AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE HERERO
OF NAMIBIA, 1915 - 1946

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Doctor of Philosophy, Department of
Economic History, University of Cape Town

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A special debt of gratitude is owed to my relatives, Lex and Lore Marnewecke as well as Felix, Marius and Gisela. Over many years their home has been a welcome retreat during times of frustration.

Last but not least, it is due to the generous support of my parents that this study could become a reality. I hope that the result has justified their patience and faith in the project.
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<tr>
<td>A.Z.</td>
<td>Allgemeine Zeitung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.I.D.</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.F.R.C.</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Relations Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.C.S.</td>
<td>Imperial Cold Storage Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.O.N.</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.U.D.O.</td>
<td>National Unity Democratic Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.M.E.G.</td>
<td>Otavi Minen und Eisenbahn Gesellschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.M.C.</td>
<td>Permanent Mandates Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.M.S.</td>
<td>Rhenish Mission Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.M.R.</td>
<td>South African Mounted Rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.W.A.</td>
<td>South West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.I.A.</td>
<td>Universal Negro Improvement Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.A.</td>
<td>Windhoek Advertiser</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago, SWAPO's then Secretary for Information, Peter H. Katjavivi, presented the movement's 'comprehensive analysis and authentic version of our own history.' He concluded his foreword by saying that

There is much that remains to be done - not least to close the last chapter of the liberation struggle itself. That moment, however, will only herald the beginning of a new task of national reconstruction, a new era of control over our own lives, a time when, free of imperialist domination, we can begin not only to write, but to make our own history. (1)

As the last chapter of the liberation struggle draws to a close, the need for Namibians to write their own history remains as acute as a decade ago. For while the body of literature on the territory has grown tremendously since 1979, many aspects of the country's history and political economy remain under- and un-researched. (2)

The task of researching and writing the history of Namibia has been hampered over the years by a number of factors. Perhaps the single most important difficulty has been that many students and intellectuals were forced into exile, thus restricting their access to Namibian archives. 'Ideally,' Saunders argued, Namibian scholars

would have access to well-ordered government archives in Windhoek as well as those in Cape Town and Pretoria; the rich records in Potsdam, East Germany of the German colonial administration; the Rhenish
Missionary Society records held by the Vereinigte Evangelische Mission in Wuppertal, West Germany; and the Finnish mission records in Helsinki. (3)

With regard to overseas archives, language barriers made their utilisation difficult in any case. Moreover, 'the ravages of war and the security dangers...constrained the openness of the intellectual process itself' (4) and just about precluded possibilities for systematic oral research. An important exception in this regard is the Michael Scott Oral Records Project which has been collecting oral testimony in Namibia. Unfortunately, none of it could be utilised for this dissertation. (5) This is all the more serious in view of the growing importance of oral testimony in other fields of African, particularly South African, studies. Tim Keegan, to take one recent example, used oral testimony in an attempt to reconstruct the lives "of four black South Africans who lived and worked in the countryside". In doing so, Keegan hoped that their "experiences as individuals, as blacks in a white-dominated South Africa, and as peasants, sharecroppers, farmers, tenants and labourers will become more widely known and understood." (6) Helen Bradford, too, systematically employed oral data both to fill gaps in the primary written sources and to amplify the experiences of ordinary people in her analysis of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union. (7)

Most scholars who have written about Namibia have been concerned to record its political history. In particular, the
great majority of authors have focussed on the dispute between the United Nations and South Africa over the independence issue. (8) Many have examined organised black resistance to colonial rule. (9) As elsewhere in Africa, these were necessary steps in order "to clear away the rubble, to confront the false propositions about the past that had emerged, or had been developed, as an ideological weapon in the colonial era." (10)

But in wiping away reactionary and often racist interpretations of Namibia's past, the broad sweep of this new historiography has occasionally threatened to obscure both differences of periodization and experiences both between regions and between and within classes. Key examples are those analyses which document German and South African colonial domination and exploitation, specifically the proletarianization of black Namibians. Implicit in all of them has been a widely held assumption of an essential continuity between the German and South African administrations of the territory. Although this assumption has taken various forms and been incorporated within a variety of different analytical frameworks, its implications have been consistent: Namibia merely passed from one set of imperialist interests to another, and it continued to evince the typical characteristics of imperialist subjection and capitalist exploitation. (11)

This assumption of basic continuity between colonial eras informs Katjavivi's important recent book, for example. While this study admittedly focuses "not so much [on] the history of domination as...[on] African resistance" (12) Katjavivi begins
his brief characterisation of South African rule by pointing out that it continued and extended the land expropriations of the Germans... By 1937 the white take-over of land in the central and southern regions started by the Germans was almost total, with the African population confined to small barren reserves. (13)

The reserves were never able to sustain their populations, ‘for they were always intended to be pools of labour from which black workers would come to the so-called white areas...’ (14) Mbuende’s conclusion is equally blunt. Together ‘with the complimentary racist regulations, [the reserves] succeeded in creating an African labouring class.’ (15)

Broadly speaking, such interpretations are quite correct. German and South African colonial policies condemned the vast majority of Namibian blacks to abject poverty, be it in the reserves or as wage labourers in urban ghettos and compounds. But important as this emphasis on impoverishment undoubtedly is, it nonetheless ignores a number of important questions. With the exception of Moorsom’s pioneering work on underdevelopment, class formation and labour migration in Ovamboland (16), no study exists which provides an historical analysis of the peasantry in Namibia. Mbuende’s work, for example, adopts Saul and Woods’ classic definition of the peasantry as “those whose ultimate security and subsistence lies in their having certain rights in land and in the labour of family members on the land, but who are involved, through

- 4 -
rights and obligations, in a wider economic system which includes the participation of non-peasants', (17) but does so in an ahistorical context. And precisely because his study lacks historical depth, Mbuende too readily assumes that the peasantry is a homogenous class which "has come to identify its interests with the idea of national independence because of the fact that its precarious situation has been largely due to colonial policy." (18)

Yet, as Mbuende himself suggests almost in passing, the situation of the peasantry was not always precarious, nor was it passive. According to Mbuende, peasants were involved in conscious attempts to stave off proletarianization. He identifies two mechanisms by which the peasantry sought to save itself 'from total disintegration': 'the periodic sale of their labour power' and the sale of 'their livestock and by-products.' (19) Unfortunately these tantalizing suggestions are not developed, undoubtedly because exile prevented Mbuende from utilising the necessary archival and oral data. But as this thesis argues, analysis of these processes is of the utmost importance in attempting to establish the precise composition of the peasantry. (20)

The present study seeks to take up certain of these issues in historical perspective by focussing Aminuis, Epukiuro, Waterberg East, Ovitoto, Otjituuo, Otjohorongo and Otjimbingwe reserves.
Discarding the assumption that all peasants were equally poor, this thesis sets out to examine processes of accumulation and social differentiation. More specifically, this concern involved investigation of strategies not only to arrest proletarianization but also to reverse it. As these strategies involved different forms of resistance and defiance, the thesis attempts to link such resistance to specific class interests where appropriate.

Because of the need to situate discussion of the reserves in a wider political and economic context, considerably more space is devoted to discussion of the general political economy of the territory. Although several valuable studies have attempted to provide an outline of Namibia's political economy, they usually go no further than describing how Namibia's black population was dispossessed and a prosperous settler economy built on their backs. (21). For the purposes of this thesis, not only was greater historical depth required than was normally the case in such overviews (22), but it was also necessary to detail the process of Namibia's economic incorporation into the Union of South Africa after 1915. After the Mandate was granted in 1919 the Union integrated the territory into the South African Customs Union and brought the railway system under Union control. This enabled it to manipulate tariffs in favour of Union merchandise. In this way Namibia became largely dependent on Union markets for both its exports and imports.
Livestock exporters, for example, could only export what the Union market could absorb. The effects of incorporation on settler agriculture were particularly important because of the crucial role it played in determining the balance of class forces in the countryside.

Detailed examination of the process of Namibia's economic incorporation into the Union of South Africa revealed the extent to which the overall process of colonial incorporation had been highly uneven. This was given concrete expression by the establishment of the Police Zone. The Police Zone encompassed all those regions where an effective police presence could be established after the dispossession and subjugation of Namibia's indigenous population during and after the 1904-1907 war. Those regions beyond the Police Zone were left largely unaffected by land alienation and political subjugation. Indeed, it was not until 1932 that the last Ovambo chief, Ipumbu, had been violently deposed by the South African colonial regime.

Narrowing the focus down to the Police Zone itself, it becomes clear once again that even within this 'sub-region' incorporation was uneven. Although both Herero and Nama were subjected to the genocidal policies of the German colonial administration, the Herero suffered incomparably greater losses. Not only were their numbers decimated by about 80 per
cent, but survivors were scattered over a vast area reaching into Bechuanaland. Moreover, while the Herero had lost all their land, several Nama communities considered loyal to the German government retained their land as treaty reserves. (25)

The initial stimulus for focussing this study on the Herero in particular was the changing role which Herero leaders have played in resisting colonial rule. At the beginning of the century, chief Samuel Maharero and his advisors initiated Namibia's first war of anti-colonial resistance. Forty years later, Hosea Kutako in conjunction with other chiefs, spearheaded the campaign against incorporation into the Union by sending petitions to the United Nations. Yet this line of resistance to South African rule received a dramatic twist in the 1970s when Kutako's successor, Clemens Kapuuo, allied himself with the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, an ethnically based alliance opposed to SWAPO. In trying to understand this, it was necessary to delve into the history of the Herero.

Recognising that the Herero, as indeed the Nama and Ovambo, experienced colonial incorporation in their own unique way does not of course argue the case for tribalism and ethnicity. As this thesis will show it is only by identifying the differential impact of colonial penetration that one is able to begin to understand the historical origins of ethnic consciousness. When the term Herero is used in this study it
refers to a group of people who share a common language and certain cultural similarities and customs. In so far as Herero leaders and colonial officials refer to the Herero as a 'nation' or a 'tribe', this was taken to mean what Anderson has called an 'imagined community'. The Herero as a tribe or 'communion' existed only as an intellectual image, an image, moreover, that was constantly created and recreated by manipulating cultural elements. (26)

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into five chapters, corresponding to the way in which the overall period under discussion has been periodized. While the particular periodization followed in this thesis does emphasize significant changes in Namibian political economy, it has meant some sacrifice of thematic unity. The subject of the Truppenspieler, for example, is dealt with at various points in four of the five chapters.

Chapter One traces the social and economic history of the Herero before 1915 in very broad terms. It describes how the arrival of Oorlam Afrikaner, missionaries, and partly mediated by them, merchant capital, changed the pre-colonial political economy by accelerating the process of social differentiation and centralisation of political power among the Herero. Although the Herero economy managed to absorb the demands made
on it by traders and settlers after Germany had colonised the country, the rinderpest pandemic of 1897 marked a watershed. Heavy stock losses forced many poorer stock owners into wage labour, while chiefs, most notably Maherero, sought to recoup their losses by selling land to white settlers. Herero resistance to increasing land alienation and unscrupulous trading practices culminated in the war of anti-colonial resistance in 1904. The outcome of the war left the Herero decimated. All their land and cattle were confiscated by the German colonial government and Herero survivors were subjected to a system of forced labour. As a result of these ruthless actions, the settler economy was plagued by labour shortages until the outbreak of World War 1. Since this chapter is intended purely as an introduction, it is largely based on secondary sources.

The main body of the thesis begins with Chapter Two. By focussing on discontinuities between German and South African colonial policies, it examines how events after 1915 enabled some black Namibians to embark on a process of 'self-peasantization' by acquiring stock and land. Considerable attention is devoted to conditions in settler farming in order to show how the overall political economy of the country made it possible for blacks generally, but the Herero in particular, to re-establish themselves on the land.

The impact of these changed circumstances on popular
consciousness among the Herero is briefly discussed.

Chapter Three covers the first eight years of Mandate. It shows how the Union consolidated its hold over Namibia by incorporating the territory economically and by pursuing a strategy of land settlement. To facilitate the latter, the state launched an attack on the gains made by the Herero after 1915. The Native Reserves Commission was appointed and 'reserves' declared in 1924. Many Herero were removed from fertile pastures in the Windhoek and Otjiwarongo districts to marginal lands on the eastern border of the country. Thereafter the chapter examines Herero responses to these changes. It does so by looking at the rise of Garveyism in the early 1920s and the extent to which its ideology reinforced opposition to the Rhenish Mission by emphasizing the value of Herero customs and traditions. The chapter goes on to examine how the re-introduction of some of these customs and the death and funeral of chief Samuel Maharero shaped an Herero ethnic consciousness.

Chapter Four describes the impact of drought and Great Depression on the settler economy and the reserves. The Depression led to the virtual standstill of mining. This in turn resulted in large scale unemployment of black and white workers. While the latter were accommodated in state relief works, black workers were repatriated to the reserves. The
combined effect of drought and Depression also led to a decline in settler farming. This resulted in the eviction of tenants' livestock which had to be absorbed by reserves. Already overcrowded, reserves were unable to sustain additional stock numbers and losses resulted. The chapter traces the various strategies employed by stock owners to save their herds, and also attempts to determine the effects of the drought in particular on the distribution of livestock.

Chapter Five discusses the general recovery of settler agriculture after c.1930. It suggests that the economic and financial crisis brought about by drought and Depression brought about important changes in so-called 'native policy'. These changes resulted in the extension of commodity production in the Herero reserves by the introduction of dairying. The chapter traces in some detail how dairy producers sought to acquire control over the production and marketing of cream by opposing several schemes proposed and implemented by the state. It also details the considerable opposition which was displayed towards reserve leaders, particularly by the Truppenspieler movement, during this period. The chapter concludes by looking at opposition to proposals for incorporation into the Union.
Sources

Secondary sources focussing on rural Namibia in general and the Herero reserves in particular are almost non-existent. Six studies conducted under the auspices of the Department of Native Affairs in Pretoria in the mid-1950s on the Okahandja, Otjiwarongo, Omaruru, Grootfontein, Gobabis and Karibib districts devote sections to the reserves under consideration in this thesis. (27) These were of limited value to the present thesis first of all because the data they provide falls outside the period under consideration. Secondly, these studies do not provide any historical explanation or discussion of the data presented, so that the picture that emerges from them is rather static. The only published sources that do yield information on the reserves are the reports of various commissions of enquiry, and the annual reports submitted by the Administrator to the League of Nations between 1918 and 1939 and then again in 1946. Information on 'native affairs' gained from these official publications is very limited, however. Conscious of the fact that the Permanent Mandates Commission scrutinized all information on 'native affairs' and policy, the Union government was very selective about what it put into the reports. Invariably, first and second drafts of the annual reports, for example, yielded incomparably more information than the final, published version. With regard to commissions of enquiry, the only two reports on 'native reserves' comprise
no more than 33 pages in total.

As a result, the bulk of information on which this thesis is based is drawn from unpublished sources mainly in the Windhoek National Archives. This has been augmented by research in the archives of the Vereinigte Evangelische Mission in Wuppertal, West Germany, which houses the documents of the Rhenish Mission Society. The major problem experienced with all the sources consulted, though, is their silence on matters of an ethnographic or anthropological nature. The absence of ethnographic material from missionary sources is partly explained by the fact that none of the reserves under discussion had a resident missionary.

