AN ENQUIRY
INTO NICOLAI HARTMANN'S APPRECIATION
OF NIETZSCHE'S AXIOLOGY

THESIS PRESENTED
FOR THE DEGREE OF M.A. (PHILOSOPHY)
of The University of Cape Town

by

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ABBREVIATIONS

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E - Hartmann's Ethics, translated from the German by Stanton Coit; the Roman numeral after E refers to the relevant volume of the translation, thus:
E I - Ethics, Volume I (Moral Phenomena, 1950);
E II - Ethics, Volume II (Moral Values, 1932);

AW - Hartmann, Der Aufbau der realen Welt, 1949.

GO - Hartmann, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, 1948.


MW - Hartmann, Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, 1949.

FEW - Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materielle Wertethik, 1954.

AZ - Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra (Also sprach Zarathustra) as contained in The Philosophy of Nietzsche (The Modern Library), 1954; the Roman numeral after AZ refers to the specific part of the book, the other numerals in their turn to the specific paragraphs of the parts.

GB - Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (Jenseits von Gut und Böse) as contained in The Philosophy of Nietzsche (The Modern Library), 1954; the numeral after GB refers to the specific paragraph of the work.

GM - Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals (Zur Genealogie der Moral) as contained in The Philosophy of Nietzsche (The Modern Library), 1954; the numeral everytime indicates the specific paragraph of the specific section of the book.

EH - Nietzsche, Ecce Homo as contained in The Philosophy of Nietzsche (The Modern Library), 1954; the numeral refers to the specific paragraph of the relevant part of the book.

GT - Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (Die Geburt der Tragödie as contained in The Philosophy of Nietzsche (The Modern Library), 1954; the numeral refers to the relevant paragraph of the work.

G-D - Nietzsche, Götzendämmerung as contained in Nietzsche's Werke, Band 8 (Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1923); the numeral refers to the specific paragraph of the relevant part of the book.

OTHER ABBREVIATED REFERENCES:

. C. Brinton, Nietzsche - C. E. Brinton, Nietzsche, 1941.
Prof. Dr. A. Wenzl, Nietzsche - Prof. Dr. A. Wenzl, Nietzsche: Vergschung und Verhängnis, 1948.
'And now, therefore, after having been long on the way, we Argonauts of the ideal, our courage perhaps greater than our prudence, often shipwrecked and bruised, but, as I say, healthier than people would like to admit, dangerously healthy, recovering health again and again—it would seem as if our trouble were to be rewarded, as if we saw before us that undiscovered country, whose frontiers no-one has yet seen, a land lying beyond all other known lands and hiding-places of the ideal, a world so overflowing with beauty, strangeness, doubt, terror, and divinity, that both our curiosity and our lust for possession are wrought to a pitch of extreme excitement.'

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (ECCE HOMO).

'Nietzsche was the first to see the rich plenitude of the ethical cosmos... Here for the first time, with full consciousness, "beyond" and independently of everything which in the course of the ages had been accepted as such the question was raised concerning the content of good and evil. This question is a hazardous undertaking, for it touches that which has been consecrated. And the hazardous undertaking avenged itself upon the daring doer... His vision, only just freed, fell upon the realm of values; and in the first delirium of victory he thought he comprehended the whole. The discoverer, indeed, could not dream that what had opened itself before him was a field for intellectual work of a new kind, which could not as yet be completely surveyed... Seldom does a discoverer know fully what he has discovered. Nietzsche knew it as little as did Columbus. The successors inherit the field; to them falls the task of acquiring what they have inherited, in order to possess it.'

NICOLAI HARTMANN (ETHICS).
INTRODUCTION

In a world and a time when man is confronted with but one ultimate choice: either a return to self-responsibility or the annihilation of life, in which, because of his now proverbial technical ascendancy and its train of spiritual impoverishment, he can indeed neglect to relearn the ability of exercising a wilful choice only at the risk of sacrificing his being as such - in such a world it is a fatal omission to neglect any thinker whose object it is to reconstruct for us our sense of responsibility.

In the field of philosophy no contemporary thinker has done more in this respect than Nicolai Hartmann who considers Friedrich Nietzsche to have been his immediate predecessor. Yet Hartmann is not well-known in the English-speaking world.

The following study represents an attempt to explain Hartmann's position in epistemology, ontology and ethics, stressing the inter-dependence of these disciplines for the philosopher; in the light of Hartmann's appreciation of Nietzsche, to review Nietzsche's critique of "Christo-European morals" or the spiritual decadence of the West; and to show why Hartmann made so much of Nietzsche's supra-moral philosophy of Becoming, the philosophy "beyond good and evil".

Since the Greeks, the case for the responsibility of man as constituting the essence of his existence, has not been stated more forcefully than in the philosophy of Nietzsche and Hartmann. Hartmann is extremely conscious of the need of our time for a thoroughgoing appraisal of man's position in the cosmos. At the same time he looks despondently towards the future
when he considers that man has become the plaything of petty politics from which we can expect little, if anything at all. "The type of statesman, as we know him in our day, and as history repeatedly shows him," says Hartmann, "does not act from a sense of responsibility for the wider future of nation and State, but from the need and opportunity of the moment. He is not a conscious carrier of the great and far-reaching responsibility which actually rests upon him. He works for immediate ends, as if beyond them there were no wider and more important perspectives... To us it may sound Utopian if we are asked to consider the children of generations which will be of another mind and another circumstance. Nevertheless it is true that those generations will be our heirs and will reap the fruits of our actions, and that we bear the responsibility for what we load them with." But, Hartmann continues, "political life is only one example. Our responsibility is wider. It reaches to all the departments of life. Everywhere the same law of spiritual inheritance holds good, the same historical continuity" (E II, p. 316).

While Hartmann's philosophy is not by any stretch of the imagination a programme for social or political reform, and while it also fights shy of an eschatological expectation, there is without a doubt inherent in it the hope for a better world and a future in which man's spirit will approach what he calls "Ideal Personality", the exercise of a supreme sense of self-responsibility as exemplified in the virtue of Love of the Remotest which Nietzsche, as he thought, had newly discovered: the capacity and the will of present men to rise above the desire for short-lived glory and to take on themselves the burden of responsibility for all the future; basically this means a return to the ethos of the Platonic Eros.

Wherever there was Eros, however, there was an Ideal - indeed, Eros, as Hartmann himself points out, represented the unconditional passion of man for the Ideal. However, the difficulty of a philosophic definition of the "Ideal" is well-known; it is still most clearly illustrated by
the case of Plato's Good; and after Kant's critique of speculative metaphysics, it was natural that philosophers should become suspicious about, and even antagonistic to any attempt at positing an Ideal. Still it is clear beyond a doubt that if there is to be any faith in regard to the future, and any hope and love to sustain it, we cannot do without an Ideal. It is impossible to believe, hope and love Nothing.

That philosophy alone is incapable of rendering the Ideal, we cannot doubt; it has always been so and Kant's philosophy has merely repeated a truth which has become obscure. There remains only one source from which belief, hope and love can acquire their sanction and ultimate significance - and that is religion, that undeniably vital force in man's life which, however, we must not confuse with the theologic finery of centuries, and which, after a thinker like Søren Kierkegaard, need no longer be a threat to intellectual honesty. Therefore we have found it necessary in our Conclusion to give a brief appraisal of Hartmann's view of the Ideal, and to suggest that despite Nietzsche's rejection of religion and Hartmann's own separation of the spheres of ethics and religion, any future ethics which truly understands and wishes to overcome the position of Nietzsche and Hartmann, will have to wrestle anew with the problem of its relation to religion.

It is here that Hartmann's basis of ontology does not satisfy us. He believes in an ideal self-existence of values, the everlasting Sosein of moral values irrespective of man or time. This is a great step forward from subjectivistic ethics and affords us an idea for getting beyond ethical relativism - and we believe with Hartmann that Nietzsche broke the ground for this when he surmised that we have never yet known what good and evil are. Rationality, however, compels us to discover an ultimate authority for values and everything pertaining to them. To stop short at ontology does not seem satisfactory. All through the history of thought we have never really felt that "the world is just so" is a sufficient reply to the why about existence; that this attitude can lead to grave error and presumptuousness.
has been proved over and over again in history - we have no illusions about this; but then it is not the fault of the attitude as such - we believe, indeed, that this attitude is as much a part of the ontological description of the world as anything else.

This primacy of ethics in Hartmann's philosophy does not obviate the fact that in studying his work we must attempt an understanding of his ontological works, and more especially Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie and Der Aufbau der realen Welt, as a prerequisite. It will not be possible to do justice to his epistemology unless we see it against the background of his ontological research. In any case, Hartmann himself ultimately intends the epistemology as part of a single labour "diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus", that is as part of ontology. It is precisely for this reason that he prefers to speak of Metaphysics of Knowledge ("Metaphysik der Erkenntnis") instead of epistemology or theory of knowledge ("Erkenntnistheorie"). For Hartmann, all philosophy is ontology - but all ontology is metaphysics.

Nevertheless we must realise that purely historically, Hartmann's epistemology preceded his ontology. The Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis appeared for the first time in 1921, followed by the Ethik four years later, whereas Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, the first of the ontological works, was only ready in 1934. The order in which the works appeared is for Hartmann not merely a matter of common incidence. In fact, he considers it as an evidence which itself is metaphysically founded. He says that the ontology forms the essential background for the earlier work, and that the latter are labours lying towards the periphery of the central task. He also maintains that it is in the nature of the world and its problems that the experience gained on these outskirts of philosophy - the phenomena of which are the first to force themselves on our consciousness - , should precede a conspective view of the world ("Denn so ist der Mensch: was sich nicht drastisch aufdrängt, ihn nicht erfasst, herumwirbelt, bedrängt
oder bedroht, das wird ihm so leicht nicht glaubhaft" (Go, p.244).

It is only the impatience of speculative procedures which causes this order of thought to be reversed.

According to Hartmann, ontology's first task is a general consideration of the question of being as being ("die Frage nach dem Seienden als Seienden in ihrer vollen Allgemeinheit" (AW, p.1)); next it must inquire into the broadest modes of being - reality and ideality - and their relation to each other ("das Problem der Seinsweisen (Realität und Idealität) und ihres Verhältnisses zueinander" (AW, p.1)); then, when the problem of being begins to differentiate itself, ontology attempts a full categorial analysis of being ("Kategorialanalyse") and becomes a theory of categories ("Kategorienlehre"). A category, for Hartmann, is nothing else than a mode of existence - he calls it a "Grundbestimmung" ("Um die Grundbestimmungen des Seienden also, und zwar in inhaltlicher Hinsicht, soll es sich in den Kategorien handeln. Das ist eine klare Aufgabe, an der es nicht viel zu deuten gibt. Denn fragt man nun weiter, was Kategorien sind, so stellt sich die Antwort ganz von selbst ein, sobald man Beispiele nennt: etwa Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit, Quantität und Qualität, Mass und Grösse, Raum und Zeit, Werden und Beharrung, Kausalität und Gesetzlichkeit u.s.f. Man kennt die Seinsbestimmungen dieser Art sehr wohl auch ohne Untersuchung, sie muten uns vertraut an, begegnen uns im Leben auf Schritt und Tritt. Sie sind in Gewissen Grenzen das Selbstverständliche an allen Dingen; wir bemerken sie im Leben zumeist nur deshalb nicht, weil sie das Gemeinsame, Durchgehende sind - dasjenige, wodurch die Dinge sich nicht unterscheiden - , kurz das Selbstverständliche. Uns aber ist es im Leben um die Dinge in ihrer Unterschiedenheit zu tun. Die Philosophie dagegen gestehet wesentlich darin, dass sie das Unverständene im Selbstverständlichen allererst entdeckt" (AW, pp.2,3)). We can say that Hartmann considers the totality of being as a system of co-existing categories; we can never be definite about their number, not to speak of the number of problems
of which they are the carriers. Philosophy consists in the "Herausarbeitung", the forcing to the surface, of these problems, and philosophy can in any case only last as long as there are problems.

This sufficiently indicates the basic constitutive character of ontology in Hartmann's thought. Nevertheless, for Hartmann man is first and foremost a practical being so far as life unceasingly challenges him to act and make decisions; as such, "only ethical reflection can set him free", and ethics "is the first and most positive philosophical interest of man... It is the source and innermost motive of philosophical thinking, perhaps even of human intelligence in general" (E I, pp.31,32). The basic constitutive quality of ontology and epistemology in regard to ethics can perhaps be explained by saying that before man can think ethically, he must first of all appreciate the fact that he finds himself in a world which it is his duty to think about.

As to the problem of thinking or philosophizing, Hartmann believes that it becomes evident only when we already have at least some knowledge of the object that we want to approach. We have a specific purpose when we say "becomes evident" instead of, for instance, "is devised" or "is constructed", since Hartmann is emphatic about the fact that the method of philosophy cannot be something of our making. In fact, for Hartmann, method is itself an aspect of being. Here, he believes, the problem of method acquires a new dimension ('"Damit rückt das Methodenproblem in ein neues Licht. Es steckt in ihm selbst ein Kategorienproblem" (AW, p.577')). Method cannot be our description of a way for approaching the problems of the world. The nature of the problems alone can describe the method for us. The choice of method cannot be a merely fanciful or arbitrary affair, and it does not precede the activity of philosophy. That is, philosophy does not proceed in terms of a pre-established method since it is only in the act of philosophizing that the problem of method itself becomes evident.
"Denn alles fruchtbare Forschen hat die Sache allein im Auge und schreitet im Hinblicken auf sie fort, sein eigenes Verfahren aber "erfährt" es bestenfalls erst in diesem seinem Tun. Die Reflexion auf das Verfahren folgt nach; was vorausgeht, ist das unreflektierte Verfahren" (AW, p.576)). Hartmann tells us that even historically this is true; philosophizing as one ought to, without having pre-established any method, is what he calls "die arbeitende Methode" ("Auch geschichtlich gilt der Satz: die arbeitende Methode geht voran, das Methodenbewusstsein folgt nach... eigentliche Methodologie ist Epigonerarbeit" (AW, p.577))

Of course the problem arises whether such primal thinking (to call it so) without any trace of methodological presupposition can get us beyond the bare consciousness of the necessity for method - what Hartmann calls "Methodenbewusstsein". That is, can we by such a simplest act of thinking (not in terms of any "idea" one might have of the world, but simply in the sense of "letting one's thoughts go"), and so becoming conscious of problems, get anywhere beyond the mere realisation that unless from this point on we adopt methodological means we will not be able to make head or tail of the phenomena of and in the world? Hartmann sees this difficulty and tries to argue away what he himself calls the seeming circularity of his position ("der Zirkel des Methodenbewusstseins" (AW, p.580)). He tells us that to become conscious of problems, that is to begin thinking, is to begin looking for possible solutions. But looking for possible solutions presupposes looking for method ("Problembewusstsein ist immer zugleich schon die Umschau nach möglicher Lösung. Die Umschau aber ist die Reflexion der Methodenfindung" (AW, p.579)), and when he says that "Reflexion der Methodenfindung...ist deswegen freilich noch kein explizites Methodenbewusstsein" (AW, p.579), he means frankly that ultimately philosophy cannot get beyond a mere consciousness of the world as problematic, beyond mere "Problembewusstsein". Philosophy would be superfluous, and philosophers idle, if the world could not be understood as a problem, or rather as a system of problems - and
the problem of method is merely one in the totality of problems. As such, philosophy is primal thinking; as such also it distinguishes itself from all other disciplines. The categorial structure of the world is necessarily basic also to all science and all disciplines of research — science cannot do without the fundamental posits of a world and problems. But philosophy alone is concerned with being in its most fundamental differentiations, that is with the categorial structure of the world as such. Every discipline of research with a restricted field of enquiry — restricted either through prejudice, or through necessity as in the sciences where there is a concentration on highly differentiated and specific forms of being — should realise that it is ultimately and inescapably embedded in the metaphysical foundations of the world ("...da es kein anderes als das eigene gegenwärtige Problemfeld kennt, so muss man es ihm auf eben diesem seiner eigenen Problemfelder nachweisen; d.h. man muss ihm beweisen, dass es selbst die grossen unabweisbaren Problemgehalte enthält und nur das Wissen darum nicht hat" (Go, pp.2,3)).

It is in terms of this metaphysical embeddedness of all existence and all thought, that true philosophy can be distinguished — it is recognized by the fact that it allows for the greatest possible maximum of evidence in terms of which alone it can help to construct the totality of things into a system. In this sense systematization is always a preliminary affair, a contribution, conscious of its limitations, in the search after possible universal coherence. Systematization in the light of pre-established conviction leads to the reduction of the entire phenomenon of existence to one point of view, which, however, can only be one evidence within the totality of possible evidence. Hartmann claims that the critics have not understood his views on systematization ("Anstelle der scheinbar ,kritischen" Devise, so wenig als möglich Gegebenes anzunehmen, muss der umgekehrte Grundsatz aufgestellt werden; so viel als möglich Gegebenes zu übersehen. Nur das grösstmögliche Maximum an Gegebenheit kann der wahrhaft kritischen Einstellung genügen, die bis hinter alle..."
möglichen Standpunkte zurückgreift und auch gegen sie kritisch bleibt. Die Durchführung dieses Grundsatizes ist nur möglich, wenn alle Gesichtspunkte der Auslese vorläufig zurückgestellt werden, und das Gegebene ohne Auswahl hingenommen wird" (ME, p.43).

Here Hartmann's appreciation of Nietzsche explains itself; for in the field of ethics it was Nietzsche who broke most completely with tradition, founded - as Hartmann puts it - on the serpent's lie that man would be like God in his knowledge of good and bad. Heroically scornful of ages of wisdom, Nietzsche has again made possible the asking of the most fundamental questions. It was "a hazardous undertaking, for it touches that which has been consecrated. And the hazardous undertaking avenged itself upon the daring doer" (E I, p.84). Hartmann, therefore, considered it his duty to try to understand Nietzsche better than this philosopher understood himself. Our task now is to try to understand both Nietzsche and Hartmann in this way.
FIRST CHAPTER

THE MAIN FEATURES OF HARTMANN’S PHILOSOPHY

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

1. Philosophy as Metaphysics

The metaphysical foundations of being; epistemology as a metaphysic of knowledge, rather than theory of knowledge; the meaning of philosophy as "Herausarbeitung" of the fundamental problems of the world illustrated by Nietzsche’s ethics; the timelessness of philosophical problems and their independence of systems.

2. The Structure of Being: Hartmann’s Theory of Categories

Being as real and ideal being; the absolute ideality of mathematical and ethical being; basically a category is nothing else than a mode of being, and all philosophy can be considered as a doctrine of categories; categorial being is normative being; the four categorial laws; an outline of the history of the doctrine of categories.

3. The Subject-Object Relation: The Primacy of the Irrational

The three ways of resolving the dualism of subject and object indicated by the history of the epistemological problem; the true problematic nature of the subject-object relation manifests itself only when we approach the relation as a problem of ontology in the first place; the relation is a correlation; "gnoseologische Ansichtseins"; the representation of the object as a third autonomous factor in the phenomenon of knowing; the four gnoseological determinations of the object of knowledge; the possibility of truth as a matter of irrationality; the irrational foundation of all knowledge; a priori (intuitive) and a posteriori (symbolic) knowledge; conspective intuition and freedom from method.
FIRST CHAPTER

THE MAIN FEATURES OF HARTMANN'S PHILOSOPHY

1. Philosophy as Metaphysics

Nicolai Hartmann's critique starts from the belief that there is always a remainder of problems in the world. He considers this seemingly everlasting content of problems in the world itself to be a metaphysical phenomenon. ("Die metaphysischen Theorien, gegen die sich die Kritik wandte," (writes Hartmann) "sind schliesslich nur Losungsversuche gewisser Problemkomplexe. Ihre spekulative Verstiegenheit war ihr Fehler, aber dass überhaupt sie sich um die gefährlichen Grenzen des Begreifbaren bewegten, war nicht ihr Fehler; das lag in der Natur ihrer Probleme, und diese zu ändern, steht nicht in der Macht der Vernunft. Es gibt Probleme, die sich nicht ganz lösen lassen, in denen immer ein ungelöster Rest bleibt, ein Undurchdringliches, Irrationales" (ME, p.12)).

Only as so far as this problematic content of the world is always there, is philosophy possible. We ourselves can do nothing about this quality of the world; it is there in spite of ourselves: we cannot change it. It is not an arbitrary product of our curiosity. We may ignore it, or purposely brush it aside, says Hartmann, but that will not cancel its being. We cannot avoid our own embeddedness in it, that is we cannot avoid metaphysics. It is common to all our researches, which in the first and last resort are only products of the eternally enigmatic nature of the world ("die ewige Rätselhaftigkeit der Welt" (GO, p.2)) on which they are all founded. Man is constantly faced with the problematic nature of the world ("der Mensch (ist) dauernd und unaufhebbar vor sie gestellt" (GO, p.2)).

All this might even seem very obvious, but Hartmann
believes that generally our contemporaries are not at all aware of this meaning of metaphysics ("(es) ist zur Zeit keineswegs Gemeingut des Wissens" (GO, p.2)).

Metaphysics, says Hartmann, was first considered as "Gebietsmetaphysik" (ME, p.11). It was thought of as a specific field of problems ("ein inhaltlich bestimmtes Problemgebiet" (ME, p.11)), a sort of scientific discipline, one may say, with a field of problems exclusively its own. Speculative metaphysics ("spekulative Metaphysik" (ME, p.12)) is something different. Gebietsmetaphysik was also speculative, but it was considered as metaphysics not insofar as it was speculative, but insofar as it was supposed to describe a certain field of problems. Kant made this distinction clear and he endeavoured to overcome the idea of a speculative metaphysics ("Die Kantische Kritik nun hat den Unterschied deutlich gemacht: sie richtete sich gegen jene Metaphysik nicht als ,,Gebiet", sondern als ,,Spekulation". Die Problemgebiete blieben in ihren Gerechtsamen; die Theorien nur, die sich an sie gewagt hatten, verfielen der Kritik. Metaphysik als Spekulation ist es, was seitdem mit Recht für lahmgelegt gilt" (ME, p.12))

However, Hartmann's own view of metaphysics differs from both these views. His view is that of a metaphysics of problems ("eine Metaphysik der Probleme" (ME, p.12)). We may say - and this brings out his meaning more clearly - that for him the problematic nature of the world is its metaphysical nature. It is metaphysical insofar as it is problematical - everlastingly problematical in the sense that there is in its structure of problems "immer ein ungelöster Rest... ein Undurchdringliches, Irrationales".

This view of metaphysics, indeed, does not only represent the beginning of Hartmann's philosophy; it is fully definitive of it. Hartmann considers his philosophy as a critique in the Kantian sense and he maintains Kant's position that no metaphysics is possible without critique. However, he believes that he goes beyond this by maintaining also that no critique is
It is in this regard that he writes that metaphysics of knowledge would be a much better name for epistemology than theory of knowledge - not metaphysics in the sense of merely another speculatively propounded theory or "solution", but rather in the sense of an indication of unavoidable, though perhaps even insoluble, problems ('Metaphysik der Erkenntnis - das will ein neuer Name sein für Erkenntnistheorie - besser als Erkenntniskritik: nicht eine neue Metaphysik, deren Grundlage Erkenntnis wäre, sondern durchaus nur eine Erkenntnistheorie, deren Grundlage metaphysisch ist" (ME, p.III)). All knowledge is an attempt to understand something which precedes it and is entirely independent of it ("ein Erfassen von etwas, das auch vor aller Erkenntnis und unabhängig von ihr vorhanden ist" (ME, p.1)).

When Hartmann therefore tells us that philosophy is metaphysics, he means nothing more than that philosophy has a humble task. By way of defining his own work, N.P. Van Wyk Louw has adopted the following phrase which purports to be the judgement of "the intellectual" - die intellektuel -, that is the person who searches for truth without any pretension or expectation of easy solutions and finality - Because we cannot do anything else, we must think (Omdat ons niks anders kan doen nie, moet ons dink). To the pattern of this, we may say that what Hartmann means is that philosophy, since it cannot do anything else, must "raise" the problems with which the world is always full. But it is not simply a matter of raising problems in that sense of the word which might suggest a mere fanciful creation of problematics by the mind - let us say the mind in a petulant or perhaps mischievously imaginative mood. Philosophy is, indeed, a game - but different from, and infinitely more serious, than chess! While in chess we can not only move, but also make the pieces, so that we know precisely how many pieces there are to reckon with, it is not so in philosophy. In philosophy the pieces - the problems - are there independent of us. They are part of the constitution of a world which need not thank us for its being. How this can be so, is precisely one of the problems. In any case, what is important for our analogy, is that
we do not know how many pieces - how many problems - there are in this game of philosophy; and moreover, however much we labour at a particular problem (the problem of what ought we to do, for instance), it seems that, instead of getting near finality and a solution, the problem becomes more and more manifest as a problem - perhaps we may speak here of the problematics of a problem. Thus the problem or the question what ought we to do, is found to contain an indefinite series of problems within apparently inexhaustive problematics. Chess has its pieces numbered; philosophy has not. The game of chess is a game played with an assemblage of pieces - it takes the totality of the assemblage of its pieces for granted. The philosopher's game, however, consists precisely in his trying to assemble its "pieces".

