THE CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
OF JONATHAN EDWARDS (1703 - 1758)

by

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Philosophy and theology combine in Jonathan Edwards in a way that is not usual for either discipline. The field of study is therefore that of historical philosophy and historical theology but only in so far as to give the historical situation and interpretation of Jonathan Edwards' epistemology. The philosophy is Christian, Neo-Platonic and Lockean and the theology is Calvinistic.

The author gives the historical background with reference to John Locke, Isaac Newton and compares Edwards with Kant who was almost contemporary and shows that epistemology is situational and that a philosopher's works can never be studied out of context. He then touches on the massive Puritan heritage of Jonathan Edwards' and shows briefly the epistemological tradition of Calvin but chiefly concentrating on the knowledge of faith. He traces this through the English Puritans to Jonathan Edwards.

The author then by means of a detailed commentary from various parts of Edwards' works places the locus of Edwards' epistemology in the doctrine of the Sovereignty of God. He shows that each Person of the Triune God, was a permanent emotional, devotional, theological and homiletical feature in
Edwards' life. The holistic vision of God working in a consciously epistemological way from eternity to eternity, raises the locus of the epistemology far above Perry Miller's comment that Edwards was extrapolating Lockean psychology into the Godhead. The reverse was true, the vision of God in His eternal sovereignty, omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient, places the locus in eternity, in the heavens, so to speak, and the ordinary elements of epistemology usually discussed by philosophers, must be considered in that context if they are to be true to Jonathan Edwards. This locus is most clearly seen when the eschatological development of his epistemology into eternity is systematised. Knowledge is bound up with glory, virtue, joy, beauty and with an existential encounter with God, growing into eternity. Knowledge is viewed as being mediated by Christ the God-man to an hierarchy of created spirits. Knowledge is itself in an hierarchy and must be considered in its full implications. The knowledge of the damned involves Edwards in a contradiction as he sees them growing in knowledge, suffering and pain yet cut off from Christ the mediator of knowledge and also growing in stupor.

For those here on earth the most important single epistemological event is the salvific crisis, regeneration. The doctrine of faith was highly developed in Edwards and was related to his doctrine of Justification by Faith. The sinner is to believe in the absolute promises of Christ who had given only one condition that man must believe. The reflex act of faith is accepted as a means of assurance. The Holy Spirit's
witness is the work of grace done in a changed life. Edwards' book on the Religious Affections and his many definitions of faith are the main sources for this description and analysis of faith, which did not come from the secular philosophers like Descartes, Leibniz and Locke. The reflex act is traced to the Puritans though Aquinas knew it in principle. Reference is made to Flavel but particularly to Thomas Goodwin, whose direct act of faith (the first faith) and the reflex act of faith (the second faith) is the same as Edwards' doctrine, and the epistemological status of faith and doubt.

The author finds the Lockean/Neo-Platonic/Augustinian-Biblical synthesis uneasy, thinks that Edwards may have absorbed some ambivalence from Locke, but finds his theology sure. Mediate and Immediate knowledge do not seem to compatible in Edwards but the solution is probably to be looked for in his Pastoral Theology where immediate revelations were a scandal and the Lockean concepts seemed very useful. The author hopes that in future Edwardsean epistemology will take account of the proper context of Edwards, which was as a Puritan Pastor and theologian and that the locus of Edwardsean epistemological studies will be lifted above that of Perry Miller for all that writer's brilliance and scholarship. Edwards' epistemology should share his eschatological vision and take proper cognizance of his soteriology.
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1. REFERENCES. It will be helpful to take note that when a reference is to Edwards' 1834 collected WORKS, and a paragraph is quoted, paragraph 1 refers to the top paragraph of the column even if the paragraph commenced in the previous column. For example, WORKS 1, p.101, col 1, par 2, refers to the second paragraph of printing on the page, commencing with "But how God's value for...". The first paragraph commences in column 2 of page 100 and runs on to page 101. If it were to be referred to on page 100 it would be described as "col 2, par 6". If it were to be referred to on p.101, it would be described as col 1, par 1.

However, Edwards' WORKS has a complex numbering system, so great care has been taken to make references clear. However I could not reproduce the symbol "o" and so it has been rendered "par" as well.

2. ESCHATOLOGY. In Jonathan Edwards' time there already existed a considerable body of eschatological literature. This has been totally avoided as it has not been considered relevant to epistemology. To become involved in the intricacies and extremes of chiliasm and prophetic schemes would not in my view have been helpful and in any event, I did not have access to the literature. Even Edwards' History of Redemption did not add much to the eschatological development of his epistemology as such.

3. GENDER IN LANGUAGE. The English language has a strong bias towards the use of the masculine in such a way as to include include the feminine. Although in these days endeavours are made to write less in the masculine style, in the time of Jonathan Edwards this use was the norm. It would have been too distracting for the author and for the reader constantly to be slipping in and out of one style or another, particularly in view of the many quotations. I have done so sometimes, however, mainly for relief and clarity.

4. TENSES. T E Lawrence gave acknowledgement to Mr and Mrs Bernard Shaw for all the semi-colons in The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Dr Chidester is responsible for most of the use of the past tense in this thesis! I have a tendency to write in the historic present. Whereas I have tried to cast the thesis in the past tense it is a peculiarly difficult task. For one thing a concept which was expressed in, say, 1738 was meant to be timeless and of universal application and sometimes the present tense is required, within a past situation. Often force of habit rules the paragraph. I do not claim that I have always been consistent but I hope that the result is not too distracting.

5. THE PERSONAL PRONOUN. As far as I am aware only royalty may use the Royal "We". However, if "I" were to be used there would be just too much "I" to be palatable, so I have used "we" throughout.

5. NUMBERING. The numbering at the top of the pages is in chapters and sections. The numbering at the bottom of the pages is sequential throughout.

6. ACKNOWLEDGMENT. Acknowledgment and thanks are due to Dr David Chidester who first recommended that I focus my ideas on Christian epistemology on Jonathan Edwards. I have appreciated his guidance in our personal relationship and particularly because he is an Augustinian scholar.
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INTRODUCTION

In this thesis we wish to offer chiefly two new insights into Edwardsean epistemology, one the eschatological implications of Jonathan Edwards' epistemology, and the other the epistemological implications of his soteriology.

When we commenced drawing up this thesis we had in mind that we would use Jonathan Edwards as the focus of a Christian epistemology in order to show what the elements of a Christian epistemology would be. It was expected that a commentary would show these elements. Three things emerged, firstly, that Jonathan Edwards was consciously epistemological, in his private philosophical views in relation to his discovery of John Locke, and also in his theology, secondly, that his theological epistemology was eschatological, and thirdly, that the crisis of regeneration which was such an important element in his soteriology had an important place in his epistemology. It became evident that the sovereignty and omnipresence of God and his immediacy in the life of an individual produced not only a cognitive but also an affective experience when this was a saving experience, and it is the most critical moment in his eschatological scheme. Viewed in this light and receiving this central "message" from Edwards' writings themselves, in contra-distinction to Perry Miller's assessment, it became imperative to place Jonathan
Edwards' epistemology in its theological context. This in turn required an examination of the epistemological implications of Edwards's doctrine of faith and the reflex act of faith and the Puritan heritage from which it came. The phenomenon of faith is properly an object of epistemological investigation in its own right, certainly in the history of philosophy, and the Edwardsean system contains both natural faith and divine faith which both involve a direct act of the soul. The reflex act of faith is that act of the soul in which it knows that it knows.

It therefore became necessary to place Jonathan Edwards' epistemology in an historical context which ran in two totally separate streams, a philosophical and a theological one, both of which informed his total view. This itself required some apology as this is not normally the way epistemology is studied today. It is evident, however, that throughout the long range of history, epistemological studies have always been situational.

The brief outline of this thesis is, therefore, that all epistemological studies are situational and conceived and written to fulfil the particular needs of the philosopher and his historical context and this is no less so in the case of Jonathan Edwards. He wrote at a time when John Locke had broken new ground and had brought out what Edwards called the New Logick, that all knowledge is based
on sense experience, that there are no innate ideas and no immediate revelations, that all are therefore dependant upon the substance of external reality for their ideas and knowledge. At the same time Newton's new discoveries revolutionised the nature of the universe. All this Edwards accepted, yet, in view of his Puritan background, he had a Biblical world-view and an heritage of massive Puritan scholarship. His Puritan and Biblical world-view drew all these elements of his epistemological scheme into an eschatological framework containing an hierarchy of knowledge, imparted to an hierarchy of created spirits.

In view of his pastoral experiences in the Great Awakening when, as he explained it, the very power of the presence of God produced an astonishing sense of the immediacy of God and of the imparting of divine light to the soul, he formulated afresh the doctrine of faith. There was a paradox in his thinking: all knowledge is mediate but saving knowledge is immediately imparted by the Spirit of God, yet mediated by the senses and powerfully affecting them. He was Lockean and yet he was a Neo-Platonist in the Augustinian-Biblical tradition. He was an Emanationist in that all knowledge emanated from God and remanated to God. Saving knowledge is immediately imparted by the Spirit of God yet mediated by a spiritual sense analogous to the physical senses. There is no innate knowledge, there are no immediate revelations yet he was an Illuminationist. It is a matter of debate whether
he resolved the paradox.

Jonathan Edwards, in the fact that he inherited a long and immensely rich tradition of Calvinistic evangelical theology, with its high learning and intense concentration on soteriology, had wrestled with the intellectual and pastoral problems of the English Calvinistic doctrine of faith. The knowledge of whether or not a person was in a state of grace was vital knowledge. Historically one could be assured of one's election by the reflexive act of the conscience in a syllogism, for so the Puritans expressed it. Thus the saving knowledge of faith, which came in a crisis in one's knowledge of God within one's eschatological and eternal destiny, was cognitive, affective and reflexive. There was a direct act of faith involving the whole soul and certainty of this could be had in a reflex act wherein one could know that one knew. This knowledge belonged not simply to the content of knowledge but was an act of the soul bringing a qualitative change to the person. However, it was validated by the effects in a person's life: "By their fruits ye shall know them." Sense experience alone could not inform so important a subject, cognitive certainty was not enough, a qualitative change in the whole life was the proof of grace.

So, whereas we started off believing that in the life and works of Jonathan Edwards we would not only find an
epistemology suitable to the Christian faith, and that normal epistemological issues would not be incompatible with that framework, we ended up finding a sophisticated eschatological epistemology, particularly with respect to the saving knowledge of faith. Within such a system, normal issues are compatible with the whole, but the locus and the crisis are overwhelmingly more important.

Jonathan Edwards' epistemology, that is, his theory of knowledge, therefore, is a Christian eschatological epistemology, based on the Bible and is basically theological. It is not philosophical in the sense of an independent free-standing philosophy in the modern way of studying philosophy, but is philosophical in the sense of a philosophy as a sister of theology and a younger sister at that.

We wish to show that the basis of it was the Person of the Triune God who in His infinite goodness designed to communicate Himself to His creatures and that by stages, eschatologically.

The modus operandi of God's impartation of self-knowledge to his creatures was from the Father, through the Son as Mediator of knowledge (as he is of all things) in order to the Son's glory until he hands over all to the Father at the consummation of all things, and through the agency of the Holy Spirit.
This eschatological epistemology includes all created beings in their hierarchies: angels, men (the word is used generically for men, women and children), and devils. Fallen angels and wicked men have rejected God's modus operandi and grand design.

All creatures are conceived of as growing in knowledge but this knowledge is dispensed in periods and epochs, which is why the epistemology is called eschatological.

Knowledge, therefore, is not static but dynamic and growing. In Jonathan Edwards' scheme it has an important psychological corollary, humility. Knowledge is in a hierarchy. It is of different kinds, but the most important knowledge of all is the knowledge of God's Person in a saving experience.

We have faced a problem with the order of the chapters. If we placed the commentary first, without the historical context with its rationale, we would disturb the reader with questions as to what the writer understands by epistemology and why he is not attending to normal epistemological issues and indeed whether this can be called epistemology at all. On the other hand if we placed it last, we would miss giving Jonathan Edwards' epistemology its correct locus. In a very definite sense
this **locus** is entirely different from that of Descartes, Locke, Hume and Berkeley. And all the time we have been haunted by the fear that we will fall into A D Lindsay's criticism of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in the Introduction to the Everyman edition, that the best preparation for reading it for the first time is to have read it four times before, without having the merits in this thesis of having created one of the great achievements of the human spirit! May I just ask the reader's patience: the commentary in the second chapter gives the **locus** of Jonathan Edwards's epistemology, as well as its exposition, the first chapter gives both the philosophical and theological context from an historical perspective. The third chapter relates the epistemology to Edwards' soteriology. The **locus**, although it comes second, is extremely important. Unlike Perry Miller who dismissed *God's Chief End in Creation* in a few pages in a very off-hand way (1), and who considered it "a projection of Lockean psychology into the Godhead itself" (2) and who said that in Jonathan Edwards' ideas it is implicit that even God "must submit to the postulates of John Locke" (3), we see *God's Chief End in Creation* as the implicit model to which Edwards had been referring all his life. With that all-embracing holistic glance, Edwards adhered to a Biblical pattern or world view, shining out from his vision of God. His epistemology was an extrapolation of Divinity into the affairs of men and his vision was not an extrapolation of Locke into Divinity. Puritan theology at
its best shared that \textit{locus} but seventeenth century philosophy did not. While Locke gave Edwards certain essential tools he did not give him the vision itself. However inadequately presented, that \textit{locus} is set out in the Commentary in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

The third chapter concentrates on what we hesitantly call the dualistic nature of knowledge in Edwards' scheme. The epistemological crisis is regeneration which brings a new spiritual cognition and affection. However it is placed within the context of the epistemology of his early years. There are two kinds of cognition and two kinds of affection and even two kinds of the reflection and two kinds of the reflexive act possible. The reflexive act of faith is also called the reflex act of faith or the reflexive act of the conscience. All these are elements of Edwards' epistemology.

Finally we attempt an analysis of the problems inherent in the somewhat uneasy synthesis in the whole of Edwards thought. The analysis points to what we consider are anomalies in the synthesis. Edwards did not systematise his epistemology or philosophy. His theology is surer than his philosophy. The analysis was not the prime object of presenting this thesis and is tentative. Edwards is so very much bigger than any criticism of him can ever be. We hope that the positive elements in the presentation of the framework, \textit{locus} and the elements of
his epistemology particularly with respect to his soteriology will far outweigh the negative elements which are in any event, debatable.
CHAPTER 1. JONATHAN EDWARDS' PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF EPISTEMOLOGY

1.1 EPISTEMOLOGY IS SITUATIONAL

Epistemology is one of the two main branches of Philosophy, the other being Logic. Epistemology and its relation to Metaphysics, Logic and Psychology has been variously described and is itself controversial. Historically there are different definitions for Metaphysics, Epistemology and Psychology. When writers speak of the Psychology of Brentano, Meinong and Husserl, just to mention one example, the word has a different meaning from modern Psychology which is an experimental science.

In the intellectual milieu of philosophical studies in the time of Jonathan Edwards, the predominant view of Descartes and Locke (and after Edwards, Kant) was that the theory of knowledge had a prior status to that of metaphysics because it was the investigation of the possibility and limits of knowledge and as such would have to take precedence over any other speculations as to the nature of reality. Other later writers, Spinoza, Hegel and A N Whitehead reversed the order. (1) As there are fundamental differences of thinking about philosophy, metaphysics and epistemology, it follows that there will be some difference of opinion as to what should be discussed in a thesis such as this.

Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. As a concept it
is as old as the third of fourth centuries before Christ when, as is well known, Plato was discussing universals as ideas and Aristotle (c.350 B.C.) in the Corpus aristotelicum compiled by Alexander of Aphrodisias, was discussing logic, the categories, the judgment, reasoning, perception, imagination and memory, the intellectual soul, the idea of God and whether virtue was a universal or not. As an English term the word "Epistemology" dates to J F Ferrier (1854) and its German counterpart, or perhaps better, prototype, "Erkenntnistheorie" dates to the Kantian scholar K L Reinhold (1789). (1) Although the word "epistemology" itself, therefore, post-dates Jonathan Edwards, we are not guilty of an anachronism when using it of that era, as the discipline and subject matter of Epistemology had long been discussed.

Because of the long history of the theory of knowledge, the word means different things to different persons and different persons have approached it from different starting points, attempting to meet different psychological and intellectual needs. However, according to Ledger Wood, writing in the Dictionary of Philosophy (2), properly speaking it covers the whole field of the very possibility of knowledge, the limits of knowledge, its origin, the methodological problems associated with it, the problem of the a priori, the differentiating of different kinds of knowledge, the "structure of the knowledge-situation",
and the problem of truth itself. It therefore covers a very wide field and it has been the subject of major discussion for over 2000 years. It has meant and does mean different things to different people.

D W Hamlyn takes much the same position as Ledger Wood with regard to the wide range of epistemological subjects that have been discussed. He includes scepticism and rationality, the search for certainty, rationalism, empiricism, knowledge, meaning, concepts, the discussion of knowledge and belief, types of knowledge, truth and objectivity, "perception, knowledge and belief", memory, self-knowledge and knowledge of others, and a priori knowledge in relation to certain kinds of knowledge such as mathematics and science.

Hamlyn also expresses it in other terms, saying that the problems to be dealt with in epistemology cover those of the nature of knowledge in general, those about the scope of knowledge accompanied by what he calls "the correlative problem of whether knowledge is dependent entirely on sense perception" and then those problems within specialised fields of knowledge. We have included the quotation in order to emphasise what he himself found necessary to emphasise on his first page, that theories of truth, perception, memory, etc., are really "sub-theories within the theory of knowledge itself". (3) Epistemology is really a very wide subject indeed, and the problems of
metaphysics and epistemology and indeed psychology, overlap. What one may call metaphysics (such as the question of the existence of God) is for another the foundation of epistemology. The question of the existence of spirits as independent objective ontological essences (if that is not a tautology!), would be considered by some to be irrelevant to epistemology, arguing that the theory of knowledge has nothing to do with such metaphysical matters but has to do with matters such as how one knows, the act of intuition, the experience of sense-perception and so forth.

To take a further example, another, such as Jonathan Edwards, would consider the objective existence of spirits as crucial to epistemology, if the term had been in existence then. At least so we hope to demonstrate. The modern psychologist, concerned with empirical data, would find Edwards irrelevant to the issues of epistemology, for apart from those interested in esoteric psychology, the modern psychologist probably, but not necessarily, would be looking at the processes of knowledge within the human body. To him Edwards simply would be setting up an a priori (revelation) and arguing from that position that spirits exist as objective beings. This criticism he would apply to all of Edwards' system as experimental science is considered more proper for dealing with the problems of psychology. However Edwards was no mean
psychologist himself. In his pastoral capacity he laid down guidelines from his own observations on the pastoral psychology of Revivals. (4)

In the Brentano-Meinong-Husserl development of phenomenology (latter 19th century), epistemology is concerned with the act of consciousness, the intention, and the meaning. Brentano was concerned with acts of consciousness as the science of psychical phenomenology: here psychology carries a somewhat esoteric meaning, where the act of intending or meaning is analysed. His three references were simple presentation to the consciousness, judgment (recognition or rejection; affirmation or denial) and movements of the will and feelings. Meinong took one element of Brentano's scheme, that of objects that do not exist apart from consciousness (inexistent objects), and dealt with them as objects of consciousness. Husserl developed Brentano in respect of the noesis (act) as distinguished from the noema (the meaning or intention) and asked if objects of consciousness exist as an ontic reality. Thence he developed his famous epoche. This created special problems relating to the validating of their knowledge. (5) (6)

In the Marxist epistemology (it was rudimentary in Marx himself and it was only developed by later Marxists like Engels (8)) the emphasis is on human activity, where praxis is a key word and it is required of epistemology that it
should have a social conception of knowledge, that it can account for human activity, that it can be a dialectical theory and so forth. (7) Marx' own philosophy, which was the basis of his own rudimentary epistemology (8), followed Hegel and Spinoza in a philosophy of internal relations because nature and society, in his view, were internally related and could not separated (9). Furthermore, Marx took the central dialectic of Hegel, abandoned the latter's transcending philosophy for a pragmatic one which was face to face with praxis (social action) (10). Taking Hegel's own principle he inverted it to his own use. This in turn created problems in respect of ethics (11). From its historical perspective, therefore, it follows that Marxist epistemology is situational and that if one were to study Marxist epistemology one would have to study it in its own situation and concern oneself both with the issues within its parameters and those problems raised by them. (12)

D'Abro considers epistemology from the point of view of a mathematical scientist, claiming the field for those trained in the methodology of science. No philosopher or theologian may enter the debate with "private" knowledge: all knowledge must be "public" in which all relations are agreed. The categorical imperative is excluded from his discussion. He sees the world especially from the viewpoint of a mathematician or mathematical-physicist. Only what is demonstrable therefore can be called
knowledge. (13) It follows that from such a position the numinous would be excluded. Another, like Otto, takes cognizance of the numinous, attempting to speak both to Christians and those taking a naturalistic evolutionary model as true. (14). Another seeks the physical limits of the individual world view in experimental psychology and sees the eye as "the most important avenue of personal consciousness" (15) (16). One could continue to quote examples but it is not necessary.

It is evident that a given approach to epistemology commonly arises from the intellectual milieu in which a philosopher moves, either out of a prevailing world-view or in opposition to one. It is evident that philosophy in general and epistemology in particular is situational. In philosophy, one has to follow the trail where it leads though sometimes it leads to unexpected and perhaps even unwelcome places as Mary Warnock has said. In the case of Jonathan Edwards it is inseparably intertwined with theology, then contemporary and pre-contemporary philosophy and his pastoral perspective.
1.2 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 'SECULAR' PHILOSOPHERS

1.2.1 KANT AND THE NEED TO DEFEND PURE REASON COMPARED WITH EDWARDS' SITUATION

Coming nearer to Jonathan Edwards' time, in a situation which had its intellectual roots in at least some of the same authorities, Kant commenced his studies in the complex welter of views generated by the conflict of the intuitive-deductive method which Descartes had established with the inductive-mathematical method which Newton used in *Principia Mathematica* (1687). In the intuitive-deductive method one worked down from a premise as a necessary step: by intuition one deduced the validity of one's knowledge by mathematical means from one's *a priori* knowledge. In the inductive-mathematical method used by Newton, a number of observed, particular facts were "led into the ground" to arrive at a position by *a posteriori* reasoning, arguing back from effect to cause. In addition to the conflict of methods, one very important early influence on Kant is "the principle of adequate ground", also called the "the principle of rejection", also called the "the causality principle". He was also influenced by Descartes via Leibniz and Wolf. Descartes had a system of "innate ideas". Locke and Hume, the disciples of Newton had attacked Descartes' method, whereas Malebranche and Leibniz substituted a pre-established harmony for Descartes' innate ideas. Rather than believe in innate ideas, it was thought to be better to believe that one was ready to
accept ideas that seemed to be innate, because they fitted the pre-established harmony of things so well. This was popularised by Wolf. Kant could not escape his past. A third fierce conflict was raging: was space absolute or relative?

Kant was born in 1720 and died at the age of 84 in 1804. He was a university academic, a professor, a teacher. He lived in Germany. At 35 he wrote a philosophical treatise called Nova Dilucidatio (A new investigation of the first principles of metaphysics) which has been called "the tractate of the principle of sufficient reason". His view was that reality has a rational structure and the intellect can know it correctly by its own reasoning and principles. (17)

Kant faced this problem: that the empirical method (data obtained through the method of observation and experience) can only guarantee the real, that which can be observed and experienced. It cannot guarantee the universally objective and necessary character of that knowledge. On the other hand, a priori knowledge does guarantee the objective and necessary character of knowledge but cannot guarantee reality. In the dispute between relative and absolute space, Kant sided with Newton and wrote to convince mathematicians that absolute space is an essential pre-requisite for geometry because it had to be independant.
of matter and that it has to be so to account for the order that rules in matter. It was therefore both ontological and a priori. This meant that Kant had to realize that in the face of the Newtonian position an a priori existed. He now had two faculties sui generis: sense (implying the a posteriori method) and reason (implying the a priori) each following its own laws. Sense had its own a priori form, space (and later time) which is the aprioristic form of knowledge itself. Reason has its own forms which are unanalysable concepts (these were later to be his categories).

This insight into the distinction between sense and reason gave Kant the solution to the problem of the limitation of reason to the data of experience. Intuition observes these things in their sensible phenomena. The scientific method therefore does not limit reason to experience and so render it universally invalid but it can also be known apart from its phenomena (the given via the senses) but by pure reason acting according to its own laws. From there, the position in his Dissertatio, Kant moved to the Critique of Pure Reason in which he held that objective truth is guaranteed by the internal relation of sense and intellect simply because the intellect does not create the object as an existing thing but brings it into being in some way when it is the necessary condition for its knowledge as an object. It is not a "Ding an sich" but an object of knowledge. He then moved on from epistemology.
Kant's approach to the theory of knowledge arose out of his need for a coherent answer to the question, can one ever say that anything is true? He therefore conducted a critique of reason itself to bring in both sense experience and reason and find out if truth did exist. He needed it for himself, for his students, for his teaching: in a sense it was an *apologia pro ratione sua*.

Jonathan Edwards was born in 1703 in New England on the other side of the Atlantic, where he lived all his life, and died at the age of 55 in 1758. He was very precocious, and at the age of 13 had a good knowledge of Latin, Greek and Hebrew and was writing papers on philosophy. He was also influenced by Descartes, more by Newton and fundamentally by Locke but appears to have been much more influenced by the Bible and the great theological writers which were in his tradition and in the theological training which he received.

Edwards was first of all trained in Puritan theology and in the system known as the Puritan "technologia". The technologia was supposed to set out how God governed the world and in what order all things were laid out, concepts, relations, propositions, principles in endless branches and subdivisions and "dichotomies" which "looked like a
genealogist's diagram of some gigantic family tree." (19) It was good training, Edwards thought, even though it was rejected when he read Locke, because "the Old Logick" taught him think in an orderly fashion. (20) Although the Puritan technologia was rejected, Edwards did not reject the essential Puritan theology: the technologica, after all, was never of the essence of Puritanism. The Puritan theology was to be with him throughout his life.

Like Kant's system, Christianity has its epistemological needs. The Christian system requires certainty: this is found in the origin of knowledge, the eternal God omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent. If knowledge is to come from God, God must be able to communicate it, his Personality assures that. The system must be reasonable: God underwrites it (Christ is the Logos, the Account, the Reason) and it will always be reasonable if man's limited mind can grasp it. Thus where Kant felt it necessary to construct a detailed and elaborate structure to justify reason, the Christian finds it in the nature of Divine Reason. One is not long into Jonathan Edwards before one realises how highly he prized reason, though never above revelation in Divine matters. In his scheme God's reason was the implicit reference to which all men knowingly and unknowingly referred. The question of how he communicates to his creatures was really a subordinate matter. How he made his will known to independant spirits was dependant primarily on the creation-pattern, or the creation status
of each creature. As "God is a Spirit and those who worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth" (John 4:24) it was essential to recognise the category of spirit. As the Bible speaks of God who "maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire" (Heb 1:7) the spirits were seen to have ontological status: to be independant free essences capable of thought, will and action (persons) (20a). As the Bible speaks of the destiny of the saved as "the spirits of just men made perfect" (Heb 12:23), the human soul or spirit must have been capable of existing without the body. This would be the "entity" to which God would communicate in the body or out of it. Sense experience in a humanistic system becomes a chief category of the system. Not so in Christianity: sense experience is not logically prior to the spirit and what the senses experience in or out of the body depends upon the nature of spirit. Whereas Kant spent his life on the question of the validation of reason and its balance with sense perception, a Christian epistemology as in Jonathan Edwards finds that validation in God and moves on rapidly to a full-orbed epistemology which takes into account all categories relating to man's place in God's creation. It brings Locke and sense-experience into the yoke with Descartes and Newton. All God's ways are one. He made all things, gravity and atomism, angels and men, animals and all things. Angels are as truly a part of his thought as are atoms (which are not things, but a way of thinking.
Boyle's chemistry proved the existence of gravity and atomism, Newton's physics likewise. However angels and the knowledge of God came by revelation. He would not have considered these an a priori set up as a creation of the mind but would have said that our knowledge of these as truly existing was part of the nature of things and that knowledge could only be derived from revelation. The scope of Jonathan Edwards' thought was broad. When Newton played with the idea that a fluid acted as a glue to bind atoms together, or that atoms hooked themselves together, Edwards rejected the notions as unscientific: the atom was a concept not a thing (22). He adopted the inductive-mathematical method of Newton, and the a priori system of the Bible, with its dependance on revelation, inspiration and illumination and all the data given there. The immediacy, or omnipresence, of the Divine Being holds the universe together. (23)

Jonathan Edwards' epistemology arose out of his reading of Locke but also out of his theology and his pastoral experience and some of it from his experiences in the Great Revival. With a holistic grasp of truth, comprehensive and intuitively fitting all parts into a great whole, Edwards was concerned about the knowledge that people were getting through the "surprising" events of the Great Revival. Some were receiving communications and knowledge that did not give evidence of the grace of God, because their lives did not show the one single proof the Lord
Jesus Christ had given as a test that they were "gracious": "By your fruits ye shall know them". That is not to say that that was Edwards' motivation in discussing knowledge. After all, he did not know the term "epistemology". It is nevertheless a fact that Jonathan Edwards had a detailed epistemology, regarding the Source, possibility of, status, mode, content and methodology of knowledge, both a priori and a posteriori knowledge.

1.2.2 THE EMOTIONAL AND FORMATIVE INFLUENCE OF LOCKE ON JONATHAN EDWARDS' LIFE AS IMPORTANT BUT SUBORDINATE

This boy, delighted, entranced and overwhelmed by God, His beauty and sovereignty, was brilliant and of prodigious mental ability and concentration. He entered Yale for his bachelors's degree at 13 and was soon noted for his brilliance. (24)

Sereno E. Dwight in his 1834 Memoir tells us that in his second year at college he was introduced to Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, at the age of 14, of which Jonathan wrote, that when reading he was

'enjoying a far higher pleasure in the persual of its pages "than the most greedy miser finds, when gathering up handfuls of silver and gold, from some newly discovered treasure."' (25)

Perry Miller explains the significance to Edwards of this reading of Locke in Jonathan Edwards in the chapter "The Inherent Good". What Locke did for him, says Miller, was
to show him the divine strategy which was to reveal himself indirectly 'because speaking the unspeakable is impossible'. Locke relieved him of the intolerable burden of the sharp nakedness of immediate revelation. So

'God works through the concrete and the specific, and the mind (Edwards would add, the regenerate mind) must know enough "to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether."' (26)

It was, says Miller further,

"not only a rescue, it was a directive for living. It saved him from the fire of his own intensity, or from the scepticism which in moments of depression seemed the only alternative, by teaching him that the one legitimate field of both speculation and worship is the content of the human mind." (27)

Miller goes on to tell how that Jonathan was learning from Elisha Williams the technologia, the Puritan "organon" of all the arts and which was the order by which God governed the world. All this collapsed 'like a pack of cards'. The way in which 'men can acquire the materials of reason and knowledge' are 'solely from...."EXPERIENCE".' We know from Edwards himself that he read this book with ecstasy and he himself acknowledges his debt to Locke's Essay. In Miller's words as Edwards read this book "the burden of an insupportable weight lifted with every page". It was no longer necessary for man to struggle through life with supposed innate ideas or concepts which had been implanted in them which were supposed to be part of the divine image and so were to be submitted to as absolutely authoritative in advance of any experience. Edwards now
had a certainty that God does not impart ideas or obligations outside of sense experience. (28) "He does not rend the fabric of nature or break the connection between experience and behaviour." (Miller) (29) Edwards the theologian would have considered that God had decreed that he should read this book. It was to prepare him for that acute, penetrating, calm and sane analysis of the "surprising events" of the Great Revival.

