THE PLURAL SOCIETY AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

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SYNOPSIS

Pluralism, as a sociological perspective to study multi-ethnic and multi-racial societies, is a popular and well-known approach. It is also an approach which has been repeatedly and effectively criticized.

This study focuses upon pluralism and the problem of order in society. Hereby, a new pluralist perspective is developed which avoids the pitfalls of the traditional approach, on the one hand, and yet retains the valid emphasis on pluralism, on the other.

By applying this new perspective, it is possible to analyze the changing relationships between the cultural (and racial) characteristics in the society, and its structural characteristics. In this way, it is hoped, more may be learnt about the nature of a plural society and about the ways it can change.
Owing to a series of events which were neither of my nor their making, I have had three supervisors for this study. I would like to thank all three for their help. I would like, first, to thank Dr Jan Loubser for the deep concern he showed for the nature of my study: a plural society. Second, I would like to thank Dr Van Zyl Slabbert for the direction he has consistently given me in my studies. Third, to Dr Paul Hare, my gratitude for the unenviable task of having to supervise a study during its last stages.

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to develop a new pluralist theoretical perspective. This perspective can be used to analyze, sociologically, plural societies and, more generally, those societies which contain plural features. The central underlying theme of this theoretical perspective is the concept of social order in society. This concept, then, will be used to unify a number of divergent approaches to plural societies. Social order in society, in fact, has been a central (though generally implicit) concern of pluralists and other theorists alike. The new theoretical perspective developed in this study, begins with this common central concern.

The terms, 'plural society' and 'pluralism' are currently used by a large and growing group of social scientists. The conceptions these terms represent, however, as used by this group, vary in meaning, refinement and complexity.

In particular, the term 'pluralism' has been and is still being used in two quite independent and divergent senses: The first, which is commonly known as political pluralism, derives from the works of de Tocqueville and English pluralist philosophers. Today, in this sense, pluralism is used by such political scientists as Kornhauser and Dahl ¹. The second sense derives from the works of J.S. Furnivall ² and is today used by those pluralists about whose work this study will be concerned.

For the time being, then, in order to avoid any ambiguity about these two quite independent traditions allied with pluralism, the term 'plural society' will be employed. Any social scientist who employs this term (or the allied term, pluralism) and who links his conception of it to the works of Furnivall, will be called, here, quite simply, a pluralist.

2) Furnivall was the first person to use the term, 'plural society'. An extended discussion of his approach is presented in chapter Three.
Any review of the recent literature produced by this (latter) group of pluralists would undoubtedly show a wide difference of opinion about both the exact definitions of pluralism and the plural society, and their utility as analytic tools. The situation today seems identical to that in 1961 when R.T. Smith, a leading critic of the pluralist approach, could write: 'The term 'pluralism' is rapidly becoming one of those words, like 'institution', that everybody understands in a general sort of way but few people would care to define precisely; 3) In fact, M.G. Smith, a leading pluralist, could write in 1969: '...there does not now exist any agreed or systematic body of concepts and analytic propositions which could pass muster as a theory of pluralism or of the plural society.' 4)

Consequently, the development of a new pluralist perspective requires, in the first place, an identification of those ideas and concerns which pluralists share. The very first, obviously, is that certain societies can be grouped together under the label, plural and that all societies in this group manifest features which are sociologically relevant. Furnivall was the first person to do this and present-day pluralists' link with him, therefore, stems basically from this labelling of certain societies as plural.

The basic underlying idea of this label can be found in the very term, 'plural society' itself. In fact, a 'society', at the very least, must refer to a relatively stable and persisting network of social bonds between its members. What types of relationships these bonds represents, vary from society to society. In a plural society, this same principle of a relatively stable and persisting network of social bonds between members, must hold within each separate 'plural' population group of the society. The critical question which is posed by pluralists, is: Under what conditions will the networks of social bonds within the plural units contribute towards

4) 'Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism', M.G. Smith, p. 415.
the persistence of the more comprehensive societal network; under what conditions will they change this societal network; and in what manner will they change it?

As J.C. Mitchell puts it:

The term 'plural society' itself is a contradiction since the idea of 'society' in terms of the usual sociological definition implies 'unity' - the antithesis of plurality. The problem of plural societies, then, lies in this contradiction - in what way can these societies be both 'plural' and 'societies' - indeed, if they are 'plural' can they be 'societies'? 5)

There are other concerns shared by pluralists for which a new pluralist perspective must account. In particular, attention needs to be paid to the nature of the plural units in a plural society; and to theoretical differences in approach which divide certain pluralists from other similar sociological theories.

"There are many societies that do not readily conform to expectations derived from much of contemporary sociological theory. They are societies possessed of a minimum of common values. They appear to be maintained more by coercion than by consensus. They are divided by sharp and persistent cleavages, which threaten their dissolution... The terms (pluralism and the plural society) refer to (such) societies with sharp cleavages between different population groups brought together within the same political unit...." 6)

"..... those that accept a pluralist position are not merely contending that societies or social situations are often characterized by racial and ethnic divisions but that these divisions are important in understanding other behavioural patterns. Clearly there are few who would be prepared to dispute that assertion and the critical point comes when it is suggested that it is this so-called plural structure which, under some circumstances, is the major determining factor in social organization...." 7)

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6) *Pluralism in Africa*, L. Kuper & M.G. Smith (eds.), p. 3.
A plural society, then, contains 'racial and ethnic' groups and is characterized by 'a minimum of common values' and by 'sharp cleavages between (these) different population groups brought together within the same political unit'. These societies, moreover, 'do not readily conform to expectations derived from much of contemporary sociological theory' because the 'plural structure (of such societies) . . . under some circumstances, is the major determining factor in social organization'.

It seems reasonable to conclude this from the two above statements since both are taken from general critical reviews of the plural society conception. The first statement was written by the editors in the introduction to one major recent publication issued by pluralists: *Pluralism in Africa*. The second was written by the editor in the introduction to a special issue of the journal, *Race* which attempted to evaluate their approach. 8)

In sum, then, a new pluralist perspective must pay attention to the following concerns which pluralists share: Pluralists agree that their basic unit of analysis is a society. This society, which they label as plural, is linked with Furnivall's conception of a plural society. In general, this society which contains plural units (differentiated in terms of ethnicity and race), is characterized by a minimum of common values and sharp, persisting cleavages between these plural groups. For this reason, classical and contemporary theories of order and change in society do not adequately explain order and change in plural societies (because they do not cover the 'plural' features of these societies adequately).

Finally, and of most import to this study, a last common concern 9) has been identified. Pluralists agree that the problem of social order in plural societies is basic to their approach. How, in fact, can a society with a plural structure, persist over time?

8) Three major assessments of the plural society approach have been made. Apart from the two mentioned, the following is also important: Volume 83 of *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1960, V. Rubin (ed.)

9) A further common concern (though not directly relevant here) is the conviction that plural societies are unjust social arrangements. The author shares this conviction.
It is this last concern which has been chosen as the underlying theme of the new theoretical perspective. This theme, moreover, is holistic in that its main focus is upon societies, and it is structural in that the problem of order is conceptualized in terms of relatively permanent networks of social bonds (structures) in a society.

The first step in the development of a new theoretical perspective of pluralism, therefore, will be to discuss what is meant by social order in society within an holistic and structural framework. The second step will be to incorporate the idea of a plural society into this framework and to show what implications this has for conceptions of social order in a society. The third step will be to analyze the works of major pluralists from this perspective of social order in plural societies.

Finally, the new theoretical perspective of social order in plural societies will be developed. This development will be based upon the discussion of social order in society and upon the works of the major pluralists which will have been discussed. In addition, this perspective will be within an holistic and structural framework.

In Chapter One, social order in society will be discussed in terms of the two dominant sociological traditions which analyze it holistically and structurally: normative functionalism and coercion theory.

In Chapter Two, the idea of a plural society will be introduced and incorporated into the framework within which social order in society was analyzed. This will be done in three steps. First, some theoretical issues dividing certain pluralists from normative functionalists; and dividing certain pluralists from Marxists, will be identified. Second, some theoretical issues which are accepted as important by pluralists, normative functionalists and coercion theorists alike, will be identified. Third, a preliminary conceptual scheme for the study of social order in
plural societies will be formulated.

In Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six, this preliminary conceptual scheme will be used to analyze the works of four major pluralists: J.S. Furnivall, M.G. Smith, Leo Kuper and Pierre van den Berghe. These four social scientists are, in the opinion of this author, the best-known and most representative pluralists. They have used a definite conception of pluralism consistently in their works, over the years.

In Chapter Seven, the works of a number of other pluralists will be analyzed in the same way.

In Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter of this study, the new theoretical perspective will be developed. This perspective will develop out of the preliminary conceptual scheme discussed in Chapter Two. It will be based upon the preceding five substantive chapters. This theoretical perspective will be discussed in three steps. The first step focuses upon the origin of a plural society. The second upon the conditions under which order in such a society can be maintained. The third step will focus upon the forces of change and possible directions of change in plural societies.
CHAPTER ONE
SOCIAL ORDER: CONSENSUS AND COERCION VIEWS

In the introduction it was argued that the central perspective of the plural society approach in sociology is the problem of social order in a plural society. This perspective, moreover, is defined within an holistic and structural framework. In other words, pluralists discuss the problem of order in societies (the main unit of analysis) and their level of analysis remains, for the most part, that of groups (usually of racial, cultural or ethnic nature) rather than individuals. Their framework, consequently, may be called holistic. In addition, pluralists are chiefly interested in these groups in terms of their persisting patterns of behaviour (especially as resulting from common institutions within themselves) rather than in the uninstitutionalized aspects of their behaviour. For this reason, their framework may be called structural.

The aim of this chapter, then, is to introduce the problem of social order within a framework which is both holistic and structural. It is generally accepted that there are two dominant approaches in sociology today which theorize about social order in society within such a framework. These are, first, the consensus approach (otherwise known as normative functionalism) and, second, the coercion approach (known, in a more specific sense, as Marxism).

This chapter, therefore, will state the main arguments relevant to the problem of social order, made by each approach. These arguments will be used to identify and compare the underlying assumptions of the two approaches. In this fashion, a number

1) A review of recent literature on social order would show this. For example, see: Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative, D. Atkinson; Modern Social Theory, P.S. Cohen; Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop; The Sociological Imagination, C.W. Mills. Exchange theory which also deals with the problem of order, is usually openly opposed to frameworks which are holistic and structural.
of definitions and assumptions will be obtained - some which are shared by both approaches; others which highlight differences between them - which will clarify what is meant by order and how it may be explained. These definitions and assumptions will be used in the second chapter to develop a conceptual scheme. This scheme will be used to identify and analyze the pluralist approach to the problem of order (in plural societies).

At this stage, a possible objection to this study needs comment. There is a group of contemporary sociologists who argue that a concern with social order in society reflects a conservative bias on the part of those social scientists who have this concern. 2) The first part of this chapter, then, will be a short discussion about what is meant, in general, by social order and the possible ideological effects of this point of view. The second and third parts will be discussions of social order as set out by normative functionalists and coercion theorists. Finally, a comparison of these two approaches will be made in the fourth and final part of this chapter.

(a) Social Order

Most men desire some kind of order in their and others' lives most of the time. They will not, in general, accept any order for its own sake but they do have a stake in what is sometimes called the status quo.

In a society, moreover, men in groups, or alone, conceive of this status quo in different ways. In addition, there are some, and perhaps, under certain conditions many, who desire a change in the status quo. The fact, thus, that there exists peaceful coexistence between these people and the groups they belong to

2) A good representative argument can be found in The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology, A. Gouldner.
in a society at any one time, requires sociological explanation. This, in short, can be called the problem of order.

Peaceful coexistence of persons in a society can be explained in terms of the persisting patterns of these persons' behaviour in different situations. In such terms, the problem of social order becomes: Under what conditions can peaceful coexistence be expected in the operation of social institutions? 3)

An ideological dimension is introduced into this argument when a desire to maintain order is assigned to those theorists who place the problem of order in the front ranks of their theorizing:

If you begin by posing the problem of order (which you do because you wish to preserve that order), the argument goes, then you inevitably counterpoise order with chaos; harmony and co-operation with force, fraud and conflict; and structure with process.

Therefore, in Gouldner's words:

'Underlying the formal conception of 'social order in general' is a tacit, concrete image of a specific order with its fixed distribution of life chances. The quest for order is thus an ideology; it congenially resonates sentiments that favor the preservation of privilege. 4)

First, since there is no one accepted way of posing, or of solving the problem of social order, it is fallacious to argue that those who place this problem in the forefront of their theories are necessarily going to be politically conservative. Theorists' reasons for giving this problem priority are so

3) Parsons and Shils write: 'Order - peaceful coexistence under conditions of scarcity - is one of the very first functional imperatives of social systems'. Jessop writes: 'Social order exists to the extent that there is peaceful coexistence in the operation of social institutions'. At this stage of this study, a more definitive description of societal order does not seem necessary. Toward a General Theory of Action, T. Parsons & E. Shils, p. 180; Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop, p. 14.

divergent 5), in fact, that any attempt to point to a community of interests amongst them for this reason (or for any other) is bound to fail. Cohen's reasons, for instance, are far-ranging:

first, order is itself positive and its opposites are only conceivable in terms of it; second, the very idea of human society presupposes order; third, the existence of social order is problematic and cannot be taken for granted; and fourth, the investigation of the problem of order illuminates the nature of disorder in its various aspects. 6)

Second, if Gouldner's statement that those with 'a quest for order' are people who have 'sentiments that favor the preservation of privilege' is accepted as an empirical generalization, then it still remains to be tested in a whole series of individual cases.

It remains true, of course, that a particular social scientist's views can, and often do, affect his work. In addition, the particular way in which he poses the problem of order is extremely important to the outcome of the study. Both a scientist's value commitments (where available) and his methods of posing certain problems will be considered relevant to this study.

It is necessary, here, then, for the author to state that the way of posing the problem of order in this study will be strictly in accordance with sociological rather than normative criteria. These sociological criteria will be made explicit during the development of the conceptual scheme. Value commitments will, so far as possible, be excluded from this study. 7)

5) See, inter alia, the following works:
Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative, D. Atkinson;
Modern Social Theory, P.S. Cohen;
The Hobbesian Problem of Order', D.P. Ellis;
Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop;
The Sociological Imagination, C.W. Mills;
Sociological Analysis and Politics, W.C. Mitchell;
The Two Problems of Order in Parsons' Theory', E. Schwanenberg;
Introducing Sociology, P. Worsley (ed.)

6) Modern Social Theory, P.S. Cohen, p. 18.

7) It may be relevant to add, at this point, that the author shares, with all the pluralists who will be discussed in this study, a strong moral commitment to change those societies which are classified as 'plural'. This sentiment, however, is not relevant to the way in which this study is constructed.
(b) *The Consensus View of the Problem of Order*

The representative of the consensus school chosen here is Talcott Parsons. He is undoubtedly the most influential theorist of this approach which has also been called normative functionalism. Parsons' arguments relating to social order will be analyzed in two phases. The first, found in his initial major work, *The Structure of Social Action*, will show that the problem of order as posed by Hobbes is used by Parsons as a point of departure in his attack upon the utilitarian and positivistic traditions in sociology. This first phase will finish with a discussion of the theory which Parsons constructs to cope with the problem of order in society. This theory is called the voluntaristic theory of action and contains three new concepts which are crucial in explaining how social order is possible: 'system', 'organism', and the idea of common ultimate ends.

The second phase will attempt to analyze some of Parsons' work done in the 1960s. He is here concerned with general systems theory and holistic or societal analysis. It will be shown, however, that explanations for societal order do not differ basically from those Parsons gave in his original works. In fact, the three concepts identified in phase one remain present in the explanations though they are called differently and are much elaborated upon. This second phase, however, shows that Parsons is more concerned with theories of societal change and with another type of possible break-down of order in society. These points, nevertheless, do not refute any of the arguments presented in his earlier works.

The main conclusion of this section will be that Parsons conceptualizes and discusses the problem of order in an holistic and structural framework. The three crucial new concepts which he

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8) This book was first published in 1937. Henceforth, it will be referred to as SSA.

introduced in 1937 will show this. Later, as he became interested in developed societies, he elaborated his holistic and structural framework by introducing the four subsystems of a society. It will be shown, here, then, how and why this framework developed.

Phase one concerns itself with a discussion of The Structure of Social Action. This book, in fact, can be seen as the founding work of the voluntaristic theory of action which emerged from an 'immanent' convergence within the works of a number of noted social scientists: Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber especially. This convergence, moreover, is seen most clearly against the backdrop of utilitarianism and positivism. Further, Parsons argues that these four theorists rejected the two abovementioned systems of thought mainly because the systems could not solve the problem of societal order within an acceptable methodology. 10)

The problem as posed by Hobbes in its pure utilitarian form, highlights the weaknesses of this system of thought and lead Parsons to reject the basic tenets of utilitarianism completely. Hobbes set out his dilemma as follows 11): Men in society are basically hedonistic. Each one of them, that is, tries to realize his own passions or desires as ends in themselves. They act rationally insofar as they use the most efficient means to try to realize these ends. Now one of the most efficient means for anyone in a group is power over his fellowmen. This power (which Hobbes conceives of in a zero-sum sense) 12) is a scarce resource in society and must, therefore, necessarily have a divisive influence by setting man against man in each one of  

10) "This problem (of order), in the sense in which Hobbes posed it, constitutes the most fundamental empirical difficulty of utilitarian thought." SSA, p. 91.


12) For an explanation of this concept, see 'On the Concept of Political Power', T. Parsons.
their individual hedonistic pursuits. In fact, it is through the application of force and fraud, the most efficient immediate means for obtaining power and one's 'desires', that this divisiveness becomes most apparent. The dilemma - the Hobbesian problem of order - now becomes clear: Given that all men are hedonistic, that they will pursue their passions by the most efficient means possible, that power, and force and fraud especially, are among these most efficient means, then the state of society must necessarily dissolve into anarchy - a war of all against all - in which a man's life, in Hobbes' famous words, must be 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. But this state, of course, will not allow a man to pursue his passions in an efficient and satisfactory way. Herein, then, lies the dilemma.13)

It is important to note here that Parsons who considers Hobbes a pure utilitarian, 'almost entirely devoid of normative thinking',14) insists that the dilemma can only be solved by exchanging this entire system of thought for another, quite different one.

This utilitarian system of thought can be clarified by way of the unit act. The unit act - an analytical tool Parsons uses to discuss all the theorists in his book - consists of an actor, an end, a situation containing elements over which the actor has no control - conditions - and elements over which he does have control - means - and, fourth, a relationship between these three components, the normative orientation of the actor.15)

Utilitarians, when using the unit act to explain social action, make four important (implicit) assumptions:16)

13) "A purely utilitarian society is chaotic and unstable, because in the absence of limitations on the use of means, particularly force and fraud, it must, in the nature of the case, resolve itself into an unlimited struggle for power; and in the struggle for the immediate end, power, all prospect of attainment of the ultimate, of what Hobbes called the diverse passions, is irreparably lost." SSA, pp. 93,94.

14) SSA, p. 89.
15) SSA, p. 44ff.
16) SSA, Ch.II.
First, unit acts are treated separately, as objects of inquiry in themselves. Any possible interdependence between them is ignored. Further, when wanting to explain action at higher levels, such as the societal level, utilitarians generalize directly from these conceptually isolated unit acts. Hobbes' view of individuals each pursuing their own selfish ends, and his view of society as composed solely of a conglomeration of such individuals, can serve as examples.

Second, utilitarians consider the overriding (subjective) relationship between means and ends in a unit act to be based upon rationality. Hobbes' assumption about the use of the most efficient means to realize the hedonistic end, is a case in point.

Third, Parsons argues, utilitarians use empiricist arguments. This system of thought, which Parsons rejects on methodological grounds, claims to be able to explain fully everything scientifically relevant about the empirical phenomena it analyzes, by using its system of analysis alone.\(^{17}\)

Finally, ends are seen as statistically random in the sense that there can be no logical relationship of ends to one another.\(^ {18}\) This is clearly seen in the case of Hobbes' posited passions.

These four assumptions, atomism, rationality, empiricism, and the randomness of ends, tie utilitarians to Hobbes' dilemma. To escape this dilemma, some assumptions must be relaxed.

Parsons proceeds to show why Hobbes' own attempt and that of

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17) An empiricist, therefore, equates logical closure with empirical closure. This is closely related to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

18) Parsons writes: "If the concrete system be considered analyzable exclusively into rational unit acts it follows that though the conception of action as consisting in the pursuit of ends is fundamental, there is nothing in the theory dealing with the relation of ends to each other, but only with the character of the means-end relationship." SSA, p. 59.
both positivists and idealists are not successful in avoiding this dilemma. He himself, then, by using the unit-act concept, proposes the following framework:

The unit act - embedded in a space-time context - contains an actor, ends, means, conditions, and a normative orientation. This normative orientation comprises norms which, in turn, can be described as 'desirable' relations between ends, means and conditions. Further, action is considered purposive in the sense that ends, means and norms are studied from the subjective viewpoint of the actor.

With this scheme and from a position which he calls 'analytical realism', Parsons rejects empiricism (and the related fallacy of misplaced concreteness); atomism (and the related danger of reifying the parts of wholes); rationality as the only cognitive relation the actor can have with external reality; and the assumption about the randomness of ends. In addition, he rejects the assumptions of the idealist school that cultural phenomena are unique and consequently inherently not amenable to scientific analysis. Instead, he introduces three new elements into his conceptual scheme: the concept, system; the organic analogy; and the conception of common ultimate ends.

The elements of the unit act, and a number of unit acts seen as elements of a larger area of social action, are considered to form systems (and systems within systems). This view stresses the interdependence within and between unit acts of the relevant components. Further, no element can be torn from its position or context within an organismic system without a subsequent loss of meaning. Parsons writes:

precisely in so far as the whole is organic its parts or units are not real entities but abstractions. Hence their

19) See SSA, pp. 60ff and Ch.XIII.
20) SSA, p. 730. This epistemological position assumes (i) that the actor acts purposively, (ii) that this action is amenable to analysis, and (iii) that action must be embedded in a situation. Further, (iv) it allows for certain analytic elements in the theory which can be considered attributes of phenomena and are not, as such, necessarily operationalizable.
use requires a particular high degree of caution to
avoid the kind of reification which creeps in when
this is forgotten and these units are treated as constant
real parts through complicated processes of change... 21)

Analysis itself, then, of any organismic system becomes problematic.

Finally, relations between ends themselves and between ends
and means, both within a unit act and in larger systems of social
action, are largely defined by the system of common ultimate
ends (the value system) and by intermediate systems of norms
(the institutional structure).

The Hobbesian problem of order is solved by pointing to the
interconnectedness of action units and the common norms and values
according to which actors orient their actions. These norms
and values are meaningful only insofar as they are understood
organically, as being desirable 22) in general rather than being
desired by one actor in a particular unit act. Actors' ends,
then, and the means they choose to try to achieve them are
conditioned by and mediated through the common value system
and intermediate institutional structure. Men do not and will
not stoop to force and fraud in their pursuit to satisfaction,
says Parsons, because they share a common value system. There
exists consensus, that is, among them about what the ultimate
ends of their actions should be. Further, there are in society
accepted norms which specify how these ultimate ends are to be
realized.

This theory of action is 'voluntaristic' insofar as an actor
is subjectively aware of these norms and ultimate ends (or values).

21) SSA, pp. 747, 748.
22) SSA, p. 75. Later, Parsons is to define values as '(c)ommitt-
ments to conceptions of a good type of society'. See 'Order
as a Sociological Problem', T. Parsons, p. 376.
An actor does not choose between a number of possible norms and values but rather integrates and internalizes rules and beliefs and thereby transforms them into norms and values. Contrary to positivism, it is possible to differentiate between the rational and non-rational components of his action.

It is extremely important to observe that Parsons solves Hobbes' problem of order both holistically and structurally. In contrast to the inter-related assumptions of atomism, rationality, empiricism and the randomness of ends, Parsons explicitly introduces the idea of an organismic system (ultimately representing a society), and argues, further, that its structure must be understood in terms of those common ultimate ends (and related norms) which condition action into repetitive and persisting forms of behaviour. It is quite clear that Parsons is saying that social order must be seen within a larger societal context, and in terms of persisting patterns of behaviour, for it to be analyzed meaningfully.

On the other hand, action must be seen 'voluntaristically;' and not as mere reaction to a static set of values and norms. The question of social order is still posed in its Hobbesian form (Why not a war of all against all?). Parsons' answer is in terms of values and norms, but the antipode of social order - the result if the value-system, for some reason, does not mediate and condition action adequately - is chaos. Here, anomie and normlessness point to the same Hobbesian world of nastiness, brutishness and brevity.

Phase two of this discussion of normative functionalism is concerned with Parsons' interest in general systems theory, societal analysis and, in particular, analysis of what he calls developed societies. It will be shown that the way in which social order is conceptualized as well as the way in which its existence is explained remain essentially the same as those of phase one. In addition, a new type of problem which relates particularly to developed societies, is defined. These 'imbalances'
in society will also be discussed.

The initial point of departure remains the same for Parsons. Why is there not a war of all against all in society? The initial answer was given by way of the unit act and the three ideas discussed in phase one: system, organism, and a common value system. In phase two, Parsons elaborates upon these ideas. First, his new use of the concept, system will be discussed. Then both his conception of the four functional subsystems and the system of values in particular will be analyzed. The elaborated scheme, though obviously more complex than the first, serves basically the same function in explaining order.

The basic unit of analysis is the action system. Action is, as before, purposive behaviour. Parsons, however, is particularly interested in analysis at high levels of generality: in macro-analysis. To cope with different levels of analysis, then, he introduces, as a principle of systems theory, an 'essential parallelism in theoretical structure between ... conceptual schemes...'. This parallelism or homology between and within systems can be understood by conceiving of, on different levels of generality, a nested sequence of systems, each of which contains and, in turn, is contained by, others. Each of these systems must have the same theoretical structure. The simile, here, of nested Chinese boxes, one within the next, is apt.

At a very high level of generality, one finds living systems. Action systems in which sociologists are interested, are subsystems of living systems. Moreover, action systems have a definite type of theoretical structure. Any action system must satisfactorily cope with four basic functional imperatives to persist as a system. These four functions define four

23) The actor, however, is no longer within the system as was the case with the unit act. Now, the elements of the system are of the order of normative patterns of behaviour.

24) 'On the Concept of Political Power', T. Parsons, p. 354. See also: Politics and the Social Structure, T. Parsons; 'Some Problems of General Theory', T. Parsons. For other general works consulted, see Bibliography.
analytically differentiable action subsystems of the original system. (And, by homology, each of these subsystems can be analyzed in the same fashion).

The first functional imperative is called the pattern-maintenance function. It is concerned with patterns of system-control. The second, the integrative function, is concerned with the internal components of the system. The third, the goal-attainment function, is concerned with goals linking the system with its environment. The fourth, the adaptive function, is concerned with the conditions of the system's environment.

If human behaviour is being analyzed and the point of departure is a living system, the following four action subsystems of this living system will be defined by the four functions listed above: The cultural system fulfilling the pattern-maintenance function; the social system the integrative function; the personality the goal-attainment function; and the organismic system the adaptive function.

Each of these subsystems are action systems and manifest the same theoretical structure. In addition, though they are obviously all empirically interpenetrating, analytically any three are considered to form the environment of the fourth.

At this level of analysis it is the social system and its allied integrative function which are central to normative functionalism. The integrative function serves to integrate complexes of social relationships into a system of normatively patterned interaction. This system is the social system. There are two reasons why this system of action is central to Parsons. First, he insists that it is in interaction between persons - rather than in beliefs, cultural traits or abilities; eventually environment and heredity - where sociology must begin its study. Second, he feels that the problem of social order is posed and regulated in this system.
He writes:

Though intimately intertwined with the personalities of the interacting individuals and the patterns of the cultural systems, the process of social interaction forms a fourth system that is analytically independent of both personal and cultural systems, as well as of the organism. This independence becomes most evident in regard to the requirements for integration that impinge upon systems of social relationships because of their inherent potential for conflict and disorganization. This is sometimes known as the problem of order in society, posed in classic form by Thomas Hobbes. The system of interaction constitutes the social system. 25)

Parsons is particularly interested in one kind of social system which he calls a society. 26) This society, then, by applying the principle of the parallelism, contains four homologous subsystems. The first is called the fiduciary (pattern-maintenance); the second the societal community (integration), the third the polity (goal-attainment), and the fourth is called the economy (adaptation).

By homology once again, the societal community is the critical subsystem within the social system. The function it serves in integrating the society, too, is relevant to the order problem.

Parsons writes:

The core of a society, as a system, is the patterned normative order through which the life of a population is collectively organized. As an order, it contains values and differentiated and particularized norms and rules, all of which require cultural references in order to be meaningful and legitimate. As a collectivity, it displays a patterned conception of membership which distinguishes between those individuals who do and do not belong..... We will call this one entity of the society, in its collective aspect, the societal community...


