A THEORY OF EXISTENTIAL
PSYCHOLOGY.

Peter Lambley.
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The theory presented in this dissertation is intended as a contribution to a central problem faced by contemporary psychologists, namely the problem of the role of value in the study of human action.

This problem can be phrased in the following fashion: most contemporary writers in the philosophy of science agree that some a priori framework is essential for the study of naturally-occurring phenomena (Feyerabend, 1965; Katsoff, 1953; Turner, 1967). Such a framework serves the dual function of indicating, in a paradigmatic fashion (Kuhn, 1962, 1970), the direction research should take and provides an underlying epistemology and methodology enabling relevant findings to be interpreted.

Now, at any time in scientific and quasi-scientific disciplines, there exists conflicting ideas about how the subject-matter should best be approached. These ideas need not but often are organized in the form of schools, orientations, or even paradigms (Watson, 1967) and in psychology this is no less the case (Hitt, 1967; Katahn and Koplin, 1968).

Psychology has, broadly speaking, two main traditional "ways of viewing" human action; the phenomenalistic (or Lockean) and the phenomenological (or Leibnizian) more commonly known as objective and subjective schools of thought (Allport, 1955;
Brody and Oppenheim, 1966; Diesing, 1966). These two traditions place emphasis on different aspects of the human, the former preferring to glean its information from publicly observable behaviour whilst the latter is more interested in experiential data.

As a consequence of these differing emphases different assumptions are made by psychologists about the basic nature of the human person. In turn, these assumed bases have important consequences for such areas as mental health, psychological research, and psychotherapy. The position is made more complex by members of both traditions claiming epistemological certainty for their own assumptions (Day, 1969; Rogers, 1956; Skinner, 1955; Straus, 1964).

Now, in the existential or empirical psychological situation which could be either a laboratory or psychotherapeutic setting the psychologist, if he is aware of the different traditions, is faced with what is in essence a value problem. He has to choose between two traditions in order to know how he is to conceptualize the situation.

This choice involves a number of features: the psychologist has for example, if he is a psychotherapist, to select some value or goal for therapeutic outcome and some technique for attaining the chosen goal. These value choices imply, additionally, a theory of mental health and - in the final analysis - an epistemology,
a theory of reality.

It becomes essential therefore that the psychologist in the pragmatic situation have some way of understanding the nature of his value dilemma (Lowe, 1959). This thesis attempts to provide such an understanding.

In the introduction, the problem is defined in greater detail. Here the various uses of the term "value" are examined and the conclusion is drawn that the term has, in the past, been defined in accordance with the general theoretical framework used by the particular investigator. Thus, for example, naturalistically-orientated thinkers have conceived of value as relating to fulfillment of natural drives or the maintenance of homeostatic states (Allport, 1963; Lowe, 1959; Tisdale, 1961): human action is explained in terms of the individual striving to attain these values. In contrast more humanistically-orientated thinkers conceive of value as referring to man's striving to creating his own Being or fulfilling his own inherent potentiality.

These considerations enable the following point to be made. In talking of "values" or in conceptualizing human action in terms of value-goals, certain assumptions are made which are themselves value choices (McClure and Tyler, 1967b). There is clearly here an infinite regression in which the person studying values has to account for his own conceptualizing (and, therefore, his own valuation) in his understanding of his investigations.
Following Bridgman (1959) and Lyons (1963), both of whom drew attention to this issue, this value problem serves to direct the investigation: we seek, in short, an appreciation of how different value orientations cope with this value problem and how they account for the observer as a valuator in the study of human action.

To this end a specific context, the psychotherapeutic situation, is chosen. There are a number of reasons for this choice. Firstly, it is important that both traditional "ways of viewing" the person are investigated and by selecting the psychotherapeutic setting both naturalistic and existential-humanistic orientations can be considered, whereas if an experimental context were selected, the latter would not necessarily apply. Secondly, both these orientations make crucial recommendations for mental health. The psychotherapeutic context allows these recommendations to be contrasted in terms of their approach to the value problem.

In Section B these two orientations are examined in detail. Naturalistic orientations discussed are the radical behaviourist position (Day, 1969) and the more moderate naturalistic positions represented by Lazarus' technical eclecticism (Lazarus, 1967) and cognitive therapy (Beck, 1970a). The conclusion drawn concerning naturalistic value orientations, is that where the problem is admitted (notably in the moderate orientation)
it is treated as an extraneous variable to be explicated. The arguments of such theorists as Kessel (1969) and McClure and Tyler (1967a, 1967b) are examined and their "explication solution" is found lacking in a number of respects.

Prime amongst these is the point that any explication of value choices removes the value problem. Explication implies that some state is possible in which the therapist would have total knowledge of all variables operating in the situation (Wann and Walker, 1961): such a state would render the need for the therapist to make value choices obsolete and would open the way for an authoritative epistemology in which conflicting orientations and paradigms would disappear.

Existential—humanistic orientations treated are Existential Analysis, Logotherapy and Humanistic Psychology. It is argued that while existential philosophers show an appreciation of the value problem not found elsewhere, the systematization found in the three "schools" of psychological thought creates a definite value essence.

This essence (authentic action) is examined in terms of the value problem and the conclusion is drawn that authenticity is a value put forward by a consensus of existential—humanistic psychologists as an ideal way of living. This is contradictory to claims frequently made by exponents of these orientations that each individual has to
create his own value. Clearly, it is argued, if this is so, it would be impossible to arrive at some consensual authentic value choice.

In the final section these criticisms are drawn together and are cited as examples of authoritative solutions to the value problem: in each case, individual therapists are urged to adapt the dictates of the respective orientations.

In contrast, the present theory retains close adherence to the value problem maintaining that the only tenable solution is one which takes as focus the value problem and retains this focus within a non-authoritative and provisional framework. The theory is in essence a development of Sartre's treatment of the value problem (Sartre, 1943, 1948a).

Sartre argued that the human person could not be totally identified by any theory about him since a theory cannot be the reality which it seeks to describe: the human person is always free to move beyond the limits imposed upon him by such theoretical descriptions.

Whilst Sartre has been criticized for attempting to construct a theory of an authentic consciousness (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Naville, 1948), the indeterminacy contained in his writings is retained here and used as a base for conceptualizing the therapist's awareness of the value problem. It is argued that the therapist
structures the existential situation in terms of his own personal and eclectic understanding of various value orientations and can choose to act either authoritatively or provisionally.

If he acts authoritatively, he chooses one value orientation and ignores the value problem. To act provisionally however requires that he keep the value problem as a focus of his attention (Polanyi, 1968).

This provisionality is achieved and intended by the therapist being aware of conflicting value orientations and allows him to choose any technique which he feels is suitable in the circumstances without prior rejection of any technique for authoritative reasons (Lambley, 1970b, 1971a).

By retaining the value problem, the therapist avoids identifying the patient or the patient's "illness". He has, in contrast, to accept that his own role as an evaluator precludes such a total identification and this allows him to see that there are a number of different ways in which the patient and his problem can be viewed.

This theory makes two main contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it provides a conceptual framework which enables the therapist to understand the value dilemma that he finds himself emerged in. He is enabled to see the different values offered by different psychological orientations as differences of opinion regarding human functioning and this without committing himself to any particular value orientation, merely to the value problem.
Additionally, the theory is a plea for tolerance of provisionality and complexity (Bugental, 1962a; Jourard, 1967; Lambley, 1971b). Most, if not all, approaches to the value problem fail to accept that other orientations have as valid claims to be orientations (not, of course, to the truth) and this is, in the main, due to authoritative belief in systems of thought.

The present theory, by avoiding parochial attachment to particular systems of thought, allows all orientations into consideration and regards such acceptance as a priori to an appreciation of the value problem.

The second contribution made by this thesis lies in the movement it makes away from the traditional boundaries set up between "applied" psychology and "pure" psychology. It attempts, in the manner of Fine (1969), to incorporate the opposing areas into one theory and does this by focussing on the value problem - an issue common to both. This allows the various orientations to be contrasted without the restrictions of either pure pragmatic or pure theoretical exigencies often found in such attempts at reconciliation.
SECTION A: INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with a particular problem - the role of value in psychotherapy. It is argued that this problem is perhaps the most crucial one facing psychologists in their dealings with people since it brings into focus the competing "schools" or "paradigms" which exist in contemporary psychology. Each theory that has gained favour amongst particular groups of psychologists presents in some way a value orientation; it advocates in some way the use of its particular way of looking at the human in favour of others.

The problem facing any psychologist at any given time and in any situation is, essentially, one of choosing one value in preference to another in order to understand his subject-matter.

Psychotherapy represents a particular situation in which this problem can be viewed. It allows, basically, two value orientations to be compared - that of experimental - naturalistic psychology and that of existential - humanistic psychology. Further, it is an area in which results of value choices take on a relatively more urgent nature than that found in laboratory science. In a sense psychotherapy is an existential situation; it requires action here and now on the part of the therapist and his existential evaluation of his actions.

From this it can be seen that psychology is in need of a theory of such an existential situation which attempts to
account for and accommodate the role of the valuer (the psychotherapist) into a general account of the process of psychotherapy. Equally, contemporary psychology demands that approaches to such delicate problem areas be open-minded in their consideration of alternative formulations since anything that can aid in the understanding of the human situation must receive attention. (Bugental, 1967; Fisher, 1967; Kelman, 1967; Lachenmeyer, 1970; Pereboom, 1971). It is hoped that this thesis will attain these requirements.

In this introduction the concept "value" will be examined in terms of the way particular orientations have conceived of it and the nature of the value problem will be clearly defined.

In the second section the approaches of two major value orientations (naturalistic and existential—humanistic) will be examined in terms of their ability to cope with the value problem. In the last section a theory will be presented which will be a critical synthesis of the two value orientations. The model used will be derived, in part, from the writings of existential thinkers such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Polanyi and from the published work of the candidate.
VALUES IN GENERAL

The history of man has been replete with attempts to find or discover that which is of value to mankind. In recent times this interest has resulted in a wide variety of endeavours, most of them concerned, as Handy and Kurtz (1963) note, with investigating behavior "... evidencing preferences among alternative choices available to individuals and groups, and the criteria, or further set of preferences, that influence the selecting of one choice rather than another (p.131)".

Elaborating on this initial specification, Handy and Kurtz point out that the study of values means different things to different people and can vary from the explicit empirical approach of Morris (1949) or Perry (1926, 1954) to the more humanistic work of Maslow, who asks:

What is the good life? What is the good man?
How can people be taught to desire and prefer the good life? How ought children to be brought up to be sound adults? etc. That is, we think that a scientific ethic may be possible, and we think we know how to go about constructing it.

(Maslow, 1959b,p.120).
Modern man, no less than old, seeks a better life for himself. The models that he uses to attain this end may be worded as the above, or may be put more formally "to provide formal criteria for rational decision choice and evaluation (Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes, 1955, p.140)". Others, such as Back (1961), prefer to use non-rational or irrational theories, arguing that formal rational models (such as the above) take little or no cognisance of psychodynamic factors which are inherent in the dynamic structure of the individual rather than the situation.

Initially the term "value" was taken to refer to the worth of an entity from an economic point of view (Frankena, 1951; Shartle, Brumback and Rizzo, 1964). Gradually, however, use of the term spread to a wide range of phenomena such as considerations relating to the "good", the "right", the "aesthetic" and so on (Burt, 1963; Handy, 1969).

In general two major uses of the term can be identified in current philosophical discussion; firstly the term can be said to refer to those things which are not "bad". In a specific sense the term - in this usage - implies particular "goods" or things desired, but in a general sense it can be used to delineate all that is on the "good side of bad". As Frankena writes, "In its widest use "value" is the generic noun for all kinds of critical or pro and con predicates, as opposed to descriptive ones, and is contrasted with existence or fact (1958, p.229)".
A special case of this may be the value expressed when one states what is right (Hare, 1952).

The second use of the term is encountered when we talk of someone's values. This is commonly taken to refer to that which a person values, as Roubiczek notes:

A value expresses the significance — great or small — which man ascribes to matters to a particular activity or experience or to his life in general and thus provides him with guidance for his behavior.


The first issue that concerns anyone dealing with the theory of value is to distinguish between the expression of a value and the evaluation of such an expression. In a profound sense this is the important difference between the various sorts of value theories, since, on the one hand the former expresses the normative view of what the case should be, whilst the latter attempts merely to describe at a meta-normative level the various value judgments about an entity.

As Burt puts it;

We think of them (humans) as living creatures like ourselves, each with his own implicit or explicit aims; and in order to discover their aims, we must first discover what things they...
value, and what are the priorities in their schemes of value. And wherever the case is one that called for remedial treatment, we too must have our scheme of values to direct our efforts.

(1963, p.62. My emphasis)

Now, normative theories of value attempt by an appropriate method, to specify the why of human behaviour. One gets, for example, theories which take some monistic concept such as desire or pleasure and human behaviour is then explained in terms of the seeking for the stated value. Such a monism need not of course be a simplistic hedonism but may involve some state of drive-reduction as a state of satisfaction – as opposed to a pure "pleasure" value (Blanshard, 1961, Frankena, 1968)¹.

Meta-normative approaches to the study of value on the other hand, attempt to take statements of value and ascertain the truth-status of such statements. One prominent example of such an approach can be found in the emotive theory of value often associated with the logical positivism movement (Ayer, 1936). This approach distinguishes between predicates which express an opinion that can be validated in reality

1 English and English (1958) define monism as the belief that "ultimate reality is of only one kind or quality (p. 328)".
and those which cannot; the latter are regarded as value judgments and are termed expressions of emotion or feeling. Such a position relies on the ability of the human investigator to correctly identify emotive statements and non-emotive statements an assumption that has received considerable criticism (Burt, 1963; Joad, 1950).

This criticism has been directed in the main, to questioning the assumed "value free" notion of science that the emotive theory implies. Burt (1963) for example raises the relevant issue by asking what the status of the general statement of the theory is. Is it, he asks, an emotive or a factual statement? Since the statement itself cannot be validated, by their own criterion, it must, therefore, be an emotive or value expression. In short, the meta-normative nature of such a theory is questioned.

Another example of the meta-normative approach is that of Perry. He contends that;

No one would be disposed to deny that there is a common something in truth, goodness, legality, wealth, beauty and piety that distinguishes them from gravitation and chemical affinity. It is the express business of theory of value to discover what this something is; to define the genus, and discard the differential of the species.

(1926, Pp. 4-5).
Again, the idea is to abstract from expressions of value, the core, or common feature.

It becomes apparent from this brief introduction to the general usage of the term "value" that there is a close interrelationship between expressions of value and any evaluation of these expressions, such that in order to investigate values, some framework must be constructed which itself, as Burt (1963) points out, contains value theory.

Consequently any attempt to define the term "value" is made more difficult by the requirement of a statement of the value of the investigator prior to definition. This difficulty has been noted by most authors concerned with definitional problems. Patterson (1959) for example synthesizes the ideas of Kluckhohn (1952) and Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb (1937) to produce the following definition;

...Values are what might be termed hypothetical constructs. They are not objective - they are not objects, or goals, nor are they needs, wants or desires. But they are tied to both of these. On the one hand they are directed toward objects or goals, in that they constitute criteria or standards for the choice of such objects or goals. On the other hand, they are expressions of wants, interests, desires and needs; that is they are preferences. (p. 55)
It is clear from this attempt at definition that the term is difficult to identify. Notice his use, for example of analogy, relating value to goals, desires etc. Additionally, values cannot be seen and have to be inferred from observable changes in some standard criterion, behaviour being that most often used in the behavioural sciences (McLaughlin, 1965).

In philosophy, this problem of the role of value in the study of value, has been labelled the "infinite value regress" (Bridgman, 1955). In essence the problem is derived from the difficulty experienced in creating epistemological systems whereby the knowledge contained in the system is complete and consistent. For a human observer to know that it is consistent he must check predictions made by the system against some non-system criterion. To ensure the consistency of this evaluation a second evaluator and evaluating criterion is required and so on.

Bridgman formulates the issue by talking of the major insight involved in knowing at the human level; Attention to activities and the first person emphasise the insight that we never get away from ourselves....The problem of how to deal with (this) insight ... is perhaps the most

important problem before us ... Not only is each one of us as an individual not able to get away from himself, but the human race as a whole can never get away from itself ...
Yet it seems to me to have been a major concern of most conventional philosophy and religion to sidestep the consequences of this insight, or not to admit it in the first place.

(1959, Pp. 5-6)

Other writers, in particular Lyons (1963) and Maslow (1966) have suggested that this infinite regress is particularly relevant in psychology where both the subject matter and the investigator are the same.

These points direct attention to the interrelation that exists between defining values as hypothetical "standards of the desirable ... and relevant to actual behaviour as a function of personal commitment and situational factors" to quote McLaughlin (1965, p.266) and specifying the particular method used to identify these values.

Clearly, the way value is defined will bear a close relationship to the method used to uncover the value and to the general theory of knowledge of the investigator: it would, for instance, be of little use to define value in such a fashion that it could not be known. 11/ ...
In any discipline there are specified methodologies which can be used by members to investigate reality. Thomas Kuhn uses the term "paradigm" to refer to the interrelation between methodology and epistemology and this is an appropriate term to use here when talking about theories of value and corresponding methodologies.

This term has come into general use in both the natural and social sciences since the publication of Kuhn's *The structure of scientific revolutions* (1962) and as a result, the term is now widely applied, and usage ranges from Katahn and Koplin's use of it to contrast the views of "behaviouristically orientated psychologists and those who prefer cognitive interpretations (1968, p.147)" to its use in contrasting orientations as far apart as behaviourism and phenomenology. Kuhn used the term to describe the activity of "normal science" which, he argued, operates within a commonly-agreed upon set of rules which act as guides for the conduct and continuation of research. Watson (1967) describes the mechanisms of paradigm activity:

As scientists go about the tasks of normal science, eventually an anomaly, i.e. a research finding, which does not fit the prevailing paradigm, is obtained ...(however) failures in science to find the results
predicted in most instances are the result of lack of skill of the scientist. They do not call into question the rules of the game, i.e. the paradigm, that the scientist is following .... Only repeated failure by increasing numbers of scientists results in questioning the paradigm which, in turn, results in a "crisis"...

(p.436)

During periods of "normal" scientific activity, the paradigm assumes a high degree of stability and demands, consequently, dogmatic acquiescence (Agassi, 1963; Kuhn, 1970; Watson, 1967). It fulfills the needs of its members' allegiance by providing "a set of rules and examples which serve to tell the practitioner how to identify a legitimate problem ...what counts as an explanation, which constructs are viewed as elementaries ...(Jenkins, 1968, p.55)" and so on.

Kuhn notes;
There must be a basis, though it need be neither rational nor ultimately correct, for faith in the particular (paradigmatic) candidate chosen. Something must make at least a few scientists feel that the new proposal is on the right track, and sometimes it is only personal and inarticulate aesthetic considerations that can do that.

(1962, p.157)
Kuhn claims - as do others such as Polanyi (1962a) - that there is not of necessity an independent, or logical "reality" to which successive paradigms approximate 1.

Whilst the term "paradigm" is derived from analyses of scientific activity, it serves as a useful analogy here. It becomes clear, therefore, that the study of values is dependent on the dictates of particular paradigms and that the position that one adopts will vary according to the paradigm chosen. Any attempt to define value as the term applies in particular disciplines requires some knowledge of relevant paradigms.

VALUES AND PSYCHOLOGY

Both Kuhn and Watson (1967) contend that the term "paradigm" can only be applied to relatively sophisticated sciences and that psychology as it stands at present lacks the initial cohesiveness required for the development of paradigms. However the term has been used in psychology (Katahn and Koplin, 1968; Jenkins, 1968; Lambley, 1970b) and its meaning...
to psychologists can be said to be fairly well established.

These points notwithstanding, there have been numerous attempts (for example, Boring, 1957 and Brunswik, 1955) on the part of psychologists to identify broad-scale frameworks from which current paradigms (for example cognitive and S-R approaches ¹) have developed. As was noted in the final paragraph of the last section, this is an important prerequisite to the definition of any value problem and in this section the general conceptual background will first be reviewed followed by a review of specific approaches to the study of values in psychology.

Conceptual Frameworks

To begin with, while there are many divergent philosophical trends that have played important roles in the development of modern psychology, two basic epistemologies can be identified and will be dealt with here. These epistemologies can be identified at many different levels and in the first place can be seen in the arguments of phenomenalists like Russell (1917) or Wittgenstein (1922) and those of phenomenologists such as Brentano (1955) or Husserl (1931).

Phenomenalists contend, briefly, that "reality" exists external to the individual and can only be known by looking

¹ This is Katahn and Koplin's usage.
at reality; that is, all knowledge is made contingent upon the empirical perceptual experience. As Turner (1967) notes "for phenomenalism, all ontological statements are reducible to statements whose meanings are assignable only in terms of empirical constituents. (p. 53)."

Early phenomenalistic philosophers posited a logical a priori which became known to the human observer through the construction of a "picture" of reality based on atomistic principles. Reality could, according to this principle, be broken into constituent parts which were directly observable by the observer. By working logically backwards from these "phenomenal facts" he could uncover the logical structure that was the common element of his "picturing" and the expression of this structure in empirical reality.

One of the more important pragmatic implications of the phenomenalist's position was its treatment of the problem of how a person was to communicate the empirical observation that served as a foundation for his epistemology. Russell (1956) points to the need for qualification of the phenomenalist's position;

It is tempting to think that a particular .... constitutes a fact. For example suppose 'a' designates the thing to which I am pointing. Is this thing (to which I am pointing) not a fact? Not as such.

16/ ...
It becomes a fact only with the assignment, or prediction of a characteristic or of a relation to another particular.

(p.91)

More sophisticated variations of phenomenalism as is exemplified by the logical positivist movement concentrated on the problem of developing basic "ideal" languages for communication of empirical particulars. Schlick (1936) and his associates maintained, for example, that sentences about "facts" were meaningless unless they bore a direct relationship to "facts". On the other hand, people like Carnap (1937), Neurath (1959) and Hempel (1959) proposed that the relevance or meaning of an empirical statement was dependent on the syntactical relation that this new statement had to other statements within the general body of existing knowledge.

All of which suggests, as Russell (1953) has pointed out, that phenomenalists are aware of the need for some conceptual classification system which can be said to exist a priori to the observation of particular empirical sense data.

I mention all this here because it is often assumed by many psychologists and philosophers (for example May, 1958) that phenomenalism implies the separation of the experiences from that which is experienced. As can be seen from the above this is not the case at all.
The second epistemology mentioned above, that of phenomenology has, as its main theme, the direct involvement of the subject in his gaining knowledge of reality. Thus Husserl for example, draws attention to an essential reality which he argues, lies at the back of phenomenalistic perceptions. The important aspect in this epistemology is its emphasis on the removal of unnecessary aspects from the total phenomenological world. One "brackets" all pre-existing expectations, constructs, theories or attitudes, and pays attention purely to essential phenomena perceived.

Knowledge therefore, for the phenomenologist is knowledge obtained through a kind of individual subjectivity and the problem of communication of such knowledge is dealt with by describing the process of attending to the pure essences (the phenomenological reduction). Both these epistemologies are related to the traditions identified by Allport (1955, 1957) in Western philosophy - the Lockean and the Leibnizian.

The former according to Allport, stresses the reactive nature of man;

John Locke, we all recall, assumed the mind of the individual to be a tabula rasa at birth. And the intellect itself was a passive thing acquiring content and structure only through the impact of sensation and the criss-cross of associations... (1955, p.7)
Allport sees the Lockean tradition as still part and parcel of the Anglo-American view of psychology, and indeed exists in all theories which emphasize the rather passive role played by the human in understanding reality. In common with the phenomenalist position, emphasis is placed on the mass of extended reality as opposed to the individual and his knowledge of it.

The Leibnizian tradition which Allport identifies with the phenomenological and existential movements of European psychology places greater emphasis on the individual, as creating his awareness of knowledge. In short, whilst both traditions take note of the complexities of epistemological interaction between the knower and what is known the Lockean tradition assumes a relatively neutral, independent body of knowledge to the more personal treatment of the Leibnizian tradition.

More recently, these two traditions have returned as the issue over "objectivism" versus "subjectivism" in the social sciences. Diesing (1966) elaborates.

...On the one side, the objectivists have argued that the scientific method requires publicly observable, replicable facts, and these are available only in the area of overt behaviour. Subjective phenomena such as intending, conceiving, and repressing...
can be studied only indirectly through
their connections with overt behaviour, if
at all... On the other side, the subjectivists
have argued that the essential, unique charact-
eristics of human behaviour is its subjective
meaningfulness, and any science which ignores
meaning-and-purpose-is not a social science.

Human action is governed by subjective
factors - images, not stimuli, by reasons,
not causes. Consequently an adequate science
of man must understand action from the stand-
point of the actor, as a process of defining
the situation, evaluating alternatives
in terms of goals, standards, and pre-
dictions and choosing to act.

(p. 124)

Other writers, for example Koch (1970) and Feifel (1964)
have added to this argument by contrasting the often conflicting
demands made of a science trying to establish itself and the
demands of a human situation in need of radical help and immediate
attention. Koch writes:

Among the brute facts that must be faced
are these: Ever since its stipulation
into existence as an independent science,
psychology has been far more concerned with
being a science... Its history has been largely a matter of emulating the methods, forms, symbols of the established sciences, especially physics. In so doing there has been an inevitable tendency to retreat from broad and intensely significant ranges of its subject matter, and to form rationales for so doing which could invite further retreat.


That this issue is a vital one is revealed by the number of publications that continue to appear in which one side or the other is taken. In the past decade this issue has been discussed in terms of whether or not psychology should be an objectivist discipline in which case some form of behaviourism has been advocated or a subjectivist discipline represented by phenomenological psychology (Blanshard, 1965, 1967; Brody and Oppenheim, 1966, 1967; Burt, 1964; Eysenck, 1967; Henle and Baltimore, 1967; Knopfelmacher, 1965; Mischel, 1963, 1966; O'Brien, 1966; Robbins, 1968; Skinner, 1967; Wann, 1964; Zaner, 1967).

