THE CONCEPT RATIONALITY IN THE WORK OF JURGEN HABERMAS

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF ARTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS.

by,

Pat Luckin,
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For financial assistance, I should like to express my appreciation to The Human Sciences Research Council. The Human Sciences Research Council are not responsible for any opinions or conclusions reached in this work.
This study attempts to answer the question of how Habermas "re-thinks" or "reformulates" the concept of rationality and rationalization processes. The method is analytical. The early, later and most recent works of Habermas are analysed with the aim of showing that he approaches the concept of rationality from an unusual perspective which has not been discussed in the secondary literature. Namely, the perspective of human agency and communicative judgment which is gleaned from the work of Arendt. Arendt's reconstruction of the Aristotelian concepts of "praxis" and "poiesis" is central to the concept of human agency in the work of Habermas. Habermas, like Arendt, distinguishes between action as a making process and action as a communicative process. Throughout his work he attempts to relate these two aspects of human agency to the concepts of rationality, knowledge, and autonomy. Arendt's reconstruction of Kant's concept of reflective judgement is fundamental to Habermas' most recent argument for grounding the concept of rationality in general. Here Habermas links Arendt's concept of communicative judgement, men/women's capacity for saying "Yes/No" with the accompanying reasons, to universal validity claims which are recognized and redeemed through dialogue between at least two subjects. Another closely related theme which is internal to the concept of human agency and which permeates the fabric of Habermas' work is Arendt's concept of plurality. The concept of plurality is fundamental to the concept of intersubjective recognition and consensus formation in Habermas' work. I show how Habermas uses the concept of intersubjectivity to clarify his concept of practical rationality in his later work and how intersubjective recognition is central to his most recent argument for grounding the concept of rationality in general.

Habermas moves beyond the work of Arendt in his efforts to appropriate and re-formulate the Enlightenment concept of reason in the light of the works of Marx, Freud, Weber, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Lukacs. The concept of reflection is revised from the viewpoint of reflective, communicative judgement. The concept of rationality is distinguished from the attitudes which actors adopt in apprehending their world. Piaget's decentration thesis is shown to be central to the concept of communicative rationality.
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INTRODUCTION

JURGEN HABERMAS AND THE CONCEPT RATIONALITY AS THE KEY TO A CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

Jurgen Habermas is a scholar of extraordinary stature. He ranks as one of the "great masters" of social theory who has "done more than any other contemporary scholar to "bridge the chasm between Continental and Anglo-Saxon philosophies" (Giddens 1977:163). As Richard Bernstein says, "One cannot help admiring his encyclopaedic knowledge, his broad historical perspective, and his mastery of current research in philosophy as well as the social and political disciplines" (1976:163). Habermas' work, is, as is that of most influential scholars, eulogised or condemned, dismissed as sophistry or subjected to detailed analysis and critique.

The purpose of the following study is that of contributing to the analysis and critique of a unifying theme in Habermas' work, namely, the concept of rationality as central to a critical theory of society. This study attempts to answer the question of how Habermas "re-thinks" or "reformulates" the concept of rationality in modern technological society which seems to be characterised by utilitarianism, dogmatism and conditioned behaviour. The method is analytical. The early, later and most recent works of Habermas are analysed with the aim of showing that he approaches the concept of rationality from an unusual perspective which has not been discussed in the secondary literature (1). Namely, the perspective of human agency and communicative judgment which is gleaned from the work of Hannah Arendt. This perspective is integrated with a vast range of insights deriving from the tradition of critical theory in general, which needs to be clarified. I approach this tradition by briefly discussing the impetus behind Habermas' work. I am then able to elaborate on the scope and aims of the study by providing a brief overview of the work. As Habermas so aptly says, "problems of presentation are not extrinsic to substantive problems" (1986:xxxix)
The Concept of Reason, Tradition of Critical Theory and the Impetus behind the Work of Habermas

In 1961 Habermas wrote an article entitled "The German Idealism of the Jewish Philosophers" for a series of radio programs initiated by Thilo Koch (1983:22). In this study Habermas invoked Walter Benjamin's ninth thesis on the philosophy of history as follows:

"In it, the dialectic of the enlightenment which, in its broken progress dominates the as yet undecided course of history, is held fast in the form of an allegorical interpretation. The ninth thesis says," (Habermas 1988:34).

"A Klee painting named "Angelus Novus" shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress." (Benjamin cited in Habermas 1983:34).

What Habermas has done from his earliest to his most recent work is to confront the crisis of modernity captured so vividly in Benjamin's ninth thesis. Habermas, in contrast to Benjamin the allegorist, has attempted to develop a systematic and critical theory of modern society. Central to this endeavour is the premise that the light of reason has not been totally extinguished despite the "darkness of the times" which the German nation in particular, and the nations of the world in general, have experienced in the Twentieth century. Habermas has consistently refused to accept the thesis that rationality is a mere idealist dream to be found in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, captured by scholars such as Kant, Schelling, Fichte and Hegel (Habermas 1987:310). He has attempted to confront the crisis of modernity as have numerous scholars before
him, such as Max Weber, Georg Lukacs, and the central figures of
the "Frankfurt School" of critical theory, Theodor Adorno, Max
Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, by raising the question of
rationality. Habermas' orientation has been, and continues to
be, complex and multifaceted. As George Lichtheim said of the
difficulties involved in an assessment of Habermas' work:

"[At] an age when most of his colleagues have painfully
established control over one corner of the field, he has
made himself master of the whole, in depth and breadth
alike. Whether he is refuting Popper, dissecting the
pragmatism of Charles Peirce, delving into the medieval
antecedents of Schelling's metaphysics, or bringing Marxist
sociology up to date, there is always the same uncanny
mastery of the sources joined to an enviable talent for
clarifying intricate logical puzzles. He seems to have been
born with a faculty for digesting the toughest kind of
material and then refashioning it into orderly wholes".
(Lichtheim cited in Bernstein 1985:1).

One way of approaching the extraordinary depth and breadth of
Habermas' work is to distil the impetus behind his work. This
can be gleaned from his study of the impact of the Jewish
philosophers on the heritage of Western thought. In response to
Thilo Koch's suggestion that the contributors to the series
record their experiences pertinent to the theme addressed,
Habermas emphasised that he experienced a traumatic break with
tradition in his formative years. He said:

"At the age of 15 or 16 I sat before the radio and
experienced what was being discussed at the Nuremberg
tribunal; when others instead of being struck silent by the
ghastliness, began to dispute the justice of the trial,
procedural questions, and questions of jurisdiction, there
was the first rupture which still gapes. Certainly it is
only because I was still sensitive and easily offended that
I did not close myself to the fact of the collectively
realized inhumanity in the same measure as the majority of
my elders (Habermas 1983:41).

This "rupture which still gapes" meant for young Habermas that
the immediate past from which he was to take his bearings was in
disarray. How could one understand why a culture, which nurtured
the philosophers of the Enlightenment, for whom critical reason
and the issues of justice, freedom and morality were central, became the ground upon which Auschwitz, Dachau, and Buchenwald stood? Why did the German nation not resist the "pathological" form of society which Hitler and his henchmen inaugurated? These questions deeply troubled the young Habermas. Habermas' response to this "rupture" was to immerse himself in the great tradition of Western thought. His central concern became that of rethinking and appropriating the valuable aspects of the tradition of Western thought which had been suppressed and distorted during the Nazi era. For Habermas this became an urgent and passionate commitment. Reason, freedom, justice and equality were not simply theoretical platitudes which were to be explored in the ivory tower of academic life, but urgent questions with practical implications to be fought for and protected from disrepute. No subject matter could bar his commitment to this task of coming to grips with what he calls the "heritage of Occidental reason" (Habermas 1986:106). Habermas had learnt from Adorno to approach the primary works of scholars such as Weber, Durkheim, Freud, Parsons, Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling and to "systematically exhaust them" before considering the secondary sources (1986:94). Habermas' aim was, and still is, that of distilling the heritage of Western reason from whatever he casts his attention upon. He avidly studied the classical tradition of German and Grecian thought. He had learnt from the Jewish scholars who returned to Germany after the war that participatory democracy was something to be cherished and nurtured. Habermas says:

"You ask about the influence of Hitlerism on my intellectual development and also what possible general significance it had. Well all biographical facts have an idiosyncratic element. Perhaps I could say that in general that the intellectual and cultural provincialism we were plunged into by the Nazis was not overcome at a stroke, but relatively slowly. The traditions of the Enlightenment and of radical modernism did not generally become accepted before the end of the fifties. However when they did achieve a breakthrough, it was with fewer reservations than at any previous time in German history. Incidentally, this breakthrough would have been scarcely conceivable without the outstanding intellectual impact of the last generation
of German-Jewish scholars, philosophers and artists who returned to Germany after everything was over, either in person or through their works and writings...We learned that the bourgeois constitutional state in its French, American or English form is a historical achievement. This is an important biographical difference between those who experienced what a half-hearted bourgeois republic like the Weimer Republic can lead to, and those whose political consciousness was formed at a later date." (1986:38;75)

Habermas investigated the historico-philosophical dimensions underlying the tradition of the constitutional states and presented his assessment of this period of European thought in "Theory and Practice" which was published in 1963. Central to this study is the relationship between the concept of reason (in its broadest sense, encompassing the ideals of autonomy, justice and responsibility), and public opinion. Here, Habermas agrees with Sieyes who points out that:

"in this gap between the individual insight and majority opinion, the practical task falls to the philosopher to secure political recognition for reason itself by means of his influence on the power of public opinion...for only when reason hits its mark everywhere, does it hit it properly, for only then will it form the power of public opinion, to which one can perhaps ascribe most of those changes which are truly advantageous for the peoples".

(Sieyes cited in Habermas 1963:88).

Central to the relationship between reason, public opinion and the formation of a constitutional state, was the philosophers task of stating the "truth" as best as he/she could. Here reason became a practical force in the lives of men/women, Habermas argues. Another experience which may be seen to inform his work was Habermas' distress deriving from the role which Heidegger played in the rise of the Nazi state. Habermas was disturbed that one of the major philosophers who considered himself to be a leader of the "volk", who participated in major Nazi party rallies, simply continued his work at the university, "without apology, or regret" after the horrors of the Nazi era were exposed (1986:196). Habermas says:
"In the case of Heidegger, Schmitt or Junger—who was never a Nazi, but an outright anti-semitic in the Weimer republic—there was never a single sentence of regret afterwards. There was no apology or remorse afterwards by any of these people. The moral and psychological implication was devastating" (1986:197).

The break with the past simply did not occur for these scholars. The crucial question for Habermas became: What is the relationship between personal responsibility, public opinion and the philosophical understanding of the concept rationality? How does one's critical use of the faculty of reason affect one's daily activities? What is the relationship between reason and action? How are theory and practice related? He delved into the American tradition of pragmatism covered by Dewey, Mead and Peirce. The theme which Habermas stresses in relation to the work of the American scholars is that of participatory democracy. He says of the work of Peirce:

"It was only later, in the mid sixties, that I became familiar with the work of Peirce. Then I discovered that there was a missing branch of the young Hegelianism, one that led to a more or less radical-democratic humanism. You find this already on a philosophical level in Peirce". (1986:193)

Habermas similarly emphasises democracy when he discusses the work of George Herbert Mead and Hannah Arendt. He records that the works of Hannah Arendt, on communicative action and participatory democracy and those of Alfred Schutz on the "life-world", had a profound impact upon his vision as a student (Habermas 1980:129). He says in this regard:

"It should be no surprise that I, as a student in the field of social theory, have learned most from A. Schutz and H. Arendt. Let me mention three achievements of fundamental importance: the reconstruction of an Aristotelian concept of "praxis" for political theory, the introduction of an Husserlian concept of "life-world" into social theory and the rediscovery of Kant's analysis of Urteilskraft or Judgement for a theory of rationality" (1980:128).

Hannah Arendt is responsible for the first and third "fundamental achievements" and Schutz for the introduction of the concept of the "life-world" into social theory.
Habermas has consistently confronted the tradition of Western thought and appropriated what he has considered to be of merit to his task of developing a critical theory of modern society. He says in this regard,

"Naturally, one can remain in such traditions only if one criticizes and transforms them...the traditions that survive are only those which change in order to fit new situations" (Habermas 1986:97).

His most recent publication "The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity" (1987) can be seen in this light. Habermas confronts the thesis that the Enlightenment concept of reason with its ideals of freedom, justice, equality and happiness is an empty platitude in modernity. He rejects this thesis by delving into the work of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Hegel, Adorno, Marx, Marcuse, Horkheimer, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Bohme, Weber, Luhmann, Benjamin and a host of other scholars. His basic premise is that these scholars all respond to the Enlightenment concept of reason through their work. His aim is to demarcate the points where the responses to this concept of reason and the "reflexive self-understanding", of the scholars investigated are erroneous (Habermas 1987:32). Scholars such as Lyotard announce the collapse of the "Enlightenment project as a whole" and argue that the hopes and ideals of the Enlightenment, have, after the horrors of Auschwitz and Stalinism, been destroyed (Habermas 1985:78-94; 1986:27). Habermas' answer is that it is only from the perspective of the ideals, internal to the Enlightenment concept of reason, that Fascism and Stalinism are revealed to one in their "full horror" (1986:27).

There is a danger in attempting to reduce the entire intellectual project of a scholar to a "psychology of research" which is circumscribed by the experiences stemming from totalitarian forms of society such as Nazi Germany and Stalinism. Habermas has clearly indicated that the impetus behind much of his work stems from his experience of the fall of fascism and modern forms of thought and action which neglect the basic premise of participatory democracy (2). He would, however, be sceptical if one attempted to argue that his life's work can only be understood from the perspective sketched thus far. The impetus behind critical modes of thought is complex and equally part of the heritage of Western rationalism.
Critiques of the forms of domination, repression, and dogmatism, encountered in society can be traced to the basic concept of reason held by the ancient philosophers. Critical Theory, one can argue, has its roots in the Socratic notion of negative reason, where the scholar's task is that of saying: "No". As Trent Schroyer says:

"Plato mythically depicts Socrates' "inner voice" (the symbol of reason) as always saying no, and while this does not exhaust the concept of reason it is clearly its major function...With the Socratic method [of dialogue] Plato shows the basic concept of reason as a critique of conventional mystification which releases a changed praxis (action) in the individual's life". (1973:15 emphasis in text).

Critical Theory can be seen as a complex and multi-faceted body of knowledge which is historically rooted in the forms of thought and action guiding and expressing the lives of men and women. Aspasia and her student Pericles, Diotoma and her student Socrates, Plato and his mother Pretictione, Aristotle and his countless followers can all be viewed as Critical Theorists. Critically oriented forms of reason were temporally suppressed in March 415 when Hypatia, a scholar following the Aristotelian tradition of practical reason, was brutally murdered for her "pagan rationalism" by the fanatical monks of the church of St' Cyril(Alic 1986:25-48). Critical forms of thought were preserved in the ancient Edessa school which became a major Arab centre of Greek thought during the Dark Ages (Alic 1986:34). Critical scholars such as Roger Bacon and Peter Abelard criticised the Medieval notion of reason which disavowed critical reflection and was limited to the description of religious doctrine. These critical scholars paved the way for Thomas Aquinas' effort to unite Aristotle's concept of practical reason with the concept of faith which dominated Medieval thought (Zebel and Schwartz 1963:200). From the earliest records of humankind, critical reason, which disavows forms of domination and suppression, has been part of the "taken for granted" of countless scholars. Thus the concept of rationality which is central to what Habermas names the "heritage of Occidental reason" is oriented toward a sustained critique of dogmatism and repression. It encompasses an orientation toward freedom from domination and informs the daily
activities of men. The basic premises of freedom, justice, equality and enlightenment circumscribe the concept of rationality which Habermas is interested in. He strives to develop a theory of society in which thought and action are rationally related. Thus the concept of rationality is for Habermas a key to a theory of society which harbours the practical intent of facilitating modes of thought and action oriented toward freedom from domination.

Habermas and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory

The "Frankfurt School" of Critical Theory comprises the work of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal and Friederich Pollok (3). These scholars share with the heritage of Western rationalism a concept of reason which is inherently critical, or more basically, says "No" to forms of repression or dogmatism. Habermas holds that the critical theory of the Frankfurt School is best captured as a collection of diverse, critical essays stemming from each theorist's field of interest. From his point of view there was no Critical Theory in the sense of a coherent whole. He says in this regard:

"For me there was no critical theory, no coherent doctrine. Adorno wrote critical essays on culture and held seminars on Hegel. He made contemporary a certain Marxist background. That was it. Only some clever young people in the late sixties discovered early critical theory and made it clearer in my mind that a theory of society should be systematic" (Habermas 1986:97)

Habermas argues that it was only in the late sixties that the Frankfurt thinkers were considered as a "school" by the "politicised students" and the public at large (1986:49). He holds that for Adorno, "Critical Theory meant thinking in fragments which he then made into a programme" (Habermas 1986:49). Adorno wrote critical pieces, notes or fragments on music, astrology, aesthetics, and the work of literary figures such as Kafka, Brecht, and Proust. Central to this form of Critical Theory, was the view that critique and the social phenomena which were analysed were inseparable from the conditions pertaining to content, origin, reception, and production of the form of life which they reflected. The essential point with regard to the concept of rationality, is
that the concepts reason, critique and society are inter-connected. Thus for the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt school, the concept of rationality is never simply stated, but is revealed in and through the critical process of systematic analysis. Habermas points out that the Frankfurt scholars implicitly subscribed to the Enlightenment concept of reason in their sociology or theory of society, understood as a form of critical reason. He says:

"...critical theory renewed its affirmative moment in its relation to the philosophy of the bourgeois epoch. The theory of society had to take from the latter the concept of reason, without which it lost its normative basis. "Reason" wrote Marcuse, in an essay expanding in Horkheimer's programmatic delimitation of critical theory in relation to traditional theory, "is a fundamental category of philosophical thought, the only one by means of which it has bound itself to human destiny".

(Marcuse cited in Habermas 1986:231)

Thus for Habermas and the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, the concept of rationality is central to their endeavour as sociologists, to develop a reflective and critical assessment of modern society. Habermas however, has always stood apart from his mentors, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse in that he learnt from Hannah Arendt how important participatory democracy was, and still is, to a critical theory of society. He says in this regard, that the "old Frankfurt school never took bourgeois democracy very seriously" (1986:98). Habermas holds that Adorno took the aphoristic mode of philosophy to extremes and sought refuge in the abstract critique of instrumental reason. He argues that this led to three basic weaknesses in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School which he captures as follows:

"In the first place, Critical Theory never took the theoretical contributions of the social sciences and analytic philosophy seriously. It never engaged them seriously as it should have done. Secondly...it made only a limited contribution to the empirical analysis of the over-complex reality of our society. And finally, it failed to give an unambiguous account of its own normative foundations, its own status. Adorno denied that it was possible to provide a systematic grounding of the concept of
reason to which he always implicitly appealed. This, incidentally is one of the reasons why I have attempted to elaborate a theory of communicative action, of action oriented toward validity claims." (1986:49)

Habermas, unlike the Frankfurt scholars, has great respect for the tradition of analytical philosophy. He explains that he learnt from the work of Carnap, Wittgenstein and Popper that the "theory of science and linguistic analysis has set standards of rigor which continental philosophy could no longer satisfy". (1986:37)

Adorno and Horkheimer never fully accepted Habermas's arguments for a rational reconsideration of the public sphere in "Structural Transformation in the Public Sphere" (1963). Here, Habermas emphasised discursive will formation, the public formation of opinion through debate. Adorno and Horkheimer's work on the "Dialectic of the Enlightenment" disavowed such a notion of discursive will formation. Habermas learnt a great deal from and developed many of Horkheimer and Adorno's theses but the extent to which he can be simply classed as a second generation scholar of the "Frankfurt School" of thought is debatable. I hold that from his earliest works to his most recent, Jurgen Habermas can be classed as a phenomenologist alongside Hannah Arendt.

Scope and Aims of the Study: The Concept of Rationality in the Work of Jurgen Habermas

Central to the concept of rationality held by Habermas, is the sociological endeavour to articulate a theory of modern society. The sociologist asks: What is society? How is modern society to be understood and how can the scholars of society contribute to a critique of the factors which suppress men/women in the modern world? Are the modes of thought and action revealed through the critical study of society rational or irrational? The concept of rationality then must be seen as internal to the theory of society. From his earliest to his most recent work, this question of an adequate depiction of society is repeatedly addressed by Habermas. I approach these questions through a detailed analysis of his primary works published in English. Habermas' thought is steeped in the German and Grecian tradition of philosophy, classical sociology, psychology and modern philosophy. He draws
from a vast array of sources assuming that the reader is familiar with the works referred to. Where pertinent, I digress in order to provide the background information necessary for an understanding of the issues he is dealing with.

This study can be roughly divided into two main sections which attempt to answer three questions. Firstly one can ask: Why is the reconstruction of the Aristotelian concept of "praxis" of fundamental importance to Social Theory and Habermas' concept of rationality in particular? The first three chapters are an answer to this question. Secondly one can ask why the rediscovery of Kant's analysis of Judgement is fundamental to a theory of rationality. Thirdly one can ask how the concept of the life-world is related to the concept of rationality. Chapter four is an answer to these two questions. I briefly outline each chapter in turn.

Chapter One

Habermas bases his interpretation of the classical Greek tradition of politics on a perspective gleaned from the work of Hannah Arendt. I outline Arendt's unique position in this regard in detail. My aim is to trace the origin of the distinctions which Habermas makes between the concepts communicative action (praxis) and work (poiesis). These distinctions form the basis of his understanding of human agency which has direct bearing on the concept of rationality. He builds upon these distinctions throughout his work and systematically develops a concept of rationality which differs from that of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse in that he argues for a communicative dimension of human rationality. The Frankfurt scholars in contrast limit their horizons to the critique of instrumental rationality.

I view the discussion on the work of Hannah Arendt as crucial to this study as a whole. The contribution which Arendt has made can be seen as the "neglected heritage of critical theory" since it is not dealt with in the secondary literature on Habermas' work. I focus on this "neglected heritage" and thereby attempt to address the question of the foundation and subsequent development of Habermas' concept of rationality.

I analyse Habermas' assessment of the transition from the classical form of community to the modern form of society. The work of Aquinas, More, Machiavelli and Hobbes is discussed.
Chapter Two

I address the manner in which Habermas builds on the distinctions discussed in chapter one and further develops his concept of rationality. This occurs through his critique of the works of Max Weber and Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse argues that what Weber names rationality is actually domination in disguise. He reaches this conclusion by analysing Weber's concept of formal rationality. Marcuse calls for the rejection of modern science and technology since they are based on formal rationality. Habermas responds to this call in a unique manner. He refutes Marcuse's rejection of science and technology with the aid of the Arendt's work. Habermas then casts the concept of rationality into a new framework. I outline Habermas' reformulation of the concept rationality and discuss his assessment of the transition from traditional to modern society. The concepts rationality and rationalization processes are thematic.

Chapter Three

Habermas' "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1972) is addressed. The relationship between the concept rationality, human interests, science, reflection and human agency is thematic. I briefly outline Habermas' assessment of theoretical rationality in the classical tradition. Habermas holds that modern and classical scholars adhere to a contemplative stance which disavows the connection between knowledge, human interests and action. He aims to show that three specific human interests are constitutive of knowledge and that they are rooted in three fundamental life activities. Namely work, language and power. Corresponding to these three life activities are three forms of science which he names the empirical-analytic, historic-hermeneutic and the critical sciences. I briefly indicate what Habermas means by knowledge constitutive interests and how they are related to the three forms of science. I show how Habermas comes to the conclusion that the empirical-analytic sciences are rooted in work, the purposive rational action of the species which harbours a fundamental interest in the technical control over the external environment. Habermas develops this theme through an assessment of the work of Charles Peirce. I then analyse the manner in which Habermas comes to the conclusion that the historic-hermeneutic sciences are rooted in the
pre-scientific realm of ordinary language and harbour a practical knowledge constitutive interest in mutual understanding. Dilthey's work is addressed. Habermas holds a concept of intersubjectivity which incorporates the concept of plurality deriving from Arendt's work. These concepts are used in his critique of Dilthey's view of understanding as a making process. For Habermas, understanding is a communicative process. The concept of intersubjectivity is central to his concepts of communicative action and communicative rationality. I then address Habermas's thesis that reason inheres in interest. The work of Kant, Fichte, Marx and Freud is analysed in order to establish the thesis that reason inheres in interest. I conclude this chapter by indicating that Habermas uses two logically distinct concepts of reflection in order to show that reason inheres in interests. Chapter four addresses the manner in which he solves this problem.

Chapter four

I outline Habermas' view of the life-world which stems from the work of Schutz. Arendt's interpretation of Kant's theory of reflective Judgement as communicative judgement is depicted. This is fundamental to Habermas' concept of communicative rationality. Habermas views Arendt's study of Kant's "Critique of Judgement" as the first "approach to the concept of communicative rationality" (Habermas 1980:130). I clarify Habermas' concepts of critique and science as rational reconstruction and show how this is related to the theory of Universal Pragmatics. I briefly sketch the basic elements of his theory of Universal Pragmatics. I outline the concept of rationality as depicted in Habermas' "The theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society" (1984). Here the relationship between knowledge and rationality is thematic. I then deal with the manner in which Habermas grounds his concept of communicative rationality on Arendt's concept of Communicative Judgement which is integrated with his theory of Universal Pragmatics. Habermas' critique of the concept of instrumental reason as reification in the work of Adorno and Horkheimer is then briefly addressed.

Chapter five

I conclude this study of the concept of rationality in the work of Jurgen Habermas.
1 RATIONALITY AND THE TRANSITION FROM COMMUNITY TO SOCIETY

1.1 Introduction

In "Theory and Practice" Habermas states that his goal is to develop "a theory of society conceived with a practical intention and to delimit its status with respect to theories of different origins" (1974:1). The practical intent of his theory is that of contributing to the age old struggle for freedom and enlightenment from forms of domination and dogmatism. Habermas begins this task of developing a critical theory of society through a contrast which he draws between the classical tradition of politics and modern political science. Aristotle is the scholar who is representative of the classical tradition where politics and ethics are one and is orientated toward the development of a "good and just" way of life. In stark contrast, modern political science is categorically separated from ethics. Here political scientists strive for a precise method of ordering society. Human behaviour becomes the "material" for a science of man. The classical notions of practical prudence and a virtuous way of life are transformed into technical-administrative issues orientated toward the material "well-being" and the "safety" of citizens in a well regulated society or state. Hobbes is the first representative of the modern view of political science, Habermas argues. Behind this contrast between the work of Hobbes and Aristotle, lies the question of how a form of technical rationality comes to prevail in modern society such that men/women strive for a "technically ordered" society. Women/men no longer ask after the questions of truth, justice and freedom in a public arena but seem to be locked into a "technically rational" world in which utilitarianism is the order of the day. Rationality is defined in terms of "means" and "ends" such that men/women calculate the most efficient, effective ways of doing things. Political questions pertaining to the "good" and "just" ways of life are translated into technical "problems" and are answered by "political experts". Modern citizens are no longer afforded the conditions under which they can critically assess the technical solutions to the problems of the world in which they live. He asks how all this comes about. Habermas holds that a
"confusion" occurred between technical, practical and theoretical forms of reason in the transition from antiquity to modern society.

Influenced by the work of Hannah Arendt and Hans-Georg Gadamer, he sets out to show how the "confusion" between the three concepts of rationality occurred. What I see as relevant to the rationality problematic is Habermas appropriation of Hannah Arendt's concepts of action ("praxis"), work ("poiesis"), power, craftsmanship ("techne") and force which she develops in her assessment of the classical and modern traditions of political thought. Habermas appropriates Arendt's rather than Gadamer's interpretation of action ("praxis") and craftsmanship ("techne") in the classical tradition. Habermas recasts Arendt's concepts into his own frame of reference. The analysis of the transition from the classical form of community to the modern concept of society in "Theory and Practice" (1974) is one of the most abstract and obtuse works which Habermas has written. This may be one of the reasons why this aspect of his work has not been systematically analysed in the secondary literature. The importance of Arendt's concepts, and view of human agency in particular, to Habermas' concept of rationality has not been debated in the literature as far as I am able to ascertain (1). This is rather peculiar since Habermas systematically notes his debt to Arendt (2). My theses are:

1. That Arendt's view of human agency forms the ground upon which Habermas develops his assessment of the transition from the classical concept of community to the modern concept of society.

2. That Arendt's work informs Habermas' interpretation of the break with tradition such that Hobbes' view of political science is understood from a viewpoint which differs from that of Horkheimer. Here Arendt's concepts of a life of contemplation (vita contemplativa) and a life of action (vita activa) are decisive for Habermas' interpretation of the break with tradition.

1.2.1 The Neglected Heritage of Critical Theory

Arendt set out to develop a detailed study of Marxism in the early nineteen fifties (Young-Bruehl 1984:250) (3). The questions she poses are:
Why does Marxism culminate in the horrors of Stalinism? What are the totalitarian elements internal to Marxism? Why and how did Marx elevate the concept of labour to the noble rank of creative human action? (Young Bruehl 1984:278). These questions may be seen against the background of Arendt's study on "The Origins of Totalitarianism" (1951). In this study Arendt focuses upon the concentration camps and the employment of terror which are seen as two dimensions of totalitarian forms of government whether in the Soviet or Nazi mould (4). Arendt argues that the internment camps of the First World War and those found in Europe were different in kind from the Soviet and Nazi form in that the latter Totalitarian regimes used the concentration camps in order to institutionalize terror. She points out that:

"Both Nazi and Soviet history provide evidence to demonstrate that no totalitarian government can exist without terror and no terror can be effective without concentration camps. (Arendt cited in Young Bruehl 1984:201). She holds that totalitarianism is an "exceptional phenomenon" which occurs when there is a turn away from the basic tenets of democracy. The annihilation of personal space and time is held to be a basic feature of totalitarian forms of government. In the concentration camps the inmates are denied the "existential conditions for a human life - a present in which to think, a space in which to act" (Arendt cited in Young Bruehl 1984:253). Her basic question becomes: What are the spatial and temporal conditions for human action and freedom? This way of posing the question of freedom and action stems from Arendt's philosophical training under Jaspers and Heidegger (5). From Jaspers she learnt to ask what place (or space) a phenomenon and the concept pertaining to the phenomenon holds in the world. A related question is: What are the conditions pertaining to the definition of the concept? The voice of Kant is operative here in the sense of the "conditions for the possibility of" a particular phenomenon. From Heidegger she learnt to ask after the experiences of time, and in time, at the root of concepts. This is the context in which "The Human Condition" (1958), the work from which the young Habermas learnt a great deal as a student, develops.
1.2.2 The Concepts Communicative Action ("praxis"), Work ("poiesis"), Craftsmanship ("techne"), Power and Force

In "The Human Condition" (1958) Hannah Arendt investigates the various ways in which the concepts communicative action (praxis), work ("poiesis"), craftsmanship ("techne"), power and force are employed in the transition from antiquity to modernity. Habermas says of this endeavour:

"When H. Arendt reintroduced the venerable distinction between poiesis and praxis, she was not primarily interested in a renewal of Aristotelian theory. Her immediate intention was a systematic, and not a philological one, namely to solve those basic conceptual confusions which resulted from the specific modern temptation of reducing the political practice of citizens to just another kind of instrumental action or strategic interaction. The outcome of her critique is a concept of action as "praxis" which articulates the historical experiences and the normative perspectives of what we today call participatory democracy; this concept is no less modern, but only more adequate than most contemporary action theories deriving from Hobbes, Bentham or Marx" (1980:128).

In the "Human Condition" the activities of men/women are captured by the phrase "a life of action" ("vita activa"). This is contrasted to "a life of mind or thought" ("vita contemplativa") (1958:7). The life of action encompasses three kinds of human endeavour, labour, work and action. Arendt states that these three activities are

"fundamental because each corresponds to one of the basic conditions under which life has been given to man" (1958:8).

This crucial statement and those which follow directly after it are an answer to a decade of questions which Arendt poses to Marx and the tradition of political thought. I therefore cite her in full. Habermas may be classed as a scholar who has integrated these ideas into his horizon to such an extent that they form part of his "taken for granted" (6). Arendt states that the three life activities, labour, work and action are:
"fundamental because each corresponds to one of the basic conditions under which life has been given to man. Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labor. The human condition of labor is life itself. Work is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturality of human existence, which is not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, the species ever-recurring life cycle. Work provides an "artificial" world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings. Within its borders each individual life is housed, while the world itself is meant to outlast and transcend them all. The human condition of work is worldliness. Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world...Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anybody else who ever lived, lives or will live. All three activities and their corresponding conditions are intimately connected with the most general condition of human existence: birth and death, natality and mortality". (1958:7-8 emphasis mine)

The most striking aspect of the concept action is that for Arendt action occurs "directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter" (Arendt 1958:78). For Arendt, the specific human activity captured abstractly as "action" is moral political action or "praxis". The key concept which resolves this strange notion of action devoid of objects is what Arendt calls "the space of appearance". This is Arendt's metaphor for the "objective" relationships between men/women as political actors, women/men as makers of "artifacts" and music and men/women as providing for the necessities of life. I discuss the notion of the "space of appearance" and the related aspect of "objectivity" shortly. In general, Arendt's project is that of developing an understanding of politics which places men/women as acting beings at it's centre. This requires a clear threefold distinction between:
1. Women/men as doers of deeds and speakers of words.
2. Men/women as the producers or makers of useful and beautiful objects (artifacts) and musical sounds.
3. Women/men as providing for the biological necessities of life

1.2.3 Women/Men as Doers of Deeds and Speakers of Words

Arendt emphasises a specific linguistic dimension of Aristotle's notion of moral political action (praxis). This is in stark contrast to the vast majority of interpretations one encounters in the literature on Aristotle (7). The standard interpretations of Aristotle's notion of moral political action (praxis) usually follow a discussion of the various forms of knowledge or science which he distinguishes. For Aristotle, moral political action (praxis) is guided by the prudent understanding of what is to be done. This occurs through man's capacity for "phronesis" or practical reason. Most scholars agree up to this point where practical reason asks after the questions of "the good" and "the just" ways of life. Here practical reason is inseparable from ethics. Political action for Aristotle is an ethical question and is seen in terms of his teleological conception of the world. Each act involves a telos or end to which it is directed. This is where the various interpretations begin to differ. The crucial question becomes the interpretation of what, for Aristotle, constitutes a human way of life. Some scholars emphasize the elements of Aristotle's conception of the soul. Here man's humanity is seen to be contingent upon the rational mastership of the instinctive aspects of the soul. Hence man as a political being is held to be derived from Aristotle's notion of man as a rational animal (8). Others emphasize the concept of "choice" as distinctive of man's humanity (9). Gadamer argues that the concept of "praxis" in Aristotle's work is diffuse, covering both the human and the animal realms of life. He says:

"The original notion of practice (praxis) means the actuation of life, a life that is lead in a certain way (bios). Animals too have praxis and bios which means a way of life".

(Gadamer 1984:91)

For Gadamer the decisive feature which separates animal "praxis" from human "praxis" in Aristotle's work is the concept of "preference or prior choice ("prohairesis")...consciously
choosing among the alternatives is the unique and specific characteristic of a human being" (Gadamer 1984:91).

Arendt emphasises that Aristotle's notion of man as political by nature ("zoon politikon") only attains its full meaning when it is understood in conjunction with his view of man as "a living being capable of speech (zoon logon ekon)" (1958:27). She stresses that political action for the Greeks occurs in the public arena (polis) through public discussion and debate. Those who are excluded from the political realm, slaves, women, children and barbarians, are seen by Aristotle as "anue logou", deprived, of course, not of the faculty of speech but of a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense and where the central concern was to talk with each other" (Arendt 1958:29).

She holds that when Aristotle speaks of man as a political being he is not referring to man's highest capacity contemplation. Contemplation occurs outside the realm of political action "in perfect silence", she argues (Arendt 1958:30). This is a unique linguistically orientated approach to Aristotle's concept of action (praxis) in relation to the concept of human nature (10). The aim of this brief comparison is to highlight the fact that Arendt self-consciously challenges the prevalent ways of approaching Aristotle's work. I invoke Arendt's interpretation of Aristotle's concept of praxis in relation to the polis in the assessment of the classic concept of community. This enables one to decode Habermas' analysis. I first want to depict Arendt's concepts in isolation to those of Aristotle. Arendt introduces two concepts, plurality and natality, as the conditions for political action (praxis) and thereby develops a concept of communicative action. Her aim is to stress the intersubjective nature of action. She says:

"human plurality, the basic condition of both action and speech, has the twofold character of equality and distinctness." (Arendt 1958:175)

She then clarifies the concept of distinctness. Otherness accounts in a similar way to Hegel for the multiplicity of things. Otherness is that aspect of plurality which enables one, in the naming process to say what something is by pointing out distinctions. Arendt says:
"whereas all organic life already shows variations and distinctions, even between specimens of the same species. But only man can express this distinction and distinguish himself, and only he can communicate himself and not merely something—thirst or hunger, affection or hostility or fear." (Arendt 1958:176)

The crucial aspect of plurality is captured as follows:

"In man, otherness which he shares with everything that is, and distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, become uniqueness, and plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings." (Arendt 1958:176)

Speech and action are the modes (or the medium as Habermas would say) through which plurality is communicatively revealed when people come together and reciprocally unite their different viewpoints intersubjectively. This view of human plurality is essential to Habermas' concept of rationality. Plurality is revealed in the manner in which men/women insert themselves into the world. Arendt's point is that it is only through word and deed that men/women insert themselves into the human world. Reality is communicatively created through the insertion of the "who" one is into the web of human relations which she calls the "space of appearance". The disclosure of the "who" in contradistinction to "what" someone is, ones qualities, gifts, talents, and short-comings which may be displayed or hidden, is implicit in everything one says or does. Thus through acting and speaking, one reveals one's unique identity. Arendt says:

"this insertion is not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, and it is not prompted by utility, like work. It may be prompted by the presence of others whose company we may wish to join, but it is never conditioned by them;its impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world when we were born and to which we respond by beginning something new...to act means to "begin", to take the initiative ,to set something in motion."

(1958:177 emphasis mine)

Action as the beginning of something new is the actualization of the human condition of natality. The birth of every individual holds for Arendt the possibility of something new and unpredictable entering the "public realm", the "space of appearance", or the "life-world" in Habermas' language. The "space of
"appearance" is the public space where deeds and words are seen and heard by other fellow human beings. Thus for Arendt, birth is the actualization of the human condition of natality and speech is the actualization of the human condition of plurality. Through speech the unique being is distinguished from others who form the intersubjective realm of the "space of appearance". Although an act may be perceived in its "brute physical appearance" without the verbal accompaniment, it only "becomes relevant through the spoken word where the actor and others announce what he does, has done and intends to do" (Arendt:1958:179). This concept of praxis as communicative action is different in kind to other forms of action where speech plays a minor role such as in warfare, in mathematics or certain kinds of team work. Arendt says:

"thus, it is true that man's capacity to act, and especially to act in concert, is extremely useful for purposes of self-defence or in pursuit of interests; but if nothing more were at stake here than to use action as a means to an end, it is obvious that the same end could be much more easily attained in mute violence, so that action seems a not very efficient substitute for violence, just as speech, from the viewpoint of sheer utility, seems an awkward substitute for sign language... as in mathematics or other scientific disciplines" (1958:179).

The "space of appearance" may be seen as the realm in-between men/women and men/women, and in-between men/women and objects. The central idea behind the notion "space of appearance" is that a twofold phenomenon occurs when one acts and speaks in the social construction of reality. On the one hand, subjects are "objectively" concerned with the world of things. Arendt notes in this regard that the physical world lies between men/women and gives rise to:

"their specific objective worldly interests. These interests constitute, in the word's most literal significance, something which "interest", which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together... most words and deeds are about some worldly objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent" (Arendt 1958:182 emphasis mine)

On the other hand, the disclosure of the agent, is seen as the
intangible in-between for which one requires the metaphor of the "web of human relations" to capture this aspect of reality. Arendt says of this in-between:

"For all its intangibility, this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common... The basic error of all materialism... is to overlook the inevitability with which men disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons, even when they wholly concentrate upon reaching an altogether worldly, material object" (1958:184 emphasis mine).

Thus, on the basis of the concepts of plurality, natality and the space of appearance, Arendt wants to account for:

1. The "objective" world of things and human relationships which occur at this level of analysis. The concept of human interests binds people and things together, and is actualized through speech and the production process.

2. The agent revealing character of intersubjective dialogue as the medium through which different perspectives are united. Plurality is stressed such that the notion of subjectivity held by materialism, which overlooks the disclosure of unique individuals through the abstractions such as "species being" and "Nature" in Marx; "Spirit" in Hegel are voided (11).

3. Natality stresses the fact that action is unpredictable and a beginning which sets something in motion. This accounts for the frailty of human affairs in that any act or word occurs in the multiplicity of human relationships. The specific act becomes boundless through the various reactions and subsequent actions of others in the "web of human relations".

Arendt's concept of power is articulated within this perspective of action as a communicative process. She sees power as something which formed in and through communicative action. Power is not something that is quantifiable like strength and force, she argues. Power is understood as something which occurs in and through communicative action and vanishes when the actors disperse. Arendt captures her specific notion of power as follows:

"In distinction to strength, which is the gift and possession of every man in his isolation against all other men, power comes into being only if and when men join themselves together for the purpose of action, and it will
disappear when for whatever reason, they disperse and desert one another. Hence the binding and promising, combining and convenanting are the means by which power is kept in existence; where and when men succeed in keeping intact the power which sprang up between them during the course of any particular deed, they are already in the process of foundation, of constituting a stable worldly structure to house, as it were, their combined power of action" (1958:174).

Power, like action, is boundless. It requires public mechanisms like agreements or contracts to keep it in being Arendt holds. Thus, for Arendt, power is intersubjectively and communicatively constituted. Men/women as political beings then are emphasised under the concept of "action". This concept of communicative action facilitates the establishment of political institutions and creates the conditions for remembrance, that is, for history. Arendt hence stresses a communicative concept of action.

1.2.4 Men/Women as Producers of Useful and Beautiful Artifacts

What Aristotle calls "poiesis", the production or "making" of the useful and beautiful, is distinguished from communicative action in Arendt's perspective. Here man as producer (homo faber) guided by knowledge based upon mastership or skill ("techne") is emphasised. Arendt notes that the craftsman creates his object with the aid of model or mental image, which is reified and made into a design. This notion of "techne" is very different from that of Gadamer who emphasises skills which are learnt as rules, devoid of the creative element and which can be forgotten as easily as they are learnt. Thus Gadamer's interpretation of Aristotle's concept "techne" is more akin to the modern concept of technique. Arendt deals with the modern production process in terms of the means-ends categories. The production process is determined by the means-ends categories in the following twofold sense. On the one hand the production process comes to an end in the thing that is made. The "process disappears in the product as Marx said" (Arendt 1958:143). On the other hand, the process itself is the means to produce the end. Labour also produces for an end, namely consumption. Since the end of labour, the thing to "be consumed, lacks the worldly permanence of a piece of work,
the end of the process is not determined by the end product but rather the exhaustion of labor power, while the products, themselves, immediately become means again, means of subsistence and reproduction of labor power" (Arendt 1958:143).
Arendt emphasises that the end of the work process is a durable thing while the end of the labour process "disappears" via consumption. The artifact is added to the world of things and is qualitatively different from the product of labour in that it has the property of durability which enables it to remain independently in the world. Thus when Marx speaks of men/women and their alienation from their products, he was actually speaking of the products of work and not labour, Arendt holds. She argues for a distinction between labour and work on the further grounds that the work process has a definite beginning and predictable end while labour, "caught in the cyclical movement of the bodies life process, has neither a beginning nor an end" (Arendt 1958:143). The repetition inherent in labouring, is internal to the process and is compulsory in the sense that "one must eat in order to labor and must labor in order to eat"(Arendt 1958:143). The repetition of the work process is, in contrast, external to the process itself in that the market demand for multiplication is added to the work process itself. Here the process is repeated for "reasons outside itself unlike the compulsory repetition inherent in laboring "(Arendt 1958:143). Thus when Marx attempts to capture the reproduction of mankind, his usage of the concept of labour is correct in that he speaks of the labour process as the mixing with or metabolism of man and nature. On the other hand his usage of the concept labour for the reification process where a permanent object stands opposed to man's nature, is incorrect. He is actually using the concept labour but meaning work (12). The products of work, Arendt names "human artifact", tables, chairs and artworks for example. Human artifacts establish a "measure of permanence and durability to the futility of mortal life and the fleeting character of human time" (Arendt 1958:8). This is the domain of work where reification takes place for Arendt. Men/women as creators of artifact are always the destroyers of nature. Arendt says that "fabrication, the work of homo faber, consists in reification" (1958:139). Men/women as producers can only "materialize" objects through destroying the life process
within the natural object. For example the tree is transformed into the chair only once the natural life process is halted. Work (the realm of "poiesis") then is the domain of man/woman the maker ("homo faber") of the product, the durable artifact, on the basis of knowledge understood as creative and skilful craftsmanship ("techne").

1.2.5 Men/women as Providing for the Biological Necessities of Life

Men/women as part of the ever-recurring life cycle are emphasised under the concept of labour. Men/women as labouring animals (animal laborans) fall into the domain of labour. Here men/women as labouring animals mix with, rather than destroy, or reify nature. The condition of labour is life itself. Arendt develops an extended discussion of the concept labour in relation to the means-ends categories. This analysis is beyond the scope of the present study since Habermas focuses upon the concept of work rather than labour in his appropriation of Arendt's distinction between praxis (action) and poiesis (work). The interrelation of men/women as political actors (engaging in praxis) and men/women as producers of artifact (engaging in "poiesis") and men/women as maintaining the species survival is addressed. This is the aspect of Arendt's work which is neglected in the literature. Like Hegel, Arendt starts off with abstract statements about labour, work and action. In the analysis of each activity the necessity for the interrelation of concepts comes to the fore. The fascinating aspect about Arendt's work is that every concept is so tightly interconnected with the next that one has to follow the movement of categories carefully. The analysis which Arendt traces in "The Human Condition" is that of a threefold "reversal" of concepts in the transition from antiquity to modernity. Which concepts are accorded first, second and the lowest rank in the pre-Socratic, Socratic, Medieval, Christian and Modern periods? She asks. Is a life of action accorded more esteem or is a contemplative way of life of a higher order? The same question is asked of the concepts internal to the life of activity itself (work, labour and action). For example is labour more highly esteemed in the Christian period than work or political action (praxis)? Why and how does the "balance" of the human activities change? Arendt asks. The
depth and breadth of her investigation is certainly, as Hans Jonas says, "frightening in its sweep" (1977:27). The discussion of Arendt's basic concepts is essential to an understanding of Habermas' depiction of the transition from "community" to "society" as is shown below.

1.3 The Concept Rationality and the Transition from Community to Society in Habermas' early work.

The young Habermas, under the influence of Adorno, develops a densely woven tapestry in his depiction of the transition from the classical concept of "community" to the modern concept of "society". Habermas employs an array of Greek and Latin terms to capture important phases in the transition. Some of these concepts are clarified, while others are not. The presentation is episodic and difficult to follow. Central to his analysis is Arendt's concept of power and her interpretation of praxis as communicative action. The analysis proceeds in four phases as follows:

1. Habermas sets up a contrast between the classical tradition of politics represented by the work of Aristotle and the "modern" tradition of political science represented by the work of Thomas Hobbes. He focused on three distinctions between the two traditions of politics. Namely: the concept "man's nature", the concept "action (praxis)" and forms of reason central to each tradition.

2. Habermas then invokes the work of Thomas Aquinas which is seen as a link between the classical tradition of politics and modern political science. Aquinas translated the Greek notion of "man is political by nature" as "man is social by nature". Aquinas hereby reduces the classical notion of the "polis" to that of the "household", Habermas argues. Internal to the realms of the "polis" and the "household", are the concepts of freedom, action, power and domination. Habermas assumes that the reader is aware of the differences between these realms and uses Greek and Latin terms to capture the differences. The emphasis falls on the form of power and freedom internal to each realm. I clarify the basic features of the polis and household from this perspective through the work of Hannah Arendt. Habermas' argument is thus decoded through the work of Arendt.
3. The break with tradition is represented by the work of Machiavelli and More who deal with the political and social realms respectively. More and Machiavelli break through the barrier separating communicative action and work (praxis and poiesis), Habermas argues. Political action is understood as a form of strategic means to an end and practical reason, in the Aristotelian sense, is reduced to technical reason. Here practical reason is screened out of focus in a pragmatic fashion. The emphasis falls upon the forms of power exhibited by these two theorists in their depiction of the social and political "order". Thus the confusion between practical technical and theoretical reason is closely related to the concepts of power and domination.

4. The work of Thomas Hobbes is then discussed in detail. Habermas views Hobbes as the scholar who synthesizes the social and political realms into unified theory of society based upon the premises of rigorous science. Once again the concept of rationality is tied to the concept of power. Practical reason is reduced to technical reason in a scientific rather than a pragmatic manner.

This overview serves to indicate the direction in which Habermas's analysis proceeds. It is necessary to follow his logic in order to depict the specific concepts which he uses and to show how the transition from the classical concept of "community" to the modern concept of "society" occurs from his viewpoint. It is also necessary to explain essential Greek and Latin terms which he uses. The analysis in the first two phases seem to have little bearing on the concept rationality, but the import of these phases of the analysis lies in the basic concepts which form the ground upon which Habermas builds and develops his concept of rationality throughout his work. I deal with each phase of the analysis in turn.

1.3.1 A Contrast Between The Classical and Modern Traditions

1.3.1.1 Man as Political by Nature.

Habermas points out that the classical tradition of politics is continuous with ethics since it incorporates questions pertaining to "the good" and "the just" ways of life. In modern political science in contrast, morality is strictly separated from legality
which is in turn clearly demarcated from politics. For Aristotle, he argues, there is no distinction between the ethos of civil life and the political constitution which is formulated in terms of the customary laws (nomoi). Habermas holds that for Aristotle, man is political by nature:

"Only the politeia makes the citizen capable of a good life; and he is altogether a zoon politikon, in the sense that he is dependent on the city, the polis for the realization of his human nature." (1974:42)

Habermas states that for Aristotle, man's human nature is actualized through speech (lexis). The order of the "true community", he argues, is "anchored in the praxis and lexis of free citizens, in the public political life" (Habermas 1974:29). Thus Habermas uses the phrase "man is political by nature" ("zoon politikon") as Arendt does. He does not explain what he means by the polis beyond stating that it is defined in "contrast" to the household. Aquinas is seen to reduce the "order" of the "polis" to that of the household and unclarified terms are used to capture this important phase of the transition. The specific phrases employed are similar to those of Arendt. I indicate her interpretation of the polis in order to complete this aspect of the classical view of man. When Aristotle states that man is "political by nature", Arendt reads him as articulating the specific concrete condition of men/women in the particular period in which he, Aristotle, lives. Namely, the conditions which distinguish men from slaves, barbarians, women and children. Aristotle is referring in this context of man as political by nature, (man as "zoon politikon"), to the men insofar as they partake of life in the public realm (the polis). The public realm (polis) in Greek politics is defined in contrast to the private realm of the household (oikos). The household is the domain in which the necessities of life are taken care of. Men are released into the realm of freedom (polis) as citizens on condition that the necessities of life itself, namely sheer survival, are dealt with. Thus two realms or ways of life pertain to ancient Greece. Firstly, the household consisting of masters, servants, women and children where the activities of labour and work secure the reproduction of life in the biological sense and the production of useful and beautiful objects (artifacts) respectively. The household is the realm of labour where men and women are driven
into natural association by their needs and wants. The "natural community in the household therefore was born of necessity and necessity ruled over all activities performed in it" (Arendt 1958:30). In this domain of master-serf relationships, necessity, is a pre-political phenomenon. Force and violence are justified as the only means of mastering necessity. Masters force slaves, women and children to obey their absolute rule and reify nature by creating useful and beautiful objects (14). Secondly, the public realm (the polis) is the sphere where citizens actualize their freedom through public debate as equals. Arendt emphasises that Aristotle's notion of men as political by "nature" (zoon politikon) only attains its full significance when seen in conjunction with the definition of man as "a living being capable of speech (zoon logon ekon)" (1958:27). The conditions in the human community for a political way of life, are "action (praxis) and speech (lexis) which give rise to the realm of human affairs from which everything merely necessary or useful is strictly excluded." (Arendt 1958:22-25). The central idea of praxis, for the Greeks, is that action and speech are of the same rank or kind. This means that political action takes the form of communication or persuasion in contrast to the pre-political modes of ruling, mastering or commanding. Habermas accepts Arendt's interpretation of political action and its relation to "man's nature" in the work of Aristotle. This is further developed in the second sense in which the classical tradition is distinguished from political science from Habermas' viewpoint.

1.3.1.2 The Concept of Praxis.

Habermas invokes the the concept of praxis:

"the old doctrine of politics referred exclusively to praxis in the narrow sense of the Greeks. This had nothing to do with techne, the skillful production of artifacts and the expert mastery of objectified tasks. In the final instance, politics was always directed to the formation and cultivation of character; it proceeded pedagogically and not technically. For Hobbes, on the other hand, the maxim promulgated by Bacon, of scientia propter potentiam, is self-evident: mankind owes its greatest advances to technology, and above
all to the political technique, for the correct establishment of the state" (1974:42 emphasis mine).

Here Habermas indicates what "techne" means. The production of "artifacts" grounded on skill. He invokes Arendt's interpretation of production or making (poiesis) and the form of knowledge (techne) associated with it. What Habermas says is that making has nothing to do with political acting. Habermas is moving beyond Arendt in that he includes a dimension of practical reason, "the formation of character" which is strictly separated from "techne", skillful craftsmanship. He contrasts technical knowledge of modern political science with practical reason of the classical tradition. Practical reason, which informs political action, must be seen to proceed pedagogically and not technically. The "techne" of the craftsman must not be confused with the technology of modern political scientist. Habermas emphasises that political action (praxis) proceeds pedagogically and not technically, via techniques, as Hobbes holds. This is further emphasised in the third sense in which the classical tradition is "alien" to modern scholars.