26) "We define society as the type of social system characterized by the highest level of self-sufficiency relative to its environments, including other social systems." The System of Modern Societies, T. Parsons, p. 8.

27) Politics and the Social Structure, T. Parsons, p. 11.
It is clear that the societal community, 'the core of a society', is the key regulator of social order. In fact, if it is functioning properly, then the values, norms and rules, referred to by Parsons above, will be 'meaningful and legitimate'. Under these conditions, peaceful coexistence in the society seems assured. It is important to note, however, that 'cultural references' are needed for this situation to obtain, and these references are obtained from the fiduciary. It becomes important to inquire, then, into the relations between the four subsystems of a society.

First, Parsons argues, there exists a cybernetic hierarchy of control among these subsystems. "The fundamental proposition here is that systems which are low in energy but high in information can control systems which are higher, much higher, in energy and lower in information". The latter systems can be conceived of as setting the conditions within which the total comprehensive system operates and changes. Starting from high information and control, the hierarchy in a society is as follows: first, the fiduciary, next the societal community, then the polity and finally the economy. The societal community, then, is largely controlled by the fiduciary.

A second way in which Parsons conceptualizes the relations between the four subsystems is by defining each as a production unit. There are then inputs into, and outputs from each system from its environment. This environment is none other than the other three subsystems. This paradigm has, of course, been developed and refined by economists for the economy. By extending this basic economic paradigm by homology to the other three

28) 'Order as a Sociological Problem', T. Parsons, p. 380. Parsons gives the following example: "a programed (sic) sequence of mechanical operations (e.g., in a washing machine) can be controlled by a timing switch using very little energy compared with the energy actually operating the machine's moving parts or heating the water". Politics and the Social Structure, p.10. For a further discussion of the use of cybernetics in sociology, See: Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, W. Buckley.

29) A similar control hierarchy exists at the social system level: culture system; social system; personality system and organismic system.
subsystems, Parsons constructs a complicated model of interchanges in the social system.\textsuperscript{30)  }This interchange process is controlled by and filtered through four generalized media of exchange, one for each subsystem. Each medium regulates the production function of each subsystem. These generalized media, moreover, are symbolic and largely dependent, therefore, on the normative order which, as was seen earlier, constitutes the core of the society. Each medium, however, can also be seen as a constraining device and, as such, is related to a specific type of sanction. This sanction base, too, falls within the normative order insofar as the societal community is functioning adequately. As an example of these exchanges and forces of constraint between subsystems, the economy/polity interchange and interface will be briefly discussed.\textsuperscript{31)  }

The basic function of the economy in the society is production; that of the polity is effective collective action so as to attain collective goals.\textsuperscript{32)  }The symbolic medium of the economy is money; that of the polity power.\textsuperscript{33)  }The output from the polity which becomes capital as one of the inputs (factors of production) into the economy, is what Parsons calls 'opportunities for effectiveness'. The output from the economy is a commitment of services to the collectivity which becomes

\textsuperscript{30)  }'Some Problems of General Theory', T. Parsons, pp. 37 - 43.

\textsuperscript{31)  }This discussion is largely based on Parsons' first 'media' paper: 'On the Concept of Political Power', Ch.14 in Politics and the Social Structure.

\textsuperscript{32)  }The function of the fiduciary is to maintain and reinforce the basic values of the society; that of the societal community is to allocate rewards, privileges and facilities to maintain normatively integrated interaction in society.

\textsuperscript{33)  }Money is defined as: "The unit's capacity, through market channels under given rules of procedure, to command goods and services in exchange, which for its own reason it (the acting unit) desires." quoted in Jessop, op. cit., p. 22. "Power ... is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in the case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions - whatever the actual agency of that enforcement." Politics and the Social Structure, p. 361.
control of productivity when seen as an input into the polity. Seen as constraining media, money is founded upon positive situational sanctions or inducement; power on negative situational sanctions or coercion. 34) In turn, inducements are grounded upon gold; coercion upon physical force. It is important to note, however, that money and power, as symbolic media of exchange, are dependent upon confidence in the economy, and legitimacy in the polity, respectively. Without confidence and legitimacy, the media money and (for Parsons) power are useless symbols. This is clear in the relationship between money and property as an institution, in a sphere of confidence, on the one hand; and power and authority as a status position (from which power may be used), in a sphere of legitimacy, on the other. The following diagrammatic presentation serves as a summary:

SEE TABLE I

34) Parsons generates a four-type sanction scheme by differentiating between positive and negative, situational and intentional sanctions. See TABLE II, CHAPTER II.
TABLE I

ECONOMY

Interchange

POLITY

Interchange

from polity

}input

\( \text{capital} \)

\( \text{production} \)

commitment of services to collectivity

effective collective action

opportunities for effectiveness

\( \text{output} \)

\( \text{input} \)

effortive control of collectivity

MONEY

grounded in the social system upon PROPERTY INSTITUTIONS

inducements (positive situational sanctions)

Confidence Sphere

Ultimate base GOLD

POWER

if recalcitrant

grounded in the social system upon AUTHORITY POSITIONS

Legitimacy Sphere

Ultimate base PHYSICAL FORCE

GENERALIZED SYMBOLIC MEDIA

if recalcitrant

POSITIVE SITUATIONAL SANCTIONS

Confidence Sphere

Ultimate base GOLD

NEGATIVE SITUATIONAL SANCTIONS

Legitimacy Sphere

Ultimate base PHYSICAL FORCE
In sum, then, relations between the four subsystems of a society depend upon a whole series of factors. In particular, these subsystems are closely interdependent in the sense that each must depend upon three crucial inputs from its environment and must, in return, produce three outputs, one for each subsystem in its environment. The cybernetic control hierarchy and the symbolic nature of the generalized exchange media, however, point to the priority that the normative order enjoys in this scheme. Eventually, the fiduciary - concerned with the maintenance and reinforcement of the values of the society - controls the other systems. Order in society is explained, in large part, by the efficient functioning of this subsystem of a society.

These relations between subsystems of society, moreover, become critical in a type of society in which Parsons became interested in his second phase. He calls them 'developed' societies. The social structure of such societies tends to become differentiated about the four subsystems. In other words, more 'systemness' develops within the economy, polity, societal community and fiduciary than between them. New roles and positions created by the increasing division of labour tend to cluster within these subsystems rather than to cut across their boundaries. The shedding by the family of its economic role and the concomitant specialization of occupational roles in the economy, can serve as a general example. In short, the four analytic subsystems of a society, though empirically interpenetrating, tend to 'crystallize out' in a developed society.

One important consequence of this process of crystallization is that relations between subsystems in a developed society become much

35) See, for example, 'On the Concept of Political Power', p. 380. These societies can be typified by the process of increasing division of labour. Parsons, of course, is also interested in the evolutionary aspects of such development. In this process, value generalization, inclusion and adaptive upgrading are considered as important as structural differentiation. This is not relevant to the discussion here. See: Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, Ch. 2.

36) See: Explorations in Social Change, G.K. Zollschan & W. Hirsh, 'Section Two'.
more important. The cybernetic control hierarchy becomes explicit, as do the generalized media of exchange 37) and the required inputs and outputs in the social system. In short, societal order, in a developed society, requires another dimension: that of the peaceful coexistence of the people and that of the smooth functioning of the subsystems.

Jessop puts it this way:

The differentiation of the social system creates new problems for the system integration and the maintenance of social order. Each of the differentiated subsystems requires certain factor inputs if it is to perform its own function adequately and each must dispose of its product if the other subsystems are to function in turn. It is inherent in the interchange process that an imbalance may emerge in the acquisition of inputs and the disposition of outputs and so create social strains. An additional complication is introduced by the dependence of highly differentiated societies upon generalized media of exchange for the adequate functioning of the interchanges between subsystems..... 38)

The three elements that Parsons introduced in 1937 to solve Hobbes' problem: system, organism and a shared value system, remain central to normative functionalist theory. The concept of a cybernetic hierarchy of control has replaced the organismic analogy but it is clear that the assumptions underlying the former are the same. 39) Further, instead of a simple shared value system, this control hierarchy allied with the idea of homologous action systems, and interchanges between them, is used to construct a much more complex conceptual scheme. The assumptions about what integrates interaction into ordered systems, as has been shown, however, remains the same. 40) The problem of order is, again, solved holistically and structurally.

37) Money, as a symbolic medium of exchange, in fact, can be conceived of as a characteristic of a certain level of development.
38) Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop, p. 22.
    Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, W. Buckley, Ch.2.
    'Order as a Sociological Problem', T. Parsons, p. 380.
40) Parsons writes: "The most fundamental ground of order in societies is the internalization of the normative culture and the institutionalization of that in the normative culture of the society." and "At the top of the hierarchy of normative components I would place values." See: 'Order as a Sociological Problem', T. Parsons, pp. 379,376.
There is, on the other hand, an important difference. It is now much clearer where and how order can break down. It is clearer in what areas of society social strain can accumulate and under what conditions this may take place. In fact, in developed societies (which seem increasingly to monopolize the attention of consensus theorists) strain is seen to be inherent in the process of structural differentiation. This can cause serious 'imbalances' between the four functional subsystems. An example of this is the conception of power deflation where the legitimacy allocated to power-wielding decreases which, in turn, necessitates the overt use of coercion and, eventually, force. This down-ward spiral may lead to a break-down of societal order.

In conclusion, societal order is still conceptualized in Hobbes' question: Why not a war of all against all? Parsons' answer is found in the normative core of a society. Men share common values and norms. If this core should fail, if the critical ordering mechanisms malfunction, then a state of Hobbesian chaos descends: a normless world of anomie and of war of each against the other. In both phases, for Parsons, social order and chaos are antipodes of each other.

(c) The Coercion View of the Problem of Order

It is not possible to trace, here, the development of the thought of an eminently representative theorist over a period of forty years. This is essentially what was done in the last 41) The terminology is Smelser's who is perhaps the foremost normative functionalist to tackle the problems of conflict and change. See: Social Change and the Industrial Revolution, N. Smelser; Theory of Collective Behavior, N. Smelser; Essays in Sociological Explanation, N. Smelser.

42) See 'On the Concept of Political Power', T. Parsons. The analogy with the economy is again being made.
Instead, Marx's and Dahrendorf's approaches to the order problem will be discussed. It should be noted, moreover, that similarities rather than differences between their two theories will be stressed.

For Marx, a man expresses himself and thereby his humanity through his labour. 'The whole of what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labour.' It is not surprising, then, to note that in the 'beginning' and at the 'end' of world history, the primitive and future communist societies are basically consensual: structural conflict is absent. Man, if not strait-jacketed in an alienating mode of production, is basically co-operative. It is this mode of production - the organizing of labour, capital, machines and men to produce goods and services - and its concomitant societal structure, both of which are conceived of as being 'outside' the individual, which disrupt man's essentially harmonious relations with his fellow-men. In particular, it is the capitalist mode of production which Marx analyses and which poses the problem of order.

43) Apart from Marx's own works (in Feuer(ed.) & Jordan(ed.)), the following studies have been used:
- Main Currents in Sociological Thought, I, R. Aron;
- Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative, D. Atkinson;
- Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, R. Dahrendorf;
- Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, A. Giddens;
- Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop;
- Karl Marx, Z.A. Jordan (ed.), 'Introductory Essay';
- The Sociology of Marx, H. Lefebvre.
Also see: Marx and Engels, L. Feuer (ed.).

44) See Atkinson (op. cit.); Jessop (op. cit.); Dahrendorf (op. cit) 'Toward a Theory of Social Conflict', R. Dahrendorf; Key Problems in Sociological Theory, J. Rex.

45) Marx, quoted in Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, A. Giddens, p. 19. It follows from this that Marx's sociology focuses upon human action. Jordan, in fact, writes: "...the social world (for Marx) is created by interacting individuals. As Marx himself puts it, society is not an aggregate of individuals but 'the product of men's reciprocal action'..." Z.A. Jordan, op. cit., p. 11.
Marx believed that capitalist society would be destroyed by endogenous causes. These are the internal contradictions which deepen as capitalism develops. The problem of order cannot be couched in Hobbesian terms if it is to relate to this conception. It will, on the other hand, still be couched in an holistic and structural framework. The question of order, here, is: Given the fact that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction, how is it possible that men can, at a particular time, co-exist peacefully in a capitalist society?

To answer this question, the theory of the development of capitalism must be reviewed. First, the development of the forces of production, and, second, of the relations of production will be analyzed. These will then be related to the development of class-consciousness. Finally, the relationship between the state and the production process will be analyzed. After this analysis, an answer to the problem of order as stated above will be found.

Marx's analysis of capitalism is wholly predicated upon the postulated connection between the expansion of the division of labour... on the one hand, and the emergence of a polarised class structure, on the other.... Capitalism is thus, in its essence, a class society; the existence of a bourgeois class presupposes a subordinate class of propertyless workers, and vice versa.... 47)

The development of capitalism can be analyzed in two phases. The first focuses upon the expansion of the division of labour and the second upon the polarization of classes in the society. The first element in this process of development to be looked at is the forces of production: These comprise scientific and technological knowledge, and the organization of collective labour.

46) It is difficult to use Marx's idea of contradictions in a sociological framework. Here, the concept of conflict will be used instead.

47) Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, A. Giddens, p. 239. Emphasis in the original.
Early capitalist society starts with three groups: the landowners owning land, the capitalists owning capital, and the proletariat who sell their labour for a wage. In this early stage, the forces of production will function in favour of the landowners and capitalists. The rent and profits these two groups receive, in fact, can be ploughed back into the production process and will contribute, along with the forces of production, toward capitalist development, toward the expansion of the division of labour. These profits, moreover, are called surplus value in that they represent the difference between what members of the proletariat produce and what they receive in wages. In this early stage, then, it is possible that capitalist development is not materially detrimental to the proletariat.

This situation, however, changes. In the infrastructure of a society - what can be called its economic base - the capitalists are forced by competition and through the rising demands of technology, to extract more surplus value from the proletariat.\(^48\) The logic of the capitalist process of development, hence, demands that the capitalist refines the exploitative process. This, in turn, brings about a drop in the life standards of the proletariat and inexorably involves those still outside this capitalist economic system (peasants and petty bourgeoisie, for example) in this process. These exigencies caused by the forces of production force all members of the society into one of two large classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Class membership is defined by a person's relationship to property institutions and the distribution of capital, to the ownership and control of the means of production. The bourgeoisie monopolize these means; the proletariat exchange their labour (or, more strictly, their

\(^48\) For an exposition of the assumptions underlying these propositions, see Main Currents in Sociological Thought, I, R. Aron, pp. 125ff. In these terms, exploitation refers to the fact that members of the proletariat who produce the surplus value through their labour, have no say in how it is to be used. The capitalists, in effect, decide.
labour-potential) for a wage.

The social relationships which arise from this process are called the relations of production. In the long run, these relationships are dependent upon the 'objective' relation the person and his class has to the means of production. Nonetheless, men may be forced to work longer hours for less wages, be further exploited at work and at home, without realizing along with their fellow-workers, that their common class position is the true cause of this hardship. Insofar as they are members of a class without being conscious of this membership nor of the collective action this implies, they form a class-in-itself. This gap between being a member of the proletariat and becoming conscious of the true role the proletariat and its members are to play, is a measure of what Marx called the false consciousness of the proletariat.

The proletariat matures and becomes a class-for-itself when its members, brought into overt opposition with the bourgeoisie, revolt against the established order and attempt violently to dismantle the capitalist structure and institute a classless communist society. Given that the forces of production have reached an advanced stage in the capitalist society, the success of this revolution will depend upon the scope of class consciousness present and upon the effectiveness of the coercive means which the bourgeoisie can bring to bear.

Likewise, the measure of social order in such a society will depend upon the scope of false consciousness present amongst the proletariat; the effectiveness of the bourgeois monopoly of political power; and the effectiveness of the dominant ideology in the society. In short, it will depend upon the quality of the superstructure.

49) The economic base does not only include objective factors but property institutions as well: i.e. normative factors. See Social Reform, Order and Revolution, B. Jessop, p. 33 & Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative, D. Atkinson, p. 41.
Theoretically, property relations in the infrastructure define what the dominant ideology of the society is to be (an embodiment of the vested interests of the ruling class); who is to monopolize the state institutions and wield the political power (the bourgeoisie as ruling class); and, in the case of unrest, against whom this coercive power is to be applied (the proletariat). In effect, the superstructure which comprises these non-economic institutions and the ideologies of the society, is treated as an epiphenomenon. In practice, however, Marx's empirical works point to a much more complex set of relations between these institutions and ideologies, on the one hand, and the infrastructure, on the other. As an example, Marx's conception of the state will be discussed briefly.

Marx believed that if man sheds the constraints of the capitalist mode of production, he will be able to create a consensual society. Further, he believed that man is 'essentially' a social rather than (as Hegel believed) a political being. In fact, in the long run, at least, a man's life chances are dependent upon the social relationships he forms, especially those concerned with the ownership and control of land, machines and labour, rather than upon his citizenship and his relationship with the state. The distinctions, then, between the private domain (in which a man is unconstrained) and the public domain where the business of the state is conducted; and between civil society in which man's social relationships with his fellows are most important, and the political sphere, are both crucial for an understanding of the state.

In the public domain, the argument goes, a man's de jure civil rights (to vote or to compete for public office, for example) are fictitious. His true position in society is defined, in fact, by his social rights which are ultimately reducible to his

50) See Social Science and Political Theory, W. Runciman, Chapter II.
relationship to the means of production. The state, then, is nothing more than a tool used by the bourgeoisie to further their own interests in civil society. "Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another". 51) Political power, founded upon state institutions, is applied coercively to secure the bourgeois monopoly of the means of production and to squeeze a larger surplus from organized labour. The attempt to maintain the false consciousness and passivity of the proletariat rests upon this power and its concomitant ideology. This ideology, moreover, is couched in exactly those terms which Marx rejects: a man's political, de jure rights, his citizenship, his right to be served by the state, and so on. The extent to which this ideology is accepted by the proletariat, serves as a measure of the scope of legitimacy which the bourgeoisie enjoy in their control of the state.

This situation, too, however, changes. After the two classes have confronted each other in overt conflict, the state as an appendage of the ruling class will no longer be necessary. The private domain of the individual in which his social rights are realized, will coincide with the new communist society.

The relationship, in practice, however, between the infrastructure and the state is neither one-to-one nor one of complete dependence. Two examples will show this. First, Marx left open the possibility that change could occur by way of the ballot-box. 52) This implies that under certain peculiar conditions, action in the public domain can have independent causal significance. Second, though the state disappears along with the capitalist mode of production, its institutions and their derived power are necessary for the overthrow of the capitalist order. The dictatorship of the proletariat, in fact, is an interim phase during which the state is used, in effect, to bring about its own downfall.

52) Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop, p. 28.
Social order is conceptualized within a capitalist society. This order varies inversely with the depth of contradictions in that society. These contradictions are a measure of the lack of fit between the forces of production and the relations of production. Since the forces of production inexorably cause deeper and deeper contradictions as capitalism develops, social order, in the first place, dissolves as capitalism reaches its mature stage. In the second place, however, social order varies directly with the scope of false consciousness amongst the proletariat. This, in turn, is dependent upon the effectiveness of the dominant ideology of the state and the ruling class. In the third place, social order varies directly with the effectiveness of the coercive power of the state. In short, social order depends upon the influence which the superstructure (the ideology of the ruling class and the power of the state) has upon the relations of production in the infrastructure. 53) When this superstructure becomes completely dependent upon the infrastructure and classes become conscious of their true positions in the society, overt class conflict ensues and social order is shattered. Direct dependence relations between the superstructure and this economic base are skewed, however, by the cultural lag of false consciousness, the need for state power to conclude the revolution, and by certain other peculiar empirical conditions.

Order – peaceful coexistence of institutions in a capitalist society – is, Marx argues, inherently unstable. Insofar as it exists, it is explicable along three dimensions: the ideological order (of the bourgeoisie); the coercive order (of the state); and the exploitative constraints (of the economic base). As capitalism develops, as the superstructure fits better into its position of dependence upon the economic base...

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53) This can only occur, of course, in the short-run. In the long run, conflict based in the infrastructure, especially between the forces and relations of production, will gain precedence over the ruling social order, and will bring about class-conflict. Social order, for Marx, can only be conceived of in the short-run if the society falls within a capitalist mode of production.
base, as the contradictions in this base deepen, so the societal order dissolves. The antipodes, for Marx, are social order and open class war.

Dahrendorf tries to loosen Marx's theory from its capitalist context. He rejects the Marxist assumptions that the ownership and control of the means of production are the ultimate source of conflict, that structural change is only possible through violent revolution, and that private property relations are the only sources of classes. In other words, Dahrendorf attempts to generalize Marxist theory.

His basic unit of analysis is an imperatively co-ordinated association, a structured group in which there exists a differential distribution of authority positions. Such an association can always be divided into two quasi-groups, the members of each of which share the same relationship to the authority structure of their association. There is, then, in every such association, a superordinate quasi-group which monopolizes authority-positions, and a subordinate quasi-group which is excluded from authority-positions. An authority-position, of course, carries the advantage of sharing control over others with other such positions. This control is backed by sanctions. Insofar as the members of a quasi-group become conscious of their position vis-à-vis the authority structure, they form an interest group. Each interest group, Dahrendorf argues, will be in basic opposition to its counterpart in the association.

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54) This is, in the author's opinion, an accepted Marxist assumption, though Marx wrote of exceptions.

55) The term is Weber's. Dahrendorf, in fact, uses much of Weber's conceptual apparatus in his theory. See Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society.

56) Dahrendorf uses the terms, latent and manifest interests to refer to unconscious and conscious role expectations relating to the authority structure of an imperatively co-ordinated association. It is obviously unclear how the existence, in empirical terms, of latent interests can be ascertained. Their existence, then, must be regarded as an assumption.
A society will contain a large number of imperatively co-ordinated associations. In a society, furthermore, a social class consists of a number of individuals who, by virtue of their common membership in similar quasi-groups - all either superordinate or subordinate - share similar role expectations. Finally class conflict is conceived of as being any group conflict which is reducible to these relations of superordination and subordination.

It is clear, then, that Dahrendorf, in broadening Marx's axiomatic base, sees conflict as ubiquitous and social order, consequently, as inherently unstable. The problem of social order, consequently, though not linked with a capitalist society, must be considered an empirical problem: Given that conflict is always potentially present in the above sense, under what conditions will social order obtain?

To regulate, rather than resolve this conflict, and thereby maintain social order, at least three conditions are required: First, opposing groups must recognize and accept their opponents' cause. Second, these opposing groups must have a semblance of organization so that they are visible as entities to their opponents. Third, both groups must agree to "certain formal rules of the game". Cross-cutting membership in superordinate and subordinate quasi-groups on both sides of the conflict situation, too, is seen as conducive to conflict regulation. Dahrendorf insists, however, that these conditions must be seen as necessary but not sufficient.

Though not anchored to any economic base, this theory of class conflict has obvious similarities with Marxist theory. In particular, it explains social order in terms of (i) the repressive sanctions wielded by the superordinate group in an association over those without authority positions, and (ii) the

57) Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, R. Dahrendorf, p. 226.
common normative order embedded in organized groups' recognition and acceptance of their opponents' causes and in the common rules of the game. Dahrendorf requires, then, that a number of rules and norms be shared by opposing classes for conflict regulation to be possible. 58)

Social order, finally, is again an empirical problem and exists to the extent that class conflict can be regulated. As with Marx, social order and overt class conflict are antipodes.

(d) Similarities and Differences in the Two Views

The aim of this section is to compare the two differing conceptions of social order, which have been discussed in the preceding sections. To make such a comparison requires some minimal common ground covered by both approaches. Quite clearly, this is represented by a common concern with social order in society.

On the other hand, there is a clear difference in the scope of Parsons' theory, on the one hand, and Marx' theory, on the other. Parsons is interested in systems of action in general, 59) whereas Marx focuses, for the most part, on societies within the capitalist mode of production. Furthermore, for Parsons, the alternative to societal order is Hobbesian chaos, for Marx and Dahrendorf, order is a variable with societal order grounded upon the ruling ideology at one end of the continuum and full-scale class-conflict at the other.

To explain these differences in theoretical scope and explanations for social order, certain underlying assumptions of the two views

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58) This does not necessarily imply the existence of a shared value system. In fact, a successful ideological order, for Marx, also implies that some rules and norms are accepted by both bourgeoisie and proletariat.

59) Parsons writes: "so fundamental is the problem of order that the structure of systems of human social action ..., consists of internalized and institutionalized normative patterns of culture - rules, values and other normative components." 'Order as a Sociological Problem', T. Parsons, p. 375, my emphasis. It is therefore in the nature of the structure of all action systems to maintain order.
will be mentioned.

For normative functionalism, man 'in a state of nature', is a selfish, dishonest and antagonistic being. It is 'society' and its value system which civilize him. For Marxism, on the other hand, man 'in a state of nature', is co-operative. Conflict and confrontation derive from the mode of production within which he and his fellows must work. It is to be expected, then, that normative functionalists will approach social order in society universally, whereas Marxists will focus upon a particular mode of production; societies within that mode; and attempts, by men, to do away with that mode.

It has been shown, however, that Parsons became interested in 'developed' societies and their particular order problems; and that Marx and, especially, Dahrendorf, diverged from the strict theoretical boundaries of the capitalist mode of production. For the sake of the comparison to be made here, this shared interest in developing and developed societies will be considered as additional common ground covered by both approaches.

Both approaches, then, attempt to explain the maintenance of social order in developing and developed societies. It will first be shown that the following are basic similarities in the two approaches:

(a) Both approaches conceptualize social order within an holistic and structural framework.
(b) Both approaches explain the maintenance of order in terms of action.
(c) Both conceive of order and problems relating to it, in terms of four analytically separable sectors of a society.

60) See, T. Parsons, op cit., p. 373.
61) It would, of course, also be possible to compare the two universally, i.e. in terms of their conceptions of social order in all societies. Dahrendorf, in effect, attempts to deal with social order in societies in general.
Both consider a minimal consensus and a minimal degree of effective wielding of power, prerequisites for the maintenance of order.

Second, it will be shown that the two approaches differ in certain arguments.

(a) Priority in the explanations of order, is given to different sectors of a society.
(b) Therefore, power is conceptualized quite differently by the two approaches.
(c) The two approaches differ radically in their expectations for the directions of change in developing and developed societies.

The foundation of Parsonian order is one of normative consensus. Men will not act selfishly, dishonestly and antagonistically because they share a commitment to certain shared ultimate ends or values, and to norms that lay down the ways to achieve them. Thus men in society will, in general, act peaceably - within institutions - in terms of a societal value-system.  

Order exists for Marx (and, analogously, for Dahrendorf) to the extent that the binding effects of the dominant ideology and the coercive instruments of power outweigh the divisive effects of the basic duality in society. For Marx, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in a capitalist society form this duality; for Dahrendorf, the superordinate and subordinate quasi-groups in any imperatively co-ordinated association. Social order obtains in a given situation to the extent that conflict between these two groups is regulated or avoided by way of the dominant ideology and the coercive (political) power of the ruling group.

Parsons explicitly introduces 'action' into his theory, as was shown earlier. Marx and Dahrendorf feel that man, in his labour or his actions in associations, produces the basic duality in any society through his actions. Neither approach can be typified as 'static' or 'cultural'.

62) Parsons, in fact, defined values as '(c)ommitments to concep­tions of a good type of society', 'Order as a Sociological Problem', p. 376. Emphasis added.
The basic framework of analysis, for normative functionalism, consists of societies and their four subsystems of action: the fiduciary, the social system, the polity and the economy. For Marx, the basic framework consists of the infrastructure and the superstructure. The latter, as was shown, can be analytically differentiated into the public domain (including the state), civil society, and the dominant (ruling) ideology. These coincide, in terms of their functions, with the four subsystems of action. In fact, the infrastructure can be called the economic sector; the public domain the political sector; civil society the social sector; and the ideology makes up the cultural sector (the fiduciary). Both approaches use these four sectors as an underlying framework of analysis.

In addition, both agree that some degree of consensus and some degree of power-wielding is necessary for the maintenance of social order. For Marx, the former can be measured by the false consciousness of the proletariat and the concomitant ruling ideology. For, Parsons, especially in developed societies, power, as a generalized medium of exchange, is necessary to maintain functional interdependence between the subsystems of a society.

On the other hand, priority in theorizing is attributed to different sectors by Marxists and normative functionalists. Marx, as has been shown, gives priority to the infrastructure to show how change takes place and, therefore, how social order is maintained. Though elements of the superstructure (the three other sectors) are important, they themselves are eventually explicable in terms of the lack of fit between the forces and the relations of production. These are rooted in the economic sector.

Parsons, on the other hand, gives priority to values in the cultural sector. This is true both in terms of the cybernetic

63) There must be some consensus. This both approaches agree upon. This consensus, however, need obviously not be value-consensus. The very ideas of false consciousness and an ideology of the ruling class show this.
principle of control as well as in terms of the different functions the four sectors fulfill in the encompassing society.

