THE IMPACT OF RACE LEGISLATION ON KINSHIP AND IDENTITY

AMONGST INDIAN MUSLIMS IN CAPE TOWN.

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Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
This study focuses on the relationship between the responses of Indian Muslim migrants to the Cape, (based in an Indian group area in Cape Town, called Rylands) and the responses of the environment to Indians. There has been remarkably little work of any nature undertaken concerning Indians in the Cape. The broad anthropological framework emphasises the centrality of the Indians' own perception of their lives, and the significance of the external constraints imposed on them through various means. The theoretical approach used has been taken predominantly from migration theorists who emphasise the over-arching importance of external constraints on the behaviour of migrants, whatever group preferences may be, such as their position in the labour or housing markets, or in the face of de jure or de facto discrimination. A second feature of this approach is to analyse the differing degrees of participation of first generation and second generation migrants in the spheres of the "homeland" or area of origin; the local migrant co-ethnic life; and in the majority society. In this way, there is a tension between the ideals and expectations of the older and the younger generations. This approach considers the formation of ethnic groups by migrants to be a strategy for coping in an alien environment; ethnicity providing a means of recruitment to the group. Because in the Cape, and in Cape Town especially, there is a large population of Muslim non-Indians ("Cape Malays"), the situation of the cross-cutting identities of Indian and Muslim served to emphasise that these identities mean different things to informants, and they are used in different contexts. Indian identity is used in the domestic domain in the relationship between elders and juniors in extended families, and as part of the moral justification of the worthiness of
an extended family, which acts as a resource redistribution centre.

Islam, however, forms a broader range of alliance with other Muslims, not only in South Africa. With the increasing politicisation of Islam in South Africa, Islam has become increasingly associated with other groups seeking to redress the imbalance of the race legislation.

The central discussions in the thesis revolve around the external constraints - the race legislation. Not only has the race legislation affected the position of Indians in the housing and labour markets, but the statutory imposition of a classification "Indian" serves to propagate the concept that this group is distinct from all other South Africans. Combined with this, residential and educational separation attempt to propagate this concept of distinction. According to the race legislation, "Indian culture" is assumed to be the primary basis of the distinction, and it assumes that the primary networks for all those classified as Indian are based on shared ethnicity. The extent to which this occurs is discussed in the thesis. The major problem is that there is an ambiguity involved in the jural definition of "Indian" and the emic definition of Indian, and many people reject for a variety of reasons, their jural classifications.

The conclusions reached are that different groups are mobilised for different purposes, using either the symbols of Indian traditions and kinship for the coping strategies of the extended family; or the symbols of Islam and Black Consciousness for strategies aimed at eradicating the race legislation. In this way, Indian tradition is not merely a cultural relic, but rather a set of symbols used in a new context for mobilising groups. This study indicates that
future research could look at the tension between the elders, familiar with Indian traditions, and the younger generations, unfamiliar with it, and on what bases the younger generation will mobilise groups when they assume positions of power.
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Fieldwork was undertaken for eight months during 1978 and 1979 predominantly although not exclusively in Rylands, one of the two Indian Group Areas suburbs of Cape Town. Rylands is situated in the central part of the Cape Flats, where a large proportion of people in Cape Town who are classified as "non-White" now live. This choice of fieldwork area involved an obvious problem. Preliminary research indicated that Rylands in no way formed a community, a type of "urban village" that could be studied in isolation. Its raison d'être and the history of its development preclude the rise of any community feeling, at least at this stage in its development. Rylands was created by government legislation which demarcated a more or less uninhabited tract of land near Athlone, for the use of Indians. In fact, Indians came to live in Rylands only about fifteen years later, as the areas in which they were previously resident became proscribed to them. Thus, Indians now living in Rylands have come from all over the Cape peninsula, many having few contacts, friends or relatives in Rylands. Because of the housing and land shortage in Rylands, their kin and friends may not have found accommodation in Rylands, and live elsewhere (not necessarily even in the other Indian Group Area). It was found that in every household, some of the relationships valued most highly by informants were with people resident in other areas, whilst Rylands' neighbours were, frequently, only peripherally important. Residents of Rylands have not, on the average, been living there long enough to build up the degree and intimacy of contact that forms a community awareness.

If Rylands does not form a well-knit community, why was it then chosen as a fieldwork area? Firstly, it was chosen to impose some demographic and geographic constraints to the size of the fieldwork unit, which
would otherwise have been unmanageable in the scope of research for a Master's degree. Secondly, since the aim of the research was to study the effects and implications of race legislation on Indians, it seemed logical to choose as a study area an Indian group area created by this legislation. It must be emphasised, however, that since the networks of informants were followed in many cases, the fieldwork includes data on over two hundred individuals resident outside Rylands. To provide some form of comparison, Indian households outside Rylands and with, at first sight, apparently little connection with Rylands, were also studied. There were ten of these households.

Therefore, the residents of Rylands provided individual examples of how Indians may react to the constraints imposed upon them, including enforced removal to a group area. But the data collected do not lead to the implication that the study provides a general account of how all Indians in Cape Town attempt to cope with the situation arising from the Group Areas legislation.

The study is limited to Muslim Indians for two reasons. One is merely to impose a demographic limit on the size of the sample. The other, more cogent, reason was to study the implications of cross-cutting identities and allegiances, given the situation where Indians have imposed on them by the race legislation a jural definition as "Indians". This may not, however, coincide with the in-group definition, given the fact that ties to the Muslim faith cut across the boundaries of the legal category of "Indian". In the Cape, unlike elsewhere in South Africa, there is a large population of Muslims who are not Indian by origin - the so-called "Cape Malays". Therefore, for an Indian
to emphasise his adherence to Islam is for him to acknowledge religious kinship, to some extent, with non-Indians. Because of this cross-cutting identity, it seemed that the glib pre-eminence given to being "Indian", by the race legislation, should be re-assessed by examining the situations in which the two possible identities are emphasised by informants, and the strategies for coping which they may provide. Thus, the situation in Cape Town provides an opportunity to study the significance of Indian identity when it is cross-cut by another identity, that ties part of the Indian population to a far larger non-Indian group.

The fieldwork consisted of intensive participant observation, undertaken for eight months. A random household census was the first stage of fieldwork, when every fourth household in Rylands was censused. Following this census, a more detailed census of the Muslim households was undertaken. Both these census questionnaires appear in Appendix II. Since almost every household spoke either English or Afrikaans as one of its mother languages, there was no need to learn an Indian language. The latter would have been problematic, considering that such a wide range of Indian languages are spoken by residents of Rylands. In the text, to protect anonymity, all names are pseudonyms, and in some cases, where the argument is not thus affected, sex of informants and ages have been changed also.

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Indian migration to South Africa should be seen in the perspective of the enormous movements of population both across international borders, and within national borders, that have been occurring more and more frequently since the mid-nineteenth century. Beijer (1969) looks at involuntary migration, such as refugee movement and movement of prisoners of war, and maintains that in the single decade after the end of World War Two, there were more involuntary migrants than there were free migrants in the entire nineteenth century and in the first decade of the twentieth century. Migration numbers from India are also impressive. Petersen (1970) calculates that the total number of migrants from India between 1834 and 1937 was some thirty million people, of whom some twenty-four million returned to India. For South Africa, the government statistics regarding repatriation, emigration and immigration figures for Indians (1962) show that between 1916 and 1921, there was a net loss of Indians amounting to 9704 people. From 1922 to 1926, there was a net loss of 9978 people. (The Department of Statistics provides a warning that these figures are not very reliable). From 1927 to 1964, the figures relate only to "non-white" emigration and immigration, but the Department of Statistics notes that over 90% of these "non-whites" are "Indians". Despite a constant trickle of immigrants into South Africa, there is a net loss of 2937 "non-whites" during this time period (see Chapter I for fuller details).

It is appropriate here, then, to clarify the concept of "migrant" that is being used. Following du Toit and Safa (1975), Watson (1977) and others, a migrant is any person who permanently or temporarily leaves
his place of birth to live elsewhere. This definition is broad enough to include rural to urban migrants within one country, and also oscillating migration of migrant labourers, as well as a permanent move from one country to another. The Indians who have lived in South Africa have been both migrant labourers who have returned to India after a period of working in South Africa, and labourers and free immigrants who migrated intending to live permanently in South Africa, and who still remain here, with their descendants.

ASSIMILATION THEORIES

Sociological approaches to migration have, in the past, been concerned to show the extent to which an immigrant group adapts to - or is assimilated into - its new environment. A successful immigrant group is taken to be that group that soonest becomes indistinguishable from the host society.

Milton Gordon (cited in Price, 1969), delineates a process of assimilation. Degree and facility of assimilation are affected by the migrants' residence area (the region, and urban or rural), social class and what he calls "ethnic group" of the immigrants. "Ethnic group" constitutes people sharing the same customs, race and nation of origin. There are several types or levels of assimilation. These he lists as cultural or behavioural assimilation (also known as acculturation), structural assimilation, marital assimilation, identificational assimilation, attitude receptional assimilation, behaviour receptional assimilation, and civic assimilation. These can be generally summarised as assimilation through imitation of the customs of the host society; assimilation through participation in primary domestic units (kin groups); and assimilation through participation in local level and wider ranging politics and civic affairs. Central to Gordon's hypothesis is a
concept taken from Eisenstadt (cited in Price, 1969), which is the extent to which the host society is prepared to tolerate either assimilation or a plural society.

Gordon postulates that the first type of assimilation is likely to be acculturation, on the basis that migrants are forced to conform in outward behaviour to the norms of the host society. He suggests that once structural assimilation occurs, (that is, assimilation into the host's primary groups) then all the other types should follow automatically.

Price (1969) criticises Gordon's hypothesis on several grounds. One of the major flaws is that Gordon has postulated an evolutionary, unidirectional change for migrants, from unassimilated and different, to assimilated and the same. He does not allow for any interaction between types of change that occur, for example, that a later change may have a feedback effect on an earlier change. Following from this, Gordon does not account for peoples acculturated in different ways within the same host society, and subject to differing amounts and types of discrimination. Although Gordon is using the United States as his example, he does not look at the heterogeneity of behaviour; he assumes the host society to be homogeneous. Price also criticises that Gordon does not allow for any type of economic absorption and thus leaves out the complicated issues of economic competition and class differences.

A further criticism is supplied from the work of Barth (1969). Barth maintains that the sharing of a common culture by an ethnic group (that is, in Gordon's terms, a "traditional" group or a Westernised assimilated group) is more a by-product of ethnicity than a primary definition. If one regards culture as central, then one's hypothesis is based on morphological characteristics, which
are thus regarded as immutable in time, by implication. Ecological conditions also affect cultural forms, so that to imply a static view of morphological characteristics is to disregard this influence: "It is thus inadequate to regard overt institutional forms as constituting the cultural features which at any time distinguish an ethnic group - these overt forms are determined by ecology as well as by transmitted culture". (Barth: 1969: 13).

The studies undertaken by Siddique (1977) and Weppner (1972) illustrate the least plausible use of Gordon's hypothesis. Siddique studied the changes in behaviour of Indians and Pakistanis who had migrated to Canada. The core of the study was to illustrate the extent of change, of assimilation and of Westernisation of these migrant families. Taken as indices of significant change were family relationships, and participation in Indian ethnic activities. Siddique compared what he called "traditional" Canadian family life with that of the immigrants, analysing differences in authority patterns and decision-making patterns. Immediately, several criticisms are applicable. Firstly, his assumption of any "traditional" and homogeneous Canadian family life is simplistic, and he never indicates from where he obtains his stereotype. Secondly, his assumption that there is a single "traditional" Indian family life is just as simplistic (see Chapters III and IV). Thirdly, he encounters so much individual variation in the authority structure of the immigrant family that an adequate explanation of it is difficult. Fourthly, he immediately assumes that on arriving in Canada, Indian and Pakistani immigrants seek out a stereotype of the "traditional Canadian family" on which to base their family structure: he assumes that
it is inevitable that the immigrant families should change to his
dubiously derived stereotype. There is no indication that this
stereotype is in any way a reference point for immigrants at all.

His second set of criteria is the degree and type of participation
in ethnic activities. The more the immigrant participates in
non-ethnic activities, the more Westernised and acculturated he is.
Siddique, however, fails to give any indication of the extent and
type of participation in ethnic activities of any other Canadians.
He also does not consider that ethnic-based activities may in
themselves be an adaptation to the new environment, rather than a
reactionary failure to change. After analysing the extent and
degree of immigrant participation in non-ethnic activities, such
as theatre and cinema attendance, and commenting on the significance
of this in terms of adaptation, Siddique then nullifies it all by
stating that since the migrants are all from professional classes,
they probably would have been participating in non-ethnic
activities to some extent in India, according to data provided on
professionals in India. Siddique does not mention local level
discrimination that may be practised against immigrants and act as
deterrent to participation in non-ethnic affairs, nor the potential
value of ethnic co-operation and association. The central flaw in
Siddique's presentation is that he has ignored the context of
immigrant response to a new environment - also the significance of
over-riding political and economic constraints. He assumes a uni-
directional evolutionary change from non-Westernised to
Westernised, and that lack of change indicates reactionary behaviour
and maladjustment to the new conditions. Weppner's study (1972)
has the same type of value judgement. He studies urban assimilation
in the United States, using as his criterion of assimilation a psychological test of urban orientation, in which grammar proficiency is one of the central issues. The more proficient in grammar, the more one is urbanised. Weppner makes no attempt to indicate how correctly Americans speak who have been living in cities for decades. Nor does he indicate whether he is using Oxford English as his criterion of correctness. The fundamental mistake is his complete lack of analysis of economic and political integration in the context of conditions in urban life compared with the area of previous residence. Any sign of ethnic affiliation is construed as a remnant from the old times, rather than as a strategy employed in a new situation. These studies typify some of the mistakes made by sociologists following Gordon's assimilation hypothesis uncritically.

TRADITION AND MODERNITY

The controversy over the use of the polarised concepts of "tradition" and modernity has been well presented by Gusfield (1966), Bendix (1966), Shiner (1975) and others. Considering that earlier studies of migration were based on this distinction between "tradition" and "modernity", it is apposite to present the outcome of the critiques, without listing the entire controversy.

Gusfield (1966), like the others, criticises the oversimplified view of unilinear evolution from "traditional" societies to "modern" ones. "Modern" invariably means industrial and urban, and generally is understood to describe Western countries, who are, by implication, therefore more progressive, more highly evolved, than non-industrial "traditional" societies.
Gusfield analyses the concept of tradition and finds that to any contemporary generation, it represents a model of and a model for society (in Geertz's terms, 1973). "Tradition" is a reconstruction of the behaviour and values of one's ancestors, a moral evaluation of them to find them good and worthy of emulation, which is used to provide a moral justification for the behaviour and beliefs of contemporary life. "Tradition" is thus not an invariable determinate, but a morally based strategy to bolster one's own values, using historically based behaviour as a precedent. It involves choice and evaluation, since not always are all aspects of tradition equally important. As society changes, so will different emphases be placed on different aspects of past history and tradition.

There are several fallacies that Gusfield discusses, associated with the concept of tradition. So-called "traditional" societies are seen to be static, whereas in actuality, they are not. He quotes the case of pre-colonial India, often represented as an ideal type of unchanging traditional society. He uses the work of Srinivas (1962) and others to show the extent of change and flexibility that occurred on the local levels, and on the national level following wars between Indian rulers, and wars involving foreign powers such as the Moghuls. Traditional society is also represented as being harmonious within a structure-functionalist analysis of consistency, but a theoretical change in emphasis from structure-functionalism immediately indicates that this is not so. Gusfield cites the example of the laws of caste inter-relationship appearing to be strict and immutable, but in practice, there are many built-in conflict mechanisms which enable these laws to be disregarded or
A particularly misleading idea implicit in an evolutionary framework, is that old traditions are replaced by new ones. Gusfield cites the example of Gandhi and his symbols of Indian nationalism to disprove this point. Gandhi took aspects of old traditions from throughout India, and moulded them into a people's concept of a national united India sharing common traditions. The old traditions are often redefined and used with renewed vigour and importance in a new situation. This point has particular importance in this thesis, in the discussion of symbols of ethnicity and strategies for obtaining access to resources (see Chapters IV and V). The same example serves to disprove the axiom that "modernising" changes serve to weaken tradition. Srinivas' concept of Sanskritisation (1962 and 1967) admirably disproves the point.

The basis of this type of analysis, criticised by Gusfield, is that tradition and modernity are artificially polarised, and seen, in the context of an evolutionary value-judgment, to be mutually exclusive. Tradition and urban industrialism do co-exist throughout large parts of Africa and Asia.

Anthropologists such as Geertz (1973) have shown how new national level changes have been inaugurated using the strategies provided by "traditional" networks and values. The rise of the Black Consciousness movement indicates the redefinition of elements of "black cultures" or négritude (cf. Senghal) to form modern international political upheavals that have and are changing the balance of power in Africa.
PRICE'S MODEL OF MIGRATION

Price (1969) expands a chain model of migration first propounded by Lochore and then by Borrie. He uses data gained from the study of Eastern European migrants to Australia for his model.

The first settlers in a country are single or groups of pioneers, who usually intend returning to their natal country. Often, these pioneers are peripatetic, roaming the country in search of different sorts of jobs. Eventually, when they decide to stay, they endeavour to encourage other men from their natal areas to join them. These men are most often kinsmen from the same village, and other co-villagers. Some groups of pioneers may still be itinerant, joining with other groups, remaining awhile, and then splitting again.

In the Australian example, these pioneers had to learn many of the cultural characteristics (such as language, dress and outward behaviour patterns) of the host society, in order to obtain jobs. Because of the lack of their own womenfolk, some pioneers married British-Australian women, which further acted to anchor the migrants more firmly in Australia. Once the majority of immigrants had managed to establish some relatively secure form of income, in this case, small independent businesses, mining, fishing or labouring, they encouraged their own womenfolk to migrate. The immediate impact of the arrival of the women and children was that suddenly ethnic enclaves appear. The women were not familiar with the cultural symbols of their new surroundings, and continued
to utilise their own. They re-introduced customs, and values haphazardly used or forgotten by their menfolk. They also discouraged marriage outside the ethnic group, and in practice, they discouraged much intermixing. Especially when the women were housebound, and so presented with little opportunity for learning other customs and values, the domestic domain acted as an encapsulating unit.

When the pioneers encourage their womenfold to emigrate, there may be such a consequent flood of migrants to the new country that there may be sufficient numbers of them to form ethnic associations, such as schools and churches. Price clearly emphasises that ethnic identity and co-operation are not invariable. His model proceeds to outline sources of tension between the migrants and their colonial born children. The Eastern European migrants came from relatively poor peasant surroundings, or from a poor urban unskilled labourer setting. Therefore, their petit bourgeois achievements, or even their achievements to become artisans and skilled labourers, are viewed by them with contentment. Their children, however, imbued with British Australian social snobbishness, would prefer to see their parents as haute bourgeoisie, raising their general standards. The children often have different ambitions for themselves than those their parents hold for them. Price records how frequently, their parents wanted their children to take over the family business, whilst the children preferred different occupations. In addition to this, the children conflicted with their parents over the value of the old customs and ideology in the new setting.
The marriage patterns of the emigrants varies directly in proportion to the number of emigrants available to choose from, and in proportion to the sex ratio of the community. The extent of cultural change also depends on the number of emigrants, the sex ratio, and whether the emigrants inter-act to form a community or not. The reaction of the host society towards them also influences marriage patterns and cultural change.

Price continues his model to describe the emergence of a third generation, but he cautions that his model is tentative here because in the situation studies, the third generation was still young. He postulates that despite the tension that develops between the first and second generation, many of the third generation will still live within the migrant community, and marry co-ethnics.

This general model of the arrival of migrants in a new country has found wide applicability (cf. Watson, 1977, R. and C. Ballard, 1977, Meer 1969, and others). It describes accurately although in general terms, the migration of non-indentured Indians to South Africa, and the process of their responses to their new situation.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF PRICE'S MODEL

Du Toit and Safa (1975), Watson (1977) and others, whilst accepting Price's outline, emphasise that any study of migration, to be adequate, must include a study of the situation on both sides of the migration - the natal country and the country of immigration. They therefore analyse which groups of people tend to migrate and which do not. Price has been criticised (Douglas, 1970) for concentrating on the followers of the emigrants, and not on the leaders, and why they emigrate in the first place.
Watson (1977), Du Toit and Safa (1975) and others look at which social categories and statuses tend to migrate and why, and how individuals within (or without) these categories and statuses maximise and manipulate their choices.

They suggest that it is the people who are culturally or economically marginal who will tend to migrate. This includes not only individuals who through some idiosyncracy of their circumstances are marginal, but also categories of people who are marginal: "It .... suggests that persons who are marginal due to exposure, experiences and knowledge or who are dissatisfied and frustrated with their conditions will tend to migrate" (Du Toit and Safa: 1975: 3).

Scarlett Epstein (1962) discusses a southern Indian village situation, in which the Muslims, as a minority, are on the fringe of village life, excluded by religion and varna from participating in the Hindu caste orientated village rituals and celebrations. Being thus on the fringe, they are, she suggests, forced to be more resourceful and enterprising than the Hindu majority. Hence they become merchants. A shop is seen as a source of great wealth by both Hindus and Muslims, but members of the dominant Peasant caste will not open one because it entails serving lower castes and untouchables. Also, in terms of the "noblesse oblige" type of relationship between dominant and subordinate castes, the Peasants would be expected to be charitable, give gifts and easy credit to all members of all subordinate castes. The Muslims, however, by being outside the caste system, are outside this system of values, and so they can exploit this economic niche.

Although Scarlett Epstein was describing conditions in southern India, the logical argument regarding Muslim enterprise and
entrepreneurship in the retail business seems to be justified in West India, in the Gujerat region (from where all the Muslim Indians in South Africa have emigrated). This may partially explain why so many Gujerati Muslims see their future in the retail trade, and have continued in this line outside of India, following the logic of their natal communities. But further than this, Scarlett Epstein illustrates adequately how Muslims are marginal to the caste system, and in villages in which Hindus predominate, they are even marginal to local village life and politics.

Taking the argument further, Srinivas (1962 and 1967) shows how in any single village, there can be only a certain maximum number of persons occupying any economic niche or jati, and this would, of course, include Muslim traders. The other members of that caste would be able to support themselves by becoming peasant farmers. With the vast increase of population, however, land was no longer so readily available, and millions became dispossessed of all means of livelihood, and migrated to the cities for employment, or migrated overseas, indenturing in the Colonial Office labour scheme (see Chapter I). Muslims without either shop or land - given the strict Muslim practice of partible inheritance between agnates - are thus particularly vulnerable to the incentives of migration. They are at a double disadvantage: marginal to begin with, in many parts of India, and doubly marginal without some means of support. Why particularly Gujerati Muslims emigrated in such numbers to South Africa, only further research can indicate.

Price, in his hypothesis, postulated that although a migrant may spend the rest of his life in the country to which he emigrated,
his value orientation remains towards his natal country. R. and C. Ballard (1977) describe the orientation in fuller detail. They studied Sikh migration to Britain. The Sikhs remained Punjab orientated, to the extent of sending back regular large remittances. The migrants' money would be invested in schemes at home, either private ones, or ones of public benefit, such as adding on to the school or hospital buildings, or building a well. For these efforts, the migrant would win high status and acclaim in his natal community, and it was to this evaluation of his actions that he responded. Badr Dahya (1974), finding the same orientation amongst his study group of Pakistani immigrants to Britain, concludes:

"Completely to abandon one's attachment to the village of origin and to one's landholding means giving up one's claims to membership of one's village-and-kin network .... Migration is undertaken for raising the immigrant's family's socio-economic status back home, and not for the immigrant's immediate gratification" (Dahya: 1974: 82).

The significance of this conclusion is that it is precisely branches of this village-and-kin network with whom one interacts in the domestic domain in the new country. To reject it or to relinquish claims of membership also means to relinquish the resources available through a reciprocally aiding network, in an alien environment.

Foner (1977) further analyses the homeward orientation of migrants who have spent many years abroad. She ascribes it to the factors mentioned above, and also to the impact of a hostile or at least alien new environment, where de facto if not de jure discrimination
is practised against immigrants: "The homeward orientation seems to shield migrants from some of the stings of racial prejudice: if England is not their real home, then they can more easily endure prejudice". (ibid.: 133).

This further analysis by Foner can be applied to the Indian position in South Africa. Given the legislative discrimination against Indians in South Africa, and their consequent hardships (see Chapters I and II and Appendix I), the homeward orientation and the enveloping folds of the extended family may possibly take the sting out of the present situation. Meer (1971) presents exactly this idea in the following quotation, referring to Indians in Natal:

"Desperate for security, and fearful of not obtaining it in the general social milieu, he (the Indian) searches for it in the intrinsically Indian cultural idiom. There is a lively revival of interest in Indian languages, religion, music, dancing, drama – scholars come from India and visitors go to India. But this in the main, is the comfort of the adult generation. The young, knowing no other idiom but that of urban South Africa seek it in the South African idiom. There is anger, but the anger is directed against the parent generation and for the while, conflict is confined within the Group Area" (Meer: 1971: 30).

Foner (ibid.), Saifullah Khan (1977) and R. and C. Ballard (ibid.) emphasise the phase in Price's model which deals with the interaction between first and second generation migrants.
They describe, first, how, in the new environment, customs and values are altered by existing pressures - demographic, social, economic and political - and that the type of behaviour pattern first generation migrants adopt is not just a reiteration of tradition from the old country, nor is it completely a matter of choice. Choice is involved, together with moral commitment to tradition, but choice is constrained by the external factors of the new environment. Therefore, the conservative first generation migrants will seldom behave exactly like the friends and family left in the natal country, even if they wish to. Their behaviour fits their new context. The second generation diverges even further from the cultural traditions of the homeland of their parents, since most of them have been educated and socialised completely in the context of the new environment. "Many of the people discussed, especially those who were born in Britain, are caught between the cultural expectations of their parents (the first generation migrants) and the social demands of the wider society". (Watson: 1977: 3). Saifullah Khan (ibid.) expresses the tension between first and second generation migrants more clearly. She discusses the problem of the second generation children who participate in differing degrees from their parents in the three areas - of homeland orientation and knowledge, in the local migrant world, and in the majority host society. Foner (ibid.) continues this line of thought, saying that amongst her group of immigrant Jamaicans to Britain, few of the second generation can talk of Jamaica as a homeland, since they have never even visited it. They feel themselves to be more British than Jamaican, but the people of the majority society with whom they mix do not accept them fully as British. There is always an undercurrent
of prejudice against them on the part of the British. Therefore, the young people have found another element of identity. They seek identification with others in a similar situation, an identification that completely cross-cuts their Jamaican ethnicity: "Neither Jamaican nor fully English, they often look to their blackness as a basis for identification" (Foner: ibid.: 145).

ETHNICITY AND MIGRATION

During the process of migration and the responses of the migrants to their new setting, it is indubitable that the migrant group will define itself vis-à-vis its host society, and be defined by the host society. It will lose some of its members and gain others (such as women through marriage). Members will also use some of the cultural symbols of the host society merely since they have to participate in it, yet despite this, the migrant group may maintain conceptual boundaries around itself:

"It is clear that boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them. In other words, categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories" (Barth: 1969: 10).

Ethnic behaviour has often been regarded as a resource, a strategy for obtaining ends in a multi-ethnic situation (cf. Levy, 1973, Collins, 1973, Crespi, 1973). In this way, behaviour is seen to be not only reflective of the sum of the
past, but also creative, creating means of manipulating the present. Thus, behaviour patterns also involve deliberate choice: one is not only ascribed to a particular group, one also chooses to maintain and perpetuate these ascribed relationships: "Not only do migrants make choices, manipulate and utilise various kinds of networks for their own ends, they are also the creators of and the receivers of well thought out rationale for the manner in which they behave" (Kasdan: 1970: 5).

This approach emphasises the importance of an individual's awareness of his ability to manipulate ethnic identity and the symbols of ethnicity, and his choice in doing so. The criticism of early transactional analysis (cf. Paine, 1974) may be applied to the extremes of this approach. Is an individual always aware of his position, can he always manipulate his ethnic symbols, does he know what his most effective ethnic symbols are in a certain situation, and, finally, how does he know he is maximising his own self advantage?

Cohen (1974) criticises this extreme application of transactionalism to ethnic behaviour. He illustrates that there is a dialectic relationship between an individual and ethnic symbols, both of which are moulded by the other. Ethnic identity, he agrees, is not a matter of once and for all commitment, but rather a matter of degree: "The difficulty with this kind of explanation is that it is one-sided and cannot account for the potency of the normative symbols which the individual manipulates in his struggle for power. An ethnic group is not simply the sum total of the strategies adopted by independent individuals" (Cohen: 1974: xiii).
Sanford (1974) working from perspectives gained from Price, Leach (1961) and Barth (1969), looks at the resurgence of long-disused ethnic symbols amongst a disadvantaged group in the Caribbean. One political leader decided to win support by re-activating long forgotten ethnic symbols, such as vocabulary, dress, songs, which were alien to the other islanders who held the power. In this way, he enthused a following of co-ethnics, who campaigned for the implementation of full democracy. According to the old assimilation theorists, this resurgence of old traditions in the face of "Western" customs, involving the rejection of the latter could be seen only as degeneration, an inability of the ethnic group to adapt. Sanford explains this resurgence otherwise: "The revitalisation movement, although it seems to look inward, in reality looks outward to attempt a change in values in the dominant society, to change the social structure which places the subordinate group at a disadvantage" (Sanford: 1974: 507).

This analysis is particularly important when discussing Indian ethnicity in South Africa (cf. the Meer quotation cited earlier), considering the disadvantaged position of Indians there. This issue will be discussed below.

This approach indicates the importance of external factors in determining the significance of any ethnic statement. Whatever else it includes, ethnicity is a statement of boundaries, which is a political statement. Boundaries enclose membership and resources available only to members. Parkin defines ethnicity as follows: "... the articulation of cultural distinctiveness in situations of political conflict or competition" (1974: 119). Ethnicity is thus not only a resource, and the "outcome of individual strategies", 
but also its form and significance depend very much on external political and economic conditions. Ethnicity is partially created by the environment, and partially created by the participants to cope with the environment, and partially created by historical precedent. R. and C. Ballard (1977) state this position unequivocally:

"... it should also be recognised that the external constraints, such as the migrant's position in the labour and housing markets or the discrimination he faces, are ultimately prior to the internal preferences of the group ..... These internal preferences should not be regarded as fixed or static but rather as positive and dynamic responses to the external constraints" (ibid.: 1977: 53).

Badr Dahya (1974) whilst agreeing to this outlook in principle warns of the analyst applying his own concept of the external constraints to the behaviour and choices of immigrants, without asking the latter their reasons for such behaviour.

So thus, an idea of ethnicity emerges, in which an analyst must pay attention to the normative aspects of ethnicity, its resource and strategy value vis-à-vis the external constraints which impose a certain form on the manifestation of ethnicity. But the analyst must also pay attention to folk explanations of behaviour.

THE APPLICATION OF THESE APPROACHES TO INDIAN ETHNICITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

The concept that so-called "traditional" cultural elements are conservative and an indication of not adapting completely to "Western" ways has been used implicitly in the work on Indians
in South Africa. Kuper (1960) and Palmer (1957) never talk directly about degree of acculturation, but they both describe Indian customs as relics from India. What gives their analyses this slant is that neither of them analyses Indian behaviour in the context of the external system - in the context of externally imposed restrictions and disabilities. Kuper, for example, presents an analysis of household composition of Natal Indians without considering that the impact of the Group Areas rezoning for Indians has been to cause an extreme housing shortage (see Chapters I and II), which will undoubtedly affect household composition.

Although Palmer presents a political history of Indians in Natal, rather than an anthropological study, neither she nor Kuper consider the meaning of what has so glibly been called "Indian ethnicity". To display symbols of Indian identity too openly has, in the past, resulted in further discrimination against Indians by the ruling elite. For example, since 1897 (see Appendix I), immigration restrictions have been imposed whereby all those deemed to be unassimilable into "White South African culture" on the basis of strong commitments to a different culture, have been refused entry to South Africa. Education and means tests were also applied to prospective immigrants. Therefore, for Indians to profess too openly their Indianess became a distinct disadvantage. Discrimination against Indians (see Chapters I and II, and Appendix I) in the economic and political spheres further showed the danger of exposing ethnic symbols too openly.

Yet despite this, Indian ethnicity in Natal has often been used as a political symbol mobilising support against discrimination (cf.
But the Race Classification Act of 1950 further complicates the issue of Indian ethnicity. By means of this act, the Nationalist government classified the entire population into different "races", based on area of origin, phenotype, cultural practices, and general acceptability as a member of a proposed "race". As indicated in Chapters II and V, the people classified as "Indian" by means of the legislation are not necessarily regarded as Indian by other Indians. And the Race Classification Board has rejected claims to be classified as Indian by people who see themselves as Indian, and who are considered by the group to be Indian.

