SOUTH AFRICA AND POLITICAL CHANGE:
AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED STUDIES
OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS

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TO MY MOTHER AND FATHER
for being the people they are
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It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject allows.

Aristotle
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PART I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE AIMS OF THE THESIS

To a political scientist the challenge is irresistible of trying to explain and understand a conflict society which is generally characterised in the world as historically anachronistic, politically untenable, economically wasteful and morally unacceptable. It is common cause that South Africa will change. What are the likely ways in which the conflict will be resolved, and which is most likely?

These are the questions to which this thesis will attempt to provide answers: it is an effort to determine, as far as possible, the nature, direction and pace of change in South Africa, as seen by a selected group of recent studies of South African politics.

The method will be to test the validity of the respective positions on this and related issues embedded in the selected studies of South African politics. Part II, the major part of the work, therefore, is an examination of the
explicit or implicit assumptions and values, the conceptual and theoretical frameworks, the use of evidence, the existence of counter evidence, the omissions, inconsistencies and conclusions of various studies of South Africa, in order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of each as explanations of the political, social and economic process. In the course of the examination, an alternative analysis of the issues will be presented and defended.

A synopsis of the analysis will be given in Part III. This will be used as a means for testing the analyses of the selected studies, before selecting what is valid in all of them in terms of providing possible answers to the questions posed about the resolution of conflict.

1.2 THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The immediate difficulty encountered with this subject is the meaning of the concept 'change', and it is worth elaborating on what is meant by change at the outset of the thesis.

The South African system has certain core characteristics. These are White control of the power structures, institutionalised racial stratification, differential
incorporation into the political and economic system, a largely capitalist economy, economic interdependence between racial groups, and an unusual degree of cultural heterogeneity. These factors partially determine the patterned political, social and economic interactions of people in the system.

There are two possible ways in which the South African system can change. The first is marginal change, which does not affect the salient features of the system, and the second is fundamental change, which does affect the core characteristics. These correspond to Talcott Parsons' distinction between change within and change of systems. As Coser points out,

"even though it may be difficult to pinpoint the exact time at which one social system has been transformed into another, we can talk of changes of social systems when all major structural relations, basic institutions, and prevailing value systems have been transformed" (Coser, 1967, p.18).

For example, it could be argued that the creation of a Cabinet Council which excludes Africans, and in which Indians and Coloureds have a consultative rather than an executive role, is marginal change which does not alter the basic
characteristics of the system. Fundamental change, if it were also equitable change, would result in a system in which no South African would be at a disadvantage because of skin colour or ethnic affiliation.

The distinction between 'marginal' and 'fundamental' change, and between change 'within' a system or 'of' a system, is naturally a relative one, since there is always some sort of continuity between the past, present and future of a social system. Societies do not experience birth and death, except metaphorically, in the same way as biological organisms.

Relevant to this is a further distinction between 'purposive' change, which is brought about by overtly political action (the establishment of independent homelands, say, or three parliaments for White, Brown and Indian), and 'non-purposive' change, brought about as a result of, for example, new technology, or an increase in African birth rates, which are not planned political moves but may nevertheless have a clearly political impact on the system.

Since change, even revolutionary change, is a process, it is necessary to define what is meant by the term social or political 'process'. The term is used descriptively by political scientists of various ideological positions. A Marxist would see the historical process as being formed
through the tensions generated by the differential access of individuals and groups to scarce resources and power in society. It is an essentially conflict view of society, and according to Marx conflict leads not only to ever changing relations within the existing social structure, but the total social system undergoes transformation through conflict.

Easton suggests that

"the political process . . . is a continuing flux of activity among social elements that seek to influence policy. The process conception views social elements as in constant tension or power struggle over policy, and the task of the political scientist is to extricate the various elements for independent study in order to examine the exact role of each. But for most political scientists, the political process is not only a complex network of human interactions; it is also specifically the interaction of groups" (Easton, 1953, p.175).

The concept is useful for South Africa specifically because the country is clearly divided into differentially incorporated groups within the social and political systems, and generally because it emphasises that politics is the dynamic product of interacting groups.
The problem, however, goes deeper than definitions of change, to the analysts' fundamental perception of society. One possible way of looking at society is as a system in which stability is the norm and change is pathological, a system which tends towards equilibrium. For example, Barrington Moore has pointed out that

"as the expressions 'immune' and 'vulnerable' show, English usage imposes a conservative bias on the analysis of revolutions: the implicit assumption is that a 'healthy' society is immune to revolution" (Moore, 1966, p.457).

Since each word in a language is a shared symbol, we understand the implicit images common to most members of society by examining the words used to describe certain phenomena.

Another way of viewing society is as a collection of conflicting interests in which continuous change is the norm. In other words, coercion, conflict and change are seen as more basic societal attributes than consensus and equilibrium. Marx's basic premise was that collective interests and concomitant confrontations of power are the central determinants of the social process.

These two views of society are not necessarily mutually exclusive: actual societies are held together by a mixture
of factors, including consensus, coercion and interdependence. Coser affirms that a mature political theory is aware that consent and coercion are at the basis of the political order, analogously to mature psychology being aware of the intricate interplay of nature and nurture in the determination of psychological phenomena. Later in his study of social conflict he notes that

"to Marx, societal equilibrium was a special case of disequilibrium, whereas to current normative functionalism, disequilibrium is a special case of equilibrium" (Coser, 1967, p.141).

Are South African conditions such that social conflicts will lead to inner adjustments, or to the disintegration of the existing social order? This problem is the central concern of this thesis.

In any discussion of change, the time factor is of critical importance: if this were not so, there would be no difference between a theory which argued for the end of White domination in fifteen years and one which suggested that ultimately, perhaps in a century or more, the Africans would become dominant.
1.3 METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS

This thesis accepts the assumption that continuous change is the norm: where there is a (temporary) equilibrium, there must have been conflicting forces which led to its establishment in the first place; and conflicting forces will lead towards the establishment of a new (temporary) equilibrium, and so on throughout history. Clearly, social life always involves change, sometimes fast, sometimes slow, sometimes peacefully and at others violently, which in the end results in the formation of a new social system and the disappearance of the old order. The model used in this thesis, therefore, will be a combination conflict and equilibrium model.

The concept of power is a useful one for organising the study of politics, and it is one which influences the analysis in this work. The insights gained from systems theory, game theory, communication theory and other approaches to political science are also useful in analysis, depending on the topic under examination.

Some sort of explanatory framework is required, since it is insufficient to simply describe the facts and let them speak for themselves; on the other hand it is unlikely that any
one model or paradigm of politics can bear the weight of interpretative burden placed upon it. One cannot assume that a syncretic approach is prima facie better than any other, but it is often helpful in the study of South Africa in avoiding the pitfalls of compartmentalisation, one-sidedness and excessive reliance on a particular theory.

Different theoretical perspectives all contribute to the explanation and understanding of South African society. Lever (1978, pp.100-101), for example, gives several suggestions of features from different theories which are valuable for the formation of a more all-embracing theory. A few of these are: from the race cycle theory, the notion that relations between groups develop, although such development is not necessarily progressive or unilinear; from the functionalist theory, the notion that value dissensus may be disruptive of society; from the Marxist theory, the importance of position in the economic hierarchy as relevant in shaping the beliefs of actors; and from the theory of the plural society, the diversity of groups serving to limit or define communication and contact.

An interdisciplinary approach is also valuable:

"Given a problem or a problem area, then it is
rarely that one approach alone would be sufficient. We need a detailed knowledge of all the relevant aspects of the problem, not only purely economic but also institutional, political and social. We must be prepared to go beyond the conventional boundaries of economics . . ." (Knight, 1977, p.40).

The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the study of political events.

A major simplifying assumption of this thesis is that individuals and groups in South Africa attempt to pursue their perceived self-interest, which is compatible with a wide range of prescriptions and actions, but not always rationally or morally. The pursuit of self-interest is also assumed to apply to groups and countries outside the Republic.

1.4 THE SELECTED STUDIES

Pierre van den Berghe's work was chosen because it suggests that developments in South Africa would take the form of increasing conflict, which in turn would lead to the breakdown of the system. Heribert Adam, on the other hand, suggests that the ruling elite is not so intransigent as to preclude all adjustments to the system, but is attempting to secure survival at the minimum cost. O'Dowd is included
because his is an explicit theory of change, and was a seminal work in the South African context of the argument that industrialisation and general modernisation lead to liberalisation.

The works of writers such as Giovanni Arrighi, F.A. Johnstone, Shula Marks, Harold Wolpe, Martin Legassick, Stanley Trapido and others are included because their studies have applied different perspectives and added a new dimension to research on South Africa. These studies suggest, inter alia, that racial discrimination was useful for the development of South African mining, industry and agriculture, and that change is unlikely to result from the forces for change identified by O'Dowd and similar thinkers.

Although these are the major writers whose works are examined, there are many others who make useful contributions towards understanding South Africa, some directly, such as Diana Russell on revolution, and others such as Barrington Moore and Walt Rostow indirectly, by influencing writers on South Africa.

Indeed, this work developed as a result of concern with the profusion of analyses and theories on the subject of South African politics, particularly when the focus is on change.
It represents an effort to put some of these academic findings into perspective, to explain the interrelated political, social and economic process, and finally, to suggest the ways in which conflict might be resolved, and what the consequent range of outcomes might be for South African society.
PART II
2.1 PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE

2.1.1 Aims, Analytical Concepts and Assumptions

Professor van den Berghe is a social scientist who analysed South Africa ('South Africa: A Study in Conflict', Wesleyan University, 1965), in a work which Heribert Adam later described as the

"most thorough overall study of South Africa published in the sixties and an analysis relying less than others on a single social science" (Adam, 1971, p.120).

This section will begin with a brief discussion of his aims, analytical concepts and assumptions. Van den Berghe affirms that his work is an attempt to analyse South African society in its entirety, from a broad sociological perspective. The difficulties in achieving this aim arise from the complexities of South African society. He continues to outline the broad characteristics of the society, the compartmentalised groups which nevertheless interact, the rapid change in industrial-
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isation and the relatively static ascriptive system of stratification, and summarises the outcome as a high level of internal conflict, contradiction and dysfunction.

Indeed the key analytical concept of his study is conflict, which results from conflict over the distribution of social rewards, from the lack of value consensus in South African society, and from the role ascription in terms of race. Van den Berghe stresses early his belief that the meritocratic demands of an industrialised state are incompatible with role ascription by race, so that conflict and contradictions have become increasingly acute over the years.

Van den Berghe's assumption of the incompatibility of apartheid (understood as role ascription by race) and industrial development is a recurring theme in studies of South Africa, with some observers arguing for and others against the assumption.

As an explicit assumption in his analysis of South Africa, Van den Berghe accepts the Talcott Parsons' functionalist postulate that value consensus is a necessary condition for the existence of a society, and that, should this be lacking, the society faces disruption. He also uses Hegelian dialectical concepts, arguing that both functionalism and
Hegelian-Marxian dialectic present one-sided but complementary and reconcilable views of society.

Coser quotes Van den Berghe as seeing his theoretical effort leading towards the establishment of a theory of society:

"that achieves an adequate balance between stability and the various sources of endogenous and exogenous change, between consensus and conflict, and between equilibrium and disequilibrium" (Coser, 1967, p.5).

2.1.2 The Central Theme

There is a clear connection between Van den Berghe's theoretical assumptions and his prognosis of instability and possibly revolution in South Africa. Societies with low value consensus are unstable societies; South Africa has a low value consensus and is therefore unstable. Interdependence defuses conflict, but in South Africa the absence of value consensus overcomes interdependence. Therefore, South Africa will progressively destabilise to a revolutionary situation:

"Under these circumstances violence and revolution seem inevitable . . ." (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.182), and "although the exact course of events is impossible to foresee in any detail, the likelihood of revolution seems high. Mounting internal strains and
external pressures doom White supremacy and racial segregation within the near future. . . " (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.262).

Thus the central theme of his work is that developments in South Africa will take the form of increasing contradictions, dysfunctions and conflict within the system, which will lead to the breakdown of the system itself.

2.1.3 The Study of South Africa

Within the terms of his perspective, therefore, the South African political order presents to Van den Berghe the anomaly of a system which does not appear to rest on value consensus. In his study, Van den Berghe does not appear to resolve this point in an entirely satisfactory manner, except to suggest that perhaps the conventional functionalist approach is inadequate (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.4). At other points in his study he says that

"the functionalist model of society as characterised by a high degree of integration, normative consensus, and equilibrium must be regarded as one-sided, and revised to incorporate the concepts of conflict, malintegration, and disequilibrium" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.216); and "the postulate that value consensus is a functional prerequisite of any society is patently contradicted by the existence
of numerous culturally pluralistic societies wherein several groups have radically different values" (Van den Berghe, 1965, pp.217-218).

However, his predictions of revolution, quoted above, do flow logically from his perspective. If he argued that South Africa could possibly or probably have a revolution, he would not falsify his assumptions. However, as has been seen, Van den Berghe was categorical, not only about revolution, but about revolution in the near future.

The revolution has not occurred, so two conclusions are possible:

(i) that Van den Berghe's prediction of revolution might still be correct, but it will take much longer to materialise than he thought; and

(ii) that his theoretical assumptions are of debatable validity when applied to the South African situation and need to be modified.

In the long term, it may be that his conclusions and the sorts of theoretical assumptions that they rest on will be validated. However, it is interesting to consider why his conclusions of revolution in the short term has not been validated. Over any given time span, whether the forces
leading towards disintegration of South African society will prevail depends not only on their own momentum, but on the strength of the countervailing forces within the society. A weakness of Van den Berghe's study is that he does not sufficiently stress these countervailing forces, as, for example, does Kuper:

"There is too much interdependence to sustain the threat of severance or divisive conflict. In fact, apartheid restructures the society by an elaboration of intercalary institutions and structures, which bind together, as with hoops of steel, the units-in-separation" (Kuper, 1971, p.182).

Van den Berghe is aware that plural societies have "often been held together by a mixture of political coercion and economic interdependence" (Van den Berghe, 1965, pp.138-139), but appears to have judged that the forces leading to malintegration were stronger. In the short run, at least, his judgement does not appear to have been borne out by events: as will be pointed out later in this section on Van den Berghe, revolution still seems to be a remote possibility in the foreseeable future.

Van den Berghe says that
"I have introduced on occasions a Hegelian dialectic in my argument, and indicated the usefulness of such an approach to analyse the conflicts and contradictions in South Africa" (Van den Berghe, 1965, pp.265-266).

It is worth giving an illustration of this use of dialectics, so that the way he applies both functionalism and Hegelian dialectics to his analysis of South Africa will be clear before going on to summarise and interpret his main ideas. The following analysis is a good illustration:

"Because the missionaires all but monopolised African education until the 1950's, and insofar as they have emphasised (in theory, if seldom in practice) the egalitarian and universalistic aspects of the Western ethic, they have been the first and most effective agents to spread the values with which Africans were later to challenge the legitimacy of White supremacy. In South Africa, as in many other parts of the continent, Christianity, which preceded or accompanied European conquest, has spread the seeds of the destruction of colonialism. But whereas elsewhere this Hegelian dialectical process was recognised only quite late, in South Africa, the Afrikaners have, from the seventeenth until the nineteenth century, combated the spread of the Gospel as conducive to the 'corruption of the Natives'. The Boers opposed the baptism of slaves quite early in the history of the Cape settlement, and later they consistently and bitterly opposed the activities of the London Missionary Society" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.230).
2.1.4 The Main Ideas

Van den Berghe points out that the modernisation process politicised the Africans, but that their demands were met by increasing repression rather than reform, so that South Africa's history has been one of emerging polarisation between the races. This polarisation, he suggests, greatly increases the chances of upheaval.

Continuing White intransigence, moreover, contributes to the polarisation:

"If White racialism has powerfully contributed to the creation and continuation of South African society in its present form, it will just as surely help to bring about the total collapse of White domination. Such is the basic dialectical process of change in South Africa" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.246).

The study essentially concludes that White intransigence plus polarisation plus external pressure add up to a high likelihood of revolution. The situation is such that

"any retreat would precipitate the crisis, but every new repressive measure, while postponing the explosion, also increases its potential violence" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.262).
These are the central thrusts of Van den Berghe's arguments and the conclusions he draws from his study of South Africa.

As has already been noted, Van den Berghe believed that the forces leading towards malintegration were stronger than those leading towards, at least, an uneasy maintenance of the core characteristics of the South African polity, or perhaps even greater interdependence and integration between the various groups which he identified as playing a political role. The reasons for this are probably to be found in his theoretical assumptions, and also in that he does not consider the possible counter-arguments to his own in sufficient detail and depth; the latter is probably the critical weakness in his study of South Africa.

For example, Van den Berghe saw what he regarded as the incompatibility of apartheid and urbanisation as an important dysfunction in the system. Other academic observers, whose work will be considered later in this thesis, question the assumption by Van den Berghe and others that economic growth is incompatible with apartheid. On the contrary, it is argued, apartheid was highly functional for the development of South African mining, farming and industry. Van den Berghe does not adequately consider this possibility, although he is aware that there
is no rigid application of what he terms macro-apartheid for economic reasons. The industrialisation debate developed into a wider range of perspectives on the problem than were examined by Van den Berghe, whose conclusion is that

"the fact that the economy has expanded does not mean that it is not inefficient, ridden with dysfunctions, and generative of mounting conflicts" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.215).

These economic strains, therefore, are seen by him as one of the forces leading to the disintegration of the South African system.

Van den Berghe stresses the role of Afrikaner values on policy, and suggests that the Afrikaner people, and the National Party, are reactionary in the sense of trying to recreate some idyllic situation of the agrarian past.

Against the evidence of a "pragmatic race oligarchy" as described later by Adam (though Adam probably overstressed the rational, pragmatic aspect of the Afrikaner leadership), Van den Berghe argues that

"every attempt was made /By the Whites/ to resist social /In contrast to strictly technological/ change, or even to revert to a paternalistic, master-and-servant model of
society. Lack of change or reactionary change can thus result in ever increasing malintegration, and one may describe the political deadlock as one of static disequilibrium" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.273).

Van den Berghe labours the notion that Whites and particularly Afrikaners wish to go back to "old-style colonial paternalism" (p.111) and the "good old days of the Boer Republics" (p.105), and does not widen his conceptual horizons to consider, for example, the possibility of a modernising oligarchy with an evolving system of domination.

He does not note the differences in Afrikanerdom, but this may be for understandable reasons, since it seems there are no serious differences in the fundamental aims and methods of Nationalist social policy. There are Afrikaners with different perspectives like Kowie Marais, Nic Olivier, or Johannes Degenaar, who questioned whether Nationalists like Dr Treurnicht asked themselves how much the apartheid policy and maintenance of Afrikaner identity has cost South Africa in terms of social injustice and human suffering. Professor Degenaar suggested that some young Afrikaners rejected the possibility of a "pure Afrikaner heaven in favour of a just South African earth", and affirmed that "I agree with Voltaire: men will continue to commit atrocities as long
as they believe in absurdities" (Degenaar, 'The Cape Times', 5th September 1977, p.7).

However, these are intellectuals who do not have direct influence on the power elite, so their views do not constitute a politically significant difference in Afrikanerdom. The Government decides and implements policy, and the Afrikaner intellectuals are either left out or drawn into the fold, depending on their own perceptions of Government policies at any point in time.

Although Van den Berghe was writing and researching in a more ideologically hide-bound era, his portrayal of the Afrikaners as a backward-looking monolithic bloc shows some lack of sensitive analysis.

He ought also to have made it clearer that although the South African Government has enormous powers to impose its values in the form of policies, it interacts with its environment to a certain extent, and this environment imposes constraints as well as provides possibilities. The constraints imposed by the environment (for example, African and White interdependence in the economic sphere) have effectively prevented the ideological blueprint of separate development from solving South Africa's problems in the way
the Nationalist Government had thought it might.

2.1.5 Acquiescence in the System

Van den Berghe is aware that there are factors militating against his prediction of disintegration in South Africa, but he does not actually follow through this understanding, thereby leaving his analysis incomplete. As Petryszak has pointed out:

"A more complete understanding of the reasons for the continued passivity of the South African minority (1) population requires a careful evaluation of the characteristics and objectives of the White power structure, as well as the ways by which the minority groups themselves contribute to the perpetuation of the social, political and economic system as it exists in South Africa today" (Petryszak, 1976, p.445).

In this analysis, the same writer suggests that the seeming differences between the Whites themselves, particularly in their attitudes to non-Whites, confuse the latter about the

(1) The author writes that "the term minority is used here in the sociological sense in reference to the degree of power . . . which the Africans, Asians and Coloureds hold in South Africa, rather in terms of their absolute numbers as percentages of the population."
real source of their subordination. Other factors which contribute to at least a minimum acquiescence in the system (enough to prevent its disintegration) include the minimal success of the ideology of Black consciousness, partly because it stresses fictitious links between Africans, Indians and Coloureds; an increasing amount of value consensus as regards orientation towards a modern consumer society; and a hesitancy on the part of non-Whites to destroy the socioeconomic system on which they are dependent for livelihood and satisfaction of the material benefits idealised in western culture.

Other observers have also emphasised the factors leading towards the maintenance of the status quo:

"One further point is often overlooked. People involved in a social system often closely reflect that system in their values and attitudes. Despite obvious reasons for conflict and resistance, and despite evidence of discontent, a considerable degree of consensus or compliance can still exist. Thus to assume that Africans in South Africa are in a constant ferment over the injustices perpetrated upon them is to underestimate the effectiveness of the very oppression and conditioning to which they are subjected" (Lemon, 1976, p.221).

This psychological dimension of domination can be further
articulated:

"Get some notions of what a person's system of channels is like and you have a rough sketch of the network within which he is prepared to exercise his human right to freedom. Observe the shrinkage of a man's system, and you find yourself a witness to a gradual human enslavement, enslavement without barbed wire or coercion. When a person can apply a construct to his own behaviour, consciously or unconsciously, it opens for him a channel of choice along which he is more or less free to move. But without such a channel his freedom has no dimension, no extent; he cannot even strive towards objectives, nor can he hope for things to come, nor long for something out of reach, for he has no idea of what he is missing, nor even any sense of missing at all. He can no more move about in lines he has not construed than he can use the fourth dimension to sidestep a locked door. This is why, throughout the history of the world, men seeking what they supposed to be freedom have struggled heroically to change their masters, but have made only feeble efforts to lose their chains" (G.A. Kelly, 1962, p.87).

Perhaps the demonstration effect of Angola and Mozambique, and possibly Zimbabwe in the future, together with the growth in communications since Van den Berghe wrote, has heightened awareness of their position among the Africans.
The Soweto generation, though brought up entirely under apartheid, or perhaps because of it, are likely to be politicised and to 'have an idea of what they are missing'. Ironically, and as Van den Berghe has written, "the government's policy of creating uniracial Bantustans might backfire and be seized upon by African leaders to adopt an ideology of Black racialism" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.149). Van den Berghe does not expand on the Black consciousness movement or Black leadership, probably because the 1960's, during which period he researched and wrote, were years of relative quiescence in which opposition to apartheid was being eliminated.

Thus far it appears that Van den Berghe underplays the cohesiveness of South African society (which is owing to cross-cutting economic interests and values) and overplays the polarisation of the races.

There is a tendency in Van den Berghe's study to examine only the aspect of a given phenomenon which interests him in any depth, and to neglect other factors. Naturally, the future consequences of present actions are often unpredictable; there are too many variables whose implications are not clear, and new factors may enter the equation, all of which make it difficult to relate the independent and dependent variables to one another in a systematic way, to assign weights to each,
and to make prediction less dangerous: Van den Berghe, however, does not take as much care in considering why his predictions might be invalidated, as he does to show that they will be validated by events in South Africa.

2.1.6 Revolution

Nowhere is this tendency clearer than in his consideration of revolution, and for this reason the notion of 'revolution' will be examined in detail in the following pages. Another reason for so doing is that the possibility of system breakdown must be examined in order to reach some conclusions on the nature, direction and pace of change in South Africa.

