PONDOKS, HOUSES, AND HOSTELS: A HISTORY OF NYANGA 1946-1970,
WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON HOUSING

By

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis I outline the history of Nyanga up to 1970. Diverse aspects are covered, including location politics, women's protests, rent arrears and boycotts, and gangsterism. There is a special focus on housing issues, for they were related to most facets of location life and demonstrated the contradictions within apartheid policy.

Four themes are followed throughout the thesis. First, the extent to which the state achieved control of the African urban population is assessed, particularly in terms of its housing and influx control policies. I argue that the formulation and implementation of policies were influenced minimally by pressures "from below", and that central and local authorities achieved extensive control over the lives of urban Africans. Nevertheless, government officials did not succeed in curbing African urbanisation or controlling the residential movement of urban Africans, as witnessed by the high number of "illegal" Africans and consistently high tenancy turnover.

A second topic that threads its way through the thesis is the role of African constables and clerks in Nyanga. I show that residents working with the location administration were attracted particularly to the material benefits of collaboration. Utilising their linguistic skills and knowledge of location inhabitants, they extracted money and sexual favours from Nyanga residents and were given first priority in the allocation of Old Location houses. They did not, however, form an identifiable social group as they came from diverse occupational and educational backgrounds and did not associate closely with one another.

A third theme is the differential impact of apartheid laws on African women. I outline the laws that applied to urban African women and describe the actual process by which they were expelled from the Cape Peninsula. Arising from this, the changing nature and scope of women's demonstrations in Nyanga is described. My research shows that the protests of the early 1950s, which were small, infrequent, and centred on local issues, broadened in the late 1950s to include the application of pass laws to African women. The reasons for the change are shown to be both political and material in nature, with their origin in the forced removals from Peninsula shack settlements.

Fourthly, I have concentrated on spatial dynamics at various points. There were significant differences in physical space between Mau-Mau and the Old Location, which contributed to the social distance between the two neighbourhoods. During the massive "black spot" clearance campaign of the 1950s, the authorities succeeded in gaining spatial control over Africans by forcing them into segregated, fenced locations where entry and exit was monitored. To counteract this, residents asserted their control over the transit camp by constructing shacks in such a way as to impede raiding pass officials and make administrative surveillance of their lives difficult. The contradictory effects of placing contract workers in accommodation next to families are also examined: on the one hand, there was considerable socialising and cooperation between the two groups; on the other, much friction developed over the relationships between women in the married quarters and men in the hostels.
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This is my version of the history of Nyanga, and I offer it to the people who supplied me with the materials from which it was fashioned, whether to be challenged or supported, criticised or commended. I welcome any of these responses, for it will be evidence that past and present residents and administrators are assessing their roles and experiences in the making of Nyanga’s past.

Hildegarde Helene Fast
16 October 1995
ABBREVIATIONS

ANC African National Congress
AWC Administrasie Wes-Kaapland
DBAD Department of Bantu Administration and Development; see also NAD below
Cafda Cape Flats Distress Association
CLPF Coloured Labour Preference Policy
CNIP Ciskei National Independence Party
Combined Area/ Municipalities Area encompassing Bellville, Goodwood, Parow, and the Cape Divisional Council. This was a "proclaimed area" for the purposes of applying the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923.

CPSA Communist Party of South Africa
CSIR Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
CTCC Cape Town City Council
CTCC manager Manager of CTCC Native/Bantu Affairs Department
Divco Cape Divisional Council
Divco manager Manager of Native/Bantu Affairs for the Combined Area; employed by Divco.

DRC Dutch Reformed Church
MK Mkonte weSizwe (armed wing of the ANC)
NAD Native Affairs Department (changed to Department of Bantu Administration and Development in 1960)

NBRI National Building Research Institute
NCAW National Council of African Women
NSL/NTL Native Services Levy/Native Transport Levy

PAC Pan-African Congress
Poqo Armed wing of the Pan-African Congress
Sabra South African Bureau of Racial Affairs
SAIRR South African Institute of Race Relations
Saldrui South African Labour and Development Research Unit
SAP South African Police
TNIP Transkei National Independence Party

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INTRODUCTION

Most researchers are familiar with the path that winds its way from the initial conception of a project through to its final form. At the start of the research, my intention was to trace the development of social conflict in a Cape Peninsula township. This was modified considerably along the way: I decided to provide a broad history of Nyanga, added a focus on housing, and pursued certain themes in some depth. In what follows, I will relate how I came to study the history of Nyanga and why I chose to focus on housing. I will then argue for the importance of detailed case studies in current historiography and will outline the themes which shape this thesis.

The Peninsula has three older townships known as "Lagunya", namely Langa, Guguletu, and Nyanga. A number of theses have concentrated exclusively on the history of Langa: Musemwa's research on popular struggles in Langa between 1927 and 1948, Kondlo's description of the culture and religion of Langa residents up to 1958, and Mohamed's outline of the political struggles over education.\(^1\) Two studies have focused on Guguletu, namely a brief survey of youth culture throughout the 1960s and 1970s by Ngokoto and a study of housing and education in Guguletu between 1958 and 1987 by Makosana.\(^2\)

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The history of Nyanga had been studied the least, save a few sociological studies which raised intriguing questions. A profile of Nyanga was provided in 1984 by Sikwebu, who sketched a brief history of the location and described the recreational activities and living conditions in Nyanga. He noted that Nyanga had a reputation for being "backward" and crime-ridden among residents of Langa and Guguletu.³

Weichel et al put a questionnaire to 20 Nyanga residents in 1978, asking them to compare Nyanga and the adjacent shack settlement of Crossroads. The results were fascinating: while Nyanga residents were very actively involved in community projects, they perceived there to be little solidarity among residents, unlike in Crossroads. The people of Crossroads, for their part, preferred to live in shacks even if they were offered the option of a township house.⁴

Although the Weichel survey sample was a narrow one, research by Dludla in 1980/81 supported these findings. Based upon interviews with 200 respondents, it indicated that most Nyanga residents came to the location by coercion, and that most would leave if they had a choice. The interviews also revealed that most residents perceived themselves as belonging to the same social class as their neighbours, which Dludla used as a basis for concluding that there was no middle-class in Nyanga.⁵ By contrast, studies of Guguletu and Langa revealed distinct classes.⁶


⁶Ngcokoto found that there was a lower middle class in Guguletu which comprised teachers, nurses, and administration clerks: Ngcokoto, "Youth Culture in Guguletu", p. 22. Wilson and Mafeje noted cleavages in Langa based upon wealth and degree of urbanisation: M. Wilson and A. Mafeje, *Langa: A Study of Social Groups in an African Township* (Cape Town, 1963).
Nyanga seemed to be a township which had been studied little and admired even less. Among Cape Town residents familiar with Nyanga, the location is known as the "slagpaal" (abattoir) of the Peninsula. What brought about the reputation for "backwardness" and crime? Was the reputation justified? Why did there appear to be less class development in Nyanga than in Langa and Guguletu? The lack of research into these questions confirmed that Nyanga was to be the focus of study. It provided two challenges: to discover the origin of its reputation, and to shed light on the broader processes which shaped Nyanga's past.

Once the area of study had been fixed, it remained to define the topic beyond "social conflict". As Bozzoli noted, the research of the last two decades has pointed to profound cleavages within African communities, making it imperative to explore further this differentiation. The initial research was therefore aimed at discovering the primary cleavages within Nyanga, after which one or more social groups would be chosen and studied in depth, whether hostel residents, youth, or women.

Some historians have successfully undertaken such a thematic approach. Regarding the development of youth gangs and the correspondingly high crime rates on the Reef during the 1940s and 1950s, Bonner has shown how massive youth unemployment and the difficulties in developing family life contributed to this state of affairs. Glaser also studied

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youth gangs on the Reef, describing tsotsi subculture and the involvement of gangs in youth politics in the 1960s and 1970s.\[^{10}\]

In both these works, the focus was on one social group. The problem arose that the cleavages in Nyanga assumed varying importance over three decades. In the late 1950s, serious conflicts developed between adults and youth, who were joining gangs and engaging in crime. During the 1960s, the number of contract labourers\[^{11}\] in Nyanga rocketed, sparking off tensions with occupants of the family quarters. I therefore decided to write a broad history of Nyanga which would include an examination of various social groups.

As the research progressed, it was found that many of the themes related to housing in one way or another. Administration officials were obsessed with housing policy and implementation, keeping detailed information on the construction and financing of housing schemes, the number of people in each scheme and the state of their gardens ("good", "fair", "needs work"), the regulations for payment of rentals and alterations to dwellings, and the procedures for evictions and arrests in the case of arrears. It was understandably a central administrative concern, for revenue from rents financed the running of the township and the administration of housing provided a formidable means of social control.

This concern with housing also emerged in interviews with Nyanga residents. Although questions around housing did not figure prominently in the first interviews conducted, informants would consistently return to housing policy when they sought to explain their dealings with the administration and dynamics within the location.


\[^{11}\]The term "migrant worker" is avoided in this thesis as many African workers spent their working lives in Cape Town and returned to the countryside every year for only brief visits. Many of these workers considered the Cape Peninsula their home but were categorised as "migrants" by apartheid terminology, which designated their area of origin as their "homeland".
Although the sociology of housing has not been well-developed on a theoretical level, housing appears in a wide variety of literature, whether in policy studies and spatial analyses (see below), or development studies. It comprises an important component of analyses of Third World cities, for the emergence of vast slum settlements in and around urban areas in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia has been integrally related to migrancy, urbanisation, and poverty. These themes surface frequently in this thesis, especially in terms of the relationship between urbanisation and housing conditions.

The crucial feature of the housing issues that emerged was their all-encompassing nature. In arguing that housing is related to social structure in many ways, Kemeny stated:

[Residence] includes issues of urban form, limitations which it places on restructuring, the relationship between housing and welfare, and the entire gamut of institutional and organisational arrangements that impinge directly and indirectly on issues of residence. Residence as a dimension of social structure can thereby be seen as a key dimension of the social organisation of modern society.

Housing influenced many social dynamics in Nyanga. For example, it played a crucial role in creating and exacerbating tensions between hostel residents and families in Nyanga. The size and location of dwellings had a profound influence on the character of different neighbourhoods and the relationships between them.

Primary sources, then, were crucial in developing housing as a focus of my study, which in turn shaped some of the suppositions I chose to investigate (see below). This also

12 As Kemeny has argued, housing research has been practical and policy-oriented, with social theories about housing only at a rudimentary stage: J. Kemeny, Housing and Social Theory (London, 1992), p. xv.


14 Kemeny, Housing and Social Theory, p. 11.
influenced the periodisation of the thesis, for social relations in Nyanga were profoundly affected by the (usually) forced movement of people into and out of Nyanga.

The chapters were therefore divided according to the establishment of each successive housing development and the effect of the new arrivals on social and political dynamics within Nyanga. The starting point of the thesis is 1946, when Nyanga location was proclaimed and the first residents moved in. Thereafter, the chapters are divided according to when the housing schemes, hostels, and transit camp were established. There were two reasons for choosing the end point of 1970. First, the transit camp was almost cleared by 1970, which marked the end of another housing phase. Second, the period from 1971 to 1976 (and thereafter) falls into a different era, for it was marked by increasing defiance of influx control, the mushrooming of "illegal" informal settlements, and the alienation of the youth, all of which contributed to the uprising of 1976. As Lodge noted, the resistance of the 1970s provides a startling contrast - in terms of the scale and duration of the political movements - to that of the 1950s and 1960s.\(^{15}\)

Nyanga and the Practice of Social History

During my undergraduate years I prepared a history essay which sought to explore the causes of a particular conflict in the Middle East. I confidently submitted the paper, which listed four reasons for the conflict in declining order of importance. I was deflated when the essay was returned to me bearing one comment: "History is messy."

Indeed. It is a dictum even more relevant in the 1990s, what with rapidly changing political dynamics worldwide and the demise of grand structural theory. This makes the project of history in the 1990s a challenging task, for the certitude of operating within single

paradigms is being replaced by a broader choice of theoretical directions. Moreover the staples of social history, namely approaches involving social or economic causation and subordinate groups, are being challenged by approaches based upon textual criticism and cultural analysis.\textsuperscript{16}

One consequence of the latter trend is that the practice of narrative history has been questioned. Opponents have argued that narration imposes a structure on the past which compromises its truth, and that a coherent narrative with a single discoverable meaning is impossible as it is fashioned out of words which generate multiple words and meanings.\textsuperscript{17}

In this context, it is important to state my reasons for researching and presenting an (essentially) chronological history which explores various social themes. First, the lives of the majority merit consideration - the rents they paid (or did not pay), the houses they lived in, their communal activities - and it is important to assess their influence. For too long, black South Africans read a history which focused on white men; the monopoly of power - in which information plays a pivotal role - will only be comprehensively challenged by attempting to articulate the past experiences of all the inhabitants of South Africa.\textsuperscript{18}

There are certainly many "voices" which speak to us from the past,\textsuperscript{19} but history written in the critical tradition has always grappled with the dilemma of interpreting and

\textsuperscript{16}For further background on this trend, see W. Bleik, "The Dilemma of Popular History", \textit{Past and Present} 141 (1993), p. 207. See also F. Weinstein, \textit{History and Theory after the Fall} (Chicago, 1990).

\textsuperscript{17}D. Harlan, "Intellectual History and the Return of Literature", \textit{American Historical Review} 94 (3) 1989, pp. 582-583. A critique of this view is provided by A.P. Norman, "Telling it like it was: Historical Narratives on their Own Terms", \textit{History and Theory} xxx (2) 1991, esp. pp. 133, 135.

\textsuperscript{18}The production of history, as Crais has noted, cannot be separated from the reproduction of power: C.C. Crais, "South Africa and the Pitfalls of Postmodernism", \textit{South African Historical Journal} 31 (1994), p. 278.

\textsuperscript{19}As Scott pointed out, democratic history accepts that there will always be a plurality of stories: J.W. Scott, "History in Crisis? The Others' Side of the Story", \textit{American Historical Review} 94 (3) 1989, p. 691.
linking different accounts of the past. What literary theory teaches us is a greater awareness of our role as historians in telling a story - producing a text, in effect - from a cacophony of voices which demand a hearing.

In writing this thesis, then, I am attempting to convey firstly the stories I gleaned from the archives and Nyanga residents, and secondly the sense that I made of them. In tracing events chronologically, I have been able to assess their cumulative effect and to produce a context upon which my analysis is based. It is my hope that the direction of my inquiries was influenced as much by these voices as by more abstract theory. The focus on housing, for example, arose from their centrality in many of the sources.

The current critique of history has therefore been an enriching one, and it alerts us to shortcomings of past practices. One of these, Hobsbawm has told us, is the enormous temptation simply to uncover what has hitherto been unknown, and to enjoy what we find. An author has the responsibility to demonstrate the importance of the subject, whether as a factor influencing others or as an aspect that is significant enough to warrant attention. Furthermore, it is important to draw connections between grassroots struggles and the behaviour of ruling groups. Indeed, the trend in recent social history has been to stress the interaction of influences "from below" and "from above", which is in contrast to the previous emphasis on the culture and struggles of the underclasses.

While this trend is evident in the most recent published collection of Wits History Workshop papers, the urban research of the 1970s and 1980s in South Africa has been


divided by Maylam into two categories: analyses of urban policy and attempts by the central and local state to control black underclasses, and case studies of townships and informal settlements, which have sought to describe the lifestyle and struggles of (usually African) urban residents. 

Most of the case studies have described government policies in order to place the history of local communities in a broader context. Glaser, for example, outlined the laws to which youths were subjected to explain the emergence of gang sub-cultures, and Proctor situated the history of Sophiatown in the context of repressive labour policies. As their research was aimed at exploring certain themes in depth, whether tsotsism or class struggle, the prime focus was not on the relationship between broader processes and their local manifestations.

One of the current tasks of history, then, is to close the gap between macrohistory and microhistory, or - as one historian put it - to elucidate "Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons". A promising method in pursuing this, I would argue, is the use of a detailed case study. We know much about the forces which shaped the formulation of state

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policy,\textsuperscript{27} and the popular culture and struggles of the urban underclasses have been described and analysed in case studies of Brakpan, Doornfontein, Cato Manor, East London, and Port Elizabeth. Yet the former have raised questions and put forward hypotheses which have not been thoroughly investigated on ground level. Reference is often made to the inherent contradictions of apartheid policy.\textsuperscript{28} How were these revealed at the level of African townships? It is common to hear that apartheid was unworkable, indeed that it was doomed from the start. Were apartheid laws always ineffective, and what were the respective roles played by incoherent or contradictory state and local authority policies, popular resistance, and local socio-economic conditions? As Robinson noted,

the micro-geographies of administrative strategies, social control and individual and collective actions could help us to understand how apartheid racial domination was maintained, and perhaps why it collapsed.\textsuperscript{29}

It is my aim, then, to trace apartheid policies from their enactment in law through to their implementation in practice in the location of Nyanga. The merits of such an approach have been demonstrated by Mayer:

Recognising the several analytic parts of a controlling process - its origins, its actual operation and its effectiveness - combined with an awareness of differing types of control - social and coercive - each with different levels of imposed power or choice allowed, should enable historians to discuss control with greater accuracy and complexity. It should also lead to an examination of the constituency towards which controls were directed, rather than just focusing upon the motivations and programme design of the controllers. This would compel the recognition that some controls may not have been effective;


\textsuperscript{28}See, for example, Maylam, "Urban Historiography", p. 34.

the constituency were often participants, not simply clay to be moulded in the controlling process.\textsuperscript{30}

The efficacy of apartheid laws is therefore a theme which will draw links between broader processes and the specific situation in Nyanga.

In line with this theme and the focus on housing, it is my intention to outline the objectives of housing policy and assess the extent to which these were realised in Nyanga. The extant studies of African housing policies tend to focus either on the formulation of state policy or its implementation in one place. In the former category is Stren's analysis of housing policies in colonial and post-colonial Africa,\textsuperscript{31} Morris' overview of the financing and regulation of African housing in South Africa,\textsuperscript{32} and Wilkinson's two studies, which placed South African housing policy in its political and economic context.\textsuperscript{33} Analyses of housing policy at local government level have been provided by Edwards and Torr, who dealt with political dynamics between central and local authorities.\textsuperscript{34} I will again be straddling the macro and micro levels in an attempt to explore the (in)efficacy of apartheid legislation.


\textsuperscript{32}P. Morris, A History of Black Housing in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1981).


Another theme which is explored in this thesis is the role of space. It is no coincidence that housing has been a primary focus of spatial analyses, for it both reflects and provides the means for re-ordering social, economic, and political landscapes.\(^{35}\) One example of the imaginative use of space as a tool of analysis is Davidoff and Hall's examination of the separation of private and public spheres in middle-class housing in Birmingham.\(^{36}\) This was reflected in the buildings, with servants being housed separately during the nineteenth century, and in overall residential patterns, with work (public) and home (private) becoming more differentiated.

Spatial analysis has been used to great effect by South African scholars. In *Outcast Cape Town*, social geographer Western traversed various levels of analysis, from the macro level of the apartheid city in theory and its implementation in practice, to the micro level of the economic and social effects of the spatial distance placed between removees and the city.\(^{37}\) Ramphele's study of the migrant labour hostels in Cape Town described the impact of space on the lives of hostel residents, and Robinson's thesis explored the role of space and place in the foundations of racial domination in South African cities.\(^{38}\)

\(^{35}\) The significance of space in social theory was first stressed in the 1960s, when Rex and Moore focused on the interface between residential patterns and class structure: J. Rex and R. Moore, *Race, Community and Conflict* (London, 1967). Anthony Giddens placed space at the heart of social theory in the late 1970s, arguing that spatial structure was not only the arena in which social life unfolded, but also a medium through which social relations were produced and reproduced: A. Giddens, "Time, Space and Regionalisation", in D. Gregory and J. Urry, eds., *Social Relations and Spatial Structures* (London, 1985). It is significant that considerations of "space" replaced those of "class" at a time when Marxist concepts were being seriously questioned.


In this thesis, I use space as a tool of analysis on both a macro and micro level, and as a reflection of societal relations as well as a shaper of it. State techniques of domination fall into the macro category, with apartheid policy-makers manipulating residential space to achieve surveillance and control of the black underclasses. The legal segregation of Africans in the Cape Peninsula in the course of the 1950s therefore acts as a mirror of broader power dynamics in South Africa. The effect of spatial organisation within Nyanga reveals how space acted as an independent variable to profoundly influence social interaction in the township.

The third motif which will be traced is the role and social position of African officials. As studies of colonialism in Africa have shown, the most important mechanism of European control of its colonies was the use of collaborating groups. Nevertheless, studies of the maintenance of colonial authority through soldiers and police have garnered little attention, as McCracken has pointed out. The most notable exception is van Onselen's study of collaborators in the Rhodesian mining industry to 1935, which detailed the material and social benefits accruing to mine recruiters, police, and messengers. Tantalizing glimpses of the activities of "wardsmen" and "police boys" have also been provided in studies of Port Elizabeth and Brakpan.

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Two sub-themes on the subject of "collaboration" will be followed. First, the motives of African constables and clerks in cooperating with the white administration in Nyanga will be ascertained. Second, the role that collaborators played in the social and political life of Nyanga will be outlined. Van Onselen's definition of collaboration will be the basis for following this theme: collaborators were those people responsible for implementing policies which the majority of the population had no share in formulating and which they found abhorrent; furthermore, they were consciously perceived as collaborators and were rejected for their role.43

A fourth theme is the differential impact of apartheid laws on African women. The discriminatory laws to which they were subjected and their resistance thereto have been the subject of full-length studies.44 There is one dimension which has yet to be explored in depth, namely the actual process by which African women were endorsed out of urban areas. While Walker and Wells provided detailed studies of pass protests, it is unclear how many women were expelled from urban areas, how many chose to remain "illegally", and the relationship between these processes and African women's protests.

Arising from this, the underlying reasons for the activism of Nyanga women will be probed. As Bozzoli has stressed, the various ideological and organisational forms of women's protests can be understood by examining the materialist basis for the variations.45 I will therefore show how the nature and scope of women's demonstrations in Nyanga changed over two decades and will explore the social and material reasons for the changes.

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43 Van Onselen, "Role of Collaborators", p. 403.

44 C. Walker, Women and Resistance in South Africa, 2nd ed. (Cape Town, 1982); J. Wells, We now demand! The History of Women's Resistance to Pass Laws in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1993).

In this thesis, then, I am seeking to gauge the efficacy of apartheid and to examine its effects on the ground, to explore the role of collaborators in Nyanga, and to describe African women's experiences of legislation which discriminated against them as women and as Africans. My thesis draws from social history tradition in that it takes account of social and material factors, but it also presents a political history in emphasising the implementation of and resistance to apartheid laws.

**Secondary sources: Africans in Cape Town**

The literature covering the history of Africans in the Cape Peninsula provided a context for understanding the establishment of Nyanga and the background of its inhabitants. Barnett and Saunders traced the history of Cape Town's first African location of Ndabeni from its construction in 1901 to its disestablishment and removal of residents to Langa by 1935.46 Their work is pivotal to understanding the traditions of state and local authority control and African resistance in Cape Town, which influenced subsequent struggles in Nyanga location.

Another study centering on Langa was a comprehensive anthropological survey of the township carried out in the early 1960s by Mafeje and Wilson. They noted that traditional differentiations of language, custom and status were disappearing and being replaced by cleavages based upon wealth and degree of urbanisation.47 Particularly important was the distinction between recent migrants, the semi-urbanised, and settled townspeople. The processes by which "encapsulation" and assimilation took place in the urban setting caused me to examine whether the same cleavages existed in Nyanga.


47 Wilson and Mafeje, *Langa*. 
A work that has taken a broader view is Kinkead-Weekes' M.A. thesis about state policy and popular resistance among Africans in Cape Town to 1936. The time period was extended to 1973 for his doctoral thesis: he looked at labour control, segregation measures, and ANC internal politics in Cape Town. Both theses concentrated on organisational politics at metropolitan level and provided a thorough background to struggles taking place within local authorities, especially the the Cape Town City Council, and within African opposition movements.48

Muthien's study of pass controls and resistance in Cape Town to 1965 supplemented Kinkead-Weekes' work. Her thesis focused on the implementation of influx control and the extent to which resistance influenced policy formation. Although her work promised to cover a wide range of issues - ranging from African class formation to the conflicts between different state apparatuses in establishing control over Africans - it supplied little more than a chronology short on analysis.49

The studies of Muthien and Kinkead-Weekes provided valuable overviews of the history of Africans in Cape Town. Any information they supplied on Nyanga was sparse, however; unlike Langa and Guguletu, Nyanga was administered by the Cape Divisional Council, so that Cape Town newspapers rarely reported on events in the more distant location.


Primary Sources: Documents

The archives were rich in sources on Nyanga. The most important records were the monthly reports of the Manager of "Native" or "Bantu" Administration in Nyanga, which were contained in the monthly minutes of Cape Divisional Council meetings. While they proved invaluable in tracing out a history of the location, they also gave a distorted picture of Nyanga. As Thompson has noted, there is a social purpose behind the creation and preservation of documents, which are not available to the historian by accident. In the case of the Nyanga records, the administration put extraordinary emphasis on certain kinds of statistics, especially the monthly population breakdowns, number of prosecutions for pass offences, and amount of money in accumulated arrears. The information reflected the administration's concern with influx control and the self-balancing revenue account.

Other important sources of information were two manuscript collections. The D.B. Molteno Papers furnished information on the early history of Nyanga to 1948 and provided a summary of state housing policy in the 1950s. A treasure trove of information on the implementation of the pass laws during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s was provided by the Athlone Advice Office records collected by members of the Black Sash. As many advice seekers lived in Nyanga, the case histories provided first-hand accounts of the human cost of influx control, illuminated the insecurity of many Nyanga residents, and provided insights into the particularities of Divisional Council administration. Many of these records must, however, be taken with a grain of salt: the advice seekers sought to have the Advice Office on their side, and sometimes provided erroneous information on, for example, their length of residence in Cape Town. The records were therefore more valuable in

understanding the legal insecurity of Peninsula Africans, rather than for their statistical veracity.

Records relating to central state policy were in the Pretoria Archives. While these were more concerned with the financial and planning aspects of Nyanga, they shed light on the constraints within which the Divisional Council operated in administering Africans in the Combined Area.

Nyanga was jointly administered by five local authorities, each of which had its own political background and none of which has been researched. There was therefore a gap in the research: while state and local authority housing policy could be covered in detail, information on the internal dynamics which generated these policies is not to be found in secondary sources. Likewise, the administrative practices of Nyanga officials are described and their effects on Nyanga residents outlined, but the internal political struggles which influenced administrative practices are little-known, although they are touched upon in Chapter Seven.

Primary Sources: Interviews

The information provided by the administrative records was supplemented and corrected by the information gleaned from interviews. As Thompson stated,

Oral history...makes a much fairer trial possible: witnesses can now also be called from the under-classes, the unprivileged, and the defeated. It provides a more realistic and fair reconstruction of the past, a challenge to the established account.  

51 While primary sources are available, in-depth study of the dynamics within and between the five local authorities was outside the parameters of this thesis.

52 Thompson, Voice of the Past, p. 5.
Nevertheless, oral information can be a "slippery medium for preserving facts", as Hobsbawm put it, and caution consequently had to be exercised in the conducting and interpretation of the interviews.

As memory is a selective mechanism which is constantly changing, oral testimony reveals not only what people did, but what they now think that they did. This was certainly true for the interviews conducted with three white administration officials. They were at pains to point out positive aspects of apartheid rule: there were frequent references to the orderly planning and occupation of the transit camp as compared with the uncontrolled shack settlements of the 1990s. While their attempts to paint a rosy picture of Nyanga jarred with residents' recollections and written accounts of the arrears and prosecutions that dominated location life, their attempts to vindicate themselves provided a window into their present-day attitudes toward their role in administering Nyanga.

There were various dynamics which influenced the conducting and usefulness of the interviews with Nyanga residents. There was a tendency for them to present their township in a positive light and downplay social tensions. When Andrew Silk interviewed residents of the Peninsula shack settlement of Modderdam in 1977, he noted:

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55 While one official was very distrustful of me (see interview with Mr A. Grové, 16 June 1993), two others supplied valuable information. Mr I.T. Brent, Superintendent of Nyanga for over twenty years, refused on several occasions to speak with me, claiming that he could not remember anything of his time in Nyanga.

It was very hard for an outsider to determine the depth of divisions and rivalries within the camp. Many residents who wanted their community to win the support of sympathetic whites denied that there were any splits or factions at all because they wanted Modderdam to be seen as a peaceful, unified camp.\footnote{A. Silk, *A Shanty Town in South Africa: The Story of Modderdam* (Johannesburg, 1981), p. 11.}

It was found that where rapport had been established through previous contact with informants, there was more evidence gleaned about internal cleavages. My involvement with the Black Sash and peace monitoring in Nyanga was important in this regard.

Although the interviews were conducted after the political reforms of 1990, there was still considerable suspicion as to how the research would be put to use. This applied particularly to political activists, who had bitter experiences of being betrayed by informers in the past and therefore insisted on remaining anonymous.\footnote{Each informant was asked whether s/he wished to be designated by name in the thesis. If they did not indicate their preference during the interview and did not respond to a letter sent subsequently, their identity was not revealed.} Before the start of an interview conducted by Samkelo Blom, the informant asked her partner to witness the interview so that if there was any trouble later, Mr Blom could be called to task for being a spy. There were several informants who claimed that they could not remember anything about significant events, such as the political upheaval of March 1960. At the time of the research, there was also considerable political division in Nyanga as evidenced by an ongoing "taxi war", which caused informants to exercise caution by requesting that their names not be associated with the information they provided.

There was much less suspicion encountered with people who had been active in community organisations: they communicated easily in English, were used to dealing with visitors to the area, and were conscious of the effects of Nyanga's history upon social conditions in the township. The least successful of the interviews involved former hostel
residents. Most could not communicate freely in English and were highly suspicious of the motives of a white, female researcher. They were often unwilling to relate past events, and the presence of an interpreter did not assist matters. Dludla had a similar experience in interviewing Nyanga residents, finding that people who had lived in the Peninsula for many years communicated more freely than those with strong rural ties.59 Oral history has its own biases; in this case, the bulk of the oral evidence was provided by informants who were well-educated and active in organisations and political movements which extended beyond the boundaries of Nyanga.

Chapter Surveys

Chapter One outlines the development of pass controls and the patterns of African settlement in the Cape Peninsula up to 1945. It places the establishment of Nyanga in 1946 in the context of a worsening housing crisis, tightening influx control, and the increasing numbers of Africans migrating to the Peninsula in search of work. State and local authority attempts to impose segregation and influx control are outlined to show that the lack of a coordinated approach rendered the legislation ineffectual. In describing the various strategies employed by Africans in evading controls on their labour and residence, the chapter provides a background to the traditions which subsequently influenced the struggles of Nyanga residents.

In Chapter Two the establishment of Nyanga location is outlined. The housing and administrative policies of the state and the Cape Divisional Council were poorly formulated and haphazardly implemented, so that the aims of establishing Nyanga were defeated. The first years witnessed a high turnover of residents, with the shack residents for whom the houses were intended moving out and city residents moving in. Despite this turnover, a

59 Dludla, "Nyanga Survey", p. 36.
vibrant political culture emerged in Nyanga which was spearheaded by the Vigilance Committee, the African National Congress, and the Communist Party. These bodies challenged the informal patronage network being cultivated by the administration and succeeded in dominating Advisory Board deliberations.

The focus of Chapter Three is the development of the second housing scheme of Mau-Mau in 1952. State housing policy had shifted from subsidising African housing to placing it on an "economic" footing. The result was a high rate of tenancy turnover owing to arrears and evictions, which served to defeat the state's intention to minimise costs and maximise control. The economic housing policy also resulted in smaller dwellings with fewer amenities, which created a significant contrast in the living conditions of the residents of the First Scheme and Mau-Mau. This contributed to the antagonism that emerged between residents of the two neighbourhoods, which was further aggravated by the nature of the forced removal of Mau-Mau residents, who came from shantytowns in four local authority areas.

Chapter Four describes how Cape Town was spatially re-mapped during the mid-1950s through the shack clearances carried out by the Cape Divisional Council. Over 11,000 Africans moved to self-built shacks in the transit camp and hundreds were expelled from the Cape Peninsula. The chapter demonstrates that pass controls were vigorously imposed on both African men and women prior to their implementation in the Cape Town City Council areas and in South Africa as a whole. The traditions of political protest which the transit camp residents brought to Nyanga are summarised, and the social differences and dynamics between shack and house residents outlined.

Chapter Five describes the political turmoil of the period 1959-62. Up until 1959, social interaction within Nyanga tended to be divided along neighbourhood lines. As
residents faced the common threats of expulsion from the Peninsula, unaffordable rents, ejections for arrears, and forcible transfers within the location, they mobilised a series of militant political protests. These culminated in the extraordinary resistance of March/April 1960, in which Nyanga was the hub of the three-week defiance of Peninsula Africans against the state. The continued and imaginative resistance of Nyanga residents to the corrupt location administration occurred in the face of a massive and brutal crackdown by security forces. The chapter ends with an explanation of Proclamation No 11 of 1960, which divided the Cape Peninsula into two proclaimed areas and exacted a high human cost from Nyanga residents throughout the 1960s.

While Chapter Five shows how state repression significantly dampened African resistance, Chapters Six and Seven supply further reasons for the "silenced sixties". Both chapters cover the period from 1963 to 1970, and demonstrate that state control was by no means complete or uncontested. Chapter Six explains how the undermining of Section 10 (permanent urban residence) rights had the effect of diverting the energies of Nyanga residents toward surviving state attempts to divide their households. This insecurity was further increased by their precarious residential status, for the moratorium on the construction of family houses in Nyanga in 1962 laid the foundation for a serious accommodation crisis. A dominant theme is influx control, which was rendered impracticable owing to African defiance of pass laws on an individual level, legal loopholes, and a growing economy which required more labour in the face of restrictive labour policies.

Chapter Seven follows a variety of themes. The inefficient and corrupt administration is described, as are the deteriorating living conditions within the location. The Proclamation of 1960 is revisited, showing how the line drawn through the Peninsula resulted in thousands of Nyanga residents being transferred to the City Council township of Guguletu by 1970.
The reasons for Advisory Board members' participation in an ineffectual body are explored, showing that material gain was the most common motive. The core of the chapter is an analysis of the social relations between house and hostel residents. While there were few contract workers resident in Nyanga in 1960, the importation of thousands of "single" men throughout the 1960s pushed up the male-female ratio to 4.7:1 by 1970. Tensions arose between house and hostel residents over women and crime; in reference to the latter, the roots of increasing gangsterism are traced, as are the continued efforts of residents to address the issue.

As the above discussion has indicated, researching the history of Nyanga provided me with a smorgasbord of topics, questions, and approaches. It is my hope that the themes I chose to follow will shed light on the efficacy and social effects of influx control and housing policy in one township and thereby contribute to the study of the processes shaping black lives in South Africa during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. To accomplish that, however, would be a bonus. In the first instance, I wish to present an account of the lives of people living in "backward" Nyanga, the township with no written history.
CHAPTER ONE
Patterns of African Settlement
in the Cape Peninsula to 1945

Introduction

Black society in Cape Town comprised people of diverse backgrounds during the latter half of the nineteenth century, including indigenous Khoisan, ex-slaves from Madagascar and East and West Africa, labourers from Mozambique, and Xhosa-speaking (especially Mfengu) people who came to Cape Town as a result of the upheavals of the Frontier War of 1834-35 and the famine and cattle-killing of 1856-57. According to the (male) property-based franchises of 1853 and 1872, there was no technical discrimination based upon colour. Terms to describe black people in Cape Town were used quite loosely, with the word "Coloured" referring either to all black people or to those who were not Bantu-speaking.¹

Large numbers of Bantu-speaking labourers from the Eastern Cape arrived in Cape Town in the 1880s and 1890s owing to the the rinderpest epidemic of 1896-97 and the Glen Grey Act of 1894, which allocated allotments too small to maintain subsistence in the reserves.² They were given the least desirable jobs and were residentially segregated from other black Capetonians. The Harbour Board built a compound at the docks for Mfengu migrant labour in 1884, and barracks for dock workers were built outside Simon's Town, which also had a "Kaffir Location" for railway workers by 1896.³ The separation of the

¹See Census of 1891, G6-1892, p. xvii; V. Bickford-Smith, Ethnic Pride and Racial Prejudice in Victorian Cape Town (Cambridge, 1995, p. 31.)


workers was further reinforced by the different language and cultural practices of the migrants.

As the new labourers replaced other black dockworkers and were paid less, fights broke out between the recent migrants and black Capetonians. In the course of the 1880s, the Bantu-speaking dock labourers were called "kaffirs" or "natives" to distinguish them from the more established black population.\(^4\) This was reflected in the census of 1891, which enumerated black Capetonians as "Kafir and Bechuana" (1107 people), "Fingo" (100), "Malay" (11,105), and "Mixed and Other" (35,913).\(^5\) These divisions were written into law in 1898 with the passage of the Liquor Law, which prohibited the sale of alcohol to "aboriginal natives". The law was not applied to people who - according to a casual assessment - did not belong to a "Bantu tribe".\(^6\) Further discriminatory laws followed, such as the Morality Act of 1902, which forbade sexual intercourse between "natives" and white prostitutes.

People categorised as "native" under the Liquor Law lived dispersed throughout Cape Town. By 1900, there were over 1500 migrant workers in the harbour barracks and 8000 "natives" living in District 6, scattered in "kaffir haunts" and in huts on the slopes of Table Mountain.\(^7\) This was to change in 1901 with the establishment of the "Native Location" of Ndabeni in Cape Town, which signalled the beginning of central state and local authority attempts to coerce people into segregated "native" areas in the Cape Peninsula.

\(^4\)Bickford-Smith, *Victorian Cape Town*, pp. 190-191.

\(^5\)Census of 1891, G6-1892, p. 18. The total number of black Capetonians was 48,739 as compared with 48,544 "European or Whites".

\(^6\)Bickford-Smith, *Victorian Cape Town*, pp. 190-191.

\(^7\)Saunders, "Creation of Ndabeni", p. 166-168.
This chapter seeks to trace the history of these people - subsequently known as "Africans" - in Cape Town from the turn of the century up to 1945 and thereby to explain the origins of Nyanga residents and the legislative context in which Nyanga was created. The forces compelling and drawing people defined as African to the Peninsula will be described, and the degree of dispersion or centralisation of African settlement in Cape Town will be analysed. It will be demonstrated that the piecemeal, uncoordinated nature of government policy and the unwillingness of local authorities to commit funds to African accommodation rendered influx control and segregatory legislation ineffective. African resistance to these laws will be shown to have played a significant role in the failure of state policy.

Throughout this thesis, the term "African" is used for people classified "native" (later designated "Bantu" or "African") in the official records and in newspapers. The reader will recognise that rigid legal categories did not reflect the reality of social fluidity, with much blurring between groups defined as "White", "Malay", "Mixed", "Hottentot", or "Native". Nevertheless, race classification was used to restrict the urban influx and residential patterns of people classified as "native", and thereby served to shape the experiences of a group of people later known as "African".

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African influx, settlement, and control to 1945

With a section of the white population increasingly unsettled by the expanding African population in the 1890s, the bubonic plague of 1901 provided the ostensible reason for the segregation of Africans at a new location at Uitvlugt, which was renamed Ndabeni in 1902.⑨ The Reserve Locations Acts No 40 of 1902 and No 8 of 1905 made it compulsory for all Africans in the municipality to live in Ndabeni, unless they were registered voters or received permission to reside outside the location.

The establishment of Ndabeni was significant, for it brought to Cape Town enforced residential segregation, a rudimentary pass system, and a controlled location which offered no possibility of freehold title. Although segregation was a legal requirement in Cape Town from 1902 onward, it proved unenforceable. Evictions and the demolition of shacks in the Peninsula were repeatedly challenged in court on the basis that the accommodation provided in Ndabeni and later in Langa was insufficient. In 1919, for example, Africans arrested for living outside Ndabeni pleaded that no accommodation was available in the location; they were subsequently discharged.⑩

In addition to the legal ineffectiveness of the Acts of 1902 and 1905, the Cape Town City Council (CTCC) was confronted by the resistance of Ndabeni residents to the location administration and the payment of rents. The forced removals to Ndabeni resulted in a stayaway and rent strike in 1902, which were only quashed when over 200 residents were

⑨Saunders, "Creation of Ndabeni", pp. 171-172, 184-185. The desire on the part of whites in the Cape Colony geographically to distance themselves from African urban settlements, which were associated with disease and crime, has been called the "sanitation syndrome": M.W. Swanson, "The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape Colony, 1900-1909", Journal of African History 18 (1977).

arrested and convicted for arrears. A more effective strategy to fight rents and removals was the use of legal test cases, which were utilised time and again throughout Ndabeni's 35-year history.

During World War I, South African urban centres experienced a significant influx of Africans. Although the industrial labour force expanded, sharp inflation and inadequate housing and services resulted in a dramatic deterioration in the standard of living of urban blacks. The Housing Commissions of 1903 and 1913 and the 1914 Tuberculosis Commission condemned shantytowns for their ill-chosen sites, absence of systematic layout, sanitary services, and water supply, and dwellings that were "unfit for human habitation". The South Africa Act of 1910 had introduced a new tier of government, namely provincial, and the overlapping jurisdictions of municipal, provincial, and central authorities was to paralyse coherent policies regarding urban Africans until 1923.

In response to the increase in inner-city slums and shack areas, the Union government passed the Municipal (Provision of Homes) Ordinance No 23 in 1919 and Housing Act No 35 of 1920. The former empowered local authorities to develop housing schemes for lower income groups, but the Housing Act provided only for economic housing loans, thus ignoring the needs of the very poor. The legislation therefore did little to address the housing shortage.

13 Lodge, Black Politics, pp. 3-4.
As with other cities, Cape Town experienced increased in-migration during World War I. When the enforced protectionism of the war stimulated production of consumer goods in Cape Town, many Africans were drawn by the employment possibilities. By the mid-1920s, 14% of the industrial labour force in Cape Town was African, being confined primarily to labour-intensive sectors such as quarrying and construction. A significant proportion of the migrants were women: between 1911 and 1921, the number of African women in Cape Town increased 110%. 16

Many white people were alarmed at the continuing flow of Africans to the urban areas. This prompted the Johannesburg Town Council to appoint the Stallard Commission of Enquiry, which reached the following conclusion in 1922:

The Native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister. 17

The Stallard report was to have far-reaching impact, for its recommendations that Africans be considered residents of the reserves, and that they be accommodated in segregated municipal locations, became the basis for the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act No 21 of 1923. The Act was intended to freeze the permanent population of Africans in the urban areas, with additional labour requirements to be met by migrant labour.

The Act of 1923 also stipulated that responsibility for housing Africans be transferred from central government back to the local authorities, which had controlled it until the Act of Union in 1910; Ndabeni therefore fell under City Council control in 1925. In 1926, the Act


17 Quoted in Sapire, "Brakpan", p. 49.
was applied to the Peninsula: all but "exempted" Africans within a five-mile limit of Cape Town were required to live in a location, and Africans entering the municipal area had to obtain work-seeking or visitor's permits which were valid for 14 and 30 days respectively.

It is necessary at this point to include a description of the Cape Divisional Council (Divco) area. Divco had jurisdiction over what were regarded as rural areas within and around Cape Town such as Kommetjie, Hout Bay, Philippi, Durbanville, and Elsies River. As urban areas expanded this distinction began to break down, and some areas were transferred to City Council control, such as Windermere in 1943. The five-mile limit designated by the Urban Areas Act therefore included some portions of Divisional Council districts.

The Urban Areas Act of 1923 was more significant for what it boded for the future than what it accomplished at the time. The courts found that African defiance of repatriation orders was not a punishable offence, thus rendering the Act ineffective. An amendment passed in 1930 was defectively worded, and it was only in 1937 that the Urban Areas Act began to be moulded into an effective instrument of influx control.

It was the labour legislation that followed the passing of the Urban Areas Act which was to have a more immediate impact on the black population of the Peninsula. The "civilised labour policy" of the Pact government that came to power in 1924 gave white workers preferential access to employment opportunities at "civilised" wage rates, which the government subsidised in part. This policy affected the employment of Africans and, in the early 1930s, Coloured workers also. It also had an impact on the provision of housing for

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18 Africans were exempt from the provisions of the Act if they were registered voters and owned property worth over £75: Saunders, "From Ndabeni to Langa", p. 14.


Africans. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 declared that only skilled (read white) labour was to be used in the building industry. Consequently the township of Langa was built in 1927 by unionised white labour at high wages, so that the high interest payments could only be covered by correspondingly high rents.\(^{21}\)

Although labour legislation discriminated against African workers during the 1920s, this did not curb the increasing numbers of Africans finding employment in Cape Town. Drought and animal diseases after World War I weakened Africans' ability to subsist in the reserves. This was paralleled by an increase in job opportunities in Cape Town: secondary industry continued to expand in the Western Cape during the 1920s, with the number of industrial establishments increasing significantly.\(^{22}\) At the same time, state expenditure on road construction and harbour and railway development increased. By 1927, there were 10,000 Africans officially living in Cape Town and many more unofficially.\(^{23}\) The continuing housing shortage meant that shack settlements sprang up throughout the Peninsula in the 1920s in places such as Woodstock, Maitland, Kensington Estate, and the Wynberg Flats.\(^{24}\)

Divco and Wynberg municipality tried to crack down on shantytown residents in Parkwood Estate and Grassy Park during the 1920s, but stopped their efforts when they realised that the destruction of shacks was useless as long as alternative accommodation was

\(^{21}\) Saunders, "From Ndabeni to Langa", p. 21.


\(^{24}\) Saunders, "From Ndabeni to Langa", pp. 4-6.
not provided.\textsuperscript{25} The most Divco could do was to ask the Provincial Council to pass the Townships Ordinance No 18 in 1929, which empowered Divco to prevent the erection of unsanitary or "unsuitably situated" buildings.\textsuperscript{26}

This legislation was merely a reaction to an established pattern of informal settlement throughout Divco areas. In addition to scattered shantytowns, the massive settlement of Windermere (subdivided in 1918 and called Kensington Estate Reserve until 1928) fell under the jurisdiction of Divco. Divco attempted to shift this responsibility to the Cape Town City Council in 1931, which declined the offer due to the financial implications;\textsuperscript{27} it was finally transferred to City Council control in 1943.

As the number of Africans increased, so the "kaffir problem" became an ever-pressing social issue for many whites in Cape Town. To move Africans even further away from the city, Langa was opened in 1927 with barracks for 2200 men and married quarters. Once it was established, Africans were hounded out of the city by police in an effort to move them to the new township. Due to the high rents in Langa, few people willingly went there, with many disappearing into settlements on the Cape Flats.\textsuperscript{28}

Ndabeni residents also resisted the move to Langa, and when their rents were raised in 1929 to force them to move, they not only successfully challenged the higher rents in court but succeeded in having the excess rent refunded to those who had paid the new amount. This won only a stay of execution, with Ndabeni residents being gradually transferred to


\textsuperscript{26}M. Budow, "Urban Squatting in Greater Cape Town, 1939-1948" (University of Cape Town, B.A.(Hons) thesis, 1976), p. 28.

\textsuperscript{27}Kinkead-Weekes, "Africans in Cape Town to 1936", p. 176.

\textsuperscript{28}Saunders, "From Ndabeni to Langa", pp. 19-20, 23-24.
Langa, and Ndabeni being deproclaimed as a location in 1936. By 1938 Langa was filled to
capacity with 5260 residents, out of a total of 18,500 Africans enumerated in Cape Town in
the 1939 census.\textsuperscript{29}

The deproclamation of Ndabeni and removal of its residents to Langa from 1927 to
1936 was the continuation of a trend: beginning with the docks location and Ndabeni,
Africans were pushed out to the periphery of Cape Town as the city grew and enveloped
previously distant locations.\textsuperscript{30}

Legislation was not the only force which influenced the settlement patterns of Cape
Town's African population. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, surveys carried out in South
African urban centres revealed that the income of urban Africans was far short of satisfying
basic needs.\textsuperscript{31} Due to spiralling rents and overcrowding in black "pockets", Cape Town's
poorest residents were being forced to outlying areas like Athlone and Crawford to enable
them to cover their rent. Thus, although 37\% of residential areas in Cape Town were
classified as "mixed" in 1936, the tendency up to 1948 was toward increasing segregation due
to the cost and overcrowding in the city.\textsuperscript{32}

The process by which the poor were moved to the outskirts of the city was also a
feature in developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa by the 1940s: as land
was cheaper on the edges of cities owing to the lack of provision of water and other services,
it was there that impoverished urban residents were forced to shelter.\textsuperscript{33} One additional factor

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29} Saunders, "From Ndabeni to Langa", pp. 25-26, 30; Kinkead-Weekes, "Africans in Cape Town
to 1936", pp. 137, 177.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Western, Outcast Cape Town, p. 46.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Bonner, "Crime and Political Consciousness", p. 398.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Western, Outcast Cape Town, pp. 33, 55.
\item \textsuperscript{33} S.W. Sinclair, Urbanisation and Labour Markets in Developing Countries (London, 1978), pp.
14-17; J. van der Linden, "The Limits of Territorial Social Movements: The Case of Housing in

\end{itemize}
exacerbated this trend in Cape Town: the Urban Areas Act of 1923 restricted the residential settlement of Africans within a five-mile limit, which provided another compelling reason for Africans to build shacks on the urban periphery.

Throughout the 1930s, further legislation attacked the position of Africans in the Cape. Under the Representation of Natives Act of 1936, Africans who met the property qualifications in the Cape were removed from the common voters' roll and placed on a separate roll from which they elected three white "Native Representatives" to the House of Assembly and two to the Cape Provincial Council. In addition, Africans were no longer allowed to attend Salt River School from 1933, so that African secondary education was only available in Langa as of 1937. Such conditions were meant to discourage further African influx into the city.

Furthermore, the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937 tightened up the 1923 Urban Areas Act considerably: registration of service contracts was now compulsory for urban local authorities, being extended to Cape Town by Proclamation No 105 of 1939; African women needed permits to leave their home district and to enter or reside in Cape Town; African Parliamentary voters lost their exemption from influx control; and urban land purchases by Africans were prohibited without permission of the Governor-General.

It was the Amendment Act of 1937 that defined some Africans as permanent urban dwellers on the basis of birth or continuous residence. In order to identify people as belonging to one or the other category, all African men were required to carry passes. A


34 Mohamed, "Langa High School", pp. 52, 81.

35 Although passes in various forms had been imposed on the African population until 1937, the Amendment Act made it compulsory for all African men - including registered voters in the Cape - to carry passes.
nation-wide drought starting in 1930 forced even more black and white people off the land and into the cities, where they faced the spectre of unemployment and low wages due to the surplus of labour.\textsuperscript{42}

When industrial activity revived after the Depression, the Cape Town factory belt grew in the Woodstock-Salt River area. Industrial establishments also developed in Paarden Eiland, Maitland, Kensington, Epping, Parow, and Bellville during the 1930s and 1940s. The location of these industries coincided with the location of informal settlements: for example, the increased number of factories in Maitland and Kensington accounted for the growth of Windermere.\textsuperscript{43} By 1943, when the City Council took over jurisdiction of Windermere from Divco, over 20,000 people lived in approximately 1,000 shacks in Windermere.\textsuperscript{44} Likewise, very few Africans lived in Goodwood and Parow up to 1936, but there was a substantial settlement at Goodwood Acres soon thereafter.\textsuperscript{45} In response, the legal entry of Africans into Durbanville and Parow was restricted in 1939 and in Goodwood in 1942.

A survey carried out by Divco's Medical Officer of Health in 1937 found that 36\% of the 5384 dwellings inspected in the 38 sub-divided estates were "unfit for human habitation".\textsuperscript{46} By 1940, there were subdivided estates in the City Council areas of Retreat, Parkwood Estate, and Athlone, and in the Divco areas of Grassy Park, Elsies River, Hirson, Yours for the Union: Class and Community Struggles in South Africa, 1930-1947 (Johannesburg, 1989), pp. 16-17.

\textsuperscript{43}Budow, "Squatting in Cape Town", p. 53.

\textsuperscript{44}Elias, Housing in the Cape Peninsula, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{45}H. Britten (Chair), Report of a Commission of Enquiry appointed to enquire into conditions existing on the Cape Flats and similarly-affected areas in the Cape Division (hereafter Britten Enquiry), U.G. 18/1943, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{46}Britten Enquiry (1943), p. 15.
Many Africans owned plots in these estates, for although the buying of land by Africans was restricted by the 1923 Urban Areas Act, it was only terminated as of 1 January 1938.

Central government housing policy did not address this housing shortage throughout the 1930s. As slum clearance was not possible with the "economic loans" made available by the Housing Act of 1920, provision was made in 1934 for sub-economic loans at 2% interest, with local authorities sharing at least half of the loss. The new deal did not induce many local authorities to build sub-economic houses until 1936, when the interest rate was lowered to 0.75%. 48

In response to the more favourable financing terms, the City Council in 1937 announced a massive 12-year plan to build 11,669 sub-economic housing units at a cost of £6 million. By 1948, however, only 2,618 units had been completed due to lack of financing from central government, high building tenders, and opposition to expropriation and removals on the part of shack occupants. 49 Although no information on private construction firms is available, it is likely that they did not invest in African housing for the same reasons as in Johannesburg: the profit margins were low as high skilled wages pushed up the cost of construction, yet the overall costs charged to the local authority had to be kept low. 50

The dearth of location accommodation made effective control of the urban African population very difficult. When Ndabeni residents were compelled to move to Langa

47 Sayers, "Housing in the Western Cape", pp. 21-24.


49 Sayers, "Housing in the Western Cape, 1940-1960", pp. 41-42.

50 E. Koch, "Doomfontein and its African working class, 1914 to 1935; A Study of Popular Culture in Johannesburg" (University of the Witwatersrand, M.A. thesis, 1983), pp. 64-65. Low African wages meant that only some of the expenditure was met by rentals, and local authorities were not willing to subsidise African housing schemes heavily.
between 1927 and 1936, many disappeared to areas such as Athlone and Retreat rather than live in Langa. Similarly, Langa residents who were in arrears could easily relocate to shack settlements where it was extremely difficult to trace them.

Though planning in the shanty towns was haphazard, residents organised themselves to oppose demolitions. When the City Council tried to evict Africans from the Blaauwvlei area in 1942 to build a location, the residents with the help of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) successfully protested, arguing that no alternative accommodation was available.\(^5\) Similarly, Retreat residents held a mass meeting in 1942 to oppose the City Council threat to demolish all their shacks.\(^5\)

It was no different in the Divco and northern areas. At Sakkiesdorp\(^5\) in Philippi (soon to become Nyanga), a Vigilance Association campaigned against Divco's threat to demolish their camp. The residents managed to enlist the support of the nearby cement works and quarries which employed them, so that Divco allowed its continued existence provided that employers supply drinking water and sanitation to the inhabitants.\(^5\) In 1945, residents at Goodwood Acres mobilised against Divco's plans to level the settlement to make way for a sports field; they won a reprieve until the mid-1950s.\(^5\)

However the shack settlements in Cape Town were not as organised as on the Rand during the 1940s, where sub-tenants were led onto vacant tracts of land by charismatic

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51 Sayers, "Housing in the Western Cape", p. 61.
53 The shack frames were covered with sacks, hence the name "sack town".
54 Muthien, State and Resistance in SA, p. 137.
55 Sayers, "Housing in the Western Cape", p. 57.
Patterns of African Settlement in the Cape Peninsula to 1945

leaders such as James Mpanza.\textsuperscript{56} Population turnover in the Peninsula camps was high as many of the residents had strong ties to the reserves, and the settlements were smaller and more scattered due to frequent police raids.\textsuperscript{57}

With the declaration of war, the government had to obtain armaments, clothes, and equipment for an army of over 300,000 people. The overall effect on urban employment was phenomenal: during the period 1939-1945, there were 18,000 new positions for whites in industry and 100,000 for blacks.\textsuperscript{58} This was paralleled by the sharp decline in economic prospects in the reserves, where malnutrition, poverty, and overstocking continued due to the land shortage. In addition, many white farms were extruding black workers. Between 1936 and 1951, 40\% of urban African population growth came from European farms and only 8\% from reserves.\textsuperscript{59}

Many Africans drawn to the cities moved into factory jobs vacated by Coloured servicemen. Between 1935 and 1945, the number of Africans in manufacturing increased by 119\% country-wide, though this was mostly still unskilled labour by 1945.\textsuperscript{60} Not only did the African urban population almost double 1939-52, but this number included many families. Although African wages increased overall during this time, this was offset by unemployment and increases in the cost of staple foods and fuel.\textsuperscript{61}


\textsuperscript{58}Hirson, \textit{Yours for the Union}, p. 25-26.

\textsuperscript{59}Posel, \textit{Making of Apartheid}, pp. 27-29.

\textsuperscript{60}Posel, \textit{Making of Apartheid}, pp. 26-27.

\textsuperscript{61}Lodge, \textit{Black Politics}, pp. 11-12.
In the Cape Peninsula, the Department of Defence needed workers to erect defence works on Robben Island, Signal Hill, and in Simon's Town. African employment in private industries in the Western Cape increased by 116% during the war, for secondary industry was boosted by the need for import substitution.\textsuperscript{62} A case in point is the canning industry, which between 1938 and 1945 expanded its canned food production by 400%, with the number of workers increasing five times.\textsuperscript{63}

The Union government displayed little enthusiasm in assisting local officials in prosecuting pass law offenders as Africans constituted an important industrial labour force during the war and were housed at no cost to state or industry. Such was the need for African labour that the Union government briefly suspended influx control in the major cities during 1942-43.\textsuperscript{64}

The war-time economy drew more Africans to the cities but did not generate accommodation for the new work force: housing construction was at a virtual standstill by 1944 due to a shortage of materials and skilled labour and the unwillingness of local authorities to assume financial responsibility for African housing.\textsuperscript{65} The Peninsula's African population numbered 60,000 with official housing for only 16,000 in 1944.\textsuperscript{66} Of this number, an estimated 14,000 Africans lived in the Cape Divisional Council area, of whom 9,000 were men.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{62}Muthien, \textit{State and Resistance in SA}, p. 23.


\textsuperscript{64}Lodge, \textit{Black Politics}, pp. 12, 16.

\textsuperscript{65}Molteno Papers, BC 579 J5.3, SAIRR memo 172 of 1951.

\textsuperscript{66}\textit{Cape Argus}, 28 March 1944.

\textsuperscript{67}4/CT 239/1(A), Divco Medical Officer of Health to Native Commissioner, 16 March 1945.
The worsening shortage, high rentals in the city, and low wages meant that Africans had limited choices, with overcrowded rooms or shacks in unsanitary shack settlements scattered on the edges of Cape Town being the main alternatives. As one informant recalled,

When I came back now [from Grahamstown] my wife also wanted to come back to Cape Town but I couldn't find a place to reside because it was during those war years. It was difficult to find a place then for everybody, even the Coloureds, if you found an Indian building you had to squat there maybe as four families. I went to Kensington and I got a place there... 68

The mounting housing shortage was not only faced by Africans: the population of Windermere in 1946 was conservatively estimated at 14,325, of whom 7138 were classified Coloured, 6436 African, and 557 white. 69 The number of shack occupants in the northern suburbs and Divco areas of Philippi and Grassy Park was put at 29,373 in 1943. 70

The migration of thousands of Africans to Cape Town and the increase in informal settlements in the early years of the war concerned central and local authorities. Over the course of 1941-1943, three studies of housing in the Peninsula were carried out, all of which lamented the ineffectiveness of pass controls. The Caudwell Report of 1941 pointed out the obvious, namely the "hopeless inadequacy of Native housing" and the difficulties in controlling movement of Africans as no effective pass laws were in place. 71 The Slarke Report of 1943 recommended that registration regulations be extended to the entire Peninsula and that the African exodus be restricted at its source. 72

70 Muthien, State and Resistance in SA, p. 43.
71 NTS 4504 581/313, Caudwell Report (1941).
72 NTS 4504 581/313, vol 1, Report by C.W. Slarke, 21 April 1943.
Chapter One

The Britten enquiry of 1942 surveyed the 24 "black spots" in the Peninsula, concluding that their underlying cause was the "constant struggle to reconcile the urge for food with the requirements of shelter", with poverty-stricken Capetonians seeking a place away from the high rent districts of the city.\(^{73}\) The most significant aspect of the Britten enquiry was its linking of housing provision with influx control:

...if sufficient housing is provided for all Natives in employment, the police in collaboration with the Department of Native Affairs would have little difficulty in enforcing those provisions of the Native (Urban Areas) Act affecting natives living in peri-urban areas. Until such housing development reaches a stage of fulfilment there can be no worthwhile enforcement of both the Act and its effluent Proclamation, No 105 of 1939.\(^{74}\)

The Commission also singled out Cape Divco for particular criticism, noting that it had not addressed its housing shortage in any way. It consequently recommended that the City Council take over the jurisdiction of Windermere from Divco, and that Divco establish a "Native leasehold village".\(^{75}\)

To respond to these recommendations and develop a Peninsula-wide housing policy for Africans, a conference of local authorities was called in 1944, which included representatives from Divco, Goodwood, Parow, Fish Hoek, Bellville, Simon's Town, Milnerton, Cape Town, and Pinelands. At this meeting it was decided that Cape Town City Council would undertake to administer influx control regulations on behalf of all the Peninsula municipalities under powers provided under the Urban Areas Act of 1923. This would include administering influx control regulations, erecting a reception depot, and operating a labour bureau to issue African men with work-seeker’s permits.\(^{76}\)

\(^{73}\)Britten Enquiry (1943), pp. 5, 11.

