SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA ISSUES RELATED TO POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

PETER CHARLES BENNETT

A Dissertation Submitted To The Faculty of Social Science University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, For The Degree of Master of Arts October 1983
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Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
This dissertation constitutes a study of all issues relevant to South West Africa/Namibian independence, from 1915 to June 1983. The method employed is primarily of a descriptive, historical and analytical nature, which brings together in a concise study a variety of primary research materials, particularly with extensive use of newspaper resources. Due to the limited available material on South West Africa/Namibia, it was necessary to rely upon these journalistic sources to a large extent.

It was, therefore, necessary to assume that:

1. newspaper references are correct and valid, and that articles by relevant authorities and political figures are a true expression of the writers' political beliefs;

2. that in terms of books, journals and other published materials in relation to South West Africa/Namibia, the facts have been accurately researched and verified, and

3. that personal conversations with relevant authorities are genuine as to the thoughts expressed.

A number of hypotheses are put forward:

1. that independence will come about as the result of a
process of negotiation and not because of military victory or defeat;

2. that the South West Africa People's Organisation is bound to be part of any true settlement;

3. that this organisation cannot claim to be the 'sole authentic representative' of the Territory's population, and

4. as a result of this, there is a definite need for the accommodation of other internal parties in a genuine settlement as well.
I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Cape Town, Rondebosch. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

PETER CHARLES BENNETT

14th day of October, 1983
Dedicated to my mother, Ann Bennett
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PREFACE

This dissertation is undertaken with the purpose of placing South West Africa/Namibia in a recent perspective. The topics and material analysed in this dissertation have been discussed in an impartial manner, without preferential treatment to any organisation or authority. Being a born South West Africa/Namibian greatly contributed towards this end. I must express gratitude to David Welsh who made many valuable suggestions while supervising this dissertation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTA</td>
<td>Democratic Turnhalle Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAN</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army of Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA/Namibia</td>
<td>South West Africa/Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People's Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWATF</td>
<td>South West Africa Territorial Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>Nation Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCG</td>
<td>Western Contact Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People's Union</td>
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INTRODUCTION

As with all other dynamic social situations where people have to resort to force to attain their national independence, the South West Africa/Namibian case requires careful identification of the most salient features and themes intricately bound to this independence process. Having identified these features with regard to this particular study of SWA/Namibia, it is possible to construct an overall perspective, and to decide on the procedures to be adopted.

SWA/Namibia can correctly be described as a country of startling contrasts. Geographically it is comprised of vast wastelands subjected to extreme climatic changes. It has a small population, numbering little more than one million people living together in isolated urban or rural areas, who uphold and support a variety of political ideas, convictions and parties. They share a long history of colonial administration, and many of the population groups, at one stage or another, have sought an end to colonial domination. This search for self-government was, and still is, the strongest bond binding the peoples of SWA/Namibia. In addition to the presence of a foreign colonial administration, the present situation in the territory is further complicated by the diversity of existing local political aspirations, and the fact that all eleven population groups are not united in a common struggle.
Briefly then it would appear a number of study areas can be identified:

(i) a geo-economic description of the country itself;

(ii) to identify the main actors, political parties, groups, and governments with real interests in the territory and its independence;

(iii) and to evaluate the merits and demerits of their respective claims, principles and policies, in order to reach some tentative conclusions on the current state of affairs in SWA/Namibia, and what would theoretically appear to be the most desirable future state of affairs.

The above are the main themes of study covered in this dissertation. At first sight it is clear that this is too wide a scope to cover in any dissertation, without it being likely to suffer from superficiality and possible theoretical gaps. The dilemma involved in the analysis of political situations and issues as complex as those encountered in SWA/Namibia, often compels the analyst to adopt a micro or macro approach. On the micro-level the focus will be on the detailed examination of one or a few interrelated sets of central issues, while a macro-level approach aims at all the most salient issues into a broad perspective.

The second approach has been opted for in this dissertation.
As it is impossible to separate and rank in order of importance the areas of study the aim was to place the entire SWA/Namibia independence dispute in an historic analytical perspective, current until 1983. Methodologically this was achieved by:

1. Extensive culling of contemporary newspapers from SWA/Namibia, South Africa and some United States papers;
2. Interviews with political and bureaucratic actors in SWA/Namibia; and through reviews of published secondary sources.

It is regrettable that limitations on length resulted in the unequal treatment of the five sections of this dissertation. Section 1.1, dealing with the economy of SWA/Namibia, is one of the areas of study covered in less detail. The intention of this sub-section was the presentation of a broad perspective of the economy of the territory. It was not aimed at suggesting possible alternatives to the existing economic structure which could facilitate the needs of an independent Namibia. It simply points out that the country has the potential to become economically independent, provided that cordial trading relations are maintained with South Africa.

Sub-section 1.2 identifies the central actors and groups with vested interests in SWA/Namibia. This sub-section is of considerable importance as it identifies the two main
camps involved in the independence dispute, as well as setting out their respective versions of an independent future. (Many issues mentioned briefly in sub-section 1.2 are discussed in more detail in Sections 2, 3 and 4.)

The views and future policies of the South West People's Organisation (SWAPO), active under the banner of the United Nations and international community, is dealt with first. Attention is then paid to the South African Government's attitude towards SWA/Namibia, and to those indigenous parties which identify themselves with the government's views.

1. SWAPO is aspiring for an independence settlement in line with 'majoritarian democracy', based on the principle of 'one-man one-vote'.

2. The South African government is seeking a 'peaceful' transition towards independence and the continuation of democratic competition through regular popular elections.

In this dissertation it is argued that a simple 'majoritarian' settlement does not appear to be the most suitable way to uphold democratic practice in SWA/Namibia. The existence of a number of ethni minority groups, in the presence of one very large population group, the Ovambo, would appear to call for a different type of settlement. Some form of 'consociational' or 'participatory' democracy is suggested.
There was no scope for a complete study of all the theoretical issues related to consociational democracy, but because it is claimed to be a technique of coping with conflict in deeply divided societies such as SWA/Namibia, only the fundamental principles of this type of democracy have been pointed out. Nor was any attempt made to suggest an 'ideal' form of government for the territory and its peoples.

Furthermore, this dissertation does not include an evaluation determining whether SWAPO's program has progressed from a one-party social democracy to democratic socialism. The term 'democracy' is interpreted as incorporating a set of fundamental human rights; freedom from the arbitrary use of force; and the rule of law.

Sub-section 1.3, highlights SWA/Namibia's position in relation to the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation (UN). The discussion takes on the form of an historical analysis. This sub-section provides a useful perspective of the background against which local political and military resistance emerged from the 1940s. Mention is also made of what appears to be an inability on the part of the international community, and the UN in particular, to compel the South African Government to grant SWA/Namibia national independence.

Section 2, dealing with the military situation in SWA/Namibia
in particular, and Angola and Southern Africa in general, sets out the consequence of South Africa's administrative and military presence in the territory. The section examines how this presence is perceived by the indigenous population groups, SWAPO, the international church community, and South Africa. The Cuban issue is discussed only in relation to SWA/Namibia, and not as an issue per se. As the Cuban issue poses an almost insurmountable obstacle in the way of SWA/Namibian independence, there appears to be no reason for discussing the issue at length.

In the conclusion of Section 2, South Africa's military and economic policies towards Southern Africa are put into broad perspective. Throughout Section 2, extensive reference has been made of the Government's objections to the 'dangers' inherent in the linkage between SWAPO and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. Although suggested as a possibility, the feasibility of an ANC instigated insurgency war on the South African border has not been discussed. It must be remembered that geographical conditions prevalent on the South African border, such as harsh open terrain and sparse vegetation, are much less suitable for the conduct of insurgency war than those conditions prevalent on the SWA/Namibia-Angola border where there is dense semi-tropical vegetation.

Section 3 takes on the form of a detailed discussion of local political developments between 1970 and 1983. This
obviously is a further essential part of the dissertation as it ascertains not only the importance of the indigenous political parties and actors, but also whether SWA/Namibia's peoples are politically mature enough to don the mantle of national independence. It is evident from this discussion that the major indigenous political groupings are bound to be part of any true independence settlement, and that such a settlement, in their eyes, is in fact long overdue.

The party spectrum of SWA/Namibia ranges from the conservative far right, to parties with socialist principles and policies. Only the larger more important parties have been isolated for discussion in Section 3. Amongst these, priority has been given to those parties which opted to function 'within' the structure of the existing political dispensation, if only through voicing consistent criticism. This approach is relatively plausible as only SWAPO is actively involved in the armed struggle. Parties such as SWANU, SWAPO-D and the NIP keep a lower political profile without compromising their beliefs.

Section 4 is devoted to the evaluation of SWAPO's claims in the independence dispute. The organisation's history, ideological motivations, popular support, and unity are discussed. The issue of SWAPO's popular support is of the utmost importance and is considered at length.

Informed observers are united in the view, and as this
dissertation asserts, that SWAPO's massive support from the Ovambo-speaking group is sufficient to assure the organisation of an electoral victory in a 'free and fair' election held within the territory. However, considerable uncertainty exists as to SWAPO's wider national support from the other ten ethnic groups.

To ascertain SWAPO's non-Ovambo support certainly would require empirical research, and endeavour not undertaken in this dissertation. Speculatively, though, it is possible that percentage wise SWAPO could be as strongly represented in the other population groups. For the purpose of this dissertation it is assumed that SWAPO's support from the Ovambo is already almost certain to result in an election victory, and that further support from the other population groups would only assure such a victory.

Despite SWAPO's massive Ovambo support, it is argued that some form of representative dispensation should be introduced to accommodate the other minority groups. It is unfortunate that only a 'free and fair' election or empirical research can reveal the extent of SWAPO's wider national support, and therefore, determine the viability for a 'consociational' or 'participatory' political structure for the territory.

In conclusion Section 5 brings together the most salient points to have emerged in the dissertation, of which the most important are:
1. The unlikely possibility of a military victory for either the South African Defence Forces or SWAPO;

2. The need for indigenous political participation in any true independence settlement;

3. The crucial factor of SWAPO participation in such a settlement; and

4. The desirability of an independence settlement as soon as possible.
SECTION ONE

BACKGROUND
THE ECONOMY OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA

GEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION

South West Africa/Namibia (SWA/Namibia) is a vast territory in the south-western part of the continent of Africa, stretching along the South Atlantic coast, covering an area of 824,295 square kilometers. It shares a 1,600 km border in the north with Angola, in the east it is bordered by Botswana, in the south and south-east by the Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa, while the Caprivi Strip, a 64 km wide corridor stretching into the border area between Zambia and Botswana, is also part of the Territory. There is little doubt amongst those knowledgeable about SWA/Namibia, that it is a country of extremes, a fact which seriously hampers its economic development. Twenty percent of its area is desert, while only 32% is suitable for dry-land cropping.

MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ECONOMY

The economy of SWA/Namibia has been described as a plural or dual economy, consisting of a predominantly modern European exchange sector and a traditional subsistence African sector. The exchange sector is represented by large mining companies controlled by South Africa and other foreign interests, a fishing industry, commercial communities in the larger business centres and many large, individually-owned, farms. The traditional subsistence sector, owing to the
dry nature of the climate with prolonged droughts, is largely comprised of non-profit orientated crop cultivation by African subsistence farmers.

The Territory is rich in natural resources: diamonds, found mainly in the coastal desert and coastal waters; copper, lead, zinc, vanadium and uranium; its rich off-shore fisheries; an extensive beef industry and its karakul industry. The majority of these enterprises are white-owned, and in the case of minerals, dominated by large South African or international companies. SWA/Namibia is ranked as one of the world's largest producers of diamonds, and in recent years, 1976-1983, there has been extensive exploration for uranium, while the prospecting for oil has been intensified.

**MINERALS**

W.H. Thomas correctly pointed out that mining is the most important resource base for development in the Territory. In the past, mining activities were entirely dominated by two mines, viz. the copper mine at Tsumeb, and the diamond mine around Oranjemund. They produced about 90% of the value of all minerals extracted in SWA/Namibia, and contributed approximately 27% to 35% of the total Gross Domestic Product during the 1960s, even though their share in overall employment was only about 4% in 1970. There is some controversy about the role played by these mining enterprises in the development of the Territory and its peoples.
Consolidated Diamond Mines Limited (CDM), the De Beers controlled diamond mine in the south of SWA/Namibia, to discuss but one of the more prominent examples, has made an important contribution to the economic progress of the country. Through the revenue and foreign exchange accruing to the government from its operation, and through its investment in the training and advancement of its employees, CDM could be considered as the single most significant private sector contributor to the development of this emerging state. In 1980, CDM contributed 17% towards the profit of its parent company, De Beers, though in doing so, it provided SWA/Namibia with approximately 40% of the public revenue generated in the country. Furthermore, company and other taxes effectively absorbed more than 60% of CDM's profits in 1980, in addition to personal income-tax on salaries and wages paid to employees, (R44 million in salaries and wages in 1980). CDM and associated companies spent R27 million on prospecting during 1981, while prospecting expenditure over the period 1979-1981 amounted to R51 million.

CDM is also the biggest employer of labour in the private sector, with 6,800 employees at the mine at any given time. Taking their dependents into account, a substantial number of SWA/Namibians rely wholly or partly on work provided by CDM for a cash income. Each year the company ploughs back a proportion of its profits into the CDM Chairman's Fund, which initiates and supports numerous projects of social, economic, cultural and educational importance in the Territory. At first sight it would appear that CDM is not randomly exploiting the resources of the country without any form of return - some of the activities undertaken
would be necessary in an independent future. CDM's policy, as expressed by Sir Harry Oppenheimer, is to remain unchanged when independence comes to SWA/Namibia. (11)

In addition to copper and diamond mining, uranium extraction has gained prominence since 1976. Rio Tinto of South Africa is developing what is expected to become one of the world's largest uranium operations. Reserves in the uranium mine at Rossing, near Swakopmund, are estimated to be 100,000 tons. Figures on the earnings of uranium are kept secret, but Thomas believed that gross tax revenue from this source could amount to about R100 million in the early 1980s. (12)

FARMING

Commercial farming is almost entirely restricted to the export of cattle and the production of Karakul pelts (persian lamb) which is carried out mainly by white farmers. (13) Farming contributed approximately 20% to SWA/Namibia's Gross Domestic Product in the 1970s. Commercial agriculture and stock-raising are totally controlled by whites, with the majority of Africans employed as sheperds and farm labourers. Over 90% of the value of agricultural output is livestock or livestock products. (14) In contrast to mining and fisheries, most farms belong to farmers residing within the Territory. This is true for most of the 6,324 farms held by some 5,000 whites, the majority of whom are Afrikaans and German-speaking.

Despite the high expectations placed on the farming industry by
outside organisations such as the United Nations, a rather different situation exists in reality. Prolonged droughts, deficient marketing systems, general maladministration and insurgency warfare, since the early seventies, combined to significantly reduce the productivity of the northern farming region. The central and southern regions are similarly hard hit by the drought conditions. Indebtedness of the farming community, amounting to R157.7 million in 1982, was to the poor prospects for the period 1983/84. A survey on Proposals for the Restoration of Farming in South West Africa, conducted by J.E. Harrison Farm Consultants, in association with the Institute of Agricultural Economics of the University of Stellenbosch, tabled in 1982, present some revealing figures on the well-being of the farming community from 1970 to 1981/82. This is reproduced as Appendix III at the end of this section. Its most important finding was that the severity of the drought conditions experienced during the late 1970s and early 1980s was not worse than on previous occasions. This is supported by the figures in Appendix III, which, in a number of cases, reflects a steady increase in productivity over the past decade, 1970-80.

The production of Karakul pelts, however, reflects a gradual decline since 1979. SWA/Namibia is one of the world's largest suppliers of this luxury commodity, exports going to the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom. However, as Thomas correctly pointed out, the supply and price of Karakul is subject to fluctuation. Due to changing fashion trends, ineffective marketing and droughts, the price of Karakul pelts deteriorated markedly between 1979 and 1981.
FISHERIES

More important than agriculture, as far as exports are concerned, but less stable and less employment intensive, is the Territory's fishing industry. (18) Commercial fishing is an important part of the industry and is dominated by eight South African companies and their affiliates. Most of the produce is canned for export. However, there has been a serious decline in both inshore and deep water catches, and profitability, primarily caused by ruthless overfishing. The result was that by 1981/82, the fishing industry was near to collapse. This, it was suggested, resulted from South Africa's purchase of larger and more efficient trawlers, as well as overfishing by foreign countries, such as Russia, Spain and other members of the International Commission of South East Atlantic Fisheries - founded after South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation. (19)

For the following examples, figures and conclusions, I am heavily indebted to Eric Lang's public addresses delivered in Windhoek during May 1982 and May 1983. Mr Lang, a local businessman and millionaire, who made a thorough, but unpublished study of the SWA/Namibia economy, made several revealing statements never made in public before. (He challenged individuals and authorities to prove any of his findings incorrect.)

Lang had not been part of any political group in the country, nor had he taken part in any party-political organisation. As a result of what he called "this fortunate state of affairs" he was able to venture into the minefield, researching some "darker" regions of the economy. (20) Lang, like Thomas (21), comments on
the fact that so many statistics relevant to an understanding of the SWA/Namibian economy is "officially" inaccessible. He said that he had come to the conclusion that these figures are withheld from local government in order to "eliminate any chance of interfering with the South African overall strategy". (22)

Regarding the political situation, he felt strongly that South Africa, as the architect of the present constitutional dispensation, and as the dominant factor in the economic and political spheres, is largely to be blamed for the Territory's economic and political crisis. Referring to the controversial Proclamation No.AG.8 (1980), providing for an ethnic dispensation and eleven local governments — which will be extensively discussed in the section dealing with Local Politics — Lang described these as an

"... enormously complicated, bloated, inefficient and hideously expensive government system, devoid of all sanity, that has institutionalised tribalism and effectively led to the semi-paralysis of the political and economic development of the Territory." (23)

In his opinion, South Africa imposes an economic and political infrastructure on the country primarily to serve South African and not SWA/Namibian interests.

"In fact I am prepared to go so far as to call South West Africa's economy a slave economy, an economic buffer, a pantry of the South African economy from which it smooths out the ups and downs in its own economic cycle."

(i) From 1920 to 1969 the Territory was treated as a colony, and all development was narrowly focussed and minimal,
compared to the wealth created for South Africa and foreign shareholders.

(ii) Between 1969 and 1976 the country was, for all intents and purposes, integrated as a fifth province of the Republic of South Africa. During this period South Africa "pretended" to locally invest R200 million, but "this was all South Africa ever contributed between 1915 and 1976". (24)

Lang drew attention to the growing indebtedness of SWA/Namibia to South Africa. From 1979, when the total external government debt was R28 million, to a debt of R70.7 million in 1980, to R80 million in 1981, to an estimated R600 million in 1982, and a staggering projected R1 000 million for 1984/85. (25) However, for those who persist in calling SWA/Namibia a poor country dependent on its rich neighbour, South Africa, one can draw attention to the following statistics. In 1981 SWA/Namibia produced:

1. 25% of the copper production of South Africa;
2. 35% of the zinc production of South Africa;
3. 65% of the silver production of South Africa;
4. 70% of the tin production of South Africa;
5. 93% of the lead production of South Africa, and
6. 70% of the value of diamonds of South Africa. (26)

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: Independence and Beyond

A booklet entitled 'Transforming A Wasted Land', by Richard Moorsom and published by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, made the following relevant statements. Any attempt to predict economic and social trends in SWA/Namibia's agricul-
tural sector, or to discuss rural development strategy, is faced with a number of special difficulties. Firstly, the likely situation at independence is far from clear as an agreement on independence is not yet in sight, nor is there any hard evidence that South Africa had any target-date planned. Independence, therefore had a time horizon of any time between 1983 and some point in the indefinite future.

Secondly, the terms of independence, whenever granted, definitely will influence the short and long-term aftermath, as the Territory's social, economic and administrative structures are so closely integrated with those of the Republic of South Africa, that a thorough-going disengagement is bound to be a radical process. Thirdly, the resources on which an incoming Namibian government will be able to rely in organising and carrying through its development programme, would largely depend upon the amount of international support that it can gather. A fourth aspect that will limit available resources will be the real prospects for a SWAPO government in a genuinely independent Namibia, especially because of the organisation's commitment to socialism. Any transition towards socialism would be an arduous process requiring a great deal of caution as it proceeds.

Mr E. Cross, General Manager of the Zimbabwean Dairy Marketing Board, supports these views. When he presented the Rossing Foundation Quarterly Lecture in Windhoek in November 1982, Mr. Cross emphasised that businessmen in SWA/Namibia should prepare themselves for a SWAPO government. He outlined a number of difficulties businessmen in Namibia would be faced with under a SWAPO government:
1. Overcoming the strains in society, particularly overcoming the tensions between social and economic classes;

2. The new political leadership would lack essential administrative skills crucial for the smooth operation of a modern state;

3. The high living standards of the minority would heighten the sense of conflict in a free society;

4. The entrenchment of military groups with strong political influence and power;

5. The outflow of administrative and technological skills once the process of independence had been concluded;

6. The heavy dependence on a small number of economic activities, closely linked to and dependent upon South African transport and markets. (27)

Finally, however, independent or not, SWA/Namibia, as result of existing linkages and structures, is going to remain thoroughly reliant on South Africa for years to come. (28) Yet, one important point that has emerged throughout the preceding first part of section one, is the desirability for much greater local involvement in the administration and control of the economy, as this can only benefit the entire country. As Thomas sums up:

"In South West Africa the process of sharing the existing economic wealth is currently more crucial than the creation of such wealth. Vested interests from foreign countries, from the Republic of South Africa and from the existing elite are indeed aware of such wealth, and have successfully exploited it so far. Impediments like droughts, the long distances, low labour productivity, etc. have not really prevented such profitable investments. The challenge now is to widen the resource base and incorporate all groups of the small population into
the modern economy. If this can be achieved in a way that also guarantees political stability, the country may in the long run also attract significant numbers of skilled and enterprising immigrants (irrespective of their racial background), who may fill South West Africa's most important resource gap." (29)
APPENDIX II
SOUTH WEST AFRICA
SUID-WES AFRIKA
MINERALS
MINERALE

LEGEND OF SYMBOLS
VERKLARING VAN SIMBOL£
(alphabetical by symbols)
(alfabelies simbole)

Silver Ag Silwer
Gold Au Koud
Beryllium Be Berillium
Bismuth Bi Bismut
Caesium Cs Sesium
Copper Cu Koper
Diamonds Diamante
Iron Fe Yster
Fluor-spar Vloei:;paal
Germanium Ge Germanium
Graphite Grafiet
Gypsum Gips
Cyanite Ky Kianiet
Lithium Li Litium
Vanadium V Vanadium
Tin Sn Tin
Soda trona Soda trona
Tantalum Th Thantaal
Titanium Ti Titaan
Vanadium V Vanadium
Zink Zn Sink

GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION
GEOGRAFIESE LIGGING

1 Tsumeb mine myn
2 Abanab mine myn
3 Friesenbg Alt Bobos Keravari Uris
4 Hanab Uibab
5 Berg Aukas mine myn
6 Baflka
7 Konrad mine myn Gochab
8 Kallfontain prospect mynboumooonsethied
9 Parabib Pb-Zn prospect mynboumooonsethied
10 Okapuka
11 Eisenberg
12 Ondjoodoo mine myn
13 Goanagab
14 Cooper valley
15 Koperen
16 Ongaba Owindebe
17 Olusindoo mine myn

26 Onganja (Oijanaatji) mine myn
28 Otjiwarongo
34 Au
37 Mn
39 Cu
40 Cu
41 Sn
42 Bt
43 Cu
44 Pb
45 Cu
46 Fe
47 Cu
48 Pb
49 Co
50 Consolidated Diamond Mines. Main working area

18 Otjozondjupa mine myn
20 Oamites
21 MatcMus
23 Orion
25 Khan mine myn
26 Kranzberg mine myn
27 Gightswape
28 Ongati
29 Namib leadmine loodmyn
30 Do limine limen
31 Brandberg West mine myn
32 Loddy
33 Swartmodder
34 Neuras
36 Neuves
37 Main mine myn
38 Pb
39 Cu
40 Cu
41 Sn
42 Sb
43 Au
44 Ag
45 Ag
46 Cu
47 Sn
48 Pb
49 Co
50 Consolidated Diamond Mines. Main working area

Trig survey, 1953.

[Diagram showing geographical positions]
## SWA/NAMIBIA MEAT BOARD ANNUAL REPORT

### Marketing of Livestock in SWA/Namibia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cattle Slaughtered in SWA/Namibia</th>
<th>Live Animals Exported/SA</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>106 514</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>140 528</td>
<td>72.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>26.4</td>
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<td>64 298</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>33.4</td>
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<td>43.0</td>
<td>150 523</td>
<td>57.0</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>39.9</td>
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<td>194 323</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
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<td>69.8</td>
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### Small Stock

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Slaughtered</th>
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<tr>
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<td>36.8</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>406 234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>423 639</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>66.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>256 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>315 698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>412 566</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>389 370</td>
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<td>1977</td>
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<td>73.1</td>
<td>377 376</td>
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<td>335 720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>750 735</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: 1981 SWA/Namibia Meat Board Annual Report
Appendix III continued

Gross Domestic Product - Contribution by Agriculture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>R, million</th>
<th>Perc. of Total SWA/Namibia</th>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>119,6</td>
<td>16,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>100,7</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>91,1</td>
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<td>98,0</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>124,3</td>
<td>8,7</td>
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</table>

Gross Output from Farming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Karakul Pelts R, million</th>
<th>Sheep + Beef R, million</th>
<th>Wool</th>
<th>Other R, million</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>50,2</td>
<td>86,3</td>
<td>2,6</td>
<td>13,3</td>
<td>152,4</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>36,2</td>
<td>78,6</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>14,9</td>
<td>132,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>34,3</td>
<td>79,3</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>16,1</td>
<td>132,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>46,7</td>
<td>82,7</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>17,1</td>
<td>148,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>42,8</td>
<td>107,8</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>30,6</td>
<td>184,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>20,1</td>
<td>130,5</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>35,2</td>
<td>188,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

++ Source: Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing, Pretoria.
REFERENCES: Section 1.1

1. Footnote: See Appendix 1.


5. Footnote: See Appendix II.


8. Footnote: In 1976 production from SWA/Namibian diamond mines amounted to 1,693,997 carats; in 1977 to 2,001,217; dropped to 1,898,208 in 1978, and further dropped to 1,559,506 in 1980.


10. All figures supplied by Mr Dough Hoffe, Director of the Consolidated Diamond Mines Limited in Windhoek.


15. Schneider-Barthold, *Namibia economic potential and existing economic ties with the Republic of South Africa* (Berlin, German Development Institute, 1977), p.22.

16. Report conducted by J.E. Harrison, SA Farm Consultants, in Association with the Institute of Agriculture Economics of the University of Stellenbosch.


21. Thomas noted that "The attempts to bring together relevant data on recent economic performance and expected development proved extremely frustrating in the light of paucity of published and released information", in *An Overall Perspective*, pp.1-2.


26. Ibid.


INTRODUCTION

In the preceding part of Section 1, I have briefly dealt with South West Africa/Namibia's geography, natural resources and industrial and agricultural sectors, but refrained from dealing with the Territory's population. This I have done with a specific purpose in mind, one which is neither easily arguable nor defensible. Despite these difficulties, which will become more apparent as the discussion progresses, I will argue for SWA/Namibia being a plural society and the need for a political solution that gives recognition to this fact. This, I believe, is contrary to the popular belief in a 'majoritarian' settlement for the Territory.

The statistical table (overleaf), based on its multiplicity of population groups, suggests that SWA/Namibia is a plural society. Taking pluralism to mean what Kuper, Smith and others believe it to denote, the plurality of the SWA/Namibia society becomes even more evident. Kuper defines plural societies as

"... societies characterised by certain conditions of cultural diversity and social cleavage ..., arising from the contact of different peoples and cultures within a single society", while Smith's definition reads:

"... pluralism is a condition in which members of a common society are internally distinguished by fundamental differences in their institutional practice". (4)
Population Composition and Statistics: 1960-1981/82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ovambo</td>
<td>239 363</td>
<td>45,5</td>
<td>352 640</td>
<td>46,3</td>
<td>516 600</td>
<td>51,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>73 464</td>
<td>14,0</td>
<td>90 583</td>
<td>11,9</td>
<td>75 600</td>
<td>7,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damara</td>
<td>44 353</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>66 291</td>
<td>8,7</td>
<td>76 800</td>
<td>7,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herero</td>
<td>35 354</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>50 589</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>77 600</td>
<td>7,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavango</td>
<td>27 871</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>49 512</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>98 000</td>
<td>9,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nama</td>
<td>34 806</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>32 935</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>49 700</td>
<td>4,9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>12 708</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>28 512</td>
<td>3,7</td>
<td>43 500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caprivian</td>
<td>15 840</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>25 580</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>39 500</td>
<td>3,9</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAN</td>
<td>11 762</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>22 830</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehoboth Baster</td>
<td>11 257</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>16 649</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>25 800</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaokolander</td>
<td>9 223</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>6 567</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td>9 992</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>4 407</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>6 800</td>
<td>0,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15 089</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>526 004</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>762 184</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1 009 900</td>
<td>99,67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both definitions by Kuper and Smith hold true with respect to the SWA/Namibian society, which exemplifies cultural diversity on a significant scale, social cleavages and institutional differentiation between the indigenous groups. (Even when defined in cruder terms such as the existence of a black/white, traditional/modern division.)

D. McK. Irvine, in his paper 'Plural Societies and Constitutions', includes, among other qualities denoting pluralism:
1. cultural diversity;
2. ethnic or racial particularism;
3. disparities in power;
4. socio-economic differentials, and
5. perceptions of relative deprivation. (5)

All of these, in one way or another, are applicable to the SWA/Namibian situation. Furnivall's definition refers to groups that:

"... mix but do not combine, which upholds their own religion, culture, language, ideas and ways, and live side by side but refrain from inter-mingling into one political unit", (6)

could be applied to SWA/Namibia, provided that one important qualification, which is equally relevant to the other definitions, is added. It can be said that South Africa's early colonial rule, and its policy of separate development since the early 1960s, not only perpetuated the German colonial policy, of enforced separation of the indigenous groups, but actually entrenched the existence and further development of the multi-ethnic pluralism of SWA/Namibia. Equally undeniable, however, is the fact that separate indigenous societies had existed in the Territory even before German colonialism came in the eighteenth century. Herero, Nama, Damara and Owambo were separate polities and were subjugated separately. (7)

Critics of this viewpoint would argue that a natural process of unification or amalgamation would have taken place in the absence of the repressive colonial regimes. This argument, however, is not as persuasive as its advocates would like to believe. Numerous historical examples of nations and ethnic groups on both the European and African continents suggest that such a process of 'natural amalgamation' is by no means inevitable. Despite centuries of development they have remained as diversified as before.
Besides, unification into one South West African nation did not start off before German arrival, and after a long period of enforced division, it is even less likely to begin in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the important fact is the indisputable plural nature of the SWA/Namibian society in the 1980s.

**THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION: A MAJORITARIAN APPROACH**

Political organisation in and around SWA/Namibia, from the 1950s, focused upon two main directives envisaged for an independent future. The entrenched Status Quo structure, backed by South Africa, has gradually come under increasing pressure from a national liberation movement opposed to a South African imposed settlement. (For convenience and clarity, the South African initiative is discussed and incorporated in a later part of this section.)

It must be remembered that violent, military-based, rebellions against German occupation had already taken place in the late nineteenth century (8), and that semi-organised non-violent political opposition to South Africa's colonial occupation of the Territory started in the 1940s and 1950s. Traditional leaders such as Herero Chief, Hosea Kutako, and Nama Chief, David Witbooi, repeatedly submitted petitions to the United Nations for South West African independence which gave the anti-colonial movement its initial impetus. Kutako and other leading Herero formed a Council of Chiefs to watch, publicise and protest each new act by the South African administration. (9)
During the early 1950s South West African contract workers in Cape Town came into contact with the African National Congress and other parties opposed to white rule, and came to realise the need for a similar representative organisation. The Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO) was subsequently founded on 15 April 1959. (10) The OPO, initially sought to protect Ovambo workers' interests only, was renamed the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) only on 19 April 1960 (11), in order to be broadly nationally representative. Despite increased numbers of deputations and petitions to the United Nations (by 1960 120 petitions annually reached the United Nations), (12) SWAPO, at a national congress in Windhoek in 1961, realised the futility of peaceful resistance and started its preparation for a military struggle. On 18 July 1966, from its Headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam SWAPO officially declared its intended military campaign against South African occupation of SWA/Namibia.

On 12 December 1973, the United Nations General Assembly, through Resolution 3111 (XXVIII), recognised the national liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), as the sole authentic representative of the Territory and its peoples and declared its support of the movement in its efforts to strengthen national unity. (13) On numerous occasions, from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s the United Nations Security Council has reaffirmed the legitimacy of the indigenous peoples' struggle against South African presence, undertaking to supply moral and material support for the struggle. It further called upon the South African Government to fully cooperate in a peaceful transfer of power in Namibia - Resolution 323 (1972) - to an independent government.
Security Council Resolution 385 (1976) condemned all South African attempts calculated to deny free and fair elections under United Nations supervision, which would enable the Territory's people to determine their own future. Resolution 385 (1976) called for free elections for the entire country as one political entity to 'enable the people to freely and fairly determine their own future', by electing representatives to a 'Namibian Constituent Assembly', to draw up and adopt the Constitution for an independent and sovereign Namibia. This was reaffirmed by Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)

SWAPO envisaged that, in the immediate aftermath of independence, the new peoples' government would be faced by a formidable task of national reconstruction and social transformation. For SWAPO, political independence would mark the threshold of a new phase of struggle whose objective would be nothing less than the complete elimination of all forms of imperialist domination and the transformation of capitalist exploitation into a genuine socialist democracy - there are, it argues, only two paths for an independent nation: to return to imperialist domination (neo-colonialism, capitalism, state capitalism) or to take the path of socialism.

Tasks anticipated by SWAPO prior to independence include:

"... the liberation and winning of independence for the people of Namibia, by all possible means, and to establish a democratic peoples' government". (17)

This will imply the:

"... unification of all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the peasantry and progressive intellectuals into a vanguard party capable
of safeguarding national independence and of building a classless, non-exploitative society based on the principles of scientific socialism", (18)

"... the economic reconstruction in a free, democratic and united Namibia will have, as its motive force, the establishment of a classless society." (19)

From these quotations it is clear that SWAPO stands for the upholding of certain democratic principles, in its desire for a 'democratic peoples' government', yet, this government in its ideal form, would be underlined and strongly based upon the 'principles of scientific socialism'. In short, the organisation would want to establish a "SOCIAL DEMOCRACY" in an independent Namibia. (Note, these terms are not explicitly used by the organisation.)

It so happens that democracy has never been identified with one specific ideological doctrine - it rather has come to be a universally honorific term. Richard Wollheim saw social democrats as:

"... indifferent to constitutional and political organisation, but at the same time wanted to secure the full prestige of this concept (democracy) for their own preferences in what they considered to be the truly important field - that of economic organisation". (20)

'Social Democracy' is generally conceived as a state and style of the society, and may thus be defined as an ethos and way of life - characterised by a general levelling of status differences which, in practice, is envisaged as a government exercised in the name, and in the interests of an overwhelming majority of the population, the working class. (22) By implication this would
mean a black "peasant" class government for South West Africa/Namibia.

These basic SWAPO ideals are not only condoned and supported by the International Community, the United Nations in particular, repeatedly pledged full commitment to do whatever possible to enact them through 'free and fair elections'. Moreover, it is possible to list in point form a number of reasons for this unswerving support for SWAPO and its cause:

1. As pointed out before, as early as the 1940s and 1950s, deputations and petitions to the United Nations depicted South Africa as the enemy and oppressor of the indigenous peoples of South West Africa. This view of South Africa remained unaltered right into the 1980s.

2. In recent years, especially since the 1970s, a call had gone up for the holding of 'free and fair elections' under United Nations supervision. South Africa's refusal to cooperate in holding such elections, along with other attempts at working out a future for the Territory, did not help to create a more favourable international position for South Africa as far as SWA/Namibia was concerned.

3. SWAPO's special representative with observer status at the United Nations enabled the organisation firmly to entrench its claim to wide national support, as well as allowing it to campaign for the 'honouring of the will of the majority', i.e. through United Nations supervised elections. In addition to being provided with a platform to state its
policies, SWAPO also received extensive financial support to uphold its struggle.

On the other hand, there are other practical considerations that place the SWAPO - and international - claims in a less favourable light. In this concluding part of the first section, these practical, and very real, considerations will be discussed. This is done, however, not to deliberately discredit SWAPO in any way whatsoever, but to suggest and advance one possible alternative solution to the Territorial question, other than outright "majority rule" as demanded by SWAPO. (Attention must be drawn to the fact that points only briefly mentioned in this section will be dealt with in detail in the relevant subsequent sections.)

A suitable issue to begin with, one surrounded by much controversy, claims and counter-claims, is the extent and source of SWAPO's national support. The International Community and 'informed observers' often claim the organisation to be broadly nationally based, with support coming from a number of indigenous groups, and not only from the Ovambo-speaking group, as opponents of SWAPO assert. The Ovambo are the organisation's major source of support, since, as indicated by the tabulated statistics, by 1981/82, it comprised 51.1% of the total population - which in itself constituted sufficient back-up for SWAPO's demand for "majority rule" - provided that it received this group's un-divided support.

Nevertheless, granting SWAPO the benefit of the doubt in allowing for some support emanating from the other ten groups as well, it
would appear as if the organisation's claim that it enjoys majority support would be further strengthened and justified. In the final analysis this might very well be the case, although, SWAPO's support amongst these groups could not be total. It could hardly be the case, as in 1981/82, there existed more than 40 listed internal parties, (a number of which existed on paper only), each with its own constitution, political leaders and aspirations.

In the event of 'free and fair elections' under United Nations supervision, after 1983, a SWAPO victory would almost be a foregone conclusion - based simply on the expected support from the Ovambo-speaking group. Yet, would such an election victory necessarily justify SWAPO or Ovambo domination or rule over the remaining groups and parties? Quite a few of the local political leaders would deny this, because an election based on the principle of first-past the post, winner-takes-all, or simple majoritarianism would possibly consign them to perpetual exclusion from any share in power.

These leaders, like SWAPO, could very well enjoy the popular and true support of their respective groups, but due to irreversible numerical discrepancies be unable to serve their interests. Obviously then, the question of importance is whether an unqualified system of 'majority rule' would in fact be the most suitable type of political system for the SWA/Namibia situation.

Finally, mention must be made of the strong role played by ethnicity in all existing political parties. Virtually all
parties, even the hotly non-collaborationist socialist ones, have ethnic bases. SWANU effectively being Herero, the NIP Coloured, and SWAPO-D Ovambo.\(^{24}\) Even SWAPO is overriding ethnically based, drawing most of its support from the Ovambo. The SWAPO-Democrats even claim to be:

"... composed of loyal SWAPO members, representing the SWAPO members who have remained true to the original and traditional principles and policies of SWAPO." (25)

Ironically, leader of the SWAPO-Democrats, Mr Andreas Shipanga, had been expelled from a United Nations conference on SWA/Namibia in the French capital during April 1983, with not a single "Namibian" accredited as delegate (26) – other than the SWAPO delegates.

The problem at present is that:

(a) one does not know with any precision what the patterns of support for the different parties would be, although it is widely acknowledged that SWAPO would win with a majority, and

(b) by definition one cannot know what bases would crystallize once competitive electoral politics had been initiated.

But one can have a reasonable idea that ethnicity would continue to be significant and that present divisions (however created and entrenched by whoever) would continue to be salient. Thus, the case of making provision for a political system that avoids simple majoritarianism is strong.
Turning to SWAPO's concept of 'democratic majority rule', much needs to be said. What must be established at the outset, is whether SWAPO's notion of democracy, as Joseph Schumpeter suggested, would imply a competitive system in which politicians from all groups would be free to rally and compete for electoral support in order to gain political office (27), and if so, whether such competition would recur at regular intervals in the future. The earlier discussion on the nature of a social democratic state suggested that this might not be the case.

Kenneth Minogue points out that democratic principles work only because there is an overriding constitution – contract or agreement – that prevents their being principles only (28). This, in effect, would call for the continuation of democratic principles and not just occurrence as a one-time event, i.e. 'free and fair elections' under United Nations supervision, merely to install a SWAPO government.

Given that the people should govern, and that direct democracy (whereby the people themselves actually participate in the act of governing) is not possible in a modern State a system in which there are elections at fairly regular intervals and where the candidate who receives the most votes gains office, does seem logical at first sight. But it is precisely this notion of majority rule and government by the people that is being questioned.

As H.B. Mayo set it out, it is so difficult to defend the majority system under the so-called universal franchise, that one of the
commonest methods of defending current practice is to argue that the system precludes genuine majority rule and actual government by the people. (29) This is a view supported by Michels and Mosca, who argue that the political elite 'chosen by the people' in themselves constitute an exclusive ruling minority. (30)

Furthermore, in the presence of competing ethnicities, as in Africa, demands for the application of the majority rule principle are unrealistic as it produces more social conflict rather than less. (31)

In his book, Approaches to Democracy, Stankiewicz states, on the issue of majority rule, that:

"... making decisions by counting heads ... is a final resort to break a deadlock when reason can go no further ... Originally, that is what voting was supposed to do. It was the condition that made (the) majority rule compatible with minority rights. When made the primary principle of political action, however, it raises serious difficulties in respect of minority rights: the latter, under the primacy of majority rule principle, are reduced to a set of restrictions of dubious power and uncertain extent. What powers they have depends upon the degree of tolerance within the society ... if the principle of majority rule is shifted from a position of last resort to that of first resort, 'tolerance', not reason, becomes the primary value of the society, the one without which the system will not work." (32)

In terms of SWA/Namibia, the following quotations from a reader's letter in the Namibian Review expresses the crucial issue. It appeared after a comment published by the editor on the so-called "two-way" pre-implementation Geneva Conference:

"Mr Editor, I think you could have elaborated a little more on the UN's refusal to invite these three parties (NNP, NIP and SWAPO-D) (33) and to make the show a two-way operation. The point
here is that there is a danger of many of us falling into the trap of certain people who want to dichotomise the SWA problem into simply a military issue between SWAPO and South Africa and in the process diminish the long-term implications of such a dichotomisation. Our problem, I believe, is only partly a military question. Long-term stability based on internal stability and a sound economy will ultimately depend on the cooperation of all the patriotic forces of our country. And as things stand today, no single organisation has a monopoly over the will to fight for freedom or of the answer to the problem of national reconstruction. This vital element of our problem should never be allowed to be sacrificed on the altar of political expediency." (34)

"Insofar as the issue of United Nations impartiality is raised by South Africa, I agree that it is a bogus issue. But not the issue itself. Personally, I maintain that United Nations support for SWAPO and South Africa's tutelage over the DTA are two evils that MUST be opposed with equal force. They are both predicted on false notions and are disastrous in their consequence for the unity and welfare of our people. The possibility and possible danger of replacing the DTA's despotic rule with a victorious "Idi Amin" (Sam Nujoma) wrapped in the glory of United Nations recognition may have consequences which it might be too late to do anything about." (35)

A PLURAL APPROACH: SWA/NAMIBIA

There exists an enormously detailed and well-crafted literature on the characteristics of plural societies and the problems encountered in maintaining or installing democratic government in such societies. It would be tedious as well as unnecessary to attempt a summary of this literature in any detail. As I do not want to outline an "exact model" system for SWA/Namibia, but merely advance a proposed alternative to 'majority rule', I will confine myself to the most basic and well-known literature on what is described as consociational democracy; the prerequisites,
central features and workability of a consociational structure in SWA/Namibia.

