid down, were discussed in depth at Broederbond meetings. This resulted in their approval for a "distinctive South African television service...that will not be a pure replica of overseas services, but one that will by definition prevent all the excessive and undesirable effects of overseas systems on particularly the morals of the population and particularly of the youth of the country". [Wilkins and Strydom, 1978:280].

As far sighted as the Broederbond was, so was prominent academic, Francis Wilson. In an article in the Cape Times of 15 May 1969, he warned of the dangers of the SABC television service becoming a public corporation as "it enables party politicians to appoint a like-minded man to a position of great power within the Corporation and then, when those of differing views question the tendentious manner in which the Corporation is being used, the Government can evade all responsibility by declaring that the matter is beyond their control and that it would be improper for it to interfere".

Wilson [Cape Times, 15/05/1969] added that "this method has great dangers in that it throws what should be an impartial institution into the midst of the political arena where it can be buffeted by the prevailing pressure groups". Indeed, the SABC had taken on the very characteristics that Wilson outlined which seemed to provide the corporation with the sufficient security through its authoritarian control to embark upon the introduction of television.

The go-ahead for the introduction of a full television service was granted for January 1976. The authorities had moved from a position of outright mistrust for the medium to a position where they felt that it could be introduced to benefit their own ideological needs. Indeed, a Nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. J.C. Otto [Hansard, 1971:8225-8226], justified the state controlled introduction of television by quoting Dr. Verwoerd as saying in 1960 that "television cannot be kept out permanently, but its introduction must wait until we are able to counter any of the possible evils which are being experienced elsewhere".

Dr. Otto went on to add that "for the sake of the maintenance of our national integrity and of the preservation of the identity of every national group, of our traditional values and of our Christian morals and our spiritual level, it is absolutely necessary that television be controlled thoroughly and judiciously". [Hansard, 1971:8225-8226].

Throughout the early seventies Meyer was at pains to point out that the television service would "show nothing permissive and would not be given over to immature reformers who want to shock the public" [Cape Times:21/11/1973] and would "maintain and strengthen Afrikaner identity". [Cape Times:12/07/1974].

Similarly so, SABC Director General, Douglas Fuchs, said that the SABC would be a "bulwark against revolutionary attacks" and perhaps gave a further indication as to how the television service would marry with the ruling ideology by saying that "television makes people more conscious of their differences. In our television service we will try to place the accent of an own identity on all our people". [Cape Times:13/07/1974].

Indeed, as Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:72] highlight, "the introduction of multiple channels and specialized programmes for each of those channels tends automatically to reinforce and insulate whatever differences there are between various class fragments, thus retaining overall control in the hands of the controllers of broadcasting in particular and the hegemonic alliance in general". The introduction of television, therefore, would indicate the maintenance and perpetuation of the apartheid policy by converting the legislative differentiation of groups into distinct broadcasting entities.

In a strong directive to the English programme directors at the SABC which may be seen as an attempt to offset any attempts at English independence from these tight controls, a SABC brochure entitled "A Guide for the Production Staff" unambiguously concluded with the instruction "It should be remembered that programmes should follow Government policy, SABC policy and departmental policy". [Rand Daily Mail:14/01/1975].

### **The Continued Control Over Radio and Fears for Television:**

In the years leading to the official switch-on of the television service, the regular characteristics of the SABC's radio services

remained. In unprecedented criticism of the "Current Affairs" programme in 1974, the editor of Die Vaderland, Dirk Richard, lambasted the "Current Affairs" programme for "overstepping the mark and ignoring the right of people to reply" [Rand Daily Mail:06/12/1974].

He questioned the integrity of the news broadcasts which "left the impression that the selection (of news items) is made for a definite purpose...and it appears that the SABC places a protective sheet over what listeners want and decides what is good for them". [Sunday Times:01/12/1974].

Indeed, such criticism represented the first signs of traditionally pro-government supporters finding fault with the overtly one-sided political views expressed through the media and represented albeit on a very limited scale, a movement away from the authoritarian Verwoerdian legacy.

Amidst criticism from the English Academy [see Rapport:15/12/1974] that the SABC has not appointed an English speaker to the board of the SABC, was the anomaly of a lack of language parity and the resulting bias in favour of English programming on the commercial service of Springbok Radio.

This resulted in some of the most vehement criticism from the Afrikaans press [see Die Burger:21/01/1975] with Piet Meyer suggesting that "Springbok Radio had been started as commercial service to make money to support the English and Afrikaans services and it had never been envisaged that the time devoted to English and Afrikaans would be an issue". [Cape Times:21/01/1975].

Indeed, this could be seen as the practicalities of economics having an effect on the ideal of complete language parity through increased commercial revenue commensurate with English rather than Afrikaans programming - a problem that was later to be encountered with television.

Another factor may have been the desire on the part of the SABC to keep the English speakers happy through the predominance of English on this service in order to elicit some form of political compliance from them. It should also be noted that many of the radio programmes produced were written and directed by British expatriates with much of this output emanating from the Durban studios of the SABC and thus being produced in English.

Anomalies aside, the criticisms of SABC radio services were extended to fears of the characteristics of the forthcoming television service. Rene de Villiers [Cape Times:15/03/1975] suggested that "the SABC was the only State broadcasting system in the non-communist, non-totalitarian world that unashamedly had become the mouthpiece and apologist of the Government" and as a result of this South Africa could "expect a bronze ox-wagon outlook with Current Affairs in brilliant technicolour when television was introduced". De Villiers [Hansard, 1975:2624] also quoted prominent playwright Etienne Leroux as saying "Television will probably be a mirror of what the radio has been". [see Hansard, 1975:6343-6347 for forewarnings regarding the television service].

Such fears became a reality when the views of Nationalist parliamentarians such as Barend du Plessis are analyzed. He clearly stated that "we shall deal selectively with this service of distorted images which are stampeding us and we shall put them in perspective

for our listeners (and viewers). Then they begin to interpret and give their comment. The SABC decided for itself that it has a task in this connection". [Sunday Tribune:20/04/1975].

Such was the mistrust that Brian Page of the United Party pleaded in Parliament for an assurance that the television service would be "technically sound, informative, unbiased and objective for all time" [Argus:21/05/1975]. In reply, the director of news services of the SABC, Kobus Hamman, said that "objectivity will not be a major consideration...what we intend doing is reflecting the news fairly", [Sunday Tribune:10/08/1975] which can be coupled with the governmental view that it was necessary to "interpret, rather than merely reflect" the news. [see B.J. du Plessis in Hansard, 1974:5007].

It can therefore be clearly seen that television was set to take on the authoritarian characteristics that had made radio in South Africa a bone of contention. The ruling elite, through their complete monopoly and resulting manipulation of the technology of radio and television programming were able to institute a multi-channel approach to broadcasting which enabled them to promote their policy of Apartheid or separate development. This was made possible through the development of broadcasting technology that allowed the authorities to build a broadcasting infrastructure whilst simultaneously entrenching themselves politically and occupying key offices of the bureaucracy.

The ruling elite were by implication proponents of the ideology of the day. They therefore engaged in promoting that ideology through as many means as possible of which broadcasting was a major component. Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:70-71] suggest that there was a

"conscious attempt to establish the new SABC programming policy and organization as representing the national interest".

Most importantly, this 'national interest' was and still is that of the ruling National Party interest and it was through broadcasting that the ruling elite attempted to "maintain the divisions of culture, race and class in accordance with the Nationalist governments policy, thereby benefiting the the hegemonic alliance as a whole". [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:71].

The 'national interest' was one of the ruling elite; but it was more specifically that of those controlling the SABC like Piet Meyer, Albert Hertzog and Douglas Fuchs. Indeed, David Harrison reports that Fuchs' (Director General from 1972 to 1974) views on broadcasting were that, "We are at war. We are involved in the politics of survival. The SABC cannot stand aside. We cannot cast doubt on the rulers of the country. No useful purpose can be served by causing the public distrust of our leaders' policies". [Harrison, 1981:208].

It is these views - the views of the controllers - that were the predominant ones over the airwaves. The controllers had gained almost unlimited power. Their ideology was that of the ruling politicians and their vision was one that promoted Afrikaner Nationalism as the sole legitimate ideology to be adopted by all to the virtual exclusion of others. This then, is the authoritarian legacy inspired by the neo-Calvinist ethic [see Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:42-44] that came to be the dominant feature of the political characteristics of the SABC.

Having studied the historical process whereby South Africa entered the broadcasting age; harnessed new technology in support of the ruling elite and moved to a highly emotive and politicised debate

surrounding the introduction of television, it is now necessary to look at the SABC during the contemporary period (1976 - 1989) to judge the current state of the organization and comment on any visible continuities or changes.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **THE CONTEMPORARY CHARACTERISTICS OF SABC TELEVISION: 1976-1989**

The SABC today remains by far the most powerful broadcasting service operating within South Africa. Its diverse services reach a daily audience of many millions who also rely on the many news broadcasts to keep them abreast of local and foreign events.

Indeed, news listening and viewing provide probably the most convenient form of information gathering for most people and it is this area of the SABC that has continually faced an ever increasing barrage of criticism that has touched upon the entire management of the corporation and has strongly questioned the legitimacy of the broadcasting authority.

This chapter will highlight the continuing authoritarian influences maintained from the historical example in Chapter Three by the dominant State-run SABC. Television has enjoyed its own unique relationship with the ruling elite resulting in the identification of many characteristics employed by the ruling National Party in order to seek compliance from this relatively new service. It shall be important to note and contrast these influences with the wider broadcasting system to be discussed in Chapter Five.

The news and public affairs division of the SABC has in the contemporary period devoted itself to the dissemination of the views of the National Party. Newscasts have continually reflected the views and opinions of Nationalist cabinet ministers and have given proportionately greater lengths of time to the ruling National Party in virtual exclusion of other alternative political viewpoints.

Coupled with this was ideological interference in documentaries and other entertainment programming with directives from the controllers ruling the activities of the corporation as per the views of the

ruling political party. Such authoritarian interference in these selected areas of operations culminated in the contemporary period with a virtual direct order from the State President to remove the Director-General of the SABC of his post.

Whilst since the late fifties, there had been considerable opposition to the introduction of television in South Africa, 1976 heralded the beginning of a full television channel. This was to be a key year in the restructuring and development of broadcasting since this country was one of the last advanced economies to receive a fully operational television service.

With the approval of the Broederbond [see Chapter Three and Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:280] and after some months of test transmissions in 1975, a television service was launched on 5 January 1976. This service (later known as TV1) was set to become South Africa's flagship broadcast media channel. High viewership figures were punted in order to gain sufficient advertising revenue to provide a selection of top entertainment mingled amongst steady doses of 'public affairs' or news programming. This channel was later supplemented with the Black language services of TV2 and TV3 and TV4 which utilized the non-broadcast hours on the TV2 and TV3 transmitter network in 1985.

Indeed, having seen the increased governmental control that existed over the radio services of the SABC in Chapter Three, it is apparent that there was a great deal of continuity into the television era. This was also due to the 'Broederbondization' of the SABC which had begun in the sixties and had extended to the point where by 1977, there were forty-nine Broeders in the SABC and by 1978 "at least four

of the nine members of the Board of Management were members of the Broederbond". [Harrison, 1981:207]. It should be noted that with the public and press exposure of the aims and activities of the secret Broederbond society in the late seventies, its influence diminished in the years following the introduction of television.

Keyan Tomaselli and Graham Hayman [1989:153-154] suggest that there were three key reasons for the introduction of television. Firstly, the rapidly developing communications technology meant that in order for the SABC to retain as much control of the broadcasting system as possible, it would be necessary to provide the country with its own distinct broadcasting service in order to maximize control on programme output.

Secondly, there was a movement from primary to secondary industry that also saw the convergence of the English and Afrikaans economic groups which increasingly were one in defending the ideology of the State - a convergence that could be promoted through the judicious use of the television medium.

The third reason was the emergence of a technological revolution that saw world wide development and deployment of low cost consumer electronics that could simply not be ignored by the local authorities. [see Tomaselli et al, 1989:153-154]. This highlights the desire on the part of the authorities to remain in control over the technology as well as the message broadcast as far as possible whilst simultaneously bowing to popular public pressure for the introduction of television.

The initial television service was made up of one single bilingual station that broadcast for five hours per evening divided equally

between the two official languages. The only truly bilingual television programme was the extended sports coverage broadcast on a Saturday afternoon. It should be noted that the refusal to split the single television station into two separate language channels meant that both language groups were largely forced to watch programmes in their second language. However, this also meant that the lack of bilingualism saw two virtually independent services operate side by side and often duplicate programmes.

As the basis for all its broadcasting operations, the SABC adhered to the Broadcasting Act of 1936 which is a statutory act and was repealed and replaced in 1976 with the introduction of television. The 1936 act had as its basis the promulgation of the SABC as the sole "transmitter" and "broadcaster" in South Africa. [see the SA Yearbook, 1981:761]. The broadcasting license was further updated in 1979 and its clauses indicate the close relationship the broadcasting authority enjoyed with the ruling elite as it was largely their monopoly service.

The updated act "provides that with due observance of the Christian character of the Republic, the Corporation shall broadcast its programmes:

(a) to afford all the national communities of the Republic of South Africa the opportunity of achieving full self-realization within their own cultural and social spheres;

(b) with due regard to the prevailing conventions and customs of the different national communities, to encourage and promote cordial and sound relations between those communities;

(c) to disseminate information, to entertain and to educate; and

(d) to report newsworthy current events in the Republic and abroad clearly, unambiguously, factually, impartially and without distortion."

[from The Government Gazette, Notice 1249, 15 June 1979]

The above clauses can therefore be seen to be a direct manifestation of government policy and its desire to control broadcasting and took into account the pluralist policy adopted by the ruling National Party. Over and above these clauses were others that related to the maintenance of acceptable societal standards and values which guarded against broadcasts that were "blasphemous, contained distasteful details of torture and pornography". [Dalling, 1973:179-180]. These terms are also based upon the conditions for the television service as outlined by the official Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to Television. [see Hachten and Giffard, 1982:209].

More importantly, however, was the inclusion within the broadcasting license of the following clauses that were open to considerable interpretation by the controllers of the corporation - namely the ruling National Party. The SABC was unable to broadcast material that:

"(a) is contrary to any rule of law;

(b) may inflame public opinion or may directly or indirectly lead to any contravention of the law or may threaten the security of the State;

(c) may cause unrest or panic;

(d) may hamper any Government department in the execution of its duties; or

(e) is calculated to damage the Republic's image abroad". [Dalling, 1983:180].

From these conditions, it is clearly visible that any ruling body can interpret such clauses according to their own subjective political bias. The practical application of these conditions (as interpreted by the broadcasting authorities) are a reflection upon the external and internal political environment. It was therefore only natural that with the extensive control that the ruling National Party enjoyed over the broadcast media, their interpretation would become the order of the day at the SABC. It should be emphasized that similar conditions also apply to the broadcasting media outside South Africa and specifically to the BBC which is not specifically party or ideologically oriented.

Indeed, the difference here is the National Party's subjective application of such clauses compared to the relatively objective employment thereof in the United Kingdom. It should also be noted that the conditional go-ahead given by the Broederbond for the introduction of television (as outlined in Chapter Three) was bound to manifest itself in the rules and charter governing the style of broadcasting as well as in the content of the broadcasts itself.

National Party domination of the SABC is maintained through the board of the SABC (comprising between 5 and 15 members) being appointed by the South African State President who is also the leader of the dominant National Party. In 1987, there were fourteen members of the board all appointed by the State President as well as a presiding Chairman of the Board and the Director-General.

In addition there exists a Management Committee which currently consists of the Director-General, three Deputy Directors general in charge of programmes, technology and finance as well as the Director-

in-chief of News who have all been appointed by the board. Whilst the board is largely responsible for determining broadcasting policy, the Management Committee "determines policy and general strategies and guidelines for achieving corporate objectives". [from "The SABC Today", pp25].

These appointees adhere to the philosophy ("Mission") of the SABC which, according to the SABC Annual Report [1988:1] desires to "inform, educate and entertain the differing cultural groups constructively" as well as "disseminate a positive message about South Africa and it's peoples". Such terms as "constructively" and "positive" are seen by many critics of the SABC as value judgments and the implementation thereof will largely be determined by the conceptual understanding of the controllers of the corporation as defined by their governmental superiors.

These stipulations must therefore always be taken into account when dealing with the politics of broadcasting in South Africa because the justification for the bias in favour of the ruling elite is largely based on the provisions of the charter and until this is changed, SABC political content is likely to remain intact.

#### 4.1 THE EARLY YEARS OF TELEVISION:

##### Emerging Characteristics:

It was within this context that the SABC introduced its television service at considerable expense. The minister of National Education Piet Koornhof, under whose auspices the SABC fell, disclosed that by the end of 1976 the creation (capital costs) of TV1 were about R70 million with operating costs for that year totaling R36 800 000. [Argus:11/02/1976]. This meant that at the beginning of 1976, the

SABC found itself facing a large debt although this did not deter the authorities.

Already at this early stage, the control of the ruling elite regarding news reporting and public affairs programming became apparent. The SABC refused to provide the National Union of South Africa Students (Nusas) with the "right of reply" to certain allegations made by an opposing student organization through the evening television news broadcast. This refusal was confirmed by the then public relations officer, Hein Jordaan who stated that "it was not the corporation's policy to allow organizations or businesses equal TV time to comment on news bulletins". [Argus:17/03/1976].

This implied a rejection of the liberal "right to reply" value that is institutional within the broadcasting media of Democratic nations. Further evidence of this was a refusal to allow opposition political parties time to state their case regarding the 1976 budget with the Minister of Finance having the sole say "since he had presented the budget". [Piet Koornhof in Cape Times:01/04/1976].

It was evident from this early stage that the television service would be used for official announcements from governmental ministries via their respective Ministers. Vause Raw of the United Party reporting that in one night "he had counted 11 Cabinet Ministers who had appeared during television news bulletins". [Argus:24/04/1976]. This was born out in a survey conducted by the Weekend Argus [12/06/1976] which found that "SATV news bulletins devoted more than 80 percent of their political coverage to speeches and statements by Cabinet Ministers".

A further characteristic of the television service came through its use of domestically produced news background/documentary programmes that were shown outside that of official news bulletin times. These included topics that praised the 'homelands' concept and were described in a Rand Daily Mail editorial as "probably the most important and insidious aspect of the SABC programming". [Rand Daily Mail:15/06/1976]. These programmes were later to be classified as "public affairs" programming and became a feature of the extended nightly "Network" news broadcasts.

These early characteristics indicated that the new television broadcasting service was to be used to maintain the dominant view of the ruling order. In the debate on the Broadcasting Act of 1976, the SABC was accused of moving away from parliamentary accountability to direct governmental influence and interference. Indeed, Nationalist M.P. Barend Du Plessis admitted the party political bias of the corporation by stating that "it was only natural that if the board of Governors was appointed by the ruling party, it would reflect the feelings of the majority". [Argus:31/03/1976].

As highlighted earlier, the Broadcasting Act made provision for the board of the SABC to be appointed by the Prime Minister (or later State President) but once this had been done, the government deemed that the board and therefore the SABC as a whole was autonomous and acted in a fair and unbiased fashion not being a party political instrument. Opposition spokesmen mistrusted this governmental interpretation of the character of the SABC and there were continual calls for the establishment of "an independent committee to act as judge which would report to Parliament via the SABC and the responsible minister". [Cape Times:31/03/1976].

Such requests came at a time when the government spokesman, Piet Koornhof, had declared that he would "never allow politics on television" and dismissed any chance of holding political debates as was done in other major Western nations. The Cape Times, in commenting on Koornhof's statement, declared that it was only opposition politics that would be suppressed on the SABC and that Koornhof "was expressing one of the common illusions of primitive societies. This is the illusion that to suppress conflicting opinion is to achieve approval of the criticized policy". [Cape Times:05/04/1976]. This highlighted the reluctance on the part of the SABC and their controllers to broadcast programmes with politically controversial participants.

An early feature of television programming was a lack of immediacy in reporting. This was due to a vetting process that took place before the respective news and public affairs programmes were aired to enable any editing to take place. This resulted in a "palace revolt" at the SABC during the early part of 1976 that saw "programmes being produced as close as possible to viewing time to stop cutting and shelving of scheduled programmes". [Sunday Times, 11/04/1976].