\(^{74}\)Britten Enquiry (1943), p. 7.

\(^{75}\)Britten Enquiry (1943), pp. 17, 22.

\(^{76}\)AWC 138, minutes of meeting of Peninsula municipalities, 4 April 1944.
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At this conference it was also decided that provision of African housing outside Cape Town and Simon's Town municipalities was to be the responsibility of Divco.\textsuperscript{77} To enable it to acquire land and loans for housing Africans under the National Housing Scheme and to apply the Urban Areas Act of 1923, Divco was proclaimed an urban local authority under Proclamation No 248 of 1944.

Construction on the location of Nyanga commenced in 1945. As shown by the Britten Enquiry of 1942, the origin of the location of Nyanga lay in a desire to implement effectively pass controls in the outlying areas of Cape Town. There were at least 14,000 Africans in the Divco area by this time; the proclamation made some measure of Divco control over this population possible, for it now had the authority to build a location and forcibly move shack dwellers into it.

Conclusions

There are several patterns that have emerged with regard to African settlement in Cape Town. The main reason for African migration to the Peninsula was economic: conditions in the reserves made subsistence difficult, and the expanding economy of Cape Town seemed to provide a better alternative. This was also the case throughout Africa and in South America and Southeast Asia, where significant income differentials between rural and urban regions ensured that migration became a familiar feature of countries with developing economies.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{77}AWC 138, Divco Secretary to Peninsula municipalities and councils, 22 March 1946. The Native Affairs Department strongly supported the idea that control of Africans be vested in one body such as Divco instead of many local authorities: 4/CT 1/1/1/61, Divco meeting minutes of 21 March 1944.

\textsuperscript{78}J. Gugler, "The Rural-Urban Interface and Migration", in A. Gilbert and J. Gugler, Cities, Poverty and Development (London, 1981), p. 52. As Simon pointed out, the income differential was largely due to the extraction of surplus from rural areas to underwrite industrial development and higher living standards in the metropoles: D. Simon, Cities, Capital and Development (London, 1992), p. 183.
King has observed that the nature of spatial segregation in many colonial cities in Asia and Africa changed over time according to the respective roles played by socio-economic status, occupation, and race. The same can be said for Cape Town, where Africans were pushed to the urban periphery between 1900 and 1950. By 1900, African dockworkers were segregated by their employers in Cape Town and Simon's Town; during the decades that followed, economic pressures generated by low wages and high inner-city rents forced Africans to seek accommodation in the peri-urban areas, where land prices (and corresponding rents) were cheaper. Influx control measures encouraged this trend in the 1930s, for pass laws were either not applicable or difficult to enforce in the outlying areas of Cape Town. Ironically, it was not segregatory legislation but economic factors and the pass laws which achieved greater segregation in Cape Town.

State and local authority attempts to implement influx control and provide accommodation for Africans were repeatedly frustrated by the lack of a coherent policy. Responsibility for housing Africans was transferred from local to central authority in 1910 and back to local authorities in 1923, demonstrating the unwillingness at both tiers to assume financial responsibility for the task. The operation of the "civilised labour policy" translated into higher costs in building Langa and thus higher rents, resulting in rent boycotts. The lack of official accommodation which arose from these factors made the application of influx control impossible, for Africans could not be forced out of shantytowns without alternative accommodation, and the peri-urban shantytowns were notoriously difficult to raid.


80 In a similar vein, Gilbert found that racial segregation in colonial India and Africa gave way to class segregation once the deliberate policy was gone, underlining the primacy of economic factors in influencing segregation: A. Gilbert, "The Housing of the Urban Poor", in A. Gilbert and J. Gugler, Cities, Poverty, and Development: Urbanisation in the Third World (London, 1981), pp. 98-99.
The poorly formulated policies were compounded by African evasion of influx control and segregatory legislation. When Africans were raided in the inner city and compelled to reside in Ndabeni or Langa, they moved to the peri-urban areas where pass raids were less frequent and where they successfully resisted local authority attempts to demolish their shacks.

The rate of urbanisation in the Western Cape during the first half of the twentieth century was staggering. While Africans made up only 14% of the industrial labour force in 1924, this proportion had increased to 25% by 1948.\textsuperscript{81} By the end of the war, the only official location of Langa housed only 7849 people of an estimated 60,000 Africans in the Peninsula.\textsuperscript{82} The majority of Africans lived elsewhere: in privately owned and rented high density flats and houses along the docks-Observatory axis; in "pondokkie" settlements, either as plot owners or tenants of plot owners in subdivided estates on the Cape Flats; or in illegal shack settlements.\textsuperscript{83} Although Divco was to develop a policy of housing only those Africans employed and resident in areas under its jurisdiction, it was from all of these places that the future population of Nyanga was to be drawn.


\textsuperscript{82}Western, \textit{Outcast Cape Town}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{83}Sayers, "Housing in the Western Cape", p. 31.
CHAPTER TWO
The Establishment of Nyanga,
1946-52

Introduction

The central state reacted to the proliferation of shacks in South African urban areas by passing legislation which tightened influx control and provided limited finance to local authorities for the accommodation of urban Africans. Divco made use of the funds in building the location of Nyanga in 1946, which was to achieve two goals, namely the elimination of the shack settlement of Sakkiesdorp and the housing of Africans who lived within Divco boundaries. This chapter will demonstrate that the goals of Divco and the state were not realised owing to the inherent contradictions of housing policy, bureaucratic inefficiency, effective rent resistance campaigns by Nyanga residents, and the corrupt behaviour of location officials.

The dynamics of power relations within Nyanga forms the second theme of this chapter. In attempting to assert control over location residents, the administration developed allies among conservative residents and African officials. This resulted in an informal network of influence, whose members used their contacts with the administration to extract material benefits. The development of this network will be described, as will opposition to the network on the part of political bodies in Nyanga. Included in this discussion will be housing issues such as rent arrears and the allocation of dwellings, which were central to the internal political struggles taking place.
2.1 Post-war influx and control

After the end of World War II, there was a reaction on the part of some white people to the increased numbers of Africans in urban centres. The alarm was heightened by the volatility and militancy of many urban Africans, who were responding to the desperate social and economic conditions faced in urban areas. The development of vast informal settlements - on the Rand, in Cato Manor, in Cape Town - presented graphic reminders of the magnitude of African urbanisation and poverty.

The government adopted two approaches, one of which was the tightening of regulations to stem the African influx into urban areas. To address the shortcomings of the 1923 Urban Areas Act and its subsequent amendments in 1930 and 1937, the government passed the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945. Although this Act provided for stricter influx control, it depended upon a request from the affected urban local authority to have the regulations proclaimed in its area of jurisdiction.

Neither the Act nor the end of the war spelled a cessation to the steady flow of migration to the Cape Peninsula, for many African men preferred the manual work in Cape Town to the heavy labour of the Rand mines. The newcomers faced a competitive job market as returning soldiers took up their previous positions, with unemployment in Windermere alone estimated at 45% in 1945. A postwar economic boom took up the slack, and it was apparently easy for African men to find jobs in factories. However, due to increasing pass controls and a labour policy which gave preference to white and Coloured

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2 Cameron, "Bantu Education", p. 132. African women were also migrating to the Western Cape at this time, but rarely found employment in the formal sector.
workers, Africans were not moving into semi-skilled and skilled positions in the Peninsula as was happening in other industrial areas after the war.\(^5\)

After the 1944 conference of local authorities granted Peninsula-wide influx control powers to the City Council, there was energetic implementation of the plan. As of 1945, all trains arriving from the reserves were met by the staff of Langa location, where a reception depot had just been built. The 400-600 people were escorted directly to the depot, where the new arrivals were required to undergo a medical examination and register for employment. If they did not find employment within three days, they were required to leave. These controls were ineffectual, however, as Africans used other modes of transport to travel to Cape Town and successfully evaded train ticket quotas. Up until the late 1940s, there were few pass law prosecutions in the Peninsula, and it was difficult for the influx bureaucracy to control "illegals" as many lived in the peri-urban areas where there were no restrictions on their entry or residence.

The Nationalist election victory in May 1948 resulted in a "particularly vigorous clampdown" on "illegal" Africans in the Western Cape.\(^6\) But the pass raids were pointless, for those who were convicted simply disappeared back into the shanty areas (see Figure 1). As in the 1920s and 1930s, police were powerless to demolish the shanties, for property owners were keen to accommodate them in return for rent, and the occupants could not be evicted as long as no alternative accommodation was available.\(^7\) The police were also unable to stop new structures being built: Divco’s six mounted patrolmen were legally prohibited from destroying dwellings once the roof was on, and most of them were constructed under


\(^7\) 4/CT 1/2/1/1/71, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Nov 1948.
African Settlements in the Cape Peninsula, 1952

LEGEND

- Informal Settlements > 100 people
- Official Locations
- Municipal/Divisional Council Boundaries
- Railway Stations

Figure 1
cover of darkness. The sudden increase in influx control raids during 1948-49 was therefore followed by a lull until 1953, when local authorities were sufficiently empowered by the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act No 52 of 1951 to demolish shanties and remove the inhabitants to "emergency camps".

The government's second approach to uncontrolled shack settlements was to re-examine its African housing policy. The "squatter movements" on the Rand during the 1940s contributed to a radical shift in policy as the state found that virtually all camp dwellers were in bona fide employment and that housing had to be provided. The newly-established National Housing and Planning Commission unveiled a formula whereby housing was to be financed by government loans at the economic rate of 3.25% interest. The loan charges were to be paid by the Treasury; if the subsequent administration of the housing scheme generated losses that could not be absorbed by rents, the losses were to be shared by the central state and local authority at a respective ratio of 2:1.

The scheme was more generous than the ones to follow. Until the mid-1940s, the central state supported the principle that the building and administration of the African locations should be subsidised by the government as most township residents could not afford to pay even minimal rents. It is interesting to note, however, that the tendency at local

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8 Cape Times, 18 March 1949.
9 Swart, "Windermere", p. 66.
11 Molteno Papers, BC 579; J5.3, SAIRR memo RR172 of 19 Dec 1951. This ratio sometimes increased to 3:1, depending on the total rentals collected.
authority level was to move toward self-balancing Native Revenue Accounts which relied
heavily on beerhall profits.\textsuperscript{13}

With the financing provided under this new programme and powers provided by its
proclamation as an urban local authority in 1944, Divco began to address the African housing
shortage in the division. It proceeded with plans to establish two locations, with land being
bought in Bellville South and Philippi in 1945. Due to concerted opposition to the Bellville
option from ratepayers, the land next to Sakkiesdorp at Philippi was developed.\textsuperscript{14}

\section*{2.2 The building and occupation of Nyanga}

One of the earliest reference to Africans living in the Philippi area occurs in 1932, when the
proprietor of "Gordon's Ground" (eventually incorporated into Nyanga township) was
ordered to either evict the people living in 26 shacks on his land or provide water and
sanitation. Mr J.E. Gordon and the police combined to ensure that the residents left and that
their structures were demolished.\textsuperscript{15}

Attempts to keep Philippi clear of shacks proved futile. By 1944, a number of
settlements with an estimated 3000 residents had developed, which included 800 people living
in the shantytown of Sakkiesdorp. The settlements were spread over 100 acres and were

\textsuperscript{13}Morris, \textit{History of Black Housing}, pp. 34-35. This raises intriguing questions as to how much
local authorities influenced the central state's change in policy after 1948, when the principle of self-
balancing Native Revenue Accounts was accepted and gradually implemented.

\textsuperscript{14}4/CT 239/2, Divco Secretary to NAD Secretary, 24 July 1944; 4/CT 1/1/1/63, Divco meeting
minutes of 22 May 1945; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/64, Divco meeting minutes of 18 Dec 1945; NTS 5586
616/313H, Director of Housing to Provincial Secretary (Cape Town), 1 Sep 1944; NTS 4504
581/313 vol 1, Native Commissioner to Native Affairs Department, 28 July 1943; 4/CT 1/1/1/61,
Divco meeting minutes of 22 Feb 1944; 4/CT 239/1(A), Divco Secretary to Native Commissioner, 24
Feb 1944; 4/CT 1/1/1/64, Divco meeting minutes of 18 December 1945.

\textsuperscript{15}4/CT 202/9, Sanitary Inspector to Divco Secretary, 14 November 1932; ibid., Divco Secretary to
Sanitary Inspector, 16 February 1933; ibid., SAP Sub-Inspector to Divco Secretary, 28 March 1933.
called Cape Town's "worst and largest pondokkie settlement". The land they lived on belonged to five landowners, with the bulk living on Mr H.J.S. Durr's land. The tenants paid a rate of 5s per month for a hut to 8s or 10s per month for a wood and iron hut. Sakkiesdorp was located beside a quarry and derived its name from the sack covering on the shacks, which had been painted over as protection from the rain. Most of the male inhabitants worked at the nearby quarry and at Portland Cement.

It was the opinion of the Divco Medical Officer in 1944 that Sakkiesdorp presented "a truly appalling state of affairs" which required drastic action owing to its "menace to public health". The hands of Divco officials had been tied with regard to Sakkiesdorp, however, as magistrates were reluctant to order demolition of the shacks if there was nowhere for the occupants to go. The only course of action open to Divco was to attempt to enforce compliance with Rural Sanitary Regulations by requesting that the property owners throughout the Cape Division provide the shack occupants on their land with nightsoil removal and a water supply. The residents of Sakkiesdorp made persistent requests that Divco allow them to erect their own school, to which Divco acceded.

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16 Cape Times, 7 May 1946.

17 Caudwell Report (1941); NTS 6154 616/313N(1) vol 1, Divco Medical Officer of Health to Secretary, 15 June 1946; Cape Times, 7 May 1946; interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, 14 Oct 1993, p. 1; conducted by H. Fast; 4/CT 202/9, Health Inspector to Divco Medical Officer of Health, 24 February 1943; NTS 4504 581/313 vol 1, Native Commissioner to NAD Secretary, 16 Aug 1943.

18 4/CT 202/9, Divco Medical Officer of Health to Health Committee, 11 November 1943. For a description of the living conditions, see Cape Times, 12 Feb 1944, Mrs A.C. Abbott to Editor.

19 4/CT 202/9, Divco Secretary to Medical Officer of Health, 5 January 1944; 4/CT 202/9, Secretary to Divco Medical Officer of Health, 5 January 1944; ibid., February and March 1944 notices to L.R. Brown, H.H.O. Abeln, J.E. Gordon, H.J.S. Durr, and Oliphants River Farms; 4/CT 1/11/61, Divco meeting minutes of 25 May 1944; 4/CT 202/9, Divco Secretary to I. Frank, 20 May 1944.
Divco chose the area next to Sakkiesdorp for its first experiment in African housing, and intended to demolish all the structures in the Philippi area and force the occupants to relocate to the new township. The plan was opposed by both shack residents and landowners alike: the Sakkiesdorp Vigilance Association petitioned that alternative accommodation be provided before their shacks were demolished; the landowners, for their part, were trying to prevent the loss of their income from rents.20

Divco proceeded with the housing scheme, building 210 houses adjacent to the Sakkiesdorp settlement. To Divco officials it was known as Smit's Quarry, to Sakkiesdorp residents as Nyanga ("the moon").21 The housing development itself was called the "1946 Scheme", "First Scheme", or "Old Location" (elokishini Endala) in subsequent years, and was to be the most prestigious housing scheme in Nyanga. The houses had four rooms (including kitchen and living/sleeping room), inside water taps, and electricity. As a former administration official boasted,

They had water laid on and they had electricity laid on and they had a little outhouse, a little storeroom, and another little outhouse with a bucket system...So it was quite a housing scheme, if you look at what was going on in other locations...oh, let me mention that they had white painted ceilings. No, it was quite a little housing scheme.22

20 4/CT 202/9, Divco Secretary to Louw & Key Attorneys, 11 Oct 1945; 4/CT 202/9, Louw & Key (attorneys to J.E. Gordon) to Divco Secretary, 17 Sep 1945; Sayers, "Housing in the Western Cape", p. 62. With at least 150 shacks on his land with a minimum rental of 5s a month per shack, Mr Durr collected more than £40 in rent every month. In Cook's Bush, Ottery, the Cook brothers earned an estimated £400 a month letting stands to shack residents: Budow, "Squatting in Cape Town", p. 77.

21 4/CT 1/1/63, Divco meeting minutes of 17 April 1945. The name Nyanga ("moon") was intended to complement the name of the township Langa ("sun"), although Langa was in fact named after the Natal rebel, chief Langalibalele: Saunders, "From Ndabeni to Langa", p. 8.

22 Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, 21 May 1993, p. 3; conducted by H. Fast.
Despite the alleged luxury of the First Scheme, the houses had no wooden floors, only one interleading door, and unfinished inside walls.\textsuperscript{23} The brick floors were very cold in winter, especially as those who were too poor to own beds had to sleep on the floor.\textsuperscript{24} Any improvements had to be carried out by the tenants, with no reimbursement offered should they vacate the dwelling. The fact that these houses were of better quality than all those that followed is an indictment of the small, overcrowded houses which were subsequently built.

In addition, there was no public transport, with only a private bus service which twice a day conveyed cement works employees to and from their place of work;\textsuperscript{25} children attending school in Langa therefore had to take this bus to the cement works and find their way to Langa, making for tremendous inconvenience and increased cost and travelling time. There was only one telephone, which was installed in constable Daniel Ngo's house, so that both residents and nearby shack residents had to walk to his house to obtain emergency medical or police services.\textsuperscript{26} There was no shop or church. The first school was run out of the teacher Mr A. Mabowe's house until Divco provided an army hut, whereupon Mrs F. Mabowe used the house to establish a creche.\textsuperscript{27} No livestock could be kept in Nyanga, unlike in Sakkiesdorp.

Despite these defects, the First Scheme was considered by the central government to be too extravagant. Unlike the loan schemes which followed, capital costs on development

\textsuperscript{23}Interview with Mr G., 13 Oct 1993, pp. 3, 5; conducted by S. Blom.

\textsuperscript{24}Molteno Papers, BC 579; A31.72, Secretary of Nyanga Vigilance Commee to Molteno, 4 June 1947; A31.76, Divco Secretary to Molteno, 28 June 1947.

\textsuperscript{25}Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 2; conducted by H. Fast; interview with Mr G., pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{26}Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{27}Interview with Mrs M. Ngo, 9 Dec 1993, pp. 10, 15; conducted by H. Fast and S. Blom. See also Molteno Papers, BC 579; A31.62 & 31.65, Secretary of Vigilance Committee to Molteno, 12 Dec 1946; Molteno to Secretary, Cape School Board, 23 Dec 1946.
work such as electricity and water supply were included in the annual costs that the government bore. The higher cost of the schemes built under the National Housing formula resulted in fewer houses with more amenities than the government had intended, which an official review criticised:

By "loading" a housing scheme with the capital costs of various services, normally provided out of rates, a local authority could obtain, in addition to the full capital, a considerable Government contribution towards the maintenance and upkeep of normal undertakings via a housing subsidy. In other respects, too, the very fact that the new formula reduces their commitments, has in some cases resulted in local authorities not building as economically as otherwise could have been the case, and it has been found that the cost of "sub-economic" dwellings in certain schemes was unreasonably high. 28

The end result was heavy losses throughout South Africa: in housing schemes built in Jabavu and Orlando West in Johannesburg, the losses averaged £20-28/house/year; in Port Elizabeth, Pietermaritzburg, and Vereeniging, the losses were as high as £54/house/year. 29 This caused the government to limit the losses borne by the state, which increased the deficit burden of local authorities and made them less willing to build housing schemes for Africans.

The provisions of the National Housing formula were not the only factor which pushed up the cost of building Nyanga. As in Langa in 1927, African skilled labour could not be used in building locations as the lower wages would undercut those of white workers. 30 This meant that only skilled and highly-paid whites could build African townships. This angered the executive of the Cape ANC, which:

"deprecate(d) in particular the attitude of the European Trade Union movement in opposing the training and use of African labourers in housing schemes for Africans." 31

29 Molteno Papers, BC 579; J5.3, SAIRR memo RR 172 of 19 Dec 1951.
30 Inkutuleko/Freedom, 29 Jan 1945.
31 Molteno Papers, BC 579; B14.32, ANC (Cape) Executive resolution of 16 March 1946.
Added to this was the high cost of building in Cape Town after the war due to the lack of coordination amongst contractors and building tradesmen. While the City Council could cut some of its costs by creating its own building unit to construct sub-economic housing, Divco lacked the resources to do the same.

Due to all these factors, the capital expenditure on the 1946 Scheme was an astronomical £125,429, which resulted in high interest and redemption payments. Added to this was the cost of administering a controlled location, which included the salaries of township officials, general maintenance, and the absorption of financial losses owing to rent arrears. Between 1946 and 1950, these costs represented between 52% and 76% of annual expenditure, with the remainder coming from loan repayments.

Fortunately for residents of the First Scheme, the heavy cost of administering the location was borne by the government until the mid-1950s. Only 31% of revenue in 1946 was derived from rentals, with the balance coming from Divco and the central state. As the Director of Housing noted, the government loss of £35 per house was "already considerably higher than anything the Commission has hitherto approved in a scheme for Natives."

To minimise its losses, Divco's Finance Committee originally set the rentals at 12s 6d per week. One resident's complaint that his rent was unaffordable was met with a cold reply from Divco's Secretary:

32 Budow, "Squatting in Cape Town", p. 47.
33 4/CT H4/68, Actual Revenue and Expenditure, 1946 to 1950.
34 4/CT H4/69, Accountant to Divco Secretary, 23 Feb 1948; 4/CT H4/68, Actual Revenue and Expenditure for 1946. The central government bore three-quarters of the losses and Divco one-quarter: 4/CT H4/16, Divco meeting minutes of 16 April 1946.
35 NTS 5586 616/313H, Director of Housing to Divco Secretary, 15 Oct 1947.
36 4/CT 1/2/1/1/65, Divco meeting minutes of 16 April 1946.
I would suggest that if you are not satisfied with the position that you now take steps to move out of the Location and the council will let the cottage to somebody who will be more grateful for what has been done for them.\(^\text{37}\)

This response was no doubt influenced by the expectation that Divco would experience little difficulty in filling the houses owing to the thousands of Africans in Divco areas requiring accommodation.

The proposed rental immediately ran into opposition from the fledgling Nyanga Vigilance Committee. Within two months of moving into the houses, the first residents had organised themselves into a Committee with Mr G. Pikashe as chair. The idea to form the Vigilance Committee came from the ANC, to which many Committee members belonged.\(^\text{38}\) Meetings were open to all residents, and women were actively involved.\(^\text{39}\) The Committee's first action was to ask Divco to reduce the rents by a fifth, to 10s per month.\(^\text{40}\)

The rental also came under fire from the Native Commissioner, without whose approval the new rental could not be promulgated. Possibly due to pressure from the Vigilance Committee and "Native Representative" Molteno, he slashed the rate to 7s 6d per week, giving as his reason the unsubsidised and consequently high transport costs to Nyanga. As a result of the Commissioner's decision, Divco was forced to agree to the final rate of 7s 6d per month.\(^\text{41}\)

\(^{37}\) AWC H4/16, Divco Secretary to A.A. Mabya, 8 November 1946.

\(^{38}\) Interview 1 with Mr D., 13 Dec 1993, p. 2, conducted by S. Blom. See also interview 2 with Mr D., 21 Dec 1993, p. 19; conducted by S. Blom.

\(^{39}\) Interview with Mrs H., 6 Jan 1994, p. 10; conducted by S. Blom.

\(^{40}\) 4/CT H4/16, Vigilance Committee Secretary to Divco Secretary, 29 July 1946.

\(^{41}\) 4/CT 1/2/1/1/66, Divco meeting minutes of 20 Aug 1946; AWC 58, Native Commissioner to CTCC Town Clerk, 6 Dec 1946; 4/CT H4/16, Divco Works Committee to Finance Committee, 1 Aug 1946.
Chapter Two

The first families moved into the new houses in May 1946 and came under the administration of the Divco Housing Committee via the Superintendent of Native Housing, Mr D.D. Coetzee. By October 1946, 194 of the 210 houses were occupied, and almost all of the Sakkiesdorp shacks had been levelled. Over the next six years, the population of Nyanga fluctuated between 1200 and 1300 people.

Even the reduced rental proved unreasonably high, for many of the residents were unemployed or otherwise unable to pay rentals significantly higher than the 5s per month paid for their shacks. Families came and went, with 5 families already vacating their premises by October and a further seven by January 1947. These statistics are misleading, for indications are that many more families left within the first year than were officially recorded:

...the houses were actually for those squatters, but they moved in one day and moved out the next day, because they were not accustomed to paying 7/6 a week, they used to pay 50 cents a month in the squatter areas. It was too much, as soon as they moved in they moved out, because as I have been in the admin, you would notice that house number so and so, rent hasn’t been paid for several months, and then you come and check up, what’s going on there. You find the place empty, people have just gone back to the bush, we had that problem.

42 4/CT 1/2/1/1/65, Divco meeting minutes of 16 April 1946. Responsibility for Nyanga soon passed to the Works Committee and then to the Combined Native Affairs Committee in 1953.

43 Nyanga News, March 1969; AWC H4/16, Divco Secretary to Accountant, 8 May 1946; interview 1 with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 3. Two informants stated that Nyanga had originally been built for returning Coloured soldiers, who were subsequently removed. No corroborating evidence has been found, but its recurrence in residents’ narratives is interesting: interview with Mr P.H., 30 Oct 1993, p. 1; conducted by H. Fast; personal communication, Mrs S. Conjwa, 29 May 1993.

44 Native Commissioner Mr C.W. Slarke reported in 1943 that a significant proportion of Sakkiesdorp residents were unemployed: NTS 4504 581/313 vol 1, Slarke Report of 21 April 1943.

45 Occupants of Sakkiesdorp paid between 2s 6d and 5s per month for their sites. The wages for quarry and cement plant workers averaged 4s and 5s per day respectively: Caudwell Report (1941).

46 AWC H4/16, Divco Secretary to Accountant, 24 Oct 1946; ibid., Divco Secretary to Accountant, 16 January 1947.

47 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 2. See also interview with Mr G., p. 5.
As one former Sakkiesdorp resident recalled,

I don't think people who moved from Sakkiesdorp moved all back to Sakkiesdorp...those who could not manage to pay the rent, those were thrown out because of the rent, back to squatters, but I think those who managed to pay managed to live there.\(^{48}\)

Divco was faced with a quandary: it wished to eliminate Sakkiesdorp and collect all rentals so as to limit its subsidy of the scheme, yet Sakkiesdorp residents were unable to pay. Divco therefore broadened its policy in giving preference to Africans resident in the Divco area and in steady employment, although Sakkiesdorp residents were still to obtain first priority in the allocation of houses. Divco soon gave up on clearing Sakkiesdorp, for as quickly as old shacks had been demolished, new ones went up. Divco's immediate aim of eradicating Sakkiesdorp was therefore frustrated, for by August 1947 the Superintendent had to report that "the original position has almost been reverted to."\(^{49}\)

From the start, then, Nyanga consisted of permanent housing contiguous to shack settlements which were not always under direct Divco control. In 1948, there were still 520 people living in Sakkiesdorp and 180 at Brown's Farm,\(^{50}\) with both camps abutting the boundaries of the proclaimed township. When this land was incorporated into Nyanga during the 1950s, many continued to live there on what was called "undeveloped land" (see Chapter Three). People continued to filter into Sakkiesdorp over the next decade\(^{51}\) and it existed alongside the formal housing until the 1970s.

\(^{48}\) Interview with Mrs M.R., 21 Aug 1994, pp. 1, 13; conducted by H.Fast.

\(^{49}\) AWC H4/16, Divco meeting minutes of 16 April 1946; ibid., Divco Secretary to Medical Officer of Health, 26 April 1946; 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board minutes, 19 Sep 1947; Cape Times, 20 June 1946; 4/CT 202/9, Divco Health Inspector's report on Sakkiesdorp shanties, 25 March 1947; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/68, 26 August 1947 Divco meeting minutes.

\(^{50}\) NTS 6511 616/313S vol 1: "Pondok Settlements (or Groups) under Health Control Scheme of the Divisional Council of the Cape, April 1948".

\(^{51}\) AWC 202/9, Divco Secretary to South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) Secretary, 21 Jan 1955.
Who, then, ended up in the houses meant for Sakkiesdorp residents? Africans living in overcrowded conditions in the City Council areas of the Peninsula, such as Athlone, Salt River, central Cape Town, and Woodstock, took advantage of the vacated houses:

They lived in houses, rented houses. I remember when some of them used to hire a house, and then you let it out, and then you found that in one room probably three or four, five, six families, and when this location was built, Nyanga, a lot of them felt that they should come make their stakes......

The tenants of inner-city houses were accustomed to paying rents between £2 and £5 per month for one room.

The new tenants were motivated by more than the prospect of better accommodation and lower rent. The opening of Nyanga in 1946 coincided with the application of the "Native Registration Scheme" in Cape Town, which resulted in pass raids in Langa, Retreat, Windermere, and the inner city. Africans found to be without official permits were charged criminally or told to leave within three days, causing many of them to move to more remote areas like Nyanga.

In addition, Africans facing expropriation of their land in other shack settlements also moved to Nyanga:

Some of them were coming from squatter houses, but not in the sense of overcrowded squatter houses, but mainly zinc and iron, and also in camps, and others built their own houses in those camps with bricks and things...they had to sell their plots and come to Nyanga because they were moved out of that area.

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52 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 3.
53 Interview 2 with Mr D. Ngo, 14 Oct 1994, p. 1; conducted by H. Fast.
55 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 13.
While the houses were meant to accommodate the poorest of the shack residents, then, Africans with greater means took over the vacated accommodation. 56

There was thus a contrast between the residents of Sakkiesdorp and the newer tenants. The incoming residents were able to pay the rent of 7s 6d per week, having had to pay higher rentals or buy plots closer to the city. 57 According to one informant, the new residents were "modern" and "used to town life", which could be seen by their clothing and eating habits; although the Sakkiesdorp residents had been in the Peninsula for a long time, they had apparently not grown accustomed to town ways. 58

In attempting to escape high rents and pass controls, the new tenants came up against the Divco policy that Nyanga residents live and work in its area. To sidestep this requirement, they would arrange with people vacating their houses to take over their tenancy, and this without informing Divco:

That’s how most of these people coming from Athlone and other areas who were interested in coming over, how they got these houses, because they were not originally allowed to move in because the houses were only built for people living in the Divco area, Bellville, Goodwood, and Parow, and as soon as these people got in there, they moved out. 59

It seems that in such transactions, the incoming tenant would pay an "unofficial" transfer fee to the legal tenant. 60

56 This has been a persistent problem with low-income housing projects throughout the developing world, whereby rents were too high for the intended occupants, causing groups with higher incomes to move in: Grimes, Low-Income Housing, p. 6.

57 Inspector of Urban Locations Mr P.G. Caudwell stated in 1941 that African men housed in compounds were paying 7s 6d per week for their accommodation; at Windermere, rents were between £1 and £1 5s 0d per month for a site: Caudwell Report (1941).

58 Interview 2 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 1.

59 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 2. Ngo is incorrect in stating that the residents could also come Bellville, Parow, or Goodwood; the first housing scheme was built for Africans residing in the Divco areas of jurisdiction.

60 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 4.
One such case was that of Mr G., who moved into a house at the invitation of his friend's sister, who could not afford the rent. It was while living with his friend that the house next door was offered to him:

In this house here a teacher was staying who got used to me. While I was staying there, seeing that I was squatting in that house, he called me one day. He said to me, "Look here, I am a teacher, I have made an application to Port Elizabeth for a school. If I get the school I will give you this house." 59

He subsequently rented the house in the teacher's name. Another case was that of Mr Ngo, who acquired a house in 1946:

I had a friend who was staying in the squatter's camp here, one old girl, and she went to go and call me there, "Look, I've got a 4-roomed house there, I don't know what to do with this, I've only got my little [kombuis?], that's all I've got. I'm supposed to pay, come and stay with me and see to the rent, it is 7/6, I can't afford. So I came in, I stayed with her, of course she went back to, so then I remained in the house, that's how I got my house. And most other people also did the same. 60

When Ngo later arranged to have the tenancy registered in his name, his wife Mildred, who was born and raised in Kimberley, had to state that she was born in Cape Town.

It is appropriate here to divert attention to this informant, Daniel Ngo. Born in Athlone in 1920, he received his high school education in Lovedale and teacher training in Kimberley. Already resident in Nyanga by 1946, he was appointed in 1948 as the first "police boy" of the administration, which at that time consisted of only four people including himself. He informed himself of everything going on in the location by joining every association possible, including the Advisory Board. As he put it, "There was no organisation that I didn't put my nose into, at least to find out what goes on there." 61

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59 Interview with Mr G., p. 11.

60 Interview I with Mr D. Ngo, 12 Nov 1992, p. 4; conducted by H Fast.

61 Interview I with Mr D. Ngo, p. 7. For an account of his background, see ibid., p. 1.
In 1955, Ngo was promoted to the position of general clerk, undeterred by the fact that "once you are working in the admin, even up to now, you automatically, you're a sell-out." He used his leverage within the administration to play an active role in the informal allocation of houses in return for bribes. He no doubt used his knowledge of Nyanga residents and the Xhosa language to do much of this without the knowledge of the white administrators. As he boasted himself, "I know the position better than the officials at that time, because they were just sitting in the office and I was deeply involved."  

According to Ngo, Divco head office was unaware that its policy vis-à-vis the allocation of houses was being flouted. Although Ngo stated that superintendent Mr D.D. Coetzee, "officially didn't know anything about it", there is little doubt that he had full knowledge of the situation. Coetzee was, at the time, faced with a worrisome rental situation due to the high turnover of residents. Within two months of the occupation of the first houses, he was experiencing problems in collecting rents, and by September 1946 families in two houses had been ejected. Arrears mounted to £423 by October 1947, equal to almost three months' rent per house. In addition, residents were refusing to pay water charges and some tenants were demanding rental discounts as they still had no electricity.

64 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 10.
65 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 4.
66 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 4.
67 4/CT 1/2/1/1/65, Divco meeting minutes of 19 June 1946; 4/CT H4/16, Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 10 Sep 1946. This action was no doubt illegal, as the rental regulations had not yet been promulgated. Divco's Secretary had a rather cavalier approach to this, asking the Divco advocate, "Can't we throw a few of the worst cases out now, Regulations or no Regulations?: 4/CT H4/16, Divco Secretary to T.W.A. Koller (Advocate), n.d.
68 4/CT H4/16, Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 12 Feb 1947.
It is no wonder that he allowed private arrangements to proceed, for unlike the inhabitants of Sakkiesdorp, the new tenants were able to pay the rent:

Then it was a question now, either you had to go on with the position as it is, or you had to blind eye [sic]...the Council had to get their money in, and it was my suggestion too at the time, "Look, man, there is no point in sticking to a policy like this, when there are so many people wanting houses."^69

The other advantage of this unofficial policy for Coetzee and his assistants was that the incoming residents were prepared to pay bribes to obtain tenancy.

The same situation prevailed elsewhere in southern Africa owing to the privileged intermediary position of African constables. In the Reef location of Brakpan, for example, low police salaries made the acceptance of bribes an attractive proposition, such that it was impossible to obtain a house without resorting to a bribe, as one resident described:

"If you want a house in the location, you must pay [police constable] Nkabinde or buy him liquor first and then he will recommend your application to the superintendent."^70

Similarly, the "headmen" and "wardsmen" who assisted the location superintendent in Port Elizabeth were implicated in corruption.^71 As Van Onselen noted of black policemen and mine recruiters in the Rhodesian mining industry, the power invested in middlemen gave ample opportunities for abuse.^72

Unfortunately for superintendent Coetzee, his practices were soon discovered by Divco head office, and his hitherto lax and erratic administration of the location was terminated. He was dismissed for "a dereliction of duty amounting to misconduct",^73 his

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^69 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, pp. 3-4. See also interview 2 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 1.

^70 Sapire, "Brakpan", pp. 172, 318.


^72 Van Onselen, "Role of Collaborators", pp. 408-409.

^73 4/CT 1/2/1/1/69, Divco meeting minutes of 24 Feb 1948. See also 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 20 Nov 1952.
The establishment of M•anga. 1946-52

offences including the theft of Council moneys, not keeping proper records, and bringing in large numbers of residents from outside the location without official approval.\textsuperscript{72}

Divco had built Nyanga with two goals in mind, namely the elimination of Philippi shacks and the housing of Africans who lived exclusively in Divco districts. Neither aim was realised owing to the pressures to minimise financial losses and the corruption of Divco officials.

2.3 Political dynamics in Nyanga, 1946-48

The corruption in the allocation of houses during Coetzee's tenure was challenged by Nyanga residents, and it is therefore to local political dynamics that we turn. The first two years of Nyanga's existence were characterised by unfettered political activity and cooperation between the administration, Advisory Board, and Vigilance Committee. With the installation of an autocratic superintendent in 1948, location life was more strictly controlled. Yet the activism of the Vigilance Committee, successful rent boycott by residents, and bureaucratic bungling resulted in high rent arrears and an administration which was on the defensive.

A feature of the period 1946/47 was the cooperation between the Vigilance Committee and Advisory Board, with the former nominating candidates for the latter.\textsuperscript{73} The Vigilance Committee had no choice but to participate on the Board, for the Advisory Board was the only body recognised by Divco. Both organisations utilised lawyers to give advice

\textsuperscript{72} 4/CT H4/16, Report to Council by Secretary, Divco meeting minutes of 24 Feb 1948. It is probable that the residents' complaints that houses were not allocated to lodgers stemmed from bribes given to the superintendent by "outsiders".

\textsuperscript{73} In East London, the Vigilance Association and Advisory Board also worked together: as in Nyanga, this only lasted until 1947: P. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen: Conservatism and the Process of Urbanization in a South African City, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 52-53.
on the location regulations and to make representations to Council. The Vigilance Committee received the support of the location administration at this time, as the superintendent recommended three of its members for the two appointed positions on the Advisory Board.\(^76\)

The first Advisory Board was elected four months after the formation of the Vigilance Committee. The Board consisted of four elected and two nominated members, all of whom had to be registered tenants. As women were not allowed to hold tenancy of houses unless they were widows with dependent children, women who participated in the Vigilance Committee could not be put forward as candidates unless they were widows.\(^77\)

The Board met for the first time on 28 November 1946. Over the next two years they put many requests to Divco such as the cleaning of drains, installation of individual water meters, permits to brew "kaffir beer", and permission to present their grievances directly at Divco ordinary meetings. As with the Vigilance Committee’s requests, Divco considered these concerns during the first two years and showed some willingness to address them: residents were allowed to form a school committee, some of the location regulations were modified in response to Advisory Board criticisms, and beer-brewing permits were issued. Nevertheless, the Advisory Board noted that their petitions did not yield as much as those of the Vigilance Committee working in conjunction with the Parliamentary Representative. This was owing to the strong links forged between the Committee and outside pressure groups, which made representations to Divco on behalf of Nyanga residents.\(^78\)

\(^76\) Interview 1 with Mr D., p. 3, Interview 2 with Mr D., p. 19; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/66, Divco meeting minutes of 26 Nov 1946.

\(^77\) In fact, no women ever served on the Nyanga Advisory Board.

Despite these minor successes, the most pressing concerns expressed by the Advisory Board were not addressed. They requested that rental arrears be a civil offence (as opposed to criminal), which the Native Affairs Department rejected, as the Council would be put to enormous trouble and expense in collecting from bad tenants and a most undesirable precedent would be established. A further concern was the allocation of houses to people outside the Divco area. Because location officials ignored the official waiting list in favour of accepting applications from people willing to pay bribes, families on a wait list who were lodging in Nyanga were passed over. Though Ngo stated that the situation of lodgers being denied houses in favour of outsiders "never arose to a great extent...very very seldom, not even worth mentioning", the concern consistently figures in the Advisory Board minutes of the late 1940s.

Another major concern of the Advisory Board was the requirement that rentals be paid weekly rather than monthly; this occasioned two mass meetings in 1947 and continued to be a grievance throughout the 1950s. As residents had to pay rent at Divco head offices in Cape Town during office hours, weekly rents were a contentious issue.

The Advisory Board became increasingly frustrated due to Divco's high-handed approach to day-to-day problems. The Medical Officer of Health, for example, addressed the serious problem of damp floors by showing the women in the location how to make rugs out of sacks. Comparisons with Langa began to crop up, for the older township houses had

79 NTS 5586 616/313H, Native Affairs Department memo, 21 July 1948.
80 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 5.
81 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 18 April & 16 May 1947, 13 Feb 1948.
82 4/CT H4/16, Secretary's Report to Divco meeting of 24 Feb 1948.
wooden floors and inside lavatories, and transport costs were much lower. Faced with persistent requests, the Divco Works Committee, which was responsible for supervising Nyanga at this time, asked Divco to make Advisory Board meetings quarterly rather than monthly.\(^{83}\)

Residents' dealings with the administration were not to improve under the new superintendent. Coetzee was replaced by Divco Health Inspector Mr H.M. Pansegrouw at the beginning of 1948, and his autocratic manner immediately made itself felt. Pansegrouw, who was superintendent 1948-1952 and Divco's Manager of Bantu Administration 1954-1966, started off his long tenure by characterising Nyanga as a location afflicted with liquor and dagga smuggling, unreasonable demands for amenities, disrespect for Divco, and excess brewing of "kaffir beer".\(^{84}\) His attitude toward "urbanized settled Natives" was expressed thus:

Unfortunately, every year there is an increase of this urbanized settled population, either by way of influx or breeding. This group presents a new and growing problem because they discard their own codes and customs, yet use them as a means of defence when in trouble under the European legal machine.\(^{85}\)

An executive member of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, a think-tank for apartheid strategists,\(^{86}\) he enthusiastically implemented government policies to the point

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\(^{83}\)4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 19 Sep 1947; ibid., Works Committee meeting minutes, 2 Sep 1947. The October Divco ordinary meeting supported the motion for quarterly meetings but was overruled by the Minister of Native Affairs: ibid., Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 16 Jan 1948; see also Cape Argus, 28 Oct 1947.

\(^{84}\)4/CT 1/2/1/1/71, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Nov 1948.


\(^{86}\)For an account of Sabra, see J. Lazar, "Verwoerd and the 'Visionaries': the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (Sabra) and Apartheid, 1948-61", in P. Bonner, P. Detius, D. Posel, eds., \textit{Apartheid's Genesis 1935-62} (Johannesburg, 1993).
where he was accused of being loyal first to the government and then to Divco. He would grossly misrepresent events in the location but would not be questioned by Divco councillors, who rarely ventured into Nyanga and consequently never queried his monthly and quarterly reports. His administration was not characterised by efficiency or sensitivity, for even the simplest requests were not addressed for long periods of time. For example, residents requested from 1952 onward that their rent receipts specify the period for which they were paying; this was not done until the early 1960s.87

The location regulations gave wide discretionary powers to the superintendent. He could allow residents to pay their rent monthly rather than weekly; he or his officials could enter any dwelling at any time if they suspected an African was "unlawfully employed" or brewing beer over the allowed limit; tenants could be ejected without a court order; he decided whether or not to grant visitor's permits, prosecute tenants for arrears, grant permission for a tenant to sublet or take in lodgers, and prohibit meetings.88

Pansegrouw fully utilised his far-ranging powers: he prosecuted residents who were "passive resisters" and thereby challenged Divco's authority (see below for account of residents N.S. Mali and Jackson Xesi). Other residents were favoured, such as C. Ngobese, who was imprisoned for a year, assaulted his wife after being released, and was granted continued tenancy despite his wife's pleas that the house be registered in her name.89

87 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 12 March 1952. For a more detailed account of Pansegrouw's administration, see Chapter 7, sections 7.1, 7.1.1 and 7.1.2.

88 4/CT 239/9, Government Notice No 82 of 11 Jan 1952; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/67, Divco meeting minutes of 2 April 1947.

89 4/CT H4/16, Divco Legal Assistant to Acting Secretary, 12 Aug 1952.
Chapter Two

When he took over the administration from Coetzee, Pansegrouw was faced with a daunting situation. By Ngo's own estimates, three-quarters of the houses in 1948 were occupied by people who were not the officially registered tenants:

I suggested to the authorities at that time, the Council, "Look man, to rectify this you can't go on, because we don't know who stays in our houses, the wrong person, this person has died or left, so and so. I think, let us just for once make a clean slate, call everybody in, where do you stay, do you stay in that house, yes...and then you revise the situation in the registration of the house, in that particular person's name." And I remember that also caused a thing, the story went you could only get a house if you pay, but that wasn't the position, the position was, here I owe the rent, I come with you, I say to you, this is a cousin of mine, she's going to pay my rent.  

Mr G. vividly remembers the "cleaning of the slate" that took place:

Yes, there were many "You must rent in my name"...and then Pansegrouw got in and even the person who was this white man was sacked. When I arrived to Pansegrouw I told him that this name I am renting by is not mine, and he asked me who is it. I told him and he said, "I shouldn't do that again, you must rent in your own name." He deleted that and I told him my name and he wrote it down.

The official recognition of tenants in actual occupation of the houses did not instantly ameliorate the collection of rentals. The procedure required before rents became legally enforceable was that the Native Affairs Department had to approve the rents, which would then be incorporated into the location regulations, which could only be instituted once an Advisory Board was elected or appointed. Until the regulations were promulgated on 3 September 1948, the only legal recourse Divco had in the case of rent arrears was to use civil action for ejectment. Even when this was resorted to on rare occasions, the residents were not legally obliged to pay either their arrears or current rentals.

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90 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 5.

91 Interview with Mr G., pp. 11-12.

92 4/CT H4/16, Divco Secretary to Medical Officer of Health, 26 April 1946; ibid., Divco Secretary to Acting Superintendent, 20 March 1948.
As in Langa in the late 1920s and in the Reef location of Brakpan in the 1930s, residents capitalised on this flaw in the process. Some tenants drew on the legal expertise of lawyers such as Esau Shapiro to represent them in rent dispute cases, which ensured that the cases received a detailed perusal by Divco. As court challenges were successful in preventing the eviction of rent defaulters, regular rent payers noticed that they could withhold rent with relative impunity and the problem threatened to get out of control. As the Divco Secretary complained, the situation was proving most difficult and resulting in the growing up of an undesirable state of affairs amongst the inhabitants, who, unlike their fellowmen in the Langa Location, are becoming accustomed to living freely and uncontrolled and will resent strongly the Regulations when they are promulgated.

Residents also resisted paying their electricity charges. Divco subsidised residents' electricity at the rate of 7s 6d per month, with the excess to be paid by residents. It was rarely paid:

Now the reasons can be roughly be put down as follows, that the meters were unfortunately inside the houses, which meant that the meter reader would come around...if the house was locked, he would not read the meter and he would estimate the charge...but some husbands and wives were in permanent employment and were never there, which meant that Eskom would estimate month after month after month, and they would say, "No, but it can't be £1.2.6 every month because we have no fridge and we have no this and we have no that and we're never there and not possible and not paying." Once this business started up, "I'm not paying", it spread like wildfire...I was a little disgusted because that 7/6 it hurt me, because that 7/6 came out of my pocket, I'm a white taxpayer, I pay Divco tax.

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93 Sapire, "Brakpan", pp. 122ff. See also Chapter One.

94 4/CT H4/16, Shapiro to Superintendent, 24 Sep 1948; ibid., Superintendent to Secretary, 7 Oct 1948; ibid., Acting Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 12 May 1948; ibid.. Divco Advocate to Divco Secretary, 12 June 1948. In the absence of location regulations until September 1948, Divco had no legal basis for enforcing the payment of rents.

95 NTS 5586 616/313H, Divco Secretary to NAD Secretary, 16 April 1948.

96 Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, pp. 13-14.
The Vigilance Committee was an important vehicle used by residents to resist payment of rental, water and electricity charges. A key component in their strategy until the late 1950s was the forging of relationships with influential legal people outside the location. Advocate D.B. Molteno, who was "Native Representative" for the Western Cape 1937-1948, took forward their concerns until 1948, when he declined to run for office again. It is most likely Molteno who helped to challenge many provisions in the draft location regulations, for the Committee's representations on this matter are couched in legal language.97

It was after his resignation and the election of lawyer and Communist Party member Sam Kahn in his place that a dynamic partnership was forged between Kahn and the Vigilance Committee until Kahn was expelled from Parliament in 1952.98

He was an advisor, he was an advocate of the people, and that's was made him to be involved greatly in our meetings. And then we elected him to Parliament, and that was when we here in the Cape were still represented, and he always came to report to the Vigilance Association how things were going in Parliament, and we also told him our needs.99

Not only did Kahn use his political influence to challenge the validity of rentals, but he also represented individual tenants in legal test cases and defended residents like Oscar Mpetha when they were arrested for political activities.100

Once the location regulations were in place in late 1948, ejectments were a regular occurrence. Pansegrouw energetically prosecuted 11 residents who had not paid rent due to the absence of regulations, of which four "absconded" and six were ejected; residents soon started paying regularly. Pansegrouw ensured that rentals were paid weekly to speed up

97See, for example, 4/CT 1/2/1/1/67, Divco meeting minutes of 2 April 1947.
99Interview 2 with Mr D., p. 23.
100When Mpetha was arrested for trespassing in Crown Forest, Bellville, to address a political meeting, Kahn succeeded in obtaining an acquittal: Morning Star, July 1957.
evictions when they were necessary, but allowed residents to pay monthly with his permission. His tactics succeeded in the accumulated arrears dropping to almost zero by 1952.101

To tighten his control over the location, all lodgers were required to obtain lodger permits and renew them monthly, failing which they could be charged and sentenced to two months in prison or a £10 fine. Many residents disregarded lodger registration entirely: in June 1949 alone, 27 lodgers were charged, although the number averaged about 10 per month. Disputes between tenants and their lodgers cropped up frequently; although tenants took in lodgers of their own accord - no doubt to help with rentals - they did not have the authority to evict such lodgers except by civil ejectment. In 1952, for example, a tenant's eviction of a lodger was ruled "illegal" by the superintendent and the tenant fined for his action.102

Until late 1948, then, Divco exercised little control over rents and tenancy within the location. With the promulgation of the location regulations and installation of a draconian superintendent, tenancy was monitored more strictly. Residents had less room for manoeuvre, for they faced the threat of eviction or criminal conviction if they dared to ignore rentals and service charges.

101 4/CT 1/2/1/1/71, Divco meeting minutes of 26 Oct 1948; 4/CT H4/16, Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 21 Jan 1949; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/72, Superintendent's quarterly report to Divco meeting of 26 April 1949; 4/CT H4/16, Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 14 July 1949; ibid., Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 7 April 1951; ibid., Divco Secretary to Accountant, 22 Nov 1952.

102 4/CT 1/2/1/1/73, Superintendent's quarterly report to Divco meeting of 26 July 1949; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/74, Superintendent's quarterly report to Divco meeting of 25 Oct 1949; 4/CT H4/69, Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 19 July 1951.
2.4 The Advisory Board and Vigilance Committee, 1948-52

The new superintendent also turned his attention to the recalcitrant Advisory Board. Legally, the Board had no powers, for although Divco was required to consult with that body, it was not obligated to address any grievances. Nevertheless, the Board was at the centre of controversy between 1948 and 1952: the location administration sought to place its allies on the Board in order to portray a sympathetic image to Divco head office and the public. These allies in turn benefitted from their close association with Divco, and the Vigilance Committee viewed Board deliberations as a platform from which to raise broader political issues. Although the administration attempted to quash all challenges to its authority, the Committee was successful in achieving election to the Board and subverting Board deliberations when excluded from the Board.

The Advisory Board regulations allowed the superintendent to disqualify any candidates if they were in rent arrears or if any one of their five nominators was in arrears; additionally, anyone infringing location regulations or sentenced to over seven days in prison lost his candidature. A resident could be disqualified simply for failing to renew his lodger's permit timeously.

This allowed tremendous room for manipulation, for the administration could disqualify candidates by enforcing any one of the plethora of petty regulations, or could ignore a breach of the regulations. In 1948, for instance, Board member and administration ally Daniel Ngo was in arrears, yet he was allowed the opportunity to pay up and his seat on the Board was never threatened. As much of the resistance to the Nyanga administration

101 For example, Divco was required to place the Annual Estimates of Revenue/Expenditure before the Board, but could proceed even if the Board was unanimous in rejecting the budget.

102 Divco Housing Committee Meeting, 20 September 1948.
was in the form of non-payment of rent and challenging rentals in court, the regulations provided the ideal vehicle for ensuring a majority on the Board which was sympathetic to the administration.

Besides sidelining "agitators" through use of his discretionary application of the regulations, Pansegrouw also set about cultivating allies. The most logical choices were people who worked for the administration, namely police constables such as Edgar Nkomo, Paulus Vatsha, and Daniel Ngo. Though Nkomo tried to run for election (coming last) and Ngo was elected to office for one year, the police constables tended not to be involved in the Advisory Board. Others who were associated closely with the administration were men appointed by Divco to the Advisory Board. The Board consisted of four elected and two "nominated" positions, with the nominees consistently siding with the administration. The appointees' reasons for allowing themselves to be coopted were various. Some were elderly, educated men who were suspicious of political organisations; these included schoolteacher Clement Molise and school principal James Bam. In other cases, it was clearly the material advantages of the position which attracted nominees. For example, Abraham Mabowe was a schoolteacher who was appointed to the Advisory Board 1947-48 and 1950-60. His wife Mrs Florida Mabowe, who "did much for the township", was assisted in running a creche out of her home from 1948 to 1951. Mabowe himself was given a trading license, which was

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105 The same pattern prevailed on the Rand, where Councils promoted conservative location leaders who distanced themselves from "political" organisations such as the ANC. They lacked the support of the majority of location residents, who called such appointees "Izimpimpi" (traitors or informers): Sapire, "Brakpan", pp. 322-323.

106 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 22 June 1950.
hard to come by in Nyanga, and when his shop was destroyed in the disturbances of March/April 1960, the administration rebuilt his shop and disregarded his arrears.\(^{107}\)

Hence there existed an informal patronage network at the hub of which was the administration. Daniel Ngo, as the longest-serving police constable, continued to have tremendous influence in terms of housing administration. According to one resident, who moved into a house in 1949:

Houses then, they would give it to you as you passed the road. During that time I remember when I got this house, I used to walk with [unclear], who came to his friends here in the office. Ngo said to me, "Don't you want a house?" I said, "What will I do with a house?", he said, "You always like to stay in hostels, here you will relax." I asked him how much is it. I think the price was 7/5, I just gave out the 7/5 and he wrote down and gave me the key. He came to this man who was staying here, but the man said no, he is leaving. I don't know where he said he was going. That's how I got a house without a wife during that time. You could just get a house like that, but now you can never get a house without a wife.\(^{108}\)

Residents Mr G. and Mr M. Mzongwana also confirmed that this practice was common within the administration, with bribes being accepted by both black and white officials.\(^{109}\)

If a resident was not well-connected in terms of this network, the results could be dire:

They can just threaten you to leave your house and then they put somebody else, doesn't matter who is you. Sometimes they evict you forever because they've got some people, the people now were smuggling in these houses, the people working in the admin...\(^{110}\)

\(^{107}\)4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 12 Aug 1948; Cape Times, 4 May 1951; 4/CT H4/68/A, Manager to Divco Secretary, 6 Oct 1960.

\(^{108}\)Interview 1 with Mr D., p. 4. Obtaining a house without being married was not tolerated in later years; see Chapter Four, Section 4.2 for an account of Africans who were forced to marry in order to qualify for housing.

\(^{109}\)Interview with Mr G., pp. 10-11; interview 1 with Mr M. Mzongwana, 2 Nov 1993, pp. 1-2; conducted by H. Fast.

\(^{110}\)Interview with Mrs S. Conjwa, p. 31.
It was not only the officials who received payoffs. For a fee, appointed Advisory Board members used their position to find out from the administration who was behind in rent and would arrange to have that family evicted and another one installed. Corner houses, located on substantially bigger plots, were the choice of those who availed themselves of this corrupt service, which is why there is today a stigma attached to occupying a corner house in Nyanga.\textsuperscript{111}

It is likely that lodger permits and tenancy transfers were also obtained this way. Residents frequently took in lodgers and reached private agreements to transfer their tenancy to them. Under this arrangement, a lodger would pay the registered tenant's arrears and then claim the right of occupation. While the administration was aware of this practice and was worried that it gave residents the impression that houses were allocated according to the wishes of the outgoing tenant, it was tolerated as it helped to clear the arrears.\textsuperscript{112}

The dynamics which developed between the Advisory Board, Vigilance Committee, and the administration must be seen within the context described above. A small, loose-knit group of people associated with the location administration used their influence to obtain material advantage, especially in terms of housing allocation. The majority of residents attempted to challenge the corrupt administration by participating in the Vigilance Committee, through which they were elected to the Advisory Board. Some of the dynamics between these bodies will be traced below.

There was an immediate change in Advisory Board/Vigilance Committee dynamics as soon as Pansegrouw arrived in Nyanga in 1948. He based his antagonism to both bodies on

\textsuperscript{111}Interview with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1; interview with Mrs L., 19 Aug 1994, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{112}4/CT 1/2/1/1 Divco meeting minutes of 28 October & 27 November 1947; 4/CT H4/16, G. Kwababa to Divco Secretary, 2 Feb 1952; ibid., Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 8 June 1952.
the political affiliations of their members and "a certain section of the tenants", some of whom were active members of the Communist Party.\textsuperscript{113} It was Pansegrouw's strategy to characterise the Vigilance Committee and three Advisory Board members as representing a minority opinion in the location which dictated the Advisory Board's actions:

"...there is a small group of agitators who actually do not represent the views of the bulk of the location inhabitants but nevertheless claim to do so, who are endeavouring to obtain control of the Advisory Board and whose object, in fact, appears to be to achieve an idyllic state where the Natives of Nyanga may be ensured that they are free from control of any kind."\textsuperscript{114}

There was therefore a palpable shift when Pansegrouw took control in February 1948. In January 1948 the chairman of the Advisory Board, Mr A. Miller, was still encouraging the cooperation between the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Committee in sending a delegation to Council. Two months later, accusations surfaced that the Advisory Board was "being ruled" by the Vigilance Committee in setting up the delegation. This resulted in an ineffective deputation which presented minor demands.\textsuperscript{115}

Given that the timing of the rift between the Vigilance Committee and Advisory Board coincided with the arrival of Pansegrouw, it is likely that he sought to cause division between the two bodies as well as among Advisory Board members. One of the appointed members, Amos Ngxowa, complained bitterly in October 1948 that he as a nominee was doing more work for the residents than the elected members, who were "killing the people".\textsuperscript{116} The distance between nominees and elected members increased throughout the year, with the three Vigilance Committee members boycotting meetings of the Board and

\textsuperscript{113}4/CT 1/2/1/1/71, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Nov 1948.
\textsuperscript{114}4/CT 1/2/1/1/71, Housing Committee Report to Divco meeting of 28 Dec 1948.
\textsuperscript{115}4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 16 Jan, 12 March & 16 July 1948.
\textsuperscript{116}4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 22 Oct 1948.
requesting that all members of the Board be elected as the nominees did not represent the residents.  

The friction between the two bodies mirrored wider conflicts in South Africa. According to Mr G., ANC members in Nyanga were older, and it was the ANC that encouraged the establishment of the Vigilance Committee. By the late 1940s, however, younger and more militant ANC members were shifting to more confrontational politics. This reflected a loss of faith within the ANC in traditional tactics of deputation and negotiation, which had done nothing to stop the creation of segregated political institutions and the intensification of influx control in the Cape. In addition, ANC leadership in the Western Cape was being drawn increasingly from the unskilled, urbanised working class.  