Finally, a few notes on terminology and orthography. Whenever Namibia is referred to in an historical context, its colonial name South West Africa, or more often, the abbreviation S.W.A., is used. The word Herero is used as a plural noun. Where the Herero are referred to as 'Hereros' (plural) in a quotation, however, no attempt has been made to change it. It perhaps needs to be emphasized that no unanimity exists as to its usage. Both Katjavi and Ngavirue, for example, refer to Hereros, whereas SWAPO, Bley, Drechsler, Vivello and Poewe use it as a plural noun. With regard to the spelling of names, the orthography as found in archival documents has been adhered to.
With regard to presentation it needs to be pointed out that the justification of right hand margins and consequently the spacing of words in a line is done automatically by the word processing software used. This may result, for example, in a single space between five digit numbers being stretched into two or three spaces, or worse still, that half the figure appears on one line and the rest on the next. Unfortunately it is impossible to change this manually. The author apologizes for this and asks the reader to bear with him.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. SWAPO Department of Information and Publicity, To Be Born a Nation, The Liberation Struggle for Namibia, (London, 1981), iii
3. Ibid
12. Katjavivi, A History of Resistance, xi
13. Ibid, p.14
14. Ibid, p.15. See also SWAPO Department of Publicity and Information, To Be Born a Nation, pp.60-64
17. Mbuende, Namibia, the Broken Shield, pp.195-196
18. Ibid, p.198
19. Ibid, 197
20. The only published work that attempts to throw some light on production and reproduction in Namibian homelands is Vesper's book. Unfortunately his highly suggestive theoretical ideas are not backed up by any historical data. See Vesper, Überleben, particularly chapters one and five
21. See, for example, Ibid, chapter four; Hubrich and Melber, Namibia, chapter three; Mbuende, Namibia, the Broken Shield, chapter five
22. Emmett's Ph.D., 'The Rise of African Nationalism', is a notable exception. See especially chapters two and three.
24. Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia, p.19
CHAPTER ONE: HERERO PASTORALISM BEFORE 1915: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Ecological Features of ‘Hereroland’

The pastures which became collectively known as Hereroland cover the topographical area of the central Namibian plateau, ‘which forms the watershed area draining towards practically all four points on the compass.’ (1) It does not contain any permanent rivers, but is characterised by dry sand courses, consisting on the one hand of shallow omurambas in the east and north-east, and ‘large river channels which sometimes carry large volumes of water.’

While the true river channels usually have a deep water-bearing bed of sand, the beds of the omurambas and oshanas are usually covered with vegetation because there is seldom a strong flow of water in them. Both types are characterised, however, by the fact that they seldom contain permanent surface water except during the rainy season, but nevertheless form catchment and storage places for underground water. (2)

Among the bigger rivers draining Hereroland are the Kuiseb, Swakop, Omaruru and Ugab rivers which flow westwards into the Atlantic Ocean and the Black and White Nosob and Auob rivers, which flow in a south easterly direction, ultimately running into the Orange River. Among the large omurambas in the Kalahari belt bordering on the central plateau in the east and northeast are the Epukiro, Eiseb, Otjosondjou and Sankora,
'which all drain the level country and do not reach the sea.' Further north the Omuramba Omatako runs in a north-easterly direction into the Okavango river. (3)

The main rains in Namibia fall between the months of December and April, with annual average precipitation declining from the north-east to the south-west. In the north-eastern region - described by the Odendaal Commission 'as the best-watered part of the Territory' (4) - an annual average rainfall of about 500 mm (20 inches) is recorded, declining progressively to 25 mm or one inch in the western and south western Namib Desert. (5) At the same time, rainfall is characterised by 'its variable and incalculable nature.' (6) Even in a good rainy season, the distribution of rainfall can be such that it does not benefit pastures. As the Long-Term Agricultural Policy Commission pointed out,

in some years, in many parts, the intervals between the 'follow-up' showers and thunder storms are long enough for young grass or cultivated crops to shrivel or wither completely, and the later the rains the less the prospect for veld or crops to recover or reach maturity. (7)

Given the nature and extent of rainfall in Namibia, drought has been a common feature of its climatic conditions. Wellington identified several successive drought years from 1880 on:

1887/88-1889/90; 1893/94-1895/96; 1900/01-1902/03; 1912/13-1915/16; 1928/29-1932/33; 1944/45-1947/48. (8) He concluded that 'no cyclic or other regularity in the rainfall
is traceable from the records.' (9)

Table 1.1 below depicts average annual rainfall figures for central Namibia, the region into which the Herero reserves fall.

Table 1.1 Average Annual Rainfall for Hereroland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>Mean Amount</th>
<th>Absolute Maximum</th>
<th>Absolute Minimum</th>
<th>Deviation (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grootfontein</td>
<td>567,3</td>
<td>969,7</td>
<td>200,7</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjiwarongo</td>
<td>422,3</td>
<td>714,4</td>
<td>215,2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franzfontein</td>
<td>245,0</td>
<td>399,1</td>
<td>54,8</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>375,0</td>
<td>1039,9</td>
<td>140,8</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Windhoek</td>
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<td>119,9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Otjimbingue</td>
<td>174,0</td>
<td>513,8</td>
<td>16,5</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swakopmund</td>
<td>18,0</td>
<td>146,3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Report of the Long-Term Agricultural Policy Commission, Table 1

Considering the time span covered in this thesis and the fact that no ecological detail exists for the pre-colonial period, the question arises as to whether it is legitimate to assume that the descriptions of rainfall provided after the mid-1940's can be extrapolated into the 19th century. Existing climatic studies sound a word of caution in this regard, noting after careful analysis of available rainfall figures that 'the climate has become more arid or less favourable in its effects on farming.' The 'universal supposition of fear' that rainfall has diminished gradually over the years could not be supported, although
the land has already become more arid, as indicated by diminution in the flow or drying up of springs of pre-European occupation times, by intermittent streams and rivers becoming more intermittent, by sinking of the water table in wells and boreholes or the drying up thereof altogether, that the character of the vegetation over extensive regions in many parts is becoming gradually more xerophytic and that secondary plant communities are replacing the primary and becoming established therein; consequently the land is becoming more bare and erosion by wind and water is increasing extensively and intensively. (10)

With a few exceptions Namibia does not have much permanent surface water. Its most important sources of water are 'the sandy beds of river channels, omurambas and underground water supplies.' (11) During the colonial period artificial dams and boreholes provided an important means of procuring water for farming purposes and urban areas. In pre-colonial times, however, water was mostly drawn from man-made wells and springs. (12)

Given the low and erratic nature of rainfall and the lack of permanent surface water, it is clear that for the most part Namibia is unsuitable for agricultural purposes. With the exception of the Ovambo, Kavango and Eastern Caprivi regions as well as scattered areas with artesian water in the southern parts, grazing constitutes the biggest asset of the territory. Pastoralists in Namibia thus 'exploit a territory that is on the whole beyond the limits of rainfall agriculture; its domain begins where that of field and village end.' (13)
Social and Economic Relations up to c. 1840

According to oral sources, the Herero migrated into the Kaokoveld region of northwestern South West Africa from the interlacustrine area of central and eastern Africa around the middle of the 16th century. (14) Indications are that they resided in the Kaokoveld for about 200 years, before starting their southward migration into central S.W.A. towards the end of the 18th century. (15) Andersson informs us that the Herero had expanded 'east nearly as far as Lake Ngami, and to about 24 degrees of latitude on the south', running just south of the Swakop and Kuiseb rivers. (16) The territory lying beyond its southern boundary was occupied and controlled by Nama chiefdoms, and in the north, at about 19 degrees latitude, by powerful Ovambo chiefdoms. Towards the east 'they were checked in their onward career' by the 'Matjo'nas, with whom, from time to time, they had several desperate conflicts.' (17)

Such evidence as there is suggests that the settlement of central S.W.A. by the Herero was characterised by conflict. Bergdamara communities in particular were subjugated and largely dispossessed. Andersson noted that those Bergdamara

who were not killed were made captives. The few that escaped took refuge among the mountains, or other inhospitable and inaccessible regions, where they are still found dragging on a most miserable and degraded existence. (18)
Ecological and socio-political conditions shaped the form of settlement in Namibia. The scarcity and unpredictability of the reproduction of pastures required Herero pastoralists to disperse over a wide territory in small groups in order to utilise these resources. Moreover, the efficient exploitation of resources required a relatively high level of mobility, characterised by 'epicyclic' patterns of migration, i.e. "a movement in adjustment to an unpredictable distribution of pasture and water." Descriptions of Herero pastoralists as 'a highly mobile, nomadic people' abound in the literature on the pre-colonial period. Missionary Hugo Hahn for example described them as generally living a constantly nomadic life, like the Bedouins. They move from place to place with their herds, depending on the conditions of the pastures.

And missionary Brincker referred to them as 'inveterate nomads' at the end of the 18th century.

The high degree of mobility found amongst the Herero is not accounted for by ecological factors alone. The social and economic organisation of Herero pastoralists was undergoing significant transformations during their southward expansion, which had not yet come to an end in the 1830s. The exact nature of this process is not clear but it appears that the dual descent system which had structured their society along patrilineal and matrilineal lines or oruzo and eanda, was
undergoing fundamental changes. While some contemporary anthropologists still maintained in the early 1980s that "the most striking feature of Herero social structure is the practice of double descent reckoning" (23), the German ethnologist Lehmann suggested that in the early 19th century patrilineally-defined clans — otuuo — were in the process of giving way to extended families. (24) His contention is supported by evidence that at the turn of the 19th century Herero pastoralists did not have any chiefly leaders or central political institutions. (25) Indications are that up to the 1840s at least "there was no leadership beyond the level of the individual homestead, which was headed by the omuini or homestead owner." Such homesteads were politically autonomous. (26) Consequently, there was no homogenous and united Herero tribe to speak of. This was clearly recognised by Andersson when he wrote in the early 1850s that

The Damaras [i.e. Herero] were once, undoubtedly, a great nation; but, unlike others which gradually become powerful by the union of a number of smaller tribes under the head of a single chief or king, they have dwindled into an endless number of petty tribes, ruled by as many chiefs. (27)

Traditionally, the primary residential and productive unit among the Herero was the homestead or onganda. Characteristically the core of individual homesteads consisted of the household clusters of the owner's wives, but usually additional people were incorporated. Amongst those were the household clusters of the omuini's or owner's younger brothers'
wives as well as those of the wives of his married sons. In many cases more distant relatives, 'poor and elderly agnatic or uterine relatives, and even unrelated poor Herero (who herd for the omuini in return for milk)' were also attached to the homestead. (28)

Most of these labours were carried out within the homestead, governed by a division of labour along age and sex lines. Broadly speaking, men were responsible for the caring and herding of cattle, while women had to take care of domestic matters. This was graphically illustrated by missionary Viehe's description of the daily activities of a typical homestead in the late 1880s:

Women start to milk the cows early in the morning, and before they return individual men drive the oxen to distant pastures and water, others move out with the cows for the same purpose a little later; the women disperse to collect firewood or materials for new huts, or to dig for oxoseu (small onion-like fruit), and only towards evening one after the other return home. (29)

While girls were being introduced to female duties by accompanying their mothers on their searches for wood and veldkos, boys started to herd small stock. After initiation, youths of the same age group either began to herd cattle close to the homestead or assisted servants in doing so. At the same time they started to acquire hunting skills by practising to shoot with bow and arrow and to throw the kirie. (30)
Pre-Colonial Trading

During years of normal rainfall the pastoral economy of the Herero produced a surplus sufficiently large to engage in regional distance trade with the Bergdama and agricultural Ovambo in the north. (31) Ovambo traders travelled south in caravans to barter their goods for cattle. In the early 1850s Andersson met such a caravan, consisting of 23 individuals. Their articles for barter included spear-heads, knives, rings, copper and iron beads, &c., but of exceedingly rude workmanship. Indeed, it was to me a constant wonder how they could persuade their neighbours to buy such trash. Yet all these things were very dear; an unfinished assegai-blade, or a yard of beads, being the regular price for an ox. (32)

After 20 days of trading the caravan left for Ovamboland with 'about 200 head of cattle, the result of their trade.' (33) On the annual average of about four caravans, Galton estimated that about 800 head of cattle left Hereroland as a result of such trading. (34)

On its way back to Ovamboland, the caravan swelled to about 170 people.

Of this number were no less than seventy or eighty Damara [Herero] women, bent on various speculations—some in hope of obtaining employment, some to get husbands, and others with a view of disposing of their shell-bodies...The latter, as we afterwards found, are taken to pieces by the Ovambo women and worn in strings round the waist. In exchange the Damaras receive beads, tobacco, corn &c. (35)
Apart from trade with the Ovambo, in the early 19th century 'Herero were trading with Portuguese north of an inlet on the coast, at about 17 degrees south (probably Tiger Bay), exchanging cattle for iron, copper, knives and calabashes.' (36)

According to Gibson, trade with the Tswana in the east only started in about 1895. (37)

Contact with Europeans in the first half of the 19th century was incidental and limited to 'non-trading activities (exploration, game-hunting).' (38) Missionary Irle noted that in the 1840s there was little demand for European manufactured goods among Herero pastoralists:

They lived off their herds, and were dressed in hides, possessed spears, bows and kieres as arms; in addition wooden spades and sticks to dig wells; small iron axes to manufacture their milk pails, troughs and thorn kraals were bought from the Ovambo, as well as arm- and leg decorations. They made their own iron arrow-heads as well as stone knives. Firearms were unknown. (39)

Horses were equally unknown to the Herero. (40)

Accumulation and Differentiation to c. 1840

Imperfectly documented as the process of production and trading is for the time being, it is beyond any doubt that it was accompanied by social differentiation. In the mid-1840s missionary Hahn identified a group of impoverished Herero who referred to themselves and were referred to by other Herero as
Cligita or ovatjimba ovanyak. (41) Although Hahn was writing at a time when the Herero had already fallen victim to Jonker Afrikaner’s raids, it is reasonable to assume that the process of differentiation he referred to preceded these raids. What characterised differentiation before the arrival of Oorlam, missionaries, and traders, however, was its fluidity. Class relations only began to assume more rigid forms after the intervention of extraneous forces.

The single most important factor militating against fixed patterns of social differentiation was the pervasiveness of raiding during the early decades of the 19th century. The declining importance of patrilineal descent reckoning and consequent dispersal of clans meant that the establishment of incipient chieftaincies increasingly depended on the ability to control means of production, i.e. land, water and cattle, thus unleashing fierce competition for these resources. (42) Raiding developed into an important mechanism to acquire and accumulate means of production. References to intra-Herero raiding abound in the literature. (43) An informant of Dr. Vedder gave a vivid description of the processes referred to:

If someone was richer than someone else and possessed large herds, he called himself a chief without really being a chief. Poorer Hereros joined him. If the cattle herds of a cattle owner were taken away from him (NB either through battles among the Hereros themselves or in battles of Herero groups with Nama- or Oorlam-Hottentots respectively), it would not occur to another rich Herero, who called himself a chief, to help the other one. He was glad that his own cattle herds were not driven away. It was left to
the damaged person to avenge himself. But he became poor. His people who gathered around him then left him, instead of going to war with him against the robbers and sought another chief (omuhona), who had a lot of cattle. (44)

Although the statement above suggests that it was possible for stock owners to be 'deprived by their own people of everything' as a result of raiding, (45) mechanisms did exist under the cattle post system to cushion the effects of complete destitution.