The early years were also characterised by a marked lack of Black faces on television screens justified by the continual reference to the planning and implementation of a separate Black language television station. There were also technical interruptions of the television services which were often manifest during news broadcasts.

Public censure was also leveled at the content of programmes and for many years, the daily press was besieged by letters of complaint as to programme selections and content. Ray Wilson, head of television

presentation at Wits University attacked the "lack of novelty and originality" in the television service along with "lack of apologies for breakdowns, indeed sometimes no acknowledgment at all that anything is wrong, is prevalent". [Rand Daily Mail:07/01/1977].

It should, however, be noted that the service was in its infancy and too high a level of programme sophistication could not really be expected although the technically superior German PAL colour system was successfully introduced.

Television came to South Africa late resulting in comparisons being drawn between the new service and the already very firmly established British and American examples - a comparison which in retrospect is unfair especially in the light of the SABC securing some of the world's best television programmes such as "Rich Man Poor Man", "The World at War" and "Civilization" in its first year of operation.

However, in a scathing criticism of SABC policy, a former SATV children's programme producer, Desmond Bishop, whilst acknowledging an initial lack of experience and inherent difficulties within the medium itself, nevertheless ascribes the failure of the television service to live up to high standards to the fact that "South Africa is a taboo-burdened society (and) where legislation runs out, intimidation does the rest". [Argus:10/03/1977].

Bishop goes on to cite four key characteristics of the SABC that he encountered during his short spell at the corporation:

"(1) In order for the Government to exercise its power, almost the entire superstructure of the SABC is in the hands of the Afrikaans section;

(2) An unwritten rule exists in the English Variety Department that no Black face is allowed to appear on the box more than once every three weeks;

(3) The entire superstructure gives the Afrikaans children's section access to these facilities while no English programme has yet succeeded in being adequately supplied;

(4) I was told that it was wrong for the scarecrow to make friends with the birds. The farmer expected him to 'shoo' the birds away and by making friends with them, he was undermining the authority of the farmer".

[from Argus:10/03/1977].

These generalized impressions correspond with those of William Hachten [1979:63] who mentions the use of television by the National Party as "a propaganda instrument that espouses the political goals and aspirations of Afrikanerdom". He also refers to the tight control over the news and public affairs programmes and the "avoiding of what it (the government) considers the distortions of the English language press".

Indeed, the advent of a monopoly television station broadcasting 50% of its news in English must have been a tremendous incentive for the government to provide the necessary funds for the implementation of television as it was finally able to counter the anti-Nationalist sentiments of the English language press which had for so long been an irritant.

The new television service was also seen as one that would "promote and protect the language and culture of the 2.6 million Afrikaners against the inroads of Anglo-American mass culture". [Hachten,

1979:63]. The perceived negative influences of foreign pop culture was one of the reasons for the long delay in the implementation of television in South Africa.

Indeed, the question is whether the SABC can really be said to have effectively achieved this and therefore shielded its viewers from this "media imperialism" that was seen as threat to the Afrikaner's "traditional values and culture"? [Hachten, 1979:63]. Already within the first year of television the SABC screened some of the world's most popular television programmes - much of which was violent in nature (crime/police shows such as 'Kojak' and 'Columbo').

John Van Zyl, then a senior lecturer in charge of radio, film and television studies at Wits University criticized the use of non-controversial material aired nightly. Also highlighted after the first year of television was the use of innocuous documentaries on the sea; bland anti-communist documentaries resulting in a lack of any meaningful discussion; the doctoring of certain programmes and the "pyramid of access" on news bulletins where the SABC interviews certain selected individuals "that can be relied upon to trot out obligingly the familiar bogeymen of communism, corrupt black governments and 'hypocritical' Western politicians". [Wilkins and Strydom, 1978:282].

Van Zyl added that these characteristics indicate "that behind every educational programme lies the paranoia of the Nationalist - that discussion will lead to the questioning of authority, the Word revealed if not made flesh". [Star:05/01/1977]. Also highlighted against the background of news emanating from the Soweto unrest is that "the greatest strength of TV is the immediacy - the fact of

simultaneity - that something is happening now and you are watching it and this is seldom exploited by SABC-TV. Not just because of technical reasons but for ideological ones. Actual news is dangerous, it cannot be predigested and controlled". [Star:05/01/1977].

It is perhaps noteworthy that whilst for many years, the only live programmes broadcast were those containing sports coverage, the SABC shied away from the transmission of live television programmes (other than formal news broadcasts) as they had a "real fear of the informal, the unpredictable, and the random. The broadcasters always want to be in control of things". [Hachten and Giffard, 1984:213].

Van Zyl [Star:05/01/1977] also highlights the subtle introduction of propaganda in programming when "the broadcast authority intervenes between the viewer and the process and filters away the process or event". It is here that the authorities impose their world view where the SABC "cushions the viewer against too much reality" whilst providing a service that is "good, safe entertainment". [Star:05/01/1977]. Similarly, Hachten [1979:65] has also characterised the early years of television in South Africa as being "bland, innocuous and safe - clearly intended to safeguard moral standards".

Van Zyl [Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:282] detects "several built in features that comment visually on the words spoken by the newsreader". These included graphical representations shown as backdrops to the news reader on the nightly 20h00 news bulletin on TV1. These took the form of the hammer and sickle on a map of Angola as well as the use of graphic caricatures of Jimmy Carter and Fidel Castro which strongly contrasted with the pleasant depiction of Prime Minister Vorster. This was coupled with the over-exposure of selected

news commentators lending a visible bias to the news which tended to confuse commentary and opinion with the actual hard news facts.

Hachten reports that minor controversies that emerge within the policy making at the SABC reveal much surrounding the character of the organization itself. In 1978, suggestions were made that the nightly five minute epilogue be periodically given by a Rabbi only to be told by a spokesman for the SABC, Retief Uys, that "South Africa being a Christian nation, only members of Christian denominations are invited to take part in regular religious programmes". [Hachten and Giffard, 1984:212].

This religious bias coupled with the same political indicates, according to Van Zyl, that the SABC "gives a weird picture of the world - a self-centered view of South Africa as a badly misunderstood and wrongly persecuted little nation that is a bastion of Christian democracy". [Hachten and Giffard, 1984:213].

#### **4.2 OVERT AND COVERT CONTROLS ON TELEVISION OUTPUT:**

##### **Unrest Reporting:**

It should also be noted that whilst a new form of broadcast media had been launched within South Africa, so had a new political climate which also influenced the controllers of broadcasting. The political unrest of 1976, "obliged radio and television to adopt new approaches towards informing the public without falling into the trap - as has happened so often in other parts of the world - of being an instrument for promoting unrest and panic". [SABC Annual Report, 1976:15].

Guidelines adopted by the SABC included "not exploiting the dramatic potential of isolated incidents in a manner that would lead to a distorted picture". [SABC Annual Report, 1976:15]. This resulted in unrest news down-played on television newscasts with very few visuals aired.

The SABC also felt that "the opinion of the silent majority should be solicited in areas affected by disturbances and that the voice of reason should be made audible and that inciting utterances should be avoided". [SABC Annual Report, 1976:15]. This meant that those anti-government activists were to receive little or no airtime whilst Blacks who supported the Government in its desire to quell the unrest should receive prominence.

These guidelines were justified by the SABC in "helping to avert the inducement of panic and emotional tensions" as "the story told by the camera in dramatic fashion frequently distorts the truth and fails to promote real understanding of a situation" whereas the SABC strives for "a conscious effort to establish a spirit of optimism and trust in the future". [SABC Annual Report, 1977:11]. Hachten [1979:69] quotes Giffard as saying that as a consequence of this policy, "anxious South Africans, assured by the SABC that all was quiet, had to read their morning newspaper to find that all hell had broken loose the night before".

These conditions for the reporting of unrest meant that it became necessary for certain producers (particularly those in the television services) to provide self-censorship in order to continue working for the SABC and have their material broadcast.

Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:111] quote an unnamed producer working within the SABC documentary department during the Soweto unrest who suggested filming a programme that would look at the causes of the unrest as well as the feelings of the people of Soweto only to be told by the SABC management, "Just keep your nose out of it, it's got nothing to do with you. We don't want that kind of television coverage".

The characteristics of SABC coverage of the Soweto uprisings were similar to the disturbances between 1984 and 1986. Virtually no visuals of violence were shown on the main evening newscasts with State of Emergency regulations forbidding the entry of foreign camera crews into the trouble areas. This, according to Frederickse [1986:8] may be due to an instruction from PW Botha issued in 1980 "not to feature reports of the onslaughts on South Africa by revolutionary elements as main news items".

#### Internal Production "Gatekeeping":

Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:116] cite censorship exercised by the Organizers of the English Magazine department within the SABC who, whilst "not actively promoting a pro-Government standpoint, act as a barrier preventing producers from recording ideologically sensitive material on the one hand, while absorbing consensual discourse from upper management on the other hand translating this into organizational practice". This occurred particularly in relation to the magazine programmes of "Midweek", "Women Today" and "Spectrum". [see Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:115].

This provided a guide for producers to produce work that would be favourable to their immediate superiors or would simply not be shown

at all. This was publicly exposed when dismissed producer, Kevin Harris, reported before the Steyn Commission saying that "any prospective programme conflicting with Broederbond or National Party ideology was not broadcast". [Race Relations Survey, 1981-1982:98-99].

Whilst governmental interference occurred unevenly throughout the news and actuality programmes of SABC television, Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:116-120] cite clear examples of "post production interference" by management in SABC television documentaries which included "Black Education", "Under the Southern Cross" and "The Miner". Further extreme examples of meddling were to be found in the Donna Wurzel produced edition of "Woman Today" entitled "Maids and Madams" as well as the Kevin Harris produced documentary on Baragwanath Hospital.

This type of criticism indicates that even though producers may be expected to tow the line, it is evident that many of those that have been employed by the SABC are indeed politically alien to the National Party and due to pressures placed on their creativity may find it difficult to continue working. Dave Dalling [Hansard, 17/02/1978:1293] quotes a source close to the SABC as describing interviewers and producers at the SABC conducting themselves "with their hands tied behind their backs. It is a castrated service produced by castrated producers".

It should also be noted that such self-censorship and the possible variables within the political views of employees of the corporation manifest themselves in the production of television programmes dealing with topical issues that often have to be altered at the last moment in order to comply with the views of the broadcasting authorities.

One of the most visible signs of such activity took place in 1981 in an interview with the visiting former British Prime Minister, Ted Heath on the foremost news actuality magazine programme, "Midweek". The discussion dealt at length with the topical (and controversial) topic of the Nyanga Squatters near Cape Town but was heavily edited just before the programme was due to be aired. This resulted in the prime-time evening TV1 schedule being completely adapted in order to accommodate late editing. In this particular instance, it was established that the producer of the programme was himself, unaware, of the editing and resulting cuts that were to be made. [Sunday Times:10/09/1981].

It is evident therefore, that the covert and overt controls of the output of broadcasting across the programme production sphere and particularly within the news/public affairs programmes are authoritarian in nature. The directive on the nature and contents of the programme is set from above (the controllers or 'gatekeepers') with little chance of the alternative viewpoint being aired. The appointment of senior programme directors that are ideologically one with the state lends further control to this scenario.

However, the influence of individual staff members can not be discounted and whilst they themselves may not follow the official party political line, they nevertheless are forced to comply. At the same time, this highlights the conflict between the broadcasting authorities and the producers indicating that whilst control may be effective, the personal involvement of anti-establishment producers and journalists affect complete control and compliance and may create important anomalies.

Such anomalies were evident again in the "Midweek" and "Spectrum" magazine programmes as well as in the arts oriented "Portfolio" programme. [see Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:121]. On radio, the "Radio Today" programme has constantly broadcast (albeit somewhat limited) alternative viewpoints. These elements of opposition leave the door open for an examination of the contradictions within the broadcast media regarding the extent and nature of control. [see Chapter Five].

#### 4.3 GENERAL ELECTION AND REFERENDA COVERAGE:

Since the inception of television, there have been four general election or referenda campaigns in South Africa. The first, in 1977 which was just over one year since the introduction of television, saw the ruling elite exert considerable influence on the SABC and it was clearly discernible that election coverage and manipulation thereof would be one of the most useful aspects of the broadcast media to the ruling National Party.

When dealing with an election within a democratic society, the expectation is created that the voting public be free to elect and compose the government of their choice whether it be the same as before or totally changed. This implies that all participating political parties would be entitled to fair and balanced coverage in order to provide the public with the most accurate picture possible.

Indeed, Brian Page of the New Republic Party stated in 1981 that "after all, the idea of an election is that all parties have an equal chance and therefore should all be given equal time on television". [Hansard, 18/09/1981:4186]. However, in the four national polls (including the 1983 Referendum) since the introduction of television,

the reality has shown otherwise.

### The 1977 General Election:

This election saw a number of informal surveys conducted by various newspapers in order to gauge the the SABC party political coverage during the campaign. These surveys all concurred with the Sunday Times of 06 November 1977 concluding that over a one week period (October 25 to November 01) the "Government was given nearly five times as much exposure as the two main opposition parties". [Sunday Times:06/11/1977 also see separate survey in The Star:23/11/77].

The survey, monitored over 42 nights until the election found that the National Party received two hours, 24 minutes and 13 seconds of television coverage to the four combined opposition parties (PFP, NRP, SAP and HNP) tally of 30 minutes and 55 seconds. [see The Argus:30/11/1977].

A Rhodes University study undertaken by Marion Whitehead and Roy Cockayne also showed that during 12 monitored newscasts, "the National Party received 81% of political time, other White opposition parties received 8.4% of political time, Government sanctioned Black bodies received 10.5% of political time and any other Black organizations 0%". [see The Argus:22/02/1978].

### The 1981 General Election:

A similar picture was to emerge after the 1981 election. According to the Unisa ELEKOM '81 survey undertaken by Stephen Finn, the representation of political parties on television has been "given to the parties in direct relationship to their strength in parliament" which would clearly benefit National Party dominance if one crudely

accepts that political bias equals political success. [see Cape Times:29/07/81].

Another survey conducted by the English speaking 'watchdog' group, the 'Fortypercenters', showed that "the NP which fielded 42% of the 368 candidates received 66% of political time; the HNP which had 23% of the candidates received 9% of political time; the PFP which had 21% of the candidates received 19% of political time with NCP coverage minimal". [Sunday Express:29/03/1981]. This indicated that the time allocation was closely related to the existing representation of each respective political party in the previous parliament although the HNP coverage remains generous considering they had no public representatives.

Against this background, surveys conducted in 1981 showed a clear bias towards the ruling National Party. The Fortypercenters survey, showed that during February of that year, "the NP received 1200% more news coverage on TV than the PFP". [Sunday Express:29/03/1981]. The survey [Argus:07/04/1981] also showed National Party representatives being given coverage not worthy of their news value. Opposition spokesmen were mainly seen complimenting the government thus providing the authorities with the argument that the opposition enjoyed considerable coverage. [see Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:87-89 and Sunday Express:29/03/1981].

Indeed, the key point here is the quality of coverage in that visuals of NP speakers will largely highlight their main point whilst that of opposition figures are likely to be edited or watered-down. Such bias, it must be said, was also apparent in the English and Afrikaans press with both groups strongly favouring their respective political parties. However, as a public corporation which should theoretically

be as objective as possible, the bias in favour of the NP was clearly visible.

### The 1983 By-Elections and the Referendum:

These characteristics are again evident when dealing with findings that analyze key by-elections and the constitutional Referendum of 1983. Greg Garden, in the Rand Daily Mail, found that in a two week period between April 18 and May 01 1983 (pre-Transvaal by-elections), "the National Party commanded 79.1% of air time devoted to political matters". [Rand Daily Mail:05/05/1983].

Garden reported extreme exposure to Cabinet Ministers where "Cabinet and Deputy Ministers were quoted or appeared on the television news 94 times in the 14 days of the analysis with a new low point in partisanship being reached in 8pm news news bulletin of Friday April 29 when no fewer than 10 Cabinet Ministers were referred to". [Rand Daily Mail:05/05/1983].

Such use would seem to bear out the often used justification of Retief Uys, then spokesman for the SABC, who stated that "an absolute balance between political parties is not possible because newsworthiness is taken into account all the time. And it is a fact of life that it is the people in power who make the news". [Rand Daily Mail:25/11/1977].

This official explanation bears a very close resemblance to that provided by National Party speakers in parliament who justified the preponderance of Cabinet Ministers on television by arguing, "If a certain Minister or any other person appears on television more than once a week, we should not say that he is being given preferential

treatment. He appears there because he is topical and because he is a newsmaker". [Mr. G.P.D. Terblanche in Hansard, 12/05/1977:7844].

Similarly, National Party parliamentarian Piet Du Pontes said that "the NP as the governing party determines the direction in which this country moves, and as such the statements and actions of its leaders are, after all, far more newsworthy than the, at times, extravagant statements and actions of basically irrelevant parties and their leaders". [Hansard, 17/09/1981:4166]. This clearly indicates the authoritarian view of broadcasting as perceived by the National Party.

There can be little doubt that the ruling personalities (Cabinet Ministers) will receive prominence on television. This is likely to occur in many democratic countries as names do make news but the key element here is the confusion between objective news from the government of the day and the use thereof to promote that particular government.

Indeed, this has been the justification since the inception of television for the bias shown towards the National Party. Whilst newsworthiness is subjective the aforementioned survey figures even allowing for the SABC's explanation, would indicate that "only a television service which is over-whelmingly an official service will provide such an accessible platform for Government views which are not tested or probed by informed viewers". [John Van Zyl in the Sunday Times, 16/07/1978].

This is particularly evident if one takes into account the fact that "the constant parade of Government spokesmen on TV, whether formally propagating the National Party line or not, serves to reinforce their

authority in the public mind, and hence influence an election". [Marion Whitehead of Rhodes University replying to Hein Jordaan in Argus:25/04/1978].

It is worth noting Greg Garden's concluding remarks in referring to the 1983 by-election coverage. He says that "this content analysis of political representation on SABC-TV news was undertaken to remove - once and for all - from the realm of conjecture, the extreme National Party bias of the SABC. The results are even more stunning than even I would have ventured". [Rand Daily Mail:05/05/1983].

Statistics are again available for determining the bias in favour of a "yes" vote in the 1983 Referendum. In an extensive survey the week 17-23 October, Garden found that total "yes" coverage amounted to 65,7% of political television time with the "no" vote attracting 34.3% of political time. [see also Appendix A: Figure 1]. The SABC further used news background programmes like "News Focus" to explain the constitution to their viewers. This task was entrusted to Professor SAS Strauss who himself had endorsed a "yes" vote in a nation-wide Sunday newspaper advertisement. [Rand Daily Mail: 25/10/1983].

Other characteristics employed by the SABC was the 'first and last word' approach. According to figures released by UNISA's Department of Communications [from Dalling, 1983:182], when a multiple speakers from different political parties appeared on the nightly news, "the NP appeared first 80% and last 64% of the time" as this characteristic was perceived to provide the voting audience with the most lasting impression of what the speaker had to say. Unisa's report goes on to show how both the views of the PFP and HNP surfaced only late in the campaign indicating the almost total subservience to

the National Party and relegation of opposition viewpoints.

### The 1987 General Election:

The most detailed analysis of SABC-TV coverage of a general election came in 1987 with many and varied studies undertaken. Roger Hulley, the PFP Member of Parliament prepared a list of what he referred to as "dirty tricks" employed by the SABC in their election coverage. [Argus:10/04/1987. Also see Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:87-89 and Stewart, 1987:139-151].

These tactics are vitally important in explaining how the SABC is used to present a very definite bias on its newscasts and favour the ruling group. Indeed, many of these characteristics were not new to the 1987 Election but have over the years been used extensively and developed further to the detriment of not only the parliamentary left but also the right-wing political parties.

Hulley cites the following:

- (a) News which is bad for the government is played down but is emphasized when bad for the opposition.
- (b) Bad news locally is positioned with foreign disaster stories to make it appear less damaging. Hachten cites an incident during the school boycotts in Cape Town where no visuals were shown on the evening newscast but instead, viewers were treated to film of unrest in Miami. [see Hachten and Giffard, 1974:214].
- (c) Items damaging to the government may be omitted altogether from news-casts.
- (d) News items can be chosen and emphasized to correspond with issues raised by National Party politicians.
- (e) Camera positions can be used to improve or reduce the image and

effectiveness of the personality talking.

