A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CURRENT HOUSING AND ACCOMMODATION PRACTICES IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF JCI

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Social Science University of Cape Town, for the Degree of Master of Social Science (Industrial Sociology).

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Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
This study outlines and discusses recent changes in employer housing practices in the South African gold mining industry. Beginning in the 1970s, but more particularly in the 1980s, a number of factors compelled employers to introduce alternatives to the system of hostel accommodation. South African migrant workers now have access to a broader range of housing options including home ownership schemes and off-mine rental schemes. These initiatives are critically examined and their implications for workers and the migrant labour system are assessed. A general overview of the housing policies of the six major mining groups is provided, with a more detailed focus on the labour practices of Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company Limited. At present, participation rates in management devised accommodation schemes remain low. It appears that existing schemes do not fully meet the needs and preferences of migrant workers. Affordability and migrant attitudes towards permanent relocation to the urban areas are two important considerations in this regard. A number of other obstacles to the implementation of a flexible housing model for the African workforce are identified. A central conclusion of this study is that progress towards a locally housed industry workforce will continue to be slow. The migrant labour system will undergo further transformation, but will continue as the central form of labour supply to the mines.
I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted to the University of Cape Town for the degree of Master of Social Sciences. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

PETER MATHEW HUNTER

3 October 1991
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figures</th>
<th>vi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tables</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 1**  
**MIGRANT SYSTEMS: CONCEPTS AND THEORY**  
i) The Reproduction of Migrant Labour  
ii) Transformations in the 1980s  
iii) Migrant Labour Under Changed Conditions of Reproduction  

**Chapter 2**  
**THE EVOLUTION OF HOUSING ON THE MINES**  
i) The History and Functions of Mine Compounds  
ii) Upgrading the Compounds and Revising Migrant Practices  
iii) Towards Stabilisation  

**Chapter 3**  
**THE DEMAND FOR A FLEXIBLE HOUSING APPROACH**  
I. Challenging the System  
i) NUM Demands an End to Migrancy  
ii) Mine Violence and the Hostel System  
iii) The Skilling of African Workers  

II. Reform from Above  
i) Home Ownership for Workers  
ii) Rent Subsidies and the "Clean Wage"  
iii) Upgrading the Hostels  

**Chapter 4**  
**LABOUR PRACTICES AT JCI**  
i) Upgrading the Hostels  
ii) Housing at H.J. Joel  
iii) Breaking from the Hostels:  
a) The Home Bond Subsidy Scheme  
b) The Home Rent Subsidy Scheme  
c) The Clean Wage Approach
Chapter 5  MIGRANTS AND THE STATE: RESPONSES AND CONSTRAINTS

i) Do Migrants Want to Stabilise?  92
ii) Housing in the Broader Context  99

Summary and Conclusions  106

Appendix A:  Surface Map of Randfontein Estates  111
Appendix B:  African Workers Employed on Chamber Affiliated Gold Mines, December 1990  112
Appendix C:  Gold Production by Mine and Mining House, 1989  113
Appendix D:  Notes on Method  114
Appendix E:  Interview Guidelines  117

References  120
FIGURES

1 The Major Gold fields of South Africa viii

2 Map of the Orange Free State Gold Mines and Surrounding Urban Areas 56

3 Map Showing the Geographical Location of Randfontein Estates and Western Areas Gold Mines 68

4 Surface Plan of Randfontein Estates Showing Local Townships, Hostels and Mine Shafts 111
TABLES


3.1 The Skilling of Black Workers on the Gold Mines, 1960-1990. 52

4.1 Workers Employed on JCI Gold Mines, 1991. 69

4.2 Employment of African Workers on JCI Mines by Source Area, 1991. 70

4.3 The Home Bond Subsidy Scheme, 1990/1991. 78

4.4 Participation in the Home Bond Subsidy Scheme, March 1991. 79

4.5 Mineworkers Attitudes Towards Housing, Randfontein Estates, 1988 - Awareness of Scheme. 81

4.6 Mineworker Attitudes Toward Housing, Randfontein Estates, 1988 - Intention to Participate in Scheme. 82

4.7 Mineworker Attitudes Toward Housing, Randfontein Estates, 1988 - Preferred Accommodation. 82

4.8 Mineworker Attitudes Toward Housing, Randfontein Estates, 1988 - Reason for Not Wanting to Participate in HBSS. 83

4.9 Participation in the Home Rent Subsidy Scheme, March 1991. 85

5.1 Participation in the AAC Home Ownership Scheme, Oct.1987 - Oct 1990. 96

5.2 Rent/Bond Affordability - Ability to Pay, 1991. 98
Figure 1.

The Major Gold Fields of South Africa

(Showing the Geographical Location of Individual Mines and the Parent Mining Group)
Two central questions have guided my research. Firstly, I was concerned to find out why -- after almost a century of oscillatory migration to the South African gold fields -- employers were now offering workers the chance to break out of the migrant system. My second question was a logical extension of the first: what were the likely implications of changed housing practices for the migrant labour system?

In attempting to find answers to these and a range of other related questions, I learnt a great deal from the work of Michael Burawoy, Jonathan Crush, Wilmot James, Alan Jeeves and David Yudelman. I found Burawoy's theoretical arguments to be particularly useful as a starting point for this study. From an empirical point of view, it was necessary to gain a clear understanding of the details of current company housing schemes. Research was directed at assessing managerial attitudes towards the relevant accommodation issues. In this regard, a series of interviews were conducted with representatives of management at the head office and mine level of the various mining groups. A more detailed summary of the methodology of this study is provided in Appendix D.

From July 1990 to June 1991, I was employed as a part time research assistant to the migrant labour project based at the
University of Cape Town. My participation in that project greatly benefited this work, and made it possible for me to travel to the Witwatersrand and Orange Free State gold fields on two occasions. With regard to my fieldwork, I would like to thank the various individuals who gave of their valuable time to answer my questions, and to allow me the chance to visit the sites of the different housing schemes. In many instances, it was encouraging to find that management proved quite willing to discuss my topic openly. Throughout this study I have kept the identity of interviewees anonymous, and have cited information gained from such sources simply in the form of (Interview, 1990) or (Interview, 1991) depending on when the research was conducted.

In writing, I wish to extend my appreciation to Wilmot James for his guidance and supervision of this project. Without his clear thinking and direction it would not have been possible for me to undertake or complete this study. I would like to acknowledge the funding of the Human Sciences Research Council for supporting my first year as a Masters student, and the Centre for Scientific Development for a scholarship during my final year of study. Opinions expressed in this work, or conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not to be attributed to the above institutions. I also wish to thank the University of Cape Town’s Research Committee for a grant that assisted with my fieldwork, and the trustees of the Doris Crossley Award for additional assistance. Finally I would like to thank my wife, Simone, for her understanding and support during the past two years.
Introduction

The wealth-generating capacities of the South African gold mining industry are based on the migrant labour system. Each year, over 400,000 migrant workers travel to the Transvaal and Orange Free State gold fields to work for cash wages. South Africa's forty-odd gold operations use their labour to produce over 600 tons of the precious metal annually.

While at work on the mines, migrant workers are accommodated on a single basis in densely populated hostels. These barrack-like structures house over 98% of the African workforce. Historically, the hostels helped to keep labour cheap and easily controllable. More than this, they were essential to the system of male only migrancy. For workers these institutions were oppressive -- they lacked privacy, were cramped, and separated migrants from their wives and families.

In recent years, employers in the industry have introduced a range of schemes that give black mineworkers a chance to settle with their families near the mines. These initiatives have included the promotion of home ownership schemes for workers and the provision of rent subsidies that enable workers to live in nearby townships. Such practices directly contradict the migrant labour system and are therefore of some sociological significance.
The purpose of this study is to examine the nature of these initiatives, and also their limitations. Through an in-depth study of the labour practices of one mining group -- JCI, the complexities of housing delivery for the African workforce are looked at. Further, the implications of new housing schemes for the future of hostels, and more broadly the migrant labour system are discussed.

Chapter 1 provides an analytical framework for understanding migrant systems generally, and for contextualising housing practices under migrant conditions. Neo Marxists have asserted that the state plays a crucial role in perpetuating migrant systems -- particularly by preventing workers from stabilising near the mines. From this perspective, Michael Burawoy argues that under certain conditions we should expect the migrant labour system to fail to reproduce itself. By contrast, this paper argues that employers have been able to respond to changed conditions of reproduction by restructuring the migrant labour system to a limited extent. The housing schemes reviewed in this study can be understood as a consequence of such restructuring.

An historical overview of housing on the mines is presented in Chapter 2. Here it is argued that accommodation practices in the gold industry have undergone an evolutionary development. The chapter is divided into three sections: the first dealing with the origins and functions of the compound system; the second with
changes to employer housing practices in the 1970s; and the third
with emerging concerns to settle a portion of the African
workforce in family accommodation. A central argument is that
living conditions for African workers changed little during the
first eighty years of gold production. It was only in the 1970s
that changes to the political economy of gold mining prompted
employers to begin rethinking migrant arrangements, and to
improve the conditions under which migrant workers were housed.

In the 1980s, more fundamental changes to the labour framework
compelled employers to introduce alternatives to the hostel
system. These factors -- which included the emergence of the
National Union of Mineworkers, the skilling of the African
workforce and a resurgence of intergroup conflict on the mines --
are outlined in Chapter 3. Following important changes in state
urbanisation policies in the mid 1980s a number of mining groups
began to experiment with different housing schemes for African
workers. The broad initiatives embarked on by each of the six
mining houses are outlined in this chapter.

A more detailed analysis of housing practices at the JCI group of
mines is presented in Chapter 4. JCI administers three gold
mines, and has introduced a home ownership scheme as well as a
"living out allowance" scheme for black employees at these mines.
The schemes are outlined, and reviewed in terms of the number of
workers who have joined them to date.
In chapter 5 employer attempts to restructure accommodation policies are evaluated in terms of workers needs and preferences. In this regard, an attempt is made to outline the various factors that influence the migrants decision to urbanise. It is argued that for a number of reasons it cannot be assumed that migrant workers want to relocate permanently to areas near the mines. In addition, it appears that the majority of mineworkers remain unable to afford the terms and conditions of current home ownership plans.

In the broader context, the chapter also provides a critical analysis of current housing practices in relation to the wider housing environment and political economy. In this regard, it is argued that there are a number of factors that continue to impede the stabilisation of certain sections of the migrant workforce. A central conclusion reached is that despite important changes to employer housing policies and state urbanisation strategies, migrancy will continue as the dominant form of labour supply to the gold mines for the foreseeable future.
Chapter 1  Migrant Systems: Concepts and Theory

i) The reproduction of migrant labour

Michael Burawoy (1977), in his article "The functions and reproduction of migrant labour: comparative material from Southern Africa and the United States", asserts that systems of migrant labour are defined by the separation of two essential processes: those of maintenance and renewal.

In the first instance, he argues, a workforce is maintained through the day to day subsistence of workers. Maintenance functions therefore include such things as the feeding, housing and clothing of workers. Renewal processes, on the other hand, ensure that any new demand for labour is reproduced and made available in the market. For example the rearing of children is a central part of the renewal process which ensures the reproduction of labour power.

For Burawoy, under migrant conditions these two processes take place in different geographical locations, but are nevertheless wholly interdependent. Thus, while renewal processes depend on income derived from migrant remittances, the migrant is in turn dependant on the family in the sending area, since he/she has no permanent political or legal status at the place of work. In Burawoy's words:
Further, Burawoy argues that in order for migrant labour systems to be reproduced, there has to be a continued separation of the means of renewal from the means of maintenance of a particular migrant labour force. Accordingly, there are two conditions for this continued separation: 1) a mutual dependence between the capitalist economy and the supply economy, and 2) the coercive separation of family and worker in such a way that they remain dependent on each other.

As is common to a range of other neo-Marxist scholars concerned with migrant systems, Burawoy contends that the state plays a crucial role in meeting the above conditions. For him, the interdependence of the two economies, as well as the continued reliance of worker on family and vica versa, are organised through a series of legal and political arrangements instituted by the state:

In other words, influx control and pass laws preserve the separation of renewal and maintenance functions, prevent the stabilisation of families in the urban areas and the surrender of subsistence existence in the reserves, uphold the continued interdependence of worker and family, and, finally, regulate the circulation of labour between the place of work and "homes" (146)

Such an understanding of oscillatory migration is common to a
number of other writers. Most notably, Robin Cohen (1988) has accepted Burawoy’s framework with regard to the mechanisms that maintain migrancy. In his book, he too argues that:

... it is my view that the state plays a central and directing role in the structuring of a division of labour, in the legitimation of an involuntary labour regime through legal and ideological means, in defining the relationship between free and unfree workers, in the recruitment and regulation of coerced labourers and, finally, in the policing of the frontiers of the regional political economy. (26)

and with regard to South Africa’s migrant system that:

... a sophisticated battery of labour regulations and bureaux have been established to continue to permit the state to intervene, control and perpetuate a helot/citizen division of labour. (110)

In a somewhat different sense, though in implicit acceptance of what we may perhaps call the "regulation of circulation thesis", Wolpe (1972) formulates his own understanding of the dynamics of migrant labour. His by now classic paper "Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid", is an attempt to draw continuities between pre-1948 segregationist policies, and apartheid. The basis of his argument is that both segregation and apartheid were different historical responses by the state to maintain the reproductive base of migrant labour. In other words, the principal institutions which maintained migrancy as a cheap labour system, were state regulated. Pass laws,
influx control, and the attempt by the Nationalist government to legitimate the African reserves (by granting them "independence"), were all regarded by Wolpe as part of the state's concern to ensure the future of South Africa's cheap labour system.

The necessity of institutional factors to maintain labour migrancy is also a central theme for Francis Wilson (1972) in his pioneering study of labour in the South African gold mining industry. Thus, while viewing migrancy as the outcome of various push-pull dynamics, he nevertheless argues that when any of these push-pull factors weaken,

... the system can only be propped up by legislative action preventing the families of workers settling in the areas where the breadwinners are earning their living (123).\(^3\)

In essence, what these analyses have in common, is a perception that migrancy to a large extent is a state-regulated phenomenon dependent upon the rigorous enforcement of coercive legislation that ensures the rotation of workers between their place of employment and their home areas.\(^4\)

Of course, Burawoy, Cohen, Wilson and others do not argue that state regulation is the only important factor in maintaining a system of migrant labour. To continue with Burawoy's analysis, two other factors are important in the reproduction of migrant
systems. They are: 1) restrictions on occupational mobility for migrant workers, and 2) migrant labour powerlessness.

With regard to the former, Burawoy asserts that the skilling of migrant workers requires training and acquired experience, making skilled work incompatible with high rates of labour turnover usually associated with migrant systems. Secondly, Burawoy contends that the gaining of skills by migrants is also incompatible with migrant labour powerlessness. In relation to these prerequisites therefore, Burawoy argues that:

the preservation of the colour bar ... represents a major factor in the reproduction of a system of migrant labour (146),

and that

the reproduction of a system of migrant labour hinges on the inability of the migrants, as individuals or as a group, to influence the institutions that subordinate them to the other fractions of the migrant labour force as well as to the employer. (146)

In sum then, Burawoy has provided a framework of analysis which outlines the conditions necessary for the reproduction of a system of migrant labour. These conditions relate to the maintenance of coercive measures which keep migrants from settling in the urban areas; ensure that they remain unskilled; and prevent them from having a say in the conditions under which
they work. Moreover, and arriving at the crux of his arguments, Burawoy declares that:

when the specific mechanisms that ensure the circulation of labour, restrict its upward mobility, and establish the migrant's powerlessness are relaxed or disappear, if my thesis is correct, we should expect the system to fail to reproduce itself. (149)

ii) Transformations in the 1980's

The conditions under which South Africa's migrant labour system is reproduced have fundamentally been altered in the past decade. Broadly, the 1980's have witnessed the removal of many of the repressive features outlined by Burawoy and others as necessary for the continued existence of the migrant system. Some of the more important developments in this regard have been:

1) the abolition of influx control, and the repeal of the pass laws;
2) the recognition by government of the right of African workers to belong to registered trade unions; and
3) the amending of the Mines and Works Act to formally end job reservation in the mining industry.