Juan Linz asserts that:

"... extremist politics are the result of structural strains, and in certain societies, in certain historical situations. The ideal democratic situation occurs when very large majorities grant legitimacy to both political institutions and the socio-economic structure, and when the social order is not perceived as unjust nor is reasonable change seen as threatening to those in privileged positions in the existing order. The constraints imposed on significant segments of the society by the illegitimacy of the existing social order will affect the degree of freedom to institute and defend democratic political institutions. It is no accident that political actors who are highly indignant about the injustice of the social order are often ready to risk the stability of democracy, which for them is of lesser value than social change." (36)

In terms of SWA/Namibia two common difficulties are pointed out. The difficulty of creating democratic institutions, in a formerly oppressed society, and to maintain these once they are installed. The strong possibility of a SWAPO Government and its definite commitment to socialism will endanger such institutions. The plurality of the SWA/Namibian society poses further problems. As Professor Robert Schrire stated in his paper, 'Power and Power Sharing in South Africa', in situations where:

"... the population is heterogeneous with vast differences in race, ethnic background, values and income, a system that is based upon one-man one-vote in one National Parliament is not suitable for undertaking the enormously complex task of reconciling conflicting group aspirations." (37)

John Seiler, in his 'Consociationalism Authoritarianism: Incen-
tives and Hindrances Toward Power Sharing and Devolution in South
Africa and Namibia' agrees, asserting that:

"... the multi-ethnic character of Namibia must be accounted for in any broadly acceptable political solution. Only consociational democracy offers this general prospect for a just and stable political future." (38)

Similar to the point made by Linz, Arend Lijphart in 'Democracy in Plural Societies' makes it clear that societies with deep cleavages based on racial or ethnic lines, with large socio-economic inequalities between the segments, present serious problems for the initial institutionalisation of democratic principles in such deeply divided societies. (39) Since, as Donald Rothchild pointed out, "ethnic boundaries may acquire a dangerous self-sustaining quality, especially in those cases where ethnicity is deliberately fostered", SWA/Namibia and South Africa being prime examples. Rothchild further asserts, and Lijphart would agree with him, that mutually reinforcing cleavages, contrary to cross-cutting cleavages, directly diminish the workability of consociationalism. (40) Presently, SWA/Namibia lacks such cross-cutting cleavages.

In fact, the Territory reflects much deviation from the four basic principles Nordlinger lists for the institutionalisation of conflict regulatory measures in the first place:

1. the existence of mutually perceived external threats;
2. that intense conflict and its consequences would hamper the economic well-being of all the groups;
3. to acquire or retain government office, and
4. to avoid bloodshed amongst the segments. (41)
In SWA/Namibia the external threat that does exist, the insurgency war on the northern border, is not mutually perceived, in fact, the greater part of the population, the Africans and other non-whites, see this threat as beneficial to their liberation. As a result of the military conflict in the northern operational area the interests and well-being of all sections already is affected. Power-sharing, and not the entrenchment or acquisition by one group, is the objective in SWA/Namibia, while bloodshed, as a result of the military struggle, is a reality which must be terminated as soon as possible, as it could very easily spill over to the socio-political spheres as well.

At first glance it would then appear as if the situation in SWA/Namibia by the early 1980s was not conducive to the introduction of consociationalism at all. Arend Lijphart, however, in his contribution to the Buthelezi Commission’s investigation into structural alternatives for governing Natal-KwaZulu, explicitly states that:

"... the conditions favourable to consociational democracy are not necessary conditions, and hence that unfavourable conditions do not render consociational democracy impossible. Furthermore, if one wants a plural society to be governed democratically as a single unit, there is no alternative to consociational democracy, since majority-rule democracy is not suitable for a plural society." (42)

Consociational democracy abridges the principle of majority-rule, though without deviating too much from normative democratic theory. (43)

According to Lijphart, consociational democracy may be defined in terms of four principles, all of which deviate from the Westminist
model of majority rule: grand coalition; mutual veto; proportionality, and segmental autonomy. (44)

(a) The principle of grand coalition, or what may be called the principle of power-sharing, means that the political leaders of all segments of the plural society jointly govern the country. Thus, joint consentual rule in contrast to one-man one-vote, winner-takes-all.

(b) The mutual veto gives each segment the assurance that it will not be out-voted by a majority when its vital interests are at stake. This is synonymous with John C. Calhoun's "concurrent majority" principle that requires a majority in each segment before proposals on vital matters are accepted.

(c) Proportionality serves as the basic standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and the allocation of public funds. It is aimed at giving special protection to small minorities.

(d) Decision-making authority is delegated to the separate segments as much as possible. It complements the grand coalition principle: on all issues of common interest, the decisions are made jointly by the leaders of all segments, but on all other issues, decision-making is left to the respective segments. (45)

The crux of Lijphart's consociational principles is the prevention of Zero-sum-situations (46) in which groups fear encroachment on their group-rights, and to avoid replacement of one form of
tyranny by another by means of constitutional arrangements. The most extensive criticism of the workability of democratic and consociational systems is advanced by Rabushka and Shepsle. In a short powerful paradigm they set out the developments most deeply divided plural societies undergo when granted independence. They are:

1. pre-independence ethnic co-operation - a multi-ethnic leadership coalition;
2. post-independence ethnic co-operation - ambiguity and strains develop in the ranks of the multi-ethnic coalition;
3. demand generation and the increased salience of ethnicity - the intensification of communal and not national preferences contributes to a short-lived multi-ethnic coalition;
4. outbidding and the decline of the multi-ethnic coalition - the disappearance of brokerage institutions as a result of the emergence of ambitious politicians; and
5. electoral machinations and mistrust (47) - "The temptation of the majority to strengthen its powers by means which are not democratic, and for the minority to rely on such means in order to obtain power, becomes overwhelming." (48)

Yet, with extensive consociational provisions, guaranteed by outside powers such as the Western Contact Group and South Africa, it does not necessarily have to follow that SWA/Namibia will undergo the same breakdown process. Although different in a number of respects, Australia, Belgium, India, Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sri Lanka and Botswana, have demonstrated
the effective functioning of consociationalism. Sri Lanka, in fact, is precisely a case which demonstrates the non-workability of a non-consociational system in a divided society. SWA/Namibia may very well be a further exception to the Rabushka and Shepsle paradigm. Linz, for example, noted that

"... none of them has experienced a breakdown of their institutions, which leads to the suspicion that the very political mechanisms described by 'consociational democracy' might be very effective in handling the strains that might otherwise endanger their democratic institutions." (50)

While Benyon argues that the entrenchment of constitutional rigidity is not necessarily an adequate safeguard of even those guarantees which are less dependent on economic prosperity, as they can be by-passed, Linz stresses the importance of constitution-building in new democracies. He adds, however, that equally important, or even more so, is the initial agenda adopted in the process. For that agenda often creates expectations that cannot be satisfied immediately or within the framework, and soon becomes the source of semi-loyalty on the part of the forces involved in the regime-building process. (52)

Despite the occasional words of optimism, it is clear that every multi-ethnic social situation, SWA/Namibia included, poses very special problems to the institutionalisation and maintenance of democratic practices. The safest and simplest prediction that can be made about the behaviour of ruling groups, whether ethnically defined or not, is that they will act in the furtherance of their own interests, or at least in what they perceive to be their own interests. (53)
Minorities Comparative Perspectives Pierre L. van den Berghe aptly sums up the state of affairs in situations where there are competitive ethnicities as:

"Those who control the central apparatus of the empire will, irrespective of ideology, suppress ethnic dissidence as ruthlessly as they need or dare to ... A policy of assimilation logically flows from situations where the state recognises the reality of ethnic differences, but denies legitimacy to all but one ethnic identity. Assimilation is consistent with the nation-state ideology. A single cultural norm is officially espoused, conformity to which is required of all citizens for full acceptance and rights. Groups failing to conform to this norm are defined as being outside the system until they pass the test of assimilation. Assimilationist ideology is always ethnocentric, in that it assumes that the dominant group sets the cultural standard that other groups are expected to emulate ... Furthermore it can be safely assumed that, to the extent that the state is identified with one of the constituent groups, whatever ethnic group policies the state implements are going to benefit the dominant group rather than the subordinate groups." (54)

In conclusion, a final very important point needs to be stressed. When I suggest a constitutionally provided for consociational democratic system for SWA/Namibia, I want to state clearly, in the strongest possible terms that such a system must stem from a process in which true popular leaders of all the population groups genuinely participated and contributed towards its formulation. If this is not the case, there would be no possibility that even this type of political system will function in the Territory. By implication, I do not suggest a system equal to that experienced under the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, which, in some ways, resembled a consociational dispensation.
REFERENCES: Section 1.2


3. 1981/82 Figure Released by the Department of Statistics, April 1982, Based on the 1981 Census Survey as published in Die Suidwester (Windhoek), 2 April 1982.


11. Africa Bureau Fact Sheet No.48, July/August 1978.
12. To Be Born A Nation, p.167.


17. The Political Programme of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia, (Delft, Holland, Printed by Brouwer Offset, 1976, pp.5-6.

18. Ibid.


23. On 12 December 1973, Through Resolution 3111 (XXVIII), SWAPO was granted full observer status at the General Assembly - the only liberation organisation to achieve this status - and participatory rights in all UN agencies.


32. Ibid.

33. Footnote: The section dealing with Local Politics explains these abbreviations more fully.


35. Ibid.


45. Ibid.

46. Lijphart, A. in McRae, K., Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies, p. 78.


The following historical analysis of United Nations' involvement in the South West Africa/Namibia question is aimed at providing a useful factual background against which resistance to South Africa's administrative and military occupation of the Territory can be viewed. This section is purely analytic, many of the issues raised will be discussed elsewhere in the dissertation.

INTRODUCTION: GERMAN OCCUPATION 1884-1915

The "modern" history of South West Africa, also referred to as Kalanami (Kalahari-Namib)\(^1\) or Namibia, can be retraced well beyond the sixteenth century arrival of the hunter-gatherer San people. The San were joined by the southward-migrating stockbreeders, initially the Nama, later followed by the Herero and Ovambo, each arriving and settling as separate indigenous tribes or nations\(^2\) who remained separate peoples by maintaining endogamy. By the close of the eighteenth century a relative degree of coexistence and a basic minimisation of intergroup warfare had been attained.

Due to the political nature of the dissertation, the historical
side of the SWA/Namibian situation will be sketched very briefly. White missionaries and traders who entered the territory during the 1860s, preceded German colonisation of the Territory, initiated at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. In 1878, the British had already annexed Walvis Bay, which was subsequently transferred to the administration of the Cape Colony in 1884, while only in 1883, the German businessman F.A.E. Luderitz purchased, through an agent, the Bay of Angra Pequena and a strip of land around it from a Nama Chief. In the ensuing quarrel over British and German claims, the Germans extended their control inland through "treaties of protection" with rival chiefs. An Anglo-German Agreement in July 1890 shared the spoils. German South West Africa was created, but Britain retained Walvis Bay.

The Germans never established complete control over the entire colony, leaving the northern regions unpoliced, but by 1904, they had subjugated the native nations, the Herero and Damara, who lived south of the region today known as Ovambo, to their iron rule. Vast tracts of land were alienated under the guise of 'treaties of protection', signed by the local chiefs, which at the end of 1903, left the Africans with 31.4 million hectares out of a total land area of 83.5 million hectares. The rest was divided between the colonial government and the white settlers.

Not only were the Herero and Damara dispossessed of their land, their social and political structures were shattered too. A series of native decrees was enacted between 1906 and 1907 forbidding Africans to acquire land or cattle, forcing them to carry passes and face punishment for vagrancy if they could not
prove their employment. These measures were successful in forcing Africans into wage labour for white employers, mostly farmers. By 1912, only 200 Herero and Nama were without paid employment, at the lowest wage-rates possible. (8)

For the first 30 years of White occupation, from 1884 until the First World War, South West Africa was under German administration. In 1915 it was invaded by a force of approximately 43,000 white South African volunteers shortly after the beginning of the war. (They acted upon British instructions.) This force completed the occupation of the northern region of the country. The Khorab Peace Treaty, 9 July 1915, officially marked the end of German sovereignty over South West Africa and for the duration of the war (9), July 1915 to December 1919, the Territory was placed under the military rule of the Union of South Africa, i.e. until the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.

SOUTH AFRICAN RULE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATE

After the war, the Allied Powers had to decide what was to be done with colonies formerly held by Germany and other defeated countries. They agreed that members of the new League of Nations would be designated to administer those territories. Article 22 of the League Covenant stated:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a
sacred trust of civilisation, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. (10)

South Africa, however, intended to annex former German South West Africa. (11) While the British war cabinet expressed basic agreement (12), opposition from the United States President resulted in a compromise. South Africa would instead administer the former colony under a "C" mandate of the League of Nations on behalf of the Mandates Commission. Its duty, laid down in the Mandate, was to prepare the Territory for eventual self-determination and to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants". (13) This administration of South West Africa was to take place as an integral part of the Union Government, i.e. subjected to the same laws, regulations and proclamations, and constituting an economic responsibility until it could become 'viably independent'. (14) A gross oversight occurred in that the meaning of 'viably independence' was not clearly stipulated, in later years this was dearly regretted.

Reports on the extent and direction on social, political and economic progress within the Territory had to be presented to the League on an annual basis. (15) Until the demise of the League in 1939, South Africa submitted the required annual reports, which were examined by the Permanent Mandates Commission. Though, South Africa did not disguise its dislike of having to report to the League, as the Commission was critical of South Africa' actions on several occasions (16) - especially questioning the system of separate reserves for Africans and frequently reminding the Union Government that it could not annex the mandate.
With the outbreak of the Second World War the League of Nations expired, signalling the resumption of international controversy around the future status of South West Africa and other mandated territories. Was South Africa to be responsible for its actions in South West Africa to the United Nations Organisation, created on 24 October 1945, or was the South West Africa Mandate to be dissolved? In reality, South Africa considered the Mandate merely as a gesture towards international understanding, furthermore it felt that its obligations to the League did not carry over to the United Nations. (17)

Four possible alternatives were to be considered:

1. annexation of South West Africa by the Union of South Africa,
2. incorporation of South West Africa as a province of South Africa,
3. placement of South West Africa under direct trusteeship of the international community, the United Nations, or
4. the South African Government could maintain the Mandate, provided that it took place under direct supervision of the newly-created United Nations, as a trust territory.

Although General Smuts, in 1936, opted for the first alternative, annexation, this idea was vigorously pursued only in 1943 when a local survey was held to gauge local attitudes. This "survey" indicated that 208,850 members of the non-white groups favoured provincial incorporation with South Africa, while only 33,520 opposed the idea. (18) These figures were hardly persuasive since the "survey" was conducted by South African officials only,
and it was further clear that many of the indigenous people did not understand the real implications of provincial incorporation. Nevertheless, South Africa had already extended its influence in South West Africa through control over local institutions. The South West Africa Constitution Act of 1925 (No.42) established an all-white Legislative Assembly for the Territory, consisting of six members appointed by the Administrator and approved by the Governor-General of South Africa and twelve elected members. Africans and other non-white people were not allowed to vote. In 1949, the National Party Government introduced the South West African Affairs Amendment Bill whereby the Territory's white population was granted direct representation in the South African Parliament - through six white members from the Territory. Two of the six members were to have "special knowledge of native affairs".

After lengthy deliberations, on 12 December 1946, the United Nations Security Council rejected South Africa's demands for full incorporation of South West Africa into the Union. (A demand that was reiterated in 1947 and 1948.) The United Nations disagreed with any new form of imperialism after World War Two, an even more important motivation for this refusal was that the General Assembly viewed the educational level of the indigenous peoples as too low to make such an important decision on their political future. South Africa subsequently refused to enter into a new international Trusteeship agreement and in 1949 ceased to submit the reports required in terms of the Mandate.
Disturbed by these developments, the General Assembly decided to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. In its first ruling in 1950, the International Court held that the Mandate was still in force and that South Africa could not unilaterally alter the status of South West Africa, but that it had no obligation to enter into a Trusteeship agreement. Some of the more salient findings of the Court were:

1. South Africa continued to have the international obligations contained in the League Covenant and the Mandate;
2. The function of supervision over the administration of the Territory by South Africa should be exercised by the United Nations, to which annual reports and petitions from the inhabitants were to be submitted;
3. South Africa continued to have the obligation to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants as a sacred trust of civilisation;
4. The Charter did not impose on South Africa the legal obligation to place South West Africa under the Trusteeship System, although it provided the means by which the Territory might be brought under the system.

South Africa, however, as it would frequently do in years to come, did not regard the Court's opinion as binding and it continued to deny the United Nations authority. Since its refusal, in 1949, to submit further reports, the South African Government adopted an increasing arrogant attitude towards the international community. For example, South Africa simply refused to cooperate with the United Nations' South West Africa Committee, appointed in 1953.
The Assembly had set up this new Committee on South West Africa to pursue negotiations with South Africa.\(^{27}\) The Committee was authorised to examine available information on the Territory and to report to the Assembly on conditions in the Territory.

During 1954-1955 the United Nations General Assembly and the new Committee continued to invite South Africa to negotiate on the future of South West Africa but South Africa declined, stating that it would not consider proposals which did not suit its basic requirements. The Committee in turn stated that the administration of the Territory by South Africa, particularly in regard to apartheid legislation, was not in conformity with the requirements of the Mandate, but it was unable to enact measures to alter this state of affairs. In 1956, the General Assembly requested\(^{28}\) the Secretary-General to explore ways and means of resolving the question on the future of South West Africa, and to take whatever steps he deemed necessary to solve the issue. No positive results, however, were achieved. South Africa remained unwilling to negotiate with either the Committee on South West Africa or the Secretary General, and no further progress reports were submitted either.

In 1957 the General Assembly made a further attempt to reach a solution through negotiation, when it established, through Resolution (1143 (XII) of 1957), a Good Offices Committee, composed of the United Kingdom, United States and Brazil, "to discuss with the Government of the Union of South Africa a basis for agreement which would continue to accord to the Territory of South West Africa an international status."\(^{29}\) All efforts by the Good
Offices Committee to reach such a basis for agreement were unsuccessful. Under chairmanship of Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, the Good Offices Committee met with representatives of the South African Government in Pretoria in 1958, but its proposals, involving United Nations supervision over the entire Territory, were unacceptable to South Africa. In 1959 the Committee reported to the General Assembly that it had not succeeded in finding a basis for agreement under its terms of reference.

On 4 November 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia, both members of the former League of Nations, and members of United Nations, instituted proceedings against South Africa at the International Court of Justice. The case concerned the continued existence of the Mandate for South West Africa, these countries charged that South Africa had violated its obligations under the Mandate by introducing apartheid policies in the Territory. By so doing, these states introduced the start of a six-year effort to solve the problem by legal methods. These initiatives failed to resolve the dispute over the Territory, however. In its judgement, delivered on 18 July 1966, the Court found that Ethiopia and Liberia could not be considered to have established any legal right or interest appertaining to them in the subject matter of their claims and the Court accordingly decided to reject them.

The Court's 1966 ruling proved to be a watershed in South West African politics. The indigenous inhabitants who had petitioned the United Nations for their independence since 1946, were shocked and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), formed in 1960, saw no alternative but to turn to an armed struggle.
Two weeks after the Court's decision, 35 African countries requested that the problem of South West Africa be considered a priority topic at the General Assembly's 1966 autumn session. The judicial path seemed to be closed; and in August/September 1966, both the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the South African authorities reported a clash between African freedom fighters and South African soldiers in the Ovamboland area.

In the meantime, in May 1962, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee for South West Africa, which had replaced the Committee on South West Africa in 1961 by Resolution 1702 (XVI) of the General Assembly, visited South Africa and South West Africa in response to an invitation by the South African Government. (35) Reporting to the Assembly on their discussions with representatives of the Pretoria Government, and their meetings with representatives of the African and Coloured population groups in the Territory, the deputation concluded that it was the overwhelming desire of the African population groups that the United Nations assume direct administration of the Territory. They further concluded that there seemed to be no way to carry out the tasks assigned to the Committee "short of the use of force or other compulsive measures within the purview of the Charter." (36)

During 1964 the South African Government endorsed in principle the recommendations made by the Odendaal Commission of Inquiry into South West African Affairs, for the establishment of separate "non-white homelands" in the Territory on tribal or ethnic basis, as well as a separate "white area". (37) (The Odendaal Recommendations, therefore, signified the beginning of a
sustained effort to apply the apartheid system in South West Africa.) The Special Committee, in 1964, viewing the situation with concern, called upon South Africa to desist from implementing the Commission's recommendations — a request that was not heeded. In 1965 the General Assembly declared through Resolution 2074(XX) that any attempt to partition the Territory, directly or indirectly, constituted a violation of the Mandate for South West Africa and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. (32)

In 1966, following the negative results of the continuous proceedings instituted against South Africa by Ethiopia and Liberia in the International Court, and as an expression of outrage and concern over South Africa's decision to implement the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, the General Assembly decided to terminate South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa and to place the Territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. (39) By an overwhelming vote (40) Resolution 2145(XXI) was adopted in the General Assembly to relieve South Africa of its Mandate responsibilities, placing South West Africa under direct "control" of the United Nations. (41)

The Afro-Asian group at the United Nations, (since the South West Africa People's Organisation announced its intended military struggle against South African occupation, from the organisational Headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) on 18 July 1966) became more insistent in its demand for international action. (42) Between 1945 and 1957 only two African States, Ethiopia and Liberia, were members of the United Nations. By the end of
1962 this situation had changed drastically, independent African States then amounted to fifty percent of the United Nations membership.\(^{(43)}\) As these states became more organised in the United Nations, and due to their one-state one-vote status and strongly held feelings about racial discrimination, they were able to embarrass major Western powers to pressurise South Africa. Algeria's Panonian African Radicalism\(^{(44)}\) and the establishment of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), in May 1963\(^{(45)}\) fuelled this pressurising of South Africa.

**THE UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA**

In 1967, the General Assembly, at its fifth special session, convened for the purpose of discussing the question of South West Africa, decided by means of Resolution 2248 to establish an eleven-member Council for South West Africa (renamed the United Nations Council for Namibia in 1968) to administer the Territory until independence. (By 1980 its membership had expanded to 31.)\(^{(46)}\) Among the Council's many functions are to help South West African refugees, organise training programmes for them, issue travel documents and establish an emergency programme to render economic and technical assistance to the Territory – a United Nations Fund for Namibia was established to finance these activities.\(^{(47)}\)

In accordance with standing arrangements, the representative of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) which has permanent observer status in the General Assembly, participates in the work of the Council for Namibia. The Organisation for African Unity (OAU) also participates in this Council in an
observer capacity. (48) The General Assembly, in 1967, decided to establish a post of United Nations Commissioner for Namibia to whom the Council for Namibia should entrust such executive and administrative tasks as it deemed necessary. The Commissioner for Namibia is appointed by the General Assembly on an annual basis. (49)

In 1968 the Council reported that it had been prevented from actively developing its functions by the refusal of the South African Government to comply with the terms of the Assembly's Resolutions (50) The Council stated that:

"... as the body charged with the administration of the Territory, the Council has sought to exercise its authority as much as possible under prevailing circumstances."

while the then Secretary-General, U. Thant, observed that it "remains in effect a Government-in-exile". (51)

By Resolution 2372 (XXII) adopted in June 1968, the General Assembly proclaimed that:

"... in accordance with the desire of the people of the Territory, South West Africa would henceforth be known as "Namibia" and the name of the Council for South West Africa would change accordingly". (52)

(For the purpose of this dissertation and until official internationally recognised independence is attained, the Territory will be, as far as possible, referred to as South West Africa/Namibia - SWA/Namibia.)

The liberation movement in SWA/Namibia had become more militant
from the mid-1960s, and in August 1969 the Security Council, through Resolution 269, specifically recognised the legitimacy of the military struggle of the people against the illegal presence of the South African authorities in the Territory. (53) South Africa, as before, continued to ignore all United Nations decisions - not only the Assembly's 1966 decision to terminate the Mandate, but also other decisions, including Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) of 30 January 1970, that condemned, the continued presence of South Africa in the Territory as counter-productive to international peace, and the advisory opinion of 1 June 1971 of the International Court of Justice which said, among other things, that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal, South Africa was under obligation to immediately withdraw its administration from Namibia and to end all forms of its occupation of the Territory.

This second advisory opinion of the International Court not only emphasised the "illegality" of South Africa's administrative occupation of the Territory, but also stated that:

"Member States of the United Nations are under obligation to recognise the illegality of South Africa's occupation of Namibia and the invalidity of its acts, and in particular any dealings, with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration." (55)

In the 1970s the dispute surrounding SWA/Namibian self-determination intensified greatly, on both local and international fronts, while the liberation struggle gradually gained momentum to become a fully-fledged guerrilla war by the close of the 1970s. Throughout this period, 1966 to 1980, the United Nations continually expressed
its total support for the South West Africa People's Organisation's cause and struggle. South Africa on the other hand, not only disregarded decisions of the Court and United Nations, but embarked on further defiance. It intensified implementation of its Bantustan policy within the Territory, by the establishment of more 'homelands and administrations', (see the section dealing with local political developments - during the 1980s), as well as strengthening the forces designed to suppress the liberation movement.

In pursuance of the Security Council's mandate, the Secretary-General proceeded to South Africa and SWA/Namibia from 6 to 10 March 1972, where he had extensive discussions with the Prime Minister and prominent members of the Government. Further discussions between the South African Government and the Secretary-General, or his special representative, Dr A.M. Escher, took place in the course of 1972 and in the early part of 1973. In their report they stressed that many issues in regard to South Africa's interpretation of self-determination and independence for SWA/Namibia still remained to be clarified. The Security Council invited the then Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, to continue with his negotiating effort, and again called upon South Africa for its full co-operation with the Secretary-General to bring about a peaceful transfer of power in the Territory. (Resolution 323-1972).

The Council for Namibia, in the Lusaka Declaration of 14 June 1973, termed, (contrary to Resolution 323 of 1972), the results of the contacts as laid down in the Secretary-General's
report as not only unsatisfactory, but counter-productive too, and called for their termination. The Council further concluded that the international community had to recognise that:

"... South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia could not continue without serious danger to international peace and security and that it was therefore, incumbent on all the nations of the world to actively support the struggle of the people of Namibia for liberty and independence." (59)

And on 12 December 1973, the General Assembly, by Resolution 311 (XXVII) (60) recognised SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, and supported the efforts of the movement to strengthen national unity.

In 1974, the General Assembly endorsed the decision of the Council for Namibia to establish an Institute for Namibia in Lusaka, for the purpose of providing Namibians with the necessary education and administrative skills to administer an independent Namibia.

Following the announcement by South Africa on 31 August that from 1 September 1977 South Africa would administer Walvis Bay as part of the Cape Province, the United Nations Council for Namibia issued a statement condemning:

"... in the strongest terms this unilateral attempt by South Africa to destroy the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia". (61)

South Africa's administration of Walvis Bay is hardly justifiable in political terms, not even to mention that the indigenous peoples had no say in what was an arbitrary exclusion of a natural part of the Territory.

On 10 April 1978, the five Western members of the Security
Council—Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States — transmitted to the Council a proposal for the settlement of the question of Namibia. To the amazement of all parties concerned, this proposal was accepted by the South African Government on 25 April 1978. This Western proposal called for:

(a) the appointment of a Special Representative whose central task would be to make sure that conditions were established for free and fair elections based on an impartial electoral process;

(b) the release of all Namibian political-prisoners or detainees and the return of all Namibian refugees and other Namibians outside the Territory;

(c) a comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts by all parties; and

(d) the restriction to base of South African and SWAPO armed forces. (62)

The Security Council, by Resolution 435 (1978), on 29 September approved the establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the Western proposal to support, for a period of up to 12 months, the Secretary-General's Special Representative to carry out his mandate. That, is, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

Throughout 1979, efforts to achieve an agreement for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) were stalled
by South Africa's objections to certain provisions in the United Nations/Western Plan. These centered specifically on SWAPO bases inside SWA/Namibia and the supervision of SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries. President Neto of Angola proposed a 50 km wide demilitarised zone (DMZ) on both sides of the SWA/Namibian-Angolan border, to break the deadlock then being experienced in the settlement negotiations. South Africa, however, subsequently stipulated that a number of additional points must be resolved; including the number of South African bases remaining in the DMZ, disarmament of SWAPO personnel and confirmation that SWAPO would not have bases inside SWA/Namibia.

At the beginning of 1980 the stage was set for detailed technical discussions between the South African Government and the United Nations on the proposed DMZ. Lt. General Prem Chand, Commander-Designate of UNTAG, visited SWA/Namibia, Angola, Zambia, Liberia and Nigeria during January 1980 to discuss the implementation of the proposed DMZ. This visit was followed by that of a high-powered United Nations team, including two Under-Secretaries-General, Mr B. Urquhart and Mr A. Farah, Mr M. Ahtisaari and Lt. General Prem Chand. However, no substantive progress was reported on the proposed DMZ.

Internal developments during 1980 confirmed earlier suspicions on the part of Western negotiators and the United Nations that the South African Government had, in fact, ceased to believe, if it ever had believed, in the possibility of an internationally recognised settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). Their suspicions arose from the South African
Government's actions, which included:

(a) in terms of Proclamation No.AG.19 (1980), a Ministers' Council with executive powers which came into effect on 1 July 1980. (66)

(b) Proclamation No.AG.105 (1980) which led to the establishment of a South West African Territorial Force;

(c) Proclamation No.AG.169 (1980) which provided for the Territory's own police force; and

(d) Proclamation No.AG.8 (1980) which provided for the creation of ethnically based second-tier Representative Authorities.

These acts were viewed as the introduction of a unilateral process of internal political consolidation and a quest for legitimacy, which might well prove inimical to international negotiations. Ideally, both the Western Contact Group and the United Nations hoped to begin implementing Resolution 435 (1978) in March 1981 and to secure independence not later than by the end of 1981. This, due to South African intransigence was not to be. Throughout 1982 the progress of the independence negotiations suffered further setbacks. South Africa found a new issue, the Cuban presence in Angola, to further stall upon a resolution of the problem. Although it was, in fact, the Reagan Administration which had introduced the Cuban issue in the negotiations the South African Government leapt at it with enthusiasm.

The United Nations Security Council met from 21 to 28 April, at the request of the African group, to reconsider the question of Namibia in the light of South Africa's refusal to implement
Security Council Resolutions in the Territory. The request, in the form of a letter to the President of the Council, further called for examination of the further Report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). In this Report the Secretary-General noted that the President of SWAPO, Mr Sam Nujoma, reiterated the organisation's acceptance of Resolution 435, and that it was ready to sign a cease-fire agreement with a South African delegation, so that peace might come to Namibia. It was further stated in the Report that the pre-implementation meeting in Geneva (7 to 14 January 1981) had not achieved its objective, because:

"... it became clear in the course of the meeting that the South African Government was not yet prepared to sign a cease-fire agreement and to proceed with the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978)". (67)

Later in 1981, 2 to 5 June, the United Nations Council for Namibia met in Panama, where it adopted the so-called Declaration of Panama. The question of Namibia, it said, was:

"... one of decolonisation and must be resolved in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly Resolution 1514. The Council also reaffirmed that the present and illegal occupation of 'Namibia' in defiance of the United Nations constitutes a blatant denial to the Namibian people of their inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia". (68)

The Declaration of Panama included both the recommendations of the Council and an extensive suggested programme of action on the Territory. However, no concrete developments materialised from these.
A new proposal, agreed upon by South Africa and the Western Contact Group, was tabled, near the end of 1981, to facilitate the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). It declared that negotiations for a SWA/Namibian settlement should be divided into three phases. Phase One was scheduled for July 1981 to November 1981, and would centre on a list of Constitutional Principles which would serve as guidelines for the creation of a Constituent Assembly whose task would be the formulation of an independence Constitution. Phase Two was scheduled for December 1981 to February 1982, and would define transitional arrangements in the period between the implementation of the United Nations' Plan and the day of independence. It focussed also on possible modifications to Resolution 435, the size, components and status of UNTAG and United Nations personnel, as well as the responsibilities of the Administrator-General in SWA/Namibia. Phase Three would start with the actual declaration of a cease-fire, the exercise of the Administrator-General's powers by the United Nations Special Representative, and the start of the seven-month period to culminate in the United Nations supervised elections. Unfortunately, this plan met with a host of difficulties, the most important of which was the Cuban presence in Angola, and no progress has been made beyond Phase Two (by 1983).

South Africa introduced two new factors which complicated matters even further; the abovementioned demand for the prior withdrawal of Cuban troops as an essential pre-requisite for South African acceptance of the United Nations' Plan and the announced intention for new internal elections in March 1983. The Cuban issue, by mid-1983, remained to be resolved, and the proposed
March 1983 elections did not take place. However, the Administrator-General, Mr Hough, did disband the first so-called interim government which had been functioning since 1978/79, and his successor, Dr W. van Niekerk, went ahead to prepare the Territory for a second so-called interim dispensation, with new internal elections, for a "new" National Assembly, scheduled for September/October 1983. (71)

During May 1983, the African Bloc in the United Nations agreed to ease demands for economic sanctions against South Africa, in favour of a Geneva-type all-party round-table conference. Such a conference, "scheduled" for the end of 1983, would guarantee that the SWA/Namibian issue was once again put firmly on the United Nations agenda. (72) The organisation had taken a backseat in the independence negotiations for the previous few years, in favour of the Western Contact Group. But whether South Africa would agree to such a conference was questionable, as South Africa's Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr Kurt von Schirnding, informed the Security Council, on 24 May 1983, that South Africa wanted a peaceful SWA/Namibian settlement, but that attempts to force an early settlement would be disastrous. He said that:

"... the world must understand that the South African Government will not bow to threats". (73)

In the meantime, in May 1983, the United Nations Secretary-General, Dr Javier Perez de Cuellar, is to pursue the elusive settlement for SWA/Namibia, under a formula prepared for approval by the Security Council. He will be allotted three months, June to
31 August 1983, to parley with South Africa and its adversaries, before he must report back to the Security Council. (74)

As stated in the introduction, the preceding section was meant to be merely analytical, providing a useful background to subsequent sections of the dissertation. The most significant fact to have emerged in it, was the United Nations' evident inability to intervene decisively in the SWA/Namibia question over a period of more than three decades. What is more, as further issues are introduced, it is possible that the United Nations will in the foreseeable future play a less important role in deliberations on the future of South West Africa/Namibia.
REFERENCES: Section 1.3


2. Footnote: The concept "nation" is defined and discussed in Section 4.4.


22. Ibid.


34. Information on SWAPO. *SWAPO: An Historical Profile*, published by the SWAPO Department of Publicity and Information, (Lusaka, 1978), p.15.


40. The Resolution was adopted by 114 votes in favour and two against (Portugal and South Africa) with three abstentions (France, Malawi and the United Kingdom).

42. Dugard, J., The South West Africa / Namibia Dispute, p.216.


46. Members of the Council for Namibia in 1980 were: Algeria, Angola, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Chile, China, Columbia, Cyprus, Egypt, Finland, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Cameroon, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia.


49. Ibid.


51. A Trust Betrayed: Namibia, p.29.

52. Decolonisation, p.21.


SECTION TWO

CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE
UNDERSTANDING GUERRILLA WARFARE: A COMPARISON

BETWEEN THE MAOIST MODEL AND THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA
PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION GUERRILLA MOVEMENT

A comprehensive understanding of the nature and implications of the type of war being fought in northern SWA/Namibia, and of the military situation elsewhere in Southern Africa, is an essential part of understanding the dispute surrounding the Territory's independence.

SWA/Namibia and its patron, the South African Government, are the only remaining vestiges of White rule on the Africa continent. This in turn is attributable to South Africa's economic and military superiority in the region. Economically South Africa is in a position to dictate the economic well-being of most Southern African states to a greater or lesser extent, while South Africa's efficient military infrastructure is geared towards maintaining and securing this privileged position without major challenge or alternation.

The South African Government and its ideological allies in the Western world conceive the security of SWA/Namibia, and South Africa in particular, to be under a constant communist threat from International Communism, which in this case is perceived to emanate from the north of the Cunene and Okavango Rivers. South Africa, unlike SWA/Namibia, is confronted by dissident elements from
within the country, notably the African National Congress, while SWA/Namibia presently serves as the front line to combat this communist threat. Since this 'so-called' communist onslaught is not in the form of a conventional offensive, but is rather modelled on the lines of classical guerrilla warfare, it is necessary to explain the meaning of the war-related terms frequently encountered when dealing with the SWA/Namibian situation.

One of the key terms is that of "hot pursuit", developed by the Rhodesian armed forces in their crossing of borders to pursue retreating insurgents based in the neighbouring countries of Zambia and Mozambique. Including follow-up operations on their bases when it was deemed in the interests of Rhodesian security. Since approximately mid-1975, the South African Security Forces have taken up similar tactics in pursuit of SWAPO bases in Angola and other neighbouring territories harbouring SWAPO guerrillas.

Strict legal interpretation of this type of activity is bound to create difficulties. There is some measure of uncertainty surrounding the right of self-defence and especially preventative self-defence, such as South African and SWA/Namibian Security Forces' operations into southern Angola which does not always meet the requirements of "hot pursuit" as narrowly defined. For example, the August/September 1981 incursion by these forces into Angola, code-named 'Operational Protea', reminded one more of semi-conventional warfare. In strict legal terms, "hot pursuit" is defined as military action within
State B's territory, by State A, by which State A hopes to destroy the guerrilla bases from which previous attacks have come and to discourage further attacks. Clearly, this type of military action cannot strictly be regarded as self-defence. (4)

In May/June 1977, Rhodesia entered Mozambique territory and attacked insurgent bases up to a distance of sixty miles from the border. The Rhodesian Government justified its action on grounds of "hot pursuit". The United Nation's Security Council condemned the action. (5) The invocation of the doctrine of "hot pursuit" across a land border would appear, in the absence of a treaty between the states concerned permitting it, to be unjustifiable. (6) In 1966 the General Assembly solemnly declared that

"...no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic or cultural elements are condemned. (7)

One must, however, point out the difficulties of definition and terminology problems involved in every situation-specific example, be it South Africa, Israel, the USSR or whatever country in question. In terms of SWA/Namibia it is important to remember that South Africa's occupation of the Territory is regarded as illegal, while the insurgency cause of the South West Africa People's Organisation is regarded as legal and encouraged by the International Community. South Africa on
the other hand, holds a diametrically opposite viewpoint. While the governments of states harbouring insurgent elements justify their actions mainly on political and ideological grounds, justification for cross-border operations by South African and SWA/Namibian Security Forces has been based on a variety of factors, including those of a legal, political and strategic nature.

Legally, the right of "hot pursuit" has only been codified in the international law of the sea. This "right" may also, however, find expression on land as well as in the air, but not in the strict terms defined in international law. In case of ground pursuit it refers to the uninterrupted immediate pursuit of an offender, or group of offenders into the territory of another state. Hot pursuit should be clearly distinguished from actions such as self-defence and reprisals. The distinction between the right of self-defence and the right of hot pursuit is founded primarily on the difference in objectives. Self-defence aims to repulse aggression or armed attack from the outside, and to protect the territorial integrity and independence of a country. The main objective of hot pursuit on the other hand, is the perceivedly effective administration of justice by an injured state, and, if possible bringing before its courts, and punishing, transgressors.

As to reprisals, there appears to be some uncertainty as far as their legality is concerned. Under the Charter of the United Nations the use of force by way of reprisals is illegal. The destruction of guerrilla bases for the security of a state
as a means of preventing future attacks - pre-emptive raids
is no longer permitted under the abovementioned Charter,
Article 51, in fact, requires an actual armed attack. The
United Nations Security Council considers "hot pursuit" as
being one-sided and akin to reprisals which are illegal. (9)

Excluding the legal justification on which cross-border opera-
tions are based, considerations of a political and strategic
nature obviously prove to be important rationales behind such
operations. In this regard the following motives can be
identified: Pre-emptive, in strategic terms, has the objec-
tive of forestalling an imminent attack, immediately or on a
long-term basis. Destruction or capture of weapons is, there-
fore, a prime objective in any pre-emptive strike in order to,
at least temporarily, reduce, delay or destroy an insurgency
movement's military capacity. Pre-emptive strikes are
obviously aimed at the larger insurgent bases and cannot pre-
vent smaller groups of insurgents from functioning. In fact,
the destruction of command bases more often than not, causes
extensive fragmentation among the insurgent forces, in order
to avoid detection until such time as organised regrouping can
take place.

In the period following World War Two the doctrine and prac-
tice of "deterrence" steadily crystallised in international
relations, especially as the Cold War became more intensified. (10)
In its most general form, deterrence is simply persuading one's
opponent that the cost, and or risk of, a given course of action
he might take could outweigh its benefits. (11) In this case
the image of threat represented by the enemy, directly or indirectly, plays a decisive role on the activities of the opposing side. (12)

Deterrence through cross-border operations could serve both as a warning to the governments of states harbouring insurgents, as well as to the insurgent leaders, indicating that future operations will follow unless insurgent activities cease. Where deterrence in the original sense, as defined above, that is defensive or capability deterrence through the application on conventional level, can seldom serve to prevent liberation struggles, offensive deterrence, through threats coupled with action, is often seen as a more effective alternative, as is clearly illustrated in the case of SWA/Namibia. However, it does not appear as if cross-border operations can be a completely effective deterrent either. None of the governments, the Angolan Government more specifically, harbouring and assisting SWAPO/PLAN and other anti-South African insurgents has reacted by withdrawing support, training or base facilities. (13)

Thus far, a number of war-related terms have been explained, although, no definition has been provided for the meaning of either "guerilla warfare, insurgents, or insurgent activities". Clear understanding of these terms is vital for assessing the merits of both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary causes.

Two types of warfare are generally acknowledged to exist. So-called conventional warfare is practised when frequent land,
sea and air forces of two or more parties oppose each other, and when the outcome that is reached is of a military nature. Unconventional warfare includes nuclear and revolutionary warfare. " Revolutionary or insurgency" warfare is by no means a modern phenomenon. Rather it is the age-old practice of the weaker resisting the stronger. Revolutionary warfare, often described as a guerilla war or a war of liberation, unlike conventional warfare, does not depend exclusively on military powers, extensions thereof are also found on a psychological, political, social, and economic level.

"Terrorism" is the military technique or tactic employed by the revolutionary or insurgent, which involves strikes into the opponents territory by means of murder, indiscriminate assassination and public execution. Terrorism is a term with strong pejorative overtones that can be both official and counter-revolutionary as well as revolutionary. In opposition, it is essentially the weapon of a minority which sees no chance of success by means of persuasion. "Terrorists" on the other hand are perceived as groups of revolutionaries or insurgents who use sudden indiscriminate attacks on non-military personnel with the purpose of spreading terror to the detriment of established order.