Whether academic observers like Van den Berghe envisage systemic pathology leading to dissolution, or whether they advocate revolution as the only remedy for the Africans, Coloureds and Indians to improve their relative position, they have rarely attempted to analyse in depth the meaning and possibility of revolution in South Africa.

Van den Berghe, for example, does not define what he means by revolution. In order to clarify what is meant by revolution, reference will be made to the definitions suggested by Diana Russell and Chalmers Johnson. Russell says that:
"Rebellion is defined as a form of violent power struggle in which the overthrow of the regime is threatened by means that include violence. In a successful rebellion, overthrow is achieved whereas it is not achieved in an unsuccessful rebellion. A successful revolution may be said to have occurred when substantial social change follows a rebellion; and a revolution is regarded as unsuccessful when little social change results therefrom" (Russell, 1974, p.6).

The Chalmers Johnson view of revolution is change effected by the use of violence in government, and/or regime, and/or society. By society is meant the consciousness and the mechanics of communal solidarity, which may be tribal, peasant, kinship, national and so on; by regime is meant the constitutional structure—democracy, oligarchy, monarchy; and by government is meant specific political and administrative institutions. Violence is not the same as force; it is force used with unnecessary intensity, unpredictably, and usually destructively.

A possible point of departure for examining revolutionary potential in South Africa is to ask

"Why should the present system not continue indefinitely? Most people in the world would give the same answer to that question: because the system is morally evil, and humanity has
ceased to tolerate that kind of evil" (Keppel-Jones, 1974, p.38).

However, Keppel-Jones confesses a little cynicism in the matter of moral forces in human affairs; on the other hand, and this is probably one of the points of observers who predict revolution in South Africa, if most of the people within a given society find it reprehensible, then there is a theoretical likelihood of revolution. This is a factor, but there are other, less intangible factors to be considered, those of the ruling elite and the role of the armed forces being the most important in South Africa.

Following Van den Berghe's assertion "that South Africa has survived so long in such an acute state of disequilibrium is indeed highly problematic for sociological theory" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.213), Russell continues:

"In my analysis, too, the case of South Africa seems to challenge the validity and usefulness of most theories (2) of causation of rebellion and revolution. Most of the theories focus on conditions that affect the rebels and do not consider the conditions that

(2) E.g. the 'misery theories', the relative-deprivation theories, the Davies J-curve theory, Tilly's 'uprooting' thesis; Johnson's 'multiple dysfunctions plus elite intransigence plus an accelerator equals revolution' theory, Marx's polarisation of the haves and have-nots, as well as the central role of organisation, and so forth.
affect the regime and its agents, or the wider structural context of rebellion. That is why they are useless in understanding the South African situation where it is probably not that the push for rebellion is weak, but that the obstacles are so enormous" (Russell, 1974, pp. 53-54).

The elitist thesis, "that a rebellion or revolution can succeed only if the regime or elite is disintegrating or disunited, or loses confidence in itself, or stops believing that it has the right to keep the power" (Russell, 1974, p.53), is critical for South Africa. Neither the Nationalist Party nor the Afrikaner people show signs of serious disintegration: on the contrary, they appear to be both united and resolute on the core issue of White survival (i.e. White domination), if not on more peripheral issues.

The other critical factor is the role of the armed forces. In a systematic study of seven successful and seven unsuccessful rebellions, Russell established that armed force disloyalty is a necessary condition for successful rebellion (rebellions may still erupt, but they cannot win unless a significant part of the armed forces is either neutralised or changes sides). It may be superfluous to add that it seems highly unlikely that there will be disloyalty on the part of the South African armed forces. The current small-
scale recruitment of non-Whites may or may not result in the long-term creation of a portion of the armed forces which will be willing to turn against the White regime.

Eckstein makes a distinction between the preconditions for internal war (3) and obstacles to it (Eckstein, 1965, p.159). He conceives of preconditions as the positive forces that make for internal war, and obstacles as the negative forces that work against it. Applied to South Africa, the probability of a successful rebellion occurring depends on the relative strengths of these positive and negative forces: it is perfectly possible that the preconditions might be present, but the obstacles are too considerable for rebellion to occur, much less succeed.

Since predictions of revolution are commonly found in works on South Africa, it is worth analysing the phenomenon in more detail. This will not only clarify the internal preconditions for revolution, but bring into prominence another factor of vital importance, that of external intervention on the side of those working for revolutionary change.

(3) 'Internal war' is a much broader concept than 'revolution' as defined above. All that the various forms of internal war—strikes, terrorism, civil war etc. have in common is the use of violence.
In his discussion of external pressures, Van den Berghe suggests that "revolutionary change will thus probably result from a combination of several of the following actions: strong international sanctions, strikes and passive resistance in the urban centres, peasant revolts in the rural areas, and well-organised sabotage from a foreign-based underground receiving outside military assistance and training" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.263).

Statements such as "a South Africa divided against itself awaits the impending and inexorable catastrophe" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.263), given without explanation of the mechanisms for revolution, can be contrasted with more sophisticated analyses.

For example, Greene points out that "lacking regime access and weak in organisational structure, no revolutionary movement should expect to succeed - regardless of the personal talents or ideological resolve of its leaders" (Greene, 1974, p.32). He goes on to say that "it may be true that revolution, peculiar to the early stages of modernisation and to the intense nationalism of anticolonial movements, is more a relic of the past than a promise for the future. Contemporary revolutionaries must consequently
place all the more emphasis on a frequent characteristic of the revolutionary process: the external support that foreign states can provide for revolutionary movements abroad" (Greene, 1974, p.93).

Internally, South Africa provides a good paradigm for the supposition that

"the relationship between government violence and most types of political violence . . . appears to be curvilinear: political violence increases along with government violence, until a threshold is reached where increased government violence coincides with a rapid decline in the collective violence of citizens" (Greene, 1974, p.113).

The weight, domain and scope of the power that is concentrated in Government hands in South Africa is overwhelming, and the country has obviously crossed the 'threshold' mentioned above. Thus future revolutionary potential in South Africa, as well as the regime's capacity for counterrevolutionary violence, appears to be partially a function of the cohesion and determination of the political elite.

Elite fragmentation may be accelerated by attempts on the part of elites to initiate reform, especially where socio-economic development has not been accompanied by changes in political institutions and representation, but it seems
unlikely that the Nationalist Government would commit the 'error' of reform in the foreseeable future: otherwise improved conditions, political and economic, might make the remaining grievances more intolerable, the resentments more bitter, and the consequent repression more severe still.

In an illuminating survey of theories of revolution Lawrence Stone points out that

"fundamental to all analyses, whether by historians like Brinton and Gottschalk or by political scientists like Johnson and Eckstein, is the recognition of a lack of harmony between the social system on the one hand and the political system on the other. This situation Johnson calls dysfunction, a word derived from the structural-functional equilibrium model of the sociologists" (Stone, 1972, p.9).

The analysis goes on to suggest that dysfunction may have many causes, but perhaps the most important one is a new and developing process (e.g. industrialisation), as a result of which certain social groups find themselves in a condition of relative deprivation.

Much depends on the rate of change and the adjustment potential of the ruling elite; if the change is rapid and profound, it may cause the sense of deprivation and alien-
ation to spread into many sectors of society at once, causing what Johnson calls multiple dysfunction, which may not be curable within the existing political system.

A critical variable is the attitude of the entrenched elite, since a revolution becomes possible when a condition of multiple dysfunction meets an intransigent elite. This description fits the South African situation.

However, revolution only becomes probable if certain special factors intervene: the 'precipitants' or 'accelerators'. Of these, continues Stone, the three most common are the emergence of an inspired leader or prophet (in South Africa he would be banned, imprisoned or exiled); the formation of a secret, military, revolutionary organisation (in South Africa it would probably go the way of Pogo and Umkonto we Sizwe); and the crushing defeat of the armed forces in foreign war (there is no indigenous sub-Saharan force, or even concert of African countries' armed forces, which could tackle South Africa successfully without outside intervention to balance and tip the scales).

2.1.7 External Intervention

Therefore it seems clear that revolutionary change of major
structural relations, basic institutions and prevailing value systems in South Africa can only be implemented at this juncture by powerful outside intervention, which is a perspective insufficiently emphasised by Van den Berghe. This is a view supported by Russell, Greene and Potholm, who all agree that while the preconditions for revolution exist, the critical factor for revolutionary success is outside military intervention.

Despite the fact that the socialist governments in Angola and Mozambique achieved power with Cuban and Soviet support, it is likely that Potholm's conclusion remains a valid one: that the great powers will not intervene to overthrow the South African system; and without overt action by medium to large powers there is little in the past and less in the present to suggest that the Whites in South Africa are about to give up the core characteristics of the system, or that any endogenous forces could make them do so in the foreseeable future.

A possible linkage between internal unrest and external intervention might exist if the internal upheaval were such that the South African Government lost control of the country: in this situation, the great powers would be likely to intervene to pick up the pieces and remake the
puzzle to their own liking. However, this intervention would take place after full-scale rebellion had succeeded in breaking down White control of the country. Once again in African history, then, it would be the violent revolutionary praxis of the indigenous people which would eventually bring in outside intervention and force concessions from the ruling European-descended elite.

As Grundy and others have pointed out, there are built-in rewards for violent behaviour. Black Africa's leaders progressively abandoned a Ghandian approach in favour of a Fanonesque one as it became clear that nonviolent methods made no impression on the rulers, nor, for that matter, on the outside world. Tom Mboya noted that the world only helps African nationalists when they have become active, but not before; and outside moral, material and ultimately active support is essential to revolutionary success.

Thus it was that Nelson Mandela and other Black leaders in Africa adopted the Von Clausewitz doctrine of continuing the political struggle by other means. Using Van den Berghe's dialectical approach, it becomes clear that the use of violence by one side in a polarised situation will evoke a violent response from the other.
The fate of a particular revolutionary movement, it has been argued, is in part a function of its external support, in neighbouring countries and the outside world. However, against this must be weighed the external support available to the target government. The extent of support for the South African system is difficult to judge. On the one hand, the considerable economic interests of Britain, Germany, the U.S. and others in South Africa probably makes their policy towards the country more conservative than it might otherwise be. Yet on the other hand, the strategic importance of the Cape sea route to the West appears to be marginal in terms of global nuclear warfare (and conventional warfare along World War II lines between the superpowers is an unlikely possibility). The Carter Administration has placed a higher priority on ethical considerations than is usual in international relations operating within the framework of standard 'realpolitik': it regards the South African system as fundamentally unjust; it does not consider South Africa's mineral resources to be of critical importance (they would be sold on the international market by whatever government was in power locally); and it must consider the trade-offs between support for South Africa or the Third World. The policy implications of this are that the U.S. cannot support South Africa unless substantial changes in the relationship
structure between the races takes place, and this is a pressure for change in South Africa (although it is hard to assess its impact on internal policies).

However, it is possible to suggest that the tentative movements away from discrimination that have taken place in South Africa are the result of outside pressure, and that the Government response to, for example, the Soweto unrest, was more restrained because of awareness of external opposition to harsh measures.

Potholm contends that

"the development of viable revolutionary organisations within South Africa is considerably hampered because large segments of the population simply do not believe that the system can be overthrown. It seems safe to say that this attitude would be dramatically changed with outside intervention; with such a change in attitude, the quiescence of the South African domestic situation could no longer be assured" (Potholm, 1972, p.631).

There is certainly a dynamic dialectical process between external pressure for change and the internal situation. This cause-and-effect relationship takes the form of a ratchet effect:
(i) Increased pressure from abroad - arms embargo and threats of economic boycott, UN and OAU condemnations and moral opprobrium, support by governments, churches and neighbouring countries for guerillas, sports isolation, diplomatic and press pressure, worsening relations with the countries that would like to support South Africa but cannot be seen to be dealing too openly with institutionalised racial discrimination and so forth - encourages the Africans to believe that their situation is not hopeless, and therefore diminishes their apathy and increases their demands for a better political, social and economic role in South Africa;

(ii) Black demands or Black unrest in turn lead to increasing authoritarianism on the part of the Government, which is noted by the outside world and increases pressures from abroad;

(iii) These pressures for equitable change again affect the internal dynamics in the way described, and so on up the ratchet. There can be no return to the status quo after each input.

Yet this is a slow process. It may produce changes in the long run, but, as Potholm concludes, "for those Africans,
Coloureds and Indians presently under its jurisdiction, this seems at best a scant and distant hope" (Potholm, 1972, p.638).

While the Western powers are finding it more difficult to support the South African system for a number of reasons, and are in fact advocating reform in clearer terms, this does not mean that the Communist powers, specifically the U.S.S.R., will automatically assume that an opportunity has been granted them to make gains in southern Africa: in terms of the global 'balance sheet', the cost of intervention in South Africa is probably too high. The Soviet Union has not only become a global power since about 1970, but also a status quo power. The world is no longer made up of two international actors: the global system is a loose bipolar one moving towards multipolarity, which complicates international issues. With the emergence of deterrence and a stable balance of terror, the Soviet Union recognises, at least implicitly, the limits of its power.

Both America and Russia know that the other is a permanent feature on the globe, and that their own best long-term interests lie in a limited adversary relationship. Factors such as trade with the U.S., technical aid from the U.S.,
and the success of the SALT talks probably weigh more heavily than domination in South Africa. Concrete issues and great power politics are stronger than ideological considerations in the modern Soviet Union. Though it is not necessary to do so here, a case can be made that Angola was a unique opportunity for some benefit at little cost, and that such circumstances are unlikely to be repeated. The essential point of this brief analysis of the global situation is that direct external intervention on the side of the Africans in South Africa is improbable unless (a) there is internal destabilisation, and (b) the world situation changes significantly in a way which is unforeseeable now.

These are the sorts of considerations which Van den Berghe does not examine in sufficient depth. What he does say, moreover, is not very useful. Adam points out that Van den Berghe "bases a single chapter on 'External Pressures' on no fewer than eight fallacious predictions and assumptions that cannot all be dismissed as historical accidents" (Adam, 1971, p.120).

These include statements such as "Basutoland and Bechuanaland will most probably adopt a hostile policy towards White South Africa" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.248); after the independence of the British Protectorates "the collapse of White supremacy
will be imminent" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.262); and South Africa "will be highly vulnerable to foreign based terrorist organisations" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.255).

In the euphoria following independence throughout much of Africa, there was an almost universal belief that White domination could not last, and something of that spirit shows early in Van den Berghe's study of South Africa. In his Preface he maintains that

"the liberation of South Africa remains contingent on two main external factors. First, the territories north of the Limpopo must come under majority rule. Second there must be effective outside support for the South African underground and an escalation of sanctions."

Yet nowhere in his work does he analyse the interpenetrating and interdependent relationships of the countries that make up southern Africa in the way that Ken Grundy and Timothy Shaw have done. Shaw, for example, says that

"continued UN-OAU harrassment has encouraged White unity and intransigence; yet the prospects for reform are not all exhausted. This analysis of regional politics, focusing on the variety of actors, strategies, coalitions and structures in and around the subsystem, suggests the need to take into account the impact of bargaining within
and between the two multinational coalitions. The established modes of analysis which concentrate on national or global relations to the exclusion of regional interactions have not explained or predicted the politics of southern Africa very satisfactorily. The balance of dependence and interdependence, change and control in southern Africa depend not only on national or global attributes and interests, but also on the impact of two diverse multinational coalitions and on bargaining within these groups of actors" (Shaw, 1976, p.19).

Van den Berghe does not consider the point made by Shaw, applicable even when all the remaining territories in Africa are under Black rule, that "because of South Africa's regional hegemony, southern Africa may be a case of involuntary integration" (Shaw, 1976, p.4).

There is no exposition of the necessary and sufficient conditions for turning internal Black dissatisfaction, or White disaffection for that matter, into more than a South African underground of token opposition, but into rebellion and successful revolution.

Finally, there is no clear consideration of what is required in order to make sanctions effective, and the obstacles to action by the relevant actors.
Whereas Van den Berghe is clear in establishing that conditions for revolution exist in South Africa, he is weak in consideration of factors which suggest that the South African system may not break down (at least not in the imminent future, which is what he suggests).

2.1.8 Instruments of Change

Consideration should be given to some of the specific mechanisms for coercing concessions within the existing system, or bringing about a change of system, and a resultant revolution in the Russellite sense of the word.

These instruments of change include internal rebellion, external military intervention, nonviolent methods such as boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience, and violent methods such as assassination, sabotage, terrorism and guerilla warfare.

On the basis of the analysis already made in this study, it appears unlikely that change will come through rebellion and/or military intervention in the short term, and possibly not in the medium term either. Of course, new factors, as yet undiscernible or seemingly unimportant, may enter the equation at a later stage, in which case a reassessment may
lead one to suggest that rebellion and military intervention are either more or less likely than they are at present.

In the meantime, that leaves open the theoretical possibility that reforms may be wrested or coerced from the ruling elite through the use of the other instruments mentioned above. A brief study will be made of each in the following pages, since this was not done systematically in Van den Berghe or the other works selected for analysis.

2.1.3.1. Boycott as a Means for Effecting Change

Of the nonviolent instruments for change, boycott is the most significant in terms of both power and probability. The potential force is concerted international sanctions, applied under Section 39 of the United Nations Charter, if South Africa is deemed to constitute a threat to peace. To actualise this force requires Security Council approval, and although Britain, France and the U.S. are likely to veto sanctions proposals at present, it is not inconceivable that their policies might change. A Socialist-Communist government in France, a Britain that becomes more involved in the E.E.C. and relatively less financially interested in South Africa, an American administration more dependent than Carter's on the Black electorate and made up of committed
anti-apartheid members, are possible future scenarios which may affect the exercise of the veto in the Security Council. However, in order to make sanctions effective, there needs to be a blockade of South African ports, requiring a high degree of cooperation among the major powers, and this may be difficult to achieve. Furthermore, the underlying assumption of such international action is that it will somehow be translated into political reform in favour of the Africans, but this may well be questionable. Given the perceptions of the Whites, and particularly the Afrikaners, of the alternatives to White rule as chaos, it follows that their limits of tolerance to pressures for fundamental change are very high indeed.

International sanctions may well have an immediate effect on the economy, preventing the export of vital foreign currency earners such as gold, wool and diamonds, and the import of oil, machinery and so forth, but it is debatable whether it will have the ultimate effect of causing the target group, the Whites, to bring about fundamental political, social and economic change in South Africa, short of total system breakdown, which remains a theoretical possibility.
2.1.8.2 Withholding of Labour

The cessation of labour in order to paralyse the national economy, thereby coercing reforms from Government is again potentially powerful as an instrument, but difficult to utilise successfully in South Africa. The main facts militating against the Africans are their poverty, lack of funds and organisation, which means that they cannot strike for long, and, unless they are dedicated martyrs, are driven back to work by hunger, the will to survive and to support their families. In addition, a leadership which attempts to organise an industrial strike of any magnitude is likely to be incarcerated before the organisation can become effective enough to support its aims. With their low current state of countervailing power, it is possible that strikes by Africans will be counter-productive, leading to further repressive measures.

2.1.8.3 Civil Disobedience

Civil disobedience aimed at disrupting the three law enforcement agencies of the courts, police and prisons is neutralised in South Africa by severe penalties for the open flouting of authority. The courts are not over-burdened because offenders are simply not brought before
them. Again, the leaders who try to organise such movements are not likely to remain at large long enough to complete their tasks. Commenting on the technique of moral suasion used by, for example, the A.N.C., Fatima Meer says that

"the movement had used satyagraha-social force, the human possession of freedom, and the firm conviction that right must triumph. It was using it in an age which had wholly rejected right, or God, or morality - an age of repression in which success demonstrated reality, and in circumstances where soul force could not succeed against nuclear power" (Meer in Sundemeier, (ed.), 1975, p.139).

If the tone is a little exaggerated and the reference to nuclear power obscure, the point still remains that civil disobedience is not successful against force and legal sanctions, unhesitatingly used by a determined ruling elite. Even if the standing of the laws broken is low in the majority's eyes, and the character of their acts is impeccable, civil disobedience cannot succeed unless it is sufficiently extensive to swamp the system, and this in turn requires cohesion and organisation which are discouraged by a battery of Government measures.
2.1.8.4 Violent Means

Assassination of a political leader would bring about change only in a system in which power is highly personalised, so that the removal of the leader also removes his system. This would not be the case in South Africa, where a cohesive Nationalist Party would produce another, probably similar, leader.

It is difficult to make an a priori assessment of the efficacy of terrorism and sabotage in South Africa, but it has not been demonstrably successful to date. Violence may intimidate some of the White population, while at the same time making others, including possibly the political leaders, more intransigent in their resistance to African demands for change.

Rural-based guerrilla warfare in South Africa, given the power imbalance between Whites and Africans, the geographical fragmentation of the Africans, and the lack of a unifying ideology amongst them is unlikely to be an effective instrument for change at present, though it may become more powerful in the future if conditions change (for example, Homeland support for guerrillas, fewer tribal, political and ideological differences amongst the Africans).
2.1.9 The Possible Impact of Pressures

This underlines an important point, which is that the techniques outlined have both an immediate and an ultimate effect. The immediate effects may seem insignificant, but the ultimate effects may be significant, especially if the instruments are deployed in combination over a long period of time.

However, both the internal and the external pressures which the Government can tolerate without losing effective control of the country are probably very wide. Martin Luther King once suggested that a riot is the language of the unheard: it may be that South Africa will see spontaneous or planned outbursts of frustration, anger and resentment by Africans and perhaps Coloureds too, increasing incidence of rural and urban guerrilla warfare against the Whites and acts of terrorism against both Whites and uncommitted Africans. These will exact a high psychological and economic price from all South Africans, but they are not sufficient to bring about the breakdown of the system.

Externally, the will and capacity of the Western nations, led by the United States, to establish unity of purpose and action towards South Africa may increase, in conjunction
with the growing potential of Black Africa to retaliate against supporters of the South African system. However, the analysis of sanctions and direct intervention in this work suggest that the former is largely unworkable and the latter too costly, so external pressure is likely to act as a catalyst and secondary source of change, forming a dialectical process with internal pressures for change.

Despite recent shifts resulting from the independence of Angola and Mozambique, and the Soweto uprising, together with the involvement of the major powers in the southern African subsystem, and the human rights stance of the American administration, which have led to the questioning of this premise, it still appears to be a sound assumption that the South African Whites will continue to control South Africa for the foreseeable future.

The specification of the time period is important for those living under the South African system:

"Whilst many of their attitudes may stem from the colonial period, White South Africans are not settlers. Only one attempt at evacuation ever took place, when Arkansas, Colorado and Wyoming offered the Boers land in 1900. Such an offer would be no more acceptable today than at the turn of the century: indeed in
many ways less so, for the Whites have built a modern industrial nation in Africa. They have built it, however, with the aid of all races, who cannot ultimately be denied citizenship in the country which they and their fathers have helped to create" (Lemon, 1976, p.245).

Lemon does not define 'ultimately', but the point is that the non-Whites can be denied citizenship in the country they helped to build, and will probably continue to be denied citizenship until a force equal or superior to that of the South African ruling elite is mobilised and applied on behalf of the Africans. In the absence of such opposition, the South African Government can continue in power for a long time to come, and can continue, therefore, implementing its policies if it wishes to do so.

Careful academic analysis still remains to be done on issues which are germane to a better understanding of the prospects for successful armed struggle in South Africa. The sorts of questions which require thoughtful consideration are, inter alia: Do the Africans, Indians and Coloureds form natural allies against the Whites? What difference does the fact that most Whites in South Africa have no lines of retreat, unlike those in Algeria and Vietnam, make to the possibility of successful guerilla warfare to overthrow
White control? What is the degree of the West's dependence, if any, on a White controlled South Africa and vice versa? What are the likely long-term effects, highlighted in Soweto, of the concentrated location of urban Black populations? What are the implications of and the prospects for urban terrorism? Is there an answer to Kuper's question 'whether there are grounds for declaring that the people prefer death to oppression, the finality of annihilation to the indeterminacy of existence'? (Hugo, 1977, pp.72-73).