The subtle effect of the Race Classification Act is that, whatever concept of group boundaries Indians entertained before, the boundaries have, in certain, vital aspects, been made static and inflexible by legislation. Despite the discrepancy between the legal and the folk classifications, the legal classification deliberately emphasises and maintains a boundary and a concept of difference which must influence the folk classification since it applies to every aspect of an Indian's life. The folk classification may quite plausibly have undergone alteration, in time according to changing circumstances, being more flexible; but the inflexibility of the legal classification has a feed-back effect on the Indian's concept of "Indians".

In addition to this, the sister act of the Race Classification Act, the Group Areas Act, has a profound influence. Previously, Indians lived in mixed areas, in the Cape at least, but the Group Areas Act ensures that each "race" should live in its own group area, thus
isolating it geographically from other groups. Kuper (1960) and Meer (1969) do not discuss the effects of either of these pieces of legislation on the concept of and practice of Indian ethnicity.

Meer (1969 and 1971) does, however, discuss how the effects of discriminatory legislation, such as shortage of housing and limitations in commerce, have influenced the development of strong links between members of an extended family. This line of analysis is particularly valuable in understanding what conditions induce certain behaviour patterns and value judgments. She shows very clearly how kin links not only provide members with affective support, but also with a whole range of other resources, such as mutual aid, in a long-term reciprocal arrangement. Economic security is increased through becoming and remaining enmeshed in extended family relationships.
MAP I. I. INDIA: AREAS OF ORIGIN OF MIGRANTS

SCALE:

0 200 400 Statute miles

KEY:

= Area of origin of migrants
CHAPTER I

A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA

MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA

Migration from India to South Africa began in 1860, as an extension of the larger organised effort by the British Colonial Office to redistribute what was considered to be surplus Indian labour to various parts of the Empire and to allied countries. This large scheme was begun in 1834, when Indian labourers were recruited from the areas around Bombay, Madras, Hyderabad and Calcutta (see map I.I.) to become indentured labourers to ease labour shortages in South America, Mauritius, Ceylon, Fiji, Guadaloupe, and French, Dutch and British Guiana (Meer, 1969).

Natal sugar cane farmers were suffering from a severe labour shortage in the 1850's, mainly because of Shepstone's policy of not coercing the local indigenous peoples to become wage labourers. Sir George Grey, then Governor of the Cape, and High Commissioner for Natal, recommended the use of Indian labour to alleviate this situation. The Colonial Secretary approved the request, despite opposition by the board of directors of the British East India Company. The latter objected that the proposed conditions of labour in Natal were grossly inadequate; and that also, their own company interests in the Bombay area were expanding rapidly and so required a large supply of labour (Pachai, 1971). Later, in 1874, the Cape had also applied for indentured Indian labour (Ginwala, 1974), but nothing further was done following delays in Whitehall.

In 1859, Law Fourteen of Natal was passed, allowing Natal to indenture
Indian labour, and also guaranteeing the right of the labourers to a free return passage to India after ten years service, or permitting the passage to be commuted to a land grant equal in value to the cost of the return fare. (See Footnote 1 on Page 61). After five years initial obligatory service, the labourer would then be allowed to contract his labour freely.

The first Indians arrived in Durban in 1860. At first, according to Ginwala (1974), any healthy Indian was indentured in India, but after the initial period, Muslims were not favoured as recruits, since they were considered to be poor labourers and a bad example to others. More importantly, they could desert and easily pass as non-indentured Indians, since most of the non-indentured Indians were then Muslims (from the Report of the Protector of Indians in Natal, 1905, cited in Ginwala). So poor were living and labour conditions of the Natal indentured workers, that in 1872, the Colonial Office terminated further indenture, until improvements had been made. Two years later, further indenture began, but again was stopped because of the poor conditions. By the first decade of the twentieth century, relations between India and South Africa were severely strained over the treatment of British Indians - indentured and non-indentured - and the influential Indian nationalists (such as Gandhi) were suggesting that indenture to South Africa be halted altogether.

It was only Natal that indentured Indian labour. The Cape attempt had been abortive, whilst the Orange Free State and the Transvaal had not considered the idea of importing cheap labour. These provinces used, instead, indigenous supplies of labour. Because
the numbers of indentured Indians and free Indian migrants in Natal had increased so rapidly by the turn of the century, and Indians had started to emigrate to the other provinces, the two conservative powers, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, feared an Indian take-over in control of land and retail trade. They therefore called for complete exclusion of all Indians, not only from their own lands, but, at Union, from South Africa. Table I.I. indicates the rise of the so-called "Coolie" population in Natal ("Coolie" referring to indentured Indian labour). 1866 was the first Natal census in which "Coolies" are recorded.

**TABLE I.I. INDENTURED INDIAN LABOUR IN NATAL**

(SOURCES: GOVERNMENT CENSUS REPORTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Date</th>
<th>Female Coolies</th>
<th>Male Coolies</th>
<th>Total Number of Coolies in Natal</th>
<th>Coolies as % of Natal Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>1147</td>
<td>3894</td>
<td>5041</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* 1872</td>
<td>1402</td>
<td>2758</td>
<td>5068</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>3101</td>
<td>6650</td>
<td>9751</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* 1880</td>
<td>5413</td>
<td>10155</td>
<td>18877</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* 1891</td>
<td>15456</td>
<td>25686</td>
<td>41142</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* 1904</td>
<td>37421</td>
<td>63497</td>
<td>100918</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Census uses "Asiatic" and not "Coolie" so that free immigrants are included here.

+ = Discrepancy between given total and sum of columns caused by lack of breakdown by sex of the population of the Borough of Durban. Totals only are then provided.

In 1909, when the Union of South Africa was formed, the other provinces
insisted that if Natal joined the Union, all further indentured immigration should be stopped, since they feared what became known as "Indian penetration". Natal fought against losing this source of very cheap labour, and managed to extend the period of indenturing for a further year. In 1910, the Union government petitioned the Indian Viceroy to end statutorily all indenturing to Natal. This move was seen as the start of a uniform South African policy towards Indians—halting their penetration and encouraging repatriation to India (Pachai, 1971).

There were other categories of Indians immigrating to South Africa, however. These were Indians migrating freely, as British citizens, within the Empire, entitled to full citizen rights. Because these Indians paid their own passage, they were called passenger Indians. The first to arrive in South Africa came to Natal early in the 1870's, to serve the indentured Indian population as religious leaders, teachers, and, most importantly, as traders. Many of the early traders were members of large merchant families sent to various parts of Africa and Mauritius to expand the family trading empire, and from their names (some listed in pamphlet No. 170 of the Indian Chamber of Commerce, n.d.) they are mostly Muslim. For example, one man, Moosa Hajee Cassim, came from a princely family in Gujerat (where Muslim rule had long been established), of which, from time to time, several members had acted either as Regent or as chief advisor to the Maharajah of Porebander State (ibid.) The Cassims had a merchant chain stretching from Natal, to Mauritius, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, Porebander and across India to New Delhi and Hong Kong. They also ran their own merchant fleet. Once a trading community had been
established in Natal, new passenger Indians interested in trading tended to choose to immigrate directly to other parts of South Africa, to avoid the over-competition in Natal. Thus, of the Muslims in Rylands, none of the first generation Indians migrated from Natal; they all came to the Cape directly from India. For the indentured labourers - mostly Hindu - the situation was different. Their only means of arriving in South Africa had been to indenture to a Natal plantation, and only after the expiry of their term of service could they choose to move. According to an official of the Department of Indian Affairs, most of the Hindus in Cape Town originate from a constant trickle of migrants from Natal, from about 1885 to 1908 (when entry to the Cape was restricted - see Appendix I). Most of these were from the basket-weaving caste, who were from Southern India (Tamils). In due course, other wealthier Hindus followed, as religious leaders, teachers and professionals, not of the same caste.

The process of migration for indentured labourers and for passengers differed. Frequently, indentured labourers came as individuals (Meer, 1969, records case histories where Shanghai methods of "recruitment" were used), or very poor extended families indentured together. It was only after many years of service, at the set wage of ten shillings per month, that indentured labourers could afford to pay the passage across to South Africa of their wives and children. There were recruitment officers at Madras, Hyderabad, Calcutta and Bombay, so that the indentured Indians were drawn from all over India. The passenger Indians, however, migrated in a pattern corresponding to Price's model of chain migration (1969) described in the Introduction. The men arrived first to find work, and, once established, encouraged kinsmen and co-villagers, and then their womenfolk, to migrate to join them. They came almost
exclusively from the three hundred mile stretch of coast in Maharashatra Province, around Ratnagiri and Bombay (Gujerat District). Price's model has as a central theme the idea that even if migrants remain permanently in their country of immigration, they believe they will return to their natal place, and they remain orientated towards it. He emphasises how migrants migrate to make money to send to the place of origin, and they do not regard themselves as settlers. This approach seems inadequate for the Indians in South Africa, considering that so very few ever returned, that remittances were curtailed early in Union history and then stopped by 1919. Bradlow (1978) indicates that the severe restrictions against any form of earnings being taken out of the country (by Indians) extended to jewellery. In 1921, through the intervention of the Indian Immigration Advisory Board, which was controlled by the Union government, these remittance restrictions were relaxed sufficiently to allow Indians to remit to India gold and jewellery to the maximum value of £25 per annum. Thus, there never really existed the means in South Africa whereby a migrant could remit enough funds to India to build up his status in his natal village, as described by Price (1969), Watson (1977), Foner (1977) and others in the Introduction. This prohibition on large remittances immediately provides a contrasting situation to those described by the authors above. It meant that, in economic terms, at least, migrants could not use their remittances to improve their social status in their natal villages. Economic investments were forced to be predominantly in South Africa. Also many Indians have never been to India (see Chapter VI).

Palmer (1957), H. Kuper (1960), Pachai (1971) and Ginwala (N.D.) all describe how emigration from India was selective not only in terms
of indentured labourers, but also in terms of those who came to serve the labourers as traders and teachers, since these latter came from such a small area of India. Ginwala (N.D.) describes the economic background of fifty years of widespread emigration from India - of over one and a half million people emigrating between 1830 and 1880. Between 1800 and 1850, there had been seven major famines, during which an estimated one and a half million people died. Between 1850 and 1900, there were twenty-four major famines, during which an estimated twenty-eight and a half million people died. In addition to this, taxation on the Indian peasant was extremely high, since a dual system often operated: tax for the Indian prince, and tax for the British. Merchants had been particularly hard hit by the deliberate British policy of forcing Indian industrialism to be underdeveloped, so that India would provide a ready market for British produce. The result was gross commercial underdevelopment and complete economic dependence on Britain. Maharashtra Province had suffered from all the major famines; and Bombay was one of the centres of the East India Company, and its "development scheme", which involved an industrial monopoly of the area. Combined with these natural and man-made catastrophes, was a sudden increase in Indian population, which has not yet halted. Srinivas (1967, 1955) documents how the caste system had coped with population pressures before. Any one village can support only a certain number of people of the same occupation (or jati) such as barbers, priests, teachers or, for the Muslim non-caste members, of traders. Those members of a sub-caste who were not employed in their traditional occupation could find a living by turning to the land and becoming peasant farmers. As the population pressure increased and land
became relatively more scarce, people moved to the cities to find employment. Already by the mid-nineteenth century, the pressure on the land was so high that there was just not sufficient land to cope with the demand. Yet largely because of the British policy of deliberate industrial underdevelopment, there was a dearth of urban industry at that time to employ the excess people. The migration of so many people from India within fifty years can be directly correlated to the economic circumstances. Migration was directed more by "push" factors than "pull" factors from the receiving countries.

**Migration Figures in South Africa**

The Department of Statistics itself acknowledges the unreliability of the statistics available for numbers of Indian immigrants to South Africa before 1938. Between 1938 and 1958, the data from census reports differentiates between Indian migrants and those from other nations. After 1958, immigrants and emigrants are classified merely on the basis of "white" and "non-white", until 1965, when no phenotypical distinction of immigrants and emigrants is noted at all, and the figures are not broken down into any classification.

Considering the unreliability of immigration and emigration figures, Table 1.11 presents instead the provincial population growth of Indians from 1891 to 1970. Blank spaces are where data is unavailable in the census reports. The anomaly of the 1904 census figure for the Cape is probably explained by the census use of different categories for population classification. The category "Asiatics" is not always clearly distinguished from the "Malay" and "Mixed and Other" categories in the early Cape census reports. "Asiatics" consist of all those "whose homeland is in Asia", but
according to the Department of Statistics, over 96% of those so classified since 1904 were from India, the others being Chinese.

Early in the century, the rate of repatriation to some extent offset the rate of immigration and the rate of natural population increase, but there is little statistical data available on this point. What encouraged both repatriation to India and re-indenturing (rare before 1897) was, according to Ginwala (1974), the heavy annual head tax of £3 imposed on all Indian males and females over the age of thirteen. This tax had been imposed at a time when indentured labourers received a set wage of ten shillings per month. Only after 1905 did the numbers re-indenturing consistently exceed those repatriating (from the Protector’s Report, 1908, cited in Ginwala, 1974). When India stopped indenturing labour to Natal, wages rose, thus encouraging more Natal Indians to re-indenture. For example, Bradlow (1978) illustrates how in 1906, 47% of the indentured labourers re-indentured, whilst in 1912, 95% re-indentured, and only 7% of the total Natal Indian population returned to India. Bradlow (1978) shows that between 1914 and 1919, 17,806 Indians repatriated from Natal. This represents 13% of the 1921 population census figure. There were, however, 12,000 immigrants to Natal during this period. The overall picture is a net loss of Indians, through a steady trickle of emigrants from South Africa, from this period until the present. Bradlow (ibid.) provides emigration figures for Indians in Natal over the five year period of 1920 to 1924, in which a total of 11,482 Indians left South Africa. The Union government, in an attempt to encourage greater numbers of people to repatriate to India, extended the benefits provided to emigrés to Indians of the
Transvaal and the Cape. The Indian Immigration Board provided through its Repatriation Officer, that every voluntary repatriot would be given £5, per member of the family, with a maximum of £20 per family. Efficient transport was organised for the Indians, free transport being provided from Durban to the village of origin, even in rural India. Bradlow continues, to document that in the case of very poor Indians, clothing allowances were provided at sixteen shillings per adult male, six shillings per adult female, and three shillings per child. Since very few Indians were participating in the repatriation scheme, in 1924, when these benefits were extended to the Transvaal and the Cape, the per capita pecuniary encouragement was increased to £10, with a maximum of £50 per family. Bradlow summarizes the numbers of Indians in South Africa repatriating and returning after indenture, between 1914 and 1925. The total number of people repatriated was 19609, and the total number of ex-indentured labourers returning to India was 12116. This gives a total of 31725 Indians leaving South Africa during this period, which is approximately equivalent to 16% of the Indian population of South Africa in 1921. Pachai (1971) shows how the pecuniary incentives to repatriation were dropped in the 1960's as it became apparent that the only people taking advantage of them were the old people who were retiring to India anyway.

When analysing Indian immigration and emigration, the attitudes of the various governments should be noted. From Union, all political parties adopted the attitude that Indian immigration to South Africa should cease, and that all Indians currently resident in South Africa should be forced or encouraged to repatriate. This attitude was the basis of all government dealings with local Indians and with the
Indian government which protested several times on behalf of South African Indians who were facing statutory discrimination.

Table I.II shows a gradually increasing Asiatic population, whose percentage ratio to the total South African population has changed little this century. The column indicating the Asiatic population for the Orange Free State shows the effect of the 1891 Statute Law of the Orange Free State which prohibited the settling of all Asians in this province, and summarily deported all Asiatic businessmen without compensation for their lost businesses.

**TABLE I.II.** **ASIATIC POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA: 1891 – 1970**

(SOURCES: GOVERNMENT CENSUSES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Date</th>
<th>Number of Asiatics in</th>
<th>Total Number of Asiatics in South Africa</th>
<th>Asiaties as % of South African Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>Transvaal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>41142</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>100918</td>
<td>10712</td>
<td>10948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>133419</td>
<td>7564</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>141600</td>
<td>7388</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1936</td>
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<td>37753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>299491</td>
<td>17818</td>
<td>49342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>394854</td>
<td>18477</td>
<td>63787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>514810</td>
<td>21617</td>
<td>80563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

1. No figures are given for Asians resident in Bantustans, except in the 1970 Census, when 3441 Asians resided there.

2. + = Figures in these columns vary from Report to Report.

3. + = The totals for the 1909 and 1970 Censuses do not equal the sum of the Provincial Breakdowns, but are cited in both the 1960 Report and the Cumulator "Union Statistics For Fifty Years 1910 – 1960".
Natal has the largest Indian population, amounting to 83% of the Indian population (1970) of South Africa. (Since fractions of a percentile are not relevant in this aspect, percentages are taken to the nearest integer). The Transvaal has 13% of South Africa's Indians, whilst only 3% of the Indians live in the Cape. Broken down further, the statistics provide an indication of the percentage of Indians living in a certain province compared with the total population of the province. In Natal, the 1970 government statistics reveal that Indians formed 9.1% of the Natal population, so that there are nearly as many Indians as Whites in Natal. In the Transvaal, Indians form 0.7% of the Transvaal population, their number very much lower than the number of Whites resident there. In the Cape, Indians form only 0.3% of the Cape population, which in many ways contributes towards their more privileged position in this province, with less discrimination than has been faced by Indians in the other provinces (see below for fuller details). If the number of Indians is so small, then they are not perceived as any form of a threat by the holders of power.

Bar Chart I.I. indicates the immigration and emigration of Indians to and from South Africa from 1938 to 1958 (source, Government statistics). The figures present the overall gain or loss of Indian immigrants/emigrants to South Africa, calculated from the government statistics by calculating the difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants for each year. The Chart indicates that the net gain of Indians to South Africa never exceeded one thousand persons per annum during this twenty year period. During the height of the Second World War, immigration was particularly low, reaching 151 immigrants in 1942, and a
maximum in 1941 of 265 emigrants. Immediately after the war, immigration rose abruptly, reaching peaks in 1947 and 1948 of 874 and 889 immigrants respectively. Pachai (1971) delineates a war and post-war home policy involving increasing xenophobia, focusing on Indians. In the face of this policy (see Appendix I for the legislation passed in the post-war decade), local Indians realized that further legislation restricting immigration was bound to be passed. Several bills to this effect had already been read in parliament, although none had yet been passed. The statistics relating to immigration and emigration of "non-whites" (not just Indians) indicate that the immigrant sex ratio averaged two males to every three females. The emigrant sex ratio averaged two males to every one female (this breakdown is not available for the figures concerning Indians only). Pachai (ibid.) and Bradlow (ibid.) both show that the immigrants were mostly wives of men already resident in South Africa, arriving with their children. No data were available for the years 1951 and 1952. In 1953, however, the Chart indicates a maximum gain of 940 Indians, most of whom arrived in the first quarter of the year, of whom 710 were female. In the years following, immigration figures have dropped in marked contrast to the previous numbers, and since 1957, the loss of Indians has exceeded the gain.

This fluctuation can be directly correlated with the passing of the Immigration Regulation Act of 1953. According to this act, foreign Indians may live in South Africa only by requesting South African citizenship as stateless people. It prohibited the entry to South Africa (after February of 1953) of any Asiatic woman born outside the Union, who had married a South African overseas. The
BAR CHART I.I.

NET IMMIGRATION-EMIGRATION OF INDIANS TO AND FROM SOUTH AFRICA: 1938-58

IMMIGRANTS
Immigrant sex ratio:
2 Δ: 3 0.

EMMIGRANTS
Emigrant sex ratio:
2 Δ: 1 0.
entry of their minor children was also prohibited except with special permission granted by an immigration officer or the Minister himself. The large numbers of women immigrating again turned out to be the wives and children of South African residents, who quickly came to South Africa to "beat the ban" as they called it. The immigration acts are discussed further below.

BREAKDOWN INTO RELIGIOUS GROUPS OF INDIAN POPULATION

The Indian population in South Africa follows three main religions - Hinduism, Islam and Christianity - although other religions are represented by small groups (such as the Parsees). Table C I of the government census report 02-05-03 of 1970 gives a breakdown by denomination of the Asiatic population in South Africa. In 1960, 68.58% of the Asiatics were Hindu, and in 1970, 68.26% were Hindu. In 1960, 20.72% were Muslim, and in 1970, 19.99%. Christian denominations accounted for 7.53% in 1960, and 8.54% in 1970. Religions categorised as "other", in addition to Confucianists, (mostly Chinese) accounted for 0.40% of the Asiatics in 1960, and 0.44% in 1970.

Table I. III gives an indication of the percentage ratio changes in the Muslim Asiatics, vis-a-vis the rest of the Asiatics. Since 1921, the proportions of Muslims to Hindus have increased in both Natal and the Transvaal, but in the Cape, there has been a drastic decrease of 40.9% in the proportion of Muslims to Hindus. This latter tendency has been caused largely by the fact that generally the first Indians to arrive in the Cape were the free immigrants, whilst the ex-indentured Hindu labourers arrived as a result of internal migration only later (Brand, 1966).
from the 1970 census indicates that the balance to 100% left over from the percentage of Muslims indicated in Table I.III comprises mostly Hindu, with a very small minority being Christian and "other". The 1970 figures are: for Natal, 75% of the Asians are Hindu; for the Transvaal, 34%; for the Cape 26%, and for South Africa as a whole, 68% are Hindu. It is in the Transvaal and the Cape that Hindus are outnumbered by Christians and Muslims, the percentage ratios in the Cape being 26% Hindus, 27% Christians and 47% Muslims.

It is only in the Cape that there exists a sizeable population of non-Asian Muslims, who, in South Africa, are Blacks and "Coloureds". In the Cape, there lives a large population of Muslims descended from political prisoners and slaves taken by the Dutch from the area encompassed by present-day Indonesia, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Islam rather than Christianity became the religion of these exiles not merely because it was the religion of their forebears in India; and not merely because of the slave owners' dislike of converting their slaves to Christianity.
(which could have entitled them to freedom). Davids (1969) suggests that a central reason was a political one. Christianity was the religion of the slave-owners. As the only means of incipient "rebellion" against them, the slaves chose a religion which taught that it was the fulfillment of Christianity, the answers to the problems unsolved by Christianity. Islam also has an extremely strict code of laws to be followed in daily life, and through these, slaves could gain a measure of self-respect, and at the same time thus be able to feel superior to their Kafir owners. Also, Islamic teaching generally involves learning to read and write Arabic (to understand the Qu'ran), so that slaves otherwise illiterate could now become literate and well versed in Arabic history and Islamic laws.

From government census data (census reports from 1904 to 1970) in 1904, Asiatics constituted 33% of the Muslims in the Cape, the remaining majority being constituted by the "Cape Malays". The 1904 figure for Asiatics is anomalously high because of a lack of distinction in the census categories between "Mixed and other" and "Malay", which also meant, at that stage, in the Cape, "Muslim". By 1921, the Asiatics constituted 13% of the Cape Muslims; by 1960, 8% and in 1970, 8%. This change in ratio has two major causes. The one is the high birth rate of the "Malays" compared with that of the Asiatics, and the other is that there have been increasing numbers of Blacks (Africans), in the Cape, converting to Islam. In 1946, 0.3% of the Cape Muslims were Black, whereas by 1960, they formed 12.2% of the Cape Muslim population.
The contact between the Asiatic and the "Cape Malay" Muslims is described further in Chapter II. There was little contact between the Blacks and the other Muslims, because a large proportion of the Black Muslims are rural based, whilst the Indians and Malays are almost completely situated in the major Cape towns (1970 census figures).

**THE REACTION TO INDIAN IMMIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA**

By the 1890's, the White population in areas in which Indians had settled (Natal along the coast, Transvaal, the Orange Free State), had begun to fear the power of the rapidly growing Indian population. Indians who had been brought to Natal, and the passenger immigrants, were seen more and more as "the Indian problem". The Statute Law of the Orange Free State of 1891 was one of the earliest statutory measures expressing this type of reaction. This law prohibited all Asiatics from settling in the Free State, and all existing Asiatic businesses were closed, and the owners deported without compensation. This law is still in effect, so that in the 1970 government population census, there were fewer than twenty-four Asiatics in this province.

What the Whites feared specifically was that the Asians who qualified for franchise - that is, all free immigrants in the British Empire - would either form a strong minority, or even a majority given the rapid rate of immigration, and so threaten white political hegemony. (By 1894, only 251 Indians had been enfranchised). Thus, Act 8 of 1896, of Natal, revoked the parliamentary franchise of all "non-whites", although their rights to municipal franchise remained until 1924. (Parliamentary
franchise was lost to all "non-Whites" of all provinces at Union. The Cape refused to alter their system of universal male suffrage, for municipal vote but to counter the situation, in favour of the Whites, in 1930, all White women were enfranchised, whilst no "non-White" women were. Also, the property qualifications of £100 in money, or £200 in property, were revoked for Whites, but retained for "non-Whites", in 1931. The Group Areas Amendment Act, of 1962, provided that those "non-Whites" who held municipal franchise in the Cape would retain it whilst they still had the necessary qualifications, but no new Indian or Coloured voters would be registered. This act also provided for the establishment of group area suburban consultative or management committees, initially elected by the Department of Indian Affairs (or Coloured Affairs for Coloured suburbs), who were to act as brokers between their communities and their government departments. Their rôle was seen to be advisory, eventually growing towards autonomy.

Economic competition between Whites and Indians was the other major area of contention, leading to subsequent legislation to protect White interests. It was therefore the petit bourgeois passenger Indians who were affected by this economic legislation, rather than ex-indentured Indians. From the end of the nineteenth century, Indian rights of freehold, of free trading and security of tenure were gradually withdrawn (see Appendix I for the full list of important legislation affecting Indians). Firstly, there were efforts to restrict availability of trading licences for Indians in rural areas and in mining areas, such as the Gold Laws of 1908 and 1919. Trading licences became increasingly difficult to obtain. For example, in 1910, the Cape Chamber of Commerce adopted a resolution to
request the Department of Immigration to curb Asiatic immigration, and
to request the Department of the Interior to refuse to grant any
further trading licences to Asiatics (Bradlow, 1978). The 1913
Immigration Act answered the first request, and minor municipal by-laws
partially answered the second. In the Transvaal the implementation of
the Transvaal General Dealers Control Ordinance of 1925 limited
availability of licences to Indians. The Pegging Act (Trading and
Occupation of Land (Transvaal and Natal) Restriction Act) of 1943
imposed further restrictions on Indians, particularly with respect
to acquisition of further property. No Indian could acquire property
occupied or owned by Whites on or before 6.2.3.43 (and vice versa).
The Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act (the Ghetto Act) of
1946 raised just as much protest as did the Pegging Act. It
limited Indian ability to acquire land in Natal, and forbade
the practice of White nominees acquiring land on behalf of Indians
in proscribed areas. Communal franchise was offered to Indians
with White representation in parliament, which the militant leadership
of the Natal Indian Congress rejected, so that this offer was withdrawn.
It is notable that the bulk of these restrictive acts were passed
regarding Indians in the Transvaal and Natal, with an optional
extension to the Cape. It is suggested that little direct
legislation was passed regarding Indians in the Cape because at no
stage did Indians amount to more than 5% of the total Cape population.
The Indians in the Cape were not perceived by the Whites to pose as
much of a direct economic or political threat to them.

The White attitude of resentment towards Indian commercial competitors
is still retained, and official Indian policy is directed partly
towards allaying this fear. The following two quotations aptly
illustrate governmental attitudes. The Deputy Minister of the
Interior announced in parliament in April, 1960:

"The Indians have arrogated to themselves the right to be the only businessmen. Why cannot some of them also work? Why should White people have to use their hands and not they? They think that they only are entitled to do business" (Hansard 13, Col. 5285: cited from Meer: 1971: 22).

The annual report of the Secretary of Indian Affairs phrases the matter more circumspectly, but arrives at the same conclusion:

"In the economic development of the Indian community, the primary objective of the Department is the diversification of the economic activities of the Indians. In this connection its action takes particular account of the community's historical but vulnerable dependence on the retail trade and the Department encourages them to enter the industrial and other trades" (Report RP 38/1972: 1972: 9).

Regarding the economic rights of "non-Whites", the most significant legislation passed has been the Population Registration Act of 1950, and the Group Areas Act of 1950 with all its subsequent amendments. The former divided the South African population into discreet "racial" groups based on phenotype, area of origin, culture and acceptability as a member of one of these "races" by the other members. The latter act allocated suburbs to these "races", and for the Indians at least, allowed ownership of property and trading rights only in these areas. Occupation of property, and rights to trade outside these areas are granted by special dispensation only.

Schlemmer (1967) documents how trading in Indian areas is over competitive, since there are too many traders serving small areas.
Often, previous custom is lost, since the new Indian areas are removed from the mainstream of city life, and from major transport routes. (The largest shopping centre for Indians in Cape Town, on the border of Rylands, is, however, built on a major thoroughfare). Schlemmer shows how there is a system of licensing that favours the development of a few traders around a shopping centre, who now monopolise this economic niche. Hence, this gives impetus to the rise of consortia of wealthy families who control business and properties. Work has been done in Natal by various authors (including Pachai, 1971; Schlemmer 1967) showing how these consortia of families form conservative, closely knit endogamous units, keeping wealth and property within the groups. There is often evidence of intermarriage between these extended family units. The other major landowner in the Indian group areas is the government itself, through the City Council, and the Community Development Board.

The basis of the government reaction to the Indians of South Africa has been, until 1961, to regard them as temporary residents, as Indians in South Africa rather than as Indian citizens of South Africa. Thus, it has been possible for the various governments since 1860 to shelve issues affecting the Indians — particularly housing problems — since they had always hoped that the Indians would repatriate. It was only in 1961 that the Minister of the Interior announced for the first time, to the House of Assembly, that:

"... the Indians are here and the vast majority of them are going to remain here, and although repatriation is used on a very small scale, we must realise that the vast majority of them are South African citizens and as such they are also entitled to the necessary attention and the necessary assistance" (cited from Meer: 1971: 15).
The immigration laws (see Appendix I) have been designed particularly to reduce the number of Indian immigrants. The stringent education tests (introduced uniformly for all provinces by the Immigrants Regulation Act Number 22, of 1913) demanded literacy in a European language, which virtually stopped further Indian immigration, since combined with this was a means test, and a cultural acceptability test. The latter was designed to disqualify as immigrants all those who were seen as not suited to European standards and civilization, and could not be easily assimilated to these. The most stringent of all the Immigration Laws was the act of 1953. This act prohibited the entry after February 1953, of any Asiatic woman born outside the Union, who had married a South African overseas. It also excluded from entry their minor children, except with special permission. Indians can enter South Africa permanently only by requesting South African citizenship as stateless people. The 1972 act closed the last loopholes. An Indian person was hereby deemed to have lost rights of domicile in South Africa if he or she leaves the country and does not return within three years of the date of departure. Rights of domicile are lost by a woman whose marriage has been dissolved, other than by death of her husband, during her absence from South Africa. Also excluded from entry are any persons born outside South Africa from a marriage entered into after 10.2.53, or any person born outside South Africa after 10.2.54, unless the parents brought the child into South Africa before 10.2.56. It also excludes the wife of a union entered into after 10.2.56, or any children born outside South Africa of such a union. From 10.2.56, the wife of a union entered into before 10.2.53, and her offspring born outside South Africa are also excluded. A wife includes a woman...
recognised as such by any Indian religion, but not if there is any
other such woman in the same relationship to the same man, nor if
there are any surviving children of any other such woman, who reside
or are entitled to reside in any province.

THE DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: GOVERNMENT CONTROL

In accordance with the separate development policy, a separate
government institution catering only for Indians was created, as the
Department of Indian Affairs, in 1961. This department is intended
to be the vehicle of communication between the government and the
general populace. Therefore, a branch is established in most
major cities, with the main branch of the province in the provincial
capital, and the central national branch situated in Pretoria. The
department is supposed to administer all activities involving Indians.
Thus, under its control is the administration of all Indian group
areas; the administration of all Indian schools, reformatories and
places of higher and technical learning; the administration of
welfare to Indians; the implementation of removals and disqualifications
recommended by the Community Development Board: and the issue of
all travel documents and passes required by Indians. Until 1971,
Indians required permits to travel from their province of residence,
to another province within South Africa. These permits were issued
by both the Department of Indian Affairs, and by local magistrates' courts. The department also acts as a means of liaison between the
National Indian Council and parliament.

In 1962, the Group Areas Amendment Act provided for the establishment
of management committees in all Indian (and Coloured) suburbs.
The members of these committees would be wholly nominated by the
department, but by their fourth year of operation, they would be wholly elected by all Indians over twenty-one years of age, with certain property qualifications. These committees are supposed to act in an advisory capacity to the department, relaying municipal, welfare and administration problems experienced in their areas to the department, and advising the latter on suitable courses of action. Eventually, these committees are intended to provide autonomous administration to their areas. The Rylands management committee has five members, who were by 1975 elected. The head of the committee is a wealthy Hindu businessman. Cravenby’s management committee became fully operative in 1974-75.