In the technologia an exhaustive chart laid out all things, concepts, relations, propositions, principles and dichotomies, etc., etc., etc., in an extreme form of apriorism. However, a human being had to deal with what actually presented itself to the mind. The mind itself brought an existent object to life by means of an idea. An idea was "the object of the understanding when a man thinks", it was "whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species," and it was what was in one's mind, simply, and one is conscious of them in oneself. (30) This simple first principle delivered Edwards from the complicated technologia, and set him free to be assured that it is only the mind's ideas that it knows. It does not know all sorts of other knowledge derived from "innate ideas" (31) So much of what Locke writes in his Essay seems to a modern very common-place but it was revolutionary in its time. He makes it a fundamental principle that ideas only come from sensation. They are mediated by the senses.
Copleston says that Locke oscillated between the representationist view that ideas are the objects of knowledge and the view that ideas are psychic modifications by which we know things directly. (32) Edwards sided with Locke on the view that the senses provide the mind with the furniture for reflection (33). In their simplest form they can neither be made nor destroyed (34). Each idea comes through one sense (i.e. coldness, hardness) (35). The combination of these ideas are the materials of thought. When we have more complex ideas such as perception and willing, these are derived from the observation of the operations of one's own mind. (36) Sensation and reflection are combined to produce thought. Locke discusses what Kant later incorporated into his "categories". (37) All these ideas Jonathan Edwards absorbed and his works abound with evidence of the profit he received from the Essay. On the question of mediate and immediate knowledge, Edwards sided with Locke that knowledge must be mediated by the senses. This was to be fundamental to his soteriology and the doctrine of assurance of salvation, or "the witness of the Spirit", which, as we shall see, was related to the theological concept of the reflex act of the conscience.

Perry Miller is therefore correct when he emphasises so strongly the profound influence of Locke (and in fact Newton, to whom we shall be turning) on Edwards. Locke influenced his theology because, of course, Edwards did not
exist in a vacuum but enamoured as he was with the Bible, he was influenced by his teachers and the authors that he studied. Edwards adopted the principle of scientific observation (empiricism) instead of that of a priori constructs. The result was that Edwards held two principles in tension,

1. that theology comes from the Bible, that is from revelation, theology is 'given', and
2. that scientific observation should also inform theology.

We would not go so far as Perry Miller who says that

"In 1734 Edwards was applying to theology a critique which assumed that theology should derive from experience and not from logic or from convention."

(38)

It is certain that the insights obtained from Locke and Newton informed Edwards' theology but we do not believe that it could ever be said that Edwards' theology was derived from experience. In fact, it is almost the thesis of The Religious Affections that experience is a most deceptive guide. Furthermore, Perry Miller implies that Locke's thesis was the source of Edwards' interpretation of theology: at least if this is the implication we believe that Miller is saying too much by far. (39) Add his explicit warnings about experience to his intense Biblicism, which can be seen throughout Edwards' Works on every page except in his philosophical notes, and we have a formidable contradiction of Miller's statement.
Furthermore Perry Miller's statement that "the one legitimate field of both speculation and worship is the content of the human mind" is misleading. It is indeed true to say that Edwards was an Idealist and that he believed that the Material Universe existed in the human mind and that all things exist in the human mind as representations. Edwards said a number of far reaching things in his Notes on the Mind.

He says, for example, on Sensation

"All ideas begin from thence; and there never can be any idea, thought, or act of the mind, unless the mind first received some ideas from Sensation, or some other way equivalent, wherein the mind is wholly passive in receiving them." (40)

The reader may as well be warned now, once for all, however, that there are many traps for the unwary and superficial reader in Jonathan Edwards' works. Even the very next paragraph raises a question which he noted for further study and clarification in his own mind as to whether this statement would stand in the whole scheme of things in the light of theology. He raises the question

"How far the Soul, in a Separate State, must depend on Sensation, or some way of passively receiving ideas equivalent to Sensation, in order to conversing with other minds, to the knowing of any occurrence, to beholding any of the works of God, and to its further improvement in knowledge." (41)

He is here anticipating his later major scheme of eschatological epistemology, for "glorified saints", angels
and even demons know and communicate. When philosophers talk about 'knowing only through sensation' they almost invariably mean through the five senses of the human body. Edwards saw and jotted down in his note books at any early age that this would not do in a Christian epistemology. He raised the question of some analogous sensation belonging to angels at the same time. After mentioning some of the angels' activities he asks

"--how far these things necessarily imply, that they have some kind of Sensations like ours; and, Whether these things do not show that, by some laws or other, they are united to some kind of Matter?" (42)

At the same time that Edwards was saying that ideas can only come through sensation, he was saying that the material universe exists only in the mind. Yet again he is quick to qualify his remarks.

"When we say that the World, i.e. the material Universe, exists no where but in the mind, we have got to such a degree of strictness and abstraction, that we must be exceedingly careful, that we do not confound and lose ourselves by misapprehension. That is impossible, that it should be meant, that all the world is contained in the narrow compass of a few inches of space, in little ideas in the place of the brain; for that would be a contradiction; for we are to remember that the human body, and the brain itself, exist only mentally, in the same sense that other things do; and so that, which we call place, is an idea too. Therefore things are truly in these places; for what we mean, when we say so, is only, that this mode of our idea of place appertains to such an idea. We would not therefore by understood to deny, that things are where they seem to be." (43)

Edwards could never be said to mean "the one legitimate field of both speculation and worship is the content of the
human mind", to use Perry Miller's words in the sense that God was merely in the human mind and the whole of the universe of created things and God the Eternal and Uncreated was, or is, merely any idea. Of course Perry Miller knew that. However the emphasis on the locus of Edward's epistemology must be lifted from contents of the human mind, the merely ideal, to a very different level. It is precisely for this reason that it is important to know and to feel the largeness of God in Edwards' mind and emotions.

On the other hand, so great was the influence of Locke upon Edwards that his soteriology was permanently influenced by the Essay. Dwight tells us that when Edwards was investigating the subject of power

"...he came to the settled conclusion that men have in the physical sense, the power of repenting and turning to God." (44)

Thus it was Locke who helped Edwards to avoid the morass of hyper-Calvinism which sees one as helpless in the grip of the eternal decrees of God. This element of voluntarism was significant, particularly in view of the total system in which everything was subject to cause and effect, each in its proper place. It meant that the ethical demands of the Gospel were possible and the responsibility of man was without question, not indeed through his own efforts - never that, but because God had decreed it that man must
act in repentance, prayer and use of the means of grace. The Freedom of the will was written to say the last word on man's lost estate and total depravity. Nevertheless the action of repentance was man's responsibility and it was Locke who cleared his mind for him.

1.2.3 THE NEW WORLD-VIEW OF THE NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE

It is scarcely possible to retroject ourselves into the pre-Newtonian and pre-Lockean world-view. Alexandre Koyré who had the distinction of holding chairs at Princeton and the Sorbonne simultaneously and spent his life studying Galileo, Descartes and Newton, in his article "The Significance of the Newtonian synthesis", has digested a life-time of study on the revolutionary character of the change that took place through Isaac Newton. It was, he says, "one of the deepest, if not the deepest, mutations and transformations accomplished - or suffered by the human mind since the invention of the cosmos by the Greeks, two thousand years before." (45) It has been variously explained, he says, in its empiricist results, its new science, its belief in modern man itself and his ability to discover by his own powers, senses and intelligence, over against the old faith in tradition and authority. It has been explained in man's turn away from the via contemplativa towards a scientia activa operativa (Bacon), or as a turning to a new science of creative man.
This had its fruit in engineers, enterprise and calculating trade. All these explanations, says Koyne, have truth. However, there was a much more fundamental change which had its effect in these things. This was the new metaphysical approach to nature.

Koyne distills this new metaphysical approach into two closely connected features, (1) the destruction of the cosmos and (2) the geometrization of space. The hierarchical concept of the cosmos vanished. Before it had been a world of ontological hierarchy. There were two worlds, one of becoming and one of being, heaven and earth, physica coelestis and physica terrestis. The structures based on value, perfection and harmony, meaning and aim, had been objective and governed scientific thought. Now they were expelled. The a priori gave place to things proved by a posteriori reasoning. Now all was levelled to what could be identified as its fundamental contents and laws. The laws and principles could be discovered by experiment. The Cartesian concept of "motion" was a species of becoming which affected the moving bodies, as "rest" did not. Motion was a kind of being, an indestructable status, and inertia was resistance to motion. Rest was likewise a status. With the advent of Newton, rest and motion were conceived of as relations and also status. Newton's famous first law or axiom was that "Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is
compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it."

This law revolutionised man's view of the universe! Mathematical entities were also affected. Above all else, corpuscular texture formed the inner reality of being. Matter was no longer homogeneous (Descartes) but previously differently determined corpuscles. Newton's views produced a synthesis, "the book of nature written in purely corpuscular characters and words" (Koyne on Boyle) and a purely mathematical syntax binding all together (Koyne on Galileo and Descartes).

Three characteristics prevailed in the Newtonian world, (1) matter was an infinite number of hard, unchangeable, separated and isolated non-identical particles, (2) motion, not affecting the being of matter but moving them hither; and thither in a void, and (3) space, an infinite and homogeneous void; in which corpuscles or conglomerates or corpuscles moved about. Above this, either God's action, or a mathematical stricture, that is attraction, held everything together. Newton actually proved the latter but could not himself accept action at a distance. Gravity, it was a fact, things were attracted to each other, but how he knew not.

Voltaire wittily summed up the change of world-view. In France where the "old world" predominated, a Frenchman knew the world was a universe composed of vortices of subtle matter. If he went to London he would find all things
changed. The universe is a void. "In Paris everything is explained by pressure which nobody understands; in London by attraction which nobody understands either." It was the Newtonian world-view that prevailed. Only an infinitesimal part of the cosmos was filled by matter moving freely and unhampered. It was not chaos, it was ordered by the straightforward law of attraction, gravity. Every atom was related to every other. But what a different world! The law of attraction states that force diminishes in proportion to the square of the distance. It is an ordered world of laws and it was considered only reasonable to suppose that God created it thus. Thus although the new world-view was empiricist and at first blush it might give a blow to Christianity with its medieval colour, it greatly undergirded faith in a God or order and harmony. It was easy to believe in the pre-established harmony of all things. What was previously accepted a priori could now be accepted as a result of empiricist proofs that implied it.

And this is where we find Jonathan Edwards. "It is only reasonable to suppose" is a formula constantly used by him. Empiricist analysis of the experiences of the Great Awakening was penetratingly done. He accepted Newton as he accepted Locke. He immediately applied to his Calvinism, as every Christian did to their theism, the implications of an ordered universe. Whereas Newton found it impossible for matter and even for God to act at a
distance (atoms might even have hooks on them to link them together, there must be some explanation for their adherance to one another), Edwards at once accepted that the immediate presence of God held all together. To Newton the agent would have to be proximate but to Edwards God held all together by his will and in his mind. It was a Neo-Platonic synthesis to which Locke and Newton were subject.

It was because Newton was a supreme experimental and supreme mathematical genius that his world-view prevailed. As Pope wrote

"Nature and nature's laws lay hid in night; God said, Let Newton be! and all was light."

Unhappily as Koyne said,

"'Twas not for long: for Devil, howling, "Ho, Let Einstein be! restored the status quo."

Newton himself believed in God but not as Edwards did. Newton kept his unitarian views a careful secret. (46) Perry Miller has said that Edwards all but anticipated Einstein in his view that atomism is merely a concept. If we may take Koyne's wit seriously for a moment, Edwards would have seen Einstein as only a step further. The disorder and chaos at the sub-atomic level would only point to an order at a much more fundamental level than at present capable of empiricist demonstration. The fact that the present order is maintained even at the level of appearance would be indicative of God's immediate presence.
holding all things together. The apparent disorder would be superficial to the order of God's Mind at the most fundamental level.

The world-view of Newton's own synthesis and Locke's empiricism was absorbed by Edwards but it was itself subject to an Edwardsean synthesis. Thomas Anton Schafer said that Jonathan Edwards accomplished a remarkable synthesis between Lockean empiricism, Augustinian illuminism, the (Biblical) plan of salvation, Platonic idealism and Neo-Platonic emanationism (47). Leonard P Riforgiato sees the synthesis as that of Locke's solidity as the basic characteristic of bodies, Newton's atomic theory with the bridge between ontological and theological speculation as the Trinitarian model. (48) There is truth in this view but the truth is bigger but to define God according to Edwards as "gravity and space" incredible dictu! J D Stamey sees Edwards' "unwritten" philosophical system as a synthesis of Newton's space, time and mass, Locke's psychology and his own vision of divine providence, serving as an ideological guide as theologian and revivalist. (49) R K McMaster gives the historical position of Edwards as inheriting Calvinism, the Cambridge Platonism, and Neo-Platonism. (50)

The Edwardsean synthesis brought all these concepts into a single world-view, not that of the post-Newton secular
philosophers but a world-view compatible with the Neo-
Platonic-Augustinian-Biblical synthesis. Stephen J Stein
has said,

"He must be viewed as a transitional thinker, looking
back to the Reformed heritage and also drawing heavily
on the Enlightenment." (51)

Where Locke and Newton led the way, Edwards followed. He
dropped the "Old Logick" with the coming of the "New
Logick". He saw that experimental psychology was possible
in a pastoral context. Without question the "New Logick"
would have informed his theology. He saw gravity as a key
to the binding of the universe together into a single
interlocking system held together by the will of God and
his immediate presence. By analogy the spiritual world
was likewise held together in the Mind of God. "All God's
ways are one." Every part of the material and spiritual
worlds were extensions of God's understanding and will.
Each atom and each human or spiritual incident had its
proper place in God's economy, each having its proper cause
and producing its proper effect. There were no mistakes,
there was nothing shoddy, all was foreseen, foreknown and
given from or taken up into the will of God. Grace itself
came from the interposing act of God. All, however, was
subjected to his theology and for this his Puritan heritage
had well prepared him.
1.3 THE KNOWLEDGE OF SALVATION AS A COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE AND REFLEXIVE ACT

1.3.1 THE AUGUSTINIAN-BIBLICAL TRADITION

Edwards reflects many of the issues dealt with by St Augustine. He did not, as did the saint, arrive at the place of faith through strenuous doubt and confusion and so have to have an intellectual conversion as well as a moral and emotional one from a dissolute life. A personal regeneration was necessary but from the beginning his life was exemplary. As a consequence he did not have the enormous emotional struggle and tremendous intellectual conflict over doubt or find it necessary to hammer out a theory of the possibility of knowledge, as did Augustine. However the same sweetness of the Divine Presence and the knowledge of the Divine Person, the same love of God the same presuppositions which have their origin, of course, in the Bible, are evident. Each has their own vision of eternal truth and its relation to the Eternal God. However Augustine to a large degree was addressing a pagan world and the church, whereas Edwards was addressing the Arminians most of his life, his own congregation, the congregations of New England, Antinomians (those who believed that salvation meant spiritual lawlessness) and in many cases some imaginary opponent, for he hammers out his arguments as if answering a most determined debater. The Arminians of his time were both moderate and extreme from
Isaac Watts, an impeccable evangelical and the great hymn writer of the evangelicals, through to Chubb, an Arian who became a Deist. (52) He also had to defend the principles of the Great Revival against other evangelical leaders like Chauncey, equally committed to Biblicism but very dubious of the high emotionalism that the powerful preaching of Edwards and the impelling sense of the immediacy of God produced. (53) But out of it all, serene and penetrating, dispassionate, analytical, devoted to God and to truth, Jonathan Edwards produced as a by-product as his life's work as a preacher and theologian, and of his literary work as a philosopher, a Christian epistemology meets many of the needs of the Christian.

One element new in the philosophy of Jonathan Edwards which we are not aware earlier philosophers linked to epistemology is eschatology. From the time of the Apocalypse, and earlier, of course, the coming glory of Christ was part of the Christian hope. It was particularly the hope of the church in times of the dreadful persecutions of the first 350 years of Christianity and formed part of the Christian tradition at all times. It experienced a great revival after the Reformation and many wild theories had been advocated. (54) Jonathan Edwards, however, saw a teleological implication in epistemology: knowledge was linked to the end purposes of God. Nor are we aware of any writer who has linked epistemology to teleology in the same way and
with the same prominence since Edwards.

We have already seen that epistemology is situational; to expound Jonathan Edwards' epistemology truly, we must take cognizance of the knowledge of God in conversion which is so very important in his scheme. The abstract study of knowledge in the tradition of the secular philosophers was an integral background of his system of thought, for he did not ignore it, but the real live issues were pastoral and theological. For those who have been trained to think of philosophy as wholly a matter of reason, it may well seem as if we are now about to move out of the proper field of epistemology into that of theology. However as our subject is the epistemology of Jonathan Edwards, if we approached the subject from a milieu foreign to that of Edwards' himself, we would be in danger either of eisogesis, or of simply getting the whole of his epistemology in a wrong perspective and leaving out what he himself would have considered were the most important elements. His whole life centred on the "advancement of true religion" and in his pastoral concerns it was of cardinal importance that people should know that they were in a state of grace. This knowledge, in what we might term the Augustinian-Biblical tradition in which he moved, was the single most important knowledge that any human being could have, because it was at the same time the evidence of his election, the entry into the eternal kingdom of God, the point at which a man became reconciled.
to an angry but loving God and began to live to His glory. As God is the One for whom all things in heaven and earth consist, the knowledge that one is "truly gracious" is pre-eminent knowledge. It would be a mistake and a misrepresentation to exclude it from his system. If this knowledge were merely part of the content of knowledge, we could ignore it, but the experience of it and its mode make it an epistemological fact.

So then, although it is not customary in epistemological studies to consider theological issues, because in Jonathan Edwards' epistemology this is a vital issue, we must take a short look at the theological context of the subject.

1.3.2 THE CALVINISTIC TRADITION

Calvin wrote extensively on the knowledge of God and the first two books of his Institutes are given especially to the subject. However, although the knowledge of God in a certain sense is part of a Christian epistemology, it has been extensively written on ever since, as reformed theologians followed Calvin's structure and order of theological subjects, and it is far too large and discursive a subject to be discussed in this connection with any profit. In any event it deals mainly with the content of knowledge which is not to the point. As we shall see, it is not the knowledge of God in the sense of the content of knowledge to which we wish to draw
attention, but rather to the experience itself and the mode of that experience, which are epistemological matters more properly. If one were to look in Calvin for a relevant issue, it seems that one would have to look in Book 3 of his Institutes and in certain of his commentaries, where he makes an application of the knowledge of God to man. As far as man's capacity for this experience is concerned, in Book 1, chapter 15, he views the soul as having two parts, intellect and will, "the office of the intellect being to distinguish between objects" (with approbation or disapprobation) and "the office of the will, to choose and follow what the intellect declares to be good, to reject and shun what it declares to be bad." (55) The understanding and the will are the fundamental powers of the soul. For a definition of the soul itself, Calvin could find no help in his predecessors, except Plato. The "substance of the soul is incorporeal...though not properly enclosed by space, it however occupies the body as a kind of habitation, not only animating all its parts, and rendering the organs fit and useful for their actions, but also holding the first place in regulating the conduct." (56)

With this Edwards would be in agreement. And as we shall see, Edwards whole epistemology could be viewed as a thorough-going commentary on Calvin's comment in the same paragraph, namely

"...man was undoubtedly created to meditate on the heavenly life...And, indeed, man would want the principal use of his understanding if he were unable to discern his felicity, the perfection of which consists
in being united to God. Hence, the principal action of the soul is to aspire thither..." (56)

Calvin, being an eminently practical and devotional writer, is not too concerned with the analysis of the faculties of the soul. For those who are interested, his brief description is in Institutes I.15.6 and Ford Lewis Battles has a useful table of the Faculties of the Soul as found in Calvin, with his sources. (57)

It is Calvin's doctrine of faith that is of significance in Jonathan Edwards' epistemology. Calvin's definition of faith is found in the following paragraph,

"We shall now have a full definition of faith if we say that it is a firm and sure knowledge of the divine favour toward us, founded on the truth of a free promise in Christ, and revealed to our minds, and sealed on our hearts by the Holy Spirit" (58)

We shall see a little later that Jonathan Edwards was right on the Calvin target in his exposition of faith. Faith for Calvin, then, was knowledge of a certain kind, founded on the promises of God in Christ, with a cognitive element ("to an enlightened mind") in which there was also 'affective' experience ("sealed on our hearts"). Now all of these elements were destined to play an important part in all Puritan theology and pastoral experience. Indeed it was the nuances flowing from the shifting emphases on these practical issues, that is, the practical application of the elements of this definition to needy hearts, combined with
the nuances flowing from the shifting emphases on the doctrines which will be mentioned below which represent the content of the knowledge, that fill the pages of the Puritan writers with debate, Observations, Propositions, Uses, Applications, Corollories, Doctrines, Warnings and, of course, comforts. They were concerned chiefly with bringing men and women into the experience of life in Christ, in which the soul passed from death to life with a qualitative change of heart and life. Not only were the cognitive faculties enlightened by the application of the Gospel to the mind, but the affections were altered as the life of Christ came into the soul. The Holy Spirit enlightened the understanding and quickened the religious affections.

Above all else the Puritan 'greats' were pastors. Every one who comes to read Calvin instead of reading about him, is impressed with the warmth and devotion of his writings. Though he was first trained in philosophy and law, he was above everything the Pastor of the church at Geneva (59).

"I saw that many were hungering and thirsting after Christ and yet that only a very few had even the slightest knowledge of him". (60)

He was a pastor concerned with church order, worship, prayer, and every other duty, and even in great demand in so very much a pastoral matter as to choose brides.
And so it was to be with all the great Puritans (though not necessarily in respect of brides!) for to be accounted great a man had to be sound in theology, able to awaken and apply the word of God to the conscience, warn the sinner, comfort the doubting, reassure the godly in their doubts and fears, in all they had to be great soul-physicians. They lived in danger of their lives and their religion was a living thing. Luther, for years did not wish to marry as he expected to die a martyr's death at any moment. Many English and Scottish Puritans found shelter in Holland and in America. They were intensely in earnest about their religion and knew great heights of joy and sorrow. The usual caricature of the sour Puritan spoiling the fun is just a sour caricature. To be sure if one was 'chambering' and 'dicing', 'licentious' and 'frivolous', they were terrible denunciators of the judgment of the Law of God. John Knox cast a dreadful gloom on the ladies and gentlemen of Mary's court. However that great Reformer was pre-eminently a pastor.

The Puritans' writings abound with the pastoral concern for their people. Pick up Richard Sibbes (c.1640) and it appears on almost every page. "Ay, but will God make an end of afflicting his servants?" asks Sibbes. Every sermon that we have looked at reflects it. His sermons breathe the devotional spirit and care for his people. So
with Thomas Watson (c. 1620 - 1685) whose Body of Divinity was so famous and, to take an example, whose The Lord's Prayer abounds with pastoral concern. (64) William Guthrie in The Christian's Great Interest wrote to settle the same question as that with which Jonathan Edwards was concerned in The Religious Affections, how one could be sure that one had a "saving interest" in Christ (65). So Edmund Calamy, Thomas Brooks, John Collins, Thomas Lye, John Oldfield, John Whitlock (66), Samuel Bolton with his "True Bounds of Christian Freedom" (67), Alexander Henderson, scholar, statesman, man of affairs, preacher and pastor (68), the saintly Samuel Rutherford (1600 - 1661) (69) whose warm and devotional letters have been a classic of comfort for hundreds of years. (70) Richard Baxter's "Call to the Unconverted" is an example of their concern for the conversion of souls (though Baxter was not as Calvinistic a Puritan as many), and whose Saints Everlasting Rest is typical of their concern to comfort their people and whose implicit epistemology on the growth of joy in the knowledge of God and the growth of torment of the damned is the same as that explicit and carefully worked out epistemology of Jonathan Edwards in the next century on the other side of the Atlantic. (72) Baxter's Call has been said to have been the means of more conversions in the succeeding two hundred years than any other work and his "Reformed Pastor" was an imperative for all Pastors to study. John Bunyan was in the same tradition and his "Pilgrim's Progress" (73) has
been (in time past) the most translated book other than the Bible and was written to ease poor pilgrims of the burdens on their backs, and whose Holy War (74) depicts the conflict between Immanuel and Diabolus for the soul of man. Joseph Alleine, like Baxter, had his Call called An Alarm to the Unconverted, which was published posthumously after he had died in 1668 at the age of 34, having spent two periods in gaol for preaching the Gospel. (75)

William Haller in his definitive The Rise of Puritanism (76) particularly in his first 4 chapters brings these great "Physicians of the Soul" (as he calls them) to life. It cannot be denied that they wanted the kingdom of God on earth and many strove with all their might for a proper secular order settled in godliness and righteousness, the kingdom of God visible on earth. They often viewed the nature of things as if it was the sine qua non that church order and state affairs might flourish after their own particular fashion. This was not surprising considering the persecutions that they had suffered under the establishment. Nevertheless, above all else they were pastors and preachers.

All this was the tradition inherited by Jonathan Edwards. In addition there were the great American theologians in his tradition, Thomas Shepard, Peter Bulkeley, Thomas
Hooker John Cotton (77), John Preston, William Ames (78), Increase Mather, Uriah Oakes, Samuel Sewall, Cotton Mather and Solomon Stoddard. (77) These were the dominant influences on Jonathan Edwards, much more than any secular writer. There was a kind of dynasty through William Perkins, Paul Baynes "who converted" Richard Sibbes, who converted John Cotton before he went to America, who converted John Preston, who converted Thomas Shepard. (78a) William Ames' Marrow of Divinity became the main text-book in Harvard and later Yale for many years. (79) Ames compared Perkins and Baynes to Elijah and Elisha. Jonathan Edwards was the grandson and heir of Solomon Stoddard, the "Pope" of Northampton. (80) The reader may refer to Perry Miller's Jonathan Edwards in the 2nd chapter, for the closeness of this New England community.

From the time of Calvin, reformed theology had held at least 5 doctrines in tension. The first was the Decrees, a second was the doctrine of Election, a third was Limited Atonement (it was usually said that Christ's death was sufficient for all men but efficient only for the elect), a fourth was the Covenant of Grace (in which Effective Grace featured: interposing grace is essential for repentance and this is the gift of God. Within the Covenant of Grace there is Justification by faith in Christ alone). Fifthly Repentance (a man is held responsible if he does not repent (to which was related Voluntarism:
the will was involved in repentance so the question of the freedom of the will was vital - hence Jonathan Edwards's *Freedom of the Will*). That is not to say that this was the order in which the doctrines were taught, though this is roughly the case, nor that these are all the doctrines that they taught, it would not be to the point to mention them all. Furthermore these are not to be confused with the so-called 5 points of Calvinism, as these were so arranged and so called from the controversy with Arminius and were merely a convenient summary of the points in the dispute. These are the doctrines which we consider are part of the context of Jonathan Edwards' epistemological position with regard to the knowledge of salvation as a cognitive, affective and reflexive act.

With regard to the doctrine of the Decrees, they were taught by Calvin, but as far as English Calvinism was concerned, were re-interpreted by Beza. In real terms the Doctrine of the Decrees is simply an acknowledgement that God is God, and if He was omniscient and beyond time, He must have decreed that all things that have happened would happen, either by His direct will or by His permissive will. One could be a Supralapsarian or an Infralapsarian. The former placed God's decrees of election and reprobation logically prior to His decrees to create the world and to permit the Fall. In other words the creation is in order to redemption. Therefore there is no provision in the
Atonement for the non-elect (the reprobate). This limits all possibility of salvation to the elect and totally excludes the rest. (81) The Infralapsarians held that the order of the Decrees was that God determined to make the world, then to permit the Fall and then to elect an unspecified number for salvation and then to send His Son to save them leaving the rest to the just punishment of their sins. Beza was a Supralapsarian and R T Kendall in his book (which was the fruit of his 1979 Oxford Ph.D. dissertation) has made a case that he shifted the emphasis away from the position of Calvin in this respect and permanently influenced English Calvinism to that degree that his position was embodied in the Westminster Confession, though the framers of the Confession deliberately made their wording ambiguous to cater for both supra- and infralapsarians. (82) The issue was tremendously important to them as supralapsarians excluded the non-elect from all possibility of salvation, causing critical pastoral problems. Because of the predominance of Beza's thought in English Puritanism it was a weighty pastoral problem in England and, of course, crossed to America. Most preferred the dictum that Christ's death was limited in a certain sense: it was "sufficient for all but effective for the elect" and the doctrines of common grace (wherein all share) and effective grace (which is causative and by which the elect are saved) were developed as corollaries.
Now Kendall has shown most effectively that the inevitable pastoral result of these doctrines of Calvinism was that all the great divines were faced with earnest people with immense fears that they were among the reprobate. The pastoral implications were profound and acute. (83) Richard Greenham (d.1594) who wrote the first English book to comfort afflicted consciences ("...many...came to him with weeping eyes, and went from him with cheerful souls...") taught that all must be 'brought low' and then must be assured of their election by their godly living" (84) This was the storm centre for many a long day. One can find the problems treated again and again in Puritan writings. In order to overcome the pastoral problems caused by the tension of the doctrine of election and its related doctrines, and the need for assurance of salvation, as early as William Perkins (d 1602), the "reflex act" in which a man might know that he knew was hypothecated. The man who is regenerate, according to William Perkins, could discern that he has the knowledge of saving faith which was the assurance of his election, by what Perkins called an "experimental" knowledge, "an infallible certenty of the pardon of sinne". Conscience (the inner awareness of a man) gives its judgment "by a kind of reasoning or disputing, called a practicall syllogisme". It was called the "practical syllogisme of the holy Ghost". It had become apparent that some people had a faith that was temporary and that these fell away.
How could this be squared with the eternal decree that the elect should eternally be saved? Calvin used the expression "transitory faith" (temporalis fides and fides caduca ad tempus) (85) saying that it was true from scripture and experience that some believed only temporarily. William Perkins developed this into the doctrine of temporary faith. Now much as we would like to we cannot enlarge on the development and the discarding of the doctrine of temporary faith. The reader is referred to Kendall. However, it was the background from which the practical syllogism came. William Perkins was a great influence on Jonathan Edwards. (86)

The fluctuations and variations on this theme from Perkins to Edwards must be touched on, but very lightly. The ordo salutis, (the order of the causes or elements of salvation), the first grace (saving faith), and the second grace (sanctification) and the shifting emphases are of great interest but cannot be more than mentioned. We could just mention that William Perkins had an eschatological view of the ordo salutis. (87a) The debate is related also to the extent and efficacy of Christ's priesthood, and the Covenant of Grace. In William Perkins faith is "a supernaturall gift of God in the minde, apprehending the saving promise". (87) Perkins' followers make it clear that "faith is in the direct act" (of "apprehending and applying Christ") and "assurance is in the reflex act". (88). Knowledge of our
election is not by revelation, not immediately applied to
the heart but through the practical syllogism which only
the elect can reason. (89). While "tasting" of the
gospel is "verely a sense in the hearts of the Reprobates,
whereby they doe perceive and feel the excellencies of
Gods benefits", the food cannot be digested and the reflex
act of assurance cannot take place. (90)

John Dod (c. 1555 - 1645) distinguished between a "Sun-
shine" and a "Moon-shine" assurance which corresponds to
the distinction between the direct act of faith and the
reflex act of faith nevertheless uprightness of heart is a
ground of assurance. (91) (So, in essence, did Rogers,
Mosse, Webbe, Cleaver, Bradshaw and Hildersham.) (92) In
Paul Baynes the "reflexed operation" of the mind bringing
assurance might come long afterwards. (93) In Richard Sibbes
man had to take action and "labour to get into Christ". "Do
thy duty", "Believe and obey". (94) The debate may be
followed through John Cotton to America (95) and he called
the "knowledge that we have this will to keep God's
commandments" the \textit{actio reflexa}. "I know it by
experience", he said. (95) In John Preston it was
placed much more in the clasp of the Covenant of Grace
and the assurance was derived ultimately and completely
from the "reflexive knowledge of our 'sincerity' to keep
the Law". (96). Thomas Hooker took it to full-tide (to
use Kendall's expression) and he had a long and exhaustive
preparation of heart in his system. "...wee judge Him by sense, and some extraordinary sweetnesse": we must look to the promise and not to revelations. (97) Arminius appealed to the practical syllogism. 98) William Ames (d. 1633) became the standard for theology in Massachusetts Bay and developed William Perkins theology very fully. He held that the scriptures equate faith and knowledge. There is a "speciall assent" that God is ours. This "is not the first act of Faith, but an act flowing from Faith" but it is uncertain whether faith is knowledge. (99) By the time of William Ames, faith was almost man's prerogative, what Kendall calls an "irony in a predestinarian system". (100)

John Cotton majored on the Covenant of Grace and the Covenant of Works. He saw the Spirit of God "doth set on a power above the word, and in that respect I call it immediate". The inner witness is "by a testimony from itself". This was in a later age pretty well John Wesley's position. In Cotton faith carried its own inner witness: the witness is not grounded in sanctification. (101) This is reminiscent of Richard Sibbes who said; that one must look for one's comfort in one's justification and not in one's sanctification. (102) Cotton's reflex act seems to be contracted to one experience and not protracted as in others who often had a long delay before receiving assurance. Cotton's position implies direct revelation from God. His position
really lays the ground for Jonathan Edwards' clear analysis of the witness of the Spirit, which we will be seeing. Cotton, therefore, runs counter to the Beza-Perkins tradition. Cotton became more and more embroiled in the results of his teaching until there was a confrontation at the Hutchinson Synod in which Anne Hutchinson, who had too well listened to Cotton's preaching, was confronted with the direct revelations that she claimed to have experienced. Cotton supported her position to the very last when he backed down from conflict with all his colleagues. His teaching was discredited. Kendall says that Cotton should be called an experiential predestinarian rather than an experimental predestinarian. William Ames, on the other hand, made saving faith the act of the will and destroyed two Calvinistic ideas, that faith is a persuasion and that there could be temporary faith, as such. His voluntarism consisted in that one must apply Christ to himself and faith is a "condition" of the Covenant of Grace. Arminius, standing in a different position, made faith an act of the will (election was grounded in faith and not vice versa.

