A Gaze of One's Own:

Feminist Film Theory, with application to Klute

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ABSTRACT

This study is concerned with the development of a field of film theory around the place of the female spectator.

Chapter 1 presents an historical overview of some trends in the development of film theory, with emphasis on the emergence of a paradigm in which theories of semiotics, ideology and psychoanalysis intersect. It critically assesses the establishment of a dominant theory founded in the notion of film as art, proposing certain parallels between this and contemporary Leavisite literary theory, and notes auteurism as the point of departure from this into the consideration of film as popular culture. It then traces the impact of the critiques by Barthes and Foucault of authorial intentionality, Althusser’s theory of ideology and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory in the shift to a body of film theory centrally concerned with the notion of film as text. The feminist intervention is located at the meeting point of this theory with the concerns of the emergent women’s movement, and is traced in its development from the “image of” criticism of Rosen and Haskell to Claire Johnston’s and Laura Mulvey’s seminal work on women and representation.

Chapter 2 focuses on some of the theoretical considerations of the image and the gaze, extends these into the theory of cinema as an apparatus, and outlines feminist critiques of apparatus theory. Accounts of representation and the image are drawn from Bill Nichols, John Berger, and Peter Wollen’s summary of C.S. Peirce. In the shift of theoretical interest to the process of viewing film, Munsterberg’s account of the psychology of vision is noted. The psychoanalytic construction of visual meaning is traced.
through Lacan’s elaboration of the mirror phase to its significance for cinema in the centrality of desire and the gaze. The consequent development of a model of cinema as an apparatus by Baudry and Metz is followed. The feminist criticism of the androcentricity of this model is traced, both through its outright rejection, and through specific critiques by Teresa de Lauretis, Jacqueline Rose, Kaja Silverman, Mary Ann Doane and Constance Penley.

Chapter 3 follows three theorists in their attempts to account for female spectatorship: Laura Mulvey’s theory of oscillation, Teresa de Lauretis’s double identification and Mary Ann Doane’s accounts both of textual strategies of specularization in the "woman’s film" and the masquerade are considered.

Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the text Klute in order to apply some of the theoretical implications, particularly around questions of female subjectivity and spectatorship. It situates Klute within its historical context, in relation to the cinema industry and the emergent women’s movement, and within the terms suggested by its generic structuration.

The Conclusion provides a summary of my intention to provide an overview of this difficult and fertile field of debate.

An Appendix provides a script of Klute.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... 4

CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 5
   EARLY DOMINANT FILM THEORY: "FILM AS ART" ..................................................... 5
   A PARALLEL: LITERARY THEORY .................................................................................. 8
   COUNTER-THEORY: "FILM AS TEXT" ......................................................................... 10
   THEORIES OF IDEOLOGY ............................................................................................... 13
   DIFFERENCE: POST-STRUCTURAL BEGINNINGS ......................................................... 17
   FEMINIST BEGINNINGS: IMAGE OF WOMAN ............................................................. 19
   FEMINIST BEGINNINGS: REPRESENTATION OF WOMAN ........................................... 22
   CLAIRE JOHNSTON ......................................................................................................... 23
   LAURA MULVEY .............................................................................................................. 26

CHAPTER TWO: THE AXIS OF VISION ................................................................................. 30
   THE IMAGE: PERCEPTION AND CODES ....................................................................... 30
   THE IMAGE: SIGNS ......................................................................................................... 35
   THE IMAGE: NATURALIZATION ..................................................................................... 38
   LACAN: SUBJECTIVITY, THE GAZE AND DESIRE ...................................................... 40
   APPARATUS THEORY .................................................................................................... 44
   APPARATUS: FEMINIST OPPOSITION ......................................................................... 46
   APPARATUS: FEMINIST REJECTIONS .......................................................................... 48
   APPARATUS: FEMINIST CRITIQUES ............................................................................. 51
CHAPTER THREE: LOOKING FOR THE WOMAN: IN SEARCH OF THE FEMALE GAZE .............................................. 59

LAURA MULVEY: OSCILLATION ............................................................................ 60
TERESA DE LAURETIS: DOUBLE IDENTIFICATION ........................................... 63
MARY ANN DOANE: PROXIMITY AND ADDRESS ........................................... 69

CHAPTER FOUR: KLUTE: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS ........................................... 82

THE NEW HOLLYWOOD? ...................................................................................... 83

GENRE: KLUTE AS DETECTIVE THRILLER AND FILM NOIR .............................. 87

BREE AS GENERIC MISFIT ............................................................................ 90
MODEL AUDITION SEQUENCE (#36-38) ....................................................... 96
HOTEL ROOM SEQUENCE (#50 - 57) ............................................................... 104
APARTMENT SEQUENCE ((#58 - 69) ............................................................... 107
SUMMARY: THE FIGURATION OF BREE THROUGH GENRE ......................... 113

BREE VERSUS THE IMAGE ........................................................................... 115

BREE AND THE MASQUERADE ..................................................................... 118

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 120

WORKS CITED .................................................................................................. 122

APPENDIX ......................................................................................................... 127
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CHAPTER ONE
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

This introduction presents an historical overview of aspects of the development of film theory with a particular focus on how theories of semiotics, ideology, psychoanalysis and feminism have come to have a central bearing on contemporary film theory.

EARLY DOMINANT FILM THEORY: "FILM AS ART"

Film theory, as a distinct tradition with its own history, began within decades of the beginnings of commercial cinema (Rosen, vii). Vachel Lindsay's The Art of the Moving Picture (1915) and Hugo Munsterberg's The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (first published in 1916) were early works that gave serious attention to the new phenomenon. In so doing, early theorists laboured under a perceived need to counter several prejudices against the new phenomenon of film: denigration of the mechanical nature of film's means of reproduction (Perkins 13); the legacy of its early association with the "low culture" of vaudeville, evident in the development of the dominant film genres of melodrama and farce (Mast 27); the class basis of film's popularity, its appeal across language barriers that brought American immigrants - the bulk of the country's working class - into exhibition halls in their millions (Terry Ramsaye quoted in Rhode 29). The claim for film's status as an art was thus a central tenet in the development of film theory; the onus was on serious writers on film to counter such
judgements as William DeMille's in 1911, when he denounced the movies as "galloping tintypes [which] no one can expect ... to develop into anything which could, by the wildest stretch of the imagination, be called art" (quoted in Perkins 9). Although not always the central point of debate, this issue has nonetheless provided a continuous strand through the development of the tradition.

But in this long 'battle for prestige', in developing film theory as a major weapon, 'the pioneers ... made it the campaign's chief casualty' (Perkins 11). Developments in the other arts, particularly in painting where the Post-Impressionists had led the revolt against representational art, and the Cubists had taken that revolt through into a revolution, had created a critical climate where 'descriptive imitation was ... highly suspect' (Perkins 12). 'The idea of art holding up a mirror to nature became a nostalgic one: a means of diminishing instead of interpreting reality' (Berger 135). Perkins notes an irony in the process in which 'developments in painting, resulting largely from the impact of photography and film, promoted attitudes to art which film theory could accommodate only by ... [denying or minimizing] the importance of the camera's function as a recorder of reality' (13).

Thus such declarations as: 'perhaps the greatest handicap imposed on aesthetic progress was the camera's misleading faculty of being able to record the actual' (from Paul Rotha, The Film Till Now); '[cinema] does not reproduce but produce and through [this] it becomes an independent, basically new art' (Bela Balazs, Theory of the Film);

'Between the natural event and its appearance on the screen there is a marked difference. It is exactly this difference that makes the film an art' (V.I. Pudovkin, Film Technique and Film Acting); 'art only begins
where mechanical reproduction leaves off' (Rudolf Arnheim, *Film*) (all quoted in Perkins 13-14).

Trapped in the need to comply with particular criteria to qualify as Art, film theory became a prescriptive dogma concerned with the 'twin mystiques ... of the image and ... montage' (Perkins 17). What Perkins terms the established or orthodox theory of film functions as a dogma that 'not only fails to provide a coherent basis for discussion of particular films but actively obstructs understanding of the cinema' (11). In privileging method over works, such dogma fails, too, in practice; particular films may comply with prescribed formulae but fail to meet critical approval (he cites *Triumph of the Will*), while films acknowledged by such theorists as masterpieces (*Greed*, for example) contravene directly such formulae (26).

Perkins' trenchant criticism of established film theory is supplemented with a plea for a radical re-orientation. 'A useful theory will have to redirect attention to the movie as it is seen, by shifting the emphasis back from creation to perception ... [It will] need to concentrate not on the viewfinder and on the cutting bench but on the screen' (27).

Perkins' critique of the critical establishment's 'sterile orthodoxy' (11) is credited by Willemen with being the most useful account of the emergence and consolidation of a film culture establishment founded on an aesthetics of taste¹ (Presentation in Neale 1). But such an aesthetics rests on considerations of status, applied not only in the

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1 R. Stephenson and R.J. Debrixf's *The Cinema as Art* is prefaced by an instructive quotation from Lope de Vega: 'Only by taste can we account for taste'.
project of elevating cinema to an Art, but also, by implication, to the critic and writer on that cinema.

The notion that the 'taste' of a few educated amateurs with refined sensibilities constitutes the touchstone of film appreciation is in fact the tip of the iceberg of a complex set of propositions founded on many different institutional practices and determined by equally diverse ideological and economic factors. (Willemen in Neale 1)

A PARALLEL: LITERARY THEORY

To claim aesthetic appreciation as the preserve of a select minority was an approach not exclusive to film theory. In tracing the rise of English literary theory from the eighteenth century to the present, Eagleton has ascribed a similar position to the most influential movement in literary theory this century, led by F.R. Leavis and his colleagues (30-44). As an academic subject, English had its origins in the education of working class men; its growth as a university subject was directly linked to the gradual admission of women, which only added to its identity as an amateurish, dilettante pursuit - 'idle gossip about literary taste' (Eagleton 27-29). In the wake of the First World War, which saw both a 'carnage of ruling-class rhetoric' and a surge of nationalism, the way was cleared for English Literature to emerge from this downgraded identity, and take its place as 'the supremely civilizing pursuit' in the halls of academe (Eagleton 29-31).

In fashioning English into a subject for rigorous critical analysis the Leavisite 'architects' placed the new English crucially within the contemporary crisis in Western culture: because literature
'encapsulated creative energies which were everywhere on the defensive in modern "commercial" society', its study was to be 'a spiritual exploration coterminous with the fate of civilization itself' (Eagleton 32). Consequent on this placement was the recuperation of a central ideological purpose for English: as literature was firmly posited in opposition to popular culture, close engagement with great literary works would provide a defence against the 'insidious effects of "mass civilization"' (Eagleton 34).

The nature of such engagement, and what would qualify as a literary work, were key issues for Leavis, but as issues they remained unproblematised. Close reading, as an exclusive critical practice, requires an isolation of the text that functions as a denial of historical or cultural context (Eagleton 44). Literature is circumscribed as being works of great (individual) minds; literary criticism works to endorse through qualities read "in" the text particular moral and social values, while it stops short of any political explanation for, for example, the poverty of 'mass culture'. 'Radical in respect of the literary-academic establishment', Scrutiny espoused an "essential Englishness" that provided 'a kind of petty-bourgeois version of the upper-class chauvinism', the very rejection of which had provided its genesis (Eagleton 36-37). Thus Leavis' 'remapping of the literary terrain ... [was] one arguable construction of a tradition, informed by definite

2 The term is apposite; a need to defend is doubly evident in the militaristic/paranoic set of I.A. Richards' argument preceding his notorious pronouncement on cinema: 'What is needed is a defensible position for those who believe that the arts are of value. Only a general theory of value ... will provide such a stronghold. At the same time we need weapons with which to repel and overthrow misconceptions. With the increase of population the problem presented by the gulf between what is preferred by the majority and what is accepted as excellent by the most qualified opinion has become infinitely more serious and appears likely to become threatening in the near future ... we have not yet fathomed the more sinister potentialities of the cinema ... ' (36).
ideological preconceptions', preconceptions that Eagleton locates in the petty-bourgeois origins of its originators (35-37).

Consideration of the Leavisite tradition is pertinent to tracing the development of film theory. Its similarities to Perkins’ configuration of the film culture establishment place developments in literary and film theory from the First World War to the fifties in more than a time parallel. Both answered needs created by the social disintegration of the First World War: the literary theory by creating 'a conscious ideology for reconstructing social order' (Eagleton 45) and film theory in attempting self-definition within the complex of post-war movements in the plastic arts. Both literary and film theory claimed an elevated status for works of art that were to be distinguished from mass culture, and for both the recognition of such great works was the preserve of an intellectual elite that functioned in conscious opposition to the cultural effects of 'mass civilization'.

COUNTER-THEORY: "FILM AS TEXT"

These parallels, however, function beyond historical and formal concurrency. In the late sixties and early seventies, in the wake of the intellectual and political upheavals of 1968, a series of challenges to dominant notions of cinema emerged and rapidly gained force; Rosen writes of a "movement", Nichols of a "ferment" (P. Rosen vii; Nichols 1985 1-2). In Britain these challenges came largely from teachers

3 With MacCabe, ‘I use that particular date simply as a convenient shorthand for that movement in the late sixties which placed questions about education, culture and lifestyle at the centre of a political agenda drawn up in schools and universities throughout the world’ (5).
people who had come to film through an educational system permeated with Leavisian theory (Eagleton 31), and their rejection of the orthodox film theories was based largely on a rejection of such critical practices as Leavis had developed (MacCabe 4-5).

The main point of departure for this movement was auteurism, originally articulated as La politique des auteurs by the editors of Cahiers du Cinema and subsequently (inaccurately) dubbed a Theory by Andrew Sarris. Auteurism itself had arisen (in the mid-1950s) as a revolt against the anti-popular film stance of orthodox film theorists, specifically in the Cahiers' editors' validation of particular Hollywood directors (Lapsley and Westlake 106). The orthodox identification of Hollywood as film factory within which Art had no place was challenged by auteurism's claim that the work of particular Hollywood directors was marked by a distinctive directorial style, that individual artists were to be found within the traditions of popular cinema (Neale 2).

But this claim for the potential compatibility between art and popular culture was the only area of consensus in what proved to be a range of positions described under auteurism. Willemen points to the main division between these positions being between a derivation of Leavisite literary ideology - privileging the artist as talented individual working within and despite the rigidity of codified genres of popular film - and a structuralist-based auteurism, combining the anthropological model of Levi-Strauss with elements of linguistics and Marxism (Neale 2). Although structuralist auteurism was to founder on both criticism of its theoretical grounding (Brian Henderson's
questioning of 'the comparability of myths to films and the appropriateness of the structural method to analyse film') and growing doubts as to the validity of Levi-Strauss's methodology, it did begin to problematise the concept of author, allowing a distinction between author as creator of meaning and author as construct of the reader (Lapsley and Westlake 110-3). 'It was structuralist auteurism that put the notion of meaning production on the agenda and programmed the appeal to semiology as the discipline that was to account for the way texts work as signifying structures' (Neale 2).

Central to this 'displacement away from the artist towards problems of text construction' (Neale 2) was the Barthesian critique of the workings of texts, and in particular "The Death of the Author" (Barthes 49-55). Ascribing the construct 'author' to the positivist impulse of capitalist ideology, Barthes substituted language itself for that which had been 'supposed its owner', and acknowledged linguistics as the means to relocate analysis from the "person" of the author to the "subject" of language. This transformative act -- the 'removal of the Author' -- transforms the text; it becomes 'a multidimensional space in which are married and contested several writings' (Barthes 53). The 'site where this multiplicity is collected ... is not the author, ... but the reader: the reader is the very space in which are inscribed, without any of them being lost, all the citations out of which a writing is made' (Barthes 54).

Foucault's work on discourse extended the notion of the death of the author in ways that prove useful particularly for film theory (Lapsley and Westlake 125). While he accepts the notion of the death of the author, Foucault seeks to account for the persistence of the
privileged notion of author indirectly through the concepts of work and of writing (*écriture*) (Foucault 105). His investigation of 'the space left open by the author's disappearance' leads into an identification of the "author-function" as a 'characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society' (Foucault 108). In thus treating the author-function as an historical and political reality, he opens to analysis authorship as 'one way ... of regulating the circulation of texts' (Lapsley and Westlake 126). As 'a first step in the historical analysis of different modes of discourse', Foucault's work has proved useful for film theory, although it has not adequately accounted for the need for an author-function, a need that may best investigated through psychoanalytic theory (Lapsley and Westlake 126-7).

In this way film theory moved from a central concern with authorial intention -- a literary-based identification of text/film as the product of a great mind -- to the concerns of textual productivity, the analysis of film's production of meaning. Applied to any text, the critical question moved on from the evaluative or aesthetic: What does this film mean? to the analytic or semiotic: How does this film make its meaning?

THEORIES OF IDEOLOGY

Implicated in the semiotic enterprise was the question of ideology; as in the post-1968 questionings of all areas of cultural practice, a central concern with the political identity and potential of
film underpinned subsequent elaborations of film theory (Lapsley and Westlake 1).

Marx had written, in his Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, that

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will ... The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness (181).

Lapsley and Westlake point to the problem, *inter alia*, created for Marxism by either an economist reading of this crucial passage, in which the base is all-determining, or a reading which allows the superstructure some autonomy, thus entailing the problem of the degree of determination by the base (3). Another major problem pointed to by them is the two contradictory conceptions of ideology in Marx's writings: that of the conflicting ideologies of opposed classes within any social formation (implied by the last sentence in the above passage), and that of the ideology of the dominant class being instilled into the subordinate class/es.

Both problems, of base/superstructure and of ideology, were seemingly answered by Althusser's theoretical interventions (Lapsley and Westlake 3). In *For Marx* (1969) his decentring of the social formation into three practices or instances - the economic, the political and the ideological - allowed each practice a degree of autonomy while retaining 'appropriate emphasis' on the economic with its
determination in the last instance (5). This model in which the elements are 'reciprocally determining', borrowed from Freud's concept of overdetermination (6), and effected a reconciliation between base and superstructure that 'did justice to the complexity of the social formation' (5).

Althusser's elaboration of dominant ideology relied strongly on Gramsci's notion of hegemony. Gramsci argued in *Prison Notebooks* (1968) that hegemony exists where a ruling class, or an alliance of ruling class fractions, is able to exert a 'total social authority' over not only subordinate class/es but over the social formation as a whole (summarised in Hall 332-334). This is accomplished by a combination of force and consent; the dominant class fractions 'not only possess the power to coerce but actively organize so as to command and win the consent of the subordinated classes to their continuing sway'. Hegemony cannot therefore be won in the economic sphere only; the state, politics and the superstructures are the terrain on which hegemony is accomplished. In that 'the 'definitions of reality', favourable to the dominant class fractions, and institutionalized in the spheres of civil life and the state, come to constitute the primary 'lived reality' as such for the subordinate classes', these structures of hegemony work by ideology. Crucially, such a model is not a static one, and while hegemony has constantly to be actively secured within the 'unstable equilibrium' between hegemonic and counterhegemonic forces, the degree of coercion or consent necessary to maintain dominance varies accordingly.

Althusser's "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" (1971), in elaborating the concept of the reproduction of social
relations, developed the idea of the ideological state apparatuses as
being the main agents in securing such reproduction. His expanded
definition of ideology as 'a 'representation' of the imaginary
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence' (152)
replaces the concept of 'false consciousness' with a notion of ideology
that has the materiality and effectivity of 'lived experience' (Lapsley
and Westlake 7). Althusser drew on Lacan's psychoanalytic theory to
explain the individual's lived relation to the world, the process in which
he is constituted as a subject. 'All ideology hails or interpellates
concrete individuals as concrete subjects' (Althusser 162).

In introducing the category of the subject and developing the
concept of interpellation, Althusser provided a more workable concept
of the individual and (his) consciousness than was implied by either
individuals as 'personifications of economic categories, representatives
of special class relations and class interests' (Marx, Preface to Capital
I) or the consciousness that is determined by 'social being' (quoted
above). Moreover, his account of interpellation provided the link
between subject/identity and social structure that allowed a working
alternative to the (capitalist ideologically-bound) prime category of the
individual.

Althusser's work provided the greatest single influence for the
political project of cultural theory in the decade following 1968
(Lapsley and Westlake 2; 12-13). For film theorists, in particular, who
were seeking to theorise (and intervene in) cinema's relation to the
existing social structure, it both gave a place to cinema within the
historical process, and allowed for an explanation of the political
effectivity of texts (8).
But by the late 1970's 'Althusser's re-reading of Marx was coming to be seen as generating as many problems as it solved' (Lapsley and Westlake 13). Most significant among these, for film theory, were those concerned with interpellation; Paul Hirst argued that if, in constituting the individual as subject, interpellation involves misrecognition, a pre-existing subject would be required to misrecognise and thus be interpellated by ideology (Lapsley and Westlake 14). The problem of agency was central; some of the very attributes required for interpellation could provide the capacity to resist interpellation. The frequent criticism of theoreticity levelled at Althusser (de Lauretis 1982 213) may be more justly placed on those film theorists who initially attempted to use him to theorise the relation of spectator to film (Lapsley and Westlake 15). In its combination of interpellation and the Saussurean notion of language possessing its own productivity, theory concerned itself with the internal structure of film texts, assuming a univocal determination of spectatorial response. With the development of the notion of agency of the subject, and the fact that 'the subject's response could be determined by forces elsewhere in the social formation, then it followed that the text was not the sole determinant of the mode of its reception' (15).

DIFFERENCE: POST-STRUCTURAL BEGINNINGS

Film theory, thus impelled by notions of difference, moved forward into the moment of post-structuralism. Two of the most salient theoretical fields were psychoanalysis and feminism.
"The cinema is a technique of the imaginary" (Metz 1982 3). "The cinema" is taken to mean the cinematic apparatus in both its productive and consumptive functions, the machinery of both the cinema industry and the psychology of the spectator.

This industry, peculiar to the epoch of capitalism and a state of industrial civilisation (Metz 1982 3), functions 'to set up good object relations with films' in order to create in the spectator the 'spontaneous' desire to attend the cinema. In paying for tickets, spectators provide the industry's apparatus with returns on its investment, thereby ensuring 'the auto-reproduction of the institution' (Metz 1982 7).

The relationship between the outer and inner machine (between industry and psychology) is not, Metz argues, a metaphorical one, but is metonymic, in that the motivation of 'wanting to go to the cinema' is both 'a reflection shaped by the film industry' and also 'a real link in the chain of the overall mechanism of that industry' (1982 8). The exchange of money for the experience of viewing a film occupies a critical and privileged position in the circulation of money, the turnover of capital inaugurating the circuit of return of money to the financing sectors of the industry. These returns are what allow new films to be made.

In this way, the libidinal economy (filmic pleasure in its historically constituted form) reveals its 'correspondence' with the political economy (the current cinema as a commercial enterprise), and it is, moreover ... one of the specific elements of that economy. (Metz 1982 8)
It is this widening of the terms of the institution of cinema to include the psychoanalytic that informs much recent theoretical work on film (Heath 1980 1-2).

Such accommodation shifts film theory into a position of conjuncture of semiotics, ideology and psychoanalysis.

Feminist Beginnings: Image of Woman

Historically, this shift in theories of the text coincided with an emergent body of feminist film criticism, that in turn served to relocate those textual theories. (For this and the following 8 paragraphs I am indebted to Doane et al. 1-8, except where otherwise specified).

Feminist interest in film initially found its strength through the documentaries and festivals that were integrally part of the activism and consciousness-raising of the Woman’s Movement of the early 1970s. The practice of film-making sought, through mainly cinema verite-style documentaries, to create ‘more truthful, unstereotyped images of women in their particular social, racial and class contexts’ (7), thereby both seeking to empower women (film-makers on both sides of the camera and audience alike), and posing a challenge to male-dominated use of film. Film theory, in this early phase and particularly in the USA, addressed the product of male-authored cinema in investigating stereotyping - what has been termed “‘image of woman” scholarship’ (4).
Kaplan states that this focus in the critical theory emerging in this period (in all popular arts - literature, painting, film and television) evolved from a need to re-evaluate the socialisation and education of women within a patriarchal culture; she argues that this impetus distinguished it from earlier critical movements, which were generated by intellectual reactions to dominant theories. 'Feminism is unusual in its combination of the theoretical and (loosely speaking) the ideological' (1982 23). In Psychoanalysis and Cinema Kaplan points out that feminist criticism has a vested interest in explaining female representation on both the individual/social and abstract theoretical levels:

...it matters to the feminist critic how "woman" is signified in dominant sign systems including literature and film, since that bears on who she is herself, on how she has come to be' (7).

The early "image-of-woman" criticism of mainstream film -- notably in Marjorie Rosen's Popcorn Venus (1973) and in Molly Haskell’s From Reverence to Rape (1974) -- was a broadly sociological investigation of sex-role stereotyping. In keeping with contemporary feminist thought these writers worked to counter the notion of sexual difference. In valorising the exceptional stars who had 'held their own with the men', they sought to de-emphasise that notion of difference that had so often been used to oppress women (5).

Marjorie Rosen traced female stereotypes in films over seven decades, arguing that they reflect and help to entrench patriarchal ideas of woman's place. The 'Cinema Woman ... has been a Popcorn Venus, a delectable but insubstantial hybrid of cultural distortions' (19).
From Reverence to Rape provides a decade-by-decade account of the trends in mainstream Hollywood film with supplementary accounts of "The Woman's Film" -- the 'wet, wasted afternoons ... [of] the weepies' (Haskell, 154) -- and "The Europeans". Haskell locates the focus of her study in the images of stars that have provided effective role models for woman viewers: the 'triumphs ...[and] incandescent moments ... through [which] ... we transcended our own sexual limitations' (v). In these terms, the generic category of the 'woman's film' is particularly significant. Although the genre displays many 'types' of film, in all 'the woman - a woman - is at the centre of the universe' (155). In its heyday through the thirties and forties, Haskell argues, it offered a space for the exploration of women's concerns which, while suffering a predictable devaluation by critical and popular opinion, nevertheless enjoyed a mass audience that 'had considerable influence on movie production and on the popularity of certain stars' (187). While its place was usurped by television afternoon soap operas (187), the basis of its appeal was revived in the buddy-films of the sixties and seventies (362). This writing-out of women from their traditional place in love stories is related by Haskell to the emergence of the women's movement in the early 1970's: 'The closer women come to claiming their rights and achieving independence in real life, the more loudly and stridently films tell us it's a man's world' (363).
FEMINIST BEGINNINGS: REPRESENTATION OF WOMAN

While recognising the value of these works in initiating feminist criticism (Kaplan 1982 23) and in serving as a point of departure into the field (Doane et al. 6), subsequent criticism has questioned their simplified conceptualisations of sexual difference and of realist representation.

Particularly, 'British feminists criticised them on the basis of their acceptance of realist documentary modes of representation associated with patriarchy' (8). Developments in film theory in Britain in the early 1970's (alluded to above) provided the theoretical tools of psychoanalytic and semiotic theory, specifically, both to initiate a critique of, and to develop more adequate perspectives on, issues of difference and realism. The literality of the term 'image' in film theory (as opposed to its metaphorical usage in literary theory) makes its usage problematic; the visual/auditory closeness between sign and referent in film works to naturalise the cinematic construct of woman, binding it to the ideological "lived reality". This necessitates a displacement of theory from a focus on "image" to the process of imaging - 'the modes of organizing vision and hearing which result in the production of that "image"' (6).

Developing theories of signification and subjectivity problematised the relationship between spectator and image, and found for women spectators 'a zero position, a space of non-meaning' (de Lauretis 1982 75). Thus one strand of feminist film theory found common terrain with contemporary theories of the text, incorporating psychoanalytic and semiotic theories to illuminate the production of
meaning in films, in a strategy that 'seemed capable of accounting for the ways in which patriarchal ideology has elided the representation of woman' (7).

This radical critique of realist representation was elaborated both in theoretical writings and in feminist avant-garde film-making practice. Its practitioners helped form what Kaplan terms 'a dominant strand in film scholarship' from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s that developed 'its own complex paradigm'. This paradigm was founded in a mixture of theories of semiotics, post-structuralism, Russian Formalism, feminism, a Brechtian "politics of modernism", Althusserian Marxism, Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, that collectively gave the theoretical framework for the influential British film journal, Screen (1990 8).

Key works that integrated feminist perspectives within that 'complex paradigm' were Claire Johnston's essay "Women's Cinema as Counter-Cinema" in 1973 and Laura Mulvey's "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" in 1975. Both these essays set out to offer a critique on aspects of contemporary feminist film theory, and at the same time served to integrate feminist perspectives into the 'set of approaches' that constituted Screen's complex paradigm.