A thorough analysis of the meaning and possibility of revolution goes far beyond what was attempted by Van den Berghe: the foregoing discussion has thrown into relief some of the political topography which he left largely unexplored, to the detriment of his discussion on the possibility of fundamental change in South Africa.

2.1.10 Economic Growth and Social Change

"White supremacy is busily digging its own grave in many ways other than ideological" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.279). Van der Berghe assumes without question that the changes wrought by industrialisation and economic growth will create strains that cannot be contained within the system. He describes the normal socio-economic and potentially
political impact of the industrialisation process and then continues:

"... far from adjusting to the trends set in motion by economic changes, the political system has reacted in a maladjusting direction. South Africa thus presents the spectacle of an equilibrium system that has 'run amok', and where the polity, by introducing reactionary change, attempts to reverse the social, political and cultural tendencies brought about by industrialisation" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p. 213).

"The result of such policies has, of course, been cumulative maladjustment between a modern expanding economic system on the one hand, and a political dinosaur coupled with a racial caste system inherited from an agrarian society on the other hand" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p. 213).

The challenge to undertake a more thoughtful economic analysis of South Africa was taken up by several analysts (whose works will be considered later in this thesis) after Van den Berghe, so that it is no longer possible to be simplistic about the impact of industrialisation and economic growth in bringing about change in the core characteristics of society. Van den Berghe does not question his assumption of the incompatibility of apartheid and economic growth. He therefore sees the increasing strains and contradictions arising
from this source as another factor supporting his prediction of the breakdown of the South African system.

2.1.11 Conclusion

Van den Berghe contributes some interesting explanations and insights in his overall sociological analysis of South African society in its historical setting. He gives an explanation of the conditions that exist in South Africa, as well as the historical and sociological reasons for them.

Van den Berghe clearly describes the groups which are formed by the institutionalised racial stratification in the country, and captures some of the textural richness in the fabric of South African society. There are sociological insights into the groups he is studying, which uncover underlying attitudes: for example, he says of the Afrikaner feeling after South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the establishment of the Republic that

"the bitter humiliation of defeat in the Boer War was wiped out. God had favoured His Chosen People and given them unlimited control over the Promised Land" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.105).

Van den Berghe's term 'Herrenvolk-democracy', as Adam later
pointed out, describes the White political structure more precisely than a comparison with the Nazis' leader cult or a one-party bureaucracy, and this is another example of his contribution towards understanding South Africa.

His application of a modified structural-functionalism has heuristic value in enabling him to look at various facets of the South African system, and classify them according to whether he sees them as functional or dysfunctional, in terms of maintaining the essential equilibrium of society. The use of Hegelian dialectics gives a dynamic dimension to his analysis, and is useful in explaining, for example, the increasing polarisation of the races in a dialectical process. This is in keeping with his aim of establishing a theory of society which achieves a balance between crude equilibrium and conflict models, which accounts for both stability and change.

However, there are shortcomings in his study of South Africa. In a sense, Van den Berghe himself gives partial answers to the problems raised by his work. Despite the fact that he foresees the demise of the South African system, Van den Berghe acknowledges that

"although there are probably limits to the amount of tension and internal contradictions which a
society can take without disintegrating, the South African case suggests that these limits are quite wide" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.216).

These tolerance limits are wider still than he envisaged! Van den Berghe's study does not entirely meet its own objective of achieving a balanced analysis. It is the major weakness of his work that he delves more deeply into the dysfunction of South African society, without laying equal stress on what is functional. He considers conflict in some detail, but not conflict regulation. He examines the forces which tend towards revolution, but not the forces which are working against revolution. After all, the weight, domain and scope of White power over the Africans is overwhelming, so even if the preconditions are there, it is not easy to predict revolution as cavalierly as does Van den Berghe.

The principal reasons for this are to be found in his theoretical assumptions. A minor contributory factor could be his viewpoint on South Africa. This is not an ad hominem argument, but points out one of the pitfalls of political analysis. In his Preface, Van den Berghe approvingly quotes Danziger, who at one point says that subjective views of the social process do not merely lead to meditation, but also to social action, and that "he is nearest the truth whose
situationally transcendent ideas represent the interest of social forces which are favoured by the historical process". Van den Berghe points out the foolishness of pretending Olympian detachment, expresses his profound distaste for the system, and leaves it for the reader to decide to what extent his own values coloured his interpretations. Admittedly, moral indignation is compatible with a wide range of assumptions and conclusions.

However, it is possible that Danziger's approach, and by implication Van den Berghe's, could result in misplaced emphasis or even misinterpretation of the situation. Objective analysis, however unpalatable the facts, is a precondition for realistic action. So it may be that a small part of the weakness in Van den Berghe's study is attributable to his wish to be near the truth. The forces favoured by the historical process at the time seemed indisputably to be those which were resulting in the overthrow of colonialism and White power, and the victory of the Africans, throughout Africa. It would appear that his own values, plus the ethos of Africa at the time, did somewhat colour Van den Berghe's interpretations. After all, it is difficult for personal cognitive maps not to influence the directions taken by explorers of South Africa's difficult political terrain!
This discussion of Van den Berghe's study of South Africa has highlighted an important point, namely that most societies exist in a condition of uneasy equilibrium (some more uneasy than others). As Stone points out, the model of society in a stable, self-regulating state of perpetual equipoise in which violent conflict is an anomaly, is a utopia, presupposing consensus on values, social harmony and isolation from external threats. The opposite model is based on pure interest theory and postulates that the social order rests on physical coercion of the majority by a minority in order to distribute material rewards and power in an inequitable way. The latter model doubtless has greater explanatory powers in relation to South Africa than the former, making it easier to overlook what the equilibrium model has to offer. South African stability is under pressure from a host of political conflicts, but it is not, at least at this historical juncture, held together by physical coercion alone. The alternatives for the future range in theory from totalitarian repression at one end of the spectrum, through changes within the system, to fundamental change of the system itself at the other end. Clearly, Van den Berghe believes that change of system is the most likely outcome of the political process he observed in South Africa.
2.2 HERIBERT ADAM

2.2.1 Introduction

In a sense, Professor Adam completes the work undertaken by Pierre van den Berghe, by examining in greater detail than Van den Berghe does why the South African system might endure rather than break down.

"Modernising Racial Domination" (University of California Press, 1971) is based on five years of research in South Africa, beginning in 1966. Adam affirms that his study of South Africa differs from others in two respects: by its focus on the political economy and the specific dynamics of the South African scene, and in trying to avoid the tone of moral indignation frequently found in writings on South Africa.

Although personally opposed to racial discrimination, Adam suggests that

"emotional abhorrence, derived from deep commitment to universal ethics, seems understandable, but is no substitute for realistic analysis. The dedicated activist too frequently suffers from illusions arising from wishful thinking" (Adam, 1971, Preface).
Naturally his work is not entirely unaffected by personal and environmental factors. He studied South Africa during a time of quiescence, when apartheid was steadily strengthening its control and eliminating opposition; there was disillusionment about the possibility of real freedom and democracy and self-respect for the vast majority of Africans in independent states throughout Africa. As Van den Berghe was possibly influenced by the hopes of an earlier era, so perhaps was Adam influenced by his own times.

However, in his study of the dynamics of South African politics, Adam makes a positive effort to transcend the influence of factors which he outlines:

"The failure of moralism against an overwhelmingly stronger reality and the ambivalence of pragmatic survival within it was for me the most striking aspect of the South African experience. My wife, herself a member of the South African subordinate group, has above all helped to clarify my perspective on this crucial question. My contact with her vulnerable Indian community in Durban has most contributed to my understanding of South Africa's ethnic problems" (Adam, 1971, p.x).

The result is careful consideration of the facts and some perceptive political analysis. The most interesting facets of his study for this thesis are the reasons for what he
terms "stalled revolution", and the implicit theory of change which is contained in his work. The impact of the changes he envisages, however, are not likely to be such as to affect the core characteristics of the South African system in the short or medium term; it is doubtful whether these changes would lead to a change of the system itself even in the long run. What one concludes from his analysis, rather, is that the basic system will be maintained in the foreseeable future. His theory of change will be examined in detail after consideration of the basic structure of his argument.

2.2.2 Methodology

In discussing methodology Adam concludes that:

"without a perspective applying a truly interdisciplinary approach including economic as well as political insights, an isolated sociological analysis of racialism and colonialism is inadequate. The extreme case of South Africa's continued internal colonialism reveals the shortcomings of a strictly cultural focus instead of a socio-economic one, which alone can come to grips with the decisive contradictions among imperial interests" (Adam, 1971, p.36).
2.2.3 Key Concept: "Pragmatic Racial Oligarchy"

Adam says that the irrationality of racial beliefs does not necessarily characterise the implementation of racial discrimination, which can be rational and efficient with respect to its intended purposes. What Adam understands by Pragmatic Racial Oligarchy is

"precisely this means - end rationality that seems the decisive new feature of South Africa's version of racialism. This pragmatism treats racial and related historical experiences only with reference to their practical lessons. It overrides the ideological implications of racial beliefs and is oriented solely toward the purpose of the system: the smooth, frictionless, and tolerable domination over cheap labour and political dependents as a prerequisite for the privileges of the minority" (Adam, 1971, p.53).

Adam begins his explanation of the situation by stressing the differences between South Africa and other countries, particularly of the colonial type.

"The Apartheid system has been viewed as simply the most outdated relic of a dying colonialism, yet possibly it is one of the most advanced and effective patterns of rational, oligarchic domination" (Adam, 1971, p.16).
This analysis stands in contrast to that made by Van den Berghe. He then goes on to show that standard conceptions may not entirely explain the South African case.

The main conceptual schemes are cultural pluralism, colonial imperialism, totalitarianism and fascism.

In a comparative analysis of all these with his key concept of pragmatic racial oligarchy, Adam sets out to show why they all have weaknesses in comparison to his concept.

There is a vast and complex literature on cultural pluralism and indeed on the other conceptual schemes. Adam has a facility for summarising the findings and putting them into perspective (though his approach certainly should not be taken as putting the full stop to the debate on each one). His conclusion on the first of these schemes is that cultural heterogeneity should not be reified into a quasi-natural state of affairs, and ethnic identifications should be seen as the result of efforts by subordinate groups to improve their lot through mobilisation (I suppose the Afrikaners are an excellent example, which, moreover, succeeded); or, conversely, as the result of efforts by superordinate groups to preserve the privileges they enjoy by exploiting subjected groups (the Afrikaners seem to have used both blades of a
double-edged sword to their advantage).

Crude theories of colonialism cannot be applied to South Africa. Adam distinguishes between colonies of exploitation and settler colonies. The latter are neither exploited in the interests of a foreign power, nor degraded to a market for foreign surplus commodities. They might or might not exceed metropolitan colonies in degree of exploitation of the indigenous population. Adam points out that

"as a ruling class, the settlers are also forced to maintain a degree of harmony in the system. They have more at stake than a foreign colonial power: their own survival. Their coexistence in the same social system with strange people whom they cannot integrate is for them a source of permanent frustration but mitigates against direct colonial brutality at the same time" (Adam, 1971, p.33). (4)

South Africa is thus seen as a case of domestic colonialism.

In the sense that a regime is totalitarian if it excludes alternatives to the established system, South Africa is totalitarian. However, says Adam, South Africa is not a

(4) A powerful portrayal of "direct colonial brutality" is Joseph Conrad's "The Heart of Darkness", which underlines Adam's point.
totalitarian state when compared to the features of such states as outlined by Friedrich, Brzezinski, Neumann and Coser. For example, Coser says that totalitarian states destroy traditional groups and replace them with new, controlled units. Adam points out that the opposite is true in South Africa:

"the government attempts to keep the traditional power structure and ideologies alive in order to use them accordingly in a framework of a divide et impera policy" (Adam, 1971, p.39).

Adam then gives a summary of the groups that result from the "officially propagated pluralism" in South Africa (it occurs to one that if the differentiation in South Africa were purely 'cultural', there would be little to distinguish the Afrikaner and Coloured peoples). (5)

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(5) Since the differentiation is, in fact, on grounds of colour, the so-called 'Coloured' people in South Africa form a 'marginal' group, whose plight is reflected in a verse by Guy Butler:

"This is the man the Empires made
From lesser breeds, the child of Trade
Left without hope in History's shade;
Shouldered aside into any old place,
Damned from birth by the great disgrace,
A touch of the tar-brush in his face"

(Butler, "Inscapes", OUP, Cape Town, 1976, p.105).
The most interesting comparative analysis is that between apartheid and various forms of fascism, particularly national socialism. The decisive difference between them is their goals: national socialism was aggressively expansionist from the start, whereas apartheid, affirms Adam, is designed to preserve the status quo. They resemble each other in the need of the privileged owners to create a strong state machinery without relinquishing it to the democratic control of the population; and in the importance of suspending competition and limiting upward mobility to the privileged.

Another difference between the two stems from the different levels of political development: in Germany the state had to do away with a democracy that had universal franchise, whereas in South Africa, the point was to prevent such a situation from the beginning. Adam quotes Barrington Moore as saying that fascism is inconceivable without the prior existence of democracy; in South Africa democratic conditions have never existed.

In a racially fixated society such as South Africa, says Adam, the race conflict constitutes by definition the background of all policies. I have characterised South African politics as chromodynamics, or colour-politics; but the
problem with this definition, and also with what Adam says, is that it neglects other dimensions such as a class struggle, which is not of necessity coterminous with colour in South Africa.

Whereas a unifying ideology for the racially separated masses is incompatible with the policies of the ruling elite in South Africa, and might not work anyway even if it were tried, what is required is a legitimising ideology:

"domination generally, in so far as it does not perpetuate itself solely through coercion, has to refer to a justifying basis, especially where its character does not allow for rational argument. The theoretical Apartheid programme fulfils the ideological function of an apology with the appearance of rationality" (Adam, 1971, p.45).

The content and role of ideology in general and apartheid in particular may also be endlessly debated. Apartheid can be seen as simply a cynical rationalisation of White rule. It may have some genuine idealistic content. Stadler (University of the Witwatersrand, unpublished manuscript) has argued that apartheid cannot be analysed in terms of the interests and functions it serves, but that ideologies create interests by making specific actions appear to be sensible and coherent.
Adam sees South African race ideology as different from German antisemitism and previous colonial policies; it has evolved away from stressing the inferiority of one race as compared to another to assertions that the races are simply different. The irrationality of the apartheid programme lies in the assumption of 'natural' as opposed to socio-cultural differences between the race groups, which are obviously reinforced by the imposed separation. Apartheid is practically fictitious, says Adam, but theoretically consistent (the latter lends zeal, through its plausibility, to those charged with implementing apartheid in all its forms throughout South Africa).

Yet another difference between national socialism and the South African system is that the White oligarchy does not glorify the leader along fascist lines. The egalitarian aspects of the Afrikaner past have survived to some extent, at least within the group.

There is a legal opposition, which serves to maintain the appearance of a democracy, while being an ineffective democratic ornamentation. In contrast with fascist states, South Africa depends on a semblance of democratic legitimacy. Since the law legalises White supremacy, it is scrupulously adhered to by the Whites, gives legislative respectability
to all measures adversely affecting the non-Whites, and gives the appearance of civilised standards compared to the lawlessness elsewhere in Africa.

Also in contrast to other totalitarian regimes, the South African ruling elite seems relatively undisturbed by consuming power struggles amongst themselves. Such differences as there are do not reflect life and death struggles as in fascism, but differences in approach within the understood fundamental principle of the preservation of Afrikaner rule (seen as necessary in order to secure Afrikaner survival as a distinct people).

Adam says that even though antisemitic attitudes are latent and widespread, there has been no manifest discrimination against Jews, which is yet another difference between South Africa and Nazi Germany. In addition, the connection between South Africa and Israel militates against overt antisemitism.

For these reasons, Adam rejects simple comparisons with fascist states, while at the same time noting less important similarities. Though he says that racial prejudice may be practically realistic to those who harbour it in South Africa, as opposed to merely irrational and emotional, the evidence
suggests that he overstresses the practical aspect of apartheid and underestimates the sheer, irrational racialism which is deeply embedded in South African politics and society.

Having made all these comparisons with other conceptual models Adam suggests that his own, that of a pragmatic racial oligarchy, is a more useful concept for analysing South African society, since it takes into account the flexible and realistic domination over the racially separated majority. There is no doubt that this has been a valuable analytical approach which has yielded impressive explanations of the South African system. Using his key concept he has been able to explain the means of social control in South Africa and the removal of non-instrumental or symbolic manifestations of the apartheid system. Adam suggests that one consequence of the pragmatic approach is that revolution in South Africa now seems a remote possibility.

2.2.4 Stalled Revolution

Like Van den Berghe and others before him, Adam saw what are usually regarded as prerequisites for revolution in the South African system, on which were based predictions of violent revolution and a bloody demise for White rule.
Clearly, the system was one of domination by a privileged minority, blatantly based on colour and enforced by harsh tactics. Since the Second World War, Africans were increasingly drawn into the modern economy and must have been made aware of their relative deprivation.

There are two opposed but plausible views on this subject. One is put by Kuper: "the greater the advance (of the urban African) the greater the impatience with arbitrary restraint" (Kuper, 1965, p. 404). The contrary view is that if revolution is to have a chance to succeed in South Africa, the economic situation will have to grow worse instead of better. Those who wish to see revolution succeed regard economic gains by Africans as 'worsening' the situation.

Adam would probably say that his central hypothesis of an advanced and effective pattern of rational, oligarchic domination can explain why revolution can be contained, whatever the preconditions might be; and his reasoning will be examined in the following pages.

Adam discusses a variety of factors that "stalled" revolution in South Africa: the exclusion of non-Whites from the essential sources of power is institutionally rooted and
total; internal resistance has failed and police control is virtually unchallenged; South Africa's economic boom has produced real gains for all urban groups and has had, at least temporarily, a neutralising political effect; and the policy of separate development has had some psychological success. Although the gap between the reality and the ideological ideal of viable homelands remains enormous, Adam points out that separate development has provided some political compensation for real rights through local government and caused further political fragmentation of the Africans. It may be that it is not in the Government's interests for the Homelands to be both viable and recognised by the outside world, so that in reality they remain dependent on South Africa and unable to take a strong stand against it.

The experience of self-government in the Homelands, together with the increasing need for a skilled African labour force and the growing differentiation of the Afrikaners and their interests, constitute the three processes which Adam sees as having the potential to bring about change and forestall system breakdown. This theory lies at the core of Adam's thinking on the possibilities of internal change. Before it is examined, however, his assessment of the chances of change being brought about by external pressures will be considered.
2.2.5 External Pressures

Adam begins by quoting Keppel-Jones as saying "whatever changes, it will not be forces within South Africa" and Van den Berghe stating that "one can safely predict that external pressure will steadily increase and eventually help in bringing about radical change in South Africa". However, Adam is more cautious in his approach than other writers. He concludes that

"only if the United Nations, with the support of the United States and the Soviet Union, were prepared to engage in armed conflict would the imposition of economic sanctions be an effective first step" (Adam, 1971, pp.133-134) and that

"while one might hope for such benign influence (what Kuper called a 'world ethics of racial equality'), it would seem more realistic to expect change from the gradually changing interest constellations within South Africa or on war from without" (Adam, 1971, p.134).

In his analysis Adam places more emphasis on the dynamics of the internal political and economic scene, particularly since the Whites actually want to avoid reliance on brute force alone, and would prefer a legitimation of their policy. He also concludes that economic sanctions as a kind of limited warfare can only be successful if those
who impose them are prepared to intervene militarily; otherwise the demand for sanctions remains "the militant decoration of actual passivity" (Adam, 1971, p.135).

The conditions he sees as necessary for intervention are acute polarisation to the point of war, interests which are jeopardised by the polarised conflict, and the realistic expectation of high gains (not just moral rewards) for those intervening. Two out of three would constitute minimum conditions for intervention. I tend to disagree with Adam, believing that the powers would only intervene after war broke out, and preferably after it was clear which side was winning: that way it would be easier to devise a strategy to ensure maximum gains for those intervening in a post-bellum South Africa or Azania. However, I take Adam's point about the illusionary striving after committed external intervention, but disagree again when he says that it is as apolitical as the belief that the use of force is the only way for the oppressed to change their situation: it may be that the structural violence of the South African system, which he and other observers have noted, will call forth a violent response (prolonged and bloody guerilla warfare in Rhodesia was a critical factor in forcing concessions from the Whites there).
However, Adam argues that in the light of the enormous differential in military power of the antagonists in South Africa, reliance on an (unrealistic) violent solution leads to apathy, since it relies on what is impossible and neglects to do what is possible within the contradictions of oppression. He says that this approach, doing what is actually possible, does not imply giving up the full demands for abolition of racial domination, but brings the goal nearer by actively combating the growing despair, resignation and ignorance on which so much of the system's stability rests.

Adam's thinking has similarities with other meliorist approaches to South Africa's problems, and his thinking is based on his analysis. However, he does not sufficiently develop his observations on the internal-external interplay, and is perhaps too optimistic about the possibilities of internal reform. Had he been studying post-Soweto South Africa, he might have wished to downplay the 'rational' component in his description of a pragmatic racial oligarchy.

2.2.6 The Southern African Subsystem

Although Adam describes how "the weakness of the independent African states is the strength of White South Africa" (Adam,
1971, p.136), his work would have been enhanced by a deeper analysis of regional politics.

As Cantori and Spiegel have shown, by not considering the importance of regional international relations within regions, those scholars who were preoccupied with the state, took too restricted a view, while those who concerned themselves with the international system as a whole, had too broad a perspective. Studies which have focused on the intermediate conceptual focal point of the region have yielded interesting results.

Ken Grundy has described how a southern African regional subsystem based on diplomatic-organisational criteria, differs markedly from regional relationships based upon economic and other criteria, and makes it clear that there is an absence of long-standing and cross-cultural agreed-upon patterns of political interaction that could be translated into stability and government security. Politics in many African states is still a fundamental struggle over the ground rules by which to structure the socio-political order and to direct change.

Grundy traces the economic and transport relationships, the political and diplomatic networks, examines the
'bridge-builders', revolutionary thought and practice, the 'outward-looking' policy and draws certain conclusions. For example, the total international environment has been passively protective (the regional environment has not been allowed to be solely determinative) and White governments have been brought to realise that to hurt weaker African states could well be to hurt themselves; however, the Africans cannot depend on this and must work to achieve conditions of symmetry and equality. The passivity became active with Soviet intervention in Angola and Mozambique, and this intervention has introduced a new element of uncertainty into regional affairs, although the core sector of South Africa shows a continuing high level of cohesion. An interesting way of looking at the subsystem is to construct different maps, for example, a simple geographical map, a racial map, an economic map and others: the subsystemic panorama is ever changing, and so are the limits of what is possible at any time. Grundy's final conclusion is that the southern African sub-system seems to be a fundamentally unstable one.

"In the long run its core is predicated on what was historically proven to be an insecure as well as a morally objectionable foundation" (Grundy, 1973, p.301).
This useful approach is taken further than both Adam and Grundy's work by Timothy Shaw in a sophisticated analysis.

Shaw says that although there has been a shift in the southern African balance of power since the independence of Mozambique and Angola, and increased pressure on the Whites in Rhodesia and South West Africa, the area continues to be dominated by the hegemony of South Africa. The regional subsystem is characterised by substantial economic and other interactions. The political economy of the region has yet to undergo significant change in the direction of either socialism or self-reliance. He suggests that changes in the region might best be understood as shifts in multinational coalitions among a rich diversity of actors. These complex coalitions involve relations of both conflict and cooperation amongst actors at sub-national, national, regional, continental and global levels over several important issues.

The article examines the alternative regional orders proposed by the White regimes and by the Liberation movements and the impact of these on the future regional political economy.