Perhaps the most important changes to the migrant reproductive framework, came with the abolition of influx control legislation, and in particular with the removal of the pass laws on 1 July
1986. Specifically, these reforms meant that: 1) black South Africans were no longer required to obtain permission from the government to live or work in urban areas; 2) employers were no longer required to obtain permission from the "pass offices" to employ these workers; 3) the "passes" would be replaced by identity documents issued to South Africans of all racial classifications; and 4) South African blacks were legally allowed to bring their families with them to the urban areas.

For the gold mining industry, these changes meant that the statutorily enforced mechanisms that regulated the circulation of internal migrants to the mines no longer applied. In other words, given the domestic to foreign labour ratio of the gold mines, approximately sixty per cent of African mineworkers were given the legal freedom to settle with their families at their places of work.

The abolition of the pass laws did not, however, amount to the complete removal of all legal and other obstacles to black worker settlement near the mines. As we will see in later chapters, a number of other limitations continue to impede the stabilisation of African mineworkers and their families.

In addition to the removal of influx controls, a number of other legislative changes further transformed the position of African workers in the economy as a whole, and in the mining industry in
particular. Firstly, the right on behalf of African workers to belong to registered trade unions became entrenched in law. This followed the findings of the Wiehahn Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation which recommended to government the scrapping of the racially discriminatory definition of "employee" contained in the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1976. For migrant workers in the gold industry, this paved the way for the emergence of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) giving African workers a substantial say over their employment conditions. Formed in 1982, the NUM is today one of the largest unions in the country, and has come to challenge mining management on a wide range of issues affecting migrant workers. In contrast to the 1970's and before, the establishment of NUM represents a significant step towards the empowerment of the African workforce.

A second important development for Africans employed on the mines, came with the ending of job reservation. In this respect, amendments to the Mines and Works Act in August 1987 did away with the last but most important aspects of the formal colour bar. In part, the changes followed on from the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission, but were also the result of protracted struggles between mine management and the white Mine Workers' Union. Management had continually argued for the need to promote Africans into skilled work, and the amendments which opened up the job hierarchy to all were welcomed by employers. For African workers, the many legal restrictions placed on their occupational
mobility had officially been removed.

From the brief discussion above, it is clear that the conditions under which migrant labour is reproduced have fundamentally changed. Specifically, influx controls affecting black South Africans have been removed, the formal colour bar in the mining industry has been abolished, and migrant mineworkers have been empowered to a degree with the emergence of the National Union of Mineworkers.¹⁰

In the light of existing views of migrancy, and given these changed conditions of reproduction, a number of questions emerge which hold relevance for the mines’ most important form of labour supply. In particular, it is necessary to consider whether changes to the overall reproductive framework have resulted in transformations to the migrant system. For example, what have been the implications of the removal of the job colour bar and the emergence of the NUM for the migrant system? And has the removal of influx controls resulted in the emergence of a fully stabilised African workforce on or near the mines?¹¹ On a more theoretical level, has the disappearance of the specific mechanisms which served to ensure the separation of maintenance and renewal functions resulted in the failure of the migrant system to reproduce itself? And if not, what are the implications for existing views of migrancy?
iii) Migrant labour under changed conditions of reproduction

To begin with, it is important to note that the migrant labour system has been significantly transformed in recent years. In this regard, four distinct developments have altered the system as it has classically been known.\(^2\) These can be described both in terms of the changing nature of migrant behaviour, and in terms of emerging alternatives to oscillatory migration. They are:

1) the shift towards a more stable pattern of migrancy;
2) the emergence of a permanently settled core of African mineworkers with their families near the mines;
3) the partial urbanisation of sections of the migrant workforce and the emergence of a form of "commuter migrancy"; and
4) the introduction, to a limited extent, of alternatives to single-sex accommodation.

Firstly, there has been a shift towards a more stable pattern of migrant behaviour. In this regard, Crush (1987) argues that since the 1970's, but more particularly the 1980's, there has been a trend towards longer work periods and shorter homestays among mineworkers from all areas. Changed labour market conditions have allowed the mines to introduce standard contract lengths for workers, with predetermined departure and return dates, with the result that "an altogether new level of stability has come to
characterise migrant behaviour at all levels of the job hierarchy"(1). James (1989) too has argued that high levels of unemployment combined with the inability of the homelands to provide for subsistence production has given rise to a rural proletariat desperately in search of work. Within this context, the introduction of various "re-engagement" certificates by the industry served to ensure that by the 1980s migrancy had become "almost self-regulating"(10).

Secondly, the industry has begun to stabilise core components of its African workforce at or near the mines. In this regard, the mines have for many years been concerned to permanently settle a proportion of the migrant workforce essential to the running of the industry. These concerns were fully articulated when, in 1978, the Chamber of Mines introduced a new and detailed model aimed at the partial stabilisation of the migrant workforce. What was proposed was that the mines begin to settle their more senior skilled and supervisory workers in family accommodation while the bulk of the workforce remained migrant. The Chamber argued that ultimately, 10-15% of the migrant workforce should be stabilised in this way. While progress towards the new model has been limited, stabilisation policies represent a significant departure from orthodox migrant practices.

A third important development, and one directly related to the removal of influx controls, has been the "partial urbanisation"
of sections of the migrant workforce to locations within travelling distance of the mines. In this respect, Julian May (1990) has noted that the abolition of the pass laws has allowed for the relocation of rural families to a "commuter belt" enabling them to break out of established patterns of migrancy. May continues by asserting that oscillatory migration has given way to rapid urbanisation and commuter migrancy. With regard to labour in the gold mining industry, however, these developments have been limited. In the first instance, over forty per cent of the migrant workforce are foreign, and remain subject to provisions such as the Aliens Act which prevent them from settling in South Africa. In the second instance, the decision to relocate - even to the urban fringes, is not a simple one. Many considerations such as the various commitments and social networks migrants hold in their "home areas", impinge upon this decision. The removal of legislative barriers to geographical mobility has not translated into the immediate and extensive relocation of mine migrants and their families to the peripheries. At the same time, however, partial urbanisation of mine migrants has occurred to a degree, representing another important change within the migrant system. 

Finally, a fourth dimension to the transforming migrant system, has been the introduction on some mines, of alternatives to hostel accommodation. While the issue of alternative forms of accommodation for migrant workers will be looked at in detail in
Chapters 3 and 4, it is important to note at this stage that a range of new housing initiatives are currently being explored by the mining companies. By implication, these new initiatives (which include the promotion of home-ownership for migrants), imply a downgrading of the migrant system - the extent of this being dependant on a range of factors.

A review of these recent developments is instructive in considering the extent of transformation of the migrant system under changed conditions of reproduction. With regard to the questions posed earlier and particularly concerning the framework of analysis forwarded by Burawoy and others, a central conclusion can be drawn from the above review: while undeniable transformations to the migrant system have occurred in recent years, there is no question that migrancy has continued as the dominant form of labour supply to the mines. This system still meets over 98% of the gold industry’s African labour requirements. It is likely that for the foreseeable future, and because of a range of reasons not yet fully explored, migrancy will survive despite important changes in the overall reproductive framework.

The removal of influx controls has certainly had fundamental repercussions for the migrant system. They were, after all, the most important parameters determining what changes to the system could occur. Their removal has facilitated the emergence of new
initiatives by the mining companies that go beyond migrancy, but
this has not meant plans for the wholesale dismantling of the
system. On the contrary, we noted that the mines, since the late
1970's have succeeded in moving towards a more stable pattern of
migrancy, and by all counts plan to retain oscillatory migration
as a central means of labour supply.

Further, the abolition of the pass laws and other influx controls
as the "prime regulatory mechanisms" of oscillatory migration,
has not stopped the rural-to-urban-to-rural cycle. Admittedly,
there has been a limited degree of relocation by migrant
mineworkers to the urban periphery. But important considerations
have constrained this phenomenon - namely the restrictions that
apply to foreign migrants, and the complexity of factors involved
in the decision to urbanise. In addition, as we will see,
particular sections of mining capital are still committed to
keeping the migrant system intact.

What is being argued here, then, is that the existence of a
system of migrant labour cannot be understood merely in terms of
the maintenance of broader objective institutional factors. For,
existing views of migrancy which subscribe to such a
functionalist approach fail to account for the persistence of
migrant labour under changed conditions of reproduction. The
absence of many of the more important features of a coercive
framework has not brought an end to labour migrancy, though
important changes to the system have occurred.

An alternative perspective is therefore needed to account for the persistence of the migrant labour system. On one level, this perspective should be historically rooted to account for the specific conditions that gave rise to a particular system of migrancy. On another level, it should take into consideration the various "actors" that participate and have a vested interest in that migrant formation. In part, this study is an attempt to forward such a perspective, and to outline the ways in which the migrant system has been transformed under changed reproductive conditions.
NOTES

1. The notion is tentatively introduced. It is in fact terminology that Burawoy himself uses. See Burawoy (1977: 145).

2. The thesis that South Africa's migrant labour system constitutes a "cheap labour system", while shared by writers such as Legassick (1972), Castells and Kosack (1973), Castells (1975), and Lacey (1981), is refuted by Burawoy. For example, Burawoy asks the important question - cheap for whom?, maintaining that migrancy has a range of hidden costs to both employers and the state. Burawoy argues:

   If industry bears a small minority and the state the majority of the costs of organising a system of migrant labour, the former may find it cheap compared with other systems of labour, while the latter may find it more expensive than systems relying on market institutions for the regulation of labour supplies (1977: 142).

3. The "push-pull" thesis of migrancy is primarily an economistic perspective that was refined by Wilson (1972: 120-123). See also Nattrass (1976).

4. Bardill et. al. (1977) forward this view strongly.

5. For Burawoy, the powerlessness of migrant labour in South Africa was a function of four essential conditions: 1) the fact that migrants had no rights of citizenship in the capitalist economy; 2) African migrants were not unionised; 3) migrants had no legal or political rights in the urban areas; 4) migrants were dominated in the labour market due to their inability to compete freely for employment in other sectors.

6. Most observers agree that historically, the job colour bar played an important role in the perpetuation of migrancy - though different interpretations exist as to the nature of the relationship between the two. See for example, Johnstone (1976: 66-75); Davies (1979); Lipton (1980); Yudelman (1984), and Jeeves (1985: 30-34).

7. The various laws were repealed by the Abolition of Influx Control Act No.68 of 1986. See Government Gazette No. 10317, 27 June 1986, pp.3-17.

8. For a more complete discussion of the repeal of the pass laws and influx control legislation as well as on the history of state urbanisation policy, see Hindson (1987).

9. Previously, African workers were excluded from the definition of "employee" contained in the Act, and so precluded from belonging to registered trade unions.
10. It is a point of debate whether changes in the reproductive framework have meant an end to labour repression. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between a number of concepts: involuntary labour regimes, unfree labour, forced labour, coerced labour, and labour repression. See Moore (1967: 434); Rex (1974: 50); Cohen (1988: 1-3 and 20-26); Greenberg (1980: 133-138).

11. The term "stabilised workers" refers to African workers who have chosen to settle permanently at or near their places of work, with their families.

12. That is, the traditional model of rural-urban migration involving relatively long distance travel, the geographical separation of the migrant's home and work, and the housing of migrants on a single-sex basis.

13. Crush and James (1991) refer to this as "intermediate migrancy", involving the commuting of migrant workers on some mines to their homes in nearby urban areas such as Botshabelo in the Orange Free state.

14. On one level, it could be argued that Burawoy’s thesis (that when the specific conditions necessary for the maintenance of a migrant system are relaxed or disappear the migrant system should fail to reproduce itself) is sustained. If taken at face value, it is technically correct that South Africa’s migrant system has failed to reproduce itself in its present form. Indeed, the migrant system is fundamentally different in character to what it was before the changes which occurred to the reproductive framework in the 1980’s. This qualification, however, was not made by Burawoy.
Chapter 2  The Evolution of Housing on the Mines

On the gold mines of South Africa, employers faced two basic problems: they needed to secure the labour-power of workers on a very large scale; and they had to realise this work potential for their operations.

The solution to the first problem lay in the creation and maintenance of a system of oscillatory migration.¹ The development of the migrant system was by no means automatic. It required the subversion of much of the African population of Southern Africa. It also required the establishment of a system of labour recruitment that extended throughout the country and into the neighbouring states of Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland.²

But labour migrancy and an efficient recruiting system only met part of the accumulation needs of the mines. Once at the mines, workers had to be organised and disciplined and they had to be prevented from deserting. Further, since the mines operated both night and day, workers had to be housed in such a way that allowed access to their labour at all hours. The mines developed a particularly austere housing system to meet these requirements - the compound system.
i) The history and functions of mine compounds

The origins of compound accommodation in South Africa's mining economy can be traced to the Kimberley diamond fields, where they were introduced in the early 1880s.

On Kimberley mines, the 'closed compound' system was introduced by the De Beers group primarily in an attempt to put a stop to diamond theft and the illicit diamond buying (I.D.B.) trade. The compounds also served a number of other functions. They prevented desertions, reduced the turnover of labour, and gave mineowners a greater degree of control over their workers.

The early housing system on the diamond mines laid the basis for the housing strategies of other extractive industries. Most significantly, compounds came to serve as the central form of housing in the South African gold industry.

Unlike on the diamond mines, however, employers on the gold mines did not introduce compounds to stop theft of any kind. Rather, they wished to house migrant workers as cheaply as possible, and in a way that would give them as much control over the workforce as possible.

On the Witwatersrand, compounds were introduced shortly after the discovery of gold in 1886. By the early 1890s, the majority of
African workers were housed under this system. Almost a century later, compounds continued to accommodate more than 98% of the industry's black workforce. (Crush and James, 1991: 1)

In the early years of the gold industry, living conditions for migrant workers were extremely poor. McNamara notes that the first compounds:

... appeared to be groups of wood and iron huts, often built back to back, in order to share walls and thereby reduce costs. Floors were of soil, antheap or asphalt. (1978: 22)

On arriving at the mines, workers were herded into these structures and had to share rooms with as many as 50 or more other migrants. Typically, new recruits slept on tiered concrete bunks stacked against the walls.

Most of the early compounds lacked proper heating and ventilation facilities. Government regulations regarding minimum standards for services, food, and what the industry crudely referred to as "air space per head" (in other words the number of workers housed in relation to the size of the room) were seldom enforced.

In other areas of mine infrastructure, the welfare of unskilled African workers was largely ignored. Hospital facilities and medical care for workers only emerged after 1912, when the Chamber of Mines began to provide these services. In addition, up
until 1912 most mines did not provide changehouses for workers near the shafts. This had serious consequences for the health of workers who -- after having worked in the hot underground environment -- could not change their clothing for the cold surface temperatures.

The lack of changehouses and poor compound conditions directly contributed to a high incidence of respiratory disease on the mines. Callinicos (1980: 49) notes that in 1911, more than 67 out of every 1000 mine-workers employed by the gold mines died of pneumonia. In addition, many workers died of meningitis, intestinal infections from bad food, scurvy from lack of vegetables, and tuberculosis from sudden changes in temperature and damp conditions.

