SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA

by

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INTRODUCTION

South African foreign policy in Africa is a study in frustration. Only rarely were the more ambitious objectives accorded policy towards Africa realised. Despite the hopes written into the Union's constitution of a considerable expansion of territory, the boundaries of South Africa to-day are the same as those of 1910, with the de facto but disputed addition of South West Africa. Further, the country has undergone a marked decline in status since the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948. In 1948 "South Africa was held in high esteem as a senior member of the British Commonwealth, a bastion of western capitalism, and the most advanced economic region in Africa". To-day "she is .......... a byword among nations for bigotry, intolerance, and despotic rule." Her racial policies are the subject of frequent and repeated attack and condemnation at the United Nations; an organisation, ironically, whose charter a former South African Prime Minister (Smuts) helped to draft. At almost every level of international relations, South Africa has been ostracized by the world community.

In these circumstances, South African foreign policy has, not surprisingly, been characterized as essentially defensive and reactive, notwithstanding the modest success of the new outward-looking policy towards Africa. But while survival in an alien milieu of South Africa's pigmentocracy may be seen to-day both as the prime determinant and the highest priority of South African foreign policy, her policy towards Africa has not always been so narrowly - or defensively - conceived by successive South African governments. Indeed one of the drawbacks of casting South African policy towards Africa in a single conceptual framework is the difficulty of incorporating in any one model the radical shift that has taken place both in the priorities of South African policy and in the constraints placed on her policy by the international environment?
In the period from Union until the end of the Second World War, South African foreign policy was prompted less by the fear of submergence than a desire to expand South Africa's territory in Africa and enhance South African influence internationally.

The principal proponent of South African expansionism or imperialism during this era was Smuts, who in and out of government dominated the formulation of South African foreign policy objectives. Even during the battle of the Boer Republics for survival against British Imperialism at the turn of the century Smuts felt able to spell out expansionist ambitions of his own - ending his denunciation of British perfidy in The Century of Wrong with the words: "Then from the Zambesi to Simon's Bay it will be - Africa for the Africander (sic)." J.A. Hobson writing on British imperialism at the turn of the century perceptively detected the roots of an indigenous imperialism in South Africa cutting across the divisions between the two white communities:

"... men at the Cape, in the Transvaal and in Rhodesia, British or Dutch, have fostered a South African imperialism, not opposed to British imperialism, willing when necessary to utilize it, but independent of it in ultimate aims and purposes. This was the policy of 'colonialism' which Mr. Rhodes espoused so vehemently in his earlier political career, seeking the control of Bechuanaland and the North for the Cape Colony and not directly for the Empire. This has been right through the policy of an active section of the Africander (sic) Bond, developing on a large scale the original 'trek' habit of the Dutch."

Hobson concluded:

"A South African federation of self-governing states will demand a political career of its own and will insist on its own brand of empire, not that of the British government, in control of the lower races in South Africa."

For Smuts, the achievement of Union, the grant of full domestic self-government to South Africa's white communities on their terms, offered South Africa the opportunity to expand her influence and
power under the protective umbrella of the British Empire, which he saw as guaranteeing the new state against the imperialist ambitions of other European powers in Africa, particularly Germany. Under Botha's premiership during the first decade of the Union's existence Smuts enthusiastically pursued a policy of reconciliation between the two white communities, as the essential basis of South African expansion. Conversely, he believed that expansion itself would promote white unity domestically and during the First World War argued forcibly against the retrocession of German South West Africa on the grounds that it would give Afrikaner nationalism a powerful boost. During the 1920's Smuts' commitment to political co-operation between the two white communities led him to resist strong domestic pressures to unite Afrikanerdörn in a single party and his South African Party fused in 1921 not with the Nationalists but with predominantly English-speaking Unionist Party.

But South African expansionism was not simply the creation of Smuts. Powerful economic forces - the search for cheap African labour to meet industry's increasing needs and for land to provide new areas of settlement for rurally impoverished Afrikaners - promoted expansion. However, there were also counter-pressures. Afrikaner nationalists opposed expansion where it involved the incorporation of non-Afrikaner white settlers who might impede their drive for supremacy in South Africa. They argued too that Smuts failed to put South African interests first in his subservience to the wider interests of the British Empire and feared the submergence of the Afrikaner nation under the impact of increased white immigration, which by contrast Smuts saw as the natural accompaniment of South African expansion. Indeed, Smuts' imperialist ambitions prompted Dr. Malan to comment: "There sits Rhodes redivivus." 13

Nevertheless, in the end, external factors provided the main obstacles to South African expansion. In the 1920's German settlers in South West
Africa resisted full incorporation into the Union because of fears of submergence by poor white Afrikaner immigrants. For the same reason and because they feared the drawing away of their Afrikaner labour supply to the Rand, Southern Rhodesia's predominantly English-speaking settlers opted in a referendum in October 1922 for responsible self-government despite the generous terms offered by Smuts for incorporation into the Union. African resistance prompting Britain's firm adherence to guarantees protecting African land rights provided the major obstacle to South Africa's incorporation of the High Commission territories, an objective of successive South African governments until the 1960's. The Portuguese state, weak and bankrupt at the turn of the century was able, thanks in part to its alliance with Britain during the First World War, to resist successfully Union encroachment on Mozambique during the first decade of Union when Portuguese East Africa was arguably the main target of Smuts' and Botha's imperialist ambitions.

Despite these early disappointments, Smuts' "vision of a South Africa made greater than itself by the enlarged field of action which membership of the Commonwealth made possible" remained undimmed. In November 1929 he set out his thoughts on the future of Africa in a series of lectures appropriately in memory of Cecil John Rhodes:

"I have tried to show that the claim of the natives to civilization, no less than the claim of the world to the vigorous development of these valuable tropical lands, calls for a great colonizing effort on the part of Great Britain. The building up of a strong white community to hold and develop the healthy high lands which stretch from Rhodesia to Kenya would be a magnificent response to this call. Now that Great Britain holds these territories from North to South in one unbroken chain, she has an opportunity greater even than Rhodes dreamt of, to carry out her historic mission and establish in the heart of the African continent and as a bulwark of its
future civilization another great European community. To me it seems the next critical step in the evolution of our Commonwealth of Nations. These fragments of Crown Colonies should be put in the way of becoming in time another important self-governing unit of the Empire. There are here the makings of something of far-reaching importance for Africa, for the Empire, and for the world. But a definite forward policy is wanted which will eventually lead to this consummation. The future only can show whether this new group will be linked with the Union in the south or whether it will follow lines of its own in a new northern constellation. What is urgently wanted is the settlement of a white population, able and competent to undertake the task of development, and finally to conquer and hold this continent for European civilization. 19

In effect, Smuts had modified his original objectives of direct South African expansion through British Africa to the hope that the Union could act as a go-between for Britain in Africa. Initially, he proposed the organization of an annual conference of British African states held under the Union's auspices. 20 He returned to this theme during the Second World War proposing: "a grouping of the overseas dependencies in units large and strong enough to manage their own affairs without control from London but rather in close association with neighbouring dominions." 21 His proposals were designed:

"to make South Africa not merely secure within her own borders but also the leading power in Africa from the Zambesi to the Sudan. In effect, he was proposing a loosening, if not the complete elimination, of the imperial factor and a corresponding extension of South African influence." 22

Finally in 1945 Smuts summed his principal objectives in Africa in the following terms: "The whole of my striving has been to ensure the knitting together of the parts of Africa, the parts of Southern Africa which belong to each other; parts that must work together for a stable future on the continent of Africa." 23
Smuts' hopes for an extension of South African power on the continent were dashed in the aftermath of the Second World War and despite his prestige as an international statesman the beginnings of South Africa's post-war decline in status were discernible in the last years of his premiership. By the time the Nationalists came to power in 1948, while lip-service continued to be paid in South Africa to Pan-African co-operation, the pressures of decolonization had already begun to force a re-casting of South Africa's objectives on the continent in far less romantic terms. Occasionally, to-day, the grander visions of the past are re-echoed by South African politicians. For example, in an election speech in 1970, the Minister of Immigration (Dr. C. Mulder) spoke of the day when Africa would rule and dominate the world and concluded: "when that day comes, the few whites of South Africa will play a role out of all proportion to their numbers and wealth."^24 However, at the policy-making level, the South African government to-day has no such illusions in its quest for acceptance in what is still a predominantly hostile continental environment.

What principally necessitated the re-casting of South African foreign policy in far narrower, far more modest terms was a radical transformation of the international system. The world of 1910 when the Union came into being had been dominated by Europe. Two world wars shattered European supremacy bringing to an end the system upon which South African internationalist hopes had been based.

"For Smuts with his feet in Africa, the focus in international relations was ........ upon Europe."^25 But more than simply Smuts' perspective on the world was at stake. The demise of Europe's dominant role in the world potentially threatened South Africa's whole domestic way of life.

"(The) dominant white minority, whether it supports the apartheid policies of the Nationalist Party or the alternative white leadership policies of the United Party, seeks to preserve a quasi-colonial system when colonialism has been execrated by the rest of the world."^26
Pursuing this line of argument, Colin De B. Webb argues that for South Africa:

"the decisive theatre of war ....... was not Europe, but the Far East. For it was there, with the Japanese attack on South-east Asia, that the first of the death-blows was struck at that world of European political ascendancy in which the South African system had had its appropriate place." 27

But what made a more immediate impact on South African policy-makers forcing the abandonment of the assumptions upon which Smuts had formulated the country's foreign policy was the decline of Britain as a great power in the post-war period and her consequent withdrawal from empire under the impact of Asian and African nationalism. It was a process that shocked the Nationalists quite as much as those who cherished South Africa's British connection even though Nationalists by no means shared Smuts' assumptions or pre-occupations. Indeed, there is fitting irony in the fact that Dr. Malan once Prime Minister sought to use South Africa's position in the Commonwealth to halt the final retreat of British imperialism from Africa. 28

The doctrine that provided the ideological basis for Europe's shedding of imperial responsibilities was the principle of self-determination. Associated with this doctrine was the principle that international relations should be based upon the recognition of the equality of independent sovereign states. The first of these principles (self-determination) has also provided the principal ideological basis for attacks on South African policies at the United Nations and in the world community generally (notwithstanding the sharp divergence of actual practice from the principles of the new international order throughout the world), while South Africa has attempted to invoke the second principle to prevent intrusion into her domestic affairs. What has especially exacerbated South Africa's conflict with the world community has been the fact that the direction of her domestic policy has been widely perceived as running
counter to the spirit of the international system as constituted after
the Second World War.\(^{29}\)

In order to take account of the radical change in South Africa's inter-
national and continental environment, I have divided this thesis under
two headings; policy towards colonial Africa (broadly, the period
1910 - 1959) and secondly, policy towards independent Africa (1960 - ).
The division is by no means an absolute one. South Africa first
began to feel the pressures of decolonization soon after the end of the
Second World War. These took a variety of forms; for example,
India's attacks on South Africa's racial policy and the United Nations'
refusal to countenance the incorporation of South West Africa into
the Union. They were echoed internally by growing militancy on the
part of the African National Congress in the 1950's. Similarly after
1960, by which time most of the countries of Africa had achieved
independence, the remnants of colonialism remained important to
South African foreign policy. Firstly, the continuing existence of the
Portuguese empire has carried the colonial order into the 1970's.
Secondly, the former colonial powers have continued to exercise
considerable influence on their ex-colonies. In particular, France's
neo-colonial hold on many of her former colonies has assumed
special importance in the context of South African initiatives towards
francophone Africa.

These considerations aside, the transformation from colonial Africa
to independent Africa remains of critical importance to any consider-
ation of South Africa's foreign policy in Africa. Whereas in Smuts'
era South African governments had looked to Africa in the context
of easing domestic pressures for land and labour, the interaction
between domestic and foreign policy was reversed in the post-war
period, as the South African government discovered that the widely
accepted categorization of its racial policies as those of a colonial
power\(^ {30}\) provided a major stumbling block to the development of
normal relations with the new states of Asia and Africa. The point
has not been lost on writers sympathetic to South African policy.
The following is typical: "The biggest obstacle" (to the development of relations with Africa) was the violently emotional anti-colonial spirit and the fact that South Africa was regarded as a colonialist power.

Domestically, South Africa's deteriorating international position contributed to a revision of the ideological framework of South Africa's racial policies and at the theoretical level the sketching out of a programme of domestic decolonization. The Bantustan programme was also of course the product of domestic forces, particularly growing militancy on the part of African nationalists leading up to the massacre at Sharpeville. The massacre further illustrates the close inter-relation between domestic and foreign policy, for its international repercussions while not forcing a radical change of direction in South African policy made steps towards the implementation of the Bantustan programme necessary to a normalization of South Africa's relations with the West. Nonetheless, the attempt to implement separate development in the face of international pressure was not without its difficulties for, in general, world opinion remained highly sceptical of Verwoerd's ideological reconstruction of apartheid as incorporating the principle of self-determination. It was widely appreciated that the Bantustan programme as Verwoerd envisaged it did not represent a radical devolution of power to South Africa's African population.

However, the past Transkei development of friendly relations with the former High Commission territories and Malawi on a pragmatic basis has eased pressure on South Africa, at least from the West, to provide evidence that the creation of Bantustans represents any substantial reform. Indeed, the South African foreign minister (Dr. Muller) has argued that the West is more likely to judge South Africa on her ability to come to terms with Africa and, in particular,
her neighbours than on her internal policy.

"As the West becomes aware of our fruitful co-operation with other African states, their attitude towards us improves. I believe that it will happen to an increasing degree because we must simply accept that our relations with the rest of the world is largely determined by our relations with the African states. In this connection we are giving the world considerable food for thought." 33

The process of South Africa's coming to terms with decolonization on the continent was a slow one. With the benefit of hindsight, Rhoodie and Venter argue that it began shortly after the Second World War when "the previous detached approach to external affairs had ..... to make way for a re-appraisal of structure of the African continent." 34 Strydom made a similar claim in 1956: "after the Second World War we suddenly realized that 160,000,000 or more non-Europeans of Africa, who through the ages have slept, have awakened." 35 However, his hopes that "through correct guidance and management we can preserve the good relationship between one another (Europeans and Natives)" 36 was not matched by much understanding of the currents of African or world opinion, as his open characterization of South African policy as white baasskap or domination showed.

Verwoerd was the first Prime Minister to realize the need to give South Africa's racial policy a more up to date ideological gloss, as was apparent in his 1959 speeches. "We must ensure that the outside world realizes and that the Bantu realizes that a new period is dawning, a period in which the white man is leading him through the first stage towards full development" ... and ... "We want to build up a South Africa in which the Bantu and the white man can live next to one another as good neighbours and not as people who are continually quarrelling over supremacy." 37

It would be wrong though to exaggerate the significance of Verwoerd's acceptance of decolonization in theory. In practice, South Africa's
response to decolonization was one of shock and opposition and the colonial powers were constantly berated by South African politicians for 'scuttling' out of Africa. In this context Verwoerd himself was hardly less critical than Malan or Strydom.

"I see as a result of his (Macmillan's) policy the white man disappearing from Kenya, in the course of time being submerged .... I fear for the position in the Central African Federation ... the policy that Britain is following in Africa does not do justice to the white man, and ultimately will not be best for the black man either." 38

Despite the striking contrast between South Africa's international position since 1948 and her posture during Smuts' heyday, a degree of continuity in the development of the international system as it affected South Africa can be discerned. The post-war transfer of power from Europe to the new states of Africa and Asia mirrored an earlier devolution of power from Europe dating back to the end of the 19th century, though as far as most of Africa was concerned, the period marked an expansion of European influence. The formation of the Union of South Africa was itself part of the earlier process of devolution (as was the grant of powers of internal self-government to Canada and Australia). European domination of the international system was further weakened by the First World War. In particular, in the aftermath the United States emerged as a power able to challenge the supremacy of Europe. The consequences for South Africa of the relative decline in Europe's importance and power were mixed.

On the one hand it gave rise to the doctrine of the equality of British dominions. South Africa's consequent enhanced status was reflected in her separate representation at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 and in the creation of the Department of External Affairs in 1926; changes very much welcomed by Afrikaner nationalists who were especially
eager to see the few remaining imperial restraints on South Africa lifted. In particular, they were determined that South Africa should have the right to remain neutral in any future war involving Britain. It was a right the Union obtained with the passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1931. (Nationalist resentment of British imperial power was a recurring theme of South African domestic politics. Hence, Macmillan's famous characterization of the Afrikaners in his 1960 speech as the continent's first nationalists.)

On the other hand, the change in the balance of world power had some less agreeable consequences for the South African government. President Wilson's championing of the principle of self-determination at the Versailles Peace Conference had the practical result that South Africa was unable to incorporate South West Africa as a fifth province. The application of the principle to white people overseas was generally accepted and welcomed by White South Africans, but its application to the indigenous peoples of Africa was considered another matter entirely. Smuts summed up white South African attitudes in declaring that the indigenous peoples were "barbarians, ....... to whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of political self-determination in the European sense." For South Africa, the mandate over South West Africa was a warning of the possible long-term consequences of Europe's decline, though in the short term that decline appeared to enhance South African prospects of expansion on the continent. Nevertheless, there were those who full recognized that the United States President's insistence that South Africa accept a measure of international control over South West Africa might open the way to the focussing of international attention on the Union's racial policy, that in short, "the mandatory theory ......... may easily contain the gems of future trouble."
In practice, though South Africa could not be faulted on the fulfilment of the technical aspects of the mandate, the Permanent Mandates Commission became increasingly critical of South Africa's racial policies in the territory. While this criticism was on the whole mildly expressed and while there was never any suggestion that the Union should be deprived of her mandate, the reports of the P.M.C. were a source of embarrassment to the Union internationally and laid the basis for the more radical criticism of South African racial policy in the territory by the United Nations. Indeed, the South West African dispute is a striking illustration of underlying links between the pre-war and post-war period, notwithstanding the radical nature of post-war changes in the organization of the international system.

In general, however, the prospects for South African expansion overshadowed the dangers to white South Africa of Europe's relative decline in the inter-war years. Similarly, most attention in the post-independence period was focused on the threat posed to South Africa by the triumph of African nationalism on the continent rather than on the opportunities European withdrawal may present South Africa. However, the weakness and vulnerability of the new states over the last decade has brought about the belated recognition that the new circumstances, while by their nature a challenge to South Africa's domestic policies may nonetheless offer new prospects for South Africa to extend her influence and refurbish her tarnished image internationally. The pursuit of an outward-looking policy towards Africa since 1966 indicates the South African government's awareness of the opportunity.

Two final points need to be made about my approach to the subject. Firstly, I have not dealt at any length with the mechanics of foreign policy formation in South Africa. My reason for not doing so (apart from the lack of material on the subject), indicates that there is little evidence to suggest that the frustration of South African foreign policy objectives stemmed from any want of technical expertise.
By the outbreak of the Second World War, little more than a decade after
the creation of the Department of External Affairs, South Africa had the
"most extensive representation of any of the Dominions." 41
Munger suggests that Malan's ignorance of emergent Africa may have
played a part in the slowness with which South Africa accommodated
to decolonization. After discussions with Malan, he recorded: "the
former Prime Minister did surprise me with his limited and hazy
comprehension of the geography, and contemporary events, through much
of black Africa." 42
Certainly, the creation of an African division
within the Department of External Affairs in 1956 put South African
diplomacy on a more professional basis and in general terms, there has
been a large increase in both expenditure on the foreign service and
representation abroad since the early 1950's. However, any lack of
expertise in South Africa's foreign service in Malan's day was probably
compensated for by the information supplied through the commonwealth.

Secondly, my approach to the subject is largely historical and descriptive
and while theoretical considerations play their part in my analysis of
South African foreign policy, I have not attempted to encompass them
within a single theoretical model or system. My reasons for adopting,
for want of a better word, a 'traditional' approach are three-fold.
The first lies in the realm of theory itself. It is that the 'scientific' or
'behavioral' approach to international relations and politics associated
with model-building and general systems theory is no escape from the
exercise of judgement and intuition, which by their nature are inconclusive
and tentative. As Bernard Crick has pointed out the new science which has
dominated American study of politics is not value-free and on the contrary
is rooted:

"In the doctrinal assumptions made by advocates of
this science: a type of specifically liberal and
democratic political doctrine of far more limited
applicability than the authors supposed. Values
were taken for granted amidst the enervating unity
of belief of American liberalism, so it was believed
that the mere discovery of facts would create a kind
of spontaneous national therapy." 43
More detailed criticism of the scientific approach in international relations have been made by Hedley Bull whose criticisms seem to me particularly trenchant. Firstly, he argues that:

"by confining themselves to what can logically or mathematically be proved or verified according to strict procedures, the practitioners of the scientific approach are denying themselves the only instruments that are at present available for coming to grips with the substance of the subject."

Secondly, as a counterpart to this argument, he maintains:

"where (they) have succeeded in casting light upon the substance of the subject it has been by stepping beyond the bounds of that approach and employing the classical method. What there is of value in their work consists essentially of judgements that are not established by the mathematical or scientific methods they employ and which may be arrived at quite independently of them."

Thirdly, he argues that progress along analogous lines to modern physics is unlikely to be made by the application of a scientific approach to the realm of politics in view of "the present welter of competing terminologies and conceptual frameworks," from which the prospects of the emergence of a common language and a foundation of a firm theory are "very bleak indeed". Finally, Bull declares that he knows of "no model that has assisted our understanding of international relations that could not just as well have been expressed as an empirical generalization."

In addition to my agreement with these criticisms I have a more deep-seated philosophical objection to the scientific approach to politics and that is that many, if not most, of the propositions that have been put forward under this approach are not open to empirical verification of even a loose kind, falling far short of the rigour demanded in the natural sciences. Ironically, the shortcomings of the scientific method in the field of the natural sciences exposed by the very rigour demanded of it has been used as an alibi to excuse the inevitably arbitrary
drawing of boundaries to variables in politics. Where rigour has been introduced in an attempt to produce a plausible facsimile of scientific arguments, the results have often been disappointing producing little more than platitudes wrapped up in vacuous jargon.

These considerations aside, there is a second reason why the scientific approach appears to me particularly inappropriate in the context of a study of South African foreign policy. While there are wide-ranging disagreements about the value of the approach itself, of which the argument above is necessarily but a brief sample, there is general agreement that the area in which this approach has made its greatest strides has been in the realm of communications theory and peace research or conflict resolution and that its greatest appeal has been to the rationalist school of international relations. Briefly, rationalist - as opposed to realist - thought may be summed up as resting on the belief that much international conflict is caused by misperception, failure in communication, and defects in the decision-making process. While there are areas of conflict where realist assumptions about the clash of national interests are open to question, one could hardly find a less promising starting-point than South Africa for a set of theories that tend to devalue material interests as a source of conflict. Perception and communication certainly do not lie at the root of the differences between Afrikaner and African nationalists. Clearly, too, the preservation of the privileges of white society is not an interest of the same order as that of the United States in Vietnam or Russia in the Middle East; two cases where, arguably, perception of interests rather than the nature of the actual interests themselves play a critical role.

My third justification for following a traditional approach is that South African foreign policy is a new field of inquiry. Books devoted to it as such are all of recent origin and consequently the scope for basically historical studies is greater than it is in the case of the major powers where extensive literature on the development of policy already exists.
Finally, notwithstanding my general adherence to the traditional approach, I have considered in the conclusions attempts to apply systems theory within the narrower perspective of current international relationships among the states of Southern Africa as well as the possible application of linkage theory to the relationship between South African foreign and domestic policy.
Notes on the Introduction

1. Its official name is the National Party but it has become accepted English usage to call it the Nationalist Party.


3. Ibid. p.8.


7. For this and other reasons (see below) I have not attempted to adapt to South African circumstances a conceptual model of foreign policy. For examples in this field see J. Frankel - The Making of Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, London 1963) and the more abstract G. Modelski - A Theory of Foreign Policy (Pall Mall, London 1962).


10. Ibid. p. 346.
11. It was not of course the only grounds for his opposition. See below - South West Africa: Origins of a dispute.


14. See Below - South West Africa: origins of a dispute.

15. See Below - South Africa's other neighbours.

16. See Below - Incorporation frustrated: The High Commission Territories.

17. See Below - The Union and Africa .... and ...... South Africa's Other Neighbours.

18. Black and Thompson (eds.) p. 431


20. Ibid. pp. 68-9


22. Ibid.


25. Black and Thompson (eds.) p. 425


27. Ibid.

28. See Malan in Senate Debates IV Col. G 584 - 1951

29. Perceived, for example, in South Africa's refusal to be a signatory to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
30. See, for example, L. Marquard - South Africa's Colonial Policy (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg 1957).

31. L. Egeland - South Africa's role in Africa (South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg 1967) p. 10

32. The Transkei was given "self-government" in 1963 and presented as a showcase of separate development. The Relationship between Bantustans and South African foreign policy is discussed in greater detail in the body of the thesis.


35. Strydom quoted in Rhodie and Venter p. 200.

36. Ibid.


38. Ibid Vol. 107 Col. 3507 - 1961


41. Black and Thompson (eds.) p. 430

42. E. Munger - Notes on the formulation of South African foreign policy (The Castle Press, Pasadena 1965) p. 92

44. A few examples of the scientific approach are:
   C.A. McClelland - Theory and the International System
   (Macmillan, New York 1966)
   K. Deutsch - The Analysis of International Relations
   (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey 1968)
   M. Kaplan - System and Process in International Relations
   (Wiley, New York 1957)


46. Ibid. p. 28
47. Ibid. p. 29
48. Ibid. p. 30
49. Ibid. p. 31


51. See, for example, J.W. Burton - International Relations: A General Theory. Burton is a leading exponent of the rationalist school.


The Africa the Republic faces today is very different from that the new Union of South Africa faced in 1910. Then, only Ethiopia and Liberia had survived as independent African states. The rest of the continent fell under one European colonial power or another. South Africa herself was part of the British Empire and while she had attained internal self-government, she was not as yet a full member of the international system. Indeed, it is misleading to speak of an international system as we know it today. It was rather an European system projected onto the world outside. Africa like much of Asia provided a backyard in which European powers played out their rivalries.

In speaking of a South African policy towards the continent, it is important to bear in mind the restraints placed on South African foreign policy by her place within the British Empire. Prior to the First World War, South Africa's relations with other countries were almost entirely managed by Britain. After the war, however, South Africa in common with the two other "white" dominions, Canada and Australia, asserted greater independence from Britain; an independence which was reflected at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and subsequently in the League of Nations.

Formal acknowledgment of the enhanced status of the dominions was given at the 1926 imperial conference by a declaration that the dominions enjoyed equal status with Britain, were autonomous, and were in no way subordinate to one another. The following year the Union government created a portfolio for external affairs, which until 1955 was held by
the Prime Minister of the day. As Marquard explains:

"South Africa's external affairs did not require the undivided attention of a cabinet minister, because as a member of the Commonwealth her foreign affairs were geared to those of fellow members and were to a large extent coordinated by the Dominion Office in London." 2

In 1931, the Statute of Westminster set the seal on the development of dominion independence when Britain gave up her power to legislate for the dominions without their consent. The Governor-General remained the British monarch's representative in South Africa, but in future he was appointed by, and acted solely on the advice of, the Union Government.

Even after South Africa formally established her independence from Britain over foreign policy, Britain's role in South Africa's relations with the African continent continued to be a dominant one simply because Britain remained the leading colonial power in Africa until African states achieved independence in the late 1950's and early 1960's. In general too, decisions affecting Africa continued to be made in Europe for many years after the Statute of Westminster. However, it is also important not to over-emphasize South Africa's early dependence on Britain.

From the outset, successive South African governments recognised that the country had interests and priorities of her own in Africa. On the whole, non-Nationalists hoped to see the Union's objectives on the continent achieved within the context of the British Empire, while the Nationalists were far more critical of the Empire's role in South African policy.

Politicians of all persuasions in South Africa did however agree that South Africa's role would be that of the dominant power on the continent apart from colonial powers themselves. The Union with her gold and diamond mines was the economic powerhouse of Africa and was seen as the gateway to the opening up of the interior and its resources.
Rhodes' dream of an Empire linked by a railway from Cape to Cairo remained potent. Most important of all, the Union's boundaries as of 1910 were not envisaged as permanent. The South African Constitution itself included the expectation that not just the High Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland but also Northern and Southern Rhodesia might be incorporated into the Union. These British territories provided the most obvious targets for South African expansion, but many South Africans also looked to what was then German South West Africa and Portuguese East Africa as areas for settlement and perhaps eventual take-over.

A basic factor in South Africa's expansionist drive in the years following Union was economic; hunger for land for white settlement and hunger for cheap African labour. The very sessions of the Convention (to found Union) were punctuated by demands for Bantu lands by men from all the colonies, especially Natal. It is not difficult to see what lay behind these demands. By about the 1870s the land frontier in South Africa was coming to an end. Almost 90% of the country's land was by then already under white ownership. Few farmers' sons consequently could hope to obtain a new farm and the new industrial centres opened by the mines were largely being manned not by local whites but by new immigrants from Europe. Sub-division of the land had begun and by the 1920s and 1930s it was to lead to large-scale white poverty especially among Afrikaners. In the years following Union the extension of South Africa's frontiers came to be frequently cited by politicians as a cure to the problems of white poverty.

Meanwhile the new industrial centres had created a demand for African labour far outstripping the previous incessant demands for labour of farmers, which had been a major concern of the Cape, Natal, and the Boer republics prior to Union. In 1904, 76.5% of the 77,000 African gold and coal working in the Transvaal came from foreign
territories, chiefly Portuguese East Africa. In short the mining industry was heavily dependent on foreign labour and although basically satisfactory arrangements were worked out with the countries concerned, persistent complaints of a shortage of African labour gave added impetus to demands for incorporation of new territories as well as making relations with countries from whom South Africa imported labour, stretching as far north as Nyasaland, important to successive Union governments. However, these remained economic rather than political ties.

Ties of kith and kin linked South Africa to much of east and central Africa. In particular, South African settlers played an important role in the colonisation of Kenya.

"One of the largest early applications for land (500 square miles) was made in April 1902 by the East African Syndicate, a company with a strong South African interest. After some questioning, the British Government granted it. With only a dozen settlers established at the beginning of 1903, in August the Commissioner Sir Charles Eliot, sent his Collector of Customs, A. Marsden, to South Africa to encourage settlers to migrate to the country. By the end of 1905 over a million acres of land had been leased or sold by the Protectorate authorities. By 1906 a large party of Boer "Irreconcilables" trekked overland from the Transvaal to the Uasin Gishu plateau; others poured in by boat from Britain and South Africa "

As might be expected South African settlers also played an important role in the early colonisation of the two Rhodesias.

"By design, and not by accident, the Pioneer Column was composed of South Africans as well as Britons. The political aim, as frankly outlined by Rhodes, demanded a substantial
"number of men from Natal and the Cape, so that if things went wrong and outside help were needed, the electorate of these two colonies would join in the clamour for Britain to intervene. Again, at Rhodes's specific direction, the South Africans were 'men of both the races', so that the Afrikaners of the Cape Colony would have a stake in the new nation from the start."

The role of South Africans in the early colonisation of British Africa had important repercussions for the policies adopted by settler communities. Firstly, from the outset South Africa's policy of segregation far from being regarded as exceptional was looked to as a model by the settler communities elsewhere in Africa and in the early period of British rule their voice was dominant in the political affairs of Britain's African colonies. Secondly, from early on the settlers in British East Africa and the Rhodesias aspired to the self-government enjoyed by the Union.

Much today is made of the restraining influence on settlers exercised by the British colonial office. It is therefore salutary to note that the historian, Eric Walker records that no pressure was exercised even on the National Convention (to form Union) to ensure a more liberal constitution. In fact, only after the First World War did the British Government begin to curb the power of settler communities in Africa. (One ironic consequence was that, until it did, the settler communities in different parts of Africa lacked the incentive to band together more closely on political issues.)

South African hopes for expansion into Africa were first raised by the First World War. Before that, domestic concerns had naturally enough been the first priority of the new Union Government under Botha, though the Prime Minister had in fact raised the question of the transfer of the High Commission territories briefly in 1913. In fact, the Union's immediate involvement in world affairs was not of the government's making. When Britain declared war on Germany in 1914 South Africa's involvement was automatic. The Union had not as yet attained the constitutional status that would have allowed her to remain neutral
in law towards the conflict, but, that aside, the Prime Minister stated that he regarded neutrality as unthinkable. The day of the outbreak of war in Europe the Union government sent a dispatch to the British Government indicating its preparedness "to employ the defence force of the Union for the performance of the duties entrusted to the Imperial Troops in South Africa."

This was followed by a British request for what amounted to an invasion by African troops of German South West Africa. (The territory potentially threatened the Cape route, a vital supply line of the British Empire.) Botha immediately drew up plans for an offensive. However, South Africa's involvement in the war was not passively accepted by the electorate and before the invasion of South West Africa took place it was the subject of fierce domestic controversy, bordering on civil war. A rebellion by Nationalist-minded Afrikaners was put down and although in 1915 Botha successfully led South African troops in the conquest of the German colony, elections that same year revealed considerable resentment at the obligations placed on the Union by her membership of the British Empire.

Botha had hoped originally to confine South Africa's participation in the war to the conquest of South West, especially in view of the division of opinion among the electorate about the war. However, when later in 1915 the British government appealed for further South African help in the war in East Africa and also in France, he readily responded. It is not difficult to see why. Firstly, it was becoming clear that a German victory in East Africa, while not posing a direct threat to the Union, would weaken the Union's position on the continent. Secondly, the swift conquest of South West Africa had greatly added to the Union's stake in a British victory, as South Africa could now see herself sharing in some of the spoils of victory. This had in fact helped to temper domestic criticism of the Union's involvement in the war, though it did
not alter Botha's determination to confine South Africa's contribution to voluntary contingents.

Botha's deputy, Smuts, took personal charge of the campaign in East Africa. Despite some initial difficulties, he met with considerable success and following the defeat of German forces in East Africa, some enthusiasts suggested that German East Africa be re-named Smutsland. Consequently, when Germany unconditionally surrendered in 1918 following the decisive intervention of the United States, expectations in the Union ran high that South Africa would be richly rewarded in terms of territory for her contribution to the Allied war effort. These hopes were by no means confined to the general public.

Recently, British secret papers relating to the First World War have been made public. They contain some revealing exchanges between Botha and Smuts which illustrate the extent of South African ambitions. For Smuts the conclusion of the First World War provided the hope that "we shall consolidate our territories south of the Zambesi and the Kunene." Botha set his sights as high. "I support you in getting many things for which we shall perhaps never have another chance especially Mozambique ...... This is a matter which we must bring up and settle in our favour." Botha's remarks are the more remarkable when one considers that Portugal had been an ally of the British during the First World War, though it was not unusual in those days for victors of a war to make adjustments in territories among themselves. (Presumably, Botha thought the Portuguese could be offered German East Africa in exchange).

However, South African hopes were disappointed. The belief that imperialism, the ambition of states to add to their territories, was a major cause of war had been gaining ground during the First World War as had a determination following the horrors of that war to outlaw future conflict. This view had a powerful champion in Woodrow Wilson President of the United States.
He was adamant at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 that none of Germany's colonies should be ceded outright to the victors. As it was unthinkable that the colonies should be returned to Germany, he proposed a mandate system in its place, ironically drawing on proposals made by Smuts himself in relation to the Middle East, where the war had shattered the Turkish Empire. Wilson was insistent even that South West Africa be included in the scheme over the opposition of both the British and South African delegations. South West Africa finally became a C class mandate, one that placed fewest obligations on the mandatory power, South Africa and enabled her to rule the territory as an integral part of Union. Former German East Africa was divided into two mandate territories, one falling under Belgium, the other and largest (Tanganyika) falling under Britain.

There was considerable anger at the outcome of the Versailles Peace Conference in South Africa where "the sanguine hopes of those who had looked to see him (Smuts) return from Versailles with great acquisitions of territory to the west and the far north had been disappointed". Smuts tried to make the best of the result by maintaining that South Africa's mandate over South West Africa amounted in practice to incorporation and indeed he could point to the fact that many thousands of whites from South Africa had settled in the territory since the conquest, easing the pressure on the land in the Union. To the Nationalist Opposition, however, the outcome confirmed its doubts about the value of membership of the British Empire to the Union. It was a view that enjoyed widespread support among Afrikaners whose "own patriotism was intensely local and instinctively protectionist, whether in matters of colour, language or economic policy. Politically they felt that they were being dragged into world affairs at the chariot wheels of an Empire for which they felt no love."

"
In the 1920's, despite the set-back at the Paris Peace Conference, South Africa continued to press and hope for the acquisition of new territory. During his premiership Smuts set his sights on the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia. When he became Prime Minister in 1919, Southern Rhodesia was administered by the British South Africa Company, but both the British government and Southern Rhodesia electorate regarded the Company rule as only temporary and in the 1920's the settlers were given a choice between internal self-government and incorporation into the Union. Smuts campaigned strongly for incorporation and in this he apparently enjoyed the support of Sir Winston Churchill, the Colonial Secretary.

"Churchill had tried unsuccessfully to persuade Coghlan and his colleagues to enter the South African Union as its fifth member state. The settlers, who saw themselves about to shake off the Company's control - such as it was - as well as the last vestiges of Whitehall rule, were unwilling to accept a new domination." 17

Southern Rhodesia's future status was decided by a referendum in October 1922 and despite Smuts' willingness to pay nearly £7 million for the Crown lands, the railways and public works as the price of incorporation, the electorate voted decisively for responsible government and against joining the Union.

A major factor in the vote was the fear of the settlers in Rhodesia that an invasion of poor whites in search of land and work would follow incorporation into Union. Further the largely English-speaking electorate was worried by the growing strength of the Nationalist Party under Hertzog. To Smuts, the vote was a body blow to his hopes for involving the Union more deeply in the development of the continent. "To him, the Union was what the old Cape Colony had been to Sir George Grey, the most important power in Africa. Rhodesia was the railway bridge to the copper of the Katanga and much else in the far north." 18
In the years following the referendum, the Union and Southern Rhodesia drifted apart and there was in fact little co-operation between the two countries politically until the Second World War. In 1924 Smuts was defeated at the polls. He was succeeded by Hertzog who immediately turned his attention to the High Commission territories. However, his approach to the British Government met with no success and after a number of exchanges between the two governments, the matter was dropped, to be raised again in the 1930's. By 1930 the more extravagant hopes of South Africans that vast editions of territory would be added to Union were beginning to fade. Hertzog still looked forward to the eventual full incorporation of South West Africa. However, both the attitude of the League of Nations and that of the politically well-organized German community in South West Africa provided obstacles to integration.

Ironically, just at this point settler communities throughout British Africa began looking to the Union for support. The immediate cause of this development was the publication of a white paper on Africa by the British government in 1930. The white paper pointedly stated that in countries where Africans were predominant in terms of population over white settlers, African interests should be paramount. This statement of principle by the British Government met with an angry response from the Union. Smuts called for a conference of settlers from East, Central and South Africa to "show the British government the Native policy it ought to pursue", while Hertzog asked at the Imperial Conference of that year that the Union be consulted before a racial policy radically different to her own was adopted elsewhere in British Africa.

In the colonies themselves the white paper "stimulated a 'get-together' movement from Kenya southward ....... . The Union's Native Policy (was) applauded by Europeans on both sides of the Zambezi and throughout the Tanganyika and Kenya highlands".
The controversy was an early indication of conflicts to come between the British government and settler communities over racial policy while also indicating British disquiet at the direction of the Union's own domestic policy. The controversy further served to stimulate greater interest in the Union in the future of the African continent. In view of today's developments some of the ideas canvassed were particularly interesting. For example, some Nationalists spoke of the need for a Dixie line across Africa to the north of the copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia to separate colour bar states in the south from colour-blind states in the north. 22

Among whites throughout British Africa, South African influences could be found which dated back to the early days of colonisation. For example, there were Dutch Reform Church missions as far north as the Sudan. Rhodesian law remained basically the Roman Dutch law of the old Cape Colony and Rhodesia was still linked to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein. Indeed, perhaps it is surprising that the Union had not shown more interest before the 1930's in these territories apart from considerations of incorporation. Realistically, the Union now looked not to incorporation but to the creation of federations in East and Central Africa. The Union Minister of Defence saw these as being "linked to the Union by a common defence policy". 23

Reflecting her new interest in Africa, South Africa acted as host to three conferences of African states on continental co-operation in various fields in 1935 and 1936. The conferences on health, transportation, posts, telegraphs and radio communications were attended by representatives from the High Commission territories, the two Rhodesias, Nyasaland, Mozambique, Angola, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and the Belgian Congo.
The one on transportation resulted in 1936 in various agreements on, among other things, a standard railway gauge, the demarcation of air routes, and the setting up of a permanent secretariat. The following year the Union Minister of Defence went on a seven thousand mile goodwill flight across Africa. When he returned, he spoke of the need to make Africa south of the equator, and in addition Kenya and Uganda, the concern of the Union and more self-sufficient and independent of the colonial powers. In short, to use an expression in vogue today, South Africa was developing an outward-looking policy towards the continent.

A minor illustration of what South African involvement in the affairs of the continent could mean was the unsolicited action of the South African Minister of Defence in 1935 when he sent a plane with a supply of tear gas to Northern Rhodesia at the time of a strike of African workers on the copperbelt. However, the most immediate stimulus to military co-operation on the continent proved not to be the challenge of African nationalism but renewed European involvement on the continent that threatened stability.

In 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia. It came as a rude shock to the Union government who feared that whatever the result, it would damage Union interests. If Italy lost, it was feared that it would undermine African deference to white authority. On the other hand, if the Italians won,
it was feared that African resentment would be stimulated. Further an Italian presence in Ethiopia would threaten Britain’s colonies in East Africa. Initially, South Africa placed her hope in the League of Nations system of collective security. She fell in immediately with British suggestions that economic sanctions be applied against Italy. The subsequent half-hearted attempt to enforce sanctions and, finally, their cancellation met with strong opposition from the Union, but to no avail. 25 The Italians marched into Addis Ababa.

The appeasement of Italy and the collapse of the system of collective security strengthened already existing tendencies in South Africa to pursue a more independent foreign policy. As the situation in Europe began to deteriorate, the Union came more and more to cast herself in the role of the defender of white interests on the continent. However, hopes that South Africa might be able to escape involvement in any new war in Europe received a set-back when Nazi Germany began to demand the return of Germany’s lost colonies in Africa, which included, of course, South West Africa. Further, Germany’s demands brought home to the Union Government its dependence on the imperial connection.

Nevertheless, there was considerable sympathy for Germany’s case in Nationalist circles and even among some members of the government. In particular, Pirow caused some embarrassment to the Union government by declaring himself in favour of a German foothold on the Continent. His statements were followed by repeated declarations by the Union government that there was no question of South West Africa being handed back to Germany. In any event, it was becoming clear that if war broke out in Europe, the cabinet would be seriously split on the question of South African participation. Consequently, the Munich agreement in 1938 was welcomed with some relief in South Africa.
When war nevertheless broke out the following year after the collapse of the agreement, the decision whether South Africa should support Britain was left to the House of Assembly. It voted by a narrow majority to declare war on Germany. The Prime Minister, Hertzog, who spoke in favour of neutrality, resigned. He was succeeded by Smuts. The Second World War resulted in widespread internal conflict inside South Africa, but it lies outside the scope of this thesis to describe it in detail. Suffice it to say that many Nationalists openly flouted their sympathy for National Socialism, believing that a German victory would end the link between Britain and South Africa they were so distrusted and disliked.

As in the First World War, the government did not bring in conscription but raised a volunteer army; initially, a Mobile Defence Force whose members made themselves liable for service for four years anywhere in Africa. To begin with, Smuts did not commit himself to sending South African troops to Europe, and South Africa's main contribution to the war effort was in Africa, though towards the end of the restriction on troops serving outside Africa was lifted and South Africans played an important part in the Italian campaign. During the war, the Union's prestige reached its zenith internationally, particularly in the person of Smuts, who as an individual had been the dominating influence on South Africa's relations with the outside world. Churchill went so far as to ask Smuts to take his place as Acting Prime Minister in Britain while he (Churchill) was attending a summit conference in Teheran. This honour Smuts declined, but the offer does indicate the international respect Smuts enjoyed.

The war also strengthened South Africa's position on the continent. The Southern Rhodesian government placed her troops under Smuts' command and worked in close cooperation with the Union. Kenya, where there were South African troops stationed on the border with Ethiopia to meet any Italian threat, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland also maintained close military liaison with the Union. Further, South
Africa entered defence agreements with the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique and the Belgian Congo.

Smuts clearly hoped that these war-time contacts would lead to closer permanent ties with the continent in peace.

"Now is the time for us to readjust our outlook on African affairs and to develop a new conception of our relations with our neighbours .... We cannot stand aloof, we of this richly-endowed South Africa. If we wish to take our rightful place as the leader in Pan African development and in shaping future policies and events in this vast continent, we must face the realities of the present and seize the opportunities which those offer." 26

Thus spoke Smuts at the beginning of the war. He was optimistic on other fronts as well. The Windhoek legislature had unanimously requested incorporation into the Union and he hoped that after consulting the former League of Nations powers South West Africa would at last become a fifth province of the Union. He also looked to Britain for the incorporation of the High Commission territories as a reward for South Africa's contribution to the war effort. At the same time, he assured the Rhodesias and countries to the north that the Union had no plans to incorporate them.

The gradual change in outlook that had taken place on this score partly reflected a change in South Africa's economic priorities. The demand for African labour was still strong and the Union still depended heavily on foreign migrant labour. However, hunger for land no longer represented a pressing problem. The war-time boom absorbed many thousands of poor whites and former tenant farmers or bywoners into industry. As Walker put it, "the struggle" between black and white was "transferred from the openveld to the factories and poorer quarters of the rapidly growing towns". 27
South Africa now looked to the north not so much for land, but for trade. Smuts pressed home the need for improved communications with the continent and remained to the end of the war optimistic on the future of peace-time Pan-African co-operation.

However, by no means everyone shared Smuts' optimism on the post-war role of the Union.

"Unfortunately, South Africa seems to be interested in neighbouring territories mainly as potential customers. A few indefatigable optimists even look on Africa as a vast hinterland crying out for the Union's industrial products and anxious to pour its wealth into her bilingual lap. South Africa, however, cannot expand industries on imports of African raw materials based on low paid sweat labour and at the same time hope to find profitable markets in these poverty-stricken areas. Moreover, the African continent cannot be regarded as, and will not in any case become, the Union's private preserve". 28

However, in general, sober analysis of this kind was rare. Hopes in South Africa that the Union would play a major role in post-war Africa were high; hopes inflated, at least in part, by Smuts' international prestige.