The Indians Education Act of 1965 provided for the control of Indian education by the department. That is, control was removed from the hands of the Provincial Department of Education, which also controlled "Coloured" and "Black" education. This meant that the department would now build schools for Indians only, in Indian areas, and take over the administration of all private schools catering for Indians. Schools for Indians in the Cape, however, came under the department’s control only from the first of April, 1970, because of the small number of pupils relative to the expense of building separate institutions. Until schools were provided for them, then, Indian schoolchildren had to attend "Coloured" schools in the Cape: "[there are] only 5700 Indians pupils in 1960 [in the Cape], almost all of them at Coloured schools. In regard to the resettlement of Indians in their own areas and in connection with the shortage of Indian teachers these are problems which cannot be dissolved in the near future" (1972: 37: Report by the Department of Indian Affairs).

By 1971, only one Indian school had been built and was in the control
of the Cape department, and that was in Malabar Township, in Port Elizabeth. In 1976, the senior school and the junior school situated in Rylands and serving Indians in the peninsula were opened.

The department controls the right to set a curriculum and then the matriculation papers of Indian schools. It has introduced to the Indian syllabus subjects such as Arabic, Hindi and other Indian languages. This system of differentiated education has existed since the beginning of the school year of 1973. The General Law Amendment Act of 1973 ensured free and compulsory education for Indians (for the first time) on the basis of pupils who enrolled in the first kindergarten class in 1973 and thereafter, had to remain at school until they reached fifteen years of age. An amendment to this act in 1979 ensured compulsory education for all Indian children aged between seven and fifteen years.

In 1964, the National Indian Council Act was passed, to create such a council consisting of twenty-five members, under the auspices of the department. In 1968, by the South African Indian Council Act, the Council was established after its provisional period from 1964. Qualifications for membership are that a nominee must be Indian, of good repute, a permanent resident of South Africa for at least five years prior to his nomination. The executive committee of five members is partly elected, and partly nominated by the Minister of Indian Affairs. The nominated member is automatically the Chairman of the Council. The 1978 amendments of this act allowed for the membership to be increased to forty, with the following provincial allocation: twenty-seven members from Natal; ten from the Transvaal and three from the Cape. The first elections of this Council were
not freely democratic, since only the members of management committees were allowed to vote. The elections to be held in 1980 are, however, open to all adults over eighteen years of age.

The legitimate political activities of the Indians in South Africa are completely government instituted and controlled. The government's plan is to separate the Indians in all affairs from other South Africans, and give them, in time, the autonomy to control their own affairs. It is explicitly aimed at creating, recreating and maintaining, ethnic boundaries:

"The political development of the Indian in South Africa is motivated by the Government's declared policy that there should be developed for them a governing body, parliamentary in character, with legislative and administrative powers in matters affecting them" (Report from the Secretary of Indian Affairs: 1972: 16).

CONSEQUENCES OF THESE REACTIONS

The Indians' response to the increasingly antagonistic attitude towards them on the part of the various governments has undergone change, in time, becoming progressively more radical and militant. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, Indians were more or less helpless since they were indentured labourers, whose conditions of service disallowed freedom of movement. It was the action of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi which first unified and politicised the Natal Indians, but since he campaigned against the removal of parliamentary franchise from Indians, and trading and immigration restrictions rather than against indenture conditions (although this was included), his supporters were firstly the Gujarati traders.
Kuper (1960) suggests that because the legislation was aimed particularly at the traders, they became politically mobilised first, and because they had access to capital, influential people, newspapers, and they had freedom of movement, these were the people who became the first political leaders:

"The passenger Indians, by entering into trade, challenged white privileges and were the first to be affected by anti-Indian legislation. As a result, merchants, who were mainly Moslems, took the lead in organising legal defence against Indian trading rights."  (Kuper: 1960: 45).

In the early part of the twentieth century, the Indian leaders generally co-operated with the authorities, submitting evidence before commissions, with the only type of opposition being satyagraha (passive resistance) which involved an intellectualisation of the Indian position, started by Gandhi. According to Meer (1969), until the 1940's, Indian political reaction in Natal and the Transvaal was confined to Indian-only parties, which addressed themselves to Indian grievances, and attempted to redress them through compromise with the Whites, and acceptance of White cultural, political and economic hegemony. In the Cape, Indian political response differed in that although it accepted White hegemony, the Indians had never doubted from the start that the only way to achieve success was to unite with other minority groups with similar ideals and methods (see Chapter VI). By the mid-1940's, however, discriminatory legislation against all "non-Whites" had proceeded so far that national alliances between African, "Coloured" and Indian groups began to be made: "The Passive Act, by accident and not
design, was serving to bring the Black peoples of South Africa together" (Pachai: 1971: 171). Since then, the leadership has become increasingly radical and militant. Pandit Nehru claimed that the future of Indians in Africa lay with the cause of African nationalism and African independence (Stigger: 1970). Indians in South Africa heeded this advice. The 1949 Durban riots between Indians and Africans came as the first setback to this alliance, and events in the 1950's in Kenya and Uganda further discouraged moderate and more conservative Indians. In the Cape, however, the leaders of the militant Black organisations were also the leaders of the "Coloured" and Indian parties, and, furthermore, the most powerful of these leaders had close affinal and agnatic links (see Chapter VI, the Abdurahman extended family). After the events at Sharpeville in 1960, leaders of Black opposition - including Indians - have been discouraged through arrests, bannings, fleeing into exile, of other leaders. Meer has stated (1969) that the suppression of leaders and political movements has been so effective that at the present it has successfully suppressed all political organisations and all ambitious political leaders amongst Indians.

One must also look at the direct practical consequences of government legislative reactions. These revolve around the economic security of Indians: their economic position vis-à-vis trading; and their housing position given the policy of group areas removals.

To see the change in occupation of Asians (census classification), the 1936 and the 1970 government census reports of occupation by racial groups are compared. There are, however, several problems in assuming a direct comparison. Firstly, the census reports
have changed their occupational categories from 1936 to 1970, so that only those that are the same or directly compatible have been given in Table I.IV. Secondly, the 1936 census report on occupation includes only those people fifteen years and older, whilst the 1970 report includes the entire population. Thus, some leeway in percentage proportions should be acknowledged, and the upwards skew on the percentage of unemployed people in the 1970 census be understood, especially considering that about half the Asiatic population in the 1960's was under twenty years old.

**TABLE I.IV. ECONOMIC OCCUPATIONS OF ASIATICS: 1936 AND 1970**

(SOURCES: GOVERNMENT CENSUS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Asiatics of Total Asiatic Population of South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1936 Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture/Fishing</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport/Production</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales/Commerce</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Economically Active</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the skewing effects of including juveniles in the 1970 report, distinct changes in occupations of Asiatics can be seen. Firstly, few now are involved in agriculture. In 1936, most of those involved in agriculture were in Natal (amounting to 30.66% of the Natal (Asiatic) male work force of 1936). Also decreased is the percentage
of Asians involved in commerce, which indicates the success of government legislation to limit Asiatic competition in this field (cf. the two quotations cited earlier regarding government attitudes to Indian commerce). The percentages involved in service occupations have also decreased by the same proportion (by two-thirds) as the participation in commerce. The 1936 census indicates that percentage participation in both service and commercial occupations was approximately the same for all the provinces, but the 1970 census indicates that the decrease in percentage in these two occupation categories has occurred mainly in Natal, corresponding to a higher percentage increase in Natal of Asians involved with production occupations. There has been an increase in percentages of Asiatic professionals, correlated in practice to the opening of the University of Durban-Westville, in Natal, in 1959, for Indians, and to the admittance of selected numbers of Asians to White "open" universities.

Although the unemployment figures cannot be analysed comparatively because of the skewing effect, from details of the reports not shown in Table I.IV, it is immediately noticeable that more Indian women are participating in economic activities than previously. The 1970 census indicates that this increased participation of women has occurred more or less equally in all the provinces, amongst all religious groups. The vast majority of Indian women are still unemployed, however, generally remaining in domestic seclusion.

Table C 4 in the 1970 census breaks down the Asiatic occupation categories further into occupation by religious group, per province. To indicate the extent of the economic similarities and dissimilarities
between Muslims and Hindus of the Cape, their occupations are given below, from the government census tables of the 1970 census in Table I.V.

**TABLE I.V. OCCUPATION BY RELIGIOUS GROUP FOR ASIATICS: THE CAPE, 1970**

*(SOURCE: 1970 GOVERNMENT CENSUS 02-05-03)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>Muslim Total No. Muslims = 100%</th>
<th>Hindu Total No. Hindu = 100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administerial</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming/Fishing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production/Transport</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Classifiable</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Economically Active</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The significant difference between Muslim and Hindu occupations in the Cape is in the proportions entering the sales and service occupations. Muslims outnumber Hindus in the sales category by nearly three to two. Hindus outnumber Muslims in the service occupations by just over four to three. This significant distinction may be correlated with the economic situations that faced Muslims and Hindus when they migrated to the Cape. As stated earlier (cf. Brand, 1966), most of the Muslims
in the Cape came as free passenger immigrants, directly from India, with the intention and capital to start trading. Most of the Hindus arrived as poor semi- and unskilled ex-indentured labourers from Natal, and did not have the capital to start trading. Instead, they sold their labour in the least competitive economic niche, which Hindus had already monopolised in Natal: the service industries, particularly in personal service such as waitering.

Table I.V. thus indicates that the majority of economically active Muslim Indians in the Cape are engaged in trade still. Of the Muslim female population in the Cape, 89.2% are not economically employed (equivalent to 43.5% of the total Muslim population in Table I.V). Amongst the Cape Hindus, 83.7% of the women are not employed (equivalent to 41.3% in Table I.V). There is a problem in accepting these statistics glibly, not only because of the skewing effect described above, but also because Indian women who help in a family business or take in odd jobs at home, tend to consider themselves housewives rather than as economically active, and to answer to this effect in census questionnaires.

One cannot look at the position of Indian traders in South Africa without regarding the government action of restricting business areas available to Indians, and removing disqualified traders en masse. The Indians are allowed to trade in Indian only areas (always away from the central business district) except by special dispensation from the Minister, which is rare. The object has been to remove the competition of Indian traders from the more profitable business areas, and to limit competition further by forcing ex-traders to undertake other occupations by denying them
trading licences. Thus, Horrell (1976) documents that from the implementation of the Group Areas Act until 1975-76, a total of 5078 Indian traders had been disqualified in certain areas throughout South Africa. Of these traders, only 1277 had been provided with alternative trading sites in prescribed areas, or under licence. By 1976-77, a further 1908 traders throughout South Africa had been disqualified from trading. Of these, 668 were in the Transvaal; 470 in Natal; and 770 in the Cape. Horrell indicates that besides these traders, there were a further 3781 traders to be removed from disqualified areas throughout South Africa. 2332 of these traders are in the Transvaal, 552 in Natal; and 897 in the Cape. This means that from the beginning of the implementation of the Group Areas Act until about 1978 - 1979, a total of 10767 Indian traders have been removed or will be removed from their areas of trading, throughout South Africa. The significance of the economic aspects of the implementation of the Group Areas legislation is not to be underestimated. Looking at this total, it is not surprising, then, that there has been a marked decrease in Indians involved in sales and commerce from 14.4% in 1936 to 4.8% in 1970, (although one must acknowledge the skewing effect of the 1970 census categories mentioned above).

The other major practical consequence of government policy is shown by the housing position of Indians. As more and more areas were declared for one group or another, so were those who did not qualify evicted and told to find alternative accommodation in their respective group areas. A serious problem has been that rate of construction of new housing has not equalled the rate of eviction, and land allocations for many group areas have proved insufficient in the course of
development.

The effect of moving people en masse from one area to another has been to create a serious housing shortage, largely for artificial reasons. Most of this type of movement began in the late 1950's, and continued into the late 1960's. In Cape Town, a great deal of residential movement of Indians has occurred for these statutory reasons in the early 1970's, because of a delay in implementing the Group Areas legislation. In 1976, according to the annual report of that year of the Secretary of Indian Affairs, there was an official waiting list of 21000 Indian families for housing in Durban alone. Averaging six persons per family, this means that 126000 Indians require housing, in Durban. This is about one seventh of the entire Indian population of South Africa. By 1974, a total of 38678 Indian families had been disqualified from living in their original residences, in South Africa (Horrell, 1974); of which 29230 have been resettled. 38678 families approximates 232058 persons, which is about one-third of the 1976 government estimate of the Indian population. In 1976, a further 5146 Indian families were removed from their residences throughout South Africa.

In the Cape, by 1976, the total number of Indian persons removed from their previous residence through the implementation of the Group Areas legislation has been 2134 families, approximately 10670 persons, or half the Indian population of the Cape. Still to be removed in 1976 in the Cape were 642 families or another 3210 persons, bringing those disqualified to a total of nearly 70% of the Indian population of the Cape (Horrell, 1976). From the
annual report of the Department of Indian Affairs for 1978, there were still a further 758 families in the Cape to be resettled, involving approximately another 4548 people. This means that nearly the entire Indian population of the Cape has been disqualified from residing in specific areas, and has had to, or shall have to, move to an Indian group area.

The outstanding problem is that the rate of construction of housing for Indians has not matched the rate of disqualification, and nor has land allocation for Indians been adequate for the size of the population (from an official of the Department of Indian Affairs). The Minister of Housing gave as his official figures the shortage of housing for Indians as follows (cited from Horrell, 1976) for 1975: the Cape 1600; the Transvaal 2100; and Natal 16000.

The Minister warned that these figures are less than municipal and department figures, because they are based on what he termed "scientifically calculated shortages" rather than on figures on waiting lists.

Such a severe shortage of housing must be taken into account when studying residence patterns and their significance, and also the significance of the kinship network. For example, a person or couple cannot move out of the parental home unless there is other accommodation available, which would be learnt through the contacts of the kin-and-neighbour/friend network. On the other hand, a person or couple cannot remain in or return to a home that is overcrowded, and so they are forced to find an alternative, probably initially as boarders in a private house. They, too, learn of these places through their networks. There is usually a very low degree of
choice available when people choose where and with whom they are
to live. Accommodation is so scarce that people take it as it
becomes available. This aspect is explored further in Chapter III.

FOOTNOTE 1
E.E. Kharnsay, in an M.B.A. thesis for the University of the
Witwatersrand, claims that of 13000 claimants, only 53 actually
received these land grants, since commuting of free passage to land was
dependent on the approval of the Lieutenant-General of Natal. The
latter position was influenced by conservative politicians and land-owners
who saw Indian control of property as a direct threat to White
interests, and so disencouraged or actively inhibited it. This
concern was aggravated by the fact that by 1904, the Indian population
of Natal was nearly as large as the White population of Natal.
CHAPTER II

THE SETTING TO RYLANDS

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RYLANDS

The development of housing and amenities in Rylands serves to illustrate the pattern of development of other Indian group areas in the Cape. Generally, people were moved from well developed mixed or "Coloured" suburbs near the central business district or on the major routes of communication, to areas far from the central business district, with few houses and amenities. It was only as the population grew that shops, schools, places of worship were built to serve the people. Rylands is larger and more fully developed than Cravenby (the other Indian group area of Cape Town), although only a year separates their date of declaration as an Indian group area. Since Rylands is sited more conveniently for access to places of work, and is adjacent to an older well-established "Coloured" area provided with all the amenities, people have tended to choose to settle in Rylands rather than in Cravenby.

Rylands was declared an Indian group area on 5th July, 1957, and the following year the only other Indian group area in the Peninsula, Cravenby, was proclaimed on the 31st of January. Brand (1966) states that at the time of the proclamation of Rylands, only 10% of the Cape Indian population was living there. Most of these residents were Hindus, serving in light industrial works in the neighbouring industrial sites. About 30% of the Indian population at that time lived in the District Six and Woodstock-Salt River areas, just
outside the centre of Cape Town. The rest of the Indian population lived along the Cape Town-Muizenberg routes of communication, with relatively larger concentrations of people in the central southern suburbs (see Map II.I).

Although Rylands was declared an Indian group area in 1957, rapid development of housing, shopping facilities, and building of schools, began only in the early 1970's. The rapid development was, of course, consequent to greater numbers of people moving to Rylands. People had waited for their area of residence to be proscribed to them before they moved, generally, and in Cape Town, areas were declared specific group areas only in the mid and late 1960's. In 1976, the report of the Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs said that Rylands and Cravenby were still undeveloped, owing to their small populations, but noted that with the prescription of District Six (in the central business district) to Indians, the several hundred displaced families would move to these areas. Horrell (1976) shows that by 1976, 341 Indian families had left District Six, of which 282 had moved to Rylands, and the remaining fifty-nine to Cravenby.

Rylands is divided into Rylands Estate (also known as Rylands "proper"), which consists of five extensions; Gatesville Estate; part of Hatton Estate and Doornhoogte Estate (see Map II.II). There is no unsold property in any of these estates of Rylands. Property owners are private Indian owners, the Community Development Board (which also owns all the shopping centres except one) and the City Council. Extension I of Rylands proper was open to public purchase, with provision made for 380 houses. Extension II, with provision made for 32 houses and 2 flat sites, is owned by a local Rylands Hindu...
MAP II.1. THE CAPE PENINSULA SHOWING INDIAN GROUP AREAS.

SCALE:
0 2 4 6 8 10 Km.
1: 230000

KEY:
N = National Road.
Area = Areas of previous residence of Indians.
= Indian Group Area.
business magnate, here designated by his sobriquet, Kismet. Extension III is owned completely by the City Council, which has completed development by building 215 economic houses. Extension IV, providing for 107 houses and 8 flat sites, belongs to Kismet. Extension V is owned by the City Council, which plans for a maximum development of 209 housing units. (All housing figures are supplied by the Department of Indian Affairs, and relate to the situation as it was by October, 1979). Table II.I summarises the housing situation for Rylands.

**TABLE II.I**

**HOUSING PROVISIONS AND ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT FOR RYLANDS BY OCTOBER, 1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part of Rylands</th>
<th>Number Sites Available</th>
<th>Privately Owned</th>
<th>Owned by Kismet</th>
<th>Owned by C.D.B.</th>
<th>Owned by City Council</th>
<th>Total Houses Built</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rylands Ext. I</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ext. II</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ext. III</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>215</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ext. IV</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ext. V</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatesville</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatton</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doornhoogte</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From Table II.1 it is apparent that only 69.9% of the sites available are developed (one must here take into account that of these developed sites, 12 include flat sites: 11 in Gatesville, and 1 in Extension II). Of the available sites, 53.1% of them are owned privately (excluding Kismet's holdings); whilst government departments hold 34.1% of the sites. To compare, in Cravenby, provision has been made for 735 housing sites, of which 398 are developed. The Divisional Council has provided 185 of these houses, in the form of economic and sub-economic houses, and private owners have built 215 houses. 185 undeveloped sites belong to the Divisional Council, and 152 undeveloped sites belong to private owners. Of the total sites, in Cravenby, private persons own 367 (49.9%), and the Community Development Board owns 368 (50.1%). (From the Department of Indian Affairs).

It is appropriate here to indicate what sort of pressure is placed by the Indian population on the accommodation available for them. The government population census of 1970 gives the Cape Indian population as 21000, or 0.3%, of the Cape population. About 12000 Indians live in the Greater Cape Town area, whilst most of the others live in Port Elizabeth and in Kimberley (estimate from the Department of Indian Affairs). Of the 13000 who live in Cape Town, about 7500 people live in Rylands, 2000 in Cravenby, and the remainder in non-Indian areas. There are thus 3500 Indians outside Indian areas waiting for accommodation. Table II.11 indicates that in Rylands there is an average of six persons per household. Therefore, by taking this extrapolation, these 3500 Indians would require a minimum of 585 houses, at six persons per house. All the available accommodation in both Rylands and Cravenby is already occupied. No allowance is
made here for people wanting to live alone, or for a couple to live alone. No allowance is made, either, for the future increase in population which will put further pressure on accommodation.

The housing shortage problem is exacerbated by the control of large portions of the two Indian areas by government departments (totalling 38.2% of both Indian areas) and by a single individual (totalling 5.6% of both Indian areas), who have not developed them to their capacity. Table II.I shows how, in Rylands, 83.4% of the sites owned by private individuals (excluding Kismet) are developed, whilst only 62.1% of government owned sites are developed.

Because there are so many other prospective tenants clamouring for accommodation, landlords can hold lessees completely at their mercy, since tenants are so easily replaced. Without the stabilising effect of rent control, rents can rise at the will of the landlord, who often does not uphold his duty of maintaining his rented property in good condition: "The shortage of housing, which is partly due to the lack of sufficient land, is still a serious problem which the Indian community, especially that of the Cape Peninsula, has to cope with" (Report RP 38/1977, from the Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs: p. 28: 1977).

There are three shopping centres serving Rylands. The major one, comprising 62 shops, along the major thoroughfare, was built and is owned by the Department of Community Development, ready for occupation in 1976. Fifty-nine shops were allocated to disqualified traders; and of the three others, one was allocated as an off-course tote; one as a post-office; and one as a consulting
room to a medical practitioner (from report RP 19/1978 from the Secretary of Indian Affairs: 1978). All the shops are occupied.

There is a smaller shopping centre in the middle of Rylands proper, consisting of eight private shops (the buildings owned by the Department of Community Development). The third shopping centre is a new, modern block that also houses a large cinema and nightclub and includes an adjacent petrol station. It is owned by Kismet.

Besides these shopping centres, there are three or four small private shops formed from a converted part of a private house (the back used as a dwelling still) scattered throughout Rylands. All these shops are in the Rylands proper area. To place these figures of granting of trading licences and shop sites in perspective, Horrell (1976) documents that a total of 1667 traders in the Cape were disqualified from trading in the areas in which their businesses were situated. Of the traders who had been disqualified and then issued permits to trade in Indian areas, or offered alternative employment, by 1975, 631 were from the Cape peninsula. There were a large number of other traders in the Cape peninsula who remained to be removed (from Reports RP 38/1972 and RP 48/1975 of the Department of Indian Affairs).

ACCESS TO ACCOMMODATION AND TRADING SITES: CASE STUDIES

Access to accommodation to Rylands has, in principle, been on a "first come first served" basis for both buying and renting of properties. In the late 1960's, before the boom in development in Rylands, there was relatively little interest in buying or renting properties, since few people lived in the Indian group areas. As the boom grew, however, people had to place their names on waiting lists to
buy or to rent. This meant, in effect, that persons were selected by the Community Development Board and the City Council, who were selling the properties. How they were selected seems to have been on several bases: financially reliable, good references by Indians well reputed by these departments, and lack of a prison record or anti-government political involvement. In this way, as Meer (1969) states, wealthy consortia of families could buy several properties (and obtain trading licences). These consortia were politically conservative, and because they were so often given first option to properties and licences, they supported the government and the moves to create Indian group areas. The "little man" found it difficult to compete with wealthy consortia, who through their vast networks, could obtain large sums of money. In this way, of the privately owned properties, which are rented to others, in Rylands, 46% of them are owned by people who own at least five other properties. Two owners have real estate empires that stretch from the Cape to Natal, and in fact live in Natal. (See Chapters III and IV for further detail on kinship and extended kin networks).

The case of Mr. Munsook is typical of those "little men" not fortunate enough to compete successfully for either a trading licence or a site to buy for a house. The lack of business acumen and perspicacity to understand the trend of group areas legislation and to plan in advance, is a major factor why these "little men" were so unsuccessful. If they had bought properties in the Indian areas before they themselves were disqualified, before the boom, they would not only have obtained properties, but obtained them far cheaper than at the current inflated prices. But like Mr. Munsook, they seemed to believe
first that they would never be disqualified from living and trading in their non Indian areas, and then secondly, that they would be able to influence enough important people to be able to obtain permits and so remain where they were. Even members of the wealthy consortia, however, often encounter problems in attempting to wield such influence.

Mr. Munsook, a Muslim, was living in his own house in a white area, to which was attached a retail greengrocery shop thriving because of its position regarding traffic and accessibility. He describes his fifteen years in Newlands "the happy days". He was issued first with a notice to vacate his residence - a four bedroomed house with a large pleasant garden. Since he did not have ready capital with which to purchase new property (the Community Development Board had not yet recompensed him) he remained in this house until the end of the stipulated time of two years, and then boarded with relatives in Athlone, with his wife and four children. They then found a flat in Athlone, and moved in, despite that Athlone is a Coloured area. Some years later, Mr. Munsook was issued with an eviction notice regarding his business, and all applications for a permit were refused. Only four years later was the property sold, at the market value at the time of his notice of disqualification, which Mr. Munsook is convinced is several thousand rand lower than the market value at the time of sale. By this stage, he had to move into Rylands, and, having cash, decided to buy a property. There was, however, none for sale. This was six years ago, and since then the Munsooks have lived in a rented semi-detached house which is attacked by damp. There have been only a few houses on the market since then, all of which are far beyond Mr. Munsook's means, since he has undertaken to support his eldest daughter through university. He has been unable to find anything other than temporary work, since he is disabled. He cannot open a shop in Rylands because he has no permit. He is beset with worry about the economic security of his wife and family: "Look at me. With my sickness, I'm useless to everyone. And I can die any time now. What will my family have? Not enough money to see the kids through some training; a little for my wife and mother. But not enough to keep them safe and secure. Without some property, you've got nothing at all. Even our little business is gone."

Another informant elaborated a plan to redistribute property in
Rylands, to protect the little men from rapacious landlords and to protect them from the consortia of wealthy families that purchase huge tracts of property. He suggested that no people from outside Cape Town should be allowed to purchase property here; and that each family should be allowed only one piece of property to allow everyone a chance to buy. The Community Development Board would become the real estate managers, ensuring justice, preventing circumvention of these rules, and fixing a maximum rent. They would also undertake to inspect properties to ensure that landlords maintained them properly.

The case study of the Naickers illustrates how an extended family with readily available collateral, standing in good repute with senior officials in certain government departments, can obtain sites.

The Naickers do not live in Rylands, because they have a permit to live and trade in a white area. The Naickers are part of a large and very wealthy extended family, whose members own real estate and retail businesses throughout the Peninsula, which means in areas normally closed to Indian enterprise. The marriages of the five Naicker children who are already married have all been arranged by the parents, ensuring that the children married into property owning, wealthy families. Before their investments in Rylands, the Naicker extended family already operated six shops, and owned eight houses, and rented three others in white areas not open to Indian ownership of property. As Rylands was being opened for purchase in the 1960's, old Mr. Naicker, as a shrewd businessman, realised the potential profitability of purchasing property there, and of opening a shop. It was only between 1969 and 1971, however, that he actually took steps to obtain property. His name was placed on an already rather long waiting list, but when, through the co-operation of his extended family, he offered to pay half the price of the three properties immediately in cash, and the remainder over a period of two years, he was apparently placed at the top of the list because he seemed financially reliable. He then also applied for a permit to trade in Rylands, which was more difficult to obtain, since he could not claim that his livelihood depended on one shop. Therefore he applied in the name of his son-in-law, saying that his own
children were heirs to his property, and therefore it was necessary for the "survival" of his son-in-law and daughter that they obtained a shop. It took some months of persuasion and discussion with the Department of Community Affairs before the licence was granted. Simultaneously, Mr. Naicker purchased his properties and opened the seventh shop, in the name of his son-in-law. The three properties each were subdivided, and semi-detached houses built on them. None of the family lives there: they are all rented.

To provide an over-view of ownership and rental of houses in Rylands, the following figures from Muslim householders were obtained in the fieldwork area. Of the Muslim householders, 36% own the house they occupy, whilst 41% rent the house they occupy (data unavailable for the remainder). The rented houses are owned by government departments, large scale real estate entrepreneurs, or by small scale private entrepreneurs, who own two or perhaps three properties altogether. Some of these latter constitute a property divided into two, with two semi-detached houses, in one of which live the parents, and in the other, their married offspring who pay rent to their parents.

THE PEOPLE OF RYLANDS

The sample area censused for fieldwork was the Rylands proper area, consisting of Extensions I, II and III. There was a total of 136 houses, each on its separate piece of ground, and with a total population of 923 persons, which constitutes 12.3% of the total population of Rylands. Of this population, about two-thirds of the people were under eighteen years of age.

In Chapter I, the percentage proportions of Hindus, to Christians, to Muslims, are given for Asiatics of each province. In the Cape, the Muslims outnumber the Hindus and Christians by nearly two to one.
The percentage proportions of Rylands reflect the provincial proportions to a certain degree. Table II.II indicates the proportions encountered in the fieldwork area, during a random census.

**TABLE II.II**

**SHOWING CATEGORISATION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY RELIGION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of Households</th>
<th>Mean No. Persons/ Household*</th>
<th>Total No. Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>923</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (Figures Rounded to Nearest Whole Person).

The Muslim to Hindu proportion in the sample is what one would expect given the provincial proportions, but there are significantly fewer Christians. When asking informants the reason for such a disproportion, the inevitable answer was:

"Well the Christians, like a lot of the Hindus, are poorer than the Muslims. They can't afford to stay here. They often live in the Coloured areas, but a lot of them live in Cravenby, which isn't so nice as Rylands. There are a lot of empty properties, the roads aren't tarred, and really the poorer Indians live there because it's cheaper". It was not in the scope of this fieldwork project to examine the foundations of this sort of statement.

Table II.II indicates the relative proportions between the three religions. The local standing of each religion is reflected in these proportions. Rylands mosque, the Habibia Mosque, is a huge
building built at the end of last century. It is the largest mosque in Cape Town, and certainly one of the most beautiful. It is fitted with hand-made stained-glass windows in traditional Islamic style, and surrounded by a well-kept garden. Attached to the mosque, is the shrine of its founder, an ancestor of the present Imam. This shrine is of a holy man the Indians call a "pir", similar to the Catholic concept of saint, who is reputed to have performed miracles, healed, helped, (after his death) those who visit his shrine. His tomb in fact forms part of the circle of Kramats (Malay word for shrine or tomb) that protects Cape Town from natural disaster and evil according to Cape Muslim legend. The shrine is still well visited. Also attached to the mosque is a nursery school, catering mainly for Muslim children, who receive some religious instruction. There is also a large Islamic education centre, called the Centre for Islamic Studies, consisting of a large double-storied library, class-rooms, lecture theatres, a hall and a conference room. This building forms a centre for the frequent scholastic discussions of Islam that are well attended in Cape Town by Muslims.

The Hindus do not have a temple in Rylands. Instead, they use a converted barn in Mowbray, or they pray at home. The Hindu community has, however, built a small building which contains a hall and a classroom. This is used as a Hindu crèche and as a Hindu dancing studio. The Hindus organise several public functions throughout the year, despite their lack of facilities, although these are seldom scholastic religious discussions. During the period of fieldwork, they organised an Indian music evening, booking a hall in a neighbouring "Coloured" area called Athlone for the purpose, and a
Indian dance and music evening, using a huge hall in a distant white area. These functions are fund-raising, with goals being funds for a temple site, and to contribute towards scholarships for Hindus.

Although most of the Christians in Rylands are Catholic, there is no Catholic church in the area. There is a pentecostal church however, which is well attended since it serves the surrounding suburbs also. The Christians, as such a small minority, are seldom publically conspicuous. They are, however, well known because of the proselytising activities of the few Pentecostal Christians, which are considered to be annoying by other Indians.

Despite Brand's assertion (cited above) that Hindus were the earliest Indians living in Rylands, in the sample area (which forms the oldest part of Rylands) the mean length of occupation of the present residence for Hindus, Muslims and Christians was very similar, although the standard deviation differs. Table II.III presents this data.

**TABLE II.III**

**Comparing Mean Length of Occupation of Present Residence Between Denominations in Rylands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>(Years)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean Length Occupation Present Residence</td>
<td>Standard Deviation (Yrs.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>8.72</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>8.73</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The length of occupation of the present residence does not, however, refer to length of residence in Rylands, since several (twelve) families have moved within Rylands. Of those families that have moved within Rylands, the majority (nine) have lived in the suburb for longer than ten years.

Most of the Indians in the sample came from the southern suburbs, lining the communication route from Cape Town to Muizenberg, and their length of residence in Rylands can be directly correlated with the date of the implementation of group areas legislation in these areas. Every head of household consulted claimed that he had either moved to or remained in Rylands solely because of this legislation. People had previously lived in both predominantly "Coloured" or "mixed" areas (such as District Six) or predominantly white areas (such as the southern suburbs); Pie Chart II.1 illustrates this point. In addition to these areas, 3.5% of the Muslims came from mixed northern suburbs; 3.5% from Natal, and 1.2% from the Transvaal. Likewise, 18.2% of the Christians came from Natal. 8.1% of the Hindus came from Natal, and 5.4% from the Transvaal. It must be emphasised again that this is not the birthplace of respondents, merely the area of previous residence. Birthplaces are discussed in Chapter VI, "Contacts with India", but it is apposite to mention here that 81% of the sample were born in Cape Town, 3% in Natal, 2% elsewhere in South Africa, and 14% in India. Most who were born in South Africa are under fifty years of age; most of those born in India thirty-five years and older. To generalise and simplify, the sample population consists of three generations: the migrants; offspring of migrants; and children born to offspring of migrants. In a few cases, the fourth generation has been born.
PIE CHART II.I
SHOWING AREAS OF PREVIOUS RESIDENCE OF MUSLIM HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD IN SAMPLE

CHRISTIAN 12 H

HINDU 37 H

MUSLIM 87 H

SCALE:
1cm² = 1.28 Heads of Household.