1.3.1.3 Forms of Knowledge or Reason

Habermas says that for Aristotle practical reason is different in kind from rigorous science (episteme). Practical reason is orientated toward ethical questions pertaining to "the virtuous", "the right", "the just" "the good", and "the excellent". These questions are asked in the realm of "praxis" which is contingent and variable. Thus rigorous scientific criteria such as "logical necessity" and "ontological constancy" do not pertain to practical reason in the classical tradition. (Habermas 1971:42). Practical Reason entails "phronesis", a form of practical prudence which is oriented toward the understanding of concrete situations in the daily lives of men. This form of reason can not be derived or justified by theory ("Theoria"). Theoretical reason in the classical tradition is closely associated with the notion of contemplation. "Theoria" is orientated toward the eternal or unchangeable cosmos. Rationality is seen to permeate the universe which is ordered and harmonious. Through contemplation of the cosmos the theorist mimetically brings his soul into accord with the rationally ordered cosmos. This occurs
when all activity ceases. Thus "Theoria" entails a kind of looking or viewing and can never be "made" by the active application of man's reason to the particular entity investigated. Hobbes, in stark contrast, aims at a rigorous science of politics which enables men to produce or make a rationally ordered state.

1.3.2 Thomas Aquinas and The Reduction of the Political to the Social

Habermas opens his discussion of the work of Thomas Aquinas by asking how the classical view of politics is transformed into social philosophy. What took place in the interval between the concept of community held by Aristotle and the concept of society held by Thomas Hobbes? he asks. Habermas states that for Aristotle, the polis is the community which is orientated toward the virtue of its citizens. The mere association of men through private legal contracts for commercial or military ends is not the "true community" in the classical sense of the polis, he argues. Mere association is what the Romans name the "society" ("societas"). The polis, he notes, is defined in contrast to the household by Aristotle. Habermas does not indicate what the household means and how this differs from the polis. He then immediately compares the Roman concept of society ("societas") with Hobbes's notion of society:

"Hobbes deals precisely with the natural law construction of such a commerce of bourgeois private individuals regulated by private law and protected by the sovereignty of the state." (1974:47)

Here Habermas is equating the concept of society held by Hobbes with the Roman concept of society ("societas"). In other words Hobbes' concept of society is the antithesis of Aristotle's concept of community. The social philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is then invoked as the link between the views of Hobbes and Aristotle in order to explain how this antithesis or reversal of concepts comes about. Aquinas

"no longer understands this community as a genuinely political one: surreptitiously the civitas has become the societas. Nowhere is the involuntary remoteness from the old politics made visible so clearly as in the literal translation of the zoon politikon: homo naturaliter est animal sociale" (Habermas 1974:48)
Habermas does not clarify these terms. Arendt points out that in the transition from the classical concept of community to the concept society held by Thomas Aquinas the definition of man's nature changes. Thomas Aquinas stresses that "man is social by nature" (Arendt 1958:27). Aquinas elevates the notion "man is social by nature" to the fundamental human condition she argues. For the Greeks the mere social company of others is not a fundamental human characteristic but something men have in common with animals. Aquinas compares political rulership with household rule:

"the head of the household, he finds, has some similarity to the head of the kingdom, but, he adds, his power is not so "perfect" as that of a king." (Arendt 1958:27)

For the Greeks absolute uncontested rule is understood as a pre-political mode of ordering or "managing" the household as Aristotle would say. The "order" of the household is based upon rulership and domination. In stark contrast the "order" of the polis is contingent upon the equality and freedom of its citizens. Equality and freedom are the conditions of felicity meaning health, happiness and the practice of goodness which is the aim or "telos" of the polis. Aristotle says in this regard:

"the end of the state is not mere life; it is rather a good quality of life. If mere life were the end there might be a state of slaves or even a state of animals; but in the world as we know it, such a state is impossible because slaves and animals do not share in true felicity... it is not the end of the state to provide for alliance for mutual defence against all injury or to ease exchange and promote economic intercourse" (Aristotle 1958:118:1280b:6 emphasis mine)

Habermas argues that Aquinas reduces the distinction between the polis and the household to the "common denominator of societas" (1974:48). He says:

"the princeps whose power Thomas was investigating rules as a monarch that is in principle in the same manner as the pater familias as dominus. Dominium now means domination mastery pure and simple." (Habermas 1974:48)

Thus Habermas holds that for Aquinas the power of the political leader is in principle equivalent to the absolute rule of the head of the household. Habermas views this form of power as absolute despotism. He stresses that the criterion of "order" in
the polis is the "political substance of the citizens politically orientated will and consciousness as formed in public discussion" (1974:48 emphasis mine). Habermas argues that Aquinas "sacrifices" this dimension of the polis whereby citizens are empowered to actively participate on a communicative basis in the activities of legislation and justice. Thus Habermas subscribes to a concept of political power which is communicatively formed in the polis through communicative action (praxis). This is the concept of power which is central to the concept of "praxis" as grounded in language in Arendt's interpretation of Aristotle's work. Habermas also subscribes to this notion of praxis since he makes the second crucial point: "the ordo of the civitas can no longer be anchored in the praxis and lexis [speech] of free citizens in public political life" (1974:49).

Habermas holds that Aquinas is no longer able to anchor the concept of society in the communicative action of citizens. For Aquinas, the basic criterion of social order is not the freedom of citizens but rather "peace" and "tranquillity" which is achieved through the obedience of subjects to the absolute rule of the king or ruler (Habermas 1974:49). Habermas argues that the concepts of peace and tranquillity derive from the Christian concept of "pax" which actually means "police" or authority. Social "order" for Aquinas derives from questions of authority and obedience stemming from the Decalogue which provides universal and immutable knowledge of modes of conduct. These modes of conduct reflect an ethic of status and social rank which is codified and hierarchically structured. Habermas holds that natural law for Aquinas comprises a form of virtue deriving from the Stoic view of an ordered and rational cosmos which is interpreted from the viewpoint of Christianity. The questions of virtue are answered through the laws of Christianity (The ten commandments) and the form "virtue" which this entails serves to entrench the stratification of society in a rigorous manner. The pivot around which this assessment turns is Habermas' statement that "social order" in Aquinas' sense results in the eclipse of the classical orientation toward "the good" and "the just" laws of governance which in turn are anchored "in the praxis and lexis [speech] of free citizens, in public political life" (1974:49). The laws governing the daily lives of the Greeks are constituted
through debate and rational reflection. This occurs through practical reason which is orientated toward mutual understanding and prudence. The order of society for Aquinas is not based on the freedom of citizens who realize their human nature in the polis through communicative action and practical rationality. It is based on passive obedience to the lord and master and the laws of Christianity. For Habermas this form of "order" is based on domination and not freedom.

In sum:

It is patent from the specific manner in which he speaks of action and craftsmanship, that Habermas relies on Arendt's specific and unique interpretation of Aristotle's concept of action (praxis) and work ("poeisis"). Gadamer's emphasis on "prior choice", as definitive of praxis is not invoked. Habermas employs a specific view of praxis such that men as doers of deeds and speakers of words are strictly differentiated from men as makers of artifacts. The distinction which Arendt makes between communicative action and work (praxis and poiesis) is thus central to Habermas' interpretation of Aristotle's work. In the transition from the Greek tradition to the Christian period, the classical concept of "community" is "alien" to the "social philosophy" of Aquinas, in the sense that political power is no longer "formed" communicatively by acting and speaking subjects who actualize their freedom in the public realm of the polis (Habermas 1974:49). Here passive obedience to the absolute rule of the "king" or master is substituted for active participation in the public realm, Habermas argues. Habermas' assessment of the Christian period is inadequate. Thomas Aquinas develops his concept of society within an onto-theological context in terms of which he appropriates the natural law of the Greeks and the natural right of the Romans. Aquinas integrates natural law and right through St. Augustine's concept of divine reason. Divine reason pertains to a personal God who transcends nature. For the Stoics, reason is immanent in nature and gives rise to an ordered universe. This impersonal concept of rationality is held to be the basis of human rationality such that an orderly life is possible. Aquinas derives his concept of order from the Stoic premise that rationality permeates the cosmos. He substitutes the divine reason of a personal God who
plans and directs nature derived from the work of St. Augustine, for the Stoic notion of a "divine" yet impersonal concept of rationality which permeates the cosmos. (Eterovich 1972:30-60). Habermas does not adequately clarify these aspects of Aquinas' concept of society. He merely states that Aquinas develops his view of natural law through an onto-theological unity between the laws of the Stoic cosmos and the laws of Christianity, or the ten commandments. He does not clarify these crucial realms beyond linking the Decalogue to knowledge which reflects social stratification. He does not explain how or why social stratification in this sense occurs. Thus his analysis does not accord with the minimal requirements of description and explanation. Habermas focuses upon the realms of the polis and the household. He notes that Aquinas' concept of social "order" is analogous to the absolute despotism characteristic of household "order". He then indicates that the communicative formation of will and consciousness as distinctive of the classical Greek tradition is eclipsed in the work of Aquinas. The theological dimensions of this conclusion are not dealt with beyond mere suggestion. Habermas briefly refers to "peace" and "tranquillity" as definitive of social "order" for Aquinas. He argues that the concepts of "peace" and "tranquillity" derive from the concept of "pax" which means "police" or authority. He assumes that in pointing out the derivation of a concept, he is explaining the manner in which it is understood by Aquinas. Here Habermas confuses explanation with philology. Habermas holds that questions pertaining to quality of governance are eclipsed in the work of Aquinas. He also notes that the concept of labour is "rehabilitated" in the work of Aquinas. Habermas says:

"The ordo civitas now embraces labor rehabilitated by Christianity, which for the Greeks was a purely apolitical magnitude.(1974:48)

To argue that labour is "rehabilitated" Habermas must assume that it is negatively evaluated in the classical tradition. He thus agrees with Arendt that labour is excluded from the political realm of the polis and that it is negatively evaluated in the Greek tradition. He thus implicitly accepts her trichotomous view of the human condition. The concept of labour is internal to the realm of the household but how it is "rehabilitated" by Christianity is not dealt with. The interpretation of the social
order through the use of the concepts of peace, tranquillity and stratification, in an onto-theological context is suggestive, but not demonstrated in an adequate manner. These are probably some of the reasons why critics and commentators alike do not deal with this phase of the assessment of the classical and Christian concept of social "order" Habermas' work. The following basic concepts are central to the contrast which Habermas sets up between the Classical, Christian and Modern periods when they are decoded with the aid of the Arendt's work.

1. Communicative action (praxis).
2. Communicative formation of power.
3. Work (poiesis) - the production of artifact on the basis of craftsmanship (techne).

Habermas does not change his basic orientation in this regard but develops his concept of rationality upon these concepts. Most critics and commentators accept Habermas' distinction between communicative action ("praxis") and production (work or "poiesis") and assume that they derive directly from the work of Aristotle without the mediation of Arendt's work (1). I now proceed to the third phase in the analysis.

1.3.3 The Break With Tradition

During the Renaissance, vast changes occurred in Europe. Martin Luther and Henry VIII rejected the papal authority of Rome. The New World was discovered along with the telescope which revolutionized astronomy. This was the age of Copernicus (1473-1543) and Galileo (1564-1642). The geocentric and heliocentric notions of the universe were supplanted by the universal consciousness inaugurated by Newton fifty years after Descartes' mechanistic cosmology. Man developed his science from the viewpoint somewhere in space whereby spatial and terrestrial objects were subject to the same universal laws (Arendt 1958; Koestler 1982). During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Italian city-states were characterized by civil strife and the continual threat of foreign invasion (Zebel and Schwartz 1960:224). Niccolo Machiavelli was active in the diplomatic service in Florence and developed his "art" of politics which was recorded in his work "The Prince". Sir Thomas More was a jurist and adviser to Henry VIII on constitutional matters. He published his major work "Utopia" entailing
his view of the rationally ordered society (Habermas 1974:50). Machiavelli is the scholar who concentrates upon the political realm, Habermas argues. He focuses upon the techniques of acquiring and maintaining political power. Habermas indicates the orientation of Machiavelli's work as follows:

"Politics is the art, practiced internally as well as externally, of permanent strategies for asserting one's own power, an art which can be studied and learned." (1974:50)

More's task is that of establishing social order with the aid of legal "techniques" (Habermas 1974:50). Habermas sets up the contours of the argument as follows:

"Salus publica and bonum commune can no longer be determined teleologically. They have become unspecified gaps which Machiavelli can fill on the basis of an analysis of the Prince's interests, with raison d'état, while More, on the other hand fills them, on the basis of an analysis of the interests of the laboring citizens, with an economic order of immanent rationality" (1974:50).

What Habermas is saying here is that the question felicity which is the aim or "telos" of the classical notion of community, can no longer be posed in a scientific universe. Equality and freedom are the preconditions of the classical concept of felicity (health, happiness and the practice of goodness), which is why Habermas invokes Salus, the Roman goddess of health, happiness and prosperity in this context. More and Machiavelli deal with the question of virtue, health and happiness in a pragmatic fashion on the grounds of their respective experiences in government service. Habermas argues that Machiavelli is the scholar of political rationality which is the guiding interest of man as a political animal. More is the theorist of economic rationality which is the guiding interest of man the labouring animal. These scholars no longer ask after the moral conditions of a "good life" but orientate themselves towards:

"the actual conditions of survival. This practical necessity requiring technical solutions marks the beginnings of modern social philosophy." (Habermas 1974:50)

Machiavelli and More ask after the conditions of survival within a hostile world. The classical tradition in contrast, is orientated towards the conditions of a virtuous way of life. This is seen in the context of the cosmos, which for the Greeks, was
harmonious and rationally ordered. Habermas says:

"if the theoretically based point of departure of the Ancients was how human beings could comply practically with the natural order, then the practically assigned point of departure of the moderns is how human beings can technically master the threatening evils of nature."

(1974:51 emphasis mine)

More and Machiavelli do subscribe to a notion of virtue but this is defined from the perspective of sheer survival which colours the questions of the health, happiness and what Habermas calls "betterment" rather than "the good" (1974:52). For Machiavelli, "human nature" is understood as the war of all against all. This "natural evil" is reflected in man's fear of a "violent death at the hand of one's neighbour" (Habermas 1974:51). For More the "natural evil" is the fear of starvation in the face of one's neighbour striving to secure his livelihood. Habermas says:

"Machiavelli asks: how can the reproduction of life be made secure politically? More asks: how can it be made secure socially and economically" (1974:51)

Habermas argues that for both scholars the central question becomes that of devising techniques which will ensure man's self-preservation. Machiavelli emphasises techniques of acquiring and maintaining power. More emphasises techniques of legally structuring the economic realm. Habermas points out that More and Machiavelli both attempt to articulate a form of "virtue" which ensures the peace, safety, happiness and wealth of all in an ordered society. Machiavelli subscribes to the norms of power and security which he "promises to men suffering from aggression and anxiety" (Habermas 1974:52). More subscribes to the norm of abundant wealth and happiness which he "promises to the toil-worn and overburdened" (Habermas 1974:52). These scholars inaugurate a new form of political and social philosophy since they extricate those elements which they consider to be "natural evils", namely forms of domination, from the empirical life context and universalize the "natural evils". The "natural evils" are seen to be definitive of mankind. For both scholars, the "natural society" or man's "natural" relationships are defined as man against man. Thus, for these scholars, man is evil by nature. In the classical tradition, in contrast, men are
between men are those of equality. The classical notion of natural law, is orientated toward practical prudence in terms of which individual deviations from the customary laws are debated. Through debate each case is evaluated. This entails a form of reflection, which is guided by a kind of knowledge named "phronesis", or practical reason, which aims at understanding. This form of practical reason can never be absolute and static. Habermas points out that for Machiavelli, the political realm is derived as follows:

"from the vicissitudes of the institutions Machiavelli isolates the underlying structure of a relationship of repression which always remains the same. It is determined by the inevitability of aggression and defence, of threats and of self assertion, of conquest and defeat, revolt and repression, power and impotence. This tension follows naturally, as it were, from the potential or actual reciprocal applications of force; it gives the new concept of the political its meaning." (Habermas 1974:53 emphasis mine)

Here a communicative concept of power is the standard against which the new concept of politics acquires its meaning for Habermas. Communicatively formed power is transformed by Machiavelli into the application of power which, for Habermas, is not power at all but force, since power can only be formed communicatively in contrast to force which can be applied. Here Habermas is using the concepts of power and force in a similar manner to Arendt. Habermas argues that the concept of force supplants the communicative concept of power in the social and political philosophy (15). By substituting the concept of force for what Machiavelli names power, Habermas notes that this scholar no longer understands practical reason in the classical sense, which is orientated toward prudential understanding. Habermas says that in the classical tradition:

"the issue was legislation to give citizens the possibility and power to lead a good life; the positive value of the system of authority must prove itself in terms of the virtue of its citizens and of the freedom realized in the laws of the polis". (Habermas 1974:52)

Machiavelli, in contrast, does not incorporate a concept of rational reflection as the essential ingredient of the public formation of power and the actualization of freedom in the
political realm. He eliminates the classical concept of freedom from his notion of a rationally ordered society since he argues that those who demand freedom, actually "desire to live in security" (Habermas 1974:52). The few who are interested in freedom "desire to be free in order to obtain authority over others" (Machiavelli cited in Habermas 1974:52). This concept of "freedom" is very different from the freedom of the classical tradition which is based on equality and debate. For Habermas, "freedom" in Machiavelli's sense really means the absolute freedom in the rational choice of means through which the strategist acquires and maintains his position of force. Habermas cites the guiding maxim of Machiavelli's orientation as follows:

"The sole aim of the Prince must be to secure his life and power. All means which he employs to this end will be justified... A Prince cannot observe those rules of conduct in respect whereof men are accounted good, being often forced, in order to preserve his Princedom, to act in opposition to good faith, charity, humanity and religion."

(Machiavelli cited in Habermas 1974:54).

Thus Machiavelli divorces politics from ethics. He develops formal techniques in terms of which the political realm can be "rationally ordered". If domination is the underlying interest of the "rational" man as political animal, Machiavelli's political actor can not be rational, because Machiavelli sets out to overcome the irrationality of all against all which is the basic premise of the chaotic state of nature. The "ordered" society is institutionalized to overcome this state of nature. The ordered society is achieved through institutionalizing the irrational state of nature, since the Prince rules as an absolute master who is orientated toward the domination of his subjects who obey his absolute rule. Citizens are no longer empowered to discuss and reflect upon the laws which they now have to obey. Therefore the classical notion of natural law is eclipsed and the natural law based upon the "natural evils" of men is institutionalized. Domination and not freedom is then the criterion of order. Therefore, the rational order which Machiavelli strives for is irrational since he argues for the institutionalization of the irrational state of nature in the name of power which actually is force, Habermas argues. He says
of Machiavelli's orientation:
"the removal of one evil [fear of violent death], produces another: the danger of enslavement. Therefore these social philosophers who define natural evil politically cannot assume the Utopian character of those who define it economically. Even when they do not wish to forgo a counter-Utopian form of enhancing life, they still fall prey to irrationality: even in Machiavelli virtu assumes the sense of a barbaric vitality, the transfigured guise of political power per se." (1974:52)

This "transfigured guise of political power" means for Habermas that force or domination supplants the concept of power as communicatively formed and legitimated through debate. The notion that the "immanent irrationality" of Machiavelli's political animal, as revealed in this critique, is only applicable if one rejects Machiavelli's basic premise of man's nature and contrasts this with the notion of man's nature held in the classical Greek tradition. Thus Habermas' critique is not immanent since he presupposes the validity of the classical notion of man's nature. If one follows the logic of Machiavelli's argument as outlined by Habermas, it does reveal that domination is institutionalised, but this then does not automatically mean that the form of political action to which Machiavelli subscribes is irrational. Habermas shows that the form of rationality here is that of the strategist and that it is devoid of morality, but he does not clearly demonstrate that Machiavelli's position is irrational as he claims. Machiavelli does not claim to be striving for a concept of political order based on justice and equality. The norms of peace, safety and force are constitutive for Machiavelli's rationally ordered society. Habermas equates rationality with the conditions of freedom, equality and justice and irrationality with the conditions of domination, safety and peace. He does show that practical reason in the classical sense is eclipsed, but it does not then automatically follow that the strategic rationality of Machiavelli's political man is irrational.

Habermas argues that Thomas More reduces the normative sense of the classical conception of natural law to the static underlying concept of economic exploitation. Society is viewed in
terms of the fixed compulsion of man against man in competition for daily subsistence. More does retain a notion of happiness and the Stoic ideal of leisure, but the key thesis which separates his perspective from that of the classical tradition is that the technically ordered society is accorded priority over the "good life". More recommends the abolition of private property in the Utopian state of economic well-being. More's rational social order is the Utopia in which men no longer strive to secure their sustenance through strife. The state controls the means of production which is regulated by the rational selection of legal techniques whereby the social realm is "rationally ordered". Habermas holds that More's notion of social order is analogous to that of Machiavelli in that the criterion of order is domination. Habermas states:

"Thomas More invalidates the traditional way of posing the problem of the constitution by making an analogous point. The substance of the relationship of domination which, underlying the changing normative orders, always remains the same, is conceived by him not in terms of a basic human condition which cannot be abolished, but in terms of the compulsion towards exploitation which is established by private property" (1974:54)

Habermas does not clarify the notion of the "basic human condition which cannot be abolished" (1974:54). Here he implies that the basic condition of communicative action which is orientated toward understanding between men cannot be abolished. More is held to emphasise social heteronomy as opposed to the validation of the constitution through the public debate among equals. For Habermas this form of order is irrational since it is founded on domination. Once again, the classical notion of politics is the standard in terms of which this scholars work is judged.

1.3.3.1 Machiavelli and More's Concept of Society at the Methodological Level of Analysis

Habermas introduces the methodological level of analysis through a comment on Horkheimer's assessment of Machiavelli's work. Horkheimer says:
"It is the greatness of Machiavelli...to have recognized the possibility of a science of politics, corresponding in its principles to modern physics and psychology and to have enunciated its fundamental traits simply and definitely" (Horkheimer cited in Habermas 1974:60)

Habermas disagrees with Horkheimer in that Machiavelli and More articulate their theory of society in a pragmatic fashion. Neither of them claim to be practicing the "science of politics", Habermas points out. I cite Habermas in full as this is a crucial aspect of the analysis. He explains as follows:

"This interpretation [of Horkheimer] anticipates the development that only took place after Machiavelli, insofar as for him the skill of acquiring and preserving political power results in the transfer of workmanlike techne to a domain of praxis till then reserved for phronesis; but this still lacks the scientific precision of calculated technique. The claim to a foundation of politics on the principles contained in the Galilean ideal of science, can strictly speaking only be made within the mechanistic picture of the world. To be sure, the guiding cognitive interest of The Prince and the Utopia had already suggested acting in the mode of producing. Machiavelli and More had broken through the barrier, inviolable in classical philosophy, between praxis and poiesis, had sought the relative certainty of workmanlike-technical knowledge in a field till then reserved for the uncertainty and the nontransferable character of practical prudence. However, this initiative could not be be carried out radically until technical knowledge itself was secured theoretically and not pragmatically. In order to attain this another barrier had to fall: the superior valuation in the Greco-Christian tradition of the vita contemplativa over the vita activa, the shutting off of theory from praxis."

(1974:60 emphasis in text)

Therefore Arendt's assessment of the life of action (vita activa) and life of contemplation (vita contemplativa) is the presupposition in terms of which Habermas develops his critique of the work of Machiavelli and More. It is also the perspective from which he differentiates his position relative to that of Horkheimer. I deal with the first aspect of Habermas'
response to Horkheimer. The fall of the contemplative way of life is dealt with in the following section under the analysis of Hobbes' work. Machiavelli and More are the theorists who break through the barrier between political action (praxis) and work (poiesis) Habermas argues. For Habermas this means that practical rationality, as understood from the viewpoint of the classical Greek tradition, is reduced to a form of technical rationality based on the criteria which define workmanship or skill. Political man, as an acting and speaking being (the realm of praxis and lexis), with his knowledge of prudential understanding (phronesis) of political action is reduced to: Man as the maker of artifact, homo faber, with his means-ends rationality in the production process (poiesis). The kind of knowledge entailed is that of workmanlike skill (techne). This represents a form of technical rationality. Habermas states his position very clearly when he says:

"the guiding cognitive interest of The Prince and the Utopia had already suggested "acting in the mode of producing"."

(Arendt cited in Habermas 1974:60)

Machiavelli and More no longer speak of action (praxis) as Habermas and Arendt understand the term. They subscribe to a mode of action which for Arendt and Habermas is akin to "acting in the mode of producing" (Habermas 1974:60). This means that the actor "makes" his society like a craftsman makes his stool or the painter "makes" his picture (16). Machiavelli's "art" of politics, Habermas argues, is inconceivable to the Ancients since the "material" which Machiavelli aims to shape is human behaviour. Habermas names this the "art without precedent in the cannon of the traditional arts" (1974:59). Habermas' stance against that of Horkheimer is that although Machiavelli and More adopt a model of production (work or poiesis) as their model for action, this is arrived at pragmatically. The final break with tradition in political science only comes about when technical knowledge is secured theoretically and not merely pragmatically, Habermas points out. In breaking through the barrier between communicative action and production, "praxis" and "poiesis", Machiavelli and More subscribe to a strategic, production orientated, form of human agency. This means that the actor rationally selects specific means, legal techniques and strategies of force, in order to achieve the end, defined as
producing or "making" an ordered and peaceful society. This form of rational technique results in the eclipse of the classical form of communicative action based upon practical rationality, and the associated norms of equality, justice and freedom. Habermas argues that Machiavelli and More subscribe to a concept of rationality entailing the workman-like skill of the strategist. He holds that this orientation is circumscribed by the:

"absolute freedom in the rational choice of means for the purpose of maintaining power in the exceptional state of latent civil war, of potential revolt or competing foe". (Habermas 1974:55)

The classical concept of practical reason, which is directed toward the good, is eclipsed by a form of strategic rationality orientated toward domination and heteronomy. Thus the specific forms of human agency: namely, a communicative model of human action and a work model of human action, deriving from Arendt's work, are central to the critique of the form of rationality revealed in the work of Machiavelli and More. I now address the last phase of the analysis of transition from the classical concept of community to the modern concept of society.

1.3.4 Thomas Hobbes and the Technically Rational "Order"

Hobbes is the scholar who integrates the social and political realms on the basis of a view of science facilitated by the mechanistic vision of the world. Habermas invokes Arendt's assessment of the fall of the classical concept of contemplation to capture his interpretation of the final break with the classical Greek tradition. An adequate understanding of the break with tradition in this sense requires an understanding of two reversals in concepts which Arendt analyses. The first is the reversal between the life of action and the life of contemplation in general. The second is the reversal within the life of action composed of the activities of work, labour and communicative action. Habermas names the first reversal between the life of contemplation and the life of action the theoretical justification of technical knowledge. He names the second reversal, between man the maker and man the communicative actor, the "shutting off of theory from praxis" (Habermas 1974:60). This is an aspect of Habermas' work which has not been assessed in
the secondary literature as far as I am able to ascertain (1). In a detailed analysis of the reversal between the life of action with that of contemplation, Arendt comes to the following conclusions:

1. In the classical tradition contemplation is accorded priority over the life of action. Through contemplation the eternal truths of the stable universe are revealed to the mind of the beholder. Theory ("Theoria") in this context means a kind of looking on. Action and speech cease and truth reveals itself to the contemplative man/woman of theory. Theory acquires its meaning from the Greek conception of the universe. The universe is a rationally ordered whole and the philosopher's soul is brought into accord with the rationally ordered universe through contemplation. Theory (or theoretical reason) in this context can not be seen as a mode of grounding the practical affairs of man since all deliberation ceases in the realm of contemplation. Practical prudence and the active production of artifact are held to pertain to the lower faculties of man which, strictly speaking are "theory-free". Habermas points out that:

"For the Ancients the capacity for goal directed activity, skill, techne, was knowledge that always pointed toward theory as the supreme aim and the highest goal, just as the prudence of the reasonable action, phronesis; but they could never themselves be derived from or justified in terms of theory. They remained "lower" cognitive faculties precisely for the sake of this self-sufficiency of contemplation. The sphere of action, of doing, the life-world [Lebenswelt] of human beings and citizens concerned for their preservation or their communal life was, in a strict sense, theory-free. This only changed when the modern scientific investigation of nature set about to pursue theory with the attitude of the technician." (1974:61)

2. The break with tradition results in the eclipse of contemplation in the sense of the ancients. Arendt argues that after Galileo discovers the telescope, the notion that truth reveals itself to the "eyes of the mind" is challenged. The classical concept of "Theoria" falls away and truth acquires a new criterion. Truth is arrived at through action and not contemplation. Men now actively search for truth "behind"
appearances and passive contemplation is denigrated.

3. Arendt argues that modern science does not entail a mere reversal of the classical notion of truth as revelation. Central to modern science is the "universal consciousness" such that both the earth and the sky are now subject to the same astrophysical laws (Arendt 1958:260). Galileo empirically demonstrates the theoretical hypothesis that the moving earth and planets revolve around the sun to a community of scientists. This paves the way for Newtonian astrophysics with its universal consciousness which enables men to act upon nature as never before. Arendt says of the new science:

"For whatever we do today in physics - whether we release energy processes that ordinarily go on in the sun, or attempt to initiate in the test tube the processes of cosmic evolution, or penetrate with the help of telescopes the cosmic space to a limit of two and even six billion light years, or build machines for the production and control of energies unknown in the household of earthly nature, or attain speeds in atomic accelerators which approach the speed of light, or produce elements not to be found in nature, or disperse radioactive particles, created by us through the use of cosmic radiation, on earth - we always handle nature from a point in the universe outside the earth. With out actually standing where Archimedes wished to stand (dos moi pou sto), still bound to the earth through the human condition, we have found a way to act on the earth and within terrestrial nature as though we dispose of it from the outside, from the Archimedean point. " (1958:262)

4. The central questions of the "what?" and the "why?" of scientific knowledge now changes to the "how?" The objects of knowledge are no longer eternal and never changing motions of the rational order which are revealed to contemplative man, but the processes of nature and how they come about. The modern experiment answers this question through "imitating","making" or "reproducing" the processes of nature under experimental conditions. The new criterion of theory then is that one only knows or understands the phenomenon studied to the extent that one is able to make or reproduce its processes under experimental conditions. Habermas puts this as follows:
"from the days of Galileo on, the intention of research itself is objectively to attain the skill of "making" the processes of nature oneself in the same way as they are produced by nature. Theory is measured by its capacity for artificially reproducing natural processes. In contrast to "epistome" it is designed for application in its very structure. Theory thereby gains a new criterion of truth (aside from logical consistency) - the certainty of the technician: we only know an object insofar as we can make it. The certainty of the technician that is distinctive for modern scientific knowledge is not to be compared with the more relative certainty of the classical artisan, who masters his material by long practice."

(1974:61 emphasis in text.)

Habermas holds that Hobbes is the first scholar to study the "laws of civil life" on the basis of science such that political action can be ascertained with certitude. He holds that once the experimental approach is fused with the new concept of theory, theory is used as a guide in the technically precise sense of imposing "order" upon human affairs. Thus the classical concept of practical reason which guides action is supplanted by the technical rationality which in Hobbes' case becomes the ground of his notion of "rational" natural law. Hobbes radically re-interprets natural law in a mechanistic fashion thereby deriving what Habermas names "the norms of natural reason from the mechanics of natural desire" (Habermas 1974:62). Hobbes accepts Machiavelli's basic premises and casts these into a mechanistic view of man's human nature. In a similar manner to Machiavelli, Hobbes extracts what he considers to be "man's state of nature", from the life context in which it is embedded. The state of nature, man's evil natural state, is now understood in causal mechanistic terms. This mechanistic nature of man, consisting of natural processes, causally gives rise to "rational" social contracts. His argument is as follows:

The power of the ruler is premised upon the necessity to enforce a system of economic and political contracts. The contracts themselves stem from the necessity to secure peace and prosperity in a state of nature where men live like beasts in a life and death struggle for survival. Hobbes argues that "society" stems
from the rational agreements or contracts which men enter into.
His task then is that of explaining:
1. Why men enter into contracts.
2. Why men adhere to contracts once they are enforced.
3. Why the sovereign is obeyed and not perpetually deposed by the evil beasts that he governs.

Hobbes answers as follows:
The social contract is derived from men's "natural" reason. Natural reason for Hobbes means "reckoning", that is, adding and subtracting of consequences within man's mechanistically conceived imagination. Man's mechanistically conceived desire compels him to produce or make contracts. The contract is then the logical outcome of the mechanistic drives which cause man to overcome his fear of death at the hand of his neighbour. Thus logical necessity and empirical necessity are confused and seen to be co-terminus. Habermas says of this circular reasoning:
"the social contract and the contract of government are no longer understood merely as instruments for the rationalizing of nature devoid of law; instead their rationality, which proceeds from the laws of nature itself, is demonstrated. Justice becomes immanent in the nexus of causality." (1974:64)

Hobbes finds himself caught in an equivocal position which becomes methodological. He names "natural law" the causal connection of man's antisocial instinctive nature prior to the contractual establishment of society. He also names "natural law" the lawful association between men which is established after contracts are institutionalized. Therefore the derivation of the "rationally ordered" society which is established by contracts is based on equivocation. Hobbes is not able to explain why men should agree on a contractual basis to refrain from annihilating one another. Man as a speaker of words and communicative actor is eclipsed. Practical rationality orientated toward the prudential solution of deviations from customary law is disregarded. Hobbes prescribes theoretical techniques in terms of which the socio-political realm is rationally ordered. The certainty of the technician is the mark of this book of rules. Hobbes holds a concept of rationality which is derived from the mechanics of natural desire. This concept of rationality can only be arrived at if the notion "laws of nature" is understood in an
equivocal sense. Thus Hobbes' technically rational view of society is fallacious. Like Machiavelli and More, Hobbes holds that one can make or structure a society in the same manner as the craftsman makes his stool. Thus the reflective communicative action of the ancients is supplanted by the "technically rational expert" who administers and controls the socio-political realm with the precision and exactitude of the modern scientist. Hobbes adopts the universal consciousness of the physical scientist and looks down upon the social and political realms which he assumes can be rationally reconstructed with the aid of techniques. Hobbes' notion of "rationality" is orientated toward the "true" Leviathan or absolute state. The immanent "rationality" of the Leviathan represents for Habermas a concept of society where men as communicative actors, are reduced to irrational beasts, devoid of justice and rational agreements between men. Habermas says of Hobbes:

"in the place of the animal sociale in the Christian-Aristotelian sense of zoon politikon he sets an animal politicum in the sense of Machiavelli, in order to show quite readily that precisely these rights, especially the right of all to everything, as soon as it is applied to a pack of "free" and "equal wolves", will have as consequence a state in which they mutually tear and devour each other. This subtle playing with venerable attributes reveals the radical rethinking of the classical Natural Law, so that it becomes the actual absence of all right and justice for the natural environment, which lacks positive regulation and rational compacts. The conditions under which a community of saints was supposed to live, appear, in a diabolical inversion, as the conditions under which human beasts live in a continual life-and-death struggle" (1974:65 emphasis mine).

In sum:
Habermas develops an extensive and highly abstract critique of the classical tradition of politics in relation to political science. The guiding thread throughout the analysis is the specific interpretation of the classical form of practical reason which is alien to the social and political theory of More, Machiavelli and Hobbes. The classical Grecian concept of practical reason entails a form of practical prudence (phronesis) which aims at understanding the contingent and variable
activities of men. Practical reason is orientated towards a virtuous way of life. The customs and laws guiding the lives of the Greeks are not fixed rules which have to be accorded with, but are open to debate and ratification in the public realm of the polis. Practical reason is closely tied to the concept of political action and man's nature. Habermas employs Arendt's specific and unique linguistic interpretation of praxis as communicative action which is actualised in the public realm through debate. This view of human agency is in turn closely connected to the concept of man's nature. For the Greeks, man is by nature a political being, Habermas and Arendt argue. Through debate in the political realm man actualizes his political nature and rationally reflects upon the laws and customs guiding his activities. The classical form of human association or community is thus ordered in terms of the concept of practical reason, communicative action and the concept of man's nature. Habermas assesses the transition from the classical concept of community to the modern concept society on the basis of these three concepts. He holds that the classical concept of practical reason is replaced by a technical form of reason which is at first based on the pragmatic orientation of More and Machiavelli. Hobbes is the scholar who subscribes to a form of technical reason which is secured theoretically. Theoretical reason in Hobbes' sense is based on a concept of certitude which implies that the "rational order" can be made or produced. Rational action is thus understood as a form of making. Thus communicative action based on speech is reduced to techniques of production. Praxis is reduced to work (poeisis) and "Theoria", theoretical reason, as the contemplation of the rationally ordered universe, is eclipsed. Habermas arrives at these conclusions through invoking the distinctions between communicative action (praxis) and production (work or poeisis), a contemplative way of life and an active way of life, the application of force and the communicative formation of power. These distinctions are central to Arendt's work and form the basis in terms of which Habermas distinguishes between the practical, strategic and technical forms of rationality in the transition from antiquity to modernity. Habermas extends this orientation to the concept of rationality in his critique of the work of Max Weber and Herbert Marcuse which is the theme of chapter two.
2. RATIONALITY AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORK AND INTERACTION

2.1 Introduction

The concept rationality as internal to the theory of society in Habermas' early works is clearly presented in the essay "Technology and Science as Ideology" (1971:81). Here Habermas confronts Max Weber's concept of formal rationality in the light of Marcuse's critique of Weber's work.

In 2.2 Habermas' Approach to the Work of Max Weber, I indicate Habermas' approach to the work of Max Weber.

In 2.3 Max Weber's Concept of Formal Rationality and Rationalization Processes, I outline Weber's understanding of formal rationality and rationalization processes. Habermas' critique of Marcuse's stance with regard to Weber's work requires such a retrieval since Habermas assumes that the reader is aware of the basic contours of Weber's position.

In 2.4 Habermas' Critique of Formal Rationality as Understood by Weber and Marcuse, I assess Habermas' critique of Marcuse's work in two stages. Marcuse holds that Weber's concept of formal rationality has substantive implications. The key thesis of Marcuse's critique is that formal rationality actualizes the domination of man by man in the name of rationality. I outline Habermas' critique of this aspect of Marcuse's assessment in 2.4.1 Formal Rationality as Domination.

In the second stage of the analysis, I focus upon Marcuse's call for a new science and technology in order to overcome domination. Habermas holds that Marcuse's rejection of science and technology is based upon a confusion at the level of the concept rationality. I clarify this confusion from Habermas' perspective in 2.4.2 The Analogy Between Purposive-Rational Action and The Concept Work. Habermas rejects Marcuse's call for a new science and technology. He carefully refutes Marcuse's rejection of science and technology with the aid of Arendt's work.

In 2.5 The Concept Rationality and the Transition from Traditional to Modern Society, I show how Habermas recasts the concept of rationality into a new framework such that the rationalization processes which occur in the transition from traditional to modern society can be understood.
2.2 Habermas' Approach to the Work of Max Weber.

Habermas states that Weber introduced the concept "rationality" into social theory in order to clarify the particular forms of economic, legal and bureaucratic activity that are unique to capitalist society. Without further clarification, Habermas then invokes the concept "rationalization" and describes the Weberian "rationalization processes" in modern society as follows:

"Rationalization means first of all, the extension of the areas of society subject to the criteria of rational decision. Second, social labor is industrialized, with the result that criteria of instrumental action also penetrate into other areas of life (urbanization of the mode of life, technification of transport and communication) both trends exemplify the type of purposive-rational action, which refers to either the organization of means or choice between alternatives....the progressive "rationalization" of society is linked to the institutionalization of scientific and technical development. To the extent that technology and science permeate social institutions and thus transform them, old legitimations are destroyed. The secularization and disenchantment of action-orienting worldviews of a cultural tradition as a whole, is the obverse of the "growing "rationality" of social action". (1971:81)

In this condensed overview of Weber's concept rationalization, Habermas orientates (1) himself towards:

1. The mean-ends dimensions of purposive rational action.
2. The "link" between rationalization processes and the thesis of the disenchantment of the cultural tradition.

In order to understand Habermas' critique and reformulation of Weber's concept of purposive rational action and rationalization processes, it is necessary to briefly indicate what Weber means by these concepts (2).

2.3 Max Weber's Concept of Formal Rationality and Rationalization Processes

Weber's concept of formal, purposive rational action can be schematized in two related senses:

1. In terms of the means-ends orientation to rational action.
2. In terms of the means-end schema of rationalization processes
as this applies to what is "peculiar and specific" about the social order of capitalist society.

2.3.1 The Means-Ends orientation to Rational Action.

Weber's depiction of rational action refers to four ways in which action may be determined. Traditional action is determined by habits. Affectual action is determined by feelings or emotions. Value-rational ("Wertrational") action is determined by the conscious belief in the "intrinsic value" of acting in a particular manner (Brubaker 1984:50). Purposive-rational action ("zweckrational") is determined by conscious reasoning in terms of means and ends. Purposive-rational action entails the conscious and deliberate attempts of the actor to achieve specific ends via appropriate means. The conscious or deliberate orientation to action is the decisive element in Weber's depiction of these forms of action (3). To the extent that action is conscious or deliberate, it is seen as rational action. Action determined solely by feeling, affect, or habit is held to be non-rational. Thus value rational and purposive-rational actions are located at the rational pole of the continuum and affectual and traditional action lie at non-rational pole of the continuum. Purposive-rational action is orientated towards the rational choice of means which are directed toward ends which in turn are rationally chosen in the light of possible consequences which follow from this choice. Ends in the sense of ultimate life values are not rationally determinable. This is the area of Weber's work where the distinctions are somewhat confused and require an understanding of his concept of disenchantment and his position on value free social science. I briefly indicate these dimensions of the concept rationality and the rationalization processes in capitalist society.

2.3.2 The Means-End Schema of Formal Rationalization as it applies to what is "Peculiar and Specific" about the Social Order of Capitalist Society

Weber states in "Science As A Vocation" that: "the fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the "Disenchantment of the world"(1974:155)

With the rise of modern science, which Weber often calls
"intellectualization", the world is "disenchanted" since magical and religious orders are supplanted by an order which, as a "causal mechanism", is amenable to "technical" mastery and calculation (Weber 1974:139,350). The technical mastery of the world occurs through technical rational action. Purposive rational action, entailing the following essential tenets, is seen by Weber as technical rational action.

1. The rational choice of means based upon technical knowledge derived from modern mathematics and experimentation.
2. Determined only by the criterion of calculability.
3. The end is clearly specified.
4. All considerations of resources and cost are excluded.
5. Answering the question "how" and dealing with processes of action which are applicable once a fixed end has been specified.

A concrete example may be the construction of an aircraft to combat the "Mig 23" irrespective of the cost in terms of materials and ultimate destruction of life. Scientific knowledge does not answer the questions "why?"; "what are we doing?"; "to what end?" when the end is a value. This narrow form of purposive rational action named technical rationality is held to be "objective" in the scientific sense. What Weber means in this context is that modern science is the "objective standard" in terms of which technical rationality can be judged. The technician uses scientific knowledge of means and ends, where the end is not a value but a goal, "build x" or "design y", in his technically rational mode of action. Technological rationality enables the actor to answer the question "how" do I build or design the "Mig24"? Here the end, build a "Mig 24", is clearly specified. When the actor asks - ought I, from a moral point of view, to build a "Mig 24"? he is not able to answer from the viewpoint of formal rationality. Weber adopts a neo-Kantian position on the "oughts" of social inquiry. For Kant, reason is able to discover "truths" via the mathematical sciences, in the phenomenal world. In stark contrast, the noumenal realm of human values and beliefs, is not rationally determinable in the sense of yielding truths to the reasoning actor. Thus formal or "pure" reason is limited to the realm of "facts" in the phenomenal realm while the noumenal is the domain of individual autonomy and freedom. Individuals choose and creatively
constitute values or ideals to guide their lives. Weber sees the world as a disenchanted sequence of meaningless "facts" which are subject to prediction and calculation of modern scientific and bureaucratic man. The broader conception of purposive rational action pertains to the rational choice of both means and ends within a configuration of available resources. As soon as the elements of cost and scarce resources are considered, the actor adopts an economic stance. Formal rationality is viewed as the rational choice of means and ends where the ends are formally considered in terms of the probable and predictable outcome of action. Although it is difficult to concretize Weber's concept of technological rationality, devoid of the economic consideration of means and ends, Weber's emphasis upon technological rationality is pervasive. It is seen in conjunction with the broader concept of purposive rational action. For Weber, rationalization means the progressive penetration of formal purposive-rationality into spheres of life such as the economic, judicial, administrative, and scholastic realms. Formal rationalization occurs through an orientation to efficiency, calculability, predictability and the consideration of people and objects as means to an end in the various spheres of life activities. Rationalization in this sense is characterized as the rationalization of the external environment. Rationalization of the internal environment or personality via Puritan worldly asceticism is another essential aspect of what is specific and peculiar to the modern order. On the basis of the work of Richard Baxter, the representative of Puritan asceticism, Weber distils four factors which determine internal rationalization.

1. Labour is viewed as an "approved ascetic technique", as a means of answering the "calling" of God. Weber stresses that for the Puritan,

"this calling is not, as it was for the Lutheran, a fate to which he must submit and which he must make the best of, but God's commandment to the individual to work for the divine glory. This seemingly subtle difference had far reaching psychological consequences, and became connected with a further development of the providential interpretation of the economic order which began in scholasticism." (1971:160)

Weber points out that the division of labour and occupations in society was understood by Thomas Aquinas as a
"direct consequence of the divine scheme of things. But the places assigned to each man in this cosmos follow ex causis naturalibus and are fortuitous (contingent in the Scholastic terminology). The differentiation of men into classes and occupations established through historical development became for Luther, as we have seen, a direct result of the divine will. The perseverance of the individual in the place and within the limits which God had assigned to him was a religious duty....hence the world had to be accepted as it was, and this alone could be made a religious duty." (1971:160)

In the Puritan view, in contrast, the providential nature of economic life takes on a different emphasis

"True to the Puritan tendency to pragmatic interpretations, the providential purpose of the division of labour is to be known by its fruits. On this point Baxter expresses himself in terms which more than once recall Adam Smith's well-known apotheosis of the division of labour. The specialization of occupations leads, since it makes the development of skill possible, to a quantitative and qualitative improvement in production, and thus serves the the common good, which is identical with the good of the greatest number. So far the motivation is purely utilitarian, and is closely related to the customary view-point of much of the secular literature of the time." (Weber 1971:161)

Weber explains that the Puritan's approach to the concept of labour is differentiated from the secular in that Baxter points out that the achievements of men are merely incidental and irregular if they are viewed "outside of a well-marked calling" (1971:161). Weber concludes as follows:

""and he [the specialist worker] will carry out his work in order while another remains in constant confusion, and his business knows neither time nor place...therefore is a certain calling the best for everyone"" (Baxter cited in Weber 1971:161). "Irregular work, which the ordinary labourer is often forced to accept, is often unavailable, but always an unwelcome state of transition. A man without a calling thus lacks a systematic, methodological character which is, as we have seen, demanded by worldly asceticism" (1971:161 emphasis mine)
Through hard and continuous work the "Glory of God" is secured. "Unwillingness to work, is symptomatic of the lack of grace" (Weber 1971:159). Labour as a calling then becomes "characteristic" of the worker (Weber 1971:179). The notion of a calling is premised upon the tenet of a systematic and methodical orientation to life. Thus the Puritan demands not only labour but "rational labour in a calling" (Weber 1971:162). The methodical orientation to labour entails planning such that activities are ordered via fixed rules and routines. Thus the activity of labour is formalized and rationally organized.

2. The spontaneous and mystical elements in religious and daily life activities are denigrated. The rational orientation toward life activities in this context means that all emotional, spontaneous and mystical factors which motivate action are excluded from man's rational orientation to life.

3. Consumption, especially of luxuries, is restricted. Emphasis upon labour and restricted consumption results in acquisition of wealth as a consequence of the rationality of the "calling". Thus comes to the fore the aesthetic compulsion to save and re-invest money. This is a prerequisite for the development of capitalism in conjunction with the "calling" or "vocational" orientation to work.

Weber notes that the religious roots of this orientation, in the sense of an intensive search for the "Kingdom of God gradually pass over into sombre economic virtue;...giving way to utilitarian worldliness" (1971:176)(4). Internal rationalization occurs to the extent that the elements of the Puritan asceticism permeates the personal orientation of actors. It is only when the elements of external and internal rationalization come together in the Western world that capitalism can develop. Weber depicts the specific and peculiar development of occidental reason as being complex and permeating the various social institutions at different phases in history (1971:77;1968:1400). Therefore the notion of a one-dimensional logic of historical "rationalization" for Weber is not supported by his work when contextualized (5). On the other hand the "Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" (1971) documents the coming together, as it were, of the rationalization processes into a constellation named Occidental Rationality. Thus rationalization processes
which are originally contingent and unique conjoin into a complex constellation characterised by formal-rational modes of action, the formal-rational constitution of knowledge and personality which characterises the "fatefulness" of the modern order. The fatefulness of the modern order for Weber derives from the permeation of purposive rational modes of action and particularly technical rationality into most spheres of life. As the "bureaucratic machine" becomes increasingly dependent on scientifically grounded technology, economic, political, military, artistic and religious forms of life are transformed into an "iron cage" of formal-rational spheres of action from which there is no escape. Thus the effective and predictable control of man over man and man over nature becomes for Weber the epigraph of modernity. He captures this as follows:

"no one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or if neither, mechanized petrification embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance." (Weber 1971:182)

2.4 Habermas' Critique of Formal Rationality as Understood by Weber and Marcuse

2.4.1 Formal Rationality as Domination

Marcuse's critique of Weber's concept of formal rationality covers three related domains. Firstly he rejects the "iron cage" as the "fate" of modernity. For Marcuse, the fatefulness of the modern order is seen as a fate that can be overcome. Marcuse states that

"any scientific analysis that is not committed to this possibility is pledged, not to reason, but to the reason of the established domination". (Marcuse 1968:215)

Secondly, he rejects the conception of "value-free" social science. Thirdly he argues that a new form of political domination is internal to the concept of formal rationality. Habermas focuses upon the concept of formal rationality and its relation to the notion of domination in his assessment of Marcuse's work. He opens his immanent critique by stating that for Marcuse formal rationality has specific substantive
implications. Namely:

1. That what Weber names "rationalization" denotes not rationality but rather a specific form of political domination in the guise of rationality. Marcuse defines domination as follows:

   "Domination is in effect whenever the individual's goals and purposes and the means of striving for and attaining them are prescribed to him and performed by him as something prescribed. Domination can be exercised by men, by nature, by things—it can also be internal, exercised by the individual on himself." (Marcuse 1970:165)

Weber's formal rationality entails efficient systems of action with fixed aims in specified situations. These systems of action are established in a technically correct manner through the choice of strategies and the application of techniques. Habermas and Marcuse point out that critical reflection on the social interests which determine choices are disavowed in these efficient systems of action. Habermas notes that the efficient procedures devoid of critical reflection upon interests underlying the procedures, constitutes not rationality in the positive sense, but rather domination for Marcuse. As I note under 2.3, for Weber, the formal rationality of choice between various means is guided by scientific procedures and not "social interests" (6).

2. Formal rationality extends to "relations of possible technical control" and hence exhibits a form of action which implies domination of men over nature and the domination of men over men. (Habermas 1971:82)

3. The very structure of purposive-rational action is an exercise of control. Thus the rationalization process whereby formal rationality permeates the various spheres of life may be seen as the institutionalization not of rationality but of an unacknowledged form of domination in the name of rationality. Habermas then focuses upon the unacknowledged institutionalization of domination in the forces and relations of production as seen by Marcuse. Habermas explains that with the advance in science and technology, progress in the forces of production exhibits a paradox. On the one hand, the unprecedented advance in modes of production implies that a great potential exists for the provision of the basic needs of
mankind. On the other hand, these very technological advances become the basis for the new form of political legitimation which subject individuals to the bureaucratic machine, as Weber would say. Thus the existing relations of production come to be seen as technically necessary and rational in and of themselves. Marcuse argues that the "renunciations and burdens placed on individuals seem more and more unnecessary and irrational" when viewed from the perspective of the potential release from surplus repression implied in the technological progress of the modes of production (Habermas 1971:83) (7). Marcuse argues that a certain amount of repression is necessary in society to provide for the necessities of life. Surplus repression occurs when additional controls are forced upon individuals through institutions of domination. Habermas captures this process as follows:

"In Marcuse's judgement, the objectively superfluous repression can be recognized in the "intensified subjection of individuals to the enormous apparatus of production and distribution, in the deprivatization of free time, in the almost indistinguishable fusion of constructive and destructive social labor" (Marcuse cited in Habermas 1971:83). "Paradoxically, however, this repression can disappear from the consciousness of the population because the legitimation of domination has assumed a new character: it refers to the constantly increasing productivity and domination of nature which keeps individuals...living in increasing comfort" (1971:83)

The famous statement made by Habermas in this regard is that formal rationality in Weber's sense now "shows its Janus face" (1971:83). What he means is that reason is no longer the critical standard in terms of which the forces and relations of production can be shown directly to exhibit relations of inequality and oppression. On the contrary, "rationality" becomes the "apologetic standard" through which the relations of production are justified (Habermas 1971:83). Marcuse's conclusions are cited as follows:

"the very concept of technical reason is perhaps ideological. Not only the application of technology but technology itself is domination (of nature and men) - methodical, scientific, calculated, calculating control. Specific purposes and interests of domination are not foisted upon technology
"subsequently" from the outside; they enter the very construction of the technical apparatus. Technology is always a historical social project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and things. Such a "purpose" of domination is "substantive" and to this extent belongs to the very form of technical reason." (Marcuse cited in Habermas 1971:82)

Marcuse comes to the conclusion that technological reason is an "historical project", and that in the framework of formal reason, man and nature are conceived as objects of scientific domination in an a priori fashion. What he means is that a technology which is structured toward the "rational" control of men and things is only possible if the assumption is made that man is a "thing" or object to be controlled and dominated. To the critical theorist who views men as creative actors who are capable of making their own history with will and consciousness, as Marx would have said, this form of science and its technological implications is unacceptable. Marcuse therefore calls for a new science and a new form of technology based upon the attitudes of partnership and equality. Habermas says of this:

"The transcendental framework within which nature would be made the object of a new experience would no longer be a functional system of instrumental action. The viewpoint of possible technical control would be replaced by one of preserving, fostering, and releasing the potentialities of nature." (1971:86)

Habermas does not accept this "romantic" rejection of science and technology (1971:86). He argues that the idea of a "new" science and technology stems from the "promise, familiar in Jewish and Protestant mysticism, of the resurrection of fallen nature" (Habermas 1971:86). He sees this theme to have permeated the thought not only of Schelling but also that of Marx of the Paris Manuscripts, of Bloch's philosophy and "in reflected forms, directs the secret hopes of Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno." (Habermas 1971:86). It is at this point that view of human agency which is presupposed in Habermas' critique of Marcuse's position, is on the verge of emerging. Some clarification is necessary though before my thesis can be demonstrated. I clarify this crucial aspect of the analysis in two steps. First I indicate how Habermas draws an analogy between
purposive rational action and the concept work (poeisis). Secondly, I show how Habermas recasts the entire investigation of the concepts rationality and rationalization processes into the concepts of work and communicative action, such that he can articulate a concept of rationality which:

1. Avoids the utopian demand for a "new" science and technology.
2. Rejects the traditional Marxist understanding of the relations and forces of production in the sense of the base superstructure model.