In fact, the immediate aftermath of war proved even Smuts' modest hopes unjustified. In particular, he was rebuffed by the newly formed United Nations Organization on the question of South West Africa though he had a hand in the drawing up of its Charter! Britain made no move to transfer the High Commission territories as appreciation for the Union's war services. Worse from the South African government's point of view was to come. The war years had given rise to widespread questioning of the legitimacy of colonial rule throughout Africa and Asia, not least because of the idealistic principles of self-determination enunciated by the victors,
for example, in the Atlantic Charter. Further, two super-powers had emerged, the United States and Russia and both were committed to opposing colonialism. In October 1945 African leaders representative of the new elites on the continent gathered in Manchester for the sixth Pan-African Congress to articulate demands for self-determination; demands which were to transform the continent in the 1950's and 1960's. They made this radical challenge: "We demand for Black Africa autonomy and independence, so far, and no further, than it is possible in this one World for groups and peoples to rule themselves subject to inevitable world unity and federation." 29

This stimulus the war gave to African nationalism was not a factor Smuts appreciated in his hopes for post-war Africa. In this, he was not alone. The colonial powers themselves underestimated the growth of African nationalism and while envisaging that some reforms in administration were necessary were not prepared for the radical changes that, in fact, took place. The speed with which the colonial powers succumbed to the demands of African nationalists was to become in the 1950's a source of unending shock to both major political parties in South Africa.

The depth of feeling aroused in South Africa by decolonisation can best be gauged by Malan's reaction to British policy in West Africa.

"There will have to be a psychological revolution. One finds in the world today that there is sickly sentimentality in regard to the black man. Someone in authority told me in England ... that one can say with truth that they venerate a black skin. The position is that under these circumstances I fear that the people of Europe, the white nations of Europe are becoming decadent!" 30

It is then not surprising that almost twenty years elapsed before South Africa pursued actively an African foreign policy geared to the transformation brought about on the continent by African nationalism.
In retrospect, what is surprising was not South Africa's containment of African nationalism within her own borders, but her incapacity to take a greater part in the combat of African nationalism elsewhere on the continent. It was an incapacity that in part reflected a remarkable decline in South Africa's status in the world following the war. It was also a consequence of the facts that decolonisation began in an area of Africa where South Africa had little influence, the territories of West Africa (as Verwoerd was later to put it, these were "undoubtedly wholly black men's countries")

South Africa's stature was in part affected in the immediate post-war years by the attention India's new leaders focused on the Union's treatment of Asians. However, more important than this was the change of government brought about by the Nationalist Party's victory at the polls in 1948. The new government lacked the prestigious figure of a Smuts to command international respect. It was committed to policies entrenching white power in a world in which the spirit of liberal reform was strong and many in Britain as elsewhere were unable to forget the role some of its leaders had played in the war. Further, the wholly Afrikaner composition of the new government dedicated ultimately to republican status did not commend it to the largely English-speaking settler communities elsewhere on the continent who might otherwise have seen in South Africa a natural ally in their fight against the reforming policies of the British Colonial Office. In addition, many of the new Cabinet Ministers lacked experience of office and, for example, the blunt terms in which some of them defended white supremacy at its most extreme served simply to aggravate opinion of their policies. In short, the image the Nationalists projected to the world was not a favourable one and this in itself contributed to the country's lack of influence on developments on the continent.
The policies of the new Prime Minister (Dr. D. F. Malan) towards Africa were not essentially different to those Smuts pursued. As an Afrikaner Nationalist, he rejected Smuts' objective of the political unification of British territories, but he still hoped that the Commonwealth would provide the basis for furthering "white Christian civilization" on the continent and the combat of communism. Indeed, the need to exclude communism from Africa was the subject of most of Malan's pronouncements on Africa and in this context he wholeheartedly endorsed Smuts' plea for Pan-African co-operation. Like Smuts, he strongly supported the firm maintenance of power in white hands.

In 1953 Dr. Malan spelt out his policy towards Africa in greater detail. The main points of what was called Malan's African Quarter were as follows:

"1) protection of the indigenous people of Africa against the penetration by peoples of Asia.
2) the guidance of Africa along the road to European civilization.
3) the suppression of communist activities, and
4) the prevention of militarization of Africans."

Hostility towards India because of her championing of the anti-colonial cause played an important part in policy. In particular, the South African government feared that Africa's wide-open spaces were a target for Indian settlement and resented India's membership of the British Commonwealth. Further, by placing South Africa's treatment of Indians (inside South Africa) on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly in 1946, India had placed South Africa's racial policies in an unfavourable light; an action that did much to arouse South Africa's suspicions as to India's intentions towards Africa.
In practical terms, Malan’s first initiative was to appoint a special Ambassador-at-large for Africa, Charles Te Water. Te Water was an experienced diplomat, who had acted as President of the League of Nations Assembly. After a tour of the nations of Europe with dependencies in Africa, Te Water reported back to Malan that he encountered considerable hostility to apartheid. His advice was for the Union to concentrate on co-operation in the economic, scientific and cultural spheres with countries south of the Sahara, rather than to develop direct political ties. Te Water’s indirect approach had powerful critics. Louw - later to become the first Minister of External Affairs - was one of them. He wanted the Union to make direct contact with the leaders in the settler communities in Kenya, the Rhodesias, and elsewhere. It was a position that enjoyed wide support in the Nationalist Party, but, in practice, Te Water’s advice was followed if only because the opportunities for political co-operation with settlers failed to materialize.

An area in which both Louw and Te Water agreed on the need for continental co-operation was defence. Originally, South Africa had hoped to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but had been rebuffed. The Union government now argued the case for a regional African defence alliance to reinforce N.A.T.O. This suggestion was more sympathetically received by the colonial powers and in 1951 a conference on defence was held in Nairobi comprising representatives of the colonial powers, South Africa and Rhodesia. The United States attended as an observer. The result of the meeting was "a series of unanimous recommendations designed to ensure the rapid movement of troops and military supplies through the eastern and central parts of Africa". However, no agreement could be reached on the formation of an African regional defence organization because of South Africa’s strong hostility to the arming of Africans. Despite the failure of
this conference, there were further efforts in the 1950's by South Africa and the colonial powers to reach agreement on defence co-operation. Indeed, one explanation given for South Africa's readiness to grant Britain wide-ranging rights under the 1955 Simonstown agreement was the expectation that "the Agreement would be the first stage in an African regional defence alliance similar to the network of alliances then being established in the Middle East, Europe, and the Far East". The emergence of independent Africa saw this expectation disappointed as it became clear that South Africa's racial policies would permit of no co-operation with Central African nations.

The attempt to secure co-operation on defence was not the only African initiative taken by Malan. In 1950 South Africa acted as host to a conference on problems of transport in Southern and Central Africa. Malan pushed ahead with the closer integration of South West Africa into the Union over a growing volume of protest at the United Nations. He also raised without success the question of a transfer of the High Commission territories to the Union. However, the main focus of attention in the 1950's was on constitutional changes taking place elsewhere on the continent.

Changes in the Gold Coast provided the Union government with its first shock. The result of elections in 1951 under a new constitution had been an overwhelming victory for Nkrumah's Convention People's Party and consequently the British authorities appointed Nkrumah as Leader for Government Business. The realization of the precedent this created caused an immediate reaction in South Africa, where previously very little attention had been paid to West Africa, a part of the continent in which South Africa had little influence or interest.
Walker records that:

"the South African Prime Minister was shocked deeply and the leader of the Opposition only slightly less so by this elevation of a Negro to so high an office, and by the hope expressed subsequently by the British Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths, that the Gold Coast would soon become a Dominion."

Malan, in particular, feared a further change in the composition of Commonwealth. India had already been, as far as the Union was concerned, a disagreeable addition.

Besides this development in West Africa, the early 1950's saw the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland moving towards Federation under the banner of partnership between the races. The eventual constitution was very much a compromise between settler segregationist attitudes and British hopes for an alternative to apartheid. These hopes were described as follows by Creighton: "The design ...... was intended in the first place to contain South Africa and erect an inexpugnable barrier of British liberalism across the southern half of the continent."

In short, despite the conservative constitution that finally emerged, there was little in the thinking behind the scheme that appealed to the Nationalists in South Africa. Indeed, one M.P. called for incorporation of Southern Rhodesia into the Union, to which Malan replied that any move in that direction would have to come from the Rhodesian settlers themselves. It did not. Consequently, the formation of Federation in 1953 left the Union government, ideologically, more isolated than ever. The same year saw the elevation of Nkrumah to Prime Minister in the Gold Coast. Malan was quick to draw the moral that African nationalists in Northern Rhodesia would soon be demanding the same rights as Gold Coasters; a comment perhaps reflecting his disappointment at the acceptance by the settlers of partnership.
At the end of 1954, Malan retired as Prime Minister and Strydom took his place. The following year, Eric Louw became the Union's first Minister of External Affairs, a portfolio previously always held by the Prime Minister. Louw was the logical choice in view of his wide international experience. Indeed he had exercised considerable influence on South Africa's foreign policy during Malan's premiership. His main achievement was to put South African diplomacy on a more professional basis. In particular, in December 1956 a separate division of African Affairs was created within the Department of External Affairs. These developments heralded a more realistic attitude towards events on the continent, (for example, when Sudan became independent in 1956, Louw sent a telegram of congratulations to the country's new leaders. Louw even had tea with the Sultan of Zanzibar! 41).

Malan had always conceived of co-operation in Africa as being through the colonial powers and was fierce in his opposition to decolonisation. Under Strydom, the Union government began to realize the need to come to terms, as far as possible, with the changes on the continent that the Union was, after all powerless to prevent. In a speech in August 1955 Strydom gave expression to the new attitude.

"The relationship between South Africa and non-white states in Africa, with their millions of inhabitants, should be one of mutually interested parties in Africa, without hostility towards one another - a relationship of peoples and governments who recognise and respect one another's rights of existence".

Louw, formerly a critic of Te Water, now placed special emphasis on the development of scientific and technical co-operation with the emergent African states. South Africa continued to play an active
role in the Council for Technical Co-operation in Africa (C.C.T.A.) and the Scientific Council for Africa (C.S.A.) after Ghana's independence and in fact Ghanaian representatives attended meetings of a specialised committee of C.C.T.A. held in South Africa at the end of 1957. Further, South Africa became a member of the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara (F.A.M.A.) at its inauguration in February 1958 in Accra. The new organisation was to be a clearing house for technical information.

When Ghana became independent in 1957 South African representatives attended the celebrations and the idea that South Africa would eventually be exchanging diplomatic representatives with black governments in Africa was gaining ground in the Union. In short, the need to reach an accommodation with emergent Africa was already being appreciated in the second half of the 1950's. However, speeches also reflected a good deal of apprehension at what was taking place on the continent. Particularly interesting was a speech of Louw's in June 1957 on the importance of the continent to South Africa as a future market for her goods.

"As far as the Union of South Africa is concerned, we naturally welcome any development on the continent of Africa .... We welcome it in the interest of the continent, of which we are a part, provided no impediment will be placed in the way of South Africa's access to those markets. The territories to the north of the Limpopo are the natural markets for our large and expanding industries and whatever arrangements are made, whatever interests are secured by outside countries, we expect that no impediment will be laid in the way of our access to those markets.

"May I at this stage also express the hope that our industrialists will take note of what is happening in Africa .... I trust that they will take greater pains than they have done in the past, to secure a footing in these markets." 43
At the time Louw was speaking, South African trade with the continent was small and falling as a proportion of total trade. From 1950 - 57 imports from Africa constituted less than 10% of total imports and while exports to Africa constituted 22.6% of South African exports during this period, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland took over 80% of these. Louw had reason to be concerned at African attitudes on the question of trade. By the close of the decade, a number of African organizations, including the All-African People's Conference, the Ghanaian Trade Union Congress, and the Kenyan Federation of Labour had called for boycotts of South African goods. Small though the direct impact on the South African economy would be of a continental boycott, it threatened to deprive South Africa of the opportunity otherwise offered by independence of greatly expanding her trade with the continent.

In general, by the close of the decade, South Africa's racial policies were increasingly a stumbling block to the Union's relations with Africa and the world at large, whether economically or politically. Part of the reason why Strydom's outward-looking pronouncements on Africa remained essentially in the realm of theory was his defence of white supremacy in terms of domination (baasskap). The first tentative recognition that a change in the framework in which South Africa's racial policy was judged was necessary to the country's foreign policy was to come under Verwoerd's premiership. He became Prime Minister in September 1958 following Strydom's death.

Introducing the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill in 1959, Verwoerd laid the basis of the new framework.

"I believe that we are now faced with a fateful hour in which a final choice has to be made. It is not an easy choice because, in whichever way one regards the future there are difficulties to be surmounted. But among the alternatives is the
"choice of separate Bantu development
in line with the development in Africa and in line
with the objects of the world at large; viz. to give
the Bantu self-government in their own areas.
Then, however, we can also tell the world and
Africa with even more justice: Also give us,
the white people, the right to retain and to govern
our own area."

The need to replace the concept of baasskap was clear enough.

By 1959 South Africa found herself under heavy fire at the United
Nations on both the issue of apartheid and her mandate over South
West Africa.

However, the outlook for South Africa in 1959 contained some
brighter features. One was Nkrumah's invitation to Louw
to visit Accra in 1960. The South African government could
still optimistically maintain that whatever the hostility to apartheid
dialogue was still being secured. Further, many areas of Africa
had not as yet been decolonised and these were precisely the areas
where Union and settler interests were greatest, the Rhodesian
Federation where white supremacy had survived partnership without
difficulty, and Kenya where British troops were restoring order
in the country, in the wake of the Mau Mau uprising. In 1960,
the situation was to be very much more menacing and at a time
when the Union faced possibly the worst domestic crisis in her
history. In 1959 independence was confined to West Africa
(apart from, that is, the ancient empire of Ethiopia and the Arab
states of the North) and British policy for Central and East Africa
still remained apparently unsettled. 1960 saw it clearly
enunciated.
Notes on the Union and Africa 1910 - 1959

1. Libya was actually part of the Turkish Empire until taken over by the Italians in 1911.

2. Leo Marquard - *Our Foreign Policy* (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg 1959) p. 5

3. South African efforts to incorporate the High Commission territories are dealt with in more detail in a subsequent chapter as are South Africa's relations with the Rhodesias and the Portuguese provinces.

4. South West Africa is dealt with more fully in the next chapter.


10. See Walker p. 533


12. The Nationalists won 27 seats in the general election in October.

13. Quoted in *The Cape Times* 21.5.1966

14. Ibid.
15. Walker p. 592
16. Ibid p. 545
17. Keatley p. 208. Coghlan was the leader of the main settler party in Rhodesia.
20. Walker p. 629
21. Ibid. p. 684
22. See Ibid. p. 629
23. Pirow quoted in The Cape Times 6.2.1935
27. Walker p. 752
28. Raymond Burrows - The Development of Southern Africa (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg 1945) p. 23
32. Malan's speech is in House of Assembly Debates Vol. 82 Cols. 1205 - 1326 -- 1953.
33. Vandenbosch p. 160
35. Britain, Belgium, France, Italy and Portugal.


39. Walker p. 825

40. T.R. Creighton - The Anatomy of Partnership (Faber and Faber, London 1960) p. 38

41. Significant only in terms of the attention this informal contact was given by politicians and press alike in South Africa.


43. Louw in House of Assembly Debates Vol. 95 Col. 7638-9 - 1957.

44. See Appendix B on the economic aspects of South Africa's relations with Africa.

45. Verwoerd in House of Assembly Debates Vol. 100, Col. 6236 - 1959 My emphasis.

46. The invitation was withdrawn after the shootings at Sharpeville.
SOUTH WEST AFRICA - ORIGINS OF A DISPUTE

To-day South West Africa's status remains disputed. The United Nations maintains that South Africa's continued administration of the territory is illegal, a view endorsed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971. For its part, the South African government holds that the United Nations General Assembly resolution terminating South Africa's mandate was itself illegal. However, for all practical purposes the territory is ruled to-day as an integral part of the Republic; in fact, since the passing of the 1969 South West Africa Affairs Act, virtually as a fifth province.

Throughout the period of Union South West Africa was a major area of foreign policy concern for successive South African governments and serves as an illustration of many of the common themes of South African foreign policy whether it be the impingement of relations between Afrikander and Englishman on foreign affairs or the impact of South Africa's racial policy on her international position. At the time of Union South West Africa was a German colony. Initially, British policy-makers had been prepared to welcome Germany's emergence as a colonial power, but the attitude among the British in South Africa was hostile from the outset. "The general opinion here is that there is not room for two flags in South Africa." 

By the time of Union, relations between Britain and Germany had deteriorated to the point that British policy-makers fully shared South African suspicions as to Germany's intentions in the area. Britain feared that Germany might use the territory as the base for an attack on the Cape, Britain's southern sea-route to India and a vital supply line of Empire. Further the Kaiser's warm message of support for President Kruger during the Anglo-Boer war had not been forgotten and it was feared that Germany might once again attempt to exploit the tensions existing between the two white communities in South Africa.
Finally the 1904 Herero uprising prompted the view that German maltreatment of the indigenous population would lead to further unrest that might spill over South West Africa's borders and affect the Union.

Consequently, when Britain declared war on Germany in 1914, Britain decided to carry the war in Europe to Germany's colonies overseas. The South African government needed little prompting to fall in with British policy. An invasion of South West Africa was swiftly planned by Botha (the Prime Minister) and Smuts (the Minister of Defence) and when fighting broke out in September on the border between the Union and South West Africa action by the Union government became a matter of urgency. However, Botha wisely approached the situation with caution. Firstly, he enlisted only volunteers for the campaign and secondly he secured the support of Parliament.

The wisdom of this policy was soon borne out in practice. On October 9th, Colonel S. Maritz of the Union army defected to the Germans and a rebellion was sparked off among Afrikaner nationalists against the war effort. About 7,000 Free Staters and 3,000 Transvaalers participated in the rebellion. However, Botha was able to put down the rebellion within a few months, in part because key Nationalist leaders like General Hertzog refused to give the movement their overt support. The concern of the British government that the rebellion might spread can best be gauged from the fact that it secretly arranged to divert Australian troops to the Cape. But in the event the British government was spared the prospect of re-fighting the Anglo-Boer war while already engaged in war in Europe. The Union government's chief concern was that the rebellion should not inflame feelings between the white communities. Consequently Botha set great store by the fact that "in suppressing the rebellion the government have had the most hearty co-operation of both races" and he called for "the same co-operation in German South West Africa". In Smuts' opinion:

"These difficulties through which we have passed successfully have helped to consolidate the people of South Africa and to weld them into a strong united
"people, and in that sense, I think they have been strengthened rather than weakened by the occurrences that have taken place." 8

This viewpoint proved over-optimistic. The rebellion did leave its scars. In particular, the execution of Commandant Japie Fourie for his part in the rebellion created sympathy for the rebels among a wide cross-section of Afrikaners. Further, the belief of many English-speaking South Africans that Germany was implicated in the rebellion heightened tensions between the two communities. The Rand Daily Mail bluntly stated: "In German South West Africa were made plans for fomenting civil war in the Union, for the invasion of its territory and for the overthrowing of its elected government." 9 The evidence given for this view was an "agreement concluded between the rebel leader Colonel Maritz and the South West African government by which South Africa would become a republic and South West Africa would acquire Walvis Bay." 10

But most important of all, the rebellion highlighted a growing feeling among Afrikaners that the Botha government was acting on behalf of British imperial interests rather than those of South Africa. This feeling had been expressed as early as 1912 by General Hertzog.

"The time has come when South Africa can no longer be ruled by non-Afrikaners, by people who do not have the right love for South Africa ....... Imperialism is only acceptable to me as far as it is of service to South Africa. When it comes into conflict with the interests of South Africa, I am a decided opponent of it .... I am not one of those who always talks of conciliation and loyalty, because these are idle words which deceive no-one." 11

Hertzog's attitude found expression in the formation of the Nationalist Party in January 1914, with its slogan "South Africa first". The party soon proved its potency by winning 27 seats in the general election in October 1915. By contrast, Smuts maintained that South Africa's foreign policy interests were best served by South Africa's operating under the protective umbrella of the British Empire.
It was a fundamental difference of approach that was to dominate South African politics until South Africa became a republic and left the Commonwealth.

The actual campaign against German South West Africa was short and successful. On January 14th, 1915, South African troops under Botha's command invaded the territory. On May 12th the capital, Windhoek, fell and finally on July 9th the Governor of German South West Africa surrendered unconditionally. Both in Britain and South Africa Botha was hailed as a hero and it was even suggested that the territory be re-named Bothaland. It was widely assumed that the territory would be absorbed into South Africa. The Times editorialized:

"It is theirs no longer. The colony where in a time of weakness and indecision we suffered Germany to plant her foot has been wrested from her by the prowess of a Dominion on whose disaffection she fondly built and her name disappears from the map of South Africa." 13

The South African peace terms under the Treaty of Khorab were generous. Non-regular troops on the German side were allowed to return to their civilian occupations and only 26 of the regular officers were interned. In general, the German settlers were content to await the outcome of the war in Europe. Nevertheless, by the end of the war the composition of the white population of South West Africa had undergone a substantial change. The German population had shrunk from over 12,000 at the outbreak of war to less than 8,000 in May 1921 when a new population was taken in the territory. By contrast the total white population of South West Africa had risen to over 18,000 due to the settlement of some 10,000 South Africans. 14 Indeed, the area opened to white settlement - easing pressure on the land in the Union - was represented by Botha and Smuts as a major political and economic benefit of the conquest to the Union.

While it was appreciated in South Africa that the outcome of the war in Europe would necessarily play an important part in the re-drawing of the map of Africa, the South African government readily assumed
that the annexation of South West Africa would be little more than a formality. Consequently President Wilson's "Peace Note" of 1917 urging the conclusion of a peace without annexation came as a rude shock to both the Union and the British government. In April 1917 a committee of the Imperial War Cabinet gave its full backing to South Africa's position.

"The retrocession of German South West Africa was absolutely impossible even in the contingency of a completely unsatisfactory peace. It would mean the submergence of those who had made every sacrifice on behalf of the Empire in South Africa and would bring other elements to the front whose predominance would jeopardise the whole position in South Africa."

In short, it was feared that the handing back of South West Africa to Germany would provide Afrikaner Nationalism with a powerful boost.

The strength of the United States President's position lay in the growing belief that imperialism was a cause of war. It was a belief particularly strong in left-wing circles and supported by the new communist government in Russia. That this new climate of opinion might eventually deprive the Union of South West Africa alarmed and angered white public opinion in the Union. Overseas, Smuts campaigned against the return of any of Germany's colonies by playing of fears of a German Mittelafrica in which Germany would build up a massive black army. He received strong support in conservative quarters in Britain. The Express and Star commented: "The world owes General Smuts a debt of gratitude for his expose of the threat to civilization entailed in Germany's colonial plans."

Smuts' campaign was effective in countering suggestions that territories conquered during the war should be handed back to Germany but it failed to meet suggestions that Germany's lost colonies should be placed under some form of international control.

The argument over the fate of these areas came to a head at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference after Germany's defeat in 1918. The United States President, Woodrow Wilson championed the view that former German possessions should be administered as a sacred trust of
civilization under a League of Nations. Ironically, his ideas owed much to proposals Smuts himself had put forward a year earlier for the Middle East and Eastern Europe. However, Smuts had specifically insisted that his ideas were not applicable to Africa.

"It is a continent inhabited by barbarians who not only cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of political self-determination in the European sense. They might be consulted as to whether they wanted their German masters back, but the result would be so much a foregone conclusion that the consultation would be quite superfluous."

By contrast, Wilson - fearing the accusation that "the Great Powers first portioned out the helpless parts of the world, and then formed a League of Nations" was adamant that there could be no exceptions.

Smuts' tactics from the outset were that "unconditional annexation of the German colonies should be pressed for to the utmost." Smuts was not alone. He had the full support of Britain and Australia. However, Wilson was the key figure because his approval was seen as essential to a post-war Pax Anglo-Americana - envisaged by all at that time as perhaps the only hope of a lasting peace - and in the end, Britain, South Africa, and Australia were forced to compromise and accept mandates for the territories they had conquered.

The Union's mandate for South West Africa was a "C" class mandate, one that placed fewest obligations on the mandatory power. The conference applied "C" class mandates to:

"territories, such as South West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population or their small size or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory, and other circumstances, can be..."
"best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to safeguards in the interests of the indigenous population." 

The specific safeguards included the prohibition of the slave trade and of the sale of liquor to the indigenous population, the control of arms traffic and military training, the guaranteeing of freedom of religion and conscience, and the submission of annual reports to the League of Nations. There was also a more general safeguard, namely that "the mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory." 

The outcome of the Versailles conference caused considerable resentment in South Africa, where some at least recognized the possible long term implications of the United States President's determined stand. The periodical, South Africa, was not untypical of reaction in the Union. It asked: "what is a mandate?" and gave the answer:

"We know and all South Africans know what it must not mean. It must not mean that the natives of South West Africa are to have any ground for supposing that if they are dissatisfied at any time with the Union government some mysterious League across the seas will take up their imaginary grievances. The mandatory theory will have to be very carefully applied to South West Africa or it may easily contain the germs of future trouble." 

They were prophetic words:

In domestic political terms, the failure of the Union government to secure outright annexation lent added weight to the arguments of those who questioned the value to South Africa of the imperial connection. While Smuts did not hide his disappointment at the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference, he maintained that the specific terms of the mandate were tantamount to effective incorporation. However, Smuts' own power created a very different impression.
"The mandatory state should look upon its position as a great trust and honour, not as an office of profit or a position of private advantage for it or its nationals. And in case of any flagrant or prolonged abuse of this trust the population concerned should be able to appeal for redress to the League, who should in a proper case assert its authority to the full, even to the extent of removing the mandate and entrusting it to some other state if necessary." 24

Nevertheless, Smuts had some grounds for hoping that eventually outright annexation would be achieved. The previous German administration had been strongly criticized for its inhumane treatment of the indigenous population, especially its virtual extermination of the Hereros, and initially the Union's rule had been welcomed by opinion in the League of Nations.

Indeed, in the early years of the mandate South Africa's racial policy was not the principal obstacle to annexation. That proved to be the attitude of the German population. They were, as Smuts put it later, "relentlessly opposed to incorporation in the Union and identification with this country (South Africa)." 25 Although the German settlers formed a minority of the white population in South West Africa, it was a large - and politically influential - minority, thanks in part to the generous terms of the 1915 treaty of Khorab. In fact, because of the division among the South African majority between followers of Hertzog and of Smuts, the German settlers organized under the Deutscher Bund won a majority of elected seats in the first elections to the South West African Legislative Assembly in 1926. 26 In addition, the German section was supported in its opposition to incorporation by the sympathetic interest of the German government. 27

The opposition of the German settlers in South West Africa to incorporation did not stem from any disagreement with South Africa's racial policy, but from the fear that in the event of incorporation they would be further swamped by an influx of poor Afrikaner settlers that
would both prove a burden to the territory's economy and threaten their dominance of it. In the years after the First World War they resented the fact that "land-hungry South Africans, spilling across the border, were allocated huge farms, virtually for the asking, that they were then petted and pampered into eventual solvency." 28 The maintenance of the German section's cultural identity and opposition to immigration formed the cornerstones of the Bund's policy.

The conflict between the two white communities did not directly involve the League of Nations and from the outset it was South Africa's racial policy that provided the main source of conflict between the Union and the League's Permanent Mandates Commission. In particular, criticism followed the disappointment of initial hopes that South Africa's rule would spell an end to the abuses of the German administration. Through Proclamation 15 of 1919 the Union government maintained the police zone - comprising the southern three-quarters of South West Africa - created by the German administration in 1911. Under German rule, responsibility for African education had been left entirely to the missionaries with the help of small government subsidies. This pattern was maintained by the Union until 1935 when just one government school was created in the Aminius reserve. Similarly, the prohibition, of African private ownership of land stayed in force, as did with little modification the pass laws the Germans had instituted. The arrest of Africans for "Laziness", "indolence", and "disobedience" continued.

The persistence of these abuses did not go unnoticed at the League of Nations. In a 1930 study for the Permanent Mandates Commission, Professor Quincy Wright concluded that "the mandatory's policy appears to be devoted to white rather than native interests", 29 while the situation in South West Africa led Commissioner Rappard of the P.M.C. to comment that "on every occasion in the past when whites and blacks have come into contact in territories equally habitable by both, the blacks had gone to the wall." 30
While this criticism was resented by the South African government which could not be faulted on the specific obligations under the mandate it had little to fear from a conservative body like the League which included colonial powers, which did not expect the Union to right wrongs of the German administration overnight.

League criticism was in part a response to particular events in South West Africa. The most important of these was the Bondelswarts massacre in 1922. A tax on dogs had led to a revolt by the Bondelswarts, a tribe (in the southern portion of the territory) which was dependent on dogs for hunting. After the tribe had refused to surrender one of its leaders to the police, the authorities had used planes to bombard the tribe into submission. More than a hundred men, women and children were killed in the raid. 31 Another revolt by the Rehoboth Basters in 1925 was ended without bloodshed, but it also threw an unfavourable light on South African policy at the League. 32

The conflict between South Africa and the League was not confined to the Union government's treatment of the indigenous population. It also revolved around the question of sovereignty and South Africa's interpretation of the mandate, though the two areas of dispute were linked. Misgivings about South Africa's racial policy in South West Africa undoubtedly contributed to the P.M.C.'s zeal in resisting South African pretensions of sovereignty over the territory.

Speeches by South African politicians, especially Smuts' 1920 claim that the mandate was virtually equivalent to annexation, roused suspicions that South Africa would attempt to secure complete integration of the territory by stealth, as did a 1926 treaty between South Africa and Portugal which blandly stated that South Africa possessed sovereignty over South West Africa. Finally, South Africa's suggestion in its 1936 report to the League that the inclusion of South West Africa as the Union's fifth province would not conflict with the terms of the mandate brought a hostile response from the Permanent Mandates Commission.
Important though the skirmishing between the P.M.C. and Union was, it should not be exaggerated. There was never any question for example, that the League would deprive South Africa of the mandate. Indeed, in retrospect, the attitude of the League appeared reasonable compared to that of the United Nations. In 1950 the South African Prime Minister, Dr. D.F. Malan complained:

"The United Nations wants to thrust down our throats a doctrine of equality between white and non-whites. In the League of Nations we had to do with a reasonable body. The League trusted the Union and South West Africa".  

In the wake of its defeat in the 1926 elections in South West Africa, the Union section ended its political divisions and banded together under the United National South West Africa Party (U.N.S.W.A.P.) in 1927 - thereby foreshadowing the eventual fusion of the United Party and the Nationalist Party in South Africa. The U.N.S.W.A.P. easily won the 1929 elections to the Legislative Assembly in Windhoek and the German section was consequently forced to adopt a more accommodating attitude towards the South African government and the Union section in South West Africa. A period of co-operation between the two communities followed, but it was short-lived. The rise of nazism in Germany - bringing Hitler to power in 1933 - sparked off fresh agitation among the German community in South West Africa. In particular, Hitler's demands for the restitution of Germany's former colonies (including South West Africa) were taken up by the German community and heightened tension in the territory. Branches of the Nazi Party and Hitler Youth were established in South West Africa and existing German organizations taken over by supporters of National Socialism. Alarmed, the Administrator banned the two overtly Nazi bodies in 1934. A year earlier, the German members of the Legislative Assembly had walked out after the U.N.S.W.A.P. had called for the ban.  

The position of South West Africa internationally was complicated by the policy of appeasement followed by the British and French.
governments in the 1930's. In particular, Britain's appeasers envisaged a scheme under which Germany would be compensated economically for the loss of her colonies, for example, by being granted a share in the raw materials of the mandates. However, despite considerable sympathy for Nazi Germany among Afrikaner nationalists, there was no support in the Union for the restitution of South West Africa to Germany. Few went further than Oswald Pirow, Minister of Defence and a Nazi sympathizer, who suggested that a new territory should be carved out of the Cameroon, the Belgian Congo and Angola to meet Germany's colonial aspirations.

The Nationalist leader, Dr. Malan, argued that South Africa should "try to obtain the co-operation of Germany with a view to a friendly solution under which South West Africa (would) be vested in the Union", and promised "moral support to a scheme that (would) satisfy Germany's colonial needs." Nevertheless, the atmosphere of appeasement served to raise German hopes in South West Africa that German rule would eventually be restored.

"A Territorial Führer supervised the Nazification of children in the German school. The processions and flag-waving demonstrations were poor mimicries of the real thing in Europe, but they frightened the antagonistic in Windhoek and Swakopmund. After Munich, tension and German truculence rose in South West Africa. Young Germans left the territory to train as soldiers and pilots in Germany." But the situation was transformed by the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and the South African parliament's narrow decision to participate in support of Britain. During the war, hundreds of Germans were interned in South West Africa and the political power and influence of the German section effectively broken. The defeat of Hitler in 1945 ended once and for all the prospect of the restitution of German rule. As Smuts noted in 1946, by then those who opposed incorporation had
"either disappeared or waived their claims". 38

At the close of the Second World War, delegates from 50 countries met at San Francisco between 25 April and 26 June 1945 to frame the Charter of a Successor to the League of Nations, the United Nations. Smuts represented South Africa at the conference and took the opportunity to press the Union's claim for the incorporation of South West Africa. However, the conference ruled his attempt to secure approval for incorporation out of order and the question of South West Africa's status was deferred for consideration by the U.N. General Assembly the following year. In the intervening months, while other mandatory powers agreed to place their mandated territories under the trusteeship of the United Nations, the South African government prepared its case for incorporation. During the war, the Legislative Assembly in Windhoek had passed a unanimous resolution in favour of incorporation. To supplement this demonstration of white opinion, the South African government organized a "referendum" among the indigenous inhabitants of the territory through consultation with native commissioners, tribal chiefs, and headmen. The result was an overwhelming majority for incorporation, but the General Assembly did not accept the methods used to arrive at it.

The other main planks of the Union's case were that the Union had administered the territory for 25 years and had introduced a progressive policy of native administration and that there was no geographical or economic prospect that South West Africa could exist as a separate state. These arguments failed to sway the Trusteeship Committee, which voted without opposition to reject South Africa's request for incorporation; a decision endorsed by the General Assembly. The Union retaliated by refusing to accede to requests to place South West Africa under U.N. Trusteeship.
However, by approaching the United Nations Smuts laid himself open to the accusation that he had implicitly acknowledged that the mandate over South West Africa had survived the demise of the League of Nations. His action consequently gave rise to considerable dissatisfaction in South Africa. In 1947 Eric Louw for the Opposition introduced a motion in the House of Assembly calling for the incorporation of South West Africa as a fifth province. He argued that such a step did not require an approach to the United Nations because South Africa's obligations to the international community for South West Africa had ended with the dissolution of the League.

"My submission is that with the passing of the League and with the removal of League supervision, the Union of South Africa, thereby, in addition to de facto possession also acquired de jure possession. I may put it this way, that the nine points of law arising from possession now become the ten points of the law in the full sense of the term."

Though angered by the attitude of the United Nations towards incorporation Smuts was not willing at this stage to flout world opinion by integrating South West Africa as a fifth province. He did concede that the time had come for the Union to consider providing representation in the Union Parliament for the white population of South West Africa. But unlike the Nationalists Smuts still hoped that a compromise satisfactory to South African interests could be arrived at that would meet South Africa's more moderate critics at the U.N. In particular, he was opposed to:

"language which looks like a challenge which may appear provocative and which may put the bristles up of stronger nations than ourselves and make our case more difficult. It is not wisdom to use language which looks like a challenge. We are at the beginning of what may be a difficult phase for this country."

However, the 1948 elections in South Africa brought the Nationalists to power, who immediately adopted a more uncompromising stance over South West Africa. In 1949 they introduced legislation that gave white voters in South West Africa six M.P.'s in the House of Assembly. In addition, the government provided for the nomination of two senators
for South West Africa. However, Malan did not go so far as to make the territory a fifth province and indeed, as D.B. Molteno had pointed out in the 1947 debate, on the question of the authority of the U.N., there was considerable common ground between the parties. 41

At the United Nations, South Africa's representative formally told the Trusteeship Committee that his government saw no legal or moral obligation to put the territory under U.N. trusteeship. The essence of the case he presented was that with the demise of the League, the second party to the mandate over South West Africa had ceased to exist and that consequently South Africa's obligations to the international community for South West Africa had lapsed; in effect, the position adopted by Louw in Opposition. The legalistic nature of the Union government's position transformed the South West African issue from a political dispute to a legal one, though the division between the political and legal aspects of the case never became absolute for the U.N. never entirely abandoned hope of securing a solution through political initiatives. Faced with South Africa's refusal to negotiate on the political issues at stake, the United Nations turned to the International Court of Justice at the Hague to establish the status of South West Africa and South Africa's obligations, if any, to the international community.

On July 3 1950, the court gave the first of its Advisory Opinions on South West Africa. The main findings of the court were as follows:

1. that South West Africa was still a mandated territory as assumed by the Union in 1920,

2. that South Africa's obligations as the mandatory remained,

3. that U.N. trusteeship could be applied to South West Africa but that South Africa was not obliged to place it under that system,

4. that the status of the territory could be modified only with the consent of the United Nations.
In reaching its decision the Court considered "two principles ..... to be of paramount importance: the principle of non-annexation and the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization". 42

In short, the Court rejected South Africa's claim that the mandate had lapsed. The decision was a considerable set-back for the Union but at the same time the Court's finding that South Africa was not obliged to place South West Africa under the trusteeship system gave South Africa room for manoeuvre. In December 1950, the General Assembly voted to accept the Court's Advisory Opinion and set up an Ad Hoc Committee to confer with the Union government on its international obligations over South West Africa. However, the government did compromise to the extent of declaring its readiness to renew its obligations under the mandate under certain conditions. These were the negotiations of a new agreement with the Allied powers of the First World War, the United States, Britain, and France under which South Africa would be directly obligated to them. In this way, the government hoped to extract the maximum advantage out of the most favourable reading of the court's findings.

It is not difficult to see the political logic behind the South African proposal. Firstly, the offer was an attempt to meet a section of world opinion half-way while in fact making minimal concessions. After all, South Africa's concrete obligations under the original mandate had never been taxing ones and would not interfere with South Africa's application of apartheid to the territory. Secondly, an agreement with the three governments would effectively both end debate at the U.N. on South West Africa, which threw an unfavourable light on South Africa's domestic policies, and remove the possibility of U.N. supervision, which South Africa feared would lead to demands for the political emancipation of South West Africa's indigenous peoples. South African fears on this score partly stemmed from the racial composition of the United Nations as Louw made clear in the 1947 debate.
"It consists of predominantly Coloured and Asiatic countries, and of countries whose inhabitants are of mixed blood ....... A large number of the South American and Central American peoples are predominantly of mixed blood ....... The U.N. should be afforded no opportunity, by the submission of reports, to interfere with our affairs or discuss our administration of South West Africa." 43

The Ad Hoc Committee - established to secure the implementation of the Courts opinion - not surprisingly rejected South Africa's proposal as did the American, British and French governments. Faced further with South Africa's unwillingness even to submit reports, the Committee requested that two Herero chiefs, sharply critical of South African policies, be allowed to address the U.N.'s Fourth Committee. The Union government reacted angrily to the request and refused to grant passports to the two chiefs. The Committee's request touched South Africa on a particularly sensitive nerve, the political rights of the indigenous population; an issue underlining the difference of approach between the League and the United Nations. The Permanent Mandates Commission's criticisms of South African rule had been essentially administrative in character. It's concerns were the government's failure to provide further educational opportunities for the indigenous people, working conditions, and wage levels. While the ultimate goal from the outset, despite Smuts' objections, was self-determination, the standard by which South African policy was judged was whether it furthered the general betterment and education of the inhabitants. By contrast, the United Nations demanded more tangible progress of a directly political nature towards self-determination. This was the 'equality' Malan found so objectionable and was why U.N. activity on South West Africa reflected on South Africa's internal racial policies in a way much P.M.C. criticism had not done.

The United Nations' response to South Africa's refusal to give the Herero chiefs passports was to grant hearings to the Reverend
Michael Scott on 8 and 11 December, 1951. This action raised yet another legal question, that of the constitutionality of the Fourth Committee's practice of hearing petitioners. At the January 1952 session of the General Assembly, the South African representative, Dr. Dönges, vigorously attacked the practice as unconstitutional. In a bitter speech he declared:

"If others will persist in making of the United Nations a forum for discussing the internal affairs of South Africa, we shall be forced to retaliate in kind and we certainly have sufficient straw with which to make bricks for use against our attackers." 44

There was now clearly little common ground between the majority of U.N. members and South Africa.

In 1953 the Ad Hoc Committee reported that negotiations arising out of the 1950 Advisory Opinion had been abortive. After its suggestion of a new agreement with the Allied Powers of the First World War had been rejected, the South African government had re-affirmed that it was neither willing nor obliged to submit South West Africa to U.N. supervision. Deadlock was thus complete. At this point, a member of the Fourth Committee suggested that the dispute might be resolved by a further reference to the International Court of Justice by a member of the defunct League of Nations that would make the Advisory Opinion binding on South Africa. However his suggestion was not taken up partly because the enforcement of the Court's 1950 decision would not of itself oblige South Africa to place South West Africa under U.N. trusteeship.

Following the failure of the Ad Hoc Committee, the General Assembly established a new Committee on South West Africa authorized to negotiate with the Union and to compile annual reports on South West Africa. However, hopes that this body would succeed where the Ad Hoc Committee had failed quickly faded when the South African
government flatly turned down a request that it send a representative to the Committee's sittings. Nevertheless, the Committee persevered with its intention to compile reports on the territory. A question left unresolved by the Ad Hoc Committee, the admissibility of hearing petitioners, inevitably arose again. To resolve it, the Committee referred the matter to the International Court of Justice, which decided by 8 votes to 5 in June 1956 that hearing petitioners was not inconsistent with its 1950 Advisory Opinion. However, apart from settling this minor issue, the Committee was no more successful than its predecessor. In view of South Africa's refusal to co-operate, it could hardly have been otherwise. But while South Africa's intransigent stand effectively made the committee's work impossible, opinion moved against South Africa at the United Nations as a result of her stand.

General Assembly resolutions became yearly more critical of South Africa's policies and finally in February 1957, the Assembly asked the Committee on South West Africa to prepare a report on the following question:

"What legal action is open to the members of the United Nations or to the United Nations acting either individually or jointly, to ensure that the Union of South Africa fulfils the obligations assumed by it under the mandate pending the placing of the Territory of South West Africa under the Trusteeship System?" 45

At the same time, there fresh moves towards reaching a compromise with the Union involving a proposal that South West Africa be partitioned. This proposal gave rise to the creation of yet another committee, the Good Offices Committee. It included in its membership representatives of the United States and Britain and to begin with, at least, this new essentially conservative creation met with greater success.

In June 1958, the committee visited Pretoria and discussed the possibility of partition with the Union government. As a result of these
discussions it put forward a proposal that the northern area of South West Africa be created a trusteeship territory while the south would be incorporated in the Union. The South African government cautiously acknowledged that the Good Offices Committee's suggestion merited consideration, but nevertheless re-stated its own previously rejected proposal of a new mandate agreement with the United States, Britain, and France. And that in fact was the closest the United Nations or any of its committees and South Africa ever came to agreeing over the future of South West Africa.

After the Fourth Committee granted new hearings to the Rev. Michael Scott and Mr. Kerina Getzen despite South African protests, the Union government withdrew from all further discussions with U.N. bodies, including the Good Offices Committee, on South West Africa. And finally at a session in October 1958 the Fourth Committee itself rejected proposals for the partitioning of the territory. Its decision effectively ended any possibility that the Good Offices Committee's work would reach a fruitful conclusion; its work had been the last serious attempt by the international community to arrive at a political solution to the dispute through agreement with South Africa. By 1959 it was clear that there was virtually no possibility of a voluntary settlement of the South West African issue.

In the light of this realization, the General Assembly in November 1959 drew the attention of member states to the Committee on South West Africa's report on legal action open to them on the status of South West Africa. The report, the result of the Assembly's 1957 request, concluded that legal action was feasible under Article 7 of the mandate and Article 37 of the statute of the International Court of Justice. The dispute thus entered a new phase and though the South West African issue continued to engage the United Nations in the early 1960's, its work was overshadowed by the case at the Hague.
Inside South West Africa, African and Coloured opposition to South African rule had wholly superceded pre-war German opposition to incorporation. Reconciled to the Union the remaining German population gave its support in the main to the Nationalist Party, which consistently won six of the newly created South West African seats in the Union House of Assembly. Tribally based opposition to South African rule, particularly from the Herero Chief's Council had always been strong in the territory. In the post-war years this opposition took on a more avowedly nationalist character, leading to the formation of the South West African Progressive Association in the mid 1950's. Finally in 1959, two African nationalist parties were founded, the South West African National Union (S.W.A.N.U.) and the Ovamboland Peoples' Organization.

Opposition to the mandate in part took the form of petitions to the United Nations but at the close of the decade events in South West Africa itself dramatically highlighted African dissatisfaction with South African policy. An attempt to move the African population of one of Windhoek's locations to a new township led to strong protests and after an angry crowd gathered on 10 December (1959) following the arrest of pickets outside the location beer-hall, the police opened fire killing 11 and wounding 44. It was not the first incident of this kind in the post-war period. Three Ovambo contract workers had been killed by police fire during a strike in 1953. Nonetheless, the 1959 incident, which occurred when the General Assembly was in session, served to emphasise that there was an unbridgeable gulf between South Africa and the overwhelming majority of U.N. members.

By 1960 it was possible to conclude that the central significance of the dispute over South West Africa's status was that it had brought to the fore South Africa's fundamental conflict with the international system; her failure to provide for the political self-determination of all her inhabitants. The issue of self-determination had been raised as early
as 1919 at Versailles, but the argument there was essentially about the acceptance of abstract principles. The principal members of the League of Nations were after all colonial powers and consequently self-determination was seen at best as the ultimate goal of policy. In fact, in the case of 'C' class mandates, it was not expected that the indigenous population would be provided with any political representation in the short term. Nevertheless, Wilson's determined stand of principle at Versailles did play an important role in making apartheid an international issue some 40 years later.

During the 1950's the South West African issue provided emergent countries which viewed apartheid as an affront to their newly won independence with a backdoor to sponsoring debates on South Africa's domestic racial policies at the United Nations. It lost this importance in the 1960's when the United Nations became less inhibited about debating directly South Africa's domestic affairs. Lastly, by the end of the decade, it was clear that the Nationalist government's efforts to forestall internationalization of South West Africa's status by tactics of non-co-operation had been counterproductive. Far from preventing the intrusion of the international community into the Union's domestic affairs, they were highlighted and debated in greater depth because of the Nationalists' rigid insistence that they had no obligations to the international community over South West Africa.
Notes on South West Africa - Origins of a dispute


2. General Assembly Resolution 276 (XXI) - October 1966

3. See below: From South West Africa to Namibia.

4. South West Africa was Germany's first colony.


10. Segal and First (eds.) p. 58

11. Quoted in Wilson and Thompson (eds.) Vol II p. 369
12. It was a major factor in party divisions in South Africa.

13. The Times 10.7.1915 quoted in Louis p. 55

14. See Ngavirue p. 3.

15. From the Committee of the Imperial War Cabinet on Territorial Desiderata 17.4.1917 quoted in Segal and First (eds.) p. 63.