KEY:
A = Rylands
B = Cape Flats (Coloured)
C = C.B.D. (Mixed)
D = South Suburbs (White)
E = Other Provinces
H = Heads of Household
This means that in nearly every Indian household there lives a person who was born in India, even though in many cases, informants left India when they were still small children. The connection with India is indicated, amongst other things, by the home languages spoken by informants. Table II.IV indicates the percentage of Indians who speak the different Indian languages as a home language. But immediately to offset this picture, it must be emphasised that in every household, English or Afrikaans was also spoken as a primary language, although sometimes the oldest generation would not be fluent in either language. The young generation tends to speak English or Afrikaans to its peers and outside the home, and an Indian language to its elders within the home. It is interesting to note that some languages seem to be religion-based, although in actuality, they are geographically based. Kokanie, Urdu and the bilingual Kokanî and Urdu and Marathi speakers were all Muslim: no Hindu spoke these languages at all. On the other hand only Hindus and Christians spoke Tamil and Hindi. Kokanie and Urdu are spoken in central and west India, the place of origin of all Muslims in the sample. Few Hindus came from this area, however. Tamil is a southern Indian language, and Hindi is central, southern and eastern Indian, reflecting on the places of origin of the Hindus. The only comment on use of a language being for religious reasons was concerning Urdu. Apparently, according to informants, most of the Islamic literature in India is written in Urdu rather than in Arabic, and the Muslim theologians and scholars in India prefer to speak in Urdu. It is therefore a symbol of high religious and scholastic status to speak the archaic Urdu language, as it was a symbol of status to speak Latin or classical Greek in Europe for some hundreds of years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home Language</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Christian and Hindu</th>
<th>Total Households</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokanie</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokanie and Urdu</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujerati</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Households</strong></td>
<td>87</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In thirty-two (or 23.5%) of the total number of households (136) no Indian languages were spoken, the home languages being solely English or Afrikaans. These households were all of descendants of migrants who had been living in South Africa for some decades. In two households visited (but not censused because of the lack of communication), the members could speak only Indian languages, and no English or Afrikaans at all. These were middle-aged and elderly ladies. The men of the household could, presumably speak English or Afrikaans, since they were at work as wage labourers for a non-Indian company. In about one out of every eight households, the elderly ladies present could speak little or no English or Afrikaans, and required younger persons to interpret for them. The reason for their lack of fluency in these languages is that because of the practice of female domestic seclusion, these women have not had to go out into the outside world, and so have not had to learn the languages of the outside world (see Chapter IV). The men, who participate as wage labourers in the outside world, are forced to learn a minimum vocabulary to communicate: it is to their best advantage should they be fluent in the languages of the outside world.

OCCUPATIONS OF MUSLIMS IN RYLANDS

Pie Chart II.II gives a breakdown of the occupation of all Muslims over the age of eighteen, who are not full-time students. The largest category is that of the unemployed or irregularly employed. Most of the women of Rylands are unemployed, being housewives or daughters helping in the home. The difficulty with this category, as explained above, is that many women aid in the family business,
or take in dressmaking or cooking to do at home, for which they earn money, but because this work is sporadic, they consider themselves to be housewives first, rather than wage-earners. Of the unemployed men, most of them are either young school-leavers who have not yet found a job, or they are elderly, over fifty years old, and have retired. There were eight men over fifty who used to be shop-keepers, but with the implementation of the Group Areas Act, they lost their licences to trade in a non-Indian area, and were not issued with another licence. These men consider themselves to be unemployed rather than retired.

PIE CHART II

OCCUPATIONS OF MUSLIMS IN RYLANDS OVER 18 YEARS OF AGE (EXCLUDING STUDENTS)

SCALE:
1 cm² = 3.9 Workers

KEY:
Total no. Workers = 308
(All persons in sample over 18 years old excluding students)

= Males
= Females

A = Unemployed/ Irregular
B = Wage Labourer
C = Professional
D = Own or Husband's Business
E = Family Business
F = Sales/Service
The category wage labourer refers to skilled and semi-skilled mechanical, technical or commercial work. This is one of the largest occupation categories for men in Rylands. Of the women who were so employed, all of them were younger than forty. There are few professionals in Rylands. Those who are professionals are predominantly doctors of medicine, pharmacists or, for the women, nurses. There is one notable example of a family in Rylands, who ran a retail store which did well. The father put through university four children, and through other training one child. One daughter and one son became doctors of medicine; one daughter a pharmacist; one son an accountant; and one daughter a nurse.

The categories D and E are separated to indicate whether a person was aiding in his own business, or in a family business to which he is just a partner or junior member. Taken together, 15.7% of the men and 4.2% of the women are self employed or work in family businesses. This number actually exceeds those employed as skilled and semi-skilled workers, so it is the largest employment category in Rylands. 19.8% of those over eighteen years old are involved in family or their own businesses. Of these businesses, 71.4% were green-groceries or retail shops, whilst the others were butcheries, factories, textile agencies and cartage contractors. Those who own the businesses tend to be men in their middle age, whilst those who work for others are the younger men who have not yet been able to establish enough capital to acquire a shop - and who also have not been granted trading licences. Few of these businesses were sited in Rylands. Most of these shop-keepers were trading by permit in non-Indian areas.
Category F was separated out from B not because it seemed intrinsically different, but only to see how many people in the category "sales and service" were actually employees rather than owners or kinsmen of owners. In the Rylands sample, it is seen that very few people work in shops that they themselves do not own or in which they do not have vested interests.

Although the unemployment rate for men is not very high, there is a growing concern in the Department of Indian Affairs about increasing unemployment amongst Indian men over the last five years:

"The rising tide of unemployment is a source of concern to the Indian Council and a committee has been appointed to watch the position ... The people worst hit appear to be the unskilled and semi-skilled groups. Many of them have either exhausted their unemployment benefits or do not qualify for assistance at all" (Report from the Department of Indian Affairs RP 19/1978: 1978: p.9).

The people most involved seem to be Hindus in Natal, from further description in the report, although the report is not clear about this.

The numbers of women unemployed are high, owing to the practice of purdah. Of all the women over eighteen years old in the sample, 80.1% were unemployed. There is a marked change, however, in that many young girls obtain employment before they marry, instead of staying at home. Most of the working women in the sample were unmarried young girls. A girl is expected to leave her job when she gets married, or at the latest, when she falls pregnant. Thus, in the sample, many housewives indicated that they had worked before marriage, but had never since worked.
**THE BASES OF INTERACTION IN RYLANDS**

Interaction between Indians is not confined to Rylands or to residents of Rylands. The interaction networks of residents in Rylands do, however, illustrate one way in which Indians interact in an urban environment consisting predominantly of people who are not Indians.

The attempt to restrict Indians (and other population groups) to group areas is an attempt to isolate them not merely residentially, but also, in practice, socially, since a large amount of domestic level interaction occurs between neighbours. This social restriction is especially effective given the practice of domestic seclusion of women. The latter does not only entail that women maintain the house whilst men go out into the external world to support the household, but it also entails, in the case of purdah, that women seldom venture from their houses and gardens alone, and that they restrict their social activity to interaction with neighbours and relatives. Thus, in an Indian-only suburb, the housewife's choice of neighbours with whom she can interact is severely restricted. (See Chapters IV and VI).

This consequence is seldom realised by informants, however, although one man did express the following idea:

"Look at the flowers you get. Didn't Allah make thousands and thousands of different flowers? And have you ever seen an ugly flower? No – they are all beautiful, although different. But Allah creates flowers in nature, and not in garden flower beds. Where have you ever seen a single type of flower growing by itself, away from all other flowers? Don't the flowers look so much more beautiful all mixed up and together? Don't they help each other in some ways, the big ones shielding the little ones; some flowers giving food to others; and giving pollen to each other? That is Allah's way. But to separate and segregate in group areas, in man-made flower beds where the different flowers can't help each other – that is not the way of Allah."
The bases of interaction depend very much on the reasons for interaction. For rites de passage, such as naming of babies, weddings and deaths, because each status is marked with a particular ritual, religion is a major basis of interaction. Kinship and then friendship follow in importance. Combined with religious differences are differences in the emic conception of purity and danger. A Muslim, for example, will seldom eat in a non-Muslim home because it is not halal, not kept according to Muslim ideals of purity and cleanliness. A Muslim woman explained why she never accepted invitations from Hindu neighbours to attend their wedding celebrations:

"Those Hindus are dirty people. They eat pork. All their pots and cutlery and crockery are infected with pork. All their dish towels too. Also, you know, they drink. Our Shari'a does not allow us to touch drink. But with a Hindu, you never know if at a party he's going to get drunk. Or the young ones put some alcohol into your cup of tea or cool drink".

If a person requires advice or aid - such as cash, labour, help with educating children - amongst the Muslims he approaches his extended family, which can incorporate friends included symbolically as kinsmen (see Chapter IV). In every day living, however, there is a broader range of interaction, generally based on similarity of income level and spending patterns, rather than on religion or kinship. Propinquity in residence also aids this sort of interaction. The younger generation, for example, has, until 1976, attended schools that were "racially" mixed, and formed friendships that often persisted after school with children from a wide range of backgrounds. A young Hindu man described his network of close friends in Rylands:
"My friends are young people I met at school mostly, and here around Rylands. We form a group - boys and girls. Some of them are Muslims - two of the boys and three girls; there are two Hindu boys, besides me, with their three sisters, and a Catholic boy. We always go out hiking or shopping together. The only point is that the Muslim girls aren't allowed out at night unless they come with brothers or male cousins, but that doesn't matter so much, since one of the boys is the cousin of two of the girls. There are a few Hindu boys who live down the road who often want to join us - I think they're interested in the girls. But they're low class - skollies nearly. They come from a shanty, they all left school before Standard Four, and they're just not our type of people. The problem is that we get friendly with the Muslim girls - and you know how it is. Next thing, when you get older, you want to marry one. But the Muslims! Man, they're so tight with their daughters. I suppose I could marry one if I converted, but why should I? We don't insist on Muslims converting to our religion to marry us!"

There are few cases of marriage across the religious line amongst Muslims, but more often examples of this in the Hindu and Christian families. Muslims tended to hide all evidence of this sort of marriage, and if the non-Muslim refused to convert, the Muslim marrying him or her was invariably (that is, in both examples discovered) considered *mutaz* or outcaste, dead to the family. "Here seems to be little overt stigma attached to a Muslim convert. Rather, converts are often praised as good Muslims, presumably because they are over-zealous in ensuring that they conform to high Muslim standards, since any instance of neglect could be seized upon as backsliding, far more serious for one who converts than for a born Muslim.

"After all", said Fatima A., "We were born Muslims. Those who convert have had the education of a heathen religion all their lives - which is not easy to forget, even if you want to. A convert who doesn't do things properly is more to blame than a Muslim who is lazy, because the convert could be slipping back to his heathen ways. You seldom find a Muslim who converts out of Islam, though".
Indian Muslims in the Cape belong predominantly to the Hanafi sect, founded by Imam Hanafi who travelled east from Arabia to proselytise. The Cape Malays, however, belong predominantly to the Shafi sect, based on the teachings of Imam Shafi. Oral tradition records that in the early part of the twentieth century, there was overt antagonism between these sects, to such an extent that intermarriage between them was forbidden. This antagonism seems to have been based largely on competition for leadership of the Muslim congregations of the Cape peninsula, and for control of the mosques, between Shafi and Hanafi Imams (cf. Davids 1970). Considering that the Shafi followers far outnumbered the Hanafi followers, Shafi leadership was assured by the 1940's (see Chapter VI), with Hanafi leadership restricted to mosques attended mainly by Indians. Currently, the minor points of difference in dogma are de-emphasised or not even known by Muslims, who prefer to regard themselves as a Muslim brotherhood, rather than as divided on sectarian grounds. People do not admit to basing interaction on sectarian grounds, and the choice of whom is invited to ceremonies and functions rests on factors described above.

In Rylands, as will be shown, one does not find people associating merely on the common basis of being Indian. For the Muslims, their faith was a far more important criterion of classification. They considered themselves to be firstly Muslims, and only secondly Indians. This means that in many ways, under certain circumstances, they saw more affinity with non-Indian fellow Muslims than with other non-Muslim Indians. What binds the Muslims together is a common orthodox ideology, and an extremely detailed code of laws that
governs every aspect of daily public and private life. What binds the Indians together is that, as the classified group "Indians", they are subject to specific discriminatory legislation. But more and more, the Indians see a fellowship with all other groups, that suffer under statutory discrimination, and so form political alliances with the general Black Consciousness movements (see Chapter VI).
CHAPTER III

THE DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE AND RESIDENCE PATTERNS IN RYLANDS

Rylands has developed very rapidly within the last eight or nine years, since 1971 - 1972 (see Chapter II), when the majority of present residents moved in. This rapid development meant that suddenly there was a high premium on available accommodation, and the size of the suburb was inadequate for the population it was supposed to contain. That is, too little land was set aside for both Indian areas in the peninsula, so that even were they fully developed, there would still be a shortage of housing amounting to hundreds of houses (see Chapter II). The significance of this shortage of housing was that people had to take accommodation as it became available, or lose out, so that the growth of ethnic areas or areas where kin groups live together or in proximity has been largely fortuitous. Thus, a person's kin may live widely scattered not only in both the Indian areas, but throughout the "Coloured" areas of the Cape Flats, waiting for a chance to move from proscribed to prescribed areas. Thus, to attempt a study of "kinship patterns in Rylands" is meaningless. One must rather examine kinship networks (which may often extend over the municipal boundaries of Rylands), and residence patterns changing in time of people living in Rylands, as indicators of how Muslim Indians have coped with this problem of acute shortage of housing, and being confined residentially to small group areas.

Every household head interviewed maintained that had it not been for the Group Areas legislation, he would not today be living in Rylands. The move to Rylands in many cases resulted in hardship and in the
breaking up of large joint households. The experience of the Parkers is not unusual in Rylands.

The Parkers had lived in a five-bedroomed rambling old house in a White area, behind their family-run greengrocery. In the house lived old Mr. Parker, his unmarried sister, two married sons, their wives and between them seven children, his two unmarried daughters and his youngest son: altogether a total of sixteen people. Old Mr. Parker was autocratic, demanding co-operation and obedience from his family in running the shop and the house. He had started alterations to the house to accommodate the young family of his second son, when they were served with notice to evacuate to a prescribed area. Despite their claim that their shop demanded long hours and it would damage their business were they to move, they had to sell their house to the Community Development Board, and look for alternative accommodation. Old Mr. Parker immediately applied to purchase a plot in Rylands, but his application was unsuccessful. Through his large network of friends and family, he eventually learnt of a semi-detached house to become available in Rylands in six to nine months time, so he put his name on the waiting list for it. Meanwhile, the large family had to find a place in which to live. The family was billeted out with friends and matri- and patri-lateral kin. The eldest son heard of a house to rent in the other Indian group area, Cravenby (far away from the shop) and decided to take it. The other married son found a room in a "Coloured" area bordering on Rylands where he and his family could board. When the four-roomed house became available in Rylands, only old Mr. Parker, his sister and the three remaining children moved into it. Since the four rooms comprise a kitchen, lounge, two bedrooms and a bathroom, all sixteen could not have lived in the house comfortably (this house is identical in design and size to many of the other semi-detached houses in Rylands).

The sons still came to the Mowbray shop, but increasing transport costs from Cravenby to work made the eldest search for alternative work. Then the trading licence expired and was not renewed, since the shop was in a White area; and Mr. Parker was refused a licence for Rylands on the grounds that there were too many shops there already. He says that today he lacks the capital, the initiative and now the physical strength to run a shop. He lives off what capital he saved; the price for his property paid by the Community Development Board; and what his children can provide. He claims he lives in near poverty, because the Community Development Board paid him only half to two-thirds of what he considered the property to be worth. He is now dispirited and apathetic, lonely for the company of his sons and their families.
The case of the Sundays gives further illustration of the type of distress and real hardship that the enforced group areas removals has caused in many cases.

Mr. Sunday, in his late fifties, lived with his wife and twenty-five year old niece in an affluent White suburb. Mr. Sunday worked as a blockman in a butchery, augmenting his income by cooking for weddings and encouraging his wife and niece to take in sewing to do at home. He had a history of heart trouble, and had had two minor attacks whilst they were still living in this area. They were then issued with an order to leave and to live in an Indian area. At that time, in the early 1970's, the building boom had not yet started in Rylands, but enough other Indians had been evicted to cause an unprecedented housing shortage. Mr. Sunday could find nowhere for his small family to live. He asked his siblings for help, expecting them to offer accommodation temporarily. But they refused. He found a flat in a "Coloured" area, but they had been there only five weeks when he arrived home one day to find that in his absence, Community Development Board officials had evicted his family and thrown the household goods into the street. For some days they had to go from door to door, begging to be allowed to sleep on the verandah or in the garden. Some of the furniture was stolen, the rest taken by a kindly shopkeeper and stored on his premises. With all this anxiety, Mr. Sunday suffered from a severe heart attack, remaining several months in hospital. As a result of this attack, he is almost completely paralysed, with limited hand and arm movement, and limited ability to speak. The horror of his situation rendered him a manic depressive, and for many years afterwards he was considered by his wife and niece to be insane at times. The two women were given accommodation by a friend whilst Mr. Sunday was in hospital, and before his release they managed to obtain a semi-detached house in Rylands through the intervention of the Imam. Mr. Sunday has been bedridden for nearly eight years. In 1979, through the offices of the Department of Indian Affairs and the Imam, Mr. Sunday was provided with a motorised wheelchair, and so was able to get out of bed and be relatively mobile, for the first time in eight years. He was so happy with this wheelchair that he has not retreated into an inane state of depression, and his articulation of sounds has improved more in the three months he has had the chair than in the previous eight years.

TYPES OF HOUSEHOLDS FOUND IN RYLANDS

A household is easily identifiable as such in Rylands. Firstly, the
accommodation in Rylands is predominantly individual houses separated by small fenced gardens. Sub-economic blocks of flats are under construction, but few are yet occupied. There are some older flats above the main shopping centre along the major thoroughfare, which are occupied. No flat dwellings, however, formed part of the area censused, since extensions I, II and III have no flats. Residents of a house are not necessarily related to each other, but there was always some degree of commensality, which was usually regular and extensive.

Table III.I indicates the ratio of extended households to households of a conjugal family, and also the generation depth in each type of household. It can be seen that conjugal households of two generations depth far outnumber any other type of household. There are, in fact, twice as many conjugal households as there are extended. The next largest category of households is two generation extended households, which are only slightly more numerous than three generation extended households. Equally few extended and conjugal households are only one generation deep (together forming only 4.6% of the total number of households).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Household</th>
<th>Numbers of Households of:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Generation</td>
<td>2 Generations</td>
<td>3 Generations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conjugal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56 = 64.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31 = 35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>87 = 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The types of recurring relationships that exist in the extended households are shown in Table III. II. Where the category in the Table includes married offspring, the spouses and children of the offspring are, of course, also included. The Table indicates that there is a definite trend for married sons to continue to live with their parents, but only a small percentage of married daughters remain in their parental households. What is obscured by the Table is that married sons and their families do not necessarily live permanently at the home of their parents. As younger brothers marry, older brothers leave the home which would otherwise be too crowded. Or alternatively, the oldest brother may have right of preference to remain in the parental home, so that the younger one is obliged to seek alternative accommodation, unless the parental home is large enough to accommodate all.

TABLE III. II

TYPES OF RECURRING RELATIONSHIPS IN MUSLIM EXTENDED HOUSEHOLDS IN THE RYLANDS SAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Recurring Relationship</th>
<th>No. of Extended Households in Sample</th>
<th>Extended Households % of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 or 2 Parent(s) + married son(s)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 or 2 Parent(s) + married daughter(s)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 or 2 Parent(s) + married sons + married daughters</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married brothers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But offspring cannot leave the parental home until they have found other accommodation. The example of the marriage of Adam to Ghairo illustrates this point.

Adam is the youngest of six siblings, five of whom are daughters. His father died some years ago, leaving a large estate. Adam's mother lives in an eight-roomed large house, together with her late husband's mother, a widowed sister of hers, two unmarried daughters, and a married daughter, her husband and new born child. Adam and his new wife, Ghairo, wanted to purchase a house to move into once they were married, since Adam's parental home was too crowded for them. They spent the year of their engagement looking for a house in Rylands, and they even applied to buy one of the undeveloped government properties. Only one house came on the market during that time. It was situated on the average sized plot (thirty metres by fifty metres), and it had five rooms, excluding the bathroom. It was newly built, and the bidding for it began at R48000. Despite Adam's large inheritance, he could not afford to buy it at that inflated price. So he and Ghairo moved into his mother's house. After some weeks, the occupants decided the house was overcrowded, and Adam's married sister decided to move out, into the home of her husband's brother. The latter had a spare room and wanted boarders to supplement his income. The room became available only three months after Adam's marriage.

The situations in Rylands where both married sons and married daughters remained in their parental home were explained by informants in three ways. The most common explanation was that there was no alternative accommodation available, otherwise some of the married children would have left. The other common explanations were that children remained to help in the family-run business; or that married offspring remained in the house to look after very elderly parents, who had indicated that the house was to be inherited by all of them. Since the inheritance was in a non-partible form, they shared it by all remaining there.

The incidence of married brothers or married siblings (included in the
"other" category of Table III.II) sharing a residence was high. The reasons given for this sharing were the same as those given above: no alternative accommodation, or a non-partible inheritance. The fact that no alternative accommodation was cited by informants as a reason for them to remain together in the same household does not necessarily mean that given a surplus of accommodation, all households would be only conjugal. But it does indicate that extended households that have been attributed to relics of "traditional Indian kinship patterns" (cf. Kurian 1961, and Ramasar 1967) reflect more the significance of pragmatic issues such as availability of accommodation, rather than on straightforward retention of tradition.

The problem with breaking down household structure so formally into extended versus conjugal households is that it obscures any type of process or change from one to the other and back again, in a domestic developmental cycle (cf. Goody, 1958 and Fortes, 1949). There is a second associated problem. It has been characteristic of work on Indians in India (Kurian, 1961), and in South Africa (Ramasar, 1967, and to some extent Kuper 1960) to assume that "traditional Indian kinship" implies that the majority of people live in patrilaterally extended households in patrilocal residence. The sign that change towards "Westernisation" is occurring has been taken to be the proportion of neolocal conjugal households formed, when people eschew their patrilateral relatives in favour of voluntary friendships and associations. Ramasar (1967), writing about Indians in the Transvaal and Natal, directly correlates the rise of juvenile delinquency and what she sees to be growing moral turpitude, with the breakdown of the o'd extended family system: "Today, the Indian family has changed from
the large, settled, traditional and sacred institution of kinship to the smaller, isolated secular households, many of whose functions have been assumed by other institutions" (ibid: 29).

THE PROCESS OF HOUSEHOLD CHANGES: THE DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE

The process of household changes is best presented first by describing some examples, and then afterwards by endeavouring to reconstruct some general principles, working from perspectives gained from Fortes (1949), Goody (1958) and in the local context Jithoo (1978). The two examples presented are of changes that have been taking place in the respective households over the period of two years, involving moving of residence across the borders of Rylands.

Piriwideen lived in her mother's five-roomed house in Rylands, together with her mother, who was widowed, three unmarried sisters, and her matrilateral cross cousin who had been adopted by the family on the death of his own parents when he was about fourteen years old. Piriwideen married in her late twenties, and went to live with her husband's parents in a small overcrowded house in a "Coloured" area. She describes the situation thus, "You see, we had nowhere else to go. My mother's house was full. In his house, his parents lived, with the six other children besides him, and a boarder. But they had only four rooms. We said that we would pay double the rent that the boarder paid, and take his place. But the boarder shared a room with one of my husband's brothers. So what we did was this: my parents-in-law had their room, and shared it with the baby (a six year old); the three girls had another room; the two brothers had another room; and we had to sleep in the lounge. It was terrible - we could go to sleep only after everyone else had gone to bed." After three years, Piriwideen and her husband found a four-roomed semi-detached house in Rylands, which they took immediately.

Since the rent amounted to just over half her husband's salary (the rent being R138.00 per month, and her husband earned R220.00 per month), they decided to use the free rooms for boarders. In Rylands, no one ever advertises in newspapers for boarders: they just let it be known amongst their kin and friendship networks that they are prepared to take in boarders. Within six weeks, Piriwideen had a letter
from strangers living in Natal presenting their credentials, and asking for board for a son who intended to come to Cape Town to study, and needed a reliable place to stay. Some weeks later, a similar letter arrived, from the Transvaal. Within three months of Piriwideen and her husband moving into their home, they had found two boarders - one Muslim man and one Hindu man. At the end of that year, the two boarders left, after making arrangements to return the following academic year.

The Muslim student never returned, but the Hindu did. "We liked the Hindu boy: always polite and never inconveniencing me. But that Muslim boy was really awful. He came in at odd times and always expected me to have his meals ready, even if we'd all eaten hours earlier. Or he'd just arrive with three friends and expect me to feed them free. And when we were fasting, he expected me to serve him and the other men first when we broke the fast, and only after they had finished could I eat. And I was seven months pregnant, too. But my husband took him aside and told him that I didn't need to serve him like that." 

Since Piriwideen was pregnant, she and her husband decided not to look for more boarders for some while. She was very ill during her confinement, so her mother came to look after her, the baby and to run the house. Her mother lived with them for over a year, contributing nominally to the finance. After her mother had left, Piriwideen and her husband had made arrangements to accommodate three boarders. But before the boarders arrived, Piriwideen was asked to aid her youngest sister.

This sister was married, and had also just had a baby. She and her husband had been living in a barn on a small-holding owned by Muslim shop-keepers they knew, near to the coast. The barn, however, was not adequate as a house. During the winter, holes in the roof opened up, and the wind and rain came in through the badly fitted planks of the wall. Why they remained there was that they could find nowhere else to stay, especially since at that time, her husband could find only irregular employment. The sister, Amina, contracted pneumonia, which induced premature delivery of the baby. The baby also contracted a lung disease. So Piriwideen offered to let the three of them live in one of her spare rooms as boarders. Whilst Amina was recovering, a third unmarried sister moved into the spare room, to help Piriwideen to cope with the housework and nursing. At this time, Piriwideen had a miscarriage, so the unmarried sister lengthened her stay for another three months.

Amina's husband had since found a permanent job, and together, the two husbands supported the household. When the unmarried sister left, they decided to arrange for one boader to stay with them. Within two days of this decision, they had had four men, ranging in age from eighteen to forty-five, apply for the room. They selected a middle-aged widower whom they
had known for some years. He pays R65.00 per month for board and lodging. Piriwideen was by now looking for accommodation for a cousin from Natal who wished to stay in Cape Town for six months. She regretted that her house could not afford him hospitality.

Amina had now been living with Piriwideen for several months. She said, "We would love to move out, not because we mind staying here. But it's just so cramped, and really, I'm not strong enough to help work for such a big household. But where can we go? We've tried everywhere we can think of, but there is nowhere we can afford to live. We can't pay over half our earnings for rent!"

This particular household, then, has shown great fluctuations of membership over the last two and a half or three years. It has changed from conjugal to extended, and back again several times, in accordance with the changing needs and economic pressures put on the householders.

This case study illustrates the economic importance of boarders in some households, not just from the boarders' point of view of having found accommodation, but from the viewpoint that the householders would not be able to cope without the extra money provided by boarders. To categorise households into "those with boarders" and "those without" gives a falsely static idea of what is really a continuously changing process. At one stage of fieldwork, seven households of the 87 had boarders; whilst at a later stage, seventeen had boarders. Those households with boarders were predominantly the smaller conjugal households rather than large extended households, simply because the former had the room to spare. The case also illustrates the typical method of recruitment of boarders, which is usually through informal and personal means (through a person's networks) rather than through formal and impersonal means (such as advertising in newspapers).
The second case study is slightly different, involving wealthier people, with personal acrimony and tensions between the senior head of the household and junior men being a main goad for people to consider leaving the household.

The Miabhais are an influential and wealthy Muslim kul-kutum, (see Chapter IV) branches of which spread throughout Cape Town. The head of the extended family lives behind one of his flourishing supermarkets. He has a chain of shops that he owns or manages (the shop sometimes being rented from the Community Development Board if it is in a White group area). In his large household lived twenty-three to twenty-eight people, the number varying because of long-term visits by various relatives. The members of the household are most easily described through a kin diagram, presented as Diagram III.1. The house is huge, but as the daughters say, "It is alright for a big family, but our army over-runs it".

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DIAGRAM III.1. MEMBERS OF THE MIABHAI EXTENDED HOUSEHOLD

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Old Mr. Miabhai runs altogether four shops with the aid of his extended family. He acts as a general manager, controlling the accounting and the ordering of goods. His eldest son and his wife, and the unmarried children, all aid in the
running of the largest shop, which is attached to the residence. The other two married sons and their wives have been allocated two other shops in different areas to run. The married daughter, Nadia, and her husband manage the fourth shop, which was a joint economic venture, financed half by the father-in-law and half by the son-in-law. It nevertheless still forms part of the Miabhai enterprise.

The second eldest son, Chetty, had purchased a luxurious house behind the supermarket which he was managing. He had never occupied this house, because it is in a White group area and he requires a permit, which he has not yet obtained. Over the months, however, he has been furnishing and re-painting the house in a most extravagant and luxurious way. His reason for such extravagance was that "Whites don't like Indians living in their areas because they think Indians are dirty and make their homes into slums. I'll show them how we can live, and in such style that their mouths will water".

During this time, Chetty's wife and Nadia had been becoming increasingly annoyed at living with old Mr. Miabhai. They both resented the intervention into every intimate detail of their private lives that was inevitable in such a large household. More than that, they resented the right to veto all decisions and behaviour, however trivial, that old Mr. and Mrs. Miabhai insisted upon, and which they were given. The old parents are so conservative, Nadia complained, that they do not even allow the children to go to the cinema. Also, Nadia disliked the fact that she and her husband, or she and her family, could do nothing separately, let alone individually. Always one of the twenty others would want to participate, and it was just not acceptable to refuse such a request. She and her husband shared a room with their youngest child, an eight month old baby, and the other two children were put in other bedrooms.

Nadia was especially upset that she and her husband were never paid wages. She described her grievance: "My father said to me he would buy me a property in Rylands, and build a semi-detached house on it, so it could be rented out. It cost thousands, and I agreed to it because I assumed he was giving me this for working so hard for him for eight years, when I could have been building up my own bank account. But do you know what he's doing? He's charging me for the cost of the house he built on it, and by the time I can start to pay off the bond, it will have tripled. I was so furious when I learnt this, that all the little things about living here suddenly seemed to choke me!"

Nadia's husband was also thoroughly irritated by living with old Mr. Miabhai. Since it was not the house of his own
parents, he really had little authority in it. His brothers-in-law seldom supported him in any argument, and his word did not carry weight against that of the elders of the house, his parents-in-law. He had moved into his wife's house because it had seemed a good proposition originally: he had been offered a junior managerial post in helping to run the family enterprise, in the shop attached to the house. So it was convenient, and also saved on his own expenses. In time, he managed to save enough money to prepare the way for some independence, and he and Mr. Miabhai each put forward fifty percent towards the running of another shop. But Nadia's husband had been allowed very little voice in the running of this shop. Attached to this shop is a flatlet, but it is also situated in a White area and so needs a permit, besides being in need of repair.

Within six weeks of each other, Chetty's family and Nadia's family left old Mr. Miabhai's household. Chetty's family moved into their luxurious house, without having yet obtained a permit, so disgruntled and frustrated had he and his wife felt in the parental house. Nadia and her family could not move into their flatlet, so they persuaded Mr. Miabhai to repair and furnish old servants' quarters belonging to him, next door to his house. Both couples rejoice in the measure of independence they have thus gained although they are not completely independent, since they receive family visits at all times of the night and day. But it seems that they did not want to isolate themselves from their family: just to achieve a small measure of independence.

In this second example, splits in the household were caused by tensions between the old generation and the second generation, and by tensions induced by overcrowding. But only when accommodation is available, and only when a young couple is economically independent, can they leave the parental household.

Jithoo (1978) presents a particularly useful analysis of the changing structure of households, from her work on Natal Indians. She criticises the use of the joint family as a starting point of an analysis of household structure because it is often assumed to be constant in membership, co-residential and commensal, but the extent to which it is any of these varies in time. It is thus imperative to study the
fluctuations of a household and not to assume that it remains static as a joint or a conjugal household:

"Jointness in these "functional" aspects of living, eating and sharing property is therefore ... a matter of degree which fluctuates not only between families, but also often within one family according to its developmental phase and its changing material circumstances .... This fluctuating "jointness" can, therefore, be regarded as an index of adaptation to a variety of opportunities by families that differ in terms of demography, skills, enterprise and even luck" (Jithoo: 1978: 93).