The poor conditions in the compounds were a reflection of the fact that employers wished to limit expenditure on housing. Management's justifications for not upgrading the compounds -- or for that matter providing workers with family housing -- were that the particular cost structure of mining dictated how much money could be spent housing the workforce. The standard argument was that the low grade nature of the ore mined meant that cost minimisation was imperative to the survival of the industry (Johnstone, 1976). With the price of gold being fixed until the 1970s, employers could not rely on market mechanisms to take into account increased working expenses. In other words, containing
costs became a function of maintaining profits. In particular, it was black labour costs that employers sought to minimise. This reflected itself in two ways: in the very low wages paid to African workers, and in the inadequate conditions under which these workers were housed.9

Cost containment was not the only benefit of the compound system. It also provided employers with the opportunity for a high degree of control over their workers.

Management made use of a particularly coercive set of controls to ensure workers did as they were told. In the compounds, the so-called "indunas" were responsible for maintaining order, and for seeing to it that workers were roused for work on time.10 Any disciplinary problems were dealt with by the indunas who had under their command "compound policemen" to assist them with these responsibilities. This system of control was also known as the "tribal representative" system.

There was little that was either "tribal" or "representative" of the induna system. In all cases, the indunas were not elected by workers, but rather carefully chosen and appointed by management. They were seldom, if ever, tribal leaders in the homeland areas, and their function was not so much to represent the needs and interests of workers, as to ensure the extension of managerial control.
In the chain of command on the mines, authority relations were structured along racial lines. The indunas, compound police and workers were all under the authority of the compound manager who was white. Moroney (1978) notes that:

The compound manager through the tremendous power he exercised, often determined the level of coercion and violence that would prevail throughout the mine. He could choose to provide relatively good accommodation and food as well as protection against violence inflicted by white workers. (1978: 34)

At work underground, African mineworkers came under the authority of the "boss boys" or "team leaders". Again, these were appointed by management, but were usually the more experienced and highest skilled African workers. It was the team leader's function to coordinate work activities in the shafts and stopes underground.

In direct supervision of the team leader, was the white miner who oversaw the shift operations of African workers. The white miners often left much of the actual skilled mining work to African workers under their charge, sometimes in contravention of government safety regulations. They also preferred to act in a supervisory capacity, getting as much out of their labourers as possible.

The compound managers, and white miners, together exerted a substantial degree of control over the migrant workforce. Authority relations on the mines were characterised by what could
perhaps be called "racial paternalism": a set of relations in which white miners and managers adopted the roles of protector and judge, supposedly acting in the black worker's "best interests".

Both during and between work shifts therefore, the lives of African workers on the mines were highly regulated. Underlying this authoritarian and paternalistic order, was management's central concern to maximise the productive capacities of workers.11

Considered broadly, the compound system can therefore be seen as an integral part of a broader network of labour arrangements that met the productive needs of the mines. The migrant labour system, itself created and maintained through a range of repressive institutions, delivered to the mines sufficient quantities of unskilled African labourers. The compound system -- a logical extension of male-only migrancy -- was the essential institution of control that facilitated the exploitation of these workers.

ii) Changes to the system: upgrading the compounds, and revising migrant practices

The rudimentary features and conditions of housing on the gold mines remained unchanged until the 1970s. Compounds continued to afford management control over workers, and there was never any real compulsion for a radical revision of the system. What suited
the mines for well on eighty years, was a situation where the vast majority of African workers lived on a single basis in the compounds, while a select few of the industry's most essential workers were housed with their families.

In the 1970s, a number of factors prompted employers to finally begin making improvements to the compound system, and to rethink migrant policies.

A central factor was the freeing of the gold price in 1971. From a fixed price of $35 a fine ounce in that year, to $612 an ounce in 1980, the rising gold price brought with it unprecedented profits. In many respects, the increased profits gave the gold industry new life. Existing mines were expanded, and new mining ventures were entered into. Shareholders' dividends soared, and this encouraged further investment in the gold industry.¹²

Mining expansion brought with it an increased demand for labour. At the very time that the mines were requiring greater supplies of workers though, two of the industry's principal labour sources were disrupted. In the first instance, Malawian miners were repatriated allegedly because a number of that country's nationals were killed in a plane crash en route from the mines in April 1974. As a result of repatriations, the number of Malawians employed by the industry shot down from nearly 120,000 in 1974 to a few thousand by the end of the following year (Yudelman and
Later, in 1976, the number of Mozambicans employed on the mines also declined dramatically due to different immigration procedures introduced by the new Frelimo government. In January 1976, there were more than 114,000 Mozambicans employed on the gold mines. By the end of December, this figure had dropped to just over 48,000 (First, 1983: 58).

The repatriation of Malawian workers and the disruptions to the supply of Mozambicans had serious consequences for the gold industry. Most obviously, the exit of more than 170,000 workers from mining in such a short space of time created huge labour shortages, and these were particularly felt when the industry began to require more labour. On many mines, labour complements dropped to well below requirements, and the situation only began to improve towards the late 1970s.

Almost as important as the quantity of workers who left, was their quality. Mozambicans and Malawians were generally the more experienced and skilled workers of the industry, and they tended to work longer contracts than other miners. As opposed to South African migrants who chose to stay for shorter periods of work, Malawis and Mozambicans often worked for periods of up to 18 months and more. Their exit from mining thus deprived the industry of a large category of workers who were used to mining
and who could be relied upon as a stable segment of the labour force.

As James (1989) has shown, the gold industry had become substantially dependant on foreign labour because of the migrant policies it pursued during the period in which the price of gold remained fixed. During the 1950s and 1960s, the mines remained profitable essentially because they were able to increase production by employing larger numbers of workers from foreign areas at low wages. The widespread use of foreign labour -- essential to the mines during the years prior to the freeing of the gold price -- turned out to be a detriment in the early 1970s. Following the labour upsets of 1974 and 1976, it was widely argued throughout the industry that the mines had become "overly dependant" on foreign labour.

Buoyed by rising profits, and free of the cost constraints inherent under the fixed price regime, employers were able to respond to the situation in a number of ways.

To begin with, the mines began to reduce their dependence on foreign labour by concentrating on domestic supplies. To attract South African blacks, wages for African workers were increased. Yudelman (1984) notes that between 1971 and 1980, the average wage paid to black mineworkers increased from R18.96 per month to R214.97 per month (an increase in real terms of 246 percent).
On one level, the mines were successful in their attempts to restructure their labour supplies, or as Yudelman and Jeeves (1986) put it, to "open new labour frontiers" within South Africa. Between the years 1972 and 1978, the proportion of South African migrants employed by the mines increased from only 25 percent to 53 percent of the total migrant workforce. By the 1980s, the gold industry was drawing 60% of its African labour force from within the country’s borders. 

These rapid changes to the composition of the migrant workforce did reduce the industry’s dependence on foreign labour, but also had other less desirable consequences. New recruits had no mining experience, and they worked for shorter periods than had migrants from Mozambique and Malawi. For example, on gold mines in the Orange Free State, the average contract lengths declined from 17 months before 1974 to about 9 months in 1978 (Lipton, 1980: 109).

To further complicate matters at the time, international and local criticism over poor wages and conditions for African workers was mounting. A United States boycott organised against South African coal exports in 1974 precipitated the removal of the so-called masters and servants laws that same year. These laws had made it a criminal offence for black migrant workers to break their employment contracts. 

A consequence of their removal was that the number of African workers who left the mines before their contracts had been completed increased dramatically.
Between the years 1973-1978, the number of black "absconders" increased by nearly five-fold (Ibid.: 110).

During the period of the early to mid 1970s, employers therefore faced a number of challenges that compelled them to rethink existing labour policies. The withdrawal of Malawian labour and the disruptions to Mozambican supplies were of great concern, and employers wished to restructure their migrant sources. But shifting dependence to South African sources brought other problems -- specifically workers who stayed for shorter periods on the mines, had little or no mining-related skills, and were far more likely to leave the mines if dissatisfied. Further, the absence of one of the industry's principal coercive measures -- the masters and servants laws -- meant that employers needed to develop new ways to retain workers for the lengths of their contracts.

To offset these problems required a complementary approach. On the one hand, employers were forced to concede that they would have to make the mines more appealing to the "new breed" of migrants. Increased wages were only a part solution -- they could attract new recruits, but not hold them. Living and working conditions had to be improved, and this entailed a variety of factors. For a start, something had to be done to "humanise" the compounds. Problems such as overcrowding, lack of basic services and recreation facilities, and other grievances had to be
addressed. Increasing levels of violence and unrest on the mines were another problem that had to be looked at. The mining companies recognised that in part mine violence was due to the tensions inherent to crowded and ethnically divided living in the compounds (Horner and Kooy, 1979; McNamara, 1986).

The upgrading of mine compounds was made possible by the increase in the price of gold. Millions of rands were spent updating old hostels in the 1970s. By contrast, the mining groups invested little in providing family housing for workers in this period (Crush and James, 1991).

As Lipton (1980) notes, the mines embarked on a number of "meliorative" measures designed to ease the immediate hardships of workers. Hostel room densities were decreased, and the harsh discipline of compound governance was relaxed somewhat. The mines also began to modernise basic services, and to offer a range of recreation facilities for workers, such as bars, sportsfields and dancing arenas. In some instances, where practically possible, migrant workers were permitted to commute home to their families on weekends. In instances where this was not possible, some mines constructed visiting quarters for wives who were able to stay for short periods of time.15

Some mining groups also began to ethnically integrate the hostels in an attempt to "defuse" black worker conflicts. For a time,
workers were housed according to their underground work sections. The general reaction of workers to this forced integration was negative, however, and management abandoned these efforts by the early 1980s. (McNamara, 1985)

In addition to the above measures the recruiting agency of the Chamber of Mines, The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA), attempted to gain some control over migrant behaviour by reviving an incentive programme that had been used by the mines in earlier years. For migrants working a nine-month contract, employers introduced early return bonuses. The purpose of these bonuses was to encourage migrant workers to stay away from the mines for shorter periods of time between contracts. For workers on six month contracts, TEBA introduced the so-called "re-employment guarantee" ensuring that these workers would be given work on return to the mines. TEBA also offered more skilled workers a "stabilisation bonus" if they returned to the mines on a date set by management.

This incentive program -- known as the "VRG program" (for valid re-engagement guarantee) -- introduced in 1976, was further modified to serve all gold mines in 1979. As a result, employers regained a measure of control over the functioning of the migrant labour system (Crush et.al. forthcoming)."}

In these ways, employers sought to attract new workers to the
mines, to make sure that they fulfilled their work contracts, and to regulate the periodicity of their return. For the time being, the traumatic changes of the 1970s could be contained without having to seek alternatives to migrancy. By upgrading the compounds, restructuring dependence on migrant supplies, and stabilising the migrant flow, employers gained temporary respite from developments that might otherwise have threatened the migrant system.

iii) Towards stabilisation

In the 1970s, employers were able to respond to changes in the labour framework without having to go beyond the constraints of the migrant labour system. The widescale disruptions to migrant sources and to the nature of migrant behaviour did however, prompt new thinking within the industry about the prospects for an alternative labour system. In particular, individuals within the Chamber of Mines and a few of the mining houses began to give some thought to a partially settled African workforce.

As early as 1974, the General Manager of the Chamber of Mines, A. Fleischer, had voiced the need for a "dual system of labour" as opposed to a strictly migrant one. Fleischer argued that employers should attempt to stabilise 10-15 percent of the African workforce. These workers would be skilled South African miners enjoying better pay and committed to mining as a career.
The remaining 85-90 percent of the workforce would continue to be migrant, less skilled and more easily replaceable.

There were a number of additional factors that underpinned the arguments for a dual labour system. Throughout the 1970s, African wages had risen sharply as had overall working costs, while productivity remained largely unchanged. Between 1970 and 1980, black unskilled and semi-skilled wages increased by 819 percent while productivity over the period increased by only 4 per cent (Pillay, 1987: 8). As African labour became more expensive, the industry began to seek ways that would either make it more productive, or reduce the labour intensiveness of production. Replacing capital for labour through mechanisation had the potential to achieve both these objectives. Mechanisation was not only necessary to bring about improved productivity, it was also regarded as a means by which to reduce the industry's dependence on unskilled migrant labour. After Malawi decided to recall its nationals, the Chamber launched a crash research and development programme with an emphasis on mechanisation.

At the same time, capital-intensive mining techniques required a stable, committed and higher skilled complement of workers. High rates of labour turnover -- an inherent problem under low-wage migrancy -- were not consistent with modern mining methods. The stabilisation model outlined by Fleischer promised to provide a workable alternative to a migrant only workforce. In 1978, TEBA
accepted Fleischer's arguments as the basis of its new five year manpower planning strategy (Yudelman and Jeeves, 1986).

By the early 1980s however, very little progress had been made towards a partly stabilised African workforce. In 1985 for example, the Anglo American Corporation (the industry's largest employer of migrant labour) housed less than two percent of its total workforce in family accommodation (Table 2.1). The bulk of its workforce continued to reside in single hostels. Similarly, by 1985, Rand Mines had built only 431 units for married migrant workers on its gold mines. With regard to the gold industry as a whole, only 4902 married units had been constructed for migrant workers by 1984 (housing approximately 1 percent of the total migrant workforce) (Crush, et.al. forthcoming).

Table 2.1 Married Accommodation on Anglo American Mines, 1960-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Units</th>
<th>Total Workforce</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>51 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>77 421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>98 347</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>86 841</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2653</td>
<td>135 893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2844</td>
<td>167 209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There were a number of reasons why so little progress had been made towards a dual labour system. Firstly, significant technological advances continued to elude the mines despite
substantial investment into research and development since 1974. The transition to capital-intensive production methods was not a straightforward matter. A major limiting factor was a lack of technology suitable to the geological peculiarities of South African gold reefs. Historically, only on three notable occasions had the industry enjoyed the benefits of technological advancement. In 1905, reciprocating rock drills were first introduced; in the 1930s mechanical scrapers were applied to mining; and in the 1960s concentrated mining techniques were developed (Wagner, 1986; James, 1989). While these changes did bring about improved productivity, they did not significantly alter the labour-intensive nature of gold mining.

In 1974, after Malawi withdrew its migrant workers, the Chamber of Mines renewed its efforts to develop the technology that would bring about changes to the labour process. It was only in the 1980s that some mines were able to move towards mechanisation on any significant scale (Frost, 1990).

Secondly, government regulations and influx control policies continued to prevent the mines from moving towards the stabilisation model outlined by Fleischer. In the early 1950s the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. Verwoed, decreed that no more than three per cent of the black labour force could be accommodated in married housing on the mines. In 1975, the government indicated that it would allow certain mines to go
beyond the three per cent quota. This concession was made on condition that the mines housed their married workers in neighbouring black townships and that these workers qualified for residency rights in terms of Section 10 1(a) of the Urban Areas Act. As Crush (1989b) notes, this second condition effectively excluded the majority of black mineworkers who did not qualify for such rights and remained subject to influx control restrictions.

Finally, by the time Fleischer’s arguments had been fully articulated and accepted by the Chamber of Mines, much of the urgency for a partly stabilised African workforce had been lost. Towards the end of the 1970s, employers had regained a measure of control over the migrant system and the pressures exerted by the labour crisis of the mid 70’s had eased.
NOTES

1. The literature on the origins of the migrant labour system is voluminous. For a review of this material, see Crush, et.al. (Forthcoming).

2. On the early history of the mines' recruiting system, see van der Horst (1942), and Jeeves (1985).

3. For a more detailed account of the origins of the compound system of Kimberley mines, see Worger (1987) and Smalberger (1974).

4. Turrell (1984) argues that although the primary reason why compounds were first introduced to the diamond fields was to prevent diamond theft, the important functions they performed in the control and discipline of the mine workforce soon became a key feature for employers. Similarly, van Onselen argues that:

   The control over black workers which at DeBeers had been primarily a by-product of an attempt to restrict the illicit diamond trade, became a central feature of compound systems that had nothing to do with diamonds but everything to do with employers seeking to maximise control over labour (1976: 131).