CLAIRE JOHNSTON

Claire Johnston's "Women's Cinema as Counter-Cinema" is widely acknowledged to be a seminal work (Doane et al. 7; Kaplan 1982 131; de Lauretis 1982 4). Its first section, "Myths of Women in the
Cinema”, addresses centrally the problems of realist representation in film. Noting Panofsky’s detection of ‘primitive stereotyping’ in early cinema, Johnston argues that whereas this functioned originally as a fixed iconography to aid the audience’s comprehension of the narrative, its persistence in women’s roles (while men’s roles differentiated extensively in the purported interests of ‘character’) related to ‘sexist ideology itself, and the basic opposition which places men inside history, and woman as ahistorical and eternal’ (209). The major means, therefore, in which women have been used in the cinema is myth. She draws on Barthes’ account of the operation of myth, whereby a sign, emptied of its original denotative meaning, acquires a new connotative meaning and becomes the signifier of a new signified. As the new signified subtly appropriates the place of the original denotation, its connotation is (mis)taken for a ‘natural’ i.e. evident denotation; it has become a signifier within a particular ideology. Johnston thus accounts for the way that ‘myth transmits and transforms the ideology of sexism and renders it invisible ... and therefore natural’ (210). She argues that, while myth uses icons, these are its weakest point. The iconography of Hollywood offers some resistance to realist characterisation, creating the potential for a critique of ideological tradition. Johnston thus declares

In rejecting a sociological analysis of women in the cinema we reject any view in terms of realism, for this would involve an acceptance of the apparent natural denotation of the sign and would involve a denial of the reality of myth in operation. (211)

In the second section of her essay, “Towards a Counter-Cinema”, Johnston argues that ‘only a film-making practice that questioned and countered the dominant cinema of realist representation could begin to speak for women’ (Doane et al. 7). She
rejects in turn the notions of women's creativity per se ('as limited as the notion of men's creativity') (213), the universality and thus potential androgyny of art (as idealist), and the possible neutrality of cinematic techniques. Instead, she identifies film as an ideological product, and locates it 'as a discourse within a particular conjuncture - for the purpose of women's cinema, the bourgeois, sexist ideology of male dominated capitalism' (214). In particular, the misapprehension of ideology as an intentional deception is misleading; ideology cannot be eliminated by using 'non-interventionist' techniques of film-making. 'What the camera in fact grasps is the 'natural' world of the dominant ideology' (214). The task, then, of women's cinema is to construct new meanings 'by disrupting the fabric of the male bourgeois cinema within the text of the film' (214).

Any revolutionary strategy must challenge the depiction of reality; it is not enough to discuss the oppression of women within the text of the film; the language of the cinema/the depiction of reality must also be interrogated, so that a break between ideology and text is effected. (215)

Johnston concludes her essay with a call for a strategy that 'embraces the notion of films as a political tool and film as entertainment ... [because] women's cinema must embody the working through of desire' (217). Women's cinema as counter-cinema will develop from an understanding of 'how cinema works and how we can best interrogate and demystify the workings of ideology' (217).
LAURA MULVEY

Laura Mulvey’s "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" (1975) offers a feminist reworking of psychoanalytic theory to link the workings of desire in viewing film to those patterns of desire already existent in the individual and his social formation. Her focus on male desire is predicated on his centrality as subject within the phallocentric order. She thus seeks to demonstrate ‘the way the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film form’ (305). In particular, she addresses the ‘importance of the representation of the female form in a symbolic order in which, in the last resort, it speaks castration and nothing else’ (305).

Central to the pleasure that the cinema affords is pleasure in looking (scopophilia); its two forms, voyeurism (attraction: active, erotic, instinctual) and narcissism (identification: ego-constituting, self-preserving, libidinous) providing a productive contradiction between pleasure and threat. ‘It is woman as representation/image that crystallises this paradox’ (309). Thus woman ‘holds the look, plays to and signifies male desire’, while her presence provides a tension, breaking the narrative in a variety of ways (309). The male, by contrast, ‘articulates the look and creates the action’, providing the

4 Juliet Mitchell’s Psychoanalysis and Feminism, published the year before, had provided a ground-breaking work for feminist theory, premised on the argument that ‘psychoanalysis is not a recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of one’ (p. i).

5 Its exclusion of the female spectator has been the major criticism of this essay; Mulvey herself has addressed the inadequacy, while pointing to the ironic usage of the male third person, in 'Afterthoughts on "Visual Pleasure..." Inspired by Duel in the Sun' (24).
powerful, ideal ego whose gaze both bears the power/meaning in the film and provides the point of identification for the viewer (310).

But in psychoanalytic terms, a deeper anxiety attaches to the female figure. Woman as representation signifies the lack of a penis, on which is based the castration complex, the means of entrance to the symbolic order and the law of the father. The two avenues of escape from this anxiety - voyeurism and fetishism - are particularly effectively articulated by cinema. Voyeurism involves a 'pre-occupation with the re-enactment of the original trauma (investigating the woman, demystifying her mystery), counterbalanced by the devaluation, punishment or saving of the guilty object (an avenue typified by the concerns of the film noir)' (311). Fetishism relies on a disavowal of castration by substituting a fetish object or fetishising the female figure 'so that it becomes reassuring rather than dangerous (hence over-valuation, the cult of the female star' (311). Voyeurism has sadistic associations that favour narrative - action/change within linear time - while fetishism finds satisfaction in the look alone. Thus 'the structure of looking in narrative fictional film contains a contradiction in its own premises: the female image as a castration threat constantly endangers the unity of the diegesis and bursts through the world of illusion as an intrusive, one-dimensional fetish' (314).

While the background for her argument is classic Freudian psychoanalytic theory and thus has general application in patriarchal ideology, Mulvey claims for cinema a privileged place as a representational practice: film's peculiar ability to shift the emphasis of the look means that 'cinema builds the way [woman] is to be looked at into the spectacle itself ... cinematic codes create a gaze, a world and
an object, thereby producing an illusion cut to the measure of desire' (314). Within the conventions of the three looks intrinsic to cinema - those of camera-to-pro-filmic event, audience-to-screen and characters onscreen - the first two are subordinated to maintain the illusion of the fiction, while the third is at once structured around desire and caught within its own contradiction. The first task in countering woman's usage in traditional film, then, is to break the conventional structuring of the look, and thus make evident cinema's voyeuristic mechanisms.

Doane et al. note that by the mid-1970's there had emerged two clearly divergent traditions of feminist film theory and practice: a (largely) U.S. body of theorists/filmmakers drawing on a sociological, journalistic tradition and those (mainly British) drawing strongly on semiotic and psychoanalytic tradition (8). The main ground of contention concerned forms of representation, and the degree to which divergence from dominant patriarchal cinematic forms would be productive for women's cinema. The apparent simplicity of such a 'territorial mold' is, however, simplistic and suggests a mutual exclusivity that belies the many ongoing debates. One common capability that has developed is an adeptness at reading the classical cinema text "against the grain", a practice in which 'the critic is less concerned with the truth or falsity of the image of woman than with gaining an understanding of the textual contradictions that are symptomatic of the repression of women in patriarchal culture' (Doane et al. 8).

This chapter has sought to outline the development of film theory in general, and feminist film theory in particular, up to the mid-1970's, when 'feminist work around the representation of women ...
had begun appropriating the tools offered by patriarchy for its own analysis' (Gledhill 1984 18). Such work, however debated its terms and conclusions, agreed on one crucial issue: 'that "women as women" are not represented in the cinema, that they do not have a voice, that the female point of view is not heard’ (Gledhill 1984 18).

Subsequent critical work has addressed centrally this problematic, which will be looked at in the next chapter.
CHAPTER TWO
THE AXIS OF VISION

As indicated in the previous chapter, recent film theory has aggregated around three major areas: ideology, semiotics and psychoanalysis. Within that conjuncture, feminist film practice (criticism, film-making and, in particular, theory) has provided a considerable inflection on the developing theory, while aspects of film theory have themselves fed back into feminist cultural politics.

This chapter will consider some of the main issues that have emerged from that reciprocal relationship. In particular, it will review some of the theoretical considerations of the image and the gaze that film theory has developed over the last two decades. In its semiotic moment, such theory has sought to articulate and address some of the problems consequent on the verisimilitude of the image itself; in its psychoanalytic moment it has addressed the construction of meaning through the agency of the gaze, using the theory, in particular, of Jacques Lacan. Feminist perspectives have been particularly productive of theory around the nexus of the image and the gaze.

THE IMAGE: PERCEPTION AND CODES

Film is a strongly representational art; its ‘ability to re-present the surfaces of reality’ makes it a particularly effective vehicle for realism, a fact that has provided the basis of the realist aesthetic as exemplified by Kracauer and Bazin (Nichols 1981 10).
But where Bazin, for example, founds his aesthetic on 'a film form that would permit everything to be said without chopping the world up into little fragments, that would reveal the hidden meanings in people and things without disturbing the unity natural to them', he unintentionally points to a major flaw doubly inherent in such a proposition (38). Bazin's model of cinematicity (developed in "The Evolution of the Language of Cinema") is the deep focus shot, a unity of time and place, in which the camera claims a neutral stance, the 'ambiguity of experience' is revealed and the work of discerning meaning rests with the spectator. Such exemplary directors as Welles and Wyler thus 'place their faith in reality' rather than placing it 'in the image' by using the 'tricks' of expressionist plastics and, in particular, montage -- devices that are overlaid on the object represented (24).

But in locating meaning as immanent within the text, and in allocating the discernment of that meaning to the 'personal choice' of the spectator (C. Williams 52), Bazin claims a transparency for film and for spectatorial perception that is belied by the codifying involved in both processes (Nichols 1981 11-12).

1 A problematic term, 'realism' is used here to designate the practice employed by the classic realist film text, a practice derived from the nineteenth century novel, in which a hierarchy of discourses rests on an empirical notion of truth that is vested, in film, in the narrative (MacCabe, p. 34). The extensive debate around realism and film, while not central to the present purpose, is testimony to film's mimetic properties, and the problems these raise. And, while film's verisimilitude does not guarantee realism, it certainly provides it with the preconditions for the construction of a realist narrative.

2 Such an aesthetic extends well beyond classical realist practice; such film-makers as Flaherty, the Italian neo-realishts and the Maysles brothers predicate their varied and distinctive styles on similar precepts.
Nichols describes the processes governing 'normal' perception -- the learned way of looking at the world and making sense of it for purposes of survival. Warning that 'a useful habit formed by our brains must not be mistaken for an essential attribute of reality' (12), he draws a distinction between the sensory impressions that are conducted to the brain, and the resultant information into which those impressions are translated. This crucial translation is achieved by the 'perceptual process', in which the sensory information is organised into a pattern which can then be matched to codes which render it meaningful.

We translate sensory impressions into information and process this information in relation to codes in order to sustain a meaningful dialogue or relationship between ourselves and our environment (25).

Such codes derive from the rules or procedures that govern perceptual habits; as a result of their consistency, they 'sink down' into the unconscious where they provide a system governing the processing of perception. Nichols points to the survival value of such an economy, in its rationalisation of potentially infinite possible meanings into a consistency that permits relatively efficient functioning of the individual (27).

But codes that govern the perceptual process are not individual constructs - they are culturally mediated. Because the experience

3 Not only perceptual habits are thus 'automatised'; the learning of any bodily function is accompanied by its control passing from the cerebral cortex to the cerebellum, which controls such behaviour as a semi-reflex.

4 'Real understanding and communication will be achieved only through generalisation and conceptual designation of ... experience. ... Word meaning [is] a unit of both generalising thought and social interchange' (Vygotsky 8-9).
through which the codes are acquired is realised within a cultural field, the codes themselves are culturally determined; our 'ways of seeing' are culturally coded. At the same time, the environment is itself a product of culture (work). Thus is maintained a reciprocal relationship that guarantees, for the participant in a particular culture, a meaningful world.

Formally, codes function metaphorically, in that they serve to pattern the relationships between (variable) entities, as opposed to patterning those entities themselves -- they are (in Lacan's terms) the 'algorithms of the unconscious'. The 'sense of self', as a significant constant in social relationships, can thus be understood as an aggregate of those codes that hold such a sense ('as subject, ego or consciousness') in place (Nichols 1981 28-9).

But this constitution of the self-as-subject serves a socialising function, too; it is, according to Althusser, an over-determined act practised by the ideological state apparatuses which serves to guarantee the reproduction of the relations of production. Through interpellation, individuals are made complicit in their (class) roles (Nichols 1981 34).

John Berger has written, for example, of the power relations inherent in learned 'ways of seeing'. He has analysed in particular the practice of linear perspective, a code developed by European oil painters from the Renaissance to the late nineteenth century. Linear

5 Bateson draws the parallel, in that the guiding principle of a metaphor is a constant relationship which is applied to different relata (Gregory Bateson in Nichols 1981 29).
perspective is structured around an illusionary pyramidal space on each side of the (flat) canvas: one that recedes to a vanishing point 'behind' the canvas, and one that projects in front of the canvas, thus 'placing' the viewer (Berger 16-18; Nichols 1981 53; Baudry 1986 291). The qualities of oil paint lend a particular tangibility\(^6\) to the objects, people and scenes represented, giving it a 'visual desirability' (Berger 90). At the same time, the placement of the viewer proposes a point of origin for the perception, or owning,\(^7\) of this desirable world, catching the viewer in a 'dialectic of appropriations' (Nichols 1981 53). The wealth and mastery of the owner/viewer of the painting are thus declared through these elements of medium and form, a celebration of power that is identified by Berger as the primary function of the mainstream of the oil painting tradition.\(^8\)

Berger dates the period of the European oil painting tradition as being roughly between 1500 and 1900. The emergence of this tradition coincides, not coincidentally, with the rise of capitalism, to which it is ideologically bound in its propertarian and individualising operations. Its 'way of seeing' undermined by Impressionism and overthrown by Cubism, the oil painting tradition ceded its dominance as the principal source of visual imagery to photography (Berger 84).

\(^6\) 'What distinguishes oil painting from any other form of painting is its special ability to render the tangibility, the texture, the lustre, the solidity of what it depicts. It defines the real as that which you can put your hands on' (Berger 88).

\(^7\) The relations of viewing and owning the painting can be conflated more literally than usual in that paintings were typically works of commission and therefore addressed the owner as viewer.

\(^8\) Berger points to the contrast between the exceptional and the average in this tradition, an antagonism marked by the contradiction between art and market (88).
The same perceptual codes are thus at work in the images produced by the camera, both still and movie (Nichols 1981 53; Heath 1981 27 ff).

THE IMAGE: SIGNS

Photographic and film images are, however, even more marked than traditional oil paintings by their relationship to 'the real'; semiotically such an image is a sign that is analogous to its referent. For an understanding of the problems raised by this relationship, the semiotic taxonomy of C. S. Peirce has proved particularly useful.

Peter Wollen, in Signs and Meaning in the Cinema, describes Peirce’s distinction between the classes of icon, index and symbol. An icon is a sign that works through resemblance or similarity to its object. This category is sub-divided into images and diagrams, with images resembling their objects through their 'simple qualities', and diagrams working through the 'relations between the parts'. An index is a sign that bears a physical or existential connection to its object, a causative relationship ('I see a man with a rolling gait ... a probable indication that he is a sailor ... A sundial or clock indicates the time of day'). A symbol is a sign by virtue of convention; it has no relation of resemblance or of existential connection to its object. Words are symbolic signs, their use governed by a 'contract' which has the force of a law, overriding the individual will (120-124).

The three classes of sign are hierarchised into a progressively abstract order: the first and second classes, the icon and index, work
through 'simple qualities' and reaction to object (respectively), both claimed by Peirce to be unmediated, not to require interpretation (Eco 178). Eco, however, in "Peirce and the Semiotic Foundations of Openness", points to the contradiction between context and claim in Peirce's writings, indicating that icons and indices, and not only symbols, rely in some measure on interpretation. While 'Peirce has said that only symbols (not icons and indices) are interpretable', the need for defining (from their generality) the simple qualities of images, and the deductive potentialities of diagrams mean that they 'can be interpreted and do arouse interpretants in the minds of their interpreters' (178).

The arbitrary nature of the connection between symbol and object places Peirce's 'symbol' in correspondence with Saussure's 'sign', which articulates a relationship between signifier and signified that is also arbitrary. Wollen claims that in its limitation to the sign, however, Saussure's system is over-restricted; by contrast he declares Peirce's trichotomy to be 'elegant and exhaustive' (123).

Teresa de Lauretis, too, attributes a more adequate formulation to Peirce in that he allows a reading that 'points toward a possible elaboration of semiotics as a theory of culture that hinges on a historical, materialist, and gendered subject' (1987 41). Semiology, founded in Saussure's insistence on the arbitrary nature of the sign, is thus predicated on an essential discontinuity between the orders of the symbolic and the real, which excludes the referent from any consideration in the signification process, while it renders the signified inaccessible, either separated from the signifier by the Lacanian "bar" of repression or engaged in the Derridean "play of differences". Thus
'the work of the sign ... (has) no reference and no purchase on the real' (39). It is the weighting of 'the real' in (Peircian) semiosis that enables the imbrication of experience (habit) and meaning, with the consequence 'that practices - events and behaviours occurring in social formations - weigh in the constitution of subjectivity as much as does language' (42). The inclusion of the categories of icon and index, with their specifically visual capability, have proved particularly useful for film semioticians, in the deconstruction of the naturalism of film, in particular as it is used as an element of construction in the classic realist film.

Peirce's classification of signs into three categories is not rigid in that it allows for overlap. In particular, photographic images are seen as partly iconic (in their capacity for exact representation of their object), and partly indexical (in that they reproduce, point for point, the light impressions of the object photographed) (Wollen 123-4). The non-arbitrariness of such signification, its connection to material objects, lends it a particular strength in the naturalisation of the image, and thereby a particular significance in the 'reality' purveyed by realist film.

Thus the common sense\textsuperscript{9} equation between seeing and understanding ("I see what you mean") is undercut by the complex that intervenes between the reception of light-waves and the cognitive/codifying processes that make meaning from that stimulus. Such processes are not exclusive to vision; all sensory stimuli are thus

\textsuperscript{9} I use the term 'common sense' in Catherine Belsey's sense of 'the collective and timeless wisdom whose unquestioned presence seems to be the source and guarantee of everything we take for granted' (3).
codified into meaning. Nevertheless, the idiomatic usage points to the primacy of vision in the human range of senses, a primacy that has provided a major point of departure for recent film theory.

THE IMAGE: NATURALIZATION

In analysing the inadequacy of what they term the "image of" criticism for film, Doane et al. point to the specific properties of the filmic image (6). Because the cinematic sign is primarily iconic and indexical, the gap between sign and referent is reduced, which serves to naturalize the image 'and to bind filmic images more closely to "lived reality", i.e., the ideology of men's and women's daily lives'. For women, specifically, the lived reality is bound up with the notion of 'being seen' ("woman" within patriarchal society being a narcissistic construct), and so the term 'image' must be taken literally in feminist film theory. Thus, for the theory,

the very crucial displacement ... from "images of" to the axis of vision itself - to the modes of organising vision and hearing which result in the production of that "image". (6)

These 'modes of organising vision and hearing' operate in the material construction of the cinematic text. Metz distinguishes film's five specific 'materials of expression': its multiple and mobile photographic image, speech, music, sound effects and written credits (Heath 1985 511-2). These point to the construction of a film from four recorded tracks, one visual and three sound. Such construction, within mainstream film, works to efface itself through such cinematic codes as continuity editing, close-ups, shot-reverse-shot structures and
point-of-view shots (Kuhn 132). Its result is therefore a product made to be read as if it constituted (within the bounds of fiction) a real world.¹⁰

But where orthodox film theory has tended to concentrate on the product (film) as the object of its analysis (i.e. situating meaning as immanent within the text), semiotic/psychoanalytic theory has sought to analyse the very processes in which film makes its meaning. When Heath characterises film as a 'specific signifying practice', he points to the operations of film, its particular range of codes and systems, and its working of relations of subjectivity (1985 511-2). Such an orientation for the study of film locates its work at the (so to speak) viewer¹¹/text interface -- the site of meaning-production.

Such a location of interest is not new; Munsterberg’s The Film: A Psychological Study (1916) investigated 'the mental means' by which film comes to make sense to the viewer. While limited in its scope¹² and in its contemporary and subsequent influence (Griffith in Munsterberg xi-xii), Munsterberg’s work provides something of a starting point for theory that locates itself in the processes of the viewer. He held that the perception of two illusions central to film --

¹⁰ This statement overlooks a crucial questioning of the nature of 'the real' and thus bypasses such central issues as realism, narrative and genre. But at this point a spectator complicit in reading classical narrative coding, and its structuring of meaning, is assumed.

¹¹ The term 'viewer' is here taken as what Ellis terms the 'point of intelligibility' of the film, 'the point where its meanings will coalesce into an order and a knowledge' (89).

¹² This limitation derives from his avowedly behaviourist and, it could be argued, somewhat circumscribed conception of the human mind itself: 'The story of the subconscious mind can be told in three words: there is none' (quoted in Griffith's Introduction to Munsterberg xi).
depth and movement -- rely on the mind's ability to 'invest the impressions' received from the screen with meaning, and that the mind's capacity for attention and for memory are 'objectified' by the close-up (38) and the flash-back (41) in particular. His contention that 'the photoplay obeys the laws of the mind rather than those of the outer world', in that 'the pictures themselves' are 'shaped by the demands of the soul' (41), provides the precondition for the notion that meaning is not immanent within the text, but is realised in the processes of viewing.

As the introductory chapter sought to demonstrate, it has been only in the last two decades that a body of film theory has developed out of a central concern with that notion.

LACAN: SUBJECTIVITY, THE GAZE AND DESIRE

A major impetus for this development has been the work of Jacques Lacan. His extension of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, in its emphasis on a linguistic model, combines Freudian psychoanalytic structures with semiology, thus providing a linkage for film theory (Kaplan 1982 19). More specifically, his distinction between the imaginary and symbolic realms, and his elaboration of the mirror phase, allow a less simplistic link between screen image and lived experience than sociological critics (the "image of" criticism described in the previous chapter and below) assume.

Lacan maintains that the child passes through the imaginary phase (corresponding roughly to Freud's pre-Oedipal phase) to the
symbolic phase and that the transition is achieved not by the threat of castration but by the acquisition of language. His concept of the imaginary and the symbolic orders has provided a theoretical basis for investigating the workings of subjectivity through the agency of the gaze in film.

In particular, Lacan’s elaboration of the mirror phase\(^\text{13}\) provides a privileging of the sense of vision in the developing and functioning of the ego, or ‘self-as-subject’ (Nichols 1981 31), notably in the workings of desire.

Grosz describes Lacan’s account of the mirror phase as his ‘attempt to fill in the genesis of the narcissistic ego, whose adult residues Freud so convincingly described’ (31). Freud vacillated between two views of the ego: the realistic ego, an innate faculty that functions to mediate between the competing demands of the id and the requirements of reality, and the narcissistic ego, described as a boundary surrounding the libidinal reservoir, which thus varies with the libido, depending on the subject’s relations with the other (Grosz 24-31; Rose 170-1). In the latter view, the ego is governed by modes of identification and introjection, and thus defends not against an external reality but against a part of itself. Thus, significantly, ‘the subject that takes itself as its own object is fundamentally split, as a subject and an object’ (Grosz 31).

\(^{13}\) Doane points to the suitability of the psychoanalytic “scenario” [for example the primal scene, the mirror stage, the ‘look’ at the mother’s [castrated] body, the fort/da game] for film theory. Freud and Lacan, in particular, use the scenario to vividly represent the organisation of psychical processes; their visual, auditory and narrative dimensions make them particularly appropriate to theorising film (1987 13-14).
Born into the order of the Real (a state of pure plenitude that Lacan calls 'the lack of a lack'), the child experiences its body as fragmented (as it develops unevenly) and therefore has no sense of bodily or psychic unity, nor can it distinguish between itself and the surrounding environment (in particular its mother) (Grosz 34). Lacan proposes that, because the infant's perception correlates with its bodily experience, it 'actually becomes the image or object in primordial fantasy'. This is what Lacan terms primary identification (Ragland-Sullivan 18-19).

At about six months the child undergoes a major perceptual change, ushered in (argues Ragland-Sullivan) by improved motor control - a biological capability which conditions (rather than causes) the perceptual advance in development - and transforming subjectivity from being a series of 'imagistic unities' to being a 'unified body' (21-2). This capacity allows the internalisation of an image of an-other (itself, its mother) which works in two ways: it serves at once to fracture its sense of pure plenitude, and to provide a model of completeness, wholeness (a gestalt) that functions as an ideal in comparison with its sense of its own incomplete control (Nichols 1981 30-1; Grosz 34). This ideal other provides the point of identity/opposition in relation to which the ego, or self-as-subject, defines itself (Nichols 1981 31). Thus it is this first acknowledgement of lack or loss that propels the child into its identificatory relations (Grosz 34-5). But these specular identifications are bound, too, with perception, recognition and pleasure. The mirror phase, lasting from about six to eighteen months, marks the transition to the order of the
imaginary, an order of ‘images, representations, doubles and others’ (Grosz 35).

With the acquisition of language, structured as it is on lack and difference, the child enters the order of the symbolic, the world of arbitrary signs and symbolic exchange governed by the Law of the Father. This entry is enacted through the Oedipal complex, the resolution of which is the transference of the desire of the (boy) child for the place of the father (possessor of the mother/phallus) to a desire for the place of the Father (as symbolic function) (Nichols 1981 32). Thus the imaginary’s ‘tug-of-war’ between identity and opposition, self and other, is superseded by a system of floating signifiers that circulate around the phallus as prime signifier (Nichols 1981 32; Kaplan 1982 19).14

Although the child has passed into the symbolic realm, however, the imaginary persists in part as an order that mediates between the Real and the symbolic (Grosz 117).

Lacan identifies the three effects of the orders of the Real, the imaginary and the symbolic as need, demand and desire. Where need, an effect of the Real, is ‘the experiential counterpart to nature ... as close to instincts as is possible in human existence’, its objects are material and linked to survival; satisfaction is attainable (Grosz 59). With the recognition of absence, and with access to language, need is

14 Lacan’s claimed distinction between phallus and penis is problematic; Macey states that, as the basis for ‘a theory of the constitution of gendered subjectivity ... [the concept of the phallus] proves highly unstable and is in itself the site of a constant regression towards the biological’ (209).
transformed into demand. Thus articulated in language, demand expresses a fundamental ambiguity in that it has two objects: the (spoken) object demanded, and the (unspoken) imaginary (m)other. 'The thing demanded is a rationalization for maintaining a certain relation to the other' (61). [While it seeks affirmation of an ego, demand can be satisfied only by imaginary union with the other, thus it entails an annihilation of the self (61).] Demand always exceeds need, and that excess is desire. Desire is thus a fundamental lack. As opposed to demand which operates through language, desire is repressed from articulation, and carries its signifying effects into the unconscious.

The formation of the ego is thus grounded in the experience of division, loss, lack. Its striving to fill that lack continues, from this formative moment, in the workings of desire, the goal of which is recognition by the other. Paradoxically, the ego can attain a desiring subjectivity only by being a desired object -- by being the object of an other's desire.. 'Desire reduces, ultimately, to the desire for desire itself' (Nichols 1981 31).

'Subjectivity is thus the transition from meaningless satisfaction to meaningful dissatisfaction' (Silverman 1981-2 80).

APPARATUS THEORY

Lacan's work has become central to film theory. In the shift (mapped in the last chapter) from concerns internal to the text to concerns with the text as system, and the consequent inclusion of
spectatorship, the theory provided the means for exploring the relations between film and spectator. Over the past two decades a considerable body of work has sought, broadly, to account for the effectivity of desire in film, using Lacan's accounts of the working of subjectivity. The conceptual model of cinema as a machine was initiated in France and developed around issues of cinematic subjectivity, in what became known as apparatus theory.

One of the most influential writers on cinema as apparatus is Jean-Louis Baudry. He describes cinema as a dispositif, a machine with a certain arrangement, a disposition: for the spectator seated in a darkened hall, projector behind, screen in front, the viewing position simulates the preconditions - immature powers of mobility and a precocious maturation of visual organisation - necessary to the release of the mirror stage (1986 294-5). If the screen operates as the Lacanian mirror, a double identification takes place: with the character onscreen, and (more significantly) with the unifying or transcendental subject, that is most closely identifiable with the camera; through its (controlling) gaze, the camera offers a mastering ego-ideal to the spectator; Baudry terms this "primary identification".

Christian Metz's account of cinema's specificity rests on two workings of the lack that is central to desire: voyeurism and fetishism. Voyeurism is the ideal form of desire: as desire 'depends on the infinite pursuit of its absent object, voyeurism is the only desire whose principle of distance evokes this fundamental rent' (1982 60). Because of the distance that separates spectator from screen, the cinema is structured on a specifically voyeuristic separation between spectating subject and the object of desire. But in addition to this voyeuristic
separation from the object of desire, what distinguishes cinema
(particularly from similarly voyeuristic arts like theatre and painting) is
its presence-in-absence, the coupling of ‘unaccustomed perceptual
wealth’ -- its five material components: analogical image, graphic
image, natural sound, speech, music -- with a radical absence (1982
45). The idealist cinema thus requires a disavowal, ("I know, but I
don’t know"), rooted, claims Metz, in the disavowal of castration. The
 cinema is thus the fetish whose function is to restore the good object,
threatened by the terrifying discovery of lack.

'Broadly speaking', writes Penley

the cinematic apparatus achieves its specific effects (the
impression of reality, the creation of a fantasmatically
unified spectator-subject, the production of the desire to
return to the cinema) because of its success in re-enacting
or mimicking the scene of the unconscious - the psychical
apparatus - and duplicating its mechanisms by way of
illusion. (60)

APPARATUS: FEMINIST OPPOSITION

Yet, 'in a world ordered by sexual imbalance',15 it was the very
centrality of the gaze that provided the point of departure for a critique
of apparatus theory, based on its (generally) undifferentiated
conception of the subject-position. More specifically, the viewing

15 This key statement in Mulvey's "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" continues:
'... pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and passive/female'
(309).
subject of the apparatus was criticised by feminist theorists as being ‘androgynous, or neuter, or male’ (Kuhn 60).