This struggle was also taking place in other urban centres; in East London, for example, the Vigilance Association and "ANC-A" consisted of an old guard, which was being challenged by a breakaway "ANC-B" led by young militants.  

The more militant members were led by Oscar Mpetha, who moved to Nyanga in 1948. Secretary of the African Food and Canning Workers' Union soon after its founding in 1947, his union concerns were similar to ANC ones, such as grievances related to forced removals and inadequate housing. President of the Western Cape ANC in 1958, he was a

117 4/CT 1/2/1/1/71, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Nov & 28 Dec 1948.
118 Interview with Mr G., pp. 3-5. See also interview 2 with Mr D., p. 19.
119 Lodge, Black Politics, p. 23.
122 Kingwill, "ANC in the Western Cape", pp. 51-52.
dynamic organiser in Nyanga who was "very good on the legal side although he was not a lawyer".\textsuperscript{121}

It is difficult to know how many residents began to oppose the Vigilance Committee at this time. According to one informant, there was no internal friction within the Vigilance Committee until explicitly political issues were raised at Vigilance meetings and taken forward at Advisory Board meetings. More conservative Vigilance members wished their Committee to address only social issues faced in Nyanga, such as housing, schools and transport. Due to the shift to wider issues, some Committee members left:

...that is where the disagreement started in this Advisory Board, because it was sometimes sending issues which we didn't decide on, we were then dissatisfied and three of us men resigned. It was in 1949 when we resigned when things were like this. The "wise ones" came up with this and that, it seemed now that it wasn't going according to the ways and aims that we had when we formed it. We didn't plan in this way now of having political issues.\textsuperscript{122}

The fact that the Vigilance Committee took forward such political issues and was in partnership with "outsiders" such as Sam Kahn only aggravated the situation:

We were in disagreement now because the things we discussed they now were not residential issues...And we saw whites now coming to this Advisory Board, which shocked me. We asked, "Who are these?" "No, these are the people who are going to stand for us." That is when the trouble started.\textsuperscript{123}

To sideline the Vigilance Committee's influence altogether, Pansegrouw manipulated the Advisory Board election of 1949, which saw three of four candidates disqualified on various grounds, be it arrears or contravening location regulations, leaving one "duly elected" member and five members to be nominated by Divco.\textsuperscript{124} In his opening speech to the

\textsuperscript{121}Interview 2 with Mr D., p. 18.
\textsuperscript{122}Interview with Mr G., p. 4. This interview was carried out in Xhosa; Mr G. consistently used the word "amaCule" or "wise ones" to facetiously refer to politically active residents like Mpetha.
\textsuperscript{123}Interview with Mr G., pp. 7-8.
\textsuperscript{124}4/CT 1/2/1/1/71, Divco meeting minutes of 28 Dec 1948.
Board, he emphasised that some Europeans thought that Native Advisory Boards "engaged more in agitations than in their advisory capacity", which he hoped the new Board would disprove.\(^{127}\) That the new appointees were willing to cooperate was spelled out by its secretary, who stated that "...though at times the Advisory Board had to wait, yet with patience we shall do so, and yet ask."\(^{128}\)

Pansegrouw also attempted to remove the right to vote from registered lodgers in the location,\(^{129}\) which suggests that many of the active Vigilance Committee members were lodgers. Not able to participate on the local body, the Vigilance Committee appealed to outside support. The secretary of the Committee wrote a letter to the Cape Argus complaining that Divco ignored residents' grievances, and Sam Kahn led a delegation of Vigilance Committee members that presented 24 grievances to Divco.\(^{130}\)

The Advisory Board reacted strongly and stated its disappointment in Divco for

"allowing an unofficial body which is not only illegal but a political body, to present the needs of the residents of the Location...This action has definitely denounced the duty and the rights of the Local Advisory Board."\(^{131}\)

To buttress the position of the Advisory Board, Divco referred the Committee's 24 grievances to the Advisory Board and took a decision only to receive Advisory Board deputations in future. In addition, Divco undertook to address some of the 24 Vigilance

\(^{127}\) 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 14 Jan 1949.

\(^{128}\) 4/CT H4/69 Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 14 April 1949.

\(^{129}\) 4/CT 1/2/1/174, Manager's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Oct 1949.

\(^{130}\) 4/CT 1/2/1/172, Divco meeting minutes of 22 Feb 1949.

\(^{131}\) 4/CT 1/2/1/172, Divco meeting minutes of 22 Feb 1949; 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 18 Feb 1949.
Committee grievances after the Advisory Board had prioritised six of them, and sent the two nominated members to the Advisory Boards Congress in December.\textsuperscript{132}

Blocked by Divco's unwillingness to hear their grievances, the Vigilance Committee asked all the new Advisory Board members not to attend Board meetings and urged residents to boycott Advisory Board elections. The pressure exerted on Board members must have been considerable, for three of the six members were absent from the April meeting, when the Native Commissioner attended, four out of six were reported ill at the May meeting, and attendance was sporadic throughout the remainder of the year, with no quorum reached at the September and October meetings.\textsuperscript{133}

Undeterred by their lack of representation on the Board, the Vigilance Committee continued to meet regularly. They were required by location regulations to inform the administration of every meeting 24 hours in advance, which the superintendent could prohibit if he obtained the approval of the magistrate and the police. To get around this, the Committee would ask permission for a meeting after closing time on Saturdays, making it impossible for Pansegrouw to consult the police and a magistrate. When a rally was held at the Grand Parade 30 April 1950, the Committee called a public meeting which only two members attended, apparently to draw policemen to Nyanga and away from the Parade.\textsuperscript{134}

The Committee also nominated eight men for the Advisory Board elections in January 1950; three were disqualified for being in arrears and a fourth for working openly for the

\textsuperscript{132}4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 17 March 1949; ibid., Housing Committee meeting minutes of 6 May 1949; ibid., Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 17 November 1949.

\textsuperscript{133}4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes for 1949.

\textsuperscript{134}4/CT 1/2/1/1/67, Divco special meeting minutes of 2 April 1947; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/72, Manager’s quarterly report, 26 April 1949; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/76, Divco meeting minutes of 30 May 1950.
Communist Party. Only J. Lehana and W. Ncusana "qualified" as candidates and were declared duly elected, although they were outnumbered by the four appointees. The Board attempted to increase its power by supporting the superintendent's suggestion that each Board member act as blockman for a corresponding block committee. This would, stated one appointee, "end many undesirable frictions which are always caused by the vigilant committee". In addition, to cut Vigilance Committee ties with "outside organisations", the Board requested that Divco supervise the new creche rather than the Cape Flats Distress Association (Cafda).

The appointed members appear to have been associated with the Nyanga branch of the National Council of African Women (NCAW), whose executive included the wives of Daniel Ngo and constable Edgar Nkomo. The Board agreed to discuss a list of grievances put forward by the NCAW, which included the allocation of houses for teachers.

The Vigilance Committee continued to oppose the appointee-dominated Board by actively mobilising residents. Divco's plan to change Nyanga's name to "Kwezi" (morning star) was stopped by the overwhelming opposition of residents. One Board member was accused of being a "traitor" and was warned that he would be "dealt with". Matters reached a climax in August 1950, when the Superintendent convened a meeting between the Vigilance Committee and the Advisory Board/NCAW alliance; no settlement was reached.

135 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 13 April 1950.

136 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 16 March 1950.

137 4/CT H4/69, NCAW to Superintendent, February 1950; ibid., Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 9 Feb & 27 Feb 1950. Divco agreed to discuss a similar list of NCAW (Nyanga) grievances a year later, although - as usual - little was done about them: 4/CT 1/1/1/66, Divco meeting minutes of 26 June 1951.

Due to the increasing pressure placed on them by the Committee, no quorum was reached at Advisory Board meetings from September onward and the Advisory Board members failed to appear at a pre-arranged meeting with the Native Commissioner in October. Outvoted on the Board by appointees, then, the Vigilance Committee was nonetheless able to bring Board meetings to a halt and to influence the decision concerning the proposed name change.

By 1951 the Vigilance Committee had learned all the "ins and outs" of the Advisory Board election process. All four positions on the 1951 Advisory Board were filled by elected candidates, of whom at least two were Vigilance Committee members. As the superintendent noted with apprehension, "Judging from past experience with some of the elected members, it is feared that there will be discord in the 1951 Board."

The Vigilance Committee members on the Board challenged Divco on issues of process, such as tampering with Advisory Board meeting minutes and asking the Board to approve 1952 Estimates when no approval had been sought for Estimates before. The elected members also refused to approve the 1952 Estimates and declined to send a Board member to the Advisory Boards Congress in Durban. The confrontations which took place at Board meetings reflected the political climate in Cape Town. A campaign against the Separate..

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137 4/CT 1/2/1/1/77, Superintendent’s quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 31 Oct 1950.

138 Only two Board members voted against the 1952 Financial Estimates, suggesting that the other four members were not connected with the Vigilance Committee. However, there is evidence that the other two elected members supported the Committee, as they supported other proposals such as the election of the Advisory Board secretary.

139 4/CT 1/2/1/1/77, Divco meeting minutes of 19 Dec 1950; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/78, Superintendent’s quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Jan 1951.

140 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 18 Jan, 29 March, 10 May, & 8 Nov 1951. As it was, Pansegrouw attended the Advisory Boards Congress in Durban and, finding it too "political", recommended that Advisory Board delegates no longer be sent: 4/CT 1/1/1/69. Divco meeting minutes of 26 Feb 1952.
Representation of Voters Bill was launched in 1951, which culminated in a strike in May. Over 65% of black pupils stayed away from school and 95% of black shops were closed.143 Five people ran for the 1952 Advisory Board: four were elected with between 91 and 110 votes and the remaining candidate, constable Nkomo, gleaned only 28 votes. At least three of the four elected members belonged to the Vigilance Committee, namely Communist Party member James Xaba and ANC members W.H. Jacobs and Oscar Mpetha.144 Vigilance Committee concerns were discussed at Board meetings, and the Board elected a delegation to make representations to Council.145

An issue which the Board once again took up was that of the unfair allocation of houses. Lodger families were not prioritised in the allocation of vacated houses, for there were so many lodgers by 1952 that to grant each lodging family a house would leave few houses over to clear the shack areas. Such was the shortage of houses that when one woman's husband was hospitalised with tuberculosis, the administration re-allocated her house and relegated her to lodger status.146 Individual arrangements and administration policy therefore discriminated against those lodgers who had been on the waiting list for houses for a long period of time.147

143 Muthien, State and Resistance in SA, p. 111.

144 4/CT 1/1/1/69, Divco meeting minutes of 29 Jan 1952. Jacobs was honorary secretary of the Nyanga ANC.

145 4/CT 1/1/1/71, Superintendent's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Sep 1952; 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 8 May 1952.

146 4/CT 1/1/1/70, Divco meeting minutes of 27 May 1952. Women were often forced out of their houses if they became widowed, separated, or divorced; examples of how women were marginalised in the allocation of houses are given in Chapter Six, Section 6.2.3.

147 4/CT H4/16, Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 12 Feb 1952; 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board minutes of 8 May & 12 Aug 1952; ibid., Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 12 Feb 1952.
Relations deteriorated during 1952 between the Vigilance Committee and the police constables, who by virtue of their job were associated with and had influence in the administration office. The constables were unpopular because they were responsible for enforcing the plethora of petty regulations and had the reputation for being unsavoury characters. In 1952 alone, one constable was dismissed when liquor was found on his premises, another was fired for assaulting residents while intoxicated, and yet another was accused by residents of not handing their rent money over to the office. The Vigilance Committee lodged formal complaints against two of the constables, summoning Paulus Vatsha to a Vigilance meeting and taking Daniel Ngo to court over the alleged theft of their rent moneys.148

The Vigilance-dominated Board continued its attack on the administration, complaining that even the simplest of requests were ignored, such as the emptying of latrines on Monday instead of Tuesday.149 The Board's activities were curtailed during 1952, however, for Nyanga residents were caught up in the nationwide Defiance campaign that had been launched in the Western Cape in April. Mass meetings were held on the Grand Parade, activists defied train apartheid, and the rioting that commenced in New Brighton spread to Langa in December, when administration offices and three churches were burnt down.150 Because Vigilance Committee members on the Board actively participated in the campaign, the Advisory Board failed to reach a quorum at its June, July, and August meetings.

148 4/CT 1/1/69, Divco meeting minutes of 26 Feb & 25 March 1952; 4/CT 1/1/70, Superintendent's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 27 May 1952; 4/CT 1/1/71, Divco meeting minutes of 8 June 1952. As many residents were unable to travel to Divco headquarters in Dorp Street, Cape Town, where rent was to be paid, it was common for constables to be entrusted with the task of forwarding their rent money.

149 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 12 Aug, 10 Oct & 20 Nov 1952.

In response to the activism of the Vigilance Committee 1948-52, Pansegrouw set about trying to rid the Advisory Board and Vigilance Committee of its troublesome members. Mr Jackson Xesi, former chairman of the Vigilance Committee, was ejected from his house in 1950 for illegally conveying 14 Africans from Port Elizabeth to Cape Town and for rent arrears. Pansegrouw tried to have Advisory Board member and secretary of the Vigilance Committee Mr N.S. Mali declared "idle, dissolute or disorderly" and ejected from the urban area; when this did not succeed, he was unseated from the Board when the lodgers staying with him did not renew their lodgers' permits timeously - a common enough offence in the location - and was soon after ejected from the location for non-payment of rent.149

It was in 1952 that, no doubt at Pansegrouw's urging, Divco resolved to receive no more representations from the Vigilance Committee and to instruct location staff not to attend its meetings. In reaching this decision, Divco stated

"that the body styling itself the Vigilance Committee of Nyanga, which is a self-appointed one, is little more than a trouble making organisation within the Location".150

The hard line taken by Divco reflected the state's tightening of its legislative control over opposition groups, with the Criminal Law Amendment Bill of 1952 imposing heavy sentences and fines for "incitement" or "breaches of the peace".151 The Vigilance Committee

149 4/CT 1/2/1/1/76, Superintendent's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 29 Aug 1950; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/78, Superintendent's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Jan 1951; 4/CT H4/69, Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 19 July 1951; 4/CT 1/1/1/68, Superintendent's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Oct 1951.

150 4/CT 1/1/1/69, Divco meeting minutes of 25 March 1952.

continued to meet regularly during the year despite the worsening political climate, although
one meeting was prohibited on the suspicion that ANC speakers were to be present.\textsuperscript{154}

The friction within Nyanga during the years 1946-1952 has been characterised by
Ngo as occurring between Vigilance, CPSA, and union members:

...at that time there was a Vigilance Association which supposed [sic] to look
after the interests of the residents, and we also had the Communist Party who
also had its own agenda, and we also had this labour chap, he organised
labour...[they were] vying for, wanting to sort of get members, or get
recognition, and getting the ear of the people...these clashes were really for a
fight for one wanting to outdo the other in getting certain things done by the
Divco, and the Divco at that time was not playing...\textsuperscript{155}

In actual fact, the split that developed was between the Vigilance Committee and those who
associated with the administration, be they police constables, Advisory Board appointees, or
more conservative residents. The Vigilance Committee consistently challenged the informal
patronage network cultivated by Ngo and the administration and worked together with the
ANC and the Communist Party to contest Divco's control of the location.

This was similar to what was taking place in other African townships. The
Communist Party grew tremendously during World War II and became very involved in
township politics; between 1942-1944, Communist Party candidates were elected to Advisory
Boards in East London, Johannesburg, and Langa, where the CPSA/Vigilance Association
alliance swept all six elected positions.\textsuperscript{156} The same applied to the ANC, which in 1947

\textsuperscript{154}4/CT 1/1/1/71, Superintendent's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of
20 Sep 1952. The superintendent claimed that the purpose of the meeting was to canvas volunteers for the "resistance campaign".

\textsuperscript{155}Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{156}Bunting, Moses Kotane, p. 115; Musemwa, "History of Langa", pp. 173-174; Muthien, State
repudiated the Africanist policy of boycotting Advisory Board and Native Representative
elections as they provided useful platforms.\textsuperscript{155}

The Vigilance Committee did, in the view of all Nyanga residents interviewed
(including Mr Ngo), represent the "views of the people".\textsuperscript{156} Vigilance attempts to dominate
the Board were thwarted by administrative manipulation of the election process, however the
Vigilance members appear to have had the support of residents, who in turn pressured
appointees not to attend meetings. Once the Committee knew how to work around Advisory
Board election regulations, it was able to elect enough members to the Board to be able to
dominate deliberations.

2.5 The social life of Nyanga, 1946-52

Many residents left the location during the first years of Nyanga's existence. Applications for
houses averaged 15 per month in 1949, but an almost equal number "absconded" or were
ejected for non-payment of rent.\textsuperscript{157} This meant a mountain of paperwork for the
administration, which had to re-allocate houses and try to trace residents who left with
sizeable debts.

Residents could leave Nyanga because there were still some options open to Africans
in Cape Town in the 1940s and early 1950s: the former shack residents, faced with high rents
and a state-controlled environment in Nyanga, often preferred to move back into the informal
settlements or, in some cases, drift onto nearby farms.\textsuperscript{158} One rent defaulter moved back to

\textsuperscript{155} Lodge, \textit{Black Politics}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{156} Interview with Mr J.N., 13 Dec 1993, p. 3; conducted by S. Blom.

\textsuperscript{157} 4/CT 1/2/1/72, Divco meeting minutes of 22 Feb & 29 March 1949.

\textsuperscript{158} 4/CT 202/9, Medical Officer of Health to Divco Secretary, 15 June 1946.
Sakkiesdorp and successfully evaded officials trying to collect the rent.\textsuperscript{161} Due to the shortage of accommodation in Nyanga, Divco lacked the means by which to compel Africans to take up accommodation in the location until the mid-1950s.

Despite the high turnover of residents, a good number of residents remained, particularly those who came from areas closer to Cape Town, such as Crawford and Athlone. It was a very small location surrounded by forest and farmland. "You must remember the atmosphere was rural," stated a former administration official, "it was lovely."\textsuperscript{162} Residents who came into the location at this time, such as the Kakaza, Ngo, and Kolori families, were similarly nostalgic, referring to Nyanga as a "very quiet" place which was free of crime.\textsuperscript{163} Though there may be some truth to this, it is likely that their positive impressions were influenced by the current situation in Nyanga, in which the Old Location is ringed by high-density housing and shack areas where crime is rife.

One unusual feature of the first residents was the number of Sotho-speaking people. There was a massive efflux of people from Basutoland between 1936 and 1946 due to poverty and overpopulation, with the overall population dropping by 8,500.\textsuperscript{164} While most migrated to the Reef, many found their way to the Cape Peninsula. Their predominance in the First Scheme and later the Mau-Mau scheme seemed to be related to compounds nearby where there were predominantly Sotho workers.

\textsuperscript{161}4/CT 1/1/166, Manager's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 29 May 1951.

\textsuperscript{162}Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{163}Interview with Mrs M. Ngo, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{164}Sapire, "Brakpan", pp. 91-92.
There were a lot of Sothos because of this manufactory, I think that's where they came from...and they had a camp, not squatter camp but a compound, and that's how it happened...A lot of them came here...you find most of them today, they speak Xhosa fluently, so only afterwards do you realise this man was Sotho-speaking.\textsuperscript{165}

There were enough Sotho speakers to warrant a separate school for them, which was the Dutch Reformed School.

Although churches were not granted sites in Nyanga until 1952, when the Methodist and Anglican Churches were allocated building sites, church groups met on school premises as early as 1948. The religious composition was diverse: a 1951 census showed that 30% of the 1273 residents considered themselves Baptist, 18% Anglican, 8% Dutch Reformed, and 7% Roman Catholic.\textsuperscript{166}

Given that the Old Location consisted of only 210 houses, it is surprising how many associations existed within a short time. According to Daniel Ngo, this was because Nyanga was in an isolated location and associations were the best means for residents to become acquainted.\textsuperscript{167} By June 1947, both rugby and soccer teams existed and two playing fields were requested. A Nyanga Women's Committee was in existence by at least 1949, and the National Council of African Women met frequently. Abonwabisi Lawn Tennis Club, 40 of whose 100 members were Nyanga residents, collected the necessary £200 to build a tennis court in 1949.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{165}Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{166}4/CT 1/1/69, Divco meeting minutes of 29 Jan 1952; 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 17 Dec 1948; 4/CT 1/1/1/68, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Oct 1951.

\textsuperscript{167}Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{168}4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 18 June 1947; ibid., Nyanga Advisory Board minutes of 14 Jan 1949 meeting; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/72, Manager's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 22 Feb & 26 April 1949.
Chapter Two

It was the intention of Daniel Ngo to transform Nyanga into a "better-class" neighbourhood, which was made difficult by the fact that houses were allocated to anyone willing to pay the rent (and the bribe that usually went with it). In Langa, middle-class families were frustrated that they raised their children on the same street as neighbours from different class backgrounds. A similar situation existed in Eastern Native Township on the Rand during the 1950s, where families set apart by their education and wealth were "living in enforced intimacy with people whom they naturally shun and avoid." As the conservative Advisory Board in Brakpan complained in 1946,

"The houses in Brakpan are built according to only one pattern. As a native may not live elsewhere, this means that the teacher, the nurse, the clerk, the trader, and the minister are compelled to live in houses designed to satisfy the needs and taste of the Town Council." 

Ngo tried to use his leverage within the administration to allocate houses to educated people:

I felt that we should separate, have different people, can't take a squatter from the squatter area and put him next door to me...Now my idea was firstly, I had in the back of my mind a place like Pinelands. I felt this could be another, like Pinelands, you know, people have gardens...people who were very proud of these houses. Now to stick that person next to a person who's brewing beer, selling the beer on a big scale, because they were from the shacks, that's how they used to live. But the authorities never agreed to that, what they were interested in, getting in their rent. Consequently you found that that the priority would always [be] given to people on the railways, because their rent was always deducted from [their salary]... Yet Ngo must have used his influence to draw as many professionals to the 1946 Scheme as possible, for it certainly developed such a reputation:

172 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, pp. 5-6.
The Establishment of Nyanga, 1946-52

...people who was [sic] placed there from Sakkiesdorp quickly sorted themselves out, those who couldn't pay the 7/6 per week rental, but this was before my time. When I arrived there were 210 houses and they were occupied by the better type of person, you know. 172

Ngo consequently enjoyed the support of the "very very conservative" people in Nyanga, most of whom lived in the Old Location. 174

Another strategy utilised by Ngo in realising his goal of creating a "better-class" township was to convert the location to a home ownership scheme. Ngo was encouraged by the administration to pursue this:

...I went around to influence the admin, "Look man, chaps, get rid of the houses, it's the only way, otherwise your expenses will run up all the time." "All right then, try and get a motion through the Advisory Board, it must come officially through that in a motion." So six members of the Advisory Board were elected by the residents and I think two by the Divco, there were two, and I couldn't get Mpetha crowd to bite, so I had to get these other two chappies, "Look chaps, this is the advantage...it's dirt cheap at £375, so bring up a motion." So this chap brought up a motion, and Mpetha crowd opposed the motion. 175

Much of the motivation for the conversion to home ownership actually came from Divco and the Native Affairs Department, who agreed that either rents must increase significantly or the houses should be sold in order to eliminate the high annual losses borne by both. 176

The plan to convert the Old Location to home ownership was thus stopped by the Vigilance-dominated Advisory Board. 177 Whether ownership was economically feasible for

172 Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 14. See also interview with Mr A. Grové, 16 June 1993, p. 8; conducted by H. Fast.

174 Interview 2 with M. Mzongwana, 31 March 1994, p. 1; conducted by H. Fast. According to this informant, Ngo's influence did not extend beyond his neighbourhood.

175 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, pp. 7-8.

176 NTS 6512 616/313S vol 2, NAD Secretary to Urban Areas Commissioner (Cape Western), 26 June 1951. The Native Affairs Department subsequently made approval of the new dual-occupancy scheme dependent on the condition that First Scheme houses be sold at market value, although this did not include the land and services: NTS 6154 616/313N, minutes of meeting between Divco, City Council, NAD, and National Housing officials, 27 April 1953.
residents is doubtful, for by Ngo's own admission there was not a well-developed middle­
class in Nyanga. One reason for this was that few advantages accrued to Africans in the
Peninsula if they were educated. Van der Horst's study, based on fieldwork done in 1955-
56, found that there was little correlation in Cape Town between educational level and wages
or type of work performed. What aggravated this situation for teachers in Nyanga was
that it was difficult to find work as there were few educational institutions for Africans in the
Peninsula. An additional factor was the operation of Coloured labour preference in the
Western Cape, which kept Africans out of semi-skilled and skilled positions in the Peninsula,
especially after the war.

Conclusions

State and local authority attempts to demolish shack areas in South African urban areas
during and after World War II were ineffectual, for there was no alternative accommodation
available in the official townships. To encourage local authorities to provide housing for
urban Africans, the state provided loan funds and a partial subsidy. The aims of this policy
were not realised: the costs of the schemes were very high owing to the use of expensive
white labour, the inclusion of capital costs on development work, and the substantial expense

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177 Owing to changes in Nationalist policy over the next two years, it is unlikely that home
ownership for Nyanga residents would have become a reality even if the motion had been approved.

178 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 16.

179 Van der Horst, African Workers in Town, p. 5.

180 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 3. Burman noted that the lack of training institutions for
teachers or nurses and very few employment opportunities in these spheres in the Western Cape made
access to the middle-class even more difficult for Africans in Cape Town: S. Burman, "Divorce and
the Disadvantaged: African Women in Urban South Africa", in R. Hirschon, ed., Women and
of administering controlled locations; the correspondingly high annual subsidies from central and local authorities discouraged the latter from embarking on additional housing schemes.

There were additional reasons for the failure of the housing policy in Nyanga. The intended occupants of the housing scheme, namely Sakkiesdorp residents, could not afford the high rents and moved out as quickly as they moved in. Instead of the houses being allocated to other Africans in the Divco area, corrupt location officials allotted them to people living in the City Council area. The housing scheme built by Divco was therefore occupied by Africans who lived and worked primarily in the City Council area, and the "black spot" of Sakkiesdorp was not eliminated.

Divco was also not successful in dominating the political process in Nyanga. The Vigilance Committee achieved a majority on the Advisory Board for several years, and brought Board deliberations to a halt when they were barred from office by the administration. The tactics of evading and challenging rentals, which had first been developed in Ndabeni and the shantytowns of the Peninsula, meant high accumulated arrears and a correspondingly higher Divco subsidy.

It was the high annual losses which caused both central and local governments to re-examine the cost and financing of housing. Official thinking on the locations was moving towards the idea of the locations paying their own way and not being subsidised by rates. The manager of Nyanga emphasised this when he recommended in 1950 that the financial burden of sub-economic housing schemes be borne not by taxpayers but by industry and commerce and location residents.181 To achieve this meant changes to the housing formula, the tapping of alternative sources of finance, the revision of construction minimum standards,

and studies into cost reductions in the building industry.\textsuperscript{182} It meant, in effect, higher rentals and smaller houses for Africans, which set the stage for future confrontations between Nyanga residents and location officials over rentals and tenancy.

\textsuperscript{182}Sayers, "Housing in the Western Cape", pp. 75-76.
CHAPTER THREE
"The Troublesome Place":
The Extension of Nyanga and Creation of Mau-Mau, 1953-55

"[It is] a wrong notion that the Native who has barely left his primitive conditions should be provided with a house which to him resembles a palace and with conveniences which he cannot appreciate and which he will not require for many years to come."

Dr E.G. Jansen, Minister of Native Affairs, 1950

Introduction

When Dludla carried out his survey of Nyanga in 1980/81, his intention was to establish whether Nyanga could be classified as a "community". To that end, he asked 200 respondents whether they had come to Nyanga by choice or coercion; 90% answered that they had been forced to move to Nyanga. On being asked whether they would leave Nyanga if they had the option, 75% replied in the affirmative.

While these results do not prove or disprove the presence of community identity, they raise questions which can only be answered by travelling back to the Nyanga of the 1950s. Between 1953 and 1958, over 16,000 Africans were forcibly removed from shantytowns in the Divco, Bellville, Parow, and Goodwood areas to tiny houses and self-built shacks in Nyanga. How were they removed? What social and political dynamics arose from the nature of their removal and the accommodation provided? To what extent did people want to stay in the schemes to which they were forcibly removed? Were resistance movements strengthened or weakened by the failed resistance to the removals? These issues will be

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1 Quoted in Morris, History of Black Housing, p. 48.
addressed in the next two chapters, which cover the establishment of the Second Scheme (Mau-Mau) and the transit camp.

In this chapter, there will be a focus on the creation of the Second Scheme, namely Mau-Mau, and the ways in which it differed from the 1946 Scheme. The reasons for the dissimilarities will be outlined, showing that changing state and Divco housing policies resulted in smaller houses and higher rents in Mau-Mau. The effects of this policy will be then described, namely a lack of administrative control and the social distance which developed between residents of the two schemes.

3.1 The building of Nyanga Extension (Mau-Mau)

Divco had embarked on its first housing scheme as a novice and set about preventing a repeat of what it considered to be mistakes. The houses built in the First Scheme were considered too large and extravagant; as one resident remarked, "Council swore that they will never again build houses with such spacious ground."\(^3\) Of the operating expenditure of £10,444 per year in 1948, interest on the debt alone was £4282, or 41%.\(^4\) This entailed significant annual financial losses for both Divco and the central government, which were apportioned 40% and 60% respectively under the National Housing formula. But the ceiling for government losses on the First Scheme had been set at £6300 per year, and as housing losses steadily increased, so did Divco's share of the debt. By 1951 Divco was carrying 58% of the operating losses, namely £8725.\(^5\) Divco was therefore determined that all subsequent schemes would not be subsidised by general rates.\(^6\)

\(^3\)Interview with Mr G., p. 13.

\(^4\)/CT H4/69, Divco Accountant to Secretary, 23 Feb 1948.

\(^5\)/CT H4/68, Actual Revenue and Expenditure for 1952. Divco and the central state had also built houses for Coloured people at Matroosfontein, Hout Bay, and Melkbosch, with government
This was in line with the thinking of the central state, which, along with colonial governments throughout Africa, was moving toward housing policies based upon central planning controls and large-scale urban master plans. African housing policy had been slowly taking form through the late 1940s and early 1950s but was slowed by the fragmentation of responsibility for African housing. During the period 1945-1950, housing issues were variously dealt with by the National Housing and Planning Commission, which administered funds for housing schemes of all population groups, and the Departments of Housing, Health, and Native Affairs. All aspects of African housing were gradually centralised within the Native Affairs Department, so that by 1951 the NAD had appropriated jurisdiction over African housing.

Due to the influx of Africans into urban areas of the Union during the 1940s, the NAD estimated in 1952 that 167,328 houses for Africans were needed immediately and 185,813 over the following 10 years. While government funds had been made available to loans totalling £622,000 (as opposed to the £108,000 loan for Nyanga). As these were sub-economic schemes, they also entailed annual losses borne by Divco: NTS 5586 616/313H, Director of Housing to Provincial Secretary (Cape Town), 1 Sep 1944.

As Divco's revenue was derived from a primarily rural tax base, it was not in the same position as the Cape Town City Council to subsidise housing schemes. Divisional Councils were established for the purpose of constructing and maintaining roads and protecting public health. See NTS 4504 581/313 vol 3, Divco Secretary to Native Affairs Department, 29 Sep 1941; interview with Mr A. Grové, p. 4.


Based on correspondence in GEM 765 H28/359/5 and 4/CT 185/96, Native Housing Schemes. See also NTS 4272 120/313 vol 7, NAD Secretary to Gordon Mears, 26 June 1953; Wilkinson, "Urban Housing", pp. 77-78.
local authorities to build houses for Africans, it was owing to the acute shortage of labour and materials that full use of this allocation was not made during the years 1945-48.\textsuperscript{9}

In order to meet the staggering demand for houses and yet assume minimal financial burdens, the state utilised a number of strategies. First, the responsibility for subsidising African housing was shifted elsewhere. In 1952 the government passed the Native Services Levy Act, which required all firms which employed but did not accommodate Africans to pay a monthly fee to the Native Affairs Department. The fees, which were 2s 6d a week per African employee in the Peninsula, financed the drainage, water, and sewerage work in the locations. Of the fees collected in the Peninsula by City Council authorities, one-third was transferred to the Divisional Council, in return for which Divco was expected to supply one-third of African housing in the Peninsula.\textsuperscript{10}

Secondly, the overall schemes were to be economic even though portions of housing schemes were classified sub-economic. The rentals charged to contract workers were significantly higher than those charged to families, who paid per dwelling rather than per person. In effect, the hostels were to subsidise the married quarter schemes. The absurd aspect of this policy was that sub-economic housing loans for Africans were phased out during the 1950s but continued for other population groups.\textsuperscript{11} This was done despite the results of a 1950 survey by the National Building Research Institute (NBRI), which indicated that "a large proportion of the urban Bantu community...cannot afford to pay any rent

\textsuperscript{9}NTS 4272 120/313 vol 7, Memo (unsigned) to NAD Secretary, 1952. See also Wilkinson, "Urban Housing", p. 66.

\textsuperscript{10}Van der Horst, African Workers in Town, p. 37; Elias, Housing in the Cape Peninsula, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{11}Morris, History of Black Housing, p. 70. This underlines the point made by Gilbert and Ward that the ability of the urban poor to improve their material conditions depends largely on state policy toward the poor: A. Gilbert and P. Ward, "Low-Income Housing and the State", in A. Gilbert, ed., Urbanization in Contemporary Latin America (Chichester, 1982), pp. 79-80.
without jeopardising their requirements for the minimum necessities of life."¹² Those least able to afford housing received no state subsidy, while those with greater means qualified for government assistance.

A third strategy was to drastically cut capital expenditure on housing schemes. As from 1948, the central state did not fund electricity or water within dwellings, which had to be financed by local authorities. In order to avoid the "extravagance" of houses built during the 1940s, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was commissioned to establish new standards for African houses, which were adopted by 1951. All housing plans submitted to the NAD and National Housing and Planning Commission were expected to conform to these standards, which included specifications on the minimum number of rooms, minimum room size and ceiling heights. As the construction of Nyanga's second scheme was to show, this translated into smaller houses, fewer amenities, and cheaper construction, and where standards fell below the minimum, Divco applied for and received exemption from the new standards.¹³

Another cost-cutting tactic was the use of African labour, which had hitherto been prohibited due to the strength of white building unions. The Native Building Workers Act of 1951 allowed for the training of black builders and prohibited non-Africans from doing skilled building work in black areas. During 1953/54, both Divco and the City Council

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¹²Wilkinson, "Urban Housing", p. 82. Africans falling into this category were classified "sub-sub-economic". While no percentages existed for South Africa as a whole, the NBRI found that 47% of Africans in kwaThema could pay only "sub-sub-economic' rentals: ibid., p. 81.

¹³Molteno Papers, DC 379; J5.3, SAIRR memo RR172/51 of 19 Dec 1951. See also note 16 below and Chapter Four, Section 4.1.
established African building squads, which contributed to reducing the cost per square foot of location dwellings.\textsuperscript{14}

Divco made use of all these measures in building the second scheme, called "dual-occupancy" to indicate that two families were to live in one dwelling. To ensure that the cheapest possible design was effected, Divco in 1950 invited various construction firms to build "experimental houses", from which they would choose the final design:

...[Council] then decided to expand, and they called on various firms to build one unit of housing in the townships which we called the experimental houses, because they had one house constructed in pise-de-terre system...then we had one house built of concrete panels, the concrete panels were pre-cast...there was an aluminium house, the company who put up the aluminium house forgot to anchor it and it blew away, I don't think it's been found since. So those were experimental homes, and one of those houses was a brick-on-edge house...Instead of the brick lying flat, the brick was put on end, but that wasn't as effective as it should have been, because when you put the brick on edge your wall is 3" thick instead of 4"...\textsuperscript{15}

The brick-on-edge houses were chosen and placed on plots much smaller than the minimum size established, necessitating special approval and holding up the scheme.\textsuperscript{16}

Once the design had been chosen, construction began next to the First Scheme on land bought from Messrs. L.R. Brown and H.H.O. Abeln for £27,000. A total of 350 dual-occupancy dwellings (700 family units) and 14 hostel blocks accommodating 448 migrant workers were built. In line with government policy, the new scheme was classified sub-economic, with estimated annual losses of £1275 to be offset by the £1653 surplus generated.

\textsuperscript{14}Muthien, State and Resistance, p. 188. The establishment of African building squads led to similar savings in Soweto, where the price per square foot was reduced from R1.22 in 1946 to R0.61 thereafter: P.R.B. Lewis, "A 'City' within a City - the Creation of Soweto" (University of the Witwatersrand, lecture delivered in 1966 and published in 1969), p. 13.

\textsuperscript{15}Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 3. See also 4/CT 1/2/1/177, Divco meeting minutes of 28 Nov 1950.

\textsuperscript{16}AWC 58, Divco Secretary's Report to Council on Conference of Local Authorities, 30 June 1952.
by the hostel scheme. By dropping the standard of house drastically, Divco succeeded in slashing capital expenditure: only £160 was spent per house, compared with the £495 per house expended on the First Scheme seven years earlier.\textsuperscript{17}

The drop in housing standard was to have serious repercussions for the physical comfort of the new residents and the social life of the neighbourhood and location as a whole. The dwellings consisted of only two rooms and were without electricity, floors, ceilings, and internal doors, with one latrine expected to serve the needs of two households.\textsuperscript{18} The "bricks" used were in fact hollow clay blocks which allowed the seepage of water into the interior.\textsuperscript{19} This was aggravated by inadequate preparation of the land:

These houses were built in blocks, blocks L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, etc. I remember S block, which was near the township administration office, was under water every winter. No it was a basic, it was an engineering problem, it was an area that should have been properly filled and drained before construction took place, but it wasn't. No, we had the insistent problem, because half of the Mau-Mau was on a slight rise, and the other half, the S, T, U blocks, were slightly elevated, yet it was in a hollow. No, the damp was not due to bad construction, I think it was bad planning right from the beginning...\textsuperscript{20}

When residents asked for explanations for the dampness, the manager evaded the problem in stating that "Many theories [have] been made but it seemed that none of these fitted in with situation."\textsuperscript{21} It was only when Divco's Medical Officer of Health pointed out the severe

\textsuperscript{17}NTS 6154 616/313N(1) vol 2, Secretary of Health to Divco Secretary, 23 May 1950; Cape Argus, 20 April 1951; Cape Times, 16 May 1951; AWC 58, Divco Secretary's Report to Council on Conference of Local Authorities, 30 June 1952; 4/CT 202/55, Administration questionnaire of 1955.

\textsuperscript{18}P. Mbude, "History of Sihume Road, 30 years ago until the present" (University of Cape Town, Third Year History Project, 1990), pp. 6-7. Although thought was given to adding internal doors, apparently nothing came of it: Cape Times, 1 April 1964 & 24 May 1965; Weichel et al., Nyanga and Crossroads, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{19}Cape Argus, 18 December 1963.

\textsuperscript{20}Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{21}4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 10 June 1954.
health threat posed by these conditions that 120 dual-occupancy houses had floors installed in 1956.\(^{22}\)

The second housing scheme differed substantially from the First Scheme in another important respect: whereas the 1946 houses were built to accommodate families living in the Divco area, the new housing and transit camp schemes were established and managed together with the northern municipalities, namely Parow, Goodwood, and Bellville (hereafter the Combined Municipalities or Combined Area). Houses and hostel beds (and any losses incurred from building or administering them) were to be allocated to each participating local authority according to the size of each area's shantytown population:

...if you were employed in the Divco area, Bellville, Parow, Durbanville, right up to Mamre, right down to Cape Point, excluding the southern suburbs, including Hout Bay, Llandudno...they called that the "Combined Municipalities", and this NDO system, the dual occupancy, originally that was funded by the Combined Municipalities, and they also had problems with squatters, Bellville for instance, in Oakdale. And the portions was divided, it all depends on how much finance they put in, they said a certain amount of houses will belong to Bellville, Parow, and whatever the case may be...\(^{23}\)

Goodwood was expected to fill 43% of the 700 family units with shantytown residents, Divco 27%, Bellville 20%, and Parow 10%. Divco managed this and all subsequent schemes but was supervised by a Combined Native Affairs Committee, which consisted of two representatives from each of the four local authorities.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{22}\) 4/CT H4/68, Divco Secretary to Native Commissioner, 8 June 1956.

\(^{23}\) Interview with Mr A. Grove, p. 3.

\(^{24}\) 4/CT 1/1/1/66, Divco meeting minutes of 28 Aug 1951; interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 4; 4/CT 1/1/1/67, Divco meeting minutes of 28 Aug 1951. The northern municipalities wished to control the scheme on an equal footing with Divco, but were overruled by the Minister of Native Affairs: Muthien, State and Resistance in SA, pp. 179-180.
3.2 From shacks to cubby-holes: the arrival of residents in Mau-Mau

The Advisory Board took up the cause of their future neighbours in arguing that the dwellings were far too small and the amenities scant. When rents for the new scheme were set at 10s a week, the Board requested that they be lowered to 5s 9d. They argued that families in Nyanga paid an average of 10s 5d a week in transport, which pushed their weekly expenses up to £2.15.3 as against the average African weekly wage of £2.10.--. Their appeal was refused.²⁵

The first two-roomed dwellings in the Extension, subsequently named Mau-Mau by residents, were occupied in July 1953 when shanties at Cook's Bush, Ottery (8 km from Nyanga) were demolished and some of the occupants transferred. Because the housing scheme was sub-economic, no family was to be accommodated if its combined income was over £15 a month. It was difficult to calculate how many families earned less than £15 a month and the policy eliminated many families who would remain in Cook's Bush; as a result the rule was relaxed. In terms of forcibly moving Africans to the location and establishing a good working relationship between the participating local authorities, the scheme was considered by Divco to be "very successful".²⁶

The move was not greeted with the same enthusiasm by the unwilling new residents. As one woman from Steenberg stated:

²⁵4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 12 Aug & 10 Oct 1952; 4/CT H4/69, Minutes of Advisory Board delegation to Divco Housing Committee, 12 Feb 1953; 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 12 March 1953. Divco justified the rental by claiming that the average wage for African men was £3 per week: AWC 58, Divco Secretary to Native Commissioner, 15 Aug 1952.

²⁶Interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, p. 1; Cape Times, 21 Sep 1953; 4/CT 1/1/1/75, Superintendent's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 29 Sep 1953; interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 4.
We were forced to move out by the Council because the area was to be set aside for Coloureds. It was a painful experience because I loved the place, our house there was bigger than the one we were forced to move into.\textsuperscript{27}

The incoming tenants immediately complained of the high bus fares, poor transport to the northern areas, and tiny houses without amenities. In addition, they were accustomed to paying much lower rent in the shack areas whence they came.\textsuperscript{28}

These conditions caused the vacation rate in the dual-occupancy scheme to be much higher than in the First Scheme, which gradually became known as the "Old Location". As the massive clearing of Divco "black spots" only began in 1956 and in City Council areas in 1959, many of the new tenants quickly moved back to shack areas. Shortly after the first houses were occupied, the superintendent was reporting that houses were periodically found vacant as the tenants had "absconded", and residents were already building "unauthorised structures" onto their meagre dwellings, a practice that was to become a permanent feature of Nyanga. In September 1955 alone, 82 demolition notices were issued for unauthorised structures.\textsuperscript{29}

The high vacation rate was coupled with staggering rent arrears: by October 1953, 44\% of the dual-occupancy tenants were in arrears and legal action had been taken against 68, of whom many were ejected and others simply left. The problem was blamed on "poor screening" by the participating municipalities: they had allocated houses to many unemployed people, upon whom they blamed the rising crime rates in their respective

\textsuperscript{27}Interview with Mrs M., as quoted in Mbude, "Sihume Road", p. 3.

\textsuperscript{28}4/CT 1/1/1/75, Superintendent's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 29 Sep 1953.

\textsuperscript{29}4/CT H4/16, Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 14 Oct 1953; 4/CT 1/1/1/75, Superintendent's quarterly report, Divco meeting minutes of 29 Sep 1953; 4/CT 1/1/1/84, Manager's report for September 1955, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Oct 1955.
areas. According to Mr M. Schietekat, housing official at the time, almost every Mau-Mau
resident was in arrears with rent:

I took the dual occupancy scheme once, the list of the rent arrears, and I
marked them either "hold" or "summons" for our legal adviser to issue
summons...when I'd done the job....the percentage of persons to be
prosecuted was too large, it was ridiculous, there is some inherent problem,
some other problem that needs to be looked at. Forcing people from where
they are into accommodation which they don't want and which they don't like
in a place which they don't fancy, far away from Cape Town - there was no
railway line then - and the bus service was bad, so you know, moving a man
to a place where he doesn't want to be against his will, do you expect him just
to say, yes well fine.31

One factor exacerbating the arrears situation was the discrepancy in rentals, which in
turn was due to shifts in government housing policy. The First Scheme was still a sub-
economic scheme receiving annual central government and Divco subsidies, whereas the shift
to overall economic schemes for Africans meant that rentals for new houses were higher.
While Old Location residents still paid rents set in 1946, namely 7s 6d a week, Mau-Mau
tenants paid 10r a week for smaller houses with fewer amenities. This was no doubt a
significant factor in the high arrears total, for Mau-Mau residents refused to pay the rental of
10s per week, insisting on paying the 7s 6d per week paid by Old Location residents.32

Owing to the eagerness of government authorities to terminate housing subsidies,
then, rents were high and building standards low in the housing scheme of Mau-Mau. In the
short-term, this negated the aim of state policy to move Africans into controlled townships:
control was difficult owing to high arrears and the ensuing evictions and tenancy turnover,

30/4/CT H4/16, Superintendent to Divco Secretary, 24 Sep 1953; ibid., Divco meeting minutes
of 27 Oct 1953; ibid., Legal Assistant to Divco Secretary, 22 Dec 1953. For an account of the
correlation drawn between African unemployment and crime by northern municipalities, see
Cape Times, 17 Aug 1943.

31Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 15.

32NTS 6154 616/313N, Minutes of meeting between Divco, City Council, NAD, and National
Housing officials, 27 April 1953.
and many Mau-Mau tenants returned to the shantytowns from which they had been removed.

Another effect of the policy is discussed below, namely the frictions that developed between First and Second Scheme tenants.

3.3 Mau-Mau and First Scheme residents

The discrepancy in rentals did not augur well for relations between Mau-Mau and First Scheme residents, which were already strained due to the significant social distance between the recent and settled residents. The occupants of the First Scheme were not very welcoming of the thousands of new residents who outnumbered them by three times (see Figure 2), according to one official:

The existing residents were very disappointed. They told us straightforwardly that these tsotsis, these gangsters, would lower the [standard?] of the township, which did indeed happen.33

First Scheme residents complained that the "quiet" atmosphere of Nyanga was spoiled by the newcomers:

They came from shacks. And they were violent, they liked to fight and we were not used to that and we first saw this in Mau-Mau, black people are fighting and they were selling liquor etc, and we didn't have any of such things here...34

One intriguing aspect of Mau-Mau's history is the various stories about the origin of the name. According to location accountant Mr M. Schietekat, Mau-Mau derived its name from the fact that it was constructed during the Mau-Mau uprising in Kenya.35 This was not the explanation offered by Old Location residents, whose attitudes toward Mau-Mau were

33 Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 11.
34 Interview with Miss M., 4 Jan 1994, pp. 2-3; conducted by S. Blom.
35 Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, 21 May 1993, p. 4.
reflected in their theories about the naming of the area. Daniel Ngo claimed that his brother inadvertently gave the place its name:

"...my brother said to me, "Dan, those people are such a mixed, like the Mau-Mau in Kenya," and the name stuck..."

Mr G. stated it was named Mau-Mau because it was rude people who were staying there in this location, rude people from Elsies River, etc entered that place... [by rude] I mean a person who doesn't have respect, who cares for nothing.

Miss M., concurred with this opinion:

now it was rough, you couldn't travel during the night, they were so rough, and that is why they were called Mau-Mau.

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36 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, pp. 8-9. Information about the Mau-Mau rebellion was regularly reported in the Guardian, which was sold from Daniel Ngo's house.

37 Interview with Mr G., p. 15.
Apparently a story circulated that a dead body was found when the first residents moved in, prompting a rumour that Mau-Mau guerrillas had been there during the night. All of these hypotheses reflect an image of Mau-Mau as a violent and turbulent place.

There were a number of factors which contributed to poor relations between the two neighbourhoods, one of which was the nature of Mau-Mau's establishment and composition. Old Location residents were not forced to move to Nyanga, and after the rapid turnover of its residents during the first two years, a fairly stable population had been created. By contrast, Mau-Mau residents were forcibly transferred to the Extension and their shacks demolished. As Divco shack areas were only completely cleared by 1959, the unhappy new tenants of Mau-Mau had the option of returning to the shantytowns. The number of residents coming and going in Mau-Mau during its first five years was consequently high and had a negative effect on the development of social cohesion.

The dissatisfaction of Mau-Mau tenants was increased by their arbitrary resettlement, for their removal represented only a partial clearing of the shack areas from which they came. Cook's Bush, for example, was a large settlement that was only completely cleared by 1958.

As already noted, the Combined Municipalities displayed a decided preference for moving unemployed or ill people, which aggravated the arrears situation and may also have contributed to crime rates, which were higher in Mau-Mau than in the Old Location.

Mau-Mau was therefore composed of residents selectively removed from numerous shack areas under the jurisdiction of the Combined Municipalities. Removing them from settlements in which they had lived within a context of close community relations, and

38 Interview with Miss M., pp. 2-3.

39 Interview with Mr S., as quoted in Mbude, "Sihume Road", p. 2.

40 A survey of the social composition and political resistance in Peninsula shantytowns during the 1950s is provided in Chapter Four.
placing them in tiny houses next to complete strangers from places as distant as Ottery and Bellville, made the development of neighbourhood "togetherness" unlikely. In reference to such forced removals, R.E. van der Ross stated,

In many cases their previous lives were community lives, in most cases their new lives are not...suddenly all this is gone. A new address, a new house, new people next door. But no togetherness, no homeliness, no neighbourliness. And youngsters look at their elders and realise their powerlessness. It adds to the lack of esteem for their parents, and it adds to their own disorganisation in that they are the more unable to find people to whom to turn for an anchor in their lives.41

Various Old Location residents recognised that the way in which Mau-Mau was created was the cause of the trouble:

...these people from different areas put all in one pot, there are bound to be friction, not friction as such, but lawlessness...Up to this day, if you walk up here, you go over there, there are beatings. Dual-occupancy has retained its character, which we were afraid of.42

A similar sentiment was expressed by all Old Location residents interviewed, who expressed dislike for Mau-Mau:

With the Old Location I don't have a complaint because it was a very quiet place, without troubles. "Izixholoxholo", Mau-Mau, was the troublesome place...there was some roughness, maybe it was because those people had been drawn from various areas and made to stay in Mau-Mau and now they started the trouble which they had been doing in their original places.43

In considering additional reasons for the social distance between the Old Location and Mau-Mau, it is helpful to consider the difference in the previous lifestyle of both groups of residents. Although the occupants of the Old Location had lived in Nyanga for just over seven years, they had become accustomed to the small community of residents and the

41 Quoted in Western, Outcast Cape Town, p. xi.
42 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 8. See also interview with Mrs K., 6 Jan 1994, p. 2; conducted by S. Blom.
43 Interview with Mrs K., p. 2. Izixholoxholo means "troublesome".
controls to which they were subjected. In contrast, Mau-Mau residents came directly from shack areas free of many of the controls operating in the Old Location. There was a thriving informal sector in the shack areas, which included trading and the selling of liquor. As one Old Location resident stated,

...what affected us mostly with them was that it is difficult to stay a squatter life and then also come and stay in the location, because here in the location we like to know what you are doing, what is happening, and that is the thing that confused them, but they later got used to it and we understood each other.\(^{44}\)

The situation was aggravated by the fact that there were reputedly no shebeens operating in the Old Location well into the 1960s, with only traditional beer being brewed.\(^{45}\)

The greater freedom from police and administrative control also resulted in political differences between the two neighbourhoods. In resisting their removal to Nyanga, shantytown residents had become galvanised politically. For example, the regular raids carried out in Cook's Bush to induce shack residents to leave resulted in a strong response to ANC organisers in the camp, who had had little success before.\(^{46}\) According one informant, Mau-Mau residents were not interested in residents' meetings, preferring to attend political party meetings instead.\(^{47}\) This is not surprising, as both the Vigilance Committee and Advisory Board in Nyanga were completely dominated by Old Location residents even after Mau-Mau residents had settled in,\(^{48}\) a dominance which continued into the 1970s.

\(^{44}\)Interview 1 with Mr D., p. 12.

\(^{45}\)Interview with Miss M., pp. 3, 7; interview with Mr J.N., 13 Dec 1993, p. 7.

\(^{46}\)Advance, 17 Dec 1953.

\(^{47}\)Interview 1 with Mr D., p. 12.

\(^{48}\)Sapire found a similar situation in Brakpan, where the more settled inhabitants expressed their grievances through the Vigilance Association, while the newest arrivals showed no interest in this body: H. Sapire, "The Stay-away of the Brakpan Location, 1944", in B. Bozzoli, ed., Class, Community and Conflict: South African Perspectives (Johannesburg, 1987), p. 378.
While Old Location residents generally preferred to attend residential as opposed to political party meetings, some - such as Moffat Phutego, Oscar Mpetha, and Mr Mafanuke - were very active in the ANC. It was the combined political expertise of these men and politically active Mau-Mau residents which became an advantage to Old Location residents, who apparently did not have the political know-how to fight battles with the administration:

They didn't know how to fight for water rents which overcharged them, they were helped by us, this rude location, because people who stayed there and who were involved were Mr Phutego, Mr Mafanuke, who were ANC members...\(^{49}\)

That dynamics within Mau-Mau were significantly affected by the nature of the removals is confirmed by an examination of Old Location relations with two shack settlements next to Nyanga. Sakkiesdorp still existed despite Divco attempts to move all its inhabitants to the location, and a settlement next to the location sprang up after the First Scheme was built.\(^{50}\) Known as Brown's Camp, the land on which these shack residents lived was included within the enlarged boundaries of Nyanga. Mau-Mau tenants were therefore not the only newly registered tenants, for this "undeveloped land" now also fell under Divco administration.

Brown's Camp, which was described as a "reincarnation of the little Sakkiesdorp",\(^{51}\) accommodated 464 people in August 1954, which rose to 916 in November when the occupants of shacks in Philippi (across the road from Nyanga) were moved to Brown's Camp. Although no sanitary services were provided and the residents were expected to walk to the hostels to fetch water, Divco demanded site rentals of £1 a month. The arrears of

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\(^{49}\)Interview with Mr T., 10 Jan 1994, p. 5; conducted by S. Blom.

\(^{50}\)Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 2.

\(^{51}\)Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 5.
these residents made up 19% of Nyanga arrears in 1954 although they only made up 9% of the population; they simply refused to pay rent to Divco, which was unable to take legal action against them as no services were provided. The administration's only recourse was to threaten demolition of the shacks, which caused some of the residents to pay.\textsuperscript{52}

The people of Brown's Camp and Sakkiesdorp, which was still outside the location's boundaries, had been living adjacent to Nyanga for a number of years. Like Mau-Mau residents, they were expected to pay rent to Divco but rarely did. As with the areas from which Mau-Mau residents came, there was presumably less police and no Divco control over these settlements until 1954. Yet good relations prevailed between Old Location residents and the tenants of Brown's Camp and Sakkiesdorp.\textsuperscript{53} Accusations of higher crime rates and vandalism were never levelled at these neighbours, whereas there was immediate antagonism toward Mau-Mau residents.

But what of Mau-Mau tenants' attitudes toward their own neighbourhood and the Old Location? Former residents were not nearly as negative about their area as were Old Location residents. One former Mau-Mau resident claimed that some of the trouble in dual-occupancy originated in the Old Location:

... those from there [the Old Location] came here if they wanted to cause trouble, a young person he would join here in this side to make trouble, and then go back and be safe on that side.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} 4/CT 1/1/1/79, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 28 Sep 1954; 4/CT 1/1/1/80, Manager's monthly reports, Divco meeting minutes of 26 Oct & 30 Nov 1954; 4/CT 202/9, SAIRR Regional Secretary to Divco Secretary, 7 Dec 1954; ibid., Medical Officer of Health to Divco Secretary, 11 Jan 1955; 4/CT H4/16/A, Manager to Divco Secretary, 24 Jan 1955.

\textsuperscript{53} Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 2. According to resident Daniel Ngo, Mau-Mau comprised "different characters, whereas Brown's Camp was composed of one lot": interview 2 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{54} Interview with Mr T., p. 5.
Mau-Mau residents rarely ventured into the Old Location, whose residents admitted that they were only troubled when they passed through Mau-Mau.55

Many Nyanga residents lived in Mau-Mau as a transition stage to moving into bigger houses. Reasons given for leaving therefore related to the size of the houses, not the nature of the neighbourhood. Mrs H. recalls,

...we wanted a big house because the houses in Mau-Mau were small with only two rooms. We wanted a big house in Zwelitsha because it was a new township that was being built, we liked it and so we went to stay there.56

Another factor which profoundly influenced this conflict was the discrepancy in physical space between the two neighbourhoods. The plot of land on which Mau-Mau was built was approximately equal in size to that of the Old Location (see Figure 3), yet it housed over 3100 residents as opposed to the 1100 in the Old Location. The dual-occupancy houses were built in 13 blocks of four-roomed houses per street, with each four-roomed house divided into two dwellings, resulting in 26 families on each side of one street block. By contrast, the Old Location had 13 families on each side of the street.

The difference in living space had a significant effect on social dynamics. Firstly, Mau-Mau families were expected to eat and sleep and socialise and study within tiny two-roomed dwellings. As a result, many of their activities took place out-of-doors and resulted in constant "movement throughout the day which you don't find [in the Old Location]:"

What can you do in a dual-occupancy house, wake up in the morning, wash yourself, what else can you do, except going and sitting in the street, watching the cars go? Whereas...here on the other hand, they've got a hell of a lot to do. We used to initiate a garden competition, Mr [unclear] used to go around watching their gardens and their yards to be kept clean...57

55 Interview with Mrs K., p. 2.

56 Interview with Mrs H., pp. 2-3.

57 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 15.
The Extension of Nyanga and Creation of Mau-Mau, 1953-55

Nyanga, 1953

Legend
- Church
- School
- Exp Experimental Houses
- Bush
- Farm
- Sand
- Cements factory
- Landedown Road
- Kilometres
- Hostels (1953)
- Old Location (1948)
- Dual-Occupancy (Mau-Mau) 1953
- Group Area
- Brown's Camp

Figure 3
Children therefore had no space at home for recreational activities. Bonner found that overcrowding in African townships on the East Rand made it difficult to develop family life as children were encouraged to remain in the streets to make way for adults.\(^{58}\)

This may have contributed to the high rate of juvenile delinquency in Mau-Mau, which in turn led to gangsterism and a reputation for crime. Old Location residents complained that Mau-Mau youths vandalised telephones, lights, and ablution blocks, and that drunkenness and crime were common there:

A policeman didn't enter this place because there was no trouble all over this Old Location. Even during Christmas or at any time, you wouldn't even see a drunk person...that side [of the location] was all wrong and it is still wrong now. As you hear the rumours about the cruelty of Nyanga, let's say for example if you are in Langa, they would say "Nyanga!?!" They are not speaking about the Old Location, they are speaking about that side over the road.\(^{59}\)

Secondly, the high population density combined with the scarce amenities led to fierce disputes. As one Mau-Mau resident recalled:

They were fighting because for example in Mau-Mau there is only one toilet because these houses were built for one person...there was one toilet for two families...some people did clean their toilets and others didn't, and others made them dirty after cleaning and then a conflict would erupt.\(^{60}\)

There was no doubt a much higher level of social tension in Mau-Mau than in the Old Location due to overcrowding alone. As in towns elsewhere in Africa, social conflict needed but a spark in the context of gross overcrowding.\(^{61}\)


\(^{59}\)Interview with Mr G., pp. 15-17.

\(^{60}\)Interview with Mr T., p. 9.

Compare this with Old Location houses, which were situated on relatively generous plots of land which provided physical distance between neighbours. There were fewer people per street and the residents did not compete for use of communal taps, latrines, and bathing facilities. In terms of basic amenities, then, Old Location residents were self-sufficient and had less reason to interact either with Mau-Mau residents or their own neighbours.