2.4.2 The Analogy Between Purposive-Rational Action and The Concept Work

Habermas opens his critique of Marcuse's notion that technology is an "historical project" grounded upon the concept of purposive rational action by stating that:

"an alternative New Science would have to include the definition of a New Technology. This is a sobering consideration because technology, if based at all on a "project", can only be traced back to a project of the human species as a whole and not one that could be historically surpassed." (1971:87 emphasis mine)

Drawing on the work of Arnold Gehlen, Habermas argues that there is an immanent connection between technology and purposive rational-action. For Gehlen, Habermas points out, the logic of technological development is analogous to the logic of purposive rational action. The basic argument is that if one understands the "behavioural system regulated by its own results, as the conjunction of rational decision and instrumental action", the history of technology can be reconstructed as the "step-by-step objectification of the elements" of rational decision and instrumental action (Habermas 1971:87). Habermas qualifies this idea by explaining that technological development lends itself to being interpreted,

"as though the human species had taken the elementary components of the behavioural system of purposive-rational action, which are primarily rooted in the human organism, and projected them one after another onto the plane of technical instruments, thereby unburdening itself of the corresponding functions" (1971:87 emphasis mine)

He explains that, for Gehlen, the first stage in the history of
technology may be seen as the "augmentation" and "replacement" of the "human motor functions (hands and legs)" (1971:87). What Habermas means is that the tool, machine and the vehicle are the technological analogues of man's motor functions. Machines replace the functions of the hand and foot. These functions are objectified or embodied in the machine which functions in a manner which augments and replaces the motor functions of the human organism. The next stage in the development of technology is that of energy production (analogous to the energy production of the human body) followed by sensory functions (eyes, ears and skin) and finally the functions of the "governing centre" (the brain). This aspect of his work is not at all clear. What the analogue between the human body and energy production is, is open to speculation. The functions of the brain and "governing centres" are suggestive of computer technology but Habermas does not elaborate further (8). In the next paragraph, and subsequent development of the critique, Habermas ignores the biological analogy in the sense of the parallels between the functions of the organism and technology. He seems to require an idea of the human condition as it has developed to the present, and the idea that technology is analogous to the logic of purposive rational action. Habermas then directly invokes the concept of work which can be viewed as logically analogous to purposive rational action. He equates the basic idea of Gehlen that technology is logically analogous to purposive rational action with Arendt's concept of work. For Arendt, the work process can also be understood in terms of human purposiveness. "The products of homo faber", Arendt argues, are "realized in a step-by-step fashion which have a willed beginning and a definite end, they assume the character of automatism" (1953:151). Habermas states his view as follows:

"Technological development thus follows a logic that corresponds to the structure of purposive-rational action regulated by its own results, which is in fact the structure of work. Realizing this, it is impossible to envisage how, as long as the organization of human nature does not change and as long as we have to achieve self-preservation through social labor with the aid of means that substitute for work, we could renounce technology, more particularly our technology, in favour of a qualitatively different one." (1971:87 emphasis mine)
I regard this citation as fundamental to the thesis that Habermas is refuting Marcuse's call for a new science and technology on the grounds of the Arendt's work. Habermas can only claim that purposive-rational action "corresponds" to the logic of work if he assumes that the distinction which Arendt makes between the concepts labour, work and communicative action are correct. For Arendt the decisive error which Marx makes is to argue that one can achieve "freedom" or human autonomy through the dialect of labour. As I note in chapter one, Arendt indicates that Marx does not distinguish between the concepts of labour and work. Arendt's point is that labour, work and communicative action are activities which are fundamental to the human condition. She argues that man engages in all three activities and priority cannot be accorded to one over and above the other. The life of action must be seen in the interrelation of concepts and not merely in the isolated abstract form in which she initially presents them. For example Arendt states:

"If the animal laborans [man the labourer] needs the help of homo faber [man the worker] to ease his labor and remove his pain, and if mortals need his help to erect a home on earth, acting and speaking men need the help of homo faber in his highest capacity [the reification process at its highest level] that is the help of the artist, of poets and historiographers, of monument builders or writers, because without them the only product of their activity, the story they enact and tell would not survive at all". (1958:173 emphasis mine)

Habermas can only argue that

"it is impossible to envisage how, as long as the organization of human nature does not change and as long as we have to achieve self-preservation through social labor with the aid of means that substitute for work, we could renounce technology, more particularly our technology, in favour of a qualitatively different one," (1971:87)

if he is in agreement with Arendt. Habermas does not call for the liberation of man from the bondage of labour. This is an orientation which is overlooked by commentators and critics of Habermas' work. McCarthy, in his detailed and authoritative analysis of Habermas' work, interprets this citation as follows:
"Habermas' own view is that while the specific historical forms of science and technology depend on institutional arrangements that are variable, their basic structures are grounded in the very nature of purposive rational action. As long as this does not change, as long as human beings have to seek their own self preservation and emancipation from material necessity through labor aided by means that substitute for work, there can be no more humane replacement for scientific-technical progress. Technology if based at all on a historical project, can only be traced back to a project of the human species as a whole, and not one that can be surpassed." (1978:22 emphasis mine)

Habermas is by no means calling for the "emancipation of men from material necessity through labour aided by means that substitute for work" as McCarthy claims. This is precisely Arendt's critique of the absurdities theorists speak of when they adhere to the concept of labour in the Marxist paradigm. For Arendt and Habermas it is absurd to see the concept of labour as a means of "emancipating men from material necessity." There can be no such activity which "emancipates" mankind from material necessity except perhaps mans mortality which means that man is no longer subject to the necessities of life. Habermas says of this logic that Arendt's work corrects the "productivist aberrations" which stem from such arguments (1980:129). Habermas very carefully says "as long as we have to achieve self-preservation through social labor with the aid of means that substitute for work", technology cannot be renounced (1971:87). The emphasis falls on self-preservation and not on emancipation through the concept of labour with the aid of means that substitute for work. Habermas can only formulate this problematic in this manner in stark contrast to the traditional Marxist notion of labour as the magical concept leading to freedom, if he subscribes to Arendt's viewpoint. Therefore the concept of labour is for Habermas, the condition for the possibility of LIFE of the human species and not the condition for the possibility of freedom or emancipation. From this it follows that if men as labourers need the aid of men the makers, the rationality of making as it is presently known, cannot be renounced as it is grounded in the human condition of the present historical development of the species. The specific manner in
which the concept of work is invoked is very similar to the manner in which Arendt uses the concept work (9). Since the concept of work in turn is the basic condition of worldliness, and the artifact which is the product of man the maker is the MEANS whereby worldliness is constituted, the logic in terms of which this process occurs, namely the means-ends logic of the reification process, cannot be renounced. For Habermas the logic of reification is the logic of work which in turn is the logic of purposive-rational action in the realm of the work process. This logic encompasses the means-ends schema of technological reason. Therefore as long as the organisation of human nature does not change, technology as it is known at present, cannot be renounced in the name of an historical project which surpasses the human condition in some utopian beyond. Human freedom for Arendt and Habermas is located not in the realm of the biological life cycle, the domain of labour. Nor is freedom located in the realm of reification, the domain of work. The concept of freedom is articulated in the realm of communicative action, the domain of communicatively formed rather than imposed power. Therefore Habermas calls for the limitation of the concept purposive rational action to its domain of reification. What he objects to is the permeation of purposive-rational action (the reification process) into all spheres of life, particularly the realm of communication between human subjects. In other words what Habermas objects to is the universalization of purposive rationality as the only form of rationality in the modern world. For Habermas communicative action, and the form of rationality this form of human agency entails, is central to the human condition as known at present. I formulate these distinctions in an unorthodox manner in order to highlight the specific concepts and what they mean for Habermas when they are seen in the context of Arendt's work. I now return to the logic of the immanent critique. Habermas holds that Marcuse confuses the political content of purposive-rational action with the call for a new science and technology which in fact is a call for a new "attitude" towards nature. He states this position as follows.

"instead of treating nature as the object of possible technical control, we can encounter her as an opposing partner in a possible interaction. We can seek out a fraternal rather than an exploited nature...be this as it
may, the achievements of technology, which are indispensable as such, could surely not be substituted for an awakened nature." (Habermas 1971:88 emphasis mine)

Habermas explains that the alternative "project" of nature in fact refers to an alternative structure of action, namely symbolic or communicative interaction which is different in kind to the logic of purposive rational action. He makes this crucial point as follows:

"This means, however, that the two projects are projections of work and language i.e. projects of the human species as a whole and not of an individual epoch, a specific class or a surpassable situation." (1971:88)

To argue that Marcuse has confused the logic of purposive rational action (work) at the substantive level of a specific class or epoch, with the logic of communicative action (an alternative structure of action), clearly indicates that Habermas must embrace Arendt's trichotomous depiction of the human condition if he sees these "structures of action" as operating as historical "projects" of the species as a whole. He says that Marcuse "seems to doubt whether it is meaningful to relativize as a "project, the rationality of science and technology." (1971:88)

Habermas explains that in many passages of "One-dimensional Man", Marcuse speaks of revolutionising technological rationality in a manner which means a change in the institutional framework such that the governing values are changed while the structure of progress in and of itself remains the same. Therefore the direction of progress is new in the sense that it is seen in terms of fostering, preserving and releasing the potential of nature, but the "standard of rationality would remain the same." (Habermas 1971:89) What Habermas is saying can be summarised as follows:

1. Marcuse sees in the concept purposive rationality, a form of domination which must be overcome. This form of domination is internal to the very structure of modern science and technology.

2. Therefore what is needed is a new form of science and technology which is not directed toward the domination of man and nature.

3. The present form of science and its technological reason entails the unprecedented progress in material development.
other words the forces of production have advanced dramatically in the modern world.

4. Therefore the present forces of production can be harnessed to unburden men of the surplus repression they presently experience through a change in "attitude" with regard to the manner in which technology is used. This implies that the present form of technological reason is only irrational to the extent that surplus repression is maintained.

5. If the last two points are seen in isolation of the first two, Marcuse is calling only for a change in "attitude" but leaves the concept of rationality as it stands.

6. Therefore Marcuse obscures the substantive content of purposive rational action entailed in points one and two with the attitudes he prescribes for the "new science", which he in fact doubts.

This assessment of the internal logic of Marcuse's position highlights Habermas' intent. Habermas holds that a distinction must be made at the level of the concepts of human agency and rationality and not at the level of attitudes towards nature. The logic of science and technology is analogous to the logic of work (poiesis), Habermas argues. Here purposive rational action, encompassing the means-ends schema, entails the step by step actualization or "objectification of the elements" of rational decision and instrumental action (Habermas 1971:87). Thus, if the organisation of human nature does not change, the standard of rationality at this level of analysis remains the same. Habermas can only argue that a one-dimensional concept of rationality pervades Marcuse's work, if he (Habermas), has discovered another concept of rationality which goes beyond the mere change in the "attitudes" directing purposive rational action. Arendt's three dimensional assessment of the human condition furnishes Habermas with a concept of communicative action grounded in language rather than work. The rationality of communicative modes of action is the new dimension of the concept rationality which Habermas is to clarify. On this basis Habermas can scrutinize Marcuse's notion of the new science to see whether he in fact distinguishes between "communication with nature" on the grounds of communicative action or work. Habermas comes to the conclusion that the concept of purposive rationality, encompassing the form of human agency captured by the concept
work, pervades Marcuse's "monistic" view of modern reason. A change in attitude based upon new values rather than a distinction at the level of the concept of rationality is called for by Marcuse, Habermas argues. One may object, with justification, that Habermas distorts Marcuse's position since the erotic and sensuous elements of the "new" science are totally ignored (10). I do not discuss this aspect of Marcuse's work as my aim is to follow Habermas' logic and to clarify his reformulation of the concept rationality. The fundamental idea which pervades Habermas' work from this point onwards is that the concept rationality can be reformulated in terms of the work (poiesis) / communicative action (praxis) distinction deriving from the work of Arendt.

2.5 The Concept Rationality and the transition from Traditional to Modern Society.

Habermas argues that both Marcuse and Weber fail in their attempts to capture the progressive rationalization of society. He states that through the concept rationalization, Weber "attempted to grasp the repercussions of scientific societies engaged in modernization" (Habermas 1971:90). In this endeavour, Weber shares an interest guiding the work of the classical social theorists Habermas argues. Habermas holds that the classical social theorists use paired concepts such as status and contract, mechanical and organic solidarity, traditional and bureaucratic authority, in their attempts to explain the institutional changes which occur in the transition from traditional to modern society. Habermas notes that even Parsons' pairs of value orientations:

"affectivity versus affective neutrality, particularism versus universalism, ascription versus achievement, diffuseness versus specificity," (1971:91)

imply an orientation towards the articulation of the historical changes which occur in the institutions of society on its way to modernization. Habermas sees in this abstract theory of value orientations of Parsons, the change in attitudes which occur in the transition to modernity. He links the work of Parson with that of Weber as follows:
"Subsystems of purposive-rational action do indeed demand orientation to the postponement of gratification, universal norms, individual achievement and active mastery, and specific and analytic relationships, rather than the opposite orientations." (Habermas 1971:91)

Habermas says that he intends to reformulate what Weber names rationalization such that he moves beyond the subjective approach implicit in the work of Weber and Parsons and by implication Marcuse, who also is shown to focus his attention upon the changes in "attitude" necessary for the new science.

The first step in the reformulation of the concept rationality is Habermas' statement that a "fundamental distinction" must be made between the concepts work and interaction. This distinction is crucial to an understanding of Habermas' concept of rationality and its subsequent modification in the later works. The basis of the distinction lies in the integration of the concepts which are central to Arendt's view of human agency with sociological theory. The concepts employed are as follows:

1. The concept work (poiesis): The form of knowledge associated with work, the skillful production of artifact, is now understood from the modern viewpoint of the philosophy of science and is integrated with the Weberian ideal typical concept of purposive rational action with its means ends schema.

2. The concept of communicative action which is actualized through language and occurs in the web of human relationships: Language is seen as the medium through which communicative action is intersubjectivity constituted. This view of human agency is integrated with the sociological theory dealing with social roles, norms and sanctions.

Habermas states that:

"By "work" or purposive-rational action I understand either instrumental action or rational choice or their conjunction" (1971:91 emphasis in the text).

He clarifies each concept in turn. "Purposive-rational action realizes defined goals under given conditions" (1971:92).
Instrumental action is held to be governed by technical rules which are derived from empirical knowledge. This form of knowledge implies "conditional predictions" about physical and social events which are observed by the researcher. Predictions of observable events can be proven to be correct or incorrect. "Instrumental action organizes means that are appropriate or inappropriate according to criteria of an effective control of reality." (Habermas 1971:92)

Rational choice is "governed" by "strategies" which are derived from analytic knowledge. This is the domain of strategic action which is rational in the sense that rational choices are made in the selection of means to achieve ends. Habermas stresses that implicit in the rational choice of means are deductions made from rules of "preference" which stem from value systems and "decision procedures". What he means is that the rational choice in the strategic sense is not purely analytical. Thus "strategic action depends only on the correct evaluation of possible alternative choices, which results from calculation supplemented by values and maxims" (1971:90). The concept work then covers both instrumental action and strategic action which are seen as purposive-rational modes of action.

The concept interaction is introduced as follows:

"By interaction, on the other hand I understand communicative action, symbolic interaction. It is governed by binding consensual norms, which define reciprocal expectations about behaviour and which must be understood and recognized by at least two acting subjects. Social norms are enforced through sanctions. Their meaning is objectified in ordinary language communication" (1971:92)

Here, for the first time, Habermas is implicitly introducing a concept of subjectivity which includes the concept of plurality. He says that communicative action is governed by norms which are "understood and recognized by at least two acting subjects". This implies the notion of plurality which becomes explicit in his later work which I deal with in chapter three. Habermas is now able to distinguish between the domains of truth and understanding which pertain to these two realms respectively. Invoking the concept validity, Habermas says of the realms of purposive-rational action and interaction:
"While the validity of technical rules and strategies depends on that of empirically true or analytically correct propositions, the validity of social norms is grounded only in the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding of intentions and secured by the general recognition of obligations." (1971:92)

Thus questions of truth fall into the realm of purposive-rational action which is guided by analytic and empirical knowledge. Questions of understanding and by implication those of meaning fall into the realm of interaction. Habermas then focuses upon the consequences which follow from the violation of the rules pertaining to the two spheres of action. In the realm of purposive rational action the violation of technical rules and strategies, results in behaviour which is classed as incompetent. Habermas says:

"Incompetent behaviour, which violates valid technical rules or strategies, is condemned per se to failure through lack of success; "punishment" is built, so to speak, into its rebuff by reality." (1971:92)

Thus, at the level of instrumental action, the carpenter who violates the technical rules of production and produces a two-legged stool as Arendt says in this regard, is seen as incompetent and is "punished", when the stool falls over. This "rebuff" is "built into the reality." Another rebuff of reality is the displacement of the incompetent worker by one who obeys the technical rules of producing stools in the workshop.

At the level of strategically rational action, the commander who fails in his strategy of defeating the enemy is labelled as incompetent and suffers the consequences. Habermas holds that the rules of purposive rational action equip actors with skills (11). This is contrasted at the level of interaction where the violation of consensual norms is seen as deviant behaviour rather than incompetence. Social sanctions are invoked as the consequence of deviant behaviour. One of the interesting examples of this in critical theory is the scapegoating phenomenon which occurs when the "scapegoat" is subjected to ridicule when he transgresses accepted norms of behaviour in social settings. Habermas continues his reformulation as follows:
"Learned rules of purposive rational action supply us with skills, internalized norms with personality structures. Skills put us in a position to solve problems; motivations allow us to follow norms." (1971:92)

On the basis of these distinctions, Habermas now indicates what he means by the concept society. For Habermas, the "institutional framework" of a society consists of norms which guide symbolic interaction. Within this system of symbolic relations are what he calls subsystems such as the economy and the "state apparatus" in which purposive rational "sets of action" are primarily institutionalized. (Habermas 1971:93). These subsystems are contrasted with subsystems such as the family and the kinship structures in which moral, interactive rules predominate. Habermas is emphasizing the relative pre-dominance of purposive rational modes of action over the interactive mode in some subsystems (the economy and the state) in contrast to other subsystems (the family). He certainly is not attempting to state that the two realms of action, purposive rational and interactive, as institutionalized in society, are mutually exclusive (12). Habermas states his position as follows:

"I shall distinguish generally at the analytic level between (1) the institutional framework of a society or the socio-cultural life-world and (2) the subsystems of purposive-rational action that are "embedded" in it. Insofar as actions are determined by the institutional framework they are both guided and enforced by norms. Insofar as they are determined by subsystems of purposive-rational action, they conform to patterns of instrumental or strategic action. Of course, only institutionalization can guarantee that such action will in fact follow definite technical rules and expected strategies with adequate probability" (1971:94)

On the basis of these distinctions, Habermas now reformulates Weber's concept of "rationalization processes." Behind this analysis lies the question: How does one explain the transition from traditional to modern society? Internal to his specific notion of traditional society is the idea of classing societies in terms of their level of "civilization". Thus an evolutionary dimension of rationalization processes can be articulated. Habermas says that the criterion of "civilization" represents "a specific stage in the evolution of the species" (1971:94).
Traditional society is characterized as differing from more "primitive" social formations on the following grounds.

1. Traditional society denotes systems which meet the criteria of civilizations. Civilizations are seen as being established on the basis of a relatively developed technology, the division of labour and social production processes such that a surplus, beyond the satisfaction of elementary needs is produced (13).

He says of traditional societies:
"they owe their existence to the solution of the problem that first arises with the production of a surplus product, namely, of how to distribute wealth and labour both unequally and yet legitimately according to criteria other than those generated by a kinship system" (1971:94)

2. Traditional society in this sense entails the centralization of power in the form of an organized state as opposed to tribal organization.

3. Traditional Society is divided into socio-economic classes since the distribution of social obligation and reward is contingent upon class position and not kinship status.

4. A centralized world-view is prevalent ("myth, complex religion") in terms of which political power is legitimated. Habermas qualifies this last point as follows:
"the prevalence of a central world view (myth, complex religion) to the end of legitimating political power (thus converting power into authority)." (1971:94 emphasis mine)

Habermas argues that traditional societies tolerate a limited degree of technological innovation. He states that pre-capitalist mode of production, pre-industrial technology and pre-modern science, in traditional society, exhibits a particular relationship between the institutional framework and the subsystems of purposive rational action. Central to traditional society, is an institutional framework which is grounded upon the cultural tradition made up of mythical, religious and metaphysical interpretations of reality. These world views are accepted as authoritative and are not questioned by the majority of the citizens. Habermas invokes the concept of rationality as follows:
"despite considerable progress, these subsystems, developing out of the system of social labor, and its stock of accumulated technically exploitable knowledge, never reached a measure of extension after which their "rationality" would have become a threat to the authority of the cultural traditions that legitimate political power." (1971:95)

Traditional societies are thus limited to specific forms of rationality. Habermas holds that traditional societies exist as long as subsystems of purposive-rational action are confined or limited by the "superior rationality" of the cultural tradition. In this context, the validity of the intersubjectively shared tradition, which legitimates the authority structure of society, is not questioned.

Capitalism, in contrast, is seen by Habermas as the first mode of production in history whereby the subsystems of purposive rational action are institutionalized such that innovation or progress is endemic. A "reversal" of the superiority criterion occurs. Habermas says:

"The capitalist mode of production can be comprehended as a mechanism that guarantees the permanent expansion of subsystems of purposive-rational action and thereby overturns the traditionalist "superiority" of the institutional framework to the forces of production." (1971:96)

In this framework the principles of "universally valid rationality" in the form of technical or strategic means-end relations assumes the criterion of superiority (Habermas 1971:96). The decisive feature in this period of "civilization" is that the validity of the cultural tradition is called into question. Habermas holds that he is developing an understanding of capitalist society at a different level of analysis to Marx. His main point is that it is not merely the dynamic of the forces and relations of production which bring about the institutional changes, but that the structures of legitimation change. The decisive concepts from Habermas' viewpoint are what he names the subsystems of purposive-rational action and their relation to the communicative rationality of the institutional framework as a whole. What he says is that the traditional world views operate at the level of the logic of interaction contexts. They are seen to answer the questions pertaining to "men's collective existence and individual life history" (1971:96). Their themes are the
classical questions of "freedom" and "justice", "violence" and "oppression", "happiness" and "gratification", "poverty", "illness" and "death" (Habermas 1971:96). The rationality of these "language games" which are characteristic of communicative action, comes into direct conflict with the rationality of the means-ends relations of instrumental and strategic action "at the threshold of modernity" (Habermas 1971:96). He says:

"as soon as this confrontation can arise, the end of traditional society is in sight: the traditional form of legitimation breaks down." (Habermas 1971:96)

Habermas hastens to add that not only does this legitimation problem occur, but that capitalism solves it. The legitimation of domination in the modern society now derives from the "base of social labour" and not from the "lofty heights of cultural tradition" (1971:97). What Habermas means is that the unequal distribution of wealth in traditional society rests on the institutionalization of social force. Tradition legitimates the inequality such that it is accepted without question. (14)

In the early phase of modern society, legitimation stems not from tradition, but from the rationality of the market where the notion of "just exchange" is the new legitimating category. Habermas makes the crucial statement that the capitalist mode of production has two "roots".

1. An economic mechanism is established such that the subsystems of purposive rational action are permanently expanded.

2. Political legitimation occurs on the basis of economics such that the political system can be adapted to the "new requisites of rationality" brought about by the developing subsystems of purposive-rational action. (Habermas 1971:94)

He sees this process of adaptation as the "rationalization process" which Weber attempts to capture. Now, Habermas argues, one can speak of a dual rationalization process. Habermas makes a distinction between rationalization "from below" and rationalization "from above".

2.5.1 Rationalization from Below:

Through the term "rationalization from below", Habermas wants to account for the permeation of the subsystems of purposive-rational action into the institutional framework of society. At this level of analysis he employs the term "society" in the sense
of the institutional "framework" or sociocultural life-world in which the subsystems of purposive rational action are embedded. Once he has established that capitalist mode of production necessitates a subsystem of purposive-rational action in which progress and innovation are endemic, he can argue that pressure for adaptation becomes endemic. Thus the pressure from "below" for the rationalization of society becomes operative as soon as the capitalist mode of production is institutionalized through the establishment of the the domestic market and the labour power necessary for this process. The "why's" of this aspect of the analysis are not stated. Habermas then must accept Marx's explanation of this process. Marx holds that the institutions of society are modified by the new relations which are entered into as soon as the forces of production develop. The necessary connection between the relations and forces of production is the nexus in terms of which change is articulated for Marx. Habermas assumes that by describing the characteristics of rationalization he is accounting for the transition. He merely states that once the exchange market and the necessary labour power are "institutionalized", adaptation pressure begins. The subsystem of purposive rational action becomes fully operative, and through its "endemic progress", traditional structures are increasingly subordinated to the conditions of instrumental and strategic rationality. Thus instrumental and strategic rationality permeate the organization of labour, trade, communication systems, legal systems, financial and administrative systems, education and family structures. Habermas calls this the "urbanization of the form of life" (1971:98). He argues that "subcultures are generated which train the individual to "switch over at any moment from an interaction context to purposive-rational action" (1971:98). This is a variation on the Weberian theme that "ideas" function like "switchmen" and determine the tracks along which action is propelled. Habermas suggests that training becomes the catalyst which enable men to change from communicative rationality to purposive rational action. This theme is not developed beyond the level of suggestion. The discussion of rationalization from below is highly plausible but he does not provide the explanatory links between the two periods. The detailed description of traditional society and liberal capitalism stand opposed to one another in
terms of their characteristics which are translated into the language of rationality. Habermas does not indicate why the leap from traditional society to liberal capitalism itself occurs.

2.5.2 Rationalization From Above

For Habermas rationalization from below co-incides with pressure toward rationalization which comes from above. Rationalization from above derives from the dual nature of "secularization" as outlined by Weber. Firstly, traditional world views lose their validity as myth, public religion, and customary ritual, since:

"they are reshaped into subjective belief systems and ethics which ensure the private cogency of modern value-orientations (the Protestant ethic)" (Habermas 1971:99)

Secondly, when traditional world-views lose their validity, they are transformed into

"constructions which criticize tradition and reorganize the released material of tradition according to the principles of formal law and the exchange of equivalents (rationalist natural law)" (Habermas 1971:99)

Thus traditional forms of legitimation are replaced by new ones. These new forms of legitimation are seen to emerge from the critique of dogmatic interpretations of the world and "claim a scientific character" (Habermas 1971:99). Habermas notes that the mechanistic worldview of the seventeenth century becomes the basis upon which natural law is reconstructed. The revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries then occur. This is the particular constellation upon which Marx develops his critique of ideology as a critique of political economy. Habermas argues that liberal capitalism is transformed into welfare capitalism in modernity and that the traditional Marxist concepts of the base and superstructure are no longer applicable. In welfare capitalism, the state intervenes directly in the economy in order to secure its stability. Through the various fiscal and monetary controls, the "free market" is "stabilized". Research and technology progressively become interdependent. Habermas argues that the sciences become the "leading productive force" (Habermas 1971:100). With the advent of large scale industry, science, technology and industrial utilization of technological knowledge mutually interpenetrate. Industrial research is linked to research under government contract, which promotes scientific
and technical progress in the military sector. From there, information flows back to the civilian sectors of production. Thus technology and science become leading productive forces. Both tendencies, the direct intervention of the state in the economy and science and technology as leading productive forces, result in a changed constellation between the institutional framework and the subsystems of purposive-rational action. Thus the traditional Marxist notion that the super-structure is a mere epiphenomenon, dependent on the economic "laws" of the underlying economic base no longer holds. Habermas argues that the key to deciphering these new structures lies in Marcuse's notion that technology and science are the loci of legitimation processes. Habermas says,

"The root ideology of just exchange which Marx unmasked collapsed in practice. The form of capital utilization through private ownership could only be maintained by the government corrective of a social and economic policy that stabalized the business cycle. The institutional framework of society was repoliticized."(1971:101)

The direct form of legitimation which pertains to traditional society reappears. But the traditions have been "disempowered", thus a substitute is required. Science and technology fulfil this function. The state is orientated toward the elimination of dysfunctions in the system. Politics becomes the realm through which technical solutions to problems are sought while the classical form of practical reason, orientated toward questions of the "good" are no longer thematic. Habermas says of this development.

"Old-style politics was forced, merely through its traditional form of legitimation, to define itself in relation to practical goals: the "good life" was interpreted in a context defined by the interaction relations. The same still held for the ideology of bourgeois society. The substitute programme prevailing today, in contrast, is aimed exclusively at the functioning of a manipulated system. It eliminates practical questions and therewith precludes discussion about the adoption of standards; the latter could only emerge from democratic decision- making process." (1971:103)

The solution of technical problems in the modern world is not
dependent upon public discussion but rather the advice of technical experts. Thus science, technology, research and public administration fuse into an interlocking system developing formalized and specialized languages which are not open to public reflection and critique. Habermas echoes Arendt in this context stating that the public realm in modernity loses its political function as practical questions are translated into technical ones. Once again the realm of communicative action and practical rationality is held to be reduced to the realm of technical rationality which is the theme of chapter one. Once scientific and technical progress are institutionalized, they assume a form in which "men lose consciousness of the dualism of work and interaction", Habermas argues. (Habermas 1971:105). Here Habermas introduces the famous "technocracy thesis" which expands upon the basic idea that science and technology becomes the new ideology which legitimates the new form of politics. Briefly, the basic contours of this thesis are as follows. "Social interests" determine the direction of technical progress. Habermas does not say what he means by social interests but in the context of the discussion, he equates social with economic as he does in the earlier work on More and Hobbes (15). These interests co-incide with the interests in maintaining the system as a whole. The quasi-autonomous progress of Science and Technology becomes the independent variable in terms of which economic progress depends. Thus the social system appears to be determined by the logic of scientific-technical progress. Technical "experts" replace citizens in the decision making functions which are translated into technical problems. The "depoliticization" of citizens is legitimated on the grounds of science and technology. Habermas says:

"when this semblance has taken root effectively, then propaganda can refer to the role of technology and science in order to explain and legitimate why in modern societies the process of democratic decision-making about practical problems lose its function and "must" be replaced by plebiscitary decisions about alternative sets of leaders of administrative personnel." (1971:105)

For Habermas an important aspect of this process is that the new ideology suppresses the traditional framework of interaction based on communicative action. The institutional framework of
society is progressively rationalized in terms of science and technology such that behavioural controls and technical recommendations are accorded priority over custom and morality in a disenchanted world. Action is reduced to conditioned behaviour. For Habermas, the "moral realization of the normative order is a function of communicative action" which is orientated to intersubjectively shared cultural meaning premised upon the internalization of values (1971:106). The normative order in this sense asks after questions of justice, equality, freedom and democracy. In the most advanced industrial societies, behavioural controls are determined on the basis of a stimulus response model. Artificially produced stimuli, particularly in the realm of "subjective freedom" (electoral, consumer and leisure behaviour) displace norms and values deriving from intersubjective expectations and interpretations based upon reflection. Habermas makes the interesting point that "sociopsychologically, the era is typified less by the authoritarian personality than by the destructuring of the super-ego " (1971:107). Here Habermas is implicitly criticizing Adorno and Horkheimer with his dual concept of purposive or instrumental rationality and communicative rationality. He is suggesting that communicative rationality, which is orientated towards the normative realm is "urbanized", "colonised" and suppressed, by forms of purposive rationality. Thus the super-ego, which develops through socialization processes, via communicative rationality is "destructured" by purposive or instrumental forms of rationality. Meaning is progressively eroded and utilitarianism, which is based upon a "means-ends" form of reason, is the order of the day. This can be deciphered at the level of rational planning. Rationalization at the level of urban planning follows the logic of systems analysis. Habermas notes of this planned reconstruction of society, that systems theorists apply the abstract model of cybernetics to the real life context in order to organise reality. Habermas objects to this systems approach toward the reconstruction of society. The planning imperatives of capitalist and bureaucratic socialist systems follow the same logic, Habermas holds. Namely, the exclusive focus upon one dimension of rationality, purposive-rational action and adaptive behaviour. Habermas extends the implications of this form of reasoning to its logical conclusion.
He notes that the technocratic consciousness of bureaucratic socialism and modern systems planning, can only be achieved at the cost of closing off the dimension of interaction which is mediated by ordinary language. He sees the future repertoire of control techniques as expanding at various levels. Drawing from Herman Kahn's fifty most probable technical innovations over the next thirty years, he notes for example:

30. New techniques of surveillance, monitoring and controlling individuals and organizations.

33. New and more reliable techniques for the "educational" control of individuals both privately and publicly through propaganda and sophisticated technical media.

34. Practical application of electronics to stimulate and control the functioning of the human brain.

39. New drugs "controlling fatigue, relaxation, alertness, mood and personality". (Habermas 1971:117)

42. New genetic and control procedures.

This is a projection of the possible future toward which the behavioural system is progressing when it is detached from the normative system of communicative interaction. Habermas stresses that he is not stating that this projection is being fulfilled but that these are the logical implications of the technocratic consciousness. He is here pointing toward the negative utopia implicit in the assumptions of science and technology as ideology. His aim is to indicate against this background that two concepts of rationalization must be distinguished. The purposive-rational dimensions of scientific progress has already resulted in the reorganization of social institutions. Habermas sees in this development a potential for liberation, if and only if, rationalization at the level of the productive forces does not replace rationalization at the level of the institutional framework of society or what he names the life-world. He now casts the concept rationalization of the institutional framework into a positive mould. Habermas holds that:

"Rationalization at the level of the institutional framework can occur only in the medium of symbolic interaction itself, that is through removing restrictions on communication"(1971:118)

Habermas calls for a form of communicative action which clearly shows his development of the concept of praxis deriving from
Arendt's work. Namely the public and unrestricted discussion of the implications of the subsystems of purposive-rational action upon the daily lives of citizens. Citizens in turn orientate their lives through the norms and values which are ratified through public debate and reflection. Habermas says of this public realm:

"Such communication at all levels of political and repoliticized decision-making processes is the only medium in which anything like "rationalization" is possible."

(1971:119 emphasis mine)

Habermas points out three dimensions of this rationalization process. The rationalization of social norms would result in the decrease in repression:

1. At the level of personality structures such that "ambivalence in the face of role conflict" is tolerated at a higher or "above average" degree. (Habermas 1971:119)

2. There would be a decrease in the degree of rigidity at the level of the presentation of self in everyday life.

3. Action would be judged in terms of norms which have been reflectively arrived at.

Habermas is attempting to point towards an orientation which aims at the "emancipation and progressive individuation" of men in the modern age (Habermas 1971:119). His main point is that although the progress in the productive forces entails a vast potential, it is essential that members of society be empowered to choose the direction and limits to which this potential is put. Thus rationalization at the level of purposive rational action need not permeate the entire fabric of society producing Weber's "iron cage" as the "fate" of modernity. Habermas says of communicative rationalization,

"Rationalization measured by changes in these dimensions does not lead to the rationalization of purposive-rational sub-systems, to an increase in technical control over objectified processes of nature and society. It does not lead per se to the better functioning of social systems, but would furnish the members of society with the opportunity for further emancipation and progressive individuation. The growth of the productive forces is not the same as the intention of the "good life". It can at best serve it".

(1971:119)
Habermas hastily adds that these questions cannot be answered in advance through an alternative Utopia. He is merely pointing out that rationalization of the life-world is different in kind to the rationalization of the realm of work. Habermas' central theme is that the imperatives of the systems theory and Marxism which focus solely on the concept of work or purposive rational action is to be combated. He makes this point as follows:

"According to this idea the institutional framework of society—which previously was rooted in a different type of action—would now, in a fundamental reversal, be absorbed by the subsystems of purposive rational action, which were embedded in it." (1971:106)

This is the most widely misinterpreted aspect of Habermas' work. Habermas does not say that the institutional framework is totally absorbed by the imperatives of purposive-rational action as Benehabib, Jean Cohen, David Held and Anthony Giddens would have him say. He is here pointing out the implications of a process which is developing but is by no means total. Habermas' strategy is to decipher the rationalization processes and to point out the implications of this logic if carried to its conclusions. He does not say once and for all that society is totally rationalized along instrumental lines as his mentors Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, claim. In fact, critical theory would not even be possible in such a world since social theorists who are part of the very phenomenon which they investigate would be so integrated into the "man-machine" system of instrumental rationality that all action would be reduced to conditioned stimuli and responses. Critical thought and judgement would no longer be possible. The young, Habermas states quite clearly that

"IF this occurred, old regions of consciousness developed in ordinary-language communication would of necessity completely dry up" (Habermas 1971:118 emphasis mine)

Habermas does not say that the realm of communicative action has dried up. Habermas continues this line of reasoning by pointing out that the depoliticization of the population, which is legitimated through the technocratic consciousness, represents at the same time "men's self-objectification" on the basis of the concept of purposive-rational action and behavioural adaptation. Thus men come to view one another not as equal communicative partners establishing their relative identities through mutual
dialogue, but as "objects" or "things" to be strategically manipulated like any other object in the scientized world devoid of cultural significance, through the categories of purposive rational action. Habermas sees the ideological "nucleus" of this progressive permeation of purposive rational action into the institutional framework of society as the "elimination of the distinction between the practical and technical" forms of rationality (Habermas 1971:113). The crucial point which he makes is that this ideology "reflects but does not objectively account for the new and systems of purposive-rational action that have taken on a life of their own." (Habermas 1971:113). Arendt's work now comes to Habermas' aid in presenting the key to deciphering this new constellation in a manner which moves beyond that of his mentors, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse. Habermas casts this problem complex into a new frame of reference which I read as a masterful development of Arendt's work. This is how he presents the new "objective" orientation open to a critical theorist:

"The new ideology consequently violates an interest grounded in one of the two fundamental conditions of our cultural existence: in language or more precisely, in the form of socialization and individuation determined by communication in ordinary language. This interest extends to the maintenance of intersubjectivity of mutual understanding as well as to the creation of communication without domination. The technocratic consciousness makes this practical interest disappear behind the interest in the expansion of our power of technical control. Thus the reflection that the new ideology calls for must penetrate beyond the level of particular class interests to disclose the fundamental interests of mankind as such, engaged in the process of self-constitution." (Habermas 1971:113)

This lengthy citation reveals the extent of Habermas' acceptance of Arendt's work. He here clearly argues for a new orientation which investigates the relationship between the human condition as such and the "interests" grounded in this condition. The manner in which Habermas presents this orientation bespeaks his acceptance of Arendt's argument that communicative action is one of the fundamental conditions of life. Habermas' premise is that communicative action can be reformulated at another level of
analysis such that the rationality of communicative action and the interest structure to which it is related can be clearly presented. The traditional idea of practical reason asking after the questions of "the good" and "the just" is then cast into a modern framework which does not attempt, as Hegel does, to heal the wounds of the sundered ethical totality in the never-never land of the Idea or Reason in the idealist sense. Habermas clearly rejects this orientation since he says that the technocratic consciousness reflects "not the sundering of the ethical situation but the repression of ethics as such as a category of life" (Habermas 1971:112 emphasis mine). Habermas, contrary to Hegel, does not argue for a single all inclusive concept of reason which heals the wounds of the sundered totality. He indicates that the suppressed, but ever present communicative action which is a fundamental condition for the possibility of the human condition as it is known at present, can be revealed at a level of analysis where the two forms of rational action can be clearly located in their respective realms. He also aims to show how the two realms of action and rationality are interrelated since they are both fundamental conditions of mankind as such. The realm of communicative reason is then clearly separated from the modern questions of technical and scientific reason which follow the logic of purposive rational action. For Habermas the latter form of rationality cannot be renounced, as he points out in his critique of Marcuse's work. Thus Habermas calls for the further deciphering of the confusions which occur in modernity between practical, technical and theoretical reason at another level of analysis. Namely, through an investigation of the interest structures of the human condition as such. This is the theme of chapter three where I approach Habermas' concept of rationality at the level of the interest structures of the human condition.
3 RATIONALITY, HUMAN INTERESTS AND SCIENCE

3.1 Introduction

The conclusion Habermas reaches in re-formulating the concept rationality beyond the "subjective" approach of Weber, Parsons and Marcuse, is that the rationality problematic can be developed at another level of analysis. The new level of analysis moves beyond particular class interests and clarifies the "fundamental interests of mankind as such, engaged in the process of self-constitution" (1971:113). This is the theme Habermas takes up in his controversial "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1972) (1). My aim in this chapter is to investigate the relationship between the concept of rationality and human interests, reflection and science.

In 3.2 Knowledge and Human Interests, A General Perspective, I outline Habermas' view of theoretical reason in classical Greek tradition in relation to the views of Husserl and Schelling. Habermas holds that modern scholars adhere to the contemplative stance of the classical tradition of theory which disavows the connection between knowledge, human interests and action (2). He aims to show that three specific human interests are constitutive of knowledge and that they are rooted in three fundamental life activities. Namely, work, language and power. Corresponding to these three life activities are three forms of science which he names the Empirical-Analytic, the Historic-Hermeneutic and the Critical Sciences.

In 3.3 The Knowledge-Constitutive Interests and Three Modes of Social Organization: Work, Language and Power, I briefly indicate what Habermas means by knowledge constitutive interests and how they are related to the three forms of science.

In 3.4 Rationality and the Technical Cognitive Interest of the Empirical-Analytic Science, I show how Habermas comes to the conclusion that the empirical-analytic sciences are rooted in work, the purposive rational action of the species which harbours a knowledge-constitutive interest in the technical control over the external environment.

In 3.5 Rationality and the PracticalCognitive Interest of the Historic-Hermeneutic sciences, I analyse Habermas' thesis that the historic-hermeneutic sciences are rooted in the
pre-scientific realm of ordinary language, entail a concept of practical reason and harbour a practical knowledge-constitutive interest in mutual understanding.

In 3.6 Rationality and the Emancipatory Cognitive Interest of the Critical Sciences, I address Habermas's thesis that reason inheres in interest. If this can be shown to be valid, rationality cannot be seen as a mere "attitude" which actors adopt or reject, Habermas argues. Habermas holds that the self-generation of the species cannot be adequately captured through the idealism of Kant and Fichte or the reductionism of scientific Marxism. Through a critique of these scholars work, he aims at recasting the concepts of reflection, interest, and reason into a new framework which unites the concept of rationality with men/women's interest in emancipation from domination and dogmatism.

3.2 Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective

3.2.1 Theoretical Reason as Contemplation and A Way of Life

Habermas assesses Husserl's thesis that modern science is in a crisis situation. For Husserl, the European sciences are in "crisis" because scholars are no longer able to orientate themselves toward a "thoughtful and enlightened mode of life" which he holds is the mark of the classical conception of theory (Habermas 1972:302)(3). Habermas enlarges on Husserl's call for a return to the classical conception of theory by invoking Schelling's view. For Schelling, the modern "fear of speculation" results in an orientation which accords priority to practical reason over and above the theoretical reason (1972:302). This entails a superficial approach to theory and a shallowness in action, Schelling argues. Schelling calls for the study of theoretical reason which immediately acquaints men with "Ideas". Schelling's premise is that "only Ideas provide action with energy and ethical significance" (Schelling cited in Habermas 1972:301). For Schelling, the only form of knowledge that is genuinely able to orientate action, is:

"knowledge that frees itself from mere human interests and is based on Ideas-in other words, knowledge that has taken a theoretical attitude." (Habermas 1972:301)

Habermas thus sets up the parameters of the discussion by
focusing on Schelling's and Husserl's view that only "true theory", devoid of human interests, is able to orientate action and that "true theory" must be seen as a "way of life" for the scholar. He then carefully explains his own view of theory in the classical tradition. He points out that the concept, "Theoria" had religious roots. "Theoros", Habermas explains, was the Greek delegate who attended public festivals and celebrations in honour of the Gods. Through "looking on he abandons himself to the sacred events" (Habermas 1972:301). Habermas does not explain this point. I interpret it in a manner which is in keeping with the subsequent development of his argument. "Abandonment" may be seen as the first function which "Theoria" served prior to the philosophy of the Socratic period. Here "Theoria" was used to organise the sacred myths, stories and rituals into a coherent whole such that the incidents which befell men could be meaningfully interpreted in terms of violation or adherence to the will of the Gods which guided the universe. For the Socratic tradition, in stark contrast to the Pre-Socratic tradition, the myths and stories were held to be mere conviction or opinion ("doxa") which the philosopher was to rise above. The universe was viewed as a rationally ordered whole which was unchangeable and eternal. I return to the sequence of Habermas' argument. Habermas holds that in the classical Greek tradition "Theoria" means contemplation of the cosmos. In this form, theory:

"already presupposed the demarcation between Being and time that is the foundation of ontology...it reserves to logos a realm of Being purged of inconstancy and uncertainty and leaves to doxa the realm of the mutable and perishable."

(1972:301) (4)

Through the process of contemplation the philosopher brought his soul into accord with the rational motion of the cosmos. This occurred through mimesis whereby the philosopher reproduced the order and harmony of nature and music within himself. Thus "theory enters the conduct of life" and the philosopher "forms himself through mimesis" or imitation. (Habermas 1972:302). The crucial point which Habermas makes is that the philosophers "banished" the gods and demons of the Pre-Socratic tradition to the realm of the human soul and a new concept of theory emerged. He says:
"Philosophy domesticated them and banished them to the soul as internalized demons. If from this point of view we regard the drives and affects that enmesh man in the empirical interests of his inconstant and contingent activity, then the attitude of pure theory, which promises purification from these very affects, takes on a new meaning: disinterested contemplation then obviously signifies emancipation. The release of knowledge from interests was not supposed to purify theory from the obfuscations of subjectivity but inversely to provide the subject with ecstatic purification from the passions...the new stage of emancipation is that catharsis is now no longer attained through mystery cults but established in the will of the individuals themselves through theory." (1972:307 emphasis mine)

Central to this interpretation are two points. Firstly, Habermas argues that classical contemplation was "disinterested" and secondly, that it signified "emancipation." One way of interpreting these claims is to compare Habermas' position on the concept of theory with that of Gadamer and Arendt. Gadamer would object to the thesis that theory in the classical tradition was a form of "disinterested looking on" as Habermas puts it. Gadamer holds that there was a continuity between the sacred and the philosophical concept "Theoria". For Gadamer, "Theoria" meant a particular form of participation in the sacred events. This was not the neutral observation of some "splendid demonstration or show, but rather a real being present" (Gadamer 1981:18).

Gadamer says:

"the rationality of being,...is not first and foremost a property of human consciousness but of being itself, which is the whole in such a way and appears as the whole in such a way that human reason is far more appropriately thought of as part of this rationality instead of as the self-consciousness that knows itself over and against an external totality." (1981:18)

For Gadamer "Theoria" carried the connotation of man's active participation in the unity of the rationally ordered cosmos. He rejects the opposition between consciouses and the external totality. He discusses emancipation in his assessment of practical and not theoretical reason (5). Arendt captures the concept "Theoria" as follows:
"The philosophers experience of the eternal, which to Plato was arrheton ("unspeakable"), and to Aristotle anue logou("without word"), and which later was conceptualized in the paradoxical nunc stans ("the standing now"), can occur only outside the realm of human affairs and outside the plurality of men, as we know from the Cave parable in Plato's Republic, where the philosopher having liberated himself from the fetters that bond him to his fellow men leaves the cave in perfect "singularity", as it were, neither accompanied nor followed by others. Politically speaking, if to die is the same as "to cease to be among men", the experience of the eternal is a kind of death, and the only thing that separates it from real death is that it is not final because no living creature can endure it for any length of time. And this is precisely what separates the vita contemplativa from the vita activa in medieval thought. Yet it is decisive that the experience of the eternal, in contradistinction to that of the immortal, has no correspondence with and cannot be transformed into any activity whatsoever since even the activity of thought, which goes on within one's self by means of words, is obviously not only inadequate to render it but would interrupt and ruin the experience itself. Theoria or "contemplation" is the word given to the experience of the eternal." (1958:20 emphasis mine)

The experience of the cosmos was seen as "speechless wonder" which occurred in "perfect silence" from which action and speech were excluded (Arendt 1958:20). Arendt holds that the contemplative way of life in the classical tradition entailed emancipation from the worldly affairs. Thus freedom for the Greek philosopher, as philosopher, and not as a citizen in the polis, meant the cessation of action and speech such that the rationality of the cosmos could be revealed to man. Habermas introduces a specific interpretation of the concept of theory, as contemplation, in the classical tradition. Namely one which is in accord with that of Arendt such that he can point not only to the exclusion of action from contemplation, but he goes a step further and links the concept of action to the concept interest. For Habermas, contemplation or theory in the classical tradition meant the exclusion of men's interest in action. Emancipation was
achieved in a dual sense. Firstly, the subject was emancipated from the external will of gods and demons of the pre-Socratic era. The subject emancipated himself from the "gods and demos", which were internalized in the psyche and were hence controllable by man. Secondly, the philosopher was emancipated from the irritating influence of the human interest in action since contemplation could only occur when action ceased. This view of "Theoria" as contemplation is unique and is a rejection of the interpretation of "Theoria" held by scholars such as Gadamer, Schelling, Husserl and McCarthy (6). The concept of "Theoria" as contemplation of the cosmos is based on the pre-supposition that the life of contemplation was defined in contrast to a life of action. Like Arendt, Habermas views the theoretical endeavour from a perspective which asks after the question of human action and the possibilities for emancipation from forms of thought and action which harbour dogmatism and domination (7).

3.2.2 The Three Forms of Science in Relation to Theory as Contemplation.

Habermas compares the classical notion of theory with modern forms of theory. He categorises modern theory into three basic modes of inquiry.

1. The empirical-analytic sciences include the natural and social sciences which aim at producing nomological knowledge.

2. The historical-hermeneutic sciences include the humanities, historical and social sciences which are orientated toward interpretation and understanding in the study of cultural tradition.

3. The critical sciences encompass critical social theory, psychoanalysis and philosophy as critique. Critique as initiated by Kant and developed by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are examples of what Habermas names the critical sciences in the philosophical form.

Habermas argues that the empirical-analytic sciences develop in a manner which "automatically generates continuity with the beginnings of philosophical thought" (1972:303). This bold and provocative statement is clarified as follows. Both traditions entail:

1. An orientation, "the theoretical attitude", which frees the scholar from the "irritating influence" of man's interest in
action (Habermas 1972:303).

2. "The cosmological intention of describing the universe theoretically in its lawlike order, just as it is."

(Habermas 1972:303)

The historic-hermeneutic are similar to the empirical-analytic sciences in that they adhere to the methodological orientation of the "theoretical attitude" which frees the scholar from the irritating influences of man's interest in action, Habermas argues. He then addresses Husserl's attempt to revive this "theoretical attitude" of "theory as a way of life". Habermas argues as follows:

He accepts Husserl's charge of "objectivism" levelled at the sciences where the object domain appears as "a universe of facts whose lawlike connection can be grasped descriptively" (Habermas 1972:304). "Objectivism" is an approach which disregards the social constitution of the "facts". Habermas holds that:

"Knowledge of the apparently objective world of facts has its basis in the pre-scientific world. The possible objects of scientific analysis are constituted a priori in the self-evidence of our primary life-world." (1972:304)

Husserl's aim was to purify the theoretical endeavour from the subjective interests deriving from the life-world thus achieving "true theory" purged of subjectivity. His "rigorous contemplative stance "brackets" or screens out human interests, Habermas argues (1972:304). Husserl did not realize that objectivism is to be found in the classical tradition of theory. Habermas holds that it is only on the basis of ontological distinctions that the classical tradition is able to:

"take cognizance of a self-subsistent world purged of demons. At the same time, the illusion of pure theory served as a protection against regression to an earlier stage that had been surpassed. Had it been possible to detect that the identity of pure Being was an objectivistic illusion, ego identity would not have been able to take place. The repression of interest appertained to this interest itself."

(1972:37)

Thus the two most influential theses of the classical tradition, namely:

"the theoretical attitude and the ontological assumption of the self-subsistent world appear in a connection which
they explicitly prohibit: the connection of knowledge with human interests." (Habermas 1972:307).

In sum: Habermas presents a unique interpretation of the classical conception of theoretical reason. "Theoria" is shown to disavow the human interests in action. This stems from a particular interpretation of theory as contemplation of the cosmos which is similar to that of Arendt and is in conflict with that of Gadamer. The key to classical contemplation for Habermas is that the interest in action and emancipation was suppressed through the objectivistic illusion of a rationally ordered cosmos. Ego identity was secured through this illusion of an ordered and rational cosmos. It was only on this basis that the ego identity of the philosopher could be maintained in a form which did not regress to the earlier mode where the will of external gods and demons had to be complied with. Habermas articulates a particular concept of emancipation in the classical tradition such that the rational philosopher was emancipated from the gods and demons through likening his soul to the rationality of the cosmos when action ceased. But this form of rationality was only attainable on the basis of a human interest in emancipation which was suppressed since the interests deriving from the life-world were supposed to be irritating factors which distracted the philosopher from acquiring knowledge of the rational cosmos in the first place. This specific interpretation of the classical concept of theory as contemplation permeates the fabric of "Knowledge and Human Interests" and forms the backdrop against which various scholars work is assessed. Habermas refers to the "contemplative stance" or the "theoretical attitude" in his critique of various scholars work. He holds that scholars are guilty of the objectivism when the "contemplative stance" or "theoretical attitude" is adhered to. He says:

"we shall designate as objectivistic an attitude that naively correlates theoretical propositions with matters of fact. This attitude presumes that the relations between empirical variables represented in theoretical propositions are self-existent. At the same time, it suppresses the transcendental frame-work that is the precondition of the meaning of the validity of such propositions. As soon as these statements are understood in relation to the prior
frame of reference to which they are affixed, the objectivistic illusion dissolves and makes visible the knowledge constitutive interest." (1972:308)

I now explain what the fundamental human interests are. How they are grounded and in the pre-scientific realm of the life-world and how they are related to the concepts of rationality, reflection and knowledge.