The apparatus metaphor ... provides an adequate descriptive model of the way classical film functions of and for masculine fantasy. (Penley 58)

The scenarios which ground the theory of the cinematic apparatus are all aligned in some way with the delineation of a masculine subjectivity. (Doane 1987 16)

Although I believe that psychoanalytic theory offers a productive frame of reference for a consideration of issues of relevance to a feminist analysis of dominant cinema, much of the work in the field is conspicuous for its failure to raise explicitly any such issues. (Kuhn 59-60)

The psychoanalytic model [of film theory] ... articulates [subjectivity] in processes (drive, desire, symbolization) which depend on the crucial instance of castration, and are thus predicated exclusively on a male or masculine subject. (de Lauretis 1984 16)

An appeal is being made to psychoanalysis which seems systematically to ignore the question of sexual difference. This is all the more striking in that the appeal continually draws on concepts from psychoanalysis which were only produced in response to that question. (Rose 199-200)

The positing by apparatus theorists of a subject that was male (explicitly or by default) was addressed as radically problematic in a variety of ways. While one response was to take the theory on its own terms but to use those terms to interrogate its inadequacies, another response was total rejection of all such theoretical work for its exclusion of woman, in favour of what Penley terms ‘a reductive biologism, sociologism, or mysticism of the feminine’ (60).
APPARATUS: FEMINIST REJECTIONS

Among the 'sociological' feminists in, particularly, the United States, there was on the one hand a tradition of rejection of (Marxist-based) theory per se and on the other hand a strong opposition to Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Such tendencies can be traced through Kaplan's account of some of the discrepancies between U.S. and British/European intellectual traditions, particularly in the decades following World War II (1990 8-11). In Britain, a strong Marxist theoretical tradition made apparatus theory - particularly its ideological focus - readily assimilable from its French originators. Furthermore, because of the traditional marginalisation of psychoanalysis in British intellectual and cultural life, French revisions of Freud could be taken up, 'untainted' by negative prior associations. In the U.S., both the political and psychoanalytic frameworks of apparatus theory were problematic. Marxism has never been a dominant strain in U.S. intellectual life, as it has in Europe, so the Althusserian underpinning of apparatus theory found no purchase in the development of this paradigm in the U.S. (hence the dominance of Baudry's apolitical theory through the seventies). On the other hand, Freudianism, which had permeated American popular culture from the end of the war into the fifties, suffered something of a backlash in the sixties. The resistance to this popular neo-Freudianism was political: leftist movements of the sixties rejected its reductionism (social conflict recast as unresolved Oedipal issues) while emergent feminist theory read Freud as complicit in, and indeed the central theorist of, women's oppression. By the 1970s, the transmission (via Britain) of apparatus theory in the U.S.'s expanding graduate film programmes on the one hand served to rehabilitate psychoanalytic theory but, on the other
hand, effectively leached apparatus theory of its political basis in its adaptation to ‘America’s governing apolitical intellectual modes’ (9). (This was to change, claims Kaplan, with Fredric Jameson’s interventions in the early 1980’s). But the feminist movement in the U.S. remained generally unpersuaded of the value of both Marxist and Freudian psychoanalytic theory.

In her review, in the prestigious avant-garde film journal Jump Cut, of Kaplan’s Women and Film, Sarah Halprin compares Kaplan’s book with Annette Kuhn’s Women’s Pictures, and takes issue with both works on their use of theory. She takes both these books to task for their construction of a dominant discourse of feminist film criticism and theory that mainstreams ‘the structural-semiotic-psychoanalytical women associated with the English publication Screen’ while it marginalises ‘other directions’ which are explicitly identified with ‘American feminists’. Indeed, Halprin’s own deductive methodology, favouring inclusion over analysis, her populist rhetorical style, and her conclusion that ‘the best theory emerges from practice’, display a notion of theory that is difficult to reconcile with that deriving from a Marxist-based ideological critique.

Those ‘sociological feminist’ critiques16 that derived from a rejection of classic Freudian theory, contested its structures of ‘identity-formation’,17 specifically the foregrounding of the castration crisis in the Oedipal formulation.

16 I am indebted to Bill Nichols for his tracing of key writings in this regard in his introduction to Mulvey in Movies and Methods Vol. 2 (303-4).

17 The term is symptomatic of an understanding of subjectivity as identity, a fixed entity, which is at odds with the Lacanian notion of the subject as essentially divided.
Julia Lesage ("The Human Subject - You, He, or Me? Or, The Case of the Missing Penis") argues that the woman's body signifies more than the threat of castration. In particular, she attacks the (then emergent) Freudian tendency in Screen and denounces its premises of penis envy, the definition of woman as castrated, and fetishism as 'not only false but overtly sexist' (26). Her description of 'an oppressive orthodox Freudianism that takes the male as the basis for defining the female' encapsulates some of the problems that the article presents: while it points to a fundamentally different starting point and itinerary with regard to reading Freud,\textsuperscript{18} it leads to a conclusion similar to that reached by feminist theorists working within the terms of the psychoanalytic paradigm.

Nancy Chodorow's influential work, The Reproduction of Mothering (1978), uses object-relations theory to examine 'the ways that family structure and process, in particular the asymmetric organization of parenting, affect unconscious psychic structure and process' (49). Reading Freud as an 'instinctual determinist', her argument that social relations play a critical role in 'personality formation' serves the political purpose of her text: that significant changes to woman's oppression can be made by 'a fundamental reorganization of parenting, so that primary parenting is shared between men and women' (215). Chodorow is charged by Penley with

\textsuperscript{18} That itinerary clearly does not include Lacan, the revitalising force behind the Screen writers' engagement with Freud. Lesage's intended irony, in 'I wonder what psychological theory besides Freud people are reading in England' before directing them to Karen Horney as a corrective, could now be turned around in a double irony, but it also shows a level of prescience.
providing a 'fundamentally sociological' revision of psychoanalytic theory, that allows for a levelling of all differences to historically determined social ones, thereby making no allowance for differing levels of theoretical analysis (xix). While Penley nicely refers to this as 'a very economical theory', she points to the need for a more adequate psychoanalytic basis to account for theories of difference.

APPARATUS: FEMINIST CRITIQUES

On the other hand, many feminist critics began 'appropriating the tools offered by patriarchy for its own analysis' (Gledhill 1984 18). Following Mulvey's articulation (in "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema") of the gendered nature of the gaze itself, a substantial body of feminist elaborations of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory developed.\(^{19}\) Given Baudry's apparatus theory that posits a spectator who regresses to the mirror stage, and Metz's elaboration of the psychic relations that bind spectator to film, feminist theorists have taken apparatus theory as a point of departure for a critique of historical materialist theory of film that, in linking the technical and social, fails to take account of subjectivity's basic premise of the construction of sexual difference (de Lauretis 1984 14).

Some of the arguments tendered against apparatus theory follow. In brief, apparatus theory relies on an analogy between the 'machine' of the cinematic apparatus and the 'machine' of the

\(^{19}\) The central and considerable influence of the French theorists Irigaray, Cixous, Kristeva and Wittig is acknowledged, but attempting to account for such influence lies beyond the scope of this thesis.
psychical apparatus. Limitations in this analogy are registered, in particular, by Teresa de Lauretis and Jacqueline Rose. The criticism of de Lauretis centres on the elision of gender that Metz’s use of the term ‘primary’ entails, while Rose offers a counter-analysis of disavowal to that used by Metz and Comolli in establishing the analogy. Kaja Silverman extends the discussion by Rose to initiate a symptomatic reading of disavowal in both Freud and film theorists. While Mary Ann Doane discusses the problems that apparatus theory’s figuration of the machine as a closed system raises for questions of difference, Constance Penley offers a diagnosis of this tendency to closure.

In "Desire in Narrative", Teresa de Lauretis criticises Metz’s term ‘primary cinematic identification’ as carrying the chronological implication that the psychoanalytic term ‘primary identification’ does: that is, the early identification with the other (usually the mother) that occurs prior to the subject’s awareness of the autonomous existence of the other (1984 144, see above). (Instead, Freud employs the concept of primary and secondary more usually for the unconscious and conscious/preconscious modalities, the existence of which processes - in the adult - is simultaneous and interdependent). Because ‘primary identification’ describes a phase in which the subject is not yet gendered, its invocation in ‘primary cinematic identification’ is problematic. Thus the analogy that Metz draws between the adult spectator and the child at the mirror stage is limited: ‘if the child can be construed as not (yet) gendered, the adult spectator cannot’ (145). The adult spectator is an en-gendered, historical subject incapable of a ‘pure perception’ of a film’s images, but able to find significance in them only through their coded potential for identification, ‘placed in a certain position with respect to desire’ (145).
In her article "The Cinematic Apparatus - Problems in Current Theory", Jacqueline Rose locates as centrally problematic Metz's (and consequently Comolli's) pivotal use of disavowal in the analogic relation between the machines of cinema and the psyche (201-2). Metz introduced the concept of the imaginary into the metapsychology of film to account for 'a kind of technological programming of a desire for recognition' (201). Caught in the debate on realism, Metz countered the idealist ontology of film (cinema as an appropriation of reality) with the imaginary fantasy of the spectator, subject to the effect of that ontology. The delusion of the spectator was matched by a counter-awareness, a disavowal of the reality of the image: 'I know, but ...'

In Freud, disavowal derives from the moment of revelation for the boy child of anatomical difference. For feminism, Rose asserts, the concentration on the visual as simply perceptual belies the fact that for this moment to have meaning as revelation of absence, an oppositional term of presence is necessary: a structure of sexual difference ('the phallus as always already privileged') needs already to be in place (202). Yet, while Freudian disavowal is thus structured on the question of sexual difference, it is used by apparatus theory only in relation to perception. So the theory does not challenge the illusion of imaginary identity beyond the terms of the unreality of the image. Difference is conceived only as difference between image and the real.

20 The article originated as a response to Jean-Louis Comolli’s contribution ("Machines of the Visible") to the conference on 'The Cinematic Apparatus' held in 1978 at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (de Lauretis & Heath viii-ix). For its publication in Sexuality in the Field of Vision, Rose included Metz in the address, extending the scope of its polemical thrust (200).
object, and there is no challenge to the terms of the imaginary itself. Rose points to a further problem, raised by apparatus theory’s conception of disavowal as a conscious (‘I know, but ...’), rather than an unconscious, process: questions of spectator intelligence replace issues of sexual difference (202).

Thus, for Rose, the failure of Metz and Comolli to see the phallic reference of disavowal entails a failure to engage with the way that woman is structured as image around that reference and thus ‘how she thereby comes to represent the potential loss and difference which underpins the whole system’. What apparatus theory leaves undisturbed, therefore, is the classic cinema’s ‘image of woman as other, dark continent’, the founding term of difference, into whose body sexuality is ‘frozen ... as spectacle, the object of phallic desire and/or identification’ (211).

Kaja Silverman develops the significance of disavowal in film theory further, in her [Lacanian] critique of Freudian castration, and its extension into film theory in the form of the lack or absence that has preoccupied film theorists from Munsterberg and Bazin through Metz, Comolli, Oudart, Dayan and Mulvey (1-41). While she endorses Rose’s critique of Metz and Comolli, Silverman uses their ‘deconstructive potential’ to begin ‘dislodging woman from the obligatory acting out of absence and lack’ (14). She performs symptomatic readings of Freud to argue that his insistence on restricting the meaning of castration to the absence of the penis ‘reveals [his] desire to place a maximum distance between the male subject and lack’ (15). Three areas are investigated: his emphasis on the delayed nature of the castration crisis (in contradistinction to the immediacy of the girl’s realisation); the
defensive mechanisms (disavowal and fetishism) that serve to protect the male child from knowledge of loss; Freud's own 'malice' towards the female subject revealed in his essay on anatomical difference (15-16). All these attest to 'a successfully engineered projection, to the externalizing displacement onto the female subject of what the male subject cannot tolerate in himself: castration or lack' (16).

Further, Silverman points to the significant similarity between disavowal and projection in that they are both a "refusal to recognize" a source of unpleasure. While disavowal is a refusal to recognise an unwanted quality in the other, projection is a refusal to be that which evokes unpleasure, thus necessitating the subject's separating off, projecting onto the outside world, and experiencing as hostile that part of itself which is unpleasurable (another splitting necessitated by the need for consistency and wholeness). If projection is the mechanism of paranoia, Silverman finds a 'striking' conformity between Freud's account of the male castration crisis and the defensive operation of paranoia. Paranoia involves a projecting subject protecting itself against unpleasure by placing the unwanted quality at a visual and/or auditory remove; the castration crisis is also a process of division in which vision is the agency for establishing the 'otherness' of the woman.

It is hardly surprising, then, that at the heart of woman's otherness there remains something strangely familiar, something which impinges dangerously upon male subjectivity ... That fear [of becoming like his sexual other] speaks to the "doubling, dividing and interchanging of the self" out of which sexual difference emerges. (17-18)

Mary Ann Doane, in her essay "Remembering Women: Psychical and Historical Constructions in Film Theory", argues against the
totalising tendency of apparatus theory. She describes psychoanalytic film theory as having become bound, through its theoretical excesses, in an impasse: the problem is inherent in its activation of the metaphor of the apparatus. The analogy between the optical instruments of the cinematic apparatus and Freud’s metaphors for the psychical apparatus is persuasive, but it elides an anomaly. The 'insistently spatial logic' of apparatus theory serves to reduce the Lacanian gaze; the substantializing of the gaze within a geometral perspective ('the gaze of the camera, the gaze of the spectator') relies on a mapping of space not sight, posits a subject in a place guaranteed by perspective, in control. 'The apparatus always works' (52). Instead, Doane argues, because the Lacanian subject is essentially split, its desire the desire of the Other, 'what is specific to Lacan’s gaze is not the maintenance of the subject but its dispersal, its loss of stable boundaries' (53). Apparatus theory, bound by the logic of geometral perspective, 'cannot accommodate the notion of desire as a disorganising force in the field of perception' (53).

This problem is apparent in Baudry’s conflicting conceptions of the subject across his two essays, "Ideological Effects of the Basic Apparatus" (1970) and "'The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the Impression of Reality in the Cinema" (1975). The first essay posits a post-Oedipal subject, situated as a stable, transcendental gaze for a cinema that functions as an ideological instrument. The (pre-Oedipal) subject of the second essay, however, regresses in the "more-than-real" of the (dream-like) cinema, 'ceaselessly witness[ing] its own subjectivity' (55). This account, Doane claims, works only by assuming the autonomy of the psychical
realm, free from historical and ideological determinations. It thus accomplishes an ‘essentializing gesture’: yet another theory of Man. Doane’s criticism of apparatus theory centres on this ‘bind’: the totalising tendency of an ideological analysis, where the machine unfailingly produces a mastering subject, or a psychically persuasive analysis which works at the cost of history and ideology.

Penley uses the notion of the bachelor machine to argue that, while apparatus theory poses classical film as a closed system operating for the male psyche, the theory subscribes to ‘a theoretical systematicity, one that would close off those same questions of sexual difference that it claims are denied or disavowed in the narrative system of classical film’ (58). Apparatus theory itself functions as a bachelor machine. Penley registers three general complaints about the apparatus as a model for cinema: firstly, (similarly to Doane) she criticises Baudry’s ahistoricity in his activation of Plato’s cave as a correlate for cinema. She also criticises the foreclosure of questions of pleasure: the apparatus’s claim for unfailing pleasure makes no allowance for the complexities of the vicissitudes of desire (repetition compulsion, death drive, hysteria) (61-2). Thirdly, the fact that neither Metz nor Baudry offers any specific examples of films implies that all films operate with a ‘ruthless’ determinism that precludes any alternative practice, any ‘possibilities of radical experimentation’ (62). Apparatus theory has thus joined Marxism and psychoanalysis in facing a feminist challenge to theoretical practices that ‘stand accused of keeping bachelor quarters’ (58-60).
Thus, feminist theoretical elaborations, while differing in their responses to the problems of apparatus theory, share a common genesis in the central (rhetorical) question formulated by E. A. Kaplan as a challenge to that theory: "Is the gaze male?" (23).

If voyeurism and fetishism are the inherent modes of vision in film, and voyeurism and fetishism are both, by definition, denied to women-as-subjects, what of the desire of the female spectator? Counter-theories of female spectatorship have sought to address the impasse implied by the linkage of desire with modes of spectating inherent in film that seem to exclude a desiring gaze for woman.
Chapter 2 considered the introduction of questions of sexual difference into the field of film theory, in particular through the development of a critique of apparatus theory. Central to the formulation of the cinematic apparatus is subjectivity and its engagement in the cinematic machine. That engagement, enabled by subjectivity’s condition of desire, and enacted through the agency of the gaze, is radically complicated by the feminist intervention.

The feminist critique of apparatus theory emanates from the recognition that subjectivity is rooted in ‘the founding distinction of culture’, sexual difference, and that if subjectivity is radically differentiated along sexual lines, then cinematic structurings of desire must be accordingly differentiated. Where apparatus theory has delineated the subject’s desiring relationship with cinema, feminist critiques have pointed to the exclusive maleness of that subject. Feminist theory has thus sought to account for cinematic structuring of desire that accords a gaze to the female spectator.

This chapter examines three main theoretical approaches to this search. Firstly, it looks at two theorists who, while differing considerably in their approaches, propose that the female spectator is in a relation to film that serves to combine male and female subject-positions: Laura Mulvey’s idea of "oscillation", and Teresa de Lauretis’s
construct of "double identification". Then, Mary Ann Doane's analysis of dominant cinema's attempted construction of a specifically female gaze (in the 1940s' "woman's film") and her application of the masquerade and its privileged moments of "double mimesis", are traced and assessed.

LAURA MULVEY: OSCILLATION

While Laura Mulvey's 1975 article "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" has been widely acknowledged to be seminal to feminising psychoanalytic film theory (see Chapter 2), it has also been criticised for its lack of attention to one of the very problems (that of female spectatorship) that served to generate its writing. As Mulvey herself writes in the article cited below, while 'inbuilt patterns of pleasure and identification impose masculinity as "point of view"', to have confined the argument to the (however ironically assumed) male, 'closed off avenues of enquiry that should be followed up' (1990 24). Her article "Afterthoughts on "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" inspired by Duel in the Sun" (1990) attempts to follow up one of those avenues: the problem, for the female spectator, of identification.1

Where "Visual Pleasure" drew on Lacanian notions of the mirror phase to develop insight into the gaze in film, "Afterthoughts" returns to Freud's ideas on femininity and applies them in the field of narrative identification and closure (Kaplan 1990 17). Femininity emerges, for

1 All references in the following discussion are to this article, unless otherwise stated.
Freud, from a period of development common to both sexes, that he characterises as masculine\(^2\), or phallic, and femininity can be successfully accomplished only with the repression of this 'masculine' phase. Which is to say, it is unlikely to be fully successfully accomplished.

The development of femininity remains exposed to disturbance by the residual phenomena of the early masculine period. Regressions to the pre-Oedipus phase very frequently occur. (Freud "Femininity", quoted in Mulvey 1990 165)

Femininity is, in other words, an unstable identity, threatened by the return of the repressed phallic phase. This instability, argues Mulvey, is what provides the potential for enjoyment by the female spectator of male-hero Hollywood films; the "masculinization" of her point-of-view while watching such action movies relies on her ability to oscillate between feminine and (regressive) masculine identity.

To illuminate the position of this spectator, Mulvey gives consideration to films that provide an on-screen enactment of this oscillation, melodramas that show a woman protagonist in a struggle for stable sexual identity, 'torn between the deep blue sea of passive femininity and the devil of regressive masculinity' (25).

Mulvey analyses the conflicting desires of the heroine in King Vidor's *Duel in the Sun* (1946) to test her hypothesis. The Western

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\(^2\) Mulvey points to the difficulty created by Freud's changing use of this word; she notes the shift (in his description of the libido) from a metaphorical usage of 'active/masculine' to an apparently biological frame of reference. He justifies the latter usage as 'conventional', but it serves to limit 'feminine' to a term of opposition (passive) or similarity (the phallic phase), rather than allow for difference. Thus 'its structural relationship to masculinity under patriarchy cannot be defined or determined within the terms offered' (26).
genre provides a useful test case in several respects: it carries traces of the primitive narrative structure analysed by Vladimir Propp in fairy tales; the traditional invulnerability of the Western hero recalls Freud’s account of the ego’s fantasised control in daydreams; sexual difference provides personification of active/passive elements in the story. The Proppian character function of "princess" is the marking of "marriage", an important aspect of narrative closure, and the Western frequently reproduces this function, but it may activate and then refuse it, if the hero chooses to refuse the princess. If the resolution of the Proppian tale represents the resolution of the Oedipal complex, its obverse (the refusal of marriage) represents a ‘nostalgic celebration of phallic, narcissistic omnipotence’ (28). Thus, unlike the Proppian tale, in the Western there is commonly a splitting of the hero in two: between the symbolic (marriage and integration into society, gratification of social demands and responsibilities) and narcissism (the lone hero, resistance to these demands). A film like John Ford’s The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (1962) personifies this split in function in its doubled hero, one symbolic and one narcissistic. The tension of the narrative derives from the question of how the villain’s defeat will be inscribed in history, and its resolution (the marriage function) represents the repression of narcissistic sexuality.

While the function of the woman in the classic Western is to provide for the marriage function as closure, making a woman central to the story produces another kind of narrative discourse. Duel in the Sun is ostensibly a Western, with two male oppositional characters similar in attributes to the split hero of Liberty Valance. The dramatic core of the film is, however, the conflict in desire of a woman whose sexual identity oscillates in relation to the two men. The men personify
a split, not in the concept of hero, but in the heroine's desire; the film, asking "What does she want?", becomes a melodrama.

While the split in the hero has an appeal that, in its 'mourning for a lost phantasy of omnipotence' is pre-Oedipal, this appeal is more complicated for the female spectator. Its activation of an 'internal oscillation of desire, which lies dormant, waiting to be "pleasured" in stories of this kind' finds its significance in the political dimension: for the female spectator, activation of the phallic phase 'has its own romantic attraction, a last-ditch resistance, in which the power of masculinity can be used as postponement against the power of patriarchy' (33-4).

TERESA DE LAURETIS: DOUBLE IDENTIFICATION

Teresa de Lauretis' investigation of "Desire in Narrative" is informed by a question: if narrative is a question of desire, 'whose desire is it that speaks, and whom does that desire address?' (112). Her linking of narrative and desire derives from Mulvey's claim that 'sadism demands a story' (made in "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema"), and she turns to narrative theory for elucidation of female spectatorship. If film relies on identificatory processes to make its meaning for the spectating-subject, she identifies two sets of

3 All references in the discussion that follows are to "Desire in Narrative" in Alice Doesn't (1984), unless otherwise stated.

4 As the central operation in the construction of the subject, identification is the 'process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides. It is by means of a series of identifications that the personality is constituted or specified' (Laplanche and Pontalis in de Lauretis 1984 141).
identificatory relations. The first, well known in film theory, is associated with the visual register: 'the masculine, active identification with the gaze (the looks of the camera and of the male characters) and the passive, feminine identification with the image (body, landscape)' (144). The second set of identificatory relations she locates in the narrative register, for which she provides an analytic overview of salient narrative theory, linking it to questions of desire.

Early structuralists (Levi-Strauss, Propp) argued convincingly that narrative is structured on a quest, its movement the passage of a mythical subject, the hero whose passage effects a transformation. de Lauretis moves the argument on from these established notions of narrative systematicity, where desire would, she says, have been viewed as a type of thematic content of narrative (104), to a consideration of the mutual implication of desire and narrative. What she is particularly concerned to make clear is how the generally accepted view of narrative as quest rests on 'a specific assumption about sexual difference' (113). She traces this assumption through the accounts by Propp, Lotman and Freud of the paradigmatic Oedipus story.

For Propp, folkloric plots emerge from social contradictions; as different social orders succeed one another, the conflict in the long transitional period between old and new orders is manifested in the tensions of plot, transformations of plot types and hybrid character formations. The Oedipus myth, for example, has multiple variations, determined by changing social historical conditions. The Oedipus story arises in the transition period between matriarchal and patriarchal forms of succession, when inheritance shifts from the agency of the
princess (matriarchal marriage) to the king's own son (patriarchal system). This shift sets up certain contradictions. While succession demands the death of the king, usually by regicide, the new system compounds this to an act of patricide, yet patricide is not only a crime, it implies a weakening of paternal power. This conflict is solved by the function of the prophecy. The theme of prophecy emerges concurrently with the social system of the patriarchal state; it is necessary to the exoneration of the son, and it necessitates the gods. The role of the princess (which in the earlier tales is to pose a task to the hero so that he can prove himself worthy of the power she can bestow on him) and that of the serpent (initiator and bestower of strength, wisdom and leadership, inhabiting the female domain of the forest) are condensed in the Oedipus story into the Sphinx. Thus the Oedipus figure combines son and son-in-law, while the Sphinx is a hybrid of the princess and the serpent (Propp's Donor function) (113-5).

Lotman proposes two "text-generating mechanisms": one located at the centre of the 'cultural massif', serving to reduce diversity and variety to invariant images, like science, classifying, stratifying, regulating to norm and system. This central mechanism engenders cyclical myths (sacral, scientific). The second mechanism generates texts of anomalies that contravene the cycle by linear or temporal means, engendering historical and fictional narrative texts. While there are multiple characters across these 'plot-texts', he divides them into two categories, mobile and fixed, heroes and antagonists (obstacles/boundaries). de Lauretis notes that the obstacle is always morphologically female (variant on the womb), thus the primary
distinction is a biologically-based male-female one, and all terms are predicated on the single hero who crosses the boundary and penetrates the other space.

In so doing the hero, the mythical subject, is constructed as human being and as male; he is the active principle of culture, the establisher of distinction, the creator of differences. Female is what is not susceptible to transformation, to life or death; she (it) is an element of plot-space, a topos, a resistance, matrix and matter. (119)

In this distinction between 'man' and 'non-man', de Lauretis asks, 'what forms of identification are possible, what positions are available?' to female readers/viewers/listeners (121). She sees as potentially useful the focus by Propp on 'the interdependence of material social relations and cultural production', and by Freud on 'the inscription of such relations into the sphere of subjectivity' (121).

Freud's attempt to understand female subjectivity ("What does a woman want?") is constituted as a narrative, 'the journey of the female child across the dangerous terrain of the Oedipus complex' (131-2). Successful negotiation of this terrain will bring the girl child to the feminine position - passive, waiting - her reward (the biological destiny of) motherhood. But Freud's hint of a schism between this (biological) destiny and the desire of woman5 causes de Lauretis to examine the narrative more closely; the myth of her subjecthood constructs her as a 'personified obstacle', the end-point of her journey is a state of waiting for the male. The Oedipal story, in other words, is a male trajectory of desire; for the girl-child, the successful

5 'More constraint has been applied to the libido when it is pressed into the service of the feminine function ... than in the case of masculinity. ... the accomplishment of the aim of biology has been made to some extent independent of women's consent' (Freud "Femininity", quoted in de Lauretis 132).
development of femininity culminates in the fulfilment of male desire. But in that Oedipal desire requires its object to identify with the female position, consent is essential to femininity. Hence the importance of what, in Mulvey and Wollen's film *Riddles of the Sphinx*, is termed "the politics of the unconscious", a phrase which cogently identifies the site of struggle for women's consent to femininity (134).

de Lauretis thus argues for the imperative need for theoretical attention to questions of female subjectivity to be articulated within narrative theory through the interrogation of mythological female experience. Where mythological female figures survive, they do so as inscriptions in someone else's story, and their narratives must be sought: "What became of the Sphinx after the encounter with Oedipus on his way to Thebes? Or, how did Medusa feel seeing herself in Perseus' mirror just before being slain?" (109). Such questions are political questions that bear directly on the issues of cinematic identification and spectatorship: the relation of female subjectivity to ideology in the representation of sexual difference and desire, the positions available to women in film, the conditions of vision and meaning production, for women. (136)

And it is narrative rather than visual terms, de Lauretis claims, that allow these issues of female identification and spectatorship to be most productively addressed (143 - 4). Freud's narrativising of femininity and masculinity provide passive and active subject-positions in relation to desire. Within the movement of narrative discourse, these positions specify and produce the masculine as mythical subject (movement), the feminine as mythical obstacle or space (closure). As figural identifications, these positionalities are mutually implicated by the process of narrativity, and are therefore both sustained at once.
They thus uphold both active and passive aims of desire: desire for the other, and desire to be desired by the other. The core of de Lauretis’ argument rests on this claim, that narrativity requires a double identification which solicits the spectator’s consent, and serves to seduce women into femininity (143).