Old Location residents were thus privileged relative to Mau-Mau tenants, paying lower rents for houses with four rooms, electricity, water, and water closets. Yet prior to the building of Mau-Mau, Old Location houses had not been in great demand. The first residents from Sakkiesdorp left soon enough because of high rents; although those who followed could afford the rent, the pressures of pass raids, expropriation, and high rents elsewhere were what motivated their move to Nyanga. The houses they moved into were far from comfortable, with no wooden floors, one interleading door, and unfinished inside walls.

As against the Mau-Mau dwellings, however, the value of their houses suddenly increased. Whereas in 1949, "houses then, they would give it to you as you passed the road," by 1955 they were a scarce commodity. This meant a lower turnover of Old Location tenants, who wished to hold onto their houses, and that greater efforts had to be expended to acquire a First Scheme house. Between 1953 and 1955, the only residents who paid their rent regularly were Old Location tenants, for they did not wish to chance eviction.

The combined arrears for Old Location houses were a meagre £65 in 1954, comprising only 2% of Nyanga arrears.

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62 Old Location residents had water laid on in their houses, whereas Mau-Mau residents had to walk over 200 metres to reach communal showers: Mbude, "Sihume Road", p. 7.

63 Interview 1 with Mr D., p. 4.
The actual layout and amenities of the Old Location therefore contributed to an essentially conservative outlook on the part of most Old Location residents. This was reinforced by class, for Old Location residents had been able to pay their rents (unlike the initial tenants, namely Sakkiesdorp shack residents) and were seen as "better type" people by the administration (see Chapter Two). Old Location residents developed a reputation for thinking themselves "just a cut above the others", not only with regards to Mau-Mau residents but also subsequent residents. The area has been typified by all informants as "quiet" and most of its residents, notwithstanding the sprinkling of active ANC and Communist Party members, expressed a desire to be involved in "residential" and not "political" meetings. As one former Old Location resident pointed out, they were afraid to lose what little they had.

Over the years, the relationship between Old Location and Mau-Mau residents continued to be one of distance ("those people from Old Location, they like to stay together, as you know, that side..."). Old Location residents stayed clear of Mau-Mau if possible:

...we were cautious in Mau-Mau...my mother knew two or three families in Mau-Mau, the rest she didn't know...I don't want to say it's pride, she was saving herself from something seeing that Mau-Mau entered in a wrong way. So a person just went to that relative which she knew, whether it be from Bellville, you were not interested to know the other people because of the situation in Mau-Mau then.

This section has explored some of the reasons for this attitude. Old Location and Mau-Mau residents moved to Nyanga under very different circumstances, and changing state

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64 Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 17. See also interview with Mr T., p. 5.

65 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 14.

66 Interview with Mrs L.H., 5 Sep 1994, p. 4; conducted by H. Fast, interpreted by M. Mzongwana.

67 Interview with Miss M., pp. 4-5.
policies resulted in significant discrepancies between the two schemes in terms of rentals, population densities, and quality of accommodation. This caused a social distance to develop between the two neighbourhoods which has yet to be bridged.

3.4 The social and political life of Nyanga, 1953-55

Another group of people who arrived in the location during this time were contract workers, who moved into the "Single Quarters" in April 1954. Although the beds were filled by the end of the month, they were consistently less than half full throughout 1954/55. This was not for lack of contract labourers, for the number of men in registered service contracts in the Divco area was 3344. But when "single" men in Goodwood and Bellville were raided and given notice to take up accommodation at Nyanga, they would simply disappear to another area. The administration struggled to fill the 448 beds as it lacked the legal power to force men living elsewhere to take up accommodation in Nyanga. Although contract workers made up less than 5% of the total population of Nyanga in 1954, their arrears were 26% of the total as they frequently "absconded" without paying rent.

There were some tensions between hostel and married quarter residents soon after the first workers moved in. One Advisory Board member requested that hostel residents should "respect the peace of other residents". When location residents wished to use the hostel

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68/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 29 April 1954; 4/CT 1/1/1/81, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Jan 1955; 4/CT 1/1/1/82, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 May 1955; AWC G1, "Schedule of Natives on Service Contracts", 1954.

69/CT 1/1/1/79, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 28 Sep 1954; 4/CT 1/1/1/87, Manager's Report for Aug 1956, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Sep 1956. The number of "absconders" probably reflected the high rate of annual labour turnover in the Peninsula, which was 138% for the period 1949-54.

70/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 21 April 1955.
dining hall as a recreation facility, the idea was resisted by hostel residents, who stated that their dining hall was primarily for eating. Yet due to the low number of contract workers housed in Nyanga, their presence had no appreciable effect on social relations at this time. It was not until February 1960 that Divco could legally compel contract workers in its area to move to Nyanga, whereupon the number of hostel residents rose steeply and significantly affected social dynamics in the location.

The various groups of people who became residents of Nyanga during 1953-55 therefore had different reasons for being in Nyanga and they also lived in residentially separate areas: the hostels, Brown's Camp, and the Mau-Mau and Old Location schemes. However, some social groups cut across neighbourhood lines. In what follows, the activities of two of these groups, namely women and Sotho people, will be outlined.

As mentioned in Chapter Two, a significant minority of Old Location residents were of Sotho origin, a trend that was to continue with the arrival of Mau-Mau residents. Sotho families requested that Sesotho teachers be appointed and they formed the Batho-Bantu Cultural Syndicate. The syndicate requested an additional tennis court in 1952 and arranged for "singing and dancing for the adults and sports for the children".

Sotho families were socially well-integrated in Nyanga. Although the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) School was set aside for Sotho-medium instruction, many Xhosa-speaking children attended the school; similarly, many Sotho children attended Xhosa-

71 H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 17 Sep, 21 Oct, & 15 Dec 1954.

72 In 1957 a census of Nyanga residents revealed that 82.4% were of Xhosa origin, 11.9% were Sotho-speaking, and 2.7% were Zulu-speaking.

73 H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 22 June & 10 Aug 1950; 1/1/172, Divco meeting minutes of 28 Oct 1952.

74 Cape Times, 21 Sep 1953.
medium schools in Nyanga. Nyanga celebrated a "Moshesh Festival" on 6 March 1955; all residents of Nyanga were welcome to join in this event, which took place annually until the 1970s. All the informants interviewed in the course of this research remembered attending this festival and indicated that there was no conflict within Nyanga based upon whether people were of Sotho, Xhosa, or Zulu origin.

It is likely that one of the reasons that Sotho people in Nyanga maintained their ethnic identity was their workplace experience. As explained in Chapter Two, some of the factories close to Nyanga employed predominantly Sotho workers, many of whom were accommodated on the employers' premises until the construction of Nyanga. Their residential segregation would have reinforced their culturally defined distinctions, which were carried over into Nyanga. Once their workplace segregation ceased, they gradually assimilated with other Nyanga residents. Significantly, the "Moshesh Festival" is no longer an annual occurrence in Nyanga.

Women's organisations and protest activities also drew participants from different neighbourhoods. In December 1952 women from the National Council of African Women and the Nyanga Women's Vigilance Association together petitioned the superintendent for street lights, a school, and more residents' meetings. In 1953 a group of 100 residents

75 Interview with Mrs M. Ngo, pp. 10-11; 4/CT 1/1/1/91, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 24 Sep 1957; 4/CT 202/83, Minutes of Housing Committee meeting, 18 Sep 1957. In 1957, the DRC Sotho-medium school had 500 children, of whom only 64 were Sotho; at the Roman Catholic Xhosa-medium school on Lansdowne Road, 47 of the 136 children were Sotho-speaking: NTS 6154 616/313N(1) vol 2, Divco Secretary to NAD Secretary, 21 Aug 1957.

76 4/CT 239/6, Kaffir Beer; interview with Mrs S. Conjwa, p. 2. See also interview with Miss M., p. 6.

77 A model which seeks to explain the persistence of "tribalism" in Africa is put forward by L. Vail: "Ethnicity in Southern African History", in L. Vail, ed., The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (London, 1989). One of the variables considered in the model is the experience of rural people in industrial workplaces.
representing the Advisory Board and Nyanga women were allowed to send a deputation to Divco regarding the proposed rent rise and the high administrative costs of the location due to so many white personnel being employed. Although the Vigilance Committee was sidelined in 1954, the administration did agree to accept the representations of the Nyanga Women's Vigilance Association in 1954, which was chaired by Mrs Rose Mpetha. In 1955, 100 women from the undeveloped shack area marched to the superintendent's office to demand permission to keep their fowl, goats, and horses, which was to be prohibited under the new Emergency Camp Regulations. They received a reply to their list of grievances, few of which were addressed.\textsuperscript{78}

Various trends can be discerned in the women's protests. Firstly, women belonged to organisations which paralleled those of their husbands. Mrs. Mildred Ngo was Secretary of the NCAW, a conservative women's organisation which steered clear of ANC politics and whose main purpose was to teach women how to become better housekeepers. The Nyanga Women's Vigilance Association was chaired by Mrs Rose Mpetha, whose husband was a moving force in the Vigilance Committee, which worked hand-in-hand with the ANC. One prominent activist to whom this did not apply was Mrs Mildred Holo, an active member of the ANC Women's League, who was served with a five-year banning order in the late 1950s. She had been exposed to politics through her involvement in the African Food and Canning Workers Union, rather than through the two women's organisations in Nyanga.

Secondly, the women did not seem to be as antagonistic to each other as were their male counterparts in the administration and on the Vigilance Committee. One informant recalled that though they waged separate protests and took up different issues, they did not

\textsuperscript{78}4/CT 1/1/1/73, Manager's quarterly Report, Divco meeting minutes of 31 March 1953; 4/CT 1/1/1/78, Divco meeting minutes of 25 May 1954; 4/CT 1/1/1/82, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 May 1955.
compete nor clash with one another.\textsuperscript{79} Lastly, although membership in these organisations was open to all, there tended to be a neighbourhood focus to the protests. The Nyanga Women's Vigilance Association and the NCAW were dominated by Old Location residents, and women living in the shack area organised their own demonstration in 1955.

Vigilance Committee and Advisory Board politics followed the same trend, for both the Advisory Board and Vigilance Committee consisted primarily of Old Location residents. Up until 1953, the Vigilance Committee was supported by the majority of residents; after Mau-Mau residents arrived in the location, few of them participated in either Vigilance Committee or Advisory Board structures. Popular support for both bodies therefore came primarily from Old Location residents, whose participation in a rent boycott is described below.

3.5 The Vigilance Committee and the Rent Boycott of 1953-56

During the period 1953-56, location officials continued to manipulate Advisory Board elections in an effort to stifle opposition to their administration. Again, the Vigilance Committee succeeded in shutting down the Board when it consisted solely of appointees, and it scored a stunning victory in initiating an effective rent boycott and winning its case in court.

Although the Vigilance Committee was keen to have its members elected onto the Advisory Board in 1953, it was hindered by the administration. To remove the thorn in the administration's side, the new superintendent, Mr I.T. Brent, had not adequately publicised

\textsuperscript{79} Interview with Mrs H., p. 5. See also interview with Mrs M. Ngo, p. 4.
the deadline for nominations for the 1953 Board. Despite complaints from the 1952 Board, the entire 1953 Board was appointed.80

Divco was motivated by two factors in manipulating the election so as to exclude Vigilance members. When the Vigilance Committee dominated the Advisory Board in 1951 and 1952, they constantly challenged Divco at Board meetings and were able to make direct representations to Council, where they criticised the location administration. Second, Divco had been unsettled by the Defiance Campaign of 1952, during which 490 people had been arrested in the Western Cape, most of them while defying train apartheid.81 This gave the ANC a "vast new following",82 and the administration no doubt felt threatened by the prospect of having active ANC-aligned Vigilance members on the Advisory Board.

That the main issues taken up by the Board and the Vigilance Committee were Old Location concerns was evident in the protracted battle over rents that took place between 1953 and 1956. The Old Location was still being subsidised at the rate of £12,937 per year in 1954, of which Divco paid £6,637 and the central government £6,300.83 To cut state expenditure, "graduated" rentals were introduced under Government Proclamation 1513 of 1954: if tenants earned more than £15 a month, 3/10 of their additional salary was deducted for rent. The tenant's income included half the earnings of each child and lodger to a maximum of £4 per person. This meant that Old Location tenants could pay as much as £7.4.10 a month, whereas Mau-Mau rents changed little, fluctuating between £2.3.4 and

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80 4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 11 Dec 1952.
81 Muthien, State and Resistance in SA, p. 148. See also Chapter Two, note 150.
82 Lodge, Black Politics, pp. 42-43, 69.
83 4/CT H4/68, Actual Revenue/Expenditure for 1954. Although the dual-occupancy/hostel scheme was generating a surplus of £5449, this surplus could not be applied to the Old Location deficit, which was a Divco and not a Combined Area scheme.
£2.16.4.\textsuperscript{84} Despite strenuous objections to these new rents by the Advisory Board, the plan went ahead and Old Location arrears soon soared to "fantastic amounts".\textsuperscript{85}

The Vigilance Committee immediately sought to use the issue to overthrow the appointed Advisory Board. The Board Secretary, Mr H. Ngezana, who belonged to the Vigilance Committee, circulated Board discussions about the impending rent rise:

> It was then that secret papers which people had not been told about arrived. He brought one paper to us and we read it and found out that this paper was saying the rent would rise [and that] "You shouldn't tell people up until we inform you when to do so." We took the paper and printed it for the whole community.\textsuperscript{86}

Controversy centred on the issue of whether or not the Advisory Board opposed the impending rent rise, with Vigilance members claiming that the Board supported the new graduated rentals.\textsuperscript{87} This created such a stir that residents pressured Board members to resign. When they refused, residents attempted to barricade administration offices so meetings could not proceed, Board members were threatened with violence, and one member was assaulted.\textsuperscript{88}

Ngezana was censured by Divco and the Advisory Board and he agreed to withdraw from the Vigilance Committee. There was no quorum at the September Board meeting and

\textsuperscript{84}4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 12 Aug & 2 Sep 1954. This was due to the fact that Mau-Mau households were supposed to be earning less than £15 a month.

\textsuperscript{85}4/CT H4/16/A, M. Schietekat to Manager, 29 March 1956.

\textsuperscript{86}Interview 2 with Mr D., p. 17.

\textsuperscript{87}According to Divco records, the Advisory Board opposed the new rentals: 4/CT 1/1/1/73, Divco meeting minutes of 31 March 1953.

\textsuperscript{88}4/CT H4/69, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 20 April 1953; ibid., Superintendent to Acting Divco Secretary, 26 June 1953; 4/CT 1/1/1/75, Superintendent's quarterly report, 29 Sep 1953.
plans for a deputation to Council to request fences and trading sites fell through. Again, the Vigilance Committee had been able to bring the Board to a halt after being excluded from participation on the Board.

The anger of Old Location residents over the threatened rental increases provided the momentum that the Vigilance Committee needed to sweep the 1954 Advisory Board elections. Members Oscar Mpetha and Moffat Phuthego led the charge:

When the Vigilance Association was now strong, we saw it fit for us now to challenge the Advisory Board by entering the Advisory Board. We contested the elections, it was me, Mpetha, and another young man called Matanzima. Appointees on the Advisory Board were isolated, as when they were excluded from a residents' meeting called by the Vigilance Committee. As one Vigilance Committee member stated,

What changed now was that things never went smoothly for the council because they could decide on nothing. We blocked their decisions there, because we were strong in voting, it was four against two.

Administration ally Mr Ngo agreed:

...there was a time when the whole Advisory Board was Mpetha crowd, and no progress was made, absolutely, they were just difficult, you know, just difficult.

For all the militancy of the new Board, little was accomplished: nothing was done about leaking roofs, the unfair allocation of houses, or the high bus fares.

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89 4/CT H4/69, Superintendent to Acting Divco Secretary, 26 June 1953; ibid., Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 19 Nov 1953.

90 Interview with Mr D., p. 18.

91 4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 29 April 1954.

92 Interview 2 with Mr D., p. 22.

93 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 7.
Yet the one great advantage of the Vigilance Committee's domination of the Board was their use of that body to challenge the "graduated rentals" which had been promulgated. In time-honoured Vigilance fashion, outside contacts were utilised: J.T.R. Gibson of the Liberal Party petitioned on their behalf, urging Divco to level all rents to the 7s 6d paid by Old Location residents. The request went unheeded by Divco, but the alliance with and expertise of political activists outside Nyanga enabled the Vigilance Committee to take advantage of legal loopholes. The Committee discovered in February 1955 that the new rentals had been declared invalid by the Transvaal Supreme Court. Sam Kahn & Co thereupon successfully challenged the Nyanga graduated rentals in the case of Elizabeth Nabe versus Council, so that from June 1955 on, all tenants were charged a flat rate of £2.3.4 a month. The new rental was also challenged by Sam Kahn in Snethile versus Council, which caused rent payments to slacken as Divco could take no legal action until the case was concluded.

Eventually the rents for October 1954 to May 1956 were declared invalid, so that all summons for rent arrears in that period were unenforceable. This placed the administration in a very difficult position, for those residents who had advocated the withholding of rents were financially in a much better position than those who had paid regularly. Those who had paid demanded refunds of the excess rent paid, which totalled £1365.

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94 NTS 5587 616/313H vol 3, J.T.R. Gibson to Secretary of Divco Housing Committee, 5 July 1954.

95 4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 10 Feb 1955; 4/CT 1/1/1/82, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 May 1955; 4/CT 1/1/1/84, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 20 Dec 1955.

96 4/CT H4/16/A, Superintendent to Manager, 27 Jan 1958; ibid., Edgar S. Nkomo to Divco Secretary, 24 Feb 1956; 4/CT 1/1/1/88, Manager's Report for Oct 1956, Divco meeting minutes of 27 Nov 1956; 4/CT H4/16/1, Divco Treasurer to Manager, 11 Sep 1956.
The administration was stung by the flagrant disregard of rent payments that was successfully advocated by the Vigilance Committee in tandem with the Advisory Board. It retaliated by rigging the next Advisory Board elections. Prior to the 1955 election, some candidates were discouraged from applying by administration officials, who told them that "the office had in mind those who are eligible for the office". True to this statement, six of the 11 candidates were disqualified, resulting in a Board solidly aligned with the location administration. As one Committee member recalled,

When the next term came, we were never told, we were just told that there has been elections already in the office. People like Mabowe and others were elected, we were just put aside, we never entered again.

The new appointees were all Old Location residents with the exception of Caswell Maya, hostel representative between 1953 and 1960.

The Vigilance Committee did not let the Board go unchallenged. Utilising their legal contacts, they found out about another set of rent increases before the Board did, which infuriated the latter. The information was disseminated at a residents' meeting, and the residents subsequently confronted Board members and questioned them about the rent increases.

The dynamics surrounding Nyanga Advisory Board politics were similar to those in other African townships in the 1940s and 1950s. The Boards were often the foci of popular discontent over localised issues, and were consequently used by political organisations such
as the ANC and CPSA to mobilise residents. On the Rand, the ANC actively participated in Advisory Board elections throughout the 1950s, achieving full control of at least three Boards.¹⁰² In Port Elizabeth, the ANC, CPSA, and Council of Non-European Trade Unions contested Board elections from the mid-1940s onward.¹⁰³ As Baines noted of New Brighton and Musemwa of Langa, the Advisory Board provided many activists with valuable political training.¹⁰⁴

In Nyanga the influence of political organisations was indirect but no less important. Rather than running for office as ANC or CPSA candidates, party members participated actively in the Vigilance Committee, which in turn put forward candidates for Advisory Board elections. Prominent Vigilance Committee members Oscar Mpetha and Mildred Holo were active in the African Food and Canning Workers Union, and both drew union members into the ANC.¹⁰⁵ Mpetha and ANC member Moffat Phutego were moving forces in the Vigilance Committee and dominated Advisory Board deliberations during the terms to which they were elected.

### 3.6 Nyanga residents and Divco administration

From an administrative viewpoint, the most difficult task in the expanded location was the collection of arrears. It was impossible for officials to collect rent from door to door as those

¹⁰² Lodge, *Black Politics*, p. 78.


¹⁰⁵ *Morning Star*, July 1957; Interview with Mrs H., p. 9; interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, 12 Nov 1993, p. 7. Mpetha stated in 1956 that "Trade unions are the roots through which the great tree which is the ANC receives its nourishment": Kingwill, "ANC in the Western Cape", pp. 88-89.
in arrears were alerted by neighbours and temporarily fled their houses. Most of the defaulters demanded detailed accounts and subjected the officials to threats and verbal abuse. As the superintendent noted,

"It is a known fact that the official responsible for rent collections and prosecutions is the least loved member of the administration staff." 106

If the rent defaulters vacated their premises, especially in the case of contract labourers, the administration went through the laborious process of tracing their employers via the Langa Registration offices in order to recover the amount owing. 107 Divco's final strategy was to threaten those in arrears with hard labour, for rent arrears was a criminal offence under the location regulations. 108 By the end of 1954, there was an astounding arrears total of £2,739, of which £1,433 was uncollected in Mau-Mau, £530 in the shack area, £711 in the hostels, and only £65 from Old Location residents. The amount rose to £3,544 in 1955. 109

The overall effect of the arrears situation was that many residents were under constant threat of eviction. In April and September 1955 alone, 366 Nyanga residents were served with notices to vacate their premises. Upon receiving a final notice, most tenants paid; those who did not were ejected, as were 9 families in December 1954, 18 in April 1955, and 8 in

106/CT H4/16, Superintendent to Manager, 29 Dec 1954.

107/CT H4/16, Manager to Divco Secretary, 27 Jan 1954. Under Section 20(3) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act No 25 of 1945, Divco could recover rentals from employers, although they were only empowered to do so from 1954 onward: 4/CT 1/1/1/77, Divco meeting minutes of 26 Jan 1954.

108/CT 1/1/1/82, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 26 April 1955; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/67, Divco meeting minutes of 2 April 1947, Section 10 of location regulations. Divco only made arrears a criminal offence at the insistence of the Native Affairs Department: 4/CT H4/16, Divco Secretary to Council, 21 May 1947.

109/CT H4/16, Treasurer to Divco Secretary, 12 Oct 1954; 4/CT H4/16/1, Treasurer to Divco Secretary, 12 Feb 1955.
September 1955. Many tenants pre-empted their ejectments by leaving, so that the number "absconding" was usually greater than those ejected.\(^{110}\)

Meanwhile the informal rental arrangements which characterised the earlier period continued, with houses being "sold" by outgoing tenants to lodgers or incoming residents without Divco's knowledge.\(^{111}\) One tenant attempted, for whatever reasons, to alert the administration to this:

"The 'selling' of houses is a brisk business at Nyanga. Several people who are unknown at the office occupy houses which have been 'sold' to them. These people rent with other peoples names. Here are a few instances..."[there follows a list of 7 Mau-Mau and 6 Old Location houses]\(^{112}\)

This continued the discrimination against the allocation of houses to lodgers, who numbered 676 by 1955, of whom 182 had families with them. The Vigilance members on the Advisory Board again requested that lodgers be given priority over Africans in suburban dwellings, but to no avail.\(^{113}\)

For the most part, then, the state and the Combined Municipalities did not succeed in establishing control over Nyanga residents. The implementation of an economic housing policy resulted in a poor standard of dwelling and unaffordable rents in the hostels and Mau-Mau. This produced rent arrears and the eviction from and vacation of dwellings, which in turn led to a very high rate of tenancy turnover and the return of many Nyanga residents to shantytowns. Combined with the difficulties of tracking rent defaulters through Langa

\(^{110}\)4/CT 1/1/1/81, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Jan 1955; 4/CT 1/1/1/82, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 May 1955; 4/CT H4/16/A, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Oct 1955; 4/CT 1/1/1/84, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Oct 1955; 4/CT H4/16, Accountant to Divco Secretary, 1 Feb 1954.

\(^{111}\)4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 17 March 1955.

\(^{112}\)4/CT H4/16, Anonymous to Divco Accountant and Secretary, May 1954.

\(^{113}\)4/CT 202/55, Native Affairs Department questionnaire on Nyanga, 1955; 4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 20 May & 10 June 1954.
registration offices and the informal rent arrangements made by tenants, the administration could not say at any given time who actually lived in each dwelling. And yet in the years to follow, the government continued to pursue the impossible objective of minimising costs and maximising control.

Conclusions

By 1955, then, the face of Nyanga had changed significantly, with the population rising from 1300 in 1952 to 6200 in 1955. The boundaries of the township had been enlarged to include up to 1,000 shack residents living adjacent to Nyanga, a few hundred contract workers, and 3200 tenants in the Mau-Mau scheme. The new arrivals were not adequately housed, with the majority living either in unserviced shacks or meagre dual-occupancy units. Neither were amenities provided: there were still no churches, meeting halls, bus shelters, street lighting, or permanent schools, and the closest hospital was 8 miles away, with only a weekly clinic run by South African Institute of Race Relations.114 Nyanga had no street names or recreational parks, as all housing funds were being funnelled into the servicing of the new transit camp.115

Residents were therefore doubly disadvantaged: they did not have local access to shops and medical care, and yet transport to and from Nyanga was inadequate and expensive. Bus fares to Cape Town were more than twice the amount for Nyanga than for Langa residents in 1954.116 The inconvenience was equally unsatisfactory: those who worked in the northern municipalities faced a 4 km walk to Klipfontein Road to catch a bus. With

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114/CT 202/55, Native Affairs Department questionnaire on Nyanga, 1955.
115/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 24 Feb 1956.
116 AWC G1, CTCC Schedule of Rail and Bus Fares, 16 July 1954.
average wages estimated at £12 a month, rent and transport alone came to £5 a month for most Nyanga households, forcing many tenants to take in lodgers.\textsuperscript{117}

Nyanga residents challenged the administration over these conditions. Women mobilised through the Women's Vigilance Association and the local branch of the National Council of Women, and were able to gain a hearing (if not an addressing of all grievances) unlike the male-dominated Vigilance Committee. The primary political achievement was the rent boycott initiated by Old Location residents and spearheaded by the Vigilance Committee, which successfully challenged the new rent regulations in court. This was, in a sense, the "golden age" of the Vigilance Committee and Advisory Board, both of which would experience fewer successes and greater administrative control in the later 1950s.

The new state policy for African housing had a profound impact on administrative control of and social dynamics within Nyanga. While the Old Location houses were superior in construction and amenities to Mau-Mau dwellings, rents in the former were lower as they were subsidised under a sub-economic loan scheme. While the economic housing policy allowed the state and the Combined Municipalities to dodge financial responsibility for Mau-Mau, it produced a situation in which tenancy turnover was high and control of location residents was consequently more difficult.

Within Nyanga, the spatial disparities between the Old Location and Mau-Mau, combined with the selective, forced removal of Mau-Mau residents from various shantytowns, produced two neighbourhoods of very different character and created a deep cleavage on a local level. The tension between the two housing schemes was aggravated by the high turnover of tenants in Mau-Mau. Nyanga residents still had the option of leaving the

\textsuperscript{117}NTS 5587 616/313H vol 3, J.T.R. Gibson to Secretary of Divco Housing Committee, 5 July 1954.
location and re-building a shack in one of the City Council camps not under imminent threat of clearance. After 1955, however, the legal and administrative pincers closed very rapidly on all Africans in the Cape Peninsula.
CHAPTER FOUR
"You cannot run until you've crawled":
Forced Removals to Nyanga Transit Camp, 1956-58

Introduction

The new scheme of Mau-Mau housed only a fraction of shantytown residents in the Combined Area, for the influx of Africans into the Peninsula had continued after the war. During 1948, the number of "black spots" in Divco's area rose from 22 to 28, with the number of families totalling 2256 by 1949.1 A detailed survey carried out by Divco in 1948 established that there were 5515 Africans in camps scattered throughout the Divco, Goodwood, Parow and Bellville areas, with the largest concentrations being at Cook's Bush in Ottery (852 people) and Oakdale Estate in Bellville (1000 people).2 The Urban Areas Act was being ignored by landowners, who were not supposed to allow Africans to reside on their land within five miles of an area declared white.3

By 1950 Divco's Medical Officer of Health stated that the (now) 30 "black spots" were "completely out of control".4 The number of Africans living in shacks had more than doubled between 1948 and 1951, with a total of 17,886 living in the Combined Area by 1951.5 This mirrored the broader situation in the Peninsula, where only 30,000 of an

14/CT 185/96, Divco Engineer to Secretary, 20 Dec 1949. The Urban Areas Inspector's population estimates were higher, listing 32 camps with 3438 families: NTS 6511 616/313S vol 1, Inspection Report of H.H.L. Smuts, 19 Nov 1949.

24/CT 185/96, Divco Secretary to Council, 17 Nov 1948; NTS 6511, 616/313S, vol 1: "Pondok Settlements (or Groups) under Health Control Scheme of the Divisional Council of the Cape, April 1948".

3NTS 6511 616/313S vol 1, Report of Divco delegation to Native Affairs Department, 8 Nov 1948.

4Cape Argus, 30 June 1950.

54/CT 239/6, Divco Secretary to Medical Officer of Health, 20 Aug 1951. According to official Divco surveys, the number of shacks more than tripled between 1948 and 1951; it is likely they were
estimated 80,000 Africans lived in locations, on employer's premises, or in compounds by 1954; the remainder lived in informal settlements.  

What caused particular concern to Native Administration officials was the influx of African women. Between 1946 and 1951, the average annual increase in the number of African women in urban areas of South Africa was 8.5%, while the increase for men was 5.4%. To address this, the state amended the Urban Areas Consolidation Act of 1945 with the 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act. Act No 25 of 1945 was applied to all urban areas, not just the local authorities requesting its application as was previously the case, and women were now included in its provisions. To understand the implications this was to have for Nyanga, Section 10 is quoted in its entirety:

10. (1) No native shall remain for more than seventy-two hours in an urban area or in a proclaimed area in respect of which an urban local authority exercises any of the powers referred to in sub-section (1) of section twenty-three or in any area forming part of a proclaimed area and in respect of which an urban local authority exercises any of those powers, unless -  
(a) he was born and permanently resides in such area; or  
(b) he has worked continuously in such area for one employer for a period of not less than ten years or has lawfully remained continuously in such area for a period of not less than fifteen years and has not during either period been convicted of any offence in respect of which he has been sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine for a period of more than seven days or with the option of a fine for a period of more than one month; or  
(c) such native is the wife, unmarried daughter or son under the age at which he would become liable for payment of general tax under the Natives under-enumerated in 1948, as many small camps remained undetected in the dense bush and were unreported by property owners.

6 Molteno Papers, BC 579; J5.5, SAIRR memo on "African Housing in the Cape Peninsula", 2 March 1954. See also Van der Horst, African Workers in Town, p. 36. The proportions were similar in other urban centres; in East London, for example, only 20% of Africans in the locations lived in municipal houses in 1955: Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, p. 45.

7 Muthien, State and Resistance in SA, p. 16.

8 As Friedman pointed out, urban African policy often evolved in direct response to the inability of the state to control the settlement of African women: M. Friedman, "Looking for green pastures": the urbanisation of African women in Pretoria in the early twentieth century" (Paper presented to the "Promoting Women's History" Workshop, Rhodes University, 1995), p. 1.
Taxation and Development Act, 1925 (Act No. 41 of 1925), of any native mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of this sub-section and ordinarily resides with that native; or
(d) permission so to remain has been granted to him by a person designated for the purpose by that urban local authority.

In 1957, a further amendment stipulated that women could only qualify to remain if they had obtained permission to live in the urban area when they originally entered. Section 29 introduced the provision that those with "permanent" qualifications could lose these rights if they were judged to be "idle and disorderly". 9

Quick to respond to the legislative changes, the Cape Town City Council began issuing work permits to African women in 1954. One woman explained why women so readily applied for the permits:

We were tricked. They said that if we had our "dombook" we would be able to travel all over and that if anything happened to our husbands we would get pensions. So we said "Good!" and we all went down to the offices to have our photos taken. Nothing happened for five years. 10

By January 1955, most of the women in Nyanga had been registered, and thereafter the superintendent of Nyanga was authorised to extend their permits. 11 By 1956, 14,955 wives had been given permission to reside with their husbands, while 12,299 women were permitted to remain in the Peninsula for purposes of employment; only 4928 women left the area or were refused permission to remain. 12 The permits were issued freely by City Council officials until 1959-60, when they began "endorsing out" thousands of African women.

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9Bekker and Humphries, Administration Boards, pp. 50-51.

10Quoted in Silk, Modderdam, p. 44. The informant lived in Windermere, which was not subjected to "black-spot" clearance of families until 1959.

114/CT 1/1/1/81, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 22 Feb 1955; AWC 58, CTCC Chief Inspector to Manager of Native Affairs, 8 Feb 1957.

Forced Removals to Nyanga Transit Camp, 1956-58

The issuing of permits to African women and reference books to African men in the Peninsula 1954/55 was to have enormous ramifications for Africans in the Combined Municipalities. Within a year, these documents formed the basis upon which officials decided which families "qualified" to remain in the Peninsula. Those who did not were "endorsed out" of the proclaimed area, while those who did or whose status was in doubt were forcibly transferred to the site-and-service emergency camp in Nyanga, where they waited for permanent accommodation to be built.

This process involved a spatial re-mapping of the Cape Peninsula, with African shantytowns destroyed and their occupants funneled into large site-and-service camps on the edge of Cape Town. In this chapter, the reasons for the state's elimination of "black spots" and establishment of centralised emergency camps will be outlined, and then the implementation of this policy will be described. In tracing popular resistance to the removals, it will be demonstrated that while political strategies to halt the destruction of shantytowns did not succeed, removees were able to transplant their traditions of resistance and stake out spaces of autonomy within the Nyanga emergency camp.

4.1 The establishment of Nyanga transit camp

The mushrooming of informal settlements in post-war South Africa exposed the state's failure to provide adequate housing for Africans. It also represented a breakdown of government control, for shantytown residents were able to undermine the pass system by establishing and

13 African men in the Peninsula were issued with reference books in 1955: Cape Argus, 4 July 1955.
controlling their living environment. The thriving informal businesses, unfettered political activity, and lack of police control in the settlements posed an obstacle to the political hegemony of the state. In the western areas of Johannesburg, for example, a surge in political protests in 1949-50 played a major role in the decision by state and local authorities to clear Africans from the area. In reacting in this way, the South African state was little different from its counterparts in Latin American countries, where state intervention in slum settlements occurred only when social stability or the legitimacy of the political system were threatened.

Yet the South African state was faced with a quandary: on the one hand, the government carried no financial burden in housing shantytown residents; on the other, "total control and perpetual scrutiny" were not achieved. As Minister of Native Affairs W.M.M. Eiselen remarked,

"Only by provision of adequate shelter in properly planned Native townships can full control over urban Natives be regained, because only then will it be possible to eliminate the surplus Natives who do not seek or find an honest living in the cities." This echoed the findings of the Britten Enquiry of 1943, which linked housing provision with influx control (see Chapter One).

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16 Gilbert and Ward, "Low-Income Housing", pp. 119-120.

17 This phrase was coined by J. Rex in "The Compound, the Reserve and the Urban Location: the Essential Institutions of Southern African Labour Exploitation", in South African Labour Bulletin 1 (4) 1974, p. 12.

18 Quoted in Wilkinson, "Urban Housing", p. 78.
By 1948, the central state had indicated to local authorities that the solution to the housing shortage and African influx lay in transferring urban Africans to site-and-service schemes until such time as permanent housing was built. A precedent had been established in 1946 when the Johannesburg City Council demolished shantytowns and forcibly moved 60,000 people to the massive Moroka Emergency Camp, which had 11,200 sites. This serves to underline the point made by other historians, such as Maylam and Kinkead-Weekes, that there were long-term continuities between segregation and apartheid.

The Nationalist government therefore carried forward the site-and-service approach adopted by the United Party and local authorities, for it was expected to achieve both control and a minimal financial burden. This was stressed by the NAD Secretary in 1950:

...this is a point that cannot be too strongly stressed for apart from the cost of land and services no capital outlay by anyone except the natives themselves is involved....

The policy was also attractive because it presented a relatively quick resolution to the elimination of shantytowns: as the case of the Cape Peninsula was to demonstrate, the construction of permanent accommodation for "qualified" Africans in shantytowns was only completed in 1973. In the time lag between the removal of shantytown residents and the move into permanent housing, the emergency camps were to provide a central place of control.

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19/4/CT 1/2/1/1/69, Divco meeting minutes of 28 April 1948.

20Morris, History of Black Housing, pp. 37-38. The removals sparked riots in 1947, during which three policemen were killed: Lewis, "Creation of Soweto", p. 8.


22NTS 4272 120/313 vol 7, NAD Secretary to Secretary for Health (Cape Town), 21 March 1950.
Once the restrictive provisions of Section 10 were spelled out in the 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act, it was clear that many of the people removed to the emergency camps would not be allowed to remain in the urban area. As the NAD Under-Secretary C.A. Heald stated in 1955:

After all the natives now living in the various squatter camps have been concentrated under proper control in the emergency camp, all those families who in accordance with policy are not entitled to be in the area will be repatriated and approved houses will be built for those families who qualify under section 10 of the Act [No 25 of 1945] to remain in the urban area. 23

The camps were therefore to serve a dual purpose, namely to bring "qualified" urban Africans under state control and surveillance, and to provide a "clearing-house" for the screening and expulsion of "unqualified" urban Africans.

A crucial feature of Native Affairs Department policy was the centralised nature of the schemes. Although the Divco schemes were at first to be sited in existing shantytowns, which were as far afield as Kommetjie, Fishhoek, and Ottery, the idea of a centralised scheme encompassing Parow, Bellville and Goodwood and run by Divco was decided in principle by 1948. 24 When applied to huge areas such as those encompassed by the Combined Municipalities, the inconveniences for removees were great. From a government viewpoint, however, the situation was advantageous. By excluding Africans from living anywhere in the Combined Area and forcing them to live in a centralised camp, Divco was limiting the space within which Africans lived, both in a physical and political-economic

23 AWC G1, C.A. Heald to CTCC Town Clerk, 10 Sep 1955.

24 4/CT 1/2/1/1/70, Divco meeting minutes of 31 Aug 1948; 4/CT 1/2/1/1/71, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Nov 1948. The scheme originally included Pinelands, Durbanville, Fish Hoek, and Milnerton, which later withdrew from the arrangement: 4/CT 185/96, Peninsula Local Authorities to Minister of Native Affairs, 17 Sep 1948.
sense. As Cooper noted, the most critical division of space in Africa is that of "legal" and "illegal" space, with the latter posing a political threat to the state.25

In establishing its emergency camp, Divco had many examples besides that of Moroka to follow. Durban Corporation had bought land at Cato Manor in 1952 and established an emergency camp comprising 4427 sites.26 By 1954, the installation of 30,000 serviced sites at the future Soweto had begun.27 This was representative of the process in which established inner-city African communities were uprooted and reconstructed on the urban periphery.28

The fact that Divco and its three partner municipalities were establishing their own emergency camp was opposed by the Cape Town City Council. As the CTCC Manager of Native Administration, Mr S.A. Rogers, noted,

The administration of two adjoining Native Townships by separate local authorities is fraught with innumerable administrative difficulties as the result of variance in policies and other factors.29

The CTCC administration, for example, provided 500 portable huts on serviced sites for Africans who possessed Section 10(1)a/b qualifications,30 whereas Divco expected all shack residents to demolish their shacks and re-erect them in Nyanga. The comparisons between

26G. Maasdorp, "Introduction", in G. Maasdorp and A.S.B. Humphreys, eds., From Shantytown to Township (Cape Town, 1975), pp. 16-17.
27Wilkinson, "Urban Housing", p. 83
28Lodge, Black Politics, p. 93.
29AWC Gl, S.A. Rogers to CTCC Town Clerk, 31 July 1956.
30AWC G11, CTCC Treasurer to Town Clerk, 27 Feb 1959.
Nyanga and Guguletu (Nyanga West) which cropped up in future years originated in the separate development of the two adjoining townships.

Notwithstanding this opposition, Divco applied pressure on the central government to enable Divco to institute a scheme along the lines of the Moroka Emergency Camp. Divco was stymied by its legal inability under the Housing Act to expropriate land for an emergency camp. Throughout 1948 Divco sent a flurry of telegrams to Pretoria to persuade officials that Divco was on the verge of catastrophe if the enabling legislation was not passed immediately.31

The state would not grant these powers until Divco submitted its plans for the emergency camp, which involved lengthy consultations with the municipalities of Parow, Goodwood, and Bellville. Thus it was only in February 1954 that Divco was empowered to apply the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act No 52 of 1951.32 The Act authorised local authorities to demolish shanties without a court order, compel Africans to reside in a "Native location, village, or hostel", and establish an emergency camp in which to accommodate them.

Nyanga location was enlarged when an adjacent area of 261 morgen was bought in 1952 for £59,854, which included a large portion of the farm "Duinefontein" belonging to Mr H.J.S. Durr and smaller plots belonging to five other landowners. The sites of the emergency camp were reduced from the original 70'x45' to 60'x40' to accommodate more people, although this occurred over the objections of the National Housing and Planning

31 NTS 6511 616/313S vol 1, NAD Secretary to Secretary for Health, 15 March 1949; see also various telegrams in this file. This seems to indicate that much of the pressure to clear shantytowns in the Peninsula came initially from Divco and not the central state.

324/CT 1/1/1/66, DMM of 28 Aug 1951; AWC G2, NAD Secretary to CTCC Town Clerk, 10 Sep 1955.
Commission. The area was levelled and cleared, 2500 sites marked out, and site rentals set at £1/month. The servicing of the camp was financed by the Native Services Levy, which was first collected from employers in 1953.33

Although Divco stated that the "controlled squatting scheme" was to exist for only a few years, it was apparent to officials that the process of screening residents and building houses for "qualified" Africans would be a long one. No sooner was the camp filled than the name was changed to more appropriately reflect the nature of its existence:

I changed the name to transit camp. Yes, emergency camp indicated that there was an emergency. There was no emergency, it was an ongoing thing. The best word I could find was transit camp.34

Unlike the Nyanga West Emergency Camp, which existed for seven years, the Nyanga transit camp was not completely cleared until 1973, 17 years after its establishment.

4.2 The removals

Although the first sites in the emergency camp were available for occupation on 1 May 1956, 600-700 families had already been transferred to the camp owing to flooding and smaller "black spot" removals.35 This meant that they had to rebuild twice within one year - first in Nyanga, and then on a serviced site.

The removals began in earnest in mid-1956, at which time there were 12,714 Africans living in shanties in the Divco and Goodwood districts. By October 1956, there were 3158 people in the transit camp (in addition to the 1842 residents in Sakkiesdorp and

33 AWC 58, Divco Secretary's Report to Divco, "Problem of Squatting Natives", 1952; ibid., NAD Secretary to Divco Secretary, 24 Jan 1953; ibid., Meeting of Peninsula Local Authorities Re. "Squatting Natives", 30 Jan 1953; NTS 6154 616/313N(1) vol 2, Native Affairs Department memo, 1953; 4/CT 1/1/179, Divco meeting minutes of 28 Sep 1954.

34 Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 1.

35 NTS 5588 616/313H(1), Divco Secretary to NAD Secretary, 12 June 1956.
Brown's Camp, who were gradually transferred to the transit camp); the number climbed steeply to 8406 transit camp residents and 1246 "other squatters" by November 1957. By June 1957, the Combined Area's 48 "black spots" had been reduced to only three, and by early 1959 all of the shack areas in the Combined Area had been cleared. The transit camp population stood at 11,474 people.  

Shantytown residents were moved area by area. Oakdale Estate in Bellville and Goodwood's shack settlements, most of which were concentrated in Elsies River, were the first to go, with 4709 people transferred to Nyanga during 1956 and 2499 in 1957. After Goodwood came Cook's Bush (in the Divco area), from which some residents had already been moved to Mau-Mau in 1953; its population was reduced from 2628 to 308 residents between August 1957 and February 1958. Next came Turner's Bush, Jakkalsvlei, Surrey Estate, and Welcome Estate (see Figure 1, p. 50), which were cleared of 2219 residents between February 1958 and February 1959.

In order to induce shack residents to demolish their shacks and rebuild them in the far-off transit camp, Divco utilised several strategies. Schools in the camps were closed well in advance of the removals. By forcing scholars to commute to Nyanga while living in places like Elsies River, the final move to Nyanga became inevitable if parents wished their children to continue their education. Women's passes were not renewed unless they had a site allotted to them in Nyanga; in addition, a family paid rent in two places if it did not take up residence

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36 4/CT 1/1/1/86, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 29 May 1956; 4/CT 1/1/1/88, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 27 Nov 1956; 4/CT 1/1/1/92, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 23 Dec 1957; Cape Times, 6 June 1957 and 11 Feb 1959; RSC 115, Superintendent’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 24 Feb 1959.

37 NTS 6512 616/313S vol 3: "Particulars of Native Squatting in Cape Divisional Council Area, 1959". See also RSC 113, Manager monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 29 July 1958.
in the camp immediately.\textsuperscript{38} The strategy in Goodwood had an ironic twist: shacks in Elsies River were to be demolished as they did not comply with building regulations. As one removee noted, "The very same pondok which does not conform in Elsies River apparently conforms excellently in Nyanga."\textsuperscript{39}

Despite the Divco Secretary's public assurances that the Camp was "being established without friction, pain or hardship",\textsuperscript{40} the manager reported that there were apparent signs of reluctance on the part of squatters to move to the Transit Camp, and the indications are that they are being advised against the move.\textsuperscript{41}

Cook's Bush residents appealed against the speed of their forced removal from Ottery via the Grassy Park Vigilance Association, which was represented by a lawyer.\textsuperscript{42} Removals in early 1956 had to be put on hold as Divco was the object of public criticism for moving shanty occupants during winter,\textsuperscript{43} which was particularly early and severe in 1956. According to one official, the amount of resistance to the move varied considerably:

You get a certain percentage who knock at the door, "Excuse me sir, what will my number be? When can I move in? When can I start building my pondok?" And then you have the other gangsters in the black spots saying to them, to the local newspapers, "We ain't goin' nowhere."\textsuperscript{44}

Regardless of the protests and resistance, the removals continued.

\textsuperscript{38} Cameron, "Bantu Education", p. 153; Cape Times, 10 June 1957; New Age, 24 May 1956.

\textsuperscript{39} New Age, 24 May 1956.

\textsuperscript{40} Cape Times, 9 Aug 1956. See also ibid., 6 June 1957.

\textsuperscript{41} 4/CT 1/1/1/90, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 April 1957.

\textsuperscript{42} 4/CT 1/1/1/74, Divco meeting minutes of 30 June 1953.

\textsuperscript{43} NTS 5588 616/313H(1), Divco Secretary to NAD Secretary, 12 June 1956.

\textsuperscript{44} Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 7.
Chapter Four

One important aspect of Divco's removal figures was that the population of the camps was "reduced" by 14,877, yet only 11,474 people were in the transit camp. This was due to the Native Affairs Department’s wish that Africans be screened as they were moved, "and any who have no right to reside in the Peninsula should be disposed of by other means." Such a process was used in Durban, where 56% of Cato Manor residents "disappeared" during the removals to KwaMashu between 1958 and 1965. Over half of the Cato Manor residents were, as in the Combined Municipalities, without legal permission to be in the proclaimed area.

Although screening continued after the removals, many people were not even allocated sites in the Nyanga transit camp if they could not produce a work-seeker's permit or service contract, documentary proof of marriage, and permission for wives to be in the area. Africans were not allowed to register for a site in the transit camp if they "were not married Western", resulting in many hasty marriages. One African woman was told by an official to "go to the Langa bachelor flats and ask one of the single men to marry you."

45 NTS 6512 616/313S vol 3: "Particulars of Native Squatting in Cape Divisional Council Area, 1959".

46 NTS 6511 616/313S vol 1, NAD Secretary to Secretary for Health, 14 Dec 1949.

47 G. Maasdorp and P.A. Ellison, "Beyond Cato Manor", in G. Maasdorp and A.S.B. Humphreys, From Shantytown to Township (Cape Town, 1975), p. 61. It is likely that "disappearances" occurred elsewhere, as the screening of shack occupants prior to and during their removal took place throughout South Africa; see, for example, B. Taylor, Controlling the Burgeoning Masses: Removals and Residential Development in Port Elizabeth's Black Areas 1800s-1990 (Grahamstown, 1991), p. 81.

48 4/CT 1/1/1/85, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 27 March 1956.

49 Muthien, State and Resistance in SA, pp. 197-198; see also Posel, Making of Apartheid, pp. 204-206. Many women who were separated, divorced, or widowed were allocated sites in the camp if they were categorised as "displaced", that is, there was no place in the reserves to which officials could send them. For a discussion of this, see Chapter Five, Section 5.1 and Chapter Six, Section 6.1.3.
This was representative of Native Affairs Department policy, which was attempting to reconstruct the "African family" along the lines of the Western nuclear family.\textsuperscript{50}

Of the 397 structures left in the Cook's Bush area in 1957, only 240 shacks had occupants who "qualified" to be in the transit camp. Administration records bear witness to significant number of Africans who were not assigned a site: in February 1957, 56 families were refused sites in the camp; in May 1957, 30 families were turned away, of which seven were refused due to residing in the City Council area. This trend continued into 1958, when an average of 58 applications were refused each month.\textsuperscript{51}

Many of the Divco shack occupants issued with notices to move to the Nyanga transit camp were therefore "found to have left the area".\textsuperscript{52} There is little doubt that many of them moved to the shantytowns falling under the jurisdiction of the City Council, either because they worked in the City Council area or because they did not "qualify" to be in the Peninsula and were enjoying a brief reprieve before the City Council started its demolition of shacks in 1959.

As the Native Affairs Secretary had pointed out to the City Council, the advantage of the scheme from an administrative viewpoint was that the government did not bear the costs of resettlement. The costs were rather borne by the shantytown residents themselves, not only in financial but also in physical and human terms.


\textsuperscript{51}4/CT 1/1/89, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 26 March 1957; 4/CT 1/1/90, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 June 1957; 4/CT 1/1/92, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 29 Oct 1957; 4/CT 1/1/93, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Feb 1958; 4/CT 1/1/94, Divco meeting minutes of 25 March & 29 April 1958; RSC 113, Divco meeting minutes of 29 July & 26 Aug 1958.

\textsuperscript{52}RSC 113, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Sep 1958.
If residents refused to move, they were fined £2 and their shacks demolished. This forced many people to sleep out in the open while they re-built their meagre shanties, a bitter experience if it was raining, as during the Kraaifontein removals. One woman vividly remembered the experience of moving to the camp:

Whenever they made the forced removals, maybe it's raining, you have got children, you have got all your belongings, it was just...they will put you in an open field and see that you build your own house. Illness was common as people were left without shelter, and once the move was completed, many children became sick from the disease-carrying flies which infested the latrines.

The financial costs of the move were also high. Camp residents were expected to erect their own shacks in Nyanga, and their requests for future compensation when their structures were to be demolished were ignored. Many people lost their savings on transport and materials, a situation compounded if they had been sharing a shack with others. A cheap shack in 1957 cost at least £25 and one with windows, floors, and ceilings came to £100. Average wages for Peninsula Africans were between £2 to £4 per week at this time.

As with all Africans who moved to Nyanga, the increased commuting distance imposed a heavy financial burden. A Social Science survey carried out by the University of Cape Town in 1954 warned against centralising Africans in Nyanga, as families would have to pay an extra 7s 6d to £1 per week on transport. People already resident in Nyanga were spending 20% of their income on transport; although the proportion of malnourished African

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53 Interview with Mrs L., p. 1; New Age, 29 March 1956.
54 Interview with Mrs N., 5 Sep 1994, p. 4; conducted by H. Fast, interpreted by M. Mzongwana.
55 New Age, 16 May 1957.
Forced Removals to Nyanga Transit Camp. 1956-58

children in the Peninsula was 60-70% in 1957, it was reportedly much worse in Nyanga due
to high transport costs alone.\(^{57}\)

The transport inconvenience was just as great, especially for those employed in the
northern areas. People working in Bellville, for example, had to take a bus from Nyanga to
Claremont, a train from Claremont to Salt River, and then transfer to the Salt River-Bellville
train. Even though some firms subsidised the costs involved, many workers quit due to the
increased travelling time. Some Kraaifontein residents lost their jobs in a Paarl canning
factory as the lorries sent to pick up the workers refused to drive as far as Nyanga.\(^{58}\)

In addition to the hardships and costs of moving, their new home was no more than a
piece of ground. Plots had been numbered and pegged off but not properly cleared, so that
people had to remove bushes, level hills, and fill holes. The land had not been adequately
prepared for drainage, causing the winter rains to flood some of the shacks and forcing the
occupants to move again. There was one water tap for every 12 houses and one latrine for
every four, with the latrines consisting of a hole in a concrete slab and a door that did not
lock on the inside. The entire scheme was without electricity, public phones, a civic hall,
and shops.\(^{59}\)

The hardships did not cease after the move. A survey of African families living in
informal settlements on the Cape Flats in 1954 revealed that only 40% of them had been in
the urban area for 10 years.\(^{60}\) Most of the families transferred to the transit camp were

\(^{57}\) NTS 6154 616/313N(1) vol 2, Summarised proceedings of SAIRR Conference of 2 April 1954;
Cape Argus, 31 Jan 1957. See Chapter Three, Section 3.2 and Conclusions.

\(^{58}\) NTS 6154 616/313N(1) vol 2, Summarised proceedings of SAIRR Conference of 2 April 1954;
New Age, 29 March 1956.

\(^{59}\) New Age, 16 May 1957.

\(^{60}\) Van der Horst, African Workers in Town, p. 31. See also Elias, Housing in the Cape Peninsula,
pp. 59-60.
therefore in a tenuous position, and Divco lost no time in exploiting it. Within weeks of moving house and home, hundreds of women were refused the renewal of their permits and ordered out of the Peninsula. Police raided the transit camp regularly and monitored the bus stops to apprehend "illegals".61

From an administrative point of view, the entire exercise of clearing all the shack towns was a great accomplishment:

...in terms of the law at the time, it was extremely successful. If you think in terms of having cleared, shall we say, the white areas - all this in inverted commas, of course - cleared the white areas of black spots, yes, it was very effective.62

The removals were also financially successful, with Divco saving £43,842 out of a budget of £208,524 in servicing the emergency camp.63 Over half the removals had been completed by 1956, whereas City Council removal of families only commenced in 1959 with the transfer of 13,000 people at Windermere to the Nyanga West Transit Camp.64

According to Divco administration, it had provided well for transit camp residents:

Pit latrines were put down...one pit latrine for every two houses, I can't remember, and then we had standpipes, water standpipes, one for every four houses. Now, if you have an apoplexy and you say, "My God, man, do you want to tell me that you actually placed four people on a barren piece of land with only one tap, was the best you could do?" Then my answer is this: if you take into consideration where these people came from, the abject squalor in which they lived in the various existing, still remaining black spots, and

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61New Age, 12 Dec 1957; Kinkead-Weekes, "Africans in Cape town to 1973", p. 335. Many women came to the Athlone Advice Office upon being endorsed out of the transit camp; some of these cases are described in the Advice Office records, BC 1020, Box C2, File I.

62Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 6.

63NTS 5588 616/313H(2), Secretary of National Housing Office to Executive Committee, Bantu Housing Board, 21 Oct 1959.

64Elias, Housing in the Cape Peninsula, pp. 59-60. In fact, the Native Commissioner for the Cape Peninsula froze the Native Services Levy and housing funds of the City Council until the Council established an emergency camp: Muthien, State and Resistance in SA, p. 181.
then putting them there on tarred roads with a latrine and running water, was a magnificent achievement. You cannot run until you've crawled.\(^\text{65}\)

Not all agreed with this official that the net effect was "beautiful rows of neatly spaced, self-constructed little pondoks".\(^\text{66}\) The City Council Engineer offered his opinion of the camp in 1957:

Overcrowded and cramped construction of pondoks in every state of dilapidation and disrepair have completely nullified the principal objectives which these schemes sought to achieve...which can only reproduce - in even worse form - the undesirable conditions they were intended to eliminate.\(^\text{67}\)

A deputation of transit camp residents and Member of Parliament Ben Turok complained to Divco in 1957 about the appalling conditions in the camp,\(^\text{68}\) but their concerns were not addressed.

The story of such removals was repeated in urban centres throughout South Africa during the 1950s.\(^\text{69}\) Moreover, the removals continued over the following decades: between 1960 and 1983, an estimated 3,500,000 black people were forcibly relocated, including labour tenants on white farms, property owners in classified "white" rural and urban areas, or

\(^{65}\)Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 6.

\(^{66}\)Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 7.

\(^{67}\)AWC G2, second Report of CTCC Engineer on proposed Nyanga West Native Township, 5 June 1957. The CTCC Medical Officer of Health concurred with the engineer's opinion: G11, CTCC Housing Action Sub-committee meeting minutes of 29 July 1958.

\(^{68}\)4/CT 1/1/92, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 26 Nov 1957.

occupants of land in "consolidation" areas. In most cases, the moves involved loss of income opportunities, greater commuting time and cost, and community disruption.

South Africa was not alone in eliminating slums and forcibly removing the residents to low-income housing projects. In places as diverse as Nairobi, Rio de Janeiro, and Manila, authorities demolished shack settlements and transferred occupants to houses which were smaller, further from the workplace, and unaffordable. Unlike South Africa, however, removees could register their protest by moving into other uncontrolled settlements.

There were therefore similarities between Cape Town and many Third World cities until the 1950s in terms of settlement patterns. Economic factors produced increasing social differentiation along spatial lines, with informal settlements steadily pushed to the periphery of the city (see Chapter One). These socio-spatial configurations continued in these cities and South African urban centres in the 1950s and 1960s, with one significant deviation: the segregation in South Africa was along racial lines and was enforced by law.


71 Morris, History of Black Housing, p. 69; Maasdorp and Humphreys, Shantytown to Township, p. 17. For a moving eyewitness account of removals during the late 1960s, see C. Desmond, The Discarded People: An Account of African Resettlement in South Africa (Harmondsworth U.K., 1971).

72 C.L. Choguill, "Crisis, Chaos, Crunch? Planning for Urban Growth in the Developing World", Urban Studies 31 (6) 1994, p. 935; Gilbert, "Housing of the Urban Poor", p. 100; Grimes, Low-Income Housing, p. 4. While the reasons for most of these removals was ostensibly to improve the living standard of removees, the high value of the land which was cleared appears to have played a crucial role.

73 Simon, Cities, Capital and Development, p. 10. In Mexico City during the 1940s, for example, the poor moved to the east and north of the city where land was cheaper: P.M. Ward, Mexico City (London, 1990), p. 37.
4.3 Profile of the transit camp residents

Once all shantytown residents in the Combined Area had been moved to Nyanga, they made up more than two-thirds of the location’s population (see Figure 4). In this section their backgrounds are sketched to reveal considerable diversity in terms of origin and degree of urbanisation. Yet removees were united in their resistance to the removals and carried this tradition into Nyanga, where they established and fiercely defended their space in the transit camp.

Information about the cultural and socio-economic milieu of the settlements from which the transit camp residents were drawn can be found in various studies. The most detailed study of life within the camps was carried out in 1952, when Lipschitz and Greshoff surveyed one in ten households in the African shantytown of Eureka Estate in Goodwood. The degree of urbanisation varied considerably: in some cases, the entire family was well-established in the Peninsula and on housing wait-lists; in other cases, both husband and wife had only recently arrived in Cape Town. Over half the families had strong ties to the rural areas, with more than half sending money to their families and some sending their children for schooling.

There appeared to be no dominant trend in terms of length of residence in the Peninsula or area of origin, whether it be the Free State, Zululand, or the Transkei. What the families did share was extreme poverty, with the average family wage being £3.13.5 per week in formal income (comparable to that of Nyanga residents); this was supplemented by informal sector activities such as trading and beer brewing, which were widespread. The small camp had established its own school in 1949.  

Kondlo's study of shack areas in Cape Town during the period 1945-60 corroborates the findings of the Eureka Estate survey. Camps were located close to industries where the (mostly) men worked; the Lipschitz and Greshoff study found that only one in thirteen women found employment outside Eureka Estate.\textsuperscript{75} Coloured and African shack residents lived side by side in some settlements, with most camps consisting predominantly of one "racial" group.

Shackland culture was characterised by a blend of rural and urban values, with progressive assimilation into urban culture being evident in older camps like Windermere.\textsuperscript{76} Significantly, most of the camps in the Combined Municipalities were fairly recent. At


\textsuperscript{76}Kondlo, "Peri-urban Squatting", pp. 106-107, 168-169.
Forced Removals to Nyanga Transit Camp, 1956-58

Goodwood Acres, for example, one informant stated that "it was just like in the countryside", with camp organisation based on the authority of elders and conflicts settled internally.