Power, then, derives, for Parsons, from this normative consensus and disappears without it. Power, in fact, rests upon coercion - negative situational sanctions - which are accepted as legitimate by both the power-wielders and subjects. 64)

On the other hand, power, for Marx, is rooted in the bourgeoisie's monopoly of the means of production (and, consequently, the state-institutions). Authority 65), for Dahrendorf, is rooted in the superordinate group's monopoly of authority positions. For both, this monopoly is maintained coercively (without any dimension of legitimacy). Quite clearly, there is a difference in theoretical approach to power.

Finally, structural differentiation, for normative functionalists is a major source of endogenous change. This process affects, in an inherently disequilibrating way, the four sectors of a society. The result is strain 66): problems of socialization and, hence, internalization; and problems of role-clashes and, hence, institutionalization. Though such strains are considered ubiquitous, the direction of change is that of 'development': increasing structural differentiation and functional integration. 67) Stasis or break-down into chaos exhaust alternative directions.

Structural differentiation - the expansion of the division of labour - is, for the coercion theorists, also relevant to the explanation of imbalances in society. For Marx, the lack of fit between the forces and the relations of production in the economic sector; and the skew dependence relations of the superstructure with this economic sector, are both deepened and

64) Likewise, money and inducements - positive situational sanctions - in the economic sector are considered legitimate.

65) The important point, here, is that authority is structural. Power, for Dahrendorf (who uses the Weberian definition) is not.

66) For a discussion of this, see the works of N. Smelser listed in the bibliography.

67) Amongst other things. See Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, T. Parsons.
clarified by the increasing division of labour. This differentiation in structure, however, is not seen as causal: Imbalances and conflict are treated as ubiquitous.

For Marx, capitalist society moves, in the long run, inevitably toward open class war. The possibility that capitalist society is capable itself of containing a change in its mode of production is a possible alternative.

In sum, then, though both approaches express an interest in societies characterized by an increasing differentiation in structure (i.e. 'developing' societies), the expected directions of this change differ. In essence, normative functionalists expect evolutionary change, Marxists revolutionary change.

68) See *One Dimensional Man*, H. Marcuse, 'Introduction'. 
CHAPTER TWO

A PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL SCHEME TO STUDY SOCIAL ORDER

In the previous chapter, social order was discussed within the frameworks of the two major main-stream sociological traditions which analyze it holistically and structurally. In this chapter, a preliminary conceptual scheme will be developed. This scheme will be used to analyze explanations of social order, made by pluralists. It will, further, be used to construct a theoretical scheme which will incorporate those major insights and arguments made by pluralists, normative functionalists and coercion theorists alike, which are of relevance to the maintenance of social order in plural societies.

The preliminary scheme to be developed here, then, aims to translate differing terminologies used by pluralists and others into a common language. It aims to avoid a number of old and relatively fruitless debates between representatives of the different approaches about social order. Rather, it aims to ascertain the common theme underlying explanations given for social order. Finally, it aims to highlight the central difference between pluralists and others, and to offer a framework within which social order, particularly in plural societies, may be analyzed. In this way, a theory of plural societies may be begun. The roots of this theory, therefore, will lie firmly in three traditions: pluralism, normative functionalism and coercion theory.

The first section of this chapter will analyze some major differences dividing certain pluralists from the normative functionalist approach; and dividing certain pluralists from the coercion approach. The second section will identify the main common issues underlying the three traditions. It will then be possible, after these two sections are completed, to
identify the major difference between pluralists and others in their approach to social order.

Finally, in the third section, the preliminary conceptual scheme will be developed. This development will be guided by the frameworks discussed in the previous chapter; by the major difference between these approaches and pluralism (which refers particularly to plural societies), and by the nature of a plural society itself. This preliminary scheme, then, will include a number of explicit assumptions, a number of new inter-related concepts, and a number of general hypotheses relating to plural societies.

(a) Basic Differences in Approach

There exists no commonly-accepted plural society or pluralist approach in sociology today. This section, then, aims to identify a number of controversial issues which have divided both normative functionalists and coercion theorists from certain pluralists, and which have led to a number of confusing generalizations being made about 'pluralism' in general. This is obviously not the place to spell out, in detail, what these differences are. That is the aim of the later substantive chapters. It is possible, however, to discuss differences in the meta-theories of certain pluralists and those of the other approaches.

Adherents of normative functionalism in sociology feel that the assumptions underlying pluralism are quite unacceptable. Their criticism is aimed at Furnivall and, in particular, M.G. Smith. First, they feel Furnivall to be at error when he writes that plural societies do not manifest a 'social will' and Smith to be at error when he writes that such societies are characterized by a complete lack of value consensus. Braithwaite, who is a good representative of this group of critics, writes:

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1) Cohen defines a meta-theory as follows: "...theories, at the highest level of abstraction, which provide a set of ideas in which the more concrete speculations are carried out." Modern Social Theory, P.S. Cohen, p. 10.
The concentration (on) the phenomenon of the lack of social will of which Furnivall speaks obscures the really important fact that no society can exist without a minimum sharing of common values, without a certain amount of "social will" ......... 2)

Second, criticism is aimed at M.G. Smith for another reason. As an anthropologist of the Malinowskian school, Smith uses a particular institutional approach to define pluralism. This approach, it is argued, results in the reification of institutions within the different cultural groups of a society. The core of this approach, then, reduces to an enumeration of similar and different cultural traits within groups of a plural society. Any possible explanations of behaviour, consequently, must be founded upon a theory of cultural determinism. Braithwaite writes:

The problem of a plural society is indeed a problem of social structure posed by the existence of marked differences of culture, but a society or social system cannot be defined by merely observing the presence or absence of cultural traits; it must be done in terms of social action, that is, the interaction of social roles... (Otherwise), sociology becomes reduced to cultural anthropology. 3)

These two criticisms certainly point to different basic assumptions made by the people involved. In particular, the differences seem to focus upon the role a value-system plays in a societal system, on the one hand, and the underlying meaning of social behaviour, on the other. Both points will be covered in the conceptual scheme.

The claim of some proponents of the concept of the plural society that this idea represents a radical innovation in dominant sociological theory is only true with respect to that body of thought which attributes overriding

2) Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism', L. Braithwaite, p. 819.

importance to the function of common values for social integration... 4)

It is clear that Lockwood, arguing in this vein, represents another group of critics who share little with the first group discussed above. Lockwood feels that from another perspective - Marxism - the pluralist approach is a little too simple and, at times, confusing. He writes:

From this (Marxist) point of view, the concept of the plural society is less of a novel contribution to social theory, and, in several respects, it poses less fundamental issues of sociological analysis. This is mainly because the cultural pluralism of ethnically, racially, or linguistically divided societies originates exogenously through the physical movement into the indigenous society of one or more culturally distinct groups, whose presence then results in a juxtaposition of separate blocks. On the other hand, the Marxist idea of a revolutionary society refers to a process of internal change..... 5)

Pluralists' point of departure, it is argued, is defined by differences in race, culture and ethnicity in a single society. Their subsequent theorizing, therefore, tends to be over-simple - a one factor theory of behaviour - and static. In fact, pluralists do not relate race, culture and ethnicity, theoretically, to any dynamic theory of social stratification. Empirically, however, these factors are related to stratification patterns in plural societies. Moreover, these societies do not conform to the expectations of normative functionalist theory.

If priority is to be given to race, culture and ethnicity, then, the empirical links between these factors, on the one hand, and class, status and power, on the other, must be explained in terms of a theory of the origin and development of the plural society.

4) 'Race, Conflict and the Plural Society', D. Lockwood, p. 62
Pluralists, it is further argued, do not possess such a theory. What they do, consequently, is to present ad hoc historical analyses of the (exogenous) origins of particular plural societies, on the one hand, and static analyses of the structural aspects of pluralism present in these societies, on the other. The result, in Cox's words, is that

The commonplaces of race relations together with their distortions are... couched in the abstract, imprecise terminology of 'pluralism'.

These criticisms, too, point to different basic assumptions made by the people involved. The basic point at issue, moreover, seems to be the distribution of racial, cultural and ethnic characteristics in a society, and the relations between these and other variables which are conceived of within the four sectors of a society: the cultural, social, political and economic. This point will be covered in the conceptual scheme.

In conclusion, three differences between certain pluralists and those who use the two meta-theories discussed in the previous chapter have been identified. The first concerned the role which the value-system played in a society. This value system is closely linked with the 'cultural' sector introduced in the previous chapter. The second concerned social behaviour as such. This point is relevant to this study in the sense that a sociological assessment of a plural society is to be made. Third, the link between race, culture and ethnicity, on the one hand, and the cultural, social, political and economic sectors of a society, on the other, needs to be specified.

(b) The Basic Common Perspective: Social Order in Society

The central problem posed by the plural society approach is that

of the peaceful functioning of the institutions of a plural society. These institutions, in large part, are rooted in separate 'plural' sectors of the society. These plural sectors, moreover, are usually of racial, cultural or ethnic nature. How, then, pluralists ask, does the society cope with these 'centrifugal' plural forces within itself? The answers which are offered, are usually in terms of power and coercion, common economic concerns and a monopoly by one sector of the power-structure.

Quite clearly, pluralists pose the question of social order in an holistic and structural context. The context is holistic in that the prime unit of analysis is a society. The problem of social order, therefore, focuses upon explanations given for the peaceful persistence, over time, of a plural society in terms of behaviour within plural sectors. The level of analysis remains, for the most part, that of racial, cultural and ethnic groups within a society. The context is also structural in the sense that behaviour within these groups is considered to be, again for the most part, institutionalized behaviour. The problem of social order is conceived of in terms of conflict and consensus arising from these differing institutional systems - in terms of, that is, these differing structures contained within a society.

J.S. Furnivall who may be called the first pluralist, conceived of a plural society as a developing colony. 7) Though there is deep disagreement about the colonial status of a plural society, pluralists generally agree that such a society is one with a relatively developed economic and relatively modern political system. 8) In general, then, they assume that there is an ongoing, relatively developed, process of structural differentiation present in the society.

Pluralists also agree that race and ethnicity are not, in themselves, differentially distributed in a society. It becomes

7) More exactly, Furnivall wrote of a colonial dependency in the tropics. This will be dealt with at length in Chapter Three.
8) M.G. Smith attempts to generalize the class of plural societies by including within it, undeveloped societies. This exception will be dealt with at length in Chapter Four.
necessary, therefore, for them to analyze this distribution and its effects upon social order in a plural society in terms of other variables. These variables can be identified and analyzed within the context of the cultural, the social, the political and the economic sectors of a society.

In conclusion, then, the following points of common concern amongst pluralists have been stated:

(a) Their central concern is that of the maintenance of societal order.
(b) This concern is rooted in an holistic and structural framework.
(c) The plural society is conceptualized as a developing or relatively developed society.
(d) Societal order is explained in terms of relationships between two sets of variables. On the one hand, race, culture and ethnicity form one set. On the other, variables based upon the cultural, social, political and economic sectors of a society.

The arguments developed in the previous chapter showed that normative functionalists and coercion theorists share these concerns. First, social order in society is basic to their theory-building. Second, their theories are also holistic and structural. Third, both pay most attention to developing and developed societies. Fourth, relations between the four sectors of a society (the cultural, social, political and economic) present the major framework in which social order is discussed.

The meta-theory pluralists use, differs from those of normative functionalists and coercion theorists at one point. Pluralists claim that the variables of race, culture and ethnicity can, under certain circumstances, be of critical sociological importance for the maintenance of social order in plural societies. This claim represents the crux of the pluralist argument. The conceptual scheme which is being developed here will be used to analyze and test arguments supporting this claim.
(c) **The Conceptual Scheme**

Race, culture and ethnicity are concepts which are central to the pluralist approach. In this study, an ethnic group is understood to refer to a population which

1. is largely biologically self-perpetuating;
2. shares fundamental cultural values;
3. makes up a field of communication and interaction;
4. has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.  

A race is understood to refer to an ethnic group which is, in part, distinguished and identified in terms of (purported) physical differences of its members.

It is imperative, however, to stress the sociological nature of this study. Ultimately, an explanation for social order in plural societies is sought in terms of the interaction of the members of those societies. This explanation, consequently, must relate cultural, ethnic and racial variables to variables embedded in the actions of persons and groups. It has been shown that these variables must be of the same type as the three classical variables of stratification: class, status and party. Since the critical question posed by pluralists is that concerning social order, however, these stratification variables will not be chosen. Rather, variables will be chosen which will be embedded in the four sectors of a society: the cultural, social, political and economic sectors.

A plural society contains identifiable ethnic and racial groups. This accounts for its plural nature. On the other hand, as a

9) See *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, F. Barth (ed.), 'Introduction'.

10) It is certainly true that this double identification (by the group itself and by others) boils down to a cultural definition of a racial group, as Cross argues. The important point is that these physical criteria remain extrinsic referents, as Kuper points out. See: 'Book Review of Race and Racism', M. Cross, p. 302. For Kuper's argument, see Chapter Five.
developing or relatively developed society, it contains a common economy and a state which is separate from the structures within the plural groups. Social order in such a society can be analyzed from two quite different perspectives.

Social order can be considered problematic at the level of the actors in a given situation. This has been called Hobbes' perspective. On the other hand, the problem of social order can be posed at the level of the society viewed as a social system. This second perspective focuses rather on the sectors of a society. It was shown in the previous chapter that Parsons began with the former perspective and paid increasing attention to the latter as he became more interested in what he called developed societies. The focus of coercion theorists remained upon the latter perspective.

David Lockwood has assigned terms to these two levels of analysis. The terms he uses are social integration and system integration. Whereas the problem of social integration focuses attention upon the orderly or conflictful relationships between actors, the problem of system integration focuses on the orderly or conflictful relationship between the parts of a social system. 11)

In addition, Lockwood argues that social integration refers to consensus among these actors. He does not specify, moreover, whether this consensus is based upon a system of common ultimate ends shared by these actors, or whether it is based upon compliance to the exigencies of the actors' situation. In short, then, social integration may include value consensus, but not necessarily. It is, for this reason, applicable to both variants of the explanation given for social order: normative functionalism and coercion theory.

11) 'Social Integration and System Integration', D. Lockwood, p. 245. Emphasis in the original.
System integration, Lockwood argues, points to 'functional interdependence'\(^{12}\): to the absence of what was earlier called skewness or imbalances between the sectors of a society. In developing or developed societies, such imbalances are constantly present (as was shown in the last chapter). Problem of system integration are endemic, therefore, in such societies.

In a plural society, little social integration is to be expected. The different plural groups in this society each form areas of social integration within themselves. The existence of consensus (and especially value-consensus) at the societal level becomes highly problematic. In a developing plural society, on the other hand, system integration is imperative for the maintenance of social order. It is important, thus, to inquire into the goals which are set and pursued in the four sectors of a plural society. It is also important to ascertain who sets these collective goals and whether these goals clash with one another (producing system integration problems).

It is for these reasons that the variables chosen will each be based upon one of the four sectors of a society. It is for these reasons, moreover, that each variable will be defined in terms of power. In fact, system integration can be analyzed in terms of the collective goals set and pursued in the different sectors of a society; in terms of the relations between these goals; and in terms of opposition to them.

Most generally, power can be defined, in Dahl's words, as referring to "subsets of relations among social units such that the behaviors of one or more units (the responsive units, \(R\)) depend in some circumstances on the behavior of other units (the controlling units, \(C\))."\(^{13}\)

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\(^{13}\) 'Power', R. Dahl, p. 407.
This general statement must be specified to become useful to this study. Specification is directed (i) by the need for a conception of power at the holistic or societal level and (ii) by the need for a conception of power based upon the four sectors of a society.

Both controlling units (C, the power-wielders) and responsive units (R, the power-subjects) can be superindividual entities such as groups or systems. Power, moreover, is assumed to be relational (rather than a property of a unit); impositional (to ensure that R responds even against its 'will'); intentional (referring to goals set by C for R amongst others); and, fourth, potential rather than episodic (in the sense that power is considered an ability or capacity). The definition used here, then, will be Lehman's:

*Power refers to the capacity of some unit (C) acting as an agent of the system to overcome the resistance of system members (R) in setting, pursuing and implementing collective goals.* (16)

It is assumed that C, the power-wielder, has access to sanctions to overcome the resistance of R, the power-subject. Parsons' four-type sanction scheme will be used. Any one of these four types, then, can be used to overcome this possible resistance of R. Each sanction type, moreover, corresponds to one of the four sectors of a society.

At this point, Jessop's model is followed quite closely:

"We thus distinguish between four main types of power - economic, military or political, social and cultural. Within this general framework we may say that the ultimate basis of economic power is control over the means of production, distribution and exchange of goods and services; that of political power is control of the political capability to set and achieve certain collective goals in the economic realm; that of social power is control of the social capability to form and maintain a collective system of social norms; that of cultural power is control of the cultural capability to create a collective body of cultural symbols and ideas."

14) For an analysis of macro-analysis and macro-power, see Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations, H.M. Blalock; Toward a Macrosociology of Power, E.W. Lehman. 15) There is a voluminous literature on this; see Power and Discontent, W. Gamson; Lehman (op.cit.); 'Some Problems in Defining Social Power', D. Wrong. 16) Lehman, op. cit., pp. 455, 456.
over the means of coercion; that of social power is control over the means of status attribution; and that of cultural power is control over the means of value creation, interpretation and maintenance." 17)

SEE TABLE II

These four analytical types of power are assumed to vary independently of one another. Hence skewness and imbalances between the four sectors can occur and will be related to the types of power in each sector, and to the effectiveness of the wielding of that power.

Problems of system integration can be analyzed in terms of the power which is wielded in each of the four sectors; in clashing collective goals set and pursued within these four sectors; and in the amount of control over the power-bases in these sectors.

Social integration depends upon the effectiveness of cultural and social power, which, in turn, depends upon the scope of the two power-bases. The first, control over societal values, and the second, control over the means of status attribution, are problematic in a plural society. It is to be expected, therefore, that little effective intentional sanctions can be used, at a societal level, over members of a plural society. The most effective sanctions (and, consequently, the most effective power-wielding) in such a society, will probably be situational: coercion and inducement.

For normative functionalism, power (i.e. political power) derives from legitimation and depends, ultimately, on control over societal values. For Marxists, (political) power is rooted in certain relations to the means of production and, hence, to control over the production process.

17) Jessop, op. cit., p. 58.
### TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of SANCTION:</th>
<th>SITUATIONAL</th>
<th>INTENTIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of POWER:</td>
<td>INDUCEMENT</td>
<td>PERSUASION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of BASIS:</td>
<td>ECONOMIC POWER</td>
<td>SOCIAL POWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of SANCTION:</td>
<td>CONTROL over the PRODUCTION Process</td>
<td>CONTROL over the Means of STATUS ATTRIBUTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of POWER:</td>
<td>COERCION</td>
<td>ACTIVATION OF COMMITMENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of BASIS:</td>
<td>POLITICAL POWER</td>
<td>CULTURAL POWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of SANCTION:</td>
<td>CONTROL over the Means of COERCION</td>
<td>CONTROL over VALUES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Situational Column:** C has control over R's situation. 
C can therefore change it to R's advantage (Positive); 
or to R's disadvantage (Negative).

**Intentional Column:** C has control over R's intentions. 
C can therefore change these to R's advantage (Positive); 
or to R's disadvantage (Negative).

(For a further discussion of these four types of sanctions, see "On the Concept of Political Power", T. Parsons).
In this study, power has been defined more generally as being analytically differentiable in terms of the four sectors of a society. Moreover, no theoretical dependence is assumed between these power-types. In contradistinction to normative functionalism, the possibility must be kept open, in Giddens' words, that "power (i.e. political power) extends as deeply into the roots of social life as do values and norms". In contradistinction to coercion theorists, power is assumed to be dependent upon neither the production process nor 'authority' relations in an association.

In a plural society, then, social order, at both social and system integration levels, can be analyzed in power terms. Since the plural groups within such a society are ethnic or racial by nature, it is to be expected that goals set and pursued within the four sectors of the society, will create tensions and imbalances because they are set for all members of the society. It becomes important, therefore, to inquire into which persons and groups are in power-wielding positions, and which persons and groups have gained control over the bases of power as they had been defined. Those who have gained control over such bases are in a position to apply effective sanctions when wielding power.

To analyze this problem, the idea of centre and periphery is introduced.

Society has a centre. There is a central zone in the structure of society... The centre..., is a phenomenon of the realm of values and beliefs. It is the centre of the order of symbols, of values and beliefs, which govern society... The centre is also a phenomenon of the realm of action. It is a

18) "Power" in the Recent Writings of Talcott Parsons', A. Giddens, p. 268.
structure of activities, of roles and persons, within the network of institutions... 19)

Center-periphery problems start from the center; that is, the center (if it is a center in any meaningful way) has control over the periphery. This seems obvious, yet it is crucial in the matter. Much of what we think about as conflict in politics can be restated in terms of the ways in which the center exercises its control over the periphery... 20)

The concept has been criticized for attempting to incorporate both a value-sphere and an action-sphere simultaneously (see first quotation), and for being defined in a circular fashion (see second quotation) 21). Here, following Jessop, 'centre refers to the structural aspect of power and comprises those organisations, groups and individuals who exercise most 'power' in a given social system'. 22)

Two dimensions of the concept need clarification. First, the question of the boundaries of the centre is obviously important. Units in the periphery, in fact, consists of 'organisations' and 'groups' which wield little power: those, in other words, not positioned in the centre. Methods of boundary delineation vary, of course, from society to society. Second, the relationship between the centre and the periphery can also vary. Lerner, for example, mentions three modes: that of disinterest in which those in the periphery are ignored by those in the centre; that of difference promotion; and that of dissidence reduction. 23) The latter two are treated as ways in which those in the centre attempt to maintain both their positions and order in a society. Difference promotion refers to the devolution of power to other

19) 'Centre and Periphery', E. Shils, p. 117.
20) 'Some Comments on Center-periphery Relations', D. Lerner, p. 259.
21) Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop, p. 54.
22) op. cit., p. 55,
23) 'Some Comments on Center-periphery Relations', D. Lerner, passim.
(newly formed) centres in the society; whilst dissidence reduction refers to the lessening of the unequal distribution of power within a society with one (main) centre.

The centre, here, refers to the coincidence, in the four sectors of a society, of power-wielding positions. A leading politician who is also a leading businessman and church-elder, may serve as an example. Each position this person fills, taken separately, defines a position of power within one sector. The strength of a centre is measured, first, in terms of the amount of control such positions have over the bases and sanctions allied with the power-types. Second, a centre is strong insofar as the capacity to wield all four types of power compatibly, coincides in such positions.

From this it follows that the centre is a structural concept - rather than one of action of value - and that it is defined, basically, in terms of the amount of overlap and scope of overlap between the four types of power. As such, the concept is not circular for the periphery is defined negatively, in power terms.

Centre-periphery relations have been discussed by a number of sociologists in the context of developing countries. Whereas in traditional societies units in the centre could ignore those in the periphery for the periphery was, as Shils puts it,

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24) Nonetheless, 'the area of political control as such must not come into question. When the political control of the center is either divided or disputed, or even, doubted, then the mode of difference promotion becomes unstable and disruptive.' op. cit., p. 261. Emphasis in the original.

25) Power was defined as a 'capacity' rather than the actual wielding during an 'episode'.


27) 'Centre and Periphery', E. Shils, p. 127.
outside 'society'; in developed societies, relations become inherently strained between the two. Whether it be through the growing common value system\(^{28}\) or through the revolutionary and secularizing orientations of the masses\(^{29}\), it seems accepted that what Weber called 'traditional authority' has disappeared. Both relations between the centre and the periphery and relations between the four sectors of a society are assumed to become troubled by an increase in the structural differentiation in that society.

Broadly speaking, then, the critical decision-making and goal-setting positions in each of the four sectors tend to overlap. The units\(^{30}\) filling these coincident positions control a broad base from which collective (societal) goals can be set, pursued and implemented.

The positions such units occupy, constitute the centre of that society. Such units attempt, by using these positions of power, to maintain peaceful co-operation between the institutions of that society.

Units in the centre are faced with two critical and recurrent problems. Both are brought about to a large extent by the process of development in the society. First, developing out of the inherent problem of system integration (especially in developing societies), there is a constant possibility that collective goals set in institutions within the four sectors clash. Under such circumstances, the centre is liable to split into a number of competing centres (and elites)\(^{31}\).

\(^{28}\) loc. cit.

\(^{29}\) 'Continuities and Changes in Systems of Stratification', S.N. Eisenstadt, p. 73.

\(^{30}\) In accordance with the definitions of power and centre being used here, these units can be organizations, groups and individuals.

\(^{31}\) It is, for these reasons, possible to speak of the development of more than one centre in a society. Different groups and organizations in one society may control different power-bases. These groups and organizations, then, may create their own centres. This immediately poses serious problems for the maintenance of social order in the society.
To avoid the formation of opposing centres, units turn to their control over the means of value creation, interpretation and maintenance, in other words, cultural power. Social power may also be used. Consensus (or social integration) amongst the units in the centre is critical here.

Second, units in the periphery are constantly attempting to gain a control over (especially) the reward structure of the society. Thus, they attempt to gain a greater control over the means of production, distribution and exchange of goods and services, in other words, economic power. Though other sanctions types are also used, those in the centre tend to apply coercion (or the threat of coercion) in this case. It is political power that is critical in the handling of centre-periphery relations.

These problems concerning social order are interdependent. The gravity of the first problem - that of system integration - depends upon the initial solidarity amongst units in the centre. It also depends upon the effectiveness of the centre's ideology (i.e. in how far units in the periphery accept the collective goals set in the cultural sector). This ideology is also important for the second problem: that of centre-periphery relations. In fact, if the units in the periphery accept political power as legitimate, peaceable relations with those in the centre can be maintained. In such a case, wide-spread social integration can contribute towards social order. This, in essence, is the normative functionalist view of social order.

Conversely, an effective monopoly of political power by units in the centre tends to increase their internal solidarity and to dissuade units in the periphery from making too great demands on the reward structure. In such a case, system integration (without wide-spread social integration) can contribute towards social order. This, in essence, is the coercion view of (short-term) social order.
In this study, both problems will be considered and both explanations for social order in a society will be analyzed. Moreover, in a plural society, the following arguments become feasible.

Little social integration (among the members of the plural society) is expected to be present. This is basically a result of the plural nature of the society. Moreover, as a result of the developing nature of the society, problems of system integration are expected. Consequently, it may be expected that positions in the centre tend to be monopolized by one ethnic or racial group. In this way, social integration in the centre can be maintained (in terms of the common ethnic and racial origin of its members) and system integration can be maintained by the use of political power over the units in a periphery. In short, then, a monopoly of the bases of political and economic power by members of one ethnic or racial group can be expected.

SUMMARY
In the previous section, a conceptual scheme was developed. This scheme contains a number of implicit assumptions, a number of inter-related concepts and a number of general hypotheses (relating to plural societies). These will be reviewed briefly.

The scheme was developed explicitly so that it could analyze social order in societies, in an holistic and structural fashion. The following are its more important assumptions:

(a) Social order is defined as peaceful co-existence in the operation of social institutions in a society.

(b) Explanations for social order are sought in terms of the interaction of members of a society. The scheme, then, is explicitly sociological.

(c) A society and its four sectors are considered to form systems.

(d) Structural differentiation is assumed to be an ongoing process in a society.
A minimal normative order and a minimal degree of effective wielding of political power are necessary conditions for the maintenance of social order in such (developing) societies.  

The conceptual scheme developed, to an extent, out of the discussion, in the previous chapter, of two other approaches to order. Three new concepts have been introduced. They are the social and system integration distinction; a conception of power based upon the four sectors of a society; and the centre-periphery distinction. Though the first concept was originally defined by Lockwood, a coercion theorist, and the latter two by normative functionalists, it has been shown in this chapter where these concepts (as defined here) differ from their original definitions.

In fact, social integration may (though not necessarily) refer to value consensus in a society. Second, power is defined in such a way that it does not necessarily refer to legitimation (nor to control over the means of production, for that matter). Third, the centre does not refer to a value-sphere but to structural aspects of power-wielding in a society.

The critical difference between the pluralists' explanations of order in (plural) societies and those of normative functionalists and coercion theorists is rooted in the priority which the variables of race, ethnicity and culture must, under certain circumstances, be given in such explanations.

As a result of this difference, the following general hypotheses relating to plural societies, have been suggested:

32) Numerous other assumptions, of course, have been made. They are not directly relevant to this particular scheme. See, for example, the assumptions discussed by Jessop in his study: Social Order, Reform and Revolution, p. 81ff.

33) A plural society, to this point, is defined as a developing society which contains a number of well-defined ethnic and/or racial groups.
(a) A plural society will develop a common economy and state-structure.

(b) Little cultural and social power which can be effectively wielded over most members of the society, is to be expected.

(c) Consequently, system integration, rather than social integration, is expected to be the basis of social order.

(d) One ethnic (or racial) group tends to gain a monopoly of the centre of the society.