The "clash" between these opposing traditions is seen best in the debate that arose over the attack made against the phenomenological point of view by Brody and Oppenheim (1966).
They contend that "the fundamental data of psychology are the publicly observable behaviours of organisms (p.295)" and that the phenomenologist, with his emphasis on a pure experientially-based methodology does not contribute in any way to scientific knowledge of man. They argued that "any advantages inherent in non-conceptualized experiences are obtained at the price of their irrelevance per se for science (p.302)".

In a later paper, the same authors point out that:

1. Psychologists are phenomenologists, irrespective of the many differences in viewpoint among them, if they take as the fundamental data ("phenomena") for their investigations experiences themselves.

2. Psychologists are behaviourists, irrespective of the many differences in viewpoint among them, if they take as the fundamental data for their investigations not experiences themselves, but the publicly observable behaviour of organisms, including verbal communications about experiences of any kind (whether they are sensory or not) in the form of first and third-person reports.

3. Behaviourists can obtain intersubjective agreement with respect to their data, since their data consist of publicly observable
behaviours.

4. Phenomenologists cannot obtain inter-subjective agreement with respect to their data, since their data are experiences to which, by definition, only an experiencer himself can have 'privileged access.'

(1967, p.330)

Implicit in the above is the independence of pieces of behaviour, which are treated as facts and thus, as Zaner (1967) points out, the ultimate criterion in the study of man.

The opposite point of view contends that mental phenomena such as experiences of emotion, etc., are irreducible to behavioural levels of explanation (Burt, 1964; Knopfelmacher, 1965) and have to be known by some form of subjective experience whereby the knower partly from self-knowledge and partly through empathy the feelings of the other. In this approach the experiencing consciousness of the person (as opposed to purely behavioural considerations) is used as a valid intervening or hypothetical fiction (Winthrop, 1963) to help in understanding the nature of the experience perceived.

by Koestenbaum (1966). He conceptualizes the main problem as follows:

The question of confirmation ... exists at two levels: at the level of the particular or the individual and at the level of the universal. At the universal level it is simply a matter of confirming the truth of the generalization. At the individual level, however, it is a question of recognizing the abstraction. And this is the question of precision: what criteria tells us that the quality in question is really present in the experience ...? Behaviouristic criteria are inadequate, since the new empiricism or phenomenology deals principally with introspective data, ... the closest we can get to precision is intuitive certainty or adequacy.

(Pp. 417-418)

Clearly the two opposing points of view represent clashes of levels of confirmation. The objectivist confirms that his knowledge of the individual is correct by predicting his behaviour while the subjectivist confirms his knowledge by understanding the feelings of the other.

These two points of view differ, then, in the content of the criteria but both, as Robbins, (1968) points out,
involve the use of some consensual framework - some agreement amongst fellow workers as to the meaning of results obtained (Abramovitz and Abramovitz, 1970; Lunnette, 1966; Hotopf, 1958, 1959).

In a recent paper Hitt (1969) contrasted these two poles and suggested that they be seen as two "models of man". Hitt draws attention to the relevance of the positions taken by either view for human affairs;

The acceptance of either the behaviouristic model or a phenomenological model has important implications in the everyday world. The choice of one versus the other could greatly influence human activities (either behaviour or awareness) in such areas as education, psychology, theology, behavioural science, law, politics, marketing, advertising and even parenthood. Thus, this ongoing debate is not just an academic exercise.

(p. 657)

It is possible now to consider actual research performed in either or both of these traditions and to see how the particular theory of value developed is a function of the methods used.
Research on Values

The definitive review in this area is Tisdale's (1961). His task was to identify various clusters which had predominated in thirty years of psychological research into values. This was certainly an extremely arduous task made more so when one considers that Albert & Kluckhun's bibliographic survey of related literature (1960) contained over fifteen hundred references to the study of values.

Tisdale identifies five "clusters".

1. The first associated with the work of Maslow (1959a, 1959b), Goldstein (1959), Murphy (1953, 1964) and Fromm (1947) "defines values as needs or need satisfactions (Tisdale, p.1244)". Maslow (1954, 1955, 1962) for example argues for a "Needs hierarchy" by which he means a continuum running between so-called "basic needs" which, once satisfied, are superseded by less-biologically rooted and more psychologically-rooted needs such as man's highest values including man's need to "self-actualization". Closely related are the writings of Freeman (1936), Mace (1953), Thompson (1952) and White (1944, 1951).

Criticism of this approach is directed at the lack of empirical evidence (Tisdale; McLaughlin, 1965) and the problem of knowing which particular need is operating in specific situations (Margenau, 1959; Weisskopf, 1959). Weisskopf suggests
that these "needs" are value-judgments themselves and are not suitable for the scientific study of values.

2. Tisdale describes the second cluster as follows:

Group Two, while granting the biological basis of values, prefers to stress their motivational nature as predispositions operating prior to behaviour. (p. 1245)

Tisdale refers to the work of Allport (1961) Allport, Vernon and Lindzey (1951) and Spranger (1928). Additionally the work of Bruner and his associates (Bruner and Klein, 1960, Bruner et al., 1966) is relevant. In essence this cluster posits a close interaction between environmental, cognitive (or psychological) and biological determinants of behaviour. The respective theorists varying in emphasizing the role of cognitive aspects in directing behaviour (Allport, 1963; Locke, 1969).

In general, however, emphasis centres about the intricacies of situational-bound contexts in which behaviour is seen as a function of external situational exigencies together with motivational (or valutative) pre-existents which pre-dispose the conscious "awareness" of the person toward a particular action orientation. In short the perceiver is "keyed" by these determinants to receive particular information patterns rather than others. Thus, for example, Bruner et al. (1966)
argue that particular values obtaining in specified cultures can dictate the super-ordinate classification system used to identify objects in "reality". An orange or an apple for instance may not be classified automatically as "fruit" but may be classified according to specific cultural value criteria.

3. The third approach to the problem of value contends that "values arise only when problem situations demand behavioural choices (Tisdale, p. 1245)". This cluster places more emphasis than the second on behavioural and empirical correlates of value choice (Barton, 1962; Dukes, 1955). An excellent example of this approach is the study by Charles Morris (1956) who, influenced by the views of people like Dewey (1922), Mead (1938) and Lewis (1947) claimed that a study of values from a scientific perspective was the only way to develop a genuine "humanism" in which optimal conditions for all could be obtained.

Morris's main task was to exhaust the possibilities of human values, that is he sought the extent of all possible modes of living. He finally decided on thirteen which, he claimed, were independent to cultural determination. In his study he concentrated on the conceived notion of value in that his questionnaire administered to subjects in different cultures, asked subjects to assess how they conceive of the "good life".1

Examples of Morris' "Ways to live" are; to preserve the best that man has attained (way one); act and enjoy life through group participation (way five); live with wholesome, carefree enjoyment (way eight).
Morris does however discuss operative and object-related values but sees conceived value as more relevant to actual behaviour (Morris, 1942, 1948). Other examples of this emphasis on expressed behavioural preferences as defining the term value can be found in Grace and Grace (1952), Woodruff (1942, 1944) and Woodruff and di Vesta (1948).

4. The fourth cluster deals with definitions of value which hold that these are "intellectually held concepts or beliefs (Tisdale, p. 1245)". Relevant theorists here are Hartman (1959), Kluckhohn (1952), Scott (1959) and Smith (1954, 1960, 1963).

McLaughlin writes;

... values are standards that may generate motivation, and the first task of analysis is to identify these value standards. The person's commitment to these standards is important also, since the extent to which values affect behaviour may be a function of commitment.

(1965, Pp. 264-265)

This approach bears some similarity to that of the second cluster in that they are both concerned with cognitive aspects in the definition of values.

5. The final cluster is a development from Gestalt approaches to psychology and emphasizes, as Kohler (1938) did, the objective and subjective interrelationship which dictates the appearance
of particular situational Gestalts. These Gestalts are said to have a value properly independent to the variation of subjective taste. Asch (1952), Lewin (1944) and Winthrop (1961) have extended this conceptualization to incorporate the social context of knowledge. McLaughlin points out that for this cluster;

The objectivity of values derives from their ethical nature and is defined in terms of the intrinsic appropriateness or harmfulness of behaviour as it affects other people in the shared field.

(1965, p.263).

In sum, these clusters represent attempts at defining the scope and nature of the problem of values according to the particular guiding epistemology. Clearly distinction can be made between the behavioural approach to the value issue and the cognitive approach, the latter extending into the humanistic realms of cluster one. What can be said at this stage is that the concept, value, plays an extremely important role in the understanding of human action and that both traditions obtaining in Western psychology have contributed to the development of approaches to the problem.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

So far a number of definitions of values have been offered but it is not necessary, for the purposes of this thesis, to
have one specific definition of the term. What is important is that there is a problem peculiar to the study of values and it is to this problem that we now turn.

Burt (1963), as has already been pointed out, introduced the problem as being one which occurs when a psychologist has to "treat" a person - or has to change in some way existing values. He must be sure, in his knowledge of his own values that his own values are superior in some way to the other's.

We have also seen, above, that values can only be investigated from within some orientation (or paradigm) which itself contains an element of choice of value (for example in choosing a definition, a certain orientation is also assumed). This is succinctly stated by Lowe (1959)

The dilemma of the practicing psychologist is compounded by the existence of a multiplicity of competing sets of values, for one value orientation tends to exclude all others, each makes a demand for loyalty, setting at the same time its own criteria or goal. (p.687)

Lowe prefers to use the term "value orientation" to "paradigm" - a practice that will be maintained here - although much of what is contained in the definition of paradigm applies to the term "value orientation."
That this "dilemma" is true of the realm of general psychology as well as that of the study of values is maintained by Hitt (1967) as well as by Bannister (1970) and Koch (1964, 1969). Hitt for instance lists cybernetics, behaviourism and existentialism as examples of different ways of studying the human and remarks that psychology needs some "higher authority" in order to synthesize these conflicting value orientations. He suggests that "reason" is the only possibility arguing that this "journey of logic and intuition, grounded in facts, but inspired by imagination" can "lead to scientific discourse among all psychologists— from existentialists to behaviourists, or from phenomenologists to mathematical model builders (p. 271)."

Let me now formulate in general terms the problem to be treated here. Firstly, Hitt notwithstanding, one of the main failings of approaches to the study of values has been the lack of attention paid to the role of the investigator in completing his investigation. Hitt's use of the concept "reason" is just such an example, for how is it that he knows what this "reason" is (clearly it is a value of his) whilst this knowledge has eluded for so long the approaches that he distinguishes? Equally, one point made against the more cognitive approaches to the definition of value was the lack of scientific rigour (Tisdale, 1961; McLaughlin, 1965) yet does being scientific imply that one's observer is neutral with regard to his subject matter? Clearly not. He has, for example, to choose in the first place
the scientific \(^1\) rather than a non-scientific orientation which is itself expressing preference for one methodology (and all that it values) over another. \(^2\)

Apart from the above examples I have in an earlier publication (Lambley, 1970b) defined the problem rather differently.

... the history of empirical science and its attempts to create criteria that give certain knowledge, is interspersed with problems of the relationship between reality and the description thereof. Some theorists attempted to formulate a logical atomism in which atomic propositions referred to facts. Such a proposition had to consist of a particular (an event) and a universal (a class of events), so that a fact could be related to the general class it belonged to ... (We) can see, I think, the clash of various paradigms as being clashes of analysis and of language: the empirical psychologist today is pointing to a particular event and describing it by using his own paradigm language. Essentially the paradigm ...

\(^1\) I refer here to the phenomenalistic tradition.

\(^2\) Anybody reading Husserl's writings will be immediately struck by his repudiation of the "naturalistic" attitude in favour of the "true science of phenomenology".
provides the universal. Consequently, when we say the paradigm refers to some 'thing' we accept that 'thing' is problematic, just as we accept that several people may have different knowledge of the same 'thing'.

For theoretical psychologists, however, the problem becomes one of analysing these separate paradigms and trying to see what they have in common.

If we look at Piaget's work (1959) we are given to understand that there are common logical structures in thinking. This is in fact a commonly accepted base to much research into thought and cognition, but how does it help us here? An article by Mary Henle (1962) provides a useful analogy: she points out that it is often held that because Ss do not appear to arrive at correct logical answers given syllogisms, thinking is not necessarily logical. She contends that the person does in fact think logically, it is just that he perceives the axioms differently, according to his background needs, and so on. In other words, given the same 'facts' then
the same end-states can be reached logically.

Now what of our paradigms? Are they not in fact generalized instances of the above, in which the logical structure of numerous paradigms is the same, they just perceive different aspects of 'reality'?

Let us look closely at this. Firstly we see that the existence of reality is not in doubt: indeed, so it seems, all that we have to do is to agree on a delimitation of the total aspects of reality and then we would see that all thinking (be it by individuals or paradigms) is logical. Yet, is this not the very root of the trouble? Just what is reality? The logical atomists and empiricists could not agree on it, and it seems neither can the paradigms of psychology. In effect, what psychological paradigms do is to pick only those aspects of reality which they consider important (Buchwald, 1961; Gorowitz, 1962). This is Henle's problem. Even if everybody does think logically, epistemologically, difficulties such as the above do arise; "what is reality"
is not really a logical issue at all, but is one involving conflicting views about "reality".

(Pp. 577-578)

The problem as expressed above has also been dealt with by Beth and Piaget (1965), Bolles (1967) and Küng (1967). It is dealt with at some length above because of the rather special place logic has in the minds of many scientists. Clearly, the issue cannot be resolved by positing some value existing independent to those individuals, investigating the problem. Or, rather, one can, but at the expense of stating how different paradigms or value orientations come to disagree about what this constant is.

Most approaches to the problem make some appeal to either an independent self-obvious criterion or to some consensual criterion. By doing this the problem is seemingly resolved since, logically, if all people within a particular value orientation accept the basic approach of that orientation as de rigueur and unquestionable, then only someone outside that consensus (or a rebel) can disagree with the prevailing attitude.

In what follows two value orientations will be examined in terms of their "solution" to the problem of value, that is how they build the observer into their systems, and how they allow for the evaluation of the values of the valuer. This thesis will provide a new theory working on from the examination of

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1 For example, Burt's "intuition".
the two orientations.

Before this however it is necessary to define certain limits of the study and to specify the exact nature of the theory to be developed.

In the first place, I intend considering a somewhat specialized part of the value problem - that of the problem of the role of value in psychotherapy. There are a number of reasons for choosing this specific area and these can be enumerated as follows:

1. Clearly in order to investigate value orientations and their approach to the value problem, some area must be delineated in order that a comparison be made. As I have pointed out, this selection of an area involves a value choice in itself - shall we, for instance, demand empirical or experimental predictions so that a linear comparison can be made? Obviously this would be unfair to the cluster associated with Maslow's work and to the existential—humanistic psychologists in general.

The choice of area is made more complex by the status that has accrued over time to empirical experimental psychology. "Pure" psychologists tend to regard themselves as the direct descendents of "true science" (Sanford, 1965). Their position and power being gleaned from the remarkable success of the
natural sciences in which accurate control and prediction in laboratory situations were the foundations of technological advancement. Psychology of the "pure" variety, by being able to use the experimental method and its concomitant stress on aspects or abstractions of the total person, attempts to measure man, and not merely to describe him. The fortune of such a psychology rests on being able to predict and control man's direction not only in the laboratory but in life-at-large. To the extent that the former is accomplished adequately, reputations remain intact, but the application of laboratory findings to the human situation remains problematic.

This point is emphasized by Mehlman (1963) who suggests that the controlling nature of the experimental situation tends to be a limiting as well as advantageous condition in the study of human action. Mehlman points out that the sheer complexity found in the human condition cannot adequately be re-created in laboratory conditions using humans, let alone when such research is performed on animals.

Additionally, when one considers that the empirical psychologist has to select relevant variables for study and that he frequently spends his life dealing with experimental situations - as indeed is advocated by Skinner (1963) - then there would appear to be little point in using his experience of human
action as a criteria when compared to the experience, for example, of the clinician. It seems fair to say with Sanford (1965), Koch (1969), Pereboom (1971) and Wallach (1971) that empirical research is done often for the sake of research alone, little attention being given to the penultimate value that the work has for the study of man. In effect what researchers seem to be saying - albeit, in most cases, implicitly - is that "one day, when all our little bits of research are put together, a conclusive way of living which has been proven scientifically, will emerge".

Nobody can reject outright the value of such a viewpoint which is merely, I think, asking for a patient, "all-will-come" attitude; yet at the same time - what if one does not subscribe to such a belief? Surely one has the right to ask at any moment (not just in the future) "what does the work I have been doing mean for humanity? Perhaps this sounds overly philosophical but it need not be. If Skinner, for example, can develop his ideas ahead, as it were, of his research (Skinner, 1948, 1956) then so, it follows, should other empiricists and humanists.

Putting this more firmly it seems that theories about how mankind should conduct its affairs should be put to more than just laboratory test; they should also be applied in a value
setting such as psychotherapy. More important for this thesis: surely by requiring the testing of theories of value solely in terms of a laboratory model inflicts a limiting condition on certain value orientations such that their theories about the human, not easily tested experimentally, are rejected (Ausubel, 1956, 1961).

This does not imply that we reject the values of empirical experimental psychology, but that we seek a field which most prevailing value orientations can apply to. Only by choosing the psychotherapeutic area does each of the clusters have an opportunity to be compared.

2. Earlier I quoted Maslow (1959b) as saying that psychologists sought general rules for living happily. Now, the second reason for choosing psychotherapy is closely related to Maslow's expression of the general intent of psychology and this is that the problem of value in psychology is - at Maslow's level - the problem of good or bad mental health.

It seems reasonable to suggest that a viewpoint developed by any method will, in so far as it is a viewpoint dealing with human problems, make some contribution to the creation of
a dictate for living. And, so it has been argued by people such as Popper (1965) and Polanyi (1958), that even when a theory is used dealing with non-human problems, such as an engineering theory, there are important side-effects for mental health. This latter point can be seen clearly by studying for example inter-relations between automation, technological development, computerization, and variables such as alienation, suicide and other "side affects" (Merton, 1957; Seeman, 1959).

Confirming this position are the numerous articles and books that have appeared in recent years that have drawn attention to the need to reconsider both conceptualizations of mental health and the role of value in psychotherapy. Marie Jahoda (1958) for example wrote;

In a sense, the attempts to give meaning to the idea of mental health are efforts to grapple with the nature of man as he ought to or could be. (p.1)

Further in her book she points out that integration between research and concepts of mental health is sadly underdeveloped. Other writers, such as Adams (1964), Bordin (1966), Brewster Smith (1954, 1961) and Szasz (1958, 1960, 1961) have argued for a re-appraisal of established dogma related to the...
concept of mental health. Szasz and Adams, for example write about the need to see mental health in terms of "problems in living" whereby the therapist is an agent and "induces (the patient) to give up his habitual mode of communication and to substitute for it a new language .. (Szasz, 1961, p.301). In effect, this new "language" is a theory about the human, paying particular attention to a direction that the individual must take in order to attain fluency in the new "language". Szasz adds;

In his dilemma, man is confronted by the imperative need to relinquish old games and to learn to play new ones. Failing this, he is forced to play new games by old rules, the old ones being the only ones he knows how to play. This fundamental game-conflict leads to various problems in living. It is these that the modern psychotherapist is usually called to treat.

(1961, p.308)

Clearly, from this, the psychotherapist must have knowledge of the correct "game". As Papanek says "The problem of the 'real' innate nature of man must be faced by every thinking person and especially by every psychotherapist (1958, p.160)". Thus the therapist relies to a certain extent on the ability of some framework to provide
him with such an understanding (McCall, 1964). Here again we
find the therapeutic situation a focal point for varying
views of "the real nature" of man.

3. Again, the third reason is closely tied to the above
two. There would appear in Anglo-American psychology to be a
fairly wide gap existing between the "pure" researcher and the
"applied" clinician in that the former tends to concern
himself with a different type of proof of his theories about
human actions than the latter.

Attention has been drawn to this unfortunate "gap" by
Cronbach (1957) who wrote;

Psychology continues to this day to be
limited by the dedication of its investigators
to one or the other method of inquiry rather
than to scientific psychology as a whole.

(p.671)

The two methods, experimental and correlational psychology,
are distinguished by the fact that "correlational psychologists
like people!" The gist of Cronbach's argument was that the
two should co-operate and evolve "... a common theory, a
common method and common recommendations for social better-
ment (p.683)".

The importance of this position was reiterated by Reuben
Fine who, in a series of papers (Fine, 1959, 1961, 1969), began
such a reconciliation.
Fine attempted to set up a framework within which various methodologies could be interrelated. He suggests the following division of labour:

Three types of psychological responses may be distinguished: stimulus-bound, organism-bound and affect-laden, organism bound and not affect-laden. If the response is stimulus-bound, experiment is the appropriate method. If the response is organism-bound and not affect-laden, statistical inference is appropriate. If the response is organism-bound and affect-laden, the case-history is appropriate.

(1969, p.530)

Instead of rejecting methodologies such as introspection, Fine sees the concept as organism-bound and affect-laden and in his view introspective case-studies provide scientific insight into a valuable aspect of human functioning which can supplement and add to experimental investigation.

In accepting this need for rapprochement as a problem area, and taking note of the other reasons for choosing psychotherapy, it is apparent that psychotherapy provides the only level, at this time, which most of the respective value orientations can all apply to. Equally, rapprochement requires some synthesis.
between theory and its applications and mental health represents such a synthesis.

So far, the nature of the problem in general has been discussed; it remains to specify the precise nature of the problem. This can best be done by considering first the way previous researchers have conceived of the problem of value in psychotherapy.

Generally, writers in this area have provided a particular definition of "value" and then gone on to discuss various ramifications of these definitions. Patterson (1959) for example, discussed values in general and concerned himself with criteria of mental health, therapeutic methods, selection of clients and the influence of the therapist's values on the client. Ehrlich and Wiener (1961) on the other hand concentrated on empirical problems in the measurement of values.

Kessel and McBrearty (1967) provide the most recent survey and after presenting a number of opinions on the matter conclude that;

... psychotherapy may at least in part consist of a didactic situation in which the patient learns and adopts the values of the therapist; the therapist as a controller of behaviour is responsible for concern with the issues of values, and mental
health and psychopathology are, at least in part, value problems.

(1967, p. 683)

Amongst the examples cited in this review is the study of Rosenthal (1955) in which twelve patients and their respective therapists were asked to complete the Moral Values Q sample as a measure of the values held by each person. Rosenthal found that patients who were successfully treated tended to shift their values in the direction of the therapist's. Another example was the more recent work by Pentoney (1966) who found that "there was a general tendency for the values of clients to resemble the values of client-centered therapists as they proceeded in psychotherapy (Kessel & McBrearty, p. 677)". The instrument used in this latter example was a Q-sort based on Kluckhohn & Strodbeck's (1951) classification of value orientations.

Other studies have questioned whether or not values do in fact get transmitted and are adopted by the patient. Rosenthal, for example in the study cited above, failed to establish transmission when he used the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey questionnaire. Further, as Farson (1961) has pointed out, the transmission of values may depend very much on the ability of the therapist. Farson argues that competent therapists will not make it their business to get the patient to adopt their values but will encourage the patient to...
develop his own. If Farson is correct in this then "values" as defined operationally in terms of specific scalar measures, may or may not get communicated.

Clearly what we have here is confusion over the meaning of the term "value" and disagreement as how to measure values. Ehrlich and Weiner (1961) made an attempt to come to grips with this problem. They demanded that studies of value commence with a categorical analysis of the particular conception of value allowing a common classification of values to be developed. Given such a classification, then both therapist and patient can complete a questionnaire or Q-sort and indicate what they value.

Such a programme has been attempted by Allport, Vernon and Lindsey (1951), Carter (1956), Catton (1954, 1956), Grace and Grace (1952), Hawkes (1952), Hughes and Thompson (1954), Morris (1956) and Woodruff and D'Vesta (1948). In each case some attempt was made to quantify selected value dimensions. Resultant problems experienced by such investigations and listed by Ehrlich and Weiner involve the poor controls available in studying the therapeutic situation and the effect of investigation on the parties concerned. As we have seen above, the main problem was the evaluation of change, that is of communication of values.

Ehrlich and Weiner suggest that this can only be done by inference from a minimum of three levels;
... greater frequency of patient's bringing in problems independently ranked by the therapist as important ... changes in patient's evaluation of the importance of certain problems (and) ... the analysis of changes in patient's observed or self-reported behavior as they may reflect 'new' values.

(p. 369)

Whilst this is a useful consideration there are two important omissions not only in Ehrlich and Weiner's analysis, but in most if not all treatments discussed above. Firstly, the initial analysis of the meaning of the term "value" is not carried far enough. If it were, then the value problem - as discussed earlier - would receive prominent treatment. Further evidence that this problem receives scant attention is seen in the almost universally-accepted bias that obtains in the above studies which assumes there is only one way to investigate the values of the participants in therapy - using empirical and experimental criteria.

Secondly, there is no attempt to interrelate at the conceptual level the existential therapeutic situation with the person analysing it in terms of the value problem. At the most mention is made of the problem of the role of the observer; research then progresses as before.
Specifically then, this thesis attempts to present a theoretical perspective in which these considerations are given prominent attention. In short, the theory to be developed is one which allows the therapist to conceive of the therapeutic situation in terms of the problem of value. Further, the importance of the observer-therapist remains at the forefront of the theory and does not at any stage disappear.

**MODE OF INQUIRY**

In the earlier parts of this section, attention was drawn to definitional problems involved in any study of values and this was found to be no less the case at the psychotherapeutic level. Clearly, whether or not values are present in therapy, let alone get transmitted, is a question that is answered in different ways by different investigators defining "value" in different ways.

To approach the problem in terms of a preconceived methodology, as we have seen, presents difficulties. In the present case the value problem has first been discussed so that our focus will be a problem rather than a methodology. In doing this however, certain assumptions have had to be made - for example, the existence of the various "schools" in current psychology, the relevance of what has been written to this segment of the study of man etc. In order to proceed beyond this point certain simplifications have to be made as regards the selection of specific value orientations to be
considered.