Underlying the cattle 'post system was the acknowledgment that individual stock owners could only herd a limited number of cattle by themselves. Beyond this, they needed additional labour. (46) The accumulation of cattle was therefore crucially dependent on the number of people a wealthy stock owner could attract and keep. The wisdom of this was captured rather succinctly in a proverb: 'Start your economy with people and not with cattle.' (47)

Under the cattle post system, wealthy stock owners farmed out cattle to client clans or families. (48) Wealthy stock owners attracted impoverished people after raids, by loaning stock to them in return for their loyalty. Galton observed in the early 1850s that it was customary among Herero pastoralists that when one tribe had utterly ruined another they should give them back a part of what they had taken, as an act of clemency, which should secure them against retaliation. (49)
In another passage Galton described the cattle post system in the early 1850s. On his way to chief Kahitjenë he passed by a great many kraals, in few of which were more than ten houses, generally only five or six — probably one hundred cattle and not more, belonged to each kraal. Of these, twenty or thirty were the chief's own property, taken care of by the people who occupied the huts, together with the other oxen which were their own. The perquisites for taking care of the chief's cattle consisted of the milk of cows and occasionally a calf or a lamb.

Anxious to retain their clients, wealthy stockowners treated them with circumspection. Andersson noted in the 1850s that 'on an attempt to punish heavy offences, the guilty individual often coolly decamps with his cattle, and takes refuge with another tribe.' Apart from impoverished Herero, wealthy stock owners also employed captured Bergdamara and Nama. These were classified and treated in the same way as servants from their own tribe, ovahore. Now and then they were also referred to as ovatua, foreigners...They can also own and dispose of their own possessions.

Cattle posts also enabled stock owners to spread the risks of drought and raiding, by spreading their herds over large areas. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that wealthier stock owners stood a better chance of surviving raids. At the same time, however, the system provided impoverished stock owners with an opportunity to reacquire stock.

There is insufficient evidence for a detailed assessment of the
importance of the control over land and water in the process of accumulating stock and establishing centralised political structures. An unpredictable climate and epicyclic migration patterns militated against the evolution of stable political and economic relations. (54) Moreover, the relative abundance of land and pastures during the first decades of the 19th century limited the extent to which access could be controlled. It was only after contact with Nama and Oorlam pastoralists that pastures became more restricted.

The situation was slightly different with regard to water resources. Not only were water points more scarce, but the digging and repairing of wells, as well as the actual process of watering stock generally required the co-operation of a number of people. (55) As a result of these factors,

A man, who with his herd and family, migrated to a well-watered area was considered to exercise limited control over the resource. He did not "own" the resource itself (though if he invested effort in tapping the resource, for instance by digging a well, he then indisputably owned the product of his effort), but he did control to a limited extent access to the resource. Since he was first in the area, he had first claim to the resource. Anyone wishing to water his herds in the area first had to ask his permission. By requesting such permission, a later arrival expressed his recognition of the other's first rights. (56)

Oorlam, Missionaries and Trade

The relative fluidity characteristic of Herero social differentiation outlined above gradually gave way to more
permanent forms with the arrival of the Oorlam Afrikaner, missionaries and traders. In brief, the arrival of Jonker Afrikaner in Windhoek in the mid-1830s marked two fundamental changes in the prevailing social relations. Firstly, land — or strictly speaking pasture — was no longer infinitely available, and therefore became an object of competition at the inter-tribal level. Second, the form of the mode of subsistence of the //Ai-Xa-//Ain [Oorlam Afrikaner] was qualitatively different. Unable to supply its subsistence needs internally, it acquired the means (firearms) to procure them externally, and thus develop a necessary dependence on the maintenance of a military-technical superiority over its neighbours. (57)

Although possession of firearms by the Oorlam undoubtedly assisted Jonker Afrikaner in establishing his hegemony over central S.W.A. this process was greatly facilitated by his exploitation of the unstable situation characteristic of Herero pastoralism at the time. The existing conflict between petty Herero chiefs enabled Jonker in the early 1840s to form alliances with a number of Herero chiefs, the most well-known of whom were Tjamuaha, Kahitjene and Mungunda. (58) Alliances with Jonker Afrikaner provided such chiefs with protection and the opportunity to accumulate cattle and guns. According to Lau,

The Herero chiefs had to take care of numbers of Afrikaner cattle. They had to assist the Oorlam Afrikaners with their knowledge of their country, and with Afrikaner exploitation of their own dependants. In return, Herero chiefs were issued with guns, their own cattle posts were not taxed, or very rarely so in a punitive action, and they had a chance to enrich themselves during frequent and mostly successful Afrikaner raids. (59)
It was under the protection of Jonker Afrikaner that the foundations for a centralised political system among the Herero were laid. More specifically, the alliance with Jonker enabled Tjamuaha, father of chief Maharero and once described as an insignificant chief by missionaries, to acquire considerable wealth and might.\(^{(60)}\) In 1860 missionary Hugo Hahn reported that Tjamuaha's homestead (Werft) counted 80 to 90 huts at Osona, 'disregarding that many people were at cattle posts.' Moreover, he had about 100 guns in his possession.\(^{(61)}\) Judging by the losses suffered as a result of a raid in 1850, chief Kahitjene controlled in excess of 30 cattle posts with more than 18 000 head of cattle.\(^{(62)}\)

The extent of these raids had a devastating effect on countless smaller Herero stock owners. A contemporary report noted that since the mid-1840s stock and people had been decimated by about one half in an area measuring 'a couple of days' journey' around the mission station Otjikango. According to the report some 'tribes' - probably a reference to homesteads under a petty chief - were completely destroyed, while others wandered around 'aimlessly'.\(^{(63)}\) The traveller Galton wrote in his diary that in 1851

The Damaras [Herero] I saw were paupers who had no cows - people who chiefly lived, not on milk, but on roots like pig-nuts, and who collected around the white man with a vague hope of protection by him against their countrymen.\(^{(64)}\)
And James Chapman, explorer and hunter, noted that in the mid-1850s mines, traders, missionaries and travellers had no problem in finding Herero labour,

most of them people or the remnants of tribes formerly destroyed or broken up and plundered by Kamaherero himself, while fighting on his own account or in the ranks of the late Jonker Afrikaner. (65)

The beneficiaries of such impoverishment were on the one hand Jonker Afrikaner and the Herero chiefs allied to him, and on the other Rhenish missionaries. Following the maxim that 'if you can't beat them, join them' many impoverished Herero pastoralists turned to Jonker and his allied Herero chiefs for protection. In the early 1850s Jonker was said to have had more Herero under his protection than Nama or 'Hottentots', as one missionary put it. (66)

With regard to the Rhenish Mission, the impoverished Herero formed the core of future missionary activities. (67) Under missionary influence they began to cultivate grains on mission stations. As early as 1845, 17 poor Herero were making gardens at Otjikango (68) and in 1858 the harvest recorded at Otjimbingwe was 20 muid of wheat and 2,5 muid of barley. (69) Not only were populations at mission stations growing steadily, but by 1850 missionaries reported that the poor in Otjikango had attained 'a kind of prosperity.' (70)

Quite a few [at Neu-Barmen] who did not possess anything earlier, became owners of relatively large herds and looked after their gardens with great care...Hereros came from far away to barter their
hunting spoils and cattle for a variety of utensils. (71)

While the early missionaries were not very successful with regard to their Christian mission - the first baptism of a Herero was recorded in 1865 (72) - their economic success was reflected in the fact that Otjikango soon developed into a vibrant peasant community and marketplace. Missionary Hugo Hahn described the market that had developed by 1850 in the following way:

A big party of rich Herero came today with 50 to 60 head of cattle, to buy tobacco here. Such trade companies come weekly, sometimes daily. The main articles of trade here are: tobacco and calabashes, the cultivation of which was learnt by poor Hereros, who call themselves Ovatjimba, from us. By this they earn a lot. Other articles such as scissors, axes, bracelets and ostrich eggshells are also sought. Apart from cattle, the rich bring fat, meat, beads, which they bartered from the Ovambo, wooden and woven pots etc. (73)

Towards the late 1850s, a few Herero peasant communities seem to have existed independently of the mission stations. Missionary Hahn reported in his diary that on his way to Ovamboland he came across a community of Ovatjimba at Okandu, a small warm spring on the bank of a tributary to the Swakop river. These people had settled with missionary. Kleinschmidt at Okahandja and fled with him to Otjikango. Since then they were living at Okandu, where they grew 'tobacco, gourds, calabashes and watermelons', but also possessed some cattle and small stock. Their chief was called Kandambo. (74)
The arrival of Jonker Afrikaner in Windhoek in the mid-1830s also began the process of incorporating central and north central South West Africa ever more closely into the trade network of the Cape. Windhoek soon developed into a thriving trading centre. In the early 1840s Andersson had noted that Windhoek was a 'crowded, bustling market the whole year round.' (75) a view which Galton corroborated in 1851 when he wrote that

a great deal of trade was carried on in Jonker's werft. A blacksmith's shop was put up there, and iron things, assegais, choppers for cutting wood, beads and so forth, were made in great quantities and sold for cattle, which again were exchanged with traders from the Cape for clothes, guns, and such like things. (76)

Regular trade fairs attracted many Herero pastoralists, 'possibly on invitation.' (77)

Jonker Afrikaner was anxious, however, to control this trade closely out of fear that traders would provide Herero chiefs - whether allied to him or not - with arms and ammunition, which in the long run would threaten his hegemony over Hereroland. Galton wrote in this regard that Jonker 'never, even when on the best of terms with whites, permitted any of them to enter Damaraland' and that 'traders were peremptorily refused permission to go there.' According to Galton Jonker reasoned
that if free intercourse were established between the whites and Damaraland, the Damaras would soon buy guns and weapons, which would place them on more equal terms with the Hottentots. (78)

Indeed, an attempt by chief Kahitjene to dissolve the alliance forged with Jonker in the early 1840s ended in the former's downfall and ultimate death. Lau argued that 'this could be directly attributed to Kahitjene's attempts to win independent access to guns, horses and information via a European missionary.' (79)

For as long as trade was conducted in the form of itinerant traders working their way into and out of Hereroland, Jonker's control seems to have been fairly effective. In time, however, itinerant trading was transformed into permanent trading establishments in S.W.A. The first permanent trading company was established in 1860 in Otjimbingwe. Acknowledging that 'traders had previously lived for long spells at one place', Lau nonetheless argued that the establishment of a permanent trade centre in Hereroland had definite repercussions for the quantity and quality of trade conducted.

The limits of itinerant trading fell away. Andersson's traders could take their time to plan and conclude the best deals and collect as many cattle as possible, always returning to the base at Otjimbingwe. Setting out with one wagon only, they were mobile and inconspicuous and could also "sneak" into Hereroland, past Jonker's controls. Once enough cattle had been collected to justify the despatch of a drove to the Cape, Andersson could afford to be absent for a few months to take it there and auction it himself. (80)
Because this posed a serious threat to Jonker's hegemony in Hereroland, he opposed the establishment of Andersson's trading centre. (81) An outbreak of lungsickness in the area of Otjimbingwe in the early 1860s added to the tension between Andersson and Jonker, as the latter sought to prevent treks of infected animals going through his territory to the Cape. Andersson 'threatened force whenever his way was barred to get his cattle through to the Cape' a process which set off a series of battles until in 1864 Afrikaner forces retreated. As Lau concluded 'they may not have been actually defeated, but neither did they emerge as victors.' (82)

Andersson's military actions against the Oorlam Afrikaner were facilitated by another factor, viz. the decision by Maharero, who by now had succeeded his late father Tjamuaha as chief, to change the terms of his alliance with the Oorlam Afrikaner. (83) This provoked military retribution by the latter and formed the start of a seven year war between Herero and Oorlam, which ended in 1870. In colonial historiography, Maharero's decision to break away from the Afrikaner has been seen as the 'Herero war of liberation'. (84)

Andersson, as the leading merchant, soon realised that his military actions against the Oorlam were insufficient to guarantee safe passage of his cattle to the Cape. What was required was the establishment of his hegemony over Hereroland
and the trade route to the Cape. To this end he sought and gained the cooperation of local Herero chiefs in order to create a major army and destroy the Afrikaners and their allies and to put an end to their bush warfare techniques in a single massive battle. Missionary Hahn also expressed an interest in the subjugation of the Oorlam and offered Andersson 'all the missionaries' fullest support'.

After carefully considering the pros and cons of such alliances, Andersson and his 'close lieutenant', Green, decided that the best course of action would be 'that one of the Herero chiefs must be elected as chief of all Herero-speakers by those present at Otjimbingwe.' Once it was agreed upon that Maharero would fulfil this function Andersson induced him and some of his close advisers to sign a document which appointed Andersson 'as Regent and Military Commander for the period of his natural life or for a long as he desires to hold office.' This was the first attempt in the history of S.W.A. to establish a paramount chieftaincy.

The defeat of the Oorlam Afrikaner and thus the removal of controls on transport routes to the Cape did indeed increase the volume of trade in S.W.A. and invited the establishment of more companies. By the mid-1870s four merchandise depots in Walvis Bay were handling the import and export trade for the central and northern parts of the country, although only two of
them were ‘of any size’. These belonged to the Missionshandelsgesellschaft and Messrs. Eriksson & Co.

These two firms do between them more than half of the trade in Damaraland [Hereroland], and are likewise employed as landing and forwarding agents for the other establishments. (90)

In the absence of annual aggregate trade figures, impressionistic descriptions will have to suffice to convey something of the volume and nature of such trade. Thus Galton noted in 1851 that ‘a steady export of Damara [Herero] oxen goes on southwards to our [Cape] colony in droves of from 200 to 800 head of cattle.’ (91) This number had increased considerably in the early 1860s. In 1860 for example trader Andersson registered three of his traders returning to Otjimbingwe from trade trips inland with 600, 350 and 220 bartered oxen respectively; this meant that he had accumulated a drove of more than 1000. In 1861 the herd of cattle sent to the Cape by him was estimated at 1400 head, and the following year at 2000 cattle and ‘at least 3000 sheep.” (92)

In 1865

J. Chapman estimated that between 10000 and 12000 head of cattle were annually sent overland to Cape Town, while between 15000 and 20000 lb. ivory was exported overland and through the Transgaries harbours. (93)

Unfortunately it is not possible to disaggregate these figures into separate figures for Herero- and Great Namaqualand.

Import and export figures through Table Bay harbour confirm the general increase in trade.
Table 1.2 Imports and Exports from Table Bay Harbour to S.W.A. Ports, 1850-1880

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Import (R)</th>
<th>Export (R)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>4 496</td>
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<tr>
<td>1860</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>48 940</td>
<td>68 206</td>
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Trade with the Cape peaked in 1878 with imports and exports jointly totalling to R178 864. (94) Esterhuyse points out, however, that overall trade with S.W.A. was probably greater than the figures suggest, as they do not reflect overland trade, for which there are no separate statistics.