(f) Lighting, use of filters and sound echoes can be used to enhance or affect the image of speakers.

(g) Selectivity in the footage of respective audience members (such as the filming of empty chairs at public meetings) can indicate interest or boredom.

(h) Selective editing can focus upon the strong sections of Government speeches whilst focusing on weak areas of the opposition.

[see "Warning to the Public" by Roger Hulley in Argus, 10/04/1987. Also see Ruth Tomaselli in The Argus, 22 and 29 April 1987].

These were not the only "tricks" used in favouring the ruling group. In an intensive research project into the 1987 General Election, the Rhodes Department of Journalism under Gavin Stewart came to the following conclusions:

1. The National Party received considerably more broadcast time than the other participating (parliamentary) political parties. This included the "Goldilocks effect" where when broadcasting the opinions of the three major political groupings, the SABC tended to allow National Party speakers the last word. Gavin Stewart explains that "the first option seems 'too hard', the second option seems 'too soft' and the final option seems 'just right'". [see Policom report of the Rhodes University Journalism Department, Commentary, 1987:8].

2. None of the political organizations (mainly extra-parliamentary) who opposed the elections themselves, were given any broadcast time whatsoever. [Stewart 1987:08]. This can be contrasted with additional time given to State/Quasi-State speakers (other than National Party) which gave pro-Nationalist speakers 52.6% of the available broadcast

time at the expense of the PFP/NRP/Independents (18.2) and Conservative Party/HNP/ (15.8). [Stewart in Van Vuuren et al. 1987:143 - See Appendix A: Figure 2. Also see SA Barometer, Volume 1. No 3. 10 April 1987 and Volume 1. No 5. 8 May 1987].

3. Sources quoted on television were from acceptable political groups as defined by the SABC (only those parliamentary political parties) who saw the National Party as representing the centre position in South African politics indicating the close working relationship between the NP and the SABC. [see Stewart in Van Vuuren et al, 1987:148].

4. The SABC allowed the National Party to set the election agenda by giving it opportunity to criticize the opposition groups when and how it saw best. This applied throughout the campaign with preference given to speeches by Cabinet Ministers and access to the NP to promote items that would slur the opposition. [see Stewart in Van Vuuren et al, 1987:148].

Ruth Tomaselli of the University of Natal has highlighted the trust that white television viewers have for news-readers. She argues that this factor should be taken into account when one realizes that "throughout the election, SABC-TV worked to mobilize voters to the NP through emphasis, selection, omission and misrepresentation (where) character assassinations of both PFP and CP candidates were carefully presented in quotations from government sources, thus excusing the SABC from blame". [Argus, 05/12/1987].

Tomaselli [Argus, 05/12/1987] argues that Nationalist candidates were treated far more deferentially than their opposition counterparts and were "allowed to use the interview as a platform from which they

could state their prepared argument without having its basic premise challenged" as was the case with opposition candidates. Again the technique of "electioneering presented as news" was also used as well as its inverse where news is presented as electioneering and affords a speaker a chance to drive home an electioneering point of view whilst reacting to a specific news event. [see Tomaselli in The Argus:22/04/1987].

The importance of SABC television in electioneering is outlined in a study by Conradie et al. [1987]. They argue that television usually focuses on various selected themes within an election campaign and "it is usually therefore the television agenda that moulds the final election agenda among members of the public. In the case of the present study, this means that it can be concluded that those individual themes highest on the television agenda (namely, reform, segregation/apartheid, the onslaught against the country and Government action against unrest] were also high on the public's agenda while voting. It can also be concluded that the disproportionate television coverage given to the candidates of the NP could have contributed to a view that the NP as being more important than the other parties". [Conradie et al., 1987:162].

#### **4.4 THE SABC AND THE EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY ORGANIZATIONS:**

It should be noted that since the 1983 Referendum and the resulting formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the SABC has seen fit to define the legitimacy of the political groupings within the country. The parameters of mainstream politics lies in those working within the system with those who reject it, largely ignored. Indeed, this shows almost a direct correlation between the Governmental attitude of the day to negotiate and accept the 'acceptable'

opposition (albeit sometimes unwillingly) whilst denigrating and silencing the extra-parliamentary or 'unacceptable' opposition.

Even before the introduction of television, Selier [Tomaselli, 1989:89], explains that in relation to the SABC, "the political process simply does not exist outside of the parliamentary context". Similarly, Stewart [1987:9] suggests that this indicates that "the SABC accepts absolutely the National Party definition of political life in South Africa.

Morris [1976:95] also asserts that the SABC subservience to the National Party is based on the predominant view that "the authorities give life, while anything that threatens this order is bad, irrational and is death to the system and the viewer". Needless to say, the ANC has born the brunt of suffering under the National Party definition as has most of the extra-parliamentary organizations.

In this respect, senior television news director, Sakkie Burger has said that "we want to create a climate where people of all persuasions can come together to talk - although we don't want the African National Congress". [Financial Mail, 04/04/1986].

Ruth Tomaselli argues that that "the SABC has excelled in its stereotyping of the ANC as a demonic force and almost invariably, reports about the ANC are in terms of violence and terrorism. The process of demonization has been undertaken at all levels: in news reports on radio and television as well as in-depth current affairs programmes such as Network". [Graaf(ed), 1988:22].

Tomaselli goes on to explain the use of the morning "Comment" radio programme [see Chapter Three] in labeling the ANC as "folk devils;

incarnations of evil and inhumanity who are without conscience in their single-minded determination to overthrow the norms of civilized society". [Graaf(ed). 1988:22]. Regarding television coverage, Tomaselli explains the value of the language used in news broadcasts that "is controlled in such a way to favour definitions issuing from the state". [Graaf(ed). 1988:26].

Coupled with this is the use of varying "para-linguistic conventions" which includes the use of linguistic codes maintaining and reinforcing the stereotype of the ANC as 'terrorists' and 'communists' rather than more legitimate political actors. [Graaf (ed). 1988:26].

It is therefore apparent that the State-run broadcasting services have clearly attempted to portray the extra-parliamentary organizations in a negative light. It should be noted that prominent anti-apartheid figures like the head of the South African Council of Churches, Reverend Beyers Naude and UDF patron Reverend Alan Boesak were often associated with the ANC thus providing the SABC with a useful means of discrediting their opponents. These authoritarian characteristics .pawhich prevented those affected with a 'right to reply' to visible smears, were particularly evident during the mid-eighties and subsequent State of Emergency. [see also Frederickse, 1986:10-11].

#### **4.5 DIRECT GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE:**

A key element of authoritarianism in the public affairs and news programming of the SABC has been the manifestation of direct governmental manipulation and control exercised by elements within the managerial structures of the corporation as well as by

Governmental officials as senior as the State President himself.

### The Information Scandal:

In November 1978, the Mostert Commission publicized its findings relating to the misuse of funds by the Department of Information. These revelations later become known as the 'Info Scandal' and were to rock the Afrikaner political establishment implicating Cabinet Ministers and even the State President. On the day of the publicizing press conference given by Judge Anton Mostert, the SABC virtually ignored the story with the evening television news broadcast omitting coverage of the press conference leaving South Africans to receive the news via both the English and Afrikaans press. [see Pollak, 1981:67].

Pollak quotes J. E. van Zyl, the SABC's director of news services as saying with reference to publicizing Mostert's findings that "the SABC is biding its time, as requested by the government, until the government reports on the information affair. At this time there are no facts, only newspaper speculation by the SAAN group. The real facts are that the English-language newspapers are in a battle with the government". [Pollak, 1981:67].

This led the Argus [07/11/1978] to comment, "The SABC stands rightly condemned today for putting its master's interests before the public's. It has done so for years to the detriment of the country. It puts a halo around the Government's deeds. It covers up faults and failures. It soothes the public conscience. It urges no reform, no changes that are not the Government's. It is the Government's voice. It therefore cannot be relied on for objective presentation of the news and for fair comment. The voice, effectively of one political

party, it is paid for by all South Africans". This description clearly shows the frustration with the authoritarian operation and characteristics of the SABC.

### The SABC and the "Total National Strategy":

Another example of direct governmental interference which was highly significant as it was this time more overt than covert came in 1980 when the Prime Minister, PW Botha, clearly stated that "the SABC would be directed not to give prominence to revolutionary activities. The SABC was financed by the state and he would ensure that it followed this policy". [Survey of Race Relations, 1980-1981:296]. This clearly linked the practical financial viability of the corporation with continued pro-governmental bias on behalf of the SABC.

This renewed mission to secure complete control over the broadcast media formed part of the "Total National Strategy" that was a feature of the early PW Botha years. This included an intensification of the State security machinery in an effort to curb 'revolutionary' activities and "inculcate in the White public a 'total onslaught' hysteria with programming reflecting and justifying the increased militarization of the South African state". [Davies, 1984:418]. Davies also highlights the post-1978 period which has seen "an increase in the number of programmes designed to boost morale within the armed forces and present the Defence Force's own self-image to the public". [1984:418].

This view was confirmed by Mr. G.P.D. Terblanche of the National Party who stated that, "The SABC is a powerful instrument for impressing upon all the people of this country the reality of South

Africa's threatened situation. The radio and television services of the SABC can become the most important instrument in our struggle for survival". [Hansard, 19/03/1980:3003].

### Direct Ministerial Interference:

In further direct governmental or ministerial interference, in 1981, the then Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr. Piet Koornhof, apparently walked out of a 'Midweek' (the then premier news-background show) programme dealing with issues surrounding the Nyanga Squatters because "he had not been given a prepared list of questions". [Sunday Times, 10/09/1981].

Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:88] cite sources who claim that "Cabinet Ministers often ask to see the questions first...There were people in the news department who were telephoned daily by the Prime Minister's office" indicating a high degree of direct authoritarian influence in the broadcast of news and public affairs.

Perhaps one of the most surprising events (and perhaps politically significant) in the relationship between the SABC and the government came in 1982 after the split in the National Party and the resulting formation of the Conservative Party led by Dr. Andries Treurnicht.

Following incorrect and unfounded news reports that Dr. Treurnicht had been shot dead coupled with extended television time given to a CP spokesman reacting to the dismissal of Rapport editor, Willem De Klerk, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, Barend Du Plessis, criticized the SABC for allowing the CP considerable air-time and in so doing providing it (the CP) with an opportunity for party-political propaganda. [see Die Burger, 02/09/1982].

Du Plessis' remarks were forthcoming at a time when there was considerable tension within the Afrikaner ruling elite. The split in Afrikanerdom was a cause of concern for the ruling National Party as its institutions such as the SABC became vulnerable to alternative political influences.

It should be noted that this event came under indirect fire by the Steyn Commission into the Media who said that there was a desire on the part of the government to "achieve a position of more direct control over the SABC" with the climate being ripe for a "take-over" which made sense for the ruling elite in the prevailing political uncertainty as the effects of this schism on the electorate had yet to be determined. [see J.J. Roelofse, 1983:73].

#### The Riaan Eksteen Case:

It was within this climate of political tension and uncertainty that Riaan Eksteen was appointed to the position of Director-General in 1983 and was a forerunner to perhaps the clearest example of State intervention in the broadcast media.

Eksteen had been a loyal representative of the National Party as he had been the South African Ambassador to the United Nations as well being first secretary at the South African Embassy in Washington thus having considerable contact with the then Minister in charge of the SABC - namely Pik Botha. Botha's links with Eksteen led commentators to label Eksteen a "protege" [Dave Dalling in Cape Times:07/02/1983] of Botha as evidence exists that he (Botha) actually nominated Eksteen for the position [see Financial Mail:29/04/1988 and Die Burger:18/02/1983].

This prompted the pro-Nationalist Vaderland newspaper to declare that this "unfortunately lends weight to the accusation that the SABC is increasingly being controlled and prescribed to by the Government". [Rapport:06/02/1983]. Indeed, when questioned on his relationship shortly after assuming his new position of Director-General, Eksteen remarked that, "I will not hide the fact that I've known him (Botha) and worked with him for 18 years and that I have a close relationship with him. I'm not ashamed to say he is a friend of mine". [Argus:07/03/1983].

Eksteen's career at the SABC is fraught with contradictions. The Financial Mail [04/04/1986] wrote in an article critical of the SABC, "What's wrong with the SABC? Why does it regularly give an impression of incompetence, coupled with a radical misreading of public preferences? Is this merely a question of image or is the problem more subtle"? This criticism was a reflection upon the management style of Eksteen himself. The same Financial Mail later declared "Riaan Eksteen did better at turning the SABC around than his critics conceded". [Financial Mail:07/04/1989].

Indeed, Riaan Eksteen was faced with a mammoth task of establishing himself within a corporation of which he had limited experience. This was coupled with the fact that in the administration of a corporation of the nature and size of the SABC, policies that were put into practice by Eksteen's predecessors would still influence the corporation in the immediate years following his appointment.

Eksteen's appointment also came at the time of a recession which naturally saw a marked decline in advertising revenue coupled with the SABC continuing to lose money on the economically unviable TV2

and TV3 Black language television services. This saw the SABC forced to become more profit oriented and adopt a more relaxed news and public affairs policy that allowed for the liberalizing of certain key services [see Chapter Five].

Eksteen has been credited with the rationalization of departments and services within the SABC having reduced the numbers of employees from 7200 to the current 5000. [see Wynand Malan in Sunday Star:14/04/1988]. Eksteen was also witness to the demise of Springbok Radio as a distinct commercial radio station and the introduction of commercials to the so-called 'cultural' English and Afrikaans radio stations. These events were characterised by a public outcry in the press with the Financial Mail commenting that, "the effect on staff and listeners was bewildering, to say the least. Mistrust flourished". [Financial Mail:04/04/1986].

The Eksteen years has also (and has been shown in this chapter) resulted in the very visible bias shown towards the ruling National Party. Eksteen himself, has been loyal to the Government in this respect and was even taken to task by the Media Council of South Africa for stating that the SABC would "not become a platform for those who by word or deed, wish to create revolution, unrest or disruption and the corporation would not reflect the standpoint of those who had opted out of consensus politics". [see Cape Times:03/09/1984 and The Argus:18/10/1984]. In Parliament, Independent M.P. Wynand Malan has suggested that under the management of Riaan Eksteen, "no one can expect the SABC news services to be more propagandistic than they are at the moment". [Pretoria News:14/04/1988].

Eksteen's downfall followed from events directly initiated by the State president. On August 24 1987, the leader of the Labour Party, Allan Hendrickse resigned from Cabinet. According to Pottinger [1988:360], this event was reported "routinely" by the SABC in the 20h00 Network news programme that evening. The reporter in question, Freek Robinson gave prominence to Hendrickse's reasons for resigning as being of his own initiative which angered State President PW Botha. Botha apparently (according to newspaper reports at the time) felt that the news slant should have highlighted the fact that it was Botha himself who saw fit to terminate Hendrickse's Cabinet membership rather than the other way round.

The events of the evening showed clear and direct state intervention in the public affairs/news programming of the SABC. The initial eleven minutes of the particular evening's news broadcast was devoted to the Hendrickse letter of resignation. In the later time slot devoted to news-background material further reports were included that "had just come to light" [see Die Burger:27/08/1987] and lengthy mention was then made of the letter PW Botha had sent to Hendrickse which stated that his membership of the Cabinet was "unacceptable". [The Star:27/08/1987].

This late addition to the earlier news reports followed a personal telephone call from Botha to Eksteen during the transmission of the evening Network news programme to ask him to intervene in the reporting of this specific event. Botha himself had earlier used an entire evening news-cast to castigate Hendrickse for bathing in protest on a "Whites Only" beach and was clearly, in this case, again directly involving himself in the news presentation on television.

The handling of the Hendrickse resignation led to the forced resignation of Riaan Eksteen as Director-General of the SABC. This caused Finance Week [14-20 April 1988] to declare that "the SABC will effectively have to surrender any pretence at being autonomous or independent. It will be universally regarded as an arm of the public service to such an extent that its own statute may as well be scrapped and Stoffel van der Merwe, as the new Minister for Broadcasting Services, appoint a director-general in his department as in any other government departments".

The downfall of Eksteen is interpreted differently by the official opposition, Conservative Party. In an interview with their spokesman on broadcasting, Dr. Pieter Mulder, it is suggested that Eksteen's appointment was based upon his being able to take orders from his superiors as well as benefit his friend, Pik Botha. Mulder feels that this was part of the Pik Botha empire that had as its ultimate goal, the eventual election of Pik Botha as State President.

Mulder argues that Pik Botha has received an inordinate amount of television coverage even in traditional quite news periods like the Christmas season. This occurred during the reign of Eksteen which angered his fellow colleagues and resulted in the administration of broadcasting moving to Alwyn Schlebusch who became the Minister in the State President's office entrusted with Administration and Broadcasting Services.

Coupled with the perilous financial state the SABC found itself in, was the Hendrickse resignation. Both Mulder and the Financial Mail refer to Botha as "irascible and irrational" [see Financial Mail:04/09/1987] and these events pushed Botha to ask for Eksteen to be relieved of his post. It can be argued, that the authoritarian and

imperial nature of the PW Botha Presidency meant that anything that angered the head of state would simply not be tolerated [see Financial Mail:04/09/1987 and Pottinger, 1988:418-421].

In the case of Eksteen, it would seem that even though the broadcasting medium was highly sympathetic towards the National Party, it needed to maintain its sympathy at all times and not digress for one moment. Mulder argues that complete compliance is demanded of the SABC by Nationalists and the Hendrickse report was "just inadequate enough to indicate to the NP leadership that the SABC is not doing enough to promote the NP". [interview with Dr. Mulder 08 June 1988].

According to Mulder, the SABC operated in the late 1980's in an environment of great internal political feuding within the ruling elite coupled with the authoritarian nature of the Presidency. This view would contradict with the official Government explanation for Eksteen's resignation that spoke of "a breakdown in his (Eksteen) relationship with the board and the SABC's poor financial showing". [Sunday Star:24/04/1988].

This reason could largely be attributed to the difficulties that Eksteen inherited rather than caused by himself. Eksteen was, however, given a 'golden handshake' of R650000 and "will receive five years of basic pay but also deferred pension of undetermined value" as compensation for his resignation. [Sunday Star:24/04/1988].

Later reports (based upon the 1988 Annual Report financial statements) suggest that measures adopted by Eksteen were successful in turning the 1987 loss of R13 million into a 1988 record profit of R58.3 million indicating that had Eksteen remained at the SABC, he

could have claimed credit for this turnaround. Ironically, Eksteen's successor, Wynand Harmse stands to inherit a favourable financial position from Eksteen himself. [see Financial Mail:07/04/1988 and 1988 SABC Annual Report].

Perhaps the reasons for Eksteen's downfall can be seen in the visible changes within the SABC since his resignation. Whilst these are difficult to articulate, the most apparent (and immediate) was the appointment of senior news-reporter Johan Pretorius to political editor-in-chief. Pretorius was also entrusted with reporting all news events concerning the State President. This was coupled with the move of the previous political correspondent, Freek Robinson (who reported on the Hendrickse resignation), to the SABC bureau in London.

This could indicate that it was the individual wrath of PW Botha that was instrumental in stamping out any reporting he personally did not like and is born out by the deferential style adopted by Pretorius's reporting of Presidential matters. Essentially therefore, Eksteen was unable to maintain the adequate pro-Nationalist bias that was required whilst simultaneously encouraging advertising revenue that was distinctive of a service increasingly oriented towards entertainment programming. With this explanation, it is then perhaps fitting to agree with the Financial Mail's analysis that Eksteen was a "victim of the political system he supported so avidly".

Yet another example of direct intervention came in later reports showing PW Botha's anger at statements made by the SABC news director, Sakkie Burger during the 1987 all-night election coverage. Beeld Newspaper reported that the State President had "chastised Mr. Burger for not presenting the election results as a triumph for the

National Party". [Argus:16/06/1989]. Mr. Burger was subsequently (and unexpectedly) not appointed Chief Director News and Public Affairs but was rather dispatched to London to open an SABC office in the city. [see also Sunday Times, 11/06/1989].