In addition to the social autonomy they enjoyed, residents established and ran their own schools. Before the implementation in 1955 of the Bantu Education Act No 47 of 1953, schools built with local community funds could receive matching government grants on the condition that they were under the overall supervision of the province. If no funding was received, schools hired their own teachers and set the syllabi. Eureka School received a subsidy from the Parow School Board, while schools in Grassy Park, Bellville, Kraaifontein, and Retreat received no aid. There were four African primary schools in Elsies River alone, with a total of over 700 pupils.

Disputes centering on community-run schools had the effect of mobilising shack residents politically. When the principal was replaced in 1954, Eureka parents picketed outside the school, sent two delegations to the Parow School Board, and organised a mass march. The Eureka Vigilance Association organised the protest.

With the introduction of Bantu Education, the government withdrew grants from private schools for Africans, which could only continue if they found their own funds and followed government syllabi. When a school boycott was launched in 1955 to protest the implementation of Bantu Education, the government shut down schools that participated:

79 Cameron, "Bantu Education", pp. 184-185.
Grassy Park, in Bellville, in Kraaifontein. This closure coincided with the imminent removals to the Nyanga transit camp and sounded the death knell of the camps.

In contrasting the "squatter movements" on the Rand during the 1940s with the informal settlements of the Peninsula, Kondlo concluded that shantytowns in the Cape were not as organised. He attributed this to the high population turnover in the camps, their smaller and more scattered nature, the strong ties that the predominantly Xhosa-speaking shack residents had to the reserves, and the frequent police raids throughout the 1940s and 1950s.

Yet there is little doubt that the constant raids on these scattered camps also drew the inhabitants together and facilitated political organisation. In Kraaifontein, for example, the ANC joined with the Congress of Democrats to attempt to halt demolitions. Elsies River was known as a "hotbed" of ANC activity, and it was here that residents throughout the 1940s and 1950s consistently challenged state attempts to regulate beer-brewing and politics.

Although shack residents were unable to halt demolitions, their persistent and concerted resistance to their removal to Nyanga served to politicise them. Most ANC members in the transit camp had joined the organisation before their removal to Nyanga, and upon arriving they established branches in every part of the transit camp. There were strong leaders in each branch, such as Tata Zihlangu and Mr Stuurman.

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82 Cameron, "Bantu Education", p. 180.
83 Kondlo, "Peri-urban Squatting", pp. 113-116. Between 1953 and 1958, for example, regular police raids in Windermere resulted in 10-12,000 men being sent to the "single" quarters in Langa: Swart, "Windermere", pp. 67-68.
85 Interview with Mr M. Mzongwana, 16 Aug 1994, p. 1; conducted by H. Fast.
Forced Removals to Nyanga Transit Camp, 1956-58

Those who moved into self-built shanties in the transit camp therefore came from varied backgrounds, with some having recently arrived in the Peninsula and others being "borners" (that is, possessing Section 10(1)a qualifications). Yet most shared the experience of living in impoverished circumstances and defending the social and political space which they had carved out for themselves, whether in the area of beer-brewing, political activity, or control of community schools.

Above all, they shared the experience of the forced removals, with all the raids and arrests, appeals and petitions, that this entailed. It was this background that they brought with them to Nyanga:

...the [transit camp residents] were more exposed to such things, they were arrested for anything any day, compared to the people here [in the houses], so I think they could have taken anything. 86

The transit camp residents consequently had a reputation for resisting control and asserting themselves politically:

They were very active, very strong and independent. Those who were coming from that camp, to me, they seemed very independent compared to us, because we were under strict laws, from the parents and also from the administration board, and they were freer to be independent than us...because they had other things to fight for... 87

While the state succeeded in spatially concentrating all Peninsula shack residents in the camp in order to achieve greater surveillance and control, transit camp residents asserted control over the space to which they had been assigned. The transit camp was a formidable place for police and location officials to enter: residents constructed their shacks in such a way as to make access by motor vehicles difficult, and shack numbers were obliterated to

86 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 15.

87 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 14.
make tracing of "agitators" difficult.\(^{88}\) In 1957 a group of 400 women from the transit camp attacked a police patrol for brutally beating a youngster during a pass raid in the camp; the officials beat a hasty retreat.\(^{89}\) Police were consequently wary of entering the transit camp, for they feared reprisals from shack dwellers.\(^{90}\)

In Kraaifontein [Section] there was a horse-shoe-like road, they couldn't enter without the escort of soldiers. They used to say they were Russians and so on, because that was the stronghold of Nyanga.\(^{91}\)

The transit camp thus developed a reputation for frustrating administration attempts to regulate activities in the shack areas, a reputation which continued into the 1970s.

Not all the people who arrived in Nyanga during 1953-58 came from impoverished shantytowns. In a housing survey conducted by Divco in 1953, there were 215 "properly constructed houses" outside Nyanga accommodating 300 African families, many of whom owned land in places such as Crawford, Oakdale, and Elsies River.\(^{92}\) As "Group Areas" were steadily delineated, more and more Africans began applying for houses in Nyanga - 18 in August 1955 alone were referred to Nyanga by the Land Tenure Advisory Board; in January 1957, 17 people applied for houses and refused to accept sites in the transit camp. This increased in 1958: Africans living in Claremont, Rondebosch, Athlone, and Retreat applied for houses, with an average of 46 applications received every month.\(^{93}\)

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\(^{88}\) Interview 2 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 2; interview with Mr A. Grové, p. 9.

\(^{89}\) 4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 15 Oct 1958. See also Muthien, State and Resistance in SA, p. 200.

\(^{90}\) Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 4.

\(^{91}\) Interview with Mr T., p. 11.

\(^{92}\) 4/CT 202/38, Divco Medical Officer of Health to Secretary, 5 Nov 1953.

\(^{93}\) 4/CT 1/1/1/83, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of of 27 Sep 1955; 4/CT 1/1/1/89, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 26 March 1957; 4/CT 1/1/1/93, 94, 95, & 96, Manager's monthly reports.
Forced Removals to Nyanga Transit Camp, 1956-58

One man owned a plot and house in Kraaifontein in 1927; he was forced to pull it down, give up his land, and move to Nyanga.\textsuperscript{94} A family which owned a "beautiful house" in Crawford lost both their house and land, for which they received compensation and a place in the Old Location.\textsuperscript{95} One elderly woman who owned property in Oakdale Estate was staunch in her refusal to move:

...she didn't want to come to Nyanga, but later on she had to come because she was isolated, no more family there, she had that big house with few grandchildren. Then she got sick, she wasn't quite well, she couldn't do everything by herself. Then she had to come to the daughter now in the squatter camp, leaving her house there. She had to sell that house of course, then she was now compensated about her house.\textsuperscript{96}

Besides losing her house, the woman referred to above also forfeited her pension as she refused to take out a pass.

While the financial costs of the move were high for such people, they were able to build better shacks. The average amount of money expended on a shanty was £55, although some families paid as much as £286:\textsuperscript{97}

There were nice ones, beautiful homes built up...there was a shop owner, what do we call these shops, spaza shops, serving lettuces, and he had a big nice house, and his children were also well-educated.\textsuperscript{98}

Wealthier African households could at best wish for a four-roomed Old Location house, which was hard to come by, or build an expensive shack, for which there was no security of tenure. As one Old Location resident pointed out,

\textsuperscript{94}New Age, 29 March 1956.

\textsuperscript{95}Interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{96}Interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{97}AWC G2, M.C. Joubert to Manager, 13 Nov 1957.

\textsuperscript{98}Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 4.
Now tell me, what can a chap do with his money? The chap has got money, he's made business, and he's made his money, he can't buy properties in Cape Town, he's not allowed... what else can he do with it, there's nothing he can do, to buy furniture or buy a car? and he can't buy furniture, because he's got a pondok, so the next best thing to enjoy his money is buy a Benz.99

Some of the incoming residents of Nyanga may have possessed middle-class characteristics before they arrived, then, but they were prohibited from accumulating fixed property in the location.100 This continued the trend of earlier years, when Daniel Ngo's aspirations to fashion a middle-class "Pinelands" out of the Old Location were frustrated.

4.4 Transit camp and "brick house" residents

The population of Nyanga had trebled between 1956 and 1958. The removees were forced to adjust to their new surroundings, and residents of the brick houses had to adapt to their new neighbours. The extent and nature of their social and political interaction is discussed below.

Because the shantytowns were systemically cleared one at a time, their occupants were placed together in the transit camp. The various sections consequently became known as the Elsies River, Kraaifontein, Jakkalsvlei, amaPlangeni, and amaSakeni (Sakkiesdorp) sections (see Figure 5). "Dutch" for example, consisted of people from Elsies River and Bellville, and was named after the Dutch Reformed school next to which it was located. "Kraaifontein" section was sub-divided into two, one of which contained Eureka Estate people.101 The new transit camp residents consequently lived close to their former

99Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 16.

100While conducting his survey of Nyanga in 1980/81, Dludla asked respondents to classify the relative status of their neighbours; 85% responded that their neighbours were "equal" to them in socio-economic terms: Dludla, "Survey of Nyanga", p. 118.

101Interview with Mrs L., p. 1. See also Kondlo, "Peri-urban Squatting", pp. 101, 217ff.
Forced Removals to Nyanga Transit Camp, 1956-58

Figure 5
neighbours. In the case of Cook's Bush, the shack school they had established was rebuilt by them in the transit camp.\textsuperscript{102}

This situation made the social adjustment of transit camp residents easier than that of Mau-Mau residents four to five years before; as one woman stated, "We knew each other very well, because we came from those areas."\textsuperscript{103} Nonetheless, former residents stated that they preferred the atmosphere in the settlements from which they were removed:

> It wasn't as in Elsies, it wasn't the same as in Elsies, because in Elsies everything was free, everything was free, living nicely with our neighbours, if you're Coloured, Indian, Moslem, we were living in the same places. 
> [Q: What was it like when you came here then? Did you also play with other children, or not as much?] 
> Ja, well, you take time to understand each other, but okay, we managed. So when I went to school here, it was then that I get a lot of friends.\textsuperscript{104}

Another informant noted,

> A human being was a human being. People knew each other like that, that this was a person, it's a human being, and I'm a human being...But when we moved to this place, then it was the time that the tsotsis started to attack people and mug and rob people.\textsuperscript{105}

The increase in crime was probably due to the rapid growth of Nyanga over the previous five years. Although transit camp residents knew people in their section, they represented only a small percentage of Nyanga residents.

When informants were asked whether any conflicts arose between transit camp and housing scheme residents on a communal level, they either had very little to say or replied with comments such as "No, we understood each other well" or "We were accepted by the

\textsuperscript{102}4/CT 1/1/1/92, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 23 Dec 1957.

\textsuperscript{103}Interview with Mrs L.H., p. 1. See also interview with Mr H., 19 Sep 1994, p. 1; conducted by H. Fast.

\textsuperscript{104}Interview with Mr M. Msutu, 5 Sep 1994, p. 5; conducted by H. Fast.

\textsuperscript{105}Interview with Mrs N., p. 3.
community." While this may have indicated that no such conflict existed or residents were not revealing it, it is more likely that frequent interaction was physically not very feasible. The distance between the Elsies River section and Mau-Mau, for example, was two kilometres. In addition, residents in the two areas did not share communal facilities such as a civic centre.

The schools did not necessarily provide interaction between children as they were located within one or the other area. Hlengisa Primary School, for example, catered to Sakkiesdorp and amaPlangeni residents. One school which drew from both the transit camp and housing schemes was Nyanga Public School, although children did discriminate according to type of housing occupied:

Nyanga Public School, it was one school which was accommodating all of us, it was there before the camps...I remember when we were as children, there were those who were regarding children coming from those settlements as coming from, you know when children are undermining one another...

There was thus little social contact between the formal and informal settlements, and residents of the housing schemes were somewhat uneasy about the 11,500 people who flowed into the transit camp. The manager of Divco's Native Administration was asked to fully explain the layout and operation of the proposed site-and-service scheme to the Advisory Board, and he emphasised that the camp was of a temporary nature. After the transit camp was half full, the Advisory Board and manager complained of increased crime, which they blamed on transit camp residents, particularly the youth. The response of Old Location residents was similar to when Mau-Mau residents moved in, although there was not the same underlying antagonism:

106 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 14.

107 4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 21 July 1955.

It was very strange to us when they, they had a number of, more active open violence than the people from where we were coming from, the Old Location, who seemed like, quieter than the transit camps...I think it was this packing and moving, because some of them had left and lost their belongings behind when they were moved, and also this packing of people, it was not giving them this freedom which they had where they were coming from, because where they were coming from they had animals...109

One former transit camp resident stated that she observed that housing scheme residents were uncertain of them, but accepted them when they "saw that we were people".110

Although transit camp residents were strong politically, occupants of the houses did not actively draw transit camp residents into their meetings or activities:

They were not as free to move in to deal with issues of this area. And I don't also think they were encouraged to by people of these brick houses. Sometimes some of the people from these brick houses were not seeing the sights of the camp situation as a good sight, you always find those people who are always undermining, not accepting.111

It seems, then, that there was more interaction within the areas of the transit camp and brick houses than between them, which derived primarily from spatial factors. As two informants stated, "it's only now that when we moved to the brick houses that we had meetings together."112 However, tenants of the housing schemes seemed to consider themselves socially different from the shack residents. A comparison can be made with neighbouring Guguletu, where Makosana found that distinctions were made between occupants of houses, backyards, and free-standing shacks.113

109 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 3.
110 Interview with Mrs L., p. 1.
111 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 15.
112 Interview with Mrs L.H., p. 2; interview with Mrs N., p. 3.
113 Makosana, "Guguletu", pp. 31, 79.
4.5 Nyanga administration and rent arrears, 1956-58

There were eight African constables - also called "wardsmen" - on Divco's staff by 1955, which had increased to 13 by 1957. They continued to be the subject of accusations, with one constable accused in 1953 of promising someone a house if he were paid £5. The police had stopped serving summons in the location in 1957, which meant that this task was left to the wardsmen, making their job even more unpopular.

That service with the Council was disliked is borne by the fact that seven of the nine African constables resigned in 1956, five in order to work for the new Nyanga Bus Service. In December 1957, two wardsmen were fired for "dereliction of duty" and one resigned; by the end of 1958, two more wardsmen had resigned and three had been fired. While this was probably related to the hostility with which wardsmen were regarded, there was another important reason for the high turnover. When Daniel Ngo was questioned as to the reason for the high turnover, he stated,

I am partly responsible I must say, plead guilty there to this, what we call this changeover, because I always said to these chaps..."If you want a house, get into this job as a police boy...Once you are a police boy, we will see to it that you get a house." And we see to it that he gets a house, and when he's in the house, even if he's comfortable in the job, well, he remains. But he's not comfortable, he just resigns, and he still remains in the house.

Even though administrative control over their lives increased during this time, especially for people in the transit camp, Nyanga residents were not powerless. In her study

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114 4/CT 202/55, Native Affairs Department Questionnaire for Nyanga, 1955; 4/CT 1/1/1/89, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 26 March 1957. The constables earned a salary of £228 per year in 1957, which was slightly more than the average African wage in the Peninsula.

115 4/CT 1/1/1/85, Manager's Monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 26 March 1956; 4/CT 1/1/1/93, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 28 Jan 1958; 4/CT 1/1/1/94, Manager's monthly reports for March, April, and May 1958; RSC 114, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 28 Oct 1958.

116 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 13.
of hostel environments in the Peninsula, Ramphele rejected the notion of "zero-sum" power whereby power is possessed by one person to the extent that it is not possessed by others. In her book, the dominant theme she pursued was one of the reproduction of social forms characterised by unequal power relations, yet within these constraints people have managed to find room for manoeuvre, to cope and to survive. We must thus also recognise the emancipatory possibilities within this environment.  

One example of this "room for manoeuvre" was mentioned above, namely the shack occupants' assertion over their space in the emergency camp. Another was the evasion of rental payments. For transit camp residents, the threat of eviction was not as feasible as it entailed the demolition of their shacks, which was costly and laborious for the administration. Tenants with Section 10(1)a/b/c qualifications could not be ejected from the location for arrears once legislation was in place requiring all Africans to live in a "Native location"; neither did Divco wish to send them to the transit camp, which it wished to clear quickly. One former official stated the difficulties encountered:

A man would fall into arrears with his rent, so you issue a notice re arrears and then you issue a notice to vacate and then you issue summons, and then it goes for due process, and eventually you have in your hand an eviction order, and you have the staff and you have the truck and everything, and you physically evict the man…my first question is, where is that man now supposed to go, no, nobody knows. I said I said, "Now hang on, hang on, according to the law, that black man may not live anywhere else but in a black township, please tell me, what must I tell him, where must he go?"
That's forty years ago, I haven't an answer yet.

The administration opted for criminal prosecution: in the months of June and November 1956, 549 summons were served, of which 43 were imprisoned. The situation

117 Ramphele, Migrant Labour Hostels, p. 10.
118 See Cape Times, 27 Nov 1957.
119 Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 16.
Forced Removals to Nyanga Transit Camp, 1956-58

was similar in 1957, with an average of 195 court summons being issued every month. As officials systematically screened and summoned defaulters one section of the township at a time, it would take them 45-48 weeks to return to one section. Even then, serving the summonses was extremely difficult as defaulters - especially hostel residents - often successfully avoided the rent collectors by sleeping with friends or relatives in the location or leaving Nyanga for shack settlements such as neighbouring Brown's Camp or the more distant Kensington, which was not demolished until the early 1960s. Stated the location superintendent, "It is doubtful whether this type of 'passive resistance' will ever be overcome." 121

Despite the fact that Africans had "nowhere to go" when they were evicted, the administration increasingly relied on this tactic with house tenants who were in arrears with rent. In 1958, over 200 households were ejected from their premises, 122 leaving the evictees with no alternative accommodation:

You go maybe to your neighbours and ask for shelter, maybe your neighbours will give you shelter, because when they throw your things out, they will put their own lock in the doors, both back and front, and then they will say okay, in three days time if you've got money, you fix it, you go and fix it, but maybe we will put someone else in there. 123

These evictions were only the tip of the iceberg, for they were usually only enforced if the tenant was over three months in arrears or was deemed to be a passive resister. 124

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120 4/CT H4/16/A, Superintendent to Manager, 29 Nov 1956; Divco meeting minutes for 1957: 4/CT, 1/1/89; 4/CT 1/1/90; 4/CT 1/1/91; 4/CT 1/1/92. The penalty for rent arrears was one month in prison with hard labour.

121 H4/16/A, Superintendent to Manager, 9 Sep 1958.


123 Interview with Mr M. Msutu, p. 5.

124 Cape Times, 29 April 1958.
While the high arrears total was no doubt related to resistance to state control, there were also profound economic reasons for it. When the manager of Divco's Native Administration complained of the "passive resisters" in Nyanga who were evading rent payments, the ANC pointed to the low wages, high fines for influx control offences, and bad health as the main reasons for arrears. This was aggravated in the transit camp: the study by Lipschitz and Greshoff showed that living expenses in shack settlements were very high, not least due to abnormally high wear-and-tear on clothing and an increased number of illnesses and accidents, causing medical costs to soar. Residents were transferred to the same circumstances in the transit camp, with the added cost and effort of reconstructing their shacks, their social networks, and their lives.

4.6 The social and political life of Nyanga, 1956-58

Nyanga administration continued to restrict the opportunities of Nyanga residents to voice their grievances through the government-sponsored Advisory Board. Although nine men stood for the 1956 Board elections, the voter turnout was so low as to make the term "election" almost meaningless: the leading candidate received only 27 votes, and no Vigilance members were elected. It is likely that the administration used its previously successful tactic of not informing residents of the elections:

125 Cape Times, 9 May 1958.


127 4/CT 1/1/1/85, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 31 Jan 1956.
As time went the Board didn’t like to elect people because these people were no longer nominated by people. You only heard that they were members of Advisory Board, if you asked where were the elections, they would say on such a day, and when you asked where were the papers, they would say they were in the office. If people didn’t go to the office how were they going to get the information?  

The only crucial issue discussed by this Board was that of rentals: when the motion was proposed that rents differ according to type of accommodation occupied, Board members voted 3-2 against the motion.  

In 1957 the administration established the Transit Camp Advisory Board, which was to meet together with the Location Advisory Board. All four transit camp candidates were disqualified in 1957. There were few nominations received from transit camp residents over the years owing to their uncertain status in Nyanga, for most were destined for Guguletu or "repatriation". This meant that camp representatives were almost always appointed by Divco, and their attendance was sporadic and their input inconsequential as compared with Board members from the housing schemes.

No nominations were received for the 1957 Location Advisory Board elections, and the entire Board was appointed. Sensing their delicate position, the Board members asked that the plan for a beerhall be put before all the residents. Similarly, when the issue of

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128 Interview 1 with Mr D., p. 3.
129 4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 24 Feb 1956. Presumably those voting against it lived in the four-roomed Old Location dwellings and did not wish to pay higher rents.
130 4/CT 1/1/1/88, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 18 Dec 1956.
131 4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 16 May 1957. The Board soon after passed a unanimous resolution opposing the beerhall: ibid., Advisory Board to Superintendent, 23 May 1957.
differential rentals came up, Board members stated that as they were all appointed, Nyanga residents had to be consulted directly.\textsuperscript{132}

The 1958 Advisory Board included at least one Vigilance member, Oscar Mpetha. However, he was not included on the school committees, which were made up of four people "elected" by parents, four appointed by the administration, and two appointed as "religious representatives". The school committee members were long-time administration allies, such as Charles Yeza, Abraham Mabowe, E. Mgoqi, and Shadreck Magwa. Divco completely bypassed the Board on important issues during 1958, for residents were informed by circulars about impending rent increases before the Advisory Board was informed.\textsuperscript{133}

It seems that after 1955, then, the Vigilance Committee gave up on the Advisory Board as they were continuously stymied in their attempts to run for office:

[The administration] came up with stumbling blocks, saying that those who had been in prison or who were in politics cannot enter, and now they were preparing to take all the informers and put them in, and that's how they beat us.\textsuperscript{134}

The lack of interest in the Board was probably also due to the frustration that Vigilance Committee members experienced even when they were elected onto the Board.

The Advisory Board became consistently dominated by the same appointees, who began to use their affiliation with the administration to further their financial interests. Business licenses were in great demand: when Divco called for applications in 1957, 139 were received and only 2 were granted.\textsuperscript{135} The qualifications required for being favoured

\textsuperscript{132} 4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 18 July & 8 Nov 1957.

\textsuperscript{133} 4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 15 Oct 1958; Cape Argus, 22 Aug 1958.

\textsuperscript{134} Interview 1 with Mr D., p. 15.

\textsuperscript{135} 4/CT 1/1/1/90, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 April 1957; 4/CT 1/1/1/91, Divco meeting minutes of 30 July 1957.
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were blatantly political. One of the two men granted a license was Leslie Kakaza, Secretary of the Advisory Board 1954/55 and the brother-in-law of Daniel Ngo. Similarly Abraham Mabowe, who was a school principal and Advisory Board appointee for 12 years in the 1940s and 1950s, was granted a general dealership and fresh produce license in 1956. This correlates with accounts of state-sponsored "native" bodies in the rest of Africa, which were used by African office-holders for their own financial advantage.

The list of applicants for business licenses reveals the social background of aspiring/ business people in Nyanga. Of 139 applicants, 121 were male and 18 female. It seems that most of the applicants were of modest means, for the majority had less than £100 to invest in their business and 29% were in rent arrears; only 18 people had over £300 on hand. The educational qualifications of 77 applicants were listed, showing that over 70% had attained Standard Five or higher and that three were former teachers.

In addition to rewarding its allies, the administration continued to muzzle opposition groups in Nyanga. An ANC meeting was prohibited in 1956 as "the ANC in no way tried to abide by Location Regulations and attempts to flout them at every opportunity"; the following year a transit camp resident was banned from attending gatherings for five years under the Suppression of Communism Act. The local state could be equally intransigent if

136/CT 1/1/1/87, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Sep 1956; interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, p. 21.

137 In Kenya, for example, Africans participated in Local Native Councils to gain access to credit, develop business contacts, and acquire jobs: G. Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya (New Haven, 1980), pp. 188-192. See also J. Sender and S. Smith, The Development of Capitalism in Africa (London, 1986), p. 79.

138/CT 1/1/1/90, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 April 1957.

139/CT 1/1/1/88, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 18 Dec 1956.

140/CT 1/1/1/90, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 June 1957.

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its economic interests were threatened: the four temperance societies in Nyanga were refused permission for a meeting in 1957 at which they wished to muster opposition to the planned beerhall.141

This did not quell popular support for extra-parliamentary political organisations. When one ANC meeting was allowed to go ahead in 1957, it was attended by 400 people who were protesting the proposed rent increases. The Communist Party continued to operate underground in Nyanga during the 1950s, running night schools and providing an important information network which was of great value to the ANC.142

4.7 Women's protests, 1956-58

By 1958, African women were being endorsed out of the Peninsula at the rate of 4000 a year.143 It is likely that the majority were from Divco shack settlements where "black spot" clearances had been taking place. The uncertainty of their position due to Section 10 provisions caused many African women to take up employment after 1955, mainly in domestic positions vacated by Coloured females absorbed into industry.144

As a result of the increasing harassment that Nyanga women had been experiencing, many became more involved in pressing for reforms. A delegation of women from the Old Location and Mau-Mau marched to the administration offices to complain of night raids; they

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141 4/CT H4/22, J.N. Ngwevela (Secretary, African Western Grand True Temple) to Superintendent, 4 Nov 1957.

142 4/CT 1/1/1/91, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 27 Aug 1957; interview with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1.

143 Dr O.D. Wollheim in Cape Argus, 17 Sep 1958. Despite this, women outnumbered men in Nyanga: there were 3154 adult men (excluding hostel residents) and 3323 adult women in Nyanga in 1958: 4/CT 1/1/1/93, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 March 1958.

received a hearing and at least one of their concerns was addressed. A deputation of 60 women from the transit camp similarly complained about frequent raids and assaults by policemen in 1957. In 1958, women from the transit camp again marched to the superintendent's office and raised issues concerning high rents, the requirement that visitor's permits be obtained, and police raids for brewing beer.¹⁴⁵

The women's protests occurred regularly, "so as to keep us on our toes," as one location official put it:

[Mrs Sikhunana] organised marches to the administration office in 1956, 1957. But it would be a march of housewives only, and there would be, say, 50, and they would come to the office, then they wanted to see the superintendent...they would explain that they were dissatisfied with this and dissatisfied with that, and dissatisfied with the other, all reasonable requests, not like today, tomorrow they'll demand to move into Parliament Buildings, whatever. Some damn stupid thing they'll demand. In those days they demanded more clinic hours or the midwife and nurse to be on duty twice a week instead of once a week, and no, man, acceptable requests which we went out of our way to accommodate.¹⁴⁶

It is possible that women demonstrated more frequently than men because many women were in the township during the day. They were therefore more consistently confronted with location issues and were in Nyanga during the administration's working hours. Bonner has noted that women near Benoni were at the centre of shackland politics during the 1940s and 1950s precisely because they were at home and could organise marches and demonstrations.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ 4/CT 1/1/1/89, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 29 Jan 1957; 4/CT 1/1/1/92, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 26 Nov 1957; 4/CT 1/1/1/93, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Feb 1958.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 10.

Another possible reason for the greater activism was the arrival of women in the transit camp. As many of them had brewed beer in the shack areas, they had generated their own income and enjoyed the independence it gave them.\textsuperscript{148} They continued to brew beer once in the transit camp, and this despite continual raids by location officials.\textsuperscript{149} As Cooper remarked,

\begin{quote}
The woman who brewed beer at night might refresh a downtrodden workforce for the benefit of capital, but she was a dangerously autonomous person, with too many ties to other people, with too few official eyes on her.\textsuperscript{150}
\end{quote}

A parallel can be drawn with Tanzania, where women forced into the informal sector owing to a dramatic decline in living standard found that they achieved a greater measure of autonomy within their households.\textsuperscript{151} It is this experience of autonomy which may have spurred Nyanga women to take collective action independently of their men.

It is interesting that the administration listened to the women's grievances and usually addressed them in some token way. Administration response to the male-dominated Vigilance Committee, on the other hand, was always hostile. This is probably because the women's delegations did not occur under the aegis of the ANC and the protests focused on specific grievances rather than on the political legitimacy of Divco administration. As Mildred Ngo, secretary of the conservative National Council of African Women, stated,

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{148} Such was the case in the Natal countryside; see H. Bradford, "We women will show them": Beer Protests in the Natal Countryside, 1929", in J. Crush and C. Ambler, eds., Liquor and Labor in Southern Africa (Pietermaritzburg, 1992), p. 217.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{149} Interviews with Mrs N., p. 3; interview with Mrs M.R., pp. 6-7; interview with Mr W. Makwenkwe, 19 Sep 1994, p. 2; conducted by H. Fast, interpreted by M. Mzongwana.
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{150} Cooper, "Urban Space and Industrial Time", p. 8. See also Friedman, "Urbanisation of African Women", p. 10.
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\end{quote}
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From what I have experienced, the men are most of the times are putting their cases in a harsh way, you know...I think the mothers always put their case in a nice way. So these people listen and they say, "Well, these people are not coming to us in an indecent way, they are talking nicely to us so let us give them what they want." 152

As another woman noted,

We just grouped ourselves as women and said, "Let women go this time, maybe they will listen to women"...The men were greatly oppressed and things did not go well when it was them who spoke. 153

In short, by avoiding direct confrontation and restricting their grievances to everyday concerns which Nyanga officials were within their powers to address, Nyanga women were able to achieve some measure of success through their protests.

Conclusions: the extension and evasion of control, 1956-58

In financial and administrative terms, the state and Combined Municipalities had achieved their goals: all "black spots" had been eliminated over the course of three years and at minimal cost to government authorities. By the end of 1958, the township of Nyanga contained 18,518 people, of whom 11,474 lived in the transit camp. 154 Removees bore the brunt of the removals in financial and human terms, leaving behind a familiar environment and entering one which was unfamiliar and state-controlled. In view of this, the answers to Dludla’s question in his Nyanga survey of 1980/81 are not surprising: most residents did not move to Nyanga by choice, and most did not wish to remain there. 155

152 Interview with Mrs M. Ngo, p. 2.
153 Interview with Mrs K., p. 7.
154 RSC 115, Superintendent’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 24 Feb 1959.
155 Judging by their previous place of residence in the Peninsula (see Dludla, "Survey of Nyanga", p. 60), survey respondents were long-term residents of Nyanga who came from areas subjected to "black spot clearance" during the 1950s.
Chapter Four

For three years a battle over space had taken place. In the "uncontrolled" settlements of the Peninsula, urban Africans had been able to create and control their living environment. Shantytown residents had fought and lost the campaign to prevent the destruction of these camps and were shunted into Nyanga. In the location, the land, buildings and services were owned by government authorities, and all activities were subject to strict regulation. But the authorities failed to achieve complete control of this space: administration officials feared to enter the transit camp, and they were unable to enforce effectively the payment of rentals.

One additional point: the majority of people living in Nyanga in 1958 worked in the City Council area. This was to have tremendous consequences in the years that followed: transit camp residents were transferred to the new three-roomed housing scheme built in 1958 only if they were both employed and resident in the Combined Area. After 1960, Nyanga residents who worked in the City Council area had to either find jobs in the Combined Area or transfer to Guguletu. For most Nyanga residents, then, even their long-term residence in the location was not secure. As one African leader in the 1950s put it, they were "forever hamba", forever ordered to go, forever moved on.

156 AWC G1, S.A. Rogers to CTCC Town Clerk, 31 July 1956; 4/CT 1/1/1/94, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 29 April 1958.

157 Quoted in Western, Outcast Cape Town, p. 46.
CHAPTER FIVE
Pass Controls and Militant Protest, 1959-62

Introduction

By 1959, Nyanga location consisted of disparate groups of people, most of whom had been transferred there against their will. Social interaction between residents of the hostels, shacks, and houses tended to occur within neighbourhoods. This chapter will describe the factors which caused this to change dramatically in the years that followed: the continued "repatriations" of Africans on a large scale, the restrictions on political activity within the location, and the effects of Proclamation No 11 of 1960, which divided the Peninsula into two proclaimed areas and thereby stripped many Nyanga residents of residential rights. The response of Nyanga residents to these conditions will also be outlined, demonstrating a new militancy which culminated in a massive show of resistance in March/April 1960. It was a valiant effort, and one which would only be stifled by mass arrests and police brutality.

5.1 A woman's place is in the home(land): Repatriations, 1959-61

The living conditions of Nyanga residents deteriorated considerably in the late 1950s owing to the intensification of pass controls and the ongoing evictions for arrears. In the following two sections, the operation of housing and influx control policies will be described in order to provide a background to the protests of 1960 and to demonstrate the impact of these policies on urban African women.

Government legislation during this period increased the restrictions on African urban residents. In 1957 the wording of Section 10 (of the 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act) had changed from "lawfully remained" to "lawfully resided". This meant that if a person was
born in the Peninsula but resided elsewhere for a period of time, Section 10(1) qualifications were forfeited. Residence had to be proved with a permit to be in the proclaimed area, although the decision to recognise "residence" was left to the discretion of local authority officials.\(^1\)

The Native Commissioner's office in Cape Town began issuing women with reference books in October 1959; as of 1 December 1960, it was compulsory for all women in the Peninsula to carry passes. The issuing of the books in the Combined Area carried little significance, for Divco officials had been endorsing out hundreds of women before and after the transit camp was filled. Between January 1954 and March 1962, over 18,000 African men and 5975 African women were endorsed out of the Peninsula. Despite this, the manager of Divco's Native Administration admitted that influx control had not stemmed the flow of Africans into the Peninsula.\(^2\)

The Western Cape came under particular scrutiny from the central state due to the Coloured Labour Preference Policy (CLPP). Articulated in 1954 by the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr W.W.M. Eiselen, the ultimate aim of the Nationalist state was to remove all Africans from the Western Cape.\(^3\) The policy was to be implemented in stages: first, foreign Africans (from colonies such as Nyasaland and the Rhodesias) were to be removed, the number of African families in the Western Cape frozen, and migrant workers imported to

\(^1\) 4/CT 202/120, Divco Secretary to Black Sash, 7 Aug 1963.

\(^2\) Muthien, *State and Resistance in SA*, pp. 69-70, 82.

\(^3\) As Kinkead-Weekes has pointed out, Coloured labour preference was official policy in the Western Cape for two decades before the Nationalist government came to power in 1948: "Africans in Cape Town to 1973", p. 217. The policy announced in 1954 was not only more extensive and more rigorously implemented, but was also used as justification for expelling Africans from the Western Cape.
ensure that the labour needs of the area were secured. At stage two, Protectorate Africans (from Bechuanaland and Basutoland) were to be deported, the number African families reduced, and migrant workers gradually replaced by Coloured workers.4

The implementation of this policy in the Western Cape was intended to provide a convincing example of apartheid in practice. As the Nationalist Party stated, the removal of Africans from the Western Cape would provide "a purposeful demonstration of the practicability of the policy of racial separation."5 Influx/efflux control was therefore zealously implemented in the Western Cape.6

As noted above, the majority of Africans expelled from the Peninsula between 1954 and 1962 were men. The main reason for their expulsion was their lack of employment,7 so that upon returning to the reserves they could register for and obtain contract work in the Peninsula. An African woman's urban qualifications, on the other hand, depended almost entirely upon her relationship to a man, whether as a daughter or wife. While African women could apply for contracts if they were living in the reserves, in practice they were rarely offered work.8 For an African woman to be endorsed out of the Peninsula therefore


5New Age, 7 Dec 1961.

6According to Bekker and Coetzee, the CLPP was not implemented until 1962, when committees were appointed to oversee its application: S.B. Bekker and J.H. Coetzee, Black Urban Employment and Coloured Labour Preference (Rhodes University, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Working Paper No 1, 1980), p. 6. Their statement is contradicted by the expulsion of thousands of Africans from the Combined Area in the late 1950s; see also Posel, Making of Apartheid, pp. 212-213, 222.

7There were two instances in which this happened: the men were required to return to the reserve after completion of a service contract, or they had become unemployed while living in the urban area.

meant either permanent banishment to the reserves or a twilight existence of illegality in the city.

The "repatriation" of African women followed a rough pattern. The first group to be ejected from the Combined Area were women whose husbands had not yet achieved Section 10(1)a/b qualifications. Mrs N.M., for example, entered the Peninsula in 1957 to join her husband, who had been working in the area since 1951; she and at least five other Nyanga women in similar situations were endorsed out in March 1959. A favourite trick of administration personnel was to endorse out women just before they or their husbands attained permanent status.

Although women with "qualified" husbands were not the prime target at this time, there were also cases of such women facing deportation. The one method by which a woman could stave off her expulsion from the area was to obtain a job, which she had to keep in order to renew her permit to live in the area.

Another category of women who were rigorously screened were women from the protectorates of Bechuanaland and Basutoland. They were endorsed out regardless of their

An overview", in C. Walker, ed., Women and Gender in Southern African to 1945 (Cape Town, 1990), p. 173. The preponderance of male over female migrants has been a feature of rural-urban migration in most of Asia, Africa, and Oceania. For an examination of the reasons for this, see Gugler, "Rural-Urban Migration", pp. 60-61.

9 Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (II) & (III), cases of 1958/59. The number of women endorsed out by Nyanga officials during March was probably much higher, as the Black Sash estimated that only 25% of the women endorsed out came to their office for advice: ibid., A2, Monthly Report for January 1965.

10 Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (III), cases of Mrs N.M., Mrs I.H., Mrs A.M., and Mrs A.W., 1958/59.


12 See, for example, Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (III), cases of Mrs E.M. (Aug 1959) and Mrs S.M. (9 June 1959).
length of residence in Cape Town and Section 10 qualifications; of 12 cases that were dealt with by the Athlone Advice Office in the course of 1959, eight concerned women who had resided in the Peninsula from 8 to 25 years. As one husband pleaded,

Since I came here I have never been in the reserves and my home is broken and is still to be build up by me when I have got enough money that is why is impossible to send her home.\(^ {13}\)

One Sotho woman stated,

I am so old I have no one to look after me and I have no home because I left there long long time ago and I depend of this 16 years old daughter of mine.\(^ {14}\)

All remonstrations fell on deaf ears. Sotho men were sent to hostels and the women bluntly told by officials: "The Basutos must return to Basutoland."\(^ {15}\) By 1962, the number of Sotho people living in Nyanga had dropped from 11.9% in 1957 to 8.5% in 1962, and it is likely that most of the 8.5% in 1962 were contract labourers.\(^ {16}\)

Many women who were expelled from the Peninsula had come to the city for a limited period of time. The Black Sash noted the high number of African women who came to Cape Town to conceive and deliver their children in hospital, and sought to obtain visitor's and extension permits for these women on medical grounds; the women usually stayed with their husbands in the hostels. As one woman explained to the Advice Office,

I got married the first three born children died while they were one month old, the reason for not having enough money to send them to the Doctor and my wish is to see this one is under the doctors treatment and is sick and even now is coughing and has a loose stomache.\(^ {17}\)

\(^ {13}\) Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (II), case of Mrs J.S., 16 March 1959.

\(^ {14}\) Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (III), case of Mrs J.N., 1959.

\(^ {15}\) Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (II) & (III).

\(^ {16}\) RSC 142, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 27 March 1962.

\(^ {17}\) Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (III), case of Mrs B.M., 17 Feb 1959.
Some women also entered the area to trace husbands who had ceased to remit money to them.\(^{18}\)

It is important to emphasise that local authority officials were given considerable discretion in deciding whether a woman was "ordinarily residing" with her husband. As Posel has shown, some municipalities allowed all wives to join their husbands, while others prohibited all wives from entering.\(^{19}\) The large number of African women endorsed out of the Peninsula during this time attests to the effects of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy.

By 1961, there was a complete ban on the acquisition of Section 10(1)c rights by African women in the Cape Peninsula.

One aspect of the influx control machinery was its inability to deal with people who apparently had no family in the reserves to receive them. Such individuals and families were categorised as "displaced", and lived in limbo until resettlement camps were built in the mid-1960s; until then, the administration was powerless to remove them.\(^{20}\)

This applied particularly to African women who were single, divorced, widowed, or deserted. Government policy stipulated that women were to be endorsed out to their husband's home district; this could not be done if she no longer lived with him. The case of one deserted woman, as described by an Advice Office case worker, serves to illustrate both the predicament of influx control officials and the human cost paid by the victims of pass controls:

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\(^{18}\)See Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (III), cases of Mrs F.M. and Mrs N.M.

\(^{19}\)Posel, Making of Apartheid, pp. 214-216.

\(^{20}\)RSC 132, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 May 1961.
[Mrs A.M.] has been arrested three times and fined, and on the last occasion she could not raise the £10 fine, so she and her baby spent two months in Roeland Street jail. She was released in June 1959 and told to leave the Cape Area at once, or she would be bringing up her baby in jail. She has five children all under 12 years and is living with a relative at Nyanga, but says that the children had no one to look after them while she was in jail, and that they are starving. She asked us to find her husband and make him take her and the children back to Basutoland. She has no living relatives there and does not know how she could support her children.\footnote{Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (III), Joan Syme to Black Sash, 29 July 1959.}

Officials had little choice but to issue the woman with a workseeker's permit.

There were many similar cases. One Nyanga resident had been deserted by her husband, and the father of two of her children lived in the Transkei; she was classified "displaced" and also given a work-seeker's permit.\footnote{Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (III), case of Mrs E.M; see also ibid., case of Mrs J.M., 29 Oct 1959.} "I don't know where to go, my husband got his real wife, he met me here," stated one woman in a similar predicament.\footnote{Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (III), case of Mrs E.A., 20 Aug 1959. In this case, the woman was probably married under civil law and the "real" wife married under customary law. For a discussion of civil and customary law as applied to African marriages, see Burman, "African Women in Urban South Africa", pp. 123-125.} Mrs R.M. was endorsed out to her husband's birthplace at Peddie; as his parents were both dead, she was sent back by the magistrate and subsequently classified "displaced". One Mau-Mau resident asked officials to revoke his wife's permit as he had not paid the required lobola for her and had sent her away; as she was separated from her husband, she could not be sent to his family and was allowed to live with her mother in the transit camp.\footnote{Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (III), case of Mrs R.M., 17 Aug 1959; ibid., case of Mrs J.M., 1959. The above cases illustrate the state of flux in which colonial African societies found themselves, for customary marriages were significantly affected by the process of urbanisation. See, for example, M. Lovett, "Gender Relations, Class Formation, and the Colonial State in Africa", in J. Parpart and K. Staudt, eds., Women and the State in Africa (Boulder, 1989), pp. 24-25.}
It is likely that many Africans facing expulsion from the Peninsula probably did have relatives in the reserves, but claimed that they could not remember their names.\textsuperscript{25} It was then up to influx control officials to contract the magistrate in the person’s home district to ascertain if the person had any living relatives, which often proved fruitless.

Location residents came under the scrutiny of Nyanga officials regardless of their place of residence. Athlone Advice Office records indicated the address of each advice seeker; while most lived in the transit camp, some also lived in Mau-Mau, Zwelitsha, and the Old Location. After Mrs M.T.’s husband died of tuberculosis in 1959, she was evicted from her Old Location house and had to leave the Combined Area with her four children. Influx control was even used as a lever to force families to move from the transit camp into the 1958 Zwelitsha Drive houses: two women faced expulsion from the Peninsula unless they agreed to be transferred into brick houses.\textsuperscript{26}

The conditions faced by African women who were sole breadwinners were difficult. Even if they were allowed to stay in the Peninsula, they were restricted primarily to domestic work as the CLPP excluded them from working in the manufacturing sector. Wages for domestic workers were notoriously low as compared with the wages of jobs occupied primarily by men: they were R2.93 per week in 1960, whereas the wages in building and construction were R9.17 per week and R6.25 per week in factories; these proportions were just as true in 1970.\textsuperscript{27} The shack clearances had also cut off many additional sources of income, for raids by police and location officials in Nyanga cut down on beer-brewing and

\textsuperscript{25}See, for example, the case of Mrs A.R., who "could not remember" the names of her relatives in Basutoland: Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (III), case of July 1959.

\textsuperscript{26}Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020, C2 (III), cases of Mrs R.K. and Mrs A.M., July 1959.

informal businesses, which had been the economic mainstay of many women in the shantytowns.\(^{28}\)

The total wages earned by women were therefore very low. Hubbard's study of poverty among Africans in Cape Town in 1960 indicated that 72% of household income came from the male head of household, while 9% came from wives.\(^{29}\) While some women may have been involved in informal sector activities such as trading and beer-brewing, this could not have been on such a large scale. Once Africans in the Combined Area were centralised in Nyanga, there were frequent raids for beer-brewing and informal trading was effectively restricted to those holding Divco trading licenses.

Women facing "out endorsement" devised a number of strategies. One common tactic was the use of doctor's certificates in order to obtain extensions on their stay in the Peninsula. Another was to "lose" one's reference book if an "out endorsement" was contained therein; the issuing of a replacement usually took months.\(^{30}\)

5.2 Housing issues: Arrears, evictions, and convictions

The threat of "repatriation" was coupled with the inability of many Nyanga residents to meet their monthly rent payments. In January 1959 alone, 186 summons to pay arrears were served, with 121 tenants paying and the remainder being convicted. By 1960 manager

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\(^{28}\) The processes of colonisation and urbanisation caused many women throughout Africa to seek their livelihood through such activities, which included beer-brewing, prostitution, and cooking food for men. See, for example, J. Parpart, "Class and Gender on the Copperbelt: Women in Northern Rhodesian Copper Mining Communities, 1926-1964", in C. Robertson and I. Berger, eds., Women and Class in Africa (New York, 1986), p. 155.

\(^{29}\) Hubbard, Poverty in Cape Town, p. 14. The remaining 20% came from "other earners", who were presumably lodgers or grown children still living at home.

\(^{30}\) Interview with Mrs K., p. 1; interview with Mrs M.R., pp. 19-20. See also Posel, Making of Apartheid, pp. 223-224.
Pansegrouw reported that during the month of January, 177 summonses had been served, of which 107 paid their rent, 19 failed to pay, 15 failed to appear and were arrested, and 36 cases were remanded or the summonses withdrawn.\textsuperscript{31} While the number of summonses for January was unusually high, it fluctuated between 80 and 90 summonses a month in 1960/61. The problem was so serious that Divco asked the Native Commissioner's Court at Langa to increase the number of arrears cases heard every week.\textsuperscript{32}

In his monthly report for October 1960, the manager of Divco's Native Administration outlined all of the difficulties his staff encountered in collecting rents. Firstly, only two or three court days were set aside for Nyanga summonses, which meant that a limited number of summonses could be served and just the worst offenders could be prosecuted. Secondly, although the authorities were empowered to order employers of Africans to deduct rent from wages, the amount deducted was not to exceed 25\% of the total wage. In many cases the full 25\% was already being deducted and could not legally be increased. Transferring families to cheaper houses was "not always possible due to the size of the family", and no doubt the paperwork, expense and hostility involved in serving summonses and ejecting residents took a heavy toll. The final tactic was criminal prosecution; even this was not effective, for residents would usually be given a suspended sentence on their first appearance in court; shortly before they were due to pay, they would "abscond".\textsuperscript{33}

This was a continuation of the predicament in which the administration found itself when Mau-Mau was established (see Chapter Three, Section 3.2). To make the township...

\textsuperscript{31} RSC 115, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 24 Feb 1959; AWC 138, Manager's monthly report to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 31 January 1960.

\textsuperscript{32} AWC 138, Manager's reports to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 30 May 1960, 31 October 1960 and 30 September 1961.

\textsuperscript{33} AWC 138, Manager's monthly report for October 1960.
carry itself financially, rents were set at a level out of reach for many families in Nyanga. This forced households to transfer to smaller lodgings, live "illegally" with other families, or move back into shacks in Brown's Camp or the transit camp. Yet Divco's priorities were to clear the shack areas and control the tenancy of every person living in Nyanga. Once again, the government's aim of minimising costs and maximising control was not achieved.

The effect of these arrears must have been tremendous. In the first place, the majority of registered tenants were in arrears at any one time and therefore technically under threat of eviction. Many of these were evicted and sent to smaller dwellings, and conceivably many were pressured to do so without being issued a summons. Statistics for January 1960, October 1960, and September 1961 show that 16, 26 and 12 houses respectively were vacated in those months. One family from the Old Location was sent to live in the transit camp due to arrears totalling £107 (equal to almost two years' rent).\(^{34}\) This situation was aggravated by the mass arrests of 1960, which kept many bread-winners in detention.

Nyanga residents were therefore engaged in a constant battle for survival during the late 1950s. Many were expelled from Cape Town, which meant the loss of both their home and livelihood, and those who remained faced a constant battle to stave off evictions.

5.2.1 The building and occupation of Zwelitsha Drive, 1958-59

In addition to dealing with the arrears problem, the administration faced the task of building and filling its new Zwelitsha Drive houses. This scheme consisted of three-roomed dwellings in rows of four, with one pit latrine per dwelling, communal ablution blocks, and 28 water

\(^{34}\)AWC 138, Manager's reports to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 31 January 1960, 31 October 1960, and 30 September 1961.
standpipes to serve the entire scheme. This was one step up from Mau-Mau, where two two-roomed dwellings shared one bucket latrine. In line with the Coloured Labour Preference Policy, the dwellings conformed with the government directive that all new houses built in Peninsula townships be convertible to hostels, and later reconvertible to family housing for Coloured people. The scheme was also in accordance with ethnic grouping guidelines, so that one area was set aside for 42 Sotho families.

To fill the new houses, the original shack settlement of Sakkiesdorp was cleared and the residents told to transfer to the new houses. Although 580 houses were handed over in 1958, one year later 200 remained unoccupied, resulting in significant financial losses. One of the reasons for this was that the administration could not find enough "qualified" families to occupy the houses. Families had to satisfy two requirements: they had to both work and live in the Combined Area and earn an income high enough to pay the rentals. Only 218 such families were found by March 1959, necessitating a relaxation of the rule.

Once the houses had been allocated, a more serious problem cropped up: families in transit camp shacks refused to move into the houses and complained to Advisory Board members that force was being used to make them move. While manager Pansegrouw claimed that the houses remained vacant owing solely to "screening difficulties", the Chief Inspector of Cape Town City Council noted "the experience of the Divco whereby the

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35 RSC 132, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 May 1961.

36 AWC G1, NAD Under-Secretary to CTCC Town Clerk, 10 September 1955. Some of these houses were converted into hostels in the 1960s.

37 RSC 113, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Sep 1958.

38 Cape Argus, 16 October 1957; Cape Times, 9 May 1958; AWC G11, CTCC Chief Inspector to CTCC Native Affairs Department, 24 March 1959; RSC 116, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 31 March 1959.

39 4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 29 April 1959.
occupants of pondoks refuse to remove to their permanent buildings” owing to high rents which "they all claim they are unable to afford". 40

Ignoring the underlying economic reason for the refusal, Pansegrouw threatened recalcitrant transit camp residents with expulsion from the Peninsula if they did not move in. When this did not work, he instructed Langa registration offices to refuse to extend documents of registration to women living in the transit camp unless they could show proof that they had obtained or been refused accommodation. 41 One former location official explained:

...the next thing a house becomes available and promptly Mrs Shabalala is grabbed and put in the Mau-Mau accommodation and the pondok broken down. Next family. No, he's not going anywhere, he's staying here. So all right, we leave them...But we couldn't say for an undetermined period, "All right, you can stay." We couldn't maintain that. We did eventually insist that they move. 42

By May 1959, the manager was reporting that all transit camp residents were refusing to move into the houses. 43

The higher rentals were a chief reason for the refusal to move. The rents were set at £3 a month, triple the amount paid for a transit camp site. Because all the housing was run on an "economic" basis, no provision was made for Nyanga residents to apply for a reduction

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40 AWC G11, CTCC Chief Inspector to CTCC Native Affairs Department, 24 March 1959. To avoid subsidising African housing, local authorities consistently refused to build enough sub-economic dwellings. In kwaMashu, for example, over 80% of households fell into the sub-economic category, yet only 25% of the houses were designated sub-economic: Edwards, "Cato Manor", pp. 177-178.

41 Cape Argus, 3 March 1959; RSC 118, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 28 July 1959.

42 Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 8.

43 RSC 117, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 June 1959.
in rent due to low income. One resident explained that other factors played a role, namely the prohibition on women holding tenancy and the amount of space in the shacks:

One I think was also about the rental which they had to pay, the others felt that they've got their own homes, some of them have their own homes upcountry, but they didn't regard having another responsibility of a rented house, and others didn't have ways of coming in, like those women without husbands, didn't have ways of coming in because they were not given the rights as a woman without a husband, that was the second reason. And I think the third reason, others had extended their houses to bigger rooms rather than the houses that they were coming into...

No doubt both the rent and space requirements were a crucial consideration, as one official pointed out:

The reason is very simple. They were paying a pound a month site rental. Why now go and pay R7.50 for a house which is much smaller than the pondok? Yes, there was resistance. In similar circumstances, I would have resisted also.

As many transit camp residents were endorsed out during 1959 and their shanties demolished, this left more space for their neighbours and correspondingly less competition for water taps and latrines. It was for this reason that one family of 15 children, together with their horses and fowl, remained in their shack until forced to move by the administration. Similarly, one woman left her shack only when the area was levelled to make way for hostels. She recalled conditions in the shanty:

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44 Hubbard, Poverty in Cape Town, p. 26. As of 1969, a household in Langa qualified for sub-economic rental if the breadwinner earned less than R30 per month.

45 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 4.

46 Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 9.

47 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 3.
I liked very much to stay in those houses because you had rooms for children, you had rooms for your own, there was very wide space and bigger space for the whole family in the pondoks, because you built your own house, because I've got 6 children.  

Another advantage of living in the transit camp was that being in arrears could entail a jail term but not eviction. As one tenant recalls,

...in the brick houses, you see, they will throw your things out, and then will put someone else in your place, someone who's willing to pay the rent. But it was difficult for them in the pondokkies to demolish the pondokkies...Ja, I guess it was easy when we lived in the pondokkies, because it was very hard if you live in the brick houses. If they say 7 days it's 7 days, they will come and move you with the cops, and they will take up everything.

In fact, many people who were evicted from their houses moved into the transit camp or Brown's Camp.  

Response to the transfers was not uniform, for some residents did prefer to move into houses. As the shacks varied in size, a family would prefer a house if it was larger than their shanty. Also, the fire hazard was greater in the transit camp, for if one shack caught fire, others close by would frequently catch alight. In 1969, for example, five adults and two children died in a shack fire, which was caused by a burning candle.  

Although the administration did succeed in filling the houses, their difficulties had further highlighted contradictions in state policy. The rents of the houses were unaffordable,

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48 Interview with Mrs L.H., p. 3. See also interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, p. 29. Residents of shack settlements in the developing world similarly found that their informal structures afforded greater flexibility than did formal houses, which could not be extended as easily: Gilbert, "Housing of the Urban Poor," p. 90.

49 Interview with Mr M.M., p. 4.

50 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 5.

51 Interview with Mrs L., p. 1.

52 Interview with Mr M.M., p. 3; interview with Mr W. Makwenkwe, p. 1; Nyanga News, April 1969.
and - as the one quote revealed - women who headed households were not permitted to be registered tenants of the houses. It was as much state policy as popular resistance, then, that kept many Zwelitsha Drive houses vacant for two years.

5.2.2 The Old Location joins the struggle

Transit camp residents were not alone in defying the administration on housing issues. Up to 1958, Old Location residents had for the most part kept themselves aloof from broader location struggles. This changed when the Old Location, which was still being subsidised by Divco and central government by £5394 and £2741 per year respectively, was converted from a sub-economic to an economic scheme in 1958. The conversion to economic housing resulted in rents rising steeply from £2.12.6 per month to £4 15s. (This compared unfavourably with the rent charged for four-roomed houses planned for Guguletu, which were to be set at £3.17.6 per month; Guguletu had the additional advantage of lower transport costs.) Rents for the two-roomed houses went up nominally (£2.3.4 to £2 5s), with the new three-roomed units to be rented at £3 5s.

Few Old Location residents had the financial means to meet the doubled rental. Even the manager conceded this, stating that Section 20(3) of the Urban Areas Act, which provided for the compulsory deduction of 25% of African wages to be paid towards rent, was

53 The gender dynamics around tenancy and rent arrears are described in Chapter Six, Section 6.2.3, "Women and tenancy".

54 4/CT H4/68/A, Actual Expenditure/Revenue for 1958; see also Cape Times, 9 May 1958. The Old Location was the only housing scheme which was run by Divco alone and which incurred annual losses. The conversion to economic scheme ensured that losses were minimised and that the Old Location was financially integrated with the Combined Area housing schemes in 1959: 4/CT 64/53/A, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 10 June 1958.

55 Cape Argus, 30 July 1958; Cape Times, 3 Sep 1958; AWC G11, CTCC Town Clerk to Secretary, National Housing Office, 28 January 1958.
of no use in the Old Location as the rental was seldom less than 25% of the wages of the tenant. By August, the manager had already transferred six widows and their children to "cheaper houses" as they could not afford the new rental.\(^{56}\)

When Old Location residents ceased to remit their rents in protest, Divco's response was not to reduce the rents, but rather to push for persistent defaulters to be arrested and to tell those in the Old Location to transfer to smaller houses with lower rent.\(^{57}\) According to the assistant superintendent in Nyanga, "scores of families" in Nyanga were willing to pay the higher rent in order to move into the Old Location.\(^{58}\) As one administration clerk stated:

...a lot of them did not pay, and the only alternative, that is to either eject, and as the argument was, there's a queue of people waiting outside if you are not prepared to pay, that man is going to pay, or sent to jail.\(^{59}\)

The rent boycott had the effect of drawing Old Location residents to frequent meetings. As one resident recalled,

They were standing up against this payment of this high rent, and all those who were standing up, I remember the open spaces here, there was a big tree, where people were holding their meetings, general meetings under the tree, people all discussing, they're not going to pay, not going to pay, and those who were afraid to pay, they did sneak to pay, and those who were not afraid, they stood up, and not paying. And most of those who did not pay were evicted out of their houses, because the amount of money now was too much for them.\(^{60}\)

Even administration ally Mr D. Ngo participated in the rent boycott:

\(^{56}\)AWC 138, Manager's report for October 1960; RSC 113, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Sep 1958.

\(^{57}\)Cape Argus, 26 November 1957 & 22 August 1958. Divco claimed that it had been instructed (it is uncertain by whom) to fix rents according to family income, but Divco "had been able to arrange" for rents to be fixed according to type of house.

\(^{58}\)Cape Times, 28 August 1958.

\(^{59}\)Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 9.

\(^{60}\)Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 7.
Not that I couldn't afford it, but being chairman [of the Residents' Association] I couldn't be seen to be paying, and the people not paying, so I just stopped paying too... One dead of night, early morning... a big van went around to pick us all up. When we got to court the next morning, you either pay it in full or you sink, there we sat... Employer gave me hell, but I couldn't tell him that it was strategy... ⁶¹

Old Location residents used the legal system to challenge the rentals. The court ruled on 28 April 1958 that the new rental was invalid as residents were not given the required 30 days notice of the rent increase. ⁶² In the meantime, Council had ejected three of the defaulters before their appeal was lodged, and their attorneys managed to get them reinstated. As the manager remarked bitterly, "This made them heroes, and they soon had followers in this recalcitrant attitude." ⁶³

Divco duly gave residents what it deemed to be one month's notice of increase, and ten residents were summoned as test cases. Mr Paulus Vatsha, secretary of the Nyanga Rent Action Committee, stated that residents still refused to pay the rent, even if this meant being served with an ejectment order. ⁶⁴ In any case, they were not legally obliged to do so: as the notification had been served sloppily and did not conform with one full month's notice, the cases were again thrown out. The manager reported in October that with few exceptions, all tenants in the 1946 Scheme had failed to pay their rents that month and that a "political party" had collected money for a court challenge. ⁶⁵

Officials tried again and gave one full month's notice in December 1958, finally winning their court case (but endorsing out the test case tenant; see below). By March 1959,

⁶¹Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 9. See also interview 2 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 2.
⁶²RSC 118, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 28 July 1959.
⁶³RSC 116, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 31 March 1959.
⁶⁵RSC 114, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Nov 1958.
Chapter Five

the rent boycott continued, with 89 of the 210 tenants listed as "recalcitrant defaulters" who either did not pay their rent at all or paid the old rate.\(^{66}\) Four residents were ejected from their Old Location houses in October 1959 and told to move to the transit camp. They again took the case to court and although it was lost, they managed to stay their eviction until their appeal had been heard.\(^{67}\) The events of 1960 intervened to draw out the dispute even longer, and it was not until June 1960 that the administration finally succeeded in ejecting the four tenants when their appeal was withdrawn.