She describes two examples of extended households over time, the one case having corporate assets, the other none. In both cases, the household grows as wives marry into it, and splits through arguments and death, then grows again as sons of the next generation take wives. She gives no general reason for the fission of extended households, although she illustrates how important the economic factors can be. Arguments over independence, access to and control over funds can cause fission, but only if the dissenting party is economically self-sufficient.

Owens (1971) emphasises this factor in discussing fission and fusion in joint families in India. He suggests that in the beginning of a man's working career, his wage is so minimal that he depends for support on the joint household. In time, as his income increases, he gradually contributes more until the general fund relies heavily on his income. In the end, it is no longer economically viable for
him to remain in the joint household, where he is supporting other members to his own detriment. Owens suggests that it is at this point that fission often occurs. When fission does not occur, it is, according to Owens, because ties of corporate assets keep the members together.

The two case studies cited earlier seem to show fluctuations at the same sort of crises as Jithoo and Owens outline. In the first case, the household membership changes for the economic benefit of the householders: growth of the household is a strategem used deliberately to aid with coping with the problems of the economic situation. But a central point in the first case was the constraints that the external environment placed on the fission and fusion of households. A couple could not leave the place where it was staying until alternative accommodation had been found. The acute shortage of housing has a far-reaching effect on a couple's range of choice and decisions of where and with whom to live. They must stay where there is place for them. In this way, board and lodging offered provides a means of alternative accommodation for people wishing to leave their present homes, for whatever reasons. In this way, a young couple may establish themselves (semi-) independently from the authority of its elders even if it does not have the means to purchase or rent a house for itself.

The second case emphasises the power struggle between the generation who wields power, and the younger generation who would like to assume some, if not all, of this power. A joint household was seen by its members to be convenient for the best exploitation of their communal
assets, so to break away is a threat to the centralised power vested in the oldest generation. Once the completely dependent junior has begun to earn money, or to take a larger part in the running of the family business, he already threatens the total control of the elders. But he poses more of a threat when the oldest generation, through growing incapacity, is forced to retire gradually, being replaced by the younger generation. This was occurring in the Miabhais household, and tension was extremely high between members of the first and second generations. To counteract his losing power in business matters (as yet, he retained the majority of power), Mr.Miabhais prevailed more and more on his prerogative to direct the private affairs of his family, which was increasingly resented.

A generalised schema of an economic cycle (adapted from Jithoo and Owens, ibid.) is presented below. It must be emphasised that it cannot explain why there is a disproportion between conjugal and extended households, nor why each type of household exists. What it can do is to give the parameters of when, under what conditions, a household is liable to split. This schema postulates a cycle of economic dependence. There is a period when the youngest generation is completely economically dependent on the oldest. There is another phase when, as the youngest generation grows older, some members of all generations present will contribute economically to the household finance. Then, as the oldest generation grows older, there is the phase of gradual replacement of the old by the younger, and the old are now increasingly dependent on the younger, in their turn. Whatever the tensions as the power struggle between generations proceeds, a
coupie is not expected to, and is unable to leave the household until the couple is economically self-sufficient, and has other accommodation available. It is only when these conditions are fulfilled that a couple may leave and form their own conjugal (or extended) household.

Thus, the formation and persistence of an extended or conjugal household does not depend entirely on internal group preferences. The range of alternatives and choices is constrained by external factors, which in this situation are the effects of the implementation of the Group Areas Act, and its subsequent amendments. There is a particularly appropriate quotation by Goodenough, although made in an entirely different situation (an analysis of Truk residence patterns), that emphasises the importance of pragmatic considerations over "traditional" or emotional considerations when people choose their residences:

"With what parents, if any, a couple resides is a fortuitous by-product of a choice made with other considerations in mind" (Goodenough: 1956: 33).

TRADITION, MODERNITY AND RESIDENCE PATTERNS

There was an articulated group preference amongst people to whom I spoke for a young man to bring his bride to live at the home of his parents, but this preference is governed by the external constraints outlined above. It is also necessary to emphasise that although this young man might at first live with his parents, he is just as likely at a later date to move out of the house. Thus, no significance can be given to the preliminary breakdown of household types into conjugal and extended in terms of "modern" or "traditional".
The idea that extended households are results of Indian kinship and residence traditions (Kuper 1961, Ramasar, 1967) not only ignores that household structure changes in time, and is constrained by external conditions, but also that in the Cape, specifically, there are other groups exposed to similar constraints who also live in extended households. Whisson (1976) and Theron and Swart (1964) describe household structure amongst the so-called "Cape Malays" and "Coloureds" in the peninsula, which seems to be not only similar to that of the sample described here, but also seems to have arisen out of the same circumstance: the group areas removals and the consequent acute shortage of housing. Household structure thus appears to be significant in the light of an adaptation to external circumstances rather than a result of internal group preferences.
CHAPTER IV

THE EXTENDED FAMILY AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES

The patrilineal extended family, with patri- or viri-local residence, has become closely associated with the "traditional" kinship patterns of Central and Northern India (cf. Chapter III). Kurian (1961) and others attempt to show how, under industrial and urban conditions, this extended kin network breaks down into isolated and autonomous conjugal units, which, they reason, are better adapted to urban conditions than the extended family because a conjugal unit is more flexible and has greater mobility. Gould (1965), Owens (1971) and Benedict (1968) show, however, the persistence of the extended family in India, in urban areas, particularly with reference to family-run businesses. The essence of their approaches is that the extended family persists because the multiplicity of contacts, rights and obligations it involves provides members with a wide range of resources which can be used successfully to exploit the urban environment: "... under modern conditions of change, kinship bonds outside the nuclear family tend to persist, or more correctly to assume certain new functions" (Piddington: 1965: xii). This misapprehension that the "traditional" extended family necessarily changes to conjugal units in an urban environment, as a sign of "adaptation to modern conditions" is important to emphasise, because the degree of extended family contact has often been used as an index of adaptation of migrants to their new environment (cf. Siddique, 1977) without much consideration of the relative values of either autonomous kin units or extended families within their specific social contexts. That is, kinship patterns have not been regarded so much as strategies involving choice, but
rather, they have been regarded as morphological characteristics, mutating only under duress.

But as the previous chapter indicates, extended families in urban areas are not unique to Indians, especially in South Africa. Whisson (1976) and Theron and Swart (1964) describe the importance of extended families and extended households amongst "Cape Malays" and "Coloureds", respectively, in the Cape peninsula. As a consequence of the Group Areas legislation, these people are also experiencing an acute shortage of housing (Horrell, 1976), which must also place added emphasis on an extended network (recruited, in these cases, through kinship links). An extended network would act as a resource for the members (see below).

It is particularly in analysing the significance of the extended family amongst Indians in South Africa that one must beware of arbitrarily imposed residential limitations - such as the Indian group areas suburbs - and beware of accepting one such suburb as a community. Owing to shortage of land (for further development in that suburb) and to the extreme shortage of housing, close kin frequently may be unable to live together, or in the same street or even in the same suburb. Thus, one must follow kin networks as they spread. The geographical spread of the extended family can, in practice, be an advantage to the members, since a widely spread out but closely interacting network gives members information and access to certain resources in areas otherwise inaccessible to them.

The extended family has many names, depending on the dialect spoken by informants. The most commonly used name, however, is the
Kokanie amalgamation of the two terms, kul and kutum. Informants spoke about their extended families as their kul-kutum, using these words hyphenated together. **Kul** was defined by informants loosely as "all", and **kutum** as "family", so *kul-kutum* was loosely translated by my informants as "all the family". Immediately significant was that in this definition, there is no concept of agnation and only a remote emphasis on patrilaterality. A married man would include in his *kul-kutum* his wife, children, their spouses and their children. He would also sometimes include his children's spouses' parents and their siblings. Also included would be his own siblings, their spouses and their children, and also those of his wife. Both his parents and her parents and their siblings are included, and the descendants of their parents' siblings. He would include his father's parents, but seldom his mother's, and even more rarely, his wife's grandparents. Hence, the concept of *kul-kutum* is an ego-centred bilateral kinship network, with a slight tendency to patrilaterality in the third ascending generation. It is significant that informants indicated that sometimes they would include more or less remote affines in their *kul-kutum*, and at other times, these same affines would be excluded. Other informants insisted that affines such as ego's wife's sister's husband belonged to ego's *kul-kutum*, and so did his parents, but other informants said that although he did form part of ego's *kul-kutum*, really he belonged to that of his own father. Diagram IV.I represents the Dhansay *kul-kutum* as described by Hassan, a junior member of the four generation network. As will be indicated below, it is significant that this is the Dhansay *kul-kutum* as perceived by one member.
Another member may perceive it differently, especially if of a different status within the structure of the kul-kutum.

**DIAGRAM IV.I**

**DHANSAY KUL-KUTUM**

There are several complicated marriage interconnections within this kul-kutum. The oldest generation shown were all born in India. Ego says that there are some cousin marriages amongst them, but because the marriages occurred so long ago, he does not know the exact nature of these interconnections. In 1943, ego's parents, his father's eldest brother, and his father's parents sailed from Bombay to Durban. During the passage, the boat was wrecked, and all his relatives were drowned. In 1947, ego's father's younger brother (B) removed ego and his siblings from the care of ego's mother's parents in rural Gujerat, to take them to Durban. In Durban, B was living with ego's father's father's brother, marked A on Diagram IV.I. The three orphans were raised in A's home.
Apparently ego's father had left a sizeable inheritance for his children, but I and B claimed the inheritance for themselves, and forced the children to go out to work, removing them from school to do so. When he was sixteen years old, ego was introduced to two prospective brides for himself. The one was the ugly daughter of a rich young friend of "A"'s, and the other girl was "A"'s own grandchild. "A" and "B" endeavoured to force ego to marry the rich girl, but ego asked the head of the kul-kutum to intervene and to allow him to marry his cousin. They were married a few months later, and after a while, moved to Cape Town to avoid the acrimony within the kul-kutum. They decided to move to Cape Town because ego's wife's sister was already living there with the family of friends of the head of the kul-kutum. This sister had promised to organize accommodation for ego and his wife, and had found an offer of work for ego, through the kul-kutum network of the family with whom she was staying. Some months later, the wife's sister married the only son of ego's father's brother (deceased), to cement the high degree of closeness and co-operation between the junior branch of the kul-kutum. Today, the two families live a few blocks away from each other in Rylands, and co-operate closely and frequently.

That is the overview to the history of this kul-kutum. But according to the generalized views of which kin comprises the kul-kutum, the Dhansay kul-kutum has some omissions, that need to be explained. Ego's mother's parents and her siblings are not included because they live in India, although ego said that they were still family. Ego's elder brother's wife's parents and siblings are not included either, because they live in the Transvaal: "We never see them and don't know what they do", ego explained. C's siblings and parents are not included because the parents are deceased, and the siblings live in India and in London, and are thus not seen or interacted with at all. Ego's wife's younger brothers, D and E, are married to Cape Town Indian girls, previously unconnected with the Dhansay kul-kutum. It is significant that the parents of these girls, and the girls' siblings are included.
in the kul-kutum. The kul-kutum is, therefore, a selection from ego's bilateral kin and affines.

Hassan Dhansay described why he had included these people in his idea of who was a member of his kul-kutum and what his kul-kutum meant to him.

"For us, we never live alone, never seeing family. Our family is the most important thing we have: in our religion our family is honoured, too. It's like this. Say you're sick, then your family will help out — looking after your wife and children, helping in the shop, and all contributing something, perhaps not much, to the cost of treatment. But you'll do the same for them. That's why it's very difficult if there is a black sheep in the family, who won't help, or just takes without giving. It doesn't happen often, but when it does, that sort of person may just find himself alone one morning.

These people I showed you are all part of my kul-kutum. I see them often, we help each other, and we're really all the same family, including in-laws. Each kul-kutum has a leader, the eldest father in the family, and we follow his advice. My wife's sisters' husbands will listen to what our head has to say to them, and because they're part of the family, they must respect him. But they must also listen to the advice of the eldest father of their family, who has their surname. Yes, we must also respect this other head, but our head's advice must come first for us. If we really disagree with our head, we can ask the other elders, or perhaps turn to the head and elders of the kul-kutum of my wife's sisters' husbands. The head and elders of our kul-kutum must be invited to all celebrations, and their advice asked when we want to do something important. They can help us, or ask the rest of the family to help us, or even their friends may help us. Especially when you're young, with a young family, looking for a house, needing money for clothes, education, furniture, then the kul-kutum is the best way of getting all this help. I like to think of my kul-kutum as a mutual aid society, with no profit-making!"

Hassan Dhansay included in his concept of his kul-kutum affines of his wife, who are thus remotely connected to him. His logic for including them was not only that, through their affinal association
with his wife, they could be potential co-operators in this "mutual aid society", but that they were, in actuality, very active participators whose aid was seen as important to Hassan. It is therefore difficult if not impossible to look for a kinship criterion delimiting membership of this type of network. What has emerged as significant in defining who are members, however, has been the degree of interaction between members. For example, the parents and sisters of the wives of D and E are members of the kul-kutum for ego because they live close by, invite each other to their homes for meals, celebrations, religious festivities, and in general, they aid and co-operate with each other extensively. C's siblings and parents are not included (according to ego), not because they are more distantly related, but because they live so far away, and there is no interaction at all between them. The same applies for the reason why ego's eldest brother's wife's siblings and parents are not included. Never did any informant give as a reason for excluding people from his kul-kutum that they were not sufficiently closely related (although some type of kinship or affinal link is essential for membership).

So far, a kul-kutum seems to be a three or four generation network that is ego-centred, and that includes a selection made by ego of both kin and affines on the basis of degree of interaction. Because it is ego-centred and based on the personal choice of interaction it therefore follows that people included in a kul-kutum by one person will not necessarily be the same as those included by another member. For example, in a four-generation kul-kutum, with the eldest generation called A and the youngest D, a member of C may include in his concept of his kul-kutum the siblings and parents
of his married sisters. A member of A, or B, however, might not necessarily include these people, or they may be very peripheral to his concept of who forms the core members.

It also follows that if a kul-kutum is based partly on degree of interaction, any individual may become involved in the networks of other kul-kutum. For example, a man may be involved in his own kul-kutum, but he also considers his married sisters' husbands and their siblings to be an integral part of his network. They, however, may not acknowledge the authority of ego's father's father as much as they would acknowledge the authority of their own father's father. But for the everyday purposes of reciprocal aid and extended interaction, ego and his affines form a closely co-operating network that they call (part of) their kul-kutum. What is important to the young C generation is the amount of aid and resources that can be obtained: the network is a primary moral, affective and material support (see the case studies below).

But the concept of a kul-kutum must also somehow involve the concept of leadership. Every kul-kutum has an acknowledged male leader. This leader is invariably of the oldest generation, and, according to popular convention, should also be married. (A short case study of a leader and his roles is given below. Here, the theoretical implications of leadership are discussed.) A person owes allegiance to his kul-kutum head on the basis of several factors. These are personal choice and loyalty; degree of interaction, which is influenced by geographical nearness; and some form of kinship or affinal tie. This kinship or affinal tie is not necessarily of central
importance, since non-kin may be incorporated. The kinship allegiance is based on patri-filiation, so that when a kul-kutum ranges over four generations, accumulative patri-filiation accounts for loyalty to the head. Thus, a person can be a member of a kul-kutum on the basis of any or all of the criteria mentioned above, so that he does not have to be able to trace direct descent from the leader. The concept of leadership acts as a means to focus the identity (and therefore membership and inter-group ties) of a group. The first two criteria of membership are voluntary, and therefore from a leader's point of view, loyalty is never assured. The third, based on patrifiliation, is ascribed by birth-right, and thus, in theory, loyalty is incontrovertible, although a person may always renounce membership of his own kul-kutum in favour of participation in another. The vague notion of descent inherent in patrifiliation delimits criteria of loyalty for the followers, and delimits and assures criteria of authority for the head and other powerful elders.

There are thus two levels of abstraction of the workings of a kul-kutum. For a junior member, a kul-kutum hardly represents a bounded group, but rather, it is an ego-centred wide range of kin and affines co-operating to form an open-ended, changing network. In this way, ego may participate intimately in the interactions of other kul-kutum as a member, recruited through the non-kin criteria. But he need not reject membership of a kul-kutum group to which he owes patrifiliation allegiance: he may participate simultaneously in two kul-kutum. For a leader, who needs to assure himself of followers, a kul-kutum becomes more of a bounded group than an open-ended ego-centred network, since leadership is not essential in the workings
of the latter. The formation of a group occurs through patri-
filiation, but the group's boundaries are easily permeable because
loyalty is also a matter of personal choice and geographical
propinquity. Thus, the concept of what and who constitutes a *kul-kutum*
can vary according to the status of an individual in the structure of
a *kul-kutum*, and what an individual (in a certain structural position)
requires from this sort of set of relationships.

It is illuminating to turn here to what has been written about *kul*
and *kutum* in India, to understand the significance of any differences.
Mayer (1965) shows that in central India, there is vernacular
distinction between agnatic lineage and a bilateral extended family.
The first, recognised primarily in ritual, is called the *kul*.
Recognition of members is based on the agnatic principle, and the links
may be traced back ten generations. Not all the genealogical
interconnections between members of the *kul* may be known, however.
The *kutum* is loosely translated as "family", and as Mayer explains, the
Indian word has a wide a range of meanings as the English. The
*kutum* in one sense refers to a small agnatic descent group, about
four generations in depth. In another sense, it refers to an
ego-centred concept of "family" involving both affines and agnates,
also only three to four generations deep. But not necessarily all a
person's affines or agnates will be included in his concept of his *kutum*.
What seems to be of primary account is not nearness or remoteness of
genealogical link, but rather the degree of co-operation with ego,
geographical nearness, and personal likes and dislikes. Central
to whom is included in one's *kutum* is the alter's ability or
willingness to respond, to fulfill his obligations to one. If he does not, he is excluded from the *kutum:* "All kin relations are connected with obligations to invite and to make gifts, and money is basic to this. Without enough money, the tie will lapse just as surely as it does if one party withholds his proper contribution when he does, in fact, possess the money" (Mayer: 1965: 172).

*Kul* and *kutum* are never used together as a joint term, in Mayer's area. They would contradict each other should they be so used. Hence, the tendency of Indians in the Cape to use these terms as a joint term, when talking about their kin networks, seems to indicate a linguistic and conceptual blurring of the distinction between the principles of agnation on the one hand and filiation and affinity on the other. The significance of this usage will be discussed further below.

In both the Indian and the Cape Town contexts, it is evident that the terms *kutum* and *kul-kutum* are problematic because they are polysemic. Strathern (1973) working in New Guinea, faced a similar problem. He reiterates the observations by Scheffler and Keesing, that although people of a society may have a clear conceptual definition of descent constructs, they may in actuality apply them in different ways; furthermore these descent constructs may not in fact always be the criteria for membership of an apparently descent-based group. Strathern concludes that the significance of polysemic kin terms lies in the degree of manipulation and choice they permit in resource management and competition: "... multiple criteria of eligibility leave room for manipulation in the world of choice and transactions" (Strathern: 1973: 30).
There is a widely used practice amongst informants in Rylands of giving non-kin symbolic kinship terms. For example, a woman may call close friends of an equal status to her "Bhan" (which is Urdu for "sister"); and male friends of her husband "Dhai" ("brother"). In this way, non-kin are symbolically included in the wide definition of "kutum" or family, thereby giving further significance to Strathern's conclusion. Thus widening the kul-kutum widens the network of mutual aid, information and loyalty, so that these terms of relationship are not merely affective, but of great strategic value in manipulating resources.

**THE NATURE OF POWER IN THE KUL-KUTUM**

Power in the kul-kutum is vested in the hands of the oldest generation of both sexes. There is always a centralisation of power in the position of head of the kul-kutum, but the extent of his power compared with that of other elders is a matter of personality and personal ambition.

The head is generally the oldest living married male in a group which is bound together by acknowledged (accumulative) patri-filiation. To a large extent, this leader becomes a leader because of the convention that assumes that a man of such a status is eligible for leadership, and that those people junior to him but tied to him (for any reason) must pay him respect and obey him. In this sense, a leader is not chosen by his followers. But a follower can choose whether he would like to follow a particular leader or not, since there are other criteria whereby he may join other kul-kutum groups. The followers can in this way oppose their leader and impose certain sanctions on
him, by threatening to withdraw their support. But merely because a man is the eldest married male in a group that acknowledges patri-filiation loyalties does not ensure that he would be the leader. Married men of the senior generation must compete against each other for leadership.

A leader needs to be of the eldest generation, he needs to be (or have been) married, he needs a certain amount of influence and therefore a corresponding amount of affluence. Finally, his ability to be an adequate leader, his personality, is important, since his leadership is in the realm of personal problems and needs. He is a leader by virtue of his understanding and ability to cope with people, as well as by virtue of his structural position. The Dhansay kul-kutum cited earlier illustrates in its leader, the complex inter-play of factors that arise when leadership is contested.

In the case of the Dhansay kul-kutum, the head was not the eldest married male of a line of brothers, but rather the third eldest. The eldest brother had never become the head because of his unpleasant personality and his inability to understand younger people. When the old leader had died, the next eldest brother had assumed the role of leader. He had all the necessary prerequisites of seniority, being married, influence and affluence, but he was a particularly conservative man who had a great antipathy to all things "Western". He also believed that all women and all juniors should obey him totally, and had the reputation in his dealings with his wife and children, of being so uncompromising and authoritarian that he never considered it necessary to ask for anyone's point of view. Therefore, when he was called upon to arbitrate a kul-kutum dispute, he was, predictably, unsuccessful in mollifying either side since he never even considered their arguments. This situation continued for some while, but gradually, the more junior members of the kul-kutum began to ask the third eldest of the brothers for his advice. This continued until this brother was accepted as leader.

Young Mr Dhansay described the eldest brother thus: "He is so ... conservative in Indian ways that none of us can get
on with him. He won't even allow us to watch T.V. He says it's unIslamic. He just doesn't understand young people, including me - and I'm forty!" The second eldest brother was not chosen either, because he never married and is thus ineligible for the position. The reasoning is that a head must be able to counsel through understanding, to illustrate what problems lie ahead, to guide in family matters, which it is felt, a bachelor cannot do adequately, having lacked personal experience. Therefore, the head of the Dhansay kul-kutum is the third eldest brother, who is married, and who has a personality adequate for his rôle. He became the leader really through the choice of his followers, by being able to fulfill the rôle of leader far better than the man convention originally placed in this rôle. The ousted leader has had to accept this reversal of roles, and, as an elder, still enjoys considerable authority. There, is, however, a great deal of acrimony between these two brothers because of the eldest's failure, which means that for most kul-kutum decisions, the eldest attempts to block the leader's suggestions. According to young Mr. Dhansay, the eldest is seldom successful, since the other seniors generally support the decisions of the leader. This eldest brother is gradually isolating himself more and more, then, from any effective authority in decision-making councils of the kul-kutum because of his retaliatory policy, which is unsupported by other seniors.

Although the extent of the authority of the head and his advisors (the other senior members) depends on individual circumstances, amongst the informants there was seldom a case of the head having more than advisory and tutelary powers. The other elders have a right to discuss any problems with him, advising him on what approach to take. There was seldom a case of elders' advice being ignored. It was usually accepted and followed, or occasionally, modified slightly.

Anything affecting any member of the kul-kutum is theoretically of concern to the head. The head's advice or permission is asked - often as a matter of form - when plans regarding schooling, accommodation, travel, marriage, work, finance and so forth are being
made. If there is a particularly serious problem, then all the elders of the kul-kutum will be summoned, and may be asked to use their connections with other kul-kutum to procure more advice.

After the elders, it is the middle generation men who have greatest authority. Generally, their authority is limited to their own households and to giving advice to their siblings. Their wives, the women of the middle generation, have the lowest rank of authority, although the extent of their power may be considerable. Their authority is limited generally to their own children (and grand-children).

If a child would like to make a request that is of major importance (and therefore requiring the sanction of the head of the kul-kutum) — perhaps regarding marriage or being sent away to school — he approaches his same sex parent and asks him to mediate. If the parent is not amenable, then the child is entitled to ask an uncle or aunt. The parent (or uncle or aunt) will not necessarily be of a suitable rank to address the head directly. He may have to ask a same sex person of the next generation to approach the head. The answer from the head will follow the same channels downwards. Seldom will a person of a junior generation approach the head directly with a request, merely as a matter of courtesy rather than a strict segregation of generations.

The structure of power is based on two principles, both of which are also central in Islamic orthodoxy and so their importance is magnified to the participants. The one principle is that respect and veneration are due to the aged, and their counsel is wise and ought to be followed. Hence, any older person is to be respected: and
respect for elders is strictly enforced amongst the Indians in Cape Town. It is considered locally that one of the worst offences a child can commit is to be disrespectful to any elder, let alone those of his own family, who have more power over him because they are more closely related. Tied in with this principle is the respect owing to parents, and by extension, to all kin, which is another central tenet of Islam, and also strictly enforced amongst Cape Town Indian Muslims.

The other principle on which authority is based has to do with the honour and shame complex written about by Peristiany (1966 and 1976), Campbell (1964), Pastner (1972) and others. This principle is based on the segregation of men and women, and the separation of activities into those appropriate for women (house-keeping and other domestic duties) and those appropriate for men (dealing with the external world, and protecting the honour and virtue of women). Men protect the virtue of their women because it reflects on their own reputations as protectors and providers, and it is partly through reputation that they endeavour to influence local affairs and to achieve suitable patron-client relationships.

Amongst Cape Indian Muslims, the government census data of 1971 showed that until the 1960's, women formed less than 3% of the total Indian workforce. By the time of the 1971 census, the percentage of women workers had tripled. The statistics still indicate, however, that the vast majority of Indian women remain at home, kept in relative domestic seclusion (see Chapter II). All informants advocated the guarding of women's modesty as a fundamental part of their commitment
to Islam.

This protection of the reputations of women provides power and authority not just for the men who protect. The older women of the household, often already grandmothers, also keep tight control of the younger women of the household. But more subtly, they achieve status and authority by acting as "fidei defensor", insisting on all members of the household conforming to their ideas not only of morality, but closely associated with that, with their ideas of tradition and "tehvar". (Tehvar is a Gujerati word used by Gujerati and some Kokanic informants to mean, "The way things are done in India"; "Indian tradition"). Being kept in domestic seclusion in an alien country, such old women may have had little chance of learning the "new" ways, or occasionally, even non-Indian languages. They continue to do things according to "tradition", and make special efforts to maintain the tradition in the face of the alien world in which their menfolk and children participate. To succumb to change, to render tradition obsolete and thus their esoteric knowledge redundant, is to jeopardise their position as keepers of the old ways, keepers of morality, which gives them a special sort of authority not only in their own households, but if they are knowledgeable, in the other households of their kul-kutum. Especially as ceremonies and traditions of old India are forgotten by the young generation, their knowledge gives them power as they are called upon to advise.

This situation arose very clearly in the course of a conflict between a daughter-in-law, Nadirah, and her mother-in-law. Nadirah was born in Cape Town, of a German father and Malay mother. Her husband was born in India, the youngest of a large wealthy family, who then emigrated to Cape Town.
Nadirah was chosen to marry the son since she comes from a very respectable, although not affluent, family of politicians. On her marriage, she went to live with her husband's parents, three unmarried daughters, and an elder married brother, his wife and their baby. She was the only non-Indian. Her mother-in-law, after thirty years in South Africa, still refused to speak either English or Afrikaans, so Nadirah was forced to learn Kokanie. As she started to master it, the old lady changed to Urdu, apparently more difficult to learn. Even her own children had difficulty understanding her. She also insisted on Indian cuisine, also previously unknown to Nadirah. But most of all, she kept all the daughters and daughters-in-law in an extremely strict state of purdah, previously almost foreign to Nadirah who had enjoyed freedom of movement. The state of purdah forbid the girls to leave the house without the old lady's permission, or to go out by themselves. The old lady insisted on accompanying them every time, but she would allow only a certain number of trips per week. The old lady is regarded by outsiders as highly moral and enjoys high status because she has kept the Indian ways so pure of change, and she is consulted by other ladies concerning tehvar on various occasions. One of the central ways in which this old lady keeps power in her hands in her household is by refusing to speak any other language than one of the six Indian ones in which she is fluent. None of her children or her daughters-in-law is nearly as fluent as she is, and as soon as they show signs of fluency, she changes to another language, for a year or a few months, and they quickly lose their fluency, for they speak Afrikaans and English amongst themselves.

It is not easy to rebel against the authority and decisions of one's kul-kutum. If one disagrees with advice given by an elder or by the head, or if one is asked to perform a request against one's wishes, one can always appeal to the elders for a joint decision. If one still finds the decision objectionable, there is no physical compulsion to obey it. The moral compulsion is generally incentive enough. The smooth running and continuing reciprocity of the kul-kutum is controlled by the elders and their influence. They act to sort out grievances, and to ensure that members continue to co-operate.

If a member fails to co-operate, he jeopardises the smooth running for all other members. The basic guiding ethos is unstinting aid
for fellow members, with strong respect for one's rights and duties, for it is through reciprocity and the fulfillment of rights and duties that the kul-kutum network acts as a most efficient centre for all sorts of resources. Hence goodwill amongst members is essential for its success as a resource pool. Thus, obedience towards the elders is not merely a matter of traditional respect, but also a choice of strategy by an individual whereby his submission to authority ensures his access to certain group resources.

Thus, to disregard the advice of the elders is to incur the disapproval if not the anger of other members, who fear that this action will in some way jeopardise them. Unless the matter is very trivial and can afford to be disregarded, a person may (although not necessarily) in fact encounter a range of expressions of opposition to him should he disobey, from being temporarily ignored to having a cessation of all rights and obligations he enjoys and of all relationships with him. So unless a person has a wide range of other external relationships that can provide him with the resources of his kul-kutum, or unless he ingratiates himself into another kul-kutum, to incur the displeasure of one's kul-kutum is not a sound resource-management strategy.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND THE KUL-KUTUM

The kul-kutum can act as a source of resources for its members only if they abide by its central principle of long term reciprocity. To show that members are willing to reciprocate, or to enter into aid arrangements with other members, there is generally a constant flow of minor prestations between members. For example, when women bake,
they send a tray of sweetmeats to two or three other households; or
a mother may send a child to another house to ask if he or she may
help with chores. These prestations are completely voluntary, and
are constantly being made. Not to make them, and not to receive them,
is to indicate that one is unwilling to have anything to do with the
other people. Of course, prestations are not made merely to kul-kutum
members in the same town, but also to friends and neighbours who are
incorporated into this network through being given symbolic kinship
status.

Rather than generalise about how the kul-kutum aids its members, and
in what range of activities it participates, the following three case
histories will endeavour to illustrate the kul-kutum's scope.

The Dhansay kul-kutum described earlier in this chapter has
members living in Cape Town, Kimberley and Natal. The head
is resident in Kimberley. One day, Hassan Dhansay (the ego
of the example) received a letter from the head's daughter's
daughter-in-law, called Shariffa, saying that her eldest
daughter was leaving school. Since the girl was only thirteen,
the Cape Town people became most concerned, and asked if the
daughter were being removed from school because of her
approaching puberty. (This had been a custom amongst many
conservative Muslim Indians. Hassan's wife left school at the
age of twelve, after completing four years of school, because
of her approaching womanhood.) The family replied that the
girl was getting a job, because they could no longer afford to
support five children at school. Hassan and his wife's
sister's husband discussed the situation, conferred with their
wives, and then telephoned to Kimberley, undertaking to support
the girl at school until she had matriculated. They also
undertook to aid in the support of the third eldest child of the
Kimberley family.

This child, called Jasmin, was an unofficially adopted child.
Her parents were distantly related, through grandparents, to
Shariffa's natal kul-kutum. On a woman's marriage, although
she becomes more incorporated into her husband's kul-kutum,
she does not necessarily cut off all ties with her own. The
importance of her natal kul-kutum depends on her extent of
interaction with it. Jasmin's parents were extremely poor,
and lived in a distant rural area in Natal. There was no
school in the vicinity, and Jasmin's parents refused to send her away to a "strange" school alone. So Shariffa and her husband undertook to raise and educate her. Occasionally, Jasmin's parents will contribute money, or more often, send home-made gifts, but they cannot afford to subsidise Jasmin's upkeep. Jasmin is accepted as a daughter in Shariffa's family. The extent of her acceptance is shown by the fact that the eldest daughter, after seven years school, was prepared to leave school to allow the younger children to be educated. At no stage was the expense of maintaining Jasmin considered to be responsible for any hardship. Hassan commented on this situation: "Well, you see, amongst us people, we don't think twice about adopting other children, even if it means we can't do this or that because of money. For a few years we support a child: in twenty years time, this child has grown up and will support us in time of need. Just imagine if we would not help each other. Where would we be? How could we call ourselves Muslims?".

It is not only perceived as a family obligation to aid when the call comes, but as a very strong religious obligation. Time and again, informants quoted the sura in the Qur'an that state explicitly that a man may pray five times a day and fast the whole year, but unless he puts his belief into practice, in his relationships with other people, he will never be rewarded by Allah.

The second case history indicates the utilitarian value placed on marriage alliances.