#### Authoritarianism, Change and the SABC:

In the ten year reign of PW Botha, the SABC has had five Directors-General which does question internal developments within the Presidency and constant attempts to find compliant administrators who will practice and promote National Party policy. As argued in this chapter; over the last ten years, the government has involved itself in the affairs of the SABC to a greater extent than in the previous forty years.

Indeed this is an important point. The increase in Government interference should be seen as part of a two pronged attack on the broadcast media. Firstly as has clearly been shown in this chapter, there can be little doubt that there was a realization within government that the broadcasting services could be a vital asset in winning the hearts and minds of the public (particularly since the introduction of television). However, the constant interference comes in an era of change and reform. The attempts at reform on the part of PW Botha and the National Party meant that a new message had to be inculcated in the minds of the voter.

This was coupled by a shift in the parliamentary attack on the National Party from the liberal PFP to the right-wing Conservative Party. This also necessitated a change in the message conveyed to the electorate. The message further needed fine-tuning with the unrest of 1985 and the resulting declaration of the State of Emergency. These

political shifts should also be seen within the context of a deteriorating economy and declining growth rate resulting in the adoption of profit oriented practices in order to remain financially viable.

Therefore it may be argued that the bias of the SABC can not be judged in a vacuum. It needs constant reference to the National Party leadership, the nature of the Presidency and reflects the reform policies of the National Party and the securocrat notion of the State of Emergency.

The influence of the Broederbond has diminished and has been replaced with a new generation of Afrikaner leadership that increasingly shows considerable sophistication in adapting to change and utilizing the media as events dictate. The resignation of P.W. Botha and the subsequent end of this era itself reflects a dynamic situation that may find the SABC take on new characteristics under changing leadership.

It is therefore apparent that the advent of reform has seen some elements of liberalized thinking begin to emerge within the SABC and its respective controllers. Whilst clear control techniques are discernible within the programme areas discussed, the internal controversies within the SABC would highlight that the gross authoritarianism of the Broederbond era has become fragmented as a result of political and economic changes.

Indeed, the Presidential interference in the Riaan Eksteen affair may be seen as one of the last vestiges of complete or gross authoritarianism (particularly since the resignation of P.W. Botha) in reaction to decreasing subservience to the controlling authorities

and the introduction of a more market oriented service rather than a purely ideological channel.

From this perspective it is possible to discern certain liberalizing anomalies that whilst simultaneously occurring with the authoritarian characteristics outlined, resulted in an important dilution of the control paradigm. These contradictions are a reflection of the changing policy of the ruling National Party as well as of the political and economic dynamics of South Africa and will be discussed in Chapter Five.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

# **ANOMALIES AND CONTRADICTIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM**

It has been clearly shown that direct and effective control over the broadcast medium has been established by the National Party. In an historical context, it has been possible to trace the influence of key personalities who have been associated with the ruling elite and therefore represent a particular ideology. This they can apply from a position of authority resulting in a symbiotic relationship with the ruling elite.

The characteristics of broadcasting have been exposed where the policy and practice of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) as the country's leading broadcast media institution has been largely guided by the National Party its sectional interests.

However, this chapter serves to highlight the move away on the part of the South African broadcast media from the authoritarian position of the past to a more pluralistic and mixed model. This is occurring often concurrently and despite State sponsored authoritarianism and is due to the increasing anomalies found within the realm of broadcasting that have emerged over the last ten years.

From this discussion there can be little doubt that governments shape their specific broadcasting system according to their own political orientation. Throughout the Third World, many one-party states have developed a uni-channel media system where the state enjoys a monopoly particularly in the realm of broadcasting.

This is applicable to Zimbabwe where the state-run broadcast media is likely to continue to be biased in favour of the ruling elite as the movement away from White minority rule, has been replaced with a majority one-party state thus limiting media criticism and access. In another one party-state, Malawi, foreign correspondents are banned from entering the country and there are strict regulations pertaining

to local journalists who may face heavy penalties if their reporting does not please the ruling elite. [see Editor and Publisher, 21/01/1984:16-19].

By comparison, the pluralistic (private and public) British example is based upon the parliamentary democracy of the United Kingdom and its model therefore, needs to be as unbiased as possible preventing the ruling party from dominating broadcasting and precluding opposition groups from threatening the ruling order. [see Head, 1985:70].

In essence, the key here is the ownership of the media as this reflects on the characteristics of the particular national media system. It is evident that with the abandonment of democratic principles largely within the Third-World and other Developing nations, media freedom has deteriorated commensurately.

Within the South African context, reference has been made to the tight political control that exists over the SABC particularly in relation to its monopoly television news coverage. It has been noted that governmental policies are either presented as the only viable option for South Africa and are given extensive coverage on television news broadcasts to the detriment of other opposing views.

This situation has led to the SABC being perceived as a mouthpiece of the National Party by opposition leaders to the left and right of the political spectrum and its close relationship with the ruling party emasculates its originality and objectivity and serves as a rubber-stamp for the dissemination of governmental initiatives and programmes. However, Hachten and Giffard [1984:217] report that "the SABC does enjoy a high credibility with the South African public"

thus enhancing the quality of its pervasiveness.

Having discussed the extent to which the broadcast media is controlled and manipulated, it is important to contrast this control with the tenets of authoritarianism as outlined by Fagen in Chapter Two. [see Chapter Two and Fagen, 1966:24]. This will indicate the extent to which the mass media in South Africa remains within an authoritarian paradigm as the evidence of the previous two chapters would suggest or whether there exists anomalies that make such a categorization difficult.

The extent of political participation and power within South Africa is largely oligarchic in nature. This immediately assumes that a certain proportion of the population may elect a government of their will through the ballot box. Under the new South African Constitution of 1983 (the Tri-Cameral Parliament), it is the ruling party in the House of Assembly that dictates the political agenda based upon the dominant political beliefs of the White electorate. The exclusion of Blacks from the formal parliamentary process effectively sees 20% of the population legislating over the rest.

This entails a degree of political competition for control of the House of Assembly but is supplemented by forces who have rejected the Parliamentary option in favour of a transference of power through extra-parliamentary pressure. Both these groups (intra and extra-parliamentary) vie for support within the broader South African body politic thus making for visible political competition throughout the political spectrum.

Contradictions abound when discussing the scope for available criticism within South Africa. Over the last three years, the State of Emergency has effectively silenced and detained critics of the

government, banned political organizations and has severely restricted or silenced the press. At the same time, there does remain avenues of criticism that range from carefully self-censored press editorials to statements from trade-unions to opposition personalities. The sanctity of Parliament has largely been unaffected and the opposition criticism emanating from that source remains more vociferous than ever.

The key question of how the citizens of the country become informed about the world around them is of direct relevance to this discussion. Indeed, if it is the Whites who largely elect Lasswell's WHO (the ruling National Party) then their source of information plays a vital role in their 'Weltaanschuung'.

The press perform contradictory roles. Whilst operating under severe restrictions the 'Alternative' press serves to criticize government policy and present an alternative information source compared to the 'verligte' main stream pro-Nationalist Afrikaans newspapers. The English press also continue to be highly critical but in an increasingly competitive media market coupled with economic problems find themselves searching for circulation rather than promoting vehement opposition to the ruling party. Indeed, the domination of the SABC in the sphere of the broadcast media and its resulting bias towards the National Party means a compliant radio and television service although this is tempered by key anomalies and contradictions.

Just as these contradictions occur within these various societal components, they are also apparent within South Africa's broadcasting system. Such anomalies portray alternatives to Governmental policies of Separate Development (or Apartheid) as articulated by laws such as

the Group Areas, Population Registration and Separate Amenities Acts.

These anomalies highlighting differing lifestyles to that implemented as a result of these acts may even be broadcast by the State-run SABC and may be tolerated by their respective controllers. The contradictions also include a definite move away from pervasive control to more enlightened and relaxed programming that differs from the normative authoritarian model. This is further enhanced by the existence of alternative broadcast media (new 'independent' operators) with a resulting different media culture.

This discussion serves to highlight the predominant contradictions that exist within the political environment of South Africa today. The anomalies within the wider society are also prevalent within the broadcast medium and it shall be necessary to show exactly where these exist within the available radio and television in South Africa.

These anomalies are widespread and include the movement away from ethnically based language stations by the SABC; the emergence of 'independent' radio and television stations thus breaking the SABC monopoly; the adaptation of SABC programming in the face of competition and the relaying by the SABC of entertainment programming that under the Albert Hertzog era would have been unacceptable. [see Chapter Three].

The contradictions are highlighted when taking into account the opposing views presented by those on the far-left and far-right of the political spectrum. As with their criticism of the government of the day, there remains a widely disparate view on the role of the SABC within the South African context which also highlights certain

visible inconsistencies within broadcasting policy.

It should be noted that many of the component elements that together create such contradictions correspond with the component elements of the De Fleur model as outlined in Chapter Two [also see De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:173-176]. In assessing the contradictions presented in this chapter, it will be important to note this correlation in showing just how the broadcast media in South Africa is also a function of the social system operational. The vital element here is that such a social system is one that is moving away from the conservative ideological rigidity of the past due to the changing dynamics and influence of its component elements.

The key question is to discover what form these anomalies take and why have they arisen? This contributes to finding some clarity regarding the characteristics of broadcasting in South Africa and to clearly delineate the bias (Chapter Four) from the apparent anomalies. As shall be seen, these anomalies are evident to a lesser or greater degree throughout the major broadcasting services operational within South Africa and are also evident within the State-run broadcasting corporation.

### 5.1 THE ANOMALIES OF RADIO IN SOUTH AFRICA:

#### "Black" Radio in English - Radio Metro:

Although the advent of television has recently dominated the analysis of broadcasting in South Africa, it is crucial to recognize the role radio plays in highlighting very definite anomalies within the broadcasting medium in South Africa. Indeed, whilst television may be the glamour medium, any tentative steps towards contradictions within the broadcast media may well initially manifest themselves in the

radio network as radio's influence may not be perceived as effective as that of television whilst remaining financially less draining.

It is evident that the radio services provided by the SABC have historically been as racially segregated as possible. The SABC operates 23 radio stations with much of these being distinct Black language services like Radios Tsonga, Zulu, Ndebele as well as the recent addition of Radio Lotus serving Indian listeners. [see SABC Report, 1988:37].

These differing services may be seen as simply providing listeners with a service in their home language with which they are most comfortable and which may be an essential cultural requirement. However, this choice is largely confined to the services of the SABC although English speakers are able to tune into foreign broadcasts (Radio Moscow; BBC; Voice of America) and receive news from an alternative source whereas few foreign Xhosa and Tswana broadcasts exist.

The existence of this multitude of separate services may also be seen as a perpetuation of the Apartheid ideology and an extension of the desire to see each individual Black group attain independence through its own homeland. Heribert Adam [Hachten and Giffard, 1984:220] has suggested that radio can be seen as "one of the most powerful tools of social control over the urban African".

Drury [Hachten and Giffard, 1984:220] has suggested that "Radio Bantu is one of the most obvious, and most expensive features of Apartheid. It does an undeniable amount of good and, in the mind of its critics, an undeniable amount of bad, in that it of course gives the Government an ideal medium for political propaganda and persuasion".

There is little evidence to suggest whether such propaganda succeeds although research quoted by Hachten and Giffard [1984:220] indicates that these services and the propaganda broadcast does serve to perpetuate a feeling of "separateness" and thus avoids any "nationalistic or integrative tendencies among Blacks by reinforcing tribal and traditional differences". This therefore can be seen as the extension of the "Divide and Rule" tactic that has for decades been part of the National Party's unwritten policy in eliminating a black nationalistic consciousness.

Hachten and Giffard [1984:221] tend to qualify the effect of such a broadcasting policy. They suggest there remains a split in the acceptance of the SABC by the Black population. It would seem that the SABC is more popular amongst older conservative Blacks than with the more militant younger generation who are aware of the the manipulative message that is directed at them.

However, this policy of language separation was ended with the introduction of the Radio Metro service on 01 September 1986. Here, the SABC broke with their policy of the past and instituted their first radio station aimed at Blacks broadcasting purely in English. The station, broadcasting on MW, was targeted at the large urban Black population of the PWV although there is "even some spillover into a White, urban, young listenership". [Green and Lascaris, 1988:74]. Metro's format coincided with that of the White oriented Radio Five broadcasting popular music the telephone 'phone-in' concept that started in the United States and became popular world-wide.

Metro's introduction was accompanied by an extensive advertising campaign that portrayed the urban Black as a distinct key figure of

importance within South Africa who had definite sectional interests. This was contrary to the language and tribal differences that had historically been SABC broadcasting policy. [see Appendix B: Figures 1 and 2].

The question remains as to whether the SABC genuinely intended this new service to personify a new inclusiveness in its handling of the urban Black population or was it merely a more sophisticated attempt at the co-optation of this group or even just a reaction to competition from other radio stations?

The answer may be a combination of all these factors. There can be little doubt that Radio Metro represents a break from the past. The fact that all broadcasts are in English accepts the importance of the English language as a means of communication thus eliminating the need for Afrikaans broadcasting to be forced upon a population that rebelled against Afrikaans schooling in 1976.

However, critics of the SABC will point to Metro retaining the SABC character in their news broadcasts thus maintaining the political orientation of this new service to influence and channel political opinion. This may be as a result of desire on the part of the SABC and their parent authorities to take advantage of the massive and recent urbanization of Blacks and the resultant establishment of an ever increasing Black middle class with increased spending power. This may also be a factor in the introduction of the TV2 and TV3 services.

Metro also came into being at a time when SABC listenership was being challenged by a non-SABC Bophuthatswana radio station, Radio Bop [see Appendix B: Figure 2a], which initiated English language programming

for Blacks in the Transvaal. Metro could therefore be seen as a reaction to this competition as well as that posed by Bop TV in its attempts to reach the massive Soweto audience. [see denial by the SABC in Star:09/08/1986].

The third reason for this break with tradition on the part of the SABC could be the financial crisis it found itself in during the mid-1980's (referred to in Chapter Four) and the simultaneous increase in the consumer power of the urban Blacks that would encourage increased advertising expenditure on the part of advertisers resulting in increased revenue for the SABC. It would therefore be financially beneficial for the SABC to exploit these conditions by creating a new service.

These reasons were possibly important motivating factors in the establishment of Radio Metro. However, the mere existence of such a service must indicate an acceptance into the broader South Africa of a politically significant sector of the population which historically, has had to identify with their respective 'homelands' rather than being regarded as permanent residents within South Africa. This is particularly evident as a function of

Green and Lascaris [1988:74] have suggested that "traditionally the points of difference in establishing an identity for a radio station were geographic location, language and ethnicity. Closer examination shows that ethnicity is not an impenetrable barrier and probably never was for our linguistically talented Black population". Indeed, this factor may well have been realized by the SABC and their controllers.

The desire of the SABC to provide this service may be seen as shift in attitude even though some motivations may reflect the vested

political and/or economic interests of the corporation. Radio Metro, therefore, highlights one of the key anomalies in South African broadcasting.

### The Role of the "Independents" - Capital; 702 and Bop:

The second key anomaly is that of competition in radio. In the preceding chapters, mention has been made of the extent to which the SABC monopolizes the airwaves. Indeed, the provisions of the Broadcasting Act only allows transmissions to be undertaken by the State-run broadcasting enterprise. Ironically however, the National Party's own policy of Separate Development/Apartheid and the creation of nominally 'independent' homelands has led to the establishment of competitive operators.

In their desire to establish 'independent', internationally recognized and viable homelands, it was necessary for the South African government to provide these 'states' with symbols of their own independence with which the local population could identify. This includes the erection of parliament buildings in the respective capitals, the creation of national flags and anthems, the building of airports and sports stadiums and ironically, the ability for these states to broadcast independently for themselves, even across their own borders.

A distinctive broadcasting service is a vital element of the symbols of independence. However, geographically many of these homelands often comprise multiple tracts of land close to the major industrial areas of greater South Africa causing considerable signal spill-over and result in virtual economic dependence on South Africa. These services may therefore be classed as virtually operating within South

Africa although their ownership and their transmissions originate from across the border. The major actors in this regard are Capital Radio, Radio 702 and Radio Bop.

All three stations are, in the words of 702's Gary Edwards, "independent licensed companies and neither the South African Government nor the SABC can touch us. They are separate organizations in separate countries". [Sunday Tribune:22/05/1983]. At the same time, though, the reliance upon revenue from South Africa is highlighted by Capital's admission that "although the station is completely owned by the Transkeian Government, 99% of our advertising revenue comes from South Africa so it's not our intention to buck the system". [Sunday Tribune:22/05/1983].

Capital Radio broadcasts from the Transkei on medium wave (MW), FM and on short-wave to a largely daytime audience stretching from Port Elizabeth in the South to Richards Bay in the North. [see Appendix C: Figure 1]. Although its transmitters are located in the Transkei, programming originates from studios in the Milner Park shopping centre in Johannesburg and is sent via landline to Umtata where it is relayed to its transmitters.

Radio 702, broadcasting from Ga-Rankua, north-west of Pretoria managed within a few years of its inception to become a major threat to the SABC in terms of listenership. Initially, both stations (with Capital) pitched their programming at the 16-24 age bracket and successfully launched new radio concepts that shifted listeners from the SABC's relatively outdated services. [see Sunday Times, 30/06/1985 and see Appendix A: Figure 3].

The resulting key anomaly was the introduction of alternative newscasts. David Wigston of the Unisa Department of Communication

found that when compared with the SABC's Radio Highveld, " 702 provided an opportunity for critics of the status quo to be heard". [Star:08/08/1987]. Wigston also found that 702 news was more "appealing and snappier" and in reference to news reports dealing with the repeal of the Mixed Marriages Act and Section 16 of the Immorality Act, found that "Radio 702's report was dialectic in structure posing the pros and cons of the issue while Radio Highveld's was ironic, using a distant scepticism to avoid polemic situations inherent in the event". [The Star:08/07/1987]. This highlights the differing news-styles operational as well as the differing broadcasting cultures now available to the South African listenership.

From an interview with a Capital Radio free-lance journalist [29/06/1988], it would seem that Capital initially presented a "progressive" news service. Many news items carried were simply not touched by the SABC such as detailed unrest coverage in the nightly news background programme during the 1984-1984 period. Capital's news included "a random sampling of topics included news on pass raids, trade unions, the British anti-apartheid movement, detainees, black protest against apartheid, rent and bread price increases, few of which were featured on the SABC". [Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:141].

Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli also highlight Capital's use of news as a "process" which follows a particular news story or set of events over a period of time as opposed to the SABC's "isolated" approach where a particular news story may be presented without highlighting the build up to it thus causing a "state of panic". [Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:142].

Capital may therefore be seen as "one of the few mass media in South Africa trying to present an alternative voice to the highly controlled SABC" [Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:143] having "exploited their South African-created status of 'independence'". [Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1988:89-90]. It should be noted that whilst these 'independent' stations (particularly Radio Bop) had an anti-South African orientation they largely supported their own local autocracies.

However, technical problems and resulting poor reception quality of Capital's broadcasts coupled with their geographical location have sorely affected the operation of the station. In addition, are problems encountered with the post-office upon which Capital is dependent for its transmissions; the allocation of frequencies (Capital broadcasts on 585Khz which is close to the SABC's 558Khz which causes interference) and other unknown sources of interference in the Capital signal. [Interview with unnamed Capital journalist, 29/06/1988].

There also exists a degree of interference from the Transkeian Government with "little coverage given to the internal Transkei situation" even during the military take-over in December 1977. [Interview with Capital Radio free-lance journalist, 29/06/1988]. There is also harassment from the SABC and in 1985 both Capital Radio and 702 were prevented from covering certain major sports events because the "SABC demanded exclusive rights" [Sunday Tribune: 21/07/1985] thus affecting the advertising revenue of the independent stations. Further covert restrictions were apparent during the 1987 General Election when the opposition Progressive Federal Party (PFP) were barred from buying advertising time on Capital Radio. [Interview

with Neil Ross of the PFP, 24/10/1988].

Naturally, the reliance upon revenue from South African sources in advertising will mitigate against the independents taking a particularly controversial line lest their advertisers feel threatened in any way. This suggests considerable self-censorship and restraint in these stations' political output.