In the following chapters, this conceptual scheme will be applied to the works of a number of representative pluralists. In this way, their explanations of social order in plural societies will be discussed, the above hypotheses will be tested and refined, and pluralists' explanations for the origin and directions of change of plural societies will be introduced.

In the concluding chapter, then, a theoretical scheme, based upon the scheme developed in this chapter and upon analyses of pluralists' works, will be developed. In this theoretical scheme, particular attention will be paid to the origin of a plural society 34) and to the probable directions of change in such societies. 35) In this way, the critical difference between the pluralists' meta-theory and that of normative functionalists and of coercion theorists can be assessed.

34) According to Lockwood, it was shown, earlier in this chapter, that the question of origins was the main difference between Marxist and pluralist assumptions.

35) It is here, of course, that expectations defined by normative functionalism and coercion theory, have failed when applied to plural societies. See quotation on page 3 of this study.
The object of this chapter is, first, to introduce the term, plural society, with an analysis of the works of Furnivall who was the first person to conceptualise it; and, second, to apply the scheme generated in the second chapter to this conception.

Furnivall was the first writer to refer to the 'plural society' as a distinctive class of societies sharing important characteristics. He was Dutch-born, trained as an economist and had many years of administrative and academic experience in British and Dutch colonies in the Far East. It is important to keep in mind that Furnivall conceived of the plural society in the dying years of Dutch and British colonialism in the Far East: Netherlands India and Colonial Policy and Practice, his most important works as far as the concept of the plural society is concerned, were originally published in 1939 and 1948 respectively. Both the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of his work, as well as labels such as 'liberal colonial theorists' and 'naive...radical', should be seen in this light.

The Plural Society: Its Origin and Development

It is quite clear that Furnivall restricted plural societies to 'tropical dependencies' or colonies. It is just as clear that

1) 'Enkele interpretasies van het begrip 'plurale maatschappij', O.D. van den Muijzenberg, p. 69.
2) For further biographical notes, see his own Colonial Policy and Practice, 'Preface', and The Plural Society in Africa, M. Fortes, passim.
3) For other works consulted, see Bibliography.
5) 'Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism', L. Braithwaite, p. 817.
Furnivall explained the origin of these plural societies directly in terms of the deliberate economic expansion of the western metropolitan countries into the tropics: "It is, indeed, generally true that colonisation has arisen out of commerce, and not commerce out of colonisation: the doctrine that trade follows the flag is quite modern, and in history the flag has followed trade".  

Before the European explorers, fortune-hunters and colonisers arrived, Furnivall argued, Oriental society was dominated by strict custom, personal authority and traditional religion. Social welfare took precedence over individual welfare. This conception is essentially similar to the Durkheimian segmental society characterized by mechanical solidarity and repressive law. As is seen from the following quotations, Furnivall saw pre-colonial tropical society as custom-bound, economically repressive and integrated about a common set of religious values:

In all social life there is a conflict between individual and social welfare... But social organization is so weak that for the survival of the society individual activities must be limited by customary restraints, and custom is strongest when enforced by a religious sanction... Hence we find religious and military interests dominant in Oriental societies; economic freedom would be incompatible with their survival.  

(Before colonisation), a typical village in Upper Burma was rather like a large family, with its life centring round the Buddhist monastery and the soil... Social and economic life were regulated by village custom and social demand prevailed over individual demand. The general pattern of social life was summarized in a proverb, "Cultivation gives place to houses, and houses to the monastery"; religion came first, man second, and money last.  

6) Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 4.  
7) 'Capitalism in Indonesia', J.S. Furnivall, p. 66.  
8) 'Some Problems of Tropical Economy', J.S. Furnivall, p. 165. Emphasis in the original.
In the West, in Europe, on the other hand:

Greece liberated reason from the restraint of custom; Rome substituted the stronger rule of law for the rule of custom; and Christianity furnished a moral principle stronger than the rule of law for restraining rational activities within the bounds of social welfare. The happy fusion of these principles in the Renaissance allowed a high degree of freedom without disorganising society. 9)

These distinctions created two quite different types of society. In both there is a common culture which contributes to the maintenance of order in that society. The former type is characterized by traditional authority; in the latter, there is rational-legal authority. In both, moreover, economic activities are considered subordinate to the social welfare of persons in the society. The common value system and its corresponding set of norms - what Furnivall called 'social will' and 'social demand' - proscribe economic activity detrimental to the society.

When expansionist capitalist economic forces start acting in new colonial societies, however, they become loosened from their peculiar western rational-legal context. These new societies incorporating a number of traditional cultural groups, lack both a common value system and a corresponding set of norms. They are consequently qualitatively different from the two types of society discussed above. Furnivall called them plural societies.

This plural society will now be discussed on three levels: the societal, the 'sectional' and the individual. First, though the origin of a plural society is found in the economic expansion of Europe, its actual creation is the work of the colonial

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9) 'Capitalism in Indonesia', J.S. Furnivall, p. 67.
power. It is, then, a political entity in the sense that it is created and run by a foreign colonial power. The reason for its creation is, as has been shown, to promote economic expansion. Equally, the effect of colonial rule is to promote this same expansion: "Ordinarily control has been established for the economic advantage of the colonial power, and the general result has been the domination of tropical society by economic forces". 10)

The social consequences of the unleashing of these economic forces are explicable in terms of two fundamental economic principles. The first, 'the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest' 11) is considered to apply independent of human will. In short, this principle states that a person who can subsist at a 'cheaper' standard of living, has a better chance of survival in an economic system than his fellow-man - assuming that 'all other things are equal'. The second principle is 'the desire of gain, the economic motive of profit' 12), a rational principle which Furnivall considered a fundamental part of 'human nature'. These two principles are, of course, operative in traditional 'tropical' society and rational-legal western society. They are tempered and directed by the over-arching social will of both these societies, however. As has been seen, economic activity is subordinate to social welfare. This is not the case in a plural society.

Men coming from different traditional societies, meet one another in the market-places of their new common plural society. Sharing no common cultural background, they interact solely in terms of these two economic principles: the survival of the

10) 'Some Problems of Tropical Economy', J.S. Furnivall, p. 162.

11) Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 290. This is a Social-Darwinist assumption which would today be unacceptable methodologically in that it assumes that this principle holds in some 'natural' sense, all other things being equal.

cheapest and the drive for profit. The only restraint placed upon them is the new western legal system which promotes laissez-faire capitalist activity. Although these economic forces penetrate far into the rural areas, it is above all in the towns and cities that the characteristics of the plural society are seen most clearly.

One consequence of this atomistic, potentially chaotic picture of the market situation is, in Rex's words, "the 'Market problem of order', the problem of why life in the market-place is not poor, nasty, solitary, brutish and short, and, if not, why not".\(^{13}\) The wider society, Furnivall argued, must be held together not only through the common economic activity of its members, but also by western law backed up by coercive political means. The colonial power maintains a monopoly over the running of the state.

A further consequence is that work categories tend to coincide with ethnic and cultural groups. In fact, though anyone is free to participate in economic activity in a market-place, colonial economic interest groups and the functioning of the two economic principles soon create an economic hierarchy broadly based on ethnicity:

Everywhere..., the working of economic forces makes for tension between groups with competing or conflicting interests; between town and country, industry and agriculture, capital and labour... but in a plural society there is a corresponding cleavage along racial lines. The foreign elements live in the towns, the natives in the rural areas; commerce and industry are in foreign hands and the natives are mainly occupied in agriculture; foreign capital employs native labour or imported coolies...\(^{14}\)

\(^{13}\) 'The Plural Society in Sociological Theory', J. Rex, p. 115.

\(^{14}\) Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 311.
Ethnicity, race and a defined stratum in the economic hierarchy all tend to coincide in a plural society.

These consequences, Furnivall insisted, are unintended and create long-term problems for the colonial power, the traditional leaders within the society and all its members. "The plural society was not planned; it happened." This, of course, substantially complicates planned solutions to such problems.

A traditional cultural group, when it becomes one of the 'sections' of a plural society, loses the economic role it played for its members. Indirectly, however, membership in this cultural section becomes equivalent to access to certain economic roles in the commercial economic systems of the larger society (and lack of access to others). Before colonization, Furnivall considered these cultural groups as comparable to large extended families. In their subordinate position within a plural society, he saw them as work-groups in a large factory:

The fundamental characteristic of the organization of a plural society as a whole is indeed the structure of a factory, organized for production... Organization of this type, for economic rather than for social ends, and the accompanying lack of a social demand common to all sections have a vital effect on the internal structure of each section.

One consequence of the emphasis on production rather than on social life, which is characteristic of a plural society, is a sectional division of labour; although the primary distinction between the groups may be race, creed or colour, each section comes to have its own functions in production, and there is a tendency towards the grouping of several elements into distinct economic castes.... 16)

On the one hand, then, traditional ways disappear as individuals compete with one another in common market-places. On the other hand, however, ethnic groupings re-emerge as work categories in this new 'industrial' context.

15) 'Some Problems of Tropical Economy', J.S. Furnivall, p. 169.
16) Netherlands India, J.S. Furnivall, p. 450.
In social and cultural terms, too, the importance of the cultural section decreases. Its value system and corresponding set of norms waver in the new economic climate and the resultant centralization and urbanization draw members of these sections away from their traditional areas.

Finally, in political terms, the traditional authority structure of these sections is destroyed, first through indirect rule\(^{17}\); then, overtly, by the monopoly of the state by the foreign group in the larger society. In the polity then, these sections come to play a minimal role if any: "nothing remains between the Government and twenty-three million individuals".\(^{18}\)

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17) See Colonial Policy and Practice, Ch. VIII for a discussion. Succinctly, Furnivall writes: "In maintaining order the colonial power must choose between the western principle of law and the tropical system of relying on personal authority, between direct and indirect rule". (op. cit., p. 8)

18) op. cit., p. 298. It may be objected that this section over-emphasizes the weakening of traditional cultural solidarity. O.D. van den Muijzenberg goes so far as to write of a contradiction in Furnivall's conception at this point. It is true that, within the bounds of one chapter, Furnivall could write that, 'Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways', and then point to the weakening of these sectional ties in terms discussed above. The critical point, however, is not this seeming contradiction but the changing function which group ties played in the life of a member of a plural society. Culturally and socially, though relevant to such a member, his section becomes a 'crowd and not a community', and 'the sectional common social will is feeble'. In economic terms, 'the feebleness of social will is reflected in the weakness of social demand which is the economic aspect of social will'. Finally, in political terms though headmen still exist, 'public opinion embodied in the headman is no longer able to control (the desire of individual gain) in the public interest'. See 'Enkele interpretasies van het begrip ' plurale maatschappij'. O.D. van den Muijzenberg, pp. 77,78 and Colonial Policy and Practice, pp. 304, 307, 308, 309, 298.
An individual in a plural society, finally, relates to his society, Furnivall would argue, in two important ways: first, subjected to the 'natural' law of the survival of the cheapest and the instinctive human drive for profit, he buys and sells, selfishly and alone, in the market-places of the cities and towns. The only constraint placed upon these exchanges is that of western law which also creates the second relationship which orders an individual's world. As a subject in a plural society, he must conform to these laws and if he doesn't he will be sanctioned by the coercive institutions of the state. Since the state is monopolized by the colonial power, and since there exists no common 'social will', or value system in the society as a whole, this relationship is basically a coercive one between subject and state.

The individual still retains ties with his traditional section, of course. The important point, however, is that his two new relationships of 'homo economicus' 19) and of subject in the larger society become more important to him. By implication, then, his traditional culture no longer fulfills its traditional economic and political roles in his life. The values and norms it represents no longer cover his new political and economic realities. Finally, then, the complete lack of a new cultural relationship with his new society must be seen as a third characteristic of the individual in a plural society. His 'social life is incomplete'. 20)

The critical question, now, refers to the maintenance of societal order in such a colonial set-up. Furnivall writes:

In a plural society the sections are not segregated; the members of several units are intermingled and meet as individuals; the union is not voluntary but is imposed

19) The term is used by van den Muijzenberg, op. cit. p. 74ff.
20) Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 306.
by the colonial power and by the force of economic circumstances; and the union cannot be dissolved without the whole society relapsing into anarchy. 21)

To try to evaluate Furnivall's conception of a plural society, the model generated in the second chapter will now be applied to it.

THE PLURAL SOCIETY AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

Furnivall differentiated between three societal types: the traditional, the western rational-legal and the plural. The critical difference between the first two and the third was the lack of a common value system in the plural society: 'in the (plural) society as a whole there is no common social will', 22) This point seems equivalent to saying that such a society exists without its members sharing a minimal consensus. This in turn can lead to a debate about whether societies need such a consensus to be able to exist. M.G. Smith's exchange with L. Braithwaite epitomizes this argument.23) Here, instead, the scheme generated in the second chapter of this study will be applied to Furnivall's conception.

The plural society is, in the first place, a political entity created by a colonial power. Expansionary western capitalist economic forces brought about its creation. The centre of a plural society, then, consists of positions of political control over state institutions and economic control over these forces. Positions in the centre are monopolized by a foreign colonial elite group.

21) op. cit. p. 307.
22) Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 308.
23) The Plural Society in the British West Indies, M.G. Smith, 'Preface' and 'Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism', L. Braithwaite, passim. This argument was mentioned earlier, in Chapter Two, section One.
The strength of this foreign centre resides in two facts. First, the centre's political power, theoretically rooted in western law but backed up by the vast coercive sanctions of the colonial metropolitan power, is used to promote colonial economic interests. Political power is used to secure a substantial amount of economic power. Second, the colonial elite group manifests an internal cultural homogeneity which lessens the likelihood of clashing collective goals being set and pursued within the centre. This group rules the colony basically for its own collective economic profit and in accordance with the colonial power's policy (and the two rarely clash).  

The weakness of this centre resides in two other facts. First, it wields, in the society at large, no social or cultural power. It cannot manipulate common values or the means of status attribution to its own advantage for the simple reason that neither exist. In cases of recalcitrance among members of the periphery, the centre cannot fall back on shared commitments. It cannot use persuasion. It must use situational sanctions: inducement or coercion. Second, those in the centre cannot direct or control economic growth. Furnivall insisted that economic forces, once loosened from their western context, take on a life of their own. The two principles, one 'natural' and the other 'rational-instinctive', dominate the society. The plural society 'happened'. The centre does not possess enough economic power to direct growth. Structural differentiation is guided more by the principles of the survival of the cheapest and the profit motive (and their social consequences) than by the governing foreign elite group.

24) Furnivall wrote: '...in colonial relations humanitarian ideas do not control but are controlled by economic circumstances...', 'Some Problems in Tropical Economy', J.S. Furnivall, p. 164.
One such consequence, the creation in the economic sector of a caste-like group hierarchy which is based largely on ethnicity and race, seems to be the result of both the centre's wielding of power for the advantage of the colonial elite and the unintended workings of the economic forces in the society. This, however, is a late development in a plural society.

In the earlier stages of development, when colonial government is mediated through indirect rule, natives of the area welcome this foreign political hegemony. The periphery, here, contains important traditional centres of social and cultural power. In addition, economic rewards in the eyes of profit-motivated individual members of the periphery seem greater than under their traditional governments.

In time, however, the importance of these traditional centres diminishes and their role becomes one of placing a person in the periphery within a caste-like work-group out of which he cannot move. Power-centres move away from traditional areas to the cities and towns which contain the most important market-places. As individuals in the society, natives are involved in the greater economic and political sectors as homines economici and subjects. Possible centres of opposing power in the periphery are dissipated by these processes of atomization and individualization upon which Furnivall layed so much stress. In its colonial context, a plural society is a forced union which would relapse into anarchy without the centre's situational sanctions.

Seen as a factory, a plural society contains a culturally homogeneous foreign management motivated by profit to increase production. Employees are divided into cultural groups and assigned tasks accordingly. There is no binding belief amongst all members apart from a basic individual profit drive.

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26) Colonial Policy and Practice, pp. 292, 293.
27) op. cit., p. 307.
Production itself, however, is not controlled by the management but is driven by a logic all of its own. This logic is partially explicable in terms of the natural law of the survival of the cheapest. The social consequences of this increased production, then, are uncontrollable. The management maintains control, on the other hand, over employees through wages and, if necessary, coercion. Without these two sanctions, the economic logic of production and its ensuing consequences would soon reduce order and surplus to anarchy and stagnation.

The factory brings about the gradual dissolution of traditional cultural life, the atomization of an individual's life, and yet locks him in his racial category to his economic disadvantage. For the apparent freedom of competition in the open market-place, a native is left with this racial and ethnic work-category and with an 'incomplete' social life.

There is no consensus in the society except insofar as the rational-instinctive drive for profit can be considered an underlying value in any society. System integration - functional interdependence between the four sectors of a society - on the other hand, is present to the extent that the foreign elite succeeds in directing economic development in a way compatible with colonial policy. This, in turn, accords with the western cultural values of this elite group. Given the economic logic of a plural society, system integration is present to the extent that the centre maintains political and economic power in the society and cultural and social homogeneity within itself. So long as Furnivall's theory remains within this context: 'an holistic, comparative theory of colonisation and its effects' 28), societal order.

will be maintained by the control wielded by the centre and by the workings of economic forces.

Outside of this context, the picture changes substantially. Furnivall's suggested prescriptive solution to the inherent problems of a plural society shows this:

It is quite clear that Furnivall considered plural societies unsatisfactory social arrangements and unhappy places.

Profit, progress and welfare, are all linked together on a single chain, and economic forces, unless controlled by social will, corrode the chain that links them. Man is a social animal, but economic forces tend to convert human society into a business concern. In tropical dependencies the outward and visible sign of this is the evolution of a plural society...29)

The solution he conceived of, shortly, was the creation of a common value system, the creation of a cultural power base in the form of a nationalistic movement in the society as a whole.

But nationalism, dangerous everywhere, has peculiar dangers in the plural society of the tropics. For it not only sharpens the edge of antagonism between groups, but sets the large native majority against the government representing the colonial power, weakening instead of strengthening society... (The) dangers and difficulties are due chiefly to the fact that the interests of the colonial power are, or seem and are thought to be, closely identified with one group in the plural society, the group representing European capital interests. The solution lies in separating economic and political control..... 29)

Furnivall desired a rational-legal society in the tropics in which enlightened western ideas could join with native cultural loyalties to create a social will strong enough to temper and channel the destructive free-wheeling capitalist economic forces of the plural society.

He hoped for a new centre whose power would be based on the old

29) Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 303.
30) 'Some Problems of Tropical Economy', J.S. Furnivall, p. 172.
cultural centres and certain of the new imported western values. Persons in this centre would rely more on intentional sanctions - grounded ultimately in nationalism - than on inducement and coercion. The periphery, then, would be drawn into this new independent society through activation of nationalistic commitments and through the influence of the new leaders.

The danger of this approach can be highlighted by looking at the centre. Once the inducement and coercion of the foreign elite in the centre are taken away, competing interest groups seek to control the means of production, the state institutions and the traditional cultural centres. The setting of clashing collective goals in the new centre may well shatter the order of the new society.

CONCLUSION

Social order - the peaceful co-existence of social institutions - in a plural society is maintained within a colonial context. The foreign centre which remains compact and effective in its wielding of political and economic power, contributes towards this peaceful functioning. The existence of a universal profit motivation freed from any restraining ideology, serves as another binding factor. The atomization of individuals who are drawn away from their traditional ways of thinking and living, inhibits any traditional opposition movements among the natives of the society. In this way, traditional cultural (and social) bases of power are eroded. The only common belief left in the society is that of individual profit-seeking within a laissez-faire colonial economy.

Given inexorable capitalist economic development, order is maintained in a plural society basically because the centre is monopolized by a foreign elite group who wield effective political and economic power, and, second, because those in the periphery, as a possible opposition to those in the centre, are
rendered harmless. Individuals, in fact, live incomplete atomistic lives with recourse to neither their traditional cultures nor to a new societal culture.

NOTE

It may be objected that the 'dualistic' theory \(^{31}\) of the Dutch economist, J.H. Boeke, was as influential in the original creation of the plural society model as Furnivall's contribution. This is claimed by a number of commentators. \(^{32}\) There are however, important differences in the two approaches.

It is certainly true that Furnivall was aware of and used Boeke's ideas in his own works. \(^{33}\) Boeke conceived of a 'dual' society as one characterized by two economies: the one modern, capital-intensive, and technologically developed; the other traditional involving peasant agriculture and village handicrafts. A feature of this second economy is its 'almost complete absence of profit seeking'. \(^{34}\)

Clearly, then, though there are certain similarities between the two theories, Boeke emphasized the different sectors of the economy to such an extent that Furnivall's two fundamental economic principles cannot function. This difference is seen most clearly when one looks at the different policy implications of the two approaches. Furnivall stressed the creation of common value-system in the society which could harness the common economic forces for the new nation's benefit. Nationalism was to be the answer. Boeke stressed the backwardness of the traditional economy and argued for an expansion of the western economic system into these 'backward' areas. Boeke was a diffusionist.

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\(^{32}\) 'The Question of Pluralism', O.C. Cox; 'Discussion of the paper', S. Rottenberg in 'Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism', L. Braithwaite.

\(^{33}\) Netherlands India, Ch. 13; Colonial Policy and Practice, Ch. 8.

CHAPTER FOUR

M.G. SMITH AND THE PLURAL SOCIETY: AN APPROACH FROM CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

M.G. Smith is an anthropologist who has had field experience in West Africa and the West Indies. Intensely interested in Furnivall's conception of the plural society, he adapted this to his circumstances. In so doing, he diverged quite substantially from the Furnivallian model on two points: First, the new conception was much more general in its application. Smith, in effect, loosened the model from its colonial (and 'tropical') context and made it universal in application. Second, he changed priorities in his discussion of the plural society. Furnivall, as has been seen, laid great stress on economic forces in the origin of a plural society. Smith, on the other hand, defines a plural society, ultimately, in terms of cultural differences. This divergence must lessen the validity of any claim Smith makes as to continuity between Furnivall's and his works. In fact, he has been criticized by at least three writers for making this very claim.¹)

The new model, then, will be different from its predecessor in certain crucial respects. Before turning to a study of it, moreover, it must be pointed out that Smith is a social anthropologist and, as such, uses a technical language substantially different from most main-stream sociology. For this reason, his model of a plural society will be discussed under the following subtitles: (a) Identification of the crucial analytic concepts; (b) The ways in which these concepts are used to build up the framework of analysis; (c) The methods used to differentiate between unitary, heterogeneous and plural societies; (d) The types of specific analysis suggested for the study of plural societies. Finally, the scheme generated in Chapter Two will be applied to this model.

The development of M.G. Smith's model took place in two phases. These can be found in two publications: *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* which includes the seminal essay of phase one ('Social and Cultural Pluralism'); and *Pluralism in Africa*, edited by M.G. Smith and Leo Kuper, which forms the main work of phase two.

(a) **Identification of crucial concepts**

In his definitions and discussions of the three terms, social structure, institution and corporate unit, Smith refers repeatedly to Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Nadel. It is these three concepts which form the centre of his framework of analysis. Each will now be discussed.

An **institution** consists of standardized modes of co-activity. The family and marriage are two examples. Elsewhere Smith writes that 'institutions are collective modes of action, organization and orientation, both normative and cognitive'.

**Social structure** refers to the complex network of social relations. It is closely allied with the concept of institution and institutions, in fact, make up 'the matrix of social structure'. By quoting first Fortes and then Radcliffe-Brown, Smith tries to further explicate this concept:

Social structure is not an aspect of culture, but the entire culture of a given people handled in a special frame of theory...

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3) Nadel's definition quoted in *The Plural Society in the British West Indies*, p. 78.

4) *Pluralism in Africa*, p. 28.

5) *The Plural Society in the British West Indies*, pp. 80, 163.

6) *Pluralism in Africa*, p. 91.
and

Social institutions, in the sense of standardized modes of behavior, constitute the machinery by which a social structure, a network of social relations, maintains its existence and its continuity. 7)

A corporate unit can be of two types: a corporate category or a corporate group. Corporate status is achieved if a group has the following characteristics: 'presumed perpetuity, closure, determinate identity and membership'. 8) This, in fact, defines a corporate category.

If a corporate category contains 'this inclusive organization, a set of distinctive common affairs and the procedures and autonomy necessary to regulate them', 9) then it is called a corporate group. An acephalous society and a slave population in a larger society are examples of corporate categories. A nation-state (with an explicit government) is an example of a corporate group.

(b) Conceptual construction of the analytic framework

Institutions are not isolated from one another in the sense of being independent 'standardized modes of co-activity'. Rather, they tend to cluster and form, hence, institutional subsystems and then an institutional system. This clustering takes place because 'the collective modes of action, organization and orientation' in different institutions are usually mutually supporting. In fact, institutions dealing with 'the same phases of life' 10) form institutional subsystems. In this complex, there tends to be a greater compactness and integration within than between subsystems within the institutional system. For example, marriage, kinship and education - at 'the same phases of life' - deal with social life...

7) op. cit. p. 437.
8) op. cit. p. 31.
9) loc. cit.
centering around setting up a family and procreating, and social behaviour within this subsystem will portray particular patterns.

All these institutional complexes prescribe an overall pattern of social behavior or a network of social relations, i.e. the social structure. Further, given this cumulative clustering within and, to a lesser degree, between subsystems, the institutional system tends towards an internal integration and some closure. In other words, Smith argues, the institutional system forms the skeleton of a corporate unit.

Pluralism is the condition in which a number of different corporate units and aggregates of persons form, together, one society. As Smith puts it:

Pluralism is a condition in which members of a common society are internally distinguished by fundamental differences in their institutional practice... Such differences ... simultaneously identify institutionally distinct aggregates or groups, and establish deep social divisions between them. 11)

A society, consequently, though usually defined as 'a self-sufficient, self-perpetuating and internally autonomous system of social relations', 12) has, in its plural sense, a specific political dimension. In fact, if a society is considered as a 'territorially distinct unit having (its) own governmental institutions', 13) it becomes clear that 'the essential precondition' 14) for the maintenance of order in a plural society is the monopoly of power and, hence, the regulative system by one corporate group. This is so since decision-making powers shared by members of radically different institutional groupings is not considered possible. It follows, then, that

11) Pluralism in Africa, p. 27.
12) op. cit. p. 29.
13) The Plural Society in the British West Indies, p. 79.
14) op. cit., p. 86.
the dominant corporate unit is, by definition, a corporate group whilst other aggregates and corporate units in the society lack the inclusive organization to institute effective political action, i.e. to become fully-fledged corporate groups and thereby challenge the organized dominant section which rules them.

In such situations, the subordinate social sections often seek to regulate their own internal affairs independently of their superiors. By contraposing these two regulative systems, it follows that conflict is inherent in a plural society.

Now clearly even the highest degree of institutional integration and uniformity does not exclude conflict... But surely the conflicts that divide a people who share identical institutional organization and orientations differ radically from those that contrapose collectivities differentiated also at the institutional and organizational levels... 15)

There is hence a qualitative difference between certain types of conflict in plural societies compared with conflict in non-plural societies. This classification of societies - into unitary, heterogeneous and plural - is dealt with in the next section.

(c) **Methods to classify societies**

There are two methods of classification which Smith discusses. The first, involving institutional analysis, requires classifying institutions in three types: (i) compulsory (ii) alternative and (iii) exclusive. Compulsory or 'basic' institutions are those that are common to all societies or corporate units. 'This basic institutional system embraces kinship, education, religion, property and economy, recreation and certain sodalities'. 16) Alternative institutions are voluntary in the sense that they are neither compulsory

16) *The Plural Society in the British West Indies*, p. 82.
nor specific to a socially recognized category. These are often called voluntary associations by other writers. Exclusive institutions are those which are shared by individuals who belong to certain socially recognized categories (an occupational group, for instance).

A unitary (or culturally homogeneous) society is one in which the members share the same compulsory institutions. A heterogeneous society is one in which there is a difference in the basic institutional systems of different sections but since these differences are not too pronounced, they do not affect membership in the alternative or exclusive institutions. Finally, a plural society is one in which, due to basic institutional divergencies, membership for some sections of the society in alternative or exclusive institutions is either disallowed or granted differentially.

This first method of classification appears in one of Smith's early essays entitled Social and Cultural Pluralism.

The second method of classification (which should be seen as a refinement and modification of the first) involves an analysis of three levels of pluralism: the structural, the social and the cultural.

Structural pluralism consists ... in the differential incorporation of specified collectivities within a given society... It institutes or presupposes social and cultural pluralism together, by prescribing sectional differences of access to the common public domain, and by establishing differing contexts and conditions of sectional co-existence, segregation and subordination.17)

Further, Smith says, this structural pluralism can be instituted in one of two ways:

(a) 'by the total exclusion of subordinate sections from the inclusive public domain'. 18)

18) loc. cit.
(b) 'by instituting substantial and sufficient inequalities of sectional participation in and access to this sector of societal organization'.

This level, then, deals with the way in which one section of the dominant corporate group - through its monopoly of government - specifies the incorporation, into the society, of other sections.