Thus in cinema, which operates across the two registers of the look, the visual and the narrative, there are two sets of identifying relations. The first set, deriving from the visual register, provides the male-gaze/female-image set, as proposed by Mulvey in "Visual Pleasure" and elaborated by much subsequent theory. But the female spectator, claims de Lauretis, is here presented with two ‘incommensurable entities’, the gaze and the image⁶, making identification either impossible (‘split beyond any act of suture’) or masculine (144). The second set, that deriving from the narrative (as elaborated above), overlays this first set, and provides the female spectator with a viable identificatory subject-position.

de Lauretis’ configuration of a double set of identificatory relations has been criticised by Doane for the complexities it raises, while the second (narrative) set of identifications is seen as ‘disengendered’, and problematic in their simultaneity (1987 7). Her comment on the difficulties deriving from the ‘multiplicity and dispersal of subject positions’ consequent on the activation of the second set of identifications seems, if anything, understated. The charge that the simultaneity of these figural identifications is problematic is, however,

⁶ ‘The gaze is a figure, not an image. We see the image; we do not see the gaze ... no image can be identified, or identified with, apart from the look that inscribes it as image, and vice versa’ (de Lauretis 1984 142 - 3).
less persuasive. It seems to overlook the insistence that the narrative relies on the interdependence of the discursive agents to make meaning: no movement without space, no space without movement; hero and obstacle are mutually constitutive.

MARY ANN DOANE: PROXIMITY AND ADDRESS

Two major features distinguish the work of Mary Ann Doane from that of Laura Mulvey and Teresa de Lauretis. Firstly, where both Mulvey and de Lauretis seek to account for female spectatorship in classical cinema, as it is structured on voyeurism and fetishism for the male gaze, Doane investigates a category of films that attempts the structuration of a specifically female gaze, the 'perverted specularisation' of the 1940s' "woman's film" (1984 71; 1987). Secondly, decisively inflecting her reading of these films is her contention that what specifies the female spectatorial relationship to the image is proximity (rather than passivity, as proposed in Mulvey's "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema") (1982; 1987). The second of these points will be developed and then Doane's account of female spectatorship will be assessed.

The dominant system of aligning sexual difference in a subject/object dichotomy catches subjectivity inescapably in a binary opposition. But where this supportive opposition is identified by Mulvey and others as active/passive, Doane argues that distance/proximity in relation to the image provides a more fundamental oppositional pair (1982 77). She cites Metz's claim that voyeurism is a perfect form of desire because it spatially enacts this
separation from the lost object: cinematic desire is specified by both the space between spectator and screen (voyeurism) and the loss or lack that the sensory plenitude of the image evokes (fetishism) (Doane 1982 78). Doane refers, too, to Noel Burch’s alignment of cinematic desire with a precise spatial configuration (1982 77-8). But this precondition of distance for spectatorial desire is seemingly negated by the woman’s relation to the image:

For the female spectator there is a certain over-presence of the image - she is the image. Given the closeness of this relationship, the female spectator’s desire can be described only in terms of a kind of narcissism - the female look demands a becoming. (1982 78)

Doane notes the recurrence of the motif of proximity in theorisations of female specificity, particularly in the ‘new French feminisms’: Irigaray, Cixous, Kofman, Montrelay all elaborate on woman’s closeness to the body (1982 78-9).7 Freud, in his analysis of the construction of ‘the subject supposed to know’, characterises the boy child’s response by the temporal gap between his seeing the female genitals (visible difference) and his knowing (sexual difference). He specifies the girl child’s immediacy of understanding of sexual difference on first seeing the penis, ‘her merging [of] perception and intellection’ (Doane, 1982 79). ‘They [girls] at once notice the difference and, it must be admitted, its significance too’ (Freud "Femininity", quoted in Doane 1982 79). The boy, on the other hand, sees but delays understanding. Only the subsequent threat of castration prompts a re-reading to endow the image with meaning. And ‘this gap between the visible and the knowable, the very

7 While Doane adopts their ideas of proximity, overpresence, in woman’s relation to the body, she refutes what she sees as their tendency towards embracing these tropes in a “ghetto politics”, while recognising their centrality to psychoanalytic and cinematic constructions of femininity (1987 12).
possibility of disowning what is seen, prepares the ground for fetishes (Doane 1982:80). The woman cannot thus fetishise her body away; the lack of distance between seeing and understanding means she does not have access in the same way as the male to the lack that inaugurates the symbolic register. This relationship of immediacy between seeing and understanding, a ‘deficiency in relation to structures of seeing’, gives her what Doane terms an ‘over-identification with the image’, that is borne out by the affectiveness of ‘feminine’ film genres (soap operas, ‘women’s films’) (1982:80).

We will now turn to the second distinguishing feature of Doane’s work on the female gaze: her focus on the "woman’s film".

Doane suggests that the genre of the "woman’s film" provides a privileged site for analysis in that its explicit address to a female viewer allows for an examination of dominant cinema’s given terms of female spectatorship (1984:69; 1987:3). A distinction needs to be made here between ‘address’ and ‘spectator positioning’. ‘Address’ is a category of rhetoric, referring to conscious, explicit and socially/historically specific strategies. On the other hand, the spectator -- as ‘the subject positioned within processes of cinematic signification’ - is a theoretical concept developed in the relationship between psychoanalysis and film theory (Doane 1987:34; Kuhn 191). But the attempt to shift female identity from objecthood to subjecthood by according the woman the gaze is marked by failure; the very forms that the films inhabit, the traditional Hollywood narrative, cannot

The term is used with a degree of flexibility; the frequent combination of the woman’s film with other genres gives them an intertextuality that ultimately underlines their point of unification: the fact of their address (1984:68).
sustain the attempt to trace the "woman’s story", her subjectivity and desire (Doane 1987 13). Constant formal resistances to elaborating a desiring subjectivity for the woman indicate ideological 'stress points' that Doane relates to their historical context: the 1940s provide a peculiarly intensive period of reorganisation of sexual roles⁹, and the films are marked by evidence of accordingly intensive ideological upheaval (1987 13 4). The ‘crisis in subjectivity’ that the films document around the figure of the woman is manifested in the films’ persistent activation of vicissitudes of female subjectivity incompatible with a mastering gaze (1987 4 14).

These vicissitudes of female subjectivity are described by those Freudian scenarios that focus on the mechanisms of masochism, paranoia and hysteria (1987 16). The compatibility of these psychoanalytic scenarios with the filmic scenarios of this genre is notable, and underscores their pertinence to an investigation of the woman’s film. These mechanisms are, moreover, in contrast with those (voyeurism and fetishism) employed by apparatus theorists that fully align classical film with masculine subjectivity. Where identification for the male subject is a mechanism by which mastery is assured (the controlling knowledge which guarantees the unity of the subject), for the female subject identification can only reinforce her submission.

⁹ Citing Michael Renov, Doane argues that, ‘while the 1930s were characterised by class conflict, the mobilisation and unification spurred by World War II displaced the most perceptible differentiation from the realm of class to that of sexuality’ (1987 33).
Thus the four subgroups that Doane devises - the medical discourse; the maternal melodrama; the love story; the paranoid woman's film - turn on those psychical mechanisms that are specifically associated with the feminine: masochism, hysteria, neurosis, paranoia (1987 36). Doane points to the paradox of this repeated association of fantasy with a pathological condition: "How can the notion of female fantasy be compatible with that of persecution, illness, and death?" (1987 17).

Freud makes a crucial linkage between masochistic fantasy and the female in "A Child is Being Beaten".\textsuperscript{10} Whereas the male retains his identity and sexuality in the fantasy, the female loses both. Peculiar to the female account, the third statement - "A child is being beaten" - places the female as spectator, outside the event. As she transforms the child being beaten into an anonymous boy, she loses not only her sexual identity but her very access to sexuality -- she 'escapes from the demands of the erotic side of her life' into masochistic fantasy (Freud quoted in Doane 1987 18). This supplanting of sexuality by masochistic fantasy, argues Doane, is the very process in the woman's film whereby the look becomes de-eroticised (1987 19).

The woman's film thus in particular ways works against the relation between the female body and sexuality established by the classical cinema (1987 19). Whereas the latter (following Mulvey) requires of its female spectator an oscillation between transvestite and

\textsuperscript{10} In that the fantasy derives from an incestuous attachment to the father, the male fantasist's masochism derives from an "inverted" desire, whereas the female's falls within the terms of "normal" female Oedipal desire (Doane 1987 17-18).
narcissitic identifications, the woman’s film minimises the transvestite option in favour of narcissistic identification. But this identification is itself problematised by the de-eroticisation of the gaze. Because spectacle relies on the 'welding' of the erotic and the specular in the female body, de-eroticising the gaze reduces the specularity of the female body too. The desexualised spectacle is consequently something of a contradiction in terms. The woman’s film thus serves to disembody its spectator: it 'functions in a rather complex way to deny the woman the space of a reading ... for, a bodyless woman cannot see' (1987 19-20).

Lest her thesis be read as a simple vindication of the political potential of the woman’s film, however, Doane is quick to point out that its attribution of an epistemological gaze to the woman, with its obsessive repetition of masochistic scenarios, functions to 'immobilize' (1987 19). Articulating with this inscription of female subjectivity, moreover, is an 'economy of desire' - the inscription of a 'consumer gaze' that is critical for the placement of women within the social field (1987 22-33). This consumer gaze is grounded in the integral relationship between the classical cinema and the 'consumer culture' with which it is historically coincident, but it carries a particular urgency for woman, who is (argues Doane) both object and subject of exchange. The theoretical opposition between woman as consumer and woman as commodity is only an apparent contradiction, belied by a consideration of the woman’s investment in the affective, in sexual relations in a patriarchal society. The 'absoluteness' of the subject/object dichotomy, and 'the ways in which the woman is encouraged to actively participate in her own oppression' need to be re-thought (1987 23). Three instances of commodification are cited:
of the woman herself as commodity, arising from a narcissistic
apprehension of the image onscreen (the currency being both body and
display space for that body); the commodity tie-in which explicitly links
the film (onscreen or offscreen) with commercial product/s that provide
access to the ideal image for the consumer; commodification of the
film itself\textsuperscript{11} in a circuit of exchange. For the woman, then, her
positioning as spectator dovetails with her role as a consumer: 'the
cinematic image ... is both shop window and mirror, the one simply a
means of access to the other' (1987 33).

It is within this context of a social imperative made more acute
by the historical conditions of the 1940s that Doane situates her
analysis of the terms of address of the woman's film. Her interest in
the ideological project of the woman's film - the engagement of a
female subjectivity in a narrative discourse classically structured on
male viewing pleasure - focuses on the disjuncture between 'female'
and 'desire'. For the absence of that distance which grounds access
to language and desire renders a desiring subjectivity difficult, if not
impossible, for (the psychoanalytic and cinematic constructions of) the
female spectator. As the woman's film inscribes the culturally
constructed positions of femininity in 'particularly moving and intense
forms', it solicits a gaze that cannot be contained. Its representation
of woman's relation to desire is highly mediated (1987 176 9).

\textsuperscript{11} This point invites comparison with Heath's notion of the narrative image: 'a film's
presence, how it can be talked about, what it can be sold and bought on, itself
represented as - in the production stills displayed outside a cinema, for example ...
a kind of static portrait in which [the film] comes together, on the basis of which it
is talked about' (1981 121, 133). And, not accidentally, the narrative image
operates around the function of the woman: it depends on the narrative's
restoration of her as good object (obliging her to be envisaged first as bad object)
(1981 140).
Paradoxically, denied a gaze invested with desire, the woman's only access to desire is to strive for an access to a desiring subjectivity - the desire to desire (1987 122 9).

Doane argues that attempting to make the woman the subject of the gaze places strains on these films that their conventional narrative form can barely contain (1984 69). Her taxonomy of the woman's film thus traces the vicissitudes of specularization that arise from the attempt to engage a specifically female subjectivity (1984 70; 1987 178-9). Films of the medical discourse effect a despecularization as the woman is deprived of subjectivity, her body losing its function as spectacle to become a set of symptoms to be read by the male/medical gaze. The maternal melodrama dramatises a separation between mother and child, inducing a potential for voyeurism that is recuperated as pathos. The attempted eroticisation of the love story, returned as narcissism, activates a desire that is so excessive that often its only possible closure is death. The paranoid gothic film attributes a gaze to the woman in her investigation of her own space, the home, but because it is an objectless gaze, putting into crisis the very opposition subjectivity/objectivity, it turns against itself. The difficulty of female subjectivity is here most acute, the cinematic response most violent.

This 'obsession with the repetition of scenarios of masochism' evidences a need to shift the terms of address of classical cinema (1987 19). But against the 'immobilizing' effectivity of the woman's film Doane proposes one instance of a strategy of alienation that is inscribed in the text: the notion of the masquerade (1982; 1987 180-2).
This concept derives from Joan Riviere’s paper of 1929, "Womanliness as a Masquerade", in which she considers ‘women who wish for masculinity’ but ‘put on a mask of womanliness to avert anxiety and the retribution feared from men’ (35). Her argument rests on a case study of a woman whose public professional behaviour alternates between masculinity (intellectual prowess) and femininity (coquetry), and whose relations with women are governed by supremacy or intense rivalry. Riviere’s analysis locates her contradictory behaviour in manifestations of the castration complex, a sadistic fury felt towards both parents, and characterises her feminine behaviour as ‘an unconscious attempt to ward off the anxiety which would ensue on account of the reprisals she anticipated’ (37). Womanliness is thus a masquerade, a mask worn by the woman who has claimed the penis, that aims to placate both him from whom she has claimed it and her to whom it is due (42-3).

But Riviere takes her argument a step further: she proposes not only that womanliness can be worn as a mask for defence, but that ‘genuine womanliness and the ‘masquerade’ ... are the same thing’ (1986 38). As she suggests in her conclusion, the conception of mask serves to invoke the thing hidden: she describes ‘womanliness as mask, behind which man suspects some hidden danger’ (43).

A contemporary reading of Riviere’s account must contend with the complications of the psychoanalytic discourse of the time, and with her own ambivalences regarding the subject matter. Heath comments, for example, on the paper’s duplication of the contradiction implicit in the idea of woman as mask: ‘The masquerade says that the woman exists at the same time that, as masquerade, it says she does not’
(1986 54). Rivière's ambivalence regarding male and female perceptions of this contradiction is resolved by 'misreading' her subject's protest as sadism. Reading with the Oedipal grain, she ignores questions of power relations -- and 'sexual politics gives way to a psychology of sex' (Heath 1986 56).

The masquerade has nevertheless proved a seminal idea since Lacan's 'retrieval' of it in 1958 (Heath 1986 48). Taken up in France by the editors of Cahiers du Cinema ("Morocco de Josef Sternberg", 1970) and by Luce Irigaray (Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un, 1977), it was 'imported' into English writing by Claire Johnston in "Femininity and the Masquerade: Anne of the Indies" in 1975, to argue the 'trouble of a radical heterogeneity' (Heath 1986 57; Doane 1982 fn 25, 81; Johnston 69). Although Johnston's view of the masquerade as 'trace of the exclusion and repression of the feminine' serves the polemic of her argument well, it does not take the notion of masquerade adequately beyond its articulation at a diegetic level in a particular film, as evidence of a fundamental bisexuality.

Doane's conception of masquerade differs from Johnston's in that she sees it as a textual strategy of distancing that counteracts the production of femininity as closeness. The masquerade is constituted as the demonstration of a representation. As an 'hyperbolization of the accoutrements of femininity', it flaunts that femininity (Doane 1982 82). It therefore serves to instate the distancing consequent on a double representation, foregrounding the representational nature of the image. This "double mimesis", occurring in privileged moments in the text, has the capacity to undermine the credibility of the representation of woman (1987 180).
This capacity for subverting the look is contrasted by Doane with the limited effectiveness of another theory of female spectatorship: the transvestism upon which Mulvey's thesis of oscillation depends (Doane 1982 180-1). The latter is (for female reversal, specifically) a play that relies on and endorses the sexual mobility of (a culturally constructed) femininity. Its 'masculinisation' of the female spectator provides the opportunity for a desiring gaze that reinstates woman as object of desire (1982 80-1). It is thus culturally fully recuperable. The masquerade, on the other hand, achieves its distancing by the very 'realignement of femininity, the ... simulation of the missing gap or distance' (1982 82). Doane thus accords it a potential for resistance to patriarchal positioning.

The effectivity of masquerade lies precisely in its potential to manufacture a distance from the image, to generate a problematic within which the image is manipulable, producible, and readable by the woman. (1982 87)

While patriarchal modes of vision, then, accord the female spectator a place that ties her to the image, the masquerade can restore the distance that is necessary to a reading of the image, thus affording her a position of subjectivity.

Attractive though Doane's argument is, it raises some problems evident in the very terms of its expression. Centrally, its adequacy to the problem of female spectatorship has been questioned. Masquerade

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12 Doane effects something of an elision in this argument. Mulvey's transvestism is an activity of the spectator and enables a desiring gaze. The transvestism that Doane then analyses is located in the image itself, and is articulated as a function not of the subject of the gaze, but of its object. This elision is symptomatic of a wider problem in the logic of Doane's argument, referred to below.
is, as Doane herself has pointed out, a figure of representation (1982 81). It applies to a position inscribed within a filmic text, and its transference to the spectator assumes an unproblematic equivalence between intratextual and spectatorial positions. When the femme fatale displays 'herself' as excessive and threatening femininity, the gap 'she' creates between 'herself' and this role is a function of a representation, and cannot be assumed to be reproduced in the spectator. According to D.N. Rodowick, Doane 'confuses the activities of identification and reading' (35). This uneasiness is evident at times in the terms of Doane's argument. When she states, for example, that 'to masquerade is to manufacture a lack in the form of a certain distance between oneself and one's image' (1982 82), the non-specificity of 'one' opens something of a hiatus around the identity of the masquerader. The problem is referred to by Doane herself in her subsequent article "Masquerade Reconsidered" 13 when she acknowledges 'a pronounced difficulty in aligning the notion of masquerade with that of female spectatorship' in the earlier article (1991 39). This difficulty she sees as due in part to a 'blurring of the opposition between production and reception' that is a consequence of the masquerade's 'curious blend of activity and passivity' (an active striving for an image of passivity) (1991 39).

The central claim made for masquerade, too -- that, in its destabilisation of the image, it subverts the look, thereby 'disarticulating male systems of viewing' -- seems to be in excess of its potential effectiveness (1982 82). While the examples of "double

13 Written as a response to Tania Modleski's critique of the earlier article's analysis of Doisneau's photographic 'joke', this article nevertheless contains some useful reflections - and reiterations - on the masquerade itself.
"mimesis" cited in the conclusion to The Desire to Desire are more persuasive, its application in the earlier article (to the figure of the femme fatale) would seem to lend itself to a recuperation through stylisation, particularly camp. (This point is returned to in Chapter 4).

The concept of masquerade, then, has not provided an adequate solution to the problem of female spectatorship, although it can be productively activated as a figure of representation. It 'would seem to facilitate an understanding of the woman's status as spectacle rather than spectator' (Doane 1991 39). Mediating between representation and spectator is the process of reading, with its constraints social, sexual and historical (Doane 1991 41).

Finally, if this chapter has presented an overview of rather a bleak terrain, a more optimistic closing note may be sounded by pointing to the potentialities of fantasy. The formulation of fantasy as a 'staging and imaging of the subject and its desire' approximates the aims of apparatus theory, but does not eliminate sexual difference (Penley 1989 80). What is made available to the spectator are shifting and multiple identifications that allow a mobility in relation to desire. By replacing prescribed sexual identificatory positions with a capacity for such mobility, fantasy provides a model that offers a radical subversion of present understandings of the gaze.
CHAPTER FOUR

KLUTE: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

The film Klute (1971) presents an opportunity to exercise some of the concerns outlined in the foregoing chapters, particularly around issues of spectator positioning and female subjectivity. The film was made at something of a turning point both in the industry and in social history: the Hollywood mode of film practice was changing, and there was a powerful resurgence of the women's movement. These changes are inscribed in the text in ways that are productive for an analysis that seeks to locate spectatorship within the parameters of a social and a psychic subjectivity1.

I will therefore start my analysis of Klute by examining critically the context of the New Hollywood in which it was made. I will then assess the implications of these changes for Klute's generic structuration, as a detective thriller in the film noir style, and as a realist articulation of emergent feminism. The textual analysis concentrates on the three sequences that introduce the figuration of the character Bree, with reference to the generic play across these sequences. Brief analyses are also made of the sequences with the psychiatrist, the recurrent image of Klute's gaze and Bree's masquerade with Mr Goldfarb, all of these focussing on the struggle for control of the image.

1 Doane's observation that 'psychoanalysis and Marxism have never successfully collaborated in the theorization of subjectivity' articulates what might be seen as the central challenge for theorising popular culture.
When *Klute* first appeared in 1971, it enjoyed generally good reviews and a positive critical reception. Jay Cocks called it 'a sharp, slick thriller', Pauline Kael 'a superior thriller-melodrama', Tom Milne described it as 'authentically Chandlerish', Penelope Houston praised it as 'brilliantly unsettling' and Elliott Sirkin wrote that it was 'compelling and alive and exhilarating' (all 1971). In addition, it was greeted by a positive critical reception, with feature articles appearing in *Sight and Sound* (Spring 1972) and *Positif* (March 1972). Particularly noted in contemporary reviews were Alan Pakula's direction, Andy and Dave Lewis's script and Jane Fonda's acting (which won her an Academy Award). *Klute*'s reputation has continued to grow and it is frequently cited in writings on the period, often as a prime example of that meeting between classical Hollywood thriller and European art-house film that is referred to as "New Hollywood" (Bordwell et al. 372).

**THE NEW HOLLYWOOD?**

This emergent cinema has been equated with an "independent" production practice, and is seen by some theorists as something of a quantum shift from the 'old Hollywood' style and production practices (Manvell 48; Pye and Myles 16). Underpinning this view is a negative characterisation of the studio system as (dream) factory, a production line in which such constraints as the profit motive and generic codes

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2 A notable exception was Stanley Kauffmann: 'one more of that new breed of rotten film ... Pakula is just another artistically shallow slicknik, operating in the new psychologized show biz' (1971 22).
conflict with artistic creativity or cultural integrity; its breakdown is therefore seen as allowing a freeing of talent (Manvell 8). Opposing this construction, Bordwell et al. posit Hollywood cinema as a creatively productive industry, from which a classical style has evolved and persisted beyond the studio system. They argue that the Hollywood mode of film practice provided the conditions for the development of a group style, its history characterised by a tension between standardisation and differentiation, and that 'just as the Hollywood mode of production continues, the classical style remains the dominant model for feature filmmaking' (370).

As *Klute* draws strongly on classical style, yet was made within the historical and aesthetic context of the New Hollywood, the relationship between old and New Hollywoods should be critically assessed. As Pye and Myles, on the one hand, and Bordwell et al., on the other, present opposing points of view regarding the continuity between the two systems, some of the main points of difference between their arguments are presented.

The studio system that had governed commercial cinema through the 1930s and 1940s finally broke down by the mid-1950s. The causes were several: the major studios' monopoly across the industry (on production, distribution and exhibition) was eroded by a

3 'Hollywood had for the most part been bad for the film-maker ... in an area which has gathered together a phenomenal number of able and talented people, there is no collective culture, no 'background', nothing of the 'ambience' of a London, Paris, Rome or New York' (Manvell 26).

4 'For me ... the attraction was in using a genre for my own ends; it wasn't pastiche which interested me but, on the contrary, making a contemporary exploration through the slant of a classic form' (Pakula in Michel Ciment "Entretien avec Alan J. Pakula". *Positif* no. 36 (March 1972): 36, quoted in Gledhill 1987 20.
series of antitrust laws that eventually broke their control over exhibition; studio corporate crises (notably those at United Artists) compounded a loss of confidence by bankers; television provided a growing threat to audience attendance (Pye and Myles 24-27). Pye and Myles argue, however, that the primary cause of the breakdown of the old system was the emergence of "Middle America". Suburban lifestyle and its attendant consumer culture entailed mass changes in patterns of leisure that saw a rapid audience fall-off from the late 1940s to mid-1950s (28-31). This analysis serves their thesis of a 'youth revolution', a phenomenon generated by post-war socio-economic conditions, that filled the gap in production and consumption from both sides. From suburbia an affluent youthful audience developed, while in Hollywood the shift in production patterns - from studio factories turning out many films to "Independent" companies' production of fewer, more specialised films - gave the opening for a generation of young, film school-bred innovators to 'take over Hollywood' (Pye and Myles 31-2; 54-60).

This account is not endorsed by Bordwell et al., for whom the shift from the old to the new Hollywood represents less of a break than Pye and Myles imply. They trace the changes in systems governing Hollywood's division of labour through its history, through to the 'producer-unit' system (dominant through the 'studio' period of the 1930s to the mid-1950s) and the 'package-unit' system that superseded it (93). The production unit in the producer-unit system operated across a self-contained studio, which organised its resources (including a stable supply of contracted labour) to serially manufacture films within a vertical hierarchy of specialisation (Bordwell et al. 320 ff). With the breakdown of the studio as a production base, this
changed to the package-unit system, a short-term, film-by-film arrangement, in which the whole industry served as a pool of potential resources, contracted for the production of a single film (Bordwell et al. 330-1). The studios persisted as sources of finance, technical resources and distribution, but diversified their interests well beyond film making.

This shift in system of division of labour underlies the emergence of the New Hollywood, and Bordwell et al. argue that the claims for its novelty are limited: Pye and Myles’s argument for a ‘youth revolution’ among directors is belied by the number of directors from the ‘old Hollywood’ who started young; the new directors’ film school training gives only a limited technical versatility, and often serves to entrench dominant standards; nor can technological innovation be taken as the hallmark of a new movement, as it has been used to promote films throughout Hollywood’s history (372-3). Most significantly, the claim that the new approach to narrative and technique represents a break from classical Hollywood is strongly contested. Manvell refers to ‘that modern movement in film-making, perhaps more European than American, which bases its interests on the real ambivalences of human nature rather than on creating clear-cut characters for the fulfilment of a story-teller’s plot’ (152). Bordwell et al. acknowledge a tendency in Hollywood films since 1960 to imitate the look of European art films (suggesting among others Klute’s resemblance to Godard). But while New Hollywood selectively borrowed from the international art cinema, they claim that ‘classical film style and codified genres swallow up art-film borrowings, taming the (already limited) disruptiveness of the art cinema’ (373-5).


Klute provides an interesting test case for this claim regarding the ability of classicism to 'swallow up' borrowings from art cinema. While Klute's narrative is cast largely within the generic conventions of the detective thriller, and incorporates strong stylistic elements of film noir, its iconoclastic treatment of the woman appears to transgress these generic conventions, by drawing instead on art-film conventions of characterisation. We shall now consider the related questions of generic placement and film noir style in relation to Klute, before focussing on its figuration of woman.

GENRE: KLUTE AS DETECTIVE THRILLER AND FILM NOIR

John Cawelti writes of the transformations that the hardboiled detective film was undergoing in the (cultural and artistic) transition period of the late 1960s into the 1970s (567-8). We can immediately note important correspondences between Cawelti's main points and Klute itself. According to Cawelti, the traditional detective thriller has an established narrative formula: its protagonist is a private investigator who has a marginal relation to institutionalised law - Klute is a small-town cop who has taken leave to investigate his friend's disappearance, and about whose abilities the detectives of Tuscarora are sceptical; a man of integrity, he is not a financial success - Klute refuses Bree's bribe in exchange for his tapes of her telephone conversations, and can pay her no more than she could make 'in a

5 See shots 45 and 46 in the appended script.

6 See shots 151 - 154.
lunch break', for her help; the hero’s mission is initiated by a client who acts deceptively - it is Cable, acting in feigned concert with Holly Gruneman, who claims to ‘feel entitled’ to arrange with Klute a further investigation of Tom’s disappearance; the world the detective enters is a morally corrupt, specifically urban society - New York City is characterised as a place of prostitutes, drug addicts, seedy dives and brothels. Cawelti’s formulation of the beautiful and dangerous woman who frequently turns out to be the murderess, or from whom the hero ultimately separates to resume his marginal situation is not, however, compatible with the characterisation of Bree. It is the breaking of this part of the formula that is responsible for the interest of the film. (561-4).

In considering film noir style, it is worth remarking at the outset that, although this category of films is associated with the detective genre, the two are by no means fully equivalent. Gledhill describes film noir as ‘a phase in the development of the gangster/thriller’ (1987 13). Its prime period is commonly identified as the 1940s and 1950s, although some critics include later examples. Rather than a generic category, film noir is used variously to describe a visual style (‘expressive use of darkness, both real and psychological’), a mood (‘paranoid, claustrophobic, hopeless ... without clear moral or personal

7 See shot 246.
8 See shots 41 - 44.
9 Jay Cocks’s review in Time describes Klute ironically as ‘a sharp, slick thriller about murder, perversion, paranoia, prostitution and a lot of other wonderful things about life in New York City’.
10 Cawelti’s formulation here seems to incorporate a specifically film noir inflection, as opposed to Gledhill’s distinction between the detective thriller’s peripheralisation and the film noir’s centralisation of the woman (see below).
identity') or ‘particular patterns of nonconformity within Hollywood’ (Place 39, 41; Bordwell et al. 75 resp.). While both historical period and constituting features are contested, it is agreed that what Bordwell et al. term the ‘critical canonization’ of film noir began in post-war France when, with the ending of the occupation, Hollywood films became freely available again, and the resemblance of some to French films noirs was noted (75). The positive attention paid to Hollywood movies by French film critics through the influential Cahiers de Cinema ironically returned this influence, now made respectable by European endorsement, to American ‘arthouse’ cinema audiences (Rhode 538; Bordwell et al. 75).