Ironically, in February 1959 the Divisional Council finally began paying refunds to Nyanga residents for the period 1 October 1954 to 31 May 1956, when Old Location residents successfully argued that they had been forced to pay an excess of £1 per month due to invalid rent regulations. When this refund finally came through, many residents who had been boycotting the new rentals since 1 August 1958 found that they had credit balances to their name.\(^{68}\)

It therefore took the administration a long time to evict the rent boycotters. In the interim, residents used other means to fight back. During 1960, Old Location residents were still resisting by using copious amounts of water and electricity, which was not included in their rental; over half of the dwellings had their electricity cut off. One Old Location resident who was £43 in arrears (approximately one year's rent) was finally transferred to the transit camp in 1960.\(^{69}\)

\(^{66}\)RSC 116, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 31 March 1959.

\(^{67}\)RSC 121, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 26 Jan 1960.

\(^{68}\)RSC 116, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 31 March 1959.

\(^{69}\)H4/68/A, Manager to Department of Bantu Administration and Development (DBAD) Secretary, 6 June 1960; RSC 125, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Oct 1960.
...most of the people was not in favour in the office with him, because sometimes they used to reject people out for the rent, put their things outside, then from work he will come back and say, "You stay here, go and borrow money and go and pay and put your things inside." 161

In addition, Conjwa allowed himself to be appointed to be Advisory Board. He thereby filtered important information to people sidelined from the Board due to their known political leanings.

5.4.2 The Advisory Board and demise of the Vigilance Committee

The administration also set about cementing relations with conservative Nyanga residents. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 made provision for the appointment of urban representatives by "territorial authorities". Chief Matanzima appointed 20 men in Cape Town, five of whom lived in Nyanga. 162 This included Shadrack Magwa, who was regularly appointed to the Advisory Board from 1957 on. Magwa faced opposition from residents due to serving on the committee; he accused resident Isaac Bongo of instigating "some Pondo tribesmen to view with extreme disfavour the fact that I lend ready assistance to the Council in these matters," and was told he would be "dealt with" in Bizana. 163

Only four nominations were received for the 1960 Advisory Board, so that four residents from the transit camp and location had to be appointed. The residents who served on this Board as well as those appointed in 1962 consisted of men who had either been on the Board previously or who were to become fixtures on it, such as P. Hobe, S. Magwa, J.

161 Interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, p. 2.
162 AWC 275, K.D. Matanzima to Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Cape, 28 Dec 1961.
Nono, E. Mtwazi, and T. Maloi. Board members insisted that they be regarded by location residents as "authorities of the location", and ensured that any requests to collect money for funerals be channeled via them to the superintendent.

Whilst the Langa Advisory Board was boycotted for three years after the events of 1960, the Nyanga Advisory Board continued to meet during 1960 save for one meeting in April. In 1961 Board members encouraged workers to ignore people who tried to intimidate them from going to work, telling them that the police would protect them.

The Board members' collaboration with the administration met with considerable opposition. The Board at first agreed to an administration proposal in 1961 that it tour beerhalls throughout the country with a view to establishing one in Nyanga; Board members subsequently withdrew from the tour, stating that residents were very angry that the Board had agreed to the tour without consulting them. When the manager suggested that residents be called to a public meeting on the matter, Board member S. Magwa objected, stating that "a floodgate of abuse and bitter recriminations against some of us will be opened." The matter caused considerable embarrassment to the manager, who had announced the tour to the Council and finalised travel arrangements with four local authorities across the country.

164 RSC 125, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Oct 1960; RSC 148, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Sep 1962.


The Vigilance Committee was the driving force behind the opposition to the Board. It called a public meeting on 11 February 1962 to complain about unsanitary conditions, the attitude of administration officials to residents, bus service, and pass and permit regulations in Nyanga. The Advisory Board was roundly criticised for making representations to Divco without considering the residents. A memorandum was subsequently drawn up and submitted to various government departments.\(^{170}\)

Smarting from the public criticism, the Advisory Board four days later accused the Vigilance Committee of "instigating residents against the Advisory Board".\(^{171}\) The Board unanimously passed amended location regulations which governed public meetings.\(^{172}\) The manager of Bantu Administration was to be given far-reaching powers to control, restrict or prohibit meetings in Nyanga, which meant an effective ban on all public meetings that had not been approved in advance by the District Commandant of police. One month later, the Board extended its control of the location by nominating eight people to school committees in Nyanga; six of the eight had served as Board appointees in the past.\(^{173}\) The Vigilance Committee was subsequently closely watched by the administration, as it had been closely allied with the ANC.\(^{174}\)


\(^{171}\)Argus, 27 March 1962.

\(^{172}\)The regulations had already been drawn up by the manager in December 1961, and would probably have been passed regardless of the Vigilance Committee’s meeting of 11 Feb 1962; see 4/CT 64/53/A, Manager to Divco Secretary, 19 Dec 1961.

\(^{173}\)Argus, 27 March 1962. See also Interview with Mr W.N., 5 Sep 1994, p. 3, conducted by H. Fast; H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meetings of 15 Feb & 15 March 1962. The Divisional Council approved the new regulations without debate at its monthly meeting in March.

\(^{174}\)Interview 2 with Mr D., p. 20.
The ban on public meetings must be viewed against the background of the state's nervousness about the activities of the ANC and PAC underground. The two organisations had espoused a programme of armed resistance, establishing Umkonto weSizwe (MK) and Poqo respectively. In 1961/62, MK carried out over 200 attacks in South Africa, with the number in Cape Town totalling 35, the second-highest total next to Port Elizabeth. The attacks provoked draconian legislation and brutal repression: forty-five people in Peninsula townships were arrested in 1963, including Oscar Mpetha, and MK and Poqo were banned. The back of the PAC was broken when the police raided Maseru and obtained the PAC membership list in 1963; mass arrests followed between April and June.

Many of the people arrested in 1963 lived in Nyanga. When 39 of them were subsequently convicted of belonging to the ANC or PAC in 1964 and sentenced to 1 1/2 to 3 years in prison, the manager of Nyanga sent a list of their names, marital status, and urban residence qualifications to the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. The list reveals some interesting trends: of the 34 people whose legal status was given, 30 possessed Section 10(1)a/b rights and only four were "unqualified". At least 32 of the 39 were married, and the information supplied about their partners reveals that 26 of the spouses had lived in Cape Town for at least 14 years. In terms of residence, 17 lived in the transit camp, twelve in Mau-Mau, five in Zwelitsha, and three in the Old Location, which was proportionate to the number of people in each area. Two of the activists were women.

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175 Lodge, Black Politics, pp. 235-236.

176 Lodge, Black Politics, p. 255. Over 500 cases involving Poqo members went through the court system in 1963: Kingwill, "ANC in the Western Cape", p. 88.

177 BAO 3398 C44/1005, Manager to DBAD, 19 Oct 1964.
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The profile that emerges from this list is of Nyanga activists who possessed urban residence rights and had established themselves with their families in the Cape Peninsula. The fact that they lived scattered throughout Nyanga demonstrates the extent to which the political protests of 1960 drew residents from every neighbourhood in Nyanga except for the hostels.

Political activists in Nyanga had had every route to expressing their grievances and mobilising opposition closed off. Their organisations were banned, most of their leaders jailed, and the Vigilance Committee gagged. The surprising facet of Nyanga's history in the 1960s is that these conditions did not discourage residents from mobilising communally, but they did so in very different guise.

5.5 Crime, the amaVolontiya, and the Flying Eagles

Most Nyanga informants indicated that 1960 was a turning point in Nyanga. They agreed that conditions in the township deteriorated and pointed to the increased crime rate as the main culprit, which was almost exclusively blamed on the youth. A similar escalation in youth crime took place in Rand townships in March and April 1960.

Although the references to crime and complaints about a "tsotsi element" increased in 1960/61, the problem had been building in Nyanga during the late 1950s. One of the contributing factors was that many youths were not in school: while 2543 children attended

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178 Interview with Mr M., p. 13. This informant laid the blame for crime on tsotsis who had come down from Johannesburg: ibid., p. 5.


schools in Nyanga and 365 studied elsewhere in 1959, over 3000 children between the ages of 6 and 16 could not attend school due to the lack of facilities.\(^{181}\)

I think that also contributed to gangsterism because there were a lot of drop-outs, you could not afford boarding school, [Langa] High School was the only school and it was full...\(^{182}\)

The manager was unwilling to build schools in the transit camp, where most of the children not in school lived, as he expected most of their families to be "repatriated" or transferred to City Council townships.\(^{183}\)

The National Council of Women stated that the cause of spiralling crime in Nyanga was the absence of books and playing fields.\(^{184}\) When the Institute of Race Relations similarly suggested to Divco the reasons for the gangsterism lay with the lack of schools and recreational facilities, the manager responded that "ambitious provision of European sporting activities in a location often leads to disunion and dispute among residents."\(^{185}\) He blamed the crime on "the absence of general interest in youth by the community as a whole."\(^{186}\)

Glaser’s study of tsotsis on the Rand revealed additional reasons for the increase in gangsterism. Male youths were expected to apply for reference books once they reached the age of 16. Many youths did not qualify to live in the urban area, while many others who did

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\(^{181}\) RSC 117, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 26 May 1959.

\(^{182}\) Interview with Mr N. Mbiko, p. 4.

\(^{183}\) RSC 117, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 26 May 1959. Pansegrouw claimed that he would only know the number of "permanent" families in Nyanga by the end of 1960: RSC 118, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Aug 1959.


\(^{185}\) RSC 124, Manager’s monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Aug 1960.

\(^{186}\) 4/CT 209/9, Manager to Department of Bantu Administration and Development, 24 July 1961.
qualify were endorsed out or sent to Transvaal labour farms if they were unemployed. This caused them to become fugitives, with gangs their only refuge.\(^{187}\)

The same conditions prevailed in Nyanga. Every youth was closely questioned when police and location officials launched their periodic raids:

They used to come every day, sometimes 2 o'clock in the morning, we are still asleep, you see, kwakwakwa, "Open up! This is the police!", we must open...and they want pass, "How old are you?", and they want proof. I say, "No, he's still at school," oh yes, his books, he's still at school, or phone to the rent office, then they will phone the rent office, "Do you know such and such a person?", they will say and reply that yes, they know me. If they don't know you, if they can't find you [unclear], they will lock you up.\(^{188}\)

As on the Reef, male youths aged 16 and over were required to register for a reference book and lodger's permit to enable them to live with their parents. The reference book was checked regularly to ensure that the youth was in employment or in school. If neither applied, the youth had to have his pass endorsed weekly; if it was found to contain numerous seven-day unemployment stamps, he was sentenced to a term of farm labour in the Transvaal.\(^{189}\) If a youth reached the age of 18 and was in employment, he was expected to leave his family and move to the hostels. Exceptions were sometimes made, as when the eldest of 14 children was allowed to remain at home to help with the children.\(^{190}\)

In addition, the permanent qualifications of children were under attack. If a child was born in Cape Town but lived outside the proclaimed area for over a year, Section 10(1)a "borner" status was lost.\(^{191}\) One girl by the name of Elizabeth Bikashe lost her "borner"

\(^{187}\)Glaser, "PAC on the Witwatersrand", pp. 299-300.
\(^{188}\)Interview with Mr M.M., p. 2.
\(^{189}\)Interview 3 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 2.
\(^{190}\)Interview with Mr M.M., p. 3.
status due to attending school in the reserves; her parents could not afford to pay for her to visit them in Cape Town every year.\textsuperscript{192}

Such conditions created a population of young males who were constantly on the run from police and location officials. While females had to obtain lodger permits upon reaching the age of 18, they were not required to be in school or in employment as were male youths. Gangs became their natural refuge:

There were Black Stones, and there was another gang, they used to fight with each other, or maybe go to Mnandi. They will moer it out at Mnandi Beach, fight against each other, most of them were fighting over women, over girls. So if they fight here, they say okay, we'll catch each other Mnandi Beach, and you’ll have to run, because they'll kill you, all sort of weapons, so you can't stand in their way.\textsuperscript{193}

As one elderly resident noted,

It seemed now that in 1960 crime was at its highest peak here, and we said "Boys, you should extinguish this fire because we old people will just beat every moving thing, thus also beating the innocent ones." One day they beat totally all the tsotsis here in the squatter camp, and these things have just risen now when we also have lost all the energy and strength.\textsuperscript{194}

The living conditions in Nyanga aggravated the proliferation of youth gangs. Bonner's list of reasons for gangsterism on the Rand in the 1950s has a familiar ring to it; he pointed to the lack of recreational facilities, the absence of parents if both were working, and overcrowded housing which made it difficult to develop family life.\textsuperscript{195} Although Divco did not keep statistics on the proportion of female-headed households in Nyanga,\textsuperscript{196} it is possible

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Interview with Mrs N. Robb, 15 July 1994, p. 7. The girl was forced to "play Coloured" in Cape Town until she was discovered and endorsed out; after five years in the legal system, she won the right to live in the Peninsula.
\item Interview with Mr M.M., p. 3.
\item Interview i with Mr D., pp. 9-10.
\item Bonner, "Crime and Political Consciousness", pp. 402-404.
\item Adult women significantly outnumbered adult men in the transit camp, suggesting the presence of many female-headed households.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
that the *tsotsism* in the township also arose from a situation in which women reared boys in a hostile environment and in the absence of a patriarchal authority figure, as in East London's locations.\(^{197}\)

Divco's solution was to try to repatriate "idle" youths, but convictions were impossible to obtain under Section 29 of the Urban Areas Act until the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964 facilitated this procedure; those who were expelled to the reserves drifted back soon enough.\(^{198}\) When the manager of Nyanga reported that the situation "deteriorated to such an extent that it calls for immediate action" and asked location officials to round up all unemployed male youths, the Registering Officer replied that it was "not advisable to enter Nyanga East location for any type of arrest because it may just have the opposite effect among the residents."\(^{199}\)

Faced with unchecked crime and the inability of the administration to deal with it, Nyanga residents established street committees, which set out to systematically eradicate gangsterism:

...we're trying to solve our problems self, because government they don't help us. If you report...took the case, when it came to the court he gets free out...if that man got moneys, he's paying for the what's name, case dismissed, before you go to court. So now decide that, the best thing, because we must make our community, what's name, street committees, if I've got problem, then I must go to the street committee, talk and see how to get it right. Then if you don't want to understand, or I don't like to understand my wrongness, then we decide to see what we can do with you. But we don't kill you, just try to get you right, to understand.\(^{200}\)


\(^{198}\)4/CT 202/77, Registering Officer to Manager, 20 April 1961. Divco's strategy seems similar to that employed in Soweto, where authorities used spatial containment, controls on mobility, and the raid system to restrict crime: Glaser, "Youth Politics in Soweto", pp. 163-169.

\(^{199}\)4/CT 202/77, Manager to Senior Inspector, 12 Jan 1961; ibid., Registering Officer to Manager, 1 March 1961.

\(^{200}\)Interview with Mr W.N., p. 7.
These street committees roughly took the form of organisation advocated by Nelson Mandela in 1953. The "M-Plan", which was formulated in anticipation of the ANC having to operate underground, was based upon the idea of a "cell", which was linked to a branch, which in turn communicated with the region and the National Executive Committee:201

During that time they were called the Mandela plan, the street committees, because during that time the organisations were banned...meetings were not allowed and then we formed street committees so that I can speak with my neighbour, he also in turn can speak to another neighbour, so that we can all come together with collective views, and see what the decision will be.202

The organisation of Nyanga residents into M-Plan cells contradicts the assertion by Feit that only the Port Elizabeth ANC came close to applying the M-Plan in practice.203

The street committees were made up of residents called the amaVolontiya; during the 1950s, this was the name given to ANC members.204 After the ANC was banned, it was the amaVolontiya who were behind the street patrols:

After [the ANC] ended we then formed another one...When we could see now that the government was getting strict, we would then form another one. It was the same people but now there was just a change in the name.205

The amaVolontiya did not only mobilise around issues of crime, but sought to settle disputes between Nyanga residents:

I think a number of things, because even issues of people harassing one another, residents, they would take up cases also...to solve problems of community members, of residents' relationships, and also with information of things that were happening that would affect the good living conditions, such

201 Lodge, Black Politics, p. 75.
202 Interview 1 with Mr D., p. 10.
203 Feit, Urban Revolt, pp. 100-101.
204 Interview 3 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1.
205 Interview 2 with Mr D., p. 20.
things. I know because my father attended those meetings, and he was also one of the older people.\textsuperscript{206}

The increasing crime rates had a similar effect on the Rand, where civilian patrols temporarily wiped out \textit{tsotsi} crime in the early 1950s and attempted to contain it in the 1960s. As with the Nyanga patrols, they received no official recognition for their efforts, and crime prevention often took the form of generational conflict.\textsuperscript{207}

In addition to the street committees and the patrols which they organised, another strategy was developed which provided a partial solution to both the banning of political organisations and the rising crime statistics. Since the late 1950s, a gang called the Spoilers had plagued the location.\textsuperscript{208} To combat gangsterism and employ the youth's energy in a constructive way, ANC organisers such as Oscar Mpetha and Samuel Majadi founded the Flying Eagles Rugby Club in 1960, which had as its intention the reformation of these \textit{tsotsis}:

There was a very naughty group here in 1960 known as the Spoilers gang. They used to trouble people, stabbing them and even robbing. Now Mr Mpetha and Mr Majadi decided that to end this crime, let's collect these boys and form a club, and they did that successfully.\textsuperscript{209}

Residents delivered an ultimatum to the gangs:

We gave them options that either you join us and play rugby and sport, or we're taking you to jail. So there was all rugby clubs in Nyanga that came together, and then there was a raid of all these guys. Some of them they gave up and played rugby, and some of them were jailed. And that was the end of that era.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{206}Interview with Mrs M.R., pp. 9-10.

\textsuperscript{207}C. Glaser, "Students, Tsotsis and the Congress Youth League; Youth Organisations on the Rand in the 1940s and 1950s" (University of the Witwatersrand, History Workshop paper, 1987), p. 22. See also Glaser, "Youth Politics in Soweto", p. 195.

\textsuperscript{208}Interview with Mrs K., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{209}Interview with Mr N., p. 5. See also interview with Mr T., pp. 1, 3.

\textsuperscript{210}Interview with Mr N. Mbiko, p. 2.
Although the Flying Eagles became the most prominent rugby club, other rugby clubs such as the Bluebirds, Blues, and Tigers sprang up, as did the Rangers, Pony Express, and Home Defenders soccer clubs.\footnote{211}

The sport organisers did not only have the reformation of tsotsis in mind, however, for they recruited these youths for the underground ANC.\footnote{212}

Crime was here in 1960. There was a team here which we formed called "Flying Eagles". We formed it as our factory for recruiting MK members. This was our factory for collecting all the boys to teach them about rugby and about politics and then we sent them back outside the country.\footnote{213}

As one player recalled,

We were involved in a way with the struggle because you found that most of the guys that were playing, some of them were cadres, and some of them were involved in the Youth League, some of them were involved in the PAC youth, but mostly it was the ANC Youth League.\footnote{214}

The street committees and rugby clubs had the desired effect on the crime rate. By November 1963, the manager noted the "very low crime record" in Nyanga, for which he took the credit.\footnote{215}

According to Muthien and Kinkead-Weekes, the PAC and ANC in Cape Town achieved little grassroots organisation after their banning.\footnote{216} This is true only if one conceptualises political activity in narrow terms: once the ANC and PAC were banned, they had no choice but to use other forms of organisation. As this section has shown, rampant

\footnote{211}{Interview with Mr N. Mbiko, p. 2.}
\footnote{212}{Interview with Mr N., p. 6.}
\footnote{213}{Interview i with Mr D., p. 9.}
\footnote{214}{Interview with Mr N. Mbiko, p. 1.}
\footnote{215}{H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 6 November 1963.}
\footnote{216}{Muthien, State and Resistance in SA, pp. 163-164, 166; Kinkead-Weekes, "Africans in Cape Town to 1973", p. 424.}
crime and the ban on overt political activity galvanised Nyanga residents into forming street committees and the Flying Eagles Rugby Club.

5.6 Nyanga East, Nyanga West: drawing the line

One last aspect to be considered during this period is the passing of Proclamation No 11 of 1960, which divided the Cape Peninsula into two "proclaimed areas" and thereby placed the neighbouring townships of Nyanga and Guguletu under the administration of two local authorities. The proclamation was passed at the insistence of Divco; the reasons for the proclamation and the extent to which it achieved Divco's goals will be explored in this section, as will the consequences of the proclamation for the labour and residence of Nyanga residents.

Although Divco had cleared its "black spots" by the end of 1958, City Council officials only completed their screening of Windermere residents in 1958, with a total of 4000 families to be moved to the City Council's new township.\(^{217}\) The CTCC had selected a site adjacent to Nyanga for its new township (see Figure 5, p. 164); the emergency camp was significantly smaller than Divco's, and was in existence for a much shorter period of time. Originally called Nyanga West due to its location, it only received the official name "Guguletu" in 1962. The use of the names Nyanga and Nyanga West caused much confusion in the interim, causing Nyanga to be commonly referred to as "Nyanga East", which is still in use today.\(^{218}\)

\(^{217}\) Cape Times, 7 Oct 1958.

\(^{218}\) Elias, Housing in the Cape Peninsula, p. 91; interview with Mr M. Schietekat, pp. 2, 20. According to Mr Schietekat, the streets in Guguletu were labelled NY1, NY2 etc because the new township was adjacent to Nyanga and a system for marking roads had to be used as construction proceeded.
The Windermere removals to Nyanga West Emergency Camp began in earnest in 1959, and by May there were 735 families in the camp. After Windermere was cleared, officials moved on to Retreat and Athlone. Those who qualified for housing were moved to temporary zinc huts or directly into houses, while those who were "displaced", that is, who had neither Section 10 permanent qualifications nor a home in the reserves, had to build their own shacks. In 1960, there were an estimated 3128 such families, of whom 1128 had been moved to the Emergency Camp.219

Many residents in Nyanga East and West worked within one local authority area but lived in another. In 1953, Divco was already concerned about what to do with people to be cleared from its "black spots" who were employed in the City Council area.220 In 1956, after the forced removals were well under way, the manager of Native Administration in Cape Town noted that "the majority of the Natives now housed by the Cape Divco at Nyanga work in the City area."221 A policy implemented from 1957 onward was that Africans could not work in one area and live in another without receiving special permission.222

In practical terms, this meant that transit camp families could only be allocated houses in the new Zwelitsha Drive scheme in 1959 if the (male) household head worked in the northern areas.223 A long-term consequence was that almost half of all Nyanga residents

219 AWC 140 vol. 2, CTCC Manager of Native Administration to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 18 May 1959; Swart, "Windermere", pp. 70-71; Cape Argus, 4 March 1959; AWC 138, CTCC Manager of Native Administration to Divco Manager of Native Administration, 21 April 1959; AWC 243, CTCC Manager of Native Administration to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 26 Oct 1960.

220 AWC 58, Divco Secretary to Divco, n.d. (probably 1952 or early 1953).

221 AWC G1, CTCC Manager of Native Administration to CTCC Town Clerk, 31 July 1956.

222 AWC 58, Manager of CTCC Native Administration to Divco Manager, 24 May 1957; 4/CT H4/16/A, Manager to Divco Secretary, 23 Oct 1958.

223 Cape Argus, 3 March 1959.
awaited transfer to Guguletu and knew that their stay in Nyanga was limited. By 1963, a total of 1725 of the 3695 families in Nyanga awaited transfer to the City Council area.

The managers of Native Administration for City Council and Divco sent each other lists of such families to inform each other of their obligation to accommodate them. Of the three lists that exist for 1959, 57% of the families in Nyanga's camp were destined for Nyanga West, while 39% of the families in Nyanga West were destined for Nyanga East. For example, all but one of the Jakkalsvlei families removed to Nyanga transit camp in 1958 worked in the City Council area.\(^\text{224}\)

As a result, any families screened during the City Council removals whose household head worked in the Combined Area were sent to Nyanga East from 1958. In 1959, an average of 23 families per month arrived in the Nyanga transit camp over a three-month period from City Council shack areas. This continued into the 1960s; for example, 35 of the 648 families cleared from Retreat in 1962 ended up in Nyanga East.\(^\text{225}\)

This does not mean that all of these families stayed in Nyanga: many did not possess Section 10(1)a/b/c qualifications and were "repatriated". Divco statistics compiled in 1963 showed that of the 1725 African families awaiting transfer to Guguletu, 367 families were deemed "unqualified" yet were allowed to remain in the Peninsula as long as the breadwinner was employed; a further 172 families were categorised as "displaced" and were also likely to be endorsed out of the Peninsula.\(^\text{226}\)

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\(^{224}\) AWC 138, CTCC Manager to Divco Manager, 29 April & 29 May 1959; ibid., Divco Manager to CTCC Manager, 11 May 1959; ibid., CTCC Manager to Divco Manager, 12 Nov 1958.

\(^{225}\) RSC 114, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 23 Dec 1958; RSC 118 & 119, Manager's monthly reports, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Aug, 29 Sep, & 27 Oct 1959; AWC 131, Manager of CTCC Native Administration to CTCC Native Affairs Committee, 28 March 1962.

\(^{226}\) RSC 160, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 8 Aug 1963.
Divco statistics indicate that the population of Nyanga increased from 18,518 to 20,129 during 1959-61,\textsuperscript{227} of the increase of 1611 residents, 1083 were contract labourers. Yet a continuous stream of families were arriving in the transit camp from areas such as Windermere and Retreat with no corresponding outflow of families from Nyanga East to Nyanga West. This was because Nyanga residents who worked in the City Council area were not to be transferred to Guguletu until permanent houses were built, which were only ready by 1965.\textsuperscript{228}

If there were hundreds of families arriving in the transit camp and well over one thousand new contract labourers in the hostels, then the minimal increase in population attests to the scale of "repatriations" that were carried out by Nyanga officials during this time. The number of Africans endorsed out of the Combined Area from January 1959 to April 1962 totalled 909 African women and 3377 African men.\textsuperscript{229} If it is assumed that many of the women had children with them, then the total number of people endorsed out was much higher than the combined total of 4286 men and women.

The informal trading of tenants between Divco and City Council townships was legalised on 1 January 1960, when an area including Divco and the four northern municipalities (Durbanville was added to the Combined Area in 1959) was declared a "proclaimed area" - that is, anyone who worked in the Combined Area was required by law to live in Nyanga or on a "licensed premise".

\textsuperscript{227}RSC 115, 121, 129, Manager's Monthly Reports, Divco meeting minutes of January 1959, 1960, 1961. The fluctuation of 1611 between 1959 and 1961 was due largely to the arrival of 1083 additional contract labourers in Nyanga.

\textsuperscript{228}By 1964, there were still 654 families in the transit camp and 532 families in houses who awaited transfer to Guguletu: AWC 138, CTCC Manager to Divco Manager, 12 Feb 1964.

\textsuperscript{229}4/CT 202/120, Black Sash Memorandum to Divco Secretary, 9 May 1963. The high number of men endorsed out reflects the yearly return of contract workers to the reserves.
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The proclamation was justified by Divco in financial terms. According to the manager of Divco Native Administration, Mr H.M. Pansegrouw, Divco would be the recipient of registration fees that went into City Council coffers. He claimed that although Divco would receive a smaller share of Native Services Levy (NSL) income, the registration and labour bureau income would swell Divco coffers to the tune of £67,640 annually. As he confidently stated, "On the face of these figures it appears the Council stands to gain considerably and be master of its own house."230

In fact, the amount to be gained was minimal. The City Council, which opposed Divco's proposal to appropriate influx control machinery, argued that it was not in Divco's financial interests nor in the interests of labour control to divide the Peninsula into two separate areas. As of 1958, Divco still received one-third of the Native Services Levy collected from employers, which was double the amount collected in their area.231 If the levy income was limited to the amount collected in the Divco area, then Divco's NSL income would drop quite substantially and wipe out most of the profits projected by Pansegrouw. The issue exacerbated the tensions between the Native Affairs administrations of Divco and City Council, with much animosity generated.

True to City Council predictions, the surplus generated by Divco during the first year that it ran the registration office and labour bureau was only £2506, a far cry from the £67,640 estimated by Pansegrouw; in the following years, the profit did not amount to more

230 NTS 6512 616/313S vol 3, Memorandum of H.M. Pansegrouw, "Registration of Native contracts", n.d. It would appear that Divco officials believed the City Council was "taking money from us": interview with Mr A. Grové, p. 3.

231 AWC 138, CTCC Manager of Native Administration to CTCC Town Clerk, 6 Oct 1958. Over the period 1953-1959, £175,923 in Native Services/Transport levies was collected from the Combined Area whereas £356,632 was paid out to Divco during that time period. The City Council complained that despite this, Divco was unable to provide waterborne sewerage in Nyanga: AWC 138, CTCC Manager to City Treasurer, 5 June 1959.
than 1% of actual revenue. By 1968, the registration section of the Divisional Council showed a R95,494 deficit, so that the rents of Nyanga residents were heavily subsidising Divco's influx control machinery.

From the viewpoint of access to labour, the policy also created problems. As the Cape Chamber of Industries pointed out, employers wished to draw labour from the closest location, which was not possible under the new policy. In addition, the two local authorities had different-sized labour pools; if there was a shortage of labour in the Combined Area and a surplus in Langa, there could be no exchange between the two areas.

It is the latter part of Pansegrouw's reason that therefore holds weight, namely that Divco wished to be "master of its own house". Because the Cape Town City Council was responsible for administering influx control regulations for the whole Peninsula, the Combined Area was often neglected. Although there was sufficient hostel accommodation in Nyanga, 1024 "single" beds remained unfilled in 1959 as Divco did not register service contracts and therefore could not trace the employers of rent defaulters to collect arrears and cancel accommodation. In addition, many of these migrant workers lived in the Langa hostels - 2740 in 1958 - but were not compelled to remove to Nyanga even if they worked in the Divco area. The result was the loss of £11,600 in revenue during 1959 due to the empty beds.

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233 RSC 218, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 11 July 1968.

234 AWC 268, Cape Chamber of Industries to Divco Secretary, November 1959.

235 4/CT H4/68/A, Acting Divco Secretary to Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 3 Nov 1959; RSC 118, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Aug 1959.

236 AWC 138, Chief Native Commissioner to CTCC Town Clerk, 27 Oct 1958; ibid., CTCC Manager to Town Clerk, 29 May 1959; 4/CT H4/68/A, Acting Treasurer to Manager, 2 July 1959. This amount was exaggerated as £26,000 per year by the manager to justify the Proclamation of the
Nyanga officials were also hampered in collecting rent arrears from house tenants. If a rent defaulter left the location, the only way to trace the person prior to 1960 was to contact the Langa Registration office and request that the Langa officials find the person's employment record. Establishing its own registration office therefore empowered Nyanga officials to keep employment records for all the residents of the location. This allowed them to compel contract labourers to move to Nyanga hostels, control the labour and accommodation of location residents, and track down rent defaulters more efficiently. While the Registration Section incurred increasing deficits throughout the 1960s, then, a portion of the losses were made up through the recouping of arrears.

In addition, Divco could hire its own registration officials. Divco was more rigorous in clearing its shack areas and was no doubt glad to be free of the City Council's administration in this regard. As one official remarked,

My way of thinking is that they thought perhaps the City council was too lenient, wasn't strict enough with influx control. 237

It is likely that this was the main reason that the state supported Divco takeover of registration, despite the opposition of the City Council and organised commerce and industry. 238

It is here that an additional motive comes to the fore: Pansegrouw was keen to appropriate for himself the title and salary of Registering Officer. As one former administration clerk recalls,
I was never trained as a typist, but [Mr Pansegrouw] had no option to use me as a clerk typist, and I used to type very confidential reports. Now I picked up some of it when he applied to Divco, to the government rather, the administration of Nyanga should be made a separate registration office, because in Langa, the superintendent there was getting a salary as a Registration Officer, ja, and this chappie always resented that, and he also wanted the Registration.\

While Pansegrouw's motive was clearly a personal one, then, it was also in Divco's interests to fill its own hostels and have more control over Africans living within its jurisdiction.

Proclamation No. 11 of 1960 designating the Combined Areas of the Peninsula a "proclaimed area" for the purposes of administering the Native Registration Regulations took effect on 1 Feb 1960. The hostel quarters were quickly filled, officials were more successful in reducing rent arrears, and Pansegrouw received a larger paycheque. From Divco's point of view, the proclamation was a success: while it was not financially profitable in the long-term, it did allow Divco to control more effectively the labour and tenancy of Africans who lived in the Combined Area. An additional benefit for Divco, as will be outlined below, was that many Nyanga residents lost their Section 10 qualifications.

5.6.1 Stepping over the line: Nyanga residents and the proclamation

While the proclamation contributed to greater administrative efficiency and control for Divco, it was a nightmare for Nyanga residents. It restricted job opportunities, nullified the Section 10 qualifications of many residents, and was used to victimise residents deemed troublesome.

Nyanga residents were not allowed to accept offers of employment in the City Council area and vice versa, even if the wages were higher and travelling distances shorter:\

239 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 11.
240 Interview with Mr A. Grové, p. 3.
We would be screened, and they would find that you're coming from Nyanga, and then you're returned home and said that sorry, you cannot take this job because it requires somebody from Guguletu or the Coloured area, so more of that was also affecting the people and made them more angry and more resistant.\textsuperscript{241}

This presented a particular hardship for Nyanga residents:

The Cape Town City Council had more areas, industrial areas, than the Divisional Council, Divco had industrial areas, Elsies River, otherwise it was a farming area, and the job opportunities was in Ndabeni, or whatever the case may be.\textsuperscript{242}

These hardships were completely ignored despite the representations of the Black Sash, the African General Workers Union, and employer organisations.\textsuperscript{243}

Another serious consequence was that people often lost their hard-won Section 10 rights. Such cases were often referred to the Athlone Advice Office:

What happened, somebody who always lived and worked in that same Nyanga West, which was now Guguletu, he would be offered a job, he wouldn't even realise it was in the Divisional Council. He would be offered a job in the Divisional Council, which he would take, still living there, and fine, that was fine, but then when he left the job, if he hadn't been there 15 years, they endorsed him out and said, "You've lost your rights." I mean, that was the worst thing, I think. I don't think that happened in any other town, it was fantastically ghastly here.\textsuperscript{244}

While there is no evidence to suggest that Divco motivated for the proclamation in order to nullify the Section 10 rights of Nyanga residents, Divco certainly took advantage of this side effect of the proclamation.\textsuperscript{245}

\textsuperscript{241} Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{242} Interview with Mr A. Grové, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{243} Cape Times, 19 March 1960; 4/CT 202/10, African General Workers' Union Secretary to Divco Chairman, 24 Oct 1961; 4/CT 202/120, Black Sash to Divco Chairman, 30 Jan 1963.

\textsuperscript{244} Interview with Mrs N. Robb, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{245} As Foucault pointed out, mechanisms of power are not static in their application and can become useful in ways initially unintended: Foucault, "Disciplinary Power and Subjection", p. 236.
The proclamation could also rid the location of unwanted residents. It was used as a tool against those in arrears: they were given notice to register with the City Council for accommodation. It was also used to justify the attempted transfer of "agitators" such as Oscar Mpetha and Alfred Ndevu to Guguletu as they were employed in the City Council area.\(^{246}\)

The proclamation also had an effect on a daily level. Residents of Nyanga and Guguletu could technically not cross NY44 to visit each other without first obtaining a visitor’s permit from the administration.\(^{247}\)

Those two areas were merely divided by a road, which meant that a man living here in the Nyanga area would require to go to the office 2 miles away to obtain a permit to walk across the street to speak to Mrs Nabe and borrow a cup of sugar.\(^{248}\)

Also, Nyanga officials had a reputation for being more inflexible and less polite than City Council officials; after Divco established its own registration section, the Black Sash complained that Divco personnel were "unduly harsh in their dealings with the Africans", and that a very different atmosphere prevailed in Nyanga than in Langa registration offices.\(^{249}\)

One last consequence of the proclamation still remains to be examined, namely the effect of having adjacent townships administered by different local authorities. As the manager of Cape Town’s Native Administration pointed out, once the City Council’s Nyanga West township was built, water and sanitation services in Nyanga West would be superior to those in Nyanga, and yet the rents in Nyanga West for both family and hostel quarters would

\(^{246}\)4/CT H4/16/A, Manager to Superintendent, 13 April 1959; RSC 113, 114, & 116, Manager’s monthly reports, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Sep 1958, 23 Dec 1958, & 31 March 1959. Divco did not succeed in transferring Mpetha to Guguletu.

\(^{247}\)Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 6; Cape Argus, 8 Aug 1959.

\(^{248}\)Interview with Mr M. Schietelat, p. 17.

\(^{249}\)4/CT 202/120, Black Sash to Divco Secretary, 11 April 1960.
be lower. The Cape Chamber of Industries echoed this concern in predicting that the number of "agitators" in Nyanga would increase due to these disparities.\textsuperscript{250} That this was a legitimate concern is underlined by the fact that two years after the violence of March/April 1960, the secretary of the Divisional Council strongly recommended spending more on sanitary and sports facilities in Nyanga so as to avoid unfavourable comparisons with Nyanga West and the dissatisfaction and unrest that would follow in its wake.\textsuperscript{251}

The City Council claimed in 1959 that some Nyanga residents had "indicated their desire to go to the extent of changing their places of employment to Cape Town in order to qualify for transfer".\textsuperscript{252} After the proclamation came into effect, hundreds of Africans working in the Combined Area and living in Langa hostels refused to re-register with Divco or obtained jobs in Cape Town, telling City Council officials that Nyanga was "less pleasant and more expensive to live in."\textsuperscript{253} The continuing discrepancy between the two adjoining townships is still resented by Nyanga residents.

This type of policy was not unique in South Africa. The Brakpan municipality enforced a regulation in 1945/46 that tenants in houses had to work in the Brakpan municipal area. Many people working in other industrial areas were promptly evicted; as in Nyanga, the location administration used the policy to get rid of people who were unemployed, in arrears, or considered to be "agitators".\textsuperscript{254} In Paarl during the 1960s, Africans who

\textsuperscript{250}AWC 268, CTCC Town Clerk to Divco Secretary, 7 Dec 1959; ibid., CTCC Manager of Native Administration to Regional Organiser, Institute of Race Relations, 12 Oct 1959; ibid., Cape Chamber of Industries to Divco Secretary, November 1959.

\textsuperscript{251}Cape Times, 16 Feb 1962.

\textsuperscript{252}AWC 268, CTCC Town Clerk to Divco Secretary, 7 Dec 1959. See also ibid., Cape Chamber of Industries to Divco Secretary, November 1959.

\textsuperscript{253}Cape Times, 19 March 1960. See also BAO 1575 A19/1005/1, Divco Secretary to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 27 Oct 1960.

\textsuperscript{254}Sapire, "Brakpan", pp. 225-229.
possessed Section 10 qualifications in the Divisional Council area were stripped of their rights if they moved to the municipal area.\textsuperscript{255}

The decentralisation of "Bantu" registration outlined above owed its origin to the system of divisional councils. The councils occupied an intermediate tier in government and often surrounded municipalities, with each claiming jurisdiction over their respective African population. It is likely, then, that the experience of Peninsula Africans in battling the bureaucratic nightmare of decentralisation was repeated elsewhere.

Conclusions

By 1962, Nyanga was far from the "model township" it was intended to be. Fifteen years after its establishment, Nyanga streets still had no names and a mere 13 shops served a population of 20,129 residents. Over 800 residents suffered from tuberculosis, and the number was estimated to be much higher.\textsuperscript{256} Even the Divco Secretary had to admit the result of spending a minimum on housing and services:

"From a housing point of view, I personally express the opinion that a more windswept and desolate area will be difficult to find in Africa."

It was this desolate landscape that provided the setting for a remarkable series of events between 1959 and 1962. Confronted with the vigorous implementation of efflux control, forcible transfers from shacks to houses, doubled rents in the Old Location, and evictions due to chronic rent arrears, residents from every section of Nyanga mobilised.

\textsuperscript{255}V.C. Malherbe, ed., Paarl - The Hidden Story (Cape Town, 1988).

\textsuperscript{256}H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 16 May 1961; 4/CT 209/9, Manager to Department of Bantu Administration and Development, 24 July 1961; RSC 134, Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health, Divco meeting minutes of 25 July 1961. The disease was often hidden by tuberculosis sufferers, for officials often tried to "repatriate" the patient's family while the breadwinner lay in hospital.

\textsuperscript{257}Cape Times, 16 Feb 1962.
They protested against living conditions in Nyanga and were active in opposing pass controls through their participation in broader political organisations. As Karis and Gerhart concluded of the resistance of Peninsula Africans, "Never had an African urban population been so solidly united in its determination to defy white authority." 258

The massive state crackdown on opposition groups succeeded in removing location leadership, and the buttressed powers of police and administration officials resulted in corrupt and arbitrary rule. Despite these formidable obstacles, Nyanga residents resisted these pressures by forming street committees and sports clubs, which organised residents communally and tackled the problem of rising crime.

There were more challenges that lay ahead. Proclamation No 11 of 1960 was to threaten thousands of residents with transfer to Guguletu, efflux control was to be applied even more ruthlessly, and arrears would continue to mount. Yet Nyanga residents would have one resource to fall back upon, namely their tradition of challenging Divco and the state in unorthodox ways.

CHAPTER SIX
Passes and Places to Stay, 1963-70

Introduction

Graeme Bloch stated that the political history of the 1960s has usually been conceived "simply as a time of silence and defeat, almost without a history."\(^1\) The previous chapter provided a partial explanation for the relative silence by describing the massive crackdown by security forces and the corrupt location administration in Nyanga, and showed that the resistance was not completely defeated. The next two chapters will provide further explanations for the stifled resistance and describe the experiences of Nyanga residents during the 1960s.

Nyanga residents were to face their greatest challenge in the 1960s as they sought to withstand the continuous onslaught on their rights to live in the Peninsula. This chapter will outline the series of laws that were passed and explain the effects of influx control, housing, and migrant labour policies on social dynamics in Nyanga. It will thereby be demonstrated that the prime reason for the "silenced sixties" lies in the insecurity of urban African residents.

A further theme to be explored is the efficacy of the pass laws in Nyanga. The decade of the 1960s was one in which influx control was consolidated and extended, which makes it a crucial period in which to assess the degree to which the state's aim of reducing the Peninsula African population was realised on the ground.

\(^1\)Bloch, "Silent Sixties", p. 3.
6.1 Influx Control and Urban Labour Preference, 1963-70

The Department of Bantu Administration and Development became more ideologically hardline and intransigent during the 1960s, seeking to eliminate Section 10 rights altogether. Although this plan was not realised due to the opposition of organised commerce and industry, which faced a growing need for labour, DBAD did succeed in seriously undermining Section 10 rights and in introducing labour quotas by the end of the decade. To vigorously implement its policies, DBAD expanded its bureaucracy and placed more Broederbond members in administrative positions in local authorities.

The permanent urban rights of Africans were attacked through a series of laws passed during the first half of the decade. The most crucial law in this respect was the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964. The Act empowered the DBAD Minister to determine quotas of African labour to be allowed into urban areas and removed the right of local authorities to grant visitor's permits to African women. Thereafter the Black Sash noted that officials had little discretionary power in administering the pass laws, which were far more rigidly enforced.

The most significant aspect of the Act was Section 29, which stated that residents with Section 10(1)a/b/c qualifications could lose their "permanent status" if deemed to be "idle or undesirability". While the Urban Areas Act of 1923 was amended as early as 1930 to provide for the deportation of "idle, dissolute or disorderly" Africans, it was rarely enforced owing

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5 Torr, "Lamontville", p. 38.
to the ambiguity of the wording. The amendment of 1964 specifically defined "idle", making
it more easily enforceable: if an African refused employment three times, lost his/her job
more than two times in six months, or was dismissed from employment three times in one
year for "misconduct", permanent rights could be revoked.

The Act was applied immediately, with 1370 Africans declared "idle or undesirable"
in South Africa during the first four months of 1964, of whom 12% were sent to farm
colonies for up to two years and 14% were forced to accept employment or face a prison
sentence. 6 The prospect that therefore faced African families was the possibility of being
endorsed out if the breadwinner was unemployed. Losing one's job could become the pretext
for the expulsion of an entire family from the proclaimed area:

...since that time we never have a rest...If maybe you're working for your
boss and you two don't understand, chase you away, they give you 7 days
chance. If you can get a job before that 7 days chance, that business owner
must bring you to the office and arrange everything ...Otherwise after 7 days,
you must come back again, ask for another 7 days, on the third time, they
don't give you anymore, you must leave Cape Town.... 7

If an African held a part-time job, the reference book still had to be endorsed every week,
which applied equally to women engaged in part-time domestic work. Section 29 was also
applied to contract labourers, who were endorsed out by Divco officials if they lost their job. 8

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6 D. Hindson, Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat in South Africa (Johannesburg,

7 Interview with Mr W.N., p. 2.

8 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 18; 4/CT 202/120, Divco Secretary to Black Sash, 7 Aug 1963.
6.1.1 Influx control and Coloured Labour Preference, 1963-70

While the pass laws tightened controls over the movement and labour of Africans throughout South Africa, influx control policies in the Western Cape were even stricter. To further implement the Coloured Labour Preference Policy, Pretoria in 1961 required that firms wishing to employ Africans had to obtain a certificate from the Department of Labour stating that no Coloured labour was available. In 1963 local labour committees were established in 64 magisterial districts to assist with the "integration and full utilisation" of Coloured labour so as to eliminate the need for African workers.9

In 1965 the government passed an amendment to the Black Labour Regulations Act which granted labour offices the right to sanction or refuse the employment of an African worker in the Western Cape. Although this simply formalised the administrative procedure inaugurated in 1961, the Act also stipulated that contract workers were to return to their "homeland" after expiration of a contract and reapply for admission. This prevented contract workers from acquiring permanent rights to be in the urban area and was a major blow to African men on the verge of qualifying. This policy was extended to the rest of South Africa in 1968.10

The final stage of Coloured Labour Preference was announced in 1966: the number of African contract workers in the Western Cape was to be reduced by 5% per annum and

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94/CT 202/103, Labour Consultative Committee (Cape), meeting of 25 Jan 1961; Hendrie, "Coloured Labour Preference", p. 96. The "Eiselen Line", which drew the boundary between the Western and Eastern Cape, was shifted further east in 1963 to include 22 more magisterial districts. In 1967 it was moved again to encompass the Cape Midlands; the line ran roughly from Aliwal North to the sea: ibid., pp. 96, 99.

the "Bantu labour complement" of Western Cape employers would be frozen as from 31 August 1966.

The influx/efflux control of the 1950s therefore shifted to a harsher efflux control in the 1960s and was most stringently applied in the Western Cape. The Athlone Advice Office noted in 1962 that the further application of the CLPP resulted in officials rarely making exceptions when applying the pass laws. In the course of 1963, 660 Africans were endorsed out of the Combined Area; the number more than doubled to 1489 in 1964. While no gender breakdown was given in Combined Area statistics, City Council figures for the same period show that approximately two-thirds of the people endorsed out in 1963/64 were women.\textsuperscript{11}

In their zeal to expel as many Africans from the Western Cape as possible, officials created a labour shortage. In October 1963 there were 227 vacancies in the Langa labour pool, whereas there were usually 700 men available.\textsuperscript{12} All men without permanent qualifications were endorsed out if they left their employment, regardless of whether they had found another job.\textsuperscript{13} This effectively terminated their accumulated record of urban residence and relegated them to the status of permanent contract workers. Although the Black Sash was directly involved in trying to find loopholes in the laws, they often found that "you could save the man, but you couldn't always save the wife and children, and they'd been there all the time."\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11}Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; A2, Monthly Report for July 1962 & January 1965.
\item \textsuperscript{12}All African men in the Peninsula were required to register with the Cape Town City Council's Bantu Labour Section if they were unemployed.
\item \textsuperscript{13}Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; A2, Monthly Reports for October 1963, March 1964, April 1964, & June 1964. See also Cape Times, 4 Oct 1962; 4/CT 202/120, Divco Secretary to Black Sash, 7 Aug 1963.
\item \textsuperscript{14}Interview with Mrs N. Robb, p. 3.
\end{itemize}
The number of people charged with pass offences therefore climbed dramatically from 1964 onward, with 14,000 successful pass law prosecutions in the Cape Peninsula during 1965.\(^\text{15}\) The perceived power of the administration to expel any African from the Peninsula induced fear in Nyanga residents:

This piece of stone, maybe it's lying in front of your house, they wants you to come there, "Why have you got that stone in front of your house?" Then you tell him, or maybe you said no, you didn't see the stone before that, then that's where they got chance to let you go, to make a place dirty, so on.\(^\text{16}\)

The perception was based upon reality, for the manner in which "repatriations" were carried out differed qualitatively from the those of the 1950s. Whereas officials had sought to prevent the establishment of families in the Peninsula during the late 1950s by sending away women who had only recently arrived (Basutoland and Bechuanaland women excepted), the 1960s saw the administration seizing upon any excuse to break family units apart, whether recently or long-established in the area.

If Africans left the proclaimed area for a period of over six months, they forfeited their rights to live permanently in that urban area, although African men could return as contract workers. Authorities also tried to prevent the children of Section 10(1)a/b/c parents from acquiring permanent rights. Children returning from rural areas could not re-enter the proclaimed area unless their parents obtained permission from their local authority for the child to return.\(^\text{17}\)

Another petty pretext for expulsion was the refusal to recognise the continuous employment of men employed by certain firms. DBAD ruled in 1966 that if a man had


\(^{16}\)Interview with Mr W.N., p. 6.

worked for one employer for a number of years, and then the company changed hands or amalgamated with another, the man’s previous service record was to be disregarded and he was to be assigned the status of a contract worker.

The Proclamation of 1960 continued to "cause endless confusion and misery", for it stripped many Nyanga residents of their qualifications. As the Black Sash noted, Section 10 was

further contorted by this extra line of red tape, twisting along the boundary line between the two areas, a length of tape seen usually only too late, after it has been crossed.\(^\text{18}\)

One woman had her continuous residence record broken by moving from the Combined Area to the City Council Area in 1956, which resulted in her resettlement in 1968. Many men in the Langa labour pool accepted jobs in the Combined Area without realising that this would break their residential record in the City Council Area.

In some instances pass officials would manufacture reasons for a person’s expulsion. In one case, a labour inspector told an employer that her domestic worker had been charged with illegally brewing beer, and persuaded the employer to give him the worker’s employment card. The employee was endorsed out of the area and not allowed to return, even after it was established that the inspector had lied to the employer. Firms were pressured to fire their employees just prior to their attainment of permanent qualifications, and were told that their African labour quota would be reduced if they did not comply. Officials would ask Nyanga residents to sign papers without telling them the content of the document, which was an agreement to resettle their families in the reserves.\(^\text{19}\)


Whether someone was endorsed out of the proclaimed area therefore depended completely on circumstances, for officials sought any technicality whereby a person or family could be stripped of their qualifications. When a woman living in Nyanga transit camp went to the Transkei on a brief visit, her husband was sent to a hostel as he was "single", his wife lost her qualifications, and their shack was destroyed. A widow in Nyanga was endorsed out of the Combined Area in 1969 because she only registered in 1956 and was therefore two years short of qualifying for 15 years continuous residence; although officials knew that she had been living in Nyanga since 1954, she only won her case when she was able to produce rent receipts for that year.\textsuperscript{20}

"Repatriations" were also a convenient way to get rid of political activists. Africans detained under the 90-day detention law during the crackdown on MK and Poqo faced "repatriation" when they were released: those who had been convicted for a prison term of six months or more were expelled from the proclaimed area; if they did not possess "permanent qualifications", they were endorsed out regardless of whether they had been charged or convicted. Those who had Section 10 qualifications faced a brief reprieve until the passing of the Amendment Act of 1964, when Section 29 could be used to expel them. The families of prisoners were "repatriated" while their relative was in prison, unless the family members qualified in their own right.\textsuperscript{21}

Efflux control shifted into high gear in 1966, when DBAD instructed all Western Cape magistrates to resettle all "superfluous" Africans.\textsuperscript{22} As it instructed its officials,


\textsuperscript{21}BAO 3398 C44/1005, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner to Divco Secretary, 4 Oct 1963.

\textsuperscript{22}AWC 243, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Western Cape) to all magistrates, 23 March 1966.
Chapter Six

It must be stressed that no stone must be left unturned to achieve the resettlement in the homelands of non-productive Bantu at present residing in the European areas. 23

Elderly and handicapped people, widows, and women with dependent children were targeted for resettlement, but those with Section 10(1)a/b rights could not be transferred without the consent of the person concerned. The administration reported that of 10 pensioners interviewed during the course of March 1966, six "agreed" to resettlement, three refused, and one was undecided. 24 The Advice Office noted that many people were bullied into leaving, either by signing documents they did not understand or by being unaware that they had a legal right to stay. By 1969, many Western Cape Africans had been resettled in Mdantsane and Zwelitsha. 25

6.1.2 A woman's place is in the home(land), Part 2

There were two ways in which African women could legally qualify to live in the urban area. Firstly, they could qualify in the same way as men, namely by virtue of birth [Section 10(1)a] or 15 years residence/10 years continuous employment in the urban area [Section 10(1)b]. This route to legality was severely restricted in 1965, when a court ruling stated that if a woman had not registered with her local labour office within 72 hours of 24 June 1952, when the Native Laws Amendment Act came into effect, any previous residential evidence was disregarded. As the Langa officials only began registering African women in the Peninsula from 1954, no women in 1965 could claim permanent status based upon...

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23Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; A2, Annual Report for 1967/68.

24RSC 189, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 14 April 1966.

continuous residence, very few had worked for one employer for 10 years, and even fewer had been born in the Peninsula. Women who had lived in Cape Town since the 1930s were endorsed out on the grounds that any evidence that they had lived in Cape Town prior to 1954 carried no legal weight. 26

To ensure that African women who had lived many years in the Peninsula did not achieve qualification in their own right, officials actively endorsed out women who would attain Section 10(1)b status during the next few years. The Athlone Advice Office dealt with 339 such cases between October 1964 and September 1965, and with 223 cases between October 1966 and September 1967. This represented a fraction of the total, for the Black Sash estimated that advice seekers represented only 25% of the actual number endorsed out. 27

A second way in which an African woman could remain in the Peninsula was if she was classified as Section 10(1)c, namely as a dependent of a man who qualified as Section 10(1)a/b. Many "qualified" men brought their wives to Cape Town and anticipated that once they had lived together for a short while, the wife would be classified Section 10(1)c and together they would obtain accommodation. 28 They were stymied by DBAD, which in 1963 stated that

"...where a man so qualifies and is subsequently joined by his wife, and, after a period of ordinary residence, she claims qualification in terms of paragraph (c) of sub-section (1) of Section Ten, the family as such cannot be accommodated as a family group." 29

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28 AWC 243, CTCC Bantu Affairs Committee memo to Town Clerk, n.d. (probably 1963); ibid., CTCC Director of Bantu Administration to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 5 Aug 1965.

29 AWC 243, CTCC Bantu Affairs Committee to CTCC Town Clerk, 1963.
Whether or not a woman was deemed to "ordinarily reside" depended on the discretion of local authority officials, for there was no minimum period of residence prescribed by the Act. As Chapter Five has shown, Divco registration officials were stricter than City Council personnel in applying Section 10.

Unmarried women with children, who made up 14% of the households in Nyanga in 1968, were in the worst position possible. These women, whether widowed, divorced, separated or single, were sometimes allowed to remain in Nyanga with their children if they had a job in the proclaimed area. If they had no dependent children (whether due to being childless or their children reaching adulthood), they were endorsed out.

In the late 1960s, DBAD placed a further pressure on unattached women: either they were to leave the proclaimed area with their children, or work in the city and send their children to the country. The process was described by a former Advice Office director:

They had a terrible thing called the "breadwinner's concession": if the woman almost qualified, say she'd worked 9 1/2 years with one employer, or lived in the area for 14 1/2 years, they would say, "You don't qualify, but if you will take your children home and leave them upcountry, we'll let you come back on a sort of contract." And we called it the breadwinners' concession, and many women did that, took their children, left them at home with granny or somebody, and then the employers had permission to have them on a contract, which was renewed year after year. But if the children came back, then they wouldn't renew the contract. Many's the case where I'd say, "Why won't you renew this woman's contract?" "Because we know her child is back in Cape Town."

30 CT 202/120, Divco Secretary to Black Sash, 7 Aug 1963.
31 BAO 133, A2/1005, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 31 Dec 1968.
32 Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; A2, Annual Report for 1966/67. See also interview with Mrs L.H., p. 4.
33 Interview with Mrs N. Robb, p. 8.
The situation was advantageous to administration officials, for they obtained the woman's labour power but were able to prevent her children from acquiring urban residential rights. As the Advice Office noted at the time, 

By sending [the children] away in order to be allowed to remain here to work in order to support them, the mother is trading in their inalienable right to live and work in Cape Town in exchange for permission to accept work offered. 34

By 1969, this euphemistically-named "Supplementary Settlement Scheme" was operating on a large scale.

The state was not alone in wishing to send African women from the urban to the rural areas. The official in charge of the Female Registration Section in Nyanga 1963-66 related cases in which African men with more than one wife in the urban area would choose which wife could stay and which would be sent away. The men would also collude with officials in preventing the entry of women into the Peninsula. For example, if a man's wife wished to join him in Cape Town but he was living with another woman, he would ask that his wife be refused a visitor's permit. 35 Barnes and Schmidt have documented similar situations in colonial Zimbabwe, where African men called on the state to pass legislation to reinforce their control over women. 36

The number of women who were "refused permission to remain" in Nyanga averaged 482 per year between 1964 and 1968. 37 By 1970, the number of African women endorsed

34 Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; A2, Annual Report for 1967/68.

35 Interview with Mr R. Murray-Rawbone, p. 5.


37 This statistic was derived from the Manager's monthly reports for 1964-68, which are found in the Divisional Council monthly minutes.
out of the Peninsula was low, for so many women had already been "repatriated", and those remaining in the Peninsula had acquired permanent rights and could not be endorsed out unless they became widowed, separated, or divorced.³⁸

Because most adult African women could not stay in the city without being married, it is likely that many were forced to stay in intolerable marriages. If an African woman instituted divorce proceedings, her Section 10(1)c status would be nullified.³⁹ As Burman remarked of the situation in the 1970s,

An African woman on a Section 10(1)c pass is allowed into the urban areas very much as a possession of her husband, and if she ceases to be his, she is treated by the state as an object to be returned to the storeroom, irrespective of her blameworthiness.⁴⁰

Even if a divorced woman could stay in the urban area due to being classified "displaced", she could not obtain tenancy of a house.

Housing policy and influx control worked in tandem. The state wished to reduce the number of African families in the Western Cape, and therefore did not build permanent housing for all of the qualified families in the Peninsula. By 1963, a family was not allocated permanent housing unless both the husband and wife possessed Section 10(1)a/b status.⁴¹

Under the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964, African women could not enter an urban area unless they "ordinarily resided" in town and had accommodation available. Officials were thus able to use the shortage of accommodation as a basis for endorsing out hundreds of women. When the City Council cleared Retreat of Africans in 1962, women whose husbands had Section 10(1)a/b qualifications could not stay in the Peninsula unless

⁴¹ AWC 243, CTCC Bantu Affairs Committee memo to Town Clerk, n.d. (probably 1963).
they found work; in addition, women who themselves possessed 10(1)a/b rights but whose husbands did not were sent to the reserves and their husbands to the "single" quarters in Langa.\(^{42}\) A similar situation prevailed in Nyanga, where husband and wife had to be Section 10(1)a/b and had to have minor children:

If you have children, then you can get a house. If you have no children, they will tell you, "Go and work", you are not given a house, which means it's either a woman will stay amaKitchen, if you're a man you go to the Single, ja, that's how it was, that's why you find the servant's quarters, you must go and stay in a servant's quarters here.\(^{43}\)

The worst tragedy that could befall a family was the death of a spouse: if a man died, his wife and children could be sent to the reserves; if the wife died, the husband was liable to be sent to the hostels and his children to the reserves.\(^{44}\)

On paper, Divco's zealous pursuit to decrease the number of African families in the Combined Area succeeded: between 1960 and 1970, the proportion of Africans living in household conditions dropped from 17,000 to 9,000 people, a drop of 47\%. In the City Council area, the number of people living with their families fell from 60,000 to 50,000, a drop of only 17\%.\(^{45}\)

The reasons for the substantial reduction in African families in the Combined Area are two-fold. First, Divco officials were endorsing out Africans to the reserves as well as transferring residents to Guguletu. Second, Divco seems to have implemented state policy more rigorously than the City Council; indeed, it seemed to have a significant influence on the formulation and application of influx control policies (see Chapter Seven).


