AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE'S POLICY WITH RESPECT TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS: 1976 TO 1990.

A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Philosophy (Education) degree at the University of Cape Town, Faculty of Education.

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ERRATA

p12. line 14. Conference of Headmasters (not for)
p27. line 12. should read 'component of the state'.
p159. line 1. should read 'Secondly, there was a seemingly arbitrary ---'
p164. line 16. should read 'in Port Elizabeth' (not on).
p168. line 10. should read 'SA Association of Independent Schools' (not private).
p173. fn 39. should read 'Cowan House' (not Gowan).
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Introduction

I believe myself that what we have to look forward to is a resolute campaign, ... directed against the claim that English ideas and English culture have a right to a place in the South African nation of the future... The private schools of the country are among the institutions which stand in the way of the realisation of this idea. Those who have the nationalist outlook have no need of private schools. I believe that there is no place for them in the South Africa of the future as envisaged by our present rulers. (1) (Extract from the Opening Address by the Lord Bishop of Cape Town, the Right Reverend G H Clayton, 1950 MC Conference.)

Two years ago the Archbishop of Cape Town addressed to you an impressive warning of the evils that might come upon you, if existing trends in Government policy towards the private schools should continue. I do not need to remind you how justified that warning has proved to be. In the Transvaal, this year has seen the production of a draft Educational Ordinance which, if it is applied, may easily go far towards annihilating the independence of private schools in that province. Christian National Education professes (disingenuously, I think) to be concerned only with schools with Afrikaans speakers; but it is essentially at English schools that this latest blow is aimed. (2) (An Address to the Conference at St. Andrew's College by Michael Roberts, 1952.)

I think it was made quite clear yesterday that, in our opinion, private schools really no longer have the right to exist. We regard the Government school as the proper school. It gives everything to the child which can possibly be given and no necessity any longer exists to call a private school into existence for special reasons. (3) (Extracts from a speech made by Dr. Wassenaar, member of the Executive Committee of the Transvaal, 1953.)

These quotes graphically illustrate the tensions that arose within the ranks of the 'organised' private/Independent (4) school movement with the coming to power of the Nationalist party, and its concomitant imposition of Christian National
Education. The rigidly Calvinist educational ethos as promoted through C.N.E. brought the Anglicised private church schools into opposition with the Afrikaner state and its policy of cultural hegemony.

The introduction of Bantu Education, combined with the undermining of the role that Anglicised church-based education had played in South Africa, served to deepen the division between 'public' and 'private' education. An uneasy coexistence continued throughout the ensuing decades.

It can be convincingly argued, however, that the seventies, and, increasingly, the eighties saw the gradual decline of this confrontationist trend.

By the 1970's there was a more pragmatic approach towards apartheid evident in government circles and a growing awareness in the country as a whole that rigid separation was economically not possible, and was not, at any rate, in the best interests of the country (5).

Juxtapose, for example, the following quotes from members of the ruling National party with those above, and the change of emphasis in government policy becomes obvious:

Private schools render an important service alongside the public provision of education by the government (Minister P.J. Clase, 10/03/86). My question is should the Department of National Education not consider the abolition of the quota system for these schools and allow them to select their pupils on merit? And should the Government not increase the subsidies to allow for multiracial education at those private schools which wish to provide that facility? If they flourish we can learn more. If they don't succeed we will not have jeopardised our whole education
In line with this reality, the government began to demonstrate an increasing tolerance towards, and tacit acceptance of, the private schools. Whereas prior to 1976 there were officially no 'non-white' children outside of public schools provided for them in terms of their race classification, by 1986, 143 out of 170 English-medium private schools accepted 'non-white' pupils (6), or 84% of the schools had chosen to open their doors (7). More importantly, they were under no serious threat of closure as a result.

This pragmatism extended beyond the unofficial 'nod' for open schools to include the financial recognition that the state conferred on the private schools through the 1986 Private Schools Act which provided a private school subsidy nationally as opposed to the previously provincially based, differentiated, uncoordinated and financially negligible subsidisation.

Finally, and most recently, the 1990's have seen the fruition of this policy development with the selected opening of public, state schools. As early as 1989, Minister Clase had stated that the government was prepared to provide "...multi-racial schools in open or free settlement areas" (8). The proposition, which was intended policy for the 'open' areas only, made provision for either a 100% subsidy for private schools within the areas, or for "...state-run
multiracial schools in free settlement areas" (7).

Previously the stated policy for these areas was that children would have to be educated either within open private schools, or attend segregated government schools — whether these schools were situated within the 'open' area or not.

The dramatic political developments of 1990 saw the state announce its intention to revoke apartheid's 'sacred cows', including Group Areas and Separate Amenities. The speed with which the state began to ditch traditionally non-negotiable policies saw the proposed free-settlement areas become a 'non-issue' with the scrapping of Group Areas in early 1991. As a result, Clase’s proposals for open public schools within the free settlement areas were adapted to form the basis for the three models of open public schools. These will be examined later.

For the first time, then, the state acknowledged its partial support for 'multi-racial' state schooling. This development, while relating specifically to public schools, should be seen as the natural progression of the policy of open schools as developed with respect to the private schools. As such it serves to qualify the changes that occurred in the state's private schools policy which, over the period in question, moved from confrontation, through a burgeoning manipulation of the schools' open policies to financial support of the schools.
The state's motivation for the fluidity and pragmatism evident in its private school policy during the years 1976 to 1990 remains the primary aim of this dissertation.

**Aims**

If one accepts, then, that the period in question saw a fundamental shift in state policy towards the private schools -- beginning with its unofficial tolerance of the first open private schools in the late 1970's, and ending with financial support for open schools and the opening of selected state schools in the 1990's -- one question begs answering.

Why did Nationalist education policy, which increasingly existed in direct contradiction to the policy of separate development, experience this gradual yet fundamental change of direction?

Additionally, one needs to question, not only the causes, but the effects of this policy swing. How, then, did state policy manifest itself in terms of both legislation and practice? Or how did the application of the new policy affect the private schools? What were the implications of the three differing subsidy levels contained in the 1986 Private Schools Act, and was their application uniform or discriminatory with respect to all private schools?

Clearly, there are a host of unanswered questions.
This dissertation seeks to examine these issues in two sections. The first will attempt to develop an hypothesis with regard to the motivation for the state's policy change. This will be undertaken through an examination of identifiable and underlying political and economic reform initiatives of the South African state preceding, and including the period 1976 to 1990.

Once a motivational hypothesis has been developed, the dissertation will look at the specific development, implementation, and implications of the state's policy -- with respect to the private schools themselves -- over the period 1976 to 1990. This will be undertaken through detailed commentary on the available documentation in an attempt to situate the hypothesis for the policy change against available documentary evidence.

At present there are two schools of thought which inform the discussion around the question of the state's policy change. This dissertation will explore both of these with a view to establishing their relevance for the state's reform initiatives during the period.

Present Approaches to the Question of Nationalist Private School Policy

Briefly, the first proposes that present policy is a manifestation of the state's recognition of the importance of cultivating and manipulating the so-called 'black middle
class'. Michael Corke, for example, cogently argues this hypothesis when he claims that "...attempts at reform are therefore directed towards meeting the needs of industry for a stable and literate labour force, from which an emerging black middle class can be co-opted in support of the system..." (10). This school of thought explains the increasing government recognition and support given to the private schools in the light of this co-optive paradigm.

The 'open' private schools, in other words, offer the state an ideal vehicle for development of this class. These schools with their traditionally high standards of education serve not only as facilitators for the education of this class, but also as a vehicle for entrance into increased economic mobility. Alf Stadler, while citing the reforms of the 'P.W. Botha era' states that "...one intention of these reforms was to replace racial criteria with market principles in determining access to opportunities within the capitalist social order" (11).

The second explanation promoted to account for the 'toenadering' between the state and private schools, is umbilically linked to the first. It argues that the increase in government support for the private schools is sympathetic with the state's declared privatisation intents which have become increasingly more prominent during the period in question.

The government is of the opinion that the encouragement of private initiative and the devolution of functions from the Central
Government to other authorities or to the private sector will serve largely to prevent education taking on an impersonal cast, and avoid indifference and inefficiency in the administration of education (12).

Education is not only one facet of privatisation moves, but private school education is particularly linked, both historically and socio-politically to the free enterprise system. It embodies the central tenets of prestige, pursuit of academic excellence and the assertion of individual over collective growth. "The conclusion seems inevitable: the private schools are...whether they like it or not, involved in the perpetuation of an elite" (13).

Both of these possible motives, or 'causes' for the change in the state's policy will be examined further in Chapter One.

**Methodology**

A policy is modified through a chain of events which usually involves many people doing quite different things. To focus upon the final authoritative selection of an alternative to replace an existing policy without considering how the issue was created and pressed, who proposed the alternatives or who exercised political influence which biased the outcome in favour of one alternative or the other, is to miss important elements of the policy process (14).

An acceptance of this fact is important for this dissertation. It embodies the realisation that policy change cannot simply be viewed as a 'before' and 'after' scenario. Reality dictates that policy progression is convoluted, with
a wide range of contributing factors serving to influence policy adaptation.

Coterminously, then, one cannot hope to extract motive or meaning from a narrow analysis of 'official' documentation, or legislation, which is merely the manifestation of "...the final authoritative selection of an alternative..." (15).

While the methodology employed in this dissertation is largely one of documentary analysis, and the focus is largely concerned with 'official' policy, it is hoped that this particular constraint can be circumvented through as wide a range of documentary analysis as possible.

These will include reference to the following:

* the debates contained in Hansard;
* the abundant and untapped information in the files of the various private school organisations;
* newspaper reports;
* various official documents and publications, and, finally;
* the legislation itself.

In addition, use was made of interviews with relevant private school spokespeople, educationists and teachers. Through a thorough examination of these various documents and opinions, it is hoped that the emerging policy trends can be isolated, identified and explored.

It was notoriously difficult to, firstly, arrange meetings with government spokespeople, and, secondly, extract
anything other than official comment. Consequently, particularly heavy use has been made of the information contained in the files of the private school organisations.

These files contained not only the particular denominational records of issues like the 'open' schools, but also recorded the minutes and correspondence of the Joint Liaison Committee's meetings with government.

This approach has facilitated a fresh perspective in that the extensive contact and negotiation that continued 'behind the scenes' highlights the reality that dictates that policy is malleable and that legislation, while the end result, shows little of the process involved.

Literature

Any examination of private school education in South Africa will inevitably be faced with the reality of a dearth of directly applicable reference material. The field is hugely under-researched. In effect there are only two or three texts which can be considered 'standard' reading. These include Peter Randall's Little England on the Veld, (16) and Alastair Smurthwaites's The Private Education of English-Speaking Whites in South Africa (17).

It may be useful here to briefly, and very generally, refer to these works so as to ascertain the relevance of this research as opposed to that which has preceded it.
Peter Randall's *Little England on the Veld: The English Private School System in South Africa*, which was originally submitted as an M. Ed. degree in 1980, deals largely with the 'English' private schools as represented in South Africa. His work can be seen as a pioneering one, documenting the history and growth of the South African Anglican schools as modelled on the British public school system. This includes a detailed examination of the organisational development of the schools through a chapter entitled, "Evolution of a System" which explores, among other things, the formation and development of the HMC, firstly in 1929 (18), and the APS in 1974 (19), the two bodies representative of the Anglican private schools.

Randall's work, then, deals mainly with those South African private schools linked directly or indirectly with the British public school system. This is the stated focus of his research:

> The primary focus of this book will be that select band of about 50 Protestant schools that most closely resemble the English public school model, and which through their membership of the Conference of Headmasters and Headmistresses and the Association of Private Schools form something of a closed community, jealous of their role of preserving a loosely-defined 'English tradition of education'... (20).

Smurthwaite's work, also submitted as an M.Ed, in 1981, is of wider scope than Randall's in that it deals with both 'Conference' and APS, or largely Anglican schools, as well as Catholic church schools. It is impressive in that it covers the 'Scope and Nature', and the philosophy attendant
to, private education in South Africa, its history, as well as the various political, economic and social factors perceived as relevant to the development of South African private schools. If one considers that the first Anglican church school in South Africa was started in 1808, (21) and the first Catholic private school appeared in the Cape in 1838 (22), then producing even a purely historical analysis is clearly a daunting prospect.

Both Randall and Smurthwaite, then, have provided a significant foundation for research into the South African private school phenomenon.

There are, of course, other references. These include Conference (23), a useful reference to the organisational growth of the Conference for Headmasters and Headmistresses in South Africa and an invaluable record of the annual meetings of these heads of Anglican schools, as well as providing references to the relevant provincial legislation pertaining to private education.

With respect to Jewish education, Myer Ellis Katz's Doctoral thesis, The History of Jewish Education in South Africa: 1841-1980 (24) in two volumes, is a vast source of information. It records the history of South African Jewish education from the establishment of the first Hebrew school, through the development of the Talmud Torah schools which "...provided a more intensive Jewish education than the Jewish 'public' Schools..." (25) and took place as
supplementary classes in the afternoon. These, in turn, gave way to the post-war Jewish Day Schools which rapidly eclipsed (26) the Talmud Torah schools and formed the basis for Jewish private school education as it stands today.

On the whole, however, as stated previously, and apart from the references mentioned here, the field is under-researched. In addition, a reading of the available material reveals certain fundamental gaps in this research.

The primary one, and one which this dissertation will seek to redress, is the concentration of the works on the private schools themselves -- their historical development and their organisational structures, per se -- as opposed to an analysis of state policy towards these schools and the schools' interaction with the state. Certainly, both Randall and Smurthwaite do refer to the difficulties inherent in reconciling the heavily Anglicised and English church-based schools with the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism, yet they are not concerned with directly addressing the nature and relationship of government interaction with the private schools.

In particular, and for obvious reasons, their works have been steadily eclipsed by the inexorable progression of time. There is a world of difference between that which took place in the early 1980's, which is when both Randall's and Smurthwaite's works were completed, and the situation as at
1990. Some more obvious examples of the changes within the field of private education would be the following:

* the introduction of the new constitution and the attendant restructuring of education;
* the progressive and rapid desegregation of many of the schools;
* the introduction of numerous new private education initiatives, organisations and schools and, more specifically, the increased subsidisation of the private schools through the Private Schools Act of 1986 and the accompanying recognition that this conferred upon private education;
* finally, and possibly most importantly, is the state’s acceptance, albeit reluctantly, of the principle of open public schools.

This dissertation will seek to show, then, that there has been a noticeable improvement in the state’s relationship with the private schools, not only in quantifiable data in the form of legislative adaptation, but in terms of state ‘attitude’ or policy towards these schools over the past ten years. Clearly, the available material has, to some extent, been overtaken by progress and, for reasons of period or focus, does not adequately reflect the changing government policy.

**Limitations and Key Assumptions**

At this point it is desirable to delineate more clearly the central assumptions and limitations imposed upon this dissertation. Firstly, the dissertation confines itself primarily to the period 1976 to 1990 in recognition that
this period saw the most change in the state's private school policy.

Secondly, the dissertation intends to concern itself exclusively with an examination of the relevance of the changing policy with respect to the 'organised' or traditional church-based schools, or Anglican, Catholic and Jewish schools and their representative bodies (27). It is equally important to remember, however, that while this dissertation confines itself largely to an analysis of government private school policy as it affects those schools affiliated to either the Anglican, Catholic or Jewish schools, these three sectional and denominational groupings are in no way representative of all non-state, or 'private' education in South Africa. There are a host of other educational institutions which are not state-run and are therefore, technically, 'private' in their operation.

These include the S.A.A.I.S. (28), an independent body of schools operating within Southern Africa. This organisation, which represents a substantial and dynamic section of the independent school movement has, as its stated objectives, the following:

* promoting the well-being of its member schools;
* promoting integrated practices and opposing racism in education in Southern Africa and actively supporting the promotion of full integration in public and private systems of education throughout the region;
* developing sound principles of practice in admitting students, employing staff, awarding financial support;

* promoting the establishment of independent, non-racial schools, and;

* promoting appropriate educational opportunities and programs appropriate to Southern Africa (29).

In addition the S.A.A.I.S. has been largely instrumental in the creation of the Independent Examinations Board (30) which aims to develop alternative curricula and conduct examinations free from social bias. This in the face of the imminent closure of the J.M.B. in 1992. An analysis of South African private education should not, therefore, neglect this body formed in 1988.

Other private education initiatives include the L.E.A.F. schools -- or Leadership Education and Advancement Foundation -- heavily financed by private enterprise and offering "...senior colleges for what it terms 'excellent non-racial and co-educational facilities for really capable, highly motivated creative young people...' " (31). The idea behind these schools is that 'promising' students will be brought to the colleges for their last two years of schooling. Through this policy increased 'cost effectiveness' is pursued as well as a better chance of optimising successful academic achievement as opposed to if students were selected and educated from the beginning of their junior, or even senior years.
The N.E.S.T. schools, or New Era Schools Trust, of which there were, at the time of writing, two, are also primarily supported by business and are calculatedly 'non-racial' in their educational ethos in that they purposely enrol "...pupils in just about equal numbers. The notion behind this thinking is that a careful match of races will ensure no group will find itself outnumbered and will therefore create a racial environment that is 'non-threatening' " (32). While it is not the intention of this dissertation to dwell on those private initiatives outside of the stated group under examination, this particular enrolment policy and the accepted ethos informing this policy begs comment.

To call an educational enterprise 'non-racial', on the one hand, and to enforce this through calculated and controlled equality of numbers is surely contradictory? The very act of adhering to state-imposed race classification in shaping admissions policy, and the emphasis on 'groups' as a basis for non-racialism is discriminatory.

The A.C.E. schools, or Accelerated Christian Education are Charismatic in ethos and are loosely based on the 'little schoolhouse' concept of educating all pupils under one teacher and roof.

In addition there are countless privately run 'cram' colleges in South Africa which cater for pupils in their final years of schooling. One should also not forget the growing numbers of 'street academies' or impromptu
educational institutions desperately trying to redress some of the educational imbalances within the townships. These schools are increasingly receiving recognition and, in some cases, financial assistance from capital-sponsored foundations.

Finally, it can be convincingly argued that the countless literacy and adult education projects, as well as the numerous 'in-house' training programmes run by the business community, are essentially 'private' education initiatives.

To talk of private education in South Africa, then, is to include all of these, and other educational institutions. While this dissertation confines itself largely to the 'traditional' schools, it must be remembered that the scope of private education is becoming increasingly larger with growing collaboration between capital and state institutions and resources.

A limited focus is accepted, therefore. The study will remain largely confined to an analysis of the state's policy and legislation, and its effects on the 'traditional' private schools and their representative bodies over the fourteen years in question. This will be accomplished through as wide a range of documentary analysis as possible.

The first chapter will concern itself with setting out the two most prominent theories advanced with respect to the state's changing private school policy. Both the attempted
co-option of a black middle class and the rise of the
privatisation ethos will be examined as part of the state's
reform initiative. The first chapter will attempt to
demonstrate the significance of these two issues for the
state's reform policy, in general, and more specifically,
with respect to its relationship with the private schools.
If it can be posited that these two issues influenced and
informed the state's policy towards the private schools,
then, the examination of the period under scrutiny, its
legislation and attendant policy adaptation, can be effected
and situated against the developed hypothesis.

The second chapter will look at the period from 1976 to 1981
encompassing, roughly, the genesis of the open schools
movement and the surrounding debates and policy responses
from the state.

Chapter Three will focus on the period 1981 to 1985. This
was a period of rationalisation and consolidation of policy
in which the state attempted to come to terms with, and
impose control over, the process of desegregated schools
while coterminously shaping its responses in terms of its
reform strategies.

The fourth chapter is primarily concerned with examining the
state's developing policy from 1990. This period was
dominated by the subsidy debate encompassing the formulation
and application of the 1986 Private Schools Act and the
attendant outcry over the blatant attempt by the state to
link its monetary input to reformist control over admissions policies.

The final chapter will attempt to summarise the main conclusions reached in this dissertation.
Footnotes: Introduction


(3). As quoted in Richard Feetham's Opening Address to Conference at Roedean in Sutcliffe, Conference... 1986, p. 54/5.

(4). For the sake of this dissertation, the term 'private school' will be used, generally, to refer to all three school groups, and their representative organisations, to be included; the Anglican, Catholic and Jewish schools.

This is not intended to negate the autonomy of the various parts with respect to the whole. Neither does it ignore the very real differences in ethos and goals which exist within the 'private school' movement. It is a convenient, rather than ideal generalisation and, where necessary, distinctions will be made.


(6). THE STAR, 22/04/86.

(7). THE CAPE TIMES, 19/02/86.

(8). THE ARGUS, 29/09/89.

(9). THE WEEKEND ARGUS, 30/09/89.


(16). see fn. (13).

(17). see fn. (5).


(23). see fn. (1).


(27). * A.P.S., or Association of Private Schools which, in 1988, changed its name to the Independent Schools Council

* C.I.E., or Catholic Institute of Education

* Jewish Board of Education.

(28). Southern African Association of Independent Schools


(30). I.E.B., or Independent Examinations Board.


Chapter One: The 'Black Middle Classes' and Privatisation --

The Politics of Co-option

This chapter seeks to develop an hypothesis within which to situate the change in government policy with respect to the South African private schools. It will attempt this through an exploration of the development of both the 'black middle class', or petite bourgeoisie, and privatisation as elements in a progressive strategy of co-optive reform developed and refined by the state during the years 1976 to 1990.

If it can be proposed that these two issues encompass the nub of the state's reform strategy, or provide an explanation for the state's changing private school policy, then an examination of the particular policy developments, using the available documentation, can be effected and situated against the developed hypothesis. In this way, too, discipline and relevance is imposed upon the later chapters.

While this is clearly presumptive, it is unavoidable. A straightforward analysis of documentation, without a coterminous declaration of the relevance of the political economy of the period, and the very real constrictions and imposed choices that have effectively shaped and directed policy, would be irrelevant.

Before these issues can be examined, however, it is necessary to provide a definition of educational policy as used within this paper.
**Educational Policy**

"Education does not exist in a vacuum but in a particular social, economic, political and (now in South Africa) constitutional context" (1).

This dissertation accepts this simple though crucial point. The practice of educating, or being educated, is a process fundamentally linked to the society within which it takes place. Educational policy, whether directed at regulating the public or private domain, reflects this tenet.

As Peter Kallaway asserts, then:

The state does not have the power simply to impose any policy without reference to what is possible within a given context....We delude ourselves if we think that educational policies can be formulated in air-conditioned conference rooms where academics, statesmen and administrators meet, and simply imposed without reference to legitimate community, religious and educational leaders, as well as to students, teachers and parents (2).