We have presented the historical background for the position of Jonathan Edwards who was above all else a theologian and a pastor. This was his heritage in an age when 200 and 300 years were as nothing.
2.1.1. GOD’S SOVEREIGNTY A PERMANENT EMOTIONAL AND DEVOTIONAL ELEMENT IN JONATHAN EDWARDS’ LIFE

Jonathan Edwards's epistemology was based in the Person of God and his infinite goodness. It was seen as the subject of the predeterminate purpose and plan of God and was dependant upon God's sovereign grace. Therefore, although the influence of Locke and Newton is indisputable, as we have seen, we must look elsewhere and higher up for his prior source. As a first step to this we will show chiefly by quotations from his own words how emotionally and spiritually he was taken up with God in his sovereign majesty. These quotations will be at sufficient length to give the reader a feel for the emotional involvement of this deeply devotional man.

As a boy Jonathan was under the influence and tuition of his parents and was trained in Christian doctrines, principles and behaviour and was under the influence of religious revivals. Before and at the age of twelve he

"had two more remarkable seasons of awakening, before I met with that change by which I was brought to those new dispositions, and that sense of things, that I have since had."

(1)
When he came to that "change" is not specifically known but he came to a wonderful sense of the sovereignty of God and of each Person of the Trinity. Previous to the change he tells us

"From my childhood up, my mind had been full of objections against the doctrine of God's sovereignty, in choosing whom he would to eternal life; and rejecting whom he pleased; leaving them eternally to perish, and be everlastingly tormented in hell. It used to appear like a horrible doctrine to me. But I remember the time very well when I seemed to be convinced, and fully satisfied, as to this sovereignty of God, and his justice in thus eternally disposing of men, according to his sovereign pleasure. But never could give an account how, or by what means, I was thus convinced, not in the least imagining at the time, nor a long time after, that there was any extraordinary influence of God's Spirit in it; but only that now I saw further, and my reason apprehended the justice and reasonableness of it. However, my mind rested in it; and it put an end to all those cavils and objections, and there has been a wonderful alteration in my mind, with respect to the doctrine of God's sovereignty, from that day to this; so that I scarce ever have found so much as the rising of an objection against it, in the most absolute sense, in God showing mercy to whom he will show mercy, and hardening whom he will. God's absolute sovereignty and justice, with respect to salvation and damnation, is what my mind seems to rest assured of as much as of any thing that I see with my eyes; at least it is so at times. But I have often, since that first conviction, had quite another kind of sense of God's sovereignty than I had then. I have often since had not only a conviction, but a delightful conviction. The doctrine has very often appeared exceedingly pleasant, bright, and sweet. Absolute sovereignty is what I love to ascribe to God. But my first conviction was not so.

The first instance, that I remember, of that sort of inward, sweet delight in God and divine things, that I have lived much in since, was on reading those words, 1 Tim. i.17. Now unto the king eternal, INVISIBLE, the only wise God, be honour and glory, for ever and ever. Amen. As I read the words, there came into my soul, and was as it were diffused through it a sense of the glory of the Divine Being; a new sense, quite different from any thing I ever experienced before. I thought with myself, how excellent a Being that was, and how happy I should be, if I might enjoy that God, and be
rapt up to him in heaven; and be as it were swallowed up in him for ever! I kept saying, and as it were singing, over these words of Scripture to myself; and went to pray to God that I might enjoy him; and prayed in a manner quite different from what I used to do, with a new sort of affection. But it never came into my thought, that there was any thing spiritual, or of a saving nature in this." (2)

Not only was the Sovereign God sweet and precious to him but also Christ, the Redeemer.

"From about that time I began to have a new kind of apprehension and ideas of Christ, and the work of redemption, and the glorious way of salvation by him......And my mind was greatly engaged to spend my time in reading and meditating on Christ, on the beauty and excellency of his person, and the lovely way of salvation by free grace in him." (3)

In his Personal Narrative he tells of his later experiences of fellowship with God belonging to the period of the thirtyfourth year of his life.

"God has appeared to me a glorious and lovely Being, chiefly on account of his holiness. The holiness of God has always appeared to me the most lovely of his attributes. The doctrines of God's absolute sovereignty, and free grace, in showing mercy to whom he would show mercy; and man's absolute dependence upon God's Holy Spirit, have very often appeared to me as sweet and glorious doctrines. These doctrines have been much my delight. God's sovereignty has ever appeared a great part of his glory. It has often been my delight to approach God and adore him as a sovereign God and ask sovereign mercy of him." (4)

His delight was also in Christ as Mediator:

"I have sometimes had a sense of the excellent fulness of Christ, and his meetness and suitableness as a Saviour; whereby he has appeared to me, far above all, the chief of ten thousands. His blood and atonement have always appeared sweet and his righteousness sweet; which was always accompanied by ardency of spirit; and
inward strugglings and breathings, and groanings that cannot be uttered, to be emptied of myself, and swallowed up in Christ.

"Once, as I rode out into the woods for my health, in 1737, having alighted from my horse in a retired place, as my manner commonly has been, to walk for divine contemplation and prayer, I had a view, that for me was extraordinary, of the Son of God, as Mediator between God and man, and his wonderful, great, full, pure and sweet grace and love, and meek and gentle condescension. This grace that appeared so calm and sweet, appeared also great above the heavens. The person of Christ appeared ineffably excellent, with an excellency great enough to swallow up all thought and conception..." (5)

The Holy Spirit equally enthralled him:

"I have, many times, had a sense of the glory of the Third Person of the Trinity, and his office as Sanctifier; in his holy operations, communicating divine light and life to the soul. God in the communications of his Holy Spirit, has appeared as an infinite fountain of divine glory and sweetness; being full, and sufficient to fill and satisfy the soul; pouring forth itself in sweet communications; like the sun in its glory, sweetly and pleasantly diffusing light and life." (6)

To show that the experience of delight that Jonathan Edwards had was not youthful excitement like an adolescent dream but remained with a constant motivating power, we quote from what he wrote in his thirties:

"Though it seems to me, that in some respects I was a far better Christian, for two or three years after my first conversion, than I am now; and lived in a more constant delight and pleasure; yet of late years, I have had a more full and constant sense of the absolute sovereignty of God, and a delight in that sovereignty; and have had more of a sense of the glory of Christ, as a Mediator revealed in the gospel." (7)

We therefore must understand that in Jonathan Edwards' psychological experience and his conscious, personal thought-
life, the Person of the Triune God, God's sovereignty, Christ as Mediator, and the Person of the Holy Spirit was dominant.

The Bible was also central:

"I have loved the doctrines of the gospel; they have been to my soul like green pastures." (8) and "...I have sometimes an affecting sense of the excellency of the word of God as a word of life; as the light of life; a sweet, excellent, life-giving word; accompanied with a thirsting after that word, that it might dwell richly in my heart." (9)

As a corollary to his great sense of the majesty and sovereignty of God, Jonathan Edwards had a strong sense of the necessity for humility and we shall see at a later stage how as truly fundamental this was to his scheme as was the sovereignty of God. However it was a subordinate factor in his epistemology proper while a fundamental factor in his total scheme. As regards humility we quote:

"I have greatly longed for a broken heart, and to lie low before God; and, when I ask for humility, I cannot bear the thoughts of being no more humble than other Christians. It seems to me, that though their degrees of humility may be suitable for them, yet it would be a vile self-exaltation in me, not to be the lowest in humility of all mankind. Others speak of their longing to be 'humbled in the dust;' that may be a proper expression for them, but I always think of myself, that I ought, and it is an expression that has long been natural for me to use in prayers, 'to lie infinitely low before God.'" (10)

These autobiographical sketches of Edward's devotional and spiritual exercises have been given in some length because it is extremely important to feel the atmosphere of his spiritual and devotional life. It is customary to try to "abstract out" a thinker's philosophy particularly when the
thinker is both a theologian and a philosopher. Karl Barth, for example, has laboured to show how that Anselm as a philosopher may not be taken out of the theological and devotional milieu of 'fides quaerens intellectum' without violating the integrity of his thought. (10a) Without a feel for the spiritual and devotional life of Jonathan Edwards one will be unable properly to understand his epistemology. The spiritual and devotional experience are in themselves not unique. They can be found in the devotional literature of all ages. What is remarkable is the particular emphasis upon the sovereignty of God as an emotional and devotional experience, passing into a settled frame of mind that became permanent. In the case of Jonathan Edwards this sense of the Divine sovereignty was not only a permanent and abiding spiritual and psychological experience but it governed his theological and philosophical thinking in general and his epistemology in particular. And it was precisely because of the sovereign eternal purpose of God, omniscient and immutable in his purposes as he is, that this epistemology is eschatological.

2.1.2 THE THEOLOGICAL PLACE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD - THE DOCTRINE IN JONATHAN EDWARDS' SERMONS

It was not only in Edwards' emotional and devotional life that God loomed large, but also in his mind. It is a fact that all his life, Jonathan Edwards was an orthodox, Bible-believing evangelical. He started within that framework and
died within it. Furthermore it was a Calvinistic framework and the starting point was the Sovereignty of God. This great concept gripped his mind and dominated his preaching.

His first published sermon dated 17 August 1731 was God glorified in the work of redemption, by the greatness of man's dependence upon him in the whole of it.

Above the Advertisement to the Reader, the text is from Judges 7:2, "Lest Israel vaunt themselves against me, saying, Mine own hand hath saved me." (11) The sermon was preached on 1 Cor. 1:29,30,31 "That no flesh should glory in his presence....He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord." The main doctrine taught is

"God is glorified in the work of redemption in this, that there appears in it so absolute and universal a dependence of the redeemed on him"—Here I propose to show, 1st, That there is an absolute and universal dependence on God, for all their good. And 2dly, That God hereby is exalted and glorified in the work of redemption." (12)

The sermon is a Calvinistic exposition of the Sovereignty of God in redemption. The sermon was preached "on the Public Lecture in Boston, July 8, 1731" at the age of 28 at which time he had been a minister of the Gospel for 9 years. (Prior to this his first call accepted was in August 1722 at the age of 18 to a Scotch Presbyterian church in New York (13). In 1723 he moved to a church in Boston, Connecticut. After taking his M.A. degree at Yale he became a tutor on 21 May 1724. He was ordained in the Congregational church at Northampton at the age of 23.) He was raised a Calvinist,
trained as a Calvinist and died a Calvinist.

In the first sermon already mentioned, Jonathan Edwards stated the proposition which is the foundation stone of his theology and philosophy.

"Now whatever scheme is inconsistent with our entire dependence on God for all, and of having all of him, through him, and in him, it is repugnant to the design and tenor of the gospel, and robs it of that which God accounts its lustre and glory." (14)

In a sermon preached 3 years later in 1734 at the age of 31, he relates this basic premiss to his epistemology. The sermon is

A Divine and Supernatural light, immediately imparted to the soul by the Spirit of God, shown to be both a scriptural and rational doctrine.

Although the sermon was preached and written to distinguish between spiritual knowledge and natural knowledge, Edwards states

"God is the author of all knowledge and understanding whatsoever. He is the author of all moral prudence, and of the skill that men have in their secular business. Thus it said of all in Israel that were wise-hearted, and skilled in embroidering that God had filled them with the spirit of wisdom. Exod. xxviii.3" (15)

The fact of God as the author of all knowledge, directly or indirectly, proximately or ultimately, is sustained throughout Edwards' work.

In June 1735, Edwards preached a sermon entitled
The Sole Consideration, that God is God, sufficient to still all objections to his sovereignty.

The text was "Be still, and know that I am God." (Psalm 46:10) in which the divinity, being, greatness, worthiness of God are carefully stated. God owns creation, sustains and exercises moral government over it. Furthermore He will be Sovereign and it is our duty and proper place to give submission and service to him in silence. Our mean thoughts of God are the cause of our failure to give God his proper place. Our mean thoughts result in that we are not convinced that our sins deserve his eternal curse, that we quarrel about his justice in condemning sinners and trust in our own righteousness and quibble that he gives grace to some and not to others. All should be still and know that he is God. (16)

In a sermon on Rom 9:18 "Therefore hath he mercy of whom he will have mercy, whom he will he hardeneth", Jonathan Edwards preaches the absolute sovereignty of God in personal salvation. He defines it as:

"The sovereignty of God in his absolute, independent right of disposing of all creatures according to his own pleasure." (17)

The sermon deals with the principle of God's sovereign dealings with man regarding salvation, that he can

"without prejudice to the glory of his attributes, bestow salvation on any of the children of men, except on those who have committed the sin against the Holy Ghost." (18)
He can save anyone without prejudice to his holiness or to the honour of his majesty, or without inconsistency to his justice or to the prejudice of the honour of his truth. But likewise he may

"....refuse salvation to any sinner whatsoever, without prejudice to the honour of any of his attributes." (19)

Or his righteousness or faithfulness. Furthermore God actually does this as Edwards proceeds to show. The sermon is a call to acknowledge our dependence upon God, to humility, to adore and admire his sovereign power. The sermon seems hard in its expression but he ends with a warning to guard against two extremes, presumption and discouragement and his final sentence is

"Let you be what sinner you may, God can, if he pleases, greatly glorify himself in your salvation." (19)

Now strange as it may seem to those who concentrate on the influence of Locke and Newton on Jonathan Edwards' epistemology, it is precisely on the same note that Edwards lays out the doctrine of the knowledge of God and from the same stated doctrine of the Sovereignty of God. The knowledge of God is pivotal to his epistemology even though the doctrine of the knowledge of God is usually thought of as theology and not philosophy. The locus of his epistemology is just here as we shall see as this dissertation develops. This is explicitly stated in the book he wrote just before
his death,

A Dissertation concerning The End for which God created the World.

This was a companion volume to another work, its twin, A Dissertation concerning The Nature of True Virtue. The first, God's Chief End in Creation deals with epistemology proper, whereas the second, the Nature of True Virtue, deals with the moral element in man's nature.

Dr. Williams, the 1834 editor of Edwards' Works, summed up God's Chief End in Creation like this:

"The end which God had in view in creating the world was doubtless worthy of him; and consequently the most excellent and glorious possible. This therefore must be worthy to be known by all the intelligent creation, as excellent in itself, and worthy of their pursuit. And as true virtue distinguishes the inhabitants of heaven, and all the happy candidates for that world of glory, from all others; there cannot surely be a more interesting subject." (20)

Useful and devout as this summary is, it is misleading in that it implies that Jonathan Edwards had expressed himself as meaning that the chief end of God's creating the world, that is, the end that he had in view was worthy to be known by all intelligent creatures. What he actually said was that the chief end God had in view was to communicate knowledge to his creatures. In order to show this, which is the true starting point of Edwards' epistemology, we will have to turn to God's Chief End in Creation.
CHAPTER 2, SECTION 2. GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION IS EPISTEMOLOGICAL

2.2.1 THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON (1) The argument in God's Chief End in Creation

In the Introduction to the dissertation God's Chief End in Creation Jonathan Edwards in his own careful and thorough style clears the ground with definitions of the various ends applicable to the theme: "immediate", "ultimate", "chief", "subordinate", "inferior", "highest", "last", "original", "independant", "consequential" and "dependant" ends. These are important and useful to the argument but need not detain us, except to quote this sentence:

"It may be observed, that when I speak of God's ultimate end in the creation of the world, in the following discourse, I commonly mean the highest sense, viz. the original ultimate end." (21)

In his second chapter Jonathan Edwards takes the subject from the point of view of reason. He does so rather as an ad hominem argument because he would prefer to go straight to revelation with respect to a subject inscrutable apart from revelation but in view of objections that have been raised from "the pretended dictates of reason", he would

"soberly consider in a few things, what seems rational to be supposed concerning this affair; and then proceed to consider what light divine revelation gives us in it." (16)

Edwards proceeds to make 6 points:

1. that no notion of God's last end in the creation of the world would be reasonable which would imply any
shortcoming or changableness in God, or any dependance of the Creator on the creature. (22)

2. that whatever is good and valuable in itself is worthy that God should value it ultimately. (23)

3. that whatever was so prior to the creation of the world and is attainable by the creature must be God's chief end in creation. (24)

4. that this necessarily implies that this does not rule out the possibility that God could in truth value Himself more highly than anything else and, in fact,

"if God has respect to things according to their nature and proportions, he must necessarily have the greatest respect to himself" (25)

Edwards here brings in the hypothetical concept of what the case would be like if "some third being of perfect wisdom and rectitude" were to judge with perfect impartiality between God and His creatures whether God should regard himself more highly than his creatures. Such a judge would have to consider the degree of regard which should be given to the proportion of excellence and the degree of greatness and goodness taken together. To cut a long statement short, God far outweighs all mankind in the quality of his existence, his excellence, his greatness and goodness and any other attribute predicated of him. The hypothetical third impartial being would have to declare the sovereign God much more worthy of regard than his creatures. "The thing supposed is impossible; but the case is, nevertheless, just the same as to what is most suitable and fit in itself." (26) God, as God of Truth and having "that perfect discernment and rectitude which have been supposed", God must have and "show a supreme regard for himself". Edwards' point is that God by definition but not only in theory but in existence, actually is the most excellent being that can be, and therefore could never in truth ignore himself as the most important and glorious Factor of all. He must be the chief end in creation.

5. Edwards' fifth point is that whatever is "good, amiable and valuable in itself, absolutely and originally must have been aimed at by God ultimately in the creation of the world. (27)

6. Finally "whatsoever thing is actually the effect of the creation of the world which is simply and absolutely valuable in itself, that thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world". That is, we find out what God meant to do by what he actually did do. (28)
Edwards' first section (cap. 1 sec. 1) was a necessary foundation to Jonathan Edwards' statement of his epistemology. He will develop this to show that God's end in creation is to make himself known, to actually share himself. Edwards must of necessity have shown by this time that God was worthy to be made known and that it was reasonable for Him to do so.

Edwards intends to prove that the chief end that God had in mind was to make Himself known. In Edwards' thought there is a clear shining principle, the hierarchy within creation. The highest order within creation is the order of intelligent beings. These are in themselves in an hierarchy but intelligence is the crown of creation. Nothing has meaning without it, no purpose can exist without it, nothing created without intelligence can rank with beings having intelligence. God has the highest intelligence, He had created intelligent beings and his chief end is to communicate with them. His own superior attributes, by definition having no opposite or equal, must make His Person, thoughts, excellencies, glories and wisdom the supreme height of all subjects or objects of knowledge. Thus Edwards has laid the foundation in the worthiness and supremacy of God in all His attributes.

Edwards' second section (cap. 1 sec. 2) gives us an explicit statement of the basis of Jonathan Edwards'
epistemology. He starts by showing that it would not be enough for God to be able to do what would be appropriate for him to do but that he should also do those things. Also, and with this he follows on, the glorious perfections of God should be known.

"It seems to be a thing in itself fit and desirable, that the glorious perfections of God should be known, and the operations and expressions of them seen, by other beings beside himself. If it be fit that God's power and wisdom, &c, should be exercised and expressed in some effects, and not lie eternally dormant, then it seems proper that these exercises should appear, and not be totally hidden and unknown."

Of course Jonathan Edwards is not so naive theologically (he is at the opposite pole) or inconsistent with himself to assume that God had ex necessitate to create in order to make himself known. He says only that it would be entirely consistent with revealed truth that God would act in this way. Perry Miller has a comment about Edwards here on earth reading into God's mind what moved God in eternity. (29) However Edwards is arguing the case from reason. There is some justice in Miller's remark. It would be difficult, however, to propose another solution on the information he (and we) have about God from reason and from revelation. To proceed with the argument, Jonathan Edwards goes on to say

"God as perfectly knew himself and his perfections, had as perfect an idea of the exercises and effects they were sufficient for, antecedently to any such actual operations of them, and since. If, therefore, it be nevertheless a thing in itself valuable, and worthy to be desired, that these glorious perfections be actually exhibited in their corresponding effects; then it seems
also that the knowledge of these perfections and discoveries is valuable in itself absolutely considered; and that it is desirable that this knowledge should exist. It is a thing infinitely good itself, that God's glory should be known by a glorious society of created beings." (30)

This is the conceptual basis of Edwards' epistemology. The eschatological nature in it is continued in the very next line:

"And that there should be in them an increasing knowledge of God to all eternity, is worthy to be regarded by him, to whom it belongs to order what is fittest and best." (30)

As we have said, Jonathan Edwards in more than one place has noted the pre-eminence of the intelligent part of creation over the non-intelligent part. In the very next line he refers to it:

"If existence is more worthy than defect and non-entity, and if any created existence is in itself worthy to be, then knowledge is;..."

He also has an hierarchy of knowledge which is referred to in his next clause

"...and if any knowledge, then the most excellent sort of knowledge, viz. that of God and his glory. This knowledge is one of the highest, most real, and substantial parts of all created existence, most remote from non-entity and defect." (30)

This hierarchy of knowledge also has its conceptual basis in God's sovereignty and glory. Strictly speaking the use of the word "sovereignty" could be disputed by a purist as this word relates to government; in the context of God's
"Thus it is fit, since there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light should shine forth in communicated knowledge and understanding; and, as there is an infinite fountain of holiness, moral excellence, and beauty, that so it should flow out in communicated holiness." (33)

We wish to draw attention to two important facts in this last paragraph,

(1) It may be noted that light and knowledge are synonymous. Thus A Divine and Supernatural Light, if we may thus use the title of Jonathan Edwards' early sermon for its subject matter, must be equated to divine and supernatural knowledge. Knowledge is light because as light it illumines the understanding. In that sermon, however, although the shining of that divine and supernatural light is of the same kind as mentioned in this last paragraph, it relates to the carrying into effect of the purpose of God in fallen mankind. In the paragraph quoted above, however, the purpose and scheme of God is seen holistically whereas the shedding of divine and supernatural light into the mind and affections of a sinner in New England, for example, is a subset, an emanation of the grand design. In God's Chief End in Creation we see the grand design. In The Religious Affections we see the particular effect. This emanation of the divine glory into a redeemed sinner is one such emanation. It has other emanations and effects which Edwards develops eschatologically.
(2) In the quoted paragraph reference is to "holiness, moral excellence, and beauty" and "communicated holiness". This properly belongs with "true virtue" and not with epistemology, or so it could be held by a critic. However God often accomplishes more than one end with one action: it is His way. This is typical of the elegance which Edwards saw in the ways and works of God. In the expression "communicated holiness" Edwards is again speaking holistically. Analysis may separate knowledge and virtue but they come together enfolded in the same beams of light and are not separated as by a prism. With some important exceptions, such as in the case of Satan and the wicked, angels and men, as we shall later see. Also certain subsets of knowledge, such as the wisdom given to craftsmen or mathematics, may come without holiness and virtue. In declaring the grand purpose of God, however, Edwards conceives knowledge and virtue as one. As a result he resorts to a word which he uses in capitals, FULNESS, which in a footnote he explains he will often use. (34)

"I shall often use the phrase God's fulness, as signifying a comprehending good which is in God natural and moral, either excellence of happiness." (35)

Jonathan Edwards' epistemology, his theory of knowledge, is eschatological, so also is his theory of virtue, good, holiness and happiness, eschatological. It will be as well to note that many of the quotations that could be given
contain both knowledge and virtue and its concomitants, in the context and often in the same sentence or clause. It is explicitly expounded in Section III of God's Chief End in Creation. The FULNESS of God contains all, and this FULNESS is communicated, to creatures who have been given a disposition or capacity to receive it.

Edwards concludes Section II with this and summing up

"Therefore, to speak strictly according to truth, we may suppose, that a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fulness, was what excited him to create the world; and so, that the emanation itself was aimed at by him as a last end of creation." (36)

In other words, it was in God's nature to communicate, and his infinite fulness moved him to create beings to whom he could communicate his fulness.

In Section III Edwards needed to consolidate his argument. It might well have been objected that if the case is as it was presented then the creature is the chief end of creation. But no, says Edwards, He could not consider the creature more highly than Himself and He would be untrue to Himself if He did so. In any event in the beginning of God's grand purpose the creature did not exist and a non-existent, contingent being cannot be considered more highly than God Himself. God's worth and fulness are without comparison and beyond dispute. All his actions must find their springs in God himself.
"So God looks on the communication of himself, and the emanation of his infinite glory, to belong to the fulness and completeness of himself; as though he were not in his most glorious state without it." (37)

It was therefore a kind of enhancement of his glory to give of himself. For this reason God transfers His fulness and glory to His church and calls them His fulness and glory. Thus Isaiah 46:13 "I will place salvation in Zion, for Israel MY GLORY."

2.2.1 THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON (2) The basis, nature, content, and object of epistemology

The BASIS of epistemology, then, is not only in the sovereignty of God, or better expressed, the sovereign or kingly nature of God, but in its unending, unmeasured fulness. The fulness of God's being flowed out in a purpose to communicate, in the creation of beings capable of receiving communication of knowledge (and virtue and of all goodness) and, to anticipate, in the final effect being carried out in just proportion to the purpose and nature of the sovereign God.

The NATURE or CONTENT of this knowledge is now made clear. This is God Himself. This is the proper origin in Edwards' scheme of that existential experience of knowledge which is so important, that is the immediate presence of God in the Christian, or in the saint (as Edwards consistently calls "truly gracious" believers in
Christ) and in the effect of that encounter with the saint. This is expressed in *A Divine and Supernatural Light* and in great detail in *The Religious Affections*. However, conceptually, the latter describes the practical outworkings in time and place, of the cosmic purpose. It is a part of the subordinate effect of the whole Divine purpose. The Divine purpose was that God's created beings should have an existential, experiential encounter with Him in respect of knowledge and virtue.

"One part of that divine fulness which is communicated is the divine knowledge. That communicated knowledge, which must be supposed to pertain to God's last end in creating the world, is the creature's knowledge of HIM. For this is the end of all other knowledge; and even the faculty of understanding would be vain without it. And this knowledge is most properly a communication of God's infinite knowledge, which primarily consists in the knowledge of himself. God, in making this his end, makes himself his end. This knowledge in the creature, is but a Conformity to God. It is the image of God's own knowledge of himself. It is the participation of the same; though infinitely less in degree; as particular beams of the sun communicated are the light and glory of the sun itself, in part." (38)

The **OBJECT** of this knowledge is also stated.

"Besides, God's glory is the object of this knowledge, or the thing known; so that God is glorified in it, as hereby his excellency is seen. As therefore God values himself, as he delights in his own knowledge, he must delight in every thing of that nature: as he delights in his own light, he must delight in every beam of that light; and as he highly values his own excellency, he must be well pleased in having it manifested, and so glorified." (39)

2.2.1 **THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON** (3) The eschatological outworking of this epistemology
The eschatological outworking of this communication of knowledge has its foundation in God's grand design.

"And it is farther to be considered, that what God aimed at in the creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that communication of himself which he intended through all eternity."

"So that in the eyes of God who perfectly sees the whole of it, in its infinite progress and increase, it must come to an eminent fulfilment of Christ's request, in John xvii. 21,23 That they all may be ONE, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be ONE in us; I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in ONE."

"What has been said shows, that as all things are from God, as their first cause and fountain; so all things tend to him, and in their progress come nearer and nearer to him through all eternity: which argues, that he who is their first cause is their last end." (44)

In *God's Chief End in Creation* Jonathan Edwards only hints at the eschatological purpose. As we shall see later we will need to go elsewhere in his works to develop this element.

In the development of Jonathan Edwards' argument that God made himself the chief end of creation, Edwards naturally had to meet objections which would be raised immediately against such a proposition. The first was: If God was complete, immutable and absolutely perfect in himself from eternity, how could he be said to seek to advance himself in the way described. The second objection was that this view of God's chief end in creation supposes that God did everything selfishly. The third objection was that this
seems unworthy of God and the fourth is that this takes away from the freeness of His goodness. If God did everything for himself he did it for his own sake and not for his creatures' sakes. Edwards answers these objections in Section IV: we will not discuss either the objections nor his answers as they would lead to a digression. At the end of the Section he acknowledges the obscurity of the subject from the point of view of reason alone; and in Chapters II, Section 1 through to the end of Section VII (that is the whole of Chapter II) Edwards proves his position from his chosen field revelation, that is, from Scripture. These sections are the most important for the Biblical scholar and in Edwards' scheme without which the other parts have no meaning.
2.2.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM REVELATION

In Edwards' scheme arguments from reason are subordinate to arguments from revelation and the scriptures are to him the supreme revelation. In the previous section he was merely trying to show that such a scheme is not unreasonable. In this section he shows that is in accordance with revealed truth.

His method of doing this is again to take as his thesis that God makes Himself his own last end in the creation of the world. This is the subject of Sections I, II, III and IV of Chapter II. Paramount in the argument is that God created the world and did all his great deeds in history for his name's sake and for his glory, expressions which are virtually synonymous. This is established from various proof-texts and from different angles. At the same time emphasis is laid upon the fact that it is all laid upon the intelligent part of God's creation. His GLORY and his NAME were to be known and to be responded to reciprocal praise and enjoyment. For the sake of economy of space we will not quote Edwards' quotations.

He next shows (in Section V of Chapter II) that

"...communicating good to the creatures is what is in itself pleasing to God." (40)

The "glory" of God includes in its root and in its use the
idea of emanation and communication.

"The Hebrew word ( \( יִלּוֹ ד \) ) which is commonly translated glory, is used in such a manner as might be expected from this signification of the words from whence it comes. Sometimes it is used to signify what is internal, inherent or in the possession of the person; and sometimes for emanation, exhibition, or communication of this internal glory: and sometimes for the knowledge, or sense of these, in those to whom the exhibition or communication is made. This might be abundantly proved......but probably it will not be denied." (41)

The glory means

"...the excellency of a person or a thing, as consisting either in greatness, or in beauty, or in both conjunctly." (42)

It is often used in Scripture

"...to express the exhibition, emanation, or communication of the internal glory." (43)

but particularly

"...when applied to God and Christ." (44)

again

"The word glory, as applied to God or Christ, sometimes evidently signifies the communication of God's fulness, and means much the same things with God's abundant goodness and grace." (45)

next

"...the word glory, as applied to God in Scripture, implies the view or knowledge of God's excellency. The exhibition of God's glory is to the view of beholders." (46)
To consider glory that is not seen, honour that is not displayed is virtually a contradiction in terms: in Edwards' hermeneutics the key thought of the glory and honour of God so insisted on in Scripture is that it must be displayed. This presupposes that God's intention was to communicate the knowledge of Himself.