16. See, for example, V.I. Lenin - Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970)
The study was originally published in 1917.

17. Express and Star 29.1.1918 quoted in Segal and First (eds.) p. 68.


20. Smuts quoted in Segal and First (eds.) p. 74


23. South Africa 8.2.1919 quoted in Louis p. 141

24. Smuts pp. 21-22

26. The Bund won 7 of the 12 elected seats. The 1925 Act establishing the Legislative Assembly in South West Africa also provided for 6 nominated members.

27. Germany's position in respect of South West Africa was strengthened when she was admitted to the League of Nations in 1926.


32. Ibid p. 7


34. See Ngavirue pp. 5 - 7.

35. Ibid. p. 7

36. The Round Table No. 109 - December 1937 p. 189
37. First p. 50.

38. Smuts in *House of Assembly Debates* Vol. 56 Col 3681 - 1946

39. Louw in *House of Assembly Debates* Vol. 60 Col 1327 - 1947

40. Smuts in *House of Assembly Debates* Vol. 60 Col 1360 - 1947

41. See Molteno in *House of Assembly Debates* Vol. 60 Col. 2599 - 1947


43. Louw in *House of Assembly Debates* Vol. 60 Col. 1343 - 1947


46. See First pp. 198-200. The Ovamboland Peoples' Organization was expanded into the South West African People's Organization (S.W.A.P.O.) in June 1960.

47. See on this point I. Goldblatt - *The Mandated Territory of South West Africa* (Struik, Cape Town 1961).
The history of relations between the three territories and South Africa provide an early example of the frustration of South African foreign policy objectives stemming from her domestic policies. This is one reason why relations with the territories occupy such a special place in the study of South Africa's policy on the African continent. South Africa consistently pressed for the incorporation of the three territories until the 1960's, when South Africa finally acknowledged the impossibility of dissuading the British government from going ahead with its intention to grant self-government and ultimately independence to the territories.

The original exclusion of the three territories from the Union of the four self-governing colonies of Natal, the Cape, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal was largely a result of the British Government sensitivity to African fears as to the consequence of inclusion in the new state. In particular, the African tribal authorities feared that their lands would be taken over for white farming, a fear justified by some of the speeches of farmers at the National Convention to draw up the Union's constitution. Geographically, however, the territories' exclusion was anomalous as successive South African Prime Ministers have taken great pains to point out. Economically too there was a strong case for their inclusion. All three were members of the pre-Union customs union and were important sources of labour for the Witwatersrand mines.

However, while not sanctioning their initial inclusion in the Union of South Africa, the British government made it clear that it envisaged the eventual incorporation of the territories into South Africa. The preamble of the Act of Union passed by the British parliament in 1909 declared "it is expedient to provide for the eventual admission
into the Union or transfer to the Union of such parts of South Africa as are not originally included therein.\textsuperscript{3} That geographically the territories were an integral part of South Africa was not disputed. Details of the way in which such a transfer could take place were included in a schedule to the Act of Union.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{quote}
"Upon receiving addresses from both Houses of the Union Parliament, the King-in-Council was empowered to grant a transfer of government upon the terms and conditions set forth in the same schedule, conditions which forbade the alienation of land, the sale of liquor and the imposition of differential tariffs."\textsuperscript{5}
\end{quote}

The crucial point to be picked out was, of course, the condition prohibiting the alienation of tribal lands. Its significance was not lost on delegates to the National Convention, where it ran into strong opposition particularly from Natal and the Orange Free State.

In addition, the British government gave assurances that the people of the three territories would be consulted prior to any transfer and though this did not specifically form part of the Schedule, it remained a major element of British policy throughout negotiations with the Union. Nevertheless, the belief that the ultimate destiny of the territories lay in incorporation into the Union was reflected both in the administration of the territories and their relations with South Africa after the establishment of Union.

The South African government collected customs for the three territories on the basis fixed by the customs union of 1903; namely the Union government agreed to pay a fixed percentage of revenue collected.\textsuperscript{6} The common law of the Union prevailed in all three. In all three South Africa contributed to the running of the rail and bus services. South African currency was used in the territories and South Africans dominated positions in the administration. In two (Basutoland and Swaziland) the postal and telegraphic services were run by South Africa.
These then were the deep roots of the territories' present day dependence on the Republic.

Efforts by the Union government to secure incorporation of the territories form the major theme of relations between the territories and South Africa. In the early period, in particular, British government objections to incorporation stemmed largely from its fear that the land hunger of South Africa's white farmers suffering under the effects of the sub-division of land would undermine the rights of the tribal authorities. It was also naturally enough a major factor behind tribal opposition.

In the course of time, however, opposition from both quarters flowed more directly from the Union's domestic policies of segregation. Although it is difficult sometimes to distinguish exactly and neatly between these two sorts of opposition, it is nevertheless an important distinction to make, because it is easy in retrospect to ascribe attitudes to the British government of fundamental opposition from the outset to South African racial policy that is simply not justified by the evidence. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the Union came closest to securing incorporation in the late 1930's when pressure on the land, a persistent factor behind popular agitation in South Africa for incorporation was beginning to ease.

The first approach to the British government was made by General Botha in 1913. The pretext was a speech by Sir Starr Jameson to a meeting of the Chartered Company of British South Africa. The speech had touched on a historical claim of the Company to the administration of Bechuanaland. And while there was no reason to believe that the British government would now contemplate such a transfer, the existence of apparently conflicting claims afforded Botha the opportunity to raise the whole issue of a transfer.

Initially, Botha set his sights on the joint incorporation of Bechuanaland
and Swaziland, but was prepared to make Swaziland his first objective. "Should the simultaneous transfer of both these Protectorates not be feasible in the opinion of the Imperial Government, then we urge that Bechuanaland also be transferred as soon as possible after the incorporation of Swaziland has been settled." 9 The British government replied that it was prepared to consider the transfer of Swaziland but not for the present that of Bechuanaland.

However, the outbreak of the First World War interrupted the exchanges between the two governments. After the war they were re-opened by Botha. While making clear that he envisaged that ultimately Bechuanaland and Basutoland would be transferred he acknowledged that there was no special urgency for their inclusion and directed his attention to Swaziland. He pointed out that the territory was not exclusively African but contained a sizeable white population mainly former Transvaal residents. (Transvaal had, in fact, administered the territory before the Anglo-Boer War).

In particular, Botha argued that incorporation would enable the Union "to make better provision for the political representation of the resident white population of Swaziland," 10 a theme repeated by Dr. Verwoerd as recently as 1963. The whole question of Swaziland's future was discussed in 1919 when Botha and Smuts visited Britain. However, Botha's death that same year and the domestic difficulties faced by Smuts, the new Prime Minister, delayed and hindered negotiations. Besides, Smuts was more concerned during this period with securing the inclusion in Union of a much richer prize, Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, Smuts did on occasion refer to the need for the incorporation of Swaziland notably in order to "save the western Transvaalers (sic) from becoming bywoners in their own country." 11 But these were hardly terms likely to appeal to the British government fearful that the Union might violate tribal land rights.
In 1924 Smuts was defeated at the polls and succeeded by the more uncompromising figure of General Hertzog. Hertzog's immediate concern in office was the implementation of his policy of segregation. Among the measures he was preparing to this end was a Native Land Bill, one of whose purposes was the fulfilment of a 1913 pledge to provide Africans with more land for their reserves. White farming interests made it difficult for the government to acquire the land in the Union and consequently Hertzog looked to the High Commission territories.

He made his first approach to the British government in October, 1924. He stressed, in particular, the economic advantages to be gained from a transfer. Further he pointed out that white deputations from Bechuanaland and Swaziland had seen him to press for incorporation and he asked the British High Commissioner to make a general investigation of the feelings of the inhabitants. The British government replied to this approach in December 1925 indicating that it did not consider the time suitable for any transfer in view of the fact that the Union's native policy was about to be radically revised.

However, the British government did add that it would be prepared to discuss transfer of Swaziland in a year's time, while stressing that the inhabitants of the territory would have to be consulted and that care would have to be exercised so that the reception given to plans for a transfer by African tribal authorities did not force their withdrawal. British apprehensions as to the feelings of the territories' inhabitants was understandable. At the time of Hertzog's first approach, the chief of the powerful Bamangwato tribe in Bechuanaland had declared: "We are a contented people, not like those who are under the Union government. There the native people are oppressed .... We strongly oppose any effort to include the Bamangwato reserve in the Union." The opinion of chiefs was much the same in Basutoland and Swaziland. The lower status in the Union of tribal authorities did not appeal to them. Further, in all three territories the tribal authorities exercised a strong hold over the people.
Of all the territories, though, Swaziland did appear to the British to be the most feasible candidate for transfer in view of its extensive white settlement. Replying to the British letter in April, 1926, Hertzog agreed to confine his attentions for the moment to Swaziland. He outlined proposals for giving the whites there parliamentary representation as well as promising to build a railway to serve Swaziland's economic needs after incorporation. Further, he undertook to respect the provisions of the Schedule as far as Africans living in the reserves were concerned, but expressed the view that some amendment to the Schedule would be necessary as it affected Africans outside the Swazi reserves. The reason for Hertzog's reservation on this score was obvious enough. He wanted Swaziland to conform to the pattern of segregation he envisaged for the Union.

The British government replied that it was not prepared to compromise over the terms of the Schedule and that it would not contemplate any amendment to the protection the Schedule afforded Africans. It is easy to see in the British stand on this issue objection to the direction of South Africa's domestic racial policy, for the British refusal to consider changes to the Schedule implied, did it not, that Britain believed Hertzog's policy of segregation would lead to a diminution of African rights in the territory. Here, admittedly, it is hard to distinguish between the two kinds of opposition to transfer I mentioned earlier and it is reasonable to suggest that British coolness to transfer stemmed in part from a general feeling of disappointment in Britain that the Northern tradition of segregation had gained the upper hand since Union over the more integrationist policies of the Cape. However, I think it would be wrong to ascribe to the British government's attitude opposition to segregation any more radical than that.

In 1927, the British Secretary of State for the Dominions visited all three territories himself and was able to gauge at first hand the
hostility of the African inhabitants to incorporation. Later that year in discussions with Hertzog in London, he put this to him. As a consequence, Hertzog was compelled either to concede that the time was not ripe for securing a transfer of even one of the territories or face rebuff by the British government. Faced with this choice Hertzog decided to drop his request for the time being.

The question of transfer was next raised by Hertzog at the end of 1932 when he sent a general letter to the British government expressing his desire to re-open negotiations on the transfer of the territories. There was a note of exasperation in the letter, which contained a veiled threat; its emphasis on the need for "reserving as much as possible fields of labour within the Union for the Union natives, with the consequential exclusion of natives from outside the Union." 13 The implication was clearly that if the British government refused to give ground on transfer, South Africa would consider retaliating against migrant workers from the High Commission territories, but the threat contained little conviction in view of constant complaints in the Union of a shortage of African labour.

Hertzog's letter did, however, underlie South African determination to pursue renewed negotiations to a successful conclusion and the next six years saw a major effort on the part of the Union to secure agreement to incorporation. His letter was followed up by discussions between Smuts and the British government the following year in London and by a memorandum prepared by the Union's Minister of Finance, the gist of which was that as South Africa was forced to bear "the brunt of the economic maintenance of the territories" 14 her request for incorporation should be granted. The British government's reply stressed the importance of pledges given to the African inhabitants of the territories. Hertzog did not let the matter rest there, but pressed for a decision by the British government.
Besides the economic arguments advanced earlier, Hertzog raised the issue of stock disease in the territories as an additional reason for getting an urgent answer. He received a reply from the British government at the end of 1933 repeating British pledges to the inhabitants and stating simply that the British cabinet did not consider the time suitable for effecting a transfer. From the British point of view two new factors were complicating negotiations. The first was the autonomous character of the Dominions after the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931; an independence emphasised by the Union's own Status of Union Act of 1934. Constitutionally, it meant that South Africa could no longer be bound by the terms of the Schedule to the Act of Union in the event of the transfer of the territories.

The second factor was the Pim reports on conditions in the three territories. They pointed to far-reaching neglect on the part of the British government of the economic and social development of the territories. The first served to intensify African apprehensions about incorporation.

"Suspicion of the Union's intentions mounted high in all three territories. Tribesmen feared that their lands were to be overrun by the Union's Poor Whites and 'redundant' Natives; they feared the pass laws, and, those who had them, the loss of their cherished guns, the loss also of the sense of freedom that was still theirs." 16

The second led the British government to suggest to the Union that if she co-operated in measures for the economic and social improvement of the territories, that might help to improve the climate of opinion in the territories towards incorporation. This message was conveyed to the Union government in a letter in July 1934. It seemed that the way was at last open for a successful outcome to negotiations between the two governments.
However, there were still difficulties. One was created by an approach by the Southern Rhodesian government for the incorporation of Bechuanaland. The British government stalled on this request and continued to press for Union co-operation. This did come, Hertzog agreed to advance £35,000 towards development schemes. However, in announcing, and having to justify, the grant to the House of Assembly in 1936, he clumsily stated:

"I got the definite assurance that the British government would use every effort to see that the transfer took place, but that it was necessary to obtain the goodwill of the natives inhabiting those territories. Then steps would be taken by the British government .... Since last year we have been in the position that England is actually only holding those territories for us, to hand them over to us as soon as that little child is quiet, and does no more shouting." 17

By "that little child" he meant the African population of the three territories. Further, Hertzog threatened the inhabitants that if they did not accept transfer "then they must realize that the markets of the Union will no longer be open to them .... The longer they try to remain outside the more they will have to pay the penalty for it." 18

Hertzog's carrot or the stick approach thoroughly alarmed the territories' inhabitants with the consequence that:

"so strong a feeling against acceptance of the contribution was in fact expressed by the African authorities, that the High Commissioner eventually found himself compelled to inform the Union government that he could not hope for some time to ask that the contribution be actually paid!" 20

The offer was then withdrawn. Hertzog's speech was also followed by a denial that the British government had given any assurance that transfer would take place. In fact, the whole incident rather soured relations between Britain and the Union. The following year the South African Prime
Minister repeated his allegation that Britain had given a written assurance that the territories would be transferred within a few years and complained; "The Union's right to the transfer of the administration of the Territories to it is indisputable. That the time for transfer to the Union has already expired was conceded two years ago".

Hertzog also appeared angered that the British government had not done more to influence the African inhabitants towards an acceptance of a South African take-over. He was further adamant that since South Africa had achieved autonomous status, the Schedule was no longer operative. However, despite all these difficulties some progress towards co-operation between the two governments in regard to the territories was achieved. In a letter to the British government at the end of 1937, Hertzog took an altogether more reasonable approach.

Without changing his mind on the status of the Schedule, he indicated that in the event of transfer, South Africa would respect the lines laid down in the 1909 Schedule as the system of administration approximated to that in the Transkei, an example the Union was willing to see extended. On more practical matters, for example the entry of cattle from the territories Hertzog, while sensitive to the Union's white farming lobby, indicated that he was prepared to compromise. He further suggested that a Joint Advisory Committee be set up to consider development schemes.

The suggestion was favourably received by the British government and in March 1938 the British Secretary of State for the Dominions announced agreement on the setting up of the committee. It was to consist of Union officials and the Resident Commissioners of the three territories. The first report of this committee came out in February, 1939. It mainly concerned itself with "the amelioration of the position
in regard to cattle", their production and marketing, and the control of cattle disease. However, the report only covered Swaziland and a section of Bechuanaland and had little on the various improvement schemes initiated as a result of the Pim reports.

More important was a memorandum sent by the Union to the British government during 1939. It was a conciliatory document that went a long way to allaying Britain's remaining fears as to the Union's intentions. The South African government now agreed to maintain the scheme of administration envisaged in the Schedule and to consult the British Government prior to any amendment. It guaranteed that the powers and status of the chiefs would not be changed. Further, South Africa assured the British government that she would support existing schemes for the economic, social and educational betterment of the inhabitants. She also agreed not to interfere with the rights of Swazis to buy land outside their reserves, a point at issue between the two governments in 1920's.

Whether this memorandum would have in the end formed the basis of a transfer, we do not know as the outbreak of the Second World War interrupted the negotiations. However, what evidence there is, suggests that it might well have. British opposition prior to this had not stemmed from any radical abhorrence of South African racial policy. Segregation was after all the pattern in British Africa. It is true that Hertzog did complain in 1937 that South Africa's racial policy was misunderstood in Britain, but disagreement with South African domestic policy was not a significant feature of British argument on the subject of the future of the three territories.

The British government was more concerned to see that safeguards for tribal rights in the Schedule were honoured. That Britain insisted on this as a point of principle flowed from her experience elsewhere on the continent that settler communities could not always be relied upon, if left to themselves, to meet their obligations to tribal peoples.
There was of course, no question at this stage that the High Commission territories would ever achieve self-government, let alone independence.

Once satisfied that the Union was prepared to honour the guarantees that the British government had given the tribes in the area, it seems reasonable to suppose that the British government would have agreed to transfer, though the opposition of the tribes to incorporation might still have proved an obstacle. That it would not have proved insurmountable is suggested by the fact that when Hertzog in 1937 pointedly stated that while the British government was committed to consulting the inhabitants, it was not committed to securing their support for transfer, he was not contradicted by anyone in the British government.

No formal exchanges on the question of a transfer took place during the war years. South African and British politicians were fully absorbed by the problems created by the war effort, though in 1943, Smuts Hertzog’s successor as Prime Minister, raised the issue indirectly by expressing the hope that “his country might at last be allowed to take over the governance of the High Commission Territories, if only as a reward for its war services”. However, in the immediate post-war years the question of transfer was not raised and the next South African Prime Minister to approach the British government was Dr. D. F. Malan following the Nationalist Party’s victory at the polls in 1948.

It seems appropriate at this point to deal with some aspects of relations between the High Commission territories and the Union during this period (1910-1948) not directly bearing on the issue of incorporation. The two most important areas of co-operation were the customs union South Africa and the territories belonged to and migratory labour. By 1945, it is estimated that some 50,000 labourers from the High Commission territories worked in the Rand mines alone.
The earnings of these migrants was an important factor in the economy of the territories particularly Basutoland. It also benefited the Union, a point underlined by the report of an interdepartmental committee on labour resources in 1930 that complained of a chronic shortage of labour in the Union.

Restrictions on labour recruitment outside the Union were consequently few and when the Union government did act in 1937 to regulate the employment of foreign Africans in South Africa, the High Commission territories were specifically excluded from the provisions of the regulations. A 1914 regulation that for a time suspended recruitment north of the Tropic of Capricorn did, however, affect part of Bechuanaland. Apart from that, what few restrictions existed originated from the territories themselves.

The sale of cattle did provide one source of friction between the territories and the Union. Bechuanaland and to a lesser extent Basutoland were hit by Union regulations that disallowed the sale of light-weight cattle; regulations stemming largely from the fear of South Africa's white farmers that their prices would be undercut. Cattle disease was also a bone of contention. The territories felt with some justice that Union precautions on this score were designed more for the protection of Union prices than for hygienic considerations.

The co-operation between the Union and Southern Rhodesia on the administration of the railway line linking the two countries through Bechuanaland led to other more ambitious railway schemes involving the High Commission territories. One was to link Southern Rhodesia with Walvis Bay through Bechuanaland, another the Transvaal with the east coast through Swaziland. However, in the end neither got off the ground. Finally, there was other less dramatic technical co-operation between the Union and the territories on the combat of tsetse fly and locusts, the control of malaria, and on agriculture and animal husbandry generally.
Malan first raised the question of the High Commission territories with the British government when he attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in 1949. He told the House of Assembly the following year that he had told the British government that:

"The people of South Africa were becoming impatient, because in spite of numerous attempts which had been made in the interim, almost 40 years has passed without anything having been done, or, at any rate without anything having been accomplished and without any practical steps having been taken to transfer the Protectorates to us." 32

In the coming years Malan's comments on the British attitude became increasingly bitter as it became clear that the British government now viewed South Africa's racial policies as a major obstacle to incorporation and in rebuffing Malan's approaches strongly emphasised the opposition of the territories' inhabitants to incorporation.

In February 1951, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Patrick Gordon-Walker, visited the three territories. He met Malan in Cape Town where the South African Prime Minister took the opportunity to press the Union's claim. Malan complained that the Union was "compelled to harbour territories, entirely dependent on her economically, and largely also for their defence, but belonging to and governed by another country", a position he maintained that no other Commonwealth country would be prepared to tolerate for a moment. The British reply stressed once again the need to consider the views of the inhabitants.

The effectiveness of the British position lay in the fact that any serious attempt to ascertain the views of the inhabitants would surely have resulted in a stinging rebuff for the Union, which would not only have reflected on Malan's attempts to secure incorporation but on his apartheid policy in general. Following the change in Britain from a Labour to a Conservative administration, Malan
returned once again to the subject, threatening to make transfer an issue at the next South African general election and to demand customs payments from the territories. The new British government simply ignored these threats and Malan in fact did not carry out either threat but after his party's re-election in 1953 he did tell the Free State Party Conference that the issue would have to be settled in the next five years "without any of the assurances which some were demanding that Africans should thereafter have a say in South African affairs". 34

Malan's next step was to introduce a resolution supporting his claim in the House of Assembly in April, 1954, following further fruitless discussions with the British government earlier in the year. He hoped to get support of the Opposition for his resolution, so as to present a united front to the British, but the United Party refused on the grounds that his tactics were wrong. Consequently, the debate turned into an acrimonious discussion of apartheid and achieved very little.

It did, however, induce the British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, to make a statement urging Union Ministers "not needlessly (to) press an issue on which we could not fall in with their views without failing in our trust". 35 This infuriated Nationalist M.P.'s who saw in it an implicit attack on apartheid and led some to demand that the territories be seized. However, Malan was not prepared to involve the Union in a conflict with Britain over the issue and refused to back up his tough words with action. Malan's threats on the issue contained a good deal of bluff, which the British government was able to call.

On one issue, though, the British government had proved sensitive to the Union's feeling. In 1948 Seretse Khama the designated successor as chief of the Bamangwato in Bechuanaland had married an English girl. There was a strong reaction in the Union where the new Nationalist government was in the process of legislating to prohibit racially mixed marriages and subsequently carnal intercourse
between white and non-white. Malan conveyed his government's strong feelings on the issue to the British government as did the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins. In addition, Smuts as leader of the Opposition warned that on this highly emotional issue the United Party would find it impossible to oppose demands for an economic blockade of the High Commission territories. Fearing that the strength of feeling in the Union might lead to unilateral action by the South African government to incorporate the territories, the British government decided to appease white opinion in Southern Africa by banning the Khamas from residence in Bechuanaland for a five year period.

In December 1954, Strydom succeeded Malan as Prime Minister and while pledging to continue Malan's campaign for incorporation did not in fact press the issue. He did raise the question of transfer at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, but the British merely restated its previous position and no progress towards an agreement was reached. Apart from this approach, Strydom took little action on the issue acknowledging that incorporation was not a possibility, at least for a time, considering the British attitude. However, interest in the future of the territories remained high and was given added point by the publication in 1955 of the Tomlinson Commission's report. The report included the three territories in its proposed Bantustan scheme and while Verwoerd denied that their incorporation was essential to the success of the policy, it was obvious that if the Union could secure their inclusion in the scheme, it would greatly add to the creditability of the Bantustan policy. This led - the Nationalist newspaper, Dagbreek, to put forward an interesting suggestion that the Union could co-operate with Britain to this end without actually demanding the incorporation of the territories as such. It was an idea taken up by Verwoerd in the 1960's.

In September 1958, Verwoerd became Prime Minister following the death of Strydom. It was clear by this time to the British government that having rejected South African approaches for a transfer, it would
have to provide itself for the political future of the territories, in the light of developments elsewhere on the continent. For years the question of possible incorporation into the Union had so dominated British thinking on the territories that political development in them had been neglected, though some reforms had followed the jolt of the Pim reports in the 1930's.

In 1959 Britain at last introduced a measure that opened the way towards internal self-government in the territories. The country to reap the benefit of this policy was Basutoland. Orders-in-Council were promulgated in September for a new constitution to become effective in 1960. The new constitution created a Legislative Council of 80 members of whom half were to be elected by the country's nine District Councils, which were in turn elected by the people. These reforms, which were followed by others in the other two territories, set the territories on the path towards a political future, nominally at least, independent of South Africa and created a new situation in the 1960's as far as relations between South Africa and the territories were concerned. South Africa's policy in the light of these changes is the subject of another chapter, but this is an appropriate point to comment on the most striking feature of relations prior to the constitutional reform in Basutoland.

This was South Africa's failure, even in the 1950's when the British government's attitude to apartheid clearly provided an obstacle to incorporation, to appeal to those who wielded political influence in the territories, in particular, the chiefs. Even granted that the tribal authorities were hostile to incorporation - and it should be mentioned that the Union government's threats to the territories were often responsible for the degree of antagonism towards South Africa - it certainly lay within the Union's power to develop some political links with the peoples in the territories. That the government did not even attempt to do so suggests that Verwoerd's prophecy as early as 1951 that "the Apartheid policy will mean that the protectorates will actually become self-governing territories" lay in the realm of theoretical philosophy as far as the Union was
concerned rather than of practical politics.

It is not difficult to trace an ideological background to present day relations between South Africa and the territories, but it needs to be tested against the background of actual behaviour and South Africa's behaviour during this period certainly did not take into account the possibility that the territories would achieve self-government and independence. It was only in the 1960's in haphazard ways that South Africa began to come to terms with the political development of the territories and in a sense South Africa's relations with the territories prior to this were only an aspect of her relations with Britain. The distinction is an important one for it underlies the radical nature of the adjustment South Africa has had to make in coming to terms with the existence on the continent of independent states no longer directly tied to the foreign policy of the former colonial powers. It is a point I will be returning to in other contexts.

I have dealt at some length with the efforts of South Africa to secure incorporation of the three High Commission territories because it neatly illustrates two other common themes of South African foreign policy on the continent. Professor Macmillan has spoken of the proprietary nature South Africa's interest in the continent has at times shown. This is certainly evident in the case of the territories as is shown by South Africa's unwillingness to accept in full the restraints that would have been placed on the Union by the Schedule. In fact, the Union only accepted the Schedule wholly in 1939, which with the outbreak of war proved too late to secure incorporation.

A second theme, the frustration of foreign policy because of the country's domestic policy becomes evident in the 1950's efforts. In this case the British government's view of apartheid proved decisive, though it should be said that Britain's view derived in part from the views of the inhabitants, who were her responsibility. Further, their attitude to apartheid anticipated the outlook of new independent states on the continent towards South Africa.
1. Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. Called the High Commission territories because they fall within the jurisdiction of the British High Commissioner in South Africa.

2. Especially Dr. Malan, who described their existence as an "absurdity". See below.


4. Referred to below simply as "the Schedule".


6. Basutoland received 0.88575% of total customs receipts, Bechuanaland 0.2762% and Swaziland 0.149%.

7. I think that both Lord Hailey and Richard Stevens are somewhat guilty on this score.

8. The Union's first Prime Minister.

9. cmd. 8707 p. 13


15. So-called because their author was Sir Arthur Pim. The first (on Swaziland) was published in 1932.


17. Hertzog in House of Assembly Debates Vol. 27 Col. 5920 - 1936


19. The carrot was the £35,000; the stick the threat to the territories' markets.


22. Constitutionally, there is little doubt Hertzog was right.

23. Cmd. 8707 p. 96


27. Walker p. 735

28. See Ibid. p. 754

29. Act 46 of 1937 made it an offence for any foreign African to enter, or anyone to employ such a foreigner, without the permission of the Secretary of State for Native Affairs.

30. The territories' suspicions were raised by the coincidence in time between tough Union measures and price depression. See Hailey p. 45.

31. A line originally built by the British South Africa Company.


34. Walker p. 853


36. See M. Benson pp. 200 - 1.

37. The Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas, to give it its official title, laid the basis for the implementation of separate development.

38. Then Minister of Native Affairs.

40. That is, the distinction between direct relations with the territories and relations through another party, Britain.

41. See W.M. Macmillan - Africa beyond the Union (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg 1949) p. 6.
Initially, the Union did not enjoy close relations with her other neighbours in southern and central Africa, the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, as Marquard has pointed out South Africa's relations with these territories until the end of the Second World War were "economic rather than political." This was especially true of the Portuguese territories despite strong economic ties between the Union and Mozambique. The principal reason why these economic ties were not accompanied by closer political and diplomatic relations was the apparent weakness of Portugal's Empire in Africa. At the end of the 19th century few thought it could survive the pressure of European powers far richer and militarily stronger than Portugal. When the Portuguese state declared itself bankrupt in 1893, the disappearance of Portugal from the map of Africa seemed imminent. Consequently during the first decade of Union, many South African politicians saw in Portugal's political instability an opportunity for the expansion of the Union's boundaries. Indeed in 1911 the South African Prime Minister, General Botha even contemplated the annexation of Lourenco Marques by force but was restrained by the British government concerned to maintain its alliance with Portugal in view of the deteriorating situation in Europe. South Africa was not alone in wishing to relieve Portugal of her colonial burden in Mozambique. The British South Africa Company in Rhodesia declared its interest in securing Beira as a port for the new colony should the Portuguese leave and during the First World War the Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, F.D.P. Chaplin wrote to the British Colonial Secretary outlining a scheme whereby Southern Rhodesia would annex Beira and the area around it, while South Africa would secure Lourenco Marques and the southern districts of the country. Chaplin suggested that Portugal might be compensated
with a new colony carved out of German East Africa.

Towards the end of the war Botha also expressed the hope that South Africa would secure Mozambique in the context of a general settlement after the First World War. However, President Wilson's insistence at the Versailles Peace Conference of a peace without annexation put an end to South African and Rhodesian hopes of ousting the Portuguese from East Africa.

However, even after South Africa and Rhodesia had become reconciled to the continued presence of the Portuguese in a strategically important position in Southern Africa, differences of language, religion and racial policy inhibited the development of close political links. Another reason for Portugal's isolation was the small size of the white communities in Angola and Mozambique prior to the 1950s. Nonetheless, economically, Mozambique was indispensable to both Rhodesia and South Africa as a major source of African labour. As early as the 1860s the Transvaal had recruited labour from among the Tonga in southern Mozambique. The major gold discoveries on the Rand greatly increased demand and by the last decades of the 19th century, the foundations of Mozambique's importance to South Africa as a vast labour pool for the mines had been laid. In 1897 an agreement regularising the flow and recruitment of labour from Mozambique was signed by Portugal and the Transvaal Republic.

Labour was not the only area of economic co-operation between the two countries. In 1884 the Transvaal Republic had entered into an agreement with the Portuguese for the construction of a railway linking the Rand to the port of Lourenco Marques. The line, completed ten years later, had a partly political purpose. It enabled the Transvaal to "break out of the British commercial stranglehold by channeling her foreign trade through Lourenco Marques".
However, from the outset the line faced stiff competition from a rival railway completed two years earlier in 1892 linking the mines with Cape Town and a year after the Mozambique railway came into operation a third line from Durban reached the Rand. But largely for political reasons, President Kruger - through his control of tariffs on the Transvaal section of the three lines - discriminated in favour of the Portuguese line. Even after the defeat of the Boer republics and the subsequent establishment of Union the Mozambique railway retained the lion's share of traffic to and from the Rand thanks to special privileges granted to the Portuguese in return for their co-operation on the labour front.

In 1909 Portugal and the Transvaal (now a self-governing colony) entered into a new labour agreement. Under this convention - as it was called - the continued commercial viability of the Lourenco Marques railway was guaranteed by the stipulation that "50-55% of all railway traffic to and from the competitive area (Johannesburg, Pretoria, Krugersdorp industrial area) would pass through the Portuguese port. In return the mining companies were granted wide labour recruiting privileges in Mozambique. The convention remained in force after the establishment of Union. In the 1920's the South African government came under strong pressure from the Cape and Natal to protect their ports against Portuguese competition. Consequently in 1923 South Africa allowed the Convention to lapse but at the same time insisted on continuance of labour recruitment privileges in Mozambique. From the Portuguese point of view this was clearly unacceptable and finally, in 1927 they threatened to end South African labour recruitment altogether. As a result a new Convention was negotiated in 1928 and with minor modifications remains in force to-day. Under the 1928 convention Mozambique was guaranteed 47½% of rail traffic to and from the Rand while South Africa received in exchange a guarantee that the Portuguese administration would ensure the supply of not less than 65,000 African labour recruits for the
Mines each year. The current agreement provides for a maximum of 100,000 recruits per year from southern Mozambique (below the 22nd parallel).

The organization handling the recruitment of African labour from Mozambique was the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association. It was exclusively entrusted with this task from 1903. Initially, the W.N.L.A. resorted to questionable and often illegal methods; for instance it formed "a corps of armed 'runners' or 'emigration police', uniformed in such a way as to be confused with the regular police in the minds of the Africans". At times the corps numbered upwards of six thousand. In addition, the W.N.L.A. actively encouraged illegal immigration of labour to South Africa in excess of the total provided by the agreements with the Portuguese. After the Second World War these abuses were curbed and the W.N.L.A. now operates within the law, maintaining offices and some 250 agents in Mozambique. Indeed, since the war recruitment has presented few problems given what is a sufficiently attractive wage when compared to opportunities for African employment in Mozambique itself. Further the convention itself has occasioned little political controversy despite some resentment from white settlers in Mozambique at the drain on the country's labour reserves. For example, Marvin Hams has estimated that in 1954 the labour recruiting companies in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa together held some 350,000 African workers from Mozambique under contract. Adding a further 50,000 illegal migrants to this total he concludes that migrant workers accounted for 400,000 Africans out of a total labour pool of about 600,000 in southern Mozambique. The Portuguese administration which received a fee for each worker recruited, strongly defended the migratory labour system.

The use of Mozambique's ports and railroads for the transit traffic of the Rhodesias and South Africa and the export of labour were
essential sources of income in meeting the Portuguese territory's "constant trade deficit". Indeed Duffy argues that most of the development of both Angola and Mozambique was the result of "external influences and the development of lands on Portuguese African frontiers - the Congo, the Rhodesias, and South Africa." 

South Africa's relations with Angola were never as close as those with Mozambique. Angola had no common border with the Union proper and was never an area of major labour recruitment for South Africa. Indeed the tenuous historical ties that did exist tended to strain rather than cement their relations. In 1880 some 300 Boers under the leadership of Jakobus Botha had settled in Angola. Some became successful farmers while others were re-settled in South West Africa soon after its conquest by the Union in the First World War.

"But the Trekkers were never really happy in Angola their sense of isolation in a Catholic Portuguese-speaking community, and various governmental restrictions on their use of firearms, led many of them in 1928-9 to return to the Union".

Prior to this exodus, however their grievances did aggravate South African relations with Portugal as did for a time disagreements over the boundary between Angola and South West Africa. The final delimitation of Angola's frontiers with an agreement between South Africa and Portugal in 1926 considerably improved matters. But even before this agreement there had been some military cooperation between Portugal and South Africa to defeat pockets of African resistance to white rule in Ovamboland.
Much closer South African ties with the two Portuguese territories came in the 1950's when "Angola and Mozambique took on more and more the aspect of white colonies". The post-war influx of Portuguese immigrants itself brought about a significant change in the social structure of the two territories.

"The cultural and economic life of the white communities became more intensely Portuguese. The occasional blending of African and Portuguese worlds was now less frequent. The homesickness and the insecurity of the new arrivals led them to re-create their cultural patterns and to assert their presence on the basis of the color of their skin." Many of the new settlers looked to South Africa.

"And the discovery that they each shared a concept of white supremacy, whether called assimilation or apartheid drew the countries of southern Africa into closer rapport." De-colonization elsewhere on the continent and the common threat posed by African nationalism also prompted a change in outlook and consequently more extensive co-operation between the Portuguese and South African governments. In particular, South Africa was more willing to acknowledge Portugal's contribution to the combat of African nationalism following the withdrawal of other colonial powers from Africa.

"The South Africans have in recent years come to admire the Portuguese regime in Africa..... While the South Africans do not wish to emulate the Portuguese social policy with regard to the few Africans who have been able to acquire an education they recognize its merits as a policy. It is a logical and sensible policy to keep in primitiveness and ignorance as many as they can, while integrating the others, and it does not require the police force that has been found necessary in South Africa."
The Union, therefore, which receives tangible benefits from its neighbour will give the maximum of support to the Portuguese in diplomacy and in the United Nations, and it is probable that at least the Nationalist government in South Africa would supply even military aid if it were needed especially against a black African nation.

This judgement seems essentially correct, though perhaps over-stated. In 1956 the President of Portugal, General Lopes visited South Africa. The following year Portugal was host to the Union's Governor-General, Dr. Ernest Jansen who gave expression to the new cordiality between the two countries. "By a happy accident", he declared "we are neighbours". I believe that we should be grateful to history for this accident." As yet, however, there was no question of an alliance between South Africa and Portugal. When Portugal became a member of the United Nations in 1956, her Foreign Minister, Dr. Noguiera commented: "There is not the slightest likelihood of a military agreement between us and South Africa. The moral condemnation of having to accept aid from South Africa would be too high a price to pay."

Subsequently, Portugal found her own policies under attack at the United Nations and Noguiera's reservations lost much of their weight, but it was not until the 1960's that obstacles to South African-Portuguese exchanges in the political and military field wholly fell away.

Southern Rhodesia's ties with South Africa were from the outset very much closer. Indeed, the Act of Union made provision for the eventual incorporation of both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. English and Afrikaans South Africans predominated among the first white pioneers in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa's influence on the institutions of the territory was strong.

At the time of Union Southern Rhodesia was administered by the British South Africa Company under a charter from the British government. A delegation (without voting rights) from Southern
Rhodesia had in fact attended the National Convention to form Union, but it had opted to stay out of the new state as it was clear that were they to throw in their lot with the Union their representation in the Union Parliament would be small. The delegation was divided between representatives of the British South Africa Company and of the settlers themselves led by Charles Coghlan (in 1899 the Company had made provision for the election of settler representatives to the country's Legislative Council, while maintaining unfettered executive power). Coghlan declared that he was convinced that it was Southern Rhodesia's "absolute and inevitable destiny" to join the Union and consequently, while incorporation fell into abeyance for the time being, provision was made for both the Rhodesias to come in at a later date. His views were to change.

During the First World War little consideration was given to Southern Rhodesia's constitutional status. It was in the immediate post-war period that the issue crystallized down to a choice between incorporation into the Union and responsible government. There was general agreement that the Company as a ruling power had served its purpose "now that the country was beginning to pay its own way." The charter of company rule was due to expire in October 1924 and there was no question of its extension. Another alternative, that of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia, did not command popular support among the settlers. "Amalgamation with the 'Black North' with its swarming Bantu and sprinkling of Europeans could indefinitely postpone the self-government which they more and more confidently expected." The overwhelming majority of the elected members of the Legislative Council pressed for responsible government. However,
incorporation into the Union also commanded powerful support in the colony especially among businessment and in the press. The British government favoured incorporation and stalled on settler requests for responsible government. But the keenest advocate of Rhodesian inclusion in the Union was the South African Prime Minister, Smuts. The case for incorporation stressed the country's ties with South Africa. Southern Rhodesia had been settled from the south. Its law was Roman Dutch; appeals went to the Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court in Bloemfontein. The country was a member of the Southern African Customs Union; most of its trade was with South Africa or went through South African ports. Bulawayo was linked to the Union's railway system. Finally, it was argued that the settler community was too small to stand on its own feet.

"On the other hand, many Rhodesians feared centralised Pretoria rule and the republicanism and bilingualism of the Union. They prided themselves on being a British community in spite of the Jews, Greeks and Moslems in the towns and the Afrikanders (sic), perhaps one-eighth of the total European population, who lived in groups in the countryside. They dreaded an influx of Poor Whites into their empty acres and the free movement from the south of bankrupts and other undesirables, whom, mirabile dictu, their immigration laws had hitherto succeeded in keeping out. They feared, too, the drawing off of their native labour supply to the Rand."

The rise of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa as evidenced by the Nationalists' increased strength after the 1920 elections reinforced settler fears. Following post-war elections in Rhodesia in the responsible government party won a resounding victory, the Legislative Council petitioned the British government for self-government. The settlers' case was considerably strengthened by the recommendation of the Buxton Committee set up by Winston
Churchill (then Secretary of State for the Colonies) that self-government be granted to Southern Rhodesia subject to safeguards to protect the indigenous population.

Nevertheless Churchill prevailed on the settlers' representatives to confer with Smuts in South Africa on their way to discussions on the country's future in London. Smuts seeing South Africa's hopes of incorporating Southern Rhodesia slipping away made an extremely generous offer to the Rhodesians. Under the terms he offered Southern Rhodesia would become South Africa's fifth province and be represented in the Union Parliament by ten and ultimately seventeen members in the House of Assembly with four seats in the Senate. Smuts also promised that the Union would spend not less than £500,000 on development over the next ten years and would buy the company's land and mineral rights valued at nearly £7 million. Further, Smuts characteristically argued:

"The entry of Rhodesia into the Union is not only in her own interest and that of the Union, but also in the interest of the British Empire. Rhodesia as a separate state struggling vainly with her impossible task is certain to become an embarrassment to the British government in the end." 29

In South Africa Smuts' action roused Nationalist suspicions that the attempt to secure the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia was designed "to break the back of Afrikanerdon. 30 The Nationalists calculated quite reasonably that Southern Rhodesia's ten seats in the House of Assembly - rising with population to 17 - would provide Smuts with a substantial electoral advantage as Southern Rhodesia's settler community was predominantly English-speaking and loyal to the British Empire. Undoubtedly Smuts' speeches and the generous character of the terms considerably influenced opinion in Southern Rhodesia in favour of the Union. However, they came too late
to win majority support for incorporation in the Union.
Lingering suspicions existed that the money Smuts promised would finance the settlement of poor White Afrikaners in Rhodesia. Further, Smuts' handling of the revolt by white workers on the Rand and Nationalist hostility towards their entry into the Union damaged South Africa's case. The settlers made their final choice in a referendum - as recommended by the Buxton committee - in October 1922. They voted by 8,774 votes to 5,989 for responsible government, which Coghlan now championed rather than incorporation in South Africa.

The result was a bitter disappointment to expansionist-minded South Africans who were forced to admit that "Rhodes' dream of a united Southern Africa was at an end." For Smuts, the vote was a shattering blow to his grandiose ambitions for South Africa on the continent. He believed:

"If he succeeded in bringing the Rhodesians in, he would hold the whiphand over the Portuguese in Mozambique; he would be in a position to establish South African control over the emergent copper industry in Northern Rhodesia, if not in Katanga; he would be able to build economic and political bridges between all the territories of white settlement as far north as Kenya." 32

As a result of the referendum Southern Rhodesia was granted internal self-government in 1923. After the defeat of Smuts and the election of a coalition government of Nationalists and Labour in 1924 in South Africa the two countries drifted apart politically, while maintaining close economic ties. In the 1930's the wealth of the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia attracted settler attention. They saw the possibility of extending the country's political power and adding to its prosperity through ties with the North. Various proposals
to amalgamate the two Rhodesias dominated the political scene. The Union was forgotten.

Like its southern counterpart at the time of Union, Northern Rhodesia fell under the administration of the British South Africa Company within the framework of the British Empire. Originally, the administration was divided between North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia until the two were finally merged in 1911. White settlement in Northern Rhodesia at this point of time was small though rising (from 1,500 in 1911 to 2,300 in 1914) 33 Many of the early settlers were South African and at the close of the 19th Century the Dutch Reformed Church had sent missionaries to Northern Rhodesia. However, while mining did attract whites to Northern Rhodesia from the earliest days of settlement, it was not until the 1930s that mining transformed the country and attracted more than a modest number of settlers. This followed the discovery in 1925 of rich copper deposits near Ndola close to the Congolese border.

From the outset Northern Rhodesia had close ties with her southern neighbour. A railway system linked Northern Rhodesia to Bulawayo in the south and Katanga in the north. The line took coal from the Wankie mines in Southern Rhodesia to the Congolese copper mines. However, to begin with, Northern Rhodesia was not seen as a promising area for white settlement. Milner, the British High Commissioner in South Africa at the turn of the century saw the Zambezi as the natural boundary of what he imagined would one day be self-governing British South Africa. Afrikaners, too, like Smuts had seen the Zambezi as the logical boundary of their political ambitions: "Then from the Zambesi to Simon's Bay it will be - 'Africa for the Africander' (sic)." 34
Consequently Successive Union governments did not show the degree of interest in the political future of the territory that they showed towards Southern Rhodesia or the High Commission territories despite provision in the Act of Union for Northern Rhodesia's eventual inclusion in an enlarged South Africa.

In the 1930s the growing settler community began to exercise political influence in Northern Rhodesia. In particular, the settlers were attracted by proposals for Union with Southern Rhodesia. They reacted strongly as well to the 1930 British White Paper declaring the paramountcy of African interests and looked south for allies. A strike of African mine-workers at the Mufulira copper mine in 1935 accompanied by rioting further alarmed white opinion. (The South African Defence Minister, Oswald Pirow, sent tear-gas by carrier plane to Northern Rhodesia during the troubles. His action reflected South Africa's growing interest at that time in the continent generally). The strike gave added impetus to white demands for the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias and in January 1936 a conference at Victoria Falls of representatives of political parties from both Rhodesias passed a resolution in favour of "the early amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia under a constitution conferring the right of complete self-government". As a result the British government appointed a Royal Commission to enquire into the question of closer association among Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Bledisloe Commission as it was known reported in March 1939. While it accepted the idea of amalgamation in principle, it recommended - to the settlers' disappointment - that the time was not yet ripe for such a step. The two main reasons given were the small size of the white population in the three territories and the need to co-ordinate more closely the territories' African policies. There the matter rested at the outbreak of the Second World War.
Though the Bledisloe Commission recommended its inclusion, Nyasaland had played little part in the settlers' proposals for a new Central African state in the 1930s. Unlike the two Rhodesias, Nyasaland had not been included in the Charter of the British South Africa Company but had become a British Protectorate in the 1890s. White settlement in the country was very small—only some 1,500 by 1930. Nevertheless from an early date, the importance of Nyasaland to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was immense. For both countries it was a major source of African labour.

"The indigenous exchange economy had superimposed on it a money economy in which few of the Africans could fully participate. Large numbers of able-bodied men soon migrated to Rhodesia and South Africa in search of work not only to meet their tax demands and to supplement nominal subsistence but also because of their natural restlessness." 37

Prompting in particular the migration to South Africa were strong links between the two areas dating back to pre-colonial times. The Ngoni people had settled in Nyasaland after breaking away from Shaka's Zulu Empire in about 1820. There had been extensive South African participation in Sir Harry Johnson's expedition establishing British rule including a donation from Rhodes. Indeed, in the early years of colonial rule Rhodes "subsidized" the financially embarrassed administration to the tune of £10,000 a year. 38 He consequently had considerable influence on the new protectorate's government which he used to promote the employment of South Africans in key positions in the civil service. He also encouraged South African missionaries to work in the territory and, in fact, the Dutch Reformed Church "were allowed a spiritual monopoly of the central districts of Malawi." 39 Rhodes' championing of the dignity of labour provided the background to the early imposition of a hut tax, perhaps the key factor in establishing the early dependence of the protectorate on the south.
"With these growing links, news of South Africa's great wealth quickly spread in Malawi. Large numbers of Malawians unable to find jobs in their homelands and consequently unable to pay the newly imposed hut tax flocked to South Africa and Rhodesia in search of work." 40

Apart from migratory labour, however, the Union showed little political interest in Nyasaland prior to the territory's inclusion in the 1950s in the Central African Federation.