This analogy between philosophy and the game of chess is our own and not Hartmann's, but it serves to throw light on his view of philosophy as metaphysics. For Hartmann, philosophy is nothing more than an attempt at forcing to the surface the problems inherent and hidden in the structure of the world, a task which he describes excellently as a "Herausarbeitung" of the world's problematic nature. Philosophy remains true to itself only to the extent that it does this ("sofern es den metaphysischen Gehalt der Probleme selbst...nicht überschreitet, sondern einfach dessen reine Herausarbeitung ist" (ME, p.8)). Hartmann's meaning becomes even more clear when we consider a concrete example. We have been labouring at the ethical problem, formulated by Kant as the problem what ought we to do, for more than two thousand years. Yet it was possible for Nietzsche to stand up in the nineteenth century, "a solitary figure, warning us with his startling assertion that we have never yet known what good and evil are" (E I, p.15). This discovery of Nietzsche, Hartmann tells us, "simply shows that in the realm of values we are only novices, and...we stand again at the very beginning of a work the greatness of which is difficult to measure" (E I, p.16). Thus in the field of ethics, philosophy can really claim nothing more than that hitherto it has discovered some problems.
History itself therefore proves that philosophy is not a matter of solving or settling problems, but rather one of probing for them. That is, it is of the nature of philosophy that it should be involved in problems, and as such it is metaphysics. Hartmann is emphatic about this view of philosophy. Either one accepts philosophy as the humble preoccupation of "raising" problems, or one leaves philosophy alone. He tells us that philosophy is a way and a task whose end we cannot know ("Die Grundprobleme der Philosophie haben zu allen Zeiten den Charakter des Esoterischen gehabt. Man kann sie nicht nach Belieben auf das eingefahrene Geleise zeitbedingter Interessen umlenken. Sie schreiben dem Suchenden ihren eigentümlichen Weg vor, der nicht jedermanns Weg sein kann. Hat man den Weg erkannt, so steht man nur vor der Wahl, ihn einzuschlagen oder auf weiteres Eindringen zu verzichten. Der Verzicht ist die Freigabe der Philosophie. Das Einschlagen des Weges aber ist das Aufsichnehmen einer Arbeit, deren Ende man nicht absieht" (MW, p.VIII)) There cannot be philosophy where there is not a belief in timeless problems. ("Der tief eingerissene Relativismus - in Deutschland am bekanntesten in der Form des Historismus - hat erschlaffend gewirkt... alle forschende Arbeit geht auf Erringung der Wahrheit. Wie aber, wenn als wahr alles gilt, was der geschichtlichen Geisteslage einer bestimmten Zeit konform ist?... dann kann es...keine Problem beständ mehr geben, die unaufhebbar wären und irgendetwas unnachrichtig vor uns erheischen könnten... So glaubt man schliesslich nicht mehr an Probleme. Man nimmt sie so wenig ernst wie die Wahrheit, auf die man mit ihnen abzielt. Und damit hebt man den Sinn der Forschung auf - zugleich aber auch den eindeutigen Sinn der Position, die man mit eben dieser Aufhebung einnimmt. Es ist die Selbstaufhebung des philosophischen Denkens" (GC, p.3)).

For Hartmann, then, this belief in problems is a perspective which must be gained before philosophy becomes possible. The question arises: What are these problems? What sort of problem is it that can be called a philosophical problem? Hartmann considers that a philosophical problem becomes
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distinguishable as such by its metaphysical character ('...alle eigentlich philosophischen Probleme - auch die ganz nächternen, nicht himmelstürmenden, wie das Erkenntnisproblem - (sind) im letzten Grunde metaphysische Probleme" (ME, p.8)). And again, its metaphysical character means nothing more than its lasting problematic quality, that quality by virtue of which it maintains itself as a problem throughout time, and despite the pretensions to finality of any particular system of philosophy. Only problems (if we may put it thus) which defy solution, and therefore destruction (for a problem which is solved is no longer a problem), are philosophical. Ultimately, therefore, if we want to know what sort of problem is philosophical, our appeal will have to be to time itself.

Philosophical problems are known as such because of their timelessness. Thus, for instance, ethical problems can be philosophical because of an independence of particular periods and persons: "The moral situation is never wholly merged in persons, it is always something else lying above and beyond them, even if not something existing independently of them. It is, besides, a cosmos in itself with its own manner of Being and its own legitimacy, not less a determinant factor for the person than the person is for it" (E I, p.40); and problems of ontology can be philosophical because of the same independence of systems ("Sie verhalten sich ebenso indifferent gegen Idealismus und Realismus, wie gegen Theismus und Pantheismus. Das beste Zeugnis dafür ist die Tatsache, dass die idealistischen Theorien es zu aller Zeit und unter allen Umständen mit denselben Seinsphänomenen zu tun haben wie die realistischen" (GO, p.40)). There can, however, be no such timelessness of problems if the structure of the world itself does not allow for it.

2. The Structure of Being: Hartmann's Theory of Categories

Hartmann considers the world, or more correctly Being, as ideal and real under the two aspects ("Seinsmomente") of
being-there ("Da-sein") and being-such ("Sein"). Further, Being can be either possible, actual, or necessary. Reality is the mode of existence of everything having a place and duration in time ("Realität ist die Seinsweise alles dessen, was in der Zeit seine Stelle oder Dauer, sein Entstehen und Vergehen hat - einerlei ob Ding oder Person, Einzelveorgang oder Gesamtläuf der Welt, so bietet sich die Bestimmung an: das Seiende Überhaupt ist das Reale, Sein ist Realität" (Go, p.73)); real being, we can say, is concrete, sensually observable being. Ideal being is mainly mathematical, logical, and ethical being - Hartmann speaks of mathematics and logic as busying themselves exclusively with modes of ideality ("ausschließlich mit dem idealiter Seienden als solchem" (Go, p.92)), and ethics is concerned with an ideally existent realm of values ("das dem idealen Sein zugehörige Reich der Werte" (AW, p.57)).

Modern positivists might be vexed to hear of mathematical and logical being, but Hartmann tells us that the copula is clearly more than a mere symbolic factor in a proposition or judgement or expression. It is that also, but above and beyond its copulative function in the mere grammatical sense, it indicates a type of being entirely independent of the expression as such ("Die Aussage also ist so beschaffen, dass sie sich selbst tranzendiert. Sie sagt nicht sich selbst aus - das wäre ein Urteil über ein Urteil - , sondern den bestimmten Inhalt; und dieser ist schon in der Aussageform als ein solcher gekennzeichnet. Darin besteht der ontologische Sinn der Copula. Das ,,,ist" im Urteil ist zwar identisch mit der Setzung, aber die Setzung selbst meint ein anderes, ein Seiendes" (Go, p.247)). The "is" of "3^6 is 729", or "a^0 is 1", expresses a definite "Sein", an entirely independent "Sein" in terms of which alone the expression is or is not true. Its truth is entirely independent of the expression, precedes it, and is presupposed by it ("Darin zeigt sich deutlich, dass ein Wirklichsein der Grössen a^0 und 3^6 in ihrer Sphäre, ein Sein sui generis, im Sinn der Aussage schon vorausgesetzt ist, auf welches bezogen die Aussage wahr oder unwahr sein kann, an dessen Bestehen
aber das Wahrsein oder Unwahrsein der Aussage nichts mehr ändern kann" (GO, p.249) - "a" does not cease to be equal to 1 when it is not "thought" or "known", but...it "is" equal to 1 always and under all circumstances" (EI, p.223).

As for ethics, Hartmann believes that moral values have an ideal self-existence, are supra-temporal, and have a being comparable to that of mathematical truths. The ideal self-existence of the latter "furnishes the analogy according to which we must understand the ethico-ideal self-existence of values" (EI, p.225). Man is the carrier of moral values only insofar as in every generation he senses them and attempts to form his life with them as norms. Hartmann denies a relativity of moral values. Man cannot make them, he can only make them real. He depends on them for the good life. Their being is not relative to him - "there is a realm of values subsisting for itself" (EI, p.226). The realm of moral values has a "Dasein" and a "Sosein" independent of the flux of time and human temperament. Insofar as man is morally conscious, he is the link between ethically ideal and real being.

Having pointed out these first and most basic differentiations of being, we have already named a number of categories ("Die Modalitätsstufen sind die allgemeinsten und fundamentalsten Kategorien sowohl des Seienden als auch der Erkenntnis des Seienden" - "Alle Ontologie, wenn sie ins Besondere geht, wird zur Kategorienlehre; genau so wie auch alle Erkenntnistheorie und alle Metaphysik" (MW, p.VI)) This makes it clear that categories for Hartmann are really nothing else than aspects or even parts of being - but aspects (and this is very important) which throughout have a principia! and normative nature. Thus, for instance, men or stones (as real existences), or numbers, triangles, and ellipses (as ideal existences) are not categories; they are aspects or parts of being, but only insofar as they are, that is insofar as they have being. There is nothing "Gesetzlich" about them, and for Hartmann "Gesetzlichkeit" is a distinguishing feature of categorial being. In the case of numbers, for example, Hartmann writes: "Zahlen sind ideale Gebilde, aber sie sind nicht Kategorien" (AW, p.56).
Men, stones, numbers, triangles, and so on, are in every instance a Concretum, normatively determined by a category, or also: a Concretum of a category, the category itself not being as immediately evident as the Concretum ("Nun liegt es... im Wesen der Kategorien, dass sie den Inbegriff aller notwendigen und allgemeinen Züge an den Concretum ausmachen, zu dem sie gehören. Das eben besagt ja der Prinzipiencharakter in ihnen, dass sie das ‚ ‚Prinzipielle‘ im Concretum sind" (AW, p.50) - "Kategorien sind überhaupt nicht in gleichem Masse erkennbar wie das Concretum, das sie determinieren" (AW, p.60)).

When we speak of the normativeness ("Geltung") of a category, we must, however, be careful; its "Geltung" is not normative in the sense of a merely prescriptive and regulative law or formal judgement, says Hartmann (and least of all has it to do with relative historical and empirical judgements). We know the distinction between constitutive and regulative principles from Kant's philosophy, and in the light of it we might expect categories to be of a merely regulative nature in the Kantian sense, whereas Hartmann believes that they are in fact constitutive ("Kategorien sind ‚konstitutive‘ Prinzipien. Man kennt nun aus Kant den Unterschied der ‚konstitutiven und regulativen‘ Prinzipien; man erwirkt daher vielleicht eine gewisse Gleichstellung des Modalen mit dem Regulativen. Damit indessen würde man das Problem der Modalität von vornherein verfehlen. Jener Kantische Gegensatz ist ein rein erkenntnistheoretischer, er scheidet das Inhaltliche der Erkenntnis vom Methodologischen, berührt also das Seinsproblem überhaupt nicht. Methode gibt es nur im Gange der Erkenntnis als solcher. Das Seiende als Seiendes hat keine Methoden" (MW, p.VI)).

A consideration of categories cannot be the task of epistemology ("Nicht von Verstandesbegriffen handelt die Kategorienlehre, sondern von den strukturellen Fundamenten der realen Welt" (AW, p.V)). The orientation and breadth of ontological research alone is favourable to such a task ("Kategorienlehre ist nicht Sache der Erkenntnistheorie; sie ist für diese zwar unentbehrlich, kann aber von ihr allein nicht bewältigt werden. Nur ontologische Frageweise
Categories are therefore "Gesetzlich" in the sense that they are aspects or parts of being that are such-and-such and not different, despite us or anything, and in this sense are of determinative consequence for the particulars within their respective fields. Taking the two fundamental categorial differentiations of being - ideal being and real being - , we can say that one particular, a triangle, and another particular, a stone (let us say), are determined in these categories, the former by ideality and the latter by reality. The triangle cannot avoid ideality of being and the stone cannot avoid reality of being, since being is categorically so differentiated and they belong to these different categories. It is, of course, not possible to describe or to name all the categories into which real being and ideal being are in their turn differentiated. We can point out that the stone is a single, or one, thing and also that it can be seen as a member of a plurality of things, or that it is subject to efficient causality, and so on, so that it falls under the categorial determination of unity, plurality, causality, and so on; we can point out that a number is a quantity or a measure, or that a triangle is a special proportion, thus indicating ideal differentiations or categories of quantity, measure, and space; we can further indicate that the stone, as one thing, can be counted, and is therefore also subject to a quantitative determination, and in this way we would draw attention to the phenomenon of the interplay of categorial functions between the different layers or spheres of being; we have already shown how, for Hartmann, man is the agent of the relationship between the realm of moral values and the realm of real being.

Hartmann discusses a number of these categorial differentiations and relations in detail, but the main purpose of his work, he says, cannot be more than to give us an idea of the complexity and scope of the task in hand (...wir (stehen) überhaupt heute erst in den Anfängen der Kategorienlehre... So ist es denn auch heute nur ein Ausschnitt aus der kategorialen Mannigfaltigkeit
was ich auf diesen Blättern vorlege... Denn so steht es einmal im Kategorienproblem: es hängt alles unaufhebbbar einander, und man kann die Anfänge erst zur Klarheit bringen, wenn man mit der Kategorialanalyse bedeutend über sie hinausgelangt ist und etwas vom Aspekt des Ganzen erfasst hat" (AW, pp.VI, VII). Hartmann does not consider his work to be more than a basis ("mehr als einige Grundzüge" (AW, p.IX)); as yet he could see the categorial system of the world only as a loose network of problems ("ein lones Geflecht, indem manches hypothetisch und vieles ganz offen bleibt" (AW, p.IX)).

Hartmann's so-called four categorial laws ("kategoriale Gesetze") merely constitute a synopsis of the main features of his philosophy of the categories. The first law ("das Gesetz des Prinzips") states that the being of a category is principal being, it is being which functions principally for its Concretum; the second law ("das Gesetz der Schichtengeltung") states that the determination of a category is absolutely binding for every Concretum falling within the sphere of its determination - nothing can possibly remove the Concretum from the range of its determination; according to the third law ("das Gesetz der Schichtenzugehörigkeit"), a category is absolutely binding only for the Concretum of its particular layer of being ("Seinschicht"), outside of which it can only have a limited and modified normative property; the fourth law ("das Gesetz der Schichtendetermination") states that categorial being does not only absolutely determine its Concretum, but also determines it throughout - the Concretum is categorially saturated ("kategorial saturiert") and requires ("bedarf") no other determination for its being. (AW, p.412 etc.)

Trivial and even tautological though these laws may appear at first glance, Hartmann considers them to be of fundamental importance - so much so that he finds it possible to maintain that they actually form the central theme of the doctrine of categories ("dass in den kategorialen Gesetzen der eigentlichen Schwerpunkt der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre liegt" (AW, p.205)). The importance for Hartmann's philosophy of (for instance) the fourth law becomes clear when we consider his ethical
research which is intended as a labour on the basis of, but also in the face of all the insight of history into the problem of the "Ought", with Nietzsche's judgement that we have never yet known what good and evil are, as the key - for this whole labour is undertaken to prove the ideal self-existence of values, that is to prove the supra-temporal existence of a realm of being (ethical being) so "categorically saturated", so much determined in being what it is, that it requires no other determination for being, whether man or anything else.

In the theory of categories we indeed encounter the most basic features of Hartmann's philosophy. It is "primal and foundation-laying philosophy" (E I, p.31) par excellence ("Kategorienlehre ist ausschliesslich Fundamentalontologie" (AW, p.42)). It is also not the problem of one or a few philosophies, but that of time or philosophy as such itself - neither sceptical nor critical philosophy could avoid it ("Die grosse geschichtliche Linie des Seinsproblems stellt sich, wiewohl vielfach unterbrochen, verdunkelt, überwuchert, doch als klar und eindeutig heraus. Weder skeptische noch kritische Philosophie hat sie ablenken können" (60, p.XI)).

The first groundwork was done by Aristotle. For him the problem of categories was a problem of essences, says Hartmann, and he took over this prejudice in favour of essences from Plato. Pre-Socratic philosophy was never a philosophy of essences, but of substances, and also powers which govern reality. In pre-Socratic thought the nearest approach to a philosophy of essences is Pythagoreanism with its theory of numbers and table of opposites. The Mediæval controversy over universals is as clear an evidence of the problem of categories as any - so much so that Hartmann tells us: "Der Universalienstreit ist nicht abgetan, nicht eine Sache ferner Vergangenheit, über die wir glücklich hinausgewachsen wären. Er ist, so möchte ich behaupten, noch eine heutige Angelegenheit... Oder ist es etwa nicht wahr, dass dem Kategorienbegriff heute noch dieselbe Zweideutigkeit anhaftet, die damals die Streitfrage der Universalien hervorrief? Ob Kategorien

Kant took over the problem of categories in the form in which it was left to him by Descartes and Leibniz, whose simplices ("die ersten Ideen" oder simplices, wie Descartes und Leibniz sie schildern") according to Hartmann, are not merely ideas understood as essences of the mind ("als begrifflich verstandene Wesenheiten dem Intellekt angehören"), but also intended as basic categorial units of being as such ("kategoriale Grundlagen des Seienden und der Welt") for their presupposition was that the human mind carries within it the categories of divine being since the mind of God is architectonic with regard to the world. Kant's theory of transcendental apperception as a matter of understanding the possibility of synthetic judgements a priori in the light of the categories as "reine Verstandesbegriffe", and also as "Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände" (Hartmann calls this "eine doppelte Funktion der Kategorien") is also mere speculation. The view that categories are essences of the mind is therefore also to be found in Kant's work, whence it proceeds as the theme of the philosophy of the nineteenth century. (AW, p.45).

Hartmann considers that it is only the critical labours of Nominalism that prevented a return to the ancient ontology of essences, and for him these subjectivistic tendencies which falsify the problem ("die Subjektivierung der Kategorien" (AW, p.46)) can only be overcome by epistemological research which understands that the epistemological relation is not a basic ontological relation, and that being cannot be divided into "subjective" and "objective" being ("Das Erkenntnisverhältnis ist kein ontisches Grundverhältnis. Es spaltet das Seiende nicht in eine Welt des Subjekts und eine des Objekts" (AW, p.172)). Hartmann maintains that being is transobjective ("übergegenständlich" (AW,
3. The Subject-Object Relation: The Primacy of the Irrational

For Hartmann the problem of knowledge is entirely bound up with the phenomenon of the duality of subject and object. He tells us that there are three possible ways of resolving this dualism, which are also the three ways indicated by the history of the problem. Firstly, it is possible to consider the object as set over the subject ("Das Objekt ist dem Subjekt übergeordnet"), so that the subject is determined by the object in the act of knowledge; secondly, the subject can be considered as set over the object ("Das Subjekt ist dem Objekt übergeordnet"), so that the subject produces the object in the act of knowledge ("bringt es im Erkenntnisakt hervor") without receiving anything from it; and finally, it can be considered that a third factor is set over both subject and object, itself not appearing in the act of knowledge but constituting the original unity of subject and object and making the relation between them possible. In the first case the subject-object relation is an inner-objective ("inner-objektive") relation; in the second case an inner-subjective ("inner-subjektive") relation; and in the third case the relation is one outside both subject and object ("sowohl ausser-subjektiv als ausser-objektiv"). (ME, p.128 etc.)

Epistemological theories of Realism, says Hartmann, are all of the inner-objective type. The most naive form of epistemological Realism is Natural Realism. Here man is supposed to be simply aware of things in the world, whether these things are material objects or creations of the imagination, it does not matter. All is "Dinglich" ("Auch der Mensch ist ein Ding, und auch die Seele in ihm ist ein Ding"). To be is to be a Thing ("...der Mensch (ist) von einer Welt dinglicher Wirklichkeit umgeben, in die hinein er geboren wird, in der er lebt und stirbt, die also unabhängig von ihm besteht und sich gleichgültig gegen..."
sein Dasein und sein Erkennen verhält”). Knowledge becomes a matter of man's adjusting himself to the "Dinglichkeit und Konkretheit des Welt", to the world as a Thing ("eine Welt als Ding") in which he himself is the central thing. The world is anthropocentric, and the measure of man's knowledge of the world depends for him on how exactly he succeeds in copying it ("Die Erkenntnis hat die Tendenz ein getreues Abbild des Wirklichen zu sein"). (ME, pp.133,134).

The Pre-Socratics already revolted against this primitive view of the world and knowledge. Hartmann tells us that the second phase of Realism is Scientific Realism. The mythological admixtures of Natural Realism now disappear in the face of the new belief in a thoroughly natural causality which ultimately develops into the modern idea of the function of the natural laws ("die Funktion des Naturgesetzes" (ME, p.139)). Hartmann maintains that we can already discover all the basic features of our modern scientific view of the world in ancient Atomism ("Diese gewaltige Revolution des Realitätsgedankens vollzieht sich in langatmiger Entwicklung seit den Zeiten der Vorsokratiker. In der alten Atomistik finden wir schon fast alle Grundzüge des neuen Weltbildes beisammen" (ME, p.137)). It is, however, still the world's "Dinglichkeit", the world as an object, which is definitive for the act of knowledge.

That scientific principles cannot account for the experiences of spiritual being, has been known of old. Beyond mere scientific experience, therefore, there exists a practically unlimited field for speculation. This fact gives rise to what Hartmann calls Metaphysical Realism which proceeds by borrowing from empirical or anthropomorphic experience for its so-called "principlal" clarification of spiritual being. Metaphysical Realism is a matter of analogy; it works with borrowed terms ("entlehnten empirischen oder gar anthropomorphen realitätszügen, die auf das Prinzip übertragen und so ins Kosmische und Metakosmische potenziert sind... Die Prinzipienbildung wird zum vagen Analogiespiel" (ME, p.143)). Such principles are Aristotle's forms and first entelechy, the Stoic logos and world-soul, the ontological substances of the
Scholastics, Schopenhauer's "Welt als Wille", and so on. Here also the "Dinglichkeit" of the world is of determinative significance. Idealism adopts the second view of the subject-object relation. Its tradition begins with the Empirical or Psychological Idealism of ancient Scepticism. Here, says Hartmann, it is maintained that we cannot know anything about objects as objects. The individual subject is the measure of all things. Worked out to its ultimate consequence, the theory is summed up by the formula: esse est percipi.

Hartmann tells us that Kant tried to overcome this position by considering the process of knowledge not as the projection of the individual subject on the object, but as a process in which the individual subject can partake although the process rises above it. He considered the process of knowledge in so far as it is one and the same for all subjects alike ("Erkenntnis im Grossen, den ,sicheren Gang der Wissenschaft", der in geschichtlicher Entfaltung über das Einzelsubjekt hinweggeht und niemals in ihm aufgeht. Die Stufen dieses Ganges haben dem Erkennen des Individuums gegenüber etwas Objektives, Übergreifendes, an dem der Einzelne wohl teilhaben kann, das aber gegen dieses sein Teilhaben gleichgültig dasteht" (ME, p.149)). As such the subject is universal or transcendental ("gemeinsam und einheitlich für alls"(ME, p.151)); the categories are aspects of transcendental subjectivity and as such "reine Verstandesbegriffe", "Rein" especially in so far as, at least for Kant, psychologism is not involved. But transcendental subjectivity also contains the "Gesetzlichkeit" for the appearance in knowledge of the object, so that the categories are also determinations or conditions for the objective content of knowledge ("Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände").

As we have said, Hartmann considers himself to be continuing Kant's criticism, breaking, however, with this Parmenidean aspect of Kant's work and all the neo-Kantian elaborations on it. It is in this respect that Hartmann interprets his own work as a new critique of pure reason ("rein kritischer Arbeit, und zwar auf einem Wege der, wie mir scheinen will, der
Weg einer neuen Kritik der reinen Vernunft ist" (AW, p. V)). It was Parmenides who first identified thought with being, and although Kant's work was directed against the pretences of speculative metaphysics, Hartmann believes that he did not yet see that it was precisely because of the attribution to the thinking subject of such a pre-eminent place in the world, that speculative metaphysics is possible at all. Hartmann maintains that while there can be no doubt about the blow dealt to dogmatism by Kant's formula "keine Metaphysik ohne Kritik", there can, however, also be no doubt that this philosopher's work did not yet erase the unwarranted distinction between subject and object in so far as it is considered as a final distinction belonging to the nature of the world itself. Kant did not yet appreciate the fact that the carrier of the apparatus of knowledge, even in so far as it is considered as supra-individual, that is from the aspect of logic, and, in Kant's terminology, as "transcendental", as "Subjekt überhaupt", is itself merely one evidence in the total flux of evidence in the world - one which can, of course, be recognized and pointed out but which cannot be made the guiding evidence for all other evidences in the world.