After showing that "the glory of God" means much the same as the "Name of God", in widespread Scripture usage, Edwards rests his case from revelation. His argument has been that God has concern for His own glory (his excellence, beauty and goodness) above all else and that this includes in scripture usage, His tendency always to communicate this to his intelligent creatures. This, then, is God's ultimate end in creation. This, then, is the basis, scope, content and purpose of Christian epistemology.

In his summing up, Edwards expresses it thus:

"The thing signified by that name, the glory of God, when spoken of as the supreme and ultimate end of all God's works, is the emanation and true external expression of God's internal glory and fulness;...in a true and just exhibition, or external existence of it." (47)

Now lest there be any misunderstanding in respect of the epistemological element of God's glory, Jonathan Edwards distinguishes between God's internal and his external
The external element of God's glory can give no problem. Being external it is by definition the communication of the internal glory of God. What then is his internal glory? It can be either his understanding or his will. To remove His understanding as an element of His Person would be totally ridiculous: He would no longer have Personality and it would be a negation of all Hebrew and Christian teaching. This Edwards rejects. His will includes his holiness and happiness. We will let Edwards speak for himself:

"The whole of God's internal good or glory, is in these three things, viz. his infinite knowledge, his infinite virtue or holiness, and his infinite joy and happiness. Indeed there are a great many attributes in God, according to our way of conceiving them: but all may be reduced to these; or to their degree, circumstances, and relations. We have no conception of God's power different from the degree of these things, with a certain relation of them to effects. God's infinity is not properly a distinct kind of good, but only expresses the degree of good there is in him. So God's eternity is not a distinct good but is the duration of good. His immutability is still the same good, with a negation of change. So that, as I said, the fulness of the Godhead is the fulness of his understanding, consisting in his knowledge; and the fulness of his will consisting in his virtue and happiness." (48)

The corollary of this is that his creatures must have the faculty to receive what he communicates

"And again, it hence appears that here is no other variety or distinction but what necessarily arises from the distinct faculties of the creature, to which the communication is made, as created in the image of God: even as having these two faculties of understanding and will." (49)

There is thus what Edwards calls "emanation" and "remanation"
"In the creature's knowing, esteeming, loving, rejoicing in, and praising God, the glory of God is both exhibited and acknowledged; his fulness is received and returned. Here is both emanation and remanation." (50)
CHAPTER 2, SECTION 3. GOD'S CHIEF END IN CREATION IS ESCHATOLOGICAL

2.3.1 THE PURPOSE OF GOD

We have already made brief references to the eschatological purpose of God as stated in God's Chief End in Creation. In its purest form (conceptually) this purpose was an infinite, eternal, progressive increase of knowledge. Because God is his creatures' good and he is himself infinite in goodness, the progression must be infinite if the aim is perfect union with God. For the reader this appears to contain a contradiction: How can God aim at union with himself in say a one-to-one relationship if it takes an endless time to reach that relationship? However Edwards did not say that that ultimate one-to-one relationship would or could ever be reached, he would deny such an assertion. He does say that

"...he aimed at the creature's excellency and happiness in creating the world; viz. during the whole of its designed eternal duration; in greater and greater nearness, and strictness of union with himself, in his own glory and happiness, in constant progression, through all eternity...And if any good, as viewed by God, is beheld as infinite, it cannot be viewed as a distinct thing from God's own infinite glory." (51)

We learn, therefore, that epistemology is designed, is progressive, is eternal, and has its aim as an increasingly intimate, existential encounter with God. It may be summed up in one of the many Scriptures quoted by Edwards:

"The Lord hath made all things for himself." (Prov.
16:4) or in another, "For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things." (Rom 11:36) (52)

The final references to the eschatological nature of God's purpose in epistemology in God's Chief End in Creation is at the end of the work in which Edwards reinforces the thesis in respect of its eternal duration and "celerity". (53)

In God's Chief End in Creation only the grand eschatological purpose in epistemology is stated. For the elements of this eschatology we must look elsewhere in Edwards' works.

2.3.2 THE HIERARCHY OF CREATED BEINGS AND THE HIERARCHY OF KNOWLEDGE

We already have had occasion to speak of the hierarchy of knowledge in Jonathan Edwards epistemology. This hierarchy is related to the hierarchy of created beings.

As a Biblical theologian Edwards believed in created intelligent beings, angels (in degrees of greatness), demons (in degrees of greatness), saints (the word was used regularly of those who were regenerate or "truly gracious", that is who had truly received special grace, and wicked or unregenerate persons. "Professors" might be saints or hypocrites or earnest people whose hearts had not yet received the divine and supernatural light. Some creatures, not intelligent, were also viewed as having a
kind of knowledge.

In *God's Chief End in Creation*, the progressive, existential encounter with God in a union was stated in its purest form. This, however, applied only to

"...that part of the moral world which are good, in their being, and in their being (54)

The different character of creatures in their hierarchy required an hierarchy of knowledge applicable to each. In its purest conception it was union with God sharing in His fulness. In different degrees angels and saints were sharers in this fulness. However in the "moral world", that is in the world capable of morality, there were creatures that are not good, demons and wicked men. These could not share in God's fulness as could angels and saints although they did share some of his knowledge.
In Edwards' Biblical scheme there is therefore an hierarchy of knowledge something like this

**GOD**

**Good intelligent beings**

1.1 Angels
1.2 Saints

**Evil intelligent beings**

2.1 Demons
2.2 wicked people

**Creatures without intelligence**

3.1 People without intelligence?
3.2 Animals

Not only are angels and saints capable of an higher kind of knowledge but of a different kind of knowledge. The knowledge of God in the sense of knowledge about God may be known to all mankind in different degrees ranging from zero knowledge, to what would go for a very great knowledge among scholars. They may also have a certain existential knowledge of God in that they may have great and even remarkable experience of His power. However the divine and supernatural light shed on the mind and altering the affections, in regenerating power, making a person "gracious", able to delight in God, is of a higher and different kind and known only to the redeemed. In other words the converting power of this light is known only to the saints. Any knowledge without redemption and
regeneration is of the same kind as that known by the un Fallen angels. Thus the church consists of the elect saints and the elect angels. All the elect share the same delightful fulness of God, but the elect on earth, that is the saints, need redemption and regeneration, unlike the elect angels. In view of the great importance of the place of conversion to him as an evangelical preacher, and in view of many remarkable spiritual experiences seen in those who professed to be Believers but did not live up to their profession, the book The Religious Affections was written. It was written to record the distinguishing marks of grace in a Believer, or in other words, those marks of grace that distinguish a gracious professor of religion from one who does not have grace.

Again, there is a distinction between those who are independent spirits, angels and souls that are in a "separated state", that is, separated from their bodies, and those whose souls are joined to their bodies. The same distinction applies to the evil side of the "moral part of the world".

Still lower are non-intelligent creatures who share passively and eventually in God's purpose.

"A main difference between the intelligent and moral parts, and the rest of the world, lies in this, that the former are capable of knowing their Creator, and the end for which he made them, and capable of actively complying with his design in their creation, and
promoting it; while other creatures cannot promote the design of their creation, only passively and eventually (55)

2.3.3 THE MEANING OF THE "MORAL" PART OF THE UNIVERSE, THE CHURCH AND THE ELECT

The interpretation of the "moral parts" of the world referred to by Edwards is that this is not the good men or angels but those capable of morality (i.e. the elect angels, and homo sapiens) as distinguished from other animal life. The ELECT has a meaning beyond merely those ultimately saved. The CHURCH is the company of the elect comprising angels, saints united to a body and saints whose spirits are in a separate state. The church consists only of those in a state of grace who have experienced the saving moment. The church is thus considered holistically but different parts exist in different states and these in turn have different conditions of knowledge proper to them. The holistic view is perhaps the chief characteristic of Jonathan Edwards' thought. It is an approach that is a fundamental characteristic of Edwards' thought patterns. We may consider the following apposite example:

"Here we may take occasion to observe the sweet harmony that there is between God's dispensations, and particularly the analogy and agreement there is between his dealings with the angels and his dealings with mankind; that though one is innocent and the other is guilty, the one having eternal life by a covenant of grace, the other by a covenant of works, yet both have eternal life by his Son Jesus Christ God man, and both, though different ways, by the humiliation and
sufferings of Christ; the one as the price of life, the
other as the greatest and last trial of their stedfast
and persevering obedience."  (56) (57)

This holistic view is of course the direct result of faith
in the sovereign God, omniscient, omnipotent and
omnipresent. However it was also in Edwards' cast of mind.
Perry Miller says of Jonathan Edwards' short sermon
*A Divine and Supernatural Light*

"It is no exaggeration to say that the whole of
Edwards' system is contained in miniature within some
ten or twelve pages in this work. Yet it, no less
than its predecessor, is a puzzle. Edwards was not the
sort who undergoes a long development or whose work can
be divided into "periods." His whole insight was
given him at once, preternaturally early, and he did
not change, he only deepened.....he altered little from
his adolescence at Yale to his death at Princeton."  
(58)

2.3.4 SPIRITUAL BEINGS AND THE CATEGORY OF "SPIRIT"

2.3.4.1 The Angels: the hierarchy, office, service as
purposed by God.

Angels are the highest order of created beings:

"The angelic nature is the highest and most exalted
created nature."  (59)

The understanding of angels is limited and not infinite:

"As the angels are made to be employed as the
ministers of God's providence of the government of the
world, and as they are beings of a limited
understanding, and not equally capable of understanding
and managing the affairs of the whole universe, or of
the whole extent and compass of divine providence, or
of any part indifferently, as they may be of affairs of some particular kind, or system, or series of events, or of some particular part of the universe... so it is very reasonable to suppose from hence that the different angels are appointed to different kinds of work..." (60)

In particular their knowledge is of the "majesty of the gospel till Christ's coming" (60a)

There is an hierarchy in the realm of angels which is not merely titular but truly related to rule, power and authority.

"It is not reasonable to suppose that the angels are called thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers, merely for the honour they have in their great abilities and excellent qualifications, for the words do properly denote rule and authority" (61)

The point is that the Apostle Paul refers to principalities and powers as those who have real rule (Titus 3:1), so also it is reasonable to suppose that the Psalmists (Psa. 92:7, Job 38 (sic), Job 38:33 which are the references quoted) speak of real authority and rule in the universe. This paragraph [838] of Miscellaneous Observations has it title "Angels-why called Thrones, Dominions, Principalities and Powers." It makes a careful statement (all Jonathan Edwards' statements are careful!) but does not fully back his statements from Scripture. Nevertheless there are many other places where he does, such as in "The Confirmation of th Angels" when he quotes the key scripture Col 1:16-20. (62)
2.3.4.2 How does God communicate or impart knowledge to angels

Edwards extrapolated his understanding of the elect on earth into an understanding of the state of the elect angels, as without doubt the Apostle Paul does. The hermeneutical principle is that of analogy.

"God's ways are all analogous, and his dispensations harmonize one with another. As it is between the saints that are of an inferior order of beings, and the angels which are of more exalted natures and degrees, and also between those Christians on earth that are of inferior order, and those who are of superior, being ministers of Christ; so without doubt it also is in some respects in heaven, between those that are of lower and those that are of higher degrees of glory."

(63)

The key principle of humility applies here that the highest must serve the lowest. This principle of Christ is fundamental to Edwards' doctrine of the relationship of angels to one another and angels towards mankind. Edwards goes on to say

"Thus, though the angels excel in wisdom and strength, and are advanced to glorious dignity, and are principalities and powers, and kings of the earth, yet God makes them all ministers to them who are much less than they, of inferior nature and degree. Thus, also, the saints who are most exalted in dignity are servants to others. The angelic nature is the highest and most exalted created nature; yet God is pleased to put greater honour upon our inferior nature, viz. the human, by causing that the Head and King of all creatures should be in the human nature, and that the saints in that nature in Christ, should be in many respects exalted above the angels, that the angelic nature may not magnify itself against the human; and the man Christ Jesus, that creature who is above all, owes his superiority and dignity, not at all to himself, but to God; viz. to his union with a divine
Edwards' doctrine of angels turns on the Epistle to the Hebrews 1:14

"Are they not all ministering spirits sent to minister to them that shall be heirs of salvation."

Thus then angels serve the elect on earth and are in some respects made inferior to them (65) the key element of the angels' ministry or service to the church is humility and as we shall see, it is on this that the Fall of the Angels and the Confirmation of the Angels turns. This is likewise the key element for the elect on earth. So, as Edwards loves to say, all God's ways are one. Edwards always saw what we might call an elegance in the works of God. Just as medieval theologians and philosophers saw the doctrine of the Simplicity of God as that which made the many attributes of God coherent, so Edwards saw the doctrine of the unity or simplicity (in that sense) of God's purpose (His single purpose), making the overall plan coherent. Arguing therefore from the Gospel of Matthew 20:25 - 27 and comparable sayings of the Christ, wherein Christ insists that his disciples should follow his example by being a servant and by being the least, unlike the princes of the Gentiles who "exercise lordship" over their subjects, Edwards says

"...so without doubt it also is in some respects in heaven, between those that are of lower and those that are of higher degrees of glory. There, those that are most exalted in honour and happiness...yet in some
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respects they are the least; being ministers to others... to their good and happiness." (66)

Christ is Head of the whole church which includes the elect angels and the elect saints. God communicates with his angelic creatures primarily through the Mediatorship of Christ.

First in importance is that Christ

"...in his divine nature, he is the NATURAL IMAGE of God." (Edwards' capitals) (67)

Secondly, in his human nature Christ is the Head of both: he is the Mediator of the salvation, eternal life and communication of both the elect angels and the elect saints. The Incarnation was crucial for both.

"From this we may see that the angels are interested in Jesus Christ God man, as well as elect men, and that the incarnation of Christ was not only for our sakes, (though chiefly for ours,) but also for the sake of the angels. For God having from eternity, from his infinite goodness, designed to communicate himself to creatures, the way in which he designed to communicate himself to elect beloved creatures, all of them, was to unite himself to a created nature, and to become one of the creatures, and to gather together in one all elect creatures in that creature, who he assumed into a personal union with himself, and to manifest to them, and maintain intercourse with them through him. All creatures having this benefit by Christ's incarnation, ...and all elect creatures hereby have opportunity for a more free and intimate converse with God, and full enjoyment of him, than otherwise would be. And though Christ is not the Mediator of the angels in the same sense that he is of men, yet he is a middle-person between God and them, through whom is all their intercourse with God and derivations from him." (68)

Christ is thus everything to the elect angels. He is
their Creator, Judge, Saviour, Mediator, Governor their life and their end.

The all-sufficiency of Christ to the angelic hosts is actually the fulcrum around which the whole of Edwards' doctrine of the eschatological development of the epistemology of the angelic beings, turns. In an observation ([937] of Miscellaneous Observations), entitled Angels elect--their dependance on Christ, Edwards raised two questions, which he answered. The first question is "How far the elect angels are dependent on Christ for eternal life?" and the second is "How far the angels are dependent on Christ as God man, and have benefit by his incarnation, sufferings, and exaltation, and the work of redemption that he wrought out for mankind?" (69)

In answering the first question, Edwards pointed back to the rebellion of Lucifer against God and Christ when he drew away a great company of angels after him. Christ at this point showed himself as an "opposite head" and in an act of grace dissuaded and restrained many from succumbing to Lucifer's temptation

"...so that they were upheld and preserved from eternal destruction at this time of great danger by the free and sovereign distinguishing grace of Christ. Herein Christ was the Saviour of the elect angels..."

His saving grace in so far as the elect angels was concerned was in preventing their fall. So two opposite camps formed, and "there was war in heaven" (Edwards quotes..."
They were dependent upon Christ and his sovereign grace to keep them in favour and obedience and "to keep them from ruining themselves". They were taught their own insufficiency and dependence upon Christ and had to learn humility and

"self-diffidence to look to Christ, to seek to him, and depend on him, in whom it pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell to preserve them. So that they all along hung on him."

This was followed by a time of trial in which they were supported by his grace and strength. Angels are therefore dependent upon Christ for eternal life "in a way of self-emptiness, self-diffidence, and humble dependence on him."

Christ is their judge and they also

"actually, continually, and eternally derive it from him as their head of life and divine influence, the Spirit is given them through him." their happiness and joy is in "God's glory and express image....they behold the glory and love of God, and so have eternal life in enjoyment of God."

In the second question Edwards developed this doctrine and showed that the elect angels continued to serve during this time of the trial of their obedience, but that they "did not enjoy perfect rest till he (Christ) descended and confirmed them. The angels obtained life from Christ (by the covenant of works) through their faithfulness to Christ in his humiliation. They were actually confirmed at the Incarnation and through this they entered into a new
qualitative experience of Christ. He became their head in a new dimension. This came about through the Passion of Christ. (69)

2.3.4.3 The stages of eschatological development.

We are now in a position to say that eschatologically speaking there were distinct epochs in the relationship of the Son of God and the elect angels.

The first epoch: from Creation to the Decree

The first epoch was from the creation of the angels up to the time that God declared his purpose to unite the Son of God with the creaturely nature of mankind, (if we can properly use the word "time" of that epoch). This decree occasioned the rebellion in heaven because Lucifer and the angels that fell would have nothing of it. Christ had "his delegated dominion" over all the works of creation from the very beginning with the plan to work out the plan of redemption. The communication of knowledge and of all the glory of the Father to all the angels was through the Divine Son ab initio. (70) So Edwards says

"Especially did the angels obtain life by attending on Christ, and being faithful to him during the time of his humiliation, which was the last and most trying part of their obedience." (71)
The second epoch: from the Decree to the Incarnation.

The second epoch was from the decree in respect of the Incarnation up to the time of the Incarnation. At this stage the "good part" of the moral universe, the angels that kept their first estate (cf. Jude 6), continued to have their communication from the Father through the Divine Son but the "angels that kept not their first estate", the "evil part" of the moral universe, while they received whatever communication might be made to them via the Son of God, they did so in rebellion.

On what Edwards calls the Occasion of the fall of angels, Edwards comments

"We cannot but suppose that it was made known to the angels, at their first creation, that they were to be ministering spirits to men, and to serve the Son of God in that way, by ministering to them as those that were peculiarly beloved of him, because this was their proper business for which they were made; this was the end of their creation. It is not to be supposed that seeing they were intelligent creatures, that were to answer the end of their beings as voluntary agents, or as willingly falling in with the design of their Creator, that God would make them, and not make known to them what they were made for, when he entered into covenant with them, and established the conditions of their eternal happiness, and especially when they were admiring spectators of the creation of this beloved creature for whose good they were made, and this visible world that God made for his habitation. Seeing God made the angels for a special service, it is reasonable to suppose that the faithfulness of the angels in that special service must be the condition of their reward or wages; and if this was the great condition of their reward, then we may infer that it was their violating this law, and refusing and failing of this condition, which was that by which they fell. Hence we may infer, that the occasion of their fall was God's revealing this end and special service to them, and their not complying with it. That must be the
occasion of their fall." (78)

Regarding this epoch, Edwards said that the elect angels grew greatly in their knowledge of God and themselves, of good and evil and in the glory of God and Christ as they watched God work out his purposes. This greatly increased their holiness and happiness. Looking back on the frightful fall of the erstwhile colleagues, they learned evil by example rather than personal experience, were humbled, and their obedience following these events greatly increased their holiness and dependance on Christ. (80) So therefore the dreadful judgment of God upon Lucifer and the angels who followed him put the fear of God into the elect angels to their great benefit. Their (probable) very great surprise at the wrath of God on Lucifer reinforced their own desires for holiness. (81)

This epoch was a dispensation of trial and relative ignorance for the angels, particularly in respect to the highest of God's plans, namely Redemption.

"One trial of obedience of the angels before Christ's exaltation was, that till then they were in a great measure kept in the dark as to God's drift and aim in those great works of God in which they were employed as his ministers from age to age. The grand design and scheme of infinite wisdom in the successive operations of his hands and dispensations of his providence from one age to another, was not opened till Christ's exaltation, as appears in Eph iii. 9,10." (82)

During this same period the angels experienced a great work of grace in confirming them in their state. This confirmation was by the increase in knowledge of what God
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was doing. One might call this the experiential confirmation of the angels in their holiness. Edwards says that they had their hearts

"...greatly confirmed in holiness...by the tendency and influence of the means God used with them to that end...This confirmation of the hearts of the elect angels...consisted in the following things:..."

Here Edwards reasoned that the sight of the fall of the angels served notice to them of what would happen to them in like case. They entered into the experience of the fear of God, were humbled and made aware of their own insufficiency, they learned more of God and his "glorious excellency, and goodness, and grace to them, to increase their love to God and Christ." The example of the Son of God, so high yet stooping so low, to minister to "so mean and despicable a creature as man" also served to confirm them in their position. Finally "they had their hearts confirmed in obedience by habit and custom, having long preserved in perfect obedience, and having often overcome under trials..." (83)

2.3.4.4 The crisis of the Incarnation and Passion of Christ.

The third epoch was from the time of the Incarnation and Passion of Christ. The Incarnation precipitated a crisis on which all that went before and all that came after, depended. When the Son of God became man and united his
nature with man in the hypostatical union, the God man, Christ Jesus became the Head of the church, which means the Head of the elect angels and the elect saints. The hypostatical union is the union of the two natures of Christ, the divine nature and the human nature. (75)

"Both have eternal life through different ways, by their adherence and voluntary submission, and self-dedication to Christ crucified, and he is made the Lord and King of both, and head of communication, influence, and enjoyment to both and a head of confirmation to both; for as the angels have confirmed life in and by Christ, so have the saints: all that are united in this head have in him a security of perseverance." (76)

As Edwards saw all the ways of God as one, there is an analogy between the dealings of God with angels and saints. Christ is the head of both and both are confirmed in him. The Calvinistic doctrine of the perseverance of the saints has a counterpart in the perseverance of the elect angels. Angels are elect by the free choice of God placed upon them, saints are elect by the same free choice. Saints are confirmed and sealed to the day of redemption and secure in the hands of God; angels are likewise sealed and confirmed. Both are done by virtue of the passion of Christ. While the experiential confirmation of the angels was appropriate in one epoch, the passion of Christ was the occasion of the judicial confirmation of the angels in order to secure eternally the salvation of the elect angels. (84a)

The resurrection of Jesus from the dead was the appropriate
occasion for him to commence the eternal union, judicially, and this headship continues from that time into eternal futurity.

Epistemologically speaking, the Incarnation and the passion of Christ brought a new dimension into the experience and knowledge of angels. It is important to remember that in Edwards' scheme knowledge and experience go together. Knowledge always has an existential dimension. The being of angelic or human person always has an encounter with the Being of God, which enlarges the personality in goodness, enjoyment, purity and holiness at the same time that there is a quantitative increase in the sum of knowledge.

"They have their happiness in him in this brightness of God's glory and express image...Thus Christ is the tree of life in paradise, on whose fruit all its inhabitants live to all eternity, and the Lamb is the light of that glorious city" (84b)

and further

"They have this benefit by the incarnation of Christ that God is immediately united with a creature, and so is nearer to them, whereby they are under infinitely greater advantages to have the full enjoyment of God."

(84)

Edwards argued from Isa. 64:4; 1 Cor. 2:7,9; Eph 3:9,11, Rom. 16:25,26 and Col 1:26, that the angels were ignorant of the counsels and designs of God regarding redemption. In Edwards' vision of the dispensations of God this was a qualitative as well as a quantitative increase in the
knowledge that they had of God. The existential experience enlarged with the revelation to them of the grand mystery and the whole quality of their life was enriched. Edwards was so far removed from a paste-board concept of angels as is the experience of a glorious summer's day removed from a newspaper article about it. It is therefore of cardinal importance to remember that in Jonathan Edwards' epistemology all intelligent creatures have an existential and experiential encounter with God in their knowledge of him, with a most important difference in so far as the "evil part" of the moral universe is concerned.

Above all it was the humiliation of Christ which was instructive to angels (and, indeed, to all elect creatures). Humility is a cardinal principle particularly because Christ humbled himself from an infinite degree of greatness to share our despicable state.

"Christ's humiliation many ways laid a foundation for the humiliation of all elect creatures. By seeing one infinitely above them descending so low...they are abundantly made sensible how no abasement is too great for them...It tends to humble the angels...it tends to abase elect men in two ways..." (85) These are by example and a view of the dreadful nature of their sin and their sinfulness.

The time of the trial of the angels came to an end at the Passion of Christ. The humiliation of Christ was the climax of the trial and so humiliation is not only a key concept to the fall of the lost angels, the behaviour of
the elect angels, the salvation and the behaviour of the elect on earth, but also the key to the temporal aspects of the eschatological epistemology of Jonathan Edwards. The view that all the elect whether in heaven and on earth have of the humiliation of Christ is the crucial moment of the enlargement of the knowledge of God. Any other knowledge pales into insignificance before the knowledge of Christ's humiliation. This is because of the supreme quality of the Person of Christ and the immensity of his condescension. As he is also the outshining of the Father's glory, any knowledge of inanimate matter is like the 'skirts of his garments'.

"It was fit that the angels should be confirmed after they had seen Christ in the flesh, for this was the greatest trial of the angels' obedience that ever was. If the other angels rebelled only at its being foretold that such an one in man's nature should rule over them...how great a trial was it when they actually saw a poor, obscure, despised, afflicted man, one whom they had just seen so mocked, and spit upon, and crucified, and put to death like a vile malefactor? This was a great trial to those thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers, those mighty glorious, and exalted spirits, whether or no they would submit to such an one for their sovereign Lord and King." (86)

However at the Ascension of Christ the angels were confirmed in their obedience beyond the ability to fall in the same way as the fallen angels had fallen. This is the judicial confirmation of the angels as distinguished from their experiential confirmation. So Edwards goes on to say in the next paragraph:

"It was also very fit that God should honour the day of the ascension and glorious exaltation of his
which was a day of such joy to Christ, with joining with it such reward of eternal life..." (i.e. the confirmation of the elect: angels so that they would never thereafter fall). (86)

"The angels are now confirmed and have been since Christ's ascension." (87)

This confirmation Edwards establishes from Psalm 118:22 and Hebrews 1:6. He expounds it at the place last cited and asserts that Christ is the Head of all government and communication to them (Edwards' italics where underlined). A little later he quotes Col 1:16 - 20 as showing that angels were created by him and for him and have their fulness in him. As we have before explained, it is not possible to understand Edwards' epistemology unless we understand all the strands of goodness, virtue, joy and holiness are bound together in a cord. One may abstract them out but in the ontological experience of the angels they go together. The judicial confirmation had the great effect of

"...filling them, bestowing eternal life and blessedness upon them, that the angels in heaven might all receive the reward of confirmed and eternal glory from him and in him." (88)

This occasioned an enlargement of their knowledge of God and enjoyment of him. It was not as if they experienced merely an enlargement of the number of facts that they learned but there was a qualitative and quantitative increase in knowledge, for Christ

"...is he in whom all the fulness of the Godhead dwells, and in whom the creature receives that fulness;
and he is the head of communication whence ye receive fulness, or in whom ye are filled full" (free expansion of Col 2:9,10) (89)

Christ is called "angels' food" (Psalm 78:26 cf. John 6:31,32). Using precise interpretation (as he always does) Edwards takes "manna" which was called "angels' food" as a type of Christ from the interpretation that Christ himself gave to it. Thus Christ is the Bread of life to angels just as he is to men. He fills them in His encounter with them, so they "live for ever" as man does through His encounter with him.

"And the highest heavens was not a place of such happiness and rest before Christ's ascension as it was afterwards; for the angels were not yet confirmed. So that it was in Christ God man that the angels have found rest. Then angels, therefore, have this to sweeten their safety and rest, that they have it after they have known what it is to be in great danger, and to be distressed with fear." (81)

2.3.4.5 The Third Epoch: from the Incarnation to the Judgment.

The third epoch covers the church age and more, from the humiliation, resurrection and ascension of Christ to the Judgment. The church in heaven, comprising of elect angels and men, is joined in one and is in a progressive state.

"The church of angels and saints there at first was in a state of infancy to what it is now, as it was with the church on earth, and have been brought forward to greater fulness and perfection by great events of providence, as it has been with the church here; and
things will arrive at a consummation at the same time, and at the same great event at the end of the world. The church in heaven was greatly advanced in happiness at Christ's exaltation, whence commenced the gospel-day to the church in this world; and so again the church in heaven will receive another still much higher advancement in glory at the time of the fall of antichrist, as appears by several passages in the book of Revelation, as abundantly appears, Rev xviii.20. and the nine first verses of the 19th chap. and 20th chap. ver. 4. And both that part of the church that is on earth, and that which is in heaven, shall at the same time receive their highest advancement in glory, together with the consummation of Christ's exaltation at the day of judgment." (90)

In this third epoch the angels and the glorified saints unite to form the elect company in heaven. Much of their joy is attributed to their increase in the knowledge of the development and progression of God's plan for the world and the advancement of the effects of redemption. (91)

As Edwards now views the elect company in heaven as one and because there is no difference in principle between angels and saints in a "separated state", we will consider the further epochs under section 2.3.6.

2.3.4.6 The category of "spirit"

It will by now be unmistakably clear that the category of spirit is fundamental to any proper understanding of reality as Edwards saw it. In this meaning spirit is an ens, having substantive existence. It has objective existence. As Kant said "Wo Handlung, mithin Thatigkeit und Kraft ist, da ist auch Sustanz," (where operation and consequently activity and power are, there is substance).
The existence of independent spirits was assumed in their historical Biblical sense. The human being, as we shall see in the next paragraph, has a spirit united to a body but the spirit is immortal and in the "separated state" is not, in principle, distinguishable from an angel. It is interesting that T A Schafer saw fit to isolate this element of Edwards' system for special mention: "spirits are only properly substance."
2.3.5 THE SAINTS

2.3.5.1 The Pre-Incarnation Epoch for Man.

We have dealt with the eschatological purpose of God in setting up and carrying into effect an epistemological scheme for the communication of knowledge of himself to created beings. We have seen how this scheme was carried into effect in the heavens.

What happens in the heavens has its counterpart on the earth in the eternal destiny of the saints. As we have previously noted with quotations, the key hermeneutical principle is that of analogy. (90)

Inasmuch as the church on earth has two distinct periods of existence, one in the body and one in a "separate state", the two modes of existence have to be treated separately.

During the second epoch of the angels' experience of God as expounded above, the creation of man took place, followed by the fall of man. The first epoch of man is therefore temporally equivalent with the second epoch of the angels. The Covenants and the dispensations of God's government of man are not irrelevant to Edwards's epistemology as the progressive revelation is a part thereof, but seeing that it relates to the content of knowledge, as distinguished
from its mode, it need not concern us. Through these
Covenants and in the Old Testament dispensations, the Old
Testament church, as Reformed theologians used to call it,
was born and, of course, saints would pass into a separated
state at death.

From heaven and from earth the church views the works of
God.

"It seems to me probable that that part of the church
that is in heaven have been from the beginning of the
world progressive in their light, and in their
happiness, as the church on earth has, and that much of
their happiness has consisted in seeing the progressive
wonderful doings of God, with respect to his church
here in this world. Thus Moses with great joy saw the
promises of God fulfilled, in bringing the children of
Israel into Canaan, with far greater satisfaction than
he would have seen it on earth....So those saints, who
die now, before the accomplishment of the far more
glorious things to the church that God has foretold
which are not yet fulfilled, and for which they have
prayed and waited will see the fulfilment of them with
greater satisfaction....The church in heaven and the
church on earth are more one people, one city, and one
family, than is generally imagined. (91)

It is not surprising then, considering the carefully worked
out plan to be expected from the omniscient God, that the
saints in heaven had notice of Christ's Incarnation and are
cognisant of the development and progress of God's plan.