After the Second World War, interest in the creation of a Central African Federation grew. The settlers in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (which as a result of the Bledisloe Commission came increasingly to figure in the plans for a new state) saw in it the basis of a new British Dominion in Africa. The idea was given added impetus by the election of a Nationalist Party government in South Africa in 1948. Settler leaders in both Rhodesias were quick to impress on the British government the importance of creating a bastion of British influence in Africa in view of the Afrikaner victory in South Africa, where Nationalist cabinet ministers were continuously referring to the desirability of creating a republic, possibly outside the Commonwealth.

"In a future war, Welensky declared, South Africa might remain neutral: hence it could no longer be considered strategically safe." 41

It was an argument that appealed to the British government which feared the spread of Afrikaner influence to the north and more particularly the Nationalists' racial ideology. As the British government saw it;

"If the Nationalist influence got a foothold north of the Limpopo then north of the Zambezi, there was no knowing where it might stop nor what harm
it might do to Britain's plans for colonial liberation and African development in the whole continent. The will to extend apartheid and baasskap was not lacking; they could be expected to penetrate any undefended points of weakness. The design to federate Northern and Southern Rhodesia which the colonial office recommended ... was intended in the first place to contain South Africa and erect an inexpugnable barrier of British liberalism across the southern half of the Continent". 42

The Rhodesian settlers approached Federation from a very different viewpoint. On racial matters, there was, in fact, a large measure of common ground between the settlers and the whites of South Africa, though it tended to be masked for a time by differences between Englishman and Afrikaner. Indeed, the Northern Rhodesian settlers were attracted to Federation precisely because they saw in it the opportunity of escaping the liberal policies of the Colonial Office; while

"Southern Rhodesia wanted to perpetuate its own European way of life, which is essentially a South African one based on white supremacy and racial segregation, and to expand the self-governing colony into a great white Dominion. It needed the riches of the copperbelt to realize its ambition, and felt pretty sure that if it could assimilate Northern Rhodesia because of its large, increasing and powerful white population". 43

Nyasaland, the Rhodesian settlers would have preferred not to include in the new state, but were prepared to do so as a necessary concession to the British government, which hoped thereby to diminish its commitments in the area. Hopes in the Rhodesias that the new state would be the basis of a great "White Dominion" stemmed in part from the large post-war white immigration. Between 1946 and 1951, 34,672 South Africans alone settled in Southern Rhodesia. 44
In the end, the constitution of the new Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a compromise between settler aspirations and the development envisaged by the British government and in 1953 the new state was launched under the Prime Ministership of Sir Godfrey Huggins and under the banner of racial partnership.

Much to the British government's relief the experiment seemed to rule out for all time the possibility of Southern Rhodesia's joining up with the Union. Not surprisingly, there was a strong reaction to these developments from the Nationalist government in South Africa. Malan made clear on a number of occasions his cool attitude towards the proposed Federation and his resentment at British intentions to set up the Federation with a rival racial ideology to the Union. "There should be," he said, "the most cordial relationships and co-operation between the Union and our neighbours in the north, and everything which amounts to an attempt to drive a wedge between us we should disapprove and disapprove strongly." He saw Federation in this light and complained bitterly about "the effort that is being made in certain circles to get that scheme, which has been provisionally drawn up, adopted in these three territories by frightening them in some way or another with the Union." And when the Federation came into being, one Nationalist M.P. (Albert Hertzog) commented that "Federation is obviously aimed against the Union ....... to prevent the Europeans of Southern Africa from forming a unit ...... to prevent the possibility that the Europeans (of Southern Rhodesia) might look more and more towards the Union."

There was a further source of conflict between South Africa and the Rhodesias and that was the treatment of the Afrikaner minorities. There was a sizeable minority of Afrikaners in both Rhodesias. Creighton puts the figure as high as "nearly 40 per cent of Northern Rhodesia's white population ...... and 20 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's." By 1950 Afrikaners in Southern Rhodesia had founded their own newspaper and petitioned the government for the establishment of
Afrikaans medium schools. The denial of this request caused considerable resentment in Nationalist circles and brought loud protests from the Nationalist press in South Africa. For their part, the English-speaking settlers resented Nationalist interest in Afrikaner communities outside South Africa which at times they saw as almost resembling that of Hitler to the Auslandsdeutche.

Cited as evidence for this view was a speech by the South African Governor-General during a visit to Southern Rhodesia in 1953, in which he told an Afrikaner audience, "Your loyalty to the country where you are now settled does not detract from the maintenance of the spiritual possessions which are your own. It does not mean that ties of blood and tradition have necessarily been broken".

Throughout the 1950's differences of this kind tended to inhibit political co-operation between the Union and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and tended to obscure their common interest in the maintenance of white supremacy. (In a somewhat similar way, differences of language, religion, and racial ideology had delayed political co-operation between South Africa and the Portuguese territories). South Africa did maintain close economic relations with the Federation, which accounted for about three quarters of South Africa's exports to Africa. The vast bulk of these went to the two Rhodesias. (Ties of labour rather than trade gave Nyasaland her southward orientation). However the Federation's share of South African exports to the continent was from 1957 a declining one and the protection given Southern Rhodesian industry through Federation undoubtedly hit South African exporters especially in the Northern Rhodesian market. Economically, the break-up of Federation was to South Africa's advantage. It was the twin shock of the rise of African nationalism and the direction of British policy that forced a re-assessment in the early 1960's on the Federation (and its constituent parts) of its relations with South Africa. Speeches
in 1960 by British Ministers - in particular Macmillan's firm re-affirmation of British protection over Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland ended the self-delusion of Federation settlers that a great White Dominion could be created in Central Africa, if not with British consent, then with British acquiescence. The consequence was that politics in Central Africa entered a period of fluidity in the early 1960's. A re-assessment of relations with South Africa also occurred in the Portuguese territories following the African nationalist revolt in Angola in 1961 and attacks on Portuguese policy at the United Nations. However, at the end of 1959, there was little to indicate that what would emerge would be a white redoubt comprising South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and the Portuguese territories or that South Africa would come to terms with African governments on her doorstep.
Notes on South Africa's Other Neighbours

1. I have used the term "neighbours" loosely to include Angola, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, though these territories do not share common boundaries with the Union as such.


4. See above: The Union and Africa

5. Wilson and Thompson (eds.) Vol. II p. 312


8. ibid.

9. ibid.

10. See Marvin Harris - Portugal's African Wards (Columbia University Press, New York 1958)

11. J. Duffy - Portugal in Africa (Penguin, Baltimore 1963) p. 197


13. Duffy (Portugal in Africa) p. 144

15. See First pp. 98-100

16. Gann and Duignan (eds.) Vol II p. 175

17. ibid.

18. Duffy (Portugal in Africa) p. 205


20. Quoted in Duffy (Portugal in Africa) p. 205


24. Walker p. 595

25. ibid.

26. ibid. p. 596

27. 12 of the 13 members returned in the elections were pledged to responsible government.

28. L. Gann (A History of Southern Rhodesia) p. 246

30. Walker p. 595


32. Hancock Vol. II p. 152


34. Smuts (A Century of Wrong) p. 98.

35. Quoted in Clegg p. 88


37. Ibid p. 102


39. Ibid. p. 28

40. Ibid.

41. Clegg pp. 159-60. Welensky later became Prime Minister of the Federation (its second and last).

42. T. Creighton - The Anatomy of Partnership (Faber and Faber, London 1960) p. 38

43. Creighton p. 39
44. Figure from Cockram p. 173.

45. Malan in Senate Debates IV Col. 6580 - 1951

46. Ibid

47. Hertzog in House of Assembly Debates Vol. 82 Col. 1350 - 1953

48. Creighton p. 37

49. Ibid.

50. See Appendix B

51. In the June 1958 Federal elections, the Dominion Party dedicated to dominion status at once failed to win power only on the basis of second preference votes.
1960 has been described as the year of Africa, for in that year no fewer than 15 African states attained sovereign independence including the Congo (Leopoldville) and Nigeria, two of the giants of Africa by reason of size and population. The number of independent states on the continent was more than doubled. (At the end of 1959, there had been only 12 independent states on the continent including South Africa and the Arab states of North Africa). This in itself would have made 1960 a difficult year of adjustment for South African foreign policy. As it was, events inside South Africa aggravated South Africa's international position, making it a year of crisis for the Union.

Less immediate in its effect than the emergence of the new African states and the Union's internal troubles, but equally important was the change in British policy towards her remaining territories in Africa. Peter Calvocoressi dates the change to 1959.

"At some point in 1959, the British Prime Minister turning now his attention to Africa decided to change his policy (with his Colonial Secretary), to push British territories into independence instead of applying a half-hearted brake and so to make a bid for the friendship of the African nationalisms which were becoming a force to be reckoned with in world affairs." However, 1960 was the year in which it was publicly spelled out by the British Prime Minister in circumstances that could hardly have been more dramatic.

In 1959, Macmillan decided to visit British territories in Africa. He included the Union on his itinerary despite some protests. After all, he could hardly ignore the Union as a member of long standing in the Commonwealth. On February 3, 1960, Macmillan addressed
the South African Parliament. In retrospect, it could not be called a particularly radical speech. The British Prime Minister spoke of "a wind of change", the rise of African nationalism on the Continent. His criticism of apartheid was mildly expressed.

"As a fellow member of the Commonwealth it is our earnest desire to give South Africa our support and encouragement, but I hope you won't mind my saying that there are some aspects of your policies which make it impossible for us to do this without being false to our own deep convictions about the political destinies of free men to which in our own territories we are trying to give effect". 4

However, the implications of his speech and the fact that he had chosen South Africa's Parliament to make it ensured a far-reaching reaction.

"The South African Prime Minister was visibly dumbfounded and as Mr. Macmillan's words spread beyond the Parliament Africans received them with a jubilation that was all the greater because it sprang from surprise. The speech was a shock even to those who saw but dimly and could not have formulated its central point: that in future Britain, if forced to a choice between kith and kin and new states in Africa would choose the latter and that therefore the white minorities in the Union could not look to a mother country or a big white brother to succour them in times of trouble. An illusion was shattered". 5

The grant of independence to states in West Africa while affecting South Africa's position in the Commonwealth and the United Nations could not be said to have posed a direct threat to the Union's security. The same could not be said with as much confidence of the grant of independence on a basis of majority rule to the territories in East, Central and Southern Africa and this was clearly enough what British policy pointed to. Indeed, the practical consequences of British
policy were spelt out that same month by the Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod at a conference reviewing Kenya's constitution. The outcome was a constitution that put the country on the road to majority rule and ultimately independence. Dependent on British military aid to maintain security, the settlers were powerless to resist. In Central Africa, Sir Roy Welensky, the Federal Prime minister prepared to fight a rearguard action.

Replying to Macmillan's speech, Verwoerd at once retorted that there were dangers inherent in British policy "in that the very objects you are aiming at may be defeated". Later in the House of Assembly on 9th March, he made a fuller reply to Macmillan. "It seems to me", he said, "that the Western nations are prepared to abandon the whites in Africa", and he went on "We do not accept ... that the white inhabitants must be satisfied as a minority in a multi-racial country to compete with the black masses on an equal basis, which in the long run can only mean a black government". Finally, to make his meaning quite clear, he later added "We will see to it that we remain in power in this white South Africa".

Six weeks after Macmillan's speech in Cape Town, during a day of protest against the pass laws South African policemen opened fire on a crowd of Africans outside a police station at Sharpeville in the Transvaal. All told 67 were killed and 186 wounded. Sharpeville as it came to be called received immediate world-wide publicity. Dramatic pictures of the shootings appeared on the front pages of newspapers throughout the world. The reaction was one of horror. Brazil recalled its ambassador; in Norway flags were flown at half-mast on the day of the funeral of the victims; in the United States, the Secretary of State issued a statement, to mention just a few reactions. In many countries, individuals and organizations proposed boycotts of South African goods.
At the United Nations, the Security Council met in emergency session and on April 1 passed a resolution deploring apartheid and calling on South Africa to abandon racial discrimination. It was carried by 9 votes to 0 (France and Britain abstained). The resolution was a triumph for the new independent African members of the U.N. and to South Africa a disturbing demonstration of their influence and effectiveness. 1960 was to be the year of Africa at the U.N. as well.

In the aftermath of Sharpeville, foreign confidence in South Africa's stability slumped.

"The relation between domestic stability and external confidence emerged clearly in the months following the Sharpeville crisis of March 1960. In this period, capital left the country at the rate of 12 million Rand a month. By May 1961 gold and foreign exchange reserves had fallen from the January 1960 figure of R312 to less than R153 million, and a severe balance of payments crisis was averted only by raising the bank rate and imposing import and foreign exchange controls."

The further shock on April 9 of an attempt on Dr. Verwoerd's life added to the fears of investors.

Sharpeville was undoubtedly a turning point in South Africa's relations with the outside world and particularly with Africa. Writing on South Africa's isolation in 1964, de Kiewiet attributes it partly to a propaganda victory of the Afro-Asian block. "(They) have changed the whole frame of reference in which South Africa is judged. They have destroyed the concept of South Africa as a normal modern state and have gone far in substituting an African or Pan-African concept."

The starting point of this process was Sharpeville. It cast its shadow over most of South Africa's efforts in the early 1960's to project a favourable image to the world. International interest in South Africa's domestic policies was enlarged by Sharpeville and in the months and
years that followed the massacre, there was plenty to attract the attention of newsmen, whether it was a political trial or protests at new draconian security legislation.

Internally, the government reacted to the crisis by declaring a state of emergency and by banning the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress. In the longer term, the government greatly increased defence expenditure.

Early in 1960, Verwoerd had announced his intention to hold a referendum on the question of making South Africa a Republic. It was held in October and by a narrow majority the all-white electorate voted in favour of the Union becoming a Republic, but the task of securing the agreement of other members of the Commonwealth to such a change proved to be more than just a formality. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in May 1960 attended by Eric Louw as Verwoerd was still recovering from the attempt on his life, Macmillan succeeded in keeping apartheid off the formal agenda, but Louw did not get what he wanted. South Africa's application to remain in the Commonwealth in the event of it becoming a Republic was held over as, at this stage, hypothetical. Further it was clearly hinted in the final communique of the conference that in the absence of a change in South Africa's racial policy, it might be rejected. The new African and Asian members of the Commonwealth were particularly hostile to South Africa's application. At the Conference, Nkrumah cancelled his invitation to Louw to visit Ghana.

There were further blows to South Africa's position in world affairs at the Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa, a meeting attended as well by African Nationalist leaders of countries not yet independent. The Conference adopted two resolutions aimed at South Africa. The first noted the intention of the Governments
of Liberia and Ethiopia to institute legal proceedings against South Africa at the International Court of Justice at the Hague over the question of South West Africa and set up a steering committee "to determine the procedures and tactics incident to the conduct of the juridical proceedings". 14

The second called on members to sever or not to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa. It further urged boycotts of South African goods and the closing of ports and airports to ships and planes flying the South African flag. It also invited African members of the Commonwealth to do all in their power to "secure the exclusion of the Union of South Africa from the British Commonwealth". 15 Although the implementation of a trade boycott was never, in fact, complete, it had a small but noticeable impact on South Africa's trade with Africa. 16

A number of states took swift action to implement at least the spirit of the resolution. Somaliland announced that it would exclude South Africa from Commonwealth countries to be granted a 15% trade tariff preference. Nigeria decided to ban all imports from South Africa as did the Sudan and Ghana. Ghana went further and closed her ports to South African ships and aircraft. She also required South African citizens wishing to enter the country to sign a declaration that they opposed racial discrimination. Verwoerd retorted by warning that action would be taken against any South African citizen who signed such a declaration. There were unofficial boycotts of South African goods in Kenya and Tanganika. 17

The immediate practical effect on South Africa of the various boycott moves was not great. In fact, during 1960 South Africa's export trade increased. However, these moves were nonetheless important. Diplomatically, South Africa felt the cold shoulder and was effectively excluded from the affairs of the continent.
In more favourable circumstances, the South African government might have hoped that the withdrawal of the colonial powers would have resulted in better opportunities for South Africa to promote trade and technical co-operation with Africa. Leaving aside the unwelcome encouragement withdrawal gave to African nationalist movements on and within South Africa's borders, politically, too, the South African government was unable in the early 1960s to exploit the vacuum left by the colonial powers. Alarming, also, from the South African government's point of view was the degree of influence the new states appeared to have on the West, particularly the United States. The honeymoon in relations between the West and Africa after independence in the early 1960s tended to obscure the weakness and vulnerability of the new states.

On June 30, 1960 the Congo (Leopoldville) became independent. A week after independence African soldiers in the Force Publique the Congolese army, mutinied against their Belgian officers. They resented the fact that they were still subject to the orders of Belgians and felt that independence had passed them by. There was a breakdown of law and order through much of the country as Europeans who provided the backbone of the administration fled the country. In these circumstances, Kasavubu (the President) and Lumumba (the Prime Minister) appealed to the United Nations for help. Showing considerable diplomatic skill, the African states persuaded the Great Powers to agree to the intervention of a United Nations force. On July 14, the Security Council authorized the Secretary General:

"to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government ... the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government to meet fully their tasks."
Adding to the Congo government's difficulties was the declaration of independence by the Katangese provincial authorities led by Moise Tshombe on July 11. In fact, Tshombe had made an abortive attempt to secede a few days before independence but had failed because of the opposition of the Belgian authorities in Elizabethville and the majority of businessmen. Following the mutiny the situation had changed and Tshombe secured the enthusiastic backing of the local European community and Union Miniere, the great Katanga mining corporation, which saw secession as a way to protect its investments.

Both in the Federation and in South Africa, the declaration of independence was welcomed, and though South Africa never went quite so far as to officially recognize the new state, Die Burger wrote that "very cogent reasons" could be quoted for supporting recognition of the new state. The Observer's correspondent in the Federation described the reaction there as follows:

"There is widespread hope that Mr. Tshombe will achieve and maintain his independence. It would bring marked commercial advantages for the Federation particularly in the increased use of Federal power and transport. It would also present a staggering set-back for the Congo Government of Mr. Patrice Lumumba which is most cordially loathed here".

To Welensky and Verwoerd, Lumumba represented militant African nationalism sweeping south with as its ultimate aim the elimination of white rule from the continent. The hope was that Katanga would act as a buffer state ensuring the collective security of the white south. Added impetus was given to this thinking by the Angolan revolt in 1961. Katangese secession offered South Africa one of its first opportunities to take initiatives in independent Africa to consolidate her own position on the continent.
It is not difficult to see the importance of the Congo strategically to South Africa. Occupying the centre of Africa, the Congo provides a link between Central and Southern Africa and East and West Africa. The long border with Angola means that the composition of the Congolese government can radically affect the ability of the Portuguese to maintain themselves in that country. Further, Angola provides a route south into South West Africa. However, it is fair to say that strategic thinking of this kind was still in its infancy, though by this time, the political differences that had inhibited close political links between the Portuguese, the Federation and South Africa had declined in importance in the context of opposing militant African nationalism.

In the months that followed, the new regime in Katanga consolidated itself and it seems probable that Katanga entered into trade agreements with South Africa, the Federation, and Angola to offset supplies unavailable due to the closure of the border with the rest of the Congo. The unity which had attended the initial efforts of African states to bring law and order to the Congo did not last long. It was disrupted by the dispute between Kasavubu and Lumumba. The more radical states led by Ghana and Guinea, formed themselves into the Casablanca block, while the more conservative, consisting of most of the former French territories, formed the Brazzaville group.

These divisions did not bode well for a successful conclusion to the United Nations' operation in the Congo. In these circumstances Tshombe was well placed to entrench himself in 1961, which he did with some success. The Katangese regime maintained its close links with the Federation and South Africa, where it recruited
mercenaries from offices in Bulawayo and Johannesburg.
In August 1961, two members of Tshombe's Cabinet (Gabriel
Kitenge and Jean Kitwe) visited Pretoria for discussions with the
South African government. It was the first contact of this kind
that South Africa had had with independent Africa.

However, by the end of 1961 Katanga's position had deteriorated.
U.N. troops in Elizabethville had become actively involved in
ending secession, for which they had the support of the American
government. The new Kennedy administration's backing for
African nationalism clearly had its message for the South African
government:

"American backing for the United Nations' action
in December demonstrated that the United States
was not prepared to support white interests in
Southern Africa indefinitely, particularly when
this meant incurring extensive hostility among
the Afro-Asians and made communist penetration
easier."

So concludes Catherine Hoskyns in her study of the Congo between

In fact, secession only finally came to an end in January 1963 and
the situation in the Congo was once again to favour South Africa when
Tshombe succeeded in becoming Prime Minister of the whole of the
Congo in 1964. In dealing with the first Congo crisis, I have strayed
somewhat from consideration of the events of 1960 as they affected
South Africa. To summarize the most important of these in the
second half of the year; a large number of African states, mainly
former French territories attained independence. Inside South
Africa, a referendum of white voters in the Union and South West
Africa voted by a narrow majority for a Republic. Finally,
Ethiopia and Liberia formally filed charges against South Africa at the International Court of Justice over South West Africa. The impending court case ended the year on a note that stressed the difficulties faced by South Africa internationally.

1961 was another uneasy year for the South African government. In that year, South Africa became a Republic and left the Commonwealth. At the beginning of the year, there was a revolt against Portuguese rule in Angola. Tens of thousands fled into neighbouring Congo and thousands were killed by the Portuguese security forces. Riots in Luanda, in particular, caught the world's attention and although the revolt did not directly involve South Africa, by isolating the Portuguese internationally it brought the two countries (Portugal and South Africa) closer together politically. The situation in Angola was discussed a number of times during the year by both the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council and on June 9 the Security Council adopted an Afro-Asian resolution calling on Portugal "to desist forthwith from repressive measures" by 9 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions (Britain and France). The resolution had the support of the United States, a pointed indication of the new Kennedy administration's attitude towards white rule in Southern Africa.

In March (1961), Verwoerd flew to London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. For South Africa it was a crucial meeting. The issue of South Africa's continued membership of the organization could no longer be deferred. South Africa had determined to become a Republic, and legislation to that effect had been passed through Parliament. During the referendum campaign, Verwoerd had made it clear that he hoped that South Africa would be able to retain her place within the Commonwealth. However, in a broadcast in January 1961, he emphasized that South Africa would not be prepared to stay in at the price of allowing interference in
South Africa's domestic affairs "or of sacrificing principles on which her government had been elected repeatedly since 1948 or of submitting to any reflection her sovereignty or her national honour". 24

At the Conference, attempts were made by the older Commonwealth countries to satisfy the new states' criticisms of apartheid, but to retain South Africa in the Commonwealth. These failed partly because of Verwoerd's own refusal to compromise in any way his domestic policy and partly, too, because of the stand taken by Julius Nyerere, the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, which was soon to become independent. In a strongly worded letter to the Conference, Nyerere indicated that Tanganyika would not remain in the Commonwealth if South Africa did.

When the extent of opposition to apartheid within the Conference became apparent, Verwoerd decided to withdraw South Africa's application to remain in the Commonwealth, rather than face a humiliating showdown on the issue of apartheid. The official communique described the outcome as follows:

"The Prime Minister of South Africa informed the other Prime Ministers .... that in the light of the views expressed on behalf of other member governments and the indications of their future intentions regarding the racial policy of the Union government he decided to withdraw his application for South Africa's continuing membership of the Commonwealth as a Republic." 25

Consequently, on May 31 when South Africa became a Republic, she ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth. It was the end of an era. On his return from the Conference, Verwoerd maintained that the rebuff he had received was really no defeat at all. He told a crowd of supporters at the airport "What happened in London was not a defeat but a victory ...... something greater than we could
have expected has happened .... We have freed ourselves from the Afro-Asian states." 26

Yet for all Verwoerd's optimism, South Africa's virtual expulsion from the Commonwealth was a blow to the country's prestige. However, it is true that the value of Commonwealth membership to South Africa had declined considerably since the time of Smuts' premiership. The Commonwealth was no longer a small group of states linked by close ties of kith and kin and prepared to exchange confidences between one another. It had expanded in size and had changed in nature.

As early as 1955, Die Burger had complained "Open-hearted and fruitful exchanges have already become impossible on many matters. For example, we believe that military and African affairs cannot with advantage be discussed in the presence of India". 27

Domestically, too, there were certain advantages to the Nationalists in leaving the Commonwealth. It satisfied a section of Afrikaans opinion that had always regarded any link with Britain with suspicion. In addition, many Nationalists felt that the break with the Commonwealth, while isolating South Africa still further, would bring many English-speaking whites into the Nationalist laager. One of the reasons why Verwoerd had pushed ahead the previous year with the referendum for a Republic was his belief that the link with the British crown was a divisive influence on the electorate, a source among English-speaking South Africans of divided loyalties.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that many English-speaking South Africans should feel that Verwoerd's efforts to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth had not been genuine.

"Some of Verwoerd's bitter critics more than insinuated that he had gone to the conference (in March 1961) with the secret intention of taking South Africa out of the Commonwealth."
There is no evidence to support such a charge and much to the contrary. But to allay the alarm of those who feared that establishing a republic would mean the loss of Commonwealth membership, the Nationalists went far in declaring that there was no danger whatever of the latter. Verwoerd, as well as most white South Africans, was deeply shocked by the expulsion. Probably the best summary of the event is that the Prime Minister suffered a defeat but the National Party scored a victory."

While I think Vandenbosch exaggerates the sense of shock felt by Verwoerd and indeed Afrikaner nationalists generally, I think he is basically correct in saying that Verwoerd's application to keep South Africa wasin essence genuine. It seems implausible that the humiliation suffered by Verwoerd at the 1961 conference was deliberately engineered to impress English-speaking voters at home of the sincerity of his declarations during the referendum campaign. However, though the loss of Commonwealth membership was a blow to the South African government internationally, it was a set-back viewed with rather more equanimity by Verwoerd especially in the domestic political context than Vandenbosch suggests. Further, Verwoerd's inflexible determination not to make any concessions over domestic policy at the conference lent credibility to criticisms that his efforts were insincere.

South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth did damage foreign confidence in the country upon which foreign investment depended. But the damage was temporary and Verwoerd proved correct in assuming that in the long run domestic stability would be a more important factor in determining the attitude of investors. On the establishment of the Republic, Verwoerd took great pains to re-assure investors by favourably contrasting South Africa's stability to "the chaos in the Congo" But South Africa's position in international forums was lastingly weakened by the loss of Commonwealth membership. She could no longer, as in the past, rely on the older Commonwealth members doing what they could to ease
her position. In the field of trade though, South Africa was hardly affected. Most of the agreements with other Commonwealth countries were bilateral and survived the change of status. Nor was there a radical change as such in South Africa's relations with other African states, but South Africa's virtual expulsion from the Commonwealth was a victory for the new states and encouraged the belief that pressure on the West over the issue of South Africa could exact dividends.

1961 saw further steps by individual African countries to isolate South Africa, but little collective action. In June, the United Arab Republic withdrew her diplomatic mission from South Africa which meant that there were no representatives of independent Africa left in the country. Tanganyika, which became independent in 1961, ended labour recruitment by South Africa. Sierra Leone also gaining independence in 1961 barred her territory to South African ships and planes, and instituted a trade boycott, while Senegal barred South African passport holders from her territory and Liberia, in addition, closed her ports and airports to South African shipping and aircraft. 30

In other respects 1961 was a better year for South Africa. As described above, Katanga's secession offered South Africa opportunities in the Congo. Further, the Congo crisis divided African states and took up their attention. The second half of the year also saw a substantial improvement in South Africa's economic position. Her reserves rose from less than R153 million in May to over R316 million by February 1962. 31 However, as yet her economic recovery was not complete.

In 1962, the new African states once again looked south.

"From 1962 on, as the situation in both Algeria and the Congo began to ease, the differences between the various groups of
"African states grew less and there was fairly general agreement on a campaign to press the United Nations into further action over South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies". 32

Initially, the African group at the U.N. directed their attention towards the situation in Central Africa. Southern Rhodesia became the main target of the Committee of Seventeen, which considered the position of non-self-governing territories, after a special U.N. sub-committee had decided that Southern Rhodesia came within the Committee's terms of reference.

At the end of the year, South Africa once again came under the spotlight. The African group succeeded where they had failed the previous year. They persuaded the General Assembly to adopt a resolution 33 by the necessary two-thirds majority urging states to impose diplomatic and trade sanctions on South Africa. However, it was somewhat of a hollow victory as it was opposed by most Western countries, the Republic's main trading partners. The African group also succeeded in getting a special U.N. committee on apartheid set up. Shortly after this in December 1962, the International Court of Justice found, though by the narrow majority of 8 votes to 7, that the case brought against South Africa by Ethiopia and Liberia over South West Africa fell within its jurisdiction. This boost to African states intent on a show-down in Southern Africa was reflected in a flurry of activity the following year at the U.N.

In other spheres, too, African states were active. In January (of 1962) the Senegal government refused to grant visas to South African delegates for a meeting in Dakar of the International Communications Union. After threats of a move to expel her, South Africa decided not to attend a meeting of the C.C. T.A. (Council for Technical Co-operation in Africa) in Abidjan in the Ivory Coast.
In February, the Republic decided not to send delegates to a meeting in Addis Ababa of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, because of the inclusion on the agenda of an item dealing with racial discrimination. During the year Tanganyika and the Somali Republic joined the ranks of countries with an official boycott of South African goods, but there were widespread reports in 1962 that boycotts announced by African states were not being strictly enforced. The South African government could also take some heart from the visit to Pretoria of a Cabinet Minister from the Congo (Brazzaville) government; a reminder that independent Africa was not altogether united in its determination to ostracize South Africa.

Economically, South Africa's position continued to improve during the year and undoubtedly, the fact that internally, there were fewer disturbances than in 1960 or 1961 contributed to growing confidence in the country's stability.

During this period, important changes were taking place in the Federation which we should briefly consider, though, in fact, South Africa played little part in the drama of the Federation's final breakup. South Africa had never looked on the Federation's experiment in racial partnership with favour. To a certain extent, relations between the Federation and South Africa had improved under the impact of African nationalism. For example, the Federal authorities co-operated with the South African police by returning political refugees to the Republic. Nevertheless, at no stage was there much enthusiasm in South Africa for sustaining the Federation. After the review of the Federal constitution in 1960, Eric Louw predicted that the time might possibly come when South Africa and Southern Rhodesia would have to stand together to maintain white civilisation in Africa.
Towards the end of 1961 Verwoerd also indicated that he did not support the policies of the Federation, declaring that it pursued "a policy opposite to ours".

Progress towards majority rule in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland following constitutional reviews in 1960 and 1961 also made Federation a less attractive proposition to whites in Southern Rhodesia and while the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead secured approval of a more liberal constitution at a referendum, he succeeded partly because voters believed that the new constitution would provide the basis for independence. However, it soon became clear that this hope would be disappointed. Further violence on the part of the African nationalist movement and attacks on Southern Rhodesia's racial policies at the U.N. contributed to a growing white backlash. This culminated in Whitehead's defeat at a general election in December 1962, which brought the right-wing Rhodesian Front to power.

The policies of the Front were orientated towards those of South Africa and one of its main objectives was independence for Southern Rhodesia. It had little interest or faith in the survival of the Federation.

In October 1962, elections on a wide, but not universal suffrage, had been held in Northern Rhodesia. Under the complicated voting system, the ruling United Federal Party had emerged with the largest number of seats, 16. However, it was thrust out of office by a coalition of the two African nationalist parties, the United National Independence Party and the African National Congress. (U.N.I.P. secured 14 seats; the A.N.C. 7) The new government under Kaunda, like its African nationalist counterpart under Banda in Nyasaland was committed to breaking away from the Federation at the earliest opportunity. Thus, by the end of 1962, all three
constituent governments of the Federation were, in varying degrees, opposed to its continuance. The Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky was increasingly an isolated figure. He had obtained a hollow victory earlier in the year in federal elections which the majority of both white and black voters had ignored.

The British government's announcement in December 1962 that it would sanction Nyasaland's secession from the Federation was simply a recognition of the inevitable. It was followed in March 1963 by a similar announcement in regard to Northern Rhodesia which effectively set the seal on the Federation's demise. This action elicited the comment from Verwoerd that he had never believed the Federal experiment would succeed, while Louw predicted close co-operation between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Finally, in June and July 1963, arrangements were made at a conference in Victoria Falls for the dissolution of the Federation in December.

However, that is not quite the end of the story. In August of 1963, the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky visited South Africa for discussions with Dr. Verwoerd. Exactly what the purpose of the visit was is difficult to determine. The Round Table saw the visit as "the harbinger of a strong 'white front' consisting of South Africa, Angola, Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique with strong economic, defence and intelligence links forming part of the scheme". While developments in this direction may well have been discussed, it seems strange that Welensky should make the visit for that reason. After all, he was due to go out of office in a few months with no obvious place awaiting him in either Southern or Northern Rhodesian public life. It seems, at least possible that he was sounding Verwoerd out on the possibility of South African support for unilateral action to maintain the Federation. On a number of occasions, Welensky
had threatened unilateral action and in 1961 drawn up plans for such an eventuality. 39 But if Welensky was toying with the idea of unilateral action, it is certain Verwoerd would have discouraged him from taking such a course, which in view of Welensky's political isolation within the Federation would almost certainly have led to disaster.

In January 1963 Katanga's secession finally collapsed, and African states were able to direct their attention to the achievement of African unity. In May, thirty heads of state met in Addis Ababa. They represented a complete cross section of African opinion ranging from the radical Casablanca group and the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (centred on Tanganyika) to the somewhat more conservative Monrovia group (including Nigeria and Liberia) and the French-speaking African and Malagasy Union (the U.A.M. 40).

Despite differences of approach, an All Africa Charger was drawn up and agreed to. In terms of this, a central organization, the Organization of African Unity was set up to promote unity.

A policy of non-alignment between power blocks was agreed to. It was also decided to set up an African Liberation Committee (directed at the white south) with headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. It was to consist of representatives of nine states and each member state of the O.A.U. was to contribute 1% of its budget to the liberation fund. In addition, the heads of state adopted a resolution calling upon all states to sever diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa and Portugal, to close ports and airports to their ships and planes and to ban over-flights of aircraft to these countries.

In fact, between May and September a number of states announced that they were banning the use of over-flight facilities to South African aircraft.
In some cases, these bans were of little consequence, but more serious were the bans imposed by Algeria, Libya, the United Arab Republic, Chad and the Sudan. They meant that South African aircraft could no longer fly by the direct route to Europe. The South African government responded to these bans by contributing R3.8 million to the building of an airport on one of the Cape Verde Islands and by concluding agreements in terms of which South African aircraft could land at Luanda in Angola and at Brazzaville in the former French Congo. The conservative government in the Congo (Brazzaville) refused to fall in with C.A.U. demands. However, South Africa was inconvenienced by the action of the other states. An average of approximately 900 miles was added to each trip to Europe by South African aircraft. 41

South Africa was not immediately affected by other decisions of the O.A.U., but general stand of the organization was a cause enough for concern. The setting up of the O.A.U. was a considerable achievement for the radicals and the Pan-Africanists. However, the actual structure of the organization and the limitations set on it showed a conservative influence. 42 Clearly, too, the unity of African states was crucial to their ability to put pressure on the West to take action over apartheid (and, in the future, South West Africa, should the court decide in favour of Ethiopia and Liberia).

In short, the formation of the O.A.U. put South Africa on the defensive and made it more difficult for her to take initiatives on the continent to ease her isolation.

This was reflected in the second half of the year at the United Nations. In August, the Security Council met to consider the situation in South Africa. A resolution was adopted by 9 votes to O (Britain and France abstained) stating that the situation in South
Africa seriously disturbed international peace and security and calling on all states to cease the sale of arms to South Africa. Following the adoption of this resolution, the United States announced that she expected to terminate all sales of military equipment to the Republic by the end of the year, while Britain and France said they would cut off supplies of weapons that could be used for internal suppression.

In October, the General Assembly of the U.N. met. It called for the release of political prisoners and an end to the trials of all those accused under the "Sabotage" Act. Further, in 1963 the South African government had put through legislation enabling the police to detain people without trial and this had given added impetus to international criticism of apartheid, as had a series of political trials in the country. In December, the Security Council met again to discuss South Africa. On this occasion a resolution was unanimously adopted calling for an end not only to the export of arms to South Africa, but also to the export of equipment and materials that could be used in the manufacture of arms. This time Britain and France joined the United States in voting for the resolution, though they did so with reservations.

However, in the course of these debates the Great Powers made it clear that they did not regard the situation in South Africa as a direct threat to international peace and they were not willing to support military or economic sanctions against the Republic. As we shall see, the African states attempted to challenge that position during 1964.

At the end of 1963, Kenya became independent. South Africa withdrew her Consul-General, which left her without diplomatic representation on the continent outside Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. Kenya also joined countries imposing a boycott of South African goods,
a significant step considering that in 1962 the Republic had sold
Kenya goods worth an estimated R6\(\frac{1}{2}\) million. During the year, too, South Africa found herself forced to withdraw
from the activities of U.N.E.C.A. and from the C.S.A. and C.C.T.A. Further, the Plenary Committee of the Food and Agricultural
Organization decided to exclude South Africa from regional meetings
of the organization in Africa. There were also other more
trivial moves against the Republic during 1963.

On the surface then the actions of the African states through the
O.A.U. and the U.N. posed something of a threat to the Republic
in 1963. However, as yet none of the steps taken by the U.N.
Security Council and supported by the Great Powers directly
threatened South Africa's position and it was already clear that the
Western powers were not prepared to countenance a confrontation
with South Africa. Internally, while there had been outbreaks of
sabotage, the government's hold on the situation was secure and
economically the Republic was moving from strength to strength.
During 1963, South Africa had a growth rate of 8.5% by any
standards a considerable achievement and at the end of December
the country's gold and foreign currency reserves stood at an
impressive R516.3 million, more than three times larger than
on the eve of the establishment of the Republic.

In general, the moves against the Republic had been more symbolic
than substantial, but they did have the effect of masking for a time
South Africa's economic recovery. While the arms embargo was an
embarrassment and inconvenience to the Republic, it did not, for
all that, greatly impede the country's ability to strengthen her
position militarily.

Politically, 1964 proved to be the turning point for the Republic.
In that year a concerted effort was made to cajole the Western
powers into taking more substantial steps against South Africa. It failed. It was also a year in which a fresh crisis in the Congo shattered African unity and brought about widespread disillusionment in the west with Africa. In 1964 U Thant, the U.N. Secretary-General appointed a commission chaired by Mrs. Gunner Myrdal, a Swedish diplomat to investigate the situation in South Africa and to suggest possible solutions. When the commission reported, it suggested that South Africa be given a deadline by which to hold a national convention of all races to draw up a new constitution, failing which the use of sanctions against South Africa should be considered. In April, a sanctions conference was convened by Ronald Segal in London with the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Mongi Slim, in the chair.

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in June sanctions were discussed and the final communique records that there were "a difference of opinion ...... as to the effectiveness of economic sanctions". Sanctions were called for at the O.A.U. conference of foreign ministers in Lagos in March, at the African Summit Conference in Cairo in July, and at a conference of non-aligned states in Cairo in October. Specifically, the July African Summit Conference urged oil-producing countries to cut off supplies to South Africa.

However, despite all these efforts to mount a sanctions campaign, it was made increasingly clear that South Africa's major trading partners were not prepared to support the sanctions proposals. At the United Nations, impatience among Western nations at the demands of the African group became apparent. The report of a sub-committee deploring Western investment in South West Africa was attacked by the United States representative as an "undisguised propaganda attack on the United States and the United Kingdom".
The United States, Britain, and France pointedly abstained on an African resolution in the Security Council calling for an end to the Rivonia trial. 50

Disillusionment among Western countries with the African states was not confined to their stance over South Africa. It flowed also from the reaction of some African states to a second crisis in the Congo and from the inability of African states to cope with the new crisis. In May 1964 Tshombe had been appointed Prime Minister of the Congo. His appointment was, to say the least, a controversial one in view of his past record as leader of secessionist Katanga, in which role he had openly maintained close ties with the south. He continued to do so as Prime Minister of the whole Congo. White mercenaries were recruited from South Africa and Rhodesia to help his army quell rebellion against his rule in the east.

In this, Tshombe clearly had the support of the South African government, as indeed a Nationalist observer has pointed out.

"The fact is that Tshombe's government advertised for hiretroops in South African newspapers and the recruiting offices were set up openly in public buildings. Had the government of South Africa (and Rhodesia) wanted to, they could have put a stop to the recruiting immediately". 51

A further indication of the South African government's goodwill towards the new government was the dispatch to the Congo of an aircraft full of medical supplies as a humanitarian gesture.

In August, the Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, made a speech proposing a multi-racial common market in Southern Africa "in which none of the member nations would have political control of any of the others, but in which all would co-operate to their mutual benefit". 52
Undoubtedly, he was in part encouraged by the new government in the Congo, as well as by the stance taken by Kaunda in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Banda in Nyasaland (Malawi). In any event, Verwoerd's speech was the first important sign of South Africa developing an outward-looking policy towards Africa.

Tshombe's position in the Congo also helped the Portuguese in Angola where they were still battling with guerillas. Tshombe ended all previous help to the guerilla movements that the former Congo government had given and made their use of the Congo more difficult. What Tshombe did infuriated the radical African states alienating them from the more conservative states which were prepared at least to give Tshombe a trial. The unity that had been achieved by the O.A.U. the previous year was shattered. When in November 1964 there was a joint Belgian-American action in the form of an airlift to safeguard their nationals in Stanleyville, the reaction of African states underlined deep divisions in Africa, which were fundamental.

"The inability of the O.A.U. to cope with the crisis only served to emphasize the lack of agreement in Africa on aspirations and goals. The aftermath of the Congolese 'rescue operation' in November 1964 brought this message home to the United States. One part of Africa responded with what Ambassador Stevenson called an unprecedented 'torrent of abuse; 'verbal violence', 'hatred', and 'malign accusations' against the United States. Another part silently acquiesced or openly approved the Belgian-American action. There is a prevalent feeling among Africans that after a brief encounter the United States has lost interest and is having second thoughts about Africa".

Writing in 1965, Rivkin concludes, "In Washington, Africa now has the lowest priority of any area."
South Africa's new concern with Africa was not limited to the Congo. In October, the government concluded agreements with Portugal on closer economic relations between the Republic and Angola and Mozambique. Earlier, in February representatives of private business interests set up the South African Portuguese Economic Institute to promote industrial ties. On November 30, a new trade agreement was concluded between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Further, during the constitutional crisis in Southern Rhodesia, Dr. Verwoerd urged her political leaders not to countenance interference from Britain or any other country. With the improvement in her own security position, South Africa began to show a more active interest in the position of her neighbours.

Interesting, too from the point of view of South Africa's relations with the continent was the attitude taken by the leaders of Zambia and Malawi. Both Kaunda and Banda made it clear that they were not in a position to cut off their economic ties with the south. Banda was quite explicit at the O.A.U.'s summit conference that he was not prepared to "commit economic suicide to be a loyal O.A.U. member". Undoubtedly their attitude was, in part, the reason for Verwoerd's hopes of a Southern African common market.

More surprisingly, perhaps, in view of what has since happened was Verwoerd's reaction to an offer made by Kaunda in January 1964 that he would be prepared to exchange envoys with South Africa on condition that his diplomats enjoyed the same rights and treatment in the Republic as South African diplomats would expect in Zambia. Verwoerd made no direct reply to this offer, presumably because it was not made through official diplomatic channels. However, he made his attitude towards the offer perfectly clear in the House of
Assembly in April. "It must be very clear to representatives of other countries in South Africa that while we shall act in their countries in accordance with their customs, we expect them to act in South Africa in accordance with South Africa's customs." 56

Verwoerd thereby missed a golden opportunity to strengthen immensely South Africa's position on the continent, an opportunity that certainly would not be passed by to-day. Why was it that Verwoerd turned down Kaunda's offer? I think there are two basic reasons. Firstly, Verwoerd prided himself on his commitment to maintain apartheid without making any concessions to world opinion. At this stage, at least, he probably regarded the lifting of apartheid for a black diplomat as an unacceptable concession. Secondly, in the early 1960s he concentrated on the task of ensuring internal stability, upon which foreign confidence and economic recovery depended.

Consequently, when opportunities did present themselves for South Africa to improve its position on the continent, the government was somewhat slow to realize the implications of these opportunities and to take its chances, though by 1964 South Africa was beginning to realize that her security depended on what happened to her neighbours.

There was, in fact, some criticism in South Africa of the government's conduct of foreign policy. The Johannesburg Sunday Times complained "on this continent we hold most of the cards and all we need to do is to see that they are properly played". 57 That South Africa needed to concern herself with relations in Southern Africa was underlined by the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in Northern Mozambique. The outbreak coincided with the declaration by the
African nationalist movement in Mozambique, Frelimo of a "general armed insurrection of the Mozambican people against Portuguese colonialism". 58

I have dealt with South Africa's relations with the rest of the continent from the beginning of 1960 to the end of 1964 on a year-by-year basis, largely because I believe it is important to understand what happened in its historical perspective. Let me now in conclusion to this chapter summarize the main strands of development.

At the beginning of the decade, South Africa's marked hostility to the grant of independence to African states had waned to the extent that she was resigned to accepting the inevitable and even concerned to develop relations with the new states on a low key basis of economic and technical co-operation. After Sharpeville, co-operation became virtually impossible and South Africa concentrated on securing internal stability to regain foreign confidence. Verwoerd also turned his attention to broadening his support among English-speaking South Africans. White unity in the interests of security was stressed in place of Afrikaner exclusivism. Anti-communism was stressed above Afrikaner nationalism. These domestic considerations meant that, in general, few foreign policy initiatives were taken by the Republic during this period, even in relation to the future of Central African Federation.

Most of the initiatives were, in fact, taken by the new African states. There were three basic elements in their attack on South Africa. The first was to isolate South Africa in the international community and to cajole particularly the Western powers into adopting substantial rather than symbolic measures against South Africa, through the U.N. They were fairly successful in isolating South Africa, but
unsuccessful in persuading the West to agree to more than an arms embargo. African action at the U.N. reached the peak of its success in 1963.

Certainly, the South West Africa case had put South Africa on the defensive and by the end of 1964 the Court had yet to give its verdict, but the failure of the African states to pressurize the West into sanctions over apartheid already suggested that African states would face difficulties in forcing the hand of the Big Powers over South West Africa.

The second element of the attack was the trade boycotts the African states initiated themselves. Certainly, there is evidence that it had some effect on South Africa's trade, but it was little more than a pin-prick and failed to impede South Africa's economic recovery. Further, where boycotts were adopted, they were not always strictly enforced. It also became clear in 1964 that states with strong traditional economic links with South Africa were not in a position to enforce much of a boycott, if any at all.