To extrapolate, it can be argued that the line between those actions, or policies, which are state-imposed, and actions or policies that are, of necessity, imposed upon the state, is usually a thin one. While the South African state certainly followed its own agendas and policy goals, it would be short-sighted to ignore the correlation between state policy and societal influence. Witness, for example, the rejection of the 1976 language policy in the field of education, or the eventual demise of the pass laws through, amongst other reasons, the sheer weight of defiance.
The most widely accepted definitions of educational policy usually incorporate and accentuate reference to official, or governmental promotion and imposition. As Buckland points out, however:

Educational policy is not simply the product of the ideas of education experts, but is rather the result of a complex and intricate dialectic between processes internal to the context of schools and the educational establishment on the one hand and the complex range of sometimes contradictory social forces in the broader society, on the other (3).

The formulation of educational policy is inherently bound to the constraints of political, economic and societal circumstance and is not a process confined purely to the 'official' realms of educational ministries or individuals.

Within a piece of research such as this, then, with its particularly narrow focus it is nevertheless essential to recognise the divergent influences that affect a particular policy choice. Even if one chooses to examine policy solely as that which is encompassed within Acts and ensuing Regulations, it remains true that these decisions are directly and indirectly, multiply influenced. "Policy is an amalgam of what the Act and the Regulations will allow and what it is that people can live with" (4).

While the Private School Act of 1986 is a recent official policy document regulating the state's contact with the private schools, the process of arriving at the given Act,
as well as the implications of the relationship between the state and schools, in terms of the Act, is a process multiply affected by the society within which it was formulated.

This chapter chooses to recognise this reality and will examine the state's private school policy as an extension of the general social, economic and political milieu in which it was developed and influenced.

The Emergence of the African 'Middle Class' in South Africa

There is considerable academic debate surrounding the issue of the African middle class in South Africa. The discourse is largely concerned with examining three issues. Firstly, the academics seek to define whether the 'new' middle classes can be designated as constituting a class or intermediate strata. Writers like Crankshaw, and Nzimande seek to develop the criteria by which 'membership' of this grouping can be determined.

Secondly, the literature examines the relative size and growth characteristics of the middle class and the relevance this holds for the state. Writers like Simkins and Hindson, Wolpe and Davies emphasise the growth of the South African petite bourgeoisie.

The outstanding features of occupational change over the period are the increase in the share of owner/manager, and more particularly, petty bourgeois occupations, and the decrease in the proportion of unskilled workers (5).
A notable exception to this is Nolutshungu who argues cogently against an implicit acceptance that the relative statistical growth of this class necessarily implies increased political and economic relevance.

Finally, the literature is widely concerned with determining the relevance of this class, or grouping, with respect to the state.

It is not the intention of this dissertation to pursue the first two issues in depth. The aims of this section can be effectively incorporated within one question. Can the development of the African middle class be seen as an integral component the state's reform strategy? If so, what implications does this hold for the private schools?

Having said this, it is clearly necessary to define the constitution of the African middle class as accepted within this enquiry before seeking its relevance to the topic at hand.

The Constitution of the 'New' African Middle Class:

This issue is inevitably enmeshed within the ongoing Marxist debate surrounding the application of economic, political or societal criteria in determining the composition of a social class. Specifically, it could be argued that Marxist theory, with its inherently bipolar emphasis, has traditionally
displayed some difficulty in defining the so-called 'middle classes'.

Charles Simkins highlights some of the problems of relating traditional Marxist analysis to the contemporary reality of advanced capitalist society:

(i) the problem of the distinction between productive (that is of surplus value) and unproductive labour and, hence, of defining the boundaries of the proletariat in a plausible fashion

(ii) the difficulty, in capitalist society, of fitting the observed class system to a two-class Procrustean bed, with the attendant worries about the old and new petty bourgeoisies and how to credibly claim in an increasingly educated and technologically sophisticated system that 'deskilling' is the predominant trend in the labour process

(iii) the necessity of trying to explain everything else in a society as arising from class structure (6).

The middle classes, by their nature, are not readily classifiable. This problematic has become more pronounced with capitalist development as changing patterns of employment opportunity and provision necessitated a re-assessment of the occupational criteria traditionally used to define the middle class.

With monopoly capitalism, particularly, came the growth of a set of people who were significantly distinct from both the working class and the old petite bourgeoisie, or small-scale producers and entrepreneurs. They were very often employed within large corporations in supervisory and technical
positions which involved an element of mental as opposed to manual labour. This group became generally known as the 'new' middle class.

As Nzimande has pointed out, while we generally refer to the 'new' middle class, there is often

...far less agreement on the nature of such a grouping of people. There is also an absence of clearly identifiable criteria for the new middle class or the intermediate strata. And the very criteria which have been advanced thus far seem to be rather economistic (7).

If we accept, however, that there is a group of people who are being actively recruited and encouraged by the state as apart from the working or bourgeois classes, and as evidenced by 'reform' initiatives such as the Wiehahn, Riekert and de Lange Commissions, and accept the real political, economic and ideological forces that structure class determination (8), and this group of people specifically, then it is possible to define this group as significantly distinct from both the working and bourgeois classes. In this way we circumvent what Charney has termed the "...sterile debate over exactly where to draw the line between the working class, petite bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie" (9).

This paper chooses to accept the middle class as constituting a class in the interests of brevity and focus. Further, it accepts the constitution of this class as promoted by Craig Charney:
As 'middle classes' I am designating those classes or fractions of classes which are neither bourgeois (those who own or control capital and the labour process) nor productive manual labourers...:

- the 'old petite bourgeoisie': independent professionals, proprietors and small scale commodity producers

- the 'new petite bourgeoisie': technical, professional and supervisory functionaries who serve within public and private bureaucracies or professional corps as the executors of the wishes of those controlling the state and capital

- 'white collar workers': non-productive workers in tertiary sector occupations (clerical, sales, etc.)

The term 'middle class' is used for all these groups... (10).

While there is a dispute as to the boundaries and composition of the 'new' middle class, it does not follow that the questions being posed about the emergent relevance of this class are equally controversial. Fundamental to the literature surrounding this issue is the question of co-option and inclusion of this class as part of the state's reform strategy.

As Wolpe explains:

The possibility of economising the demands of urban African businessmen, by detaching their economic position from government regulation was taken up in the writings of influential academics at the time when the regime established 'reformist' commissions...in the late 1970's (11).

It was not only academics who were beginning to pose questions about the inclusion of an urban elite, however.

From the early 1970's both capital and state began to
acknowledge the need for a comprehensive reform strategy which incorporated greater freedom of market forces and a rationalisation of labour provision and education (12).

The stated purpose of this chapter is to ascertain whether or not there are grounds for believing that the state's policy-swing with respect to the private schools can be partly based on a commitment, by the South African state, to stimulating the growth of the African middle class. If indeed there was such a commitment, then can the private schools be seen as vehicles for the state and, at a later stage, capital, in their attempt to 'woo' selected pupils into the 'white' educational, and economic milieu?

Certainly, if community animosity is of any relevance as a yard-stick for measuring co-option then the private schools which were, on the whole, widely viewed with suspicion and often open disapproval, could be seen as co-optive and potentially divisive institutions.

There are many who think that this gesture will have little or no impact, that it will not change South African society. They argue that it will create an elitist minority, who will be ostracised and alienated from other blacks... (13).

While the focus of this paper is limited, as stated previously, it is patently unrealistic to attempt at this stage to examine the growth of the middle classes in solely educational, or even 'private school' terms alone. It is first necessary to situate the stimulation of this class within the political economy of the period before we can
examine its specific relevance for the state's private school policies.

The Growth of the African Middle Class:

"In South Africa, the African petite bourgeoisie has in the past few decades been sizeable and rapidly growing, contrary to widespread belief" (14).

Using Charney's categorisation of the occupational constitution of the middle classes, (including professional/technical occupations, independent proprietors, clerical and sales workers), we see that from 1970 to 1980 the numbers of people termed 'African middle class' jumped from 264 790 in 1970 to 566 361 in 1980, or effectively doubled in size (15).

The roots of the development of this class in the economy can be effectively linked to the needs of capital, and it is worthwhile to shortly document the progressive incorporation of the petite bourgeois classes into the economy.

Capital's needs and state policy ensured that most of the growth in African employment in petite bourgeois occupations occurred in the spheres of reproduction and circulation. The first educated Africans were essentially preachers, teachers, clerks and a few skilled labourers (16).

The original petite bourgeoisie consisted largely of rural-based, conservative "...indigenous go-betweens..." who responded to the rural penetration of missionary and capital
They were mostly teachers, religious or otherwise, and clerks who were responsible for administration of local business. Nolutshungu cautions here against an uncomplicated acceptance that this early co-option necessarily led to a class devoted to separation and superiority from the working class.

They have never been the main purveyors of 'modernity' or its authentic source for the mass of Blacks. If they have taught at schools and in churches, it has been the white man's word that they have passed on, more or less, under his direct supervision.

Despite this, missionary education and its attendant privileges, was frequently a 'pass-key' to entry into the middle classes.

Some mission schools were designed to produce an African-educated elite. And even after the shift to a more practically orientated industrial education, graduates from mission institutions such as Lovedale, Healdtown, Adam's College, St. Peter's and Fort Hare would become political leaders not only in South Africa but well beyond its borders.

With the advent of the Location Advisory Boards came further selective opportunities in the form of trading rights and income. Charney argues that the exchange of resources and opportunity between the bourgeoisie/state, and the petite bourgeoisie led to the creation of a patron-client relationship between the petite bourgeoisie and the "...dominated classes...". They could, in other words, intercede with the bourgeoisie and manipulate the system.
With the development of secondary industry, however, came the concomitant need for a settled and urbanised workforce.

In the 1950's the economy began some diversification into manufacturing. There was also a rapid expansion of the public and service sectors under the political and economic dominance of Afrikaners. The apartheid system was set in place during the 1950's through a labyrinth of restrictive laws. This highly regulatory framework was aimed at cutting off the burgeoning political movements and, at the economic level, providing some kind of balance of interests in terms of labour supply between agriculture, mining and industry (21).

Secondary industrialisation in the 1940's and 1950's, then, led to the decline of influence that the original 'middle classes' had enjoyed, and a broadening of the basis for definition of the petite bourgeoisie through rapid expansion of the public and service sectors. Most importantly, however, with the development of industry began a massive urbanisation process.

Parallel and inextricably linked to this process of proletarianisation came the development of monopoly capital, which served to further create labour processes which demanded more highly skilled and trained workers. "The 1960's also witnessed a concentration and centralisation of capital with the emergence of large corporate entities, both local and foreign" (22). The rigid application of the state's segregation policies also saw a burgeoning of African owned small businesses in response to segregated services.
As a result the petite bourgeois classes experienced rapid reproductive growth throughout the 1960's, largely for two reasons. Firstly, the policy of separate development offered expanded opportunities in terms of service provision within restricted areas (23) and, secondly, because of the rapid growth of monopoly capital and a coterminous expansion of opportunity. While the size of this class increased, however, the policy of separate development inevitably frustrated significant inclusion of this class into the South African political economy.

The 1960's saw both the brutal repression of popular resistance and the strengthening of the Verwoerdian policy of separate development (24). At the same time, the rigid application of this policy led to an emerging structural contradiction between the needs of capital and state. While the state was actively enforcing influx control and resettlement in the Bantustans, this conflicted with the growth in capital's demand for settled labour -- skilled or otherwise. Legislation like the Bantu Urban Areas Consolidation Act, (1945); the Bantu Labour Act, (1964) and the Physical Planning and Employment of Resources Act of 1967 all served to prevent workers from living near urban areas (25).

Occupational mobility was further limited through the statutory curbs present in such legislation as the Mines and Works Act (1941), the Bantu Building Workers Act (1951) and the Motor Transportation Amendment Act of 1955 (26).
Educational policy, too, became encompassed within influx control and educational facilities were encouraged within the 'homelands' to the detriment of those in the urban areas (27).

We see, therefore, the beginnings of divergence between capital and state. As Hyslop so cogently explains, then:

During the long boom of the 60's, big capital had not seriously contested these policies. But with the beginnings of slump at the end of the decade, the minds of both Anglophile and newly risen Afrikaner industrial capitalists were wonderfully concentrated on the problems facing them in regard to the re-organisation of their labour force (28).

Gradually the economic boom of the 1960's began to give way to the recession of the early 1970's. As a result, increased pressure from capital began to manifest itself in marginally more enlightened state policies. "From the early 70's, the government somewhat ameliorated policies vexatious to industry such as statutory discrimination in skilled employment, and restrictions on the numbers of blacks in urban industry" (29).

This view is echoed in Craig Charney's paper, "Restructuring White Politics: The Transformations of the National Party" in which he argues that the early 1970's saw

...Nationalist businessmen, and their allies among Afrikaans intellectuals, journalists, and politicians, propounding what would become familiar verligte themes: freer utilisation of African labour, some sort of political rights for coloureds and indians, and reductions in petty apartheid. They brought concerns once voiced only by opposition capitalists and politicians into the ruling circles (30).
Selective advancement and assimilation was a natural extension of the state's policy. The change in emphasis of labour provision and increasing political unrest provided the impetus for grudging 'reform'. The issue of assimilation and co-option in the stimulation of this class is central, therefore. Whether one views the process of selective stimulation in terms of the specific motives of the ruling class, or whether one assumes that the emergent petite bourgeoisie represented the natural economic progression of those possessed with initiative and talent, then, there is general agreement as to the relevance of examining the issue in terms of the proposed assimilation of this class.

The educational, and ultimately economic and political, crisis of 1976 are seen by many as a catalyst for action. By 1977 economic growth rates were down to zero and the productivity of labour was either static or it had actually fallen in some sectors such as mining and construction. The shortage of skills was accompanied by high rates of unemployment amongst blacks (31).

The state was, consequently, forced to act in response to the increasing pressure of economic and political crisis and moved towards an adaptive and reactive process of 'reform'. It is within this context that the stimulation of the middle class as a reform strategy reached fruition.

As the 1979 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa reported:

A marked feature of the Government's policy this year was its concern to promote the creation of stable urban African communities. This concern no doubt resulted in part from the 1976 riots, and of
an awareness of the possible social and political instability to which growing unemployment in urban areas could lead (12).

The process was taken up by representatives of capital who began to push for greater economic freedom and rationalisation of labour provision in the face of skill shortages, societal unrest and increasing legitimacy problems, both locally and internationally. Capital's response can be seen within this extract from Harry Oppenheimer's Chancellor's address to the University of the Witwatersrand in 1979:

Progress in human affairs, just as in military affairs, is not generally to be brought about by means of a move forward on a broad front, keeping the pace of advance to what can be managed by the slow and ill-equipped. Progress is nearly always achieved by a breakthrough on a narrow front by a limited number of able, well-equipped men and women who, by their success, create the opportunities for advancement by the masses who follow after (33).

Within this milieu of social, economic and political crisis, the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions came to embody the direction in which the state was moving. It is worthwhile to shortly examine the aims and implications of these Commissions as both hold special relevance for the development of the state's reform policy and, particularly, for the stimulation of the petite bourgeoisie.
The Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions:

Both the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions were commissioned in 1977 as direct responses to economic and political turmoil. By 1979 the Commissions had reported their findings. The Riekert Commission Report and the state's consequent acceptance of most of its recommendations in the white paper are generally accepted as signifying the beginning of state restructuring.

The Riekert Commission's view was that the development of a stable urban African community was dependent on giving urban Africans preference over migrant workers in regard to existing facilities, and that unemployment in the urban areas was in part a result of the 'illegal' existence of rural Africans in urban areas (34).

The Riekert Commission accomplished the effective dismantling of administration restricting labour movement within areas under white administrative control, combined with a strengthening of controls over the movement of potential migrant labour from the 'Bantustans' into white areas. This effectively created a division of South Africa, and South Africans into two separate sectors: those within the borders of 'white' South Africa with the attendant prospects of employment, higher wages and relative stability, and those restricted to the rural 'homeland' areas with little chance of employment and low income. Additionally, the Commission directly promoted the African entrepreneurial class through, amongst other concessions, limited deregulation of trading areas and licences, and 'open' C.B.D. zones (35).
Quite clearly while the state was willing to adopt a policy of incorporation of urban Africans, and actively promote small-scale African enterprise, there was a concomitant acceptance of 'exclusivity' inherent to these 'reforms'. As Hindson and Lacey point out, "The policy programme formulated by the Riekert Commission was based on the assumption that the permanence of a section of the urban African population should be recognised in law and administrative practice" (36). There was no parallel development of political incorporation apart from the stimulation of local community councils (37). Urban Africans were to be accorded no political rights outside the 'bantustans'.

Despite difficulty experienced in translating the Riekert recommendations into legislation (38), the impact of the Commission was felt in two immediate ways. Firstly, the Commission's findings deepened divisions between rural and urban blacks, and, secondly, it improved prospects and mobility for urban workers through increased control of 'outsiders' and decreased restriction on those 'inside' urban 'boundaries' (39). In effect, specific sections of the population were courted to the detriment of others.

The Wiehahn Commission basically sought to provide for the legalisation of trade union membership for Africans for the first time. In terms of legislative adaptation, the Wiehahn Commission recommended that the Industrial Conciliation Act, and the Black Labour Relations Regulations Act should be
consolidated in a single statute (40). This recommendation ultimately led to the 1981 Labour Relations Act.

Amongst other recommendations, the Commission advocated full trade union rights and freedom of association. "The Commission also recommended that individuals should be free to join any trade union of their choice and trade unions should be free to prescribe such membership qualifications as they saw fit" (41). The Commission advised that job reservation be scrapped through the removal of Section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act.

What is immediately noticeable in the government's reaction to the Wiehahn Commission's reports is the exclusion from trade unions of migrant workers (42), thereby reinforcing the Riekert proposals.

Both the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions should be seen as embodying not only the reform of labour utilisation, but as part of the response to a wider structural crisis within the state. The perceived skills shortage, a disastrous economic slump and attendant unemployment and social crises, and growing anti-apartheid militancy, both locally and internationally, combined to induce the state to 'reform' wasteful policies.

At the same time, the ascendancy of the Botha government encouraged the combination of reform and repression into the infamous 'Total Strategy' which centralised power and
structures under what was effectively the amalgamation of military and civilian rule. An integral part of this strategy was the new-found alliance between capital and state which was formally consecrated in the 1979 Carlton conference. These 'reforms' had profound implications for the growth of the middle classes.

John Davies in his paper 'Capital, State and Educational Reform' argues that a key aspect of the reform strategy was the introduction of modifications to...

...the racial divisions of labour, both in order to create greater labour mobility and thereby reduce the constraints on capital, and as a core tactic of a 'hearts and minds' co-optation campaign aimed at granting material, but not political, concessions to favoured urban blacks...

The co-option of a favoured black middle class as a reform strategy was conceived in the late 1970's. As a result the state began to widen its avenues of opportunity for inclusion. As will be evidenced in the following chapter, the private schools offered significant possibilities for the recruitment and training of this class.

Education and the Growth of the Middle Class:

It is at this juncture that one can start to question the stimulation of the middle classes in educational terms. As Linda Chisholm has noted, "educational reform is crucial to the strategy of limited incorporation of small numbers of blacks" (44). Additionally, education moved to the fore-
front of the challenge against the state after 1976. While individuals and organisations across the social and political spectrum mobilised around the education crisis, the state was forced to respond.

It quickly became clear, however, that the state lacked both initiative and funds to institute the kinds of educational reforms that capital was demanding. While total strategy was a 'pragmatic' adaptation on the part of the state it was nevertheless based firmly on apartheid policies and effectively amounted to a 'modernising' of apartheid as opposed to its abolition. Educational reforms were destined to be limited by this doctrine.

The alignment of state and capital, too, meant that it was no longer possible for capital to merely agitate for societal and, specifically, educational reform. The years from 1976 onwards saw the progressive emergence of private initiative within the field of education. "The motives for the private sector's involvement in the restructuring of education are both economic and political" (46).

"Obviously an educational system that alienated and radicalised so many youngsters, and especially capital's 'natural' supporters within the black student elite, was in considerable need of overhaul" (47). Capital's intentions were not spurred by principled desires for educational and societal egalitarianism. On the contrary, new policies of educational aid were designed to "...reduce the racial
component of education's contribution to the reproduction of the social division of labour...on a selective basis only" (48).

The National Manpower Commission of 1980, the HSRC report into "Demography, Education and Manpower" and the De Lange Commission all sought to develop the policy of selective accommodation and emphasised the growing collusion between the aims of capital and state. The De Lange Commission, particularly, furthered this cause through its proposition of a division of education into academic or vocational emphasis. An integral part of the De Lange Commission's report was its emphasis on promoting 'open' private school education, while the state, in the subsequent white paper, agreed to look into comprehensive private school subsidies. In reality, 'differentiation' would be administered only to that minority of blacks accorded some kind of permanent status within 'white' urban areas. The ultimate division of this already exclusive grouping would result in the 'mentally superior' students -- the future 'middle class' -- being granted access to 'open' elite private schools and universities where they would complete their education (49).

This policy found favour amongst representatives of capital:

It is along these lines, so it seems to me, that university autonomy and the private school system can best be justified. In the struggle to end racial discrimination...we surely cannot afford to delay the opening up of opportunities and responsibilities to the limited number who can now take advantage of them... (50).

It is no coincidence, then, that the co-optive component of the state's reform strategy that arose after 1976 should
coincide with the beginnings of a subtle but significant restructuring of the state's education policy. The state's private school policy, that has its roots in this period, was no exception. Significantly, the 'open school' movement saw its beginnings in 1976 and the state, while not outwardly welcoming the move, effectively encouraged the initiative by refusing to directly challenge 'non-white' enrolments. The 'open school' history will be thoroughly examined in the following chapter, but it is crucial to note at this point the strategic coincidence of state enlightenment on the question of 'open' private schools, the inherent crisis in South African education at the time and the upturn of selective capital sponsorship in the field of education. These factors hold the key to the question of the state's changing private school policy.

The growth of capital's educational involvement and direct sponsorship through the eighties should not be seen in isolation. Increasingly privatisation was seen, by both state and capital, as offering a solution for a wide range of economic, political and social ills. In effect, the increasing involvement of capital within the field of social provision and services such as housing, hospitals and education, amounted to the steady growth of privatisation well before it became a 'buzz-word' for economic advancement and prosperity. Privatisation came to be increasingly seen as embodying the central tenets of what has been termed the "second phase" of reform (S1), or provided a sophisticated extension of a crude co-optive strategy.
The state has resolved to withdraw from the lower reaches of the economy, hoping to remove the barriers to accumulation now constituted by orthodox influx control, forced removals and decentralisation based on the bantustans. This is a tacit admission that apartheid has failed to meet the labour needs of capital (52).

It was precisely for the reason of selective withdrawal from the economy and the perceived skills shortage that privatisation came to embody a specific direction of the second reform phase. More importantly, the growth of the privatisation ethos had crucial significance for education provision in general, and private schools specifically.

Privatisation

In contrast to the issue of the black middle class, privatisation, while having existed for some time in various forms, particularly in the field of social services, is a relatively recent economic phenomenon in South Africa.