"...they can better see and understand the marvellous
steps that divine wisdom takes in all that is done, and
the glorious end he accomplishes, and what opposition
Satan makes, and how he is baffled and overthrown.
They can see the wise connexion of one event with
another, and the beautiful order of all things that
come to pass in the church in different ages, that to
us appears like confusion. They will behold the glory
of the divine attributes in his works of providence
infinitely more clearly than we can." (92)
2.3.5.2 The Epistemological implications of the Death of a Saint.

On the death of a saint there must be the beginning of an increase in knowledge.

"That the glorified spirits shall grow in holiness and happiness in eternity, I argue from this foundation, that their number of ideas shall increase to eternity...their knowledge will increase to eternity; and if their knowledge, their holiness; for as they increase in the knowledge of God, and of the works of God, the more they will see of his excellency, and caeteris partibus, the more will they love him, and the more they love God, the more delight and happiness will they have in him." (93)

Some of Edwards most beautiful thoughts are about the state of the church in heaven. He was a person with a strong sense of beauty and a powerful array of words and in his notes on Heaven he exercises himself to the full on the subject.

2.3.5.3 Mediate rather than Immediate knowledge of God in Heaven

It is not at once clear whether in the presence of God the church learns immediately from God or not. The overpowering impression is that knowledge is imparted immediately to elect angels and saints in a separated state. If one compares the saints on earth, in the body, with those in heaven, then relatively speaking those in heaven certainly learn from the immediate presence of God compared with those on earth who must learn mediately. It
is doubtful, however, that Edwards should be understood as meaning that in the 'immediate' presence of God the church receives knowledge immediately in the absolute sense.

In our introductory remarks on the influence of Locke on the young Jonathan, we had occasion to quote from his Remarks on Mental Philosophy - "The Mind" made either during his reading of Locke or just after, that would mean between the ages of 14 and 16 years. (94) He made a note to explore in a Treatise of the Mind, the subject of Sensation

"How far all the acts of the mind are from Sensation. All ideas begin from thence; and there never can be any idea, thought, or act of the mind, unless the mind first received some ideas from Sensation, or some other way equivalent, wherein the mind is wholly passive in receiving them." (95)

He also at the same place wished to enquire

"How far the Soul, in a Separate State, must depend on Sensation, or some way of passively receiving ideas equivalent to Sensation, in order to conversing with other minds, to the knowing of any occurrence, to beholding any of the the works of God, and to its further improvement in knowledge."

The influence of John Locke is clear. We are dependant upon our senses for ideas. (96)

Edwards also noted down for thought the question as to whether the Lockean hypothesis of no innate ideas was valid, and whether it applied to angels. He asks his
"Whether all ideas wherein the mind is merely passive, and which are received immediately without any dependence on Reflexion, and not ideas of Sensation, or External ideas? Whether it be possible for the Soul of man, in this manner, to be originally, and without dependence on Reflexion, capable of receiving any other ideas than those of Sensation, or something equivalent, and so some external idea. And whether the first ideas of the ANGELS, must not be of some such kind?" (97)

In the following note he asked whether spirits are in place and referred to angels as having "seeing bodies" and their having to do with the bodies of men and

"...how far these things necessarily imply, that they have some kind of Sensations like ours; and Whether these things do not show that, by some laws or other, they are united to some kind of Matter?" (98)

In later years in his writings on Heaven he again referred to this concept. Speaking of "Spirits separate" he wrote

"Though we do not certainly know that separate spirits can properly be said to be in any place; seeing that a spirit cannot be said to be in place at all, only with respect to the immediate mutual operation there is between that and body...whether or not there be any immediate excitation of any corporeal ideas, or any other way than as they see them in minds that are united to bodies, or remember them as formerly excited in themselves...yet it does not seem probable that their manner of existence and receiving ideas shall be so exceedingly different from what it is here and from the church on earth...it seems to me very improbable that there should be no corporeal world with respect to the angels who have so much to do with the church on earth...but that corporeal ideas are excited in them by some law." (99)

It is apparent, therfore, that there is some kind of "sense experience" in a separated state. It is an intermediate
stage, not as fully developed as after the Resurrection at the last day. We cannot date his comments on Heaven, but if it is in his later years, as the style seems to indicate, he at that time still had not completely solved the matter of sensation in beings in a separate state from the body but he had concluded that the elect in heaven also received knowledge through the mediation of senses suitable to pure spirits. In writing of heaven he extrapolated our experience on earth by analogy into our anticipation of heaven.

"How ravishing are the proportions of the reflexions of rays of light, and the proportion of the vibrations of the air! and without doubt God can contrive matter so that there shall be other sort or proportions that may be quite of a different kind, and may raise another sort of pleasure in the sense, and in a manner to us now inconceivable, that shall be vastly more ravishing and exquisite....And it is out of doubt with me that there will be immediate intellectual views of minds, one of another, and of the Supreme Mind, more immediate, clear, and sensible than our views of bodily things with bodily eyes. In this world we behold spiritual beauties only mediate by the intervention of our senses, in perceiving those external actions which are the effects of spiritual proportion. Hereby the ravishingness of the beauty is much obscured, and our sense of it flattened and deadened; but when we behold the beauties of mind more immediately than now we do the colours of the rainbow, how ravishing it will be! All that there wants in order to such an intellectual view, is that a clear and sensible apprehension of what is in mind should be raised in our own mind constantly according to such and such laws; for it is no other way that we perceive with our bodily eyes or perceive by any of our senses." (100)

In this particular reference Jonathan Edwards, in point of fact, telescoped the third and the fourth epochs. The third epoch is up the the Judgment which co-incides with
the Resurrection, or properly speaking Resurrection just precedes the Judgment. The Resurrection is the occasion of a qualitative and quantitative increase in knowledge with the change from a separated state to a state in a glorified body in the elect. Until that time the saints in a separated state do not have the same degree of sense experience as the elect angels. (The fourth epoch succeeds the Resurrection as we shall see later.)

The experience of the saints in heaven, of knowledge in its greater dimensions, will be mediated by some kind sense experience appropriate to the separated existence. Edwards draws on nature's beauty and music, intellectual beauty and harmony to express what glories of knowledge are to come. He all along acknowledged ignorance but was certain from his understanding of revealed truth and from reason that such was the case as we have seen. This is again referred to in 2.3.6.1 (infra)

With regard to the state of the church in the third epoch:

"The church now in heaven is not in its fixed and ultimate, but in a progressive, subordinate, and preparatory state. The state they are in is in order to another. In the employments in which they are now exercised, they look to that which is still future, to their consummate state...and God in his dealings with them has a constant and perpetual respect to the great consummation of all things. So it is both in respect to the saints and angels: all things in heaven and earth, and throughout the universe...It is God's manner to keep things always progressive...But when I say the church is progressive before the resurrection, I mean that they are progressive with a progression of preparation for another and more perfect state, their state is itinerary, viatory; their state, their ...
employs, their glory and happiness, are subordinate..." (101)

In this epoch the knowledge of grace received and the fulfilment of God's promises will therefore bring a qualitative and quantitative change in the life of the separated spirits of believers. They will not be less but more filled with God. Edwards says

"...although the resurrection be indeed the proper time of their reward, and their happiness before be small in comparison of what it will be afterwards...they may be said to be in possession of the promises of the covenant of grace." (102)

As in the Old Testament dispensation, so in this epoch the happiness of the separated souls of saints consists in seeing the progression and development of God's works: hence it is essentially related to epistemology. (103)
2.3.6 THE UNITED CHURCH: ELECT ANGELS AND SAINTS AFTER THE RESURRECTION (The Fourth Epoch)

2.3.6.1 The Fourth Epoch: After the Resurrection

The Resurrection, while giving a qualitative and quantitative increase in the whole spectrum of knowledge, goodness, happiness and perfection, introduces a new growing phase.

That it is an occasion of such an increase:

"But the more properly perfect and consummate state of God's people will be after the resurrection...Then the saints will be in their natural state of union with bodies, glorious bodies, bodies perfectly fitted for the uses of a holy glorified soul." (106)

In this state the angels and saints will be more nearly alike. However even the angels will receive a qualitative increase in their existential experience at that moment.

"Then also the glory of the angels will receive proportional additions..." (108)

Edwards wrote at considerable length in an homiletical, hortatory style, in what one might call a pastoral manner, and it is evident that he used his most beautiful concepts for the comfort of his congregation.

Perhaps the best place to read a summary of the various stages of the saints' progress (though it is not a complete summary), is the paragraph [710] Heaven-Separate state-
Resurrection-Dispensations. (107) Here Edwards gathered up ideas scattered elsewhere in many places and related them to the Dispensations of revelation in the church on earth. In this fairly long section one may see the use of the word "immediate" used relatively when comparing the saints in the presence of God with those in the body. In the very next paragraph, however, it is clear that in another way of expressing things, all knowledge (here after the Resurrection) is mediated by sense experience and is therefore not immediate. It is after the Lockean principle, yet in harmony with the Christian and biblical epistemology. Edwards is not contradicting himself. In the presence of God the saints will receive knowledge immediately, relatively speaking to the saint on earth, but evidently not as a naked spirit to naked Spirit: rather mediated by spiritual senses appropriate to that state.

"As the saints after the resurrection will have an external part, or an outward man, distinct from their souls, so it necessarily follows that they shall have external perception, or sense; and.... every perceptive faculty shall be an inlet of delight...they will have the seeing...exciting sensations or ideas in the beholders perfectly different, of which we can no more conceive than we conceive of a colour we never saw..." (108)

Its nature will be spiritual for

"...it will be so ordered in its degree and circumstances as to be wholly and absolutely subservient to a spiritual sight of that divine spiritual glory...as the body will in all respects be a spiritual body..." (109)

Again, the eternal epistemological principle is emphasised...
in a most beautiful passage covering God's plan to draw mankind into the fellowship of the Trinity, in Christ.

"Again it shows how much God designed to communicate himself to men, that he so communicated himself to the first and chief of elect men, the elder brother, and the head and representative of the rest, even so that this man should be the same person with one of the persons of the Trinity. It seems to have been God's design to admit man as it were to the inmost fellowship with the Deity. There was, as it were, an eternal society in the Godhead in the Trinity of persons; and it seems to be God's design to admit the church into the divine family; so that which Satan made use of as a temptation to our first parents, "Ye shall be as gods", shall be fulfilled contrary to his design. The saints' enjoyment of Christ shall be like the Son's intimate enjoyment of the Father, John xvii. 21, 22, 23, 24." (110)

2.3.6.2 The Fifth Epoch: The New Heavens and the New Earth -The Consummation of All Things.

Just when one seems to think that Jonathan Edwards has said about all that he could say concerning the future happiness, goodness, knowledge and glory of the church, one finds that his vision is still greater and keener and his writings more moving and inspired. It becomes a matter of logical necessity given the premises of the self-existence and eternity of God, His omniscience, the perfection of His glory, the eternal character of His purpose and the distance of the creature from the Creator, that the Christian epistemology of Jonathan Edwards has the character of infinity. It is for this reason that it is absolutely essential to lift the locus of Edwards' epistemology into his theology. And having lifted it
there, it is necessary to share his ecstatic vision. The end of the subject is the Beatific Vision. It has been a characteristic of most philosophers to separate theology from philosophy, particularly the post-Christian philosophers. Even the early Christian philosophers separated the disciplines and with good reason. However as Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God can only properly be understood in the context of fides quaerens intellectum and indeed of the devotional warmth of his theology, so Edwards' epistemology only can be understood from the inside, from the vision of union with God into all eternity.

It follows, as has been remarked before, that his constant references to progression in the knowledge of God are because the end of the purpose of God is the union of the elect creature with Himself. Progression must of necessity be to eternity. Heaven is conceived of as God's throne. Heaven is seen as that which God fills,

"...the place of God and Christ, and the angels, and the place of blessedness; and all good whatever of a divine nature, is called heavenly; and heaven is always spoken of as the proper country of the saints." (111)

Heaven is the origin of the earth and to it will earth return. (112) Heaven embraces all the universe but is particularly "the upper part of it". The earth is so to speak suburban, to use C.S.Lewis' expression. After the Resurrection the whole upper and lower parts of creation
will be changed and "exalted to higher glory". Only God is immutable, heaven is not, and earth is destined to be burned and a new heavens and a new earth will be filled with greater glory than ever. All of which is familiar to the reader of the New Testament. Edwards rises from height to height, with the utmost clarity of expression, carefully defining, arguing by analogy, from necessity because of the essential nature of things, from scripture, never straining scripture to improbable exaggeration, expounding the eternal glory of God revealed in the consummation of all things. Throughout he keeps the epistemological purpose of God clearly before him. Of course the Miscellaneous Observations are notes put together, obviously written at different times, but its themes are recurring and not contradictory. Everything exists for an intelligent appreciation of God. Knowledge rises and grows eternally. God irradiates everything with his glory. His glory is known, is to be known. His glory fills. His glory transforms heaven and earth.

"Every manner of beauty or excellency there, is immediately dependant upon him: there is no shining or lustre, no fineness or purity, no vivacity or pleasantness, in anything there, but it is in such a manner dependent on him, as to appear to be immediately, every moment, from him, as a kind of diffusion of his glory and sweetness on everything, and into and through everything; so that the most inward nature of every thing there receives all excellency, and all purity, and preciousness, and sweetness from him immediately. In heaven, Christ appears and acts most visibly and sensibly as the Creator, and Life, and Soul, and Fountain of all being, and perfection, and he of whom and through whom all things are, and by whom all immediately consist." (113)
Other interim occasions of the qualitative and quantitative increase in knowledge.

Within the development of the epochs, concurrent with them and advancing in stages, "there are discernable steps in which the knowledge and happiness of the elect angels and elect men are advanced. For example, the Fall of Anti-Christ is such an occasion (114). This falls within the Third Epoch. The "Conflagration of the World" after the Judgment is another such occasion (115). This follows the Judgment and is at the beginning of the Fifth Epoch. Every step in the growth of the kingdom of God is an occasion for this (116). This, however, will add nothing new to our exposition.
qualitative difference in his (Lucifer's) knowledge of God. Whereas before the Fall of Lucifer, Christ was the mediator of God's glory to Lucifer, this could no longer be the case from the changed nature of things. If the Beatific Vision was the chief source of the knowledge of God, then Lucifer was now denied it. As virtue and holiness are inseparably linked with knowledge in Edwards system, Lucifer could not share in that fulness as he did before.

"...before the fall of this cherub he is spoken of as being alone entitled to this great honour" (of covering cherub) and nearness to God's throne in heaven." (120)

He was also at the

"summit and height of all creature perfection in wisdom and beauty." (121)

The angels that fell were in an hierarchy of status and power and each had its proper degree of wisdom, beauty, power and knowledge. Satan rebelled at hearing that he and his angels were to be ministering spirits to the race of mankind

"...and to be subject to one of that race that should thereafter be born, he could not bear it." (122)

The Man Jesus Christ was "translated and set in the throne of Lucifer" to be head of angels and men henceforth. It is here that we find the importance of humility in the Edwardsean scheme. The lack of it is the chief and first sin, the exercise of it is found to a marvellous degree in the Son of God and it is an indispensable virtue required
of mankind. (It may be noted by the theologian that it is Christ as the Son of Man that is so exalted as the new head of angels and men rather than Christ as the Son of God.)

Edwards found it a paradox that Satan is "so cunning and subtle" and has such a long experience of how God has frustrated his plans and brought them to His own honour, yet he continues to plot and to act against God.

"And seeing he has experience of it, for so long a time, all his deep-laid contrivances have at last come out to his own overthrow, and the work has been directly contrary to his design. To this I say, that although the devil be exceeding crafty and subtle, yet he is one of the greatest fools and blockheads in the world, as the subtest of wicked men are. Sin is of such a nature that it strangely infatuates and stultifies the mind. Men deliberately choose eternal torments rather than miss of their pleasure of a few days...." (123)

And this likewise is a paradox of Edwards' epistemology as it relates to the Devil, fallen angels and wicked men. Granted such a view, an eternal suffering would surely lead one to expect that the mind would progressively become more and more "infatuated and stultified". If this went on eternally, the mind would surely end up either in annihilation or become totally feelingless. Yet this is not so.

In considering the increase in happiness that the saints will experience, Edwards raises the objection

"It will be objected that at this rate we might prove..."
that the damned increase in perfection. I answer, No; for, though it is true that they shall increase in knowledge, they shall increase in odiousness in the same proportion." (124)

Edwards' doctrine of original sin witnesses also to the stupidity into which man falls in his natural state. (125) Taken as a whole (though in Original Sin Edwards is arguing about mankind in particular) the propensities that all spiritual beings have, is seen by their effects (126).

"If any creature be of such a nature that it proves evil in its proper place, or in the universe, it is of an evil nature....So, if mankind are of such a nature, that they have an universal effectual tendency to sin and ruin in this world, where God has made and placed them, this is to be looked upon as a pernicious tendency belonging to their nature...and thus it is with most of the propensities in created spirits." (127)

This is essentially Edwardsean. Propensities follows their proper laws: as gravity, magnetism, electricity and other natural laws, follow their propensities, so it is in the spiritual world. The depravity is odious and pernicious, fatal and destructive. Because of the nature of things, evil men (unless there is the interposition of divine grace (130)) will remain evil: their propensity is evidenced by their behaviour. Sin is a corrupt moral sense. It is a prevailing tendency to continue in opposition to God. (131) It has "no tendency in its self to a diminution; but rather to an increase" (132). It should follow on these premises that the stupidity, the tendency to do what is only to Satan's harm, would follow
the cases of evil spirits or evil men, except that evil men
could always experience intervening grace as long as they
lived. The inevitable consequence of this harm done to the
entity (whether the Devil, a fallen angel or a wicked man)
is self-destruction. However while Edwards reads
"eternal" in this relation in the most absolute sense,
"destruction" is not read in an absolute sense, either
proximately or remotely.

Jonathan Edwards, where he is known outside of Evangelical
circles, is usually known as the preacher of "Sinners in
the Hands of an angry God". (133)(134). His published
sermons also contain two sermons on "The Folly of looking
back in fleeing out of Sodom" (135). He preached on
"Scripture Warnings the best means of wakening" (136)
Three sermons are on the "Future Punishment of the "Wicked"
(137). Others are "Wrath on the Wicked to the uttermost".
(138), and "The Wicked useful in their Destruction only".
(139) He wrote a long discourse on why men are
naturally God's enemies, "Men naturally God's enemies"
(140), one on the Final Judgment (141), one on "Sinners in
Zion Tenderly Warned", (142) and one on "The End of the
Wicked Contemplated by the Righteous". (143) He published
a sermon on "Natural Men in a dreadful condition", (144) a
discourse on "Man's Natural Blindness in Religion", (145) a
sermon on "The Portion of the Wicked as a partner to "The
Portion of the Righteous". (146) Edwards has a
popular reputation as a preacher of Hell-fire. (147) His reputation came from his unusually powerful preaching with the enormous and awesome sense of the immediacy of God that came with it, so much so that persons clung to the pillars of the church fearing that they were falling into Hell. Yet although the above list of sermons on the doom of the wicked seems long, it is not a tithe of the work that Edwards did. Most of the time his pen was directed to other purposes. He dwells far more on the bliss of the saints than the damnation of the wicked. His pen as was his preaching, was pastoral. As a pastor he had to warn men of the 'wrath to come'. This was a solemn and awesome responsibility felt keenly by every Puritan preacher and contrary to popular opinion, it was little relished. It was a painful and necessary exercise felt deeply by those whose responsibility it was. Edwards' major work was positive in its nature. Nevertheless it remains a fact that the Edwards' Biblical doctrine regarding the eternal perdition of the wicked is consistently held throughout his writings and, in the pastoral situation, was extremely compelling and very dreadful indeed as it necessarily must be to be consistent with Christ's teaching. (147) (148) (149)

The doctrine of the state of the lost, includes the Devil, the fallen angels and wicked men. All are held responsible for their actions. The Devil and the fallen angels consciously spurned God and carry the consequences of
their action eternally. Wicked men are also responsible for their actions and add guilt to guilt by refusing the freely offered grace of God in Christ. Unable to save themselves except by Divine interposition, the door of grace is always open to them and the "general promises" of Christ (absolute promises of pardon offered to all who will believe) have the consequence that no anxious enquirer need remain so, he must heed the Gospel call, repent and trust in Christ. Should he persist in the wickedness of unbelief the lost estate is seen to be everlasting. In his Miscellaneous Remarks when writing of the endless misery of the wicked, he argues against the pains of hell being of a probationary nature which would have an end in a final salvation at some unspecified time, when the wicked had suffered enough. (150) Although this writing is in another context (the apology is aimed at a disputant for reasons other to make the point under discussion), it becomes completely clear that implicit in his thought is a concept analogous to that of the state of the saints, that the wicked have an eschatological progression in their state of wickedness, pain and suffering. The whole chapter bears out the eternity of the suffering, the "many thousand years" of suffering, "tens of thousands of years" of pain. As the period progresses they have "infinitely greater and clearer knowledge and view of those things to be manifested at the day of judgment!". (151) They will
know the facts of the glory of Christ, the triumph of God
and the eternal felicity of the saints. This, however,
only will increase their sufferings. The whole is
biblically expounded from the words of Christ and the
apostles and from the Apocalypse. To refute Edwards one
must either refute the scriptures or apply some temporal
reservation to the words "ever and ever" in Scriptures such
as Rev 14:9 - 11. In his exposition eternal damnation is
terribly to be feared, is far more horrifying that anyone
can ever imagine. It is a real state. The torments are
those of a "truly and strictly everlasting fire". The
fire would be appropriate to spirits both in their nature
(that is, literal to a spirit and not literal to a body)
and to the absolute justice of God who has been abused by
those by reason of their wicked propensity in, a most
serious manner. His infinite majesty, His supremely
exalted state, the exalted glory of His Person make their
wickedness utterly reprehensible. In the very nature of
things as they are constituted, they will suffer eternally.
They will continue to grow more and more wicked, more and
more blameworthy, and to suffer to eternity. Edwards
inexorably follows their progression in sin after final
expulsion from the presence of God. Their hatred of God,
their blasphemy, their bitter cursings of the infinitely
good God, only increase their guilt eternally. If these
things were sin while grace abounded they no less will be
sins when grace is withdrawn. Thus their guilt, their
knowledge and their sufferings will increase eternally.
the punishment of the wicked was so very terrible as he was face to face with reality itself.

"The certainty of connection between sinfulness and misery rests not upon anything in the cause which will, in some future, engineer the effect, but upon an "inviolable sequence" which is independent of time. It does not wait upon the contingency of anyone's behaviour: to say that God will not certainly fulfill His threats is to suppose Him obliged to use a "fallacy" in governing the world, to imagine that because the fear of punishment is a device of great utility in restraining men from sin, God utters insincere threats to assist social regulations, and then finds Himself compelled, regretfully, to punish those who persist in sinning......But God's threats do not hang upon suppositions; they rest upon "what He knew would be future in execution." God speaks truth, and truth is not conditioned by time, and so God cannot speak "contrary to what He knows and contrary to what He intends." Thus for Edwards, the futurity of torment was of less interest than the eternity and the certainty--the timelessness--of agony." (150)

In this Perry Miller has interpreted Edwards truly. Edwards was starkly conscious of things as they were constituted. God was awesomely sovereign, real, true, eternal and terribly to be feared. But Perry Miller is not to be trusted when he says

"...God was no longer bound by any promise, whether of metaphysics or of law. Edwards brought mankind, as Protestantism must always bring them, without mitigation, protection, or indulgence, face to face with a cosmos fundamentally inhuman." (151)

Perry Miller does not understand Puritanism. The epistemological significance of Edwards' soteriology will be explained in Chapter 3 of this thesis. However, the
reader is referred to Jonathan Edwards' work "Concerning faith" (152), and, in fact, all the "Remarks on Important Theological Controversies" and Book 1 of Justification by Thomas Goodwin. (154) Miller should not have quoted Edwards out of his theological context. Edwards was a Puritan through and through, even if Perry Miller misses the Gospel appeal in "Sinners in the hands of an angry God". God's will was shown in His infinite grace and goodness flowing out of His eternal love. Even "Sinners in the hands of an angry God" was written to bring men to Christ and not to rob them of anything but false security. Edwards made a Gospel appeal in that sermon (that's why it was so useful his Gospel armoury, namely

"And now you have an extraordinary opportunity, a day wherein Christ has thrown the door of mercy wide open, and stands in calling, and crying with a loud voice to poor sinners..." (154)

As far as Edwards' doctrine of the eternal and lost estate of the wicked is concerned, epistemologically speaking there is in it an unresolved paradox. If the wicked grow more and more stupid (the law of entropy presumably working), and their knowledge grows more and more acute, and their 'spiritual senses' grow more and more acute, and the duration is eternal, then he has left himself in a contradiction. There is the further fact that the knowledge of the damned is necessarily cut off from the
life of God. There is no existential encounter with God into eternity, but rather an eternity antipathy. Edwards has left the problem unresolved. Much more crucial to his concept, if Christ is the mediator of knowledge to all His creatures, how can he mediate knowledge into eternity to those whom he has finally banished from his presence? What would be the mode of the mediation? "Separation" is a key word used in describing those finally lost: it must necessarily mean that the mediation of knowledge, from Christ to the damned, ceases. In eschatological terms, the same problem exists in the period up to the Judgment, though here it is not so severe. Christ may mediate knowledge to those fallen beings whom he has not finally banished, though not in the same way as to the elect. It presupposes the concept of 'mediate knowledge' which is, of course, very much a part of Edwards' epistemology, as we shall see. But even with that ability to know having been given from creation, and here we are assuming qualities in their being irrevocably given ab initio, and granted that the spiritual beings may retain those qualities or attributes after the Judgment, the irresistible principle of self-destruction, without any communication from the Throne of God to those finally banished, must surely render the self-destruction inevitable into eternity. Edwards, however, holds both concepts (eternity and destruction) in parallel and while he may have resolved the paradox elsewhere in his voluminous writings, we have not been able
to find such a resolution.
Chapter 3 Section 1: EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM: two kinds of Cognition and two kinds of Affection

3.1.1 THE DUALISM PROPERLY COMMENCES AT REGENERATION

We have seen that Jonathan Edwards abandoned the scholastic Technologia used by the Puritans for Lockean empiricism and Newtonian physics. The world-view of vortices and a priori relations as then imagined fell away but the a priori of revelation and the relations belonging to Puritan theology proper were far from abandoned. He absorbed the new knowledge into his Puritan world-view in which God was all in all. All material and all spiritual relations were then conceived of as being held together by the immediate presence of God, each in its proper place. The whole concept of innate knowledge was abandoned for knowledge mediated by the senses. His epistemology was on a grand scale, part of a plan which was conciously and omnisciently designed and willed by God before the worlds were made. It was planned and executed and will be consummated in eschatological stages in which God communicates and mediates a hierarchy of knowledge within the history of redemption of which the knowledge of God Himself was and is to be communicated to an hierarchy of creatures in an existential encounter with himself, in
virtue, holiness, joy, beauty and glory, to the eternal happiness of those who by God's interposing and special grace are the happy recipients of it. To those who continue in wickedness, knowledge and suffering will increase into eternity.

It is obvious that if there is to be an eschatological epistemological encounter with God into eternity, there must be a critical moment when one enters the scheme. It would not be possible to over-emphasise this crisis in Jonathan Edwards' world-view. Edwards was a philosopher by natural bent of mind but not a teacher of philosophy like Kant. He was a Christian Pastor with the eternal welfare of souls on his heart and mind and his efforts, his reading, studies, preaching and writing was only to this end. When we are finished with this thesis the importance of this crisis in Edwards' life, work and Works will still be understated. The epistemological crisis when the true saving knowledge of God is communicated to the soul was so pivotal in Puritan theology that once experienced it could never be undone. Whereas the elect angels were confirmed at the Resurrection of Christ, the elect on earth are confirmed at the New Birth. The doctrine of the preservation of the saints was of such importance that it was never surrendered by Calvinists in any polemic, at all. We have already shown, in our first chapter, how the impact of the Calvinistic doctrines produced critical anxieties in many
and many was the person who was concerned to know whether he was truly among the elect. It was considered a salutary experience for people to go through these traumas of soul, just as among the early Quakers who were after all Puritans. (1) A whole pastoral theology developed to aid the distressed of soul. The distressed soul had to be comforted without being told that he was among the elect, for this no Reformed Pastor had the presumption to do. It was the work of the Holy Spirit to give assurance of salvation. At the same time the distressed soul had carefully to be counselled lest he rested on a false foundation. The careless and unbelieving had to be warned of the wrath to come. We already have had a glimpse of the long history of theological debate and teaching which was Edwards' heritage. It is unmistakably clear from Edwards' writings that there are epistemological implications in both the salvific crisis and the salvation process. On the other hand there are normal natural epistemological issues which have nothing to do with salvation. These normal epistemological issues, and by this I mean the staple diet of philosophers, really belong to Edwards' early period but they are compatible with a total Christian epistemology.

The salvific crisis created an epistemological "dualism". This dualism began properly with the experience of regeneration, or the New Birth. Not even prevenient grace in which some light was shed on the soul, ranked with the
spiritual perception received at the New Birth. While the quantity of light shed on the soul at the moment of its salvation might differ, the fact of its coming, the mode of its shedding and its divine and supernatural quality, were the same. The sense experience of the soul under-going regeneration might, and usually did differ from person to person, but the holy, saving quality of the experience was common to all the elect.

We have had some doubt as to the wisdom of calling this epistemology dualistic. The dualism was "simplified" (as in the simplicity of God). We will see that there are two kinds of cognition, two kinds of affection. There are, vertically speaking, two kinds of men, the natural man and the spiritual man. The natural man has cognition and affection. The spiritual man has two kinds of cognition and affection. Yet cognition and affection are not two, but one. Also the natural man is not divided but is one man and one person. He is one whole man. The spiritual man is one whole man. There are ways of analysing and identifying relations and properties belonging to a man but the man is always one. (2)

3.1.2 COGNITION: TWO KINDS

There are two kinds of cognition, that which is natural and that which is spiritual. In The Religious Affections Edwards distinguished between
natural and spiritual men. (3) The distinction comes from 1 Cor 2:14,15. Spiritual men are those to whom the Spirit of God has been given, the "true saints", in whom He dwells "as his proper lasting abode...as a divine supernatural spring of life and action". Saints are 'sanctified men', set apart for God by the distinguishing grace of God. On the other hand, natural men "have no union with him" and whatever influences of the Spirit of God that may have been their experience, these influences were "without communication of himself to be an active principle in it". One can see again the existential encounter that there is in the experience of this saving knowledge.

"And as the saints are called spiritual in Scripture, so we also find that there are certain properties, qualities, and principles, that have the same epithet given to them."

This epithet "spiritual"

"...is not used to signify any relation of persons or things to the spirit or soul of man, as the spiritual part of man, in opposition to the body, or material part. Qualities are not said to be spiritual, because they have their seat in the soul, and not in the body; for there are some properties that the Scripture calls carnal or fleshly, which have their seat as much in the soul, as those properties that are called spiritual. Thus pride and self-righteousness, and a man's trusting in his own wisdom, the apostle calls fleshly..."

The word 'spiritual' is thus used in a strictly Biblical sense with its specific meaning and not in the modern sense..."
of the word in which a poem, for example, or anything relating to the intellect, could be called spiritual. Following on this distinction, Edwards drew the distinction between two kinds of cognition.

"From hence it follows, that in those gracious exercises and affections which are wrought in the saints, through the saving influences of the Spirit of God, there is a new inward perception or sensation of their minds, entirely different in its nature and indeed from any thing that ever their minds were the subjects of before they were sanctified. For, if God by his mighty power produces something that is new, not only in degree and circumstances, but in its whole nature...then, doubtless, something entirely new is felt, or perceived. There is what some metaphysicians call a new simple idea...it follows that the mind has an entirely new kind of perception or sensation...a new spiritual sense...as entirely diverse from any thing that is perceived in them by natural men, as the sweet taste of honey is diverse from the ideas men get of honey by only looking on and feeling it" (3)

No new faculties are given, but new principles of nature. It is not a new faculty of understanding but

"a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of understanding." (4)

3.1.3 THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES OF THE NATURAL MAN

With regard to the FACULTIES of the natural man, all things are copies of the divine mind and so the mind is actually a copy of Mind, made as he is in the image of God. (9) In this section we are assuming that Edwards
retained the early jottings of his thoughts on the mind, all his life. We are following Perry Miller in what seems to be the case, that Edwards saw reality from his earliest years in a holistic, 'given' view. This is perhaps too readily assumed. It would be a long task to read through Edwards' three million words to scrutinise his sentences to see whether his epistemological views on the natural man underwent any change.