The fairly frequent appearance of guerrilla warfare since World War Two, as well as the praise of it in voluminous literature and propaganda, has conveyed the impression that as the classical uses of military power recede, this type of conflict may spread more rapidly. The modern doctrine of "people's
"wars" is of Maoist origin and has been further developed by other revolutionary and guerrilla leaders. Three theories on the nature of this type of warfare have been formulated in recent decades:

1. Guerrilla war is initially the weapon of the weak, who will eventually grow stronger and achieve victory in conventional battle.

2. Protracted guerrilla war will eventually undermine the will of the opponent and achieve success by political rather than military attrition.

3. Revolutionary guerrilla war can be used not only to change the status quo after a revolutionary situation has already arisen, but also to provoke and create a revolutionary situation. (18)

In his excellent study, 'The Myth of the Guerrilla', J. Bowyer Bell presents historical evidence to show that, contrary to the abovementioned general belief, this form of warfare is unlikely to become as significant as some observers and proponents would like to believe. All successful cases, he said, (e.g. China, North Vietnam, Algeria, Angola and Mozambique), have involved national wars of liberation. The revolutionary guerrilla, however, whether rural or urban, has failed in nearly all other cases. (19) For example, the failure of workable long-term solutions to domestic problems of a political, social or economic nature, failure to uphold the protection of civilian life and property after independence has been forcibly attained.
The Rabushka and Shepsle paradigm introduced in Section One of the dissertation supports this point made by Bell. That is, the emergence of ambitious politicians, in the post-independence period, who involve themselves in politics of outbidding which is based upon, and further fosters, ethnicity that ultimately leads to the breakdown of brokerage institutions; the decline of democratic principles and electoral machinations and a strong possibility for political violence. (20)

As so-called Father of Revolutionary thought, Mao Tse-tung made a number of contributions to broaden our understanding of this type of warfare. It should be sufficient, however, to reproduce the most central of his thoughts on this topic, for comparison and contrast with the SWA/Namibia situation:

(a) "In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla warfare is a necessary part. Guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. It is but a step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation or liberation organisation, inferior in arms and military equipment, may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. (21)

(b) "Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, co-operation and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus its revolutionary character. Because guerrilla warfare derives basically from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist, nor flourish, if it separates itself from their sympathy and co-operation." (22)
(c) "All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units. Unorganised guerrilla warfare cannot contribute towards victory. The unorganised guerrilla movement is a haven for disappointed vagabonds and bandits." (23)

(d) "The strategy of guerrilla warfare is manifestly unlike that employed in orthodox operations, as the basic tactic of the former is constant activity and movement. Small units acting independently play the principal role. There is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate and society in general are obstacles that may be used to the advantage of the guerrilla. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realisation of the guerrilla strategy:

1. Arousing and organising the people;
2. Achieving internal unification politically;
3. Establishing bases;
4. Equipping forces;
5. Recovering national strength;
6. Destroying the enemy's national strength;
7. Regaining lost territories." (24)

Quite a number of similarities can be seen between the Maoist concept of guerrilla warfare and the activities in which the South West Africa People's Organisation's military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) is engaged in, in northern SWA/Namibia. A vast number of differences, however, are also discernible.

(a) PLAN acts as the military wing of the party and not as a separate organisation independent of SWAPO. PLAN is recognised by the entire organisation as the vanguard of the liberation struggle. The organisation as a whole is moving step by step towards complete identification with the military wing. (25) Furthermore, in the South African
Defence Force, PLAN is confronted by a formidable opponent far superior in military expertise. It is, therefore, the task of the party, SWAPO external, which is responsible for the political leadership, to organise the entire movement as a strong unified force - with one voice, one party and one leadership, activities both on a military and a political level. However, to coincide with the basic rules laid down by Mao Tse-tung. What we have to determine is whether the organisation has succeeded in mobilising the revolutionary consciousness of the entire SWA/Namibian society.

(b) The Political Programme of SWAPO stipulates that the organisation is a mass movement supported by the majority of oppressed Africans and that it is working towards the universal arming of the Territory's people. That is,

"... to transform the armed struggle in Namibia into a truly people's war. All commanding cadres of PLAN are called upon to make concrete efforts towards the correct understanding of the revolutionary role of the masses in this struggle as well as to make them realise that that role is the primary condition for victory." (27)

The organisation, therefore, professes to be conducting a struggle in the interest of all Namibians; and asserts as fact that the broad mass of the Territory's people is in support of its revolutionary cause, and that this mass support is essential for victory - all in accordance with Mao's requirements. These claims are questionable:

SWAPO cadres are predominantly recruited from one of the
Territory's eleven population groups, the Ovambo-speaking group, with a small number coming from the Kavanga-speaking group. The other nine groups do not actively participate in the armed struggle, which became evident from the examination of the identity of deceased insurgents in the operational area. In practice, not even the entire Ovambo population is actively involved, while it is safe to assume that at least a small number completely dissociate themselves from this armed struggle. This group, as pointed out in the section dealing with the South West Africa People's Organisation, support alternatives such as the SWAPO-Democrats, the Reverend Peter Kalangula's CDA, or the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance which is also active in Ovambo. This, however, is only important for the sake of argument, as the Ovambo, SWAPO's major source of support, constitute 51.1% of the total population, leaving no doubt as to the magnitude of SWAPO's popularity in the Territory.

(c) The political Commissar of PLAN, Kakaure Nganjane, has on various occasions argued that the only way to militarily defeat South Africa, or attain political independence, is through an organised armed struggle. In a personal interview with co-founder member of SWAPO, Mr Andreas Shipanga, one very significant point that emerged centred around the reason for the establishment of the liberation organisation in the first place. That was the fear of the indigenous leaders that SWA/Namibia would stay South African dominated, unless a drastic effort was made to
alter this state of affairs. They believed that unless they took up active resistance against the South African Administration in the Territory it would refuse to grant territorial independence.

Initially, from 1957/1958 to 1961, resistance took place on a political level only, without resort to military means. Failing to achieve this end, the party leadership decided that a military programme was necessary. Returning to the Maoist model, it would then be correct to state that SWAPO's military and political strategies are very closely linked with the same goal. Furthermore, SWAPO have a centralised political and military leadership in the Commander-in-Chief of PLAN who is also the President of the party.

(d) In terms of the guerrilla strategies set out by Mao, very little needs to be said except for the fact that SWAPO did not entirely succeed in attaining the military goals set out by him. SWAPO has not grown into a formidable opponent capable of conventional victory or reclaiming lost national territories. It did succeed, however, in mobilising the mass of Ovambo in support of the national liberation cause, although, the extent of this support is uncertain it can be assumed to be fairly extensive. Unlike the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) in Algeria which was involved in a similar protracted war of liberation, SWAPO's support was never broadly based, coming from all the indigenous groups. (28)
The earlier cited, but not discussed, three theories of Leites and Wolf also bear some relevance. Especially, two of the alternatives which are applicable to the SWA/Namibian situation. Since the late 1970s SWAPO has, like the South African Government, followed what could be described as a "two stream" policy. This policy, on the one hand, is the continuation of a lost military struggle with one purpose only, to maintain the organisation's credibility and recognition in the international area and at home. Thus, the organisation's military activities function as back-up to its international position and continued political role in whatever negotiations may take place. On the other hand, should SWAPO be deprived of its political role, there is no doubt that the armed struggle would continue indefinitely.

Furthermore, since the armed struggle is most unlikely to be won, either conventionally or unconventionally, it is to be expected that the organisation would hope for, and work towards, a negotiated independence settlement rather than be compelled to continue with the armed struggle. This two-stream policy ties up with the third alternative, the creation of a revolutionary situation in order to change the status quo. Initiation of the armed struggle in the early sixties did indeed contribute greatly towards the politicisation of the Territory's population groups. By the close of 1982, the SWA/Namibia War of Independence had progressed to the stage where SWAPO could be discarded as a decisive military factor, yet, politically and diplomatically the organisation had grown from strength to strength. Incidentally, SWAPO's military struggle did not
progress as favourably as that of ZANLA-PF in the Rhodesian War of Liberation, which, by June 1976, had a definite edge in the military sphere as well. (31)

Included in the Appendix is a graph which illustrates the gradual decline of SWAPO's insurgency activities between January 1981 and December 1982. Nevertheless, despite its poor military performance, as suggested by the graphs, it could, on the contrary, be said that SWAPO's activities were true to the basic principles of guerrilla warfare which require not so much military victories as an ability to continue with such subversive activities. The following section examines the point that the South African Defence Forces' military prowess counted to its own detriment, as far as its popularity within the Territory was concerned.
REFERENCES: Section 2.1


3. It is significant to note that P.W. Botha warned that a revolution is not impossible in South Africa, and that indeed may have domestic origins in Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's "Total National Strategy", p.8.


30. Footnote: In interview with Andreas Shipanga.

SECTION 2.2

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE IN

SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA:

AN ARMY OF OCCUPATION?

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, announced on 21 June 1971, was a complete and decisive vindication of the United Nations' position. (1) After twenty-five years of equivocation the right of the United Nations (UN) as the lawful governing authority in South West Africa/Namibia (SWA/Namibia) had been put beyond legal doubt. In the phase to follow, from the early 1970s, the churches in the Territory took on a leading role in expressing and safeguarding the interests of the SWA/Namibia people. The principal SWA/Namibian churches, the Anglican, Lutheran, and Roman Catholic churches (2), responded to the patriotic aspirations of their members by taking, for the first time, a public stand against the continued occupation of the Territory. (3)

These churches declared unequivocally that,

"We believe that South Africa, in its attempts to develop the country has failed to take cognisance of Human Rights as declared by the United Nations in 1948 with respect to the non-white people of the Territory." (4)

Furthermore, the Church Boards of the two Lutheran churches expressed in a letter to the South African Prime Minister in June 1971 that their:
"... urgent wish is that in terms of the declaration of the World Court and in cooperation with the United Nations, the South African Government will seek a peaceful solution to the country's problems, see to it that Human Rights are put into operation, and that South West Africa may become a self-sufficient and independent state." (5)

Simultaneously, the Church Boards issued a pastoral letter which stated in clear language their opposition to apartheid. (6) This pastoral letter was read in every Lutheran Church. In a country where 80% of the population is black, its impact was profound. The two other major churches, the Anglican and Roman Catholic, gave their full and public support to the Lutheran stand.

"The Christian Church, as the conscience of this nation, must now speak out with clarity and without fear, that apartheid must be denounced as unacceptable before God", stated Bishop Colin Winter on 25 July 1971. (7)

Several months later Bishop Winter was expelled from the country for his outspokenness. In 1978 two churchmen, H. Hunke and J. Ellis, published a book called 'Torture: A Cancer in Our Society' (8) which contained sworn statements by torture victims. This book was promptly banned and within the year the two churchmen were expelled from their congregation in SWA/Namibia. Since 1982, international church concern over alleged South African Defence Force (SADF) atrocities within SWA/Namibia has mounted markedly. Reports on this issue were published by the British Council of Churches, the South African Council of Churches, as well as by the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference:
1. The British Report found that there were unanimous opinions on the fears of the local inhabitants. SWAPO guerrillas it said, were called "amati" or "friends". They operated in areas where they were known, and because they explained their actions to the local people, what they did was predictable and understood. On the other hand said the British Council of Churches, the "Security Forces maintain a reign of arbitrary terror against which the local people have no redress."(9)

2. The Reverend Peter Storey, Director of the South African Council of Churches, (SACC), and Bishop Desmond Tutu visited the Council of Churches in SWA/Namibia (formerly a member of the SACC). During the visit they spoke to several church leaders, but did not visit the war-stricken North. On their return, the Reverend Storey said that truth was the first casualty in the war situation, because public opinion in the Territory was not reflected in the Republic. (10) The churches, he said, were deeply concerned about the violence and suffering of the people. He said Bishop Tutu spoke to a wide spectrum of the population, and discovered that the situation was "reminiscent of Vietnam." The most universal thought amongst the suffering people was the fear of the Defence Force, and the fact that they, rather than SWAPO, were to be feared. The South African Army, Reverend Storey said, alleged that it was protecting the country from onslaughts from outside, however, he concluded that "he had discovered not gratitutde, but a deep resentment to the South African military occupation."(11)
3. Shortly after the breakdown of the Geneva Conference, 7 to 14 January 1981(12), an official of the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference made a tour of SWA/Namibia. The official reported to the Administrative Board of the Conference. This report arose so much concern that a special meeting was held to study the situation. This in turn led to the holding of an extraordinary plenary session of the Conference on 27 August 1981. At the end of this special plenary session the Bishops' Conference issued a statement which:

"... assured the Namibian people that it gives its full support to their hopes and aspirations to become an independent nation, agreeing that this should come about through a ceasefire and the holding of free and fair elections as envisaged in UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) that had been accepted by all parties involved." (13)

The statement added that 'out of deep solidarity with the churches in Namibia, the Southern African Bishops' Conference intends to study and observe the situation in Namibia and seek ways of closer co-operation with those churches'. It was decided that there should be a further investigation of conditions in the Territory, with a view to the Conference using its influence in the cause of peace and justice, and insofar as this appeared necessary, expressing its Christian concern about the wrongs being inflicted on the peoples of Namibia. (14) It was further agreed that a six-member delegation should visit the Territory on a fact finding tour. This visit was duly carried out during September 1981 and resulted in a thirty-five page Report released by the SACBC on 14 May 1982.
The Report made numerous criticisms of the present political dispensation in the Territory. It also arrived at a number of conclusions, of which the most important were:

1. That the majority of Blacks in SWA/Namibia's northern operational area were not afraid of SWAPO, but were petrified of the South African Security Forces there;

2. That the majority of SWA/Namibians had an overriding desire to see Resolution 435 (1978) implemented;

3. That atrocities were committed by both the Security Forces and SWAPO;

4. SWAPO enjoyed majority support and would win any free and fair election held within the Territory;

5. That although SWAPO was purportedly Marxist-orientated it was infiltrated by Christians and enjoyed widespread Christian support;

6. That South Africa was trying to impose its system of Apartheid on the peoples of SWA/Namibia; and

7. That it was also responsible for the current impasse in the independence negotiations, primarily because South Africa was not serious about reaching a settlement in the Territory. (15)

This Report of the SACBC received widespread support as well as evoked further similar criticism. Archbishop Dennis Hurley, President of the Bishops Conference and leader of the six-member
delegation, claimed that the Report corresponded with reports by the General-Secretary and President of the South African Council of Churches as well as with views expressed by the British and Namibian Church Councils. A (London) Times editorial read that

"... if only half of the alleged military brutality in SWA/Namibia was true, the charges constitute a condemnation which no government can ignore." (16)

Early in 1982 in London, the British Council of Churches and the London-based Catholic Institute brought together church leaders from all the major denomination in an appeal to the Western Contact Group (WCG). Should South Africa continue to prevent the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), then the respective governments of the WCG would be justified in supporting a call in the United Nations for the imposition of mandatory sanctions, in particular, a strictly-monitored oil embargo. The group concluded its statement by expressing the belief that in a country as overwhelmingly Christian as SWA/Namibia, the voice of the church was both significant and representative of the aspirations of its peoples. Furthermore, in their dealings with the Council of Churches in SWA/Namibia, they encountered the belief that too little attention had been paid by the WCG to the Christian Churches in the Territory, which "speak unequivocally for the majority of Namibian people." (17)

THE CASE IN SUPPORT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE

In sharp contrast to the widespread international support for
the cause of the Namibian peoples, support for South Africa's military presence in the Territory is rather thinly spread. Only limited instances of support for the South African Catholic Defence League (SACDL), which is only a fringe group and barely representative of the Catholics, voiced its conscientious objection concerning the statement made by the Bishops Conference on SWA/Namibia. The Leagues' Secretary, J. Roodbol, said that if the Bishops had proof of atrocities committed by Security force members, it was their conscientious obligation to bring this to the notice of the courts. As far as SWAPO's alleged Christian faith was concerned, he pointed out that the official orientation of the organisation was Marxist and that it was backed by international communism. Therefore, the SACDL was asking the Bishops Conference to stop whitewashing SWAPO and stand up and preach Catholic doctrine instead of communism and terrorism and condemn them both, as Pope John Paul II had done. (18) In addition to the SACDL not being representative of the Catholic it is clear that Mr Roodbol's statement was underlined by strong personal motives.

A prominent black leader of the internal Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, Mr K. Riruako, even went as far as stating in the interim National Assembly, during 1982, that the "blood of this country" is on the hands of the Catholics and Lutherans. They "assist the murderers to murder well", and act as agencies for SWAPO, while encouraging ill-feeling amongst the inhabitants of the country. These allegations in turn were promptly repudiated by the local Catholic services'. This official announcement called upon Mr Riruako to produce proof to sub-
stantiate his allegations, otherwise his statements would have to be considered as deliberate slander against the Church.\(^{(19)}\)

Similarly, Mr K. Kaura, member of the DTA Head Committee, released a report accusing the Evangelical Church in Germany, the World Council of Churches, the World Lutheran Federation, and the Namibian Council of Churches, of actively supporting SWAPO in its planned campaign of brutality against the indigenous Black peoples of SWA/Namibia.\(^{(20)}\) Once more requests were made, this time by the Namibian Council of Churches, that substantiating evidence be brought forward, and again no response was forthcoming.

**SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS**

As is usually the case in situations of conflict, the pictures presented on the one side of Churches within the local and international communities, as well as private people interviewed; and on the other side, by the South African Government and its supporters, are so different that they scarcely seem to refer to the same issues and country. The fact of the matter is that atrocities were committed by Security Force members, a fact readily admitted by Security Force spokesman. In March 1982 a Military Board of Inquiry was officially instituted to investigate all reported acts of brutality committed by Security Force members.

The Inquiry temporarily completed in June 1982, presented findings supporting accusations brought by local and inter-
national bodies. Atrocities of various natures were committed. Altogether thirty-seven people testified before the Board of Inquiry. In Kavango allegations ranging from theft, physical and sexual assault, intimidation and murder were investigated. Sixteen complaints, involving eight separate incidents, were brought to the attention of the authorities in this region.

In Ovambo twenty-four incidents were brought to the attention of the Board, only one of which could not be solved, while more serious cases were referred to the SWA Police. It was further intended that this Board of Inquiry would resume its functions whenever new cases were reported, and to this end it addressed a serious request to the general public, urging them to report all complaints and incidents for investigation. This led to a second military investigation into alleged mistreatment of Kavango civilians by Security Force members during May 1983.\(^{21}\)

The second investigation followed after the man-handling of three villagers detained on 20 April 1983.\(^{23}\) As with the first investigation it was interesting to note that alleged atrocities were limited to either the Kavango or Ovambo areas, both of which are situated in the northern operational area.

A number of factors suggest that the Board of Inquiry was by no means successful in clearing all suspicion surrounding Security Force brutalities, or in erasing either the local or international communities' fear of recurring incidents in the future. In fact, its success and credibility was jeopardised right from the outset, as the three major churches active in the operational area, the Evangelical Ovambo Kavango Church,
the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches, rejected the possibility of a viable outcome emanating from this joint Security Force - Ovambo Administrative Board of Inquiry - exactly because of the prominent role played by the Security Force officers on the Board.

Church participation is urgently needed to lend credibility to the Board's activities amongst the local population. Acts of brutality are often reported to the churches but rarely to Security Force Officials - only thirty-two complaints came to the attention of the Board. The stumbling block to church participation and recognition stems from the strong representation enjoyed by the Security Force on the Board of Inquiry, as a senior church official said,

"... why should one of the parties under investigation play such a prominent role in its proceedings?" (23)

Consequently, even though invited, there was never any church representation on the Board of Inquiry.

Further shortcomings of this Board of Inquiry need brief mention. The most obvious is the fact that the Board became operative only in 1982, and was, therefore, bound to miss quite a number of allegations and complaints simply because of the long time that had elapsed since the occurrence of some incidents. Fear of retribution most certainly also played an adverse role in limiting the number of complaints officially lodged, all of which enabled local and South African Authorities to present their own case in a more favourable light.
Unfortunately, even more serious accusations against the Security Forces went unnoticed. For instance, late in 1982, the Editor of the Windhoek Observer, Mr Hannes Smith, known as an out-spoken opponent of South Africa's military-administrative occupation of SWA/Namibia was put on trial on several charges. He was convicted under the Police Act, the Defence Act, the Publications Control Act and the Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act. Legal details of this sordid court case need not be mentioned here, but, as a well-informed member of the White community, Mr Smith made a number of interesting general statements relating to the Defence Force's status in the Territory.

Amongst other things, he alleged that there was a definite deterioration in Defence Force liaison with the media and that the public were kept in the dark as to the true role and activities of the Defence Force in the Territory. In his own words,

"For years and years you (SF) have misled the people of this country with wrongful propaganda."

He also claimed that he was victimised since he,

"... acknowledged the existence of SWAPO and reported on the atrocities allegedly committed by both sides." (24)

Coming from a prominent community member, such accusations can hardly be ignored.

This is still not the end of the matter. Security Force members are by no means viewed as the major culprits in vio-
lating the civil security of local inhabitants. The Board failed to investigate rumours about the unofficial "extermination" squad operative in Ovambo under such names as "Koevoet/Crowbar", "One Way", or "Unit K". This omission diminishes even further the Board's credibility - none of the units alleged atrocities were brought before the Board.

It is said that this "Police Task Force", (its official status) was founded to terrorise and intimidate residents of Ovambo, with a view to pressurising them to assume a more anti-SWAPO stance. An article published in a church publication, "Omukwetu"(25), stated that "Death Squad K" had an extermination list of all the leading figures in Ovambo, which had to be achieved before independence. "Omukwetu" further alleged that some people had already been eliminated, while approximately fifty more names remained on the list.(26) Task Force K is further accused of many acts of brutality, destruction of public facilities and private property, thereby amounting to a further source of fear and intimidation.

In personal interviews with several people, who wish to remain anonymous, as they frequently visit the northern region of SWA/Namibia, Ovambo more specifically, I was left with the impression that "Koevoet" or "Police Task Force K" indeed constitutes a severe menace to the safety of persons and property of civilians residing in this region. Moreover, there is no doubt whatsoever about the brutal and suppressive nature of this police task force. Denis Beckett, Editor of Frontline during a visit to the northern operational area, confirmed the
utter rejection with which Koevoet is viewed by the local inhabitants. (27)

Interestingly, not only black people are harassed, White people too fall prey to its victimisation. I came to the overall conclusion that an organised reign of terror had been enacted in Ovambo. The purpose of such a policy is somewhat unclear, yet, it is known that the majority of SWAPO supporters reside in Ovambo, and may, therefore, be intimidated by these violent activities. It also represents a further threat to SWAPO supporters as many of the Police Task Force's members are "turned" ex-SWAPO's. (28) The "turning" and active use of captured insurgents was extensively practised by the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. (29)

It is known that Police Task Force K is a formidable counter-insurgency unit, involved in almost every hot pursuit operation and it is claimed that it is responsible for 60% to 70% of all guerrillas slain in the war-zone annually. However, Commander of the Task Force, Brigadier Hans Dreyer, dismisses all adverse accusations, describing the unit strictly as a disciplinary force which must execute its orders and functions within the confines of what is prescribed by the Police Code. Though, as Beckett pointed out,

"... it would be wrong (to say nothing of being illegal) to pass on specific allegations without taking considerable steps to verify them,". (30)

This proved a difficult task due to the paucity of information published and the secrecy surrounding the unit. Peter Kalangula
for example, leader of the Christian Democratic Alliance for Social Justice which is operative in Ovambo, when interviewed by Beckett, bluntly stated: "I have no comment to make on Koevoet."(31)

Consequently, one is forced to rely on the local news media for publicised information on Koevoet. Due to the serious nature of issues surrounding the Task Force's activities, one must also be rather discriminatory in selecting this material. On 23 May 1983, in the proceedings of a court case held in Windhoek, the Court heard from Police Secret Service Inspector Phillipus Nel that "Koevoet" did exist and that he had heard that members had been "disguised" as SWAPO insurgents, but that he did not have personal experience of this.(32) In a further court case held in Windhoek on 4 May 1983 a former SWAPO insurgent, Angula Mwaala, told the Supreme Court that his group had made contact with a Police counter-insurgency unit dressed in the same uniforms as SWAPO infiltrators. Known as "Iikenelelela" because they "wore the same clothes as SWAPO", Mwaala alleged that this was done to achieve success in capturing or killing SWAPO insurgents.(33) As pointed out earlier, the tactic of masquerading as insurgents was put to extensive use by the Rhodesian Selous Scouts.(34)

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

So far only civilian-related incidents have been recounted. Often questions arise about the treatment meted out to SWAPO Prisoners of War (POW). Proclamations AG9 and AG26 provide
for detention without trial and for the release of information
to relatives. (35) These two Proclamations, passed in November
1977 and April 1978 respectively, have provoked criticism from
as far afield as the Committee on South African War Resisters,
various local international Church and Humanitarian founda-
tions, and from the internal Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
which has repeatedly appealed to the Administrator-General's
office for the scrapping of these Proclamations as they reflect
the Defence Force's case in a bad light. How should SWAPO
POWs be treated? University of Witwatersrand Professor of
law, Professor Dugard, examined this question in depth.

The South African and South West African Defence Forces have as
one of their objectives, the capturing of insurgents in order
to bring them before the courts. In one such court case,
giving evidence in defence of the accused insurgents, Professor
Dugard summed up the situation with the following comments:

1. In order to fully understand the international legal frame-
work surrounding the South West African issue, it is essen-
tial to keep abreast of developments in the United Nations
and other international bodies. International Humanitar-
tarian Law, initially formulated under the 1929 Geneva Con-
vention, applied only to declared wars or to conflicts
recognised by belligerents as amounting to a state of war
under international law. (36)

2. In order to overcome this weakness in the Geneva Convention,
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 introduced a common
article which extended the conventions to "armed conflicts"
even if a state of war is not recognised by one of the parties. The principle underlying the specific prohibitions on murder, cruel treatment and torture contained in that article, was that those persons taking no part in hostilities, including surrendered combatants, the wounded and sick, were in all circumstances to be treated humanely. (37) As South Africa acceded to the 1949 Geneva Convention on 31 March 1952 consequently, this specific article should govern the treatment of SWAPO members. (38)

3. United Nations Proclamation 1514 of 1960 declared that colonialism in all forms is illegal. Resolution 2621 of 1970 was adopted to stipulate that members of national liberation movements should be treated as Prisoners of War, while Resolution 3103 declared that armed conflicts involving struggles of peoples against colonialism and alien domination were to be regarded as international armed conflicts. (39) There is no doubt that these actions intended that South West Africa, too, would fall within the ambit of Resolution 1514 of 1960, which declared all forms of colonialism illegal, and by implication, SWAPO's struggle as being legal. (40)

4. A Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law was called by the Swiss Government in co-ordination with the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1974, to revise the 1949 Geneva Convention in terms of armed conflicts and national Liberation movements. However, South Africa did not attend the
final session of the Conference and did not sign the subsequent protocol. Therefore, in strictly legal terms, South Africa is not bound by treaties other than the 1949 Geneva Convention signed in 1952. Nor is it obliged to confer prisoner of war status on SWAPO members.\(^{(41)}\)

However, two issues need to be mentioned. SWA/Namibia is seen as a territory with a definite international status, which is not even denied by South Africa, and any major conflict in the Territory should likewise be regarded as having international status. There is also the fact that South Africa's presence in the Territory had been deemed to be illegal thereby conferring full international support to the cause and struggle of the South West Africa People's Organisation.\(^{(42)}\)

In conclusion, a number of points can be made concerning the Security Forces' presence in the Territory. Although conclusive proof is, in the nature of things, hard to establish, there is much circumstantial evidence that points to a pattern of brutality and violence towards the local populace. It would be surprising if this were not the case, seeing that, invariably, insurgent wars - whether in Algeria, Vietnam, or Rhodesia - were characterised by great brutality on both sides.\(^{(43)}\) Since both sides see their activities as just and legal, it would not be entirely justified summarily to brand and reject the Defence Force as "an army of occupation", even though this would appear to be the view shared by locals and outsiders alike. In all fairness, due consideration should be paid to the overriding motivations behind the South African Defence Forces' war-effort in SWA/Namibia.
REFERENCES: Section 2.2


5. To Be Born A Nation: The Liberation Struggle For Namibia, pp.185-186.


7. To Be Born A Nation: The Liberation Struggle For Namibia, pp.185-186.


11. Ibid.


25. Omukwetu is published by the Evangelical Lutheran Ovamba Kavango Church.
28. Ibid.
32. Windhoek Observer (Windhoek), 28 May 1983.
33. The Windhoek Advertiser, 5 May 1983. (Windhoek).


39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

To offer plausible arguments in defence of South Africa's military presence in South West Africa/Namibia (SWA/Namibia) is no easy task. For one reason, South Africa itself very aptly could be described as the world's leading country in socio-political conflicts \(^1\), while for another, SWA/Namibia forms only part of, although a vital one, South Africa's broader Southern African security and economic strategy \(^2\). It is important to view the Territory as an integral part of such a broad Southern African perspective, as it could be considered a positive new front in the alleged onslaught against South Africa. \(^3\)

National Party policies evoke much criticism both in South Africa and SWA/Namibia, yet, it appears that the Government remains generally indifferent to it. Due to South Africa's present political dispensation that structure and command the entire society, generate confusion amongst the media and public alike, it so happens that SWA/Namibia is a further "grey Area" surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty about how the Government sees the Territory in its future policy for Southern Africa.

In particular, one finds two general views on the SWA/Namibia issue, neither of which is very accurate or dependable. Trends
in the international view of the Territory, a view based largely on facts, impressions and bias of outsiders, depicts the South African Defence Force as a brutal repressive force illegally occupying the Territory. The second view is that presented by the Defence Force and Government spokesmen. Unfortunately, developments within SWA/Namibia often contradict the validity of statements made by these spokesmen, as is clear from the opinion of the churches cited in the preceding section.

Political scientists and professional observers who wish to understand the SWA/Namibia problem in its entirety must study not only political developments within the Territory, but also the South African political climate, its government and policies (4), as well as how these fit into the broader Southern African picture. For convenience and clarity I have divided and selected from this vast quantity of material what I consider three areas of priority. Section Two, 1, 2 and 3 deal broadly with matters directly related to the SWA/Namibia issue, while Section Two, 4 focuses on Angola and its "linkages" to SWA/Namibia, and Section Two, 5 briefly outlines the broader Southern African perspective. Due to the tremendous complexity and overlap of material of these sections, the aim is to be as brief as possible without omitting too much information or perspective.

Earlier quoted theories on guerrilla warfare described SWA/Namibia's socio-political situation as a revolutionary situation, exercising direct influence on both Territorial and South
African security. Mention also has been made of the political, economic, historical and emotional overtones attached to, and forming part of, the ties between the two countries. As for legitimacy, Government and Defence Force spokesmen regularly manipulate the media in attempting to mould a more favourable external opinion of the South African Defence Force and its military activities North and South of the Cunene River.

Within the Territory attempts have been made to win the "hearts and minds" of the local population groups through a programme known as the Civic Action Programme (CAP). The intention of the CAP has been set out very clearly in a paper by the Supreme Military Commander of the Territory, General Charles Lloyd, in 1979.

"To secure through administrative and socio-economic action, the good will, support and co-operation of the local population by

1. alleviating friction points, grievances and dissatisfaction;
2. improving the standard of living; and
3. giving the local population something worthwhile to defend in the revolutionary war." (8)

At the same time the Defence Force utilises the opportunity to demonstrate to the local population that they are there to help and protect them. (9) The Civic Action Programme consists of the use of military servicemen in non-military forms of service, but always as members of the South African Defence Force. They work as teachers, engineers, legal, agricultural and financial advisers, doctors, dentists, veterinary surgeons, lecturers,
administrative personnel and even as traders and directors of tourism. (10)

The extent of success achieved by the CAP is not quite clear, as it is still active in a number of fields. However, for various reasons, one can safely assume that it has met with moderate success only:

1. The Ovambo-speaking region remains grossly underdeveloped and has to undergo a long developmental process before it will be able to adapt to the modern values and standards now introduced.

2. The decades of bush war, suffering, misery, and the fact that SWAPO still draw the larger part of its support from the Ovambo-speaking population, surely have had an adverse effect on the progress of the CAP. Brutalities and atrocities committed by members of the Security Forces did not further its cause either.

3. On the other hand, SWAPO is also known to be ruthless towards locals suspected of informing on its activities. They are normally accused of being puppets of the South African armed forces, and executed on the spot as traitors to the Namibian people. The local inhabitants are therefore, caught between the two conflicting forces, which leaves them little choice for wholehearted support for either of them.

To overcome this dilemma, the Defence Force implemented a
rather "ingenious" method to overcome the animosity of the local population. They were provided with a new, more acceptable cause to identify with, at least from a Security Force point of view. Under the effect of Proclamation No.AG.131, sixty-seven military units were transferred to the authority of the locally residing Administrator-General, a major move towards the establishment of a multiracial local South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF).\(^{11}\) Although Proclamation AG.131 came into effect on 1 August 1980, it did not involve the withdrawal of the South African defence forces from the Territory. The creation of the SWATF would appear to be attributable to two overriding reasons. Firstly, to function as the backbone of local security after independence, by filling the security vacuum left by the withdrawal of South African forces; secondly, and possibly more importantly, to establish an official armed force within which members of all the Territory's population groups can participate freely.\(^{12}\)

The latter aspect derives its importance from its multiracial character. All units and Battalions\(^{13}\) are multi-racially composed with no form of discrimination or apartheid amongst rank-and-file recruits, while the command structure is still predominantly comprised of white officers. In the period 1981-1982, more than 30% of the troops doing border duty in the northern operational area were drawn from SWATF ranks.\(^{14}\) Reference must be made to the earlier discussed Police Task Force K with its large Ovambo-membership. Major-General Geldenhys stated that SWAPO had lost approximately 2 000 men through "desertions" during the first six months of 1979\(^{15}\),
all of whom, in the form of "turned"(16) insurgents, joined security force ranks. It would then appear as if SWAPO's central source of support was badly mauled in the process of local militarisation, as defence force spokesmen insist that since the early 1980s, SWAPO has had to rely largely on the abduction of young Ovambo to replenish its fighting ranks.(17)

Yet, local reaction to the establishment of the SWATF was not favourable either. The Damara Executive Committee, for example, totally opposed a multiracial Territorial Force based upon compulsory military service. The Committee felt that such a step would cause an escalation in the ongoing population exodus - especially amongst young people; that the war would take on a civil character where fellow Namibians would kill one another; and that it could easily jeopardise sensitive developments in the settlement talks.(18) Despite such criticism from various sources, local news media regularly described the outstanding services voluntarily performed by the non-white members of the SWATF.

Other spill-over effects resulted from Proclamation 131. The multiracial nature of the SWATF is bound to be advantageous to the formation of a broader pro-South African attitude amongst a significant cross-section of the local population.(29) This, it is hoped, will have a stabilising effect on the country and its peoples. Since conscription for non-whites is not yet compulsory, the SWATF acts as last resort for employment, for the estimated 30 000 to 75 000 unemployed in 1982.(20)
General Lloyd, Supreme Military Commander in the Territory, recently explained the status and role of the SWATF during the actual independence period. He said that the development of the SWATF was an intricate part of SWA/Namibia's independence process, and that it would form the basis of the new state's defence force. There would be a temporary demilitarisation of the SWATF immediately prior to independence, though, this would only last for the duration of the independence campaign. After the election the constitution would provide for a defence force which would incorporate the SWATF as it is known today. To reassure the local white population group, General Lloyd emphatically stated that personal weapons would not be handed over to UNTAG supervision, nor would UNTAG control arms and ammunition handed in for custody. He assured this group of the public that he personally cleared those issues with General Prem Chand, the officer who would command the UNTAG (United Nations Transition Assistance Group) peace-keeping force.

The central question of this section undoubtedly should focus on the reasons that inspired this militarisation of the SWA/Namibian society. Is the South African Government purely interested in securing its economic interests in the Territory, or, are there deeper underlying reasons for South Africa's persistent occupation of the country? Clearly this question is of a multi-faceted nature, and, since we are dealing with two dynamic communities which interact on various levels, there cannot, therefore, be one correct answer to this question. In addition to over-simplification, one must guard against omitting
the importance of historical ties between the countries, an error frequently committed.

The existence of extensive economic dependency of SWA/Namibia on South Africa, must be a further factor of importance to South African policy makers who would much prefer to have a "moderate" rather than a "radical" government in Windhoek, as it will ensure easier access to the Territory's markets and primary products, and hence, maintain such dependency. Despite the fact that SWA/Namibia's economy is largely export-orientated, and that the larger part of these exports is for the South African market\(^{(23)}\), two qualifying statements need to be made.

Should South Africa, for one reason or another, lose its economic assets in the territory, there is no way that it will seriously affect or hamper South Africa's economic well-being - as was clearly stated in the introductory economic section. Furthermore, the existence of future trade relations between the two countries need not necessarily have to be of an exploitative nature. The true state of affairs is that SWA/Namibia, and not South Africa, is dependent on the aid and economic interaction with South Africa, and will suffer more severely from the severance of these ties than the latter. Although South Africa profits from its economic relations with SWA/Namibia, the Territory is, in purely national economic terms, a liability for South Africa.\(^{(24)}\)

The South African Government and local white population in
particular, place much emphasis on the alleged 'security-linkages' between the two territories. (25) The existence of these security relations is by no means fictitious. It is widely agreed that SWA/Namibia at present, next to South Africa, is the second last remaining "vestige" of white supremacy not yet engulfed by Africa's era of African Nationalism. (26) However, once SWA/Namibia attains internationally recognised independence, South Africa automatically will become the next focal point in the African nationalist struggle. Quite possibly Namibia would open-up as the last new front in the campaign against South Africa. (27)

For these reasons it is to be expected that the South African regime will do all in its power to prevent a 'hostile' regime from coming to power in Windhoek. A SWAPO Government, backed by the Soviet Union (28), is often equated with a 'hostile regime', and, therefore, seems to imply that South Africa would not accept a SWAPO Government in the Territory. This view is correct as far as the "communist" element is concerned. On the other hand, Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, on numerous occasions has stated that his government would welcome SWAPO rule in Windhoek, provided that the organisation came to power through its participation in 'free and fair' democratic elections held within the country. (29) As Mr Botha said at a Cape Congress of the National Party:

"Any political party that takes part in a constitutional, peaceful way, will be allowed to go to the polling booth with its supporters and they have the right and possibility of winning the election. My attitude would be to
accept the verdict of the people of South West Africa but I am not going to allow foreign interests to foist a minority government with guns on the majority of the people of South West Africa." (30)
REFERENCES: Section 2.3


7. Expression used by the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan. It was the British in Malaya, during the 1950s, who first coined the phrase, in Stiff, P., *Selous Scouts Top Secret War*, (Alberton, RSA, Galago Publishing, 1982), p.502.


12. Footnote: Presently eight Battalions are in existence.


22. Footnote: Civilian arms; owned privately.


27. Gann and Duignan, op.cit., p.67.


CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

In 1979 some 32 000 Cuban troops were in Africa\(^1\), concentrated primarily in Angola and Ethiopia. Cuba's leadership publicly emphasised the role of Cuban civilians engaged in development work in Africa, although the civilian personnel were outnumbered four to one by the military personnel active in Africa. A Research Paper compiled by the United States National Foreign Assessment Centre, on Communist Aid activities in non-Communist less-developed countries, provided more accurate, but averagely higher, estimates on Cuban activity on the continent. See Appendices I - III.

Ethiopia, in 1979, accommodated 13 000 Cuban troops, while some 19 000 enjoyed Angolan hospitality by the close of the 1970s.\(^2\) With 14 000 defence personnel and only 5 000 economic technicians in Angola the Cuban presence clearly is not aimed at the reconstruction of the country's economic infra-structure but rather for reasons of security.

Apart from Cuba's military and economic ties with Africa, Cuban leaders frequently point to Cuba's historical links with Africa since the slave trade, so that allegedly, more than half of Cuba's population are descendants of freed slaves, (mainly
of West African origin). Cuban President, Fidel Castro, uses this historical linkage to identify Cuba with African National causes (3) — such as the elimination of white minority rule in South Africa. He has described Cuba as a "Latin-African" nation. However, domestic realities in Cuba suggest a different picture. Cubans of African descent are seriously under-represented in the Council of State, Council of Ministers, and the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee, where, in 1980, they had only 8% of the seats. (4)

Cuba's involvement in Angola is only part of an historic trend in Cuban foreign policy. After Castro's seizure of power in 1959, Cuba quickly identified itself with other revolutionary movements. (5) In 1960 it provided military assistance to the Algerian Liberation Front (FLN) in the final stages of the Algerian liberation struggle. (6) Links were established with left-wing opposition groups in several independent African states. Several leaders of the 1964 revolutionary movement in Zanzibar were trained in Cuba. Activists of the banned Senegalese Communist Movement, the Parti Africain d'Indépendence, were arrested in Dakar, 1965, on their return from military training in Cuba (7), and in 1969 Senegal complained about the discovery of pamphlets originating from Cuba that incited anti-government activities in Senegal. In 1966, Cuba's Embassy in Accra was shut down following the disclosure that Cuba was training Ghanaians in guerrilla activity, aimed at restoring the deposed President Nkrumah to power.

During the 1970s, these activities were increasingly replaced
by direct support for radical governments and causes. (8) Cuban troops, supported by massive deliveries of Soviet weapons, were decisive for the MPLA victory over the rival National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Liberation of Angola (UNITA), in the civil war that erupted in the wake of the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola in November 1975. (9)

Extensive Cuban involvement is also noticeable in the Horn of Africa. Prior to 1975, Cuba's military presence in East Africa was largely a military training mission in Somalia. (10) The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in 1974, and the introduction of a radical regime in Addis Ababa resulted in the presence of Cuban troops in Ethiopia. (11) By late 1980, the Ethiopian forces, with Soviet-Cuban assistance, had effectively expelled Somali armies from the Ogaden. (12) However, some 13,000 Cuban troops remained in Ethiopia as a symbol of the Communist country's support for the present Ethiopian regime.

This brief historical analysis illustrates that Cuba's military presence in Angola is by no means a new phenomenon to Cuban policy-makers. (13) It is also noticeable that Cuba's involvement in Africa is in broad agreement with Soviet policies in Africa. (14) During the Rhodesian independence struggle Cuba adopted Soviet policy in directing most of its assistance to Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) which the Soviet Union supported in preference to Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). (15) On the other hand, unlike
the Soviet Union, Cuba has recognised the Sahara Arab Demo-
ocratic Republic as well as provided personnel to the Polisario
guerrillas who are fighting Moroccan forces in the Western
Sahara. Nevertheless, both the Havana and Moscow Governments
adopted the same stance on the Angola-SWA/Namibian issue.