During the mid-1870s, most traders believed that trade was "not capable of any material extension." (95) Trade in firearms and ammunition had almost ceased, as demand was satisfied. (96) Many dealers with large stocks on hand had to look to Ovamboland for a new market. (97) Irlé estimated that in 1903 the Herero possessed about 15 000 guns, slightly more than the official statistic of 12 531. (98)

While the demand for arms and ammunition had declined, the
Demand for clothing increased as a result of missionary activities. (99) With the market for arms saturated the main trading articles in the mid-1870s were:

- A few ploughs and a little saddlery, iron cooking pots, iron wire, beads, knives, tinder boxes, coffee and tobacco, complete the list of articles required for the Damaraland trade. (100)

Renewed conflict between Herero and Nama in 1880 led to the virtual breakdown of all trade in the country: 'The Missionshandelsgesellschaft suffered such heavy losses that it had to be liquidated.' (101) The second largest trading company, Eriksson & Co., suffered losses between R10 000 and R20 000 as a result of the first year of the war, and 'seriously considered breaking its trade connection with the Transgariep and closing its business undertaking there.' (102) As a result, trade with the Cape declined considerably between 1880 and 1882 from R138 886 to R52 032. (103)

The Effects of Trade on the Herero

Merchant capital, being dependent on the market for its profits, had 'no direct control over the labour process' and as such was 'dependent on the class which does, even where it dominates this class.' (104) This dependence on pre-colonial classes explains Andersson's active military support for Maharero in his struggle against Jonker Afrikaner. Once Jonker had been defeated, commodity production among Herero
pastoralists received a major impetus, as discussed above. But this process, in conjunction with missionary activities, hastened the dissolution of social relations among the Herero and 'tended to upset the balance within and between indigenous class forces.' (105) Mission stations, with their possibilities for agricultural production, soon developed into major trading centres, attracting growing numbers of poor Herero. This enabled the latter to attain modest levels of wealth. (106) But mission stations did not only attract Herero who did not own any stock. For reasons that need to be illuminated by future research, many young Herero congregated on mission stations. This considerably weakened the authority of elders over younger people, and drained the pre-colonial economy of vital labour power. The effects of this were sufficiently pronounced by the late 1860s to elicit strong opposition to mission stations. In a determined effort, 'reactionary-heathen' elements, presumably a reference to Herero elders, attempted to reassert their control over the younger generation by fetching them back from mission stations. Missionaries alleged that this often happened under severe physical threats. (107)

But access to trade also provided aspirant chiefs and other notables with an opportunity to consolidate their position by accumulating wealth and political clientele. In the absence of a paramount chieftaincy, this introduced additional sources of conflict among notables. The example of Maharero illustrates
the point. His position of authority depended largely on access to and an alliance with traders and missionaries. (108) He was painfully aware, however, that access to traders and missionaries would provide other chiefs and 'lesser notables' with a similar opportunity 'to amass considerable fortunes through sales of cattle', (109) thus potentially threatening his authority. Indeed, he maintained that certain Europeans were using disunity among Herero chiefs to conspire against him. (110) As a result, he attempted to control trade and the movement of missionaries as much as possible. In 1872 he tried to prevent missionary Irle from visiting other chiefs out of fear that such contacts might reduce his authority. (111) His immediate subjects had to bring him their stock and hunting spoils and he bought guns and lots of ammunition for it...He also took charge of the ammunition so that his people could not squander it. No Herero nor trader was allowed to trade without his permission. (112)

A lack of data makes it impossible to go beyond this rather impressionistic account of the dissolution effects of merchant capital on pre-capitalist social relations among the Herero. What is less difficult to ascertain is that a small section, among them the chiefs, accumulated considerable private wealth. Maharero's herds, for example, were estimated at several thousand. (113) A small section of Herero was wealthy enough to invest in wagons and horses. By 1890 there were about 150 to 200 wagons in Hereroland, which had to be
purchased for 45 to 60 oxen. In addition, wealthy stock owners bought on average 800 to 1 000 horses per annum after 1870 at a price of eight to fourteen oxen. (114) It is not clear, however, whether this process reflected a growing concentration of stock in fewer hands. An answer to this question would be particularly interesting in view of the fact that migration was not yet an option for those at the bottom of the economic ladder to 'arrest or perhaps even reverse their economic decline' (115) as no significant mining or settler farming existed prior to the turn of the century.

Accumulating in the sphere of exchange, merchant capital 'must always engage in unequal exchange to appropriate part of the surplus product of society.' In this way it 'drains part of the surplus out of the sphere of production'. (116) Herero pastoralists seem to have been able to limit this drain on their primary means of production cattle, until the 1890s. (117) They were able to do so by resorting to trade in other commodities. Because cattle acted as a form of universal currency in pre-colonial S.W.A., Herero frequently received stock in payment for ivory and ostrich feathers. This trade received a major impetus after the outbreak of lungsickness in the early 1860s had threatened cattle exports to the Cape. (118) In practice, traders were paid in cattle for their merchandise, but in turn paid Herero in cattle for ivory and ostrich feathers. According to Palgrave 'bullock wagons and horses are
freely bartered for cattle, which change hands again for ostrich feathers and ivory.' (119)

While the exploitation of natural resources such as ostrich feathers and elephants for ivory might have offset the impact of trade on the cattle herds of the Herero, such fortunes were shortlived. Under increasing threats from hunters, game moved to east of Gobabis, which in the mid-1870s formed the main hunting ground of the Herero. But in 1879 it was reported that even in that area the insatiable appetite of hunters had now pushed the game out of the territory. Hunting grounds had become so distant that hunting was no longer a viable option. (120)

Access to trade and missionaries facilitated the consolidation of chieftaincies. The closing of the land frontier and ensuing military pressure brought about by the arrival of the Oorlam Afrikaner in the 1830s favoured centralising tendencies among Herero pastoralists. Together with missionary influences this led to increasing sedentarization of formerly nomadic pastoralists. By the mid-1860s Hereroland had been carved up into three main 'chieftaincies' by tacit agreement: that of Kahimemua, Zeraua and Maharero. (121) In the mid-1870s Palgrave identified nine major chiefs, controlling a population of about 84 000 Herero. The three biggest among them had between 60 and 76 'kraals' under their direct control, with populations
ranging between 13 000 and 23 000. Maharero reportedly had 76 kraals and 23 000 people under his control, more than any other chief. (122)

While the ownership of land remained communal, its increasing concentration under one chief as the nominal owner had serious repercussions, particularly after the onset of German colonial rule. For, as Sundermeier has pointed out, white colonists regarded chiefs such as Maharero and Zeraua as the owners of the land and concluded treaties with them. (123) Indeed, as early as 1876 chief Maharero had proposed to set aside certain areas in Hereroland as a reserve. The remainder of the land, being sufficient for the establishment of 400 farms, could be sold to settlers. (124)

The overall affect of trade, missionary intervention and indigenous warfare in pre-colonial S.W.A. was that on the eve of German colonialism not only the Herero, but also the Nama 'were extremely well armed by African standards.' In addition, 'the two peoples had organised around military leaders' and, having been Christian and literate, 'were perfectly capable of negotiating with European powers.' In short, when Germany began to colonise the country it had to contend with people who 'were much more formidable in terms of arms, organisation, education, and diplomacy than most peoples of Africa.' (125)
The level of military and diplomatic organisation alluded to above had important effects on the colonisation of S.W.A. by the German imperial government. (126) More specifically it meant that Herero pastoralists could resist German encroachment on their land fairly effectively up to the outbreak of the rinderpest pandemic in 1897. Until then the Herero were reluctant to part with their land and cattle. (127) Indeed,

During the first ten years of German colonial domination the Herero did not sell any land at all. The chiefs had no authority to do so because the land was still communal property. All they did was to give individual Europeans, including the missionaries, the right to use some of their land. Whenever a European moved away or died, the land reverted to the Herero. (128)

The German colonial government was determined, however, to turn S.W.A into a settler colony. The idea was that "after the demarcation of Native reserves, the Government will gradually declare as Crown land the remainder of the Territory." (129) In the absence of a military force sufficiently strong to conquer Herero and Nama pastoralists, colonial administrators sought to subjugate them by so-called protection treaties. Exploiting local conflicts, they set out to promise individual chiefs protection against their adversaries. In return, signatories of such protection treaties could no longer alienate any land to 'a different nation or members thereof' without the consent of the German emperor. Similarly, by signing so-called
protection treaties, signatories signed their rights away to enter into any other treaties with foreign governments. In this way the German colonial administration strengthened the hand of aspirant chiefs sympathetic to their rule, while destroying those opposed to it. (130) This policy culminated in the recognition of Samuel Maharero as paramount chief of the Herero in 1891. (131)

Only after the rinderpest pandemic of 1897, however, was Herero resistance to white land alienation effectively broken. While between 50 and 95 per cent of settler stock was saved by timely inoculations, an estimated 95 per cent of Herero stock died. (132) A malaria epidemic in 1898 caused about 10 000 deaths among both Herero and Nama. (133) The following year a locust plague, followed by severe drought, destroyed what little agricultural production the Herero had started. (134) These events 'altered the whole economic balance in the colony...A European ranching economy had at last become possible, and the basis of one was established.' (135)

Land settlement progressed rapidly after 1897. The number of white settlers increased from 1774 in 1895 to 4640 in 1903. (136) On the one hand settlement was aided by improved transport infrastructure, once the colonial government started to build a railway line from Swakopmund on the coast to Windhoek. This decision was prompted in part by the loss of
transport oxen as a result of the rinderpest. (137) On the other hand, the colonial government established a fund in 1901 to grant loans to prospective settlers. (138)

Rinderpest and Trade

From available evidence it is not possible to establish the precise impact that rinderpest had on different strata of stock owners. On a general level, however,

*Cattle losses had made the Herero more dependent on a supply of European goods, and in particular had eliminated the use of cattle in barter and had made land itself the object of business transactions. (139)*

Chief Maharero, having been greatly impoverished by rinderpest, sought 'to improve his precarious financial situation' by disposing of Herero lands 'despite strong protests from the lesser chiefs'. Colonial officials reported for the first time in 1897 that Maharero "will henceforth sell farm land right in the midst of [his] territory." (140) Not only was he willing to sell land, but communal land was the cheapest land to be had, with chiefs charging on average 50 Pfennigs to 1 Mark. This compared to land prices ranging between 1 and 5 Marks per hectare for company land and between 30 Pfennigs and 1,50 Marks demanded by the Government. Chiefs' land was made even more attractive, however, by 'the fact that the chiefs were usually paid in kind, with the value of the goods delivered being arbitrarily determined by the settlers.' This 'method of
acquiring land used to save at least another 50 per cent." (141)
Those not so fortunate to sell land were forced to enter into wage labour for the first time. (142)

Settlers and traders were quick to take advantage of the situation. In Windhoek district alone trading licenses increased from 53 in 1898 to 100 in 1900. (143) According to one missionary about 50 traders were active in Hereroland in 1904, to which could be added about an equal number of settlers who were farmers by now but had started off as field traders. (144)

For prospective settlers trading was an important source of capital accumulation. Generally, field traders, as they were known, sold their goods on credit to the Herero, usually collecting their debts in the form of cattle.

Cattle obtained in this way grazed on a farmer’s land until the trader could buy his own land. The field trader was in no hurry to repay his debts to the company, since his gain on breeding stock was bigger than the interest he had to pay. Trading companies in turn built up large herds for the same reasons rather than to redeem their overseas debts. The trading system was thus based on the provision of credit from beginning to end. (145)

These factors greatly accelerated the process of dispossession of the Herero. By 1902 only 46,000 head of cattle remained of an estimated 100,000 in their possession in the early 1890s. At the same time 1051 German settlers and traders had increased their herds to c. 44,500. Out of 83.5 million ha. of land in the colony, only 31.4 million remained in African hands; with
29.2 million owned by concession companies; 19.2 million ha. by the colonial state; and 3.7 million ha. by white settlers.

'Early in 1904 the property - moveable and immovable - of the German farmers was valued at about 20 million Marks, the cattle alone representing a value of roughly 14 million Marks.' (146)

In a letter to Governor Leutwein in 1904 the Commissioner for Settlement, Dr. Paul Rohrbach, informed the Governor that the stock acquired by settlers from the Herero through trading during 1902-1904 must be estimated at no less than 10,000 head, not counting the calves. The sum total of the 'outstanding debts' owed by Herero to traders or farmers either dead or alive comes to approximately half a million Marks, a figure that does not include claims that are downright fraudulent. Considering the unscrupulous way in which prices are fixed, the equivalent would have been at least 10,000 head of cattle if the repayments of the debts had been enforced. (147)

The Wars of Anti-Colonial Resistance, 1904-1907

The rapid dispossession outlined above formed the background to South West Africa's first 'war of anti-colonial resistance'. (148) In January 1904 the Herero rose against the German colonial authorities. Very little evidence exists for the way in which they mobilised or what kind of debates had preceded the war. Bley concluded 'that the initiative for the war came from Maharero's opponents, principally the younger generation.' (149) As to the causes of the war, it is clear that the increasing encroachment by German settlers on Herero
ancestral lands constituted the main reason for the war. (150)
In the words of Bridgman:

...every Herero was alarmed at the progressive loss of land. Up to 1900 only a minor portion of the Herero hereditary lands had been alienated, but with the completion of the railroad to Windhoek the pace of alienation accelerated rapidly, so that by 1903 three and a half million hectares out of a total of thirteen million had been lost, and the day when the Hereros would not have enough to continue their traditional way of life was fast approaching. (151)

In recognition of the seriousness of dispossession the Rhenish Mission Society recommended in 1901 that reserves be established under their control for the Herero. (152) After initial opposition by the colonial authorities to the idea, Leutwein ordered an investigation into the feasibility of reserves for Herero in the Windhoek, Omaruru, Karibib and Gobabis districts. Towards the end of 1903 the boundaries for proposed reserves were announced. (153) But the only Herero consulted about the proposal were people from the Okahandja area, i.e. chief Maharero and his most prominent adviser, Assa Riarua. While the principle of reserves was not at issue, their size certainly was. Maharero wanted their size reduced so as to be able to sell more land, whereas Riarua wanted reserve areas to be extended. Pastoralists at the Waterberg added their voices to those who demanded larger reserves. (154)

A strong feeling prevailed among many stock owners that the government proposals for reserves would drive a nail into their
coffin. At Waterberg some Herero reacted to the government's refusal to change the size of the proposed reserves by stating: 'Now we won't make gardens any more, we will in any case be driven away by the Germans.' (155) The land question, now in the form of the reserve question, thus became a major cause for revolt. (156)

This point is emphasised by Alexander in his assessment of the nature of the war. He argued that

Even though it is true that many of those men who participated in the war were already labourers on white farms, railways, ports, and mines and that many Herero-speaking men who worked in the copper and diamond mines of the Cape colony returned to Namibia to join in the war, the fact that the land question (rather than the wages question or the question of political rights) was the central question shows that the main thrust of the war was anticolonial...The hegemonic ideology was undoubtedly that of the backward-looking chieftaincy. Though the younger people were the more militant and although questions such as wages loomed in the consciousness of some of them, they had no independent ideology that could challenge that of their elders. At best they differed from the older generation in the assessment of the military-political balance between the opposing camps, having in general a more optimistic view of the outcome of the war they were about to launch. (157)

A number of other factors contributed to the decision to revolt, however, such as 'the maladministration of "justice", exploitative merchant practices and ill-treatment of the indigenous people by the settlers.' (158)

Maherero chose the beginning of the war very carefully. In
January 1904, at a time when the colonial Governor together with three companies were busy fighting the Bondelswarts in the south of the country, he launched a surprise attack on German settlers and soldiers, killing 'more than a hundred.' (159) For as long as Leutwein's troops were 400 miles away in the south, the Herero regained complete control over most of their land, 'destroying German farms and driving off the settlers' cattle.'