"God, in the beginning, created such a certain number of Atoms, of such a determinate bulk and figure, which they yet maintain and always will, and gave them such a motion, of such a direction, and of such a degree of velocity; from whence arise all the Natural changes in the Universe, for ever, in a continued series." (9)

God has all things in his mind and

"causes all changes to arise, as if all these things had actually existed in such a series, in some created mind...And, although created minds do not; yet, the Divine Mind doth; and he orders all things according to his mind, and his ideas."

Perception consists of ideas that we passively receive from God. (5) Ideas are but

"...repetitions of those very things over again—as well as ideas of colours, figures, solidity, tastes, and smells, as the ideas of thought and mental acts." (5)

PERCEPTION is common to animals and man. Both passively receive ideas, and even make judgments by force of habit.
The difference lies in the fact that men are "capable of reflecting upon what passes in their minds". (7)

All these things belong to the natural man. However man is also capable REFLECTION,

"by reflection to behold and contemplate spiritual things. Hence it arises that Man is capable of Religion."

CONSCIOUSNESS is the

"mind's perceiving what is in itself--ideas, actions, passions, and every thing that is perceptible. It is a sort of feeling within itself. The mind feels when it thinks; so it feels when it discerns, feels when it loves, and feels when it hates." (8)

Edwards' scheme is essentially Platonic, or better, Neo-Platonic. (10) Everything is "according to his own settled order". Everything is in its order following cause and effect, everything in its proper place. Man receives perceptions and ideas through his senses. These originate in causes and have their effects. The will by no means acts freely, on its own, as if it had no proper influences and pressures upon it. Our inclinations to do something or to choose something are dependant upon our perceptions of the good that we see in the course of action. We do not determine, desire, act or think in a
vacuum. However, thought is independant of matter in its true nature. Matter cannot think. Whereas God could have bound thought to matter as to make them inseparable, he has not done so absolutely but only in so far as he has bound thought to the human body. Matter has solidity, extension, figure, motion and gravity and these are its properties. It is in these that materiality consists. Perception follows its separate but analogous laws, after all, "all God's ways are one". There is, however, no connection between perception and the individual properties of matter like solidity, motion or gravity. Thus there is no essential link between matter and thought, in the sense that thought is part of matter. In the sense expressed above it can be in place, that is, in the body, but not absolutely so. Edwards would have no sympathy with any biological view of thought. (11) The soul, by the same token is not in the brain: in fact the brain itself is only an idea. (12)

As for MEMORY, it

"...is the identity, in some degree, of Ideas that we formerly had in our minds, with a consciousness that we formerly had them, and a supposition that their former being in the mind is the cause of their being in us at present...(it is) also an act of the judgment, that they were there formerly, ...and that judgment arising from a Law of nature which God hath fixed...In Memory, in mental principles, habits, and inclinations, there is something really abiding in the mind, where there are no acts or exercises of them." (13)
These can exist in the mind without recognition, just as a chair can be in a room unnoticed. People form universals like colours and sounds out of particular simple ideas put together. However it could not be said that colours, for example, really are made up that way. They are really external to man even if paradoxically they exist only in the mind. They are different in kind from sounds, for instance, and from the ideas of "Horse" or "Man". The mind recognises the likeness of colours to each other, and sounds to each other. The mind would not confuse a colour with a sound. It ranks ideas which are agreeable to each other. It receives the simple ideas, it forms ideas of universals, but seems to be working from the soul's own nature. God therefore has made not only species but also genera. (14) Genera and species are part of the hierarchy of knowledge.

INTUITION is what we know by immediate sensation. These are

"properly self-evident truths: as, Grass is green; The Sun shines; Honey is sweet." (15)

There is only one definition for TRUTH and that is

"The agreement of our ideas with existence. To explain what this existence is, is another thing. In abstract ideas, it is nothing but the ideas themselves; so their truth is consistency with themselves. In things that are supposed to be without us, it is the determination and fixed mode of God's exciting ideas in us. So that Truth, in these things, is an agreement of our ideas with
that series in God. It is existence; and that is all that we can say. It is impossible that we should explain a perfectly abstract and mere idea of existence; only we always find this, by running of it up, that God and Real Existence are the same...how proper are these names of the Deity, JEHOVAH and I AM THAT I AM. (16)

Truth is also the perception of the relations there are between ideas. If one supposes relations inconsistent with those ideas, it is falsehood. So also if they disagree "with things without" (presumably 'external reality'). Truth is "the agreement of our ideas with the things as they are". If it be argued that this is difficult to conceive if things only exist mentally, the

"Truth, as to external (read: objects), is the consistency of our ideas with those ideas...according to God's stated order and law."

KNOWLEDGE is

"the perception of the union, or disunion of ideas—or the perceiving whether two or more ideas belong to one another." (17)

It is therefore impossible to know mysteries. So prejudice does not belong to the "prime essence of things" and "exceedingly clog the mind" and "cast such a mist over things, that there is a need of a sharp sight to see clearly through". It comes from the pressure of colours and sounds everywhere (that is, the pressure of external reality when data is constantly pouring in through the
senses) which the mind must analyse. These cause confusion in man and inclines him to prejudge matters. (18)

The two fundamental faculties of the mind are the UNDERSTANDING and the WILL although man always acts as a whole man. Edwards deals with it fully in his difficult book The Freedom of the Will. The will always follows what it considers to be the greatest good, as dictated by the understanding. Will is synonymous with choice. The perception of good that the mind has consists in two things, the judgment, in which one judges the degree of good that there is, and the deepness of the sense of the goodness. That does not mean that the goodness is what is absolutely good in itself, but what the understanding perceives is good for it. So a man may choose evil, thinking that he is choosing good for himself. In The Freedom of the Will, it is the soul's very incapacity to perceive its greatest good that is the crucial point: it cannot rise of itself to desire Good. The will is in bondage in the same degree that the understanding is darkened. (19) (20) (21)

All these cognitive faculties belong to the natural man. The cognition of the spiritual man is different in quality. imparted by the Spirit of God as the active principle in it.
3.1.4 AFFECTION: TWO KINDS

Just as there are two kinds of cognition, so there are two kinds of affection which relate to the natural man and to the spiritual man respectively. The word affection is the old word for emotion but Edwards is careful to define it.

When Edwards was faced with the emotional problems of the Great Awakening he was confronted with opposition on two sides. On the one side there was extremism which was exhibited in many places and had its most prominent example in Davenport who was ultra-pietistic and claimed immediate revelations from God and caused much scandal among the churches. On the other side he had to face the strong opposition of critics like Chauncey who kept urging the people to stick to the Bible (somewhat ironically as Jonathan Edwards was himself an intense Biblicist) (30) (32) and he had to avoid the extremes of emotion to which those "convinced" in the Great Awakening were so often prone. He had therefore, to defend himself on two fronts, or perhaps better, he had to defend the Great Awakening and the affections on one front and show it to be Biblical and he had to teach those in the Awakening sound principles by which they could distinguish between what was of God and what was either of "the flesh" or from Satan. He also had to speak against "immediate revelations" and against those who wanted no emotion or emotionalism in religion. In the terminology of those days, these were the problems of
enthusiasm and of affection. Was affection permissible in religion? It was a critical issue! One man committed suicide, and many others were tempted by voices to committed suicide "now being a convenient time". To meet these Edwards critical pastoral problems, he wrote The Religious Affections and it is chiefly in this work that the epistemological dualism of the spiritual man is seen. The purpose of the book is distinguish the nature and signs of "the gracious operation of God's Spirit" from what is in the mind of man and of a "saving nature". It was the old question of "Christian certainty", how one could be sure that one was among the elect. From a pastoral point of view it was essential to give guidelines both to break down the self-assurance of those who thought that they were "gracious" because of their emotional experiences (often bizarre and often very like the real thing) while their ethical conduct was suspect. It was also essential build up those who had the gracious workings of the Spirit of God within them and had received divine and supernatural light but were filled with doubt and fear that they were misled.

In order to do this Edwards set out to show in his First Doctrinal Proposition that "True Religion in great part consists in Holy Affections." He defines affections:

"The affections of the mind are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul." (23)
The understanding is capable of perception and speculation, it discerns, views and judges. The result is "inclinations": the soul is "inclined to them, or is disinclined and averse from them." When it governs actions it is the will and when exercised it is called the heart. There are degrees of inclination and disinclination. The higher degrees of the action of the soul are called the heart and the more vigorous and sensible are affections. The will and the affections are not, in fact, separate and do not differ. Cognition or affection? It is a matter of degree. The will and the affections do not, in fact, differ. Affections do not differ "from the mere actings of the will, and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise......Such seems to be our nature, and such the laws of the union of soul and body, that there never is in any case whatsoever, any lively or vigorous exercise of the will or inclination of the soul without some effect upon the body...But it is not the body, but the mind only, that is the proper seat of the affections."

Although true grace has various degrees, those who have the power of godliness as the predominant element within them and of prevailing to the end, are truly Christ's: these are the elect. Accordingly it is necessary to look for true and gracious affections which differ from bodily joy, or "animal spirits". The "motion of the blood and animal spirits" is not the same as the godly affection that is
There is thus in regenerate man an epistemological dualism that reaches not only to the cognition, as shown above, but also to the affections. However, it is clear that affections are not emotions, though they have emotional effects. Today they would be called emotions but affections in Edwards are affections of the mind, reminding us of the phrase "The passions of the mind". (26) There is no difference really between what the mind experiences in cognition and affection, it is simply a matter of degree. However there is a difference between "bodily spirits" and emotions like love and fear which also in the natural man take place in the mind. Cognition has its more vigorous outward expression in affection. However there is a qualitative difference between the spiritual affections and natural affections. Again there is a difference between the mind's working and its emotional reaction on the body. He taught that we must not confuse the effects upon the body, with the cognitive-affective experiences themselves, both in the natural and in the spiritual man. So Edwards says, in this instance speaking of the spiritual man,

"There is a sensation of the mind which loves and rejoices, that is antecedent to any effects on the fluids of the body and this sensation of the mind, therefore does not depend on those motions in the body." (27)
The Religious Affections we can see that Edwards had well laid the groundwork for his defence of emotional experiences of the highest sort, in making the point with care that religion is for the most part experienced in "holy affections", as Scripture and experience teach us. He infers that those who discard all religious affections are wrong. It is important in his argument that

"...there are false affections and there are true. A man's having much affection, does not prove that he has any true religion: but if he has no affection, it proves that he has no true religion." (28) (29)

3.2.1 THE DIVINE AND SUPERNATURAL LIGHT IMMEDIATELY IMPARTED TO THE SOUL BY GOD

The epistemological crisis took place when by intervening grace God shed the light of salvation into the soul. Our heading comes from the famous Sermon 1 of Five Sermons, preached by Jonathan Edwards in Northampton in 1734. This sermon was his manifesto and a doctrine from which he never deviated throughout his life. The human soul, utterly lost and "dead in trespasses and sins" and so altogether unable to save itself, has graciously imparted to it by God, a divine and supernatural light. This knowledge is positively imparted by God, and negatively, impossible to be obtained by "flesh and blood". The sermon is from Matthew 16:17.

There is no difference in principle between this sermon and Edwards' later book The Religious Affections or the position in the Distinguishing Marks of work of the Spirit of God. (22) The illumination of the soul by the divine light of the Holy Spirit is the critical epistemological moment of crisis in which a qualitative change takes place in the heart of a man. This is to be distinguished from any work of preparation which may be done in the mind of the person through prevenient grace. At the critical moment a man becomes a spiritual man and a
new sense of the heart is experienced.

3.2.2 THE REFLEXIVE ACT: TWO KINDS

The reflex act itself was not a purely theological concept but was a philosophical concept in its own right. Lawrence Dewan found it in St Thomas Aquinas where Dewan sees primary knowledge and reflexive knowledge. In the primary theory of knowledge, knowledge is

"...a programming of the knower, by the thing to be known, prior to any act of knowing. The knowing that results from this principle is entirely thing-oriented and is thus "immediate Knowledge"" (31)

On the other hand, reflexive knowledge is the knowledge of oneself knowing things.

Copleston recognises primary and reflexive knowledge in Aquinas. However his exposition of reflective knowledge in Aquinas is that it is of two kinds. Reflective knowledge appears to be Reflective knowledge of the second kind, reflective knowledge of the first kind being ordinary reflection.

"According to Aquinas it is in the act of knowing truth that the mind is made aware of its ability to attain truth. Truth is predicated primarily of proportions; or, as he puts it, truth is found primarily in the judgement...And in recognising the truth of indubitable propositions the mind recognizes both the fact that it knows their truth and that it is its own nature to be conformed to reality and so to know...Truth is known by the
mind according as the mind reflects on its act but also knowing the relation of conformity between the act and the thing \(\text{proportionem eius ad rem}\) \ldots\ Thus the mind knows truth according as it reflects on itself (De veritate 1.9). Therefore the mind knows truth according as it reflects on itself (De veritate 1.9). Thus the mind knows its own power of attaining truth by reflecting on itself in the act of knowing truth. Therefore the mind knows truth according as it reflects on itself (De veritate 1.9). Thus the mind knows its own power of attaining truth by reflecting on itself in the act of knowing truth. Aquinas point of view was that sometimes at least we know something with certainty, that we know that we know it and that in knowing it we know that the object is knowable \ldots\ The passage quoted above is an instance of second reflection" (33)

The above quotation is rather long, but we wished to call in the comment of so great an authority on Aquinas as Copleston as we would not presume to interpret him ourself. We understand Copleston to mean that Aquinas has a first reflection and a second reflection. The first is when a man knows something with certainty. Ordinary men do at times know some things with certainty, and though they may be mistaken at times, such error does not violate the principle that such knowledge takes place. Second reflection is when one reflects on oneself as knowing. The reflex act is when we reflect on our own reflection.

The reflex act is therefore an old idea and is common to all men, natural and spiritual, at least in principle.

We have not been able to find the reflexive act itself in other primary sources prior to Edwards, which we have been able to consult. It is not in Descartes. He speaks of seeming to know that he knows, as for example,

"...I see light, hear a noise and feel heat. But it will be said that these presentations are
false, and that I am dreaming. Let it be so. At all events it is certain that I seem to see light, hear a noise, and feel heat; this cannot be false, and this is what in me is properly called perceiving (sentire) which is nothing else than thinking. From this I begin to know what I am with greater clearness and distinction than heretofore." (35)

This is what we have understood Aquinas to have called a first reflection: just thinking. There is implicit in this quotation what Aquinas but not Descartes, described as a second reflection. By that we mean, that obviously Descartes was trying to know that he knew. But he does not get to it. When Descartes says

"...it cannot be that when I see, or which comes to the same thing, when I think I see, I myself who think am nothing." (36) then

he is not thinking reflexively in the sense of the second reflection, he is merely arguing backwards (a posteriori) from the effect (I think) to the cause (I who exist). It is an implicit syllogism which concludes in the statement "I exist". Descartes was intensely sceptical. In his search for certainty even his "moral certainty" and "absolute certainty" never, as far as we can make out, rose above the first reflection. (37)

As for Leibniz, his "acts of reflection" are of the first kind. (38) So is his apperception. He writes

"...it is well to distinguish between perception which is the inner state of the monad representing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this
inner state." (39)

Apperception is merely thought, or reflection upon monads which were conceived to be "the real atoms of nature, the elements of things...different from material atoms...imperishable...in substance force...a perpetual living mirror of the universe" (Maier, J, Dict.Phil.). Leibniz says

"...reflection is nothing but an attention to what is in us." (40)

Intuitive knowledge was the most certain kind of knowledge that Leibniz could have had. It did not rule out demonstrative knowledge. (42) But the truth of demonstrative knowledge is known intuitively. There is only intuitive knowledge and demonstrative knowledge. The rest is faith or opinion. (41)

Now faith is related to the reflex act. Not in Aquinas, to our knowledge, but in Edwards and his Puritan predecessors. In Aquinas an act of faith was knowledge but not of the same kind as perception. Aquinas says

"On the contrary, Gregory says that when a thing is manifest, it is the object not of faith, but of perception. Therefore things that are of faith are not of perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of science. I answer that...as was stated above it is impossible that one and the same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science and belief for the same person." (34)
In the theological tradition, faith is knowledge, as we have already seen. Aquinas would have been aware of faith in both the natural man and the spiritual man. As we understand it, there are two kinds of faith compatible with Thomism. The faith of the natural man is the faith exercised in the normal affairs of life such as believing what your brother tells you when you have no other evidence for what you hear. The faith of the spiritual man is of the order of grace. Knowledge has also the same distinction: the knowledge of the natural man is different from the knowledge of God "as he is". (34a) The reflexive act could also be capable of the same distinction in Aquinas but we know of no place where he discusses it. But in principle, if a natural man can reflect on himself reflecting, that is, know that he knows, about ordinary matters of daily life, the spiritual man would also be capable of the same reflexive act (or act of reflection of the second kind). The faith of the spiritual man is of the order of grace. It is of divine inspiration. So the reflexive act of the spiritual man would be the knowledge that he knows God. It would be not faith but the assurance of faith.

So, in principle faith, the knowledge of God and the reflexive act relate separately to the ordo naturae and the ordo gratiae.
When we turn to John Locke, one of the sources of Edwards' sources (he had many) we find that Locke saw faith as a different kind of knowledge. However we must not expect the ordo naturae and the ordo gratiae. We will only find the former, at least so we think. For all his talk of faith in God it savours of the natural man. After all it is the result of demonstrative knowledge. Firstly, faith, here, is not isolated from knowledge, and is therefore a "species" of belief, in what seems to be an hierarchy of knowledge. Secondly, faith is independent of ordinary knowledge and infallible. (43) Locke knew three kinds of knowledge, "intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive". (44) Woozley says of Locke's kinds of knowledge that

"...A man knows by intuition that he himself exists (IV ix 3) (see Locke 378) and the existence of God can be established by demonstration (IV x). (see Locke 329) Only one other kind of existential proposition can be known, viz. that asserting the existence of what is at the time of assertion sensibly perceived (IV ii 14) (See Locke 330) (ix 8-9) (see Locke 391-2)" (45)
(parentheses with page numbers ours: they refer to the Essay)

As far as faith is concerned

"To believe a proposition is to accept it or to assent to it, when it is not known to be true... (IV xi 10) (see Locke 387)

Faith here is that of the natural man.

We can find no trace of reflexive knowledge in John Locke's Essay. When he says
"In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being; and in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty" (47)

This is not the reflexive act but reflection on Aquinas' first level. Self-consciousness is not the reflexive act. Reflection is

"This source of ideas every man has wholly within himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation so I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself." (50)

This is simply reflection on Aquinas' first level. When Locke says "reflecting on its own operations within itself" he is speaking about reflecting on sense-data, and of course complex ideas, by the normal principles of the operation of the mind. Introspection may occur, reflection may tower into sublime thoughts, but all these are not reflexive acts of the mind. It is the normal process of thought taking place. It is reflection. So in the further elaboration of the properties (perhaps we should say action) of the mind, Locke, in II.vi, gives the other "great and principal action of the mind" (perception = thinking; and volition = willing), also known to him as "understanding and will". Here we have one of the main sources (there were many - it was standard Puritan epistemology to identify understanding and will from the
time of Calvin) for Edwards' epistemology as already explained.

Now faith, cognition, knowledge, and reflection in John Locke are all what Edwards would apply to the natural man. We have said that we have found no true reference to the reflexive act on Aquinas second level in Descartes, Leibniz or Locke. Yet although it has been a negative exercise in one sense, it has been a useful exercise in other ways, because firstly we have established the existence of reflection on the first and the second levels in Aquinas showing that the reflexive act is a philosophical concept in its own right just as are cognition and affection. Secondly we have had opportunity to make the distinction between reflection on the first and second levels, clear. Thirdly we have seen that in principle these two levels can occur in the natural man and in the spiritual man, and remembering that in the Calvinistic tradition this was applied to their soteriology, we can now see that just as there exists a dualism of cognition and affection in the spiritual man, so there could exist a dualism of the reflexive act in the spiritual man as well. This survey from Aquinas to Locke is also significant for us in that it makes it possible for us to see how very far off beam Perry Miller is when he locates all the epistemology of Jonathan Edwards in John Locke. Whenever Locke writes of knowledge, of understanding and will, he writes of what Edwards would call the natural man. That "spiritual man"
is nowhere in Locke. It comes from the Bible. When Locke proves demonstratively to his own satisfaction that God exists and

"This discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal Mind does sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God..." (i.e. as a cogitative Being who has made cogitative beings) (48)

Locke is nowhere near the concept of the knowledge of God that Jonathan Edwards, nor, in fact, Aquinas expressed. That is not to deny the formative influence of Locke on Edwards - he himself acknowledged it. But the locus is so different! The knowledge of God to Edwards (and Aquinas) was an existential encounter with God with the influx of grace into the soul. The spiritual senses were changed by the imparting of a new principle of life in the soul by the Spirit of God. The cognitive and affective faculties or properties of the mind received a new principle. And this is nowhere in Locke. There was nothing in Descartes, Leibniz or Locke to teach Edwards anything about the reflexive act of the soul, on either level, let alone the spiritual. There was nothing in the secular philosophers to teach Edwards about the spiritual man. That was in his Puritan heritage. And at this point we must turn to the pastoral situation as Edwards found it as it relates to the reflex act of the soul and to what the nature of that act was in Jonathan Edwards' soteriology.
3.2.3 THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT OF EDWARDS' DOCTRINE OF THE REFLEXIVE ACT OF FAITH.

In our first chapter in the brief historical sketch of the Puritan tradition to which Jonathan Edwards was the heir, it was seen that for many long years their people had experienced immense fears that they were among the reprobate and very early William Perkins had developed the doctrine of the reflex act of the conscience in which a person could discern whether or not he possessed the knowledge of saving faith by an "experimental" knowledge, what we today would call an "experiential" knowledge, the infallible certainty of the pardon of sinne". Conscience (the inner awareness of a man) was conceived as giving its judgment by a kind of reasoning or disputing, called a "practicall syllogisme of the holy Ghost". Over the long period between William Perkins and Jonathan Edwards, this doctrine had varied and, pastoral theology being situational, Pastors had to adapt to the local situation.

By Jonathan Edwards' time the pastoral situation had changed totally. The New England church was in the Covenant of Grace and comfortably so. (51) The earlier Covenant had proved too high a standard, in the opinion of Stoddard, to which the church members were expected to conform. He was Edwards' grandfather. He had changed church policy from strict Communion to allow the unconverted to come to communion as a duty (51a) The
change had not been without opposition. Increase Mather had opposed this new relaxed system, called the Half-Way Covenant. When Edwards came the situation had been settled for 22 to 23 years and in his judgment many were destitute of piety. The controversy which started as a result of his determination to reverse this, by insisting that one had to be a "visible Christian" in order to be able to come to Communion, led to the congregation deciding by a majority of one vote, to put him out of the Pastorate. In 1749 his view became known (he had taken some time to come to a firm decision) and they gave great offence. In the tumult following he had the greatest difficulty in even getting a hearing, so he published "An Humble Inquiry into the Rules of the Word of God, concerning the Qualifications requisite to a Complete Standing and Full communion in the Visible Christian Church". He had to oppose his own colleagues and his own (deceased) grandfather. In the Half-Way Covenant there were communal services of confession and dedication. It embraced the church community and the demand for the individual soul to have a personal experience of God had become very muted. The pastoral situation had thus changed from the earlier times and instead of there being souls desperately anxious about whether they were among the elect or not, those within the Half-Way Covenant assumed that they were in grace. New England Calvinism had become anthropocentric in practise. The Revivals which are described in chapters VIII through XI of the Memoirs (35) had not yet begun when
young Edwards first came to the pulpit and had passed by the time he was dismissed. These revivals changed the pastoral situation to a great extent but not so as to produce an identical situation to that described by Kendall referred to earlier in this thesis. As for the dismissal, Perry Miller has said that Edwards' cardinal sin for which the community could never forgive him was his break with the establishment set up by his grandfather Stoddard. (54) This would be true, for we all know that great men sometimes rule from the grave. There was no doubt a much more simple, down-to-earth explanation, that half the congregation plus one had no intention of being exposed and embarrassed by the new demands. When the badly handled case of youth discipline occurred, in which the children of most of the prominent families featured, it was altogether too much. The after-effects of the suicide of one disturbed man combined with all these matters and Edwards lost his pastorate.

Although from the time of his first coming to the congregation until the time that he was repudiated, there were two marvellous and exceptional awakenings, (the Revivals were not "Revivals" in the American usage of the word, such as "holding a Revival" but spontaneous awakenings), the pastoral needs of the people required pastoral theology of a different kind, as we have said. The Awakening spread widely, and indeed it was not confined
to New England but similar awakenings were taking place in other places of America and Europe and notably in Cambuslang, Scotland, and to such a degree that this phenomenon is known as the First Great Awakening. Edwards also had wide local influence through extensive preaching. However, in the face of such great events which had results in many changed lives, Edwards could still write as late as April 2, 1750, in a letter to the Rev Mr Gillespie in Scotland,

"We have had, and have to this day, multitudes of such firm believers, whose bred, presumptuous confidence, attended with a very wicked behaviour, has given the greatest wound to the cause of truth and vital religion, which it has ever suffered in America." (54)

In the Awakening the pastoral needs were not related to whether or not one was among the elect, as such, though in Edwards's study, his preaching and his written work, in the very nature of the man, his mental constitution and his understanding of the demands of truth, his pastoral theology had to be consistent with his dogmatic theology. There were those who had had extraordinary psychic and psychological experiences. These had to be counselled. Many of these experiences involving imaginations of God, Christ and heaven and so forth, were judged by Edwards to have nothing spiritual in them at all. With his usual rigorous logic and acute psychological insight he analysed the common emotional experiences on which people rested their souls. Just to summarise his section headings in Part II of The Religious Affections shows this. It is no
sign of true grace, he writes, that our emotions run very high, that they greatly affect the body, that they produce great fluency of speech about what has occurred, that the experiences have come upon the recipient involuntarily, that they come to the mind "in a remarkable manner with texts of Scripture", or with texts of Scripture running in sequence. They may even have an appearance of love in them. They may be of various kinds and bring comfort and joy which seem to follow in a certain, acceptable order. They may cause people to spend a lot of time in religion and worship. People may be loud in their praises of God and they may become very confident of themselves. They can even have experiences that are "very affecting". These experiences prove nothing either way. They are neither wrong nor right, they are simply no evidence one way or the other as to whether the person has truly received grace and has been born again or not. There is truly only one way in which one can know a Believer, and Christ gave us that sure guide, "By their fruits ye shall know them." There is just nothing to prevent people having all kinds of ordinary emotional ("affecting") experiences which are possible by the constitution of the human body and mind, from either natural or even diabolical sources. Satan can just as easily talk Scripture to anyone as he did to Christ in the Temptation. We are all prone to these things and subject to many fluctuations of mind and body. We must look elsewhere for certainty.
Above all, no secret facts are revealed by the Spirit of God to the soul, as far as it concerns this great matter. No one may take a text of a verse and add another meaning to it to apply it to himself, which is not to be found in that text by sound exegesis. And as far as the promises of the Gospel itself are concerned, they are general promises and not for private interpretation. It seems, he said, that we will not be satisfied with Christ's express command and direction, "By their fruits ye shall know them." We always must look for some sign or emotional experience to prove to ourselves that we are in a state of grace.

The analysis is very searching and any sensitive soul reading these sections would be inclined to shut the book and say "Who then can be saved?". Many pastors have felt the same way. It has generally been found to be strong meat. Even as great an evangelical as Alexander Smellie (1898) commented as printed in the Introduction to the Banner of Truth edition, that he is too high and pure at times, yet he would not exchange him for another. Da mihi magister, he says. Edwards' book would have spoiled the sleep of those who are called by Edwards "evangelical hypocrites", whom he considered the worst kind. It is well known that in times of religious excitement people will put their trust in strange psychological experiences and ignore the ethical demands of the Gospel ever afterwards. These have nothing in their life-style to show that they are
followers of Christ. In point of fact Edwards' guidelines are not impossibly high in the sense that he requires one to be a super-Christian before one can say that one is saved. Edwards taught Justification by faith in Christ alone. One has to read Edwards' in the light of all he says on this matter. The only Gospel requirement for salvation was true faith in Christ. What he was concerned about was that the faith should be true faith, which was accompanied by the coming of the Spirit of God into the heart to change the life. He recognised that it could be very small faith in the beginning and could not always be seen. His principles allowed for growth in grace and made room for doubt, soul travail and dark valleys. He did not require a legalistic adherence to certain standards of some perfect life before the perspiring soul could find peace with God. He did, on the other hand, insist that the soul should truly trust in Christ alone for salvation.

The other class of person who had to be counselled and warned was represented by the one who had no "affection" at all but claimed to be religious. This again was far removed from the earlier cases of those who came with weeping eyes because they were afraid that they were reprobate. These simply assumed their salvation because they had been comfortably in the Half-Way Covenant since childhood. It was often said that one must simply believe even if one had no feelings to accompany one's faith. This has been called "easy-believism" in modern times. It
is the essence of Antinomianism. One just says that one believes in Christ and then does what one likes. It is also a common misconception about the doctrine of Justification by faith in Christ alone. Of this Edwards wrote to Dr Gillespie,

"I believe it is absurd of a very hurtful consequence, to urge persons to believe in the dark, in the manner, and in the sense, in which many hundreds have done in America..." (54a)

Whereas Edwards had taken pains to break down false confidence in religious excitement, he was at as great pains to break down false confidence in which people could take the words of faith on their lips without any "sense of the heart". This sense of the heart was the essence of true religion. If the reader of The Religious Affections has the endurance to persevere through the pages of Edwards' penetratingly negative analysis in Part II, he will be rewarded in the overwhelmingly positive analysis of Part III. In this part Edwards comes to "take notice" of some ways in which one can know "affections that are spiritual and gracious". Not so that anyone can arrogantly judge others but these guidelines are given by God for our own safety. Nor are these rules of any use to anyone "very low in grace". It is not God's way to give comfort to those who are in a "dead, carnal, and unchristian frame". It is not because of the fallibility of the signs given in God's word that such persons cannot know whether they are gracious or not, it is best that way
and it is in the nature of things as they are. It is possible that when true grace is very small it cannot always be recognised. But particularly when there is sin in the Believer's life, it is like a "defect in the eye" which hinders sight: assurance then cannot be known. We cannot know that we are in grace, in those circumstances, in every case. Disobedience to the known will of God, neglect of the means of grace (worship, prayer, confession, attendance at the preaching of God's word) would rob the child of God of assurance of salvation. It is best that it be so and it is God's way. It is itself one of the means that God uses to cultivate grace after it has been received.