However, the situation is made somewhat easier by the considerations raised earlier regarding firstly the two "traditions" obtaining in Western Psychology and secondly the "clusters" identified by Tisdale which fall relatively easily into two main orientations, that common to what I shall call the naturalistic orientation and that common to the existential-humanistic orientation. The difference between each is taken to be a matter of degree and revolves around the use of inferred (not necessarily observable) conceptualizations of values as opposed to behaviouristic, observable and physical conceptualizations of values.

This decision to use two value orientations is, however, not a function entirely of what has gone before, but is also based on treatments of the problem as it applies in psychotherapy. Lowe (1959) for example distinguished four sets of value orientations, naturalism, culturalism, humanism and theism. He defines naturalism as the doctrine whereby "... all notions that are not susceptible to empirical validation (p. 667) " are rejected and the application of science to all facets of human action is the only conceivable methodology." Lowe adds:

Since reality is limited to what is defined operationally, naturalism limits psychology to the study of behaviour, the mind being
reduced to the physiological and physical, which can be measured. The result is behaviourism and a limited scientific vocabulary that prevents the erection of any hierarchy of values that will transcend the physical.

(Pp. 687-688).

Lowe includes in this orientation, the classical psychoanalytical school claiming that it postulates a physicalistic homeostasis. He is supported in this contention by Allport (1963).

Lowe believes that "culturalism" takes as its focal point the social world. These theorists "see man's problems as arising more from his social needs than from his physical wants (Pp. 688-689)". This orientation identifies values as "loyalty to the culture". Lowe quotes from the A.P.A.'s "Ethical Standards of Psychologists" as supporting this view;

The psychologist's ultimate allegiance is to society and his professional behavior should demonstrate an awareness of his social responsibilities.

(1953, Para. 1. 12 - 1)

With regard to humanism, Lowe writes;

... humanism is belief in the self-sufficiency of man to control his own destiny and to realise his inherent potentialities through rational thought processes. Man's final moral obligation is to strive continually to realise all the unique potentialities.
which are inherent in human nature, the ultimate value being man.

(p.690)

Lowe includes the work of people like Rogers (1957a, 1957b, 1958) and Fromm (1955) under this orientation, terming their writings examples of "American activism".

Finally, "theism". Briefly, this orientation is concerned with the "loyalty of man to a God". This position stresses the importance of the individual finding his God and thus achieving the supreme value.

Two other writers, London and Rossi, have added to the above. Perry London's contribution rests on the distinction that he draws between "insight" and "action" psychotherapeutic orientations;

In general, the activities of psychotherapists are efforts to implement either of only two gross kinds of therapeutic operations ... I think the difference (between the two) can be most clearly understood as an orientation towards the problem of symptoms.

(1964, Pp. 34-35)

This distinction, he argues, is the main area of dispute since "If the therapist is orientated toward Insight methods" he writes, "he will probably try to assail the ailment that
lies beneath the symptom" whilst, the Action therapist tends to "behave as if the symptom were itself ailment enough, and try to remove it (p. 36)" Clearly the distinction drawn by London is similar to that posited here.

Rossi (1967) adds to this by distinguishing between "game" and "growth" orientations in psychotherapy. He writes;

... psychotherapists are struggling to define, develop, and integrate two very different dimensions in their work with human beings. In the game dimension one is generally concerned with the individual's relation to the outside world and his ways of coping with it. One typically analyzes ... repetitive patterns of behaviour which are apparently maladaptive, one analyzes the bad games and seeks to substitute good ones in their place. In the growth dimension, on the other hand, one is more concerned with the individual's experience of his inner world and his relation to it ... the focus of the work is more definitely on the development or growth of something new in the personality.

(p. 139)
Rossi argues that the game orientation emerged from a model that viewed man as "a kind of mechanism, with a model derived from areas like biology, mechanisms, or, more recently, computer and information technology (p.140)". He cites, in this respect Dollard and Miller (1950), Wolpe, Salter and Reyna (1964), Eysenck (1960), Ullman and Krasner (1965) and the computer-derived systems of Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) and Breger and McGaugh (1965). He also refers to behaviouristically orientated writers such as Sullivan (1953), Kelly (1955), Berne (1961, 1964), Wolberg (1964), Glasser (1965) and Szasz (1961) who, he argues, advocate therapies that "concentrate on learning better ways of coping with reality and thus, in the final analysis, be understood as therapies that teach people better games they can play (p.141)".

The "growth" dimension is not as concerned with the learning of socially-adaptive games as the above but rather concentrates on the individual. The patient is encouraged to create his own personality and assume responsibility for his own growth. Rossi says that "... the subject is always in a process of development wherein he designs or synthesizes his experience of the world (p.144)".

Finally, other psychologists have also made mention of the basic dichotomy that seems to exist in psychotherapeutic thinking. In particular Jessor (1956) writes:

"Discussions of psychotherapy in nearly all
recent tests refer to two general directions or goals of treatment. The first of these is *intrapersonal* and usually refer to the reduction or elimination of conflict on inner tension ... the second major goal of treatment (is what has been) called the agreement of behaviour with cultural expectations; what others have referred to as social conformity. (Pp. 264-265) Others such as Rotter (1963) and Weisskopf Joelso
(1953, 1968a, 1968b) have made similar comments.

Any exposition of the problem must take into account both these orientations and a convenient break up is that between the naturalistic and existential—humanistic, despite Lowe's four orientations. It seems appropriate to subsume Lowe's "culturism" under the naturalistic orientation and to place the theistic under the existential—humanistic (Royce, 1962; Strickland, 1966).

The naturalistic orientation will be examined first followed by the existential—humanistic. In each case, the general tenets of the orientation will be discussed and then we shall endeavour to ascertain the orientations position with regard to the value problem in psychotherapy. In discussing the naturalistic orientation, three variations will be treated—radical, eclectic and cognitive approaches—whilst in the existential—humanistic orientation existential analysis, logotherapy and the humanistic approach will be discussed.
SECTION B: 1. NATURALISTIC VALUE ORIENTATIONS
It is important to distinguish (as Lowe, 1959, fails to do) between three approaches which, whilst being clearly naturalistic in their general value orientation, nevertheless have different implications for the psychotherapeutic situation. On the one hand, there is a form of naturalism which I shall term radical and on the other a position which I shall call for convenience, moderate. There are a number of important differences between these which have to be specified.

Before proceeding however it is necessary to explain the apparent neglect of the psychoanalytic orientation in the break-up of value orientations into two broad groups. The position of psychoanalysis is somewhat difficult to classify involving as it does components of both the naturalistic and existential - humanistic orientations. Lowe, for example argues that;

Both Behaviorism and classical psychoanalysis
in turn imply a physical hedonism by placing
emphasis on physical laws which reduce the
life of the mind to the needs of the body.

(1959, p.668)

Equally however, much of more recent psychoanalytic theory emphasizes the importance of ego-functioning in much the same way as humanistic psychologists emphasize growth of self concept (Bellak, 1970; Brown, 1964; London, 1964, Macleod, 1963).
Allport (1963) makes a useful suggestion by distinguishing between closed and open system theories in the study of personality; he argued that psychoanalysis, along with similar reductive theories, was concerned mainly with the biological homeostatic balance assumed to underlie human functioning. More existential and humanistic theories tend, on the other hand, to believe in an essential growth factor underlying behaviour.

In this thesis then following Allport and Lowe, we will consider psychoanalytic theory to be fundamentally naturalistic in nature whilst at the same time recognizing the contribution it has made to virtually all orientations treated (Binswanger, 1957). What is important in the distinction made here between the two orientations is that the type of approach to the value problem be examined. Clearly, if one wanted to cover every possible approach to the value problem, numerous other distinctions would have to be made. The distinction employed here seeks to incorporate value orientations which are representative of the two epistemological traditions discussed in Section A. This has necessitated including Continental as well as Anglo-American psychologies, something that is not always done in other treatments.
RADICAL NATURALISTIC VALUE ORIENTATION

Traditionally, naturalism in psychology began with the work of J.B. Watson (1913) who advocated an environmentalistic determinism which still holds an influential place in modern psychology. Watson's writings, together with developments in laboratory science, the use of animals in experimentation and the growth of appropriate philosophy of science (logical positivism), helped to ground behaviourism in the methods of traditional science. Consequently, terms often associated with natural science become familiar to psychologists (for example, operationism, empiricism, the public nature of knowledge etc).


Although there have been debates in the literature over the particular delineations of the various "action" schools, (Breger and McGaugh, 1965; Yates, 1970a, 1970b) here I shall use the views of what Breger (1968) calls the Eysenck-Wolpe axis and what Yates terms the Lindsley-Skinner (American) school. What I am after is an expression of the value that is applied in therapy by the radical school of thought. And in this respect the ideas of Eysenck and Skinner overlap.

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This position is that closest to the phenomenalistic tradition and involves the conceptualization of the study of man as a public, behavioural task. Man is examined in terms of a functional model and the units of analysis are determined by the operationality (Skinner, 1945) of constructs used (Boring, 1945; Boring et al., 1945). Involved in such a programme is the reduction of human "data" to the level of observable measures (Maltzman, 1966; Millerson, 1968; Jessor, 1963). Thus argues the radical, to talk of a "mind" or any other inferred entity is to give reality to a term which cannot be observed. However, the radical does not just deny such inferred entities (Marx, 1951, 1963);

Even the most mentalistic language is understandable and valuable in this sense. The meaningfulness of psychological and mental terms provides no insuperable problem, provided the verbal practices of both speaker and hearer have been shaped by overlapping verbal communities. The meaning of such terms can be clarified by an attempt to assess the observable (not necessarily publicly observable) events that act as discriminative stimuli in control of emission of the term.

(Day, 1969, p.320)
The radical behaviourist wishes to guard against assumed, or animistic commonsense formulations which have no factual basis. Day writes:

He (the radical) does not believe that the functional relations he describes constitute an identification of anything which might be called 'true laws of nature', in the sense that the systematic collection of such functional relations can ultimately be expected to fit together into a completed picture of an account of human interaction with the environment. Rather, he is content for the most part simply to describe whatever natural consistency he can actually see, and to hope that the report he makes of his observations will in turn generate ultimately more productive behaviour in the control of human affairs. He adopts this course of action out of an interest in increased efficiency and a conviction that only the analysis of behaviour will lead some day to a more trustworthy set of guidelines for the acquisition of knowledge.

(p. 319)

In his desire to describe these "natural consistencies" the radical has to rely on some criteria which will tell him when he has successfully described these consistencies. Day (1969)
suggests that this focal point is the search for the variables in the environment which control behavior;

(the behaviorist) is most confident in his statement of a functional relationship if it plays some part in guiding him eventually to the successful manipulation, i.e. control, of specific behavior.

(Day, 1969, p. 318)

We see from this a clear role being given to the manipulator, but what status does this manipulator have in terms of radical behavior theory? The radical behaviorist has a ready answer to this; as Day puts it;

A second basic dimension of radical behaviorism is its insistence that scientists are themselves no more than behaving organisms. Science is at heart either the behavior of scientists or the artifacts of such activity, and scientific behavior is in turn presumably controlled by much the same kind of variables as those which govern any other aspect of complex human behavior ... The radical behaviorist faces the fact that the ultimate achievement of his scientific activities is for the most part either further verbal behavior on his part or a new set of acquired behaviors which hopefully enable him to control nature more effectively.
Day is trying to avoid establishing a science of behaviour in which knowledge is reified independent to the knower (Mandler and Kesslen, 1959). Yet his arguments seem contradictory in that on the one hand he says that what a scientist sees is the result of a particular reinforcing contingency acting on him. Yet at the same time "natural consistencies" do occur and can be controlled. The contradiction occurs when we are asked to accept the community relativism of the former statement together with the reification contained in the latter (Gibson, 1960).

Other tenets can be found in the work of Eysenck and his associates. These writers have tried to develop explanatory systems in terms solely of empirical criteria.

Writing as early as 1952, Eysenck attempted to apply empiricism to psychotherapeutic and related areas. He denounced the criteria for therapeutic change set up by conventional psychotherapies and insisted on the use of empirically valid criteria as the only acceptable explanation of human action. Despite attacks on his position, notably by Rosensweig (1954), Hoppock (1953, 1954), Rausch (1954) and Strupp (1963) Eysenck, 1954, 1955, 1960, 1964a, 1964b). In common with Day above he has repeatedly stressed that this method is the only valid
one, deriving its privilege from learning theory approaches to the study of behaviour.

Eysenck's general position can be characterized as follows: he views the disturbed personality as the result of two interrelated determining conditions. The first can be regarded as a biological pre-condition which stresses individual difference in genetical inheritance, "conditionability and autonomic lability (Eysenck and Rachman, 1965, p.12)".

The second condition, a more environmentally determined one interacting closely with the first, involves poor learning developing in the individual through the lack of correct conditioning occurring. Describing this interacting, Eysenck and Rachman write;

In the first instance, we have a single traumatic event, or else a series of sub-traumatic events producing unconditioned but strong autonomic reactions...

At the second stage we find that in a large number of cases conditioning takes place, in the sense that a previously neutral stimulus, through association, becomes connected with the unconditioned stimuli which give rise to the traumatic, emotional reaction ... (However) conditioned responses which are not reinforced
begin to extinguish, and we would expect, therefore, that conditioned autonomic responses ... would extinguish as the individual concerned encounters many examples of a conditioned stimulus which are not followed by reinforcement ...

The evidence is indeed very strong that such remission takes place ... The fact that not all cases show spontaneous remission, however, must make us suspect that there is, in many cases, a third stage.

(Eysenck and Rachman, 1965, Pp. 4-5)

The third stage involves the action of the person in evading conditions under which "spontaneous remission" would occur. Here there is a failure in the conditioning process resulting in the development of socially undesirable habits.

Eysenck and Rachman distinguish a sub-group of this latter; ... there may have taken place a type of positive, appetitive conditioning which is contrary to the rules and laws of the country in question. Thus homosexual, fetishistic, or other perverse erotic behavior patterns may have become fixated through a process of conditioning
in which these undesirable behavior patterns were in fact reinforced through orgasm or in some other way, so that the problem for the therapist is now one of breaking down the positive conditioning and of establishing instead a negative conditioned response to these stimuli ... Punishment (i.e. from society) therefore, coming much later than the rewarding consequences of the guilty act, is not likely to lead to extinction of behavior in the long run.  

(Pp. 8-9)

It is clear from the above that a strong element of social conformity enters into this particular value orientation. In fact, emphasis seems placed almost entirely on the adequacy of a person's observable behaviour where observable means socially observable. Where implied events are considered they are seen as intermediaries and only used where appropriate to the control of overt behavior (Champion, 1967; Lichtenstein, 1971).

Psychotherapeutic value implications

In sum, this radical orientation involves the acceptance by its exponents of one overriding perspective: behaviour is the sole criterion and involves, at the psychotherapeutic level, the therapist fitting "easily into his role as an expert in the repetitive and empirically verifiable pattern of psychopathology. He has been taught to do this and has authority and theory to guide him. (Rossi, 1967, p.149)". Or, as London puts it, "the Action
therapist is interested entirely in his ability to manipulate
behaviours to eliminate symptoms, and is somewhat complacent
about their origin (1964, p.78)"

In general, objections to this programme have concentrated
on the facile acceptance of social action as the value expressed
in therapy. (Breger and McGaugh, 1965; Jourard, 1959, 1961;
for example, wrote;

If there is agreement that all psychological
treatment involves a lawful interpersonal
influence process, then objections must be
made to the kind of manipulation or
influence involved in behavior therapy,
rather than to manipulation per se.

(1964, p.84)

Now clearly, this is a criterion that involves the value
problem. How is it, one has to ask, that the behaviour controller
alone can decide which behaviours are acceptable and which not?
Ulrich (1967) makes this claim in reply;

There has been some feeling that the actual
application of the scientific control of
behaviour, especially as pertains to human
values, should be withheld until goals and
restrictions have been made more explicit.
But why should scientists refrain from actively working to effect cultural ethics ...? If we refuse to apply our knowledge of behaviour, we are not simply taking a neutral position. Rather, we are endorsing other forms of control which gain in potency as we withhold the competition offered by our methods ...
Perhaps research will someday yield reliable criteria that can be used to help decide which individuals will control which behaviours ...
Debate concerning the morality of behaviour control should be replaced with experimentation, both basic and applied, designed to better determine immediately the behaviours necessary for approximating a reinforcing existence for all.

(Pp. 232-233)

For Ulrich and others (Kanfer, 1965; Parsons and Fox, 1958) "experimentation" is the answer to the value problem. The fact that the controlling therapist is a person involved in living is considered irrelevant; all problems of living cannot be solved by discussion but must be solved by a naturalistic programme (Bandura, 1961, 1968; Ullman and Krasner, 1965; Ulrich et al., 1966).
There are however several writers who have gone into this problem in more depth. Skinner (1956) for example shows that he is very aware of the dangers involved in advocating the naturalistic control of human behaviour. He writes:

Control must be analyzed and considered in its proper proportions. No one, I am sure, wishes to develop new master-slave relationships or bend the will of the people to despotic rulers in new ways. These are patterns of control appropriate to a world without science. They may well be the first to go when the experimental analysis of behaviour comes into its own in the design of cultural practices.

(p. 278)

With regard to the role of value, he suggests the following;

Any list of values is a list of reinforcers - conditioned or otherwise. We are so constituted that under certain circumstances food, water, sexual contact, and so on will make any behaviour which produces them more likely to occur again ... People behave in ways which, as we say, conform to ethical,
governmental, or religious patterns because they are reinforced for doing so. The resulting behaviour may have far-reaching consequences for the survival of the pattern to which it conforms. And whether we like it or not, survival is the ultimate criteria. This is where, it seems to me, science can help - not in choosing a goal, but in enabling us to predict the survival value of cultural practices. Man has too long tried to get the kind of world he wants by glorifying some brand of immediate reinforcement. As science points up more and more of the remoter consequences, he may begin to work to strengthen behaviour, not in slavish devotion to a chosen value, but with respect to the ultimate survival of mankind. Do not ask me why I want mankind to survive. I can tell you why only in the sense in which the physiologist can tell you why I want to breathe. Once the relation between a given step and the survival of my group has been pointed out, I will take that step.

(Pp. 289-290)
and thus finally;

Fear of control, generalized beyond any moment, has led to a misinterpretation of valid practices and the blind rejection of intelligent planning for a better way of life ... in conquering this fear we shall become more mature and better organized and shall, thus, more fully actualize ourselves as human beings.

(p.292)

I have quoted at length here in order to reveal the subtle attempt to evade the main issue. Where one expects a significant treatment of the value problem, one gets mere reference to the ultimate survival value of particular actions. There is no acceptance of difference in opinion amongst academic equals, such that one would expect: survival is best achieved through the agencies of behaviour theory as espoused, in this case, by Skinner. That other orientations may see different choices is out of the question, they are, in short, simply wrong.

In this respect Krasner (1962) writes;

We would suggest two major steps to be taken ... The first is to develop techniques of approaching the basic problem of social and ethical issues involved in behaviour control...
A second ... is communication between the
general public and the research investigations.
The psychologist (must be) ... constantly alert
to what is taking place in society and ...
(be) active in investigating and controlling
the social uses of behaviour control.

(1962, p.203)

and Eysenck (1969) in criticising therapists who dare to
deviate from this experimental norm, writes;

This eclectic, middle-of-the-road, common-sense
approach has a considerable appeal to the
practising therapist ... It sounds fine
to say that each method should be used
when appropriate, or for suitable
subjects, but in fact this is, at the
moment, a statement of no empirical
content.

(p.1)

In sum then, this variation of the naturalistic value
orientation either ignores the depth of the value problem
(Eysenck and Rachman, 1956; Frank, 1961; Greenspoon, 1961,1962;
Greenspoon and Brownstein, 1967; Kanfer, 1961; Krasner, 1961;
Salzinger, 1959) or, where it is treated in depth (London, 1969)
recourse is made to the application of the value orientation to
correct its own errors. London writes;

... Man is thus ethically committed to a
technical contest with himself whose future
limit is not evident: he must keep making new things to correct the indecencies which are sometimes by-products of the new things he has made. (Pp. 215-216)

This grasping search for penultimate certainty seems doomed to remain just a search and it assumes obsessive proportions in its attempts to keep out all alternative formulations. So much so that it neglects the important ethical and value issues with which it is supposed to deal so efficiently (Goodkin, 1967).

Criticism of this value orientation has generally been of the type that invokes the "full" nature of man as an alternative. Thus humanists like Maslow (1962), May (1951), Caruso (1964) and others such as Koch (1969a, 1969b) and Lyons (1965) complain of the narrowness of the radical point of view which restricts the study of man - especially in a psychotherapeutic context - to observable behaviours.

However, whilst these points of criticism are well taken there is still a more important one and that is that this particular orientation denies the value problem. It reduces the problem of value to the level at which it is seen as an unfortunate and temporarily uncontrolled variable, not of any importance and easily accommodated by increasing the application of the orientation's methodology (Holt, 1952; Immergluck, 1964; Skinner, 1969).
The resultant position expressed is that the psychotherapeutic goal is behaviour which is in conformity with socially acceptable behaviour (Skinner, 1966a, 1966b).

**MODIFIED NATURALISTIC VALUE ORIENTATIONS**

Consideration of the naturalistic position in modern psychology reveals the need to identify a movement away from the tenets expressed above towards a framework in which, whilst remaining naturalistic in orientation, makes a deal more use of non-observable entities (Meissner, 1966).

By way of background it is appropriate to discuss two major philosophical ideas which have found adherents among psychologists and which have helped in formulating the modified naturalistic approach.

Perhaps the most significant of these "revolutionary" ideas has been the argument for a relational epistemology. Günther (1968) for example, suggests that "reality" today cannot be seen as a Platonic-like mass awaiting discovery; rather, he argues, modern conceptions of reality involve obvious disagreement about the ultimate nature of reality. He points out that the existence of competing schools of thought is more of a reality than faith in the evolution of some ideal epistemology independent to human conception of it.
These ideas have been developed in depth by many philosophers of science in particular Feyerabend (1961, 1962, 1965, 1970), Hanson (1958), Katsoff (1947, 1949, 1953), Lewis (1923, 1929) and Polanyi (1958). Lewis (1929) for example contends that the development of empirical knowledge requires an a priori schema of defining concepts which direct attention to particular empirical "reality".

Similarly, Turner (1967) cites a number of different types of a prioris which can influence directions taken in research and in thinking. Amongst others, she distinguishes the "epistemological" a priori that Lewis talks of above, as well as Kant's "intentional" a priori whereby the world view, or experience of the world is created by an intuitive awareness; that is one's being here in the world. Other types discussed by Turner are "linguistic" a prioris which stress the limitations placed by linguistic classification on inquiry and conceptualization (Whorf, 1956) and psychological a prioris which limit man's ability to transcend his physiological capabilities (Hayek, 1952, 1964; Bertalanffy, 1955).

The general principle involved in all this is best expressed by Katsoff's statement that "Every scientific observation involve a set of categories a priori (1947, p. 688)". Feyerabend (1965) takes this further by arguing for the development of a pluralistic philosophy of science in which
meaning is given to facts by the presence of alternative explanatory systems. Value is thus put on realizing that there are no ultimate criteria for the evaluation of theories, since advocating the independence of facts involves the denial of the need for an a priori. 1

Closely related to the above is the second idea. This concerns the desire on the part of many philosophers of science to "make explicit that which is implicitly contained in scientific practice (Kessel, 1969, p.999)". In essence this idea involves the scientist being aware of the sort of a priori influences discussed above. Thus philosophers of science have turned to an examination of the effects of their own actions on their subject matter and found, in many cases, that gaps existed between what scientists said they did and what, in actuality, was done.

The point here is that if one argues that various influences such as culture, language and measurement (Heisenberg, 1958; Northrop, 1958) have unwanted effects on investigation then the role of the personal effects of the investigator must certainly count as one such effect. Discussions about the role of the personal in science have abounded. Ghiselin (1952),

1 Ernan McMullin's review of these new trends in the philosophy of science (1966) emphasizes this movement away from factual simplicity to epistemological pluralism.
Margoshes and Litt (1965), Medawar (1967), and Popper (1965) have helped to emphasize the important role played by personal values and creativity at all levels of investigation.

**Main tenets**

With this background we can now look at the effect of these two philosophical ideas on psychology.

Whilst psychologists have from time to time, written about these philosophical changes (see for example, Kantor, 1959; Lachenmeyer, 1970; Louch, 1962; McCall, 1964) developments within psychology itself, have helped to give psychological relevance to the ideas expressed above. In particular, many changes have taken place in behaviouristic psychology, as researchers have discovered that numerous difficulties presented themselves in the application of behaviouristic principles.

Koch (1959, 1964) has outlined this trend and his analysis shows clearly that psychologists have slowly been taking note of the human and personal nature of scientific research. Guthrie for example wrote:

> The phenomena in which the psychologist is interested are not specified in terms of mass, length and time. They involve categories not reducible to positions on a scale. In fact, they normally involve patterns, situation and movement that require recognition by a human observer. (1959, p.164)
Guthrie stresses the need to appreciate the fact that stimuli have "meaning for the responding organism (p. 165)", a plea also made by Bevan (1968), Bruner et al (1966), Gibson (1959, 1960) and Miller (1959) who all contributed to the use of intervening, non-observable formulations interceding between stimulus and response. Koch (1959) remarks:

To those who have seen the methodological problems of psychology primarily in terms deriving from the study of learning theory, it will be illuminating to discover that the present 'convergence' is largely unilateral. It is the S-R theorists who have moved and the man-preoccupied systematists who have (relatively) stood still.