In September 1982, Mr Richard Ovinikov, Soviet representative
to the United Nations, addressed a letter to the United
Nations Secretary-General, Dr Javier Perez de Cuellar, in
which he pointed out the 'unrelatedness' of the Namibian and
Angolan questions. The Bulletin of the Africa Institute
suggested that such a "hard line" approach from the Soviet
Union was to be expected as a Cuban withdrawal from Angola
would directly influence its interests. (16) With respect to
SWA/Namibia the Soviet Union bluntly advocates a straight
"transfer of power to SWAPO" as its ideal solution to the
country's problems. (17) The Soviet leadership appears to be
firm in its position on the SWA/Namibian - Angolan/Cuban
deadlock, even after a meeting between Dr Chester Crocker and
the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Leonid Ilychev, on 7
December 1982, where these issues were discussed. (18)

CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA

The precipitate departure of 400,000 Portuguese combined with
the civil war between the three internal national parties,
the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, led to the collapse of much of the
basic infra-structural scaffolding - administrative and
community services, transport and communication systems -
needed to ensure the continuity of state and society.\(^{(19)}\)

It is further known that without extensive Soviet-Cuban aid, the present MPLA Government in Luanda would have found it impossible to gain control of the government in 1975 and to maintain this control. Soviet-Cuban backing still remains essential for its survival.\(^{(20)}\) Mr Antonio Lenque, Head of the Angolan Department of Foreign Affairs, himself affirmed that the MPLA Government in Angola by now would have collapsed if it was denied the support of the Soviet-Cuban backbone.\(^{(21)}\) This amounts to a foreign element directly and decisively intervening in Angola's domestic affairs, even though it takes place at the invitation of the host government.

During February, 1982, Angolan President Dos Santos declared in a national speech that, "during the Second War of Liberation", it was the socialist countries that gave Angola massive support to face up to South African aggression. To this day, he continued,

\[\ldots\] the sophisticated military technology that we (Angola) possess cannot be handled without careful training from these socialist countries." \(^{(22)}\)

As far as the Angolan Government is concerned, it is clear that Cuban presence in the country has always been considered a purely domestic matter, completely unrelated to the issue of SWA/Namibian independence.

The Luanda-Havana view, however, needs careful examination, even though the rest of Southern Africa, except South Africa, UNITA, and a number of local SWA/Namibian parties, share this
view. On 4 February, 1982, a joint statement released by the Angolan and Cuban Governments reaffirmed their unchanged position on Cuban presence in Angola until after the implementation of Namibian independence (23), which must be in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 435. This position was publicly maintained throughout 1982, even after the two-round and much controversial Cape Verde Islands talks between South African and Angolan high-level government delegations, during December 1982 and early 1983. (24)

The Frontline states frequently declared themselves in favour of continued Cuban presence in Angola until such time as Resolution 435 has been firmly implemented in Namibia. (25) Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and outspoken Frontline spokesmen, Mr Salim Salim, voiced Southern Africa's mutual concern about the Reagan Administration's pro-South African approach, warning that a strong US-SA linkage could seriously jeopardise affairs in Southern Africa. Early in 1982, Angolan officials informed the United States Government that the Cubans would remain in Angola until the implementation of Resolution 435, and, that the issue was non-negotiable. (26) Between 7 and 9 June 1982, Angolan Government representatives and news agencies as far apart as Dar-es-Salaam and New York confirmed prolonged Cuban presence as well as the strengthening of the Cuban contingent before October 1982. The Luanda Authorities further stated that the Cuban presence also acted as an internal insurance policy to maintain the "status quo".

The Havana Government, on the other hand, indirectly acknow-
ledged the existence of a SWA/Namibia-Angola linkage - and publicly stated that discussions on Cuban withdrawal would start as soon as Namibia achieved independence, and providing that South African aggression against Angola ceased completely. (27) Havana most certainly links the SWA/Namibian and Angolan situations, while the Angolan Government, on the other hand, accepts the UNITA threat as the overriding motive behind the Cuban presence. (28) The MPLA Government points out that Soviet-Cuban aid is vital in its effective resistance to UNITA, and must be retained until UNITA is defeated. (29)

The Havana/Luanda claims require closer examination. Not only are the issues, the SWA/Namibian - Angolan "linkage", and the real reasons for Cuban presence in Angola, very important in deciding the validity of claims from both opponents and supporters, closer examination will also shed light on the changing trends in regional security. The main emphasis being placed on what would be described the "linkage" issue and the Cuban question.

THE FIRST ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR

From the following analysis it will become clear that the presence or second Angolan civil war between the MPLA, with Cuban assistance, and UNITA, with its South African aid, was not instigated by South Africa at all. The reason for this 'war of liberation' should be sought in causes within Angola itself. The analysis is further aimed at providing evidence in support of the theory that Cuban military presence is still
aimed at keeping UNITA at bay, and not as generally believed, fending off SADF threats to Angolan security. It will also be argued that some form of "linkage" between the two countries does exist, but that the South West Africa People's Organisation is closely related to this "linkage".

In 1961 Jonas Savimbi committed himself to revolutionary activities by joining and becoming the FNLA's foreign minister, while the diverging interests of the central Angolan people and growing hostility between the FNLA leader, Holden Roberto and Savimbi, led to the latter's breakaway from the FNLA in 1963/64. This led to an Ovimbundu movement organised by Savimbi. (30) (In 1967 Savimbi was expelled from Zambia after directing attacks on that country's copper ore carrying Benguella railroad. He then spent eight months in exile in Cairo. (31) Late in 1966 Savimbi finally committed himself to the Angolan bush, personally leading the struggle and organising the UNITA movement until after the 1974 coup. (32) In this he is neither marxist not capitalist, not even a black revolutionary, but an Angolan patriot fighting for the freedom of the Ovimbundu people. (33)

Prior to independence the FNLA was supported primarily by moderate neighbouring African states, especially Zambia, Tunisia, the Ivory Coast and Senegal (34), while UNITA remained unrecognised and received help only from Egypt with China contributing financial aid and training facilities. (35) In The Angolan Revolution, Vol.II. Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976, John Marcum asserts that after adding up
aid provided by China, France, Great Britain, West Germany and others, it is reasonable to conclude that the FNLA and UNITA received roughly the same amount of aid that the CIA estimated the MPLA received from the Soviet Union - about 80 million dollars throughout October 1975. (36)

The Angolan civil war began in October 1975, one month before independence, between the three internal factions, the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. (37) During October-November 1974 and early in 1975 Cuban troops, supported by massive deliveries of Soviet weapons, arrived in Angola, and this proved to be a decisive element ending the first phase of the civil war in favour of the MPLA. (38) In the wake of the withdrawal of the Portuguese colonists and mounting tension between the internal factions, South Africa's Defence Forces made use of the "low-risk" opportunity to mount its first major military incursion into Angola to smash both the MPLA and SWAPO and to secure the future for "moderate" alternatives in Angola and Namibia. (39) This incursion stopped short of Luanda (40) under the backlash of much international condemnation of South Africa's militaristic activities.

It is important to notice the strong possibility of a conventional conflagration between South African and MPLA/Cuban forces. Fortunately this has not happened, even though military contact between these forces has occurred on several occasions. (41) During March 1976 the South African Defence Force withdrew from Angola for reasons other than military defeat. (41) The SADF did not suffer defeat in Angola, nor
did the Cuban troops and their so-called "Stalin Organs", (mobile 122 mm rocket launchers), inflict much impression or damage on the South African forces. The primary reason for South Africa's withdrawal could be ascribed to the fact that the MPLA with the assistance of Soviet-Cuban aid, had defeated both the FNLA and UNITA militarily during February-March 1976.\(^{43}\)

Furthermore, the SADF's incursion was believed to have been in co-ordination with strong American support behind the scenes\(^{44}\), which eventually, when the need came, did not materialise. America's failure to support South Africa's activities, either diplomatically or materially, would appear to have been a further decisive factor in South Africa's troop withdrawal.\(^{45}\) South Africa withdrew during March 1976, while 13 000, later increased to 19 000, Cuban soldiers failed to follow suit.\(^{46}\) They remained in Angola as token support for the ruling MPLA Government that came into power at that time.

The Clark Amendment passed during the 1976 or "First Angolan Civil War" effectively brought an end to official American support to revolutionary movements, which was specifically aimed at curbing United States military or financial support to the UNITA movement. According to reports UNITA and the FNLA enjoyed extensive support from the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency).\(^{47}\) The FNLA has since disintegrated, with many of its former members joining up with UNITA. From 1976, UNITA, under the leadership of Savimbi, took up the "Second Civil War" in order to liberate Angola from MPLA domination. Unaided, UNITA's military cause was doomed to failure, as was
the case with the MPLA's military wing, the FAPLA, which needed Soviet-Cuban support before being able to subdue the FNLA and UNITA.

On the other hand, extensive South African aid, since the own withdrawal in 1976, greatly contributed towards UNITA's ability to continue its resistance struggle right into the 1980s, thereby enabling UNITA to achieve certain successes. It must be stressed, and not surprisingly, that UNITA and South Africa are in close agreement on the present state of affairs in Angola, and to a lesser extent on the SWA/Namibian issue. As a result, it has become quite clear that UNITA, with its aid from South Africa, was by no means a spent force in Angola. The movement might have lost the short term stakes against the Soviet-Cuban backed MPLA during 1975/76, but this certainly did not imply its military impotence in the long term. (49)

By the early 1980s Savimbi claimed UNITA control over large parts of central and southern Angolan provinces, such as Cuando Cubango, Mexico, Bie, Huambo, Benguela, and the southern parts of Cuanza Sul, while provinces free from UNITA activity were, Luanda, Lunda, Zaire, Guanza Norte, Uige and Mocamedes. The areas under UNITA were by no means under total control as contacts with FAPLA and Cuban soldiers were and are constantly being made. Flimsy evidence as it may be, groups of UNITA prisoners of war occasionally handed over to the International Red Cross, unanimously affirm UNITA's virtual unopposed domination of the southern provinces. (51)
UNITA's continued functioning since 1976, not even to mention its prominent upsurge in the 1980s, is in pure military terms, truly astounding, given the extensive assistance from the Soviet-Cuban elements to the MPLA. Yet this feat could not have been performed without South African aid. Dr Savimbi, when interviewed, never concealed his willingness to accept such aid whenever offered—however, once his acceptance of South African aid became known, his movement's struggle for credibility and recognition from the international community became doubly arduous.

Nevertheless, South African aid to UNITA's military effort is effective on various levels. It was alleged that the South African Defence Force had established at Bagani, in northern SWA/Namibia, a base for the training of UNITA and ex-FNLA soldiers who were to return to Angola to resist the MPLA. Captain Jose Belmundo, a Portuguese and "self-proclaimed" former member of the SWATF's 32 Battalion, revealed that not only is 32 Battalion a mercenary unit comprising Angolan refugees, but that it frequently operated in support of UNITA whenever it ran into trouble. Defence Force spokesmen, in rhetorical fashion, denied these allegations. However, the fact of the matter is that more informed people, such as those who have actually served in the Defence Forces, are convinced that not only 32 Battalion, but also Battalion's 31, 33 and 34, all are crack 'recce or mercenary' units exclusively charged with special operations inside Angola. In addition to training facilities, UNITA is further supplied with food, transport, fuel, and logistics and military intelli-
gence. The arms and ammunition supplied to UNITA, it is said, are those captured by South Africa in its raids into southern Angola.

THE UNITA - MPLA CONFRONTATION

Savimbi has on occasion stated that UNITA is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with SWAPO's aggression in southern Angola. During April 1982, Dr Savimbi accused SWAPO of being gradually more in co-operation with the MPLA government in Luanda, because SWAPO soldiers increasingly encroached on UNITA-controlled territory to harrass UNITA supporters. Previously, he pointed out, good relations existed between UNITA and SWAPO but this changed when the MPLA came to power. SWAPO now aligned itself with the MPLA, while it was UNITA which previously made possible SWAPO raids into SWA/Namibia. (56)

On another occasion when sixteen of UNITA's POW's were set free, on 4 April 1982, Savimbi said that UNITA harboured no ill feelings towards SWAPO and did not wish for military confrontation between the two movements, as the MPLA, and not SWAPO, was the enemy of UNITA. He said,

"I am in control of this side bordering your country (SWA/Namibia), presently, there are two wars waging in the area - South Africa's war with SWAPO and UNITA's war with the MPLA." (57)

John Marcum agreed with this point when he pointed out the ethnic kinship relation between UNITA, largely rallied around Ovimbundu support and loyalties, and SWAPO, which is reliant on Ovambo support. (58)
On 5 April 1982, Savimbi reiterated UNITA's dedicated commitment to continue with the civil war until the MPLA agrees to an election similar to the one being demanded in SWA/Namibia. He pointed out the irony in the MPLA Government's demand for 'free and fair' elections in Namibia, but itself being unwilling to hold such a 'free and fair' election in Angola. (59)

In fact, prior to 1980, elections were held only where MPLA structures were sufficiently strong, stable and mature. (60)

Early in 1983, Savimbi acknowledged

"UNITA gets a lot of support from various countries, but that the only door to get that support into Angola is through Namibia." (61)

Thus UNITA is of the opinion that South West African independence could complicate its guerrilla war against the MPLA.

Even more serious is UNITA's difficulties in obtaining either support or recognition from the West. Savimbi expressed personal fear of the Western negotiators not rating UNITA as a force that must be taken into account. (62) After meeting with the then US Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, Savimbi recounted that he was left with the impression that the US Government demands reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA as "part and parcel" of a Namibian independence settlement. (63) The United States does not recognise the MPLA Government in Luanda; and, with the coming to power of the Reagan Administration, there was a strong revival of campaigns to have the Clark Amendment repealed. If successful, it would again enable the United States to support movements such
as UNITA. Furthermore, US relations with South Africa are considered better than ever before. (64) In the light of the United States' "binary goals" in SWA/Namibia and Angola it is surprising that it has not adopted a more favourable public approach towards UNITA and its ethno-nationalist cause.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA — 1982

Meanwhile the "two Wars" had been raging on, causing more destruction in Angola than in SWA/Namibia. Noted historian and author on African affairs, Robin Hallet, after a visit to Angola, concluded that 'outside South Africa' the FPLA was the strongest military force in Southern Africa, thereby implying that UNITA's chances of toppling the MPLA regime as remote. (65) Similarly, the presence of Soviet-Cuban elements in Angola has become an ominous "fait accompli". (66)

By 1981, the joint FAPLA/Cuban forces numbered just under 40 000 men — approximately 20 000 FAPLA's (67) and approximately 19 000 Cubans (68) — without any real reserves. An estimated force of 23 000 well-armed men, but without adequate transportation, is deployed with a specific two-fold strategy: to protect the central production centres and at all costs to avoid contact with South African incursion forces. The Cubans on the other hand, are centred around the country's oil installations, primarily to prevent sabotage attacks from UNITA (69), and, they are also involved in the training of FAPLA recruits. It is important at this stage to stress the Cubans' non-combatant role in relation to invading South African forces.
Since the 1976 "incident" no extensive clashes have occurred between Cuban and South African forces.

It would then logically follow that UNITA and not the South African Defence Force is the FAPLA and Cubans' real opponent by implication placing some doubt upon the linkage of the SWA/Namibian and Angolan/Cuban issues. UNITA's forces number between ten and thirty thousand men, roughly divisible into three sections - a guerrilla section, an urban guerrilla section and a semi-regular section, which normally operate in restricted groups smaller than 300 men. It stands to reason, and as Hallet rightly pointed out, that UNITA is unlikely to topple the MPLA by military means while the latter is supported by the Soviet-Cuban elements. That is, for as long as the Soviet-Cuban support to the MPLA/FAPLA continues, it will be unlikely that the Second Angolan Civil War will be brought to a conclusion.

THE CUBAN QUESTION

The situation boils down to the Cuban question. Cuban presence proved decisive in the maintenance of the power-balance in Angola as it was known by the close of 1982. Furthermore, the issue of linking together the issues of SWA/Namibian independence and the departure of the Cubans from Angola resulted in a deadlock in the negotiations surrounding these issues. Although it was the Reagan Administration which introduced the question of Cuban departure from Angola, in 1982, the South African Government eagerly took hold of this opportunity to further stall SWA/Namibian independence.
Opponents of "linkage" view the issue as a strategy of South Africa, to further delay SWA/Namibian independence. The Cubans, they believe, are in Angola for the purpose of ensuring both its domestic and national security, more specifically, to fend-off South African threats to Angola's national integrity. For the supporters of "linkage", the South African Government, the Reagan Administration and to an extent the UNITA movement, two further factors are brought into account. Finally, the Cubans, as a foreign element, directly intervene in the domestic affairs of an already unstable state, and by so doing, create a situation where the governing body is kept in power by artificial means, and not as a result of public popularity. Secondly, it so happens that this government, the MPLA, freely and voluntarily supply the South West Africa People's Organisation with base facilities without which the latter organisation's liberation struggle would have been much more difficult.

A number of quotations from a speech by Dr Chester Crocker neatly summarises the situation. These extracts are from the opening excerpt of the second session of the hearings on Dr Crocker's nomination:

"That the end of the Zimbabwe conflict is only the beginning of a new set of challenges for the United States, (US), and Western policy. In the short to medium term these will probably centre on the closely intertwined conflicts in SWA/Namibia and Angola. So great is the overlap between these two wars; in fact, that outsiders sometimes have a problem deciding which is the key to the other. The Carter Administration and many observers in Europe and Africa prefer to operate as if the Angolan Civil War were simply an extension of South Africa's battle with Angolan and Zambian based guerrillas of SWAPO."

(75) It reads as follows:
In this view Angola should be considered a fully-fledged member of the Front Line States grouping, a diplomatic partner whose co-operation in the search for a Namibian settlement is essential. Washington would probably already have recognised the MPLA Government, were it not for the domestic political repercussions of being seen to accommodate yet another Soviet-Cuban 'fait accompli' and to legitimise the large communist presence in Angola. (77)

This liberal school of thought believes that the only way to get the Cubans out is by stopping the regular South African raids into Angola and by obtaining reconciliation between the MPLA Government and its opponents in central and southern Angola. Presumably a SWA/Namibian settlement would accomplish both objectives, since UNITA, as this school argues, would lose South African support that is critical to its continued anti-MPLA struggle. By such reasoning it follows that the Soviet-Cuban presence is somehow justified or legitimate until SWA/Namibia is settled and UNITA finally defeated.

A different view of the situation is held by many centrists and conservatives in America and Europe, as well as by the governments of China and most pro-Western Arab states. That is, that Angola is the logical focal point for policy. It is in Angola, after all, that anti-communist forces are actively engaged in trying to liberate their country from the new imperialism of Moscow, and raising doubts in many Angolan minds about the benefits of the socialist alliance. (78)
This school of thought, of which Dr Crocker is an advocate (79), argues that this process of disenchantment with socialism should be encouraged, with the aim of evacuating the Cubans in order to facilitate a genuine political reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA. As for SWA/Namibia, while a settlement is important there, it will not by itself end the Angolan conflict because Savimbi is by no means an instrument of the South African Government. Savimbi could continue to operate with the active support of other African states and sympathetic governments elsewhere. Accordingly, the West should back UNITA, until such time that the MPLA is prepared to negotiate and expel the communist forces from Angola. SWA/Namibia, according to this view, is a separate and less important issue. (80)

However, there are flaws in the logic of both views. There is little doubt that Savimbi's UNITA could survive the loss of logistical co-operation it now receives from South Africa, assuming that his important African, European and especially his Arab supporters do not desert him. Hence, the Angolan problem will not go away just because SWA/Namibia is settled, as the liberal school would like to believe. Moreover, it is difficult to see how a meaningful reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA could occur if the latter was first weakened decisively, or, for that matter, for as long as the Soviet-Cuban elements remain in Angola actively supporting the MPLA against UNITA. This would be a reconciliation between victor and vanquished. According to the conservative school the West has few reasons for supporting such a reconciliation, given UNITA's anti-Soviet record and strong ethno-nationalist support in some areas of the country. (83)
The Cubans are not too popular amongst the Front Line States either. US Vice-President, Mr George Bush, after visiting seven Southern African states during November 1982, concluded that,

"... while black leaders object publicly to linking the Cuban issue to SWA/Namibia independence, there definitely is private flexibility." (84)

"Africans", he said, "did not want Cubans in Angola." (85) Mr Bush thereby correctly pointed out the ambiguity between the "private" and "public" considerations of Front Line, and other, African leaders.

Cuba, the Soviet Union and Angola strongly maintain Cuba's benevolent intentions in Angola, especially in ensuring the country's security from South African threats. (86) Fidel Castro personally stated that the Cuban troops would strongly resist any invasion of the country by South Africa, and would remain in Angola until South African forces pulled out of SWA/Namibia. (87) It would appear as if Castro is open to question on both counts. Firstly, the South African Defence Forces' strategy of conducting limited military incursions into Angola was not in the least affected by the presence of Cuban troops, as these forces, since 1976, have never had serious clashes. (88) The SADF's policy from the outset was aimed at avoiding contact with the Cubans in order to prevent a possible major conflagration, and ironically, as stated earlier, the Cubans themselves went out of their way to avoid contact with invading South African forces. (89)
CUBAN PRESENCE – CONSEQUENCES FOR ANGOLA

Angola undoubtedly is the hardest hit, and suffered most, under the hardships and devastation brought about by the "two wars" currently being fought in Southern Africa – South Africa's pursuit of SWAPO insurgents in southern Angola, and UNITA's resistance to MPLA rule. Not only did Angola suffer the collapse of its economic infra-structure in the productive southern and central provinces, it suffered also a huge loss of life, a tremendous outflow of its population, investment capital, and technological expertise. The country further surrendered a large part of its territory to the conduct of active ongoing guerrilla warfare, which negated proper reconstruction of the economic system's full potential.

Other than an all-out conventional war, relations between Angola, South Africa and SWA/Namibia could hardly deteriorate further than the low level reached by the end of 1982. For seven years a state of limited war existed between Angola and South Africa, even though the latter's military activities in southern Angola were directly aimed at incapacitating SWAPO. Invading South African forces caused extensive damage to the southern Angolan economic infrastructure, without any form of retribution. Add to this South Africa's aid to UNITA and the hostile anti-South African attitude of the ruling MPLA Government in Luanda becomes quite understandable.

This state of affairs contributed to Angola's enormous defence expenditure: half of its annual budget is channeled towards the military sector while extensive use is made of...
Soviet-Cuban aid as well. The almost complete communist presence and involvement (94) would appear to be more detrimental than beneficial to the country's distorted balance-of-payments situation. (95) David Lamb, Bureau Chief of the Los Angeles Times, after a visit to Angola in 1982, described Soviet military presence in Angola as evident as the large scale destruction in all southern provinces. The Soviet Union, in his opinion, moved quickly into Angola to capitalise on the regional instability, as well as to mount pressure on the MPLA Government not to accept Western proposals on either Angola or SWA/Namibia. (96) The Soviet Union obviously realised the inherent danger to their interests, both in Angola and in Southern Angola, should a Western inspired Angolan settlement, coupled with a SWA/Namibian settlement, come about. (97)

East European diplomats, such as GDR ambassador Dieter Klinger, in 1980, informed their Western counterparts that one of the reasons for Angola's weak economy, is the payment demanded by Moscow for the military equipment delivered to the MPLA/FAPLA since, and prior to, independence in 1975. (98) Portuguese officials estimated Angola's debt to the Soviet Union as high as two milliard rand, which syphons off the greater percentage of revenue derived from Angola's fish harvest and oil production as payment. Exact economic figures are uncertain, but they estimated the maintenance cost to the Angolan Government of every Cuban as high as R600 per month, thereby adding a further astronomical burden to the already over-taxed Angolan economy.
As pointed out earlier, it is wrong to argue that SWA/Namibian independence would drastically, if not completely, reduce the need for Soviet-Cuban military assistance, because settlement there would not necessarily imply a reconciliation between the warring Angolan factions, and, it would also be contrary to Soviet interests in this region. \(^{99}\) Not surprisingly then is the Soviet Union's attempts to influence the Angolan Government away from a possible severance of economic relations between the two countries. In the advent of an internal Angolan reconciliation, it is obvious that the need for Soviet-Cuban military aid may become redundant. In order to prevent total alienation, Moscow, in January 1982, offered the Angolan Government an additional two milliard rand in financial aid for economic projects scheduled well into the 1990s \(^{100}\) - an offer which, according to an Angolan Government official, was declined.

Significant, in terms of Angola's economic relations, was the fact that 69% of Angola's trade in 1980 was conducted with the West, and only 14% with Cuba and Eastern Europe. \(^{101}\) This imbalance in trade relations may prove decisive in Angola's future East-West relations, Angola already declined to tie itself to long term commitments with the Soviet Union, while business commitments between Angola and American multi-nationals, on the other hand, grew considerably during 1980. For example, the United States Export-Import Bank guaranteed a loan of 96.9 million dollars for the purchase of oil drilling equipment by Sonangol, the Angolan State oil company, and Cabinda Gulf Oil. \(^{102}\) Gulf Oil is the United States' major economic interest in
Angola, with royalty and tax payments to the Angolan Government accounting for 50–60% of government revenue in 1976, which indicated Gulf's strong incentives to co-operate with the MPLA Government. While the Carter Administration withheld formal diplomatic recognition, because of the Cuban troop presence, American business interests, notably the oil industry, were rapidly expanding relations with Angola.

During December 1981, Angolan President Dos Santos, for the first time declared himself willing to enter into negotiations with the United States on Cuban and SWA/Namibian related issues — Western diplomats arguing that Angola desired a hasty settlement in SWA/Namibia in order to be left alone with its own domestic problems, while Soviet diplomats attached more value to his private condemnation of the United States for interfering in Angola's internal affairs.

It appears as if the MPLA regime is willing to adopt a moderate stance for as long as prospects for a negotiated Namibian settlement exist, but, should they recede, Luanda can be expected to revert to its earlier hostile stand — even more so if the suspicion grew that the United States and South Africa were co-operating in support of Savimbi's UNITA forces — and consequently, to invite even more support from the Soviet-Cuban bloc. One certainty, however, is that Moscow and Havana can offer only the instruments of repression, war and liberation, and not the instruments of development that African leaders in general have identified as the top priority.
In December 1981, President Dos Santos admitted that Angola was in a strong bargaining position, with the Soviet Union and the United States as primary buyers. Contrary to Moscow's attempts to win Angolan favour through economic aid, Washington required both a Cuban withdrawal and an internal settlement before US recognition of, and economic aid to, the Luanda Government would be forthcoming. (107) By the end of 1982 it was no secret that Angola was experiencing severe economic difficulties, yet, neither Moscow nor Washington surfaced as highest bidder.

Furthermore, statements made by the Angolan Government, during 1982, and subsequent events resulted in its position becoming more obscure and ambiguous. A joint press communication released by the Havana-Luanda Governments on 4 February 1982, reiterated that the Cubans would remain in Angola for as long as South Africa occupied SWA/Namibia and invaded Angolan territory. (108) This attitude was publicly maintained throughout 1982, even after the first round of the controversial Cape Verde meeting - held in total secrecy - between the South African and Angolan delegations. (109) This meeting was a clear indication of Angola's willingness to negotiate with South Africa despite its public pronouncements.

New possibilities opened up with President Earnes' visit to Angola during April 1982. It ensured Angola of Portuguese assistance in the restoration of its coffee, sisal, sugar and cotton production, with the revival of some of the basic industries. (110) Such efforts, however, are negated by South
Africa's incessant military raids into southern Angola and the continuation of the Second Civil War. Economic reconstruction and development are unlikely to meet with any substantial degree of success until these difficulties are resolved to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANGOLA AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA

In conclusion, the discussion will focus on what have been described as the "Angolan - SWA/Namibian linkage". The purpose is two-fold: to determine whether such "linkage" actually exists, and to place the entire debate in broader perspective. It is important to remember that the practical side of the issues related to the Angolan and SWA/Namibian situations is more complicated than a mere theoretical discussion.

Dr Crocker referred to the overlap and intertwining of the conflict situation in SWA/Namibia and Angola as being of such magnitude, that outsiders sometimes had a problem deciding which was the key to the other. (111) That a relationship or "linkage" between the two countries exists, is beyond doubt, but, what was less clear, was the nature and extent of this linkage, and the influence it would have on the future of these countries.

"Non-linkage" and its advocates; the Soviet Union, Cuba, proponents from Eastern Europe, the United Nations, and the majority of independent African states, and the MPLA Govern-
ment in Luanda, has been examined above and needs little more discussion. Attention must instead be paid to setting out arguments and evidence in support of linkage, and to discuss the nature of this linkage. Needless to say, South Africa, the Reagan Administration, some local SWA/Namibian parties, and UNITA's Savimbi, are the foremost, and possibly the only, defendants of linkage.

During March 1983 a press report in The Cape Times quoted a number of statements by the head of the security police, Lieutenant P.J. Coetzee, who addressed a symposium on 'Marxism and South Africa'. Lieutenant Coetzee alleged that the African National Congress (ANC) had become an integral part of the Soviet Union's strategy against South Africa and the West and that this onslaught against South Africa had entered a new phase which embodied three areas (112):

1. To isolate South Africa in every conceivable way, particularly from its natural friends in the West.

2. To create a black-white confrontation in the country in order to hasten and facilitate a Marxist take-over.

3. To define and intensify guerrilla attacks against South Africa, because it is the visible showpiece around which the hearts and minds of the people revolve. (113)

The ANC and PAC are seen as the central opponents of the South African regime. These organisations, in the South African Government's view, embody the forces and ideology of communism. (114)
The most important aspect of the external element of opposition to South Africa, is the armed struggle waged by SWAPO forces against South African presence in SWA/Namibia, with the ANC, PAC and Black Consciousness African Revolutionary Army as internal opponents to the Republic of South Africa. The Soviet Union is undoubtedly the dominant communist factor in Southern Africa, and has established itself as the chief patron of SWAPO, as well as reinforced its long-standing ties with the ANC. The South African Government sees Cuba as the Soviet Union's principal ally on the African continent and its Angolan-based military personnel as instrumental in the inconspicuous advance of communism in Africa. They are viewed as posing a real long-term danger to South African and SWA/Namibian security.

The Cubans are pledged to defend the MPLA Government in Angola, which is supposedly faced by two security threats: South Africa, whose troops were stationed on Angola's border with SWA/Namibia, and Savimbi's UNITA, whose guerrillas operate in the south-central region. Yet such claims are by no means foregone conclusions. It has been pointed out that a SWA/Namibian settlement will not necessarily resolve the Angolan conflict and it is equally important to stress the Cuban's non-combatant role in relation to the South African forces. The Cubans in fact are involved only in defending the country's oil installations from UNITA attacks, and in training FAPLA recruits. It would appear as if UNITA, and not the SADF, is the FAPLA/Cuban's real opponents. Although there were approximately 19,000 Cuban combat troops in Angola, they were
not actively engaged against South African troops during any
of the fighting in 1980 and early 1981. Over the past
few years the MPLA Government has repeatedly stated that the
Cubans will remain in Angola until UNITA is defeated.

With Cuban support, Angola has provided arms, training, and a
safe haven for SWAPO insurgency forces. South Africa in
turn had used this tacit support as justification for both
ground and air attacks on southern Angola. Territorially
Angola fulfilled a vital role in SWAPO's military campaign,
from its inception in the early 1960s right into the early
1980s - Zambia ceased to play an important part in the insur-
gency struggle since SWAPO's forces moved to Angola in 1976.

The MPLA, in turn, supported the organisation and voluntarily
aided SWAPO through allowing the organisation base facilities
which were used as a springboard for its insurgency offensives
into SWA/Namibia. As a result of the SADF's counter-
insurgency activities, the SWAPO bases were subsequently moved
to central and northern Angola where greater security from
South African attacks existed. Nevertheless, the impor-
tant point, as argued by South Africa, was that if the MPLA
was denied its Soviet-Cuban military support, it could well
lose its political power to a more "moderate" or approachable
group such as UNITA. This could then lead to SWAPO losing
the platform from which it conducts its military campaign.

The broad argument in favour of linkage is based on indirect
reasons. As opponents of linkage correctly argue, the
presence of the Cubans in Angola is a domestic matter unrelated to SWA/Namibian independence. Indirectly, however, it is as a result of Cuban support that the MPLA is in power and able to supply SWAPO with base facilities. For the South African government the Cubans also represent part of the communist onslaught against South Africa and SWA/Namibia. For the independent observer, it is SWAPO and its activities in southern Angola, and not the Cubans as such, which ties together SWA/Namibia and Angola. For example, it is known that SWAPO/PLAN and the MPLA/FAPLA make use of the same logistics, communications, intelligence and security networks (128), which, for the past few years, have been set up under Cuban instruction. SWAPO's military campaign then depends not only on MPLA cooperation, but also on Cuban goodwill and military technology.

Whatever the outcome of negotiations on SWA/Namibian independence, there is certain also to be extensive discussion on Angola's internal affairs. While Angola is not in the process of becoming independent, as is SWA/Namibia, it is faced with difficulties of equal magnitude. Besides extensive damage done by invading South African forces, Angola's own economic reconstruction and political tranquillity can only come about after a reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA. Not only is such a reconciliation unavoidable, it is also bound to involve the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. In terms of SWA/Namibian independence, a report from the Angolan news agency, Angop, quoted Angola's Minister of Interior Affairs, Lieutenant Colonel A. Rodrigues, as saying that Angola has not yet "turned its back on talks" concerning SWA/Namibian independence, despite
the cutting short of South Africa-Angola's second round of face-to-face talks at the Cape Verde Island, during February 1983. At this stage it is, however, clear that the South African Government will continue linking SWA/Namibian independence to a Cuban troop withdrawal.
## Communist Military Technicians in Less Developed Countries 1979

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## COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS

### IN NON-COMMUNIST LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

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Minimum estimates of number present for a period of one month or more.


++ Ditto. pp.10
## COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: MILITARY AID TO NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES (LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 1955 - 1979)

### MILLION US DOLLARS

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(Million US Dollars)

### Table: Soviet Military Relations with Less Developed Countries

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### Communist Training of LDC Military Personnel

**In Communist Countries 1955–1979**

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REFERENCES: Section 2.4


17. The Cape times, 16 December 1982.


29. Die Suidwester (Windhoek), 16 November 1981.


35. Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for US Policy, p.36.

36. Marcum, op.cit., p.263.

37. Each of the Angolan Liberation movements were more or less entrenched in one of the country's three ethno-linguistic regions - Holden Roberto's FNLA among the 700 000 Bakongo of the north; Jonas Savimbi's UNITA among the two million Mbundu of north-central Angola. It was exactly this tribal element that led up to the first and second civil war - prior to independence and the continuation thereof after independence in Legum, C., Angola: Foreign Intervention, After Angola the War over Southern Africa, p.10.


42. Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-77, p.8445.


45. Debates of the House of Assembly, 8 March 1979, col.2067, P.W. Botha accused the West of having left South Africa in the lurch.


49. Legum, op.cit., pp.35-38.


52. Windhoek Observer (Windhoek), 8 April 1982.

53. Windhoek Observer (Windhoek), 12 September 1981.


55. Ibid.

56. The Windhoek Advertiser, 16 April 1982.

57. Windhoek Observer (Windhoek), 8 April 1982.
58. See reference 37.

59. The Windhoek Advertiser, 6 April 1982.


65. Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola.


68. Schrire, op.cit., p.10.


70. Ibid.


73. Abrahams, O., Strategic Options in the Namibian Independence Dispute, p.113.


77. Ibid.


84. The Argus, 3 December 1982.

85. Ibid.

86. Legum, op.cit., p.15.

87. Windhoek Observer (Windhoek), 1 August 1982.


91. Legum, op.cit., p.36.


99. As Du Pisani pointed out, "ultimately, the convent of the Soviet Union on the withdrawal of Cuban forces will have to be obtained".

100. *Die Republikein/Angop* (Windhoek), 27 April 1982.


111. Crocker, op.cit., p.5.


113. Ibid.


120. Ibid.


122. Die Suidwester, 16 November 1981.


127. Foreign Intervention in Angola: *After Angola the War Over Southern Africa*, pp.36-37.

A SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE: THE REDUCTION
OF SOUTH AFRICA'S REGIONAL DOMINATION

Throughout the course of Section Two, I repeatedly referred to South Africa's administrative, and especially its military, involvement in SWA/Namibia and neighbouring Angola as merely forming part of its broader overriding security and economic policies followed towards the rest of Southern Africa. In conclusion of Section 5, I want to expand this view by placing South Africa's position of regional domination in an all-encompassing Southern African perspective. This will include a brief analysis of the counter-measures enacted by the Southern African states to minimise South African domination.

An article in the Financial Mail (1) stated that the economic consequences of peace in 'Namibia' itself, assuming that a negotiated settlement means a complete end to South African involvement in the Territory. The current cost of South Africa's military and administrative engagement in SWA/Namibia is estimated to be about R1.35 billion per annum. (2) Pure military costs for South Africa were estimated at R400 million a year in the late 1970s, reaching R600 million in 1980. (3) Yet, despite such hard economic realities, for South Africa there is a further side to the financial ledger.

Strategically Namibian independence would cause the removal
of South African forces from battle stations near Central Africa, and almost certainly, many observers would argue, install the black nationalist movement that South Africa has been trying to crush for the almost 20 years — while at the same time depriving the continent's last white bastion of its last buffer state. (4) (South Africa had already been rudely awakened by the stripping away of the Portuguese imperial buffer; the achievement of independence in Angola and Mozambique in 1975 and Zimbabwean independence in 1980.) These "unpredicted" events largely explains why the Botha government and its predecessors appeared permanently schizoid on the question of SWA/Namibia, and, why many analysts still cannot believe in its willingness to carry out any proposed settlement agreement in the Territory. (5) Besides, granting the Territory independence on international terms, which more than likely would mean a SWAPO Government coming to power, is bound to have negative domestic repercussions for the South African government.

On June 3, 1982, the Prime Minister, however, reiterated his government's wish for stability in South West Africa, stating that his government would not stand in the way of its attaining independence. He further stressed the need for an internationally recognised solution and not merely an internal settlement reached amongst the local parties and South Africa. As he phrased it at Durban on 5 August 1979,

"I have repeatedly indicated in the past that the South African Government, as well as leaders of South West Africa, attach great value to an internationally acceptable solution. We went far to make this possible." (6)
On a number of occasions the South African Government acknowledged that SWAPO would have to be included in a genuine settlement solution. (7) Prime Minister Botha stated on 19 October 1978, that

"... any political party that takes part in a constitutional, peaceful way, will be allowed to go to the polling booth with its supporters - and they have the right and possibility of winning the election." (8)

Though; in the same breath pointing to a number of preconditions that must be met before independence would be granted. These included a system of checks-and-balances aimed at ensuring that:

1. South Africa would not be faced with another hostile neighbour along the Orange River,

2. That the strategic integrity of South Africa on the sub-continent, vis-a-vis the ANC and Eastern Bloc, would be reinforced by the United States, with or without the direct or official support of a SWAPO-controlled Namibia (9),

3. And, the assurance (from the Western Negotiators) of Constitutional guarantees for a Bill of Rights protecting inter alia multi-party democracy, private property, an independent judiciary, and minority groups in a post-independent Namibia. (10)

SWAPO AND THE ANC: THREATS TO SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY

The relationship between SWAPO (South West People's Organisation), the ANC (African National Congress), and the
inherent "communist threat" attached to these organisations has become a regular topic of discussion over the past few years. The South African Government especially had long objected to such a relationship, thereby projecting the fear of a pro-ANC attitude once 'Namibia' becomes independent. On the other hand, it is necessary to bear in mind that the government's view of a "communist threat" differs from that of leading academics on the Territorial issue. Totemeyer and Serfontein, amongst others, perceive this phenomenon rather as the emergence of black nationalism.

Published evidence, such as joint ANC-SWAPO press communiques, mutually organised conferences and seminars, confirm that contact does, in fact, take place between these organisations. One of the more notable examples being the National Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa, convened in New York between 11 and 15 October 1981. This conference, jointly summoned by the ANC and SWAPO, and attended by about 1000 delegates from all over Africa, called for greater mutual co-operation, solidarity and support amongst all progressive African states. For example, in 1977 a meeting took place between three African nationalist leaders: Joshua Nkomo, Sam Nujoma and Oliver Tambo, and Fidel Castro, to discuss what role Cuba could play in the respective ZAPU, SWAPO and ANC liberation struggles.

past co-operation between the ANC and SWAPO amounted to mutual support and solidarity in local and international diplomatic circles, aiming to mount as much pressure on
South Africa as possible, to win international acclaim, recognition and financial support. However, their efforts at urging on Western sanctions did not meet with much success as South Africa proved to be an elusive opponent, strongly reliant on its abundance of strategic mineral resources to counteract international isolation. (South Africa is often described as the Saudi Arabia of minerals.)

Politically and militarily the ANC and SWAPO have a mutual enemy in the South African government from whom they seek to liberate themselves. The documented history of SWAPO further suggests that part of the organisation's founding roots are traceable to South Africa and to the ANC, as

"... during the 1950s many Namibians went to South Africa where they worked on contract. A large number of them went to Cape Town where they came into contact with the ANC of South Africa and other parties opposed to white minority rule. There they came to recognise the need for an organisation which could represent the interests of the people." (16)

The South African Government is convinced that these historical links between SWAPO and the ANC still exist and that they will continue in the future until both South Africa and SWA/Namibia are ruled by black governments. The government also believes that both organisations are strongly communist orientated, a view in which they have the support of a number of outside bodies. For example, a report of the United States Senate Sub-Committee, presided over by Senator Jeremiah Denton, found that the Soviet Union and its allies had achieved "alarmingly effective" control over the banned
African National Congress and SWAPO. Evidence brought before this Committee suggested that

"... the original purposes of the ANC and SWAPO have subverted to suit Soviet aims in Southern Africa". (18)

These findings were disturbing to the South African Government which fears a stronger linkage between the ANC and SWAPO once Namibia becomes independent.

The President of SWAPO, Mr Sam Nujoma, when interviewed in Paris during November 1980, affirmed these fears when he said that SWAPO and the ANC in a joint endeavour had brought political awareness to the peoples of both countries, and that this process political awareness to the peoples of both countries, and that this process was progressive in both Namibia and South Africa. (19) Mr Moses Garoeb, SWAPO's Secretary-General, on the other hand, tried to negate the fears of a strong future ANC-SWAPO linkage, when he pointed out that SWAPO is fully aware of the great importance of racial appeasement after independence, and that the actual transition towards independence should take place as peacefully as possible. (20) As spokesman of the organisation, he went on to say that SWAPO would not provide or allow ANC military bases in the Territory after independence, and that SWAPO would strive towards maintaining correct and hearty relations with South Africa. (21)

Despite extensive dependency relations between SWA/Namibia and South Africa, and the real danger of massive retaliation
should SWAPO allow ANC bases in an independent Namibia, the South African government is still sceptical of such promises. Fearing that SWAPO would backtrack on these as soon as internationally recognised independence is attained, by then welcoming ANC cadres to set up organisational facilities in Namibia. These would then be used in directing the final onslaught against South Africa. The government further fears greater Soviet involvement in this onslaught. (Appendices I-III of Section 5.4 presented figures prepared by the United States National foreign Assessment Center which reflects a definite increase in Soviet aid activities in Southern Africa since the early 1970s.)