Klute clearly draws strongly on the stylistic tradition of film noir. Harvey’s description of the characteristic style of film noir, as with its ‘unbalanced and disturbing frame compositions, strong contrasts of light and dark, the prevalence of shadows and areas of darkness within the frame … ’, can clearly be read as a description of Klute’s own visual style. Pakula himself speaks of his attempt to create a world ‘off balance’, by his cameraman’s use of ‘very nervous compositions’ (Milne 1972 90-91). In this regard, filming in Panavision created a problem. The massive spaciousness characteristic of Panavision was overcome by using darkness with selected lighting (in much of the film half or less of the screen is lit), the persistent use of verticals (window frames, furnishings, building structures), sets that create a sense of claustrophobia (Bree’s apartment, the garment workshop). Pakula comments, in particular, on the first scene, which shows the

11 In an echo of Griffith’s famous remark, Pakula answered a studio executive’s criticism of the film’s claustrophobic atmosphere: “This is not a cheap picture, but you’re not going to get the whole screen for your money” (Milne, 1972, 91).
familial environment in Tuscarora. It stands out as ‘the only sunny scene in the film’, and contrasts to ‘the darkness ... a world where people are enclosed’ (Milne 1972 89).

From the above we can see that Klute clearly complies with the generic formula of the detective thriller, and is located firmly within the film noir stylistic tradition. But its particular interest lies in its deviations from the generic conventions governing the role of the woman.

BREE AS GENERIC MISFIT

The particular inflection which film noir operates on the generic representation of the woman is seen by many theoreticians as a definitive marker of this category (Bordwell et al. 76; Gledhill 1987 18). Gledhill argues that whereas the detective thriller’s male world of action and logic tends to locate women peripherally in criminal and domestic spheres, the ‘aberrant style’ of film noir reverses this view, placing a woman at the centre of the investigation (1987 14-15). At the same time the norm of the bourgeois family - ‘locus of woman’s particular oppression’ - is absent from film noir (Harvey 33). This centralisation of woman in a male criminal world in which the family is a suppressed entity, leads to representations of woman that undermine conventional sexual ideology (Gledhill 1987 15). Instead of figuring as the prize in a heterosexual romance, the film noir heroine’s combination of sexual allure with potential treachery makes her a threat to the hero (Bordwell et al. 76). As Place argues, film noir functions ideologically as myth: it first gives expression to the power of the strong, assertive,
sexual woman and then destroys that power, and frequently the woman too (45).

As suggested above, the characterisation of Bree is particularly complex with regard to these conventional formulations, and it has been the focus of much critical attention and debate. It was this concern that gave Klute the reputation of being a feminist film. Before giving attention to some of these arguments, however, it is necessary to refer back to the historical context in which the film was made, to clarify the importance of the feminist dimension.

That the trouble in a 1971 text should come from a female character struggling with issues of autonomy is not coincidental. The 'second wave' of the woman's movement that had begun in the late 1960s was gaining strength in both Europe and the United States. A broad-based, grassroots and multifaceted movement, its origins and manifestations are complex, but some threads can be drawn. In Europe, particularly in Britain, France and Italy, one consequence of the events of 1968 was the extension by activist women of the New Left's political critique to their own position. In the United States women in the movements of popular resistance, notably the civil rights and antiwar movements, began in the mid-1960s to organise around specific women's issues, while Betty Friedan's 1963 ground-breaking book, *The Feminine Mystique*, had a rallying influence (Zinn 495-7). Common to the history on both sides of the Atlantic was a linking of

12 The first wave had been the woman's rights movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, what is commonly referred to as the Suffrage Movement. Although the struggle for the vote retains the highest profile in historical accounts, the issues and events in both Britain and the United States were far more complex than that term would imply (Brown and Seitz, 6-26).
middle- and working-class women's experience (although this was not without difficulties), and an emphasis on the linkage between public and private spheres, expressed in the slogan "The personal is political". Where the 'first wave' had been concerned primarily with women's political rights, the 'second wave' showed a foregrounding of questions of ideology. This was manifested in the prominence given to consciousness raising, and the concern with images of woman in literature and visual media. As discussed in Chapter 1, from the early 1970s women were actively creating a feminist alternative film culture, through film-making, festivals and journals (Doane et al). But mainstream narrative film was also a focus of attention: in the United States Marjorie Rosen and Molly Haskell gave accounts of its female stereotypes and changing images of women, while in Britain theorists, notably Claire Johnston, Pam Cook and Laura Mulvey, argued the necessity of a feminist re-reading of classical film texts.

Catching the rising tide of popular feminism of the early 1970's, then, Klute was hailed by many as a politically sound contribution to the emergent critique of patriarchal society. 'Since women have united to raise their own consciousness and society's' wrote Marjorie Rosen in her pioneering work Popcorn Venus in 1972, the movie industry had proved inadequate in 'reflecting ... women as productive and emotional beings'. Among only four exceptions that she cites is 'Jane Fonda's gritty and needy call girl Bree in Klute' (29). Molly Haskell makes much the same point, although in less enthusiastic terms. The female stars of the 1930s and 1940s, she claims, 'far surpass women in the movies

13 Kate Millett (Sexual Politics (1970)) did for literature what Marjorie Rosen and Molly Haskell were to do for film.
today, where the most heroic model that women can fasten upon is Jane Fonda's grubby prostitute in *Klute* ...’ (31).

A debate has since emerged concerning the degree to which the film deserves this reputation. One set of arguments, consistent with Haskell’s and Rosen’s presentations of Bree as a model for contemporary women's issues, elaborates an account of Bree’s character as the centre of the film.

Diane Giddis locates the central interest of the film in the ‘intense inner conflict’ of the female protagonist, the other characters (notably Klute and Cable) serving as projections of her psyche (195). She argues that their opposition reflects Bree’s conflict between the need for love and the loss of self, and that the ultimate ascendancy of the former option, when Bree goes off to Tuscarora with Klute, signals a defeat for Bree in her struggle for autonomy. Despite this, Giddis sees the film as a reflection of the struggle of ‘most women’ for equality in relationships, and Bree as an embodiment of contemporary female concerns (201).

Although Giddis roots her argument in an acute analysis of the structuration of the film, her critical methodology, which unproblematically reads the film as a reflection of ‘real life’, demonstrates much of the difficulty inherent in a sociological analysis that was discussed in Chapter 1. Another point of criticism is that the

14 This emphasis saves Giddis’s account from fitting the criticism made by Peter Brooks of feminist usage of psychoanalytic method ('situational-thematic studies' of characters’ behaviour), although it does not match Kaplan's counter-argument that much feminist criticism uses themes to foreground how patriarchal signifying systems work (Kaplan 1990 11; 15).
article's structuring and unqualified category of 'most women' rests on an implicit assumption that most women are first-world and heterosexual.

Gledhill criticises Giddis for reading the heroine's subjectivity as the unifying principle of the film while ignoring factors of genre and style in the production of the female image. Gledhill herself argues that *Klute* combines film noir and European art movie conventions to 'profoundly anti-feminist' effect: its modernisation of film noir allows a displacement of contemporary feminist issues onto the film noir woman, so that these issues can be recuperated through the humanism of the European art film, as psychological problems (1987 113). The effect of this is to relocate the woman in 'a place less threatening to patriarchy' (1987 122).

Rather than reading *Klute* as if the film were about Bree, it is more profitable to examine how the film text represents woman's subjectivity in and through the figuration of the character Bree. I make use of the term 'character' here to denote a specifically filmic formulation: the ensemble of character-effects generated through the narrative of the film as a whole. Unlike the novel, film as a specific signifying practice is generally less interested in the creation of 'rounded characters', but subordinates character to action. As the prime causal agent of the narrative, the character must be constituted as a bundle of qualities or traits that are consistent with each other and with the narrative function of the character (Bordwell et al. 13-14).

That the character is drawn with relatively few traits invites a 'filling out' of the character. A large part of spectatorial pleasure comes through the process of identification with characters, which fills them
out through that very process. That it can do so is made possible by the fact that they are not so filled out. In this process, the introduction of the character in the narrative is critical: the salient traits are indicated, frequently by another character's description, and the first appearance of the character confirms these traits as salient (Bordwell et al. 14).

The introduction of the figuration of the character Bree, then, is central to an understanding of the film's positioning of woman's subjectivity. This introduction takes place across three key sequences that establish Bree before she meets Klute in the film. It would therefore be useful to examine these sequences to determine the elements that Pakula uses to serve such purpose. They show Bree in public at an audition for a modelling job, in private on an assignment as a call-girl with a client, and alone in her apartment that evening and the following morning. Broadly, these sequences operate with a kind of telescoping effect, starting with her open (respectable) working life, narrowing down to her illicit working life (behind closed doors), and finally closing in on her isolation at home.

As the narrative delineates Bree's characterisation within the context of woman's working situation, it traces some of the contradictions operating through the power relations in these conditions. The sequence of Bree at home, however, shows changes that are significant in this respect. The following textual analysis looks at the way that this introductory figuration works to address a particular

15 I use the term sequence as a pragmatic sectioning of the narrative, and do not attempt to approximate any theoretical model.
spectatorial position: one that relates through identification with Bree to questions of women’s power.

Shot numbers (indicated with #) refer to the appended script.

MODEL AUDITION SEQUENCE (#36-38)

This is the fourth sequence in the film: it follows the two introductory sequences in the Gruneman home and the title sequence, with no apparent narrative continuity (other than the also unexplained woman’s voice over the titles) and with no explanation. The mise-en-scene breaks stylistically from what has preceded it: a brightly-lit, busy business environment, in stark contrast to the preceding muted, domestic opening sequences, and the darkness and clandestine intimacy suggested by the title sequence. This ‘breaking’ effect has a precedent in the contrast between the first and second sequences - Gruneman present and Gruneman absent - achieved also through the sudden change in lighting, colour and sound. This series of disjunctures operating between the first four sequences helps to announce the film as a thriller. Its resolution is prefigured by the lettering of the title as the word KLUTE is built up from a composite of triangles: Klute will provide our solution - but not without great anxiety, suggested by the music, a staccato series of notes running up and down the scale/spine.

But the shift from the third to the fourth sequence does more than indicate a change in mood: it signifies a shift in stylistic convention, out of the dark, low-key film noir style set up by the first
three sequences into a contemporary realist style, that opens the way for the political agenda of the film. This sequence establishes Bree in the narrative within the context of a particular social placement of women, thereby initiating the film’s space for the critique of patriarchal power relations.

The sequence has three shots: it opens (#36) with a long shot of a line of seated women. Above them on the wall are three large pictures of a woman’s face. Three people (two men and a woman) are standing to the left, inspecting the women. The man asks one of the seated women to stand. As she does so, it is evident that she is unusually tall. They move on, and she sits.

The three highly magnified images on the wall above is a play with scale that not only suggests the pictures as a fantasy to which the women are aspiring, it (the discrepancy in size) also clearly
activates the ongoing debate regarding representation of women. As Pakula himself has noted:

That scene with the models was ... an image of what is supposed to be ... It was also an artificial composition, taken flat on, an attempt to show a certain kind of pretension in that world, where image and reality are totally contrasted. (quoted in Milne 1972, 91-2)

The pictures themselves, with their embellishments, foreground the notion of image as synthetic product, as does the sequencing of negative and positive of the same image. The women, lined up on seats below, are reduced in scale and levelled to a repetitive sameness by their sitting position. This levelling works two ways: to reduce the women to sameness and to incorporate Bree into the group (see below). Within the stylistic shift mentioned above, from film noir to a contemporary realism, this juxtaposition of the gigantic images with the real women sets into play contemporary concern with issues of representation and power.

The second shot (#37) is a tracking shot down the line in close-up, showing four women in turn as each is scrutinised. Bree is the third of these. The advertising producers discuss various features of successive women -- eyes, hair, colouring, hands, smile -- and reject each woman in turn. This shot works to position the spectator in relation to the issues suggested in the previous shot through its parallel strategies in sound and image. The advertising agency producers exert power over the women both through the fact of their speaking, while the women are all but silent, and through what they say (see below). At the same time, the image, in its (literal) focus on the women, provides a locus for spectatorial identification with the effect of that domination.
The dialogue between the producers objectifies the women (by persistently referring to them in the third person), fragments them ("the hair", "the colouring"), and pronounces judgement on them ("too pretty", "quite exotic", "She's funny"). This assertion of power is supported by the producers' presence in and absence from the image. Their shapes loom, out of focus, framing each woman in turn, and at appropriate moments (as each is dismissed) occluding them. But the image includes their mid-bodies only, so their voices emanate from off-screen. Doane proposes that the voice-off functions to suggest a fictional space that exceeds the image (1986 340). If the voice-off thus 'validates both what the screen reveals of the diegesis and what it conceals' then this (partial) use of the voice-off, speaking oppressiveness, suggests a wider diegetic space with which those relations of oppression are co-extensive. Furthermore, their range of nonverbal responses shows the women disempowered through being deprived of speech: they are able to respond only by mimicking speech (silently mouthing 'my hair?'; 'hullo'), biting or pursing their lips, or smiling on command.
The close-up image works to locate identification for the spectator in the subjectivity of the women in terms of these relations of power. The action\textsuperscript{16} of this shot is structured around the fourfold

\textsuperscript{16} Bordwell et al. quote a 1924 guide to screenwriting on the distinction between
repetition of a pattern: a model's expectation followed by rejection. The close-up registers this 'outer expression of inner feelings' as the central action of the shot, and the spectator sympathises with the plight of the models against the callousness of the advertising producers.

The final shot (#38) of this sequence returns to a long shot, showing the women being dismissed. The women's rejection is recapitulated in the producers' awarding them a collective score of C-minus. As they file out, a new group -- all black women -- files in and is asked to sit. Their movement in single file suggests their cattle-like insignificance as individuals. The ejection of one line of women to the right to make way for a similar line of black women from the left is a further suggestion of the insignificance of individual models: each reduced to one of a herd-like group, each group easily replaceable by another.

The introduction of Bree into the narrative cannot be discussed without considering the entry of Jane Fonda, the star, into the film. John Ellis has written of the star as an institutional structure in mainstream film: a performer whose figure enters subsidiary forms of circulation and then feeds back into performance. The subsidiary forms of the star image -- in media, advertising endorsements, action and movement, in classical film: 'Movement is merely motion. Action is usually the outer expression of inner feelings' (15).

17 The subtle suggestion of cattle is in keeping with the discourse around the beauty industry that was a major focus of the women's liberation movement in the late 1960s. A demonstration at the 1968 Miss America Pageant in Atlantic City claimed to be first mass action by Women's Liberation [caption to photograph; "No More Miss America!" (anon.) in Morgan 282-3; 521-4 resp.].
merchandise -- offer elements of the star's person to the public, that in themselves are incoherent and incomplete, but serve as promise of the completed person in the film's performance. These elements (image in newspapers and magazines, voice on radio, words in print) will come together in the filmic presence, offering a completeness, but one that is virtual. In the subsidiary forms, the star is, paradoxically, at once ordinary and extraordinary, available for desire and yet unattainable. In film, where the image presents an absence that is present, these paradoxes are intensified. So what the star image really promises is cinema, that intensive experience of desire that is founded on presence-in-absence. While the star image is never complete, though, the film's fiction stabilises its incoherences and fixes a stable identity -- that of the fictional character -- for the duration of the film. This character may relate to the star image directly, by resemblance, or it may relate indirectly, by contradiction, or it may be 'to one side' of the star image. (91-108)

As a star presence in the film, then, Fonda brings with her an image, built around past roles and highly publicised offscreen activities, that has assumed a set of associations and is at least in part responsible for her casting in this particular film. Barbara Seidman traces the development of this high-profile image, from the rebellious starlet, to the sexual libertine associated with Roger Vadim, notably in Barbarella (1968), through her association with the anti-Vietnam War movement to her 'conversion' to feminism in the late 1960s (192-197). Fonda therefore brings to Klute a public image of notoriety derived

18 In this sense, the star image in subsidiary forms functions in a similar way to the narrative image, its very incompleteness providing an invitation to the fulfilment offered by the film, and hence an inducement to buy a ticket.
from her anti-establishment involvements, in particular her recently radicalised feminism. That image matches the engagement with emergent feminist politics to which, I argue, Klute aspires.

The first appearance of Bree in the film is therefore a complex interplay between star image and narrative requirements. Those elements of her star image that are invoked in the film as a whole (her nonconformism, outspokenness, feminist associations, acting pedigree) are initiated here, in order to be counteracted in accordance with the needs of the narrative at this stage. This sequence establishes her as one of a ‘chorus line’ of women who share the disempowerment of the system, yet it also makes her exceptional. In her first appearance (in #36), Bree shares the levelling of the seated models mentioned above, but is made more readily discernible by her central positioning, by her clothing (a grey outfit between two black-clad women) and by her movements (fixing her hair, nervous hand movements) next to their stillness. In #37, she is third in the series of four women auditioned: the first two to establish the pattern, the fourth to confirm that pattern in the wake of the threatened exceptionality of Fonda - an extension of the rule of three to accommodate such an addition. Bree’s response to her rejection (pursing her lips) suggests an outspokenness, while her

19 Seidman argues that Fonda’s politics are compromised by her skill at exploiting her star image, in that she always places herself at the centre of her analysis. This echoes Godard and Gorin’s celebrated criticism, in Letter to Jane (1972), of Fonda in a highly publicised photograph showing her in conversation with North Vietnamese victims of U.S. bombing; her appropriation of centrestage in antiwar propaganda places her within a tradition of metropolitan agitprop that serves to perpetuate relations of exploitation.

20 According to Seidman, Fonda chooses her feminist positions judiciously: ‘Fonda’s talent as a filmmaker rests upon her skillful manipulation of established Hollywood forms ... in order to explore and render “safe” those consequences of the women’s movement that have already begun to be felt by the popular consciousness’ (205-6).
direct gaze, in contrast to the downcast looks of the other models that have preceded her, is an indicator of her non-conformity which is endorsed by the interviewers’ response to her ("She’s funny"). Both have direct linkage with her star image, and make ready meaning in ‘filling out’ the character. The desire evoked by Fonda the star can only cause her dismissal to place the spectator further out of sympathy with the directors.

HOTEL ROOM SEQUENCE (#50 - 57)

A long shot (#50) of Bree walking towards the camera across a wet city plaza cuts to a silhouetted close-up of her in a call-box(#51). She makes an arrangement through a contact to meet a client. As she

21 This moment also provides the most striking example of Bree’s appropriation of the gaze, which is enacted elsewhere in moments such as putting on her eyelashes just before Klute enters her life. These moments recall Doane’s reference to glasses as signifier of woman’s transgressive active look (1982 82-3).
leaves the call-box a peal of bells sounds. The peal continues into the next shot (#52), and is repeated twice more as Bree walks towards the camera in a quieter street.

The scene shifts to a hotel room where she keeps the appointment with the client (#53 -57). Bree, through easy chit-chat and skilful encouragement, leads him to a deal that doubles her expected takings while she builds up his apparent confidence.

This, the second sequence featuring Bree, is separated from her first appearance at the modelling audition, by a sequence set in the Gruneman home in Tuscarora. This Tuscarora sequence signals a return to the detective genre and film noir style, in a number of ways. Its low-key lighting and mise-en-scene break with the harsh brightness of the advertising agency. The main business of the scene -- the initiation of Klute’s investigation -- has a strong generic structuration, as argued above. Crucially, the final shot of this sequence (#49) establishes Klute’s gaze, a close-up that will prove a dominant image in the film (see below). His gaze extends with Trask’s voice-over, into the next two shots of Bree in the city streets (#50-51). This voice-over narration is a distinctive film noir device that here, against the stated mission of finding Tom’s killer, indicates another defining characteristic of film noir -- the diversion of the investigation onto the woman.

22 Bordwell et al. list voice-over narration as one of the devices that mark film noir style as a challenge to classical technique: it is a means of unsettling the viewer by tracing the protagonist’s disorientated mental state (76). This observation is pertinent to a point in the film that marks Klute’s first direct link with Bree.
What follows fulfils this narrative promise: the sequence shows the investigatibility of Bree, by carrying the narrative into her illicit work life. While this potentially offers a doubling of the voyeuristic capability of cinema, this is countered by a switch back from the film noir style into the brightly-lit realist style established in the modelling audition sequence. Pakula has commented on the decision to use a real hotel room rather than a set, to force 'a sort of cinema verite photography' thereby creating a 'cold reality' for this exchange of sex for money (Milne 1972 91).

The resumption of this style returns the narrative to woman’s subjectivity and continues its association with issues of women and power, situating Bree’s work as a prostitute within these terms. But the competence she displays in this deal performs a direct reversal of the balance of power so graphically evoked in the audition sequence: instead of the earlier scenario of humiliation, Bree’s cool professionalism and skill in her encounter with the john show her in total control. The encounter is an exact enactment of her later detailed
description to her therapist of the attraction of being a call-girl (#97). This sequence, then, works as a reply to the humiliation of being powerless, summarised in Bree's later declaration: "When you're a call-girl, you control it" (#97).

APARTMENT SEQUENCE (#58 - 69)

The first shot of this sequence (#58) follows directly on from the previous sequence: Bree walking energetically along a crowded street, comfortable in the city environment, the success of her deal indicated by a conspicuously cheerful bunch of large yellow flowers and a smile to herself (her later statement "I always feel just great afterwards" in #98 will refer back to this moment). But the next shot (#59) of the front of her apartment building begins to unsettle that sense of repletion. Its dilapidation reiterates her straitened circumstances (recalling the line from the previous sequence: "I could use a quick fifty"), while the contrast between the visual shot of the "Buckley Funeral Home" sign and the soundtrack of children at play works to suggest the immanence of death in the city, and hints at the threat that underlies her life.

This hint is picked up on by the next shot (#60) showing Bree walking up the darkened passage into close-up. The sudden switch in sound, from street noise to silence, together with the lighting, signals another shift back into film noir style. Bree's selectively highlight eyes, large and nervously shifting as she looks up the stairs, signify fear that is explained by the music23 that begins halfway through the shot.

23 For the sake of convenience, I have designated this 'anxiety music'.
This, the narrative's first return to the title music, recalls the elements of the title sequence -- the tape recorder, hand and voice -- and links them to Bree's fear.

As she double-locks her door the anxiety music stops, the ensuing silence signifying the suspension of her sense of fear (#63). The next four shots show Bree running a bath, relaxing with a drink and a joint, reading in bed. It is worth tracing the operation of the camera, as site of primary identification for the spectator, in its structuring of the meaning of Bree's relaxing (##63 to 66).

The movement of Bree from close-up, redundantly indicating her relief by wiping her brow under the lampshade, into medium-long shot as she prepares her bath, gives the sense of her movement into aloneness in the rather empty space of her apartment.24 The soundtrack here is notable for its emptiness, emphasised by the echoing sounds of her activities.

24 Redundant is used here in the sense of textual reiteration of story information, made necessary by the speed with which film unfolds (Bordwell et al. 31).
Shot 64 is a long shot placing Bree in a red robe at the centre of a darkened room at a table where she lights two candles and switches off the light, throwing her surroundings into deeper obscurity, while she has a drink and smokes a joint. She sighs, there is a long pause, and then she begins to sing, a children’s thanksgiving hymn. The mise-en-scene, with Bree surrounded by darkness except for the comforting light of the candles, shows her isolating herself from the cares of her world, as does the soundtrack -- her sigh suggesting a shrinking off of the day’s cares and the pause (a lack of sound) providing an auditory equivalent of the dark space around her. Within this space she weaves a protective cocoon with emotional analgesics, candlelight and song. It is a moment of regression into a womb-like place of comfort, warmly red.

A cut to medium-close-up (#65) intensifies the sense of enclosure in the cocoon. But her comfort is not total: a nervous
movement of her fingers operates in tension with the soothing effects of the song. The slightly lower angle of this shot works to suggest a valorisation of Bree in her struggle against the world outside -- and inside her, as these shots clearly suggest. Her song at this point reiterates this idea ("And from the beginning the fight we were winning"). The ending of the song on the single word "divine" and the stillness that follows (a pause in while she gazes upwards, immobile, lit by the two candles) provide the moment in the film in which Bree is most intensely identified through religious iconography with the idea of salvation.
This intensity is released in the cut to Bree reading in bed (#66), with a radio playing jazz: it is an image of relaxation, with the sense of closeness sustained by the medium-close-up. As she reads Linda Goodman’s "Sun Signs" Bree smiles to herself and shakes her head in a gesture indicating recognition. The pleasure that is registered in this moment is enacted in her smile of recognition: the book reflects a gestalt that rounds off her sense of completeness. But the gestalt is an illusory image of completeness, and it is destroyed by the telephone call.

The meaning of these 3 shots (#64-66) is thus to frame the deceitfulness of this cocoon. From the long shot that separates Bree from the world and frames her regression, a move to medium close-up for the next two shots shows progressively the apparent achievement of her cocooned world. The camera’s movement back out of the close shot into long shot is a reversal of the prior inward movement, returning Bree to a figuration of isolation and fear. The repeat of the image of Bree in an encircling, tunnel-like frame of darkness signifies her powerlessness against the intrusion of the threat from outside, reiterated in the anxiety music that accompanies the camera’s retreat.
It is worth noting the iconography in these shots. The elements of comfort for Bree -- thanksgiving hymn, wrought-iron bedstead, patchwork quilt -- are icons of the late nineteenth century mid-West, a time and place that has been mythologised into what Peter Wollen, in his discussion of John Ford, identifies as an American Promised Land (97). Against her conscious protestations, defining Klute disparagingly in terms of rural backwardness, Bree’s regressive fantasies are rooted in that most conservative of traditions.

The sudden change in the next shot from the ‘tunnel’ of darkness to the bright skylight effects a break from the film noir back into realist lighting, but it carries traces of the unease of the previous shot. As we move down from the roof, the clear sound of Bree’s footsteps, detached from any sight of her, makes us eavesdrop before we voyeuristically peer into her kitchen. It is an unsettling moment, establishing a point of view that will later become identified with Cable. The next shot works hard to dispel this unease and ‘normalise’ Bree once more through a cinema verite-style recording of her morning activities: the hand-held camera captures moments of haste (licking cat-food from the fork, drinking her egg-nog straight from the mixer)

25 Pakula says of his attempt to counteract the expansiveness of Panavision: ‘For Bree’s apartment, George Jenkins originally designed three little rooms. I said let’s yank all that and just have a tunnel: I wanted her at the end of a tunnel’ (Milne 1972 91).

26 In Bree’s first encounter with Klute, she asks him for identification in a grossly exaggerated Southern drawl, a conventional signifier of the country bumpkin (#78). Later, in Central Park, when Klute hands over his tape recordings of her phone calls, she goads him with a parody of a rural view of city life: “Tell me Klute - did we get you a little? Huh? just a little - us city folk? The sin, the glitter, the wickedness? Huh?” (#234-5).
and the soundtrack emphasises discordant kitchen noises. This apparent artlessness characterises the scene as recognisable, familiar, real. Bree’s deft, assured movements around the apartment reconstitute her as in control of the space around her.

The moment of Klute’s arrival carries traces of the previous intrusion. Bree’s movement has ended at the mirror, in a long shot. Again, Bree is faced with a reflection of an image that is deceptively whole. And again, her figuration is one of isolation in a space. The harsh noise of the door buzzer cuts into that space, an echo of the telephone’s ring. It signals a return to the tension of the thriller mode that is immediately realised in the shadowy figure at the door.

These three sequences, then, function as a unit in introducing Bree into the narrative, up until the point where she meets Klute. There are several points to be made about the way that the film structures the figuration of Bree through these introductory sequences.

SUMMARY: THE FIGURATION OF BREE THROUGH GENRE

Firstly, the generic structuring of the terms of address: in distinct contrast to the film noir style of the detective thriller sequences that frame them, the first two of these sequences are marked as realist by their use of camera, lighting and sound. This realist style allows the figuration of Bree to be articulated as a nexus of women’s issues -- primarily around questions of work, representation and power. Both the work sequences -- the advertising agency audition and the encounter with the john in the hotel room -- involve the
commodification of woman's body, the former licit, the latter illicit, and both play on woman's image, linking soft and hard porn. Through its clear positioning of the spectator, the film establishes a discomfort with this commodification, and hence initiates a critique of woman's social and economic disempowerment.

But this clear generic distinction is not maintained in the third of these sequences, showing Bree in her apartment. In her home, in what Doane has termed the paradigmatic woman's space (1984 70), we home in on the 'real' Bree, and the generic boundaries shift. Cinema verite alternates with film noir. Both of these are styles of excess, and there is a sense in which the encroachment of film noir style onto the figuration of Bree elicits an opposition in the form of cinema verite's excessive reach for authenticity. But now the realism begins to serve a different purpose: although it continues the figuration (begun in the two work sequences) of a 'real' woman, with elements for identification drawn from contemporary women's conditions -- the apartment, "Sun Signs", cats, JFK -- the terms of that reality change from the women's issues of power and representation to Bree's incompleteness and need.

If, as argued above, the realist style has been used to create a potential space for the development of a feminist discourse, while the film noir style constrains the woman within generic conventions, then the encroachment of film noir onto the narrativisation of Bree is a crucial realignment of the figuration of the woman. From Klute's entry onwards, the subjectivity that is initiated in the early sequences finds articulation only in her voice in the sequences with the psychiatrist, and, powerful though these moments are, their narrative effectivity is
severely undermined by the strategies of the film that work against the subjectivity of woman.