5. In other mining industries, employers tried with varying degrees of success to adapt the compound model to their needs. On Namibian mines, see Gordon (1977); on mines in Southern Rhodesia, see Van Onselen (1976); and on mines in Ghana see Crisp (1984).

6. Although the vast majority of African workers were housed in compounds, some mines did draw a small proportion of their workers from squatter areas around the mines. See for example McNamara (1978). Crush, et.al. (forthcoming) note that after 1911, several mining companies began to provide married quarters on mine property for senior workers. By 1931, however, less than 3% of the industry workforce lived in family housing.

7. Jeeves (1985) provides a fairly detailed account of compound conditions in the gold industry in the years up until 1920.

8. Moroney (1978: 31) notes that in 1903, 5022 African workers were reported to have died on the gold mines. The most important causes of death were pneumonia and meningitis which accounted for almost 60 per cent of the total. Other causes were: intestinal infections (11,86%); scurvy (5,87%); accidents (4,08%); tuberculosis (5,39%); and other causes (12%). Regarding these mortality rates, Jeeves (1985) notes that:

   Chamber of Mines medical officers tried to explain the horrifying mortality by reference to the generally poor physical condition of the recruits and their consistent

41
inability to stand the rigours of the Rand’s winter climate at an altitude of 5,000 feet. Less interested contemporaries had no trouble seeing that bad food, cold, drafty compounds, and grossly inadequate clothing were major causes of illness and death (225).

9. It was not true, however, that all the industry’s gold mines were equally affected by the fixed price of gold. Grades of ore mined as well as working costs varied considerably from mine to mine, with the result that some mines were especially sensitive to the industry’s cost structure, while others were not. Considered overall, the profits of the industry remained high during the fixed price period, and much more could have been done to improve the wages and living conditions of African workers if industry profits (as opposed to individual mine profits) had been used as a basis for capital expenditure. Employers were willing to make use of a central recruiting agency and the technical and advisory services of the Chamber of Mines for their benefit, but when it came to meeting costs, they insisted that individual mines were registered companies in their own right and had to fend for themselves. Under the group system, the head offices of the mining corporations would not consider subsidising the costs of marginal mines with the profits generated by their richer mines. In other words, the mines were prepared to pool the profits of individual mines but not their costs. The result of this is that the standard of accommodation for mineworkers varied from mine to mine, being largely dependant on the profits generated by each. In later years, the National Union of Mineworkers came to argue that the industry could easily afford to provide family housing for workers when the overall profits of the industry were taken into account. In the 1990s, with the depressed price of gold, the issue of subsidising "poorer" mines with the profits generated by more profitable ones continued as a major point of contention between the union and management.

10. For a more complete description of the Induna system and other structures of authority used by the mines, see Pearson (1977), Moodie (1980), and Ramahapu (1981).

11. The highly regulated nature of compound living has led some writers to compare single living arrangements on the mines to "total institutions". Goffman (1968) first defined the term as:

A place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life (cited in Pearson 1977: 1).

Various authors (e.g. Pearson, 1977; Lipton, 1980; McNamara, 1985; James, 1989; Crush, 1989a) have accepted this as a way to describe the institutions of African accommodation on the mines. On occasion, even mine employers have used the phrase in reference to
the single quarters they provide.

12. On new mining ventures entered into following the freeing of the gold price, see Leys (1975).


14. The Masters and Servants Laws were enacted in the Cape in 1841 and 1856. These laws regulated the formation, length and ending of contracts with non-white workers, making breach of contract a criminal offence. In 1911, these laws were extended to workers in the mining industry by way of the Native Labour Regulation Act. See Doxey (1961).

15. A study conducted by the Human Resources Laboratory of the Chamber of Mines in 1983 found that 32 out of the 42 Chamber-affiliated gold mines provided some form of guest accommodation. The study includes a survey of workers' attitudes towards visiting arrangements for wives and families. For more details, see Hall (1984).

16. In 1982 the Human Resources laboratory of the Chamber of Mines carried out a study on one mine to assess migrant worker attitudes towards employer stabilisation schemes (see Mashaba, 1982). It was found that although workers felt more secure in their jobs, they "... wished to stay at home longer than the mines wanted them to" (7). It was also found that the majority of mineworkers returned to the mines earlier than they had intended. In explaining this, Mashaba argues that:

... adherence to the conditions laid down (by the scheme) was not because they were inherently desirable, but rather that the socio-economic situation in which they (migrants) found themselves left them little other choice (Own brackets, 22).

17. It was never clear to employers whether the three per cent rule applied only to the South African component of the workforce or to the total black workforce employed by the mines. See Godsell (1975).

18. In the mid 1970s, the Chamber of Mines attempted to recruit workers from the urban centres who had the necessary Section 10 rights. These attempts were unsuccessful. See James (1988).
Chapter 3 The Demand for a Flexible Housing Approach

I. Challenging the System

During the 1970s a range of factors induced employers in the gold industry to begin reviewing their migrant practices. In particular, factors such as the freeing of the gold price, the disruptions to Malawian and Mozambican labour supplies, and the abolition of the masters and servants laws had a profound impact on the labour policies of the gold industry.

In Chapter 2 it was noted that a major response of employers to events of the early 1970s was to restructure migrant supplies in order to reduce dependence on foreign labour. African wages were increased, and various re-engagement certificates were introduced stabilising the migrant system. Employers throughout the industry began to upgrade their hostels -- partly in an attempt to retain new recruits, and partly as a way to quell mounting criticism over poor conditions. Further, at least one mining group -- the Anglo American Corporation, began to tentatively promote family housing for a very small percentage of its migrant workforce.

Considered overall, the changes brought about during the 1970s never really required of employers that they go beyond the migrant system itself. The changes that did occur to labour practices during the 1970s and early 1980s took place within the overall parameters of migratory labour. In short, the migrant
system remained largely intact. In the 1980s, a new set of developments further transformed the political economy of gold mining, this time compelling employers to begin implementing alternatives to migrancy and single sex housing.

In 1982, African mineworkers became unionised. Their union -- the National Union of Mineworkers -- embraced a range of demands, including calls for the provision of adequate housing for workers, and an end to oscillatory migration. In 1987, the job colour bar was removed further opening the way for the skilling of the migrant workforce. Migrancy and single housing were becoming more and more incompatible as black workers began to find their way into skilled positions. In the mid 1980s an escalation of inter-group violence amongst black workers highlighted anew the problems inherent under a migrant order.

In the wider context the labour repressive framework continued to be eroded with the abolition of influx controls, and the failure of territorial apartheid. Practically, the ideology of separate development had proved to be unworkable. The migrant labour system -- on one level an affirmation of apartheid -- was now increasingly open to question.

i) Num demands an end to migrancy

In 1982, following in the wake of the Wiehahn Commission of
Enquiry into labour legislation, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was formed. In the years 1982-1987, NUM was the fastest growing trade union in the country. By the end of 1987, the union had a signed up membership of over 360,000 mineworkers, with the majority of these being employed on gold and coal mines (Crush, 1989a). Today, the union remains the principal representative of black worker interests in the gold industry.

In 1985, NUM withdrew its affiliation from the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), and joined the larger and more politically assertive federation, COSATU (the Congress of South African Trade Unions). NUM’s alliance with COSATU marked a new period of struggle for the union, and the terrain of conflict began to change. The union extended its campaigns on safety, wages, arbitrary dismissals and job reservation to embrace a broader set of issues. Increasingly, NUM began to call into question the broader framework of labour repression comprised largely by the migrant system and mine compounds.

In 1987, NUM demanded the complete dismantling of the migrant system and the abolition of single compounds. At its fifth annual congress in February, the union called on employers to publicly declare their commitment to ending migrancy and to make available a range of housing alternatives for workers. NUM’s demands for downgrading the migrant system came at a time when the union was perhaps at its strongest. Over the past five years, it had built
itself up painstakingly. Its leadership had proved to be quite astute, avoiding unnecessary conflict and outright confrontations with employers that might otherwise have damaged the union before it had consolidated properly.²

In response to NUM’s demands, executives from a number of mining houses outlined their positions regarding migrancy and mine housing. Their proclamations were vague, however. Naas Steenkamp, Director of Human Resources and Public Affairs of Gencor (now Genmin) announced that the group was opposed to "... a system that makes it impossible for men to live with their families". Steenkamp went on to argue that Genmin was committed to providing family housing "as extensively as possible" (Financial Mail, 13 March 1987: 34). Similarly, the Chairman of Rand Mines argued that the negative consequences of migrancy (such as enforced bachelor living and labour instability) conflicted with the group’s "philosophical values and business ethics". (Rand Mines Annual Report, 1987: 10). Spokesmen for Anglo, JCI and Anglovaal were equally forthcoming in their utterances about the undesirability of retaining the migrant system. Even Gold Fields, usually silent on such politically sensitive issues, went so far as to say that the migrant system was "abhorrent". (Gold Fields Annual Report, 1988: 18)

Questions regarding the future of the migrancy -- and in particular the hostel system -- were given added significance in
August that year, when the NUM launched its first industry wide strike. During the three week long action, workers temporarily seized control of the hostels using them as centres of organisation and resistance. Although management regained control of the hostels (and subsequent to the '87 strike introduced a range of measures designed to ensure they stayed in their control), it had been clearly demonstrated that the hostel system could be used to the advantage of workers. As James argues in his forthcoming book, managerial authority in the compounds could no longer be taken for granted -- the hostels had become "contested institutions".

The takeover of hostels by workers, and the increasing assertiveness of NUM over broader issues such as the migrant labour system compelled employers to revise existing methods of housing and controlling the workforce. In the aftermath of the 1987 strike, employers responded with a mixture of reform and repression. On the one hand, management resorted to a range of tactics to curtail the power of the NUM, and to tighten control over workers in the compounds. Mass dismissals, selective rehiring and the withdrawal of union facilities were all part of a coordinated strategy to, as Karl von Holdt notes:

... break the power of the union, and shift the balance of power back towards a dictatorial management (1989: 88).
On Anglo mines, where the union was most strongly represented, there was a marked increase in the level of repression following the 1987 strike. Security measures were increased, and access to and from living quarters was more strictly policed. In 1989 Cyril Ramaphosa, general secretary of NUM commented that the mines were now being run "as mini-states", and that it was "as though you have to obtain a visa to get into them" (Weekly Mail, 5/10/1989). The NUM alleged that curbs on entry to the mines and the hostels were probably stricter now than they had been thirty years ago. In addition, room searches were carried out more often, and workers were again divided and housed along ethnic lines.

On the other hand, employers began to give more clarity to their plans for providing alternatives to the hostels, and to devise new initiatives for normalising industrial relations. As a start, some mines attempted to involve their workers in the day-to-day running of the hostels. Worker participation schemes were introduced, and on several mines hostel committees were established to allow residents a degree of influence over administration issues. Such initiatives emerged even as the repressive measures outlined above were being put into practice. Management also began to assess more carefully the feasibility of non-hostel forms of accommodation for African workers.

ii) Mine violence and the hostel system
A second important factor that necessitated change to existing housing policies concerned the problem of mine violence. While violence has characterised the social history of the mines, the problem took on new proportions in the 1980s. In the period 1974-1986, at least 141 separate clashes between African mineworkers occurred, leaving 330 dead and over 2000 injured (McNamara, 1989: 24). In 1986 alone, 118 workers lost their lives in these incidents, and between the months December 1986 and February 1987, 52 deaths and 763 injuries were reported (Liebenberg, 1987).

In 1986, this escalation of inter-group conflict or "faction fighting" prompted a joint investigation into the problem by the Gold Division of the Anglo American Corporation and the National Union of Mineworkers. In the unpublished report which followed, there was general agreement between the union and management that the most important causes of violence related to mine hostels, and the "abnormal conditions imposed by the migratory labour system" (Leatt, et.al., 1986: 13-18). The authors of the report argued that there were a number of specific factors which could be identified in this regard. They pointed to the "highly regulated environment" of the hostels and the social deprivations of single living. It was found that in some instances, workers continued to be housed along ethnic lines, and that this led to tension among workers. It was further argued that there were inadequate mechanisms for dealing with worker grievances, and
that "tribal indunas" continued to play a conflictual role.\textsuperscript{5}

With regards to the hostel system, the report concluded that a range of housing alternatives were needed to "overcome the structural problems inherent in hostel life" (14). It was argued that in the short term, attempts should be made to ameliorate conditions in the hostels but that in the longer term, solutions should not "reinforce the migrant labour system", and should be "the subject of joint union/management negotiations" (29).

In part, the ongoing attempts of mineowners to upgrade the hostels in the 1980s and to provide alternatives to this form of accommodation can therefore be understood in terms of the problem of mine violence.

iii) The skilling of African workers

A third factor that has necessitated the introduction of a more flexible range of housing alternatives, relates to the changing class character of the African workforce.\textsuperscript{6} In particular, black workers have begun to move into positions of skill, and this has had broad implications for traditional housing arrangements.

Since the 1960s, African workers have increasingly come to occupy skilled and semi-skilled positions throughout the industry. These trends are reflected in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 The Skilling of Black Workers on the Gold Mines, 1960-1990. (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>8,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>21,7</td>
<td>26,7</td>
<td>31,6</td>
<td>36,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>67,8</td>
<td>60,4</td>
<td>53,1</td>
<td>45,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8,2</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>8,7</td>
<td>9,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The trends towards the advancement of African workers up the job hierarchy, and the erosion of the racial division of labour were given a significant boost with the removal of the colour bar in 1987. Prior to the amending of the Mines and Works Act, African workers were prevented by law from obtaining blasting and other certificates of competency which were needed to perform skilled work underground. The removal of these reservations meant that African workers began to obtain these certificates and to move into positions which had been the preserve of white miners.

In other areas of mining, additional restrictions on the upward mobility of black workers were removed during the 1980s. In 1980, the government amended the Apprenticeship Act of 1944 (now the National Manpower Training Act), making it possible for blacks to be indentured as apprentices for trades in all industries, subject to negotiated agreements between employers and the relevant artisan unions. In the mining industry, the Chamber of Mines reached an agreement with the Federation of
Mining Unions (an umbrella organisation consisting of seven artisan unions) in 1983 allowing blacks to be signed on as apprentices. Also in 1983, legislation which reserved work connected to sampling, surveying and ventilation for whites only was removed. By the mid 1980s, black workers had therefore begun to slowly move into a range of new skilled positions (Hunter, 1989).

The removal of the colour bar, and the progressive skilling of African workers has had several implications for traditional housing practices. Firstly, the industry has become concerned to stabilise its more skilled, supervisory workers in family occupied housing. This has resulted in the emergence of alternatives to hostel accommodation. Secondly, the ending of job reservation has called for the removal of racial disparities in accommodation practices for black and white workers of similar skill. Thirdly, the increasing stratification of the African workforce along lines of skill has necessitated the introduction of housing policies which are sensitive to emerging class divisions within the workforce. Mine hostels do not provide for these changed housing needs.

II. Reform From Above

Industry-specific pressures for employers to reform existing housing practices came to a head in the mid to late 1980s. The National Union of Mineworkers was at its strongest, mine violence
had reached unprecedented levels, and the job hierarchy had just been opened to all workers. These factors directly challenged the feasibility of relying on hostel-only accommodation for the African workforce.

At the same time, broader political developments provided the mines with the opportunity to restructure their housing policies. Government acknowledged the inevitability of black urbanisation, and with this came a number of important legislative changes. Most importantly, the pass laws and influx controls were removed in July 1986. This meant that black South Africans - including residents of the TBVC areas, were given the legal freedom to move with their families to the urban areas. A second related development was the extension of freehold title rights to blacks, making full home-ownership possible. This was a significant improvement on the 99-year leasehold system which had only allowed for long term leasing of properties. Further, in terms of the Black Community Development Amendment Act of 1986 procedures were introduced by which more land would be made available for black housing.