In August of 1986 Assocom, the Federated Chamber of Industries, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut and the South African Agricultural Union constituted a permanent task force to work with the state on developing a set of privatisation goals and practices (53).

The state followed closely with the white paper on Privatisation and Deregulation of August 1987. The State President's opening of parliament address in 1988 contained key references to privatisation and the possibilities of
using revenue from privatised assets to reduce the national
debt (54).

Before one can begin to examine privatisation and its
ramifications in general, or even specifically educational
terms, it is first necessary to define the concept.

In its most basic form, privatisation is defined as the sale
of state assets to the private sector. These assets range
from state corporations through to social services,
including health and welfare, public transport and
education. Mahadea takes the definition one step further:

...Privatisation involves a combination of changes
in the relationship between the government and the
private sector in the areas of ownership, control,
production and finance, the net effect of which is
to reduce or alter the size and functions of
government activities in the economy (55).

Broadly, there are two forms that privatisation may take.
Firstly, there is denationalisation, the term used to
describe the sale of state assets. Secondly, there is
deregulation, which maintains similar objectives to
denationalisation, but through an alternate route.

Denationalisation implies either the sale of state assets
like Iscor, or the withdrawal of the state from certain
activities in order to 'tender out' opportunities to the
private sector. In this scenario, the state remains
ultimately responsible in terms of regulatory control, yet
relinquishes operating control. Education would be one
example where this process has already begun. While private schools, religious or otherwise, are run by the private sector, the state maintains effective control through a variety of regulatory and financial measures.

Deregulation -- the second form that privatisation may take -- is concerned with opening up state activity to competition. This is effected through a process of reducing regulations which inhibit private enterprise (56).

At present much of the debate around the issue of privatisation is concerned with disputing the social and economic advantages of privatising public enterprise. Will privatisation alleviate perceived inefficiencies, debt repayments and other economic and ultimately societal ills, in other words, or will it compound social and economic injustice? This dissertation is more interested in ascertaining whether the state saw the privatisation of state-controlled enterprises or services, particularly education, as a goal sufficiently attractive to influence its relationship with the private schools.

To effectively analyse this it is first necessary to examine at least some motives advanced for privatisation. Once this has been done, the particular relevance of the development of privatisation for the state/private school relationship can be looked at as a facet of privatisation strategy.
Privatisation's rise to 'salvation status' must be seen within the context of restructuring apartheid. This restructuring, in turn, owes its development to the structural crisis facing the continued adherence to apartheid ideology and the rapidly escalating costs, both financially and socio-politically, of this doctrine. Privatisation, it was believed, could help to alleviate some of these symptoms.

The privatisation lobby makes specific claims as to the merits of privatisation. These include:

* economic growth through deregulation and consequent burgeoning of the entrepreneurial spirit amongst small and big business
* a reduction in inflation
* a reduction in corporate inefficiency and corruption
* attraction of foreign investment and, ultimately,
* provision of a pragmatic vehicle for redistribution of wealth.

Privatisation, however, can be seen as more than a pragmatic adjustment as a consequence of wasteful policies, economic or political. Duncan Innes exposes the relevance of privatisation as part of the more subtle "second phase" of reform:

The strategic thinking behind the privatisation argument runs as follows: The present white-controlled state has immense power and influence in the economy...If the majority government would inherit this power...white capitalists will suffer a double blow: not only will their influence over the state be diminished but their economic interests will be threatened.
The privatisation strategy seeks to reduce the threat which a transfer to majority rule poses to white capitalists: first by handing to the private sector many of the assets currently owned by the state; secondly, by reducing if not removing the regulations which govern the economic activities of the private sector; and thirdly, the state itself will be broken down into ineffective cantons and stripped of many of its key functions, such as responsibility for defence, the police, housing, education, transport, and the economy as a whole (57).

Innes proposes, thus, that by taking away its monopoly of control and handing it to private enterprise, the state attempted to absolve itself of overtly repressive political control thereby reducing the legitimacy of majority demands. Privatisation, he asserts, is as much a strategy of depoliticisation as it is of economic re-appraisal.

One of the main benefits espoused by the pro-privatisation lobby is the possible redistribution of capital, and ultimately, control of the forces of production that privatisation offers. It is proposed that employee shareholdings arising from the sale of state assets would allow employees a greater stake in the business, thereby starting a chain of increased incentive, productivity and ultimately, prosperity. This factor alone carries certain distinctly political undertones.

Firstly, it assumes that increased prosperity will match a decrease in political demands and, secondly, it implies that all employees are equally able to afford stock. Both of these assumptions are, at best, naive. Vusi Khumalo,
president of POTWA (the Postal and Telecommunications Workers' Association) states:

The point is that you cannot promote progressive principles in...a society that is totally unbalanced. If shares in the Post Office were offered now, the majority of African people will not buy them. Not because they don't want to buy, but because they have not got the means to (58).

Privatisation might not equal merely a transfer of monopoly of control from the state to the private sector. Economic reality dictates that the majority of shareholders will be one or other of the huge private concerns.

Privatisation has been equally hailed as a mechanism for removing the bureaucratic dictates of the state in the interests of free-market economics. This ideal can be encapsulated within this quote from Dawie de Villiers, Minister of Administration and Privatisation and chairman of the Privatisation Cabinet Committee:

Generally, however, the whole point of moving a public-sector undertaking into the private sector is, on the one hand, to let market forces determine the allocation of funds and the running of the company, and to reduce undue political interference or influence; and, on the other hand, to remove from them certain protective measures such as guaranteed loans (59).

There are, however, inherent problems attendant to allowing market forces, with their in-built profit motive, to control certain services. By way of example, one can look at the provision of telephones as a service provided in the interests of communication. With the present system of public control, initial installation costs are relatively
low in order to ensure as wide a range of subscribers as possible. User costs are high, in contrast. If this service were privatised the profit motive might dictate a rise in installation costs, with a possible drop in user costs. This would ensure that those who could afford the high installation costs would benefit in the long term from lower usage costs and improved technical service. Ultimately those without the funds to ensure installation would lose out (60). Quite clearly privatisation cannot be seen in purely economic terms.

Privatisation and Education:

Turning more specifically to the field of service provision -- particularly education -- privatisation maintains certain profound political implications. The De Lange Commission proposed that education be stratified into vocational and academic emphasis. While academic education would have to be paid for, trade-based education, already heavily sponsored by capital, would be free. The implications are the same as for the offering of shares to employees. Access would be limited to those with money to pay for services with some small scale co-option.

The state could be seen to be attempting to use privatisation as a lever to move the emphasis away from race-based exclusivity to class-based control of resources. This amounted to an attempt at depoliticisation of control and, ultimately, a substitution of one form of control for
another. This is echoed in the words of van Zyl Slabbert as he warned that

...we should not underestimate the policy initiatives which will flow from those in power now that they are beginning to abandon racist segregation for racist integration, or as they move from exclude, divide and rule towards include, divide and rule (61).

Perhaps more telling is this quote by Kent Durr, Minister of Budget and Works: "...More people are being absorbed into the market economy every day and more people are demanding fulfilment of the expectations created by the process of reform. More and more we must build and strengthen the policies of inclusion for all our people" (62). Private schools with their emphasis on cultural and academic superiority were excellent facilitators of the joint goals of co-option and exclusivity.

I think that even in government circles they are accepting the inevitability of black majority rule in South Africa. The question is when? And I think that they have got to have several irons in the fire, and legislation that will protect their cultural values. Private schools would be one of them (63).

The seventies and more importantly, the eighties, saw enormous growth in the number of private education initiatives in South Africa. These included exclusive new privately run schools, heavily sponsored by both local and foreign capital, steady growth in the numbers of 'non-white' enrolments at church schools, dramatic increases in subsidies for private schools, both from the state and from
business, and the growth of 'in-house' technical and vocational training.

Ken Hartshorne in his paper "Private Sector Involvement in Education 1960-1986" tackled the question of private sector involvement in education. He stated that following the education crisis of 1976, the private sector responded with two major initiatives. The first was the setting up of the Urban Foundation, and the second, the introduction of the Sullivan Code (64).

While the Urban Foundation's goals were not solely aimed at educational upliftment, the first two-and-a-half years of its existence saw 44% of its operational expenditure devoted to education (65). The Sullivan code, too, contained reference to social responsibility and upliftment.

In general, while the period 1976-1982 saw the introduction of the concept of 'social responsibility' as a major area of debate in the private sector...the latter's perceptions continued to be dominated by questions of economic growth, skilled manpower, protection of interests and image, responses to overseas criticism; improving the education system rather than its reconstruction...acceptance and amelioration of the political system rather than fundamental challenge... (66).

The structural crisis of the eighties that saw the introduction of the new constitution, the abolition of the pass laws and major urbanisation and devolution strategies (67) meant that capital could no longer afford to ignore the inherent political responsibilities that education initiatives incorporated (68). Simplistically, financial aid
in itself was not enough to secure educational and societal harmony.

Hartshorne quotes the important Urban Foundation Education Report of 1984 that states that the private sector should "...move beyond financial contributions to negotiating, facilitating and lobbying roles...There is an urgent need for it to develop innovative strategies that will bring about structural change in the system...'" (69).

It is important to remember, however, that while a social awareness was slowly prodded into the collective conscience of business, it does not follow that education strategies were reformed accordingly. More money may have been spent, yet low community "credibility" (70) remains a fundamental yardstick in the evaluation of capital's educational programmes.

From the blacks' point of view, the private sector changed because of its own self-interest. This was seen as an effort to stop black resistance. The stated objectives of the private sector and their suspected motives have led to the rejection in the black community of initiatives like PACE college (71).

While private educational institutions like PACE college and the NEST and LEAF schools formed the visible portion of private spending and influence within education, they were by no means representative of the extent of capital's educational provision. Additionally, one should focus on the numerous technical and vocational schemes, the responsibility for which was being increasingly 'shared' by
the state and capital. Capital's involvement in the sponsorship of education, particularly 'in-house' and service training schemes began to grow steadily from 1980, paralleling the growing accommodation between capital and state.

Drawing heavily on the statistics available in the yearly South African Institute of Race Relations handbooks, we see that privately sponsored educational programmes like The Star's TEACH fund and the READ project began tentative steps towards educational assistance in the early 1980's (72). In 1981 this phenomenon grew with large donations towards costs of equipment, buildings and furniture for black education coming from the Chairman's Fund of Anglo American and De Beer's Corporation; the Barlow Rand Group; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co.; and the S.A.B., amongst others (73). Interesting to note, at this point, is the relative growth of the state's provision of technical and vocational training which grew from approximately R4,8 million, as budgeted for the 78/9 years, to R13,4 million in the 81/2 budgetary year (74).

In 1982 this figure, as estimated for the 82/3 year, jumped again to approximately R20,8 million (75). At the same time it was estimated that 500 000 people received private in-service training during 1982 (76).

By 1988 the figure had risen to approximately R34 million (77). In contrast it was estimated that from 1979 to 1984
22,000 private training courses had been approved by the National Training Board and more than 1,000,000 people underwent some form of technical or vocational training each year (78).

In 1985 the Anglo American and De Beer's Chairman's Fund spent R30 million on education and training alone and I.B.M. announced its plans to spend R20 million on computer education (79). Disinvestment saw this trend slowly reverse in 1986 when social responsibility programmes were withdrawn along with divesting companies (80). It was estimated that roughly 259,000 people attended private vocational educational centres and schemes in 1986 (81), a figure which remained largely unchanged through 1987 (82).

While these figures are inconclusive and to some extent juxtapose school vocational training, as provided by the state, against that provided as out-of-school technical and vocational training by the private sector, they graphically reflect the growth of capital's sponsorship of education and the gradual relinquishing of at least some of the responsibility on the part of the state.

Serious consideration, too, should be given to the upsurge of educational aid programmes sponsored by foreign countries, particularly America, that occurred in the early eighties. With the policy of constructive engagement came renewed support for black education. In 1981, President Reagan announced on American T.V. that, "...South Africa was
of 'vital strategic importance' to the West, and that, because a genuine effort was being made to remove apartheid, there was no reason for the United States 'not to be helpful to South Africa' *(83).

1981 saw the beginnings of this trend with the Eagleburger package including:

* a $4 million dollar a year scholarship programme for disadvantaged students to attend U.S. institutions
* black manager training programmes
* University preparation programmes
* U.S. government aid for trade union leadership training, and,
* plans for a $5 million scholarship programme within South Africa *(84).

Additionally, U.S. corporations directly sponsored institutions like PACE and St. Barnabas.

**Conclusion**

The stated aim of this chapter was to provide a basis for further examination of the documentation surrounding the state's relationship with the private schools. This was to be done through an examination of the growth of the black middle classes, and privatisation, as strategies of reform. In this way, it was hoped that it could be demonstrated that these two issues provided a suitably realistic scenario upon which to base the state's reformist policy towards the private schools.
There seems to exist a duality of purpose in the private provision of education. On the one hand the private schools, including those set up by capital as well as the more established and traditional church schools, operating as specifically 'multi-racial' institutions inevitably cater for the co-option of a minority elite, while another facet of private sponsorship provides the skilled labour needs of capital which the state is finding itself increasingly unable or unwilling to provide.

Ultimately, both approaches form two sides of the same coin. The past decade has seen a steady growth in support for private education in South Africa in both academic and vocational training. This support has come from both the state and private enterprise. Its increased support parallels the rising costs of maintaining apartheid policies and the necessity for 'reform'. This does not imply a simplistic acceptance that all private education initiatives are necessarily dominated by the state. Rather it accepts that within the changing structural crisis of the state's rule, private education initiative has been encouraged not because of its rejection of apartheid principles, but as a pragmatic extension of the state's declared 'reform' intents.

It is quite clear, for example, that while the state did not initiate 'open schools' it did little to stop the process once begun. As Davies has put it, then:
serious consideration was also given by the government, albeit reluctantly, to granting the future 'middle class' and the offspring of the current black elite partial access to hitherto exclusively white private schools and universities as a means of effecting the ultimate division of the black student population (85).

Indeed, the notion of multi-racialism, or incorporation, as advocated within most of the schools gradually became part of the stated 'reform' process of the state. Similarly with the provision of technical education, the state benefited from capital's willing educational assistance in terms of their combined technicist understanding of the particular societal and political crises that South Africa faced.

Both the theories advanced for the changing private school policy are relevant, therefore, in that they exist as explicit and often reiterated strategies of 'reform'. Over and above this, however, education has increasingly been targeted as a crucial area of reform and both issues contain explicitly 'educational' agendas.

As we have seen, the stimulation of the black middle classes arose largely as an extension of the combined needs of capital and the state for a settled and increasingly specialised workforce. This could not be accomplished without appropriate educational reform. Similarly, privatisation allowed for an extension of educational opportunity and provision to a limited number of black pupils who were both financially and mentally 'able' to take advantage. It also encouraged the creation of private
technical and vocational training. Again this was in direct response to the changing political and economic requirements of capital and state. It was precisely because South African private schools catered so specifically for both the academic and technical needs of the state's strategies of reform, that the state changed its policy towards these schools.

The state's attempts at co-option through the stimulation of a section of the urban black population effectively coincided with the stated ethos of many private church schools. As Michael Corke remarked:

> In many instances...the nominally non-racial schools set ethnic quotas in line with what individual schools think are acceptable to government or their parent or 'old boy' constituencies.... Many are consciously... duplicating state education programmes, subscribing to examinations of provincial 'own affairs' education departments, and are helping in the selective co-option of 'the right kind' of black people to the new multi-racial but white dominated elite (86).

Increasingly, too, deregulation, which embodied not only the strategic maintenance of societal control, but also inherently co-optive strategies, came to be seen by the state as a crucial strategy of being seen to relinquish some economic and political responsibility to the private sector in the face of massive legitimacy challenges. In this way, limited empowerment was promoted as a basis for reform.

This particular conjunction of private ownership and control, coupled with inherently co-optive intents, is
nowhere as evident and prominently encouraged as in the South African private school system.
Footnotes: Chapter One


(6) Simkins, C., "What can demographic analysis tell us about the evolution and structure of social classes?" in ASSA Conference papers, 1984, p. 3/4.


(8) Nzimande, "Problems in Analysing...", p. 11.


(10) Charney, "JANUS IN BLACKFACE...", p. 2.


(14) Charney, "JANUS IN BLACKFACE...", p. 4.

(15) Charney, "JANUS IN BLACKFACE...", p. 47.

(16) Charney, "JANUS IN BLACKFACE...", p. 4.

(17) Charney, "JANUS IN BLACKFACE...", p. 11.


(21). Swainson, "The Role of Corporate Capital...", p. 3.

(22). Swainson, "The Role of Corporate Capital...", p. 3.


(38). Hudson and Sarakinsky, "Class Interests and Politics...", p. 179.


(47). Davies, "Capital, State and Educational Reform...", p. 349.


(49). Davies, "Capital, State and Educational Reform...", p. 349.

(50). Oppenheimer, "Chancellor's Address...", p. 6.


(52). Moss and Obery, "Introduction"..., p. xxi.


(55). Mahadea, "Returning the State's assets...".


(60). Lewis, D. "PRIVATISATION", Seminar given at University of Cape Town 'Summer School', January 1990.


(68). Hartshorne, "Private Sector Involvement in Education...", p. 42.

(69). Hartshorne, "Private Sector Involvement in Education...", p. 44.

(70). Hartshorne, "Private Sector Involvement in Education...", p. 49.


(83). Davies, J., "United States foreign policy and the education of black South Africans", Seminar presented for The University of Cape Town Education Faculty, 1984, p. 4.

(84). Davies, "United States foreign policy...", p. 2.


Chapter Two: Open Schools -- 1976 to 1981

Segregated schooling remains a reality with respect to state schooling in South Africa. As late as 1975 it was also the case in private education. In 1976 a few Catholic private schools began actively supporting a process of incorporation of a handful of 'non-white' pupils (1). From this limited beginning the call for 'open schools' has grown to the present reality of 'open' (2) state schools.

Open schools mean different things to different people, yet it remains true that the opening of private schools is fundamentally relevant to any examination of private educational provision in South Africa. Over and above this, however, the open schools initiative is of central importance to this dissertation, forming the primary focus of debate between the state and private schools.

This chapter will attempt to explore the initial development of the open schools process. It will concentrate largely on the formative years, from 1976, when the open schools issue became a reality, to 1981, when the De Lange Commission officially recognised the role of the private sector in education. This will be accomplished largely through a detailed examination of the documentation contained within the files of the private school bodies, particularly those of the Catholic schools in recognition of the leading role that the Catholic church played in the process of opening private schools. In this way the developing contact between
private school communities and state can be documented in terms of an interactive policy process.

Before this can be attempted, however, it is necessary to summarise some of the debates and issues charting the course of desegregated schooling in South Africa prior to 1976.

Open Education Prior to 1976

Among the first private schools in South Africa was St. George's Church School in Cape Town, which was established before St. George's Grammar School in 1848. Of the school's 54 pupils in 1845, 43 were 'European' while 4 were children of "'apprenticed negroes' " and 7 of "'Hottentot and other persons of colour' "(4). By the late 19th century, many mission schools were mixed and in the Cape Colony a third of all white school-going pupils attended mission schools open to all (5).

Peter Randall argues, consequently, that a tradition of multi-racialism exists in South African private schools, although this is a tenuous assumption at best. With Nationalist party rule in 1948 came the introduction of Christian National Education. The private school became officially racially exclusive, in line with state policy.

Further, whereas United Party policy had been to promote an intermingling of English and Afrikaans speaking white communities in the form of dual-medium schools, the
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE'S POLICY WITH RESPECT TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS: 1976 TO 1990.

A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Philosophy (Education) degree at the University of Cape Town, Faculty of Education.

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Date submitted: 30 September 1992
burgeoning apartheid policy of the Nationalist state dictated that 'own schools' would become the norm.

By the late 1950's however, signs of a growing social awareness within both the Catholic and Anglican church and their schools became evident. The hypocrisy of reconciling the church with apartheid policies became increasingly difficult to ignore. In 1957, the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference stated that:

The practice of segregation, though officially not recognised in our churches, characterises nevertheless many of our church societies, our schools, seminaries, convents, hospitals and the social life of our people. In the light of Christ's teaching this cannot be tolerated forever. We are hypocrites if we condemn apartheid in South African society and condone it in our own institutions (6).

Despite this statement, little was done to translate this ideal into practice. Similarly, in 1958 and 1959 the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town publicly denounced the government's apartheid policies as unchristian. The state countered with an accusation of hypocrisy evident in the maintenance of the Anglican church's all-white schools. The Archbishop retorted that the Group Areas Act and the Bantu Education Act made it illegal for private schools to admit non-white children, and were these legal impediments to be withdrawn, then the schools would be opened (7).

The irreconcileability of Christian Doctrine and apartheid policy promoted an exchange of heated debate, within and without church schools, throughout the 1960's. In 1963, the
'Church Action Group' consisting of former Anglican School pupils called for the opening of church schools within a document entitled, "Challenge to the Church Schools" (8). Predictably, however, many headmasters and church schools spokespeople sheltered behind the illegality of opening their schools in an attempt to appease both conscience and public.

As Brother H.C. Smith has noted, "...the English-speaking South African had luxuriated in the position of being able to criticise, but take no part, or not be able to take a part in the promulgation of laws or ordinances" (9). This stand-point was becoming rapidly more costly, however, as the "post-Vatican concern for social justice gave impetus to the efforts of those who felt that the church was too easily disposed to the South African pattern of racial discrimination" (10).

A series of highly publicised attempts by coloured Anglican parents to get their children admitted to Anglican schools throughout the 1960's saw the continuation of the acrimonious debate (11).

In line with the growing structural crisis that the state was forced to face in the 1970's, however, came an inexorable increase in pragmatism with respect to the imposition of apartheid. Inevitably, this translated into a relaxation of the policy with respect to private schools. In
1971 a visiting Malawian Ambassador's child was admitted to a Catholic school (12).

This was perhaps prophetic in that from this point onwards it was the Catholic church schools, particularly those run by the female religious, who took the initiative. The 1973 Peace and Justice Commission of the Archdiocese of Cape Town called for a "...test case on integration in a Catholic school" and asked that the Catholic Education Council, or Education Council of Associated Religious (ECAR) consider the issue (13). At its Annual General Meeting in May 1974, ECAR resolved to promote racial reconciliation within Catholic schools (14), yet stopped short of organising a test-case for desegregated schooling.

In September 1975, the Catholic National Council of Religious adopted the resolution put forward by the Association of Women Religious which stated that

the time has come for those Catholic Convent Schools which have hitherto accepted only White pupils to give practical Christian witness to social justice by accepting Non-White Christians into their schools. We consider that the policy should be one of quiet infiltration, with no sought-for publicity and that it should be adopted by all Convent Schools (15).

The Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC) in November 1975 referred the matter to its newly created 'Department of Schools', which met in February 1976. At the same time it was learnt that Springfield Convent in Cape Town was planning to admit coloured pupils during the 1976
academic year (16). It was decided, in principle, that the Catholic Department of Schools would support this stand on the basis that while it was clearly illegal to admit African pupils, the legal boundaries surrounding the admission of coloured and Indian pupils to private Catholic schools were obscure. Additionally, it was accepted that a programme of preparation and information be prepared to acclimatise all concerned to the process of education for "...social justice and reconciliation" (17).

This information was referred to the SACBC Plenary Session which met in February 1976 and stated that: "Realising that the Church must give witness to the Gospel in its institutions, the Conference favours a policy of integration in Catholic schools..." (18). Once this decision had been taken in principle, and reported extensively in the press (Sunday Times, 21/03/76), there was clearly no retreat.

Open Schools: 1976 to 1981

At this point it is necessary to pause and re-examine the definition of policy as accepted within this dissertation. Up to this point, the paper has been largely concerned with reflecting possible socio-economic influences on the state's private school policy and attempting to posit a rationale behind policy change. As stated previously, however, policy is seldom an homogeneous entity as imposed from above.
Quite clearly this is evidenced through the provincial authorities' acceptance of the opening of private schools. As Brother Jude Pieterse has stated there is a distinction to be made between state and provincial policy. "There is a definite difference in approach in the four provinces" (19). While the state was slowly exploring a pragmatism based on co-option, and as part of its 'reform' process, it does not necessarily follow that these principles were being applied and accepted unanimously among the provinces, and indeed, amongst individual provincial authorities.

At the same time the state was faced with the dilemma of formally rejecting either the moves towards desegregated schooling, or the legislation which forbade it. In reality it did neither, allowing a cabinet decision to provide a temporary solution.

This approach was not confined to private school policy, but was characteristic of the state's 'reform strategy' of the time which was, in effect, not only fragmented and grudging, but also a contradiction of terms. To talk of a reform or 'total' strategy implies calculation on the part of the state. Genuine reform cannot be strategised but should be a natural progression from societal expression to legislative adaptation. This approach attracted vast criticism -- social as well as within parliament:

We find ourselves in a new situation and a new society...We cannot deal with it in the piecemeal fashion in which we are dealing with it at the moment...I am desperately concerned about the fact that this government is acting on an 'ad hoc'
basis, reacting to commission after commission and trying to do bits and pieces (20).

This initial unwillingness to provide a concrete policy change, in the form of legislative review, or rejection thereof, created uncertainty and ambivalence amongst not only the private school representatives, but also amongst provincial authorities.

What then happened was that the government became ambivalent. A lot of the decisions were left to the civil servants to carry out....It became, then, a matter of people in positions following their own thinking and imperatives (21).

Generally speaking, it is possible to characterise the relationship, during the early years of open schools, between the Natal provincial authorities and the Catholic school representatives as co-operative. To a lesser extent this was also the case in the Cape. As Brother Jude Pieterse explained, "The situation in the Cape was by and large a reasonable one. It wasn't a policy of co-operation, but we worked well with individual inspectors and individuals within the department" (22).

This does not imply that these provincial representatives formally accepted open schools. On the contrary, the provincial education authorities were obliged to uphold the state's policy of segregated schooling. Yet there was a leniency evident in the 'off the record' comments at meetings with private school representatives as well as in the application of provincial regulations.
In the Orange Free State, the private schools enjoyed a unique relationship with the province. For some years prior to 1976, the teachers at these schools were registered with, and paid by, the department. Financially, at least, these schools were semi-departmental.

In the Transvaal, however, the relationship can only be characterised as poor. "There, at best, the private schools were tolerated" (23). With the opening of some schools in 1977, Sybrand Van Niekerk, the Transvaal Administrator, immediately threatened to de-register the schools (24), and intermittently re-iterated this threat until was replaced in 1979.

Both the Catholic and Anglican church school organisations undertook to explore the legality of the open schools stand and obtained legal opinion. At a Department of Schools meeting in July 1976, information was provided on "...the possible legal and financial consequences of integration". What was immediately clear was that the admission of black pupils was the most obviously illegal. In terms of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945 (as amended) Boarders in white urban areas required special licences, while section 9 of the same Act forbad the admission of African day pupils to any school outside "locations" and "Bantu Villages" (25). Admission of coloured and Indian pupils was less clearly defined and was largely subject to an interpretation of the Group Areas Act, No. 36 of 1966.
The legality of open schools was intermittently questioned within the private school organisations and it is clear that some tension existed within these organisations between those who supported civil disobedience in pursuit of moral conviction and those who chose to be restrained by law. While this certainly existed on the individual level, the most visible example of this was the difference of opinion between female and male Catholic religious. It is significant, for example, that it was a Convent for girls that first admitted non-white pupils.

Despite initial hesitancy, however, the majority of Catholic religious asserted that moral imperatives were higher than legislative ones and pushed ahead with the admittance of non-white pupils.

On January 27, 1977 some Catholic schools in the Cape province received return forms from the Cape Education Department asking for personal details of all pupils. This, after legal advice, was refused by the Dominican sisters in the Cape and Port Elizabeth. A meeting was set up between the Director of Education in the Cape and Sisters Marion and Raymunda, Heads of Catholic Open Schools. During the course of this meeting, the Director stated that neither he nor the Administrator had objections to the principle of open private schools, yet were bound by the law to enforce segregation (26). In a subsequent letter to the Chairman of the P.T.A. of Springfield Convent in the Cape (17/02/77), from the Administrator's office, however, the official
policy was forcibly underlined. We immediately see, therefore, evidence of covert acceptance of desegregation, yet outward maintenance of apartheid policy and practice.

Similarly, in Natal, provincial authorities, while not openly condoning the moves, expressed conciliatory feelings (27).

I too sincerely hope that confrontation can be avoided and that a solution which is acceptable to all concerned will be found. If this proves to be impossible it will not be because of any lack of goodwill on the part of the authorities in Natal (28).

On March 28, 1977 a delegation from the SACBC met with the then Minister of National Education, Dr. P. Koornhof and the Administrators of the Transvaal and the Cape, Sybrand Van Niekerk and L.A.P.A. Munnik respectively. At this meeting, the Catholic delegation were asked openly by Koornhof whether they sought confrontation with the state. The Minister produced a handful of international newspaper cuttings which foresaw "looming confrontation" (29). As Brother Jude recalls, "I remember...when he came with a wad of newspaper cuttings from right around the world and said 'look at the trouble you've caused us' " (30). Similarly, in the South African press, rapidly growing non-white enrolments in Catholic private schools stretching through Cape Town to Port Elizabeth, Eshowe, the Transvaal and Windhoek (31) attracted extensive comment. Pressure was making itself felt for a more enlightened policy from the
state. This pressure was coming from within and without South Africa.

At the same time a reformist faction within the ruling National party began to articulate the desirability of stimulating the Black middle class through, specifically, increased secondary education.

It is important that a middle-class be established that comprises Black people who, because of their own possessions and vested interests, would also run the risk of losing a great deal if disorder and anarchy were to prevail. That is why such an economic middle-class has an important stabilising influence on the community....One important factor that could make a large contribution to the establishment of such a middle-class, is education and particularly, secondary education (32).

While the Minister and his Provincial Administrator’s were obliged to uphold national and provincial legislative provisions the beginnings of an undercurrent of leniency became evident, particularly within meetings between private school bodies and the state -- provincially and at Cabinet level. The situation remained unresolved, however, pending a Cabinet decision. In the words of Koornhof:

The Prime Minister with whom I spoke on the matter has no axe to grind but he told me to avoid at all costs confrontation to allow for an in-depth study by the cabinet....We are happy to allow the 57 children in the Transvaal and the 64 in the Cape to continue but you will have to bring yourself within the law in that you undertake not to enrol new pupils this year or in the beginning of 1978 until the Cabinet has discussed the matter (33).

The Catholic delegation agreed to these terms. Included within this deal was an acceptance of no further comment or
statements to the press until such time as the Cabinet had reached a decision.

At the same time, some Anglican schools began to take tentative steps towards opening their schools. At a meeting with the Cape Education Department on April 1, 1977 E. King, A.W.H. Mallett and R. Wilson, representatives of, respectively, Western Province Preparatory School, Diocesan College and Herschel explored the possibility of opening their schools. It should be noted however, that they did not represent the Anglican church as such, and sought contact with the state in their individual capacities. Here, again, the difference of emphasis between Anglican and Catholic schools. Whereas the Catholic church is fundamentally linked to its schools through, amongst other factors, the use of the Catholic religious as teachers, the Anglican private schools retain an Anglican character, yet possess functional autonomy of operation through their governing bodies.

Despite assurances that the matter would receive urgent Cabinet attention, at a subsequent meeting with the Minister of National Education in September 1977, the Representatives of the SACBC were informed that the matter had not yet been referred to the Cabinet (34) "in view of other more far embracing and pressing issues occupying its time" (35). Minister Koornhof, throughout these contacts reiterated his desire that the issue be handled "without confrontation" and to a large extent set himself up as a sympathetic mediator between the Catholic schools and the rest of the Cabinet
"He had already twice intended to discuss the matter at a Cabinet meeting, but had then decided against it because he did not think the time favourable" (37). The Cabinet decision finally came through in December 1977.

On December 8, 1977, Dr. Koornhof telephonically relayed the Cabinet's decision to both Bishop Burnett of Cape Town and the Chairman of the Commission for Christian Education and Worship.

The Cabinet had discussed the matter for a long time and agreed on the following answer:
1. The fact that the children had been illegally admitted to Catholic Schools had been noted.
2. Those children who have already been admitted need not be withdrawn.
3. This concession, however, must not be regarded as a condonation of the infringement of the law.
4. In future, for instances that merit special consideration, application for authorisation to admit such pupils must be made to the education authorities (presumably to the Education Department of each Province) (38).

Additionally, the Catholic representatives were urged to give no publicity to this decision and to use "...great circumspection..." (39).

The direct consequences of this decision were twofold. Firstly, this effectively amounted to a tacit recognition of open schools and embodied the development of the state's co-optive reform strategy. Secondly, it contributed directly to the creation of a climate of uncertainty amongst not only the Church representatives, schools and parents, but also among the provincial authorities who were trapped by the
inherent tension which this ambiguous decision introduced into the Nationalist educational ethos.

On the one hand, then, Nationalist politicians were making statements in parliament like: "Our policy is not integrated schools. Our policy is Christian National Education" (40) and "Our answer to school integration is a very definite: No, it cannot be!" (41). In contrast the evidence suggested that while the state may have been openly averse to the idea, both the potential for adverse publicity and conflict, as well as the inherent advantages of open schools were increasingly acknowledged.

There was at this stage no question of legislative reform, merely a temporary adaptation. Control would be exercised provincially in the form of individual applications which would have to be lodged with the respective Provincial Directors of Education for every new non-white applicant. While it was stated that approval would only be granted in 'exceptional cases', it quickly became clear that provincial bias and interpretation of this crucial proviso would largely influence the number of accepted pupils. "Again we see in the Cape and Natal a tremendous amount of cooperation. The Transvaal takes a very tough line. So we continue through 1978/9 where the Transvaal's position is a very dogged one" (42).

In January 1978, the situation in the Transvaal came to a head when various Catholic schools received no response from
the Transvaal Director of Education concerning a list of new non-white applicants enrolled in Catholic schools. Some principals admitted these pupils as well as others whose names were not among those sent to the Department (43).

On Monday 23 January, Archbishop Hurley was contacted by Koornhof who relayed the information that the Administrator was "...extremely annoyed by the fact that some Catholic Schools had gone over his head and admitted pupils without waiting for permission from the Director". Koornhof cited the fact that in the Vryheid by-election the N.P. candidate was using the local Convent's admission of two African boarders as a political issue and was seeking to organise demonstrations against the admission of these pupils. He added that he had had to use his influence on the Editors of two newspapers to get them to drop their stories (44). This apparently minor incident serves to highlight the tension surrounding the issue of open schools, as well as the division within Nationalist ranks concerning reform initiatives.

In a subsequent meeting (25/01/78) between Catholic Sisters and the Assistant and Deputy Directors of the Transvaal, Jonson and du Toit, this tension again made itself evident, this time within the Transvaal department itself. The minutes of the meeting of Major Superiors of teaching congregations in the Transvaal record that Jonson stated he had pointed out to the Administrator the fact that the principle of strictly segregated schooling had been departed
from following the admission of the children of Black diplomats to private schools, and since the recent Cabinet decision allowing children admitted in 1977 to remain. While Jonson was conciliatory, du Toit, the Deputy Director, was uncooperative and stated that while the replies were probably in the post, very few applications had been accepted (45).

The Transvaal Education Department remained openly opposed to the open school movement. At a meeting between representatives of ECAR and the Administrator on January 30, 1978, Van Niekerk admitted that he "...regretted that the Church had embarked upon the policy of open schools as he saw it as being contrary to what was customary in the country and in the best interest of all" (46).

In the Cape, of the 147 applications submitted by Catholic schools, 137 were accepted in time for schools' re-opening (47). While there are no figures available for Natal, the relationship between schools and department was amicable with the Director of Education assuring Archbishop Hurley that he remained favourable towards the open school initiative. The sharp contrast between these provinces and the Transvaal is evident.

Quite clearly, the first few years of open schools were largely characterised by indecisiveness on the part of the state and an unwillingness to openly commit itself to legislative reform. Consequently we see local variation with
respect to the application of regulatory measures by the provinces. As Sister Brigid Flanagan, Secretary of the Department of Schools of the SACBC wrote,

It seemed obvious that neither the Minister nor the Director wanted to lay down very clearly defined norms or to commit themselves in writing. They preferred to leave things rather vague which indicated that the matter was still negotiable (48).

By February 1978, at a meeting on the issue of open schools held in Pretoria, the Catholics decided once more to send a delegation to meet with Koornhof. This was as a result of all of the approximately 200 applications for non-white pupils in the Transvaal being turned down (49). The meeting also questioned whether the few Anglican schools (Woodmeade, St. Peter's) who had applied for non-white registrations in the Transvaal should be included within the delegation. It was decided that at this crucial stage of negotiation the introduction of new parties could complicate procedure (50).

While the Catholic church had stated that it wished to avoid confrontation, it undertook to ensure that those pupils admitted in the Transvaal without permission would not be turned away. "The 'Church' could not return to the status quo in the sense of sending away black pupils admitted in 1978" (51). The potential for confrontation, particularly with the Transvaal Administration, was high.

On March 30, 1978, Minister Koornhof, the Administrators of the Transvaal and the Cape, Van Niekerk and Munnik
respectively and the Director of Education in Natal, Dr. G. Hosking met with Archbishops Daniel and Hurley, Sisters Marion and Evangelist and Brothers Jude and Neal in Cape Town. At this meeting, both Koornhof and Van Niekerk accused the Catholic schools of disregarding "clause 4" of the Cabinet decision which stated that no new admissions of non-white pupils could be considered until permission had been granted (52).

Koornhof specifically referred to the fact that he had been "left in the lurch" by the Church, while Van Niekerk reiterated his view on the illegality of admitting non-white children to white schools. Despite their verbal tirade, however, it was becoming clear that no punitive measures would be forthcoming. Koornhof referred to the fact that since the story had broken in the press "...all the ingredients were present for provoking or trying to provoke a real cat and dog fight -- between himself and Mr. Van Niekerk -- between the United States and South Africa -- between the Church and the state" (53). Van Niekerk stated that "...he could not promise that the children would not be removed but he would do his best" (54) and that he would instruct the Transvaal Director of Education to send a form to each school requesting details of all non-white pupils currently in attendance.

While the Transvaal Administrator was quite openly averse to the concept of open schools, the substantial publicity that the issue was generating combined with the reform of central
government policy dictated that no immediate action would be taken despite localised threats. As Brother Jude remarked in a letter to fellow Transvaal religious in June 1978:

When what was actually said in the Provincial Council by the Administrator and the Member for Education of the Executive Council, is separated from all the comment and speculation, you will no doubt notice that both have been very careful in their choice of words, and that clearly no decision has yet been taken with regard to the pupils admitted this year. In actual fact, nothing new has been said at all (55).

Again, if one looks at the situation as developing in Natal, a substantial difference in tone is evident. In a letter to The Principal of one of the Catholic Convent's in Natal, the Director of Education, G. Hosking, acknowledges that "...in implementing the policy agreed to by the representatives of the Churches and the Minister, I am technically breaking the law" (56) yet continues to extol the virtues of pragmatism.

Similarly, in the Cape. At a meeting between the Cape Director of Education, P.S. Meyer and some 25 Anglican school principals (28/08/78) it was clear that the Cape provincial authorities did not wish to attract negative publicity and urged all the principals to use discretion and tact (57). At the same time, it should be reiterated that the actions of those within control of the Cape Education Department, such as Meyer, were still inherently bound to discriminatory 'logic'. This is made clear when one views the following quote taken from this particular meeting:
He also spoke of certain research being done to investigate whether there were any genetic reasons for the poorer performance of certain black peoples when compared to their white counterparts, all other factors being equal (58).

The Anglican schools had, by this stage, taken the lead given by the Catholics and were cautiously admitting a few non-white pupils to their schools. "As the 1970's drew to a close, the HMC schools were becoming bolder on the issue" (59). The records show that the first of these pupils were admitted to various Anglican schools like St. Andrew's and St. Mary's in the Cape, (60) in 1978. Generally, Anglican schools lagged behind in their physical acceptance of open schools. Peter Randall attributes this hesitancy to the inherent conservativeness of the Governing bodies of many of these schools, modelled as they are on the British public schools. Randall also argues that the "social desirability" of multi-racialism within the elite Anglican schools contributed largely to their increasing interest in limited incorporation (61).

Transvaal Catholic schools had submitted applications for 1979 by September. As these were invariably refused, it became imperative that the schools formulate a response. At an open schools meeting in October, the Executives of ECAR and Major Superiors proposed four various courses of action in response to the developing crisis:

1. To decide that further discussion was useless and to go ahead admitting Black pupils, without permission.
2. To decide to abandon the idea of the Open School since it seemed useless trying to do anything in the circumstances.
3. To request one meeting with the Administrator and the Minister simultaneously and if they proved intransigent to inform them there and then that we intended going ahead with the Open Schools, as a matter of conscience; that no further negotiations were possible.

4. To attend such a meeting mentioned in 3, to try to negotiate and bargain, but to give no final decision until the matter was reported back to the principals and major superiors, who would then have to take their own decisions (62).

The meeting opted for the fourth proposal, reasoning that neither negotiations or principles should be abandoned and that individual congregations and schools should be granted autonomous powers of decision. The meeting concluded that there was no question of abandoning the initiative and that the Transvaal department's total refusal of all applications for 1979 was unacceptable (63).

In a subsequent letter (31/10/78) to the Minister of National Education the Chairman of ECAR, Brother Jude informed Koornhof that while the Catholic schools were prepared to accept some "...agreement on the size of the intake of pupils in 1979...they cannot see their way clear to accepting a situation of no intake".

Archbishops Hurley and Daniel, Sisters Evangelist and Marian and Brothers Jude and O'Neill met with the new Minister of National Education, W. Cruywagen, and Van Niekerk on December 1, yet while the Minister professed sympathy with the schools, he stressed that he could not influence the T.P.A. decisions. Van Niekerk re-iterated his stand that no new admissions would be considered for 1979 (64).
stalemate continued, therefore, through the end of 1978 while a suitable date was finalised for a meeting with the new Minister, and his four provincial Administrators. It was finally announced that the meeting would be held in Cape Town on January 23, 1979.

This again placed pressure on those Catholic schools in the Transvaal who had undertaken to admit new non-white pupils in 1979, as the date coincided closely with that of the re-opening of Transvaal schools. As a result, the ECAR executive requested that principals accept a postponement of the admission of Black pupils until Monday January 29, 1979 (65).

It was subsequently learned that this meeting would not be solely between the Catholics and the state, but would include representatives from individual Methodist and Anglican schools as well as an A.P.S. delegation. The four Ministers responsible for education in the various 'population groups', and the four provincial administrators would also be present. Additionally, five Directors of Education (both National and Provincial) were included (66).

From the outset of the meeting it was evident that Van Niekerk remained intransigent. He explained that his interpretation of "clause 4" was that permission should be granted only in "highly exceptional cases". In his opinion the criteria advanced by the schools as evidence of special
circumstance were not sufficient to warrant special exemption (67).

In response, Advocate King, acting on behalf of the Anglican Association of Private Schools, replied that the process of opening the schools was working smoothly in the Cape due to an atmosphere of trust and co-operation with the Cape authorities. Further, the private schools did not seek confrontation with the state, neither were they to be considered "activists". He emphasised the fact that the schools were

'...acting in a mature and responsible way. They were selective in their admissions as they wish to maintain their high standards. Only those who could cope academically and socially in the situation were accepted. The fact that private schools had to charge fairly high school fees also made for selectivity. Advocate King submitted that in the existing situation in South Africa, any black pupil that could qualify academically, socially and financially for admission to an open school was highly exceptional' (68).

Sister Evangelist, speaking on behalf of the Catholic church schools stated that the Catholic church considered the right of freedom of choice as fundamental and that black parents chose to send their children to the private schools, realising that they would come into contact with "...a mingling of diverse cultures..." (69). As such, she argued, this right should be respected.

What is evident from these two statements is the orientational differences between the Catholics and Anglicans. While the APS argued the issue in terms of the
schools' exclusivity remaining uncompromised and self-imposed selectivity of the school bodies, the Catholic delegation argued in principle against the restriction of admissions policy. While this is simplistic, and while elements within both the Catholic and Anglican church and their schools certainly differed with respect to this generalisation, it remains pertinent to recognise the orientational differences between the two.

After various inputs, Brother Jude urged that the meeting examine the issue at hand which was the urgent need to solve the impending crisis in the Transvaal. He re-iterated the Catholic schools' desire to avoid confrontation, yet confirmed that it was unacceptable that every one of their applications had been turned down.

As a result, Van Niekerk agreed to re-examine the submitted list of applicants and a further meeting was called for January 26, 1979 between himself and church representatives. Once again this meeting included APS as well as individual Anglican and Methodist delegates. Van Niekerk began the meeting by stating that he was not prepared to discuss the "principles" involved in the applications, rather he wanted to confine the meeting to a re-examination of the issue of criteria by which cases may be judged as exceptional (70).

The Administrator stated that the applications of 1979 consisted of 99 Africans, 64 Coloureds and 58 Asiatics (71). Of these only 4 were accepted. The Administrator submitted
that factors such as the desire for secular religious education, English as a home language, high academic standards and an ability to pay the fees were important considerations although they did not, in themselves, warrant special consideration (72). Other justifications put forward by the schools included:

-- An inspector who felt that the quality of education in the African school his child attended was not up to standard.
-- An Indian pupil from Witbank where there was no Indian school.
-- The pupil of a Chinese mother and Coloured father.
-- The child of a Hindu father and Moslem mother who was rejected by both cultures" (73).