BREE VERSUS THE IMAGE

The generic structuration of Klute is not the only such strategy: the image itself works to redefine the subject-effect that Bree’s monologues attempt to sustain. Mention has been made above of the strikingly close ‘fit’ between Bree’s accounts of her work as a call girl and the image’s enactment of that work in the hotel room sequence. A similar ‘fit’ occurs in the second session with the psychiatrist, working both retrospectively and forwards in the narrative (##371-377). Bree’s account to the psychiatrist matches what we have seen of her confusion about ‘the world’ she was ‘trying to get away from’, and her expression of despair is filled out by the image’s enactment of her words: as she expresses the wish to ‘be faceless, and bodyless, and be - left alone’, the words overlap the beginning of the next scene where we see her in silhouette, ascending in a lift-cage to the storage room where she and Klute are shown Jane McKenna’s effects. The echoing sound and pitch darkness of this storage room fill in the meaning of what Bree has hesitated to express directly, but what Jane McKenna’s absence becomes a sign for: annihilation through death. In the next psychiatric session, however, this ‘fit’ begins to slip as Bree’s words and the evidence of the image begin to diverge (##390-394). Her account of her feelings about Klute are in full accordance with the image until she talks about her feelings of anger towards Klute (as we watch her acceptance of his caresses), her wish to manipulate him (as we see him tracing the outline of -- defining -- her face) and her
declaration that 'It's easy to manipulate men, right?' (as the camera acts to incorporate him with her, moving with Bree to include Klute in the frame). Although the next psychiatric sequence (##416-420), in which Bree acknowledges her feelings for Klute, returns to a close fit with what has been seen to happen, its endorsement of Bree's feelings is closely followed by her own denial of these feelings to Klute: 'You're not going to get hung up on me are you?' (#423). This implies not that Bree is being defined by the text as unreliable as Gledhill claims (see below) but that Bree's moments of denial constitute a character trait with a narrative function. The closing scene with Bree finally capitulating to the feminine role of submission (#615 where she sits at Klute's knee while he grants her the benediction she has needed) consolidates this process of recuperating the characterisation from a progressive figuration to one that permits a classical closure.

Gledhill has noted the same points, but sees these as the image undermining the effectivity of Bree's voice as a film noir device (1987 123-4). I argue, rather, that because this establishment of the unreliability of Bree's voice takes place within the psychiatric sequences (that space in the film in which a female subjectivity is being fought for) it effects a shift in the figuration, adding this unreliability to the traits of her characterisation, and thus serving to recuperate Bree for 'normal' femininity. The effect is to undermine the very attempt at subjectivity that these parts of the film try earlier to achieve, as it collapses into a figuration that serves the requirements of the narrative, in its delineation of the resolved woman as dependent on a figure of reliability, the male hero. From the attempt at being a questor, Bree is returned to the role of princess.
The most striking example of male control through the image, however, is the prominence given to the image of Klute's face.27

Both the generic codes governing the film as detective thriller (as described above) and the cinematic structuring of the gaze as male (as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3) endorse the effectivity of the male gaze in its dominance over woman. From the moment this gaze is extended over Bree as object of investigation, (in #49-50 as discussed above), these generic and cinematic structurings prefigure an inevitable resolution of Bree's 'problem'.

In the light of this, it is worth giving some attention to a moment that holds a potential for the subversion of the male gaze by its destabilization of the image: that is, the masquerade.

27 A quantitative assessment is revealing: of the 106 close-up shots of Klute, 42 are related to him speaking or in interaction. The other 64 (i.e. about two-thirds of the total number) represent Klute in silent observation. More than 10% of the total number of shots in the film are devoted to Klute's gaze.
BREE AND THE MASQUERADE

Bree’s performance for Mr Goldfarb (Sequence 12) serves as a striking example of Doane’s designation of the Masquerade (see Chapter 3). Bree’s entrance (#106, 107, 108, 110) fits exactly Sylvia Bovenschen’s description of a performance by Dietrich: ‘we are watching a woman demonstrate the representation of a woman’s body’ (Doane 1982 82). Indeed, the resemblance is not coincidental: Pakula and his cameraman filmed it in deliberate imitation of Von Sternberg28.

But while the sequence is so compatible with the notion of masquerade as performance - ‘the sheer objectification or reification of representation’ - it demonstrates the very difficulty that Doane refers to

28 "There was an attempt to extend the picture stylistically in that scene.... Very early on in the picture I said to to Gordon Willis, "That entrance should be just like von Sternberg photographing Dietrich."” (Pakula in Milne 1972 91).
in her 1991 article "Masquerade Reconsidered". The earlier article, she writes, 'continually oscillates' between two conceptions of masquerade: one as a mode of representation (of women looking, performing), and the other as a facilitation of female spectatorship (1991 33). Based on Riviere's proposition that womanliness is a representation, she argues that foregrounding the representational nature of woman's image would dislocate the female spectator's identificatory closeness, instate a distance and thus provide a position of subjectivity for the female spectator. But the examples she cites (Riviere herself, Dietrich, the femme fatale) all suggest masquerade as a mode of representation, located in the performance itself.

The re-enactment of Dietrich in this sequence throws the problems raised by this concept into some relief. The representation is three-layered: Fonda playing Bree playing Dietrich. For the spectator, if the distanciation is not diffused through that three-tiered construct, it is surely going to be familiarised as style. As historical subject, the spectator recognises Dietrich in terms of a style close to camp or burlesque. In other words, the image stays intact as image, because any potential distanciations are recuperable as stylistic convention.

This brief analysis cannot hope to be inclusive of all the problems raised by Klute, but it has attempted to draw in some of the theoretical issues discussed in the chapters preceding this. The film's attempt to activate a female subject-position within the contemporary political terms of understanding, its address to the emergent feminist consciousness, relies on a generically-created space that is ultimately subverted by classical film noir's intensification of cinema's structuring of the gaze for the male.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The main conclusion I have reached in this study is that the current field of debate in and around film theory is both fertile and problematic, and that work in this relatively new discipline or area of study is still at a relatively preliminary stage in terms of academic disciplines. As Metz said long ago, 'It's because film is easy to understand that it's so difficult to explain'.

For this reason, Chapters 1 to 3 deal largely with a schematic account or overview of what I see as the trajectory of film theory with feminist concerns. I have tried to outline what I see as the major phases of this history: the establishment of a dominant film theory, that had strong parallels with literary theory in its concern with the work as art, up to the 1950s; the initiative of auteurism's break with dominant film theory in its consideration of film as popular culture, in the 1950s; the impact of the intellectual upheaval of the 1960s in which elements of theories of semiotics, ideology, psychoanalysis were incorporated into a film theory which relocated its focus in the text; the elaboration of apparatus theory in the 1970s to account for the desire that cinema elicits; the criticism of the apparatus's androcentricity by feminist theorists, and their responses of either rejection, or criticism and intervention in attempting to account for a female subject of the apparatus.
In trying to indicate some problematic theoretical concerns, particularly those related to theories of ideology, the image, identification, subjectivity, the feminine, I have drawn primarily on Althusser, Nichols, Berger, Wollen, Peirce, Lacan, Freud, Mulvey, Johnston, Doane, de Lauretis, Penley, Silverman and Rose. From the evidence of this survey, I can offer no firm conclusions, nor is it in the nature of this MA thesis to do so. My intent has been largely to survey the field in order to elucidate and explain its relations, and this has precluded conclusions as such.

Chapter 4 presents something of a case study for the concerns indicated in the previous chapters. It has allowed an exercising of many of the complex theoretical issues raised in the previous chapters: identification, subjectivity, female spectatorship. Working from the evidence of early reviews, and through a careful analysis of the film text itself, I have therefore attempted to position the terms of my argument to facilitate a clarification of these issues, which, however complex they may be, have to be faced if one is to work as a serious analyst and interpreter of even popular culture.

In this light, perhaps the most modest element of this work -- the 'total script' of the film -- may be of most use to other students of this difficult and demanding medium.
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--- 1984. "The "Woman's Film": Possession and Address". Doane et al. 67-82.


--- 1984. "Developments in Feminist Film Criticism". Doane et al. 18-45.


Riviere, Joan. 1986 (1929). "Womanliness as a Masquerade". Burgin et al. 35-44.


Chapter 4 of this thesis takes the film Klute as a text for analysis. The difficulties of discussing a filmic text are not easily overcome, but a transcript of the film would seem to be a basic necessity. As I could not locate a script of Klute, I have had to make my own transcript from video.

A major problem here was the discrepancy between the dimensions of Panavision and of the television screen. This became evident when comparing 2 different video versions. Both image and editing varied considerably: one version tried to overcome the tv frame's limitations by cutting from one region of the original image to another. I chose to use the less cut version, in order to retain the editing of the original, but often at the cost of coverage.
The script that follows is divided into 4 columns:-

Column 1 numbers each shot, and these numbers are used for reference in Chapter 4.

Column 2 gives the length of each shot, in seconds.

Column 3 summarises the most significant elements of the image.

Column 4 incorporates 3 sound tracks:

- dialogue
- noise, natural or diegetic sound* indicated by [ ]
- music (non-diegetic) indicated by { }

* While the film track is never silent, I have used [silence] in preference to [room sound] where this is appropriate to the meaning-effect at that point.
**SCRIPT OF KLUTE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHOT</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>VISUAL</th>
<th>SOUND TRACKS:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>7s</td>
<td>Small tape recorder among other items</td>
<td>[diegetic sound &amp; music] (non-diegetic music) speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>6s</td>
<td>C-U: Tom's face, smiling, serving himself</td>
<td>[noise continues]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>2s</td>
<td>C-U: Holly Gruneman smiling to left</td>
<td>[noise continues]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>15s</td>
<td>M-S: right end of long table, 4-5 people visible, flowers and leafy garden in background, pan to left</td>
<td>[noise continues]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>15s</td>
<td>C-U Klute and half of woman's head masking his (out of focus). He looks down, smiling, nibbles food on fork</td>
<td>[noise continues under:] HOLLY: Tom ... Tom!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>3s</td>
<td>C-U Tom silently smiles to right, looks down, takes drink, mouths something inaudible</td>
<td>[noise continues]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>3s</td>
<td>C-U Holly in profile, holds up glass, nods firmly and smiles</td>
<td>[noise continues]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>5s</td>
<td>C-U Tom drinks, lowers glass, looks right and smiles</td>
<td>[noise continues]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>3s</td>
<td>C-U Holly drinks, puts glass down, smiles to left</td>
<td>[noise continues]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>4s</td>
<td>C-U empty chair-back, dark wood on dark background</td>
<td>(pause) LT. TRASK: Did you know the subject, Thomas Gruneman? KLUTE: Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>2s</td>
<td>C-U Holly looking down, seated on similar chair, dark background. Looks up</td>
<td>LT. TRASK: Very well?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>6s</td>
<td>C-U Klute in blue uniform</td>
<td>KLUTE: He was my best friend ... um ... we grew up together LT. TRASK: Can you er account for his disappearance in any way? ... Mrs Gruneman?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>13s</td>
<td>M-S table, darkness, half figure on left, man's back to camera, Klute in same position as in previous sequence. Pan to right end of table, Holly in same position</td>
<td>HOLLY: No. LT. TRASK: Did he appear to be agitated in any way?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. 13s C-U back of Cable, turns to profile, looking right

15. 2s C-U Lt. Trask

16. 5s C-U b&w photograph of Tom Gruneman, frame showing on right

17. 7s C-U Holly head tilted, looking left
   head lifts
   shakes head

18. 4s C-U Klute looking left

19. 3s C-U Holly
   Looks left, frowns

20. 2s C-U Klute looks right

21. 2s C-U Holly

22. 10s M-S Trask, Klute, Holly at table

23. 7s C-U Lt. Trask breathes in, looks down

24. 5s C-U Klute looking left

25. 9s C-U Holly leans forward, swallows

26. 3s C-U Klute, looking left then right

27. 14s C-U Holly, mouth pursing, reaches forward, looking down. Looks up, grim smile
   Looks left, shakes head

HOLLY: No.

Lt. TRASK: Er ... Mr Cable, at the plant, did he voice any grievance or, er, discontent about his work there?
CABLE: No, not at all, as a matter of fact Tom operated best when he was under pressure.
LT. TRASK: Please forgive me, Mrs Gruneman, but I er ... have to ask. Did he, er, your husband
did he ever show any ... er, er, moral or
sexual problems or peculiarities ...
HOLLY: No ... no.
LT. TRASK: Any marital problems?
HOLLY: We were very happy.
LT. TRASK: Did he ever mention specifically a girl or a woman
in New York City?
HOLLY: No.
KLUTE: No.
HOLLY: Why?
LT. TRASK: We recovered in his
desk at the plant in one of the drawers
letter, a typewritten letter, that was
evidently written on the Friday before he disappeared.
It was written to a ... girl in New York City and ... we contacted the police
they brought her in, questioned her and
and she said that she had received six
or seven letters of this type.
HOLLY: Can I see it?
LT. TRASK: Well, it's er, it's an obscene
letter, Mrs Gruneman
HOLLY: I would like to see it
[diegetic sound]
LT. TRASK: I would like you to remember that it was written by a very
disturbed man.
HOLLY: I don't believe it.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>8s</td>
<td>C-U Klute looking down, looks left, down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>4s</td>
<td>C-U Holly looking left, shaking head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>9s</td>
<td>M-S table with 3 seated Holly looks down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>2s</td>
<td>C-U photograph of Tom Gruneman, frame on right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>53s</td>
<td>Dark screen CREDITS in red on rhs Hand on left with silver box, puts it down, opens it to show a tape player: &quot;AN ALAN J. PAKULA PRODUCTION&quot; plug in from rhs: &quot;JANE FONDA&quot; remote switched on: &quot;DONALD SUTHERLAND&quot; reels start turning: &quot;KLUTE&quot; Zoom in on switch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>23s</td>
<td>BREE: Has anybody, er, talked to you about the financial arrangements? It depends naturally on how long you want me for, and, what you want to do... (laughs) ... I know you. It would be very nice ... um, well - I'd like to spend the ... the evening with you if it's - if you'd like that. (Laughs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>19s</td>
<td>C-U side view of tape turning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>18s</td>
<td>top view of tape and lead</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LT. TRASK: I'd like you to know that situations of this kind are not unique, Mrs Gruneman. A man will lead a a ... a double life, a Jeckyll and Hyde existence and his wife has no idea what's going on.

[silence]

{Anxiety music, continues over credits}

Have you ever been with a woman ... before? ... a favour? You like it? I mean I have a feeling that that turns you on very particularly. What turns me on is because I have a good imagination and like ... pleasing. Do you mind if I take my sweater off? I think in the confines of one's house one should be free of clothing and inhibitions.

Oh inhibitions are so nice because they're so nice to overcome (laughs). Don't be afraid ... I'm not ... as long as you don't, er, hurt me more than I like to be hurt - I will do anything you ask. You should never be ashamed of things like that.

I mean, you mustn't be ... you know, there's nothing wrong - nothing is wrong. I think the only way that any of us can ever be happy is to ... is to let it all hang out - you know, do it all ...and ... fuck it.
36. 9s

hand enters right and switches off
(fade out with music)

L-S 3 large pictures (negative blue and
positive red images of woman's head)
over a line of seated women. 2 agents
(male and female) with male assistant
pass left to right down line

A woman stands. She is noticeably tall.
They move on.

37. 42s

C-U Blonde woman with large picture
behind. Pan with 2 agents in foreground
(waist level)
She smiles, removes hat (mouths: My
hair?)

2 figures almost cut her out

pan to next woman

Her face falls, she looks down
Pan to Bree
Bree raises hands,
purses mouth
F/Agent turns away for aside
Pan to next woman who mouths 'hullo'

She holds out hands, smiles

pan to next model

{music fades}

FEMALE AGENT: Hi - would you stand
up please?

MALE AGENT: Hi. Can I see your eyes?
Let me - let me see the hair. Take your
hair... er, your hat off.
Okay

F/AGENT: Too pretty
M/AGENT: Too pretty
ASSISTANT: Too pretty
M/AGENT: She's... quite exotic
F/AGENT: Now that's a good colouring...

M/AGENT: The colouring - the colouring
is great. Yeah... I dunno
F/AGENT: It's not quite it...
M/AGENT: No, no...
M/AGENT: Hullo. Can I see your hands?
Hmm...
F/AGENT: Thank you
(aside) She's funny...

Hi!

M/AGENT: She is - great!
Beautiful eyes.
F/AGENT: Yes - that's the colouring.
M/AGENT: Yes... let me see your smile
F/AGENT: I think she has that cross
between...

M/AGENT: ...but I've seen you before.
Have you done any cosmetic ads?
MODEL: Yes I have...
F/AGENT: You have?
M/AGENT: A conflict! How...
F/AGENT: It's got to be a new face...
Call that agency. Irene...
M/AGENT: How can... a conflict
F/AGENT: ... Dunn would have had it.
M/AGENT: That would be perfect
L/S Line of models seated with 3 agents on rhs. Third large picture shows, b&w negative Assistant gestures them out to right They rise and file out to right Black women file in from left, to occupy vacant seats

That's it. Thank you ladies

[Footsteps, voices of agents]

F/AGENT: Thank you.

[Footsteps, voices of agents]

M/AGENT: Hi. Would you ladies just have a seat, please.

CABLE: It's been 6 months. Tom Gruneman's been missing for half a year. And all the FBI has to offer is a report that must bore even you.

LT. TRASK: There are ... thousands of honest, decent men who simply disappear every year.

CABLE: Neither Mrs. Gruneman nor I he looks left are willing to just dismiss this case.

Therefore we feel entitled to investigate on our own.

LT. TRASK: You're entitled. Er, there are some very competent, er ... CABLE: John Klute offered us his services and we've accepted. Klute knew Tom, and he has a great many ideas about the case.

2ND DET: Have you ever done any missing persons work before?

KLUTE: No.

LT. TRASK: Have you spent any time in the city?

KLUTE: No.

LT. TRASK: Well speaking frankly ... CABLE: You're wondering why we thought of him. Frankly ... he's interested. And he cares.

Why didn't you ever find out anything from that girl?

2ND DET: We held her under surveillance, expecting your boy Gruneman to show up there. He didn't.

We arrested her on a CP charge, convicted, 2 months women's city prison. Offered to reduce sentence, she co-operated. And she thought she remembered Gruneman from those letters from before. She made that
connection. But she hadn't seen him since then and couldn't identify his photograph. A good call-girl, she'll turn 6 or 700 tricks a year. Faces get blurred. And since then she's reported several incidents like breather calls, anonymous phone calls. Also somebody may be following her, watching her - things like that. So I guess it's conceivable that Gruneman's still around there, bugging her.

**BREE:** Hey Trina, Bree! ... Yeah, listen I could use a quick fifty - you got a commuter for me? ... Terrific ... Yeah, Right. Terrific. Yeah, 'bye. [peal of church bells]

She hangs up, bends down, picks up things and leaves.

**52. 10s** L-S Street, dark shadow of building in background. Bree emerges from shadow, walking towards camera. People cross. Bree walks into camera. [peal of church bells]

**53. 14s** C-U white door Man (back to camera) approaches door, opens it into darkness. Bree emerges, smiles. She enters, walks left [3 knocks]

**BREE:** Hi, I'm Bree. **MAN:** Yeah, er, come in. I'm - glad to know you, Bree. I'm glad you could come. Sit down, please. **BREE:** Where are you from? **MAN:** Uh - can I get you a drink? **BREE:** Yeah, I'd like a ginger ale, thank you. **MAN** (off!): I'm from Chicago [sounds of making a drink] **BREE:** Come to New York often? **MAN** (off!): Often? No ... I don't come to New York too often. **BREE:** That's too bad **MAN** (off!): 2 or 3 times a year maybe.

She primps her hair.

**54. 26s** M-S Bree against light Camera pans with her sitting, he moves offscreen left

**BREE:** What kind of a party did you hav in mind? **MAN:** Uh, we could have a nice half and-half party for 50. **BREE:** We could have a good time for 50. Or, if you wanted something extra, it would be a little more.
Bree leans across his shoulder
He closes his eyes
he whispers in her ear

Pan to C-U on Bree
Pan to C-U on Man

He looks down
He looks up, pleased smile

56. 68s  M-S  Bree puts money in purse, puts purse aside, turns to man.

Is this the bed?
MAN: This is the bed.
BREE: Very nice ... very nice.

Bree stands, crosses to I C-U, removes clothes. He undoes bed in M-S, turns to her and stops, stares. Bree crosses r, out of frame, he watches her agape. She comes in frame from r, embraces him

kisses him
Bree pulls him down out of frame

57. 12s  DISSOLVE TO C-U Bree on l, back of man's head on r
She looks at her watch over his shoulder

MAN: (squeals)
BREE: Oh my angel, oh my angel.
Oh...

58. 9s  L-S Street: Bree approaches from distance, carrying yellow flowers

[street sounds, traffic]

59. 6s  L-S down onto pavement, staircases of tenement building l. Bree walking with flowers, turns in, climbs stairs. Camera pans with her, revealing lit sign "BUCKLEY FUNERAL HOME"

[street sounds continue, children's voices]
60. 7s M-S Door from inside: Bree enters in silhouette, flowers distinct. Approaches into C-U, large eyes looking up  
   {anxiety music, reprise of title music}
61.  7s M/L-S up dark stairs, cream-yellow door at top. Bree trots up stairs in silhouette, turns r at landing  
   {anxiety music continues}
62. 13s M/L-S Passage: dark. Bree enters from l, looks l 7 r, walks quietly up passage into C-U, unlocks door on r, goes through and closes door  
   {anxiety music continues}
63. 19s C-U/M-S Bree in silhouette inside door. She locks it twice, crosses room into C-U, wipes brow. Camera fixes under lightshade, she moves into M/L-s, begins to undress, switches light on in background, bathroom lit, she runs bath  
   (music stops)
   [click of locks]
   [very quiet except for sounds of activities]
64. 49s L-S Dark, table lit by overhead light. Bree sits in red robe, rubbing her brow, with drink in one hand, joint in the other. She lights 2 candles, switches off light, puts feet up on table, exhales, sips drink, takes 2 draws.  
   [very quiet except for sounds of activities]
   Long pause.
   BREE: (sings) We gather together to ask the Lord's blessing, He hastens and changes his wisdom divine
   And from the beginning the fight we were winning ... Lord be at our side (hums and inhales) ... divine  
   (pause)
   [Noisy jazz music]
65. 17s M-S Bree with 2 candles
66. 67s C-U/M-S Bree in bed with big book (woman's picture on back cover), smiles, shakes head as she turns page. Book tilts to show title: "SUN SIGNS".
   Looks up to left
   Closes book marking place with flap
   switches off radio
   Switches off light, lies down, covers ears with arms, then lies down.
   Pause
   Her eyes open wide.
   She picks up the receiver
   Puts receiver down rapidly. She sits in bed, clutching her sides.
   Camera pulls back.
   She shuts eyes, opens them and stares ahead, as she and phone recede
   MAN'S VOICE ON RADIO: (gong) It's 12 midnight. This is Jim Donnelly, WNEW News. Con Edison has again resorted to a cutback in voltage to conserve generating capacity, and represent the ...
   [click, then silence]
   [Telephone ring]
   BREE: Hello ... hello!
   {Anxiety music starts}
   [Telephone ring]
67. 5s  C-U Skylight from outside in daylight:  
    pan down to window, Bree moving about below inside  
    [footsteps]

68. 30s  M-S Bree in kitchen, camera moves with her to liquidiser, fridge, catbowl: she  
    licks cat-fork, looks at watch, back to fridge, mixes egg-nog, switches off,  
    drinks from mixer; moves into C-U, passes through r to mirror. JFK prtrait  
    on wall, reflected in mirror. She starts to put on eyelashes.  
    [natural sound]

69. 19s  L-S Bree turns head, freezes at mirror till  
    [door buzzer...]
    buzzer stops  
    leaves mirror, circles on tiptoe, pauses,  
    approaches door into C-U, looks through peephole  
    [... door buzzer]
    (stops)  
    [door buzzer]

70. 2s  C-U chin out of focus, lit in centre of dark screen. Face comes down  
    BREE: Who is it?

71. 5s  M-S Bree at door (from behind)  
    KLUTE: Miss Daniel, my name is Klute, John Klute? I'd like to talk to you.  
    BREE: Whaddaya want?  

72. 2s  C-U Klute from behind, in silhouette  
    against panes of light of the door  
    [click of door unlocking]

73. 4s  C-U door opens slightly, Klute's face in opening, Bree's head r  
    BREE: You said that.  
    KLUTE: I'm an investigator. I'd like to ask you some questions about  

74. 8s  C-U opening of door, Bree's face in opening, Klute's r  
    Bree smiles, shakes head, looks Klute up and down  
    Tom Gruneman  
    BREE: Who?  
    KLUTE: Tom Gruneman? He wrote you some letters.  
    BREE: Wow.  
    KLUTE: He was a research engineer at the Tuscarora Laboratory  

75. 4s  C-U opening of door, Klute's face, Bree r  
    ... in Pennsylvania? He disappeared from there last December and I've been hired  
    to look for him.  

76. 1s  C-U opening, Bree's face less sure, Klute l  
    BREE: Why!?  

77. 3s  C-U opening Klute's face only (closer)  
    KLUTE: You know what I'm talking about, Miss Daniel.  

78. 6s  C-U opening, Bree smiles, Klute l  
    BREE: Honest?  
    KLUTE: Can I ask you some questions please?  
    BREE: (exaggerated Southern drawl) Do you hi-yave any identification?
79. 4s  C-U opening, Klute looks down, holds up card.

80. 11s  C-U opening, Bree looks down

You’re not a cop? You’re not FBI?
You’re a private detective. And you just want to ask me some questions.
KLUTE: Right.

She smiles broadly.

81. 2s  C-U opening, Klute’s face, smiles

82. 1s  C-U opening, Klute, door shuts in his face

[click of lock]

83. 1s  C-U back of Klute in silhouette against panes of door.

[click of lock]

84. 3s  C-U Klute I, turns from door towards camera, moves off l.

85. 3s  C-U Bree coming through glass-panelled door, in sunglasses. She looks r & l, closes door.

[Street sounds, traffic]

86. 3s  Mil-s Street. Bree trots down steps, into bright sunlight, along pavement r

[Street sounds, traffic]

87. 10s  L-S Bree walks towards camera on b&w checkered pavement, crosses camera l to r. As she passes out of frame Klute comes in from l, following her

[footsteps fade out]

[different footsteps fade in faintly]

88. 10s  C-U hands on black briefcase

Briefcase lowered, revealing agent

BREE: They’re not very recent. That’s ... last year.
AGENT: Oh - they’re quite good. Mm-hm, mm-hm.
Tell me, what have you done that I might have seen on Broadway or

89. 11s  C-U Bree, looking r

off-Broadway?

BREE: Well, I study with - er - with George Taylor...
AGENT: George.
BREE: Yeah.
AGENT: Uh, George is very good, he’s a good man, a good man to begin with ...
BREE: And er I’ve been in 2 of his productions - workshop productions.
AGENT: Workshop.

90. 35s  M-S Bree l, Agent r at table with Chinese lion base

Well! They’re very nice, very nice. Tell me, how do you feel about being an actress?
BREE: Oh I like it very much.
AGENT: Do you think you know yourself?
BREE: As much as anybody, I guess.
AGENT: Do you really know yourself?
he touches executive toy on table

he touches her fringe

91. 10s C-U Bree, turned I, smiles briefly, turns r and looks anxious, bites lip. Bree takes briefcase, moves off I, leaving wallpaper

92. 2s C-U wall, children's drawings of people

93. 7s C-U Bree in suede jacket, ribbed jersey. Looking down, then up Bree nods slightly, psych's head r, out of focus

94. 2s C-U Psych.

95. 7s C-U Bree

coming here all this time and I've been paying you all this money and why do I still want a trick, why do I still ... walk by a phone and want to pick up the phone and call?

96. 7s C-U Psych

97. 80s C-U Bree

BREE: No ... I ...
AGENT: It's very important.
BREE: I forget myself when I act.
AGENT: No - you can't forget yourself, you can't. You have to ... know yourself and ... kind of like yourself. You have to relate - relate to people
BREE: Mm
AGENT: You see, I had an identity crisis 2 years ago and since then I've been working to know myself. It's very important. Very.
Don't hide your face, you know. You've a nice face
{Buzzer} you shouldn't hide it. 'Scuse me just a second (groans).

PSYCHIATRIST: How are you today?

BREE: (pause} I'm not going to be able to come back anymore.
PSYCH: Oh, I'm sorry.
BREE: 'Cause I just can't afford it.

PSYCH: Did I fail you, Bree?
BREE: Well I mean I've been

PSYCH: Did you think I had some magic potion? You'd come in and tell me whatever your problem was and I'd just take it away. What's

what's the difference between going ou on a call as a model or as an actress and as a call-girl? You're successful as a call-girl. You're not success...
BREE: Because when you're a call-girl you control it, that's why. Because - someone wants you - not me. I mean there are some johns that I have regularly that want me - that's terrific. But they want a woman ... and I know I'm good ... and I arrive at their hotel or their apartment ... and ... they're usually nervous which is fine because I'm not - know what I'm doing - and for an hour
for an hour I'm the best actress in the world, I'm the best fuck in the world ... and ...

PSYCH: Why do you say you're the best actress in the world? At that time.
BREE: Well, because it's an act. That's what's nice about it. You don't have to feel anything, you don't have to care about anything. You don't have to like anybody - you just ... lead them by the ring in their nose in the direction they think they want to go in, and you get a lot of money out of them in as short a period of time as possible and ... uh ... you control it and you call the shots ... and ... I always feel just great afterwards.