(Pp. 762-763)

This shift in emphasis from an almost mechanical model to a more flexible model of man's behaving can be found at particular levels apart from the general convergence cited above. Perhaps the most significant of these has been the increased interest taken in experiential aspects of human functioning. Richardson (1965) for example, argued as follows:

A scientific fact is a function of the reputability of the methods employed, including the reputability of the observer himself. Ultimately the
reputability of the method is a function of the frequency with which it has been found to produce consistent results. When put in this form it becomes obvious that psychologists have been using subjective report ever since experimental psychology began.

(p. 226)

Richardson believes that experiential analysis can be just as readily used as behavioural analysis since both demand consensual agreement as to the defining categories involved (See also Wallach, 1971 and Wolman, 1960). There is no reason, he argues, for behaviour to be considered a more fundamental level of reality than experience, a point made by the "subjective behaviourists" Miller, Gallanter and Pribram (1960) and Pribram (1962, 1968).

What Richardson is saying is that the subjective experience of the individual can be studied as readily as pure behaviour and has the advantage that the subject plays an important role, not as an object to be examined in isolation but as part and parcel of the research act (Natsoulas, 1970; Pereboom, 1971). Closely related to this example is research into what has come to be called the social psychology of the experiment. Here the work of the following may be cited; Argyris (1968),
Campbell (1959), Criswell (1958), Ekman and Friesen (1960), Friedman (1967), Kelman (1966), Lester (1969), McGuigan (1963), Orne (1962), Reitman (1959), Riecken (1958), Rosenthal (1963a, 1963b, 1966) and Sarason (1965). These authors have been concerned with the social psychological effects of the experimenter on subject's cognitions and performances, during experimentation. Friedman (1967) in describing Rosenthal's work wrote;

He has shown in experimentation on rats, ... planaria, ... and humans ... that the experimenter's expectancy can be a significant partial determinant of the results he obtains.

In the paradigmatic study of experimenter bias, rats are randomly assigned to cages labelled 'maze-bright' and 'maze-dull' respectively. Analysis of the results of maze-learning experiments run by naive experimenters shows that those rats labelled 'maze-bright' have done significantly better than those labelled 'maze-dull'.

(p.3)

In effect workers in this area feel that experimenters approach research problems with particular "cognitive expectancies" and in subtle ways influence their subjects
to respond according to these expectancies. In a sense this idea is relevant to the discussion above on a priori classifications since from the experimenter-bias literature it appears that these "cognitive expectancies" can be seen as classification "sets" involving both the formal, stated aim of the experimenter together with his personal influence on the experiment.

There have been two main answers or solutions to these findings, each designed to reduce in some way the error factor involved in such a bias. Rosenthal himself advocates reducing the expectancy of the observer and making him as aware as possible of the bias factor (Rosenthal, 1967a, 1967b). Others, for example Breger (1968) and Chomsky (1959, 1964, 1968) argue that some kind of cognitive inferred construct must be used to explain and account for the error involved in trying to reduce the totality of human functioning to a finite limit.

On the other hand others, such as Ammons and Ammons (1970), Buck (1963), Harrington (1967) and Ingraham and Harrington (1967) have suggested that this "bias" occurs only at certain levels where total control of the situation has not yet been possible - due, they argue to poor training of researchers and lack of sufficiently sensitive operational controls. Implied in this position is that these controls will be provided in time (Burns, 1960; Champion, 1967; Johnson, 1963; Reid, 1960).
In sum then, the modified naturalistic approach is less inclined towards the overall ethos of control found in the radical position. The modified naturalist is prepared to admit that he has an influence on research and that behaviour alone is not sufficient for an appreciation of human functioning. Indeed the use of non-observable constructs seems to be a pre-requisite for the understanding of experimenter-effect findings in that influences operate that the experimenter is not aware of. We should note here that the approved method of approaching this problem is to increase the awareness of the experimenter (Kraft, 1971).

What has to be done now is to examine the therapeutic value orientations that have been influenced by this modification and to appreciate the efforts made by these orientations to come to grips with the value problem.

**Psychotherapeutic value implications**

One of the points raised in criticism of the radical position by Breger and McGaugh (1965, 1966) concerned the looseness of the term "experimental". Valid procedure was taken to refer to a broad "learning theory" which, so argued Breger and McGaugh, hid many arguments and unresolved conflicts amongst learning theorists (see for example Estes et al, 1954). Yates (1970a, 1970b), who reviews the origins and development of behaviour therapy introduces a broader view of experimentation...
which attempts to encompass the therapeutic as well as the laboratory situation. Yates defines the experimental method as applying to each individual such that the individual provides the raw data on which the experimental method is applied. This is in contrast to the approach of radicals such as Eysenck where idiographic manifestations are minimized in order that the individual better fit the experimental method derived from laboratory learning-experiments.

This revised definition of the term "experimental" is closely related to the above-named developments in that it is in accordance with the movement towards attaching importance to the social nature of effects (effects which occur incidentally, at a level not included in the traditional definition of experimental conditions) and to inferred, non-observable concepts. Expanded definitions of the term "experimental" as reflected in the most recent reviews (Lachenmeyer, 1970; Pereboom, 1971 and Wallach, 1971) are, in effect, attempts to bring these "extraneous" value effects to the attention of psychologists instead of denying them. 1

1. This new definition which whilst more idiographic than previous ones, has to be differentiated from idiographic approaches in psychology outlined by people like Adler (1931), Allport (1962), Rogers (1951), Rosenzweig (1953, 1956), Snygg and Combs (1949) and Stephenson (1953, 1961). As Brunswik (1955) Holt (1962) and O'Connell (1956) point out, the emphasis in idiographic psychology is on understanding the individual per se. The revised definition of experimental psychology still seeks a degree of control and predictability as opposed to understanding.
This revised approach has received considerable attention from therapeutically-orientated psychologists and here we shall discuss the work of Arnold Lazarus and other "eclectic" psychologists together with cognitive therapy approaches as representative of this interest.

**Technical eclecticism.** The work of Lazarus, himself a guiding light in the development of behaviour therapy (Wolpe and Lazarus, 1966), provides an excellent example of the shift in emphasis of the modified naturalistic orientation.

Lazarus admits that in his early work he employed "subjective techniques such as insight, support, guidance, etc., when they seemed warranted (Carole Abramovitz, 1970, p.256)" and that these techniques were overlooked because his attention was directed to S-R interpretations. Only later was he able to appreciate the influence of his own effects on the situation.

Commenting on his new awareness, Lazarus asks "Can a practising psychotherapist afford to ignore any effective technique, regardless of its theoretical origins? (1967, p.415)". In reply he adds "the consequence of adhering to a particular school of thought is to exclude from one's armamentarium a significant range of effective procedures".

The important point, for Lazarus, is that the patient in therapy has to be cured. Consequently, the treatment is
structured around the particular patient's level of functioning. As Lazarus puts it;

... those who practice psychotherapy ... should be trained to (a) rapidly identify the patient's basic problems, (b) determine the seemingly best way for that individual of dispelling these problems, and (c) skilfully apply the necessary procedures or make the appropriate outside referral(s)"

(1971, chapter three 1)

Similar ideas can be found expressed by Marks and Gelder, therapists of similar persuasion to Lazarus. Gelder for example writes:

An initial psychiatric assessment of phobic patients is essential, because it differentiates the patients with more isolated phobias, who will do well with behaviour therapy, from those with free floating anxiety, underlying depression

1 Owing to the non-availability in this country of Lazarus' new book at the time of writing, I have been unable to identify page numbers. The quotations are however taken from a draft of the book that was made available by Arnold Abramovitz.
and so on, who will not. The psychiatric assessment must be combined with a psychodynamic assessment to determine the place of the symptom in the patient's mental economy.

(1968, p. 315)

while Marks states:

The same piece of behaviour may have different significance in different situations. It may be unassociated with other clinical phenomena or it may be part of some complex psychopathology. In the former situation behaviour therapy, and in the latter psychodynamic therapy, is appropriate. If we overextrapolate by taking everything to the extreme we may lose the value of any new technique by applying it to all patients, for some of whom it is completely inappropriate.

(1968, p.315)

Thus far we can see a real appreciation of the value problem in that the authors seem to be aware of the fact that no one orientation can provide all the answers and that they, as therapists, do have a considerable role to play both in the
outcome of therapy and in the very conceptualization of therapy.

However, there are certain limitations imposed on this "freedom" particularly by Lazarus. He writes;

> While the basic point ... is a plea for psychotherapists to try several effective techniques ... it is nevertheless assumed that any selected manoeuvre will at least have the benefit of empirical support.

(1967, p.416)

And this is important. He is concerned with therapeutic success and yet still intends remaining within the empirical framework (Lazarus 1968a, 1968c).

Technicians, be they physicians, surgeons, or psychotherapists, should operate rigorously, making as much use as possible of applied scientific principles, but without forgetting that their function is to alleviate suffering rather than to advance knowledge or satisfy their own curiosities.

(1968b, p.48)

This in short is the limit accepted by Lazarus and his associates. He is prepared to use techniques that work, but only empirically verifiable techniques: much in the same manner as Skinner (1955) describes the collection of
empirical facts, so Lazarus advocates the collection of empirical techniques.

Once we have become aware of these limits then we can see that critics of this position, for example Eysenck (1969) and Maultsby (1968a, 1968b) take a radical approach to matters scientific and fail to appreciate the wide range of both philosophical and psychological support for this modified view of therapeutic action.

The important thing to bear in mind is that whilst an empirical framework is retained, the status of the observer or therapist receives increased importance. His effect on the interaction is registered in the fact that the therapist has to decide which of several techniques are most suitable for the particular individual's problem.

What emerges from these considerations is a value orientation, still empirical in nature, but in which particular individuals, each with a unique configuration of identifiable "illness patterns" present for treatment. Treatment consists of fitting the therapist's interpreting of the individual's symptomatic pattern within an existing pattern of therapeutic techniques. One presumes that as empirical techniques grow, so, slowly but surely, will all, or most, aspects of mental ill-health be covered such that at some desirable stage in the future, techniques will exist literally for the treatment of all disorders.
Some of my own objections to this programme are contained in a critical assessment published this year (Lambley, 1971). There I drew attention to the obvious empirical a priori residue found in Lazarus' approach, and argued that this axiom has not been given enough attention since;

If we take as the main concern of the psychotherapist the recovery of his patient then, as Lazarus has pointed out, how the therapist achieves this is relatively unimportant - he can be as eclectic as he likes. Now this leads to two major points. First, should there be any limit set on the types of techniques used? Epistemologically, if we grant that no technique or data can be said to exist a priori and if we grant that existing techniques and theories are relative in that they are perspectives, ways of looking at reality, then we must also grant that other techniques such as the numerous existentialist ones (Pervin, 1960) and the Zen therapies (Maupin, 1962) have as valid a claim to be techniques as desensitization, relaxation therapy, and so on. The
point being that insisting on only empirically acceptable techniques is asserting one point of view as being superior to others. There is no logical reason why this should be so since the only criterion (therapeutically) of interest is that the patient be treated successfully (London, 1964).

(Pp. 93-94)

The second point that I raised in the paper concerned - as it does here - the value position put forward, that is, what direction does therapy take? Therapists like Lazarus seem to operate with a goal, albeit an implied one, of a socially and emotionally well-adjusted personality. ¹ Equally, responsibility for the direction taken in therapy rests on the judgment of the therapist;

... the behavior therapist rapidly gains insight into his patient and uses his insight to change

¹ Hunt (1968) for example writes that

... behaviour therapy assumes that an organism only retains behavior that is somehow satisfying, favors only that behavior which maximises satisfaction, and works persistently and cleverly toward that end no matter what we do.

(p. 260)
the patient's behaviour. The patient, in turn, may not gain much insight about himself but fundamental changes in his behaviour will persist and spread.

(Lazarus, in Porter, 1968, p.325)

Certainly we can accept that the therapist imparts a value in the situation, but it is apparent that his vision is only as good as the techniques that he is prepared to use. Following the above argument, this is an act which would curtail values unacceptable to the eclectic therapist but which may have value for the improvement of the patient (Lambley, 1971b).

Cognitive therapy. If, for discussion purposes, we accept that the modified naturalistic approach involves a shift away from behavioural data towards the use of inferred constructs, then cognitive therapy is the most far removed from the radical approach. Cognitive therapy involves, usually, the therapist working with an inferred concept and often advocates some sort of growth or re-orientation of this concept as a criterion of successful therapeutic action.

Clearly almost any approach that is not explicitly behavioural can be considered a cognitive one but we are here concerned more with naturalistic theories of therapy.

1 See also Bandura (1968) and Marks (1968).
To facilitate discussion recent work by Breger (1968), Breger and McGaugh (1965, 1966) by Beck (1963, 1967, 1970a, 1970b) and by Ellis (1957, 1958, 1962) will be cited to give some idea of naturalistic cognitive therapy and its value orientation.

To begin with, Beck (1970) defines cognitive therapy as follows:

... any technique whose major mode of action is the modification of faulty patterns of thinking can be regarded as cognitive therapy. This definition embraces all therapeutic operations that indirectly affect the cognitive patterns, as well as those that directly affect them ... An individual's distorted view of himself and his world, for example, may be connected through insight into the historical antecedents of his, misinterpretations (as in dynamic psychotherapy), through greater congruence between the concept of self and the ideal (as in Rogerian therapy) and through increasingly sharp recognition of the unreality of fears (as in systematic desensitization).

(1970, p. 187)
More specifically;

... cognitive therapy may be defined more narrowly as a set of operations focussed on a patient's cognitions (verbal or pictorial), and on the premises, assumptions, and attitudes underlying these cognitions.

(1970, p. 187)

Beck, in contrast to Breger, cites the work of Ellis (1956, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1970) as representative of cognitive therapy. Beck and Ellis distinguish between primitive and mature cognitive structures (a distinction which corresponds closely to Freud's primary and secondary processes) whereby;

Many of the primitive concepts are idiosyncratic and unrealistic ... Peculiar or irrational cognitions emanating from the primitive system are generally tested, authenticated, and rejected by higher centers.

(Beck, 1970b, p. 194)

When, for some reason overall cognition organization is dis-orientated, then these "primitive" cognitions exert considerable directive functioning over the behaviour of the system as a whole. "In such circumstances, the conceptual systems grind out a powerful stream of depressing, frightening, or paranoid thoughts (Beck, p.194)". As Ellis puts it;
A large part of what we call emotion, is nothing more or less than a certain kind—a biased, prejudiced, or strongly evaluative kind-of-thinking. What we usually label as thinking is a relatively calm and dispassionate appraisal (or organized perception) of a given situation.

(1958, p.36)

The cognitive therapist's task is then one of the cognitive therapist returning the patient to a more "rational" or "logical" mode of thinking within the particular area in which deficiency has occurred. Beck lists four major examples of cognitive inconsistencies:

Arbitrary inference refers to the process of drawing a conclusion when evidence is lacking or is actually contrary to the conclusion ... Overgeneralization refers to the process of making an unjustified generalization on the basis of a single incident ...

Magnification refers to the propensity to exaggerate the meaning or significance of a particular event ... cognitive deficiency refers to the disregard for an important aspect of a life situation.

(1970b, 190-191)
Closely related to these patterns of inconsistency is the general value orientation of these authors. Ellis, for example, devotes his therapy to helping his patients "to be less illogical, less neurotic (1958, p.38)". He adds;

... the therapist serves as a frank counter-propagandist who directly contradicts and denies the self-defeating propaganda and superstitions which the client has originally learned and which he is now self-propagandistically perpetuating ...

cognitive therapy is consciously performed with one main goal in mind:

namely that of getting the client to internalize a rational philosophy of living.

(Pp. 44-45)

The other example of the cognitive approach to therapy is that of Breger and McEachern and their associates, (Breger, 1968). Here, cognitive is defined slightly differently in terms of information storage and retrieval;

Learning is viewed as the process by which information about the environment is acquired, stored, and categorized.

This cognitive view, is of course, quite contrary to the view that learning consists ...
of the acquisition of specific responses; responses according to our view, are mediated by the nature of the stored information, which may consist of facts or of strategies or programmes analogous to the grammar that is acquired in the learning of a language.

(Breger and McGaugh, 1965, p. 355)

Breger and McGaugh conceptualize neurosis as follows:

... what is learned in a neurosis is a set of central strategies (or a programme) which guide the individual's adaptation to his environment. Neuroses are not symptoms (responses) but are strategies of a particular kind which lead to certain observables (tics, compulsive acts, etc.) and certain other less observable, phenomena (fears, feelings of depression, etc.)

(p. 355)

They make the following suggestions regarding psychotherapeutic programmes,

First, a careful study should be done to delineate the neurotic language; both its vocabulary and its grammar, of the individual.
Then a situation might be constructed ... in which the individual's existing neurotic language is not understood and in which the individual must develop a new 'language', a new set of central strategies, in order to be understood.

(p. 356)

The important point to be borne in mind in both these examples of the cognitive view is the central, mediatory role played by cognitive or conscious constructs (Roberts, 1967; Spielberger, 1965).

There have been a number of criticisms levelled at the cognitive approach to therapy. These have stemmed in the main from the lack of clarity regarding the referent of the term "cognitive" (Rachman and Eysenck, 1966; Ullman, 1970; Wiest, 1967). Other writers have welcomed the use, however, of such mediatory concepts (Bandura, 1969; Bergin, 1970; Davidson, 1968).

There has, however, been little appreciation of the approach adopted by cognitivists towards the value problem and this seems to be simply a result of the cognitivist's non-concern with the problem. We get, for example, concern with inferred entities but cognitivists in general seem to have forgotten why there arose a demand for these constructs. Clearly, as has been shown, the effect of the observer-therapist on the empirical situation was a major reason for the advancement of
these constructs, yet it could appear that only Lazarus and his associates have shown any awareness of this problem. ¹

By way of example consider the direction or goal to be taken in therapy. We have to accept statements by cognitivists (Ellis, 1962, 1970 for instance) to the effect that mental health is "rational" or "logical" or "successful adaptation". Yet how is this "logical" new language derived and why is it different to the equally "logical" (one presumes) language of radical behaviourists?

What is lacking is an awareness of the role of the "rational" therapist in the process of therapy and, more fundamentally, awareness of the value problem. Without this awareness, the status of cognitive therapy remains comparable to the radicals denial of the existence of the problem: the cognitivist in other words maintains that his orientation, his view of human functioning, is the correct one.

CONCLUDING EVALUATION

We are in a position now to make certain statements about naturalistic value orientations without being accused of neglecting important new developments in these orientations. ¹

¹ Tom Kraft, for example, writes "My own view is that the therapist himself plays a central role in the treatment process, whether this is behaviour-orientated or not (Personal communication, August 11, 1971)".
It will be remembered that our task is to elicit the general approach of each orientation to the value problem outlined earlier and in this respect we can draw the following conclusion: in so far as the radical position is concerned, the value problem is of little or no concern. In so far as the modified orientation is concerned the problem is important but it is a problem to be overcome by the application of scientific principles: in short by explicating values as far as possible.

In therapeutic terms we can see that Lazarus envisages a net of empirically-validated techniques for each and every disorder and we can see that the cognitivists rely on the development of a cognitive-rational non-neurotic language.

Now, the one over-riding contention that emerges from this conclusion is that where values enter into therapy, they are to be explicated. This fact is implied I think by most of the authors of the modified naturalistic orientation and certainly it appears that they would probably agree to it if asked (Kraft, 1971). Unfortunately we have to turn to more theoretically-orientated authors for a more detailed treatment of this problem, but this — in terms of this thesis' expressed desire to interrelate theory and practice — is no real problem. What is important is that this penultimate approach to the value problem be examined.
That this is the most relevant single orientation can be seen clearly in the work of Ellis and Hitt (1967) where emphasis is put on the growth of reason. Equally, as London (1964) points out, where inferred entities are posited some kind of growth in consciousness is advocated as a sign of mental health. Growth in consciousness may be of a qualitative kind but more importantly it can mean a growth in knowledge of variables that enter into therapy. In this sense explication is clearly analogous to growth in consciousness: by knowing all the values (variables) that operate in therapeutic activity, full, complete knowledge is possible.

This emphasis on explication receives its most sophisticated treatment from Kessel (1969) and McClure and Tyler (1967a, 1967b). Kessel makes it clear not only in his article but in personal correspondence (July 1970) that whilst he accepts into scientific discourse, personal values, these present no real problem provided they are explicated: thus invoking the image of a growth in awareness which can be seen to tend towards a finite epistemology in which all values are, logically, identified. Naturally enough under these conditions the value problem disappears.

This point can be made clearer by considering the two articles of McClure and Tyler. The authors argue that the process of scientific exposition demands a number of decisions,
most of these directed to obtaining accuracy. Some of these decisions include decisions over good planning (control), sampling, precision, and what constitutes acceptable data:

It is, the author's wish to argue, a necessary characteristic of all policy decisions that they ultimately employ some criterion of value as an essential factor in the decision ...
A policy decision always involves considerations of purpose, goal, or aim: the purposes of the decision maker himself or of his organization, his discipline, his nation, and so on.

(1967a, p. 73)

From this and from the work of Irwin (1958, 1961) they conclude that every statement of fact is made on the basis of and as a result of a statement of value and vice versa. They point out that one way of showing why this is so is because "it is not possible to give a complete account of man's valuings without considering him as discriminating states of affairs (1967a, p. 78)". The valuer must, in short, be able "to recognize, distinguish, or discriminate (something) in his surroundings (1967b, p. 218)".

More specifically, the authors argue as follows:

An individual's preferences, at any given period, will depend partially, though
importantly, upon a host of 'factual',
as opposed to valuational matters. The
way the world is viewed by his culture
and his own history in sizing up the
'facts' will guide his discriminations
of what the situation of the moment
is (as well, of course, as his eval-
uations of the situation once he has 'decided'
what it is) ... preferences are exhibited
only in a context of successful
discriminations of the relevant out-
comes and of the circumstances on
which these outcomes are contingent. Any
statement of the general form 'prefers X
over Y' rests necessarily upon other
propositions about the capability of A to
discriminate the relevant contingencies and
outcomes. If these other propositions have
'not been justified' or at least recognized
explicitly as assumptions, then the preference-
claim has no point.

(1967b, Pp. 219-220)

Thus far, the most succinct statement of the value problem.
Clearly, for the authors this problem emerges when one seeks
some sort of certainty regarding either the nature of facts
or of value: The assumption that some fact (that is, a discriminating state of affairs) must be assumed for the existence of a value judgment is clearly indicative of the author's belief in a relational epistemology whereby there are two components of an act of knowledge - the knower and the known.

The problem as phrased by McClure and Tyler (and, of course, by these value orientations in general) can be seen to revolve around the search for common criteria in knowing. If such criteria could be established they would be definition, have to be value-free and independent to the values of the knowers. Yet this, so McClure and Tyler argue, cannot be so. How then do they escape from the dilemma?

The solution offered is a simple one and involves the recognition of two assumptions. Firstly, they argue that "since science has been proceeding on its way without severe difficulty (1967a, p.80)" therefore "the procedure may be carried on indefinitely (p.81)";

... the only standard for "success" being the adequacy of the knowledge thus discovered to the purpose of the enterprise of the day - in other words, a pragmatic standard.

(p. 81)
The second assumption concerns their own pragmatic suggestions; At some stage in research or therapy or counselling, a judgment, must be made as to which of several value alternatives would be the proper or best choice ... or which of the client's values or society's values is the one that ought to be saved. ... one probes for the fact-claims that are presupposed by the values; and having discovered them, one attempts, as a first step, the critical scrutiny of these fact-claims.

(p.82)

One can then point up to other facts and their accompanying values but this by no means "solves" the value problem, as the authors readily admit;

The procedural assumption that remains as an anchor in the otherwise circular process we have described can perhaps be called "procedural control"—control in the broadest experimental sense: i.e. knowledge of the limits, assumptions, characteristics, and defects of the particular procedure one is following at the moment, and of the general system within which one operates. (p.84)
further this procedural control;

... implies ... that one is aware of the variables involved in the logical construction of (one's) ... experiment.

... Value criteria are, as we have argued, found among the assumptions of any experiment. Maintaining control means knowing explicitly that these value criteria are assumed in one's test. Procedural control is a refinement, then, of the ordinary idea of knowing what you are doing.

(p.84)

They do no present this as a new thesis, but merely argue that it is this basic tenet that has always been tacitly assumed in science and has kept the value circle from turning on itself. In a sense what is proposed is a dialectic whereby from within an explicit system, including the explicit awareness of the implied, there is always movement left such that the system can be criticized. In the words of the authors; "There must always be some appeal to a further - an outside, extra systemic-criterion. (1967a, p.81)".

Clearly what the authors have in mind is the growth of knowledge albeit a continuous, never-ending growth. This
growth is attained by relying on pragmatic considerations and
by the explication of the values of respective investigations.

What we have to ask is, "Is this a suitable answer to the
value problem?" I think the answer is no, and for two
reasons. Firstly, as has been argued, how is it possible to
reconcile the duality of fact and value with the denial that
is implied in an approach that demands the explication of
values? Surely if such an explication occurs then these values
assume the status of fact, that is, identifiable aspects of
the experimental situation and thus no longer values. Equally,
through constant explication, knowledge of experimental action
would tend to be finite, that is, completely known. Again,
values would disappear.  

The second reason concerns the "extra-systemic-criteria"
involved in their theory. This is obviously a kind of scientific
ethos which is an implied component of scientific activity and
can be said to operate independently to this action. Thus if I
explicate the values that I felt operated in a piece of research
then, so McClure and Tyler argue, another researcher would be able
to more realistically evaluate my research. What is involved
here is the process of science which, it is assumed, tends to
remove extraneous bias (values) and so preserve the core that is

1 Interestingly enough the authors refrain from defining the term
"values" preferring to note that when they use the term they mean
what everybody else means. In terms of the above criticism this
is unacceptable since their final solution is vague and clearly
avoids specifying the nature of their explicated state.
reality.

If such an ethos does operate the epistemological problem of how the resulting reality "core" is conveyed to individuals remains. How can psychologists be sure that any one individual's statement of what this core is is in fact so? Once again the value problem emerges as we are returned to the state of conflicting views of reality. This is concealed by McClure and Tyler's assumptions that explication of values and the process of science will solve the problem; examination of these assumptions leads straight back to our central problem.