SOUTH AFRICA: DESTABILISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The International Institute for Strategic Studies warned that an escalation of the SWA/Namibia conflict could prompt greater Communist Bloc involvement and lead to a widening war in Southern Africa deteriorated markedly during this period and that the prospects for reducing tensions during 1982/83 were minimal. In the course of 1982 it indeed became evident that South Africa had intensified its pre-emptive counter-insurgency warfare, through heavy and prolonged attacks against targets deep inside Angola, as well as mounting attacks on suspected ANC headquarters in other neighbouring Southern Africa might in fact hope to provoke Cuban forces into entering the SWA/Namibia war. This would fulfil South Africa's self-serving claim that the Namibian struggle was not one of national liberation, but part of a Soviet Grand Design for Southern Africa. (23)
Furthermore, anxieties are mounting rapidly in Western capitals over Pretoria's long-term intentions in Southern Africa, and that it may actually be trying to topple some regimes. During 1982 no fewer than seven of South Africa's neighbours accused it of trying to destabilise them - Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Internationally, it has been suggested that Pretoria's real motive, particularly in Mozambique, is to create such turmoil that the Cubans or Russians or some other communist government will be asked for assistance, and that South Africa would then look to the West, and especially the Americans, for intervention. A United Nations Commission has found South Africa guilty of complicity in the abortive Seychelles coup, while Lesotho's King Moshoeshoe II, in his address to the UN Security Council, has accused South Africa of trying to overrun neighbouring states and rule them as colonies in its 'constellation of Southern African states'.

Lesotho is the third Southern African state where South Africa quite openly used its armed forces to raid across the border, (see Appendix II of Section 2.5), the others being Angola and Mozambique. All these cases have been justified on the grounds that anti-South African guerrillas, notably ANC cadres, have been operative from bases within these countries. Prime Minister Botha made it clear that South Africa will not tolerate its neighbours allowing their territories being used as springboards for insurgency attacks against the Republic.
There is also a considerable body of evidence, and widespread conviction in Africa, that Mr P.W. Botha's forces are giving material support to a variety of dissident guerrilla groups in other states of Southern Africa, especially in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, with the aim of destabilising their governments. Consequently, Western government officials are now beginning to suspect that SWA/Namibia too, may fall into the pattern described as 'segmented destabilisation'.

This view is supported by the thinking of many local and international observers, news agencies and political observers. For example, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, leader of Inkata and the Black Alliance and the most formidable black leader in the local legal political arena, outrightly named Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho as victims of "a deliberate and calculated" process of destabilisation, while the London Times in an editorial on August 2, 1982, numbered various incidents in which South African involvement was suspected - among these were: the murder of Dr Ruth First in Maputo; the activities of the Mozambique National Resistance movement; the anti-FRELIMO guerrilla movement in Mozambique; the attempted coup in the Seychelles during November 1981, and a raid into Zimbabwe in which three South African soldiers were killed. (See Appendix II of Section 2.5.)

The concept 'destabilisation' came into general usage during the second half of 1981. Linguistically destabilisation is taken to mean an uneven balance of disfunction of the com-
ponents of a society or various societies. In a SATV interview the South African Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, defined destabilisation as:

"... actions aimed at creating a situation in a country whereby you can disrupt the country or overthrow the government". (30)

Yet, surprisingly, he denied allegations that South Africa is pursuing a policy of destabilisation of its neighbours. In realistic terms, however, General Malan cannot otherwise but deny all destabilisation allegations. Though, such denials, in effect, do not succeed in overriding the solid evidence suggested destabilisation activities.

Prime Minister Botha reflected that South Africa's "sphere of influence" extends to all its neighbours in Southern Africa (31), while the country's official Opposition is of the view that this sphere of influence should be put to good use, that is, that destabilisation would be immensely disadvantageous for South Africa, it would complicate SWA/Namibian negotiations, and besides, if the economies of these neighbouring countries could settle down as a result of South African help, they could become even more closely linked to South Africa.

THE FRONT LINE STATES AND THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT CO-ORDINATION CONFERENCE: MINIMISATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN INFLUENCE

The Front Line states, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Botswana and Mozambique, have repeatedly pledged their full support to the SWA/Namibian independence movement (32), including assistance in the military struggle, even though, as set out in the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, they would prefer a peaceful negotiated settlement. During November 1981, Tanzanian Ambassador Mr Paul Rupia, reiterated the Front Line States' approach towards SWA/Namibia in the UN General Assembly, i.e.

1. independence for the Territory in accordance with UN Resolution 435 (1978),

2. to allow Namibians themselves to decide on their Constitutional future,

3. ensure democracy and Human Rights for the entire population, and

4. to resist any attempts at blackening SWAPO's popular image or acceptability. (33)

While early in February 1982, Tanzania's government, speaking for all Front Line members, accused the West, and particularly the United States, of co-operating with South Africa in stalling on independence for Namibia. The Sunday News reported that

"... the West has over the past months been coming up with proposal after proposal, giving South Africa room for stalling on the Territory". (34)

Since becoming independent themselves, all the Front Line States have been engulfed by a wide range of internal political
conflicts (party versus party) elite versus the masses) and severe economic problems. In addition, South Africa has deliberately weakened their ability to assist SWA/Namibia by an offensive which involved supplying so-called resistance movements with weapons (Angola Mozambique); restricting the passage of essential commodities (Zambia); direct military invasion (Angola); a continuous campaign of anti-government propaganda (Zimbabwe); and overt economic control through Customs Agreements and inclusion in the Rand Monetary Area (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland). The Front Line states responded to these measures through the creation of the Southern African Development Co-Ordination Conference (SADCC).

While it would be incorrect to suggest that SADCC was designed solely in reaction to, or as counter-move, to South Africa's proposed constellation of states, it is seen as a regional grouping designed to promote Southern African economic liberation through co-ordinated developmental initiatives, much as the Front Line states are facilitating political liberation from South Africa through diplomatic initiatives and political solidarity. Its members include all the internationally recognised black ruled states of Southern Africa, namely Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Namibia with reserved membership. This Front Line grouping is faced with the dominating economic and military power of South Africa. With the exception of Angola and Tanzania, all these states function within the complex web of an established dependency relationship with South Africa. Therefore, no
one can doubt the enormity of the future trails to be overcome by SADCC, however, it is unrealistic to ignore the fact that within a decade South Africa's secure cordon of white dominated buffer states has been stripped away.

Within the Republic itself the growth of black political consciousness; highly visible acts of sabotage; persistent ANC infiltration; black labour unrest, and student protests, have become more evident. Nevertheless, it is often argued that Mr P.W. Botha's 'constellation of states' was largely a defensive effort post-dating the initial steps towards SADCC or that SADCC came into existence as a result of Mr Botha's 'constellation of states' idea.\(^{(42)}\) It is true that the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only on South Africa, played an important role in the establishment of SADCC, though, SADCC is possibly best perceived as an ongoing process of regional economic development as well as the disengagement from dependency relations which will assume different forms and dimensions according to changing circumstances. SADCC goals are the promotion of economic independence, the establishment of equitable economic integration, mobilisation of regional resources, the solicitation of international support for these objectives, and as SADCC leaders have gone to great lengths to emphasise, the avoidance of confrontation with South Africa as the result of carefully designed economic strategies.\(^{(43)}\)

Development co-ordination implies the consolidation and linkage of efforts across national boundaries. In his opening
speech as Chairman of the July 1981 SADCC Summit meeting in
Salisbury, President Quett J. Masire of Botswana made these
significant remarks:

"I have no doubt that our decision to decentralise SADCC programmes is the correct one. Decentralisation means that, as SADCC grows, it will become increasingly visible throughout the region. SADCC's visibility, I trust, will not be measured by physical assets, but by activities and achievements of direct benefit to our people." (44)

In accordance with this strategy there has been a division of responsibilities corresponding to the interests, resources, and to a lesser extent, the capabilities of member-states. The present distribution of responsibilities is as follows:

1. Angola - energy policies
2. Botswana - arid lands cultivation
   - foot-and-mouth disease control
   - headquarters of the SADCC Secretariat
3. Lesotho - land utilisation and soil conservation
   (with Zimbabwe)
4. Malawi - fisheries and wildlife
5. Mozambique - transport and communication
6. Swaziland - manpower development and training facilities
7. Zambia - development fund proposals
   . - mining
8. Tanzania - industrialisation programmes
9. Zimbabwe
- food security plan
- land utilisation and soil conservation
  (with Lesotho)
- air transport, including regional airport

SADCC members admit that they are poor at present, but insist that their potential is tremendous. The organisation has repeatedly indicated that an independent Namibia would be encouraged to join its ranks, and a South Africa under genuine majority rule would also be welcome. (SWAPO, the ANC and PAC have consulted with SADC for some time, and were in fact invited to participate actively in a seminar on SADCC organised by Botswana's ruling Democratic Party in Gaberone during October 1981.) In particular 'Namibia's' strategic and economic resources would be a significant addition to the SADCC camp. It is virtually certain that a SWAPO regime would join once it attained power.

In summary, several major roles of SADCC deserve special emphasis. The grouping is primarily concerned with creating foundations of economic power within each participating nation and the region as a whole. Specific and substantive ventures dispersed among member states, but co-ordinated to assure maximum regional impact, are the primary mechanisms. If successful the SADCC approach will make slow but tangible strides towards reducing dependency and open new alternatives to interaction with South Africa.
### MAJOR SADF OPERATIONS AND RAIDS

**INTO SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES 1976–1982**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>July 1976</td>
<td>Raids on Oshitotwa</td>
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<td>May 1978</td>
<td>Operation &quot;Cassinga&quot;</td>
<td>Angola</td>
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<td>March 1979</td>
<td>Strikes into Southern Angola</td>
<td>Angola</td>
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<td>March 1980</td>
<td>Occupation of South-Western Zambia</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>June 1980</td>
<td>Operation &quot;Smokeshell&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1981</td>
<td>Operation &quot;Carnation&quot;</td>
<td>Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>August - September 1981</td>
<td>Operation &quot;Protea&quot;</td>
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<td>November 1981</td>
<td>Operation &quot;Daisy&quot;</td>
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<td>March 1982</td>
<td>Operation &quot;Super&quot;</td>
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<td>July 1982</td>
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<td>August 7–22, 1982</td>
<td>Extensive Purgatory Raids into Angola</td>
<td>Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1982</td>
<td>Air Raids into Angola (Russian &quot;Mig&quot; aircraft destroyed)</td>
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INCIDENTS OF ACTUAL AND ALLEGED SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT GEARED TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICAN DESTABILISATION

October 1981
The Lesotho Government accuses the Government of South Africa of harbouring dissidents of the Lesotho Liberation Army.
(Die Suidwester 23 October 1981 - Sapa Reuter)

February 1982
Robert Mugabe accuses South Africa of instigating attacks on Zimbabwean arms and ammunition dumps, and of the recruitment of anti-government dissidents.
(Die Suidwester 3 February 1982 - Sapa Reuter)

February 1982
Zimbabwe, Angola and Zambia complain to an EEC fact-finding commission about South Africa's destabilising activities in Southern Africa.
(Die Republikein 4 February 1982 - Sapa Reuter)

July 1982
A quarter of the Zimbabwean Air Force destroyed by dissidents, with strong rumours that South African military personnel masterminded the attack.
(The Cape Times 26 July 1982)

August 1982
Three South African Defence Force members shot dead during an unauthorised mission into Zimbabwe.
(The Argus 27 August 1982)
December 1982 Western nations react sharply in condemnation of the SADF's aggressive actions against Lesotho-based members of the ANC, 22 ANC casualties were recorded. *(The Cape Times 14 December 1982)*

December 1982 A series of synchronised pre-dawn raids by Swazi police and troops to detain members of the ANC clearly indicate Swazi's desire for peace with South Africa and its military forces. *(The Cape Times 17 December 1982)*

The abortive Seychelles' coup (November 1981) is possibly the best example, illustrating to what extremes the South African government is willing to go in the enactment of its policies.

December 1982 The infamous "month of the hawks" during which South Africa demonstrated the crippling hold it has over the Zimbabwean economy. In the form of direct and indirect destabilising measures such as the severance of trade links, recall of South African locomotives and wagons, as well as the non-renewal of 40 000 Zimbabwean workers' contracts in South Africa.


May 1983 "Operation Bits and Pieces" on six ANC targets based in Maputo by the South African Air Force: South African Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, stated that it had been a retaliatory measure for the car-bomb attack by the ANC in central Pretoria during May 1983.

June 1983  A South African remote-controlled recon­
naissance plane shot down over Maputo while it
was on an information-gathering trip. Such
information is used by the Military Intelli­
gence branch of the SADF to plan future
attacks against ANC bases in neighbouring
countries.
(The Cape Times, 2 June 1983)

June 1983  South African Foreign Minister, Roelof Botha,
in Parliament, disclosed that nine meetings
had been held with five neighbouring states
in the past six months. These meetings
took place, he said, to discuss issues of
"bilateral concern" and issues of concern to
Southern Africa as a whole.
(The Cape Times, 18 June 1983)
REFERENCES: Section 2.5

1. Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 16 July 1982

2. Footnote: This figure includes direct and indirect subsidies, budgetary aid, estimated military expenditure, and the labour earning of the soldiers fighting in northern South West Africa/Namibia.


4. Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for United States Policy, p.15


6. P.W. Botha's speech in Durban on 5 August 1979


8. P.W. Botha's speech in Cape Town on 19 October 1978


10. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 2 October 1981

11. The concept of a "total national strategy" is in fact the officially presented counter-strategy to the "total onslaught" aim at the Republic of South Africa. Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's "Total National Strategy," p.2


18. The Cape Times, (Cape Town), 22 November 1982

19. Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek), 29 November 1980


22. By attacking the ANC and its neighbouring bases, South Africa was, General Malan Minister of Defence, suggested, taking preventative action. Beeld, 17 February 1981

23. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 13 May 1982


25. The Cape Times, (Cape Town), 18 December 1982


27. The Cape Times, (Cape Town), 18 December 1982

28. The Cape Times, (Cape Town), 25 September 1982

29. London Times, 28 August 1982
30. The Cape Times, (Cape Town), 13 October 1982

31. Ibid.


33. Die Republikein, (Windhoek), 25 November 1981

34. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 1 February 1982


43. The Second SADCC Summit Meeting, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's Opening Address, (Salisbury, 10 July 1981), p.10

44. Dr Q.K.J. Masire, Opening Statement by the Chairman, SADCC Summit Meeting, (Salisbury, July 1981)


SECTION THREE

LOCAL POLITICS
POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

WITHIN SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA:

INTRODUCTION TO THE 1970's

In more than one respect did the 1970s highlight a turning point in South Africa's relations with South West Africa/Namibia (SWA/Namibia) and the International Community. Firstly, it was during 1971 that the International Court of Justice officially condemned South Africa's continued presence in the Territory\(^1\); secondly, the General Assembly declared South Africa's administrative presence there as illegal, ordering the immediate withdrawal of both its administrative personnel and military forces; and thirdly, the widespread Ovambo labour unrests during 1971/72 demonstrated the Black people's solidarity with the ongoing liberation struggle.\(^2\)

Yet, significant as these developments might have been, they failed to culminate in South Africa's departure from the Territory. In fact, by the close of 1974 it was possible clearly to identify two mainstreams within the development of SWA/Namibian affairs:

On the one side we had the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the International Community united under the United Nations banner ardently striving towards attaining domination and control over local political developments, in
order to establish an independent Namibia based on the principles of majoritarian democracy. On the opposing side was the South African Government, the local National Party and their ethnically-based concept of an independent South West Africa/Namibia. (3)

For the purposes of this section of the dissertation the central focus will be on the South African point of view with its ethnic bases. In Section 4 the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) will be discussed in detail.

To do this contextual analysis properly it is necessary to briefly review the history of the Territory during the entire period under South African occupation, since this will indicate a line of continuity in South Africa's ethnic approach which became progressively manifested during the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s:

1. Between 1915 and 1920 South West Africa was under the military rule of the Union of South Africa(4), after which, in 1919/1920, it was placed under South African mandate by United Nations approval, and this lasted relatively undisturbed until 1945. (5) One can safely state that South Africa's concern towards the Territory, between 1915 and 1945, was expansionist, although very little exploitation of natural resources or local industrial development took place.

2. During the late 1940s and 1950s South Africa's international status, due to its institutionalised Apartheid
policy, suffered drastically from being the originator and co-drafter of the mandatory system. South Africa became the political scapegoat and outcast.\(^{(6)}\) Naturally, this had an adverse effect on how South Africa's involvement in South West Africa was perceived on both the local and international political fronts - especially if one takes into consideration that opposition to colonialism emerged in the 1940s and 1950s when traditional leaders started to submit petitions to the United Nations urging direct intervention in the South West African issue.\(^{(7)}\)

3. Earlier events, such as South Africa's attempts in 1945, 1946 and 1947, to manipulate the United Nations in favour of incorporating the Territory as a fifth South African province, illustrated the government's desire to keep South West as closely linked to South Africa as possible.\(^{(8)}\) Although these attempts were fruitless, the idea of incorporation was not abandoned completely; as reaffirmed in 1949 when the Nationalist Government gave White South West Africa direct representation in the Parliament of the Union of South Africa. (The SWA Affairs Amendment Bill allowed for six elected White members in the Union Parliament.) And in 1950, the then South African Foreign Minister, Mr E. Louw, openly denied any considerations of withdrawing South Africa's administration from the Territory.

4. From the late 1950s and early 1960s South West Africa acquired greater significance for South Africa, not only
economically, but also politically and strategically.\(^{(9)}\)

South West Africa, together with Angola and Mozambique under Portuguese colonial rule, and the then White-ruled Rhodesia, became one of the so-called 'bastions' against the era of progressive African nationalism.\(^{(10)}\) The encroaching "communist threat" also became a by-word during this period.

5. For the same period, 1952–1962, the relation between South Africa and the United Nations on the issue of South West African independence remained indecisive and unchanged. In 1962, however, the government chose to initiate the appointment of the so-called Odendaal Commission for the purpose of devising a five-year 'modernisation programme' specifically aimed at boosting non-white development within the Territory.\(^{(11)}\) It would be accurate to state that the initiative, in terms of administrative and political developments within the Territory has remained in the hands of the South African Government ever since. The Commission tabled its recommendations in the South African Parliament on 27 January 1964.\(^{(12)}\)

The ethnically-based 'homelands policy' devised by the Odendaal Commission coincided with the government's ultimate aims for the Territory's independence. The Commission suggested the creation of separate 'homelands or reserves' for each of the eleven ethnic groups, which roughly corresponded to the traditional areas occupied by them\(^{(13)}\) — only the Whites were
not assigned to occupy any specific area.\(^{(14)}\) Within the 'reserves or homelands' the other groups were expected to develop to their maximum socio-political potential, while they could still engage in economic contract activities within the so-called White areas, mostly the towns, but were expected to return to their homelands after the fulfilment of their contracts. Unlike their South African counterparts these homelands were not destined to attain ultimate independence beyond a small measure of self-government. (See Appendix I for a graphical illustration of these homeland boundaries.)

It was the Odendaal recommendations that laid the basic foundation for the Territory's ethnically-based constitutional future so ardently pursued during the 1970s.\(^{(15)}\) Except for the regional allocation of ethnically-based homeland territories very little had been done to implement the Commission's recommendations at the time it was tabled. Only in 1974, with the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the subsequent radical change in the power structure of Southern Africa, did a new sense of urgency arise over the constitutional future of South West Africa.\(^{(16)}\) Zimbabwean independence in 1980 added to the pressures on the Territory's future. (Incidentally, as from 1968 the Territory became known in international circles as Namibia, though for the purpose of this dissertation and until independence is attained, it would be more correct to refer to the country as South West Africa/Namibia - SWA/ Namibia.)
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS LEADING UP TO THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE: ETHNICITY IN THE 1970s

Having presented a brief background to the 1970s one can now look at the political and administrative developments that have taken place within SWA/Namibia since the beginning of this period. Particular attention will still be paid to what has been described as the 'South African initiative'.

Until April 1974, the local National Party continued to elect members for direct representation in the South African Parliament. The National Party, its Constituent Assembly and supporting Bureaucracy was the supreme political bodies in the Territory. In terms of multi-ethnic policies the National Party supported the separate-development recommendations of the Odendaal Commission as well as closer ties with South Africa. (17)

However, by September 1974 the local National Party decided that 'the time had come to speak to the other population groups', thereby adopting a sudden and radically different approach. The leader of the Nationalist Party, Mr A.H. du Plessis, announced that "a constitutional conference would take place", while fellow Nationalist member, Mr D. Mudge, stressed that "only tribal authorities and not political parties would be allowed to participate". (18) It was speculated that this change in policy had come about only as a result of pressure from the South African Government, and that four major
factors led up to the talks in 1974:

1. the protracted dispute between South Africa and the United Nations over SWA/Namibia's future;

2. Pretoria's overall Bantustan programme;

3. the change in the balance-of-power after the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire; and

4. the liberation struggle in the Territory itself. (20)

Nevertheless, this was when the "Turnhalle" was born in concept, involving talks between the leaders of all the major population groups to work out a "compromise" for existing political problems and to advance suggestions for future constitutional developments. (21) On 1 September 1975, the Turnhalle Conference convened for the first time. As only tribal authorities were allowed to participate - including fifteen delegates from the unpopular Ovambo Authority - the Conference failed to draw representatives from parties such as SWAPO, SWAPO-D, SWANU and NIP. They objected to South Africa "staging" the exercise, and felt that the proceedings would not lead to true political independence. The absence of these parties was also the reason why the Turnhalle Agreement did not enjoy international recognition. (22)

SWAPO was, in fact, invited to join the constitutional talks in Windhoek but turned down the invitation after stating "that it is only interested in the transfer of power directly to it". (23)
As delegates to the Turnhalle were mobilised, SWAPO issued a statement condemning it as

"... a monumental exercise in Boer-bad faith",

"... a public relations exercise ... aimed at the perpetuation of white minority rule under which South African domination would continue." (24)

SWAPO's European Representative, Mr P. Katjavivi, made it clear that the organisation would not participate in pre-independence elections and talks unless:

1. they were held on non-ethnic lines;
2. they were controlled by the United Nations;
3. South Africa abandoned its plans to establish an ethnic-based Turnhalle interim government; and
4. South Africa's security forces were first withdrawn from the territory. (25)

The Credentials Committee under the Rehoboth leader, Dr Ben Africa, worked out the composition of the delegations. The White, Coloured, Rehoboth Baster, Kavango, East Caprivian, and the Ovambo groups were represented by elected bodies. The Herero, Nama, Damara, Tswana and San were represented by elected and appointed delegations of varying size. (See Appendix II for delegations to the Turnhalle.) In a Bruckner De Villiers Report it was pointed out that the selection of the delegations was "a highly individuous exercise to make a fair selection of truly representative delegates to the Conference"
and that one can

"... in all fairness, hardly see how else the authorities could have gone about constituting a relatively representative body of delegates from all sections of the population."

Furthermore,

"... in the end, the credentials of the various delegations passed muster with - apart from SWAPO - the most critical of all parties concerned." (26)

Although it was delegates from the White group who introduced the larger part of the draft outline that led to the Turnhalle Agreement in 1977, it was by no means a simple process. Decisions had to be made on a basis of complete consensus and not a mere show of hands. (27) During the first plenary session unanimous agreement was reached only upon a formal Declaration of Intent. (28) (The Declaration of Intent is reproduced in Appendix III.) Most incidents of dissension resulted from the very nature of the composition of the Conference, as it was usually delegates representing dissenting parties who caused most disagreement. (29)

Despite the exclusion of SWAPO from the Conference, the believe amongst non-white participants indicated that they viewed the creation of an interim government as the first step towards including SWAPO in the country's future constitutional order. (30) A Conference statement released on 18 August 1976, announced an unanimous agreement on the establishment of a multi-ethnic interim government for SWA/Namibia, with 31 December 1978 as proposed date for independence. (31)
At the close of the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in March 1977, a petition was submitted to the South African Government for the establishment of an interim government for the Territory, based on the Turnhalle Agreement. And to approve an interim constitution which, according to Mr A.H. du Plessis, the then leader of the local National Party, would become, "with only minor changes", the permanent constitution for an independent Namibia. The proposed constitution envisaged a three-tiered government consisting of a Central Authority on the first-tier, Representative or Ethnic Authorities on the second-tier and Local or Municipal Authorities on the third-tier. (See the flow diagram of Appendix IV which sets out the composition of the proposed Central Authority.)

The first-tier was made up of a multi-ethnic Ministers Council and National Assembly, the second-tier of eleven ethnically-based Representative Authorities, with the third-tier allowing for Municipal Councils supposedly under control of the different population groups. In reality, white towns stayed under white municipal councils. A further oddity of this multi-ethnic three-tiered set-up was that the second-tier authorities were in no way answerable to the first-tier Central Government. Section Three, 2 and 3 deal with these issues in greater detail.

After the conclusion of the Turnhalle Agreement, 1977, all that remained to be done was the actual 'preparation' of the Territory, its people's and institutions, for an internally
settled independence declaration. It was also necessary to find a suitable figure-head to act as symbolic leader to direct the country during the interim period prior to independence. The preparation for independence involved the abolition of all forms of institutionalised racial discrimination and to set up a multi-ethnic government structure that would ensure the continuation of a moderate multi-ethnic government after independence.

The first task, removal of institutionalised discriminatory measures, was performed by Judge M.T. Steyn, the first South African Administrator-General to reside in the Territory.\(^{(36)}\)

In terms of the second task, a suitable figure-head was found in the person of Mr Dirk Mudge, former member of the National Party, who, after an unsuccessful attempt to take over the leadership of the National Party, broke away from the Nationalist Party to establish his own Republican Party in December 1977. (This party had only white members.) After the split in the National Party ranks Mr Mudge had to fight a rearguard action amongst his own supporters in order to accept limited power-sharing on a multi-ethnic basis.

In July, Judge M.T. Steyn was appointed as first Administrator-General of SWA/Namibia. Administrative steps enacted by Steyn "prepared" the country for independence, through the removal of apartheid legislation from the statute books. This resulted, in theory at least, in an integrated multi-racial society.\(^{(37)}\) In practice, however, inequalities and
apartheid based upon ingrained differences in wealth between black and white remained unchanged. (38) Despite tremendous socio-political problems created and entrenched by a history of colonialism, there still is no denying Steyn's achievements. Apart from abolishing apartheid legislation, he also issued the proclamation that led up to the December 1978 elections. (39)

It was in 1978 that the South African Governments' initiative nearly came to fruition. Government spokesmen addressing the International Community pointed out that the Territory and its people's were ready for, and in fact desired, their independence. For instance; on 25 April 1978 the Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed a letter to the ambassadors of the Western Governments stating that,

"Having now been advised by the Administrator-General that he has consulted the various political parties and church organisations in the Territory and that he was satisfied that the (Turnhalle) proposals are acceptable to the majority, he has recommended acceptance by the South African Government."

Furthermore,

"The people of South West Africa are anxiously and impatiently awaiting their independence which has been promised them not later than the end of this year (1978)." (40)

On another occasion, addressing the United Nations Security Council, 27 July 1978, Minister Roelof·Botha said:

"Very soon South West Africa will be independent. The people of the Territory demand it: it is their will and inalienable right ... We (South Africa) have repeatedly
stated that we recognise the separate international status of the Territory and that it is our goal to bring it to full independence, and as we stated as far back as 1967: "The people themselves will ultimately decide." (41)

In March 1973 Prime Minister John Vorster stressed the need for the peoples of South West Africa to gain experience in self-government, as it was an essential part in promoting the right to self-government. Prime Minister Vorster again expressed the wish of the Government to "bestow" independence on SWA/Namibia on 20 September 1978, when, at a press conference, he said:

"I reiterate, South Africa always has accepted the principle that it is for the people themselves to determine their own future. It is not for the Secretary-General or United Nations or any other entity to delay the process leading to self-determination and independence. The Cabinet in its deliberations yesterday (19 September 1978) concluded that the people of South West Africa, in accordance with their wishes, would have to be given the opportunity to elect their own representatives. This will be done on the basis of universal adult suffrage in country-wide elections in order to establish unequivocally who has the right to speak for South West Africa." (42)

Now in 1983, looking back over the five years since those remarks, it is clear that they amounted to little more than empty rhetoric as the Territory and its people still seek independence. What is equally clear is that at that stage in time the South African Government had been of the impression that it could successfully settle the SWA/Namibian issue on
the basis of an ethnically structured government dispensation, initially devised by the 1964 Odendaal Commission Recommendations and further expanded by the 1975/1977 Turnhalle Conferences. The DTA itself consisted of eleven different parties representing all ethnic groups.

Obviously these plans had gone seriously awry, in 1978 the government had reason for optimism in the proposed elections in December 1978, purportedly based on one-man one-vote and universal suffrage. This optimism would appear to have been well-founded as the 1978 election proved to be a massive boon for the South African initiative as a vast majority of the electorate supported the multi-ethnic Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, under the leadership of Mr Dirk Mudge, as the most "popular" party in the Territory. The DTA won 41 of the seats in the Constituent Assembly, the National Party, under its AKTUR banner won only 6 seats. The DTA received more than 82% of all votes cast, thereby assuming a clear majority in the Constituent Assembly. (43)

The opposing view, held by SWAPO, the United Nations and others, was that the entire Turnhalle Conference,

"... can be described as a humiliating defeat for Western diplomacy",

and

"... a major set-back for the United Nations' attempt to settle the problem through negotiation". (44)

Nevertheless, in December 1978, South Africa was again
challenged to act when Sam Nujoma confirmed SWAPO's acceptance of the United Nations elections provided for under Resolution 435 (1978), challenging the South African Government to allow such elections to take place. (45) The South African Government, in March 1979, responded that the United Nations would not be permitted in SWA/Namibia on March 15, and also launched a series of raids against SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia. (46)

The Constituent Assembly, as part of the transitional process in the establishment of the Central or first-tier government of the proposed interim dispensation, was converted to a National Assembly in May 1979. During this conversion process 15 additional seats were added to the existing 50 seats, reserved for those parties who did not participate in the 1978 elections, however, these seats were never occupied. The Central Authority for the "interim period" was completed with the coming into existence of the DTA dominated multi-ethnic Ministers Council on 1 July 1980.
THE PROPOSED HOMELANDS OF SWA/NAMIBIA:

THE ODENDAAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Namibia (South West Africa)

Institute of Cartography, University of Stellenbosch

TOTEMEYER G., NAMIBIA OLD AND NEW

(LONDON, HURST + COMP. 1978)
DELEGATIONS APPROVED BY THE TURNHALLE

CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delegation</th>
<th>No. of Delegates</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basters</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushmen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpivians</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaras</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereros</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavangos</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namas</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ovambos</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>396,000</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswanas</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>355,000</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

156          837,000         98.2%

Figures for population are taken from South West Africa Survey 1974, published by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa. They refer to estimates made in 1974.
DECLARATION OF INTENT

That, in the exercise of our right to self-determination and independence, we are voluntarily gathered in this Conference in order to discuss the Constitutional future of South West Africa;

That we most strongly condemn and reject the use of force or any improper interference in order to overthrow the existing order or to enforce a new dispensation;

That we are firmly resolved to determine our future ourselves by peaceful negotiations and co-operation;

That, mindful of the interdependence of the various population groups and the interests of South West Africa in its entirety, we intend to create a form of government which will guarantee to every population group the greatest possible say in its own and national affairs, which will fully protect the rights of minorities and which will do right and justice to all.

AND FURTHER WE DECLARE:

That we are resolved to devote continuous attention to social and economic conditions which will best promote the welfare,
interests and peaceful co-existence of all the inhabitants of South West Africa and their posterity.

That we are resolved to exert ourselves towards the promotion of and deference towards human rights and fundamental freedoms of all without discrimination merely on the basis of race, colour, or creed.

We THEREFORE RESOLVE:

(a) to draft a Constitution for South West Africa as soon as appropriate and if possible within a period of three years.

(b) to devote continuous attention to measures implementing all the aims specified in this declaration.

**APPENDIX IV**

**SWA/NAMIBIA GOVERNMENTAL FRAMEWORK**

**DURING INTERIM PERIOD**

---

**EXECUTIVE POWER**

- **PRESIDENT**

**CENTRAL GOVERNMENT**

- **COUNCIL OF MINISTERS**
  - (12 Members)

**SECOND LEVEL**

- **OWAMBO**
  - WHITE
  - KAVANGO
  - CAPRIVI
  - NAMA
  - DAMARA
  - HERERO
  - COLOURED
  - BISLANIES
  - HUNTER
  - TSWANA

**Municipal Authorities and Traditional Local Authorities**

**LEGISLATIVE POWER**

- **NATIONAL ASSEMBLY**
  - (60 Members)

**SUPREME COURT**

**JUDICIAL POWER**

**REPRESENTATIVE AUTHORITIES and ELECTORAL COLLEGES**

**LOWER COURTS**

**TRADITIONAL COURTS**

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43. Die Republikein, (Windhoek), 7 April 1983

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46. Ellis, J. p.18
THE INTERIM DISPENSATION UNDER PROVISION OF PROCLAMATION No.AG.8 REPRESENTATIVE AUTHORITIES PROCLAMATION 1980

The constitutional dispensation for SWA/Namibia effective during the 'interim period' prior to independence had been elaborate, complicated and in effect, greatly confused. The 'new' dispensation as outlined by the second Administrator-General, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, during the first week of June 1980, was destined to leave even the informed observer flabbergasted. In Dr Viljoen, Chairman of the Afrikaner Broederbond, the Administrator-General's post saw a sharp "upgrading". His goals were two-fold; to work towards a more acceptable image for the DTA amongst black SWA/Namibians, and to "rebuild a unified white position through his Broederbond connections". (1)

The resultant structure of government, (or rather governments) was hierarchical in its power base and quite top heavy at that. It must be noted that the structure of government to be set out in the subsequent pages came into effect in mid-1980 and remained functional until early in 1983, when a number of fundamental changes came into effect, including the abolition of the Central Government and its replacement by the Administrator-General's office and five so-called Advisory Committees.
At the tip of the governmental pyramid, and still in supreme control, was the South African Government which retained control over foreign affairs, overall defence of the country, and with determining powers over the future of the country with regard to international negotiations. On a slightly lower level, the direct representative of the South African Government within the country, the Administrator-General: who had a veto right in the final stages of legislation; retained certain legislative and constitutional authority; retained his status as arbiter between the different levels of government, and retained his authority pertaining to the civil service.

Next in line was the Ministers Council which had been deprived of advisory functions in favour of executive powers. The Ministers Council, composed of a Chairman and eleven members elected from the ranks of the National Assembly, operated on a collective basis and not on an individual portfolio basis. The Ministers Council had in effect jurisdiction over affairs under the continued control of the Administrator-General. Legislative powers were centred in the National Assembly that became elected in terms of the 1978 elections held under the auspices of South Africa (for the duration of its one and only term this body had been dominated by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance). It retained legislative powers, while sharing certain aspects of these powers with the Administrator-General.

Separate from the Central or first-tier government, as set
out above, was the second-tier or Representative Authorities which were ethnically organised and in effect amounted to eleven different 'ethnic governments'. The various elements of the interim government will be discussed separately and in greater detail, but strictly in accordance with the provisions set out in Proclamation No.AG.8 (1980).

THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL

The Administrator-General (AG) had extensive executive powers over the Central and Representative Authorities, as well as arbitrating powers between these different levels of government with South Africa and often enough with the Western Contact Group on matters concerning the political independence of the Territory. The executive powers of the AG, as supreme executive official of the government, covered a wide range. Due to the importance of these, some detailed examination is required:

1. The Administrator-General may issue different proclamations in respect of different (representative) legislative authorities.

2. With reference to any particular legislative authority, issue different proclamations in respect of different subjects falling under a defined matter and defined in the proclamation concerned; and determine different dates in respect of different such matters or subjects. (This clearly meant that the AG had "Napoleonic" powers...
vis-a-vis the Representative Authorities on both executive and legislative levels.)

Subject to the provisions of Proclamation No. AG.8 (1980) and the constitution of the Representative Authority established for any population group, the Legislative Authority of such groups may make laws, to be called ordinances, in relation to; any matter defined in the said constitution with the consent of the Administrator-General previously obtained. (5) Thus, Representative Authorities could not make laws/ordinances without the consent of the Administrator-General.

Furthermore, the Legislative Authority of a population group may not make any ordinances under which the following laws are amended or repealed:


(b) Proclamation 181 of 1977 of the State President.

(c) The National Assembly Proclamation, 1979 (Proclamation AG.21 of 1979), of the Administrator-General; or

(d) any other law in force in the Territory or any part thereof immediately before the date referred to in sub-section (2)(b)(II) of Section 14 or make any ordinance which is inconsistent with this Proclamation or the Constitution of the relevant Representative Authority. (6) And any ordinance assented to by the Administrator-General shall
be promulgated in the Official Gazette of the Representative Authority concerned in accordance with the constitution of the Legislative Authority which passed such ordinance. (7)

THE MINISTERS COUNCIL

The first interim Central Government, (functional until 18 January 1983), was comprised of a Ministers Council, National Assembly and an assisting Administration. The first of July 1980 marked the inauguration of an autonomous multi-ethnic Ministers Council, in principle established on 28 May by the second SWA/Namibian Administrator-General, Dr Gerrit Viljoen. The establishment of the Ministers Council was officially promulgated in a Government Gazette Extraordinary on July 12 and 13 1980, while Mr Dirk Mudge, Chairman of the DTA was proposed and unanimously accepted as the first Chairman of the Ministers Council, a position he maintained until the disbandment of the Ministers Council and National Assembly in January 1983. (8) The Ministers Council consisted of twelve members inclusive of a Chairman. Although the ordinary members were not fully fledged ministers with portfolios they did receive ministerial salaries.

Membership to the Ministers Council was restricted to the leaders of the eleven ethnically-based parties affiliated to the DTA, which had won the majority of seats in the National Assembly. This configuration of the Ministers Council caused much dissatisfaction and eventually led to its disbandment in January 1983. (9)
While the Ministers Council functioned, decisions were made collectively on a consensual or majority vote basis. All powers vested in the Administrator-General, (the supreme executive official), by legislation, were executed by or on behalf of the Administrator-General, or his administrative departments. The Ministers Council could make decisions on specific matters, but these decisions had at all times to be "rubber-stamped" by the Administrator-General.

Legislation drafted by the Ministers Council, on relevant issues, still had to be approved by the Administrator-General who retained the supreme legislative power officially and directly vested in him by the South African State President. He could refer draft legislation back to the National Assembly as well as to the ethnic Representative Authorities for reconsideration, or, as previously mentioned, he had the power to simply 'veto' legislation. (10)

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The National Assembly was composed of 50 members, first elected in 1978 to a Constituent Assembly which was converted into a National Assembly in May 1979. Unfortunately the 1978 DTA election victory and the 'unofficial interim' government structure was not welcomed by the majority of the Territory's population, since neither SWAPO nor SWANU, the more powerful Black political parties, chose not to participate in the activities surrounding the electioneering, composition and
functioning of the Ministers Council and National Assembly. However, prior to the 1978 election South Africa and the participating internal parties agreed that the "government" resulting from this election would not be official as such, but would rather function as "interim" government that would formulate an independence constitution - incidentally a task the "ruling DTA government" failed to perform.

The National Assembly had both executive and legislative powers: the executive powers were vested and executed by the Ministers Council which was elected from the ranks of the National Assembly. The first session of the National Assembly had been devoted to the Bill on the Abolition of Racial Discrimination - Urban Residential Areas and Public Amenities. The aim was to make it possible for all SWA/Namibians to purchase houses in all proclaimed residential areas and to remove restrictions on the use of libraries, hotels, restaurants, halls, rest-camps, theatres, places owned by private persons, the government and municipalities, which were erected for public use. Unfortunately, persons from non-white groups were limited by financial means to make full use of these facilities and concessions.

Whites living in the country were upset at the decisions of the National Assembly, and the first day the National Assembly discussed the Bill on Racial Discrimination approximately 1,000 whites demonstrated against its abolition outside the Turnhalle building. Other people felt that the National Assembly failed
to approach the real and serious problems such as unemployment, housing shortages, the high cost of living, educational and health service shortages. (11)

As unofficial interim institutions, the National Assembly and Ministers Council were limited in the tasks they could perform. Most of which could only be performed by a genuine independent government. The South African Government was a severe impediment to these political bodies. For example, the introduction of an educational system equal in all respects for both Black and White, could only be introduced by a truly independent government.

THE ADMINISTRATION

The Ministers Council had been served by an Administration which was departmentalised for increased efficiency. Each department was headed by a Secretary who had the status of Permanent Secretary. There were Secretaries of Manpower and Civic Affairs; Finance; Justice; Agriculture and Nature Conservation; National Health and Welfare; National Education; Post and Telecommunications; Water Affairs; Roads and Transport; Constitutional Development and Defence. In theory these departments were supposed to put into practice the policies of the Ministers Council, in practice they were not responsible to the Ministers Council, but rather to the Administrator-General.
THE REPRESENTATIVE AUTHORITIES/ETHNIC GOVERNMENTS

Subordinate to the Central Government was the second-tier governments or Representative Authorities which functioned on an ethnic basis, (these synonyms are reflective of the same bodies). As with the Ministers Council and National Assembly the idea of regionally based ethnic authorities was not original but originated from the 1964 Odendaal Commission Recommendations, providing for eleven "native Nations". (12)

The Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in SWA ACT of 1968, outlined the creation of the first six "Native Nations", (or regional authorities) and authorised the establishment in each of a Legislative and Executive Council.

This act provided for the establishment of regional authorities in Ovambo, Kavango, East Caprivi and the Rehoboth Gebiet, while Bushmanland and Namaland each got an Advisory Board, while a Coloured Advisory Council was elected and the Whites being represented by their Legislative Assembly. (13) This state of affairs continued basically undisturbed until 1980 when these 'homelands' were replaced by the second-tier Representative Authorities system, which was expanded and facilitated in great detail by Proclamation No.AG.8 of 1980.

The repeal of Act 54 of 1968 and replacement by the Representative Authorities Proclamation of 1980 'officialised' but not 'legitimised' the state of affairs prior to 1983, i.e.

52.(1) Subject to the provision of subsections (2) and (3) and of the Constitution of the Representative Authority contemplated
in subsection (2), the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in SWA Act, 1968, is hereby repealed.\(^{(14)}\)

(3) Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Act in any part of the Territory, any law which was made under any provision of that Act or was under any such provision deemed to have been so made, and was in force in the relevant part of the Territory immediately before such date and which is not replaced by or inconsistent with the relevant Constitution mentioned in that subsection, shall continue in force until repealed by a competent authority.\(^{(15)}\)

As mentioned earlier, under the Representative Authorities Proclamation, 1980, Hereroland, Kaokoland, Kavango, East Caprivi, Ovambo and the Rehoboth Gebiet, were provided with Representative Authorities. While groups legally allowed to establish Representative Authorities included the Baster, Bushmen, Coloured, Damara, Herero, Kavango, Nama, Ovambo, Tswana and the White; with a Representative Authority defined as inclusive of a Legislative and Executive Authority:

(i) Legislative Authority

At least once every financial year of a Representative Authority there had to be a session of the relevant Legislative Authority. These Legislative Authorities had to, from time to time, adopt standing rules and orders not inconsistent with Proclamation No.AG.8 or with its constitution, for the regulation and conduct of its proceedings and despatch of business, for the
passing, entitling and numbering of ordinances and for the presentation to the Administrator-General for his consent. (16)

Therefore, subject to the provision of Proclamation No.AG.8 the Legislative Authorities of the respective population groups may make laws, to be called ordinances in relation to any matters defined in the Proclamation and any matter in the particular Constitution, but with the consent of the Administrator-General previously obtained. (17) He may in turn 'veto' or issue different proclamations in respect of the drafts presented by the Legislative Authorities.