The third element of the policy of African states was the decision by the O.A.U. Conference in 1963 to set up a Liberation Committee. I have mentioned it in passing because the guerilla movements only really began to assume importance in the latter half of the decade. The fortunes of the Liberation Committee tended to fluctuate with those of the O.A.U., though it ran into some early difficulties when it was sharply attacked by Nkrumah in 1964.

In general, these African initiatives, while they were something of a challenge to South Africa's position, could not be described as a serious threat to the South Africa government's survival.
After the improvement of South Africa's economic position, the build-up of her military strength, and the restoration of domestic calm, the government began to look to Africa to take initiatives of its own. It did so with caution and the first steps in 1964, the improvement of relations with the Portuguese and Rhodesia and the encouragement of Tshombe in the Congo, were modest ones.

Earlier, I mentioned that the Stanleyville operation had shattered African unity as well as contributing to Western disillusionment with Africa. Events in 1965 carried these developments a stage further. Tshombe's continuing leadership of the Congo during much of 1965 and his use of white mercenaries aggravated the split between the radical states and the more conservative, effectively immobilizing the O.A.U. Regional and language groupings that the O.A.U. had been formed to replace grew up again. In particular, conservative French-speaking states in West Africa launched a campaign against Nkrumah in Ghana, charging him with attempting to subvert their governments by giving refuge to opposition groups from their territories. Some went as far as to boycott the Accra meeting of African Heads of State.

Adding to the difficulties of African states was the immobilization of the United Nations in 1965, due to a financial crisis over the payment of dues for the U.N. peace-keeping operation in the Congo. Both France and the Soviet Union refused to contribute. Although the dispute was eventually resolved, it did lasting damage to the United Nations' prestige. By the time Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence in November 1965, the African states were seriously divided. The O.A.U. was weak and in debt. Twenty-four countries (two thirds of the membership) had failed to pay their dues. It was against this background of revealing weaknesses in the position of the new states of Africa that South Africa began to develop an "outward-looking" policy towards Africa.
1. For a brief chronology see Appendix A

2. Ethiopia, Liberia (since 1847), South Africa (1910), Egypt (1922), Libya (1951), Morocco (1956), Sudan (1956), Tunisia (1956), Ghana (1957), Mali (1959) and Senegal (1959).


4. Quoted in The Cape Times 4.2.1960

5. Calvocoressi - pp. 10-11

6. Quoted in The Cape Times 4.2.1960


8. Ibid. Col. 3021

9. Ibid. Col. 3984


12. C.W. de Kiewiet - "Loneliness in the beloved country" in Foreign Affairs Vol. 42 No. 3 - April 1964 p. 415.
13. The state of emergency was declared on March 30th. The A.N.C. and the P.A.C. were banned shortly after that under the provisions of new legislation.

14. From the Conference resolution quoted in Calvocoressi p. 84

15. Ibid. p. 65

16. See Appendix B for analysis of the boycott


19. Translated from Die Burger 20.7.1960

20. The Observer 17.7.1960


22. See below: From South West Africa to Namibia.


25. From official communique (15.3.1961) quoted in Hepple p. 181.


27. Translated from Die Burger 14.1.1955

28. Vandenbosch p. 188


31. Figure from Spence p. 47 (Republic under Pressure)


33. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1761 (XVII) (6.11.1962)
   The full text is quoted in Brownlie pp. 426 - 8.


35. See above: South Africa's Other Neighbours.

36. Cockram p. 174


38. "Rhodesian Divorce" in the *Round Table* Vol. 53 No. 4 - September 1963 pp. 345-6.
39. see Keatley pp. 493-5.

40. Made up largely of the former conservatively-inclined Brazzaville grouping of states.


42. The Charter of the O.A.U. is quoted in full in Brownlie (ed.) pp. 2 - 9.


45. The last year for which figures for most independent African states' trade with South Africa are available. See Appendix B.


47. Figures from Spence p. 47 (Republic under Pressure)


Text in full is to be found in Brownlie (ed.) pp. 428-9
The Rivonia trial was the trial of Nelson Mandela and others
on charges of plotting to overthrow the state.

51. E. Rhoodie - The Third Africa (Nasionale Boekhandel?,
Cape Town 1968) p. 65.

52. Quoted in Spence (Republic under Pressure) p. 77

53. A. Rivkin - "Lost goals in Africa" in Foreign Affairs

54. Ibid. p. 113.

55. Banda quoted in D. Austin - Britain and South Africa
(Oxford University Press, London 1966) p. 31

56. Verwoerd in House of Assembly Debates Vol. 10 Col. 4900 -
1964

57. The Sunday Times - (Johannesburg) 30.8.1964

58. From the Proclamation of the Central Committee of Frelimo
quoted in E. Mondlane - The Struggle for Mozambique

59. See Appendix B.
On November 4, 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia filed concurrent applications in the International Court of Justice at the Hague instituting contentious proceedings against South Africa over the status of South West Africa. Previous decisions of the International Court on the territory had been advisory opinions, by which South Africa could not be bound in law. By contrast, contentious proceedings enable the court to make a compulsory judgement which binds the parties to the case under international law. The distinction is an important one, the significance of which the South African government did not fail to recognize when proceedings were instituted. The case placed South Africa on the defensive internationally in what was already a crisis-laden year for the Union.

1960 had been the year of Sharpeville, of Macmillan's "wind of change" speech heralding the British government's intention to grant independence to her remaining colonies in Africa, and of an attempt on the life of the South African Prime Minister. Ethiopia's and Liberia's action ended the year on a note that further aggravated the international climate of doubt and uncertainty about South Africa's future. That is not to say the South African government was taken by surprise by the initiation of legal proceedings. Earlier in the year the two African states had clearly signalled their intention to file charges against South Africa. Indeed at the Conference of Independent African states at Addis Ababa in June, a steering committee of four African states (including Ethiopia and Liberia) had been established to co-ordinate political tactics in support of the legal case at the Hague.

Legal action against South Africa over South West Africa had been proposed at the United Nations as early as 1953, but it first loomed as a serious possibility in 1959 when a special report of the Committee
on South West Africa suggested the practicality of legal action. The Committee's report in large part provided the basis for Ethiopia's and Liberia's application to the International Court. The two African countries' charges against the Union were contained in eleven submissions to the court. The principal points were as follows:

a) that South West Africa was a territory under the mandate conferred on South Africa by the League of Nations in 1920.
b) that South Africa remained subject to the obligations under the mandate and that "the General Assembly of the United Nations is legally qualified to exercise the supervisory functions previously exercised by the League of Nations.

c) that consequently South Africa was obliged to submit annual reports on South West Africa to the United Nations and to transmit petitions from the territory's inhabitants to the United Nations; obligations which South Africa had failed to carry out.
d) that the practice of apartheid in South West Africa was a violation of South Africa's duty to promote the material and moral well-being and social progress of the territory's inhabitants as demanded by the terms of the mandate.
e) that South Africa had adopted policies in the territory contrary to "orderly evolution towards self-government, the right to which is implicit in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the terms of the mandate and currently accepted international standards."

The South African government's reaction to the crisis took two main forms, one legal and the other political. Firstly, South Africa lodged preliminary objections with the Court to Ethiopia and Liberia's
submissions. The main theme of South Africa's preliminary objections was:

"The Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia have no locus standi in these contentious proceedings and that the Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to hear, or adjudicate upon, the questions of law and fact raised in the Applications and Memorials and prays that the Court may adjudge and determine accordingly." 4

The political reaction came later. In September 1962, it was announced in the Government Gazette that the State president had appointed a Commission of Enquiry into South West African affairs:

"to enquire thoroughly into further promoting the material and moral welfare and the social progress of the inhabitants of South West Africa, and more particularly its non-white inhabitants, and to submit a report with recommendations on a comprehensive five-year plan for the accelerated development of the various non-white groups of South West Africa, inside as well as outside their own territories ...... and for the further development and building up of such Native Territories in South West Africa." 5

Ostensibly, the enquiry bore no relation to the court case at the Hague, but the fact that its terms of reference quoted, at times verbatim, the obligations of the Mandate suggested that it was indeed designed to meet criticisms of South African rule in South West Africa contained in Ethiopia's and Liberia's submissions.

The need for a political initiative by South Africa to meet the African states' challenge on the substantive issues was underlined shortly after the Commission had been appointed. On December 12 (1962) the court gave its verdict on whether the case brought by Ethiopia and Liberia fell within its legal competence to judge after it had heard the final oral arguments and replies of the parties in October.
Its decision was that it had jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the case. The Court's verdict was a set-back for the South African government which was still under sharp attack internationally, although the country had already largely recovered from the economic difficulties that had followed the massacre at Sharpeville and South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth. That the court lacked the legal competence to decide on the substantive issues raised by the case had been the main pillar of South Africa's defence. Nevertheless, the narrowness of the voting on the decision - the verdict was adopted by 8 votes to 7 - afforded the South African government the hope that the Court's final verdict might yet be decided in South Africa's favour on one of the many legal technicalities involved in the case.

The next major development was the completion of the Odendaal Commission's report on South West Africa in December 1963, a year after the Court's verdict. It was a lengthy report. Indeed, all told, the Commission made some 475 recommendations. At the outset it considered how self-determination in South West Africa might best be achieved and concluded: "One mixed central authority for the whole territory would not further the aims of self-determination for each population group." According to the commission, the population of South West Africa consisted of 12 distinct ethnic groups "which differ from one another both physically and spiritually in one or more important respects." On these, it centred its proposals for the constitutional development of the territory.

Firstly, the Commission recommended that the South African government should take over practically all the branches of administration which had previously fallen under the control of the
South West African administration. The Territory's Legislative Assembly, which was elected by whites, would be left with legislative powers in the 'white' area for 'white' education and health, the environment, local authorities and whatever else was not specifically taken over by the South African government.

Secondly, for the future of the non-white peoples of the territory, the Commission recommended a programme of demarcating and developing reserves for the different ethnic groups. While placing the responsibility for implementing such a programme on the South African government, the Commission nevertheless itself suggested boundaries for 11 homelands and recommended the form political institutions should take. Its scheme had some obvious drawbacks; in particular, in the case of five of the groups more than 50% of the group was resident outside of its proposed homeland. Finally, the Commission put forward proposals for a five-year economic plan and recommended increased governmental expenditure on educational, medical and social services.

In the short term, the Commission's proposals implied a greater concentration of power in Pretoria, but the longer term objective was of a gradual decentralization of power along ethnic lines. Such a devolution of power within the framework of separate development mirrored the government's efforts in South Africa itself; in particular, the political proposals of the Commission closely matched the constitution setting up a Legislative Assembly in the Transkei in 1963. A common goal of convincing the world that South Africa could ultimately meet demands for self-determination lay behind both schemes. Critics at the U.N. quickly latched on to the propaganda aspect of the Commission's report. They argued that:
"To try to divide a population of 526,000 into twelve homelands was an exercise not in trusteeship but in the 'divide and rule' technique of a past and discredited era and that the whole argument sounded suspiciously like a clever subterfuge on the past of the South African Government . . . . to justify the denial of non-white participation in South West Africa affairs". 13

In the event, the South African government itself decided to defer implementation of the Commission's political recommendations as it feared implementation would complicate rather than assist South Africa's case in the International Court. However, the government did decide to implement the non-controversial recommendation of the Commission that the government increase expenditure on the medical and social services.

While after 1960 the dispute over South West Africa largely centred on the International Court of Justice at the Hague, African states continued their efforts to put pressure on South Africa over the issue at the United Nations. Resolutions were passed in the General Assembly calling for the repeal of all apartheid laws in South West Africa and for elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Further, the African states endeavoured to have the situation in South West Africa declared an international threat to peace. In 1962 the South African government finally responded to this pressure by issuing invitations to the chairman and vice-chairman of a newly established U.N. Committee on South West Africa to visit the territory. This the two, Dr. Carpio and Dr. de Alva did. What followed did much to damage the Committee's reputation. At the conclusion of their visit, Dr. Carpio and Dr. de Alva issued a communique in Pretoria stating that they "had found no evidence and heard no allegations in the places visited that there was a threat to international peace and security within South West Africa". 14 The communique was later repudiated by the chairman, Dr. Carpio.
Subsequently, without mention of the communique, the Committee recommended to the General Assembly that:

"South Africa be given a short time in which to comply with Assembly resolutions, after which the mandate should be revoked, and the United Nations should assume direct administration of the territory, if necessary using collective measures at the same time to enforce South African compliance." 15

In August 1963, the Security Council itself resolved that the situation in South Africa was seriously disturbing international peace and security. 16 However, the Council stopped short of calling the situation a threat to world peace that could warrant the use of enforcement powers under Chapter 7 of the United Nations charter. The Western powers indicated that they were not prepared to support the use of enforcement action in the case of either South Africa or South West Africa. In regard to South West Africa they were insistent that the outcome of the court case should be awaited before further action was contemplated. Under these circumstances, the high flown rhetoric of General Assembly resolutions and Committee reports amounted in practical terms to very little.

By 1964, the Western powers began to show signs of impatience in regard to the work of the U.N. Committee on South West Africa. In particular, a report on foreign investment in South West Africa, which concluded that "foreign companies...... also bear responsibility for the suffering of the people of the territory", 17 was sharply attacked by both Britain and the United States.

By the time the International Court of Justice came to give its verdict on Ethiopia and Liberia's case in 1966 the atmosphere
surrounding debate of Southern Africa had considerably changed. The early 1960s had been characterized by considerable idealism about Africa as a whole. Hopes had been high that the wind of change that had swept West and East Africa bringing independence in its wake would sweep away the last vestiges of white domination in the south. These hopes had been disappointed and when Rhodesia had unilaterally declared independence in November 1965, it appeared that the very opposite had occurred. Independence to the north had also brought disillusion in its train, when the scope of the political and economic problems the new states faced came to be appreciated. A plethora of military coups d'etat early in 1966 in West Africa added to Western doubts about the political stability, or reliability, of the new states.

The court handed down its verdict on 18 July 1966 which was that "it was unable to give a decision on the merits of the dispute because Ethiopia and Liberia had no legal right or interest in the subject matter of their complaints." The court reached its decision by the narrowest of majorities, the casting vote of its President, Sir Percy Spender. In effect, the Court had reserved its earlier decision in 1962 that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits of the case. The minority of the 1962 judgement had become the majority in 1966, thanks partly to the death of one judge and the withdrawal of another.

In short, the Court had decided the issue on a legal technicality, albeit an important one. It was something of an anti-climax. Following the 1962 judgement, both parties to the dispute had assumed that the way was open to a definitive judgement on the merits of the dispute and had prepared their briefs accordingly.
After the 1962 decision, South Africa had filed an 11 volume counter memorial to that of the applicants and following their reply, a 2 volume rejoinder supplemented by lengthy documentary material including the long Odendaal Commission Report. From March 1965, 99 public sittings had been devoted to oral hearings which included the arguments of both parties and the testimony of 14 witnesses.

While the judgement could hardly have seemed to justify the expenditure of time, money and effort invested in the case by either party, this in no way detracted from the fact that the decision was a triumph for the South African government. Verwoerd hailed the verdict a great victory.

"The most important implication .... was that attempts to use the Court's machinery as a basis for a drastic attack against South Africa had failed ....... The purpose of Ethiopia and Liberia had been to obtain a decisive decision against South Africa and if the judgement were not complied with, to exert pressure on members of the Security Council to apply coercive measures".

This raises the interesting question of what would have happened had there been a judgement adverse to South Africa. A number of writers have expressed doubts as to whether it would have been implemented. To Munger, writing after the judgement, it was "not at all clear that a decision hostile to South Africa would have been implemented" while Austin in 'Britain and South Africa', written before the judgement, is sceptical that the Security Council would take the measures necessary for implementation of a verdict against South Africa. Considering the extent of disillusion in the West with Africa by 1966, I am inclined to agree.
On the other hand, three days before the verdict was due, the United States State Department took the unusual step of announcing that it was the United States' intention that the Court's decision be implemented. Whatever view one takes on this issue, this much is clear. A decision adverse to South Africa would have undermined South Africa's reliance on legality in defence of its racial policies and the serious possibility that coercive measures might be used against her would have put the Republic on the defensive internationally, at the very least. As it was, the Court's judgement considerably eased South Africa's position and gave added confidence to the development of an "outward-looking" foreign policy towards the African continent.

The leader of the Republic's legal team at the Hague, Advocate D.P. de Villiers had described the importance of the outcome of the South West Africa case to South Africa as follows:

"The laager idea could never be permanent ... one needs healthy communications with the world not only for economic reasons but because of the spirit of man. It was difficult to decide when to give up the laager but the South West Africa began an opening out process. We learned that we could practice this with success". 23

Reaction to the verdict among African states was angry and bitter. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia described the court's decision as "contrary to the interests of mankind, and particularly the African people". 24 At the United Nations African states registered their disapproval of the verdict by rejecting a proposed supplementary appropriation of some R52,000 for the Court's 1966 budget. Then on October 27, 1966 the General Assembly gave its own verdict on South Africa's conduct of the Mandate. By 114 votes to 2 (Portugal and South Africa) with 3 abstentions (Britain, France and Malawi) the Assembly declared: "South Africa has failed to fulfil
its obligations in respect of the mandated territory . . . . and has, in fact, disavowed the mandate". 25 It, therefore, terminated the mandate and placed South West Africa "under the direct responsibility of the United Nations". 26 The United States government supported the resolution, but its delegate indicated that it did so with reservations and it was immediately apparent that the major Western powers would not be prepared to support coercive measures to enforce the Assembly's action, which amounted to a reversal of the court's decision.

The South African government responded by declaring that it regarded the Assembly's resolution as illegal and consequently would not co-operate with the ad hoc committee set up by the Assembly "to recommend practical means by which South West Africa should be administered". 27 The South African government's position was succinctly summed up by Vorster shortly after he had become Prime Minister.

"The public may ask - what is the government's standpoint and what is it going to do? My answer is 'nothing'. The Republic will continue to administer the territory as it has always done and it will continue to implement what it has planned for the territory." 28

For the next three and a half years the South African government was able to maintain this posture and it was only when the Security Council referred the question of South West Africa's status back to the International Court that the government found it necessary to take positive steps to meet the U.N.'s challenge to her jurisdiction over South West Africa.

The ad hoc committee set up under the 1966 resolution after failing to reach agreement on a programme of action to oust South Africa
from South West Africa simply reported its deliberations to the Assembly in April 1967. In May the Assembly passed a fresh resolution on the territory setting up an 11 member Council on South West Africa "to administer South West Africa until independence, with the maximum possible participation of the people of the territory". The Council was requested "to enter immediately into contact with the authorities of South Africa ..... (to secure) the transfer of the administration of the territory with the least possible upheaval". The aim was to bring the territory to independence by June 1968. On this resolution both the Communist bloc (with the exception of Yugoslavia) and the Western powers abstained. An attempt by members of the new Council to enter South West Africa without South Africa's consent in 1968 predictably failed.

The next step taken by the General Assembly was an appeal to the Security Council to take effective measures to end the Republic's rule of South West Africa. The Security Council met in March 1969. 13 of its 15 members voted for a resolution calling upon the South African government to withdraw its administration of South West Africa immediately and threatening further action if South Africa failed to respond to this appeal. Britain and France abstained and though the United States voted for the resolution, her representative explained that his government believed sanctions would both prove to be ineffective and damaging to the people of South West Africa themselves. It was therefore plain that the African states would not win the support of the Council for mandatory sanctions against South Africa over the issue. Consequently South Africa was under little pressure to act on the resolution and when in August the Security Council set October 4 as a deadline for South African withdrawal, the South African Foreign Minister, Dr. Muller wrote to the U.N. Secretary-General declaring:
"We neither present any threat to peace nor are we a threat to any country. On no account will we abandon the people of South West Africa who for half a century have placed their trust in us to lead them on the path of progress, peace and stability. The results achieved fully substantiate my government's attitude."\(^\text{31}\)

The deadline came and passed. Nonetheless, the Security Council's recognition of the General Assembly's decision to terminate South Africa's mandate had important repercussions as it opened the way to a fresh reference to the International Court of Justice on South West Africa's status. After the passage of a resolution (276 of 1970) re-affirming that South Africa's presence in Namibia, as South West Africa had been re-named by the General Assembly, was illegal, the Council by 13 votes to 0 submitted the following question to the International Court of Justice with a request for an advisory opinion: "What are the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?"\(^\text{32}\) This brought a more forceful response from the Republic. In September Muller announced that written statements would be submitted to the court and a legal team sent to the Hague to present South Africa's case.\(^\text{33}\) As South Africa had based her refusal to comply with Security Council resolutions on South West Africa on the ground that the original General Assembly resolution depriving South Africa of the mandate was illegal, the government was determined not to lose the case by default. Further, South Africa could not, in any event, be bound by an adverse advisory opinion, while a decision in her favour would render ineffective African efforts to reverse the 1966 judgement.

Action to oust South Africa from the territory was not confined to the United Nations. Sporadic guerrilla activity on a small scale had
occurred in the north of the territory, dating back to September 1965. The first batch of guerillas

"established a forest hide-out in Ovamboland where training was given to local Africans: this was captured by the South African Police about six months later (i.e. the autumn of 1966). Some of the men attacked Government offices in one village and tribal offices in another. One group infiltrated into the Southern sector and attacked the home of a white farmer. Guerillas wounded several people and killed an African tribal official".  

Some of the guerillas were killed by the police; others arrested.

In 1967, the South African government brought in the Terrorism Act which defined "terrorism" in very wide terms and made it a capital offence. The Act, in addition, gave the police powers to detain suspects without trial for an indefinite period of time. The Act was made retrospective to July 1962 and expressly extended to South West Africa. Subsequently, 31 of those arrested from the first batch of guerillas including Herman Ja Toivo, a leading member of the S.W.A.P.O. were convicted under the Act and sentenced to long gaol terms. It was the first in a series of trials of South West Africans who had resorted to violence to end South African rule. One of the reasons commonly given for the increasing resort to violence was the "bitter disappointment" that followed the 1966 decision of the International Court of Justice.

In October 1968, the South African Minister of Police (Louwrens Muller) stated that there had been guerilla incursions into the Caprivi strip sector of South West Africa and disclosed that there had been some 37 arrests. Since then there have been intermittent reports of further guerrilla activity both in the Caprivi strip and on the Angolan - South West African border north of Ovamboland. In 1970 the government announced a R1,000 reward for information
leading to the arrest of Iyambo Israel, an Ovambo leader, described by the government as "the most wanted terrorist in the country". More serious and widely publicized incidents occurred in 1971. In May two policemen were killed and seven injured after their vehicles struck a landmine in the Caprivi Strip. In October the Prime Minister told a Nationalist Party Congress that a police captain had been killed and four police constables injured in further landmine explosions. He repeated a declaration he had made a year earlier that South Africa reserved the right to pursue terrorists wherever they might flee. He went on to indicate that steps had been taken in this particular case to prevent further incursions. His remarks were widely interpreted in both the Afrikaans and English press as meaning that South African police had crossed the border into Zambia in pursuit. Despite a denial from the South African Minister of Police that this had happened, Zambia made an official complaint to the Security Council which passed a resolution calling on South Africa to respect Zambia's territorial sovereignty.

However, while these incidents received wide publicity and further strained relations between Zambia and South Africa, the scale of guerrilla activities was not such as to represent a serious challenge to South African rule in South West Africa. A greater challenge was presented by a strike of 13,000 Ovambos in December 1971 against the contract labour system. The strike brought the territory's mining industry virtually to a halt and forced the government to take emergency action to maintain essential services. The gravity of the situation can best be gauged from the fact that Ovambos constitute nearly half of the population of the territory and 90% of its mine workforce. Further, despite a denial by Nathaniel Mahuinn, President of S.W.A.P.O., that the guerrilla movement had been involved in the organization of the strike, there
was widespread concern in the government press that the two were, in fact, linked. After the unrest in Ovamboland that followed the strike, Die Burger concluded editorially that some such link was anything but improbable. The unrest among the Ovambos particularly shook the government because whereas "people like the Hereros and the Rehoboths have always been non-co-operative and vociferous in their hostility to the government", the Ovambos had no similar tradition of resistance to white authority. Indeed, prior to the strike Ovamboland had been seen as a showcase for separate development in South West Africa.

The first steps towards the development of Bantustans in South West Africa had followed the International Court's 1966 judgement when the South African government announced its intention to implement constitutional proposals made by the Odendaal Commission. To this end, it introduced the Development of Self-government for the Native Nations of South West Africa Act in 1968. The Act establishes the boundaries of homelands for six ethnic groups in accordance with the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission. However, no mention was made in the Act of the Bushmen or Tswana people, and the coloured, Nama, and Rehoboth Baster people were judged to fall outside the scope of the Act, as the government planned that these three groups should fall under the administration of the Republic's Department of Coloured Affairs. The Act further provided for the establishment of Legislative Councils for the different communities by proclamation of the State President. The first, in Ovamboland, was created by a proclamation in October 1968. The Council was to consist of 42 members; six nominated by each of seven traditional tribal authorities recognized by the South African government.
In response to the reference of the South West African issue back to the International Court of Justice, the South African government took three preliminary steps objecting to the conduct of proceedings. It asked for the recusal of three of the Court's judges in view of anti-apartheid statements they had made while representatives of the United Nations. This objection was rejected by the Court as was a request for the appointment of Justice Van Wyk as an ad hoc judge. The South African government also asked for a preliminary inquiry into the validity of the Security Council resolution requesting the advisory opinion, the propriety of the court's furnishing an advisory opinion and the Court's jurisdiction to hear the case.

Further, in a letter to the court the South African government proposed that in the event of these preliminary objections being over-ruled that a plebiscite of all races be held to ascertain whether the people in South West Africa wished to be ruled by South Africa or by the United Nations. It suggested that the plebiscite be jointly administered by the South African government and the Court. This bold proposal excited considerable comment in the South African press. It was sharply attacked by the leader of the Herstigte Nationale Party, Dr. Albert Hertzog and the party's paper declared:

"This government has shown a hostile outside world which seeks the downfall of the white man in South Africa that it no longer has the inherent strength to withstand pressure from outside." 45

However, in general the proposal was welcomed. Die Burger called it "a dramatic challenge .... the action of a country which is perfectly sure of its case". 46 In the event, the court turned down the proposal as expected considering that a plebiscite had no obvious relevance to the legal issues before the court.

On June 21, 1971 the President of the International Court of Justice,
Zafrulla Khan delivered the court’s advisory opinion. It was:

"by 13 votes to 2,
(1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the territory;

by 11 votes to 4,
(2) that states members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration:

(3) that it is incumbent upon States which are not members of the United Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia." 47

The South African Prime Minister immediately rejected the opinion. Noting that an advisory opinion was not binding in international law, he argued that "political, rather than legal, considerations had motivated the majority of the judges (and that) they had, once again evaded a thorough investigation of the facts of the situation." 48 Nonetheless, in spite of the powerful dissenting opinions delivered by the French and the British judge, the decision was undoubtedly a considerable setback for the South African government as it undermined the legal basis on which South Africa had defended her position in South West Africa. But while the full legal implications of the judgement are not yet clear, it soon became apparent that politically, the advisory opinion had not ended the impasse over the issue at the United Nations.
At a meeting of the Security Council in September, the British and French delegates indicated that their governments did not accept the advisory opinion. By contrast, the United States government accepted the advisory opinion and re-affirmed its policy of officially discouraging new American investment in South West Africa. However, it was also made clear that the United States' opposition to sanctions remained unchanged. In these circumstances, the latest initiative taken by the United Nations has been to enter into discussions over the issue with the South African government through its Secretary-General, Dr. Waldheim. This followed the passage in the Security Council of an Argentinian resolution proposing talks with all concerned parties to secure self-determination and independence for the people of Namibia. Whether this initiative will prove anymore fruitful than previous attempts to resolve the dispute seems doubtful. The United Nations is not seeking self-determination on a Bantustan basis for each ethnic group but for the country as a whole, while South African government will plainly only consider constitutional progress along the lines of separate development.

Since it is unlikely that the Western powers would countenance enforcement action against South Africa over the issue, there appears to be little prospect that U.N. action will substantially alter either the fact of South African rule in South West Africa or its nature. Indeed, the failure of sanctions against Rhodesia has considerably reinforced the determination of the Western powers - and particularly those like Britain with a sizeable economic stake in South West Africa - to avoid a confrontation with South Africa. Arguably, in fact, the U.N.'s countless resolutions on South West Africa present a greater danger to the organization's credibility than to South Africa's presence in the territory. In practical terms South Africa's hold on South West Africa has not been loosened.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of the 1971 advisory opinion - itself the result of a Security Council resolution. The judgement opens the way to legal action in the national courts of the Western powers challenging, for example, South Africa's title to exports from South West Africa. While it seems improbable that such action will succeed, South West Africa's position in international law as a responsibility of the United Nations is likely to inhibit foreign investment in the territory. In part, indeed, South Africa's greater flexibility as evidenced by her offer of a plebiscite and her entry into discussions over the territory's future with Dr. Waldheim, reflects the government's realization that it is vulnerable internationally on this issue. This, of course, does not mean that the government would ever contemplate giving up South West Africa. Quite apart from the political impossibility of justifying such a step to the electorate, the strategic position of South West Africa rules out a South African withdrawal. The importance of the territory to the Republic's defence was summed up by the New York Herald Tribune in an editorial in 1963:

"South Africa says it needs the territory for defence purposes. It argues that the long coast line and desert stretches can help to keep a possible invader from the north at arm's length" 52

This argument remains as relevant today. Indeed, in recent years the South African government has strengthened its military base at Walvis Bay 53 and has built a base and an airstrip at Katima Mullilo in the Caprivi Strip close to the border with Zambia, the front line between militant black Africa and the Republic. South Africa's concern to maintain her hold on South West Africa is also reflected in the special importance she attaches to co-operation with Portuguese Angola to the north. In particular, both countries hope that the joint Kunene river scheme will provide the foundation
for extensive white settlement in southern Angola which will be a contribution to security in the area. Besides South West Africa's strategic importance, its immense mineral wealth, much as yet untapped, provides another strong incentive for South Africa to hang on to the territory.

Indeed, precisely because of South Africa's determination to stay in South West Africa despite the vulnerability of her position legally, the battle between South Africa and the United Nations on this issue is of special significance. Commenting on the strike by Ovambo workers at the end of 1971 Die Volksblad declared: "South West is the first target of our enemies who would like to make trouble there, especially because of the international consequences for South Africa". The fact is the progress of the dispute between the international community and South Africa over the territory is likely to provide a telling indicator of South Africa's overall international position. Finally, South Africa's response to international pressure over South West Africa may go some way towards indicating the probable direction of South African domestic policy should South Africa herself become subject to increased international pressure over the issue of apartheid as such.
Notes on From South West Africa to Namibia


2. Ibid. p. 52

3. Ibid.


7. So-called after its chairman, F.H. Odendaal M.P.


9. Ibid. paragraph 185

10. No constitutional recommendations were made in the case of the Rehoboth Basters.

12. See, for example, E. Munger: *Afrikaner and African Nationalism* (Oxford University Press, London 1967) p. 80. He quotes a Nationalist M.P. as describing the Transkei as a smokescreen for world opinion.

13. Wellington p. 399


18. Segal and First (eds.) p. 329

19. The voting being split 7 - 7

20. Broadcast 18.7.1966 quoted in Cockram p. 22


24. Quoted in Cockram p. 22

25. Resolution 2145 (XXI) quoted in I. Brownlie (ed.): 
Basic Documents on African Affairs (Oxford University 

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Vorster quoted in Rand Daily Mail 2.11.1966

29. Resolution 2248 (S-V) quoted in I. Brownlie (ed.) p. 408

30. Ibid. pp. 409-410

31. Republic of South Africa: South West Africa - South Africa's 
Reply to the Secretary - General of the United Nations 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria September 1969) 
p. 50

pp. 410-11.

33. See M. Horrell (ed.): Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 

34. M. Horrell: Terrorism in Southern Africa (S.A.I.R.R., 
Johannesburg 1968) p. 10

35. South West Africa People's Organization. See above chapter 
on South West Africa: Origins of a dispute.

37. M. Horrell (ed.) *Survey 1970* p. 66

38. See *ibid.* p. 77


40. See *Die Burger* 28.1.1972


42. South Africa's proposal for a plebiscite (see below) was in part based on the confident expectation that the Republic would receive majority support among the Ovambos.

43. In 1969 the government passed the South West Africa Affairs Act which stripped the South West African administration of most of its powers and transferred them to the central government, in accordance with the Commissions recommendations. In virtually all but name, South West Africa became the Republic's fifth province.

44. These issues were covered in the court's final judgement.

45. Translated from *Die Afrikaner* (Pretoria) 5.2.1971
46. Translated from Die Burger 28.1.1971


49. See Africa (London and Paris) No. 4 October 1971 p. 48


51. See Africa No. 8 April 1972 p. 25.

52. Quoted in Segal and First (eds.) p. 256

53. Walvis Bay is actually part of South Africa, though administered from South West Africa.

54. See below section on the white redoubt.

55. Translated from Die Volksblad (Bloemfontein) 14.12.1971
Throughout the 1960's, the High Commission territories provide a sensitive indicator of South Africa's international position. In the crisis years of the early 60's relations between the territories and South Africa deteriorated to a new nadir, but they improved swiftly when international pressure on South Africa began to ease in 1964-65 after calm had been restored internally. In fact, the improvement in relations with the territories was to herald South Africa's "outward-looking" policy towards the African continent. South Africa's desire to incorporate the territories which had bedevilled relations in the early period, was not the major issue in the 1960's, though in the first years of the decade suspicion of South African intentions remained high.

In 1961, Dr. Verwoerd finally indicated that South Africa had given up any hope of ever incorporating the territories. He "publicly told his followers that, in view of Britain's changed policies and South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, the Territories were legally lost forever to the Republic". However, his speech also contained the warning that in future relations between South Africa and the territories would have to be on the same basis as those between foreign states. The implication clearly was that South Africa would not feel bound to maintain the privileges accorded migrant labourers from the three territories in South Africa. It was also to become apparent that Verwoerd had not given up hope of influencing political development in the territories, short of South Africa actually directly taking over the administration of the three territories.

In September 1962 Verwoerd told a Nationalist Party Congress, "We
do not aspire to incorporation, which is clearly not practical politics". Yet a year later, he declared "if South Africa were to be, or to become, the guardian, the protector or the helper of these adjacent territories, instead of the United Kingdom, we could lead them far better and much more quickly to independence and economic prosperity than Great Britain can do." At the same time he maintained "I have most clearly stated on behalf of my Government that South Africa has no territorial ambitions with regard to these areas".

There was further evidence to suggest that South Africa had by no means lost interest in the constitutional development of the territories. After South Africa had become a Republic, the government brought in legislation to repeal any enactments that impinged upon the change in the country's constitutional status. However, specifically excluded from repeal were those sections of the Act of Union and the attached schedule that provided for the transfer of the territories to South Africa. To Hailey,

"It is possible that in so doing the Union government desired to keep alive the implications contained in the Schedule; or it may be that it desired to put on record a reminder that it had in its Memorandum of 1939 explicitly accepted the terms embodied in the Schedule for regulating the process of transfer of the Territories to the Union."

Similarly, the British government took no steps to repeal the 1909 Act of Union, but a British government spokesman explained "we consider that as a result of the constitutional change this Act is spent and we have so informed the South African Government." It was pointed out that the schedule contemplated transfer to a Dominion, a status South Africa no longer enjoyed after becoming a Republic outside the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, this did not allay everyone's suspicions. In June 1962, the U.N. Committee on Colonialism pointedly declared that any attempt to annex the three
territories would be an act of aggression, a violation of the U.N. Charter. Further allegations in the Trusteeship committee that it was the aim of British and South African policy that the territories be transferred to the Republic brought a categorical denial from both governments in December 1962.

In short, there was a wide divergence of opinion as to South Africa's intentions towards the territories during the early 60's; a divergence that sprung from how often conflicting speeches by Dr. Verwoerd on the subject were interpreted. However, the same difficulty does not arise in regard to British policy. There is little reason to suppose that the British government regarded incorporation as a possibility, though, admittedly, the decision to develop the territories towards self-government and independence was taken reluctantly. The evidence does not justify the placing of a sinister connotation on Britain's failure to repeal the 1909 Act.

Understanding South African intentions is admittedly more difficult. The Republic's position was anyway far more complex. On the one hand, the impossibility of securing British agreement is grounds for believing that Verwoerd was genuine when he stated that South Africa did not regard incorporation as being in the realm of practical politics. On the other hand, it is clear from his 1963 speech that Verwoerd did not believe that this ruled out the possibility that the territories could be included within South Africa's sphere of influence as Bantustans. Further, the South African government was apparently prepared to exert pressure on the territories to this end through its control over migratory labour. It is also clear that during this period (1960-63) South Africa remained deeply apprehensive about the development of the territories as independent states. For example, in 1962 Verwoerd expressed the fear that on becoming
independent the territories "could well become a danger to South Africa, for a weak neighbour could become a danger if good relations were not maintained". 8

Naturally enough, South African attempts to influence constitutional development were seen by the territories as an effort on the part of the Republic to deny them independence.

Aggravating mutual suspicion between the territories and South Africa was the position the territories occupied as a safe haven for political refugees from South Africa. In fact, it was this rather than the incorporation issue that was the major cause of the deterioration in relations, though it was those incidents which revolved round the question of sovereignty that created most resentment in the territories. The first widespread use of the territories as a haven for refugees from South Africa followed the state of emergency after Sharpeville in 1960.

"As police swoops began, leaders of the African National Congress Alliance and the rival Pan-Africanist Congress took refuge in ever-increasing numbers in the High Commission Territories. No passports were at that time required for entry and any visitor could stay for up to three months without applying for a special permit". 9

In addition, Bechuanaland came to be used (by Nelson Mandela among others) as an escape route to the north. The route is described by Halpern as follows:

"by car or, even better, on foot across the long South African-Bechuanaland border; then, if guards permit, by chartered private plane from the northern most landing field in Bechuanaland, at Maun, across neighbouring Northern Rhodesia and into now independent Tanganika; and from there, to Accra, Cairo, London or, in fact, anywhere". 10
The South African government bitterly resented the use of the territories by refugees and as an escape route and put strong pressure on the British government to return all refugees to South Africa, but these efforts failed. The British government stood firm on the principle of refusing to hand back political refugees, though it did take steps to restrict the political activities of refugees in the territories. For example, in Swaziland which had the largest contingent of refugees, each refugee was required to sign the following declaration:

"In the exceptional circumstances of my presence in Swaziland, I shall, so long as I remain in the Territory, refrain from taking an active part in the politics of this Territory or of either of the other High Commission Territories or of any other territory bordering on any of the High Commission Territories."

This was not sufficient as far as the South African government was concerned. The Minister of Justice declared that "the state of Emergency could not be lifted until the 'Communists and agitators' in the British territories had been apprehended". The government then took steps to prevent easy access into the territories. Police road blocks were set up on all the main entry roads into the territories while mobile patrols kept watch on the borders.

If that had been the full extent of South Africa's response to the situation, it seems unlikely that the refugee issue would have become such a major source of tension. However, on more than one occasion, South Africa showed herself less than willing to respect the territorial integrity of her neighbours where refugees were involved. Further, a series of incidents occurred in the early 60's which highlighted the position of the refugees and strained relations
almost to breaking point. These incidents were followed by further limited British action to curb the political activities of refugees, while South Africa took additional measures to close the borders.

The first major incident involving a refugee occurred in August 1961, when Anderson Ganyile, a former Fort Hove student and opponent of Bantu Education, and two companions of his were kidnapped by six masked men from their isolated mountain hut in Basutoland. They were taken at gunpoint across the border and handed over to the South African police. Ganyile was then detained in Umtata under the Transkei's emergency regulations. It was some time before the full story of the kidnapping came to light. When it did, a full bench of the South African Supreme Court called on the Minister of Justice to justify Ganyile's detention to the court on 18 January (1962).

In the meantime, Ganyile had been brought before a magistrate's court in Umtata for a preparatory examination on charges of attempted murder and incitement to murder.

The day before the South African government was due to justify its action before the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice announced that the charges against Ganyile had been dropped and that he would be allowed to return to Basutoland. In addition, the South African government expressed its regret to the British ambassador that the incident had occurred. The reason for the South African government's about face on the issue -- earlier it had denied that Ganyile had been kidnapped -- appears to have been belated British representations after persistent Opposition pressure in the House of Commons and after it had been established beyond doubt that Ganyile had indeed been kidnapped.

Later in 1962, there was a clearer indication of Britain's determination to safeguard the rights of refugees in her territories. In November, two
Hereros and a coloured man who had fled from South West Africa were arrested in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. They were then placed under police escort on a train passing through Bechuanaland, but bound for South Africa. Acting on the instructions of the British High Commissioner, Sir John Maud, Bechuanaland police boarded the train and freed the three men, who were then granted political asylum in Bechuanaland. This demonstration of British firmness was the subject of bitter comment in South Africa. Following the Gaayile case, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had announced that it was the government's intention to take further measures to control movement across the borders and in October tourists visiting Basutoland were told they would require passports.

Even more disturbing than these last two incidents as far as the South African government was concerned was the holding at the end of 1962 of a secret conference in Lobatsi (Bechuanaland) by the African National Congress. Further point was given to South African government fears that the territories might be used as bases for attacks on the Republic the following year. In an extraordinary press conference in Maseru early in 1963, Potlako Leballo, a leader of the Pan-Africanist Congress, announced that he had 150,000 underground supporters under his command in South Africa and that they were on the point of staging a general uprising. Leballo's speech led to a furore in South Africa and considerably aggravated British-South African relations. It was followed by a much tougher policy on the part of the British authorities in the three territories towards refugees. Leballo's home and office in Maseru were raided and a number of documents were seized by the police including, it was revealed, a list of P.A.C. - Poqo members in South Africa.

On 3 April, South African police staged a series of raids on P.A.C.
members throughout the Republic. However, both the British and South African governments denied that these raids were linked with that on Leballo, though there is some evidence to suggest that there was a measure of co-operation between the two governments. In particular, the ready access of all three territories to the members of South Africa's Special Branch suggested co-operation going beyond purely criminal matters.

In June, the British government announced that Patrick Duncan, who had been a prominent member of the South African Liberal Party, was to be banned from all three High Commission territories. In addition, the British authorities informed two South African refugees, Mr. and Mrs. Jack Hodgson that they would become illegal residents when their temporary residence permits to stay in Bechuanaland expired. However, when the Hodgsons refused to move, the British government balked at returning them to South Africa and flew them to England at government expense.

Further evidence of Britain's tougher attitude towards refugees came in July when the British government gazetted a Proclamation for the Prevention of Violence Abroad, which made it an offence for people in Basutoland or Swaziland to plan or bring about or to incite violence against persons or property outside the territories. A few weeks later it was extended to Bechuanaland.

In July 1963, the South African Police had arrested a number of people in connection with the activities of the A.N.C.'s sabotage group, the Spear of the Nation, after a raid on a house in the Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia. Four of those arrested (A. Goldreich, H. Wolpe, M. Moolla, and A. Sassat) dramatically escaped from their cells on 11 August. It was subsequently established that they had bribed a young police constable to let them go. An intensive man-hunt was launched to recapture Goldreich and Wolpe. Rich rewards were offered for their return to custody and a close watch maintained on borders. However, it was to no
avail. Disguised as priests, Goldreich and Wolpe safely arrived in Swaziland. From there they flew on a charter flight to Bechuanaland on 20 August, where an East African Airways plane was due to collect them and a number of other refugees. However, the night before the plane was scheduled to leave, saboteurs gelignited the aircraft. Nevertheless, Goldreich and Wolpe eventually succeeded in making their way to Tanganyika and thence to Britain.

There was an angry response to their escape in South Africa. In September, the Minister of Transport announced that South African aircraft licences would be withdrawn from holders who transported refugees. As a consequence East African Airways was banned from operating flights to South Africa from October. Further, the government banned over flights between the three territories over South African territory. In future, all planes would have to land in South Africa on their way. Finally, the government established 36 additional control posts on the borders.

In August, 1963 another case of kidnapping came to light. Dr. Kenneth Abrahams had fled after the issue of a warrant for his arrest from South West Africa to Bechuanaland, where he was seized on the road between Ghanzi and Lobatzi. His kidnappers handed him over to the police on their arrival on South West African territory. As in the Ganyile case, representations by the British government resulted in the release of Dr. Abrahams who was due to be charged with sabotage, and his return to Bechuanaland. The Minister of Justice, Mr. Vorster announced that the decision to return Dr. Abrahams had been made "in the interests of good relations" with the governments of South Africa's neighbours.
Clearly, however, Goldreich and Wolpe's escape and the Abrahams case contributed to a deterioration in relations between Britain and South Africa. At the end of August, the head of the South African Security Police, Col. van der Bergh bitterly attacked the British government at a press conference for permitting the use of Bechuanaland as a "free port for runaways, Reds and saboteurs". Van der Bergh's indignation was understandable. In 1962 and 1963 the flow of refugees through the High Commission territories had been particularly large. In November (of 1963) Amnesty International estimated that the number of refugees that had passed through Bechuanaland alone since the 1960 state of emergency was in excess of 1200, while Vorster told the Senate early in 1964 that 562 people, who would have been charged with sabotage, had fled the country. He added that estimates of the numbers who had left for military training abroad varied from 900 to 1500.

South Africa's preparedness to use any measures (legal or illegal) at her disposal to prevent the leakage of refugees through the High Commission territories was underlined by an editorial in Die Burger in August 1963:

"It must be obvious that an underground war that recognizes no borders also necessitates underground defence ... South Africa will perhaps have to go deeply and professionally into this business, for no games are being played by the other side. The less that is said in public about such countermeasures the better it would be, but one aim should probably be to deprive the revolutionary of his sense of security once he has left South Africa." 17

In 1964, there were a number of further incidents involving refugees. In particular, a new refugee centre in Francistown called the "White House" was gelignited by saboteurs shortly before it was due to
open and Rosemary Wentzel, a refugee in Swaziland alleged that she was kidnapped from the territory. She subsequently gave state evidence in a South African sabotage trial. However, in general 1964 saw a decline in the flow of refugees into the three territories and a consequent easing of tension between the British and South African governments. The year also saw an improvement in the position of South Africa's internal security which made the refugee question less of a burning issue.

One of the other issues affecting South Africa's relations with the High Commission territories was that of migratory labour. It was an issue of great importance to the territories, two of which, Basutoland and Bechuanaland, were heavily dependent on the earnings of their citizens in South Africa; a dependence the South African government on occasion threateningly pointed to at times of tension between the territories and South Africa. In May 1961, the South African government had appointed an inter-departmental committee on Foreign Africans, which became known as the Froneman Committee after its chairman, Mr. G.F. van L. Froneman M.P. Its report was tabled in Parliament in January 1963.