Social pluralism is the condition in which... institutional differentiations coincide with the corporate division of a given society into a series of sharply demarcated and virtually closed social sections or segments.

Cultural pluralism consists, solely, of 'institutional differences to which no corporate differences attach'.

The difference between these last two levels can be either analytic or concrete. Analytically, cultural pluralism involves a specification of institutional differentiation between sections without the concomitant social or corporate cleavages. Concretely, it is possible, in a heterogeneous society, for cultural pluralism to obtain without corresponding social pluralism. A plural society must manifest all three levels of pluralism whereas cultural pluralism may exist without social and structural pluralism. Analysis of these levels depends crucially upon two new concepts Smith introduces: the public domain and differential incorporation.

Smith's distinction between the private (or 'familial') domain and public (or 'collective') domain of a corporate unit is a generalization of Meyer Fortes' distinction between kinship and politico-jural domains of social organization.

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19) loc. cit.
20) loc. cit.
21) loc. cit.
22) op. cit., p. 38.
public domain encompasses that area of social life which concerns corporate action: 'to exercise and protect corporate rights, to enforce corporate obligations and to allocate corporate responsibilities and privileges'. The private domain encompasses other areas of social life.

This Aristotelian distinction, of course, can be used to define what one means by political action in a community. Fortes uses his narrower distinction to show that institutions, in simple societies, may figure prominently in both the kinship and politico-jural domains. In such relatively undifferentiated societies, for example, the institution of kinship substantially affects the status of a person in the politico-jural domain.

Smith's generalization of these domains can be applied analogously to a plural, highly differentiated society. Hence, in simple societies, such institutions as education and economy may fall primarily into the kinship domain whilst, in highly differentiated societies, it may be possible to study corporate structure with minimal attention to the private domain. All societies, however, 'depend for their boundaries, organization and internal order on the scope and character of their corporate structure, which is explicitly centered in the public domain'.

In a plural society, there may be an almost total exclusion of subordinate sectors from the public domain of the dominant sector which, on one level, constitutes the area in which the explicit regulation of this corporate group takes place and, on another level, the area in which the regulation or governing of the whole society takes place. On the other hand, through differential incorporation, partial or

23) 'A Structural Approach to Comparative Politics', M.G. Smith, p. 119.
discriminatory access to the (then common) public domain may be instituted so as to integrate the corporate units into the society differentially and, at the same time, to maintain differences of institutional practice between sectors.

It is clear that though these structural differentiations between sectors fall in the public domain, institutional differentiations in the separate private domains can be of equal importance. Here, it is necessary to look at the cultural level of pluralism and to focus on the form and origin of differential incorporation. In other words, it must be shown in how far original institutional differences aided the process of differential incorporation and in how far this process solidified cleavages or created new or modified forms of institutional differentiation and segregation. For example, institutions of education, in one society, may vary widely in form and content and may be used, by the dominant group, to justify a process of differential incorporation. This process, then, by a formal creation of explicit parallel educational institutions may create further and deeper institutional cleavages between corporate units and may, in fact, create new boundaries within the subordinate units.

It is to this concept of differential incorporation, which has a clear historical dimension, that attention is now turned.

M.G. Smith writes that 'differential incorporation obtains when the structure of the inclusive collectivity prescribes differences in the modes of articulation of particular corporate components'.

In an essay entitled Pluralism in Pre-colonial African Societies, Smith isolates different modes of collective accommodation: societal segregation, symbiosis, consociation, assimilation and differential incorporation. The first two, societal segregation and symbiosis, represent varying complementary associations between separate corporate groups.

25) op. cit., p. 93.
26) Chapter 4 in Pluralism in Africa.
Of much greater importance, here, however, are the last three modes: assimilation, consociation and differential incorporation, which correspond with unitary, heterogeneous and plural societies.

Assimilation, usually preceded by minimal differentiations in the separate institutional systems, 'denotes the condition in which uniformities of internal organization and external articulation are sufficiently general and intense for a single corpus of law and custom to have equal validity for all types of social relation in all groups'. 27) The 'ideal' nation-state springs to mind here as the typical example.

Consociation, typified by a federation or confederation, obtains 'when two societies or segments thereof join together as equal and autonomous collectivities in a distinctive common polity that surpasses alliance in its scope, content and intensity, while preserving their internal distinctness'. 28) Though institutional differentiations between units are clearly assumed, these should be contained in their respective private domains so that group relations and practice in them become optional. In the public domain, there should be both formal and substantial equality of articulation and access to government. The appearance or continuation of separate public domains paralleling the common public domain highlight points of weakness in the consociation. Obviously such factors as linguistic differences and geographic distribution are also factors in the stability of a consociation but very sharp initial institutional differentiations seem to preclude the emergence of a consociation.

Differential incorporation may arise from many situations: conquest, colonization, or resettlement and migration. It does not presuppose, but is usually found with initial sharp

27) op. cit., p. 95.
28) op. cit., p. 94.
institutional differentiations between units. These institutional differentiations and the process of differential incorporation vary directly with one another modifying and increasing the cleavages between corporate units. Ideally the dominant unit - a corporate group - can be seen as representing a nation, in which the members are citizens, whereas the other units - corporate categories - fall within the inclusive society but its members are subjects rather than citizens. The state, the regulation and governing of which falls within the dominant corporate group, is extended beyond this unit's boundaries. Hence, in a plural society, neither culture and society nor nation and state are congruent.

Access to the public domain of this dominant section is either forbidden or granted differentially to 'subjects'. The extent to which separate public domains develop within the subordinate sections indicates the potential of conflict in plural societies.

(d) The Plural Society: Different Levels of Analysis

It is possible to isolate four main directions of analysis in Smith's framework. Though these directions are obviously interdependent, it is useful to differentiate between them:

(i) Institutional analysis, which isolates and compares institutions within and between units and indicates their importance in their respective public domains. Smith writes of a 'criterion of compatibility' applied to the same basic institution in different sections. Different pairs of family institutions, for instance, may be found to be more or less compatible for intersectional activity and mobility.

(ii) Analysis of corporate units, which isolates and compares different sections of the plural society. Special attention must be given to the dominant section since analysis, here, must take place on two levels. First, as an

inclusive corporate group itself, this section is amenable to analysis and, secondly, due to its monopoly of the regulative system, this section will have to evolve specialized regulative subsystems to deal with subordinate sections within the society.

(iii) **Political analysis**, which delineates the scope and depth of monopoly of the regulative system by the dominant group and the partial and differential access other units have in this area. The definition, in fact, of a society as 'a territorially distinct unit with a government' gives priority to its polity and from this flows Smith's proposition that 'changes in the social structure presuppose political changes'.

(iv) **Historical analysis**, which traces the process of differential incorporation and attempts to explain how, due to political changes, changes take place in the social structure.

The Plural Society and the Problem of Order

M.G. Smith initially defined a plural society in terms of its institutions. His focus here was on cultural pluralism. Later, when the two concepts of differential incorporation and the public domain took precedence over institutional analysis, the plural society became a politically (rather than a culturally) defined concept. Though a definite shift did take place, his implicit solution to the order problem remained broadly the same. Nevertheless, where differences seemed possible, his second and more recent approach has been used. The main point, however, is that cultural pluralism is an integral part of Smith's second conceptualization of pluralism. As Kuper puts it:

Smith's first paper ascribes a primary role to cultural incompatibilities in molding the plural structure of the society. His present contribution (in Pluralism in Africa) emphasizes rather the primary significance of differential

30) op. cit., p. 91.
incorporation, but conceptually the differentially incorporated groups are still distinguished by cultural differences, whether antecedent to or consequent upon the differential incorporation. 31)

This new conception of pluralism and the plural society is freed from any historical period and from any allied moral tag. The plural society, here, becomes one category in a typology of societies. As such, the problem of order in this category of societies must be analyzed theoretically in the same way as Parsons did it for societies in general. Further, there is no theory about the origin of such societies. Smith's model, then, is a 'static' or 'ahistorical' one.

The plural society is, in the first place, a political entity in the sense that one corporate group in the society maintains control over corporate action in the public domain common to all members of the society. This implies that other corporate units are categories rather than groups and that they are differentially incorporated into this common public domain. The dominant corporate group, thus, monopolizes positions in the centre of the society and the other corporate categories are positioned in the periphery of the society. Boundaries between the centre and the periphery coincide with those between this dominant group and the other categories.

Structural pluralism, the presence of which can be considered a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a plural society, implies (a) cultural pluralism or clear differences in institutions; (b) social pluralism or the coinciding of these institutional differences with corporate units; and (c) the emergence of a dominant corporate unit incorporating others differentially in the society. This third and last element Smith calls structural pluralism. It is thus quite clear that the dominant corporate group is culturally homogeneous and internally organized to maintain this cultural homogeneity.

31) 'Ethnic and Racial Pluralism,' L. Kuper, p. 46ff.
The centre, then, internally wields cultural power but over the society as a whole it has no such cultural power. In fact, Smith explicitly rejects the Parsonian (consensus) assumption that value consensus is the main binding force in any society. \(^{32}\) Insofar as members of other corporate units in the society are given access to the common public domain, however, certain common beliefs and practices will emerge. It can be, in fact, argued that these positions in the common public domain point to a minimal amount of social and cultural power which the centre may attempt to manipulate in granting certain other 'ethnics' positions in the centre.

It is clear that units in the centre wield massive and effective political power. Formally, control of the common public domain means exactly this. Further, Smith feels that it is in the area of political power where conflict can be expected. Corporate categories, refused access to important positions in the centre, will attempt in their own public domains, to accumulate political power. At this point, the confrontation is measured in terms of a balance of coercive means and sanctions. An important insight is that units in the periphery usually consist of more than one corporate unit and consensus can be as minimal between these as in the society as a whole.

The question of economic power creates problems. In his earlier works, Smith included the economy within the basic institutional system of a 'section'. This implies that a plural society does not possess a common economy. \(^{33}\) Later, however, he drops this form of classification and seems to regard the question of economic power as not relevant to the existence of a plural society, as such.

\(^{32}\) 'Preface', The Plural Society in the British West Indies. 'Introduction', Stratification in Grenada. 

\(^{33}\) Rex suggests reasons for why Smith introduced this 'limitation'. These are not relevant here. 'The Plural Society: The South African Case', John Rex, p. 403.
In sum, if it is remembered that the public domain of the dominant group is both its own (exclusive) public domain and that of the whole society, the power of those in the centre lies almost exclusively in the political and monopolizing aspect of their control over the common public domain of the society, on the one hand, and their cultural and social power over their own members within the public domain of their own corporate group, on the other. Negative situational sanctions are used over non-ethnics and intentional sanctions over members of the in-group. Positive situational sanctions are not considered relevant to the distinction between a plural and any other type of society.

In Lockwood's sense, then, Smith feels that the plural society manifests enough system integration to hold itself together. There exists no social integration whatsoever.

Conclusion

As he shows in his essay, 'Pluralism in Precolonynd African Societies', Smith considers the plural society to be a type cutting across all levels of development or of structural differentiation. Further, race differences, as he shows in the same essay, are by no means a necessary factor in a plural society. 34) Smith's typology, then, is at a very high level of generality (and has, hence, even been called 'over-simple'). 35) Not surprisingly, then, the formal solution to the problem of societal order which is obtained from his analyses, is also at a high level of generality.

Societal order - the peaceful co-existence of social institutions - is maintained by the political power of the dominant corporate group over the society as a whole and indirectly through the cultural homogeneity of each corporate category. Within the dominant group, persuasion and the activation of commitments are used to obtain conformity. Over members of the society

34) See 'Political Change in Plural Societies', L. Kuper, p. 597.
at large, when their actions might harm societal order, coercion is used. Otherwise, their actions conform to the cultural expectations of their individual corporate units. Those in the periphery, then, can challenge those in the centre by generating and attempting to use countervailing political power. Conflict in a plural society is political conflict par excellence.

It is only through differential incorporation that any type of common values and means of status attribution - cultural and social power - may be generated. Otherwise no type of value consensus exists.

The plural society, and the way in which order is maintained within it, are independent of any level of structural differentiation, any type of economy, and any composition of racial types. The relevant variables are (a) the institutional differences; (b) the organization into corporate units; and (c) the coincidence of these two with the consequent monopoly of political power by a culturally homogeneous corporate group. It is this group, ultimately, that maintains order so long as opposition is not too serious.
Leo Kuper is a sociologist who began his career in South Africa (at the University of Natal, Durban) and then moved to the U.S. in the mid-sixties. This geographical change corresponds, broadly, with a change in emphasis in Kuper's sociological interests. In his written works, this change is quite clearly discernible: Until 1965, the date of publication of An African Bourgeoisie, Kuper's published works all show almost total immersion in and deep concern with South Africa's peculiar plural structure. After the publication of this synthesizing statement on the South African dilemma, Kuper becomes more comparative, by turning to Algeria, Zanzibar, and Ruanda-Urundi to cite a few examples, and more theoretical in that his works are much more self-critical and aware of their place in the major currents of sociological thought.1)

Within the context of the theory of the plural society, then, interest remains focused on ethnic and racial pluralism, though Kuper admits that racial differences are not a prerequisite for the emergence of a plural society,2) and much attention is paid to a certain type of plural society, 'white settler society'. 3) Moreover, even though societal change always remained one of Kuper's major preoccupations, his later works reflect a conscious attempt at constructing a general theory of social change in plural societies. Of importance here are factors militating for evolutionary and for revolutionary change. It may be said, thus, in the rather ambiguous terminology of North American academic sociology, that

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1) For a list of the works which have been consulted, see Bibliography.
3) 'Political Change in White Settler Societies', L. Kuper, p. 170.
Kuper's major areas of professional interest are those of race relations and social change.

The theory of the plural society, Kuper argues, differs in important if not fundamental ways from both the Marxist theory of class conflict and the Durkheimian theory of evolutionary change. Following the analytic scheme constructed by M.G. Smith 4) closely, Kuper writes:

Theories of the plural society or of pluralism stress the cleavages, or discontinuities, between sections differentiated by race, ethnicity, religion or culture. These bases of differentiation are not conceived to be primordial: they are socially structured in the process of interaction. Racial difference has no intrinsic social significance. It comes to have social significance only as it is elaborated in systems of differential political incorporation, economic stratification and racial segregation. Since the theory of plural societies is derived from the analysis of sharp and persistent cleavage, it tends to stress the enduring nature of plural divisions and the high probability of violence in the process of political change... 5)

In this chapter, then, Kuper's analyses of the Marxist and Durkheimian theories of development and change will be reviewed. Important differences and similarities between these theories and the theory of the plural society will be highlighted, with special attention being given to explanations for social change and to the role ideologies play in these processes. Hereby, a clearer understanding of what Kuper meant by racial pluralism will be obtained. Finally, the scheme generated in Chapter Two will be applied to this concept of racial pluralism.

Racial Pluralism

Both the Marxist and Durkheimian theories 'derive initially from the context of western industrial societies' 6) which can be

4) As discussed in Chapter Four.
5) 'Political Change in Plural Societies: problems in racial pluralism', L. Kuper, p. 595.
6) 'Continuities and Discontinuities in Race Relations: Evolutionary or Revolutionary Change', L. Kuper, p. 361.
considered racially homogeneous. Their explanatory power decreases considerably when they are transplanted to plural societies.

Racial pluralism stresses the deep cleavages which exist in multi-ethnic and multi-racial societies characterized by differential incorporation. It follows that recurrent conflict along these lines of cleavage is structurally built into the society. What is at issue, Kuper argues, is the underlying reasons for this conflict; the general direction (if any) in which this society is likely to change; and the ways in which this change can take place. On all three these critical issues, 'pluralists' and Marxists disagree.

Marxists, Kuper writes, face grave problems when trying to handle these issues:

1. How to explain the persistence of pre-industrial relations in an industrial society.
2. How to find a class basis for revolutionary struggle in a racially structured society.
3. How to reconcile the national liberation movement with the class struggle...

These problems will now be discussed.

If the process of urbanization in plural societies is studied, it becomes clear that the primary basis for urban stratification is race rather than class though the two do tend to coincide. The primacy of race is shown by the existence of parallel and intercalary institutions in the towns; the persistence of tribal affiliations; the emergence of ethnic religious

8) 'Structural Discontinuities in African Towns', L. Kuper, p.133.
9) op. cit., pp. 133ff.
10) 'Sociology - Some Aspects of Urban Plural Societies', L. Kuper, pp. 120ff.
movements; and, finally, the lack of complete coincidence between cultural groups and structural divisions in the society.

New towns should not be analyzed in terms of the antecedent cultures of the dominant ethnic and racial groups within them, though these cultures are clearly important. Rather, Kuper argues, these towns 'should be studied as structures in their own right', in which racial pluralism looms as an all-important characteristic.

Extreme social distance between and differential incorporation of ethnic and racial groupings, when coupled with a political power monopoly by one group, create a situation in which racial status tends to coincide with a certain economic position and a certain social status in the society. Nevertheless, 'race is the primary basis for stratification in the society as a whole.' The duplication of certain institutions, such as schools and churches, so as to serve different racial groups separately and probably unequally and consequently to maintain social distance between them, is one aspect of this primacy. Another is the existence of intercalary or 'brokerage' institutions which intervene or mediate between different racial groupings. They serve as a device to co-ordinate and yet keep separate in their assigned places, these groupings. A tribal headmanship, when this position is filled by colonial government appointees, may serve as an example.

In their attempts to explain the persistence of tribal affiliations in towns, Marxists usually point to the material interests maintained by these structures. Recent studies, however, 11) 'Religion and Urbanization in Africa', L. Kuper, passim. 12) 'Structural Discontinuities in African Towns', L. Kuper, p. 139. 13) 'Structural Discontinuities in African Towns', L. Kuper, p. 127. 14) op. cit., p. 133. 15) The expression is Despres': See Chapter Seven. 16) 'Sociology - Some Aspects of Urban Plural Societies', L. Kuper, p. 120.
have shown that tribalism must be seen as situational rather than in terms of fixed relationships between people. Further, differences in tribal modes of behaviour in the same situation may be due to differences rooted in the tribal background rather than in material interests in the cities. Mayer's Red and School distinction is a case in point. 17) Again, tribal antagonisms, in certain situations, have occurred amongst both uneducated and educated Africans in South Africa, groups with differing material interests. 18) Thus, it would seem that priority cannot be granted exclusively to class or material interests: Both at work and while interacting with Whites, Africans evolve new patterns of behaviour; whilst at home, they usually interact more in line with their tribal custom. Race and economic position cannot, in general, be directly and causally linked with each other.

In general, economic position, social status and racial status, though interdependent, do not coincide exactly. This, in itself, adds to the already existing tensions in the society for between those of low status in the dominant group and those of high status in a subordinate group, for instance, there is bound to be tension and resentment. In situations such as these, moreover, stratification follows the cleavage lines defined by the mode of differential incorporation. In other words, stratification accords primarily with the racial criterion.

The main component in the Marxist theory of change is the dialectic in the economic process, which brings about a polarization of classes, a violent confrontation between these classes, and, finally, a revolutionary transformation of the society. The crucial questions relating to plural societies are whether revolutionary change can take place and, if so, whether the polarization will occur along class or race lines.

17) op. cit., p. 121.
The first question which involves the possibility of evolutionary change and hence, Durkheim's functional theory, will be discussed later.

To answer the second question, Kuper analyzes revolutions in Zanzibar, Rwanda-Urundi and Algeria, and the absence of revolution in South Africa, the role Communist Parties played in the latter two countries and the types of ideologies which developed there and in other tension-ridden plural societies.

It is abundantly clear that 'the defining characteristic in the dialectic of conflict' in a plural society is the political structure, the distribution of power. Since ethnic and racial groups (rather than classes) are differentially incorporated into the polity, it follows that race rather than class will be the cleavage along which confrontation over power recources will take place - under the assumption that the two do not coincide exactly. In the revolutions which took place in Rwanda-Urundi and Zanzibar, the racial and economic stratification systems, though superimposed upon each other and clearly interdependent, did not coincide exactly. Kuper concludes: '... the racial divisions are the propelling force in the revolutions, the predisposing factors are those that affect racial status in any of its many social dimensions, and the dialectic of conflict is essentially racial'.

A study of the role Communist Parties played in the recent history of Algeria and South Africa reinforces this conclusion. In

19) 'Theories of Revolution and Race Relations', L. Kuper, passim.
20) 'Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary Change', L. Kuper, passim.
21) op. cit., passim.
23) 'Theories of Revolution and Race Relations', L. Kuper, pp. 105, 106.
fact, a common relationship to the means of production created (if any at all) much less of a group consciousness than did common racial membership in societies where this latter status implied differential access to the available economic, prestige and power positions in the society.

In addition, the Party which usually included many members of the dominant minority racial group, seemed to lack dedication to the liberation of a nation oppressed by a colonial power. National movements, on the other hand, exclusivist in terms of the ethnicity and race of their members, diverged from and became suspicious of the internationalism and interracialism of the Communist ideology. Again, then, lines of cleavage formed by differential incorporation along race differences, proved the deeper since national movements overshadowed class-based movements in all four countries discussed.

In plural societies, then, with race and class lines blurring into one another, with conflict between racial groups promoting polarization, with the long-term direction of change indeterminate, it becomes important to inquire into the conceptions the members themselves hold of their societies - what are the ideologies commonly found in plural societies?

These ideologies may be used as 'an index of the probability of violence', 24) Kuper suggests. As before, the spectrum runs from a belief in interracial co-operation, at the one end, to racial confrontation and violence, at the other. What has been called the 'Jabavu School' in South Africa, which preached a 'colour-blind' policy of individual political participation, on the one hand, and Fanon with his call for curative racial violence, on the other, better represent this

spectrum than either the Marxist or Durkheimian perspectives. In fact, the Marxist spectrum of false consciousness developing into class confrontation, and the Durkheimian consensus/anomie spectrum both assume interracial co-operation as a consequence of the increasing division of labour in society.

The spectrum is not as simple as this, however. Kuper writes of unitary, two-category and multi-category conceptions where gradations in the envisaged racial structure take on any number of nuances. In addition, these gradations, such as African, Coloured, Asiatic and White in South Africa, are then related to other hierarchical conceptions, producing a composite stratification system. 25) In concluding, Kuper differentiates between class-stratified and race-stratified societies. He writes:

Class societies... may be viewed as arising directly out of the interaction of the members of the society... Race by contrast is... extrinsic to that interaction... This difference between race and class structure gives race a greater salience and persistence in the conceptions of the social structure held by both dominant and subordinate racial groups and increase the likelihood of dichotomic and revolutionary perspectives in racially structured societies under conditions of social mobility and increasing social continuity.... 26)

Once again, racial rather than class conflict is considered endemic in plural societies and ideologies present in the society can serve as a racial weather-vane.

In order to evaluate the possibility of evolutionary change 'from segmented to functionally differentiated societies, or from primordial attachments to civil politics', 27) Durkheim's theory will be discussed. This theory points to the increasing division of labour and concomitant functional


26) op. cit., p. 101.Emphasis in the original.

specialization as the most important impulses for progressive change. An individual is loosened from his 'segmental' community and becomes involved in a common culture through his membership in institutions which cut across ethnic and other backgrounds. Achieved status now counts more than ascribed status. Through structural differentiation and functional specialization, vertical segments blur and interdependent structures develop to create an institutionally integrated society.

When this approach is applied to plural societies, however, immediate problems arise. First, Durheim would argue that interracial co-operation is a consequence of the progressive division of labour. In a plural society, by contrast, coincident lines of cleavage and differential incorporation militate against the development of such co-operation: 'the new relationships resulting from the progressive division of labour may be largely superimposed on the old divisions, thereby elaborating, rather than changing, the plural structure of the society'.

Second, then, both cultural differences and cultural assimilation become political issues and, as such, potential nuclei of conflict. In fact, the culture of the dominant minority group is usually carefully guarded. Access to it is limited. The right to, and type of, education, consequently, becomes a contentious political issue.

Third, if an elite member or group of a subordinate grouping does succeed in becoming upwardly mobile in the society, one of two things happens. Either they will be lost to their racially or ethnically defined grouping and assimilated into the dominant minority culture, in which case cleavage lines and social distance between sections are maintained, if not

28) 'Political Change in Plural Societies', L. Kuper, p. 602.
reinforced. 'Trying for White', in South Africa, is a case in point. Or, as is more probable in cases of racial difference, status incongruity and upward partial mobility result. In other words, expectations based on mobility in one sphere are frustrated in other spheres. This is so, Kuper argues, since race includes an important extrinsic referent which remains visible even when the type of interaction changes. The positions of African professionals and doctors in South Africa, are examples. This may bring about an increased emphasis on the part of the elite on racial exclusiveness with polarization along racial lines as a consequence. This, of course, is the very opposite of the expected result in terms of Durkheim's evolutionary theory.

At the ideological level, Durkheim's approach promotes interracialism, as was seen above; underwrites a conception of peaceful progress; and corresponds to (American) liberalism. This ideology has obviously much in common with the normative theory of political pluralism, as proposed by de Tocqueville, Laski and Shils. The fact that many black political leaders in South Africa used to adhere to this philosophy, but have subsequently deviated from its tenets, is repeatedly documented by Kuper and serves to emphasize the lack of fit between theories based on Durkheim's perspectives and actual plural societies.

29) For a discussion of these ideas, see op.cit., passim & 'Continuities and Discontinuities in Race Relations', L. Kuper, pp. 378, 379.


31) See 'Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems', L. Kuper, passim.

32) See, inter alia, An African Bourgeoisie, 'Nonviolence Revisited', and 'The Political Situation of Non-Whites in South Africa'. In this last article, Kuper writes: 'There is one important conception in African political thought which is held by leaders of very different political schools. This is the conception that the structure of white domination in South African society cannot be changed by nonviolent evolutionary means'. pp. 96, 97.
In a relatively early article, Kuper differentiates between two broad approaches to societal change: the conflict and the consensus, and places the plural society perspective within the former. Later, however, he places this perspective outside the two classical approaches and argues that directions of change, at the present level of theoretical development, must remain more indeterminate in plural societies than in those to which the classical theories usually apply. Explicitly, in viewing plural societies as a separate type of society which is not amenable to classical analysis, Kuper states:

In theories of the racially plural society..., there is no promise of progress to interracial solidarity or to racial equality. The perspectives are somewhat sombre and the theories lend themselves readily to ideological distortion....

.... the processes of political change in plural societies should be seen as indeterminate....

Since racial subordination constitutes a diffuse multi-faceted status, almost any element may act as a catalyst of racial conflict and revolution... There is no inexorable predetermination, by the initial differential incorporation, of the course of race relations...

The critical difference between theories of classical Marxist and Durkheimian type and that of the plural society, is the existence

33) 'Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems', L. Kuper, passim. This paper, though included with others in Pluralism in Africa, was circulated beforehand to members participating in the colloquium. It should, therefore, be treated as of earlier origin than Kuper's other papers in the same volume. See 'Introduction to Part I', p. 5, Pluralism in Africa.

34) Kuper, in fact, pays more attention to, and becomes more critical of, Marxist theory in his later works. For example, he writes: 'Such is the power of early conditioning, that it is only after many years of reflection that I have come to question the university of the class struggle (i.e. economic exploitation)'. In addition, after an extended analysis, he writes: 'the basic (Marxist) theory may be somewhat tautologous'. 'Race, Class, and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary Change', L. Kuper, p. 400 & 'Theories of Revolution and Race Relations', L. Kuper, p. 88.

35) 'Political Change in Plural Societies', L. Kuper, p. 596.

36) op. cit., p. 604.

37) 'Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary Change', L. Kuper, pp. 418, 420.
of relevant socially defined racial or ethnic lines of cleavage in the structure of the plural society. Further, though this latter theory is considered 'loose' and does not specify any direction of societal development or change, it does specify factors allied to these cleavage-lines which promote either revolutionary or evolutionary change. In the final section, here, then, factors favouring each type of change will be discussed.

There are, to begin with, some theoretically obvious factors: a widespread ideology supporting interracialism promotes evolutionary change. A racist ideology promotes the opposite. Moreover, these types of ideologies may reflect (rather than promote) such changes. A particular ideology can bring about, or be the result of a particular structure. Second, complete coincidence between structural and cultural divisions — where, for example, class and ethnicity are perfectly superimposed, one upon the other — furthers both intense, violent group-conflict and coercive regulation of group-activities.

On the other hand, multiple affiliations producing cross-cutting solidarities in institutions, promotes evolutionary change in the direction of a democratic pluralistic structure.