3.3 The Knowledge-Constitutive Interests and Three Modes of Social Organization: Work, Language and Power

3.3.1 The Concept Interest in Habermas' Work

The concept interest in "Knowledge and Human Interests" is understood in the German sense of "inter-esse" meaning "the in-between". One way of looking at interests in this sense is the manner in which Arendt speaks of human interests. She invokes this concept as follows:

"Action and speech go on between men, as they are directed toward them, and they retain their agent revealing capacity even if their content is exclusively objective, concerned with the matters of the world of things in which men move, which physically lies between them and out of which arise their specific objective worldly interests. These interests constitute, in the word's most literal significance, something inter-est which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together." (1958:182 emphasis mine)

The concept of interests in Habermas' work is not to be viewed as a subjective attribute of men. Habermas attempts to clarify the interests in Arendt's sense of the in-between which bind people and things together. Habermas develops an investigation of human interests as "in-between" human agency and forms of science or knowledge(8). He asks: How are the concepts of purposive rational action and communicative rationality tied to the kinds of knowledge or science humans produce? Habermas says:

"knowledge-constitutive interests take form in the medium of work, language and power" (Habermas 1972:313).

I approach this thesis by briefly indicating what the three knowledge constitutive interests are, and the forms of science in which they are located.
3.3.2 The Three Forms of Science in Relation to the Cognitive Interests.

Habermas argues that there are three basic kinds of science. The empirical-analytic, the historic-hermeneutic and the critical sciences. For each kind of science, there is a corresponding cognitive interest. The empirical-analytic sciences, entail a technical cognitive interest. This is understood as a technical interest in the prediction and control of the environment. The historic-hermeneutic sciences incorporate a practical cognitive interest understood as the practical interest in understanding. The critical sciences incorporate an emancipatory cognitive interest understood as an interest in freedom. The interests are knowledge-constitutive in that they determine what are accepted as the objects of enquiry, the fundamental categories and methods of establishing and testing propositions, and the range of application pertinent to each kind of science. Habermas notes of the knowledge-constitutive interests that they are not to be seen as mere irritating influences of subjective cognition, but that "they themselves determine the aspect under which reality can be objectified and thus made accessible to experience to begin with. They are, the conditions which are necessary in order that subjects capable of speech and action may have experience which can lay claim to objectivity" (1974:9)

The cognitive interests as the conditions for the possibility of objective experience then have a transcendental status. Habermas argues that the cognitive interests are basic in that they are rooted in the natural history of the human species. The specific manner in which the objectivity of reality is apprehended originates in the interest structures of the species that is linked in "it roots" to a definite mode of social organization. Habermas says:

"these viewpoints [the three forms of science and their specific kind of knowledge] originate in the interest structure of a species that is linked in its roots to a definite means of social organization: work, language and power. The human species secures its existence in the systems of social labour and self-assertion through violence, through tradition-bound social life in ordinary language communication, and with the aid of ego identities that at every level of individuation, reconsolidate the
consciousness of the individual to the norms of the group. Accordingly the interests constitutive of knowledge are linked to the functions of an ego that adapts itself to its external conditions through learning processes, is initiated into the communication system of the social life-world by means of self-formative processes, and constructs an identity in the conflict between the instinctual aims and social constraints." (1972:313)

Now Habermas has to say that the knowledge constitutive interests are "quasi-trancendental" because they are not rooted in a transcendental subject or consciousness in the Kantian sense but in the human species which reproduces itself through the three activities of work, language and power. The notion of a natural species which reproduces itself is the "quasi" or naturalistic aspect of the argument. The interests then must be seen as the "in-between" or "mediating" between knowledge and the reproduction of the life of the species. This location of the knowledge constitutive interests in one of the three modes of social existence (work, language or power) is crucial to the internal structure of the complex and detailed analysis which Habermas develops in "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1972). Once this basic framework is in the foreground in conjunction with the critique of the classical concept of theory, the concept of rationality and its relation to the forms of science and knowledge-constitutive interests can become thematic. I analyse each form of science in turn with an emphasis upon the concept of rationality.

3.4 Rationality and the Technical Cognitive Interest of the Empirical-Analytic Sciences

3.4.1 Empirical-Analytic Science and the work of Peirce

Habermas says of the natural sciences:
"scientific progress does not only motivate us psychologically to take science seriously as an exemplary form of knowledge, it is itself the exemplary feature of science. The intersubjectively acknowledged cognitive progress of the theoretical natural sciences is also the systematic feature which distinguishes modern science from other categories of knowledge." (1972:91 emphasis mine)
In following the intricacies of Peirce's work, Habermas attempts to understand the logic of inquiry which leads to the progress of the empirical-analytic sciences. He aims to show how the empirical-analytic sciences are rooted in one of the modes of social existence (work, language or power) and how this is related to the progress of this form of science. He argues that the work of Peirce is superior to that of Mach and Comte who do not reflect upon conditions for the possibility of scientific knowledge (9). Peirce asks this famous Kantian question starting from the assumption that scientific progress is institutionalized through a methodology which is shared by the community of scientists. Closely related to this insight is the idea that the scientific endeavour is a process which generates intersubjectively held beliefs which are not infallible but subject to confirmation and refutation by the community of scientists and the "resistance of reality". Habermas finds in Peirce a "kindred spirit" in that science, for Peirce, is a kind of action or conduct. Peirce holds that the methodology of empirical-analytic science is a system of procedures which are required for a certain kind of human activity. Habermas focuses on the three forms of inference: deduction, induction and abduction comprising method of inquiry internal to science as an activity. Abduction and induction are the dimensions of the method of inquiry which propel science forward through the discovery of new hypotheses which are confirmed in the objective life context of purposive rational action (work) (10). The three forms of inference may be seen as rules which settle opinions, reduce uncertainty, and facilitate the acquisition of stable beliefs. Peirce names this the "fixation of belief" (Habermas 1972:119). These functions occur in the specifiable objective context of purposive rational action, Habermas argues. Pierce states that:

"belief consists mainly in being deliberately prepared to adopt the formula believed in as a guide to action; the essence of belief is the establishment of habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by different modes of action to which they give rise."

(Peirce cited in Habermas 1972:113)

The method of inquiry can be concretized through the following example. The cancer researcher believes that:
1. Abnormal cell division occurs because the chromosomes in the cell release chemical "x" when the cells divide.
2. Chemical "x" is not recognized by the body as a foreign substance and hence the auto immune system does not react to destroy substance "x".
3. Injections of substance "m" into the body will destroy substance "x" and abnormal cell division will cease.

On the basis of these beliefs the scientist acts by injecting substance "m" into the body of the rat and abnormal cell division ceases. Belief, as Peirce argues, consists in being prepared to adopt the formula or hypothesis as a guide for action. Thus on the basis of purposive rational action the belief that substance "m" is a cure for cancer is established (fixation of belief). The hypothesis that substance "m" will destroy substance "x" derives from a long process of abductive and inductive reasoning and purposive action in which substances "a" to "l" are each attempted in turn and in combination in numerous experiments prior to the discovery of substance "m". Habermas understands this process in the following manner. The belief is held to be unproblematic as long as the action which it guides does not fail in reality (the cancer cells are destroyed by substance "m"). As soon as action is rendered uncertain by the "resistance of reality, doubt arises with regard to the orientation that guides behaviour" (Habermas 1972:120). Thus the validity of the belief is doubted. This doubt motivates the scientist to find new beliefs which will establish behavioural certainty. For Habermas "the results of synthetic reasoning have a function only in the behavioural system of this purposive rational, feedback-controlled, and habitual behaviour. The beliefs define the realm of future behaviour that the actor has under control." (1972:120 emphasis mine)

Valid beliefs are universalised and become technical recommendations in terms of which scientists predict and control the external environment. This prediction and technical control over the environment is not understood as a subjective "attitude" of the scientist. The interest in prediction and control is seen to be "rooted" in one of the fundamental conditions of human existence, namely, work. For Habermas, work means purposive-rational or instrumental action. He says:
by "work" or purposive-rational action I understand either instrumental action or rational choice or their conjunction." (1971:91 emphasis in text.)

The "quasi-trancendental" interest in technical prediction and control of nature serves to locate the concept instrumental action and instrumental rationality in the realm of empirical-analytic forms of objectifying reality. The technical interest in the control and prediction of reality has nothing to do with the denunciation of this form of rationality. Scientific progress occurs through the adaptation of the ego to the external environment through learning processes which are rooted in one of the three modes of human existence, namely, work. For Habermas, Marcuse's attempt at disavowing the form of knowledge based on instrumental rationality amounts to disavowing one of the fundamental conditions of human survival. Habermas casts what he considers to be valuable in Peirce's work into a framework where the concept of purposive rationality is linked to the interest in technical control of the environment which is the condition for the possibility of a specific mode of inquiry which propels technical scientific knowledge forward. Habermas calls this the cognitive progress in the realm of the empirical-analytic sciences. This is one of the most widely misunderstood aspects of his work. Habermas is not saying that the only kind of knowledge of nature which is "legitimate" is that of the empirical-analytic sciences. He accepts that alternative approaches to nature are possible and desirable. What he does say is that scientific progress is contingent upon man's purposive rational action which is one of the forms of human agency which secures the survival of the species. I now briefly note Habermas's critique of Peirce's work which prepares the ground for the analysis of the practical cognitive interest.

3.4.2 The Contemplative Stance in Empirical-Analytic Science

Habermas argues that Peirce does not consistently adhere to the transcendental orientation. In the passages where Peirce attempts to articulate the relationship between the universal laws and the particular occurrences he ignores his transcendental approach and adopts a contemplative stance, Habermas argues. Here Peirce contemplatively understands the laws as "facts" existing in reality. Habermas holds that here scientific progress is
contingent upon "theoretical curiosity" which Peirce calls the "Gnostic instinct" (Habermas 1972:133). He invokes numerous examples of the contemplative stance in Peirce's work at the meta-theoretical level of analysis. He concludes that Peirce is not able to articulate a concept of the community of scientists adequately. Habermas emphasises that Peirce does not realize that the ground for consensus on meta-theoretical questions is not the purposive rationality of the isolated individual which is universalized, but rather the communicative rationality of intersubjectivity. The method of inquiry serves to establish monological relations between statements. One can think and act instrumentally on the basis of this monological mode of rationality, but not enter into a dialogue required for intersubjective communication. Habermas puts this as follows:

"It is possible to think in syllogisms, but not to conduct a dialogue in them. I can use syllogistic reasoning to yield arguments for a discussion, but I cannot argue syllogistically with another. Insofar as the the employment of symbols is constitutive for the behavioural system of instrumental action, the use of language involved is monological." (1972:137)

Communication between investigators requires the use of language which moves beyond the limitations of the technical control over "objectified natural processes", he argues (1972:137). Habermas states that the communicative use of language occurs in the symbolic communication between subjects who "reciprocally know and recognize each other as unmistakable individuals"(1972:137). Here he incorporates Arendt's concept of plurality in his understanding of intersubjectivity (11). Communicative action is a "system of reference" which can not be reduced to the framework of instrumental action (1971:137). This is discernible, he holds, when one investigates the concept of self in Peirce's work. For Peirce self-consciousness is understood from the framework of behavioural feedback. The example Habermas uses to display the limitations of Peirce's concept of public consensus is that of the child who, on being told that a stove is "hot", only becomes conscious of this fact when he touches the stove. Peirce argues that it is only through the feedback of behaviour that the child develops self-consciousness. Habermas objects to the limitation of self-consciousness to the level of universally
"true" statements about reality in the context of behavioural feedback. He holds that Peirce's concept of communication amounts to "subsuming consciousness under the general intellect of all true propositions about reality" (Habermas 1971:138). This is "in principle mute subjection to a public monologue" which each individual "can reproduce for himself", he argues (1972:138). Habermas points out that dialogue develops on a different basis through the reciprocal

"recognition of subjects who identify one another under the category of selfhood and at the same time maintain themselves in their non-identity" (1972:138 emphasis mine)

Habermas is basing his critique of Peirce's work on the concept of plurality derived from Arendt's work. I indicate in chapter one that for Arendt, plurality is a condition for communicative action. She emphasises the agent revealing character of inter-subjectivity which unites different perspectives through dialogue. When these two positions are compared, it is patent that Habermas understands intersubjectivity in the same manner as Arendt although he does not invoke the concept plurality itself.

In sum:

Habermas argues that Peirce, in contrast to scholars like Mach and Comte, asks the Kantian question: What are the conditions for the possibility of knowledge? Peirce differs from Kant in that the conditions are not rooted in the transcendental consciousness in general, but in the logic of inquiry. Habermas casts Peirce's logic of inquiry into a framework which encompasses a technical interest in control and prediction. This technical interest mediates between the transcendental function of the logic of inquiry and the pre-scientific realm of work (purposive rational action). The concepts, purposive-rationality or instrumental rationality, which Habermas uses interchangeably, are located in the empirical-analytic sciences such that scientific progress is understood as man's adaptation to and of external reality. At the same time man's purposive-rational control over the environment is constitutive of a specific form of knowledge of the external environment. Thus the concept of purposive rationality cannot be viewed as a subjective "attitude" which the scientist merely adopts or rejects. At the meta-theoretical level of analysis, Peirce is not able to account for the formation of consensus between the community of scientists since his framework is
limited behavioural feedback in terms of which self-consciousness is understood. Dialogue, which is essential for the formation of consensus, is "beyond the bounds" of Peirce's logic of enquiry, as Strawson would say. Habermas holds that a concept of intersubjectivity which accounts for the mutual recognition of individuals as unique speaking and acting beings, is the basis of dialogue in which consensus formation can take place. This concept of intersubjectivity encompasses the concept of plurality as the condition for the possibility of communicative action. It derives from Arendt's work where intersubjectivity unites different perspectives of unique individuals through dialogue. Habermas argues that the rationality of the empirical-analytic sciences presuppose the communicative rationality of concrete and unique individuals. This does not mean that Habermas is denigrating the empirical-analytic sciences. In so far as instrumental rationality contributes to the progress of the natural sciences on the basis of its monological language, he holds that this mode of science is "exemplary". On the other hand when the empirical-analytic sciences are universalized as the only "legitimate" form of knowledge or paradigm pertaining to the understanding of reality, he objects. Habermas attempts to locate the form of rationality internal to the empirical-analytic science and attempts to indicate it's limits, as Kant would argue. Habermas holds that two concepts of rationality are necessary for the understanding of the empirical-analytic sciences, communicative rationality and instrumental rationality. Neither can be accorded priority over the other since he argues that the logic of inquiry depends on instrumental or purposive rationality while the communication between scientists requires communicative rationality for consensus formation. Scientific progress then occurs through instrumental and communicative rationality. Thus one concept of rationality cannot be subsumed under the other. I now discuss the historic hermeneutic sciences, where communicative rationality, which is orientated toward understanding, is dealt with in more detail.

3.5 Rationality and the Practical Cognitive Interest of the Historic-Hermeneutic sciences

Habermas holds that the historic-hermeneutic sciences are
constituted by a practical knowledge-constitutive interest in mutual understanding (12). He clarifies this thesis through an interpretation of the work of Dilthey (13). He opens the discussion by stating that the realm of mutual understanding which is presupposed by the, "participants in the process of inquiry," in the empirical-analytic sciences, "is claimed by the cultural sciences (Gesteswissenschaften) as their authentic realm" of investigation (Habermas 1972:140). For Habermas, the pre-scientific realm of the cultural life context is formed at the level of intersubjectivity, which the empirical-analytic sciences are not able to account for within the framework of the logic of inquiry limited to purposive rational action. If this interpretation is valid, he argues, the question arises as to whether the historic-hermeneutic sciences proceed within a different methodological framework and are constituted by a different cognitive interest. He states that

"Dilthey, however, sees the immediate transcendental-logical difference between the orientations of the natural and cultural sciences not in two different forms of objectivation but in the degree of objectivation itself." (1972:142)

For Dilthey, the difference between the methodologies of two sciences thus entails a difference in the degree rather than the kind of objectivation. Habermas argues that for Dilthey, the objectification process is a form of making ("poiesis"). This is the key to his interest in Dilthey's work. This aspect of Habermas' work has not been analysed in the secondary literature as far as I am aware. Most critics focus on the Gadamer/Habermas debates on hermeneutics and briefly mention Dilthey's work in the introductory statements noting his empathic model of understanding (14). The interesting factor in this regard is that Habermas develops an extensive analysis of Dilthey's work after reading Gadamer's "Truth and Method" (1975) (15). He thus chooses to focus on the work of Dilthey. He appropriates aspects of Dilthey's work in order to show that understanding is a communicative rather than a making process.

3.5.1 Dilthey's View of Understanding as a Making Process

Dilthey's view of the historic-hermeneutic sciences is depicted by comparing it with the empirical-analytic sciences. The key to
Dilthey's approach to the methodology of the sciences is the concept of experience, Habermas argues. The empirical-analytic sciences are seen to gain control over the physical world through the study of its "laws". The "laws" are only arrived at if the experiential character of men's impressions of nature, such as the feelings of joy or connection with nature, are not considered. The abstract apprehension of nature in terms of relations of space, time, mass and motion is accorded priority in the methodology of the empirical-analytic sciences. Within the frame of reference in which nature is objectified as something which is controllable via its "laws", individual biography and historically shaped experience is excluded. The knowing subject is not totally excluded in this process however. Objectified nature, for Dilthey, is the product of the active ego who intervenes in the physical environment "through instrumental action" (Habermas 1972:142). Habermas substantiates this interpretation through a citation from Dilthey's work:

"We gain control over the physical world through the study of its laws... The resistance of external objects, intervening in them by hand, and their measurability make possible experimentation and the application of mathematics for the natural scientist. Hence the uniform components of experience as discovered in observation and experiment can here be ordered in accordance with mathematical-mechanical means of construction" (Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:143)

In the objectification process, the attitudes of the scientist, understood as the degree of experience permissible in the respective sciences, result in different "configurations of experience and theory" in the two sciences (Habermas 1971:143). With regard to the empirical-analytic sciences the phenomena objectified acquire meaning for the scientist through the hypotheses or thought constructs. Thus models are created such that possible connections between entities are inferred and regularities in the manifold of nature can be explained in terms of "laws". In the historic-hermeneutic sciences, the level of theory and data are not separated in this manner. Concepts and theoretical "designs are not so much artificial products as mimetic reconstructions", Habermas points out (1972:144 emphasis mine). For Dilthey, the phenomena to be understood, for example texts, social institutions, mores, and art works are products
which have already been constituted by the creative activity of men located in the history of mankind in general. Dilthey calls these phenomena "objectifications" of "objective spirit".(16) Understanding in the historic-hermeneutic sciences for Dilthey entails the reproduction of meaning expressed in the objectifications of the past and present generations of subjects. The crucial point of the analysis is reached where Habermas states that, for Dilthey, theory and concepts are vehicles along which understanding, as a production or making process occurs. The empirical-analytic sciences terminate in "artificial products" seen as a corpus of theories comprising statements of laws through which the scientist controls the external environment. The historic-hermeneutic sciences aim at the "transposition" or re-producing objectifications of past generations, into the experiential realm of the individual researcher. Habermas agrees with Dilthey that the social scientist encounters symbolically pre-structured reality which is to be understood. He objects to Dilthey's view that understanding is a form of making (poiesis) or re-producing the the meanings objectified in the products of the past. There are two versions of this methodology in Dilthey's work. The first entails the act of understanding the life expressions in terms of transposition. This is the "empathy" view of understanding which Dilthey is usually associated with. In the process of understanding, the scientist transposes himself into the foreign experience and re-experiences or re-lives the experience objectified in the phenomenon studied. Habermas' critique of this form of understanding is interesting in that he emphasises the monological character of this process. In other words, he does not merely question the difficulties associated with a methodology of psychological empathy. He sees Dilthey's error to lie at a deeper level of conceiving the understanding process as the solitary act of the researcher who re-makes (poiesis) the meanings objectified in the products of the past. Habermas holds that this is the model of understanding which Dilthey never overcomes. The second version of understanding as a making process comes to the fore in Dilthey's later works. Dilthey replaces the empathy theory with a philosophy of reflection. The particular model of reflection which he adopts is described by Habermas as follows:
"Dilthey borrows from the philosophy of reflection the model that underlies the methodological connection of experience, expression and understanding. The life of mind consists in externalizing itself in objectivations and at the same time returning to itself in the reflection of its externalizations. The history of mankind is integrated into the self-formative process of mind." (1972:147)

He explains that this model of reflection is used by scholars such as Vico and Marx to justify their philosophies of history. It is based on the presupposition that the historical life context is the "work" of a collective singular subject. Here the demiurge-like "mankind" produces or makes externality, which Dilthey names "objective spirit" (the historical life context in general). The act of understanding occurs through "minds reflective relation to its own objectifications", the purposes, values, customs, and historical life context in general in which the "active mind congeals" (Habermas 1971:149). He cites Dilthey:

"Thus the concept of cultural science is determined, according to the range of phenomena that it comprises, by the objectivation of life in the external world. The mind only understands what it has created. Nature, the object of natural science, encompasses that reality which is brought about independently of the active mind...The first condition of the possibility of historical science is that I myself am a historical being - that he who studies history is the same as he who makes history".

(Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:149)

This model of objectification and subsequent appropriation of the products of past objectifications through reflection, is still a model of understanding as a making process, Habermas argues.

3.5.2 Understanding as a Communicative Process

Habermas holds that hermeneutic understanding is the methodologically developed form of understanding oneself and others. This thesis is established as follows: He invokes Dilthey's three forms of elementary life expressions: linguistic expression, actions and experiential expressions in order to establish hermeneutics as a dialogical rather than the monological process of re-making, as Dilthey holds. For Dilthey, linguistic expressions can be completely divorced from the
concrete life context. In this sense they imply "no reference to
the particularities of the life in which they originated"
(Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:163). Here hermeneutic
interpretation is not required since the statements serve as
"vehicles" through which information travels. An example of this
is calculus. There is no dialogue between the receivers and
senders of information in this context. Dilthey says:
"judgement is identical in the one who states it and the one
who understands. Like a vehicle, it goes unaltered from the
possession of him who states it to the possession of him who
understands it."(Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:163)

Here linguistic expressions are independent of the communicative
situation of specific persons and times, Habermas argues.
Understanding is then monological. For example the statement
E=mc^2 is understood by scientists around the globe in an
identical fashion. Only "pure" statements in this sense can be
completely understood Habermas holds (17). Where linguistic
expressions are linked to the concrete life context, their role
in a dialogic relation becomes important. He explains that
"the "vehicle" is no longer external to the content of the
expression. Complete understanding is impeded, because
there is no longer general agreement about an unchanging
meaning" (Habermas 1972:164). What he means is that where linguistic expressions are linked to
the life context, theory and data or content, can not be
separated. Where theory and data are linked, the expression is
not transmitted from sender to receiver in a monological fashion
and understood in an identical manner as in the expression
E=mc^2. For Dilthey, linguistic expressions which are linked to
the life context contain symbolic meanings which are not patent
in the manifest expression. Hemeneutics serves to decipher the
alien or unknown aspects in the expressions and hence lies
between the familiar and the alien. Habermas elaborates by
invoking the example of the "gap" which lies between the life
context and one's attempts to express aspects of daily life in
language. There is always a gap between what one expresses about
a phenomenon in daily life and the meaning this expression
conveys to other individuals. One enters into a dialogue with
another person in order to ensure that the latter understands
what is meant. The gap between what is said and what is meant is
bridged by communication. The process of understanding is facilitated by meanings which are not only objectified in language but are also expressed in actions. Habermas says that Dilthey's second category of life expressions, actions, can be understood as intentional actions which are subject to the norms through which the subject orientates himself. Here Habermas is moving beyond Dilthey by casting his second form of life expression, action, into a specific interpretation of communicative action. This stems from the earlier work discussed in chapter two where I point out that Habermas reformulates Weber's formal concept of rationality by saying that a "fundamental" distinction must be made between purposive rational action (work or poiesis) and interaction or praxis. The specific definition of the latter concept is important in this context. He says:

"By interaction, on the other hand I understand communicative action, symbolic interaction. It is governed by binding consensual norms, which define reciprocal expectations about behaviour and which must be understood and recognized by at least two acting subjects. Social norms are enforced through sanctions. Their meaning is objectified in ordinary language communication". (Habermas 1971:92 emphasis mine.)

Habermas invokes this aspect of the distinction between work ("poiesis") and communicative action ("praxis"), to reformulate Dilthey's concept of understanding. He then says that communicative action and linguistic communication are analogous in that meaning is objectified in language and in communicative action. Meanings which are objectified in actions can be translated into sentences in ordinary language. Conversely, the meanings which are objectified in sentences can be translated into actions. He makes the crucial connection between these two realms as follows:

"symbolic interaction is as much a form of representation as is linguistic communication. There appear to be meanings which can be translated from one medium into the other. This convertibility of the meanings of sentences into actions and of actions into sentences makes possible reciprocal interpretations." (Habermas 19872:165 emphasis mine)

Habermas holds that both types of life expression require interpretation since the meanings objectified in action and
linguistic expression are never totally apparent in themselves. The subject who acts in accordance with social norms in society cannot express himself directly in these actions any more than he can express himself directly in ordinary language. This stems from the fact that the unique life history of the subject cannot be fully transposed into either form of life expression. There is always a residue of meaning which is not manifest or stated directly in linguistic expressions and communicative actions. Habermas then invokes Dilthey's third form of life expression, the experiential expressions, which unites the dimension between the ego and its linguistic and translinguistic objectifications. The experiential expressions capture the realm of expression which encompasses the responses of the human body. Here the range of expressions such as gesture, facial expression, laughing and blushing are indicators of unstated intentions. The experiential expressions cannot be completely interpreted into sentences or actions. Habermas invokes Dilthey to express what he calls the "cognitive content" of these expressions:

"expression can contain more of what goes on in the mind than what can be revealed by any act of introspection. ...At the same time, however, it is in the nature of the experiential expression that the relation between it and the mental content it expresses can be the basis of understanding only with reservations. It is not judged true or false, but ungenuine or genuine. For here dissimulation, lying and deception interrupt the relation between expression and the mental content it expresses."

(Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:167 emphasis in text)

He casts this insight of Dilthey into the sociological notion of role taking. He says the experiential expressions may be seen as indicators of the role that the subject takes or pretends to take within the context of action and dialogue. Habermas wants to capture the identity of the individual which he says,

"does not manifest itself immediately in the general categories or general norms of its life expressions and only communicates itself indirectly within them." (1972:167)

This is the realm of latent meaning which is indicated by the experiential expressions. The experiential expressions connect the word and act in that they can indicate how seriously something is meant and whether the communicating subject is
deceiving himself or others in the communication process. Habermas then discusses the pre-scientific realm of the everyday life context. He states that "communication in ordinary language is never isolated from habitual interactions and attendant or intermittent experiential expressions. Mutual understanding about linguistic symbols is subject to permanent control through the actual occurrence of actions expected in a given context and these in turn can be interpreted through linguistic communication if there is a disturbance of consensus" (Habermas 1972:168).

Here Habermas is employing the reformulated life expression, action. Communicative action is understood as a process of interaction based on reciprocal expectations about behaviour. These expectations occur in the practice of daily life activity. The meanings in the two realms of daily life activity, of action and ordinary language, can be translated into one another. The actual occurrence of actions either confirms expectations or does not confirm expectations. In the latter case doubt sets in and the meaning of the action can be translated into the medium of language with the attendant spontaneous flow of life expressions indicating the latent meanings. Thus mutual understanding is subject to "permanent control". He links this process with the practical knowledge-constitutive interest in mutual understanding by citing Dilthey as follows:

"understanding first arises in the interests of practical life. Here people are dependent on intercourse with one another. They must make themselves understandable to one another. One must know what the other wants. Thus the elementary forms of understanding come into being."

(Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:174)

Here Dilthey realizes that the understanding process is rooted in the pre-scientific realm of man's practical interest in mutual understanding. This elementary form of understanding, Habermas points out, is developed methodologically by Dilthey. The knowledge-constitutive interest in practical life activities is also evident at the higher level of analysis captured by the foreign-language interpreter. In interpreting a foreign language, the greater the distance between the scientist and the life context under investigation, the more frequently uncertainty
arises. Attempts are made to overcome the distance between these realms. The starting point is the normal structure of life expression and mental content expressed in it. Where contradictions occur between what is already known and the progressing understanding process, the scientist recollects "cases in which the normal relation between life expression and the inner did not occur" (Dilthey cited in Habermas 1972:174). This brings to the fore the various forms of latent meaning. The expressive realm of life experiences aids the scientist in making a decision about his doubt. Habermas then uses his interpretation of the empirical-analytic sciences and argues that the two forms of inquiry are analogous. Both forms of inquiry are embedded in "systems of action". Both forms of inquiry display a relationship between a disturbed routine or habitual behaviour. "Both aim at the elimination of doubt and the re-establishment of unproblematic modes of behaviour" (1972:175). In the case of the empirical-analytic sciences the criterion of doubt is the failure of feedback-controlled purposive rational action. In the case of hermeneutics, "it is the disturbance of consensus, that is the non-agreement of reciprocal expectations between at least two acting subjects" (Habermas 1972:175).

The empirical-analytic sciences aim at technical recommendations. The historic-hermeneutic sciences aim at interpreting the life expressions which cannot be understood and hence "block the mutuality of behavioural expectations" (Habermas 1972:176). The experiment may be seen as a refined or methodologically developed form of the pragmatic rules of instrumental action. Hermeneutics may be seen as the methodologically developed form of interpretive activities in daily life. The hermeneutic sciences are rooted in interactions, what Habermas calls the communicative action (praxis) which is mediated by ordinary language. The empirical-analytic sciences are rooted in the behavioural system of purposive rational action (work or poiesis). Both forms of science are "governed by cognitive interests rooted in the life contexts of communicative and instrumental action" respectively (Habermas 1972:176). Habermas further compares the two forms of inquiry as follows:
"While the empirical analytic methods aim at disclosing and comprehending reality under the transcendental viewpoint of possible technical control, hermeneutic methods aim at maintaining the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding in ordinary language communication and in action according to norms. In its very structure the hermeneutic understanding is designed to guarantee, within the cultural traditions, the possible action-orientating self-understanding of individuals and groups as well reciprocal understanding between different individuals and groups. It makes possible the form of unconstrained consensus and the type of open intersubjectivity on which communicative action depends" (1972:176).

He emphasises that communication flows in two dimensions. Firstly in the vertical direction of individual life history and the collective tradition to which the individual belongs. Secondly in the horizontal direction between the traditions of different groups, individuals and cultures. A crucial factor is now introduced. Habermas says that when these communication flows break down, and the condition of inter-subjectivity no longer holds,

"mutual understanding is "either rigidified or falls apart, a condition of survival is disturbed, one that is as elementary as the complementary condition of the success of instrumental action: namely the possibility of unconstrained agreement and non-violent recognition." (Habermas 1972:176)

Habermas holds that a condition of human survival, namely the "possibility of unconstrained agreement and mutual non-violent recognition" is a presupposition of communicative action in the practice of daily living. Thus the knowledge-constitutive interest in the historic-hermenetic sciences is a "practical" interest. He distinguishes the practical from the technical cognitive interest in that the former is not directed at the comprehension of an objectified reality as Dilthey holds, but at the

"maintenance of the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding, within whose horizon reality can first appear as something." (Habermas 1972:176 emphasis mine.)

This "practical life relation", Habermas says, is discernible
not only at the hermeneutic level of analysis but also in the cultural tradition itself (1972:176). He points out that the cultural sciences originate in the categories of Roman jurisprudence, the classical tradition of politics, and the public debates of the citizens in the ancient city-states. The cultural disciplines

"did not develop out of the crafts [the realm of poiesis] and other professions in which technical knowledge is required, but rather out of the professional realms of action that require practical wisdom" (Habermas 1972:176)

The classical concept of practical reason is understood by Aristotle as practical or ethical know-how. This form of rationality is orientated to the question of the "good" and virtuous way of life and is based on man's capacity for practical deliberation and wisdom. The point that Habermas is making in this context is that the rationality of mutual understanding cannot be derived as Dilthey thinks, from the notion of making or production (poiesis) internal to the classical tradition of craftsmanship. Habermas points out that the cultural sciences derive from the realm of communicative action (praxis) with its orientation to practical wisdom and deliberation. Practical reason entails moral practical action understood as the communicative establishment of law and justice. This is not the act of making or re-making the norms, values and the general content of natural law, like a craftsman makes a stool. Once again the distinctions made by Arendt between the concepts "poiesis" and "praxis" as discussed in chapter one, are thematic. Habermas further explains that the practical cognitive interest is fundamental to the cultural sciences and "action-orienting self-understanding" of the nineteenth century educated public (1972:177). Historiography and philology are held to determine the direction of the cultural sciences through the manner in which tradition is appropriated "in the practical consciousness of the educated bourgeois strata" (Habermas 1972:177). In other words the concept of rationality, (the self-understanding of the Enlightenment thinkers), of the nineteenth century bourgeois, which Habermas is invoking in a non derogatory fashion here, entails a practical orientation to life in which the ideals of autonomy, justice, truth, equality, happiness and responsibility are central. This practical orientation of the Enlightenment
concept of reason forms the ground upon which tradition is appropriated and the categories of the cultural sciences develop in modernity, he argues. Habermas then develops a critique of Dilthey's view of objective science. He holds that Dilthey disavows the practical interest in understanding through his adherence to the contemplative notion of theory.

3.5.3. The Contemplative Stance in Historic-Hermeneutic Science

Habermas points out that Dilthey discovers the practical ground of hermeneutics and then, instead of embracing his discovery, shies away from it fearing that the goal of "objective", scientific hermeneutics is threatened by the practical interest deriving from the life-context. Dilthey discerns a conflict between "science" and "life" and disavows the practical interest. Habermas argues that Dilthey emphasises a contemplative notion of theory in his attempts to capture hermeneutics as a "scientific" and "objective" discipline. He says as he leads up to the rejection of Dilthey's contemplative stance:

"hermeneutic understanding ties the interpreter to the role of a partner in a dialogue such that at least two subjects communicate in a language that allows them to share, that is to make communicable through intersubjectivity valid symbols, what is absolutely unsharable and individual. Only this model of participation in communication learned in interaction can explain the specific achievement of hermeneutics" (1972:179 emphasis mine)

Habermas is invoking the interpretation of intersubjectivity encompassing the notion of plurality. He stresses the uniqueness of each individual while at the same time linking individuals in communication or dialogue which takes place in ordinary language that binds them together. He then immediately says of Dilthey that he never abandons the "contrary model of empathy" of the solitary reproduction, re-experiencing, or re-making, model of hermeneutics (Habermas 1972:80). This derives, Habermas says, from his contemplative view of theory. What troubles Habermas in the context of Dilthey's hermeneutics is that the contemplative stance reveals that Dilthey treats the subjects as identical copies of one another in the interpretation process. Habermas says:
"Dilthey links the possible objectivity of knowledge in the cultural sciences to the condition of virtual simultaneity. ...simultaneity fulfils the same function as repeatability of experiments in the natural sciences: the interchangeability of the cognitive subject is guaranteed" (1972:182)

Subjects are viewed as exact carbon copies of one another in their "perfect singularity" as Arendt would say. The possibility for communicative human action, communicative rationality and communicatively formed freedom is eclipsed. For Habermas, the rationality of communicative action is determined by the possibility that unique subjects can communicatively co-ordinate their plans of action, reveal and legitimate their intentions communicatively, thus facilitating the survival of the species in a nonviolent manner. Dilthey, like Peirce, cannot free himself from the contemplative notion of theory despite his Kantian orientation, Habermas argues (1972:180-186). Re-experiencing or re-making the meanings of the past, objectified in the entities studied, is achieved for Dilthey when the scientist adheres to the goal of scientific objectivity. Objective knowledge is achieved through the elimination of the interfering influence of practical cognitive interest. Habermas says that, for Dilthey, this tradition of contemplative theory is so strong that he reduces the experiential realm of the individual researcher to that of an uninvolved observer who then submerges himself into the "stream of life" and "allows the pleasurable identification of everyone with everyone else" (1972:181). For Habermas hermeneutic understanding is objective when the researcher learns through the appropriation of the alien objectifications to understand himself at the same time. He sees Dilthey as eliminating this aspect of self-reflection which he does discover in the hermeneutics of the foreign-language interpreter. Dilthey adheres to the "selfless universality" which characterises the model of re-making the objectifications of the past. Thus Dilthey is not able to articulate the self-reflection of the subject within the confines of his historic-hermeneutic science. He emphasises the notion of the impartial researcher who sheds his prejudices and submerges himself in the stream of life to copy or re-make the objectifications of the past. For Habermas the understanding of tradition and the self rooted in tradition, must incorporate a critique of tradition. Both scholars hold
that the pre-scientific realm of ordinary language is the locus in terms of which hermeneutics is developed. Habermas points out that "language is also a medium of domination and social power; it serves to legitimate relations of organized force" (1977:360). He concludes that Dilthey limits hermeneutics to the mere repetition or copying of the objectifications of past. Thus a "depth hermeneutics" which is orientated to the critique of domination and encompasses the self-reflection of the subject, is required. This issue is dealt with in the reflective and critical sciences guided by the knowledge-constitutive interest in emancipation which is rooted in the life context of power.

3.6 Rationality and the Emancipatory Cognitive Interest of The Critical Sciences

The emancipatory interest of the critical sciences is clarified through a concept of rationality which Habermas appropriates from the tradition of the Enlightenment. The motto of the Enlightenment for Kant is: "Have courage to use your own reason!" (Kant 1963:3). Habermas holds that the dissolution of dogmatism and error derives from more than mere rational insight. He says:

"more precisely, reason itself draws its life from the courage to be rational, the sapere aude, that Kant elevated to a motto of his reply to the question; what is enlightenment? Reason will attain power over dogmatism incarnate only because it has incorporated the will to reason in its own interest." (Habermas 1974:257)

He argues that the Enlightenment concept of reason "which defends itself against dogmatism is committed reason" (Habermas 1974:258). He invokes the Enlightenment concept of committed reason and says of the emancipatory interest:

"In self-reflection knowledge for the sake of knowledge attains congruence with the interest in autonomy and responsibility. The emancipatory cognitive interest aims at the pursuit of reflection as such...in the power of self reflection, knowledge and interest are one."

(Habermas 1972:314 emphasis mine)

Habermas appropriates the interest in autonomy and responsibility of committed reason which he never abandons from this point onwards. The keys to the emancipatory cognitive interest lie in:
1. The appropriation of Kant's thesis that a "pure" interest in reason, whereby reason itself entails an interest in the achievement of freedom and responsibility, is necessary to account for the morality of rational men.

2. A critique of the manner in which Kant attempts to explain the pure interest in reason through comparing his work with that of Fichte. Fichte holds that interest inheres in practical reason.

3. The reversal of the Fichtean insight so that reason inheres in interest. Habermas reformulates Fichte's insight in the light of Freud's "depth hermeneutics" which he views as an example of critical science. Habermas hereby aims to show that reason inheres in interest. If reason inheres in interest, the cognitive interests cannot be misunderstood since they are then rational themselves and are not mere "attitudes" which are appended to man's purposive and communicative action.

I deal with the emancipatory interest and the concept of rationality from this perspective. Habermas sets up the parameters of the discussion as follows. Peirce and Dilthey both "discover the roots" of the knowledge constitutive interests, but they refrain from reflecting on the implications of these discoveries (Habermas 1971:197). Thus the history of the species conceived as a self-formative process eludes them. Marx and Hegel do reflect on this self-formative process, but in the light of the unprecedented progress of the empirical-analytic sciences, a simple appropriation of this work is viewed as a regression to metaphysics in the case of Hegel and to what Habermas names "materialistic scientism" in the case of Marx. I deal with this charge against Hegel and briefly explain the charge against Marx once the Fichtean critique of Kant's work is dealt with. For Hegel self-formative processes of the species and the individual occurs through "phenomenological reflection". Phenomenological reflection entails the genesis of critical consciousness (or reflective consciousness) as it develops through the successive stages of knowledge from sense certainty to absolute knowledge or reason. Habermas rejects Hegel's totalizing "movement" of reason which gathers all the forms of knowledge within itself in its march toward absolute reason. He points out that Hegel's concept of absolute reason is his normative pre-supposition which does not enable him to characterise the empirical-analytic and
historic-hermeneutic sciences as valid forms of knowledge. Habermas states his view in this regard as follows:

"Hegel arrives at a concept of speculative scientific knowledge. In relation to this norm, sciences which proceed methodologically, whether of nature or mind, can only prove themselves to be limitations to absolute knowledge and discredit themselves. The paradoxical result of an ambiguous radicalization of the critique of knowledge is not an enlightened position of philosophy with regard to science, the relation of philosophy to science completely disappears from discussion." (1972:24)

Here philosophy as a critical science robs the methodological sciences of their legitimacy as independent sciences. The forms of rationality internal to these sciences are then eclipsed by the movement of absolute reason. The actual fact of empirical-analytic scientific progress, "unmasks this [Hegel's] claim, however misunderstood, as bare fiction". (Habermas 1972:24). Habermas holds that on the one hand, a legitimate path between the positions of Hegel and Marx is that taken by Dilthey and Peirce. The limits of the concepts of rationality entailed in the empirical-analytical and historic-hermeneutic sciences can then be charted without denying the legitimacy of each form of rationality internal to the these sciences respectively. On the other hand however, had Dilthey and Peirce reflected on the self-formative process of the species, they would have discovered the emancipatory experience of reflection. He says:

"methodically it [the experience of reflection] leads to a standpoint from which the identity of reason with the will to reason freely arises. In self-reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest in autonomy and responsibility. For the pursuit of reflection knows itself as a movement of emancipation. Reason is at the same time subject to the interest in reason. We say that it obeys the cognitive interest, which aims at the pursuit of reflection." (Habermas 1972:198)

Dilthey and Pierce do not discover this unity between knowledge and interest since they do not conceive of the processes of inquiry as entailing the process of self-reflection. Habermas argues that the concept, cognitive interest, is validated if it can be shown that reason inheres in the emancipatory interest.
He points out that the technical and practical interests cannot be misunderstood if they are viewed in conjunction with the emancipatory interest of rational reflection. What Habermas means here is that if the scientist reflects on the process of self-formation of the species, then the instrumental rationality and the practical rationality internal to the two forms of science respectively, are revealed as being central to men's interest in freeing themselves from the forces of nature and the power structures which inhibit men's capacity to understand one another and themselves. The concept of an interest in reason comes to the fore in Kant's work. Fichte, he goes on to say, is the first scholar to develop this concept of "emancipatory interest as inherent in acting reason" since he accords priority to practical rationality over and above theoretical reason (Habermas 1972:198). I briefly indicate how Habermas comes to this conclusion.

3.6.1 From the Pure Interest in Reason to the Emancipatory Interest Inherent in Practical Rationality

Kant distinguishes between interest in general, pure interest and empirical interest. Interest in general refers to the pleasure associated with the existence of an object or an action. Pure interest is seen as an interest in action. The empirical interest is named the "pathological interest in the object of the action" (Kant cited in Habermas 1972:199). The pathological interests in what is regarded as useful arise from the needs of men. This is crucial to his denigration of utilitarianism where the rational action of men is understood as a means to an end. For Kant, the pathological interest of reason can never lead to morality or the actions associated with the "good". The pure interest in "the good", on the other hand, awakens a need in men to act in accordance with the "good". The pure interest masters the faculty of desire for Kant, while the pathological interests stimulate the faculty of desire. Habermas says that the sensual inclinations may be seen as "habitualized desire" while the intellectual inclinations, which for Kant are free of the senses or the sensual, are formed by "pure interest as a permanent attitude" (1972:199). I now digress using John Kemp's (1968) study of Kant's work as a guide. This is necessary in order to provide the context in which the forms of interest, which
Habermas is invoking, occur. The realm of desire for Kant is not co-terminus with the realm of reason, since actions which are determined by desires or feelings means the heteronomy of the will and the surrender of freedom and rationality. The will of man is "free" if it accords with the laws of practical reason, from which desire and contingency are excluded. The laws of practical reason can be understood as follows. Kant distinguishes between subjective and objective practical principles. A practical principle is subjective when an actor regards the principle as applying only to himself. An example of a practical principle in the subjective sense is: "Whenever I see a chance of improving my wealth, without risk, I take it". A practical principle which is valid for all rational men is objective. An example of a practical principle in the objective sense is: "Whenever one sees another human being in distress one ought to help him/her." The objective practical principles are named laws and all rational men direct their will toward the fulfilment of the objective laws of practical reason. The practical principles of reason are expressed in the categorical or unconditioned imperatives which are ends in themselves. For example, "you ought never to tell lies" is a categorical imperative. Here there is no way of evading the command of practical reason since it is an end in itself. The hypothetical imperative in contrast is conditional. For example, "if you want to become a surgeon, you must work hard in order to pass your exams". Here the command of reason can be evaded if the end is given up. Thus the laws of practical reason are seen as categorical and are ends in themselves. As Hannah Arendt says of Kant, the "end in itself" is his solution to the perpetual chain of means and ends of man the user, who he despises. Hence his characterization of the empirical interests as "pathological". He states that everything in nature is determined by laws, but that only man as a "rational being, has the power to act in accordance with principles and only so has he a will" (Kant cited in Kemp 1968:58). Kant's aim in the Critique of Practical Reason is to show how reason can determine the will. If this is not possible, morality would be nothing more than a mere illusion since men would then be subject to the laws of empirical causality and questions surrounding the "oughts" of action would be irrelevant. The question of an "ought" arises if man has a choice between acting in accordance
with his desires and acting in accordance with a moral law, or the laws of practical reason. For Kant the moral laws are the laws of freedom. The laws of nature pertain to the realm of necessity and hence imply heteronomy of the will if man's will is governed by the laws of nature or natural desires. If men's actions do not fall under the laws of practical reason, morality is eclipsed. I return to the sequence of the critique. Habermas focuses on the function which the concept, pure interest, performs in Kant's philosophy. Kant asks: How is freedom possible? He holds that freedom is only possible if the will accords with the laws of practical reason from which contingency and desire are excluded. He asks: What then motivates men, who are subject to desires, to act according to the laws of practical reason? For example, why should a man be inclined to always help people in distress or never to tell lies? Here the concept of interest comes into play. Habermas notes that for Kant, interests in general refer to the pleasure that is connected to the existence of an object or an action. In order to account for man's inclination to act according to the laws of practical reason as opposed to desire, a feeling of pleasure must derive from acting according to the laws of practical reason. Kant therefore posits a pure interest of reason such that the feeling of pleasure is instilled in the will and the laws of morality can be accorded with. He says:

"In order to want that for which reason prescribes an ought exclusively to rational beings affected by the senses, a faculty of reason is required that can instil a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the fulfilment of duty, one that thus has causality that can determine the senses in accordance with its principles. But it is entirely impossible to comprehend, that is to make comprehensible a priori, how a mere thought that in itself contains nothing sensual can produce a sensation of pleasure or pain."

(Kant cited in Habermas 1972:200)

Here reason itself is the locus of an interest in the achievement of autonomy and responsibility. He views this as a form of causality internal to reason. This form of causality "instils a feeling of pleasure in the fulfilment of a duty", where duty is understood as a law of practical reason (Kant cited in Habermas 1972:200). Therefore a form of causality is introduced into
reason itself which produces an effect in experience, namely the pleasure in the fulfilment of a duty. Kant says:

"This [causality], however, cannot provide any relation of cause and effect such as that between two objects of experience. Yet here pure reason is to be the cause, by means of mere Ideas (which supply absolutely no object for experience), of and effect [that is, of pleasure in the fulfilment of duty] that occurs in experience. Thus it is entirely impossible for us humans to explain how and why the universality of the maxim as law, and thus morality, interests us. (Kant cited in Habermas 1972:201)

Man's pure interest in the good awakens the need to act in accordance with the laws of practical reason, but the specific form of causality which then inheres in the faculty of reason, is inexplicable. Kant holds that the intellectual inclinations are free from the sensual and are formed by pure interest as a permanent attitude but the "why's" and "how's" of this process are a mystery. All that can be said is that rational men can be sure, that in acting according to the laws of practical reason, a feeling of pleasure is experienced after the act has occurred. On the basis of the pure interest of reason, with its mysterious connection to the laws of practical reason, man is held to be responsible for his actions. Kant asks:

"How can reason, without other motives taken from elsewhere, be practical by itself? That is, how can the mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws... provide a motive for itself without any material (object) of the will in which one might take a prior interest? How can it bring about an interest that would be purely moral? In other words, how can pure reason be practical? All human reason is entirely incapable of explaining this, and all labor to find an explanation of it is in vain" (Kant cited in Habermas 1972:202).

Habermas embraces Kant's basic tenet that reason encompasses a will to be rational, namely the will to achieve autonomy and responsibility. The basic question is how does one unite practical and theoretical reason in an adequate fashion? Fichte, attempts to solve this perplexing problem, but this is achieved at the cost of "reducing nature to the posit of an absolute ego" (Habermas 1972:210) (18). Fichte, Habermas argues, overcomes
Kant's dichotomy between practical and theoretical reason. He does this by according primacy to practical reason. Theoretical reason is then dependent on the practical intention of the subject who strives for his autonomy. This can be briefly stated as follows. For Fichte, dogmatism is viewed as men's fixation on objects or things. He views a form of consciousness which understands itself as a product of things, as a product of nature, as enslaved. As Habermas notes:

"The principle of the dogmatist is belief in things for their own sake; that is, indirect belief in their own self, which is dispersed, and supported only by objects."

(Fichte cited in Habermas 1972:205).

Fichte explains that:

"... some who have not yet elevated themselves from the full feeling of their freedom and absolute self-subsistence, find themselves only in the representation of things. They have that sort of self-consciousness which is dispersed and immersed in objects and can be gleaned only from their manifold. Their image is visible to them only through things as in a mirror. When the latter are taken from them, their self disappears at the same time. For their own sake, they cannot abandon the belief in the independence of things; for it is only in things that they themselves exist. They have really become all that they are through the external world". (Fichte cited in Habermas 1972:207)

The idealist concept of reason, held by Fichte, encompasses an interest in autonomy and responsibility. Namely, the will to free the self from the "natural consciousness" with its dependence on things. Thus the will to raise the self from the dependence of things is understood as the will to achieve freedom. From this position Fichte argues for a concept of practical reason entailing an interest in the achievement of autonomy. Here autonomy is only achieved through the act of self-reflection in which the subject understands himself as the source of consciousness and enlightened knowledge of reality. Thus the interest of reason in the achievement of autonomy is constitutive of knowledge and rational action as opposed to dogmatism and enslavement. Habermas explains that Kant secretly develops his concept of practical reason from the viewpoint of theoretical reason. This can be discerned from the manner in
which the interest of reason is depicted. Kant asks how a mere thought can produce a sensation of pleasure or pain; and how the form of causality, internal to reason, is to be understood. These dilemmas are avoided by Fichte since practical reason is accorded priority over theoretical reason. Now the practical interest of reason, in the achievement of autonomy, "belongs to reason itself", namely to practical reason as the model in terms of which theoretical reason is understood (Habermas 1972:208). Here the ego, interested in his autonomy, realizes his autonomy from dogmatism through self-reflection and action. Habermas says:

"Fichte identifies the work of practical reason in the activities of theoretical reason, and terms their point of unity intellectual intuition: the intellectual intuition dealt with by the doctrine of knowledge is not at all a matter of being but one of action, and Kant does not even mention it... Self-reflection is at once intuition and emancipation, comprehension and liberation from dogmatic dependence. The dogmatism that reason undoes both analytically and practically is false consciousness: error and unfree existence in particular. Only the ego that apprehends itself in intellectual intuition as self-positing subject obtains autonomy. The dogmatist, on the contrary, because he cannot summon up the force to carry out self-reflection, lives in dispersal as a dependent subject that is not only determined by objects but is itself made into a thing. He leads an unfree existence, because he does not become conscious of his self-reflecting self-activity. Dogmatism is equally a moral lack and a theoretical incapacity" (1972:208).

For Fichte, the kind of philosophy one chooses, is directly related to the kind of person one is. He rejects the notion that philosophy is simply a set of attitudes which one can retain or discard in an ad hoc manner. He says:

"For a philosophical system is not a pile of junk that could be discarded or retained at our whim; rather, it is inspired by the soul of the man who possesses it. A character who is lax by nature or that has been prostrated and bent by mental servitude, learned luxury, and vanity will never elevate itself to idealism" (Fichte cited in Habermas 1971:209)
Habermas holds that here Fichte is emphasising the unity of theoretical and practical reason. The extent to which the man's interest in emancipation, and the degree to which man's self-reflective processes develop, in turn determine the degree of actual autonomy achieved and level of philosophical understanding acquired (Habermas 1972:209). For Habermas Fichte's "unity of reason and the interested employment of reason conflicts with the contemplative concept of knowledge"(Habermas 1972:209). He stresses that in Fichte's notion of self-reflection, the interest which inheres in reason loses its "secondary character"as a mere attitude which is appended to cognition. Kant in contrast to Fichte, holds that the intellectual inclinations are formed by pure interest as a "permanent attitude". Men act according to the laws of practical reason and pleasure is experienced after the act has occurred. For Fichte, the interest of reason is constitutive of knowing and acting since the interest inherent in reason, precedes knowledge and is realized in knowledge and action. Habermas holds that the self-formative process of the species cannot be conceived as the absolute movement of reflection since the conditions under which the human species constitutes itself are not only those conditions circumscribed by reflection. The self-formative processes of the species are not unconditioned as Fichte holds, but on the contrary, are contingent on the conditions of intersubjective interaction of unique individuals on the one hand, and on the conditions of "material exchange" with an environment which is technically controllable on the other. Therefore:

"Reason's interest in emancipation, which is invested in the self-formative process of the species and permeates the movement of reflection, aims at realizing theses conditions of symbolic interaction and instrumental action; and to this extent, it assumes the restricted form of the practical and technical cognitive interests" (Habermas 1972:211).

What Habermas means is that the emancipatory interest is partially realised in the empirical and hermeneutic sciences through man's attempts to free himself from the forces of nature and constrained communication. I now discuss the last aspect of the concept reflection and interest.
3.6.2 From Interest Inherent in Reason to Reason Inhering in Interest

Habermas develops the thesis that reason inheres in interest by integrating Freud's work with his critique of Marx's work. The contours of the argument are as follows:

1. Habermas holds that Marx reduces the self-generative process of the human species to the framework of instrumental action (work). Marx is then not able to account for the communicative dimension of action which is central to Habermas' work.

2. Freud's work can be interpreted as entailing a concept of communicative action which is related to the concepts of power and ideology through the concept of self-reflection. Habermas aims at integrating this interpretation of Freud's work with that of Marx so that both dimensions of the rationality complex, namely work and interaction, can be developed at the level of the emancipatory interest.

I now deal with these dimensions of science as critique.