All of this is an example of what Wann and Walker (1961) call "conceptual uncertainty" whereby one can not speak of successive approximations to 'reality' unless one has prior knowledge of the position of the target ... This is to say that not only does the relative nature of our concepts render us impotent, but that the tools of investigation, be they observation, experimentation, or instrumentation, also are confounding our indices of a real world ... Recognition that no experimental result can be interpreted as giving information about independent properties of the objects of enquiry should lead us to see that methods and what methods contribute to results are as much objects of inquiry as the data they provide.

(Pp. 386-388)
The common feature of naturalistic orientations lies in the attempts made to remove this "impotence" (Whittaker, 1949, and to present, in fact "reality"); be it an experimental or therapeutic "reality": the value problem then resolves itself into a straightforward case of applying some acceptable criteria (such as scientific explication, reason, etc.) whereby the problem is removed from the network of the individual psychologists' responsibility, to a generalized ethic which is assumed to preserve the system from human error, or other failings.

Little need be said in the case of the radical point of view since as has been clearly stated already, there is only one acceptable ethic. And much the same can be said of the less extreme formulations, technical eclecticism and cognitive therapy: as we have seen, these system values are grounded in such formulations as a generalized empiricism, or rationality.

At this stage, having looked at one set of orientations' attempt to cope with the value problem, we can see that the problem still remains intact. Reference is made continually by writers to the authority of some classification system which assumes almost total importance such that one would think that psychologists have never thought beyond their paradigms to appreciate the arbitrary nature of their authority.
The point I am making here is not that these orientations fail to describe "reality" adequately but that they claim authority for so doing and condemn other systems as being unrealistic. There is, clearly a failure on the part of individual psychologists to question the limits set by orientations. In short;

...we have to get back to all aspects of the investigating act. But by doing this it does not necessarily follow that there exists an investigating reality that can be known: we must beware of resolving Cartesian-like problems ... and repeating the same mistake.

Obviously an act is not a discrete act, it is an act, in context both of other acts, and other thoughts, all of which are of fundamental importance to an awareness of the meaning of the act... But once we have all this information we have to perform another operation ... we have to take note of the many assumptions that we, as investigators, have made in our own assessment of the situation and we have to appreciate that we are unable to remove the effect that we have on the subject matter. (Lambley, 1970a, Pp.232-233)

It is this second, all important, step that is missing from the naturalistic orientations.
SECTION B : 2. EXISTENTIAL - HUMANISTIC VALUE ORIENTATIONS
Whilst Lowe's description (1959) of the humanistic orientation contains a succinct statement of the views of some humanistic psychologists, it can by no means be said to correctly describe the various shades of opinion found in the general existential-humanistic framework. The term "humanistic" is too narrow for the purposes of this treatise and our outline will concentrate not only on "Third Force" psychology (Bugental, 1967) but on the various existential schools that bear many resemblances to the general characteristics suggested by Lowe.

The task becomes one of identifying the major themes of the existential-humanistic orientations as they have developed in the last decade or so. To begin with, let us first consider a number of articles that have attempted such an identification. A short article by Pervin (1962) identifies two broad trends in existential psychology. These he terms "Existential Analysis" and "logotherapy," the first derived from the writings of Binswanger and represented by May et al. (1958), the second being Victor Frankl's work (1955, 1958). It must be noted that these are trends more closely tied to psychotherapy than was found in the naturalistic orientation but this has been the area in which the existential-humanistic framework has developed.

Pervin points out that whilst existentialism is a "European creation" there nevertheless have been many American
writers who have participated in extending its influence to psychology in general; "The theory of Carl Rogers, for example, is phenomenological in character and stresses the individual and self-realization. Also, the psychology of George Kelly corresponds, in part, to the 'existential view' (Pervin, p. 306)."

Pervin points out that the first of the two trends - existential analysis - involves "The belief ... that the individual reveals himself through his world-project or world-design. (p. 306) "and by analyzing phenomenologically this design into three basic "modes of Being" - the Umwelt, the Mitwelt, and the Eigenwelt, the Being of the individual can be characterized. Related to this are various conceptions of normality that are derived from the nature of this Being;

According to Tillich in the neurotic the self which is affirmed is a reduced one and some or many of its potentialities are not admitted to actualization. From Kierkegaard's view the neuroses and psychoses would be accompanied by a loss of self, an inner alienation. Jaspers views the psychotic as one who has lost his own existence and so has lost the existence of reality. (Pervin, p. 307)

The second trend - logotherapy - is distinguished from the above in that whilst Frankl agrees that man lives in three
dimensions, the somatic, the psychic and the spiritual, (similar to the tripartite spheres noted above) the goals of his therapy include individuals becoming "what they are capable of becoming," writes Pervin, "the therapist tries to bring out the ultimate possibilities of the patients, to enable them to find meaning in existence (p. 308)."

Writers other than Pervin have made similar distinctions between opposing "schools". Schindler (1968) for example gives a fairly intensive treatment of two existentially-orientated psychologies; the one he calls "Daseinsanalytic Procedure and Thought", the other "Logotherapy and the third Viennese School of Psychotherapy." Prem Nath (1963) in a paper entitled "Existential trends in American psychology" stresses the diffuse nature of existential psychology;

Existential Psychology is not only a reaction against Behaviourism and Psychoanalysis but is simultaneously an indictment of the generality of American Culture which is allegedly tending to be ever more conformist and in which the individual is being crushed under the heavy weight of technology and huge business corporations. In a situation of such a cultural crisis it aims at the rediscovery of man by rescuing him from the external forces, thus making him conscious of his lost freedom and of a large number of dormant potentialities. (p. 125)
For these reasons, he points out, it is difficult today to isolate the various determinants of the general existential-humanistic orientation, a point echoed by Dufrenne (1965) who wrote "... to speak of Existentialism means something, but everyone of the so-called Existentialists treads now his own path in his own direction (p.51)".

Whilst it is possible, to a certain extent, to talk of themes, the main feature of existential and humanistic psychology is its diversity, and trying to discuss one example as representative of the whole is cumbersome. An example of such a treatment is Lyons (1961), who whilst presenting many telling points of criticism against "existential psychotherapy", considered only the works of a small sample - Binswanger (1957), May et al (1958) together with the writings of people like Van Dusen (1957).

Naturally, whilst one can accept that every writer takes a different approach regarding his particular brand of psychology, it is imperative that a treatment be given here that as far as possible captures the value structures of various poles that can be identified in the orientation. In Nath's article one gets the intermingling of ideas from people such as Allport, Maslow, Frankl and May whilst in Lyons reference is mainly kept to existentialistic philosophers such as Heidegger and analysts such as Boss all of whom fit in to this orientation. In order to preserve the divergences then, three major poles will be discussed; 'Third Force' psychology, logotherapy and existential analysis.
However, before this can be done a brief historical overview is required. This is doubly important, for each of the three orientations to be considered is closely related to phenomenology, and an understanding of the existential—humanistic orientation would be impossible without attention being first given to phenomenology.  

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT AND EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY.

Often cited as the first real existentialists, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche hold a prominent position in the history of existential philosophy. There is so much to the writings of both these men that one can (as with Marx or Hegel) literally take any position and discover that the authors had expressed a view about it. But within the framework of existential psychology Kierkegaard is best known for his re-instatement of individualism as an important component of epistemology. Kierkegaard devoted his life to the refutation of Hegelian systematic philosophy. This system, amongst other things and according to Kierkegaard, placed man within a framework in which he, man, was only a part, a simple movement, in the direction of the totality:  

1 This section is of necessity longer and in more depth than that of the naturalistic orientation. The reason for this is because the theory that follows draws primarily on existential—humanistic insights.
The system, so it is said, begins with the immediate, ... and hence without any presuppositions and hence absolutely; the beginning of the System is an absolute beginning.

(Kierkegaard, 1944, p.101)

Kierkegaard attempted to refute absolutist tendencies found not only in Hegelian-like systems but also in Christian ethics in which the existence of the individual was relegated to second place - the power of the Ethic predominating.

To appreciate the nature of Kierkegaard's writings one has to appreciate his attack against the dogmatism embodied in the above quotation. For Kierkegaard the beginning is all important since with it the role of the individual person is established;

*How does the System begin with the immediate?*

That is to say does it begin with it immediately?

The answer to this question must be an unconditional negative. If the System is presumed to come after existence, by which a confusion with an existential system may be occasioned, then the System is of course ex post facto and so does not begin immediately with the immediacy with which existence began; although in another sense it may be said that existence did not begin with the immediate, since the immediate never is as such, but is
transcended as soon as it is. The beginning which begins with the immediate is thus itself reached by means of a process of reflection".

(1944, Pp. 101-102)

Kierkegaard suggests that rather than man proceeding through his allotted time span moving from one stage to the next automatically, man passes through life's stages (Kierkegaard, 1941) by being involved in an act of reflection, that is, of choice.

Turning the Hegelian dialectic around, Kierkegaard argues that man begins with himself, with his own personal existence, his feelings, his emotions, his problems - that is, his own being. It is through reflecting on this a priori Being that the individual is able to choose his own life path. In the words of Harper (1948) "Kierkegaard's aim (at least at the outset) was to tear individuals out of their empty, pretentious, commonplace lives and force them to become self-conscious (p.13)."

Developing his own dialectic, Kierkegaard attempted to contrast two aspects of existence;

Two ways, in general, are open for an existing individual: Either he can do his utmost to forget that he is an existing individual, by which he becomes a comic figure, since

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existence has the remarkable trait of compelling an existing individual to exist whether he will it or not ...

Or he can concentrate his entire energy upon the fact that he is an existing individual. (1944, p.109)

Writing of the former he distinguished two parts; the initial which he characterized as the Aesthetic stage marked by a cynical non-involvement in life. The Aesthete does not in any way commit himself to life or to his own choice of life, but contents himself with experiencing in a romantic, non-synthetic way. The second stage is the Moral or Ethical stage whereby the individual sees himself as being subservient to a universal, general ethic. One can see here the beginnings of the identity problem which recurs so often in Sartre's writings, namely the problem of the person who seeks his identity as a thing in which his own unique identity is submerged: he is not thus a unique, independent individual but merely an agent of the System.

Kierkegaard's own solution to this dilemma, is based not on a theoretical nor romantic solution, but on an existing, experiential act of choice whereby the individual makes a "Leap of faith" to a state in which he confronts the Absolute,
God; not as a subordinate being but as a fully aware individual in direct communication with the Absolute.

This Christian existentialism does not deny the ordinary claims of Christianity, a position claimed by Kuhn (1949), but places the individual squarely at the beginning of commitment.

Kierkegaard claimed that this final act invoked a degree of anxiety in that the choice was something requiring a great deal of resolve. To choose oneself presented both an attraction and a repellant (Kierkegaard, 1954). Anxiety emerged when the individual became aware of the need for personal involvement and commitment; one had to have faith in the end to complete it.

From the vantage of hindsight Rollo May notes (1958);

'Here is, in Kierkegaard ..., the forerunner of relativity and the other viewpoints which affirm that the human being who is engaged in studying the natural phenomena is in a particular and significant relationship to the objects studied and he must make himself part of his equation. That is to say, the subject, man, can never be separated from the object which he observes.'

(p. 26).

In terms of relevance for the existential psychological orientation, May has succinctly stated the essential core of Kierkegaard's argument, in that the ultimate step is a leap to
not only a subjective truth but also an objective truth (the Absolute):

It (the Kierkegaardian argument) opens up the vast province of inner, subjective reality and indicates that such reality may be true even though it contradicts objective fact.

(1958, p.26)¹

One can hold that the epistemological burden is now thrown not on a System that is responsible for knowledge but on an individual's own committed Leap. The issue here is how does the individual know when his leap is accomplished? Is he alone the arbiter and, more importantly, has he the right to dictate - as Kierkegaard has, albeit somewhat mildly - that the Leap (a generalization perhaps?) is the better stage, that is, than the other two, even if this Leap is only defined in terms of a style of action.

¹ A word is in order here, related to the above, regarding May's interpretation of the significance of Kierkegaard. It is common knowledge that May's book "Existence" has shaped many psychologist's beliefs about existential psychology, yet one feels that May uses Kierkegaard's words to attain his own ends. One feels for example that Kierkegaard would not have implied that "Truth becomes reality only as the individual produces it in action ... (May, 1958, p.28)" in the sense that truth is awaiting discovery. One feels rather that Kierkegaard would place a more conservative interpretation on this.
By style, incidentally, is meant that an element of subjectivity or free variance is introduced. In short Kierkegaard is not instructing the individual where to jump, merely how to jump.

However in terms of our problem of value, we can regard this last point as a value and see that the problem of how one knows when one has achieved this value is relevant to Kierkegaard.

A second figure, Nietzsche, has often been regarded with Kierkegaard as one of the major figures in the development of existential philosophy (Jaspers, 1956). Nietzsche's contribution to this development lies in his emphasis on what one writer has termed the more negative aspects of existentialism (Kuhn, 1949):

Nietzsche dispensed with the notion of a God, something not even Kierkegaard felt he could do. Nietzsche directed his attacks against interpretations of reality as being a rational, organised, coherent process and he propounded the idea of an underlying "reality" which he felt was the opposite of such coherence.

Nietzsche saw the need for the individual to be aware or self-conscious of his role in the process of life. Additionally, as Kaufmann (1956) points out, Nietzsche endeavoured to develop a form of actualization whereby the individual becomes an integrated unfragmented personal reality. The person in the world for Nietzsche has therefore, the task of orientating himself to his world in terms of the position or perspective that he holds in
the world. Schmitt (1961) suggests that the famous "will-to-power" is not a cosmological drive (Kauffman, 1950) but is in fact the willingness of the individual to establish his own perspective.

At this point one can see that existentialistic ideas popularized by such American writers as May and Maslow, had been laid down by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Indeed, it can be argued that existential ideas have long been current in philosophy, even before the nineteenth century. One finds for example Descartes writing in the Second Meditation:

The first (rule) was never to accept anything as true that I did not know to be evidently so: that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to induce in my judgments nothing more than what presented itself so clearly and so distinctly to my mind that I might have no occasion to place it in doubt.

(1968, p.41)

It is not a new idea that the individual searcher is himself involved in that which is found. But what the existentialists Kierkegaard and Nietzsche felt strongly about was the loss of personal involvement in theories which may have begun with the individual but ended without him. However this is not the place...
for an historic overview of the long history of this conception; we continue the discussion with the work of Husserl. For it was Husserl, who attempted to base the above philosophical ideas in a subjective empiricism. Husserl, who received training in mathematics that remained an influence in all of his work, was to a large extent influenced by Franz Brentano who in 1874 published *Psychologie von empirischen Standpunkt*. In this work Brentano attempted to distinguish between mental and physical phenomena;

Every presentation of sensation or imagination offers an example of the mental phenomenon; and here I understand by presentation not that which is presented, but the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a coloured object, sensing warm or cold, and the comparable states of imagination as well are examples of what I mean ... Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are a colour, a shape, a landscape, which I see.

(Brentano, 1962, p.41)

In other words "All physical phenomena ... manifest extension and definite spatial location ... The opposite,
however, is true of mental phenomena; thinking, willing and so on, appear as unextended and without a situation in space (p.47)."

In order to integrate these two classes of data he developed the notion of an "intentional inexistence" which is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything similar (p.50)."

Briefly this distinction can be expressed as follows; "Whenever we think, we think about some object; whenever we believe, there is something we believe (Chisholm, 1962, p.4)."

Following the thread of continuity from Kierkegaard we can see that Brentano attempts systematization of the basic relationship espoused by Kierkegaard, namely the interrelationship between subject and object. The difference being that Brentano was concerned with the more immediate aspects of phenomenal experience in accordance with the intellectual Zeitgeist of his time which was replete with attempts to ground large systems in terms of experiential and experimental exigencies (Erikson, 1967; Spiegelberg, 1960).

Returning to Husserl it is necessary to point out that his thought underwent certain changes from time to time and, whilst many books dealing with Husserl's phenomenology stress the overall system (for example Lauer, 1965, or Thevenaz, 1962), the most all-inclusive accounts are given by Spiegelberg (1960), Olafson (1967) and Kockelmans (1967). The following discussion...
draws mainly on the latter.

Husserl's earlier phases (pre-1894) are of little importance to us here. They were marked however by attempts to interrelate the consistent and unchangeable nature of logic with the vacillation of human action;

For as soon as we make logical laws depend on psychological characteristics of human thinkers, we make them also relative to these thinkers and consequently make man in all his instability the measure of everything. And to Husserl relativism is a self-defeating position ... (Spiegelberg, 1960, p.94)

At this time Husserl fits into the rationalistic tradition in that he emphasized the neutrality of logical formulations and their independence to human action.

However between the years 1894 and 1900 his thought appeared to shift towards a more tolerant position in which some interrelation between the human observer and logic was entertained. As Spiegelberg remarks;

What Husserl wanted was a descriptive study of the process in which the entities studied in pure logic are presented ... Husserl's intent was a description of the ideal types of logical ... experience corresponding to the ideal laws.

(Spiegelberg, 1960, p.102)
Husserl sought a means of relating an ideal logical system to the perceiving mind of the human observer. As Kocklemans puts it;

Although an ideal being acquires form and unity in consciousness, it, nevertheless, retains an independent being or a being-in-itself. Psychological considerations can never totally account radically for these ideal beings.

(1967, p.90)

What Husserl seems to have been offering at this stage was a form of parallelism between the act of confrontation with the ideal logical system (the noetic aspect) and the content of such an act (the noematic aspect). The similarity here between this form of phenomenology and phenomenalism is apparent; both involve some basic action which establishes the relationship between the knower and the known (the universal quasi-independent system). As Olafson (1967) has pointed out, Husserl's was an early form of correspondence theory.

The aspect of Husserl's work that is of interest to us here is his expansion of the above idea into a full phenomenological system. In the initial phases Husserl began by talking about the different ways one could create meaning about the same referent, that is "Multiple acts of meaning and the one ideal meaning to which they all point: this identical meaning is to Husserl..."
an ideal entity, not only a psychological datum (Spiegelberg, 1960, p.105)". This concept led onto the notion of universals which dealt with the problem of the **essences** of conscious reality.

Briefly, Husserl, following Bergson and Stumpf (Boring, 1957), posited, as it were, a stream of consciousness which served to furnish raw data. Acts such as thinking, loving, etc. were essentially the structuring actions of the subject. It is this intentionality that provided the means "by which the various aspects, perspectives, and stages of an object are all focussed upon, and integrated into, identical cores (Spiegelberg, p.109)".

Clearly, as Olafson (1967) points out, there enters here a value element since a distinction is assumed between "adequate and inadequate apprehension of these essences (p.64)" or cores.

Husserl had to provide a method whereby such an adequate apprehension of essences could be obtained and this method goes under the general term "reduction".

His reduction process was in opposition to that of the phenomenalistic sciences; Husserl preferred the method of scientific phenomenology (Husserl, 1962) to the naturalistic attitude which, he argued, was concerned not with the essences of reality but with the collection of facts. The phenomenological
reduction allowed a knowledge of the meaningful relations that
existed between various facts;

Can the world, can human existence have
any meaning if the sciences hold for true
only things which can be stated in objective
terms, ... can we be satisfied with this, can
we live in such a world where historical events
are nothing but an unending concentration of
imaginary upswings and bitter disappointment?"

(Husserl, 1954, Pp. 411)

Following Fluckinger and Sullivan's summary (1965, Pp.267-268),
we can see that this reduction process has two phases. The first
occurs at the level of day-to-day living in that one gets
away from the particularity of daily, mundane, experience and
arrives at the "... systematic and radical erosion of every
objectifying "position" in an experience, practised both upon the
regard of particular objects and upon the entire attitude of
mind. (Husserl, 1962, p.121)". This he termed the eidetic
reduction and it occurred at the psychological level.

According to Spiegelberg, the second phase is the
phenomenological reduction proper. Here an attempt is made to
suspend belief or commitment to any "trans-phenomenal existence".
This is the famous bracketing process involving "... expert
recognition, comprehension and description of the manifold

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'appearance' of what are no longer 'objects' but 'unities' of sense" (Husserl, 1962, p.121). This is the description of the noematic. The assumptions of everyday living and mundane points of view (for example the view of an external "factual" reality independent to sensual experience) are cast aside and only that which is pure consciousness is attended to.

Whilst this process may seem confusing it must be remembered, as Spiegelberg and Fink (1934) point out, that Husserl himself indicated that a final account of the nature of his reduction and the exact nature of what was found under reduced conditions (outside of such statements as "pure subjectivity") had still to be stated. Nevertheless, Husserl's later work gives fairly clear indications of what he had in mind. Spiegelberg characterizes this direction as "transcendental subjectivity".

Similarly Husserl (1962) makes a distinction between Phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology:

To this transcendental subjectivity, transcendental experience gives us direct approach. As the psychical experience was purified, so is the transcendental, by a reduction. The transcendental reduction may be regarded as a certain further purification of the psychological interest. The universal is carried to a further stage.

(p.124)
In the *Cartesian Meditations* (1960) and *The crisis of the European sciences and transcendental phenomenology* (1954), Husserl continued to elaborate and substantiate his idealism. Here he also attempted to deal with what has more recently been termed the problem of "other minds" (Wisdom, 1952). How, for example, the question is raised, in the state of transcendental subjectivity does one apprehend the life-view of another?

Spiegelberg writes:

... we perceive a body other than our own as 'there' rather than as 'here', we apperceive it at once as the body of the alter ego, an analogy which, however is by no means an inference by analogy. In this process the analogizing ego and the analogized alter ego are 'paired' in a characteristic 'coupling' ... Thus the other ego, while not accessible as directly as its body, can be understood as a modification of our own pure ego by which we put ourselves into his body - as if we were in his place.

(1960, p.159)

Closely related to this is Husserl's concept of the Lebenswelt, the extension of the above idea as applied to the total experiences life-world of each person; "a life-world is to be conceived as an orientated world with an
experiencing self at its center" writes Spiegelberg

"Around this pole the world is structured by such peculiar patterns as 'near' and 'far', and 'foreground'".

The centrality of this concept to modern phenomenological analyses is seen in Kuenzli (1959), Natanson (1952, 1966), Schütz (1967a, 1967b), Straus (1964, 1966) and Wild (1958).

Natanson, for example points out that "phenomenology, finally, seeks the reconstruction of the Lebenswelt, the life-world within which each one of us is born, exists and dies (1966, p.8)".

Wild also pointed to a similarity that existed between this concept and British analytical philosophy, both being concerned with fundamental aspects of the Lebenswelt. ¹

Penultimately Husserl stands at the beginning of modern existential and phenomenological psychology. He was concerned with

¹ That Husserl's final writings bear close resemblance to linguistic analysis is suggested by Margaret Chatterjee's analysis (1969). She suggests that "the phenomenologist is in a favourable position for appreciating that the relation of language to Being is not at all a question of the adequacy of language to Being. He shares a common insight with a philosopher like Wittgenstein who does not speak in terms of Being at all but who nonetheless has grasped the internality of language to the whole enterprise of life (p.121, my emphasis). Charles Taylor (1959) made a similar point.
the fundamental essences of life and focussed attention on the epistemological difficulties involved in gaining knowledge of these essences.

Secondly, Husserl drew attention to the experiencing individual and, in particular to perspectivity which governs the knowledge an individual has of the world. Through his own unique perspectives the individual, for Husserl, can experience the essential reality. By bringing into focus these problems he advanced the philosophical ideas of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to the level where they could be more readily applied to the study of man.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER HUSSERL

Strasser (1957) gives some idea of just how diverse and significant was the influence of Husserl's writings, and the study of European personality theories edited by David and Von Bracken (1957) gives added support to the notion that Husserl was indeed a central figure in European philosophy and psychology. In so far as we are concerned with the influence of this movement on current value-orientations, some indication of the developments in general must be given as well as the developments that occurred in existential psychology.

Ellenberger (1958) lists five areas in which phenomenological ideas have developed with particular reference to psychotherapy.
Fundamentally these ideas have all taken as axiomatic Husserl's conception of the Lebenswelt resulting in theories dealing with the totality of the experiencing person's project in the world. By paying attention to acts the phenomenologically-orientated psychologist aims to intuit the particular Lebenswelt of the patient (Jessor, 1961).

If one examines for example, at one level in general psychopathology, the work of Karl Jaspers (1963) in which, according to Ellenberger, "a careful and accurate description of the subjective experience of mentally sick patients 'was taken' with an effort to empathize (einfühlen) as closely as possible with this experience (p.97)". Ellenberger cites also the work of Mayer-Gross (1924) and Wyrsch (1940) as illustrating this particular application, termed descriptive phenomenology.

Whilst recognizing the importance of mere description, further thought had also to be given to the basic structure of experience. The main contribution coming from Miłkowski (1927) who saw his task as defining "the basic disturbance ... from which one could deduce the whole content of consciousness and the symptoms of the patients (Ellenberger, p.100)". Von Gebsattel (1954) is also cited by Ellenberger as contributing to a genetico-structural phenomenology.

The third area in the application of phenomenology, categorical phenomenology, can be seen as an extension of the
research of the previously mentioned authors in that important dimensions, such as the temporal, the spatial, the causal and the substantial, were isolated as variables with which to study the Lebenswelt. The question of time as experienced by patients, was one such example;

According to Martin Gschwind, there are two periods in life when the speed of time seems to accelerate rapidly, the first one from the end of puberty up to twenty-two or twenty-four years and the other at a variable point of the second half of life. The feeling of the speed of time is modified in many conditions ... One of the main symptoms of depression, from the phenomenological point of view, is the subjective experience of time flowing desperately slowly, stagnating, or even being annexed. (Ellenberger, p.104)

Related work by Plethner (1964), Merleau-Ponty (1945) and Binswanger (1933, 1963) reveal the concern of phenomenology with experienced living and with reconstructing the inner world of the patient or subject. In America, work by Kelly (1955), Snygg and Combs (1949) and by Rogers (1964), for example, all show this influence.