PSYCH: And you enjoyed it?
BREE: No.

PSYCH: Why not? You said there's nothing wrong with it. Why not? you said -
BREE: Well there's a difference - I mean I don't think there's anything wrong with it, er ... morally. I didn't enjoy it physically. I ... I came to enjoy it because it made me feel good. It made me feel ... uh ... (sighs) that I had some control over my life - that I, uh ... that could determine things for myself.

Oh I don't know ... I don't know why I'm here.
It's just so silly to think that somebody else can help anybody. (silence)
[street sounds]

BREE: (phone distortion) I could come over tonight. Are you alone? ... In about an hour. Okay. See you in an hour.
[click of phone being replaced, still distorted]

[metallic clanking]

[switch sound]
[music - repeated phrase, romantic]
He looks up

106. 5s L-S Dark passage, lighting shows shelves, dummies on lhs, lit column in foreground. Figure moving towards camera from distance. [romantic music continues]

107. 5s M-S camera tracks with Bree in gleaming sheath dress, moving I to r against background of mirror, past dummies etc. [music continues, with balalaika strain]

108. 8s M-S Bree crosses r to I into C-U, face lit red, gleaming make-up. Stops. [balalaika music continues]

109. 1s Mr Goldfarb leaning on desk, looking up, smiles. [balalaika music continues]

110. 2s extreme C-U Bree GOLDFARB: Bree ...

111. 19.1s M-S Goldfarb. Bree crosses in front of camera, blocking view, then approaches Goldfarb from I. He kisses her hand, hands her a drink, takes his, clinks glasses. [balalaika music]

... you look beautiful.
(chuckles)
Enjoy.
BREE: It's good to see you again.
GOLDFARB (chuckles) Likewise.
BREE: I just got back from Cannes, you know ... and ... I have something rather exciting to tell you.
GOLDFARB: Yes?
BREE: Cannes was very amusing. We played baccarat. And a very nice little Italian marquis was rather enthusiastic about me.
GOLDFARB: Mm
BREE: But a young man can be so silly.
GOLDFARB (laughs)
BREE: And then one night at the gambling tables - I saw him. A stranger who was looking at me. He was standing very still on the other side of the table. His eyes were looking right into me. And I knew, for the first time in my life
GOLDFARB: Please -
BREE: Not young - he wasn't young. He had grey sideburns ... actually he looked rather like you.
GOLDFARB: Yes? (laughs)
BREE: No-one could tell me who he was. Was he an exiled prince or mercenary? But there was a feeling stirring inside me, a pagan feeling. The next day on the beach in my beach pavilion - it was so warm, on the sand, and I saw him again. He was staring at...
She crosses r to l
She slips right shoulder of her dress down, crosses l to r, pulls right sleeve down
She pulls l sleeve down
She moves r to l
She runs her hands down her body
L-S Same scene, more distant, with lamp and his head highlit

112 1s
S Same scene, more distant, with lamp and his head highlit

113. 5s
C-U Klute, looking ahead, turns l with grimace, leaves frame

114. 5s
M-S street at night, taxi draws up, Bree emerges. Pan with Bree r, Klute approaches her from camera.

115. 2s
M/C-U Klute in silhouette

116. 6s
C-U Bree walks towards him, into camera, pauses, looks l and r

117. 1s
C-U Pictures and notes on red wall, Tom Gruneman’s photograph, mug shots of Bree

118. 2s
C-U upright tape recorder

119. 15s
C-U back of Bree’s head. She turns to camera

Bree: You bastard.

120. 11s
L-S street on r, back of man’s head l, looking through bars across street. Bree and Klute emerge from his basement, lower r, cross to steps lower l, up stairs, flashes of reflected light as door opens and shuts twice as each enters.

{anxiety music}

121. 15s
C-U pan Bree crosses l to r in her apartment. She turns to camera as she takes off coat, revealing shiny dress. Klute enters frame at l, out of focus. Bree crosses to r, opens fridge.

Bree: Have a seat.

Would you like some wine? some beer?
KLUTE: No thank you. BREE: I don’t have any beer anyway.

BREE: You know I’ve already told the police everything I know. I don’t even remember the schlub.

[silence]

KLUTE: What else do you remember about the man who beat you up?
BREE: Nothing. Except that he wasn’t kidding, that’s all. See, er ... usually it’s a fake-out. You probably know about that. They pretend to tie you up and you wear a dress with a cloth belt and they pretend to whip you - What the hell, it’s their money, I don’t care. I’ll swing from the shower rod and whistle Maytime. Except, er, this guy really freaked out over it.

KLUTE: But you cannot identify this man as Tom Gruneman.

BREE: I can’t identify him as anybody!

(pause)

So ... is that it? ...

Listen, er ... why don’t you go downstairs - you have such a nice mouth ... and get those tapes and bring them back up here and we’ll have a party - you and I. Wouldn’t that be nice?

KLUTE: What about afterwards? about the telephone calls?

BREE: Just phone calls, right? What is it - the phone rings, you answer, there’s nobody there - kids getting their kicks, burglars finding out if there’s nobody there - it happens all the time in New York. It doesn’t - mean anything.

KLUTE: You reported that you had been followed.

BREE: Look I’m sorry - urn ...

I’ve been ... leading everybody astray. It doesn’t, er ... Yeah okay I get these feelings, but they’re just feelings - that’s just me. Oh I’m sure you’ll find this amusing - but I’m - afraid of the dark or um sometimes I get spooked, I think I see people, hear things. Or like I go out in the morning and I think somebody’s been prying open my mailbox. Or if there’s trash in front of my door I think somebody’s trying to freak me out. It doesn’t - it’s just nerves, I’m a nervous broad, it doesn’t mean anything.

Bree Daniels ... How is Ted? Yeah ...

(laughs) thank you. Thank you very very much. Um ... I’d love to.
Maybe the next time you’re in town? I’d like to meet you very much. You have a nice voice.

I … actually I’m having a conversation with a very nice cop. He’s not a cop, actually, he’s a private de-

puts phone down, looks!

KLUTE: Is that how you get most of your dates, somebody gives your name to somebody else?
BREE: Most of them, yeah.
KLUTE: And … that how you met the man who beat you up?
BREE: I don’t remember – it was two years ago, god.
KLUTE: Well how else do you get dates – pimps?

KLUTE: The police have given me a list of names. I’d like to ask you about them. Frank … Ligourin

BREE: Oh, you’re very square, cookie … no, pimps don’t get dates they just take your money.

KLUTE: What about this evening - the old man?

BREE: Look I’m sure this is going to amuse you too, but I’m really trying to get away from all that.

KLUTE: What about this evening - the old man?

BREE: (pause) You saw that?

Goddamn you!

He’s seventy years old. His wife is dead. He’s been cutting garments since he was fourteen. He’s maybe in his whole life had one week’s vacation, and I’m al he’s got. And he never lays a hand on me. What harm is there in that? And what’s your bag, Klute? What do you like – you a talker - a button freak - like to have your chest walked around with high-heel shoes? Maybe you’d like to have us wash your tinkle? Or do you ge it off wearing women’s clothes? Goddamn hypocrite squares!

KLUTE: Okay.

[silence]
Oh my, I hope this isn't going to make my cold any worse.
KLUTE: Now tell me about Frank Ligourin.
BREE: He was my old man. We broke up.
KLUTE: When? When did you break up?
BREE: About eight months ago.

KLUTE: Would you mind not doing that?

BREE: What?
KLUTE: Okay?
BREE: Tsk. Well, I thought I could trade you for those tapes. Doesn't it get lonely down there in your little room? Or maybe I can bring you some friends. I've got some terrific friends.

KLUTE: No thank you.

BREE: Men have paid 200 dollars for me and here you are turning down a freebie. You could get a perfectly good dishwasher for that.

[pause, then creaking]

[anxiety music starts] [creaking]

[anxiety music]

[anxiety music]

[anxiety music]

[anxiety music louder]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sound Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>163. 1s</td>
<td>C-U dark, dimly-lit cover closing r</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164. 3s</td>
<td>C-U iron ladder, feet then legs descending</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165. 2s</td>
<td>C-U cover slightly ajar, small light at centre of opening moves slightly</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166. 1s</td>
<td>L-S roof, dark. Klute with torch walking r, camera tracks l</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167. 2s</td>
<td>very C-U cover closing, light goes off</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168. 5s</td>
<td>dark screen, torch flashes l revealing lid being opened, torch shone down opening</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169 2s</td>
<td>C-U Klute dimly lit, looking down, moves down offscreen</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170. 2s</td>
<td>M-S Klute descending into opening</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171. 6s</td>
<td>C-U ladder on l, legs descending, jump down, head comes up, Klute silhouetted in profile, looks r, l, r</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172. 8s</td>
<td>C-U stair railings, dimly lit. Klute passes l to r silhouetted, turns and descends in M-S, holding gun up</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173. 1s</td>
<td>C-U torch light into camera</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174. 17s</td>
<td>M-S through glass-paned door, Klute on other side approaches door, struggles to open it, door opens. Pan to r with Klute in silhouette, through another door</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175. 3s</td>
<td>L-S down stairway, out-of-focus movement in foreground</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176. 10s</td>
<td>C-U from above, dark, red lighting on r, Klute descends into darkness, moves faster</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177. 13s</td>
<td>C-U dark, beam of light shows clothing l, hanging on beam. Camera pans r rapidly, then l, then r, fixes on door handle</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178. 2s</td>
<td>C-U Klute r, mouth open, closes</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179. 3s</td>
<td>Very C-U door handle</td>
<td>{anxiety music very loud}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180. 3s</td>
<td>C-U dark door on l</td>
<td>{anxiety music v. loud}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181. 4s</td>
<td>C-U Klute r, torch at bottom Klute swallows</td>
<td>{anxiety music}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KLUTE: Tom.
182. 2s very C-U door handle  
183. 5s L-S dark, Klute r, torch beam across screen  
184. 3s very C-U door handle  
185. 2s C-U Klute r, looking l, starts moving, turns suddenly  
186. 6s L-S stairway, light comes up into C-U  
187. 8s M-S Klute in silhouette enters l with gun, moves r, stands in silhouette in front of closed door. Pauses. Kicks  
188. 4s M-S down onto 3 junkies on floor. They look up  
189. 1s L-S People on floor, Klute  
190. 3s M-S Klute at door-frame l. He looks down, mouth open. Pockets gun  
191. 8s M-S Bree from behind opening door. Klute enters  
192. 22s M-S/C-U Klute looks down, turns l  
193. 4s C-U to M-s Klute's back walking away from camera into apartment  
194. 2s C-U Bree looking r  
195. 2s dissolve, pan across apartment to iron bedstead  
196. 3s M-S Klute sitting, tie off, staring and blinking  
197. 3s L-S dissolve, apartment dark with iron bedstead, Bree lit asleep.
198. 19s Dark screen, shaft of light on I, a movement across it, C-U of tape player put down on mirrored surface on r, switched on. Camera pans r, man's head reflected upside-down, red against blue.

199. 15s C-U Cable, head resting on chair back, eyes half-closed

200. 12s Light screen, silhouette vertical line and block (chair). Camera pans I to M-S Cable in chair

201 7s L-S Cable from side, seated silhouetted against light background of cranes etc. Wipe r to I to black screen

202 7s Black screen splits, C-U Klute I, Bree r, from behind They walk to mesh background, turn and face camera 2 wipes to centre

203 8s L-S Frankie's pad, Klute I, Frankie centre, Bree r in silhouette

204. 2s C-U Bree in dark glasses

205. 4s C-U Frank He crosses I to Bree

206. 2s C-U Bree, Frank crosses r to I in foreground

{anxiety music comes up}

{anxiety music with muffled sounds}

BREE: Don't be afraid - I'm not. Would you like me to hold you? (laughs) I'm just trying to figure you out.

CABLE: (clears throat) I may say not many people have been successful at that.

BREE: That's all right, I'll figure you out before the evening is over.

CABLE: I hope you do. And, in a way, I hope you don't.

BREE: The only responsibility you have to me is to enjoy yourself. Oh, inhibitions are so nice 'cause they're so nice to overcome. (laughs) I'm very bad you know, I -

CABLE: In what way? How are you bad

BREE: Well in my head. I have -

I have very wicked ideas (laughs)

I'm sure if you're sitting at your great desk you have all kinds of strange things going through your mind. You should never be ashamed of things like that - nothing is wrong. You know that -

I will do anything you ask. I think that the only way any of us can ever be happy is to - is to let it all hang out.

Sound of lift doors opening

Sliding and shutting sound

FRANK: I er ...

I was just finishing up some work, mocking up a few photographs. I used to be a photographer, right Bree? Before I made it in publishing.

BREE: He knows you're a pimp, Frankie

He knows you were my pimp.

FRANK: 'Scuse me.

Bree, why don't you wait outside?
FRANK: I always respected Bree.

KLUTE: I've just got a couple of questions.

FRANK: No, I wanna make something clear. I, er, I don't go after a girl. Girl comes to me. Her choice. Right?

KLUTE: I'm looking for a man named Tom Gruneman. Miss Daniels tells me that - the date that beat her up two years ago might have been that man and that you sent her on that date.

FRANK: Two years ago. Sorry.

KLUTE: I understand that you use narcotics. Maybe I could have someone come over and look at your ... arms.

FRANK: You know I may stand better with the cops than you do. Why don't you sit down and relax?

KLUTE: Did you see the man?

FRANK: No.

KLUTE: How can I get hold of Jane McKenna?
FRANK: Baby - would I be telling you all this? She copped out long ago. She committed suicide, Baxter.

KLUTE: And the other girl - uh, what’s her name?
FRANK: Arlyn
KLUTE: Arlyn
FRANK: Page
KLUTE: How do I find her?

FRANK: I don’t know. She’s a junkie. Make that scene, you could be anywhere - here, San Francisco - they just drop out. (pause)
Anything else?

KLUTE looks around, up, down, up
[silence]

[L-S Street, red car in foreground, leafy trees in background, very sunny. Red car passes to show Bree and Klute standing at bridge. Yellow cab crosses.]

BREE: Did you like my friend Frankie?
KLUTE: Not very much.

BREE: Did he tell you what you wanted?

KLUTE: Where can I find Arlyn Page?
BREE: You’re not going to find Arlyn Page. She’s a junkie. Didn’t he tell you that he sent me that guy?
KLUTE: Jane McKenna sent you that guy.

BREE: Did he tell you what you wanted?

KLUTE: Hey.

KLUTE: Your tapes.
BREE: Golly gee, just what I’ve always wanted.
Dirty phone-calls ha ha
What for?
KLUTE: Uh, I’m through with your part of it. You told me what you could.

BREE: Well. Tell me Klute - did we get you a little? Huh? just a little - us city folk? The

KLUTE: Ah, that’s so pathetic.

(pause) Fuck off
152

236. 5s M-S Bree walking away, swings tapes and dumps them in litter basket as she passes [traffic sounds]

237. 2s C-U Klute looking I [footsteps over traffic sounds]

238. 3s L-S Bree crossing road [footsteps fading into traffic sounds]

239. 37s C-U Bree in semi-darkness, plain red top figure crosses camera, sits on r

hand held up in close foreground figure rises into camera, exits towards camera

240. 5s C-U Klute, in semi-dark, lit shape of keyhole/minaret on l At the half-hour they will say (sings) "Be brave go on"

241. 16s L-S Bree on semi-lit stage, yellow structure on l, figure on r, camera pans slowly l, figure crosses l at the three-quarters they will say (sings) "I am thy help". But it is at the hour, when the great bell goes after (sings) "God will save France"

242. 11s Very l-S, Bree on stage, figure on l gets up and crosses r Oh, it is then that St Margaret and St Catherine - DIRECTOR: Thank you very much. Script please Very interesting accent. (calls) Booth?

243. 10s L-S Bree walks towards camera, picks up book while another woman enters with director, continues into C-U, stops BREE: Thank you.

244. 1s C-U Klute [silence]

245. 2s C-U Bree walks into camera r with smile, Klute enters, crosses from l behind smiling [movement sounds]

246. 21s M-S balcony railings from below, Bree crosses r to l. Klute follows. They speak face -to-face [movement sounds]

Bree starts downstairs l Klute follwos, overtakes her

BREE: So all right, so what do you want, cop? KLUTE: I can’t find Arlyn Page without your help. BREE: I told you you wouldn’t find her. KLUTE: If I can’t find her I can’t find him and if I can’t find him then you’re in trouble, so what do you say? Okay?
She pauses, adjusts hair, walks into camera which swings down looking through railings as they pause at door.

BREE: It's gonna cost. Time is money.
KLUTE: Okay well I can pay you a hundred dollars.
BREE: A hundred dollars I could make in a lunch break.
KLUTE: A hundred dollars is all I've got.

KLUTE: I thought you were very good upstairs.
BREE: Would you buy me a coffee.
KLUTE: Buy you a lunch. Do you want lunch?
BREE: Mm

TRINA: Whenever it suits you. No - make it Monday at 8 p.m.

I said Monday 8 p.m. baby - now don't be naughty!

(giggles) He's a lovely man. Comes here, spends a whole undle of money, and never even touches the girls. Come from Gross Point. Has a big house, eight servants - but all he wants to do is come here and scrub out my bathroom.

No, with the kind of people I get here I couldn't have a gal who was always half zonked-out all the time

You know, I get the creme de la creme

And she was trouble. And I don't allow any trouble here

KLUTE: Do you have any idea where I can look for her?

TRINA: Oh ... try Momma Reese's. Bree - if you ever get lonely, or you haven't got any place else to go ...

you come here. You'll always have a home here.

[Loud rock music]
154

258. 5s C-U Janie Dale, large ear-rings, looking I

JANIE: Why? She’s a junkie

BREE: She was with you after she left

Frankie, wasn’t she?

JANIE: Well she’s not now.

259. 2s C-U Bree, Janie on I

I tried to do everything for her. I took

her into my own place

260. 2s C-U Janie

my own little flat on First - you know

that sweet place?

261. 2s C-U Bree, Janie on I

We could have had everything together

- everything.

262. 7s C-U Janie

[loud rock music]

The little bitch stole my mink.

BREE: Do you know anybody that’s

seen her?

JANIE: Ah, as far as I’m concerned,

she’s dead.

turns, smiles, turns to Bree

263. 3s very C-U Bree looking down, looks up,

[Loud rock music]

smiles and mouths “okay”, looking up

264. 11s M-S/C-U pan across dance floor, frenetic

dancing

[very loud rock music]

265. 6s C-U cards being flipped with b&w shots

of dead women

[flipping sounds of cards]

266. 2s M-S filing cabinet, Bree with Klute

behind, silhouetted in profile, Bree

flipping through file

[slower rhythm of flipping]

267. 4s C-U file cards with hand. Cards drop

and tray slides closed.

[flipping of cards]

[sliding of tray]

268. 6s C-U Bree looking down, hand on her r

shoulder

[silence]

269. 15s Black screen, pan to I, skylight with red

light inside, camera looks down from

skylight into room, Bree seated at table

with drink

[anxiety music]

[footsteps, creaking]

270. 19s dark screen

light goes on, door jamb. Klute appears I

he opens door

KLUTE: Who is it?

BREE: Bree Daniels

[click of lock]

I couldn’t sleep. I keep thinking I hear

noises. Can I come in?

KLUTE: Come in.

271. 6s M-S Bree clutching raincoat around

er herself

BREE: Oh it’s probably just my

imagination.
KLUTE: Sit down.

BREE: I'm sorry, I woke you up. I just ... er ...

KLUTE: I don't think he's going to come back again.

BREE: I just don't want to be alone, right now. Do you mind if I stay here awhile?

KLUTE: If you'd like to go back upstairs I could come -

BREE: I'd really rather not go upstairs.


BREE: Where are you going to sleep?

KLUTE: I'll pull that up. Lie down.

[silence]


BREE: Where are you going to sleep?

KLUTE: I'll pull that up. Lie down.

[silence]

KLUTE: Good night.

BREE: Good night.

[silence]
dissolve C-U Bree, Klute's shoulder r foreground. She opens mouth, smiles [silence]

dissolve C-U Klute r, half-it, looking down [silence]

C-U Bree on pillow, laughs silently to herself [silence]

C-U Klute r half-lit, looking down

C-U Bree on pillow, smiling BREE: What's the matter. You were terrific!

C-U Klute's face, Bree's head appears in foreground. She kisses him quickly on cheek. A real tiger! [kiss]

C-U Bree from side, looks up to r BREE: Are you upset because you didn't make me come? I never come with a john.

C-U Klute's and Bree's heads cross [movement sound]

M-S door lights up at l, M-S shows Bree putting on her raincoat BREE: Don't feel bad about losing your virtue. I sorta knew you would. Everybody always does. [slam of door]

dissolve M-S through iron bedrails, Bree in bed, eyes showing [silence] {anxiety music starts}

L-S Bree's apartment, dark, starkly lit {anxiety music}

M-S Klute and Bree on l from behind, Momma Reese (with bouffant) on r {anxiety music continues, under buzzing sound - projector} MOMMA REESE: Arlyn Page? Yeah, she was with me, about 3 months. She was lucky I kept her that long. She was out of it. Somebody said she was streetwalking over on Lexington Avenue. Or was it 8th? You might take a look. Or try Bill Asia. If you can find him.

C-U Momma Reese, smiles knowingly. Flickering blue light on r. {anxiety music} Yeah, she used to dress the way you do.

L-S Klute r foreground out of focus. Bree silhouetted against window in background {anxiety music} WOMAN'S VOICE: The whore? Yes I threw her out. KLUTE: Do you know where she went from here? WOMAN: Lived like animals her and her man. Out.
157

301. 3s L-S Fenced yard, Bree and Klute climb steps

302. 1s C-U Bree climbing steps pauses, continues

303. 4s very L-S down onto street, steps, 2 figures enter building

304. 5s L-S inside dark building, from stairs down to lit door, Klute and Bree come in silhouetted, stop at first door in passage

305. 1s M-S inside room, Arlyn runs to door and opens it

306. 1s C-U back of Klute’s head I, Arlyn r in doorway turns away

307. 5s C-U/M-S from inside, Arlyn runs towards camera, Bree pushes past Klute through door

308. 4s C-U Arlyn at door frame (swallows)

309. 3s M-S Bree and Klute

310. 3s C-U Arlyn at door frame

311. 1s M-S Bree and Klute (Klute turns to Bree)

312. 4s L-S Arlyn in M-S, man in background in silhouette

313. 2s M-S Bree and Klute Klute hands Bree something offscreen

314. 1s flash to C-U photo of Tom

315. 1s C-U Arlyn looking down

316. 1s M-S Bree and Klute

KLUTE: She was living with a man?

{anxiety music continues}

{anxiety music continues}

{anxiety music}

{music stops}

[knock on door]

ARLYN: Kathy!

KLUTE: Arlyn Page?

BREE: Arlyn -

BREE: - it’s Bree!

MALE VOICE: Kathy is that you?

BREE: It’s all right.

MALE VOICE: Kathy we got a radio!

BREE: Arlyn, it’s okay

ARLYN: Bree - honey - er - I’m waiting for someone

BREE: You’ve gotta help us. We’ve gotta ask you some questions.

ARLYN: Can’t you see I’m strung out?

KLUTE: It’ll only take you a couple of minutes. Ask her.

BREE: A couple of years ago, with Frankie and Jane -

Jane sent me a guy that beat up on -

ARLYN: If he sees you he won’t come.

BREE: Was she seeing a freak, one of her regular Johns, was he a freak?

ARLYN: Yeah

What about it?

ARLYN: Yeah - What about it?

BREE: Did he come round a lot?
317. 3s C-U Arlyn looking down

ARLYN: No, he was an older guy, the
guy was older.
KLUTE: It's very important
MAN: Arlyn get them out of here!
ARLYN: I'm begging you -
KLUTE: It's very important - please -

318. 9s M-S Bree and Klute

KLUTE: Could you give me a description
of him - anything at all -
[knock]
ARLYN: Kathy!

318. 1s C-U Bree

[silence]

319. 8s C-U door swings open, man enters,
walks into camera, Arlyn follows, hand
on his shoulder, reveals Bree behind

[silence]

320. 8s M-S Man and Arlyn walk through door
away from camera, he turns and sits,
looks at Bree now in foreground. Arlyn
bends, turns and sponges him

[silence]

321. 2s C-U Klute at door looking forward r

[silence]

322. 5s M-S angled down, Arlyn sponging man,
embraces him

[silence]

323. 4s C-U Bree looking forward, turns r,
leaves through door, past Klute who
follows

[silence]

324. 3s L-S road under overhead railway,
camera swings with station wagon
[traffic sounds]

325. 3s C-U Bree through glass opf windscreen,
staring ahead
[traffic sounds]

326. 2s C-U/M-S Klute at steering wheel through
windscreen (bright light)
[traffic sounds]

327. 2s M-S Bree through windscreen, looks up
at rearview mirror, opens car door
[traffic sounds]

328. 2s L-S Bree jumps from car door, runs to r
as car halts
[traffic sounds]

329. 1s Bree runs r to l into door under arch
[traffic sounds]

330. L-S Bree goes up escalator
[traffic sounds]
331. 7s M-S dark room, Bree crossing l to r, people crossing her. She starts dancing, smiling
   [loud music]

332. 1s M-S Man with glass in hand, highlighted
   [loud music]

333. 10s M-S Bree, hands on hips, turns and smiles r, camera tracks as she walks forward, falls, hands emerge to catch her, pan r to 2 men, one in glasses
   [loud music]

334. 7s M-S Bree climbs across onto lap of one man
   [loud music]

335. 3s M-S companion of man taps Bree's arm, pan to Bree on lap r, kissing man
   [loud music]

336. 2s M-S companion claps and laughs
   [loud music]

337. 30s M-S Bree and man embrace, kiss. Bree rises, crosses l, man follows, walks towards camera, many people crossing. Bree smiles ahead in recognition, embraces woman on dance floor, they chat briefly. She turns and walks towards camera, smile fades
   (lyrics) "... higher/ ... desire"

338. 4s M-S Frank seated r, in white, woman seated l in red
   "... baby/ up to the moon"

339. 3s C-U Bree crosses l out of frame
   [Loud music]

340. 8s C-U Frankie, Bree sits r, turns head onto his shoulder. He strokes her head, pulls her up by her hair. They look at each other, she nestles onto his shoulder, his fist resting r of her head. They look r, Frank smiles.
   "... into the night ... get me up, take me higher ..."

341. 2s C-U Klute staring ahead, eye lit
   [lyrics end with scream, brief instrumental break]

342. 5s C-U Bree, Frank's hand r, stroking her cheek. She nestles into his shoulder, he stares ahead stroking
   [loud music]

343. 1s C-U Klute expressionless, turns, leaves frame l.
   [loud music]

344. 8s C-U Frank and Bree, Bree nestled in. Frankie stares ahead, stroking. Camera tracks backwards
   [loud music]

345. C-U Cable in chair against window
   CABLE: She wouldn't be reliable anyhow, a narcotics addict. KLUTE: Well I believed her.

346. C-U Klute
   I believed her absolutely. The man who did those beatings was not Tom
160

347. C-U Cable

Gruneman.
CABLE: All right, suppose it wasn’t Tom, where does that get you?

348. C-U/M-S Klute

KLUTE: Tom is still connected to the case because of the letters - whether he wrote them or not. I think the only way I’m going to find him is to find the man who did the beatings.

349. 9s M-S Cable seated at table r, Klute’s back C-U o

The only way I’m going to find him is to pursue Arlyn Page and try and secure from her some kind of identification.
CABLE: I’ll be flying back to Pennsylvania and I’ll fill them in on things.

350. 1s C-U Klute, smiles

KLUTE: How is it back there?

351. 2s M-S Cable seated r, Klute C-U on l

CABLE: I think you’re homesick. I’ll be back on Thursday.

352. 4s C-U Klute, rises from seat, leaves at back.

CABLE: John, I want to tell you how much I respect your dedication. Thank you.

353. 3s M-S Cable at desk

[silence]

354. 1s M-S Cable at desk l, from side. He

[silence]

355. 13s M-S empty chairs at meeting table

BREE: (distorted by recording): I’m very bad, you know ... I have very wicked ideas. I’m sure as you’re sitting at your desk you have all kinds of strange things going through your mind. You should never be ashamed of things like that. Nothing is wrong. Do you mind if I take my sweater off? I like to sort of walk around here without clothes on. Better? I think people wear clothes much too often, don’t you? I think in the confines of one’s house one should be free of clothing and inhibition. I think the only way that any of us can ever be happy is to - let it all hang out, you know - do it all, and ... fuck it.