3.6.2.1 Habermas' critique of Marxism as a Science

Habermas accepts Arendt's basic premise that Marx uses the concepts labor and work in an ambiguous fashion and that when he speaks of labour in the sense of the objectification process he really means work (19). Habermas focuses on the level of analysis where Marx employs the concept of labour, understood as work, to account for self-generative process of the species (20). He makes a distinction between the empirical level of analysis and the historico-philosophical levels of analysis in his critique of Marx's work (21). He stresses that at the historico-philosophical level of analysis Marx reduces communicative action (praxis) to productive labor or work (poiesis) (22). I focus on this level of analysis since Habermas is investigating scientific Marxism in this context. Habermas's assessment of Marx's critical science unfolds as follows: Marx understands the self-formative process of the species as contingent upon the conditions of nature. Habermas says that for Marx:

"The subject of world constitution is not the transcendental consciousness in general but the concrete human species, which reproduces its life under natural conditions. That
this process, "material exchange", takes the form of processes of social labor derives from the physical constitution of this natural being and constants of its natural environment." (1972:27)

Marx holds that the human species develops historically and is thus not an a-historical absolute like Fichte's concept of the absolute ego. Habermas points out that the concept of labour is a fundamental category for Marx since it is held to be a condition for the possibility of human existence. Marx says that labour:

"is a condition of human existence that is independent of all forms of society, a perpetual necessity of nature in order to mediate the material exchange between man and nature, in other words, human life...Labor is above all a process between man and nature, a process in which man through his own action mediates, regulates and controls his material exchange with nature. He confronts the substance of nature itself as a natural power. He sets in motion the natural forces belonging to his corporeal being, that is his arms and legs, head and hand, in order to appropriate nature in a form usable for his own life."

(Marx cited in Habermas 1972:27-28)

Habermas says of the concept of labour:

"Labor, or work, is not only a fundamental category of human existence but also an epistemological category. The system of objective activities creates the factual conditions of possible reproduction of social life and at the same time the transcendental conditions of the possible objectivity of objects of experience." (1972:28 emphasis mine).

Here the concept of labour, understood as work, is seen to have an epistemological dimension in that not only does it function as the fundamental category for the possibility of human life, but it is also the fundamental category for the possibility of objective knowledge. Habermas explains that the "system of objective activities" for Marx, is the work or purposive rational action of man the tool-maker (23). This system of activities encompasses the factual conditions for the possibility of the reproduction of human life. At the same time it entails a specific form of science, a science which is based on work or instrumental action. Habermas holds that although Marx
"established the science of man in the form of critique and not as a natural science, he continually tended to classify it with the natural sciences. He considered unnecessary an epistemological justification of social theory...In order to prove the scientific character of his analysis, Marx repeatedly made uses of its analogy to the natural sciences. He never gives evidence of having revised his early intention, according to which the science of man was to form a unity with the natural sciences" (1972:45-46)

The view of man as a tool making animal is the basic dimension in terms of which action and the apprehension of the world is understood for Marx at the historico-philosophical level of analysis. Man the language user has no place in the apprehension of the world in this form of science. As Habermas says:

"Marx does not actually explicate the interrelationship of interaction and labour, but instead, under the unspecified title of social praxis, reduces the one to the other, namely communicative action to instrumental action ...the productive activity which regulates the material exchange of the human species with its natural environment, becomes the paradigm for the generation of all the categories, everything is resolved into the self movement of production". (1974:168-169)

Habermas provides numerous examples to demonstrate that the paradigm of production assumes this reductionist function. For example, moral relationships are understood in terms of the paradigm of production. The conflicts between men are always about the organization and the appropriation of products. The conflicting parties are always defined by their position in the production process as conflicting classes. The dialectic of morality entails the continual antagonism between classes. The dialectical advance, occurs through what Marx calls the "causality of fate." The causality of fate is directly tied to the categories of production. Overcoming the conflict is relative to the development of the forces of production and the institutionalized level of mastery over nature, captured by Habermas as the level of:

1. Empirical-analytic knowledge with its instrumental and technical form of rationality.
2. The level of necessary labour for the production process.
Habermas states that these categories of production determine the entire dialectic of morality. The moral relationship is understood as a complex of:

1. The necessary amount of repression which is institutionalized for the specific development of the forces of production and
2. The superfluous repression deriving from the unequal distribution of wealth which is legitimated through repressive norms which are institutionalized.

Empirical analytic knowledge with it's technical interest in the control of nature, developed by man the tool-making animal, is a force of production in Marx's work, Habermas notes. The "causality of fate" is set in motion by the ruling class who maintain the superfluous repression thereby suppressing the interests and needs of the dominated class. The dominated class become the revolutionary class, as the forces of production develop historically. As technical knowledge progresses in the history of man, the production process is progressively mechanized. For Marx:

"the course of scientific-technical progress is marked by the epochal innovations through which the functional elements of the behavioural systems of instrumental action are reproduced step by step at the level of machines."

(Habermas 1972:55)

As technology develops and the labour process is eased by machines, the revolutionary class realize that they are subject to superfluous repression. The ruling class suffer their "just fate" through revolution (Habermas1972:58). The dominated class overthrow their masters and become the new ruling class themselves as long as economic scarcity prevails. Through the "causality of fate", the revolutionary class overcome their oppressors and automatically establish a new "injustice" of class rule, since they become the new dominating class. The important point which Habermas makes is that the dialectic of moral life repeats itself,

"until the materialist spell that is cast upon the reproduction of social life, the biblical curse of the necessary labor is broken technologically. Even then the dialectic of moral life does not automatically come to rest. But the inducement by which it is henceforth kept in motion assumes a new quality. It now stems not from scarcity, but
rather only from the masochistic gratification of a form of domination that impedes taming the struggle for existence, which is objectively possible, and puts off uncoercive interaction on the basis of communication free from domination. This domination is then reproduced only for its own sake." (1972:58 emphasis mine.)

Habermas argues that emancipation then becomes the emancipation of men from the necessary labour. The labour process "assumes a new quality" whereby the mastery of external nature, through technological reason is institutionalized and the communicative formation of freedom through the medium of dialogue is eclipsed. Thus the dimension of the self-formative processes of the species encompassing the practical rationality of communicative action, is eclipsed in the paradigm of production. Habermas stresses this form of "emancipation" in Marx's science, by stating that:

"the self-generative act of the human species is complete as soon as the social subject has emancipated itself from necessary labor, and so to speak takes its place alongside scientized production" (1972:48)

Another example of this emphasis in Habermas's assessment is the following:

"Here it is from the methodological perspective that we are interested in this conception of the transformation of the labor process into a scientific process that would bring mans "material exchange" with nature under the control of a human species totally emancipated from necessary labor. A science of man developed from this point of view would have to construct the history of the species as a synthesis through social labor - and only through labor. It would make true the fiction of the early Marx that the natural science subsumes the science of man just as much as the latter subsumes the former." (Habermas 1972:50 emphasis mine)

Habermas focuses upon those elements internal to Marx's historico-philosophical level of analysis which lead to deterministic Marxism. He presses the argument to its logical conclusion and finds ample evidence in Marx's writings which he cites extensively to substantiate his claim that Marx reduces the self-generation of the species to the technical rationality of man the tool-making animal. Thus Habermas is serious in this assessment of the "scientific" Marx and is quite prepared to face
the wrath of Marxist scholars in this regard. His basic premise is that the concept of labour which is used to account for human agency at the historico-philosophical level of analysis is not able to account for the communicative dimension of social life and the communicative achievement of freedom. Emancipation for Marx is depicted as freedom from necessary labour. Marx holds that, in the realm of freedom, the science of man and the science of nature (natural science) are one. This is the "materialistic scientism" that I refer to in 3.6 which Habermas rejects. Habermas is not entering into mere polemics here. The import of this critique, is that "materialistic scientism" is embraced by scholars such as Louis Althusser who are denigrated by the critical theorists as "apologists for Leninism" (Schroyer 1973:129). Habermas holds that instrumental rationality is universalized in this paradigm of production. He stresses that this is the logical outcome of the "scientistic" or reductionist forms of Marxism as subscribed to by scholars such as Engels, Lenin, Burkharin and Stalin. This science then legitimates the technocratic management of society. The reflective aspect of the self-generation of the species is subordinated to the technocratic demands of the management "experts". Habermas points out that this mechanistic disavowal of critical reflection is also to be found in the "critical science" of Lukacs who reduces the communicative dimensions of practical reason to the demands of the technocratic communist party (1974:34-35). These "productivist aberrations", as Habermas names these conclusions in his recent work, stem from Marx's notion of human agency and reflection which is reduced to work (Habermas 1980:129). Habermas holds that Marx understands the process of reflection according to the "model of production" or "poiesis" (Habermas 1972:44). Marx then deludes himself about the nature of reflection when he reduces it to the model of making, since reflection is reduced to instrumental action. Habermas expands on this point as follows:

"Marx reduces the process of reflection to the level of instrumental action. By reducing the self-positing of the absolute ego to the more tangible productive activity of the species, he eliminates reflection as such as a motive force of history even though he retains the framework of the philosophy of reflection." (1972:44)
Thus the realm of communicative action encompassing practical reason based upon critical reflection is seen to be reduced to the realm of instrumental action entailing purposive-rationality. For Habermas, the "self-generative" process of the species encompasses concrete individuals who reproduce the material conditions of life through the transformation of the material world and reflect upon and change their social institutions through communicative action. I now analyse the manner in which Habermas attempts to substantiate this thesis through his integration of the work of Marx and Freud.

3.6.2.2 Rationality as Inhering in Interest

In the context of his work on the historic-hermeneutic sciences, Habermas stresses that when communication breaks down, and the condition of intersubjectivity no longer holds,

"mutual understanding is either rigidified or falls apart, a condition of survival is disturbed, one that is as elementary as the complementary condition of the success of instrumental action: namely the possibility of unconstrained agreement and non-violent recognition." (1972:176)

Freud investigates the reflective processes which serve to restore the "rigidified" or disturbed forms of communication of individuals suffering from neuroses, Habermas argues. He points out that the "depth hermeneutics" of Freud deals with "texts" which indicate the self deceptions of the author or patient. These "texts" document "latent content" which derives from the patient's form of life which is inaccessible to him and yet is part of his self from which he is alienated (Habermas 1972:218). This form of alienation is revealed in the daily life of the subject as neurotic symptoms which disrupt the language game of normal communication, comprising speech, action and non-verbal expression. The disruption of communication is expressed at the level of speech as "obsessive thoughts", at the level of actions as "repetition compulsions" and at the level of expression as "hysterical body symptoms" (Habermas 1972:219). Thus the phenomena which Dilthey deals with are accepted as "normal" forms of communication and those which Freud deals with are classed as distorted or "pathological" forms of communication. The faulty texts comprise repressed needs and intentional aspects of behaviour which have become privatized. These privatized modes of
communication are severed from publicly accepted forms of communication. The analyst and patient aim at deciphering the distorted form of communication such that the patient is able to overcome his alienation. This occurs in the therapeutic situation where the analyst and the patient enter into a dialogic relationship. Through a process of self-reflection the patient aims at overcoming his alienation. Self-reflection is viewed as a self-formative process whereby the patient and analyst decode the distorted communication and the patient re-appropriates the alienated or estranged aspects of his self in the process. This brief sketch of Habermas' interpretation of Freud's work at the level of psychoanalysis, is a reference point for his interpretation of Freud's work at the level of "civilization". For Freud "civilization" is the means whereby men elevate themselves above the animal conditions of existence. This occurs through the family where instinctual, aggressive and libidinous impulses are transformed into socially accepted modes of behaviour. What Marx names society, Freud names "civilization" which is understood as a system of self-preservation. This system serves two functions, namely, the self-assertion of men against the forces of nature and the organization of social relationships. Habermas holds that Freud, in an analogous fashion to Marx, distinguishes between the technical mastery over nature (forces of production) and the institutional framework of society (relations of production). Marx, according to Habermas, depicts the institutional framework of society as the realm in which interests are regulated. Here interests are a direct function of the system of social labour for Marx. They are regulated through the distribution of rewards and obligations which are rooted in relations of force stemming from the "distorted class structure" in society. (Habermas 1972:276). Freud understands the institutional framework not in terms of interests, but rather in terms of the repression of instinctual impulses. In the system of self-preservation repression is universally imposed independently of the class specific distribution of goods. The important point here is that the reality which the ego faces, which makes his instinctual impulses appear as dangerous, is the system of self-preservation (society) which is represented by the parents. The authority of the parents is internalized as the super-ego of the individual. The basis of the society for Freud
is also economic since he argues that:
"the motive of society is in the last resort an economic one; since it does not possess enough provisions to keep its members alive unless they work, it must restrict the numbers and divert their energies from sexual activity to work. It is faced, in short, by the eternal, primaeval exigencies of life, which are with us to this day".

(Freud cited in Habermas 1972:275).

Habermas points out that if the basic conflict between the instinctual demands and the functions of self-preservation are defined by the conditions of material labour and economic scarcity, then the "renunciations it imposes are a historically variable factor" (Habermas 1972:275). Habermas then makes an interesting claim. As the technological control over the external environment is extended, the "pressure of reality decreases" and "the weaker becomes the prohibition of instincts compelled by the system of self-preservation" (Habermas 1972:275). Thus the ego becomes correspondingly stronger as does man's capacity to master denial rationally. Here Habermas is very carefully pointing out the potential for the rational development of social structures.

He contrasts the potential for the rational development of social structures by individuals with strong ego's with it's obverse. Namely, when the pressure of reality is overpowering and ego strength is weak, instinctual renunciation occurs through affective forces rooted in the unconscious. The species then develop collective solutions, illusions or ideologies which compensate for the renunciations imposed by the system of self-preservation. These collective solutions resemble neurotic solutions to renunciation at the individual level of analysis. The analogue is repetition compulsion at the individual level of analysis, and rigid, uniform behaviour, which is removed from public criticism, at the societal level of analysis. For Freud the conflict between the instinctual demands of men in society as a whole and the repression of these demands through the system of self-preservation, also sustains a specific form of social labour. Freud locates what Marx calls social labour in the institutional frame work of society. Here the purposive rational action of man the tool-making animal is seen to be embedded in the system of communicative action. Habermas holds that purposive rational action must be seen as a sub-system of
the broader system of communicative action. The system of self-preservation sustains the forms of repression stemming from the sub-system of social labour, namely, the regulation and distribution of wealth. Thus two kinds of repression come into focus.

1. The **general and necessary** form of repression required for the self-preservation of the species as a whole which is contingent upon the totality of economic resources.

2. The **class specific** form of repression which derives from the manner in which the goods are distributed and the manner in which the control over nature is organized.

The difference between the actual amount of institutionally demanded repression and the degree of necessary repression is then a measure of the objectively superfluous repression. Thus Habermas shows that a two dimensional analysis of forms of repression is necessary. The interesting question is: How are the relationships of repression or force understood? Habermas points out that although the web of relationships named communicative action serve the needs of the system of social labour, it must also be stabilized, since under the pressure of reality, not all needs can be accommodated. "Unacceptable" needs are channelled through the unconscious of men and are subject to the affective forces of the unconscious. The logic of the argument is as follows. The linguistically expressed needs (motives and sexual desires) may or may not be in accord with the prevailing norms of a society. If the linguistically expressed needs are not acceptable, they are disavowed by the social norms of a particular society, which the individual has internalized through the socialization processes. Disavowed needs are channelled through the unconscious and re-expressed in forms of substitute gratification which are socially, or more precisely, normatively acceptable. Thus linguistically interpreted needs which may be legitimate are suppressed by the normative structures of a society and are excluded from public discussion. The institutional framework of society therefore consists of compulsory norms, which not only sanction needs, but also redirect, transform and suppress them. Hence this form of repression is not direct but rather indirect and occurs through the unconscious structures of the ego. The redirected motives then become forces which dominate the consciousness of men and
indirectly legitimate existing norms. Habermas understands the force of social norms to be analogous to the force of neuroses, in that they function as defence mechanisms which enforce substitute gratification for legitimate needs and desires of men which are screened out of public discussion. This produces rigid and strictly circumscribed forms of behaviour in society. The analogue of this is the repetition compulsion patterns of behaviour in neuroses at the individual level of analysis. In both cases the subjects are under the control of the unconscious and hence are estranged (alienated) from themselves. At the level of society, actors are subject to norms which have become institutionally fixed and opaque. Thus, normative structures are institutions of force and may be seen as distorted communication structures. Therefore force is rooted in a form of distorted communication. This masterful depiction of the concept force is further clarified in terms of Freud's notion of "illusions". Freud calls world-views, ideals and value systems the "mental assets of civilization" or "illusions" which defend civilization from the aggressive and destructive forces of man's instinctual nature which are in conflict with the system of self-preservation. These collective fantasies provide substitute gratification for the renunciation of instinctive drives. Aspects of the illusory structures are developed into rationalizations of the existing social order. These forms of rationalization are not open to public criticism since they are based upon the defense mechanisms of the unconscious and represent distorted forms of communication. Habermas and Freud stress that the illusions are not necessarily false as are delusions. The illusions contain the wishes, desires and hopes of men which may or may not be realizable in a given society at a specific point in time. Illusions harbour utopian content and as Habermas says: "if technological development opens up the objective possibility of reducing socially necessary repression below the level of institutionally demanded repression, this utopian content can be freed from its fusion with the delusory, ideological components of the culture that have been fashioned into legitimations of authority and be converted into a critique of the power structures that have become historically obsolete" (1972:280)

Thus the potential for the replacement of the "affective" basis
of man's "obedience to civilization by a rational one, of providing a rational basis for the precepts of civilization" is indicated (Freud cited in Habermas 1972:280). The aim then for Habermas is the transformation of the institutional frameworks of society which harbour repressive norms. Habermas sees this as the organization of society in terms of "the principle that the validity of every norm of political consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in communication free of domination" (1972:283).

The central question is: How is this critique of power structures to be understood? It is only at the methodological level of analysis that this form of critique can be clarified adequately, Habermas holds. He argues as follows: The empirical analytic sciences entail a process of inquiry which is organized in the transcendental framework of instrumental action such that nature is seen to be an object of knowledge from the viewpoint of possible technical control. The processes of inquiry of the historic-hermeneutic sciences develop in the transcendental framework of communicative action, such that the explication of meaning in society becomes visible from the viewpoint of mutual understanding between unique acting and speaking human beings. These two sciences are held to be methodologically developed forms of everyday life rooted in the life activities of work and communicative action respectively. The concept, knowledge constitutive interest, is employed such that interest mediates, or is the "in-between", connecting identifiable forms of life activities to forms of knowledge which make these activities possible (23). In psychotherapy, the process of inquiry is directly tied to the conditions of the psychotherapeutic dialogue. These are:

1. A pre-requisite for therapy is the patient's interest in freeing himself from alienation. The analogue of therapy at the societal level of analysis is critique.
2. The patient is expected to take responsibility for the distorted communication since it is part of his self.
3. The analyst assumes the role of an active partner in the dialogue. The contemplative stance is hence disavowed. The analogue of the therapeutic dialogue is the communicative action at the societal level of analysis.
4. An essential feature of the dialogue is the Socratic question
and answering process whereby the patient affirms or rejects the interpretation as it progresses.

These conditions are viewed by Habermas as being "transcendental in so far as they establish the meaning of the validity of the psychoanalytic interpretations" (Habermas 1972:287). What he means is that the conditions of the therapeutic dialogue are the conditions which make the psychoanalytic theory possible and place limits on it. At the same time these conditions are "objective insofar as they make possible the factual treatment of pathological phenomena" (Habermas 1972:287). He says that:

"the analytic resolution of distorted communication that determines behavioural compulsion and false consciousness is at once both theory and therapy" (Habermas 1972:287).

Reflection is internal to therapy as a condition for the possibility of emancipation from alienation and as a condition of the kind of theory called psycho-analysis. Through self-reflection, the subject achieves self-enlightenment. Here self-reflection is co-terminus with an interest in knowledge which is at the same time an interest in the emancipation from the force which causes self-estrangement. Habermas holds that the psychoanalytic situation demonstrates the unity between "intuition and emancipation, insight and liberation from dogmatic dependence, and of reason and the interested of employment of reason developed by Fichte in the concept self-reflection." (Habermas 1972:287). In the context of psychoanalysis, self-reflection is no longer the act of the absolute ego, but occurs in the demonstrable life context of communication captured by the dialogue which ensues between therapist and patient and is "forced into being by pathology" (Habermas 1972:287). Habermas goes on to say,

"if we comprehend the cognitive capacity and critical power of reason as deriving from the self-constitution of the human species, under contingent conditions, then it is reason which inheres in interest. Freud encounters this unity of reason and interest in the situation in which the physician's Socratic questioning can aid a sick person's self-reflection only under pathological compulsion and the corresponding interest in abolishing this compulsion" (1972:287 emphasis mine).

He holds that Freud discovers that reason is inherent in
interest in the dialogic situation between patient and therapist. The psychotherapeutic dialogue facilitates self-reflection if the patient has an interest in abolishing the distorted form of communication which dominates his life. Freud also investigates the "pathology" of society as a whole. Institutions of authority and cultural tradition are the historically variable solutions to the conflict between man's "impulse potentials" and the historical "conditions of collective self-preservations" (Habermas 1972:288). Habermas understands these solutions as "pathological" since they derive from the forces which channel the linguistically interpreted needs into substitute forms of gratification. Habermas says in this regard:

"But just as in the clinical situation, so in society, pathological compulsion itself is accompanied by an interest in its abolition." (1972:288)

He likens the societal form of "pathology" to the individual form of pathology arguing that they are both forms of distorted communication. The suffering inherent in these forms of pathology are accompanied by an interest in overcoming suffering through enlightenment. Technological development which results in the reduction of the renunciations imposed by the system of self-preservation enhances the potential for self-reflection, but it is only through the reflective process itself that emancipation can occur. He then says that man's rational interest in the realization of emancipation "inclines" men:

"toward critical-revolutionary but tentative realization of the major illusions of humanity, in which repressed motives have been elaborated into fantasies of hope"

(Habermas 1972:288 emphasis mine)

Behind this cautious depiction lurks the Enlightenment ideals of autonomy and responsibility. Habermas is struggling for a way to express the actualization of emancipation. He does not want to sanction violence of any sort. Individuals decide upon what they consider to be the better or "good" and through dialogue, establish "enlightened" modes of regulating their world. This occurs through the rational mastery of desire which is achieved through ego-strength which is released when the pressure for self-preservation is reduced as the sciences progress. Rigidified forms of life (relations of force and illusion) are undermined by technological progress. These rigidified forms of
life are only "overcome" through the release of a rational potential which is harboured by illusion and the ego strength of men. Habermas holds that man's "interest in self-preservation, proceeds in accordance with the interest of reason" (1972:288). This interest in self-preservation is very carefully spelled out as being directly contingent upon the specific historical forms of life activity rooted in specific historical conditions, namely, the relative development of work, language and power. Thus the interest in self-preservation cannot be simply understood as any form of self-preservation which aims at survival. Under specific cultural conditions the actors interpret what a "good" form of life is. Habermas holds that the notion of a "good life" is determined by what individuals count as a good life. This can neither be an "essence" which holds for all time or a simple convention, but is the result of a specific "fantasy". He holds that the collective fantasies of men are produced in an exact manner such that "they correspond to the fundamental interest in a form of emancipation which is objectively possible under given manipulable conditions" (Habermas 1972:289). The interest in self-preservation takes the form of an interest of reason as long as men sustain their lives through work and communicative action, and are subject to instinctual renunciation. Habermas states that under the, "pathological compulsion of deformed communication, the interest in self-preservation necessarily takes the form of the interest of reason, which only develops through critique and confirms itself through the practical consequences of critique." (Habermas 1972:289 emphasis mine)

Habermas holds that since the reproduction of the species occurs through work and communicative action, the interest in self-preservation is actualized in work and communicative action. The body of knowledge built up by the empirical-analytic and historic-hermeneutic sciences, are rooted in work and interaction through the concept of interest. He then says, that since the interest in self-preservation takes the form of an interest of reason, the knowledge constitutive interests must be rational. Habermas states:

"the knowledge constitutive-interests that determine the conditions of objectivity of the validity of statements are rational themselves, so that the meaning of knowledge and
thus the criterion of its autonomy as well, cannot be accounted for without recourse to a connection with interest in general". (1972:289)

This interest in general is the fundamental emancipatory interest of mankind which is directed at forces of repression and domination. Habermas holds that the sciences are the rational pursuits of men striving for emancipation. Thus for Habermas, the empirical analytic and historic-hermeneutic sciences are the rational attempts of men to emancipate themselves from the forces of nature and the factors which impede open and undistorted forms of communication. The self-generation of the species then, is powered by the dynamic of reflection and the development of the natural sciences. In other words, as the natural sciences progress, through men's attempts to emancipate themselves from the forces of nature, there is an advance in technological knowledge. The renunciations imposed upon men decrease, and through critique, men unmask the normative structures which have become "obsolete". Thus the potential for attempting to actualize the basic ideals of justice, freedom and equality which are contained in the collective fantasies of men at specific historical points in time comes into the foreground. What is actualized, Habermas will not say, since this depends on the specific forms of work and communicative action at specific historical periods. What men count as the "good" is contingent upon the relative development of work and communicative action and the emancipatory interest in general. In this interpretation of the self-generation of the species the concept of freedom is closely connected to the notion of the rational mastery of desire. Men rationally constitute new social structures in their attempts to rid themselves of the shackles of dogmatism encapsulated in cultural tradition, world views, and power structures perpetuating force. This takes the form of rationally re-structuring the normative structures of society on the basis of communicative action and communicative rationality which occurs non-violently through dialogue.

In sum:
Habermas embraces the central premise of the Enlightenment scholars who hold that reason encompasses the will to be rational. This dimension of reason is understood as the will to free the self from dogmatism and domination. The crucial
question for Habermas becomes that of articulating this will to achieve autonomy and responsibility in a non-idealistic fashion. Central to this question are the concepts of reflection and interests. The major flaw in this work, lies in the concept of reflection and its relation to the concept of self-preservation, reason, knowledge and interests. Habermas fuses two logically distinct concepts of reflection in "Knowledge and Human Interests." (Bernstein 1976:209). This results in an ambiguity in his understanding of reflection and self-reflection. The first concept of reflection employed in the work derives from the Kantian understanding of reflection in the sense of reflection on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. What Kant understands by critique must be seen as the process whereby:

"reason can self-reflexively come to grasp the universal and necessary conditions for the very possibility of theoretical knowledge, practical reason and teleological and aesthetic judgement." (Bernstein 1985:12)

Habermas uses the concept of reflection in a similar manner in that he asks after the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. He develops a quasi-trancendental argument through the work of Peirce and Dilthey such that the conditions for the possibility of knowledge are no longer rooted in the transcendentental ego but are understood as the human interests which mediate between forms of human agency (purposive rational and communicative action) and the forms of scientific inquiry. This is the knowledge constitutive sense of reflection central to Habermas' concepts of the empirical-analytic and historic-hermeneutic sciences which incorporate the concepts of instrumental and communicative rationality respectively. The second concept of reflection pertains to critical self-reflection in the sense of freeing the subject from forms of repression or force. Here critique is understood as entailing a concept of reflection in the sense of emancipatory self-reflection. Kant and Fichte also subscribe to this form of reflection when they hold that enlightenment means the achievement of autonomy and responsibility through the use of ones reason. This form of reflection is the emancipatory self-reflective sense in which men employ their reason. Habermas does not clearly distinguish between these two forms of reflection. He fuses these two concepts of reflection in his articulation of the emancipatory
interest such that the knowledge constitutive interests can be called "rational interests". Rationality is then held to inhere in the emancipatory interest which pertains to all three sciences. For Habermas the technical cognitive interest of the empirical-analytic sciences is understood as an interest in emancipation from the forces of nature. The practical cognitive interest of the historic-hermeneutic sciences is an interest in emancipation from the forms of repressive communication structures which impede mutual communication between actors. The "fusion" between the two distinct forms of reflection then is deliberate and essential to the argument. Habermas holds that it is only from the perspective of the emancipatory cognitive interest that the forms of rationality internal to the sciences can be viewed as being central to man's survival and not mere "attitudes" which may be adopted or rejected. The crucial question then becomes whether the fusion between the two concepts of reflection is illicit. The answer is yes in a qualified sense. Firstly, Habermas unites these two concepts of reflection through the concept of self-preservation. He argues that the system of self-preservation serves two functions. Namely: The self-assertion of men against the forces of nature and the organisation of social relationships. At the methodological level of analysis, he invokes self-preservation as an "interest in self-preservation" which he holds takes the form of an interest of reason. He does not explain why the concept of self-preservation becomes an interest in self-preservation. He implies, but does not clearly show, that the emancipatory interest is then co-terminus with the interest in self-preservation. Secondly, he presupposes, and does not adequately explain, the dialogic nature of communicative action required for the emancipatory form of self-reflection. Habermas does not return to the conditions of knowledge and action, theory and practice, at the societal level of analysis to clarify the societal equivalent of the therapeutic discourse. The only indication which he gives of the therapeutic dialogue or critique in the form of emancipation at the level of society is "the principle that the validity of every norm of political consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in communication free of domination" (Habermas 1972:283)

Habermas re-casts Freud and Marx's concepts of civilization and
society into his own framework of communicative action and purposive rational action. He develops a sophisticated argument depicting the institutional framework of society as a distorted communication structure. He displays the concept of force through a re-interpretation of repression and renunciation where needs and motives are linguistically reinterpreted through the normative structures. He indicates that the potential for the rational mastery of desire is released with scientific advance. He invokes the Freudian concept of rationalization in the sense of a defence mechanism, which from Habermas' perspective is a pathological form of rationality in that rationalization in this sense it is a form of distorted communication. He does not spell out just what communicative action and communicative rationality in the non-pathological form at the level of scientific critique entail. He immediately moves to the methodological level of analysis and invokes the conditions of therapeutic dialogue which are the conditions for the possibility of emancipatory self-reflection. He does not clearly show what this then means in terms of norms, consensus formation and communication free of domination. What then is the communicative form of rationality underlying the emancipatory critique? What is the societal equivalent of the therapeutic dialogue? What is the societal equivalent of the Socratic question and answering process which occurs at the psychoanalytic level of analysis? What motivates actors to enter into communicative dialogue such that the "precepts" of society can be established in a rational manner? I hold that these are the questions which Habermas attempts to answer in his subsequent work. In "Knowledge and Human Interests" Habermas provides numerous indicators such as the suffering which occurs at both levels of analysis, the illusions which harbour the emancipatory ideals of autonomy and responsibility but this is hardly an adequate answer to the questions asked above. Habermas is certainly not advocating some sort of mass psychotherapy. The psychoanalytic model of emancipatory dialogue is a heuristic device at the methodological level of analysis which he uses in his efforts to break through the difficulties associated with the concept of reflection and its relation to rationality, interest, knowledge and human agency. These difficulties are displayed in the context of the critiques of the Kantian, Fichtean and Hegelian concepts of reason and Marx's
reduction of reflection to the paradigm of production. The entire endeavour of showing that rationality is not a mere "attitude", which actors adopt or reject, rests on the argument that reason inheres in interest. The crucial point is reached where Habermas argues that Freud discovers this unity between interest and rationality in the Socratic question and answering process in therapeutic dialogue. Habermas does not however, explain what the analogue of this process is at the societal level of analysis. He avoids this question through a cautious argument which stresses that emancipation is contingent upon historically specific levels of work (purposive rational action), communicative action and the potential for the rational mastery of desire. Thus Habermas is not able to substantiate his thesis that reason inheres in interest at the societal level of analysis. His emancipatory cognitive interest is trapped in a philosophy of reflection at a methodological level of analysis circumscribed by a concept of reflection deriving from psychotherapy. Numerous scholars have reacted in various ways to the manner in which Habermas employs the concept of reflection in "Knowledge and Human Interests" (24). Habermas also comments on the difficulties surrounding the concept of reflection as soon as the work is published. He responds to this issue by distinguishing between self-reflection in the sense of critique and self-reflection in the sense of universally oriented rational reconstruction. This develops the context of an extensive and detailed study of the genetic epistemology, linguistics, argumentation theory, Marxism, phenomenology and Arendt's view of communicative judgement. Habermas hereby extends the rationality problematic. I analyse this process in the next chapter.
4. COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY, LIFE-WORLD AND JUDGEMENT

4.1 Introduction

Albrecht Wellmer names Habermas' work subsequent to "Knowledge and Human Interests", the "linguistic turn in critical theory" (1977:231). This "linguistic turn" can be seen as a change in focus from the philosophy of consciousness, in terms of which the concept of rationality is articulated, to the philosophy of language as the new medium through which the concept rationality is further clarified. Influenced by the work of Chomsky, Austin and Searle in linguistics and speech act theory respectively, Habermas develops a theory which he calls "Universal Pragmatics". "Universal Pragmatics" is an inquiry into the foundations of the "communicative competence" of acting and speaking individuals in general. Behind these theories expressed in a highly abstract series of studies in genetic epistemology, linguistics, and the argumentation theory of Toulmin and Klein lie two related questions. Firstly, Habermas asks in the language of genetic epistemology and the "modes of production" developed by Marx, after the evolution of mankind and the forms of society central to the history of man (1). He masterfully weaves together speech act theory, aspects of Piaget's genetic epistemology and Dobert and Oevermann's studies on the evolution of religion, world views and identity formation. He investigates the homologies between ego identity, group identity and the evolution of world views. Secondly, Habermas asks the specific question of how intersubjective understanding and communicative action occurs and to what extent this can be shown to be a rational process. He names this endeavour "science as rational reconstruction" (Habermas 1974:22). Before I clarify the concepts I mentioned above, I want to provide a perspective from which this abstract work of the past fifteen years can be viewed.

In 4.2 The Perspective of Communicative Action, Judgement and The Life-World, I discuss aspects of Arendt's work which Habermas says are fundamental to his concepts of communicative action and communicative rationality. Namely, her concepts of judgement and action comprising three elements:

1. Plurality as essential to the concept of subjectivity.
2. Language as a medium for the co-ordinating of action.
3. Natality as revealing the free will of actors. Habermas views Arendt's study of Kant's "Critique of Judgement" as the first "approach to the concept of communicative rationality" (Habermas 1980:130). I deal with the three aspects of the concept of action deriving from the Arendt's work. Then I outline Habermas' view of the life-world which is based upon the work of Alfred Schutz. Thereafter I briefly discuss aspects of Arendt's interpretation of judgement and clarify its relation to the concepts of meaning and understanding.

In 4.3 The Foundations of Critical Theory, I clarify Habermas' concepts of critique, reflection and science as rational reconstruction. I briefly sketch the basic elements of the theory of "Universal Pragmatics". I then outline the concept of rationality in relation to the theory of "Universal Pragmatics", Judgement and the Life-World. I show how Habermas grounds his concept of communicative rationality in communicative Judgement.

In 4.4 Rationalization as Reification, Habermas' critique of the work Adorno and Horkheimer on Instrumental Reason is briefly addressed.

My reason for proceeding from the Life-world and Judgement to the abstract theory of "Universal Pragmatics" is that the former is a perspective from which the abstract studies can be viewed. When this perspective is not in focus, the theory of "Universal Pragmatics" seems to reflect a turn away from the work presented in the previous chapters of this study. One of the prevalent misconceptions which characterizes the secondary literature on Habermas' work, is that Habermas is pre-occupied with abstract theory and the attempts to unite theory and praxis, which is an important theme of the early work, has faded into the background. A vast body of secondary literature has now built up around various aspects of Habermas' work. This has resulted in a dense thicket of abstract analysis and critique, such that the impetus behind the "linguistic turn" is obscured. Habermas is partly to blame for this as he has published his extensive investigations into linguistics, cognitive/moral development, systems theory, identity formation, and studies on Parsons, Adorno and Horkheimer as separate papers. The overall picture of what he is attempting to achieve is thus obscured. I view the discussion of the life-world and judgement as a bridge between the earlier work and the most recent development of the concept.
rationality. The Perspective of Communicative Action, Judgement and Life-World is one way of locating the impetus behind the abstract investigations published thus far. Habermas does not clearly spell out what he means by the concept of the life-world in the first volume of "The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society" (1984), but he relies on it in his discussion of the concept rationality. In the second volume of this vast study, "The theory of Communicative Action: The Critique of Functionalist Reason" (1987), the concept of the life-world is integrated with the work of Mead, Durkheim and Arendt. The central concept, the life-world, and its import to critical theory and the concept of rationality, is overlaid with extensive detail deriving from the work of these scholars respectively. By discussing the insights gleaned from Arendt and Schutz in isolation, the links between the linguistic theory and the reformulated concept of rationality and rationalization processes can be shown more clearly. The feature which characterizes Habermas' discussion of other scholars' work is that his approach is not that of pure exegesis. His own concepts are tightly interwoven with those of the scholars which he discusses. This is particularly evident in his approach to the work of Peirce, Dilthey, Marx, Freud, Piaget, Adorno, Horkheimer, Schutz and Arendt.

4.2 The Perspective of Communicative Action, Judgement and Life-World

In an address which he presents at the New School of Social Research entitled, "On The German-Jewish Heritage", Habermas spells out his debt to Hannah Arendt and Alfred Schutz (1980). He notes that as a student he learned the most from these two scholars and that he continues to learn from their work. Habermas discusses "three achievements of fundamental importance" stemming from the work of Arendt and Schutz (1980:128). Namely:
1. "The reconstruction of an Aristotelian concept of "praxis" for political theory" (Habermas 1980:128).
2. The "rediscovery of Kant's analysis of Urteilskraft or Judgement for a theory of rationality" (Habermas 1980:128).
3. The "introduction of an Husserlian concept of "life-world" into social theory" (Habermas 1980:128).
Habermas counters the prevalent misconception that the work of Hannah Arendt is outdated or insignificant to critical theory. He says that he "learned from Hannah Arendt how to approach the theory of communicative action; what I cannot see, is that this approach should be in contradiction to a critical theory of society. I rather see in it a sharp analytical instrument for saving the Marxist tradition from its own productivist aberrations."(Habermas emphasis mine 1980:129)

Habermas regards Arendt's intent in "The Human Condition" as a systematic analysis of the concept of action ("praxis") which obviates the reduction of practical action to instrumental or strategic action. He outlines three important dimensions of her concept of action, which I regard as central to his view of communicative rationality. Namely, her stress upon human plurality, the symbolic nature of the web of human relationships and human natality. I deal with each dimension in turn.

4.2.1 Plurality as Central to the Concept of Subjectivity

Habermas says of Arendt's concept of plurality:
"plurality concentrates on intersubjectivity of acting in concert, where the multiple perspectives of participants who occupy inevitably different standpoints, are reciprocally connected. The unifying power of intersubjectivity preserves the plurality of individual perspectives; even in the case of violent repression intersubjectivity cannot be replaced by a higher order of subjectivity."(1980:128 emphasis mine)

The concept of plurality is implicit in Habermas' critique of Dilthey's view of understanding and is the ground upon which the concept of practical rationality stands in the earlier work, as I point out in chapter three. In the context of the address, Habermas explicitly draws attention to the concept of plurality. He holds that a concept of subjectivity which incorporates the concept of plurality enables one to account for the multiplicity of individual perspectives which are intersubjectively united when actors attempt to co-ordinate their activities. This particular concept of subjectivity is fundamental to Habermas' concepts of communicative action and communicative rationality.

4.2.2 Language as a Medium for Co-ordinating Action

Habermas reads Arendt's articulation of the "web of human
relations" as operating through "language as the mechanism for co-ordinating the concert of different actions" (1980:128 emphasis in text). He explains:

"In communication, individuals appear as unique beings; at the same time they must recognize one another as finally equal in their responsibility, that is in their capacity to say "Yes" and "No". As long as people talk to each other with the intention of reaching a consensus the very idea of a common understanding, built into speech, grounds claims for a radical equality which might be suspended for the time being but not stifled forever." (1980:128)

In this condensed citation, Habermas is integrating Arendt's view of judgement with his view of communicative action which aims at understanding and consensus formation, as I indicate in chapter three, in the work on the historic-hermeneutic sciences. In the context of the address, Habermas is fusing the concept of communicative understanding developed thus far, with aspects of Arendt's view of judgement. Namely, the concepts of responsibility, equality and the "Yes/No" response of the judging communicative actor. When Arendt speaks of the web of human relationships in the "Human Condition", the concept of judgement is not used in this manner. It is developed in this sense in her "Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy" (1970). When the concept judgement is briefly mentioned in the "Human Condition", it is invoked in relation to the concepts of man and not in terms of the web of relationships (1958). Arendt stresses the revelatory character of the web of relationships in the "Human Condition". Namely, the revelation of "who" one is through one's speech and action. Here the concept of plurality is thematic and not the concept of judgement. It is thus necessary to retrieve Arendt's view of judgement and its relation to the understanding process, in order to:

1. Clarify her view of judgement which Habermas appropriates.
2. Clarify what Habermas means by: individuals are equal in their capacity to say "Yes and No" and how this is related to responsibility and equality.

These aspects of communicative action permeate the fabric of Habermas' "The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society" (1984) and are internal to the concept of communicative rationality. I first want to indicate
the last aspect in this important sequence of argument and then move on to the concept of the life-world before I clarify the interpretation of judgement in isolation.

4.2.3 Natality as revealing the free will of actors

Habermas points out that the third feature of Arendt's concept of action, natality, focuses upon the actors free will. He says that for Arendt,

"The birth of every individual is the promise of a new beginning; to act means to be able to seize an initiative and to do the unanticipated. It is this innovative potential which makes the domain of praxis vulnerable and dependent on protective institutions. Only when they originate through the power of common convictions of those who act in concert, these institutions take the form of a constitution of liberty: and liberty can be maintained only as long as political institutions in turn protect that source of unimpaired intersubjectivity from which a communicatively generated power springs" (1980:128)

In this citation Habermas is making a number of important connections. Firstly, he indicates that the concept of power is located in the realm of communicative action (praxis) and not in the realm of social labour (praxis) as Marx thought. The realm of work for Habermas is the locus of instrumental rationality. Man with his monological knowledge, the empirical analytic sciences, is clearly separated from the concept of man the speaker with his dialogical form of knowledge, the historic-hermeneutic sciences. These distinctions can also be clarified in terms of the concept of subjectivity. The realm of subject-object (external nature) relations is understood by Habermas to entail instrumental rationality such that nature is brought under the control of men. Men free themselves from the arbitrary forces of nature (eg a malaria epidemic) and ensure species survival through the development of a body of knowledge which is constituted through the interest in technical control and purposive-rational or instrumental action. The subject-subject relations of men communicating with men through speech and actions, are understood to exhibit communicative rationality orientated toward mutual understanding. In so far as men act strategically, they employ a means-ends kind of rationality which in Habermas' view means
instrumental, or more precisely, the strategic rationality of social action. Here men view others as objects, and communication, directed towards mutual understanding, does not occur. In the context of the address, Habermas is pointing out a concept of power which is integral to his concept of communicative rationality. The focus falls upon communicative action and understanding. Habermas locates power in the realm of communicative action and explains that power and intersubjectivity are closely related. He holds that liberty can only be maintained by institutions which "protect" its "source". Namely, the mutual, non-repressive, modes of understanding between subjects captured by the phrase "unimpaired intersubjectivity", through which power is communicatively generated. Thus the concepts of power, intersubjectivity and liberty are all located in the realm of communicative action and can be viewed as a modern version of man's free will. Habermas embraces this aspect of Arendt's view of natality. This is central to the entire shift in orientation from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language. Habermas can now argue that if language is a universal phenomenon of mankind, and universal modes of understanding and reaching consensus are rooted in language itself, then the potential for the formation of "more just" institutions can be based upon praxis as a communicative rather than making process. The rationalization of the realm of communicative action can then be positively depicted as the extent to which the source of unimpaired intersubjectivity is institutionalized. Habermas is very cautious in this regard in that he does not simply want to point toward a rationally organized utopian "never-never land". He indicates the potential for rationalization in this sense.

In Habermas' recent debate with Anthony Giddens he marshals the specific concept of power, indicated in the address, to counter Giddens' objection to the location of the concept of power in the realm of communicative action (praxis). Habermas' answer to Giddens makes sense from the perspective of the address. He explains that he agrees with Arendt in that "communicatively shared convictions" are the source of legitimate power and that the "communicative practice of everyday life in the life-world as a generator of power that is acknowledged without coercion" (1982:269). The basic issue of locating the
The concept of power in the realm of communicative action is the crucial point in this context. The nub of the matter is that this is the first explicit indication that for Habermas power is something which is communicatively "formed" through communicative action (2).

The second important aspect of this citation is that Habermas is also locating the concept autonomy in the realm of communicative action through the concept of intersubjectivity. He names this the "constitution of liberty" which occurs through the "protection" of the unimpaired intersubjectivity of communicative action.

In sum:

With regard to the achievements of Arendt, Habermas focuses on the issues central to the tradition of the Enlightenment. Namely, the concepts of responsibility, "radical equality" and the free will of men. These concepts are no longer argued for through the labyrinths of the philosophy of reflection which mark his "Knowledge and Human Interests". They are stated simply as being aspects of intersubjectivity and communicative action and are entailed in the catch phrase: "normative perspective of unimpaired intersubjectivity" (1980:130). Language is stated as the "mechanism" through which communicative actions are co-ordinated. An important premise is that men/women's capacity for judgement as a communicative actor is held to be internal to the realm of "unimpaired intersubjectivity". Habermas holds that "as long as people talk to each other with the intention of reaching a consensus" which is the aim of communicative action, claims to equality, cannot he repressed forever (1980:128). Here he is very simply invoking men/women's "intent" in communicative action. He writes

"Again and again this claim [to reason] is silenced, and yet in fantasies and deeds it develops a stubbornly transcending power, because it is renewed with each act of unconstrained understanding, with each moment of living together in solidarity, of sucessful individuation, and of saving emancipation." (Habermas 1982:221)

The practical intent of communicative action, of reaching a consensus, holds for Habermas a claim to the Enlightenment concept of reason. The Enlightenment's ideals of autonomy, equality and responsibility are internal to the concept of
unimpaired intersubjectivity. The concept of the life-world and its relation to the concept of unimpaired intersubjectivity will now be briefly discussed.

4.2.4 The Life-World and Unimpaired Intersubjectivity

Habermas says that Arendt is interested in the "normative question" of how the space of appearance "should be institutionalised as a public domain" (1980:129). He holds that Schutz is the social scientist who focuses on the "descriptive question" of how the "space of appearance", now equated with the "horizon of everyday life", actually works (1980:129). Habermas points out that Schutz spent a lifetime wrestling with the problem of adequately analysing the life-world, the "taken for granted". For Schutz the life-world is "conceived as the unexamined ground of everyday praxis", Habermas argues (1980:129) Seen through the lens of Habermas' concept of communicative action, the concept of the life-world is described as follows:

"In communicative action participants can co-ordinate their different plans only on condition that they reach a common definition of the situation with which they have to cope. They offer different interpretations and try to come to an agreement. In these interpretive achievements each actor draws from a common stock of knowledge which is provided by the cultural tradition shared with others. It is this background knowledge which represents the context of the life-world, and in which any communicative action is embedded. Now the crucial question is: in what sense are we entitled to consider these background assumptions and practices of everyday communication to be knowledge?" (Habermas 1980:129)

Habermas points out that there are two important aspects of the life-world and the communicative action which is embedded in it. On the one hand, from the perspective of communicative actors, the life-world is understood as the body of background knowledge which functions at the level of implicit self-evidence. This implicit form of knowledge is taken for granted and accepted without question or validation processes in the daily activities of men who act in concert. On the other hand, one of the essential features of knowledge is that it
maintains an internal relationship to validity-claims and criticism that it thus can become problematic, those very background assumptions do not have this basic property of knowledge. What is beyond any doubt appears as if it never could become problematic; it can only break down." (1980:129)

What Habermas is attempting to do is to highlight the paradoxical nature of the life-world. On the one hand, background knowledge which one employs in daily life, functions in the form of self-evidence or implicit "know-how" and is paradigmatic for what one "knows with certainty" (Habermas 1980:129). On the other hand this domain of self-evidence can not be characterised as "true knowledge" because its specific form of "certainty" is prevented from even entering the domain where its validity is intentionally questioned, and consciously accepted or rejected. Habermas explains that it is only under the contingent pressure of a "problematical" situation, that relevant pieces of background knowledge come into the foreground and are consciously questioned and open to dispute. He illustrates the relation between the taken for granted and a "problematical" situation when says: "Only an earthquake makes us aware of what we all the time took for granted about the safety of the ground" (1980:130). Habermas emphasises the "elemental" nature of the process whereby aspects of the taken for granted are released from the realm of the implicit background knowledge into the realm of the foreground where knowledge claims are explicitly expressed and questioned. He points out that the whole life-world is not thematic when one particular, objective problem forces the taken for granted out of its encapsulation in the cultural traditions, social institutions, skills and competences. Background-knowledge only becomes known explicitly when "piece by piece" it is released into the foreground and is converted into the "semantic contents of the speech of those who act in concert." (Habermas 1980:130).

Habermas holds that there are important methodological consequences which follow from the paradoxical nature of the life-world. He elaborates saying that cultural tradition, social integration and socialization processes are three different aspects of the "symbolic reproduction of the life-world which is channelled through the medium of communicative action" (Habermas 1980:130). For Habermas the life-world consists of cultural
tradition, norms, subjective experiences, and individual skills. He indicates that not only culture but also the institutional orders and personality structures are basic components of the life-world. These phenomena are constituted through the communicative actions of social subjects. Habermas points out that in dealing with the question of the symbolic reproduction of the life-world, social scientists are faced with the task of dealing with the taken for granted. He holds that one method of inquiry into the taken for granted, is that of rational reconstruction, which is mainly practiced by philosophers. He notes that rational reconstruction is the attempt to reconstruct the "pre-theoretical, implicit know-how, of competent subjects" (Habermas 1980:130). Schutz notes that the social scientist has to "make empirical use of the philosophical method" (Habermas 1980:130). What Schutz does not realize, Habermas argues, is that access to the life-world is not simply contingent upon the social scientists choice of method or attitude toward the object domain. The realm of the taken for granted is not at the disposal of the social scientist since he is located within it himself. Hence he is also subject to the pre-scientific, taken for granted knowledge of which he is not aware. Access to this realm, for Habermas, is contingent upon the objective threats to the symbolic reproduction of this sphere. He argues that since the symbolic reproduction of the life world depends on communicative action, today there is an objective threat to the symbolic reproduction of the life-world. Hence social scientists do have access to the life-world. He states his position in this regard as follows:

"Today there is such a threat; it stems from the ever more pervasive process of commodification and bureaucratization, from the increasing autonomy of the economic and administrative subsystems which confront the life-world with imperatives of instrumental rationality, and thereby not only undermine traditional forms of life but impinge on the very communicative infrastructure of these spheres where men still have to act in concert." (1980:130)

This is a new version of the "urbanization" of the institutional framework of society by instrumental reason which comes to the fore in the early essay "Science and technology as Ideology" which I discuss in chapter two. In the earlier work, Habermas
argues that sub-systems of purposive rational action permeate the life-world, which is invoked, but not clarified beyond the brief statement that it is part of the "institutional framework" of society. This vague concept of the life-world informs his early work. The crucial point which Habermas makes in this condensed and important discussion of the fundamental achievements of Arendt and Schutz, and which I hold has not been realised by his critics and commentators to date, is as follows:

"I do not think though that we can succeed in analysing the reification of the life-world, which is so visible today, unless we rely on a normative perspective originating from within it. In contrast to A. Schutz, H. Arendt did have such a perspective with the idea of an unimpaired intersubjectivity." (1980:130 emphasis mine.)

Habermas then immediately invokes Arendt's intention to come to terms with the faculty of judgement. He says:

"She intended to explain that faculty of Urteilskraft or judgement which she regarded as the core of rational orientations in Vita Activa. H. Arendt wanted to elaborate the moral and political implications of that specific "enlargement of mind" which according to Kant enabled men to judge. It is accomplished by "comparing our judgements with the possible rather than the actual judgements of others, and putting ourselves in the place of any other man...Critical thinking makes the others present and thus moves potentiality into a space which is public, open to all sides" [Arendt cited in Habermas 1980:130]. "This is a first approach to a concept of communicative rationality which is built into speech and action."

(Habermas 1980:130 emphasis mine).

Habermas draws a comparison between the work of Arendt and George Herbert Mead in this context. He holds that Arendt's interpretation of Kant's "Critique of Judgement" and that Mead's interpretation of Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason" converge "in a project of an ethics of communication which connects practical reason to the idea of a universal discourse"

(Habermas 1980:131)

This is Habermas' endeavour. For Habermas, the link between theoretical and practical reason is judgement. Once this perspective is in view, the theory of Universal Pragmatics and
communicative competence can be seen in a new light. The decisive questions pertaining to the validation of this hypothesis are: How is man's capacity for judgement related to the concept of communicative rationality? What is the function of judgement in Habermas' theory of communicative action and rationality? I hold that the theory of Universal Pragmatics serves as the basic criterion in terms of which men judge for Habermas. Habermas may be seen to be asking: What are the conditions for the possibility of rational modes of judgement? How does man's capacity for judgement develop at the level of the evolution of mankind? These are the questions underlying his investigations into speech act theory which culminate in what he calls the communicative "competencies of actors". I deal with Arendt's interpretation of judgement first and then outline the basic concepts of "Universal Pragmatics" and "communicative competence". I then show how Habermas' theory of Universal Pragmatics and the concept of judgement are related. I hold that it is only from the viewpoint of what I name, The Perspective of Communicative Action, Judgement and Life-World, that these connections can be made. Arendt's interpretation of man's capacity for judgement, and its relation to the theories of Universal Pragmatics and Communicative Competence, is not discussed in the secondary literature on Habermas' work, as far as I am aware. I aim to make the relationship between this aspect of Arendt's work and theory of Universal Pragmatics explicit. At the same time, the concepts of communicative action and communicative rationality are further clarified.

4.2.5 Judgement, Understanding and Meaning in the work of Arendt

According to Ronald Beiner, the editor of the "Kant Lectures", there are two distinct versions of Arendt's interpretation of the "Critique of Judgement" (1982: viii). Namely, judgement from the viewpoint of a life of action (vita activa) and judgement from the viewpoint of a life of contemplation (vita contemplativa). I do not accept the latter version. Habermas would also reject the latter interpretation since he retrieves her view of judgement from the Life of Mind (vita contemplativa), and the lectures on Kant, and calls it the "core of rational orientations in the Vita Activa" (Habermas 1980:130). Given Habermas' rejection of the
contemplative stance toward theory as I indicate in chapter three, his interpretation of judgement as the "rational core" of a life of action is understandable. I discuss the aspects of Arendt's interpretation of Kant’s view of judgement which I hold are important to Habermas' endeavour in the rationality problematic. The important aspects are the relationship between judgement, understanding, meaning, reflection and what I name the "Yes/No" aspect of judgement (3).