Of particular concern to the Committee was illegal immigration into South Africa, most of which was from the High Commission territories. It consequently recommended the establishment of depots on South Africa's borders for the detention of Africans entering the Republic illegally prior to their expulsion from the country. The committee estimated the number of foreign Africans at 836,000 of whom 431,000 were from the High Commission territories and paid particular attention to the privileges they enjoyed, concluding that "the lawful presence in South Africa of so many foreign African families necessarily involves the Republic in large expenditure
which could otherwise be utilised for its own purposes. However, while the Commission recommended "the admission of African children and juveniles from outside South Africa should be stopped completely" and in general argued that the government's priority should be to find employment for unemployed South Africans, it stopped well short of any suggestion of any wholesale repatriation of foreign workers. Consequently, though there was considerable anxiety in the three territories over the position of migratory labour, it was never on its own the cause of a major crisis in relations between South Africa and the territories. In fact, on the contrary it can be argued that as the use of migratory labour is a distinct benefit to the Republic, there exists a coincidence of interests between South Africa and the territories that serves to cement rather than disrupt relations.

Of primary concern to South Africa were the constitutional changes taking place in the territories. I shall deal with the changes in each territory individually and South Africa's response in each case before dealing with the more general question of the change in South Africa's attitude to the grant of independence to the three territories. The first country to feel the effect of the reluctant British decision to develop the territories towards self-government and independence was Basutoland. In 1959, the British government had promulgated a new constitution for the territory which provided for an 80-member Legislative Council, 40 of whom were to be elected with 9 District Councils acting as electoral colleges.

The first elections under the new constitution were held in January 1960. The majority of candidates (188) stood as independents while the next largest group (125) supported the Basutoland Congress Party, the successor to the country's first modern African nationalist party, the Basutoland African congress which had been formed in 1952.
Securing 36% of the popular vote, the B.C.P. won 73 of the 162 District Council seats and with the help of independents was able to elect 30 of the 40 elected members of the Legislative Council. The electoral system tended to overstate the real strength of the African nationalist movement, which in terms of seats had won an overwhelming victory, a situation which could hardly have commended itself to the South African government, which feared the emergence of radical or unstable governments on the Republic's borders.

However, while the election had tended to overstate Congress's position, the composition of the Legislative Council was balanced by the nominations made to it by the Paramount Chief. In fact, ironically, the B.C.P.'s sole representative on the Executive Council subsequently defected from the party and consequently, the elected majority in the Legislative Council found itself without representation in the government which remained a strongly conservative body.

After the elections the B.C.P. reiterated the call it had made in the campaign for early independence and pressed for a further constitutional review. This came in 1962 when a constitutional commission under Walter Stanford was appointed. Against the background of uneasy relations between South Africa and Britain over the question of refugees and the new border restrictions, the commission issued its report in October 1963. Its main recommendations were 1) independence in 1965 2) a constitutional monarchy under Mosheshoe II and 3) a bicameral Parliament consisting of an elected lower house and an upper house of chief and nominees of the King. The commission proposed a cabinet system on the Westminster model and the abandonment of the prevailing male suffrage for universal suffrage.

Constitutional talks on the basis of these proposals began in London.
in April (of 1964). "After several weeks of heated debate, in the cause of which Britain admitted her inability even at the moment to defend Basutoland militarily against South Africa, agreement was reached on all major points." \(^{21}\) At first, the British government had been reluctant to accept the swift development of the territory to independence in the belief that it could further aggravate her relations with the Republic, but in the end Britain agreed to all the proposals except the date of independence. However, it was agreed that 12 months after elections under the new constitution "independence would be granted on request". \(^{22}\) The date provisionally set for elections was late 1964 or early 1965.

However, elections took somewhat longer to arrange and the date subsequently set was 29 April, 1965. Already, a perceptible change was evident both in South African attitudes towards the territory's constitutional development and in Basuto attitudes towards the Republic. South Africa was by this time (mid 1964) coming to terms with the fact that Basutoland's constitutional development would take place within the framework provided by the British government, while in Basutoland there was a greater awareness of the country's inevitable dependence on South Africa. Sensing that these changes were weakening his party's position, Mokhehle, the B.C.P. leader pressed for immediate elections. Delay until April 1965, he argued, would allow South Africa "to play as big a part as in the recently held Swaziland elections". \(^{23}\) That election had resulted in the triumph of the traditionalists. However, Mokhehle's protests were to no avail.

Although Mokhehle stated his concern "to negotiate on an equal footing with the Republic on matters of common interest", \(^{24}\) fears that the B.C.P.'s African nationalism and its commitment to Pan-Africanism might lead to retaliation by South Africa became a significant factor in the elections. Symptomatic of this attitude was formation in November 1964 of "The Sons and Daughters of
Moshoeshoe in South Africa, a Basuto organization dedicated to seeing that good relations were maintained with the Republic. Further, the B.C.P. faced the formidable opposition of the Roman Catholic Church which had a strong hold in the rural areas and over women, who would be voting for the first time. In these circumstances, conservative opinion organized in the Basutoland National Party under Chief Leabua Jonathan made considerable headway.

Nevertheless, the B.N.P.'s narrow victory in the elections came as a surprise. The B.N.P. won 31 seats; the B.C.P. 25 and the smaller Marema-Tiau Freedom Party 4. The result was a triumph for the South African government considerably enhancing Verwoerd's hopes for a Southern African common market. In speeches after the election Jonathan indicated that he was in favour of direct talks with the South Africa government and his strong hostility to communism, in which category he placed some of the more radical African states including Ghana and Tanzania. South Africa's stake in the maintenance of the B.N.P. government was demonstrated dramatically soon after the election. Jonathan himself had been defeated in the election. To allow him to take his place in the Assembly, a sitting B.N.P. member had resigned, thus allowing Jonathan to contest a by-election in a safe B.N.P. seat. Jonathan duly won the seat, but not without creating a storm over his relations with South Africa.

During the campaign, Jonathan appealed to Verwoerd for famine relief. The South African government duly responded with a gift of some 100,000 bags of grain worth over £150,000. Evidence that this was a political gesture and had little to do with humanitarian considerations was overwhelming. In the first place, the gift
was not made to the Basutoland government but personally to Chief Jonathan as leader of the B.N.P. The grain was accompanied by leaflets with the message "Leabua is feeding the people." Secondly, the need for famine relief and especially on this scale was to say the least highly suspect. British officials reported that the food situation in the territory was normal and that they had no requests for help. This was underscored by the fact that a month after the announcement of the gift only 6,854 of 100,000 bags had been moved to the territory and only a small proportion of that (5%) distributed. In the National Assembly, Jonathan described the gift as a "generous gesture" on the part of Verwoerd amid a storm of protest from the Opposition.

Early on, Jonathan made it clear that he intended to take a tough stance towards refugees. In December 1965 a circular was sent to all refugees requiring them to report to the police. They were finger-printed and photographed and required to reveal the nature of their political activities in South Africa. They were further told that if they engaged in politics, they would face deportation. Jonathan's stand on this issue served to considerably enhance his reputation in the South African Nationalist press.

Basutoland's foreign relations during the period prior to independence were handled by Britain. However, Jonathan and Verwoerd did finally meet in Pretoria for highly publicized talks in September 1966. As the first contact between a leader of a black-ruled state and the South African Prime Minister, the talks enjoyed wide coverage not just in the South African press but abroad. Jonathan was careful to stress that the talks were as between equals and he made the following interesting comment on them at a London press conference in October.
"When I went to see the late Dr. Verwoerd, he said to me, 'Now look, even if we would consider coming to your help financially, I just won't think of it because it would confirm the allegations levelled against you... both you and us... that you are going to sell out to us. So far as financial aid is concerned just forget all about South Africa! (Chief Jonathan then said) I am not scared myself. Even if the South Africans were to come to my aid tomorrow I would accept it. (sic) I am not an apartheid man; I am a principled man.'"

If an accurate account of the meeting, it indicates that Verwoerd took a cautious view of the new situation in Basutoland and was wary about committing the Republic to Jonathan's survival.

Soon after the 1965 elections, Jonathan made it clear that he would seek early independence from Britain; a demand that had the backing of the South African government now recognizing that independence rather than a threat to the Republic provided the opportunity for the expansion of South African influence. For the same reason, the B.C.P. (supported by the Regent Chief and Marema-Tlou Freedom Party) just as ironically opposed the giant of independence to Jonathan's government. However, it was unable to change the British government's determination to withdraw when asked. Consequently, after resolutions were passed in the Basutoland parliament for independence, the country was granted independence on 4 October 1966 as the Kingdom of Lesotho.

Constitutional reform was to begin with, somewhat slower in Bechuanaland than in Basutoland, though the two territories, in fact, secured independence almost simultaneously. Change in Bechuanaland rested on the position of the Khamas; Tshekedi who became Chief Regent of the powerful Bamangwato tribe in 1926 and his nephew, Seretse, endorsed as the rightful chief by a kgotla (tribal gathering) in 1949.
In the ordinary course of events Tshekedi would have stood down as chief and Seretse taken his place. However, the marriage of Seretse to an English girl resulted in his being barred from the territory by the British government acting under South African pressure. Seretse was supported by Tshekedi who renounced his chieftainship and was forced to follow Seretse into exile. In 1956 the Khamas were allowed to return to Bechuanaland as private citizens. Both did so and then pressed for the creation of a Legislative Council, a demand the British government eventually acceded to in December 1960.

The same month saw the creation of the territory's first political party, the Bechuanaland Peoples Party (the B.P.P.). Its formation reflected the politicization of the towns from the flood of refugees into Bechuanaland that had followed South Africa's 1960 state of emergency. The majority of the members of the new Legislative Council, which met for the first time in June 1961, was white. Out of a council of 35, there were 10 elected African members and 10 elected white ones. From the outset, there were strong protests against the council's composition, especially from the B.P.P.

Originally, the British government had planned the next constitutional review for 1968. However, the growing strength of the B.P.P., and growing political awareness in the territory generally, forced the British government to alter its plans radically. In August 1962, the Resident Commissioner announced that there would be a constitutional review in 1963. A major reason for the British decision was the formation in 1962 of the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (B.D.P.) under Seretse Khama, who had been elected to the Legislative Council on which he acted as spokesman for the Bamangwato tribe. Khama's good relations with the government were reflected in his appointment to the Executive Council of the territory in 1961. His emergence as a popular party leader was
consequently soon followed by British agreement to a review of the constitution.

The fact that Khama, though a deposed chief, was now a private citizen worked - somewhat ironically - to his advantage. "While enjoying all the charismatic attractions of chieftainship, he had all the political advantages of being free from ceremonial and uninvolved in the usual petty disputes which so complicate the life of a chief. Indeed, his removal from the succession facilitated his acceptance as a modern political leader of a country-wide party. Moreover, he could disavow rigidly traditionalist decisions by chiefs without being disloyal to the institution of chieftainship, and thus could compete with the growing BPP." 30

The 1963 constitutional review gave Bechuanaland a new constitution whose main feature was the far-reaching non-racialism "and which in terms of representative procedure, was probably one of the most advanced proposals yet submitted in British Africa." 31

The constitution provided for a Legislative Assembly of 38, 32 of whom were to be elected on a single member constituency basis under universal adult suffrage, a cabinet system, and a house of chiefs with responsibilities only in the field of tribal affairs. No special representation was laid aside for the territory's white population, which numbered some 6,000. White representatives at the constitutional conference seemed content that white interests would be protected by the incorporation in the constitution of a Bill of Rights.

However, by no means all of the territory's white settlers were prepared to accept the new constitution. During the talks a number of settlers called for the independence of the Tati district or alternatively the merger of this area into South Africa or Rhodesia. They based their claim on a concession made to the Tati company by Lobenguela in the 19th century; a concession which pre-dated the
inclusion of the Tati district into the Bechuanaland Protectorate. In 1964 Tati's white farmers organized a petition and sent a delegation to Pretoria. However, the South African government showed no enthusiasm for backing their claim. This can be seen as a significant pointer that South Africa was by this stage reconciled to the development of the territory to independence. It was also, no doubt, in part, an expression of confidence that Seretse Khama, already the dominant political figure in Bechuanaland, would exercise moderation in relations with South Africa. Further, following the hostile reaction to Verwoerd's 1963 proposals in Bechuanaland, the South African government was probably more sensitive to the danger to future relations that might arise from interference in the territory's constitutional development.

Elections under the new constitution were held in March 1965. The B.D.P. under Khama as widely expected gained an overwhelming victory winning 28 out of the 31 elected seats. The remaining three seats were won by the more radical B.P.P. On becoming Prime Minister, Seretse Khama stated that Bechuanaland would accept investment from all countries including Rhodesia and South Africa, and would be "favourably disposed towards an economic grouping of Southern African states." He also re-affirmed that temporary asylum would be granted to political refugees, but that they would not be allowed to use Bechuanaland as a base for subversion.

The response in South Africa to Khama's election was generally a favourable one. In particular, the Nationalist press "ceased to treat his wife with scorn", and Verwoerd sent a message of congratulations to the new leader. The problem created by Khama's marriage which had resulted in a ban on his entry into South Africa was smoothed over. The Minister of the Interior, Senator de Klerk blandly announced that the ban had been lifted in October 1964.
Verwoerd even went so far as to endorse early independence for the territory as "this was in accordance with the policy of separate development". 37

As in the case of Basutoland, South Africa's attitude towards independence changed. Pretoria now recognized that South African interests would best be furthered by an early British withdrawal, which would maintain Bechuanaland's dependence on the Republic and strengthen Khama's position in relation to the opposition. For its part, the African nationalist opposition fearing precisely that independence would strengthen South Africa's hold over the country (and some chiefs who felt that their power was being eroded by the Khama government) pressed for a delay in the grant of independence. New proposals for an independence constitution had in fact been put forward by Khama shortly after the elections. They included the change to a republican form of government under a President to be elected by the Legislative Assembly. In other respects, there was little change proposed to the 1965 constitution. The British government accepted these proposals at a constitutional conference in London in February 1966. Under the new name of Botswana, the territory became independent on September 30, 1966.

Swaziland's constitutional progress was much slower than that of either Basutoland or Bechuanaland. It also took a somewhat different form. This was largely because of the development in the 1960s of a powerful alliance between Swaziland's white settlers and the tribal authorities under King Sobhuza II. Historically, the whites in Swaziland had occupied a much stronger position in the territory's administration than in either of the other two High Commission territories, while Sobhuza was only too aware that elsewhere in Africa a decline in chiefly power and authority had followed self-government and independence.
In a speech in 1959 Sobhuza blamed unrest in the Federation as "due to people forgetting their own African customs and grasping at European customs with which they were not fully familiar". His extremely conservative response to African nationalism was well received by the white community, which moved promptly to suggest terms for constitutional advance to pre-empt any proposals emanating from an African nationalist source. In 1960, the European Advisory Council proposed the creation of a joint advisory council that would include representatives of the Swazi National Council, a body comprising the territory's tribal authorities. Sobhuza himself argued for the establishment of a legislative council composed along similar lines. He emphatically rejected the idea of one man and one vote.

The only political faction in the territory that campaigned for a non-racial constitution was the small Swaziland Progressive Party formed in 1960. However, its position was weakened by splits in the African nationalist leadership in 1961. In fact, the main stumbling block to the triumph of the settler-traditionalist alliance proved to be the British government. It refused to accept either the E.A.C. proposals or those of Sobhuza. Negotiations with the different parties to reach agreement on a new constitution proved fruitless and in the end the British government put forward proposals of its own in May 1963 which were in effect a compromise between the views of the traditionalists, the African nationalists, and the settlers. The proposals envisaged the creation of a legislative council "composed of a Speaker, twenty-four elected Members, together with four Official Members and Nominated Members". Of the elected members 8 would be Swazi elected by traditional methods, 8 whites, and 8 persons of any race elected on a National roll.

The British proposals were rejected both by the settlers and by the
Swazi National Council and led to a worsening of relations between King Sobhuza and the British government. In September 1963, Verwoerd put forward his proposals for guiding the High Commission territories towards independence. It seems probable that Verwoerd was encouraged to make his offer at least in part because of the situation in Swaziland. The emergence of settler-traditional alliance must have seemed to him to represent a fulfilment of the ideological justification of separate development and at the same time to provide a powerful counter-challenge to African nationalism. Certainly, Swaziland was the only territory where there was not a strongly hostile response to Verwoerd's proposals. The settler leader, Carl Todd, welcomed them, while Sobhuza remained silent.

Notwithstanding the opposition to its proposals the British government decided that no further purpose would be served by additional negotiations. Consequently, in January 1964, the British government issued an order-in-council imposing a new constitution on Swaziland based on its May 1963 proposals. Britain's action encountered strong opposition from Sobhuza who organized an unofficial plebiscite on the new constitution; the plebiscite, though hardly fairly conducted, recorded an overwhelming rejection of the British proposals. However, Sobhuza soon found a far more effective means of circumventing the intent of the constitution.

This was to enter politics himself and for the Swazi National Council to sponsor its own candidates in the elections for National roll seats. To this end, the Imbokodo National Movement was formed led by Prince Makhosini Dlamini to compete with the African nationalist parties. Further the S.N.C. acted to prevent the African nationalists from putting their case to the people in the Swazi reserves. With that, perhaps some 80 per cent of the population was virtually delivered to the traditionalists. In these circumstances, the Imbokodo registered a clean sweep in the elections in June 1964.
After the elections the Imbokodo began to press for internal self-government. The British government accordingly drew up a new constitution to this end in 1966. While conferring wide powers on the King, the new constitution did away with reserved white seats. The House of Assembly was to consist of 24 representatives elected by universal suffrage in three-member constituencies and 6 members nominated by the King. The absence of "white" seats under the proposals served to underlie a certain degree of estrangement between the white population and the Imbokodo, which was proving to be less conservative in its outlook than some whites had hoped.

Nevertheless, during the campaign for new elections under the new constitution in April 1967, the new Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini Dlamini "stressed that Swaziland could not live without her two neighbours, South African and Mocambique, and that the government wanted friendly relations with both countries". The April 1967 elections like those in 1964 resulted in a clean sweep for the Imbokodo. The generally conservative outlook of the Swaziland government was underlined in a speech by Prince Dlamini shortly before independence in September 1968. He stated that "Rhodesia and Angola are being attacked by terrorists ...... if they come to Swaziland, they would not come and mess us up alone. They would be on their way to neighbouring countries and in those circumstances South Africa would come to our aid". Consequently, the South African government has shown considerable enthusiasm for the new government despite the fact that the kind of settler-traditionalist alliance that seemed possible in the wake of the 1964 elections has not materialized, though Imbokodo retained the backing of most settlers in the 1967 elections.

Thus, by the time the High Commission territories attained independence, conservative and traditionalist governments had triumphed in all three; a situation certainly not envisaged at the beginning of the decade.
In conclusion, therefore, I intend taking a closer look at the change in South Africa's attitude towards the territories during the period 1963-1966, in other words from Verwoerd's important speech in September 1963 to Botswana's and Lesotho's independence. I have already discussed Verwoerd's speech in the context of the possible incorporation of the territories into South Africa. (In this context it backfired badly awakening old fears that South Africa had territorial designs on the territories - not a surprising response in view of South Africa's attitude towards the refugee issue.)

However, Verwoerd's proposals were more than just a "final challenge" as Halpern has put it. They were the statement of an ideological position.

Verwoerd envisaged "natural native democracy ... as in the Transkei". He went on

"We would steer them away from the principle of multi-racialism ..., where whites would be needed and must remain for some time in those areas and occupations, they would become voters in the Republic of South Africa, just as the Bechuanas, the Basutos, or the Swazis will -- when they work in the Republic be voters in their respective homelands." 46

He further suggested land adjustments between the territories and South Africa so that in their final boundaries the new states would more accurately reflect ethnic divisions. South Africa would "repurchase or exchange areas now wrongly occupied in order to include them in the white area or the black." 47

This was followed in March 1964 by an extraordinary attack by Verwoerd on the United States and Britain. He alleged that they had attempted "to exclude and undermine friendship with South Africa" and he asked "whether for once they would not act wisely and instead of the chaos they left behind elsewhere in Africa, they would not allow Southern Africa to develop naturally". 48
was seen the very much more moderate of the two. Not only was Banda associated with the most radical brands of African nationalism but "was regarded by whites as being an ogre, the ultimate in extremism" 10: a reputation resulting from the false but widely believed accusation that there had been a conspiracy in the late 50's to murder Nyasaland's white community in which he was implicated. Further, it was Kaunda who in January 1964 stated that he would be prepared to exchange diplomatic representatives with South Africa provided they received equal treatment; an offer rejected by Verwoerd who stuck to the proposition that the use of roving ambassadors provided the answer to relations with new states."

South Africa's first response to events in Central Africa (i.e. in the Congo, Zambia and Malawi) in 1964 was to propose economic co-operation rather than the forging of direct political links. It was not a surprising reaction. The prospects for economic co-operation were at the time much more promising and while it was recognised that there were benefits to be derived from political co-operation, the development of economic ties was seen as the indispensable forerunner of political ones. In general, most commentators saw little chance of South Africa securing any immediate political breakthrough, given the limits both of South African foreign policy and those of the African states. Spence is typical.

"Trading links may have to be tolerated, but these states (Zambia and Malawi), no less than those of West and East Africa, will no doubt be suspicious of any attempts at South African neo-colonialism, however attractive the package deal that is offered to them. South Africa would gain a major diplomatic advantage if she could persuade some of the new states of Southern Africa to abstain from debates in the General Assembly demanding tough action against the Republic, but this is highly unlikely." 12
The Conservatives were pledged to one last attempt to reach a settlement by negotiation but also indicated that they would not maintain sanctions indefinitely if the attempt failed. It was a weak bargaining position as Enoch Powell pointed out. The British government was saying to Smith, he said, "This is your very last chance. This time you had better settle or else we shall have to consider removing sanctions." What an arm-breaking clinch. What an irresistible argument." Contacts between the Rhodesian regime and the British government were renewed shortly after the Conservative victory, but negotiations only got beyond an exploratory stage in June 1971 when the British government's envoy, Lord Goodman visited Salisbury. By November, the ground had been sufficiently prepared for the final round of negotiations between Smith and Sir Alec Douglas Home in Rhodesia, though by this time the British government's leverage on Rhodesia had been further eroded by a vote of the United States Senate to lift the embargo on Rhodesian chrome.

Nonetheless, proposals for a settlement were agreed. These involved very substantial concessions to the Rhodesian regime including the retention of separate racial rolls and the continuation of the system whereby half the African representatives in parliament were elected through electoral colleges of chiefs and headmen. They offered little prospect of majority rule in the foreseeable future. The agreement was warmly welcomed in South Africa where the Prime Minister declared:

"I am glad that Britain and Rhodesia have reached a settlement for the sake of Rhodesia, states in Southern Africa and the free world. I want to congratulate the leaders on both sides for the statesmanship they have shown." However, the settlement was subject to the condition that an independent commission appointed by the British government should find its terms
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acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.\textsuperscript{28} This proved to be more than simply a formality as was immediately apparent when the Commission headed by Lord Pearce arrived in Rhodesia in January, 1972. It was soon clear from the chorus of noes that greeted the commissioners wherever they went that the settlement was in serious jeopardy.\textsuperscript{29} The developments in Rhodesia caused considerable alarm in South Africa. \textit{Rapport}, for example, headlined its report of the commission's first weeks in Rhodesia: "Blacks talk of revolution in Rhodesia - it looks like War - little hope left of settlement."\textsuperscript{30} What shocked South Africa was not just the threat to the settlement itself. Indeed, with the gradual erosion of sanctions and the passage of time, the dispute over Rhodesia's constitutional future was arguably no longer as great an embarrassment to South African policymakers as it had been in the 1960's. More important, perhaps, was the spectre of instability in Rhodesia; the widespread belief that Rhodesia would never be the same again.

Important though the differences between Rhodesia and South Africa that arose out of U.D.I. were, this in no way altered the trend towards greater Rhodesian dependence on South Africa economically. With the winding up of the Central African Federation, the pattern of high tariffs and declining trade\textsuperscript{31} that had characterized the Federation's economic relations with South Africa was reversed. In November 1964 a new trade agreement providing for a lowering of tariff barriers between the two countries was signed by South Africa and Rhodesia. It reflected according to Dr. Diedrichs "a growing desire on the part of South Africans and Rhodesians to strengthen their relations in all fields of common interest."\textsuperscript{32} It was followed in March 1965 by South Africa's grant of a R5 million loan to Rhodesia "to establish the Triangle irrigation development scheme at Chiredzi."\textsuperscript{33}
U.D.I itself considerably advanced the economic coalescing of South Africa and Rhodesia. South African exports and re-exports largely replaced British exports to Rhodesia and South African firms provided much of the post-U.D.I. capital investment in Rhodesia. The inevitability of her economic dependence on South Africa was quickly recognised in Rhodesia. In a speech to the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce in September 1967, the Chamber's President declared:

"South Africa will become Rhodesia's principal future source of development capital, and she is capable of exploiting the investment opportunities which we can provide even if only on a small scale to begin with." 35

He went on to indicate his support for some form of Southern African Common Market. "I personally believe our future lies as a member of a strong Southern African economic unit under the umbrella of South Africa." 36 This was a significant concession to political reality; the recognition that the risk that under regional integration "industrial development would tend to become concentrated even more in South Africa, with the other territories supplying primary products and labour and falling even further behind" 37 was unavoidable because of Rhodesia's isolation under sanctions. Subservience to South Africa of this kind had been precisely what the economic policy of Federation had been designed to avoid.

As in the case of Rhodesia, the 1960's was closer political and economic co-operation between South Africa and her Portuguese neighbours of Angola and Mozambique. Of primary importance was the change in Portuguese policy towards foreign capital investment. In 1962 Portugal began a reform of the laws which stringently restricted foreign investment;
"By 1965 these laws had been redesigned to act as an incentive to foreign investors. Foreign enterprises are no longer bound to have participating Portuguese capital and administration; they may repatriate capital, profits and dividends freely." 38

The changes reflected Portugal's concern after the African nationalist revolt in Angola in 1961 (and the latter revolt in Mozambique) to secure greater foreign financial support for her position in Africa. In particular, they opened the way for joint schemes involving South African and Western capital to exploit the two territories' economic potential. Two of these schemes, the Cabora-Bassa dam project and the Kunene River project have assumed a political and strategic importance for Southern Africa that transcends their immediate economic significance.

Politically, Portugal's relations with South Africa have been transformed by her growing isolation in the 1960's. After the Angolan uprising in February 1961 Portugal came under sharp attack internationally. Portugal's failure to develop her territories in Africa towards self-government, the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in Mozambique towards the end of 1964, her refusal to participate in sanctions against Rhodesia, and the resurgence of guerrilla activity in Angola, after Tshombe's removal from power in the Congo towards the end of 1965, have all since contributed to making Portugal's Africa policies a regular feature of the U.N. agenda. Further, the failure of Portugal's Western allies in N.A.T.O. to come to her defence has led Portugal progressively to lose her previous inhibitions, in view of South Africa's racial policies, about close relations with the Republic. During a visit to South Africa in July 1967, the Portuguese Foreign Minister claimed that "in this tormented world, the co-operation between South Africa and Portugal stands out as an example of what co-operation between nations should be." 39 This statement stands in marked contrast
to a declaration just over a decade earlier by Nogueira that "the moral condemnation of having to accept aid from South Africa would be too high a price to pay." 40

The first signs of a break-through in relations were modest. In February 1964 the South African-Portuguese Economic Institute was established by private business interests with official backing. Opening the new institute in Johannesburg the Portuguese Consul-General indicated its political dimension:

"In the economic field there is a vast potential to be developed between the Portuguese territories and South Africa. Economic co-operation will lead to the establishment of a stronghold against the disturbances from Northern Africa." 41

In October 1964 there was a new governmental agreement between South Africa and Portugal to promote trade and in the same year the South African government announced that it would provide finance for the building of a R5 million dam on the Kunene river bordering Angola and South West Africa - part of a wider scheme to utilize the river for the development of the area.

The possibilities these developments opened up were spelt out in an article by Austin Coates in Optima (March 1965). He saw the extension of South African capital into Angola and Mozambique as "destined possibly to be regarded as the most significant historical development in Southern Africa since colonial disengagement." 42 In particular, the entry of South African capital into the two territories brought the prospect that their economic potential could be developed to provide for further extensive white settlement, which the Portuguese regard as an essential element in their campaign against guerrillas and in bolstering their position in Africa.
In fact, projections of the future white population of Angola and Mozambique (by the mid 60's 225,000 and 100,000 respectively) have tended to centre on one scheme, the Cabora-Bassa dam project. (Cabora-Bassa is the narrow gorge of the Zambesi in the Tete province of Mozambique across which the dam will be built.) The scheme was first mooted in the late 1950's. Since then the Portuguese have spent over R10 million researching the project. The changes in the Portuguese law on foreign investment in the 1960's made the scheme a financial possibility and its implementation was finally assured early in 1968 when the South African Industrial Development Corporation guaranteed to contribute over R50 million to the cost of the first phase of the scheme and to buy 1000 megawatts of power annually from the scheme up to 1980 and thereafter, 1,800 megawatts annually. Details of the agreement were released in the House of Assembly by Vorster in April 1968 and in the same year tenders were sought for the construction of the first phase; tenders since awarded to a consortium of South Africa's mining and finance empire.

The first phase involving the construction of the main dam and the generating plant is due to be completed by 1974 at the cost of over R250 million. Later subsidiary dams will bring the eventual output of the scheme to 45 million kilowatt hours. Further, the dam is scheduled to irrigate 3.7 million acres of farmland. It is on this that the extravagant claim that the dam will attract a million new white immigrants to Mozambique is based. It was General Deslandes, the chief of the Portuguese defence staff who started the hare about one million whites being settled in Mozambique as a result of the Cabora-Bassa hydro-electric scheme. This hare has since been shot by Caetano. Nevertheless, should the scheme result in a trebling of the white population of Mozambique by the 1980s, to make a more conservative estimate of its potential, it would make a significant contribution to Portugal's
battle against the guerrillas. It is hardly surprising that the Governor of Mozambique should claim that "to speak of Mozambique is to speak of Cabora-Bassa." 46

Politically, the dam has acquired an importance to Southern Africa similar in some ways to that of the Aswan dam to the Middle East. (In fact, on completion Cabora-Bassa will generate 70% more electricity than the Egyptian dam).

The scheme has become a prime target of the Frelimo guerrillas and as early as 1968 according to the Economist the South African government sent two battalions to Tete province to meet the threat the guerrillas posed. 47 The Portuguese offensives against the guerrillas in 1970 and 1971 were largely designed to clear the Tete area. While protecting the actual building of the dam should not present too many problems, the 800 mile power lines taking the electricity to South Africa seem very likely to prove vulnerable to guerrilla attack. Indeed, the impact the guerrillas might make has been underlined by their success in ambushing trucks carrying equipment to the dam site and by their effect on the smaller Kunene river hydro-electric scheme.

In March 1968, the executive member responsible for power in the South West Africa Legislative Assembly (E. van Zijl) announced that the project would be unlikely to come into operation before 1978. The delay - it was originally hoped that the scheme would become functional in July 1971 - was attributed partly to guerrilla activity on the Angola - South West Africa border. 48 Nevertheless, a formal agreement to secure implementation of the scheme was signed between South Africa and Portugal in January 1969. Like Cabora-Bassa, the scheme will irrigate large areas of land for farming (1.23 million acres) and like Cabora-Bassa it is hoped that it will attract large numbers of white immigrants. A highly
A highly optimistic figure, to say the least, of half a million new settlers is given by Rhoodie and Cockram.

Zambia holds an important key to the success or failure of both schemes as the infiltration route of guerrillas both into southern Angola and Tete province. The site of Cabora-Bassa is in fact only 70 miles from the Zambian border. The two schemes alone provide compelling reasons for South African efforts to secure Zambia's inclusion in her sphere of influence. Indeed, Rhoodie optimistically assumes Zambia's inclusion.

"Yet Cabora-Bassa's message is more than merely electric. Recognising similar possibilities for Zambia and Kariba, and looking as well to the Kunene as a further power source, Van Eck's reasoning begins to have meaning on a far wider scale. It implies a closely knit Southern Africa and it implies too a signal contribution by an outward-looking Republic to all the African countries clustered in the south. Malawi, Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia, and Mozambique can all benefit by South Africa being used as a first stage buyer of power that they for the moment cannot consume." 49

However, tempting though the prospect of cheap power from the scheme might be, Zambia has steadfastly opposed Cabora-Bassa and taken a leading role in the campaign against it. The campaign is based, in part, on the fact that Rhodesia will be supplying cement and skilled manpower for the first phase and will be able to make use of the dam's cheap electricity in breach of sanctions. (It has met with limited success securing the withdrawal of a Swedish and an Italian firm.)
Cabora-Bassa is crucial to Portugal's position in Africa. Currently Portugal maintains 115,000 troops in Africa - 55,000 in Angola, 40,000 in Mozambique and 20,000 in Guinea - Bissau. She spends 45% of her national budget on defence, over 7% of her entire gross national product. There is fighting in 10 of Angola's 15 provinces and Frelimo at times virtually controls up to one-fifth of Mozambique. In these circumstances it is not surprising that doubts are often expressed about Portugal's staying power in Africa. "In the end Portugal must surely be driven out, if not entirely defeated. More effective guerrilla activity in the last year has even suggested the possibility of such a defeat." 51

However, there are others, who believe that Portugal's ability to survive in Africa has once again been underestimated. "I believe that the Portuguese are now winning the war against the guerrillas in Mozambique and that it will probably be over in, say, two years" 52 Another visitor to Mozambique, Major Patrick Wall reported that Frelimo had "been reduced to small groups whose offensive spirit seems to have been broken" 53 But a resurgence of guerrilla activity in September 1971 in Tete province on approach roads to the Cabora Bassa dam site made both these assessments (admittedly by two Conservative politicians) appear unrealistic. It seems, therefore, that much will depend in the end on South Africa's attitude towards the conflict in Mozambique, as it will in the case of Angola as well. Whitaker believes that "before a Portuguese defeat could come, however, one must foresee the deplorable if not frightening probability of massive South African intervention." 54 In the event of the guerrillas wars' continuing Portuguese - and for that matter South African - readiness to defend the status quo in Angola and Mozambique must depend in part on the success of
schemes like Cabora Bassa, which would both help offset the costs of the war and contribute to foreign business confidence in Portugal's political stand.

In 1968, Caetano succeeded Salazar as Prime Minister of Portugal after the latter's illness. Despite initial hopes to the contrary, he soon indicated that he intended to pursue his predecessor's policy and maintain Portugal in Africa. In a speech shortly after he came into office, he spelt out his own commitment to white supremacy.

"At many points our interests coincide with those of South Africa and Rhodesia, based on the conviction that progress in that zone needs the stable presence of the white man. That is why for example, we cannot be indifferent to the fate of Rhodesia, whose main outlet to the sea is through our port of Beira." 55

Like Muller, he made clear the importance he attached to a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute. In our interests, in that of Southern Africa and on behalf of world peace, we would truly like to see Rhodesia and Britain agree on a formula to permit an honourable settlement and end the present grave situation." 56

Nevertheless, in this context domestic pressures in Portugal that favour disengagement from Africa should be mentioned. In particular, the business community would like a closer association with the European Economic Community especially in view of its enlargement and the running down of the European Free Trade Association of which Portugal is a member. They have, therefore, pressed for a relaxation of "the present strictly centralized Portuguese administrative system" 57 as a step towards greater economic integration with Europe.
In 1971 Caetano acceded to some of their demands by announcing constitutional reforms granting greater autonomy to Portugal's African territories. However, at the same time Caetano made it clear that there was no question of Portugal's ending its commitments in Africa. Despite this there were some mumblings on the right against the very modest step taken.

The strengthening of relations between Portugal and South Africa has been reflected in a number of top level visits between the two countries including a visit by Vorster to Lisbon in June 1970 and in improved communications. A tarred road between Luanda in Angola and Windhoek in South West Africa is nearing completion, while in February 1969 a R50 million undersea cable linking South Africa and (metropolitan) Portugal was opened with a conversation between Vorster and Caetano. There has also been a large expansion of air traffic between the two countries. In 1969, Dr. Muller visited Lisbon where he was awarded the Grand Cross of the Order of Christ. A theme of the visit, which reciprocated that of Dr. Nogueira to South Africa in 1967 was anti-communism. Dr. Muller declared:

"Our forces stand as a bulwark against the domination of the African continent by foreign powers. We may justly claim that we patrol a gap in the free world's defences which no major power has yet seen fit to fill."

In short, co-operation between Portugal and South Africa goes very much further than South Africa's involvement in the Cabora-Bassa and Kunene river projects. Implicit in South Africa's relations with Portugal has been a political commitment to the maintenance of the status quo in Angola and Mozambique, despite speculation about where South Africa's ultimate interests lie.

It is a point that needs to be underlined. Not only has insufficient
attention been paid in studies of South African foreign policy to the coalscing of white-ruled Southern Africa in the second half of the 1960's but the limited success of the outward-looking policy has led to suggestions that the existence of black governments in Angola and Mozambique might make no essential difference to South Africa's co-operation with the two territories. It is an argument that has even penetrated verligte circles. The discovery that South Africa could evolve friendly relations with African states and that black no less than white governments have to take account of economic realities and resentment that South Africa was being forced to bear part of the cost of Rhodesia's reckless unilateral act of independence led some verligtes to the conclusion that South Africa might in the end be better off with a Banda-type government in Salisbury. It is a short step to the application of a similar argument to the Portuguese territories and the realisation that what happens to South Africa's three white neighbours will not necessarily determine the Republic's future.

Certainly, the argument that black governments in the three territories by virtue of their economic dependence on South Africa, would be forced to come to terms with the Republic and might, in fact, in certain circumstances, create a more effective buffer against guerrillas than white rule is quite persuasive and provides a ready answer to proponents of a crude domino theory. However, the argument does have essential shortcomings and limitations. Firstly, it should not be taken to mean that verligtes who have speculated in this way about the future would be in favour of black rule in these three countries becoming a goal of policy. On the contrary it is a question of pointing out that if the worst came to the worst, there is more than one option open to the South African government.
Secondly, economic realities in the case of Angola certainly would not dictate that she should align herself with South Africa. In fact, Angola's economic ties with the Republic are as yet relatively insignificant. Further the option of re-orientating their economic development to the north over a number of years would be open to Rhodesia and to a lesser extent Mozambique (i.e. doing what in a modest way Botswana is doing). Thirdly, (and most importantly) there is the question of transition. It seems inconceivable that the white settlers in the three territories would peacefully acquiesce in changes to a black government. The Fearless terms, which the Rhodesian regime rejected, stopped well short of envisaging majority rule in even the near future. Further, unilateral action by the settlers of Angola and Mozambique could not be ruled out if Portugal sought a compromise with the African nationalists.

In these circumstances, the argument under-estimates the emotional context of foreign policy formulation. It seems doubtful whether in fact the South African government would have any option (or would even consider any alternative) but to commit the Republic, were white rule to be seriously threatened in any of the three territories. Indeed, the common adherence of the Portuguese and Rhodesia to a doctrine of white supremacy is an important and, thanks to the outward-looking policy, sometimes under-rated aspect of co-operation in Southern Africa. As far as economic benefits to South Africa are concerned, these depend perhaps more on the stability of the governments in power in these territories than on their composition, though economic co-operation with black governments might prove more difficult, especially after any South African involvement to uphold white rule.
The foundations of the outward-looking policy were laid by Vorster's meeting with Jonathan in January 1967. Since then, the policy has achieved a measure of success in securing friendly or at least pragmatic, relations with a number of African states, which have contributed to some improvement in South Africa's international position. South Africa has also had some success in exploiting divisions of opinion in independent Africa. However, the success of the outward-looking policy should not be exaggerated. Since the meeting with Jonathan, South Africa has as yet secured only one really major breakthrough, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi. And while their dependence on South Africa has dictated to the former High Commission territories their policies of pragmatic relations with the Republic, they have stopped well short of giving South Africa wholehearted support in international organizations.

Indeed, South Africa's relations with the former High Commission territories since independence have not been without their difficulties. Both Lesotho and Botswana have at different times given cause for concern in Pretoria; Lesotho largely because of her political instability, Botswana because of the independent attitude taken by her President Sir Seretse Khama. Shortly after Lesotho attained independence, the King's demands for greater powers led to disturbances in December 1966 resulting in the death of 11 people. Jonathan's response to the crisis was to place the King under house arrest and to arrest the leaders of the two opposition parties. The crisis was resolved when the King agreed "to sign a pledge to adhere to his role of constitutional monarch". In South Africa, there was a sigh of relief that the dispute had been so quickly resolved, but uneasiness that instability would recur.
It did in January 1970 after the country’s first general election since independence. When it became apparent that the opposition Congress Party was winning, the Prime Minister (Chief Jonathan) stopped further counting of votes, suspended the constitution and declared a state of emergency. He alleged that there had been irregularities and intimidation of voters and declared the elections invalid. Members of the opposition were gaolled. Although the South African Broadcasting Corporation rushed to defend Jonathan’s actions the South African government was not directly implicated in Jonathan's seizure of power. Indeed, the coup was an embarassment to Vorster and his colleagues as it made their task of selling the outward-looking policy to the electorate more difficult. The fact that the Congress Party, which Vorster described as being composed of Peking Communists, in effect won the elections gave the United Party's argument that Bantustans could become springboards for communism a new lease of life in the run-up to the South African general election.

While Jonathan, in fact, stayed in office, the manner in which he did so hardly inspired confidence in the future peace and stability of Lesotho. At first there were widespread fears that the country would be plunged into chaos and civil war. However, while there were some riots and attempts to resist the regime, over a period of time Jonathan did finally succeed in consolidating his hold on power. The British government recognized his government in June and resumed aid in August. By September, Jonathan was sufficiently confident of his position to attend the O.A.U. summit in Addis Ababa and to visit Ghana and Nigeria. From the outset, the South African government stressed its non-involvement. Vorster told the House of Assembly in February "we are simply continuing as if nothing has happened". Indirectly, however, Jonathan owed much to South Africa." She (South Africa) has also given assistance -
financially and with transport - to Chief Jonathan's Police Mobile Unit in suppressing popular opinion to his coup. That is to say, South Africa provided Jonathan with the original support for the setting up of and equipping of the unit. Secondly, the fact that key positions in the civil service were held by white South Africans helped Jonathan to maintain power.

"In Lesotho . . . . the Chief Justice, Chief Electoral Officer, head of the radio, Chief Legal Adviser, Manager of the Lesotho National Development Corporation and several advisers are all White South Africans. These South Africans played an important part - albeit generally by acts of omission rather than commission - in Chief Jonathan's coup in 1970. For example, the recall of the Chief Justice on the day of the coup meant that Chief Jonathan's action could not be tested in Lesotho nor could the plea of habeas corpus on behalf of the detained opposition be brought before the courts. This was a significant factor in entrenching Jonathan in the early days of the coup."

However, despite his dependence on South Africa, Chief Jonathan has not been a willing tool of the South African government. He has repeatedly declared "I am not a Matanzima" and has fiercely resisted South African suggestions that he pay a "state" visit to the Transkei. He has also jealously maintained his country's position in the O.A.U. and in October 1971 he even went so far as to warn South Africa that "the end result of its policy of apartheid would be a violent confrontation, internally, between the blacks and whites." This unusual attack - in general, Jonathan while not defending apartheid had avoided direct criticism of South African policy - brought a warning, in turn, from Vorster.

"I want to say in all friendliness to Chief Jonathan that there are many things I can say about Lesotho, but I do not do so for the sake of friendship. Do not tempt me too far in this connection."
But far more disturbing to South Africa than Jonathan's verbal attack on apartheid has been his ambivalent attitude towards dialogue. At the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore in January 1971, for instance, Jonathan - no doubt hoping to re-establish his credibility with African states after the coup in Lesotho the year before - disassociated himself from Houphouet-Boigny's call for a dialogue with South Africa.

"I do not go along with the proposition for a dialogue as outlined by the President of the Ivory Coast. I stand fully behind the Lusaka Manifesto, whose terms I fully endorse for a dialogue. What I would now like to see is for the O.A.U. formally to convey the Lusaka Manifesto to Pretoria to get their official reactions. I have had talks with leaders in Pretoria. My own impressions from these talks is that the views of Pretoria are likely to be divided."

Nonetheless, later in the year Chief Jonathan made it clear that his understanding of the Lusaka Manifesto differed considerably from that of Houphouet-Boigny's main critics, Kaunda and Nyerere. Indeed, at the O.A.U. Council of Ministers in June, Lesotho opposed a resolution from Tanzania which declared the dialogue proposal to be contrary to O.A.U. decisions regarding South Africa. Once again, however, Lesotho failed to give her backing to Houphouet-Boigny's initiative.

"Of those who spoke in favour of a dialogue, only Malawi, and Madagascar supported the Ivory Coast's approach. The rest, led by Lesotho, strongly insisted that any negotiations should be held within the framework of the Lusaka Manifesto. They also insisted that an essential precondition for starting talks was a positive indication by Mr. Vorster that he was willing to state publicly that he accepted the right of Africans to full political rights in the Republic."
Yet after the conference there appeared to be a shift, at least in emphasis, in Lesotho's policy. In October, Maseru was the venue for informal discussions among delegates from ten African states on a suitable formula for dialogue. In South Africa Chief Jonathan's role in bringing together pro-dialogue states was widely applauded. However, evidence has subsequently come to light that Jonathan waged caution and argued in favour of a postponement of further moves towards dialogue until a joint approach by the O.A.U. could be worked out. "There is no doubt" concludes Africa that Lesotho's attitude contributed to the fact that dialogue has not got off the ground so far.

Nonetheless, Jonathan's displays of independence, galling though they must be to Pretoria, should not be exaggerated. There is no question, for instance, of Lesotho's abandoning her policy of peaceful co-existence with South Africa or that Lesotho geographically and economically the Republic's captive, would take steps to diminish her economic dependence on South Africa. Indeed, the economic development of the territory largely rests on the success of co-operation with the Republic. In this context, the proposed Oxbow hydro-electric scheme is of particular importance to Lesotho. The feasibility of the scheme, which has been under discussion during the last decade, depends on the sale of water and power to South Africa. In April 1970 a World Bank Team visited Lesotho and South Africa and after talks with the South African Department of Water Affairs gave the go-ahead to the first phase of the scheme, a water supply project. This phase is expected to cost approximately R25 million and when completed to supply South Africa with between 100 and 150 million gallons of water daily. The decision on the main phase of the scheme, the hydro-electric project has been deferred and there are doubts that it will be developed.
But whatever happens, the mainstay of Lesotho's dependence on South Africa will remain migratory labour. Each year approximately 150,000 Lesotho citizens or nearly half the territory's adult male population are absent from their families to earn a living in South Africa. The contribution this makes to Lesotho's economy can be gauged from the fact that in 1964 - the last year for which comparative statistics are available - "the remittances of Basotho workers employed in South Africa was ... one-and-half times larger than the value of Lesotho's exports of goods and services." A plea by Lesotho's Minister of Works in 1968 for an extension of South Africa's policy of border industries to Lesotho exemplifies the place of migratory labour in the territory's economy.