(ii) **Executive Authority**

Subject to the provisions of Proclamation No.AG.8, 1980, the administration of the affairs of a population group in relation to the matters specified in the Proclamation shall be carried out by the Executive Authority of that population group as from the date on which the Legislative Authority of that population group becomes empowered, by virtue of Section 14(2) of AG.8 to make ordinances in relation to that matter. (18) Section 14(2)(a) reads that the Legislative Authority of a population group shall come into operation on a date to be determined by the Administrator-General by Proclamation in the Official Gazette:

1. Proclamation No.AG.12 (May 1980) converted the White Legislative Assembly into a White Representative Authority.
2. Proclamation No.AG.14 (May 1980) provided for a Coloured Representative Authority.

3. Proclamation No.AG.23 (June 1980) converted the Ovambo Legislative Council into a Representative Authority.

4. Proclamation No.AG.29 (June 1980) repealed the Eastern Caprivi Legislative Council Proclamation of 1972 and established a Representative Authority for the Caprivian.

5. Proclamation No.AG.26 (June 1980) repealed the Kavango Legislative Council to make way for a Representative Authority.

6. Proclamation No.AG.32 (June 1980) revived the existing Damara Representative Authority Proclamation and confirmed that the duties, powers and functions of the Chiefs and Headmen would remain in force.

7. Proclamation No.AG.35 (June 1980) converted the existing Nama Council into a Representative Authority.

8. The Baster would continue in terms of the Self-Government for Rehoboth Act of 1976 and the existing system (Baster Council, Kaptein and Kapteinsraad) would be retained.
9. With regard to the Bushmen the Administrator-General had decided that the existing nominated authorities (Advisory Council) would continue functioning as their representative. (An official Bushman Council was envisaged before the close of 1982.)

10. Legislation for Representative Authorities for the Herero and Tswana were expected to be promulgated before the close of 1980. (19)

Membership to these Representative Authorities was limited to either the Legislative or Executive Authority, nor could a person be a member of the first-tier National Assembly and a member of the second-tier Representative Authority at the same time. It was also not possible to be a member of more than one group's Representative Authority, however, it was possible for a member of one population group to become a Representative Authority member of another population group. For instance, Mr Werner Neef, member of the White population group had in fact been elected by the Ovambo Executive Authority as one of its members in the National Assembly, while he was also a member of Peter Kalangula's newly established multi-racial Christian Democratic Alliance for Social Justice. (20)

Subject to the provisions of laws on government service in a region, an Executive Authority could allocate the powers, duties and functions to be performed or exercised in respect of the different matters on which the competent Legislative
Authority may make ordinances, to different administrative divisions, and could assign and allocate the administration of the different divisions to the members of the Executive Authority. (21) An Executive Authority could enter into an agreement with one or more other Executive Authorities or with the Administrator-General providing for the exercise or performance on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, of any power, duty or function conferred or imposed in terms of any law upon the first-mentioned Executive Authority or upon any other such Executive Authority or Administrator-General, as the case may be. (22)

Obviously then, the replacement of the Development of Self-governance for the Native Nations of SWA Act of 1968 by the Proclamation on Representative Authorities, 1980, revised and modified the suggestions of the Odendaal Commission Recommendations. Each person still remained under the supervision of his Ethnic Representative Authority in all matters regarded as being important to that ethnic group. Those matters under the control of the Ethnic Representative Authorities were rather extensive and of such a nature that a single unifying nation-building programme was quite out of the question. Subject to the provisions of Section 14 of Proclamation No.AG.8, 1980, the following were included under the powers of the Representative Authorities:

**Item 1:** The acquisition, alienation, grant, transfer, occupation and possession of land or any right to land.
Item 2: Farming settlements on communal land.

Item 3: The provision to members of a particular population group of education of any standard up to and including the standard ordinarily required for an examination for the tenth standard.

Item 4: The provision of health services to the members of a particular population group.

Item 5: The provision to members of a particular population group of social welfare services.

Item 6: The provision of sub-economic or subsidised housing to the members of a particular population group.

Item 7: Matters having as their object the promotion of art and culture in relation to the particular population group, including control over art galleries, theatres, libraries, museums and archives.

Item 8: Civil defence and local security.

Item 9: The subservience of Paramount Chiefs, Chiefs and Headmen to the Administrator-General.

Item 10: The administration of justice in accordance with the traditional laws and customs observed by tribes or communities.

Item 11: Election of members for the Legislative Authority,
and the registration of members of the particular population group as voters, who are also eligible to stand as candidates in an election.

Item 12: Direct taxation of the members of the particular population group.

Item 13: The collection of and the control over all revenue and monies accruing to the Representative Authority.

Item 14: The raising of loans by the Executive Authority with the prior consent of the Administrator-General.

Item 15: Estimates of revenue and expenditure.

Item 16: The provision of local services, including supplies services, buildings, works, accommodation and transport.

Item 17: The appointment, training and promotion of officers and employees in the service of the Representative Authority.

Item 18: The provision of services for members of other population groups.

Item 19: The execution of agreements with other Representative Authorities or the Administrator-General.

Item 20: The imposition of penalties, and provision for the forfeiture of property, for the purpose of enforcing any law made by the Legislative Authority. (23)
REFERENCES: Section 3.2

1. Namibia in the 1980's. Published by the Catholic Institute for International Relations and British Council of Churches (Great Britain, Russell Press, 1981), p.28


3. Official Gazette Extraordinary of South West Africa No.4127 (Windhoek, April 1980) Proclamation by the Administrator-General No.AG.8 (1980) Section 14(2) (b) (I) and (II) p.13

4. Ibid.

5. Op.cit. Section 14(I) (a) (I) and (II)

6. Op.cit. Section 14, subsection (7) (a) to (d) p.15

7. Op cit. p.16


11. The Voice of SWAPO-Democrats. The Official Organ of the SWAPO-Democrats. No.5 9 August 1979 (Department of Publicity and Information, Windhoek, 1979), p.2


14. Proclamation No.AG.8 Representative Authorities Proclamation (1980) Section 52(I) p.33

15. Op.cit. Section 52(3) (a) p.34


17. Op.cit. Section 14(I) (a) (I) and (II) p.12


19. The Namibian Review. No.18 July/August 1980 pp.6-7

20. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 25 March 1982


It is both possible and plausible to draw a two-fold distinction in reactions monitored to the ethnically-based dispensation provided for by Proclamation No.AG.8. In the first instance attention will be paid to those parties and groups who saw themselves as standing outside this structure, whereafter the focus will shift to those parties who chose to function within this structure, paying most attention to the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and to a lesser extent to the local National Party. The overriding intention being the analysis of the 'changing moods' towards the interim structure of both groups.

From the outset, 1979/1980, the interim dispensation met with considerable local opposition, coming especially from those quarters not actively drawn into, or participating in, its procedures. Initially, both the National Assembly and Ministers Council enjoyed some measure of popular support, but strictly from those parties and groups who opted for participation in the formulation and continued functioning of these bodies. The other parties preferring non-participation never credited the National Assembly and its Ministers Council with the slightest measure of righteousness, acceptability or legality. Moreover, criticism towards the interim structure
emanated not only from the so-called left, but surprisingly, also from sources located to the right of the political spectrum.

1. The local Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) was completely against any form of territorial independence and actually pledged for stronger bonds with South Africa.\(^1\) To this end Mr Sarel Bekker, leader of the HNP, withdrew his party from the National Assembly on 18 March 1982 after tabling an unsuccessful motion calling 'inter alia' for the disbandment of the National Assembly and a return to the system of government in the Territory as it had been ten years previously.\(^2\) (Since the HNP had only a small measure of support from the White voters and very little real influence on the actual governing of the country, in the strictest terms, it only had to be accommodated constitutionally as an existing minority group.)

2. On the other hand, the more influential local National Party in fact participated and supported Proclamation No.AG.8 in all its stages of formulation, but after the outcome of the December 1978 elections, which ended in a landslide victory for the DTA\(^3\), a situation of confrontation between the NP, the DTA and South African Government slowly but surely emerged, with the latter being accused of allegedly "selling out" the White population of South West Africa/Namibia.\(^4\) As a result of the DTA Ministers Council's 'unsatisfactory functioning' the National Party constantly resisted the allocation of more executive powers to the Ministers Council, arguing that
more powers would not lead to greater political unity or stability in the country. And moreover, from the Nationalist viewpoint the Ministers Council did not have the full confidence of all the population groups. (5)

3. From the more moderate Federal Party camp came a solitary call for reconciliation between Black and White. Federal Party leader, Advocate Brian O'Linn, rejected any form of UDI-type settlement on the grounds that such a settlement would be utterly useless as it would not enjoy international recognition, instead, an internal settlement would only lead to a further polarisation between the extreme left and right of the political spectrum, and more than likely between Black and White. (6)

Mr O'Linn's view was that only a fraction of the Territory's population, notably the Whites, was in favour of limited independence, while an overwhelming majority favoured full internationally recognised independence. (7) That is, SWAPO (external) the SWAPO-Democrats (internal), the three major Black churches, the Damara Raad, the Coloured Labour Party, NIP, SWANU, the Namibian Christian Democrats, the CDA as well as the Federal Party. (8)

4. In The Voice of SWAPO-D, Number 5 of 9 August 1979, the SWAPO-Democrats stated explicitly that it viewed the National Assembly as "an institution without any value, as a body which is in no way representative of the Namibian people and as an Assembly without any real
power". (9) In a further article published in a later edition of The Voice of SWAPO-D, Number 6 of 9 January 1980, this view had been reiterated in somewhat stronger terms, i.e.

"It is imperative that we firmly and vigorously reject the whole concept of second tier ethnic authorities established on ethnic lines and we must warn the country of the dangers for us, as a nation, inherent in such a form of government." (10)

(The primary objection being that the system of ethnically based second-tier authorities frustrated all efforts at building a single united Namibian nation.)

5. In a letter to the Windhoek Observer Mr Peter Katjavivi, a Central Committee member of SWAPO, wrote that he regarded the Ministers Council as "merely a multi-coloured rubber stamp for continued South African control of Namibia", while members of the other internal Black parties saw it as a blatant move towards an internal settlement and, therefore, a stumbling block in terms of an international settlement. (11)

6. SWANU also frequently attacked the Turnhalle dispensation, the Ministers Council and National Assembly included, as a political and economic burden which the Namibian nation could no longer afford any. Mr M. Katjivongo, SWANU's President, also called for the disbandment of the Turnhalle dispensation and its Executive Authority with the reinstatement of full powers in the Administrator-General until such time as an internationally recognised independence could be attained. (12)
7. The Damara Raad, established in 1971 with the assistance of the South African Government, since 1975, due to ‘South Africa’s and the local White’s intransigence’, started to move away from co-operation with these groups. In 1981 the Chairman of the Damara Executive Committee, Mr Justus Garoëb, expressed strong disagreement with the composition of the Ministers Council and the National Assembly which he did not recognise as legitimate institutions. Instead, the Damara Raad ascribed to ‘free and fair’ elections in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435 for the establishment of a truly representative and legitimate government.

8. It was not only local Black and White parties that voiced their objection to the so-called interim dispensation. Strong criticism was also forthcoming from the Western Contact Group. It viewed the establishment of a Ministers Council as an unnecessary complication to their task of finding an acceptable solution and it also raised questions about South Africa’s intentions. The Western Contact Group refused to recognise the Ministers Council just as they refused to recognise the National Assembly set up in the Territory after the internal elections in December 1978.

ATTITUDINAL CHANGES WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC TURNHALLE ALLIANCE

In contrast to the outspoken Black and White parties standing outside active government involvement, it was interesting and
at times bemusing to take note of the changing local political climate since 1980; especially those attitudinal changes taking place within the then ruling DTA circles. Initially, prior to 1978, the DTA strongly campaigned for the ethnically based interim dispensation as set out by Proclamation No.AG.8 hailing it as the only workable system for a country as diverse in population as SWA/Namibia. For this view the DTA government, after 1978, had to endure much criticism for defending institutionalised racism. As predicted by Brian O'Linn, leader of the Federal Party, Proclamation No.AG.8 was bound to encounter increasing difficulties as it institutionalised racism and ethnicity and provided for the division of functions between first and second-tier government in crucial areas such as education, health services and agriculture. (17)

It then came as some surprise that the 'ruling' DTA government, slowly but surely, altered its position towards Proclamation No.AG.8, initially because of the supremacy and dominating powers of the South African appointed Administrator-General and later as a result of the general and overall unacceptability of this Proclamation. At first, members of the DTA dominated Ministers Council demanded that the Administrator-General transfer the educational, health and agricultural functions of the second-tier Representative Authorities to the first-tier Central Government - members of the Ministers Council, such as Mr K. Riruako, even threatened to resign unless this demand was met. (18)

This DTA demand for the transfer of second-tier functions to
the first-tier continued right into 1982, when the Ministers Council extended its demands, calling for the third-tier Municipal Councils to be brought under the direct authority of the Central Government. (All these demands were made in order to improve the effectiveness of the Ministers Council, however, none were met.) Chairman of the Ministers Council, Mr Mudge, even went as far as setting an ultimatum that unless Proclamation No.AG.8, a South African product, was changed in its totality, the South African Government could no longer rely on the complete co-operation of the DTA. This demand, made in the form of a DTA motion in the National Assembly on 25 November 1981, marked the beginning of a widening rift between the DTA and the South African Government, with serious consequences in the latter half of 1982. (19)

Since the formation of the Christian Democratic Alliance of Mr Peter Kalangula, the DTA was slowly pushed into the background in favour of the new CDA. The South African Government viewed the CDA and its black Ovambo leader as more suitable material for building an anti-SWAPo front. (20)

Mr Danie Hough, third Administrator-General residing in the Territory, reacted to this ultimatum by stating the "constitutional" nature of the interim Proclamation No.AG.8, of 1980, saying that it was not open for rediscussion or sudden alteration, since all the internal parties who participated, and especially the DTA, had accepted Proclamation No.AG.8 at the time of its formulation. (21) In a press statement released on 27 November, 1981, A.G Hough explicitly stated that
Proclamation No. AG.8 would remain as it was, as any changes to it would result in a loss of confidence amongst local parties - directly referring to the National Party, as very few of the other internal parties supported the principles behind this Proclamation. (22)

In the meantime the DTA Ministers Council experienced progressively more opposition from local parties not directly represented in this body. For example, on 3 March 1982, the Baster, Damara and National Party Whites requested the Administration-General, Hough, to dissolve the Ministers Council on the grounds of this body not being representative of the true leaders and having no support from these respective population groups. (23) (Being a multi-ethnic coalition party the DTA did have a Baster, Damara and White 'leader', in subsequent ethnic elections these leaders turned out not to have the true majority support of these respective groups.) This unrepresentativeness of the Ministers Council was an important contributing factor in the Administrator-General's decision to disband the Central Government in January 1983.

During the latter half of 1982 it became more obvious that the three-tiered government structure was under great pressure from various internal and external sources with wide speculation that it would not survive until the end of that year, 1982. At that stage none of the internal parties, including the ruling DTA, pledged full support to this interim dispensation (24), and the fact that the first term of the national Assembly was due to expire on 21 November 1982, did not contribute towards greater optimism.
The DTA dominated Ministers Council and National Assembly lost a great deal of its popular representation and support. Early in March, 1982, the local National Party withdrew its representatives from the National Assembly and was closely followed by the local Herstigte Nasionale Party. (25) Former DTA President, Peter Kalangula, left both the DTA alliance and the National Assembly during August 1982, primarily because of his personal dissatisfaction with the ethnic character of Proclamation No.AG.8 (1980) as well as the DTA's apparent inability to alter this Proclamation. (26) These leaders were all united in the view that the DTA government was not only unrepresentative, but also politically bankrupt, incapable of altering Proclamation No.AG.8 or of offering a viable alternative solution.

Ironically, the DTA had no need to advance a more viable solution. Developments both locally and in South Africa suggested that the South African Government was already engaged in "manufacturing" alternatives not only to DTA domination in the National Assembly, but also to United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, (1978). (27) In August 1982, the then Administrator-General, D. Hough, emphatically denied any allegations of a possible so-called 'internal settlement', stating that such claims (made by local and foreign observers) were devoid of any truth, and that the South African Government was still working towards implementation of Resolution 435. He added that there was a substantial degree of confrontation between the Central and Representative Authorities,
and that he and his "advisors" were, in fact, considering alternative measures in an 'attempt' to introduce a more acceptable system of government for the interim period prior to independence'. (28)

To this end a summit meeting was held during August 1982 on Hough's farm, near Pietersburg in the Transvaal, which was attended by Mr Hough, the South African Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and a number of the local ethnic leaders, most notably those five leaders not represented in the National Assembly. Considering later evidence it became obvious that it was not the first meeting of this kind to find alternative solutions in case United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 fell through. Two other meetings of this nature had taken place since June 1982; one at Oshivello, (in Ovambo), and the second at the Daan Viljoen game reserve near Windhoek. (Interesting to note the growing rift between Mudge and Mr P. W. Botha who met in a 'terrific clash' of words during the August summit, when the Prime Minister criticised Mr Mudge's way of handling the administration of SWA/Namibia.) (29)

Information made available to the local media, since August/September 1982, suggested the occurrence of regular meetings between A.G. Hough, the South African delegation and those five ethnic leaders not represented in the National Assembly, to sort out the "shortcomings" in both Central and Representative Authorities, and to work out a possible solution to the 'unrepresentativeness' of the Central Government. (30) Ironically these leaders were not represented either because of
their non-participation or non-election to the National Assembly. They were Mr Peter Kalangula (Ovambo), Mr Justus Garoëb (Damara), Mr Barny Barnes (Coloured), Kaptein hans Diergaardt (Rehoboth Baster) and Mr Koos Pretorius (White).

These talks resulted in Prime Minister Botha's request to A.G. Hough to submit a framework for restructuring the existing interim structure as 'it was the South African Government's view that this dispensation does not promote stability and development in the Territory'. Speculation, on the other hand, had it that the South African Government feared the possible outcome of new elections, should these be held after the first term of the National Assembly ended.

As mentioned before, the first term of the National Assembly was scheduled to end on 21 November 1982. It was a factor that caused great uncertainty in terms of the political and constitutional future of SWA/Namibia, both in the Territory and in South African Government circles. Yet, to the surprise of many local and international observers, this did not amount to a really serious crisis, as it was overcome by a mere visit to Windhoek by the South African Prime Minister Mr P.W. Botha. He simply announced the extension of the present National Assembly's term until 28 February 1983.

This bold action temporarily delayed the need for new internal elections, but did not succeed in defusing the highly volatile political situation existing locally since the latter half of 1982. Early in June, 1982, the ruling DTA Ministers Council
announced that unless an internationally supervised election took place before the close of 1982, it would, by its own initiative, stage a new internal election during March/April 1983, with or without the participation of SWAPO.\(^{33}\)

This announcement obviously caused some anxious moments as it was soon stopped by the South African Government which ruled that 'a decision taken at Cabinet level' completely rejected the possibility of such an election taking place.\(^{34}\) Instead, the government decided to expand the personnel of the Administrator-General's office, as well as to restructure the interim government dispensation. These steps, the government argued, would not only promote economic and political stability, but would also improve the structure and quality of the Territory's administration.\(^{35}\)

The DTA Ministers Council in turn made it explicitly clear that as the ruling party it would not participate in a "new ethnically-based" interim dispensation and in effect demanded a drastic alteration of the existing ethnically-based dispensation as laid down by Proclamation No.AG.8, 1980.\(^{36}\) Once again the South African Government refused to pay heed to this demand, as it had done since 1981, arguing that although the DTA had won the 1978 election with a landslide victory it had since lost most of its support, thereby justifying restructuring towards a more representative interim dispensation by moving away from the DTA.\(^{37}\)

By the close of 1982 it was obvious that the final break between
the 'ruling' DTA and the South African Government was not far off. As Mr Mudge had put it:

"... it is impossible that the two bodies, the Ministers Council and National Assembly, govern the legislature in the Territory by means of powers delegated, but revocable at any stage by the Administrator-General in whose office is vested the true sweeping powers of government". (35)

Thereby implying, as a further severe shortcoming of the so-called interim structure, that at no stage was there any clear and effective separation of powers between the office of the Administrator-General and the local Central Government.

Eventually, during talks held in Windhoek on 27 November 1982, the seemingly inevitable happened. A break occurred between the DTA and the South African Government. This resulted from a 'verbal shouting match' between the South African delegation, Mr P.W. Botha and Mr Roelof Botha, and the DTA Chairman, Mr Dirk Mudge; more specifically between Mr Roelof Botha and Mr Mudge. (Apparently Mr Mudge retorted to Mr Botha,

"I will not allow myself to be shouted at like that by you, I am not a child. You may be a Minister, but I have been in politics much longer than you, and as a result you have no right to shout at me",

then addressing all those present, Mr Mudge said

"I am now finished with you. It is all over." (39)

This break between the DTA Ministers Council and the South African Government became official in January 1983, when, on
10 January, Mr Mudge announced his intention to resign as Chairman of the Ministers Council in protest at the handling of affairs in the Territory by the Administrator-General and the South African Government. As Mr Mudge had put it,

"I have taken this decision in protest at the humiliating way in which the Administrator-General and the South African Government have treated the Ministers Council and National Assembly in recent times." (40)

Mr Mudge went on to describe his own and the Ministers Council's resignation as a setback for democracy and moderation. Since

"... the DTA and I myself have tried over the past few years (five years) to build up a moderate front, based on co-operation between Black and White, to ensure that radical elements do not take over after independence and to prevent racist tendencies asserting themselves and making it impossible for Whites to stay on after independence". (41)

After Mr Mudge's resignation on 18 January 1983, the Ministers Council, as a sign of support for his decision, resigned in its entirety, while on the eve of 18 January, the then Administrator-General, Mr Hough, proceeded with the formal disbandment of the National Assembly as well. In the same statement Mr Hough announced that the functions and duties of the Central Government would again be vested in the office of the Administrator-General. Thus, with one fell 'swoop' Mr Hough reversed the process of self-determination started in 1978, through the repeal of Proclamation No.AG.21 of 1979
and No.AG.19 of 1980 that provided for a democratically elected Central Government. Mr Hough appointed Mr Jan Greebe as Chief Executive official for the Territory, but he did nothing to resolve the real issue of antagonism. Proclamation No.AG.8 was retained unchanged.

The situation in SWA/Namibia, between 1975 and 1983, was jestingly described by Dennis Beckett, editor of Frontline, as follows:

"The 'first big move' was to 'consensus government' in 1975, when the Turnhalle first loomed large in Southern Africa's collective consciousness, or from 'One Man One Vote' to 'One Man One Government'. With the abdication of the Ministers Council in January 1983, the slogan was re-adjusted from 'One man One Government' to 'One-Man Government', when the fourth Administrator-General assumed supreme executive and legislative powers." (42)

By the end of 1982, it became known that Mr Hough, the third Administrator-General of the Territory and successor to Dr Gerrit Viljoen, was preparing to lay down his official position to make way for his successor, and fourth Administrator-General, Dr Willie van Niekerk. Dr Van Niekerk arrived in Windhoek in January, 1983, but only took up office early in March of the same year.

**MAJOR CHANGES TO THE INTERIM STRUCTURE: 1983**

As from the date of disbandment of the National Assembly by AG Hough, the arrival of his successor, Dr Van Niekerk, and
the appointment of Mr Greebe as senior executive official.
the entire interim structure had undergone a number of fundamental changes, some of which have already been mentioned:

1. All legislative and executive powers were reinvested in the office of the Administrator-General.

2. The Representative Authorities or ethnic second-tier governments remained unchanged, and only indirectly under the control of the Administrator-General's office, as did the local or third-tier municipal governments.

3. The only new addition was the establishment of five Advisory Committees of 15 to 17 members each, made up of members of the private sector over which the Administrator-General would "govern". These Committees were designed to assist the AG with the formulation of overall policy and planning, specifically concentrating on; community services, financial and economic affairs, local government, infrastructure and agricultural affairs.

Dr Van Niekerk emphasised that this committee system was not intended as a substitute for democratic government at the Central level, although he added it would at a later stage be employed to "assist" a democratically elected government.

During the first week of March, 1983, Dr Van Niekerk made known the names of the 66 members from the 'private sector' who had accepted invitations to serve on the advisory committees.
Not surprisingly, general public opinion on the calibre of these committee members declaring themselves willing to serve, was not one of acceptance or approval. This was reflected in the views expressed by members of the public in local newspapers. For example, in the Windhoek Advertiser they expressed their dismay at the poor representation of the private sector among those committee members, as well as the inadequate representation of dark-skinned citizens and Namibians. Of the 66 members only 4 were Black, and only 28 of the 66 members named on the committees were private sector representatives while 38 were government or semi-state officials. (Dr A.G. Van Niekerk stated that at least two thirds of the committee members would represent the private sector and the remaining third the public sector.) (43)

Considerable dissatisfaction was reflected by Black readers as well. Only four committee members were non-white, they, therefore, felt that these committees were very much unrepresentative of their interests. One caller to the Advertiser stated:

"I did not know there were only experts amongst the Whites of this country, or are we back in the old dispensation where the rule applied that Black people were too stupid to think for themselves and are only suitable to be the carriers of water and hewers of wood?" (44)

A Black businessman said,

"... it leaves no doubt that we are back to White 'baasskap' and 'domination'." (45)

Wider public opinion, including that of the Whites,
reflected a feeling of doubt in relation to these Advisory Committees, in that they were a re-embodiment of ethnicity and that they were, above all, too inexperienced and, therefore, incapable of assisting the new Administrator-General with the government of the country. He himself was inexperienced in the complexities of the politics and affairs of SWA/Namibia. (46)

Mr Mudge, speaking at a press conference in Windhoek on 3 April 1983, after returning from a visit to the United States, confirmed the general observation that an agreement on United Nations supervised elections in SWA/Namibia was definitely not a likely possibility in the near future. He said that he had gained the impression that no internationally recognised progress in present negotiations on the constitutional future of the country was in prospect before the end of 1983. (47)

By mid-1983 it was clear that internationally supervised elections were not likely to take place, and it was evident that the South African Government would follow through with whatever form of settlement it had in mind for SWA/Namibia:

The government tended to contradict itself with regard to its intentions for the future of the Territory, and its frequently motivated plans for territorial independence were often aborted. A recent example of these contradictions was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Roelof Botha's public statement that South Africa was definitely in favour of an internationally recognised settlement, providing that this took place only after the evacuation of Cuban troops from Angola.
It so happened that the government had also set 15 February 1983 as an ultimatum to Dr Crocker and the Western Contact Group to achieve this withdrawal, as failing to do so 'would determine whether Resolution 435 would be implemented or not'. Furthermore, the fact that this ultimatum had come and gone without a Cuban withdrawal, and in consideration of the previously mentioned administrative developments taking place late in 1982 and early 1983, observers were left with the impression that the government had settled, for the time being at least, for 'new interim' arrangements to become effective.\(^{(48)}\) It is highly questionable as to the duration of this 'new interim' dispensation and whether Resolution 435 will be implemented at all. The DTA-dominated dispensation lasted for five years.

Dr Van Niekerk, the fourth Administrator-General, set the wheels in motion through the announcement of the so-called Advisory Committee system that would function by assisting the Administrator-General. Dr Van Niekerk further confirmed the election of a new National Assembly, the former Committee on Constitutional Development, during September/October 1983.\(^{(49)}\) This 'new' National Assembly would replace the defunct DTA-dominated body which was disbanded by AG Hough. (It was AG Hough who designed the new dispensation at the request of the South African Prime Minister.)

The local parties were informed that the newly-elected body would have 'carte blanche' in terms of its functions and
would be able to either write a constitution or alternatively decide on the immediate implementation of Resolution 435. (50) (Dr Van Niekerk emphasised that Resolution 435 "was still on the table"). The new body would be both elected and appointed. It would consist of 72 members, 50 of whom would be directly elected in one-man one-vote elections, and the remaining 22 members would be appointed on a two-each basis by the eleven Representative Authorities. Although Dr Van Niekerk did not say it in so many words, it would almost be inevitable that any decisions taken by the 'new national Assembly' would be ethnically based.

In June 1983, Dr Van Niekerk made it known that the new body would officially be known as the State Council (SC). This proposed State Council had to draw-up suggestions on the form and functions of a new interim government - which would function until internationally recognised independence was attained; it was not to "administer" or "govern" the country; proposals made by the State Council were to be submitted to electoral approval by means of a country-wide referendum - votes to be counted in total and according to the respective population groups; and the body could be seen as a

"... forum from which all leaders could actively involve themselves in the political development of the Territory". (51)

This proposed State Council, initially scheduled to become effective in July 1983, encountered difficulties even before its formation. The main problem was that of the unwillingness
of the broader party-spectrum to participate in this body. After lengthy deliberations, initiated by the Administrator-General and not the local parties, only seventeen parties agreed to participate. These included the DTA and its eleven ethnically based affiliate parties; the National Party; the Labour Party; the Namibia Peoples Liberation Front, and the Liberation Party. (52)

Notwithstanding the almost country-wide condemnation of the State Council, Dr Van Niekerk appeared to be committed to the implementation of this body. (53) Through the publication of Proclamation No. AG.14 (1983), the Proclamation on the Provision for the Institution of a State Council for South West Africa and Related Affairs, 1983, on July 18, Dr Van Niekerk made the official provisions necessary for the establishment of the SC. (54) Earlier, on July 16, Dr Van Niekerk condemned the "distinctly partial conduct" of the United Nations as "unfounded and scandalous" since the "strongest leaders" of the country were working constructively in the best interests of the Territory's inhabitants and future. (55)

This statement he based on the willingness of "seventeen parties" (previously mentioned) to participate in the proposed State Council. This, however, was by no means a true reflection of the state of affairs within the country. The major and most important parties refused to participate, and furthermore, Dr Van Niekerk failed to point out that eleven of the "seventeen" co-operative parties were, in fact, DTA affiliates.
The parties which opted for non-participation included: the SWAPO-Democrats; the South West Africa National Union; the Namibia Independence Party; the Damara Council; the Christian Democratic Alliance for Social Justice; and the South West Africa People's Organisation. As these parties were, in fact, the larger and more influential ones, their participation was absolutely vital before the proposed State Council could ever be a truly representative body.

On 29 June 1983, a unique inter-party conference took place in Windhoek when almost the entire party spectrum gathered in the same conference room to exchange ideas on the proposed State Council. (Present were officials of the AG's office, an unofficial SWAPO delegate and delegates from the DTA, SWANU and NIP). Some of the more profound statements were uttered by Mr Daniel Tjongarero, who spoke in his private capacity and not as SWAPO spokesman, and Mrs Othilie Abrahams, member of the Namibia Independence Party.

Mr Tjongarero viewed the State Council as designed "to take the heat off South West Africa", and that the SC "will assume the responsibilities of the colonial power" and that it should be seen against the background of South Africa's inability to carry out its mandate for the country. Mrs Abrahams added that "the NIP will not participate in a body that forms part of the oppressive colonial power".

To the surprise of all political observers Dirk Mudge, leader of the Republican Party, expressed himself in favour of the
proposed State Council. He also called upon other parties and leaders not to denounce the proposed SC if they "cannot come forward with better alternative proposals". (58)

Dr Van Niekerk himself appeared to have adopted a "dubious" stance on the proposed State Council. In an interview with Rapport, he said, amongst other things, that non-participant parties will "hurt" their own interests, while the Johannesburg Beeld quoted him as saying that local politicians must start to realise that they, and not himself or the South African Government, "needed" the State Council. He added that he could easily continue to govern the country until the implementation of Resolution 435 became inevitable. (59)

By July 1983, it was clear that there was considerable doubt among political leaders in the country as to whether the proposed State Council would ever get off the ground. (60) Despite the promulgation of Proclamation No.AG.14, none of the parties vital to the workability of such a body proclaimed their willingness to participate in it.

In conclusion I want to briefly outline a number of points critical to the entire interim structure as it developed from 1978 to 1983. Some of these shortcomings have already been mentioned:

1. The introduction to Section 3.3. was aimed at confirming the unpopularity of the interim dispensation as provided for under Proclamation No.AG.8. Right from the outset
it had met with considerably more opposition than support. Various internal parties with considerable national support amongst Black SWA/Namibians completely rejected and refrained from participating in these arrangements. Unfortunately, but quite understandably, it is not exactly clear just how much 'national' support the interim dispensation enjoyed as these parties referred to above refused to participate in (interim) elections other than internationally supervised elections.

2. In the course of discussions contained in Section 2.3 it further became evident that the (first) interim dispensation had gradually lost the larger part of its already limited support, primarily that of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. The DTA had lent a limited measure of 'legitimacy' to this dispensation. By the close of 1982 it was questionable whether any of the internal parties supported the (first) interim dispensation at all. (The local National Party being the only possible exception, as AG8 ensured, to some degree, White political participation and control over own affairs.)

3. In light of these facts, Administrator-General Danie Hough's statement on the so-called 'constitutional nature' of Proclamation No.AG.8, and sudden alterations to it that would 'undermine the confidence of local parties', not only become ridiculous; but were also audacious assumptions, stating non-truths as facts. (61) Clearly, at no stage did the interim dispensation enjoy any form of majority
support, be it from Black or White SWA/Namibian voters. Nor did it ever resemble what could be described as a 'formal constitution'.

Furthermore, in Section 3 attention has been drawn to the fact that the South African Government and the local National Party have, in fact, master-minded the entire interim plan, and that it was by no means the product of all the local parties. (The majority of these parties did not participate in the procedures leading to the formulation of the interim dispensation at all. Appendix I outlines the "46" local parties, some of which existed on paper only, with indicators as to those parties who did participate.) All these factors in turn placed a question mark on the legality of the entire so-called interim dispensation.

4. Nevertheless, the (first) interim dispensation, with its three-tiered structure, did exist for a considerable period of time. An yet, if its achievements over the past five years, 1978-1983, are considered, one cannot be other than disappointed at its dismal failure to bring about a responsible government that could reasonably be expected to usher the country into an independent future. However, it would then be a DTA-dominated interim government. Acknowledgement needs to be made of the severe impediments placed on the powers and effectiveness of the first-tier Central Authority. These impediments were designed and maintained by the South African Government and its residing territorial "lackey", the Administrator-General.
Right from the word go, the effective operation of the Central Authority had been hampered by specifically designed clauses and reservations on its powers, contained in Proclamation No. Ag.8. For example, at no stage did there exist any clear separation of executive powers between that of the Central Authority and those of the Administrator-General. What was more, all the first tier powers were delegated and could be revoked by the Administrator-General at any stage in time by a mere stroke of the pen. This was exactly the reason why the Central Authority, the Ministers Council and its Chairman refused to continue with the puppet show.

Observers were left with the impression that the (first) interim dispensation amounted to little more than a "trial run" by the government to see to what extent it could take advantage of the 'ambitious politicians' who were in SWA/Namibia. Apparently this experiment was a failure as the DTA-dispensation only succeeded in furthering the polarisation of antagonism and scepticism towards the intentions of the South African regime.

5. Not surprisingly, as past experience has proved, the South African Government was not particularly discouraged by the failure of the first dispensation, as it simply proceeded with putting on the cards a second 'interim' dispensation. However, the second interim structure; consisting of five Advisory Committees under the supervision of the Administrator-General and a new National
Assembly, formerly known as the Committee on Constitutional Development, was bound to be even less popular and unlikely to be more successful than its DTA predecessor. General reservations centred on the motivation for the virtual 'loading' of the new National Assembly with (22) ethnic representatives. In addition, if the Administrator-General really planned to implement Resolution 435, then in accordance with this Resolution and the so-called Phase One of the Western Initiative in particular, the ethnic Representative Authorities should, in fact, rather have been scrapped.

6. Scepticism towards the true motives of the the South African Government and its Administrator-General further mounted in the light of the proposed State Council. Judge J.J.F. Hefer, appointed by Dr Van Niekerk as chairman of the proposed body, on July 24, stated that the SC would in effect continue with the work of the now defunct National Assembly. (62)

This resulted in further criticism. Despite claims made by members of the DTA, Mr K. Kaura and Mr D. Mudge, that although the Turnhalle was not a complete success it did bring about certain "changes" - which must not be confused with the achievements of Administrator-General M.T. Steyn. (63) The National Assembly and Ministers Council were disbanded precisely because of their unrepresentativeness, with the proposed SC no real improvement.
Political observers were further of the opinion that the proposed SC was nothing more than a further attempt at keeping SWAPO at bay and to prevent the implementation of an international settlement. The only "strength" of the proposed body was that it would have "carte blanche" in terms of scrapping Proclamation No.AG.8 and implementing Resolution 435, if it so desired. (64) This did not appear to be a sound suggestion, as the proposed body would not get international recognition and it might as well be replaced with the implementation of Resolution 435 right from the start.

7. Finally, but not less important, as some of the preliminary findings of the Thirion Commission of Inquiry into Government Irregularities pointed out, the vastly complicated system of eleven ethnic Representative Authorities absolutely lends itself to corruption and mis-expenditure of government funds. (65) (This commission was expected to be finished only by the end of 1983.) In addition to the devious activities of government members, it was beyond doubt that the maintenance of eleven separate ethnic governments amounted to a gigantic drain on the Territory's already strained economy, which could hardly be afforded without substantial financial borrowings from South Africa. This could hardly be described as a healthy state of affairs.
THE POLITICAL PARTIES, GROUPINGS AND ALLIANCES IN SWA/NAMIBIA AT THE TIME OF THE DECEMBER 1978 ELECTION.

A BRACKETED X INDICATE THOSE PARTIES THAT WERE MEMBERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC TURNHALLÉ ALLIANCE AND INITIALLY PLEDGED SUPPORT TO THE INTERIM DISPENSATION

### Basters
1. Rehoboth Bevryders Party. (Hans Diergaardt)
2. Rehoboth Democratic Party (Pieter Diergaardt)
3. Rehoboth Bastervereniging (Dr Ben Africa) (X)
4. Rehoboth Action Group (AKTUR)

### Bushmen
1. Bushmen Alliance (Geelbooi Kasche) (X)

### Coloureds
1. Liberal Party (Andrew Kloppers)
2. Kleurling Demokratiese Volksparty. (Joey Julius)
3. Labour Party (Barnie Barnes) (X)

### Caprivian
1. Caprivi Alliance (X)
2. Caprivi African National Union (CANU) (Mishake Muyongo)

(Continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Leader(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Damaras</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Damara Council</td>
<td>(Justus Garoëb)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. South West Africa People's Democratic Front - SWAPDUF</td>
<td>(Engelhardt Christie)</td>
<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Namibia Peoples Liberation Front - NPLF</td>
<td>(Kefas Conradie)</td>
<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Damara Action Group</td>
<td>(AKTUR)</td>
<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hereros</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. National Unity Democratic Organisation - NUDO</td>
<td>(Kauima Riruako)</td>
<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. NUDO Progressive Party</td>
<td>(Johannes Karaihue)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. NUDO Youth League</td>
<td>(Rudolf Kamburona)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mbandero Raad</td>
<td>(Headman Manjuku II)</td>
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<td>5. Herero Chiefs Council</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kavangos</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Kavango Alliance Group</td>
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<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kavango Action Group</td>
<td>(AKTUR)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Namas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. National Democratic Turnhalle Party - NDTP</td>
<td>(Daniël Luipert)</td>
<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Witboois</td>
<td>(Hendrik Witbooi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nama Organisation for South West Africa - NOSWA</td>
<td>(Frank Bason)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Voice of the People</td>
<td>(Kefas Conradie)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Nama Council</td>
<td>(SWAPO)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tswanas</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Tswana Alliance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tswana Party</td>
<td>(Gregor Tibenjane)</td>
<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Seoposengwe Party</td>
<td>(C.L. Kgosimang)</td>
<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
Ovambos

1. South West Africa People's Organisation - SWAPO (Sam Nujoma)
2. South West Africa People's Organisation-Democrats SWAPO-D (Andreas Shipanga)
4. Ovamboland Independent Party OIP
5. Democratic Co-Operative Development Party - DEMCOP

Whites

1. Herstigte Nasionale Party - HNP (Sarel Bekker)
2. National Party (Koos Pretorius)
3. Republican Party (Dirk Mudge) (X)
4. Federal Party (Brian O'Linn)
5. Interessegemeinschaft Deutsprachiger Südwester (H.J. von Hase) (X)

Alliances, Coalitions and Independent Parties

1. AKTUR - White NP election front
2. Democratic Turnhalle Alliance - DTA Front (XX)
3. Namibian Independence Party NIP (Albert Kohn)
4. South West African National Union - SWANU (Moses Katjuungwa)
5. Namibian Christian Democratic Party - NCDP (Hans Röhr)
6. Namibian National Front - NNF (Coalition)
7. Namibia national Convention NNC (Coalition)
8. National Democratic Party

It is important to take note of the tremendous flux in the formation of parties and alliances in SWA/Namibia. Some of the parties and coalitions noted in Appendix I may very well exist on paper only.
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SECTION FOUR

THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION
Since World War II, colonised and oppressed people throughout the world have been rising to recapture their freedom. Some of their struggles have succeeded, many have stopped halfway. But their efforts have provided a wealth of experience from which SWA/Namibians can benefit, as their country moves towards independence through resistance.\(^1\) Mozambique - June 1975, Angola - November 1975 and Zimbabwe - April 1980, are but a few of the more prominent and important examples directly and indirectly related to the last vestiges of colonialism. SWA/Namibian independence, pending since the late 1940's, is expected, by SWAPO and the International Community, before the second half of the 1980's. This would put an end to nearly twenty years of military struggle almost as ferocious as that of the Algerian people against French colonial occupation of Algeria.\(^2\)

SWA/Namibia, however, differs in two important aspects. Similar to the white French Algerians, white SWA/Namibian's perceive themselves as permanent settlers in the Territory, the majority having been born and bred in SWA/Namibia and not immigrants. Secondly, SWA/Namibian independence is unlikely to come about as result of a SWAPO military victory,\(^3\) or due to domestic problems of the colonial power, in this case
South Africa. Independence, if it is to come, will rather result from a process of protracted diplomatic negotiation between South Africa, the International Community, SWAPO and political parties within SWA/Namibia.

During the 1950s many South West Africans went to South Africa, where they worked predominantly as contract labourers in the mines. A large number of them went to Cape Town where they came into contact with the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and other parties opposed to white minority rule. (4) They came to recognise the need for an organisation which could represent the aspirations of the indigenous peoples.

Herman Toivo ja Toivo, Andreas Shipanga, Solomon Mifima and Emil Appolus, all born South West Africans, were the founder members of the Ovamboland People’s Organisation (OPO) in Cape Town on 15 April 1959. During 1957, Andreas Shipanga promoted the Ovambo People’s Congress, but it never became formally organised through fear of police repression. (5)

The OPO was the immediate forerunner of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) which came into being in April 1960. As the representative of the Ovambo-speaking ethnic group (6), the OPO was initially exclusively motivated towards protecting Ovambo interests, with its activities centrally channeled towards resistance to labour repressive legislation, influx control through the pass-law system, the migrant labour system, and finally to function as a mouthpiece for the Ovambo workers. Thus, the OPO was not representative of the national aspirations of all the peoples of South West Africa.
Between April 1959 and June 1960, the OPO did not attract international recognition, despite Mburumba Kerina's early attempts, since 1956, to interest the United Nations in the SWA situation. It was Sam Nujoma, the present SWAPO President, who left SWA during March 1960, joining the OPO after its formation, who was not only instrumental in changing the OPO into a true Nationalist movement but also played a major role in capturing international recognition for SWAPO and its cause. Nujoma and Kerina were responsible for the OPO's adoption of a new name and nationalist orientation in June 1960.