Despite a general retreat, to secure grazing-land and water for their herds, they continued until June 1904 with successful offensives against the partially mobile and inexperienced columns of German troops. (160)

In June General von Trotha was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the colonial forces in S.W.A. His ruthless conduct of the war soon changed the balance of forces in favour of the German colonial army. The battle at Waterberg in August 1904 dealt the Herero a devastating blow, but as Drechsler pointed out, they were not destroyed. Rather, German forces had driven the Herero into the barren Omaheke sandveld, which they then sealed off by means of a 250 km. cordon. Left to themselves in a desert without water, 'the bulk of the Herero met a slow, agonizing death.' (161) Not satisfied with the result of his genocide, von Trotha issued a proclamation known as the extermination order in October 1904. This stated that

Within the German boundaries, every Herero, whether found armed or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot. I shall not accept any more women and children. I shall drive them back to their people - otherwise I shall order shots to be fired at them. These are my words to the Herero people. (162)
The consequences of the war proved disastrous for the Herero. By December 1905 between 75 and 80 per cent of the Herero had perished, their numbers having shrunk from an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 before the war to c. 16,000. At the same time they had lost all their land and cattle. But as van Onselen has pointed out,

African cattle losses...should be measured not simply in terms of numbers, for amongst cattle-keeping people this was far more than simply an economic blow. For African peasants, cattle formed not only a source of wealth but the pivotal point of a complex and inter-woven social, political and economic system. (163)

This observation could hardly be more true than in the case of the Herero, who, in the wake of the war,

had abandoned their traditional customs and standards. Deprived of their tribal links, often without contact with their families, they became cowed and disorientated. It was only gradually that they began to search for a new form of life in a situation that denied them even the minimum personal, social, or economic self-determination. (164)

The Colonial Economy and the Labour Question

After the war, 'South-West Africa was converted into a European-dominated country to an extent that had no parallel in Africa, even South Africa.' (165) Intent on securing its control, the colonial government introduced legislation which was designed not only to keep the indigenous population under tight control but also to force it into wage labour even before
the official end of the war on 31 March 1907. In May 1905 it was announced that tribal land - including that given to the missionaries by the chiefs - would be expropriated. A formal order to this effect was signed on 26 December 1905. On 23 March 1906 the confiscation of all "moveable and immovable tribal property of the Herero north of the tropic of Capricorn" was announced and became effective on 7 August 'as no complaints were received.' (166)

In 1907 another three regulations were published. From now on all Africans over the age of eight had to carry identity cards and a service book, 'intended to check the movements of the Africans.' Moreover, 'only with the permission of the Governor could "natives" obtain land or land-rights.' Stock breeding was thus only possible with special permission, which was never granted until 1912. The number of Africans residing on white-owned land was limited by law, and 'African settlement on uncultivated and uninhabited land' was also to be controlled.

With such an armoury of legislation, the German colonial authorities effectively established a labour system that 'amounted to forced labour.' (167)

Effective as these regulations may have been in preventing the reconstitution of large tribal units by prohibiting the ownership of land and stock, they did not solve the labour question. Before 1904 the supply of local labour had not only
been sufficient to satisfy internal demand, but could be exported. In 1902 the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association obtained permission to recruit labour in Herero- and Ovamboland and a total of 911 workers were sent to Transvaal mines. Recruitment for the Rand was terminated in 1905, at which point 617 S.W. African workers were still working there. (168)

The outcome of the war changed all this. On the one hand General von Trotha's extermination policy eliminated 80 per cent of the Herero and about 50 per cent of the Nama population. On the other hand the aftermath of war witnessed the rapid expansion of the colonial economy. Land settlement increased dramatically. Not only did the confiscation of large tracts of land put 'huge areas of excellent pastoral quality' into the hands of the state as Crown lands, but the colonial government provided financial assistance to prospective settlers. (169) By 1913 'the number of privately owned farms had grown to 1331, with a total area of almost 13.5 million hectares, which represented about one-half of the total area with farming possibilities, within the Police Zone.' These farms were occupied by 1042 whites, 'of whom 914 were Germans and the remainder mostly Boers.' (170) In addition, white settlers owned 183 167 head of large stock or about 90 per cent of the total of 205 643 in 1913, compared to only 22 476 owned by blacks. Regarding small stock numbers, blacks were slightly more fortunate, owning about 300 000 or 30 per cent out of the
national herd of one million. (171)

But more important for the future development of the S.W. African economy was the discovery of diamonds in 1907 and the successful exploitation of copper. The value of diamond production rose from 51,000 Marks in 1908 to 58,910,000 Marks in 1913, and that of copper from just over six million Marks to almost eight million Marks. (172) By 1913 mineral production accounted for 95 per cent of total exports of 70.3 million Marks, the latter reflecting an almost tenfold increase from 7.8 million Marks in 1908. (173)

Related to this upswing in mining and settlement a small manufacturing sector developed, which was concerned mainly with the processing of agricultural products and with the supply of building materials, electric power, and repair facilities for mines and railways. (174)

Right from the start of the economic upswing, however, labour was in short supply. (175)

Solving the Labour Question

As if government regulations to force Africans into forced labour were not enough, settler farmers continually urged the colonial government to give them wider powers in order to "crack down without mercy on Africans who were "roaming about",

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thereby escaping exploitation as forced labour.' In an attempt to address the serious labour shortage, the government set about ‘opening] up what they described as their domestic reserves.’ (176) A first step in this direction was to offer an amnesty to the Herero on 1 December 1905. Under the amnesty regulations, missionaries were entrusted with the task of persuading so-called 'veld Herero', i.e. those refugees from the war which were scattered all over the territory, to gather at designated assembly points. As a rule these were mission stations. Two stations, Ojihaenena and Omburo, were declared temporary reserves under the supervision of Rhenish missionaries to accommodate those Herero who may still have had small numbers of stock in their possession. They were promised that they could keep their stock at these two stations 'for the sake of [their] wives and children.' (177) No evidence could be found to indicate that any Herero with stock reported to these camps. By early 1906 Rhenish missionaries had gathered c. 12000 Herero, while government troops had captured another 8889. (178)

In the middle of 1906, Governor von Lindequist travelled through the districts of Otjo, Otavi, Grootfontein, Otjituo, Otjatjingege, Waterberg and Okahandja and was satisfied that virtually all the Herero in the northern districts had been assembled in camps. The tour convinced him that 'the Hereros do not any longer have the will for armed attack and
Herero thus captured were regarded as prisoners of war and were kept in special camps under such appalling conditions that at least one historian saw 'camp life...once again threaten(ing) the Herero with extinction.' (180) As prisoners of war they were sent either to Swakopmund or Luederitzbucht to be employed on harbour or railway construction. Unaccustomed to the harsh weather conditions and clothed only in flour sacks, large numbers of Herero did not survive these camps. Between 29 January and 12 June 1905 a total of 583 Herero men, women and children died in Swakopmund alone. (181)

Attempts to collect 'veld-Herero' and force them to work did not solve the labour problem, and it was decided to recruit labour outside S.W. African borders. (182) In the first place the colonial government sought to bring those Africans back to S.W.A. who had fled the territory during the war. In August 1907 Hauptmann Streitwolf accompanied by a missionary travelled to Ngami, Bechuanaland, in an attempt to persuade Herero refugees there to come back to S.W.A. After two weeks Streitwolf abandoned his mission in the face of total rejection of his proposals. (183)

Attention was again directed towards Ovamboland, a source of labour that had already been exploited before the war. (184)
Recruiting was undertaken by private companies, but by 1912 was concentrated in the hands of two recruitment offices in Okaukuejo and Namutoni. (185) The employment of labour recruited in Ovamboland increased from an average of about 2000 per annum before the discovery of diamonds to around 10,000 between 1910 and 1914. (186)

Large employers such as the diamond fields in Luederitzbucht, the Woermann shipping company in Swakopmund and the Otavi Minen und Eisenbahn Gesellschaft (OMEG), set out to procure their own labour. They requested permission to recruit Indian and Chinese labour in South Africa and abroad. (187) Between 1904 and 1912 considerable numbers of African workers from South Africa, specifically the Cape, were employed in S.W.A.; 'in peak years the number reached around 10,000.' (188) By early 1911 over 6400 Cape workers were engaged in S.W.A. (189) Recruitment in the Union was done in competition with South African mines, however, and South West African employers soon began to feel this. From the beginning of 1911 they were no longer permitted to recruit labour in the Union, as 'the Rand gold mines were again facing considerable problems in raising an adequate supply of labour.' (190)

Labour shortages persisted until the outbreak of war. At the time of conquest in 1915, the colonial economy was still dependent on external labour. In 1912, for example, the
Governor estimated that half the Ovambo labour complement, or 5000 workers, employed on the diamond fields came from Angola. Similarly, Moorsom stated that

at the height of railway building in 1913 the number of 'Cape Boys' (Cape Coloureds and Transkei Africans) employed in S.W.A. could reach a temporary peak of 11,000 - about 25 per cent of the wage labour force... (191)

**Herero Refugees and Participation in the Labour Market**

The amnesty granted in 1905 elicited a mixed response from Herero refugees. After initial successes in attracting large numbers of refugees, the task of collecting them became more difficult. To some extent this was due to the fact that it became increasingly difficult to track down such communities, as the distances between them and the stations increased.

Evidence suggests, however, that several refugees resisted surrendering to German colonial authorities. They did not want anything to do anymore with the German colonial masters who had destroyed their people. A part of the Herero, however, who believed they could no longer endure their wretchedness (Hungerleben), turned to the missionaries commissioned by the colonial government. It can be assumed that the Herero concerned were essentially those who were under the influence of the mission already before the Herero revolt. (192)

Those opposed to surrender sought to stop their adversaries from surrendering by armed threats. (193) At the same time they received messengers with great hostility, the extent of which eventually prompted missionaries to supply the former with rifles for self-protection. Such hostility was reinforced by

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information that former refugees were maltreated in labour camps. (194)

Those communities that managed to escape government and missionary patrols continued to live as "refugees" in areas east of the Waterberg and north of Gobabis. (195) At the beginning of 1908 the colonial government still had not extended its control over all 'veld Herero'. Small numbers of them were still eking out an existence in unsettled areas of the country, being joined from time to time by people who had deserted from white farmers. In January 1908 the new Governor, von Schuckmann, tried to entice these communities to surrender by enabling them to settle in locations at mission stations, provided that they engaged in wage labour for subsistence. (196) However, in May 1912 a government commission admitted 'that there were still many vagrant natives.' (197) In face of such resilience by Herero refugees, and given the acute labour shortage, settler suggestions as to the best solution of the 'problem' became increasingly ruthless. The Deutsche Kolonial-Zeitung for example suggested that the best way to deal with the Kaffirs in their hide-out in the mountains, the Herero lurking in the bushveld and the Bushmen wandering over the savanna [was] to grant police powers along the lines of the Boer field cornet system to reliable farmers in outlying areas so that they might take action against natives who are acting against the law. (198)
The area with the highest concentration of 'roaming natives' corresponded broadly to what was previously known as Hereroland. It included the Khomashochland, Kuiseb and Swakop mountains to the west and south of Otjimbingwe, the area south of Etosha and the Sandveld east of a line Epukiro-Oparakane-Okamatangara-Coblenz. (199) Such people led a precarious existence. Without cattle and only occasionally possessed of small stock, many of these Herero lived off 'veldkos, berries, bulbs, roots and the meat they could obtain through hunting. When hunting proved unsuccessful, they of necessity lived off ants, caterpillars and mice.' (200)

Under such circumstances, wage labour became a means of restoring losses suffered during the war, undoubtedly with a view to resuming a pastoral existence at some point in the future. While future research may throw more light on the relationship between wage labour and attempts to reconstitute a pastoral economy during this period, it seems certain that the necessity to engage in wage labour was not equally pressing for all Herero. Indeed, Stals concluded that 'indications are that there were many Herero who had never or seldom been in employment...' (201) Moreover, the evidence presented by Thompson suggests that many Herero who engaged in wage labour had definite job preferences. On the Tsumeb mine for example

The Herero workers...showed a strong preference for work on the farm or in the smelter. Herero farm workers could maintain a few animals and live in a manner similar to that to which they were accustomed
before the war. Herero smelter workers were relatively well-treated and were allowed to live according to their ancient customs at near-by Lake Otjikoto when there was no smelting to be done. (202)

Nor would Herero mine workers agree to do underground or surface work. They preferred to work on farms belonging to mining companies. Mine director Dr. Heimann stated in a letter that to force them to do underground work 'would have as a consequence that they would immediately flee.' (203)

Settler farmers were not immune to problems of desertion either. Colonial officials sought 'to stop the drift away from the farms by permitting the Herero to keep a limited amount of livestock.' (204) First expressed in 1908 by Secretary of State Dernburg, the idea of Herero acquiring cattle again had to be abandoned under settler pressure, for it was feared that 'If the natives ever become rich in cattle again, the safety of the country will be threatened.' (205)

A major survey into settler farming in 1912 did not even mention the stock possessed by farm labourers. As in 1908, the colonial government 'was extremely slow to relax its ban on Herero cattle-raising, which it regarded as a threat to the whole land settlement.' (206) Between 1911 and 1914 only 34 applications for stock ownership were received from Africans, of which 30 were granted. (207) Despite such reluctance on the part of settlers and colonial officials to permit the ownership
of stock by Africans, the latter owned more than 25 per cent of all the small stock and more than 20,000 head of large stock in 1913. (208)

Tied up with the matter of stock ownership was the land question. As early as 1907, the colonial government toyed with the idea of ‘creating’ centres for future native reserves, at first only on government farms, in order to promote a physical regeneration of the Herero.’ (209) In a memorandum on the Herero question, Captain Kurt Streitwolf proposed to grant the Herero ‘land for a bit of agriculture and sufficient grazing for about one thousand cattle.’ To make this system of government successful, the Herero settled in this way would have to elect one or two headmen. (210) The idea was rejected by higher officials, ‘because a reserve was seen as a basis for renewed rebellion.’ (211) Officially, therefore, the Herero were not granted any land before 1915. According to headman Festus Kandjou, ‘the Germans promised that we should be given land which we could develop for ourselves at Drumbo and elsewhere’ in 1913. Before this could happen, however, the war broke out in 1914 ‘and nothing came of this promise.’ (212)

German ‘native policy’ after 1907 was mainly concerned with preventing the re-organisation of the Herero on an independent basis. On the one hand this meant that they were dispersed widely by deliberately taking them from their ancestral lands