The abolition of influx control, and the extension of home-ownership rights to blacks were necessary preconditions for the mines to begin moving away from migrant labour. The head offices of several mining groups began to experiment with a range of new housing strategies.
i) Home-ownership for workers

The specific initiatives pursued by the different mining groups were quite varied and to a certain extent reflected the different management philosophies and ideologies of each group. Three companies - the Anglo American Corporation, JCI and Rand Mines, amongst other initiatives, chose to introduce home ownership schemes for workers. Both Anglo and JCI provided employees with greatly subsidised bonds to stabilise portions of their workforces. Anglo developed housing schemes for workers at each of its gold mines. For workers at Western Deep Levels and Elandsrand gold mines, the Corporation virtually built its own township (called WEDELA). Here the company provided houses, infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and creches, and basic services. Anglo also developed housing schemes at Thabong and Kutlwanong townships (for workers at its FREEGOLD complex), and at Kanana (for workers at Vaal Reefs mine).

The JCI group developed a bond subsidy scheme for workers at its three gold mines (see Chapter 4). For workers at H.J. Joel in the Free state, JCI offered housing at either of the nearby townships, Meloding or Masilo, and also built houses for workers at Virginia. At Randfontein Estates and Western Areas workers were offered homes in Mohlakeng. The geographical location of these areas is shown in Figure 2 and also in Appendix A.
Figure 2. Map of the OFS Gold Mines and Surrounding Urban Areas
Rand Mines preferred not to get as involved in direct provision of housing for its workers. The group turned instead to the Urban Foundation's Family Housing Association to help it design its housing plans. As opposed to the approaches taken by JCI and Anglo, Rand Mines limited its financial assistance to suretyship for workers who wished to take out bonds from financial institutions. Management argued that low-interest, highly subsidised housing bonds would only "reinforce paternalistic practices" and "shackle the employee to the company" (Penstone, 1988).

Gold Fields on the other hand, remained opposed to the idea of home-ownership for African workers. Management at Gold Fields argued that "it (home-ownership) creates stress for workers and involves a range of responsibilities that workers do not necessarily want" (Interview, 1990). The group developed plans for the creation of mine "villages" where workers could be housed with their families. Such villages would be open to all employees, with access to housing being linked to skill levels. Gold Fields' housing practices are shaped by a broader policy that it will not withdraw from traditional labour markets. In other words, the group remains committed to using migrant labour.

ii) Rent subsidies and the "clean wage"

In addition to the above initiatives, the mining groups also
began to devise other ways to house their workers. With the exception of Gold Fields, employers started to give certain workers the option of living off the mines in nearby townships — and they paid them a rent subsidy to do so (the rent subsidy is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). In addition, a number of mining groups began to show interest in the so-called "clean wage" concept. The scheme — though in fact a method for remunerating workers — offered attractive possibilities for financing housing arrangements.

In terms of the clean wage, workers are paid a higher monthly salary and then have to meet their own food, accommodation and medical expenses at market rates. Currently, workers on the gold mines are housed in the hostels virtually free of charge (some mines charge workers a small monthly amount similar to a levy). The mines also pay for the feeding and medical expenses of workers, and provide recreation and other facilities without extra cost to employees.

Under the clean wage system, the idea is to "build" these expenses into the basic wages paid to workers. In 1989, the Chamber of Mines estimated that the monetary value of fringe benefits given to African workers averaged at R255 a month per employee (Chamber of Mines Newsletter, 1990: 34). This was in addition to the basic wages received which in 1989 figures was R720 on average for unskilled and semi-skilled employees. The
amount of the enhanced wage is determined by "adding on" the cash value of these benefits to the basic wages of workers.

The all-inclusive wage has important implications for mine housing. It can be used by management as a form of rent subsidy paid to workers who then have a choice whether to stay in the hostels or to live off the mines. The clean wage can also be used to promote home-ownership for workers, since the higher wage means that higher housing bonds can be secured.10

Increasingly, employers have begun to show interest in the clean wage system. As early as 1979, Rand Mines' Coal Division began to move towards this system. At its open cast coal mines in the Eastern Transvaal, the group developed a new housing policy which it referred to as a "consolidated approach" based on the all-inclusive wage system. All workers below senior managerial level at the groups coal mines are now offered three housing choices: i) they can continue to rent mine accommodation (either single or married quarters) but at market-related rates; ii) they can purchase housing on mine property; or iii) they can purchase or build homes in nearby residential areas (Interview, 1990).11 Rand Mines has also expressed interest in extending its consolidated approach to its 4 gold mines.

Genmin, the industry's third largest gold producer, has also been planning towards the clean wage system for some years. The group
does not have a housing policy per se, but regards the all-inclusive system as a basis for providing workers with a range of housing alternatives. Management at the group argue that the scheme allows workers the freedom to decide for themselves where and how they wish to live. The company hopes to have this scheme operational on its gold mines by June 1992, and already uses the system at its platinum mines in Lebowa and Bophuthatswana. Similarly, JCI has introduced the clean wage system to their new coal development, the Arthur Taylor Coal mine in the Witbank Area. JCI would like to introduce the clean wage to all its mines in the long term. The Anglo American Corporation has also expressed keen interest in moving towards the clean wage system.

There are many difficulties in moving towards the clean wage. Most decision-makers in the industry agree that it will be a long time before the gold mines are able to adjust their pay scales for the new system. One important factor is the extent to which NUM is involved in the transition process. For example, the union has argued that workers should be paid more than just R255 extra per month (the amount calculated by the Chamber) to live off the mines in local townships. The NUM argues that township living expenses (including travel to and from the mines) are higher than the costs involved in providing mine-based accommodation. One mining group claimed that the union was asking for an add-on portion of R450 to be attached to workers basic wages. This is a far higher amount than that arrived at by the Chamber or
individual employers. JCI for example estimates that providing workers with food and accommodation costs their mines R220 per employee per month. (Interview, 1990)

Setting the value of the clean wage is not the only difficulty involved regarding the clean wage system. Eligibility is another major issue. The mines operate both night and day according to a strict time schedule. In the overall production process, hostels continue to play an important role in ensuring miners get to work on time. Most hostels are located within walking distance of the mine shafts (this can be clearly seen from the surface plan of Randfontein Estates given in Appendix A). This is compared to townships, which vary in distance from the mines from between 5km and 25km. Anglo’s giant FREEGOLD complex for example is situated near a number of townships that are less than five kilometres away, while JCI’s H.J. Joel gold mine is nearly 25km away from Virginia -- the nearest urban area (see Figure 2).

Given these constraints, employers argue that it would be extremely disruptive to have the bulk of the workforce living off the mines. They argue that allowing workers to live off mine property would therefore be subject to management discretion. This raises further problems for the NUM whose demand is for a broad range of housing options to be made available to all its members regardless of skill level or job grade.
Management at JCI pointed out a further problem involved in moving towards the clean wage system -- the tax implications. At present, food and accommodation expenses met by the mines are not taxed by the Receiver of Revenue. An all-inclusive wage, however, would be. This acts as a disincentive for companies wishing to introduce the scheme. At the same time however, employers at Rand Mines argue that the all-inclusive wage has a capital cost saving for new mines. They argue that for future mining projects, the clean wage approach is cheaper than investing in expensive mine infrastructure such as hostels. As one personnel consultant of the group put it:

The very high cost of financing mines today militates against the provision of accommodation (Interview, 1990).

Employers at Rand Mines argue that they wish to "get out of the housing business", and that the clean wage system is the best way to do so.

iii) Upgrading the hostels

The new housing strategies outlined above have not meant that there are plans to dismantle the hostel system completely. Quite the opposite, management at all six of the mining houses continue to argue that for the foreseeable future, perhaps permanently, hostels will remain the central form of African housing.
In the 1980s and 1990s, hostel upgrading has therefore continued. Throughout the industry, renewed efforts have been made to ameliorate the hostels and to improve the way they are managed. Employers have continued to decrease room densities and modernise recreation facilities. Changehouses for workers have also been improved, and on many mines new visiting quarters for wives have been constructed. As had begun in the 1970s, management continues to organise visits home by hostel dwellers, and these are arranged more often. More recently, some mines began to move away from traditional forms of hostel administration. Participatory styles of hostel management were introduced, and in the case of one mine - H.J. Joel in the OFS -- management went so far as to do away with traditional forms of hostel governance such as the induna and isibonda systems.

To sum up, two complementary sets of initiatives have been the concern of employers on the gold mines. Firstly, some mining groups have begun to experiment with a range of new housing options to enable a proportion of the migrant workforce to stabilise near the mines. Secondly, a major thrust has been to upgrade the hostels and to ease the immediate hardships of those workers who will continue to live on a single basis.

These recent changes in the housing policies of the different mining groups can be understood in terms of underlying changes to the political economy of gold mining in the 1980s. In particular,
the advent of the NUM, the resurgence of mine violence, and the skilling of the African workforce are all factors that have compelled employers to revise their housing arrangements. At the same time, the removal of influx controls and other restrictions made it possible for the mines to begin moving towards a more flexible model for housing their workers.

In Chapter 4, the labour practices of one mining group are considered in more detail. Through a study of the specific housing initiatives introduced at JCI’s three gold mines, the chapter aims to explore the complexities of housing delivery for African mineworkers in more depth.


3. During 1988, the Media and Research Department of the National Union of Mineworkers carried out a study of conditions on Anglo American gold and coal mines before and after the 1987 strike. The findings are presented in NUM (1988).

4. On other occasions, employers have refuted claims that conflict amongst workers can be attributed to migrancy and single living arrangements. In 1989 for example, following a new spate of unrest on Anglo American mines, Bobby Godsell a director of the group was quoted as saying that:

   We (Anglo) have been involved in hostel upgrading for the past 15 years and I think it is stretching things to link the migrant labour system to the pattern of violence on our mines. (Sunday Tribune, 2/04/1989)

5. The conclusions reached in the joint NUM/Anglo report tend to confirm those made by J.K. McNamara who has researched the problem of mine violence in-depth. McNamara makes a useful distinction between communal conflicts - defined as

   ... spontaneous encounters between groups of residents in the confined social environment of mine hostels (1989: 39),

   and political conflicts - defined as

   ... goal-oriented actions reflecting a struggle of interests and objectives between different worker groups (Ibid.).

Regarding communal conflicts, McNamara further argues that these can be traced to

   ... the basic conditions of hostel life in which individual privacy and security is adversely affected by noise and other disturbances in the shared environment of the room. The enclosed nature of hostel barracks has also meant that specific arguments or disputes between certain individuals or groups, can exert a damaging ripple effect on other relationships and groupings leading to an escalation of violent conflict ... (1989: 34).
6. This argument is forwarded by James (forthcoming).

7. For a discussion on the various aspects of the job colour bar in the mining industry, see, Rafel (1987), Lever (1988) and James (forthcoming).

8. Hirschsohn (1988) for example argues that the different labour practices of the mining groups can be understood in these terms.


10. By law, no person is allowed to allocate more than 25% of their pensionable salary for bond repayments. The higher the pre-tax salary earned, therefore, the higher the housing bond that can be secured.

Before proceeding to look at the housing polices pursued by JCI, it is necessary to provide some background information about the company, and its role as a migrant employer in the gold industry.

Johannesburg Consolidated Investments Co. Ltd. is the oldest of the six mining houses that dominate South African gold mining. The group was founded in 1889 by Barney Barnato, and since that time has developed into a major producer of platinum, gold, diamonds, coal and ferrochrome. The company also has substantial investments in a range of secondary industries.

Altogether, JCI administers seventeen different mining operations, of which three are gold mines. These are:

1) The Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Company Limited;
2) Western Areas Gold Mining Company Limited; and
3) H.J.Joel Mining Company Limited.

Randfontein Estates and Western Areas gold mines are situated adjacent to one another on the far West Rand, approximately 40km south-west of Johannesburg (see Figure 3). Both mines are highly efficient producers, but rely on large bodies of low-grade ore, making them very sensitive to fluctuations in the gold price. Randfontein Estates is the oldest gold mine in the industry, while Western Areas came into operation in the early 1960s.
Figure 3. MINES OF THE FAR WEST RAND

1. Doornfontein
2. Blyvooruitzicht
3. Driefontein
4. W. Ultra Deep Levels
5. W. Deep Levels
6. Deelkraal
7. Elandsrand
8. Venterspost
9. Randfontein Estates
   A. Cooke Section
   B. S. Roodepoort
10. Libanon
11. Western Areas
12. Kloof
13. Durban Deep
14. ERPM

Kilometres

Carletonville

Bank

Krugersdorp

Johannesburg

0 10 20
In many respects, H.J. Joel is a unique mine. It is a small-scale operation - both in terms of the size of the workforce it employs, and in terms of its production capacity. Joel is a highly efficient gold mine that relies on modern trackless mining methods for underground production. This use of mechanised equipment accounts for the reduced labour needs of the mine, and also for the slightly higher skilled nature of the workforce employed there. Other significant features of the mine workforce include the relatively low proportion of foreign workers in service (the mine has a labour mix of about 70% domestic 30% foreign), and the relatively high percentage of local labour employed from the nearby townships of Meloding and Masilo (27% of the mine workforce was recruited from these areas).

Most significantly, Joel differs from the majority of gold mines with respect to the standard of accommodation offered to migrant workers. In a number of areas, the living quarters provided for workers at the mine are of a quality that is not encountered elsewhere.

For example, although the mine provides only single-sex housing on its premises, these have been constructed in the form of self-contained flatlets occupied by two workers each. Each of the flatlets built at Joel have their own bathrooms, kitchens and
H.J. Joel, which is situated between Virginia and Theunissen in the Orange Free State (see Figure 2, chapter 3), is one of the industry's newest mines. It is highly mechanised, and makes use of a much smaller, more highly skilled workforce than those employed at other mines in the industry. Table 4.1 gives the employment figures for each of the three mines.²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine</th>
<th>African Workforce</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rand. Estates</td>
<td>11,980</td>
<td>14,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Areas</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>8,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.J. Joel</td>
<td>1,324</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,104</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,997</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JCI

JCI employs approximately 24,000 workers at its three gold mines, of whom more than 20,000 are African. By far the vast majority of these workers are migrant, and are drawn from throughout South and southern Africa. The distribution of African migrants on JCI mines by source area is given in Table 4.2.
living areas, with a colour television set and radio provided. Outside, flatlets have their own washing lines, and each block of flatlets has access to modern electric barbecue facilities.

A separate number of flatlets have also been constructed which serve as temporary accommodation for visiting wives. A rotational system ensures that each worker has an opportunity to have his wife visit for periods of about a week at the mine.

The layout and design of single quarter accommodation at Joel is another feature which differs with that generally found throughout the industry. As opposed to traditional gold mine hostels which have been constructed in a barrack-like fashion, Joel's approach has been quite different. Four distinct "villages" - each containing blocks of flatlets, comprise the mine-based housing offered at Joel. Within each village are seven blocks of flatlets, with eight units per block. Each block is separated by lawns and pathways while villages are more widely set apart.

In accordance with group policy, there is no forced ethnic integration or separation at Joel. Management allows workers to live with whom they will, and the result is that villages and blocks are ethnically mixed.

Facilities provided at the mine are also of a comparatively high
standard. Dining facilities are on a par with the most modern found at other gold mines. The central eating area at Joel is well maintained, and is serviced by an efficient kitchen that makes use of the latest in cooking equipment.

There are also modern, well-equipped recreational areas and sports facilities. There is a liquor outlet, as well as a more formal bar and lounge serving drinks of a wide variety. In addition, workers are also able to purchase a range of goods from two privately run stores which have opened business on the mine. Migrant workers wanting to take home goods bought here can have them kept safely by the mine.

To complement the new housing approach at Joel, a participatory style of management that has been introduced to various aspects of mine life. With regard to the administration of single quarters for example, Joel makes use of a system of worker representation to involve residents in the running of mine villages.