Sam Nujoma left the territory in March 1960 by slipping over the then Bechuanaland border, and passing through Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Kenya and Ghana enroute to Liberia, where he departed for New York, arriving on 12 June 1960. He was granted permission to address the United Nations. In this address Nujoma presented the "Namibian peoples" just cause for freedom and national independence from South Africa, thereby winning international recognition for SWAPO and its cause. Except for a brief one-day visit to SWA on 20 March 1966, which, incidentally he spent in jail, Sam Nujoma has remained in self-imposed exile since 1960. SWAPO was not officially declared illegal, but all public meetings have been banned since 1963.

Within six months of SWAPO's formation it had made a tremendous impact by means of peaceful mass demonstrations, in protest against the removal of black people from their residential...
area on the southern outskirts of Windhoek. The organisation further demanded the abolition of racial discrimination, the right of "Namibians" to express themselves freely without fear of reprisal and the end of South African Administration of the territory. From 1959 to mid-1966, the OPOs and thereafter SWAPO's declared strategies were based on the ideas of Martin Luther King and Mahatma Ghandi, non-violent passive resistance, believing that the South African government would change their views through a combination of internal and international pressure, and grant SWA independence.

Unfortunately, all these peaceful attempts were ineffectual. SWAPO's activities were also hampered by the old traditional leadership system in Ovambo. Frustrated by the futility of this state of affairs, Sam Nujoma and other prominent SWAPO members, as well as a mass of rank-and-file supporters opted for self-imposed exile in preparation for a military struggle. Approximately four to nine hundred Africans went into exile during 1961-62. In a recent interview with the current SWAPO President, it emerged that the actual preparation for the military struggle began as early as 1961, and underground organisation had been started even before the establishment of the OPO in April 1959.

In 1963 the first signs of SWAPO's militant tendencies became apparent when the first group of Ovambo youths left for 'official' military training. After they had received training this group of six, armed with Russian weapons, infiltrated the northern border of SWA between September and
December 1965. They established a training base at Ongulumbashe in the north-western region of Ovambo, where forty to sixty men were recruited for training, before, on 26 August 1966, a small police force attacked and obliterated the Ongulumbashe base.\(^{(16)}\)

Initially training took place in Ghana (under Nkruma), Egypt (under Nasser) and also in Algeria after its independence in July 1962. Subsequently, training facilities have been provided by other African countries such as Angola, Zambia and Liberia. Soviet Bloc countries such as East Germany, the Chinese Republic, North Korea and the Soviet Union itself have provided and are proving extensive military assistance in addition to training facilities, instructors, military advisers and technicians.\(^{(17)}\)

In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia tried fruitlessly to move the United Nations towards direct intervention in the SWA dispute, in order to bring about an independent state.\(^{(18)}\) SWAPO submitted a further request for a UN-supervised referendum. As a result the United Nations General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandatory rights over SWA in 1966.\(^{(19)}\) However, it failed to take effective steps towards the implementation of this decision, thereby illustrating the United Nation's inability to pressurise South Africa towards a settlement of the SWA issue. This in turn acted as an immediate spur to SWAPO's engagement in an armed struggle.\(^{(20)}\)
"We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our own liberation, the supreme test for our cause." (21)

This was the declaration of war against South Africa, when SWAPO announced its intended military struggle from its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, on 18 July 1966. In 1968 SWA became internationally known as Namibia (henceforward SWA/Namibia) (22), although there remains a good deal of confusion about which name to use, as the Territory's status is still uncertain.

Since the 1970s the guerrilla war has escalated rapidly. (This has been dealt with in the section covering the military realities of the contemporary SWA/Namibia situation.) At this stage SWAPO's President envisages SWAPO becoming a single national army; and being a single organisation with no separate 'internal' and 'external' wings.

He stated that the only difference between the internal legal SWAPO-Democrats and the external militant SWAPO is that the latter has a specific task to perform, to militarily liberate SWA/Namibia, whilst the internal SWAPO-D is responsible for internal organisation and staging a legal front. (23)

The validity of this statement, that SWAPO and SWAPO-D constitutes one organisation, is surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty, as SWAPO-D's leader, Andreas Shipanga, explicitly rejects any formal or informal relations with SWAPO. (24) The Voice of SWAPO-D, mouthpiece of the SWAPO-

*Footnote: SWAPO is itself a legal party as it has never been banned - only its public meetings has been prohibited since 1968.*
Democrats, even claimed that SWAPO-D is not an entirely new party, but is composed of loyal SWAPO members, representing that section of the SWAPO membership that has remained true to the original principles and policies of SWAPO. More attention will be paid to the issue of SWAPO unity in the section dealing with the SWAPO-Democrats, as it is an important factor not to be neglected. For the moment it is sufficient to state that SWAPO and SWAPO-D are two distinctly separate organisations. The former, while not officially banned, does not enjoy local legal status as does the SWAPO-Democrats.

For the purpose of examining SWAPO's historical development and policies, it is necessary to look at the various components or groups comprising SWAPO as a whole and the role played by them in the liberation struggle. For convenience and clarity SWAPO-D will be excluded from the discussion.

SWAPO comprises four components or sub-groups:

1. the external leadership structure under direct command of Sam Nujoma,
2. SWAPO's Women's Council set-up for the political and social liberation of SWA/Namibian women,
3. SWAPO's Youth League, active since the early 1960s,
4. and PLAN, the military wing of SWAPO.

PLAN, for the People's Liberation Army for Namibia, will be used instead of the lesser known PLENC (People's Liberation Army
Two labour organisations, the National Union of Namibian Workers and the Namibia Trade Union Council affiliated to SWAPO and SWAPO-D respectively are both illegal - not being of the ten legally registered unions within the territory, five of which are Railway Unions. The external leadership under Nujoma will be dealt with indirectly in all the following sections as this component really is of overriding importance. Turning to the role of the women, it must be noted immediately that the non-white SWA/Namibian women are participating in the struggle as vigorously as the men, though, not in a military capacity. The SWAPO Women's Council has succeeded in drawing thousands of SWA/Namibian women, all non-white, into the liberation struggle. In the early 1970s women began to take a very active part in organising meetings and rallies, especially seeing to it that the SWAPO Youth League held meetings and demonstrations against the South African presence. When the United Secretary General Dr Kurt Waldheim and his personal representative, Dr Alfred Escher, visited SWA/Namibia on different occasions during 1972-73, African women came out in impressive numbers to urge the United Nation to take immediate and serious measures to assist the SWA/Namibian people to attain national independence. Since the mid-1970s it further became clear that large numbers of African women are undergoing military training and are now fighting side by side with the men.

Little is known about the SWAPO Youth League, except for its
more militant tendencies. The League emerged as a result of a decision made at the first SWAPO Congress held in Windhoek during 1962. It is a self-governing federal body made up of both members and non-members of SWAPO itself, and it is primarily geared towards the protection and advancement of the interests of the SWA/Namibia youth, especially in the educational sphere. The SWAPO Youth League called upon all young South West Africans to join in the process of creating a revolutionary new social order, totally free from South African occupation, with total social, political and economic equality. The youth were asked to contribute through the organisation of rallies, demonstrations and by assuming their rightful position in the economic system, thereby encouraging the youth to academic achievements. The SWAPO Youth League have been described as being militant. Doubless many of them joined SWAPO’s fighting ranks before or after the completion of their academic careers. Some of them have been lured away under false promises of a better education in Angola, subsequently exposed as being military training.

Turning to the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) the military wing of SWAPO, one finds that, unlike the Youth League, PLAN is not a separate organisation, but constitutes the vanguard of the liberation struggle. The Central Committee and the National Executive control the entire armed force. The Commander-in-Chief of PLAN is the President of the Party and he is also responsible for political leadership. Under the President is the Deputy Chief Commander who is commander of the army and responsible for all PLAN operations.
The Secretary of Defence and Transport is in charge of all logistical operations. Military operations are organised by the commanders of different regions, who in turn are responsible for making recommendations to the Secretary of Defence and Transport. (38)

PLAN's militants come from all sectors of the population - contract labourers, women and the youth, the latter being the most militant in support of the movement. (39) Military training involves both military and political education, taking place mainly through oral communication. The discussion of other similar liberation struggles form an important part of this training, citing examples such as Algeria, Kenya, Guinea, the Congo, and more recent examples, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. (40)

Briefly, SWAPO/PLAN's military policies since their inception in the early 1960s are as follows:

1. At a SWAPO National Congress at Windhoek in 1961 it was resolved to prepare for the eventual armed struggle. (41) This initial preparation lasted till 1963 when the first cadres left for military training.

2. The first fully trained guerrillas infiltrated northern Ovambo between September and December 1965 to set up rural bases for training local people. But they suffered defeat in the first armed contact with the Security Forces (a police unit), on 26 August 1966. (42)

3. On 18 July, 1966, an official declaration of war against
South Africa was issued from the SWAPO Headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. Further establishment of its guerrilla infrastructure followed between 1966 and 1969, which had to be done despite harsh counter-insurgency measures enacted by the South African Security Forces. The departure of the first large group, some 4000 peasants, to Botswana and Zambia, was reported in October, 1968, with others following at fairly regular intervals.\(^{(43)}\)

4. At the end of 1969, unable to hold its annual national Congress inside SWA/Namibia, SWAPO called together delegates from all the organs of SWAPO, including the cells and branches inside the Territory. Meeting between 26 December 1969 and 2 January 1970, the Tanga Congress reviewed the progress of the struggle, made changes in policies and organisation, replaced and/or re-elected the leadership and strengthened its dedication to the liberation of Namibia.\(^{(44)}\)

5. In the early 1970s the party reformed and broadened its organisation. The Youth League was to play a prominent role in the struggles which erupted during and after the contract workers strike in 1971-72. The Elder's Council (to mobilise elderly people and to show them that they are also needed) provided for liaison with traditional leaders. The Women's Council sought to assist the struggle of women against their dual oppression as women and as blacks. SWAPO's military wing, originally called the Namibia Liberation Army, was re-organised and in 1973, renamed the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, (PLAN)\(^{(45)}\)
6. The general strike of 1971-72 proved successful. By the end of 1971 it brought most of the major industries of the country to a halt. Some 22,500 contract workers from towns, mines and work-camps, out of the recorded 43,400 contract labourers had taken part, of whom about 18,000 returned to Ovamboland. Thus, over half the recorded 43,400 contract workers and over 70% of those employed outside joined the strike against the contract system. This was a spectacular culmination of a period of mobilisation which touched every corner of the SWA/Namibian society. Not only was this conducive to military recruitment, it was also a major landmark in black solidarity throughout Southern Africa. J.H.P. Serfontein recorded the departure of nearly 6,000 Ovambo across to Angola on their way to Zambia, in 1974.

7. The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in 1974-75 added a new dimension to the SWA/Namibia struggle. It resulted in greater mobility for guerrillas between SWA/Namibia and Southern Angola, a relatively safe retreat in case of pursuit, as well as a new availability of base facilities for PLAN guerrillas close to the Caprivi Strip.

8. Due to severe South African military retaliation PLAN was forced to adopt a lower profile between 1976 and 1978. Two major SADF military incursions into southern Angola, code-named "Operation Savana" and "Operation Cassanga", took place in 1976 and 1978 respectively. The first cases of urban sabotage occurred late in December, 1978,
9. An escalation in the number of guerrillas infiltrating the territory, early in 1979, resulted in South African military retaliation and the non-implementation of both the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, as accepted by South Africa on 25 April 1978, and the Waldheim Report that scheduled 26 February 1979 as the proposed election date. This amounted to a major breakdown in the negotiation process, and the continuation of the armed struggle.

10. Beginning in January 1980, PLAN launched a new strategy, infiltrating small but specialised insurgent groups with definite targets in northern SWA/Namibia. Distributing SWAPO pamphlets and propaganda, recruiting, gathering information and committing more serious acts of sabotage, attacking farms, military and police bases as well as laying countless landmines. By May 1980, 30 landmine incidents, 28 cases of sabotage, 38 civilian casualties and 9 cases of abduction were reported. However, in June, 1980, PLAN paid dearly for their initial successes. "Operation Smokeshell", from 10 to 30 June, dealt PLAN a devastating blow. PLAN's casualties escalated by 45%, from 915 in 1979 to 1448 in 1980.

11. In 1981, PLAN undertook to drastically intensify the war, while, on the other hand, General Lloyd of the Security
Forces announced, in similar tones, that the military defeat of SWAPO/PLAN was the top priority for 1981. His message was clear, serving both as a justification and forewarning of the Security Forces' intended cross-border raids:

"... in future it would be military policy to look for the ant-hill inside Angola instead of pursuing individual insurgents." (53)

This new approach, regular "limited" incursions into southern Angola, proved more effective than massive but infrequent raids. PLAN's casualties increased slightly from the 1447 in 1980 to 1493 in 1981, though, in 1981 a great deal of military equipment and food-stuffs were captured by the Security Forces.

12. The year 1982 was a decisive year for PLAN. After successive defeats and Security Forces incursions PLAN had to prove itself still capable of undertaking "major" military operations within the borders of SWA/Namibia. As usual, intensified infiltration took place during the first part of the year, from March to May, under cover of the semi-tropical vegetation from the rainy season. PLAN continued infiltrating small specialised groups but with the addition of civilian terror as a new strategy, in order to demoralise white civilians, especially farmers, and to diminish their trust and faith in the Security Forces. Consequently, between January and June 1982, 499 terrorist incidents, 79 civilian casualties, 66 civilian injuries, 63 abductions and 71 Security Force casualties, were reported. (54)
PLAN did indeed attain its objective for 1982, that is, to end all speculation claiming that it had been militarily decimated. To achieve this, in a special effort under the vanguard of a group of "ordinary" guerrillas, a group numbering approximately one hundred well-equipped "elite" guerrillas infiltrated the Mangeti Block during April, 1982. From the Mangeti Block a three-pronged attack was launched into the heartland of northern SWA/Namibia. Despite the nearly suicidal nature of the operation, it was quite successful. An area covering several hundred kilometres, stretching from the east near Tsumkwe to Kamanjab in the west, and penetrating nearly 300 kilometres into the Territory, was infiltrated. The operation reflected great courage, and PLAN continued functioning despite its heavy casualties of the previous seven years.

Since 1981-82, Angola has paid attention to the establishment of a more effective defence system in southern Angola, to repel and act as deterrent against future SADF incursions. This was achieved primarily by deploying Surface-to-Air-Missile batteries in the southern provinces, and by establishing an early-warning radar system to alert both MPLA/FAPLA and SWAPO/PLAN armed forces. It is known that both fronts use the same information, logistical and communication networks — which amounts to a direct link between SWAPO/PLAN, the MPLA/FAPLA and the Soviet-Cuban elements present in Angola.

In an interview on the Voice of Namibia; broadcast from Luanda early in February, 1982, SWAPO's defence secretary, Mr P. Nanjemba stated that the organisation's Central Committee has
assured the people that only the continuation of the armed struggle will bring the independence to Namibia.\(^{(57)}\)

SWAPO's permanent United Nations representative, Mr Theo-Ben Gurirab, on 19 March, added that all SWAPO's attempts to approach responsible people such as General Lloyd, proved futile, thereby leaving SWAPO only one alternative, to mobilise the people in a resistance campaign.\(^{(58)}\)

SWAPO also embarks upon regular propaganda campaigns aimed at impressing the international community and its financial backers with its alleged military victories. For example, SWAPO officials frequently claim that the military activities of PLAN cover the entire country and are not confined to the border operational area.\(^{(59)}\) Reports are made of large numbers of "South African" soldiers killed, numerous armoured personnel carriers destroyed, and large amounts of war material captured.\(^{(60)}\) Such claims would appear to be rather over ambitious since none of these type of incidents have been reported by the SADF. Only three urban incidents have been reported up to June 1983, while the southern and central parts of SWA/Namibia have been completely free of insurgent activity. Judging from the SADF's continued presence in southern Angola it would appear to be unlikely that SWAPO/PLAN's activities could amount to more than sporadic incursions.\(^{(61)}\)

Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the organisation is successful in launching regular annual operations into SWA/
Namibia. In this respect 1983 was no exception. In February 1983, SWAPO launched what the SADF have described as its largest offensive in sixteen years of fighting. \(^{(62)}\) By mid-March 1983, the SWA Territory Force announced that 203 of approximately 600 insurgents were eliminated, only ten of which were able to penetrate south of the war zone. \(^{(63)}\) Of importance however, is the organisation's evident ability to sustain its insurgent activities despite extensive counter-insurgency militarisation of northern SWA/Namibia.
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6. Footnote: Ethnic groups are defined and discussed in Section 4.3


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THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION

IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS:

SOUTH AFRICA'S JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA WAR?

No discussion of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) would be complete without reference to the organisation's ideological priorities. This should lead to greater understanding of the underlying reasons for the militarisation of not only the SWA/Namibia society, but that of South Africa too. This linkage originates from South Africa's earlier legal mandate over SWA, revoked in 1966.

General white public opinion on SWAPO's ideological orientation is largely shaped through government-censored mass communication media. The press, radio and television networks do not have total freedom of expression in either SWA/Namibia or South Africa. Consequently, public opinion in both these countries has to rely largely on information, evidence and arguments advanced by the South African Government. The un-informed are therefore in no position to formulate their own impressions on whatever issue or question is at hand - in this case, whether or not SWAPO is 'communist' by origin and aspirations. One question often asked, is why do South African soldiers have to die on the SWA/Namibian border? Other pertinent questions relate to the tremendous
financial, military, political and diplomatic costs tied to South Africa's involvement in the Territory. Financially the SWA/Namibian war costs South Africa well over one billion rand per annum.\(^{(3)}\)

South Africa defends its role in SWA/Namibia with the following arguments:

1. Since World War I South Africa has been responsible for the security of SWA in order to allow the occupants of the Territory to freely participate and expand their political convictions without fear of external interference.

2. To see to it that the territory attains independence along constitutional lines and not as a result of terror and fear brought about by a SWAPO-Marxist military victory.\(^{(4)}\)

3. SWA/Namibia is also directly tied to South Africa's own security. It is only part of the ultimate African National assault on South Africa. This security link, therefore, serves to lend more credibility to the government's survival strategy.\(^{(5)}\)

4. South Africa has strong emotional and cultural relations with the local white population group; after all, South Africa has a direct historical responsibility for the whites settled there.
5. At present South Africa and SWA/Namibia are involved in a revolutionary war with a strong ideological undercurrent. From the beginning of the war, in 1962, when SWAPO cadres began military training, and the first armed contact in 1966, the revolutionaries relied entirely on communist military aid to keep their effort going. (6)

6. South Africa and SWA/Namibia, for that matter, would be tremendous economic prizes for the Soviet Bloc.

7. A SWAPO governed SWA/Namibia, would undoubtedly facilitate an intensified assault on South Africa, (both externally and internally through urban terror tactics of the African National Congress (ANC).) The acting Commissioner of Police, Lieutenant-General J. Coetzee stated in August 1982 that the acts of terrorism and sabotage committed in South Africa had risen from 12 incidents in 1979, to 19 in 1980 and 55 in 1981. (7)

8. Should South Africa militarily withdraw before independence there would be no guarantee against direct Soviet-Cuban assistance to SWAPO. In the case of independence for SWA/Namibia through SWAPO's efforts, combined with Soviet-Cuban support, it is to be expected that a new military front would open up on the Orange River. Under such circumstances the ANC and PAC would be more than welcome to join the struggle. (8)

9. Finally, the South African presence is aimed at ensuring
a peaceful transition towards independence, and a continuation along the path of principled diplomatic negotiation with the Western powers as it has been doing since April 1977.\(^{(9)}\)

An examination of this information makes it impossible to reach definite conclusions about SWAPO's ideological position. However, to proceed, it is necessary to briefly identify two possible interpretations of the so-called "communist threat" posed by SWAPO.

This is simply to draw a distinction between what can be described as a 'direct' or 'real' threat, and an 'indirect' or 'implied' threat of communism tied to the organisation. Ultimately both interpretations identify the same issue. As a 'direct' threat SWAPO would be established as the result of Soviet planning and strategy and would be a 'pure' Marxist organisation. As an 'indirect' threat, it is believed, by the South African Government, that SWAPO, as a national liberation organisation in its course of struggle, came to completely identify itself with the socialist policies of the communist countries. This identification would then pose a real threat if the organisation attained power in an independent Namibia.

The South African Government's view of SWAPO is explicit and without reservation. A leak of secret United States policy memoranda shows a very frank Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Roelof Botha, in discussion with United States State Depart-
ment representatives during their visit to South Africa in April, 1981. Mr Botha stated:

"We (the South African Government) are convinced that Moscow controls the present government in Angola, as well as that SWAPO is a Marxist movement" (10)

Mr Botha went on to say that SWAPO's President Sam Nujoma, will nationalise the economy of SWA/Namibia, thereby causing internal upheaval and civil war between black and white, which unavoidably, will compel South Africa to intervene:

"We (South Africa) will have to invade Namibia and other countries as well. It would be better to have a low level conflict there (SWA/Namibia) indefinitely rather than to have a civil war escalate to a general conflagration." (11)

Mr Botha concluded with a reiteration of what South Africa has maintained all along, that SWA/Namibia is only part of the identified total communist onslaught on South Africa:

"... first Namibia, then Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, followed by the final attack on South Africa". (12)

South African Prime Minister, Mr P.W. Botha proclaims the right of self-determination for all the peoples of SWA/Namibia, without interference or intimidation from whatever quarter. He calls for a democratic process that envisages the continuation of democracy after elections, and not a one-man-one-vote election taking place only once. Botha conceived SWAPO as the greatest danger to the continuation of a democratic political process, as
"... it (SWAPO) will not hesitate to stoop to excess' in the programme of eliminating its democratic opponents which it is not prepared to face in a free and fair election contest". (13)

As for SWAPO's ideological commitment:

"... its history of ruthless action against dissidents within its own ranks and its dependence on the Soviet Block makes it very clear that it is impossible for SWAPO to give these (constitutional) guarantees". (14)

According to P.W. Botha, the struggle surrounding SWA/Namibia is increasingly turning into a struggle between the advocates of free expression and self-determination and the advocates of power seizure by means of force and intimidation. In his view South Africa is an unselfish benefactor of the peoples of SWA/Namibia and their great protector against violent domination by SWAPO. P.W. Botha by implication sees this organisation as Marxist along the lines of the regimes that have taken over power in Angola and Mozambique. From a South African point of view, SWAPO constitutes a direct threat to the security of both SWA/Namibia and South Africa. The Ottaway's, in their book Afrocommunism pointed out that the:

"... leaders of the militant SWAPO and the new leader of independent Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, were scarcely hiding their commitment to building new socialist societies on the basis of Marxist-Lenins principles". (15)

It is then in the interest of the South African Government to make these communist accusations against SWAPO. The Government has a desire to have conclusive evidence in support of
SWAPO's committed communist nature and aspirations. Unfortunately, again no clear distinction is drawn between communism and socialism. If the organisation could be proved to be a dedicated communist movement leeway would be provided for more ruthless military action against SWAPO's military wing. Even more important, definite confirmation would provide a basis for questioning SWAPO's credibility and trustworthiness. To prove this the South African Government has gone to extremes, even producing captured Soviet military personnel as evidence of direct Soviet aid to SWAPO. (16)

Nevertheless, P.W. Botha confirmed that he and his government realise that SWAPO will have to be accommodated in a genuine settlement solution. (17) And that:

"... any party that takes part in a constitutional, peaceful way, will be allowed to the polling booth with its supporters and have the right and the possibility of winning the election". (18)

Statements such as these have little impact on political observers, as it is a well-known fact that SWAPO believes:

"... the only solution to bring about genuine and democratic independence in Namibia is to resort to armed struggle"; (19)

that SWAPO's Central Committee:

"... resolved to continue with, and intensify the armed liberation struggle". (20)

On 28 February 1978, Sam Nujoma said that SWAPO was not interested in 'majority rule', but rather in 'fighting to seize power by means of Revolution'. (21)
In contrast to the picture presented by the South African authorities, church personnel in South Africa and SWA/Namibia, the majority of the local political parties and analysts do not categorise SWAPO as a Marxist (communist) movement. Instead, they view the organisation as a national liberation movement born out of the needs and aspirations of the SWA/Namibia people. Well-known academic and SWA/Namibia specialist, Dr G. Tötemeyer, feels that:

"... it (communism) does not tally with the deep seated Christian beliefs of the overwhelming majority of SWAPO members. The churches, especially the black Lutheran, Anglican and Roman Catholic churches which have the majority support of the black population, indeed have something in common with SWAPO, in that both institutions feel threatened, persecuted and oppressed". (22)

It need only be concluded that SWAPO is likely to jeopardise its relations with the church should it seriously involve itself in atheistic communism.

For the international community SWAPO continued to be viewed as a national liberation organisation in a natural extension of Africa's decolonisation process. However, it seems as if the international community is not entirely united in this viewpoint. Certainly, the UN, OAU, the WCG and other humanitarian bodies do form a strong anti-South African front, but without the full co-operation of the Western Governments it has no effective means for pressurising South Africa into a more moderate approach both in SWA/Namibia and domestically.
This is so despite the fact that the Western section of the international community thinks that the South African Government's stubbornness contributes to driving SWAPO further into the "communist" camp. A United Nations' report in late 1980 disclosed that 43 countries still maintained links with South Africa in spite of United Nations resolutions calling for severance of all relations with South Africa. They included Argentina, Paraguay, Portugal, France, Britain and the United States.

The Reagan Administration's delegate for African Affairs, Dr Chester Crocker, has stated that the US Government draws an important distinction between a nationalist movement applying Marxist-Leninist terminology and the Soviet Union and its real allies. Dr Crocker acknowledged that there is no doubt about the extensive military support SWAPO receives from the Soviet Union, although, adding that it would be an oversimplification to conclude that this in itself makes SWAPO communist. SWAPO, he said, is rather considered as a true nationalist movement with considerable support amongst black SWA/Namibians.

United States officials are of the opinion that the Soviet interest in Southern Africa is subsiding. In 1983, United States officials went as far as to invite members of South Africa's State Security Council to Washington to provide them with evidence showing that Southern Africa is not a top Soviet priority, and they they should be more lenient over SWA/Namibia.
At the same time it is clear that the Regan Administration in its turn adopted a much less outspoken anti-South African stand. Publicly United States Government policies aimed at being non-committal, based on a so-called "constructive engagement" approach. This approach is followed not only towards South Africa but wherever there are vested interests. "Constructive engagement" meant that the Reagan Administration, unlike its Carter predecessor, chose to negotiate 'with a friendly nation like South Africa'.

Dr Crocker described this Regan policy as 'constructive engagement' implying that Carter's policy had been 'destructive disengagement' which obviously had not been the case.

This new approach from the Regan Administration was not welcomed by the African states. The Organisation for African Unity, for example, accused the United States of "entering into an unholy alliance with South Africa". Yet Dr Crocker made it clear that the United States was not prepared to be forced into choosing between its areas of interest in order to mete out preferential treatment. He stated clearly that a binary goal is sought in the SWA/Namibia negotiations; to attain territorial independence for Namibia as well as to work towards a reconciliation in Angola.

A United States Senate Sub-Committee Hearing on Security and Terrorism organised by the far-right wing in Washington, between March and April 1982, ended abortively. The aim of this Sub-Committee, Chaired by Senator Denton, was to put
forward evidence proving beyond doubt the committed communist inclinations of both SWAPO and the ANC's leadership. This attempt was only successful in reiterating old rhetoric and did not prove anything conclusively. In America little attention was paid to the Sub-Committee as Senator Denton carried little weight in either the Senate or the Reagan Administration. But once again criticism was voiced as to the United States' position. In May 1982, SWAPO's Western European Information Officer, Mr P. Manning accused the United States Government and members of the Western Contact Group (WCG) of "double-dealing" with South Africa, to the detriment of SWAPO's position. It was a coolly delivered reminder that the current ongoing negotiation process on SWA/Namibian independence could collapse at any moment.

The President of SWAPO, Mr Sam Nujoma, stated explicitly that SWAPO was founded inside Namibia, before there was contact with anybody from the outside with the exception of the Reverent Michael Scott. In a newspaper interview in Paris, Mr Nujoma stated:

"... we started organising underground before SWAPO was formed, even before the Ovambo People's Organisation was established, and I campaigned throughout the country. The socialist countries, generally referred to as communist countries, had offered help and we have gratefully accepted their assistance to fight the enemy ..., but, if the West had offered us military assistance we would have taken it too." (35)

On another occasion Mr Nujoma, as guest of the Soviet Union Communist Party, condemned South Africa's reluctance to
engage in peaceful negotiation, thereby forcing SWAPO to con-
tinue the military struggle and its quest for allies and
support. He also made use of the occasion to express SWAPO's
gratitude for Russia's constant support and encouragement (36).
Co-founder member of SWAPO and current leader of the SWAPO-
Democrats, Mr A. Shipanga, the only person with inside know-
ledge to testify before the earlier mentioned United States
Senate Sub-Committee Hearing, told United States officials that:

"... at SWAPO's initiative I went to Moscow, Peking, East Berlin and to almost all the
capitals of Eastern Europe in search of support for our struggle against South
African rule" (37)

and:

"... in Moscow no attempt was made to make communists of us, and we do not regard
ourselves as communists." (38)

The Ottaway's made a number of interesting points in terms of
Soviet influence on SWAPO and other African nationalist organi-
sations. They stated that:

"... the two contemporary examples where direct and prolonged Soviet, East German, and Cuban
contacts may have played an important role in infusing Marxism-Leninism into the ideologies
of nationalist movements are ZAPU and SWAPO. As these two groups sent more and more
guerrillas and cadres to Eastern Europe, Cuba, and camps in Angola staffed by Cuban
instructors they became noticeably more Marxist in their thinking and pronounce-
ments ..." (39)

While the organisation's military assistance is exclusively
Eastern Bloc in origin, it has many financial and non-military
suppliers in the West. This appear to support what has
emerged so far that SWAPO accepts all forms of support, irrespective of the donors' ideological position, and that it so happens to be Eastern Bloc countries or Communist countries that believe in active military support for revolutionary and liberation struggles. The result of the West's refusal to supply military hardware to SWAPO was that the organisation was left with no alternative but to seek this aid from the aforementioned countries. SWAPO does, however, have many supporters in the West who believe the organisation's cause to be just and well-founded.

Between 1977 and 1981, the United Nations and its specialist agencies contributed more than 40 million dollars to SWAPO's war effort — which is not much considering South Africa's one million rand per day expenditure on the SWA/Namibia war. The World Council of Churches, which has donated four million dollars to SWAPO over the last decade, made a new grant of 68,000 dollars to the organisation in 1981. Despite the large sums of financial aid donated to SWAPO it is clear that these could by no means cover expenses in military aid received from the Soviet Union, which, as the Ottaway's pointed out, is the major arms supplier of SWAPO.

1. The United Nations development programme for 1977-81 allocated 7,7 million dollars to SWAPO, while an additional 7,7 million dollars was allocated for the period 1982-1986.

2. SWAPO receives large quantities of food from the West,
especially from France and Holland. The World Food Organisation donated 90,000 dollars to the organisation in 1980, while the World Health Organisation for the period 1974-1981 donated 256,000 dollars to the organisation. (43)

3. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also features prominently. Between 1979 and 1981 an amount of ten million dollars had been allocated to the so-called refugee camps of Namibia, situated in Southern African countries. (44)

4. Since 1979 the United Nations provided SWAPO with a free international communications network, access to the United Nations information centre and use of its worldwide radio service, having programmes in English, French, Spanish and German. Moreover, SWAPO is the only organisation enjoying these privileges. (45)


SWAPO is not as ideologically united and specific as it sometimes would like to appear. It embraces various ideological strands which makes it difficult to associate it with one
ideological category. For instance, it is clearly nationalist as can be seen from its claims to wide popular support. It also has an ardent desire to govern as a 'people's government' over a unified Namibian nation within a single sovereign, national territory, the Republic of Namibia. Democracy is embraced as the government will take the form of a 'people's government' - yet, whether it would be a competitive or one-party social democracy is not made clear. It merely sees as its future task:

"... the liberation and winning of independence for the people of Namibia, by all possible means, and the establishment of a democratic people's government". (48)

Nevertheless, SWAPO has never made secret the fact that "initial socialist policies" immediately or soon after independence would be inevitable to alleviate the general poor living standards of the masses. (49) In accordance with these envisaged socialist policies:

"... the government of a truly liberated Namibia will ensure that all the major means of production and exchange are owned by the people, as well as

"... comprehensive agrarian reform aimed at giving land to the tillers". (50)

Given the two possibilities, SWAPO's claim to be a true national liberation movement with vast popular support, enjoying military, financial and moral aid from the East and
West, opposed by South Africa's counter claims, one arrives at what rightly can be described as a deadlock situation. It is also not plausible to ignore realities of Soviet military support to past and present liberation or revolutionary struggles. As F. Kozongnuizi, member of the internal Democratic Turnhalle Alliance summarised so aptly:

"... the most deadly danger lies not in that the leaders of Southern Africa are communist - far from it, not even SWAPO leaders - but in their half-baked adherence to communism they let their countries become the experimental stations of Soviet expertise in their search for ways to occupy Africa as a colonial area." (51)

At the twenty-third Communist Party Congress L.I. Brezhnev's Report noted three interwoven policy priorities, the unification of socialist countries; continued support to people's liberation struggles; and to maintain harmonious economic, scientific, technological and cultural relations with the West. (52)

In a book published by SWAPO, Namibia: SWAPO Fights for Freedom, a number of "Present and Future Tasks" are outlined which show a remarkable similarity to true socialism, but a short step from communism:

1. "To unite all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the peasantry and progressive intellectuals, into a vanguard party capable of safeguarding national independence and of building a classless, non-exploitative society based on the ideals and principles of scientific socialism." (53)

2. Similar to Soviet foreign policy, SWAPO:
"... holds high the banner of international anti-imperialist solidarity. In pursuit of this the movement has resolved – to work in solidarity with the other national liberation movements and other anti-imperialist, progressive peace-loving forces throughout the world with a view to ridding Namibia, the African continent and mankind of colonialist and imperialist domination".

Especially

"... to work in co-operation with all progressive governments, organisations and popular forces for the total emancipation of the African continent".

That is, South Africa included, with a specific stipulation, reading:

"... to heighten the campaign to isolate South Africa from every possible source of support, comfort or contact with the rest of the world, because of its illegal occupation of Namibia and its institutionalised racial oppression at home". (54)

3. Finally, to:

"... strengthen our (SWAPO's) anti-imperialist international solidarity with the socialist countries, liberation support organisations, working class movements of the capitalist countries, and friendly governments and ordinary people". (55)

The United Nations Institute for Namibia prepared a document entitled Toward a New Legal System for Independent Namibia drawn up from a seminar on Namibia's future legal system which was held in Lusaka in July 1980 and was attended by several top jurists. The document suggested that SWAPO might adopt one of two avenues in dealing with existing legislation; scrapping all legislation as Russia did after the October
revolution in 1917, or apply a 'repugnance test' to existing legislation, eliminating laws repugnant to the people and retaining desirable legislation. The document says that in the event of SWA/Namibia achieving independence through the armed struggle, it is unlikely that the movement will attempt to salvage unsatisfactory laws inherited from the previous regime. Alternatively, if SWA/Namibia achieves a negotiated independence, there may be pressures to avoid a legal vacuum. The document notes that:

"... the Russian experience is relevant to Namibia because it illustrates that a new nation can, if so willed, start with a clean slate without the old laws and references to its history and other considerations, apart from its international obligations in the age of modern diplomacy." (56)

In itself this would seem unlikely as SWAPO, similar to Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe, would inherit all the punitive laws and the tradition of an authoritarian bureaucracy as part of an independent political culture.

In conclusion, two issues can be stated with certainty. SWAPO's ideological motivation, in fact, is unclear, bordering on claims to be a nationalist liberation movement perceived by the people as "their defender and liberator" (57), with its aim, "to liberate Namibia as a whole with the support of the mass of Namibian people." (58) This much is undisputed. It is in terms of the political leadership of SWAPO, which is in overall control of both military and political activities, where doubts arise. Although Sam Nujoma made it clear that SWAPO is bent upon building a classless non-exploitative Namibian
society based on the principles of scientific socialism, a point made by the Ottaway's seem to bear relevance:

"... while it is accurate to speak of the persistence of nationalism in the Marxist-Leninist states, this is only one side of them. The other is the ideological conformity and policies stemming therefrom - the building of vanguard parties, the attempts at collectivising agriculture, the nationalisation of most of the economy and the close alignment with the Soviet Union on geo-political issues - all phenomena which simply cannot be explained in terms of nationalism". (59)

On the other hand, the South African position is less unclear. There is no doubt about its reluctance to let go of the mineral-rich Territory for so long under its control. United Nations negotiators are of the opinion that South African would agree to an independent Namibia only if responsibility was assumed by white politicians there. (60)
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3. Frontline, May 1983 Vol.3 No.7 (Braamfontein, 1983), p.32

4. Point adopted from a speech made by P.W. Botha at the Cape Congress of the National Party, 24 September 1979


7. The Cape Times, (Cape Town), 19 August 1982


9. Statements by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Mr R. Botha and General M. Malan respectively, published in Die Suidwester, (Windhoek), 30 March 1981

10. The Argus, (Cape Town), 5 June 1981


12. Ibid.

13. The Cape Times, (Cape Town), 9 June 1982

14. Ibid.


18. Point adopted from a speech made by P.W. Botha, 19 October 1978


20. Central Committee of SWAPO, Declaration, Lubango, 24 September 1977


33. *The Windhoek Advertiser*, (Windhoek), 24 April 1982

34. *The Windhoek Advertiser*, (Windhoek), 21 May 1982


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37. *The Cape Times*, (Cape Town), 1 April 1982

38. *Windhoek Observer*, (Windhoek), 8 April 1982

39. Ottaway, D and Ottaway, M. *Afrocommunism*. p.35


41. Ottaway, D and Ottaway, M. *Afrocommunism*. p.33

42. Points adopted from *Die Republikein*, (Windhoek), 5 July 1982

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. See the discussion on Democracy in Section 1.2.


49. *Die Suidwester*, (Windhoek), 10 November 1981

51. Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek), 24 April 1982


54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 10 August 1982


59. Ottaway, D and Ottaway, M. Afrocommunism. p. 194

60. The New York Times, 15 November 1980
The preceding sub-section 4.2 dealt with the South West Africa People's Organisation's (SWAPO) military, financial and diplomatic support in a manner devised to shed light on its outside supporters ideological motivations. With respect to SWAPO, reference has been made to nationalist, democratic and socialist qualities reflected in the political strategy of the organisation. The latter part of sub-section 4.2 was devoted specifically to the identification of SWAPO's ideological aims while its "nationalist nature" had been set aside for discussion in sub-section 4.3. It deals essentially with the nature and extent of SWAPO's internal support with consideration of the implications it could have on the organisation's nationalist claims.

The extent of SWAPO's internal support and the validity of its nationalist claims are two closely related questions often asked but not often answered. The reason being the organisation's constant refusal to participate in any internal elections other than those under United Nations auspices. Consequently it is virtually impossible to give an accurate account of SWAPO's internal popularity other than its wide support amongst the Ovambo. Only realistic estimates can be given until genuine elections are held to reflect the organisation's popularity.
The existing ethnic division of SWA/Namibia's population is by no means artificially manufactured or implanted into the society, instead, it is possible to trace the development of local multi-ethnicity to historical events. From time immemorial SWA/Namibia has been inhabited by the San\(^2\) whose ancient rock paintings tell the story of this people's early hunting and gathering existence. These same paintings also portray the arrival of other people's with their herds of cattle; first the Nama and Damara later the Herero and the Ovambo.\(^3\) But it would be short-sighted to ignore the fact that German and South African 'divide and rule' policies did perpetuate these ethnic divisions.\(^4\)

Notwithstanding many natural and unnatural disasters, by 1960, the Territory of 824,000 square kilometres, accommodated eleven ethnic groups. The following table on SWA/Namibia's population growth from 1960 and 1981/2 will prove useful for subsequent discussion of the implications attached to the ethnic division.

Under closer examination these population figures disclose a number of significant points of which the following are the most important:

1. The multi-ethnic make-up of the population is clear. Therefore, it is not only SWAPO and South Africa, that have interests in SWA/Namibia, but also a number of other groups.

2. The table further shows that the Ovambo have increased
Population Growth in SWA/Namibia: 1960 - 1981/82

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Perc.</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ovambo</td>
<td>239 363</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>352 640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>73 464</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>90 583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damara</td>
<td>44 353</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>66 291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herero</td>
<td>35 354</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>50 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavango</td>
<td>27 871</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>49 512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nama</td>
<td>34 806</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>32 935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>12 708</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>28 512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caprivian</td>
<td>15 840</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>25 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San</td>
<td>11 762</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>22 830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehoboth Baster</td>
<td>11 257</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>16 649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaokolander</td>
<td>9 223</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6 567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td>9 992</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4 407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15 089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>526 004</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>762 184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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from 46.3% in 1970 to 51.1% of the total population in 1981/82. A clear numerical superiority over the second largest group, the Kavangos with a mere 9.7% in 1981/82.

3. Equally significant is the decline of the White ethnic group as second largest and official opposition group. This group is now only ranked fifth on the numerical list. This downward trend in the white group's numerical strength had set in after 1974, as J.H.P. Serfontein pointed out. From 99 000 in 1974 to 75 600 in 1981/82,
2316 less than in 1960. The first ethnic group to show a numerical decline over the past twenty years. Over the past decade — 1972 to 1982 — the white population has declined 15%.

The most important point is that the multi-ethnic groups will remain but their numerical strength may change with time. Earlier SWA/Namibia's population was described as multi-ethnic. It must be appreciated that the cultures of the society at large may differ from that of the ethnic group. The members of ethnic groups are, or feel themselves to be or are thought to be, bound together by common ties of race, nationality, or culture. The nature of these groups' relationships with the society as a whole, and with other groups within it, constitutes one of the major problems in describing and analysing such societies.

There are other important implications attached to the natural division of the Territory's population that deserve attention. Three sets of interrelated aspects, or consequences need consideration:

1. The ethnic division still is one of the corner-stones in the South African Government's administrative approach towards SWA/Namibia. That is, to restrain inter-group integration by urging the development of ethnic groups as separate political entities under their traditional leadership.
2. SWAPO's support undoubtedly has been affected by this policy of 'divide and rule'. The emancipation of all non-white groups' political consciousness received a tremendous boost by the 1974/75 Turnhalle Talks. The events surrounding the Turnhalle Talks have been discussed in Section Three. Sufficient then to point out that the Turnhalle events had effectively split the population along ethnic lines, with political leaders for each of the groups.

3. Both points one and two in turn have an effect on SWAPO's national claims. Taking the hypothetical situation of an ethnically divided SWA/Namibian population in support of group-based political parties. Is it then plausible for SWAPO to claim a truly nationalistic representation of the whole country? These issues are interrelated, but for the sake of convenience and clarity, each will be discussed separately.