Ego, in Diagram 4.2., is Amien Shamsodien. He was born in Gujerat province, and emigrated to Cape Town as a young man, to aid his elderly uncle (A) (his father's brother) in a retail business. None of the rest of Amien's family emigrated. Amien lived with his uncle and his large family, all of whom helped in the shop. After some years, as the business expanded, Amien expressed a desire to run his own shop. He did not have the capital to start one, however, so his uncle, his adult cousins, and some of his uncle's wife's siblings provided him with enough, on the understanding that Amien would act in partnership with his uncle. The loans were to be repaid over the years, except for one. One of Amien's aunt's brothers (B) had lent him nearly R2000. The condition to this was that Amien would take
his two sons into the business, training them in all aspects of shop-keeping and accounting, paying them a good wage, and when the time came, Amien should help them start their own business. In this way, Amien needed to repay only half of the R2000.

By this stage, Amien's uncle decided it was time for Amien to marry, and, after conferring with his wife's brothers, they selected a local Indian Muslim girl of a wealthy family. Amien agreed to the match, the girl was approached, and the match settled.

Some years later, the implementation of the Group Areas Act began in Cape Town. Amien's shop was situated in an area zoned for "Coloureds", and therefore closed to Indian enterprise. A meeting was called of the entire adult section of the kul-kutum. Eventually, one of the elders suggested that Amien could save his property by having it registered under a "Malay" name. To do this, he would have to marry a second wife, a "Malay" woman, and register it in her name.
Amien's uncle (A) had had a close business alliance with a wealthy "Malay" family for some years. He suggested a daughter (G) of this family to Amien. They also all agreed that in case it was not sufficient to register the property in the wife's name (if the wife had to be classified under her husband's classification) they would sell some shares in the business to one of her brothers (E). This action would also cement the very profitable business relationship between Amien's uncle and this family.

So the elders arranged the match, and Amien married his second wife, who was brought to live in the same house as his first wife. The Indian wife remained at home, in charge of the household, whilst Amien and his "Malay" wife took care of the shop. A few months later, the relative (B) who had lent Amien the R2000 approached Amien, to ask him about the prospects of one of his sons (working for Amien) marrying into the "Malay" family. He suggested that in this way, he could open a factory in an Indian area, if the "Malay" family gave him financial support, the "Malays" being sleeping partners. Again, a convocation of the elders was called, and this idea was accepted. Another deputation met the "Malay" family, the son was betrothed to a nine year old daughter of the family (F), and an agreement regarding the factory was signed.

The contacts of one member of a kul-kutum are thus exploited by others.

According to the ideology of the Indian extended family, the most reliable way to have a permanent relationship of mutual aid and benefit is through kinship links, hence the business alliance marriages into the "Malay" family. Indians have acquired a stereotype amongst the "Malays" because of this sort of commercial alliance. The "Malays" claim that the only time Indians marry into a "Malay" family is when the latter has property and business to which the former would like to have access. Then, the "Malays" claim, the next thing is that the Indian's contract several marriages into this family, and take over all the business.

It is also noteworthy that there were no examples of girls from a Muslim family in Rylands marrying "Malays". (These girls would then,
presumably, have to live in a group area prescribed for their husbands, since in law, they acquire the status of their husbands). Only Indian men married out of the group.

What this case study also illustrates is that "Malays" can also be incorporated into an Indian kul-kutum network. The "Malays" are not accepted as completely equal - after all, they are unfamiliar with Tahvar. The most important criterion is that the "Malays" are Muslim. To marry a non-Indian is acceptable to the Muslim Indian community, but to marry a non-Muslim is not. There is a constant flow of prestation between the Indian and "Malays" households. The case also shows that where a man, such as Amien's uncle (A) arrives in Cape Town without any other kin, he can become part of his wife's kul-kutum should he choose to do so. Not to choose to do so is to deprive oneself of all the valuable relationships entailed in the network.

The third case study shows how the kul-kutum members can be mobilised to form supporters in local-level politics. Each mosque is administered by a mosque committee, which, in Cape Town, is elected by the congregation. To be elected to a mosque committee, a man must prove that he is a good Muslim, that he has the welfare of his people at heart, and that he is willing to go to any lengths to fulfill his duties and obligations to the mosque. A man who openly uses the mosque committee as a vehicle for personal ambition is often likely to be asked to resign, or stands a chance of not being re-elected after his period of office ends, since ideally, a committee member should be beyond self-interest.
So how does a man campaign to be elected to this prestigious and powerful committee? He must be known to be associated with good works and public undertakings. He must be known to be generous in his donation of zakaat (Muslim poor tax, amounting generally to about 2½% of one's annual income). It is seldom that men competing in forthcoming elections hold rallies, but what they may do is to organise public prayer meetings or public intellectual discussions concerning Muslim theology.

Mr. Barday was running for election in the forthcoming mosque committee elections. He occupied a senior position in his kul-kutum, and the head of it was his elder brother. When he announced his intention to run for election, his kul-kutum responded with enthusiasm, because the status of his position would reflect on them also. Members of his kul-kutum had always been involved with mosque affairs. Mr. Barday's youngest sister, a lady in her mid-forties, had been teaching at the local madressa for some years. Two of his nephews (sons of one of his brothers and one of his sisters) were regarded as outstanding young scholars of Islam.

Mr. Barday himself arranged several functions in the months preceding the elections. He organized weekly discussions of the Qu'ran at his home, for men. His wife organized the same for women, held on a different day. He addressed a few civic meetings about the needs of Muslims in South Africa, and about the needs of the residents of Rylands. He made a public donation to a local charity, and he offered a small scholarship to aid poor scholars to matriculate.

The rest of his kul-kutum were meanwhile also campaigning for him, extolling his accomplishments to their friends. Amongst these kin, there seemed no hesitation at all about supporting Mr. Barday rather than any of his competitors. The basis of their loyalty was explained by one of the younger women: "Well you see, he's our family. We know him. We trust him. He's a good and honest man. Yes, the other men wanting to be elected are also good - I don't know anything bad about them or their people. But Dada is one of us. We must support each other. Imagine if I supported someone else instead of my own Dada! People would wonder what was wrong!".

The rest of the kul-kutum raised a great deal of support for Mr. Barday from their own friends and acquaintance. But the basis for support was not just the good actions and honourable intentions of Mr. Barday. The behaviour and reputation of the
entire kul-kutum was taken into consideration by people before they decided to commit themselves. This meant that the relations between members of the kul-kutum were scrutinised, that business dealings were scrutinised, and that the private reputations - the honour and shame complex - were scrutinised. During this period, for example, women of the Barday kul-kutum ensured that they always covered their hair and dressed modestly even at home, and that they never went anywhere outside unescorted. The misbehaviour of even a junior of the kul-kutum might have jeopardised Mr. Barday's following. But since the members were prepared to co-operate, the electioneering ran smoothly, and in fact, Mr. Barday did win a seat on the mosque committee.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EXTENDED FAMILY

Meer (1969) and Kuper (1960) describe for Natal Indians the joint family as being traditional and patri-laterally based. To identify kin networks solely as traditional is to analyse them outside the context of the political and economic situations in which they occur. Both these authors emphasise the supreme importance that kinship networks play in the lives of Natal Indians of all denominations, by arguing that although there are many voluntary associations, their importance is peripheral:

"The kutum is like an intimate collective conscience which socialises and controls; binds and integrates its members into a closely watched system of social interaction. The average Indian finds that his kutum obligations so envelop him that he has little time left for any other associations" (Meer: 1969: 66).

The kin networks studied in Cape Town show that there is little "traditional" about them. They are bilateral and utilitarian, each contact and interaction between members a further potential resource or source for aid. The amount of interaction between kin
is extensive. As in Natal, there exist many voluntary associations in the Cape, but they are also peripheral to the central importance of the kul-kutum. The extent of loyalty and interaction demanded from each member is such that his ability to form external alliances and coalitions - and thus subvert his potential from the kul-kutum resource pool - is limited. Members are restricted to joining few external alliances, since most of their time and other resources are demanded by their kul-kutum. In this way, the kul-kutum flourishes to the benefit of all its members.
CHAPTER V

ONGOING CONTACTS WITH INDIA

RELEVANCE OF LOOKING AT CONTACTS WITH INDIA

Theorists such as Safa and du Toit (1975) and Watson (1977) emphasise the importance of the nature of the links between migrants (and their descendants) and their areas of origin, in understanding the processes of communication and change that occur in both regions subsequent to migration. Links between migrants and their kin or friends left in the area of migration serve as information and status networks. It has often been described, for example, (R. and C. Ballard, 1977; Saifullah Khan, 1977; du Toit, 1975; Foner, 1977) how migrants realize social prestige and rise in status through remitting money to their area of origin, and using it in some form of public display, such as private spending on dress, education, housing; or for public use such as a school or hall or a village plough or waterhole.

Neither migrant nor his natal community live cut off from each other after migration. The degree of this sort of interaction, however, can be severely limited through a gradual phasing out of interest in the natal community as friends die; and the migrants' children, born in a foreign country, may have little contact or desire for contact, with the natal area of their parents. It may also be severely limited in cases of international migration through legislation affecting immigration and emigration; difficulty of obtaining visas for holidays; and strict control of foreign currency exchange.

In South Africa, and specifically in Rylands, contact with India has these positive and negative factors: on the one hand, migration to South Africa has in many cases occurred so recently that in most households...
there is an Indian born member. Therefore there are kin and friends in India who are known personally. On the other hand, however, legislation and political animosity between the governments of these countries debar or hinders the degree and frequency of contact that could, ideally, exist.

There is another, more subtle, element, in the study of contact with India of migrants and their descendants living in South Africa. Until only the last fifteen years, Indians were formally regarded as temporary migrants to South Africa, by every single party that has been in power since 1860. Therefore, to be an Indian has meant "not to be South African", and more importantly, "not to be a South African citizen, equal to other citizens". This official policy has assumed that "Indians had a foot in India" (a favourite reference used in Natal in the early part of this century) and that contact was great - so much so that any Indian individual might return to India at any time he chose without undue hardship. The very retention of the word "Indian" (not only by politicians, but by the people themselves) implies a certain amount of contact with India - enough to justify this epithet rather than that of South African.

Indians living in South Africa have been sensitive to the political and economic significance of being regarded as temporary residents with an "alien and unassimilable culture" (cf. wording to the 1953 Immigration Act). Until 1961, government reaction to Indians has been based on the assumption that eventually, Indians would repatriate to India. This has meant that many issues involving Indians were shelved, or dealt with inadequately without long term planning (such as housing); and
also that measures were passed to discourage Indians from remaining in South Africa (see Appendix I). To indicate openly contact with India seemed to justify the attitude of the governments. Thus, until the 1930's, the conservative bourgeois Indian political front expressed a policy of explicitly indicating how "Western" Indians were, in terms of education (sending sons to universities in Britain); in terms of language; in terms of appreciation of items of "Western culture" such as music, ballet and the theatre; and in terms of class and expenditure of money (Pachai, 1971; Meer, 1969). Amongst this group, signs of contact with India were minimised. By the 1930's, more radical leadership challenged the old conservatives, especially in Natal (cf. Pachai, 1971). This leadership saw no advantage in playing down what they called their "Indian heritage", and the less militant leaders attempted to illustrate to the Whites - particularly the leaders - what they valued about their own Islamic and Indian traditions. White conservatives, however, used this display of different traditions as an excuse to justify further economic and immigration constraints to be imposed on Indians, maintaining that this display of alien culture showed not only Indians could not assimilate to White South African ways, but that Indians therefore posed a serious threat to the hegemony of White South Africans and Western civilization (Pachai, 1971).

Thus, to display or not to display varying degrees of contact with India has had certain political significance, not necessarily always clearly recognized by the people concerned. Once Indians were accepted as a permanent part of South Africa's population in 1961,
National Party policies formed a separate group or "race" out of all Indians on the basis of their Indianness. Since 1961, the policy has been to encourage the practice of Indian traditions, encouraging an Indian identity, through the guiding auspices of the Department of Indian Affairs. The department patronises the formation of Indian cultural associations, and it encourages full participation in its working:

"With encouragement and advice from the Council [South African Indian Council] and officials in the Department, the Natal Indian Cultural Organization is slowly beginning to assume the role of an effective advisory and controlling body on Indian culture and on the admission to the Republic of visiting artistes and cultural leaders from India and Pakistan" (Report RP 48/1975 of the Department of Indian Affairs: 1975).

By 1936 already, however, 81.65% of the Asiatics resident in South Africa were born in the country (government census of 1936). This chapter attempts to look at the nature and significance of contacts with India, given that so few people classified as Indian were actually born there.

The types of contact with India of people in Rylands may be broadly grouped into two overlapping areas: that of direct personal contact; and the more indirect contact of maintaining Indian traditions according to ideas of tehvar. Contact with India is also perpetuated through visits to South Africa by Muslim Indian theologians and scholars, who come periodically to address missions in South Africa for some months or sometimes longer. There has also, in the past, been direct
political contact between the two countries, when individual Indian politicians (such as Gandhi) and on occasions the national Indian parliament, endeavoured to persuade the South African government of the time to alter its attitude to and its treatment of Indians in South Africa (cf. Pachai, 1971). The nature and frequency of these contacts varies in time according to internal evaluation of them, and according to externally imposed constraints (such as the immigration laws).

**DIRECT CONTACT WITH INDIA**

The migration process from India to South Africa has ended. In 1911, the Indian government forbade further indenturing of Indians to South Africa. In addition, from 1913, increasingly harsh immigration laws decreased the number of Indians allowed to immigrate into South Africa (see Chapter I and Appendix I). Bar Chart I.1 (in Chapter I) indicates a net increase of immigrants immediately before the application of the 1953 Immigration Act. Persons resident in South Africa, aware of the impending act, encouraged others in India to emigrate to South Africa before it came into effect.

Mrs. Barodien described her entry into South Africa in 1953. She was born in India, and her husband had joined some of his siblings in Cape Town in 1951. He had intended establishing a business, a retail shop, before allowing his wife to join him. By 1953, he still had not established a shop, because he could not obtain a trading permit, so he was working as a labourer at a factory.

Mrs. Barodien said: "Well, my husband was in Cape Town, and I was still in India, when this thing came about. He wrote to me and told me this act would be passed in six months time, and that I must sell the wedding jewellery if I had to, to buy a ticket over (by boat) immediately. My newly married son and his pregnant wife would be in India on holiday to help me. I went across, and arrived before the act was passed. Yes, there were lots of women and children on my
ship; we called it "beating the ban" in our Indian language. Lots of women rushed out from India at that time, bringing their small children and babies. My son and his wife, having their passes, (meaning domicile rights) stayed on in India until after the baby was born, which was at the end of 1953. And you know, they wanted to leave when the baby was about ten months old—he had been very sick, and Piriwideen (the new mother) had nearly died and had been in hospital for a long time—they discovered that they could return to South Africa, but their baby had no rights. Just imagine, what could they do? Well, a certain person we know agreed to write them a permit for the baby, but it cost a lot of money. They were lucky. Other people we know, with the same problem, were caught with this false pass, and all deported immediately to India, and they had to leave behind all their things here, although some of it was sent to them later".

Mrs. Barodie did not indicate how much of the property was confiscated, and how much returned to the people, nor by whom. It is likely, however, that the costs of their deportation and the legal action surrounding it were taken from the assets seized by the State; and that the amount allowed to be taken from the country by deportees was refunded to them, through the return of personal and household effects and cash.

Bar Chart V.I. indicates very generally, the major peaks of migration from India to Cape Town of persons in the Rylands sample. The low numbers of immigrants for the early decades of this century reflect a proportionately lower number of older people in the sample: either they had died or they had returned to India. The government census figures relating to Indian immigration (see Chapter I) does indicate, however, a higher proportion of Indian immigrants between 1939 and 1953, for this century, so that it is not entirely unexpected to see that the peak times of immigration have been between 1930 and 1954. The low numbers after 1954 reflect on the efficacy of the prohibitive immigration legislation.
BAR CHART V.I.  IMMIGRANTS FROM INDIA, AND DATES DURING WHICH THEY ARRIVED, FROM RYLANDS SAMPLE

TOTAL: 128 P

KEY:
P = Actual Number of Immigrants

%= Percentage of Total Number of Immigrants
Although the immigration process has ended, there are many Indians in Rylands who are themselves immigrants. Table V.I gives an indication of the ages and sexes of those born in India. Of these Indians, all come from the Gujerat region. In keeping with what has been indicated above, Table V.I shows that few young people have been born in India and thus emigrated to South Africa within the last twenty-five years. Most of those born in India (amounting to 71.4% of the total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (Years)</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total (Numbers)</th>
<th>Total (Percentage)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
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<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>50 - 59</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - 69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 - 79</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total: Numbers | 46 | 73 | 119 | 100% |
| Total: Percentage | 38.7% | 61.3% | 100% |     |

born in India) are older than fifty years. The higher proportion of men to women is a result of several factors. One is that there are cases of men migrating to South Africa and never bringing their wives with them. Another is of young men or children arriving in South Africa,
who eventually marry Indians already in South Africa (not presented in this table), or in the case of the Muslims, marrying other (non-Indian) Muslims; or marrying other South Africans. There are also cases in the early days of immigration to Cape Town, in the first three decades of the century, of many women who accompanied their husbands when they emigrated, but after several years, the women returned to India for various reasons, leaving their husbands in South Africa. These husbands often married as a second wife, a South African Muslim woman.

There were six examples of wives, born and educated in India, returning there after some years in Cape Town, without their husbands. Very often, the youngest children would accompany their mother. The reasons given, although flavoured by individual circumstances, contained the essence of the women feeling very isolated and lonely, not understanding the ways of life in South Africa and frequently not even speaking English or Afrikaans. Eventually, in misery, they left their husbands and families (the elder children) and returned to their own or their husband's families in India. Many informants said also that the climate in Cape Town disagreed with these women, and some had left after repeated miscarriages believed to have been induced by climatic conditions. All these examples occurred between 1920 and about 1935. Perhaps why they did not occur later is that at this period, before the 1937 amendment of the immigration act, this move did not necessarily have to be permanent: the wife and her children might always return if they chose. After 1937, it became more difficult to obtain entry permits, so that this move was made, by legislation, into a permanent separation, unless the husband returned to India. In these six cases, the husbands returned only for holidays.
In four of the cases, the husband married a second wife, so therefore, according to the 1937 and 1953 immigration acts, the first wife was then unable to enter South Africa.

Table V.I shows that those born in India are predominantly of the senior generations. Given the status of age, described in Chapter IV, these people are in structurally important positions in the household and can wield a large amount of authority. Their ideas concerning Indian traditions and values, of tehvar, can, thus, potentially, be of significance to the rest of the household who come under the influence of the older people. Of the male Muslim heads of household (see Footnote No. 1 on page 155) in the sample (where the data were available) 33% were born in the Cape Town area; 4.6% in Natal; 3.4% in the Transvaal; and 49.4% in India (Gujarat region, mostly). Thus, there is a predominance of senior men in structurally important household positions who come from India and may have strong and strict ideas concerning the propriety of tehvar.

But birth in India is not the only connection Indians in Rylands have with India. The other types of contact include letter writing to friends and kin there; holidays there; being educated there; and returning to India to become betrothed. Of the sample, forty-one people (26.4%) returned to India either to marry or to be educated, and then returned to settle in South Africa. Of those sent to be betrothed, the data showed that the majority were young men who returned to take Indian brides, in two cases cousins in the kul-kutum. There is some status for a family to have imported brides from India, since women from India are stereotyped as being more "pure" (meaning more
conservative) than South African women. (It is understood here that importing of brides has been stopped effectively by the 1953 legislation. In 1978, the ban on the entry into South Africa of foreign born brides was relaxed partly when one hundred Indian wives and children were allowed to enter South Africa (Horrell 1978)).

A young married woman (from Cape Town, married to a Capetonian) explained that people like to choose spouses from India because:

"the people here are so rough! They forget their Islamic ways, and are corrupted by the Whites — the Western ways. Boys — and girls, too — even our own Indian girls — go to parties, and you know, sometimes they drink. And they smoke dagga. Now who wants a husband or wife like that? And our Indian girls today have no shame. They go out places, they want boyfriends, next thing they have babies and nobody will marry them. What sort of good Muslim woman does that sort of thing? In India, girls are more pure — they are kept strictly by their parents and brothers. That's why it's better to marry in India. But today, we can't do that any more".

Indian children have been sent to Indian educational institutions throughout the century. There seems to be little official restriction on leaving the country for educational purposes. Indian education is favoured because it teaches the children Indian languages, and also because there education is not secular (at least at the schools to which informants' children had been sent). At the Indian Muslim schools, children receive a thorough grounding in the tenets of Islam, including literacy in Arabic. In South Africa, Muslim children learn about Islam at madressa classes which are generally held for two to three hours every day after the government schools have finished.

Parents declare this situation to be inadequate, saying the children are far too tired after school to absorb much of their madressa instruction.
Mrs. Naduwani evaluated Indian education in the following way: "My husband and I were both born and educated in India. We sent all the children, including the girls. They stayed with my family, in a village outside Bombay. They stayed there, because my husband's people are poor, and they live in a tiny village in the bush. The school there is no good. My people have a big house and they live near the new school. We sent them all back, so they could learn Indian ways, the proper thing, "tehvar". Here, they weren't even speaking any of our languages, except occasionally to us. One of my sons also wanted to go further with his Islamic studies, and here, it is quite difficult. So he remained longer than the others in India, and went to the big religious school in Northern India. Yes, the education in India is much better than here: it teaches our children Indian ways, and it teaches them to be good Muslims. Us Muslims don't believe education should be without religion, and here, all our children get is once a week a scripture lesson, and only after school can they go to magressa. Why did they come back? Well they're South Africans. They live here. We are all here. No, the politics doesn't worry them so much. In India, it's very difficult to get a job, and people are poor, not like here. Yes, it's better to live here - life is better, easier."

To send children to India for education is a status symbol involving not only tehvar but wealth also, for only wealthy people can afford to send their children overseas. To do so also requires close contacts in India. In no cases were children sent to India to boarding-schools where they knew no one else. All were sent to schools near to areas in which members of the kul-kutum lived; most children boarded with these relatives. So to send a child to India for education also requires that Indian-situated links are maintained on a close enough level to enable a child to board with relatives over a period of several years.

Not only prohibitive costs and difficulty of re-entry bar the way, however.
Ashraf, son of a wealthy family, wanted to study at Bombay University. He already had some years at U.C.T. to his credit, and had applied earlier for undergraduate study, and later for post-graduate study. On both occasions, he was refused entry by the Indian government, because he is born in South Africa and holds a South African passport. His parents are from India. Connections in India were asked to speak to immigration officials and various deans at the university, but to no avail. According to the 1927 Reciprocity Bill, India still persists in treating South Africans requiring entry into India as Indians are treated in South Africa. The principle of the matter here seems to overshadow the reason behind it, and the victims of one situation are victimised in the other. Ashraf's parents have complained bitterly how times have changed: ten years ago, they claim, children could still be sent to India to study, but today, politics stops even education.

Meer (1969) and others, however, cite cases of Indians leaving South Africa to study in India, because of lack of opportunity in higher education for Indians in South Africa. They are accepted at Indian institutions despite their South African passports.

The vast majority of people in the Rylands sample have not been to India, however, except perhaps for a holiday. 77.8% of the sample were children of migrants who had not maintained direct personal contact with India, beyond writing to kin still living there. There were even four households in Rylands, of which the members were all young second generation Indians, who had no contact whatsoever with India or their Indian kin. All maintained that they did not write to their kin not only because they were unfamiliar with the Indian languages, but also because their relatives were illiterate.

It is not necessarily the poorest people, who are unable to finance trips to India. The 77.8% who have had little if any contact with India include some of the wealthiest people in Rylands. There seems to be an indication of a preference for spending such a large sum of money
in other ways.

For example, the Moosa's are a young couple, both of whom are from prominent and very wealthy families. Mrs. Moosa is from the Cape (her mother was Indian, her father German) and Dr. Moosa was born in India. On both sides of the family, the children have all received university degrees, from universities in India or Britain. Dr. Moosa himself obtained his doctorate at Bombay University. Dr. Moosa's mother places an extremely high value on things Indian, refusing even to speak anything but an Indian language. This couple has not been to India since Dr. Moosa graduated (his wife has never been there) because they preferred to save the money to buy a double stand in Rylands, on which to build their own house. The house they built is one of the most luxurious mansions in the suburb.

Finding economic security by purchasing one's own house, given the acute shortage of land and housing in Indian group areas, is thus being seen as a top priority, rather than spending money on trips to India.

All the types of contact with India described above assume a permanent migration from India of a man, although rarely his wife and family would return to India.

There was one example of an old man who was preparing to return to India after thirty years absence. He had come to find work to support his wife, children and divers other members of his kul-kutum. His eldest son had joined him later, and then married an Indian Muslim girl from the Cape. The old man was living in Rylands with his son and daughter-in-law. Since the old man had reached the age of retirement, he had decided to return to his wife in rural India. His son explained the old man's feelings and reasons for returning after so many years:

"India is his home. These old people often did this - came here to work and after years of hard work, went home with a few rand in their pockets. In India at that time (Gujerat region) it was very hard, man. It was drought and famine, and our people had a little bit of land that wasn't enough for all the brothers. So my father came here. They (i.e. men like his father) lived a hard life here - didn't spend much, lived cheaply, to save for their families. But we came because we just couldn't manage in India. And my father said that if you're willing to work, there's always good jobs and good money in Cape Town. And there were friends my father had made in Cape Town, and other people from our village in India, who could help you once you came here".
ECONOMIC CONTACT WITH INDIA

The passage of remittances from South Africa to India is now very difficult to ascertain, since it has been made illegal through strict application and interpretation of currency and foreign exchange control. After the first currency control acts, people used to remit money to India in the form of jewellery. It is customary amongst Hindu and Muslim Indians for the groom's people to give the bride gold earrings, a gold and black chain, a gold pendant, gold bracelets and gold rings. The quality and quantity of this jewellery varies according to economic circumstance, but generally, even if only the marriage symbol of the gold and black chain is given, it is at least eighteen carat gold. Poor families must save for years to provide this sort of jewellery for their sons' wives. For richer families, the wedding jewellery, which should ideally belong inalienably to the bride, is worth several thousand rand. For example, at the last wedding attended before fieldwork ended, the bride's jewellery was worth over R4000. Migrants used to invest their money in this jewellery, and send it to India for their brothers' wives or sometimes as an extra present for sisters or mothers. In this way, a great deal of capital has been exported from South Africa. There have been severe restrictions placed also on the export of jewellery from the country. Bradlow (1978) documents how in 1921, restrictions were lifted to allow foreigners to export out the country jewellery worth £25 per annum.

People in Rylands will not talk easily about sending any form of remittance to India, because of the strict currency controls. One or two relatively affluent people have mentioned that they send "a bit of money" (as they phrase it) to elderly dependents in India, but
no further information was forthcoming.

One woman expressed the following view, which, however, is not necessarily representative: "We'd like to send something once in a while to the old people in India. But look, it's like this. Our parents came here, and died. We supported them when they needed us. My husband's mother's sister is in India. But you know, the rest of the family in India must do their share, too. We didn't ask for money when my parents were poor. Why can't the other brothers in India support the old auntie? Not that we mind, of course. But here: things are so expensive, and we haven't much money. And to get a permit to transfer it to India is terrible trouble. More trouble than that pittance is worth. Not that we wouldn't go through all of it to help. But ..."  

People in Rylands did not, then, talk in terms of status given by sending remittances to India, and think in terms of the status given to one by the Indian community for the remittance. First and foremost, status was achieved and ascribed through deeds done in the local context. Especially for the second generation, the young adults, the opinion of the people in India was not held to be in any way significant to them. Most of these younger people had never even been to India nor seen the old community. Combined with the changing personal commitments of the descendants of migrants, is the strict currency control legislation, which has strictly controlled all remitting of assets, so that an Indian in South Africa is unable to remit back much more than a pension-type allowance for dependents (excepting payment of costs of education and medical attention, for which special arrangements may be made).

THE MAINTENANCE OF INDIAN TRADITIONS

Part of the system of status achievement in the sample area was for people to adhere to Indian traditions. To do so was a moral
evaluation of things non-Indian as inferior by the participant; and to be evaluated by the discerning public as thereby achieving an overthrow of the "corrupt Western ways". Those who could articulate what they meant by the latter condemned the acquisitive capitalism they saw to be endemic to "the West", together with what they saw to be the selfishness of a conjugal unit. They advocated, rather, a reciprocal exchange of labour and aid, given generously, and over a long period, which in the end involves a process of redistribution of resources. Although informants placed this idealism within orthodox Islam and its concepts about aid and personal relationships, in the context of Chapter IV, this sort of idealism also is an implicit criticism of the relationships between members of that individual's kul-kutum, who are not aiding each other to the extent that various members would like.

The concept of tehvar, then, does not only refer to superficial symbols of ethnicity, important as they may become, but also to the ideal context of personal relationships. Included in the concept of tehvar is always the idea of the closely co-operating extended kinship network, through which an individual may solve all his problems. Thus, to create and perpetuate the efficient flow of resources through the moral evaluation of tehvar, is sound economic strategy. This point is pursued in Chapter IV.

Many of the problems in analysing tehvar are highlighted in the following case study.

Janub Bawa is the eldest daughter of a respectable family in Rylands, which is nevertheless presently intent on building up its social standing, for various reasons. Janub was engaged to the only son of a very wealthy widow, who had
lived most of her life in India. Her husband had managed real estate in Cape Town, but the business had been sold at his death. Her three daughters had each received a large sum of money (for the estate had been wealthy), and the mother and son had received the remainder, more or less in equal share. The inheritance was such that the son, Goolam, had been considered one of the most eligible Muslim bachelors in Cape Town. Janub's parents, however, were not affluent, although they lacked no necessities. Mr. Bawa owns a large farm, which is in production, in India, and in India, apparently, his family enjoys high status because they are considered to be relatively wealthy landowners. It was probably because Goolam's mother had lived in the area in which the Bawas had property, in India, that the match was contracted between the two sets of parents. (The couple themselves had a formal veto in the choice of their spouses).

The Bawas wanted to impress the success of their daughter's match on the Rylands public, thus taking a further step upwards in status. They also wanted to impress Goolam's large and influential kul-kutum, to show them that they could organise their part of the wedding in the proper way, and thus ingratiate themselves into the good graces of this family.

Goolam's family was renowned for its pedantic attachment to Indian custom. Janub's family was consequently in a predicament, since Mr. Bawa had left India as a child; Mrs. Bawa had been born and educated in Mauritius; and neither of their respective sets of parents had been particular about tehvar. Therefore, Mr. Bawa asked two elderly kinswomen of his to supervise the lengthy and elaborate proceedings with strict attention to tehvar detail, since they were familiar with it.

The wedding celebrations traditionally last eight days, and entail first a formal rapprochement of the families of bride and groom, through mutual prestations of food, followed by the presentation of costlier gifts of a personal nature for the individuals of each family, and then finally a gradual claiming of the bride by the groom's family, who, over a period of a few days, come to her to make her beautiful for the groom. All visits are highly ceremonial, involving feasting, and the final largest feast is on the day of the wedding ceremony itself - the Muslim rites - when the groom and his womenfolk lead the bride away from her parents' house.

The first problem occurred when the bride refused to be inconvenienced by an eight day long ceremony, and being a young lady of spirit, ensured that her leave of absence from work would not be that long, to the extreme annoyance of her conservative relatives. When the groom's relatives appeared with gifts, during the following days, there are certain Urdu Muslim hymns that are sung. The two old duennas disagreed on the order of singing them, and were so
incensed with each other that they refused to speak to any one for nearly a day. Mrs. Bawa was in great consternation during this time, since she needed their advice. Once the old ladies were mollified, the following rituals were performed without problem, until it came to those for beautifying the bride. The ritual includes the groom's womenfolk rubbing the bride with coconut oil, including her hair, and then bathing her themselves. The bride refused to have her hair rubbed with oil, saying it would ruin it; and she refused to allow the women to bathe her, to invade her privacy to that extent. This time all the older women were angry, and tried to persuade her that this was teyvar, and that she must conform. The younger women and girls of the bride's age supported the bride, saying that it was no one's business to bath the bride. The bride won her point.

Following this episode, the bride was to be decorated by the groom's women with henna. Her hands and feet are normally given delicately laced patterns. The groom's women, however, painted the bride's hands and feet completely, giving no patterns. The older women were infuriated, saying that teyvar decrees that a bride must have carefully decorated hands and feet, and that plain henna paint was for ordinary occasions. For this decoration, the bride should wear a sari. Janub refused, saying that her silk sari would be ruined should any henna fall on it. The old duenmas protested and remonstrated with her for more than two hours, maintaining that her denim trousers were not sufficiently modest. The bride remained adamant, saying, "These stupid old cows. I don't care about teyvar and all that nonsense. Why can't I have a quick wedding and get it all over with? What does it matter whether I wear a sari or not?" In the end, the bride changed into a trouser suit that was more similar to the traditional Indian pant or "pyjama" suit.