4.2.5.1 Communicative Judgement, Understanding and Meaning

Ronald Beiner clarifies the relationship between judgement, meaning and understanding in Arendt's work. He points out that for Arendt, understanding is the process whereby men come to reconcile themselves with the world in which they live. Arendt holds that "the result of understanding is meaning" which is generated through the process of living and reconciling oneself to ones actions and sufferings (Arendt cited in Beiner 1982:94). This activity becomes problematical in a century in which totalitarianism comes to the fore. Beiner cites Arendt as follows:

"But confronted with the horror of totalitarianism, we suddenly discover the fact that we have lost our tools of understanding. Our quest for meaning is at the same time prompted and frustrated by our inability to originate meaning." (Arendt cited in Beiner 1982:94)

Arendt is referring to the horrors of the Nazi era which she lived through. She was requested to report on the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961. She views Eichmann as an example of a man whose capacity for thought and judgement had atrophied since he was unable to distinguish between good and evil. This prompted her to develop an extensive investigation into the question of judgement. She comes to the conclusion that Eichmann cannot be dismissed as a "subhuman creature" as Jaspers thought. She holds that judgement can only function where those judged are neither "beasts or angels" but men who live and act in society. (Arendt cited in Beiner 1982:96). She states the epigraph of modernity as follows:
"no one has the right to judge somebody else. What public opinion permits us to judge and even to condemn are trends, or whole groups of people - the larger the better - in short, something so general that distinctions can no longer be made, names no longer named. Thus we find, for instance a flourishing of theories of collective guilt or collective innocence of entire peoples. All these cliches have in common that they make judgement superfluous and that to utter them is devoid of all risk. This goes with the reluctance everywhere to make judgements in terms of individual moral responsibility." (Arendt 1982:99)

The atrophy of man's capacity for judgement is precisely what made Eichmann's activities possible in the first place, she argues. Arendt views the crisis of totalitarianism as a crisis in understanding which is co-terminus with a crisis in judgement. Judgement and understanding are held to be so closely related that "one must describe both as the subsumption of something particular under a general rule" (Arendt cited in Beiner 1982:95). The basic issue for Arendt is that there are no general rules in terms of which one can take ones bearings. In a manner similar to Max Weber, she describes a disenchanted world in which traditional norms and values have become empty and man's basic common sense seems to have atrophied. She holds that under conditions such as these, when the sources of meaning appear to have dried up, judgement comes into its own. She invokes Augustine's concept of natality, and explains that Augustine, when confronted with a similar crisis of meaning, discovered the hope of a new beginning. The essence of action then becomes that of making a new beginning and understanding for Arendt becomes the

"other side of action, namely that form of cognition, in distinction from many others, by which acting men (and not men who are engaged in contemplating some progressive or doomed course of history) eventually can come to terms with what irrevocably happened and can be reconciled with what unavoidably exists." (1982:96 emphasis mine)

Judgement comes into its own since the understanding process is intimately related to man's capacity for imagination. Through the creative potential of the imagination men are able to distance themselves from those facts which are close at hand and provide
the space in which understanding can function. Imagination allows for both proximity and distance so that judgements can be made. For Arendt the imagination prepares the particular for the "operation of reflection" which "is the actual activity of judging something" (Arendt 1982:68). Thus the particular is made immediately present to one's inner sense so that it can be judged. The "example", in the "Critique of Judgement", fulfils a similar function to the "schema" in Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason". Arendt develops a communicative interpretation of Kant's work to explain the function of the "example" in the judging process. She proceeds as follows: Kant's greatest discovery is the role the imagination plays in the cognitive faculties of man. His basic premise is that the faculty of imagination "provides schemata for cognition and examples for judgement" (Arendt 1982:80). For Kant, there are two aspects of experience and knowledge. Namely intuition (sensibility) and concepts (understanding). Arendt explains that the "intuition always gives us something particular; the concept makes this particular known to us" (Arendt 1982:80). For example, if one says "this book", it is as though the intuition says "this" and the understanding adds "book". The "this" pertains to a specific entity or item, while "book" identifies the item and makes the object communicable. Arendt asks: How do the two faculties come together? Kant's answer is that the synthesis of the manifold occurs through the imagination which unites the elements into a certain content. This synthetic unity occurs through the image or "schema" which the imagination provides "for the concept". Thus, for Kant, the imagination is the "faculty of synthesis in general" (Arendt 1982:81). Arendt holds that without the "schema", one would not be able to recognize anything in the manifold of things since everything would be a "this". The important aspect which she wants to stress is that particulars are communicable. She asks, what makes particulars communicable? The answer is that in perceiving a particular entity everyone has a schema of the entity in their "mind's eye" as it were. This schema is then characteristic of many particulars. The schemata which each person holds are the products of the synthetic imagination. No schema can be brought to the fore in and of itself. All agreement and disagreements must then pre-suppose that the communicators are speaking about the same thing, such
that we who are many, come "together on something that is the same for all" (Arendt 1982:83). This interpretation of Kant's work in a communicative frame of reference is extended in the analysis of reflective judgement, as follows: Arendt highlights the fact that determinate judgements subsume a particular under a general rule, while reflective judgement in contrast, "derives the rule from the particular" (1982:83). Through the schema, one perceives a universal in the particular, Arendt argues. Through the example, in reflective judgement one rises from the particular to the universal. This requires an enlargement of mind or as Arendt puts it an "enlarged mentality." Exemplary validity is achieved through the appropriate choice of the example. Arendt asks after the standards of the operation of reflection, and Kant's answer, she points out, is that of "approbation and disapprobation" (Arendt 1982:69). In other words the formal declaration of approval or disapproval, the "Yes/ No" response of the subject. The criterion of judgement is its communicability and the standard of judgement is common sense. Arendt follows Kant in her understanding of common sense as "community sense". This community sense is never private since one judges as a member of a community. This requires an "enlarged mentality" whereby one's imagination and representative thinking enables one to "think in the place of everybody else", Arendt argues (1982:69). Judgements are made public. Through a process of "wooing" the consent of others, one strives for an agreement or validation through public debate.

In sum:
Judgements come into their own under conditions of crisis. Through the creative ability of the imagination one is able to raise the particular to the anticipated universal or general opinion of mankind and say "Yes" or "No" to the opinion expressed. The formal declaration of approval is validated to the extent to which it can be publicly discussed and argued for, through presenting reasons for the "Yes/No" response to the example. One can only "woo" or "court" the agreement of others, Arendt argues. Here understanding and judgement are co-terminus and one creates meaning in a utilitarian world. Arendt holds that without judgment in terms of which the world is rendered intelligible,
"the space of appearance would simply collapse. For it is by constantly pronouncing judgements that we are able to make sense of the world and ourselves. If we forfeited our faculty of judgement, through love or diffidence, we would be sure to lose our bearings in the world" (Arendt 1982:101)

The power of judgement for Arendt is grounded on the potential agreement between communicators. The dialogue, central to reflective judgment, is understood as an anticipated communication with others with whom one must ultimately come to an agreement. Opinion and judgement are held to be the most important rational faculties of man which have been neglected in philosophical and political thought, she notes. Habermas refines these ideas into a formal understanding of communicative ethics. These schematic aspects of Arendt's work can be seen to inform his approach to modernity and the question of communicative rationality. I address the manner in which Habermas re-formulates the concept of rationality now that the Perspective of Action, Judgement and Life-World are in focus.

4.3 The Foundations of Critical Theory

4.3.1 Critique, Reflection and Science as Rational Reconstruction

In response to Rudiger Bubner's critique of the concepts of reflection in "Knowledge and Human Interests", Habermas distinguishes between:

"self-reflection in the sense of critique and self-reflection in the sense of universalistically orientated rational reconstruction. (1982:229)

"Universalistically orientated rational reconstructions", pertain to the reflection upon universal and anonymous systems of rules which are implicit or pre-supposed to be operative in the daily activities of men, Habermas explains. The reconstructive sciences explicate the implicit "know-how" or "deep structures" which are the conditions for the possibility of life activities. In contrast to transcendental philosophy, the reconstructive sciences are based on the premise that the anonymous rule systems are not a-historical, but evolve in the vertical and horizontal direction in the self-formative processes of the human species.
The self-formative processes are understood as learning processes which develop in the evolution of mankind. The reconstructive sciences as the investigation into the possibility of universal rules below surface structures, is the interest domain of numerous social scientists. Scholars such as Von Humboldt, Chomsky, Levi-Strauss and Piaget hold that there are universals, or more princely deep structures underlying linguistic, cultural and cognitive phenomena, respectively. Habermas orientates himself to these sciences. He indicates that rational reconstruction is different in kind from the transcendental orientation of Apel where the experience and logical deduction are clearly separated. Habermas holds that Piaget and Chomsky in contrast to Apel, demonstrate that there is a close relation between formal and empirical analysis. He notes that if one renounces the idea of a transcendental subject, constitutive of knowledge, it is more appropriate to speak of deep and surface structures. This is the sense in which the systems of rules are understood. Habermas defines rational reconstruction as follows:

"Rational reconstructions... deal with anonymous rule systems which any subjects whatsoever can comply with insofar as they have acquired the corresponding competence with respect to these rules" (1971:23)

The role competence is understood as a developmental learning process which subjects acquire as they mature at the individual level of analysis and develop collectively on the societal level of analysis. Habermas embarks upon an extensive and complex research programme of science as rational reconstruction on three levels of analysis. Influenced by the work of Ryle, Chomsky, Piaget, Strawson, Austin, Searle, Frege and Alston, Habermas develops a general theory of communicative action in linguistic terms named Universal Pragmatics. Universal Pragmatics aims at explicating the "universal conditions of possible understanding" (Habermas 1972:1976). The theory of Universal Pragmatics serves as a foundation upon which the next level of analysis, a general theory of socialization, stands. This is understood as the investigation into the acquisition of "communicative competence" at the level of ego and moral development. Once again the work of Piaget is thematic. Piaget and Kohlberg, the substantive scholars of genetic epistemology and moral development, are interpreted in terms of the notion of "unimpaired
intersubjectivity" in the theory of communicative competence. In "Knowledge and Human Interests", Habermas relied on a concept of ego strength as a counterpart to the progress in the empirical analytical sciences. He argued that as the sciences advance, surplus repression is potentially reduced, and if the ego is strong, the potential for the rational constitution of normative structures is released. Through the critique of oppressive norms and traditions, men attempt to actualise the ideals of justice, freedom, equality and happiness. This normative aspect of reflective critique is indicated in the early work but is not clarified beyond the level of suggestion. In the theory of communicative competence, Habermas sets out to clarify this normative basis of critical theory. He holds that if reflection as critique

"accepts as its task the explanation of a systematically distorted communication, then it must have mastery of the idea of undistorted communication" (Habermas 1980:328).

Thus reflection in the sense of critique is orientated towards unmasking distorted forms of communication. Reflection as rational reconstruction aims at clarifying the normative foundation to which reflection as critique appeals in this process. Habermas points out that if the ideal of undistorted identity formation and moral development can be rationally reconstructed, this

"normative content can then be incorporated in the empirical theories and the proposed reconstruction of this content can be opened up to indirect testing "(1979:73).

He holds that moral development and identity formation encompass their own "inner logic" which is not reducible to the logic of the paradigm of production as Marx thought. At this level of analysis rational reconstruction asks after the conditions for the possibility of unimpaired intersubjectivity. The work of Piaget, Kohlberg and Ryle is appropriated from this perspective of unimpaired intersubjectivity. The third level of analysis is that of a reconstruction of historical materialism as a theory of social evolution. Habermas makes a startling claim in this context that rational reconstruction means

"taking a theory apart and then putting it back together again in a new form in order to attain more fully the goal which it has set for itself" (1979:96).
What this amounts to is a description of the "homologies" which pertain between ego development and the evolution of world-views; "homologies" between ego identity and "social-identity". The guiding thread in this analysis is the question of intersubjective understanding. Social evolution is described as a learning process which occurs through the underlying rules of competence in two dimensions. Namely the cognitive/technical and the moral/practical forms of rationality which are embodied in institutions and social structures pertaining to these spheres. The goal which Marx set himself was that of explicating the dynamic of change. Habermas indicates quite clearly that he is merely describing a possible research strategy through the use of homologous sets of information. This investigation is limited to the developmental logic of normative structures which are described. The dynamics of social change in Marx's sense is not dealt with. The definition of rational reconstruction in this case is then defective since it does not "attain the goal which it has set for itself" (Habermas 1976:96).

The key to the extensive and complex sets of rational reconstructions is the theory of Universal Pragmatics. For Habermas, Universal Pragmatics is the normative foundation of critical theory. I now briefly indicate the central concepts of Universal Pragmatics. Habermas says:

"What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus" (1972:314).

The goal of Universal Pragmatics is that of explicating the universal conditions for the possibility of unconstrained consensus. Habermas understands speech as a form of action, as "doing things in saying something", thus once again according priority to human action over contemplation (Austin cited in Habermas 1976:156). He defines a speech act as the the smallest unit or utterance which is comprehensible to at least two actors in communication with one another. Universal Pragmatics is the reconstruction of the rules which adult speakers master implicitly in utterances. In the speech act speakers automatically establish an interpersonal relationship with one another on the basis of four universal validity claims which can
be redeemed. The four validity claims are:

1. **Comprehensibility**: The speaker "must" choose a comprehensible utterance such that speaker and listener are able to understand one another. When an obtuse expression is employed the intent is not understanding but rather deception. For Habermas, deceptive or manipulative modes of communication are parasitic upon the implicit assumption of communication orientated toward understanding. Thus the speaker in a deceptive form of communication, oriented to strategic success, pre-supposes that the listener is orientated toward the goal of understanding when the distorted form of communication is initiated.

2. **Propositional Truth**: The speaker must communicate a true utterance.

3. **Truthfulness of Intent**: The speaker must express his intentions in an authentic manner such that the listener can believe him and mutual trust is established.

4. **Normative Rightness**: The speaker must choose an utterance which is appropriate to the communicatively recognized normative background.

When any one of these implicit claims to validity are not operative consensus breaks down, and the conditions for the possibility of understanding and meaning are abrogated. Habermas connects the concepts of understanding and meaning through validity claims as follows:

"**Universal Pragmatics can be understood as semantic analysis. But it is distinguished from other theories of meaning in that the meanings of linguistic expressions are relevant only insofar as they contribute to speech acts that satisfy the validity claims of truth, truthfulness and normative rightness** (1979:31)

Thus one can only understand the meaning of a speech act to the extent that the implicit claims to validity: truth, truthfulness and normative rightness, are operative. Actors in turn are accorded with communicative competence to the extent that they employ these implicit validity claims. The breakdown of consensus is redeemed in a special form of communication named "discourse" where all extraneous motives, except that of the co-operative search for truth, are excluded. Habermas holds that through the process of argumentation, reasons are given for the acceptance
or rejection of a particular validity claim. Thus consensus formation has a rational basis in the discourse situation. Here the presupposition is that "the structure of the communication excludes all force except the force of the better argument" (Habermas 1984:25). This is the first pre-supposition of the "ideal speech situation" which is applicable to theoretical and practical discourse. In theoretical discourse, "rationally motivated" consensus is striven for through the discursive redemption of the validity claim to truth (Habermas 1884:25). In practical discourse, normative claims are the focus of rational deliberation. The ideal speech situation encompasses four conditions which facilitate a "rationally motivated consensus" which is arrived at if the argument is continued for long enough. The four conditions of the ideal speech situation are:

1. Each speaker must have an equal opportunity in the initiation and continuation of the discourse.
2. Each speaker must have an equal opportunity to participate in the discourse via the distribution of chances to challenge, justify and discuss the issue at hand.
3. Each speaker must have an equal opportunity to express intentions, feelings, needs and wishes.
4. Each speaker must assume responsibility for commitments made in the discourse and expect others to be accountable for their positions.

Conditions three and four are the conditions of reciprocity. Thus the Enlightenment ideals of equality and responsibility are built into the theory of Universal Pragmatics via the ideal speech situation. I now analyse the concept of rationality in relation to the theory of Universal Pragmatics, Judgement and life-world.

4.3.2 The Concept Rationality in Relation to the Theory of Universal Pragmatics, Judgement and Life-World

4.3.2.1 The Concept Communicative Rationality in Abstract Form

Habermas opens his account of the concept of rationality in "The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society" (1984) by indicating its relation to the concept of knowledge. He states that when one uses the expression "rational" one assumes that there is a close connection between knowledge
and rationality. Knowledge is viewed as having a propositional structure and is presented in the form of statements. He assumes this minimal definition of knowledge. He demonstrates the relationship between the concept rationality and two forms of knowledge usage. He compares a cognitive-instrumental concept of rationality with communicative concept of rationality. The cognitive-instrumentalist concept of rationality pertains to the descriptive employment of knowledge, and the communicative concept of rationality pertains to a communicative and reflective use of knowledge. If one assesses teleological forms of action, the cognitive concept of rationality represents a form of rationality pertaining to the means and ends of action. If one assumes a communicative stance, the concept of communicative rationality is based on the conditions for the possibility of unconstrained consensus, Habermas argues. These two approaches to action, action as a means to an end and communicative action orientated toward unconstrained consensus, then have a direct bearing on the concept of rationality as follows: Assuming two subjects, A and B, have at their disposal an identical stock of knowledge. A uses his knowledge in communicative manner and B uses his knowledge in a instrumental manner. In communication with at least one other subject, A makes an assertion, p. Here the relationship between the utterance and the facts constitute the conditions for the possibility of an understanding between participants about events which occur in the world. The utterance is constituted as rational only insofar as:

1. The speaker raises a validity claim, "it is true that p", with regard to his utterance.
2. The speaker substantiates the claim to the validity of his utterance with reasons.

B, the isolated actor, selects a means that he regards, on the basis of his belief p, is suitable to achieve an end or effect. Here the relationship between the rule of action and the fact constitutes the conditions for the possibility of an intervention in the world. The rationality of the action is constituted by a plan which implies the truth of p. In the communicative case, the assertion is named rational only if the actor satisfies the necessary conditions for the goal of reaching understanding about something in the world. The goal-directed action of B is named rational only if the actor satisfies the "conditions for
realizing his intention to intervene successfully in the world" (Habermas 1984:11). What Habermas is attempting to highlight is that the same kind of knowledge can be used in two different ways and exhibits two different forms of rationality. Communicative rationality and cognitive-instrumental rationality. Cognitive-instrumental rationality has an internal "telos" which is the instrumental mastery of the external environment. Communicative rationality aims at communicative understanding about a world shared with others. The instrumentalist assumes that the world is "the sum total of what is the case" (Habermas 1984:11). This assumption enables the instrumentalist to specify the rules of action which in turn constitute the necessary conditions for the possibility of a rational intervention in the world. The communicative actor assumes a reflective orientation since he "reflects on the fact that those who behave rationally must themselves presuppose an objective world." (Habermas 1984:11). The communicative actor asks after the conditions under which the objective world is constituted by acting and speaking members of a community. In this case the abstract notion of an "objective world" is a necessary condition for the possibility of reaching understanding among communicative actors about "what takes place in the world or is to be effected in it. Through this communicative practice they assure themselves at the same time of their common life-relations, of an intersubjectively shared life-world. This lifeworld is bounded by the totality of interpretations pre-supposed by the members as background knowledge. To elucidate the concept of rationality the phenomenologist must then examine the conditions for communicatively achieved consensus: he must analyse what Melvin Pollner calls, with reference to Alfred Schutz, mundane reasoning."

(Habermas 1984:13)

Habermas cites Pollner who adopts a phenomenological rather than a descriptive approach to the concept of rationality. The mundane reasoner, Pollner explains, functions within a life-world shared with others. The community of actors orientate themselves toward a world which is held to be constant, known and knowable in common with others. This enables actors to ask questions of a specific kind of which the "prototypical representative is: "How
come, he sees it and you do not?" (Pollner cited in Habermas 1986:13). Habermas points out that the phenomenologist adopts a communicative stance and that in this model,

"rational expressions have the character of meaningful actions, intelligible in their context, through which the actor relates to something in the objective world. The conditions of validity of symbolic expressions refer to a background knowledge intersubjectively shared by the communication community." (1986:13)

Here Habermas introduces a concept of reflection which he has such difficulty with in "Knowledge and Human Interests", in a simple and direct manner. He merely states that the phenomenologist reflects upon the notion of an objective world and that the realist takes it for granted that the world is a totality of facts which exist in reality. Reflection is now simply stated as a pre-supposition of the phenomenologist. Habermas points out that the realist is limited to the conditions of devising means and ends which are then the conditions of rational action which "have the character of goal-directed, feedback-controlled intervention in the world of existing states of affairs" (1984:12). Here Habermas is making use of the concept of instrumental rationality which he develops in "Knowledge and Human Interests" under the investigation of Peirce's work. He equates this concept of instrumental rationality with the "realist's" orientation. The interest, constitutive of knowledge, is ignored in this new analysis of the concept instrumental rationality. Habermas points out that for the realist, the concept "rational", can only be appended to statements about states of affairs. This approach to knowledge usage results in a "figurative" concept of rationality. For example the realist speaks of the "rationality of the simulated response; the rationality of the systems change in state; rationality of boundary maintenance" (Habermas 1984:12). This "figurative" use of the concept rationality is avoided through a phenomenological approach. The conditions for the possibility of rational action are then not reduced to mere attributes which the scientist appends to statements about phenomena studied. Habermas holds that the concept rationality, attributed to the actions of a subject, can be grounded through the subject, who provides his reasons for his actions under "suitable conditions" (1984:13).
For Habermas, the concept of rationality is grounded in the discourse situation. Central to the notion of grounding, is the theory of argumentation in which the theory of judgement, in Arendt's sense, is located. I first want to develop Habermas' concept of communicative rationality in isolation from the details of the argumentation theory. The concepts of responsibility and autonomy need to be located along the way before the grounding question can be dealt with more fully. I return to the sequence of the argument. Habermas points out that the cognitive-instrumental concept of rationality can be accommodated in a broader communications concept of rationality. The subject can view the world from the perspective of the manipulation of things and events, on the one hand, and from man's "capacity for reaching intersubjective understanding about things and events", on the other hand (1984:15). He invokes Piaget's notion of a decentered orientation to the world and the self. Habermas points out that the contrast between a decentered and monological approach to the world is clearly visible when one attempts to employ a traditional realist model to accommodate concepts like autonomy and responsibility in the depiction of rational action. The argument proceeds as follows: "Only responsible persons can behave rationally" (Habermas 1984:14). From the perspective of monological intervention in the world, rationality is measured in terms of the success of goal directed intervention in the manipulable world. Here the only criterion of responsibility and rationality is the choice of means among alternatives in order to control the environment. This screens out the concept of rationality which is measured in terms of success in reaching understanding. From the decentered perspective of communicative action, only persons who orientate their actions in terms of intersubjectively recognized validity claims, claims to truth, truthfulness, comprehensibility and normative rightness, are held to be responsible. From the communicative or phenomenological perspective, two different concepts of autonomy and responsibility are thematic. These concepts can in turn be co-ordinated with the two concepts of rationality. Cognitive-instrumental rationality can be viewed as realizing a form of autonomy, or more precisely, independence from the contingencies of the external environment. Here the actor's self-assertion against the forces of the external nature
increases to the extent that he behaves rationally in a goal directed fashion. Thus the increase in cognitive-instrumental rationality results in an increase in autonomy of a specific kind. An increase in communicative rationality on the other hand results in a form of autonomy where the scope for "unconstrained coordination of action and the consensual resolution of conflicts" is increased. (Habermas 1984:15). When the cognitive-instrumental concept of rationality is included into the broader perspective of communicative action, the actor can be seen to be behaving rationally not only in terms of the success of his means-ends relations with regard to external nature, but also in terms of his intersubjective relations with other actors. The communicative actor puts forward an assertion in terms of his means-ends orientation. This is then vindicated through discussion and the necessary evidence is supplied to ground his cognitive-instrumental action. From the communicative perspective a second aspect of his rational action, namely the normative, also becomes thematic. He acts in cognitive-instrumental fashion within a given social context of the life-world, and hence is also following established norms of action and is able "when criticized, to justify his action by explicating the given situation in the light of legitimate expectations." (Habermas 1984:15). From the communicative perspective, cognitive-instrumental action is only held to be rational and responsible action when both dimensions of action, the normative and empirical, are vindicated through debate and feedback from reality. Habermas is here clearly indicating that norms are subject to rational grounding through the process of discussion, where reasons supporting the legitimacy/illegitimacy of social norms become thematic. Habermas hastens to point out that one calls another rational when he makes his desires, intentions, needs and feelings known, since he is then able to "reassure critics in regard to the revealed experience and by drawing practical conclusions from it and behaving consistently thereafter" (1984:15). Normatively regulated action and the expressive modes of self-presentation are then also constitutive of the concept of communicative rationality, Habermas argues. Here the world that the subject relates to is not that of the external environment but rather his own subjective world and the social world which he shares with others. Habermas argues that
expressions are meaningful and can be seen as rational to the extent that they are connected with the criticizable validity claims which pertain not only to facts, but to norms and subjective experiences as well. He emphasises that the "possibility of intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims is constitutive for their rationality too" (1984:16). He draws the threads of the forms of action together and says:

"actions regulated by norms, expressive self-presentations and also evaluative expressions, supplement constative speech acts in constituting a communicative practice, which against the background of a life-world, is orientated to achieving, sustaining and renewing consensus - and indeed a consensus which rests on the intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims. The rationality inherent in this practice is seen in the fact that a communicatively achieved agreement must be based in the end on reasons" (Habermas 1984:17 emphasis in text.)

The crucial question then is: How are these reasons grounded? Habermas' answer is that the final "court of appeal" is the theory of argumentation (1974:17). He makes this crucial point as follows:

"the rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it possible to continue communicative action with other means when disagreements can no longer be repaired with every-day routines and yet are not to be settled by the direct or strategic use of force. For this reason I believe that the concept of communicative rationality, which refers to an unclarified systematic interconnection of universal validity claims, can be adequately explicated only in terms of a theory of argumentation" (1984:18 emphasis mine.)

The theory of argumentation is based upon the communicative theory of Judgement. I now show how Habermas achieves this.

4.3.2.2 Communicative Rationality in Relation To Communicative Judgement

Through the theory of argumentation, Habermas aims at systematically relating the concept of communicative rationality
to the universal validity claims developed in the theory of Universal Pragmatics. In the final analysis this amounts to an interpretation of argumentation as a form of communicative judgement. The contours of the argument are as follows:

Habermas understands the argumentation process as a special form of "speech-action" in which the participants raise validity claims which are contested, and then attempt to vindicate them through argument (Habermas 1984:18). Central to this process is the premise that the "strength" of the argument is an indication of the "soundness" of the reasons posed (1984:19). Habermas holds that the "strength" of the argument can be judged by the extent to which it convinces the participants with regard to the contested validity claim raised. The rationality of the participants is also judged from this background via the manner in which they respond. Those who are "deaf" to the argument and answer in a dogmatic fashion are judged as being unable to deal with the argumentation process in a rational manner. Those who behave rationally in this context exhibit a "willingness to expose themselves to criticism", present reasons for their position on a particular validity claim, and learn from mistakes made (Habermas 1984:18). Habermas indicates the relationship between learning and grounding as follows:

"The concept of grounding is interwoven with that of learning. Argumentation plays an important role in learning processes as well. Thus we call a person rational who, in the cognitive-instrumental sphere, expresses reasonable opinions and acts efficiently; but this rationality remains accidental if it is not coupled with the ability to learn from mistakes, from the refutation of hypotheses and from the failure of interventions." (1984:18 emphasis in text)

Grounding for Habermas is never absolute but pre-supposes a thesis of fallibility which he learnt from Peirce and Popper. Thus the reasons presented in the argumentation process are always open to correction. This is tied to learning processes in the argument situation and to the feedback from interventions in the world (4). The argumentation process takes place in the discourse situation. Habermas distinguishes between theoretical and practical discourse. In the former truth claims are thematic and in the latter claims to normative rightness are thematic. Argumentation occurs under the conditions stipulated in the
"ideal speech" situation in which the conditions of symmetry and reciprocity pertain (5). Through the conditions of symmetry and reciprocity, the ideals of equality and responsibility are built into the discourse situation as the conditions under which arguments take place. In his discussion of practical or moral discourse, Habermas sharply distinguishes between norms and values. He argues one can speak of the universal norms of mankind in general. The universal norms which he subscribes to are truth, justice, equality, autonomy, responsibility and happiness. Values on the other hand are held to be culturally specific and are then not accepted as pertaining to all men in general. Habermas states his position with regard to norms and values as follows:

"cultural values do not appear with a claim to universality, as do norms of action. At most, values are candidates for interpretations under which a circle of those affected can, if occasion arises, describe and normatively regulate a common interest. The circle of intersubjective recognition that forms around cultural values does not yet in any way imply a claim that they would meet with general assent. For this reason arguments that serve to justify standards of value do not satisfy the conditions of discourse." (1984:20)

Only norms fulfil the conditions of argumentation in the discourse situation since Universal Pragmatics is orientated toward the implicit rule competencies which all subjects possess. Thus universal norms can be systematically related to universal conditions of communicative competence if a thesis of general or universal interest is stipulated. Norms of action are understood at this level of analysis as pertaining to the "general" or "common interests" of mankind as such (Habermas 1984:20). Values fall under arguments which are called "aesthetic criticism". Habermas argues that aesthetic forms of criticism pertaining to art, literature, and music for example, entail reasons which
guide perception and render the authenticity of the work so evident that this aesthetic experience can itself become a rational basis for accepting the corresponding standards of value" (1984:20).

He holds that aesthetic criticism thus encompasses a form of aesthetic rationality (6). Habermas then develops a critique of
the work of Steven Toulmin and Wolfgang Klein on argumentation theory in order to point out the weaknesses of their positions and to provide a contrast against which his grounding of communicative rationality can be seen. Klein's work is read as an empiricist approach to argumentation which is limited to description. Toulmin adopts an historico-philosophical approach. Klein's work exhibits the following errors, Habermas argues: 1. Klein adopts the perspective of an observer who describes but does not judge the reasons presented in arguments. Thus one argument is just as good as the next. The "strength" of the argument in Habermas' sense is then not taken into account. 2. Klein limits the validity of arguments to propositional truth and causal regularity. The concept of rationality is confused with the concept of causality. Habermas invokes his own concept of consensus formation and the achievement of rationally motivated agreement as an alternative to Klein's position. 3. Klein's theory lacks a concept of rationality which is able to account for the difference between what is valid "for them", the participants in an argument, and what is valid "for us", the social scientists studying argumentation processes, Habermas argues (1984:35). 4. Klein limits his work to relativism in which "the valid and the questionable are thus relative to persons and times" (Habermas 1984:28). Habermas' conclusions with regard to Toulmin's theory of argumentation are as follows: 1. Toulmin's theory of argumentation is superior to that of Klein in that he depicts a "plurality of validity claims" which occur in different "fields" of social endeavour (Habermas 1984:31). The fields investigated are medicine, art, science, politics and law. 2. Toulmin does not distinguish between the logical and empirical levels of analysis. Therefore he is unable to distinguish between the conditions for the possibility of discursively redeeming validity claims and the empirical occurrences of claims to validity. Toulmin realizes that forms of rationality must be judged by the researcher but he is not able to articulate this adequately. He argues for an "impartial stand-point of rational judgement" (Habermas 1984:35). Toulmin realizes that this stand-point cannot be arbitrary. He adopts
a Hegelian notion of absolute reason as a synthetic concept of rationality underlying argumentation. Habermas calls this an attempt to achieve a form of "conceptually appropriating the human species collective enterprise of reason, as Hegel did for the Phenomenology" (Habermas 1984:34). He does not realize that the thesis of a "universal audience" would remedy this error, Habermas points out (Habermas 1984:36).

3. Toulmin attempts to understand the discursive redemption of validity claims in the various fields which he assesses. The forms of argument in these fields are explained in terms of the functions which they perform in each field. Toulmin is not able to relate the different forms of argument into a unified theory of argumentation. He thus depicts collection of different forms of argument, despite his Hegelian intentions.

Habermas holds that both of these theories of argumentation are limited to the mean-ends or instrumental concept of rationality. The theme which runs through Habermas' critique of these two theories of argumentation is that of judgement. The researcher is required to judge in order to distinguish the "strength" of arguments. This then enables him to indicate which arguments are rationally binding. An approach which is able to articulate the participant/observer perspectives is suggested by Habermas. Both scholars fail to articulate a universal and its relation to the particular. The second theme is that of a means-ends form of rationality which both scholars display in their understanding of the rationality internal to arguments. Thus a communicative concept of rationality is not considered in these theories of argumentation. The third theme is that of a "universal audience" which neither scholars include in their frame of reference. Habermas does not appropriate any aspects of these scholars' work. He introduces his view of argumentation by saying:

"A considerable burden of proof is placed upon the theory of argumentation; it has to be in a position to specify a system of validity claims" (1984:38)

He then grounds his concept of communicative rationality in the "system of validity" claims as follows:

1. A validity claim, with regard to an utterance, is raised by a speaker in communication with a listener.
2. Normally this occurs implicitly
3. In uttering a sentence, the speaker raises a validity claim,
which, if it is made explicit, can be seen to take one of the following forms:

"It is true that "p"..."p" represents a proposition.
"It is right that "a"..."a" represents a description of action
"I mean what I say when I here and now utter "s"....
"s" represents a first person sentence (Habermas 1984:38).

4. Thus "a validity claim is equivalent to the assertion that the conditions for the validity of an utterance are fulfilled" (1984:38 emphasis in text). What he means is that a validity claim (the particular) can be seen as an utterance (speech act). When it's underlying form is made explicit, it can be seen to accord with the universal conditions for the validity of utterances which he spells out in the theory of Universal Pragmatics. These conditions are: propositional truth; truthfulness of intent, comprehensibility and normative rightness. Thus, whenever a validity claim is raised, it implicitly or explicitly takes the form of: x is true; y is right; b is what I intend by z; I mean x₁, x₂ and x₃ when I say X. He points out in the theory of Universal Pragmatics that when these implicit claims to validity are not operative, consensus breaks down and the conditions for the possibility of understanding and meaning are abrogated.

5. Habermas connects the universal forms of validity claims to Arendt's communications theory of Judgement. He stresses that when a validity claim is implicitly or explicitly raised, the listener, ONLY has the choice of accepting, rejecting or leaving the validity claim "undecided for the time being" (Habermas 1984:38). The "permissible reactions [in the argumentation processes] then are taking a "Yes" or "No" position or abstaining" (Habermas 1984:38 emphasis mine). Here Habermas is linking the conditions for the possibility of communicative action with one of the "standards" of reflective judgement. Namely, that of "approbation and disapprobation" (Arendt 1982:69). In other words the formal declaration of approval or disapproval, the "Yes/No" responses of subjects participating in communicative judgement, are the only permissible reactions open to communicators in argumentation, Habermas holds. Thus the formal declaration of approval or disapproval, which Arendt sees as a standard
of Kant's view of reflective judgement, is a central tenet of Habermas' argument for grounding communicative rationality.

6. He then goes on to explain that not every "Yes/No" response can be viewed as taking a position on a validity claim. If one names "imperatives, normatively unauthorized demands, then a "Yes/No" response on such demands amounts to either complying with, or refusing to comply with, the will of another" (1984:38). Habermas holds that "Yes/No" responses to imperatives are arbitrary choices and reactions to power claims. "Yes/No" response to validity claims, means for Habermas, that the "hearer says "Yes" or "No" to a criticizable expression and does so in the light of reasons or grounds; such positions are the expression of insight or understanding."


Here Habermas, like Arendt, unites communicative judgement with the concept of understanding. Thus if one judges, one takes a "Yes/No" stance on a claims to truth, truthfulness of intent, comprehensibility and normative rightness, which are implicit in utterances, and one does so in the light of reasons. These judgments reveal one's capacity for understanding and communicative rationality. This is the "core" of Habermas' concept of communicative rationality. Internal to the notion that one reveals ones understanding and communicative rationality through communicative judgement, are two important connections which Habermas makes between communicative judgement and the theory of Universal Pragmatics. The first connection is at the level of learning and knowledge and the second is at the level of meaning and understanding.

4.3.2.3 Communicative Judgement, Universal Pragmatics, Learning and Knowledge

Arendt points out that another standard of judgement is common sense or opinion and that the criterion of judgement is communicability. Communicability requires an "enlarged mentality" such that one "thinks in the place of everybody else." (Arendt 1982:69). Through the process of "wooing" the consent of others validation is striven for. Habermas argues that:
"arguments are the means by which intersubjective recognition of a proponent's hypothetically raised validity claim can be brought about and opinion thereby transformed into knowledge." (1984:24 emphasis mine)

Habermas, in contrast to Arendt, aims at cogent arguments which are supported by reasons. He thus moves beyond the level of opinion in his appropriation of this aspect of communicative judgement. He connects the two central premises, universal validity claims and the "Yes/No" stance which hearers and speakers must take on validity claims, to two concepts, learning and knowledge. He holds that "grounding is interwoven with learning" (1984:18). The concept of rationality remains arbitrary if intersubjective recognition of opinions and hypotheses does not occur. Intersubjective recognition is as essential to Habermas' concept of communicative rationality as the recognition which occurs between master and serf in Hegel's dialectic of consciousness. There is a fundamental difference between the concept of recognition held by Hegel in comparison to the concept of recognition held by Habermas. Habermas' concept of intersubjective recognition is understood in terms of reflective communicative judgement. Hegel's concept of recognition is understood as reflective consciousness. For Hegel and the tradition of philosophy ranging from Descartes to Husserl and from Feuerbach to Adorno, the philosophy of reflection stems from the model of the self. Reflection is understood in terms of a solitary self which reflects upon itself; as one consciousness facing another consciousness and as one consciousness facing nature and re-appropriating and actively transforming nature (Benhabib 1984:242-243). Benhabib, following Habermas, calls this tradition the philosophy of consciousness. Habermas initiates a paradigm shift from this philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy of language. The emphasis changes from a focus upon consciousness and the various attempts to depict reflective consciousness to a focus upon communicative action. Habermas employs the philosophy of language to clarify his view of action understood as speech-acts or utterances. The approach changes from a focus which proceeds from the consciousness of an active self facing the consciousness of another self and the inter-consciousness of men in general, to that which proceeds from my utterances to your utterances and the
validity of these speech-acts. For Habermas, reflective, communicative judgement is the crucial concept in terms of the recognition of valid speech-acts is achieved. I return to the sequence of the discussion on grounding. The notion of intersubjective recognition in the argumentation process serves to raise mere opinion to knowledge which is discursively redeemed in the discourse situation. Discourses, for Habermas, are the medium in which controversial validity claims are made thematic. Thus the cognitive-instrumental rationality of scientists is grounded when controversial statements are subjected to discussion whereby the claims to the truth of statements are ratified and recognized as valid by the communicators. Consensus can "in principle" be achieved if the discussion is continued for long enough. The voice of Peirce is palpable here. Habermas realizes that this is an "ideal proviso" but he holds that it is one which is not arbitrary and is rooted in the very nature of communicative rationality which aims at understanding. Thus Habermas sharpens Arendt's criterion of judgement, communicability, and its standard, opinion, through the concept of intersubjective recognition. The communicability of statements are no longer arbitrary as in the case of Arendt's "opinion", but are raised to the level of learning and knowledge which for Habermas are vital factors in the evolution of mankind. From this perspective the extensive and abstract studies on Piaget's work in genetic epistemology and Kohlberg's work on moral development, can be seen to address the following question: How does man's capacity for reflective, communicative judgement and hence communicative rationality, develop in the horizontal and vertical directions in the self-formative processes of the species? From Piaget, Habermas appropriates the "decentering" thesis which is employed to account for the "structurally described levels of learning ability" (Habermas 1984:68). Habermas emphasises that for Piaget the stages of cognitive development are not understood as changes in content, but rather in terms of changes in the "systems of basic concepts" (Habermas 1984:68). The decentering of cognition develops as the child gradually matures from an egocentric relation to the environment in general, toward a differentiated and reflective capacity for dealing with the physical world of nature, the social world of subject-subject relations and the inner world of the self. Central to Piaget's
thesis of the decentration from egocentric reasoning to socio-centric reasoning is the concept of communicability (Piaget 1977:87). Piaget, following the work of Bleuler, distinguishes between "two fundamental modes of thinking, directed or intelligent thought and undirected or autistic thought" (1977:84). Directed thought is held to be

"conscious i.e. it pursues an aim which is present to the mind of the thinker; it is intelligent, which means that it is adapted to reality and tries to influence it; it admits of being true or false (empirically and logically true), and it can be communicated in language. Autistic thought is subconscious, which means that the aims which it pursues and the problems it tries to solve are not present in consciousness; it is not adapted to reality, but creates for itself a dream world of the imagination; it tends, not to establish truths, but to satisfy desires, and it remains strictly individual and incommunicable as such by means of language. It works chiefly by images and in order to express itself, it has recourse to indirect methods, evoking of symbols and myths the feeling by which it is lead."

(Piaget 1977:85 emphasis mine)

Piaget explains that egocentric thought is an intermediary form of childhood reasoning between autism and the adult form of "intelligence" captured in the citation above. Egocentric reason may then be defined as a form of reason which is directed since it aims to "adapt itself to reality but does not communicate itself as such" (Piaget 1977:87). Piaget argues for the gradual construction of systems of concepts and hence the conditions for the possibility of the communicability of thought and action, as the child matures through socialization processes and encounters with the environment in which she is located. Namely, the environment of physical nature, that of subject-subject relations and that of the self. These three realms are at first not differentiated and form a totality from within which the maturing child gradually emerges through the active construction of herself and her relations to the environment (7). Habermas points out that Piaget:
"follows this development of intelligence in connection with the construction of the external and internal universes; there gradually emerges a demarcation through the construction of the universe of objects and of the internal world of the subject". (Piaget cited in Habermas 1984:69)

"The growing child works out for himself equiprimordially, the concepts of the external and internal worlds in dealing practically with objects and himself. Piaget also draws distinction between dealing with physical objects and dealing with social objects, that is reciprocal action between a subject and objects and reciprocal action between a subject and other subjects. Correspondingly the external universe is differentiated into a world of perceptible and manipulable objects on the one hand and the world of normatively regulated interpersonal relations on the other". (Habermas 1984:69)

For Piaget contact with the physical world is established through instrumental action, Habermas argues. Contact with the external world of nature through instrumental action, mediates the "constructive acquisition of the system of intellectual norms" while interaction with other subjects facilitates the constructive "acquisition of socially recognized norms" (Habermas 1984:69). Habermas further indicates that the learning mechanisms of accommodation and assimilation, function through these forms of action in a specific manner:

"if reciprocal actions between subject and object modify both, it is a fortiori evident that every reciprocal action between individual subjects mutually modifies them. Every social relation is thus a totality in itself which creates new properties while transforming the individual in his mental structure" (Piaget cited in Habermas 1984:69)

What Habermas is saying here is that for Piaget, cognitive development is not understood as the construction of the external and social universes in the sense of a dualistic ontology, which juxtaposes a sphere of empirical facts to a sphere of values. To the contrary, the decentering process is seen as the "construction" of a "referential system" (Habermas 1984:69). This system of reference means that demarcation between three "worlds" or realms occurs. Namely: the objective, the social and the subjective worlds. These categories are not ontological but
rather referential ones: they refer to the objective world of facts which are regulated by a system of intellectual norms, the subject-subject realm of normatively regulated intersubjective action and the subjective world of the self's inner experiences. Habermas holds that it is only to the extent that the formal reference system of the three worlds is differentiated that communicative actors can form a reflective concept of "world" and thus gain "access to the world through the medium of common interpretive efforts, in the sense of a cooperative negotiation of situation definitions" (1984:69). He explains that ego can consider how certain "facts (what he regards as legitimate as existing states of affairs, in the objective world) or certain normative expectations (what he regards as legitimate elements of a common social knowledge) look from the perspective of another, that is as elements of alter's subjective world... The function of the formal world concepts, however, is to prevent the stock of what is common from dissolving in the stream of subjectivities repeatedly reflected in one another. They make it possible to adopt a common perspective of a third person. Every action oriented toward reaching understanding can be conceived as part of a cooperative process of interpretation aiming at situation definitions that are intersubjectively recognized.(1984:70)

Habermas is here linking the system of reference understood as the differentiation of the three realms of world relations, to his concept of communicative action which aims at understanding. The concept of intersubjective recognition serves to link these domains. Thus the system of reference is the locus in terms of which participants then reach agreement as to what is regarded as a fact, a valid norm and a subjective experience. Habermas is then able to introduce his concept of the life-world since participants are held to come to an understanding from within the horizon of the life-world. The life-world is the "source of situation definitions that are presupposed by participants as unproblematic" (Habermas 1984:70). It is only when aspects of the life-world are released from the taken for granted through becoming problematical that the discursive redemption of validity claims becomes thematic. Habermas argues that the life-world also "stores the the interpretive work of previous generations" and is
the "counterweight" to the continual risk of disagreement which comes to the fore with every "actual process of reaching understanding; for communicative actors can achieve an understanding only by way of taking yes/no positions on criticizable validity claims." (1984:70). Thus the decentration thesis appropriated from the work of Piaget is integrated with the Perspective of Communicative Action, Judgement and Life-world.

From Kohlberg, Habermas learns that only adults are able to engage in reflective judgement and reach the stage of postconventional morality or the "enlarged mentality" which Arendt speaks of (8). This is named the "sixth" stage on the scale of moral development by Kohlberg. Adults who do reach this stage of morality are able to invoke ethical principles which appeal to "logical comprehensiveness, universality and consistency", Habermas stresses (1979:80). These principles are abstract and ethical and not concrete moral rules such as the ten commandments (9). Habermas points out that:

"these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. (1979:80 emphasis in text).

He holds that Kohlberg's analysis represents a monological approach. He stipulates a seventh stage of moral development in which communicative competence in reflective judgement, requiring a universal orientation, is necessary to correct this error. He states of his own orientation,

"the principle of justification of norms is no longer the monologically applicable principle of generalizability but the communally followed procedure of redeeming normative validity claims discursively." (1979:90)

This highly abbreviated analysis does not do justice to the detail of the discussion of Piaget's and Kohlberg's work but serves to indicate an alternative perspective, namely the Perspective of Communicative Action, Judgement and Life-world, from which these studies can be viewed. I now deal with the second important connection between the communicative judgement and universal pragmatics.
4.3.2.4 Communicative Judgement, Universal Pragmatics, Meaning and Understanding

Closely related to the question of communicability is Arendt's thesis of representative thinking. One judges as a member of a community and this requires an "enlarged mentality". Habermas faults Toulmin and Klein in that their understanding of argumentation requires the thesis of a "universal audience" such that judgements can be made whereby one thinks "in the place of everybody else", as Arendt says (Arendt 1982:69). This capacity for representative thinking, whereby the viewpoints of others are brought into dialogue with one's own and are raised to the universal stand-point of mankind, is sharpened and developed in Habermas' view of understanding and its relation to meaning and communicative rationality. Habermas introduces the thesis that a modern understanding of the world makes a claim to universality, through an assessment of the rationality debates which are conducted between Winch, Lukes, MacIntyre and Horton. Habermas views the question of understanding and meaning in the rationality debates from the perspective of the theory of Universal Pragmatics and Communicative Judgment. The contours of the argument are as follows: Habermas holds that one can understand the meaning of communicative action in an alien community because it is rooted in the "context of action orientated toward reaching understanding" (1984:115). The interpreter observes the activities of the subjects in the alien community. She notes the conditions under which symbolic expressions are accepted as valid by the participants and when the validity claims associated with symbolic expressions are criticized and rejected. She also notes when plans of action are coordinated on the basis of consensus formation and when the coordination of action does not occur, but "falls apart due to lack of consensus" (Habermas 1984:115). Habermas comes to the following conclusion:

"Thus the interpreter cannot become clear about the semantic content of an expression independently of the action contexts in which the participants react to the expression in question with "yes" or a "no" or an abstention." (1984:115)

The researcher cannot understand the "Yes/No" positions taken if she does not clarify, for herself, the underlying reasons which
motivate the participants to take their particular stance. Habermas holds that:

"...agreements and disagreements, insofar as they are judged in the light of reciprocally raised validity claims and are not merely caused by external factors, are based on reasons which the participants supposedly or actually have at their disposal. These reasons (most often implicit) form the axis around which the processes of reaching understanding revolve." (1984:115)

If the interpreter, in attempting to understand, must "bring to mind" the reasons which the participants put forward in legitimating their actions under claims to validity, then she is also drawn into the process of judging validity claims. She judges (says "Yes/No") claims to: the truth of propositions, the rightness of the utterances with regard to the normative contexts and to claims as to the truthfulness of the expressed intentions. This derives from the fact that reasons cannot be validated from the perspective of the isolated observer since they in turn require a "Yes/No" response of the participant, Habermas argues. He holds that an interpreter is not able to understand what a reason is if she does not reconstruct it in conjunction with its claim to validity. This can only occur in the communicative context in which the subjects and the researcher validate the claims raised via reasons. For Habermas one is only able to understand reasons and hence their meaning to the extent that one understands why they are sound. This leads to the strong thesis that "the description of reasons demands evaluation" (Habermas 1984:116). Mc Carthy objects to this thesis that the concepts of meaning and understanding are tied to the concept of reflective judgement in Habermas' concept of communicative rationality. McCarthy argues that one can abstain from judgement and still understand the reasons presented (Mc Carthy 1985:204). Habermas' reply to McCarthy is that in the domain of meaning, he (Habermas), holds the view that:

"we understand a literally meant speech act when we know the conditions under which it could be accepted as valid by a hearer. This pragmatically extended version of truth conditional semantics is supported by the fact that we connect the execution of speech acts to various validity
claims: claims to the truth of propositions (or the existential presuppositions of the propositional contents), claims to the rightness of an utterance (with respect to the normative contexts), and claims with respect to the truthfulness of the expressed intention." (1985(c):203)

He says that the realms of "their", the actor's explanations, are brought into accord with "our", the researcher's explanations, through the universal pragmatic notion of universal discourse (1985(c):209). For Habermas, universal discourse is implicit in the communicative aim of reaching understanding and meaning for all men in general (Habermas 1985(c):204). He holds that the stance of putting off a judgement or abstaining, implies that one does not really understand the meaning of different perspectives since one only understands through saying "Yes or No" to different perspectives relative to the "universal attitude" of mankind in general. Thus for Habermas, communicative rationality and the concept meaning, are tied to the judging process in which the formal "Yes/No" response is made in the light of the four universal conditions for the possibility of unconstrained consensus. Namely the claims to truth, truthfulness, normative rightness and comprehensibility. Like Arendt, Habermas holds that the meaning is the result of understanding. Communicative action aims at the actualization of understanding and meaning. The communicative rationality of communicative action is grounded when a "Yes/No" response to determinate speech-acts are made in a given context and are judged in the light of the universal validity claims underlying these speech acts. Thus the universal and the particular are united in a single theory which overcomes relativism and concept of instrumental rationality internal to the argumentation theory of Klein and Toulmin. I briefly concretize this point. Individual claims to validity on particular speech-acts, such as "this book is green"; "substance "m" destroys cancer cells", or "you ought to visit granny more often" exhibit their duality in that they are individual and universal at the same time. They are individual in that they are specific claims made in specific contexts. They are universal in that underlying each speech-act, is a universal claim to validity; its truth, truthfulness, normative rightness, and comprehensibility. Speech-acts can thus be be judged, (declaration of "Yes/No") in terms of the four universal validity
claims in the discourse situation. In discourse, only the search for truth is operative and communicative rationality is then grounded through intersubjective recognition of validity claims. Learning takes place through the confirmation and refutation of speech-acts and opinion is transformed into knowledge. What grounding actually means can only be ascertained from the conditions for discursively redeeming validity claims, Habermas stresses. Grounding can be concretized as follows. When a speech act such as "this book is green" or "substance "m" destroys cancer cells" is discursively redeemed under all the conditions discussed in detail above, one can say that these are descriptive speech-acts which are "true". Hence "grounding" establishes a "state of affairs" through communicative reason, encompassing the discussion and validation of empirical evidence which is at first classed as mere opinion. Through reflective judgement, the communicators say "Yes" or "No" to the evidence presented, which also includes the "feedback from reality", and opinions are raised to the level of knowledge when the claims to validity are mutually recognized. The validation process occurs in theoretical discourse. Habermas holds that actors adopt an objectivating attitude toward the external world of nature in this case. An objectivating attitude is that of manipulating or observing things or events in the natural or social world. The pertinent concept of rationality in the case of the manipulation of objects is cognitive-instrumental rationality.

In subject-subject relations, where one subject treats another as a means to an end, the objectivating attitude and cognitive-strategic rationality are operative. The form of knowledge which develops is the progress in science and technology in the case of cognitive instrumental rationality and social technology in the case of cognitive strategic rationality. Thus the concept rationality is carefully distinguished from the attitude which actors adopt towards the environment. The examples, "you ought to visit granny more often" or "you ought to employ more female doctors" are normative speech-acts. Grounding of these speech-acts establishes legitimate norms of action. Here norms invoked with a claim to validity are validated through the reflective judgement of communicators. The form of argumentation in which this takes place is named practical discourse and the pertinent concept of rationality is moral-practical rationality.
Actors adopt a norm-conformative attitude toward the social world of subject-subject relations and the form of knowledge which is produced in this realm is formal law and moral-practical knowledge. Grounding expressive speech-acts establish communicatively "rational presentations of self" (Habermas 1984:39). This occurs in a form of argumentation named therapeutic critique. This form of argumentation is modelled on the psycho-therapeutic situation. Habermas holds that the subject in psychotherapy learns to adopt a reflective attitude toward "his own expressive manifestations" (1984:20). The concept "rational" then applies to the behaviour of a person who strives and is able to free himself from illusions based upon self-deception. Habermas points out that

"Here we are dealing with the expressions of ones' own desires and inclinations, feelings and moods, which appear with a claim to truthfulness and sincerity. In many situations an actor has good reasons to conceal his experiences from others or to mislead someone with whom he is interacting about his "true" experiences. In such cases he is not raising a claim to truthfulness but at most simulating one while behaving strategically". (1984:21)

Expressions in this sense cannot be objectively criticized since they are insincere and "are to be judged" in terms of the "intended results as more or less effective" (Habermas 1984:21). Habermas emphasises that expressive "manifestations" are judged on the basis of their claim to sincerity and truthfulness in communication which aims at reaching understanding. Thus the subject who systematically "deceives himself about himself" behaves in an irrational manner. Anyone who is able to emancipate him/herself from this form of irrationality:

"possesses not only the rationality of a subject who is competent to judge facts and who acts in a purposive rational way, who is morally judicious and practically reliable, who evaluates with sensitivity and is aesthetically open-minded, he also possesses the power to behave reflectively in relation to his subjectivity and to see through the irrational limitations to which his cognitive, moral-practical, and aesthetic-practical expressions are subject" (Habermas 1984:21)
Habermas says that the therapeutic dialogue situation does not fulfil the conditions of symmetry and reciprocity central to the discourse situation. He holds that the conditions of discourse "can only be satisfied after the therapy has been successful" and thus names argumentation in which forms of systematic self-deception are addressed, "Therapeutic Critique" (1984:21).