Metaphysical Idealism and Logical Idealism result from the post-Kantian concern over Kant's position of Transcendental Idealism which left the problem of the "Ding-an-sich" open and in that sense tolerated irrationality. What happens in Metaphysical Idealism, says Hartmann, is that the transcendental subject is itself made the "Ding-an-sich". The possibility of a real object is entirely erased. The object lies entirely within the subject, it is the subject ("Hier aber liegt über das Objekt hinaus kein Reales mehr. Denn das Ding an sich ist in das Subjekt hineinverlegt. Das grosse ,X' liegt nicht vor, sondern hinter dem Bewusstsein. Damit ist der natürlichen Tendenz der Erkenntnis nach aussen, auf ein Reales, dem sie zustrebt, der Weg abgeschnitten" (ME, pp. 158, 159)).

According to Hartmann it was Leibniz who showed the way here. The monads represent the development of individual subjects from the mind of God which is the carrier of the eternal truths - the distinction between subject and object has disappeared. Metaphysical
Idealism passes over Fichte and Schelling into Hegel's Logical Idealism in which all distinction between the real and the ideal is finally wiped out and the process of the world is seen as one of its internal and dialectical self-development, the process of its self-realisation as Subject and as "Ding-an-sich".

The scientism of Logical Idealism, again, is opposed by the anti-scientism of Phenomenological Idealism. Hartmann maintains that the subject is here no longer understood to be merely self-identical ("als Setzung zu verstehen" (ME, p.169)), but acquires once more a really objective significance ("gegenständliche Bedeutung" (ME, p.169)). The subject can be confronted with itself once more, and assume the attitude, characteristic of phenomenology, that its labours in the attempt to understand its place and significance in the problem of knowledge must remain of a preliminary nature ("Sie bleibt in den Vorarbeit stehen" (ME, p.170)).

In Realism, then, the subject is of secondary significance. In Idealism the possibility of a self-sustaining object disappears. Monism wants to get beyond both Realism and Idealism to a unity in terms of which the twofold appearance of objectivity and subjectivity can be interpreted as mere appearance. All monistic procedures root in Eleatic Metaphysics, says Hartmann. Parmenides, although he did not consciously seek it, touched the core of Monism when he equated being with thought. In Plotinus' Monism, the duality of subject and object is considered as a secondary evidence; of primary significance is the irrational foundation, or God, in which subject and object coincide. In Spinoza's Pantheistic Monism, thought and extension, the two attributes of God which the human mind can grasp, cannot be reconciled in human experience. Man cannot understand how a mode of thought can reproduce ("kann wiedergeben" (ME, p.178)) a mode of extension. But the parallelism of these attributes is resolved in God in whose substance they fall together. God is not in the modes or the attributes - they are in him.

According to Hartmann, Schelling's philosophy of identity is the most comprehensive execution of a monistic
standpoint. In Schelling's Absolute, subject and object not only unite, but become identical - here Idealism and Realism coincide.

Hartmann himself wants to overcome all these positions. He cannot see how a return to any one of them can throw more light on the problem of knowledge. All of them maintain more than can possibly be known.

Hartmann reiterates his own ontological position. We should face all problems without thinking that we can solve all problems ("Gewiss darf diese kein Problem abweisen. Aber sie braucht auch nicht jedes zu lösen. Sie stellt sich vielmehr von vornherein auf den Standpunkt, dass es prinzipiell unlösbare, metaphysische Problemgehalte gibt" (ME, p.201)). Only when the problem of knowledge is approached as part of the covering ontological problem, does it manifest its true problematic nature.

It is part of the primal deed of trying to know, says Hartmann, that a knowing subject should be distinguished ("Dass alles Erkennen an ein erkennendes Subjekt gebunden ist, lässt sich wohl nicht im Ernst bestreiten. Es gehört mit zur Urtatsache des Erkenntnisphänomens" (ME, p.17)). We have seen that misunderstanding of this phenomenon, when the subject is considered as supra-individual in the light of logic, leads to subjectivistic transcendentalism. On the other hand, when the subject is viewed empirically, epistemology falls into psychologism. Hartmann warns us that we must therefore be careful not to think of the problem of knowledge as either a logical or a psychological problem.

Although the problem is entirely one of the subject-object relation, we must understand, says Hartmann, that this relation exists also independent of any problem of knowledge in forms more fundamental than, and indeed presupposed by knowledge ("Sie stehen auch abgesehen von all der Erkenntnis in mannigfaltigen Relationen, durch die sie in einen realen Seinszusammenhang gebunden sind, einen Existenz- und Lebenszusammenhang der weiter, grösser und fundamentalist als der Zusammenhang der Erkenntnisrelation und in diesem schon vorausgesetzt ist" (ME, p.205)).

For Hartmann it is also important that we realise that the relation between subject and object is merely a
correlation. An object is an object only for a subject, and a subject is a subject only for an object ("Ihre Relation ist Korrelation" (ME, p.44)) - and the subject itself can also become an object, and not only an object for itself but one also for other subjects - an object among other objects.

Gnoseeologically, within this relation, the function of the subject consists in trying "to lay hold of" ("Erfassen") or to comprehend the object, and that of the object in being open to such a function on the part of the subject. This relation changes nothing as regards the object, and as regards the subject there is a change, but only one like the change occurring in a mirror with the play of objects reflected in it ("Das Einholen des Erfassten bedeutet nicht ein Einholen des Objekts in das Subjekt, sondern nur die Wiederkehr der Bestimmtheiten des Objekts an einem inhaltlichen Gebilde im Subjekt, dem Erkenntnisgebilde, oder dem ,Bilde" des Objekts. Der Gegenstand also verhält sich gleichgültig gegen das Subjekt, aber nicht dieses gegen ihn. Nur im Subjekt wird durch die Erkenntnisfunktion etwas verändert. Am Objekt entsteht nichts Neues, im Subjekt aber entsteht das Gegenstandsbewusstsein mit seinem Inhalt, dem ,Bilde" des Objekts" (ME, p.45)).

For Hartmann, this "representation" of the object is a third factor inextricably bound up with the subject-object relation and in its turn an entirely autonomous evidence - it is not there because of either subject or object, or because of their relation; it is simply an essential aspect of the complete phenomenon of the subject-object relation ("so folgt, dass notwendig in aller Erkenntnis jenes Dritte in die Subjekt-Objekt Relation schon eingeflochten ist, und folglich unabhängig von seiner Bewusstheit oder Unbewusstheit - ja unabhängig auch vom Grade seiner Aufzeigbarkeit im Einzelfall - immer schon vorhanden ist. Das aber heisst, dass das ,Bild" oder die ,Vorstellung" ein notwendiger Wesensbestandteil der Erkenntnisrelation ist" (ME, p.47)). Hartmann calls this phenomenon "gnoseeologisches Ansichsein" (ME, p.51).

Now each subject "covers" only its limited part of being, which may even be entirely different from that "covered"
by other subjects. We know, however, that intelligent communication between men is possible, and that truth can therefore be sought as a common factor beyond mere individualistic subjectivism and Protagorean relativism. For Hartmann it is at this point that it becomes manifest that there are categories or principles of knowledge (as evidenced by the laws and relations of logic) in terms of which communication is possible. But it remains for him an irrational affair, since truth, as he tells us, has nothing to do with psychology or the act or process of knowing.

The content of knowledge may be particular, but not its truth - its truth, in fact, precedes the act of knowing. That Socrates died in 399 B.C., is true independent of whether it is known or not. As a matter of intersubjective correspondence ("intersubjektive Verständigung" (ME, p.336 etc.)), truth is irrational as far as its possibility is concerned. We discern that there are principles, and we can know the forms they take, but why they take on just these forms and what they are or mean in themselves, we do not know ("Bedingungen der Erkenntnis darf man also nicht schlechtweg als blosse Gesetze bezeichnen, sondern in streng allgemeinen Sinne nur als ,,Prinzipien" oder ,,Kategorien" der Erkenntnis. Das Gesetzsmoment mag das relativ Fassbarste in ihnen sein, ihr Wesen erschöpft es nicht" (ME, p.343)).

For Hartmann, knowledge is indeed ultimately possible only because it is founded on irrationality which, for him, is an ontological manifestation rooted not in the object but in the subject ("Es steckt also hinter der gnoseologischer Irrationalität - oder, was dasselbe ist, hinter dem ,,bloss gnoseologischen" Charakter der Erkennbarkeitsgrenze an Gegenstande - doch eine echte ontologische Verwurzelung, nicht anders als sie hinter allen anderen Teilphänomenen der Erkenntnis auch steckt. Aber es ist eine Verwurzelung nicht im ontologischen Wesen des Gegenstandes, sondern in dem des Subjekts. Der scheinbare Widerspruch löst sich einfach: es gibt nicht das an sich Irrationale, es gibt nur das für uns Irrationale" (ME, pp.249,250)).

Hartmann distinguishes four possible gnoseological determinations of the object ("Gegenstand der
Erkenntnis") as known ("das Erkannte (objectum)"); as what is to be known ("das zu Erkennende (objiciendum)"); as unknown ("das Unerkannte (Transobjektive)"); and as unknowable ("das Unerkennbare (Irrationale oder Transintelligible)"). These distinctions of objectivity can exist only for the subject. It is quite possible, for instance, that even an "unknowable" may have being - whether we can ever know it or not. The designation "objective" never describes the object - whether as known, to be known, unknown, or unknowable - but only the representation of the object to the subject, this being the third "autonomous" evidence in the subject-object relation ("Objektiv ist niemals das Objekt selbst, weder das Erkennnte noch das Unerkennnte an ihm; sondern das immanente Erkenntnisgebilde (das Bild) ist "objektiv", sofern es die Züge des Objekts trägt oder irgendwie streng repräsentierend auf sie bezogen ist"). The being-in-itself of the object remains what it is despite "objectivity", or any of its determinations ("das Ansichsein des Objekts wird durch sein Erkanntsein nicht aufgehoben"). (ME, p.88 etc.)

Hartmann points out how the primacy of the irrational in the process of knowledge becomes abundantly clear when we consider mathematical and logical knowledge. Our most basic presuppositions for knowing are irrational. We are ignorant, for instance, of what the Law of Identity, or the Law of Contradiction mean in themselves; we know them only insofar as they are necessary presuppositions for knowing. Their validity is something we do not understand (Das logische prius ist wohl erste Bedingung der Erkenntnis aber nicht erstes Erkanntes, nicht cognitio prius" - "Die Mathematik gibt als Prototyp eines rationalen Gebietes. Aber sind ihre Axiome auch rational?" (ME, pp.273,274)).

Here again man's role in the relation between ideal being and real being becomes manifest. The problem of a priori knowledge of the real ("Problem der apriorischen Realerkenntnis" (ME, p.474)) makes it clear that in knowledge, ideal knowledge penetrates deep into knowledge of the real, and that ideality can have a significance for reality down to knowledge of the most concrete particular. We know how mathematics and logic can be
applied ("Idealserkenntnis (erstreckt) sich tief in die Realkenntnis, und keineswegs nur in die wissenschaftliche, (hinein) — wie denn die Strukturen des idealen Seins die des realen bis in dessen konkrete Einzelfälle hinein durchsetzen und bestimmen" (ME, p.473)). This gnosticological function of being a bridge between ideality and reality is inherent in man's ontological nature. And this is why real knowledge (knowledge of the real) is at the same time a posteriori as well as a priori ("Realkenntnis (ist) immer zugleich a priori und a posteriori" (ME, p.491)), while all ideal knowledge is exclusively a priori.

In Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie Hartmann explains that a priori knowledge touches ("bestreicht") three of the four basic ontological determinations of being, namely ideal being-there ("ideales Dasein"), ideal being-such ("ideales Sosein"), and real being-such ("reales Sosein"). Real being-there (reales Dasein) can be known only a posteriori since it is a matter of sense perception. (To know that a stone is there, to know its being-there, is possible only a posteriori, through sense experience.) It is easy to see that knowledge of ideal being is a priori, and that knowledge of real being-there ("reales Dasein") is a posteriori. As far as the a priori as well as a posteriori nature of knowledge of real being-such ("reales Sosein") is concerned, we may explain that to know the stone's being-such, which ultimately means knowing its constitution and the conditions for its "behaviour", is in the last resort a matter of mathematical explanation — its "behaviour" is empirically observed (and as such it is known a posteriori), but mathematically explained (and as such it is known a priori). According to Hartmann, then, "1. Die Erkenntnis a priori bestreicht drei von den ontischen Gegensatzfeldern (1.Ss., 1.Ds., und r.Ss.). Nur das reale Dasein ist von ihr ausgeschlossen./2. Die Erkenntnis a posteriori bestreicht nur zwei Felder (r.Ss. und r.Ds.). Die beiden Felder des idealen Seins sind von ihr ausgeschlossen./3. Die a priorische und die a posteriorische Erkenntnis haben von den vier ontischen Feldern nur eines gemeinsam: das reale Sosein./4. Reales Dasein ist nur der Erkenntnis a posteriori zugänglich./
Hartmann believes that the concepts a priori and a posteriori in the definition of knowledge are both gnoseologically false ("Beides ist gnoseologisch falsch" (ME, p.49)). Neither is essentially definitive of the subject-object relation; they simply signify whether some insight was achieved at the hand of real being or not ("A posteriori ist alles Erfassen in welchem der reale Einzelfall als solcher gegeben ist und an ihm als vorhandenem und vorliegendem etwas eingesehen wird... A priori dagegen ist alles Erfassen bei welchem ein einzelner realer Fall nicht verliegt" (ME, p.50)).

The problem of a priori knowledge, Hartmann tells us, cannot, as with Kant, be the problem of "synthetic a priori judgements"; it is, indeed, the problem of the irrationality of the principles of knowledge as such, since a priori knowledge has "den Charakter des Bedingungen für alles besondere Gegenstandserkennen" (ME, p.340). And the problem of a posteriori knowledge is as much metaphysical as that of a priori knowledge - it ultimately remains impossible to explain, and therefore irrational, how there can be objects of knowledge at all, since consciousness on the one hand does not proceed outside itself through the senses in the process of "grasping" them, and the objects on the other hand do not enter consciousness through the senses to form in it an immanent content ("Wie können bestimmtheiten des realen Objekts unmittelbar durch die Sinne dem Bewusstsein gegeben werden, da doch weder das Bewusstsein durch die Sinne aus sich hinaus greifen und ein ihm Transzendentes ergreifen, noch auch der Gegenstand mit seinen Bestimmtheiten durch sie in das Bewusstsein eintreten und ihm immanent werden kann?" (ME, p.387)).

As for the structure of the act of knowledge, Hartmann says that a posteriori knowledge is symbolic, that is it has a medium - he calls it an "Organ" - , namely sense perception. Knowledge which is not symbolic, is intuitive knowledge ("eine Erkenntnisart, die nicht symbolisch ist, ist notwendig "intuitiv" (ME, p.529)). A priori knowledge is therefore intuitive knowledge.
Also, it is not at all mediated by any other form of knowledge, and as such it is stigmatic.

When intuition is not only directed towards single evidences (when it is not merely "Einzelschau"), but becomes a matter of appreciating coherences, it becomes conspective. Conspective intuition is more fundamental than stigmatic intuition (which is merely aspective - "aspektiv") , and is not merely a matter of deduction in the light of its awareness of relations. It is not bound to any one method. It is therefore left free to discover as much as possible ("Das aspektiv Geschaute als solches ist ein anderes als das konspektiv Geschaute, wiewohl es derselbe geschaute Gegenstand sein kann... Konspektive Anschauung als solche hat überhaupt nicht eine bestimmte Richtung des Vorgehens, an die sie unbedingt gebunden wäre. Sie ist allen Richtungen gegenüber frei, stellt nach allen Seiten Verbindungen her. Sie schreitet ebensowohl aufsteigend wie absteigend fort, analytische und synthetische Methode umfassend - je nach der Lage des Gegebenen und des Unbekannten. Sie verbindet Deduktion und Induktion, reflektiert aufwärts wie abwärts..." (ME, pp.520,521)).

And what Hartmann holds to be true of conspective intuition, he holds to be true of philosophy as such. Philosophy must remain free to allow for as much evidence as possible; free of the idea of constructing a system on the basis of presuppositions, the internal coherence of which should make the world "intelligible" - for that will simply not make it so; free also as we have seen in our Introduction, of any pre-established unity of method. System belongs to the world itself and not to philosophy. Philosophy can only attempt an understanding of the system of the world.
SECOND CHAPTER
HARTMANN'S ETHICS

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

1. The Person as Ethical Object
Man is a person in so far as he is a mediator between the realm of the ideal self-existence of values and real being in the sphere of ethics; Nietzsche discovered that values are a manifold but his view of the person as a "revaluator of all values" leads to ethical relativism; in Scheler's work the independent existence of values is stressed, but moral action is ultimately rendered impossible if personal being is considered to be correlative to the world; man is not only the ethical object par excellence, but also a subject.

2. Moral Values, Goods-Values and Value-Feeling
Hartmann is appreciative of Kant's view that there are non-causal determinants of human action; moral values as non-causal determinants account for the person's freedom in the face of his complete determination by natural causality; the ancients were aware of the problem of freedom; the relation between moral values and goods-values; value-feeling and the problem it raises as to the sanction for the claims of moral values.

3. Freedom, God and Religion
Responsibility implies freedom, and freedom responsibility; teleology in ethics is man's concern, not God's; the challenge of religion; the antinomic relation between ethics and religion, and the separation of the spheres; Hartmann sides with ethics and his position is inconsequent - nevertheless his overstatement also illustrates his merit.
SECOND CHAPTER

HARTMANN'S ETHICS

1. The Person as Ethical Object

In his desire to get beyond the ethical philosophy of the nineteenth century, which he accuses of subjectivity, Hartmann feels that values must again be allowed to speak for themselves, and this is what he calls "the idea of a concrete ethics of values".

According to Max Scheler, of whose work Hartmann makes very much, every ethics which proceeds from the question as to the highest good or the final goal, was once and for all rendered untenable by the work of Kant. The implication is that such an ethics must necessarily be metaphysically speculative ("alle Ethik, die von der Frage: was ist das höchste Gut? oder: was ist der Endzweck allen Willenbestrebungen? ausg., halte ich durch Kant ein für allemal als widerlegt" (FEW, p.29).

Appreciative of the relevant aspect of Scheler's ethics, Hartmann says that we have indeed never yet known what good and evil are, and that it was Nietzsche who brought us to this awareness. Speaking of the subjectivity of the nineteenth century, he says that "it was far from troubling itself about the objective contents of moral claims, commandments and values. There stood Nietzsche, a solitary figure, warning us with the starting assertion that we have never yet known what good and evil are" (E I, p.15). Instead of sterile speculation as to the "highest good", Nietzsche undertook a task which caused him to be "the first to see the rich plenitude of the ethical cosmos" (E I, p.16).

It is this consciousness of the pluriformity and heterogeneity of values which describes Hartmann's own task in the field of ethics: "I have chosen as my central task an analysis of
the contents of values", he writes (E I, p.15), and maintains further that when man senses the pluriformity of the ideal self-existent realm of values, he also senses that he is not their author and creator. They are there despite and independent of him.

We have seen to what extent Hartmann's fourth categorial law is important for an understanding of his position in ethics. We know that for him moral values have an ideal and independent existence, are not man-made, and do not change with time; they have a supra-temporal and supra-individual existence, and always are what they are. They are ontologically determined and absolute. This simply means that for Hartmann their being, the being of each individual value, is such and such and cannot be different, and is therefore existentially self-sufficient, requiring "no other determination for its being".

But the ideally existent realm of moral values is only one half of the ethical phenomenon, the other half being the person and his acts: "Together with the concept of value," writes Hartmann, "that of personal being is the central concept of ethics...as every reaching forth of values out of the ideal realm into the actual depends upon the part played by the subject. Among all real entities only the subject has the power of mediation... The subject is a person in so far as he is a carrier of moral values and disvalues" (E I, p.317).

Man, then, is not a creator of values, but the mediator between the realms of ideal and real being, and therefore also the medium of the actualization of moral values. It is by virtue of his function as mediator that Hartmann calls him a person.

Examining Nietzsche's view of the person, Hartmann finds that it led to ethical relativism. Despite Nietzsche's discovery of the manifoldness of values, Hartmann tells us, this philosopher did not yet appreciate the ontological foundation of values "as a determining prius" (E I, p.206) for our actions and attitude in and towards life. Nietzsche was not yet aware of the ideal self-existence of values, and that man's actions are conditioned in their light, rather than they in the light of his
actions. Here, Hartmann believes, Nietzsche was still a child of the nineteenth century. He clearly saw how sterile the search for an absolute and highest value had been. But, Hartmann maintains, Nietzsche went to the other extreme, so that in his philosophy the person became lost among the values now opened to his view in such rich pluriformity. It is true, says Hartmann, that Nietzsche showed us that "the prophecy of the serpent is the great deception. Sin has not opened man's eyes, he has not become as God; to this day he does not yet know what good and evil are" (E I, pp.83,84); but in another sense Nietzsche's ethics does see man as a god, since for him man's choice of values now becomes absolutely free and not determined from outside himself in any way. Man can be an evaluator, or rather a revaluator of all values. Man is actually above values - they are dependent on him. This is how Nietzsche understands the person as the "carrier" of values. In Nietzsche's "doctrine of the revaluation of all values" lay hidden the idea of valuational relativism", writes Hartmann - "If values permit of being revalued, they also are capable of being devalued, they permit of being manufactured and of being destroyed. They are the work of man, they are arbitrary, like thoughts and phantasies" (E I, p.85).

Nietzsche's error here is, of course, the reverse side of his discovery, and according to Hartmann it ought not to blind us to the significance of his work any longer.

However, in Hartmann's opinion the main contemporary example of ethical personalism is found in Scheler's ethics. It is important for us to note this, since Hartmann considers Scheler's work to be a bridge between Nietzsche and himself.

Scheler, in his characteristic way, defined the person as "die konkrete, selbst wesenhafte Seinseinheit von Akten verschiedenartigen Wesens, die an sich allen wesenhaften Aktdifferenzen...vorhergeht. Das Sein der Person "fundiert" alle wesenhaft verschiedenen Akte" (FEW, pp.393,394). It is this definition Hartmann has in mind when he writes that "his (Scheler's) theory starts from the position that person and act belong indissolubly together" (E I, p.319). This means, as Scheler himself puts it, that the person is not a mosaic of acts ("Aktmosaik") or,
in other words, that the essence of a person cannot be assessed by evaluating the sum-total of his acts. Scheler's meaning becomes clearer when we consider his distinction between person and subject or ego ("das 'Ich'"). The "I", he tells us, can be an object of experience for the individual. But the person itself can never be an object of experience, since all experience is pre-conditioned by it. For Scheler, the person is the whole behind experience which, precisely because it is that whole, cannot itself be objectified. Only what the person experiences is capable of objectification, but not the person as such. Since acts issue from the person, the person and his acts, indeed the person and every individual one of his acts, "belong indissolubly together" — more exactly even, they fall together, they coincide. Hartmann comments that for Scheler "the person is not something behind or above the acts, but is already contained in them; he is their real unity, inseparable from their essence" (E I, p.319). Acts, therefore, like the person, cannot be objectified ("Ein Akt (ist) niemals ein Gegenstand... Ist aber schon ein Akt niemals Gegenstand, so ist erst recht niemals Gegenstand die in ihrem Aktvollzug lebende Person" (FEW, p.397)). Here, writes Hartmann, "we may very well have an inner experience of the ego and its functions, but not of the person and his acts" (E I, p.320).

For Scheler, therefore, the person is above and beyond the subject, above and beyond experience, above and beyond the world. The world is correlative to the person. To every individual person there corresponds his individual world which is concrete precisely in so far as it is the world of a person. Every province of objects ("Gegenstandsbeiche") whether it be psychological, empirical, ethical, etc., is concrete in so far as it is part of the world — the world of, and correlative to, a person. But the person is not part of the world ("Als das Sachkorrelat der Person überhaupt nannten wir die Welt. Und also entspricht jeder individuellen Person auch eine individuelle Welt. Wie jeder Akt aber zu einer Person gehört, so „gehört“ auch jeder Gegenstand wesensgesetzlich zu einer Welt. Jede Welt aber ist in ihrem wesenhaften Aufbau a priori gebunden an die
possess. Scheler revolutionized ethics by emphasizing the existence of values independent of man, but in Hartmann's opinion he was led to a theory of the person which must ultimately make the realization or actualization of values impossible. Hartmann, however, recognizes the achievements of both Nietzsche and Scheler, and this allows him not only to build out the description of the ideal self-existence of values, but also to bring into perspective the role of man in the realm of morality.

2. Moral Values, Goods-Values and Value-Feeling

In its broadest outline, Hartmann's ethics can then be described by the two propositions that moral values have a self-existence, and that man is a person. The question now before us concerns the relation between the self-existing, ideal realm of values, and man as an inhabitant of the sphere of real being.