The Administrator stated that while he had carefully examined these, he declared that they did not constitute sufficient reason for the invocation of the special clause.

He invited the schools to re-submit applications and promised that they would receive immediate attention.

As a result, the Catholic schools called a gathering of Principals and Superiors which met on Saturday, January 27. It was stated that the number of options now available to them included the re-submittal of applications -- with or without waiting for replies -- before admitting pupils; the admittance of pupils without re-submitting applications; and the abandonment of the ideal of open schools. The minutes as kept by the Catholic delegation record that while "...each principal or congregation would have to decide for herself/himself what to do in the circumstances..." the general opinion was that schools should go ahead with
admissions, while petitioning the Minister of National Education for Cabinet intercession in the form of legislative review (74).

Archbishop Hurley, in a letter to the Minister stated that:

...the matter is viewed so seriously that for many a stage has already been reached when...having failed to come to an understanding with the Transvaal authorities, they feel conscience-bound to accept pupils into the schools and face whatever the consequences may be (75).

Further, Hurley appealed for a "common national policy" to ensure that provincial autonomy could not selectively frustrate the open schools movement.

On March 20, 1979 the Cabinet referred the decision back to the provincial authorities. The Transvaal Administrator once again threatened de-registration in terms of section 107 of the Education Ordinance 29 of 1953 (76). In May the Catholics again petitioned the Minister of National Education (77) and Van Niekerk (78), to no avail. It was learnt, however, that Van Niekerk was vacating the office of Transvaal Administrator in July. He was replaced by Willem Cruywagen, generally perceived to be more 'verlig' than his predecessor and an interview was immediately requested with the new Administrator. This was finally granted in November.

At the interview, the new Administrator informed the Catholic delegation that the matter was under review and had been referred to the Minister of National Education, then
Jansen, whose reply was still pending (79). It was subsequently learned that the new Transvaal Administrator was sending all applications through to the Minister of National Education who decided to appoint a Committee under the Chairmanship of Meyer (80) to examine the Open Schools issue and make recommendations as to Provincial response. Little further was heard of this committee.

Once again, however, shortly before the Transvaal schools were due to re-open in 1980, communication was received that of the 160 applications from Transvaal Catholic schools, only 19 had been accepted (81). In contrast, schools in the Cape and Natal were experiencing minimal provincial interference. Additionally, the Cape Administration had decided to subsidise all white private Schools at the rate of R100 per annum (82) per pupil from 1980, and Natal, while remaining cautious, had not refused any applications from Catholic schools (83).

In January, consequently, Brother Jude wrote to the Transvaal Director of Education setting out the Schools' position:

It is with regret that I must inform you that the situation, from the schools' point of view, remains unsatisfactory....While not wishing to go contrary to the instructions of the Department, the schools find themselves being faced with having to make a choice between listening to human authority and obeying what they see as the call of the Gospel. In conscience, those responsible for the schools have no option but to do what they understand to be in accordance with the teachings of Our Lord (84).
This became entrenched as the unofficial policy of many of the Catholic schools in the Transvaal. Many of the schools simply stopped applying for official sanction and admitted pupils without application or notification to the provincial authorities (85).

By November of 1981, Catholic schools in the Transvaal had admitted 1121 pupils without permission. This is in stark contrast to the 164 pupils admitted with official sanction. During the same period, all 734 non-white pupils admitted to Catholic schools in the Cape were officially sanctioned, as were the 240 pupils in Natal Catholic schools (86). This practice clearly provided a direct challenge to the authority of the state over the issue. Again, the possibility of de-registration in terms of the illegality of the moves was raised. The threats from individual departmental officials were seen to be impotent in the light of the state’s promotion of limited co-option as a reform strategy. This is evidenced in the growth of non-white enrolment in private schools. In the Cape province alone, enrolment more than doubled from 559 non-white pupils in 1980, to 1441 in 1981 (87).

At this stage therefore, a re-alignment of the state’s policy towards the private schools is clearly evident. This was particularly visible in the Transvaal where approximately 400 applications were approved in 1981 (88). In line with this, the ECAR executive urged Catholic schools
in the Transvaal to submit all 1982 applications once more (89) so as to re-assess the situation.

The tabling of the Financial Relations Amendment Bill in 1981 made legal provision for the admission of all (90) non-white pupils to private schools for the first time and empowered the provinces to regulate the admissions. It stipulated, however, that the Minister of National Education could reclassify a school as Coloured, Indian or Black thereby forcing the school to fall under these respective education departments. While official sanction was grudgingly forthcoming, then, this was not at the expense of control.

With the burgeoning development of the state's reform policy control became more sophisticated. Where, initially, the state had sought to control the process through uncoordinated reaction to the open schools movement and the conservative responses of provincial bureaucrats, financial control would become the preferred method of leverage.

The publication of the De Lange Report in July 1981 and the subsequent white paper officially signalled the new direction in which the state's educational reforms were headed. It pointed specifically to the state's recognition of the financial and political desirability of nurturing private initiative in education.
Conclusion

From the sources examined within this chapter it is possible to draw two clear conclusions with respect to the process of opening private schools.

Firstly it is made abundantly clear that the Catholic church took the lead in opening its schools and that the Anglican church's role was a secondary one. Secondly, and possibly more importantly, it is clear that the state's initial policy with respect to the desegregation of church schools was both adaptive and reactive, based on the need to confront the challenge issued by the Catholic church in the form of the illegal admittance of pupils to their schools. As such the state's response, at least initially, was uncoordinated and did not amount to a central policy adaptation.

To briefly explore these propositions, then, while both the Anglican and Catholic churches adopted resolutions accepting the desirability of open schools prior to 1976, it was ultimately the Catholics who followed through on this pledge and admitted non-white pupils without official sanction. Additionally, the 'moral justification' of the correctness of open schools was a concept more clearly defined as a rationale by the Catholic church. Where the Anglicans predominantly cited the maintenance of 'standards' as justification in the face of challenges from the state, the Catholics invariably asserted the morality inherent in non-
racial schooling and their determination to uphold these principles.

While it is certainly possible to over emphasise the differences between the two in terms of moral 'superiority' and while there were undoubtedly exceptions within both churches and their schools, the Catholics undertook to open their schools, against the law, a full two years before the first Anglican schools opened. It should be also be noted that the first Anglican schools opened in 1978 -- only after the Cabinet decision which provided tacit and qualified permission to the schools.

Further, it was the Catholic schools who predominantly challenged the state's authority by admitting pupils, in increasingly large numbers, who had not received special provincial permission. This was especially true in the Transvaal. Finally, the Catholic schools partly circumvented the criticism of tokenism through proportionately significant enrolments of non-white pupils and the lower school fees of the Catholic as opposed to Anglican private schools.

At the same time it would be naive to unquestioningly accept Catholic 'moral superiority' as a basis for their open schools initiative. Falling admissions and the closure of many private schools, particularly Catholic schools, were a feature of this period. The 'lower' fees charged by the Catholic private schools in relation to their Anglican,
Methodist and Jewish counterparts, dictated that financial reality would influence social responsibility.

In other words the opening of their schools and the consequent attraction of a substantial and untapped pupil community quite literally meant the difference between survival and closure for many schools. This is a particularly powerful motivation and can be relevantly transferred to the subsequent developments in the opening of public schools.

The second point that needs to be emphasised is the reactive nature of the state's response in the face of the challenge of open schools. The opening of schools was a serious challenge to traditional Nationalist educational policy. At the same time, however, the events cannot be distanced from the social, economic and political milieu in which they took place. While the state may or may not have foreseen the rise of the open schools movement, it reacted with the reformist and co-optive ethic as motivation for its response. This has been argued extensively in the previous chapter.

Additionally, given the willingness of the schools to break the law if necessary, the state could not ignore the process.

In essence then, the state was forced to respond. The fact that it did so hesitantly and with the express desire to rock the 'boat of Nationalist conviction' as little as
possible, does not change the fact that policy adaptation was inevitable. There were essentially three options available. Firstly, the offending schools could be closed. This was an undesirable option given a number of factors. These included massive adverse publicity, both local and international, the necessity to incorporate displaced pupils into an already over-strained public education domain and the attendant financial expense. Most important, however, was the increasingly obvious advantages that nominally multi-racial education held for the newly developed and articulated reform strategy.

The second option open to the state was to reform policy centrally and legislate accordingly to allow for autonomy in private education enrolments. Again this was not chosen as it contradicted the Nationalist ethos which the state had been developing for thirty years. As we have seen, certain elements within the party and its structures were entirely opposed to even conciliatory adaptation. In effect the state did neither of these. The response opted for can be seen as typical of the process of reform.

The temporary Cabinet decision accommodated the 'verkramp' factions within the party, such as Sybrand Van Niekerk, who retained their right of veto through provincial control, as well as acknowledging the increasing necessity for educational reform as part of total strategy. Finally, in 1981, the policy was formally adapted to allow for enrolment of non-white pupils to private schools. This policy
adaptation also entrenched provincial and financial control over the regulation of these pupils.

It should be remembered that while the state was prepared to nominally accept qualified private school autonomy in admissions, the opening of schools, while increasingly legitimated by the state, was far from an accepted ideal at this stage. There was no question of opening public schools. Nationalist Ministers and politicians vociferously opposed the idea and referred extensively within parliament to the contentious American experience of bussing and its social consequences (91) as proof of the undesirability of open schools.

By 1981, however, societal outrage against apartheid had become increasingly centred around education and the state could no longer neglect the educational agenda. It responded with the De Lange Commission. One of the central tenets of the Commission was the assertion that the state could no longer be held solely responsible for the provision of education. The role of the private sector in education needed to be expanded and openly encouraged alongside increased technical training. This assertion was taken up by the state as part of its reform package, and it became clear that the traditional private schools offered an ideal opportunity for the pursuit of this goal.

This assertion will be further examined in the following chapter.
According to the 1976 Race Relations Survey, 'Black' pupils, (probably mostly 'coloured' children), were admitted to two Roman Catholic schools in the Cape and three in the Transvaal in 1976.


(2). The term 'open' schools is an emotive and contentious one. It was a term initially coined by the press. The use of inverted commas here is intended to show that despite the connotations of the word 'open', the schools that began to experiment with enrolments were very often not 'open' in the true sense of the word and practised a limited form of multi-racialism.

This chapter recognises this reality yet equally acknowledges that the term has become standard reference with respect to the debate surrounding the acceptance of non-white pupils into South African private schools.


(10). Corke, M., "Independent Schools and the Public Interest" in Ashley and Philcox (eds), My Kind of School ..., p. 77.


(15). Hurley, "The Integration of Catholic Schools...", p. 4.

(16). Hurley, "The Integration of Catholic Schools...", p. 5.

(17). Hurley, "The Integration of Catholic Schools...", p. 5.


(20). Boraine, A.L. in Hansard, 16/05/1979, col. 6615.


(27). This was probably due to the fact that at this stage the Natal Provincial Department was under United Party Control.


(35). The looming General Election probably contributed largely to the reluctance to confront what could be a potentially contentious issue at the polls.

(36). In parliament he stated that he had "...a very soft spot for and much interest in these private schools....The fact of the matter is that we shall do everything in our power to assist them" in Hansard, 18/05/1977, col. 7921/2.


(40). Deputy Minister of Plural Relations and of Education and Training in Hansard, 02/06/1978, col. 8317.


(66). "Minutes of Meeting between Dept. of Schools (Commission for Education and Worship), Representatives of Methodist and Anglican Church Schools and Education Ministers, Administrators and Directors held at Hendrik Verwoerd Building, Cape Town", C.I.E. files, 23/01/1979.
(67). The criteria included 'academic and social responsibility' and the ability to pay the relatively high school fees.

(68). "Minutes of Meeting between Dept. of Schools (Commission for Education and Worship), Representatives of Methodist and Anglican Church Schools and Education Ministers, Administrators and Directors held at Hendrik Verwoerd Building, Cape Town", C.I.E. files, 23/01/1979.

(69). "Minutes of Meeting between Dept. of Schools (Commission for Education and Worship), Representatives of Methodist and Anglican Church Schools and Education Ministers, Administrators and Directors held at Hendrik Verwoerd Building, Cape Town", C.I.E. files, 23/01/1979.

(70). "Minutes of Meeting between Church School Representatives and the Administrator of the Transvaal held in Pretoria", C.I.E. files, 26/01/1979.


(72). "Minutes of Meeting between Church School Representatives and the Administrator of the Transvaal held in Pretoria (plus Minutes of the meeting as taken by the Office of the Director of Education, Transvaal)", C.I.E. files, 26/01/1979.


(74). "Minutes of Meeting between Church School Representatives and the Administrator of the Transvaal held in Pretoria", C.I.E. files, 26/01/1979.


(80). The Director of Education in the Cape.


(86). Figures taken from census within Catholic schools as transcribed in C.I.E. files as at November 1981.


(89). Letter from Chairman of ECAR, Brother Jude, to Major Superiors and Principals, C.I.E. files.


(91). see *Hansard*, 02/06/1978, cols. 8312 and 8369.
Chapter Three: 1981 to 1985 -- Policy Consolidation

The period from 1981 to 1985 was one of policy consolidation. While the admittance of non-white pupils to private schools was an established fact by 1981, the state was becoming increasingly sophisticated in its attempt to mould the open school trend to fit its reform policies.

This chapter will argue that this period saw the state attempting to consolidate its traditionally differential and provincially biased policy into a co-ordinated policy that would allow the manipulation of the process.

The period saw the introduction, for the first time, through the Financial Relations Amendment Act of legal provision for the admittance of non-white pupils to private schools. This in itself shows significant policy adaptation in that it indicates the state's readiness to move away from the privately negotiated policy of 'turning a blind eye' to admissions on the basis of 'special permission'.

Equally importantly, however, the period saw a steadily increasing demand on the part of the private schools, particularly the schools represented by the A.P.S., for increased subsidies. This was a demand increasingly recognised and echoed by the state in terms of its reform objectives. It can be argued that the extension of financially significant subsidy to the schools served to
both encourage private initiative and stimulate a black middle class.

The period also incorporates both the De Lange Commission and Constitutional adaptation, both of which hold key importance as to the impetus of the state's reform policies as discussed in Chapter One, and as such are important for any analysis of education. More specifically, the De Lange Commission recommended increased and co-ordinated state aid to the private education sector and as such remains pivotal to an analysis of policy change.

For this reason, the chapter will concentrate largely on the minutes of meetings of the Association of Private Schools. It was the predominantly Anglican A.P.S. that fought most vociferously for the extension and improvement of financial aid to the private education sector. Similarly, it was the A.P.S. who were largely instrumental in improving the cooperative mechanisms between private school representative bodies.

The Development of the Joint Liaison Committee

At a meeting of the A.P.S. on February 13, 1981, a decision was taken to "...maintain and strengthen the Liaison Committee previously formed as an Umbrella Body...." (1). This Umbrella Body, later to be known as the Joint Liaison Committee, or J.L.C., was an important development during this period in that it signalled closer co-operation between
the organised private school movement, or Anglican, Catholic and Jewish schools as represented by the A.P.S., Jewish Board of Education and Catholic schools.

At a later meeting the rationale behind the creation of this body was put forward. "At the Chairman's invitation Mr Von Klemperer explained how circumstances could arise in which it was desirable when approaching a Provincial Administration to be able to speak for the private schools as a whole...." (2). Most A.P.S. members supported this idea.

This does not mean that there was a convergence of identities and goals between the three organisations. On the contrary, essential differences remained in ethos and outlook. Strategically, however, it was acknowledged that a co-ordinated approach to the state in times of policy upheaval could prove beneficial. Separate meetings between the organisations and provincial and central government continued during this period, but these were supplemented by J.L.C. contact with the state.

The Joint Liaison Committee was now firmly established as an Umbrella Body with quarterly meetings. Because of decisions pending following the HSRC Investigations, however, so far no need had arisen on which joint action had been called for (3).

In the Chairman's report for 1981/2, the A.P.S. Chairman refers to a meeting between himself and the Chairman of the
Conference of Headmasters and Headmistresses with the Minister of National Education, P. Jansen.

We explained to him the role of the Association and requested that it be consulted on matters relating to the private schools. Shortly afterwards, the private schools were invited by the Minister to submit our full recommendations to the HSRC Investigation into Education. In the preparation of this we were advised to be quick, brief and to concentrate on the important issues. In our view these concerned the functions of private schools, the financing of these schools and the essential functions of the Central Government in a decentralised system (4).

The private schools, therefore, were permitted some input towards the De Lange Commission.

Provincial Bias

At a meeting with a Roman Catholic Delegation soon after his appointment as Minister of National Education in November 1980, Viljoen indicated that the Cabinet was concerned and aware about the provincial differentiation as regards admissions to private schools. Consequently, he reported, guide-lines had been drawn up by the provinces (presumably at the state's instigation) which would serve to introduce uniformity (5). Further, it was reported that these proposals had been forwarded to the Cabinet for approval which was expected by December (6).

This approval was apparently forthcoming although the private school organisations remained uninformed as to the
decisions and direction that provincial policy would follow as a result of these attempts at uniformity.

Apparently some time in the course of 1981 guidelines for the admission of black pupils to registered white schools had been circulated to the various provincial administrations and education departments, but the contents of these guidelines had not been communicated to the private schools (7).

These guidelines were directly felt, however, through a noticeable re-alignment of provincial practice. The Cape Province, for instance, had traditionally proven willing to accommodate and co-operate with the private schools, approving most applications. In a letter to the Administrator dated 26/10/81, Brother Jude notes this tendency. He adds, however, that "...judging by the replies received by schools with regard to recent applications there appears to be a change in policy which raises a serious problem for the schools" (8).

The Cape Province, which had seldom refused applications previously, refused almost half of the 1982 applications from the Catholic schools, prompting the assumption that it appeared as if the Province was aligning itself with the restrictive policies of the Transvaal (9).

At a meeting of the Joint Liaison Committee on November 27, 1981, the matter of continuing difficulty with the admission of non-white pupils was examined. In the light of continuing problems with provincial differentiation as well as the recent Financial Relations Amendment Act which empowered
Provincial Councils to create Ordinances regulating non-white admissions to private schools, the Chairman of the A.P.S. wrote to the Minister of National Education requesting an audience for a J.L.C. delegation (10). The Catholics had already held a separate meeting with the Cape Administrator (11).

It appeared that while the Transvaal was remaining belligerent with respect to private school admissions, therefore, other provinces which had traditionally been lenient as regards admissions were also showing signs of a hardening of policy.

From the minutes of a special meeting of the Western Province region held on 24 November, it was evident that there had been a change of policy by the Cape Administration as regards the admission of blacks to private schools. Whereas in 1981 less than 4% of the 316 applications made to the Department had been refused, in the current year 30% of the 148 applications made had been refused (12).

Similarly, in Natal, both Anglican and Catholic organisations reported a hardening of attitude. The Secretary of the A.P.S. in a National Executive Committee meeting as far back as 1980 reported that:

...Dr. Hosking appeared to have adopted a more restrictive policy as regards the admittance of blacks to schools. A highly eligible pupil had been refused admittance...and at least two member schools had been told that they might not admit any more blacks (13).

At a meeting with the Cape Administrator on December 7, 1981, a Catholic Delegation reported that the "...general
impression was that the Cape Provincial Administration was not happy with the position as it had developed but had no real option but to follow what had been laid down by the Government" (14).

From this it would seem at this stage as if 'behind the scenes' co-operation between the Provinces and the state had taken place in order to unify policy to private school admissions, and further that it was a decision prompted at Cabinet level as part of a process of consolidation of the application of policy. This process was aimed at facilitating uniformity in application of future policy development and is in line with the state's intended centralisation of control over education. By October 1981, the state had published its interim comments on the De Lange Commission and had indicated its general acceptance of the eleven principles as drafted by the 25 members of the Main Committee of the H.S.R.C. investigation (15).

It is worthwhile at this point to document these principles as they clearly point towards the changing initiatives of the state with respect to education during the period under consideration:

Principle 1
Equal opportunities for education, including equal standards in education, for every inhabitant, irrespective of race, colour, creed or sex, shall be the purposeful endeavour of the State.

Principle 2
Education shall afford positive recognition of what is common as well as what is diverse in the religious and cultural way of life and the languages of the inhabitants.
Principle 3
Education shall give positive recognition to the freedom of choice of the individual, parents and organisations in society.

Principle 4
The provision of education shall be directed in an educationally responsible manner to meet the needs of the individual as well as those of society and economic development, and shall, inter alia, take into consideration the manpower needs of the country.

Principle 5
Education shall endeavour to achieve a positive relationship between the formal, non-formal and informal aspects of education in the school, society and family.

Principle 6
The provision of formal education shall be a responsibility of the State provided that the individual, parents and organized society shall have a shared responsibility, choice and voice in this matter.

Principle 7
The private sector and the state shall have a shared responsibility for the provision of non-formal education.

Principle 8
Provision shall be made for the establishment and state subsidisation of private education within the system of providing education.

Principle 9
In the provision of education the processes of centralization and decentralization shall be reconciled organisationally and functionally.

Principle 10
The professional status of the teacher and lecturer shall be recognized.

Principle 11
Effective provision of education shall be based on continuing research (16).

The De Lange recommendations largely encapsulated the state's policy intents. They specifically pointed towards greater recognition and support for the private schools and
the private education sector, primarily through financial recognition and the subsequent response by the state to these proposals through the white paper indicates an acceptance of these proposals. At the same time, the state rejected the unification of education departments in favour of the models implemented in terms of the new constitution which not only maintained separate education departments on a redefined basis of race, but also attempted to centralise provincial control within the Departments of Education and Culture.

As we have seen the state had already embarked on a process of attempting to unify provincial policy in an attempt to regulate and control non-white admissions. On March 5, 1982, Brother Jude, Dr. Katz and A.M.D. Gnodde representing the Catholic, Jewish and Anglican schools respectively held a meeting with the Minister of National Education, Dr. Viljoen. At this meeting the prevailing provincial attitudes to admissions were discussed as well as the pending regulations in terms of Section 15 A (1) of the Financial Relations Amendment Act. According to Gnodde, the Minister was "...co-operative, friendly and open. He had happily suggested he would set up a meeting with the Provincial Administrators and the representatives of the private schools to consider the Draft Ordinances" (17).

At this meeting, the Minister confirmed his attempt to impose some form of uniformity amongst the provinces (18). This can be seen in the light of Provision 9 of the De Lange...
principles which refers to the attempt to institute functional reconciliation of the centralisation of control. In the eyes of the state this would be instituted under the proposed 'own' affairs department.

In a subsequent development it was learned that a meeting was held between the Minister and the Provincial Administrators in Cape Town to discuss guide-lines for ordinances in terms of regulating private school admissions (19). It can be speculated that this meeting, and others, may have provided the policy framework for the more unified response towards admissions that became evident during this period. The state had begun to consolidate its policy, then, with a view to restricting admissions to politically acceptable levels, as well as tightening its control over the process in line with its co-optive reformist goals.