Shaw supports the points made by Adam concerning change from within not being sufficiently seriously considered. What he describes as the UN-OAU coalition has not tried to
identify and support groups in South Africa advancing change, whereas a more sensitive strategy would not depend on Liberation movements alone, but employ several approaches simultaneously, leading to actions which collectively reinforced the trend towards change. Instead they have minimised the prospects of nonviolent change.

Shaw contributes a clear synopsis of the different strategies of the two opposed coalitions. The minority (White) coalition seeks political order and economic growth, whereas the majority (African and allies) faction demands economic redistribution and political disorder. The important point is that the strategy of the UN-OAU coalition is based on the assumption that acceptance of the current minimum order may prevent any transition to a future optimum order, so that co-existence now will threaten majority rule later.

South Africa's interrelated schemes for dialogue, coprosperity and detente are all designed to protect White power and affluence. The UN-OAU coalition is more concerned with the political and economic status of the Africans in southern Africa. The two multinational coalitions represent different interests and advocate different priorities and time scales. Neither one has been prepared to compromise or to recognise the concerns of the other. South Africa has not seriously
considered African demands for political and economic control. The UN-OAU coalition has not given sufficient consideration to the potential for change possessed, for example, by multinational corporations or by the Homelands.

Had Adam undertaken this sort of analysis, his explanation of the weakness of independent African states being the strength of White South Africa would have been clearer. Beyond the impact of regional politics, he might have considered the potential role of, for example, multinational corporations in bringing pressure to bear on South Africa.

As Vernon has written, multinational corporations draw their special strengths from the ability and opportunity to think in terms that extend beyond any single country and to use resources that are located in more than one jurisdiction (Vernon, 1973). However, and this is a flaw in the thinking of the Carter Administration, it is by no means certain that governments will get compliance from the multinational corporations to do what the governments want, rather than what the businessmen believe to be in their best interests. How will pressurising South Africa benefit them in terms of their global strategy and expectations? This is the question that has to be answered in detail to show how multinational corporations can contribute to change in South Africa.
Shaw concludes his analysis by suggesting that

"predictions about the direction of change in southern Africa have been inaccurate either because they ignored transnational and international actors, or because they underestimated the adaptiveness of the established regimes and their foreign associations . . . Recognition of the complexities of regional politics in southern Africa should lead to caution about predicting when or whether liberation and/or socialism are likely to be achieved in the subsystem" (Shaw, 1976, pp.18-19).

Although Adam's consideration of these questions clearly does not delve sufficiently deeply, he makes a useful contribution in showing the adaptiveness of the existing regime in South Africa, and in stressing the complexities of the situation, (rather than making simplistic predictions on the basis of what ought to happen, or what he would like to see happen).

2.2.7 Factors for Change

The core of Professor Adam's theory of internal change concerns three interrelated processes within South Africa itself, which he suggests have inherent in them the ability
to change the relationship structure of the South African polity in a more equitable direction.

First, non-White awareness and organisation will be strengthened by separate development, especially when local rule becomes an at least de jure if not de facto reality, as in Bophuthatswana and the Transkei. Second, Adam tends to believe that economic expansion eventually erodes petty apartheid and traditional racialism by demanding a stable and skilled African labour force. Third, he suggests that Afrikaners themselves are undergoing a massive class differentiation as the rapid rise of Afrikaner industrial investment has developed an educated class that narrows the traditional Afrikaner-English split, divides the ruling Nationalist Party into verligte and verkrampte, and leads to world-orientated realists who favour a gradual lessening of racial discrimination in their own economic interest. Each one will be considered in turn.

2.2.7.1 Homelands

It is difficult to separate the actual state of affairs from proposed consolidations, but at the moment the Homelands appear to be the following: Transkei, Ciskei, KwaZulu, Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu, Bophuthatswana, Basotho Qwa Qwa,
Swazi and S Ndebele, of which Transkei and Bophuthatswana are now independent states.

The Homelands comprise some 13% of the territory of South Africa.

"In designating these territories as Homelands, homogeneous societies have not been sought. Rather, the Republic has relied on tradition, propinquity, practicality and political expediency" (Butler, Rotberg, Adams, 1977, p.2).

Heribert Adam argues that the granting of political rights to the Homelands contains the nucleus of future conflicts which will change the system. In one of the more powerful passages of his study, Adam says that "suppression is either absolute and total or it develops an inner dynamic towards its own abolition", and continues that

"In this sense, the promise of independence for the Bantustans and similar self-governing bodies for the other groups indicates not only strength but also the retreat of formerly undisputed domination" (Adam, 1971, p.75).

One conclusion about South African politics which emerges is that the Nationalists have failed to satisfy either the requirements of democracy, or to achieve the efficient
streamlining of a totalitarian state. Instead, they have used an unpopular authoritarian system, which uses force while still allowing a measure of dissent, to implement policies which require absolute totalitarianism.

Adam traces the ways in which the Homelands might produce a countervailing political power to that of the Whites in the longer term.

"The more clearly the non-White administrators become aware of their pseudo-control, the more their resentment increases . . . Subversion within the scope of permitted political activity could become difficult to control. As long as such activity uses the logic and the jargon of the government, it remains relatively safe . . . Similarly, the pressure emanating from the voters, merely administered on behalf of the real power, increases. Granting the franchise for all Xhosas of the Transkei inevitably raises the question for the voter as to what his vote really means and decides. Politicised for the first time by fictitious alternatives, they will probably feel more frustrated in the long run than before, by having formal political rights and yet remaining basically rightless subjects.

Having launched the program of self-government for ethnic minorities, however, its initiators cannot now reverse the process even if it should backfire on them. A return to the former
baaskap policy is no longer possible. Were the government to withhold the realisation of these heightened expectations, greater dissatisfaction and subsequently more direct oppression would be the inevitable consequence" (Adam, 1971, pp.79-80).

Adam's approach to the Homelands serves to illustrate clearly the perennial schismatic thinking on any issue in South Africa between those who believe in liberal policies, amelioration and peaceful evolution, and those who believe in confrontation and revolution as the only way to bring about equitable change. Shaw's synopsis applies to attitudes towards the Homelands: the one side feels that acceptance of the current minimum order may prevent any transition to a future optimum order; the other side argues that, since there is no current alternative, even slight possibilities for change in the existing minimum order should be exploited to the full. Both sides have a logically constructed argument; it is doubtful whether one side will ever concede that the other has a case; and one's own view depends on fundamental values and perhaps even personal taste, over which, of course, there can be no dispute.

The conflicting attitudes towards the Homelands can be
illustrated by the debate on foreign investment in them.

Richard Blausten (in Charles Harvey et al, 1975, pp.102-108), makes a case in favour of investment in the Homelands, while recognising that they represent an inequitable distribution of territory, and are unworkable in the sense that they cannot be viable economic units in themselves.

However, it is argued by Blausten that the Homelands provide the only lawful way for Africans to organise themselves politically; the Homeland system is White-inspired so its manipulation to counter apartheid would be less of a clearcut issue for White resistance than would be flouting of existing laws or a bloody insurrection of the Africans; the Homelands are a training ground, so that when the Africans do take over, they have the necessary political and economic skills; they provide an opportunity for Africans to establish a working relationship with foreign powers. The argument is self-serving to the extent that it is partly aimed at making friends with the Africans against the day South Africa is under a new dispensation, but the factors for change identified remain valid contributions to the debate.

The other side of the case, against investment in South
Africa's Homelands, is made by Jonathan Steele, (Steele in Charles Harvey et al, 1975, pp.120-137). The Bantustans are meant to give practical expression to the theory of separate development; they are meant to justify the wholesale removal of Africans from the 'White' areas, keeping those who are required by the economy as rightless migrant labourers; the Bantustans are designed to bolster the dwindling authority of African tribal chiefs by setting them up as heads of the new Homelands; they foster separate tribal loyalties and weaken the cohesion of African feeling; the Government sees the Bantustans as a way of deceiving foreign opinion and creating a facade of respectability. From Pretoria's point of view, investment in the Bantustans increases the stake of powerful outside forces in maintaining stability in South Africa, and provides the extra capital which South Africa has been unwilling to generate for Government-approved developments. Independence would be nominal, particularly in economic, defence and foreign policy matters. The Bantustans cannot effectively challenge White supremacy, and they are not an equitable substitute for rights in a common South Africa.

Adam does not adequately deal with these objections to seeing the Homelands as instruments of change, although he does recognise the existence of counter-arguments:
"All the more so could the homeland concept serve as a union substitute even for the urban worker, a rallying point and organisational platform for emerging notions of black power and a new African nationalism in Azania. Independence is not necessarily a prerequisite for this kind of homeland power. On the contrary, having pressed for independence, some African politicians are now holding back. They feel that formal independence would finalise the white-dictated distribution of land the world would be unlikely to support claims for lost land after independence" (Adam, 1971, p.183).

It may be that he himself underestimates the control over the Homelands which will be wielded by what he calls "effective technocrats who are establishing an increasingly unshakeable oligarchy" (Adam, 1971, p.181).

A recent study concludes that whether independence becomes meaningful for the Homelands, and whether it can improve prospects for the Africans within the remainder of South Africa, depends ultimately on the price that the Homelands and their allies can compel Whites in South Africa to pay. Despite the ruling elite's affirmation that sharing power in the core area is not an available option, a federal sharing of power may become the only way of ensuring that the Homelands become allies rather than enemies.
"South Africa could conceivably use the present homelands as a nucleus of an arrangement of institutional power-sharing or as the core of some form of partition that is not against the interests of Africans now or in the future. If it does, the homelands may constitute a way station, useful to blacks as well as to whites, on the road to a restructuring of South Africa" (Butler, Rotberg, Adams, 1977, p.231).

The impact of the Homelands' policy is one of the critical unknown variables in the complicated equation which has to be solved to explain the unfolding political process in South Africa.

2.2.7.2 Industrialisation, Economic Growth and Apartheid

The idea that industrialisation and economic growth will erode apartheid via the need for a stable and increasingly skilled labour force will be examined in depth in the ensuing sections on O'Dowd and the Radical Revisionists'. Therefore, a brief discussion will suffice here.

Adam may be correct in saying that higher living standards for Africans over time will enhance their ability to strike effectively, and although he sees the flexible administration of geographical and occupational controls as the hallmarks
of a pragmatic racial oligarchy, it does not follow from this that there will be flexible administration of political and residential controls, which are only peripherally necessary for growth. As Johnstone and others have pointed out, actual apartheid takes the form of

(a) keeping African numbers to the essential minimum in White areas by influx control and other regulations maintaining the migratory labour system;

(b) reducing the status of those who stay permanently in the towns to that of rightless workers, with no right to own property;

(c) diverting industry where possible to the border areas via the Environmental Planning Act;

(d) a flexible job colour bar which relaxes job reservation when needed by temporary exemptions or the dilution of skilled jobs to allow blacks to do these at lower wage rates; and

(e) by such methods as 'call-back' the migrant labour system is worked in such a way as to avoid serious reduction in efficiency or labour shortages.
There is not much in this analysis to comfort the proponents of change through the mechanism of the demands of economic growth. Such changes as might take place would be related to increased efficiency at marginal cost to the basic relationship structure between African and White.

2.2.7.3 Divisions Amongst the Elite

With regard to the differentiation amongst the ruling Afrikaners, Adam argues that the

"historical friction between the English and Afrikaans speaking populace is gradually being replaced by class contradictions within the two groups. As an entrepreneur, an Afrikaner has more in common with his English speaking counterparts than with his poorer fellow Nationalists . . .

The differences between verligte and verkrampte would seem in the long run to be more severe and persistent than their common ethnocentric frame would suggest . . .

This does not mean that the present policy of the verligte is likely to change basically. What can be expected is only that for such a policy, ideological considerations will not be decisive, but that it will remain sufficiently flexible to adapt itself to new conditions and, if necessary to compromise . . .
"Above all, the rational racial domination is most likely to falsify the assumption that mounting internal tension will make a violent revolutionary change inevitable" (Adam, 1971, pp.179-181).

Naturally, it is not only the rational rule of the Whites, but also the lack of any force powerful enough to implement it that effectively prevents revolutionary change. Adam understresses the basic unanimity of the Afrikaners, and indeed of the Whites, on the core issue of White control over their own affairs and those of the South African state.

The processes described by Adam have a theoretical potential to bring about marginal changes, but his point, with which I concur, is that these changes are unlikely to bring about fundamental transformation of the system, even in the long run.

Change of system, therefore, is unlikely. Changes within the system could result from forced accommodation between Whites and Blacks, since the latter are not entirely powerless.

This point is illustrated in a succinct analysis of the future of South Africa written by Austin Turk in 1967 in
which he summarises the various sources of Black power, potential if not actualised.

Turk notes that power is being transferred to the Africans. Though the fountainhead of power is still with the Whites, who of course want to keep it there, the derived power which is given to the Africans through the creation of puppet Homelands does increase their power base. There cannot be immediate surveillance and control of everything that goes on in the African sectors. Turk then gives some reasons for maintaining that the Africans have some strength to force concessions from the Whites:

"Their (1) numerical superiority, (2) indispensable role in the economy, (3) tribal affiliations and cultural memories of not always unsuccessful military encounters with the whites, (4) educational advances, (5) external sources of ideological and other weapons, and (6) psychic resources derived from long and intimate contact with whites, who themselves are not really entirely indifferent to the pressures of 'common humanity', point inexorably to accommodation. African power is a fact that will not go away" (Turk, 1967, p.409).
2.2.8 A Unifying Black Ideology?

In the decade since the article was written, there has been a growing articulation of Black consciousness, by groups such as the Black People's Convention (BPC) and the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), which are now banned. The Blacks appear to be doing what the Afrikaners did before them: looking at their position in the South African context and attempting to form a unifying ideology, consequently acting in concert for the betterment of their group. A further irony is that the system provides them with a unifying factor, a subordinate position owing to a black skin.

These and related ideas were coherently argued in two articles (Thami Zani, Black People's Convention Publicity Secretary, The Cape Times, 28.4.1977 and 3.5.1977) in which it was stated that "the overall analysis based on the Hegelian theory of dialectical materialism is therefore as follows - that since the thesis is white racism there can only be one valid antithesis, a solid black unity to counterbalance the scale". The author rejects the liberal argument which says that it is racialistic for the Blacks to come together as a self-conscious group, since arguments of this type have served only to divide the Blacks. The

(6) In this section, the word 'Black' is understood as synonymous with 'African' (whereas it usually encompasses Africans, Indians and Coloureds).
founding president of SASO and honorary president of the BPC, Steve Biko, who died while in detention, saw Black consciousness not only as a way to restore self-pride in Blacks, but also as a way to dispel White prejudice about Blacks.

Though the publicity secretary might be misrepresenting Hegel, one can still take his oft-repeated point, that White racialism is fostering Black racialism.

Although Thami Zani affirms "we cannot be conscious of ourselves, and yet remain in bondage", in the present context it seems that the Black consciousness movement will have private psychological and moral consequences in terms of the restoration of pride in being Black and healthy self-image, rather than success as a political movement in the public domain. The weight of White power is too overwhelming for it to do that, but it may well lay a solid foundation for future Black efforts aimed at amelioration of their situation.

A unifying Black ideology would be a prerequisite for collective Black action, because, as Adam and others have noted,

"nothing seems further from reality than to assume a conscious homogeneity of non-White interests as
opposed to their rulers. In Marx's categories, they constitute most certainly a class 'in itself' but they are further away than the European proletariat ever has been from a consciousness with which they form a class 'for itself'" (Adam, 1971, pp. 71-72).

Conflicts between the Africans themselves, such as tribalism, militate against Black unity and provide opportunities for the Government to exploit in its policy of divide and rule. Adam talks about a widespread ethnic narcissism in all groups which responds to the right to keep their cultural identity: that for which minorities in other parts of the world struggle is granted readily in South Africa. Is it granted because of Afrikaner history and reverence for other people's nationalisms, or is it a calculated device for perpetuating White domination? Reality is usually a mixture of factors, but more weight should be assigned to the latter.

2.2.9 Conclusion

Adam's central hypothesis is that the apartheid system is an advanced and effective pattern of rational, oligarchic domination. In summary, some assessment has to be made of its usefulness in furthering explanation and understanding of South African politics.
His key concept of a pragmatic racial oligarchy goes a long way towards answering Van den Berghe's question about how South Africa can survive for so long in a state of acute disequilibrium. Adam does not overlook other reasons, such as overwhelming White power, Black disunity, economic interdependence and so forth. However, whereas Van den Berghe tends to underrate the adaptive and innovative capacity of the South African Government, Adam probably gives the Government's rationality too high a rating in his analysis.

As already mentioned, if Adam had been researching South Africa at the time of Soweto and its aftermath, he might have been left with less of an impression of 'rationality', and more of an impression of determined force willingly used to defeat any challenge to domination.

The use of force to quell disturbances could, of course, be looked upon as entirely pragmatic. However, what Adam seems to have had in mind when using the concept pragmatic domination is the truly frictionless rule of a Huxleian brave new world, or at least a movement in that direction: a more pragmatic racial oligarchy in South Africa could, for example, attempt to govern with the cooperation of African elites. As Du Toit points out, the failures prior to
October 1977 to restore civil order by coercive means alone must have made it clear to the Government that some political accommodation was necessary (Du Toit, 'The Cape Times', 30.6.1978, p.10). Cooperation with African elites would not threaten National Party unity or the apartheid system, though it might be incompatible with exclusive White privilege and social segregation. It is a step like this which Adam would characterise as "pragmatic racial domination". How pragmatic the ruling elite can be without splitting itself will be a major factor determining changes within the system in the future.

In his study of the dynamics of South African politics, Adam outlined interrelated processes which could bring about changes, though not fundamental ones. Even though one may not agree with the way he relates the variables and the weights he assigns to them, his work is a useful exercise in clarifying the complexities of the South African political process.

Adam's study offers the understanding that the Whites are playing a survival game, that the rules are not immutable, and that the business of politics is often to trade one thing for another, and that there could be a shift in the relative economic and social status of Africans and Whites as a result of economic growth and education.
2.3 MICHAEL O'DOWD


Since his theory is based on the writings of Professor W.W. Rostow, a thorough assessment of the O'Dowd view of change and the future of South Africa requires a critical analysis of its origins. This will be followed by an exposition of O'Dowd's application of Rostovian concepts, and then a critique of his work, in order to arrive at some conclusions about the validity of his theory of change.

2.3.1 The Rostovian Model: A Critique

Professor Rostow appears to have been influenced by Karl Marx's

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sequence of stages in which feudalism gave way to bourgeois
capitalism followed by socialism and then communism, and
other similar theories, and consequently, was stimulated to
write 'The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist
manifesto'. The stages of growth were intended "to challenge
and supplant Marxism as a way of looking at modern history".

He suggests that in the process of economic development,
societies pass through five distinctive basic stages: the
traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the
take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass
consumption. International conflict, notably war, is also
related to the stages of growth. Rostow affirms that his
stages of growth are not merely descriptive, but have "an
inner logic and continuity. They have analytical bone
structure, rooted in a dynamic theory of production"
(Rostow, 1960, p.12). The essentials of the theory are
that

"in the forward momentum of the economy certain
leading sectors are prominent which, in their
early stages of development, grow rapidly; there
are sectoral optimum positions determined ideally
by the trend of income and population, by
technology, the quality of entrepreneurship, and
by the empirical fact that deceleration is the
normal optimum path of each sector. These optima
postulate a sequence of optimum patterns of investment. But the actual course of investment and of the deployment of resources generally differs from these optima in being influenced not only by private choices, but also by social decisions and government policies, and the impact of wars. However, at any given time, certain leading sectors can be identified, the growth of which was vital in propelling forward the economy. Their position is determined by supply and demand in the widest sense. Thus the pattern and allocation of resources are governed by the complex social, political and economic forces affecting them" (Bauer and Wilson, 1962, pp.192-193).

Bauer and Wilson continue to say that

"the exposition thus vacillates between the suggestion, on the one hand, that the configuration of societies in particular stages of development and their progress from one stage to the next are shaped by certain specified key variables, and the suggestion, on the other, that they depend on a large number of interrelated variables and influences, which are often unspecified and the operation of which depends largely on local circumstances. These additional variables or other qualifications are sufficiently numerous, or stated in sufficiently general terms, to reduce much of the argument to unhelpful statements such as that economies will advance if there are
enough progressive sectors, or that in economic life all factors are interrelated and everything depends on everything else. A theory which depends on such escape clauses cannot be effectively refuted. But equally it cannot explain anything" (Bauer and Wilson, 1962, p.194).

Rostow's work does not offer clearly defined specific criteria for the definition and dating of the stages of growth, which makes it difficult to come to grips with his argument. Phrases such as "self-sustaining growth" are not helpful, in that growth cannot be self-sustaining in the sense of continuing irrespective of attitudes, institutions and policies. His account of development after the take-off deals entirely with countries already part of the developed world: this is one reason why it is simplistic for O'Dowd to transplant the theory to South Africa.

A key question which applies to both Rostow and O'Dowd is:

"Are there any general propositions in the social sciences implying that all societies can reach broadly similar levels of development, regardless of natural resources, historical experience, political institutions, social customs and the economic qualities and customs of the population?" (Bauer and Wilson, 1962, p.199).
It would require some audacity to state that there are.

Rostow's proposals, based on his key variables, seem to reflect a belief in economic development without cultural change.

In the context of a study on European industrialisation, Alexander Gerschenkron points out that "depending on a given country's degree of economic backwardness on the eve of its industrialisation, the course and character of the latter tend to vary in a number of important respects", so that it is not possible to suggest, as Rostow does, "that the process of industrialisation repeated itself from country to country lumbering through his pentametric rhythm" (Gerschenkron, 1966, pp.353-355).

Rostow, in common with others writing with ideological intent, appears to ignore the richness and diversity of history!

2.3.2 The Rostovian Influence: O'Dowd's Key Concepts and Theory of Change

O'Dowd belongs to what might be termed the Oppenheimer school of thought: South Africa began to industrialise only as recently as 1886. Around 1970 it reached the
stage of changing from labour intensive to a capital intensive system, and in this phase there are opportunities for Africans to do skilled work, and therefore, over a period of time, to improve their social and economic position, and perhaps be in a better position to wrest political concessions from the Government.

If South Africa is allowed time to continue the industrialisation process and to prosper, it will become possible to have political changes which are both fundamental and peaceful. During the transition period to full industrialisation, while half or more of the population is still living in the subsistence economy, there is bound to be both discrimination and hardship.

A useful parallel is the case of the Irish in the 19th century who were manipulated to suit the needs of the English economy. They may not have been legally discriminated against, as Africans are in South Africa, but O'Dowd quotes the cynical aphorism showing that there are more subtle forms of discrimination: "The doors of the Court of Justice stand open to all, like the doors of the Ritz Hotel". O'Dowd says that

"it is perfectly clear that there is not equality of opportunity in other developing countries. Even
where there is no blatant class system (as there is in Spain and India), no overt or covert tribal, language or religious discrimination and no gross political discrimination based on party membership - and there are not many countries left when we have excluded these - there remains massive inequality based on access to education, as long as there are not sufficient educational facilities for everybody. Indeed the attempt to remedy the effects of these inequalities is one of the major preoccupations of the highly developed countries today" (O'Dowd, 1974, p.38).

O'Dowd accepts Rostow's idea that society passes into a fairly short period of about thirty years during which there is accelerated economic growth resulting in a take-off into self-sustained growth (whatever that may mean). This phase is usually characterised by a minority government dedicated to growth, and harsh conditions for the majority, but this gives way to the next phase in which there is reform in a democratic direction. In O'Dowd's view, South Africa is already in the early period of the reform era.

2.3.3 Exposition and Assessment of O'Dowd's Theory

O'Dowd does not convincingly demonstrate the nexus between economic growth and equitable, qualitative, political and
social changes in society; nor does Rostow postulate a simple determinate outcome from growth as a basis for O'Dowd's optimistic and simplistic long-run political predictions.