Notwithstanding these factors working against the successful operation of independent radio stations; they have nevertheless proved to have a major impact on the South African broadcasting scene and have provided the SABC with competition in the form of alternative news and entertainment broadcasts as well as challenging the SABC to match and better these services. The break with the SABC newscast monopoly now allows the listener to re-tune to a competing station confuting the past authoritarian exclusivity.

#### The Liberalizing Effects of Competition on SABC Radio:

##### The Introduction of Controversial Programming:

The key benefit to listeners from this competition was the introduction of more controversial programming. The new independent radio stations, whilst reluctant to broadcast political controversy, did begin to cover controversial social items. This involved the concept of "live phone-in" shows that utilized audience participation in discussing a host of controversial medical, moral and particularly sexual topics. [see Gary Edwards of Radio 702 in Sunday Tribune:22/05/1983].

This meant that new material was being presented to the South African radio listener that was born out of a different media culture to that of the control orientation of the SABC. The South African radio

listener could now actually have his own view heard and hear non-SABC news presentation within a semi-liberal framework on these radio stations. That was indeed a break with the past and of great significance in providing an outlet for grievances which had not previously existed.

The importance of the independents in pioneering this element of broadcasting freedom became even more apparent when the SABC through its Radio Five service overhauled much of its existing staid programming to also include live phone-in shows on controversial subjects that had never been tackled before. Until the early 1980's much of Radio Five's programming had been pre-recorded precluding the potential for controversy.

#### The Employment of Anti-Establishment Staffers:

Another essential characteristic of the independents was their attraction of a range of disc-jockeys that were often either of British origin or were ex-staff members of the SABC. This implied their representing a more liberal ideology than those who worked within the constrained environment of the SABC and resulted in the broadcasting of contradictory viewpoints to that heard on the SABC due to their anti-control broadcasting culture. This too impacted upon the SABC where its own Radio Five announcers seem to reflect a greater degree of independence in their remarks and references rather than constantly having to toe the pro-government SABC stance.

Therefore, the competition created by the independents meant that for the first time, the various radio stations were competing with salaries and incentives in order to attract the most popular announcers. Here, the SABC also played a role in the free market for

disc-jockeys and freely sought those that had an independent (politically) bias thus exposing themselves directly to staff members broadcasting to millions of South Africans who were not of the SABC controlled broadcasting culture, and therefore, the Government viewpoint.

#### The Move away from Language Parity:

Most importantly, whilst the SABC has historically insisted on bilingualism (English and Afrikaans language parity) for most of its services, the Radio Five service now broadcasts most of its programmes in English. This indicated an acceptance by the SABC that if it wanted to compete for a larger market share it would have to allow Afrikaner youth to be exposed to English pop culture and a resulting non-collaborationist (with the ruling elite) broadcasting culture.

This lack of Afrikaans programming has received much criticism from the Afrikaanse Taal en Kultuur Vereniging (ATKV) who stated that "Van die omroepers op Radio 5, soos David Blood, het blykbaar geen respek vir Afrikaans nie en kan dit ook nie praat nie". [Die Burger:16/08/1986].

#### Technological Change:

The threat of competition forced the SABC to unleash its most powerful weapon in the battle for listeners - namely that of superior technology in the broadcast of its services which resulted in Radio 5 and Radios Good Hope and Highveld converting to FM Stereo - a facility of which the 'independents' are prevented from utilizing.

The move to stereo has seen 702 respond by changing its format "to target our programmes at the upper-income over 35's". [Sunday Times

Magazine:18/06/1989] indicating a shift away from music to news. This prompted 702 to advertise "If you like your news uncut and unbiased you're tuned to the right station". [see 702 advertisements in Appendix B: Figures 3a and 3b]. 702 has therefore become targetted at the Radio South Africa audience and may result in further competition between these two stations.

#### Anomalies within Existing Services of SABC Radio:

Whilst it has been evident that the SABC has entered the era of radio competition with regard to its Black services (Radio Metro) and to its youth market (Radio Five), the rest of its programming remains as uncontroversial and politically subservient as always. The newly commercialized "cultural" services of Radio South Africa/Radio Suid Afrika still maintain the controversial "Comment" programme although there has been some semblance of political liberalization in the "Radio Today" programme broadcast in the peak audience breakfast time-slot on Radio South Africa.

Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:107] report that initially, this programme was "backed up by a team of critical staffers who reported mainly from a liberal-humanist perspective". Effort was also made by certain announcers to distance themselves from the "Comment" segment of the Radio Today programme by announcing the programme very clearly as being "an SABC Comment" emphasizing that the views expressed therein were that of the SABC and did not represent that of the announcing staff. [Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:107].

It should also be noted that the daily "Parliamentary Report" which is carried on this programme during the Parliamentary session tends to provide an unbiased and objective overview of key speeches made in

parliament on the previous day lending a considerable amount of air-time to opposition speakers.

Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli argue that the Radio Today programme should be seen as "a token liberal gesture from the SABC to distract attention from all its other conservatism". [Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:107]. If this is the case then the question must be asked as to why the SABC has chosen this specific programme as its "token gesture"? It would seem strange that the only semblance of broadcasting liberalism is contained in a programme that is in one of the highest listenership slots on that particular radio channel. [see AMPS 1987-1988 figures]. This programme has however, been shortened thus losing some of its progressive orientation.

Indeed, Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli are right when they argue that the caliber of the staffers of such programmes are vital in defining the character of such shows. It may be apparent that liberal staffers will tend to test the system as far as it will go and may well leave the SABC when frustrated or silenced. Nevertheless, the system is constantly being tested by individuals from across the political spectrum (whether correspondents or presenters) and the anomalies that exist surrounding Radio Today may well be examples of this.

The fact that individuals are able to run contrary to the SABC news department hierarchy (albeit in a very limited way) indicates a semblance of liberalism and is therefore an anomaly within the SABC news programming. It should also be noted that programmes such as "Women's World" and "Talking of Books" also tend to offer items that may contradict the SABC viewpoint albeit within the context of non-controversial material. Each individual that has chosen to work within the 'system' may try to stretch the system as far as he can.

It should also be noted that whilst hardly described as a threat to the SABC, permission has been granted for the religious station "Radio Kansel/Radio Pulpit" to lease a portion of the SABC Radio 2000 FM transmitter time. This is the first independent radio station to be allowed to broadcast on FM albeit within the narrow confines of religious broadcasting.

Lastly, the SABC's external service Radio RSA whilst historically not criticized to the extent that the domestic services were [see Chapter Three], has recently received a favourable review. [see Browne, 1987:17-24]. Browne suggests that this service highlights the negatives of Black Africa as well as South Africa that could indicate that "Radio RSA is attempting to behave in the time-honoured journalistic tradition that promotes a revelation of the warts and blemishes of one's own nation as well as other nations". This additionally indicates a degree of liberalization within the external service operated by the SABC.

#### **Competition from Afar - Short-wave Alternatives**

The apparent political bias of the SABC coupled with considerable media restrictions may promote radio listeners to seek alternative sources of information such as those provided by short-wave broadcasters like the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) or VOA (Voice of America).

Michael Hornsby, the former BBC correspondent for Southern Africa has said that because there exists a relatively critical English language press in South Africa, the need to look to overseas broadcasts has been somewhat limited. He has, however, admitted that "the BBC only really comes into its own when the local press is for some reason

prevented from reporting what is happening". ["50 Years of Broadcasting to the World", 1982:17]. Such a scenario became particularly acute during the imposition of the State of Emergency in 1985.

The increased demand for objective news was recognized by the major international broadcasters who increased their coverage accordingly. This involved both the VOA and BBC commissioning new transmitter networks to improve their reception audio quality as well as embarking on extensive advertising campaigns in the South African press during 1985 and 1986 where "reliable news" was offered [see Appendix B: Figures 4 and 5].

The extent of BBC coverage of the unrest within South Africa was such that it prompted Cape Times columnist Guy Willoughby to suggest that this is "about as close to reliable local coverage as you can get. London, it seems, is closer to Soweto than Auckland Park". [Cape Times:14/08/1986].

It should also be noted that it is not only the Western nations that direct broadcasts towards South Africa. Radios Havana, Berlin International (East Germany) and Moscow all target specific broadcasts to South Africa with Moscow now broadcasting a segment of its programming in Afrikaans. Alternatives to the SABC also come from monitored ANC broadcasts (known as Radio Freedom) that may emanate from facilities in Zambia and Tanzania or even from the Voice of Revolutionary Ethiopia [information supplied by the South African Short-wave Listeners club].

Whilst these broadcasts beamed at South Africa are often highly critical of the National Party, the authorities engage in virtually no audible jamming (signal interference of broadcast) resulting in

these alternative views being relatively freely available again flouting the normative authoritarian theory.

However, whilst short-wave broadcasts remain a viable and distinct option to the services of the SABC and 61% of all households in South Africa have access thereto [see Appendix A: Figure 4], a United States Information Services survey conducted in November/December of 1984 has found that "there is relatively little regular (at least once a week) listening to foreign stations" with only "1.6% of Whites; 0.2% of Blacks; 1.6% of Coloureds and 1.6% of Asians listening to the BBC". [Information supplied by BBC Audience Research Department].

This may be due to the high import duties placed on quality short-wave receivers as well as the rand exchange rate making electronics extremely costly. Many short-wave signals are also difficult to locate and involve much effort on the part of the listener which mitigates against widespread usage and is coupled with listener ignorance in locating specific foreign broadcasts. However, an opinion poll taken during 1986 indeed found a definite move towards such broadcasts among SABC listeners. [see The Argus:01/09/1986].

However, with such a high access ratio there is enough scope for strong foreign competition to the local SABC services to emerge. Whether the population actually takes advantage of the multitude of differing short-wave news broadcasts or not, these options do exist and provide the most extensive opposition to the news/public affairs programming of the SABC.

## 5.2 THE ANOMALIES IN TELEVISION IN SOUTH AFRICA:

Over the last 13 years, South Africa has seen its broadcast media services change drastically. Radio has changed in character reflecting the competition from the independent stations as well as due to the introduction of television. This resulted in the commercialization of the existing "cultural" services of Radios South Africa and Suid Afrika and the demise of an entire radio station - Springbok Radio.

Television has therefore had a major impact on broadcasting in South Africa. The key question is whether this new medium has (like radio) within it certain anomalies that contradict in any way the overt political bias as outlined in Chapter Four. Indeed, the introduction of television has seen it gain in importance within South Africa in terms of biased broadcasts (and resulting authoritarian orientation) as well as becoming the major source of news (64%) for urban whites according to an Omnichick poll. [Argus:17/12/1986].

### Independent Television: The Advent of M-NET:

One of the most important anomalies in diverting from the authoritarian model has been the advent of an independent television service. Ironically, this was almost a direct result of the disastrous effect increasing adspend on television was having on the newspaper print medium which resulted in the closure and reduced readership of newspapers.

Pressure mounted on the authorities from both the English and Afrikaans press to grant a broadcasting license for a subscription television (STV) venture that would supplement their own income with that of the lucrative television advertising market. [see John Van

Zyl, Style magazine, September 1988:38-43].

Indeed, it would seem that as a quasi-Governmental body, the SABC would hardly be distressed if their advertising lead led to the closure of opposition supporting newspapers but, according to John Van Zyl, [Style Magazine, September 1988:40] the request for some form of Governmental assistance could not be refused when the two major Afrikaans press groups (Nasionale Pers and Perskor) added their voices to the growing discontent. [see Van Zyl in Style Magazine, September 1988:40].

The Government relented and agreed to have their television monopoly broken as long as "news and 'public affairs' i.e. anything which may be conceived of as political, carried on STV (subscription television) will be provided by the SABC, and not the newspapers". [Tomaselli, Indicator SA, Summer 1986:20]. It should be noted that M-NET is solely owned by the English and Afrikaans newspaper groups. [see Appendix A: Figure 5].

The advent of M-NET has caused similar characteristics of competition that the SABC radio service had to deal with after the introduction of Capital and 702 Radio. Whilst M-NET is constrained in terms of not being able to present formal newscasts, they are nevertheless testing the provisions of their charter to the limit.

By allowing an 'independent' television service to operate, the SABC are at the very least allowing a different entertainment culture to develop. Much like the imaginative formatting of independent radio challenged the conservative SABC programmes, so the conservative nature of SABC-TV has adapted over the years. M-NET, with their all-movie format, has meant that South African viewers now can watch just

about any subject matter (through feature films) at almost any time of the afternoon or evening.

The SABC has responded to this challenge also purchasing popular "low taste content" programming. This has increased the battle for viewership as both networks go after the largest financial rewards based upon advertising revenue and in so doing create a climate of competition lacking in authoritarian characteristics. [see Chapter 2 and De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:172-173].

There can be little doubt that this has contributed to a liberalization in terms of the subject matter entering viewers homes and is again often in contrast to the strict religious ethic that is often propounded by Government speakers. This is proved through programming on Sundays and religious public holidays where whilst the SABC may concentrate on religiously acceptable fare, M-NET is able to present bold programmes to attract an even higher audience.

The M-NET entertainment programming not only competes with religion on a Sunday evening but also with the political on a nightly basis. Whilst SABC schedule their main evening newscast, "Network" at 20h00 every evening for one hour, M-NET provides a definite entertainment alternative during this prime viewing slot.

This means that the SABC is prepared to lose some of its all-important news audience in favour of the entertainment programming of M-NET. Indeed, this could encourage the SABC to make its news more attractive as can be seen by the introduction of the "Network" programme and resulting format changes where a multiple of newsreaders are used for differing subjects.

Again, it should also be noted that M-NET broadcast an abundance of American programmes. Often these imports shown are those the SABC may find unacceptable as M-NET's transmission of "Soap" and the controversial "Roots" bear out. The showing of "Roots" was indeed significant as it was originally rejected by the SABC. [see Pollak, 1981:73].

Not only does M-NET provide direct competition in this area, it also is beginning to supply its own local programming as it is obliged to do this in terms of its license to operate. It has recently embarked on its own magazine programme, "Carte Blanche", which has to date raised issues which border on the political and seem unafraid to provide a wider perspective on issues than that of similar SABC programmes.

Whilst this can not be said in any way to compete with the formal news bulletins of the SABC, such M-NET programmes are able to highlight alternative angles on subjects that may be put on the back burner by the SABC. M-NET have also bought certain overseas news programmes and show these regularly as examples of investigative television journalism at its best. M-NET and Bop-Tv both transmit the Australian "60 Minutes" show whilst M-NET have recently secured the rights to the BBC "Newsnight" programme which clearly contrasts with the subservient style of SABC news and public affairs programming. M-NET also tends to involve its Coloured and Indian continuity announcers in a wide range of roles that contrasts with the SABC TV1 and TV2/3 split.

Perhaps the most daring break with the SABC control tradition has been M-NET's production of a "chat show" series (entitled "Indaba") hosted by the anti-Apartheid actor and playwright Pieter Dirk Uys.

Uys' interviews with South African personalities and politicians are conducted in a satirical and informal manner and are peppered with innuendoes parodying the ruling elite.

Indeed, the M-NET "open window" programming which allows non-decoder holders to view M-NET programmes has been allocated a time slot by the SABC from 18h15-20h00 thus avoiding any competition the subscription channel may provide for the main evening SABC TV1 newscasts. As of August 1989, this time slot changed to 18h00-19h00 as M-NET have reached their quota of subscribers upon which the original concession was based. This enables them to directly compete with the 18h00 news bulletin.

Eric Louw and Ruth Tomaselli have suggested that the governmental incentive for the introduction of M-NET has been the bringing in of the traditional opposition English press groups to a position of subservience where the "Press houses get the money and the SABC gets the (sole) power". [The Journalist, March 1987:6]. Whilst this may be true, the Afrikaans Press groups of Perskor and Nasionale Pers that share in the STV system will be faced with the influence of the English language press (with which they are partners) and if the development of the aforementioned domestic programming is anything to go by, this is indeed a by-product of such co-operation.

It should also be noted that M-NET's magazine programmes are shown live allowing not only for the airing of controversial topics but also for a certain degree of unpredictability that is a function of live broadcasting and can be contrasted with the more conservative SABC whose live broadcasts are usually confined to non-controversial magazine programmes and sport.

M-NET has also proved to be a sanctuary for ex SABC staff members and it is likely that the more independent minded journalists and staffers (particularly those who feel constrained at the SABC) will increasingly find a home in the new subscription service since it is obliged, and has undertaken to, increase its local content in programming and will therefore need the services of experienced personnel. This indicates that M-NET's local programming may provide an alternative socio-political culture much like that of the independent radio stations where "greater freedom, imaginative programming and money" are on offer. [see Sunday Times, 23/07/1989].

Indeed, the existence of M-NET allows for a new media identity, in opposition to that of the SABC within the South African communications network. Technically, the existence of M-NET (and the 'independent' radio stations) also means the erection of new transmitters and new communication facilities notwithstanding the heavy restrictions placed upon Bop-TV to prevent any spillage to White areas. All of this is occurring in a country which has over the last ten years centralized its authority and power bases under a State of Emergency.

#### **The Move Away from Language Parity - English Domination:**

A feature of both SABC-TV4 and M-NET's programming has been their overexposure of programmes in English. This contrasts strongly with the early SABC-TV attempts at complete language parity in terms of hours broadcast. Most M-NET programmes are in English with a few being simulcast in Afrikaans as per the M-NET charter. The SABC has also been party to this resulting in only 10% of the total TV4 viewing time being in Afrikaans. [see Die Burger:16/08/1986]. Most

English (and Afrikaans) viewers are no longer forced to watch programmes in Afrikaans as the English soundtrack is transmitted simultaneously on the FM radio network of the SABC indicating a move away from the forced bilingualism of the early years of SABC-TV.

This newer feature of television broadcasting has also brought with it considerable criticism from the Afrikaner Taal en Kultuurvereniging (ATKV) to the effect that Afrikaans was being neglected at the expense of English programming. [see Die Burger:16/08/1986].

The well known Afrikaans author, WA De Klerk is quoted as saying, "Afrikaans word al hoe meer in 'n hoekie ingedryf. Ek is verslae, want dit was met groot moeite wat Afrikaners vir hom 'n trotse plek in die uitsaaiwese oopgetrap het". [from Die Vaderland:12/04/1986 and in Bothma, 1988:177]. In an editorial, Beeld newspaper said that "these changes were a serious encroachment on equal language rights and were probably an effort by the SABC to safeguard its considerable income from advertisements in English." [The Cape Times, 19/08/1986].

Indeed, the increasing commercialization of the television service as a business enterprise [see Collings in "Leadership" Vol.7 No.3:190-196] and the increased usage of sponsorship is also likely to move the SABC away from insisting on language parity and towards the transmission of programmes based on popularity and high viewership ratings which usually are those broadcast in their original English. This is already evident in the Top 20 television ratings which show that 75% of such shows are broadcast in English. [see Appendix A: Figure 6].

The incremental commercialization of the SABC will, according to Green and Lascaris [1988:71], be further emphasized by the utilization of electronic 'peplemeters' research devices and the resulting more accurate audience research findings. The advent of such advanced technology is likely to increase the competitiveness of the SABC thus increasing its adherence to the business motive rather than the ideological. This will also promote a move towards more popularist programming away from rigid language parity.

The pro-English language bias may however be seen as an indication of the financial rather than ideological motivations at the core of broadcasting philosophy. Increasing English speaking support for the National Party may also have dissipated the fears of the Afrikaner establishment as to the effects of English popular culture making it increasingly easier to show such programming.

#### **Integrationist Programming - American Domination:**

Perhaps one of the most important anomalies that exist within the realm of television programming within South Africa is in the transmission of certain categories of programming by the state run SABC-TV (and other independent operators). South Africa is barred from purchasing British television material due to the Actors Equity ruling prohibiting sales to this country. Ironically, the lack of British programming means that in terms of providing entertainment, SABC programme buyers are forced to turn to the United States. Indeed, the average local content of English drama on TV1 is only 15.28% indicating the foreign domination of this category. [see Appendix A: Figure 7 (a) 7 (b) and 1988 SABC Annual Report:41-43].