During the henna decorations, there should be blessings, hymns, prayers and feasting amongst the women (all the bridal ceremonies are strictly segregated for women only). The old duenmas had a violent argument over the order of the ceremonies, and over the content of the hymns and blessings. The old women ignored each other in fury, and the singing had to be prompted by a third woman who decided on a different order and different hymns to those both old women suggested in the beginning.

The bride and two Transvaal lady visitors were discussing all this acrimony and confusion later. The Transvaal visitors supported the bride's views, saying that very seldom do young people bother with the eight days of ceremonial in the Transvaal, mostly because of its cost, and people often cannot come because they cannot obtain leave from work. The one lady from the Transvaal stated: "We don't do all this. This is all so old-fashioned and expensive. We have a short ceremony and reception in the afternoon, like the Whites, and then all is finished. None of this nonsense. You can see how confused they are, no-one knowing what to do. No-one wants the old Indian ways any more, trying to be more Indian than the people back in India" (emphasis mine).
One of the first areas of tension that is evident is that there is not always agreement on what constitutes tehvar, even by those who have lived most of their lives in India. This lack of agreement in actuality seldom affords an area for conflict as happened in this situation. Rather, people accept that in India, each village has its own ways of performing ceremonies, and thus that all variations are equally tehvar. In this way, a great deal of lee-way is provided for flexibility and variation within the confines of what at first sight appears to be rigid "tradition".

Another central issue is that many Indians, whilst acknowledging the value of tehvar and wishing to conform to it, have little or no knowledge about many aspects of it. Thus, Jamub's parents had to enlist the services of the old duennas to advise them, since they were incompetent in all things tehvar that pertained to weddings. They therefore learn through benefitting from the memories of the old people who aid them. That the memories of the old people may not be accurate and most probably do not reflect on how that particular ceremony is performed in that area currently, thirty or forty years after they have left, is not considered at all, let alone considered to be relevant.

A third central issue is that for the younger generation, the practices of tehvar are seen as irksome and irrelevant for their own concept of what ought to be done. They neither know what is acceptable tehvar, nor care about its practice. It is significant that the young Transvaal lady criticised the wedding ceremonies as "trying to be more Indian than the people back in India". The younger generation do not seem to regard tehvar of special significance to their lives in South Africa.
As youngsters, they have little to gain through observance of tehvar. One must, however, consider that a central base of authority of the elders is precisely their authority concerning tehvar, and the moral evaluation of it. Therefore, it is postulated that as youngsters begin to compete with elders for authority, within the context of extended kinship alliances, they must compete on the same basis as the elders. Therefore, as they compete for power, they begin to re-evaluate and become more interested in tehvar.

The simplest rite of all in the entire set of ceremonies was the religious marriage ceremony itself. In the preparation and undertaking of this ceremony, there was no one who did not know what to do; there was no one who argued about any aspect of its performance; there was no one who objected to it as irrelevant. It is, of course, the central ceremony. But it is also the only specifically Muslim ceremony of all of them. It has its particular Cape characteristics, but everyone was unanimous about its performance. The lack of schism concerning this ceremony is not only indicative of its importance. It is also indicative that over the expression of Islam through its rites, the performers were in agreement. They were not in agreement over the performance of the Indian rites. The young people see more significance in being identified with Islam than being identified with tehvar and Indian culture. Even the old people, by their very lack of argument, showed that the rites of Islam could not and should not be changed. They are considered to be imperative. They are primary.

All the major ceremonies of the informants' lives are based on Islam. The rites de passage are all Muslim occasions, the central rite
unchangeable, identical to the same rite performed by Muslims the world over. The celebrations surrounding the rite are influenced by "Indian traditions". There is no Indian tradition, however, that supercedes in importance a Muslim rite. The annual calendar of the informants in Rylands was also a Muslim calendar, based on the major religious ceremonies and rites which are the birth and death of Mohammed, the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham, the fast of Ramadan, the end of the fast, and the Muslim New Year. There are other sacred days that are celebrated according to Muslim rites, prescribed in precise detail in the Qu'ran and the hadith (sayings and practices of the Prophet).

The distinction between tehvar and Islamic rites was made very clearly by a devout Muslim woman, whose case is cited in the following chapters (the case of Zoghira, who wanted to be Indian). Zoghira said, "You see, the Indian customs are good, like all other customs. They enrich our lives, make it beautiful. But in the end, I am not going to get to heaven by being a good Indian. I must be a good Muslim and follow Muslim ways written in our Qu'ran".

The overt symbols of daily life have often been considered to be displays of "Indian identity", such as food preparation, ways of eating, dress, relationships within the household, and personal hygiene. But in Islam, such are the constraints imposed by the details of the Shari'a that many of these symbols come under explicit Shari'a regulation to the smallest detail, and thus can be seen not so much as symbols of Indianness, but rather as symbols of adherence to Islam.

Thus, although symbols of tehvar are shadowed by the over-arching and cross-cutting symbols of Islam, the former are important. They form one
of the bases of authority of the older generation, who thereby have a further means of moral control over their dependants (or followers). The ethos of tehvar goes far beyond trivialities of preparation of food or dress. It expresses the moral content of relationships, and therefore provides a model of how people should interact. Considering that extended kinship alliances form a central strategy for coping, this sort of ethos is particularly important, since its essence is to encourage generous long-term reciprocity and loyalty. The ethos is further emphasised through its similarity to orthodox Muslim teachings on family relationships, so that it is not merely "tradition", but it is elevated to the status of a divine injunction. Thus tehvar is neither a peripheral tradition, nor a relic from Indian customs, but it provides a set of powerful symbols regarding authority, morality, loyalty and reciprocity, which aid in forming an efficient coping strategy in the South African context.

Footnote 1:
"Head of household" is defined by informants to be the eldest male of the household, who has authority over the occupants, although he is not necessarily the only or the major breadwinner.
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

IDENTITY AND THE RACE LEGISLATION

THE AMBIGUITIES OF INDIAN AND MUSLIM IDENTITY

The Cape peninsula was chosen as a research area because of the significance of the cross-cutting identities of "Muslim" and "Indian". In the Cape, there is a large non-Indian Muslim population, the "Cape Malays", unlike elsewhere in South Africa, where Indians constitute the majority of Muslims. Therefore, elsewhere in South Africa, to profess to be Muslim does not necessarily cut across one's Indian identity and one's Indian ties. In some respects, Muslim Indians in the Cape feel that they have more in common with fellow Muslims than with fellow Indians who are non-Muslims, despite the fact that these other Muslims are classified as "Coloured" and are residentially segregated from Indians. This is partly because the code of laws of Islam, the Shar'ia involves a way of life that endeavours to set Muslims apart. So detailed and numerous are these laws that they affect every aspect of daily life. Many of the Shar'ia laws regarding respect towards the elders; an emphasis on the social and moral values of (patrilaterally) extended families; purdah; concepts regarding purity and pollution, are similar to what has come to be associated with "traditional Indian" practices (Kurian 1961, Kuper 1960, Ramasar 1967). An adherence to these laws does not necessarily mean only an adherence to Indian tradition; by the people it may be perceived firstly as an adherence to the prescripts of the Qu'ran. There is thus an ambiguity in the differentiation between "Indian" and "Muslim" traditions, which has been ignored in the literature concerning South African Indians.

There is a further ambiguity in the nature of Indian identity, however,
that has also been ignored in the South African literature (excepting Ginwala N.D. and 1974; Meer 1971). This ambiguity arises directly from the race legislation. The Registration of Population Act (1950) classified people by statute into various groups termed "races", based on area of origin, common culture, phenotype and acceptability as a member of this group. Associated with the legal classification is access to national resources (jobs, housing, education, trading rights), as formalised in the Group Areas Act (1950) and other race-based acts. Thus, to be classified as "Indian" under the law means to be subject to certain specific discriminatory legislation. The act attempts to isolate groups residentially and thus socially, and also with respect to education. Before 1976, all Indian children in Cape Town attended "Coloured" schools because there was no school for them. Since two schools have been built, the children are now being constrained to making school-friends with those who attend the same school as they. This imposed isolation must have some effect on the in-group concept of boundaries, also. The legislation has attempted to make static all group boundaries, and with this in mind, the legislation encourages the expression of cultural differences (see Chapter V). Expression of tradition is thus being manipulated, to some extent, to be part of party politics on the national level, to further the aims of the ruling party.

Because of the ambiguity of what constitutes Indian tradition, its significance, and its interaction with the race legislation, it has seemed most useful in this thesis to analyse and describe the situation in terms of the migration theory outlined in the Introduction. This theory places a chronological perspective on the responses of the
migrants to their new environment, and the responses of the environment to the migrants. In this way, interconnections between responses, and the way they change in time can be shown. The theory also emphasises that the environment places constraints on the migrants, which will modify their behaviour accordingly, despite internal group preferences ("tradition") that may be contrary to observed behaviour.

Few authors writing on Indian ethnicity in South Africa have discussed the tension between an imposed jural category, its consequences, and an emic concept of "Indian". There was also little discussion on the implications of the very choice of research unit. To choose to study "Indians" is to assume that this particular ethnic identity is primary to the people studied. Before 1961, Indians were regarded by the ruling party as aliens to South Africa, committed to India because it was their birthplace, and through their expression of Indian tradition (see Chapters I and II). Thus, authors writing before this date and during the period following immediately (Kuper 1960, Palmer 1957 and 1946, Meer 1969) attempted to show that Indians living in South Africa were firmly committed to South Africa, although they practised a distinct culture. The nature of their commitment was shown to be economic and political, and the nature of their distinction lay in the practice of Indian traditions. It is therefore implicit in most of these studies that to isolate certain central cultural features is to isolate the "core" or essence of being Indian. These cultural elements were regarded as being relics of the cultural repertoire brought by migrants from India. Kuper (1960), for example, saw Indian conservatism as directly correlated with female
domestic seclusion. The men who participated in the world external to the domestic domain were forced to learn some of its conventions and expectations. The women, secluded at home, not only did not have to learn different ways, but were presented with little opportunity to learn (cf. Chapter V). With their constant interaction with each other, they upheld and re-enforced Indian tradition:

"The women, by their enforced attachment to the home, their constant influence over the children, and their adherence to the traditional rituals retain the family as the emotional and social anchor of Indian life" (op. cit.: 139).

It is particularly with regard to the analysis of kinship patterns that this primordialist approach is manifested (see Chapters III and IV). Kuper (op. cit.), Ramasar (op. cit.) and even Jithoo (1978) talk about a "traditional Indian kinship system". They assume that there is something essentially Indian in the relationships between members of an extended family. Ramasar in particular fails to consider the social context of kinship. As emphasised in Chapter IV, these authors fail to consider that other people in South Africa, under similar constraints as Indians, also emphasise the importance of the extended family (cf. Whisson 1976).

Ginwala attempts to reduce the ambiguity of what is "Indian" by taking into account both cultural diversity and the race legislation, in the following definition of who is a South African Indian:

"[they] ... form a distinct minority group, identifiable by history, race, culture and status, and subjected to specific discrimination" (N.D.: 5).
The first point Ginwala makes is that all persons born in India or descendants of such persons form a unified group. That such persons form a minority in South Africa’s total population is shown by government census data from 1860 until 1970. To assume that Indians who come from areas representing most of the Indian sub-continent, who do not all speak the same language, nor practise the same religions, are somehow similar enough to form a united group is too simplistic. Meer (1969) describes how Muslim Indians of Natal do not consider themselves a united group. Muslim Gujeratis divide themselves into Vhoras from rural Surat, and Mehmons from Kathiawad or Kutch, who have little contact with each other, and certainly no inter-marriage. They form a group distinct only by the fact that they all originated from the same sub-continent.

Ginwala maintains that Indians are also identifiable by history. As regards the indentured Indian labour entering Natal, this point is valid. But free Indian immigrants are distinct from other free immigrants to South Africa only in that they come from India and not from elsewhere. Bradlow (1978), for example, illustrates many similarities in the migration to South Africa of Indians and of European and East European Jews.

Ginwala also distinguishes Indians from other South Africans on the basis of their race. This point is also, to some extent, valid. But Ginwala over-rates its importance, given the inter-marriage that has occurred with different peoples in India through millennia of conquests, migrations and trading. The Rylands data indicates a substantial degree of inter-marriage with the "Malay" and "Coloured"
groups also. However important actual racial difference has been, inter-marriage is fast making it increasingly irrelevant.

The fourth criterion of distinction that Ginwala gives is closely linked to the first – the concept of a unified group. It can be repeated that to assume firstly that people from such a wide area of India share a single common culture is simplistic. There is, however, as discussed above, a strong prevailing idea of "Indian traditions" and tehvar, which seems to unify the cultural baggage of all South African Indians. The variations and flexibility of tehvar, as discussed in Chapter V, are such that even people from neighbouring villages in India disagree as to what is correct tradition or not.

To elevate culture into a means of identifying a particular group of migrants, some of whom are descendants of migrants who left their natal land one hundred years earlier, is to invoke the criticism that Barth (1969) applied to those who identified ethnic groups through their cultural practices. Barth maintained that culture is an implication or result of ethnic behaviour, rather than a defining primary characteristic. To regard culture as central is to elevate into supreme importance morphological characteristics, which, by implication, are regarded as immutable, since they are made to be the defining characteristics in time of a group. Barth continued to criticise the idea that culture is immutable, outlining how it can undergo changed under ecological and political forces.

Ginwala's last two criteria are closely linked, and of more significance than the previous criteria. He maintains that Indians are distinct through status and through particular discrimination aimed at them.
The jural definition of "Indian" indeed confers upon those so classified a particular economic and political status, according to which access to resources on the national level is defined. There has also been a long history of discriminatory legislation aimed at Indians (see Appendix I), much of which is still in effect. But discriminatory measures have also been aimed at other groups, the effect of which is to ensure that the groups do not form a political or economic threat to the ruling élite. In this way, although there is legislation aimed specifically at Indians, on the whole, it has the same effect as that aimed at the other Black groups. So the discrimination practised against the Indians, whilst it may be slightly different to that aimed at other groups, is certainly not unique. The Indians in South Africa have formed a group more because legislation has been passed against them as a group, rather than through some mutual affinity amongst the members merely because they originated from the same sub-continent.

Whatever the valid points in Ginwala's definition of South African Indians, it has a major flaw in that it does not include any comment on what the Indians themselves have to say. It also does not elaborate on the contexts when a definition of "Indian" will be used by a person, rather than another definition of himself. It is therefore difficult to define what is "Indian tradition", since there is no single tradition, although one is dealing with a set of symbols regarded by in-group members and by outsiders alike, as Indian. Rather, it is more significant to discuss the social organization and contexts of Indian ethnicity and techvar, and how these are then exemplified in behaviour.
CONTEXTS OF INDIAN IDENTITY

To cope with a social setting that discriminates against them by legislation, Muslim Indiens from the sample area mobilised groups recruited through descent and affinity (cf. Chapter IV). The extended family forms a resource pool for its members, as long as they participate in the flow of prestations and are prepared to reciprocate all favours and aid given to them. What holds the extended family together, justifying its existence and acting to perpetuate it, is the ethos of tehvar as it relates to family relationship. An aspect of tehvar is that it emphasises the moral and social benefits of maintaining good relationships with members of the extended family. This is done through reciprocation and offers of aid, and favours.

This aspect of tehvar also provides the basis for authority of the oldest generation of the extended family over all younger generations. Through their knowledge of tehvar esoterica, still valued highly by many Indians, the oldest generation keeps control of the extended family.

The caveat is significant, since there were examples in the Rylands sample (see case studies cited in Chapter V) that indicated that the younger generation, not knowing much about India, evaluate their behaviour in other terms rather than in terms of tehvar (see below). Meer (1971) expresses a similar view. It is thus open to further research whether the young generation will, in time, as they grow older, compete for authority in the extended family on the basis of tehvar (amongst other criteria), or whether tehvar will have become redundant for them.
What Chapter IV indicates is that people who cut themselves off from their kin networks will no longer be regarded by other Indians as practising "Indian tradition", since "Indian tradition" involves, besides other symbols, the maintenance of and participation in an extended network. The statutory classification of "Indian" is particularly ambiguous given this type of situation. It assumes that classifications are primary, inherent and therefore immutable. Barth (1969) comes up with the same sort of problem of the paramountcy of ethnic identity when he described the far-reaching significance of ethnic identity:

"What can be referred to as articulation and separation on the macro-level corresponds to sets of rôle constraints on the micro-level ... Ethnic identity implies a series of constraints on the kinds of rôles an individual is allowed to play, and the partners he may choose for different types of transactions ... regarded as a status, ethnic identity is superordinate to most other statuses" (Barth: 1969: 17).

He continues to call ethnic identity "imperative", which enables it to impose absolute constraints on a person's behaviour in a poly-ethnic situation. The following case studies illustrate that (ethnic) identity is not as immutably pre-eminent as Barth (and the race legislation) assume (for different reasons). Nor is an individual's identity unchangeable, since there are cases of cross-cutting identities - such as those provided in the sample area. People are not necessarily one identity or another: they can also be marginal. Even in the case of two cross-cutting identities, a person does not necessarily revoke his symbols of Indian identity when he emphasises
those of Islam or Black Consciousness. Because these symbols are used in different contexts to recruit different groups with their own aims, they need not necessarily clash and could co-exist (although this does not discount the possibility of symbols being taken out of context to emphasise discord for some reason). Thus, a man may be a senior member of his kul-kutum, participating in temvar, but he may also be a paid-up member of Inkatha and support the Iranian revolution. It is when Indians, as a whole, are perceived to be of a different class to the groups with which they ally, and thus a threat, that symbols of Indian tradition and identity are removed from their kinship context and placed in the context of class struggle (as happened in Kenya and Uganda, and in 1949 in South Africa).

Therefore, it is an interesting question how is it that people who are not regarded as Indian according to the accepted jural classification can yet take part in Indian tradition and participate as active members of Indian kin networks. The following case histories illustrate how it is that these "non-Indians" come to be accepted by in-group members as Indians.

The first example is of a woman accepted as Indian in the folk model, but legally classified as "Coloured". Her father is an affluent Indian living near Rylands, and her mother is his common law "Malay" Muslim wife. After his wife bore him this daughter, his parents sent him back to Indian for a "proper" Indian wife, who was later brought to Cape Town. The "Malay" wife and her child were sent to live in Simonstown, the rest of the family living in the Cape Flats. Visits were frequent, and such is the obliging nature of the "Malay" wife that she has always been accepted into her husband's other home, and the children, now all adult, call her "auntie" (in English, and not in their native Kokanie, which they use for all other kin terms). It is considered a great disgrace for a Muslim woman to enter into this sort of alliance outside marriage, and such a woman is usually outcaste. The daughter, classified as "Malay", and married to a Muslim classified as "Coloured", is considered to be Indian by her Indian kin, not only by virtue of her father's
position. She associates fully with her half siblings, and she uses their kin network whenever she needs it, as they use hers. She participates fully in all their private kin functions, although she lives in a "Coloured" housing estate on the other side of the peninsula. That she can manipulate the kin network and is so well accepted is a function of her mother's good nature, and of her own obliging reciprocation of all favours done to her. Her children, however, do not consider themselves to be Indian, and they seldom attend the gatherings of this side of their extended family.

The Indian kinship ethic is such that once a relative acknowledges his common kinship, proving it by his unstinting help and his willing participation in all family affairs, one is obliged to reciprocate. This ongoing interaction of reciprocity is what constitutes the acceptance or not. Once started, it is, in terms of the ethos, very difficult to stop.

The other case is of a person who wanted to be regarded as Indian by her family and friends, but who never succeeded. Her case has many similar features to the previous one, and the reason for her failure seems to have been the opposite of the reason for the success of the previous case, since the person involved was never accepted by her Indian kin.

An Indian man married as his fourth wife a "Malay" Muslim, whose mother was Indian. They had several children, one of them a daughter called Fa'ima, who were legally classified as Indians. Fa'ima had a child out of wedlock, and in the ensuing scandal, the Indian father of her child deserted her. Fa'ima was later married to a "Malay" Muslim, the marriage arranged by her parents. Fa'ima's brother had by this stage realized that the easiest way to obtain work and housing was to relinquish his Indian jural classification, and to be reclassified as "Malay". He persuaded Fa'ima to apply for reclassification for herself and her child. Fa'ima commented about this reclassification as follows: "You see, in these days long ago it was so much easier to be reclassified. Our mother is "Malay", and that was all
we had to say. Never mind about father". Fatima's child, Zoghira, hated to be classified as "Malay". She considered herself to be Indian, and under the influence of her grandfather and his family, she considered all things Indian to be of superior value to "Malay". Her mother, on the other hand, had distanced herself from all her Indian relatives except her father, since they had always despised her family for its lack of Indian culture, and they had been particularly unpleasant and sanctimonious when she had had this early affair. Fatima claims that the unkindness of her father's third wife, an Indian, who raised her and her full siblings after her own mother's death, had driven her out of the home to seek affection. Two of her brothers had run away from this home. Zoghira tried to befriend her Indian kin, but they called her "Malay bastard" ("bakumalau", which is often used by Indians to refer to "Malays") and they refused to have anything to do with her. She tried to make Indian friends at school, and to visit Indian people, desperate to be accepted as Indian. She insisted on wearing a sari for special occasions, and had learnt as much Kokanie as she could from her Indian grandfather, although she was never fluent in the language. It was all to no avail. Because her own Indian kin refused to accept her, except for the grandfather, refusing to allow her to participate in any family functions, or in the on-going network of reciprocity of the kul-kutum, none of the other Indian families accepted her either.

So Zoghira instead, in her late teens, turned eventually to a thorough study of her own faith, Islam, not originally out of conviction, but to understand the criticism levelled at her and her mother from over pious Muslims. In the course of a few years, her devotion increased until she has become a strictly orthodox practising Muslim with a considerable knowledge of Islam, Islamic history and Arabic. Her religion fulfills her and she now no longer hankers after an Indian identity or to be accepted as Indian. She explained: "To want to be Indian so much - that was the thought of a child. But now I am big, I understand that it doesn't matter whether one is Indian, Chinese or English. What matters is that you are good. What matters is your religion. That's why I am now Muslim - I mean practising my religion in everything I do, or at least, trying to. And you know, many Indians have come to admire me for it". So besides giving Zoghira self-assurance, and fulfillment, her practice of Islam has also provided her with a tool of "one-upmanship" that is especially effective amongst a Muslim population that respects above all else Islamic learning. Her knowledge of Islam is an effective way to raise her social status that had seemed to be so low to her before.

These cases show how the attempt to impose jural categories which attempt
to be rigid on to people does not reflect the actualities of what happens, since the groups formed by the jural categories are not endogamous. Despite jural classifications, people continue to interact in terms of other criteria than those specified in the legislation. The legislation assumes that it is isolating groups from the South African population that are, in any case, "separate entities". That they are not, that in no way do these groups form entities except in opposition to discrimination, is adequately emphasised not only in other case histories in this thesis, but in other works on groups in South Africa (Whisson 1976; Davids 1970, Meer 1969 and 1971).

THE POLITICAL CONTENT OF SYMBOLS OF IDENTITY

Meer (1969) describes a resurgence of awareness of Indian tradition and participation in ethnic associations, especially for the older Indians. One cannot accept this description without, however, considering that since 1961, it has been the declared policy of the Department of Indian Affairs to encourage such awareness. This aspect has been discussed above. Meer (op. cit.) describes how the younger generation, who have never visited India and who are unfamiliar with Indian custom, are not participating enthusiastically in this renaissance. Instead, they turn to South African idioms to express themselves. There is thus a disjunction or tension between the ethos and aims of young and old that is not entirely a symptom of the cyclical antagonism that forms between the power-holding adults and young adults. Foner (1977), Saifullah Khan (1977) and others discuss this tension in relation to their work on migrants, commenting that it occurs because of differential participation on the part of the elders and the juniors in knowledge of and experience of the "home land"; participation in the local (migrant)
ethnic life; and participation in the larger, external society. Foner describes how the children of migrants, raised in the country of immigration, belong completely neither to their parents' ethnic group nor to their peer group in the external society, because of their partial socialisation in both. They therefore form groups based on other factors: in Foner's case, as young non-English residents in Britain agitating about the discrimination they receive.

In the Rylands sample, this disjunction between older and younger generations (already indicated in other case studies) was sharply underlined during the 1976 riots. Many children in Rylands participated in the riots, to the consternation of their parents, most of whom had little or no understanding of why the children rioted. One girl described why she and her friends participated:

"We were attending a "Coloured" school then. We all felt that this different education system is unfair - it's part of the whole oppression business. But it took a few seniors, who talked to us, to make us do something together. They just said to us - Look, you're Black. Do something for your rights. So we all boycotted classes for some days, and threw stones at windows and that sort of thing. But we did it because we felt that we, although we're youngsters, still had a right to have our say. We feel that us youngsters have more initiative than many older people - like my family, for example. There's no way we can hope for change unless we continue to be determined to go through all plans and opposition together. That's why we always call ourselves "Black" and not "Coloured", "Malay", "Indian" or whatever."
But there is another aspect to the expression of Indian tradition in behaviour, that has symbolic political content. Until 1961, the expression of Indian culture was regarded by the authorities as a threat to White hegemony. There has arisen from pre-1950 times the attitude that Indians have the right to express their own culture, which as a literate civilization actually extends far further back into time than that of the holders of power, a point that people are quick to emphasise. The expression of Indian culture, emphasising its antiquity, was then a means of declaring not only cultural equality with the power-holders, but cultural superiority. Some people see that the freedom to express their culture as they choose, and not to have to conform to "Western ways", as symbolic of the eventual granting of political and economic equality. In many ways, this attitude is similar to that of Black Consciousness adherants regarding the concept of négritude.

Sanford (1974) dealt with a similar but not identical situation in the Caribbean. Working from perspectives gained from Barth (1969) and others she described a renaissance of long-disused and forgotten cultural symbols by a subordinant group to gain political power and so raise their position. The subordinant group, native Indians, had been discriminated against in the past on the basis of their Indianness, by the ruling elite of Whites and half-castes, who emphasised "Western" ways, particularly education, as the basis of their power. The subordinant group had only one effective way to raise its status, in the past, besides open revolt, and that was for individual members to acquire overt cultural symbols of the dominant group, such as Western education, different standards of living and so forth. But
since to do so also required capital, the Indians, as unskilled and lowly-paid labourers could seldom achieve this change. Sanford documents how one Indian of particular perspicacity and ability deliberately activated the long disused and despised cultural symbols of the Indian group as political symbols of unity and consistency, uniting the Indians for the first time into a political party comprising Indians and militating against Indians being a deprived group. Unlike the South African situation, the dominant élite did not encourage the resurgence of old ethnic ties, since it posed too much of a direct threat to their hegemony. Sanford describes very convincingly how this cultural resurgence is an attempt made by the subordinant group to justify itself, as a group, to the dominant élite; and how, by activating long despised ethnicity, the members of the subordinant group seek to change the attitudes of the dominant group towards their traditions, and thus, their political and economic position. More than that, a resurgence of ethnicity binds together people who previously formed no common group:

"The revitalisation movement, although it seems to look inward, in reality looks outward to attempt a change in values in the dominant society, to change the social structure which places the subordinant group at a disadvantage" (Sanford: 1974: 507).

This analysis seems to apply also to that aspect of Indian ethnicity that sees the free expression of this ethnicity as a political statement implying equality, described above. It does not apply to people in Rylands, or Indians in the Cape in general to the point that Indian
ethnic symbols ever formed the nucleus of a political party. The similarity is seen to be on the level of the individual perceptions of his situation and his reactions, and not as a means of group mobilisation.

In these ways, then, the expression of Indian culture and ethnicity has some political content. But it must be emphasised, to place these points in perspective, that the strategic value of Indian ethnicity lies in the relationships between members of a kul-kutum, and the ethos that acts as a model of and a model for kinship relationships (Geertz, 1973).

The political content of a Muslim identity, however, is far greater than that of an Indian identity. (This is not intended to underestimate the high degree of personal fulfillment that adherence to Islam may give. It is also not intended to indicate that all Muslims in Cape Town are united (cf. Davids, 1970), and that all Muslims are politically active. Few are, in fact, politically active, beyond verbal and moral support, because of the success of the measures used by the power-holders to suppress opposition [cf. Meer 1969 and 1971, Horrell 1971 and 1972].

To indicate the importance of Indian ethnicity as a means of mobilising a group for political purposes (in the external society), a brief history is presented below, of political parties formed in the Cape and of their aims. Never once has Indian ethnicity been used as a means of recruiting this sort of group. Rather, groups have been recruited on the basis of common discrimination. This is unlike the situation in Natal, where until the post Second World War years, Indians formed
Indian-only parties for goals directed at Indian interests (Pachai, 1971).

GROUP MOBILISATION IN THE POLITICO-JURAL DOMAIN:

BLACK POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CAPE

The extended family of the Abdurahman's (who were Indian Muslims) led the range of Black (meaning here "non-White") political parties, from conservatives to radicals, for over five decades, in the Cape, until the National government began to restrict the expression of Black opposition politics by banning, detaining or forcing its leaders into exile. The first important leader of Black politics was the moderate Dr. Abdurahman who advocated a unity with so-called 'Coloureds' (not with Africans) and an acceptance of White hegemony as the best means of achieving their aims of equality. He was a member of the Cape Town city council for almost as long as he was chairman of the moderate African People's Organization, which was intermittently from 1904 to 1944 at his death.

The Cape British Indian Association was founded in the 1910's, and in 1919 it convened a South African Indian congress to formulate policy concerning increasing discriminatory measures passed against Indians. They advocated to the congress a provincial unity to form a national Indian body that would ally with any other organization formed in opposition to discriminatory measures. The outcome of this motion was the formation in 1923 of the South African Indian Congress with this aim. The attitude of the leaders during these early decades was to reject discrimination, to attempt a "Coloured" unity (not with Africans) and to accept White hegemony. As the influence of
Dr. Abdurahman's moderate party grew, so did the militant radical reaction to it from the younger leaders, spear-headed by junior members of his own kul-kutum.

In the 1930's, his daughter, Cissie Gool, and her affines Goolam Gool and Janub Gool formed the All-African Convention, and the National Liberation League (also led by Abdurahman's second wife, Nellie, and his daughter, Dr. Waradia Abdurahman). Both of these were based on the premise of all-Black unity. Soon afterwards, Cissie Gool resigned her presidency of the N.L.L. following leadership rifts, in favour of Goolam Gool, and she then formed the Non-European United Front. Together with her family from the N.L.L., she organized mass demonstrations in 1939 in protest against the Stuttaford Servitude schemes.

In 1943, a core of radicals expelled from the N.L.L. in 1939 - J. La Guma, G. Gool, Mrs.H. Ahmed and A. Brown - formed the Non-European Unity Movement, which was even more militant and radical than the N.E.U.F. Between 1946 - 1949, there existed a less radical although left-wing organization called the Cape Indian Congress (later Cape Indian Association) which replaced the previous Cape Indian Congress, renowned for its rather right-wing integrationist doctrines. The Association was led by Sheikh Ahmed Zemanea of Pretoria, and became defunct on his death (Brand, 1966).

Formed in 1950, and defunct within ten years was the Cape Indian Assembly, formed in response to the racial legislation of the new Nationalist government. It allied with the Natal Indian Congress,
but the latter, being led by communist radicals supporting militant tactics (allied with the A.N.C.) lost the support of the Cape Town conservatives. It was during the 1950's that what was called the "South African Indian question" in international matters (cf. U.N. conferences and Indian government memoranda) came to be seen by protagonists and participants not only as the "Indian" question, but rather as the question of rights for all those against whom discrimination was passed (Pachai, 1971). The Cape political organizations, under the leadership of the Gools and La Guma, had since the 1930's refused to ally with other Indian organizations that had seen the situation in narrow ethnic terms, instead of in general democratic terms, and they in large part were responsible for this shift in awareness amongst politicians from other provinces. (To emphasise this point, the Gools not only interacted on a political level with Black leaders: Janub Gool married I.B. Tabata, the African leader of the N.E.U.M., whose own sister had married W.H. Tsotsi, president of the A.A.C. in 1948). There were persistent conflicts between the more and the less radical leaders of these groups - the N.E.U.M. and the A.A.C., which for a long while had shared many of their leaders (such as the Gools), but in 1958, a formal split developed, resulting in the formation of the society of Young Africa and the African People's Democratic Union of South Africa.

In 1962, the Cape Indian People's Alliance was formed to oppose the declared government intention of creating a national Indian Council, members of which were to be appointed by the Minister of Indian Affairs for their first period of office (four years). In 1964, the National Indian Council Act to this effect was passed, and ratified
by the South African Indian Council Act of 1968. Opposition to this Council, which was hoped to be a means of liaison between the Department of Indian Affairs and the Indian community, has been widespread, based on a total rejection of an Indians-only government controlled body that has no statutory powers. Leaders claim that this measure bolsters separate development policy, and creates a false consciousness, disuniting all black consciousness groups, dividing Indians from other subordinated groups.

As illustrated above, the claim of Indian leaders that in the history of Indians at the Cape, there has never been an Indians-only party devoted to Indians only needs is valid, so that this governmental policy represents a complete break with the political tradition of the Cape.