\(^{43}\)Interview with Mrs N., p. 2.

\(^{44}\)Interview with Mrs N., p. 1; interview 3 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1. See also Muthien, *State and Resistance in SA*, p. 197.

\(^{45}\)Hubbard, *Poverty in Cape Town*, p. 6.
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The massive scale of repatriations was the experience of Africans throughout the republic. The forcible transfer of over 400,000 urban Africans to the bantustans in the 1960s resulted in the decline of the officially recorded population in two-thirds of South Africa's townships. 46 What made the Western Cape different was the application of influx control to African women three to four years before the rest of the country, 47 especially in the Combined Area, where "out endorsements" - in tandem with forced removals to the Nyanga transit camp - were in full swing by 1957. In addition, the building of African family housing in the Peninsula was frozen in 1962, whereas this policy took effect in South Africa at large in 1968. 48

This time period was therefore one of extreme insecurity for all inhabitants of Nyanga, who had to negotiate their way through a plethora of regulations and constantly changing housing and influx control policies. Legally qualified families could find themselves in danger of separation or expulsion overnight for any number of reasons: the loss of a job, death of a spouse, infringement of a petty regulation, break in continuous residence, or suspicion of political activity. Small wonder that the energies of many Nyanga residents were directed toward maintaining their foothold in the urban area, which was their basis for social and economic survival.

46 Lodge, Black Politics, p. 321. The de jure population of the bantustans increased by 70% during the 1960s.

47 See Yawitch, "African Women and Influx Control", p. 5. Women had been subject to pass controls in certain parts of South Africa since the early twentieth century (see Wells, We now demand, Chapter 1), but do not seem to have been subject to large-scale expulsions until the 1950s.

6.1.3 The efficacy of influx/efflux control, 1963-70

While the situation can be described as one of "total insecurity", it was not one of "total control", for it is debatable whether the state succeeded in substantially reducing the African population in the Peninsula. While the number of Africans charged and convicted under the pass laws is easily verifiable, it is difficult to assess how many Africans continued to live in the Peninsula despite their arrest and "repatriation" and indeed how many slipped through the net altogether. As one official commented,

It was like trying to stop the sea, influx control. You'll never be able to cope, even if you've got hundreds of thousands of policemen. I'm sure they didn't leave.\(^{50}\)

Stated another Nyanga official,

We used to submit our total figure for the month, total number of occupants, 18,906, which was the best we could do from the records we had and from the monthly census we used to take, and we always used to submit this with an enormous giggle because those were the ones we knew of...But there were many many many illegal occupants, and then of course it was also permitted in certain circumstances for a man to take in a lodger...I mean we had 400 lodgers on record, there were probably 800 or 1000.\(^{51}\)

Divco's statistics show that influx control in the Peninsula was like "trying to stop the sea". Divco noted in 1963 that while most of the women who had been warned to leave the area had returned to their "home districts", many had remained. In the course of 1964, 724 Africans were apprehended in Nyanga and charged with being in the area illegally; the figure

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\(^{49}\)The concept of "total control and total insecurity" is borrowed from Rex, "The Compound, the Reserve and the Urban Location", pp. 12-13.

\(^{50}\)Interview with Mr R. Murray-Rawbone, p. 8.

\(^{51}\)Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 19.

\(^{52}\)BAO 2066, A22/1005, Divco memo to DBAD Minister, n.d. (probably 1963, as all statistics quoted are for 1963).
stood at 513 in 1966, 497 in 1967 and 896 in 1968.\textsuperscript{53} This did not include the number
detained outside Nyanga boundaries: between 1967 and 1969, 3710 Africans were arrested
by Divco officials for being in the area illegally, which did not include arrests made by the
police.\textsuperscript{54} The manager of Divco's Bantu Administration section stated in 1970 that it was
"well-nigh impossible" to estimate the number of illegal Africans in the Combined Area.\textsuperscript{55}

Many women and children were living in the Nyanga hostels by 1967; a similar
situation was faced by City Council officials, who recorded the large number of women
living illegally in the "bachelor" zones in 1968.\textsuperscript{56} The problem seems to have progressively
worsened over the course of the decade. A serious drought in the Transkei caused many
women who had previously been endorsed out of the Peninsula to return. With no work,
money, or food, they had little to lose in re-entering the area as "illegals".\textsuperscript{57}

More "illegals" meant more "illegal employees". Due to the impoverishment of the
rural areas, Africans found it financially advantageous to live illegally in Cape Town even if
they found only part-time work and were imprisoned or fined regularly due to pass law
infringements.\textsuperscript{58} Many employers only too willingly circumvented the registration of
Africans and employed "illegals"; in fact, numerous employers preferred to engage "illegals"
over legal contract workers and "permanent" Africans as the insecure position of the former
meant that "illegals" had to settle for low wages and poor working conditions:

\textsuperscript{53}These figures were compiled from RSC 165 to 176 and 188 to 224, Manager's monthly reports

\textsuperscript{54}Kinkead-Weekes, "Africans in Cape Town to 1973", p. 544.

\textsuperscript{55}NY 24/2/2, Divco Chairman's Annual Report for 1970/71.

\textsuperscript{56}NY 7/3/1, Manager's memo to hostel residents, 18 July 1967; AWC 308, Secretary of Social
Services Association to City Council Manager, 30 April 1968.

\textsuperscript{57}Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; A2, Annual Report for 1969/70.

\textsuperscript{58}West, "Influx Control", p. 27.
A lot of employers preferred the illegals because they never used to go out...weekends they stayed in their rooms. They liked these illegals, because they treated them as slaves.\textsuperscript{59}

The result was a no-win situation for African workers, as the manager of Divco's Bantu Administration explained:

It is unfair to the Bantu concerned, for he is arrested and punished for being in the area unlawfully. It is unfair to the Bantu in the Transkei for he is denied the opportunity of legally offering his services in these instances, and it is unfair to the Bantu lawfully working in the urban prescribed areas because the illegal employee, realising his precarious position, more often than not is prepared to work for a lower wage and under less favourable conditions than his legal counterpart.\textsuperscript{60}

Illegal employment took place on a large scale: between 1967 and 1969, 3710 Africans and 457 employers were prosecuted in the Combined Area.\textsuperscript{61} The Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner rebuked officials for pursuing illegal employees much more actively than their employers. In addition, when employers were prosecuted, they consistently got off with small fines; indeed, many employers budgeted for fines for employing Africans illegally. To employ an African legally cost an employer R53 a year in registration fees and transport and services levies; a fine for employing a worker illegally was R10-R30 on each count.\textsuperscript{62}

The presence of large numbers of "illegals" was a continuous source of concern to Peninsula authorities during the 1960s. Divco sent representatives to conferences in 1966 and

\textsuperscript{59}Interview with Mr R. Murray-Rawbone, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{60}NY 24/2/1, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 31 Oct 1969.

\textsuperscript{61}NY 24/2/1, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 31 Oct 1969. See also Posel, Making of Apartheid, pp. 253-255.

\textsuperscript{62}RSC 167, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 9 April 1964; BAO 133, A2/1005, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 31 Dec 1968; NY 24/2/1, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 31 Oct 1969; AWC 140, vol 2, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner's Circular No 5/1971, 8 April 1971.
1969 on combatting illegal influx into urban areas.\textsuperscript{63} Many Africans filtered into Coloured areas such as Elsies River, where Divco authorities in 1967 were prevented from arresting them owing to the collusion of their Coloured neighbours.\textsuperscript{64} In 1968 the City Council estimated that several hundred Africans entered the Peninsula illegally every month.\textsuperscript{65}

"Illegal" families in the Peninsula found themselves in an unenviable position. One man lost his Section 10(1)b qualification because he had visited the countryside for over six months; his wife was also stripped of her permanent qualification and the family was forced to destroy its shack in the transit camp and live illegally in Brown's Camp. When their shack was demolished, they lodged with families in Nyanga and Guguletu, although the house tenants constantly pressured them to move on as their tenancy could be revoked if the illegal lodgers were discovered.\textsuperscript{66}

The presence of "illegal" workers also heightened tensions within the township, for they competed for jobs:

Quite a lot of the residents felt that these people coming in without official permission...takes the jobs away from them because they were prepared to do the job at a cheaper rate. So they in fact would come to the police boys or come to the police inspector and say, "Listen, room number that, room number that, please take them away."\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{63}RSC 192, Divco meeting minutes of 24 May 1966; NY 24/2/2, Divco Chairman's Annual Report for 1969/70.

\textsuperscript{64}RSC 200, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 19 Jan 1967. A raid on Elsies River in February 1967 netted only 13 Africans in the area illegally, and a raid involving 150 police reservists and 20 Nyanga officials in Philadelphia resulted in 24 Africans being charged under Section 10(4): RSC 201, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 9 Feb 1967; RSC 212, Divco meeting minutes of 30 Jan 1968.

\textsuperscript{65}Kinkead-Weekes, "Africans in Cape Town to 1973", p. 521.

\textsuperscript{66}Interview with Mrs G. Jafta, May 1991, as quoted in Kondlo, "Peri-urban Squatting", pp. 217ff.

\textsuperscript{67}Interview with Mr A. Grové, p. 7.
It is very difficult to estimate the number of people who lived such a twilight existence. Informants were hazy on how many families lived "in the bushes" during the 1960s as a result of the constant expulsions, although it is certain that some of them did. 68

As the former director of the Athlone Advice Office noted,

You know, we didn't realise it until 1975 or 6, was it, when Crossroads started, and a lot of people came out of the bushes. We didn't realise in those days when we did everything, including getting lawyers, to try to help someone to stay, if we finally lost it, we assumed that they went, but we found out afterwards when they all came out of the bushes that many of them hadn't gone...others who were absolutely desperate to work here, they definitely stayed here, they had in a teapot, they put a certain proportion of their money ready for their fine, and then when they were arrested they paid their R30 or R50 or whatever it was, and went on working. 69

Neither was the Divisional Council able to effectively control the growth of the African population with permanent qualifications. The birthrate far outstripped the death rate in Nyanga during the 1960s, with the overall population increase averaging 1% per year between 1963 and 1967. 70 By 1970, the manager of Nyanga was complaining that the number of qualified families was increasing by 235 per year, which outnumbered the number of Nyanga residents who were "repatriated" or "resettled". 71

In addition, the labour needs of the Peninsula forced the DBAD Minister to consistently ignore the African labour quotas, which made a mockery of the 1966 ruling that the number of contract labourers was to be reduced by 5% per annum. Due to the expanding economy and decentralisation of Cape Town industry to the Tygerberg area, additional labour

68 Interview 3 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1.
69 Interview with Mrs N. Robb, p. 5.
70 RSC 215, Report of Medical Officer of Health for 1967, Divco meeting minutes of 30 April 1968. Hostel residents were not included in this statistic; the increase therefore represented overall growth in the number of Africans living in household conditions.
71 NY 24/4/4, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 8 Jan 1970.
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complements of 2400 had been granted within the Combined Area by 1970 since the "freeze" of 1966.\(^{72}\)

The state therefore did not succeed in reducing the number of "legal" Africans, neither was it able to curb the increase in "illegal" Africans. The Divisional Council was so frustrated in its attempts to reduce the population of Nyanga that it asked DBAD in 1966 to take over the administration of Nyanga as "the Divisional Council is apparently unable to control the position efficiently."\(^{73}\)

Added to this was the thorny problem of "displaced" families, which was outlined in Chapter Five. In 1963, there were 394 Nyanga families who did not qualify for permanent housing but did not have a "home" to return to in the reserves.\(^{74}\) While many of these families lived in the transit camp, others were transferred to permanent houses, which Divco did not wish to lie vacant.\(^{75}\)

Divco faced two problems in trying to expel these families. First, they could only be separated if the household head was fired from his/her job; this presented many "practical and legal difficulties" and would also create a labour shortage.\(^{76}\) Second, there was no accommodation for these families in the reserves. Divco felt that the only solution to this

\(^{72}\) NY 24/2/2, Divco Chairman's Annual Report for 1969/70. Even this did not keep up with the demand for labour, with the number of "illegal" employees increasing as a result: NY 24/2/1, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 31 Oct 1969 & 1 July 1970.

\(^{73}\) RSC 198, Divco meeting minutes of 10 Nov 1966.

\(^{74}\) BAO 2066 A22/1005, Divco memo to DBAD Minister, n.d. (statistics for 1963 are given).

\(^{75}\) RSC 165, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 13 Feb 1964.

\(^{76}\) RSC 168, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 14 May 1964.
predicament was the rapid construction of housing in the "homelands", and applied constant pressure on the state as early as 1960 to provide this as soon as possible.  

However, by the time "resettlement villages" were built in 1967, many of the "displaced" families had qualified for permanent urban residence and could no longer be resettled. The end result was that the number of shacks in the transit camp did not decline in the early 1960s, for as families were transferred from shanties to houses, the vacant shacks were taken over by "displaced" or recently qualified families. This caused endless frustration to Divco Head Office, which had been promised by the state that the transit camp would only be in existence for three to five years.

The Riekert Commission concluded that the African population of the Peninsula increased by 69% between 1960 and 1970. The same applied throughout South Africa, where the urban African population grew by 3.9% per year in the 1960s, only marginally lower than the rate of 4.5% per year during the 1950s.

6.1.4 Living with passes

The state and its agencies therefore tied themselves in knots as they tried to contain urban African population growth, stop the flow of "illegals", and resettle "superfluous" and "displaced" Africans. It was not only the tangled web of laws that stymied them, however, for Africans found ways in which to evade influx control.

77 BAO 1575, A19/1005/1, Divco Secretary to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 27 Oct 1960; RSC 164, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 12 Dec 1963. See also Kinkead-Weekes, "Africans in Cape Town to 1973", p. 478.

78 BAO 2066, A22/1005, Divco memo to DBAD Minister, n.d. (probably 1963); ibid., Divco Secretary to DBAD Minister, 2 Aug 1963.

79 Hindson, Pass Controls, p. 55.
Nyanga residents resorted to several strategies. "Unqualified" men who wished to live in formal housing as opposed to hostel accommodation would sometimes marry "qualified" women, who could not be endorsed out of the area. Such was the case with Mr W.N., who married a "borner" and was allocated a Zwelitsha house. This was not uncommon; the City Council's Director of Bantu Administration noted in 1965 that "unqualified" men warned to leave the area "produce a legal wife and children or a concubine, but always a woman who qualifies to remain." The incidence of marriages which took place to obtain permanent qualification and houses resulted in a high rate of divorce.

In such cases, if the "unqualified" man was ejected from the area, the woman left behind usually could not meet the rent payments, which led to mounting rent arrears. This applied to political activists endorsed out of the proclaimed area after their release from prison: if their family qualified, only the activist could be ejected, leaving the state to deal with the rent arrears of the families.

It was common for women to produce a doctor's certificate stating illness or pregnancy as a reason for the extension of their visitor's permits. Another tactic was for a woman to lose her reference book, which enabled her to stay in the Peninsula until the new documents were issued. This forced Peninsula officials to work out a procedure by which

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80 Interview with Mr W.N., p. 2; interview 4 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1.
81 AWC 243, CTCC Director of Bantu Administration to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 5 Aug 1965.
82 Interview 5 with Mr M. Mzongwana, 9 Oct 1994, p. 1; conducted by H. Fast.
83 RSC 173, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 15 Oct 1964.
84 AWC 243, CTCC Director of Bantu Administration to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 5 Aug 1965.
temporary documents were issued in Cape Town and permanent documents sent to the woman's "district of origin", which cut short her stay in the Peninsula. \(^{85}\)

### 6.2 Housing Conditions, 1963-70

The precarious legal position of Nyanga residents was further reinforced by state housing policy and the local administration of accommodation. This section will outline the continuation of corrupt housing allocation and the effects of the moratorium on new family housing, and will show how the construction and administration of the last housing scheme reflected the Colour Labour Preference and migrant labour policies.

Housing conditions in the Peninsula worsened considerably during the 1960s. In line with the state's intention to reduce the number of African families in the Western Cape, an official freeze on African family housing in the Cape Peninsula was announced in 1962. As the Black Sash noted,

> Housing is the lever being used by the authorities for the implementation of the government policy of reduction of numbers of Africans throughout the Western Cape. \(^{86}\)

In addition, all African housing in the Western Cape was to be convertible to hostels and reconvertible to Coloured housing. \(^{87}\)

The state allowed the City Council to continue with its housing programme, however, as the schemes had been approved before the freeze was announced. During the period 1966-77, 3,638 housing units were built in Cape Town, of which all were in Guguletu to provide accommodation for people left over from the Peninsula "black-spot" clearout

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\(^{85}\) NY 7/21/1, Manager to Divco Secretary, 3 Nov 1965.


campaign, and hostel accommodation was built for 17,000 contract workers. The impact of the housing freeze on Nyanga: after the 1962 housing scheme in Nyanga was completed, no more family housing was provided until 1981/82.

The natural population increase of Nyanga therefore led to massive overcrowding; the problem of the 200 unoccupied houses in 1959 never reappeared. Houses in the 1946 (4-roomed) and 1957 (3-roomed) schemes were particularly hard-hit, with Old Location houses averaging 5.8 people per house in 1960 and 7.0 in 1970; Zwelitsha Drive houses went from 4.7 per house in 1960 to 5.9 in 1970. These figures do not do justice to the extent of the overcrowding, however; the constant reminders by the Administration Board that all lodgers were to be legally registered reflects that the number of illegal lodgers was high.

By 1966 the Divco Secretary stated that 296 married family units were required immediately. These families were living as lodgers and were on the waiting list for permanent dwellings. Many lodgers were the children of registered tenants; after turning 18, they were required to register and pay a lodging fee to the administration of 20 cents a month. Male youths had the option of moving to the hostels; most did not do so as lodger

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90 The Administration reminded residents via Nyanga News to register all lodgers. Residents were threatened with cancellation of their house permit if illegal lodgers were found: Nyanga News, June & September 1969.

91 AWC NY 24/2/1, Divco Secretary to Combined Bantu Affairs Committee, 6 September 1966. This corresponds with the City Council figure given in 1968 that 304 families were on the Nyanga waiting list: AWC 138, CTCC Housing Survey, 30 April 1968.

92 This fee was introduced in 1965: RSC 186, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 11 Nov 1965.
fees were lower than hostel bed rents, and the manager of Bantu Administration noted in
1970 that many adult sons lived with their parents, leading to "an unfortunate incidence of
overcrowding in many of the married quarter units". Daughters did not have the option of
moving to a hostel, and had to lodge with family or relatives. The situation was aggravated
if the children of registered tenants got married, for there was no housing available for them.
Divco reported that over 1000 adult children were living with their parents by 1969.

By 1970, the acute housing shortage meant that in practice, houses were only
allocated to men who were "borners", dashing the hopes of "qualified" families who had
been lodging for many years. The Athlone Advice Office recorded that

a very high percentage of our cases is connected directly or indirectly with
frustration over crowded and unhappy lodgings and the urgent longing of
people for minimal privacy in homes within reach of their work.

By 1972, one out of every five cases handled by the Advice Office concerned a housing
problem.

6.2.1 Housing issues: The politics of housing allocation

The increased housing density put a premium on houses with three or four rooms, as in the
Old Location and Zwelitsha Drive schemes. Consequently, the informal arrangements that
characterised the allocation of houses in the Old Location continued:

93 Men over 18 could, in fact, be ordered to move to the hostels; see Chapter 2, Section 20 of

94 AWC NY 24/2/1, Manager to Combined Bantu Affairs Committee, 1 July 1970.

95 NY 24/2/2, Divco Chairman's Annual Report for 1968/69.


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My yearning was to get a house in Old Location. Well there was somebody called Tshawe residing at C24. I talked to this gentleman to change so that he can give me the house, and he takes my house, that’s how I happen to get the house. That was in 1962.

[Q: How did you arrange to change the whole thing?]

Tshawe had been in arrears...I told them in the office that man is willing to change, they said they can’t give me the house if the rent is like that. Then I told them that I am going to square the rent, then they can change the house into my name.99

It was obviously to the administration’s advantage to allow this as it lowered the accumulated arrears total.

There were other irregularities regarding housing allocation, such as the paying of bribes to obtain the desired tenancy:

One day when I was talking to an official, Africans kept coming to the door, and he’d just wave them to another room, and we went on talking. When I left I looked in that other room, and it was full of gifts of various kinds, and there they were, sitting on the table. But women used to tell me that if they went to talk about housing, they used to take a bottle of whisky and a bottle of brandy, and just leave them under their chair when they left. So there was a lot, but it was difficult to prove.100

Residents applying for houses through bureaucratic procedures alone were therefore frustrated:

I made an application and I travelled for it up until I got the house. It was very difficult to get a house then. If you went there and they didn’t know you, they would make a promise to you and when that house was available they would give it to someone else.101

As the rent had to be paid in advance within seven days of the start of the month, most residents were not up to date. Nyanga officials would take advantage of this and evict such a family, installing the person who had paid the bribe:

99 Interview with Mr J.N., pp. 1-2.

100 Interview with Mrs N. Robb, p. 3. According to Mrs Robb, the Black Sash tried to prove the extensive corruption, but was cautioned that it could lead to libel charges if not adequately substantiated: ibid., p. 4.

101 Interview with Mr T., p. 3.
They were statutory tenants and they had to pay their rent in advance in the first seven days of the month. And what used to happen was, they never did, and they'd go on for years paying late, and not paying one month and then paying for two months and so on. And suddenly, I dare say as a result of a bribe, somebody else wanting the house, suddenly they'd be turned out on the grounds that they hadn't paid before the seventh of the month.\textsuperscript{102}

This practice was common in Nyanga.\textsuperscript{103}

Daniel Ngo continued to be an influential figure in the allocation of houses, especially in the Old Location. Although he had not succeeded in nurturing a middle-class enclave in the midst of Nyanga, he did manage to install “police boys” in the Old Location.\textsuperscript{104} Other people who received preferential treatment in acquiring Old Location houses were people who belonged to the Ciskei or Transkei National Independence Party (CNIP and TNIP respectively), for Ngo was chair of the Cape Town branch of TNIP. Not surprisingly, both TNIP and CNIP were strong in the Old Location but nowhere else.\textsuperscript{105}

The Old Location therefore increasingly developed the reputation as the residence of “conservatives” who either worked for the administration or were closely allied with it. Two Old Location informants, for example, stated their neighbourhood was generally on good terms with the police. Said one,

There wasn't this hatred which is there now. A policeman was greatly respected, a policeman was feared, and a policeman was trusted. If anything happened to you, you called the police.\textsuperscript{106}

This was in direct contrast with the perceptions of Mau-Mau residents, who generally distrusted the police.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{102} Interview with Mrs N. Robb, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{103} Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 7.

\textsuperscript{104} Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{105} Interview 2 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Mr G., p. 17. See also interview with Mr J.N., p. 5.
Nyanga residents developed their own strategies to deal with restrictive housing policies. To get around the stipulation that registered tenants had to be married, some residents changed their surnames (with the help of pass-fixing officials) and then "married" their siblings; some women married and had their "husbands" legally registered as house tenants, after which the men were "sent packing" to the hostels. Youth who faced overcrowded conditions in their parents' houses moved into vacant shacks in the transit camp, especially on weekends.

6.2.2 Housing issues: Arrears and evictions

Nyanga officials continued to battle the high rate of rent arrears, and the procedure used to collect the rent continued to be a long and onerous one. First the defaulting tenant was called in for an interview; if this failed a summons was issued to appear in court. If the tenant paid before the court date, s/he still had to pay an admission of guilt fine; if the arrears were not paid before court, the person was convicted and given a suspended gaol sentence, which was revoked if the tenant still did not pay. If the tenant was subsequently imprisoned, released, and still did not pay, the household would be evicted. One full-time and two part-time clerks were employed to carry out these procedures.

Over the course of 1964, 1884 tenants in Nyanga were served with summonses to appear in court, which represented 33% of registered tenants. Of this total, 59% paid

107 See interview with Mrs M.R., p. 11.
108 Interview 5 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1. See also interview with Mrs M.R., p. 1.
110 RSC 187, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 9 Dec 1965.
111 This figure was calculated from compiled monthly reports from February 1964 to January 1965, RSC 165 to 176. The number of registered tenants was calculated from the number of married quarter dwellings (including shacks) added to the number of hostel beds, which totalled 5679 in 1964.
before court, 27% were convicted, and 10% failed to appear and had warrants of arrests issued against them. Evictions happened regularly, with the ejected tenants not given any alternative accommodation. Administration officials locked the doors of the house and threw all of the belongings onto the street. Some of these tenants sheltered with neighbours, moved to other shack areas, whether Brown's Camp, the transit camp, or shack areas still not cleared by the City Council, or changed their surnames and moved to Coloured shack areas, especially Elsies River.

The high rate of evictions resulted in a high turnover of dwellings. The highest rate was in the Zwelitsha Drive Scheme, at 12% during 1964, and then Mau-Mau and the Old Location at 9% and 7% respectively. This rose throughout the decade: in 1968 the turnover in Mau-Mau was 19%, in Zwelitsha Drive 16%, and in the Old Location 9%.

If a registered tenant wished to avoid eviction, s/he could appeal to the administration to be granted a few month's grace with the rent, which was sometimes granted. If a registered tenant settled the arrears after being ejected from a house, there was still no guarantee that the house would be returned:

That was the ruling: the most you could ever do was if the person paid off everything they owed, they'd reconsider, which could mean anything. But in many cases they paid off the whole thing and still came to us and said they hadn't got the house back.

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112 Interview with Mrs L., p. 1; interview with Mr W.N., p. 4.

113 Interview with Mrs M.R., pp. 5, 19; interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, p. 30; interview 3 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1.

114 Compiled from Manager's monthly reports from February 1964 to January 1965, February 1968 to January 1969, RSC 165-176, 212-224.

115 Interview with Mr M.M., p. 4.

116 Interview with Mrs N. Robb, p. 5. See also interview with Mr M.M., p. 5.
Those responsible for African administration in the Peninsula were not alone in battling the constant rent arrears. In Soweto, there were 30,769 summons issued to rent defaulters in 1961 alone, of whom 51% were sentenced to prison with the option of a fine. A similar situation prevailed in kwaMashu outside Durban. 117

6.2.3 Housing issues: Women and tenancy

Women found themselves in an extremely difficult position in terms of housing. They were not allowed to be the registered tenants of a house unless they were widows with permanent qualifications and dependent children. Even this changed in 1966, when DBAD issued the instruction that only legally married men with Section 10(1)a/b qualifications could be placed on waiting lists, and women were not to be considered for housing regardless of their Section 10 status. 118 A woman could therefore be relegated to lodger status in their own house if her husband died:

One of the worst things was that in those days the houses were only given to men, not to women, and then if the man died, the woman would have to go. She very often would have some other family imposed on her, she'd be told, okay, you can stay in that house, but some other man is going to be the person. Of course, in no time this woman would get edged out... 119

A concession was made to widows that if they were qualified in their own right [Section 10(1)a/b] and paid the rent, they could remain in the house; if they had a son with a family of his own, the tenancy could be transferred into the son's name. 120

117 Morris, History of Black Housing, p. 89.
118 Muthien, State and Resistance in SA, p. 196.
119 Interview with Mrs N. Robb, p. 3.
120 AWC 140 vol 2, DBAD memo to all local authorities in South Africa, 5 Sep 1967. See also interview with Mrs M.R., p. 1; interview with Mrs K., p. 3.
Whether or not a woman lost tenancy of a house was related to the type of accommodation occupied. One widow was evicted from her Old Location house and sent to a Mau-Mau house, while a woman already living in a Mau-Mau dwelling retained her registered tenancy. The ratio of adult men to adult women in the various schemes bears this out: in the Old Location, the ratio was 1:1, whereas the ratios in Mau-Mau and the shack areas were 1:1.3 and 1:1.2 respectively.

Unmarried women therefore tended to live in transit camp shacks or small Mau-Mau houses. Due to supporting their children on a single income, which was usually much lower than the average incomes of African men, the likelihood of falling into rent arrears was high. Women living in the transit camp were regularly sent to Roeland Street prison if they fell behind in rent for over two months. As one woman related, "After coming out of jail, you start where you've left, then pay again."

6.2.4 Housing issues: The building and occupation of Zwelitsha Drive, Part 2
As demonstrated above, housing conditions in Nyanga reflected broader state policies which limited the number of family units built and prohibited African women from holding tenancy. Housing in Nyanga was also profoundly affected by a low standard of construction and the promotion of the migrant labour policy; these two factors were reflected in the building and occupation of the 1962 Zwelitsha Drive houses.

To accommodate the remaining transit camp residents who "qualified" to live in Nyanga (as opposed to Guguletu), the Combined Municipalities in 1961 embarked on another

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121 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 1; interview with Mrs L.H., p. 4.

122 RSC 240, Schedule A, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 14 May 1970.

123 Interview with Mrs L.H., p. 4.
housing scheme, the last to be built before 1980/81. The blocks of four houses each were placed between the existing Zwelitsha Drive houses, with 360 houses completed and allocated by January 1963. Families were only to be transferred into the scheme if they possessed Section 10(1)a/b/c qualifications, although in practice "displaced" families were allowed to move in.\(^{124}\)

As with the Zwelitsha houses completed in 1958, the administration experienced problems transferring transit camp residents into the houses, for living in the transit camp continued to have its advantages. Residents such as Nicholas Fuyani, an Advisory Board member 1961, remained in the transit camp throughout the 1960s. Fuyani had eight children and cultivated a "very nice" garden on his site,\(^{125}\) both of which presumably contributed to his decision to remain in the camp.

By February 1963, 100 of the new 1962 married quarter units were still sitting vacant.\(^{126}\) The loss of rentals worried Divco officials, who at one point considered offering compensation to transit camp families for their scrapped shanties if they agreed to move. Ultimately, Divco relied on force: the manager threatened recalcitrant families with removal to the "homelands" or resettlement areas.\(^{127}\)

The newer houses were of a lower standard than the existing Zwelitsha houses, being built of hollow clay blocks rather than bricks.\(^{128}\) This led to serious illnesses:

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\(^{124}\) 4/CT H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting minutes of 9 Jan 1963; interview with Mr W.N., p. 2.

\(^{125}\)  Nyanga News, July 1968.

\(^{126}\)  BAO 2066 A22/1005, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 20 Feb 1963.


\(^{128}\)  Interview 3 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1.
...now that time [my wife] get a baby in the house, the house was wet, and the baby getting sick, we take him now to the hospital...they find out that he's got TB meningitis on his brain. I've still got that son now. Then he get TB meningitis on his brain because the place was wet.129

One large family was forced to move out of Zwelitsha into a two-roomed Mau-Mau house because the dampness seriously aggravated one family member's asthma, necessitating repeated visits to the hospital.130

Divco's Medical Officer of Health went so far as to state that "it was an absolute crime to build dwellings in this area without ceilings and doors."131 The houses were condemned as hazardous by the Divco Engineer for they were invaded by damp and vermin. Although the engineer recommended the addition of floors, ceilings, and internal doors, only in 1968 did Divco begin addressing the damp problem by treating some of the houses experimentally.132

As with Mau-Mau and the older Zwelitsha houses, latrines were installed right outside the kitchens, which caused incessant problems with flies. Residents had to share taps and communal bath houses:

This place here, it was buildings, called it our bathroom, all you people, people from this side have shower there, those people from that side must also shower here, then over there, same.133

The temporary nature of the dwellings was reinforced by the unfinished construction of the houses:

129 Interview with Mr W.N., p. 7.

130 Interview with Mrs L.H., p. 1.

131 RSC 169, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 11 June 1964. See also RSC 171, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Aug 1964, Annual Report of Medical Officer of Health for 1963.


133 Interview with Mr W.N., p. 6.
Floor, no floor. Ceiling, no ceiling. Door, no doors from the kitchen and the bedroom, no doors. When you came in there you must try to fix your floor and you can't, secondly, you can’t put floor on...you must get a rights from the what’s name, the office, and ask them, yes. Ceiling, you can't touch it, it must stay just as it is, otherwise if you put ceiling on...they tell you it is not your house, you can't do what you do...If maybe you want to make your place bigger, no, you can't, because it's not your house, you can leave any time, they can chase you away anytime.\footnote{134}

One aspect of this lower standard of house was that tenants were not allowed to effect improvements to these elementary structures without permission. Most residents ignored this:

The whole township was improved behind the Council's thing, even the renovation...you don't go to the board to ask for a permit to upgrade your house, you just do it, and you know that you're going to encounter trouble, but you don’t say anymore. And the whole area of Nyanga is improved that way, compared to Guguletu where they are freely offered...even the post box in Guguletu is put by the Council, but here you don't have.\footnote{135}

Water taps were installed outside houses and sinks inside at the tenants' expense and without going through administrative channels.\footnote{136}

The most significant aspect of the 1962 Zwelitsha Drive scheme was that many of the family units were allocated to contract workers. The number of "single" men in Nyanga increased steadily throughout the 1960s owing to the economic boom experienced in South Africa during the 1960s: between 1960 and 1970, the country's Gross National Product increased by 140%, with the annual rate of economic growth averaging 5.8% per year.\footnote{137} In

\footnote{134}{Interview with Mr W.N., p. 4.}

\footnote{135}{Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 16.}

\footnote{136}{It is a feature of townships throughout South Africa that improvements were effected to Council houses, especially in the form of informal buildings added onto permanent structures. Although Guguletu residents had more amenities than tenants in Nyanga (such as flush toilets), they too "developed" their houses: interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, p. 30; Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; A2, Annual Report for 1966/67.}

\footnote{137}{D.H. Houghton, \textit{The South African Economy} (Cape Town, 1976), pp. 212-213.}

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Greater Cape Town, the number of industrial establishments rose from 702 in 1960 to 925 in 1970, which produced a huge demand for labour.\textsuperscript{138}

Consequently, the number of hostel residents in the Peninsula increased steadily over the decade.\textsuperscript{139} In Nyanga, there were a mere 388 contract workers in January 1960 (2\% of Nyanga's population), which had shot up to 6871 (43\%) by January 1970 (see Figure 6).\textsuperscript{140} This was coupled with a decrease in the number of families due to "repatriations" and transfers to Guguletu (see Figure 8, p. 301), which resulted in a significant gender imbalance: the male/female ratio in Nyanga climbed from .9:1 in 1960 to 4.7:1 in 1970.\textsuperscript{141}

The increased number of contract workers in Nyanga undermined the legal and residential rights of "qualified" Africans due largely to Divco's approach to the shortage of hostel accommodation. The administration stipulated that at least one unit out of every block of four dwellings was to be occupied by contract workers.\textsuperscript{142} Whereas contract labourers had lived in segregated blocks of hostels in the centre of the township, they were now dispersed throughout the Zwelitsha Drive housing scheme (see Figure 7). Many families were


\textsuperscript{139} Contract workers in Cape Town comprised 85\% of the economically active African men housed within the municipal boundary in 1971, which was significantly higher than that in Johannesburg (49\%) and Durban (55\%): F. Wilson, Migrant Labour in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1992), pp. 75-76. For a breakdown of the hostel population in the Lagunya townships in 1971, see ibid., pp. 68-75.

\textsuperscript{140} RSC 121, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 23 Feb 1960; RSC 237, Manager's monthly report, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 12 Feb 1970.

\textsuperscript{141} Hubbard, Poverty in Cape Town, p. 7. The ratio in Langa increased from 1.6:1 to an astronomical 7.6:1 between 1960 and 1970: Elias, Housing in the Cape Peninsula, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{142} The administration gave as its reason the difficulty in moving families out of an entire section of the 1962 houses, and stated that it preferred to move contract workers into every house that became available: H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 13 May 1964.
transferred out of the 1962 houses within a year of moving in, and in some cases were given only 7 days' notice to move. In addition, families were moved out of two streets in Mau-Mau to make way for the increased numbers of contract workers.\textsuperscript{143}

The implications were quite serious for families living in Zwelitsha Drive. Every dwelling allocated to contract labourers housed 12 men,\textsuperscript{144} and families lived in the knowledge that they could be replaced at any time by contract workers. Interestingly, these

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{143}H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 22 Jan 1964; interview 3 with Mr M. Mzongwana, 16 Aug 1994, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{144}Interview 6 with Mr M. Mzongwana, 21 Nov 1994, p. 1; conducted by H. Fast.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
houses were called "temporary houses", a name that continues to this day. This may have been either due to the rudimentary construction or owing to the perception that residents would only live there a short while before being replaced by contract labourers:

The reason that the office made a point of having a hostel within family units was trying to decrease the number of families in the Western Cape. They didn't want to have families in the Western Cape from the African communities, families must move out and then have single men staying in the Western Cape.145

As was to be expected, the proximity of large concentrations of "men without women" created friction between families and men on service contracts (see Chapter Seven).

The 1962 Zwelitsha Drive scheme epitomised the state's long-term plan to replace "qualified" Africans with contract workers, for African families often had to vacate their premises to make way for "single" men. The construction of the houses also reflected this: not only were they convertible to hostels, but the cheaply-built "temporary houses" underlined the uncertain future of their inhabitants. More broadly, the administration's

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145 Interview with Mr W.N., p. 5.
policy of month-to-month tenure and of prohibiting all improvements to dwellings in Nyanga made it difficult for residents to transform their houses into homes.

Conclusions

For Africans living in Cape Town in the 1960s, the ruthlessly implemented housing and influx control policies spelled out an existence of uncertainty. This was not only related to the possession of permanent qualifications, but also to the place of employment of household heads. In 1963, Divco's figures showed that 1186 families with Section 10(1)a/b qualifications were destined for Guguletu. An additional 693 families did not qualify to remain together in the Peninsula and were to be resettled, and 357 families were "displaced" and still had to have their fate decided. In other words, 2236 of the 3695 families in Nyanga in 1964, namely 61%, faced expulsion from Nyanga over the course of the decade.

Housing and influx control were intertwined, for families could be more readily endorsed out of the area where there was no available accommodation. Yet as the manager of Nyanga noted, this did not curb the constant flow of "illegals" into the Combined Area:

To suppose that such a migration can be effectively controlled on the non-availability of housing and accommodation is not realistic from a practical point of view. Bantu will move irrespective of whether housing and accommodation is available. The consistently high number of "illegals" living in the Peninsula throughout the 1960s attests to the failure of the notion that fewer houses meant fewer Africans.

Policies which governed the lives of urban Africans therefore succeeded in creating an atmosphere of insecurity in Nyanga, but failed in their primary objective, namely the
reduction of the African population of the Peninsula. This was traced to various factors: large-scale evasion of the pass laws on an individual level, the loopholes which allowed "displaced" families to remain in the Peninsula, the economic "boom" conditions which necessitated the recruitment of thousands of contract workers, and the steady increase of the "qualified" African population. The pass laws could not enforce settlement patterns upon the African population, for they flew in the face of economic and social realities.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Social Dynamics in Nyanga, 1963-70

"Remember these three important things in our lives: obedience to law and order, labour, and prayer to God."

S.J. Parson, guest speaker at Republic Celebrations in Nyanga, May 1966

Where You're Needed
Where you are, just where you are, is where you're needed most of all. Where you're placed today is where you have to answer duty's call...

Maybe you believe that you could really do more good elsewhere - Maybe so: but here is where you have been stationed. Here, not there.

Where you are is where you're wanted. Where God has a job for you - Where you find yourself today there's something only you can do...

So accept your situation, working out your destiny, Through your present circumstances, That's the way it has to be.

R.E. Dawes, Nyanga Welfare Officer
Nyanga News, August 1968

Introduction

The last chapter described how Nyanga residents struggled to survive in an atmosphere of residential and legal insecurity. The themes examined in this chapter relate to the influence of Divco administration policies on social dynamics within Nyanga between 1963 and 1970. The administration extended its control through an expanding bureaucracy and the strengthening of bonds with conservative elements in Nyanga. Advisory Board members

\(^1\)RSC 192, Divco meeting minutes of 24 May 1966.
consequently became further alienated from their constituents, the majority of whom did not participate in elections. The background of the Board members will be described so as to uncover some of the reasons for their participation in the ineffectual Nyanga Advisory Board.

Proclamation No 11 of 1960 will again figure prominently; the extent to which it was financially successful will be explored, and its effects on Nyanga residents in terms of transfers to Guguletu and living conditions will be described. The consequences of the administration's policy in housing contract workers amongst family dwellings will be analysed: it produced both conflict and cooperation between house and hostel residents. Although this chapter revolves around the extensive control that Divco and the Nyanga administration were able to exert on residents' daily lives, it will also demonstrate - as in other chapters - that the administration's control was not complete: it was unable to root out underground political activity and the overt defiance of pass laws within the location.

7.1 Divco's Bantu Administration, 1963-70

To enforce the ever-tightening laws that governed the labour and mobility of Africans, bureaucratic red tape multiplied during the 1960s. For example, to obtain a lodger's permit required 28 stages and eight forms to be filled out by officials. The paperwork needed to bring in and control migrant labour was even greater:

To introduce a man from the Transkei to work under contract for one year was ridiculous, because you had certain enquiries that had to be made, you had train fare that had to be found, job placement...then the trip down by train and then accommodation here in the township or on the employer's farm...it was a laborious system that was enormously top-heavy because it hadn't been thought through properly.

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3Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 18.
Confronted with the task of preventing the influx of illegals and "repatriating" and "resettling" thousands of Nyanga residents during the 1960s, Divco's Bantu Administration section expanded considerably. In 1963 the administration staff in head office and Nyanga numbered 70 people; by 1969 there were 150 staff on the payroll, of whom about half were white officials. The ratio of white and black personnel had therefore increased from 17% white staff in 1958 to almost 50% by 1969, which entailed significantly more expenditure. 4

As the registration and licensing fees paid by employers had not increased, the financial burden of the expanding bureaucracy was shouldered by Nyanga residents, whose rents covered the increased expense. Already by 1963, the Bantu Revenue Account was subsiding the registration section, 5 a subsidy which increased in subsequent years.

The Bantu Revenue Account could not subsidise registrations indefinitely, and the result was a serious financial situation for the location. Up until 1965, the Revenue Account produced large annual surpluses, with a total accumulated surplus of R199,213 in 1965; from 1966 on, annual deficits gradually reduced the accumulated surplus, which stood at R21,983 by 1969. 6

The surplus would have disappeared altogether had it not been for the Nyanga beerhall. Following in the steps of the City Council, which had established a beerhall in Langa in 1963, 7 Divco authorities constructed a beerhall in Nyanga in 1965 at a cost of

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4 H4/68/B, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 10 June 1963; RSC 205, Divco meeting minutes of 27 June 1967; RSC 227, Special Divco meeting of 1 April 1969; 4/CT H4/69/A, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 18 June 1958.

5 RSC 158, Special Divco meeting of 31 July 1963.

6 RSC 211, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 7 Dec 1967; RSC 229, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 12 June 1969.

7 The Durban City Council began developing the "Durban system" in 1909, which established a municipal beer monopoly in order to subsidise the social costs of African labour; see P. la Hausse, "The Struggle for the City: Alcohol, the Ematsheni and Popular Culture in Durban, 1902-1936" 289
Despite the revenue potential, the beerhall barely broke even during its first two years: in 1966, sales amounted to only R147,575 with a small profit of R7001. This was due to a provision in the Liquor Amendment Act which allowed Africans to purchase liquor at any outlet licensed to sell to Africans. When a proclamation was gazetted in 1968 which restricted Africans from bringing more than two gallons of liquor into a location at any one time, the corner was turned. By 1969 liquor sales had more than doubled to R305,032, which was R120,932 more than the expenditure.

7.1.1 The politics of Bantu Administration

Although Divco's Bantu Administration section was consistent in its ruthless administration of the location and influx control regulations, there was no uniform approach to African administration within Divco. There seem to have been three interest groups operating within Divco structures: the councillors who made up the Combined Bantu Affairs Committee, most of whom represented farming interests in Parow, Bellville, and Goodwood and pushed for strict application of influx control and curfews; full-time officials at head office in Cape Peninsula authorities therefore lagged far behind in building beerhalls, although the reasons for this are unclear.

(University of Cape Town, M.A. thesis, 1984). Cape Peninsula authorities therefore lagged far behind in building beerhalls, although the reasons for this are unclear.


*RSC 202, Divco meeting minutes of 28 March 1967.*

NY 24/2/2, Divco Chairman's Annual Report for 1968/69; NY 4/5/1, Actual Revenue/Expenditure for 1969. One-third of the profits from beer sales was expended on welfare and social amenities, while two-thirds was to be applied to the capital expenditure, interest, and maintenance of the townships. Profits on the sale of liquor in the locations were divided between local authorities and the central state, with 20% going towards social and recreational services and 80% to the state for "homeland development".
Town, who, led by the Secretary of Divco during the 1960s, Mr G.S. Malan, were considered liberal and were at loggerheads with the harsh administration of Pansegrouw; and lastly, the administration of Pansegrouw, which was not only zealous in its application of state policies but actively encouraged the state to tighten them further.

Malan constantly fought against the "unfettered discretion" exercised by Pansegrouw, who was Registering Officer of the Combined Area:

The Secretary stated that he was perturbed to learn that the Council was apparently satisfied that a relatively junior employee could exercise powers greater than that held by a Judge of the Supreme Court of the Republic. Malan's particular concern was that many women who were married to qualified men were being endorsed out on technicalities. He urged Divco in 1963 to adopt as its policy "to preserve a marriage whenever this is permissible in law". The Secretary also accused Pansegrouw of favouritism, noting that many rural employers did not provide suitable accommodation for their employees but were not brought to book for their infringements of the law.

While Secretary Malan succeeded in having his protests minuted and communicated to DBAD, he did not receive a sympathetic hearing. When the councillors discovered Malan's letter to DBAD, the Chairman of the Council wrote to the DBAD Minister asking him to ignore everything that Malan had said about the application of influx control in the

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11Interview with Mr R. Murray-Rawbone, p. 7. See also interview with Mr S.M., 24 Nov 1994.

12RSC 154, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 14 March 1963.

13BAO 2066 A22/1005, Divco Secretary to DBAD Minister, 2 Aug 1963.

14RSC 154, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 14 March 1963. Pansegrouw responded that he had inherited a policy whereby "farmers should be educated rather than prosecuted."
Combined Area. 15 DBAD, for its part, told Malan that his task was "to carry the policy of the country into effect, and not to create basic policy for itself." 16

Any moves within Divco to administer influx control more humanely were therefore quashed; as manager of Bantu Administration, Pansegrouw had the authority to hire whom he wished and was able to create a bureaucracy which was loyal to him and not head office; as Registering Officer, he had the support of DBAD and the majority of councillors in applying influx control to the Combined Area.

One interesting aspect of Pansegrouw's administration was that his officials often "jumped the gun" in implementing policies which had not yet passed into law. Pansegrouw attempted in 1960 to "repatriate" a Nyanga resident who had been physically and mentally incapacitated in an accident; 17 he did not succeed on this occasion, for the expulsion of "superfluous" qualified Africans from the Peninsula only became policy in 1967.

Nyanga officials also endorsed out unemployed people regardless of their qualifications. In 1962, for instance, Mr R.J. was endorsed out of the Combined Area because he was unemployed. 18 The Bantu Laws Amendment Act, which made provision for such actions, was not passed by Parliament until 1964. Similarly, the Nyanga administration was by January 1964 forcing contract workers to return to the reserves after the expiration of their contracts, 19 which created a break in their residential records and prevented contract workers from acquiring Section 10(1)b rights. The Black Labour Regulations which

15 BAO 2066 A22/1005, Divco Chairman to DBAD Minister, 17 April 1964.

16 BAO 2066 A22/1005, DBAD Deputy Minister to Divco Secretary, 17 Feb 1964.


18 Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; A2, Monthly Report for July 1962. See also RSC 122, Manager’s monthly report for February 1960, Divco meeting minutes of 22 March 1960.

empowered officials to do so were only passed in 1965 and extended to the rest of South Africa in 1968.

It is unclear what Pansegrouw's motives were in applying policies before their formulation in law. He may have been experimenting with influx control in an attempt to influence state policy; as a member of Sabra and manager of Divco's Bantu Affairs Department, he was in a position to influence state policy from the local authority level.\(^{20}\) It was not uncommon for local councils in Southern Africa to apply stricter policies to urban Africans than did the central government.\(^{21}\)

On the other hand, Pansegrouw may simply have been taking "private instructions from the government", of which Secretary Malan accused him.\(^{22}\) Certainly the relationship between Pansegrouw and DBAD was a close one. Elias has shown that the Cape Divisional Council occupied a privileged position in the hierarchy of local government in the Peninsula, and that the Combined Bantu Affairs Committee was a predecessor of the Peninsula Bantu Affairs Administration Board introduced in 1973.\(^{23}\)

\(^{20}\)For an account of Sabra's role in policy-making in the apartheid state, see D. Posel, "The State and Policy-making in Apartheid's Second Phase" (Paper presented at the University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop, 1990).


\(^{22}\)RSC 158, Special Divco meeting of 31 July 1963.

\(^{23}\)Elias, *Housing in the Cape Peninsula*, p. 68.
7.1.2 The changing of the guard: the legacy of Mr H.M. Pansegrouw and administration of Mr H. Pridham Jones

In 1966, Pansegrouw retired. As Manager of Bantu Administration for 12 years, he had supervised a harsh, insensitive, and inefficient administration. Among his staff he had the reputation of being "a very arrogant sort of bully type of man".24 He was also dishonest: in 1964 he deliberately manipulated registration figures, halving the number of African women given permits to remain from 1527 to 835,25 and Advisory Board minutes were changed by him to reflect his version of the meetings.26 He motivated for the division of the Peninsula into two proclaimed areas in 1960 to advance his own career, acquiring the salary and position of Registering Officer for the Combined Area. Upon his retirement, he urged that the two areas be re-amalgamated, and it seems personal gain was once again the motive: when the Peninsula Bantu Affairs Administration Board took over the administration of Africans in the Peninsula in 1973, Pansegrouw was appointed to the Board.27

There was also considerable corruption within his administration. There was an "epidemic of bribery" in Nyanga in 1964, with the police investigating a huge pass-fixing operation. Both black and white officials were implicated; three African men were convicted of fraud and sentenced to up to 25 months imprisonment in 1965, and two white officials

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24 Interview with Mr R. Murray-Rawbone, p. 7. See also interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 21.

25 RSC 174, Manager's monthly report, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 19 Nov 1964. This was presumably owing to pressure to limit the number of African women in the Combined Area.

26 Interview with Mr T., pp. 7-8.

27 Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; J12, Divco Secretary, Memorandum re. Bantu Administration in the Cape, 20 Jan 1967; Die Burger, 11 Sep 1973. Pansegrouw was on the Board as a representative of the Handelsinstituut en Kaapstadse Afrikaanse Sakekamer.
were fired.\textsuperscript{24} A total of 1000 cases of corruption were investigated, with an estimated R70,000 changing hands in bribes.\textsuperscript{29}

The scandal reverberated in the years that followed, for administration personnel attempted to endorse out people who had obtained their permits by bribery. In one case, an employer was pressured to fire a worker in 1968 due to allegations that the employee had obtained his pass illegally in 1964; despite no charges being laid, the man lost his job and was expelled from the Peninsula.\textsuperscript{30}

Another feature of Pansegrouw's administration was the deplorable state of Nyanga, which only improved when living conditions were disclosed to people outside the Bantu Administration section. Divco was very embarrassed by a Cape Times story which stated that "sand threaten[ed] to bury Nyanga East" and that the lack of proper sanitation had created a serious fly nuisance.\textsuperscript{31} When the Combined Bantu Affairs Committee toured Nyanga in 1964, they were "not impressed with the appearance of the location" and urged that the sand drift be stabilised, waterborne sewerage be installed by the end of the year, and wooden floors, ceilings and internal doors be added to all the dwellings.\textsuperscript{32}

The most damning reports came from Divco's Medical Officer of Health. He pointed out the high incidence of socio-economic diseases in 1964 such as tuberculosis and

\textsuperscript{24}RSC 189, Staff Committee meeting of 16 Feb 1966. Despite the fact that the pass-fixing operation was organised by a white official, Mr W.F. Roux, the manager warned the Advisory Board that if corruption continued, only Europeans would be employed: H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 11 Aug 1965.

\textsuperscript{29}RSC 229, Manager's report to Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 28 May 1969. See also interview with Mr R. Murray-Rawbone, p. 6; interview with Mr S.M, 24 Nov 1994.

\textsuperscript{30}Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; A2, Annual Report for 1967/68.

\textsuperscript{31}BAO 1575 A19/1005/1, Divco Secretary to DBAD Minister, 16 Feb 1962.

\textsuperscript{32}RSC 165, Divco Secretary's report to Combined Bantu Affairs Committee, 13 Feb 1964.
kwashiorkor, and his statistics showed that the occurrence of these diseases was proportionately almost the same in the houses as in the shacks. In reference to the general living conditions in the township, he concluded: "I cannot find words adequately to express my sense of frustration that this deplorable state of affairs still exists." 33 Between 1963 and 1967, there were an average of 329 new tuberculosis notifications per year. 34

With this new pressure from the Combined Bantu Affairs Committee and the press, the provision of additional amenities and installation of doors and ceilings in Nyanga houses was applied for and approved by DBAD. The problem of sand drift was finally addressed by the hardening of surfaces, so that Nyanga's overall cleanliness had improved by 1965. Another response of Pansegrouw to this criticism was to prosecute residents for "dirty yards" in an attempt to clean up the location. 35

The man who took Pansegrouw's place was Mr Horace Pridham Jones, who had been involved in African administration in Southern Rhodesia for many years. 36 His administration was characterised by efficiency and overall improvement in the living conditions and appearance of Nyanga location. Divco's Medical Officer of Health commented in 1969 that there was "no doubt that the township presents today a very much better appearance than

33 RSC 171, Annual Report of Medical Officer of Health, Divco meeting minutes of 25 Aug 1964.

34 RSC 215, Annual Report of Divco Medical Officer of Health, Divco meeting minutes of 30 April 1968.

35 RSC 166, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 12 March 1964; RSC 169, Manager's monthly report, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 11 June 1964; RSC 176, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 14 Jan 1965; RSC 178, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 11 March 1965.

36 RSC 194, Staff Committee meeting of 20 July 1966. There was some resistance in the committee to hiring a manager who had only conversational Afrikaans, but his impeccable qualifications overrode this.
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it did a few years ago". Nevertheless, he had to state that the "shocking shanty slums" of Elsies River did not produce as many tuberculosis notifications as did Nyanga in 1969.

In contrast to Pansegrouw's ruthless administration, Pridham Jones' attitude was a patronising one. He introduced an information bulletin called Nyanga News, which publicised activities in Nyanga which the administration wished to support, such as Boy Scouts, church functions, and charity projects. Advisory Board members were introduced in the "Personality of the Month" feature and their life histories were outlined. As an active proponent of the "self-help" concept, Pridham Jones ensured that every issue of Nyanga News exhorted Nyanga residents to be good citizens. "People who live in houses which they keep clean and tidy seem to be the 'happy people'," stated one edition of Nyanga News, "Be house-proud and join the happy throng." Every issue contained such advice: "Be courteous and be happy!"; "Drive safely and save lives"; "Don't lose your reference book"; and "Keep our township clean" were typical pearls of wisdom.

While the tone of the manager changed, the overall situation was unchanged: it was during the late 1960s that many "superfluous" Nyanga residents were forcibly resettled and many others transferred to Guguletu. In addition, those in his employ did not seem to exhibit a softer approach, for the Cape Times reported in 1970 that Africans were treated worse by administration officials in Nyanga than elsewhere.

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37 RSC 226, Annual Report of Divco's Medical Officer of Health, Divco meeting minutes of 25 March 1969. Pridham Jones also received kudos from the Cape Chamber of Industries and Cape Town Chamber of Commerce for his report on illegal unemployment, which he distributed widely: RSC 239, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 9 April 1970.

38 These quotes are drawn from various editions of Nyanga News, which was published between 1968 and 1973.

39 NY 7/19/1, Manager to Divco Secretary, 21 Aug 1970.
7.1.3 The Proclamation of 1960 revisited

When the Peninsula was divided into two proclaimed areas in 1960, the City Council administered Cape Town and the southern suburbs, while Divco and its partner municipalities of Bellville, Parow, Goodwood and Durbanville were in charge of the outlying areas. This produced significant variations in the implementation of the pass laws and the management of African locations.

The Cape Town City Council attempted to reform some aspects of influx control. In 1963 the Council recommended that qualified African families be granted rights of home ownership in the Peninsula and that Africans legally in the area be allowed to accept any employment offered.40 As described above, Divco introduced restrictive regulations prior to their entrenchment in law.

This is not to say that the City Council was averse to influx control; as Muthien has pointed out, both Divco and City Council officials were earnest in their efforts to secure effective management and control over Africans. Furthermore, Kinkead-Weekes has shown that the City Council was a pioneering city with regard to the evolution of the system of influx control.41

Another difference between the two local authorities was the extent to which they provided amenities. When the City Council stated its opposition in 1959 to the division of African administration in the Peninsula, it pointed to the inevitable comparison by residents of different amenities and services in Nyanga and Guguletu (see Chapter Five). By 1965, Nyanga was the only one of the three townships without fencing of houses and a complete

40 AWC 243, CTCC memo to Town Clerk, 1963.

stormwater scheme. Although the waterborne sewerage system was in operation by then, the sewerage was carried away by open street channels.⁴² In 1967, the City Council noted that many amenities were

"lacking in Nyanga but which are being provided in Langa and Guguletu, which is a sore point with the residents of Nyanga. This applies equally to other facilities in the fields of education, medical care, church activities." ⁴³

The City Council requested the re-amalgamation of the two proclaimed areas, and proposed that the City Council administer the area as it had prior to 1960.

Although the Peninsula had been divided into two proclaimed areas at the insistence of Divco, it soon became evident to Divco that its takeover of registration was not turning out as expected. As explained in Chapter Five, the Bantu Revenue Account subsidised labour registration and licensing fees; by 1968 the registration section of the Divisional Council showed a R95,494 deficit, which was covered by the rents and fines of Nyanga residents.⁴⁴

The amalgamation of African administration was supported by Divco's incoming manager of Bantu Administration, who stressed not only the economic but human cost that the division had exacted. He stated that the Proclamation

unduly complicates administration, is certainly most uneconomic from every point of view...[and] imposes unreasonable and severe hardships on the Bantu themselves.⁴⁵

The resolution to re-amalgamate African administration in the Peninsula was adopted by Divco in 1967.⁴⁶ As the state was beginning to formulate legislation to centralise African

⁴²RSC 178, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 11 March 1965; RSC 184, Annual Report of Medical Officer of Health, Divco meeting minutes of 13 Sep 1965.


⁴⁴RSC 218, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 11 July 1968.

⁴⁵AWC 239/2, Manager to Divco Secretary, 26 April 1967.
administration, the unification of the two proclaimed areas of the Peninsula was only implemented in 1973.

7.2 Transfers to Guguletu, 1965-70

The most significant consequence of the Proclamation of 1960 was the transfer of thousands of Nyanga residents to the City Council proclaimed area. As houses were built in Guguletu, families in Nyanga whose household head worked in the City Council area were moved to Guguletu. These transfers did not begin until 1965, for the City Council refused to house Nyanga residents until it had provided houses for Africans living in its emergency camp and in areas not yet cleared, such as Simon's Town.\(^\text{47}\) The City Council refused to accept families whose household heads worked in the City Council area but who faced "repatriation", shifting the responsibility for their resettlement to Divco.\(^\text{48}\)

The first transfers took place in 1965, with 66 families moved to the City Council area by June. By April 1968, 397 families had been transferred to Guguletu and 443 families still awaited transfer.\(^\text{49}\) It seems that house occupants were the first to be transferred, for statistics for 1966 indicate that 224 houses were vacated in the course of the year and 312 shanties were destroyed;\(^\text{50}\) the shack residents were presumably transferred to the vacated

\(^{46}\)RSC 200, Divco Secretary memo of 20 Jan 1967, Divco meeting minutes of 31 Jan 1967. Divco wanted the combined administration to fall under central state control: RSC 227, Special Divco meeting of 1 April 1969.

\(^{47}\)By 1965, Windermere was completely cleared. Approximately 1500 people were removed from Simon's Town in 1966: Elias, "Simon's Town", p. 33.

\(^{48}\)AWC 138, CTCC Director of Bantu Administration to Divco Manager, 22 Dec 1964.

\(^{49}\)RSC 184, Report of Medical Officer of Health, Divco meeting minutes of 13 Sep 1965; AWC 138, Divco Manager to CTCC Director of Bantu Administration, 26 April 1968; BAO 133 A2/1005, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 31 Dec 1968.