Rostow does not succeed in identifying clearly the circumstances under which different societies have experienced sudden acceleration of the pace of advance in conditions which led to long-term progress, and neither does O'Dowd, whose argument that South Africa is following a Rostovian pattern is partly based on the indisputable fact that there has been economic growth.

In addition, says O'Dowd, there has been the typical movement of population from the country to the towns, and the transference of economically active people from agricultural to non-agricultural pursuits. The differentials between White and African earnings, it is argued, are similar to the differentials between skilled and unskilled workers which are a normal feature in all developing countries. Yet can one infer from these, as O'Dowd does, that South Africa is following a predetermined pattern? As Leftwich writes, even if South Africa "is not sui generis, it is not easily or satisfactorily compared either with the advanced industrial societies (now, or in their past) or with the so-called 'under-developed' countries. It may be that
this amounts to little more than saying that any attempt at systematic comparison must proceed with caution" (Leftwich, 1974, p.127). Far from proceeding with caution, "and with a predictive daring that takes one's breath away, Michael O'Dowd, in applying Rostow's account about the stages of growth, foresees 'major constitutional reform in a liberal direction in or about 1980, without serious disturbance'" (Leftwich, 1974, p.125).

O'Dowd appears to be making a plea: give South Africa the critical two or three decades that Rostow talks about, and, thereafter, growth will be regularly sustained and used to pay for concessions wrested by the Africans from the Whites. As Habakkuk points out,

"whether there were periods so critical and so precisely compressed in time is a question of fact, and I can only say that I do not believe that the European experience conforms to this pattern. Growth has been more rapid in some periods than in others, and some innovations, for example the railways, have had much more profound effects than others; but I see no evidence that there has been one, and only one, decisive phase in the history of each growing economy" (Habakkuk, 1961, p.600).

O'Dowd suggests that as South Africa becomes more wealthy,
it will be cheaper and easier to make concessions to African demands than to resist them by force.

Therefore, South Africa will follow the example of countries like Britain and undergo radical but peaceful change leading to liberal democracy. Obviously, it is a tenuous thread indeed which links South African development to the events that produced democracy in Britain with its specific historical experience, traditions and relatively homogeneous society.

Reading O'Dowd's work, and indeed much of the writing which is characterised as 'Liberal', one is aware of the high degree of Eurocentrism of Whites (particularly English-speaking) transplanted by historical movements into an African setting. In Europe, socio-political modernity came with industrialisation and economic modernisation, but it does not follow logically that this is so in all societies. Liberal thought seems to have roots in the theories concerning change from a traditional to a modern, from a Gemeinschaft to a Gesselschaft, society, from one which is ruled by custom to one which is ruled by rationality.

Thus it is argued that the logical imperatives of industrialisation will eventually transcend the irrationality
of race discrimination and subject it to the logic of impersonal labour markets, of competition between workers on the basis of industrial aptitude, not colour.

The foregoing underlines a weakness in some thinking on South Africa: it is automatically assumed that changes in the economy will directly affect the political structure. Although theories such as O'Dowd's are able to explain concessions in apartheid ideology, which are made to preserve a strong economy, they are probably mistaken in extrapolating from economic concessions to those in the social and political spheres, which are not regarded as vital to economic progress. A situation of economic interdependence and social and political 'independence' could be engineered to exist for a long time to come.

However, the observation by O'Dowd that during the period of rapid growth there is usually minority government has received some support from a recent study by Huntington and Nelson, in which they discuss the problem of political participation by the poor (in South Africa one can substitute 'Black' for 'poor') in developing countries.

The authors begin with the observation that political participation is a complex phenomenon designed to influence
government. It is hardly surprising that participation by the poor, through sizeable and durable organisations that are concerned largely with their problems, should be the most effective channel for altering the attitudes of the poor and improving their condition in the long run. But the most striking fact about such participation is its rarity. Huntington and Nelson suggest that in most of the developing nations, for some time to come, the poor are less likely to be involved in politics through this than through other patterns. Their impact on government policies, therefore, will be correspondingly limited.

South Africa is, as O'Dowd says, a developing country more like Mexico and Spain than Australia or Canada, and indeed it does conform to some of the patterns of other countries in a similar position. However, it is deeply racially divided, by history and custom and draconian law, unlike other developing countries, and this racial factor may prove

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(8) It is difficult to decide precisely what this position is: for example, the World Bank regards South Africa as developed whereas the International Monetary Fund sees it as belonging to a special group amongst developing countries. A recent study ('International Business' by Daniels et al, Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts, 1976) classifies South Africa as a developed nation, and ranks it 37th in the world in terms of GNP per capita. However, South Africa does have similarities with other countries characterised by dual economies.
to be far more intractable than O'Dowd appears to think.

"In the context of socio-economic development, the levels, forms and bases of political participation are shaped by the priority that elites, groups, and individuals give to political participation as a goal of development, its value, in their eyes, as a means to achieve other developmental goals, and the extent to which political participation is itself a by-product or consequence of development" (Huntington and Nelson, 1976, p.160).

Priorities in South Africa are determined to a very high degree by the elite, rather than groups or individuals within society; and the elite does not see political participation by the majority in a common South Africa as a goal of development. The elite could be described as trying to maximise growth while simultaneously minimising political participation by the mass, and pursuing policies designed to prevent the creation of a gap between people's expectations and the state's willingness or ability to fulfil them.

However, political participation as a means to achieving other developmental goals, notably growth, is a possibility, given the indispensable role of the urban Africans in the
economy, and the pressures to give them genuine representation and a measure of control over their own affairs.

The third possibility is the O'Dowdian one of political participation as a by-product or consequence of development, and although it remains a theoretical possibility of a relatively painless way to include the poor in politics, the "relationship between development and broadened participation is neither steady nor uniform. The level and forms of participation in a society during any period are affected by communal tensions that may be unrelated or only peripherally related to modernisation . . . (thus) other factors may produce far greater or far less participation than the country's degree of social and economic modernisation would lead one to expect" (Huntington and Nelson, 1976, pp.166-167).

This analysis is more interesting than O'Dowd's, in that it considers the variety and complexity of such problems.

Huntington and Nelson say that political participation constrains the political choices of elites; as development proceeds, participation becomes increasingly costly to suppress.
In South Africa, one would think that the Whites in general and the Afrikaners in particular are prepared to pay a very high cost to maintain political control of the country. Even if the economic position of the Africans improves, there is no necessary correlation between this and increased African participation in the political system.

However, if the poor do become mobilised, the ruling elite will be constrained, so the Huntington and Nelson argument runs, to channel rather than to suppress participation, that is, to control its forms and guide its selection of issues.

"As some groups become politically active, others are under pressure to do likewise in order to protect their relative positions. This process of defensive and imitative group mobilisation is particularly characteristic of ethnically divided societies" (Huntington and Nelson, 1976, p.168).

The above analysis seems to lend support to a specific O'Dowdian or general meliorist approach to change in South Africa, but Huntington and Nelson's conclusions dispel hopes of an easy or inevitable transition to a bourgeois democracy and welfare state: "the difference in the forms, bases, and overall patterns of participation, while influenced by general social and economic trends, are primarily the products of the
decisions of the political elite" (Huntington and Nelson, 1976, p.171).

Thus the questions that have to be answered concern the nature and aims of the political elite in South Africa, to assess whether these are compatible with broadened political participation by the masses in a common South Africa: the evidence points to the contrary. It is doubtful whether the political elite will voluntarily decide to broaden participation, and it is equally unlikely that the endogenous forces outlined by O'Dowd will lead to fundamental changes in the core characteristics of the system against the preferences of the elite.

2.3.4 Some Conclusions on Industrialisation, Economic Growth and Political Change

In conclusion, O'Dowd's contribution will be placed in

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(9) The Government's new constitutional proposals exclude the majority of the population, the Africans; and, although it is too early to judge, the way Coloureds and Indians are included may merely be a cover for effective continued White domination. On the other hand, it can be argued that "by National Party standards the constitutional proposals represent a radical progression towards a system of meaningful power-sharing, and as such are at least a step, faltering though it may be, in the right direction" (Vander Vyver in De Crespigny and Schrire, p.256).
perspective as regards the debate over the alleged incompatibility between apartheid and economic development. This discussion will serve to further test the validity of his theory of change, and will provide a context for a discussion on new perspectives on economic growth and political change in the ensuing section of this thesis.

Hughes says that skirmishes between the 'Liberal' and 'Radical' views can be traced to O'Dowd's "vision of manna from heaven" (that growth and development would by themselves force the dismantling of racial discrimination) being somewhat dented by the sociologist Herbert Blumer.

"Blumer argued that, contrary to O'Dowd, entrepreneurs suffering the costs of racism would be more rational to accommodate racism than to underwrite the costs of attempting to change the existing racial order" (Hughes, 1977, p.49).

Blumer's 1965 analysis of the "structural requirements or the logical imperatives of industrialisation" (Blumer in G. Hunter (ed), 1965), including the commitment to a rational and secular outlook, the replacement of status relations by contractual relations, the development of impersonal markets, physical and social mobility, and an in-built dynamic condition which presses to keep the
preceding characteristics in play, shows that industrialisation can produce a dynamic situation. However, and this is where Blumer's analysis may do more credit to complex reality than O'Dowd's, he does not see economic factors as the seminal ones from which all others flow, overriding racial, political and social factors. The dynamic situation brought about by industrialisation may adapt itself to pre-existing racial discrimination, finding it easier to operate within the system (a point which has been greatly developed by subsequent writers): "the organisation and operation of the industrial structure bend to the racial patterning that is present in society" (Blumer, 1965, p.243).

There may be only a conceptual difference between industrialisation and social and political events. However, industrialisation generally tends to cause social changes, but the results of this process are affected by political decisions, particularly in South Africa.

O'Dowd has been criticised for a simplicity which has provided (in the opinion of the authors quoted below) a target for Marxist analyses of South Africa:

"The 'conventional wisdom' under attack is not really all that conventional. It is true that
some liberals, indulging in the habitual liberal pastime of wishful thinking, have argued that there is a determinate relationship between economic development and political reform. A high rate of economic growth will eventually lead to greater political democracy. Existing inequalities in South Africa are the inevitable by-product of economic development, but as national wealth increases the living standards of the less privileged will rise, antagonisms will diminish and political reforms, on the lines of the nineteenth century British model, will take place. . . . it is true that liberals have expounded such simple (not to say simple-minded) notions and in this way have provided a target for the Marxists. The most prominent present exponent of this approach is M. O'Dowd who accepts without question Rostow's discredited stages theory of growth and on this foundation proceeds to erect an exceedingly flimsy structure" (Kantor and Kenny, 1976, p.36).

This particular critique gives the impression of being an overreaction to both O'Dowd and other 'Liberal' writers on the one hand, as well as to Marxist writers on the other hand. Yet the important point is that some sort of debate did emerge in the past decade or so (Hughes notes that it is rather one-sided, since none of the 'Liberals' have chosen to reply - but what of Bomberger's reasonably agnostic paper on the industrialisation theme?); the debate includes
not only the so-called 'Liberals' and 'Radicals' but 'Radicals' debating between themselves and reacting against the 'Old Left', (10) and incursions by the 'Right' into the fray.

Yudelman gives a summary of the debate as he sees it:

"In fact industrialisation makes the situation more dynamic. Though this does not make significant change inevitable, it does tend to encourage it. One's analysis of industrialisation can depend to too large an extent on one's attitude to the possibility and desirability of change, and one's preferences on how it should take place. To illustrate the point one need only refer back to the differences between the liberal-reformists and the radical-revisionists. The former largely live in South Africa and are committed to evolutionary change: their theory points to the possibility or inevitability of change coming peacefully through industrialisation. They wish to encourage increased economic growth through increased industrialisation and capital investment. The radical-revisionists, on the other hand, generally live out of South Africa (frequently

(10) Edward Roux, for example, in "Time Longer than Rope", says that "the most potent factor for change is the industrialisation of the country" (Roux, 1964, p.433).
against their own wishes) and are committed to revolutionary change: their theory suggests that the inner dynamic of South African industrialisation perpetuates racial discrimination and that some external agent must be added to the equation if structural change is to be realised. The radical-revisionists strongly oppose foreign investment in the South African economy, and this opposition is directly related to arguments suggesting that industrialisation is either neutral to social and political change, or an active retardant to it. Both the liberal-reformist and radical-revisionist arguments, then, tend to be self-serving" (Yudelman, 1975, p.94).

Yudelman is aware that there is a variety of perspectives amongst the writers he terms "radical-revisionists" but refers to them, probably for ease of description, as though they constitute a school: this category has come into increasing usage without adequate explanation and justification, a point which will be considered in the next section.

More importantly, he suggests that they "are committed to revolutionary change": this may be so, but it is not evident from their work. Most of the writers concerned are historians trying to explain past changes, for example, from segregation to apartheid, and prediction is not
intrinsic to their work. However, one Marxist study which does consider the hypothetical possibility of change, by Arrighi and Saul, will also be examined in the following section of this thesis.

This brief discussion of the debate has pointed, inter alia, to the dangers of oversimplification: in the case of O'Dowd and similar writers the simplifications of a progressivist and modernisation view of history: O'Dowd, for example, states quite boldly that the stages of economic growth (as he sees them) are

1. Confusion;
2. Repressive minority rule (of which both Fascism and Stalinism were examples);
3. Old-fashioned Liberalism; and

Admittedly, the O'Dowd thesis is mellowing with time:

"In my original presentation . . . I took an essentially mechanistic economic determinist view but now I see the matter rather in the terms that socio-economic growth is a single process with social changes as indispensable
to economic change as economic changes are to social change, and furthermore that it is probably not true to regard the mechanism and motivation of the development as entirely economic" (O'Dowd, 1978, pp.42-43).

Together with his economic determinism, another feature of O'Dowd's thesis is the downplaying of race as a factor of importance in itself in the explanation and understanding of South African politics and society. He suggests rather that in the process of development the race question will be solved, "or perhaps will turn out never to have existed except as a cover for economic cleavages" (O'Dowd, 1978, p.37). The possible arguments against this will also be considered in the course of this study, but even O'Dowd has accepted that "to the extent that I have in the past suggested that economic growth would lead to the disappearance of language, religious and other groups I was wrong" (O'Dowd, 1978, p.45). There appears to be a growing realisation in O'Dowd's writings that economic growth may not be the sole panacea for South Africa's problems.

Moreover, as Kane-Berman points out

"apart from the fact that Mr O'Dowd appears to ignore political factors (such as a White
minority bent on preserving its supremacy) which may hinder the kinds of economic changes that economic conditions might seem to necessitate, he also underestimates the ability of the present system to adjust itself to meet economic needs without altering the basic structure of White domination" (Kane-Berman in Schlemmer and Webster, 1978, p. 52).

O'Dowd assumes that the Government will opt for a "rich and mixed" as opposed to a "poor and White" South Africa; it remains to be seen whether this assumption is correct, and whether economic richness and political Whiteness in South Africa are incompatible in the longer term.

It may be that ways will be found to ensure that "the Black man's labour is used for the laying of golden eggs in the White man's nest without his getting even the shell". (11) The figures for changes in the ratios (which O'Dowd agrees is what is important) of White:Black incomes which are given in the following section appear to invalidate a significant part of O'Dowd's general thesis, which is that for development

(11) This is quoted from "African Perspectives on South Africa" by Van der Merwe et al (eds), 1978; perhaps some allowance should be made for exaggeration for dramatic effect.
to take place in the way he envisages, the African majority must be accommodated "on the right side of the economic fence" (O'Dowd, 1978, p.37).

O'Dowd further says that

"we are at present at the equivalent stage of development to Britain in the early 1860's and to America in the first decade of the century and major political change equivalent to the Reform Act of 1867, or to the accession of the Democrats in 1912 which was accompanied by the breaking up of trusts and the legalising of trade unionism is to be expected before the end of the current decade. I would go so far as to say that if no such change takes place the O'Dowd thesis will have been disproved" (O'Dowd, 1978, p.40).

On the one hand, one cannot rule out O'Dowd's general modernisation and ensuing political liberalisation approach as a theoretical possibility (with perhaps a longer time scale than that suggested by O'Dowd), although there are serious flaws in his view of change and the future of South

(12) O'Dowd does not say whether he considers the new constitutional proposals to constitute "major political change" if implemented.
Africa. On the other hand, it can be cogently argued that the political, social and economic forces at play are too complex and conflicting to permit a straightforward O'Dowdian four-phase movement towards a contented welfare state in South Africa early next century.

2.4 RECENT PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY AND POLITICS

2.4.1 Analytical Categories: Controversy and Clarification

There has been a cornucopia of recent writings on the history and politics of South Africa, from a variety of perspectives, which has added new dimensions to studies of South Africa.

Controversy has surrounded the labelling of some of these writings as 'Radical' or 'Revisionist', in what is evidently an effort to include them all into an (undiscriminating) analytical category.

Since the writings so characterised add important new dimensions to South African studies, the problem of taxonomy will be dealt with in detail before consideration of the works themselves.
Views on the use of the adjectives 'Radical' and 'Revisionist' will be given by a variety of academics. (13) Some of them are considered to fall into the category under question, though not necessarily by themselves; others are not considered to be 'Radicals', either by themselves or by others.

Martin Legassick describes one of the results of the industrialisation debate as the

"emergence of a body of writing which has on occasion been labelled erroneously as 'revisionist' or as 'neo-Marxist' (in the context, pejoratively). The label is wrong because there does not exist any single new 'school'. In fact the consequence of shattering the hegemony of the liberal conventional wisdom within the South African English-speaking social sciences, and amongst prominent elements of British and American thought on South Africa has been the blooming of more than one flower. Some follow Weber; others (including myself) would see themselves in the Marxist tradition, of which there are of course a number of strains. Others would not want

(13) These views will be given in their own words: this necessitates a certain amount of quotation from the academics involved.
to tie themselves down so closely under one label or another. Even conservatives are challenging the liberal wisdom" (Legassick, 1976, pp.224-225).

The challenge to the "conventional wisdom" has led to the "revision" of standard interpretations of South African history and politics, and the main group of analysts who achieved this were writing from a generally left perspective: it has been pointed out that

"since Western capitalism has so far failed to solve the problems of the Third World and is itself experiencing a profound crisis, it is not surprising that the main drive behind the current revival of history comes from a radical pessimism which draws its inspiration, though not always its teaching, from Marx" (Hopkins, 1976, p.32).

The analyses of scholars like Johnstone, Arrighi, Atmore, Wolpe, Trapido, Legassick and others have added a new dimension to South African studies. Shula Marks places them in historical academic perspective:

"Despite the tremendous outpouring of literature on contemporary South Africa - perhaps more than on any other part of Africa - one of the major gaps in the
study of South Africa, again until the last few years, has been an adequate study of the twentieth century particularly from a socio-economic standpoint. Yet even elementary studies of White politics have been lacking. Much of the work until the late sixties focusing on Afrikaner nationalism, the ideology of apartheid and contemporary political developments fails to examine the nature of the South African state, what interests it was mediating, the conflicts within it or the precise function of racism in South African society. Heribert Adam in his 'Modernising Racial Domination' was perhaps the first to depart from the prevalent view of the Afrikaner state as representative of an outmoded colonialism. Work by F.A. Johnstone, John Rex, Harold Wolpe and Martin Legassick, took this process considerably further in their examination of existing interpretations - largely pluralist - of South African society, and their own analyses of its structure and purpose. Within the last couple of years, further new work has been undertaken, on the structural determinants of White power, the nature of White class interests and White, especially Afrikaner accumulation, and the implications of this for the regional economy as a whole and for South Africa's internal Black majority in particular" (Marks, 1976, pp.194-195).
The words underlined represent the critically important questions to which recent studies of South Africa have addressed themselves; the answers to these questions have provided new explanations, insights and evidence, thereby making valuable additions to understanding and knowledge of South African history and politics.

Yudelman says of the writers contributing to these achievements "that it is difficult to call them a 'school', since they do not share any set of coherent and unique principles;" but adds that "they are young, generally have South African backgrounds or experience, are neo-Marxists to varying degrees and concerned to fit South Africa into some world framework or paradigm involving concepts like capitalism, development and exploitation; they are nearly all Whites opposed to White rule, and have a (barely disguised) contempt for the liberal view which believes in evolutionary change, encouraged by economic forces" (Yudelman, 1975, pp. 82-83).

Wright expands on the variety which is discussed by Legassick and Yudelman:

"It is no easier to classify the radicals than to classify the liberals. All the radicals are influenced by Marxist thought to some
degree. But Marxist thought is always in a state of growth and change as theories are developed, applied, and variously accepted, discarded, or revised. Neo-Marxist and other Marxist schools oppose each other on the subject of South Africa. For some radicals the development of theory is the basic aim; others have a more empirical approach. Because radicals have written no large synthetic history of South Africa, furthermore, any depiction of the current radical interpretation must be a mosaic constructed out of many different papers on specific topics. Nonetheless, although there are differences among them, both of theory and of substance, in general the radicals rely on, refer favourably to, and provide reinforcement for each other's work. Neo-Marxism provides the most dynamic theoretical influence. Concern with the impact of capitalism on race relations, particularly since the mid-nineteenth century, provides a common set of problems" (Wright, 1977, pp.19-20).

In a trenchant critique of Harrison Wright's work, Peires says that many of the writers mentioned "are not primarily 'liberals' or primarily 'radicals' but rather historians doing their best to build on what is correct and reject what is wrong in the work of their predecessors. That they make mistakes and reach conflicting conclusions should surprise no-one. The 'false
dichotomy' (which Wright fulminates against on pp. 72-3) and the 'procrustean bed' (p. 83) of liberal/radical schools is not only analytically valueless but destructive of analysis. Names have a habit of sticking, and labelling becomes a substitute for thought. It is far easier to categorise a person as a 'liberal' or a 'radical' and therefore not worthy of consideration than it is to come to grips with his evidence and interpretation, especially when it conflicts with one's own" (Peires, 1977, p. 66).

Yet what is one to make of the admittedly invidious tendency towards indiscriminate categorisation when many well-known Africanists contribute to a new volume which is explicitly labelled "A Radical Reader"?

One of the clearest expositions of 'radicalism' is given by Waterman, one of the two editors of the volume ("African Social Studies: A Radical Reader" edited by Gutkind and Waterman, Heinemann, London, 1977). He notes that "over the last ten years or so there has appeared a clear and growing tendency away from the conventional wisdom enshrined in the bulk of writings and teaching on African history, sociology, economics and politics in the West. The generic term used for this tendency is 'radical'. Yet it appears that no-one has
examined the phenomenon, to define its limits or catalogue its content" (Waterman, 1977, p.1).

Waterman continues to examine radicalism as a commitment, as an approach, and as an interest, before suggesting limits for the use of the term.

The following is a synopsis of his argument, with commentary included in parentheses.

Radicalism as a commitment is usually overt moral or political commitment in writings on African studies, phrased in terms of opposition to imperialism and concern for Africa's masses with a preference for socialist political and economic solutions (this description could also apply, say, to Black nationalists). Most radical writings have a similar approach in evincing great interest in theory and method, which are often matters of central concern. What distinguishes radical from reformist Africanists is the radical condemnation of mainstream "Western" African studies (presumably such as those embodied in the "Oxford History of South Africa"). Moreover, there are differences between the radicals themselves on the presentation or non-presentation of alternative approaches, and, amongst those who do present alternatives, in their relationship to Marxism (which will be discussed in the following section).
Waterman quotes Amilcar Cabral on the importance of explicit theory:

"... we would recall that every practice produces a theory, and that if it is true that a revolution can fail even though it is based on perfectly conceived theories, nobody has yet made a successful revolution without a revolutionary theory."

He then suggests that the greatest activity amongst the theoretically inclined radicals has been directed towards destroying the conventional Western approaches, and that much of the criticism is well-informed and original, but "if the horse is dying, does it really need such a flogging?" (Waterman, 1977, p.6): outdated theories will be defeated not so much by attack as by the increasing irrelevance of the questions they ask and the answers they provide.