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and drafting them to other parts of the country for labour. Thus one quarter of the Herero lived in Namaland in the south of the country and on the southern Atlantic coast. (213) In addition, the colonial government sought to destroy 'all tribal connections, both political and cultural...together with their symbols: the oxen, the insignia, and the chiefs.' This aim was clearly expressed by the then commissioner for settlement, Paul Rohrbach, when he wrote that it was the task of the colonial government 'to divest the Herero as far as possible of their national characteristics and gradually to merge them with the other natives into a coloured labour-force'. (214)

Despite all this, there was according to Bley, 'a persistent and secret movement among Africans to reassemble.' (215) Gradually the Herero left the labour camps in the south and moved closer to their ancestral lands where, once resident there they resumed their old ways and kept within the boundaries of their former territory. The head-men were careful not to attract attention and lived under assumed names, which they frequently changed. (216)

In addition to slowly moving back to their ancestral lands, many Herero turned towards mission stations and were baptised. By 1911 the Rhenish Mission counted more than 20 000 baptised Christians apart from the more than 3000 baptismal candidates. (217) According to Bley, this 'indicated not a mass conversion to Christianity but a movement of the Africans
towards national solidarity,' (218) echoing the sentiments of missionary Irle when he noted that 'many heathens' only got baptised 'for the sake of the Christian "name"', not because they wanted to live as followers of Christ. (219) Christian fellowship soon became a substitute for a destroyed chieftaincy and social structure: 'the rigid discipline of the congregations served as a substitute for their broken tribal discipline.' (220)

Whereas a chief existed in former times to whom one could turn and to whom one could listen, the same existed now in the missionary. Whereas chiefs were in charge of their tribes in former times, so church elders existed now. Whereas lineages existed in former times, an organised congregation existed now. Whereas religious meetings were held at the holy fire or ancestral graves then, church services existed now. (221)

It is because the church 'offered both a new religion and a union of the nation in the community with their leaders and Herero elders' (222) that some historians have regarded this development as 'the birthplace of modern African nationalism among the Herero.' (223)

Conclusion

By the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and the conquest of S.W.A. by Union forces a year later, virtually the entire population in the Police Zone was proletarianized. Whereas Herero pastoralists were able to accommodate the influences of missionaries and traders up to 1897, rinderpest combined with
German colonial interests accelerated the processes of land alienation and proletarianization. A desperate attempt in 1904 to reverse this process by military resistance not only failed, but the defeat of the Herero paved the way for the German colonial government to subject Herero and Nama pastoralists to a forced labour system designed to meet the demands of the fledgling settler colony. If official statistics can be believed, these policies were very successful on the whole. By 1912, 90 per cent of the African male population in the Police Zone were employed as wage labourers, that is at least 20 000 of a total male population of 22 300. They formed some 30 per cent of a total African population, officially estimated at 65 000 excluding Ovamboland. Of the Herero and Nama only 200 were not in service. (224)

Developments in this period are admirably summarised in Iliffe’s conclusion:

In the years that followed the risings, South-West Africa was converted into a European-dominated country to an extent that had no parallel in Africa, even in South Africa...South-West Africa must have been the only colony in the world where the settlers resisted the taxing of Africans. It was unnecessary. (225)
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7. Long-Term Agricultural Policy Commission, p.8


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    Class in Namibia under German and South African Colonial Rule
    to 1945', M.A., University of Sussex, 1973, p.26; Gibson,
    'Bridewealth', p.624

39. Irle, Die Herero, p.160, my translation

40. Ibid

41. C. H. Hahn, Tagebuecher 1837-1860, ed. B. Lau,
    (Windhoek, 1984), Part 1, pp.217, 251, 300. According to Dr.
    Vedder the word omuthimba in Ojiherero is derived
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    impoverished sections of the Herero, because they did not
    'have any large herds of cattle to give us subsistence, but
    we have to dig our food out of the ground, as the tamandua
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43. See e.g. Andersson, Lake Ngami, p.166; Galton, Narrative of an Explorer, p.105
44. Quoted in Lehmann, 'Das Haeuptlingstum', p.33, original insert. See also Lehmann, 'Einige Spannungs- und Ausgleicherscheinungen', p.263. See also Andersson, Lake Ngami, p.166
45. Berichte der Rheinischen Missionsgesellschaft [BRM], 1854, p.210
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50. Galton, Narrative of an Explorer, p.88
51. Andersson, Lake Ngami, p.231. See also the observation of J. Hahn in 1869 that 'Although the chief is an unlimited master over the life and property of all his subjects, still his power is diminished on account of the custom that everyone can leave his chief and join himself to another. Therefore the chiefs have reason for not treating their subjects too harshly.' J. Hahn, 'Die Ovaherero', Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft fuer Erdkunde zu Berlin, 4, 1869, p.254 as quoted in Vivello, The Herero of Botswana, p.134
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159. Bley, South West Africa, pp.142, 149. For more detailed discussion of the war see Pool, Die Herero Opstand; Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros; Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, chapter 3; H. Drechsler, Aufstaende in Suedwestafrika, Der Kampf der Herero und Nama 1904 bis 1907 gegen die deutsche Kolonialherrschaft, (Berlin, 1984) pp.51-96

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165. Iliffe, ‘The Herero and Nama Risings’, p.109


168. Stals, Duits-Suidwes Afrika, p.35. See Troup, In Face of Fear, Michael Scott’s Challenge to South Africa, (London,1950), p.53 for a brief account on how Herero fugitives in Bechuanaland had ‘accepted an opportunity to

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be taken into the Transvaal by the Native Labour Recruiting Agents of the Union, where they would be available for mine labour."

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CHAPTER TWO: S.W.A. UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION, 1915 - 1919

African Consciousness and Involvement in Conquest

The war of anti-colonial resistance and its aftermath sounded the death knell of Herero economic independence. The confiscation of land and cattle effectively put an end to pastoral production and destroyed the fledgling peasant communities on mission stations. German 'native regulations' consigned former Herero and Nama pastoralists to forced labour. But despite the severity of German colonial labour laws, the German colonial government failed to establish absolute control over all the Herero. Although the documentary evidence is fragmentary, it seems that many Herero gradually moved back to their old pastures in central S.W.A. Nor did their large scale 'conversion' to Christianity after the war extinguish a deep seated desire to return to the land one day and resume their pastoral existence.

However, it was not until after the final defeat of German colonial troops in July 1915 that this movement began in earnest. The object of this chapter is to trace the beginnings of this process. It will document factors during the period of military rule which facilitated a process of Herero 'repeasantization'.

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In the words of Ngavirue, "the invasion of German South West Africa by the British South African troops in 1915 raised the hopes of the Africans in the country." (1) Since the 1860s Herero mythology had invested Britain with the ability to come and liberate them. According to Sundermeier, this myth originated with the English trader, Green, who, as Andersson's associate, had sold arms and ammunition to the Herero in the early 1860s. According to popular perceptions, the Herero owed their freedom to these arms sales and the military assistance provided during the so-called war of liberation from the Oorlam Afrikaner. The gratitude felt towards Green for his services, the argument runs, was extended to all English people. (2) The fact that chief Maharero had unsuccessfully applied for British protection in the mid-1870s did not tarnish the liberatory image of the British. Quite the contrary: 'now [1915] the British were in South West Africa, and had silenced the Germans, on their own accord.' (3)

Firmly believing that the defeat of their former German masters heralded the dawn of Herero liberation from colonial rule, paramount chief Samuel Maharero, living in exile in Bechuanaland, implored his subjects in S.W.A. not to resist British troops entering the country.

I, Samuel, the Chief of the Hereros, inform you that the troops which are coming from South Africa are the enemies of the Germans and you shall not fight against them. To clear away all doubts and in order
to confirm that these troops are coming with my approval I am going to send my son Frederick Maharero and my other son Alfred Maherero to accompany these South African troops. (4)

In oral testimony to the Rev. Michael Scott, Frederick Maharero said his father, Samuel Maherera, had sent altogether 30 men to S.W.A. in support of British troops.

We were told we would be paid only £3 each for our services, but that if the country was taken from the Germans it would be given back to Samuel and his people...Samuel asked that the promise that if the Germans were defeated the country would be given back to him be given in writing, but he was told he would be given this at the end of the war. But that was not done up to the present time. (5)

Hopes that their old pastures would be restored by their new colonial masters were reinforced by the Governor General of the Union, Lord Buxton. On a visit to S.W.A. after the conclusion of peace at Korab in 1915 he addressed the natives at all important centres and on each occasion promised the Hereros the old freedom along with great possessions of land and unlimited herds of cattle. That was all they longed for. They laid down their work on many farms in order to make sure of being in time, when South-West should be partitioned. (6)

The Administrator of S.W.A. confirmed in his annual report for 1922 that S.W.A. 's indigenous population had been under the impression that the victorious Union forces would confiscate German land and redistribute it to them. 'Almost without exception each section asked for the allotment of the old tribal areas' after conquest.' (7)
Although Chief Maharero had sent 30 men to S.W.A. from Bechuanaland, there is little evidence to suggest that any significant number of Herero fought on either side of the war. Festus Kandjou, a Herero headman, maintained that the Herero refused to support the German troops against Union forces in 1915 "because we hoped that the Union soldiers came to free us from the Germans and would return the land to us." (8) Indeed, General Botha did not welcome the same kind of involvement of black S.W. Africans in the campaign as was documented, for example, by Krikler, for the South African War at the turn of the century. (9) Botha declined an offer of military support by the Kaptein of the Rehoboth Basters on the grounds "that it was a white man's war, and forbade him to take any part in it." (10) One probable reason for Botha's decision was his own experience during the South African War at the hands of African tenants, when he "was run off his farm by his workers who told him that he "had no business there" and that he "had better leave"." (11) African involvement in the war seems to have been limited to the provision of intelligence for Union troops. Judging by the occasional deaths reported, individual Nama also fought on the side of Union troops, but beyond this, there is no evidence of indigenous S.W. Africans having actively been in combat against German colonial forces. (12)
Self-Peasantization and Resistance to Wage Labour

The response of many Herero to the defeat of their former colonial masters was informed by a marked determination to reestablish themselves as pastoralists. In this sense, then, the period after 1915 was characterised by a process of 'self-peasantization'.(13) In S.W.A., as indeed in early colonial Zimbabwe, this process involved attempts 'to resist demands for labour altogether and to opt for a full peasant solution.'(14) However, as Ranger pointed out, 'self-peasantization' was not 'arrived at almost accidentally'.

On the contrary, it involved the deliberate and painful adoption of a number of strategies designed to maximise the potentials of peasant production: strategies which meant important innovations in the division of labour, in staple crops, in location of residence, and subsequently in technology and ideology.(15)

Disruption caused by the war provided a welcome opportunity for many farm workers in particular to withdraw from wage labour and 'opt for a full peasant solution'.(16) Many farmers found themselves without labour on returning to their farms after conquest. In the district of Rehoboth, for example, 'some farmers have gone on to their farms and have to herd their own stock, as the natives leave without any cause and without notice. Everywhere the natives are wandering about and doing just as they please...'(17)
Indeed, a new popular consciousness had begun to assert itself. Rumours of an imminent Herero uprising abounded for several years. While fears about a possible rising were exaggerated, the situation was perceived by many settlers as 'really serious and demanding prompt redress.'(18) In many cases farmers left their farms for these reasons. Missionary Pardey reported from Grootfontein in 1916 that 'many remote farmers had left their farms already and moved to bigger, or rather closer farms.' He himself could not find any proof of an impending rising, and was criticised by farmers for travelling in the district unarmed.(19) In Gobabis, one Count von Vandenstein claimed to have overheard some Herero planning to kill a certain farmer on 20 January 1916. In addition, he alleged that they had planned an uprising for the same day.(20)

Herero in particular were reported to have regarded [their] former German "Master" as no longer master but an equal "by conquest": The result was impertinence to masters and indolence. The Germans resented this and shootings and floggings were the result.(21)

Labourers generally 'are showing themselves disobedient or highly suspicious.'(22) Herero farm labourers were alleged to have been 'reticent, conservative and impudent, and still retaining their strong tribal characteristics.'(23) As late as 1919 they were said to be 'going about their work in a listless manner and doing everything at their leisure'(24), and
"openly to resist the authority of their employers with a
certain degree of veiled insolence." (25)

Such resistance was not so much aimed at improving labour
conditions by withholding labour, as it was part and parcel of
the 'peasant option'. This was attested to by a police
officer. On tour through the territory, Lt. Saunders observed
that there was dissatisfaction
among the Hereros at having to continue living on
white men's farms and practically compelled to work;
it is reasonable to assume that many of them are
desirous of farming for themselves and living apart
in special reserves.

They were said to 'possess a goodly number of goats...[and]
would like a reserve to settle on so that they could live under
tribal conditions.' (26) Farmers experienced problems in
replacing labourers as re-employment was 'not sought or
apparently desired.' (27)

Occupation of Farms and Squatting on Crown Lands

In the process of deserting their former employers, many
labourers rustled cattle to lay the foundation for their new
existence. In Rehoboth, for example, settlers complained
bitterly about a lack of labour and the fact that 'so many
cattle are being stolen that the farmers are earnestly thinking
of disposing of their stock, which is wholly unprotected.' (28)

The Verband der Verwertungsvereinigungen, an organisation
serving the interests of settler farmers, complained in 1920 that cattle 'with or without the connivance of herdboys, are driven off by occupants of so-called free locations and killed.' (29) So prominent did stock theft feature in the minds of settlers and officials that the Magistrate for the Okahandja district ascribed the rapid increase in stock owned by Africans to theft. He added that it was impossible to trace and detect stolen small stock, because they were not branded in any way. (30)

It would be a misrepresentation, however, to argue that the acquisition of stock after conquest depended solely on theft. The abolition of the prohibition on stock owned by Africans after 1915 enabled the latter to acquire cattle legally. (31) In some cases they bought stock from white farmers 'on an instalment system of payment' if cash was lacking. (32) In other cases, family members 'put their earnings together and afterwards invest them in stock.' (33)

Having deserted from settler farms, many Herero resorted to squatting on vacant Crown land in central S.W.A. An officer of the C.I.D. noted in 1915:  

It is to my mind a certainty that Natives hitherto employed in the Gobabis district have and are leaving their employers in considerable numbers ostensibly for the purpose of going to the district of Okahandja and Waterburg [sic]. (34)

This process was facilitated by the fact that at the time of
conquest large tracts of land in S.W.A. were as yet unsettled. In 1915 the 1331 allotted farms only covered a small portion of available land. In 1916 there were an estimated 614 unoccupied and surveyed farms with an area of just over 33.6 million ha. (35) In the southern area, 10.9 million ha. of suitable land for farming were still available in 1917, while an inspection of the northern districts in 1918 revealed that an estimated 22 million ha. of unsurveyed state land was still unoccupied by settlers. (36)

Under these conditions, small Herero settlements sprang up all over central S.W.A., particularly in the districts of Gobabis, Okahandja and Omaruru. 'These communities are living at the present time around waterholes which are prolific even in the dry season.' (37) In Okahandja district, for example, 50-odd settlements were counted in 1916, (38) while in the district of Windhoek, 10 000 head of small stock and 550 large stock were registered in the name of black S.W. Africans and were grazing at 19 different cattle posts in the district. (39)

In the Bush Veld west of the Oma-heke [sic] there are a large number of kraals or werfs where there are a quantity of Natives, mostly Hereros and as water is plentiful there the Natives find no difficulty in subsisting. In normal times the area in question harbours several thousands of Hereros, but it is reported that their numbers have been greatly augmented by the return of those who prior to the war had fled from the Protectorate and were residing in British Bechuanaland. The majority of these Natives are undoubtedly in the possession of arms British [sic] and German weapons and they are also said to have a number of horses which were left in the veld by General Myburgh's column. (40)
But squatting also took place on settler farms, both illegally and with the consent of some settlers. Although difficult to quantify, squatting on deserted settler farms was fairly widespread in the central and northern areas of the Police Zone. In the Grootfontein district, for example, Africans had settled on deserted farms and ploughed for their own benefit. Numerous instances of such occupation were reported from the Okahandja and Windhoek districts. On the farm Okanyone in the Okahandja district a number of squatters were reported.