The situation is reminiscent of Kant's view of man as being at the same time homo phenomenon and homo noumenon. For Kant, man belongs to the natural world, to the sphere of reality "as a part of it"; as such "his doing and his leaving undone are entirely drawn into it and into its regularity". This, says Hartmann, is what Kant means when he speaks of man as homo phenomenon; further Kant presupposes "that the totality of the cosmic processes is throughout causally determined". Consequently, as homo phenomenon, man can in no way escape the causal nexus. Nature will not tolerate any gap in its network of sequences. As homo phenomenon, man is fully determined causally. (E III, p.53). However, man does not belong "to nature alone, (he) at the same time rises into a second realm with a law of its own" (E III, p.54). Man is also homo noumenon, not only a natural, but also a rational being. As such, man is in no way exempt from causality, but he is the bearer of a determination which is non-causal, the latter being, for Kant, the will or reason under its practical aspect. Here, Hartmann points out, "all the causal determinants which accompany the human will (let us say, as "motives")"
and are efficacious in it, remain unaffected. But to them is added a new determinant" (E III, p.55). The will is non-causal not in regard to the natural order, but in regard to itself in so far as it is not caused by anything but is the absolutely autonomous power of man to formulate universal moral laws and, as such, it can and does act causally in the phenomenal world, the causal nexus of which "does not allow itself to be suspended or broken but does permit of being diverted" (E III, p.55). Taking a concrete example, we can point out that the commandment "Thou shalt not steal" which, for Kant, is a universal formulation of the will (or, as he would also say, a rational prescription of duty), has causal implications when either kept or broken; and either keeping or breaking it can also be causally inspired - a man may, for instance, keep the commandment simply because he fears a retributive law or he may steal because of hunger, and so on.

Generally speaking, Hartmann accepts homo phenomenon as described by Kant. He considers Kant's achievement to consist in the fact that he saw that there are moral factors which are non-causal and determinate, and which manifest themselves at that point in the world where they become causally significant, where they make their Ought for man felt; also that Kant realized that such Oughts can be experienced -indeed, that man is, above all, the carrier and the only carrier of such Oughts. Hartmann says that we must concede to Kant "first, a demonstration of the fact that there is a power in the moral Ought, which as a heterogeneous, non-causal, determining factor, strikes into the nexus of causal trends, and, secondly, a demonstration that the structure of the causal nexus makes such an intervention possible, without any interruption to itself" (E III, p.60). Hartmann, however, rejects the idea that these moral factors and the Oughts which they express, are created by and situated in homo noumenon: "(Kant's) homo noumenon...is quite subordinate to his achievements and may be discarded along with the rest of his idealistic metaphysics" (E III, p.60).

Hartmann clearly saw, as did Kant, that the cardinal problem about moral action is the problem of freedom, the
problem as to whether and how man is free to act in a way different from the way of his causal determination in the realm of nature. "It is the peculiarity of moral value and disvalue," writes Hartman: "that these are attributed to the person, that upon him fall guilt, responsibility, merit. The person is not simply marked by the value (or disvalue); he is also accounted to be the originator of its fulfilment or of the failure to fulfil it" (E III, p.20). If in the whole world man is not determined otherwise than causally, then clearly morality is impossible, since man cannot be held responsible in any way.

Hartmann tells us that Plato was already aware of the problem. Plato discerned that there must be "another realm of being than that of existence, than that of "real" things and of consciousness which is not less "real"" (E I, p.183), and in the light of which alone man is a moral being. Hartmann indeed maintains that his notion of the self-existence of moral values is Platonic: "in their mode of Being," he writes, "values are Platonic ideas. They belong to that further realm of Being which Plato first discovered, the realm which we can spiritually discern but cannot see or grasp" (E I, pp.184,185). And, says Hartmann, even Aristotle's ethics was in the last resort not empiricist, despite "the well-known difference between the Platonic and the Aristotelian procedure" (E I, p.202); he believes that "if one examines the method of the ancients in close detail, one finds that under the various forms of procedure - even when it is apparently empirical - there is everywhere a kernel of purely aprioristic research" (E I, p.202). It is probable, he says, that Stoicism's poverty of content in so far as it rejected the real world in its endeavour for apateia and its denial of patos, which amounted to "a renunciation of all human goods, a contempt for them, for even the noblest of them" (E I, p.183), was due to an exaggerated apriorism.

In any case, it is in this regard that "Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics have remained a model for all later ethics" (E I, p.203). Hartmann is a firm believer in their apriorism as such. We have already seen that for him there is no coming-into-being of values, since "knowledge of values is genuine knowledge of Being"
and moral values are given completely in the ontological structure of the world.

Hartmann maintains further that moral values should be distinguished from other values which are not so given - economic, legal, social, aesthetic values, etc. He holds that in a purely material sense, non-moral values form the groundstuff of moral (personal) relations, and that the dependence of moral values upon non-moral values is an ontologically "unequivocal, irreversible dependence" (E II, p.25).

The goodness of a goods-value (the name which Hartmann gives to non-moral values), is always a matter of how good it is to or for someone. It is clear that a goods-value adheres also to every moral value, since every moral value involves some good for someone ("every moral value is also a goods-value indirectly" (E I, p.211)): chivalry is advantageous to the weak, love for one's neighbour benefits the needy and the burdened, and so on - "Wherein would an honest man be superior to a thief, if the things purloined were not somehow of value? What one man can steal, what another can treasure as a possession, is not merely a thing but a good. Honesty, then, if it is a moral value, necessarily presupposes the positive worth of material goods. It is inherently dependent on the latter. In the same way, chivalry which secures an advantage to the weak rests upon the worth of that advantage; love of one's neighbour, which gives, or which takes upon itself another man's burden, assumes the worth of the things given and of the relief from the burden; not otherwise is veracity related to the worth (for the other person) of the truth asserted" (E II, pp.24,25).

However, it is not its goods-value which distinguishes a moral value as such. Chivalry is not a moral value because of its advantageousness to the weak, or neighbour-love because it favours the needy and the burdened - the moral phenomenon here merely involves what Hartmann calls "life as the ontological basis of the subject... the earthly weight which holds (man) down but also the root which sustains spiritual life (E II,
In this sense life itself is a value, although a non-moral value, the corresponding disvalue being death which is "not only an annihilation of physical life, but with it also of the spiritual and personal" (E II, p.131). Hartmann tells us that "in all these cases the value of the act is altogether different from that attributed to the external good, whether this be some simple material possession or some complex situation. And indeed the worth of an act is plainly of a higher kind, the character of which is seen in this, that its degree does not increase and decrease with the greatness of the non-moral good, but according to a standard of a totally different order" (E II, p.25). The moral act is ultimately entirely indifferent to its goods-value. This is so because, while the existence of moral values, as we have seen, presupposes the existence of goods as non-moral values, "the converse is not true. The existence of the world of goods does not involve the emergence of a world of morality and immorality. The basis of the latter is provided only where a community of persons exists within one and the same world of goods. The content of the moral world lies on another plane; it is a structural novelty face to face with the whole mass of values from other quarters. Hence the novelty of its inherent quality. And indeed its peculiarity - both material and axiological - subsists without prejudice to the fact that the moral conduct of the persons touched by it has, mediately and dependently, the character of a "good"" (E II, pp.25,26). The actualization of moral values therefore depends entirely on the fact that the person is an object unto himself. Moral values are distinguished by the recognition on the side of the person that they ought to be actualized by him even if by him alone, and even if no goods-value whatsoever accrues either to himself or to anyone else from such an actualization; they ought to be actualized simply and solely because of themselves as moral values for him. Personality is essentially not for others but for self - only because of this can it be for others also. Hartmann's position means in effect that the distinguishing mark of moral values is not any utilitarian effect they may have in life, but simply that they constitute the possibility for the individual to become a better person.
It seems as if Hartmann here immediately leaves himself open and vulnerable to the question as to his criterion for "good", "bad", better", "worse", etc., and an imputation of the very relativism and arbitrariness in morals to which he is opposed. We must point out, however, that Hartmann's idea is that of "a systematic co-ordination of diverse values (which exist) without culminating in one supreme point" (E II, p.67). The problem of the highest value is not settled one way or the other in Hartmann's ethics - he does not consider ethics to be capable of settling such a question. We can say that, for him, instead of a single value forming a criterion, every discernable value does so - this applies in the case of purity, justice, wisdom, courage, self-control, brotherly love, truthfulness, fidelity, humility, personal love, to mention some of the values which Hartmann examines individually. He also wants us to understand that his list of values is not at all complete or nearly exhaustive of the realm of moral values. On the contrary, he believes that our knowledge here is only just beginning. Certain values are now for the first time being discovered or named - not created, since they were always there like continents or stars, only we were not yet able to discern them. Thus, for instance, Nietzsche was the first to pronounce Love of the Remote ("Fernstenliebe") and he was also the first to name Radiant Virtue ("schenkende Tugend").

We feel that the question as to what sanction there is for Hartmann's ideal self-existent realm of values, constitutes a serious problem; first of all, however, we must try to understand the philosopher, and he believes that the ontological and axiological phenomena involved in his researches do not allow for the absolute standards and criteria of so-called rationality. This attitude will not appear strange to us if we call to mind the parallel case of mathematical being which we have already described. That it should be so, and not otherwise, that \(a = a\), \(a^0 = 1\), \(3^6 = 729\), and that we should clearly "see" and accept that it is so and consequently arrange all our scientific experiments according to this knowledge - this is basically irrational. Yet we are not in the least indignant about this irrationality. Why then should we be
so when confronted with a discovery which tells us that moral values are what they are irrespective of time and us, that we can know them to be so, and that as such they express a claim — they claim of us that they Ought-to-Be and that we Ought-to-Act (Ought-to-Do) in their light.

It remains true, however, that Hartmann does not want to discuss the problematics of the authority for such a claim, and ultimately we cannot accept as an explanation that "it is just so". The furthest Hartmann gets here is to speak of "der Apriorismus des Wertbewusstseins" (60, p.306) in terms of which he maintains that moral values are known a priori, that our first awareness of them may be empirical or a posteriori, but that such awareness of them is only in a secondary way demonstrative of their existence. We cannot be aware of moral values in the actuality of life if they are not knowable beyond actuality: "Insight into that which is first is never the first insight... Values are not to be recognized by the fact that they are, or are not, contained in the real. They subsist even where the given case, indeed where all actual cases, contradict them... Ethical values are not to be discovered in the conduct of man" (E I, pp.95-99) but through "an aprioristic intuition, which is independent of the posternius of actual phenomena and of the part they play as guides. Even here the posterius — just as with the knowledge of theoretical principles — is only a roundabout way to autonomous aprioristic insight" (E I, p.104). But must not this aprioristic insight, this intuition, have a sanction beyond itself? Hartmann himself tells us that in choosing our exemplars, our models in life, the choice everytime constitutes a "valuational preference" (E II, p.48), that is, our stand on the side of values which are known outside of, and which rise above, the temporality of the exemplar: "It cannot be an accident that I choose precisely this one; that the Stoic chooses Zeno or Socrates, the Christian the figure of Jesus" (E I, p.195). But are we here not once again dangerously near to ethical relativism?

Hartmann's own choice of exemplars would evidently be where the valuational consciousness has the greatest range, that
is where the greatest possible number of values is allowed to "break through" the person into actuality. We can indeed consider this observation as of fundamental importance in any assessment of Hartmann's view of the moral man. For him the ultimate criterion of personal worth is the fullness of the valuational content of the person.

The obvious difficulty about this criterion is that the boundaries between values and disvalues very often remain extremely shadowy and doubtful. It is true that Hartmann leaves us with no rigid measuring stick for fixing boundaries between values and disvalues except what he calls value-feeling ("Wertgefühl"), the intuitive feeling of value which, according to him, has nothing psychological or empirical about it but is purely an autonomous axiological faculty within the ontological structure of the world as a whole: "The primal consciousness of value, the primal recognition of a commandment is a feeling of that which unconditionally ought to be, the expression of which is the commandment. This priority of feeling has nothing to do with empiricism" (E I, p.177). Hartmann is quoting Scheler when he speaks of the "Wertgefühl" as "eine apriorische "ordre du coeur" oder "logique du coeur", wie Blaise Pascal treffend sagt" (FEW, p.34; E I, p.177).

Whatever the case, however, when moral values and their character of Ought-to-Be have been discerned, the value-consciousness of the person transfers their Ought-to-Be into an Ought-to-Do for himself. He finds their actualization imperative and binding on him: "behind every Ought-to-Do there stands an Ought-to-Be, behind every wise imperative, a mass of values" (E III, p.29). But "between the commandment and the actual conduct of man stands his free decision, the open For and Against" (E I, p.39).

3. Freedom, God and Religion

The possibility of the open For or Against, moral freedom based on personal decision, becomes unthinkable for Hartmann.
if we accept the attitude of non posse peccare as formulated by Augustine. This may or may not be "a higher attitude to which man must rise" (E III, p.274), but it denies the evidence that man can consciously actualize or refuse to actualize values. Posse peccare et non peccare is an attitude of man and as such a phenomenon that cannot be argued away, says Hartmann. But then we are compelled to acknowledge the "moral freedom of the person even in face of the commandment of God" (E III, p.274).

Hartmann's position amounts to a belief that, from an ethical point of view, the fact described in the phrase posse peccare et non peccare makes nonsense of the religious doctrine of predestination, or the idea that anything exists which can be co-responsible for the actions or omissions of man. Hartmann's ethics is an ethics of personal responsibility, and it will be perfectly correct to maintain that for him the notion of freedom and the notion of responsibility coincide.

We have already seen that, for him, man is a person, that is a moral being, solely by virtue of the fact "that upon him fall guilt, responsibility, merit" (E III, p.20). Between guilt and merit stands responsibility, but responsibility implies freedom: if freedom is denied, there can be no room for responsibility in life, but then, also, any imputation of guilt or assignation of merit to a person would be meaningless. Hartmann does not think that the reality of the latter phenomena can be doubted, however: "The moral consciousness does not confine itself to the weighing of actions and dispositions; it also imputes the discerned moral qualities to the person. It not only judges, it also condemns. It metes out guilt and responsibility to the doer, and this without discrimination as to whether it be oneself or another person... The moral consciousness turns, incorruptible and relentless, against one's own ego; it permits the ego in its sense of guilt to renounce itself, to consume itself in remorse and despair. Or it leads the ego to conversion, to a change of heart, and a moral renewal of its own nature" (E I, pp.198,199).

Hartmann argues that man cannot shove his responsibility on so-called divine causality, and it has already been
established that natural causality cannot be fully descriptive of human behaviour. The person cannot "surrender his special rights to the Creator or to the world" (E I, p.281). Ethics must "restore to man what is man's" (E I, p.282). In Hartmann's philosophy, according to his own classic expression, "the metaphysical heritage of God falls to man" (E I, p.282). This, he says, may sound blasphemous to some, but it is at least not pretentious. It is a humble view in so far as it does not claim to know what it cannot know. As far as we know, he says, man alone is capable of ordering the world teleologically, according to a conception of ends. A finalistic scheme is a scheme of consciousness, and according to Hartmann we know of no higher consciousness than man's. Again, there may or may not exist such a consciousness - according to Hartmann, ethics should not quarrel with religion, but it can also expect of religion not to interfere with its enquiry which can only follow the available evidence.

However, we should not forget that Hartmann's final criterion for the discernment of the self-existing values, is the "Wertgefühl", which he himself admits to be completely intuitive; indeed, he goes so far as to call it an emotional act ("der direkte erfassende Akt ist hier gar kein eigentlicher Erkenntnisakt, kein theoristischer Akt, sondern ein emotionaler, ein Akt der Stellungnahme, ein Gefühlakt: Wertgefühl" (ME, p.554)). It would be a quite legitimate question to ask Hartmann what happens if religion claims a similar intuitive grasp of divine being? Whereas we fully agree with him that ethics should not quarrel with religion, it does not follow that we can with justice expect religion to adopt the same attitude towards ethics if religion claims awareness of a higher consciousness than that of man; religion is then the more encompassing discipline and can claim that man is in fact teleologically and finalistically determined from a sphere of consciousness above and beyond himself.

In any case, Hartmann believes that "divine providence threatens man in his independence and, when taken unconditionally (as in the theory of predestination) must logically
reduce him to nothing" (E III, p.32). He thinks, however, that this position has been surpassed, and maintains that Spinoza's pantheism has secularized the idea of God; God's person's character was lost; God and Nature became indistinguishable. Thus "the religious antinomy between divine and human efficacy" (E III, p.32) was changed into "the ethical antinomy between natural necessity and human freedom" (E III, p.32), and it became "possible to discuss the ethical problem of freedom" (E III, p.33).

Hartmann goes on to say that in Kant's third antinomy, the antinomy of freedom, Spinoza's pantheism is in its turn overcome, and the problem of freedom is seen in full clarity. It is the problem of the situation of man between the determination of natural causality and another determination which he senses or knows, and which involves his person, but which can no longer be vested in God. As such, it is the problem of man's situation between the "causality of nature" and the "causality of freedom," to use Kant's own terminology which Hartmann himself prefers since, he says, it shows clearly that Kant did not see man as though he could be lifted out of the causal nexus, or nature, but that the definition of man's personality itself introduces a further causal factor into nature, which does not suspend nature's causality (for that it cannot do) but is capable of diverting the course of it.

From inside itself, philosophy has therefore been freed from "the dictatorial aggression of religious thought" (E III, p.261). Hartmann's five antinomies between ethics and religion are intended to illustrate how critical philosophy has secured what he believes to be the mutual independence of two entirely separate disciplines. We will name the first three antinomies (1) the antinomy of Man's Destiny, (2) the antinomy of Responsibility, (3) the antinomy of the Origin of Values; Hartmann himself names the remaining two antinomies (4) the antinomy of Providence, and (5) the antinomy of Salvation.

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<td>(1) Ethically, man is directed only towards this world;</td>
<td>Religiously, man is directed towards a world other than this</td>
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Ethics

moral conduct is conduct here and now, and involves no expectation of rewards "hereafter"; "the tendency itself loses its ethical worth as soon as it casts longing glances towards a better lot in the Beyond" (E III, p.263).

(2) Ethically, man is the sole arbiter of his lot; his responsibility, his personal integrity, is the key to his humanity - without it he would be nothing; "That anything whatsoever in heaven or on earth, even though it be God himself, should take precedence over Man, would be ethically perverted; it would not be moral" (E III, p.264).

(3) Ethically, moral values must exist entirely independent of any authority; moral values are axiological absolutes and "no authority nor any fiat of power nor any will - not to mention man's sanction - stands behind ethical values" (E III, p.265).

Religion

world, towards a better Beyond. "All values which are of inherent worth lie in the Beyond. The true life is another life" and "within this world only that is good which tends beyond it" (E III, p.263).

Religiously, Divinity is ultimately in sole command of life; the key to an understanding of man is his responsibility to the dictates of God.

Religiously, moral values are commandments of God and as such they have no autonomous existence. "It is inherent in the nature of God that, in a world which is his thought and his value, nothing can be of value on any other ground, except that he wills it, that he commands it, or that it in some other way issues from his essence,
Ethics

(4) Moral freedom means that man finds himself confronted on the one hand with moral values which do not at all determine his choice directly, and on the other hand with natural causality - but the latter "is blind, it points to no goals to which it binds man" (E III, p.267). Man alone is capable of setting up ends for himself, his teleology is not finalistic, his providence not predetermined. Moral values are there, and nature is there, but moral life "is like the art of the sailor, who, when there is no wind, is himself unable to sail, but who, when the wind is up, by the mere guiding of the sails and rudder can give the ship any course - even indirectly against the wind" (E I, p.293).

(5) Ethically, guilt means a loss of man's

Religion

only thus does it have the power of an Ought-to-Be" (E III, p.265). Religiously, freedom is a contradiction in terms; its possibility is excluded by the finalistic determinism involved in the will of God: "if we grant validity to personal freedom, it inevitably abolishes the finalistic determinism of divine providence" (E III, p.267), and the converse is also true. Nevertheless religion teaches a doctrine of rewards and punishments in the Beyond, and indeed "it is pre-eminently religion which takes into account responsibility, imputability and human guilt, as is proved by the central position assigned to the concept of sin" (E III, p.268).

The problematics involved in the notion of divine providence are insoluble.

Religiously, guilt or sin is an impediment which "blocks (man's)
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<td>responsibility and personal integrity; but the guilty person must not run away from his guilt, he must shoulder the responsibility, he must have a &quot;Will-to-Guilt&quot; (E III, p.272). Guilt &quot;lasts as long as the values exist which condemn it&quot; (E III, p.271), but also: as long as these values exist, there exists the possibility of man's return to responsibility. Both guilt and merit survive man.</td>
<td>way to moral advancement&quot;, and the only way in which it can be overcome is through &quot;forgiveness&quot; which is dispensed by God as he wills. This is salvation and it is &quot;the work of God&quot; (E III, p.270).</td>
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These antinomies are insoluble, says Hartmann, and any reconciliation between the ethical and the religious attitudes must be referred to a domain beyond that of reason. Here again Hartmann is seemingly not aware of the inconsequence of his position: elsewhere, we have seen, he is prepared to stand on the side of irrationality and openly defend it; not here, however. He even considers that everytime one attitude within the antinomy of attitudes "must necessarily be illusory" (E III, p.263) - and it is not the ethical attitude! Yet Hartmann also maintains that "antinomies prove nothing against the co-existence of what is antinomically divided, even though they should be proved to be genuine antinomies, that is, should be insoluble. They only prove the inability of thought to comprehend the co-existence" (E III, p.262).

We feel, however, that we must allow for Hartmann what Hartmann allows for Nietzsche when he says that the mistakes of a true discoverer are "quite natural ones" and that it is not nearly so important to thrash them as to take note of the
discovery. And Hartmann's outstanding discovery, even if everything else in his account of ontology and axiology could not be doubted, is the tremendous responsibility to which man is committed in life.

In the whole field of philosophy, we do not know a more forceful representation of human responsibility than Hartmann's ethics. If Hartmann overstates his case, it is an overstatement in the right direction. If he antagonizes religion by suggesting that God must be done away with if man is to become fully aware of what he is, then it is perhaps because a certain type of theology has spoilt us by exaggerating the idea of God's co-responsibility for our destiny.

Especially to-day we should be able to appreciate Hartmann's portrayal of man as a Prometheus with the attribute of foresight in terms of which "the future belongs to him..." Indeed, to speak exactly, the future is the only thing which practically does belong to him. The past stands eternally still and is not to be changed. Nor is the present to be changed... Only that which has not yet entered into the present, that which is coming to us - for this is the meaning of the word "Zukunft" - can be guided, can be influenced" (E II, p.148). Perhaps man should also be happy to be a mere Prometheus in Hartmann's sense, capable of setting up ends, capable, that is, of teleology in the light of values aprioristically discerned, and of directing himself towards these ends, knowing that he may succeed or fail, but nothing more; happy that he is not a god or a Cassandra whose "prophetic vision poisons her life; for (whom) the divine gift becomes a curse; (and who) envies the happy ones who are struck with blindness and can at least spend unembittered the short span that still remains to them" (E II, p.150).
THIRD CHAPTER

NIETZSCHE'S SUPRA-MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF BECOMING

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2. Nietzsche's New Earth of Creation

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THIRD CHAPTER

NIETZSCHE'S SUPRA-MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF BECOMING

1. The Negation of Absolutes

When Nietzsche proclaims that God is dead, he prepares the way for the separation of the domains of ethics and religion as effected by Hartmann. Nietzsche himself completely denies the significance of religion and claims that religion is meaningless except in so far as it is itself a more or less subtle expression of a will to power. We will see how he arrives at this position when we consider his views on how Christendom, or what he calls Christianity, came to conquer the Western world.

The pronouncement that "God is dead", is most dramatic. However, the literary forms in which Nietzsche clothes his thought, should no longer mislead us. It should be our task to get behind and beyond the mere drama of Nietzsche, to discover his essential meaning.

When Nietzsche tells us that "God is dead", what he wants us to believe is not that God has died or has been murdered, as he also puts it, but that there has never been a God, that God only existed in the imagination of man. Zarathustra is more concerned to teach the Superman than the death of God: "The Superman I have at heart; that is the first and only thing to me" (AZ, IV:73:3), and above everything else this is his "task", his "work": "Of what account is my happiness," he says, "I have long ceased to strive any more for happiness, I strive for my work" (AZ, IV:61). It is not because "God is dead" that he teaches Superman; he does so rather because, according to him, there has never been a God, and because man's illusion of God has weakened him spiritually and has sapped his nobility. Nietzsche believes it to be the nature of a God or an absolute that it prostrates its
believers before it, killing their sense of mastery over their own destiny. Nobility, he tells us, cannot tolerate absolutes; ignoble spirits, however, must have absolutes outside themselves since they cannot believe in themselves; it all depends on the type of man one is and this can be ascertained according to one's negation or affirmation of absolutes: "Systems of morals are only a sign-language of the emotions" (GB, 187).