"We want South Africa to encourage industrialists to build close to our borders, so that family ties need not be broken through workers having to travel hundreds of miles to seek jobs." In addition, Lesotho receives technical and financial aid from South Africa including a modest contribution - under half a million rand to her annual budget. In these circumstances, it is very unlikely that any Lesotho government will make any fundamental changes in its basic policy of friendly relations with South Africa.

Swaziland's relations with South Africa since her independence in September 1968 have largely been uneventful. In 1969 an agreement was concluded between South Africa and Swaziland whereby "the Republic will recruit, pay and equip South Africans to work in Swaziland's local administration." Swaziland also receives considerable technical assistance from South Africa in other fields; most notably, there is close co-operation between the police forces of the two countries. In March 1971 Swaziland's Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini Dlamini had talks with Vorster in Cape Town, reportedly about the construction of a rail link between the two countries. Politically, Swaziland's conservative government...
has maintained low key relations with Pretoria. Like the
government of Lesotho it has jealously guarded its position in the
O.A.U. while giving cautious approval to the principle of dialogue.
Economically, Swaziland is relatively well endowed with natural
resources and consequently not especially dependent on South Africa
for employment with less than 20,000 Swazis working each year in
the Republic. Aside from her geographical position it is from
the involvement of South African companies in exploiting her
resources and the ownership of land by South Africans that Swaziland's
dependence springs. And it is over this issue that tension between
the two countries might conceivably develop in the future.
In December 1971 the Swaziland government introduced controls
that made land deals involving non-nationals subject to the approval
of a special board. Tougher action would almost certainly
provoke a South African protest.

Botswana has gone very much further than either Swaziland or Lesotho
inasserting her independence from South Africa, while at the same
time maintaining friendly relations with the Republic. During 1968,
Botswana's President, Sir Seretse Khama, was treated in a private
"white" ward in Johannesburg's General Hospital for a serious
liver complaint. His wife also received V.I.P. treatment, in
marked contrast to that the Khamas received twenty years earlier
when they were declared prohibited immigrants by the Malan government.
After his illness, Sir Seretse met and held discussions with Vorster.
He thanked Vorster for the treatment he had received in hospital
and expressed his desire for friendly relations. In general though,
the Botswanan President has balanced his readiness to co-operate
economically with South Africa and to prevent Botswana's use by
guerrillas, with a policy of strengthening his country's relations
with independent Africa, particularly Zambia with whom she shares
a common, though disputed, boundary.

In particular, Khama has expressed his determination not to compromise
the non-racial basis of his state and has explained his reservations
about establishing full diplomatic relations with South Africa.

"I have made clear that Botswana will never in word or deed give any comfort to the advocates of race supremacy. Our position makes it essential to maintain diplomatic contacts with South Africa. But since independence we have always made it clear that we shall not consider an exchange of diplomatic representatives with South Africa until we are entirely satisfied that South Africa can fully guarantee that Botswana's representatives will in all respects, at all times and in all places be treated in the same way as diplomats from other countries." 26

He has also indicated that he intends to diminish Botswana's dependence on South Africa as far as possible. Significantly, he is prepared to make sacrifices to achieve this objective.

"While heavily dependent upon South Africa as an employer of its able-bodied men, as a source of imports and specialized services, and through membership of the customs and monetary union, Botswana does not look to the Republic for development aid to a great extent." 27

Certainly, the remittances of migrant workers in South Africa - some 52,000 in 1964 - make an important contribution to Botswana's economy amounting to a quarter of the value of the country's exports. 28 However, Botswana is by no means as dependent on this source of income as Lesotho and indeed, Botswana's as yet undeveloped mineral potential hold out the prospect of a considerable reduction in the importance of remittances. In addition, by exploiting his country's geographical link with Zambia, Khama hopes to establish another outlet for Botswana's imports and exports "which will permit us to enlarge our trade with independent Africa." 29

Politically, while not departing from a policy of peaceful co-existence, Khama has adopted positions clearly opposed to South Africa's major foreign policy objectives. He has gone on record in support of the Lusaka Manifesto and in opposition to the Cabora Bassa scheme, the Rhodesian regime, British arms sales to South Africa and to dialogue.
Khama's independent attitude has not gone without notice in South Africa where the Nationalist press has carried increasingly hostile comments on his attempts to lessen Botswana's reliance on South Africa. Indeed, a marked deterioration in relations between the two countries took place in 1970 following Botswana's decision in March to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and South Africa's claim that Botswana had no common border with Zambia except at a point. South Africa's claim was first made in February and repeated in April after an announcement that the United States had offered to assist Botswana to build an international highway linking the country with Zambia, with a bridge near Kazungula. Following the announcement the South African government put strong pressure on Botswana not to build the bridge (of which the border claim was just an aspect) and it now seems probable that Botswana will content herself for the moment with the highway and an expansion of the existing ferry with Zambia.

The kind of pressure the Republic is capable of putting on Botswana has been recorded by Africa Confidential which mentions in some detail a previous example of South African arm-twisting. Between 1967 and 1969 the South African army was engaged in building a forward strike base in the Caprivi Strip. The convoys of equipment were sent through Botswana. When Khama objected, the South African government threatened to withdraw South African Railways' refrigerated cars from the Botswana rail network; cars absolutely essential to the country's beef export industry, should he attempt to stop the convoys.

While the difficulties South Africa has encountered in her relations with Botswana and Lesotho should not be exaggerated, an underlying uneasiness about relations with all the former High Commission territories is detectable beneath the surface of the propaganda of endless photographs of the leaders of the different countries shaking hands with Vorster or Muller.
Claims like Vorster's in November 1968 that "South Africa got along better with former protectorates than when they were under British control." mask South Africa's concern that relations with the former High Commission territories may yet prove explosive. The concern stems from the realisation that expediency and economic necessity and certainly not political acceptance lies at the heart of the territories' policy towards the Republic.

The Nationalist press's reaction to the United States Government's announcement that it intended to help the three territories to reduce their dependence on South Africa brought these thoughts to the fore. "It is an illusion that sees Botswana's and even Lesotho's love for South Africa as anything more than cupboard love." American policy "could be interpreted by these states as a green light to lessen ...... their ties with South Africa ........ It will raise them to a position where they too will be able to join Africa's militancy against us." However, revealing comments of this kind which recognize the existence of a fundamental incompatibility between South Africa's white supremacist policies and majority rule elsewhere on the continent are rare - especially in verligte papers like Die Beeld.

Much has also been made in propaganda terms of South Africa's generosity in providing technical assistance and aid both on an official and voluntary basis to the former High Commission territories. A more critical test of South African policy towards the territories is provided by the re-negotiation of the terms of the customs union. In December 1969 representatives of the governments of Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, and South Africa signed a new customs union agreement which replaced that of 1910. The old agreement provided for the application of a common external tariff at South African
rates for the whole customs union area and laid down what percentage share of the customs and excise revenue pool each member would receive. By contrast, the new agreement does not rigidly insist on a free exchange of goods and contains provisions to protect the infant industries of the three less developed partners. In addition, it incorporates a more complex system of revenue distribution that is more generous to the former High Commission territories, as can be seen from the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1910 formula</th>
<th>New agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>98.68903</td>
<td>97.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>0.27622</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>0.885575</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>0.14900</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Calculated from data for the fiscal year 1965 - 6

However, South Africa's generosity in making these concessions should not be exaggerated. Indeed, it was the price of preventing either Swaziland or Botswana leaving the union altogether. Nonetheless, Landell-Mills believes that "the 1969 Agreement is a considerable advance on that of 1910," though it "cannot be regarded as adequately tackling the regional differences within the Southern African geographical unit." In short, South African goodwill did not extend to significantly loosening her dominant economic grip on the three territories.

The major achievement of the outward-looking policy has undoubtedly been the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi. The first indication of such a breakthrough by South Africa on the continent was a top level Malawian trade mission to Cape Town in March 1967, though there were earlier indications that Malawi's
President Dr. Banda would not pursue a policy of strong opposition to the South African government. In fact, by 1965 Dr. Banda's disillusionment with militant African nationalism had become apparent and as early as 1966 South Africa provided the finance for a sugar mill in Malawi. The trade mission - led by three Malawian Cabinet Ministers - had highly publicized talks with Vorster and other members of the South African government.

In practical terms the result was a new trade agreement between the two countries which replaced the restrictive 1960 agreement between South Africa and the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In particular, the new agreement provided for the entry into the Republic "of certain Malawian commodities either free of any customs duty, or at South Africa's most-favoured-nation tariff." As a consequence "Malawi has achieved a slightly larger market for some of her agriculture exports - notably tea, tobacco, coffee, ground nuts and tung oil."

Politically, the visit was a great success and the Malawian ministers evidently made a favourable impression on the South African Prime Minister. After the visit it became clear that the South African government was considering exchanging diplomatic relations with Malawi. It was a step South Africa had previously been reluctant to take (for example, Verwoerd had ruled it out), in view of the difficulties likely to arise in South Africa from the presence of black envoys. However, in this case the opportunity offered to South Africa of dramatically ending her isolation in Africa and the zest with which Banda was prepared to defend his links with South Africa proved decisive and in December 1967 Dr. Banda was able to announce in Parliament that South Africa and Malawi had agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives. Faced with right-wing criticism Vorster argued that he was simply following the policy of his predecessor.
"Such relations are not established overnight but are established after a long process of negotiation and preparation. It is true that these relations were established in my time, but the negotiations did not commence in my time. If my predecessor had still been there the establishment of these relations would have taken place in his time." 41

It was not altogether convincing and probably a more important factor in re-assuring the South African electorate was Banda's attitude towards the new links. He has not just attempted to excuse the links expediently on grounds of Malawi's economic dependence on the white south, but has made a positive virtue of his stance towards the Republic. Further, instead of attempting to loosen his country's economic ties with the south, he has strengthened them so as to enable Malawi to extract the greatest possible benefit out of her position as "the Devil's disciple." 42 Banda has vigorously defended his actions, and made strong attacks on the policies of his critics."

"My first duty is to look after the interests of four million people .... I have to be realistic. Colonial geography and history are against us. We cannot boycott South Africa, Rhodesia or Portuguese Mozambique - that would mean the breakdown of Malawi's economy." (Secondly) boycotting South Africa because South Africa has apartheid ...... (would be) apartheid in reverse on our part. If discrimination is bad when practised by white on black, is it good when practised by black on white?" 43

There is nonetheless a certain irony in Banda's advocacy of links with South Africa for in part the benefits Malawi derives from her special relationship with South Africa depend on her remaining out of step with the rest of Africa. Were many other African states prepared to follow her lead, the price the Republic is prepared to pay in terms of financial aid for Malawi's political support would most certainly drop. South African aid includes an 8 million rand loan to finance the first phase of Malawi's new capital at Lilongwe
and an 11 million rand loan from the South African Industrial Development Corporation to meet the costs of a rail link between Malawi and the Port of Nacala in Mozambique. Malawi has also been able to attract a limited amount of private investment from South Africa, particularly in her tourist industry, through which she hopes to expand local employment and add to her foreign exchange earnings.

However, much more important than even financial aid is Malawi's dependence on the remittances of migrant workers in South Africa. The value of these remittances was estimated in 1970 to be 7 million rand, almost the value of Malawi's total imports from South Africa in that year. Indeed, the chief feature of Malawi's economy is the export of labour. Compared to 180,000 in wage employment in Malawi, there are estimated to be 300,000 Malawians working in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Zambia. Of these approximately 129,000 are said to work in South Africa or considerably in excess of the minimum figure of 80,000 that is cited by some writers. But whatever the correct figure is, the contribution of migrant workers in South Africa to Malawi's economy is clearly massive, especially as the earnings and remittances of those in Zambia and Rhodesia do not match those in South Africa. Further political pressures in Zambia and Rhodesia may well make it more difficult for Malawians to secure employment in these countries.

In fact, in economic terms Malawi is arguably as dependent on South Africa as either Swaziland or Botswana, despite her comparative geographical remoteness from the Republic.

South Africa's main _quid pro quo_ from Malawi has been political support in the Organization for African Unity, the United Nations and the Commonwealth. For example, Malawi even refused to support
the moderately worded Lusaka Manifesto of June 1969 and in the Commonwealth has supported the British government's decision to sell arms to South Africa. Like Lesotho, the Malawian government has placed white South Africans - seconded from the Republic's civil service - in a number of important positions. Malawi's Director of Information, David van der Spuy is a South African as is the head of the National Malawi Airways, Garth van Rooyen. So, too, is the head of the Malawi Development Corporation, A.C.F. Cornish - Bowden. 50

A further indication of the growing ties between the two countries was the establishment of a direct air link between Zomba and Johannesburg in November 1969.

The possibility of military co-operation between the two governments has also been raised. Following a speech by Dr. Carel de Wet that Malawi was "South Africa's most forward springboard against the communist dangers threatening from over the Indian Ocean" 51 there were 'rumours that South Africa was to be granted base facilities at Lilongwe airport." 52 They were officially denied. Earlier, during 1969 there was a top level military mission (in civilian clothes to avoid recognition and comment) to Malawi after insurgents led by a former Cabinet colleague of Dr. Banda's had eluded Malawi's security forces. There were rumours then that South Africa would be prepared to give Dr. Banda military support for his position; a view given added credibility by the presence of a top level military attache Colonel van Niekerk, in South Africa's five man delegation in Malawi. 53

But the most spectacular aspect of relations between the two countries has undoubtedly been Dr. Banda's visit to South Africa in August 1971 which followed trips to Malawi by Dr. Hilgard Muller in 1969 and Vorster in May 1970. His triumphal progress through South Africa was applauded by widely differing shades of opinion.
Rapport declared:

"South Africa stands within a completely new era. And it is President Kamuzu Banda who has made us realise this. The tremendous success of the small Africa leader's visit has shown the government that the country is prepared for what separate development is ultimately going to mean."

The view was expressed in the Rand Daily Mail that "South Africa will never be the same again." while Japie Basson typified Opposition comment in declaring that "no man has made apartheid look so out of place as Dr. Banda has." According to Rapport, however, "people who say that Dr. Banda came to shake apartheid do not know what it is about." Indeed, Banda's major achievement was that his presence sparked off a lively debate about the domestic consequences for South Africa of his trip.

The debate reached absurd proportions when Banda held a multi-racial banquet in honour of his hosts. The Nationalist press insisted that the banquet was "multi-national (veelvolkig)" rather than multi-racial. Only slightly less absurd was a description of the banquet in the Rand Daily Mail.

"Most of the white were of exalted rank and for most of them it was the first time they had sat down to a meal with black people. For most of the blacks it was their first venture into a white dining-room. And everyone got on famously ....."

The temporary - and calculated - relaxation of apartheid for the Malawian President by the South African government did create some doubts about the revolutionary implications of the visit. That these doubts did not gain wider currency in the English language press was in part due to Banda's own dominant personality and his occasional displays of independence through ironic guips about apartheid. Malawi's dependence on South Africa and the
fact that one of the purposes of Banda's visit was a request for further financial aid was almost completely overshadowed by the apparently radical impact of the visit on South African society. In retrospect, the propaganda value of the exercise, though that too can be exaggerated, would seem to have been a good deal more concrete than any psychological threat to apartheid. After all, few would suggest that the experience of public integration abroad by increasing numbers of white South Africans through foreign travel, represents a serious challenge to apartheid. The impact on black South Africa is, admittedly more difficult to gauge. My own feeling is that the trip may have raised black expectations in a more lasting way than can be said of its impact on white attitudes.

Finally, South Africa's relations with Malagasy Republic should be mentioned. Malagasy's President, Philibert Tsiranana was an early convert to Banda's point of view on South Africa and since 1968 when a Malagasy trade mission visited South Africa and a twice weekly air service between the two countries inaugurated has taken steps to form closer ties with South Africa. In November 1970 the South African Foreign Minister, Dr. Muller, visited Malagasy reaching agreement on R2,320,000 loan to Tsiranana's government for the improvement of transport facilities on the island of Nosse Be. In addition, the South African Industrial Development Corporation has agreed to provide credit facilities for a five-star hotel. Like Malawi, Malagasy hopes to become a haunt for wealthy South African tourists. Muller's visit was reciprocated by a Malagasy diplomatic and economic mission to South Africa in August 1971, which led to the creation of a permanent commission to explore further avenues of co-operation.
Apart from re-paying Tsiranana's support for dialogue, a further motive has been suggested by Africa Confidential for South Africa's generosity towards Malagasy and that is, that the South African navy is seeking "bunkering and other shore facilities in Northern Madagascar for its patrols watching the sea lanes into Dar-es-Salaam"\(^5\), though, despite the obvious strategic attraction of Malagasy's position in the Indian Ocean, it needs to be said that suggestions of this kind always have to be treated with caution. In any event, recent events in Malagasy\(^6\) have dramatically set back the prospects of future co-operation between the two countries providing a revealing example of the vulnerability of the outward-looking policy to political instability in Africa.
The original purpose of the outward-looking policy may be seen to have been firstly, an attempt to find a *modus vivendi*; with black states on South Africa's borders and secondly, an attempt to counteract the organized efforts of African states through the O.A.U. to isolate the Republic diplomatically, politically, and economically. Further, winning acceptance in Africa has increasingly come to be seen as offering the Republic the opportunity of restoring some of her international prestige - severely damaged by world reaction to the policy of apartheid and the massacre at Sharpeville. In part, too, South Africa recognizes that friendly relations with other African states are necessary if South Africa is to present to the world an image of stability; an important precondition of foreign business confidence. Finally, the realization has grown that South Africa's political and diplomatic relations with Africa ultimately help to determine the economic role the country is likely to play in the continent's future.

Since the outward-looking policy has come to the fore African states themselves have been forced to reconsider their own strategy towards South Africa. The first major reassessment of policy involving the main body of African states took place at a meeting of East and Central African states in Lusaka in April 1969. It was prompted in particular by Zambian and Tanzanian fears that South Africa and Portugal planned massive retaliation against guerilla havens within their borders. The result was a remarkable joint declaration by the countries taking part in the conference. The declaration which has become known as the Lusaka Manifesto, was a significant recognition by the African states that they could not expect immediate success in their campaign against the white-ruled states of Southern Africa.

"On the objective of liberation..... we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have
always preferred and we still prefer to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change."

In September (1969) the manifesto was endorsed by the O.A.U. While in November a resolution was passed by the United Nations General Assembly welcoming the declaration and commending it to the attention of all states and peoples. Two states (Portugal and South Africa) voted against the resolution and two more (Cuba and Malawi) abstained.

However, the almost universal approval given the Lusaka Manifesto masked the fact that interpretations of what it meant widely differed. The more conservative African states, which had always been uneasy about a policy of confrontation towards Southern Africa, saw the document as representing an implicit recognition of the failure of the O.A.U's strategy and a step towards a policy of negotiation. Attempting to exploit the differences of opinion in Africa, the South African Prime Minister made a speech in September 1970 inviting African states to discuss non-aggression pacts with the Republic. Vorster's speech did not initially achieve any success and his offer was for the most part roundly denounced by African Leaders. However, on November 4, the often artificial solidarity of the main body of African states on the question of Southern Africa was finally and apparently irretrievably broken. In a speech in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast's President, Houphouet-Boigny declared that "we will not achieve the solution to the problem of apartheid in South Africa by resorting to force of arms" and called for a
dialogue with the South African government. His speech was hailed as a major break-through in South Africa, while it resulted in heated recriminations in much of the rest of Africa. Initial reports suggested that in addition to states with whom South Africa already had close ties, Houphouet-Boigny could count on the support of the Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, Togo, and Gabon, though from the outset the list of states apparently prepared to back the Ivory Coast President's initiative was to change from week to week.

In December in a speech to Ghana's National Assembly, the Ghanaian Prime Minister, Dr. Busia indicated his support for dialogue, but he did so in terms that carefully preserved the O.A.U.'s objective of the liberation of Southern Africa.

"Let me emphasize that dialogue, as we conceive it, is neither a declaration of peace nor an acceptance of the status quo, but another weapon in the armoury of the strategy for the elimination of apartheid and the erection of a multi-racial society in South Africa. Dialogue and armed pressures are not necessarily incompatible in this strategy." Busia's speech underlined the fact that a wide gulf existed between the Republic's understanding of dialogue and that of most African states.

In January 1971 a meeting of O.C.A.M. (an economic community of 15 francophone African states) would only "take note" of Houphouet-Boigny's proposals in its final communique. Before this, The Star had come to the conclusion:

"South Africa's over-enthusiastic welcome of the Ivory Coast's proposal has seriously compromised any chance of its success. The Portuguese view that the proposals from Abidjan were a grim reply to the vociferous stand of Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda has also done Ivory Coast's peaceful diplomacy initiative little good and experienced French observers consider that Mr. Houphouet-Boigny's backers are not as
numerous as he had perhaps hoped. Gabon for example gave unqualified support almost immediately the policy was announced then later said Dr. Kaunda's ideas also deserved consideration.

In April, in an effort to discredit Zambia, a leading opponent of dialogue, Vorster disclosed correspondence between himself and Kaunda and accused the Zambian President of being a "double-dealer". However, this attempt to isolate Kaunda, a significant reversal of the South African government's previous policy of attempting to convert the Zambian President to a policy of pragmatic relations with the Republic failed, partly because the Zambian government itself immediately took the initiative by publishing the correspondence.

Further, Vorster's disclosure seems likely to have the result that, as an article in The Star laconically put it, "few African leaders will trust Mr. Vorster as a pen-friend".

A more decisive blow to dialogue came in June at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the O.A.U. in Addis Ababa. The outcome was succinctly summarized by Colin Legum:

"The size of the defeat of the Ivory Coast's initiative for a dialogue is revealed by these figures: of the O.A.U's 41 members, 37 were present (absentees were Congo-Kinshasa, Uganda, Central African Republic, and Mauritius), five walked out of the debate (Ivory Coast, Gabon, Dahomey, Togo, Upper Volta) and five favoured some form of a dialogue (Malawi, Lesotho, Madagascar, Ghana, and Swaziland). The remaining 27 were uniformly antagonistic."

After Banda's visit to South Africa in August, General Amin of Uganda cautiously emerged as a supporter of dialogue but after South Africa rejected his plans to send a fact-findings mission to the Republic, immediately reversed his policy. Other efforts to revive dialogue including a private visit in October to South Africa by a Minister of State in the Ivory Coast government have similarly made little headway, partly because the majority of
African states still in favour of dialogue wish to avoid a conflict with the O.A.U. over the issue and partly because while the South African government has indicated its willingness to explain the policy of separate development, it has made clear that there is no question of changing the policy. In January 1972 dialogue suffered a further setback with the overthrow of the Ghanaian Prime Minister, Dr. Busia in a military coup. Indeed, at present the divisions among African states over dialogue appear to have diminished and there seems little immediate prospect of the South African government's repeating its success of 1971 of splitting the O.A.U. on the issue or that it will succeed in seriously undermining support for the guerrilla movements in Southern Africa.

The most controversial aspect of South African foreign policy on the continent is the outward-looking policy. As a consequence the Republic's support for the Portuguese, for instance, has tended to be neglected as has South African activity outside normal diplomatic and economic channels. "As early as 1965, (South Africa) set up a R2 m fund to support sympathetic elements in other states. The use to which these funds, voted annually, are put have never been disclosed". When the Bureau of State Security was established in 1969, it was admitted that one of the functions of the new organization would be to operate inside, independent Africa. Of course, the earliest instance of South African involvement of this kind in independent Africa was her support for Katangese secession in 1960. The purpose was obvious enough - to thwart the militant policies of the Congo's new Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba.

"Lumumba had once proclaimed that the liberation of the Congo would be the first phase of the complete independence of Central and Southern Africa and he had set his next objectives very precisely; support of the nationalist movements in Rhodesia, in Angola, in South Africa. A unified Congo having at its head a militant anticolonialist constituted a real danger for South Africa."
Far more opportunistic and more secretive has been the support South Africa gave Biafra during the Nigerian civil war.

"Although the details of South Africa's efforts to capitalize upon the three year Nigerian civil war have not been fully revealed, by late 1969 three arms shipments a week were reportedly leaving South Africa for Libreville, Gabon for transhipment to Biafra. Had the Biafran secession succeeded South Africa would undoubtedly have made considerable progress in securing a grateful ally in a rich corner of Africa." 19

In the event, Biafra's secession like that of Katanga failed and South Africa's actions have rebounded to her disadvantage. Nigeria's militant opposition both to Britain's decision to sell arms to South Africa and the Ivory Coast's call for dialogue has come as no surprise.

In putting together the different elements of South African foreign policy on the continent it is important to remember that it is at its most basic level directed towards the survival of white supremacy and not an end in itself. Despite the ideological terms in which it is sometimes seen, the outward-looking policy is essentially pragmatic. Even so convinced an advocate of the policy as Dr. Hilgard Muller has made it clear that South Africa applies a stringent test of self-interest to her contacts with African states.

"You can rest assured that the Government will not exchange diplomatic mission with an African state or any other state unless the country concerned gives sufficient proof of its desire to promote only friendly relations with South Africa and unless such state subscribes to the recognized principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of others and gives effect to it in practice."

Self-interest alone though is not the reason for the government's cautious approach. As important has been the need to meet right-wing criticism of the policy at home. The outward-looking foreign policy has been one of the prime targets of the verkramptes,
right-wing critics of government policy who came to the fore during Vorster's first year as Prime Minister. While the most extreme of these were heavily defeated when they stood as the members of Herstigte Nationale Party in the 1970 elections, some of the verkramptes who stayed in the Nationalist Party still occupy influential positions both in the government and elsewhere. The verkrampte attack on the policy rests on four main points. Firstly they argue that South Africa's involvement elsewhere on the continent compromises her support for Rhodesia and the Portuguese. Secondly, they see the policy as committing South Africa to support black African states such as Malawi and they believe this could involve the Republic in dangerous and unnecessary risks. The verkrampte monthly, Veg has compared the policy to British imperialism arguing that like British imperialism it will lead to South Africa's interests not being put first.21 Thirdly, they see the policy as leading domestically to what they regard as unprincipled breaches of apartheid in regard to black diplomats which are bound to affect the attitudes of South Africa's own black population. Lastly, they regard it as an attempt to accommodate to world opinion and as such the thin end of the wedge. Thus the verkrampte editor of Hoofstad, Dr. Treurnicht argues "As Afrikaners are ideally an exclusive group, they need a measure of isolation to preserve their cultural identity." 22 The government has responded to these pressures by making breaches of apartheid by black envoys as unprovocative to its right-wing as possible.

"It is recognized by foreign diplomats in South Africa that the creation of diplomatic suburbs (in Pretoria and Cape Town) is a device to make the exchange of diplomatic representation with as many independent African states as possible more palatable to the government's right-wing following," 23

Clearly, too, the extensive publicity given to discussions in African
states of dialogue as a strategy directed against apartheid has been an embarrassment to the South African government and has arguably limited its room for manoeuvre in responding to the demands of African states that discussion of apartheid should be on the agenda of any meeting with the South African government.

Distinct from, though not unrelated to, dialogue and South Africa's diplomatic offensive in Africa are the Republic's efforts to secure a dominant economic and political position in the southern third of the continent. This theme has been most notably developed in a book by a senior South African diplomat, The Third Africa by Eschel Rhoodte. He takes as his starting-point Verwoerd's call in 1964 for a common market of Southern Africa and concentrates on an enthusiastic portrayal of the region's economic potential. Much the same approach is adopted by the journal, Africa South:

"Our economic and political objectives in Southern Africa are to harness all natural and human resources from Table Mountain to the border of the Congo River .... Countries like Rhodesia, Malawi, Portuguese East Africa, will be amicably persuaded to adopt the Rand as their currency ... There is already a Resources Planning Council for Southern Africa to avoid duplication of certain industries, which duplication could lead to extravagance and unnecessary competition between countries. Member countries of the Common Market could compliment one another. For example, the Republic of South Africa could manufacture machinery, chemicals, and electrical appliances - while the Transkei could produce jute, Swaziland sugar, Botswana beef, and Lesotho water." 24

However, the failure of South Africa to secure the inclusion of Zambia in her sphere of influence has in part proved the undoing of the "Third Africa" idea. The importance of this failure has been widely recognized.
"The really valuable "conquest" and the one which would consolidate the bloc (of Southern Africa) and make it almost impregnable would be Zambia, the wealthiest of the African states, but the Rhodesian affair has finally cooked that goose. Zambia still agonizingly dependent on the South, is ostentatiously turning its back, behind which terrorists operate freely from its territory". 25

A major effort was made by South Africa during 1968 to persuade Zambia of the advantages of co-operation. 26 These approaches were firmly rebuffed by President Kaunda.

"In South Africa the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, has of late consistently declared that he favoured friendship with Zambia. This declaration is welcome, but I have to say quite clearly that nothing stands between South Africa and Zambia in fostering friendship and co-operation except that Government's policy of apartheid which, frankly, is the policy of oppression and exploitation.... Let Afrikaners show respect to Africans in South Africa and manifest genuinely the spirit of co-operation among all sections of the South African community including the African majority. Then I will be more than ready to extend in full my hand of friendship on the basis of true equality and for mutual advantage." 27

Following Kaunda's rejection of inclusion in South Africa's sphere of influence, a tougher attitude towards Zambia was perceptible in 1969 and "Talk of an attack against Zambia (was) heard with increasing frequency in Salisbury and Pretoria". 28 The Financial Gazette's comment was not untypical of that in the Nationalist press generally.

"A growing question is: how long must South Africa endure this provocation before swinging into action to eliminate the terrorist base camps in Zambia? There is a strong undercurrent of feeling in political
Minor instances of border violations and sabotage in recent years have reminded Zambia of her vulnerability to attack from the south. In these circumstances, Zambia's efforts to cut off her ties with the south has assumed considerable political importance. One project in particular aimed at increasing Zambia's independence has captured the limelight, the Tanzam railway. Construction of the railway which will link Zambia to the port of Dar-es-Salaam was launched on October 26, 1970. The line due to be completed by 1975 at a cost of over R284 million - is being financed and built by Communist China, after Zambia and Tanzania had failed to interest Western countries in the project.

The project which politically speaking matches in importance the Cabora-Bassa dam scheme is China's largest ever overseas aid commitment and provides an important entry for China into Africa. It may also mean that the issues of Southern Africa could become deeply bound up with East-West competition. The importance of the railway for South Africa is not only its effect on Zambia. In particular, it could enable Botswana further to loosen her links with South Africa. Recently, Malawi has made an effort to improve her relations with Zambia and has asked for tenders for the construction of a railway line from Salima (on Lake Malawi) to the Zambian border. Malawi is clearly interested in the possibility of a link-up with the Tanzam railway once it's built, though this would not fundamentally alter her pattern of independence on the south. 30

At present, the states of Southern Africa divide into two basically antagonistic constellation of states. 31
Dependent on and tied to South Africa are the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola, Rhodesia, South West Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. The other constellation, which has been steadily increasing its ties with East African economic and political structures, consists of the Congo (Kinshasa), Tanzania and Zambia. However, Botswana does not fit neatly into either camp. She has maintained close links with independent Africa, particularly Zambia. Kaunda, for example, has spoken of the possibility of there eventually being a United States of Africa consisting of Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Botswana. At the same time, Botswana has maintained pragmatic relations with South Africa without, like Malawi, antagonizing independent Africa.

Whether these alignments will last remains to be seen. Most of all, perhaps, Zambia's position seems precarious. The continued slump in the price of copper, which accounts for approximately 95% of the country's earnings from exports, might yet force Zambia to re-appraise her policy towards Southern Africa, as Kaunda acknowledged in a conversation with Richard Hall in 1969. Asked whether he would accept South African aid if low copper prices precipitated a financial crisis in Zambia, Kaunda replied:

"It would be a really serious challenge - obviously it would be - but I hope we get beyond that point with our rural development before we are overtaken by such things. I would find it very, very difficult indeed to use South African money."

Further it cannot be assumed that Kaunda himself would remain in power and the possibility always exists that his successor
might be attracted by the immediate economic advantages of an accommodation with South Africa. Equally, however, a widening and intensification of the conflicts in the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia could place the South African government on the defensive and pose it an uncomfortable dilemma as to how far it should commit its own forces in defence of its white allies.
NOTES ON THE OUTWARD-LOOKING POLICY AND THE WHITE REDOUBT.

The origins of the new policy.

1. See Africa Confidential (London) 28 April, 1967 No. 9 pp 4-6
3. Cockram p.124
6. See the final section of this chapter.
9. Stevens p.258
12. Spence (Republic under Pressure) pp.78-9
14. ibid. p.20. See Appendix B on economic explanation of South Africa's outward-looking policy.
15. Spence (Republic under Pressure)) p.76n
16. Quoted in Hall p.26
17. ibid. p 123
18. Hall p.122
19. See above Chapter on Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland.
20. see C.W. de Kiewiet p.415
21. Hall p.26
22. ibid
24. Quoted in W.A. Hanco (ed.)) p.67
26. Hall p.26
27. Stevens p.94
28. Molteno p.7
29. According to *Africa Confidential* 28 April 1967 No. 9 p.5, a meeting of Vorster, Muller, the Foreign Affairs Secretary (Brand Fourie), and the head of the Africa Division (A.P.F. Burger) shortly after Verwoerd's death decided on a policy of 'outgoingness' towards Africa.
30. Cockram p.124

**THE WHITE REDOUBT.**

2. See Appendix B.
3. Cockram p.174
5. Cockram p.175
6. In any event, it is difficult to see what purpose a public expression of views would have served.
7. See *Die Burger* 12.11.1965
9. *ibid* Col.52
10. *ibid*, Col.54
12. Units specially created for counter-insurgency operations in 1965.
15. *ibid* pp 9-10
17. D. Snock :"The Forgotten Rhodesians" in *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 47 No. 3 April 1969 p.537
19. Spence (South Africa's 'New Look' Foreign Policy) p.143
20. Rhodie p.162
21. Translated from Veg December 1968 p.10
22. Commonly called the 1969 Constitution, though it only came into force in 1970.
23. Quoted in African Digest (Africa Bureau, London) Vol. XVII No. 6 December 1970 p.113
26. Estimates varied but it was generally agreed that majority rule would not be achieved under the proposals in this century.
31. See Appendix B for details.
32. Quoted in Cockram p.175
33. Ibid p.175
34. See Bunting p.433
35. The Star 19.9.1967
36. Ibid
39. Quoted in Cockram p.160
41. Ibid. p.163
42. Quoted in Bunting pp; 455-6
43. Figures from Hance (ed) p.2.
44. In fact, almost the entire output.
47: The Economist (London) 10 May 1969
49. Rhoodie p.202 (Van Eck is Chairman of the South African Industrial Development Corporation).
54. Whitaker p.15.
56. ibid.
57. The Times 15.12.1970
58. See ibid 16.6.1971
60. Conversation between author and Piet Cillie, Editor of Die Burger, in 1968.
61. i.e. the argument that black rule in one will set off a chain reaction resulting in black rule in all the countries of Southern Africa.
62. See, for example, Rhoodie p.162.
63. See below on Botswana's efforts to disengage from South Africa.
64. In view of Cabinet Minister's own deep attachment to white supremacy.

THE OUTWARD-LOOKING POLICY IN PRACTICE.

1. See Conclusion.
2. Spence (Lesotho etc.) p.53
4. Ibid.
6. Molteno p. 25
7. Ibid p. 23
8. Spence (Lesotho etc) p. 44 n.
13. Africa Digest December 1971 p. 100
15. Ibid. pp. 41-2
16. The reason most commonly given for Jonathan's attitude in recent months is a desire on his part to narrow the gap between himself and the Opposition in Lesotho.
17. See Africa No. 3 August 1971 p. 23
18. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
27. Leistner p. 26 See also Africa No. 1 May 1971 pp. 34 -5.
29. Khama ("Botswana etc") (pages not numbered).

30. South Africa's argument is that South West Africa, Rhodesia, Botswana, and Zambia meet at a point and therefore Botswana's border with Zambia has no width. Hence the building of a bridge would infringe on South African territory.


33. Cockram p.130.

34. Translated from Die Beeld. 5.4.1970.

35. South African aid is, in fact, only a small fraction of that provided by Britain.


37. Ibid. p.280

38. Ibid. p.281.


42. Term used by Cockram p.133


44. See Smit and van der Merwe p.12


46. Ibid p.97

47. Ibid. p. 110.

48. See, for example, Leistner p.20.

49. In Zambia, particularly, there are pressures to give priority in employment to Zambian citizens.

50. See Leistner p. 23.


52. Ibid.

53. See Cockram p.140

63. After student demonstrations in May, a change in the composition of the Malagasy government led to a less friendly policy towards South Africa being adopted.

**DIALOGUE AND CONFRONTATION.**

1. The suggestion that the outward-looking policy is directly economically motivated is discussed in Appendix B.

2. Bunndi, Central African Republic, Chad, the two Congos, Etiopia, Kenya, Ruanda, Somatia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

3. Quoted in 1 Brownlie (ed.) p.529.

4. See Africa Digest (December 1970) pp.113-4

5. Quoted in Africa No. 2 July 1971 p.14


7. The list has at various times also included Kenya, Uganda, the Central African Republic, Senegal, and Ghana.


13. See Republic of Zambia: Dear Vorster .. etc. See above.
16. Possible links between dialogue and British and French policies are discussed in the conclusion.
17. Molteno p.25.
24. Quoted in Molteno p.22.
26. This is substantiated by the now published correspondence between the two governments. According to the Zambian government (Dear Mr. Vorster.. p.10) there were no contracts in 1969 after 15 February.
27. Quoted in Snock p.540.
30. See Africa Confidential Vol. 11 No. 25 18 December 1970 p.2
31. This approach is discussed more fully in the conclusion.
32. Hall p.6.
33. See conclusion.
CONCLUSION.

A wit once declared that a specialist was someone who knew more and more about less and less. For good or ill such a concentration of effort is not possible for the student of politics. Paradoxically, in an age of specialization he is required to enlarge rather than narrow the field of his inquiry as each year his assumptions are threatened by developments in other fields and by the interaction between events in opposite corners of the globe. Further, in a world in which the operations of the computers are measured down to pico-seconds (millionths of micro-seconds), he is faced with a bewildering variety and multitude of variables that defy quantification.

In particular, the artificiality of the traditional division between foreign and domestic policy has become especially apparent.

"Almost every day incidents are reported that defy the principles of sovereignty. Politics everywhere, it would seem, are related to politics everywhere else. Where the functioning of any political unit was once sustained by structures within its boundaries, now the roots of its political life can be traced to remote corners of the globe. Modern science and technology have collapsed space and time in the physical world and thereby heightened interdependence in the political world. Political science however has yet to accommodate itself to this shrinking world. Even at the level where the changes appear most pronounced - the functioning of national units - events abroad are still regarded as external to, rather than part of, a nation's politics. To be sure, it has long been recognized that national political systems, like all organized human groups exist in, are conditioned by, and respond to a larger environment. Nor is it denied that international political systems, like all interdependent groups are shaped by and are responsive to developments that occur within the units of..."
As an illustration of the need for linkage theory, Rosenau cites the rash of **Coup d'etat** in West and Central Africa at the end of 1965 and the beginning of 1966. He argues that 'the power of example', which he claims is what the traditional approach is likely to offer as an explanation of the coups' coincidence in time, is no answer to the question as to how the emulative process works. However, it cannot be said that linkage theory has yet made much progress in this direction beyond suggesting various ways of classifying linkage phenomena. Indeed, arguably the theory's major contribution has been simply to draw attention to kinds of relations that are all too easily neglected in studies of both foreign and domestic policy.

As far as South African foreign policy is concerned, perhaps the most interesting linkage is that between the outward-looking policy and separate development. This goes considerably further than the role separate development has played in helping White South Africans adjust to the establishment of relations with black states (by making meetings between black leaders and white Cabinet Ministers un-extraordinary). The South African Government itself sees separate development as a fundamental part of its policy towards Africa as an article in **Rapport** declaring that Ministers saw Banda's visit to South Africa as "the natural and actual inescapable result of the success of the separate development policy" suggests. Merle Lipton noting that South Africa has made considerable progress in Africa in recent years argues that South Africans are "mistaken in thinking that this has been due to their separate development policy". Nonetheless, she too sees
an important connection between the two policies.

"In so far as the African states have shown any interest at all in the Bantustans, it has been in the potential leverage they might offer. Mr. Mungai, the Kenyan Foreign Minister recently suggested that the Bantustan leaders should be invited to the next O.A.U. meeting. This would not imply acceptance of the policy or official recognition of them, he said but would help and encourage them. They might, he argued, provide 'a great new weapon against South Africa' or alternately 'a real bridge in a dialogue'. (The corollary of this could be that as Africa became the key to improving South Africa's relations with the West so the leaders of the Bantustans - or at least black leaders in South Africa - could become the key to Africa)."

Because African states supporting dialogue justify their policy by the claim that it "will help change South African attitudes and lead to multi-racialism", they have made it clear that concessions by the South African government on the domestic front would greatly strengthen their hand in Africa. Indeed, in the case of some states concessions are a pre-condition of their support of dialogue. This applies whether a desire to bring about a change in South Africa is a principal motivating factor in their adoption of the policy of dialogue or not. In particular it is natural that the more conservative African states attach considerable importance to the rôle of the Bantustan leaders like Matamzima and Buthelezi as they offer perhaps the best hope of prizing concessions from the South African government, which, if only modest, would represent a significant propaganda victory for the dialogue states.

As far as the South African government is concerned, it is faced with the uncomfortable dilemma of weighing the risks of domestic changes, for example, from strengthening Buthelezi's
and Matanzima's position, against the benefits of a breakthrough in Africa that could further help to rehabilitate South Africa's image internationally. To complete the picture, it is my own belief that the influence of verkramptes makes its greatest impact on the outward-looking policy not directly through their stated opposition to close contacts with black Africa, but indirectly by limiting the concessions the South African government is able to make in the domestic field within the framework of separate development. In particular, persistent criticism by verkramptes of increased expenditure on the Bantustans and the opposition of the Mineworkers Union to the training of Africans for skilled work in Bantustan mines\(^{10}\) underline the difficulties the government faces if it is to take domestic steps to give dialogue a new lease of life after its recent setbacks."

The linkage between Bantustans and dialogue is itself only one aspect of a more fundamental and persistent feature of South African foreign policy; the frustration of its objectives due to the fact that South Africa's domestic policies are at odds with the present international order. What was called in Ethiopia's application to the International Court of Justice in 1960 "currently accepted international standards".\(^{12}\) The implications for the conduct of South African foreign policy have been spelled out by Marquard:

"In these circumstances, our foreign policy has been to try to persuade the world that we are not as bad as it thinks and not even as bad as some other countries. We try to make friends and alliances in the normal diplomatic way and by a heavy output of glossy propaganda designed to show how prosperous and happy South African non-white citizens are." \(^{13}\)

However, Marquard goes on, the nature of South African domestic policy is never wholly obscured and in the long run undermines
South Africa's diplomatic efforts.

"Every now and then someone in high authority will blurt out what apartheid means in practice, and months and years and millions of words, of propaganda will be undone ... All the fine words of our foreign policy fail to obscure the ugly facts of mass removals, break-up of family life, pass laws, and all the multitude of laws and regulations designed to enforce apartheid. In so far as our foreign policy seeks to enable us to live on friendly terms with our neighbours and with the rest of the world, it must in the long run fail. If we maintain apartheid and fail to give the world a convincing hope that non-white South Africans, four-fifths of the population, will soon be emancipated, our foreign policy will increasingly be forced into the narrow mould of defence to ward off possible attack". 14

His analysis is, I believe, essentially correct that unless the government takes measures to devolve power to non-whites on a more meaningful basis South Africa will be forced increasingly on the defensive. In fact, an underlying defensiveness about South African foreign policy can be traced back to the Second World War and its aftermath when the colonial world of which South Africa was in a sense a part began to crumble.

"Future historians may well judge that for South Africa the decisive theatre of war in the great holocaust of 1939-45 was not Europe but the Far East. For it was there, with the Japanese attack on South-east Asia that the first of the death blows were struck at the world of European political ascendancy in which the South African system had had its appropriate place." 15

The principal criticisms of this approach, however, are that it fails to take account of changes in the international environment that directly or indirectly have made a favourable impact on the Republic's international position and, more importantly, of economic realities. To take the point first,
it is argued that Western disillusionment with Africa as a result of the continent's political instability since independence, the racial crisis in the United States, the controversy over immigration in Britain, South Africa's isolation from the main sources of conflict in Asia and the Middle East, and the increased importance of the Cape sea route because of the closure of the Suez Canal make it possible for "the wider international scene to be interpreted as favourable to a shift by the South African government away from a simple, defensive position." 16 (In Rosenau's terminology these are examples of linkages.) The election of a conservative President in the United States in 1968 and of a Conservative party government in 1970 may be given as further evidence of changes in the international environment favourable to South Africa as, more obviously, it is argued that the failure of sanctions has strengthened South Africa's position.

Against this, the emergence of China as a world power and particularly her involvement in Africa through the Tanzam railway represents a development fraught with some danger for South Africa, especially were that involvement to re-awaken competition among the great powers in Africa of the kind that characterized the Congo crisis in the early 1960's. Intensified competition for influence in Africa, would, one suspects, make an unfavourable impact on American-South African relations as distancing herself politically from the white regimes of the south as far as possible would be obvious step for the United States government to take were it competing for the support of African states. Houphouet-Boigny, it is true, has given the combat of communism as a reason for dialogue with South Africa, 17 but it is to be doubted that this point of view would cut much ice
with the majority of African states in the event of an intensified competition for influence among the major powers. Further, while it is time that South Africa benefits indirectly from reports of racial conflict elsewhere because of their impact on public opinion in Western Europe and North America, the benefit is, I believe, no more than short term because, whatever else, racial crises in other parts of the world do not represent steps towards the re-creation of a colonial world, which alone would make South Africa's international rehabilitation fully possible. In short, what I am arguing is that while some changes in recent years in the international political environment may be seen as favourable to South Africa, none offers the prospect of a permanent improvement in the Republic's position.

More substantial is the economic argument that:

"the retention within the international capitalist system of so profitable a field of investment and source of strategic raw materials as the Southern African complex occupies the dominant position in the structure of Western capitalist interests in sub-Saharan Africa (and that) in consequence their main concern vis-à-vis independent Africa is to prevent the growth of strong politico-economic systems independent of Western capitalist hegemony in the countries bordering upon the Southern African complex... which could, among other things, seriously threaten white rule in Southern Africa." 18

Put more simply, Amighi's and Saul's argument is that the priority Western powers give to their economic interests in Southern Africa leads them both to oppose measures again South Africa that would threaten these interests and to action in independent Africa to prevent, if they can, a head-on clash between black Africa and the White regimes of the south. The first point is borne out by
the oft-stated opposition of successive governments in Britain, the United States, and the other principal European powers to the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. This opposition first became apparent in 1964 when African states launched a major campaign to win international support for collective enforcement measures against the Republic over apartheid. While by contrast the imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia after U.D.I in 1965 would appear to contradict Amighi's and Saul's thesis, the peripheral nature of Western interests in Rhodesia compared to those in South Africa itself and indeed the failure of sanctions against the Smith regime do not suggest that the Rhodesian case can be regarded as a precedent for similar action against the Republic. Evidence as to the second point (steps to avoid a major conflict in Southern Africa) is provided by the persistent public declarations of the American, British, and French governments in support of negotiation as the solution to the problems of Southern Africa and by their general diplomatic support for dialogue with South Africa.