This fact is coupled with the high production costs of manufacturing domestic programmes and the relatively low cost of acquiring

syndicated shows from the United States. As Head [1985:230-232] shows, "on average domestically produced programmes cost eight times as much as syndicated programmes" resulting in the the relatively low cost per half-hour episode of an imported programme in South Africa at US\$1500. Programmes dubbed into Afrikaans still remain five times cheaper than if made locally. [Interview with Dr. D.P. Van Vuuren, Head of the SABC Audience Research Unit, 10 July 1989].

Since the inception of television in 1976, the SABC has constantly aired most of the current Top 60 United States Nielsen ratings entertainment programming. [see US Television ratings in USA Today, 14/12/1988]. The SABC is therefore increasingly prepared to transmit most of the most popular television shows regardless of their content or subject matter which should be compared in the historical context with the extreme forms of Verwoerdian Apartheid and the personal bias of personalities like Albert Hertzog who dominated the control of the media during the 1960's.

One of the most popular forms of entertainment promoted by the SABC since the inception of television has been the half-hour situation comedy (sitcom) often either entirely involving Black actors or at least integrating Blacks into the lives of Whites. The Black orientation may well be seen as part of the growing influence evolved for themselves in the American body politic [and social system of De Fleur - see De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:172-181] and is reflected through the popular mass medium of television.

The best known and universally popular (indeed often rated the most popular show on American television) is The Cosby Show. This show depicts an upper middle-class Black American family (both parents are depicted as professionals) interrelating with their family on a micro

Indeed, the shift in the South African society away from job reservation and towards an integrated and interdependent economic workforce (Black or White) is what is being portrayed to a large extent in the multitude of American television broadcast and corresponds with Heribert Adam's view [1987:211] that a racially mixed workplace environment enables a better understanding between the groups to emerge and results in "the functional basis for racial groupings disappearing". The constant emphasis on racial harmony within the popular American television culture must be of some benefit and could hardly be seen to have a negative impact on race relations in South Africa.

Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:138], however, suggests that the transmission of American television programmes "legitimizes the capitalist ethic and the stability of the class structure" and therefore shows "the argument that multi-racial series have been in opposition to the 'Broederbond Masterplan' to be inadequate". Indeed, the programming of the SABC certainly is not geared at rocking the boat of the existing class order within South Africa. With American programming that promotes the Capitalist ethic, the SABC is merely promoting the "Free Enterprise" rhetoric that is so popular with governmental speakers. Indeed, this forms the basis of De Fleur's social system [De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:176-178] from which such programming emanates (the USA).

However, this does not mean that the mere existence on a daily basis of Government sanctioned non-racial programming portraying Blacks and Whites operating on a principle of merit-based individualism, is necessarily detrimental to society or more specifically, race relations in South Africa. Just as these programmes highlight the

advantages of free enterprise, they also highlight the values of freedom of speech [see De Fleur and Ball Rokeach, 1972:178] and resulting values of equality that can be enjoyed unhindered by the entire society.

Tomaselli [1986:19] also argues that these programmes "all feature middle class Blacks with American accents who are sufficiently remote to be unthreatening". Whilst this may be true, these shows may promote the creation of a Black middle class which is one of the desires of the ruling National Party either to further the principle of co-optation or to genuinely uplift the population.

It is conceivable that whilst most Whites interact with Blacks in a socially hierarchical fashion within South Africa, the visuals of middle-class equality may lead to greater acceptance which is consciously applied by the SABC to "create a better attitudinal climate" in South Africa. [Interview with Dave Dalling 02/10/1987].

Indeed, it is virtually impossible to quantify the effects of this on viewers and Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:136] admit that "unfortunately no survey of audience response has been done on these programmes in South Africa and our observations, at this stage, must be regarded as speculative".

The important point to re-emphasize is whatever the merits and demerits of American programming, a fundamental characteristic of drama series and sitcoms is the non-racial portrayal of life and where racism is involved, it is treated in a sensitive manner that exposes injustice and attempts to educate against it.

The recently screened classic Western series "Gunsmoke" (TV4) has been referred to, within the American context, as "teaching us about

race relations and showing us how to defend human rights when nobody was doing it overtly". [Horace Newcombe, Chairman of the Department of Radio, Television and Communications at the University of Texas on M-NET broadcast 16/04/1989].

Just as this description may apply to the USA in the 1940's and 1950's, the shows may well be intended to give South African Whites a better view of Blacks and to emphasize US superiority in race relations. Indeed, the portrayal of integration highlights the positive nature of racial mixing and integration is not viewed upon through the medium of television as something negative.

Perhaps the closest government reaction to the 'Cosby' type of programming comes from an editorial in Die Vaderland [12/08/1985 and Bothma, 1988:173] which states that, "Die waarde van hierdie gemoedelike reeks (The Cosby Show) lê daarin dat dit eerder ooreenkomste as verskille tussen blankes en swartes wat op diselfde sosio-ekonomiese peil leef beklemtoon - almal is maar ewe klein mensies, gelyk geskape met diselfde soort probleme - en dat dit ongegronde vooroordele afbreek". Indeed, this indicates that the programme is not just shown for its entertainment value but may well be part of an intentional process to, according to Die Vaderland, "break down unfounded prejudices".

The extent to which these American television shows portray contrary signals to the SABC viewership and deviate from the normative authoritarian model is highlighted by criticism from the right-wing Conservative Party. In an interview with Dr. Pieter Mulder, the CP's spokesman on Broadcasting Services and the Film Industry [08/06/1988], Mulder agrees that such programming represents a form of cultural imperialism where the values of one society are being

transported to another. Dr. Mulder, however, regards the key value as an attempt by the Americans "to do away with stereotypes within their society" and in so doing encourage integration rather than separation.

The CP have recently presented a list of television programmes (including "Matlock"; "Miami Vice" and "North and South") they regard as objectionable. The CP believe that these programmes "represent a distorted view of reality in the United States (which) gives the impression that negroes have control of the country". This, according to the CP is "unacceptable". [Sunday Tribune:31/01/1988]. This serves to highlight the CP view that these programmes encourage integration and their vehement criticism indicates the extent to which they feel their own policy of separation and Verwoerdian Apartheid is being threatened and deviated from.

One must also note domestically made material that simulates these overseas examples. Whilst locally made dramas that highlight integration of society may be far more relevant to the South African viewer, these have been rare due to the high production costs and risk incurred in offending the SABC hierarchy.

Contrary to this is the example of "The Outcast" and a number of local Afrikaans dramas that which "quarters formerly taboo subjects like mixed blood". [Sunday Star, 22/09/1985]. This indicates that the SABC is willing to allow some semblance of controversy having exposed its viewers to the American example. Some integration has taken place in the genre of "Game" shows and in a children's entertainment show called "It's a Knockout" where "White, Coloured and Indian Schools were represented competing for cash prizes." [Sunday Times, 08/12/1985].

However, the SABC is still holding the racially controversial shows, "Newlands", "Two Weeks in Paradise" and "People Like Us" written and directed by John Cundill and Grey Hofmeyr. [see Sunday Tribune:24/05/1987 and Sunday Times, 16/07/1989]. It should be noted that these shows represent the work of the more liberal staffers of the SABC and with their talents recognized and acclaimed (particularly in high viewership ratings), it would seem foolish of the SABC to stifle their work.

Some degree of liberalization may also be found within Afrikaans television. Perhaps the most notable indication is the ethnic satire contained in the highly acclaimed programmes "Kooerasiestories" and "Spies en Plessis". These shows indulge in a degree of self ridicule which may attack the conservatism of Afrikanerdom in a humorous way.

Whatever the problems encountered, the existence of such programming is a recent manifestation of the introduction of television and represents an important anomaly and contradiction with the control paradigm of the normative authoritarian model.

#### Towards a Common Television Culture:

In his discussion on whether South Africa is a common or plural society, Adam [Adam and Moodley, 1987:211] argues that the fact that all South Africans "share aspirations, Hollywood soap operas and leisure activities, jokes, tastes and sacred texts" contributes towards this country being classified plural and enables it to have a better chance at securing a democratic future as an integrated society. Indeed, Adam would argue that the cross-cutting enjoyment of the aforesaid television programmes indicates the role of the media in forging links across historically divisive cleavages.

Similarly, Green and Lascaris [1988:70] have suggested that tastes are increasingly the same whether in music, cinema, clothes and sport. TV4 with its multi-ethnic viewership is perhaps "the primary showcase for our increasingly crossover culture". In this regard, Don Beck, has stated that "the glitter of Dallas is in line with aspirations in Soweto". [The Argus:24/04/1989]. This point is vital in arguing that imported American television media, other than portraying Blacks and Whites operating on a non-racial basis, also is able to create a common culture of television identity.

If the authorities purposefully encourage the mass media in this way, then it may be seen as a unifying factor in society following the developmental theory (rather than the authoritarian model) approach which encourages "positive uses of the media in national development". [see McQuail, 1987:120]. Indeed, this cannot be argued in any way when analyzing the news/public affairs programming of the SABC but can indicate the cross-cultural acceptance of popular American programming as having a distinctly non-divisive role in the South African society.

### **The Role of Advertising:**

The State run SABC are also key actors in perhaps one of the most important changes the broadcast media has seen in the last decade - the advent of integrated advertising. Advertising revenue has continuously grown to become the major source of revenue for the SABC. [See Appendix A: Figure 8] In 1988, it provided over two-thirds (68.9%) of the total income of the corporation (R597million) and has steadily increased since the introduction of commercial television in 1978. [see Appendix A: Figure 9. Also see 1988 SABC Annual Report:12]

Increasingly, advertisers have seen fit to deracialize their advertising. This could well be as a result of the development of a common consumer culture [see Adam and Moodley, 1987:203-214] mentioned earlier. It should also be noted that integrated programming attracts advertisers who themselves are looking for an expanding market. Their appreciation of multi-racial television to reach a bigger market would indicate their own liberalistic tendencies as born out in the nature of their advertisements.

This has meant racially integrated advertising on the so-called White target television channel of TV1 and on TV4. Many major companies specifically show integrated work or social conditions with numerous advertisement flighted nightly in prime-time viewing hours. Often their contents contradicts with existing social practice in South Africa. Amenities are shown to be shared with integration depicted as the norm rather than the exception. (see the South African Breweries television advertisements).

The Conservative Party has again criticized the SABC for encouraging "an Americanization process which was taking place by the broadcast of film after film, programme after programme and advertisement after advertisement showing integration". [Prof. Chris Jacobs in The Sowetan:26/08/1987].

However, Anske Basson of the Department of Communications at the University of the Orange Free State found in a survey that "65 percent of Blacks and 35 percent of Whites believe that multiracial television commercials will help improve race relations and accelerate social integration" indicating a considerable degree of acceptance of such advertising and a perceived benefit such advertising can have. [see SA Digest, September 02, 1988]. Hunt and

Lascaris [1988:114] also show an increasing acceptability of multi-racial advertising [see Appendix A: Figure 10].

Whilst it is apparent that the SABC needs as much advertising revenue it can get, it nevertheless transmits such advertisements highlighting an Apartheid-free South Africa as opposed to the more distant aforementioned American example. Whilst such situations are lacking among locally made television shows, the quantity of television advertisements of this nature depicts greater integration than SABC commissioned dramatic works.

It should be noted that whilst the SABC vets all advertisements shown on television, M-NET's criteria may differ allowing for advertisements refused by the SABC to be broadcast on the subscription channel.

#### Contradictions in Formal News/Public Affairs Programming:

It may be apparent that by the exclusion of analysis regarding the formal news bulletins offered by the SABC, this is not an area of liberalization although some mention needs to be made of the "Network" news/public affairs programme. Ruth and Keyan Tomaselli are quite correct when they suggest that the introduction of this television programme was born out of the "internal power struggle within the SABC" [Die Suid Afrikaan, Somer, 1986:48-50] which was a result of the National Party split and resulting formation of the Conservative Party which polarized Afrikanerdom.

The new style of "Network" may have represented an attempt on the part of the SABC to increase the attractiveness of its news programme and build a higher viewership. Whilst there is little to commend the actual formal news broadcasts that comprise the first twenty minutes.

of every bulletin, the background reports vary greatly within the context of a highly controlled broadcast media network.

This segment of the Network programme has contained some of the most pro-Nationalist reports seen on South African television and in particular, the Cliff Saunders report on Liberation Theology during October 1986 found the SABC described as "sinking to new depths". [Sunday Tribune:19/10/1986].

However, Network has also transmitted relatively controversial material and during 1988, broadcast a debate on the role of the Church with Johan Heyns and Alan Boesak. This indicates that even where some of the most explicit forms of pro-government bias are to be found, at the same time, opponents of the South African Government are also beamed into the homes of viewers and given some air-time to state their case.

Ironically, the SABC themselves have brought the ANC into the spotlight by gaining special permission to quote speeches and hold relatively friendly interviews with selected members although many broadcasts have been aimed to reinforce the ANC/terrorism/Communist Party link.

These 'arch enemies' of the state (Joe Slovo) have been shown on television and may contribute to a softening in perception on the part of the regular viewer. Whilst ANC members appear rarely and in edited form, this represents a break with past SABC policy that would only allow such voices to be heard if, according to SABC News Editor, Sakkie Burger "they renounced violence and became part of the negotiation process". [Argus:26/02/1986].

Such broadcasts of opposition members have angered the right wing and Louis Bothma of the Oranjewerkers has stated that "wat egter kommerwekkend is, is die toegang wat die land se tradisionele vyande tot ons woonkamers het. Van ons vyande het skielik vriende geword. Hulle stry vandag die stryd teen apartheid op ons eie televisie met die aanmoediging van die regering". [Bothma, 1988:173].

"Network" has also been used to inform the public about certain key legislative changes. The scrapping of Influx Control saw a preparatory programme broadcast which clearly indicated that the removal of this piece of legislation would not have a detrimental effect on society.

A recent programme undertaken by reporter Barbara Folscher has suggested that the Separate Amenities Act is also an obstacle to better race relations indicating that direct governmental involvement may be instrumental in using such programming in order to soften up a conservative electorate into accepting key political and social changes indicating an apparent "meer progressiewe strekking". [Tomaselli, "Die Suid Afrikaan", Somer 1986:48].

This aspect of broadcasting, if it genuinely moves away from discrimination and towards greater democracy can hardly be termed authoritarian. In fact, it again may be more applicable to the Development Theory where "social change" and "nation building" becomes important. [see McQuail, 1987, 121].

Indeed, it is this perceived use of the media that most angers the right-wing in South Africa with Louis Bothma suggesting that "die SAUK is gebruik om 'n nuwe gemeenskap te kweek waarin ras as 'n onderskeidingsfaktor tussen mense totaal en al geïgnoreer sal word. Dit is egter nie al nie. Daar word gestreef om 'n 'nuwe nasie' daar

te stel wat rondom 'n stel gemeenskaplike waardes gebind moet wees".  
[Bothma, 1988:176].

Perhaps the clearest liberalizing feature has been the television debates between the political parties contesting the 1989 general election. The debates were unrestrained and for the first time saw the National Party confronted publically on its policies in this format. This new direction came into effect in the last weeks of the Botha presidency perhaps indicating the lessening of authoritarian influence from this source.

These contradictions apparent in formal newscasts should be seen, according to Tomaselli, as an attempt "om die reformistiese saak te stoot ondanks voortdurende ondermyning van reformistiese inisiatiewe deur die Polisie en die Veiligheidsmagte en moontlik ook die nuusdepartement van die SAUK self". [Die Suid Afrikaan, Somer:48]. This analysis could well highlight the anomalies existing due to internal political conflicts within the ruling elite and may be seen in the context of the National Party/Conservative Party fight to represent Afrikanerdom and the battle for control of key institutions between the 'verligte' and 'verkrampste' elements.

#### **The Influence of Liberal Staffers in Television:**

It should also be noted that whilst anomalies are present within the news broadcasts, so the arts television programme, "Collage" and certain documentaries (some of them shown during "Network" hours) tends to cover items that highlight a deviation from official Government thinking. This fact may well be due to those personalities/journalists involved in presenting and compiling these programmes coming from a non-Nationalist background and therefore

presenting a more liberal (albeit under threat of sanction) picture. In the case of "Collage" - the programme has for an extended period been presented by Barry Ronge whose journalistic writings are critical of the ruling establishment.

Controversies have continued to plague the SABC and have largely been based on a constant conflict between the SABC staff and their executive over matters relating to policy. The organization also suffered considerable allegations of corruption and may reflect the general stagnation of creative freedom that has characterized the corporation. [see Sunday Star:01/09/1985]. This may highlight the resistance of liberal staffers to executive decisions and creates room for anomalies in output to occur. [see Chapter Four and earlier discussion on radio for examples].

#### **Internal and External Pressures - Changing Media?**

The anomalies and contradictions are very apparent both in radio and television. The normative authoritarian model has, in practice been difficult to maintain. Internal political change based upon the split in Afrikanerdom in the early 1980's has seen the South African debate shift to the policy directives of the "Verligtes" and "Verkramptes" within the ruling elite.

The establishment of a strong right-wing opposition has seen the broadcast media adapt. Fears of the Conservative Party has seen the media present contradictory images about South Africa - images that have considerably angered the CP and their allies. Internal and external pressures also play a role in influencing the actions of the ruling elite and whilst ideally, authoritarian 'gatekeepers' may wish to silence their opponents and keep them from the public eye, pressures make this unavoidable. The pressure for meaningful reform

is one that is continually emphasized and may affect the media and the type of programmes shown. The emerging educated Black middle class coupled with the violent demands of a disenfranchised mass place pressures on the body politics that simply have to be addressed whether the authorities want to or not.

Economic realities, also indicate the need for change. If the broadcasting services are to be efficiently administered and present their desired message, they must be financially viable. These realities bring anomalies and contradictions in the desire to 'give people what they want' rather than 'give them what they should have'. To this end, integrated advertising brings in much needed revenue to support popular multi-racial programming,

The toleration of competition has, in itself, been identified as an important contradiction with the monopoly of the past. This factor has emphasised the anomalies to an even greater extent as the media agenda may now be set by a multitude of services rather than by one State-run enterprise.

Finally, the human element within broadcasting should be emphasised. Again, the diversity and dynamics of the human condition are apparent in individual political orientations of SABC staff. Such members will constantly try to test the system; particularly when the system itself is dynamic due to political and social pressures.

Clearly therefore, the differing contradictions presented indicate the way in which the internal component elements of the South African social system [see De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:173-176] are beginning to influence the broadcast media. The key element here is that this represents an important break with the past. Today audience

response, the role of advertisers, distributors and producers are vital actors in combination with the legislative bodies that ultimately control broadcasting (the National Party). Their combined influence therefore has a marked liberalizing effect.

These anomalies therefore represent continual changes within the avowed policy of the broadcasting authorities. The question is whether these changes move the SABC away from the authoritarian broadcasting model outlined in the earlier chapters of this thesis to a more pluralistic (mixed) alternative?

Flowing from this question is that of the motives of the SABC. If one is to accept that these anomalies do exist, are they there to break down racial barriers that have been established under the very same National Party or do they exist for other reasons that have little to do with providing South Africans who have been compartmentalized into racial groups with some sort of introduction to what a freer society can look like? These are the key questions that must be addressed in the concluding chapter.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **CONCLUSION: SOUTH AFRICA'S BROADCASTING SYSTEM - MOVEMENT AWAY FROM AUTHORITARIANISM**

The broadcasting of politics in South Africa is dependent on, and a function of, the politics of this country. In striving to highlight broad themes, patterns and characteristics that permeate the broadcast media, one encounters considerable internal and external dynamics that make a clear cut classification of the national broadcasting system problematic.

This thesis has attempted to show the key elements of the broadcasting of politics in South Africa. Chapter Two has endeavored to outline some of the fundamentals in characterizing mass media systems in general and has focused on authoritarian systems where the control and therefore the characteristics of the WHO are of paramount importance. This normative approach has itself highlighted the difficulties of such an analysis indicating the need to study permutations of models rather than rigidly adhering to any single one.

The historical development of broadcasting in South Africa as outlined in Chapter Three serves to show the creeping authoritarian control that was exercised over this medium particularly since 1948. This was due to the views of responsible governmental appointees like Piet Meyer and Albert Hertzog who saw television as "that evil black box, sickly, mawkish, sentimentalistic, and leading to dangerous liberalistic tendencies". [see Van Zyl in Style Magazine, September 1988:39]. These views dominated the 1950's through to the 1970's.