The proposed meeting between the Administrators and the private school representatives was not forthcoming, however, despite requests from private school organisations (20) and it became clear that due to political considerations the meeting would not take place before the end of 1982.

Brother Smith reported that because one of the Catholic schools in the Cape had displeased the C.P.A. by its policy of illegally admitting black students, high-level representations had been made to the Apostolic Delegate. As a result, he was himself flying to Cape Town...to see the Administrator. Brother Smith said that in response to approaches from Catholic representatives, the Administrator of the Transvaal had said that the present time was not opportune to discuss the admission of blacks to private schools (21).
Similarly, at the Ninth meeting of the National Council of the A.P.S. it was "...evident that at the present time, political issues were delaying any such meeting which the Minister did not expect to be held before the end of this year" (22). These 'political considerations' were probably rooted in the coming of the new constitution and its emphasis on the centralisation of control as opposed to provincial autonomy. At a meeting of the J.L.C. this was indirectly confirmed.

In a letter dated May 25, the Minister had said it appeared unlikely that draft ordinances regarding the admission of non-white pupils to private schools would be submitted in the course of this year. The Provincial authorities were '...still in the course of studying several aspects of this matter...' (23).

As such, therefore, the resolution of this issue was postponed in deference to the new policy initiatives and goals that the state began to pursue in the early eighties.

**The Pursuit of Subsidy**

As has been argued, the state had begun to re-align its policy. Open schools were a de facto reality by this stage and the state's policy imperative had changed from a reactionary response to the opening of schools, to the need to control the process to fit its reform policies.

Subsidies and their control, it could be argued, provided a more effective and indeed subtler method of control. Schools continued to receive grants in varying amounts from the
provinces. In the Cape, the majority of schools affiliated to the A.P.S. were receiving approximately R140 per pupil resident in the Cape (24). In the Transvaal, a delegation meeting with Mr Schoeman, M.E.C. Education, was told that the Transvaal Education department did not receive enough money to cover its own expenses and was therefore not contemplating financial support to the private schools (25). "He believed that eventually these would be forthcoming from the central government and not from the province" (26).

In Natal A.P.S. schools were receiving approximately R500 per pupil (27). It should be remembered, however, that these grants were negotiated with the schools individually and were directly linked to a negotiated 'quota' of non-white pupils. Some schools refused the grant and some, particularly among the Catholic schools, accepted grants but openly disobeyed accompanying quotas (28). The Jewish schools traditionally admitted few non-whites in direct proportion to their particular religious emphasis. They did not go out of their way, they argued, to recruit or accept non-Jewish children and consequently admitted few non-white pupils. Similarly, while they made representations for increased financial aid, their particular mode of operation relied largely on parental and community donations.

The quota system as developed within this period, serves to emphasise the difference in emphasis between Catholic and A.P.S. schools. At the National Executive Committee meeting
of the A.P.S. on November 2, 1982, this division is graphically clear:

Brother Smith reported that a delegation from the Catholic schools would shortly be meeting with the M.E.C. Education in Cape Town to make representations to him concerning the quota system. In answer to the Chairman's question as to whether this visit was planned in collaboration with other members of the Umbrella Body in the Western Cape Brother Smith said that he had consulted Mr Fisher about this visit... inviting his participation but that Mr Fisher had declined. Partly because he wished to avoid what might be considered as confrontation with the Cape Education Department and also because he and his colleagues had already arranged a meeting with the Department independently (29).

This quote illuminates two issues. Firstly, it reaffirms the hesitancy of the A.P.S. to commit itself to any action that may have been seen to be 'confrontational'. Once again it is necessary to stress that this is a generalisation, albeit one that has consistently been evidenced within the policies and directives contained in the minutes and documents of the private school organisations. Critical voices were certainly heard within both A.P.S. and Catholic organisations as to the politics of confrontation. Michael Corke, Headmaster of St. Barnabas and a central figure within the A.P.S. until 1986 was consistently critical of the leadership of the A.P.S. and its conciliatory stance towards the state over issues like the opening of schools, subsidisation and state attempts at control over the schools. In fact it was as a direct result of these criticisms that he and his school board withdrew their membership from the A.P.S. in 1986.
The quote equally serves to underline the inherent fragility of the 'alliance' of the Joint Liaison Committee during its first few years of existence. It was a body held together by a tenuous commitment to joint consultation in the interests of increased bargaining power. While the J.L.C. continued to hold quarterly meetings and the occasional interview with various Departmental and State officials, it was an uneasy alliance hindered by organisational policies. Most tellingly, all parties continued to hold separate and extensive meetings with the state, arguably defusing some of the effect of united opposition.

In early 1983 both Catholic and A.P.S. representatives met with the C.P.A. in order to discuss the burgeoning linkage of race to financial aid. At a meeting between representatives of the East and Western Cape regions of the A.P.S. and the Cape Administration the Chairman of the A.P.S. reported a "...favourable outcome..." although it is not specified what was decided (30). Brother Smith reported at a meeting of the National Executive Council of the A.P.S. on March 14, 1983 that "...representatives of the Catholic schools met with the C.P.A. two days earlier. It was evident to him that it was the Catholic schools which caused most of the trouble with the C.P.A. whose representatives had expressed amazement at the resentment of the quota system..." (31). In reply to a question from the A.P.S. Chairman, however, Brother Smith indicated that the Catholics accepted quotas as an interim measure (32).
Despite this acceptance, non-compliance was practised by both Catholic and Anglican schools. At a meeting of the J.L.C. in June 1983, their non-compliance was exposed. At this meeting, Brother Smith reported that five Catholic schools in the Cape had been refused their provincial grants as a direct result of exceeding their allotted quotas of non-white students. It appeared, further, that three A.P.S. schools in the Cape province were being similarly pressured.

The attempted linkage between race and finance as a tool for control over the admissions of the schools was dramatically demonstrated, therefore, as early as 1983. It was a fact not lost on some A.P.S. members.

Mr Dunne commented that these events underlined the fears originally felt by one or two members of the Committee some years ago that there would be a linkage between the admission of blacks to our schools and financial support from the government. He believed that if the private schools continued to seek financial support they would find themselves faced with further controls.

At this stage the state was prepared to test this mechanism probably with a view to introducing legislation centralising and expanding state aid to the private schools in terms of the De Lange recommendations. Similar linkage of finance to quotas could then be incorporated within the legislation. In this way the state's twinned reform policies of expanding the black middle classes and supporting the process of privatisation would be balanced against increased control over the process through legislative adaptation.
At this point, then, it is worthwhile to shortly examine the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983 and the 1984 National Policy for General Education Affairs Act which together introduced the notions of 'own' and 'general affairs' in education. Most importantly, however, these constitutional adaptations provided for a centralisation of policy control within the Department and Ministry of National Education.

In terms of Section 14 of the Constitution, "matters which specially or differentially affect a population group in relation to the maintenance of its identity and the upholding and furtherance of its way of life, culture, traditions and customs" became 'own affairs' (36). Education was included within this re-definition of apartheid policy.

Included within the First Schedule of the Constitution was the following:

2. Education at all levels, including --
   (1) instruction by way of correspondence, and institutions providing such instruction;
   (2) the training of adults in the trades at centres established by the State President; and
   (3) training of cadets at schools and official school sports (37).

Additionally, however, and in terms of the National Policy for General Education Affairs Act of 1984, education became subject to the 'general' law in relation to the following:

(a) norms and standards for the financing of running and capital costs of education;
(b) salaries and conditions of employment of staff and professional registration of teachers; and
(c) norms and standards for syllabuses and examination and for certification of qualifications (38).

The creation of the Ministry of National Education can be seen as an attempt by the state to centralise control over South African education as part of its reform policies which combined the maintenance of apartheid principles in education under the guise of 'own affairs' as well as increased centralisation of control over the policy process. Central to this policy was the acceptance by the state that financial aid should be increased to those sectors of education which were economically disadvantaged. This included black education as well as private schools.

As Selfe explained,

Whatever the commitment to equal educational opportunities, however, the concept of 'separate' schools remains of fundamental importance to the political policy of the Government, and 'separate schools' are pointedly excluded from the announced programmes of legislation which may be, or is being, reviewed, amended or appealed (39).

The 'separate but equal' principle which informed the policy of the state's declared increased financial commitment to black schools can equally be seen as contributing to its increasing willingness to financially aid the private schools. In pursuance of its reform initiatives, then, and rather than opening its own schools, the state preferred to support the limited path of recognition through finance of the private schools. The state resolutely refused to have private schools declared as falling under the Department of
National Education, or 'general affairs', and consequently maintained effective control over the schools' admissions and financial procedures.

This served to actively support the principles of De Lange which advocated increased support for private education, and facilitated the co-option of the black middle class through the private schools. It has been argued that in doing so the state shrewdly fulfilled its reform intents without having to sacrifice legitimacy in the eyes of its electorate through the opening of its own schools. In this way, too, through increased financial aid, control over admissions could be facilitated.

This control proceeded to manifest itself throughout 1983. At the Tenth Meeting of the National Council of the A.P.S. on August 27, 1983, the schools reported that three A.P.S. schools in the Western Cape had been informed that their grants were being immediately discontinued as a result of their having exceeded their quotas (40).

It had been decided that it would be preferable for each school to negotiate separately on its own behalf. Two of our three schools involved had seen the Director of Education and were met with conciliation and had gained the impression that the Department had operated under some unspecified instructions. The Director had ended the meeting with a statement that he would put in a report recommending that the grants be reinstated (41).

The third school had written to the Director and was awaiting a reply (42).
At the same meeting it was reported that one of the Catholic schools similarly affected had had its grant reinstated. Meanwhile, Von Klemperer, an A.P.S. delegate from Natal reported that while they had "...natural misgivings..." (43) about operating under a quota system, none of their member schools had exceeded their quota and were consequently unaffected. He believed, however, that some of the Catholic schools in Natal had exceeded their quotas with no action forthcoming from the authorities (44).

By 1984, all A.P.S. schools had had their grants reinstated on the condition that they reverted to their original quotas during the year (45). At the same meeting it was reported that it was "...becoming evident that control as regards such matters as the admission of blacks and financial assistance to private schools was passing to Ministerial level" (46).

Quite clearly, then, during this period, the state began to increase financial support to the private education sector while correspondingly consolidating and centralising control over these and other policy initiatives. The publishing of the "White Paper on the Provision of Education in the Republic of South Africa, 1983" on November 23, 1983 (47) confirmed this policy trend. In this document the government accepted the eleven principles guiding the provision of education as put forward by the H.S.R.C. investigation but added that there
...is nevertheless a need for a Government policy on the objectives, the structure and the functioning of the systems for the provision of education. The Government should see that decisions taken on certain aspects of general importance within these systems are in accordance with a clearly co-ordinated policy which is in line with its aims" (48).

These aims were informed and encapsulated within the new dispensation which specified 'own' and 'general' affairs. With respect to the private schools, the White Paper confirmed in Paragraph 6.2 (c) that the state was

...engaged in an investigation into a co-ordinated policy for the recognition of and granting of financial support to private schools by the executive education departments concerned (49).

This entailed a process of standardising provincial implementation under a dispensation which wished to centralise and consolidate educational policy. As such the traditional provincial differences in application of policy would decline in favour of centralised legislative reform.

As an interim measure this entailed the passing of provincial legislation in terms of the provisions of the Financial Relations Amendment Act in an attempt to standardise policy on private school admissions. The Cape Province passed an ordinance through its Provincial Council in February of 1984 (50) and the Transvaal was the last of the provinces to pass this legislation in June 1984 (51).

In an interview with Gnoddé, Chairman of the A.P.S., the Minister of National Education, Gerrit Viljoen, said that
there would be "...no tightening up in the present position as regards admission of pupils of other race groups...but also no total relaxation" (52). The Minister also indicated that while the principle of increased aid to the private schools was firmly entrenched, it was unlikely that financial aid would be forthcoming from the Transvaal in 1984.

On May 8, 1984, the Minister of National Education reported in the Standing Committee on National Education that:

...the Government's investigation regarding its policy in respect of private schools and, in particular, its financial support of private schools, has made great progress. Nevertheless, co-ordination of this programme is difficult because we are dealing here with provinces which have applied strongly divergent policies in the past. However, I hope that we can bring this matter to finality in the near future and that we shall then be able to make an announcement in this connection (53).

This quote serves to confirm residual bias in the provinces' application of policy, despite the Provincial Ordinances introduced in terms of the Financial Relations Amendment Act which were intended to regulate the application of policy. At the National Executive Committee meeting of the A.P.S. in January 1985, it was reported from the Western Cape and Natal regions that the "...roles played by Provincial Administrators were not significantly changed..." (54) in terms of their relationships with bodies like the A.P.S.

By early May 1985, despite increasing indications that the state was willing to financially support the policy it had
been developing in line with the De Lange recommendations, there was still a "...regrettable lack of communication from the Minister on the subject..." (55) according to the minutes of a meeting of the Joint Liaison Committee.

Later in the same month, however, Stoffel Botha indicated that the state was reviewing the possibility of subsidies and their possible implementation in the coming year (56). This development will be reviewed in the following chapter.

Conclusion

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the period 1981 to 1985 can be viewed as one of consolidation. While provincial attitudes fluctuated in line with the state's attempt to unify provincial policy, the subsidy debate swelled during this period, echoing the state's growing awareness of the need to support privatisation initiatives as part of its reform strategies. The progressive consolidation of provincial policy towards the private schools, firstly, and the later centralisation of control within the 'own affairs' department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly), reflect this policy.

Private schools provided a powerful vehicle for the inclusion of a black middle class. Certainly the private schools had taken the initiative in the mid-1970's and the state had responded with caution and without cohesion. As has been postulated in Chapter One, however, the development
of the complimentary reform agendas of privatisation and co-option provided the impetus for the consolidation of provincial policy. As a result, then, private schools moved out of the shadow of state condemnation into the half-light of regulated financial support.

The private schools themselves responded with the development of the J.L.C. The private school organisations recognised the desirability of maximising their input on the policy process and to an extent, then, the creation of the J.L.C. can be seen as a manifestation of the changing nature of the state's policy towards the private schools during this period.

Overwhelmingly, this period can be characterised by a strengthening of control in the hands of the state. The institution of autocratic rule and the consolidation and centralisation of power by P.W. Botha is a well documented process. The private schools, as an integral part of the South African system, did not remain untouched by this process.

This consolidation can be seen as a precursor to the introduction of legislative confirmation of the process of financial control through the Private Schools Act.

The following chapter will attempt to analyse the Act and demonstrate the implications of this process.
Footnotes: Chapter Three

It should be noted that the Association of Private Schools refused access to their documentation. This could have significantly hampered the research. Alternate copies of much of the relevant minutes of meetings held within the A.P.S. and between the members of the J.L.C. were, however, made available through another source who specifically wished to remain anonymous.

It is for this reason that some of the following citations are not sourced, apart from the fact that they are A.P.S. minutes/documents.

(1). "Minutes of meeting of National Executive Committee of the A.P.S.", 18/05/1981.

(2). "Minutes of meeting of National Executive Committee of the A.P.S.", 18/05/1981.


(4). "The A.P.S. Chairman's Report for 1981/2".


(20). "Having heard nothing further from (the Minister) concerning the suggestion, he had recently written to ask him when he planned to hold the proposed meeting", Gnodde, A.M.D., as quoted in "Minutes of meeting of National Executive Committee of the A.P.S.", 17/05/1982.


(28). "In February the Cape Provincial Council passed an ordinance providing that private schools in the Cape would in future be able to admit black pupils without having to obtain government permits, subject to conditions laid down by the Provincial Administration. Quotas ranging from 4% to 33.3% in respect of the proportion of blacks that could be admitted were laid down for 36 private schools", *Rand Daily Mail*, 25/02/1984, as quoted in *Race Relations Survey, 1984*, Johannesburg: S.A.I.R.R., 1985, p. 654.

"In May the Transvaal Provincial Council made a similar amendment to its education ordinance. However, the Roman Catholic schools in the Transvaal saw the amendment as an
attempt to impose quotas, and said that they would not abide by it", Sunday Express, 13/05/1984, as quoted in Race Relations Survey, 1984, p. 654.


(30). "Minutes of meeting of National Executive Committee of the A.P.S.", 14/03/1983.


(45). "Minutes of Meeting of National Executive Committee of the A.P.S.", 30/01/1984.


(53). *Hansard*, 08/05/1984, col. 521.


Chapter Four: The Subsidy Debate -- 1985 to 1990

This chapter will examine the provision of subsidies to the private schools as a natural progression of the state's private school policy. The preceding chapters have outlined the development of this policy which moved through initial hesitancy and confrontation, to consolidation and, finally, during this period, to an attempt at control through the Private Schools Act and manipulation of subsidies.

In line with this move, privatisation gained prominence as the policy 'engine' for co-option during this period.

It is significant that the issue of subsidies to the private schools became a focal point around which debate with the state hinged during this period. After it was announced that the state was considering subsidising the private schools in terms of the recommendations of the De Lange Commission, and in line with the privatisation ethic, it became increasingly obvious that the state was attempting to link the granting of subsidies to the racial composition of the pupil body. This would support the theory that privatisation was an extension of the state's co-optive reform strategy.

This period remains of central importance to an understanding of the continuing relationship between the state and the private schools. In 1986 the Private
Schools Act was drafted, providing for the first time, a policy of centralised and co-ordinated, legislated financial aid to the schools. As such this constituted a significant development in the state's private school policy and indicated a move to a policy based on privatisation's inherently co-optive assumptions.

State aid to the private schools further conferred an obvious formal recognition of the schools' place within South African education and as such demonstrates the coming to fruition of the changing relationship between state and private schools. Over and above this, however, the process by which the final regulations for subsidy were reached is intrinsically important in that it involved the state moving from a set of draft regulations that attempted to control the schools' racial composition to a position whereby the state had seemingly relinquished the attempt to control the schools' admissions.

In May 1985, the Minister of Education and Culture, Stoffel Botha, indicated that the state was reviewing the possibility of financial assistance to the private schools in the coming year in response to the obvious financial plight of many of the schools (1).

Elaborating on this later in the same month, Botha said that the government was creating a formula for assistance and that conditions would be made public within the next
few months (2). At this stage, the state was offering two possible grants. The first was a 10% subsidy with no underlying conditions, and the second was at 30% with some additional state control as a condition, although what form this 'control' would take was not specified (3). At a meeting between a Catholic delegation and the Minister of National Education, F.W. De Klerk on August 5, 1985, the Catholics requested that details of the proposed financing of the private schools be made known (4).

In his response, De Klerk drew attention to the distinction between public and private schools and stated that "...he saw a very definite link between the racial composition of a school and the funding it could expect to receive". He rationalised that "the government could not be expected to fund something which was contrary to its policy" (5). He stated that proposals were being considered at Cabinet level and that a Ministerial Committee consisting of the five education ministers was examining the policy of 'multi-racial' admissions to private schools (6).

Brother Jude commented on these minutes:

For the white registered schools open to pupils regardless of race, it would appear that various choices will be available depending on the extent to which they are prepared to accept government restraint and, as it appears presently, compromise on principle (7).
On September 26, 1985, the Minister of National Education announced that the categories would be 0%, 15% and 45% of the cost of educating one child a year in a white public school, although he did not, at this stage specify the conditions attached to these subsidy levels (8).

The proposed subsidisation was cautiously welcomed by the schools, although all the representative organisations expressed the hope that the new regulations would not attempt to unnecessarily control through application, as had been attempted in the past. The Chairman of the A.P.S., Dru Gnodde responded: "We have been pressing the Government for a long time to help the schools and I am delighted that something is going to be done. However, no conditions must be imposed on the schools" (9).

The Catholic Bishops Conference issued a press statement welcoming and acknowledging the decision, yet adding: "It is to be hoped however, that the aid envisaged will not be linked to any attempt to control the intake of pupils of all races to private schools" (10).

A document circulated to the private schools by the various Provincial Directors of Education early in 1986 listed thirteen criteria as guidelines for registration and subsidisation. Of these most were generally acceptable to the schools and related specifically to educational standards and practice. These included physical facilities, pupil numbers, teaching staff and
school management practice. The 7th criteria, however, provoked unanimous comment.

It read as follows: "The composition of the pupil community shall be in accordance with the agreement reached". This referred to the conclusion by the state that all private schools would be prepared to undertake an agreement, individually, as to their pupil composition. It effectively meant that to receive a subsidy, the schools would have to regulate their own admissions policy in terms of a previously accepted quota of 'non-whites'. While this was acceptable to some schools who were already receiving provincial subsidy under a similar agreement, it was clearly unacceptable to those schools who had initiated and pushed for autonomy in admissions.

It was Roger Burrows, P.F.P. spokesman for education, who drew attention to the state's intended conditions for the awarding of subsidies. He revealed that under the proposed subsidisation conditions, the state was intending to pay 45% subsidy only to those schools with a 90% 'white' pupil composition. Schools with 80% 'white' pupils would receive a 15% subsidy. To register as a private school, without any subsidy would require a 70% white pupil composition (II). The press picked up the story and ran with it.
As a result the state was publicly accused of racial blackmail and the controversy grew. While the state could previously rely on the schools' silence given their de facto complicity in accepting subsidies under the quota system, this was no longer possible. As the schools were not yet receiving any aid under the new system they could therefore not be accused of acquiescence to racist principles and had nothing to lose from extended publicity.

It was a controversy that generated almost unprecedented press coverage which ultimately played a major role in the subsequent reversal of this decision by the state and the removal of obvious racial limitations on the subsidisation of schools. As such this constituted a major change in policy direction and deserves closer inspection.

As Clive Roos of the S.A.T.A. notes:

There was a huge outcry which was not co-ordinated, but was pretty uniform in its response in that there was obviously a rejection on behalf of the private schools. There was also a very strong rejection of it by the organised teaching profession, English and Afrikaans. It was very interesting that we had no difficulty in taking the Afrikaners with us. They were firmly opposed, albeit privately. As so often happens in this country, things were achieved 'around the table' and the state backed away (12).

Roger Burrows recalls:

There was immediate and wide-scale pressure on the government from the private school
organisations, myself, the Teachers Societies and the press, amongst others, which directly pressurised government into negotiations with the various parties. The outcome was a set of regulations that would flow from the Private Schools Act and which were agreed on by both government and private schools (13).

The proposed subsidisation in terms of racial criteria had another important consequence. It galvanised the three main private school representative bodies, or A.P.S., Catholic and Jewish Board of Education into a powerful coalition to facilitate co-ordinated response and negotiation. The Joint Liaison Committee, previously under-utilised through the obvious operational dissimilarities of the private school bodies came into its own during this crisis and many of the meetings with the state over the subsidisation issue were conducted jointly. While co-operation in matters of mutual concern was an accepted principle within these bodies, then, it had never matured into the practical application and co-operation which the subsidy crisis necessitated.