What Nietzsche seeks, although he never clearly tells us how such a man must be, is "a glimpse of a man that justifies the existence of man, a glimpse of an incarnate human happiness that realises and redeems, for the sake of which one may hold fast to the belief in man" (GM, "Good and Evil", 12). Such a man, however, would not be of the type of "slave-morality (which) requires as the condition of its existence an external and objective world,... objective stimuli to be capable of action at all - (whose) action is fundamentally a reaction" (GM, "Good and Evil", 10), but would be "a heritage of the old noble aristocratic morality,... (of those who) do not have to manufacture their happiness artificially through looking at their enemies,... complete men as they were, exuberant with strength" (GM, "Good and Evil", 10). Zarathustra, as harbinger of Superman, is such a type of aristocrat which must, however, not be confused with contemporary hereditary aristocracy that "have become false, draped and disguised with the old faded pomp of our ancestors, show-pieces for the stupidest, the craftiest, and whosoever at present trafficketh for power" (AZ, IV:63:1). And Zarathustra would maintain his nobility even in the face of a God that lived. It is not the fact that God is dead which prompts him to be noble; we have just seen that such a man requires no extraneous stimulus, no incentive from outside himself, for action. His rejection of absolutes is the sine qua non for his personality or manhood. The negation of absolutes is neither consequent nor dependent on the so-called death of God. It is not a natural corollary of it.

We may safely suggest that if Nietzsche's philosophy had not been largely a reaction to his time, of the very kind which he despises (in Jesus, for instance) as the
"slave-morality" of "resentment" (GM, "God and Evil", 10), he ought to have done without the idea of the death of God. There can be little doubt that this idea, and the way in which Nietzsche framed it, was intended above all as a hurt to and scorn for those who call themselves Christians - for despite the "Anti-Christ" in Nietzsche, he often wavers in his judgement of Jesus, even calling him "noble": "He (Jesus) died too early," Nietzsche maintains, "he himself would have disavowed his doctrine had he attained to my age! Noble enough was he to disavow!" (AZ, 1:21); and once he even sees a Nietzschean approach in Jesus' way of loving God, the way in which the law was overcome: "Jesus said to his Jews: "The law was for servants; - love God as I love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with morals!"" (GB, 164).

It is therefore clear that Nietzsche's call for nobility, his desire for the "elevation of the type "man"" (GB, 257), would be sustained even if, according to him, God had not died. He is in any case explicit about the fact that man must negate all absolutes even to their face. It is the negation of absolutes which marks a man as capable of nobility. It is the negation of absolutes which stamps a man as strong enough to herald the Superman.

The importance of pointing this out becomes manifest when we find even Jaspers writing that "Die umwertenden Grundgedanken Nietzsches scheinen ihm aus einer einzigen Quelle zu fließen: Der Umsturz aller bisherigen gültigen Werte ist das Ergebnis dessen, dass Gott tot ist. Infolgedessen ist alles scheinhaft geworden, was einmal Glaubensinhalt war..." (Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche, p.379). We have shown, however, that we find this view untenable and suggest that it would only be correct and in keeping with the whole of Nietzsche's philosophy, to say that in it God's death is not the cause of the overthrow of all hitherto existing values; God's death and the transvaluation of all values fall together. Nietzsche's position is the result of a deliberate choice, of an express will (although, as we shall see, he himself would not put it so) - he wilfully takes his stand on

X "Ergebnis" and "Infolgedessen" have been underlined by us.
the side of the negation of absolutes; it is not a position he arrives at because of something that happened, because God had died (however one may understand the latter). That God is dead is a purposive declaration of Nietzsche to call attention to the fact that he considers himself to have shattered all fixed standards according to which man had hitherto been evaluated, even that which have been most firmly established, even the Christian God — for that this most important of past Gods that Nietzsche proclaims to be dead, is the Christian God, is clear: "He was a hidden God, full of secrecy. Verily, he did not come by his son otherwise than by secret ways. At the door of his faith standeth adultery" (AZ, IV:66).

"God is dead" — this is how Nietzsche expresses his wilful resentment of Christendom, or what he calls "Christo-European morality" (GB, 203). Jaspers himself writes later on in the passage from which we have already quoted: "Der Tod Gottes ist für Nietzsche nicht nur eine furchtbare Tatsache, sondern Nietzsche hat den Willen zur Gottlosigkeit. Weil er die mögliche Höhe des Menschseins, das allein wahrhaft wirklich sein kann, sucht, entfaltet er in seinem Denken den Willen zur reinen Diesseitigkeit" (Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche, p.380). But for Nietzsche this will to godlessness is certainly not the outcome of the death of God, and when we mention the Diesseitigkeit of his thought we must again remember that it also is preceded by Nietzsche's negation of absolutes. Here we need only say how thoroughly Nietzsche was impressed by the Diesseitigkeit of ancient Greece and Rome, and yet there is only one philosopher of whom he speaks with almost unqualified approval, the one "in whose presence, in general, I felt warmer and more at ease than anywhere else. The yea-saying to the flux and destruction of all things, the decisive element in any Dionysian philosophy; the yea-saying to contradiction and strife, the idea of Becoming, together with the radical rejection even of the concept Being — these things, at all events, force me to recognize him who has hitherto had the closest affinity to my thought": Heraclitus (EH, "The Birth of Tragedy":3).

It is clear that the Heraclitic aspect of notion,
which is much more than mere Diesseitigkeit (so that we question Jaspers' interpretation of the latter as Nietzsche's concern "nicht um einen Grundgedanken unter anderen, sondern um einen beherrschenden Antrieb, dem alle seine Grundgedanken dienen, gleichsam um den Grundgedanken der Grundgedanken" (Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche, p.380)), is fundamental to Nietzsche's thought, and fully coincides with the negation of absolutes. Nietzsche's philosophy is Diesseitig, it does proclaim the death of a Jenseits-ruler, it does exhort man to "remain true to the earth", and even calls for a belief in the eternal recurrence of life - but all these requirements of man would prove to be meaningless if Nietzsche did not posit his ideal of Superman and of nobility. But immediately the ideal of Superman is posited, Nietzsche's philosophy is one of Becoming, is Heraclitic and supra-moral in so far as no morality can correspond to man as long as man must be "a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman - a rope over an abyss" (AZ, Zarathustra's Prologue:4), as long as men must be "fathers and forefathers of the Superman" (AZ, II:24); for so long will they have to overcome every morality and every error on the way to the truth of Superman, for so long they cannot be in any morality and must be living a supra-moral life of Becoming - that is, for so long must they negate all absolutes. "Man is something that must be surpassed - man is a bridge and not a goal" (AZ, III:56:3) - therefore, also, every morality of man must be surpassed and none must be allowed to claim our attachment to it.

It is in this sense that Nietzsche extols error as the groundstuff of progress. Truth is not yet our possession. Neither should we make error our possession. Yet error persists. Error is the condition of contemporary man, a condition which, as we know, must be overcome. Every morality and every belief at present is therefore an error to be overcome. Nietzsche or Zarathustra who announces Superman must therefore think in supra-moral terms, in terms of Becoming. Their philosophy is necessarily one of "the necessity of error" (EH, An Attempt At Self-Criticism:5).
Here a question arises as to whether, in Nietzsche's view, a stage would, or rather should, ever be reached when the Nietzschean man will be able to say: Superman has indeed arrived, the Truth now dwells among us, now we must believe in our Absolute, now we also must be moral. It seems as if Nietzsche was fully aware of this weakness in his position against absolutes; his doctrine of Eternal Recurrence may even be a conscious attempt to counter the accusation that Superman himself is but another absolute. Nietzsche's pronouncements on Eternal Recurrence, however, leave us with no ultimate clarity about its meaning: "Everything goeth, everything returneth," he says, "eternally rolleth the wheel of existence. Everything dieth, everything blossometh forth again; eternally runneth on the year of existence. Everything breaketh, everything is integrated anew; eternally buildeth itself the same house of existence. All things separate, all things again greet one another, eternally true to itself remaineth the ring of existence. Every moment beginneth existence, around every 'Here' rolleth the ball 'There'. The middle is everywhere. Crooked is the path to eternity" (AZ, III:57:2); and, he maintains, "I come again eternally to this identical and self-same life, in its greatest and its smallest, to teach again the eternal return of all things, to speak again the word of the great noontide of earth and man, to announce again to man the Superman" (AZ, III:57:2).

But how would Nietzsche "come again"? In the flesh, as a living man? Or in his work, the lasting content of his written message? Presumably the latter — "Souls are as mortal as bodies," he writes, "but the plexus of causes returneth in which I am intertwined — it will again create me!" (AZ, III:57:2).

At no time does Nietzsche therefore seem to envisage the actual advent of Superman; Superman will only be announced eternally. It is significant to note that Zarathustra is not pictured as Superman; he expressly states: "Never yet hath there been a Superman" (AZ, II:26). Nietzsche suggests that Superman will never be arrived at, but there will be higher men, men of the type of Zarathustra, noble men whose struggle against "the petty virtues, the petty policy, the sand-grain considerateness, the ant-hill
trumpetry, the pitiable comfortableness, the "happiness of the greatest number"" (AZ, IV:73:3) will be endless and even ever more difficult, so that "always more, always better ones of your type shall succumb, - for ye shall always have it worse and harder" (AZ, IV:73:6). In this same passage we find one of Nietzsche's most moving testimonies to the meaning of the supra-moral life of Becoming, to the meaning of "supra-moral" and of "Becoming" for man: "I love you," he writes, "because ye know not to-day how to live, ye higher men! For thus do ye live - best!" (AZ, IV:73:3).

Thus a Nietzschean absolute will never be arrived at, and so Nietzsche tries to pass beyond the dangerous rocks of morality - dangerous, since for him morality is merely another name for a belief in absolutes. The status of Superman, then, is never achieved; but we cannot agree, with C. Brinton for instance (although he speaks scornfully) that, because of this, "the Superman is not quite Nietzsche's highest flight. There is yet the Eternal Recurrence..." (C. Brinton, Nietzsche, p.139). The Superman is necessarily Nietzsche's "highest flight" in the same way that "man" (which, for Nietzsche, has really become a name of derision for the hollowness of his time, a term for his reaction to it) is the lowest point that he has to look down upon. The span of the chasm between these two is essential to Becoming, and these two are essential to the span of the chasm between them! The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence cannot do without the idea of Superman as Nietzsche's "highest flight". Rather does Eternal Recurrence represent Nietzsche's retreat from that "highest flight" because he realised what would be involved if a landing had been insisted upon. Morality would have been unavoidable. The negation of absolutes would have turned empty and meaningless. Brinton maintains that "Nietzsche's concept of Eternal Recurrence is an unrefined mixture of oriental speculation on metempsychosis, old European striving for a metaphysical absolute, and misunderstood theoretical physics of the late nineteenth century..." (C. Brinton, Nietzsche, p.140). This may or may not be so. Here we would like to propose, however, the probability that Nietzsche introduced Eternal Recurrence in order to save his all-important negation of
absolutes as the central achievement of his philosophy. What would "beyond Good and Evil" otherwise have meant? If Nietzsche had defined Superman, if he had known exactly what Superman would be like, if he had posited Superman as an absolute, there would have been neither ground for, nor sense in his "startling assertion", as Hartmann calls it, "that we have never yet known what good and evil are" (E I, p.15); it would have been pointless for him to maintain that God, and all the gods, were dead; and, above all, he could not have been true to the idea of Becoming and a supra-moral attitude towards life. "When the water hath planks," writes Nietzsche, "when gangways and railings o'erspan the stream, verily, he is not believed who then saith: "All is in flux!" But even simpletons contradict him. "What?" say the simpletons, "all in flux? Planks and railings are still over the stream! Over the stream all is stable, all the values of things, the bridges and bearings, all 'good' and 'evil': these are all stable!" - Cometh, however, the hard winter, the stream-tamer, then learn even the wittiest distrust, and verily, not only the simpletons then say: "Should not everything - stand still?" "Fundamentally standeth everything still" - that is an appropriate winter doctrine, good cheer for an unproductive period, a great comfort for winter-sleepers and fireside-loungers. "Fundamentally standeth everything still" - but contrary thereto, preacheth the thawing wind! The thawing wind, a bullock, which is no ploughing bullock - a furious bullock, a destroyer, which with angry horns breaketh the ice! The ice however - breaketh gangways! O my brethren, is not everything at present in flux? Have not all railings and gangways fallen into the water? Who would still hold on to "good" and "evil"?" (AZ, III:56:8).

This is Nietzsche's testimony in support of his Ephesian model. He consistently remains true to Heraclitus.

2. Nietzsche's New Earth of Creation

Just as Nietzsche's poetic and reactionary
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that God is dead has been much misused and drawn out of perspective, so also his doctrine of the Will to Power - so much so that someone like Bertrand Russell finds it possible to maintain with a superficiality which borders on irresponsibility that "King Lear, on the verge of madness, says: 'I will do such things - What they are yet I know not - but they shall be the terror of the earth.' This is Nietzsche's philosophy in a nutshell" (Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, p. 795).

But Nietzsche's Will to Power is essentially a Will to Creation, a will to bring into being ever higher and higher values. This, however, implies the willingness and the necessity to destroy the old or lower ones which have been sanctioned and hallowed by tradition and which have become entrenched in man's self-complacency: "He who would be a creator in good and evil must first be a destroyer, and break values into pieces. Thus the greatest evil belongeth unto the greatest good; but this is the creative good" (EH, *Why I Am A Fatality*).

What is it that Nietzsche wants to destroy? What is it that he wants to create?

We have considered Nietzsche's negation of absolutes. He wants to destroy all absolutes, even, as we have seen, the idea that Superman is an absolute. He wants, for instance, to destroy the absolute of politics, the State, which he calls "the new idol" (AZ, I:11), with all its human tools, the types that "vomit their bile and call it a newspaper. They devour one another, and cannot even digest themselves. Just see these superfluous ones! Wealth they acquire and become poorer thereby. Power they seek for, and above all, the lever of power, much money - these impotent ones! See them clamber, these nimble apes! They clamber over one another, and thus scuffle into the mud and the abyss. Towards the throne they all strive: it is their madness - as if happiness sat on the throne! Ofttimes sitteth filth on the throne - and ofttimes also the throne on filth" (AZ, I:11); he wants to destroy commercialism which drowns every voice calling for an evaluation of men by means of a higher value: "There is everything misheard. If one announce one's wisdom with bells, the
shopmen in the market-place will out-jingle it with pennies" (AZ, III:53); he derides sickly patriotism, the idolatry of the fatherland which tries to conceal spiritual barrenness, and does so badly: "All the swarming virtue of the "cultured", that - feast on the sweat of every hero!" (AZ, III:56:18); and he wishes his disciples to know: "Exiles shall ye be from all fatherlands and forefatherlands!... Unto your children shall ye make amends for being the children of your fathers" (AZ, III:56:12); he hates all self-complacency and hypocrisy and decries a degenerate hereditary aristocracy as well as that "crude and boorish institution" (GM, "Good and Evil":9) of Christendom, the Church: "This counsel do I counsel to kings and churches, and to all that is weak with age and virtue - let yourselves be o'erthrown! That ye may again come to life, and that virtue - may come to you!" (AZ, II:40); he distrusts democracy as the social dominance of what he calls the "power-rabble" (AZ, II:28); he has no time for faint-spiritedness, for the "obsequious, doggish one, who immediately lieth on his back, the submissive one; and there is also wisdom that is submissive, and doggish, and pious, and obsequious" (AZ, III:54:2).

In short, Nietzsche opposes himself to all those who, in one way or another, "with their virtues want to scratch out the eyes of their enemies" (AZ, II:27).

Above all, he wants Christendom, and even Christianity, to be destroyed. In tracing his reasons for this, we shall also see more closely what he wants man to become.

Nietzsche, Jesus and the Will to Power: Christianity, Nietzsche tells us, was born out of the Jews' resentment of the dominance of the Imperium Romanum - the Jews, a priestly people with the sharpest moral instinct history can show, the Romans, a worldly people, the most remarkable of all time for their supra-moral virility. Jesus was born into this Jewish hatred which, according to Nietzsche, was the most profound and most cleverly-directed hatred the world has ever seen. Israel hated because she was the very antithesis of Rome, a people who "for the first time coined the word "world" as a term of reproach" (GB, 195). This also is creation, in which, indeed,
genius is hidden, but it is creation as a force activated by resentment, and therefore inspired from outside, a virtue with which the Jews wanted "to scratch out the eyes of their enemies"; it is not Nietzsche's idea of creation. Judaism was an invention of the experience of Jewish weakness against Rome who, because it was not weak, could be tolerant, exercising its virtue which was entirely and spontaneously generated inside itself - the strength of the Romans was that of true aristocrats and was in no way reactionary, Nietzsche tells us. The Romans lived true to the "aristocratic equation (good = aristocratic = beautiful = happy = loved by the gods)" (GM, "Good and Evil":7), the equation of the "aristocrat's system of values: it acts and grows spontaneously, it merely seeks its antithesis in order to pronounce a more grateful and exultant "yes" to its own self; - its negative conception, "low", "vulgar", "bad", is merely a pale late-born foil in comparison with its positive and fundamental conception (saturated as it is with life and passion), of "we aristocrats, we good ones, we beautiful ones, we happy ones"" (GM, "Good and Evil":10).

This is how we must understand Nietzsche's Will to Power, namely that for the weak it is a forward desire in time, and its consummation, power itself, lies in the future. Grudge is at the root of this power. Therefore it is the type of power that corrupts. For the strong, however, the Will to Power means something entirely different. They have not become strong, at least not by means of a grudge, and they do not strive for power. They are strong. The gods, chance, fate, have conspired that they should be strong at the very moment of their emergence in history or time. Will to Power therefore means to them a Will to the Present, not to the future or to the past, and amor fati pertains to them: "My formula for greatness in a man is amor fati; that a man should wish to have nothing altered, either in the future, the past, or for all eternity" (EH, Why I Am So Clever:10). This is also what Nietzsche means when he says "This moment draweth all coming things after it" (AZ, III:46:2), the idea being that nothing else can be original except such strength or power; all else can be merely reaction to it. Such power will therefore always be found back in life and,
as such, there is eternal recurrence; it is the power of "the soul which hath the longest ladder, and can go deepest down: how could there fail to be most parasites upon it?" (AZ, III:56:19). This is the power of Nietzsche's idea of creation and it clearly is not simply power for power's sake, but a definite and distinctive order of power. It is power of the type that, in Nietzsche's opinion, does not corrupt. Unless we understand this, we cannot understand the meaning of Nietzsche's Will to Power. In this case the powerful have no desire to maintain their power indefinitely and at all costs. It is, indeed, inherent in their power that they will succumb without a grudge when time calls for such a "going under" - their greatness can in any case never be annihilated and remains procreative. Nietzsche says of his man of power: "I love him who seeketh to create beyond himself, and thus succumbeth" (AZ, I.17). Thus only can the Will to Power be supra-moral and a matter of Becoming; thus only can it be true to Nietzsche's negation of absolutes. It must be emphasized that the negation of absolutes is also at the bottom of the Will to Power, for as soon as power becomes absolute, that is, as soon as it becomes a god, Procreation and Becoming cease.

It was this Graeco-Roman negation of absolutes and the strength with which it laughed at them, that the Jews hated and on which they would revenge themselves; with fateful ingenuity they invented a doctrine of love and a promise of salvation, reversing the "aristocratic equation" so that men had now to understand: "The wretched are alone the good; the poor, the weak, the lowly, are alone the good; the suffering, the needy, the sick, the loathsome, are the only ones who are pious, the only ones who are blessed, for them alone is salvation - but you, on the other hand, you aristocrats, you men of power, you are to all eternity the evil, the horrible, the covetous, the insatiate, the godless: eternally also shall you be unblessed, the cursed, the damned!" (GM, "Good and Evil":7). This philosophy triumphed over Rome. This "slave-insurrection in morals," as Nietzsche calls it, succeeded. But how? - by "that stroke of genius called Christianity" (GM, "Guilt," "Bad Conscience":21).
At this point Nietzsche proposes an idea with which his capacity to exaggerate perhaps reaches deeper into grotesqueness than at any stage of his thought. He pretends that the Jews possessed a sort of super-intelligence, an uncanny psychological far-sightedness that could pierce through history so that they could get their own back on their enemies for all time—"black magic", Nietzsche calls it. His hypothesis is that the Jews used Jesus as their tool, in cold blood and clearly conscious that nothing could further the cause of their revenge more than to kill this Jesus, creating the impression that he was the martyr of opposition to them, whereas in fact they knew that his teaching was the very consummation of their own ideals—as such they were throwing him out as a bait to all generations of their enemies. The Jews, therefore, prepared the murder of Jesus as the grandest ruse for adversaries that history has produced, and, claims Nietzsche, they have succeeded in confusing all ages to such an extent that they were still succeeding up to his time. He, however, has now "unmasked Christian morality" (EH, Why I Am A Fatality? 7), he has seen through the "black magic of a really great policy of revenge" (GM, "Good and Evil" 8).

Nietzsche, as Anti-Christ, would like us to consider what spiritual effort and courage really is involved in this breakthrough in the philosophy of values, by taking note of the fact that it was the hypnotic profundity of the Orient against which he had to lay his axe: "It was the Orient, the profound Orient, it was the Oriental slave who thus took revenge on Rome and its noble, light-minded toleration" (GB, 46). And the profundity is borne out by the fact that Judea not only conquered Rome once, at one historic time; their fight was not a merely localised one, it is the primary antagonism in history and, indeed, in life; the great revival of aristocratic antiquity, the Renaissance, was once again revenged by Christendom in the Reformation, a fact for which Nietzsche cannot forgive the Germans; and what remained of political aristocracy was shattered by the French Revolution of freedom, equality and brotherhood; yet again the struggle of Judea versus Rome was pinpointed in the person of
Napoleon whom Nietzsche calls "the most unique and violent anachronism that ever existed, and in him the incarnate problem of the aristocratic ideal in itself - consider well what a problem it is: - Napoleon, that synthesis of Monster and Superman" (GM, "Good and Evil": 16). Claiming, therefore, that he was the first psychologist capable of handling Christianity, Nietzsche maintains that he has uncovered the ancient lie of the Jews which extended and branched down into every field of contemporary life.

The Will to Power consequently resolves itself into the eternal antithesis of Judae-Rome, an antinomy between a Will to the Future and a Will to the Present which has no solution; no synthesis or reconciliation is possible since this would absolve life of its very meaning, which is Becoming. In the last resort, therefore, Nietzsche does not desire a solution.

The Historical Necessity of Judaic Values: Hans Vaihinger has made a special note of his belief that Nietzsche would probably not have freed himself so radically from all tradition if it had not been for his sojourn in southern Europe where, as he puts it, life pulsates differently than in the north and where memories of ancient Greece, the Imperium Romanum and the Renaissance are vividly alive ("Erst im Süden ist Nietzsche zur vollendeten Zuspitzung seiner Lehre gelangt. Ich glaube nicht, dass er in unserem Norden dahin gekommen wäre, sich von allem Traditionen so vollständig loszureissen. Dort pulsiert das Leben ganz anders in den Menschen und in der Natur. Dort sind andere Farben, andere Formen. Dort sind die Gegensätze greller, dort ist der Übergang zwischen dem blühenden Leben und den Schrecken des Todes schroffer. Dort, wo die Spuren der Antike noch mannigfach hervortreten, ist die Erinnerung an das Imperium Romanum, ja an die griechische Zeit und die griechischen Tempel noch lebendig. Ebenso aber auch die Erinnerung an die Renaissance und ihre Gewaltmenschen voll Leben und Kraft" (Hans Vaihinger, Nietzsche als Philosopph, pp. 7, 8)).

It may now be asked why Nietzsche insists on the necessity for an antithesis to this Graeco-Roman ideal in history. Is it not enough that Nietzsche's nobility should be
non-absolute and that their stature, their type, should be fixed as the goal and criterion for man's achievement? Why should the idea of a necessary maintenance in time of an opposite, absolute type be held alongside the thought that it is precisely such types which are to be destroyed?

Essentially, however, this is not a contradiction in Nietzsche's philosophy; on the contrary, it is the only possible logic for a Heraclitic thinker for whom Becoming is only possible if opposites remain. Now Nietzsche's ideal for man, as we have seen, is Superman; not being Superman, but becoming Superman, that is, living the supra-moral life, living life without absolutes. And yet, since an opposite is necessary for such living, the logic of the Heraclitic position requires an absolute within the totality of life. It is for this reason also that we maintain that the type of Nietzsche's nobility, "complete men as they were" (GM, "Good and Evil":10), whose existence is supposed to be motivated entirely spontaneously from within themselves without any reference at all to extraneous factors which could spark off their behaviour as reactionary, is impossible - logically within the framework of his thought, as we have just explained, and perhaps also psychologically - although in the latter case it is better not to generalize. It is impossible because Heraclitic tension between opposites is a mutual affair and in the Heraclitic scheme movement or action accounts also for reaction, and Nietzsche's philosophy itself cannot avoid being reactionary, whatever he himself wants us to believe.

If we ask in what Nietzsche's reaction fundamentally consists, there can be only one reply, namely that it is a reaction against spiritual miserliness. Janko Lavrin quotes from a letter of Nietzsche's where he writes: "There have been evil enough and slanderous hints with regard to me - but how is it that no one feels insulted when I am abused? And during all these years no comfort, not a drop of human sympathy, not a breath of love", and remarks that "The last sentence is particularly poignant. It sounds like the cry of an isolated individual whose secret craving was not one for power, but for ordinary human warmth and sympathy" (Janko Lavrin, Nietzsche, pp.86,87); but it is more than that, it
is resentment, and if this becomes clear enough in his books, it becomes transparent in his letters: "The Nietzsche of the letters is the man who abandoned the ruggedness of his mountain cave to seek, yes, frantically crave the least stirrings of kindness, who may even be content with decency and plain courtesy" (Karl F. Leidecker, Nietzsche: Unpublished Letters, pp.1,2).