This highlights the importance of the personality within South African broadcasting. The influence of such right-wing reactionary viewpoints were a manifestation of the prevailing Verwoerdian ideology and the increasing authoritarian nature of the National Party which saw the broadcast media brought under even closer

governmental control.

This creeping authoritarianism extended to the all powerful medium of television upon its introduction in 1976. The increasing control and utilization of the broadcast media to bolster a narrow political elite was a logical outcome bearing in mind the prevailing philosophies regarding the usage of broadcasting as outlined in Chapter Three. Indeed, the authorities viewed television as possibly a necessary evil that if it had to be introduced, could be of important propagandistic value to the ruling Nationalist elite.

This became apparent soon after its inception as outlined in Chapter Four. The SABC, in close contact with the government of the day, were able to broadcast news and public affairs programmes that gave prominence and access to government speakers and emphasized their viewpoint over alternative views.

This was accomplished through the promotion of the National Party at the expense of the other political actors which was particularly evident in times of elections; in internal censorship resulting in pro-Nationalist programme orientations and through direct governmental/ministerial interference. As indicated throughout this thesis, the lack of neutrality in the news and public affairs programming of the SABC (radio and television) indicates a broadly authoritarian orientation. [see Chapter Four for examples].

The authoritarian nature of television broadcasting became particularly acute during the PW Botha years (1978-1989) as a function of the centralized and more authoritarian nature of the presidency due to the implementation of the 1983 Constitution. If anything, the SABC took on the characteristics of the Presidency and the forced departure of its Director-General, Riaan Eksteen saw

"Botha's personal pique" as not only guiding the news content of the SABC but also affecting the appointment of the chief administrators of the corporation. [Pottinger, 1988:21].

### Towards Liberalization - Anomalies in the Broadcasting System:

However, as Chapter Five has clearly indicated, whilst the SABC remains and must be acknowledged as a service that "does provide the National Party with the kind of mobilizing support, consensus politics, that it furiously misses in the English press" [Phelan, 1987:55], there remain important contradictions and anomalies (as opposed to the normative authoritarian model) within its own service and within the macro broadcasting environment that have been increasingly apparent throughout the Botha years. These anomalies are:

- The SABC no longer enjoys a monopoly of radio or television broadcasting in South Africa.
- SABC newscasts now compete with entertainment programming (M-NET on television) and alternative news (the 'independents' on radio) from other non-State services for high viewership.
- An alternative radio culture has been developed by 702 and Capital and has had a competing effect on the SABC product.
- Racial integration is regularly shown in imported programmes and on a more limited scale in local productions.
- Racial integration is regularly shown on domestically made television commercials.
- Individuals within the SABC and M-NET regularly test their programmers to see how far they can go in presenting controversial programming.

- Language parity (English and Afrikaans) on certain services is disregarded.
- Limited coverage is granted to opponents of the Nationalist Government.

[see Chapter Five].

These contradictions highlight the key question of the motives behind the existence and tolerance of such anomalies. Indeed, if such motives simply perpetuate the control paradigm then one is witnessing the adaptation of authoritarianism rather than liberalistic changes. This will provide guidelines of whether South Africa does indeed retain an authoritarian system of broadcasting or whether its classification cannot be compartmentalized within this normative model.

As has been detailed, the advent of the "independent" radio stations has brought with it an alternative media radio culture to that presented by the SABC. Not only do these stations provide competing newscasts, they also employ personnel whose political outlook does not necessarily support the status quo. The existence of the television equivalent of 'M-NET' provides a similar picture albeit without direct news broadcasts.

The competition created by such services [see advertising in Appendix B: Figure 6] has seen the SABC react in a market oriented, commercial fashion in order to secure the greatest listener and viewer numbers. These stations have broken the pure governmental monopoly on broadcasting and represent a distinct move away from the control paradigm of authoritarianism.

It would seem that the existence of these services has not been welcomed by the SABC. Indeed, efforts to black out lucrative sports

coverage [see Chapter Five] are testimony to this. It has been argued elsewhere in this thesis that these radio stations constitute a manifestation of the National Party's 'homeland' policy where it is necessary to grant the trappings of independence due to pressure from the respective 'homeland' leaders. Indeed, this may be the prime motivation (reluctant as the SABC was) in allowing these stations to become a threat to the existing monopoly and to present an anti-South African and anti-Apartheid bias.

Notwithstanding the power of the SABC to subvert the listenership of such stations through its superior transmitter, technical and frequency allocation resources, the existence of alternative radio networks remains one of the most important anomalies in the broadcasting of politics in South Africa and has had a liberalizing effect on the programming and personalities within the SABC itself. [see Chapter Five].

Another key anomaly is the shattering of the monopoly of SABC television due to the introduction of a competing subscription service, M-NET. Here the combined pressures from the Afrikaans and English press groups for its introduction [see Chapter Five] meant an alliance in its development. The nature of Nasionale Pers and Perskor as representative of the more "verligte" elements of Afrikanerdom coupled with the influence of the largely anti-Nationalist English language press has seen the 'independent' radio culture extend into television with the English component of the alliance influencing this subscription service to take a more enlightened stance in its broadcasting policy.

Here again, it is unlikely that the National Party agreed to the implementation of such a service because of a desire for competition

but was rather pressurized into liberalizing the broadcast media due to demands from members of their own ruling elite who felt that the future of the pro-Government press would be in danger if the major newspaper groups could not increase their share of advertising revenue.

Indeed, whatever the motives for the introduction of M-NET, there exists today an alternative television network that is prepared to take a more progressive approach to programming (albeit under constraints - see Chapter Five) which serves as a vital break with the normative authoritarian model.

Coupled with the fact that the most popular (and available) television fare is American, the SABC themselves have reluctantly been forced to liberalize and broadcast television shows that highlight an integrated society operating successfully. In addition, in order to fund the purchase of such shows to keep pace with their competition and to enable the corporation to expand, the SABC transmits integrated advertising as a norm within its daily broadcasts. Ironically, the vitally important revenue gained here may temper the reluctance to compete efficiently.

It is therefore evident that in order to secure this revenue, the SABC is prepared to follow the liberalizing trends set by advertising agencies, their copywriters and more importantly, their clients. [see Chapter Five]. These actors (many of which may be anti-apartheid) recognize the existence of a common consumer culture and represent the desire on the part of the business community to target the expanding Black middle class through the advertising medium.

It would seem that in terms of the right-wing criticism presented,

the SABC is prepared to go for the financial gain of attracting such clients (e.g. South African Breweries) rather than be dictated to by the political morays of conservative Afrikanerdom. This suggests that the SABC sees the very obvious financial rewards as paramount over any covert social message that such transmissions may have. This also highlights the shift in SABC policy where "bureaucratic practices have to make way for a sound and competitive approach". [Riaan Eksteen in Financial Mail, 07 April 1989:26].

Taking into account the characteristics of domestic advertising and American entertainment programming, it is important to note that the SABC can effectively show these programmes without the fear that they are rocking the national boat. No matter how integrationist such visuals may be, they are not likely to result in the electorate questioning the legitimacy of the ruling elite and therefore pose no danger to the privileged status of the ruling group. This is due to the continued news/public affairs pro-Nationalist bias.

However, integration in commercials and programme content remain key anomalies. The argument of this thesis is that the continual broadcast of such visuals can only be beneficial in moving away from the concept of racial group rigidity that has for so long been a touchstone of National Party policy. [see Chapter Five].

#### **Contradictions With Broadcasting Authoritarianism:**

These key points highlight a picture that categorizes South Africa only partly within an authoritarian system of broadcasting. The SABC is no longer a pure monopoly having its own services now compete with Capital, 702, Bop Radio and TV and M-NET.

Head [1985:59-62] suggests that an authoritarian broadcasting system is one which is characterized by "insulation from both consumer preferences and market forces, with arbitrary government regulation exercised in the name of the people but with little concern for individual preferences that do not coincide with official doctrines" as well as "ruling out private ownership entirely". Indeed, the existence of the aforesaid competition and market oriented operation on radio and television mitigates against this classification.

Similarly, the South African example contradicts strongly with the typical Third World broadcasting orientation (as applicable to other Southern African countries like Zimbabwe and Malawi) which suggests that "Competition from private commercial stations with different objectives diminishes the status of the national service, limits its effectiveness in meeting its national responsibilities, creates undue competition for physical and financial resources and impedes the development of the creative possibilities of radio." [Combroad in Head, 1985:63]. Indeed, South Africa has seen a move away from monopoly broadcasting as highlighted earlier and increasingly in the direction of mixed (State and Private) or pluralistic ownership of the broadcast media.

In Chapter Five, mention was made of the increasing commercialization of the broadcast media resulting out of competition between the SABC and its competitors. Head [1985:298] argues that a characteristic of authoritarian systems is that their programming "leans towards persuasion and education".

However, since increasing competition has meant a greater exposure on the part of South African television viewers to popular American television entertainment programming, educational television

represents only 6.02% of the entire SABC-TV broadcast time. [see Appendix A: Figure 11. Also see 1988 SABC Annual Report:46]. Formal news broadcasts are also overshadowed by entertainment programming thus moving South Africa away from a normative authoritarian model.

However, an abundance of "low taste" entertainment (sex and violence) may rather highlight De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach's [1982:178-182] notion that the "maintenance of the stability of the system" is paramount where "the key to heading off dramatic changes in audience behavior is to provide entertainment (low taste) content that will satisfy and motivate the largest possible number of audience members to carry out their roles in accord with the needs of the social system". Indeed, television may not 'rock the boat' and rather be used to maintain the National Party imposed status quo. [also see Fauconnier, 1975:109-114].

It is apparent that the SABC is continually adapting its own services to remain in a dominant position. The virtual monopoly of formal newscasts (on television) make this vital area the domain of the SABC and therefore, the National Party. It is the view of this thesis that for all the contradictions that exist, the political control of the SABC remains solid and the corporation continues to represent the interests of the ruling National Party without threatening this relationship.

### **Motivations For Change: Competition or Political Shifts?**

Having discussed the motivations behind the existence of the key anomalies within broadcasting in South Africa, the key question is whether these contradictions are as a result from competition within the media system itself or whether they are a direct result of political policy shifts within the wider South African context? It is

the view of this thesis that it is a combination of both these factors that enable the anomalies within broadcasting to be explained.

Whilst it has been suggested that the motives behind the increasing liberalization of the broadcast media in South Africa are more profit oriented or as a result of pressures from traditionally sympathetic interests (the Homeland governments and the Afrikaans press groups), the capitulation to these demands on the part of the ruling elite represents a fundamental shift away from the pure monopoly and gross authoritarianism (Hertzog and Meyer) of the past. The toleration of anomalies itself is a liberalizing tenet and in turn promotes further liberalization.

This shift indicates that other than just reacting to competitive market forces, the SABC is being forced to confront the dynamic realities of South Africa today. Indeed, the National Party government faces similar pressures which may result in a conscious attempt by the broadcasting authorities and their controllers to move the electorate to a more racially harmonious society in order to cope with the changing realities of the South African body politic. The mere existence and tolerance of anomalies may also be a result of a sustained government reform package.

By being forced into a market oriented competitive broadcasting system, the SABC may be compelled to face and address the realities of South Africa. They are forced to accept the viewpoint of advertisers that racially integrated advertising and viewing is beneficial to market penetration and realize that the most popular television programmes amongst its all-race viewership remain integrated American entertainment. Whilst Equity sanctions prevent

the broadcast of British shows, the popularity of American television from across the ethnic spectrum mitigates for the increased broadcast of such programmes.

The lack of language parity and the domination of English is also important in this regard. Neville Alexander highlights the increased importance of English and states that "in a post-apartheid South Africa, Afrikaans will rapidly lose its most favoured language status and, again for purely economic reasons, the promotion of English as the 'lingua franca' will become the most rational policy option". ["Critical Choices for South African Society", June 1989:5].

Indeed, it may be argued that the evidence presented in this thesis already shows the adaptation on all constituent elements of the broadcast media (including the SABC) to this eventuality. Green and Lascaris [1988:71] that the language parity of the past has been forgotten and "market forces now determine the language used".

These inconsistencies are apparent when comparing and contrasting the news bias of Chapter Four with the emerging liberalization in Chapter Five. Indeed, the more comfortable, the WHO feels with his political environment, the less authoritarian he will become thus again conflating the normative model. The contemporary period of F.W. De Klerk and resulting international initiatives may therefore increase the anomalies.

Indeed, the desire to move away from blatant racial discrimination of the Verwoerdian era, by the National Party is accepted in this thesis. As noted, the extent of liberalization within the media indicates the symbiosis of the reform process of the early P.W. Botha years with that of the broadcasting policy and could resume under a

De Klerk premiership.

These reforms, have themselves been inconsistent as they have often gone hand-in-hand with repression (influx control abolished whilst mass political movements were restricted). Graham Leach [Tyson, 1987:206] has suggested in relation to the lack of unrest related news during the reform and repression 1984-1986 years that "there is a thought within the Government of managing the reform programme so that it does not lead to extensive instability. I think controlling what is seen on television is a part of that process". The control is therefore bound to be inconsistent as long as it is based upon the external environment.

Indeed, the "reform" process itself resulted in the significant split in Afrikanerdom in 1982 and the resulting formation of the Conservative Party. These events coupled with increasing international pressure and the practical implementation of sanctions may have direct bearing on the SABC as those in control of the organization propounding the more reformist line, may have direct influence on the liberalization within the broadcast media.

Whilst the reformists may have the upper-hand, their inconsistencies reflect that of the South African political process which has had to face mass uprisings following the formation of the United Democratic Front in opposition to the 1983 Constitution which in turn resulted in a State of Emergency.

The control and authoritarian legislation that has followed retarded the reform process and re-integrated the authoritarian model within South Africa's broadcasting system (witness the lack of unrest and biased Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) television coverage). Indeed, this situation saw the SABC "shift in tandem with the presidency from

a dutifully reformist political line from 1978 to 1984 to a confused, sullen and introspective approach post-1984". [Pottinger, 1988:420].

The other key issue is that of broadcasting's role in the split between Afrikanerdom regarding the pace of political reform and the resulting fear of losing voters to the right-wing. Here the SABC has two options. Either it can present a conservative picture of the world not to anger a potentially powerful political advisory (the CP) or it can use the media in line with the Developmental Theory model [see McQuail, 1987:119-121] in attempting to break down differences and encourage some degree of nation-building.

Here again, inconsistencies abound. Conservative news programmes contrast with integration which has caused violent anti-SABC and therefore anti-National Party sentiment on the part of the CP. The portrayal of events is also likely to change based upon the ruling elites perceived fears of the right-wing at any given time.

Evidence presented in this thesis suggests that within popular programming, the SABC is indeed, emphasizing integration (and therefore the "social change" aspect of Development Theory) through the selective purchase of such shows. If the electoral threat of the right-wing is stultified, this is likely to continue; however, the flipside of this is increased conservatism and a regression into the authoritarian "laager" syndrome. This will have a direct bearing on the pace of political reform and is likely to be reflected commensurately in the orientation of the state-run broadcast media.

It is also possible that the ruling National Party may use the mass media to present a more enlightened image in order to secure support from the more liberal English speaking voting block. This may be a

direct result of the move of many Afrikaners to the Conservative Party resulting in the need to muster the English vote in order to maintain a majority in the House of Assembly. The emerging domination of English as broadcasting language and the use of integrationist programming may be a result of this.

Increased liberalization could also occur as a result of the increased rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States as a function of the Gorbachov premiership. This links with the implementation of Resolution 435 and the Namibian independence process where South Africa has engaged in direct negotiations with historical enemies such as Cuba and the Soviet Union. Similarly so, the peace accords in Angola and Mozambique as well as increasing signs that the South Africa is enjoying a degree of diplomatic success and acceptance in Africa may lead to a relaxation of the internal political environment and the mass media as a function thereof.

Having mentioned the symbiotic relationship that exists between the SABC and the National Party, it is evident that these contradictions mentioned earlier are compatible with the reform and repression policy of PW Botha. Taking into account the continued and unabating influence of the National Party in the broadcast media, it is possible that the contradictions forced upon an historically conservative organization, place the SABC (and the broadcast media in general) in a key position ahead of the reform process.

With the apparent contradictions discussed, it would seem that the the existence of competition and the integration of all races into the various broadcasting services (radio and television) show a degree of integration and harmony not yet achieved within South

African society. Programming as discussed earlier also depicts other societies that are at a stage in their development that goes way beyond the reform process within South Africa (the USA).

It is also possible that the SABC has been prepared to change in consultation with its parent government who themselves may wish to portray a deracialized picture of society in order to decrease levels of group animosity that they have fostered for so long. This is in line with the reform desire (successful or otherwise) to reduce racial tensions in the face of increasing unrest and foreign pressure. Indeed, the immediacy that television enjoys coupled with the unlimited access given to the National Party, makes this an ideal medium in which to promote new initiatives.

Whilst this liberalization may have been forced upon the SABC and the National Party (the view of this thesis) it is indeed movement away from the historically controlled authoritarian model as outlined in the earlier Chapters of this thesis. Existing contradictions in the broadcast media may be exploited with the intention of moving away from the rigidity of Apartheid.

The anomalies within the broadcast media are likely to increase further with the introduction of Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) to South Africa. As technology develops, the cost to the public of owning satellite dishes will drop. There can be little doubt that with world telecommunications increasingly relying on satellites and more specifically with the increased use of satellite technology to broadcast television transmissions, pressure will mount on this country to legalize DBS.

Currently, a number of nations broadcast via satellite. In South Africa one of the most visible networks is that operated by Cable

News Network (CNN) that broadcasts news on a twenty-four hours basis. The legalization of DBS (currently under discussion) will therefore immediately expose South African viewers to an alternative source of news/public affairs programming and a resulting alternative television news culture.

### Movement From Authoritarianism to Controlled Pluralism:

An easy classification into authoritarianism is not possible as the anomalies overlap into varying other normative categories such as the Developmental Theory. The inadequacy of rigid classification is evident leading to the view that the available models are insufficient in dealing with a society moving from a monopoly authoritarian media system to a controlled pluralistic [see Chapter One] orientation that is liberalizing continuously.

It is again important to emphasize that in relation to the internal motivations behind the liberalization of broadcasting, it is the ever increasing role of the internal components of the social system [see Chapter Two and De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:173-176] such as the advertisers, producers, distributors and audiences that increasingly are exerting their influence alongside the legislators or ruling elite.

The more the broadcasting orientation shifts from authoritarian to a more pluralistic model, the greater the influence that such component elements will exert on the medium. Indeed, the American example outlined by De Fleur [1982:178] highlights the financial motivation as paramount. Within South Africa, the discovery on the part of the broadcasting authorities that liberalization also brings with it considerable financial rewards will promote further the tolerance of

anomalies and the movement away from authoritarianism.

Indeed, the existence of multiple motivations in the production, selection and scheduling of broadcast programmes highlighted by the existence of competition between State and privately run media institutions contribute towards a shift to broadcasting pluralism. Head [1987:13] argues that within pluralism both the profit and the public-service components of broadcasting retain equal importance. Ideally such pluralism enables healthy competition without a politically subservient State-run enterprise. Whilst within South Africa this has yet to be achieved, the emerging contradictory motivations outlined indicates the movement towards this trend.

In conclusion, the SABC remains the domain of the ruling National Party. It has reluctantly been forced into a position of accepting and reacting to the advent of competition. By merely reacting and therefore being able to react, it has moved away from the Verwoerdian historical matrix that was a characteristic of its services for so long.

At the same time the political realities and dynamics of South Africa as well as the component elements of the social system are increasingly influencing the WHO or controllers of the media away from their past rigidity. Independent operators and the increasing involvement of the private sector in the exploitation of the profitability of television and radio are also steadily pushing the various services to their respective limits which in turn reflects upon the programming of the SABC as it attempts to maintain a listenership and viewership superiority over its competitors.

These factors are likely to increase the many contradictions within the broadcast media in South Africa. Once the SABC has tasted the

benefits of increasing commercialization, it is unlikely to retreat to the era of Albert Hertzog. However, the SABC's continual dominance in the news/public affairs programming will remain a controversial issue. Whilst the entertainment monopoly has been broken, pressures will increase on the authorities to allow a full scale alternative television news culture to develop.