An examination of the literature of the last ten years seems to reveal certain problems, areas or themes of special interest to radicals. These include methodology, history, economy, social structure, and politics.

Waterman concludes that radicalism ought not only to have the connotations discussed above, but also those of
'primary, fundamental, of the roots', thereby contrasting radicalism with the conservative African studies, which 'despite their frequent sophistication and elegance', have findings which are 'banal and trivial'. In this sense, any work which ignores the superficial and epiphenomenal, which uncovers basic structures and root problems, can and should be considered radical (Waterman, 1977, p.14); (but what of radical liberals, radical conservatives, and so forth?).

Sufficient has been said in this section on analytical categories, to describe the "labelling" controversy, and more importantly, to clarify the meaning of radicalism as far as possible, and to outline some of the variety of perspectives which have been applied to studies of South Africa by various writers.

2.4.2 Methodology and Marxism

Marxist perspectives have contributed to what Legassick calls "the breaking of an intellectual log-jam, in which new kinds of questions, historical, sociological, and economic, are being asked, and new kinds of source material being explored" (Legassick, 1976, p.225); and, since they
have influenced recent writings to a greater or lesser extent, will be considered prior to the works themselves.

Waterman refers to the position of Basil Davidson, who says that in one sense he is a Marxist, and quotes him further as saying:

"I think that every serious student of Africa would have to be one. You must be familiar at least with the first volume of Das kapital, with Pre-capitalist economic formations, with The Civil War in France, and some other of Marx's writings. And you must have thought about these matters with deep and constant care. Having said that, I would strongly resist the title 'Marxist'" (Waterman, 1977, p.6).

Marxist thought offers a general theory with explanatory powers, a vocabulary with which to analyse the problem, and prescribes solutions, so, as Hopkins has pointed out, it has inherent attraction, especially when all else is seen to have failed. Much recent writing on development and Third World problems (including South Africa), has taken place in an intellectual atmosphere of disillusionment with the lack of beneficial effects of economic growth for the majority of the people in developing countries.
The Third World experience of the past decade or so, in which growth took place in enclaves without benefit to the mass, belied the optimism of liberal economists about the happy effects of growth on income distribution and political liberalisation.

In studies of South Africa, it is a short step from saying that growth per se is not beneficial to the Africans in South Africa, to arguing that growth actually works against the Africans by strengthening White supremacy. Thus if one understands the imperatives of capitalist growth and the nature of the racialist system, this argument suggests, it is evident that there are no forces for reform within the system.

More specifically, the contrast between conventional inquiry and the Marxist approach is explained by Johnstone, who says that the philosophical tendencies of idealism and empiricism underlie much of social science:

"Idealism refers to a tendency of seeing and explaining social realities solely or essentially in terms of mental and psychological factors, such as attitudes, ideas, beliefs, values and ideology. Empiricism refers to a tendency to proceed in inquiry on an 'ad hoc' basis, of attempting to understand and explain
things merely by 'describing what is', of equating reality with its specific form, with the picture of reality immediately apparent to the investigator and those in the situation under investigation, and of treating all kinds of dependent and derivative factors as 'given' . . . These approaches are weak, both intrinsically and in the degree to which they are relied upon" (Johnstone, 1976, p.8).

He suggests that Marxist analysis, in contrast, is an integral part of a more general theoretical framework, from which it derives whatever explanatory power it has, and continues to say that

"if the Marxist approach seems superior to idealist and empiricist approaches, especially for the kinds of things this study is concerned with, it is not in any arrogantly absolute sense but in relative ways, by virtue of the fact that it avoids the real pitfalls of empiricism and idealism, but does not, if handled with care, replace them with other deficiencies of equal weight" (Johnstone, 1976, p.9).

Johnstone summarises the relative scientific value of the Marxist approach:

"Class analysis has come to mean various things,
but Marxist class analysis means something quite specific, and its specificity must be recognised. It is obviously completely distinct from idealist class analysis (in which class is defined in terms of such things as status) of the kind evident in American sociology. And, more importantly, it does not mean, and is quite different from, empiricist-materialist class analysis (which merely involves an empiricist 'attention to economic factors' and selection of 'class variables', such as income and occupation, and the correlation of such factors with others in an empiricist study of 'social stratification', without forming part of any general society theory with explanatory power, and tending to lead only to re-description rather than substantial explanation of social inequality). What it means, above all, is the systematic elucidation of the differential relationships of individuals and social groups to means of production in historically and structurally specific systems of production and social formations, and the elucidation of the various ramifications of these structural differentiations, within a general theory about these systems and formations, from which it acquires its explanatory power (Johnstone, 1976, pp.9-10).

The Marxist approach contributes to the widening of conceptual and theoretical parameters, and the marshalling of new evidence, in intellectual work on the subject of
South African politics, as will be seen from the following sections.

2.4.3 New Perspectives on Race, Industrialisation, Economic Growth and Political Change

Yudelman says that the attack on the "liberal reformist" school by the "revisionists" deserves consideration for three main reasons:

"a) it has important implications for general theories of the relationship of industrialisation (westernisation, modernisation, urbanisation, growth) to race relations (or social change, cultural change, political change);

b) it has important implications for the understanding of Twentieth Century South African history;

c) it is of vital moment for contemporary political debates about South Africa, about foreign investment policies towards it, and about the probability and desirability of revolution within it" (Yudelman, 1975, p.82).
2.4.3.1 Attitudes Towards Race and Class

One of the first notions 'revised' by recent writings is the long-standing one that the frontier was the origin of South African race attitudes:

"if race attitudes are not attributable - in an almost mysterious, or at least a geographical sense - to the 'influence of the frontier' - à la McCrone and Walker - where are they to be sought?" (Marks, 1976, p.193)

and

"with the new appreciation of the African side of South African history, however, this weakness of White power (in the zone of Black and White contact) takes on a new significance and opens again the question - at what point and why and by whom and in whose interest was White supremacy ultimately imposed?" (Marks, 1976, p.194).

The origin of race attitudes lies not so much in frontier interaction and hostility, but in class interests. The answers to the questions asked by Marks, arrived at through a class rather than a race analysis, are provided by various Marxist studies of South Africa.
In his introduction to "Class, Race and Gold", for example, Johnstone says that conventional studies see racial domination in modern South Africa as a "dysfunctional" intrusion upon the capitalist economic system, stemming from non-material factors outside it such as prejudice, racism, nationalism, and social and cultural pluralism, but doomed over the long-term to destruction by the inexorable imperatives of rational industrialism and colour-blind capitalism. Johnstone affirms that this perspective is the root cause of the inadequacy of much accepted and attempted explanation.

His own approach is a Marxist structuralist one, which sees and explains the system of racial domination as a product of the system of production of which it forms a part. His thesis attempts to explain the system of racial discrimination in the gold mines: the racial system is most adequately explained as a class system (as a system of class instruments which are referred to as "class colour bars"), generated and determined in its specific nature and functions, by the specific system of production and class structure of which it forms a part.

However, Johnstone's approach does not take into account that race in South Africa acquired a significance
independent of other variables: "to hold this view is not, as Johnstone accuses theorists of the plural society concept of being, to be guilty of 'ethnological determinism' (Johnstone, 1976, p.208). Merely it is to say that racial domination cannot be explained solely as a product of the system of production" (Welsh, 1978, p.34). Welsh continues to say that

"there are problems for a Marxist analysis posed by the existence of a politically significant White working class: if the working class is divided into politically free (White) and ultra-exploitable unfree (Black) segments how does one reconcile this with an explanation derived from the relations of production unless race operated at some time as an independent factor?" (Welsh, 1978, p.34).

This critique also applies to other Marxist studies.

The correspondence between race and class is further explained by Wolpe, who says that with few exceptions, most of the literature (radical, liberal and racist alike), describes South Africa in terms of racial concepts. Even where the relationship between classes is incorporated into the discussion, race is treated as the dominant and dynamic force. Owing to this perspective, the state in South Africa is treated as the instrument of White oppression
over the Africans, but as neutral in the relationship between classes. However, "it in no way detracts from the conception of the State as an instrument of White domination . . . to insist that the South African State is also an instrument of class rule in a specific form of capitalist society" (Wolpe, 1972, pp.428-429).

There is a similar explanation by Legassick, who notes that most prevailing commentary has tended to see some paradox in the conjunction of continued capitalist economic growth, authoritarianism and racial discrimination. The assumption has been that the authoritarian and racially ascriptive features of the society are archaisms, which would disappear with the inevitable emergence of a liberal capitalist democracy. Legassick abandons the assumption that bourgeois democracy is a necessary or inevitable product of the capitalist mode of production in favour of an attempt to examine the specific social relations generated by the specific character of the capitalist mode in its internal and international context.

2.4.3.2 Industrialisation, Economic Growth and Political Change

South Africa, Legassick continues, is dominated by capitalism,
a mode of production in which the economic surplus is subject to private appropriation and in which ownership of the means of production is severed from the ownership of labour power.

The thesis which emerges from the various studies has important implications for change: since racial domination flows from the needs of the capitalist mode of production, there is no possibility of national liberation while capitalism is the dominant mode of production. Legassick concludes that:

"ultimately . . . it would seem that such national liberation could be achieved only coterminously with the abolition of capitalism in South Africa. The struggle of the South African proletariat and the struggle of the African national liberation movement under the hegemony of the African proletariat and peasantry have the same ends. The duality of the contradictions in South Africa can only finally be dissolved together" (Legassick, 1974, p.286).

Wolpe echoes this conclusion:

"The major contradiction of South African society between the capitalist mode of production and African pre-capitalist economies is giving way to a dominant contradiction within the capitalist economy. The consequence of this is to integrate
race relations with capitalist relations of production to such a degree that the challenge to the one becomes of necessity a challenge to the other" (Wolpe, 1972, p.454).

Legassick evaluates the implications of this situation for strategies of socialist change:

"Two, perhaps not mutually exclusive, directions suggest themselves. On the one hand a left movement must return to the pre-1928 attempt to develop proletarian class-consciousness amongst workers in industry, based on an analysis and an organisational structure which can explain the different circumstances of class struggle among White and Black workers.

On the other hand the national liberation movement can only base itself on those institutions and areas which still define its existence as a nation. Indeed the colonial dimension of South African society has been such as to actually absorb territory from the oppressed nation, and indeed the main means of colonial surplus transfer is now the export of labour-power. But the immediate meaning of the national struggle in South Africa would seem to be the struggle within the 'Bantustans' and the other areas subjected to South African imperialism for restoration of resources (demands for land, etc.), and for greater determination over local resources. The class
hegemony in this struggle may be of different kinds though, if, as Marx wrote, 'the proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie', then these areas will be the forum for this struggle. Indeed, national liberation cannot be completed within these limits, circumscribed as they are in territory and resources. Yet equally it is doubtful if the struggle against capitalism in South Africa can proceed, through the unification of the interests and circumstances of Black and White working class, without the leverage that might be achieved by a Black proletariat using its 'national' institutions to their fullest extent" (Legassick, 1974, pp.286-287).

Although the Radical analysis is powerful and disturbing, the prescriptions are less easily immediately applicable to the South African situation, as a perusal of, for example, Legassick's evaluation of strategies for socialist change suggests.

Developing class consciousness effectively amongst African workers in South Africa, given the system of political, social and industrial surveillance and control, and also the embourgeoisement of the workers' aspirations, would be a difficult task (although it is possible that if the workers' aspirations are not satisfied, they will become a
mobilisable urban Black proletariat in Marxist terms).

However, even more difficult would be the task of persuading White workers that their true interests lie in solidarity, not with the Afrikaner nation, not with the Whites generally, but with their African, Coloured and Indian fellow-workers!

Although thoughtful 'Radicals' avoid "vulgar, mechanistic materialism, and always recognise the crucial importance of values and ideology in social life" (Johnstone, 1976, p.9), they do not place sufficient emphasis on the fact that "ethnic or cultural plurality is a world-wide reality with a definite political significance" (Van der Vyver in De Crespigny and Schrire, 1978, p.248).

As regards the national liberation struggle of the Africans, if the analysis earlier in this study is an accurate reflection of reality, a revolution and national liberation are not achievable aims in the foreseeable future. In the meanwhile, a non-optimum South African system, capable perhaps of lesser changes, but not of fundamental alteration of its core characteristics, may be maintained, like an industrial and commercial monopoly, through lack of effective challenge and competition.
As has been noted, most of the writers under consideration are historians and their studies, whilst they have implications for predictive efforts, are not intrinsically concerned with predicting change. However, there is one Marxist study which does discuss change as a hypothetical possibility, and therefore has greater inherent interest as regards the central thrust of this thesis on South Africa and political change.

The authors of the study, Arrighi and Saul, comment on the poverty of academic debate on the relevance of socialism for the development of sub-Saharan Africa, and suggest that socialism is a historical necessity for the further development of the area. They add that the "quality of debate among socialists concerning the actual possibility of revolutionary, socialist transformation in Africa in the present historical conjuncture also leaves much to be desired" (Arrighi and Saul, 1973, p.44). They continue that oversimplification (owing to undiscriminating analytical categories) has prevented correct identification of the forces which tend towards keeping the present African situation stable and also of the contradictions which might have inherent in them possibilities for progressive action. These are points which have been made previously in this study.
The article begins by affirming that the solution of Africa's problems can only result from the revolutionary praxis of the African people. The study assesses Western capitalism's interest in Africa, and the centrality of South Africa to international capitalist concern, because it does not easily fit into the pattern of 'rationalising' world capitalism. The Whites' social and economic privileges derive from their control over the State apparatus, whereas the power of international capitalism is mainly based on control over economic structures. Thus the Whites have everything to lose from an African neo-colonial solution and are determined to prevent it. Given the Whites' entrenchment in the political economy, such a solution could only be brought about at the cost of widespread disruption of the southern African economic system: it is therefore naive to expect international capitalism, either directly or as mediated by various Western states, to risk a profitable outlet for investment and exports for the sake of marginal improvements in the "logic of the market".

The authors see South Africa as having unique problems and potentialities for revolutionary action, relative to the rest of Africa, mainly because of the advanced stage of economic development. The African subsistence economy has
been irreversibly upset. Therefore populist objectives are not enough, and Black aspirations can only be fulfilled by controlling the industrial apparatus itself and reorientating it towards the economic and social uplifting of the African masses. The African bourgeoisie is structurally weak, and cannot play a hegemonic role in the struggle. In conclusion, they affirm, the "revolution in South Africa, . . . if it is to come, can only be a proletarian and a socialist (14) and a socialist revolution and the liberation struggle will not succeed unless it is restructured in accordance with this premise" (Arrighi and Saul, 1973, p.65).

Arrighi and Saul stress that marginal improvements in race relations and normalisation of contracts with other African states will in fact probably retard thoroughgoing liberation (by which they presumably mean a proletarian and a socialist revolution) in South Africa. The success of South Africa's policy depends in part on the extent to which internal liberalisation in South Africa and/or the establishment of military dictatorships in independent Africa will relax

(14) It has been estimated by Doctor and Gallis, International Labour Review, No. 2, 1966, p.166, that in tropical Africa by 1960 at most 11% of the work force was dependent on wage employment; the comparable figure for southern Africa was 63%, a significant degree of proletarianisation.
ideological barriers between the two. In many African states the ruling elite has more to lose than to gain by radically restructuring relationships with international and South African capitalism, although they too are under pressure from other Blacks, as South Africa is under pressure from her own indigenous Black population. In the foreseeable future, though,

"the picture which emerges from our discussion is not bright. International capitalism, under the hegemony of the United States, seems about to rationalise its domination of Black Africa, a trend which may be supplemented by an economic and diplomatic offensive from South Africa. The bankruptcy of independent Africa's development policies in the last decade, has, at the same time, prepared a favourable environment for the success of both such moves" (Arrighi and Saul, 1973, p.86).

The writers suggest that the liberation struggle in southern Africa is the key to continental liberation, but warn against "any illusions concerning the nature and short-term prospects of the struggle in southern Africa. Yet, at the present historical moment, this provides the main, if not the only, leverage for revolutionary change in sub-Saharan Africa" (Arrighi and Saul, 1973, p.87).
The two main elements in their argument are the emphasis on the continental sweep of strategic calculation in contemporary Africa, and the importance of the development of subjective conditions, requiring increased clarity of analysis and a deeper understanding of the forces involved. In an important passage Arrighi and Saul state that

"Only when concepts of 'nationalism' and of 'pan-Africanism' are fully demystified and liberated from the cultural grip of the ruling classes and their ideologies can they be put to progressive use as political instruments. It is then too that a patently two-edged sword like racial consciousness can realise its full progressive potential - when, in other words, it is related to (though not submerged by) a growing realisation on the part of African radicals that their revolution is part and parcel of a worldwide anti-imperialist struggle" (Arrighi and Saul, 1973, p.91).

2.4.3.3 Evaluation and Counter Arguments

There are counter arguments to the ones that have just been examined, and they will be given both for the sake of completeness and to consider further the economic debate and its implications for change in South Africa. This will also help to evaluate the preceding analyses.
Bromberger, for example, has tried (to use Martin Legassick's description) to define rather more closely the kinds of changes that particular aspects of the industrialisation process are likely to effect.

He begins with a synopsis of the views, as he understands them, of the 'revisionists', followed by a number of counter assertions which constitute one of the few attempts to actually reply to points made in order to form a structured debate.

The synopsis is that for Africans economic growth generates poverty. If the absolute level of income per head does not decline or stagnate, at least it will decline relative to that of the Whites. Economic growth depends on forced labour or labour repression. Institutional manifestations of the system are the trade union bar, which is important, and the limitations on geographical and occupational mobility, which are less important. Economic growth strengthens White

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(15) Legassick has recently argued (in Webster and Schlemmer, 1978, p.74) that the real economic question is that of the material situation of the total population. He puts forward the hypothesis that "under certain conditions rising real wages are compatible with increasing unemployment (or a declining rate of job creation at least) and therefore with a potential static or declining real income for the population at large".
supremacy. Growth depends more heavily on the White monopoly of political power as forced labour arrangements are intensified, but it also supports that monopoly with increased resources, which Whites possess the political will to use effectively.

The counter assertions include the fact that economic growth creates employment for a rapidly growing population. In addition, it creates a demand for skilled labour at a faster rate than is compatible with the retention of conventional and statutory colour bars. Growth also produces a geographical distribution of population which is not optimal from the point of view of White security, so Whites do and will trade security for increased prosperity. There are now good reasons for treating separate development in the Homelands as a risky strategy seriously undertaken in the hope of averting long-run disaster, and continued growth will make possible with less felt sacrifice the diversion of resources to various forms of projected economic activity in these areas.

Bromberger makes the following propositions:

a) "There is no doubt that growth has been associated with African poverty. It is
far from clear that it needs to be - or will in fact continue to be."

b) "'Forced labour' or 'labour repression' are ill-defined terms but as customarily used they do apply to an important element in South African economic history."

He reiterates the way in which increased labour demand reduces statutory rigidity, however, and the way in which growth helps to 'foot the bills' for such tentative changes as are taking place.

c) "On the grounds that I have just argued I do not agree with the simple proposition that 'economic growth strengthens White supremacy'. I would accept it as a description of recent developments but in a longer-run perspective this is not true."

Bromberger's paper

"is constructed as a close criticism of certain left-revisionist writings (Johnstone, Wolpe, Legassick) published up to 1972"

and

"it undeniably fulfils its critical objective . . . lapses of logical rigour, ellipses in 'model' specification, sometimes an incomplete
marshalling of evidence - these are identified in the chosen sources, and Bromberger's role of positivist cat amongst the political-economy pigeons seems vindicated" (Archer, 1976, p.233).

The criticism of the 'Radicals' as having a limited time-horizon is taken up by Kantor and Kenny:

"The Whites have been able to have their cake and eat it. But is there any reason to assume that this trend will continue indefinitely and that a choice will not have to be made between continued supremacy, as the Whites see it, and continued industrialisation? The fact that a choice may not be urgent today hardly means that it may not be tomorrow . . . there is little reason to assume that White supremacy and rapid economic growth are mutually reinforcing and many reasons to assume that they are not" (Kantor and Kenny, 1976, p.39). (16)

A consideration of the economic debate makes it abundantly clear that the sorts of difficulties raised require further research and empirical data.

(16) Criticisms of the 'Radical-Revisionists' which state that their approach is ahistorical and undynamic are now commonplace (though the same criticisms apply to the 'Liberal Reformists'), and are made, for example, by Wright, (1977, pp.89-90), Yudelman (1975, p.95), Katzen (1975, p.212) and Leftwich (1974, pp.130-131).
The positions and optimism of O'Dowd and Bromberger, for example, are seriously challenged by available figures. O'Dowd predicts (in Webster and Schlemmer, 1978, pp.37-38) that South Africa has moved from the stage of initial rapid growth, under harsh government and with underlying social discontent, into the stage of rapid growth coupled with social reform:

"So he expects increases in Black wages, education, etc. But his figures, for 1970-73 show White:Black average real wage ratios which either narrow slightly or even widen, depending on what deflation index is chosen (p.49). Similar results emerge from a valuable paper by McGrath, on income distribution. He finds that in the decade 1960-70 White:Black personal income ratios per earner narrowed fractionally, from 10.94:1 to 10.70:1, but the ratios per capital (sic) widened, from 13.03:1 to 14.18:1, because of the relatively higher (and continuing) growth rate of the African population (p.155). So even if one fully accepts Bromberger's injunction (p.60) to ignore how unequal things are today in favour of 'the trend' (his emphasis), the results are not inspiring. The same goes for education. Bromberger enthuses in support of O'Dowd: 'If modern technological developments demand a massive human transformation of the labour force . . . then that is what will materialise' (p.61). Perhaps, but when? He shows that in the full decade 1961-71, the proportion of Black pupils in
secondary schools increased from 2.9 to 4.7%!
As McGrath soberly concludes, closing the gaps at this rate is something the Black population is not very likely to wait for" (Orkin, 1978, pp.69-70).

In the six years between a Sanlam survey and the one by McGrath on income distribution, there seems to have been only a slight movement up and down (the figures in both the following tables are from the same source, which is given at the bottom of Table II):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Population</th>
<th>% Income Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A Whites</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>73.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>71.9**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B Africans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>19.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>19.3**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sanlam
** McGrath

(17) Since the Sanlam/McGrath comparison shows only a marginal improvement of 0.2% in African income over the period, while White share has decreased from 73.7% to 71.9%, the difference has presumably gone to the Coloured and Indian population groups.
Although these figures are approximations based on a set of pyramiding assumptions, the order of magnitude is what is important, and it is roughly correct. The relative and highly unequal positions seem to be stagnant, which seriously calls into question the positions of Bromberger and O'Dowd.

**TABLE II : INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary by :</th>
<th>(a) Estimated race-group share;</th>
<th>(b) Race differential;</th>
<th>(c) Richest decile.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Race Group</td>
<td>Population Weight (% Range)</td>
<td>Income Share (% Range)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>17.8 - 21.6</td>
<td>69.0 - 78.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>67.9 - 70.0</td>
<td>17.7 - 20.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2.3 - 2.9</td>
<td>1.6 - 2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>7.9 - 9.4</td>
<td>4.1 - 5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Ratio of Income per Head</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White/African</td>
<td>12.1:1 - 15.4:1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White/Asian</td>
<td>4.7:1 - 7.2:1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White/Coloured</td>
<td>5.2:1 - 8.8:1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White/Black</td>
<td>8.5:1 - 13.6:1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Percentage Share of highest decile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Race Population</td>
<td>Share of Total Income, 1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richest 10%</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>58% plus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other useful information could be gained from comparative analysis of the development patterns (specifically the

*Source for Table I and Table II : Mr Sean Archer, Centre for African Studies Lecture 5, University of Cape Town, April 10, 1978.*
relationship between growth and income distribution) of countries such as India, Brazil, Egypt and South Africa, which have modern sector islands of wealth in a sea of underdevelopment and poverty. For example, the percentage share of income for the richest 10% is 58% plus in South Africa and 50.8% in Brazil, as against 29.8% in Japan and 22.4% in Israel.