As has been shown, however, in a racially plural society, there exists a tendency for ideologies to shed their interracial components, and for individuals or groups in cross-cutting institutional membership positions either to leave their ethnic or racial groups altogether or to stress their racial identity in these positions. In general, then, in a situation characterized by such racial pluralism, the potential for intense violent racial conflict remains high. An ideology which seeks to create confrontation and violence succeeds with ease. Whether the group professing such an ideology obtains political power or not, becomes a purely technical question concerning how effectively coercion can be used by opposing sides.
It is difficult to incorporate these two sets of opposing factors adequately into a theory of racial pluralism. For this reason, Kuper has called this theory dualistic. 38) By this, he means that, first, on a general conceptual level, plural analysis itself is dichotomous: thus, either all societies are classified as plural or non-plural; or pluralism can be viewed as a continuum so that societies can be more or less plural according to a number of specified dimensions. These two approaches have different theoretical consequences. Further, both an individual's status and his personality, in a plural society, can be viewed dualistically: the very concepts, status incongruity and upward partial mobility, are based on this view. In fact, a new position brings with it new expectations for the individual. These expectations are partially frustrated by the fixed racial or ethnic status the individual has in the plural society. This dual character of his status is reproduced, presumably by way of internalization, in his personality.

This dualism introduces a factor of indeterminacy into Kuper's theory. As a result, certain very important processes in plural societies can be regarded as reversible. An important example of this is the process of depluralization.

In seeking for factors favouring evolutionary change, it is necessary to inquire into these processes of depluralization, that is, processes producing 'a diminishing salience of ethnic and racial pluralism'. 39) One such process, that of individuation, takes place, through interaction, by involving members from different ethnic and racial groupings in common institutional activities. Hereby, in the common public domain at least, common goals or even a common culture are created. Thus, though cultural pluralism in the private domain may persist,

38) 'Ethnic and Racial Pluralism', L. Kuper, p. 481. One reason for this dualism is to be found in the term, 'plural society' itself. 'Plural' refers to a number of distinct sections whilst 'society' refers to an entity.

39) L. Kuper, op. cit., p. 459.
differential incorporation in the public domain may lose its importance and the omnipresent political dimension in all societal and group affairs may lessen.

On the other hand, dualistically, depluralization may take place 'through an intermediate phase of sectional aggression'.

Here, the argument goes, ethnic and racial identity need to be asserted and be seen as equal to the dominant cultural identity before individuation and transcendence of sectional loyalties can take place. The theoretical usefulness of this argument to Kuper's plural approach is not important except insofar as it furnishes a clear example of what dualism produces in the theory. Sectional aggression, under certain circumstances, promotes the process of depluralization; under others, the process of polarization. Processes are 'reversible'.

If change is indeterminate, processes reversible, and the very conceptual approach dualistic, one may well ask whether Kuper finishes with any theory at all. To conclude this section, then, a brief review will be given.

Though not doing so consistently, Kuper does classify societies dichotomously into those that are 'racially plural' and those that are not. The former he characterizes by their racial structure and the corresponding mode of differential incorporation into the polity. This class of plural societies manifests certain characteristic properties: social relations

40) op. cit., p. 485.

41) 'Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary Change', L. Kuper, p. 415. Earlier, however, Kuper writes of four dimensions of pluralism: particularism/universalism; segregation/assimilation; cultural diversity/homogeneity; and inequality/equality. Then, he writes: 'Plural societies may be viewed as sui generis, or as characterized in more extreme form, by phenomena of cleavage and discontinuity present in all societies. From either perspective, the analysis of plural societies raises questions for the more generally accepted theories of political change'. Since these societies are not amenable to analysis by classical theories, however, they form a clear class of their own, 'plural societies'. In effect, then, Kuper has opted for the dichotomous rather than the continuum approach. See 'Political Change in Plural Societies: Problems in Racial Pluralism', L. Kuper, pp. 598, 599.
are elaborated along the lines of this structure; violent racial conflict is endemic; struggles between racial groupings are always political and related to the initial mode of differential incorporation; and class and status divisions tend to coincide with racial cleavage-lines.

The Plural Society and the Problem of Order

The Marxist and Durkheimian theories of development and change derive from the development of capitalism in Western Europe during the nineteenth century. Both purport to offer explanations for why and in what direction societies characterized by an increasing division of labour, change. The allied explanations for why and how order is maintained in these societies have been discussed in chapter One. Kuper, however, finds both classical theories problematic when he applies them to plural societies.

The main difficulty with the Marxist approach lies in the fact that class and race boundaries do not coincide exactly in plural societies. Since race boundaries, defined by the initial differential incorporation of such sectors into the society, indicate differences in access to political power, a lack of fit between class and race boundaries implies a lack of fit between class and power-political lines of cleavage. In other words, in a plural society, since political power is distributed differentially on the basis of racial criteria, and since these racial sectors do not coincide exactly but only partially with classes in the society, it follows that the Marxist theory of change is distorted by the primacy that must be given, in the stratification system, to race (and, thus, political power) over class.

The main difficulty with the Durkheimian approach lies in the fact that increasing division of labour and specialization of function do not decrease the social relevance attached to racial differences in a plural society. In fact, due again to the
initial differential incorporation of racial sectors into the society, functional specialization and institutional integration can maintain or even strengthen racial cleavages in the societal structure. For this reason, the Durkheimian theory of political pluralism is distorted by the persistence of socially relevant racial divisions which counteract processes of 'individuation' across the boundaries of racial sectors.

Quite clearly, then, the plural society is, in the first place, a political entity: through differential incorporation, one racial sector succeeds in monopolizing positions in the centre of the society and maintains this monopoly primarily through wielding political power. Following from this fact, the dominant racial group tends to monopolize the bases of economic power and tends to manifest a strong internal consensus. Thus, in a plural society, a person's status and class position tend to coincide with his racial classification.

In attempting to construct a theory of change applicable to racially plural societies, Kuper focuses on deviations from this ideal-type construct. Positions in the centre of a plural society are controlled by members of the dominant racial group, whites in white settler societies, for instance. The periphery consists, by and large, of members of the other racial groups, black unskilled labourers, for instance. It may well be, however, that there are members of the dominant racial group who do not share the full privileges of those in the centre, the white working class, for instance. Furthermore, there may be members of the other racial categories who are economically privileged, the black bourgeoisie, for instance. By focusing on the interests, actions and ideologies of such atypical groups in a plural society, Kuper tries to find a general direction of change in such societies.

Kuper's main focus, with reference to South Africa at least, is on black groups, whether they are underprivileged and fully in the periphery or not. In white settler societies,
the white working class and other white groups not fully positioned in the centre are more or less fully co-opted by the ruling group. Those in the centre, then, wield very effective cultural power over the dominant group. The ideologies of these atypical groups within the dominant sector, on the other hand, are important indices of the direction of change. Kuper considers racist ideologies indicators of potential racial violence. Hence the freedom allowed these groups to propagate racist beliefs to secure their positions, as well as the official ideology of the centre, both point to the possibility of racial conflict in the society. The more these white groups articulate a racist ideology or the more the official line is overtly racist, the more the centre will have to rely on unadulterated coercive sanctions and political power.

Kuper, however, pays much more attention to groups in the other racial sectors of a plural society. He focuses especially on elite groups in these sectors. These elites, though not filling positions in the centre of the society, do nonetheless wield some cultural power over members in the periphery and represent, therefore, the nuclei of possible new centres. A measure of racial aggression and antagonism between these groups and the dominant sector's elite group is inevitable. As the society develops, moreover, this antagonism can spill over into racial violence which, in turn, may lead to a national revolution or to a more open coercive situation being forced upon the subordinate elites. On the other hand, this antagonism may herald the beginning of a period of individuation leading to a blurring of racial boundaries.

Which of these three outcomes is to be expected depends on a number of factors: the ideologies of both the elites in the periphery as well as the ruling group; the extent to which these elites

42) In one article at least, Kuper does focus on the dominant group in a plural society: 'Political Changes in White Settler Societies'.

control some economic or political power bases; the extent to which members of the dominant sector are prepared to admit members of the other sectors into the centre of the society; and, lastly, the level of economic development of the society itself.

Conclusion

Social order obviously varies from society to society within the plural society class. In this class, the mode of differential incorporation and subsequent political power monopoly is the primary factor. The ideologies in different sectors and areas of the society are measures of the amount of consensus which exists in the society as a whole. The processes of individuation which have been discussed represent the breadth and depth of this societal consensus. Social integration exists insofar as these processes continue.

System integration - the goodness of fit between institutions in the society - is lacking at certain critical points: demands for skills in the economy are countered by ascriptive racial classifications; the resultant heightening of racial aggression is not defused by way of grants of political power and authority to elites in the periphery; and the stratification system, based ultimately on race, meshes with difficulty into the demand structure of a modern developing society.

Of the three possible directions of change, individuation and depluralization leading to an open plural society; increasing racial violence leading to a more coercive system; and increasing racial violence leading to a 'national' revolution of the periphery against the dominant racial group, the last represent a complete break-down of social order for a time. This takes place when the coercive sanctions of the state and

43) The term is used by A. du Toit: *South Africa's Political Alternatives*, P. Randall (ed.), Part Three.
ruling group fail. In other words, this takes place when all effective intentional sanctions and inducements have failed. In fact, if ideologies take on a strident racist tone, if the economy no longer offers members of the periphery sufficient rewards, the centre is obliged to repeatedly use its coercive sanctions.

On the other hand, if individuation takes place, increasing, then, the scope of effective intentional sanctions; multiplying the cultural power bases, the gradual emergence of an open plural society is possible.

Since racial aggression is inevitable to some extent during changes of any type, it follows that even for this third alternative, social control and thus political power must be maintained by those in the centre.
CHAPTER SIX

DEMOCRATIC AND INVIDIOUS PLURALISM: PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE'S APPROACH

P. van den Berghe is a sociologist who lived and conducted research in a number of culturally heterogeneous societies: Zaire, Kenya, Nigeria, Guatemala, the United States and South Africa amongst others. He is an American citizen.¹ His works, throughout his career, reveal a strong commitment to studying race relations and pluralism in comparative perspective. In addition, they reveal a strong commitment to what he has called 'anti-racism'.² He writes:

...it seems to me that the only honest thing to do is to drop the positivist credo of 'objectivity', to make our ideological position and our value premises explicit, and, indeed, to subject ourselves to a kind of 'socioanalysis'... Is it not preferable to reach a state of conscious, disciplined, explicit subjectivity than one of naive pseudo objectivity?³

This explicit subjectivity is revealed in van den Berghe's 'distress that Southern Africa seems no closer to liberation than it was ten years ago;... anger that, in much of Africa, cultural and economic neo-colonialism have made a farce of 'independence';...and (distaste in) the parasitic and Euro-centric behaviour of the new African ruling classes'. In fact, '(i)t was in conscious reaction against the racist and ethnocentric approach to Africa that the pluralist approach was developed.'⁴

In this chapter, van den Berghe's pluralist approach will be discussed. Special attention will be given, first, to his conceptions of race, caste and ethnicity and how they fit into his approach. Second, the focus will be upon the distinction between cultural and social pluralism. Third, his distinction between paternalistic and competitive race relations will be

¹ Other biographical information can be found in his 'Introduction', Race and Ethnicity and in 'Research in South Africa: The Story of My Experiences with Tyranny'.
² Race and Racism, p. 2.
⁴ 'Pluralism and Conflict Situations in Africa: A Reply to B. Magubane'. pp. 688, 689. This article was published in June 1970.
analyzed. Finally, the problem of order will be analyzed by applying the model developed in chapter Two to van den Berghe's approach.

Though van den Berghe is a prolific writer and has published a large number of books and articles, his major works on pluralism are Race and Racism (1967), a comparative study of race relations in four countries, and Race and Ethnicity (1970), a collection of a number of articles written in the fifties and early sixties.

PLURALISM

By a race, is to be understood a group which is socially defined on the basis of (putative) physical criteria. An ethnic group, too, is a group socially defined but on the basis of cultural criteria. A caste, thirdly, is an endogamous group, hierarchically ranked in relation to other groups, and wherein membership is determined by birth and for life.

The three phenomena are clearly linked and overlap in many societies. Van den Berghe insists, however, that the three concepts be clearly separated, the one from the other, and that they should be kept separate in all analyses. In fact, he considers the existence of races and castes in any society, invidious; whilst ethnicity 'is an absolutely fundamental and ineluctable aspect of social reality'. The reason for this difference is succinctly stated in the following passage:

Discrimination may be concomitant with ethnicity, but it is not its essence: the essence of ethnicity is a combination of a distinct way of life, set of values, language, religious beliefs, and so on. Conversely, cultural differences may be concomitants of race or caste, but the essence of these phenomena is a set of attitudes making for differential status, rights, access

5) See bibliography for a partial list.
6) See, for example, Race and Racism, p. 9.
7) 'Race, Class and Ethnicity in South Africa', van den Berghe, p. 351.
8) 'The Benign Quota: Panacea or Pandora's Box', van den Berghe, p. 41.
to power, and so on... 9)

It is now clear what is meant by a racist society: If, in a society which may contain a number of ethnic groups, socially significant characteristics are ascribed to a group on the basis of putative or real physical criteria, then the society is racist. In such cases, it is likely that this racism is perpetuated by a caste structure since first, by way of endogamy, castes will tend to maintain the physical characteristic within the 'race' and the group stratification system within the racist society; and, second, through the principle of closed life-long membership, castes will confine individuals within themselves by disallowing mobility (upward or downward) outside of their boundaries.

To interpret the phenomena of race and caste sociologically, to relate these phenomena to the functioning of entire societies, the concept of pluralism is introduced. "Societies are pluralistic insofar as they exhibit, to a greater or lesser degree, two basic features: (1) segmentation into corporate groups that frequently, though not necessarily, have different cultures or subcultures; and (2) a social structure compartmentalized into analogous, parallel, noncomplementary but distinguishable sets of institutions". 10)

A society manifesting a high degree of pluralism would be one, first, that contains two or more corporate groups. These could be ethnic groups, for instance. On the other hand, there need not be a significant cultural difference between these groups: they could be different races sharing the same culture. Coloureds in South Africa may serve as an example of a corporate group which is distinguished from the white (corporate) group, though both share the same general culture.

9) op. cit., pp. 41, 42.
10) 'Pluralism and the Polity', p. 67.
The second condition necessary for a high degree of pluralism is the duplication, in these separate groups, ethnic or racial or other, of sets of institutions: separate educational institutions even including, possibly, separate universities; separate religious institutions, and so on. It is important, here, that neither the polity nor the economy, in this plural society, are compartmentalized or duplicated. In fact, the common polity is the necessary condition for the existence of a society as such; and van den Berghe claims that a common economy is another necessary condition for the ordered maintenance of such a plural society (since coercion alone is, in the long run, ineffective). ¹¹)

Plural societies, by this definition, must be differentiated both from societies manifesting continuing functional differentiation, on the one hand, and societies with segmentary kinship units, on the other.

Functional differentiation, as was seen in chapter Two, develops out of the increasing division of labour and creates problems between the newly emerging institutions. Lockwood called this the problem of system integration. Such societies, clearly, need not contain a number of corporate groups. Institutional duplication, on the other hand, points to the existence within one society, of parallel sets of institutions fulfilling the same functions in semi-autonomous corporate groups. The two processes, functional differentiation and institutional duplication, are quite independent of each other.

A segmentary undifferentiated society, such as the post-Mfecane northern Nguni, contains a whole series of corporate groups

¹¹) See South Africa: A Study in Conflict, p. 270. This problem of order will be returned to later in this chapter.
(kinship units, clans and so on) but contains a homogeneous institutional structure. The institutional structure of a plural society is, clearly, quite different.

Within plural societies, a number of characteristics related to this pluralism may be expected. First, as has been seen, cultural differences will contribute toward the emergence of separate corporate groups each containing different sets of institutions. This separation usually confines interaction between corporate groups to 'segmental, utilitarian, nonaffective, and functionally specific relationships' \(^{12}\) whilst within the group, relationships will tend to be much broader (or, more specifically, the opposites of the above-mentioned pattern-variables). As a result, there will probably be little consensus about values in the society as a whole and a high degree of group autonomy in certain areas. Finally, as was shown in the case of a racist society, the chances are that a caste system will develop, with one corporate group monopolizing the political system. Such a situation, clearly, is one in which intergroup conflict is usually endemic.

It is now quite clear that van den Berghe treats pluralism as a variable, 'a set of properties characterizing heterogeneous societies', \(^{13}\) rather than differentiating between plural and non-plural societies. In fact, in disagreeing with M.G. Smith and the latter approach, \(^{14}\) van den Berghe claims that his approach is more inclusive than that of Smith. Without a doubt, by viewing pluralism as a variable, van den Berghe can analyze a much larger set of societies than those which Smith would call 'plural'. The danger is the possible loss of analytic power.

\(^{12}\) 'Pluralism and the Polity', p. 68.
\(^{13}\) Race and Ethnicity, p. 16.
\(^{14}\) See 'Pluralism and the Polity', p. 68; South Africa, A Study in Conflict, p. 270.
Two arguments in support of the analytical utility of pluralism are presented. First, as was shown above, societies characterized as pluralistic are differentiated from those that are functionally differentiated and from those with segmentary kinship units.

Second, a distinction is made between social and cultural pluralism. Cultural pluralism refers to the existence, in one society, of two or more ethnic groups. Thus, there exist important cultural differences and lines of cleavage in such a society. Social pluralism, on the other hand, refers to the duplication, in different corporate groups within the society, of culturally alike \(^{15}\) sets of institutions. Cultural pluralism, then, since it implies a number of ethnic groups defined on the basis of ethnicity, cannot exist without a duplication of institutions in these corporate groups. The converse, van den Berghe claims, however, does not follow:

Cultural pluralism between ethnic groups cannot exist without institutional duplication and hence without social pluralism; that is, any form of cultural pluralism has a structural facet which can be treated as social pluralism. But when, in addition to ethnicity, race is introduced as a criterion of group membership, a new dimension is added to social pluralism. Race is not the structural counterpart of ethnic heterogeneity, but is an independent criterion according to which a society is segmented. Since race is a more rigid basis of cleavage than ethnicity, social pluralism can subsist longer and, indeed, even in the nearly total

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15) See Race and Racism, p. 35, where van den Berghe continues by stating that corporate groups, under conditions of social pluralism, 'are differentiated on a basis other than culture'. Here, then, social pluralism refers to institutional duplication in the absence of cultural diversity. Elsewhere, as will be shown, the term is used ambiguously.
absence of cultural pluralism whereas the converse is not true..... 16)

It is clear, then, that most often, as in the cases of Switzerland, Canada, Nigeria and South Africa, social pluralism is accompanied by cultural pluralism. In South Africa, for instance, the social pluralism is reflected in separate formal educational institutions for different corporate groups; the cultural pluralism in different value systems and ethnic groups. When corporate groups are defined racially (i.e. in terms of putative physical differences), however, social pluralism can be present with minimal corresponding cultural pluralism: Though Coloureds and Whites share the same culture in South Africa, 'racial' classification creates separate corporate groups.

This approach differs from M.G. Smith's on two counts: First, Smith argues that cultural pluralism can exist without concomitant social pluralism. Second, Smith's distinction between social and structural pluralism is collapsed by van den Berghe into one category: social pluralism. A discussion of these differences will further clarify van den Berghe's distinction and his overall conception of pluralism.

For M.G. Smith, cultural pluralism points to institutional differences in different categories of people living in one society; social pluralism points to coincidence of these institutional differences with corporate units in the society; and structural pluralism points to the differential incorporation of these units into the polity of the society. Further,

16) Race and Racism, p. 135. In this passage, social pluralism is viewed as the structural counterpart of cultural pluralism, an interpretation different from that given above. Van den Berghe is aware of this ambiguity: 'At one level, structural or social pluralism can be regarded simply as the other side of cultural pluralism... But on another level, social and cultural pluralism are partially independent variables. Thus, while the two forms of pluralism tend to go together, groups may remain structurally pluralistic even though contact has greatly reduced cultural pluralism'. 'Pluralism and the Polity', p. 69. To avoid confusion, social pluralism will here be understood to refer to the duplication, in different corporate groups, of sets of institutions irrespective of the degree of ethnic diversity in the society.
he feels that cultural pluralism is a necessary condition for the emergence of social and structural pluralism whilst the converse is not necessarily true. 17)

The best way to disentangle the rather annoying contradictions entwined in these differences of approach is to seek the priorities each theorist gives to his conception of pluralism. M.G. Smith, as has previously been shown, begins with institutional diversity or, even, institutional incompatibility. In a society, different groups exist which have sets of different institutions, such as monogamy in one and polygamy in the other. Corporate group boundaries and a mode of differential incorporation arise out of this basic difference in sets of institutions in different cultures in the society.

For van den Berghe, the emphasis is upon a number of corporate groups in the society (which may or may not be culturally similar) and upon the duplication of sets of institutions in these groups. These sets of institutions may, clearly, be quite compatible with one another.

To van den Berghe, then, ethnicity and hence cultural pluralism are not necessary for the existence of pluralism in a society. The institutionalized racial definition may suffice even in the absence of cultural differences between 'races'. On the other hand, a society manifesting a high degree of pluralism need not necessarily contain one corporate group monopolizing effective political power. In other words, differential incorporation is not a necessary condition for a high degree of pluralism (as it is necessary to Smith for the emergence of a plural society). Thus, van den Berghe writes of societies with 'democratic pluralism' 18) such as Switzerland where the two basic conditions of pluralism are met and where the usual invidious concomitants of this pluralism, race and caste, are

17) See chapter Four.
18) 'The Benign Quota: Panacea or Pandora's Box', p. 40.
not present.

In such cases of democratic pluralism, cultural pluralism or different subcultures, at least, seem necessary for the maintenance of a degree of pluralism for the institutional duplication would otherwise not serve any purpose and, presumably, disappear. In cases of social pluralism without any accompanying cultural pluralism, that is, where institutional duplication is maintained in different culturally alike corporate units in order to preserve invidious group inequalities, there appears what van den Berghe calls 'a complicating factor of secondary cultural pluralism'. 19) In fact, the inequality, social distance and separation of institutions between groups must lead, to some extent, to subcultural and possibly ethnic differences growing between these groups. Thus, the appearance of 'Black Power' in the U.S.A. and, of late, in South Africa can be interpreted, partially at least, in this light. 20)

In sum, then, though treated as a variable, pluralism as conceived of by van den Berghe is analytically useful insofar as it differentiates plural societies from two other types of society; insofar as it relates the concepts ethnicity, race and caste to one another holistically, within the context of a society; and insofar as it typifies certain democratic countries as 'plural'. Finally it should be clear that the concept has been developed for comparative macro-analysis.

One other aspect of van den Berghe's approach needs discussion: his insistence that plural societies and race relations must be studied historically 21) and his suggested scheme to do this, the development from paternalistic to competitive systems of race relations. Before this discussion, two points need to be made.

19) Race and Racism, p. 135. This phenomenon is called cultural 'drift'.
20) In South Africa, this interpretation would apply to Coloureds especially. Its explanatory power decreases to the extent that ethnic differences exist prior to the emergence of such a consciousness.
21) See Race and Racism, p. 149; Race and Ethnicity, p. llff.
First, van den Berghe insists that the mentioned development is by no means a necessary evolution though '(h)istorically, at least in Western countries since the first period of overseas expansion in the fifteenth century, the general tendency has been away from the paternalistic type and toward competitive prejudice'. 22) Second, his scheme has been criticized because it 'looks very like the Old Deep South at one end of the scale and the modern North of the United States at the other'. 23) This, in itself, is not valid negative criticism for the onus still lies with the critic to show why a scheme based on America is not applicable elsewhere. As Mason shows, however, the scheme seems to be restricted to societies that were once agricultural slave societies (as were all four countries in van den Berghe's comparative study, Race and Racism). With these two points in mind, the proposed scheme will be discussed: 24)

The differentiation between paternalistic and competitive types of race relations must be seen as a dichotomy in ideal typical terms. This dichotomy coincides in important ways with Toennies' Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft dichotomy and with Weber's traditional and rational-legal types of authority.

Thus the paternalistic type is characterized, structurally, by a rigid caste (or estate) system supported by a common value system; minimal mobility between castes and a developing but small-scale agricultural economy. Agricultural slave societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries may serve as examples.

The competitive type, on the other hand, is characterized, structurally, by large scale industrial economy; a break-down in the rigidity of the caste system due to the use of universalistic values in this economy; and a stratification system

22) 'Paternalistic versus Competitive Race Relations', p. 36.
23) Patterns of Dominance, P. Mason, p. 61.
24) Other criticisms of the scheme have been made, inter alia, by J. Rex: See Race Relations in Sociological Theory and Race; Colonialism and the City.
ambiguously based upon both race and class criteria. Conflict based on differing values arises from this ambiguity. As shown, modern urban North America may serve as an example.

The two types of race relations are accompanied by corresponding ideologies and other attitudinal aspects of the racial situation. The paternalistic type, for example, condones miscegenation; maintains elaborate forms of etiquette between castes and, generally, is based upon a common value-system which legitimizes the hierarchized positions of the different castes in the society. The competitive type, however, condemns miscegenation, does away with elaborate forms of etiquette and reflects a spectrum of ideologies in which coercion and compliance rather than value consensus contribute toward the orderly functioning of the society. 25)

Societies falling within either of these race relations types will manifest a high degree of pluralism. 26) There is not, however, an attempt to incorporate a historical dimension into the conception of pluralism itself. The degree of pluralism and the type of race relations vary independently. To show this, a review of four 'levels' 27) of pluralism will be made.

At group level, a number of factors in a situation of high pluralism may vary: the number of corporate groups; the racial or ethnic defining characteristic of these groups, whether these groups are castes or not; and the relative size of these groups.

25) For a further discussion of this ideal type, see 'Paternalistic versus Competitive Race Relations', passim and Race and Racism, pp. 25ff.
26) Both types contain castes, in fact, and castes imply pluralism.
27) Race and Racism, pp. 140ff and 'Pluralism and the Polity', pp. 70ff. Though van den Berghe does claim that the paternalistic type, more than its polar opposite, manifests cultural pluralism, an argument will now be presented which, hopefully, will show that the two conceptual schemes are quite independent of each other. Race and Racism, p. 144.
At institutional level, a high degree of pluralism can obtain if institutional duplication is present. The number and type of institutions as well as their cultural compatibility in different groups can vary independently of one another.

At value level, pluralism is characterized by a narrow range of societal consensus. The compatibility of different value systems which may exist in the plural society can vary.

At individual level, pluralism implies rigid corporate group membership. However, 'passing', mobility out of these groups and shuttling from one to the other are possible variables within the context of pluralism.

It should now be quite clear, in both the above four-level model of pluralism, and in the ideal-typical dichotomy of race relations, that the sets of variables which define pluralism, competitive race relations and paternalistic race relations, can vary independently. In other words, pluralism can be present to a high degree on some levels and to a low degree on others; and societies can be found which manifest a 'mixed' type of race relations.28)

It follows, then, that by merely noting that the variables in the race relations models are not conceptually interdependent with those in the pluralism model, that the models are independent of each other. In conclusion, here, then, it would seem that though van den Berghe pleads for a historical dimension in his studies of pluralism, all that his model offers is advice to present ad hoc historical overviews before turning to an analysis of pluralism in a particular society.

28) For the former observation, see Race and Racism, p. 140; for the latter, see P. Mason, op. cit. p. 61.
PLURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

Unlike the other pluralists who have been discussed this far, van den Berghe does not emphasize the fact that a plural society is, in the first place, a political entity. Rather, by approaching pluralism as a variable, he emphasizes the corporate groups which a society contains, the scope and degree of institutional duplication present in these groups, and a series of characteristics allied to these variables. Thus, plural societies are classified into those that are democratic and acceptable - where corporate differences are ethnic in origin - and those that are structured by the presence of races and/or castes and are considered invidious. Even though these two classes of societies are subsumed under the pluralism label, societal order in them is explained by way of quite different arguments.

As has been shown, societies manifesting democratic pluralism contain neither castes or races; do not manifest a mode of differential incorporation of groups into the polity; and are pluralistic insofar as they contain ethnic groups within their borders. Switzerland, characterized by 'coexistence of distinct but historically related ethnic groups', 29 may serve as an example.

When the question as to why order is maintained is posed, however, Switzerland's pluralism is not prominent in the answer:

Order in a democratic plural society is, in van den Berghe's words, directly proportional to (a) 'the degree of consensus about basic values'; (b) 'the degree of consensus about the procedural norms of government'; (c) 'the degree to which the main lines of cleavage in the society are orthogonal to one

29) Race and Racism, p. 150. Emphasis in the original.
another'. In addition, this order is inversely proportional to (a) 'the degree of cultural pluralism'; and (b) 'the discrepancy in the levels of technological and scientific development of the constituent groups'.

Usually, however, '(t)yranny over and economic exploitation of the majority by an ethnic minority is the more common and more enduring form of the plural society. Conflict and competition between groups are endemic, and coercion and economic interdependence rather than consensus are the bases of such social integration as exists'. Further the existence of races and castes in many plural societies implies that invidious plural societies are much more common than those of the democratic variety.

Order, then, in a democratic plural society, is maintained by allowing elites from different corporate groups into the centre of the society; by using the social integration present (i.e. the value consensus) to maintain this distribution of political and other types of power amongst members of all ethnic groups present; and by countering the emergence of racism or a caste-structure in the society. All in all, it would seem that such societies must attempt to reach a balance between ethnic differences between groups, on the one hand, and solidarities and cleavages which cut across these ethnic group structures, on the other.