Workers at each block of flatlets elect one representative who, together with representatives from other blocks, meet on a regular basis with a management team. The team - made up of the Personnel Officer, Personnel Assistants and Kitchen and Tavern Managers, consult block representatives whenever issues arise which affect the village as a whole."
Management meet on a monthly basis with three appointed village supervisors, a tavern representative and a clerical representative to discuss administrative issues and to identify issues affecting the social lives of workers that need attention.

It is by means of this system of representation that management governs relations with workers. In fact, Joel makes no use of the long-established induna/tribal representative system used by most other mines.

iii) Breaking from the hostels

JCI continues to use migrant labour, and makes extensive use of hostels to house these workers. However, management at the head office of the group argue that they are not prepared to perpetuate the migrant system in its present form. Employers say that they are committed to stabilising workers in family housing. As one director of the firm stated,

> JCI ... believes that the company stands to gain in the long run by taking positive steps to build a stable and permanent workforce, comprising happy, settled employees living with their families in the environment of their choice (cited in Husemeyer, 1988: 3).

There are two housing schemes that assist workers to settle near the mines. The first scheme advocates home-ownership through subsidised housing bonds, and is arguably meant for higher
skilled workers. The second scheme, which involves a living-out allowance paid to employees, is much cheaper for the company, and is arguably meant for less skilled workers. The two schemes are called the Home Bond Subsidy Scheme, and the Home Rent Subsidy Scheme. In addition to these two schemes, employers at JCI wish, in the long term, to introduce a third housing scheme based on the "clean wage" concept (see Chapter 3). The schemes are outlined below, followed by a general discussion of JCI’s new housing initiatives.

a) The Home Bond Subsidy Scheme - HBSS

All workers employed by JCI, except foreign workers who are excluded by law, are eligible to participate in this scheme. The HBSS functions in such a way that workers qualify for a bond of up to 39 times their monthly wage. For example, grade 1 underground workers - presently paid a base wage of R551 per month, qualify for a bond of 39 times this amount - or R21489. Similarly, grade 8 underground workers who earn R1469 a month qualify for housing bonds of up to R57291.

Monthly interest repayments for these bonds are subsidised, so that workers pay only 6% interest on the bond per month - JCI pays the difference between the worker’s contribution and the prevailing bond rate. Currently, bond interest rates stand at 19,5%. Employees are expected to pay a deposit of 2,5% of the
bond amount for which they are eligible. Building societies provide bonds for 80-82.5% of the purchase price of the house, and JCI provides surety for the rest.

Table 4.3 gives the 1990/91 minimum wages paid to unskilled and semi-skilled workers at JCI gold mines. The corresponding bond amounts have also been calculated to show what bonds can be secured by workers of a particular grade. Workers monthly payments as well as JCI’s contributions are also given.

Table 4.3 The Home Bond Subsidy Scheme, 1990/1991.

(Amounts in Rands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surface Workers</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Wage</th>
<th>Bond</th>
<th>Dep. Regd.</th>
<th>Monthly Payment</th>
<th>JCI’s Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>18993</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>231</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>21333</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>260</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>24453</td>
<td>611</td>
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<td>748</td>
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<td>1023</td>
<td>39897</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>1395</td>
<td>54405</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Underground Workers</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Wage</th>
<th>Bond</th>
<th>Dep. Regd.</th>
<th>Monthly Payment</th>
<th>JCI’s Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>21489</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>24258</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>27768</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>31863</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>36777</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1091</td>
<td>42549</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1257</td>
<td>49023</td>
<td>1226</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>57291</td>
<td>1432</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Calculations are based on a bond rate of 21%. Figures will fluctuate depending on the bond rate, and the basic wages paid to workers. The figures are as at 30 April 1991.

Source: JCI.
JCI also makes provision for workers who wish to build or upgrade their own homes. Workers can apply for self-help loans as this is provided for in the rules of the HBSS.

Approximately 620 black workers at JCI’s gold mines participate in the company’s bond subsidy scheme. The breakdown of participants by mine as at 1 March 1991 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage of mine’s African workforce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rand. Estates</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Areas</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.J. Joel</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JCI

The majority of bond holders at Western Areas and Randfontein Estates have bought homes in the neighbouring township Mohlakeng. At H.J. Joel, JCI has constructed 169 houses in Virginia (which is approximately 25kms away) for African workers participating in the bond scheme.

As a percentage of the total number of workers employed at JCI’s three mines, it can be seen that only a small fraction of the African workforce has been stabilised in homes of their own. At Randfontein, where the number of participants in the scheme is greatest, scarcely more than three per cent of all African
Considering that more than 55% of the African workforce employed at JCI's gold mines are eligible to participate in the home ownership scheme, these figures require explanation. If -- as management argue -- all workers except foreign migrants can apply for a housing bond, why is it that so few workers have chosen to do so? Given the very favourable conditions under which bonds are offered to workers (in terms of the greatly subsidised monthly repayments), why is it that more workers have not taken advantage of the scheme?

There appear to be a number of answers to this question. One possible explanation is that workers need a fairly long time to save up for the 2.5% deposit required. These deposits differ depending on the bond taken out by the worker, and the amounts were shown in Table 4.3. The bond subsidy scheme administered by JCI has been in operation for less than five years, and it is possible that a few workers have not been able to afford this initial capital.

A second reason may have to do with the extent of awareness of the scheme amongst JCI's workers. In a survey conducted at Randfontein Estates, management found that almost 30% of the workers interviewed were not aware of the company's bond subsidy
scheme (Table 4.5). JCI has set up an information centre at Randfontein Estates in an attempt to promote the scheme and to familiarise workers with the way it works. The number of workers who remain unaware of the existence of a company housing scheme, however, would perhaps call into question how effectively these information programmes have been.

Table 4.5 Mineworkers Attitudes Towards Housing, Randfontein Estates, 1988.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Awareness of HBSS</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aware of scheme</td>
<td>10885</td>
<td>71.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not aware of Scheme</td>
<td>4323</td>
<td>28.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15208</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JCI.

A third, and far more important consideration has to do with workers own choice of accommodation. Almost 80% of those workers who indicated they were aware of the HBSS, said that they would not consider making use of the company's home ownership scheme (Table 4.6). Of those workers who said they would not make use of the bond subsidy scheme, the vast majority -- roughly 80% -- indicated that they preferred to remain in the hostels. Only 16.4 per cent of the informants said that they would rather stay in one of the townships near the mine (Table 4.7).
Table 4.6 Mineworker Attitudes Toward Housing, Randfontein Estates, 1988.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention to Participate in Scheme</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would make use of scheme</td>
<td>2390</td>
<td>21.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not make use of scheme</td>
<td>8495</td>
<td>78.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10885</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JCI

Table 4.7 Mineworker Attitudes Toward Housing, Randfontein Estates, 1988.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred Accommodation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hostel</td>
<td>6704</td>
<td>78.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Township (Mohlakeng/Bekkersdal/Vika)</td>
<td>1397</td>
<td>16.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Elangeni/Randfontein/Lebowa)</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>4.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8495</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JCI

Reasons given by respondents for not wanting to join the home ownership scheme were quite varied, but in the main related to the fact that many workers wished to retain their links with their home areas. A significant number of workers also said that they were unable to join the scheme for financial reasons. Table 4.8 gives a more detailed breakdown of the reasons given by African mineworkers for not wanting to join JCI's home-ownership scheme.
### Table 4.8 Mineworker Attitudes Toward Housing, Randfontein Estates, 1988.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for not wanting to participate in HBSS</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Already have house in: homelands</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal/Zululand</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transkei/Lesotho/ Swaziland</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique/Maputo</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elsewhere</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan to build in: homelands</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo/Lesotho</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family in homelands</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer farmlife/want to farm/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have livestock in homelands</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't afford scheme</td>
<td>1483</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not ready yet/too young/not married</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners not able to use scheme</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know how scheme works/don’t trust scheme</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never thought of it</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (OK in mine hostel/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>can’t get house I would like)</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>8610</td>
<td>101.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Duplication may occur.
Source: JCI.

The results of the survey hold a number of important implications for employer housing schemes. They suggest that for a number of reasons, a significant number of workers are unwilling to abandon their ties with their home areas in favour of home ownership near the mines. In Chapter 5, the issue of migrant preferences is explored in more detail.

b) The Home Rent Subsidy Scheme

The second alternative being implemented by JCI takes the form of a rent subsidy (also referred to as a "living out allowance").
Workers not subscribing to the bond subsidy scheme, can choose to be paid a rent subsidy instead. Again, foreign workers are unable to make use of this scheme. The intention of this subsidy is to enable workers to find accommodation off mine property if they wish. The amount of the rent subsidy paid directly to workers is calculated by JCI to include the value of all subsistence expenses otherwise met by the company. These expenses include food, electricity and rentals, as well as the anticipated travel costs involved in living off the mine. The current value of the living out allowance paid to workers is in the region of about R200 upwards per month.

It is head office policy that any worker who chooses to make use of the living out allowance must find accommodation off the mine. Workers are not allowed to use mine facilities if they receive this allowance. The reason for this, management argues, is that "it ensures that workers remain with their families who have joined them in areas near the mines" (Interview, 1990).

Employers at JCI argue that this scheme has proved to be very popular, particularly amongst lower paid workers. Approximately 1,870 African workers participate in this scheme. The breakdown of participants by mine as at 1 March 1991 was as follows:
Table 4.9 Participation in the Home Rent Subsidy Scheme, 1991.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage of mine’s African workforce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rand. Est.</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Areas</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.J. Joel</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JCI

It can be seen from the above table that a significantly greater number of workers have chosen to use the rent subsidy rather than pursue home-ownership. At Randfontein Estates, more than 10% of the African workforce employed there receive living-out allowances, while at Joel, the figure is 15%.

There are two important drawbacks to this scheme for workers. Firstly, employers cannot guarantee that workers will use the rent subsidy to find adequate housing. In terms of the rent subsidy scheme run by JCI, workers are left to make their own housing arrangements. One consequence of this is that some workers have chosen to squat off the mines, using the extra income paid to them for other purposes. While exact figures for the number of workers who have chosen this route are not available, management at both Randfontein Estates and Western Areas confirmed that a number of their employees were squatting in nearby areas. In one township, Bekkersdal, it was estimated that about 200 of JCI’s workers were squatting with their families there. A number of other squatter areas have mushroomed...
around Randfontein and Western Areas, such as on the farm Rietvalei where squatters are able to rent small unserviced pieces of land for about R20 per month.

Secondly, the amount of the rent subsidy paid to workers is the equivalent of what it costs the mine to house these workers in hostels. But this does not necessarily mean that the funds are sufficient for workers to rent housing off the mines. Further, within the context of a chronic housing shortage for African workers generally, housing for rent in existing townships is in very short supply. Within these constraints, it is hardly surprising that some workers receiving the rent subsidy have chosen to squat near the mines.

Management’s attitude towards squatting is that given the housing shortage in South Africa, controlled squatting should not be ruled out as a housing option. This appears to be the general view of most employers throughout the industry. However, the question of who provides serviced land and infrastructure that can sustain squatter communities is a crucial one. The private sector - including the mining houses, argue that the state should be responsible for meeting these costs. However, caught up in a fiscal crisis of its own, and facing the enormous growth of squatter communities in recent years, state funding for informal settlements such as squatting has been limited.
Living out allowances are an attractive option for the mining companies. It is far cheaper than subsidising home ownership, and releases management from the responsibility of providing direct housing for their workers. At the same time, it is an attractive option for many workers who at the end of the month take away a slightly higher wage. However, despite the immediate benefits to workers in the form of extra income, rent subsidies hold no guarantee that adequate housing will be found. In principle, living out allowances are a more flexible way to cater for individual housing needs and demands. In practice, the extent to which they create a meaningful choice for workers is dependant on the amount of the subsidy paid to workers and the availability and affordability of housing for rent in nearby areas.

c) The "Clean Wage"

As outlined in Chapter 3, the "all-inclusive" or "clean" wage is a new concept to the gold industry. JCI has recently introduced the wage in its coal division, and views it as a possible long term option for its gold mines.

As in the case of the rent subsidy, the all-inclusive wage can be used as a means by which to finance housing for workers who wish to live off the mines. Under the clean wage system, workers are left to make their own housing arrangements. Supposedly, the scheme makes it possible for workers to choose a wide range of
accommodation options, including home-ownership.

Rent subsidies and the clean wage offer attractive possibilities for moving workers out of the hostels. But these schemes assume that workers choosing to live off the mines will be able to house themselves and their families adequately with the enhanced wages paid to them. The realities are, that even in existing townships near the mines conditions are often appalling. In the case of Bekkersdal township which is close to a number of different mines, roads are not maintained, refuse lies uncollected in the streets, and in many parts, there is no proper sewerage.

Further, workers choosing to reside in nearby townships, and who commute to work are faced with a range of other problems. These include ineffective local government, poor education facilities, lack of proper infrastructure, and civil unrest.

Crankshaw and Hart (1988) have suggested that a more progressive approach for employers would be to implement a township development policy in combination with the clean wage (or rent subsidy). They argue that the mines should remain responsible for ensuring that workers who choose to live off the mines are housed under adequate conditions.

The mining companies, however, argue that the state should be responsible for addressing poor conditions in the townships. They
claim that the state has yet to meet its commitments to orderly urbanisation in terms of providing the necessary services and infrastructure for township development.

Government in turn shifts the responsibility to the local authorities which are technically responsible for township maintenance costs. In the case of Thabong -- where a number of mining groups have implemented worker housing programmes -- rates are often not paid with the result that funds are not available to ensure proper living conditions for residents.⁹

The mining companies - who advocate housing for their workers in nearby townships, have yet to take these considerations into account in the policies they are currently pursuing.
1. Information presented in this Chapter is derived from a series of interviews conducted with management at the head office and mine level of JCI during September 1990, and January 1991.

2. Employment statistics for all Chamber-affiliated gold mines are given in Appendix B.

3. The number of men housed in each hostel room varies from mine to mine, and from hostel to hostel. On older mines, room densities are generally higher. In the early 1970s, Francis Wilson (1972) noted that on mines built before the First World War, workers were accommodated from between 60 and 90 workers per room, while on mines built after the Second World War, workers were housed about 12 to a room. For a slightly more recent discussion of hostel occupancy rates, see Woolfson (1981). On hostel conditions and room densities at Anglo mines in the late 1980s, see the paper by the National Union of Mineworkers (1988: 56-72).

4. H.J. Joel has yet to reach full production. By 1989, the mine was milling an average of 34,000 tons of ore per month and produced a total of 1,288 kilograms of gold that year. It is expected that once in full production, Joel will produce some 5,000 kilograms of gold annually. Compared to other mines in operation, H.J. Joel is one of the smallest gold producers. To give an indication of this, Anglo American’s Freegold Complex which also has its operations in the OFS, produces over 110,000 kilograms of gold per year - almost one hundred times the current output of Joel. Gold Fields’ heavyweight producers - East and West Driefontein too, have a combined output of about 54,000 kilograms each year, while Rand Mines’ Harmony and Anglovaal’s Hartebeestfontein gold mines each produce approximately 30,000 kilograms of gold annually. A table of the industry’s light, medium and heavy weight producers is given in Appendix C.

5. For a more complete discussion of mechanisation at JCI’s gold mines, see Frost (1991). For a broader discussion related to the industry as a whole see Hermanus (1988).

6. In one instance, for example, representatives met with the management team to discuss worker requests to have public telephones installed at a central location for mine residents. The request was taken up by the management team, and three pay phones were introduced at the expense of the mine.