The criteria used in judging complex concepts such as 'income distribution', 'welfare' and 'development' differ, so that comparisons are difficult. As already mentioned on page 114, the World Bank considers South Africa to be a developed country, whereas the International Monetary Fund regards South Africa as part of a special group amongst developing countries.

Experiments with productive redistribution, through mechanisms such as taxation and education, in developing countries, and efforts such as affirmative action or positive discrimination in the United States, could be evaluated, and their applicability to South Africa assessed.

Experiments with scientific socialism elsewhere in Africa and in the developing world need to be examined and assessed in order to test their relevance to South Africa's problems.

In summary, a great deal of empirical data needs to be
gathered from rigorous research, to help answer the sorts of problems raised by the debate on South Africa's politics and economics.

2.4.4 Conclusion

It is both inevitable and desirable that the debate on the interrelated factors which together constitute the complex entity 'South Africa' will continue into the foreseeable future. It is inevitable because it is unlikely that an irrefutable theory (as in the physical sciences) will be established, with which scholars and activists who prefer one interpretation can persuade those who prefer another. It is desirable because, in the process, various facets of the subject under examination become clearer.

Hughes says that

"the revisionists have made a contribution in two important and undisputed ways: by calling attention to very important facts which while they were not unknown before, were generally overlooked or undervalued; and by injecting a little venom into a debate which was previously altogether too gentlemanly and high-minded" (Hughes, 1977, p.57).

The 'radical' analysis is often cogent, and raises awareness
of important issues, philosophical and political.

A critical calculation made by revolutionary Marxists is that the suffering which usually follows revolutionary violence ought to be weighed against the structural violence and suffering which is part of the status quo. Revolutionaries do not follow laws, but radical perspectives question whether the laws themselves are just, and whether order is not simply enforced for their own benefit by the Whites who have something to lose through fundamental and equitable change.

Intellectual Marxists (whether revolutionary activists, academics, or both) operate within the framework of an all-embracing paradigm, which offers explanations for the observable political, social and economic phenomena of a society. Is Marxist theory sufficient for explanation and understanding of society, and is Marxist ideology, once applied, the solution to the problems of society? The insights derived from Marxist perspectives renders them necessary, but that is far from saying that they are sufficient, for understanding and solving the problems of people and society: for example, Marxism does not resolve the problem posed by the absence of an inter-racial working class solidarity.
However, the radical analysis has deepened understanding of class and capitalism, of exploitation and underdevelopment in South Africa, of Black history, of the possibility and desirability of revolution and other related subjects, and this approach "to South Africa's twentieth century history is clearly going to be a major growth history" (Marks, 1976, p.195). On intellectual radicalism, Waterman concludes that "we contemporary Africanists need only remember with Gramsci (who for believing so died in one of Mussolini's prisons) that truth is revolutionary, and with John Hus (who for stating so was burned by the church), that it will conquer" (Waterman, 1977, p.14).

Regrettably, however, the 'truth' is not easily established: "no doubt, when the revolution is already battering at the gate the Marxist pedants will still be wrangling over how many angels can dance up and down on a mode of production!" (Hughes, 1977, p.56).
PART III
PART III

CONCLUSION

A summary of my analysis and conclusions in Part II will be given as Section 1 of Part III for comparison and contrast with the positions of the selected writers. This will also form the background for the further discussion in this concluding section of (2) conflict and current political trends, (3) attitudes towards social conflict, (4) the nature of change and the possible futures of South Africa and (5) selected scenarios of South Africa's future which can be compared with the hypotheses put forward in this study.

3.1 SYNOPSIS OF ANALYSES

I agree with Van den Berghe that the structural sources of conflict in the South African system are such that conditions for a change of system exist. I disagree with his prediction of imminent revolution ("... the likelihood of revolution seems high. Mounting internal strains and external pressures doom White supremacy and racial segregation within the near future", Van den Berghe, 1965, p.262). The prediction made a dozen or so years ago has
not materialised because White power is sufficient to contain the conflict, and, together with a degree of interdependence between the racial groups, to maintain an uneasy equilibrium in society. However, given a weakening in the position of the Whites over a period of time (through, for example, effective economic boycott and prolonged guerilla warfare) and a strengthening of the African position (through, for example, greater power to disrupt the economy, increasing moral and material support from abroad), the theoretical possibility of change of system cannot be ruled out in the longer term.

Adam's hypothesis of a modernising racial oligarchy fits the facts in South Africa, but only up to a certain critical point: that point is probably reached when the oligarchy perceives any given change as threatening the overall power of the ruling elite over the destiny of South Africa. No 'pragmatic' concessions are likely to be made by a Nationalist Government which threaten National Party unity, and, by inference, overall Afrikaner and White control of the country: pressures for change which challenge these are likely to be met with force and suppression, whereas lesser changes may be countenanced as pragmatic responses to social conflict. However, the nature and pace of change under the policy of separate
development (which Adam recently described as a "blueprint of expedience", The Cape Times, 7.7.78, p.2) is unlikely to satisfy African demands and therefore halt the polarisation of the races. The implementation of the system requires extension of the coercive apparatus of the State.

It is unlikely that the forces identified by O'Dowd will bring about more than marginal changes in the system. The O'Dowdian model might apply if

a) the growth rate of productive employment is greater than the growth of population throughout the life-cycle of the economy; and

b) the development in any one period generates the correct group behaviour for continued development in subsequent periods (Orkin, 1978, p.70).

However, the figures given in Part II upset the first condition; and political factors (the maintenance of White domination) may well override the need for marginal improvements in the logic of the market.

I agree with the general thesis of the writers considered at the end of Part II, that racial discrimination was historically and still is functional both to White security
and White supremacy, though this need not necessarily remain so in the long term. Much depends on whether the Whites wish to maintain power largely in their hands and the current mode of production.

The sources of conflict are institutionalised in the South African political structure:

"To a substantial extent the racial conflict in South Africa revolves around its institutionalised inequalities of power, wealth, opportunity and status. There are no inherent or intrinsic reasons why groups of differing colours and/or culture should not be able to live together in harmony: colour (or ethnicity) derives its salience because it symbolises particular positions in a hierarchy, and it is the hierarchical nature of the society that determines its distributional patterns, i.e. who gets what, how and when" (Welsh, 1978, p.30).

The ruling elite controls the patterns of social mobility, ascribes roles in society according to race, predetermines status according to colour, and controls the allocation of resources and wealth.

The degree of conflict, latent or overt, at any time is a reflection of the differential acceptance of the Africans,
Coloureds and Indians of the specific form of distribution of power, resources and status in South Africa, and the ability of the Whites to control the manifestations of dissatisfaction.

Since there is an excess of claimants over opportunities for adequate reward, the most powerful group is likely to use its power to contain the resultant strain and conflict, by a variety of methods, ranging from physical coercion to 'pragmatic' concessions. This group is likely to attempt to maintain its power, privilege and wealth for as long as possible; and it is unlikely to be dislodged until equal or greater power is raised against it. This, naturally, is not to say that the cohesion of South African society depends on the unhesitating use of power alone; clearly, there are cross-cutting cleavages which help to maintain some sort of equilibrium in society.

3.2 CONCLUSIONS ON CONFLICT AND CURRENT POLITICAL TRENDS

The conclusion that the sources of conflict are institutionalised in the South African political structure to a large extent is also supported by a survey of the various sources of conflict by Schlemmer (Schlemmer in De

The prime source of conflict in South Africa is the issue of political rights for the Black majority. The two opposed positions are those which, on the one side, wish for universal franchise in a non-racial unitary state, and, on the other side, separate franchises and political domains for different race groups, and unequal participation in decisions about the central resources of society.

This is the seminal conflict source, from which all others flow. Blacks disagree about acceptance of separate development, more specifically, about the relative efficacy of working within or outside the White imposed system for its overthrow. Whites differ amongst themselves over the sort of society South Africa should be: a common society or a racially separated one.

There are value conflicts in South Africa: over ideological differences, over the inclusion of Africans in a broad South Africanism; by Africans themselves over whether Whites, Indians and Coloureds should be included in their projected South Africa, or whether to aim for Black supremacy; and over the relative desirability of an essentially capitalist or communist socio-economic system.
Job inequality, low African wages and enforced lack of African bargaining power through recognised trade unionism is an obvious source of discontent.

The partition (13.7% for the Homelands and the rest for Whites) of the land resources of South Africa is an enduring source of conflict. Schlemmer notes that the differential access to the resources of the 'White' or 'common' area is a source of conflict.

Differential access to educational facilities is one of the most important sources of conflict, and was at least the proximate cause of the Soweto uprising. Clearly, there is deep resentment amongst Blacks against a system of education which is designed to fulfil a Nationalist vision. Expenditure on Black education is low in comparison (and it is the comparison which is important, not the absolute level) with expenditure on White education. It is the antithesis of what young Blacks want, which is the same education as Whites, and equal life-chances in what is a de facto black-and-white state, characterised by economic interdependence.

The major causes of discontent do appear to be rooted in the apartheid structure of society. If the apartheid state were dismantled, and a common unitary state founded, would
the residual and irreducible (at least in the short-run) conflicts of ethnicity, religion, tribalism, ideology and so on be politically and socially significant? Experience elsewhere in the world suggests that there is no clearcut answer to this question: examples range from peaceful and prosperous plurality (Switzerland), through uneasy coexistence (Belgium, Canada) to bloody confrontation (Lebanon).

The particular structure of the South African state produces not only the conflicts outlined, but also conflict regulation, in ways both direct and indirect.

The South African state is an authoritarian one, deploying considerable and powerful legal and extra-legal means of preventing or stifling dissent. If Adam's definition of totalitarianism is accepted ("the suppression of all attempts for change detrimental to the superordinate group" Adam, 1971, p.39), then South Africa is a special case of such a state. The South African Government excludes, by force if necessary, alternatives to the established system of involuntary colour politics. However, a measure of dissent is allowed, provided it is largely ineffectual as a challenge to the established system. Furthermore, this gives the appearance of rational, open exchange of views. It is more subtle for a pragmatic oligarchy to dissipate
energies along channels which it controls than to rely on stark physical coercion alone. If a channel of dissent is judged to be a nuisance, it is closed down, as the security measures of October 19th, 1977, blatantly showed.

When a government which has superior capabilities eliminates ambiguities in the rules which govern its subjects, most people tend to follow the rules and fall into apathy and resignation, so conflict is contained. Black energies are further dissipated by splits over the Homelands issue (divide et impera), by inter-ethnic conflict (fostered by Bantu Education), and by ideological differences. Economic growth and interdependence between Whites and Blacks is seen as increasing prosperity and decreasing the chances of unrest by offering material rewards to the Blacks which counterbalance their social and political demands. Thus conflict is regulated by what has pithily been described as the 'whip of hunger and the butt of the gun' in a hierarchy of crude to subtle controls.

Conflict is simultaneously aroused and controlled by the South African system. The system would be self-defeating if it could not contain the conflicts to which it gives rise, but it has so far proved successful in its own terms.
The Whites in South Africa, who derive significant privileges from the existing system of allocation of power, wealth and status, perceive an attack on these privileges as an attack against the social order itself. The system is designed to preserve these very privileges, so the conflicts outlined are intrinsic to it, and will remain to influence every facet of political, social and economic life in South Africa as long as the system itself remains.

It is difficult to see, therefore, how the conflicts can be resolved within the system (they can only be contained); the particular conflicts which beset the present South African system can only be resolved by a change of system, which would in turn give rise to a society with its own conflicts. Progress would only have been made if the new social dispensation gave rise to fewer and less virulent forms of conflict, and allowed greater cooperation towards achieving those aims which are fairly universal amongst people. (In this context it is self-evidently desirable to agree with Barrington Moore that the task of honest thinking is to rise above the preconceptions of both capitalism and communism, and to uncover the causes of oppressive tendencies in both systems in the hopes of overcoming them.)

Van den Berghe says that
"the end of White supremacy must come in South Africa, and it will come through revolution and violence. But the end of White supremacy will not mean the end of racism. I have little doubt that the first African government in South Africa will be better than the present government. It could scarcely be any worse. Unfortunately I am not convinced that it would be enough of an improvement to want to fight for it" (Van den Berghe, 1969, p.42).

Whether or not Van den Berghe is correct, his statement underlines the complexity of the situation and explains why many South Africans are deeply divided over their perceptions of the political alternatives.

In the meanwhile, political life revolves around the issues generated by the present system. What do the various groups feel about these conflicts?

3.3 ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIAL CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA

As Barrington Moore has pointed out, "we cannot do without some conception of how people perceive the world and what they do or do not want to do about what they see" (Moore, 1966, p.487).
Much of what would otherwise be pure speculation on possible ways to resolve conflict in South African society can be substantiated by empirical evidence on how Whites and Blacks see things, and what they want to do about what they see.

In June 1978 there was a symposium in Freiburg, West Germany, on the prospects of peaceful change in South Africa. Attitudinal surveys were conducted amongst both Whites and Blacks by Professor Theodor Hanf and his group in South Africa. The findings which follow are attributable to the Freiburg group. (1)

The aspirations of Whites and Blacks are in conflict: 74% of Whites are prepared to fight to maintain South Africa as they know it today, while 83% of the Blacks want the existing system to be replaced by a one-man one-vote system.

The Government is enjoying massive and growing support amongst the Whites, whereas 50% of the Blacks have a feeling of powerlessness. Those taking part in the attitudinal survey were asked to express agreement or disagreement with

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(1) The findings of the Freiburg group have been published in German and are due to be published in English later this year. Judgement as to their value will have to await this publication. In the meantime, the figures cited have been culled from a variety of press reports.
a number of statements. The percentage of those agreeing with each statement is given after the statement.

(1) Improvements for Africans will come through patient negotiation between White and Black leaders - 67.4%.

(2) The only way of bringing improvements for Africans is by making trouble in public or by strikes - 10.2%.

(3) Africans will never get improvements without fighting and violent actions - 27.6%.

(4) Fighting and violence will harm the Africans very much more than the Whites because the Whites are very strong - 47.7%.

(5) Africans should never think of fighting and violence because hurting anybody, even Whites, is very bad - 61%.

A majority of Africans then, still prefers peaceful negotiation, and regards violence as bad in principle; the investigators say this is partly attributable to religious attitudes. The Freiburg Report also says that Black political leaders fear that this could quickly change; that with the progress of urbanisation and the growth of education, disillusionment increases and hopes of peaceful change decrease; and that readiness for conflict is growing above all amongst the African youth.
The Freiburg Group indicates that Chief Buthelezi has strong support amongst urban Blacks, and not only amongst Zulus. At the July 1978 Grahamstown conference on the future of South Africa, Buthelezi summarised his views. He said the Whites will make the smallest possible shifts to withstand a relentlessly increasing pressure; that the folly of apartheid may give rise to the greater folly of a triple parliament and a super cabinet, and that no leader of a Black group would survive long in that travesty of democracy; that it is not too late to bring about fundamental changes by peaceful means, but that they were not likely to materialise, not because Blacks would not permit it, but because Whites were intent on a last-ditch stand which conceded as little as possible.

The Freiburg Survey, which took several years to conduct, can be compared to other attitudinal surveys. One of these is the Markinor socio-political barometer (reported in "The Argus", 1st June 1978, p.11). The results were:

69% of the Whites interviewed are confident that there will be a happy future in South Africa for all races; 28% are not confident. By contrast, 62% of African men interviewed and 54% of African women are not confident of the future. However,
37% of the women and 31% of the men did express optimism.

89% of the Whites thought Mr Vorster was doing a good job leading the country, with 64% choosing the "leading the country very well" answer, to 25% who chose the "fairly well" answer. The Africans feel otherwise: 89% of the men and 70% of the women did not think he was leading the country well, and the large majority chose the strongest disapproving answer.

By a large majority Whites saw their personal relationships with other groups as being either good or very good, but the results from the other groups suggested that some Whites were deluding themselves. Africans again have a different view: 54% of the men and 46% of the women see Black/White relations as poor or very poor. The survey showed that there was a realisation amongst Whites of some degree of dissatisfaction amongst Africans, although it did not reach the same degree as the actual dissatisfaction expressed.
Africans tended to see themselves as being worse off economically than they were a year ago, while Whites, Asians and Coloureds tended to believe they were no worse off.

On all these issues there was less of a discrepancy between the Coloured, and particularly the Asian group and the Whites, which is probably a reflection of the differential incorporation of various groups into the mainstream of South African society. The feelings of the Africans expressed in the above survey are not surprising on the basic premise that the system under which they live is specifically designed to maintain the power, privileges and wealth of the Whites.

An interesting part of this survey's findings is that Indians show a high level of satisfaction and support for the status quo.

It is natural that the Africans should compare their own situation, not with Blacks elsewhere in Africa, but with that of the Whites in South Africa. However, the fact that such comparison is made need not imply dissatisfaction in all cases: "we must never take the identification of a person's comparative reference group as providing in itself an adequate explanation of his resentment at the patterning of social inequality" (Urry, 1973, p.161).
they question the legitimacy of the system which allocates power, privilege and wealth differentially according to colour, and furthermore have no channels to express their discontent, sociological analysis suggests that some of the conditions for rebellion are present amongst the Blacks. However, this is not incompatible with the findings of the Freiburg Group that a majority would still prefer the changes they wish for to come about peacefully.

Professor Schlemmer's study of political attitudes in Durban refers to the perception by Blacks that the system is positively geared to depriving Africans of their legitimate entitlements. Whites, however, appear to be unaware of the seriousness of the potential for conflict: in a nationwide study, Schlemmer found that amongst Afrikaans-speaking Whites 16% considered Africans to be very dissatisfied and 42% felt them to be fairly dissatisfied; the remainder viewed them as satisfied. Amongst non-Afrikaans-speaking Whites, 39% felt the Blacks were very dissatisfied. (The Markinor survey suggests that 62% of Whites felt there was not much satisfaction amongst the Africans.)

The Schlemmer survey suggests that White political control is seen as essential for the continued existence of the White community in South Africa; only 9% of non-Afrikaners
and 3% of Afrikaners answered that no serious or permanent danger to White interests would result from Black rule (interests being defined as order and living standards, with culture and language being accorded low priority).

The most interesting part of his survey is that which offers insights into the question of why open violence or overt confrontation is not as yet characteristic of Black South Africa, despite Soweto and its aftermath. Some 40% of African respondents exhibited a strong sense of the immutability of White authority and control. White domination tended to be seen by these people as a massive, rock-like edifice, an all-encompassing political reality which nothing could change. Substantial minorities displayed self-denigration or adopted pro-Homeland or pro-separatist stances. These were seen as second-best options, but the only way of reacting to the impossibility of doing anything else. When all the adaptive responses were added up, only some 20% of respondents remained who consistently and emphatically rejected all aspects of the system. Will this percentage increase over time?
3.4 THE NATURE OF CHANGE AND THE POSSIBLE FUTURES OF SOUTH AFRICA

With these views as background, one can look at the sorts of conclusions which can be reached about political, social and economic trends, and their impact on the future.

It appears that the range of possible outcomes for South Africa is that between repression on the one hand and revolution on the other.

Beyond stating the range of possible outcomes, it might be wise to venture no further prediction. Given the richness and variety of the society under examination, and the multitude of forces at play, though, one might hazard a guess and say, as Alice did in Wonderland, that things in South Africa are likely to become "curiouser and curiouser" in the future!

The future is full of potential and should be looked at with fresh eyes. In order to do this, as Du Toit has affirmed (The Cape Times, 26th, 27th and 30th June, 1978, p.8, p.8 and p.10 respectively), some things have to be avoided. The first is the 'Doomsday' and 'Uhuru' syndromes, which envisage either gaining or losing absolutely everything. The second is the projection fallacy, which is seeing the
future as a projection of the present. The third obstacle to clear thought is residual fixations, or the retention of perceptions that have ceased to be relevant. It is not possible to make predictions in the social sciences in the same way that predictions are made in the physical sciences.

However, some conclusions can be drawn, and tentative hypotheses put forward, to be verified, modified or refuted by empirical evidence and unfolding events. At this historical juncture in South Africa, it appears that revolution is remote; effective external intervention is unlikely; and the establishment of a unitary multiracial democracy through internal forces illusory since the power elite rejects this as a possibility:

"The sole and non-negotiable aim of South African Government policy is the preservation of the lives, lands and life-style of the White minority. The means currently proposed for the attainment and maintenance of this end are 'separate development' within South Africa and an 'outward' policy within the continent directed to the establishment of a zone of co-prosperity in the Third Africa" (Butterworth, 1977, p.27).

The South African Government is not different from other
governments which take action based on political expediency, which discount the future and emphasise the present, which take ill-considered decisions and pay insufficient attention to the possible consequences of present actions. However, the South African Government also gives the impression of being a Janus-like creature, facing towards doctrinal inflexibility and ruthless implementation of its policies on the one side, and towards pragmatic responses and devolution of power on the other. (3) This combination appears to have been successful. After all, Cassandras have been predicting the demise of White supremacy for over half a century, but

(3) Beard writes that "the African population of 'White' South Africa will always exceed the White population, and even granting that the status of Africans resident in 'White' South Africa will be that of foreign visitors, will South Africa be able to continue to discriminate against Africans by refusing to accord them the same rights and privileges as are accorded to White resident aliens and visitors from abroad? It would seem safe to assert that racial equality is not envisaged by the National Party Government, and 'baasskap' cannot be eliminated as long as people are classified and accorded rights and privileges purely on the basis of race or colour.

South African policies thus appear to be paradoxical or even self-contradictory . . . On the one hand separate development gives to Africans a degree of power and a relative security from harassment which they have never before enjoyed . . . , but on the other hand the position of Africans in 'White' areas has never been more uncertain and the position of leaders who have emerged in political and para-political organisations which do not enjoy government sponsorship has never been more insecure" (T.V.R. Beard in Van der Merwe et al (eds), "African Perspectives on South Africa", 1978, p.10).
judged in their own terms, the Whites have been remarkably successful in achieving their aims. (4) The Republic is theirs, and there does not appear to be a force or combination of forces capable of overthrowing them. They might reason, therefore, that even if there is conflict and deep dissatisfaction, it is regrettable but does not really matter as long as it can be contained. If they ensure that the weight, scope and domain of their power over Blacks remains stronger than the power of the Blacks, (5) they might remain in control for a half-century or more, preserving the privileges of the Afrikaners specifically and the Whites generally (who are supporting the Nationalists in increasing numbers). The fundamental White perception is that White rule is essential for survival. This perception may or may not be correct, but it does inform the thoughts and actions of White South Africans. (6)

(4) Even eminent science fiction writers have been predicting the certain demise of the White-controlled South African system! Arthur Clarke wrote "Death and the Senator" in 1961, projecting the story into the future to the year 1976. He makes the Senator say in 1976 that "he could even think, without pain or bitterness, of his own son, who had travelled this road before him and now lay, one cross among many, in the United Nation's cemetery at Cape Town. He had never visited Martin's grave; in the days when he had the time, White men were not popular in what was left of South Africa."

(5) The term 'Blacks' here includes Africans, Coloureds & Indians.

(6) Indeed, perceptions like these take the form of self-fulfilling prophecies after a while, analogously to the way in which theory 'x' managers give subordinates no responsibility, and then say they are irresponsible . . . .
The various surveys have shown that a majority of Africans still want peaceful moves away from White domination, and that they are neither united in implacable opposition to the Whites, nor in a revolutionary ferment. This situation may continue for a long time, but the process of separation and exclusion of the Africans will not only weaken them in some ways, but will also act to increase over time the numbers of them who opt for confrontation and violence in the face of White intransigence and unwillingness to listen.

That there will be increasing pressures on the present system seems reasonably certain. The surveys indicate considerable dissatisfaction amongst the Africans, which in the absence of alternatives might increasingly be translated into attempts to change the structure of the system itself. The example of the Afrikaners, who opted for racial and ethnic separation and identity, and who gained power in doing so, may be emulated by the Africans as the way to improve their collective position. Gatsha Buthelezi has drawn this parallel, amongst others (Buthelezi in Van der Merwe et al, 1978, p.585).