These people never work, have lots of dogs and steal from the farmers and kill game. They call on our natives at their huts at night but are gone by the morning. We cannot induce them to work and if they are found they are very hostile.

About 100 'idle natives...who are doing a lot of damage' were squatting on privately owned farm Oviakunda. They stayed in about 50 huts and owned an estimated 1400 to 1500 head of small stock. None of them had passes. Similar reports were received from the farm Schwarze Klippe, which was part of the farm Neudamm in Windhoek district.

Squatting on Crown and settler land was not condoned by the military authorities. Circular No.58 of 1915 laid down that 'squatting on unoccupied Government Lands is not to be countenanced' except under certain conditions. This circular was augmented by a memorandum in 1916 which stipulated that no
location was to be established on private property except with the Administrator's consent. In addition, 'not more than 10 families or individual persons may reside on any one farm or property.' (45)

Implementation of these regulations proved difficult in practice, however. A persistent shortage of administrative personnel hampered effective control, for example. But more importantly, attempts to eradicate the squatter peasantry were met by determined resistance. Squatters on farms and Crown land defended their newly acquired status as subsistence pastoralists as best they could. The most common strategy to escape conviction was simply to evade police patrols. On the farm Okanyone referred to above police were unable to make any convictions, because squatters moved into the Gobabis district before the police arrived. (46)

In other cases the reaction of squatters was bolder. Several incidents were reported where attempts to evict squatters from Crown land were met with defiance and armed resistance. In 1920, squatters in the mountains around Windhoek, for example, were not deterred by the impounding of 432 head of small stock and one horse by the Town Ranger: two weeks after the event the latter had found some mare illegal stock on the commonage. (47) A police patrol in Okahandja district with instructions to investigate 'and take steps against all passless and vagrant
natives' on the farm Oviakunda was fired on from the thick bush with poisoned arms in the early morning. He added that there were a number of natives squatting in the bush and these bolted into the bush from their huts on the arrival of the police.(48)

'Self-Peasantization' within the wider Economy: Settler Agriculture

The success or failure of 'self-peasantization' depended as much on the coordinates of the wider colonial economy as on the commitment of the Herero to this process. In particular, the low level of economic development in agriculture precluded the emergence of wage employment as the only form of farm labour. Instead, many farmers employed tenant labour in one form or another. In order to contextualise this argument, some discussion of commercial agriculture and the development of colonial land and labour policies is necessary.

At the time of surrender, settler farming in S.W.A. was characterised by the slow and uneven accumulation of capital. In most cases, commercial farming started only after 1907, and then very frequently by people with little previous experience in farming and very little capital. As a consequence, 'the condition of the German farmers in the Protectorate is not satisfactory, as progress has been slow, compared with Union standards.'(49) Settler farmers, moreover, were differentiated by access to capital, as well as by the scale of their
operations. In the absence of detailed data on such differentiation, it is instructive to look at the assessment made by the Administrator of the kind of farmer that had settled in the territory before 1915. 'The farmers in this territory,' he wrote, may be divided into three classes, viz. the gentleman farmer, the small company or syndicate farmer, and the soldier or working class type of man. The two former have developed their holdings through imported capital or remittances from Germany, and have been accustomed to live on a scale higher than any income they derived from farming... The third class is the one which started with little or no capital, developed their farms as the result of sheer hard work, and lived on a scale commensurate with their income. (50)

If the Administrator's assessment can be believed, the former group of settler farmers was characterised by having spent large amounts of capital in an unproductive way on the building of luxurious houses 'and furnished them on a magnificent scale out of all proportion to their requirements.' (51) As a result infrastructural developments such as the provision of waterholes and fencing was neglected on many farms. (52) Not only did this have a negative effect on the control of stock diseases in the long run, but perhaps more crucially in the short term, the lack of fencing made farmers critically dependent on labour. This point was well put in 1922 by the magistrate for the Omaruru district, when he argued that

In a country where, as far as I am aware, there is not a single farm completely fenced, where there is such a scarcity of water and where transport difficulties are almost insurmountable, a farmer is naturally more dependent on nativé labour than is the
case with his prototype [sic] in the majority of districts in the Union... (53)

The military campaign of 1914-15 had dealt the farming sector a severe blow. Large-scale depopulation of settler farms occurred as numbers of reservists were drafted from the farming community, while others sought refuge in towns. The result was that settler farming operations in the country almost came to a standstill. (54) In the absence of their owners, many farms were looted of property and livestock. (55)

Large losses were reported, particularly of cattle. In the absence of exact figures the extent of such losses have to be inferred from the number of stray stock that were rounded up by Union forces. At the end of the military campaign in 1915, 847 horses, 358 mules, 763 donkeys, 18,526 cattle and 73,213 head of small stock were being kept in specially-erected camps at Keetmanshoop, Aroab and Gibeon. (56) Many farmers were reduced to poverty as a result of the campaign. For example, Freiherr von Esebeck, a farmer in the south, claimed that of his pre-war herd only 40 cattle remained, only nine of which were cows. All of his small stock had disappeared. He further claimed that his case was representative of most farmers in the south. (57) In many cases breeding stock was destroyed, stud bulls and rams having been used for meat by the military forces. (58) Overall, the war significantly reduced the number of livestock owned by white settlers.
Table 2.1 Stockfarming in S.W.A., 1914 to 1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1914 Numbers</th>
<th>1917 Numbers</th>
<th>1917 as % of 1914</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>15,970</td>
<td>8,625</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mules</td>
<td>4,364</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkeys</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>7,235</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>211,087</td>
<td>187,423</td>
<td>88.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>490,800</td>
<td>151,590</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>532,442</td>
<td>329,263</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,263,063</td>
<td>685,874</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 2.1 indicates, only about 55 per cent of pre-conquest stock numbers were left in 1917. By far the most severe reduction was in respect of goats, mules excepted.

By 1915 the German colony had just started to produce a surplus sufficient to push down the local price of meat, but as yet too small to warrant the export of meat to the world market. Production of food fell far short of local demand, so that the bulk of it had to be imported. (59) But if agricultural production had been all but stopped as a result of the war, economic conditions after conquest did not favour rapid
reconstruction. If anything, economic stagnation threatened to draw settler farmers even deeper into the abyss. Two factors contributed more than anything else to this unhappy situation: lack of capital and the question of markets.

The outbreak of war cut S.W.A. off from capital inflows from Germany. The colonial government therefore had to rely on local capital to pay its military and civil servants during the war.

In order to do this, all funds of local banks were frozen and transferred to the Land Bank. As a result banks were practically out of funds [and] merchants and private individuals could obtain little or no assistance from these institutions although they may have had considerable amounts of standing to their credit. (60)

Salaries of civil servants, averaging about £750 000 in the years before the war, could not be paid any longer. It was estimated that the loss in wages and taxes to the government and inhabitants of the territory during the war alone was in the region of two million pounds sterling. (61) Because the constitutional position of S.W.A. depended on the outcome of the war, the Union Government was also loathe to invest large sums of capital in the country. A report on the economic situation at the end of 1915 observed that

It follows necessarily from all this that a standstill has entered into the economical life of the inhabitants, which is in reality aggravated through the difficulties which have cropped up in the circulation of money. (62)

To make matters worse, the value of German money fell from 26
Marks to the £ in 1915, to 38 Marks in 1918 and to 50-100 Marks by 1919. (63)

But it was not only civil servants who were dependent on money from Germany. Many farmers, the so-called 'gentleman farmers' - to use an expression coined by the Administrator - operated their farms on capital received from Germany. They too 'have keenly felt the effects of the war, and the majority are on the verge of bankruptcy.' (64) The general shortage of money, as well as its rapid devaluation, contributed to a dramatic increase in the debts of individual settlers. (65) South African commercial banks, while willing to assist in individual cases, charged interest rates too high for the average farmer. (66) Farmers were therefore unable to repay debts which had accumulated since before the war. In 1918 arrears on such payments amounted to £25 000 and the total still payable on sales by the late government repayable in instalments up to the year 1925 is estimated at £120 000. (67)

Nor could settler farmers expect any financial assistance from merchants, who performed the function of bankers to farmers and small traders prior to 1915. (68) Merchants had most of their capital tied up in 'long credits' to settler farmers, at times ranging between 10 000 to 15 000 Marks or more. (69) The majority of farmers were so deeply indebted to the merchants that when they had slaughter stock to sell the merchants to whom they owed money took it over at a nominal price with which their accounts
were credited. (70)

This severely limited their liquidity at a time when sterling currency was needed to obtain merchandise from the Union. (71) Rather than wait for the end of the war, merchants were said to be "preparing the way to obtain possession of large tracts of generally improved ground." It was only a matter of time, predicted the Lands Inspector in 1919, until land would "in the hands of a favourable few." (72)

The debt crisis of settler farmers was further compounded by lack of markets. On 21 July 1915 a proclamation prohibited the export of stock from S.W.A. to the Union. This, it was hoped, would save breeding stock for the regeneration of herds. (73) At the end of 1917 the border with the Union was temporarily opened for stock exports but only for districts south of 22 degrees latitude. In the short period from August to November of that year, farmers sold 4500 large stock and 19000 head of small stock, which netted them £50 000 to £60 000. An official commented that

Practically every animal fit for slaughter south of that line was bought and a similar position would have existed north of that line had the restriction not been in force. (74)

These exports were small when compared to the total number of cattle in the country. In 1917, 187423 head of cattle were enumerated in the Farm Census. (75) It was not until 1918 that the border with the Union was finally opened to the whole
country for stock exports.

Apart from this very unreliable Union market, the only outlet for stock farmers was the local market. In 1918 some 8000 head of oxen were bought from farmers: 5096 by the Supply Service of the Administration and 2899 by stock traders, who exported them to the Union during the last four months of the year, when the border was opened fully. (76) In 1919 the export of livestock to the Union increased to 17266 oxen and 89161 sheep. (77)

Improved market conditions led to slightly higher prices for slaughter stock. In 1918 prices realised ranged up to £18, all expenses paid, compared to £10 - £11 paid by dealers for similar quality stock in previous years. (78) In many instances, however, speculators netted the increases, with little benefit accruing to farmers. (79) Indications are that these middlemen were well organised and informed about markets in S.W.A. In 1917, for example, middlemen from the Union arrived in the territory just before the border to the Union was opened for export. 'These individuals must have obtained some inside information from some reliable source that the border would eventually be thrown open,' commented an official. (80) The two biggest speculators had paid 27s 6d in one case and 30s per 100 lbs. dead-weight in another case. At the same time the price on Union markets ranged between 50s and 55s, occasionally
As Johannesburg was the major meat market at the time, S.W. African farmers were severely disadvantaged by their distance from this market. This difficulty was compounded by unreliable transport links with the Union. The South African railway system was hastily extended from Prieska to Upington and before the end of 1915 was linked up with the railway system in S.W.A. Rail traffic was frequently disrupted: on the Upington - Karasburg line 44 washaways were counted between October 1916 and March 1917 alone. Nor were S.W.A.'s port facilities any better. In 1919 the Administrator commented that the want of facilities at Walvis Bay was a severe handicap to trade, particularly with respect to the export of cattle and copper and tin ore from the northern districts.

When regular exports to the Union started in 1918, 'most of the rolling stock [was] in a bad state of repair, and deaths have been reported where oxen have fallen through the bottom of the trucks or jumped over the top.' Fifteen out of every seventy head of large stock transported for slaughter to the Union died on the journey. While stock was supposed to have been fed and watered on its eleven-day journey to the markets in Johannesburg, the Administrator doubted whether 'these arrangements are always carried out.' Quality and weight losses were inevitable, with oxen losing as much as 200 lbs.
on the journey and meat dropping in quality from 'prime' in
Windhoek to 'medium' or 'compound' standard in the Union as a
result of bruising. (87) High railway rates and an export tax of
20s on cattle and 2s 6d on small stock further narrowed
profits. (88)

The negative effects of speculators and distant markets
notwithstanding, stock breeding and exports by white settlers
increased dramatically. By 1919 the Administrator noted that

Never in the history of the country have such large
quantities of stock been exported nor have such
prices been obtained and the only conclusion at which
I can arrive is that farmers, although a large number
have mortgages on their farms, are in a sounder
position financially than at any previous period, and
but for the uncertain position of the local currency
question would have relieved themselves of this
encumbrance. (89)

Indeed, so swift was the recovery of S.W.A. herds after 1915
that the Union market was soon expected to be incapable of
absorbing S.W. African surplus stock. In 1920 the
Administrator warned that the South African market could not be
looked upon 'as a permanent source of income from the exporting
of cattle and sheep since, in the ordinary way, the latter is
well able to meet its own requirements.' He therefore
anticipated the construction of cold storage facilities in
Walvis Bay for the export of stock to the world market. (90)
General Economic Decline

The upswing in cattle ranching, rapid as it may have been, was not enough to jolt farming in S.W.A. out of economic stagnation in the six year period up to 1920. Little of the capital generated by increasing exports was utilised for the development of farms, as it had to be used for the 'discharging of outstanding liabilities with storekeepers.'(91)

Moreover, capital investment, particularly from the Union, was tiny, and the Union government unable to settle people on a permanent basis because of insecurity surrounding the outcome of the war. Union merchants, eager to do business in S.W.A. were hesitant to invest in the territory. While the Union government placed no restrictions on firms which wanted to establish themselves in S.W.A. and issued 700 permits from the time of surrender to February 1916 to people desirous of visiting the territory for business reasons, less than a dozen Union firms had opened businesses in the territory by the start of 1916.(92)

Similarly, mining production and revenue fell drastically after conquest. In July 1914 an agreement was reached in London which restricted the marketed output of S.W. African diamonds to 22 per cent of the total sales of the Union. Although the agreement could not be signed because of the outbreak of war,
the Union implemented it after conquest. (93) When permission was given in November 1915 to resume diamond production, this was limited to 10000 carats a month, later raised to 40000 carats. (94) This compared to the pre-war output of more than 1.5 million carats. (95)

Copper production also suffered as a result of the war. While the copper mines continued operations after conquest, they did so on a much-reduced scale, and without any markets at first. (96) Only two mines, the Otavi and Khan mines, were producing in 1917, while all other small mines had been "abandoned on account of their exhaustion." (97)