The Bestowing Virtue: It is Hartmann's merit that he recognizes that Nietzsche was the first to attempt a definition of Radiant or Bestowing Virtue ("schenkende Tugend") (E II, p.333), which we suggest is the central theme of Nietzsche's views on the noble or the good; more than this: we believe it to be the crown of Nietzsche's teaching for man to be "true to the earth" (AZ, Zarathustra's Prologue:3), to "love the earth as creators, as procreators" (AZ, II:37) and, as such, Nietzsche's major Apolline or (if we must speak popularly) constructive contribution to ethical research. Since, however, it is rooted in and grows from Nietzsche's criticism which, as we now realize, is the very ground-stuff of his concern, we do not hesitate to maintain that Nietzsche's entire wealth of ideas meet together in his thoughts on Bestowing Virtue, the latter being the most positive fruit of his philosophy, and a truly great conception as we shall see.

At this stage it should be clear what Nietzsche means when he pleads for man's "flown-away virtue" to be led "back to the earth - yea, back to body and life: that it may give to the earth its meaning, a human meaning" (AZ, I:22:2). We have been stressing the fact that this is more than the mere opposition of a Graeco-Roman Diesseitigkeit to the Judaeo-Christian Jenseitigkeit; that it is, above all, the opposition of a non-absolute attitude towards life to an absolute one. Nietzsche's idea is that wherever men have sought their ideals outside themselves, they have lacked inner nobility and fell into absolutism by way of reinforcing their spiritual mediocrity with an illusory strength coming from "beyond" themselves. For Nietzsche, however, the body, as the visible symbol of man's existence on earth and therefore of Diesseitigkeit and the negation of absolutes, represents the full range of man's ability.
To be true to the earth means to be true to that ability. The richness and beauty of human experience, the joy of tolerance and reasonableness, the elevation of the spirit beyond the desire for "small victories" (AZ, III:56:30) of hatred and revenge, and thankfulness towards life for experiencing it as something full and whole, as a super-abundance amid which spiritual pettiness becomes unnecessary since there is nothing lacking, so that we also continuously want to be giving to life in return, and giving gratuitously - this is what Nietzsche does not want to sacrifice to absolutism in which, he claims, duty, responsibility and life have been rationalized and have become terrors and requisitions on man from outside himself for which existence is made the torture stake and testing ground. The position becomes worse when men turn hypocrites even to their own absolutes, a condition which Nietzsche undoubtedly finds to be general in Christendom. He calls Pascal ("whom I almost love because he taught me a tremendous lot") the only logical Christian (Karl E. Jaspers, Nietzsche: Unpublished Letters, p.14) and Georg Brandes, of course, wanted to bring Kierkegaard to his attention.

However, Nietzsche opposes himself to rationalism, saying that he loves the man whose "head (is) only the bowels of his heart" (AZ, Zarathustra's Prologue:4). He considers that rationalism is dangerous to our experience of the fullness of life because it must lead to absolutism, even if only that of "reason" itself; he saw that even Kant could not avoid metaphysical absolutism and laughs at the categorical imperative; he censures dialectical Socratism for negating the Greek instinct to grasp intuitively the plenitude of existence. Socrates, he tells us, was at first a rationalist who ridiculed "the awkward incapacity of the noble Athenians who were men of instinct, like all noble men, and could never give satisfactory answers concerning the motives of their actions" (GB, 191); later on, however, Socrates was a dishonest rationalist who found in himself "the same difficulty and incapacity" (GB, 191), but wanted to apologize for it with good reasons. To this extent Socrates was false, since he "perceived the irrationality in the moral judgment" (GB, 191).
Descartes, however, was the real "father of rationalism, and consequently the grandfather of the Revolution": "Descartes was superficial" (GB, 101).

Nietzsche's objection to rationalism has its roots in the fact that the rational attitude desires explanations in life, that it seeks causes, also of valuational phenomena, beyond their mere ontological appearance; and explanation implies a concern over method. Nietzsche, however, finds that methodology is a presumptuous and necessarily superficial mode of approach, whether it be to the individual person ("the only thing I have always suffered from is 'multitude', the infinite variety of my own soul" (EH, Why I Am So Clever:10)), or to life as a whole, "a world so overflowing with beauty, strangeness, doubt, terror and divinity" (EH, Thus Spake Zarathustra:2). Nietzsche does not want us to think that the body, or sensualism as the discipline most akin to the body, is a heuristic principle: "Sensualism is not a heuristic principle" (GB, 15). In this sense he wants us "to view science through the eyes of the artist and art through the eyes of life" (EH, An Attempt At Self-Criticism:2). He claims that even physics is in no way an explanatory discipline, and blames empiricism as due to "fundamentally plebeian tastes" (GB, 14).

Life is infinitely richer than method can make us realize, and since Nietzsche desires man to have an awareness of nothing less than this full richness, he rejects method completely. For him philosophy is not a matter of specialization - specialization impoverishes our experience of the world since it is not concerned with existence as such but with problems, and above all, with answers; and method, in Nietzsche's opinion, is not only an approach to possible answers, but is itself already an answer. Method is a seduction into one-sided absoluteness. For Nietzsche, rationalism leads man in the last resort to morality and is opposed to the supra-moral mode of existence, while the Will to Power of the noble man, the man whose life reflects the gladness of the super-abundance of existence, is a passion which Nietzsche describes as the "passion for power: the earthquake which breaketh and upbreaketh all that is rotten and hollow; the rolling, rumbling,
punitive demolisher of whited sepulchers; the flashing interrogative-sign beside premature answers" (AZ, III:54:2).

This proves once more that it is the negation of absolutes which is basic to Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole, and as one of supra-moral Becoming; and the life of Becoming is the life of Bestowing or Radiant Virtue. Of this, Hartmann has written that "inherent in the essence of spiritual imparting, as distinguished from material giving, is the peculiarity that he who bestows does not give away, does not become the poorer, but himself stands by as a recipient of gifts. Imparting to others is the only attitude of mind which accords with the nature of spiritual goods, for they can never be really surrendered. Radiance is the life of spiritual fulness; its life is not the fulness itself - the presence and value of which are here presupposed - but personal living in accord therewith, a vast overflowing, the ability to share, to make rich, to scatter broadcast; and in addition to this a delight in so doing and in enhancing the spiritual insight of those who accept" (E II, p.333). This alone is great and noble, but the definition of Bestowing Virtue becomes a unique event, not only in Nietzsche's philosophy but in the entire realm of ethical research when we consider that Nietzsche calls man to a life solely and exclusively by this virtue. He has no higher attribute for his "new nobility", his "higher men". The Bestowing Virtue is the mark by which they are to be known. It is the exact antithesis of the spirit of resentment and revenge and, as Nietzsche thinks, of Christianity. Yet he could call Jesus noble and we may not be wrong in surmising that the obvious antithesis which Jesus is to contemporary Christendom must have struck him, and that Jesus' doctrine, or rather life of love was not so far removed from his heart. Nietzsche calls himself "the battle and battle-field of virtues" (AZ, I: 5) and it has been said of him that "Zijn gansche leven heeft deze mensch met den Engel geworsteld en naar nieuwe goden gezocht" (Herman Wolf, Nietzsche, p.5). We are confident that the Bestowing Virtue is Nietzsche's finest victory and gain. For an understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy its importance cannot be overestimated for the simple reason that
it accepts and reveals the Dionysiac as well as the Apolline tendencies in his thought. To understand its definition is to understand what Nietzsche means by creation, since creation is for him the "sacrifice in the temple of both the deities" (GT, 25). Dionysus, on the one hand, whose meaning, Nietzsche tells us, is best conveyed by the image of drunkenness, a primordial, self-forgetful, destructive force, and on the other hand Apollo who represents sensitive plasticity, form, light and balance: "The effects wrought by the Dionysian seemed "titan-like" and "barbaric" to the Apollonian Greek: while at the same time he could not conceal from himself that he too was inwardly related to these overthrown Titans and heroes. Indeed, he had to recognize even more than this: despite all its beauty and moderation, his entire existence rested on a hidden substratum of suffering and of knowledge, which was again revealed to him by the Dionysian. And lo! Apollo could not live without Dionysus!" (GT, 4).

It is important that we do not confuse the antithetic process of the struggle of Judea versus Rome with the synthetic creative force of Dionysus-Apollo. Dionysus and Apollo are the dual force of creation in the mode of life represented by Rome; the Judaeo-Christian heritage is not the playfield of these gods and knows nothing at all about them. How can Dionysus and Apollo negate the earth, how can they equate the "world" with "evil", if they are the meaning of the earth? In their turn they know nothing of "this slandering of the world" (EH, Why I Am A Fatality:6), as Nietzsche calls it. He describes his own work in terms of these creative impulses as "my onslaught on two thousand years of opposition to Nature, of the degradation of humanity" (EH, "The Rhythm of History") and seems to have two ideas about this "degradation": there are those who maintain honesty about their ideal of Jenseitigkeit, the Pascals, and they impoverish life by denying themselves where no denial is necessary - this corresponds almost exactly to Hartmann's view that man ought to be defended "against being degraded by high-flying speculation, against the surrender of his special rights to the Creator or to the world" (E I, p.291); and there are those who are hypocrites
to the same ideal and who with this dishonest background want at the same time to lay their hands on the strength of (Nietzschean) nobility. These are the ones who Nietzsche probably thought were to be most despised.

This then, is Nietzsche's ideal and the idea of the Bestowing Virtue: that we should, so to speak, put all elevatedness of spirit into the earth, into the Diesseits, so that the whole of life can become as rich and overflowing with benevolent strength as it even now can make some of mankind; for this, however, rationalism must be vanquished and substituted by the instinct of nobility which means that every vestige of absolutism must be destroyed. But here even Nietzsche can only boast, for the latter task is one of an impossible immensity. Nietzsche's exaggerations are only repaired in so far as his concept of Bestowing Virtue has an Apolline aspect. It remains true, however, that the Bestowing Virtue can be considered as a chastising rod of conscience to contemporary Christendom. In its light the latter can be expected to account for itself whether the evidence proves that its behaviour has a higher motivation than that of an "Anti-Christ" who called Jesus noble and who writes of noble men that "they desire to have nothing gratuitously, least of all, life... we, to whom life hath given itself - we are ever considering what we can best give in return!" (AZ, III:56:5).

Nietzsche dreamt of a New Earth of Creation: "Ye lonesome ones of to-day, ye seceding ones, ye shall one day be a people: out of you who have chosen yourselves shall a chosen people arise: - and out of it the Superman. Verily, a place of healing shall the earth become! And already is a new odour diffused around it, a salvation-bringing odour - and a new hope!" (AZ, I:22:2). But this New Earth will never materialise, and in terms of his Heraclitic basis of Becoming Nietzsche had to know this. He explicitly promised himself to be satisfied to have called for the ideal, and to go down thus satisfied. It is in this spirit that he gives his most moving testimony to the meaning and significance of the Bestowing Virtue: "From the sun
did I learn this, when it goeth down, the exuberant one: gold doth it then pour into the sea, out of inexhaustible riches, - so that the poorest fisherman roweth even with golden oars! For this did I once see, and did not tire of weeping on beholding it"; and, he concludes, "like the sun will also Zarathustra go down" (AZ, III:56:3).

3. The Origin of Values

To go down as a creator means, for Nietzsche, to go down as a valuator. For him, creation and evaluation are absolutely identical. Therefore, since creation, as we have seen, is a matter of Bestowing, so also evaluation. We have intimated that for Nietzsche Bestowing or Creation and Nobility are exactly the same. To ask the question Bestowing what and Creating what would not be meaningful for him, as little as it would be to ask the question Nobility what. The reason for this is that Nietzsche creates no distance at all between the noble man and his activity or function. There is not a noble man as an entity of Being on the one hand, and on the other hand a motivator or motivation to activity for the noble man as a similar entity of Being. Nietzsche's philosophy, as one of Becoming, cannot allow for such static factors. It is in this regard that Wenzl maintains that "Bei Nietzsche fehlt nicht nur der Träger, sondern auch der Inhalt des Willens, und das ist der doppelte Grundirrtum" (Prof. Dr. A. Wenzl, Nietzsche, p.22).

Whatever the case may be, Nietzsche completely identifies the "higher man" with his activity - the noble man is what he does, his function is his description. To point the finger at him is not to indicate a subject, a substantive, one who does something - subject, predicate, object! - but a force, an activity, a doing. Nietzsche indeed blames language as a seducer of man. Rationalism is mere grammar and play with words; it is calling life by names which are not its name. What is life's name? To this Nietzsche's reply would be: that must be experienced. This is the
Deeper meaning of his reproach to "scholars" as "good clockworks... ingenious in little artifices" (AZ, II:38) that "they want in everything to be merely spectators, and they avoid sitting where the sun burneth on the steps" (AZ, II:38). Unity, Identity, Duration, Substance, Cause, Being - all these are empty words; our eyes are error as far as the movement of the heavenly bodies is concerned, but as far as values are concerned, language is error. Nietzsche calls rationalism "Sprach-metaphysik" and remarks: "Heute sehen wir genau so weit, als das Vernunft-Vorurtheil uns zwingt, Einheit, Identität, Dauer, Substanz, Ursache, Dinglichkeit, Sein anzusetzen, uns gewissermassen verstrickt in den Irrthum, notessitirt zum Irrthum; so sicher wir auf Grund einer strengen Nachrechnung bei uns darüber sind, dass hier der Irrthum ist. Es steht damit nicht anders, als mit den Bewegungen des grossen Gestirns: bei ihnen hat der Irrthum unser Auge, hier hat unsere Sprache zum beständigen Anwalt" (G-D, Die "Vernunft" in der Philosophie:5). Rationalism is a process to piecemeal life, whereas life is a whole. Nietzsche, of course, does not tell us whether "a whole" is not also grammar. In any case, "Man ist notwendig, man ist ein Stück Verhältnis, man gehört zum Ganzen, - es gibt nichts, was unser Sein richten, messen, vergleichen, verurtheilen könnte, denn das hiesse das Ganze richten, messen, vergleichen... Aber es gibt nichts ausser dem Ganzen!" (G-D, Die vier grossen Irrthümer:8). An ethics of values as moral standard is therefore impossible for Nietzsche. The question as to the value of life, the why of life, its explanation, and obedience to the demands on the human ethos which that explanation might entail, is ruled out. Jaspers gives a good account of this and explains that, for Nietzsche, this is an impossible question since, if it is to be answered, man requires a standpoint ("Standort") from which to scan or overlook the whole of existence, but such a standpoint for overlooking life is impossible since we are in life which means that there is no standard for evaluation of the whole ("das Ganze") except itself, but this ultimately means that existence knows no values other than its own "value", which is itself as such (Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche, p.294).
Yet, it may be objected, Nietzsche's philosophy is an elaborate play-off against each other of two sets of values, Judaeo-Christian values and the values of Dionysus-Apollo. How, then, have these values, so to speak, come to stand out above the surface of the whole, how did they originate, how have they become differentiated out of existence? Here we encounter an evident weakness in Nietzsche's thought. While on the one hand his position is that existence is the duel between these sets of values, he also maintains on the other hand that the values of the one set (the Judaeo-Christian) are so differentiated out of existence and therefore untrue to life and to the earth, whereas values of the other set are identical with existence as such (or rather, as it ought to be, although Nietzsche would not like putting it this way) and therefore true to the earth. For Becoming to be maintained, the Judaeo-Christian set of values is absolutely necessary as the antithesis to the Roman set of values; but since Becoming is, for Nietzsche, the meaning of existence, of life, of the earth, or of the whole, the former values must certainly be essential to existence, therefore they also must be in the whole, and if being in the whole is really Nietzsche's concern, what objection can there be to siding with these values? Is Nietzsche true to "the whole" in siding with the opposite values?

Nietzsche, of course, also tries to say that the Roman set of values is "the whole" - which, however, endangers the entire concept of Becoming in his philosophy.

However, it is now clear that values for Nietzsche, that is the values of Dionysus-Apollo, are not made by anyone in any way; they are; they identify themselves with the fullness of existence, and man is a Creator, that is an Evaluator, just in so far as he identifies himself with them. Judaeo-Christian and all other values are made, are manufactured, are due to illusion and imagination ('Der ganze Bereich der Moral und Religion gehört unter diesen Begriff der imaginären Ursachen' (G-D, Die vier grossen Irrthümer16)).

But if we have said that the values of Dionysus-Apollo are, we have not yet said that they are always the same;
it must be understood that they are in so far as they are not explained, in so far as they are not caused beyond themselves. The reason why these values do not always remain the same is therefore also not because times and circumstances change, but because, as we have seen, there must be continual progress towards Superman - Nietzsche, however, never gives any details of what such change would entail. Identification of these values at any time is for him simply a matter for the instinct of nobility which will find them within itself. Here again "the whole" is emphasized as the complete falling together of values and persons, change in any one identifying itself with change in the other. In this sense and in this sense only is man a Creator of values and an Evaluator. The "Transvaluation of All Values", the breaking down of all values that do not belong to the category of Dionysus-Apollo, the destruction of Judaeo-Christian values - this neither precedes nor follows such creation of values and evaluation, but falls together with it. In the process of Becoming, of growing towards Superman, nobility necessarily and simultaneously identifies itself more and more with Dionysus-Apollo and more and more negates the opposite values. This is how we must understand Nietzsche when he writes: "Verily, men have given unto themselves all their good and bad. Verily, they took it not, they found it not, it came not unto them as a voice from heaven. Values did man only assign to things in order to maintain himself - he created only the significance of things, a human significance! Therefore calleth he himself "man", that is, the valuator. Valuing is creating: hear it, ye creating ones! Valuation itself is the treasure and jewel of the valued things. Through valuation only is there value; and without valuation the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear it, ye creating ones! Change of values - that is, change of the creating ones. Always doth he destroy who hath to be a creator" (AZ, I:15).

The origination of values is therefore a spontaneous activity of values themselves - this insight, according to Nietzsche, amounts to a reinstatement of the innocence of Evaluation and Becoming, that is of Creation. The earth need no
longer have a complex of guilt in the face of a causa prima which in any case is illusory ("Dass niemand mehr verantwortlich gemacht wird, dass die Art des Seins nicht auf eine causa prima zurückgeführt werden darf, dass die Welt weder als Sensorium, noch als "Geist" eine Einheit ist, dies erst ist die grosse Befreiung, damit erst ist die Unschuld des Wardens wieder hergestellt" (G-D, Die vier grossen Irrtümer:8)). And this condition reflects itself in higher men to whom freedom means self-responsibility; in terms of such freedom (and here Nietzsche expresses an almost Stoical idea), man remains indifferent to affliction, hardship, privation; the fight for this attitude of self-responsibility is infinitely preferable to a search for "happiness", for instance ("Denn was ist Freiheit? Dass man den Willen zur Selbstverantwortlichkeit hat. Dass man die Distanz, die uns abtrennt, festhält. Dass man gegen Mühsal, Härte, Entbehrung, selbst gegen das Leben gleichgültiger wird. Dass man bereit ist seiner Sache Menschen zu opfern, sich selber nicht abgerechnet. Freiheit bedeutet, dass die männlichen, die kriegs- und siegesfreuden Instinkte die Herrschaft haben über andre Instinkte, zum Beispiel über die des "Glücks" (G-D, Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen:38)).

It remains an open question to what extent Nietzsche's own illness stands behind his entire philosophy; he maintained, however, that "to an intrinsically sound nature, illness may even act as a powerful stimulus to life, to an abundance of life. It is thus that I now regard my long period of illness: it seemed then as if I had discovered life afresh... out of my Will to Health and to Life I made my philosophy" (EH, Why I Am So Wise:2). His affirmation of life and of the earth leads him to declare that "pain cannot rank as an objection to life" (EH, Thus Spake Zarathustra:1). Self-responsibility should overcome even that, for these are the "signs of nobility: never to think of lowering our duties to the rank of duties for everybody; to be unwilling to renounce or to share our responsibilities; to count our prerogatives, and to exercise them, among our duties" (GB, 272). And, in any case, the noble cannot do otherwise since,
according to Nietzsche, they have no choice. Since they are what they are, there is for them no either-or.

Nietzsche does not want us to confuse the freedom of responsibility towards oneself with the so-called Free Will and all its problematics; he calls the latter a mere theologian-artifice ("Theologen-Kunststück" (G-D, Die vier grossen Irrthümer:7)). Self-responsibility has no need for the concepts of guilt and punishment which are the reverse side of the religious doctrines of Will; self-responsibility must do away with the concepts of guilt and punishment ("mit aller Kraft den Schuld-begriff und den Straf-begriff aus der Welt wieder herauszunehmen" (G-D, Die vier grossen Irrthümer:7)), and finally, self-responsibility implies not only responsibility towards the individual self, but since the individual self is in "the whole, as we have seen, it implies responsibility towards "the whole" and towards all existence. We believe that it is entirely with this understanding that Nietzsche commends what he calls Furthest Love ("Fernstenliebe"). It is almost as if he wants to say that all life depends on the self-responsibility of the few. These "furthest ones" must be loved, yes, men must become such "furthest ones" because "the furthest ones are they who pay for your love to the near ones; and where there are but five of you together, a sixth must always die" (AZ, I:16).

For Nietzsche, the origin of values is the responsibility of man towards himself.

Nietzsche maintained that "Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a lurking place, every word is also a mask" (CB, 289). We cannot deny that this opinion is largely upheld by his thought. Yet it would be foolish to maintain that the face of Nietzsche cannot be recognized; it is our belief, however, that if we want to do so, we must allow for the masquerade in Nietzsche, we must recognize that the mask
is part of the face; we must be able to understand Nietzsche as a nuance - "alas! I am a nuance" (EH, The Case Of Wagner:4): that, in any case, is all the meaning of Nietzsche's mask. It is true that if we want to bring home Nietzsche's philosophy with meaning in the whole of the history of thought, we must attempt to get at its "truth", its "real meaning"; to so much we agree. But we maintain that a description of this "real meaning" will in the last resort have to be as unashamed of Nietzsche's contradictions as Nietzsche himself was - without, however, keeping itself unaware of them, for that would be dishonesty and enough dishonesty has already been perpetrated against the thinker by political and other apologists. Sufficient clarity about the philosopher is achieved every time he is understood anew as a fundamental doubter inspired by a singular will to reform, as one who was

"zwischen zwei Nichtse
eingekrümmt,
ein Fragezeichen,
ein müdes Räthsel."x

x (Dionysos-Dithyramben, Zwischen Raubvögeln).
FOURTH CHAPTER

HARTMANN'S APPRECIATION OF NIETZSCHE'S APPROACH

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1. Hartmann and Nietzsche: Ontology, Creation and Responsibility

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2. Historical Relativism: Hartmann's Indictment of Nietzsche

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3. Specific Values

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FOURTH CHAPTER

HARTMANN'S APPRECIATION OF NIETZSCHE'S APPROACH

1. Hartmann and Nietzsche: Ontology—Creation and Responsibility

We have said of Hartmann's ethics that it is the most complete example of an ethics of human responsibility in the history of explicit philosophy; we recall once more his view that ethics ought to be a defence of man's responsibility against both God and the world; we have also seen how, for Nietzsche, the origin of values is to be discovered in the responsibility of man towards himself. It is in this return to man as a responsible creature that Hartmann's appreciation of Nietzsche centres.

Hartmann recognized the fact that Nietzsche alone of modern thinkers has again drawn attention to the richness and fullness of the valuational life, the consciousness of which, as Nietzsche himself considers, was lost with the passing away of Greek and Roman antiquity. Thus, according to Hartmann, Nietzsche provided for ethics the only basis on which it could meaningfully continue its researches. It is his belief that the future of ethical research depends entirely on two things which, as a result of Nietzsche's labours, "forced their way to consciousness: (1) Values are many, their realm is a manifoldness; and (2) we know neither the entire manifoldness nor its unity" (E I, p. 83). Because of this, Hartmann has made his own "central task an analysis of the contents of values" - "I have done so," he says, "in the belief that only in this way will it be possible in the future to grapple afresh with the problems of conduct" (E I, p. 15). Only by rejecting absolute presuppositions, he feels, can there be any progress in the definition of the human ethos. The idea of a unity of morals must be set aside, even if temporarily. Till now it has proved...
sterile as a working hypothesis in ethical research. This has been so because, in order to maintain it, it was always necessary to proceed from the presupposition that the ultimates of "good" and "bad" were already known. This, however, has only led to a Babel of confusion since every philosophical system has claimed a different "highest good" and each was equally convinced of the other's error: "The most contradictory tendencies of thought have at all times had this in common," writes Hartmann, "that they professed to know already what good and evil are. The "good" has stood for the absolute unity of the morally valuable in general - an interpretation which one could the more readily accept since one had the name for the unity and did not observe the manifoldness of values. Neither did one see that all these tendencies of thought meant, in fact, fundamentally different things by the "good", and each denied the truth of the other. That this belief was futile is one of the most recent discoveries; we have to thank Nietzsche for the first clear statement of it" (E I, p.83).