356. 6s C-U Cable, white bar behind head

cable turns to camera, rises, unbuttons and rebuttons coat, moves off camera to:

357. 10s M-S Bree on bed in semi-darkness

She rises

[Knock, door handle]

358. 6s L-S Bree’s apartment, door on l, Bree in silhouette against yellow light. She crosses l towards camera, opens door.
359. 3s M-S/C-U from outside, Bree at door. Klute pushes past to enter, Bree closes door.  
[diegetic sounds]

360. 8s M-S Bree at door, Klute crosses to r, Bree leans, Klute returns to her, guides her to a seat, pushes her head down.  
[diegetic sounds]

361. 8s C-U Back of Bree's head, rises, looks up to I, away, up, away  
[silence]

362. 5s M-S Bree rises, moves r. Klute guides her to seat near bed, switches on light, fluffs pillows  
[diegetic sounds]

362. 23s L-S Bree lying on bed, Klute at table r under light, Bree groans, tosses. Klute crosses to basin r, takes water and bowl, cloth. returns to bed and wrings out cloth  
{romantic music}

363. 2s M-S Klute at bedside, Bree jumps as he touches her with cloth  
{romantic music}

364. 1s C-U Klute, Bree moves across him, he restrains her  
{romantic music}

365. 1s C-U Klute r  
{romantic music}

366. 1s C-U Bree  
{romantic music}

367. 1s C-U Klute r, Bree on his shoulder  
{romantic music}

368. 1s C-U Klute looking down  
{romantic music}

369. 8s C-U Bree on Klute's shoulder, pulls away twice, drawn back twice  
{romantic music}

370. C-U Klute looks r, down  
{romantic music}

371. 7s M-S/C-U Bree in red jacket seated  
BREE: I was trying to get away from ... a world that I had ... er ... that I had known because I don't think that it was very good for me and ... and seeing people that I used to know ... that I ... that I liked a lot ... that were my friends ... er ... sort of ... girls ... and er ... that could have been me ... I mean, I know what, know I'm not stupid

372. 1s C-U Psychiatrist  
I'm not stupid

373. 22s M-S/C-U Bree  

374. 1s C-U Psychiatrist  
I, well I guess I just realised that er ... that I don't really give a damn

375. 8s M-S/C-U Bree gestures - spreads hands
376. 5s  M-S (dark) silhouette 2 figures ascend in lift-cage
        What I would really like to do is be faceless - and bodyless -
377. 5s  L-S metal structures against sky
        and be - left alone.
378. 7s  L-S door (dark)
        [footsteps]
        MALE VOICE: Lucky they're still here. We don't keep unclaimed possessions or suicides more than a year.
379. 13s C-U (dark) Bespectacled man crosses light patch into dark. Sudden light: man with hat pulling light cord, Klute I takes box out, extracts red purse
        Number four-nine-seven
        ah.
        KLUTE: Here
        MAN: Jane McKenna
380. 2s  C-U box, 2 hands taking articles out: white high heels
        [diegetic sound]
381. 2s  C-U Klute looking down I, up I, down I.
        [silence]
382. 6s  C-U hands with large brown envelope, remove rabbit-foot keyring, chain
        [diegetic sound]
383. 2s  C-U Klute
        [silence]
384. 2s  C-U Hands replace envelope
        [diegetic sound]
385. 8s  C-U Klute looking I, turns r, centre, shrugs, walks into camera r
        KLUTE: I thought there'd be more.
386. 1s  M-S Man switches off light. Dark.
        [click of switch]
387. 3s  M-S/C-U Bree lying on bed, looking at book, looks up
        [silence]
388. 1s  L-S room, light in centre (moon), Klute writing
        [silence]
        {romantic music}
389. 5s  C-U Bree silhouetted from side, looking I
        {romantic music}
390. 8s  C-U Klute scratching head,
        looks up
        {romantic music}
        BREE: Well there's this man ... that ... this detective ... and I don't know
        exactly ... what ... is ...
391. 3s  L-S Bree in bed
        {romantic music}
392. 10s L-S Klute seated
        Klute rises, walks towards camera panning r
        {romantic music}
        happening or what he wants out of me or anything like that but he ... he took care of me.
        PSYCH: Did you feel ... threatened by it?
        BREE: Well I don't know - when you're used to being lonely and you - someone comes in and moves that around, it's sort of scary I guess.
L-S Bree in bed, Klute moves away from camera to her, sits on bed

C-U Bree from side
(Klute's) hand from r, cups her chin

PSYCH: How do you feel when you feel scared?
BREE: Angry.
PSYCH: At whom?
BREE: Whoever it is who's making me feel that way -
PSYCH: Do you feel angry at him?

BREE: Well I don't know. I'm - yes
PSYCH: How do you feel angry? What do you want to do?
BREE: Manipulate him.
PSYCH: How?
BREE: In all the ways I can manipulate people, I mean, it's easy to manipulate men - right?

Camera moves l with Bree to include Klute in frame
Hand traces outlines on her face

M-S Klute kisses Bree

L-S quayside, orange tug r

C-U woman's hand, wet and muddy, lying on blue tarpaulin

C-U back of woman's head, red-blonde hair, arm crosses, tarpaulin covers

L-S uniformed men tying up bundle in tarpaulin, they put it on stretcher, carry it off r, pan shows red flowers, Arlyn's man

POLICEMAN: Arlyn Page was probably an alias.

KLUTE: (off) Sorry ...
MAN: Man, can you - can you help me out?

KLUTE: Yeah, yeah. What?
MAN: Uh. I mean ... can you help me out? I mean ... uh ... that's my baby, dead.

I gotta get up.

I mean, you know what it means, my baby - dead.

KLUTE: Gotta get up.
MAN: Yeah.

M-S Klute and man, small boats moving in b-g. Klute counts out money, hands it over. Man leaves r, Klute looks around,
puts hand in pocket.

406. 7s C-U Handwriting on page: list: Jane M, Arlyn P, Bree D
   x is man older than Tom
   x pretends to be Tom
   - knows Tom
   x killed Jane M?
   and Arlyn P?

407. 1s M-S Klute at phone in basement, writing

408. 1s M-S Bree sitting cross-legged on floor with cat, looks up.

409. 2s C-U Klute enters through door, turns

410. 1s M-S Bree on floor, smiling up, stroking cat

411. 2s C-U Klute hangs coat, picks up parcel, crosses r

412. 2s C-U Bree with cat, looks up

413. 2s C-U Klute crosses r

414. 2s M-S Bree hugs cat, Klute sits r, leaning forward with hands clasped

   Klute sits back, hands move

415. 3s M-S Bree on floor

416. 9s M-S/C-U Bree seated in chair

417. 1s C-U Psychiatrist

418. 17s C-U/M-S Bree

MAN: Yeah.

[anxiety music]

KLUTE: Lieutenant please.
   John Klute.
   I think we should run a check on everyone who knew Tom Gruneman.

[silence]

KLUTE: (chuckles) You're up, hey?
   How are you?
   BREE: Trask wants you to call him.
   He told me about Arlyn.

[diegetic sound]

KLUTE: It probably doesn't have anything to do with anything, er - but just as a precaution, when you go out c here tel me where you're gonna go, a phone number where I can find you - just so I can always keep in touch with you. Okay?
   BREE: Sure.

BREE: I'm all right.

KLUTE: Yeah I know.

BREE: I feel physically, that's what's different, I mean I feel - my body feels - I enjoy er, making love with him. Which is, er, a very baffling and bewildering thing for me, because I've never felt that before.

I just wish that I could let things happen, and er, enjoy it, you know ... for what it is and while it lasts, and ... er ... and relax about it. But all the time, all the time, I keep feeling the need to destroy it, to ... to ... break it off ... to ... go back to the comfort of being numb again. Um ... I keep hoping in a way
that it’s going to end. Because, er ...

I mean I had more control before, when I was with tricks at least I knew what I was doing and I was setting everything up. Now I - I - I (laughs) - and that’s what’s so strange is that I’m not setting anything up, that something is ... I mean I ... mm you obviously know what this is like, but I’ve never felt it before, it’s a new thing and it’s so strange the sensation - that something - that is flowing from me naturally to somebody else without its being prettied up or - I mean he’s seen me horrible. He’s seen me ugly, he’s seen me mean, he’s seen me whorey, and it doesn’t seem to matter, and he seems to accept me ... and I guess having sex with somebody, and feeling that ... those sort of feelings towards them is a whole ... is very new to me, and I ... and I er - I wish that I didn’t keep wanting to destroy it.

BREE: You know, I’m trying to stay out of it.

Yeah. Yeah I er ... I’d love to party with you but I ... yeah, well listen, er Why don’t you try and get somebody else and if I change my mind I’ll call you, okay?

You’re not going to get hung up on me, are you?

VENDOR: Yes sir, can I help you?

KLUTE: Yeah, can I have a bag please? a couple of bags please.

VENDOR: Couple of bags, all right.

KLUTE: What’ve you got in your bag?

BREE: What?

KLUTE: What’ve you got in your bag?

She smiles

pan I to Klute sniffing peach, turns r looking away. They smile at each other.
426. 2s  C-U peaches, hand feeling them for ripeness, selects one {romantic music}

427. 2s  very C-U (out of focus) Klute’s face, down {romantic music}

428. 3s  C-U Bree r, looking up l smiling, shakes head, looks to r {romantic music}

429. 4s  C-U Klute smiling r, looks down, crosses r, circles to M-S {romantic music}

430. 3s  C-U Bree silhouette, market people in background she moves to reveal Klute among them in M-s, selecting fruit. He points {romantic music}

431. 7s  C-U Bree at Klute’s shoulder, leans into it, staring down. Klute turns as she shakes head, he stares at her r {romantic music}

432. 2s  C-U Bree looking l {romantic music}

433. 7s  M-S Klute l facing l, Bree r facing l, both smiling, he turns and they walk away from camera, Bree holding the back of his jacket. 2 middle-aged women cross camera. {romantic music}

434. 4s  L-S street with open shops, they cross in silhouette. l to r. Klute puts an arm around Bree. {romantic music}

435. 10s  M-S/L-S dark passage, 2 figures coming towards camera, stop at door on r. Bree bites apple, offers it to Klute as he inserts key and opens door. Pulls her away rapidly, door open on r, hand emerges from l to swing door open. Klute crosses l to r through door {music stops}

436. 4s  M-S Klute crosses r to l, looking r, Bree behind him. Camera pans with them KLUTE: Wait.

437. 1s  L-S pan across apartment, wrecked [silence]

438. 1s  M-S Bree [silence]

439. 6s  M-S foot of bed, pan r to l across slashed bed to chest of drawers with underwear [silence]

440. 2s  C-U Klute with lightshade behind, crosses r and turns [diegetic sound]

441. 1s  C-U Bree looking down, looks up with wide eyes [phone rings]
167

442. 2s C-U Klute on l, brick wall r, crosses r to fill screen [phone rings]

443. 1s C-U Bree looking up

444. 2s C-U Klute reaches down r, picks up receiver, holds it towards Bree

445. 5s C-U Bree looking down, receiver on l
cups her hand over her mouth

446. 3s C-U Klute holding receiver to his ear he puts it down rapidly

447. 2s C-U Bree, hand over mouth, ducks r as Klute comes to her l

448. 3s C-U telephone

449. 1s L-S room

450. 3s C-U tape reel, finishes turning

451. 1s C-U/M-S tape player, upright, hand operating rewind

452. 5s M-S/L-S Bree sitting slumped, notebook in background, with Tom's photo and papers on it

453. 12s M-S Klute on phone, light behind. He turns, puts down tape, switches off recorder removes tape, puts in box, puts hands in pockets, sits on arm of chair

454. 12s M-S/L-S Bree sitting

455. 1s M-S Klute sitting on chair

456. 11s M-S/C-U Bree in bed, Klute behind, propped up. Both awake.

457. 10s L-S river from behind high window - very bright, framed by dark on l and r

BREE: Hullo
BREE'S VOICE ON PHONE: I can be a very bad girl, you know. I sometimes need spanking.
BREE: Aah ...
VOICE: I have very wicked ideas ...
... wanna hear about it ...
BREE: aah ...

VOICE: You should never be ashamed o yourself
VOICE: You know there's nothing wrong. I think - the only way that any o us can ever be happy is to ... is to
let it all hang out, you know - do it all
The only responsibility you have to me is to enjoy yourself.

[diegetic sound]

KLUTE: She can't remember. It could've been on a ... uh, it could've been hidden in his pocket. I've seen one of them ...

All right, I'll wait for you here.

Bree?

Trask and some officers are going to come and examine your apartment. I want you to stay here today, tomorrow. You'll be safe here. I'll only be gone for a few minutes tomorrow.

{anxiety music}

KLUTE: Bree ... Bree

{anxiety music over - }
wouldn’t need to, so if you do it’s because it excites you. Because you’re not a man that would have to pay for a woman - you could have any woman you wanted. The only responsibility you have to me is to enjoy yourself.

and I will do anything that you ask, that you want. Since you know that there are no limits to my imagination ... and I place no moral judgements on anything {music comes to a sustained high-note climax}

TRASK: We checked out 42 letters of Tom Gruneman’s friends

and we only came up with one with any similarity to the obscene letter

All right, there’s Tom Gruneman. Different different spacings. {click of projector}

KLUTE: (laughs) That’s mine. TRASK: You said to check out everybody. {click}

Same margins top and sides. Now he does best with his middle fingers - you get fainter registrations on outside keys. We noticed how he invariably does that with the t and the h {click}

blank screen
C-U on rhs of letter, shows ‘hte’
blank screen

[click]

[click]

[click]

[click]

[click]

[click]

[click]

[click]

[click]

[click]

[click]

[click]

[click]

KLUTE: Who is it

TRASK: Peter Cable.
470. 6s  C-U I and r of screen  
But you have no case. There's not even a body.
(whirr of helicopter)  
CABLE: I'm sorry we have to meet here  
John, but I'm pretty rushed for time. I  
have a very important business meeting  
tonight in Chicago. Any developments?
471. 2s  C-U Klute (lit from l) looks down  
KLUTE: I think I can close the case.
472. 2s  C-U Cable  
I think I can close the case, sir, if I can have $500 to  
purchase Jane McKenna's address book.
473. 3s  C-U Klute  
CABLE: I don't understand. Payment?  
KLUTE: Well I have found a contact who  
will sell me the book - a little black book  
containing the name of the client that  
beat up Bree Daniels - ah, he is also the  
man who came into Bree Daniels’  
apartment yesterday and wrecked it.
474. 9s  C-U Cable shakes head  
It wasn't Tom
475. 1s  C-U Klute  
[silence]
476. 1s  C-U Cable  
[silence]
477. 1s  C-U Klute  
I think this man killed Jane McKenna  
and killed Arlyn Page - I think he  
drowned them.
478. 3s  C-U Cable  
I think you should prepare yourself for  
the fact that possibly Tom is dead,
480. 3s  C-U Klute  
but the only way I'm going to find out is  
to find him and I need the money before  
tomorrow night.  
CABLE: You're meeting him tomorrow  
night?
481. 3s  M-S Cable, helicopter in b/g  
KLUTE: Yes, at my place, he's going to  
come to my apartment and bring the  
book with him.  
CABLE: At what time?  
KLUTE: About ... eight-thirty
482. 3s  M-S Klute end of helicopter in b/g  
CABLE: All right, fine, I'll handle - I'll  
notify the board as soon as I get to  
Chicago. I'll have them wire you the  
money immediately. (pause) Thank you,  
John - I
483. 5s  C-U Cable  
certainly hope you are wrong about  
Tom.  
KLUTE: Thank you, sir.
484. 5s  C-U Klute  
They shake hands off-screen
Cable passes across, off r
Klute gazes r

485. 4s  L-S Windows across river, Klute’s reflection in glass in profile turns full face as Cable passes across on other side, puts coat on arm
        [helicopter sound]

486. 2s  L-S helicopter, Klute’s shoulder r, helicopter lifts with Cable inside
        [helicopter sound]

487. 7s  M-S Helicopter window, Cable inside. As helicopter lifts, Cable looks down frowning. Manhattan in b/g
        [helicopter sound]

488. 1s  M-S foot of Bree’s bed, slashed mattrass
        [silence]

489. 12s  M-S/L-S Bree in coat, reaches across to take belt, walks towards camera, looking around at floor. Camera pans with her crossing r in C-U, stops at Frank seated watching her. She crosses again
        [silence]

490. 1s  C-U Klute looking r
        [silence]

491. 1s  C-U Bree looking down
        [silence]

492. 1s  C-U Klute looking r then straight
        [silence]

493. 1s  M-S Frank seated
        [silence]

494. 1s  C-U Klute crosses r to Bree
        [silence]

495. 4s  C-U Klute and Bree
        KLUTE: I don’t want you to do this, Bre

496. 6s  C-U Bree
        BREE: I’m ... just going to a girlfriend’s apartment. I can’t stay here obviously.

497. 3s  M-S Bree in shower-room
        crosses back under light
crosses towards camera gets to Frank, looks at him
FRANK: This other girl’s got a very big apartment - lots of room. I mean, it’s not necessarily how it looks. Look, we all respect each other, right? I respect you - (pause) Bree respects you
but you gotta respect her too

498. 2s  C-U Bree sits down and looks up
        her best interests

499. 1s  C-U Frank

500. 1s  M-S Bree and Frank
        [silence]

501. 1s  C-U Klute looking r
        [silence]

502. 1s  M-S Bree and Frankie
        [silence]

503. 1s  C-U Klute suddenly lunges r
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>504.</td>
<td>1s C-U kitchen wall with paper roller, Frank's head flashes past, Klute's after it, Frank's pulled back [crashing glass etc.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>505.</td>
<td>1s M-S Klute pulls Frank forwards, throws him down [thump of blow]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506.</td>
<td>&lt;1s M-S Klute hits Frank to the ground [crash of glass etc.] [thump of blow]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>507.</td>
<td>&lt;1s M-S Frank rolls on ground [clatter]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>508.</td>
<td>&lt;1s C-U Wall, Bree swings r to centre [clatter]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>509.</td>
<td>1s M-S Klute l, Frank jumps up, hits Klute [thump of blow]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510.</td>
<td>1s C-U Klute on floor, leaps up with mouth open [diegetic sounds]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>511.</td>
<td>&lt;1s C-U fist on l hits stomach r [diegetic sounds]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>512.</td>
<td>&lt;1s C-U Bree looks r [diegetic sounds]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>513.</td>
<td>1s C-U scissors on board, hand removes them [diegetic sounds]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>514.</td>
<td>1s M-S Klute hits Frank down to r [thump of blow]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>515.</td>
<td>&lt;1s C-U Bree [diegetic sounds]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>516.</td>
<td>1s C-U Klute walks to camera [diegetic sounds]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>517.</td>
<td>1s C-U Bree lunges towards r, camera crosses Klute r [diegetic sounds]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518.</td>
<td>&lt;1s C-U hand with scissors flashes downward over jacket [tearing sound]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>519.</td>
<td>1s C-U Bree swings back, Klute comes in from r [diegetic sounds]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520.</td>
<td>1s C-U Klute looking l [silence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>521.</td>
<td>1s C-U Bree, Klute's shoulder r [silence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>522.</td>
<td>2s C-U Klute, looking l, turns r, walks away from camera through door [silence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>523.</td>
<td>2s C-U Bree [silence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>524.</td>
<td>2s M-S/L-S Bree standing in front of kitchen unit, hand drops slightly [silence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>525.</td>
<td>9s M-S steps, feet come down, Bree descending. Turns r to basement, walks r, looks l and r sides of basement, turns l and walks, camera pans l and pulls back to mesh in foreground and man's head in silhouette [street sounds] (drum roll into anxiety music)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
172

526. 9s L-S through mesh: tracking shot Bree walking along pavement, past funeral group, hearse, flower car {anxiety music}

527. 4s M-S/L-S (closer) flower cara. Cable enters r, pauses. Lorry crosses, masking him, and passes - he has gone {anxiety music}

528. 5s L-S street, Bree approaches camera, crosses street {anxiety music}

529. 26s L-S Psychiatrist's waiting room, desk in foreground, Bree seated in background {anxiety music tails off}

530. 5s L-S Mr Goldfarb at desk in background looks at watch. Young male worker in foreground l, MR GOLDFARB: ... A half an hour? Shalom. Goodbye.

531. 7s C-U Klute at phone KLUTE: Detective Trask please. ... Hi, John Klute. He didn't take the plane. He cancelled out. I'm at home in my apartment ... I don't know where she is - she's left, but I'll find her.

532. 6s L-S street, Bree exits building l, pan r along street with her Okay I'll leave word if I go out. Okay. [click of phone] {anxiety music}

533. 3s L-S lift from above, rising. Bree pacing inside, looking up through grid cover

534. 6s L-S down aisle of shelves with skeins. Light-shade foreground r, Bree walking, comes to a halt [sounds of workshop, voices etc] BREE: I have an appointment with Mr Goldfarb

535. 3s M-S Secretary at desk looking up SECRETARY: Mr Goldfarb. Mr Goldfarb!

536. 6s M-S Bree standing l, passage in b/g. Man enters r MR GOLDFARB JNR: Hullo. What can I do for you? BREE: I'm sorry - I mean Mr Goldfarb senior.
MR G JNR: Oh my father left about 15 minutes ago - he didn't feel so good.

Can I help you?
SECRETARY: He's working himself to death, poor man.
MR G JNR: You sure I can't help you?

BREE: No, it's not important
MR G JNR: No, really I don't mind.
SEC: You're going to miss your train, Mr Goldfarb.
MR G JNR: Excuse me.
BREE: Did he leave a message for me - Bree Daniels.
SEC: Oh.. I thought that was for tomorrow.

(phone rings twice)

SEC: Mr Goldfarb's - Oh yes mama, I'm coming right now. I know you don't like to get in in the middle of the picture. Yes right away. Bye bye.
[clatter of shoes on wooden floor]
[click of light]

SEC: We're closing now

BREE: May I leave Mr Goldfarb a message?
SEC: Go on in

SEC: May I leave Mr Goldfarb a message?
BREE: This is Bree Daniels. Has the doctor checked in yet?
When she does, would you tell her I’m, I’m at ... 246 1383 and I’ll wait here about 5 minutes.

Puts phone down.

[silence]

{anxiety music}

{anxiety music}

{anxiety music gets louder}

{anxiety music}

{anxiety music fades}

VOICE: Yes can you tell me how I can get in touch with the doctor, please?

VOICE ON PHONE: The doctor hasn’t checked in yet.

KLUTE: I’m trying to locate a Miss Bree Daniels.

VOICE: I’m sorry sir but we only take messages for the doctor.

KLUTE: Well, has she called in or anything? Has she called the doctor at all today - has she seen the doctor?

VOICE: I believe Miss Daniels did leave forwarding number.

KLUTE: Can you give me that number please.

VOICE: I’m sorry sir but I can’t give out that information.

KLUTE: I’m a police officer, please don’t make me prove this, I mean it’s - it is important.

VOICE: I’m sorry sir but you must understand my position. I must comply with the rules of the exchange.

KLUTE: Yeah, I understand all that ...

VOICE: After all ...

KLUTE: Will you just give me the number. Please.

[silence]

[silence]

(pause)

CABLE: Can we talk about
562. 1s C-U Noticeboard with fashion shots: 2 smiling women

this reasonably.

563. 21s M-S Bree seated at desk, looking up.
Cable’s shoulder r.

CABLE: I know you’re expecting some kind of extravagant behaviour, but ... do you believe me?
BREE: Yes.
CABLE: We can talk. Well, it’s just an ordinary matter. I’m a very well-off man - I have a ... position to respect. And I would feel ... personally very uncomfortable to be connected with ... a certain kind of woman, I’m sure you understand what I mean.

564. 6s C-U Bree in silhouette

He crosses l to r

Look - John Klute works for me. I know you’re his contact, and I know he’s trying to acquire Jane McKenna’s book.

565. 4s C-U Cable in profile, silhouetted

I am in a position to - offer more for it than he can.

566. 2s C-U Bree in profile, silhouetted, looking up

[silence]

567. 6s C-U Cable, in profile, silhouetted

You don’t understand what I’m talking about, do you?
BREE: Yes, Jane McKenna’s book. And I’ll try to get it for you.
CABLE: No - obviously you’re frightened and you’re lying.

568. 3s C-U Bree

BREE: No I’m not - I will - I’ll try to get it for you.

569. 11s C-U Cable

CABLE: Is this ... something Klute’s invented and ... is this a trap for me - this - Klute knows about me, doesn’t he?
BREE: Knows what about you?
CABLE: Then everybody knows about me so it doesn’t make any difference what I do any more, does it?
[phone rings]

570. 2s C-U Bree turns rapidly

[2nd ring]

571. 3s C-U Cable

[3rd and 4th ring]

572. 4s M-S Bree seated, Cable with arm across on phone

[5th and 6th ring]

573. 2s L-S workshop

[7th ring]
CABLE: I have no idea what I'm going to do ... I am so deeply puzzled ... I've done terrible things ... I've killed three people.

But you know, I don't consider myself a terrible man - no more than ... than others.

You see, Tom Gruneman discovered me. We were here on business together. And he found me and Jane McKenna in my hotel room.

She ... had become hysterical and she started ... screaming and I ... guess I hit her and I ... don't actually recall, it all happened so quickly ... Anyway she fell and hit her head and that's when Tom came ... in the room, I guess he must have ... heard her screaming. But I never understood why she did that. She had never screamed before. And it was the ... revulsion and the - contempt that I saw on his face and the certainty that sooner or later he would use it against me within the company. And I ... tried to endure that as long as I possibly could you - you - you see

You just want me to keep on talking, don't you.

BREE: No I don't, I do understand, I really do.

CABLE: Well that's what you all do. Make a man think that he's accepted. It's all just a great big game to you. I mean, you're all obviously too lazy and too warped to do anything meaningful with your lives, so you ... prey upon the sexual fantasies of others. I'm sure it comes as no great surprise to you when I say that -- there are -- little corners in everyone -- which were better left alone -- sicknesses, weaknesses which - which should never be exposed - but - that's your stock-in-trade, isn't it - a man's weakness. And I was never fully aware of mine --
WOMAN'S VOICE: How far out of town are we?  
CABLE'S VOICE: About 5 miles outside of New York.  
WOMAN: Do you mind if I turn the lights down?  
CABLE: No it's up to you - turn the light out, if you like. ... My name is Peter Cable. I work for the Toll American Corporation which is situated in Pennsylvania and New York. Obviously would not be telling you these things if my intentions weren't honourable.  
WOMAN: Oh -- you look familiar to me  
CABLE: In what way?  
WOMAN: I don't know - your face looks familiar to me.  
CABLE: I guess I have a confession to make - we did meet before. About two years ago. I often wondered whatever happened to Arlyn Page, and - here you are.  
ARLYN: Yeah, I remember ... Listen, I - better get outta here. I mean, I can't -- I - I remember you, I remember you  
CABLE: What do you remember?  
ARLYN: You beat me up, that's what you did. ... It's okay ... just freaked me out for a moment.  
CABLE: I promise to drive you back - afterwards.  
ARLYN: Um - why don't you just tell me what you'd like, and then ... after you tell me what you'd like ...  
CABLE: I'd like some - to spend just some time with you. I have been looking for you for two years.  
ARLYN: Why?  
CABLE: That's my business ... However I will say that you gave me a great deal
of pleasure. I saw in you things ... that have not been in other women of your ... profession. I will not harm you at all physically.

ARLYN: It's all right.

CABLE: No it's not all right. Of course you know it's not all right.

ARLYN: No it is all right, I mean if that's what you - but you - you have to tell me first, and then - and if that's what you want ... that's fine...

CABLE: Arlyn - why don't you lie down on the bed, and make yourself comfortable, I will not strap you in, I will not tie you down. Just lie down on the bed, please ... be comfortable, nothing's going to happen ...

ARLYN: Okay... why don't you - why don't you make yourself comfortable, why don't you - take your...

CABLE: I am perfectly comfortable. Just put your head down -- you have such lovely long blonde hair. Turn your head. Like that

ARLYN: (screams)
607. 1s L-S workshop, (repeat of shot 559), Klute running up aisle [loud music]

608. 1s L-S workshop, silhouette of struggling figures lower r h corner, Klute's reflection running from centre to l, large [loud music]

609. 1s C-U Cable silhouette, r to l, eyes highlit, looking towards camera r [loud music]

610. 1s C-U Bree pushed down [loud music]

611. <1s L-S Klute running towards camera [loud music]

612. 2s C-U Cable's eyes in blurred screen, moves backwards [silence] [crash of glass etc.]

613. 2s M-S Cable silhouetted upright against bars of window, crashes through glass, falls backwards [silence]

614. 5s Dissolve from broken window to skylight, pans down to dissolve [silence]

615. 9s M-S/L-S Bree's apartment, Bree l seated at Klute's feet, leans her head on his knee Klute strokes her head BREE'S VOICE: I've explained to him what - what I have to do, and I think - think - think he understands what - what could ever happen for us. I mean we're so different that er ... I mean I know enough about myself to know that ... er ... whatever lies in store for me it's not going to be setting up housekeeping with somebody in Tuscarora, and darning socks and doing all that, I mean that's - uh - I'd go out of my mind.

616. 20s L-S Empty apartment, Klute silhouetted against far window, hands in pockets. Bree walks on l. They walk towards camera, Bree looks into cupboard and takes coat.

They pick up suitcases, walk to door

They freeze, Bree crosses r, picks up phone

617. 6s C-U Bree with phone smiles, looks up l, smile fades looks down as she speaks I - I don't know ... I - I -- it's so hard for me to say it!

PSYCH'S VOICE: To say what?

BREE'S VOICE: I'm going to miss him!

(ring of phone)

BREE: Bree Daniels.

How is Roy?

Well I'm leaving town right now and I -- I don't expect to be back.

618. L-S Klute at door. Bree replaces phone r. Klute crosses r, Bree passes by door l, gestures with hard, picks up bag, Klute follows and picks up cases as Bree goes through door.

Klute exits through door

Very nice. Thank you. Goodbye

(click of phone)

{TITLES COME UP}