The rules that Edwards gives are related to the reflexive act of the mind. The doctrine of assurance through the reflex act is really a secondary doctrine that rides on the back of the doctrine of faith. Faith as the first act of the mind comes first and the reflex act second. The second cannot exist without the first. The second cannot work without the proper understanding of the first and the first, the direct act of faith, must be followed by a proper living within the principles that the word of God lays down for the life of the Christian. Taken together, in seeking for the full assurance of faith, these rules are sure and infallible.(56)

"It is not God's design that men should obtain
assurance in any other way, than by mortifying corruption, increasing in grace, and obtaining the lively exercises of it. And although self-examination be a duty of great use and importance, and by no means to be neglected; yet it is not the principal means by which the saints do get satisfaction of their good estate. Assurance is not to be attained so much by self-examination as by action...more by running than considering...by adding to faith, virtue, &c." (57)

Throughout Part III of The Religious Affections (58) and "The Appendix...in two letters" (59), he displays the ground of assurance of salvation.
3.2.4 THE ELEMENTS OF EDWARDS' DOCTRINE OF THE REFLEXIVE ACT OF FAITH

The third part of The Religious Affections is great writing and at times very beautiful. In our view it ranks with the great works of the Puritan divines, such as Stephen Charnock, Thomas Goodwin, Richard Sibbes and Thomas Watson. We have found ourselves moved by it in the same way as when reading those Puritan greats. It is not possible here to do more than to distil the main principles which relate to Edwards' epistemology. This will be done in the following points:

1. there is a first direct act of faith in which we know that we are in a state of grace,

2. there is a reflex act of knowledge, in which we know that we know, in which there is a witness "enstamped" upon the Believer by the Spirit of God.

3.2.4.1 There is a first direct act of faith.

For Edwards doctrine of faith we will move for a while to his "Remarks on Important Theological Controversies". (60) Just in order to clear the air about faith, there is a view of faith with which Edwards would have no patience, that it is "believing what is not true", that would have been considered utter nonsense. It is not "believing what cannot be proved." It seems more like Locke's "species"
of knowledge, in principle, but it is very much more. Faith is "adhering to the truth". (60) It is locking in on the truth.

There is common faith which belongs to the natural man and divine faith which belongs to the spiritual man. The difference between these is not merely a matter of degree but "in the nature and essence of it". (61) Edwards' definitions of faith run through 88 paragraphs, some being multiple paragraphs, over 53 of his closely typeset pages! Many metaphors are used throughout and he acknowledges the difficulty of a definition. "Inclination" and "conviction" are rejected as too limited. (62) One of his many attempts is

"Faith is the soul's embracing and acquiescing in the revelation which the word of God gives us of Jesus Christ as our Saviour, in a sense and conviction of his goodness and reality as such. I do not consider the sense of the goodness and reality of Christ as a Saviour, as a distinct thing from the embracing of him, but only explain the nature of the embracing by it. But it is implied in it; it is the first and principal thing in it. And all that belongs to embracing the revelation, an approbation of it, a love to it, an adherence to it, acquiescence in it, is in a manner implied in a sense of Christ's goodness and reality and relation to us, or our concern in him. I say as our Saviour: for there is implied in believing in Christ, not only and merely that exercise of mind, which arises from a sense of his excellency and reality as a Saviour; but also that which arises from the consideration of his relation to us, and of our concern in him, his being a Saviour for such as we are; for sinful men; and a Saviour that is offered with his benefits for us." (62)
There must be a direct act of the soul. He rejects "hoping in a promise" as the first constituent part of the act of faith.

"For there must be the essence of the act performed, before any promise to the subject. But the essence of the act, as it is exercised in justifying faith, is a quitting other hopes, and applying to him for salvation, choosing, and with the inclination closing with, salvation by him in this way, with a sense of his absolute, glorious sufficiency and mercy." (63)

Hope will follow, it does not come first. (64) Edwards best likes the word "embrace":

"Upon the whole, the best, and clearest, and most perfect definition of justifying faith, and most according to the Scriptures, that I can think of, is this, faith is the soul's entirely embracing the revelation of Jesus Christ as our Saviour. The word embrace is a metaphorical expression; but I think it much clearer than any proper expression whatsoever; it is called believing, because believing is the first act of the soul in embracing a narration or revelation...." (65)

Essentially, then, faith is a direct act of the soul. It seems that the last subordinate clause of the above quotation is a general statement which would apply to both natural faith (like believing your brother's story) and spiritual faith (in believing in Christ). Natural faith would include any act of faith relating to the physical world and the things in it. In principle, always, the man is one, the man believes his brother and the man believes Christ. The dualism is more apparent than real. But there is a real difference between natural faith and
spiritual faith. Perhaps "dualism" is more correct here because the spiritual man believes in two ways depending on the object or object of his faith.

Faith is summed up in word "affiance". Edwards dislikes the distinctions and divisions of faith into "assent, consent and affiance" because the last includes the former two distinctions. He sees 5 elements in "affiance": consent, assent, application, hope and adventuring. (66) These are all applied to the excellency of Christ as Saviour but in principle these elements could be applied to natural as well as spiritual faith.

The truly epistemological element of Edwards' doctrine of faith is impressive, particularly that of divine faith, for as is obvious, it is here his interest lies. It is a direct act of knowing Christ the Truth. The whole soul or mind is involved. He speaks of it as "the proper act of the soul" (67), "more than merely the assent of the understanding" (68), as including knowledge (69), as an act of the will, "accepting" (70), "receiving" (71), "obeying" (72). The emotions are involved (73). It is "submitting" (74). The soul, the mind, the heart, the affections, the will and the understanding are all said to be involved. Indeed, it is the whole person involved in a direct act. It is a very different and more vital principle than that found in Locke.
In another book Edwards says

"As there is nobody but what will allow that there is a peculiar relation between Christ and his true disciples, by which they are in some sense in Scripture said to be one; so I suppose there is nobody but will allow, that there may be something that the true Christian does on his part, whereby he is active in coming into this relation or union; some uniting act...on the Christian's part. Now faith I suppose to be this act." (76)

In the direct act of faith the soul knows its salvation by intuition. Intuition is a very Lockean concept. It is, of course, a very old concept. Intuition is really the awareness of the soul or mind. It equates in Edwards, as we understand it, to Aquinas' first reflection. Aquinas' doctrine of faith was such that it was not perception: it did not come via the senses. Sense perception ruled out faith and vice versa. Edwards, as we understand him, was in a similar position. It is impossible that the Divine can be known through the physical senses but Divine things are known by the spiritual sense.

"Faith divine, is a spiritual conviction of the truth of the things of religion. Some have objected against a spiritual sight of divine things in their glorious, excellent, and divine form, as being a foundation of a conviction of the truth of or real existence of them" (77) (our underlining)

This ruled out empiricism: that we can know the Divine or the Divine things through sight, hearing, feeling, taste or other sense. He also ruled out "imaginings". (78)

Physical manifestations, "lively affections",
"imaginations", visions, dreams, and other sense-phenomena. In other words, sense experiences and psychological experiences of any kind might accompany the knowledge of faith in a time of religious excitement but divine knowledge could not come through the senses in the same way that knowledge of music, shall we say, can come through the senses. To return the quotation, to those who objected by saying that a spiritual sight of the excellence of divine things could not be the foundation of a conviction of the truth of a real existence of them, he answered that they must be known to exist before they could be known to be excellent, granted, but in so far as the word "known" ("known to exist") was concerned, this did not imply that one needed a clear understanding of them before they could be known to be excellent.

"...in our way of understanding things in general of all kinds, we first have some understanding or view of the thing in its qualities before we know its existence. Thus it is in things that we know by our external senses, by our bodily sight, for instance..." (79)

So the spiritual sight is analogous to the natural but different in kind. If we are to know of the existence of, let us say, a Jewish gentleman reciting his prayers, whom Edwards once used to hear daily, (our example) we must have some idea of it before we can know that it exists. By analogy, if we are to know the excellence of the Divine we must have some idea of its excellence-as-Divine before we can know it exists. This comes with the Divine and
supernatural light. "Faith cometh by hearing and hearing by the word of God." One simply knows truth of it when faith is present.

3.2.4.2 There is a reflex act of knowledge in which we know that we know

Faith and doubt. There are theological and counselling problems which have to be worked through by the Pastor and the Believer. No dedicated Pastor could ever and will ever be able to escape them. How do we know that we are accepted by God? How do we know that we know? One of Edwards' sources was Flavel. (80)

"Assurance is produced in our souls by the reflexive acts of faith: the Spirit helps us to reflect upon what hath been done by him formerly upon our hearts: hereby we know that we know him, 1 Joh.ii.3. To know that we know is a reflex act. Now it is impossible there should be a reflex, before there hath been a direct act. No man can have the evidence of his faith, before the habit is infused, and the vital act performed. The object matter for which the Spirit seals, is his own sanctifying operation." (81) (Quoted in a footnote from Flavel's Sacramental Meditations, med. 4)

The form of the reflex act in Edwards, in which the Believer knows that he knows, is the witness of the Spirit, that is the witness that the Spirit gives, in his image enstamped upon the soul, in which one recognises that the Spirit has indeed done a good work in the soul.
The Puritans used various syllogisms in which they expressed the reflex act. The most popular was

"He that believeth shall be saved,
I believe,
Therefore I shall be saved."

In expressing the syllogism, the doctrine was that Holy Spirit testified to the conscience if that statement was in fact true. Edwards conducted a correspondence with a Rev Mr Gillespie in Scotland over this as a result of the publication of *The Religious Affections*. Two of his letters are printed in the Appendix to the book (WORKS I p.337) of which one is also produced in the Memoir (WORKS I p.cix ff). The former appears to be an edited version of the latter, edited for publication.

The correspondence dealt with doubt, *inter alia*. Doubt, Edwards said, was not a part of unbelief, as his correspondent thought. It was not of the essence of the matter. Saving faith was exercised in him before doubts arose. It was a completed action. (82) In discussing the syllogism Edwards said that the emphasis must not rest on the minor premise but on the major one, or else

"...knowing it or believing it (that he believes in Christ), depends on our own immediate sensation or consciousness and not on divine testimony."

It would shifting the emphasis to the wrong place and looking to one's own psychological state for assurance.
"True believers, in the hope they entertain of salvation, make use of the following syllogism: Whoever believes shall be saved: I believe: therefore, I shall be saved. The first clause, the major proposition is of the nature of saving faith, but the second, the minor proposition is not, it is based in our consciousness and not grounded on Divine Testimony". (54a)

The main clause (the major premiss) was based on Divine Testimony. The Divine Testimony is 'he that believeth shall be saved' - it is not given to a given individual...it is a general word or promise. We must believe the general promises, and the testimony of God: these are 'properly of the nature of faith'. The "testimony of God" is an expression used frequently in those days to denote the promises of God given in the Gospel. It really means "what God has testified to about his purpose and his will". His will has been revealed in the Gospel.

"And this is the will of him that sent me, that everyone who seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day." John 6:40

God's will has been revealed in the general and absolute promises of Christ, are such as John 6:37, "Him that cometh unto me I will in no wise cast out." The Gospel promises are to all who will believe. They are not conditional, other than that one must believe. If one shifts the emphasis to the minor premiss one becomes intro-spective and with self-examination one wishes to ascertain the
measure or quality of one’s faith. Then the reflex act does not work. We know that we know because we believe in Christ and the Spirit witnesses to our spirit by the evidence of good works and a changed character that he has enstamped upon us.

One particular syllogism that Edwards does not like is the one which puts love as a condition. He does not give the whole form of the syllogism but presumably it runs like this:

He who is born of God loves Christ.
I love Christ,
Therefore I am born of God.

He does not like this because loving Christ is not a condition laid down for Christ for obtaining salvation.

"What shall we do, that we might work the works of God? Jesus answered...This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent." (John 6:28,29)

Edwards said of this syllogism in whatever form it actually was used, that it was not of the nature of true faith according to the Scriptures.

"I know that I have complacency in Christ, I know it in the same way as I have complacency in my wife and children, viz. by the testimony of my own heart, and my inward consciousness. Evangelical faith has the gospel of Christ for its foundation: but the proposition, “that I love Christ is a proposition not contained in the gospel of Christ”.

What Edwards means is not that the Christian is not
required to love Christ but that to look for assurance of salvation in the fact that our inward state assures us that we love Christ, is not what Christ taught. He taught us to believe in him. Love for him will be a fruit of faith, not the basis of faith. Nor can one rest on "I believe" as a psychological experience. One must rest on the major premiss. One must believe in Christ to be saved not scrabble around inside of us to see whether or not we believe.

Thomas Goodwin was one of Edwards' sources. The latter has a similar point of view. Goodwin and Flavel both had their sources in Gerard, who had a controversy with Bellarmine on the subject. The fruit of the debate for Goodwin was in his Of the Object and Acts of Justifying Faith. Goodwin writes:

"It is not unknown that besides those believers who have, through grace, attained unto a full assurance of faith, there are two ranks of other true believers whose faith doth fall short of assurance: 1, such as are now a-beginning to believe, as the jailor, Acts xvi.; and, 2, such as have had for some long time true faith already wrought, and many fruits thereof in the course of their lives, and yet 'walk in darkness, and have no light,' and are fain to betake themselves to live by a pure and bare faith of recumbency, or of mere casting themselves on God and Christ, renewed afresh...for their salvation....And although there may be found some difference between these two, yet I put them both into one bag, as we say, and range them together in my ensuing discourse..." (83)

Thomas Goodwin taught a "faith of recumbency and adherence"
which means "of mere casting themselves on God and Christ". He tries to help the two problem cases both negatively and positively, negatively the man did not qualify in his first act of faith in his own right, to be justified by Christ, not by his humiliation or repentance, but by believing in Christ. He quotes the promise in Matt 11:28 "Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy laden and I will give your rest. This promise

"...do contain a particular invitation to such...it is a special condescension in Christ to speak thus particularly to those that are heavy laden."

So Goodwin goes on to assure the soul of the sufficiency of Christ through Romans 4:5, giving the motiva fidei, the motives of faith: the absolute promises of God, the light of which promises, coming into the soul must be the objectum motivum, the persuader,

"...to draw his soul thus at first to cleave to God and Christ for a man's personal salvation in particular" (84)

Goodwin goes on to say about the commonly used syllogism

"Whosoever believeth hath eternal life, I believe, Therefore, I have eternal life."

"I have often reflected on it, as fearing lest this assumption, 'but I believe', out of which they fetch a conclusion of assurance 'therefore I have eternal life,' be not so well understood, 'but mistaken by many to be the first act of justifying faith." (84)
Goodwin was not saying precisely what Edwards was to say to Gillespie, that the person using the syllogism is stopping on the minor premiss, "I believe", and looking inside of himself to find his faith for his assurance, that he is mistaking the minor premiss for the major premiss. But they agree that if the doubter will just believe in the All-sufficient Christ he would be out of the doubt. Flavel had said, the reflex act of faith has its origin in 1 John 2:3

"And by this we do know that we know him, if we keep his commandments."

Edwards' position was that in this reflex act, we know that we know because we keep God's commandments. "By their fruits ye shall know them." The witness of the Spirit is really the answer of a good conscience to God to which the Spirit in turn answers.

Goodwin was coming at the syllogism from another angle and in fact Goodwin's exposition shows that they hold the same doctrine. Goodwin says

"I would therefore...examine into what act of faith or belief that application of faith in the assumption, in the syllogism 'but I believe', is to be resolved into...the most judicious do take the meaning.....to be only this: I seeing and finding by experience with myself, that I have a true faith wrought in me, and such a faith as the Scripture describes to be true and unfeigned, therefore I apply that promise 'whoever believes', with an assurance to myself, which is the conclusion. And this is indeed I take to be the most proper sense and mind thereof, as it comes into that syllogism, that can be given of it, and, so understood, it is not to be disallowed."
But so understood,

"...it cannot be that first act of justifying which an humbled sinner doth put forth, which is the point we seek for; nor can this be the genuine act whereby the sinner is justified and so not the act of justifying faith itself; and the reason is undeniable, because this believing is indeed but the sight and experience of a former, foregone, or forepassed act of faith, which the soul must have first put forth."

The meaning is this, that the whole exercise of the reflex act of faith, put forth in any of the sound syllogisms used, was not to be confused with the first act of justifying faith which accompanied regeneration. The reflex act happened afterwards and was used to assure the soul in doubt. It was "reflexive" (they would say). The word was used in other forms and similar meanings, "to teach weaker Christians by way of reflection" (Sibbes VII p.209 par 214), and "...herein consists our happiness in acknowledging of his wonderful attributes, that by reflex of the knowledge of them, we may grow in them..." (Sibbes p.373). It was reflexive upon the first act of justifying faith now past experience. In the reflex act, the Holy Spirit witnessed that there was indeed a changed life and that the first faith had been real and had had its fruits in experience. The second (the reflex act, reassuring, "seeing that you believe by experience" was not the first (direct, saving, justifying act). The first is founded on Christ and known by intuition, the second is founded on the intuition of the first.
So Edwards and Goodwin are to be found in the same doctrinal position and both gave the same advice to the doubter: go back to the first major premiss. Believe in Christ and His absolute promises which had no condition attached to them except that you believe. It is the all-sufficiency of Christ that saves you.

It is now also possible to see that in the epistemological system of Edwards, doubt has not the same status as faith. Faith is the act of the whole soul, but doubt is not more than lack of later assurance. Unbelief is different. Unbelief is the lack of the first faith. Unbelief is the condition of the natural man untouched by grace. Once direct, justifying faith is exercised, unbelief is gone. Doubt, following, is something that can be removed by attention to the content of knowledge. That is why in his correspondence with Gillespie, Edwards said that doubt is not of the essence of the matter. Goodwin would be the same epistemological position and it is in these Puritans that we must look for Edwards's sources.

In Edwards' scheme the epistemological crisis is the first, the direct act of faith, and this brings one into the whole eschatological process described in the second chapter of this thesis. The Puritan position was that once this New Birth took place it could never be undone. It brought
about a permanent change, the Believer was confirmed (in the Edwardsean sense). He was sealed by the Holy Spirit to the day of Redemption, which means the Day that the body is redeemed, that is, at the Resurrection on the Last Day.

This then was the context and meaning of the reflex act of faith. The direct act of saving faith was the first act of justifying faith in which the soul knows by intuition that it is born of God. The reflex act of faith was the attempt to assure the soul in times of doubt that it indeed knew that it knew God. Although Edwards adheres to it properly understood, he is not happy with its common use.

3.2.4.3 There is a Witness of the Spirit of God assuring the Soul.

Properly speaking in the Puritan doctrine, as Edwards explained it, the witness of the Spirit was a work of grace upon the heart. Although this is a "communication of the divine nature, (85) it is definitely not an "immediate suggestion". The following is a cardinal point in Edwards' exposition.

"What has misled many in their notion of that influence of the Spirit of God of which we are speaking, is the word WITNESS, its being called the witness of the Spirit. Hence they have taken it to be not any work of the Spirit upon the
heart, giving evidence from whence men may argue that they are the children of God, but an inward immediate suggestion, as though God inwardly spoke to the man, and told him that he was his child, by a kind of secret voice, or impression." (86)

The witness of the Spirit is actually the communication of the Divine Nature to man. The Holy Spirit is enstamped upon the man, he is sealed.

"When God sets his seal on a man's heart by his Spirit, there is some holy stamp, some image impressed, and left upon the heart by the Spirit, as by the seal upon the wax. And this holy stamp, or impressed image, exhibiting clear evidence to the conscience, that the subject is the child of God, is the very thing which in Scripture is called the seal of the Spirit, and the witness or evidence of the Spirit. And this mark enstamped by the Spirit on God's children, is his own image.... The saints are the jewels of Jesus Christ, the great potentate, who possesses the empire of the universe: and these jewels have his image enstamped upon them by his royal signet, which is the Holy Spirit. And this is undoubtedly what the Scripture means by the seal of the Spirit; especially when it is fair and plain to the eye of conscience; which is what the Scripture calls our spirit. This is truly an effect that is spiritual, supernatural and divine. This is in itself of a holy nature, being a communication of the divine nature and beauty." (87)

The Witness of the Spirit was a touchy subject. There was the history of Cotton and the Hutchinson trial. There were those such as the

"...Anabaptists, Antinomians, and Familists, the followers of N. Stork, Th. Muncer, Jo. Becold, Henry Pleifer, David George, Casper Swenckfield, Henry Nicolas, Johannes Agricola Eislebius; and the many wild enthusiasts that were in England in the days of Oliver Cromwell; and the followers of Mrs Hutchinson in New England...." (92)
The view from which Edwards dissociated himself was later taught by John Wesley.

"But what is that testimony of God's Spirit which is super-added to and conjoined with, this? How does He 'bear witness with our spirit that we are the children of God?...the testimony of the Spirit is an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly witnesses to my spirit, that I am a child of God; that Jesus Christ hath loved me, and given Himself for me; and that all my sins are blotted out, and I, even I, am reconciled to God." (88)

For Edwards the Witness of the Spirit was the changing of the nature by the impress of the Spirit on a man. For Wesley it was an immediate communication that salvation had taken place wherein the Believer was 'told' by the Spirit that he in particular was saved. Edwards represented the Puritan view which was to go into eclipse, and Wesley represented the then future Wesleyan view. Edwards represented the Puritan pietistic view and Wesley represented the Wesleyan and Anabaptist pietistic, and then future "baptistic" point of view, if we may so denote the doctrine that teaches that the "Baptism of the Holy Spirit" is an event subsequent to regeneration. Edwards' doctrine carefully distinguished the relations of assurance and certainty of salvation, the direct act of faith and the reflex act of faith wherein, as a corollary the Spirit witnessed to His work done in the soul by His presence as a vital principle. Wesley's doctrine bundled them all together. Edwards' view is the theological point of view, Wesley's the popular doctrine. Edwards' doctrine
was "for our safety" against Antinomianism and "enthusiasm" (fanaticism) and ensured the New Birth (Regeneration) and the "receiving of the Spirit" always came together as a single event, the latter brought about the former. Wesley's doctrine was simpler, he meant it to be so, and put the assurance of salvation within reach of everyone but paved the way, in principle, for the separation of Regeneration and the "receiving of the Spirit" which produced the "Holiness" or "Second Blessing" movement and the doctrine as it has been popularly taught in the Pentecostal movements.

In Edwards the "witness" is an "evidence" in the whole life, by a display of holy character, impossible for Satan to copy, of a proper Christian character. "By their fruits ye shall know them." The Believer would be "holy, harmless and undefiled" like his Master and would have "a new sense of the heart". These characteristics are based on the excellency and beauty of Divine things in themselves and being "enstamped" upon the heart by the Spirit of God, carry their own certainty.
CHAPTER 3, SECTION 3, THE PROBLEM OF MEDIATE AND IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE: an analysis of some of the problems created by the Edwardsean synthesis.

Three kinds of person may have read this thesis, the first interested in the philosophical aspects of Jonathan Edwards' epistemology and not particularly interested in Christianity, the other two probably Christians, or theologians, attracted either by the word "Eschatology" or Jonathan Edwards' name. We now wish firstly, to comment on the problematic of the philosophical synthesis with particular reference to the first kind of reader and as it relates to the Locke. Secondly, we wish to comment on the problematic as created in the eschatological scheme particular as it relates to evil which may be of interest to the second class of reader. Thirdly, we will comment on the problematic in the epistemological crisis. Each of these of points relate, as we see it, to "mediate" and "immediate" knowledge.

3.3.1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYNTHESIS AND ITS PROBLEMATIC

3.3.1.1 The situation

A person of the first kind, interested in Jonathan Edwards as a philosopher, and interested in epistemology in particular, may well be profoundly uneasy by this time and perhaps thoroughly impatient with an invasion of
"faith in Christ", "assurance of salvation", "regeneration" and other narrowly Christian dogma, into a thesis on epistemology.

If such a person had obtained a pamphlet of "Notes on the Mind", in say 1738, and assuming he had travelled from Oxford on a long journey across the Atlantic, to Massachusetts Bay, supposing that the person was uniformed about Jonathan Edwards, he would have found his way to Edwards' manse or attended church and would have been shocked to hear a sermon on "Justification by Faith", "The Church's Marriage to her sons, and to her God", or "The Eternity of Hell Torments", perhaps, "The Peace which Christ gives his true followers", or "The Perpetuity and change of the Sabbath." Jonathan Edwards was a Puritan divine, a Congregational minister, a devout, careful, brilliant scholar, but a preacher who, paying little attention to pulpit oratory, inclined to stare at the bell-rope rather than to look his congregation in the eyes, preached the Gospel as faithfully as he knew how, to what must have been a long-suffering congregation.

His epistemology is a Christian one. It embraced a vision of God, an hierarchy of created spirits, mankind and animals, as revealed in the Bible. His theory of knowledge was Biblical in so far as he never departed from Biblical revelation. His epistemology had as its
foundation the omnipresence and omniscience of God, and knowledge was mediated through the Second Person of the Trinity, Christ, God-man, Son of God and Son of Man, through whom the Father had created mankind for the express purpose of having His own beauty, excellence, loveliness of character, grace, wisdom, goodness, love and moral purity communicated to them. The plan was complete in eternity before anything was made, every eventuality foreseen, the eschatological stages foreknown, predetermined and carried into effect within the history of Redemption. The ordinary questions of the certainty of knowledge, the ontological status of beings, the categories, the mode of knowing, the act of knowing, the existential "horizon to horizon" encounter in the act of knowledge, the social implications of knowledge, the questions of colour, being, intuition and any other question, would be met only within that framework. Philosophy and epistemology are situational. No man thinks and moves in a vacuum, and the questions he asks about knowledge and the answers he attempts relate to his historical, personal and social situation.

If we were to locate our assessment of Edwards' epistemology only in the Notes on the Mind it would not be truly Edwardsean. It would not even be truly Edwardsean as he was in his earlier years. It would be out of context. We first came to Jonathan Edwards through his Diary of David Brainerd. This gave us one point of view of
Edwards. When we read Perry Miller it opened another whole world of thought which was the context of Edwards' intellectual life. However when we put down Perry Miller we hardly knew Edwards to be a Christian minister. All the historical facts were there but the taste of the author of David Brainerd was not there. We bought his full published works and we found a very different Jonathan Edwards. The fact is that there is in Edwards a synthesis of a Puritan divine, a Lockean scholar, a preacher, a Neo-Platonist, an Emanationist. Edwards lived in a time when a truly educated man read everything that he could lay his hands on, books were rare treasures and all were mastered. They did not skim as we do today. Edwards like Thomas Goodwin, John Owen and others, read everything they could and made a single, coherent world-system from what they mastered. Edwards never ceased to be a devout, humble Christian, a Pastor and a teacher of the Gospel, and his epistemology must be situated there or he will be out of context.

No one will ever be able to do Edwardsean studies without reference to Perry Miller. His great and detailed scholarship is fundamental and monumental. However we submit that it is necessary in studying Edwardsean epistemology to pay attention to the other side of the tradition that Edwards inherited. There is perhaps no more misunderstood system of thought than Calvinism.
Calvinism was at its best in the care and concern of souls. It was so in John Calvin whose works always surprise with their devotional warmth and it was so with his great successors. Pastoral theology illumines and warms dogmatic theology in the Calvinistic system. The Puritan divine was concerned about the saving of souls, in calling men and women to repentance. The act of faith became central to their actual, living epistemology. What to the philosopher is an intellectual exercise, to the great Puritan divines like Jonathan Edwards, it was the vehicle of thought by which they could render explicit to their hearers the great mercy and love of God in the saving work of Jesus Christ. Soteriology was at the heart of their system. So it was with Jonathan Edwards.

It is not to our purpose to attempt any kind of analysis from outside of the world-view and presuppositions of Edwards but to address the problem of how the Lockean element fitted with the Edwardsean synthesis.

3.3.1.2 The Problematic of the Lockean-Edwardsean synthesis

Within Edwards' world-view the greatest single problematic would seem to be the role of the mediation of knowledge by Christ as the Head of created spirits and men. It is thoroughly in accordance with Christian teaching that Christ is the Logos and as he is one substance with the
Father, "true God of true God", he is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. His Being is thus co-extensive with all creation, he being infinite and creation being finite. As Edwards said

"...he is Infinite, Universal, and All-comprising Existence."

He is also

"...an Infinite Quantity of Existence." (94)

Edwards cannot conceive of "not-being" or of any "negation of being" in any place. The omnipresence of God, the co-extensiveness of God's Being with the being of matter is the foundation of the principle of gravity, matter being held together by the power and immediate presence of God. Likewise in the realm of the mind.

It may be helpful for us to come to the problem in two steps. In taking the first we will think about the patterns of the mind and in taking the second, the validation of our ideas.

Firstly, then, of the patterns of the mind Edwards says

"We know our own existence, and the existence of everything, that we are conscious of in our own minds, intuitively; but all our reasoning, with respect to Real Existence, depends on that natural, unavoidable, and invariable disposition of the mind, when it sees a thing begin to be, to conclude certainly, that there is a Cause of it; or if it sees a thing to be in a very orderly,
regular, and exact manner, to conclude that some Design regulated and disposed of it... this is an innate principle, in that sense, that the soul is born with it—a necessary, fatal propensity, so to conclude, on every occasion." (98)

Locke's principle was that there are no innate ideas and principles. Edwards accepted Locke's principle that there are no innate ideas, though in the above paragraph he excepts causality. Note the careful qualification "in that sense that the soul is born with it" as though he is well aware that he is making an exception. This was not what Locke held, as far as we understand it. As we judge it in the history of philosophy, in the progression of thought through the centuries, Locke gave the bow to the final vestiges of the ancient concept of "the eye of the soul". We understand Locke to have held that the mind is so to speak on its own, that the idea of cause comes from the power of a substance which is external affecting the mind through the senses. Edwards modified Locke at least on this point, that the mind has the innate principle of causality within it from birth. So we must not expect that Edwards simply took over Locke en bloc, uncritically. Copleston says that Locke oscillated between the view that ideas are the objects of knowledge (the representationist view) and ideas are psychic modifications by which we know things directly. We wonder if Edwards did not absorb some of the same ambivalence. Perry Miller fastened on the representationalism that he found in Edwards that from the time of reading Locke he knew that "the one legitimate
field of both speculation and worship is the content of the human mind" (Reference Chapter 1 (27)) No doubt Miller gets this from the obvious representationist elements in The Mind. We have already taken issue with Miller on this, because it is obvious that in Edwards' whole scheme the Neo-Platonic (we mean in the Augustinian-Biblical sense) concept of God being the only prior Reality, the First Cause, of which everything else is a shadow, or an emanation, is overwhelmingly the predominant model. The other element of Locke's ambivalence is that it is the substance of the external reality that is modified psychically by the mind. Edwards took over Locke's empiricism whole-heartedly. On the other hand Edwards appears to have held that spirits have some principles in their constitution, at least this one, causality, and we know from elsewhere that spirits have will and understanding. The latter are necessary constituent elements before a spirit can be called a spirit. In principle there is no difference when spirits are united to a body. In fact, both have "sense" he thinks, the spirit has sense analogous to the spirit united to a body. This is the single exception of which we are aware, for will and understanding are not of the same kind as the principle of causality, because causality is a principle by which deductions are made whereas will and understanding are the power to choose and understand. This single exception, though there may be others somewhere in his many words, is not fatal to the principle that knowledge is
obtained through the senses. The human being is dependent upon the torrent of sense-data that flows into him for his knowledge. The mind has at least one innate principle, that of causality, to guide it.

Now, taking our second step, how does this square with the essentially Platonic system in [40] of *The Mind*. Surely the shadows or ideas must either come from a source innate, or immediately from God. Edwards rejects innate ideas. And he rejects immediate ideas. How then is he to arrive at truth. He says in [2] PLACE OF MINDS (p.ccxxi col 2) that

"...all Finite Spirits, united to bodies or not, are thus in place; that is, that they perceive, or passively receive, ideas, only of created things..."

What then of uncreated things, such as to know that it is true? Truth is "the agreement of our ideas with existence". How are we to know that? One could raise questions about beauty and colour but it would take us too long and we would have to begin quoting apparently conflicting principles at length. What about the fact that we had to have had some idea of the thing known before we knew it, so that we could recognise it. How could we recognise truth? There is no innate knowledge and no immediate knowledge from God.