7. A private research agency, Market Research Africa, was commissioned by JCI to undertake the study. The study was conducted at Randfontein Estates, and 607 hostel residents were surveyed. Informants were chosen from all job categories. 477 (or roughly 80%) of those workers surveyed were married men.
8. "Controlled squatting" occurs where land has been specifically set aside for this purpose. Water, sewerage, and other services exist for squatters. "Uncontrolled squatting" occurs where land is unsuitable for residential purposes, with no essential services. For a discussion on informal settlements, see for example Pearson and Mogane-Ramahotswa (1991). The authors identify 3 types of urban residential settlements in South Africa: *formal settlements* - in proclaimed residential areas; *semi-formal settlements* - site-and-service schemes in proclaimed areas; and *informal settlements* - housing arrangements on unproclaimed land.

9. Since about 1985, the townships have experienced major problems in getting residents to pay rates and taxes for funding maintenance expenses. In the mid 1980s, the state began to withdraw from direct financing of the townships, shifting responsibility onto the local authorities. Self-financing was to be facilitated through the levying of rates and taxes.
In the light of worker responses to employer housing schemes, it is necessary to consider in more detail whether migrants do in fact wish to relocate with their families to areas near the mines. It is also important to consider whether current housing policies are structured to meet the real needs and preferences of migrant workers. Further, employer housing policies are influenced by factors in the wider environment, and these need to be taken into consideration to fully understand the complexities of housing delivery in the gold industry.

i) Do migrants want to stabilise?

The decision on the part of migrant workers to urbanise is influenced by two general considerations:

i) the extent to which these workers are "rurally oriented"; and

ii) the perceptions of the individual migrant regarding opportunities for a secure residence in the urban area.

With regard to the former, many migrants have responsibilities and commitments in the rural areas that impact on their ability or desire to resettle elsewhere. In many instances — particularly in the gold industry — migrant workers voluntarily remit portions of their wages to support dependants at home. As
Moller and Schlemmer (1985) estimate, the number of a migrant’s dependants is often between 5 and 7 persons, and these include members of the individual’s extended family. The decision to relocate permanently is therefore one that has ramifications not only for the individual worker, but also for all those who are dependant on him or her in the sending area.

In addition, migrant workers have differential access to rural resources such as livestock and arable land which they may not wish to relinquish. In many instances, rights of access to land in the rural areas are dependant on continued occupancy by workers or members of their families. The implications of this are that it cannot be assumed that migrants will urbanise given the removal of influx controls and the promotion of employee housing schemes.

With regard to perceived opportunities for a secure residence, the migrant’s decision to urbanise is further influenced by a number of factors such as the availability of land, urban living expenses, levels of violence and civil unrest in the townships and perceptions of the stability of current employment contracts.

In a recent survey of migrant mineworker attitudes towards urbanisation and company housing schemes, the NUM found that 38% of the respondents interviewed did not wish to bring their
families to live with them while working on a mine. The survey sample comprised 250 male mineworkers who were also members of the union. Reasons given by married men in this regard were as follows:

- no wish for families to live in "violence torn" SA townships;
- concern for cattle and land rights in "homelands";
- no wish to shift settled families at this stage;
- extended families too large to settle in affordable home away from place of origin; and
- cost of living too high in urban areas (NUM, 1991).

In many respects, these findings reflect the observations made in Chapter 4 -- that is, while significant numbers of migrant workers do wish to relocate with their families to areas near the mines, there are also significant numbers of workers who have no immediate intention to do so.

Literature published since the abolition of influx control has tended to confirm this. Gelderblom (1991) for example has argued that:

... it does seem that there are significant numbers of migrants who do not want to be integrated into urban society, and who do have a very strong conception of rural return (1).
Similarly, de V Graaff (1987) asserts that better paid migrant workers can and do invest in rural resources in order to retire from migrant work and maintain an independent existence in the home areas.

The decision to urbanise is influenced by a range of factors and it is these that determine the settlement behaviour of individual workers. Migrants have not simply abandoned their rural ties in favour of living nearest their places of work. Patterns of urbanisation since the lifting of influx controls have been -- and are likely to continue to be -- uneven and varied. Different groups of migrants have adopted different settlement strategies ranging from full settlement to partial relocation, while others have continued their rural-urban migration.

In some instances entire families have not relocated as a whole to the towns. Mabin (1989) for example argues that some families have preferred to have a few members of the household move to the towns for different periods of time, while retaining a base in the rural areas. In other instances, families have partially relocated to areas within travelling distance of the industrial centres where land is cheaper (Tomlinson, 1991). Most notably, this has occurred in areas such as the borders of Bophuthatswana and Kwandebele where workers have access to jobs in the PWV region; in Kwazulu and the Transkei where migrants commute to employment centres in Natal; in the Ciskei which is close to East
London; and in other areas.

With regard to labour in the gold mining industry, the above considerations have a bearing on migrant workers who are now being offered the chance to join a number of different housing schemes. With regard to company home ownership plans, there has been a general lack of enthusiasm amongst African migrants on the gold mines for these schemes to date. In the case of JCI, only a very small percentage of migrant workers have joined the group’s Bond Subsidy Scheme since it was launched in 1987. Similarly with regard to Anglo’s Home Ownership Scheme, less than 2% of the total African workforce were homeowners by October 1990. Table 5.1 gives the latest available figures for participation in that group’s housing programme.

Table 5.1 Participation in the AAC Home Ownership Scheme, Oct.1987 - Oct 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number in Scheme</th>
<th>Total African Workforce</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>161129</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>176038</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>181941</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3423</td>
<td>174207</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Anglo American Corporation.

These low participation rates do not necessarily reflect a disinterest amongst African mineworkers in home ownership generally. In the NUM survey mentioned above, it was found that
more than 90% of all migrants interviewed were in favour becoming home-owners. It is therefore incorrect to argue (as some employers do) that home-ownership involves a range of responsibilities that migrant workers do not want.

There are however a number of factors that constrain the migrant’s interest in management-administered housing schemes. Firstly, these schemes require that workers relocate permanently to areas surrounding the mines. As we have seen, it cannot be assumed that migrants wish to leave their home areas. In addition, amid widespread retrenchments and the general uncertain future of marginal or low grade mines, worker interest in the permanency of home-ownership is further dampened. The NUM has noted that the greatest fear expressed amongst mineworkers in relation to company housing schemes is a fear of retrenchment.

Geographical location is another important consideration that has a bearing on the attractiveness of employer home ownership schemes. For example, two of JCI’s mines operate in isolated areas of the country. These are Consolidated Murchison Ltd. (an antimony mine in northern Transvaal) and Amandelbult Sections (part of the Rustenburg Platinum group of mines near Lebowa). In these areas there is little interest amongst workers for buying homes, since the only resale would be to other mineworkers.

A second major constraining factor concerns ability to pay. Thus,
although both JCI and Anglo offer highly subsidised housing packages, few workers can afford to meet even the remaining payments under these schemes. Home ownership expenses do not only involve bond repayments; they also involve the payment of deposits, transfer fees and the many other costs that come with setting up and furnishing a house. In the NUM study of migrant attitudes towards home ownership, most migrant workers indicated they would be unable to allocate more than R100 per month for housing expenses -- and only 1% of the respondents said that they could afford to pay between R201 and R250 per month (Table 5.2). Even under subsidised conditions, these figures suggest that the vast majority of black mineworkers cannot afford the expenses of home ownership.

Table 5.2 Rent/Bond Affordability - Ability to Pay, 1991.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount per month</th>
<th>Percentage of those interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R99 or less</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R100 - R125</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R126 - R150</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R151 - R200</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R201 - R250</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NUM.

In terms of JCI’s Bond Subsidy Scheme, the minimum monthly payments required for joining the scheme range between R105 per month for grade 1 underground workers to R279 for grade 8 underground workers (Table 4.3, Chapter 4). Taken together with the additional costs of home-ownership, these amounts are clearly
above the reach of the majority of workers if NUM's survey is indicative of the affordability profiles of most migrant workers.

ii) Housing policies in the broader context

In addition to considerations such as affordability and migrant preferences, there are a number of factors that continue to impede the stabilisation policies of the mines. These include inadequate finance for the urbanisation of migrant families; lack of state assistance for company housing schemes; and restrictions on free settlement in the urban areas. These problems are not confined to the gold industry, they are national issues. They do however impact on the implementation of employer housing assistance schemes to the extent that they provide a framework within which policies have to be implemented.

In this respect, perhaps the most important consideration concerns the availability of finance for housing. In terms of demand, there is a need for employers to finance low cost housing initiatives. The National Building Research Institute has estimated that 71% of the African population requires a subsidy of some sort to be able to afford housing, and that 45% of all Africans cannot make any contribution at all to housing costs (SAIRR, 1990: 101).

Within this context, employer home ownership schemes take on a
new significance. Increasingly the state has begun to look towards the private sector for alleviating the country's housing crisis. To date however, the private sector has been reluctant to finance housing for the very poor. No financial institutions are prepared to provide housing loans below R12,500 -- and this is where the demand is greatest. Recent initiatives in the form of the much publicised R3bn Loan Guarantee Fund enable financial institutions to provide housing bonds down to a minimum of R12,500. Similarly, the minimum cost of a stand provided by the South African Housing Trust is R12,000. While these initiatives do go a long way to extend housing to low income groups, there still remain large numbers of Africans who are in need of cheaper solutions.

On the gold mines employers are only just beginning to recognise the need for an incremental process of housing delivery. Until very recently neither the Anglo American Corporation nor JCI catered for mineworkers wanting to participate in site-and-service or "self help" schemes (simply because these workers were unable to arrange the finance from lending institutions). Both mining groups now provide assistance for workers to initiate very basic starter homes that can be upgraded over time. Management at Rand Mines, Anglovaal and Genmin also argue that they are not opposed to site and service schemes for workers (Interviews, 1990).
The recognition of informal housing for workers in the gold industry is a reality shift for employers. Both the Anglo Corporation and JCI have begun to experience difficulties financing their home ownership schemes. Interest rates have risen dramatically in the past five years and this has meant that the costs of subsidising bond repayments have escalated. When these groups introduced their home ownership schemes, the bond rate was 12.5 per cent. At the end of 1990 the bond rate had soared to 21 per cent, while employee contributions remained fixed. These changes occurred within the context of a depressed price of gold and declining profit margins.

The high cost of financing housing schemes has also prompted employers to revise their involvement in direct housing provision. A number of mining groups now prefer to see themselves as "facilitators" rather than "providers" in terms of housing needs. Management at Rand Mines openly state that they "wish to get out of the housing business" (Interview, 1990). In place of building houses for workers, employers now argue that their role should be to pave the way for workers to make their own arrangements. This involves for example: dealing with the state to ensure sufficient land is made available for worker settlement near the mines; lending money to local authorities for the purchase of this land, and for the provision of cheap housing stands; reworking or removing cumbersome administrative procedures that inhibit township development projects; and
providing bridging finance to encourage building societies to participate more in employee housing.

The costs involved in promoting home ownership have also meant that new priority is being given to the rent subsidies or living out schemes discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. While such subsidies do promote freedom of choice, they also shift the responsibility for housing onto workers themselves. In the case of JCI it was noted that these initiatives have directly contributed to squatting in surrounding areas.

The mining groups hope to restructure their remuneration programmes in a way that will build housing costs into workers salaries. Supposedly, this will enable workers to make use of a range of housing options, subject to the approval of management. However, policies which encourage workers to settle off the mines are very much influenced by factors in the wider environment. Employers assume that workers paid a living out allowance are free to settle where and as they wish. But state urbanisation policies continue to restrict the range of options that are effectively open to these workers. For example, although the Group Areas Act has recently been removed, legislation such as the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, the Slums Act, and a range of local authority by-laws continue to obstruct free settlement off the mines. Employers have expressed their dismay at the web of bureaucratic red tape that continues to
hinder their housing plans. At present, it appears that the wider environment is not entirely conducive to the housing policies that the mining groups are moving towards.

In review, it has been argued that it is problematic to assume that all migrants want to relocate with their families to areas near the mines. A variety of considerations impact upon the decision to urbanise, and it is these that shape the settlement preferences of individual workers. In the wider context, employers are being increasingly called upon to provide for the housing needs of their workers. In attempting to move towards a locally housed industry workforce, employers on the gold mines have had to take into account the specific needs and preferences of their employees. They have also had to rethink some of their policies to make them compatible with what workers can afford to pay. In the wider context, a number of constraints continue to frustrate management plans to implement a more flexible housing model for the African workforce.
NOTES

1. The gradual erosion of the subsistence base of the homeland areas has meant that rural households have become increasingly dependant on migrant earnings. See for example Murray (1981), and Sharp and Spiegel (1985).

2. A number of local area studies on the resource profiles of migrant workers are presented in Wilson and Ramphele (1989). More comprehensive data for migrants from various areas can be found in Moller and Schlemmer (1985). See also Peart (1982) who argues that four groups of migrant workers can be identified: i) young unmarried men who do not own land in the rural areas; ii) newly married young householders who are in the process of acquiring land; iii) married landowners who typically have 10-15 years work experience and wish to expand their rural base; and iv) migrant workers with land in the rural areas who wish to retire.


4. In a study conducted amongst Durban-based migrants prior to the lifting of influx controls, Moller (1986) found that:

   "All other factors being equal, access to land of one's own, preferably a large tract of fertile land, was a decisive factor in evaluating return migration models (574)."

   With regard to retirement plans, Moller found that the majority of migrants surveyed held an ideal conception of migration: they showed a strong preference for reliance on rural resources, and for investing their life savings in agriculturally related projects. With regard to landless migrants, however, Moller concluded that these workers:

   "... would contemplate deviation from the circular pattern of migration (562)."

5. Murray (1987) calls this a form of "displaced urbanisation". He argues that material constraints have shaped black urban settlement patterns -- urbanisation has thus occurred to the peripheries of established metropolitan labour markets, rather than to the metropoles themselves. This argument is central to the work of Mabin (1989).

6. The emergence of commuter populations in quasi-urban areas inside the homelands predates the formal abolition of influx control. For more on this see Cobbett et.al. (1985).

104
7. This figure included workers who desired to own homes in the rural areas.

8. This can be seen clearly from a reading of the government's *White Paper on Urbanisation* published in 1986. See for example Section 8.2 of the paper where it is argued that:

... the relevant government institutions, housing departments, administrations and local authorities should create conditions in which the private sector, individuals, employees and others can make and be willing to make, the largest contribution to housing (Section 8.2: 36) (Own emphasis).

By the 1990s, the state's attitude towards housing provision had not changed in this regard, although in recent years government has refined the methods by which to "create the conditions" for private sector housing delivery. See for example the series of research papers produced by the Urban Foundation (1990), particularly Volume 9 of the series.

9. The Loan Guarantee Fund was established in 1989, and is administered by the Urban Foundation. The scheme is sponsored by foreign governments (the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and also 18 large South African corporations including the Anglo American Corporation.

10. The South African Housing Trust is a private housing agency that was created in November 1986 with an interest-free grant of R400m from the government.

11. The zoning of land for residential purposes takes place at the national level according to broad "guide plans". This planning is done by the various government departments. After land has been zoned by government, the local authorities have power to control how such land is developed.
Under changed conditions of reproduction, employers in the gold industry have attempted to restructure the migrant labour system. In the 1970s, this restructuring was of a limited nature. Transformations to the political economy of mining could largely be contained without a serious revision of migrant practices. In the 1980s however, key elements of the repressive framework began to be eroded, necessitating more fundamental change to the migrant order.

In the broader context, state policy towards African workers was changing. Government granted partial citizenship rights to sections of the migrant workforce towards the end of the 1970s. In the 1980s these measures proved inadequate. The state could no longer deny the majority of the population the basic freedom to travel, work and settle where they wished. Influx controls were removed, and home ownership rights were extended to all black South Africans.