He distinguishes the realm of expressive speech acts, in the sense of self-deception, from the rational interpretation of needs and desires. He holds that actors can adopt a reflective attitude in the light of "culturally established standards of value through which feelings and desires are interpreted" (1984:21). Cultural values do not encompass claims to universal validity as do norms and hence arguments or more precisely, forms of criticism pertaining to music, art and literature for example, do not fulfil the conditions of discourse. Habermas names these arguments Aesthetic Critique. The redemption of claims to value are based upon reasons. He says:

"in aesthetic criticism grounds or reasons serve to guide perception and make the authenticity of a work so evident that this aesthetic experience can itself become a rational motive for accepting the corresponding standards on value". (1984:20)(7).

Actors adopt an expressive attitude toward the realm of music, art and literature in which validity claims with regard to the adequacy of standards of value are reflected upon and redeemed. The pertinent concept of rationality which is grounded in aesthetic forms of criticism is named Aesthetic-Practical Rationality.

The grounding of interpretive processes are also accommodated in this theory. Habermas holds that the interpreter who reflects upon linguistic rules and modes of presentation, in order to achieve understanding, acts in a rational manner. The comprehensibility or "well-formedness" of symbolic expressions are addressed in this case. The interpreter behaves in an irrational manner when he dogmatically applies his own symbolic means of expression in this situation. Habermas names the argumentation process in which comprehensibility is a claim to validity Explicative Discourse.

Thus one theory is able to account for the communicative rationality of speech-acts in general and unite context dependent
speech acts to universal claims to validity. The concepts discussed thus far can be summarised as shown in Figure 1: Rationality Complexes.

Figure 1: Rationality Complexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of Argumentation</th>
<th>Concept of Rationality</th>
<th>Validity Claims</th>
<th>Worlds</th>
<th>Basic Attitudes</th>
<th>Form of Knowledge</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Discourse</td>
<td>Cognitive - Instrumental</td>
<td>Truth Claims</td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Objectivating</td>
<td>Science - Technology</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cognitive Strategic -</td>
<td>Truth Claims</td>
<td>Subject -</td>
<td>Subject -</td>
<td>Social Technology</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rationality</td>
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<td>Subject Means-Ends Relations</td>
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<td>Subject Means-Ends Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Practical Discourse</td>
<td>Moral - Practical Rationality</td>
<td>Legitimacy of Norms</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Norm - Conformative</td>
<td>Formal Law Practical Moral Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicative Discourse</td>
<td>Explicative Rationality</td>
<td>Comprehensibility</td>
<td>Subjective</td>
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<td>Well-formedness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aesthetic Critique</td>
<td>Aesthetic - Practical Rationality</td>
<td>Value Claims</td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Expressive</td>
<td>Music Art Literature</td>
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<tr>
<td>Therapeutic Critique</td>
<td>Rational Presentation of Self</td>
<td>Truth - fullness</td>
<td>Subjective</td>
<td>Expressive</td>
<td>Self Knowledge</td>
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<td>Sincerity</td>
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Central to Habermas' work are three rationality complexes. The Cognitive-Instrumental, Moral-Practical and Aesthetic-Practical forms of rationality. Corresponding to these complexes are three systems of reference: The objective, social and subjective "worlds". Actors can adopt three basic attitudes in reference to these "worlds": the objectivating, norm-conformative and expressive attitudes. To the extent that actors adopt the three basic attitudes, an increase in rationality and accumulation of knowledge develops in the corresponding realms respectively. For example, to the extent that actors adopt an objectivating attitude toward the world of nature and other subjects, Cognitive-Instrumental rationalization occurs and the accumulation of a stock of scientific and technological knowledge develops. Habermas argues that the differentiation of the realms of science, ethics and aesthetics in modernity is accompanied by the institutionalization of knowledge pertaining to these realms in the academic institutions, research institutes, the various professions, judicial administrative systems and the institutions which facilitate the production and critique of autonomous art.

To the extent that this process occurs, the discursive redemption of validity claims pertinent to each realm is opened up to the potential for rational grounding through argumentation processes.

Figure 1 is a summary of concepts discussed under the complex concept of communicative rationality. Habermas employs these concepts in his assessment of rationalization as reification in the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and Lukacs.

4.4 Rationalization as Reification

Habermas introduces his critique of the work of Adorno and Horkheimer by stating that a change in paradigm, from a teleological model of human action to a communicative model of action, is required so that the rationalization of society can be adequately captured. He says:

"The rationalization of society would then no longer mean the diffusion of purposive rational-action and the transformation of domains of communicative action into subsystems of purposive rational action. The point of reference becomes instead the potential for rationality found in the validity basis of speech. This potential is never completely stilled,
but can be activated at different levels, depending on the degree of rationalization of knowledge incorporated into world views. Inasmuch as social actions are coordinated through reaching understanding, the formal conditions of rationally motivated agreement specify how participant's relations to one another can be rationalized. As a general principle, they count as rational to the extent that the yes/no decisions that carry a given consensus issues from the interpretive processes of the participants themselves. Correspondingly, a life-world can be regarded as rationalized to the extent that it permits interactions that are not guided by normatively ascribed agreement but - directly or indirectly - by communicatively achieved understanding."

(1984:340 emphasis mine.)

Here Habermas is casting his concept of rationalization into the new framework of Communicative Action, Communicative Judgement and the Life-World. He invokes the concept communicative rationality, as outlined in this chapter indicating the potential for the rationalization of society. He aims to show that the location of the concept of rationality and rationalization processes in his new framework obviates the error of understanding rationality as an "attitude" or orientation to action. Habermas argues for a clear distinction between the concept of rationality and the basic attitudes which actors assume in apprehending their three "worlds" and the forms of knowledge pertinent to the decentered orientation to reality. He holds that although Adorno and Horkheimer develop a radical critique of formal (Instrumental) rationality, in Weber's sense, they adhere to the premise that rationality is an attitude toward action. The reception of the Weberian concept of formal rationality in the work of the Adorno and Horkheimer, is influenced by Lukacs' view of the rationalization process as a process of reification. Habermas holds that the concept, reification, in the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and Lukacs, is understood as a "category of the philosophy consciousness: it was discerned in the attitudes and modes of behaviour of individuals." (1986:380). Habermas' critique unfolds in three phases. In the first phase of the critique, he compares the concept of rationalization held by Weber with that of Horkheimer. He focuses upon their respective "diagnoses of the times" which
is circumscribed by two theses:
1. The thesis of the loss of meaning in a disenchanted world.

He then discusses Lukacs' concept of reification.

In the last phase of the critique, Habermas assesses Adorno and Horkheimer's view of rationalization as reification. I briefly analyse each phase in turn. I do not deal with the issue as to whether Habermas' interpretation of these scholar's work is cogent in the sense of strict exegesis since this is not his intent (10).

4.4.1 Max Weber and Max Horkheimer's Diagnosis of the Times.

Habermas ignores the work of Horkheimer prior to 1940. He states that the "Eclipse of Reason" which is a "systematic summing up" of the position reached by Adorno and Horkheimer in the "Dialectic of the Enlightenment", is his focus of attention (1984:347) (11). He points out for Horkheimer and Weber "formal rationality underlies our contemporary culture" (1984:345).

Habermas argues that formal rationality in Weber's sense:
1. Enables men to act in a calculable manner.
2. Enables men to calculate or determine the efficacy of means thus facilitating instrumental action.
3. Enables men to indicate the "correctness" of the selection of means in their strategic interaction with other subjects.

Thus formal rationality is circumscribed by the attitudes of calculability and efficacy in the "determination" of the correct means to achieve ends (Habermas 1984:345). Here Habermas focuses upon subjective attitudes and the means-ends schema in terms of which the concept of formal rationality is understood. He says that Weber differentiates between the "subjective preferences" of formal rationality and the "substantive" appraisal of the values underlying the "subjective preferences" (Habermas 1984:345). He argues that here Weber merely addresses the question of the orientations to action which are "determined by cognitive-instrumental rationality without regard to the standards of morality or aesthetically practical rationality" (Habermas 1984:345). Thus the concepts of practical rationality and aesthetic rationality which Habermas is able to incorporate in his concept communicative rationality are not considered by Weber in his view of formal rationality which characterises the
modern capitalist society. Weber emphasises that an increase in formal rationality occurs when the spheres of "scientifically organized learning processes" are differentiated from the spheres of "cognitive value" orientations in modernity (Habermas 1984:345). Here Habermas is employing the decentration thesis to indicate that a differentiation occurs between the realms of fact and value in a modern, disenchanted world. Extended chains of means-ends modes of action can then be systematically appraised under the "validity aspects of truth and efficacy and improved upon in the sense of formal rationality" (Habermas 1984:345). Thus to the extent that cognitive-instrumental rationality orientates action and is institutionalized, an increase in formal rationality occurs in capitalist society for Weber.

Horkheimer in contrast, stresses the loss in rationality which occurs when actions are "judged, planned and justified only under cognitive aspects", Habermas explains (1984:345). He objects to a concept of reason understood as the mere regulation between means and ends of human action. Horkheimer says that "When the idea of reason was conceived, it was intended to achieve more than the mere regulation between means and ends; it was regarded as the instrument for understanding the ends, for determining them."

(Horkheimer cited in Habermas 1984:345 emphasis in text)

Horkheimer is seen to appropriate a view of "understanding" deriving from the work of Kant in terms of which the "subject knows and acts in accordance with technical imperatives." (Habermas 1984:345). Thus Horkheimer's view of understanding is rooted in the Kantian tradition in which the subject uses his consciousness as a tool to "determine" ends. Understanding as a communicative process whereby unique individuals reveal themselves and their plans of action in a situation of dialogue is not considered by Horkheimer. Man the tool making animal, apprehending the world on the grounds of work, or purposive rationality is thematic in Horkheimer's work. For Habermas imperatives are "normatively unauthorised demands" and a "Yes/No" response to these demands means that the actor is subject to the will of another. Horkheimer's subject then acts on the basis of a form of rationality which is an arbitrary reaction to power claims. Here the concept of rationality is implicitly grounded in domination of man over man and the communicative redemption of
validity claims is eclipsed.

For Weber and Horkheimer the disenchantedment of cosmological/metaphysical world views is brought about by the permeation of formal rationality into all spheres of life. The unity of "the good", "the true" and "the beautiful" which circumscribes cosmological/metaphysical world views is fragmented in modernity. Horkheimer names the unity of reason deriving from the ontological thinking where the human world is held to be part of the cosmological order, "objective reason" (Habermas 1984:345). Formal or instrumental reason is called "subjective reason" and it is directed toward the calculation of means and ends directing behaviour rather than addressing the universal concepts of mankind. Horkheimer holds that "objective reason",

"did not focus on the coordination of behaviour and aim, but on concepts—however mythological they may seem to us today—on the idea of the greatest good, on the problem of human destiny, and on the way of realization of ultimate goals (sic)....The philosophical systems of objective reason implied the conviction that an all-embracing or fundamental structure of being could be discovered and a conception of human destination derived from it."

(Horkheimer cited in Habermas 1984:346)

In a disenchanted world, questions of scientific truth are separated from questions of morality and beauty. Science is distinguished from morality and art. Horkheimer emphasises that one can no longer speak of aesthetic and moral rationality since these realms have lost their immanent claim to objective validity and "objective reason". The metaphysical/religious realms are "subjectivized" in the form of rigid dogma, tradition and subjective belief. Objective reason is no longer able to provide a unified meaning to life since it is undermined by the formal reason of science, the realm of calculable and predictable "facts" divorced from values. Meaning, which derives from values, is eroded by the permeation of instrumental reason into the institutional realms of life. Instrumental reason becomes the tool for the self-preservation of self-interested men/women, Horkheimer argues. Habermas holds that Horkheimer and Weber agree on the fundamental aspects of their diagnosis of the times:

1. The credibility of religious and metaphysical worldviews are
undermined by the rationalization processes. The Enlightenment which initiated the critique of ancient theology and ontology is irreversible.

2. Modernity is characterized by the differentiation of culture into the spheres of science, art and morality. Faith is privatized while art and morality are divorced from "claims to propositional truth" (Habermas 1984:350). Science in the form of purposive-rational action "forfeits its relation to communicative practice" (Habermas 1984:350). Here Habermas is invoking his own view of praxis, as communicative action. He says that moral-practical reason is seen to be eclipsed in modernity by Horkheimer and Weber.

3. Subjective reason (instrumental reason) is understood as a tool for self-preservation in a world in which actors orientate themselves towards irreconcilable "gods and demons". (Habermas 1984:350). This form of reason is no longer able to "bestow" meaning but threatens the "unity of the life-world and therewith the integration of society" (Habermas 1984:350). Here Habermas invokes his concept of the life-world to indicate that social integration is endangered by instrumental reason.

Weber and Horkheimer derive the thesis of the loss of freedom in modernity, from the Protestant ethic of asceticism. They argue that the ethic of a methodological and purposive-rational orientation to life permeates the institutional framework of society. To the extent that the economic, administrative, judicial and scientific realms are "rationalized" individuals increasingly find themselves to be locked into an "administered world" as Adorno puts it. Habermas states that "Adorno's formula of an administered world is an equivalent for Weber's vision of an "iron cage"" (1984:351). This loss of freedom for Weber and the Frankfurt scholars, stems from the sub-system of purposive rationality which permeates the life-world, Habermas argues. Although Weber and Horkheimer conceive of the loss of freedom from the perspective of action and psycho-analytic theory respectively, both scholars hold a view of modernity in which moral-practical rationality is eclipsed, Habermas concludes.

4.4.2 Lukacs' Concept of Reification

Habermas holds that Lukacs uses the concept of reification to
sever Weber's analysis of "societal rationalization from its a action-theoretic framework and relate it to anonymous processes of capital realisation within the economic system" (1984:354).

Lukacs attempts to clarify the relationship between the economic system based on exchange value on the one hand, and the manner in which the life-world is "deformed" by this system on the other hand (Habermas 1984:355). Habermas states that for Lukacs, "in the structure of the commodity relation [can] be found the model of all the forms of objectivity in bourgeois society, together with all the form (sic) of subjectivity corresponding to them" (Lukacs cited in Habermas 1984:355).

Lukacs uses the phrase "form of objectivity", in a similar manner to Dilthey, Habermas argues. Here, "form of objectivity" means the form of thought or existence which has developed historically and "characterizes the totality of the stage of development of society as a whole" (Lukacs cited in Habermas 1984:355). Lukacs views society from an historical perspective as changing forms of objectivity. Habermas stresses that, "Lukacs, like Horkheimer, holds on to the Hegelian idea that in the relation of human beings to one another and to nature, (to external as well as to their internal nature), reason is objectivated - in however unreasonable a manner" (1984:355 emphasis mine).

Capitalist society is seen to be characterized by a specific "form of objectivity" or existence which determines the manner in which its members interpret objective nature, interpersonal relations and themselves. The form of reason which predominates in capitalist society and which is increasingly objectivated is instrumental rationality. For Lukacs, the permeation of instrumental reason into all spheres of the life context means that these realms are reified. Habermas explains that reification means, "the assimilation of social relations and subjective experiences to things, that is to objects that we can perceive and manipulate. The three worlds are so lopsidedly coordinated that category mistakes are built into our understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective experiences; we apprehend them under the form of things, as entities that belong to the objective world, although they
are really elements of our common social world or of an individual subjective world. To this must be added the following: because understanding and apprehending are constitutive for communicative intercourse itself, a systematically ingrained misunderstanding of this kind affects not only the subjects' forms of thought, but their forms of existence as well. It is the life-world itself which is reified". (1984:356 emphasis mine)

Habermas argues that Lukacs develops his concept of reification from Marx's analysis of the commodity form encompassing use value and exchange value. Lukacs is interested in the manner in which social labour occurs in capitalist society. As long as the realm of social labour is regulated by traditional norms, individuals enter into communicative relations with one another and do so intentionally, Habermas argues. But, where the production of goods are

"organised as the production of exchange values and the labor power of producers is itself exchanged as a commodity, another medium for the co-ordination of action is force: Economically relevant action orientations are detached from the lifeworld context and linked to the medium of exchange value (or money). To the extent that interactions are no longer coordinated through norms and values, but through the medium of exchange value, actors have to assume an objectivating attitude to one another (and themselves)."

(Habermas 1984:358 emphasis mine)

Central to Habermas' interpretation is the thesis that the objectivating attitude is universalized in Lukacs' analysis of capitalist society. Habermas argues that in this view of society, the concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality is universalised and practical and moral aesthetic forms of rationality are eclipsed. He holds that Lukacs uses the Hegelian premise of an ethical totality, understood as the "rationally organized life-context" as his standard against which he characterises rationalization in Weber's sense, as the progressive reification of the totality. Thus Lukacs

"implicitly denies Weber's central assertion to the effect that the metaphysically conceived unity of reason had fallen apart once and for all with the separation of cultural value spheres, each with its own inner logic; and that it couldn't
be put back together again, not even dialectically." (Habermas 1984:357 emphasis in text)

Habermas rejects this strain of absolute idealism in Lukacs' work. He concludes that Lukacs' achievement is that of uniting the work of Marx and Weber such that one is able to view the "decoupling of the sphere of social labor from the life-world context simultaneously under two aspects: as reification and rationalization" (Habermas 1984:359)

4.4.3. Rationalization as Reification in the work of Adorno and Horkheimer

Adorno and Horkheimer detach the concept of reification from the historical context of Capitalist society of Lukacs' perspective. They generalise this concept temporally to cover the entire history of the species, Habermas argues. They also generalise the concept substantively such that the same logic of domination, the logic of the means-ends orientation to action, which characterises the concept cognitive-instrumental rationality, is held to pertain to man's relation to man, and man's relation to the external world of nature. Thus the "objectivating attitude" is generalized in this truncated view of rationalization understood as reification. This "double generalization" of the concept of reification means for Habermas that the basis of rational discourse, namely communicative action and judgement is eclipsed in the work of Adorno and Horkheimer. Habermas argues that these scholars reduce the concept of critical reflection to a form of imitation or what they name "mimesis" as the only source of emancipation which is to be found in the realms of esoteric art. Habermas says in this regard:

"the paradox which the critique of instrumental reason is entangled, and which stubbornly resists even the most subtle dialectic, consists in this: Adorno and Horkheimer would have to put forward a theory of mimesis, which according to their own ideas, is impossible." (1984:382)

Adorno and Horkheimer hold a position which obviates the development of a theory which encompasses the possibility for emancipation in the totally reified or administered society, Habermas argues. Thus the possibility for critical reflective judgement is undermined in their perspective. The very possibility of critical theory is abrogated and the discursive
redemption of validity claims is eclipsed under the spell of instrumental reason or reified consciousness characteristic of modern men/women. Habermas holds that this situation which these scholars manoeuvre themselves into stems from their teleological model of human agency, the philosophy consciousness in which their perspective moves, and the notion that rationality is an "attitude" appended to action. Habermas stresses that for Adorno, instrumental reason, as reified consciousness, pertains not only to the critique of "identifying" thought but also to the goal directed activity of subjects who strive for self-preservation. He says that here:

"thought is in the service of technical mastery over, and informed adaptation to, an external nature that is objectivated in the behavioural circuit of instrumental action. It is instrumental reason that is at the basis of reified consciousness. In this way, Horkheimer and Adorno anchor the mechanism that produces the reification of consciousness in the anthropological foundations of the history of the species, in a form of existence of a species that has to reproduce itself through labor...Instrumental reason is set out in concepts of subject-object relations. The interpersonal relation between subject and subject which is decisive for the model of exchange, has no constitutive significance for instrumental reason." (1984:379)

Horkheimer and Adorno are held to share with the great tradition of thought the contemplative stance as a form of theory which is "diverted from practice", it aims at the unity between nature and the human world in its efforts to "get beyond the break of culture with nature" (Habermas 1984:385). Habermas concludes that although Adorno attempts to escape the conceptual framework of cognitive instrumental rationality through the use of the notion of mimesis, the mimetic capacity "counts as the sheer opposite of reason, as impulse" (1984:390). Habermas argues that the

"rational core of mimetic achievements can be laid open only if we give up the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness namely, a subject that represents objects and toils with them - in favour of a paradigm of linguistic philosophy- namely, that of intersubjective understanding or communication - and puts the cognitive instrumental aspects
of reason in its proper place as part of a more encompassing communicative rationality." (1984:390)

For Habermas this means that a change is required at the level of one's understanding of human agency. He argues for a change from goal directed to communicative action and an effort to reconstruct the concept of rationality which becomes possible with the decentration of men/women's understanding of the world. Here the phenomena which need to be explained are no longer only the knowledge and mastery of objective nature, but also the possibilities for intersubjective understanding and communication. Thus the focus of investigation changes from cognitive-instrumental to communicative rationality. Habermas' life's work can be seen as an effort to break out of the confines of the one-dimensional concept of instrumental rationality with its means-ends schema and work model of human agency as the only form of rationality in modern society.
5.1 The Concept of Rationality: A General Perspective

In the preceding chapters, I have approached the concept of rationality in Habermas' work from a particular perspective. On the one hand, I have focused upon the impact of Arendt's work on that of Habermas. Arendt's reconstruction of the Aristotelian concepts of "praxis" and "poiesis" is central to the concept of human agency in the work of Habermas. Habermas, like Arendt, distinguishes between action as a making process and action as a communicative process. Throughout his work he attempts to relate these two aspects of human agency to the concepts of rationality, knowledge, and autonomy. Arendt's reconstruction of Kant's concept of reflective judgement is fundamental to Habermas' most recent argument for grounding the concept of rationality in general. Here Habermas links Arendt's concept of communicative judgement, men/women's capacity for saying Yes/No with the accompanying reasons, to universal validity claims which are recognized and redeemed through dialogue between at least two subjects. Another closely related theme which is internal to the concept of human agency and which permeates the fabric of Habermas' work is Arendt's concept of plurality. Habermas says of this concept:

"plurality concentrates on intersubjectivity of acting in concert, where the multiple perspectives of participants who occupy inevitably different standpoints, are reciprocally connected. The unifying power of intersubjectivity preserves the plurality of individual perspectives; even in the case of violent repression intersubjectivity cannot be replaced by a higher order of subjectivity. (1980:128).

Habermas and Arendt use the concept of plurality to stress the agent revealing character of intersubjectivity such that the disclosure of different perspectives is not overlooked. The concept of plurality is fundamental to the concept of intersubjective recognition and consensus formation in Habermas' work. I show how Habermas uses the concept of intersubjectivity
to clarify his concept of practical rationality in his later work and how intersubjective recognition is central to his most recent argument for grounding the concept of rationality in general.

On the other hand, I show how Habermas develops extensive and complex critiques of a range of scholars' views. Here he moves beyond the work of Arendt in his efforts to appropriate and re-formulate those aspects of the tradition of occidental rationality which he considers to be of importance to a critical theory of society. This form of critical theory is orientated toward a sustained critique of forms of domination and repression in society. The guiding thread of such a critical theory is the Enlightenment premise that the faculty of reason is essential to the achievement of autonomy, justice, responsibility and scientific progress. This premise must be seen within the context of the work of the Frankfurt scholars. The Frankfurt School of critical theory re-considered the Enlightenment concept of reason in the light of the works of Marx, Freud and Weber. In their early works they re-considered the bourgeois Enlightenment in their critique of the historical and social forces which obviated the realisation of autonomy of the historically situated subject. They held that the autonomous subject was not the isolated Cartesian ego as Kant thought, but the concrete and historically situated social subject. Habermas says of this work:

"In the form which it assumed in the Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung, critical theory renewed the affirmative moment in its relation to the philosophy of the bourgeois epoch. The theory of society had to take from the latter the concept of reason, without which it lost its normative basis." (1984:231)

After the horrors of Stalinism, Nazism and what seemed to be the total integration of the American populace into a thoroughly commodified and administered society, the Enlightenment concept of reason was subjected to relentless critique by Adorno and Horkheimer. Habermas holds that in the "Dialectic of the Enlightenment" (1947) these writers rejected the Enlightenment concept of reason and that the possibility of a critical theory of society was thereby abrogated (1982:232). He says:
"At that time, in 1941, Horkheimer and Adorno—and soon Marcuse as well—had lost their historico-philosophical faith in the rational potential of bourgeois culture which was to be set free in social movements under the pressure of developed forces of production. With that, the principal "lever" of the theory was also lost. Since that time the development of productive forces and critical thinking have appeared in the perspective of a cloudy mixture with, and assimilation to, their opposite: instrumental reason, having become total, embodies itself in totalitarian society. With this the classical form of critical theory fell apart...Adorno consistently renounced any attempt to gain back normative foundations. He gave himself over to the negativism of a thinking that saw in the solitary experience of a self-denying philosophy, going round in its own aporias, the only possibility of at least pointing to the contents of reason—however powerless—disguised in esoteric art". (1982:232)

One of the important yet implicit themes in Habermas' work is that of attempting to free critical theory from this impasse. He does not merely "point" towards a concept of reason which implies that freedom and enlightenment are only possible in the esoteric realm of "autonomous art" but strives to develop a critical theory of society which accounts for its normative foundations, for its status, by systematically grounding the concept of rationality to which it appeals. He does this in three stages. First he develops a threefold understanding of human agency via the work of Arendt. Here action as a communicative process, action as a making process and the communicative formation of power are thematic. In his early work, "Theory and Practice" (1963 / 1974), Habermas systematically reformulates the concept of rationality upon the foundation of human agency. He does this by applying the insights gleaned from Arendt's work to a critical assessment of the concept of rationality held by Aquinas, Machiavelli, More and Hobbes. Then in his later work, "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1968 / 1972), he attempts to ground the concept of rationality and the dimensions of human agency (communicative action, instrumental action and power) in a philosophy of critical reflection. He fuses the concept of reflection, in the sense of reflection on the conditions for the
possibility of knowledge, with an emancipatory concept of reflection. Here the attempt to ground the concept of rationality via a "quasi-trancendental" argument, where three knowledge constitutive interests mediate between three kinds of science and three kinds of human activity, flounders in the labyrinths of the philosophy of reflective consciousness. In his recent work, "The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society" (1984), Habermas grounds the concept of rationality in a theory of argumentation which links men/women's capacity for reflective communicative judgement to universal validity claims. Another important theme which is internal to the rationality problematic in Habermas' work is the empirical question concerning the sense in which the transition from traditional society to modern society can be viewed as a process of rationalization. I briefly assess some important aspects of these three inter-related themes, the concept of rationality in relation to human agency, the concept of rationality and its grounding, and Habermas' analyses of the rationalization processes.

5.2 The Concept of Rationality In Habermas' Early work.

Habermas aims at clarifying a communicative dimension of human rationality which is overlooked by Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse. I discuss the genesis of this theme in chapter one by analysing Habermas' critique of the works of Aquinas, More, Machiavelli and Hobbes in relation to the classical tradition of politics. Habermas focuses on the concept of society held by these scholars. He contrasts their views with a unique interpretation of the classical concept of community which is informed by the work of Arendt. Central to this interpretation of the classical Greek tradition is a particular view of man. Habermas and Arendt hold that for the Greeks, man was political by nature. Man's political nature was realised in the polis through communicative action (praxis), they argue. Habermas extends this thesis to the level of the concept of reason by arguing that practical reason was realised in the polis. For Habermas, practical rationality was achieved in the classical community through dialogue in the polis where the laws which circumscribed the daily activities of citizens were ratified through debate. Practical rationality was orientated toward the
prudential understanding of what was to be done in order to achieve a "good" and "just" way of life, he stresses. This concept of practical rationality, encompassing an orientation towards understanding, morality, critical reflection and consensus formation, can be seen as his first attempt to introduce a communicative dimension of rationality into social theory.

One of Habermas' goals in his early work was that of investigating how and why the classical concept of practical reason was eclipsed in modern society. He holds that in the transition from community to society, the concept of practical rationality was reduced to technical and strategic rationality. He reaches this conclusion by arguing that the classical concept of practical action in the sense of moral communicative action (praxis) was reduced to action understood as a form of making (poiesis) and control. For Habermas, Aquinas, Machiavelli, More and Hobbes each contributed to this process in their conceptions of a rationally ordered society. He comes to the conclusion that for Aquinas a rationally ordered society was achieved through uncontested rulership. Here the criteria of order were held to be the norms of peace, tranquillity and obedience. Thus for Aquinas the "rationally" ordered society was based on norms which ensured rulership and domination. Habermas comes to a similar conclusion in his analysis of the work of Machiavelli, More and Hobbes. He rejects these scholars views, since for Habermas a rationally ordered society is based on the norms of freedom, equality and justice. Thus in this early work Habermas investigates the normative foundation of the concept of reason held by Aquinas, Machiavelli, More and Hobbes.

I show how Habermas' argument with regard to Aquinas' work is not adequately substantiated. However, a crucial factor with regard to the concept of rationality is that Habermas introduces a communicative concept of power into the analysis. He hereby attempts to show that the concept of rationality held by Aquinas, Machiavelli, More and Hobbes was erroneous since domination and not freedom was its foundation. Habermas holds that in the transition from antiquity to modern society the domination of man by man via techniques of control became the criteria of a rationality ordered society. He says that,
"The real difficulty in the relation of theory to praxis does not arise from the new function of science as technological force, but rather from the fact that we are no longer able to distinguish between practical and technical power. Yet even a civilization that has been rendered scientific is not granted dispensation from practical questions: therefore a peculiar danger arises when the process of scientification transgresses the limit of technical questions, without however, departing from the level of reflection of a rationality confined to the technological horizon. For then no attempt at all is made to attain rational consensus on the part of citizens concerned with the practical control of their destiny. Its place is taken by the attempt to attain technical control over history by perfecting the administration of society, an attempt which is just as impractical as it is unhistorical. When theory was still related to praxis in a genuine sense, it conceived of society as a system of action by human beings, who communicate through speech and thus must realize social intercourse within the context of conscious communication...a theory which confuses control with action is no longer capable of such a perspective. It understands society as a nexus of behavioural modes, for which rationality is mediated solely by understanding societal controls." (1974:255)

Thus one of the important aspects of Habermas' early attempt to link theoretical rationality to practical rationality is the distinction between "practical power" (the communicative formation of power) and "technical power". Habermas argues that practical power is achieved through communicative action and consensus formation and that technical power (force) is the behaviourist, unreflective application of technical controls. This theme is highly suggestive but is not adequately substantiated. One could argue that forms of force could be ratified through debate.

Another important thesis which is introduced but not explained adequately is that "society was conceived as a system of action" (1974:255). The reader is not told by whom society was conceived as a system of action such that theoretical reason and practical reason were "genuinely" connected. Habermas implies that the
classical Greek society was understood as a "system of action". One can argue that in his unique interpretation of the classical Greek tradition, Habermas pre-supposes that society is a "system of action". The system of action which Habermas invokes in this early work derives from Hannah Arendt's understanding of action as a way of life (vita activa) in the Greek tradition. The trichotomous concept of action which Arendt develops in "The Human Condition" (1958) is pre-supposed in Habermas' assessment of the classical Greek tradition. This is evident from the manner in which Habermas uses the concepts communicative action ("praxis"), work ("poiesis"), craftsmanship ("techne"), power and force.

In chapter one I show how Habermas comes to the conclusion that Machiavelli, More and Hobbes break through the barrier between communicative action and productive action (praxis and poiesis). These scholars adopt a model of action which for Arendt and Habermas means "acting in the mode of producing" (Arendt cited in Habermas 1974:60). Habermas stresses that for Machiavelli, More and Hobbes, the actor rationally selects specific means, legal techniques and strategies of force, in order to achieve an end defined as producing or making an ordered society. Rational action then is understood as a form of making, and the form of knowledge this entails is that of workmanlike skill (techne). Thus the "production" or "work" model of human action is central to the concepts of strategic and technical rationality in these theories of society. Thus the concept of rationality in Habermas' early work encompassing:

1. Practical rationality
2. Technical rationality
3. Strategic rationality

is clarified through a specific view of human agency. This view of human agency is based upon a reconstruction of the Aristotelian concepts of "praxis" and "poieis" understood as communicative action and productive action respectively.

The links between the concept of rationality and the concepts of freedom, force, and power in Habermas' early work remain at the level of suggestion and do not fulfil the conditions of explanation.
5.3 Theoretical Rationality and the Cessation of Action

Habermas holds that theoretical rationality in the classical Greek tradition meant contemplation of the rationally ordered cosmos. This was achieved when communicative action ceased, he argues. Here the soul of man was mimetically brought into accord with the rational motion of the cosmos. He says:

"Through the soul's likening itself to the ordered motion of the cosmos, theory enters the conduct of life. In ethos theory molds life to its form and is reflected in the conduct of those who subject themselves to its discipline. This concept of theory and of life in theory has defined philosophy since its beginnings. The distinction between theory in this traditional sense and theory in the sense of critique was the object of one of Max Horkheimer's most important studies. Today, a generation later, I should like to reexamine (sic) this theme, starting with Husserl's The Crisis of the European Sciences, which appeared at about the same time as Horkheimer's" (1972:302)

Habermas re-examined this theme, by distinguishing between practical and theoretical rationality on the basis of Arendt's distinction between an active way of life (vita activa) and a contemplative way of life (vita contemplativa).

In "Theory and Practice" (1963/1974) he used this distinction in order to challenge Horkheimer's interpretation of the break with the classical tradition of politics. He concluded that Horkheimer's view of Machiavelli's theory of society was erroneous since theoretical reason as the contemplation of the cosmos was only eclipsed in a mechanistically conceived universe. This only came to the fore in the work of Hobbes, Habermas argued.

In "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1971), which was published eight years after "Theory and Practice", Habermas invoked this distinction again in order to refute Schelling and Husserl's call for a revival of the classical concept of theory. He then uses this distinction to challenge authors who adhere to the "contemplative stance" which is analogous to the concept of theoretical reason in the classical Greek tradition in that the connection between knowledge, interest and action was disavowed. In "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1971), Habermas rejected the
"contemplative stance" in the work of Dilthey and Peirce which prevented them developing an adequate concept of rational reflection such that consensus formation could be accounted for. In his most recent assessment of Adorno and Horkheimer's work, Habermas says:

"On the one hand, the theory takes on features of a rather traditional "contemplation" that renounces its relations to practice; at the same time, it cedes to art the competence to represent a reason that is now appealed to only indirectly." (1984:367)

Thus, from his earliest to his most recent work, Habermas invokes the catch phrase "contemplative stance" or the "contemplative" concept of theoretical reason in his critique of other scholars' work. Thus the distinction which Arendt makes between a contemplative way of life (vita contemplativa) and an active way of life (vita activa) is extended to the concept of rationality and is systematically used by Habermas in order to refute arguments where the concept of theoretical rationality disavows the connection between reason and action.

The important aspect of this theme is that Habermas holds that the classical view of theory meant contemplation of the rationally ordered cosmos and that contemplation was achieved through mimesis or imitation. Habermas does not clarify the concept of mimesis. How the classical Greek philosopher brought "his soul into accord" with the rationally ordered universe by imitation is a mystery which Habermas does not explain. He invokes the obscure concept of mimesis in order to argue that the notion of a rationally ordered universe was an "objectivistic illusion" in antiquity. This does seem to be plausible, but, the relationship between the mimetic process itself and the illusion of a rationally ordered cosmos is not addressed. Habermas immediately proceeds to argue that contemplation in the classical Greek tradition was a form of emancipation from the irritating influences of man's interest in action. Once again, this highly plausible suggestion is not adequately substantiated. Thus Habermas' concept of theoretical rationality in the classical Greek tradition is based on a tenuous argument. His numerous charges against scholars who adhere to the "contemplative" view of theoretical reason are then also open to question. The catch phrase "contemplative stance" or "contemplative concept" of
reason has become a methodological tenet which Habermas invokes consistently in his critique of other scholars' work. It is also a conclusion which is accepted without critique in secondary literature on Habermas's work (1). Habermas' extensive use of this catch phrase also contradicts his earlier view of the "genuine" relation between practical and theoretical rationality in the classical Greek tradition which was central to his introduction of a communicative concept of rationality into social theory.

5.4 The Concept of Rationality in Relation to Human Agency in Habermas' Later and Recent works.

Habermas' second attempt at articulating social change, understood as the transition from traditional to modern society, occurs in the complex critique of Marcuse and Weber's work. Here the distinction between communicative action and productive action is emphasised. This distinction is recast into a modern framework encompassing the philosophy of science, the Weberian concept of purposive rationality and sociological theory stressing roles, norms and sanctions. Habermas names this the distinction between work and interaction. He uses the work/interaction distinction (represented in Figure 11 on the following page) to introduce a new concept of society and to reformulate Weber's concept of rationalization. Habermas holds that the "institutional framework" or "socio-cultural life-world" of society consists of norms which guide symbolic interaction. This minimal definition of the life-world is further developed in his most recent work. In "Towards a Rational Society" he stresses that subsystems of purposive rational action (the economy and the state apparatus) are "embedded" in the socio-cultural life-world (Habermas 1971:94). Thus society is seen as a system of norms which "guide" interaction. Rationalization can then be shown to occur in two dimensions, Habermas argues. Namely rationalization from "above" and rationalization from "below". Rationalization from below is defined as the permeation of subsystems of instrumental and strategic action into the institutional framework of society. Instrumental and strategic rationality are seen to permeate realms such as the organisation of labour, trade, legal systems, financial, administrative and educative systems.
Figure 11: THE WORK / INTERACTION DISTINCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERACTION</th>
<th>WORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INSTUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>SUBSYSTEMS OF PURPOSES-RATIONAL ACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Interaction</td>
<td>Instrumental and Strategic Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rules of Action</th>
<th>Social Norms</th>
<th>Technical Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Reciprocal Expectations about Behaviour</td>
<td>Conditional Predictions Imperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquisition</td>
<td>Role Internalization</td>
<td>Learning skills and qualifications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Function of Action | Maintenance of Institutions (conformity to norms on the basis of reciprocal expectations and enforcement) | Problem-solving (goal attainment, defined in means-ends relations) |

| Violition of Rules | Punishment via Conventional Sanctions: Failure against Authority | Inefficiency: Failure in Reality |

**RATIONALIZATION**
- EMANCIPATION, INDIVIDUATION;
- EXTENSION OF COMMUNICATION;
- FREE OF DOMINATION

**GROWTH OF PRODUCTIVE FORCES**
- EXTENSION OF TECHNICAL CONTROL AND POWER

Source: Adaptation of Table in Habermas (1974:93)
Rationalization from below thus means that progress in the productive forces is accompanied by the permeation of technical and scientific forms of control into the various realms of the life-world. Rationalization from above means that traditional world views lose their legitimacy and are transformed via the critique of tradition into secular, scientific modes of apprehending the world. This is also accompanied by the potential for the emancipation of the individual from dogmatism and for communication free from domination, Habermas argues. He calls for a clear distinction between the rationalization of communicative action and the rationalization of productive action. Rationalization of productive action entails an increase in instrumental rationality in that efficient, effective and calculable means to achieve ends are increasingly institutionalized in the life-world. Habermas holds that rationalization at the level of communicative action entails unrestricted, public critique of the permeation of instrumental rationality into the life-world. This thesis remains at the level of suggestion. In "Knowledge and Human Interests", he attempts to clarify and extend this thesis at the methodological level of analysis by invoking Freud's concept of therapeutic dialogue. He fails to explain just what communicative rationality entails at the societal level of analysis. One of his aims in the early and later work is to show that society is not totally rationalized by the permeation of instrumental reason into all spheres of life as Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse hold. I show how Habermas refutes this one-dimensional thesis of rationalization in Marcuse's work by invoking Arendt's view that communicative action is one of the fundamental conditions of life. In contrast to the Frankfurt scholars, Habermas consistently holds that men/women's claim to reason cannot be silenced. He says that as long as people talk to one another with the intention of reaching consensus, claims to equality, justice and freedom from domination cannot be totally suppressed. I show, amongst other things, that Habermas' complex analysis of rationalization from above and below is limited to the level of description and that he is not able to explain why the change from traditional to modern society occurs. I also show how Habermas bases his critique of Marcuse's concept of rationality upon Arendt's trichotomous view of a life of action. Habermas comes to the
conclusion that Weber, Marcuse and Parsons adopt a subjective approach to the concept of rationality in that they see rationality as an "attitude" towards action. In his most recent work he argues that Adorno and Horkheimer also understand rationality as an "attitude" towards action. This notion of rationality as an "attitude" toward action is one of the major themes which Habermas attempts to obviate in his later works.

He approaches this complex question by re-thinking or re-formulating the Enlightenment scholars' premise that reason encompasses the will to achieve autonomy, justice and responsibility. The crucial question for Habermas becomes that of articulating this will to achieve autonomy, justice and responsibility in a non-idealistic fashion. He opposes the Hegelian view of reason dynamically actualizing itself in history. This notion of reason is unconvincing in the light of the horrors which the peoples of the world, and the German nation in particular, have experienced in the twentieth century.

Another dimension of this question is that of the unprecedented progress of the natural sciences, independent of the metaphysics of reason. How then is rationality to be understood? Is the epigraph of modernity nothing more than the progressive permeation of a purposive, value neutral instrumental reason into all spheres of life, culminating in the "iron cage" of an instrumentally rational world devoid of meaning? Habermas rejects this universalization of the means-ends notion of rationality which Weber, Adorno and Horkheimer bequest to social theory. Here the technical organization of the society is judged to entail an increase in purposive rationality for Weber, a decrease in rationality for Horkheimer and the eclipse of rationality for Adorno. Here women/ men as communicative actors are eclipsed by the monological orientation of men/ women the tool-makers. Habermas argues that one approach to the concept of rationality is via the insights of the Enlightenment thinkers in a manner which incorporates the rationality internal to the empirical and hermeneutic sciences and clearly locates the limits to the forms of rationality central to each form of science. The instrumental rationality of the empirical sciences can provide cures for cancer one day, can enable women to smile through the labour of childbirth through the use of epidural anaesthesia but this is achieved through a monological form of abstract language.
Men/Women the speakers, communicating in a non-strategic, non-violent manner surely cannot be limited to the uniform mode of abstract, symbolic language. Thus the dialogic form of language usage whereby unique individuals show themselves through expression and action need not be eclipsed by the form of rationality internal to the empirical-analytic sciences. The central premise here is that the instrumental rationality of the empirical-analytic sciences and practical rationality of the historic-hermeneutic sciences are not disavowed as mere "manifestations" of absolute reason, as Hegel would have said. Habermas rejects the Hegelian concept of universal reason. Thus the concept of rationality in Habermas' work cannot be understood as a modern form of Hegelianism. Habermas is not, as scholars such as Bubner hold, attempting to develop a comprehensive, all-inclusive concept of rationality. Bubner claims that Habermas' endeavour is that of displaying the "self movement of reason" as it traverses the various stages of reflection in "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1982:55). He sees Habermas as striving to free himself from the "tradition of a divided concept of reason. He is seeking to construct a dialectical unity, by presenting every theory that is distinct from practical reason as a false appearance which must be overcome".

(Habermas 1982:55 emphasis in text).

Habermas would call this "epistemological imperialism", which is his charge against Hegel. In the discussion of the empirical-analytic sciences for instance, the concept of instrumental rationality is held to be rooted in the pre-scientific realm of purposive rational action (work or poiesis). It is related via the technical interest to the methodological realm of inquiry and is certainly not held to be a "false" form of reason. Habermas does not view this form of rationality as surface "appearance" which must be overcome by the "movement" of the concept of practical rationality held by the men/women of wisdom. The knowledge constitutive interest in emancipation is an attempt to relate, but does not eclipse, the forms rationality internal to the empirical and hermeneutic sciences. I stress that Habermas attempts to clarify the forms of rationality internal to the sciences and to indicate their limits. He holds that scientific progress depends on instrumental rationality and that
the communication between scientists, at the meta-theoretical level of analysis, requires communicative rationality for consensus formation. Thus one concept of rationality cannot be subsumed under the other. Habermas' most recent statement with regard to this misconception that he attempts to cede primacy to one all inclusive concept of practical rationality is as follows:

"problems can be sorted out in terms of questions having to do with truth, justice, or taste. Only at the cost of Occidental rationalism itself could we rescind the differentiation of reason into those rationality complexes to which Kant's three critiques of reason refer. Nothing is further from my intention than to make myself an advocate of such a regression, to conjure up the substantial unity of reason" (1983:235)

In his most recent work Habermas distinguishes between cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical and aesthetic rationality. Piaget's decentration thesis is invoked to explain how adults are able to adopt differentiated and reflective attitudes toward the objective, social and subjective "worlds".

If one approaches the complex concept of communicative rationality in Habermas' most recent work from what I name the Perspective of Communicative Judgement and Life-world, one is able to show how he grounds his concept of communicative rationality upon a theory of communicative judgement - what Habermas calls "argumentation theory". Here Habermas connects the conditions for the validity of utterances to what Arendt calls the "standard" of reflective judgement. Namely, the formal declaration of "approbation and disapprobation", the "Yes/No" response of the communicating subject (Arendt 1982:69). Habermas stresses that when validity claims are implicitly or explicitly raised, the listener ONLY has the choice of accepting or rejecting these criticizable claims in the light of reasons held by communicating subjects. He distinguishes between taking a "Yes/No" position on validity claims and the "Yes/No" response to imperatives. For Habermas imperatives are "normatively unauthorised demands" and a "Yes/No" on such demands amounts to complying with, or refusing to comply with, the will of another (Habermas 1984:38). The four universal validity claims are held
to be the universal conditions for the possibility of unconstrained consensus between at least two communicating subjects. When the claims to validity are not operative, consensus breaks down and the conditions for the possibility of understanding and meaning are abrogated. Habermas thus grounds his concept of communicative rationality upon a concept of reflective judgement deriving from the work of Arendt where the criterion of communicative judgement is its communicability and its standard is the formal declaration of approval or disapproval with accompanying reasons. The three rationality complexes can then be connected to the three attitudes which subjects adopt in apprehending their world through the concept of learning, which Habermas holds is "interwoven" with grounding.

In "Knowledge and Human interests" Habermas attempted to ground the concept of rationality at the methodological level of analysis through the Freudian concept of psychotherapeutic dialogue. One of the conditions for the possibility of reflective consciousness in the psychotherapeutic dialogue was the Socratic question and answering process where the patient said "Yes / No" to the interpretation constituted as therapy progressed. Habermas was not able to develop this theme at the societal level of analysis. He was also criticised for the asymmetrical nature of the psychotherapeutic dialogue in that the patient and therapist are not equal partners in the dialogue situation. When the Perspective of Communicative Judgement and Life-World are in focus, the so-called "linguistic turn" in his work can be seen in a new light. Habermas no longer attempts to ground the concept of rationality in a philosophy of reflective consciousness but rather upon a unique interpretation of reflective judgement deriving from the work of Arendt. The "Yes/No" response of the patient in therapeutic dialogue is now understood as the "Yes/No" response which ensues between at least two subjects engaged in argumentation. Implicit in the therapeutic dialogue situation were the Enlightenment ideals of responsibility, freedom and equality. These ideals are subsequently incorporated in the theory of Universal Pragmatics via the conditions of symmetry and reciprocity as the conditions under which the forms of argumentation take place. Habermas stresses that the conditions of symmetry and reciprocity facilitate "rationally motivated"
consensus formation in theoretical and practical discourse situations. He argues that the subjects behave rationally when they exhibit their willingness to expose themselves to criticism and learn from mistakes made. There is a basic dilemma here. Participants enter into argumentation when the established background consensus becomes problematical or is challenged. Yet the formal conditions of argumentation stipulate that all motives, except the search for truth are suspended. Here Habermas pre-supposes the validity of unimpaired intersubjectivity. The pre-supposition is made that mutual recognition between conflicting parties is a condition for the possibility of redemption of validity claims. Yet the conflict may be such that that mutual recognition is not possible due to inequalities such as wealth, access to power and the differential status positions of subjects. The formal conditions of symmetry and reciprocity do not simply eliminate these real inequalities which do pertain to the life situations of subjects. Emotional, erotic, access to power, status or other factors which participants bring with them into the argumentation process cannot be simply "suspended" at will or through a formal rule which is stipulated by a scholar. The "willingness" of subjects to compromise and be "reasonable" rather than dogmatic or "deaf to the argument" in the face of a eloquently presented argument may well endanger true universalism. Scholars such as Livesay, Kernberg and Giddens object to fact that unconscious motives are not considered in Habermas' recent work which focuses on the rational reconstruction of the communicative rationality. The prevalence of the narcisstic personality in modern society, who strives for recognition at any cost and who is profoundly dependent on the admiration of others represents an important factor in the formation of intersubjective recognition which Habermas does not consider. Livesay says:

"Not only do the narcissist's intense envy of, lack of empathy for, and need to exploit others prevent the realization of genuine intersubjective understanding and frame all social action in desperately strategic terms, but they also threaten the accomplishment of decentration that Habermas sees as the very hallmark of modernity with a recentration of the world in the egocentric perspective of the narcissist." (1985:80)
His answer would be that psychopathology is accommodated in his concept of psychoanalytic critique and does not pertain to the rationality of discourse formation. If one accepts this argument, one could well ask Habermas whether there are any identifiable subjects in modern society who are "normal enough" to enter into argumentation and achieve communicative rationality.

However, the so-called "linguistic turn" in critical theory is a misnomer. There is rather, a "turn" from reflective consciousness to reflective, communicative judgement. Habermas' abstract "linguistic" work over the past fifteen years can be seen as an attempt to answer the following questions:

1. What are the conditions for the possibility of communicative judgement?
2. How does men/women's capacity for communicative judgement develop in the horizontal and vertical directions in the self-formative process of mankind?

By addressing these questions, Habermas attempts, via new means, to answer the question which has been thematic from his earliest work. Namely, that of clarifying a concept of communicative rationality which corresponds to men/women's capacity for communicative action.

Habermas holds that when the concept of rationality is placed within a perspective which emphasizes communicative action rather than action as means to an end, instrumental, practical, and aesthetic forms of rationality can be accounted for. He argues that the rationalization of society then no longer means that instrumental rationality permeates the realm of communicative action thus transforming the institutional framework or the life-world into subsystems of purposive rational action. The point of reference is rather the potential for rationality which is rooted in the "validity basis of speech" (Habermas 1984:340). He holds that this potential can never be silenced but can be "activated depending on the degree of rationalization of knowledge incorporated into world views" (Habermas 1984:340). To the extent that actors adopt an objectivating, norm-conformative and expressive attitudes toward the objective, social and subjective worlds respectively, and there is an increase in knowledge through the validation of validity claims raised, and an increase in rationality occurs. Thus rationalization can be
shown to occur in three dimensions. Namely as the increase in cognitive-instrumental, moral practical and aesthetic forms of rationality. Here the concept of rationality is clearly distinguished from the attitudes which subjects adopt.

Habermas uses the concept of communicative rationality and its grounding in communicative judgement to refute Adorno, Horkheimer and Lukacs' view of rationalization as reification. He concludes that these writers universalise the objectivating attitude and cognitive-instrumental rationality in their analysis of modern society. This stems from their adherence to the work model of human action where means-ends form of rationality is thematic. The communicative model of human action is not considered by these scholars. Horkheimer is shown to hold a concept of understanding where the subject acts according to technical imperatives. Subjects thus act on the basis of a form of rationality which for Habermas is an arbitrary reaction to the will of another. Habermas thus rejects Horkheimer's concept of understanding by invoking the "rational core" of his concept of communicative rationality. Namely the "Yes/No" response of the communicative men/women capable of reflective judgement. Habermas similarly invokes this fundamental aspect of his concept of communicative rationality to stress that understating and meaning are united through the interpreter's judgement of the validity claims raised by the actors of a alien community. This "rational core" of Habermas' concept of communicative rationality has become a second methodological tenet which Habermas consistently invokes in his critique of other scholars work. It is the key to his critique of the works of Parsons, Mead, Durkheim, Luhmann, the Frankfurt scholars, Foucault, Battaille, Lyotard and a host of other writers in his most recent work. Thus what I have named the Perspective of Communicative Judgement and Life-world is one way of coming to grips with the complex concept of communicative rationality in Habermas' work. In the final analysis, Habermas re-reformulates the Enlightenment concept of rationality through an integration of the work of Arendt with that of Weber, Piaget and Schutz. Central to the concept of rationality in Habermas' work are the reformulation of the Aristotelian concepts of praxis and "poiesis", the reformulation of the Kantian concept of judgement, the concept of the life-world and the decentration thesis of Piaget.
Notes To Introduction

1. Habermas' major works can be roughly divided into the early, later and recent periods.

**Early Works completed between 1960 and 1967**

"Toward a Rational Society" (1971) a collection of essays written in the 1960's


**Later Works completed between 1968 and 1979**

"Knowledge and Human Interests" (1972) First published in 1968.

"Legitimation Crisis" (1976)

"Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979)

**Recent works completed after 1980**

"The Theory of Communicative Action. vol 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society" (1984(a)).


"The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity" (1987).

See note 1 in Notes to Chapter 1 for a brief overview of the secondary literature with regard to the perspective gleaned from the work of Arendt.

2. Honneth, Knodler-Bün te and Widmann recently interviewed Habermas inquiring into his intellectual development and the motivation behind his work. Habermas consistently invoked the study on the Jewish philosophers in response to the interviewers questions. He emphasised the "rupture which still gapes" twenty five years after this work was first published. I regard this response as providing enough evidence to cast aside my usual caution when it comes to making connections between a scholar's work and the "psychological/biographical" factors which are known about a scholar. Habermas clearly indicates that these connections are pertinent to his endeavour.

See Habermas (1986:1;36;38;68;74;75.)