These developments however are of secondary importance to the modifications made by the existentialists of Husserl's concepts and we can turn now to an enumeration of these modifications.
Of the main existential philosophers like Heidegger, Sartre, Buber and Marcel, two - Sartre and Heidegger - are of particular relevance. Heidegger because of the direct relationship between his writings and two of the major schools of existential psychology - existential analysis and logotherapy - and Sartre because of the impetus his writings have had on humanistic psychology in general. Our discussion therefore will be limited to the general theme developed by these two in particular. Where necessary, however reference will be made to others.

Whilst Husserl was concerned with the crisis of science, the clash between the naturalistic world view and the phenomenological-existentialistic thinkers have expanded this concept away from a purely scientific concern about reality to a concern with the whole of ontology. In Heidegger's words:

As my familiarity with phenomenology grew,
no longer merely through literature but
by actual practice, the question about
Being, aroused by Brentano's work,
nevertheless remained always in view.
So it was that doubt arose whether the 'thing itself'
was to be characterized as intentional consciousness,
or even as the transcendental ego ... Accordingly,
the prefatory note to the seventh unrevised edition
of *Being and Time* (1957) contains the remark:
(This) 'way still remains even today a necessary
one, if the question about Being is to stir
our There-being'.

(1967, Pp. 12-18)

Existentialism as such can be reduced to one main concern,
the differentiation between that which is merely peripheral and
particular and that which is enduring. Yet it is not to be
confused with the search for reality often found in scientific
laboratories. Dufrenne (1965) suggests that existentialism
involves existence, and more specifically, human existence.
Rather than being concerned with aspects of that existence,
existentialists turn to the total nature of Being. The capital
letter gives the same status to Being as is given to the Absolute
in other systems.

Whilst other philosophies may favour study of specific aspects
of Being, such as language, or behaviour, the existentialistic
thinker prefers, as Husserl, to strive after the very nature of
Being. We have found this striving in Kierkegaard who was not
content to remain as one person within a system of many, not
contacting reality, but taking instead as substitute the words
of other philosophers or high priests (for example Comte or Hegel).
In many ways this feeling originating in Kierkegaard is more than
an intellectual piece but is, a personal revolt against the
dictates of organizations or representatives of Mass Society.
Traditionally the term "Being", as Barrett (1964) points out was used to refer to naturally-occurring categories existing "out there". Existentialists conceive Being rather differently and posit two interrelated aspects, "the in-itself, the opaque and inert being whose essence implies existence, and the for-itself, the transparent being of consciousness, whose existence posits the essence (Dufrenne, 1965, p.52)."

Heidegger serves as example here by rejecting the naturalistic notion of "things" independent to the observer. Gendlin (1967) puts it this way:

We come today upon a science in which 'things' are held to be objects around us, separable and movable in space. But (Heidegger) ... sets up three sorts of things: (1) The objects around us, (2) our human attitudes and procedures, and (3) the totality of these two in interdependence together. And, as he says, later, the third is really first ... He wants to make clear to us that the things we run into are not simply given, as they seem, but have always involved a certain 'approach' which could be different. Once we note these very different ways in which we render things, we can no longer consider the things ... as simply given independent of us.

(p.257)
He is referring here to Heidegger's more recent works (Heidegger, 1954, 1966, 1967) but this influence can also be seen in Heidegger's definitive work (1962). For Heidegger and for Sartre (1943) this approach takes as base the involvement "as thrown" into-the-world of the individual: he can only view Being from a point of view and as that view changes he must be able to retain the authentic core that is common to all points of view (Richardson, 1967).

In existentialism there is maintained a fine balance between the phenomenology of Husserl and the personalism of Kierkegaard and the aim of these thinkers is the retention of the latter in the pursuit of the fruits of the former. Certain existentialists are careful to stress the total and personalistic nature of the endeavour even to the extent of steering clear of describing Being. Marcel for example writes:

I who ask these questions about being, how can I be sure that I exist? Yet surely I, who formulate this problem, should be able to remain outside it - before or beyond it?

Clearly this is not so ... so I am inevitably forced to ask: who am I - I who question being? How am I qualified to begin this investigation? If I do not exist, how can I succeed in it? And if I do exist, how can I be sure of this fact?

(1956, p.16)
This paradox is central, involving, as it does, the value problem (Gerber, 1966; Marcel, 1935). Yet even with these appreciations of the problem, existentialists in general, do see a way out. This takes the form of an authentic search.

As Sanborn (1967) puts it;

Marcel implies that the experiences of awareness and dissatisfaction are based on the fact that every person has a sense, obscure though it may be, of what, he 'really' is. Accompanying this sense is an urge to move beyond what he now is. (p. 137)

and, in the case of others - for example Buber - some similar solution is offered;

It is only man ... whose constitution is suited to the lifetime of the individual organism by a unity which can be imagined or thought by him as existing for itself. With soaring power he reaches out beyond what is given him, flies beyond the horizon and the familiar stars, and grasps a totality. But only from the meeting of natural being with man does the near and enduring arise, that which comprehends and finitely transcends the real ... Man is like this because he is
the creative (Wesen) through whose being (Sein)
'what is' (das Seiende) becomes detached
from him and recognised for itself.

(Buber, 1965, p.62)

The important point is that the existentialists argue that man knows Being through his own awareness of Being. It is, therefore, up to the individual to open himself to the dialogue with Being (Farber, 1956; Friedman, 1960; Friedman, 1965).

In essence then existentialistic philosophy created the conditions for a psychology of existence and personal experience (Gendlin, 1962) in which the individual's contact with Being is seen as an empirical situation: this in contrast to the phenomenalistic definition of empiricism in which only a particular segment of the total world action of an individual is attended to.

This then is the background from which modern day existential - humanistic approaches to psychotherapy have developed. The main assumptions are that the individual creates his own contact with "reality" or Being and that he has to develop his own contact existentially and against the interpretations of this reality presented by mundane systems such as naturalistic science.
EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS

Under this heading the orientation represented by writers such as May et al (1958), Boss (1963) and Straus (1966) is discussed. The main feature of this orientation is that the authors involved derive their ideas in the main from Heidegger.

Heidegger's philosophy was an attempt to uncover "hidden and forgotten being (Thevenaz, 1962, p.58)" which was "to be reawakened through an analysis of Dasein (Borgman, 1967, p.163)". The term "Dasein" provides the link between the philosopher and the existential analytic movement and it is this term which has been retained in the existential psychological literature to describe, as May (1958) puts it, "the existence of this particular being sitting opposite the psychotherapist (p.37)".

What relation the two terms "being" and Dasein" have to each other in Heidegger's philosophy remains somewhat uncertain. Bartky (1970) gives the clearest idea when he remarks that "Dasein is a structure while Being is an event " he continues, "Being conceals itself in disclosing a world, first, because as the future, it is always more than what it discloses and second, as Dasein it normally remains hidden from inauthentic humanity (p. 374)". The relationship that emerges is that Dasein is the particular manifestation of Being.
Naturally enough Dasein, for Heidegger is a human reality and not at all independent to the human thinker. Now Being can be known, as we have seen, through a consideration of the experiential world of the individual.

In Heidegger's later writings Dasein analysis gives way to an analysis of Being through different modes. For example Heidegger (1962) writes;

The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world—an intelligibility which always goes with a definite situation expresses itself as speech.

(p. 203)

It should be noted that hermeneutic analysis is prevalent in Heidegger's more recent writings (Bartky, 1970) and represents a narrowing of his interest away from pure Dasein analysis.

Main tenets

Existential analysis takes as its main concern the analysis of Dasein and as such the term has become somewhat reified. Dasein, the analysis of Being in its human form, takes on a significance in the hands of Boss, Binswanger and May that is not necessarily found in Heidegger (Lyons, 1961). Here, the term assumes a paradigmatic significance which defines the focus that adherents to the school are obliged to adopt. This usage is analogous to that of many religious schools of thought.
which take certain basic values as essences which determine the action of man (Smith, 1958).

To begin with, how is Dasein defined by the analysts? To answer this we shall consider two definitions, the first from May (1958) and the second from Boss (1963). May writes:

Composed of sein (being) plus da (there), Dasein indicates that man is the being who is there and implies also that he has a 'there' in the sense that he can know he is there and can take a stand with reference to that fact. The 'there' is moreover not just any place, but the particular 'there' that is mine, the particular point in time as well as space of my existence at this moment.

(p. 41)

and Boss:

Dasein means 'being' (sein) 'there' (da). Analysis of Dasein takes this meaning literally: man's Dasein is the being of the 'there', the 'there' designates the realm of illumination which human existence is, the realm into which all particular beings may come forth, where they show themselves, may appear and thus be ...

(p. 38)
The emphasis remains Heideggerian; man becomes aware in-situation and that awareness (consciousness) is the sole giver of meaning to human Being. There is no other extant, platonic force which causes the human to see the "really real". In Binswanger's words:

Existential analysis does not propose an ontological thesis about an essential condition determining existence, but makes ontic statements - that is, statements of factual findings about actually appearing forms and configurations of existence. In this sense existential analysis is an empirical science, with its own methods and particular ideas of exactness, namely with the method and the ideal of exactness of the phenomenological empirical sciences.

(1958, p. 192)

To enable delineation, the existential analysts identify three closely inter-connected dimensions of Dasein, "... three simultaneous aspects of world which characterize the existence of each one of us as being-in-the-world (May, 1958, p. 61)".

The first of these dimensions is termed Umwelt (the world around us in its biological meaning) and is drawn mainly from the
writings of Von Uexkull (1921, 1928) who developed a complex interactional picture of the biological environment. Von Uexkull argued that the perceptual world and the action world of the animal determined the environment. Binswanger (1958) adopted this to his own needs;

When we speak of the environment (Umwelt)

the paramecium, the earthworm, the cephalopod,

the horse, and even man has ... 'Has'

signifies the establishment of a 'blueprint',
especially of the perception-and-action-
organization, limited by nature to quite definite possibilities of stimulation and reaction.

(p. 198)

The second dimension, the Mitwelt is the aspect of Dasein which deals with the interrelation of the human with others. As May (1958) puts it, "the meaning of the group for me depends in part upon how I put myself into it (p. 62)".

The final dimension, that of the Eigenwelt, "presupposes self-awareness, self-relatedness, and is uniquely present in human beings (May, 1958, p.63)". It is this dimension that allows the fullest movement of the human beyond any pure statement of his limits (Buckwel, 1958). It is the Eigenwelt which distinguishes man from other creatures and which is required for the development of the awareness of Being.

The picture that emerges of Dasein can thus be seen as an integral one. Each aspect is involved at the same time with that of the other, each determining the "world" as experienced
by the individual; Things can come forth into its (Dasein's) openness only in consonance with Dasein's actual attunement or 'pitch'. Just as the colouring and the brightness of a physical light determine what can be seen by it, so things are always disclosed in accordance with man's pitch. An individual's pitch at a certain moment determines in advance the choice, brightness, and colouring of his relationship to the world.

(Boss, 1963, p.41)

This expresses clearly the movement and relatedness of Dasein action.

Whilst Dasein analysis is the primary interest of the analytic orientation, equal importance is attached to the distinction that exists between the Dasein of the mentally well and that of the unwell. Binswanger writes;

This insight - that the world-designs as such distinguish the mentally ill from the healthy and hamper communication with the former - also throws new light on the problem of the projection of psychopathological symptoms onto specific brain processes. Now it cannot be so important to localize single psychic symptoms in the brain but rather primarily, to ask where and how to localize the fundamental
psychic disturbance which is recognizable by
the change of 'being-in-the-world' as such.

For indeed, the symptom proves to be
the expression of a spreading change of the
soul, a change of the total form of existence
and the total style of life. ¹

(1958, p. 213)

It is argued by analysts such as Hoy (1967), Maddi (1964),
Schindler (1968) and Straus (1966) that the requirements of
mental normality - or authentic existence - demand that the
individual question his biological and sociological limitations;
As Straus puts it "In questioning, man has passed the threshold
between mere animal existence and human life (p. 166-167)",
and in going beyond these "givens"; "he (man) only demonstrates
and fulfills a basic mode of human existence (p. 166".

In this desire to achieve and conceptualize mental health,
the analysts are extending the ideas of Husserl and the
existential philosophers. One can see clearly the influence
in the direction taken of the latter in that a reality (health)
has to be attended to against mundane dictates (the biological
and sociological aspects).

For the analysts, this state of authentic existence is
attained by the individual experiencing Angst (analogous to

¹ See also Farau (1964).
Husserl's reduction process;

The first step in self-discovery is Angst, a nameless dread which leads the Dasein to ask, Who am I? and What am I doing here? Angst arises from a psychological shock or from disgust produced by an utterly inauthentic existence, which leads to a realization of the Dasein's Unheimlichkeit (Un-home-li-ness) in the world. The Angst produced by this leads to self-questioning and the discovery of the whole structure of one's own existence.

(Fish, 1961, p.979)

Awareness of Angst follows on from an awareness of a sense of insecurity. This insecurity is caused primarily because the individual realizes that the dictates of the "naturalistic" or "social" attitudes to which he has become accustomed to living do not present individual salvation; they provide only a general viewpoint in which the individual is treated as one amongst many. The reality of my death, my living, is not important to a nomothetic ethic and it is this realization that creates the climate for the development of Angst.

At base, inauthentic modes of living remove Angst by offering soothing explanations of "reality". The whole aim, and this is
stated openly by May, of the analytic framework is to break this pathology and replace it by fear—the fear or dread of loneliness, anxiety, insecurity. In this system the individual is conceptualized as not one of many, but alone, isolated.

In this isolated state, the individual's full potentiality is able to be used and his Dasein can become as he, in the Eigenwelt aspect, wishes to make it, free of crippling inauthenticities. Should an individual fail to develop his individual potential as a result of the pervading Angst, he may fall into a state of ontological guilt which is described by May (1958) as follows;

**First**, everyone participates in it. No one of us fails to some extent to distort the reality of his fellow men, and no one fully fulfills all own potentialities ... **Second**, ontological guilt does not come from cultural prohibitions, or from introjection of cultural mores; it is rooted in the fact of self-awareness. Ontological guilt does not consist of I-am guilty-because-I-violate-parental-prohibitions, but arises from the fact that I can see myself as the one who can choose or fail to choose. Every developed human being would
have this ontological guilt, though its content would vary from culture to culture ...

Third, ontological guilt is not to be confused with morbid or neurotic guilt. If it is unaccepted and repressed, it may turn into neurotic guilt ... Fourth, ontological guilt does not lead to symptom formation, but has constructive effects in the personality. Specifically, it can and should lead to humility, ... sharpened sensitivity in relationships with fellow men, and increased activity in the use of one's own potentialities.

(May, 1958, p.55)

It is important to see Angst and guilt as co-existing with the notion of Dasein. The existential analyst stresses the "experience of being guilty of a definite concrete act which expresses the general estrangement of our existence, an act for which responsibility cannot be denied, in spite of the element of destiny in it (Tillich, 1961, p.14)". Should one repress or deny the felt guilt, then one runs the risk of entering a neurotic state of denial of the ontological. ¹

¹ Boss (1963) contends that ontological guilt arises because man can only fulfil one of the many choices facing him at one time. Awareness of other unfulfilled creates the state of guilt.
Psychotherapeutic value implications.

Existential—humanistic orientations in general make much of the value problem as we have defined it here. Explicitly embedded in the writings of many adherents to this orientation are ideas which point out that the therapist is himself an acting and re-acting individual and that he imparts— in a multitude of ways—effects into the situation that he is not always aware of.

Existential analysts place value on preserving this "openness" and stress the dangers involved in approaching the individual in therapy in terms of pre-conceived models. Galdston (1960) for example writes;

Existential psychiatry is both protago- and antagonistic. Its impulsion is to break down conceptual barriers, to complement and enlarge, and thereby to deepen understanding of the dynamics of becoming and of being.

(p. 210)

The essential value here is that no person can be subsumed under any one epistemological framework since, as Neufeld (1964) remarks: "Existence is considered not a static structure or giveness but a process of becoming (p.11)". Hora (1959) adds; "... it seems desirable that we liberate our patients from the chains of our own epistemological attitudes (p.172)"
an idea also to be found in Arbuckle (1965), Johnson (1967) and Cantril and Bumstead (1960).

What is demanded of the therapist in the existential situation is a basic openness which allows him to be receptive to what have often been termed the "irrational" aspects of man (Galdston, 1953). He has to avoid any action which will prejudice the nature or existence of the other (Van Dusen, 1957, 1960).

Closely related to this therapeutic value is the concept used by certain analysts (Galdston, 1960) for example of "thrust", whereby the individual has the potentiality or freedom to move beyond any description imposed upon his actions by others. From this, the notions of totality and openness assume special significance. No longer is man to be seen as one "thing" whether "thingness" is defined in terms of units of physical mass or units of behavior (Sattler, 1966); man is seen as more than any framework or classification can establish: he is, in other words, a whole that cannot be reduced or classified. For Sartre (1943) if one says "Man is X" then man has the power "not to be X". And this is a fundamental value of the analysts, since the whole concern of existential analysis is to maintain a non-reductive position.

Now, in terms of actual practice what does the term "totality" imply? This has been the concern not only of May (1958) but also of those psychiatrists connected with the development of existential
analysis such as Benda (1960a, 1960b), Braaten (1961), Hora (1959), Straus (1969) and Sutherland (1966).

The first basic task of the therapist is to be aware of the way that the patient communicates with him and with the world. The therapist has to go beyond the limits set by normal "explanations" or labels and has to open himself to total involvement. As Hora (1959) puts it;

The task of the physician is to help the patient understand the language of existence whether it speaks from his body, his mind, or his destiny.

(p. 168)

Similarly May (1967) writes;

It would seem also to me that tone of voice, inflection and infinitely variegated subliminal language with which we communicate without knowing it would be significant.

(p. 21)

In short, man expresses his Dasein in a multiplicity of ways and the existential position emphasizes this multiplicity.

The second goal or task of therapy is to ensure firstly that the patient is aware of Being as Hora suggests and that the therapist is similarly aware. Since the latter is an assumption that is seldom questioned amongst analysts, the
former requires a relatively clear demarcation of value position which allows the therapist and patient to discriminate authentic Being from inauthentic Being.

In a sense all that is inauthentic has been discussed above in that viewing a man as a thing, as nothing but drives, etc. or viewing man in such a way as to de-emphasize his uniqueness and wholeness, is evidence of a failure to appreciate the nature of Dasein. The concept of inauthenticity has been extended in many ways. Maddi (1967), for example, talks of the need for the individual to function on three levels (the psychological, the social, the biological) and regards any lesser functioning as inauthentic. Braaten (1961) lists ten 'do's' for existential-orientated thinkers and argues that "the essence of therapy is the client's movement from feeling unfree and controlled by others ... (p.11)".

In general, however, authenticity has two features; "becoming" and the importance of commitment. These will be discussed separately. Man is by virtue of the existential ethic, free to become whatever he will. He can transcend the limits imposed on him by any theory, he can make choices which he alone takes responsibility for. Thus, man cannot be seen merely as a thing, but as a movement towards something that is exclusively unique.
Closely related to this is the idea of the realization of potentialities. In May's terms (1958):

The aim of therapy is that the patient experiences his existence as real. The purpose is that he becomes aware of his existence fully, which includes becoming aware of his potentialities and becoming able to act on the basis of them...

the task of therapy is to illuminate the existence.

(p. 85)

In order to "discover his being, his Dasein," writes May, "the individual must get at the totality that he is - not just fragments, not just feeling but intellect, feeling, everything that he is (p.87)."

In contrast, the inauthentic is regarded as being abnormal because it is fragmented: "The neurotic is overconcerned about the Umwelt, and underconcerned about Eigenwelt (May, p.83)"

the individual, in the inauthentic mode of existence lives as he is told to live by the societal milieu;

Most existential concepts of an ontological authenticity of human Dasein actually represent, as it were, a declaration of spiritual independence of the individual from (contemporary) society.

(Neufeld, 1964, p.12)
Whilst philosophers such as Sartre or Heidegger may have resisted, on occasion, attempts to specify particular directions of authenticity (Closterman, 1963), the members of the analytic school have been more open in their explication of the directions to be taken for "becoming" to occur.

Closely related to the notion of "becoming" is that of commitment (Arendt, 1959; Bollnow, 1955); when one chooses to be then as May expresses it; "We use the term decision as meaning decisive attitude toward existence, an attitude of commitment (1958, p.80)". By being encouragingly open to the patient in therapy, the therapist maintains commitment to the direction chosen by the patient. At the same time he (the therapist) must be committed to his own Eigenwelt, so that therapy as such becomes an encounter and from within this develops authenticity.

Commitment then is a pre-requisite for authenticity. Sattler (1966) for example writes:

... the interaction between two people should be open. Whatever is said and done does not seal the interpersonal engagement. The relationship should be allowed to have some sort of mutual fulfillment, and should be characterized by the unexpected. Omnipotence and omniscience have no place in the science of psychology.

(p.291)

156/...
Whilst these sentiments suggest a somewhat permissive nature of psychotherapy, it is inevitable that more concrete goals would have to be set up in order, at least, to convey the meaning of the analytic point of view. This is very evident in later developments of this orientation, as Hora (1959) points out; mental health requires an authentic epistemology and to present existential analysis as a therapeutic approach demands an epistemical rationale.

One can find many examples of directives in what has gone before and other examples add to the picture of an existential science (May, 1960). Benda for example writes (1960a):

The contact with the therapist is thus (contact with a person) whose more mature and stabilized views enable the patient to evolve from his predicament and enter a new phase of life.

(p. 39, my emphasis)

And May (1967);

... the goal of therapy is not to free the patient from anxiety. It is, rather, to help free him from neurotic anxiety in order that he may meet normal anxiety constructively ... the self becomes more integrated and stronger as experiences of normal anxiety are successfully confronted.

(Pp. 81-82)
and further;

... mature values are those which transcend
the immediate situation in time and encompass
past and future. Mature values transcend
also the immediate in-group, and extend
outward toward the good of the community,
ideally and ultimately embracing humanity
as a whole.

(p. 82)

By way of evaluation it is possible to make a crucial
point against the analytic orientation. Considering the value
problem, we have to ask how it is that proponents of this
orientation know the penultimate value of authenticity as
expressed, for example, in the quotation by May above. The
answer is not readily forthcoming for, lost in the web of
existential terminology and debate, there is little attention
given to this point (as noted by, amongst other, Clive, 1963;
Olafson, 1967 and Tymieniecka, 1962). One has, in effect, to
either accept or reject existential values. If one expects, as
proof, some form of experimental or logical validity, it will
not be found: the individual person in action uncovers 'truth'
and his only tool seems to be some modification of the
phenomenological reduction espoused by Husserl (Ayer, 1959;
Taylor, 1959).
The second point that is of importance follows on from the first. Value is given by a particular kind of action: authenticity. Authenticity is, variously, defined as what the existential analysts say it is or as the individual makes it. Either way, the problem of value emerges.

If we take the former case, then the value criterion rests in the intersubjective agreement that existential analysts have arrived at; that is, the convergence of their separate opinions. Naturally, we then ask why intersubjective convergences of other orientations should not be of equal validity? To which the analyst may reply - "But we do not systematize man as others do", which in turn can be seen to be contradictory for to speak of intersubjective agreement is to speak of common features which in a very real sense destroys the conception of freedom of action that the individual is supposed to have. Alternatively, if the existential intersubjective consensus is supposed to be more "real" than others there must be some criterion which will establish this. However, as above, such a criterion is against the conception of a free-acting individual.

Taking, on the other hand, the idea that value is created by the individual, one then has to ask how he comes to recognize it once he has attained it. Clearly whilst the individual may be authentic, the therapist, because he is an individual, too, may not have the same understanding of authenticity and may, therefore, consider the individual's value to be false when it may, for the
patient, not be.

These points are mentioned here and will be dealt with in more detail later. What has to be noted at this stage is that, as was the case in naturalistic approaches to the value problem, there is an evasion of the critical re-evaluation necessary to be aware of the infinite regress that occurs when discussing value. Whilst existential analysts tend to be more open in terms of recognizing the role of value classifications in dealing with conceptions of mental health etc., they "solve" the problem by appealing either to the authority of personal experience or to that of the existential orientation.

LOGOTHERAPY

This second of the three major trends is, like the first, rooted in the writings of Heidegger, yet in contrast to the above approach, the logotherapist postulates a major motivational force that serves to direct human movement - that of the will to find meaning in life (Ungersma, 1961). The neurotic personality is one in which this will has been frustrated in some way.

Main tenets

Viktor Frankl, the founder of the "third Viennese school" of psychology, differentiates his own brand of existentialism from that of the existential analysts and humanists such as
Maslow (Frankl, 1955, 1965, 1966a, 1966c). He is concerned with the existential experiential world in which each person finds himself and with the nature of man's actions in living his own particular life. Frankl writes (1966b);

There are two specifically human phenomena by which human existence is characterized. The first is constituted by man's capacity for self-detachment ... Another capacity of man is that for self-transcendence ... In fact, it is a constitutive characteristic of being human that it always points, and is directed, to something other than itself. It is, therefore, a severe and grave misinterpretation of man to deal with him as if he were a closed system. Actually, being human profoundly means to be open to the world, a world, that is, which is replete with other beings to encounter and with meanings to fulfill.

(p. 97)

Frankl builds his system around these twin aspects. He believes that the individual is here and now, but is capable of thinking beyond the present and it is this tension created by this contrast that defines the human situation.
Psychotherapeutie value implications

Using the above idea, Frankl distinguishes between healthy and neurotic living. Frankl maintains that the neurotic individual is one who is hiding from what he terms "existential facts" (1966a, 1967). For Frankl, these "facts" are the tragic senses of life - death, pain, suffering, guilt and so on. The neurotic attempts to deny the presence of these realities and follows other pursuits, such as pleasure, in order to escape from the tragic. He sees attempts to gain these "things" as inauthentic since they evade the responsibility the individual has for creating his own meaning.