"The political development of the Indians in South Africa is motivated by the Government's declared policy that there should be developed for them a governing body, parliamentary in character, with legislative and administrative powers in matters affecting them" (from the annual report of the Department of Indian Affairs to the Minister of Indian Affairs, 1978: 16).

Since the 1960's, the major leaders of all Black radical political organizations have been either banned, detained or have fled to exile. Meer (1969) documents the rise, demise and fall of Indian political parties (mostly Natal-based), for these and other reasons. In 1971, for example, Mewa Ramgobin endeavoured to resuscitate the Natal Indian Congress, and was served with a five-year banning order, which was renewed when it expired.
At this point, it is apposite to recall the quotation from Whitefield and Adams (1975) regarding the formation of multi-ethnic organizations in situations where minority group migrants are unable to achieve goals on their own, purely because they are a demographic and political minority.

It is significant that whilst there have been no political associations based on common Indian identity in the Cape, there have been several welfare associations based on common Muslim identity. At first, these associations were primarily for religious and moral guidance, and then they became welfare orientated. But with the death in detention of Imam Haroun in 1969, Islamic leaders throughout South Africa, and in the Cape, have become increasingly politicised (Horrell, 1976; Meer, 1971). The aims of these organizations are to achieve equality, based on the fundamental Muslim tenet of the equality of all men, which is a powerful political cri de guerre in South Africa where equality of all men is not practised owing to the application of racist-based policies. The historical development of Muslim organizations in the Cape is presented below.

The history of religious organizations during this period is very different to that of political organizations. Prior to 1945, Muslims were under the leadership of cliques of powerful and/or charismatic Sheikhs and Imams, since there was no formal Islamic organization in the Cape. In 1923, Keraan and Arshud inaugurated the Cape Malay Association, which was a short-lived moderately political welfare society. In 1945, however, with increasing scholastic and purist revival amongst the "Malay" leaders, the Cape Muslim Judicial Council was formed, as the
authoritative Islamic centre for the Cape, to which most Imams belonged.
Since most of the Imams are "Malay", the organization is predominantly "Malay": the executive still is "Malay". One of the specified objects of this council was to unite Muslims in the Cape - that is, to end the on-going feuding between Indian Hanafi and Shafi "Malay". They succeeded admirably. They were, however, concerned primarily with scholastic and doctrinal Islam (Davids, 1970).

Throughout the 1950's, there was increasing discrimination against all people not classified 'White', and in the late 1950's and early 1960's, large areas in Cape Town were proscribed for various groups created by government legislation, and the mass removals began. The ulama, the leaders, persisted with their dogma and scholasticism, and were heavily criticised by younger men - mostly Indians - for failing to take cognisance of the human suffering involved in daily life. Eventually, in 1964, members of the Muslim Youth Movement and the Claremont Muslim Youth Movement called a mass meeting, at which it was resolved to form a Muslim secular organization directed towards giving aid where needed. From this was born the Muslim Assembly, a secular run body (with only one Sheikh on the executive of over fifty members) concerned with welfare problems. It was based in Athlone, since this area is central to the Cape Flats, and it was in a 'Coloured' prescribed area. The Assembly today still looks to the Council for religious guidance (since the Council has the power of excommunication) and its welfare services are non-sectarian.

The Council saw the threat to its powers of the new Assembly, so it formed in 1968, the Majlis Ashura al-Islami, or Consultative Assembly,
which it intended to serve as another secular welfare body. The Ashura executive has been characterised by rapid changes and splits, but there has always been a relatively high number of Imams serving on it. It is also renowned for its conservative approach to welfare and politics, and its extreme reformist approach to Islam (Davids, 1970). Allied with the Ashura, although an independent country-wide movement, is the Reform Youth Movement, the Tablīgī, who are very conservative Islamic purists. It is they who applaud louder than other Muslims the Iranian revolution, and, though ultra conservative, seek radical change. They are supported by other youth who are not religious purists, and support the revolution merely through radical political conviction (of equality, a fundamental tenet of Islam, which makes the support radical, since it involves an idea of egalitarian revolution in South Africa).

Group mobilisation in the politico-jural domain can be summarised in the following way. Indians in the Cape form such a small minority of the Cape population (0.3%) that not allied with larger more powerful or perhaps more vociferous groups, they cannot hope to achieve their aims. The number of Indians in Natal equals the number of Whites there, and thus immediately alters the relationship between powerful and powerless, when the powerless do not form such a very insignificant minority as they do in the Cape. In the past, Indians were recruited to political parties on the basis of personal predilection. But since Islam throughout the world, and not only in South Africa, is increasingly viewing itself as an opponent to Western imperialism and its consequent injustice, Muslims have been urged from the pulpit to alter the status quo in favour of equality, as part of their duty as Muslims. Muslim publications also encourage Muslims to alter the situation. For
example, the Eid 1979 edition of the newspaper Muslim News (published in Cape Town) contained several leader articles on Iran and the glory of jihad (holy war against unbelievers), inciting local Muslims to similar efforts.

SUMMARY OF THE THEMES PRESENTED IN PREVIOUS CHAPTERS

The Introduction presents an outline of the more recent sociological and anthropological work on migration. What these perspectives provide is a guideline to the analysis of the responses of migrants to their new communities. Ethnicity is seen to be a means of recruiting people, to a group that benefits its members (through access to resources of co-members); but ethnicity is also seen to be a moral and sentimental issue, involving Geertz's concepts of a model of and a model for reality (1973). The central issue is that people's choice of how they respond to a situation has parameters imposed by external constraints such as legislation, housing, and position in the labour market.

Chapter One, "A Political and Economic History of Indians in South Africa", attempts to outline the history of the external constraints imposed on Indians in general, in South Africa, and their general responses to these constraints. It has emerged that the most significant constraints have been the Group Areas Act and the Registration of Population Act, both of 1950 and followed by diverse amendments. These have constituted a statutory boundary around an imposed definition of "Indian" based on a mixture of factors: area of origin, phenotype, culture and acceptability. To be defined as "Indian" according to these acts entails the experience of certain specific discrimination,
generally aimed at reducing the immigration of more Indians, and at reducing the economic competition provided by successful Indian traders. As a direct consequence of these acts, the Indian population has been assigned certain group areas for residential and business areas, which have proved in Cape Town to be too small to cope with the growing Indian population. The proscription of non-Indian areas to Indians combined with the shortage of land has led to an unprecedented shortage of housing for Indians throughout South Africa.

Chapter Two, "The Setting to Rylands", provides a description of Rylands with reference to its development and to its residents. A preliminary outline of the emic bases of identity - Indian and Muslim - is given, with some discussion of the significance of either.

Chapter Three, "The Structure of Households" shows that the structure of households is largely a function of the acute shortage of housing, and that the structure changes according to the changes of the domestic developmental cycle. To equate households consisting of extended families with "traditional Indian kinship patterns", and to equate households consisting of conjugal pairs and their children with "modern Western kinship patterns", as has been done previously, is to ignore the importance of the external constraints. The most important of these is the shortage of housing, and land for development. Therefore, the choice of where a couple resides must take into account where they can reside, which then, in actuality leaves them little choice at all. Internal group preferences and individual preferences must bow to necessity.
Chapter Four, "The Extended Family and Access to Resources" illustrates that the extended kin network is an important economic unit of interaction amongst Muslim Indians in the sample. The networks, of course, often stretched not only across the peninsula, but also across the Cape, sometimes to other provinces, or to India. Through the kinship ethos of long-term reciprocity, an individual has access to a wide-range of resources otherwise perhaps inaccessible to him, and it is through the operation of the ethos that a continual redistribution of resources occurs. Thus, the extended family is not merely a relic of "traditional Indian kinship patterns", but a kinship network modified to suit the demands and constraints of a specific environment. The bilateral and polysemic nature of the kinship system makes it particularly flexible and able to adjust to and cope with a wide range of situations as they arise. Power in the extended kin network lies in the hands of the elders, and it is based partly on the knowledge of tehvar. It is in this context that the concept of "Indian identity" is particularly important.

Chapter Five, "On-Going Contacts with India" attempts to illustrate the contemporary extent of direct personal contact with India, but shows that owing to statutory currency restrictions, the sending back of remittances to India is minimal. Thus, unlike the migrant communities described by various authors (cf. the Introduction), the Indians in Rylands do not have an opportunity to improve their status in their natal communities through the public display of the use of remittances, even if they chose to send remittances. The younger generation, however, has little if any connection with the natal communities of their migrant parents, and so do not look to these communities for appraisal. Rather, they evaluate their social
position in Rylands and Cape Town through their performances within their immediate circle of kin and friends, in the Cape Town setting. Pedantic adherence to tehvar may be considered to be irrelevant to a Cape Town setting by some people, and youngsters may not even be particularly familiar with it. The authority of elders, and the underlying ethos of the workings of the kul-kutum are based partly on tehvar, and ratified through Shari'a laws that are similar. Because aspects of Islam are so intricately and fundamentally connected with the family aspects of tehvar, it is difficult for people to reject tehvar completely even if they feel it to be irrelevant to them. Islam therefore provides an alternative, enabling Indians to ally with a wider range of people ("Cape Malays" and world Islam) than tehvar allows. Islam is considered by informants to be their primary identity.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INDIAN TRADITION - AND BEYOND

Because of the race policy, it is difficult to assess the importance of Indian tradition and Indian ethnicity for the people concerned. What has emerged clearly from the data presented in previous chapters, is that "tradition" is not a cultural relic at all. It forms an emotional and moral means of uniting an ethnic-based group, in a specific social setting. The moral evaluation of "tradition" (to find it good) provides a motivation for emulation, for the contemporary generations, but only in so much as the behaviour that thereby results is relevant to the contemporary environment. It is for this reason interesting that there seems to be a wide-spread reaction against, or, rather more passively, a situation of never having learnt, Indian "tradition", on the part of the youth. It seems to indicate that
other groups are recruited on the basis of other principles, that appear to the youth to be more relevant to their situation.

It is not with unqualified enthusiasm that these new, broader based political alliances are formed, however, as Meer (1971) indicates, by describing Indian perception of his political position as caught between two powerful national feelings — African and Afrikaner. The young and more radical Indians feel that their greatest hope lies in alliance with the African nationalism, but as events in Kenya and Uganda have shown, they may not even then be secure. This is partly because in generalised class terms, Indians are different from Africans, and thus in a situation where class struggle is pronounced, there will be conflict between the two. This is the dilemma of such a small and powerless minority group: how can it achieve a change of the status quo (in its favour) and yet be re-assured that it will not be threatened by the new system afterwards.

There is complex interplay between recruitment of different groups for different purposes, and the sentimental, moral and political attachment of individuals to particular principles and ideologies involved with group identity and aims. In addition, there is the particular ambiguity imposed by the external constraints — the race legislation, which has not been discussed, in this context, in the literature. It is therefore difficult if not irrelevant to ask the questions asked in other studies of Indians in South Africa: are they Indians in South Africa; South Africans who are Indians; or South Africans who are Muslims? Therefore this study has concentrated on aspects of identity which have previously not been
considered thoroughly in the South African literature regarding Indians. These aspects are: the strategic value of emphasising these identities (given that one is dealing with a migrant group), and the contexts in which they are emphasised.
APPENDIX I

LEGISLATION AFFECTING INDIAN SOUTH AFRICANS - AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Acts marked with an asterisk are those that are still in force, or whose later amendments are still in force (updated to August 1979, from Butterworths Cumulative Noter-Up for 1979).

Occasionally acts passed early in the century or which have since been repealed do not have act numbers available. (Indicated thus: +).

LEGISLATION RELATING TO IMMIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA AND MOVEMENT WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA OF INDIANS

1859  LAW 14 OF THE COLONY OF NATAL: which provided for Indians to be introduced into Natal as indentured labourers for the sugar cane farmers, with an option to return to India after five years of service with a free passage, or to settle permanently in South Africa as free citizens, and a gift of crown land.

1891  *STATUTE LAW OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE: which prohibited all Indians from settling there. All existing Asiatic businesses were expropriated and the owners deported without compensation.

1895  LAW 17 OF NATAL: attempted to encourage re-indenturing or alternatively repatriation by imposing a £3 head tax on all ex-indentured Indians and their offspring when boys were sixteen years or older, and girls twelve or older.

1897  IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION ACT. (+) OF NATAL: attempted to curb Indian immigration by imposing educational, age,
means and health tests on prospective immigrants intending to settle in the Transvaal or the Cape.

1904

NOTICE 164 (NATAL): which barred all Asians from entering the Transkei, Tembuland, Pondoland, Port St. Johns and Griqualand East without a special permit. This was passed to combat "Indian penetration" since Indians were feared as potential agitators and too successful traders.

1906

IMMIGRATION ACT (CAPE) NO. 30: provided that there would be unrestricted immigration to the Cape, subject to the criteria of "prohibited immigrant". These included an education test, whereby the immigrant had to be literate in any European language; a means test whereby he had to be in possession of at least £20; and a desirability test, whereby he could not have a criminal record including murder, arson, rape, theft or prostitution.

1907

ASIATIC REGISTRATION AMENDMENT ACT (TRANSVAAL), NO. 2: which confirmed Ordinance 29 of 1906, whereby all Indians had to register and be identified through finger-prints. These identity documents had to be carried on one, and had to be produced on demand. There was widespread dissatisfaction amongst Indians consequently.

1908

PROCLAMATION NO. 93 OF NATAL: prohibiting Indians from travelling through or visiting the Transkei or the other provinces without a special permit. This proclamation, together with the previous acts since 1905, directly resulted in Gandhi's organization of the first satyagraha campaign,
including mass burnings of these passes, and the identity documents.

*ADMISSION OF PERSONS TO THE UNION ACT (IMMIGRANTS' REGULATION ACT) NO. 22: whereby an education test similar to that previously applied was applied, and whereby inter-provincial movement of Indians was further controlled by entailing a special permit for such travel. For Indians in the Cape it provided that no "prohibited immigrant" could own or lease land. This act lead to the march into the Transvaal, and to widespread strikes incited by Tamil women in the Transvaal and Natal, who went from mine to mine provoking workers to strike. Over 2000 people marched, and a commission was subsequently appointed to look into Indian grievances. (Amended subsequently; final amendment by Act No. 59 of 1972).

*IMMIGRATION AND INDIAN RELIEF ACT, NO. 37: which was passed owing to the resolutions of the Round Table Conference at Cape Town. Indians who obtained domicile permits fraudently would not be allowed to enter South Africa, whilst those who had already done so with false or falsely procured documents were condoned. Children of South African parents, born outside South Africa, had to enter the country within three months of birth, and those who had left South Africa for three or more years lost their domicile rights. (Final amendment by Act No. 59 of 1972).

*ASIATICS IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICTS OF NATAL ACT, NO. 33 (amended by Act No. 41, 1950): which provides for Asiatic
registration in these districts, if an Asiatic is legally domiciled there. If he is not, he cannot register. No trading licenses were to be granted to Asiatics in this area without such registration. "Asiatic" refers to all Asiatic males over sixteen years old.

1937

*ALIENS ACT, NO. 1: which empowered the Immigrants' Selection Board to select for citizenship only those immigrants who were likely to be readily assimilated by the Europeans; who did not intend to pursue any occupation that is already well represented (aimed at Indian traders); or who are the wife or minor children of legally domiciled residents.

1953

INDIAN REGULATION ACT, NO. 43: (also called Immigrants' Regulation Amendment Act), which so curtailed Indian immigration that only one person - a female cancer researcher - was granted domicile rights between 1953 and 1971. Indians can enter South Africa permanently only by requesting South African citizenship as stateless people. This act's terms prohibited the entry, after February 1953, of any Asiatic female born outside the Union, who had married a South African overseas, or of their minor children, except with special permission.

1972

*ADMISSION OF PERSONS TO THE REPUBLIC ACT, NO. 59: whereby a person is deemed to have lost his rights of domicile in South Africa if he leaves and fails to return within three years. Domicile is also lost by a woman whose marriage is dissolved other than by her husband's death during her absence from South Africa. Prohibited persons include
those economically and culturally unsuitable to South Africa since they cannot assimilate; any person who cannot read or write a European language. It may exclude from rights of domicile (on cultural and economic unsuitability grounds), the wife of a union entered into after 10.2.56; or any children born outside South Africa from such a union; or from 10.2.56, the wife of a union entered into before 10.2.53 or any child born outside South Africa on or before 10.2.54. A wife is a woman recognised as such through any Indian religion, but only if there is no other such woman as wife of the same man resident in South Africa, or any surviving children by any woman still living, who reside or are entitled to reside in any province.

1973  
*AMENDMENT OF ADMISSION OF PERSONS ... ACT, NO. 59 (1972): which relaxes restrictions on interprovincial movement of Indians so that they can visit all provinces except the Orange Free State for thirty days or less without first obtaining a permit.

1978  
*ADMISSION OF PERSONS TO THE REPUBLIC ACT, NO. 42: whereby the 1972 act is amended to provide for the deportation of anyone contravening the exchange control laws, and for the removal of his dependants.

LEGISLATION RELATING TO INDIAN FRANCHISE AND OTHER POLITICAL RIGHTS

1896  
*FRANCHISE ACT, (+) OF NATAL: which disenfranchised passenger Indians, who as free immigrants within the Empire had previously enjoyed full rights of citizenship, including
municipal and parliamentary franchise. The consequent outcry was so great that it lead to Gandhi's involvement in South African politics.

1909 *SOUTH AFRICA ACT, (+): which was issued at Union whereby existing provincial franchise practices were retained, but in which the right of Africans, Asians and Coloureds to sit in Parliament was revoked. At this time there were 22784 non-white voters in the Cape and 200 in Natal. (Amended subsequently: Final Amendment Act No. 48, 1959).

1924 *COUNCIL ORDINANCE (+) (NATAL): which deprived Indians of Natal of their municipal franchise.

1925 CAPE ORDINANCE 22: which re-affirmed the eligibility of all adult men of all races to sit as full and equal members of the city council providing they fulfilled the property qualifications of either ownership of property worth £100, or occupation of property worth £200.

1926 *LOCAL GOVERNMENT (PROVINCIAL POWERS) ACT, NO. 1: which deprived non-whites of representation on local health organizations. This was significant since it became customary for whites to press for residential segregation on the basis of health requirements.

1931 *ACT 41 (+): removed the property or income qualifications of white voters, but not for men of other population groups. In 1930, white women were enfranchised, to bolster the strength of the white vote.
1951 SEPARATE REPRESENTATION OF VOTERS ACT, NO. 46: whereby separate representation of voters for municipal franchise in the Cape was instituted, enabling all Coloured and Indian voters to elect four white members of parliament and two white councillors to the Provincial Council. Still only male adult non-whites were enfranchised.

1951 CAPE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE ACT, NO. 19: which guaranteed the municipal franchise for male Indians, retaining their right to be elected to office.

1956 CAPE MUNICIPAL AMENDMENT DRAFT ORDINANCE: whereby it became prerequisite for inclusion on the municipal and divisional council voters roll in the Cape, to be registered as a parliamentary voter.

1962 GROUP AREAS AMENDMENT ACT, NO. 49: which provides for the establishment of suburban consultative and management committees in Indian and Coloured group areas. Also, those who held municipal franchise in the Cape would retain it whilst still in possession of the necessary qualifications, but no new Indian or Coloured voters would be registered.

1963 LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXTENSION ORDINANCE, NO. 23, SECTION 4: which provides in greater detail for the membership of the local affairs committees introduced by the above act. Members were wholly nominated by the Department of Indian Affairs in the first year of establishment, but wholly elected by the fourth year, by Indians over twenty-one years old, with certain property qualifications. These
committees were to be merely advisory, subordinate to the local white authorities.

1966

**GROUP AREAS ACT, NO. 36 (final amendment Act No. 43, 1978):** whereby a Group Areas Board is to be established, consisting of up to twelve members, appointed by the Minister of Indian Affairs. It also clarified group area removal issues. Permits to lease property in a proclaimed area would not be granted except under special circumstances, and after an area is proclaimed, no one is allowed to subdivide land or to grant another person rights to use this land. If allegations are made concerning alleged Asiatic identity of a person, these are taken to be true until proven to the contrary.

1968

**SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN COUNCIL ACT, NO. 31 (final amendment by Act No. 83, 1978):** Qualifications for membership to the Council were delineated as identification as Indian, a permanent resident of South Africa for at least five years prior to membership; not holding an office of profit in the service of the State; and a member must be eligible to be registered as a voter for council elections. The 1978 amendment provides for an increase in councillors to forty, with twenty-seven from Natal, ten from the Transvaal and three from the Cape.

1977

**ELECTORAL ACT FOR INDIANS, NO. 122:** which provides for the election procedures for members of the South African Indian Council. Every adult over eighteen years old is eligible to vote unless specifically disqualified, and any
person who fails to register is guilty of an offence. The 1979 amendment (Act No. 41) provides for setting aside one day for registration of voters, and also extends the period between nomination and election.

**LEGISLATION AFFECTING LAND TENURE, TRADING AND LABOUR**

**1885**

**LAW NO. 3 OF THE TRANSVAAL:** which excluded from all burgher rights Malays, Arabs and Muslim subjects of the Turkish Empire, restricting their property rights to certain areas for sanitation purposes.

**1897**

**DEALERS LICENCES ACT (NATAL), NO. 18:** whereby municipalities were given the power to grant trading licences. The aim of the bill, according to the Rt. Hon. Harry Escombe in Parliament, was "to prevent certain persons coming to this country to compete with the Europeans on equal terms and getting the licences to trade which are required by the Europeans" (quoted from Meer: 1969: 47).

**1898**

**TRANSVAAL LAW 15 (GOLD LAW):** which excluded non-whites from working in mining areas except as labourers.

**1907**

**WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT NO. 36 (TRANSVAAL):** whereby compensation for injury to workmen was restricted to whites.

**1908**

**PRECIOUS AND BASE METALS (OR GOLD LAW) ACT, (+):** which segregated Indians for trade and residence in the Transvaal. The last of these acts, the Gold Law, precluded Indians completely from all areas proclaimed as mining areas. Indians circumvented these restrictions by forming small limited liability companies of two or more
individuals, who then had the right to purchase and occupy land more freely.

1919

**ASIATICS (LAND AND TRADING) AMENDMENT ACT (TRANSVAAL), NO. 37:** which attempted to protect Indians from the Gold Law by allowing those who were trading legally on proclaimed land to continue. It, however, prohibited the ownership of all fixed property including land through companies in which one or more Indian had the controlling share. Ownership of land through nominees was not prohibited. The South African Indian Congress was formed in opposition to this bill.

1922

**APPRENTICESHIP ACT, NO. 26:** whereby Indians were excluded from entering organized skilled crafts. The 1944 amendment enabled the Minister to prescribe, at his discretion, any qualifications he considered suitable for apprentices.

1924

**RURAL DEALERS ORDINANCE (*) OF NATAL:** whereby rural boards were empowered to grant licences for trading, with the clear aim of reducing Indian competition.

1924

**DURBAN LAND ALIENATION ORDINANCE, NATAL:** whereby the Durban municipality could exclude Indians from the sales of corporation lands.

1925

**GENERAL DEALERS CONTROL ORDINANCE, TRANSVAAL:** whereby local authorities were empowered to grant trading licences. As in the Natal ordinance of 1924, it was the stated aim (cf. Hofmeyr, the then Minister of Interior) to reduce Indian competition.
1925 COLOUR BAR ACT, (+): which prohibited Indians from handling any machinery run by steam or electricity.

1935 RURAL DEALERS LICENSING ORDINANCE, NATAL: which imposed further restrictions on Indians obtaining trading licences in rural areas.

1936 *TRANSVAAL ASIATIC LAND TENURE AMENDMENT ACT, NO. 30: which was to do with registration of land occupied by Asians. It empowered the Minister of Interior to declare certain areas restricted to certain groups, allowing Asians full freehold rights in Asiatic areas.

1937 *MARKETING AND UNBENEFICIAL LAND OCCUPATION ACT, NO. 29: which further restricted agricultural rights of Indian farmers. Since most of these farmers lived in Natal, the act was aimed at Natal Indian farmers.

1939 *ASIATICS (TRANSVAAL) LAND AND TRADING ACT, NO. 28: whereby Asians were prevented from occupying or hiring any premises not occupied by non-whites prior to 30.4.39, except by special permission of the minister. All licence applications, renewals and transfers were also dependent on the discretion of the minister. The amendment to this act, in Act No. 28 of 1941 extended segregation to rural areas.

1943 *TRADING AND OCCUPATION OF LAND (TRANSVAAL AND NATAL) RESTRICTION ACT, NO. 35 ("EGGING ACT"): which imposed further restrictions on Indians for trading and occupation of land in these areas. In Natal, it proposed that no Indian could occupy or acquire property
occupied or acquired by a White before 22.3.43, with the same applied in reverse for Whites. This raised such protest in India that the Indian parliament passed the Reciprocity Amendments Act, in which reciprocal treatment would be meted out to all white South Africans in India. The leader of the Natal Indian Congress, Kajee, postponed the initial passing of the bill by saying that he would persuade all Indians to desist from further encroaching into white areas, and he attempted to gain statutory recognition for this assurance. It incensed both Whites and Indians, and lead radicals of the latter to form a group in Natal lead by Naicker and Dadoo, totally rejecting segregation.

1946

*ASIATIC LAND TENURE AND INDIAN REPRESENTATION ACT, NO. 28*

("GHETTO ACT"): Most of the sections of this act were repealed by the Group Areas Act of 1950. The act ended holding of land by nominess, and it stated that if the controlling shares of a company are held by an Asiatic, that company would be regarded as Asiatic. No persons not Asiatic may enter into an agreement with an Asiatic, except by permit, to acquire fixed property in Natal, from 21.1.46, other than in an exempted area. Communal franchise was also offered to Indians, with White parliamentary representation. This the Indians rejected and began another satyagraha campaign in protest. This act was the major pretext for the Indian government to take the cause of South African Indians to the United Nations.
GROUP AREAS ACT, NO. 41 (final amendment Act No. 43, 1978): which provides for the establishment of residential areas specifically for the occupation of a particular group classified by statute. It also provides for areas of trade and commerce for these groups. The Group Areas Board has a pre-emptive right to purchase all disqualified property at a price not exceeding the market price at the date of proclamation or at the date the board exercised this right. Indians were denied loans for properties outside Indian areas, and also denied rights to land for industrial purposes in industrial areas. The Indians reacted by joining the A.N.C. in country-wide demonstrations in the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign.

POPULATION REGISTRATION ACT, NO. 30: whereby all peoples of South Africa are classified according to set criteria based on an area of origin, common culture and phenotype. The definition of "Indian" was indefinite in this act, so it was developed in the Government Gazette, No. 265 Vol. X of 1963, in Proclamation 46. An Indian is any person who is, in fact, or is generally accepted as a member of a race or tribe whose national home is in India or Pakistan. (Final amendment by Act No. 29 of 1970).

INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ACT, NO. 28: whereby monopolies of occupations were created through the policy of job reservation, imposing limits to status and skill upwards mobility of all non-whites. This act also forbids the registration of mixed trade unions. (Final amendment
Act No. 61 of 1966).

1967

*COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AMENDMENT ACT, NO. 42: (final amendment by Act No. 19, 1978): which contains clauses that grant power to the Community Development Board to compensate lessees, and also to enable the Board to acquire property without an estate duty certificate. It also provides for the immediate eviction of people living illegally on certain properties. The 1978 amendment abolished the payment of appreciation (in market value of property) contributions.

1977

*INDIAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ACT, NO. 50: which provides for the establishment of an Indian Industrial Development Corporation, to promote Indian interests in secondary industry. The powers of the Corporation are to promote undertakings for secondary industrial operations in South Africa; the finding or acquisition of shares in such a company; the acquisition and disposal of immovable and movable property; and the guarantee of such a company.

LEGISLATION AFFECTING EDUCATION

1923

*HIGHER EDUCATION ACT, NO. 30: whereby institutes of higher education for Indians were recognised.

1959

EXTENSION OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION ACT, NO. 59: by which the University-College of Durban-Westville, for Indians, was established.

1965

*INDIANS EDUCATION ACT, NO. 61 (final amendment by Act No. 62
of 1973): which provides for the control of Indian education by the Department of Indian Affairs, since it was previously under the control of the Provincial Councils. All private schools must be registered with the Department. Cape schools were to come under this Department's control only from 1.4.70 because of the small numbers of Indian students, all of whom were attending Coloured schools. Any member of staff at a school may be dismissed if he/she belongs to or participates in actions by any party or political organization regarded by the Minister as prejudicial to the State.

1968

*INDIANS ADVANCED TECHNICAL EDUCATION ACT, NO. 12 (final amendment by Act No. 63 of 1975): which provides for the establishment of colleges of advanced technical education for Indians, particularly establishing the M.L. Sultan Technical College in Natal. This act also provides for the control, administration and regulation of such colleges by the Department of Indian Affairs.

1969

*UNIVERSITY OF DURBAN-WESTVILLE ACT, NO. 49 (final amendment by Act No. 68 of 1978): whereby recognition is given to Durban-Westville as a full university. The amendments include the admission to the university of non-Whites other than Indians, and the 1973 amendment allows the university to invest, borrow or lend money, and to negotiate loans.

1973

*GENERAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT: NO. 62: by which free and compulsory education for Indians was ensured, on the basis of pupils enrolling in kindergarten for the first time, in 1973, and thereafter, shall remain at school until they
are fifteen years old. In the 1979 amendment, it became compulsory for all Indian children between the ages of seven to fifteen to attend an educational institution.

LEGISLATION AFFECTING WELFARE

1914  **INDIANS RELIEF ACT, NO. 22** (Repealed by later amendments: last of which was Act No. 59, 1972): making provision for the validation and registration of marriages between Indians which are recognized as valid according to any Indian religion. The wife of a resident is now allowed to enter the country if her husband has any children by any other woman still living. The £3 poll tax was abolished. This act was passed after many months of satyagraha led by Gandhi.

1963  **INDIANS AMENDMENT ACT, NO. 68** (final amendment by Act No. 43 of 1964): whereby all marriages registered prior to this act were validated, as long as they had been registered by a magistrate, the Protector or Assistant Protector of Indian Immigrants, or by the Minister of the Interior. This act does not recognize polygynous marriages. It also eliminated discrimination of marriage registration between indentured and passenger Indians.

1960  **CHILDREN'S ACT, NO. 33**: administered by the Department of Indian Affairs, which pays out maintenance and foster-parents allowances. Monthly average pension 1975 - 6 = R49,84.

1963  **RETREATS AND REHABILITATION CENTRES ACT, NO. 86**: administered by the Department of Indian Affairs.
1967  *AGED PERSONS ACT, NO. 81: which provides for the distribution of old age pensions by the Department of Indian Affairs. The average monthly pension estimated by the Department for 1975-6 was R35,12.

1968  *DISABILITY GRANTS ACT, NO. 27: which is also administered by the Department of Indian Affairs. The average monthly pension estimated by the Department for 1975-6 was R33,07.

1968  *BLIND PERSONS ACT, NO. 26: which is also administered by the Department of Indian Affairs. The average monthly pension estimated by the Department for 1975-6 was R32,66.

1968  *WAR VETERANS PENSION ACT, NO. 25: which is also administered by the Department of Indian Affairs. The average monthly pension estimated by the Department for 1975-6 was R38,71.


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FIELDWORK

Fieldwork consisted of intensive participant observation over a period of eight months. Initial contact with informants was usually made through formal interviews, and subsequent contact became progressively more informal. Census questionnaires were applied at two different stages of fieldwork. The first census, giving basic demographic data about all the households census, was undertaken at a preliminary stage in fieldwork. The second census, restricted to Muslim households, was undertaken four months later. The two census reports served to act as a check for accuracy on each other.

CENSUS ONE.

This census was applied to a random selection of households in Rylands, irrespective of religion. (Total households census: 136).

Address:

Length of occupation of present residence:

Place of previous residence:

Number of occupants of household at present:

Relationships between occupants (kin and affinal):

Ages of occupants:

Occupation of breadwinner(s):

Religion of occupants (or Muslim sect):

Home language:
This census was applied only to those households censused above who were Muslim. (Total households censused: 87).

Address:

A. Is the house owned or rented?
   By whom is it owned?
   If by occupant, who will inherit it?
   If it is rented, how much is the rent?
   Is this considered a fair rent?
   Why not?

B. Residents of household
   Who is the head of the household?
   The following questions were asked concerning the residents of the household:
   1. Relationship to the head of the household.
   2. Date of birth.
   4. Occupation.
   5. Occupational history.
   6. Educational level.
   7. Place of education (country, town and institution).
   8. Comments.
   For affines, the date of joining the household was asked.
C. Kin and affines of head of household not resident with him

Kin and affines of the head of household were separated into the following categories on the census form: children, siblings, wife's siblings, parents, wife's parents.

As for section B, the same questions 2 - 8 were asked, in addition to the following:

1. Years spent out of home shared with the head of household.
2. Marital status.
3. Number of children and their ages.
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