Nevertheless it was the immediate presence of God,
omnipresent and so existing in all places at once, pervading all matter and all the spiritual world that gave order and intelligibility to all things. All things are held in his mind, the power being expressed in the material world through gravity. The world is held together by God's omnipresent Being physically and spiritually. "In him we live and move and have our being." He even says of truth that "it is the determination and fixed mode of God's exciting ideas in us" (Reference Chapter 3 (16)). In the physical world gravity, the power of attraction, is a concept, not particles with hooks, nor held together by any cosmic glue. Edwards was dependant on the "state of the art" of science but his mind leapt forward all but anticipating Einstein (Perry Miller). Within that settled order of God's Being we live and move and have our being. However, we, mere mortals, receive all our knowledge from sense experience. Our human spirits, different in kind from our bodies yet joined by God to our bodies, give meaning to all that torrent of sense-data: by what means? No innate ideas, no immediate communication to our spirits. By Leibniz' pre-established harmony? Perhaps, it is not incompatible with the predetermined plan and purpose of God. But Leibniz' view is as we understand it just another kind of innate idea. And Edwards did not accept the monadology. Even pre-existent harmony will not bail him out because how do we know it unless God underwrites it by underwriting intuition by some kind of emanation which
he teaches in respect of knowledge in the eschatological scheme we have expounded in chapter 2. Are the twins "emanation and remanation" and Locke good bedfellows? We think not.

So we come to the conclusion that in the synthesis Edwards has cut us off from the omnipresent Logos in whom the Christian mind finds certainty. The Underwriter has been denied access to pay the claim. The eternal Word, the Account of what happens, the Reason is not allowed in the synthesis to have access. If the synthesis is not allowed it is "you in your small corner and I in mine."

Of course we cannot really believe that Edwards meant that. We are sure that the Eternal Reason validated truth for him. We believe that this is the central problematic of the synthesis, or the supposed synthesis. We believe that it is because the Lockean concepts were used by Edwards but the synthesis is very uneasy. We think that Edwards' answer to our question might be that this mediation of knowledge by our senses is of one kind in the physical world, and of another kind in the spiritual world, each analogous to the other. However, we do receive the light of God shed on our minds so that we can see clearly with our mental eyes. The light is not the same as an immediate revelation of the truth of any proposition but is such that it would give us ability to know clearly by intuition, for that appears to be how our minds are
constituted. We cannot abandon the synthesis because Edwards did not seem to abandon it. If we keep it, it seems that we are keeping an uneasy synthesis.

3.3.2 The problematic of the eschatological process as it relates to evil

With regard to evil the greatest single problem is the mediation of knowledge by Christ as Head of created spirits and man. Christ is of one substance with the Father, "true God of true God", omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent. His Being is therefore co-extensive with all creation and as Edwards said he is infinite, universal, and all-comprehending existence. He is also an infinite quantity of existence. We reiterate that Edwards cannot conceive of "not-being" or "negation of being" in any place. Christ, therefore is co-extensive with creation throughout futurity, though Christ is infinite and creation is finite. The problem of how Christ mediates knowledge to the damned who are eternally banished from his presence, seems to be a fatal one. Edwards, as far as we understand him, was Augustinian in his theory of evil. Evil had to be a negation of good. This negation of good must not be confused with the negation of being. Neither good nor evil have ontological status in the proper philosophical sense, that is in the sense that they have objective existence in the same way that a free-standing or
independant spirit has. Being has an ontological status. Even that last sentence we understand to be a tautology. Being exists in its own right but good is a quality of being. Evil is a lack of the quality of good. It is only in God that Good and Being are so to speak, co-extensive. Edwards did not conceive of evil existing in its own right. Even Satan was created good and excellent in all his parts. The essence of Satan's being was not eternal and not evil. He had a beginning and the essence of his being was good. When he turned to evil, and his evil nature can be seen in his propensity to do evil continually, evil did not obtain ontological status, or so we understand it. We would understand that in the Augustinian-Biblical tradition, being and evil are not co-extensive in Satan, nor eternal. And that is how we think Edwards would conceive of it. He was not a Manichee.

Christ omnipresent, existing in all "places" at one time, if a spirit can properly be said to be in place, could communicate knowledge in theory and practise, to all His creatures. However, to refuse any lessening of evil, any lessening of knowledge and of the pain and suffering of the wicked damned, eternally, in endless duration, and "in the most absolute sense", and on the contrary to insist upon a growing evil, wickedness, pain and suffering, eternally, in so to speak, quantitative and upward progression, would be to give evil eternal presence in the Person of God, that
is, in God's Spirit, or Being, in whom we live and move and have our being. It may be argued that the problems are not greater than they are to have Satan at large now. On the contrary, the problems are greater, for the evil will be growing eternally. For what then did Christ die? Was it not to "destroy the works of the Devil". His works are evil, pain and suffering. Even if these works are turned back on Satan himself and the wicked damned, if they are growing eternally, sooner or later they would receive ontological status and as Satan is finite and eternity is infinite the last end would be worse than the first.

What seems fatal to the concept that Christ is the mediator of knowledge to the damned is the force of the combination of the denial of innate ideas with the denial of immediate revelations combined with the final banishment of the wicked spirits of angels and men from the presence of God. Edwards did not say that Christ mediates knowledge to the damned, he laid down as a principle that Christ is the mediator of all knowledge to his intelligent creatures. The wicked damned seem to fall out of the epistemological system while still growing within it.

We cannot accept that Edwards' eschatological epistemology as it relates to evil eternally is compatible with his whole scheme. The only ways out are either (1) to put a term on "ever and ever" in a dispensational sense, which
Edwards would say is contrary to express teachings of Scripture, or (2) to put a term on "ever and ever" in interpreting the phrase as relative to time, which Edwards would not allow, or (3) to allow the law of entropy to work. Can the law of entropy be properly said to work on a spirit? It is after all a principle relating to energy loss. No doubt Edwards would find a way, by analogy, to apply it to a spirit in a separate state, much as he does with sense experience. He has already implicitly done so in calling the Devil the "biggest blockhead" that there is. The Devil gets worse and worse, he never learns that God will frustrate him always and he gets stupider. Perhaps he would have looked for an answer in this. We'll have to ask him in heaven if we can disengage his attention from his ecstatic vision of God.

3.3.3 THE PROBLEMATIC OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRISIS

The same problematic exists in the soteriology of Edwards. We are on surer ground Edwards' soteriology because the Divine and supernatural light is immediately imparted to the soul by the Spirit. Yet the same problem arises. If the light is shed on our hearts so that we can see more clearly, what do we see? Divine things? But these are surely not innate and not within us before they are seen. They must be external to us or else he would be a Pantheist. Edwards would say that just as our physical bodies are constituted so that we can see and hear, smell,
feel and taste, so our spirits are constituted that in an analogous manner we can have spiritual seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling and taste. He would not shy away from the difficulty but he would show us how that this is how we are constituted. He would carefully define the relations. He would explain that that is not the same as having innate ideas but might well be the same as having innate principles in the sense that we can know truth in general and the truth and reality of Divine things. He would explain that Divine things are more real than physical things, that they are first in the order of priority over physical things, that although we draw our knowledge from our sense experience of the physical things around us, it is in order to understand the spiritual things that are of prior status. They are given to us to give us the clue as to how the spiritual world works. All God's ways are one. He would probably say that the mind has been given understanding and that what understanding means is the ability to have knowledge of the relation of one thing to another and of the truth of things, that understanding means the power of the soul to comprehend the relation of things as they really are. When we speak of spiritual matters we are taught by the Spirit. He may answer along those lines but our attempts are futile in the face of his genius, his inexorable logic, his clear and unflinching mind. He would do it in 100 pages of closely typeset print. We are like children paddling on the edges of
Edwards' thought. Nevertheless we find it a great problem to see that he can deny innate ideas, deny immediate knowledge, and deny direct revelation. His whole system is an Illuminism. Yet his other principles deny it.

If there is indeed a central problematic in Edwards we believe that the answer will lie in the fact that we are attempting a systematising of his Notes and his whole work. There is no doubt in our mind that the Biblical model was the implicit model to which he was referring all things throughout his life. Whether his earlier Notes and the elements of Locke are compatible with the mature Edwards, is for others to decide. Are we not guilty of eisogesis when we place so much emphasis on Locke? Are we not reading into Edwards more than he would allow? Is it not far more accurate to say the he brought elements of Locke into his world-view, to say that when he jettisoned the old Puritan Technologia and the Old Logick, in principle the old a priori principles must give way for empiricism. He read Locke a few times, he read his Bible every day. He did not for one moment jettison the Biblical model.

The difficulty is that we have found is he makes such an issue of "no immediate ideas" and "no immediate revelations". The first is very Lockean and the second follows on the first, fitting well with it but has other motives. He was so adamant about this because of the
danger of fanaticism and the excesses of the Great Awakening. He could not permit the people to think because a person had had an astonishing vision the person was firmly fixed in a state of grace. Regeneration was too important for a person to have a wrong conception of his state before God. It was permanent and irreversible and it was of the utmost importance that a person was properly counselled and that there be no mistake, for the person's own sake, for the sake of the Christian community, for the honour of Christ and because that was the duty of a Christian Pastor. These old Lockean concepts may have been part of the furniture of his mind which he placed in the proper order as he saw the problems arising, bringing them forwards as he needed them as old familiar ideas, to place them so that the Scriptural principles were his absolute guide, might be better displayed.

It would seem that if there is to be any solution to these problems, Edwards will have to be studied in the periods of his life. We are probably too readily assuming that his holistic vision was complete from his youth. It is too much to expect from any man, even a genius. Mozart received his musical gift almost complete but there was much growth and development of techniques and some old musical ideas would have been discarded and others rearranged. Edwards holistic vision would hold true to a
great extent with respect to his Biblical model which came
to him with the authority of Scripture as the voice of God
but not necessarily of the other sources considered by him
to be just the voice of man.

A completely contrary suggestion is that Edwardsean studies
should be conducted along the assumption that the holistic
view is correct. We have already shown that the
Calvinistic doctrine of the sovereignty of God had
permanent emotional, devotional, theological and
homiletical effects in his life. There are certain
characteristics in the man's life and thought that few
would dispute: the sovereignty of God, his mysticism, his
his holistic vision, his acutely analytical mind. In many
ways he is like St Augustine. Perhaps the holistic vision
is indeed the key to Edwards. The very timelessness of
God, the eternal vistas of eternity covering the
eschatological sweeps of time, as known and held in the
Mind of God as in a moment in time, may be the key. The
same symbols of word, light, glory, shining, beauty which
have been found by Chidester in Augustine are in Edwards.
All the imagery is the same, but although both were
superlative logicians, Edwards is consciously less
allegorical than Augustine. The eternal vision is the
same. Edwards' vision of grace would be allowed by all to
be in the Augustinian tradition. Perhaps what is in
Edwards' mind is the 'creation-status' of knowledge, as in
the Mind of God, who spoke and all things were done.
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CHAPTER 1

2 op.cit. par 2.
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8 Ruben, op.cit. ch. 3.
9 Ollman, Bertel, Alienation (Cambridge, 1971) p.53.
14 Otto, Rudolf, The Idea of the Holy, Tr. by John W Harvey, (Milward, Oxford, 1926) ch VII ff see also The Philosophy of Religion based on Kant and Vries

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On the other hand Mary Warnock says "Kant started from the conviction that people know that they are subject to a moral law, and know that they sometimes have to decide what they are going to do, and then do it. His theory begins and ends with the thought of a human agent, faced with a decision, and actually bringing his will to bear on the world, freely." *Existentialism* op. cit. p.4. We have followed H. J. de Vleeschauwer.

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41 ibid. [30].

42 ibid. p.ccxvi [32].

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compare Nagy, Paul, "Jonathan Edwards and the Metaphysics of Consent" *Personality* 51,432-446 Fall 1960 and "The Beloved Community of Jonathan Edwards", *Transactions of the Peirce Society* 7,93-104 Spr 1971. Nagy finds "consent to being" or "being-in-general" to be unifying factors in Edwards' thought. We think that this is a very subordinate thought in his Notes on the Mind. The unifying principle in Edwards is the Person of the Triune God.


We have deliberately avoided further reference to the Eschatology of the period.


Calvin, Inst. I.15.7


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Sibbes, Richard, "The Witness of Salvation" (Works of Richard Sibbes Vol VII p.367 ff. Justification was always the ground of assurance, but sanctification had to accompany it. Richard Sibbes says that the witness of our spirit and witness of God's Spirit, "not singly but conjoined" on good evidence in our lives, together bring assurance, (at p.376).

102 ibid. p.195
103 ibid. p.181/2
104 ibid. p.182

CHAPTER 2

1 Personal Narrative, in Memoir (WORKS I page. xii, Column 1, Paragraph 3)
2 ibid. p. xii, col 2, par 3 through to p. xii, Col 1, par 2.
3 ibid. p. xiii, col 1, par 3.
4 Remainder of Personal Narrative, Memoir p. xlv, Col 2.
5 ibid. p. xlvii, col 2, par 2 and 3.
6 ibid. par 4.
7 ibid. p. xlviii, col 2, par 3.
8 ibid. p. xlviii, col 1, par 2.
10 ibid. p. xlvii, col 1, par 2.
10a Barth, Karl, Anselm, Fides Quarens Intellectum (Faith in Search of Understanding), tr. by Ian W Robertson, (Living Age, Meridian, World Publishing Co., Cleveland and NY, 1960)
11 Edwards, Jonathan, *Two Sermons*, WORKS II p.2
12 *ibid.* p.3.
14 Edwards, Jonathan, *God glorified* (WORKS II p.2)
15 Edwards, Jonathan, *A Divine and Supernatural Light*, WORKS II p.12, Sermon 1, par. 2, "secondly".
16 Edwards, Jonathan, *God's Chief End in Creation* (WORKS I p.97, col.2, par.1.)
17 Edwards, Jonathan, Sermon IV in *Seventeen Occasional Sermons*, WORKS II p.850, col 1, I (after IV).
18 *ibid.* p.850, col.2, 1.
19 *ibid.* p.851, col.1, II.
20 *God's Chief End in Creation*, Preface by the First Editor (WORKS I p.94)
21 Edwards, Jonathan, *God's Chief End in Creation* (WORKS I p.97, col.1, par.1.)
22 *ibid.* p.97, col.1
23 *ibid.* p.97, col.2.2.
24 *ibid.* p.97, col.2.3.
25 *ibid.* p.97, col.2.4.
26 *ibid.* p.98, col.2, par.3.
27 *ibid.* p.99, col.1.5.
29 Miller, Perry, *Jonathan Edwards*, op. cit., p.298
30 Edwards, Jonathan, *God's Chief End in Creation* (WORKS I p.99, col.2.2)
31 *ibid.* p.99, col.2.3.
32 *ibid.* p.99, col.2.4.
33 *ibid.* p.100, col.1, par.1.
34 *ibid.* p.100, col.1, par.1 & 2.
35 *ibid.* p.100, footnote.
36 *ibid.* p.100, col.1, par.2.
37 *ibid.* p.101, col.1, par.1.
64 ibid. p.605, col.1, par.2.
65 ibid. p.604, col.1, par.5.
66 ibid.
68 ibid. [744] Corol.III (at WORKS II p.615, col.2, and p.616 col.1.)
69 Edwards, Jonathan, Misc. Obs., Angels [937] Quest.II (at WORKS II 606 col.2.)
70 ibid. The Fall of the Angels [833] (at WORKS II p.608 col.1, par.2.)
72 Misc. Obs. The Fall of the Angels, [930] (WORKS II p.611, col 1)
73 ibid. [940].(See also Loane, op.cit. p. 107 - 163)
74 ibid. [931] (WORKS II p.607 col 1)
75 Misc. Obs. Heaven, [944], (WORKS II p.617 col 1)
76 Misc. Obs. Confirmation of the Angels, [942] (WORKS II p.616, col 1,2)
80 ibid. Ans. VI.
81 Misc. Obs. Angels, [937], Quest II, Ans V. (WORKS II p.606 col 2)
81 ibid. [941] (WORKS II p.606 col 2, p.607 col 1)
82 Misc. Obs. Confirmation of the Angels, [515],Fourthly. (WORKS II p.612 col 2
83 ibid. Fifthly (WORKS II p.613 col 1)
84 ibid. [744] (WORKS II p.614 Col 2 par 3)
85 ibid. p 615 col 1 par 3. (see also [1329] p 617 col 1)
86 ibid. Cor. V p.616 col 1, par 3 and 4.
We are indebted to Charles Hodge for this quotation Syst. Theol. I.377

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Misc. Obs. Heaven, [421] (WORKS II p.621, col 1)

ibid. [529] (WORKS II p.622 col 1 par 3)

ibid. [105] (WORKS II p.618 col 1 and 2)

see cap. 1.1.2 supra


Memoirs, Remarks in Mental Philosophy-The Mind. par 31 (WORKS I p.ccxxvi. col 1)

ibid. par 32

Misc. Obs., Heaven, [264] (WORKS II p.619 col 2)


Misc. Obs. Heaven, [182] (WORKS II p.618 col 2, through to p.619)

ibid. [435] (WORKS II p.621 col 1 and 2)

ibid [1281] (WORKS II p.641 col 1.1)

ibid. par 3 (p.641 col 2 par 3)

Misc. Obs., Heaven [371] (WORKS II p.620 col 1 par 4 through par 5 point 1) (see also (571) at p.623 col 2 par 3)

ibid. col 2.5.


Misc.Obs., Heaven [710] (WORKS II p.626 col 2 through to p.628 top col 1.)

ibid. [721] on p.628.

ibid. [721] par 2.


112 ibid. par.6.
113 ibid. [952] p.634 col.2, par 4 (see also [934] p.637 col.2)
117 Misc. Obs. [438], [320], [936], [939], [1057], [1261], [1266], (WORKS II p.607 - 611)
118 ibid. p 612
119 Fall of the Angels (loc.cit.) [320] (WORKS II p.607 col 2)
120 ibid. [936] p.609 col 1 par II.2
121 ibid. par II.3
122 ibid. p.610 col par 1
123 Misc. Obs., The Devil [48] (WORKS II p.612)
124 Misc. Obs., Heaven [105], (WORKS II p.618 col 2 par 3)
125 Edwards, Jonathan, The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended; Evidences of its truth Produced, and Arguments to the Contrary Answered. (WORKS I p.142-233 see Sect VI at p.156 from col 2)
126 Original Sin (op.cit. at 125 supra), Part I, Ch I, Sect I, col 1, par 3ff
127 ibid. Part I, Ch I, Sect II, (WORKS I p.151 col 1 par 3)
128 vacant
129 vacant
130 Original Sin, op.cit., Part I, Ch I, Sec I (WORKS I p.147 col 1 par 2) and p.152 col 1 par 3.
131 ibid. Sect IV (WORKS I p.153 col 2 par 3 et passim
132 ibid. p.154 cp; 1 par 1
133 Edwards, Jonathan, Sinners in the hands of an angry God, from Two Sermons, (WORKS II p.7 - 12) for comment by Perry Miller, see Jonathan Edwards (op.cit) p.145-146. 160-161, 167, 312.
135 Edwards, Jonathan, The Folly of looking back in fleeing out of Sodom. (There are two sermons, IV and V) (WORKS II p.61 - 68

223
Edwards, Jonathan, The Warnings of Scripture are in the best manner adapted to the awakening and conversion of sinners (Sermon VI) (WORKS II p.68 - 71)

Edwards, Jonathan, The future punishments of the wicked unavoidable and intolerable (Two sermons, Sermon IX and X) (WORKS II p.78 - 83) and also The eternity of hell torments (Sermon XI) (WORKS II p.83 - 89). It is a sermon like the latter which causes some to find Edwards repelling with points such as "The sight of hell torments will exalt the happiness of the saints for ever". (p.87 point 4) It is easy to misunderstand him so to mean that "saints will be glad to see the wicked burn". However that is not his meaning at all. Edwards would say that if saints were glad in the spirit of vengeance it would be an evidence of their "corruption" and would question whether they were regenerate. Edwards is a logician. The inevitable result of seeing the justice of God would cause the saints to rejoice on a number of levels. Firstly, God would be glorified in His righteous judgment, secondly, justice would be vindicated, thirdly, evil would be cast out finally, and, fourthly, saints would be happy by contrast with what they see. As the judgement of the wicked would the just they would also glorify God's free mercy in themselves. Even his worst enemy would not accuse Edwards of malice. He always worked out the inevitable consequences of any fact. See also 143 infra. It is very likely to our understanding, that Jonathan Edwards was an insensitive man. If he were a sensitive man, would he have been able to keep his balance in the Great Awakening? Would he have been able to analyse so acutely the psychological vagaries without losing perspective? Could a sensitive man preached to his congregation the following Sunday after he was dismissed because they were so busy dismissing him that they did not think of who would fill the pulpit? He was an intellectual, and a logician, and a very godly and dedicated man, apparently without rancour, or even humour, but apparently insensitive. Is there much wisdom in telling the world (more than once) how happy the saints would be when the wicked perished. No doubt it is true, in the sense he meant it, but it seems guaranteed to cause misunderstandings.

Edwards, Jonathan, When the wicked shall have filled up the measure of their sin, wrath will come upon them to the uttermost (Sermon VI) (WORKS II p.122 - 125)

Edwards, Jonathan, Wicked men useful in their destruction only (Sermon VII) (WORKS II p.125 - 129). This is an extreme position. The usual Calvinistic doctrine would be that God is glorified in His mercy to the recipients of common grace (which Edwards says elsewhere) and God is glorified in all the "good" that men do even though that good cannot save them. "He maketh the wrath of man to please Him".

Edwards, Jonathan, "Men are naturally God's Enemies" Miscellaneous Discourses (WORKS II p.130 - 141)

Edwards, Jonathan, The Final Judgment, or The world judged righteously by Jesus Christ (WORKS II p.190 - 201)

Edwards, Jonathan, Sinners in Zion tenderly warned, or, The fearfulness which will hereafter surprise sinners in Zion, represented and improved. (WORKS II p.201 - 206)
The end of the wicked, contemplated by the righteous: or, The torments of the wicked in hell, no occasion of grief to the saints in heaven. (WORKS II p.207 - 212)

144 Edwards, Jonathan, Seventeen Occasional Sermons (Sermon I) on Acts xvi29,30.

145 Edwards, Jonathan, Man's Natural Blindness in the things of Religion (WORKS II p.247 - 256)

146 Edwards, Jonathan, Seventeen Occasional Sermons (Sermon VII) on Romans ii.8,9 (WORKS II p.878 - 888)

147 McNerney, James R, contrasts a cold and depressing "fire and brimstone" preaching with his inner joy and peace, resolving the implied paradox in a "mystical vision". He rightly says that this was the inner conviction of Edwards and the dynamic of his thought. St.Myst. B No 1 p.20-29 Spring 1985. This paradox that a man can joy in God and preach hell-fire is common-place Puritan evangelical preachers and this did not mean that they were insensitive. Their standard was the word of God revealed through Christ and the holy Scriptures and they followed through to the logical conclusion the truths that they saw there revealed, whatever they were, declaring "the whole counsel of God". Enjoyment of God and horror of sin are two sides of the same coin.

148 Mark 9:42 - 48. Edwards documents his scriptural references continually which see.

149 "To represent man as an automaton sinning by the necessity of his nature, and yet as guilty of his sins; to represent God as having ordained all things, yet as angry with the actions of the puppets whom he has created as they are; is to insist on the acceptance of contradictory propositions from which reason recoils, and to make Christianity itself incredible by a travesty of Christian truth." Froude, Short Studies, 3rd series, p.115 quoted by Shedd, William T, who comments "Froude believes this to be a true account of Protestant theology as formulated by Luther and Calvin. But it is a pure misrepresentation; not intentional but the misrepresentation of ignorance." Shedd, William T, Dogmatic Theology (New York, 1888) Vol 1, p.23. For a contemporary of Edwards, namely Whitby, see Miller, Perry, Jon.Ed, op.cit. p 254. "It's point of view, see Concerning Effrontery Grace - Works II. p.543

150 Miller, Perry, Jonathan Edwards (op.cit.) p.149_150. See also Edwards, Jonathan, Miscellaneous Remarks on Important Theological controversies, Chapter 2 (WORKS II p.515 through to 525)

151 Miller, Perry, Jonathan Edwards op.cit. p.147


153 vacant

Edwards, Jonathan, "Sinners in the hands of an angry God" (WORKS II p.1 col 2 par2. It is easy to fall into a misunderstanding of Edwards if one has no "feel" for Puritan theology. Taking the "Hell-fire" sermons on the own without the "free offer of grace" which always went with them, and taking the "Sovereignty of God" without taking the "wide offer of pardon to poor sinners", one could go along with Miller. However, the "mere arbitrary will" of God (which is a tautology, by the way) was informed by his infinite mercy, total righteousness, and his utter incapacity to deny His own word. The "mere arbitrary will" sounds like "whim" but that meaning is as far from Edwards' mind as the concept that God could deny Himself. While some of his early sermons seem very stark Edwards had come to believe while still at College that a man "has in the physical sense, the power of repenting and turning to God" (WORKS I p.1 col 2 par 2)
CHAPTER 3


2 We will be referring constantly to Edwards' The Religious Affections (WORKS I p.236ff.) see also Hutch, Richard A, "Jonathan Edwards's analysis of Religious Experience" Jour.Psych.Th. 6,123-131 Spr 1978.

3 Edwards, Jonathan, Rel.Aff at p.266 col 1 par 3.)

4 ibid. p.266 col 2 par 2.)

5 Edwards, Jonathan, The Mind [3], (WORKS I p.ccxxi col 2.)

6 Edwards, Jonathan, Ideas [66], (WORKS I p.ccxxiii col 1.)

7 ibid., Judgement (WORKS I p.ccxxii col 2ff)

8 ibid., Consciousness (WORKS I p.ccxxii col 1)

9 ibid., The Mind [34] (WORKS I p.ccxvii col 1, col 2)

10 ibid., [36], [40], (WORKS I p.ccxviii col 1 and 2.9)

11 ibid., Matter Thought [21] (WORKS I p.ccxx col 2ff)

12 ibid., [31] [35] (WORKS I p.ccxxi col 2.)

13 ibid., Memory [69] (WORKS I p.ccxxiii col 1.)

14 ibid., Genus [7], [24], [25], A-Part [47], [41], [42], [43], [37] Genus, (WORKS I p.ccxxiii,cccxiv. For Locke's position see Odegaard, Douglas, "Locke's Unnatural Kinds" Analysis 35, 208 June 19754


16 ibid., Truth [15], [6], [10], (WORKS I p.ccxxv col 2.)

17 ibid., [71] Knowledge (WORKS I p.ccxxvi col 2.)

18 ibid., [22] Prejudice (WORKS I p.ccxxvi col 2.)


20 Edwards, Jonathan, The Freedom of The Will, Sect 1 ( p.4), Sect 2 (p.5-8) (WORKS I p.4 ff)

21 see also Edwards, Jonathan, Detached Papers, Paper 1 (WORKS II p.440-441)
22 Edwards, Jonathan, The Distinguishing Marks of a work of the Spirit of God, applied to that uncommon operation that has lately appeared on the minds of many of the people of New England, with a particular consideration of the extraordinary circumstances with which this work is attended, with a preface by Mr Cooper, 1741, (WORKS II p.257-277)


24 ibid., I.I. (WORKS I p.237 col 1 par 5, col 2 par 1 and 2)

25 ibid., I.II.8 (WORKS I p.242 par 1)


27 Edwards, Jonathan, Rel.Aff. I.II.8 (WORKS I p.242 col 1)

28 ibid., I.III.1 (WORKS I p.243 col 2 through p.244 col 1.)

29 ibid., I.III.1 - 3 (WORKS I p.243-244)

30 Edwards was also suspect in evangelical circles for being too philosophical. See also Smith, John E, "Jonathan Edwards as Philosophical Theologian" Review of Metaphysics 30, 306-324 Dec 1976. Medlicott, Alexander, "In the wake of Mr Edwards's "Most Awakening Sermon at Enfield" Early American Literature 15 No 3. 217-221, Winter 1980.

31 The reflexive act of knowledge, "knowledge of oneself knowing things" is found in St Thomas Aquinas. Dewan, Lawrence, "St Thomas, Ideas and Immediate Knowledge" Dialogue (Canada) 18, 392-404 Summer 1979.


33 F C Copleston, S J, Aquinas (Penguin, A Pelican original, 1955) P.50-54

34 Aquinas, St Thomas, Summae Theologica, Fifth Article, Objection 4. Quoted from The Age of Belief, The Medieval Philosophers, selected with introduction and interpretative commentary by Anne Fremantle (Mentor, New American Library, New York and Toronto, 1954) p.156,7

34a Copleston, S J, History of Philosophy, Vol 2, p.403

35 Descartes, Rene, "Meditation II, Of the nature of the human mind; and that it is more easily known than the body" A Discourse on Method, Meditations on the First Philosophy, Principles of Philosophy. Tr. by Veitch, John, Intro. by Lindsay, A D, (Everyman, 1959) p.89

36 ibid. p.93 (Perception = cognition in Descartes and the concepts are divided into two distinguishing characteristics, the qualities of activity and passivity, volitions and perceptions, respectively. "Notes" P.240

37 Descartes, Rene, The Principles of Philosophy, Part IV, XVIII, XIX. p.228

39 ibid. p.23

40 ibid. p.146

41 ibid. p.181-2

42 ibid. p.186 ff


44 ibid. p.46

45 ibid. p.47 (we have used Woozley instead of direct quotations for brevity's sake.

46 ibid. p.49

47 Locke, John, *Essay*, IV, IX, 3; p.378

48 ibid. IV, X, 11, 12; p.383

49 ibid. IV, XI, 12; p.393

50 ibid. II, I, 4; p.90. So also II, I, 8, 10, 11 and II, III, 1 (the last at p.101)


53 Edwards, Jonathan, *Memoir*, (WORKS I p. cx, col 1, par 3)

54 Miller, Perry, *Jonathan Edwards*, p.212 ff

55 Edwards, Jonathan, *The Religious Affections* III, I, 2 (there are two points numbered 2) (WORKS I p. 247, col 2, par 5)

56 ibid. III. Intro. (WORKS I. p.262-3)

57 ibid. p.263 col2, par 3

58 ibid. (WORKS I p.262 through 336)

59 Edwards, Jonathan, "Appendix to the Treatise of the Affections, in two letters" (WORKS I p.336-343)

61 ibid. par 88 but on WORKS II p.592, col 2, par 2 through p.596 top.
62 ibid. par 37 (WORKS II p.582, col 2)
63 ibid. par 26 (WORKS p.580, col 2)
64 ibid. par 28 (WORKS II p.581, col 1)
65 ibid. par 25 (WORKS II p.580, col 1)
66 ibid. par 67 (WORKS II p.587, col 1)
67 ibid. par 2 (WORKS II p.578, col 1)
68 ibid. par 11 (WORKS II p.578, col 2)
69 ibid. par 6
70 ibid. par 10
71 ibid. par 8
72 ibid. par 11,12
73 ibid. par 16 (WORKS II p.597, col 1)
74 ibid. par 23 (WORKS II p.580, col 1)
75 ibid. par 74 (WORKS II p.588, col 2)
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77 Edwards, Jonathan, "Concerning Faith" par 85 (WORKS II p.590, col 2)
78 Edwards, Jonathan, The Religious Affections, III.I (WORKS I p.269, col 1, par 2 and 3)
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81 ibid.
82 WORKS I cxi, (orr Letter II at WORKS II p.341, col 1, par 5)
83 Goodwin, Thomas, Of-the Objects and Acts of Justifying Faith III.III, p.207,8
84 ibid. p.211
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86 ibid. col 1, par 2
87 ibid. col 2, par 1


89 A lot of the literature shows signs of selective reading. Evans, W Glyn, "Jonathan Edwards Puritan Paradox" quotes virtually only from the Memoir and then quotes extensively from secondary sources. One gets a far clearer picture from extensive reading in the WORKS. He is not a paradox. He is a Puritan. His thought contains some paradoxes but there is no ambiguity about the man himself and his central message. (Bibliotheca Sacra Dallas Theological Seminary, Vol 124, No 493, Jan - Mar 1967.

90 Edwards, Jonathan, "EXISTENCE" The Mind (WORKS I p.ccxx, col 1, Corol 1 ff)

91 footnote to The Religious Affections (WORKS I p.287)

92 Edwards, Jonathan, [54] "REASONING" The Mind (Works I p.CCXXVI, col1)
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