Nietzsche has again weighed the anchors of the concepts "good" and "evil", and put them adrift. As far as Hartmann is concerned, this is Nietzsche's merit; his error (to continue our simile) is that his idea of man's responsibility towards himself became the entire ocean and medium for this drift. For Nietzsche, "beyond good and evil" meant only the self-responsible strength of nobility.

Hartmann's differences with Nietzsche, therefore, begin precisely at the point of his greatest appreciation for Nietzsche's work. We have seen that Nietzsche's idea was a complete liberation of man from the consciousness of guilt, a removal of the notions of guilt and punishment from the world. Yet we know that for him this by no means entailed a licentiousness of the individual towards life - on the contrary, it desired the individual to live by the consciousness of his responsibility, and by it alone. In this way the responsibility of Nietzsche's noble man becomes an unbounded responsibility; Hartmann sees this and to
him it is incomprehensible that a consciousness of guilt can remain absent from a consciousness of such responsibility. Hartmann's view is that unlimited power would be the only thing that could sustain unlimited responsibility, but only the idea of God is an idea of such Almightyness. He finds that "unbounded purposive activity means unbounded responsibility, responsibility for everything. Guilt falls upon him who has power... Man is not such a being. The degree of responsibility which he can bear is narrowly limited; and in real life, when it is exceeded, he collapses under the burden and gives up in despair... An excess of power falls upon him like a crushing load" (E II, p.153). Yet, even if responsibility crushes man, he cannot escape from it; according to Hartmann, there is no way in which he can avoid it; even if he tries to run away from it in life, it will remain present with him in his consciousness of guilt; and death is the annihilation of every value, the reduction of man to nothing.

In the last resort, therefore, it is true that for Hartmann, as for Nietzsche, man lives by responsibility alone. This is an attribute of divinity which man must claim for himself. Hartmann identifies himself almost completely with Nietzsche when he calls life "a playing with this dangerous gift; of course it is not an idle play, but necessitated, inevitable. For in it man has no freedom; so long as he breathes, he cannot withdraw from the game" (E II, p.154).

Hartmann's appreciation of Nietzsche's approach stems from the fact that Nietzsche has again made man, and man only, the concern of ethics, and not as a matter of subjectivity since, as we have seen, the ontological basis of Hartmann's work contains a square rejection of subjectivity. The essential aspects of Hartmann's ontology and Nietzsche's view of "the whole" ("das Ganze") are closely akin. Proceeding from responsibility as the common denominator to their work, Hartmann's indebtedness to Nietzsche as his immediate predecessor can especially be ascertained from two affinities which their philosophies maintain mutually - we will call them (a) the
affinity of their grounds in ontology, and (b) the affinity of their views of man's creative function.

(a) Hartmann's Appreciation of Nietzsche's Ontological Position: We have considered Nietzsche's view that man belongs in and to "the whole", that is the complete fullness of existence, so that man has no choice which can be directed beyond existence; as Jaspers explained, there is no standpoint for man from which he could exercise such a choice since, wherever he might stand in life, he is bound to be inside its totality and there is no point from which he could rise above it, or out of it, in order to place himself over against it or even opposite it. This falling together of man and existence, this basic levelling of their identity, as we may call it, is one of Hartmann's fundamental concerns. If it were not for this, subjective ethics could not be overcome.

Nietzsche tried to overcome the problems inherent in his ontology of man, those problems which Hartmann indicates when he writes that "Nature, if it were structurally like man, if it were also like him teleologically and axiologically would leave no room for man" (E I, p.292), by emphasizing what he called the "instinct" of nobility; this "instinct" lifts man into a position of consciousness of and about existence - it is the point at which man becomes differentiated from "the whole".

Whatever we may think of this, it is important for us here to note that Nietzsche's basic position is precisely what Hartmann claims of ontology as a preliminary orientation for ethics: "The total determination of ethical reality is embedded in the universal ontological determination. It must contain the universal type of the latter, but must rise above it" (E I, p.291). The account we have already given (when we discussed the doctrine of categories) of how, for Hartmann, ethics "rises above" its own ontological foundation, shows the differences between his own and Nietzsche's approach in this regard. We have, however, also pointed out that as far as valuational judgement is concerned, even Hartmann's final appeal is to "intuition".

Hartmann's appreciation of Nietzsche's
presuppositions in ontology is even more manifest when we leave Nietzsche's ontology of man as such to look at his ontology of values.

Hartmann's belief that "Nietzsche was the first to see the rich plenitude of the ethical cosmos" (E I, p.16) is nowhere better justified than in Nietzsche's view of the "conflict of virtues", each of which claims for itself nothing less than the supreme position in the judgement of the evaluational consciousness: "My brother, if thou be fortunate," writes Nietzsche, "then wilt thou have one virtue and no more: thus goest thou easier over the bridge. Illustrious is it to have many virtues, but a hard lot; and many a one hath gone into the wilderness and killed himself, because he was weary of being the battle and battlefield of virtues. My brother, are war and battle evil? Necessary, however, is the evil; necessary are the envy and the distrust and the backbiting among the virtues. Lo! how each of thy virtues is covetous of the highest place; it wanteth thy whole spirit to be its herald, it wanteth thy whole power, in wrath, hatred and love. Jealous is every virtue of the others, and a dreadful thing is jealousy. Even virtues may succumb by jealousy. He whom the flame of jealousy encompasseth, turneth at last, like the scorpion, the poisoned sting against himself. Ah! my brother, hast thou never seen a virtue backbite and stab itself?" (AZ, I: 5).

Nietzsche's idea is that values, all values, in so far as they are values and in so far as, for him, each of them represents existence equally with every other, confront man only with a single claim, namely that they should be accepted indiscriminately in life. This means that, for him, values know no differentiation in their basic ontological structure.

Hartmann accepts this as a fundamental presupposition of his own ethics. His view on how conflict develops breadth of mind sounds like a full understanding and thankful acknowledgement of the meaning of Heraclitic opposites in life - he could as well have been describing the human type of Nietzsche: "The ethos of many-sidedness presupposes mental breadth, space for
everything. This is of especial significance in respect to moral conflict. Conflict widens as well as deepens a man. Precisely in it and while standing in the midst of it a man becomes conscious of life's richness of content. From this point of view conflict is seen to be pre-eminently positive and valuable. To shrink from conflict, to avoid it, is moral short-sightedness. There must be room even for tragic conflict, from which there is no escape without guilt. Especially in it the ethos is widened. Whoever is incapable of conflict is incapable of tragedy" (E II, p.208).

Hartmann's fundamental statement about the significance of such an ontology of values, however, occurs in connection with its relation to the responsibility of man - the latter, as we have intimated, always being the ultimate in which Hartmann's appreciation of Nietzsche resolves itself.

According to Hartmann, ancient ethics considered moral conflict as "nothing but the antagonism between moral and immoral (or even only non-moral) impulses in man" (E I, p.300) and, if we are to believe him, this is also basically true of Christianity. Hartmann agrees that "this conflict is a part of the concrete moral problem. But," he submits, "it is not the whole" (E I, p.300). He says that there is in life "besides the conflict between moral and anti-moral impulses also a conflict between moral and moral. The structure of the former is not purely ethical in the inward sense; that of the latter touches the essence of ethical situations proper. Where in any situation value stands over against value, there no guiltless escape is possible. For a man cannot abstain from making a decision. He must choose either so or so, and even to do nothing is a positive decision. He may stay where he was, but he must choose at any cost. In the real world a man is continually confronted with the necessity of settling conflicts of value, of so deciding that he can be answerable for his obligation. It is his destiny not to be able to escape the obligation" (E II, p.76).

Responsibility is, therefore, founded on the ontological structure of values and, despite the fact that
Nietzsche denied the free will, we can have no doubt that Nietzsche's position here has been most valuable to Hartmann's insight. Hartmann goes so far as to maintain that if we do not allow for such an "equality of values", or rather, if this is not true of the ontological description of the world and life and it were possible for man to place himself without conflict above the demands of equality, the alternatives between which he has to choose freely would not, as regards his real conduct, continue to exist" (E II, p.116); that is, ethical life would be destroyed. Hartmann is fully aware of Nietzsche's denial of the freedom of the will, and sees the error of it which leaves Nietzsche without the means for rendering a satisfactory account of how the conflict of "backbiting virtues" is resolved in man in every concrete situation — for in every such situation man must make a choice and a decision, he must act in terms of one or one set of values rather than another; even Nietzsche could not and, indeed, did not want to escape this logic. However, even here Hartmann tries to overcome Nietzsche by first attempting to understand Nietzsche better than this philosopher could understand himself as a child of his time. There was no need for "a denial (as with Nietzsche) of the freedom of the will," he writes, "Only, in that case, by the strong will one must not understand one which in action ruthlessly executes its purpose, nor one that is inwardly passionate and stops at nothing, but a will in which the autonomous determinant rules over those which are heteronomous, with decisive energy" (E III, p.253). This, of course, is not yet Hartmann's position, but it is an attempt to clarify Nietzsche's position in a sympathetic manner which one only uses where one is conscious of one's indebtedness.

(b) Hartmann's Appreciation of Nietzsche's View of Man as Creator: We know that Nietzsche's ontology of man and ontology of values ultimately coincide. Values and the person are for him inseparable. Each has not its own being, as we have pointed out, but the two fall together and their falling together is a function, a Becoming. And this Becoming Nietzsche has also called Creation
and Evaluation. Man, for him, is a valuator in so far as he is a carrier of values by which he himself is carried. Nietzsche's noble man is a creative function in so far as he himself is continually regenerating his responsibility towards himself, and because his nobility, so to speak, guarantees that responsibility; no appeal is made to sources of value outside himself - according to Nietzsche such sources of value are in any case non-existent. It is because of this, we noted, that man "calleth himself "man", that is, the valuator. Valuating is creating... and without valuation the nut of existence would be hollow" (AZ, I:15).

Hartmann in his turn believes that ethics, as the discipline most concerned with values, "is the first and most positive philosophical interest of man" (E I, p.31). The ring of Nietzsche can escape no-one in the following remarkable passage from the Introduction to his Ethics; we can already clearly distinguish Nietzsche in the words of the first sentence where Hartmann speaks of ethics as man's "training in his world-vocation, the demand upon him to be a colleague of the demiurge in the creation of the world"; in the next paragraph we discern Superman, the goal that will never be attained, the purpose of eternal Becoming - we see man as the "rope stretched between the animal and the Superman": "the creation of the world," he writes, "is not completed so long as (man) has not fulfilled his creative function in it. But he procrastinates. For he is not ready, he is not standing on the summit of his humanity. Humanity must be first fulfilled in him"; next Hartmann confronts us with the idea of the creative responsibility of man towards himself of which Nietzsche makes so much: "The creative work which is incumbent upon (man) in the world terminates in his self-creation, in the fulfilment of his ethos"; and finally we encounter Dionysus and Apollo: "The ethos of man includes both the chaotic and the creative. In the former lie his possibilities but also his danger; in the latter he finds his vocation. To fulfil it is to be human" (E I, p.31).

There is every reason why Hartmann should
turn to the most solitary philosopher of the nineteenth century as the example par excellence for the future of ethics. Hartmann is concerned about the present condition of mankind. If we want to remedy man's spiritual retrogression it is not sufficient for us to rely on historical experience, says Hartmann. On the contrary, we may have to contradict the latter. The task in hand demands much more of us. For man now "the chief question is not how much or how little is in his power, but how fully or how little he grasps the task which looms before him" (E II, p.327). Hartmann believes that only the full creativeness of man is equal to the task; it must be creativity of the stature of Homer's who "created for the Greeks not only their Gods but their men, the Greeks themselves" (E II, p.327). For this, says Hartmann, even the poetic genius of Nietzsche could not suffice. Throughout his work, however, he retains a consciousness of the fact that Nietzsche was a most trustworthy gauge of the decline of the time. It is therefore little wonder that he felt himself drawn towards Nietzsche. Nietzsche's work, in every sense the completest mirror of the sickness of modern man, must have appealed to Hartmann as the most forceful expression of the necessity for the liberation of man's creativity which has been stunted by the mechanics of progress. In this connection we may quote Windelband's view of Nietzsche as "an individual of the highest culture, and of a thoroughly original stamp, who experiences all the tendencies of the time, and suffers from the same unsolved contradictions by which the time itself is out of joint. Hence the echo which his language has found; hence the danger of his influence, which does not heal the sickness of the age, but increases it" (Windelband, p.677). Even though Hartmann would not believe that Nietzsche increases the sickness of the time, he recognizes the fact that he does not heal it; for him, Nietzsche indicates a direction which is the only possible direction for the future, namely that of the most fundamental, even though most painful self-criticism, that of "bestirring" ourselves about our destiny - "Mankind must bestir itself about its destiny" (E II, p.327).
Hartmann considers Nietzsche's philosophy to be the most important attempt at this, and his appreciation for such a courageous thinker as Nietzsche, who is mistaken for a nihilist while his reaction was in the last resort one against the nihilism of the time (which is just the same as what Hartmann calls the nil admirari of modernity), can be fully understood when we read his own account of the sickness of modern man: "If there is such a thing as an awakening of the consciousness of value, it is our time that has need of it... The life of man today is not favourable to depth of insight. The quiet and contemplation are lacking, life is restless and hurried; there is competition, aimless and without reflection. Whoever stands still for a moment is overtaken by the next. And as the claims of the outer life chase one another, so likewise do the impressions, experiences and sensations. We are always looking out for what is newest, the last thing continually governs us and the thing before the last is forgotten ere it has been fairly seen, much less comprehended. We live from sensation to sensation. And our penetration becomes shallow, our sense of value is blunted, by snatching at the sensational. Not only is modern man restless and precipitate, dulled and blasé, but nothing inspires, touches, lays hold of his innermost being. Finally he has only an ironical and weary smile for everything. Yes, in the end he makes a virtue of his moral degradation. He elevates the nil admirari, his incapacity to feel wonder, amazement, enthusiasm and reverence, into a planned habit of life. Callously passing lightly over everything is a comfortable modus vivendi. And thus he is pleased with himself in a pose of superiority which hides his inner vacuity. This morbid condition is typical. It does not appear today for the first time in history. But wherever it has made its appearance, it has been a symptom of weakness and decadence, of inward failure and general pessimism" (E II, pp.44,45). These last words could have been the precise words of Zarathustra. "What is bent on being destroyed," Hartmann continues, "one should allow to go to ruin." (Nietzsche conjured his disciples: "And him whom ye do not teach to fly, teach, I pray you - to fall faster!" (AZ, III:56:20)). "Yet from every downfall,"
says Hartmann, "young healthy life shoots forth." And it is precisely for the same reason that Nietzsche desired hardness in man; he did not speak of destroyers who were to be hard, but of creators: "If your hardness will not glance and cut and chip to pieces, how can ye one day - create with me? For the creators are hard. And blessedness must it seem to you to press your hand upon millenniums as upon wax, - blessedness to write upon the will of millennia's as upon brass, - harder than brass, no braver than brass" (All., III:56:29).

Hartmann's dream for his time is therefore clearly that the creative forces of Dionysus-Apollo should be let loose with the fullest possible intensity in the affairs of men.

2. Historical Relativism: Hartmann's Indictment of Nietzsche

We have remarked that Hartmann's differences with Nietzsche begin at the very point of his greatest admiration for the thinker. "The knowledge of one's ignorance," writes Hartmann, "is always the beginning of knowledge. Even the knowledge of good and evil can take no other route than over this threshold of all knowledge alike. To it Nietzsche's work brought us" (E I, p.84). But in thus leading us again to innocence and "beyond good and evil", Nietzsche went to an extreme where he thought he would be farthest away from the condition of the ethical philosophies of the past - but which, instead, brought him dangerously close to them; in fact, had it not been for the tremendous positive significance of his insight that we have never yet known the meaning of good and bad, his position might even have been more dangerous than theirs for the future of ethics, since each one of them had its absolute, a single absolute, but Nietzsche, so Hartmann maintains, handed over all absolutes to man; he denied even mere ontological Sosein as a boundary for man as creator; Nietzsche made man an absolute creator and as such, thinks Hartmann, an arbitrary creator. This is what he means when he tells us that "Nietzsche was the first to see the rich plenitude of the
ethical cosmos, but with him it melted away in historical relativism" (E I, p.16).

While Hartmann is appreciative of Nietzsche's position in ontology, his differences with the philosopher are due to the latter's refusal to allow for ontological differentiation, that is his identification of man with existence. To Hartmann it seems that Nietzsche's position is not only that man is in "the whole" but also that "the whole" is in man, and man is in sole command of existence. In this way man becomes the arbiter over values - a "revaluator of all values".

Hartmann's doctrine of categories, that is of ontological differentiation, however, is opposed to such a view. The ideal self-existence of values and the real being of man pertain to the fundamentals of his philosophy as we saw when we discussed its basic features. We recall his argument that unless man can stand over against values, not as fictitious things of the imagination but as ontologically independent structures, he cannot choose, cannot live ethically - and existence for him would be meaningless since he cannot evaluate. Evaluation for Hartmann is evaluation in terms of values, but where man is the arbiter of values, it is evaluation in terms of the caprices of man's will. Hartmann cannot see how Nietzsche's philosophy can escape this accusation and consequently maintains that "the most fatal error on Nietzsche's part is to be traced...to his doctrine of the "revaluation of all values". In that lay hidden the idea of valuational relativism. If values permit of being revalued, they also are capable of being devalued, they permit of being manufactured and of being destroyed. They are the work of man, they are arbitrary, like thought and phantasies. If this be so, the meaning of the great discovery is again immediately annihilated at the first step; for then the path over the threshold does not lead into a new and unknown realm which is still to be opened; there is nothing further to discover and to find" (E I, p.85).

We must point out, however, that Hartmann is fully aware of the paradox in Nietzsche's view of man as the
"revaluator of all values". On the one hand Nietzsche speaks of a "hierarchy of values", while on the other hand he openly teaches perspectivism or what he calls "immaculate perception" ("unbefleken Erkenntnis"): "This do I call immaculate perception of all things: to want nothing else from them, but to be allowed to lie before them as a mirror with a hundred facets" (AZ, II:57). But this "lying before them as a mirror with a hundred facets" does not imply human passivism with regard to the events of the world. On the contrary, everything here depends on what Nietzsche calls the Will. Immaculate perception is, indeed, a matter of "willing with my whole will" - Nietzsche describes it as a condition of innocence and beauty: "Where is innocence? Where there is a will to procreation. And he who seeketh to create beyond himself, hath for me the purest will. Where is beauty? Where I must will with my whole Will; where I will love and perish, that an image may not remain merely an image" (AZ, II:37). This means that it is the task of man and man alone to form the world, that is to make it "beautiful", to make it as it ought to be. This is a task for men of a type in and for whom "an image (will) not remain merely an image", a type capable of "creating beyond themselves". Where do we find this type of man? Nietzsche points him out to us - in the case of Rome, for instance, history has proved the possibility of his existence on a grand scale and it is still being proved in individual cases - Napoleon was an example. These men are guided by instinct, the instinct of nobility, as Nietzsche calls it; or by a "primal consciousness" of values, to use a term of Hartmann's. Nietzsche, however, would not agree with Hartmann that this "primal consciousness" is also "the primal recognition of a commandment...a feeling of that which unconditionally ought to be, the expression of which is the commandment" (E I, p.177). Nietzsche recognises no commandments, no "musts"; the type of Nietzsche's noble individual never acts because of "musts", he acts only because he wills; his responsibility is such that he needs no "musts". He himself is the only "must". Whatever causality there may be for his behaviour, it is centred entirely within himself.

Here everything depends on the historical
personage, the "great man," the man who can say: "To redeem the past, and to transform every 'It was' into 'Thus would I have it'! that alone do I call redemption!" (EH, Thus Spake Zarathustra: 3). But this is not all. Here also Nietzsche remains true to himself as one who, in his own words, "contradicts himself in every word, in (whom) all oppositions are resolved into a new unity" (EH, Thus Spake Zarathustra: 6).

Nietzsche's thought "melted away into historical relativism" (E I, p. 16) in so far as at any particular time in history everything depends on his individual, the individual belonging to the class of "great men". Nietzsche's emphasis is not on the class as such, but on the individual, so that (as Scheler points out) it is true that for him history realizes its purpose in its "great" individuals; his philosophy was nevertheless far removed from an historical cult of "great men" ("Das Ziel der Geschichte des Menschen besteht - für Nietzsche - in den ,höchsten Exemplaren" des Menschen...obzwar Nietzsche weit entfernt war von allem billigen Historikerkult der ,grossen Männer" (FSW, pp. 508, 520). These individuals may behave very differently from one another for the simple reason that it will be different circumstances that the different individuals will have to deal with at different times, while in every time and in every set of circumstances the individual has nothing to obey or to conform with beyond his own volition. In Nietzsche's case, relativism is completely bound up with individualism. Yet Nietzsche could speak of a "hierarchy of values" ("Rangordnung der Werthe") (EH, "The Birth of Tragedy": 2), defining the class of individuals, that is "great men" in general, according to "a formula of the most extreme life-affirmation, born of abundance, of super-abundance - a yea-saying free of reserve, an affirmation of suffering itself, of guilt, of all that is questionable and strange in existence" (EH, "The Birth of Tragedy": 2) - in a word, they are all men of a Bestowing Virtue, in terms of which they are to transform the world.

Here Nietzsche gets beyond individualism and takes his stand on the side of a specific value, one which, as
we have shown, is minutely defined in his philosophy. This is no longer relativism as a rejection of Bestowing Virtue is a rejection of the very meaning of life for Nietzsche, or, as he likes to put it, of the earth. Even though Hartmann wrote of Nietzsche that he "was the first to see the rich plenitude of the ethical cosmos, but with him it melted away in historical relativism" (E I, p.16), the paradox of Nietzsche's position also compels Hartmann to admit that "in his (Nietzsche's) statement that there is such a thing as the falsification of values, he actually gives the lie to the relativism which he proclaims" (E I, p.228n).

The fact remains that Hartmann does not resolve Nietzsche's paradox in his own work. As we have pointed out more than once, it must be kept in mind that if Hartmann is challenged to show us his own ultimate criterion for value-judgement he fares no better than Nietzsche; he presents us with a "Wertgefühl", and an "intuition" which, undoubtedly, belong in the same category as the "instinct" of the Nietzschean man. If it is so that Hartmann believes that "valuational consciousness, whatever else it may be, is in the first instance a sense of value, a primal, immediate capacity to appreciate the valuable" (E I, p.86), Nietzsche will be found to do the same. Furthermore, if Nietzsche's individual is invested with the attribute of divinity in so far as his responsibility must be unbounded, it is no less so in the case of Hartmann's moral person. For both philosophers the will-to-guilt is a necessary attribute of manhood, and this is the supreme responsibility, it is responsibility without a limit. "It is not as if one wanted guilt as such," writes Hartmann, "one should be glad not to have it. But once we are laden with it, we cannot allow it to be taken away, without denying our selfhood. A guilty man has a right to carry his guilt. He must refuse deliverance from without" (E II, p.145) - he even speaks of the "notorious notion of the transference of guilt in the concept of 'sacrifice'" (E I, p.112), and Nietzsche maintained that "No deed can be annihilated, how could it be undone by the penalty! This, this is what is eternal in the "existence" of penalty, that existence also must be
eternally recurring deed and guilt!" (AZ, II:42).

With this common basis of the two philosophers with regard to man's responsibility towards himself, it is only Hartmann's ascription of an ideal self-existence to moral values which can cause us to hesitate to impute to his philosophy the same fault that he imputes to Nietzsche's. Yet we cannot doubt that Hartmann's notion of the self-existence of values has destroyed ethical solipsism and idealism alike; the dominance of the "I", whether singular or universal, in the sphere of ethics has been crushed, and Nietzsche broke the ground for this.

3. Specific Values

Turning to specific values, we find Hartmann commending Nietzsche for his pioneering work in the discussion of valuational evidences for which there has so far been no corresponding "historical ethos" (E II, p.311), so that they have remained unnamed and unrecognized: "The attempt to define them objectively is a bold venture... Here Nietzsche has been the pioneer in more than one direction" (E II, p.311). In this place also Hartmann warns us against a misunderstanding of Nietzsche's poetry and with sound insight tells us that "the sensationalism of the past "which fell greedily upon these exaggerations and cast suspicion upon the seriousness of the problem, must be entirely ignored. So far as it was right, what was prophetically seen under the pressure of passion must now be calmly surveyed" (E II, p.311).

Nietzsche's contribution towards the characterization of two values is especially appreciated - these are Love of the Remote ("Fernsternliebe") and Bestowing or Radiant Virtue ("schenkende Tugend").