Unlike the open schools debate the schools saw a common agenda in the acquisition of subsidies. Many were struggling financially and the acquisition of additional funds was a priority amongst most schools. In 1985, five Jewish schools in the Transvaal alone faced possible closure as a direct result of financial shortfalls (14).

The Catholics had the most to lose. If subsidies were indelibly linked to race, Catholic schools, which were
almost without exception the most 'integrated', (15) would be the most likely to receive a lower subsidy.

Secondly, the Catholic schools were the most financially insecure with their traditionally lower fees (16) and the increasing shortage of unpaid religious teachers.

This does not imply a simplistic analysis of the convergence of the policy and practice of the three representative bodies during this period. Certainly, the three organisations followed their own internal agendas in the pursuit of subsidies, yet they all stood to gain from increased financial support. Once the issue of racially linked subsidies was made public, however, the three private school bodies could simply not afford, financially as well as politically to lend support through silent acquiescence -- as they had done in the past.

In a representation to the Director of Education and Culture (Cape) by the A.P.S. in collaboration with Herzlia Schools in the Cape and the Catholic Christian Brothers Colleges (Green Point and Kimberley), the authors state:

The end of the baby boom and the coming of zero population growth has posed a new challenge to the viability of private schools. It was therefore not only socially acceptable, but also for some of our schools, financially providential that the rise of the urban coloured and black middle class coincided with the decline of white demand. Schools which may originally have seen the admission of black and coloured children as a Christian duty or as a forward-looking gesture which would in either
event need to be heavily subsidised by scholarships, have come to realise that they have tapped a pool of relatively affluent and committed parents whose children have fitted in well at private schools (17).

Later in the same document it is argued that "It is government policy to support the emergence of a black and coloured middle class. It is precisely these parents who will be prejudiced and discriminated against by racially linked subsidies".

This statement illustrates the convergence of the state's reform policies and the private schools' practice of seeking out and promoting the black middle class, and also confirms that the schools were becoming heavily reliant on non-white enrolments for their existence. To unnecessarily constrict this process in any way was a direct challenge to the survival of many schools.

Conflicting reports and information did little to quell the fears of the private schools. It was variously reported that under the new Private Schools Act, schools would have to re-register in order to receive subsidy and it became apparent that even re-registration could be linked to racial composition.

In the Cape in March 1986, for example, Fourie, the Director of Education stated in a query from St. George's that the school could be refused registration and/or subsidy in the light of its 30% 'non-white' pupil composition (18). At the same time, the Natal Regional
Director of Education, Van Rooyen, was informing an A.P.S. delegation that no school would lose its registration and that the limit for registration was 49% of 'other' race groups, or effectively 50% + 1 (19).

On March 24 and 25 various Catholic delegations met with the Cape, Transvaal and Natal Directors of Education in an attempt to clarify some of the myriad of conflicting reports regarding the central issue of subsidisation. Here it was re-affirmed that all schools would have to re-register by year's end, although the Directors disagreed on whether registration was necessary in terms of the proposed Private Schools Act or to qualify for subsidy (20).

Brother Jude comments on this meeting within the minutes. "It was clear that an attempt was going to be made to get individual schools to impose a quota on themselves" (21). The state was attempting to use subsidies as a lever for control over the private schools. It could be argued that some schools would find this more difficult to accept than others. Various private schools in the Cape and Natal for example, had accepted C.P.A. and Natal Provincial Administration imposed quotas since the early 1980's. The A.P.S. and Jewish schools submitted their objections to the proposed quota system of subsidy in a rationale submitted to the state. Figures stated are for the C.P.A. quotas and the respective schools' adherence to these quotas:
First Term, 1986 percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>C.P.A. Quotas</th>
<th>Non-White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diocesan College</td>
<td>10,0%</td>
<td>10,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herschel</td>
<td>15,0%</td>
<td>15,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Cyprian's</td>
<td>20,0%</td>
<td>19,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St George's</td>
<td>30,0%</td>
<td>29,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset House</td>
<td>10,0%</td>
<td>9,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPPS</td>
<td>10,0%</td>
<td>7,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Oak</td>
<td>20,0%</td>
<td>18,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldorf</td>
<td>33,3%</td>
<td>25,6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see, therefore, that some schools, particularly those falling under the A.P.S. had accepted and complied with some form of quota system. The Catholic Schools objected most vociferously and argued that this was "...totally contrary to their religious belief and would therefore be unable to apply for registration and subsidisation if this in fact were the case" (23). Indeed under the old system some Catholic schools in the Cape and Natal who had exceeded their particular imposed quota had had their subsidies withdrawn (24).

The Catholics sent letters to the Chairman of the Advisory Committee for Formulation of Regulations for Private Schools in the Transvaal (25) as well as to the Minister of Education and Culture, Piet Clase, appealing for the clauses pertaining to racial quotas and subsidisation to be withdrawn from the draft regulations (26).

On April 3 a joint delegation consisting of Jewish, Catholic and Anglican school representatives met with the
Chairman of the Advisory Committee for the Formulation of regulations for Private Schools, Terblanche (27). At this meeting the proposed draft regulations for the Registration and Subsidisation of Private Schools were made fully available to the private schools for their perusal. Amongst the clauses were a number that referred specifically to the correlation between pupil composition and available subsidy.

Additionally, it was clear from the draft regulations that schools already registered would not have to re-register to remain open as private schools.

The subsidy itself was to be divided into three categories. These were 0%, 15% or 45% of "...the subsidy per pupil per annum calculated by a standard of the Department of Education and Culture" (28). It was the inclusion of clauses like 4(4)(a) (i), pertaining to the fifteen percent category of subsidy that the schools objected to however. This clause read:

Private schools which satisfy the following additional requirements and superior conditions over and above the minimum conditions for registration may qualify to be awarded a subsidy of 15%:-

(a) Superior conditions with regard to:-

(i) Regulation 3(1)(f):

A composition of the pupil community as determined by the Ministers' Council.

A similar clause linking the subsidy to "...composition of the pupil community..." was added to the 45% category.
The rest of the clauses dealt with teaching staff, school buildings and grounds and financial audits amongst others and were acceptable to the schools. This group again met on April 8 at which time a revised draft was presented to the Catholic, Jewish and A.P.S. representatives. While some changes had been made, the central objection of the linkage between racial composition and subsidy remained (29). Predictably, the Catholics voiced the strongest protest.

The Department of Schools of the Catholic Bishops Conference met on April 11 to consider further response. At this stage the Catholics recognised the need for publicity in an attempt to force the state’s hand. Sister Brigid Flanagan, reporting on the meeting summed up the general view of those present:

All private schools should stand together on this issue, and no principal should complete forms applying for registration and subsidisation until further notice. In the meantime, the greatest publicity possible should be given to this matter and protest mobilised at diocesan, parish and school level....The more pressure that could be brought to bear on the issue now, the more hope there was of getting the regulations changed before they were finally published (30).

This is significant in that the majority of meetings between state and private schools had traditionally ended in a tacit and sometimes formal acceptance by the school representatives of the state’s insistence on minimal publicity of the 'behind the scenes negotiations'. The fact that this precedent was always taken as a sign of
good faith and mutual trust made its abandonment all the more significant.

As a result a press release was made by the Catholics on April 14, 1986. Part of the statement read as follows:

There was unanimous rejection of those clauses which would impose a racial quota on the schools. The meeting agreed that unless these clauses were withdrawn, the schools could not, in conscience, even apply for registration.

Furthermore the meeting voiced strong objection to the increased limitation on the freedom of private schools implied in the draft regulations (31).

The Catholics refused to re-register, therefore, and stated publicly that they faced the possible closure of their schools as a result of their declaration of intent.

A special general meeting of the National Council of the A.P.S. was convened on April 21, 1986 to address this question. At this meeting, members from the various regions reported their own, and their constituents, views on subsidisation. There was wide-scale concern amongst these representatives that the regulations were unnecessarily restrictive, although some felt that many of the regulations were similar in constitution to those under which they had fallen provincially and had seldom been applied (32). The regulations that attracted the most attention were those relating to 'pupil composition'.
The Natal delegate from Michaelhouse indicated that while only 4 out of 25 member schools in Natal had 10% or more pupils who were not white, the Provincial Administration provided an annual grant of R3 255 000, or approximately 10.8% of total income. He concluded, therefore, that it would be a serious financial loss should the schools lose this (33). Similarly, the delegate from St Andrew's College in the Eastern Cape said loss of any subsidisation could conceivably lead directly to the closure of schools (34).

Clearly the loss of subsidy weighed heavily with A.P.S. delegates and lent caution to overt opposition to some tenets of the regulations. There surfaced at this meeting a clear sense of division amongst members. Some argued that the regulations should be rejected out of hand as they openly limited the "...right of other races to have unlimited access to white private schools..." (35). Others agreed with this, stating that "it was not our task to save the government embarrassment and offer them loopholes but rather to be unequivocal in having no truck with conditions with racial connotations" (36).

This view was by no means unequivocally accepted, however. Many of the delegates indicated a hesitancy for confrontation of any kind in the light of a possible loss of subsidy already received, or to be accepted in the future in terms of the new regulations. The Chairman stated that
private schools would never relax their opposition to racial discrimination nor cease to declare it; but if the heavy hand of Government descended to impose an arbitrary quota, it might not be a straightforward matter to reject all grants out of hand. There might be parents, even black parents, who would wish otherwise (37).

Similarly, another member reminded those gathered that 
"...discriminatory regulations already existed and they had learnt to live with them. Moreover schools already had their own checks and balances in the matter of pupil composition and should not be hypocritical" (39).

There followed a lengthy debate about the merits of sending a letter which the Chairman had drafted to Minister Clase as well as copies to be sent to Mr de Klerk and the State President. Many delegates found the tone of the prosed letter too confrontational and felt that it should either be 'watered down' or abandoned in favour of some other approach to the state (39).

Finally the meeting decided to send a preliminary telex to the Minister expressing concern and requesting an urgent meeting. The meeting closed with the adoption of two resolutions which read:

1. No individual school, head or governor should make any statement to the Press in regard to the subject of grants or the matters discussed here tonight but should merely refer the media's enquiries to the Chairman of the Association of Private Schools.
2. No school should make any further approach to its local education authorities in regard to registration or subsidisation until further advised by the Chairman of the Association of Private Schools (40).

This response accurately reflects the difference in relationship that the A.P.S. schools enjoyed with the state and the state's private school policy as opposed to the Catholic schools.

In general, then, the desire of the meeting was to seek a circumvention of possible loss of revenue. The most effective way of doing this, as perceived by the majority of delegates was to avoid confrontation in the form of press statements, or statements of intent. This conciliatory tone has its roots firmly embedded in the fact of the control exercised over the largely Anglican A.P.S. members by these schools' governing bodies. The inherent conservativeness of these bodies is well documented. Indeed, it was this conservativeness combined with the apparent reluctance of the A.P.S. to challenge the state over racist subsidy proposals that prompted one of the founder members of the A.P.S., St. Barnabas College, to tender their resignation.

In a letter to the A.P.S. dated April 7, 1986, the Headmaster of the school documents his school's decision:

I write to confirm our telephone conversation of 4 March in which I indicated that the council of St. Barnabas College had taken a unanimous decision to withdraw from the Association of Private Schools. At its November
The withdrawal of this school is significant. It graphically reflects the inherent conservativeness of the A.P.S. through the differences of opinion within the organisation and it subsequently led to the formation of the Southern African Association of Independent Schools, or S.A.A.I.S., a non-aligned group of private schools.

The Jewish schools, too, while rejecting the state's intentions (42), would not publicly commit themselves to the confrontational action of the Catholics.

Representations continued behind the scenes with Anglican, Catholic and Jewish school representatives meeting separately with various provincial and central education Directors and Ministers. On April 22 a Catholic Delegation met with the Minister of Education and
Culture, Piet Clase. Again the issue of the need for re-registration was queried. The Minister re-iterated that re-registration was essential for consideration for subsidy, yet was conciliatory in his approach (43).

At a meeting with an Anglican delegation a week later, however, the Minister stated that there would be no need for re-registration (44). The pressure of public and professional scrutiny had begun to bear fruit. The Catholic delegates were promised a copy of the revised draft regulations imminently, and concluded that "It does look as if we are making progress" (45).

When the revised draft was received, the clauses relating specifically to funding in terms of 'pupil composition' had been removed and the ratio of subsidisation was made dependant on educational and physical characteristics of individual schools. Some confusion remained with respect to the levels of subsidisation, however, as the new regulations proposed a set of criteria by which schools could be awarded a 15% subsidy, yet merely stated that

private schools which satisfy additional requirements regarding those laid down in regulation 6(4)(a) up to and including 6(4)(g) and as laid down by the Head of Education, may qualify for forty-five percent (46).

These additional criteria, applicable for a 45% subsidy, were not specified, and in a letter to Dr Jooste, Jeffrey Bortz of the Jewish Board of Education questioned these
unspecified criteria. On May 23, 1986, Clase spelt out, in parliament, the finalised regulations.

His statement emphasised the contribution of the private schools towards South African education and specifically referred to the consultative process between the state and the three private school bodies through which the regulations had been finalised. "I wish to express my appreciation of the frank and constructive contribution made by these parties which enabled us to reach a consensus" (47). He reiterated the fact of his responsibility to the white 'own affairs' education department, yet stated that the constitution "...also made provision for the rendering of service to persons who are not members of the relevant race groups for which the institution was not primarily founded" (48).

As such the overt attempt to control the racial composition of the schools through linkage to financial reward had been dropped in favour of a reliance on the constitutional mechanisms of 'own affairs'. Where previously the draft regulations had specified 'pupil composition', the revised draft read:

"3(1)(g):- The admission of pupils is subject to items 2 and 14 of Schedule 1 of the Constitution Act of the Republic of South Africa, 1983 (Act no. 110 of 1983)" (49). These items refer, respectively, to education as an 'own affair' and the effective 'bending of the rules' in
terms of arrangements with the Ministers of the various Houses.

During his address to parliament, Clase also spelled out the additional criteria by which a school could receive a 45% grant.

Private schools which satisfy additional educational requirements regarding, inter alia, scholastic standards such as a higher pass rate and a greater proportion of pupils who reach standard 10, and which meet the educational needs of a cultural or religious group, will be considered for the higher financial grant of 45% (50).

It appeared as if the 'battle' had been won. The cooperation between the private school organisations combined with saturation press coverage and attendant public dismay had combined to force the state's hand from an overtly racist proposal to one which, while staying within the state's own constitutional machinations, appeared to constitute a significant policy adaptation. Further, the private school delegations were assured that the grants would be payable in respect of all pupils, irrespective of race. It remained to be seen, however, how the policy would be put into practice.

As Roger Burrows remarked:

In the first six months of 1986, therefore, there was a complete reversal in government policy and all racial restrictions were removed from the private schools. The only racial restriction which remains is that each private school falls under the 50% + 1 rule (51).
While the state declared that its only remaining limitation on racial composition was constitutional, however, the application of the varying subsidy levels would prove a clearer indication of intent.

On October 17, 1986, Bortz, Loveday, Henning and Brother Jude met with Terblanche who was at this stage, Chief Executive Director of Education. The meeting was called to discuss legislative progress and the procedures by which schools could apply for and receive grants (52). The church school representatives were given a set of the as yet unpublished regulations pertaining to financial assistance in terms of the Private Schools Act (53).

The discussion then moved to dates of payment. Schools were promised a first payment at the end of February 1987 for the period April to December, 1986. The second payment would become available in March 1987 for the period of the first term of the academic year 1987. The third payment would be made at the end of June for the rest of 1987 (54). Application forms would be made available to the schools by 14 November 1986 and had to be returned to the provinces by November 28 (55).

Applications would be processed by December and the Committee of Heads of Education would finalise levels of financial assistance by January 1987 (56).
While the schools felt they had accomplished a significant reversal of state policy, it would be foolish to discount the state's attempt to retain control over the private schools and their admissions policy. In a letter to the principal of a private nursery school in the Transvaal dated January 5, 1987, the Transvaal Education Department 'notes' that two black pupils had been admitted to the school. There followed a lengthy justification for separate education on the basis of 'mother tongue' and 'cultural groups'.

To limit language and cultural confusion to an absolute minimum and further to ensure that the child progresses optimally in the acquisition of his own language and culture it is therefore essential that, as far as possible, homogeneity be pursued as far as the language and cultural background of pre-primary school pupils is concerned (57).

The thrust of the attempt to link race to subsidy was tailored as a limited and co-optive tactic. Certainly, the state was forced to give ground, in the pursuit of reform. While it seemingly capitulated over the issue, however, reality dictates that we take a closer look at the terms of this 'surrender'.

Various problems began to surface after the initial financial support had been achieved. The first was that all private schools, in order to qualify for the grant, had to ensure that all their teachers were registered with the newly formed Teachers Federal Council, or T.F.C. As this was officially a 'whites only' body, this was
bound to cause problems. Secondly, the seemingly arbitrary application of the subsidies in the form of 15% or 45% subsidisation when the money finally reached the schools. These two issues formed the thrust of the continuing relationship between the state and the private schools after the introduction of subsidies.

On March 17, 1987, a joint private school delegation met with the Director of Education of the Transvaal Education Department, Dr. Bredenkamp to discuss the above two issues. In terms of Act 104 of 1986, all teachers were required to register with the T.F.C. in order for the school to receive a subsidy. Brother Jude opened the meeting by stating that registration with the T.F.C. was a problem for many of the schools and their teachers as this was a 'whites only' registering body (58). Dr. Bredenkamp referred the delegates to Terblanche and the meeting moved on to a discussion of the subsidies and their application.

Loveday of the A.P.S. said that all A.P.S. members had been under the impression that they would receive a 45% subsidy. As this was not the case, he and his school principals wished to know by which guide-lines the subsidies were being allocated (59).

Dr. Bredenkamp replied that he was "...interested..." to learn that schools had assumed they would all receive the higher subsidy level and explained that in terms of the
amount budgeted it was simply impossible to award all subsidies at the 45% level (60). Brother Jude noted clause 5 (f) that read "complies with all such other educational requirements as may be determined by the Head of Education" (61) was not applicable to receipt of a 15% subsidy and asked to know what these "...educational requirements..." referred to. Bredenkamp again referred any further comment through Terblanche.

We see, therefore, the emergence of hidden criteria by which higher grants could be allocated. In practice, various schools with similar educational and physical facilities received different levels of subsidy. The state claimed that a certain amount of money had been budgeted for the subsidy, and that the amount was such that it was impossible to subsidise all schools at the higher level. Clive Roos attempts to validate this theory:

Where you have a problem is that you have the peculiar problem of the formula, which allows for three levels of subsidisation, but you also have a fixed amount of money allocated for the payment of the subsidy. Now this is obviously a contradiction in terms. You cannot have a formula which, in theory, could generate a 45% subsidy for 100% of the schools with a fixed amount of money available to pay that subsidy (62).

Further criteria to limit the amount of schools receiving 45% had to be devised at the discretion of the Head of Education, therefore. These criteria were not made known to the schools, and it is here where suspicions were
raised as to the continued linkage of finance to race. While the state had been clearly unable and indeed, increasingly unwilling to stop the desegregation of private schools, it had initially attempted to control this process to its advantage through the linkage of race to subsidy. After this failed, it can be posited that the varying application of subsidy replaced overt racial quotas as the primary vehicle for its policy.

As at March 23, 1987, subsidies had been received as follows. A.P.S. schools in Natal had all received grants at the 45% level. Seven of the twenty-two schools in the Transvaal had received 45%, eleven 15% and four schools, 0%. In the Western Cape, of the nine A.P.S. affiliated schools, two had received 45% and seven 15%. In the Eastern Cape, one of the five schools received 45% and the rest 15% (63). As the Secretary of the A.P.S. responded, "In no instance had any reasons for discriminating between schools been given and investigations and comparisons showed neither rhyme nor reason for the differentiations" (64).

The Catholic schools showed a similar distribution. In the Orange Free State the system remained unchanged in that teachers' salaries continued to be paid by the Orange Free State department. In Natal, all schools that had previously received a quarterly grant received a cheque for the balance of the difference between what they had traditionally received, and what they were due
under the new dispensation at the higher level, or 45%. Those schools who were receiving aid for the first time received 15% (65).

In the Cape, Catholic schools who had previously received grants received a cheque for the balance of what they had received and what they were now due at the lower level, or 15%. One school proved the exception and received an effective 45% award. Two Transvaal Catholic schools received a subsidy of 45% and the others 15%. One school received no grant (66). The Jewish schools reported a similar seemingly arbitrary distribution.

Mr Bortz said that the attitude of the Jewish Board of Education was that the allocation of grants had been completely haphazard. Throughout the earlier negotiations there had been repeated assurances that the establishment schools would receive 45% -- this had come through clearly particularly in the discussions with Dr. Jooste. The Minister and his officials must now explain precisely why and how they discriminated... (67).

As a result, wide-scale confusion existed amongst the schools. Schools with patently similar characteristics and compositions received dissimilar subsidisation. At this time, some talk of the desirability of imposing a unitary subsidy level, possibly at 30% was considered by the private school organisations, although the state proved subsequently unwilling to consider it.

On March 26, 1987, the Joint Liaison Committee met with Terblanche, as suggested by Bredenkamp, to discuss both
the varying subsidy allocation and the compulsory registration of teachers with the T.F.C in the light of a letter from the T.E.D. dated 24/03/87 which required all teachers to be registered with the T.F.C. by the end of March or schools could be faced with withdrawal of subsidy (68).

Terblanche continued to argue that as funds were limited, and a set amount budgeted, it was impossible to award all grants at the higher level. He continued to state that priority was determined on the basis of the information supplied by the schools in the application forms (69). Bortz argued in favour of either a pro rata subsidy according to available funds, or a standardised level of subsidisation (70). Brother Jude asked that details of the formula be made available to quell rumours and dispel doubts. Terblanche responded that "distributions are regarded as an internal matter" (71).

The Joint Liaison Committee subsequently met to consider further response and decided to approach the Minister of Education and Culture, Clase. A letter was sent to the Minister in which the schools' misgivings were outlined and it was argued that the matter should be addressed at legislative level to provide a permanent solution (72).

It was pointed out that many schools, including some in the Transvaal had received grants for some years without teachers being registered with the T.F.C.'s predecessor,
the Teachers Council for Whites (73). The J.L.C. asked that a single registering body be established for all teachers. Further, the schools wished to know more specifically the criteria by which grants were awarded.

Schools have the right to know the basis on which grants are allocated and it must be seen that grants are decided reasonably in accordance with the regulations. A large number of parents see the postponement of an adequate explanation as having a political connotation (74).

Evidence to support this conclusion is in fact contained within letters sent from the various educational departments to church schools (75). In one such letter from the Cape Director of Education to the Principal of St. George's Preparatory school on Port Elizabeth, the Director explains the criteria for subsidy:

After evaluation a priority list was drawn up, ranking the schools according to their scores. Due to the fact that only limited funds were available a cut off point was determined for those schools which would receive the 45% grant and those for the 15%. Certain schools could also have been placed in the 0% category....