\(^{50}\)Compiled from RSC 188 to 200, Manager's monthly reports for February 1966 to January 1967.
Figure 8

houses (see Figure 8). In 1972, 136 families still remained to be transferred, and this despite the impending amalgamation of the two proclaimed areas in the Peninsula.  

There were differing accounts as to whether or not Nyanga residents moved to Guguletu willingly. Some may have moved out of fear of the consequences of defying Divco, while others stayed put:

I was working in the City Council and papers arrived on me here. I tore it apart and threw it in the rubbish bin, and I said "I will see who is going to call me to court"...No one came, but cowards ran over there, as a result they want to come back now, but it is difficult now to come back.  

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51 AWC 243, Cape Peninsula Local Committee re. Labour in the Western Cape, meeting of 8 Feb 1972. It is likely that the transfers continued up to re-amalgamation owing to the freeze on the construction of family quarters in the Peninsula in 1962. The City Council continued to build houses in Guguletu up to 1972 with funds which had been approved prior to 1962.

52 Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 1; interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, p. 28.

53 Interview 1 with Mr D., p. 5. See also interview with Mr G., p. 12.
One way in which transfer could be avoided was to keep one's job in the City Council area:

If you remained in employment and didn’t change your employment, that was one loophole, in the City Council area, there was no need for you to go and change your pass...so they would never pick up.54

Transfer was not always forced: soon after its own emergency camp was established in 1959, the City Council received many applications from Nyanga residents wishing to move to Guguletu.55 Moving to the adjacent township was an attractive proposition if a family lived in a two-roomed Mau-Mau dwelling and was offered a three-roomed house in Guguletu, as was one woman's family in 1972.56 Another factor was that Guguletu had a better reputation:

I don't think they had a choice. I think also there was something as a child, I mean as a young girl I picked up, this that others felt that Divco was not doing much for its residents, and the City Council was doing something to improve them...I think more of them went willingly because of that...57

As resident Mr D. Ngo noted, "There was always that impression City Council was a better administrator than Divco."58

If, however, the resident to be transferred lived in the Old Location, there was a lot to lose. The man who threw his papers in the rubbish bin lived in the Old Location. As another Old Location resident explained,

I said "No, I told you, I'm not going, nobody's going to touch me or force me to leave," because I still maintained at that time already that "I don't think, gentlemen, that we will ever get houses, might get more beautiful

54Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, pp. 11-12.
55AWC 268, CTCC Town Clerk to Divco Secretary, 7 Dec 1959.
56Interview with Mrs L., p. 2; Mbude, "Sihume Road", p. 4.
57Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 15.
58Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 11.
houses, but you will never get a piece of ground as big as Nyanga," that's why now I stayed put.\textsuperscript{59}

Old Location residents who did move to Guguletu apparently regretted it afterwards.\textsuperscript{60}

Another reason that some residents did not resist the move was because they did not wish to have their job opportunities restricted, as was the case in the Combined Area:

...if there was no work in the Council area or in Bellville or Goodwood or Parow, at that time blacks were not welcome in these areas as workers, there were few opportunities in these areas. That was one reason why these people left, and a lot of them, even to this day, would like to come back.\textsuperscript{61}

There were serious consequences for Nyanga residents when the Proclamation came into effect. Those who had good positions in the City Council area were safe as long as they kept their jobs; when they changed work, however, they were prevented from obtaining another job in the City Council area. One woman recalled how she got around this regulation:

Ja, I remember my brother was staying in Guguletu, I had to change the address, I said to the office, I'm staying in Guguletu, so that I can work in town, so I will get a job in town. I said, I'm staying in Guguletu, NY57, and I will get a job there.\textsuperscript{62}

In terms of the effects on Nyanga as a whole, two Old Location residents alleged that the transfer of long-standing residents out and transit camp residents into the Old Location brought in "rubbish people".\textsuperscript{63} Stated one,

It had a very great effect because the people we used to stay with were very good friendly people and we stayed a good life...Divisional Council and City Council moved people and well, most of the people left. The Divisional Council took all these other people then irrespective of what kind of a person

\textsuperscript{59}Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 11. See also interview with Mr G., p. 12.

\textsuperscript{60}Interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, pp. 28; 34.

\textsuperscript{61}Interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{62}Interview with Mrs M.S., 21 Aug 1994, p. 15; conducted by H. Fast.

\textsuperscript{63}Interview 1 with Mr D., p. 6.
he is, whether he is a drunkard or not, but they would put him in a house. You found yourself with a neighbour who is not the type to stay with. 64

In 1971, an Advisory Board member from the Old Location complained that "since the houses in the first section, which is the pride of the township, became available to families of a low social status, the moral standards in the area had deteriorated. 65"

Residents of the other housing schemes did not state that "rubbish" people came in as tenants were transferred to Guguletu. There was certainly a gap left by the transfers. According to one resident, the people who suffered most were the people transferred out, for they missed their interaction with Nyanga residents. 66 Said one woman,

We didn't like it because it was your neighbour, and you used to stay together and share. We couldn't do otherwise, but later on we were accustomed to that, we had to accept it. 67

The transfers were seen by Nyanga residents as simply another example of forced removals:

Before we came to the transit camp...we were moved from these areas where we came from, and then at the very same time we were grouped here in Nyanga all together, and when people were separated they take it as what was happening as before, it was the very same thing. It's a continuation of separating the people. 68

It is important to underline the high turnover of residents that this situation produced. In 1963, 61% of Nyanga families were destined to live elsewhere: 1186 families with Section 10(1)a/b qualifications were to be transferred to Guguletu or Langa, 693 families without

64 Interview with Mr J.N., p. 4.
65 AWC NY 4/2/1, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 10 February 1971.
66 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 16.
67 Interview with Mrs L.H., p. 3.
68 Interview with Mr W. Makwenkwe, p. 3.
qualifications were to be "resettled", and 357 "displaced" families had yet to have their fate decided.69

7.3 The Advisory Board, 1963-70

As Chapter Five demonstrated, the Vigilance Committee was effectively banned in 1962, when all meetings in Nyanga had to be approved by the superintendent and the District Commandant of Police. The Advisory Board cooperated in this banning, as the Vigilance Committee had singled out the Board for much criticism. Consequently, the Advisory Board was not openly challenged by other organisations after 1962. Whereas elections during the 1950s had been actively contested, only a handful of residents voted during the 1960s and very few candidates stood for office.70 Significantly, when the administration announced the winners of the elections throughout the 1960s, they did not publish the number of votes counted.

From 1956 until 1972, the Board was designated the "Nyanga Location/Transit Camp Advisory Board", and included four elected and two appointed members from the permanent houses and the same number from the transit camp. The administration experienced difficulty convincing people to run for office, such that most Board members were either appointed or declared "duly elected". This was especially true for transit camp residents, who showed little interest in the proceedings as many of them faced imminent removal to Guguletu. In 1965, for example, the Advisory Board lost three transit camp members as they

69 Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; J12, copy of Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 8 Aug 1963.

70 The same applied to Port Elizabeth's Advisory Boards, which were active and representative during the 1940s and 1950s but were weighed down by apathy in the 1960s: de Jongh, "Advisory Board", pp. 104-105.
had been transferred to Guguletu. As a result, many Advisory Board members were not all that enthusiastic about being on the Board; their attendance tended to be sporadic and they often lost their seats owing to three consecutive absences.

Despite a high turnover of members from year to year, a number of men were consistently appointed and attended meetings regularly. An analysis of these members reveals various patterns: the eight men who held office for four years or more between 1960 and 1970 tended to participate actively in church, Boy Scouts, and the Welfare Centre. Four of the eight were retired or nearly so (the ages of the other four were not given). Three were teachers, one was a radiologist, one a foreman, and one a businessman.

The eight "regulars" actively supported the Bantu Authorities established by the government; for example, they established a "tribal chiefs' reception committee" to deal with all visiting chiefs. Shadreck Magwa, who served on the Advisory Board for eight years between 1960 and 1970, was appointed Chief Kaizer Matanzima's Cape Town representative in 1961, while Board member Daly Conjwa, who served for four years, represented the Paramount Chief of the Gcalekas in 1968.

One pronounced trend among the regular members was their place of residence. Of the six men who represented residents in formal housing (as opposed to shacks), five lived in the Old Location and the sixth was a contract worker. As one Zwelitsha Drive resident commented,

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71 H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 7 April 1965.
73 Nyanga News, April 1968.
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The only people who worked in a close relationship [with the administration] was the Old Location, with the Advisory Board...we were living under their rule. 74

Another resident commented about the Old Location's dominance of the Advisory Board, "People didn't like it, and it created a lot of tension among the people." 75

The residential make-up of the Board had a marked influence on the issues raised. The Old Location members constantly brought up concerns about their scheme, be it the need for channelling and fencing, street cleaning, paving of roads, car garages, repair of houses, or water and electricity rates. 76 Some of the issues raised by Board members did overlap with the concerns of Nyanga residents generally. When tenants in the 1962 Zwelitsha Drive houses were given seven days' notice to move and make way for contract workers, Board members registered their protest, for it reflected the concern of Old Location residents about the increasing number of "single" men in the township. 77

7.3.1 "Building for themselves": reasons for participation on the Board

In line with the state's intention to make the Board function only in a municipal-administrative capacity, 78 members were expected to steer clear of "political" issues and to ensure that other Nyanga residents did as well. When the manager wished to promote

74 Interview with Mr W. Makwenkwe, pp. 3-4.

75 Interview 6 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1.

76 H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 12 Jan 1965; NY 4/2/1, Nyanga Advisory Board meetings of 14 January, 8 April, & 10 June 1970.

77 H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meetings of 22 Jan, 12 Feb, & 13 May 1964.

78 De Jongh, "Advisory Board", p. 143.
"cultural activities" in Nyanga such as debating, he asked Board members to attend the debates "so as to guard against debates being diverted to politics".\textsuperscript{79}

The Board therefore consisted of conservative location residents who avoided political controversy. The Advisory Board minutes are filled with trivial requests made year after year but never acted upon, such as petitions for a light in the bus terminus toilet and steel shutters for graves in the cemetery. The question arises as to why the Divco administration and Board members would make the effort of participating in such an ineffectual body.

For the administration, the Board presented an opportunity to act out a charade of legitimacy and to shift responsibility for its actions to the Board. As de Jongh noted, officials used the Advisory Board as a cosmetic device designed to give urban Blacks no decision-making or other powers or rights while cleverly manoeuvring them into a position where they have to accept responsibility for administration and government decisions.\textsuperscript{80}

In Nyanga, the administration did not take the Board very seriously. Very little if any mention was made by the managers of Bantu Administration in Nyanga to the Advisory Board in their monthly reports in the 1960s, reflecting the minimal role it played in decision-making.

If the administration used the Board to its advantage, then what were the benefits for African members? The remuneration was modest, with the fee for African members a mere R1.50 per meeting as at 1964.\textsuperscript{81} There were advantages to serving on the Advisory Board, however, such as opportunities for social control. Residents were sometimes summoned to

\textsuperscript{79}H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 7 June 1967.

\textsuperscript{80}De Jongh, "Advisory Board", p. 687.

\textsuperscript{81}H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 12 June 1963.
Board meetings to account for "quarrelling and using obscene/vulgar language in the street", as when seven Mau-Mau residents were summoned in 1970.\(^{82}\) Board members supplied the administration with the addresses of residents whose houses were "unsightly".\(^{83}\) When one of these tenants refused to appear before the meeting for "broken window panes", the Board recommended that management "take whatever action may be possible against the tenant".\(^{84}\) Significantly, all the tenants they complained of were from the less respectable Mau-Mau.

This control extended to the school committees, which consisted primarily of Advisory Board members. In 1963, for example, all six men nominated by Divco to Nyanga school committees were Advisory Board members.\(^{85}\) Although the parents of scholars also elected members to the committees, the Advisory Board was known to control the deliberations of the committees.\(^{86}\)

A thesis which sheds considerable light on additional motives of residents in participating in Advisory Board structures is that of de Jongh, who attended the meetings of the Port Elizabeth Joint Advisory Board between 1972 and 1976. He noted the various material benefits which accrued to Board members, such as the opportunity to obtain a trading license. As one Port Elizabeth Board member stated, "The businessmen among us do benefit because they get contacts", while a resident complained of a Board member, "All he wants to do is to protect his little shop." Over 25% of PE Board members depended on the administration to obtain business licenses.\(^{87}\)

\(^{82}\) AWC NY 4/5/1, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 3 February 1970.

\(^{83}\) NY 4/2/1, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 11 March 1970.

\(^{84}\) AWC NY 4/2/1, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 11 February 1970.

\(^{85}\) H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meetings of 8 May & 12 June 1963.

\(^{86}\) Interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, p. 25.

\(^{87}\) De Jongh, "Advisory Board", pp. 90, 252-253; 684.
The same preferential treatment was given in Nyanga: when long-standing Board appointee Abraham Mabowe found himself in serious financial trouble in 1964, with the combined arrears of his house and business rent totalling R225.16, his arrears were written off and he was not evicted from his Old Location house; by 1967, he was again in possession of a business license. Former Advisory Board member Mr B. Mweli was granted a trading stall in 1964.

Board members were also able to obtain desirable accommodation. Shadreck Magwa served on the transit camp Advisory Board 1957/58; by 1959 he had been transferred to the Old Location. In similar fashion, Simon Plaatjie was a transit camp Board member from 1957 to 1959; by 1960, he too lived in the Old Location. Theophilus Maloi, the "single" Board member who had been on the Board for six years by 1970, did not live in the hostels but in the Dutch Reformed Church parsonage, which was reserved for "single Bantu teachers and/or clerical type of Bantu".

Another advantage of being on the Board was the possibility of building a power base by acting as intermediaries. In Port Elizabeth, residents constantly appealed to Board members to help them to acquire a house or to sort out a pass problem. As one Port Elizabeth Advisory Board member stated, "We get some status here. We don't get money but we can see the officials anytime."

Board members were also used as intermediaries in Nyanga, only in a more covert way. Members would find out from informers who was not going to make their rental

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88 RSC 165, Divco Housing Committee meeting of 13 Feb 1964.
89 RSC 166, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 12 March 1964.
90 AWC 138, Manager's monthly report of 31 Jan 1960.
payment in a given month, and then would use their leverage with the administration to evict the household and install a tenant who had joined Transkei National Independence Party and paid them a bribe.  

As one resident commented, the Board members were "building for themselves".  

The enrichment of Advisory Board members and those who associated with them reflects a broader trend in Africa. Owing to the weakness of indigenous capital in Africa, it has been argued, the state became a vehicle for private accumulation. There emerged a "political class", which - as with the loose-knit group of people affiliated with the Nyanga administration - was economically disadvantaged by white rule, causing it to seek economic opportunities within the state.  

While the majority of Nyanga residents resisted administration attempts to control their movement and activities, then, some residents actively sought cooperation with the administration. A similar situation was developing in the Transkei, where a reluctant population was being pushed toward "independence". A small minority, comprising civil servants, chiefs, politicians, and businessmen, secured political and material resources by cooperating with the government.  

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92 Interview 1 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1.  
93 Interview with Mrs H., p. 11.  
95 See S.P. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism (Berkeley, 1977), pp. 155, 161. See also Chapter Five, Section 4.6.  
7.3.2 The Board in relation to Nyanga residents

The Board was perceived in a negative light by most Nyanga residents, for its members supported unpopular administrative decisions. A school levy of R0.20 per month for every household was approved without debate in 1965, and Advisory Board members agreed to cater for the opening of the beerhall, which had been opposed by residents. Conditions in the township were laid at the feet of Board members, as when the lack of a cemetery was blamed on them in 1963.97 The same applied to Port Elizabeth's African townships, where Advisory Board members were expected to produce results in a system which made effectiveness impossible.98

While the Board was not actively supported, neither did it arouse the hostility of residents. As one official remarked, Advisory Board members were not attacked and killed during the 1960s as were community councillors in the 1970s.99 One former Vigilance Committee member stated that despite the opposition of residents to men who participated on the Board, they interacted at social gatherings:

They were unlike Community Council members of today. People then, even when you had a disagreement or something, but when it came to wedding or funeral, no one bothered to trouble anyone. It is only now that things have changed because now a Board member who attends a funeral will die there.100

During the late 1960s there seems to have been a revival of interest in the Advisory Board. In 1968, ten men competed for the four elected positions on the Board; Nyanga News reported in 1969 that residents were showing more interest in Advisory Board

98De Jongh, "Advisory Board", pp. 149-151.
99Interview with Mr A. Grové, p. 1.
100Interview 2 with Mr D., p. 21.
elections, which reflected "growing confidence in the Board".\textsuperscript{101} In the 1970 election, eight nominations were received from residents for four positions, although all but four were disqualified, causing the four remaining candidates to be declared duly elected.\textsuperscript{102}

The increased interest seems to have been related to a rise in crime. There was a spate of break-ins in Nyanga in late 1967, with the post office, two trading stalls, and the liquor outlet being burgled.\textsuperscript{103} It may also have reflected the stifling of alternative forms of protest; with the Vigilance Committee silenced in 1963, the Advisory Board was the only political body through which local grievances could be expressed.

\section*{7.4 Hostels and houses: A statistical analysis}

Before turning to an examination of the relations between house and hostel residents, it is useful to consider the legal, economic, and social differences between the two groups. "Qualified" Africans had distinct advantages over contract workers in terms of occupational opportunities. The Coloured Labour Preference Policy stipulated that contract labourers could not be employed in certain job categories, such as vehicle drivers, delivery men, clerks, or packers; these jobs were to be occupied first by Coloured people and then by "qualified" African men already in the area.\textsuperscript{104}

Secondly, the urban rights of "qualified" residents allowed them to live in the urban area and to scout around for more preferable jobs. In the Peninsula, African males preferred

\textsuperscript{101}Nyanga News, January 1969.

\textsuperscript{102}AWC NY 4/3/1.

\textsuperscript{103}RSC 214, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 14 March 1968.

construction, engineering, and manufacturing; a survey of 1954/55 revealed that only 6% of Peninsula African males had their first job in a factory, whereas 20% had their eighth job in a factory.\textsuperscript{105} In addition, permanent residents were more easily able to develop skills as they were not obliged to enter into one-year contracts.\textsuperscript{106}

Contract workers thus had little choice in the jobs available to them and few opportunities to shift to other sectors. In 1954, 49% of registered Divco contract labourers were dairy or farm labourers, and only 4% worked in construction and 10% in manufacturing.\textsuperscript{107} This had major ramifications for wages earned, for the lowest wages paid were in agriculture and the highest in manufacturing and in the building industry.\textsuperscript{108}

The trend that emerges is that legal status was a major determinant of occupational status. Due to the legal restrictions on their labour, contract labourers were generally found in jobs shunned by "qualified" men and which garnered lower wages. Edwards also noted that hostel residents were employed in "more inferior work" at lower rates of pay in Cato Manor.\textsuperscript{109}

There were several other characteristics which distinguished men living in the hostels and those living in household conditions. Hostel residents tended on average to be older than

\textsuperscript{105}Van der Horst, \textit{African Workers in Town}, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{106}A 1977 study showed that the length of service in jobs differed significantly according to legal category, with 67% of men with Section 10(1)b having been employed at a job for more than four years as compared with 54% of borners and 40% of contract labourers: J. Graaf and J. Maree, \textit{Residential and Migrant African Workers} (Cape Town: Saldu Working Paper No 12, 1977), p. 12. It is probable that the reason why the 10(1)b men stayed in their jobs the longest was in order to gain their permanent status by remaining in one job continuously for 10 years.

\textsuperscript{107}AWC G1, Schedule of Natives on Service Contracts, May 1954.

\textsuperscript{108}Van der Horst, \textit{African Workers in Town}, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{109}Edwards, "Cato Manor", p. 117. See also Posel, \textit{Making of Apartheid}, pp. 156-160.
men who lived in houses and had stronger ties to the rural areas: before harsher pass laws were introduced in the late 1950s, migrants returned home for extended visits, which averaged 12.5 months per visit. Men with permanent rights to live in the city tended to have no land rights in the reserves, which loosened their relationship with the countryside.

The rural ties of contract workers weakened over time, as men on one-year service contracts could only go to the rural areas for a few weeks each year. Many men lost contact with friends and relatives in the countryside, which increased their social and financial insecurity as they grew older:

All in all, they lived a very terrible life. Some of them, when the contract expires, they had nowhere to go, and they just lived in the hostels until they got old.

One of the hostel residents interviewed, Mr M. Dyantyi, moved into a Nyanga hostel in 1960; as of 1994, he was retired and still living in the hostels.

The most obvious difference between permanent and temporary African urban residents was that the former lived in household conditions. Whereas the hostel population consisted of working men, the house population had a relatively balanced gender and age profile. It was this factor that aggravated the cleavages which arose from differential legal and occupational status.

110 Interview with Mr N. Mbiko, p. 8. The median age of house residents in 1983 was 25-34 and that of the hostel residents 35-44: Schneier, Occupational Mobility, p. 183.


112 Interview with Mr W. Makwenkwe, p. 1.

113 Interview with Mr M. Dyantyi, 19 Sep 1994; conducted by H. Fast, interpreted by M. Mzongwana.

114 This would not have been a normative age/gender profile, for children were often sent to the countryside for their education. In addition, it is likely that elderly Africans returned to their area of origin as they grew older, for the major influx of Africans into the Peninsula was during and after World War II; many would therefore have spent a significant part of their lives in the rural areas and may have wished to return there.
7.4.1 Hostels and houses: Social dynamics

The social dynamics between hostel and house residents were further influenced by the manner in which hostel accommodation was allocated in Nyanga. Throughout the 1960s, there was a constant problem with the lack of housing for contract workers in Nyanga. Ironically, the greatest offender in recruiting huge numbers of contract workers was the government, which brought in hundreds of workers in 1967 while at the same time pressurising private industry to curb the employment of Africans. This situation did not improve during the 1960s, for as new hostel blocks were built, they were filled with contract workers who lived in compounds which were being closed down.

This left Divco with the thorny problem of where to put the workers, who were given permits to work in the Combined Area but were not given a place to live. One solution was to allow them to lodge with families in the location; in 1964, 182 men were accommodated in location houses until new hostel blocks were completed, which had risen to 500 by 1965. This did not begin to address the problem, for by 1966 Divco reported that it had an immediate need for 2336 hostel beds.

Another solution was for firms employing significant numbers of contract workers to erect their own hostels in Nyanga, which were transferred to Divco control after completion.

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115 Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; J12, Divco Secretary, memo of 20 Jan 1967.

116 RSC 181, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 10 June 1965. The process of transferring African workers from compounds to Nyanga hostels began in 1963: RSC 152, Manager to Combined Bantu Affairs Committee, Divco meeting minutes of 3 Jan 1963.

117 RSC 169, Manager's monthly report, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 11 June 1964; RSC 181, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 10 June 1965.

118 NY 24/2/1, Divco Secretary to Combined Bantu Affairs Committee, 6 Sep 1966.
By 1969, 27 pre-fabricated structures for contract workers had been built in Nyanga and many more were needed.\textsuperscript{119}

The third approach to the hostel shortage was mentioned in Chapter Six, namely the transfer of contract workers into family quarters in Zwelitsha Drive and Mau-Mau. Due to the fact that the hostels were left half-empty until the Proclamation of 1960, Divco recouped some of the rents by allowing families to move into 98 hostel units temporarily. When the "single" men began pouring into Nyanga during the course of 1960, the families were forced to move out despite being reluctant to leave.\textsuperscript{120}

The next step was to evict households from the family quarters as well. Divco's manager asked the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner in 1960 to approve the conversion of some Zwelitsha houses into hostel quarters as the need arose. He stated that the evicted families would be dealt with according to Section 10 qualifications: permanent residents would move into other houses, "displaced persons" would be sent to the transit camp, and "unqualified" families would be repatriated.\textsuperscript{121}

This was repeated in 1963, when families were forced out of Zwelitsha and into Mau-Mau; in 1965, 84 of the Zwelitsha Drive units were converted to hostels, a number which had risen to 111 by 1966. The same process occurred in Mau-Mau in the late 1960s, when two streets were cleared of families to make way for contract workers.\textsuperscript{122} In 1970, the

\textsuperscript{119} NY 24/2/2, Divco Chairman's Annual Report for 1968/69.


\textsuperscript{121} NTS 5588 616/313H(2), Divco Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Cape Town), Oct 1960.

\textsuperscript{122} RSC 162, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 29 Oct 1963; interview 1 with Mrs S. Conjwa, p. 16; Mbude, "Sihume Road", p. 5. City Council officials similarly converted family units into hostels as contract workers flooded into the township: Athlone Advice Office, BC 1020; A2, Monthly Report for February 1972.
contract labourers were finally moved out of the 1962 married quarters and into prefabricated huts.\(^{123}\)

This situation was financially advantageous to Divco's Bantu administration. The rent for a Zwelitsha Drive house was R7.50 throughout the 1960s, whereas the bed rent charged to each contract worker was R3.25. The monthly income from a "converted house" was therefore R39 with 12 contract workers in occupation as opposed to the R7.50 charged to one family.\(^{124}\) The contract workers did not benefit, however: every room of each house was occupied by four men, leaving no space for visitors or social activities.\(^{125}\)

Accounts differ as to whether or not the ejection of families created tensions. One hostel resident claimed that the families understood that they were being victimised by Divco and not by hostel residents:

> It was not the hostel dwellers moving people out, it was the Council...During that time there were no problems, there was no ill feeling between the people, because they knew that it was not the migrants, it was the Council.\(^{126}\)

Yet soon after the families were ejected, Divco administration reported that "vandals" had smashed the windows of houses recently allocated to contract labourers.\(^{127}\)

The integration of contract workers and families in the same neighbourhood had the effect of silencing many residents in the family quarters, who feared losing their house if they

\(^{123}\) RSC 181, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 10 June 1965; RSC 189, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 10 Feb 1966; BAO 1814 A20/1005/4, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 4 Jan 1966; NY 4/2/1, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 4 Nov 1970.

\(^{124}\) The Institute of Race Relations noted that the high rents charged to "single" men in Nyanga resulted in scurvy and other deficiency diseases being uncommonly high in the hostel quarters: RSC 165, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 13 Feb 1964.

\(^{125}\) Mbude, "Sihume Road", p. 6.

\(^{126}\) Interview with Mr M. Dyantyi, p. 1.

\(^{127}\) RSC 167, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 9 April 1964.
complained about the state of affairs. In addition, households felt threatened by the contract workers, who outnumbered them:

Otherwise you can't say nothing, if you say something you're in trouble, because they're grouping in one place. You and your wife and your children, he just do what he likes with the family.

Similar tensions existed in Mau-Mau, where the houses in two streets were occupied by contract workers.

There were serious social implications to housing thousands of "single" men in the midst of family quarters. The main source of friction was the skewed male/female ratio in Nyanga:

The people in the houses don't want their daughters to go out with the men from the hostels, and the girls want to go because the men from the hostels are hungry for women and spend their money on them. And some of them would spend it on these girls, who all got pregnant of course.

It was worse for families living in the Zwelitsha Drive scheme, for the contract workers lived right next door:

I've got children, that man has got no children. Now of my children, say children is about 12 or 14 years old, that man see that can be his wife, spoil it. Young girls get pregnant, 14, 13 years old, it was very bad.

A similar situation prevailed in Langa, where the pregnancies of schoolgirls were blamed on contract workers living nearby.

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128 Interview 3 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1.

129 Interview with Mr W.N., p. 5.

130 Interview with Mr M. Schietekat, p. 17; Mbude, "Sihume Road", p. 10.

131 Interview with Mrs N. Robb, p. 6. See also interview 1 with Mr D. Ngo, p. 21; interview with Mr A. Grové, p. 5; interview with Mr R. Murray-Rawbone, p. 1.

132 Interview with Mr W.N., p. 5.

133 Mohamed, "Langa High School", p. 85.
It was not only their daughters that concerned the men in the married quarters. The manager reported in 1966 that married African women were entering the hostels "for immoral purpose". Contract labourers were consequently blamed by location informants for breaking up many marriages in Nyanga and pushing up the illegitimacy rate. As one woman stated, "Some of them used to break marriages, because some of the women would run there."

Another problem was the relationship between youths and contract labourers. Urban youths were better educated than their parents, and therefore that much more educated than the hostel residents. In addition, many hostel residents were the same age as the high school students but were married and supporting families, which led to a lack of understanding and respect of the contract labourers for township youth.

Many young men living in Nyanga were forced to leave their families at the age of 18 and rent a bed in the hostels. There was considerable tension between the location youth and contract workers within the hostels, for they were assigned beds in the same room. According to one informant, the youth had to learn to act and speak like contract labourers to avoid friction, otherwise they would be evicted by the former yet still be obliged to pay bed rent.

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134 CT 64/53/A, Acting Manager to Legal Adviser, 23 Sep 1966.

135 Interview with Mrs L., p. 2; see also interview 3 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1. A similar sentiment was voiced by some women in Langa in 1967: AWC 105, Provincial President of the National Council of African Women to Director of CTCC Bantu Administration, 5 July 1967.


137 Interview 3 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 2.
In the late 1960s, young men in the hostels began to make friends among the township youth living in their midst:

The youth from the hostels and the youth from the location they got together, they moved out of the hostels to find other places to stay....We used to warn them about this and we tried to tell them that they must not do this kind of silly things here, but instead they just turned against the old people, they ran away to build shacks outside. 138

The youths who remained in the hostels often held loud parties, which further exacerbated frictions within the hostels. 139

What particularly sparked the hostility of contract labourers was that they were often the target of young gangsters in Nyanga:

When we moved to this place [in the transit camp], then it was the time that the tsotsis started to attack people and mug and rob people...when they saw these hostel men coming to the location, they robbed them. 140

The contract labourers responded by forming their own patrols, called amaVigilants. These patrols did not occur regularly, but only when the need arose:

It would stop and leave for a season and come back when the people in the hostels had been robbed, then they would start it. It wasn't a consistent thing throughout the year. 141

The amaVigilants were already patrolling the location from 1959, when the Spoilers gang was in full swing. Their patrols would target "anyone without big pants", that is, young men would be indiscriminately and brutally attacked. 142

138 Interview with Mr M. Dyantyi, p. 2.

139 Interview with Mr T., p. 6.

140 Interview with Mrs N., p. 3.

141 Interview with Mr T., p. 6.

142 Interview 1 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1. See also H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 8 Sep 1964.
They were assaulting them at night. They even killed one young man who was staying at Dutch next to me, because I was staying there in Kraaifontein [section of the transit camp]. They killed Hloki while he was with his girlfriend in the taps, at about 7 pm while they were coming. He didn't take much notice of them because he had done nothing. They assaulted and killed him.143

Bonner described a similar situation on the Reef during the 1950s, when Sotho workers were robbed by urban youths and launched reprisals against anyone suspected of being a tsotsi.144

The youths consequently stayed clear of the area outside of the hostels at night, and took care to evade groups of contract workers patrolling the location. As one informant recalled,

They walked by night with the cops, and they will hit you if they catch you late at night. They will say, "You are a tsotsi, what do you want at this time of the night?" They will hit you. That's what made the people of the location use to fight the people of the hostels...sometimes you came maybe from your girlfriend, or maybe you come from a movie, or you come from a family, and they will catch you.145

Hostel residents in Langa similarly patrolled their location in the early 1960s, targeting anyone suspected of being a tsotsi.146

There were additional reasons for tensions between the two groups. One of the minor irritations in the early 1960s was the struggle over the hostel dining hall, which house residents wished to use as a civic hall:

We used to entertain our visitors there and have our functions also there...these hostel dwellers will start trouble and they block us from using the hall. We will find them either eating or cooking, and that was a problem.147

143 Interview with Mr T., p. 2.
144 Bonner, "Russians on the Reef", p. 166.
145 Interview with Mr M.M., p. 5.
146 Interview with Mr R. Murray-Rawbone, 8 Dec 1994, p. 3.
147 Interview with Mr N., p. 4. Another informant disagreed, saying that hostel residents "didn't cause any trouble" when their dining hall was used for entertainment purposes: interview with Mrs K., p. 4.
In response, residents pushed for the establishment of a separate civic facility. After it was built in 1962, it was used exclusively by occupants of the family quarters. 148

There was also continuous friction over the supply of warm water. Families living in Mau-Mau did not have access to wash tubs or hot water, which resulted in women queuing for warm water in the hostels. When this resulted in conflict, the women were discouraged from using hot water from the hostels and the administration took steps to provide the families with wash tubs. 149

There was a similar cleavage between hostel and house residents in the other Peninsula townships. Comments made by occupants of the Guguletu married quarters about hostel residents referred to the strong rural ties of the contract workers. One resident commented that when the "bachelors" got together

they plot a lot of silly things. And they’re always doing their rituals and whatnot like they do in the country. So the people who live near them have quite a tough life. 150

The barracks in Langa were associated with drinking and prostitution by many residents whereas contract workers frequently viewed the residents as lacking traditional values. 151

7.4.2 Hostels and houses: Cross-cutting ties and social conflict

What is surprising about the conflicts between house and hostel residents in Nyanga is that they did not reach the stage where collective violence resulted, especially given the increasing

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148 Interview with Mr N., p. 4.


150 Hermer, Diary of Maria Tholo, p. 150.

151 Hermer, Diary of Maria Tholo, p. 5; see also Wilson and Mafeje, Langa, pp. 15-16.
male-female ratio and the escalation of crime in the late 1960s. Social theories relating to the effect of cross-cutting allegiances shed some light on the reasons for this.

Deutsch stated that cross-cutting loyalties made the polarisation of social groups less likely and were therefore a moderating influence in resolving intergroup conflict.\textsuperscript{152} In an African context, Gluckman similarly put forward the hypothesis that where sufficient conflicts of loyalties were at work, social order would be maintained:

People who are friends on one basis are enemies on another. Herein lies social cohesion, rooted in the conflicts between men's different allegiances.\textsuperscript{153}

This was given empirical grounding when Ross sampled 90 pre-industrial societies and concluded that strong cross-cutting ties within a society minimised the severity of internal conflict.\textsuperscript{154}

There were many cross-cutting loyalties among the hostel and house populations of Nyanga. The most obvious was their categorisation as "African" and hence their discriminatory treatment under apartheid laws. In addition, most members of both groups originated from the Eastern Cape and therefore had friends and relatives in the other group:

They had friends and brothers who were from their home towns who were living there, so there would be that relationship of visiting your brother or family, brother will be visiting the township, the members of the family inside the township.\textsuperscript{155}

Another cross-cutting affiliation was created due to the fact that a significant proportion of men living in the hostels had acquired Section 10(1)a/b status but were not


\textsuperscript{155}Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 12.
allowed to live with their families as their wives were not deemed to "ordinarily reside" with them. As Chapters Five and Six have shown, many men lived in household conditions in the Peninsula for years before they were sent to the hostels and their wives endorsed out of the Combined Area. These men possessed the same legal status and advantages of being "permanents" and had lived in the Peninsula on a continuous basis for over ten years, often with their families. This made social ties with other "permanents" more likely.

There was therefore considerable social interaction between residents of the houses and hostels:

There was no trouble because we ourselves were visiting the location people, we were kind of living together.\(^{157}\)

People from the hostels used to stay with us without any trouble. Men used to drink in the hostels and the hostel men also used to drink here without any problem.\(^{158}\)

This also occurred between hostel and transit camp residents:

The relationship between the hostel dwellers and the people in the pondokkies was, they came to buy home-brew beer in the pondokkies, and then they would stay the whole day, even if it's the weekend, they will stay the whole day, and it was nice, that kind of relationship.\(^{159}\)

The interaction extended beyond socialising, for women who entered the Peninsula illegally to visit their menfolk in the hostels would flee to location houses when the police raided. As one hostel resident explained,

\(^{156}\)Approximately 25% of the men in the single quarters in 1977 had 10(1)a/b rights; Schneier's figures were higher, showing 12% of Peninsula hostel-dwellers in 1983 were borners and 29% were 10(1)b's: Graaf and Maree, *African Workers in Cape Town*, p. 4; S. Schneier, *Occupational Mobility among Blacks in South Africa* (Cape Town: Saldru Working paper No 58, 1983), p. 184.

\(^{157}\)Interview with Mr M. Dyantyi, p. 1.

\(^{158}\)Interview 1 with Mr D., p. 7.

\(^{159}\)Interview with Mrs M., p. 3. A recent study of hostels on the Reef noted that hostel residents interacted with "the lowest stratum of urban residents", namely shack residents: Segal, "Hostel Dwellers Speak", p. 197.
In those days, if my wife comes down to visit me, I as a husband has to go and find a place for her to live outside the hostels in the locations... There was no right for women to live here. That's why we happened to go and find a place to live in the location, it was not legal.\textsuperscript{160}

One house resident described the situation:

During the day she will stay in the location, and then in the evening if there is no place for you two in the location, then you would bring her in the hostel, then in the morning she would have to run to the location.\textsuperscript{161}

There was considerable risk involved in helping the hostel residents in this way. People who "harboured" illegal women were also arrested ("We tried to protect them and then we would go to jail"),\textsuperscript{162} which - after 1964 - could lead to expulsion from the Peninsula.

This assistance was appreciated by hostel residents; when fighting broke out between hostel and house residents in Nyanga in 1976,\textsuperscript{163} one Langa hostel resident declared himself unwilling to get involved in the fighting. Said he to a Guguletu resident,

"We have a link of friendship with you. After all, you looked after our wives when there were raids and they were not supposed to be in town. You took in our babies and reared them here because little children die so easily in the country. We're not ready to break ties with you."\textsuperscript{164}

Nevertheless, the visiting was not always reciprocated: the hostels were considered out of bounds to location residents unless they were selling food or clothing there, whereas

\textsuperscript{160}Interview with Mr M. Dyantyi, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{161}Interview with Miss M., p. 9.

\textsuperscript{162}Interview with Mrs H., p. 4.

\textsuperscript{163}At least 26 people were killed in the course of December 1976. The main factor in the violence was the political activism of Nyanga youths, who destroyed hostel shebeens and thereby provoked a furious response from contract workers. The violence was exacerbated significantly by the actions of the police, who sided with the contract workers and were directly responsible for at least half of the deaths. These two factors, namely police involvement and the political disturbances of 1976, therefore seem to have negated temporarily the effect of cross-cutting ties.

contract labourers moved about the location freely. Moreover, there was a tremendous stigma attached to location women who visited the exclusively male hostels; "You were seen as a cheap woman," stated one informant.

The relationship between house and hostel residents was therefore a complex one which involved cooperation and conflict. Tensions were created due to the skewed male-female ratio and the lack of understanding between township youth and adult contract workers. On the other hand, ties of blood and friendship cut across the cleavages created by occupation and legal and social status, which resulted in frequent visiting and assistance in evading pass officials. While the siting of hostel residents in the midst of families heightened tensions in Zwelitsha Drive and Mau-Mau, then, it also facilitated social interaction.

7.5 Youth and crime, 1963-70

As described in Chapter Five, Nyanga residents took decisive action against crime in the early 1960s by forming street committees and drawing youth into soccer and rugby clubs. By the late 1960s, poor schooling conditions and unemployment had caused crime statistics to rise, which residents battled to keep under control.

There was extensive overcrowding in Nyanga schools: in 1961, there were 3079 pupils and 48 teachers, a ratio of 64:1, with the ratio dropping only nominally to 62:1 in 1967. The lack of school accommodation resulted in long waiting lists and many children

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165 Interview 3 with Mr M. Mzongwana, p. 1; interview with Mrs M.R., pp. 11-12.

166 Interview with Mrs M.R., p. 12.

167 Segal noted in her 1992 study of hostels in Alexandra that the hostels were geographically isolated, which made contract workers visibly "outsiders" and mirrored their political marginalisation: "Hostel Dwellers Speak", p. 197.

168 RSC 132, Manager's monthly report, Divco meeting minutes of 30 May 1961; RSC 206, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 13 July 1967. Whether this included "illegal" children not registered on residential cards is uncertain.
not being in school. Students had to go outside Nyanga if they wished to attend high school, and many scholars were sent to the bantustans for their education owing to overcrowded Nyanga schools and the parental fear that their children would become juvenile delinquents.

Significantly, the proportion of males in school decreased with the level of education: in Sub A, there was an equal ratio of girls to boys, whereas by Standards 5/6, the ratio was 61% female students to 39% males. The higher drop-out rate among male youths does not mean they left school for employment. On the contrary, the operation of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy prevented youths from acquiring appropriate jobs. The administration reported in 1969 that youths who possessed Junior or Matriculation Certificates were not able to get jobs "in line with their educational and physical abilities".

Even the uneducated youths were difficult to place in employment, for they refused to accept work entailing heavy manual labour.

It is likely, then, that the lower percentage of male scholars indicates their dropping out of school and joining youth gangs. Glaser noted that tsotsi culture on the Rand was marginalised during the 1960s due to more accessible schooling and a massive state

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169 RSC 215, Annual Report of Divco Medical Officer of Health, Divco meeting minutes of 30 April 1968.

170 Interview with Miss M., p. 9. There were only two African high schools in the Peninsula during the 1960s, and only three by 1978. interview with Mr F.N., p. 4; Makhubela, "Analysis of Bantu Education", p. 30.

171 Van der Horst, African Workers in Town, pp. 104-105.

172 RSC 230, Manager's monthly report, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 10 July 1969.

173 Van der Horst's research in the 1950s showed that parents were just as likely to send their sons to the reserves as they were their daughters: van der Horst, African Workers in Town, pp. 104-105. The smaller percentage of males in school was therefore probably not due to more boys being sent to the rural areas for their education.
clampdown on gangs. The same cannot be said for Nyanga, where schooling did not become more accessible and the administration was not concerned about crime unless Divco property was attacked.

In addition, many youths lived "on the run" as they did not have jobs and therefore could be arrested:

If I have a reference book, I have to go stay with some friends...if you don't have a job, you have to go and report to Divco, really, they make you a stamp which only for 7 days, you must have, always go to check, to have the stamp....If you don't have the stamp, 10 days jail, 20 rand.

Most youths therefore lived an uncertain existence as they tried to evade registration officials.

Youth gangs lived in empty transit camp pondoks and in the dense bush areas of Nyanga:

There was the worst end of the township, but it was a squatter's area, whereby there's a lot of bushes...The whole pondoks there, they used them to hide in...They used to intimidate the schools, take girls from the schools and rape them, they were coming to a classroom and then everybody must put his money...If you stay in the Old Location, then you've got to walk from there, you can imagine our people walking, with all the bushes and everything.

Advisory Board members requested in 1965/66 that the bush between Brown's Camp and the Old Location and around the hostels (see Figure 9) be cleared of "vandals and undesirables" who were attacking residents. By 1967, the gangs were also sheltering in the Zwelitsha Drive ablution blocks.

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175 Because many families in Nyanga were to be "repatriated" to the bantustans or transferred to Guguletu in the course of the 1960s, school accommodation was not built for all the Nyanga children of school-going age.

176 Interview with Mr P.J., p. 2.

177 Interview with Mr N. Mbiko, p. 5.

Social Dynamics in Nyanga, 1963-70

Nyanga, 1968

Figure 9
The result was an increase in crime in the late 1960s. In 1968, the manager stated that Nyanga residents were "now tired of the discomforts caused by hooligans", and he urged residents to enrol their sons into Boy Scouts to prevent them from becoming tsotsis.\(^\text{179}\) The Director of Social Welfare attempted to interview unemployed youth between the ages of 16 and 20 and place them in employment. In 1968, 21 of 62 youths interviewed had been placed in employment, and the manager was considering taking action against youths who refused employment by charging them under the Section 29 "idle and undesireable" clause of the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964.\(^\text{180}\)

Residents continued to mobilise against crime by organising amaVolontiya patrol groups:

> We used to patrol even in the night, all over, also in the squatter area, amaSakeni. If we found you drunk we accompanied you...a young man with a knife which we found, we took him and asked him where is he going to slaughter during the night.\(^\text{181}\)

However, the credibility of the amaVolontiya came under fire:

> I remember how it dissolved was that, when we were trying to restore order with the elements at night, skollie elements at night, they were not seen as doing good, because there were also those who hijacked it that attacked people from work, they will be accused for doing it. The skollie elements would be taking over...and then it was warned that people should not take it up, they should rather go to the police.\(^\text{182}\)

The patrols were not only hijacked but took extreme measures to maintain a night curfew. A group of three men was accosted by a patrol one evening in 1963; when two of the men ran

\(^{179}\) Nyanga News, December 1968. See also ibid., June 1969.

\(^{180}\) Nyanga News, April 1968; RSC 214, Combined Bantu Affairs Committee meeting of 14 March 1968.

\(^{181}\) Interview 2 with Mr D., p. 24.

\(^{182}\) Interview with Mrs M.R., pp. 10-11.
away in fear, the third was surrounded by the patrol and beaten so severely that he was paralysed.

Although residents did not succeed in stamping out crime, they did manage to contain it. The Flying Eagles Rugby Club continued to be recruit members from youth gangs:

Ja, we had an effect, because most of the guys that were leaders of these gangsters, they used to play for us, and some of them, you'd be surprised because they're deacons in churches now.

The Club operated despite the continual surveillance of the authorities:

We had a lot of visiting because they felt that it was a front for the liberation movements, it was not a rugby club, so we used to have visitors, police, coming to check our books and everything.

The Flying Eagles went on to become one of South Africa's most successful black rugby clubs. In 1965 one of the players was selected for the black international team; by 1969, eight Flying Eagles members were playing on the international squad.

In his study of quiescence in South African townships during 1978-84, Seekings concluded that there was not an absence of political activity but a difference in its form, which was non-confrontational and typically evaded the state through local resolution of township problems. The same can be said for Nyanga in the 1960s, where residents bypassed the administration to organise and combat crime.

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183 Interview with Mrs M.S., pp. 10-11. Glaser documented situations in Soweto, where civic guards abused their power and broke the law: Glaser, "Youth Politics in Soweto", p. 189.

184 Interview with Mr N. Mbiko, p. 3.

185 Interview with Mr N. Mbiko, p. 1.

186 Interview with Mr N. Mbiko, p. 2.

187 J. Seekings, "Quiescence and the Transition to Confrontation: South African Townships, 1978-84" (Oxford University, D.Phil. thesis, 1990), esp. pp. 21, 285-286. While there were a number of parallels between the quiescence of the 1960s and that of 1978-84, the latter period was characterised by additional factors such as declining incomes, rent increases, and the establishment of "community councils".
Conclusions

It is tempting, in post-apartheid South Africa, to conclude that the project of apartheid was riddled with failure. The 1960s prove otherwise. Defiance of the pass laws on a daily and individual level may have rendered influx control ineffective, yet the insecurity created by apartheid laws served to divert the energies of Nyanga residents from overt political protest to issues of daily survival. The massive bureaucracy required to maintain strict control of urban influx and township life may have been expensive, but the financial burden was shouldered primarily by Nyanga residents. Proclamation No 11 of 1960 may have proven to be a nightmare of red tape and a financial failure, but it undermined the residential security of Nyanga residents and facilitated the "repatriation" of many Peninsula Africans.

These two points must be emphasised, then: central state and Divco policies did achieve an impressive degree of control over urban Africans in the 1960s, and where policies were contradictory (as in the setting of economic rents) or ineffective (as with influx control), Africans shouldered the consequences, whether it was corruption in the allocation of houses, transfer to Guguletu, tsotsism and its concomitant increase in crime, or friction between house and hostel residents. One resident summed up the decade:

We lived a terrible life, because there's been tsotsis, there's been a lot of crime, and there was also the state on the other hand, people were being arrested for passes...but we had no choice, we had to live...There was nothing we can do, like self-upliftment, or make our own businesses...all things were destroyed, now they're trying to build. All in all, we had no rights to do anything.\(^{188}\)

At the same time as control was increasing, however, defiance became increasingly entrenched:

\(^{188}\) Interview with Mr W. Makwenkwe, pp. 2-3.
People were fighting back because they didn't care what happened, they just did their own thing. It was like fun to us, even this pass laws thing, we never carried passes for the fun that we wanted to be chased around. There was that defiance, there was always that defiance, you know, why should should I carry my pass? I was born in Cape Town, this is not for me. \(^{189}\)

Divco statistics attest to the resolution of residents to "do their own thing". The administration noted by 1969 that many illegal taxis were operating in the Peninsula townships. \(^{190}\) There were many "illegal" children being introduced into the area: by attending school and producing a late birth certificate, the children's presence in the Peninsula was legalised and there was very little the administration could do. \(^{191}\) There were also many unauthorised structures added on to location houses. The incidence of illegal trading increased over the decade: in 1968, 18 people were prosecuted for illegal trading, and the problem seemed to stem primarily from the transit camp. \(^{192}\)

These were signs that the pressure was building up. Nyanga residents, as with Africans throughout the republic, could not indefinitely tolerate the intolerable: the break-up of households, massive overcrowding in township houses, lack of upward mobility in the job market, the plethora of draconian pass laws and the incessant pass raids that they spawned, and desperate living conditions. As Bloch pointed out, there was a continuity between the social struggles of the 1970s and the submerged stresses of the sixties. \(^{193}\)

\(^{189}\) Interview with Mr N. Mbiko, p. 9.

\(^{190}\) Nyanga News, December 1969.

\(^{191}\) NY 8/29/1, Manager to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 18 Aug 1970. Although school principals were supposed to ensure that every child was recorded on a Nyanga residential permit, this happened very rarely: interview with Mr A. Grove, p. 8. This ensured that many "illegal" children slipped through the influx control net.

\(^{192}\) Compiled from RSC 212 to 224, Manager's monthly reports for February 1968 to January 1969. See also RSC 226, Annual Report of Divco Medical Officer of Health, Divco meeting minutes of 25 March 1969; H4/69/B, Nyanga Advisory Board meeting of 9 Nov 1966.

\(^{193}\) Bloch, "Silent Sixties", p. 3.
CONCLUSIONS

When the first houses were constructed in Nyanga in 1945, the Divisional Council had no experience in building or administering an African township. The first two years were characterised by administrative confusion, with houses being allocated contrary to stated policy and the first superintendent being fired for corruption. Thereafter control of the location tightened considerably. The new manager, Mr H.M. Pansegrouw, waged a war against the Vigilance Committee, which was successfully contesting Advisory Board elections and publicising conditions in Nyanga. The manager also attempted to control the allocation of houses and movement of tenants more strictly.

The second housing scheme was built and administered by Divco and the northern municipalities of Bellville, Goodwood, and Parow in 1952. The forced removal of Africans from shacklands in the Combined Area to the Mau-Mau scheme radically altered social dynamics in the fledgling location. The removees were transferred against their will to tiny houses with scant amenities, producing high rent arrears, a rapid turnover of tenants, and community disruption. There were additional spin-offs: the crime rate rose, and antagonism developed between residents of Mau-Mau and the Old Location.

Nyanga's population trebled again with the massive "black spot" clearances of shacklands in the Combined Area during the mid-1950s. While the state wished to increase its control over Africans by centralising them in an emergency camp, the strong traditions of resistance forged by shantytown residents in the face of forced removals were transplanted to Nyanga. The transit camp residents developed a reputation for open
defiance: they continued their political activism and consistently refused to pay their site rentals.

The uprooting of shack communities and the expulsion of hundreds of African women from the Combined Area in the late 1950s drew the diverse population of Nyanga together and contributed to a spirit of resistance. With the commencement of the PAC's anti-pass campaign on 21 March 1960, the people of Nyanga barricaded their township and successfully defied the state for three weeks, their resistance being the most concerted in the Union.

It was impossible for Nyanga residents to withstand the onslaught that followed. Over 1500 residents were arrested, with many serving long prison terms. Resistance organisations were banned, and the administration employed many informers to ferret out political activists and sow suspicion and mistrust in the location. These were dark days, made even darker by incessant pass raids and "repatriations".

Yet defiance continued in covert ways. Political activists formed soccer and rugby clubs which effectively curtailed the rising crime rate and acted as a base of recruitment for the ANC. Defiance of apartheid laws occurred on a daily basis through the building of illegal structures and the increase in unlicensed businesses.

The prevalence of so much "illegality" brings us to one of the questions posed in the introduction, namely the extent of state control and pressures "from below". When influx/efflux control was applied in the Combined Area, it was actively resisted by Africans in shack settlements who were being "screened" for their legality. Their protests did not cause the implementation of the pass laws to slacken; on the contrary, the Divisional Council was strict in its application of influx control, cooperating fully with the central state and sometimes urging it to pass even more restrictive legislation. It
Conclusions

did, however, lead to evasion of pass controls on a large scale. Women "lost" their passes and obtained medical certificates, and thousands of individuals and families lived "illegally" in the Peninsula.

The efficacy of influx control was further undermined by the laws themselves, which created as many loopholes as they closed. The number of "legal" African families in the Peninsula increased due to natural population growth, and officials were at a loss in dealing with questions of "displaced" families and "illegal" unemployment. Had the economy not expanded considerably in the Western Cape during the 1960s and drawn increasing numbers of Africans to the Peninsula, the rate of African urbanisation might have been slower. Even then, the persistent refusal of African men and women to accept the constraints on their mobility would have made a reversal of African urbanisation impossible.

With regard to the implementation of housing policy, Nyanga residents were able to shape housing policy in the 1950s only to a limited extent. The "graduated rentals" policy, which based rents upon income rather than type of accommodation, was successfully challenged through rent boycotts and legal test cases between 1954 and 1956. The new regulations were rescinded, and residents were reimbursed if they had paid excess rent during that time period. This was their only success: although rent increases in later years were met with prolonged boycotts and numerous residents' meetings, this did nothing to stop the increases. Furthermore, many residents were victimised through evictions and expulsion from the location for their involvement in the boycotts of the late 1950s. Throughout the 1960s, the administration did not heed the housing concerns of Nyanga residents: contract workers were housed in the midst of
family quarters, overcrowding escalated steadily, and high rent arrears became a familiar feature of location life.

Yet the administration did not realise its goal of residential control. The freeze on the provision of family housing in the Peninsula in 1962 led to the continued existence of the transit camp, where there was widespread resistance in the form of non-payment of rent and the proliferation of unlicensed businesses. The setting of unaffordable "economic" rents fuelled rent arrears, creating a floating population of households: after being evicted, families lodged with friends or relatives or moved to the transit camp, all the while being unregistered tenants who were difficult to trace. These findings have confirmed the contradictory and dysfunctional nature of apartheid: in its attempt to regulate every aspect of the lives of urban Africans, the state generated a myriad of laws at cross-purposes with each other.¹

The best example of a dysfunctional law was the Proclamation of 1960, which divided the Peninsula into two "Proclaimed Areas" for the purposes of applying influx control. Although the aims of Divco administration in introducing the Proclamation were to increase its control over Africans in its jurisdiction and make a profit from registration fees, the high costs of administering the Proclamation caused Divco to abandon the plan in principle in 1967. Even after this admission of defeat, the Proclamation remained in effect until 1973 and continued to cause its African victims needless suffering.

The inefficacy of many apartheid laws should not, however, obscure the extent to which control over urban Africans was achieved in Cape Town. Segregation of the

¹For an account of similar contradictions in Southern Rhodesian labour policies, see Barnes, "Mobility of African Women".
African populace was successfully implemented by the mid-1960s, and the legal and residential insecurity of urban Africans served to divert their energies toward individual survival and away from overt political resistance. While apartheid policy carried the seeds of its own destruction, then, the Nationalist government was successful in postponing their germination until the 1970s.

A number of questions regarding the role of African administration personnel were posed in the introduction. I have argued that the Nyanga residents working with the location administration were attracted particularly to the material benefits of collaboration. Police constables, clerks, and conservative residents who belonged to the Transkei National Independence Party were given first priority in the allocation of Old Location houses and were first in line for business licenses. Nyanga clerks and constables utilised their linguistic skills and knowledge of location inhabitants to extract money and sexual favours from Nyanga residents. The amount of money which changed hands in bribes - whether for pass-fixing or transfer to better accommodation - was stupendously high. As the Isaacmans commented of Southern and Central Africa, "Privilege and exploitation were not the exclusive prerogative of the dominating racial minority."

The access to Old Location houses therefore had the effect of concentrating many administration personnel, constables, and Advisory Board members in the Old Location. They did not, however, form an identifiable social group: they came from diverse

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2 Similarly, Van Onselen showed that it was the power and prestige which settlers invested in collaborators in Rhodesia which led to abuses: "Role of Collaborators", pp. 408-409.

occupational and educational backgrounds, and did not associate closely with one another. While the Advisory Board members and constables in the 1960s were occasionally the objects of hostility, this did not lead to social isolation; even political opponents of Mr Ngo, who abused his influential position in the location, stated that they interacted with him at public occasions. This correlates closely with the research of McCracken, who found that collaborators were only reviled when they engaged in extremely unpopular activities, such as labour coercion.4

The laws which governed the lives of African women have been traced throughout this thesis. These women faced a grim future if they were endorsed out of the Combined Area, for they could not legally re-enter the Peninsula through obtaining contract work as could their menfolk. Furthermore, they were precluded from serving on the Advisory Board unless they were widows, and were technically not allowed to hold tenancy of houses. In practice, however, adult women who were single, divorced, deserted, or widowed were allocated smaller houses or sites in the transit camp, where the rent was lower. Being a woman in unmarried circumstances had its advantages, however: influx control officials found it difficult to endorse them out of the Peninsula if they did not have relatives in the reserves.

Regarding women's protests, the scale and scope of the protests changed considerably over the decades under study. The protests of the early 1950s were small, infrequent, and centred on issues specific to Nyanga location. By the late 1950s, the protests had broadened to include the application of pass laws to African women. When Nyanga women marched to government offices outside the boundaries of Nyanga, the action was symbolic: they were addressing a wider range of issues, from living

4 McCracken, "Coercion and Control", p. 145.
Conclusions

conditions in Nyanga to the pass laws to which they were being subjected. In participating in political organisations and openly defying white male authority, the women of Nyanga were beginning to make inroads into the traditionally male sphere of politics.

The reasons for the dramatic change were both political and material in nature, with their origin in the forced removals from Peninsula shack settlements to the emergency camp. The women forcibly moved to Nyanga paid an enormous cost in social and economic terms, namely dislocated community life, the costs of demolishing, moving, and re-erecting shacks, and the added expense and inconvenience of increased commuting distances. In addition, they had first-hand experience of the incoming pass controls, having had to prove their "legal" status to obtain permission to move to Nyanga. In defying attempts to expel them from the area or move them to Nyanga, they acquired political and organisational experience and established traditions of open defiance. This infused the women's protests in Nyanga with greater energy and militancy.

It is important to bear in mind the social changes which Nyanga women underwent before and after their move to Nyanga. As Walker noted, old restraints on women's independence were being eroded just as pass controls were introduced, and Bonner's research showed that the lack of pass controls for women weakened the control of Basotho men over Basotho women.\(^5\) The high proportion of unmarried adult women in Mau-Mau and the Nyanga transit camp points to changing social relations whereby women were increasingly establishing households on their own.

In fighting the pass laws, then, the women of Nyanga were therefore not only challenging the state but defending their growing independence. As Wells noted, African women protesting against passes were defending their right to maintain a lifestyle based upon informal sector activities which allowed them to meet both family and household responsibilities.6

At various points, there has been a focus on spatial dynamics. There were significant differences in physical space between Mau-Mau and the Old Location. The larger plot sizes, better amenities, and lower population density of the Old Location produced a conservative neighbourhood which was isolated from the more densely populated Mau-Mau, where competition for scarce amenities heightened social conflict. The social distance between the two neighbourhoods became a permanent feature of Nyanga.

During the massive "black spot" clearance campaign of the 1950s, the authorities succeeded in gaining spatial control over Africans by forcing them into segregated locations where entry and exit was monitored. Complete control was never achieved: residents asserted their control over the transit camp by constructing shacks in such a way as to impede raiding pass officials, which enabled the camp to become a stronghold of the ANC and PAC and a bastion of defiance during the political turmoil of March/April 1960.

The spatial effects of placing contract workers in accommodation next to families were also examined. The proximity of "single" men next to families had contradictory effects: on the one hand, there was considerable socialising and cooperation between the

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6Wells, We now demand, pp. 128-129. See also Friedman, "Urbanisation of African Women".
two groups; on the other, much friction developed over the relationships between women in the married quarters and men in the hostels.

Dludla's survey of 1980/81 suggested that the majority of Nyanga residents had been forced to move to the township against their will and would move out at the first opportunity. Set against this historical survey of Nyanga, these results are not surprising. Nyanga's history to 1970 was one of forced removals, unaffordable rents, harsh influx control, and corrupt administration. Yet it was precisely owing to these hardships that strong traditions of resistance and defiance were developed by Nyanga residents.

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