Love of the Remote: Nietzsche remarked caustically that "Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it, certainly, but degenerated into Vice" (GB, 168). It is easy to see how a degenerate Christendom, boasting a doctrine of love while being more interested in commercialism, partisan politics and
sensationalism, should lead a sensitive mind to such a thought; the general evidence about "Christian love" at Nietzsche's disposal could not give him the impression of magnanimity; the logical next step was to equate Christian love with the death of Platonic Eros as the spirit of magnanimity, the passionate procreative love of distant times and men, a seeing beyond the present which appreciate the present as a responsibility for the future - in Hartmann's words: "The trend of its (Eros') intention has exchanged the breadth of simultaneity for the depth of succession" (E II, p.315).

We feel that the spiritual pregnancy and bringing to birth of Plato's Eros is the germ-idea in Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, the eternal return to life of a man through his ideas. Here man's tremendous responsibility towards life is evident and his love becomes defined as love even of that which is furthest away from him and which he does not even know - Love of the Remote, "Fernstenliebe". Hartmann describes it as "a love which knows no return of love, which radiates only, gives only, devotes, overcomes, sacrifices, which lives in the high yearning that cannot be fulfilled for the one who loves, but which knows that there is always a future and that indifference to it is a sin. Such love is "Fernstenliebe" (Love of the Remotest). This is the name Nietzsche gave to the newly discerned virtue, to contrast it with "Nächstenliebe" (Love of the Nearest)" (E II, pp.317,318).

Hartmann rightly maintains that we can now ignore Nietzsche's rejection of Neighbour-Love. He omits to say, however, that the life of Brotherly Love as taught by Jesus entails a projection of man's spirit into the future as much as Love of the Remote, and that it is not at all a social idea - if it has been watered down to the spiritual parochialism of a social idea, then it is not the fault of its author. Nevertheless Hartmann points out that if, by definition, Neighbour-Love means love first and foremost of the nearest, "the whole value is not that of the object intended. On the contrary, all the moral value lies in the intention" (E II, p.331). This is what Nietzsche could or would not see and it was his error; but we can now appreciate that "in
the two kinds of love the value of the intention itself is practically the same" (E II, p.331).

Here again, therefore, we find Hartmann easily forgiving Nietzsche's exaggerations, for he understands that while the truth of that which Nietzsche found it necessary to lie about was not therefore lost to us, new dimensions never known to us before were thus gained through the philosopher.

Radiant Virtue: Nietzsche was also the first to give a name to what he himself called the "unnamable" virtue - Radiant Virtue. We have already discussed it at length and it only remains to point out that Hartmann narrows the radius of Radiant Virtue within the realm of all values, and this is understandable - while for Nietzsche it was the hallmark par excellence of nobility, it is merely one value among values for Hartmann.

We recall that, for Nietzsche, life is in no way teleologically ordained, that for him cause and end fall together in the creative function of man the greatness of which lies in the fact that in it there is no consciousness of or scheming for a purpose beyond itself, so that it is entirely natural to man; we are forcibly reminded of this when Hartmann writes of Radiant Virtue that "All teleology here finds its limit" (E II, p.339), and in the light of Hartmann's delineation of the value we can once again see just why Nietzsche found it possible to equate the ethos of Radiant Virtue with the noble man - Hartmann speaks of value in Nietzschean terms as a "fruitfulness, but only of a kind that is not willed, not aimed at. Just as happiness follows virtue as its inevitable result but is disturbed if striven for, so fruitfulness, unaimed at, follows inevitably from the conduct of the dispenser of spiritual values; but if striven for, it violates the meaning of the gift... Unplanned prodigality is the true form in which spiritual values are propagated. The superabundance, which arises naturally from their character, makes prodigality the adequate form of reproduction... (this) uselessness is not worthlessness, but the absence of an end in view; it is not only not "adaptation to an end without an end," but also not "purposive activity without
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a purpose." Rather do end and means return upon each other; the means is the final end. All teleology here finds its limit" (E II, pp.338,339).

Hartmann's view of the relation of Radiant Virtue to Love of the Remote also illustrates Nietzsche's view of the supra-moral life of Becoming. In the light of Love of the Remote, the ideal, for Nietzsche, was Superman and that all men shall ultimately become Superman, "a new people"; and yet, we saw, the thought of an ultimate actualization of the ideal could not be entertained; it was incumbent on Nietzsche to steer clear of the accusation of absolutism. Yet even merely for the ideal to survive, there must always be some man or a few men as carriers of the ideal, whether living in the flesh or in their work; and they are witnesses to the worth of the ideal, in themselves they exemplify it - it is their task to live by Radiant Virtue. The whole of this view and desire of Nietzsche is contained in Hartmann's judgement that "here even love of the remotest finds a special vindication. Its yearning and its hope have before them a portion of fulfilment. What one can otherwise behold only in vision as an ideal, can be seen here in flesh and blood. Radiant Virtue is a power of the ethos, it instils the Ideal into the race; and where it occurs, it is as though the ideal man were already a reality. Certainly there is here only a fragment, but for all that a real one. Here the real anticipates the Ideal, a living proof that the Ideal is possible in the world of actuality" (E II, pp.339,340).

Power and Life: When Hartmann discusses Power as a value, he is thinking of it as the ability which man has of controlling situations, "to guide them, to mould them to one's own desire" (E II, p.159); as such it is a matter of the "freedom and efficacy of will" (E II, p.160). He distinguishes "outward power" (the power man possesses as a result of the accumulation of goods-values) from "inner power" (the power of the spirit) and commends Nietzsche for having placed the will to power above the will to life. Nietzsche himself, of course, considered that "he certainly did not hit the
true who shot at it the formula: "Will to existence": that will doth not exist! For what is not, cannot will; that, however, which is in existence - how could it still strive for existence! Only where there is life, is there also will: not, however, Will to Life, but - so teach I thee - Will to Power!" (AZ, II:34).

What Nietzsche actually did was to identify the will to life and the will to power and this is another reason why his ontology could serve Hartmann only as a point of departure, for Hartmann makes a distinction between the will to life and the will to power which corresponds to an ontological differentiation - Hartmann speaks of life as the "elementary value" which forms "the ontological basis of the subject, and thereby indirectly also of the moral being and value-carrier, the person" (E II, p.131).

**Brotherly Love:** The above fact may help to explain the differing opinions of the two philosophers on the value of Brotherly Love. As soon as persons stand out in life, as soon as they recognizably raise themselves above their ontological basis, the value of Brotherly Love comes into play since, according to Hartmann, Brotherly Love "approves another person as such" and "is the living sense of another's worth" (E II, p.273). This, he says, is the main issue which Nietzsche ignores - Nietzsche considered Brotherly Love as a disvalue or anti-value but "the argument is faulty: for it ignores the main issue. The essence of Neighbour-Love is not pity at all nor suffering "(E II, p.273). Hartmann is fully justified in believing that Nietzsche's error is related to his psychology of resentment, his opposition to spiritual miserliness and mere humanism which he found so abundantly evident in what he called 'Christo-European morals' - Hartmann, however, wants us to understand that "spurious love, like a weed, springs up everywhere, side by side with real love. Outwardly they are indistinguishable. The deceptive mimicry of the spurious extends even to the highest and finest flowers of the ethos. Only an unpervated sense of value, which, as it were, listening, can detect the emotional tone itself, is able to distinguish the one from the other" (E II, p.272).
But even here Nietzsche's error is informative and helps us; in the first place, so Hartmann seems to think, it has forced us to re-assess the meaning of Brotherly Love, and in the second place to realize the necessity of the synthesis of Brotherly Love and Love of the Remote. He argues that one of the great errors of ethicists is that they tend to throw overboard all values which appear to them to be "lower" values as soon as they discern what they believe to be a "higher" value, without perhaps being aware of the fact that by so doing they are probably destroying the very roots from which the "higher" one has grown. A synthetic view of values is therefore necessary to ethical enquiry: "Many are the errors and aberrations which miss this synthesis," writes Hartmann. "The majority of the current moralities and philosophical theories have not escaped them. The radical one-sidedness of the preferential trend joins with every one-sidedness that shows itself in the discerned material. The new morality, which comes forward with the claim that it is a higher morality, only too easily throws away the "lower" in the gross—an error which will avenge itself, even if the new really be higher. It does not see that it is demolishing its own foundation (E II, pp.462,463). He finds that this has also been Nietzsche's mistake in the latter's interpretation of Christian ethics. Nietzsche was guilty of "a fanaticism of love for the far distant" (E II, p.423) and cut away Brotherly Love from Love of the Remote whereas, in fact, Brotherly Love is the only foundation from which Love of the Remote can spring.

Nietzsche has weighed the anchors, he has let loose values—he did not sink any, although he thought so. It is this, Hartmann feels, for which we must be thankful to him, but we must get beyond him since he did not and could not yet approach the realm of values in the light of the spirit of synthesis: "Thus it befell Nietzsche in regard to Christian morality. He rightly saw that love of the far distant is the higher moral value. Yet he was at the same time wrong; for brotherly love is the "stronger" value. The mistake of Christianity is the belief that the fulfilment of the moral life depends upon brotherly love alone. Nietzsche's
mistake is to suppose that love of the far distant is possible without a basis in brotherly love, that its aims are in themselves sufficient. Only in their synthesis is to be found the reciprocal content of both ideals. But to discern the synthesis is a task of far greater magnitude than to attach oneself to the one side and despise the other" (E II, p.463).

It must be clear that the questions arising in connection with this view of synthesis in the field of ethics will not be easily answered. Can a standard of judgement, a criterion for distinguishing between "values" and "disvalues" be avoided here? We believe that Nietzsche might have been more consistent and logical than Hartmann in this regard - in any case he saw that in the light of his premisses he could not make much of such a criterion. Hartmann here speaks of the "Wertgefühl"; however, as we have already suggested, we can place a legitimate question mark behind the "Wertgefühl": Why the "Wertgefühl", in terms of what does it function, in terms of what does it effect its distinctions? It is not sufficient to say that "it is just so", that it just functions as such, for then we must believe that its being is simply blind; and if we find it presumptuous to put forward an explanation of its why, we must say so and suspend our opinion while we nevertheless basically maintain that there must be some explanation. Otherwise we are in actual fact distinguishing between good and bad without being bold enough to face and involve ourselves in the ultimate problematics of such a distinction. To this extent Hartmann and Nietzsche are both at fault. We will briefly consider the meaning of this for the future of ethics in our Conclusion.

Nietzsche can then be classed with those thinkers whose philosophies, as Hartmann told us, give evidence of the basic problematic quality of the world ("die grossen unabweisbaren Problemgehalte") as opposed to a mere construction of speculative systems of thought ("Systembaumeisterei"). Nietzsche
was not conscious of the dangers which lay beyond the barriers he has broken, but Hartmann attributes to him the reopening of the way for the great art of aporetics ("Die Kunst des Aporetos, Probleme zu diskutieren, ohne sie um jeden Preis lösen zu wollen" (ME, p.8)) and considers that it would be wrong for us to blame the thinker in an ultimate sense. His error was an inevitable factor in his profundity.

Here Hartmann's expression of appreciation reaches an almost poetical peak. In Nietzsche's work, he tells us, "for the first time, with full consciousness, "beyond" and independently of everything which in the course of the ages had been accepted as such, the question was raised concerning the content of good and evil. This question is a hazardous undertaking, for it touches that which has been consecrated. And the hazardous undertaking avenged itself upon the daring doer. But his mistakes were quite natural ones... Perhaps no-one is ever wholly without blame for the misfortune of being misunderstood; but when the fault has been atoned for by the ill fate of being misunderstood and has become an historical fact, it falls back upon the one who misinterprets it... Seldom does a discoverer know fully what he has discovered. Nietzsche knew it as little as did Columbus. The successors inherit the field; to them falls the task of acquiring what they have inherited, in order to possess it" (E I, pp.84,85).

This is Hartmann's apology for Nietzsche, but it is also the testimony of his indebtedness to the philosopher.
CONCLUSION

HARTMANN, NIETZSCHE AND THE FUTURE OF ETHICS

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

The problem of the Ideal; Hartmann, Nietzsche and religion; Hartmann's "Ideal Personality", from which, however, all ground is cut away in his philosophy; there can be no sanction for the Ideal outside religion; Hartmann's fear of religion is responsible for his erroneous view of Christianity; we need no longer fear theology; Hartmann and Nietzsche, paradoxically, bring us close to true religion; the problem of all future ethics.
Although Hartmann believes that "it would be wrong to contest the virtue of a living man, merely because the axiological counterpoise was lacking in him" (E II, p.426), he recognises the fact that "in the strict and absolute sense only the just man can be truly loving, only the proud truly humble, only the pure truly participant in the fulness of life" (E II, p.426). He points this out with reference to the Stoic idea that the virtuous man possesses all virtues and not only some, that he would lack every virtue if he lacked one, since virtuosity is a whole.

Nietzsche also, despite his rejection of Stoic nihilism - its denial of the world - shares with it this idea of the "unity of virtue". Superman would be a "complete" man, a definition of his ethos would correspond to the tautology that all values belong to him because every value belongs to him.

Hartmann is right in saying that this is an ideal for man, but that practice teaches us something different. It is common knowledge that "the actual conduct of man... is always only an approximation to the idea" (E II, p.426). And that actuality does not cancel the necessity for an ideal, is something Plato already told us.

In order to make this actuality speak for itself, Hartmann wanted his central task to be an analysis of individual values, but he admits that "the universal synthesis of values is contained in the idea of a table of values" (E II, p.426) - and little wonder: the plurality of values, "the rich manifold of the ethical cosmos" which Hartmann discerns "beyond good and evil", fixes the attention on the astonishing fulness of the
valuational life and inevitably raises the question as to the unity of the manifold.

Hartmann does not once deny the legitimacy of the question why an attempt to define an ideal is necessarily involved in a description of "reality" or "actuality"; he finds for instance that actual love is entirely dependent upon "the moving principle (which) is the ethical ideal, the Idea of man as he ought to be. This too is a Platonic doctrine, the Eros looks to the Idea and is a passion for it" (E II, p.323).

While Nietzsche's equivalent of what man "ought to be" is Superman, Hartmann merely calls it the "Ideal", although his definition is perhaps better outlined: "All Eros in one way or other looks to the Ideal," he tells us; all materialistic and egotistic ideals can be left out of consideration - "in mere existence for itself," he says, 

"(personality) cannot become actualized. For self-consciousness is contrary to its nature, which is not valuational but moral. Being wholly and solely. It necessarily seeks someone "for" whom it could be... Since empirical personality never strictly corresponds to its own ideal value, but love looks exclusively to the latter, it inheres in the essence of personal love to pierce through the empirical person to his ideal value" (E II, pp.368, 369).

We have already observed that Nietzsche was truer to his premises here than Hartmann to his, that he realized that in terms of them he could not make too much of the Ideal. As we have seen, in Nietzsche's "noble man" the Ideal even becomes merged with actuality. Hartmann, however, though infinitely more cautious than Nietzsche in other things, openly takes his stand on the Ideal.

This constitutes a basic - though perhaps subtle - difference between the two philosophers, a difference of which Hartmann himself might not have been aware. We have demonstrated conclusively that Nietzsche does not distinguish between ideality and reality - for him ideality and reality fall
together in actuality. Indeed, Nietzsche's "higher men" play a greater role in his philosophy than Superman - more often than Superman it is the actual (historical) Graeco-Roman type of life, and an actual Napoleon, that constitute his ideal. It is in this sense that Nietzsche maintains that "the concept 'God' was invented as the counter-concept to life - everything harmful, poisonous, slanderous, and all deadly hostility to life, all bound together in one horrible unit" (EH, Why I Am A Fatality:8). Hartmann, however, is a realist who distinguishes between ideality and reality, and makes moral values independent of man exactly in so far as they are ideal structures. Now Hartmann declares that as far as the Ideal is concerned, it is "only in (man) and nowhere else in the world (that it) finds something real that approximates to its own value" (E II, p.369). Yet he cannot deny that for him the Ideal is in fact the ultimate ethical authority; without it there can be no moral valuation and therefore no moral life. Hartmann explains that love for individual persons is possible only because the Ideal is partially exemplified in the individual; in the same passage from which we have just quoted, Hartmann remarks that love's "commitment merges into the ideal of personality; it lets this stand for the empirical individual, accepting him as equivalent to his highest possibilities, as raised to a power above his actual being. It loves in him what inheres in his essential tendency, the axiological idiosyncracy of his Ideal, yet not as an Ideal, but as a trend towards actuality, just as if it were already actualized in him" (E II, p.369). (We may note here that Nietzsche could never say "as if" as Hartmann does here - for Nietzsche it is not "as if" it were already actualized in him, but it is already actualized in him.) - "In this way," continues Hartmann, "looking back from the Ideal upon its imperfect carrier, it loves the empirical individual in his characteristic peculiarity. For it the man, as he is, in the trend of his ethical preference, is accepted as a guarantor of a higher moral Being... Personal love lives by faith in this highest that is within the loved one,
which despite its inadequacy love senses prophetically. Such love is ethical divination in the pre-eminent sense of the word" (E II, pp.369,370).

While we can tolerate Superman in Nietzsche's philosophy (although Nietzsche never defines Superman beyond saying that it is he the "higher man" should teach) simply because Nietzsche does not make too much of Superman as an Ideal, we seriously question Hartmann's Ideal, however, since Hartmann stakes everything on it: "All Eros in one way or the other looks to the Ideal" (E II, p.368).

Hartmann does not want to say so, but this Ideal which "love senses prophetically" is the sanction behind the "Wertgefühl" and "intuition" in his philosophy. It is a standard, an absolute standard. However, it is itself without sanction. Is it then a creation of man's mind, a fiction, a thing of the imagination? Hartmann's position in ontology precludes this possibility. The Ideal represents the complete fullness of the being of values, but values, as we know, have an ideal self-existence. This means that ideal self-existence should also be predicable of the unity of values. Ideal self-existence, however, is not existence in and through man. Consequently Hartmann's view that it is only in man that the Ideal finds a measure of existential expression, is untenable within the framework of his ontology.

It is this error of Hartmann which, we believe, cuts away all ground from the Ideal in his philosophy.

It is possible that Hartmann saw that if the Ideal were itself to be given a sanction, it could not possibly be an ethical sanction according to his definition of morality as an exclusively human affair. On the one hand the Ideal could not be a Nietzschean Superman, but on the other hand it could not be allowed to have an existential status independent of man (like that of the values whose unity it in any case is!) since, as such, it would necessarily have to be a person - Hartmann has in any case told us that it is only in a person (man as moral being) "and
nowhere else in the world" that the Ideal is to a certain extent existentially expressed; but here the person had to be such that in its being all values are drawn together, with none lacking, so that it completes in itself the unity and synthesis of values; here the person could not be an "empirical personality (which) never strictly corresponds to its own ideal value" but, on the contrary, a personality which always and in every instance strictly corresponds to its own being. This, however, would bring Hartmann to the very verge of religion. But it was precisely the step into religion that he wanted to avoid.

Despite the criticisms of both Nietzsche and Hartmann, these thinkers are obviously under pressure from Kant's work and they want to avoid the imputation of absolutism at all costs. Kant, however, did not kill metaphysics and it was not his intention to do so. He has only dealt the death-blow to clever but empty dialectics. Least of all did he do away with religion - he has only maimed the reputation of a certain type of theology for always.

Basically it is perhaps the same attitude towards religion which underlies Hartmann's entirely erroneous judgement that "the mistake of Christianity is the belief that the fulfilment of the moral life depends upon brotherly love alone" (E II, p.463), for in this connection the commandment is not merely "love thy neighbour" but, according to Mark 12:30,31: "Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment. And the second is like, namely this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." In true Christianity, love of God and love of neighbour fall together; neighbour-love alone need not be a matter of Christianity at all. Christendom with its elaborate social codes - especially since the rise of nationalism with its emphatic enthusiasm for everything indigenous - could, however, well give the unwary the impression that Christianity is fundamentally a matter of concern for that which is nearest to us.

It seems very important to us to emphasize
the fact that Hartmann missed the point about love of God in Christianity; he might have realized that whatever existential status was ascribed to the Ideal, had to be that of a person; that values could not be drawn together or synthesized into a completely co-ordinate whole, and that there could be no "unity of virtue" outside the person - outside the person there could only be the manifold of values, the plurality of values each one of which exists in its individuality. Only a valuational consciousness could relate them one to another, and synthetically take them up into itself - necessarily into itself since it is obvious that the synthesis cannot be effected by the person and left outside him, for he would then be left an empty shell; but the perception of values is precisely his perception and works for his spiritual enrichment. Man, however, has not the capacity to effect the complete synthesis of values - to this extent Hartmann satisfies us. But then, we must repeat, if it can really be maintained that morality is man's affair and his alone, Hartmann had to keep quiet about the Ideal in the form in which it is contained in his philosophy - that is, as precisely this completely coherent unity of values. It is really useless for Hartmann to say that to sense such an Ideal is "not of course divination of a universal human ideal, but of the Ideal of a particular individual. It sees the perfect in imperfection, infinitude in the finite" (E II, p.370). On Hartmann's own premises, in the light of his ontological description of valuational being, it cannot be "the Ideal of a particular individual". Since for him all moral values are what they are, never change and can never be changed, the synthesis which they all share can at all times only be one and the same; and we cannot sense "the perfect in imperfection" if our consciousness of the perfect, however deficient it may be, does not precede our perception of the imperfect.

Hartmann, however, fighting shy of God and religion, and understandably so, would not and could not yet take the only logical step to save his view of the Ideal from being superfluous and unwarranted in the light of his presuppositions - the step into religion which need no longer be dangerous and a snare
to reason and a thinker's integrity.

We have shown how Nietzsche throws religion overboard altogether and also how Hartmann separates the domains of ethics and religion. We believe, however, that precisely through their criticism they help to bring us close to biblical Christianity again. Nietzsche has opened our eyes to ages of villainy parading under the banner of love and virtue, the impressive organizations of which, however, have paralysed us into submissiveness and servility before them and their office-bearers. Nietzsche's ridicule of clergy and kings is fully justified, and although it may not at all have been his conscious intention, he rendered an invaluable service to all men who are anxious for a return to true religion, religion of the stamp of a Kierkegaard's, or the martyrs', an active religion proved by one's life. One must never forget Nietzsche's descent, his relation to Protestantism. He was perhaps as little of a critic from "outside" as Kierkegaard. We do not want to speculate about this, however, but what is certain is that it is only the most biased and stunted spirits whose attitude towards religion could remain the same as before, after Nietzsche's devastating critique. The fact that organized religion has generally remained unduly sceptic towards Nietzsche and censured him as an enemy, is merely further evidence of what Hartmann has called the "morbid condition" of the time.

Here, however, Nietzsche and Hartmann only indicate a direction and, though Nietzsche's sacrifice was fundamental enough, neither of them has actually walked the path of unconditional risk to the extent that Kierkegaard has done this. It would be a most ungrateful gesture on our part, however, to leave Hartmann's error here unpardoned. He has shown us the way in his appreciation of Nietzsche. There can be little doubt that, if rightly understood, his error and its history, that is the whole case of Hartmann-Nietzsche, is to our advantage. It is precisely Hartmann's error which shows us (but then on a clear background brought about by Hartmann's calm and Nietzsche's lightning) that ultimately he cannot avoid religion; nor can anyone else, including Nietzsche.
It is, of course, possible for us to do what Nietzsche did, that is to take our models from concrete history, to rely for them only on human evidence, but Hartmann himself has pointed out that as regards man's future and destiny, historical experience can never suffice as a guide. It is true that he writes: "That anything whatsoever in heaven or on earth, even though it be God himself, should take precedence over Man, would be ethically perverted; it would not be moral" (E III, p.264). We know, however, that this is simply not true; that despite this Protagorean boast there are in actual fact many situations in life in which precedence over man is taken in one way or the other; in fact, and this is really Hartmann's own view, since the individual man's responsibility is always primarily directed beyond himself, his moral stature is in the last resort entirely dependent on the continual precedence which others take over him; and as for Hartmann, the Ideal in any case clearly takes precedence over man - we love a man, he said, because we look beyond him to the Ideal.

Our time also is bringing home to us, and forcibly, that man is not the measure of all things.

Hartmann and Nietzsche restored the meaning of responsibility for us; and it is precisely for this reason that we believe them to have brought us closer to the exacting simplicity, rationality and pathos of Christianity than they could ever suspect. Any ethics which lightly turns away from religion after them, will not have understood their meaning, will not have understood them better than they could understand themselves. "The older philosophic ethics," writes Hartmann, "related itself most elaborately to religion" but, he says, "the ages of such dependence have passed away" (E I, p.110). However, mythology, mere symbolism and moral relativism have been overcome in the face of Christendom by Christianity itself, and we suggest that any future ethics which wants to get beyond the insight of Hartmann and Nietzsche may find its fundamental problem to be that of its relation to religion. The position has been precipitated by Hartmann's own
ontology which describes the ideal self-existence of moral values beyond which the problem as to their unity becomes manifest. In handling his notion of the Ideal, Hartmann showed an unwillingness to deal with the problem but at the same time bequeathed it as a problem to any future ethics.
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