Order in societies characterized by invidious pluralism is analyzed, insofar as it exists in any permanent form, in terms of three factors: political coercion, economic interdependence and compliance.

Conflict, in invidious plural societies, tends to be structured along corporate group lines of cleavage. Political power tends

30) See 'Pluralism and the Polity, pp. 76, 77.
to be the monopoly of one of these groups. To maintain order, then, coercion - negative situational sanctions - is applied by those persons positioned in the centre of the society. These persons tend to be members of the dominant caste or 'race'. The group in the centre, then, wields political power over the periphery (the other corporate groups, castes, 'races'); and cultural power over its fellow group members (since it is a corporate group containing its own set of institutions). Coercion alone, however, when applied repeatedly, loses its effectiveness rapidly. Other types of sanctions are required to maintain order.

A plural society contains one common economy. In this institutional complex, then, members from different corporate groups interact, albeit in a 'segmental, utilitarian, non-affective and functionally specific'\(^{32}\) way. Members in the society, then, have a stake in the reward structure of the economy. Insofar as persons in the centre - members of the dominant group - manipulate this stake in the reward structure, they are effectively using economic power and positive situational sanctions. The periphery, then, will have its desire for material satisfaction partially realized.

To this point, van den Berghe agrees with the explanation commonly presented by pluralists in this context: Since those in the centre have no social or cultural power over the periphery, they are forced, when it becomes necessary, to use situational sanctions over those in the periphery. A new factor, however, is now introduced: compliance.

Compliance is conceived of as 'consensus at the level of instrumental norms coupled with dissension concerning fundamental values'.\(^{33}\) Van den Berghe goes on to say that this low-level consensus may result from coercion, economic interdependence or,

\(^{32}\) 'Pluralism and the Polity', p. 68.
\(^{33}\) Race and Ethnicity, p. 84.
even, free will. In the terminology of the model generated in chapter Two, compliance can be interpreted as social power - control over the means of status attribution or control over desired positions in the society - which can be used to increase rewards, to change the structure of the society or to realize values quite different from those of the dominant group.

These three instruments for maintaining societal order: coercion, economic power and compliance, vary in the effectiveness of their application in different types of society. Where cultural differences are great and perhaps exacerbated by racial overtones, and where there exist great differences in technological development between groups, the society tends to be unstable and coercion will probably be the most effective sanction. Where ethnic differences are tempered by an approximately equal participation in the economy, and where race and caste structures are absent, compliance rooted in the common stake members of all groups have in the economic reward structure, may increase. Plural societies, of course, exist at points between these extremes, and explanations for order in them will vary accordingly.

CONCLUSION

Van den Berghe has placed his conception of pluralism within the consensus/conflict schools debate. He feels that this conception is more oriented toward the conflict school than toward the other. Nevertheless, he conceives of pluralism as possibly bridging this well-known theoretical chasm. In this conclusion, it will be shown that he does use elements of both schools but that he does not succeed in bringing about that ever elusive synthesis.

34) Van den Berghe has written: 'One of the great ironies of underdevelopment is that, the less developed a country is, the greater its internal inequalities (which) become strongly correlated with ethnicity in most cases since the ethnic groups are so strongly localized'. 'Ethnicity: The African Experience', pp. 515, 515.

35) See 'Toward a Sociology of Africa' and 'Dialectic and Functionalism'.
Order in a democratic plural society, depends upon consensus regarding certain values and certain norms; upon not too different cultural traditions in the society; and upon cross-cutting solidarities and criss-crossing conflicts between groups. The centre of the society must be occupied by members of different corporate groups.

It is clear that this explanation uses, to a great degree, the consensual argument: societal order is based upon common values, and cultural power derives from these common values. The centre which is not representative exclusively of any one corporate group, uses this power to maintain order. Intentional sanctions are paramount. On the other hand, aspects of the classical conflict explanation are also used: If the lines of cleavage are criss-crossing, especially across ethnic group boundaries, then both conflict and solidarity between changing interest groups will contribute toward order in the society. In other words, shifting alignments contribute toward overall peaceful functioning of institutions. Conflict, ubiquitous though it may be, can play a positive role under such circumstances.

Order in an invidious plural society, depends in the first place upon coercion. This is not enough, however, and economic interdependence and compliance are also needed. The explanation, here approximates the conflict approach quite closely: Consensus is absent.36) Conflict between corporate groups is always potentially present. The centre which is monopolized by one group alone, will use situational sanctions to keep those in the periphery in line. These sanctions will be most effective when those in the periphery share satisfactorily in the reward structure of the society. Under these circumstances, positive situational sanctions will be effective and will generate

36) By consensus is meant agreement on values that contribute to order and peaceable interaction. Van den Berghe does make the point that there may be certain values on which agreement can lead to dissension rather than order: cynicism, mistrust, and egoism, for example. See Power and Privilege at an African University, p. 252.
a certain amount of social power which can be used by those in the centre. In other words, certain positions will be valued by many persons in the periphery and thus compliance can be regarded as a factor promoting societal order.

In the case of democratic plural societies, social integration - a substantial degree of value consensus - is regarded as a necessary condition for order. The ethnic differences present, which must be related so as to be compatible with this value consensus, as in the case of Switzerland, are not relevant to the maintenance of this order.

In the case of invidious plural societies, system integration - the goodness of fit between the four institutional complexes in a society - is regarded as a necessary condition for order. In fact, without this goodness of fit, the rewards allocated to those in the periphery to compensate for lack of political power and desired positions in the centre, will no longer satisfy these persons and coercive sanctions will have to be repeatedly used. In other words, order in such societies is fragile indeed and dependent upon the smooth functioning of the polity and economy, and the continuing development of the latter. 37) Otherwise, group conflict which is always latent in such race and caste societies will become overt.

It is clear that order in these latter invidious societies is explained in terms of the regulation of group conflict, as both Marx and Dahrendorf explain societal order. The nature of these antagonistic groups, however, varies from theorist to theorist. Conflict theorists posit a basic duality in all societies.

37) This argument seems to underlie van den Berghe's verdict that South Africa, 'divided against itself awaits its impending doom'. In fact, contradictions rooted in reactionary racist ideologies on the one hand and the demand-structure of a modern economy, on the other, will bring about tensions which will destroy what little compliance still exists. Coercion will be used repeatedly as a last resort until a violent upheaval will eventually engulf the society. See Race and Racism, Ch.V.; South Africa: A Study in Conflict.
Van den Berghe, however, points to the existence of races and castes in invidious plural societies to define the basic lines of cleavage, confrontation and conflict. It would seem then, that conflict in these societies will follow race and caste lines rather than lines of class and power-distribution (or 'authority'-distribution, as Dahrendorf would have it).

This approach, however, begs a very important question: Class, status and political power are all concepts which, in any society, are intrinsically differentially distributed. Different groups in the society will have differential access to scarce and valued objects in that society. Membership in a corporate group or in a 'race', on the other hand, must be considered, intrinsically, as a neutral factor within any stratification system. The reasons why races, ethnic groups or even castes, for that matter, are hierarchized, must be sought elsewhere - eventually in terms of class, status and power. Van den Berghe recognizes this when he writes:

...problems of race and ethnicity are not inherent in cultural, much less in racial diversity but reflect, for the most part, resentment at various forms of institutionalized inequalities.... 38)

When one looks at his analysis of the stratification systems in South Africa and Nigeria, at the very least, however, this reduction of racial conflict to tension between strata in the stratification system is not substantiated. In fact, van den Berghe finds that the class system in the centre of the two societies is relatively open. Thus for whites in South Africa, and Nigerian elites, access to central positions is allocated according to achievement - and ethnic criteria. In addition, little class consciousness has developed amongst South African blacks, partly due to the fact that a class system needs to be rooted in a kinship system. This is not the case of the black worker in industrial South Africa who is forced to lead a life

38) 'The Benign Quota: Panacea or Pandora's Box', p. 40.
Lines of division and confrontation remain racial, ethnic and caste rather than class by origin.

In any society, the corporate groups present and the duplicated sets of institutions within them, define pluralism. This conception is not important in the explanations of order in plural societies. In circumstances of democratic pluralism, what is important is the existence of value-consensus and criss-crossing, shifting lines of division; in circumstances of invidious pluralism, coercion and common participation in the economy.

Arguments of both the consensual and conflict schools are used in these explanations. Pluralism, however, does not represent a convergence of these schools. In itself, it is not relevant to explanations of societal order. To become so, this approach must produce a theory linking race, ethnicity and caste to stratification, and stratification, in turn, to order. This, van den Berghe's conception of pluralism does not furnish, neither analytically nor historically. His conception, therefore, as the foundation of a new sociology of Africa, succeeds in highlighting difficulties rooted in the dialectical and functionalist approaches, but does not succeed in integrating them into a new approach.

39) For South Africa, see South Africa: A Study in Conflict and 'Race, Class and Ethnicity in South Africa'. For Nigeria, see Power and Privilege at an African University.
CHAPTER SEVEN

DIVERSE APPLICATIONS OF THE PLURAL SOCIETY

The aim of this chapter is, first, to show that the plural society conception has been and is still being used in a number of different academic disciplines and a variety of academic communities and, second, to focus on some of these in order to analyze their conceptions in the same way as has been done to the present.

Attention will be paid, briefly, then, to certain works in the social sciences in South Africa, France, the United States, Britain and Holland. It must be emphasized that this treatment will be in no sense exhaustive nor (with the possible exception of South Africa) representative. Rather, the object of this first section is to furnish examples of how the conception of the plural society is used; how wide-spread this use is; how lacking in logical consistence the term is; and, finally, that the 'plural society' approach binds together a motley group of social scientists in a negative rather than positive way. In fact, these analysts share a rejection of other more classical approaches to societal analysis rather than a consensus about the content of the conception, pluralism.

Ever since Furnivall first conceived of pluralism, the structure of society in South Africa has been of central interest to pluralists. It is not surprising, then, to find that the conception is still used in analyses of this society. In historical studies, too, the term is increasingly being used. The works of Leonard Thompson may serve as a good example. 1)

Within South Africa, the term has often been used as a signaling device pointing to societal context within which many social scientific studies have taken place. 2) An introductory sociology

1) For example, see Politics in the Republic of South Africa, 'Historical Perspectives of Pluralism in Africa', and various chapters in the recent two volumes, Oxford History of South Africa.

2) For example, see Urbanization and the Plural Society, G. Kinloch et al.; 'City or Rural "Homeland"', L. Schlemmer.
text for students in South Africa placed the conception in the centre of its analysis but erred in that the author attempted to overlook very real differences in approach within the 'plural' tradition. 3) The impression created that the plural society conception is well-defined and logically consistent, is hopefully refuted by this present work. An Afrikaans periodical praised the potential comparative power of the conception. 4) More recently, an analysis of possible alternative political structures which are feasible in South Africa at present, includes a serious analysis of the present South African societal structure. This analysis uses a Kuperian plural approach. 5) In none of these works, however, are the theoretical problems which have been discussed here so far, analyzed. The 'plural society' model is usually accepted as a fully described and consistent conceptual tool. Its role in these works, moreover, (with the exception of the Spro-Cas publication) is little more than peripheral.

A French social anthropologist, G. Balandier, who has done extensive work in Francophone Africa, has developed an approach which coincides with aspects of the pluralist approach. Balandier calls his the 'colonial situation'. 6) His definition of this approach emphasizes the following factors: a foreign minority dominant group in the society; cultural heterogeneity;

4) Woord en Daad, May 1971, p. 9. This article, in fact, welcomes the appearance of a periodical entitled Plural Societies in which, thus far, articles of surprisingly variable quality have appeared.
5) South Africa's Political Alternatives, P. Randall (ed.), Spro-Cas. The authors differentiate between an open pluralistic society, 'in the sense of a wide diffusion of power throughout society', and a divided plural society, 'not merely in the sense of the segmented nature of a racially or ethnically diverse society, but also in the structure of its exploitative domination by the white minority'. The Report then attempts to delineate paths along which South African society can develop from the latter to the former type. See op. cit., p. 84.
a dual economy; and the likelihood of group antagonisms and group conflict. 7) This approach is clearly similar to Furnivall's original plural society model. Both are explicitly confined to colonial contexts. Quite independently, a French political scientist, J-L. Quermonne, uses a formalistic approach to differentiate between societies which contain a number of separate communities ("multi-communautaire") and those which contain one main community. This treatment, though similar in form to the basic plural society model, relies on formal political and legal lines of division (such as differences between a unitary and federal state; and between international and national law) and does not attempt to go further than an itemizing of probable problems such societies may expect. 8) Thus the phenomenon of multi-ethnic societies (colonial and other) is considered important and attempts are made to relate such societies to their historical contexts and their formal political systems by way of approaches similar to that of the plural society.

Leo Despres is a social anthropologist who has applied a plural society model to nationalist politics and questions of development in British Guiana. (Guyana) Though obtaining many of his ideas from M.G. Smith, he differs at certain important points with the latter's approach. As Despres puts it:

"the definition of a plural society must take into account two related sets of facts: (1) the extent to which specified groups are culturally differentiated in terms of specific institutional activities and (2) the level at which institutional activities serve to maintain cultural differentiation as the basis for sociocultural integration..."

8) 'Le Problème de la Cohabitation dans les Sociétés Multi-Communautaires', Jean-Louis Quermonne. The term 'pluralist' is used in its American (deTocquevillian) sense in this article. The concept of 'imbrication', coincidence, is given central importance in the analysis, however. As has been seen in the plural society approach, coinciding lines of cleavage are a crucial feature in such 'plural' societies.
9) L. Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana, p. 22.
groups with different institutional activities which are identified with these groups at national level, then that society is a plural society. Despres rejects M.G. Smith's earlier model in which institutions are classified into those that are basic, alternative and exclusive. All institutions function to 'serve' the culture within which they occur. Instead, Despres differentiates between local and broker institutions; the former 'which serve to structure activities and express cultural values within the context of local communities'; the latter 'which function to link local activities to the wider spheres of societal activity.'

Despres, then, positions institutions in the very centre of his analysis of plural societies, but uses a 'reticulated model', a variant of systems theory, to obtain an overall view of the society as a unit. Local institutions define the core of each separate cultural group in the society whilst broker institutions define behaviour between such groups and between members of these groups. In this way, the focus of the analysis is kept upon cohesion within cultural units, interaction between such units, and the overall society as a system. One important conclusion which Despres draws from this approach is that all protest movements in such plural societies must become, in the long run, political protest movements (even if, initially, they are not politically oriented). He writes:

"The integration of plural societies is based on a system of relationships between culturally differentiated units of unequal status and power. The core structure of this system is essentially political. Intersectional relationships not only reflect the power structure of the political order under which they are subsumed, but they also serve to express the maintenance or change of that political order..." 12)

10) op. cit., p. 23. In addition, see 'Anthropological Theory, Cultural Pluralism, and the Study of Plural Societies', Leo Despres.

11) Broker institutions are similar in conception to Kuper's intercalary institutions. See Chapter Five.

12) 'Protest and Change in Plural Societies', Leo Despres, p. 29. Despres, therefore, underwrites Smith's conception of differential incorporation.
John Rex is a South African-born English sociologist who became interested in the plural society approach in the mid-fifties.13) As in the case of Balandier, Rex called upon pluralist theory to ameliorate analyses of colonial societies. His interest in the approach, moreover, though remaining critical throughout, has not waned.14)

The positive aspects of the pluralist approach are (a) the relation which is posited between market systems on the one hand, and 'culture and community' 15) on the other. This is the Furnivallian approach. Later, M.G.Smith paid more attention to the cultural sectors in the society and this focus, Rex argues, is helpful (b) insofar as it posits a certain looseness between ethnic or cultural sectors in the society. Both functionalist and Marxist theory emphasizes individuals' interdependence in the society's economy and polity.16) Rex writes:

"According to this (plural society) tradition, what we are concerned with in the study of race relations and of the plural society are neither hierarchically arranged castes, nor classes in conflict, nor a system of roles arranged hierarchically according to their evaluation in terms of some set of ideal values. What we are concerned with are segments which cut across the strata, producing vertical rather than horizontal divisions within the society" 17)

The theory, however, is most fitted for colonial societies which as yet have not reached an advanced stage of industrialization. For this reason, Rex argues, the classical functionalist and Marxist stratification theories do not apply. In fact, Rex's central criticism of the plural society approach is that it does not allow for the development, in such industrializing

13) 'The Plural society in Sociological Theory' was published in 1959.
14) See Rex's Race Relations in Sociological Theory; 'South African Society in Comparative Perspective'; and 'The Plural Society - The South African Case'.
societies, of new institutions which derive from none of the original cultures in the society. These new institutions, which Malinowski called third-column, Kuper called intercalary, and Despres called broker, form the core of the new political economy of the developing society. Without concepts to analyze these new developments, Rex argues, a theory will be little more than useless in any society which has reached a certain level of industrialization. Referring to South Africa, he writes:

"...if the term (plural society) is meant to imply a society in which there is no involvement of all the different groups in a single political economy, or if it is taken to imply an absence of economically based class conflict, then South Africa certainly does not present us with a case of a plural society"... 18)

Rex, then, feels that the plural society approach does offer some new insights which classical theory does not provide. Pluralist theory itself, however, tends to reduce stratification models, race relations and class conflict to inter-ethnic and inter-cultural exchanges. Very complex situations are hereby crudely simplified and the positive aspects of the plural approach are lost. As an independent and holist approach on its own, plural society theory is not deemed successful by Rex.

Christopher Bagley, another English sociologist, is interested in plural society theory particularly insofar as it relates to racialism and the existence of democratic institutions in societies both of the developed and developing types. Plural societies, Bagley defines as "those which contain two or more cultural groups who are more or less separate from one another in terms of ideology, norms, folkways, and institutions. Such groups may also be linguistically, ethnically, and geographically distinct from one another." 19)

In such situations, Bagley continues, the power distribution in the society becomes critical for the presence of these 'blocs' in the society creates a situation conducive for racialism, where 'one bloc clearly dominates another'.

In comparative perspective, employing a number of variables which measure both 'pluralism' and 'racialism', Bagley uses statistical techniques to generate a two-dimensional space in which a number of societies are plotted by means of the two indices, pluralism and racialism.

Further, Bagley is particularly interested in the effect which the formal political institutions may have upon plural societies. He argues that proportional representation, 'Dutch style' is more conducive for democratic government than 'English style' parliamentary democracy. This argument is supported by Lijphart's study of pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands.

Bagley uses the plural society conception to differentiate between ethnic diversity and (invidious) racialism and caste structures. In addition, he uses it to suggest ways in which developing countries may avoid some of the usual concomitants of a plural structure, such as differential incorporation of 'blocs' into the common societal polity. Bagley's argument about the problem of order in such societies, however, though seemingly attractive, is quite unsatisfactory and, in certain aspects, contradictory:

"In my view the problem of relating theories of pluralism and those of the Parsonian model of normative consensus in society is one which can easily be solved. Societies, by virtue of being societies, possess a high degree of normative integration. But it is a mistake to equate societies with national boundaries. Such boundaries, especially in colonial countries, are often arbitrary and have no connections with the realities of social interaction."


21) op. cit. In addition, see: 'Racialism and Pluralism: a dimensional analysis of 48 countries', C. Bagley.

A plural society is not a society as such, but a collection of two or more integrated societies bound together by rather arbitrary national boundaries, and perhaps by trading interests, or by economic competition or economic exploitation of one group by another..." 23)

This argument assumes that the common economy and polity in the 'territory' have a minimal effect upon the 'realities of social interaction' which are to be found, presumably, within the separate 'societies' within the larger entity. Except in the earlier stages of some colonies and with few other examples, this situation just did not obtain. Finally, the argument seems to change direction when, a few pages later, Bagley writes:

"The key concept in analysing and comparing plural societies is that of power. A crucial cause of instability and conflict in such societies centres round the apportionment of control over resources, and the decision-making process at parliamentary level..." 24)

Certainly here, the 'realities' are found in interaction between blocs.

The plural society approach, as defined by Furnivall, evoked considerable interest in British social anthropology circles. Furnivall, in fact, was in contact with and favoured a Fabian group which was influential in Labour Party circles after the Second World War. 25) British anthropology in Africa, consequently, has been affected by Furnivall's model.

Meyer Fortes, as a first example, feels that Furnivall's ideas are still of importance (in analyzing contemporary government policy in South Africa, for example). On the other hand, he feels that pluralism as conceived of in the sixties is of too general application to prove very useful. It is especially

24) op. cit., p. 237. Emphasis in the original.
25) As were many British anthropologists, of course. See 'The Plural Society in Africa', M. Fortes, p. 5.
in Furnivall's emphasis on the economic forces unleashed in a plural society, that the approach maintains its utility:

"The concept (plural society) has... come to be applied to any society that is politically unitary through being under a single, supreme political authority..., but is internally made up of ethnically or culturally diverse groups who maintain distinguishably separate ways of life. From this comprehensive point of view, there are very few contemporary nations..., that do not exhibit some degree of pluralism...

It is only when racial or cultural pluralism is isomorphic with unrestricted economic competition and with the absence of social consensus, when it is the basis, therefore, of conflicting interests and purposes in relation to moral values and to the political order, that Furnivall's concept strictly applies.... 26)

When applied to colonial and ex-colonial Africa, however, this approach is deemed too simplistic by other social anthropologists.

J. Clyde Mitchell argues, in a vein similar to that of Rex's, that an individual when involved in the common economy of a plural society is not as isolated or 'atomised' as Furnivall led social scientists to believe. In fact, a whole series of new institutions are created so that such 'detribalized' individuals may cope with their new urban surroundings. Instead of Furnivall's approach, Mitchell suggests a net-work approach which, though it does not posit a fully integrated social system, does move the focus away from coercion and economic interest to relationships of cooperation and interaction:

"We could perhaps visualize societies as complex reticulations of social relationships in which people are linked and cross-linked by numerous ties and bonds, some operating now to hold people together this way, and some operating now to hold people together in a different way. Societies conceived thus have no boundaries for the network of relationships may ramify endlessly. The overall reticulation, however, is not uniformly distributed; here and there we may discern areas of relatively dense networks - 'plexuses' or 'clusters' of relationships - while in other areas few social bonds unite people".... 27)

26) op. cit., p. 8.
This approach is clearly designed to be of assistance to the anthropologist in the field. The methodological assumptions underpinning it are known as 'individualistic' and the units of analysis can clearly not be 'macro': a society in concrete terms does not coincide with any area of such a network. Furthermore, this network model stresses the growth of solidarity and cooperation in a social field rather than conflict. Clusters (or 'plexuses') of relationships, on the other hand, point to groups and communities in the society (which may be ethnic, racial or more "functional" in origin). This guarantees that the model is not wholly consensual in approach. It is here that Furnivall's valuable insights can be translated into terms within Mitchell's model: "Where there are sparse bonds there is naturally a lack of consensus and consequently indifference or possibly dissent."28) Such lines of 'sparse' bonding may be conceived of as cleavage-lines, possibly coinciding with one another, and may, too, be power-differentials in the larger society.

Gluckman, as a third example of British social anthropologists, further develops Mitchell's approach in his work. In the first place, he feels that a naive use of the plural society model, even at the highest level of abstraction, consists of reification of ethnic and racial sectors, and of overemphasis of the role coercion plays in the society. Rather, he feels that an equilibrium model should be employed within which consensus, "agreement on values and goals" and cohesion should be differen-

28) loc. cit.
tiated from each other. 29) The first, consensus, points to ideas which the actors in the social field have about their actions whilst the latter, cohesion, is an abstraction the analysts make of the relationships between actors.

This latter conception which, clearly, is closely related to the idea of a reticulated social network, aids Gluckman to distinguish between 'plural societies' - "certain territorial states. when they were dominated by foreign settlers of quite different culture, who possessed more powerful industrial and military technologies" 30) - on the one hand, and more homogeneously developed, more urbanized societies, on the other. In fact, Gluckman uses Durkheim's terminology explicitly and argues that increasing development, the increasing division of labour brings about a spreading organic solidarity, a more wide-spread cohesion which, in turn, prohibits lines of cleavage from coinciding. Polarization is avoided. As he puts it succinctly in an analysis of the structure of South African society:

> even if ultimately the whites maintain power by their superior force, there is a considerable degree of cohesion in the system from the development of economic and other forms of interdependence within regions, within special

29) 'Tribalism, Ruralism and Urbanism in South and Central Africa', M. Gluckman, p. 132. Since "cohesion" is the key concept, it is fitting to quote Gluckman's definition in full: "structural cohesion (defines) the extent to which the structure of a particular social field is maintained in something like continuous pattern. This pattern may be maintained by a variety of factors, such as outright force, and/or interdependence, and/or agreement of all the people involved on ultimate goals and their readiness to sacrifice for those goals, and/or the cross-linking of individuals within the total field in terms of a variety of associations and values which prevent most persons from becoming wholeheartedly loyal to one bond and hostile to all other bonds". loc. cit. It is further important to note that "structure" is conceived of as "any ordered arrangement of parts within a postulated whole"(op.cit., p. 128). The parts, then, are presumably 'bonds' between actors. Cohesion, thus, points to networks of overlapping and cross-cutting bonds at concrete low levels of analysis. These networks must be permanent in some sense.

30) op. cit., p. 137. Gluckman calls this "colonial pluralism". op. cit., p. 135.
institutions like factories and farms, and within various sets of small-scale relationships; and this interdependence within parts is communicated to the whole within which some overall cohesion also exists. This is so despite the continual development of the dominant cleavage between whites and coloured"..... 31)

To study this cohesion, Gluckman argues that the anthropologist must isolate roles and positions at certain critical points in the social field: "where there are major discontinuities in the total hierarchy"; "where disturbances and struggles provide social situations which exhibit the arrangements of alignments, and which show trends of developments." 32) By focusing on such 'inter-hierarchical' roles and positions - the missionary, administrator, trader and labour recruiter - Gluckman shows how both cooperation and conflict can strengthen structural cohesion. In fact, people's changing allegiances in different situations to such persons, and the traditional bases of institutionalized conflict both contribute to this cohesion. And, in turn, to the maintenance of social order.

In sum, then, Gluckman feels that structural differentiation and institutional integration - 'organic solidarity' - are the best basis for the maintenance of order (harsh and undesirable as that order may be). If this development does not keep pace with attempts at obtaining consensus and mobilization in societies which were typified as colonial plural societies, Gluckman foresees unrest and disorder:

..so long as utilitarian, organic interdependence between the segments of the nation is weak, many of the characteristics of the plural society will remain, despite the disappearance of the hegemony of colonial settlers backed by metropolitan authority. For the dominant characteristic of these societies is a mass of peasantry, possibly with their

31) op. cit., p. 128.
traditional culture more violently disturbed than in the past, dominated by the small industrial sector containing large proportions of unemployed and underpaid, peasants and many unemployable literati. Secondary associations will be undeveloped in the insistence on high consensus... 33)

As is shown in the last sentence, attempts at obtaining high consensus on the one hand, and attempts at creating structural cohesion on the other, are to an extent mutually exclusive activities in plural societies. And cohesion rather than consensus is the true basis for societal order.

Since Furnivall, interest has been shown in plural society theory by a number of Dutch social scientists. A publication which critically reviews the conception has already been mentioned. 34) Here, attention will be given to one author and, in fact, one particular work. Though not in the main-stream of plural theory, Hoetink's work does concentrate on relevant aspects. 35)

Hoetink is interested in people's attitude toward colour and race in the Caribbean and Southern U.S.A. He observes that in countries dominated by peoples originating in North West Europe, there is a tendency to dichotomize people into white and black (i.e. non-white) categories, whilst in countries dominated by people originating from Southern Europe, there tends to be a continuum rather than a dual classification and hence a series of categories ranging from white through grades of coloured to black. He attempts to explain these differences by differentiating between inter-group contact in the public domain and in the private (intimate and sexual) domain. He further introduces two new concepts: "somatic norm image" and "somatic distance". Both are to be understood from the point of view of group members.

33) 'Tribalism, Ruralism and Urbanism in South and Central Africa', p. 163.
34) De Plurale Sameleving, A.N.D. Den Hollander et al.
The somatic norm image refers to that image of a person which most members of a racial category would consider ideal or most desirable in terms of physical traits. Somatic distance refers to the degree of physical difference which is perceived to exist between categories or groups. The following summary of Hoetink's argument seems fair:

The particular somatic norm image of the South European plantation powers, Spain and Portugal, was acquired through contact with the Moors. These Luso-Iberian peoples literally became darker through intermixture with their conquerors (who - it would appear - lacked any norm image difficulties). The Luso-Iberians' perceptions of 'the right way to look' thus were shifted toward the darker end of the scale. In the New World, their descendants were able to accept more readily (than could peoples of North-West European origin) others darker than they, particularly those only a little darker than they. This is a general principal underlying behavior, as postulated by Hoetink, not reducible to institutional factors, economics, etc. The Luso-Iberians acted differently because they perceived differently; their self-perceptions were, accordingly, also different, since their norms of appropriate appearance were at the root of their different perceptions, and of their different behavior. 36)

What is here at issue is which factors are essential for a full explanation of the occurrence and persistence of cleavage-lines in plural societies. Hoetink does not share Smith's emphasis on differences between cultural sectors nor the emphases others give to differences in access to power, to life-chances or to other scarce resources. Rather, he argues that, amongst other factors, the subjective definition of the situation which is in part explicable in terms of previous contact (or lack of contact) with darker (or lighter) peoples, is essential for a full explanation of what might be called the institutionalization and persistence of racialism.