As has been seen the politics of broadcasting in South Africa is a complex issue. It is the conclusion of this thesis that whilst the ruling elite retain a dominant influence over both radio and television, there are enough contradictions that increasingly allow the broadcast media to present a picture of South Africa that goes beyond the narrow "General and Own" affairs policy of the National Party whilst simultaneously remaining as unthreatening as possible to the future maintenance of National Party rule.

Indeed, Dr. Paul Vorster of Rand Afrikaans University [Argus: 20/01/1986] has argued that television has "paved the way for the Afrikaner to become more part of a broader nationalism... where South Africanism and Afrikaner identity is no longer seen as mutually exclusive".

Vorster [Argus: 20/01/1986] adds that this enabled the Afrikaner to be "more ready to meet fellow South Africans on equal terms and realize that he had to discard as untrue the stereotypes of others" resulting in the Afrikaner adapting to a "new world view". If these perceptions are accepted as true then the broadcast media and particularly television has played a vital role in conscientizing an historically isolationist people into confronting societal realities.

The existence of liberalizing tendencies within the broadcast media have a multiplicity of explanations. Not only were they a response to the dynamics of the political environment and mounting political pressures, they were also a response to pressures from fellow members of the ruling elite as well as to financial and commercial demands. It should be noted that these demands are genuinely shifting the broadcasting orientation away from the authoritarian albeit within the early stages of such a continuum.

The broadcast media must be looked at as an integrative whole. The various media actors have differing orientations and cultures that exerting considerable influence on one another. In describing South Africa's broadcasting system, the characteristics of all these component elements need to be analyzed as the increasing mix of private and public ownership contribute towards a pluralistic broadcasting categorization. Whilst none of the 'independent' actors propound a serious threat to the State, the control and monopoly legacy of the past has been broken.

The perspective of broadcasting contributing to meaningful change in South Africa remains a controversial issue and it would seem that the continued dominance of the SABC as a function of the ruling National Party will dictate these terms. However, if pushed to its limits, the SABC seems set to react to both competition and societal pressures in order to retain its influential position as chief disseminator of news, entertainment and information. This position, most importantly remains ahead of the National Party and it can be seen that the SABC may in the future perform a more encouraging inclusive role despite (or due to) its relationship with the National Party.

Such a scenario may be in line with the growing autonomy of quasi-State institutions away from direct Governmental control - a sentiment that the new chairman of the SABC board, Professor Christo Viljoen, continually emphasizes in relation to the SABC. [see Citizen:06/05/1989]. It may also be a result of the weakening of the National Party as the ruling party and resulting creation of a political vacuum in which a power struggle could emerge. This lends two contradictory orientations to the broadcasting of politics in South Africa.

Firstly, the news monopoly held by the SABC prevents a free flow of information, it being adherent to the National Party. News and Public Affairs programmes largely highlight the official view and attempt to persuade listeners and viewers to accept it as their own. Indeed, the continued control of the State-run media indicates that the National Party is unlikely to capitulate to the opposition forces and will continue to employ techniques that maintain its authority. This is the perpetuation of the controlled authoritarian model.

Secondly, the liberalization of elements within the services of the SABC, the increasing influence of non-State component elements as well as the existence of competition in both radio and television create a dynamic broadcasting system. These pressures also place the broadcast media at the forefront of a process to conscientize the public into accepting the need to move away from ethnically based societal perceptions and may therefore promote a less rigid ideological matrix. Indeed, this may be a result of the weakening of the National Party's ideological base. This moves away from the authoritarian to a more mixed/pluralist model.

The categorization of South Africa's broadcasting system into a normative authoritarian model is no longer possible indicating the inadequate nature of such a model in dealing with a broadcasting system in transition. Whilst the Broadcasting system continues to contain considerable authoritarian influences, the existence of key anomalies and the increasing influence of non-State actors introducing liberalizing tenets are steadily moving the broadcasting system of South Africa towards a controlled pluralistic model sharing component elements other than those classified as authoritarian.

## **APPENDICES**




Figure 1. SABC-TV Referendum Coverage 1983.(from Dalling, 1983:184).




Figure 2. SABC % Time Allowed to Political Groups 1987. (from Stewart, 1987:143).




Figure 3. Radio Listening "Yesterday" 1987-1988. (from AMPS 87/88, Volume B6: 66-68).


OWNERSHIP OF RADIO AND ACCESS TO SHORTWAVE

	% Households with Radio	% Households with Shortwave		% Households with Radio	% Households with Shortwave
<u>Europe</u>			<u>Asia &amp; the Far East</u>		
Austria (N)	**	36	Bangladesh (U)	51	36
Finland (N)	**	66	Chinese P.R. (Beijing)	79+	72
France (N)	**	32	Chinese P.R. (Guangzhou)	59+	56
West Germany (N)	**	67	India (Uttar Pradesh)	61	49
Netherlands (N)	**	36	India (Rajasthan)	60	56
Portugal (N)	86	38	Indonesia <sup>Ø</sup>	69	64
Turkey (N)	88	69	Japan (N)	95	61
<u>Middle East &amp; North Africa</u>			South Korea (N)	86	16
Bahrain (U)	98	81*	Malaysia (Peninsular)	91	75
Egypt (N)	84	76	Pakistan (U/PR)	58	56
Morocco (U)	99	86	Philippines (N)	69	34
Oman (U)	97	69*	Thailand (Central Region)	91	62
Qatar (Doha)	99	78*	<u>North America</u>		
Tunisia (U)	87	66	Canada (N)	**	5 to 10
Yemen A.R. (U)	95	67	<u>Latin America</u>		
<u>Africa</u>			Argentina (U)	92	36
Cameroon (U)	89	85	Brazil (U)	91	64
Kenya (N)	47	45	Chile (U)	96	71
Niger (Niamey)	91	86	El Salvador (U)	97	49
Nigeria (N)	68	59	Peru (U)	97	73
Sierra Leone (Freetown)	87	60*	Uruguay (Montevideo)	99	58
Sierra Leone (Kabala)	53	n.a.	<u>West Indies</u>		
South Africa (N)	94	61	Trinidad & Tobago (N)	94	33
Zaire (U)	55	42*			

\* These are low estimates. Shortwave access is probably higher.  
 \*\* In these countries radio ownership is virtually 100%.  
 + Radio-cassettes only.  
 Ø Jakarta, Solo and Ujung Pandang.

Figure 4. Ownership and Access to Short-wave 1986. (from BBC, World Radio and Television Receivers. 1986:23)

# M-NET OWNERSHIP SHARE



INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY M-NET

Figure 5. M-NET Ownership Share 1989. (information supplied by M-NET).

## TOP 20 SABC-TV RATINGS: LANGUAGE (TV1 and TV4)





Figure 6. Top 20 SABC-TV Ratings July 1988: Language. (Sunday Times, 16 July 1989).


**SABC-TV DOMESTIC DRAMA CONTENT**  
(Local versus imported programmes)



FROM SABC 1988 ANNUAL REPORT: 41 - 43

Figure 7 (a). SABC-TV Domestic Drama Content. (from SABC 1988 Annual Report:41-43).

**TOP 20 SABC-TV RATINGS**  
(TV1 and TV4)



FROM SUNDAY TIMES 16/7/1988

Figure 7 (b) Top 20 SABC-TV Ratings July 1988. (from Sunday Times, 16 July 1989).

**SABC ADVERTISING INCOME**  
(Millions)





Figure 8. SABC Advertising Income 1988. (from SABC 1988 Annual Report:12).

**SABC REVENUE SOURCES 1988**



FROM 1988 SABC ANNUAL REPORT: 12

Figure 9. SABC Revenue Sources 1988. (from SABC 1988 Annual Report:12).




Figure 10. Acceptability of Multi-Racial Advertising 1987. (from Green and Lascaris, 1988:114).




Figure 11. Education as a % of Programme Content 1988. (from SABC 1988 Annual Report).

# T • R • I • B • A • L • D • A • N • C • E • R

APPENDIX B:



230

☛ "Yeah, maybe I pulsate to a different rhythm. Doesn't make me a primitive 'African' though, does it?"

☛ See, the city is the only jungle I know. And nothing's going to sidestep

my aspirations. I'm going places, and I'm not letting up till I get there.

☛ Stereotype me 'Urban Black' if you like, but just remember one thing— if you want to get through to me, you'd best get in the right groove."



Figure 1. Radio Metro Print Advertisement.

NOT JUST ANOTHER STEREO TYPE STATION

..R.I.T.U.A.L..M.U.S.I.C..




■ ■ "Sure I've got a black skin. Doesn't mean I come from the dark ages, my man. Yeah, I've had to move on from my rural roots — so now you want to stereotype me 'Urban Black'. Well, suit yourself. But just get one thing

straight. I am an individual, I'm educated, and I know what I want.

■ ■ See, it's no longer a question of colour. It's a matter of attitude. And if you want to get through to me, it's time you were on my wavelength."

Figure 2.. Radio Metro Print Advertisement.



Now the vibrant sounds of Radio Bophuthatswana are being heard on the Reef. It's a new station run by blacks. We play the music we like, the music you like. Famous DJ's like T.J. Thipe, Ractus Mosewe,

AT LAST. A RADIO STATION WITH A MIND OF ITS OWN.

and E. S. Makgatlha will introduce such great reggae Kings as Bob Marley and Peter Tosh.

The cool, soothing music of the Commodores.

The hot soul of Nina Simone. The mellow voice of Joan Armatrading. And the powerful sounds of our own Letta Mbuli and the great Miriam Makeba.

All on medium wave (AM)

102.5 But music isn't the only thing that will please you.

Our news broadcasts in Tswana and English will be straight, no-nonsense reports on both local and international affairs.

And we plan to introduce live sports coverage from around the country, giving you minute by minute news on soccer, boxing, horse-racing and all other major events.

Tune in to Radio Bophuthatswana on medium wave (AM) 102.5.

Have a mind of your own.

Disc Jockey T. J. Thipe




Figure 2a. Radio Bophuthatswana Print Advertisement.

# So much for the sex, drugs and rock 'n roll era Now for a little stimulation.

APPENDIX B:



Want to wake up to what's happening?  
702's morning show has all the stimulation you need.

The era we're in right now doesn't have a convenient handle. But it seems to have a lot to do with success, health and bulls 'n bears. (Mind you, sex is never out of fashion. Nor rock 'n roll for that matter.)


Like Bob Dylan said, the times they are a changin', and so is the line-up on 702. We've made a promise to do it for you and we're sticking by it. You want more intelligent stimulation. Here it comes.

## Wake up to radio that opens your eyes.

From 5 to 7 every morning Gary Edwards will ease you into the day with news and music. Then it's time to really wake up. Remember Berkeley of old? Want till you hear John Berks. Today. At 7 John joins Gary in the studio to line up news, music and a great deal of entertainment.

Plus a daily studio guest for a frank discussion of anything from sex to finance.

Are you coping with stress or heading for a breakdown?  
Ask our resident psychologist.



John also has Andy Taylor for traffic, and John Robbie for sport along with the rest of the morning team with him all the way.

Next up is Mike Mills, from 10 am through to 2 pm. Talk about entertainment! Mike does. Plus a whole lot more that makes life in 702land interesting.

702 means plenty of great music all the time. And if you



Sometimes laughter is the sanest thing in a crazy world.  
(We must be a pretty sane radio station.)

want to know what's happening at the leading edge, just tune into Rob Wheatley, from 2 to 5 pm.

## For people with wisdom beyond their ears. Hot news. Burning issues.

If you like your news uncut and unbiased you're tuned to the right station. 702 is independent, remember. That means our hands are free of red tape, so we don't pull our punches. There are things you should be hearing and issues we should be talking about. At 702 we'll let you look at it from all sides, then make up your own mind.

There is no one better than Chris Gibbons to turn the spotlight on the news of the day and put the newsmakers on the spot. Now Chris takes his Newstalk a step further, and into a later time slot. So when it's 5 in the afternoon and you're wondering what in the world is going on, Chris, supported by Ian Crewe, will fill you in with two hours of in-depth news coverage.

When Chris signs off at 7 it's time for more music with 702's resident Rock Doc, Neil Johnson.

He'll be putting his finger on the pulse of the music scene - new, local and international. Then at 10 pm David Blood dials in with a phone-in show, Talk at 10, leading up to The 11th Hour when he covers all late breaking news. That takes you through to the all night music slot. That's 24 hours of eye-opening radio.

## Speaking of Sport.

Anyone can tell you a score. On 702 we go a whole lot further by getting you to share your opinions with us. And we let the players tell you their side of it.

In addition to sport on the morning show, John Robbie will be summing up weekend sport with a round-up of events, a guest in the studio and you on the phone. That's on Saturdays, 6 - 8 pm.


We're independent and we call it as we see it. There's nothing superficial about 702 news.



They say Transvaal lack big match temperament.  
What do Transvaal say?

## Where has all the good music gone?

In case you're wondering about those unforgettable classic hits - we haven't forgotten them. In particular when you're mellowing out over the weekend, we've got the presenters ready to keep you company. Andrew Brooks, Malcolm Russell, Ian Logan, Paul Stevens, Cocky-Two-Bull, Frank Sanders, Gary Edwards, Alan Pierce, Rick Enxlin, Glen O'Donovan and more. Whether your all-time favourite music belongs to the fifties, sixties, seventies or eighties, you can bet they'll be playing your songs.



For those who prefer to make up their own minds - hear the views from both sides.

Centre, you can count on us to be there for 702land's big moments. Come to think of it with our competitions, fun days and the mobile 702 Boomer, we supply a few big moments of our own. And if that's not stimulation, what is?


## We do it for you.

702 is more than a radio station. We're also citizens of 702land. We care about what's going on, and we're prepared to get involved. Besides our Gagine, Helpline and Crisis

# 702

RADIO THAT OPENS YOUR EYES

Figure 3(a). Radio 702 Print Advertisement.



**539 000 loyal subjects.**

Recently released AMPS figures reveal that over 539 000\* people listen to the magic 702 every single day. Proving that 702 remains the most effective way of getting your message to the citizens of 702 land.

\*AMPS '85/'86

**702**  
FAMOUS FOR OUR MUSIC

—McCANN 2— 402822

Figure 3(b). Radio 702 Print Advertisement.

6190 kHz ◀ NEW FREQUENCIES ▶ 3255 kHz



*Now! Hear it more clearly.*

# BBC NEWS

## AFRICA AND AROUND THE WORLD

A new, more powerful radio signal is being transmitted on the shortwave frequencies shown below, in addition to existing frequencies.

Shortwave frequencies may be marked SW, KW or OC on your set. Please remember that reception can vary with the time of day or year.

BBC World Service opens up the world of news, international affairs, sport, commerce, entertainment and education. And, of course, it brings you special programmes for Africa and about Africa.

LOCAL TIME	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	
6190 kHz																				
3255 kHz																				

WORLD SERVICE  
 PROGRAMMES FOR AFRICA  
 SATURDAY & SUNDAY ONLY

For a sample copy of London Calling, the monthly BBC magazine with full details of programmes and frequencies, send this coupon to BBC, Dept. FM, PO Box 2787, Cape Town.


NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

Figure 4. British Broadcasting Corporation Print Advertisement.

# VOA OFFERS RELIABLE NEWS

ON-THE-HOUR AT 621 kHz MEDIUM WAVE\*\*



### Voice of America Programs of Special African Interest:

- **Daybreak Africa**  
News, music and features to start your day. Every day, 5:00 - 6:00 am and 8:00 - 9:00 am
- **Nightline Africa**  
Reports on African and world news. Everyday, 10:00 - 11:00 pm
- **African Panorama**  
In-depth reports on African events. Monday through Friday, 8:10 pm
- **Focus**  
In-depth examination of important world issues. Sunday through Friday, 8:10 pm

\*\* Also on shortwave  
kHz 17785 15600 15445 11920 7280 6035

**VOA** OBJECTIVE ACCURATE COMPLETE

For a program schedule contact: United States Information Service, 3rd Floor, African Life Centre, 111 Commissioner Street, Johannesburg telephone 29-3451

USIS Reading Room, Orlando YMCA, Soweto telephone 933 2186

Figure 5. Voice of America Print Advertisement.

Figure 6. SELECTION OF PRINT MEDIA ADVERTISING.

# NO PUNCHES PULLED

---

- A French model boss drugs and rapes his teenage models
- Greenpeace fighters risk their lives to save the whales in stormy Arctic seas
- Aids-ridden prostitutes cruise hotel bars in Amsterdam
- Male strippers. Active birth. Psychic shivers. Everybody loves to peep into other people's lives. Waiting to be shocked by what they find. Loving it
- The whispers are spreading. More and more people tune into Carte Blanche. To thrill. To marvel. To shudder.




Figure 6. M-NET "Carte Blanche" Print Advertisement.

Get caught up in every second as people's lives are entangled in a spider web of events created by the Second World War.

See War And Remembrance Thursday night at nine.



Tie yourself down for a tonic of suspense and intrigue. Catch the spies and double agents of 'Spioen Spioen', simulcast in English on Saturday night at seven.




# THIS WEEK, IF YOU WANT TO BE SHAKEN, DON'T STIR.

Get stuck into a late night movie with a reformed gangster who finds it difficult to shake off the mob. Starring Humphrey Bogart and Edward G. Robinson, Thursday night at eleven.



Steel your nerves and stay riveted to your set for our deadly movie, Road Games. Starring Stacey Keach, Jamie Lee Curtis and some very scary people. Saturday night at nine thirty.



Six down, and prepare yourself for some heart-stopping action in the British Open Golf Tournament, today at three.



If the bad guys don't shake you, then the hero's hair raising stunts in his super sophisticated, high tech chopper, will. Catch Airwolf in action at seven on Friday night.




Figure 6. SABC-TV1 "Where Variety Shows" Print Advertisement.

## WHERE VARIETY SHOWS.

CAPITAL RADIO

AREAS OF COVERAGE

MW daytime catchment area




Figure 1. Capital Radio Reception Map.

**WORLD RADIO AND TELEVISION RECEIVERS - 1985**  
(All figures approximate)

	Population ('000s)	RADIO				TELEVISION		
		Number of Radio Sets (excluding wired receivers) ( '000s)				Number of Television Receivers ( '000s)		
		1955	1965	1975	1985	1965	1975	1985
<b>WORLD FIGURES (approx.)</b>	4,785,000	237,000	529,000	1,010,000	1,650,000	177,000	398,000	737,000
<b>EUROPE</b>								
Western Europe	428,000	65,310	116,500	186,600	297,800	49,400	103,400	162,900
USSR & Eastern Europe	392,000	20,260	59,700	92,600	164,300	24,000	87,000	130,100
<b>MIDDLE EAST (inc. North Africa)</b>	229,000	2,200	12,300	29,300	58,100	1,250	6,000	19,500
<b>AFRICA (ex. North Africa)</b>								
South Africa	29,000	875	2,600	4,800	10,000	-	500	3,000
Other Countries	392,000	360	4,800	18,500	42,600	100	600	7,900
<b>ASIA</b>								
Chinese P.R.	1,050,000	1,000	6,000	35,000	120,000	70	750	56,000
India	740,000	1,000	4,800	24,000	50,000	2	300	2,300
Japan	121,000	12,000	27,000	87,000	100,000	18,000	42,000	70,000
Other countries	723,000	1,800	13,300	49,700	111,600	700	8,950	31,000
<b>WESTERN HEMISPHERE</b>								
United States of America	237,000	111,000	230,000	380,000	500,000	68,000	110,000	175,000
Canada	25,000	5,500	14,000	23,000	32,000	5,000	9,500	14,000
Latin America	382,000	12,600	29,400	62,800	133,500	7,400	22,600	54,900
West Indies	11,000	190	860	4,000	5,600	100	1,200	2,000
<b>AUSTRALASIA &amp; OTHER OCEAN TERRITORIES</b>	26,000	2,760	7,800	13,000	24,700	3,200	5,000	8,600

JUNE 1986

INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING & AUDIENCE RESEARCH

Figure 2. World Radio and Television Receivers - 1985 (information supplied by the BBC).

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