In a comparative study of race relations in six 'Anglo fragment' countries, it is concluded that

"change seldom occurs at the initiative of
White society. Rather, that society tends to respond and accept change (even changes which may limit its power and privilege) only when it is confronted by groups which, having mobilised their resources, can utilise pressure and competitive resources as a means for bringing about change" (Baker, 1975, p.19).

The South African state will probably not allow the Africans to mobilise their tangible resources to the extent that they can challenge the basic structure of the system. It is difficult, though, to prevent the spread of an intangible Black consciousness if the Africans finally become united in their perceptions of the White-imposed system as being the source of their problems. As Fanon made clear in the "Wretched of the Earth", Whites have ruled partly by shattering the Black man's identity; in South Africa, however, the ethnic identity of various groups is emphasised by the Government to facilitate a divide and rule policy. In either case, it is likely that a dialectical process will lead the Africans to form a new consciousness as a countervailing power to the common consciousness of Whites that they (i.e. the Whites) must rule South Africa.

Pierre van den Berghe wrote that
"a South Africa divided against itself awaits the impending and inexorable catastrophe. The Whites claim a right to survival which hardly anybody denies them. But in claiming to assert that right, they have set themselves against the course of history, and have become an arrogant, oppressive albinocracy" (Van den Berghe, 1965, pp.263-264).

In reaction to this, one possibility for the future is that more Africans will come to think that the calculus of suffering likely to result from revolutionary violence must include that which will come from prolonging the present state of affairs. Barrington Moore suggests that "as long as powerful vested interests oppose changes that lead towards a less oppressive world, no commitment to a free society can dispense with some conception of revolutionary coercion" (Moore, 1966, p.508).

As long as Africans, and to a lesser extent, Coloureds and Indians, are oppressed, there are likely to be mounting pressures against the Whites both internally and from the outside world. The South African system arouses strong emotions because it has institutionalised racial discrimination, and, on a more subtle level, because it touches the world conscience and is a microcosm of world problems:
"South Africa is an expression on the face of the White world in history, and one which even yet the White world does not care to erase. For to erase the meaning of South Africa is more than merely to risk the West's considerable economic and political investments there; it is to alter a policy and behind it a habit of thought, that grew with power itself. Yet the meaning of South Africa is no less to the world of colour, and all humanity may find it too costly a meaning to maintain" (Segal, 1967, p.132).

"It is being increasingly realised that what you are attempting to solve here is, in microcosm, the same conflict between races and between rich and poor that is going to confront the world on a vaster scale in the near future" (Lord Redcliffe-Maude in Gerber, 1973, p.63).

"Southern Africa's distinctive racial characteristics provide a model of the racial situation all over the world. There are a number of vexing moral and philosophical issues present, for example, the basis of government legitimacy" (Grundy, 1973, Preface).

In his Preface, Grundy goes on to say that

"one can conceive of the total world picture of
international relations as a complex and complete system, much like a gigantic electric circuit, although not nearly so predictable. An action at one point in that circuit sets off a reaction elsewhere in the system, and so forth."

If this is true, then it partly explains why South Africa arouses so much interest in the outside world. The resolution or otherwise of the conflict between White and Black, rich and poor, and the changes that take place in South Africa, may indeed be a microcosm of the larger world in certain ways.

In the complex interplay of facts and values, of manmade decisions and impersonal social forces, there are changes taking place continuously, at different levels, which might have unforeseeable consequences. The population increase in South Africa is an example of non-purposive change which might have a significant impact on future politics.

It has been estimated that there will be six million Whites, five million Coloureds, one and a quarter million Indians, and thirty-five million Africans in South Africa in the year 2000. The Homelands, independent, federated or otherwise, will not be able to support even half of the Black population, so that between seventeen and twenty-five million Africans will be living and working within the areas designated as
'White' South Africa. Eleven more cities the size of Cape Town would have to be built by the turn of the century to house the growing White, Coloured and Indian population, and eight more cities the size of Soweto for the increase in African population. These trends lead to social problems such as squatting, overcrowding, disease, crime and poverty, but these are ultimately political problems, so there will be concomitant pressure on the political system.

Politics revolves around the allocation of scarce resources, so that a greater population means more people pursuing limited resources, which in turn leads to conflict and political demands. The Africans working in South Africa will want to be recognised as an integral and permanent part of the country in which many are born, work and die, that is, as citizens with political, social and economic rights.

Developments such as these strengthen the assertion that

"it is desirable to have some concept of the alternative futures towards which policies may tend before policies are formulated. Otherwise points of no return may be passed without any conscious awareness that the panoply of choice is so great or the future so uncertain. If these be speculation or nightmares then - as they are - rather than science, prognostication,
or, except with respect to limited aspects of the problem, technological extrapolations, they (or something similar but better) ought nonetheless to be part of the intellectual equipment of modern man." (Kahn, 1967, p.357).

3.4.1 Reasons for Hypothesis on the Nature of Change

Drawing together the foregoing discussion, and given the following principal reasons, amongst others:

(1) that the Whites generally and the South African Government specifically perceive the continuation of White domination as imperative for survival (the 'doomsday' or zero-sum game syndrome in which both sides tend to think in terms of either gaining or losing everything);

(2) that the policy of separate development can provide only limited relief in terms of deflecting political aspirations and defusing dissatisfaction amongst the Africans;

(3) that the inescapable logic of (particularly) African population growth, and the inability of the economy to absorb the increase into the economy constitute a demographic time-bomb (Africans are likely to see the
economic question of unemployment as being, in the final analysis, a political question);

(4) that there is neither enough time nor economic growth for the co-optation of sufficient numbers of Africans through embourgeoisement to significantly change the situation in terms of giving enough of them a vested interest in the status quo;

(5) that the growth rate is dependent on significant foreign investment in South Africa, but that this investment will be curtailed or inhibited because of internal policies;

(6) that external pressures on South Africa will increase over time (White domination in South Africa might be seen as all the more intolerable once Namibia and Zimbabwe are independent Black-ruled states);

(7) that there are no known plans in the pipeline for bargaining over a genuine sharing of power with Africans and disaggregation of government in the direction of, for example, evolving the Homelands policy towards some sort of consociational democracy;

(8) that the percentage of African respondents who "consistently and emphatically reject all aspects of the system" will increase in view of the above;
one can put forward a tentative hypothesis for the foreseeable future in South Africa. Following Adam's assertion that "suppression is either absolute and total or it develops an inner dynamic towards its own abolition" (Adam, 1971, p. 75), and given the factors summarised above, the most likely trend for the near future in South Africa is change in the direction of increased authoritarianism (pace O'Dowd!).

The hypothesis is that changes which are not perceived as challenging the overall power and control of the ruling White elite will be countenanced and even implemented by the oligarchy: the new constitutional proposals might be an example of Adamsian pragmatic concessions at lesser levels. However, changes which do appear to threaten ultimate White power in South Africa (and future demands by Africans, Indians and Coloureds are increasingly likely to be for precisely these sorts of changes) will be resisted and suppressed by all available means, so that each new pressure on the system is met and controlled by even greater state power.

Clearly, the important caveat here is that there are a number of other courses for South Africa to follow, including a variety of ways in which there can be genuine and negotiated power-sharing between Whites, Africans, Indians and Coloureds,
such as some form of federal structure or consociational democracy, but they seem a little less likely to materialise than the one adumbrated above at this time.

Although the continuation of overall White control seems likely at this point, past patterns should certainly not be raised to the level of future inevitabilities. The future in South Africa will be partially determined by what has happened in the past, but it is still largely open: future choices, both in South Africa and abroad, could have a decisive impact on unfolding events in a way not foreseeable now.

As Francis Wilson suggests

"any number of plausible hypotheses can be put forward regarding the shape of the future, ranging from fundamental change by 1984, through second-best solutions, to an entrenched racial oligarchy living off the backs of impoverished Blacks far into the next century. All one can really do, we suggest, is try to clarify our understanding of the forces at work, to interpret some of the apparent trends, and to be ready, in the light of new facts or further insights, to modify or abandon our own particular assessment." (Wilson in Butler and Thompson, 1975, pp.199-200).
The analysis in this work suggests that the Government has the power to suppress political, social and economic demands, by violent means if necessary. If this course is chosen, it could succeed for a considerable length of time, but the psychological and economic costs might increase to the point where life is unpleasant for all South Africans, despite a superficial order and stability.

The alternative of serious negotiation with the chosen leaders of the African, Coloured and Indian population does not appear, at this point in time, to be an important political objective of the ruling elite. The Government probably also has the power to change direction significantly without losing the majority of its support, but whether it will actually do so or not is a moot point. Consummate practitioners of the art of politics might deliberately choose to negotiate, and to do so genuinely, but at the same time protract the negotiations for a generation, so that the necessary changes in structure and attitude can be brought about surely yet smoothly; the process of genuine negotiation might also decrease world hostility and increase investment to fuel growth, which in turn can be partially used for paying for the changes required to build a more stable society.

The Rhodesian example suggests that glacial movement by Whites
towards accommodating African aspirations leads slowly but inexorably to a situation in which they have to negotiate from a position of weakness, faced with the hostility of the majority of the indigenous population and the outside world. As time passes, moderate Black leaders lose credibility in the eyes of their people for not being able to coerce concessions from the Whites, while the leaders who opt for fighting for their rights tend to gain more and more support, and have less incentive to bargain with the Whites. South Africa is different to Rhodesia in important respects, but the analogy could hold to a limited extent.

It might well be, of course, that South Africa will always have to be content with a second-best solution, or even worse: there is no logical reason for suggesting that an equitable solution can be found to South Africa's political problems, or that conflicts can be resolved rather than contained.

However, political scientists, philosophers and thinkers have suggested a variety of ways of regulating conflict and bringing about a more equitably-based society (not necessarily in relation to South Africa alone). Thus the plea that there is no alternative to present policies can be answered
by reference to work which has been done on pluralism as a prescriptive formula, whether it takes the form of the consociational alternative or extra-parliamentary democratic pluralism or corporate bargaining, to the work which has been done on partition as a possible solution for South Africa, and to studies of conflict regulation.

If the individualistic democracy of Locke and Mill is held to be untenable in a deeply divided society, and a first past the post system of transfer of power in an open society is unlikely to be acceptable to either Whites or Africans, then political evolution could take place along the lines suggested by the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart, that is, some form of consociational democracy, in which there is consociational activity between ethnic groups to protect each group and provide linkage between them. Examples are given of common associational democracies such as Austria, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium and Malaysia; together with another democratic pluralistic variant, which is the Norwegian system of extra-parliamentary organised pluralism and national bargaining. Society has to accept differences between the ethnic groups; the elites of each group must be able to exercise control over their followers; the elites must be prepared to compromise, understanding that
more is to be gained by cooperation than by conflict. The argument is that conflict will be moderated if no group is indefinitely excluded from power, that the contractual spirit provides security for all, and that consociational democracy can effectively respond to the needs of the various groups.

Eric Nordlinger has written interestingly about conflict and conflict regulation in divided societies, in a way which suggests that conflict regulation is possible, without downplaying the difficulties. For example, he notes that:

"Among contemporary non-Western societies, socio-economic modernisation detracts from the likelihood of conflict regulating outcomes. The modernisation process further exacerbates already intense conflicts, promotes non-elite rejection of regulatory practices, and facilitates a violent response." (Nordlinger, 1972, pp.117-119).

This point is supported by Kuper, who says that "as the economic process generates competitive pressures, so counteracting political processes are released in an attempt to restore equilibrium by increasing the racial repression of the system" (Kuper and Smith, 1971, p.187).
Separation in South Africa has become synonymous with a facade of White domination, but a variety of thinkers have suggested that separation could be implemented morally and equitably. In a single chapter on alternative geo-political solutions of the race problem, Lever (Lever, 1978, p.290-302) mentions a number of people who have advocated separation, noting that most of them are outspoken critics of the policies of domination: Hoernlé, Ngubane, Carter, Turk, Tiryakian, Cowen, Schlemmer, Cilliers and Paul Malherbe. In addition one should note the 'demotomic line' proposed by Dr Jan Graaff in 1960, cutting South Africa and the former British protectorates into two parts of roughly 60:40 land proportion for Whites and Blacks; the radical partition suggested by Dr J. Blenk, a geographer, and Dr K. von der Ropp, a political scientist, in a report for the German Foreign Affairs Review; the plan proposed by the Sabra Chairman for consolidating the Homelands into four major independent blocks, three of which could be joined to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; and the alternative of a mixture of White, Black and multiracial states proposed by Harry Schwarz.

Lever notes that the notion of ethnic differentiation is apt to be regarded as conservative by outside observers, but that there are good reasons for incorporating a notion of

It may well be that Professors Lever and Schlemmer and all the others are too sanguine in expecting the Whites to voluntarily bring about a geo-political solution which is genuinely moral and equitable; without the will on the part of the Whites to actually give up some considerable measure of power, privilege and wealth, even the most ingenious proposals will remain a shell without substance, or, indeed, the wrong sort of substance in the form of continued White domination, which is probably not a long-term solution to South Africa's political problems.

However, on the admittedly hopeful assumptions that the ruling elite develops the will towards such solutions, and that the intellectual climate in South Africa changes to actually encouraging thoughtful alternatives to present policies, enough evidence has been given to suggest that a combination of external and internal political thinkers, using what is available from a variety of perspectives, could develop solutions which are practical, workable, acceptable, and possibly uniquely South African contributions to conflict regulation in divided societies, which might be
emulated elsewhere.

3.5 SELECTED SCENARIOS OF THE FUTURE

Finally, it is worth looking at what Herman Kahn termed the "speculations or nightmares" of a few chosen writers on the future of South Africa, to compare and contrast them with my conclusions as put forward in the preceding section on the possible futures of South Africa.

Fisher, Schlemmer and Webster distinguish between three types of possible changes:

(1) Change towards a more stable but highly unequal society, in which there is sufficient improvement of material conditions for Blacks to prevent their sense of relative deprivation from rising to a threatening level;

(2) Change towards a materially more prosperous society, but one in which class tensions increase in spite of improved standards of living, and in which the increasing preponderance of Black workers within the economy puts them in a position to force a radical restructuring of society;

(3) A situation in which, owing to continued White
intransigence, there is relatively slow overall growth, little or no improvement or even a decline in the standard of living of the Blacks, leading to rapidly increasing social tension, and, perhaps with outside aid, a rapid restructuring of the society, either in the direction of socialism or Black capitalism (Schlemmer and Webster (eds), 1978, p.25).

Whilst it seems that this last scenario is the most likely at present, I disagree that the outcome of the "rapidly increasing social tension" will be a rapid restructuring of the society: rather, there is likely to be suppression of dissidence and opposition, until equal or greater power is raised against the ruling elite. The analysis in this thesis suggests that the raising of such power, either internally, or in combination with external support, is most unlikely now, or in the foreseeable future. Naturally, it must be reiterated that the other two scenarios, and indeed a good many more, could all be regarded as plausible, precisely because the future is unknown: but following Kahn's suggestion that one ought to have some idea of the likely futures, one puts forward hypotheses in humble readiness to alter them in the face of changing evidence.

One conclusion which clearly contradicts mine - that the
Whites are likely to remain in power for a while to come - is that by Colin Legum, who suggests that southern Africa is experiencing a shift of power of historical importance, and continues to make two predictions:

a) "that it is already clear that it is only a matter of time before Black power replaces White power throughout the entire region"

b) "the second predictable factor is that this decisive change will occur within the next five to ten years, making the coming decade a period of turbulent crises and upheavals" (Legum, 1977, p.3).

The first statement seems reasonable enough, for after all Black power might predominate one day, but that could be half a century hence. However, it requires a certain amount of daring to predict the overthrow of the South African system in the next five to ten years: if the analysis in this thesis is accurate, it would require a deus ex machina for that to happen!

Ruth Butterworth suggests that "the outcome depends on the rates of change in three interlocking variables. These are, first, the performance of the South African economy; secondly, the behaviour of the White electorate; and
thirdly, the political development of Black Africa,\(^{(7)}\) including the Black majority within the southern third of the continent" (Butterworth, 1977, p.27). There seems little in these variables to suggest fundamental changes. However the South African economy performs in the foreseeable future, the day when it weakens to the point of forcing White South Africans to capitulate to Black demands is a far-off one indeed. The all-White electorate will probably offer the South African Prime Minister and the Government as much support as is enjoyed by an elected leader elsewhere in the world. Whatever the political development of the Black states around South Africa, or the internal politicisation of the Africans for that matter, they are unlikely to successfully tackle the might of White South African power. Butterworth's own conclusions talk rather vaguely about "destabilisation" of one form or another.

In a more interesting analysis, Gwendolen Carter asks what political changes that satisfy Blacks will be acceptable by Whites? Wisely, she leaves the question unanswered, except to point out that South Africa is a bundle of

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\(^{(7)}\) By "Black Africa", the author presumably means the states around South Africa, including Namibia and Zimbabwe, which will be ruled by Blacks.
contradictions and that the Homelands policy is not working, and then asks two more questions:

"The Organisation of African Unity still considers South Africa an African state but one with the obligations to dismantle its apartheid system. Will Afrikanerdom accept the challenge? Or will South Africa remain the battleground, and an ever more dangerous one, of Afrikaner and African nationalism?" (Carter, 1977, p.134).

What is interesting about these questions is the implicit suggestion that whereas one possibility is the retirement of Afrikanerdom into the laager to hold out as long as possible, the other is that Afrikaner nationalism will "once again display the pragmatism that led to the 'outward-looking policy' and accept in fact, as well as in words, the inevitability of the permanence of the urban Blacks, thereby acknowledging the basic fallacy of separate development" (Carter, 1977, p.134).

One recent predictive effort which centres on the importance of international forces is that by R.W. Johnson, who paints the following scenario: an endless guerilla war which can only get worse, accompanied by a rising tempo of unrest among urban Blacks in South Africa.
"At this point (and only at this point) the US will gain the same leverage over Pretoria that Pretoria held over Smith in 1976. The US, for its part, will wish to 'save' South Africa for the West at all costs and will presumably attempt to force South Africa to accept majority rule as the price of a major US commitment to South Africa - perhaps in the form of the SATO agreement always hungered after by Pretoria" (Johnson, 1977, p.326).

The book raises more questions than it answers. Why, for example, should the US necessarily want to save South Africa for the West at all, let alone at any price?

Sippel and Selfe (1978, p.86) point out that Johnson's discussion of the role of the South African Black population is inadequate, mainly because the book reveals no understanding of the rise of Black consciousness, and no serious consideration is given to Black organisations, be they the ANC, Inkatha or other urban-based internal groupings. The critics suggest that Johnson's process of mistaken inference (which they term "inductive leapfrog") does not arrive at an approximation of a theory of social change; and soberly point out that there is no general theory of revolution at this stage, so that prediction is a hazardous occupation! Johnson's suggestion that if the South African Government
pursues a "sufficiently ruthless and brutal policy at home", while abstaining from military intervention in its border states, "it's future would seem secure enough well into the 1990's", and this "10 - 12 year period of respite places the decisions to be faced then comfortably beyond the time horizon of working politicians now" (Johnson, 1977, p.314), appears difficult to refute in the face of the evidence currently available about the relative strengths and weaknesses of the South African Government and the forces opposed to it.

A more rigorous academic analysis by Austen Turk (1967, p.402-412), examines a range of alternative outcomes of racial conflict, extending from the one extreme in which the Africans may drive the Whites into the sea, to the other where Africans are decimated to bring a White man's country into being. Of the eight alternatives considered, he feels that the most probable solution lies with the separatist set of possibilities: "segregation is . . . a highly probable resolution as a transition from a conflict between dominant and suppressed racially and ethnically distinct peoples to the federal pattern" (Turk, 1967, p.411). Evolving the Homelands policy into some sort of federal or consociational pattern is a potentially rewarding path to follow, but as yet there is no indication that the ruling
elite is seriously considering this route into the future.

Turk continues to say that

"while nonracial democracy, implying freedom of marriage among other freedoms, may well be the most stable resolution of racial conflicts over power-authority in the long run, it is very unlikely unless and until:

(i) assimilation is deliberately and ruthlessly forced by an external party;

(ii) there has been a multigenerational history of participation in a federal political structure in which the units are in large part racially distinctive;

(iii) interpersonal contacts involving all the possible combinations of racial identity and authority have been experienced by very large proportions of the relevant populations for two or more generations;

(iv) racialism has been displaced as a cultural element" (Turk, 1967, p.411).

South African realities seem rather far removed from this scenario at present, but need not necessarily remain so in a longer historical perspective.
One factor has become abundantly clear in the course of this study: if the solutions chosen are to be both workable and acceptable to all South Africans in the long-run, there will have to be selflessness and willingness to relinquish some considerable portion of power, privilege, wealth and status by the Whites and especially by the ruling elite, in the interests of possible, but not certain, gain in the future. It is understandable if the Whites are hesitant, but future South Africans of all races may find it difficult to forgive them the consequences of not having the courage or the vision to try to establish a more just society while they had it in their power to do so. Can South Africa develop a political dispensation which most of society will want to preserve, in the knowledge that it allows its members to fulfil their aspirations as far as possible?

Edward Roux suggests "that history has lessons to teach us no one will deny. Whether any ruling class has ever taken such lessons seriously is not so certain" (Roux, 1948, 1964, p.433). Regrettably, it could be argued that it is not even certain whether history has lessons to teach us: trends which appear to be immutable do change, long-standing empires and ideas go into decline, quantum leaps in knowledge change priorities and possibilities in society, and at the current
rate of change in the world it is safer to rely less on historical lessons as a guide, and to view the future as largely open.

Whereas Roux's remark is probably correct in most cases, history has recorded some far-sighted and magnanimous gestures. For example, the German Swiss Cantons, having militarily defeated the French Cantons, instead of subjugating, exploiting and expropriating the people and wealth in the usual way of conquerors, immediately pardoned them and gave them full status in the Confederation Helvetique, thereby limiting postwar bitterness to a minimum and ensuring maximum French Canton interest in the peace and security of Switzerland.

It is an unpersuasive argument which suggests that the psychology of South Africans is so peculiar that it renders intelligent bargaining and compromise impossible. A more plausible reason for the apparent lack of compromise is the perception by Whites that White interests (including the basic one of survival as a distinct group) are mutually incompatible with African interests, which are seen as leading ultimately to African supremacy and control of South Africa. This perception precludes serious negotiation with
the Africans because the end product of any such "weakening" as bargaining is seen as leading inexorably to the demise of White society in South Africa; the alternative is viewed as being the maintenance of effective control by all available means. It remains to be seen whether these perceptions will change, thereby allowing the Whites to develop the will to find alternative fundamental and equitable solutions to the conflicts in South African society, at the least cost for the maximum long-term benefit of all South Africans.

In the meanwhile, academic studies such as those by Pierre van den Berghe, Heribert Adam and the others analysed in this thesis give new perspectives, explanations and understanding of South African society: predictive efforts also have their place, since it is imperative in a world of exponentially increasing change to at least try to think about the unthinkable. However, much serious, rigorous academic research remains to be done on concrete political events and problems in South Africa, and indeed elsewhere, for as Moore concludes:

"Whether the ancient Western dream of a free and rational society will always remain a chimera, no-one can know for sure. But if the men of the future are ever to break the chains of the present,
they will have to understand the forces that forged them" (Moore, 1966, p. 508).
Most of the information used in this thesis was derived from written sources. The form of reference which was used throughout is the Harvard system, in which the author, date and, where necessary, the page or pages are usually given in brackets before or after the quotation; the full details are given in the alphabetically arranged Bibliography, which is also a complete List of References. The reason for using this system is that the references are incorporated into the text and therefore easier for the eye to follow, while at the same time being sufficiently brief not to detract from the flow of the writing.
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