SOCIETAL ORDER

The social anthropologists discussed (Balandier, Fortes, Gluckman, Mitchell, Despres) as well as John Rex point to the emergence of 'third-column' or 'broker' institutions in plural societies. In addition, most restrict the conception, 'plural society' to societies which are or were (European) colonies. With the exception of Rex, all use, broadly speaking, a Durkheimian consensual approach. In short, then, social order is explained in terms of (a) the monopoly of political power and coercion by the colonial power which fills all positions in the centre; and (b) the development of utilitarian ties and other bonds of 'cohesion' which criss-cross cultural groups. This latter point indicates the growth of social power in which persuasion — intentional sanctions — are used to gain compliance. On the other hand, it is clear that this persuasion cannot claim to rest upon common values in the society: cultural power does not exist at the societal level. In short, then, in the common economic sphere, and especially in an urban context, common interests arise which give those in the centre a chance to manipulate scarce and valued status-positions.

Rex's argument is essentially similar to that of Kuper. The skewing factor in plural societies is the predominance of race and ethnicity over the three classical stratification variables: class, status and party. On the other hand, the racial and ethnic factor must not be reified into an explanation itself. Both ethnic and racial cleavage-lines as well as the political economy must be included in the societal analysis.

In the approach used by the above-mentioned anthropologists, moreover, it should be stressed that the network approach, the quest for bonds between actors in the social field, is a necessary aspect of the approach of the anthropologist-in-the-field. He may well refuse to generalize from this data to statements aimed at the societal level.

37) See Chapter Four.
Other theorists mentioned show that different sets of questions can be posed in an attempt to explicate societal order: Is there a relationship between the formal type of political system used in a plural society and social order in that society (Quermonne, Bagley, Spro-Cas)? In how far do group conceptions in the society contribute to the creation or dissolution of lines of cleavage (Hoetink)? It is not possible to generalize here about answers to these questions. What is of import, however is that it becomes clear that there are many divergent approaches to the one part of the basic question posed in this thesis: How is societal order maintained in a plural society?

In conclusion then, as shown by Gluckman, system integration which is allied with cohesion, is of greater importance to maintaining order than social integration (or consensus). Those in the centre, then, seek to wield cultural power over those in their own cultural group, political power over those in the periphery, and social power over all. The main additional insight furnished by this chapter is the existence of 'third-column', 'intercalary', 'broker' institutions and inter-hierarchical roles. Kuper has already mentioned these and van den Berghe's conception of compliance is essentially similar. It is finally in terms of these institutions linking individuals to one another at different times and in different places within and between different sectors of the society, that a common commitment to the society can be posited. It need not be at the level of values and it need not, consequently, be called value-consensus or effective cultural power, but it does point to the fact that those involved in the economic sector of the society do have some common interests. Societal order, insofar at it exists, is grounded upon coercion, economic interdependence and social power growing out of this interdependence.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE NEW PLURALIST THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The plural society approach was developed from Furnivall's works. His original conception, as has been shown earlier, was rooted in studies of western colonialism and laissez-faire capitalism. This is the pedigree of the plural society. One consequence of this pedigree is that some assumptions of his pluralist approach are still accepted by contemporary pluralists.

It is in part as a result of these studies that the plural society - a political entity by definition - has consistently been thought of as containing a well-defined centre and a residual periphery. The caricature, here, is that of the colonial white government and the native subjects. On the other hand, the plural society - again, by definition - contains a number of ethnic and racial groups which subdivide the periphery into separate sectors and may cut across the centre-periphery distinction. 1)

More specifically, pluralism, to Furnivall (and Fortes, Gluckman and Rex), refers to societies under colonial rule; societies which have a laissez-faire economic policy; and societies which are economically relatively undeveloped. These are the factors which interact with the culturally plural character of the society to create a set of definable centre-periphery relations.

To Kuper and van den Berghe (and Bagley), pluralism refers to societies in which one ethnic or racial group effectively monopolizes the state 2); societies in which ethnic and racial lines of cleavage tend to coincide with divisions in the stratification system; and societies in which social change and development will be characterized by deep and recurrent

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1) In this sense, then, a pluralist approach attempts to "discern the articulation between culture and the structural conditions to which it is an adaption". 'Sociology and the Study of Race - Contemporary Perspectives for Southern Africa', M.W. Murphree, p. 16.

2) Though van den Berghe and Bagley have analyzed, respectively, Switzerland and the Netherlands as plural societies, the main impetus of their analyses assumes an ethnic or racial monopoly in the political sector.
racial and ethnic conflict. As conceptualized by Kuper and van den Berghe, the pluralist approach poses the same questions in relation to all societies which contain a variety of ethnic and racial groups. If one focuses on the coincidence or lack of fit between ethnic, racial, class, power and status lines of cleavage, they argue, it is not really necessary to classify societies strictly as either plural or non-plural. As a result, both tend to use explanations which apply to all societies and which derive from variants of classical and contemporary sociological theory.

To M.G. Smith (and Despres), the plural society refers to societies in which one corporate group effectively monopolizes the state; societies where corporate units are almost totally closed to other members of the society; and societies which manifest no over-all value consensus. As conceptualized by M.G. Smith, the plural society approach attempts to generalize Furnivall's conception and to construct a new social-scientific theory in which plural societies enjoy a special position. Smith, however, does not relate ethnic and racial diversity to the dynamics of stratification in this theory. It belongs, therefore, more to the sphere of cultural anthropology than to that of sociology.

These differences in approach and definition are by no means mutually exclusive or incompatible with one another. On the contrary, they show many areas of overlap and can, in fact, be regarded on most points as differences in emphasis rather than differences in principle.

The new pluralist perspective constructed in this chapter, will be developed around these points and around the preliminary conceptual scheme generate in chapter Two. The assumptions and hypotheses of that scheme will also be used in this development.

In review, then, the foundation for this perspective will be the existence of social order in a plural society. This order will be explained, in terms of action, within a systemic framework of society and its four sectors. Structural differentiation is
assumed to be taking place in these sectors and the society, consequently, will develop a common economy and a common polity. Order will be maintained, at least, through system integration though some measure of both coercion and consensus will be present. The existence of ethnic and racial diversity, moreover, is expected to affect these structural developments substantially: Cleavage lines in the stratification system are expected to coincide, roughly, with ethnic and racial cleavage lines and, of most import, the boundary between centre and periphery will coincide with such ascriptive lines of cleavage.

Social order, therefore, will be explained in terms of relations between the centre and the periphery. Such relations are power relations and mediate developments in the four sectors of the society. In particular, the fact that positions in the centre tend to be monopolized by one ethnic group implies that little cultural or social power can be effectively wielded over members in the society at large. Intentional sanctions will not be effective over these members. Value consensus, as conceived of by normative functionalists, is not expected to be present in a plural society.

It is necessary, at this point, to differentiate between a value system (contained in the cultural sector) and an ideology. Kuper, as has been shown, stressed the role of ideologies in plural societies. He conceived of them as being both indicators of racial violence as well as causal components in the process of structural change in plural societies. A value system refers to a set of interdependent (ultimate) aims and conceptions of how a society ought to be. This system must be differentiated from both individual and group interests and should rather be regarded as embedded in the culture (and socialization system) of a particular group.

An ideology, on the other hand, refers simply to any system of ideas, opinions and beliefs which are held by a group of people.
Though this system may be dependent upon membership in a social class, as Marx claimed, this does not necessarily follow.

The possible links between ideologies and a value-system can be illustrated as follows:

Ideologies have two leading roles in the development of political conflicts. On the one hand they co-ordinate and systematize individual oppositions, and thus set them within the context of a larger conflict. On the other, ideologies give such disputes the appearance of a conflict of values, and this in turn causes deeper and more absolute commitments. 3)

Ideologies, thus, can be viewed as a link between the culture of a group and the changing structures in a society. They are always, in some measure, value-systems but also represent adaptations to new structural exigencies. As Kuper has pointed out, they may serve both as indicators of structural change and as explanatory categories for such changes.

In general, the new perspective developed in this chapter will attempt to bring the original ethnic and cultural diversity within the plural society into relation with the processes of structural change which took place within it after its inception. To do this most effectively, the perspective will be discussed in three stages: first, the origin of a plural society; second, the maintenance of order in a developing plural society; and, third, the directions of change in a plural society.

(a) The Origin of a Plural Society

Pluralists agree that a plural society, at its inception, consists of a number of different population groups having differing ethnic and cultural backgrounds, all of which are incorporated into a common polity. In the first place, then, a plural society is a political entity: political power and coercion are used to form it and maintain it as a society.

In accordance with Furnivall's approach, a plural society, at its inception, will here be restricted to those societies which were colonized by western powers. These colonizing powers formed such plural societies for reasons of the flag and trade. In fact, these societies were created to expand the empire and the empire's trade. The centre of this new society was monopolized by a colonial foreign elite. This elite exercised coercion and inducement - negative and positive situational sanctions - over the members of the periphery who consisted of a number of (usually indigenous) traditional societies. In this way, this colonial elite wielded political and economic power over the natives of the society.

In the centre itself, the political and economic goals of the elite - the flag and trade - did not clash. Furthermore, since this elite was culturally homogeneous, little more than cultural and social power, and, therefore, intentional sanctions, were needed to ensure the smooth development of the centre.

In the periphery, a simple push-pull model can be constructed. Natives were 'pushed' by the coercive machinery of the new colonial state to partake in economic activities in the new economy. (The introduction of western law, a monetary economy, and personal taxes, are examples). They were also 'pulled' by the material advantages they saw in a wage economy and private enterprise. There remained, in the periphery, moreover, important traditional centres of cultural and social power. The repeated application of indirect rule may serve as an example. These centres, then, partitioned the periphery into "sectors" in each of which intentional sanctions remained effective.

The type of conflict which can be expected at this stage of development in a plural society, can be called inter-sector conflict. Since intentional sanctions are still effective within each ethnic and racial group, confrontation will probably follow sector lines of division and traditional institutions will be used to mobilize and justify violent confrontations. The ideologies of the opposing groups, then, will coincide closely with the dominant
western 'white' culture, on the one hand, and the traditional native value-system, on the other. The fact that the former group has an almost complete monopoly of modern means of coercion assures that the outcome will be to the advantage of those in the centre. 4)

In short, then, in its early stages, a plural society consisted of a number of sectors within each of which intentional sanctions were applied effectively. To bind these sectors together, one sector applied effective coercion over all citizens. In addition, effective positive situational sanctions operated in the common market-places of the society.

An additional insight at this stage of the development of a plural society, was originally made by Furnivall: Race and ethnicity, while losing the importance they had had in traditional society, gradually became indicators of different work-categories in the new common economy. Lines of division in the developing stratification system tended to merge with racial and ethnic lines of differentiation.

It is important to note that the core of the problem of order in plural societies, viz. the absence of social integration or effective intentional sanctions, is already apparent in the above discussion. Furthermore, the core of the solution to this problem, viz. effective system integration, is also apparent. In fact, system integration is obtained by the compact foreign centre which carries out its own and its western power's will compatibly and which monopolizes the most effective coercive means in the society.

A plural society, consequently, originating in such a colonial context, will be characterized by (M.G. Smith's) cultural, social and structural pluralism. There will be ethnic differences which coincide with corporate categories. In addition, one

4) The Bambatha and Bondelzwarts rebellions in South Africa can serve as two examples of this type of conflict. See: Reluctant Rebellion, S. Marks; The Last Tribal War, R. Freislich.
dominant corporate group will monopolize positions in the centre and will incorporate other corporate categories differentially into the common polity.

This mode of differential incorporation, by which the foreign elite monopolizes positions of political power in the centre, and allocates subordinate positions to leaders of the other racial and ethnic groups in the society, is critical to the further development of the society. These subordinate positions, in fact, are either allocated within the framework of the traditional structures of the other sectors - as in the case of indirect rule - or as permanently subordinate positions within the new imported political institutions of the colonizing power. These well-defined power-political lines of cleavage (which coincide with the ascriptive racial and ethnic lines of division) tend to be maintained as structural changes take place in other sectors: Thus even though changes take place in the economic, social and cultural sectors, the mode of differential incorporation does not change in its basic line of cleavage.

Such societies can be viewed as invidious plural societies. Van den Berghe's democratic plural societies will not develop in these early stages.

(b) Conditions under which Order is maintained in a Plural Society

The conditions under which order is maintained in a plural society are discovered by analyzing the relations between the centre and the periphery in this society. The first set of relations are those which refer to the polity. In fact, the centre, which is monopolized by the dominant group in the society, is used to incorporate other groups, differentially, into the polity. These other groups, ethnic or racial in composition, then, are granted partial and unequal access to the sphere of political power. Racial, ethnic and power-political lines of cleavage coincide and, most importantly, form the division between the centre and the periphery. This political dimension is basic and affects, as will be shown, all relations of conflict, compliance and change in the society. Furthermore, this mode of
differential incorporation is fully intended and is constantly promoted by the members of the dominant group in the centre. Members of all groups in the periphery are, in this sense, subjects.

The second set of relations are those that refer to the economy. People become involved in the common economy, initially, to meet demands placed upon them as subjects and to try to improve their (and their family's) lot materially. Over time, this involvement brings about the disintegration of these people's traditional cultural centres (within their ethnic or racial groups) by forcing these people into the towns and cities of the plural society and by rendering traditional values, norms and customs useless in these new and demanding situations. Furnivall wrote, consequently, of 'atomized' individuals and 'incomplete' social lives. This point, however, has been convincingly criticized by a number of pluralists who argue that these people, involved in a common economy in a new urban milieu, will soon develop new institutions which are rooted in neither the imported dominant culture nor in the traditional culture, but in this new milieu. These 'third-column' institutions will be discussed later.

A further aspect of this involvement in the common economy is important. Partly as the intended policy of those in the centre, and partly as the unintended consequence of the demands of a developing economy, members of a plural society are gradually allocated economic roles in terms of their membership in their respective ethnic and racial groups. (Whites, for example, occupy senior and highly rewarded positions; Coloureds and Indians middle positions; and Blacks lower, labourers' positions in South Africa). It is important to note that pluralists argue that this system of differential involvement of groups in the economy is not a fully intended result of the centre's policy (except insofar as it is an indirect consequence of differential incorporation). First, the tension, here, for those in the centre is between setting compatible goals in the (racist) polity and in the (developing) economy. Second, there is only a rough coincidence between the racial, ethnic and political hierarchy, on the one hand, and the economic hierarchy,
on the other.

In the case of tension existing between goals set in the political and economic centres, priority will be given to the maintenance of system integration. It will be the explicit intention, then, of those in the centre to resolve such tensions by using the intentional sanctions available. These sanctions can effectively be used over members of the dominant ethnic group. Commitments to legal processes, common values, and respect for differing interests will be some areas upon which these intentional sanctions will be based. As a consequence, differences in the centre will be resolved in terms of common membership in this arena (and, therefore, by and large, in terms of common membership in the dominant ethnic group) rather than in terms of more narrowly defined explicit economic or other interests. In order that privileged positions, peaceful co-operation between different interest groups in the centre, and effective situational sanctions over the periphery may be maintained, those in the centre will give priority to the protection and strengthening of the political centre, even where this necessitates concessions being made in the economic sphere. System integration remains and is seen as being the critical factor.

In the second case, where ethnicity, race, and access to power coincide but roughly with access to economic power, resulting tensions define one of the most likely sources of conflict in the society. There will be, in fact, certain members of the dominant group who will not fill well-rewarded positions in the economy, and certain members of the subordinate groups who will fill such positions. This situation is one which is highly conducive for racial and ethnic conflict. Since race and ethnicity coincide with access to political power, moreover, such conflicts immediately become political in nature.

The other most likely source of conflict is to be found in dissatisfaction which may arise, among members of the periphery, in the area of economic rewards. Such dissatisfaction will be
channeled, in the early stages of a plural society, either through traditional institutions or through imported institutions within which natives fill subordinate positions. In both cases, confrontation and conflict will take place within the mode of differential incorporation in the society. This conflict, too, will be political in nature and will follow the ascriptive lines of cleavage defined by access to these types of institutions. The emergence of new 'third column' institutions may, on the other hand, change this situation. This will be dealt with later.

To regulate such conflict, the dominant group uses coercive sanctions (grounded upon their monopoly of the centre) to ensure conformity in the periphery; and uses intentional sanctions to ensure conformity within their dominant group (which is, of course, ethnically and racially homogeneous). It is in relation to this last point that the value system of the dominant group becomes important. In fact, so as to avoid conflict within this group and the ensuing clashing of collective goals set by members of this group, its internal class system is usually relatively 'open' and universalistic, achievement-oriented criteria are usually used to allocate positions in the centre to members of this group. These criteria are usually linked with the value system of the original colonizing power.

The ideology broadcast from the centre will reflect the discrepancy in treatment of members of the dominant group and others in the periphery. Kuper, in fact, feels that the racist component of this dominant ideology is a measure of the racial (and political) conflict potential in the society. In like measure, the ideologies of elite groups in the periphery can be used as a measure of (a) the extent to which each subordinate ethnic or racial group still possesses a degree of solidarity and effective intentional sanctions over its members, on the one hand; and (b) the extent to which a new solidarity based on common membership in the periphery has developed, on the other. These elite groups in the periphery can be seen as potential new centres of the society and are, by necessity, regarded as competing political forces by the dominant group.
The spread of a viable ideology for members of the periphery is not just dependent upon common membership in the periphery. It is also dependent upon the growth of common institutions for these members. Such institutions, which have earlier been typified as 'third-column', usually originate in an urban, economic milieu since it is under these circumstances that members of the different subordinate groups of a plural society have the most chance of meeting and interacting.

It is important, pluralists argue, to ascertain what links exist between these new institutions and traditional cultural centres in the periphery, on the one hand; and between these institutions and the dominant group and its culture, on the other. In fact, these institutions point to what has been called social power: the control over the means of status attribution, backed by persuasion as a sanction. If these new institutions are linked with traditional cultural centres, then elites in these traditional centres may be able to wield such social power for their own ends. On the other hand, if the links between these institutions and the dominant culture (or ideology) are strong, the dominant group may use its positions in the centre to persuade, rather than coerce, members of the periphery to conform to the pursuit of certain goals. This is what Van den Berghe called compliance. Mayer's distinction between the 'Red' and 'School' Xhosa points to two such institutions.5)

Again, it is worth pointing out that the wielding of social power does not necessarily imply the existence of shared values. Rather it points to valued status positions (usually in the common economy) and (possibly short-term) common interests which arise from them.

Since the new institutions emerging from the urban milieu can be conceived of as the emergence of a new culture for some of the members of the society, they may be seen as re-defining the lines

5) See Tribesmen or Townsmen, P. Mayer.
which conflict will probably follow. In cases where these institutions are linked with the dominant group and its culture, potential conflict can be resolved by means of intentional sanctions. In cases where these institutions are linked with the traditional cultures, conflict will probably follow the line of cleavage dividing the centre from the periphery. An important question, here, refers to the extent to which these new institutions can resolve differences between the different traditional cultures adequately within this new urban milieu. This question, clearly, is related to the possibility of the growth of wide-spread solidarity among members of the periphery.

Conflict, therefore, whether it is based on status inconsistencies or economic dissatisfaction, will tend to follow the lines of division defined by the centre and the periphery, and possibly lines of ethnic division within the periphery. Mobilization, solidarity, and the setting of goals by opposing parties in the conflict, then, will be defined in terms of common membership in ethnic and racial groups, and the broader sphere of common positions in the political power hierarchy. All conflict, whether economic or cultural in origin, becomes political conflict in a plural society.

In sum, then, members of a plural society do not share a value-system. Order is maintained in such a society insofar as those in the centre succeed in wielding effective political power over the periphery; effective cultural and social power over those in the dominant group; and economic power over all members of the society. Since the repeated application of coercive sanctions leads, eventually, to a break-down of order, the effective wielding of political power should be accompanied by the application of social power over as wide a group in the periphery as possible, if order is to be maintained. Persuasion rather than coercion is the best type of sanction to use in situations of potential conflict.

From the point of view of members of the periphery, persuasion will only be effective in those areas of interest common to the centre
and periphery. Such areas are usually rooted in the economy. The critical feature, then, of order from the point of view of the periphery, is economic rewards: positive situational sanctions (as those in the centre conceive of it). Countervailing centres in the periphery and competitive ideologies can be expected if these sanctions fail. Under these circumstances, the fragile sanctions of coercion must be used.

It would seem then that system integration is more important than social integration for the maintenance of social order. In fact, the smooth interdependent functioning of the polity and economy seem more important than the creation of consensus amongst all members. Compliance, however, does point to the latter. System and social integration, thus, are linked. What remains of import, however, is that without system integration — and, therefore, without what Gluckman called wide-spread cohesion — order is difficult to preserve.

(c) Directions of Change in a Plural Society

It is assumed here that structural differentiation is an ongoing process in plural societies. Other than this, there seems to be consensus among those pluralists whose works have been discussed, that the direction of social change in plural societies is indeterminate. It is nevertheless possible to use some pluralist analyses (Kuper's in particular) to obtain the following hypotheses.

It would seem that plural societies can develop in three directions. First, there may be a break-down of order — a revolution, or war, for example — after which a new and possibly radically different dispensation may be instituted. Since the analysis, here, is on endogenous change, the revolutionary possibility alone will be discussed.

As has been shown, countervailing powers may arise in traditional cultural centres in the periphery. The likelihood is that this will occur when the economic rewards allocated members of the
periphery do not satisfy them. Furthermore, these countervailing powers will be strengthened by support that can be obtained through those new 'third-column' institutions growing out of the common economy. In addition, the point has repeatedly been made that this confrontation will be a political one, and, therefore, a racial and ethnic one, rather than a class one. This is so since conflict tends to follow the dominant lines of cleavage in the society. In this regard, Lockwood writes: "... revolutionary goals are unlikely to emerge from the antagonisms of groups in plural societies unless ethnic and racial divisions happen to coincide with lines of economic ... relationships ... (For this reason) ethnic and racial conflict in plural society is not inherently revolutionary ..." 6)

Conflict, here, then, arises from the inadequacy of positive situational sanctions (embedded in the economy). As a result the links between new 'third column' institutions and the dominant group will weaken; those between these institutions and the traditional cultures will strengthen; and the cleavage between the centre and periphery will be reinforced. This in turn leads to a diminishing of effective social power - compliance - between the centre and periphery, and, since economic power is also diminishing, negative situational sanctions become the sole means of order-maintenance. System integration will eventually break down when repeated application of coercion no longer remains effective.

The role of the centre, in this case, would seem to be one of applying these coercive sanctions repeatedly. This will probably lead to a closing of the ranks in the dominant ethnic group and, eventually, to an open power confrontation between this group and the groups in the periphery. These latter groups, furthermore, will be developing a common ideology which opposes that of the (ethnic) centre. In this case, thus, the complete

6) 'Race, Class and the Plural Society', D. Lockwood, pp. 64, 68. "Revolutionary", here, is to be understood in its Marxist class sense. Lockwood does not exclude the possibility of a violent overthrow of the existing order in a plural society.
disappearance of any compliance leads to a racial and ethnic confrontation.

The second possible direction is that of continuing (invidious) pluralism involving the application of situational sanctions over the periphery. The key variable, here, seems to be a burgeoning economy, satisfying the material wants of the members of the periphery and bolstering up the coercive machinery of the centre. It seems possible, in fact, to maintain racial pluralism in a society which manifests steady economic development.

The conflict potential residing in this direction of structural change, is rooted in status inconsistencies arising from overlaps in the two dominant hierarchies of an invidious plural society: that based upon the mode of differential incorporation, on the one hand; and the economic system of stratification, on the other. The former, which manifests ascriptive racial and ethnic cleavage-lines will not coincide exactly with the latter, which conforms to the demands of a modernizing economy.

This creates two types of problems for those in the centre. First, economic interest groups will attempt to solve this nascent conflict by applying rational means which will clash with the mode of differential incorporation in the (racist) political sector. By using intentional sanctions, the centre will attempt to counteract this tendency by using an exclusivist ethnic ideology to maintain consensus over the form of differential incorporation in the society as a whole. Second, the centre will apply coercion over those in the periphery who attempt to develop oppositional ideologies relating to the political sector. In this fashion, effective intentional sanctions over the members of the dominant ethnic group, and effective situational sanctions over those in the periphery, can be exercised.

It is thus critical for those in the centre to assure that 'third column' institutions remain linked with the dominant group in the economic sphere so as to obtain social power and promote economic expansion. On the other hand, it is important that compliance
relations neither become too effective between ethnic groups in the political sector, nor spread to form a common ideology among the members of the periphery. By way of an effective exclusivist ideology broadcast for those in the dominant ethnic group, and through effective coercive sanctions applied to groups in the periphery, this may be achieved.

This argument emphasizes once again that the maintenance of system integration is the critical factor in maintaining order in a plural society. If consensus can be obtained in the centre, and satisfaction in the periphery, order can be maintained.

The third possible direction is that toward a 'democratic' plural society. Here, ethnic diversity (what M.G. Smith called cultural pluralism) may be maintained, but differential incorporation (structural pluralism) must gradually be replaced by equal access to centre-positions. For this to occur, the creation of cross-cutting cleavage lines must be promoted. In particular, the coincidence of race and ethnicity with, first, access to power and, second, with class membership, must be broken. Kuper calls these processes of individuation. It is feasible to expect such individuating processes to be promoted by 'third-column' institutions which are linked with the centre, and with the dominant group and culture. In fact, it seems feasible to hypothesize that the scope of effective social power will vary directly with the effectiveness of such individuating processes. There is a danger, however, involved in breaking this deep cleavage-line between the centre and the periphery. Solidarity is required amongst those units (organizations, groups, individuals) in the centre to ensure that the setting and pursuing of goals in different sectors of the society do not clash. In other words, system integration must be maintained. Individuation by promoting criss-crossing lines of cleavage, may dissolve the solidarity amongst those in the centre and, hence, lessen the degree of system integration present. For these processes to succeed, then, requires an extention of the values of universalism and achievement to other groups in society. These values are presumably practiced within the dominant group
in the allocation of positions in the centre. If those in the centre can practice these same values and apply them to members of other groups in the society, then the positions in the centre may be filled by members of a number of ethnic and racial groups in the society, and all persons in these positions may nevertheless share the same values.7)

It is, of course, imperative that economic stability and development be maintained in this situation. Furthermore, it is clear that the dominant ideology must promote a broadening of the centre, and that oppositional ideologies in the periphery do not become incompatible with the dominant ideology. In sum, then, this direction of change necessitates wide-spread inducements (rather than coercion) to maintain peaceful centre-periphery relations, and an ideology and a system of values common to a group larger than the dominant ethnic group, to form the base from which recruitment into the centre will lose its ascriptive character. In this way, system integration can be maintained whilst social integration amongst potential members of the centre of the society can be broadened. A 'democratic' plural society in which separate subcultures may persist, can develop under these conditions.

In sum, then, the three directions of social change are:

(1) a break-down of centre-periphery relations leading to a short-circuiting of the situation to one of a racial and ethnic confrontation;

(2) a persistence of the dominant centre-periphery line of cleavage with inducements forming the most important link between the two;

(3) a gradual blurring of this dominant cleavage-line by an involvement of members of a number of ethnic and racial groups in the centre.

7) For an interesting argument relating to this direction, see *South Africa's Political Alternatives*, P. Randall (ed.)
CONCLUSION

At no point in this chapter has the plural society been rigorously defined. Rather a society characterized by pluralism, is defined as one with a heritage of western colonial status, and one which manifests a set of particular relations between its centre and periphery. This chapter attempts to describe the different relations which obtain between the degree of pluralism and the presence of social order in such societies. Since social order - defined in an holistic and structural framework - has been the main perspective, more attention has been paid to the maintenance of order and, therefore, to evolutionary change than to sudden, violent, or revolutionary change.

The main difference in approach between this pluralist perspective and those of normative functionalism and coercion theory, resides in the priority which has been given, here, to the political sector of a plural society. The mode of differential incorporation and the ubiquity of political conflict have both been repeatedly stressed. Priority has been given to neither the cultural nor the economic sector. Since political cleavage-lines coincide with racial and ethnic lines of differentiation, moreover, this difference in priority in pluralist theory represents the major divergence from classical and contemporary sociological theory.

The assumptions and hypotheses presented earlier in this study have been used in the preceding pages. In particular, the hypotheses have been restated in a better-defined framework. The new perspective so developed, identifies the major problems facing plural societies and offers a framework within which these problems may be analyzed.
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