One of the criteria laid down is the affiliation with a cultural or denominational/religious group. Being interdenominational and multi-racial as indicated in paragraph 1.15 of the application form, your school has no cultural or denominational affiliation and is in fact not eligible for a subsidy (76).

While a points system was in use to standardise the awardance of subsidy, therefore, the possibility of an underlying linkage of race to finance remains evident. In apparent contrast the statement by the Minister of
Education and Culture during the Budget Vote in Parliament seeks to dispel doubt:

I have gone into the allocation of grants personally and repeatedly and I am convinced that this sensitive matter has been handled with great care. The criteria which are listed in the regulations regarding the registration of and financial grants to private schools have been applied consistently and meticulously. The criteria according to which schools are evaluated embrace teaching standards, school attendance, teacher-pupil ratio, flow-through ratio, serviceability and physical amenities.

I am however, not prepared to divulge to individual schools the finer details in this regard, as such a step would constitute an intrusion upon the privacy of the schools, and might even be construed as playing one off against the other.

The "...finer details..." it seems were destined to remain hidden, despite the fact that it was the schools themselves who were seeking to know the final criteria and were therefore not seeking "...privacy...". Further, the application of varying subsidy levels between similar schools was in itself destined to be construed as a move specifically designed to "...play one off against the other...".

The issue of registration with the T.F.C. remained unresolved, however, despite a number of meetings between the various representatives concerned. On June 23, 1987, Loveday of the A.P.S. met with Terblanche, the Superintendent General of Education at which stage it appeared that the compulsory registration of teachers
with the T.F.C. had been put on hold in response to the concern voiced by the schools (78).

On Monday, August 10, the J.L.C. met Clase. Again registration with the T.F.C. and the application of grants formed the basis for discussion. The state showed itself willing to look into the registration with the T.F.C. as well as the possibility of a central registering body for all teachers. In effect it was agreed to withhold compulsory registration until a compromise had been found. Similarly, with the issue of subsidies, the private schools received some indication of possible positive adjustments. As Brother Jude remarks in a subsequent letter to School Principals, "I was pleased with the manner in which the issue was allowed to be discussed, and would hope that something new can be agreed upon before the year is out" (79).

Registration with the T.F.C. continued as an ongoing bone of contention, however, with multiple correspondence between the Catholics, particularly, and the T.F.C. itself, continuing into 1988. Finally, Jude in an attempt to end the stale-mate, wrote to the Chief Director of the T.F.C. stating that "...if clarity can be obtained that registration and membership are not synonymous, then the present difficulty with registration can be resolved" (80). In reply, the Chief Director of the T.F.C. stated:

I wish to inform you that there is in fact (and in law, in this case) a distinction between registration in itself and membership of the
Council...the only reason why teachers have to register with this council, is because the general register has not been established and the Council is handling registration as an interim measure (81).

The resolution of this problem effectively signalled the close of the subsidy issue which had dominated policy discussion and adaptation since 1985.

Conclusion

To conclude, then, this period heralded the continued development and refinement of the state's policy with respect to the private schools. While the state attempted to retain control over the admissions policy of the open schools, it was no longer an issue that necessitated civil disobedience on the part of the private schools. With the Private Schools Act came formal acceptance of the role of private school education within South Africa. Financial support effectively underlined this. Implicit within this acceptance was the desirability of limited co-option, which the private schools provided so effectively.

The subsidy debate lost relevancy after the introduction of the 1986 Act. Apart from the initial and overt attempts to link finance with racial quotas, and the insinuation of a maintenance of control over admissions, the awarding of financial assistance, in itself,
indicated an acceptance of the schools' role within the state's perceived reform programme.

Perhaps the most telling indication of this refinement of state policy is the exception that proves the rule. While the majority of private schools accepted the subsidy as an important victory, a small group of private schools rejected any form of state aid and equated the receipt of financial aid with an acceptance of increased state control and banded together under the heading of the S.A.A.I.S. or Southern African Association of Private Schools.

In the new organisation's prospectus the thinking behind this is explained.

The private schools...appear to be bridging the gap and moving towards non-racial education, but many of these 'white' private schools only admit a token enrollment of black students under the various quota systems applied in the different provinces....They are often pressured by their predominantly white boards and white parents who want to secure positions for the children of their own race group, and they have little alternative but to turn to state subsidies. By accepting the government quotas and towing the line they are then eligible for state funding (82).

The S.A.A.I.S. was primarily formed to offer support to those private schools who found it difficult to accept the state's continued meddling through applied quotas and subsidies.

It was out of the need to offer moral and financial support to these schools, and mutual support among the well established non-racial
schools, that the S.A.A.I.S. was formed. The Association was formally launched on 14 February 1987 at a meeting of schools from Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland (83).

On August 14 and 15, 1987, a consultation meeting was held between member schools and interested educationists, and the following view was expounded:

The 'high road' prescription of Clem Sunter was nothing more than a prescription for hegemony. It was not in the power of big business to lead the country to a non-racial, democratic society, and the route for independent schools had to encompass identification with the liberation movement and a dialogue with proponents of the struggle (84).

Clearly, then, the S.A.A.I.S. encompasses within its stated objectives an unqualified rejection of the traditional role of the South African private school. This rejection takes into account the increasingly convergent goals of the state and capital in the eighties, and the special relevance for private schools that this strategy held.

At the same meeting the imminent demise of the Joint Matriculation Board (J.M.B.) was noted with apprehension (85). While many private schools had switched from the traditionally more taxing J.M.B. examinations to those run by the Provincial departments, or the National Senior Certificate, most of the S.A.A.I.S. schools continued to write the less partisan J.M.B. As such it was seen as a matter of urgency that the S.A.A.I.S. create a
replacement examining body. The Independent Examinations Board, or I.E.B. had its genesis as a result.
Footnotes: Chapter Four

(1). The Cape Times, 12/05/1985.


(15). Many of the Catholic Schools had, by this stage, enrolments of non-white pupils approaching and sometimes exceeding 50%. These included the following:

* Sacred Heart College 56,7%
* St. Joseph's College 55,1%
* Loreto Convent Primary 52,2%
* St. Dominic's Primary 46,3%
* Iona Convent 45,4%

C.I.E. files, as at March 1986.

(16). 'Lower' in comparison to the fees levied by A.P.S. and Jewish schools.

(17). "Registration and Subsidisation of Private Schools: Representations submitted to the Director of Education and Culture (Cape) on behalf of A.P.S. (Western Province
Region), A.P.S. (Eastern Cape Region), Herzlia Schools (Cape), and Christian Brothers College (Green Point & Kimberley)*, C.I.E. files, 26/03/1986.


(22). "Registration and Subsidisation of Private Schools: Representations submitted to the Director of Education and Culture (Cape) on behalf of A.P.S. (Western Province Region), A.P.S. (Eastern Cape Region), Herzlia Schools (Cape), and Christian Brothers College (Green Point & Kimberley)", C.I.E. files, 26/03/1986.


(28). Article 4(2) of the 1st Draft Regulations for the Registration and Subsidisation of Private Schools.


(35). Reverend Brown, St. Mary's D.S.G. Pretoria, as recorded in "Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the National Council of the Association of Private Schools", C.I.E. files, 21/04/1986.

(36). MacFarlane, W.W., St. John's College, as recorded in "Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the National Council of the Association of Private Schools", C.I.E. files, 21/04/1986.

(37). Gnodde, A.M.D., Chairman of A.P.S., as recorded in "Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the National Council of the Association of Private Schools", C.I.E. files, 21/04/1986.


(44). Letter to Principals of Catholic Schools from Brother Jude, C.I.E. files, 13/05/1986.

(45). Letter to Principals of Catholic Schools from Brother Jude, C.I.E. files, 13/05/1986.
(46). "Draft Regulations for the Registration and Subsidisation of Private Schools, Article 6(5) - (Revised)".


(49). "Draft Regulations for the Registration and Subsidisation of Private Schools, Article 3(1)(g) - (Revised)".


(53). The Private Schools Act had been promulgated on the 24th of September 1986 and, in terms of the Act, its provisions were effective from April 1.


(57). Letter from the Transvaal Director of Education to The Principal, Pebbles Nursery School, Bedfordview, C.I.E. files, 05/01/1987.

(58). "Minutes of the meeting between Bredenkamp, Director of Education T.E.D. and Loveday (A.P.S.), Jude (Catholic Board of Education, Bortz (Jewish Board of Education) and Henning (H.M.C.)", C.I.E. files, 17/03/1987.

(59). "Minutes of the meeting between Bredenkamp, Director of Education T.E.D. and Loveday (A.P.S.), Jude (Catholic Board of Education, Bortz (Jewish Board of
Education) and Henning (H.M.c.), C.I.E. files, 17/03/1987.

(60). "Minutes of the meeting between Bredenkamp, Director of Education T.E.D. and Loveday (A.P.S.), Jude (Catholic Board of Education, Bortz (Jewish Board of Education) and Henning (H.M.c.)", C.I.E. files, 17/03/1987.

(61). "Minutes of the meeting between Bredenkamp, Director of Education T.E.D. and Loveday (A.P.S.), Jude (Catholic Board of Education, Bortz (Jewish Board of Education) and Henning (H.M.c.)", C.I.E. files, 17/03/1987.


(68). "Minutes of meeting between Joint Liaison Committee (J.L.C.) and Terblanche", C.I.E. files, 26/03/1987.

(69). "Minutes of meeting between Joint Liaison Committee (J.L.C.) and Terblanche", C.I.E. files, 26/03/1987.

(70). "Minutes of meeting between Joint Liaison Committee (J.L.C.) and Terblanche", C.I.E. files, 26/03/1987.

(71). "Minutes of meeting between Joint Liaison Committee (J.L.C.) and Terblanche", C.I.E. files, 26/03/1987.


(76). Letter from The Director of the Cape Education Department to The Principal, St. George's Prep. School, Port Elizabeth, C.I.E. files, 05/05/1987.


Chapter Five: Conclusion

This chapter will seek to briefly examine the development of open public schools in 1990, and the implications of this move with respect to the state's private school policy as examined thus far. Finally, in conclusion, the chapter will attempt to summarise the dissertation's findings.

Open Public Schools

It was inevitable that this research would be affected by the political developments surrounding and subsequent to February 2, 1990. The speed at which the state's fundamental and traditional tenets were adapted and abandoned from 1990 onwards left few policy initiatives untouched. Education was no exception.

The state's burgeoning acceptance of open education extended during 1990 to the stage where the imminent opening of a number of white public schools in 1991 became a political reality. Compare, for example, the following statements of policy intent by representatives of the state as an example of the rapid development of new policy initiatives since the beginning of 1990.

In March 1989 during a mini-debate with Roger Burrows in parliament, and as reported in The Argus, Minister Clase stated that the "...policy not to open white government schools to all races was based on sound conclusions,"
including the provisions in the Constitution that education was an own affair of each population group". He continued to add that "...parents making calls for schools to be opened to all races did so, either deliberately or unknowingly, in ignorance of the problems that could arise" (1).

Similarly in August 1989, the Nationalist candidate for Gardens, Ron Miller, speaking in a debate with the D.P. candidate for Wynberg, Robin Carlisle, is reported to have said that "...the government remained committed to racially separate state education, even where schools want to be open to all" (2).

Most tellingly, however, is the categorical statement by the Minister for Education and Development Aid, Stoffel van der Merwe in January of 1990 that "Government schools would never be desegregated under the current system" (3). Later in the same month the Minister reiterated this stand explaining that while the government was "...prepared to allow the voluntary integration of private schools..." he "...dismissed reports that the government had already accepted in principle the integration of schools in general..." (4).

By February, however, Minister Clase had announced that provided there was sufficient parental approval, some white state schools could be given permission to open their doors.

'New and fresh thinking must also be applied in the area of education and the provision of education. Our eyes are not closed, nor are our
ears deaf to the problems which are currently being experienced. We are sensitive to the suggestions which are being made in this connection by the teaching fraternity, members of the parent body, political circles and society in general' (5).

By March 23 (6) Clase had announced two models which were under investigation for the opening of white public schools, and by September 10 (7), the finalised three models were announced, securing the state's acceptance, albeit with stringent provisos, of the principle of open public education. This constitutes an overwhelming policy shift and as such deserves short documentation.

While the call for non-racial public education had been echoed by anti-apartheid groupings for decades, the campaign crystallised only once white interests were threatened. Falling population growth in the white community, the de facto desegregation of most inner city areas and a corresponding drop in pupil attendance at white public schools directly threatened the existence of many of these schools. In 1986 while there were variously reported to be between 153 000 (8) and 205 000 (9) empty places in white public schools, there was a shortage of 193 575 places in black schools (10). By 1990 this figure had leapt to approximately 250 000 empty places (11).

Rather than open these schools and attract the additional pupils from surrounding areas, the policy of 'own' affairs dictated that these schools would have to close. Reports of schools being closed and leased or rented to private
individuals or state departments became commonplace. "Desks make way for gun racks, tills and ledgers" (12) and "Scandal of the empty schools" (13) read two of the headlines detailing the closure of schools. In 1988 in the Transvaal alone, 19 white schools were being used for purposes other than education (14).

As the trend towards decreasing enrolment in white schools continued and the state was forced to admit that it simply did not have the finances to continue to support marginal schools, the white community was forced to critically re-examine the effects of 'own' affairs policy. As a result the imminent closure of further schools in accordance with their decreased profitability began to attract heightened criticism and debate.

The state, too, was forced to move. As far back as November 1986 Minister Clase had announced that the state was prepared to consider the 'sale' of previously state controlled public schools to the private sector in order to allow them to open their doors to all pupils as open private schools (15). In 1987 many public schools, particularly within the Cape Education Department's jurisdiction, in response to this crisis voted to open their doors to all pupils if they were given permission. Despite unconfirmed rumours that the Minister offered some of these schools, at a low rental, the option of privatisation, the state officially rejected these proposals.
At this stage, the state's response to this crisis is predictable. In line with its developing privatisation policy, as discussed in this dissertation, the state begins to look at ways of marginilising and controlling the growing demands for desegregation of state schools through the privatisation of these schools. This serves equally as an envisaged partial solution to the problem of educating children in the proposed 'open' areas. A President's Council report in 1987 cited both the utilisation of already desegregated private schools as well as the possible privatisation of public schools as possible solutions for schooling in the proposed 'grey' areas (16). Reform, therefore, is limited, co-optive and cheaper -- financially and politically.

The controversy heightened and in 1989 the debate became focussed on the plight of one school in particular which epitomised the problems facing white schools. In July of 1989, Clase ruled that in light of falling attendance figures, Johannesburg High School for Girls would have to close at the end of the year (17). The school, situated in the heart of Johannesburg, was experiencing the inexorable de facto process of urban desegregation.

A 'Save Our School' (S.O.S.) campaign was started which mobilised community support. Over 10 000 signatures were collected as part of a campaign to have the school declared open (18). Press coverage was substantial. "We had news coverage from several international television agencies as
well as the British Broadcasting Corporation and Reuters" (19). Local and internationally recognised celebrities pledged their support for the campaign (20). School parents voted in favour of opening the school to all pupils (21).

In the face of this concerted effort the state announced in November of 1989 that the school would re-open in 1990 as a non-racial private school to be known as 'Barnato High School' (22). A low rental on the premises was negotiated with Clase and the school was assured of receiving the maximum private school subsidy of 45%.

This decision was significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was the first case of a privatised state school. Secondly, and possibly more importantly, it signalled the inevitability of open state schools. While the state attempted to maintain its 'own' affairs policy through the privatisation of the school, a de facto acceptance and support for limited multi-racial education within state schools can be seen in the light of the relatively supportive terms of the deal.

While 'Johannesburg High School for Girls' was privatised, it was becoming obvious that other schools would invariably be faced with the same problems and that privatisation, and its attendant extra costs, would not be universally acceptable. Shortly after the decision to allow the school to be privatised, Clase indicated that the state had accepted its responsibility for providing 'multi-racial'
education within proposed free settlement areas (23). After the announcement of the imminent scrapping of Group Areas, however, Clase was effectively forced to adapt his proposals accordingly.

The precedent had been set, therefore, and after February of 1990, procrastination became more costly. In the light of this, on March 23, 1990, Clase announced in parliament that his department was pursuing two proposals, or models, under which prospective schools wishing to open could do so. The first model, very briefly, entailed the privatisation of the state school and an attendant rise in costs. Facilities already existing at the school would be leased to the schools at favourable rates (24). Maintenance would be the school’s financial responsibility, while the salaries of teachers and administrative staff at the school would be paid by the department (25).

The second option allowed for the school to remain under state control, while providing greater latitude on admissions. Both models would have to be approved by a parental vote, possibly as high as 90% and representations were to be made by June 15 (26). Significantly, Clase also indicated that existing private schools could possibly also benefit from this scheme (27), paving the way for speculation as to greater financial assistance for private schools through the paying of salaries for teachers and administrative staff.
When the finalised models were announced in September, however, the state had changed the proposal to a three model system. The first model, (Model A), involved the privatisation of the school under terms similar to the financial assistance of most existing private schools. The school would be assured of a 45% subsidy (28). The second model, (Model B), allowed the school to remain a state school but allowed for the determination of its own admissions policy subject to the provisions of the constitution (29). The final model, (Model C), made provision for a school to be declared 'State-Aided'. Under this model the salaries of staff would be paid by the state, which approximated to 75% of the running costs (30).

Significantly, both models A and C graphically illustrate the policy of privatisation.

While the models were cautiously welcomed by some and vigorously opposed by others, the contentious nature of the polling of parental approval for acceptance of one or other model was a focus of the controversy. In an 80% poll, then, 72% of parents had to be in favour of accepting the model before the Minister would consent to consider its implementation (31).

Despite this clearly undemocratic proviso and the insistence by at least some Cape schools that 'models' were irrelevant and that all schools should simply be open to all immediately (32), many schools rushed to apply, mostly for
model B and most recorded positive votes despite the harsh voting procedure.

The precedent was set, therefore, for the open public school and in the years that followed, many white state schools chose this option.

While these developments specifically relate to the opening of public schools, then, they are extremely significant with respect to this research in that they indicate a natural extension of the state's policy towards the private schools. They serve to demonstrate the inevitable and inexorable progression of policy initiative and change that began with the first tentative steps towards desegregated schooling within the private schools and ended with the opening of state schools.

Conclusion

If we view the open school initiatives of the 1970's as the starting point, then, the developments in 1990 could be said to indicate the 'beginning of the end'. This is not to say that state capitulation was complete. Rather, it indicates the logical progression of the policy issues that have informed the debate surrounding the state's private school policy over the past years. Open private schools were effectively legitimised by the moves and the basis for financial support of private education initiatives was entrenched within state policy.
It was said at the start of this dissertation that the primary intention was to ascertain the basis for the state's changing policy towards South African private schools over the period in question. The essence of this enquiry could basically be distilled into a simple 'why'?

While outwardly this task appeared straightforward, it was deceptively so. The nature of the policy process ensured this. To answer any question of motive influencing policy one must necessarily approach the question from a particular emphasis. Subjectivity is the only bridge across a morass of dates, places, legislation and personal initiative.

While this dissertation seems to posit the solution before tackling the problem, then, or proposes the theory behind the changes before examining the policy adaptations themselves, this was unavoidable and necessary. By proposing the stimulation of a particular black middle class and privatisation as progressive stages in the development of the state's reform policy during the period in question, then, it has been possible to examine in some detail the developments of the period and affirm the relevance of these two issues with respect to policy.

The period from 1976 to 1981 saw the private schools take the initiative and open selected private schools. While the state's response was marked by hesitancy, the attendant implications meant that policy adaptation was a necessity. It was the era in which reform initiatives were beginning to
be espoused by the state and capital in response to the social and economic crisis. As a result the state began to look at ways of co-opting in order to legitimise. With the opening of the private schools the state was presented with the perfect vehicle for limited social engineering.

While the moves were tacitly approved, as we have seen, through the cabinet decision, and through an unwillingness to engage the schools in direct confrontation, at this stage the state openly denied the desirability of opening schools and engaged in tactical control through the conservative bureaucracy within the provincial education departments.

At this stage the power residing within the provinces -- in the form of legislative and financial control over the private schools -- made the formulation and application of a clear policy response impossible and, indeed, undesirable. The state was unwilling to legislate centrally a policy adaptation, yet tacitly lent support through its failure to discipline the open schools. As a result the schools expanded their non-white enrolments.

The period from 1981 to 1985, as we have seen, was one characterised by the development and increasing consolidation of the state's reform policies. As such we see the introduction of the De Lange commission and the new dispensation as the two main influences on the educational policy. The private school policy was adapted accordingly.
Through the Financial Relations Amendment Act, the open schools policy was legitimised, for the first time, through legislation which attempted to unify provincial response in line with the centralisation of control in the Department of National Education. Significantly, then, the state legislated for both the opening of schools as well as increased control over the process.

Additionally, this dissertation has argued that the state moved to consolidate its position during this period in line with the privatisation ethic which would see the application of financial support for the schools in 1986, in return for increased control over the schools.

The years 1986 to 1990 extended and refined the developing reformist tradition. Privatisation was increasingly expounded as a solution to the myriad of social and economic problems that littered the wake of apartheid policy. The private schools, quite clearly, fitted the bill perfectly. As such they were subsidised and openly supported in their attempts at co-option through the Private Schools Act.

The steady progression of the state’s 'approval', both informal and legislative, with respect to the private schools, forms a meandering thread throughout the years 1976 to the present.
With the introduction of the possibility of open state schools in 1990, the state's developing policy towards the private schools reached fruition.

It was a process irrevocably linked to South African political, economic and social pressures. This dissertation has attempted to show the development of this policy in relation to the society in which it was developed, influenced, and ultimately shaped.

After having examined the South African state's reform policy during the years 1976 to 1990, and using this as a potential base for an examination of the state's changing policy towards the private schools, it is proposed that both the development of the black middle class, and privatisation existed as integral instruments for the development and application of reform during the period in question.

Further, it is concluded that this reform policy clearly shaped and informed the state's relations with the private schools and provides a qualifiable stimulus for the changing policy of the state with respect to the private schools.
Footnotes: Chapter Five

(1). The Argus, 08/03/1989.


(3). The Cape Times, 12/01/1990.


(5). The Weekend Argus, 10/02/1990.


(16). In March 1986, The Minister of National Education, F.W. de Klerk, is reported as saying that for the price of one state school, the country could have two subsidised private schools.

In 1988, de Klerk announced that during the 1987/8 financial year the state was saved an effective R85,5 m. through the operation of private schools. This applied to the costs that would have been incurred were the pupils attending private schools to be incorporated within state schools.


(21). The Cape Times, 18/05/1989.


(27). The Cape Times, 24/03/1990.
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(Note: As stated at the beginning of the Footnotes for Chapter Three, the following documents were obtained from a source outside of the three bodies mentioned above. For this reason, the following references are not fully sourced.)

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