**THE ETHNIC DIVISION: A CORNERSTONE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH**

The Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act 54 of 1968, outlined the first six regional "native nations" with specific territories reserved for them in which they could have a legislative and executive council for local affairs. The Act provided for regional authorities in Ovambo, Kavango, East Caprivi and the Rehoboth Gebiet, while Bushmanland and Namaland received Advisory Boards. Until approximately 1980 this state of affairs
remained basically unchanged. The repeal of Act 54 of 1968 and its replacement by the Representative Authorities Proclamation of 1980, better known as Proclamation No.AG.8, that changed the situation and provided for:

"The administration of the affairs of a population group to be carried on by the executive authority of that group as from the date on which the legislative authority of that population group becomes empowered by virtue of Section 14(2) of Proclamation No.AG.8." (16)

Both the Odendaal Recommendations and the amendment thereof and replacement by the Representative Authorities Proclamation of 1980 reinforced the constitutional and political evolution of SWA/Namibia's population groups along ethnic lines. At the heart of the dispute for or against an ethnically based political dispensation, according to Kenneth Abrahams, lies a basic difference in opinion on the nature of the SWA/Namibian population. Those who accept ethnic authorities are also accepting the thesis that SWA/Namibia's population is comprised of eleven major population groups and that for each of these groups the maintenance of its unique ethnic identity is of paramount importance. (17)

Those opposed to an ethnic dispensation argue that while there may be several communities or population groups in the territory, the differences between them is not of cardinal importance, and have to a large extent been deliberately manufactured, enforced and maintained by successive colonial administrations. (18) Furthermore, the differences that do exist are far less serious than the fact that these communities or
population groups are in the process of integrating and forming a single Namibian nation. Opponents point to the fact that the territory is a single economic unit and that the South African Government should reshape and modify the social order and constitutional framework accordingly.\(^{(19)}\)

One can agree with Abrahams, that the differences between those in favour of and those against, ethnic governments are fundamental and irreconcilable, but by late 1977; only the Herero and Nama did not have a regional authority of some description, a situation rectified during the early 1980s. The major implication attached to the ethnic approach in a constitutional dispensation is the effective way in which it frustrates efforts at building one united Namibian nation.

**THE ETHNIC DIVISION - ITS INFLUENCES ON SWAPO's SUPPORT**

Did the development of an ethnically-based constitutional dispensation have an influence on the extent of SWAPO's internal support? That is briefly, the Odendaal Commission Recommendations, reinforced and replaced by the Representative Authorities Proclamation of 1980. While the 1974/75 Turnhalle Conference Talks boosted the implementation of the recommendations in practice, as well as resulting in the crystallisation of a wider more common political consciousness amongst Blacks.

All these developments were based on ethnic lines, in order to complement and facilitate the governments "official" ethnic approach towards the Territory. Proclamation AG.8 of 1980
served to officialise and foster the ethnic dispensation during the interim period preceding independence. The South African Government for its part in the current ongoing settlement negotiations, demanded constitutional guarantees that envisaged and ensured the continuity of multi-party democracy after independence. As the majority of internal parties, including SWAPO\(^{(20)}\), are ethnically based, it is to be expected that ethnicity will be further manifested in the electorate's choice of political parties, even in United Nations' supervised elections.

One of the pre-requisites for elections under United Nations auspices, is that neither South Africa, nor the UN/SWAPO front should influence the outcome of such elections in any way. The reality of course is that the mere existence of the ethnically based interim structure must have a definite effect on the outcome of such elections. It does not necessarily have to follow that the ethnic dispensation be supported by all groups. Likewise it does not necessarily follow that the local ethnically-based multi-party structure resulted from the manipulations of the South African Government. What is important, however, is that the ethnic dispensation in fact exists and that the local political scene is characterised by an unusual degree of fragmentation and inter-group disunity. By the close of 1982 more than 46 separate parties, organisations and factions were recorded.\(^{(21)}\)

As David Welsh pointed out:
"... any hope that the democratisation of a deeply divided society will have an automatic 'non-racial' outcome is a chimera, as is the hope that a common feeling of national identity will emerge." (22)

The real problem is that one cannot predict in advance exactly what configuration of groups or salient sub-national divisions will arise. (Section 1.2 pointed out the importance of avoiding zero-sum-situations which advance the interests of one 'group' to the detriment of another.)

The 1978 and 1980 ethnic elections provided useful demonstrations of the population's mixed feelings. Statistics cited are from Proclamation AG.83 of 1978 and Proclamation AG.180, 183, 184, 185 and 186 of 1980 which give the official election results. Also supplied are the percentages represented by each of the eleven groups, based on figures released by the Department of Statistics in April, 1982, and published in the Suidwester of 2 April 1982. These statistics must not be viewed as absolute, but merely as an indicator of the direction of local political sympathies.

1. **The Damara, 7.6% - 76 800 - 1981/2.** Of the Damara 41 246 people were registered; 11 677 (28.3%) voted for the Damara-Council, 8 291 (20.1%) for SWAPDUF (member of the DTA), and 449 (1.1%) supported the Damara Executive Committee. Forty-nine and a half percent of the Damara voted and 50.5% abstained.

2. **The Herero, 7.6% - 77 600 - 1981/82.** Of the Herero 40 452 were registered; 21 036 (50.9%) voted for NUDO
3. The Coloured, 4.3% - 43 500 - 1981/2. Of the Coloured 22 540 were registered; 5 292 (23.4%) voted for the Labour Party (member of the DTA), and 2 101 (9.4%) for the Liberal Party. Only 32.8% of the registered voters went to the polls.

4. The Kavango, 9.7% - 98 000 - 1981/82. The DTA obtained 6 452 (87.5%) of the registered votes while the NCDP gained 918 (12.4%) of the votes. This group amounts to a large part of the DTA's support.

5. Among the Tswana, 0.67% - 6 800 - and Caprivian, 3.9% - 39 500 - in 1981/82, only DTA candidates were fielded so that no elections were held for these groups. Similarly with the San, 3.0% - 22 830 - in 1970, and the Nama elections that did not go through. The Nama amounted to 4.9% - 49 700 - in 1981/82.

6. The Ovambo, 51.1% - 516 600; the Caprivian, 3.9% - 39 500; and the Basters, 2.5% - 25 800 - in 1981/82, had no elections at all.

Altogether 122 083 black voters were registered for the 1980 ethnic elections. Of these 33.6% - 41 071 - voted for the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA); 12.8% - 15 589 - supported opposition parties; and 53.6% - 65 423 - of
the registered voters abstained from participating. More significant being the Ovambos who did not have elections at all, ostensibly because of the border war in northern SWA/Namibia.

In 1978, 412,448 people registered as voters, despite SWAPO, SWAPO-D, NNF and SWANU's non-participation. Of these, 65.01% - 268,130 - voted for the DTA; 14.1% - 58,434 supported opposition parties, while 20.8% - 85,884 abstained. In 1980, 176,168 black and white people registered as voters. Of these, 33.6% - 59,290 supported the DTA; 23.4% - 41,339 voted for opposition parties, and 42.7% abstained. The DTA's support, therefore, declined in real terms from 65.01% in 1978 to 33.65% in 1980, while the percentage of abstentions increased from 20.82% in 1978 to 42.79% in 1980.

The Ovambo (51.1%), Caprivian (3.9%), (3.0% in 1970) Basters (2.5%), Tswana (0.67%), and the Nama (4.9%) had no elections at all. A further 42.79% of the voters actually registered did not turn up at the polls, thereby casting a cloud of doubt over the popularity of the leaders and parties that were supported. The most unfortunate aspect of both the 1978 and 1980 ethnic elections was that the Ovambo were not provided with the opportunity to express their view. As the most conservative estimates indicated that at least 80% of the Ovambo would support SWAPO it must be obvious that should elections be held in Ovambo, the massive rejection of the Ethnic Authority system would become even more apparent.

Footnote: The outcome of elections which was not conducted under 'free and fair' conditions, such as the above, should be treated with some reservation.
This is unfortunately too vague a standpoint to adopt, as the extent of SWAPO's internal support is of great importance to the outcome and aftermath of United Nations-supervised elections, besides the Ovambo are not united in support of one party or organisation. Other interesting developments have set in since the early 1970s to transform SWAPO's support into a more debatable issue.

The Ovambo Legislative Council first met in 1968 as result of Act 54 of 1968. This Legislative Council was based on the traditional leadership structure of Headmen and Chiefs. Nevertheless, it was neither truly representative of the Ovambo, nor was it popularly supported by them. Only 3% of all eligible voters participated in the 1968 Legislative Council elections. It was generally felt that the Council did not represent the represent of migrant labourers and that the low level of education of Council-members curbed much of the body's effectiveness.\(^{(26)}\)

Dr Gerhard Tötemeyer's thesis entitled 'The Role of the Ovambo elite in the political development of Ovambo', based on fieldwork done by him between 1971 and 1974, completed in 1975, provided a wide spectrum of new facts and statistics that suggested rather different political developments taking place in Ovambo. His findings confirmed the Ovambo Legislative Council's unpopularity and that the first Legislative Assembly and Executive Council were nominated and did not accommodate the developing modern elite. The traditional elite feared that their authority might be impaired if
political parties were admitted in Ovambo. Dr Tötemeyer stressed the important and responsible role played by the black churches in Ovambo. For instance, the Ovambokavango Church became politicised against its will because of the absence of a suitable party. In summary his findings were that SWAPO and especially DEMCCP were considered by the majority of the population as instruments and symbols of modernity and that they were in a position to mobilise the masses and change the patterns of behaviour. In this, they were sustained by international recognition and support.

In evaluation, the clear numerical superiority of the Ovambo leaves no doubt about SWAPO's ability to win a free and fair election based on a "one-man one-vote winner-takes-all" principle, providing that the organisation can rely on the undivided support of the Ovambo. It is important, therefore, to determine whether the Ovambo are united in support of one party or organisation.

One of the interesting developments of the 70s articulates exactly the Ovambo unity issue. In the 1974/75 Turnhalle Conference Talks, foundations were laid for the creation of a multi-ethnic political coalition composed of members of all groups, including the Ovambo. Thus, a new contender for Ovambo support was created. By the close of 1982, at least three new "contenders" came into existence. Ranked and discussed according to estimated importance they are: The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA - 1976), the National Democratic Party/Christian Democratic Alliance for Social Justice
(NDP/CDA - 1982), the SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D - 1978) and SWAPO as popular favourite.

The DTA, under the Chairmanship of Dirk Mudge, has suffered a significant setback in losing its largest member-party, the NDP/CDA which broke away under Peter Kalangula, indicating the DTA's isolation from Ovambo support. There is little hope for the alliance to set up a formidable organisation in Ovambo to counter either SWAPO or the Ovambo-based NDP/CDA. Such an organisation will have to grow out of Ovambo, it cannot be implanted there. Furthermore, the NDP/CDA break with the DTA spells out that it can no longer claim to be an official spokesman of the Ovambo.

Apart from objecting to the ethnic nature of the Turnhalle dispensation, officialised by Proclamation No.AG.8, and preceded over by the DTA until January 1983, a further important issue spurred the CDA break-away. Soon after its formation it became clear that it had the support of the South African Government. The Government hoped to foster the CDA as a new anti-SWAPO front that would be more effective and locally acceptable as it was under the leadership of a Black Ovambo political leader. Peter Kalangula himself stated that:

"We have had to work hard to get sympathy away from SWAPO. We're succeeding. Our meetings are now well attended. There is much discussion. In the past the people did not want to talk - now they are making positive contributions. The biggest change is that in the past a lot of people
used to think that without Nujoma there was no independence. Now they are openly saying that we - the CDA - can bring about real independence. They support us openly now, they do not hide their support." (35)

Informed sources in Ovambo estimate the local support for the DTA at between 2% and 3% for June, 1982, while in January of the same year, it had been an estimated 20% support, that is, before the NDP/CDA split from the DTA occurred. (36) Yet, irrespective of its apparent weak position in Ovambo, the DTA's Central Government's 1982/83 budget allocation of R96 million for Ovambo development, suggests that the campaign for support from the Ovambos is only in its initial stages. (37) In fact, in the light of a number of DTA-meetings held in Kavango during September, 1982, it would appear as if the DTA mounted its campaign for the envisaged internationally supervised elections well before 1983, the date generally considered as the "deadline" for independence elections. (38)

The NDP/CDA, under Peter kalangula, naturally evoked bitter resentment for braking away. The DTA, denied the impact of the split (39) depicting Peter Kalangula as an outcast from his own tribe, the Kuanyama, who make up some 45% of the total of the Ovambo voters. (40) (The Ovambo include sever tribal groups: the Kuanyama, Ndonga, Kuambi, Ngandjera, Mbalantu, Kualuthi and Nkolonkati-Eunda groups.)

On 15 February, 1982, Peter Kalangula left the National Assembly, i.e. as a member of the DTA, to establish his own party, initially known as the National Democratic Party,
since substituted with Christian Democratic Alliance for Social Justice (CDA). Thereby, in addition to the Baster, Coloured, and White groups, becoming the fifth major ethnic party nor represented in the National Assembly."\(^{(41)}\)

Although the extent of Ovambo support for Peter Kalangula is uncertain, the DTA Head Committee are quite aware of his efforts to reorganise the smaller parties in his area and to incorporate them into his own party. The Head Committee's objections revolve around the so-called "addition of a north-south polarisation on top of the existing black-white division."\(^{(42)}\)

Peter Kalangula in turn denied the CDA having secessionist intentions for Ovambo, but, he added that neither is there any intention to rejoin forces with the ruling DTA in the foreseeable future.\(^{(43)}\)

Instead, an alliance with other parties and groups that share principles and views basic to the CDA is more likely. For instance, the Damara Raad agreed in principle at its July, 1982, Congress to co-operate in a United Nations-supervised election with the CDA, the Coloured Labour Party and the Baster Liberation Front.\(^{(44)}\) This would indeed amount to a formidable political alliance, but possibly more significant, on 7 August, 1982, the Damara Raad decided to initiate talks with SWAPO, since it views SWAPO as an imperative link in bringing about a satisfactory solution to the country's independence settlement.\(^{(45)}\)

Overall it then appears as if the SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D)
and SWAPO are the two stronger contenders which will draw at least 70% of the Ovambo vote. That is, allowing 5% of the support to the DTA and 25% to the CDA, rather conservative estimates at this stage in time. Since the SWAPO-Democrats are discussed extensively in Section 4.4, it is sufficient at this stage to point out that the SWAPO-Democrats came into existence as a party in June 1978, and its leader, Andreas Shipanga, "claims" a certain 20% support from the electorate in any free and fair election held within the Territory. Thus, SWAPO is still left with an estimated 50% Ovambo support, should even the very worst go wrong for the organisation during election time, and 25.55% support of the total population, (of the people eligible for the vote).

Leon Kok, editor of the Windhoek Advertiser, after a visit to Ovambo in 1982, concluded to "his own astonishment" that SWAPO is very much alive amongst the local people. His personal estimation of SWAPO's support amongst the Ovambo is in the region of 75%. He added that SWAPO's local support is very much underestimated, that the 1978 elections results, ending in a DTA victory, is nowhere near a true reflection of the present situation in northern SWA/Namibia. John Barratt, Director of the SA Institute of International Affairs pointed out that a real independence settlement provides a strong possibility for a SWAPO government take-over.

Tötemeyer identified two more factors that may count in SWAPO's favour should free and fair elections take place. Firstly, there is no united white political front to act as vanguard
for white interests, or effectively combat SWAPO, with the non-white groups more likely to team up with SWAPO rather than with the whites, who are seen as remnants of the old regime. The white division was explicitly manifested in the 1980 white ethnic elections, the results of which mandated the local National Party, and not the ruling DTA, as official spokesman of the white voters. The ultra-conservative Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) remains a factor of its own, reluctant to merge with either the National Party or the DTA. Secondly, Totemeyer is also of the opinion that there are many locals who view the military struggle against SWAPO as responsible for so much suffering and misery, that while political and even military domination by SWAPO would possibly not mean any immediate improvements, it will still bring an end to death, destruction and foreign occupation. (49)

SWAPO's election campaign undoubtedly will rely heavily on emotionally-charged slogans, envisaging liberation, peace and prosperity as well as an end to all forms of oppression. This is likely to appeal to the gross majority of illiterate voters in Ovambo. Mr J. Himmelhoch, formerly employed by the Bureau of State Security, estimated that as much as 83% of the votes in a free and fair election would go to SWAPO. It may appear to be an unrealistically high estimate, however, Totemeyer and others have pointed to the Zimbabwe experience. Even Koos Pretorius, current leader of the local National Party has no reservations about a SWAPO victory in "one-man one-vote winner-takes-all" elections, only, he and his party with the
assistance of the HNP and the South African Government are against such an election taking place. (50)

THE ETHNIC DIVISION - INFLUENCE ON SWAPO'S NATIONALIST CLAIMS

Before assessing the validity of SWAPO's nationalist claims, which, it has been pointed out in Section 4.2 does carry weight, it would be useful to put forward a number of general points on the nature and meaning of "nationalism". These would then be investigated in terms of SWAPO's policies. Rupert Emerson outlines some useful points:

"In the large, nationalism in Asia and Africa, as in at least its initial phases in Europe and America, is a forward-looking and not a reactionary force, a spur to revolution and not a bulwark of the status quo." (51)

"... the major immediate contributions of nationalism are a sense of independent worth and self-respect and a new social solidarity to replace the traditional bonds. From being "natives" they rise to the honorable title of nationals ... overcoming that lack of social-political cohesion ..." (52)

"The nationalisms which have emerged are neither a spontaneous and self-generating movement among the Asian and African peoples nor merely an effort on their part to get rid of the alien intruder. Far more they are an assertion of their rediscovery or newly created individuality, already sharply influenced by the imperial impact ..." (53)

On the last aspect Ellie Kedourie would agree with Emerson, as he views nationalism simply as a reaction to conquest and alien rule. Nationalism Kedourie asserts
"... is a doctrine invented in Europe in the beginning of the nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a society of states. Briefly the doctrine holds that the only legitimate government is national self-government." (54)

In SWA/Namibia the Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO), established in 1958, became the first organisation aspiring to protect the interests of a section of the population. In 1960 the OPO, initially aimed at opposing the contract labour system and representing the Ovambo workers, was renamed the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) in order to become a national organisation representative of all the oppressed people of SWA/Namibia. (55) Country-wide national branches were established to organise workers in mines and factories and peasants in the rural areas. (56)

SWAPO's constitution also clearly states its desire to acquire independence for all the people of the country; to establish a bond of national and political consciousness amongst the people; and to establish a democratic people's government. (57) Thus, corresponding to Emerson and Kedourie as far as resistance to the status quo and alien rule is concerned.

The real issue in dispute is whether SWAPO can plausibly make its claims on behalf of all SWA/Namibians. As a result of the organisation's refusal to participate in any elections other than those organised and supervised by the United Nations,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately predict the extent of local support for the organisation. The 1971/72 strikes did illustrate a definite "nationally"-based support for SWAPO. Labourers from all the non-white groups joined the strike, which affected all spheres of activity of the SWA/Namibian society.

Is this sufficient proof for suggesting that "all" the Territory's people's, excluding the whites, support SWAPO? This cannot be the case, as it has already been pointed out that SWAPO cannot count on the undivided support of the Ovambo, not even to mention the support of the other groups. Tangari points to nationalism as a feeling of common solidarity and mutual sympathy that is not extended to outsiders. This is not the situation in SWA/Namibia. Section 3, dealing with local politics, indicated the existence of more than one feeling of group-solidarity, as well as an abundancy of political parties, each with their own principles, leadership and ethnic affiliations. SWAPO itself is largely ethnically based, drawing most of its supports from the Ovambo.

There is also a lack of unity between the major "national liberation" movements. This is well illustrated in terms of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), which, like SWAPO, draws most of its support from one ethnic group - the Herero. SWANU, established late in 1959, under the leadership of J.F. Kozonguizi, strove towards independence, like SWAPO, yet without active involvement in the armed
liberation struggle. Though there is little or no cooperation between SWANU and SWAPO, SWANU also failed to sustain momentum during the 1970s owing to a lack of a coherent internal organisation.

Equally undeniable is that SWAPO, SWANU, SWAPO-D and other internal parties are voicing objections to South Africa’s profitable economic relations with SWA/Namibia. Yet the economic aspect is of much less importance to the local resistance to South Africa’s administrative and military presence. In the latter respect, all indigenous parties, with the possible exception of the white parties, are "united" in wanting independence from South Africa. It is not sure whether they would want to replace South African domination with SWAPO domination.

The dilemma on a SWAPO Government arose and expanded to its present magnitude when the organisation was given legal acclaim to be the 'sole authentic representative' of all the indigenous people - United Nations Resolution 3III (XXVIII) (1973). In Sections 3 and 4 it had been argued that other internal parties, both black and white, certainly did not sanction this status being ascribed to SWAPO.

To evaluate SWAPO's nationalist claims it is important to consider the role played by Ovambo support in justifying these claims. SWAPO insists that it enjoys broad national support, while such a claim is by no means a foregone conclusion. What is beyond doubt, is the Ovambo "nationalist"
support underlying and backing-up SWAPO's claims. As the Ovambo comprises 51.5% of the total population, (in 1981) this support in itself is sufficient to justify nationalist claims.

As Gwen Lister of the Windhoek Observer sums up:

"... apart from the fact that certain people do not want to belong to any of the eleven classified population groups, being of mixed blood, there are other people who do not care to be classified as anything other than 'Namibians'". (66)

Until a 'free and fair' election takes place, it is impossible to tell where the peoples and parties of SWA/Namibia stand. A SWAPO victory, despite South Africa's attempts to divide the country on ethnic lines, is still a strong possibility. Yet if a SWAPO victory should come about, as Thomas pointed out, the:

"... rise of African nationalist and African socialist rhetoric ... could lead to considerable estrangement between blacks and whites inside Namibia." (67)
REFERENCES: Section 4.3


8. Tötemeyer, G. *South West Africa/Namibia*. Strictly speaking it is incorrect to refer to the Whites as one unified ethnic group, as it is comprised of three sub-groups: Africaners + 65 percent, Germans + 23 percent and English + 12 percent. p.9

9. Serfontein, J.H.P. *Namibia?* p.10


12. Ibid.


21. See Appendix I of Section 3.3

22. Van Zyl Slabbert. F. and Welsh, D. South Africa's Options: Strategies for sharing power. (Cape Town, David Philip. 1979) pp.74-75


25. Ibid.

27. Tötemeyer, G. *Namibia Old and New.* (London, Hurst and Co., 1978) p.188


32. *Die Republikein,* (Windhoek), 29 March 1982

33. *The Windhoek Advertiser,* (Windhoek), 19 February 1982


36. *Die Suidwester,* (Windhoek), 23 June 1982

37. *Die Republikein,* (Windhoek), 26 April 1982

38. *Die Republikein,* (Windhoek), 20 September 1982

39. *Die Republikein,* (Windhoek), 26 April 1982

40. *Die Republikein,* (Windhoek), 8 September 1982

41. *The Windhoek Advertiser,* (Windhoek), 19 February 1982
42. Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek), 21 February 1982
43. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 22 March 1982
44. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 1 August 1982
45. The Windhoek Advertiser, 1 August 1982 and the Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek), 14 August 1982
46. Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek), 5 December 1982
47. Die Suidwester, (Windhoek), 15 February 1982
48. Die Suidwester, (Windhoek), 29 October 1982
49. Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek), 14 July 1980
50. Die Republikein, (Windhoek), 19 January 1982
52. Emerson, R. p.380
55. Interviews In Depth Namibia SWAPO with Andreas Shipanga. (Canada, LSM Information Centre, 1973), p.4
58. Interviews In Depth Namibia SWAPO. pp.18-20
59. To Be Born A Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia.  

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   International Relations and British Council of Churches.  (United  

64. Prinsloo, D.S. South West Africa: The Turnhalle and Independence.  
   p.31

65. Point adopted from a statement made by Herman Toivo ja Toivo, in  
   Namibia: The Struggle for Liberation. World Council of Churches.  
   (Geneva, September 1971)

66. Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek), 25 June 1983

67. Thomas, W.H. The Economy in Transition to Independence in  
   (Canada, D.C. Heath and Company, 1983), p.84
Section 4.1 included a brief analysis of the development of SWAPO/PLAN's military policies since the early 1960s. Unlike other "liberation struggles" elsewhere in Africa and Southern Africa, the movement had made little headway on the military front, especially since the introduction of SADF incursions into southern Angola from 1975 onwards. By the close of 1982 it was evident that a military victory for SWAPO/PLAN was less of a possibility than when the armed struggle was initiated 21 years previously.

In international diplomatic circles, SWAPO has over the past decade succeeded in maintaining a public image portraying the organisation as a strong 'unified movement', widely and enthusiastically supported by the broad mass of Namibians. However, there appear to be cracks in SWAPO's public facade. The reality of the situation is that the SWAPO-Democrats is a breakaway party which highlights the tensions and divisions within SWAPO itself.

Tension within the military wing of the organisation mounted since 1980, especially when it became clear that independence would not result from the armed struggle. In a sense
PLAN's mission became suicidal. The only function of military resistance from that point was to back up SWAPO's diplomatic effort.

In April 1982, Dimo Aamambo, a top military official, fled to Tanzania after severe differences with party President, Sam Nujoma. This fate also befell SWAPO's (ex) Chief Commander, Peter Nanyemba, also in Tanzania, and Richard Kapelwa, Vice-Secretary of Defence, presently in a refugee camp in Zambia. In a SADF incursion, early in July, 1981, PLAN lost the services of two more officials in command. John Angula, Head of the northern Artillery and the Head of Reconnaissance, (name not disclosed) were captured by the Security Forces. A number of successful SADF incursions followed in the wake of these captures, delivering a further blow to the morale of PLAN cadres. John Angula also proved willing to elaborate on the poor conditions under which the armed struggle continued. Food shortages amongst frontline insurgents, with commander camps well-stocked, and above all, Nujoma's absence from the operational area, were some of the more common complaints of PLAN defectors who made use of the Administrator-General's amnesty offer. In December 1979, SWAPO guerrillas were offered "amnesty" if they surrendered to the Security Forces.

Irrespective of the difficulties encountered by the military wing, SWAPO's unity as an organisation, especially in relation to the SWAPO-Democrats, has long been under question. Available evidence suggested a deep-seated division in SWAPO ranks,
dating back well before 1980.\(^7\) To advocates of SWAPO's cause any statement or suggestion remotely related to a division in the organisation's ranks is tantamount to betrayal. This type of attitude is not conducive to a firm evaluation of all possibilities. It is widely believed that discontent between the external (military) wing and the internal (organising) wing is mounting as a result of discrepancies in credit and recognition given to the respective wings.\(^8\) It is surprising that the South African Government has not yet tried to play off one against the other.

Furthermore, SWAPO-D have not received international recognition and are simply written off as an internal legal front for SWAPO itself.\(^9\) This is not the case. Arguments such as these could be seen as a reason not to question SWAPO's credibility. Andreas Shipanga, leader of the SWAPO-Democrats has in the past frequently charged Sam Nujoma with corruption, tribalism and incompetence. He has made it clear that he prefers Herman Toivo ja Toivo as the real leader of SWAPO.\(^10\)

As for the initial development of local resistance Shipanga stressed the double-dealing of General Smuts and the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill:\(^\text{... who promised the black peoples of South West Africa: food, clothing and freedom, in return for their assistance in the defeat of the German armed forces, and never made good their side of the agreement.}\)

and the misguided South African attempts at attaining provin-
cial status for SWA in the early 1940s. The local black people never had any political rights, nor were they consulted in matters directly related to their future. This culminated in the formation of the OPO and later of SWAPO.

A split in SWAPO ranks occurred in 1976 after a number of "fundamental differences" between Shipanga and SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma. In May, 1982, Mr Shipanga released a public statement critical of SWAPO on several points, including the non-possibility of co-operation with SWAPO in the future. The exchange of Sapper John van der Mescht for a Soviet intelligence agent, was considered to be unsuitable. This indeed triggered off Shipanga's statement, as in his opinion Herman Toivo ja Toivo was a much more logical candidate for such an exchange. He further accused Nujoma of using Toivo ja Toivo for propaganda purposes, holding him up as "martyr" whenever South African security legislation caused a public outcry, though, when a real opportunity presented itself, not a second thought was paid to Toivo ja Toivo. Since the aforementioned examples are likely to appear trivial and unimportant, it would be advisable to put the entire SWAPO/SWAPO-D debate in proper historical context.

Examination of documents and publications issued by both SWAPO and SWAPO-D are relevant to the issue. In SWAPO's publication, To Be Born A Nation, the following extracts appear:

"The South Africans and their allies have repeatedly tried to divide SWAPO's ranks by labelling different sections of the party as 'internal' and 'external' wings and then alleging serious policy differences
between them, the former being 'moderate' and 'peaceful', the latter 'communist' and 'terrorist'. Not once in the 20 years of its existence has this manoeuvre had the slightest success; it is the Western news media, not the Namibian people, who have been deceived." (15)

On the contrary, as stated before, SWAPO projects the image of:

"... a single party united around a common programme and dedication to the overriding task of national liberation", (16)

and that:

"... in the twentieth anniversary year (1981) of its formation SWAPO remains as it started, a broad front against colonial oppression and imperialist exploitation, as it is not a vanguard party, nor an exclusive instrument of any particular social class." (17)

Academics such as John Dugard and Deon Prinsloo draw a definite distinction between an internal and external SWAPO wing. Prinsloo asserts that this resulted from factionalism and the fact that many of the organisation's leaders are in detention. (18) He also alleges that it:

"... became clear that Sam Nujoma had built a despotic leadership group around him who do not feel themselves bounded by SWAPO rules and constitutional prescriptions." (19)

Not surprisingly this does not tally with the views presented in the SWAPO-Democrats' Basic Documents; in relation to either "party unity" or "party aspirations". While Namibians have joined SWAPO as a movement in the vanguard of the struggle for independence; the very organisation itself is being destroyed from the inside by a clique which has
placed its own interests above those of SWAPO and above those of the Namibian nation. The 'Nujoma clique' is not fighting for democracy and independence for Namibia. This clique, having gained total and complete control of SWAPO, is now trying to gain dictatorial control over Namibia as well.

SWAPO-D's main accusation against Sam Nujoma, and the external leadership, is that they:

"... have left the path of principled struggle and thereby severely harmed the organisation by a fragrant abuse of authority". (20)

As a result, SWAPO-D alleged, the movement has been split and rendered vulnerable to attack from the outside.

On 21 April 1976, eleven high-ranking SWAPO officials and approximately 1500 rank-and-file supporters were arrested and detained by Zambian authorities, who acted on Sam Nujoma's instructions. (21) The main thrust of these aggressive tactics was aimed at neutralising a group of SWAPO members who dared to deviate from and to criticise the leadership's preference for armed resistance instead of peaceful dialogue. (22) The resulting "split" in SWAPO ranks had a lasting effect on the organisation's support as well. Andreas Shipanga, having been released from jail in Zambia, established the SWAPO-Democrats in Sweden, and returned to SWA/Namibia in August 1978. (23) It would be incorrect to imply that he took a significant amount of support away from SWAPO, but undoubtedly he did build a following of his own. Shipanga himself "claims" that he will
receive a "certain twenty percent" of the electoral support in any 'free and fair' election.\(^{(24)}\) Outside observers, however, are much more sceptical. They believe that SWAPO-D will be fortunate if it receives 5\% of the popular support in a free election.\(^{(25)}\)

On the strength of such "estimates", SWAPO-D cannot pose a real threat to SWAPO's victory in a United Nations' supervised election. The external leadership under Sam Nujoma also does not appear unduly concerned over the opposition embodied by SWAPO-D. Claims made by the party's mouthpiece, *The Voice of the SWAPO-Democrats*, that SWAPO-D is not entirely a new party, but is composed of loyal SWAPO members who remained true to the organisation's original and traditional principles\(^{(26)}\), is unlikely to make any real impact on the electorate.

Yet it is clear that the divide within the SWAPO organisation goes much deeper than Sam Nujoma's simplistic explanation of an "internal and external wing" which work in harmony as parts of the same organisation towards the same goal.\(^{(27)}\) As Shipanga himself explained:

"... we are calling ourselves SWAPO-D because of fundamental differences between the organisations. SWAPO's constitution is aimed at bringing about scientific socialism and a classless society in Namibia while the ideal is that SWAPO should be a party for all patriotic Namibians who want self-rule and the end of South African occupation". \(^{(28)}\)

The real reason for the 1976 arrests, he said, was Nujoma's justified fear of losing his position as leader and president of the organisation.\(^{(29)}\)
No real SWAPO congress has been held since 1969 (except for
the Tanga Consultative Congress, of December, 1969/January,
1970), and when Nujoma finally conceded to a congress con-
vening in 1976, it was again postponed because of the mass
imprisonment of SWAPO leaders and supporters alike.\(^{30}\)

Despite ready agreement amongst local and foreign political
observers and governments on the occurrence of the 1976
Zambian incident and the consequent establishment of SWAPO-D,
they fail to attach any importance to these events. Apart
from the South African Government, SWAPO-D receives no recog-
nition from the outside world and is not even allowed a plat-
form in the United Nations. As a result, it is easy to be
left with the impression that SWAPO is "above" criticism.
All issues and questions critical of SWAPO are avoided with
the same hackneyed excuse of the South African government
and its allies trying to discredit the organisation with pro-
pagandist slander. Yet, irrespective of such "trivialities",
there are some basic underlying consequences attached to
SWAPO-D's establishment:

First and foremost, as The Voice of SWAPO-D had put it, the
events leading up to the split and the actual split itself,
rendered the organisation open to outside criticism and
attack. The split itself amounted to the external leader-
ship being faced with a crisis of confidence, resulting pri-
marily from Nujoma's refusal to hold a party congress where
his position could be challenged. Since its inception,
SWAPO-D has never refrained from accusing the external
leaders of leaving the path of principled struggle. Except for adopting a 'go-it-alone' policy, the SWAPO-D breakaway provided critics of SWAPO with further fuel for their fires.

Secondly, and as important, separation into two distinct parties or organisations added more reason for questioning both the validity and justifiability of the United Nations recognition of SWAPO as sole authentic representative of the Namibian people. With the establishment of SWAPO-D, Shipanga explicitly stated that SWAPO-D did not recognise SWAPO as the only real representative of the Namibian peoples. A view supported by Justus Garoëb of the Damara Raad and by Peter Kalangula, leader of the NDP/CDA.

It was pointed out that United Nations partiality towards SWAPO has a detrimental effect on the status of other internal parties which enjoy similar popular support. For example, some of the ethnic groups such as the Baster, Damara, Herero and Whites, have as many as three separate parties competing to represent the interests of these groups. Surely a multi-party system would be more in line with the principles of free and fair democratic competition, than the assumption that one political party or organisation could be truly representative of all the interests of a population as diverse as that encountered in SWA/Namibia.

In conclusion, there is a need for some tentative speculation concerning the future of the SWAPO "organisations". The
only statement that can be made beyond reasonable doubt is that no reconciliation is possible between SWAPO and SWAPO-D. However, this will not seriously affect SWAPO's support, and therefore, its victory in any 'free and fair' election. The sincerity of the SWAPO-Democrats is certain, with Andreas Shipanga actually communicating with the United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, urging him to the utmost caution in all his activities related to the SWA/Namibia issue. Shipanga also stressed the need for an impartial United Nations approach towards SWAPO, as any partiality is detrimental to the interests of all internal parties.

On 7 April, 1982, the SWAPO-Democrats suggested a new "Geneva type" all-party conference at which problems impeding the progress of Phases Two and Three of the settlement plan could be discussed, including the speeding-up of negotiations. Later in April, Mr Shipanga reiterated his impatience with the lack of progress in the Western initiative, specifically referring to the unexpected deadlock that had set in due to SWAPO's objection to the "dual voting system" suggested by the Western Contact Group. He expressed his disappointment with this unnecessary delay, adding that he rather expected the initiative to falter on the more difficult questions in Phase Two of the Settlement Plan.

Despite such "good intentions" it is unclear what the SWAPO-Democrats stand to gain from a United Nations supervised
election, as SWAPO is bound to get the better of such an election. Equally unclear is the position of Herman Toivo ja Toivo, should he be released from detention. An interesting point is whether Toivo ja Toivo will take over the leadership from Sam Nujoma, and if SWAPO will continue to exist as a "single" party. By the close of 1983 it appeared as if questions such as these would remain unanswered for some time to come.
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4. Die Suidwester, (Windhoek), 14 July 1981


8. Gayner, J.B. pp.41-44


11. Die Suidwester, (Windhoek), 5 March 1982

12. Die Republikein, (Windhoek), 17 May 1982


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16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.


22. Ibid.

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29. Prinsloo, D.S. *South West Africa/Namibia Towards A Negotiated Settlement*. pp.16-17


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CONCLUSION
The final objective of this dissertation is to present an overview of the material covered and to advance some tentative conclusions. Restrictions on length has inevitably curtailed some information. Certain sub-section topics were discussed briefly, not so much due to greater or lesser importance, but because they are directly related to the central themes of the dissertation. It is important to discuss these topics as well, as it is impossible to isolate their influence on the central themes. In particular the discussion of the economy of SWA/Namibia was such a topic.

Wolfgang Thomas noted two views on the Territory's economic prospects. One group of observers describes the country as "poor in resources, economically unstable, and hampered by nature", while another group describes it as "having one of Africa's best resource endowments relative to the size of its population". While Thomas himself suggested that it was difficult to evaluate the country's future economic developments, Reginald Green expressed optimism when he noted that

"...the resource base, much of the basic physical infrastructure, and a substantial production/surplus generation capacity for building a Namibia able to move rapidly towards meeting basic human needs, do exist". (2)

The economic introduction of this dissertation cited a number of pointed statements by a local businessman, Eric Lang. In his opinion the country is paying dearly for politicians, local and South African, who spend millions on political experiments and buying the goodwill of a minority group. Lang suggested an immediate scrapping of the second-tier of
Evidence before the Thirion Commission of Inquiry into the malfunctioning and malpractice of the State Departments suggested built-in ingredients for malfunction of the existing government structure, as provided for under Proclamation No.AG.8 of 1980. Apart from the need for a new "political dispensation", and the Territory's multiple political problems, prevailing economic conditions also add anxiety over the country's financial well-being.

Undoubtedly, the Territory's political dilemma is still of paramount importance. Arguments in favour of the political "accommodation" of all the population groups, instead of the favoured "one-man one-vote winner-takes-all" resolution, sought by SWAPO and the United Nations, formed a very important part of the dissertation.

The fact that SWAPO is the strongest opponent of such "accommodation" is not surprising. Sam Nujoma has been quoted as saying, "We have fought. The power is due to us. And we shall not share power with anyone." It is also an open secret that the organisation has sought a 'free and fair' election as its election victory seems assured. To this end, the organisation's willingness to "negotiate" for a cease-fire has been emphatically reiterated by Sam Nujoma since 1978. In August 1983, SWAPO's Vice-President elect, Pastor Hendrik Witbooi, released the organisation's first statement in Windhoek for more than three years, which called for talks with Administrator-General Van Niekerk that could lead to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution
Furthermore, at the Paris Conference on SWA/Namibia, during April 1983, Sam Nujoma told reporters that all SWAPO wanted was to "manage or mismanage" Namibia. SWAPO, he said, was ready to talk to South Africa as it believed that "negotiations and the armed struggle are not contradictory but can run concurrently". (8)

It seems apparent that a military "solution" is highly unlikely despite SWAPO's endeavours to step-up the armed struggle. In June 1983, a Defence Force spokesman said that it was evident that SWAPO's military wing in southern Angola was engaged in a military build-up; and that 1983 could be described as SWAPO's greatest effort to win the war. (9) However, Dr Gerhard Tötemeyer, a well-known authority on SWA/Namibian affairs, is of the opinion that SWAPO has to accept that for many years to come it could not win the military struggle. Likewise, South Africa should realise that it will not win the political struggle against SWAPO. (10) Dr Tötemeyer is also of the opinion that South Africa's military presence in SWA/Namibia has not resulted in stability for the Territory, and is likely to cost South Africa severe losses economically, in military personnel and in diplomatic status. (11)

Apart from SWAPO, the South African Government and a number of local parties, there is no question about the United Nations' desire to achieve an independence settlement in the Territory. Since the early 1950s this organisation has engaged in attempts to bring the Territory to internationally recognised independence. Despite numerous failures, in
August 1983, the United Nations, via its Secretary-General, mounted a new attempt to achieve this independent status for SWA/Namibia. On 25 August 1983, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar arrived in Windhoek for talks with the local parties on an independence settlement. He also visited Angola for the continuation of these talks.

In Windhoek De Cuellar met with SWAPO, SWAPO-D, NCDP, Labour Party, Damara Council, DTA, the National Party, and other less significant political groupings. The HNP, SWANU and CDA declined invitations to have meetings with the Secretary-General. It was evident, after these meetings, that very little was achieved by the Secretary-General. Internal parties, such as the DTA, rejected the United Nations' partiality towards SWAPO. They also felt that a "solution" could not be found in twenty minutes if such a solution had been elusive for more than thirty years.

The importance of these local parties' participation in the determination of SWA/Namibia's constitutional future cannot be denied. Should they be excluded, there can be no doubt that the South African Government will be reluctant to allow such constitutional arrangements to proceed, or that it would be genuinely representative of all the peoples of the Territory. Equally certain is the fact that South Africa alone can permit developments towards independence to take place.

On the other hand, South Africa's co-operation will only be secured if a number of pre-conditions are met. Although the
Government claimed compliance with the provisions of Resolution 435 and the resulting three phases, with the inauguration of the Reagan Administration in 1981, a new issue, the Angolan-based Cubans, entered the SWA/Namibian independence negotiations. The Cuban issue is bound to impede upon a settlement in SWA/Namibia for as long as it remains an issue, despite the Angolan Government's claims that the Cuban presence is a domestic matter.

Yet the Reagan Administration is confident about a Cuban withdrawal from Angola before the end of 1984. Unfortunately, such a withdrawal will by no means guarantee South Africa's willingness to proceed with the implementation of Resolution 435, or that it will not find a new issue to stall upon. Prime Minister Botha would like the Cubans out of Angola, but is in no hurry. Particularly if the price paid were to be a loss of South African influence over half of Angola, the sacrificing of Jonas Savimbi and the danger of a SWAPO Government in Windhoek.

When the French journalist Edward Girardet of the Christian Science Monitor, interviewed Savimbi, the latter expressed his convictions on a number of issues: That the Cubans were a major factor preventing a settlement in Angola; that the Cubans would eventually leave Angola; that UNITA received extensive support from South Africa, and that UNITA supports a settlement for Namibian independence.
A Cuban withdrawal, however, will not necessarily imply a settlement in SWA/Namibia. A settlement will not be achieved unless equal treatment of all parties is assured, the rights of minority groups are protected and guaranteed, and fundamental principles of democracy are assured. (19) A settlement should also not pose security risks for South Africa. It is clear that South African goodwill is essential if any settlement is to be achieved and it would appear the latter is still in the distant future and that independence is merely a mirage in the desert of South West Africa/Namibia.
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