Of the three governments France appears to have gone the furthest in promoting Houphouet-Boigny's initiative. In fact, such have been the reports of French involvement that "opinion (is) rife in Africa that the powerful influence in support of dialogue reaches far beyond Abidjan and that President Houphouet-Boigny is merely a convenient megaphone." One strong pointer has been the key role South Africa's Ambassador in Paris has reportedly played in sounding out African states on dialogue; another the fact that initial support for dialogue was centred on francophone states that had retained strong political and economic links with Paris. But while mystery still surrounds the detailed role played by western governments in support of dialogue, there is nothing surprising about their
general policy positions which are to reconcile as far as possible their interests on both sides of the Southern African divide.\textsuperscript{22}

However, it would be a mistake to conclude that their positions rule out, or are inconsistent with putting pressure on South Africa over her domestic policies short of sanctions or of allowing a conflagration in Southern Africa. Indeed, the importance they attach to their interests north of the Zambezi precisely leads to gestures in this direction.\textsuperscript{23} Further, account has to be taken of the political pressures on Western economic interests in Southern Africa. These are not confined to the pressures African states are able to mount, but also stem from western domestic sources. This is particularly true of the United States where the demand of Polaroid workers that the corporation cease operating in South Africa was widely publicized.\textsuperscript{24} Decisions of a number of American companies to pay rate for the job in South Africa reflect according to the \textit{Financial Mail}, mounting domestic pressure on American firms to "treat their employees here (in South Africa) on the same basis as in the U.S: complete equality in all spheres."\textsuperscript{25} To sum up, while Western economic interests may be said to set limits to the international pressure to which South Africa is likely to be subjected the extent to which they might provide the basis for an improvement in South Africa's international position is altogether less clear. Indeed, if Polaroid proves to be a precedent for other foreign firms, they may even provide a further source of pressure on South Africa's domestic policies.

A very different economic argument to that of Amighi and Saul is the fashionable theory that South Africa's outward-
looking policy is itself an example of economic imperialism. I am mentioning it in this context because a consideration of the wider economic interests that exist in Africa points to one of the theory's main failings; its assumption that South Africa could rapidly turn political acceptance in Africa into economic domination. This ignores the fact that South Africa would quickly come into conflict with the firmly established economic interests of the western powers if she ever tried to use political influence to this end (assuming, of course the Republic secured such influence).

To those who argue that Malawi and the former High Commission territories are examples of countries where the coincidence of South African economic domination and political influence supports the imperialist theory, it needs to be said that South Africa's dominant economic role in these countries can hardly be attributed to the outward-looking policy. The economic role preceded the political policy by upwards of half a century.

Neither Malawi nor Lesotho therefore can be said to be a precedent for the kind of economic relationship South Africa would be able to establish with other friendly states in Africa. Further, South Africa's current balance of payments difficulties and her related longstanding restrictions on the export of capital do not suggest that the country has the economic capacity to lay the basis in terms of investment for a dominant economic role outside of her present sphere of influence. (The argument that trade could provide the basis for an economically unequal or imperialist relationship with Africa tries to turn South Africa's trade deficit from a liability into a motive. It is fully explored in Appendix B).

All this, of course, is not to say that South Africa's foreign policy in Africa should or can be considered without
reference to economic forces. This is particularly true of the Republic's role in Southern Africa. Indeed in the context of foreign policy it makes little sense to define southern Africa straightforwardly in geographical terms and not take into account the region's political and economic limits. Looking at a map, for example, provides little clue as to Malawi's "southward" orientation. Drawing a political "border" to southern Africa, Grundy reaches the conclusion that:

"Two separate constellations of states exist in Southern Africa. One finds expression in the Congo-Tanzania - Zambian loose combination with its growing ties to East African economic and political structures. The other is essentially a South Africa-Portugal pole serving to attract Rhodesia, Malawi and Lesotho and to a slightly lesser extent Botswana". 29

Economically, a perhaps even more significant picture emerges. Within the geographical area from the Cape to the Congolese border, one can point to three main economic islands of industrialization (the Rand complex in the Southern Transvaal, 30 the Salisbury, Bulaway area, and the Zambian copperbelt) in what is largely a sea of underdevelopment. Further, the three countries in which these "islands" are situated are the only countries in the region that are importers rather than exporters of labour. 31 Put another way, South Africa, Rhodesia, and Zambia only in Southern Africa can be said to possess the infrastructure for independent economic development. What is more, Rhodesia and Zambian industrialization is not extensive 32 enough to guarantee against being overwhelmed economically by the dominant power in the region, South Africa. In fact, for
Zambia to orientate herself to the north makes economic as well as political sense, despite the short term costs. Rhodesia, it should be remembered, owes much of her basis for industrialization to Federation when the markets of her two northern partners (and Zambia's copper) enabled her to achieve a measure of independence from South Africa and to protect her infant industries by erecting a high tariff wall against South African goods.33

Given Rhodesia's present economic subservience to South Africa as a result of U.D.I. it can be seen that the economic structure of the region largely underpins present political relationships within Southern Africa. Significantly, too, it suggests that short of economic disaster in Zambia, no long term conversion of Zambia to South Africa's sphere of influence is likely. In these circumstances, it is unlikely that the Republic will be able to secure the Southern African region as a whole from the pressures of militant independent Africa. This is another reason for upholding Marquard's basic thesis that South African foreign policy will remain essentially defensive as long as her present domestic policy prevails.
NOTES ON THE CONCLUSION.

1. For example what Middle East expert could have imagined that a relatively obscure revolutionary movement in Japan would become relevant to his studies? What student of Soviet-American can feel secure in assumptions that could rapidly be overturned by fresh technological breakthroughs in the field of military hardware?

2. 1 million pico-seconds = 1 micro-second. 1 million micro-seconds = 1 second.

3. Attempts are being made to overcome this problem, especially in the United States. So far however the results have tended to be trivial.


5. Ibid p.6.


8. Ibid p.18

9. Ibid p.17

10. See M. Howell et. al (Survey 1971) p.124

11. Indeed, one of the reasons why dialogue has failed to get off the ground has been the discovery by African states of the South African government's unwillingness to consider all but the most marginal changes to present policy. See above section on Dialogue and Confrontation.

12. Quoted in R. Ballinger (South West Africa) p.52


14. Ibid.

15. Black and Thompson (eds.) p.426


17. See Africa No. 2 July 1971 p.19

20. Ibid.
22. The fact that they have not loudly and publicly proclaimed their support for dialogue itself reflects their wish not to antagonize needlessly the anti-dialogue majority of African states.
23. Significant, for example, is the British Conservative government's retreat from its initial enthusiasm to sell arms to South Africa.
24. See Africa Digest Vol XVIII No. 2 April 1971 pp26-7
25. Financial Mail (Johannesburg) 21.7.1972
27. The principal component of the territories' dependence on South Africa goes back to the 19th Century. A more reasonable claim is that the outward-looking policy has helped South Africa to expand to a limited degree her economic role.
28. See Financial Mail 30.6.1972 and J.E. Spence (Republic under Pressure) p.53
30. There are of course other areas of industrialization in South Africa, but this is the principal one.
32. Zambia's is based almost exclusively on the copper mines.
33. See Appendix B.
APPENDIX A.

A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FOR 1960.

JANUARY: 1st - Cameroun becomes independent.

27th - Belgium announces that the Congo (Leopoldville) is to become independent on June 30th.


MARCH: 21st - The South African Police open fire on demonstrators protesting against the pass laws at Sharpeville, killing 67 and wounding 186.

30th - The South African government declares a state of emergency.

APRIL: 1st - The U.N. Security Council adopts resolution deploring apartheid and calling on South Africa to abandon her racial policy by - 9 votes to 0.

9th - Attempt on Dr. Verwoerd's life.

27th - Togo becomes independent.

MAY: Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London. Eric Louw's request that South Africa be granted permission to stay in the Commonwealth should she become a Republic refused on the ground that the request was hypothetical. At Conference Nkrumah cancels invitation to Eric Louw to visit Accra.

JUNE: Conference of independent African states adopt though resolutions on South Africa and South West Africa.

26th - Malagasy becomes independent.

30th - Congo (Leopoldville) becomes independent.

JULY: 1st - Somalland becomes independent.

11th - Katanga secedes from the Congo.

12th - U.N. Security Council authorises the Secretary-General to give the new Congolese government military assistance to maintain law and order.
AUGUST: 1st - Dahomey becomes independent.
           3rd - Niger becomes independent.
           5th - Upper Volta becomes independent.
           7th - Ivory Coast becomes independent.
           11th - Chad becomes independent.
           13th - Central African Republic becomes independent.
           15th - Congo (Brazzaville) becomes independent.
           25th - Senegal becomes independent.

SEPTEMBER:
           22nd - Mali becomes independent.

OCTOBER: 1st - Referendum of white electorate on whether South Africa should become a Republic votes "Yes" by a narrow majority.

NOVEMBER:
           4th - Ethiopia and Liberia file charges against South Africa over South West Africa at the International Court of Justice at the Hague.
APPENDIX B.

AFRICA AS A MARKET FOR SOUTH AFRICAN GOODS.

INTRODUCTION.

Much recent analysis of South Africa's outward-looking policy towards independent Africa has asserted that the implications of the policy are primarily economic in character. "South Africa is thrusting out into Africa for a number of reasons. She needs markets for her manufactured goods. She wants to export capital ..." 1 Indeed, many carry the argument further and suggest that South Africa is seeking an economic and political role in Africa analogous to that of the United States in Latin America.

"South Africa has now embarked upon a policy designed to neutralize the opposition to apartheid in Africa. It is attempting to develop its relations with independent African countries in order to create a community of nations in southern Africa, which can live in 'peaceful co-existence'. It is offering more trade, aid, and investment to those countries. It is bound, however, to dominate any such association of nations. Countries participating in such an association would run the risk of seeing their development arrested. That is the meaning of Dumont's warning against the 'South Americanization' of Africa." 2

Adding to the appeal of this argument is the fact that it is not confined to left-wing critics of South African foreign policy. In his book, The Third Africa, a senior South African diplomat, Eschel Rhodie argues enthusiastically that South Africa dominates the southern third of the continent
"to the same, if not a greater extent than the United States enjoys pre-eminence in the Americas." Further, it is striking how both Marxist opponents of the South African government like Brian Bunting and right-wing critics, for example in the verkrampte monthly, Veg have invoked the memory of Cecil John Rhodes in describing the "imperialist appetite" of the South African government.

Finally, in accounting for the development of the outward-looking foreign policy, Rhoodie, Molteno and Gervasi attach central importance to Dr. Verwoerd's call in August 1964 for the creation of a Southern African Common Market stretching as far north as the Congo. Molteno goes furthest in asserting:

"South Africa's ambition is not limited to trade with the individual African states. It is the creation of a huge free trade area and customs union in Central and East Africa as a market for South African goods."

In particular, he lays stress on South Africa's growing balance of payments deficit in the second half of the 1960's and points out that only increased gold sales averted a crisis.

By contrast, Spence, Legum, and Cockram, have paid more attention to the political implications of the outward-looking policy and its role in presenting to the West an image of South Africa as a stable and prosperous state enjoying the goodwill of her neighbours. This striking theme has been underlined by the South African Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, who has argued that South Africa's acceptance by Africa is more important to her relations with the rest of the world than her internal policy.

"As the West becomes aware of our fruitful co-operation with other African states, their attitude towards us improves. I believe that it will happen to an increasing degree because we must simply accept that our relations with the rest of the world is largely determined by our relations with the African states. In this connection we are giving the world consider-
able food for thought."  

Essentially the same point was made by General Hiemstra (Commandant General of the South African Defence Force) in an address to the Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns in July 1969.

"If only they (some N.A.T.O members) would realize that there is more good-will in Africa towards white South Africa than is superficially visible, they would not continue to foul their own nests by encouraging terrorists and hatemongers in their evil, and in so doing play right into the hands of their enemies."  

While these contrasting approaches to the study of South African foreign policy may be regarded as complementary rather than conflicting, they do point to the need for a more detailed study, of the salient issues as opposed to a general survey.

SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS TO AFRICA.

In this article, I intend looking at one of these, the importance of Africa as a market for South African goods. The idea that "South Africa's natural market is Africa" is by no means new. It was a common place of South African politics at the time Eric Louw recorded this reaction in 1957 to Ghanaian independence.

"As far as the Union of South Africa is concerned, we naturally welcome any development on the Continent of Africa.... provided no impediment will be placed in the way of South Africa's access to those markets. The territories to the north of the Limpopo are the natural markets for our large and expanding industries".  

Contacts and co-operation prompted by the Second World War in particular encouraged hopes that South Africans would take, in Smuts' words, "our rightful place as leader in Pan-African development". Many expected South Africa to be the main beneficiary of the post-war economic development of Africa. However, even at the high point of Pan-African co-operation at the end of the war, there were sceptics.
"A few indefatigable optimists even look on Africa as a vast hinterland crying out for the Union's industrial products and anxious to pour its wealth into her bilingual lap. South Africa, however, cannot expand industries on imports of African raw materials based on low paid sweated labour and at the same time hope to find profitable markets in these poverty-stricken areas. Moreover, the African continent cannot be regarded as, and will not in any case become, the Union's private preserve." 17

In the event, this view has been amply justified as a table comparing the growth of total exports with those to Africa shows (see Table 1)*. The most immediately striking feature of the bare figures for South African exports to Africa is the absolute decline in exports from 1957 to 1963. A closer look at the figures reveals that even despite the evident recovery in South Africa's exports to the continent in the second half of the 1960's, exports to Africa to-day represent a smaller proportion of total South African exports than they did in the mid 1950's.

Indeed, the dramatic recovery in the level of South African exports from 1965 that an uncritical look at the figures might suggest is misleading, as from 1965 the figures have been inflated by the inclusion of re-exports of imported goods. It seems likely the reason why the Bureau of Statistics introduced this change in the presentation of the export figures was Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. One of the effects of the change is to disguise the extent to which goods are channelled to Rhodesia through South Africa. U.D.I. also necessitated another important change. From 1965 the Bureau no longer published even a partial break-down of South Africa's trade with individual African countries; a policy towards which the Bureau had initially been moving in response to moves by

* TABLES ON PAGES 320 to 324
African states to boycott South African goods. 18

When re-exports are added to the figures for 1961-64, the impact made on the level of South African exports to Africa by U.D.I becomes more apparent (see Table 2). The increase in exports for 1966 over those of 1965 of almost R50 million is far and away the highest rise for a single year. But while the central role of this particular political development is borne out by a more detailed breakdown of the increase (see below), accounting for the decline between 1957-63 in political terms is more hazardous. At first sight, it might be tempting to ascribe the decline to the boycott of South African goods initiated by African states in the early 1960's. In fact, as an examination of a breakdown of the figures shows (see Table 3), the principal factor was the fall in South African exports to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland. During the period 1957-63 these fell by R39.5 million, while exports to the rest of Africa (excluding Mozambique) fell by R10.6 million. 19

In short, while South African trade with the continent was affected by the boycott, it was not the principal obstacle to its growth. That proved to be policies pursued by Federation to protect her infant manufacturing industries and in particular the restrictive nature of a new trade agreement with South Africa in 1960.

Similarly and perhaps as imports, the break-up of Federation at the end of 1963 was a turning point in reversing the downward trend in South African exports to Africa. The point needs emphasizing as it tends, not unnaturally, to be overshadowed by the economic consequences of U.D.I and secondly, because it provides a possible additional economic motive for the South African government's hostility towards Federation. During its lifetime the free trade area within Federation coupled with the high tariffs to protect Southern Rhodesian industry had acted as a strong inducement to the two northern territories to obtain their imports from Southern Rhodesia rather than South Africa.
The break-up ended this inducement and South African goods consequently became more competitive on the Zambian, Malawian, and Rhodesian markets than they had been during Federation. Whereas in 1964 inter-territorial trade had just outstripped the region's imports from South Africa, in 1965 the position had been reversed.20

U.D.I. itself sharply accelerated the decline in inter-territorial trade. Both Zambian and Malawian imports of Rhodesian goods dropped quite sharply as did their exports to Rhodesia. By 1967 total inter-territorial trade among the former members of Federation amounted to less than a third of the region's imports from South Africa.21 (Of course, it was not just trade patterns that were disrupted by the break-up of Federation and U.D.I. and in an economic context the drop in the employment of Malawians in both Rhodesia and Zambia should be mentioned.22)

While Table 3 indicates that the level of South African exports to the Federation played the primary role in determining the level of South African exports to Africa as a whole, the secondary role of exports to the rest of Africa (excluding Mozambique)23 in the decline is nonetheless important. Though the actual value of this trade in relation to total exports was small (less than 4% even at its peak in 1957), the fact that it declined sharply in the period 1959-64 when the majority of African states gained their independence indicates that African states were more conscientious in implementing a boycott of South African goods than perhaps prevailing prejudice about the vulnerability of African states to South African economic pressure or persuasion might suggest. Indeed as "other" in Table 3 includes Angola and a number of Atlantic and Indian
Ocean islands not politically part of Africa, the figures tend to overstate the level of South African exports to independent African states and because South African exports to Angola and the islands were increasing, understate the sharpness of the decline in her trade with continental Africa outside of Southern Africa.

A clearer picture is obtained by a more detailed break-down of South African exports to Africa for 1961-64 (see Table 4). This set of figures shows that in 1964 exports - with the inclusion of re-exports - to the independent states of Africa excluding Zambia and Malawi amounted to little more than R9 million or put another way, somewhat less than 1% total South African exports. Further, in the last years when a detailed break-down was given (1961 and 62), three countries - Kenya, the Congo, and Uganda - accounted for over 80% of South Africa's exports to continental Africa outside of Southern Africa. In short, exports to West and North Africa were virtually non-existent.

To establish the pattern of trade after 1964 is more difficult, but by consulting other than South African sources it is possible to identify the major factors accounting for the expansion of South African exports to Africa in the second half of the 1960's. The first problem to be faced is that after U.D.I. South Africa's principal African trading partner, Rhodesia ceased to provide a country by country break-down of her imports. Consequently for the years 1966-70 it is necessary to rely on the estimates of the U.N. sanction - busting committee. Based on the committee's access to detailed and up to date figures on inter-African trade not easily available to an independent researcher, these are the best available, though as estimates they are naturally subject to a margin of error. A further reason for using these rather than any other set of figures is that they have
been calculated to be comparable with Rhodesian figures of her imports from South Africa prior to U.D.I. In short, we can use the estimates to calculate the annual increase in Rhodesian imports from South Africa in the years following sanctions and her imports from the Republic as a percentage of her total imports. The result is shown in Table 5.

The pattern is much as might be expected; the largest annual increase occurring after U.D.I. in 1966 when South Africa doubled her share of the Rhodesian market. The figures confirm, too, Rhodesia's principal role in boosting South African exports to the continent. Nevertheless, the stagnation of Rhodesia's total imports since U.D.I. below their level in 1965 has clearly been a limiting factor on the growth of South African exports to Rhodesia. Indeed, the time has come when the lifting of sanctions-opening the way to the growth of the Rhodesian economy and consequently of her trade-would from a trading perspective probably be in South Africa's best interests, even were her share of the Rhodesian market to decline. Because of the over-riding effects of U.D.I. on trade, it is difficult to assess the impact of the liberal trade agreement signed between South Africa and Rhodesia in November 1964. Nevertheless, it is a reasonable supposition that the agreement would help to safeguard South Africa's position in the Rhodesian market if sanctions were lifted and limit the size of any short-term decline in South African exports to Rhodesia.

By contrast with Rhodesia, Zambia's total imports-mirroring the impressive growth rate of her economy-have more than doubled since 1964. At the end of 1964 the newly independent government of Zambia gave "12 months' notice of termination of its trade agreements with South Africa with a view to encouraging importers to find alternative sources of supply and reducing dependence on South African imports." Nevertheless, South
Africa succeeded in maintaining her share of the market until 1970 when for the first time since U.D.I. the proportion of imports from South Africa fell below 20% (see Table 6). The main reason for the continuing high level of imports from South Africa after the 1964 decision was U.D.I. South African exporters benefited from the high priority the Zambian government gave to implementing sanctions against Rhodesia and the consequent substitution of some items (for example, coal) formerly imported from Rhodesia by South African products. Not surprisingly, the largest increase in Zambian imports from South Africa, both absolutely and as a proportion of her total imports occurred in 1966, the year immediately after U.D.I.. Since then Zambia's imports from South Africa have declined proportionately and since 1968 absolutely.

Indeed, Zambia has really been strikingly successful in loosening her ties with the White south and diminishing her dependence on Rhodesian and South African imports. This becomes more apparent when imports from the two countries are taken together. Whereas in 1964, their imports accounted for over 60% of Zambia's total imports, by 1970 their share had fallen to less than 24%. Further, barring a resolution in Zambia's foreign policy, an even sharper fall in her trade with the south and particularly South Africa can be expected once the Tanzam railway has been built. The importance of the changes in Zambia's pattern of trade can hardly be over-emphasized. Apart from South Africa herself, Zambia imports more than any other country in Southern Africa. Indeed, her imports from South Africa alone still outstrip Malawi's total imports. But perhaps a better measure of the imminent consequences of South Africa's progressive exclusion from the Zambian market is the fact that in 1970 the drop in Zambia's imports from South Africa could be
larger than Malawi's total imports from South Africa for that year. In short, the Republic's trade with Zambia plays - and will for some time continue to play - a very much more important role in determining the level of South African exports to Africa than her trade with Malawi or for that matter any other independent African state.

Throughout the period under consideration (1964-70), Rhodesia and Zambia between them accounted each year for over two-thirds of South Africa's exports to Africa. Increases in their imports from South Africa were the main factors behind the expansion of the Republic's exports to Africa between 1966 and 1968. In addition, the two countries provided far and away the major source of South Africa's burgeoning trade surplus with Africa, which rose from R37.1 million in 1965 to R132.7 million in 1970.33 But the increases in trade with Rhodesia and Zambia were as we have seen largely the product of the exceptional and in the long run temporary trading conditions created by U.D.I., For this reason, the basis of the great expansion of South African exports to Africa and of her trade surplus with the continent was in a sense artificial. The U.D.I. factor has been largely overlooked by those seeking an economic foundation to the outward-looking policy.

"South Africa's concern is not to promote two-way trade with Africa, but to increase her own exports to the rest of the continent so as to improve her deteriorating balance of payments. Africa is the only continent with which she has a favourable balance of trade. Further in the last five years, she has succeeded in increasing this favourable balance enormously - from R6.2 m. in 1965 to R130 m. in 1968". 34

Molteno makes a technical error in calculating South Africa's trading surplus in 196535, but that aside, it is his failure to understand the basis of the increase in the trade surplus that
leads him to view it as evidence of South Africa's concern "not to promote two-way trade". In fact, on the evidence it can be argued equally plausibly that the South African government would be willing to sustain a deficit in her trade with independent Africa in return for political and diplomatic concessions and that the Republic's over-all balance of trade deficit is a handicap rather than a spur to the outward-looking policy. As it is, the last available official break-down of South African trade with Africa showed the Republic in deficit on her trade outside of Southern Africa.36

However, before a fuller consideration of the wider issues raised by these arguments can be made, a more detailed analysis of South African exports to the continent is necessary. Besides Zambia and Rhodesia, three other areas to which South Africa has increased her exports since 1964 can be clearly identified. They are Malawi and the two Portuguese provinces of Angola and Mozambique. In growth terms the most impressive, but in absolute terms the smallest market was Malawi. Her imports from South Africa rose from R1.7 million in 1964 to R7.7 million in 1970.

**TABLE 7.**

MALAWIAN IMPORTS (in thousand Kwacha (a))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>RHODESIA</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
<th>S.A. as%</th>
<th>IN RAND.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>28,640</td>
<td>11,202</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>1,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>40,806</td>
<td>14,861</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>2,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>54,292</td>
<td>12,333</td>
<td>3,928</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>3,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>50,852</td>
<td>10,854</td>
<td>3,920</td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>3,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>58,180</td>
<td>10,490</td>
<td>6,414</td>
<td>11.02</td>
<td>5,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>61,916</td>
<td>10,446</td>
<td>8,820</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td>7,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>71,367</td>
<td>15,505</td>
<td>8,968</td>
<td>12.57</td>
<td>7,665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: (a) 1 Kwacha = 1 Rand prior to devaluation in November, 1967. After devaluation £K 1 = approximately R0.855.

In part, the increase in trade between the two countries may be seen as a factor in cementing their political and diplomatic relations and in part as a consequence of them. The signing of a new trade agreement between the Republic and Malawi in March 1967 helped lay the foundation for the establishment of diplomatic relations, while part of recent South African loans to Malawi has been tied to the purchase of South African goods. Aid of this kind has already boosted – and should further boost – South Africa's position in the Malawian market.

Nevertheless, it is important to resist the temptation to exaggerate the significance of Malawi's increased trade with South Africa. Firstly, in absolute terms the extent of the trade is small and even in 1970 the Republic's share in Malawi's imports was considerably smaller than her share in Zambia's. Secondly, trade is very far from being Malawi's most important economic link with South Africa. Of far greater importance is migratory labour and following the cut-back in the employment of Malawians in Rhodesia and Zambia, Malawi's reliance on South Africa's admission of up to 80,000 of her labourers annually has become all the greater. Further, while, for instance, the completion of the Tanzam railway could radically affect Malawi's trading options, it is unlikely that she will find another market for her labour. In short, labour is a far better guarantee of Malawi's continued dependence on South Africa than trade.

Finally, the growth of Malawi's trade with South Africa should not be looked at in isolation. Malawi's trading relations with the white south as a whole, like those of Zambia were affected both by the break-up of Federation and, despite the fact
that Malawi made no systematic attempt to implement sanctions, by U.D.I. In fact, the growth of South African exports to Malawi during the period 1965-70 has been largely at the expense of Rhodesia. While in absolute terms Malawi's imports from the white south have increased substantially since 1964, as a proportion of total imports they have declined by more than 10%. Rhodesia's share of the market was almost halved, while South Africa's doubled.39

The very substantial growth of South African exports to Angola and Mozambique completes the picture of expansion (see Tables 8 and 9). It reflects both South Africa's closer political relations with Portugal and her greater economic involvement through schemes like the Cabora-Bassa dam project and the Kunene river project. The extension of South African capital to the two territories followed reforms in the Portuguese law on foreign investment between 1962 and 1965; changes prompted by Portugal's concern, in the wake of rebellion in both Angola and Mozambique, to secure greater foreign financial support for her position in Africa. Politically, too, Portugal has sought closer links with South Africa and has fostered top level exchanges to this end. The two governments concluded a new trade agreement in October 1964.
**TABLE 1.**

SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS \(^a\) (in millions of Rand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>AFRICA (^b)</th>
<th>Africa as % of Total.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>660.8</td>
<td>128.1</td>
<td>19.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>737.7</td>
<td>142.6</td>
<td>19.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>801.1</td>
<td>153.7</td>
<td>19.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>713.2</td>
<td>134.0</td>
<td>18.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>787.1</td>
<td>146.7</td>
<td>18.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>797.2</td>
<td>140.4</td>
<td>17.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>850.0</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>15.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>867.4</td>
<td>119.6</td>
<td>12.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>915.8</td>
<td>107.2</td>
<td>11.70</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>954.4</td>
<td>113.9</td>
<td>11.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1056.3</td>
<td>147.1</td>
<td>13.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1201.7</td>
<td>196.3</td>
<td>16.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1351.9</td>
<td>225.6</td>
<td>16.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1502.4</td>
<td>248.0</td>
<td>16.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1527.1</td>
<td>254.6</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1542.9</td>
<td>263.9</td>
<td>17.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


for 1970 - Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics

Third Column calculated. \( R_l = £0.585 \)

**NOTES.**

(a) For the purpose of foreign trade statistics South Africa includes the Republic, South West Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

(b) Africa includes Madagascar, Mauritius, and a number of other Indian and Atlantic Ocean islands.

Notes (a) and (b) apply to all South African figures.

(c) Up to 1964, merchandize includes goods grown, produced, or manufactured in South Africa. Re-exports of imported goods are included from 1965.
**TABLE 2.**

**SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS\(^a\) TO AFRICA (in millions of Rand)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>145.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>196.3</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>133.5</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>225.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>121.0</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>248.0</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>129.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1969</td>
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<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>147.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>263.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:**

For 1961-64 - See Table 4
For 1965-70 - See Table 1

**NOTE** (a) Figures include re-exports.

**TABLE 3.**

**Break-down of Exports\(^a\) to Africa 1955-65 (in millions of Rand)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>FEDERATION(^b)</th>
<th>MOZAMBIQUE</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>128.1</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>142.6</td>
<td>108.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>153.7</td>
<td>114.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>134.0</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>146.7</td>
<td>105.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>140.4</td>
<td>104.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>119.6</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>107.2</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>113.9</td>
<td>81.0(^c)</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1965)</td>
<td>116.2</td>
<td>86.4(^d)</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**NOTES:**

(a) Figures exclude re-exports.
(b) The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
(c) Total of constituent parts of the former Federation (Rhodesia: 51.1, Malawi: 0.8, and Zambia: 29.1)
(d) Figure not broken down.
### Table 4.
Detailed Break-Down of Exports (a) to Africa 1961-4 in Rand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Africa</td>
<td>145,415,847</td>
<td>133,499,958</td>
<td>120,987,127</td>
<td>129,814,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation</td>
<td>108,976,025</td>
<td>94,955,911</td>
<td>85,512,639</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59,894,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32,312,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,089,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>771,890</td>
<td>1,197,338</td>
<td>1,716,601</td>
<td>2,153,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>12,071,833</td>
<td>14,323,076</td>
<td>15,370,948</td>
<td>18,286,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>121,819,748</strong></td>
<td><strong>110,476,325</strong></td>
<td><strong>102,600,188</strong></td>
<td><strong>113,735,246</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascension</td>
<td>36,634</td>
<td>38,914</td>
<td>56,971</td>
<td>96,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Is.</td>
<td>22,533</td>
<td>86,010</td>
<td>332,937</td>
<td>1,180,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>105,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>3,723,488</td>
<td>4,311,070</td>
<td>3,658,667</td>
<td>4,326,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-Union</td>
<td>85,696</td>
<td>249,967</td>
<td>231,255</td>
<td>955,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Helena</td>
<td>123,533</td>
<td>100,455</td>
<td>146,495</td>
<td>134,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seycelles</td>
<td>38,121</td>
<td>60,094</td>
<td>92,907</td>
<td>125,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tristan da Cunha</td>
<td>23,049</td>
<td>15,601</td>
<td>10,204</td>
<td>36,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,053,504</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,862,236</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,529,940</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,961,441</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rest of Africa</td>
<td>19,542,595</td>
<td>18,161,397</td>
<td>13,623,508</td>
<td>9,117,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kenya)</td>
<td>7,720,273</td>
<td>5,853,618</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (b)</td>
<td>6,904,381</td>
<td>7,851,233</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda)</td>
<td>1,401,356</td>
<td>1,034,431</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Republic of South Africa - Department of Customs and Excise: South African Foreign Trade Statistics for 1962 and 1964. (Exports and re-exports added together.)

**NOTES:**
(a) The figures include re-exports.
(b) The Congo (Leopoldville), as it then was.
### TABLE 5. 
**RHODESIAN IMPORTS** (In millions of Rhode(a)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
<th></th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>216.5</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>24.34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>239.6</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>22.91</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>169.4</td>
<td>78.6(b)</td>
<td>46.40</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>187.1</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>51.52</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>207.0</td>
<td>107.1</td>
<td>51.74</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>199.4</td>
<td>110.7</td>
<td>55.52</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>234.9</td>
<td>114.3</td>
<td>48.66</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Rhodesia - Central Statistical Office (Salisbury): Annual Statement of External Trade 1965 (for 1964 and 65) and Monthly Digest of Statistics (total 1966-70)


**NOTES:**
1. (a) 1 Rhode = 1 Rand (£0.585)
2. (b) committee's figures given in U.S. dollars calculated in Rhode.
3. (c) of South African imports over previous year.
4. Columns 3 and 4 calculated.

### TABLE 6. 
**ZAMBIAN IMPORTS** (in millions of Kwacha(a)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
<th>% (c)</th>
<th>RHODESIA</th>
<th>SUB-TOTAL(d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>156.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.72</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>210.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>19.65</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>112.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>246.1</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>23.77</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>104.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>306.4</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>23.56</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>104.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>325.2</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>311.8</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>22.42</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>358.5</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>-8.2</td>
<td>17.21</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>84.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Republic of Zambia - Central Statistical Office (Lusaka): Monthly Digest of Statistics.

**Columns 3, 4 and 6 calculated.**

**NOTES:**
1. (a) 1 Kwacha = 1 Rand.
2. (b) of South African imports over previous year.
3. (c) South Africa as percentage of total
4. (d) Rhodesia and South Africa taken together.

**TABLE 7 ON P.317.**
### Table 8: Mozambique Imports (in millions of escudos (a))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
<th>S.A. as %</th>
<th>in Millions of Rand.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4,489</td>
<td>571.2</td>
<td>12.72</td>
<td>14.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4,984</td>
<td>524.2</td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>13.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5,976</td>
<td>627.1</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>15.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>5,727</td>
<td>645.0</td>
<td>11.26</td>
<td>16.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>6,740</td>
<td>793.3</td>
<td>11.77</td>
<td>19.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7,491</td>
<td>1,127.2</td>
<td>15.05</td>
<td>28.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970(b)</td>
<td>9,328</td>
<td>1,435.0</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>35.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
- Province of Mozambique - Director of Statistical Services (Lourenco Marques): *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (for 1969 and 70)
- 3rd and 4th columns calculated.

**NOTES:**
(a) 1,000 Escudos = approx. R25
(b) based on figures for 10 months.

### Table 9: Angolan Imports (in thousands of escudos (a))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
<th>S.A. as %</th>
<th>In millions of Rand.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4,714,294</td>
<td>100,159</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5,601,177</td>
<td>99,677</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5,947,606</td>
<td>98,826</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>7,908,686</td>
<td>119,218</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>8,709,858</td>
<td>219,998</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>9,261,182</td>
<td>294,064</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970(b)</td>
<td>11,398,098</td>
<td>444,926</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>11.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
- 3rd and 4th columns calculated.

**NOTES:**
(a) 1,000 Escudos = approx. R25
(b) based on figures for 10 months.
To calculate from the imports of the five countries treated above South Africa's exports to the remainder of Africa since 1964 presents a number of problems. The primary difficulty is to establish a basis for comparing the 1964 import figures given in Tables 5-9 with those for South African exports in that year (Table 4). A glance at the Tables reveals the wide divergence between the two sets of figures. For this there is no one simple explanation. A complex of factors operates and not all in the same direction. The main factors can be identified as follows:

1. The South African figures are f.o.b. while those of the five importing countries are c.i.f.
2. The South African figures include re-exports of imported goods that are not generally credited to South Africa as the country of origin by the importing country.
3. The South African figures include all exports from the Rand area while the five countries list imports from Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South West Africa separately.
4. Finally, it would appear that countries through which a considerable quantity of South African goods pass like Rhodesia and Mozambique, are on occasion wrongly identified in South African figures as the final destination of goods in transit. This at any rate seems the logical explanation why, on the one hand the Mozambique import figure for 1964 is lower than its South African equivalent while the Angolan import figure is higher although the technical basis on which the two Portuguese figures were calculated was exactly the same.

The last factor probably does not significantly alter over-all totals of five countries taken together, but the other three clearly do. The first factor deflates the South African figure compared to the foreign figure; the second and third inflate it. Given the number and complexity of the factors involved it should be clear that no technical operation is
possible that will simply convert for example Malawian figures for imports from South Africa into figures for South African exports to Malawi. Nevertheless, attempts have been made along these lines. Gervasi, for instance, tries to calculate South African exports to the rest of Africa just by correcting for the first factor. As a consequence he grossly over-estimates South African exports to Africa outside of Southern Africa. The in-built bias of the method can be readily demonstrated by applying it to comparable figures for 1964 when the result can be cross-checked against an actual break-down of South African exports to Africa.

Instead of trying to adjust for each and every factor and to avoid pitfalls of the kind I have just described, I have adopted what is in essence a simpler method of adjustment. That is, I have calculated the ratio between South African exports to the rest of Africa in 1964 and the difference between South Africa's total African exports and the total imports of Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and Angola from South Africa in 1964. I have then used that ratio to work out estimates for South African exports to the rest of Africa between 1965 and 1970.

TABLE 10.
SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS TO THE REST OF AFRICA (in millions of Rand).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>20.3(b)</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from Tables 4 - 9.

NOTES: (a) Africa excluding Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and Angola, but including re-exports.

(b) Figures 65-70 estimates.
The method used rests on two assumptions: (1) that the four factors I've mentioned above bear a roughly constant relation to the volume of trade and (2) that the imports of the five countries from South Africa formed the same proportion of South Africa's total African exports between 1965 and 1970 as in 1964. In practice, these assumptions need to be qualified. Firstly, there is evidence that re-exports of imported goods to Africa, have risen sharply out of proportion to total African exports. Secondly, imports by the five countries of South African goods have also risen as a proportion of total African exports largely because of U.D.I.. As is clear on reflection, the method I've adopted therefore slightly over-estimates South African exports to the rest of Africa.

Consequently, the stagnation of South African trade beyond Southern Africa which the estimates in Table 10 indicate is all the more striking. Exports have remained below even their absolute level in 1961 and 1962 and as a proportion of total exports to Africa have fallen from just over 17% in 1962 to approximately 7½% in 1970. Further, when the inclusion in the figures of South African trade with various Atlantic and Indian Ocean islands is taken into account, it is clear that outside of Southern Africa the Republic's exports to the continent proper have amounted to somewhat less than 1% of the country's total imports for at least the last three years (1968-70). Even the conservative assumption that South African exports to the islands have not risen above their 1964 level of just below R7 million places an upper limit on South African exports to the continent beyond her immediate neighbours of about R12.6 million. This is in fact considerably less than South African exports to just Kenya and the Congo in 1961 or 62. In marked contrast to these figures are reports of journalists of head-way by South African exporters in francophone West Africa. It is
inevitably difficult to assess the reliability of these essentially impressionistic accounts. However this much is clear: on the figures any expansion of trade in this area has not off-set the virtual loss of the Kenyan market after independence and a probable similar decline in Congolese imports from South Africa, at least after Tschombe's fall in 1965. In general, on the evidence available there is no justification for the view that a break-through in South Africa's trading relations with independent Africa has occurred as an adjunct to her outward-looking foreign policy.

CONCLUSION.

It may of course be objected firstly that the figures on which I have based my analysis are inadequate or secondly that I have over-looked the possibility of a sizeable export of South African goods to Africa through third parties. There is no complete answer to the first point, though the steps taken by South Africa to disguise the exact location of her exports to Africa is it seems to me a sufficient reason to rule out actual deceit in the official figures. Further, it is really incumbent on those who challenge this analysis to produce solid evidence that there are short-comings in the figures that necessitate a fresh approach. As to the second point, two factors in my opinion militate strongly against this possibility. South Africa is a high cost economy and even without the intervention of a third party her ability to compete with Europe in many parts of Africa over a large range of commodities is questionable. I also question whether countries finding South African goods attractive would feel, with the decline of O.A.U. solidarity and militancy on the question of Southern Africa, any need to resort to this kind of expedient. At the very least one would expect any earlier inhibitions about direct trade as such with South Africa to have declined and to be reflected in increases
in the most recent figures. For this the figures offer no support whatsoever.

Trade of course is not the only index of economic relations. Investment is another and for example in the context of American economic relations with Latin America a very much more important one. Nevertheless in the case of South Africa I have seen little evidence to suggest that there has been a sizeable expansion of South African capital outside of Southern Africa. On the contrary, far and away the most important investment abroad by South Africa has been in the Portuguese territories and particularly in the Cabora-Bassa project. However, a detailed study of South African investment in Africa is needed before any more definite conclusions can be made in this area, though I think a similar pattern to that of trade of an almost exclusive concentration in Southern Africa is indicated.

But perhaps the main question my analysis begs is this: given the difficulty of establishing basic facts about South Africa's economic relations with Africa, why is it so readily assumed by academics of often quite different political persuasions that South Africa's outward-looking policy is economically motivated? The answer lies I think in the confusion that has arisen, because of their rough coincidence in time, between the evolution of the outward-looking policy and a distinct though not wholly unrelated development, the coalescing of Southern Africa. Certainly, the consolidation of the white-ruled states of Southern Africa into a redoubt has facilitated economic co-operation with South Africa within the whole area including the black-ruled enclaves (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland) and Malawi, as in fact the trade figures show. However it has not been the case that South Africa's outward-looking policy has depended on this consolidation. Indeed, the
increased dependence of Rhodesia on South Africa as a result of U.D.I. has been very much more of an embarrassment to South African policy-makers than a help, especially in their search for a political accommodation with Zambia.

While considerable evidence can be amassed as to South Africa's economic ambitions in Southern Africa, the circumstances (U.D.I, the wars in Angola and Mozambique) opening the way to their at least partial fulfilment have not been of South Africa's making or in general politically to her advantage. In short, an element of disjunction exists between South Africa's political and her economic interests in Africa. That is, I am not arguing that South Africa has no economic ambitions outside of Southern Africa or that economic interest groups within South Africa have not played a part in promoting an expansionist foreign policy towards Africa. What I am saying is that, outside of Southern Africa at least, political objectives - the neutralization of African campaigns against apartheid through the U.N. and so on - enjoy a very much higher priority in the framing of the outward-looking policy than do any economic aims.

Indeed, the estimates of South African exports to the rest of Africa in Table 10 themselves provide evidence of the inadequacy of wholly or largely economic explanations in accounting for South African diplomatic overtures to, for example West Africa. In this area, quite apart from political barriers, South African exporters face formidable European competition and trade with South Africa is not likely to prove to be much of an indicator of the success or failure of South African foreign policy. Finally, this appendix will have fulfilled its purpose if it has made clear both the need for more detailed study of specific issues arising out of South Africa's policy towards Africa and the need to bridge the gap between political and economic interpretations of that policy in a way that does not assume a simple identity between South Africa's political and economic interests.


4. see for example *Veg* April 1969 (Pretoria) which also suggests continuity of policy from Milner.


6. Molteno p.19

7. Reflected in a fall in gold and foreign currency reserves.


11. Muller quoted in Legum and Drysdale (ed.) p.317


13. Molteno p.20

14. then South Africa's Foreign Minister.


18. The last full break-down was published in 1962.

19. Calculated from Table 3 and therefore excluding re-exports of imported goods.

20. Inter-territorial trade, calculated by adding each territory's imports from its neighbours, was R1 million more than the areas imports from South Africa in 1964; over R1.1 million less than in 1965. Unfortunately there are no official figures of inter-territorial trade during Federation itself. (Source: Official Rhodesian, Malawian, and Zambian statistics).

21. Calculated as above but using Malawian and Zambian figures of their exports to Rhodesia in place of Rhodesian import figures and U.N. estimate of Rhodesia's South African imports (see Table 5).

22. See H.R. Reed's article: The Economic Links within Southern Africa in *Africa South of the Congo*.

23. i.e. the fourth column in Table 3.

24. Of the list in Table 4, only Mauritius is today a member of the Organization of African Unity (since her independence in 1968).


26. However, the actual details of the calculations are unfortunately not given.

27. Replacing the restrictive agreement with the Federation in 1960.


29. Calculated from Table 6.

30. Her imports first outstripped those of Rhodesia in 1966.

31. See Table 7 below (Note that the Malawian Kwacha is worth less than the Zambian.)

32. R8.2 million as opposed to R7.6 million.

33. The difference between South African exports including re-exports and imports.

34. Molteno p.11.

35. The export figure he has taken in 1965 does not include re-exports (in fact over R30 million); that in 1968 does. Consequently he exaggerates the increase in the trade surplus. See above.
36. In 1964, South African imports from Africa beyond the five countries of Southern Africa exceeded exports (including re-exports) by R20.6 million. Calculated from *South African Foreign Trade Statistics 1964*.

37. Under the agreement certain Malawian commodities (principally agricultural) enter South Africa either duty-free or at South Africa's most favoured nation tariff, while South Africa gains a wide preferential access to the Malawian market.

38. For example, the loan to Malawi for a rail link to Nacala was tied to the use of South African steel. (See *Molteno p. 10* and *Africa Research Bulletin (London) -Economic Series* - Vol 6 No. 11 col. 1529.

39. Calculated from Table 7.

40. This can be confirmed by examining a break-down of both sets of figures according to S.I.T.C. sections.

41. The same mechanism seems to operate in the case of Rhodesia and Malawi.

42. See Gervasi p.96.

43. The method is not in fact the only error in Gervasi's calculations. His figure for total Rhodesian imports is half the actual figure, which leads him to a further exaggeration of South African exports outside of Southern Africa. (He estimates that in 1968 Africa beyond Southern Africa imported R85 million worth of goods).

44. R16.08 million i.e. excluding the five countries in Southern Africa but including re-exports and the Atlantic and Indian Ocean islands.

45. The difference is R26.2 million.

46. In the last years when a figure for re-exports to Africa is available, these show a large increase, from R15.9 million in 1964 to R30.9 million in 1965. (See Tables 3 and 4)

47. The unofficial figure for South African exports (excluding re-exports) to the rest of Africa in 1965 (see Table 3) provides additional evidence that this is the case. However I have not corrected for either factor in order to allow for any possible margin of error in the other direction, for instance perhaps in the U.N. estimates of Rhodesian imports from South Africa.

48. In other words, roughly the same proportion of total imports as in 1964.

49. See Republic of Kenya: *Statistical Abstract 1969*. (Ministry of Economic Planning and Development) according to which Kenyan imports from South Africa had declined to virtually zero by 1965.

51. With Dr. Verwoerd's call in 1964 for a common market in Southern Africa a natural highlight.

52. Not least because of the area's special relationship with the European Common Market.

53. Included under this general heading of political interests would be security, though a strong case can clearly be made that defence interest represent a further third dimension of South African policy.
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1. UNITED NATIONS

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   6th Session (6.12.1951 - 5.2.1952) (Paris 1952) and

2. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

   : Legal Consequences for States of the Continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa),

   : South West Africa cases, First Phase, 1962
   (ICJ Reports, the Hague 1962)

3. SOUTH AFRICA.

   : House of Assembly Debates
   : Report of the Commission of
   Enquiry into South West African Affairs.
   R.P. No. 12 / 1964 (Pretoria))

   : Senate Debates.
   : South West Africa - South
   Africa's Reply to the Secretary-General of the United
   Nations (Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria September
   1969).

   : Today's News (South Africa House, London - various from 1970)

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