Now, in the healthy mind the person is encouraged to develop a basic tension between the "I am" and the "I ought". What logotherapy tries to do is not to dictate to the individual what he must do, but rather shows him that he is responsible for his own being and therapy is directed to making him aware of the existential facts, and of the will-to-meaning;

By declaring that man is a responsible creature and must actualize the potential meaning of his life, I wish to stress that the true meaning of life is to be found in the world rather than within man or his own psyche, as though it were a closed system.

(Frankl, 1966a, p. 175)
This is important. In contrast to existential analysts, he stresses the nature of the "beyond self". Frankl believes that the existing experience of self has to be seen as one pole, the other being meaning itself. Will to meaning is the necessary tension that exists between the self as it is and that which it has potential to become.

As Frankl is at pains to point out, whilst his point of view is an existential one, it is also idealistic since man should, so he argues, be encouraged to have faith in something beyond himself (Brammer and Shostrom, 1969). It is from this point of view that he criticizes other existential-humanistic formulations;

Self-actualization is not man's ultimate destination, not even his primary intention. Self-actualization is, and must remain, an effect, namely, the effect of mercy fulfillment. Only to the extent to which man fulfills a meaning out there in the world does he fulfil himself. (1966b, p.99)

He argues that meaning (the intended, self-transcendent aspect) cannot be identified with Being since when man is his Being, he can go no further (Frankl, 1955, 1965a, 1966c).
Logotherapy, in respect of our value problem, would set values as those beyond the present Being of the individual to which he, the individual, must aim or have faith in. The problem here lies in the role of the logotherapist in this process. As is clear from Frankl's general approach the therapist's task is to show the individual the essential potentiality contained within himself. Responsibility is thus lodged with the therapist - he, one assumes, knows the required epistemological value.

The essence of the logotherapists approach to the problem of value in psychotherapy is that the therapist somehow is gifted with knowing that the individual must believe in something beyond himself. If he does not, then the individual is not being authentic. This assumption does not account in any satisfactory way for the role of the therapist in creating these values; we can be sure of only one thing, that authority is again vested in a particular insight which, while no doubt being of inestimable value, is only that. There are other orientations who claim equal authority for their insights and offer proof in just as convincing style.

It is necessary to point out that logotherapy whilst moving away from the analytic conception of a "realizable" authenticity toward a tension-creating authenticity, less awareness and appreciation is shown of the role of the
therapist. It is clear from most of Frankl’s writings that the logotherapist has to deal with the patient as he, the logotherapist conceives of that person’s full potentiality.

This conceptualization involves an epistemology based on the logotherapeutic goal of self-transcendence as one pole of the existential situation. Clearly, there is some doubt that the logotherapist has total knowledge of this transcendence since this would require the therapist setting up a criterion for the beyond-self.

If such a criteria has to be uniquely determined by the patient, the issue becomes one of inquiring how the logotherapist recognizes a unique beyond-self and how is this to be differentiated from inauthentic or, as Frankl has it, self-actualized being? Again the orientation falls back on the authoritative dictates of its followers. Clearly there is little consideration made of the
therapist as a value giver: he is seen mainly as an agent of the orientation.

HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

This last orientation represents the values of an interaction of three interrelated orientations. On the one hand, as Sutich (1962) points out, humanistic psychology has grown out of behavioural psychology and psychoanalysis, and on the other, its proponents have been influenced by Continental existential philosophy and psychology.

Humanistic psychology attempts to go beyond the mere existential presence of the individual and emphasizes more specifically the importance of studying the results of a Dasein's effect on the world. As Buhler puts it, humanistic psychology is "... a science which tries to establish by means of empirical research what the actual motives, goals and values of human beings are (1966, p.1).

From the sections on Existential Analysis and Logotherapy, we have seen that whilst there is a theoretical distinction made between authentic and inauthentic modes of being-in-the-world, the direction of authenticity remains to a certain extent determined by individual, idiographic factors (Beck, 1953). The humanistic orientation takes the systematization already evident in existential analysis further to a "... search for the
conditions under which the human organism can function optimally (Solomon, 1962, p. 89). He adds:

Values, beliefs, religiosity, and most of the subject-matter traditionally treated under the rubric 'psychology of religion' can now comfortably be fitted into the emerging framework of an existential-humanistic psychology which tries...

to come directly to grips with the inner core of human nature, its instinctoid characteristic, and that Essence which we now have good reason to believe, does precede existence.

(p. 89, my emphasis)

Other writers, for example Bugental (1965) have contributed to the general development of this point of view and conducted research designed to establish the nature of the "core" that Solomon discusses above.

Main tenets

There are two points that need concern us here. In the humanist's attempt to establish general rules for living he draws

1 The term "humanist" used here refers only to humanistic psychologists.
on a particular framework for his analysis which is best termed a wholistic one. Secondly, he hypothesizes a basic personality core or self-concept which he uses to describe the idealized value contained in his wholistic epistemology.

With regard to this wholistic epistemology, humanists take their stand from the existentialistic idea of a free individual able to create his own particular world-view. Bugental expresses this as the belief that "no amount of additional findings about parts will ever yield an appreciation or understanding of man in the world (1964b, p. 20)."

Humanistic psychologists such as Bugental (1964a, 1965), Cantril (1955), Cantril and Rumstead (1960), Maslow (1956) and Rogers (1963) seek a more comprehensive picture of man than the reductive model used by behavioural psychologists and psychoanalysts. In short, as Maslow (1960) suggests, humanistic psychology avoids rubberizing-the-individual and attempts rather to understand man in his totality. Bugental puts it as follows:

There is no way in which I, purely as a psychologist, can grasp the totality of the person whom I am encountering; nor is there any way in which I can, as psychologist, respond with the wholeness of me ... It is only with my awareness of the process of myself-and-of-the-other-person-in-the-situation-of-encountering-each-other-that I can apprehend this event.

(1963, p. 242)
The principle of wholeness assumes valuative proportions since the emphasis on the whole man is considered, too, to be the symptom of the healthy, humanized personality; 

... neurosis may be defined as (the) irreal fragmentation of one's self and the psychotherapist's inadequate glossary is apt to augment such neurotic fragmentation rather than resolve it.

(Bugental, 1963, p.245)

he adds that "... it becomes our responsibility to try to present an alternative glossary which avoids the fallacy of fragmentation (p.245)". Under these conditions we can see that humanistic psychology aims at describing and outlining what they consider to be a more fundamental mode of living (Cohen, 1962; Severin, 1965).

In order to appreciate this value, we turn to the humanistic notion of "self". This "self" is correlative with the wholistic epistemology since the latter involves the studying of man as a unique individual; the former is a prerequisite for this study and also the desired end-product.

When the humanist talks of "self" he is using a more restricted although related formulation of Dasein. This usage shows clearly the interrelation between American psychology and
Continental existential psychology since the term "self-concept" has long been in use in the former as Allport (1943) and Meissner (1966) have shown. Others such as Lowe (1961), Raimy (1943) and Raskin (1949, 1952) point out that the term has often been closely associated with "ego" and that it, in fact, may have originated in the desire of some psychologists to escape the web of psychoanalytic theory.

Since the early fifties, the term has, however come to be associated with the work of humanists such as Rogers and Snygg and Combs (Rogers, 1951; Rogers and Dymond 1954; Snygg and Combs, 1949; Snygg, 1955).

Bugental (1962a) defines "self-concept" as follows; our chief concern here is with this pre-existing conception or definition of 'who-I-am-and-what-my-world-is' ... In general terms, this self-and-world concept is learned; it is abstracted from experiences; and it provides one with a road map for seeking satisfactions and avoiding harms in life ... it is important that it be as accurate as possible, in the sense of according with external reality, so that the person actually may find satisfactions and generally avoid harms ... to the extent that one distorts or rejects incoming information, he reduces his accuracy of perception and thus the efficiency of his ability to cope with reality ... (Pp. 527-528)
This self-concept is the raw data as it were, that the humanistic psychologist works on. His method involves the apprehension of an individual's self-concept through experiencing with the person his own particular world. This is done, naturally, in a wholistic sense involving the total-being of both individual and investigator.

**Psychotherapeutic value implications**

Using the above assumptions it is possible to arrive at relatively clear-cut goals for the orientation. Thus Bugental (1962a), for example, writes;

Neurosis ... becomes a name given to the situation of a person who has such conflicts between his self-and-world concept and reality that he is distorting or rejecting much incoming information ... and so experiences anxiety, as his feelings of being a stable self in a stable world is threatened.  

(p. 528)

Similarly, Rogers (1961) writes;

Therapy seems to mean a getting back to basic sensory and visceral experience.

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1 Similarity between Bugental's conception of self-and-world and the work of Bruner (1951), Bruner et al (1966), Reger (1968), Miller, Pribram and Galanter (1960) and Pribram (1962, 1968) is fairly close. All stress the importance of the correct coding of incoming information allowing the individual to successfully operate in the environment. This is an indication of the intricate synthesis found in humanistic psychology.
Prior to therapy the person is prone to ask himself, often unwittingly 'what do others think I should do in this situation?' 'What would my parents or my culture want me to do?'... During the process of therapy the individual comes to ask himself, in regard to ever-widening areas of his life-span, 'How do I experience this?'... He comes to act on a basis of what may be termed realism - a realistic balancing of the satisfactions and dissatisfactions which any action will bring to himself.

(Pp. 103-104)

The value here lies in this awakening of the self to the real demands of the situation (Pentony, 1959). In Bugental's terms;

Since full awareness necessarily means the confrontation of uncertainty, of conflicting impulses, of threat and of one's own individual responsibility for choice, there is a constant invitation to reduce one's awareness of the actual... Conversely, one is non-self-actualizing and neurotic to the
degree that one treats himself as other than a unified totality, rejects awareness of his own experience, assigns causal power over his own feelings, thoughts and actions to other agencies, or denies the contingencies of existence by ascribing certainty to some agency. (1963, p. 248)

The point here is that some definition is required of the terms "real" and "unified". And for these, "penultimate", values we turn to the work of Maslow who is perhaps the most well-known of all humanistic psychologists.

Maslow, as other humanists, seeks to develop a discipline which is directed "toward comprehensiveness, allness, and the acceptance of all concrete experiences, all suchness, all esthetic savouring of the full richness of everything without need to abstract (1966a, p.75)". Yet he recognizes that in order to live, "to avoid total insanity", man must create abstracted concepts. This is recognition of the major difficulty of humanistic goals - if what is valued is a wholeness, a totality of experience, then how can this totality ever be reduced so that it may be described? Always remembering that description cannot be identified with the reality it refers to.
He contends;

The solution of this dilemma that I have worked out for myself ... is to know when I am abstracting and when I am concreting, to be able to do both, to enjoy them both, and to know the values and shortcomings of both.

(1966a, p. 75)

To this end, Maslow distinguishes between two types of experience, the normal everyday one and the "peak experience". He devotes much of his writing to enumerating and defining the latter. Maslow believes that certain types of people exhibit the latter and can be studied. These are "highly healthy people. They have higher ceilings. They can see further. And they can see in a more inclusive and integrating way (1966a, p. 144)". Thus, to begin with, Maslow studies those people who best cope with life, who "by definition", he argues, "are gratified in all their basic needs ... (and) are now motivated in other higher ways, to be called 'metamotivation' (1964, p.1a)". These higher metamotives;

Are not only wanted and desired by all human beings, but also needed as well in the sense that they are necessary to avoid illness and psychopathology ... in order to get these intrinsic goods, animals and men are willing to learn practically anything that will achieve for them these ultimate goods. (1970, p.5)
There is thus, a very definite value complex that is intrinsic to self-actualizers. Why is it then that these people have such contact? The answer is given in a number of papers, notably those dealing with the contact that actualizers have with "Being";

It (Being Psychology) has been used to refer to the whole cosmos, to everything that exists, to all of reality. In peak experiences, in states of fascination, or focal attention; attention can narrow down to a single object or person which is then reacted to 'as if' it were the whole of Being, that is, the whole of reality. (1962, p.51)

In a later paper, he extends this;

Contemplation of ultimate values becomes the same as contemplation of the nature of the world. Seeking the truth ... may be the same as seeking beauty, order, oneness, (etc.) (1967, p.34)

The information provided by this contact with "Being" can be used to generate basic principles for the creation of the "Good society". This thesis is developed in a number of articles (1963, 1964, 1966b, 1968, 1969) whereby "somehow two (or more)
people have arranged their relationship in such a fashion that one person's advantage is the other person's advantage rather than one person's advantage being the other's disadvantage (Maslow, 1964, p.12) 1.

Clearly Maslow synthesizes a number of methodologies in structuring his theory. The existential experience of healthy, actualized people is studied wholistically and then subjected to the checking and replicating that is the "follow-up work, subsequent to the great intuitions (1968, p.694)" provided by a humanistic analysis. 2

The penultimate value that emerges from Maslow's system, published shortly before his death last year is contained in 176/ ...
the following quotation from his last work;

Self-actualizing does not occur in young people. In our culture at least, youngsters have not yet achieved identity, or autonomy, nor have they had time enough to experience an enduring, loyal, post-romantic love relationship, nor have they generally found their calling, the altar upon which to offer themselves. Nor have they worked out their own system of values; nor have they had experience enough (responsibility for others, tragedy, failure, achievement, success) to shed perfectionistic illusions and become realistic; nor have they generally made their peace with death; nor have they learned how to be patient; nor have they learned enough about evil in themselves and others to be compassionate; nor have they had time to become post-ambiguous about patients and elders, power and authority; nor have they generally become knowledgeable and educated enough to lay open the possibility of becoming wise, nor have they generally acquired enough courage to be unpopular, to be unashamed about being openly virtuous, etc.

(1970, p.11)
The person who can achieve all these things is regarded by Maslow as something of an Olympian knower and this conceptualization fits well into the therapeutic setting.

In this last quotation, humanistic psychology reaches its zenith in terms of an explicating of its values. It involves a paradigmatic language no less than other orientations and despite its links with existential notions of "Being", there is a far more definite statement of an essential value. This follows of course from the humanist's desire to define the totality of human existence. In order to do so, some value emerges which whilst stated here explicitly by Maslow and others is implied also by people like Rogers and Von Rintelen (1961).

CONCLUDING EVALUATION

Whilst the existential—humanistic orientation has been concerned, in part, with the complexity of subject-object relationships and with personal involvements of the psychologist with the value direction taken in therapy, it has, one concludes, been more concerned with systematizing its own position and has, become embroiled in an unfortunate contradiction of its own avowed involvement in the value problem.

It began with a statement of extreme relativity: the dogma of naturalism and its concommitant positivism was to be condemned for equating its own dictates with states of reality. Individuals were encouraged to transcend the limits
of such theories about reality and to create their own beliefs, or commitments to reality.

Yet this personalism and emphasis on the unique had to give way to describing the ways in which an individual could live. A distinction was made between the authentic and inauthentic value choices that an individual could make, and, as it developed, the orientation polarized into a definite value position which was no longer personal in the original relative use of the term. Definite authentic values were "discovered" and served - as in the naturalistic orientations - to guide followers of the orientation to the "right" or "actualized" epistemology so essential for good mental health (Mullan and Sangiuliano, 1960, Tennessen, 1967).

This is where existential - humanistic orientations have failed to consider the value problem. Whilst one can find isolated statements of interest in the problem, the orientation as a whole has side-stepped it. There is little, in recent statements by members of this orientation (for example, Maslow, 1970; Winthrop, 1966a, 1966b) to indicate that the problem will be treated as it was perhaps by Sartre or Heidegger.

In conclusion therefore it is necessary to say that the existential - humanistic orientation maintains a value that is relatively authoritative. One learns, if one seeks membership of one of these orientations, to use a particular
language in order that one can be termed "existential", "humanistic" and so on; in precisely the same way as one learns to be a behaviourist of a technical eclectic.

As one learns such a language one is then able to identify "an authentic person". Clearly to be able to do this implies that authenticity is something that can be known and transmitted. In other words, as Maslow (1970) has it, it is a "higher value" which is independent to the valuer, the knower and thus the psychotherapist. This is tantamount to a denial of the value problem and is the main reason why existential - humanistic orientations do not offer a meaningful solution to the problem.
SECTION C: A THEORY OF EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY.
The problem of the role of value in psychotherapy has been examined in terms of two value orientations and both have been found lacking in certain respects. What I have tried to show is that each orientation claims that its values and methods are more reliable, more real and epistemologically sounder than any other. In this section a theory is proposed which does not make this claim but which maintains its commitment to the value problem rather than to a solution of the problem.

DEFINING THE AUTHORITATIVE

After the examination of the preceding value orientations, certain general conclusions can be drawn. The most important of these is that each value orientation offers some solution to the problem of value in psychotherapy and does so authoritatively in that some value is advocated which transcends the value problem. The naturalistic orientations either ignore the problem or invoke the process of science as corrective of value-bias. Equally, existential—humanistic orientations, whilst paying lip service to the interaction between therapist and patient, evade the problem by the use of concepts of authenticity which, clearly, represent a movement away from the complexity of therapist-patient functioning.
Since a great deal rests on my use of the term "authoritative" it is important that this usage be clearly defined. It should be made clear from the outset that my use of the term is very similar to other writers' use of the term "scientism". This latter term is used to describe an epistemology in which the method and spirit of science is applied somewhat over-exuberantly (Hayek, 1952; Schoeck and Wiggins, 1960; Winthrop, 1959, 1960).

Winthrop describes a number of assumptions of scientism and discusses at some length one such assumption which he calls the "Pythagorean complex". This, so he argues, involves, "the systematic emphasis on the notion that number lies at the heart of the universe (1960, p.301)". He adds;

Like the faith in the methods of science, the
PC ¹ also has its social determinants in that, having discovered the extent to which the laws of harmonics were expressible in mathematical terms, the Pythagoreans then extrapolated from these discoveries and took as an article of faith that similar mathematical regularities would be found to underlie all phenomena. With the rise of modern science, following Newton's amazingly successful theories, this faith has been strongly reinforced. As a result

¹ "Pythagorean Complex"
various brands of uncritical positivism have arisen in our time which take as an article of faith for intellectual inquiry, that the methods of the natural sciences assisted by the function of thinking of mathematics and various types of logical analysis, will suffice to reveal truth in all her glory.

(p.301)

Other assumptions are listed by Merloo (1956), Sorokin (1956) and Winthrop (1959). Examples are "modelling after the physical sciences" and "factophilia" - the belief in the absolute nature of facts.

Winthrop (1959) goes on to criticize scientism for its narrow emphasis on the above assumptions and raises the following points against scientistic doctrines;

... neglect of the causative role of value meaning, and the effect of the individual to maintain himself as a system ... relative neglect of the role played by the inner mental life ... the promotion of a dangerous, ethical relativism through a superficial, philosophic approach to individual and group ethics ... (and) an uncritical insistence
that there are no other ways of relating
to experience, apart from ... the
scientific attitude.

(1959, p.112, my emphasis)

Others such as Bertalanffy (1960), Couch (1960) and Schoeck (1960) demand that scientists should be aware of the dangers of over-emphasizing the value of a scientific epistemology. Battig (1962) and Bugental (1962b), for example, suggest that the attention of psychologists, in particular, be directed to creating the conditions for encouraging appreciation of the complexity of scientific activity as a human activity and one in which personal values play a major role.

My use of the term authoritative is, however, applied to any approach which claims that its own way of investigation, of knowing, of valuing human reality is the only one (Lambley, 1970b, 1970c). In particular, as developed in this thesis, the term is applied to the two psychotherapeutic value orientations.

The distinction is a subtle one. Whilst authors like Winthrop criticize scientistic thinking they suggest that another approach (in Winthrop's case an existential - humanistic one) is more appropriate. Clearly, from what has gone before, neither orientation in general offers an adequate solution to the value problem and both can be termed authoritative.
Now, it should be clear by this stage that the evaluation presented so far has been an evaluation from a particular point of view. This point of view is of course, the value problem defined in Section A. This approach was chosen to avoid subscribing to either value orientation's value theory. If one takes the naturalistic value system, one's theory generally has to take the form of an experiment in which unusual or new combinations of accepted variables are tested. Alternatively, if one commences with an existential—humanistic perspective one is often bound to explore the experiential aspect of a particular existential reality in order to ascertain the essential features of general Being (Van Kaam, 1961).

By being concerned with the value problem a particular theoretical viewpoint is implied. Quite obviously, the value problem, as I present it, is only a problem from the point of view that has been taken: if any other orientation had been taken, as I have shown, the problem would have disappeared.

Now that these preliminary points have been made, the theory itself can be outlined. This theory is in essence a non-authoritative approach to the value problem.
AN EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVE

There have been several authors who have been aware of and have attempted to resolve the dilemma created by the value problem in non-authoritative ways. We turn now to an examination of these approaches.

Many of these writers have been mentioned already in the preliminary discussion on existential philosophy and phenomenology but to begin with I shall go back to a problem faced by Husserl.

Husserl's main concern was to interrelate two seemingly unrelated concepts. That of an essential absolute reality and that of existential, subjective apprehension of this reality. Whilst Husserl developed numerous hypotheses his formulation of the concept of subjectivity has dominated the work of many phenomenologists and existentialists (Patterson, 1965).

In essence, Husserl's notion of subjectivity involved the postulation of a perceiving consciousness which created contact with the transcendent essence. This essence is only realized in consciousness of the right type (Fulton, 1966).

There are different definitions of the term "subjective" and some of these have been discussed by Spiegelberg (1966). He identified three meanings of the term;
(i) Subjective in the sense of merely personal, hence varying from person to person and from case to case, according to purely empirical circumstances ...

"Objective" is what is not subject to ...

personal variation.

(ii) Subjective in the sense of dependent upon a subject regardless of his personal, his typical or atypical constitution ...

objective is here anything that has no possible connection with a subject, and is therefore independent of it.

(iii) Subjective in the sense of subject-related ...

This is, in short, the general relational implication contained in (ii) above. The subject-related category involves, as it were, a continuum or degree of subject-related.

(p. 137)

Clearly Husserl's definition is of type (iii). It does however raise an interesting problem, that of the epistemological considerations surrounding the meaning of non-subjective.

This can be expressed in Husserl's case as a questioning of the "transcendental". Whilst we can appreciate the subjective...
involvement of the sort described in (ii) above, we have to ask what is the nature of that which is not-subjective yet at the same time subjective? For Husserl one has to ask how it is possible to know the essential "core" which, by his own admission is transcendental, that is both subject and non-subject related? To attempt, as Husserl did, to answer the problem by recourse to transcendentalism begs the question of how one is to know when one has attained this state. Is it the same for all who experience it? Does this essence have the same meaning for separate persons undergoing epoché?

These are examples of the sort of problem involved when the term "subjective" is used. Husserl's solution, as has been shown, was to differentiate between different types of perception. Within each separate perceiving subject there is the potentiality for achieving awareness of the non-subject related.

In short, he advocated a theory of perspectivity. That is, the difference between "correct" perception and purely "personal" (in the sense of (i) above) perception was merely a change of attitude or perspective. However, if we assume, with Husserl, that some form of perspectivism is essential to his theory then it is clear that what he is suggesting is that there is some new perspective which is the sum total and something more of all...
separate perspectives. By definition, this can no longer be a perspective, equally it is no longer subject-related. Husserl does not explain in any satisfactory way how the act which creates this total perspective can in fact subsume all others; we rely on his word and on the dictates of the phenomenological paradigm for this.

One is drawn therefore to the conclusion that whilst Husserl did not wish to use the terms "objective" or "independent to", this was the direction that he moved towards. Transcendentalism is subject-related but it is not personal: man, in process of the phenomenological reduction, contributes nothing personal to the transcendent essence, he is merely a voyeur of that which is beyond himself. His looking does not change the essentialistic nature of the essence.

For my own purposes I make the following point here; "subjective" does not necessarily imply personal factors as is often assumed. As Husserl uses the term it clearly does not involve, at least epistemologically, the unique personal variability of the human: this is, in fact, regarded as unimportant.

In other orientations the term is defined in relation to a specified object of interest and assumed to occur either simultaneously with the object or as a result of object action.
Examples of such a usage can be found in Champion (1967), Day (1969), Richardson (1965), and Winthrop (1963). Others such as Burt (1962) have developed similar subject-related theories to Husserl whilst certain writers (Bertalanffy, 1964, 1965, 1968; Feigl, 1958; Place, 1956; Smart, 1963) have preferred to identify subjective-experiential states with the occurrence of physical phenomena.

At root these usages do not differ overmuch from Husserl's since in each case the subjective aspect of human functioning is defined in terms of some objective pre-existant (Lyons, 1963). Clearly these various objective concepts are presumed to exist a priori to perception or to knowing. In Husserl's case transcendental "reality" appears before or prior to the particular individual's subjective awareness of it.

The point that I am making is that the personal should be brought more into focus since, so I shall argue, this is a basic requirement of a non-authoritative theory.

This conviction is echoed by Sartre's criticism of Husserl and his own approach to the problem is of considerable interest. Sartre (1940) argues that to think about an object requires some image of that object and this image cannot, logically, be that object since this is a denial of the ability of a subject to reflect on or think about anything else. 1 Thus we get the

1 "Essence is not in the object, it is in the sense of the object, the reason of the series of apparitions which unveil it" (Sartre, 1943, p.25).
beginnings of an epistemology which reaches its full fruition in *L'Être et le néant* (1943).

Sartre's theory of consciousness, closely related to the above, is also very relevant. Sartre contrasts two basic modes of "Being", that which is identifiable and that which is not. The first mode of being is *pre-reflective-existence*. The individual lives according to a particular identity; he is something and this something is usually given in terms of a theory about his identity which he accepts un-reflectively. The second mode of "being" occurs when the individual becomes aware consciously of the *theoretical* and provisional nature of his living, or, more relevantly, of his value choices.

Sartre believes that man has to fight to retain this essential "consciousness", since there are certain forces that seek constantly to remove this personal freedom created by a reflective-consciousness. These forces seek, in effect, to identify the person and thus make him something definite.