The experience of fascism certainly had an important effect on the work of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt school and the younger critical theorists who developed their work in this tradition. I reject Connerton's strong thesis that fascism totally determined the contours of their view of society. See Connerton (1980)
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3. Martin Jay (1973), David Held (1980), Judith Marcus and Zoltan Tar (1984), present three interpretations of what has come to be named the "Frankfurt School" of critical theory. Tar agrees with Lubasz's view that Jay's study is not a history of the school but rather a descriptive "chronicle of reminiscences and tends to ignore the real social and historical forces which shape the fate of the school and...its place in European intellectual history" (1984:17). Habermas' interpretation of the demise of its programs in 1941 confirms this interpretation of Jay's work. See Habermas (1984 (c):64)
Jay argues that the "school" ceased to exist due to financial problems. Lubasz documents the considerable budget of 100,000 dollars a year which was allocated to research during a period of economic depression. Tar argues that an accurate history of the institute has not been written as yet.

4. Scholars associated with the Institute of Social research, established by Hermann Weil in 1923, and contributing to the critical theory of society are: Erich Fromm, Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Henryk Grossmann, Arkadji, Gurland and Franz Neumann. Walter Benjamin was always an "outsider" due to Adorno's view of his "wide eyed empiricism" and "questionable association" (in Adorno's view that is) with the work of Brecht. Adorno benefited greatly from Benjamin's work as is documented by scholars such as Susan Buck-Mors. See Buck-Mors (1972) "Origin of Negative Dialects: Theodor Adorno Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt School"
See Ronald Taylor (ed) "Aesthetics and Politics: Debates Between Bloch, Lukacs, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno" (1977:105;127-150), for the primary sources on the relationship between Benjamin and Adorno and resulting in the suppression and dilution of Benjamin's the work on Baudelaire. Benjamin's theses on the philosophy of history were edited and published fifteen years after they were written. Shortly before Benjamin committed suicide, they were given to Adorno. Hannah Arendt was responsible for ensuring that these crucial works, which had a major impact upon critical theory, were edited and made public. See Elizabeth Young Bruehl (1982:166-168).

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1. Richard Bernstein (1976:259 note21) notes that Habermas acknowledges his debt to Arendt with regard to the distinction between "techne" and "praxis" in the work of Aristotle. He says that Arendt and Habermas attempt to unravel conceptual confusions which occur in the transition from antiquity to modernity, but he does not systematically analyze this problematic. He extracts aspects of Habermas' critique and compares these with other aspects drawn from "Dogmatism, Reason, and Decision: On Theory and Praxis in Our Scientific Civilization" (Habermas 1974:253). Bernstein presents these aspects to the reader in fragmentary form drawing from related but different arguments. The specific relationship between
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the work of Habermas and that of Arendt is not dealt with. Bernstein leaves out more than half of Habermas' critique of the classical tradition of politics in relation to modern social philosophy. Namely the transition from the Classical period through the Medieval period to the break with tradition where the works of Aquinas, Machiavelli and More are discussed.

Richard Brenstein (1983) develops a detailed comparison between Arendt, Habermas, Gadamer, and Rorty, in a general sense insofar as their work is seen to be converging toward a theory of rationality. Similarities and differences are drawn between the key concepts descriptively. Bernstein's aim is to compare the four theorists in a broad external way without exploring the internal relationships which certainly is of paramount importance with regard to Habermas who self-consciously draws from the insights of Arendt and Gadamer.

Seyla Benhabib (1986) is aware of the importance of Arendt's concepts in Habermas' work. She writes in a manner which not only indicates the integration of this domain into her theoretical horizon, but relies heavily on Arendt's concepts of plurality, interpretative indeterminacy, notion of subjectivity and the praxis, techné, poiesis distinctions in her critique of Hegel, Marx and the Critical Theorists including Habermas. Arendt is relegated to a footnote.

David Held (1980) accepts the conclusions of Habermas' early version of the public sphere and then focuses on issues raised in "Technology and Science as Ideology" which incorporate the insights gained in "Theory and Practice." The derivation of the basic distinctions between purposive rational action and communicative action is hence not dealt with. The work of Arendt is not mentioned.

Thomas McCarthy (1978) describes the variations in Greek terminology pertaining to this domain and then proceeds in a manner similar to Bernstein in that he draws from later essays without addressing the derivation of Habermas' basic concept of action (praxis) and its relation to the concept of rationality. Arendt is not mentioned in his extensive study of Habermas' work.

John Thompson (1982), (1983) briefly mentions Habermas' conclusions with regard to the critique of Hobbes' conception of political science in relation to the Classical Doctrine of Politics, but does not discuss the derivation of these conclusions.

Alex Honneth (1982) discusses the importance of Arendt's work to the concept of action. He misunderstands her basic concepts in his attempt to reformulate the concept of praxis.
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Wellmer (1971), like Benhabib, is aware of the importance of Arendt's concepts to the work of Habermas. He similarly draws from Arendt's work but does not discuss the derivation of Habermas' concepts in relation to the work of Arendt.

The following scholars do not deal with this aspect of Habermas' work at all: Whitebook (1979); Schroyer (1973); Heller (1982); Hesse (1982); Lukes (1982); Misgeld (1976); Geuss (1981); Giddens (1985) (1976 (a)) (1976 (b)) (1982).

O'Neill (1972) develops a phenomenological critical theory which he notes is "in the spirit" of Arendt's work. A large group of scholars embrace O'Neill's approach but an assessment of Habermas' work in this regard is not made.

Sensat (1979) is one of the few scholars who does not simply equate Habermas' concept of praxis with that of Aristotle. Sensat realizes that a communicative or linguistic dimension is emphasised by Habermas which does not come to the fore in Aristotle's works.

Jay (1985 (a)) develops an historico-pohilosophical assessment Arendt's work. He notes Habermas' interest in her communicative concept of praxis, but does not analyse this aspect of Habermas' work.

Jay holds that Arendt refuses to criticise Heidegger. This is erroneous since she consistently develops critiques of totalitarian arguments. She holds that Heidegger's work is a prime example of totalitarian reasoning. Her critique of the concept of necessity as internal to these forms of logic is pervasive. As Bernstein says, "In almost everything that Arendt wrote she was carrying on a battle against all forms of totalizing and necessaritarian arguments, whether they have their roots in Hegelian, Marxist, Weberian, or the new, cooler, technocratic modes of thought" (1983:211).


3. I briefly interpret Arendt's perspective by following Gadamer's notion that statements can be seen as answers to questions. I rely on Arendt's public addresses which Young Bruehl (1984) has transcribed and short notes which Arendt writes explaining her methodology. I attempt to obviate the prevalent misconception that Arendt's work is nothing but "Hellenic nostalgia". This certainly appears to be the case if one extracts, as I do, parts of her argument and focuses on the details of one aspect such as the transition from "community" to "society" without placing this in the context of her project as a whole. O'Sullivan (1976) dismisses Arendt's work as "Neo-Aristotelianism" and "Hellenic Nostalgia". Knauer (1985) echos this conclusion. He seems to have misunderstood Arendt's view of praxis.
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4. For Arendt, the central dimension of totalitarianism is the "denial of the spatial and temporal requirements of freedom" (Arendt cited Young Bruehl 1984:253). See Bruno Bettelheim "The Informed Heart" (1951) for an in depth analysis of depersonalization in the concentration camps of Dauchau and Buchenwald where he was incarcerated for a year prior to the termination of the war. He is in agreement with Arendt on this point. He is in agreement with her analysis of Eichmann as an example of a man who's capacity for communicative reason and judgement had atrophied. Bettelheim later devoted his energies toward the essential features in the establishment of meaning as it develops through the child's exposure to fairy tails. See "The Uses Of Enchantment, The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tails" (1976).

5. Bernstein (1983) in his discussion of Habermas, Gadamer Rorty and Arendt on the theory of rationality, reminds the reader "that we must not forget how deeply she was affected by the charismatic influence of Heidegger" (1983:179). I do not see how one can understand Arendt's political theory and its "movement" toward a "theory of rationality", unless one clearly distinguishes her critique of Heidegger's existentialism from the new political theory she worked towards with Jaspers. Arendt sees Heidegger as the philosopher who turned away from the question of men as acting beings through his concept of historicity. Habermas and Marcuse hold similar views on the concept of historicity in the work of Heidegger. See Habermas (1981:53-61); Marcuse (1960). Arendt's critique of Heidegger's existentialism is contained in two essays. The first, "What is Existence Philosophy?" (1926) has not been translated into English. I rely heavily on Young Bruehl's (1984:219) translation of parts of this paper in my understanding of Arendt's work. See Young Bruehl (1984:302-308) for Arendt's critique of Heidegger's notion of historicity - Arendt sees Heidegger's work as:

1."Egotistical and grandiose - making Man what God was in earlier ontology". (Arendt cited Young Bruehl 1984:218-219)

2. Deceptive: "Heidegger's ontology hides a rigid functionalism in which Man appears only as a conglomerate of modes of being." (Arendt cited Young Bruehl 1984:218)

3."Rigidly systematic and most important contrary to the tradition of freedom and concern for humanity which Arendt admired in Kant and in the early ideals of the French revolution." (Young Bruehl 1984:218-219)

Arendt holds that the existentialism of Jaspers, which was largely influenced by Max Weber's work, is in accord with her own work. Arendt's work is:
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1. Based upon an understanding of language as the medium through which communicative action and the communicative formation of power occurs. Habermas develops this insight of Arendt.

2. Orientated toward the development of a new concept of "subjectivity" which explicitly rejects the prevalent notions of subjectivity entailing Man as the universal subject of history. Habermas embraces Arendt's view of intersubjectivity and points out that a higher order of subjectivity is not attainable. (Habermas 1980:128)

3. Arendt self-consciously draws on the work of Kant who never takes the distinctions between ruler/ruled, human singularity/plurality and or those who act and those who obey for granted. Kant sees all men as capable of action and judgment. Arendt's thesis that all men are capable of judgement is central to Habermas' most recent concept of communicative rationality as I show in chapter four.

Therefore, Bernstein's "reminder" is unwittingly misleading. His "historical Interlude" which aims at clarifying the "intellectual traditions and experiences that have shaped" the thinking of Arendt, Gadamer, Habermas and Rorty, is thus incomplete and could lead to a misunderstanding of Arendt's position (Bernstein 1983:176).

6. This clearly comes to the fore in his debates with critics such as Anthony Giddens, Steven Lukes and Mary Hesse. Giddens has difficulty in understanding the distinctions which Habermas makes between the concepts, work, communicative action and power in his discussion of communicative rationality. Habermas invokes Arendt's concept of power in his answer to Giddens. See note 15.

7. In Aristotle's primary works the issue becomes more complex in that he does not simply define his concepts but develops them through a comparison of the range of possibilities by what can be named "genetic" and "analytic" procedures. The "genetic" approach characterises the first and book of the "Politics". Here Aristotle discusses the genesis of the polis in detail. For Aristotle, the polis develops "by nature" from the "natural" association between man and wife, through the "true nature of the family" through the village to the ultimate end of man's "nature", the polis. The guiding thread is that "nature always aims at bringing out the best" (Aristotle 1958:5:1253a). The analytic discussions entail the detailed division of a phenomenon into its parts and the relation between the elements is considered in a functional manner. Here the polis is discussed in terms of the citizen and his functions relative to the state, the classes of people, and forms of government. See Book 111 of the "Politics" (Aristotle 1958:95-137)
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8. See for example Ernest Barker (1981) "He [Aristotle], always regards the slave as being possessed of the semi-rational part of the soul, ....the slave is therefore a creature possessed of desire - of will, and spirit and appetite. The rule of reason over desire is only the political rule of a statesman over his fellows." (1958:365 ) For Hegel, rationality is the essence of the ethical community which he strives for through the concept of labour which dialectically overcomes natural desire.

9 See for example the work of Veach. H. (1974) and the source which he uses extensively, Ross. W. (1956)

10. The only other modern theorists [as far as I am able to ascertain] beside Arendt and Habermas who read the thesis - man is by nature a political being ("zoon politikon") in this manner are David Frisby and Derek Sayer in their study of the concept society in: "Society" (1986). Their interpretation of association in Hegel's Jena Philosophy seems to me to stem directly from that of Habermas which is a "linguistic" reading of Hegel's early work and certainly unique in its orientation. I thus hold that Frisby and Sayer present Habermas and Arendt's understanding of "political association" in Aristotle's theory.

11. This is the basis upon which Benhabib (1984:46-223) builds her critique of Hegel, Marx, Adorno and Horkheimer through what she calls the philosophy of the subject where the subject of history becomes an abstraction "Mankind". She says that:
"History [for Hegel] can be viewed as the activity of a collective singular subject that exteriorizes itself and subsequently "re-appropriates what it has exteriorized". (Benhabib 1984:47).
Benhabib notes her debt to Arendt, but Arendt's work is not thematic.

12. I realize that this sounds as though Arendt focuses upon the early Marx of the philosophical and economic manuscripts but this is misleading. Arendt develops a critique of Marx of the Grundrisse as well as the author of Capital. She also deals with the labour movements and the labour theory of value. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss this aspect of her work. For an interesting application of the insights of Arendt's critique, See Benhabib (1986). Based upon Arendt's distinction between work and labour, Benhabib, speaks of the "work model of action" and its inadequacy in Marx's early and late works. Why is this model of action inadequate? Because, Benhabib answers, it is not able to capture the plurality of human intersubjectivity internal to communicative action, which in fact is Arendt's bequest to critical theory and the basis of her critique of Marx. Benhabib's argument is far more sophisticated than that of Arendt in that she emphasises the expressivist model of human agency as clarified by Charles Taylor in his study of Hegel. Benhabib moves beyond this model by applying Arendt's insights to Marx's categories and comes
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to the same conclusions as Arendt. I emphasise Arendt's basic concepts as I aim to show how they are used by Habermas.

14. Arendt points out that the domination of other beings through the institutions of slavery and the household is legitimated on the grounds of necessity. The polis is not a figment of Aristotle's imagination but it is an historical "fact" that the polis was institutionalised after the destruction of all institutions grounded upon kinship.

See Arendt (1958:25); See R. Graves (1981:12, 29, 46) "Greek Myths". The official religion of the Greek city-state was that of Homer and the Olympian Gods. The older religion of the household and the family was seen to be inferior by Greeks of Aristotle's time. Hestia, the goddess of the city hearth, ceded her place in the assembly of twelve Olympian Gods to Dionysos. She maintained her "glory" or positive evaluation on condition that she abstained from all wars, disputes or public deliberation. She was then sanctified as the Goddess of peace and tranquillity.

15. Habermas retains this insight in his most recent work. His most recent statement with regard to the concept of power is that he is attempting to integrate Arendt's communicative concept of power with the concepts of power held by Talcott Parsons and Max Weber. He aims at distinguishing between the communicative generation of power and the institutionalization of illegitimate forms of power which he names force. He says: "I am inclined to agree with Hannah Arendt in regarding communicatively shared convictions as the source of legitimate power...if one introduces the concept of force as an alternative to the action-co-ordinating mechanism of reaching understanding, and power as the product of action oriented toward reaching understanding, one gains the advantage of being able to grasp forms of indirectly exercised force that predominate today." (Habermas 1982:269)

This citation derives from Habermas' response to his critics Giddens, Lukes and Hesse who are not aware of the impact of Arendt's concepts upon Habermas' work. This orientation is discernible in the early critique of Machiavelli's work and has direct baring on the concept of rationality as I point out in the analysis. The relationship between Habermas' concept of rationality and the concepts of force and power has not been assessed in the secondary literature as far as I am aware.

16. See note 12. Where Benhabib is mentioned with regard to the "work model of action"
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Commentaries on the concept "rationalization processes" in Habermas' early work, invoke the work of Lukacs as the link between the Critical Theorists (Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse) and the reception of Weber's work. See Benhabib (1986:182); McCarthy (1978:19); Wellmer (1977:245) This reference to Lukacs does not apply to the content of the early work of Habermas although he does indicate that he read Lukacs at the age of sixteen. Habermas develops a critique of Lukacs' work some ten years after the early work which I deal with in chapter two. Habermas directly invokes Weber's concept of rationality and attempts to develop his own concept of rationality from the perspective dealt with in chapter one. Marcuse discusses the formal concept of rationality and it's limits, in the two essays:

ii. "From Negative To Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality and the logic of Domination" (1964:119-139).

Lukacs' notion of rationalization as the reification of consciousness does not form the basis of the argument at all. Marcuse does mention reification but this does not seem to have much relation to Lukacs' notion of reification. Thus theorists like Benhabib and McCarthy distort the analysis in the direction of a simple one-dimensional notion of rationalization as reification without placing the the specific concepts in context.

2. In his most recent work, "The Theory of Communicative Action" (1984) Habermas does assess Weber's concept of rationality in detail. I therefore do not enter into a critique of the early work and the Weberian concept of rationality from the viewpoint of whether the interpretation is adequate. This would entail a vast study in itself, given the numerous distinctions Weber makes. Namely the tensions between formal and substantive rationality, between "objective" and "subjective" rationality depending upon whether Weber focuses upon the observer or participant's perspective. My aim is to highlight Habermas' early concept of rationality and not develop a detailed critique of his interpretation of Weber. In the early work, Habermas outlines Weber's orientation to the concept of rationality and assumes that the reader understands the abstract terms invoked. For Weber the concept rationality is the locus in terms of which his vast empirical and philosophical works turn. Research into this work is extensive and modern sociologists are "humbled" by the range and depth of Weber's thought and empirical integrity. Therefore any superficial depiction of
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his concept "rationality" is problematical. Weber spent a lifetime attempting to clarify what is "specific and peculiar about rationalism of Western culture" in relation to the Eastern and Ancient concepts of rationality. (Weber 1971:26) One of the most extensive and systematic analyses of Weber's concept of rationality is that of Rogers Brubaker (1984) "The Limits of Rationality". London: Allen and Unwin. For further interesting analyses see:


3. Benhabib's (1981) interpretation of Weber's ideal type of rational action is more extensive and interesting in that she carefully presents the internal logic of instrumental and formal-value rationality which goes beyond the limited aspects which I have isolated. My intent is to distil the interpretation which I see the young Habermas as focusing upon. A great deal of work is still required in order to come to terms with and develop cogent critiques of Weber's extensive treatment of the concepts rationality and rationalization.

4. Weber discusses the the revival of Methodism which is one of the preconditions for the expansion of industrial development in England. He cites Wesley who understands the relationship between religion and capitalism as follows: "For religion must necessarily produce both industry and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches... for the Methodists in every place grow diligent and frugal: consequently they increase in goods. Hence they increase in pride, in anger, in desire of the flesh, and desire of the eyes, and pride of life. So, although the form of the religion remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away. Is there no way to prevent this-the continual
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decay of pure religion? We ought not to prevent people from being diligent and frugal; we must exhort all Christians to gain all they can, and to save all they can; that is, in effect, to grow rich". (Wesley cited in Weber 1971:175)

5. It would be a gross misrepresentation of Weber's position to then conclude that modern modes of thought and action are predominantly "rational". Weber warns that even in the most highly rational social order, most action takes place in "a state of inarticulate half consciousness or actual unconsciousness of its subjective meaning ... and is governed by impulse or habit" (1978:21). Habermas and Marcuse focus on the formal concept of rationality.

6. Weber's famous statement that "Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern men's conduct" is located within the conception of value orientations in that he directly qualifies this statement with "Yet, very frequently the world images that have been created by "ideas" have, like switchmen, determined the track along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. From what and for what one wishes to be redeemed and let us not forget, could be redeemed, depend upon one's image of the world." (Weber 1974:280)

In a disenchanted world the value orientations are the mechanisms whereby individuals create meaning for themselves. Thus man is distinguished from a mere event in the endless chains of means and ends of the mechanized world. Charismatic people and intellectuals are the main bearers or creators of new value orientations which invariably clash with the status quo. Weber argues. Science for Weber does not provide the means for the rational constitution of value orientations. Thus, ultimately for Weber, reflection upon the social interests which underlie action is subject to the individual subjective choice between conflicting "Gods and Demons" and is not rationally determinable in the scientific sense.

7. From Freud, Marcuse appropriates the theory of repression which is seen in terms of the reality and pleasure principles governing human action. Necessary repression occurs when the reality principle is accorded priority over the pleasure principle such that libidinous drives are channelled into socially approved forms of action and civilized existence is possible. Surplus repression occurs when additional controls are imposed upon the individual through institutions of domination deriving from the class specific interests. The basic reality principle which governs modern man is the "performance principle" which is akin to Weber's notion of the work ethic or "rational calling". Surplus repression occurs in this context at various levels where the work ethic or performance principle is operative. Marcuse calls for the adoption of the pleasure principle in daily life and work such that pleasure defined largely in terms of eroticism is embraced. Thus a new technology which incorporates erotic elements is envisaged. Habermas ignores eroticism in Marcuse's
critique of Weber and concentrates on the concept of repression as a formal and neutral concept. Weber, like Marcuse, details the reduction of the sensual in the work ethic of modern man. Thus Weber and Marcuse deal with the important aspect of sensuality in detail while Habermas ignores it completely throughout his assessment of the concept rationality.

8. This highly anthropomorphic interpretation of technological development is criticized by Arendt. She would see Gehlen as a functionalist thinker searching for the "hidden laws" of nature which operate behind the backs of men in this context. Arendt draws on Gehlen's empirical research to corroborate her notion that men physically insert themselves in the space of appearance. She departs sharply from his biological tenets whereby the human capacities are cast into the framework of biological necessities which are seen to determine all human capacities. These notions seem to be implied in the aspects which Habermas has appropriated from Gehlen in a highly truncated fashion. An adequate assessment of this metaphysical aspect of Habermas' argument would entail detailed investigation which is beyond the scope of the present analysis. In any case, Habermas makes this point and then does not develop it any further. He casts his concept of rationality directly into the Arendt paradigm. It seems to me that the young Habermas ignores the implications of what he is saying in his haste to refute Marcuse on two different levels. Namely the dubious analogy between purposive rational action, the history of technology and the structure of the human organism and the firmer notion of work devoid of anthropomorphism depicted by Arendt. Habermas ignores the critique of anthropomorphism in relation to the concept of work and modern technology in Arendt's clarification of the poiesis/praxis distinction. See "The Human Condition" (1958:144-174).

In his subsequent work, Habermas does refute the anthropomorphic view of technological development. See Knowledge and Human Interests (1968:25-63).

9. Arendt and Habermas emphasize the AID or means whereby the three concepts of man are interrelated. For example they speak of labour with the aid of means which substitute for work. I merely present one example of the manner in which the concepts are interrelated for Arendt. "The Human Condition" (1958) is structured such that the various concepts are dynamically presented. Initially the concepts are stated in abstract form and then are shown in their interrelation in the detailed analysis of each realm. Most commentaries on Arendt do not progress beyond the initial abstract concepts stated in isolation. See for example James Knauer (1985), who notes the dialectic nature of Arendt's thinking but then paradoxically states that she avoids a theory of social justice because she emphasizes the discontinuities between her three concepts, work, labour and action. How then one may ask Knauer, is her work to be characterized as dialectical?
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10. Eight years after the publication of "Towards a Rational Society" which I discuss here in detail in order to capture the internal logic of Habermas' critique of Marcuse's concept of rationality, Habermas sees a necessary connection between the sensuous concept of rationality and the utopian call for a new science. The concept of communicative rationality, which is excluded from interaction with nature is invoked to overcome Marcuse's utopian position.


11. One way of viewing this notion of "punishment" and its relation to the violation of technical rules is through Arendt's distinction between cognition and thought which she discusses in the chapter on work in the "Human Condition." Thought processes are distinguished from cognition for Arendt in that thought inspires all great philosophy, art, poetry and creative mental processes. It has no definite beginning or end and has to be interrupted in order to be remembered and then reified or transformed into the spoken and written word. Arendt argues that cognition pertains to all and not only the intellectual and artistic work processes. She says:

"like fabrication, it [cognition] is a process with a beginning and end, whose usefulness can be tested, and which if it produces no results, has failed, like the carpenter's workmanship has failed when he produces a two-legged table. Cognitive processes in the sciences are basically not different from the function of cognition in fabrication; scientific results produced through cognition are added to the human artifice like all other things." (Arendt 1958:171)

This notion of cognition and its relation to the work process and failure is embraced by the young Habermas. The similarity between these scholars particularly in the manner in which Habermas invokes the concept of "failure" or "lack of success" and the means-ends schema of work, purposive rational action and the empirical and analytical sciences is patent. Arendt's distinction between cognition and thought is also suggestive of the manner in which the empirical-analytic sciences are approached by Habermas in "Knowledge and Human Interests"

12. Critics such as Giddens (1982:149), and McCarthy (1978:28) misread this aspect of Habermas's work as stating that the realms of purposive rational action and interaction are mutually exclusive. They then proceed to the notion held by theorists such as Misgeld, Connerton, and even Wellmer that the forces of production are captured by the concept purposive rational action and relations of production by interaction. For Habermas this simple equation is untenable and requires the detailed analysis of the meaning of these terms in the context of Marx's work. Habermas reformulates the concepts relations and forces of production at the level of social evolution which includes the genetic epistemology of Piaget as a link in this complex of modes of production as seen by Marx. Critical theorists such as Jean Cohen and Seyla Benhabib hold that Habermas in this early work which I am analysing,
follows Marcuse in his thesis of one-dimensional rationality. Namely formal purposive rationality. This is incorrect in the light of the impact of Arendt's work on Habermas critique of Marcuse's position. See Benhabib (1986:228) where she holds that Habermas shares the one-dimensional thesis with Marcuse and Adorno.

13. The work of Freud on "Civilization and it's Discontents" is one of the background influences which is operative in this context. Modern anthropologists would take issue with Habermas on these points since he equates civilization with the relative development of technology as his criterion. For Habermas the Bushmen of the Namib would be seen as primitive and uncivilized simply because they have not "developed" technologically beyond the production of bows and arrows, and do not produce a surplus in the production process which is unequally distributed. One could argue that the Bushmen are one of the few remaining examples of the "most civilised" forms of society known, since the inequality inherent in the unequal distribution of goods is not operative in their society.

14. The concept legitimation, in conjunction with the concepts of force and authority, is a component of Habermas's critique of ideology. The manner in which Habermas uses these terms and the logic internal to the tradition of Ideologiekritik of the Frankfurt School is complex and requires a study in its own right. In this early work, Habermas is attempting to deal with a number of complex issues which are not all given equal priority. The concept legitimation is one concept which is used in a general and vague manner in this early work. The concept ideology may be seen in a very general sense to be used by Habermas as a world-view which "stabilizes" or legitimates forms and relations of domination. Ideology as a form of consciousness which masks social interests and presents them as universal. "Real"- self-knowledge, interests and needs are masked by ideology, Habermas holds. He develops a complex work on legitimation some ten years later. I do not develop a critique of this dimension of Habermas's work. I merely indicate in a rather superficial manner the relationship between the concept of rationality and ideology.

15. He can only mean that the social interests are economic interests if he comes to this conclusion. Habermas, in this early work employs the term social which when read in context implies the "social realm" of Arendt which is differentiated from the political on the basis of economic activity - the gigantic "household" as "modern society" where communicative action is reduced to mere behaviour in the sense of stimulus and repose and the political realm takes on the mantle of force. An interesting investigation would be the deciphering of Habermas's term "social" in relation to the concepts of needs, nature, labour and work.
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1. "Knowledge and Human Interests" is still subjected to detailed analyses and critique. Critique of this work is complex and diverse. I mention a few areas. The concept of nature held by Habermas in this work is a contentious issue. See McCarthy (1978:99-125); Whitebook.J. (1979)


The discussion of the empirical-analytic sciences is seen as legitimating an instrumentalist view of knowledge. See McCarthy (1978:99-125); Heller.A (1982); Hesse.M (1982)

2. The significance of Habermas view of theoretical reason as contemplation is not discussed in the secondary literature as far as I am aware. The only theorist who does discuss the inaugural lecture in detail, where Habermas outlines his orientation, is Thomas McCarthy (1978). McCarthy invokes the array of Greek terms in the analysis but does not realize the extent to which Habermas deviates from his (Mac Carthy's) "conventional" manner of interpreting the classical Greek tradition. See note 6.

Bernstein (1976;1983;1985), briefly mentions the concepts "theoria", "doxa", the "Socratic attitude" and related Greek terminology in all of his works on Habermas, but does not realize the full significance of Habermas' orientation. This is a possible reason as to why he does not understand Habermas' adherence to both the theoretical and practical reason, and looks for the primacy of practice over theory in Habermas' work in vain. Habermas and Arendt accord primacy to neither practice or theory. Both concepts are located in their respective realms and the relation is shown without one standing over and above the other. Habermas sharply criticizes Bernstein for according primacy to practical reason in his interpretation of Habermas' work. See Habermas (1985) (c):196

3. Habermas is orientating himself to Edmund Husserl (1970) "The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction To Phenomenological Philosophy".

4. Here Habermas draws upon the only work of Plato, the Timaeus, where he specifically deals with "physical science". For Plato, the material world is ordered in terms of an Eternal and Ideal pattern.

5. Gadamer develops vast investigations into the classical notion of practical reason and the process of wise deliberation (phronesis) which is central to Aristotle's ethics. The focus always falls on the questions surrounding a practical way of life. The ethical domain of practical reason has been dealt with from Habermas' perspective in chapter one. He argues that practical reason in the classical sense is eclipsed and that
technical reason prevails in modernity. His conclusions are similar in many ways to those of Gadamer. See Gadamer (1981) "Reason in the Age of Science", where he develops extensive analyses of modern technical reason. He echoes Arendt in her concern that in modernity, scientists, whose professional communicative realm is that of abstract symbolic language, are eulogised and become the major spokesman of society and its requirements.

6. In his extensive assessment of Habermas' work, McCarthy holds that the extent to which the contemplative life can be realised "depended on the proper ordering of the polis" (1978:2). He is thus unaware of the significance of Habermas' notion of contemplation in relation to the order of the polis and communicative action which is defined in contrast to the contemplative stance. This basic difference in orientation between Habermas and Gadamer lies at the heart of the disputes between Habermas and Gadamer on the nature of reflection and rationality. Gadamer is correct in saying of Habermas that he "is obviously animated not only by language but by work and action; hermeneutical reflection must pass into a criticism of ideology" (Gadamer 1977:28).

7. Arendt, like Popper, has no illusions about the so called Golden age of Greece. Both scholars draw from the work of Pericles for insights into the daily lives of the Greeks as opposed to the work of Aristotle or Plato who are seen to legitimate totalitarianism. Arendt carefully displays the totalitarian aspects of Plato and Aristotle's work:
   i. Through an assessment of the Philosopher King where Plato presents his Utopian solution to the frailty of human affairs.
   ii. Through a detailed assessment of the concept of rulership as mastering, arguing that in order to rule, someone must obey and hence the communicative formation of freedom is abrogated. The concepts of rulership and management pervade Aristotle's understanding of the political realm. For Aristotle, freedom is acquired through the speechless wonder of the philosopher when he contemplates the cosmos and brings his soul into accord with the rationality which pervades the universe.

8. In a recent assessment of Habermas' "knowledge constitutive-interests", Henning Ottman, clarifies the concept of interest in a similar fashion. He points out that the concept interest in Habermas' work must be seen in the literal sense of the word which means "inter-esse" i.e. the "being-in-between" (Ottman 1983:81). Habermas responds to many of the errors in Ottman's assessment. He does not refute this point thus indicating that this is the manner in which he employs the concept. (Habermas 1983:219-283)
9. Habermas' admiration for Peirce is palpable in the two chapters which deal with his work in detail. This stems from Peirce's knowledge not only of the philosophy of Medieval Scholasticism, Berkeley and Kant, but also from his practical knowledge as a physicist. Habermas notes that his friendship with Richard Bernstein stems from their mutual interest in the work of Peirce. (Habermas 1986:151)

10. The three kinds of inference central to the logic of inquiry as understood by Peirce can be represented as follows:

**Deduction:** (Does not provide new hypotheses. No new knowledge)

- Law-like hypothesis: \( L \)
- Case or initial condition: \( c \)
- Conclusion or prediction: \( p \) --- effect

"I deduce the prediction from the Law as a result (effect) of a case (cause)." (Habermas 1971: 115).

**Abduction:** (Propels the scientific endeavour forward)

\[ L \rightarrow [c] \text{ the creative cognitive process.} \]

"I derive the case from a result and a law." (Habermas 1972:115)

**Induction:** (Propels the scientific endeavour forward)

\[ ? \rightarrow [L] \text{ creative cognitive process} \]
\[ c \rightarrow P \]

"I infer a "law from the case and result." (Habermas 1972:115)

11. Bernstein (1985:222) holds that Habermas, in contrast to Arendt, is not "sensitive to the concept of plurality". Benhabib in her most recent work on the foundations of critical theory uses Arendt's concept of plurality in her attempt to correct this "oversight" in Habermas' concept of intersubjectivity (Benhabib 1986:243-260). These critics do not realize that the concept of plurality is central to Habermas' concept of intersubjectivity and communicative rationality.

12. Richard Palmer (1969) explains that the word hermeneutics derives from the Greek verb "hermeneuein" meaning: "to interpret." Hermes is the Greek messenger of the Gods whose function it is to transform what is "beyond human understanding into a form that human intelligence can grasp" (1969:13). Hermeneutics in a very general sense means the process of rendering the alien or unfamiliar to
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understanding. This process is understood in roughly six different senses in the history of hermeneutic theory. Palmer indicates the history of this endeavour in chronological order as:

i. Hermeneutics oriented to biblical exegesis during 15th and 16th centuries

ii. As philological methodology in conjunction with 18th century rationalism. General rules of interpretation are the focus.

iii. As the science of linguistics and understanding for Schleiermacher in the early 19th century.

iv. As the methodological foundation of the historic-hermeneutic sciences. Dilthey (1833-1911) speaks of the "Geisteswissenschaften" - as those disciplines which are oriented toward the understanding, interpretation and meaning of "man's actions, art and writings" (Palmer 1969:41). For Dilthey, hermeneutics is understood as the Critique of Historical Reason of the cultural sciences, analogous to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, viewed as a critique of the natural sciences. (Palmer 1969:98)

v. As the Phenomenology of Being and existential understanding for Martin Heidegger. Hans-George Gadamer subsequently develops Heidegger's ideas in the locus of language.

vi. As the interpretation and recovery of meaning. Freud's work on dream analysis is thematic as is the phenomenology of the will. The scholar who focuses on the interpretation of meaning is is Paul Ricoeur. See John B Thompson (1981) who develops an interesting analysis and comparison of the work of Habermas and Ricoeur in what he names Critical Hermeneutics.

13. Habermas' interpretation of Dilthey's work is similar in many ways to that of Gadamer in "Truth and Method" (1975) and is in stark contrast to that of Richard Palmer. Gadamer emphasises the "Hegelian" aspects of the philosophy of life in Dilthey's work. Life history is understood as the objectifications of mind which are re-appropriated in the process of understanding. This aspect is also present in Habermas' interpretation of Dilthey's work, but he develops the methodological level of analysis via a contrast which he sets up between the work of Peirce and Dilthey.

14 See David Held (1980). Held devotes some attention to Habermas' interpretation of Dilthey's work, but he does not realize the full implications of the notion of subjectivity which Habermas develops in this context. Held focuses on the explanation / understanding dimensions central to analytic philosophy. He emphasises the Gadamer / Habermas debates with regard to hermeneutics.

Mc Carthy (1978) briefly summarises aspects from the analysis of Dilthey. He focuses on the Gadamer / Wittgenstein aspects of interpretation and language.
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Giddens (1977) focuses upon the Gadamer / Habermas debates. Bernstein (1976) Briefly summarises the conclusions of "Knowledge and Human Interests" and does not mention Dilthey's work at all.

Misgeld (1976) develops a detailed assessment of the Habermas / Gadamer debates with regard to hermeneutics. Most of the other critics merely mention Dilthey in passing and do not assess this aspect of Habermas' work.


15. See Habermas (1971:336 footnote 2.), where Habermas states that he focuses upon the work of the mature Dilthey. Habermas refers the reader to Gadamer's interpretation of Dilthey's methodology. Habermas employs Gadamer's interpretation of the Hegelian aspects of Dilthey's work but casts this into his own frame of reference which I emphasise.

16. This must be seen in the context of Dilthey's philosophy of life and history. He conceives his project as a "Critique of Historical Reason" which is understood to be analogous to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (Schnadelbach 1984:142). Central to this endeavour is the concept of life. Dilthey is interested in the total life context which is understood as a reversal of Hegel's concepts of life and spirit. For Dilthey, life is not a deficient mode of spirit. "Objective spirit", is the philosophical term for reality in Hegel's language. History for Dilthey is named "objective spirit" and is understood as the totality of objectifications of the life processes in which the individual is located at a specific point in time. Thus the individual researcher is located in this total life context (Schnadelbach 1984:142). Dilthey says of Hegel's concept of "objective spirit": "the assumptions on which Hegel based this concept can no longer be accepted today. He constructed communities on the basis of the general rational will. Today we have to start from the reality of life: in life, the totality of mental connexions is at work. Hegel engaged in metaphysical construction: we analyse what is given. And present-day analysis of human existence fills us all with the feeling of fraility, of the finiteness which resides in everything to do with life, even where the the highest forms of communal life arise from it. Thus we cannot understand objective spirit on the basis of reason, but must return to the structural connection of the units of life which is continued in communities. And we cannot treat objective spirit as an ideal construction; rather we must take as our basis its reality in history. We seek to understand this reality and to present it in adequate concepts. In this way objective spirit is detached from a one-sided foundation in universal reason... a new concept of it becomes possible, in which are embraced language, custom, every sort of form of life style of living as family, civil society, state and law." (Dilthey cited in Schnadelbach 1984:142)
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17. This notion of "pure" statements is rejected by scholars such as M. Hesse, T. Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos and Feyerabend for whom theory and data can not be separated in this fashion in that data is not independent of the theoretical language in question. Hesse holds that theory formation in the natural sciences is dependent on interpretation. Habermas agrees with her in his recent work, but casts this question into his own novel framework of communicative judgement. I focus on this framework in chapter four. Habermas also seems to ignore the fact that even so-called "pure" expressions such as calculus are constituted in specific historical periods and notions of the universe. The learning process then still occurs through communication and interpretation. Whether "pure" statements can be completely understood without the mediation of communicative and interpretive processes is then debatable.

18 Gillian Rose (1981) develops an interesting critique of Fichte's positing reflection in the context of her study on Hegel. She comes to the conclusion that for Fichte, "positing is an immediate, unconditioned, spontaneous act which accounts for the possibility of objects. On this account however, no determinate object can be posited but only an immediate being whose immediacy as a determination is illusory, since the absolute act gives itself boundaries and hence has none" (Rose 1981:195). She compares the sociological theory with Fichtean position and comes up with an interesting comparison. She points out that the antinomy of action and structure rehearses the Fichtean antinomy of the positing ego and the posited non-ego. The non-ego is seen as the structure or deed which is at first understood as independent of consciousness. The ego is equivalent to the action, which has insight into its own agency and hence is the "highest fact of consciousness", it eventually understands the structure (non-ego) as its own posit. She notes that this abstract formulation results in Hegel's bad infinity and hence is illusory. This is a challenge to Habermas' entire life's work and would make an interesting study which is beyond the scope of the present work. The Fichtean element of Habermas' work certainly requires such an investigation. The nub of the matter revolves around the concept of nature since for Fichte, nature is a posit of the absolute ego. Habermas does not account for nature adequately in his work.

19. Marx's dialectical materialism develops through his critique of philosophical Idealism and the concepts of alienation and objectification deriving from this tradition, and its subsequent interpretation by Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians. Central to Marx's notion of objectification is his critique of Hegel's the concepts objectification and alienation. For Hegel alienation pertains to man's state of consciousness which is estranged or alienated from the phenomenal world. Consciousness emancipates itself from what appears to be external and separate through the process of re-cognition. Through re-cognising the external as projections of consciousness, the self is freed from alienation and consciousness returns to itself as Hegel so
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often says. Objects for Hegel are merely reified forms of consciousness. Marx criticises this as the reduction of the material and objective world to a mere phantasy of mind, a predicate of consciousness. Objectification and alienation are then co-terminus. Marx distinguishes between the making of objects and the forms of consciousness which pertain to men's relationships between men and the relation of men to the objects created. See for example "The German Ideology" (1965:654). For Marx, objectification is a process whereby man's potentialities and human capacities are externalized and embodied in the object thus facilitating the realisation of the self. The real or non-alienated life of man is the externalization of his potentialities and capacities in the material objects and the relationships between men which facilitate this realization. The form of objectification which fragments and negates this self-realization of man and his non-coersive relationships with others is held to be "alienated" labour. See Avineri (1968) for a detailed discussion of this aspect of Marx's work.

See Benhabib (1968) for a detailed comparison between the work of Marx and Hegel on the concepts of externalization and objectification. She also deals with the communicative dimensions of interaction which Avineri ignores in his assessment of the work of Marx and Hegel.

See the extensive citations in the notes section where Habermas provides evidence to back up his thesis that Marx employs the concept labour in an equivocal fashion. (1972:326-329).

20. Habermas holds that the self-constitution of the species for Marx occurs through the dialect of labour. Wellmer (1971), a critical theorist who agrees with much of Habermas' work, develops an extensive investigation into this aspect of Marx's work. He focuses on the implications of the reduction of the concept of interaction to work in terms of the realms of freedom and necessity. This is the mode which Hegel adopts in criticizing the work of Kant and Fichte in his essays on natural law as Gillian Rose points out (1981:55). Arendt's orientation is similar to that of Wellmer. Wellmer refers to Arendt in this regard. The work of Wellmer surpasses that of Arendt whose horizon is wider and hence her assessment of Marx is limited. Their basic conclusions are similar. Namely, that when the category of work is contextualized in terms of freedom and necessity, the "scientific Marx", argues for freedom from necessity in and of itself. This is the point which Habermas stresses.

21. The extent to which the historico-philosophical dimensions can be legitimately extricated from the material investigations is an issue which is beyond the scope of this study. Habermas is criticized for splitting Marx's concept of praxis into labour and interaction by scholars such as Anthony Giddens. Habermas' point is that if the concept of praxis is able to account for the the dynamics of communication, socialization, identity formation and the symbolic reproduction of tradition,
then it is adequate to its task. He holds that Marxism, based on the concept of praxis as outlined by Marx is rooted in a notion of objectification or paradigm of production, which entails a form of logic which is not able to deal with these issues of communicative action. This is his answer to Giddens in "A Reply to My Critics" (Habermas 1982:225) in Thompson and Held (ed) 1982 Habermas: Critical Debates. Mac Millan Press

22. In his empirical analyses, Marx does employ the concept of labour as social labour such that human interaction and productive activity are articulated, Habermas argues. This is captured through the concepts of the relations and forces of production respectively. The empirical analyses encompass the material or economic base of society and the "superstructure" entailing the institutional framework made up symbolic modes of interaction and cultural tradition. Habermas argues that Marx is not able to integrate these two domains adequately. Habermas points out that Marx develops a dual concept of the subject in the two domains respectively. The institutional domain of the relations of production is composed of two classes of subjects: The capitalists and the proletariat. The forces of production on the other hand are held to pertain to the species, as a whole. Here Marx speaks of the species as the subject of history. In attempting to relate the relations of production (institutional level of analysis) to the forces of production, Marx is limited by his concept of synthesis which is too narrowly conceived since it is based on the concept of work and his dual concept of the subject is inadequate to its task, Habermas argues. Benhabib (1986) in "Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study in the Foundations of Critical Theory", develops a critique of Marx which clearly demonstrates this dual voice of Marx. She holds that Marx is unable to integrate these dimensions of his work adequately because he limits his understanding to what she names the work model of action, what Habermas calls the paradigm of production. This work model of action and its correlate, the philosophy of the subject (capturing the reflection process) is shown to permeate the entire fabric of Marx's work. Benhabib's critique of Marx is similar to that of Habermas in that it is grounded on the basic distinction between poiesis and praxis (deriving from Arendt's work) in terms of which Benhabib formulates the "work model of action" and the philosophy of the subject. Her analysis is far more extensive and systematic than that of Habermas in this specific regard. The basic distinction between poiesis and praxis (understood as communicative action) is also the ground upon which her critique of Hegel, Horkheimer and Adorno rests.

23. Habermas can be likened to Marx in that he is attempting to base his theory of interests on demonstrable human activities. Namely: work and interaction. As Arendt says of Marx:
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"Marx is outstanding not because of his materialism, but because he is the only political thinker who was consistent enough to base his theory of material interest on a demonstrably material human activity, on laboring." (Arendt 1958:183)

24. Numerous scholars have reacted in various ways to the manner in which Habermas employs the concept of reflection in "Knowledge and Human Interests"


Henning Ottmann (1982:84) basically agrees with Bernstein's view, but he develops an extended argument in which he holds that Habermas attempts to use an historically specific notion of neuroses which is generalized to the pathologies of mankind from time immemorial. He views this as illicit and as inadequate to its task of providing the universal conditions for emancipation of the species subject it is meant to apply to. This creates what Ottman calls a Praxis problem. I agree with Ottoman in this regard.

Thomas McCarthy's (1978:94-213) analysis is the most extensive and explores the relations between the concept of reflection on numerous levels of analysis dealing with the concept of nature and its relation to the knowledge-constitutive interests. The basic contours of the argument are similar to that of Bernstein, except that McCarthy provides detailed evidence from the Idealist tradition and proves that the emancipatory interest is the least well substantiated aspect of the theory.

David Held (1980:323) treats the errors of the two forms of critique as a mechanism whereby he introduces Habermas' revisions. He discusses the example of psychoanalysis in a separate section of his book and points out that the dialogic situation is not a symmetrical one and hence inadequate to the task it is called upon to perform.

Albrecht Wellmer (1976:231-263) develops a response close to that of Bernstein, then he discusses a general epistemological orientation to Marxism and introduces Habermas' revisions in a manner which is not critical but in agreement Habermas.

Roslyn Wallace Bologh (1979:237) briefly notes that reflection for Habermas is a means to an end which seems to me to be far off the mark. She does not say what this end is. Bologh holds the model of objectification and re-appropriation is adequate to the task of explaining alienation. Thus she also eliminates man the communicator from her vision.

Rudiger Bubner (1982:42) confuses reflection in the young Hegelian sense with that of Habermas and the Frankfurt School in general which is beyond the scope of this study. Questions surrounding the concept of nature, the legitimacy of the instrumental notion of science and the efficacy of the emphasis upon neuroses as the modern psychological form of alienation are all issues which I am not able to address given the limits which I have to impose on this study.
Notes To Chapter 4

1. For Marx the concept mode of production encompasses the concepts of the forces and relations of production. Habermas reformulates these concepts in terms of his basic distinction between communicative and purposive rational action. This analysis develops into an extensive integration of recent anthropological data with the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. See: "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" in "Communication and the Evolution of Society" (1979:95-130).

2. Habermas explains that he is attempting to integrate the concepts of power held by Parsons and Weber with that of Arendt in order to develop a critical approach to class structures in society. His first attempt at integrating these three concepts of power is contained in "Philosophical-Political Profiles" (1983:171-187). In the essay named "Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power", Habermas translates the three concepts of power held by Parsons, Weber and Arendt into the language of rationality. This discussion relies on insights developed in the context of the theory of communicative competence such that the strategic aspects of power formation can be accommodated. The concept of force, as noted in chapter three, is used to capture repressive social structures and ideology. The concept of strategic action is screened out of Arendt's understanding of power and hence is rectified through the concept of strategic rationality in Habermas' work. Habermas maintains these distinctions in his work. He is not consistent in his usage of the concepts of power and force. At times he invokes power in the sense indicated in the address and at other times he speaks of power in the sense of repressive force. He has not published his theory of class structures and the related concepts of power and rationality as yet.

This understanding of the communicative formation of power and the location of praxis in the realm of communicative action is the nucleus around which Habermas' extensive and most abstract work to date, "The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity" (1987) revolves. He employs the basic concepts which I outline in chapter four to develop extensive critiques of the work of a vast array of scholars such as Foucault, Derrida, Bataille, Lyotard, Parsons and Luhmann. I am not able to develop this theme within the limits which I have to impose on this study since the critique of the work of each of these scholars would entail vast studies in their own right.

3. I rely to some extent on Ronald Beiner's "Interpretive Essay" (1982:84-156) and draw from the "Kant Lectures" (Arendt 1982:7-77)

4. Habermas finds in Piaget a kindred spirit in that the latter develops his view of learning from a perspective which accords priority to action over passive contemplation. I cannot develop Piaget's perspective within the limitations which I have to impose upon this work. One way of capturing Piaget's intent is to view the learning process as a continuous spiral with ever widening loops of constructive concepts which enable individuals to develop flexible and complex modes of acting and communicating in the world. A metaphor suggestive of this
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process is that of "invention". The subject as "inventor" constructs conceptual structures rather than discovers them ready made in his cognitive/interactive faculties. As subjects creatively "invent" new ways of doing things, new reasons for contested validity claims emerge and can be discursively redeemed in the discourse situation. The essential feature of a decentered form of perception for Habermas and Piaget is that flexibility and novelty can be accounted for.

5. Habermas has been criticized with regard to the ideal speech situation. See for example Alvin Gouldner "The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology" (1976:144) for an incisive critique of this aspect of Habermas' work. For Gouldner the ideal speech situation generates a new form of stratification. Habermas does not accept the critiques of his "ideal speech situation" since he holds that the conditions of symmetry and reciprocity, "although defective in their details", are necessary for the grounding of arguments and hence his concept of communicative rationality. See the Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (1984:25).

6. "Aesthetic rationality" is one of the most contentious concepts in Habermas' work. Martin Jay (1985(b)) brings together most of Habermas' fragmentary statements in this regard. He focuses on the emancipatory potential in autonomous art as understood by Adorno and Benjamin. Jay questions the extent to which one can speak of aesthetic rationality and learning processes in this realm. Habermas' reply is that to the extent that art criticism has become an autonomous sphere in modernity, as a result of man's decentered perspective of the world, one can speak of a form of discursive rationality in art. He insists that the realms of aesthetics, science and morality are autonomous spheres in modernity. Each sphere exhibits a form of rationality which is based on argumentation or forms of criticism, learning and the "resistance" of reality. Habermas wants to strictly exclude aesthetics from universal validity claims and the concept of communicative rationality which aims at emancipation. Thus the realm of art is not seriously considered as the locus of freedom, as Adorno thought. Habermas' analysis of aesthetics is limited and he admits that this is a "neglected" and poorly developed aspect of his work. See Habermas (1979) "Conciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism-The Contemporaneity of Walter Benjamin." New German Critique 17:30-59. See Habermas (1985) "Questions and "Counterquestions". In Bernstein.R. (ed) "Habermas and Modernity" Cambridge:Polity Press. - where Habermas is criticized by Berger, Lyotard, Huyssen, Benhabib and Jay on this concept of Aesthetic Rationality. See Jay (1985)(b); Benhabib (1986)(a).
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7. Habermas is emphasising the constructivist perspective which marks Piaget's work. For Piaget, intelligence "begins neither with knowledge of the self or of things as such but with knowledge of their interaction, and it is by orientating itself simultaneously toward the two poles of that interaction that intelligence organises the world by organising itself" (Piaget 1977:278).

Piaget represents this process diagrammatically as follows:

\[ \text{surrounding universe.} \]
\[ \text{meeting point between the universe and organism} \]
\[ \text{organism} \]

Piaget employs the expressivist model characteristic of Hegel's dialectic to indicate the progress of intelligence which "works in the dual direction of externalization and internalization and its two poles will be the acquisition of physical experience (Y) and the acquisition of intellectual operation itself (X). This occurs through the dual process of accommodation and assimilation. Assimilation means the transformation of the external world such as to make it part of oneself. This entails the integration of the properties characteristic of external objects into the schemata laid down by previous activities. Piaget holds that the primitive schemata of action such as the sucking, seeing, and grasping of the infant are gradually differentiated and raised to a higher level as the child matures and develops more complex modes of interaction with the environment. If assimilation predominated, cognition would encompass a few large and stable schema in terms of which the multiplicity of objects would be understood. Differentiation would be minimal and man would not be able to distinguish between a cat and a squirrel for example, since they would simply fall under the more general category of "four legged animals". Through the process of accommodation, differentiation is possible since the existing schema are modified and differentiated such that the different properties of objects which distinguishes one from another, are incorporated in man's intellect. Thus change is accounted for through the continual interaction between novelty and familiarity which are mediated by adaptation encompassing accommodation and assimilation through which schematization occurs. If accommodation predominated, the multiplicity of schema would be differentiated, and every cat, for example, would have its own distinct category. One would not be able to develop a form of understanding in which the general class, of "feline" would develop. Thus assimilation and accommodation are two learning mechanisms which function together facilitating the adaptation of the organism to the environment through progressive stages of equilibrium (object can be
Notes To Chapter 4

easily assimilated) and disequilibrium (schemata are changed through accommodation). This dual process occurs with each encounter with the environment in the threefold sense of man's interaction with the objective sphere of nature, the social sphere of subject-subject relations and the sphere of man's relation to himself. This is understood as an active and constitutive process named equilibration so that adaptation is not understood in mechanistic or naturalist reductionist terms.


Piaget holds that all progress in the sciences is accompanied by a "reflexive progress in reason itself, that is by progress in the formation of reason itself insofar as it is an internal activity" (Piaget 1977: 276). It is Piaget the philosopher, who confronts the work of Kant, Hegel, Sartre, Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Durkheim and a host of other scholars through his extensive body of work on genetic epistemology, that interests Habermas. The simplistic caricature of Piaget as the scholar of rigid stages of cognitive development devoid of a dialectical and mediatory perspective so prevalent in modern superficial approaches to psychology is certainly not Habermas' point of reference. Habermas avoids the term constitution and uses Piaget's concept of "construction" in his work.

8. Kohlberg discovers that only a small proportion of the adult population studied ever reach the level of postconventional morality where universal principles of morality are distinguished from the authority of reference persons or groups to which the individual may belong. Mankind in general is the point of reference and the reflective capacity to adopt a universal stance, where subjective values are put aside is adopted.

9. Habermas' early critique of Thomas Aquinas' work is palpable here.

10. Habermas presents a unique interpretation of the work of Lukacs, Weber, Horkheimer and Adorno in the first volume of "The theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society" (1984: 339-399). This interpretation is seen through the lens of his concept communicative action and communicative rationality. The decentration thesis, the three basic attitudes, the external world of manipulable objects, the social world of intersubjective relations and the subjective world of the self are some of the major concepts employed in this interpretation. The work of these scholars is approached in a manner similar to which he approaches the work of Freud, Marx, Dilthey and Arendt as I indicate in chapters two and three.
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11. Habermas briefly deals with Adorno and Horkheimer's earlier works of the 1930's in his second volume of "The Theory of Communicative Action: The Critique of the Functionalist Reason" (1987:379-383). Here he employs the insights gained from the first volume, arguing for a distinction between the philosophy of history and the philosophy of consciousness, in terms of which reification is understood.

Notes to Conclusion

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