Political reform in the national arena mirrored social change in the gold industry. The status of African migrants was finally beginning to change from the powerless to the more powerful. The advent of the National Union of Mineworkers and the removal of the colour bar were central to this process. As migrant workers became unionised and advanced up the job ladder, so the various
institutions of labour repression were called into question and challenged. The compound system -- historically the cornerstone of worker control and exploitation -- was now central to the struggle between management and labour.

Increasingly, workers were demanding improvements and alternatives to enforced bachelor living. Intergroup violence and unrest amongst black workers added to the pressures being placed on the hostel system. In the 1970s, management responded to increased levels of worker unrest by segregating the compounds along ethnic lines and by upgrading living conditions for workers. In the 1980s it was clear that solutions to the problem were not that simple. Hostel segregation was found to intensify rather than diminish inter-group tensions, and compound upgrading did not nearly go far enough to deal with some of the root causes of the problem.

At the same time, management was having to acknowledge that only one form of accommodation for the African workforce was no longer appropriate. Skilled and supervisory workers could no longer be housed under the same roof as the rest of the workforce -- these workers required accommodation that was commensurate with their skill and expertise.

By the late 1980s these factors had prompted employers to begin experimenting with alternatives to the hostel system. The
abolition of influx controls and the extension of home ownership rights provided the legislative space within which new housing policies could be pursued. Gradually, the mining groups began to offer migrant workers the opportunity to settle with their families on or near the mines. Home ownership schemes were devised -- but these were clearly tailored for the better paid and more skilled African elite. For less well off migrants, some employers offered workers rent subsidies and living out allowances to enable them to settle in nearby townships. Further, in an attempt to introduce a measure of flexibility to their housing practices, employers throughout the industry began to plan towards the so-called "clean wage". Like the rent subsidies, the clean wage held attractive possibilities for moving workers out of the hostels and off the mines.

By the early 1990s, only a small proportion of the migrant workforce had been stabilised in family accommodation. Mine compounds and return migration remained entrenched despite the introduction of new housing policies. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, to a large extent, management retained control over the extent and pace of housing delivery. The different groups of employers were by no means united in their concerns to downgrade migrancy. In some quarters, employers remained wedded to traditional labour practices.

Secondly, a number of constraining factors continued to impede
the stabilisation policies of the mines. By law, foreign workers remained bound to the migrant system -- they could not bring their families to live with them in South Africa. For South African migrants, free settlement in the urban areas continued to be restricted by a variety of legislative measures -- and these have yet to be amended or removed.

Financial constraints proved to be another very important limiting factor. Those mining groups that initiated subsidised housing programmes found them to be prohibitively expensive. This dampened management's enthusiasm for large scale housing projects. Employers began to opt for less interventionist policies that were not only cheaper, but displaced the responsibility for housing onto workers themselves.

Thirdly, the formulation and design of company housing policies remained the preserve of management -- with little or no input from workers. As a result the schemes were paternalistic in orientation and did not satisfy the diversity of requirements of the migrant workforce. In this respect, affordability remained a deciding factor and prevented many workers from joining the new housing programmes. Employers have only just begun to adjust their policies to cater for the broader spectrum of demand.

Finally, for many migrant workers, breaking out of the migrant system proved extremely difficult. Permanent relocation to the
mines involved a relinquishing of security and resources in the sending areas. In the absence of better alternatives, a number of migrants "preferred" to remain in the hostels. This remains an irony and a legacy of apartheid and migrancy.

Migration and Dependency in a Post-Apartheid South Africa

Changes to state urbanisation policies, and to employer housing practices have called into question the future of the migrant labour system. In the transition to a more democratic society, this issue has become more relevant. For years the trade union movement has been challenging the institutions of apartheid. The National Union of Mineworkers (allied closely to the ANC and the mass democratic movement) has repeatedly called for an end to migrancy and single-sex housing. A key question is whether these demands will gain support in a post-apartheid setting.

Transformations to the migrant system will also depend on who retains control over migrant arrangements. In this regard, workers, the state, employers and the sending countries all participate in the labour framework, and have a vested economic interest in oscillatory migration. The extent of change to the migrant system will be determined by the tensions and struggles between these groups. It will also reflect the demands for reform counterposed against the constraints of dependency.
Robin Park

Ikwezi Hostel

32 Shaft

Bhongweni Hostel

Umhangeni Hostel

2N Shaft

THE RANDFONTEIN ESTATES
G. M. CO., W. LTD.
SURFACE PLAN SHOWING LOCAL TOWNSHIPS, HOSTELS
AND MINE SHAFTS
### APPENDIX B

**AFRICAN WORKERS EMPLOYED ON CHAMBER AFFILIATED GOLD MINES, DECEMBER 1990.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINE</th>
<th>Comp.</th>
<th>Cont.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 BARBERTON</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BARBROOK</td>
<td>694</td>
<td></td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 BEATRIX</td>
<td>7719</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>7943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BLYVOORUITZICHT</td>
<td>8315</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 BRACKEI</td>
<td>1886</td>
<td></td>
<td>1886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 BUFFELSFONTEIN</td>
<td>9303</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 DEELKRAAL</td>
<td>6755</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 DOORSFONTEIN</td>
<td>8858</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>8995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 DEEFSFONTEIN (East)</td>
<td>12403</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>12690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 DEEFSFONTEIN (West)</td>
<td>15208</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>15523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 DORSFONTEIN DEEP</td>
<td>3787</td>
<td></td>
<td>3787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 DORNSRAND</td>
<td>8541</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 DORFSFONTEIN</td>
<td>5002</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 FREDDIES</td>
<td>14223</td>
<td></td>
<td>14223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 FS GEDULD</td>
<td>12909</td>
<td></td>
<td>12909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 FS SAAPPLAAS</td>
<td>12796</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 GROOTVLEI</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 HARMONY</td>
<td>24941</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>25529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 HBFONTEIN</td>
<td>16827</td>
<td>1419</td>
<td>18246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 N.J. JOEL</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>2438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 KIMROSS</td>
<td>7802</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>8297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 KLOOF</td>
<td>14496</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>14632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 LESLE</td>
<td>2292</td>
<td></td>
<td>2292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 LEUDORF</td>
<td>4496</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>4693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 LIBANON</td>
<td>6997</td>
<td></td>
<td>6997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 LORAIN</td>
<td>7426</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>7646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 MARIKALE</td>
<td>385</td>
<td></td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 MORY</td>
<td>1018</td>
<td></td>
<td>1018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 PRESIDENT BRAND</td>
<td>18121</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>19173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 PRESIDENT STEYR</td>
<td>18007</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>18371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 RAMSFONTEIN</td>
<td>13548</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>13899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 STEILFONTEIN</td>
<td>3479</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>3898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 ST. HELENA</td>
<td>8234</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>8527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 SWISSEL</td>
<td>3042</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>3328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 VAAL REEPS</td>
<td>45314</td>
<td>3970</td>
<td>49284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 VENTERSPOST</td>
<td>7467</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>7618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 WESTERN HOLDINGS</td>
<td>17249</td>
<td></td>
<td>17249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 WINKELBAAK</td>
<td>8053</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>8530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 WESTERN AREAS</td>
<td>8251</td>
<td></td>
<td>8251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 WEST DEEP LEVELS</td>
<td>23649</td>
<td>1156</td>
<td>24805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 WEST RAND CONSOLIDATED</td>
<td>1798</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>396531</td>
<td>13322</td>
<td>409853</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chamber of Mines of South Africa

Notes: 1) The first column (Comp.) gives the numbers of people employed by the mine.
2) The second column (Cont.) gives the number on the mine who are employed by outside contractors.
3) The numbers shown represent the number employed at year end.
## APPENDIX C
### GOLD PRODUCTION BY MINE AND MINING HOUSE, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINE</th>
<th>ANNUAL PRODUCTION (Kg. Fine)</th>
<th>MINE</th>
<th>ANNUAL PRODUCTION (Kg. Fine)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Vaal Reefs</td>
<td>75455.2</td>
<td>18. Deelkraal</td>
<td>9831.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Freegold (South)*</td>
<td>62999.0</td>
<td>19. Blyvooruitzicht</td>
<td>9491.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Freegold (North)*</td>
<td>47884.0</td>
<td>20. Doornfontein</td>
<td>7932.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. W.D.Levels</td>
<td>40568.9</td>
<td>21. Lorraine</td>
<td>7908.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Healthington</td>
<td>31157.2</td>
<td>22. Erpm</td>
<td>7790.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Harmony</td>
<td>29116.0</td>
<td>23. Libanon</td>
<td>7322.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Driefontein (West)</td>
<td>28790.1</td>
<td>24. Unisel</td>
<td>6304.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Randfontein</td>
<td>26901.0</td>
<td>25. Venterspost</td>
<td>6101.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Driefontein (East)</td>
<td>25851.9</td>
<td>27. Stilfontein</td>
<td>4315.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Buffelsfontein</td>
<td>14516.0</td>
<td>28. Grootei</td>
<td>3170.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Western Areas</td>
<td>13352.0</td>
<td>29. Leslie</td>
<td>2668.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Beatnik</td>
<td>13159.2</td>
<td>30. W.R.Cons</td>
<td>2215.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Eldorado</td>
<td>12971.1</td>
<td>31. Bracken</td>
<td>2156.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Kinross</td>
<td>12106.0</td>
<td>32. Barberton</td>
<td>1420.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>16. Winkelhalk</td>
<td>11571.0</td>
<td>33. H.A.Joel</td>
<td>1284.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. St. Helena</td>
<td>10171.5</td>
<td>34. Marievale</td>
<td>759.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Chamber of Mines Annual Report, 1990.

* The Freegold complex is an amalgamation of mines administered by the Anglo American Corporation. It incorporates the following previously independent operations: President Brand, President Steyn, Free State Goldshe Mines Limited, and Western Holdings.

### BY MINING HOUSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>TOTAL PRODUCTION (kilograms fine)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglo American Corporation</td>
<td>239,868.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Fields of South Africa</td>
<td>111,948.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germain</td>
<td>130,335.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rand Mines</td>
<td>51,364.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCI</td>
<td>41,541.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglovaal</td>
<td>36,926.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>570,619.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

113
Research involved a series of discussion-type interviews with divisional management at the head office level of each of the mining groups in Johannesburg. Interviews were also conducted with mine officials and management at a number of mines on the Far West Rand, and in the Orange Free State. These were: Randfontein Estates, Western Areas, and H.J. Joel gold mines.

Two trips to the Witwatersrand and Free State gold fields were undertaken, the first in September 1990, and the second in January 1991. During the first visit, interviews were held with management at Rand Mines, The Anglo American Corporation of South Africa (Anglo), Johannesburg Consolidated Investments Company (JCI), Gold Fields of South Africa, Genmin, and at Anglovaal. Interviews were conducted according to a set of guide questions prepared in advance (see Appendix E). Interviews were not recorded, though notes were taken during discussions, and written up in more detail after each appointment. During this first visit I was accompanied by my supervisor, Wilmot James, who has travelled to Johannesburg for research with the different mining groups on numerous occasions. This proved useful, as the joint interviews meant that all aspects of the different issues were covered, and also that when combined, the notes taken were quite comprehensive.
During the second phase of the fieldwork, follow-up interviews were arranged with JCI and Anglo. Visits to each of JCI's gold mines were also organised. During this phase of research, additional information that was needed was followed up on. To a large extent, this involved getting company data reflecting employment figures, accommodation statistics and other details of the different housing policies of JCI and Anglo. A brief summary of the type of information that was sought is also provided in Appendix E.

The housing schemes at Mohlakeng township near Randfontein Estates and Western Areas and at Thabong township in the Orange Free State were also visited. In both instances, I was accompanied by various representatives of management. Visits were also made to Bekkersdal township and to several informal settlements near Randfontein Estates, and in Thabong township.

Documentary research was carried out at the Anglo American Resource Centre in Marshall Street, Johannesburg, and at a number of libraries in Cape Town. At the University of Cape Town, these were the main Jagger library; the African Studies Library; the Accounting Library; and the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU). Material at the South African Trade Union Library in Salt River, and the South African Library in Gardens was also used.
A large body of primary and secondary literature concerning labour in the South African gold mining industry exists, and extensive use was made of this material. With regard to primary information, various publications of the Chamber of Mines and of individual mining groups and mines proved useful. These included the Annual Reports of the Chamber of Mines and of each mining group, as well as those of Randfontein Estates, Western Areas and H.J. Joel gold mines. Other publications of the Chamber of Mines that were consulted were: the Chamber of Mines Newsletter (monthly), 1990-1991; the Chamber of Mines Research Organisation (COMRO) Annual Reports, 1987-1990; selected research reports of the Human Resources Laboratory, COMRO; Statistical Tables of the Chamber of Mines; and Mining Survey - a quarterly journal published by the Chamber of Mines.
APPENDIX E  INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

i) Discussion questions

1) What is the philosophy of this group regarding the use of migrant labour?

2) Would you favour a locally housed African workforce?

3) What attempts, if any, are being made to downgrade the migrant system on your gold mines?

4) How are African workers on these mines currently housed?

5) Does the group provide visiting facilities for the wives and families of married workers?
   a) How are visits organised and arranged?

6) What alternatives to the hostel system does the group offer?
   a) What is the company’s attitude towards home ownership for African workers?
   b) Do you have a home ownership scheme for black workers?
   c) Could you explain how this scheme works?
   d) How is the scheme financed?
   e) Which workers are eligible to participate in this scheme?

7) Do you allow African workers to live off the mines in nearby townships?
   a) Do you provide these workers with any form of financial assistance to rent housing in these areas?
   b) What is the amount of this assistance?
   c) Do amounts differ for individual workers, according to job grade or other criteria?

8) What is the group’s position with regard to:
   a) informal housing for workers?
   b) site and service/self help schemes?
   c) squatting?
   d) the "clean wage" system of remuneration?
   e) the use of township labour?

9) What factors have prompted changes in housing policy throughout the industry in recent years?
   a) Has the National Union of Mineworkers been a factor in this regard?
   b) Have recent changes in state urbanisation policies affected the housing policies for African workers of this group?

10) Do housing practices differ at the mine level?
    a) What factors shape the housing practices of individual
11) Is the National Union of Mineworkers involved with the formulation of company housing schemes? To what extent?

12) What efforts, if any, are being made to communicate the housing policies of the group to employees? Are workers aware of the various options open to them?

13) What has been the response of workers to the different housing schemes administered by the group?

14) What obstacles have you encountered in the implementation of different housing schemes?
   a) To what extent has the state been supportive of off-mine housing initiatives?
   b) Is there legislation which still hinders the housing policies of this group?
   c) If so, in what ways are your housing schemes affected by such legislation?

15) What do you believe to be the benefits of allowing workers to live off the mines by way of the housing policies the group pursues?

16) What are the problems involved with having African mineworkers live off the mines in nearby townships?
   a) absenteeism?
   b) time discipline?
   c) township violence and politics?

17) What do you see as being the future prospects for foreign workers employed in the gold industry?
   a) Will these workers remain an important part of the mine labour force?
   b) Will they be allowed to settle with their families near the mines in the future?

18) What are your views on the future of the migrant labour system?

   ii) Company data required

1) Could you please provide me with the following information:
   a) the total number of workers employed by the group on all mining operations.
   b) the racial composition of the workforce.
   c) the number of workers employed on group gold mines
      i) by mine
      ii) by race
   d) a breakdown of the employment of migrant workers by
2) Could I have figures showing the number of African employees who:
   a) own their own homes
   b) rent mine accommodation
   c) live in single quarters
   d) live in married quarters
   e) rent housing off the mines

3) Do you have figures giving a breakdown of participants in the different housing schemes by skill level?
   a) With regard to home ownership, could you give a breakdown of participants by size of mortgage?

4) Do you have figures of the minimum wages paid to African workers according to job grade, for surface and underground workers?
References

i) Primary Sources

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