Now this is directly related to the distinction he made between the act of thinking and the "reality" intended by this thinking. Epistemologically, one cannot identify a person because this implies that everything is known about that person and to achieve this the person making the identification will have to predict every possible movement. However as Olafson (1967)
points out:

If I am informed of ... (a) prediction of my behavior, this knowledge will open up alternative possibilities of action in the situation in which it is predicted that I will act in a certain way. In existentialistic parlance, the prediction as well as the theory from which it derives and the sequence of events which that theory projects, become elements in my situation to which I can react in a number of different ways that are not determined by the theory itself. But, if coming to know a prediction theory of some kind by itself modifies the situation in question in a way that is relevant to the possibilities of action in it, then the deterministic case can be saved only by expanding the original theory to take account of these modifications. There would, therefore, have to be a second law-based prediction in which my reaction to the circumstances specified in the first law, as well as to the prediction itself, would be taken into account. But
the same issue arises with respect to this second law: does it predict what I will do in these circumstances if I also know of this new prediction? It appears that as long as I know what it is predicted I will do, a series of possibilities opens up that cannot be foreclosed by that prediction. (Pp. 149-150)

Sartre (1948a, 1948b) takes this further and argues that the individual who accepts an identity, that is, who lives in terms of a definite norm, such as living in terms of conventional morality or in terms of any clearly defined general law, is living a determined life. His every action can be predicted and is the responsibility not of the individual but of the particular thesis that he accepts as identity-giving.

The authentic, conscious individual on the other hand, is free to choose his own identity and thus his own responsibility. With this choice however, the individual experiences angoisse owing to the uncertain nature of authenticity and the taking of responsibility on to himself (Smith, 1964). As Sartre puts it;

I am condemned to exist forever beyond my

1 Where this term is used in what follows, it is used in the Sartrian sense.
essence, beyond the causes and motives of my act. I am condemned to be free.

(1956, p.515)

Sartre clearly alters the Husserlian notion of subjectivity towards a more personal model in which the individual himself constructs his own meaning or identity - it is not given to him by contact with an essential reality.

The reason why I have begun with Husserl and Sartre and not, say, with Skinner, or any behaviourist is because Sartre, in developing Husserl's phenomenology, achieves a deep appreciation of the value problem not generally found. Additionally, my own treatment of the value problem is derived in part from Sartre.

In the introduction I presented the value problem as arising out of an infinite regress and cited the work of people like Bridgman as suggesting the problem. The preceding outline of Sartre's theory can be seen to bear very closely on the value problem: Husserl conceived of that which has value (transcendental reality) as being "found" through a subjective-related epistemology whereas Sartre tried to show that such an epistemology involved establishing a value-identity which because of its certain identity could no longer be subject to the variations of a valuing (and thus personal) individual.
If we apply this point to the problem of value in psychotherapy, the following situation arises: from Husserl's point of view the therapist attends to the "real" structure of the situation by discarding all pre-existing, mundane assumptions about the patient and noting only those features that are of an essential nature. This point of view is not solely Husserlian but is a characteristic of all the existential-humanistic orientations discussed in Section B.

In short, this position involves the therapist removing personal valuations (or at least suspending them) from consideration. Implied here is the concept of a definite non-personal but nevertheless subjective value - the essential structure of psychotherapeutic reality. In terms of general therapeutic interest this is, of course, the matrix of the patient's personality and his "problem".

Sartre's argument is that such a formulation is not tenable since there is, epistemologically, no such reality structure. The therapist can only create his own personal valuation of the situation: he errs when he considers his valuation to be identical with a "real" problem.

Sartre, as Olafson (1967) has shown, subscribes to the value problem as I have outlined it; the therapist attempts to describe a reality and in doing so involves his own values.
Consideration of his interpretation by some outside agency in turn involves a value *a priori* and so on.

It would appear then that the search for "mental health", for the "good life" or for a penultimate value is doomed to fail because of the intrinsic limitations contained in the value problem. Further, the value problem would appear to curb "authoritativism" in that, for Sartre, authoritative dictates would presuppose the identifiability of such a penultimate value.

In this I agree as too, do I accept Sartre's formulation of the value problem. However, contained in Sartre's theory is a certain implied value that I believe is authoritative and in need of examination.

This issue centres around Sartre's development of the authentic theme. It appears that Sartre uses the value problem to present a new value, that of authenticity. Sartre points out that the individual can choose between living in a state of unawareness of non-consciousness, whereby he does not take advantage of the value problem or of his essential indeterminacy, and a state of such an awareness (Sartre, 1960).

By suggesting this it is clear that Sartre is advocating that a definite value choice exists which, if only individuals would choose it, would ensure that they live in "good faith". This is clear from the following quotation;
... whenever a man chooses his purpose and his commitment in all clearness and in all sincerity whatever that purpose may be it is impossible to prefer another for him ... One may object 'But why should he not choose to deceive himself?' I reply that it is not for me to judge him morally, but I define his self-deception as an error. Here one cannot avoid pronouncing a judgment of truth. The self-deception is evidently a falsehood, because it is a dissimulation of man's complete liberty of commitment.

(1948a, Pp. 50-51. My emphasis)

Man's "complete liberty of commitment" is an essentialistic value and is something which contradicts Sartre's own belief in the value problem (McGill, 1948; Natanson 1952). In short, if one says that the value problem prevents a value ever being identified since this involves the loss of the personal valuator then to make appreciation of this into a fact or into a basic "liberty" is, in turn, creating an identifiable value. The value problem in turn becomes a universal value (Naville, 1948).

My objection to Sartre's thesis is clear; the personal gives way to a generalized value, in much the same fashion
as Husserl’s theory gives way to a general subjectivity. The objection is even more clearly seen when applied to the psychotherapeutic situation. To advocate a basic "liberty" in therapy means that the therapist can recognize the "right choice" when an individual makes it. Clearly, from the value problem this is not possible in the sense that there exists a panacea-like "right choice". To discover an authentic value involves identifying it in therapy and as soon as one identifies it the individual patient loses, in Sartre’s terms, the freedom to act differently to any valuation of him.

Further, if – according to Sartre – the individual is unique and can choose his own determination, no other person can recognize this uniqueness simply because, in the absolute sense, recognition demands knowing on a one-to-one basis. If one should argue that only the type of uniqueness is recognized as Sartre, I feel, implies when he says "he, the individual, cannot be anything ... unless others recognize him as such (1948a, p.44)", then one is obliged, as was the case with other approaches to the value problem, to ask for the values on which such a typology is based. Clearly Sartre

1 See also Chambliss (1963) and Mead (1938).
would not recognize any consensus as determining a unique authenticity since this would be against his whole philosophy (as Naess, 1968 points out). Under the circumstances Sartre appears caught in his own dialectic.

Merleau-Ponty has argued that Sartre begins with the personal "act of freedom" almost as if this freedom appears out of nowhere. Consequently, attempts to describe this freedom must fail in the final analysis because "freedom" can only be described from a point of view which must not be the one described (Tillich, 1961).

Merleau-Ponty (1942, 1945, 1955) accepts, as does Sartre, the basic indeterminacy of man. He believes that Man's consciousness allows him to make of himself what he will, yet he feels that Sartre neglected to consider the full implications of his notions of consciousness and subjectivity.

In contrast, Merleau-Ponty argues that "free consciousness" is not an isolated, suddenly created process which once awakened is free to transcend all limitations previously existing but it is, rather, tied to something that is not itself. Using Sartre's own arguments, Merleau-Ponty suggests that consciousness cannot be aware of itself if it is alone - it requires some non-conscious (in Heidegger's terms, some "non-thing") contrast in order to be known.
Merleau-Ponty's own theory rests on the distinction he makes between three levels of "Being" the physical, the vital, and the human, each of which is related to the other by a dialectical process whereby each higher process is a new synthesis of a lower. Each manifestation of "Being" cannot, therefore, be said to determine the other, yet all are necessary aspects in the development of human "Being" (Waelhens, 1951).

In *La phenomenologie de la perception* (1945) Merleau-Ponty stressed the inter-relationship between these levels of "being" and the consciousness of the individual. Any development of consciousness has, so he believed, to be a dialectical movement from some pre-existent thesis. Consciousness, as a form of "Being" must be related to non-conscious forms of "Being".

In short, man's physical or bodily presence serves as the grounding which links the two manifestations of "Being". The body is the point of contact between consciousness and the world and, as Kwant (1963) points out, consciousness takes up an already on-going dialogue which by definition lies deeper than consciousness. It is consciousness that provides meaning at the human level of "Being".

It is not necessary to accept Merleau-Ponty's metaphysic.
to appreciate the point he is making here: Sartre's penultimate value of "freedom" can never be explicated entirely because man cannot transcend all his limits which would be required by such an explication. As Kwant puts it "Man would be absolute freedom if only he did not find himself in a situation which has already a meaning (1963, p.217)" referring, of course, to the dialogue of "Being".

So far what I have done is to contrast two ways of conceptualizing the "subjective" nature of the psycho-therapeutic situation. In each, subjectivity begins with the personal involvement of the observer-therapist and each ends with some authoritative value-choice being demanded which involves a penultimate value.

Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of Sartre's position emphasize that a pure "personalism" (an unique authenticity) is not consistent with the value problem since, as we have seen this omits consideration of the non-authentic - or the non-conscious. I prefer to re-interpret this as evidence that the position which invests the value of the individual with sole validity (as is Sartre's) is an authoritative position.

Clearly, one seeks now, a theory which allows for this important "clash" between objective (non-personal) value bias and personal (uniquely individual) value bias to be understood. One such approach is provided by a group of people whose writings show Merleau-Ponty's influence. I refer here to
Grene (1966, 1969), Koestenbaum (1961, 1966) and Polanyi (1958, 1962, 1965, 1966, 1968, 1969). These authors have proposed a philosophy of consciousness in which the inter-relationship between the personal values of the individual and the conditions which have to be assumed as a priori to that knowledge assumes significant status (Bannan, 1954). In this system:

... consciousness cannot be described as a reality whose essence consists of clear self-knowledge. My self-presence is conditioned by my existential field, which is never wholly a field of light.

(Kwant, 1963, p.218, my emphasis)

Polanyi has termed this "existential field" the tacit dimension which, he argues, consists of the "kind of indefinable insights which the current view of science regards as mere psychological phenomena, incapable of producing rational inferences (1968, p.27)".

The conceptualization of the situation by the authors is best seen in Polanyi's description of the "tacit triad". In essence in any situation there are three components. The first, subsidiary particulars ("fringe facts" for Koestenbaum) which are tacit background factors, allow the individual to focus on a particular attribute of the situation;
The relation of a subsidiary to a focus is formed by the act of a person who integrates one to the other. And so the from-to relation lasts only so long as a person, the knower, sustains this integration ... This is not merely to say that if we no longer look at a thing, we shall cease to see it. The knower can dissolve the triad by merely looking differently at the subsidiaries. The triad will disappear if the knower shifts his focal attention away from the focus of the triad and fixes it on the subsidiaries.

(Polanyi, 1968, Pp. 30-31)

It is the "knower" which forms the third part of this triad. Polanyi adds;

It is intuition that senses the presence of hidden resources for solving a problem and which launches the imagination in its pursuit. And it is intuition that forms there our surmises and which eventually selects from the material mobilized by the imagination
the relevant pieces of evidence and integrates them into the solution of the problem ...

All explicit thought ... can be developed and understood only by a tacit operation and it is thus based throughout on tacit knowing. All knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowing.

(1968, p.42)

This is relevant to this theory since it provides a way of describing the value problem and allowing for the infinite regress embedded in describing value to a situation: knowledge of values is personally created by the individual and can only be so created by excepting certain "subsidiary" values.

However, Polanyi does not stop at this. He writes;

... I have argued that personal knowledge is fully determined, provided that it is pursued with unwavering universal intent. I have expounded the belief that the capacity of our minds to make contact with reality and the intellectual passion which impels us towards this contact will always suffice so to guide our personal judgment that it will achieve the full measure of truth that lies within the scope of our particular calling.

(1958, p.27, my emphasis)
There is here the hint of a synthetic "truth" emerging and this is confirmed when later in the same book he suggests that his aim is that "unifying perspective of the different aspects of man (p.34)". This truth, Polanyi argues, can only be known "by dwelling within the unspecifiable particulars of its external manifestation (p.33)".

Now clearly this "truth", even if known by a development of the tacit triad and by "indwelling", is nevertheless an essential truth. Again the impression is given that only by following this method will "truth" manifest itself.

These points are important but should not blind us to the relevance of the work of Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Polanyi et al for our problem. We at least are now in the position of being aware of the pitfalls involved in attempting to solve the value problem. Perhaps the most prominent of such pitfalls is one that I mentioned earlier - that of the dangers of being authoritative, of refusing to accept that one's own solution is not sufficient, that there is, in a sense, a need to accept the provisionality of one's every act.

Further, it seems to me that the "solutions" proposed above fail to appreciate the nature of the therapist's (or any observer's) value dilemma: he is faced with the need to choose between value orientations and he is, frequently, held responsible
for this choice. Each suggestion above helps the therapist overcome this dilemma by subscribing to some "authentic" value choice. Clearly, for a Sartre or a Polanyi, it would be quite unacceptable for our therapist to choose to be inauthentic or to dismiss "tacit" assumptions.

These considerations now enable us to define an existential perspective. It is this; the therapist, as he considers various alternative claims to solution of the value problem is faced with numerous authoritative claims. He alone can choose - in the existential therapeutic situation - to accept or reject now this and now that orientation. Quite which he accepts or rejects, be it an existential or behavioural orientation is unimportant, all are (relatively-speaking) equally authoritative in that any choice as such is a movement away from the value dilemma.

The authoritative act is, then, one which identifies a particular value as being superior or better or in some way more realistic than another - in any given situation. Now, I want to argue that the existential situation defined above contains the possibility for two sorts of action, authoritative and non-authoritative and that both are essential features of any therapeutic action.
But first, consciousness and non-consciousness have been important issues in the preceding discussion and remain so here. I assume that the therapist has some awareness of at least the following: his patient and a number of possible ways of understanding him and his needs. These "ways of understanding" are not only formal value orientations of the type treated here, but involve too, numerous background valuations provided by what is normally understood by physiological, cultural, social and personality factors in the therapist (Natanson, 1969, Winthrop, 1961).

Now I do not imply that this awareness or consciousness is of such a type that certain factors are focussed upon while some remain hidden, nor is it of the type that some reside in an unconscious part of the mind. These are types of consciousness and, as such, are theories about mental functioning. When I use the term I do not imply any particular theory of consciousness but rather that in the existential situation the therapist is aware of certain factors: he can for example be aware of the value problem or cannot be aware. I do not mean that the value problem, if he is unaware of it, awaits discovery or is, in some Heideggerian sense, hidden (Wyschogrod, 1961).

The only limiting condition is that our problem is a specified one and consciousness is tied to a particular situation.
(psychotherapy) in which a therapist is in therapeutic relationship with a patient. The problem is an existential, conscious one: the therapist seeks to understand or value the patient in some way so that he can do some thing for the patient.

I should add that this definition of consciousness is an assumption which itself can be questioned but which is used here heuristically. Like McClure and Tyler (1967a, 1967b) I assume this as minimum: consciousness is consciousness of a particular situation.

From within this situation the therapist constructs his own awareness of particular value orientations. These, of course, need not be those outlined here but could be any orientations that the therapist is familiar with. However it is important to note that in constructing his awareness, the therapist does so eclectically. By this I mean that his knowledge of a particular value orientation is a function of how he understands and synthesizes the reading or other communication that he has with members of the orientation.

The importance of this point is established when we remember that the distinction that is to be made is between authoritative and non-authoritative actions, not whether or not the therapist acts in accordance with the essential features of
one orientation or another. It follows from this that the therapist cannot identify absolutely value orientations as existing independent to himself and to his own act of knowing. what he can do however is to familiarize himself with the writings etc., of particular people and for this reason, the therapist is an eclectic because what he knows is not identical to value orientation but is his own interpretation of these writings etc.

This becomes clearer if we consider the status of a theory or value orientation if it were identifiable completely. It would, for one thing, never change, never be subject to interpretative variation or to arguments over precise meaning of its postulates and axioms. In short such a position is not in keeping with the arguments developed by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Equally, to establish the existence of a definite value orientation requires that the essential features of that orientation be constant and identifiable, that is, without the bias provided by a human interpreter.

My use of the term "eclectic" refers to the personal and unique way in which the therapist conceives of the therapeutic situation. In so far as he knows that there is more than one way of looking at the therapeutic situation he is aware of the value problem, perhaps not in quite the same fashion as outlined here but at least in so far as alternative frameworks are
recognized as such. Judging from the number of articles devoted to attacking "non-acceptable" orientations, it seems fair to say that most if not all psychologists are aware to some degree of the dilemma.

Clearly in so far as we are concerned with value orientations the therapist will direct his attention to aspects of the situation according to a number of factors one of which will be the particular value orientation that he has, in the past, chosen or in which he was trained. Thus if he has subscribed to the naturalistic orientation he would be most likely to consider those aspects of the therapeutic situation which he is familiar with, and which can be easily identified with labels that he has learnt to regard as significant. An example would be particular symptoms or symptom patterns which the therapist presumes he has the techniques to remove.

Alternatively, if existentially or humanistically orientated, the therapist would go through more or less the same process of identification: absence or presence, for instance, of "neurotic guilt", general "apathy" or fragmentation and so on (Maddi, 1967). In both cases the therapist tries to search for some value which he can identify and so give him a lead as to what to do, how to behave, what to aim for, and so on.
Now, returning to the distinction referred to earlier, it becomes apparent that authoritative action is that action which involves the individual's commitment to a value orientation. Such an act is a decision that is of the type "I choose to be a behaviourist, an existentialist, or whatever". Now this choice defines the extreme authoritative position and applies in particular to the value orientations discussed in Section B. These orientations, as I have shown, reject almost completely the value problem. One is, as it were, an existentialist or a behaviourist, for life or at least for a greater part of one's life. Notice that, from the definition of eclectic, this commitment is a personal one and is based on the choice of the individual, as he perceives and has structured the situation.

At the other extreme, the non-authoritative position advocates complete adherence to the value problem. In the existential situation there exists numerous alternative value orientations which can be used to interpret the situation and to direct action. None of these values can be applied in such a way as to constitute a "correct" solution to the dilemma since there cannot be a "correct" solution in the absolute sense. Any solution has itself to be the subject of further evaluation and the evaluation evaluated and so on.
Naturally enough, however, the therapist has to decide to act and must at some stage make use of the ideas of respective value orientations. The therapist cannot not-act in order not to be wrong, or not to create conditions in which he has only a certain amount of control. He has to choose to do something and choosing to do nothing can be as authoritative as choosing to use behavioural techniques. Besides, what is doing nothing? Surely it is only nothing from some value position itself and involves the absence of that position rather than a zero act.

Non-authoritative therapeutic action is provisional action and means that the therapist acts (and can do so by using any means he chooses) but he does so while yet maintaining commitment to the value problem.

Provisionality arises in the following way; we accept that the therapist cannot hope to define the reality of the situation since such a definition involves total identification of the reality with no possibility for evaluation of the evaluator. Such an identification is authoritative and equates reality with what the therapist thinks is the case. Provisionality follows on from the contrast provided by the value problem and involves the notion that whatever the therapist does in the situation his act cannot be evaluated finally; provisionality being dependent on evaluation which in terms of the actual situation may take the
direction of being judged correct according to some value orientation known to me, or being judged as correct by the effect I see it has on the patient. Neither of which can be said to be final.

Maintenance of this provisional and non-authoritative state of mind requires the balancing provided by contrasting value-orientations as created by the conscious awareness of the therapist. There can be no appeal to any one authority as being above or beyond the individual or vested in the individual. Such an act of authority-seeking results in the removal of the balance, and the creation of certainty and identity: the patient's "problem" becomes established and the appropriate "cure" is preferred (Szasz, 1961).

Now, whilst others have intimated that the value problem, as such, is of central importance, they have not developed notions of provisionality in quite the same way as is done here. Merleau-Ponty and Sartre appear to come close: Sartre in his notion of the authentic consciousness keeping "bad faith" at bay which seems related to provisionality (Naess, 1968) and Merleau-Ponty's "ambiguity" which involves the individual having to tolerate a certain amount of ambiguity in his understanding of the human level of "Being". However, the term provisionality used here, as the term "consciousness", does not contrast "good" ways of evaluation with "bad" but compares the value
problem with numerous ways of evaluation and it is this distinction that allows in the long-run a non-authoritative position to develop.

**CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS**

As we have defined the existential situation here, it applies to a very particular time and space network. There is, for example, implied in the definition, the social institutional determination of concurrent therapist-patient exigencies (Hotopf, 1958, 1959). We accept that the therapist has a special (trained) position and that, by virtue of his training, he is placed in a position to convey directives as to how people should best live and so on. Clearly this need not be the penultimate definition of therapeutic action and indeed we err to consider it so.

However, in this thesis it has been assumed that the existential situation is one that most therapists are familiar with. Equally it has been assumed that the orientations discussed are relevant to modern psychotherapists.

The orientations treated pertain to this particular situation but, as mentioned before, any value orientations can be used. In so far as we are dealing with naturalistic and existential - humanistic orientations, comments will be restricted to them.
Now it seems fair to say that most therapists believe that the patient has, in some sense, a problem or problems in living. Now I want to suggest that the most important implication of the provisional position concerns this view of the patient.

From the authoritative position, the patient's problem has to be identified and this can be done in a variety of ways even to the extent of employing an approach which treats the patient's complaint multi-dimensionally. Provisionaliy, however, suggests that the patient does not have a complaint "out there" but that his "complaint" is only such according to the value orientation selected; if one shifts value orientations, the complaint need not necessarily remain as such although clearly it may do so.

This becomes apparent if we take, by way of example, the behavioural definition of a problem as a socially-deviant attitude and contrast it with an existentialist orientation's view which regards this "same" complaint as evidence of authentic action (Sartre for example on numerous occasions demands that a man be judged by his actions alone, not by his thoughts - surely a unique twist to delight any behaviourist). To be aware of the value problem both these interpretations are essential since they allow the clash of value interests to be appreciated.
To paraphrase Polanyi, the therapist's being aware of these two orientations constitutes a "provisional triad" in which the two alternate orientations are secondary background characteristics which intend the focus, the value problem. I should add that unlike Polanyi, this triad is a conscious one, not necessarily based on a tacit "truth". ¹

Clearly involved in this "triad" is a certain basic requirement. This is that the therapist has to be aware of the two orientations treated here. He should, at least initially, know what the "other" has to say. However one cannot say precisely what this requirement has to be since the therapist constructs his awareness eclectically. As the various orientations have been presented here they have been presented eclectically as I see them. Any awareness should be sufficient to at least appreciate the value problem.

Now, it seems to me, that two important points follow from this conceptualization of the patient's problem. The first concerns the status of mental illness and the second therapeutic action.

In Section A, the problem of value was related to the problem of mental health: in a sense how each value orientation conceptualizes the person and his problems is intimately related to that orientation's picture of mental good and bad health.

¹ The third part of the triad is, of course, the therapist.
Now, it is apparent that the provisional position is in agreement with those theorists who have argued that mental illness is not an illness "out-there" (Smith, 1961).

Mental health is, in terms of provisionality, not a unitary concept, indeed it cannot be identified as a goal whether applied in terms of the health of the individual or the health of a societal community, but has to be seen as a complex concept made up of how different people view mental health.

The problem of mental health is the problem of value applied psychotherapeutically. In order to be non-authoritative the problem has to be seen as such, it has to be seen as the existence of conflicting directives for health provided by the various value orientations. In this sense we can agree with Szasz that mental health involves "problems in living" but we add that mental health is, equally, a problem. Can we, for example, identify the mentally healthy personality? I think not. Not, certainly, in the sense of creating an essential mode of living: we cannot, and indeed must not, if we are to remain aware of the value problem, believe that the healthy person is non-fragmented, or whole, or has a congruity between affect and cognition, or is well-adjusted.
These are authoritative dictates and are part of the way in which therapists refer to mental health but should not be regarded as, therefore, the equivalent of mental health. Equally, we cannot dispose of them, they are functional to our provisionality and this is why the provisionality advocated here does not in itself present a new way of looking at human action and human problems - it merely provides the means for therapists being made aware of the value problem. As Jourard (1967) puts it:

Might it not be better to teach acceptance of the paradoxical than to require as a 'mark of maturity' that the individual hang his identity on a limited set of his capacities for being?

(p. 25)

In terms of the naturalistic and existential - humanistic orientations, the therapist, to be aware of the value problem, should be able to appreciate that both behavioural and existential perspectives for example, define mental health yet without believing, as Hitt (1967) for example, does, that a third "new" perspective will emerge from such an appreciation.

The next point concerns the action that follows from the above. In choosing to act provisionally, the therapist does not necessarily act in a new way - he may, for example, choose to
act existentially or behaviouristically. What he does do, however, is appreciate that his action is not an action in full accordance with behavioural values or humanistic values, but is a unique act in which he, as a part of the existential situation acts as he has understood these values. That is, in his action as well as in his construction of the situation he is eclectic and cannot identify completely what he has done (Lambley, 1970a).

The best example of this point is perhaps Lazarus' admission that he was always able to understand his actions in terms of S-R psychology until he appreciated the personal influence that he himself imparted to the situation. Now he interprets all he does in terms of technical eclecticism. The point here is that why should the re-interpretation end here? Clearly, the structure of his action is a provisional one and it is not a question of what the therapist did do or did not do, but of his ability - as part of the existential situation - to identify what had taken place.

It follows from this that the uniqueness of the therapist's actions are his own responsibility in so far as it is he alone that makes them. He may feel that he acted in accordance with the dictates of a value orientation but this is an authoritative shifting of responsibility away from himself and away from the
value problem. By being provisional, the therapist is not bound by the requirements of belonging to particular value orientations and he is free to combine as he deems necessary the various orientation's values into unique syntheses. Equally he can choose to use behavioural techniques with one patient and existential "techniques" with another, without feeling that he has to be consistently "behavioural" or "existential". His is the responsibility alone if he chooses to be provisional.

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