Although both the value of diamonds and copper produced after 1915 increased, the former did not regain its pre-war peak of £2 698 000 in 1913/14 until 1920. The value of copper produced exceeded its previous peak of £396 435 in 1913/14 only once, in 1919, with a value of £480 270. (98) As a result, total revenue collected from August 1915 to March 1920 was less than the total revenue collected by the late German colonial administration during their last year of colonial rule: £1 236 957 as opposed to £2 071 157 in 1914-1915. (99) Total expenditure over the same period was estimated at £3 039 814, i.e. far in excess of revenue. (100) The Union Government was thus forced to finance expenditures in S.W.A. by taking up loans. This contrasted sharply with the position in 1913, when
the revenue generated inside S.W.A. was sufficient to pay for both the administration of the colony and the cost of the military. (101)

The overall economic situation in S.W.A. after 1915 was characterised by stagnation. Indeed, it prompted the Administrator, Gorges, to write to Smuts in 1917 that

We feel very neglected up here. Since the day General Botha has left Swakopmund (18th July 1915) only one public man of any consequence has visited the Protectorate... It has in consequence struck me that responsible people in the Union are either exceedingly indifferent about their large and important territorial acquisition, or else they repose an extra-ordinary amount of faith in my capacity to govern this colony as it should be governed. (102)

As far as the farming sector was concerned, the result was that Little or no development work on the farms in the way of dams, tanks, buildings, fencing etc. has been carried out, and although the farmers were anxious to make improvements, they were severely handicapped in being unable to obtain permits to import necessary material from the Union. (103)

Labour Shortage

The economic conditions outlined above put settler farmers at a considerable disadvantage regarding the supply of labour. Given the lack of capital, a reduction of labour costs was the only way to reduce losses. This practice was dramatically illustrated by labour conditions on settler farms. In 1916 it was reported that 'the average farmer [in the Gobabis district]
does not see the necessity for a periodical meat ration or, if
he does, perhaps cannot afford it.' (104) Similarly, farmers in
the Omaruru district did 'not feed their natives too well and
overwork them.' (105) And in the Okahandja district the most
frequent reason for desertion from farm labour in 1916 was a
lack of food. (106) Reports about low wages were so common that
the Native Reserves Commission concluded in 1921

that there is just cause for complaint in regard to
wages paid to farm labourers in some districts where
adult males only receive 10/- per month and food.
Considering the price of clothing and other
necessaries we cannot possibly regard this as a fair
wage. (107)

In the same year the Administrator received numerous complaints
from farm labourers

of ill-treatment, non-payment of wages, and
insufficiency of earnings for the purchase of
necessaries, including a certain amount of clothing.
In some instances it has been found that as a result
of hard times the employer could not pay at all. (108)

These conditions caused considerable resistance to farm
labour. Many workers simply deserted as soon as they arrived
on settler farms. Farmers from the southern district of
Maltahohe, for example, complained that Ovambo youths being
sent down for farm labour 'disappear within 24 hours of their
arrival as a rule.' (109) To make matters worse, farmers had to
compete with the railways, mines and administration for
labour. With slightly better wages being paid in these
sectors, and despite directives from the colonial
administration that other employees should refrain from

- 106 -
recruiting labour in the Police Zone so as to make such labour available to farmers, farmers constantly found themselves on the losing end. By 1918 the territory experienced a country-wide agricultural labour shortage. The Administrator argued that the farmers were more or less to blame, since they will not make the terms of their agreements with the natives more attractive, and some indeed already protest against the minimum wage of 15s a month and food for an able-bodied native...(110)

Tenant Labour

Under these circumstances labour tenancy became an important form of labour extraction. While it solved the labour question to some extent, tenant labour also aided the process of 'self-peasantization' by enabling Herero pastoralists to obtain stock for labour. Although farmers sought to discourage workers from bringing stock on to their farms by levying a tax on the number of livestock, they did so at the expense of their labour supply. In such instances, labourers sought refuge on temporary reserves (of which more below). That this did occur on a fairly extensive scale is attested to by the Superintendent of a temporary reserve in Windhoek district, who stated in 1917 that stock was coming on to the reserve at a rate of 400 a week.(111) Farmers therefore often had little choice but to tolerate their labourers' stock. In 1919 an official in the Native Affairs Department had good reason to believe that several thousands of
small stock and some horned cattle were running on private farms - I know of two farms where on each 1000 native owned goats are now running, and...the owners of the farms are putting up with this because they are afraid of losing their servants. (112)

A number of farmers also rented land out to black pastoralists. It was reported in 1916 that either owners or lessees of land in the Omaruru district 'carry on what is known in the Union as "Kaffir farming".' A number of instances were noticed where black workers controlled farms of absentee owners who resided in Omaruru or Windhoek. Owing to the size of many farms and the dense bush, convictions were almost impossible to secure. (113) Similar reports were received from the Windhoek district where unemployed blacks squatted on farms of absentee owners, who 'make them pay grazing fees.' (114) In the Otjiwarongo district the magistrate believed that many farmers in 1921 made more from grazing fees than from the sale of produce. (115)

A combination of these factors enabled a growing number of black S.W. Africans to acquire stock after 1915. Most districts reported stock increases. In the southern district of Keetmanshoop, for example, 'practically all the natives are possessed of stock.' (116) In the following year Africans in the Aroab district were said to have owned 'an average of 100 goats or so from which they exist,' (117) while individual blacks 'own no less than four to five hundred head of small stock in the
Gobabis district." (118) In the early 1920s the magistrate for the Omaruru district reported that 'many of the farm labourers are possessed of two and three hundred head of sheep and goats which continue to graze on the farms of their masters.' (119)

These developments considerably lessened the dependence of blacks on wage labour by 1920, which in turn adversely affected the labour supply. The magistrate in Okahandja was most explicit on this point when he wrote in his annual report for 1921 that:

The natives of this district are not satisfactory labourers and servants, partly owing to their innate dislike for work and partly owing to the fact that German farmers allow too many natives to squat on their farms, and to have stock grazing there. These natives are generally nominally working on the farm, but actually are peasants, owning enough stock to supply their wants. (120)

His report made it clear that farm labour was engaged in by many people because it provided access to land for grazing.

Farmers and the State: Conflicting Assessments and Policies

Unable to solve the labour problem on their own, settler farmers turned to the colonial state for help. In countless petitions and reports to the Administrator by farmers' organisations, the 'native question' 'was represented as a very serious one.' (121) Farmers in the Maltahoehe district urged the government to bring back all farm labourers who had deserted
without resigning', and distribute them amongst farmers. They should be forced 'to enter into fixed contracts with their employers, as the natives frequently refuse to do so, when asked by their masters.' Apart from demanding tighter control of Rehoboth location, farmers urged the government to keep a watchful eye on the mission, as many young blacks had left their employment to attend school and church since it was established in Maltahoehe.(122) But by 1920 a solution of the farm labour question was nowhere in sight. Farmers in the Kalkfeld district sourly summed up the position in the following way:

The natives have understood it to bring about our economic retrogression during the last years - and it is a fact through their constant maliciousness they have begun to take from us our courage and joyfulness in following the profession of the farmer. The other day a new settler, a Boer, put it strikingly by saying: "This country is hell for the white man!" (123)

While farmers' demands essentially centered around appeals to the colonial administration to reestablish their unchallenged domination in the countryside, this, according to farmers, could be achieved by returning to the German forced labour system, implying a severe curtailment of movement and seizure of livestock from blacks who could not prove ownership thereof.(124) As a result, farmers almost unanimously called on the state to strengthen the police force and to return their guns to them. 'Only in this way can the safety of the farmer be attained.' (125) The suggestion was made
that the armed forces of the Government, whether Police or Troops, show themselves at the earliest possible moment, and thereafter at stated intervals, on the farms, so that the Natives may see for themselves that there is an authority, and this authority is particularly established for them. At the present time they imagine that the English Administration is only here to look after and keep in order the German inhabitants of the country, and that to them, as a sort of a neutral body, everything is permitted.

The same settler proposed that farmers especially in remoter areas be ‘equipped with a weapon’. (126)

However, because farmers displayed considerable hostility and defiance towards the colonial administration, the military magistrate in Omaruru recommended in 1916 that authorisation for farmers' meetings be withdrawn

as, from the nature of resolutions submitted, which are couched in by no means polite language, it appears that instead of the association taking steps to mutually assist its members, it is nothing else but a Political Association, which, I am confident, is doing everything to put obstacles in the way of good administration of the Protectorate. (127)

The Administrator temporarily prohibited meetings by the Kalkfeld branch of the Omaruru Association. (128)

South Africa’s Quest for Legitimacy

White farmers were of course correct in their perception that their relation to the colonial administration had changed. The administration was neither prepared nor able to intervene on behalf of settler farmers to the extent demanded. The Union
government was involved in an act of brinkmanship: it sought to encourage German settlers to stay on the land while simultaneously basing its own claim to legitimacy as the future ruler of S.W.A. on atrocities conducted by the former. Its strategy in this regard hinged on efforts to demonstrate to S.W.A.'s black population and the international community that Germans were unfit to rule the territory. (129) In the words of J.X. Merriman, German atrocities against black S.W. Africans were regarded as 'our strong point, our sheet-anchor in any diplomatic storms.' (130) Evidence of the worst excesses of German colonial rule were published as a Blue Book in 1918. (131) The purpose of the Blue Book was stated unambiguously in the Preface:

as a colonist, the German in South West Africa, speaking generally, has been a failure. He has never shown the slightest disposition to learn the native's point of view, to adapt his ideas to the long-established customs and habits of the people, or to fall in with the ways of the country. (132)

It was not enough, however, to discredit German colonial rule on a propaganda level alone. Limited reforms of the previous system of 'native administration' were necessary to substantiate the Union's claims that its system of colonial rule was more benign than that of the former German administration. (133) The need for reform was reinforced by the Union's concern about a possible black rebellion, which 'favoured a more conciliatory approach to the black population.' (134) The Union government consequently set out to
liberalise the German system of 'native administration', particularly those aspects which comprised the forced labour regime.

Consequently, the German custom of 'parental chastisement' of farm workers in particular was outlawed. Under Union rule the control of labour was to 'be more centralised and there should be a stricter separation of magisterial and police functions.'

The master should be made to realise that a Native, as much as a European, is entitled to the protection of the laws of the country from assaults upon his person, and attempts to defraud him of his just dues under his contract, and that no individual whatsoever, except a magistrate, is allowed to mete out punishment.

The former German labour system was changed along lines more compatible with that of the Union.

The German system of registration, together with the dienstbuch [service book] and brass badge, were abolished and replaced by a pass law. The age of those required to carry passes was raised from seven to fourteen, and "Certificates of Exemption from labour" provided for those who could show "visible means of support". To qualify for this certificate the applicant had to own at least ten head of large or fifty head of small stock. As under German law, blacks were barred from obtaining any right or title to fixed property without the consent of the Administrator. They were however, allowed to acquire and own livestock.

Underlying these reforms, however, were similar objectives of labour control. In 1915 a circular laid down that

Every able-bodied Native to be self-supporting and in employment somewhere, or else be treated as a vagrant [sic]. It is undesirable to force natives to any
particular employer, but provided they are given their choice compulsory service should be insisted upon. Any natives unable to obtain employment should be referred to this Office where labour requisitions from Government units are dealt with. There is always a tendency on the part of idle Natives to concentrate in towns, locations, unoccupied farms or uncontrolled cattle posts, and the places should be raided periodically. (139)

Although the reforms were sufficient to anger settler farmers, they certainly did not strip the colonial state of all its powers. In fact, so insignificant were they that the Secretary of the Protectorate described the reformed system of ‘native administration’ as ‘a modified form of slavery’, conceding, however, that it did ameliorate ‘the rigour of the German law...to some extent.’ (140)

**Constraints on Policy Implementation**

Colonial officials were satisfied that equipped with pass laws and

> with efficient Police work an absolute control can be exercised over all natives, which will prevent squatting on Crown land and evasion of the law... (141)

Two factors intervened, however, which hampered colonial control of blacks: a concern not to antagonise them unnecessarily and lack of administrative staff.

In attempting to tighten control over S.W.A.’s rural population, the Union government was careful not to precipitate
any large scale resistance from black S.W. Africans. Diplomacy and leniency, rather than overt force initially characterised its attempts in this regard. Imprisonment was only to be used as a last resort to force blacks to work. The Deputy Secretary for the Protectorate informed the Officer in Charge of the Military Constabulary at Hatsamas in 1916 that

While the law allows the arrests of vagrants, the Administrator suggests that every effort should be made by the Constabulary to induce the natives to find employment, and only in the case of habitual vagrants or persons who neglect to find employment, after warning, should be taken into custody and become a charge to the Government. In the case to which your attention is drawn not only will the prisoners have to be provided for in gaol, but their whole families have become a charge on the Government without any compensating advantage. (142)

Magistrates in particular were accused of leniency when it came to the prosecution of blacks. (143) Farmers in the district of Karibib felt that the local magistrate had inverted the master–servant relationship by having been too lenient.

The native is privileged to the detriment of the white man in a manner which is a slap in the face of the most elementary notions of right. Not merely against the Germans, but also against the other whites. The result is that the native thinks that he can do what he likes, knowing he will not be punished for it. (144)

As if wanting to remove all doubts as to who the real culprits were, a police inspector stated quite categorically in 1920 that the 'blatant and truculent behaviour of the natives' was due to the leniency of the magistrates and not the police. (145)
Administratively, the new regime was ill-equipped to exert full control. In 1916 there existed 'only three offices dealing purely with native affairs' outside Ovamboland. At other places, because of a lack of skilled manpower, magistrates themselves were responsible for native affairs. But magistrates themselves were poorly qualified. The Administrator complained that of 18 magistrates in S.W.A. after 1915, only three had been full magistrates in the Union. 'The rest are nearly all clerks in the Union, some of them only of the second grade.' (146)

Particular difficulties were experienced with the police force. During 1916 the Military Constabulary took over from the South African Mounted Rifles and 91 police posts were occupied by a force of about 1200 men. A high proportion of these men, who mainly came from the rural areas of the Orange Free State and Transvaal, 'were entirely without previous police experience,' (147) and 'the majority of the officers knew nothing at all about the very elements of police work.' (148) An Inspector of Police in the Union wrote about the Military Constabulary that it

was established with officers and men, who never had any training, the great majority being lads from the farm. There was no one to instruct them, no books or regulations, they were left to themselves to work out their own salvation. (149)

In addition, the police was hampered in the execution of its
duties by the fact that they were used by other departments to attend to administrative business. They were used 'for example as post agents, livestock inspectors, cattle disease inspectors and issuers of passes to natives, &c...'(150) Farmers complained that as a result they did not get regular police visits on their farms. Magistrates in Omaruru and Karibib district complained that the policing system proved 'deficient' and that 'the S.A.M.R. adopt the attitude that police work is quite a secondary matter with them being subordinate to regimental or garrison duties.'(151)

Under these conditions regulations such as the pass laws and Circular 58 of 1915 which controlled squatting, for example, were unsatisfactorily implemented. The magistrate of Okahandja noted in 1917 that the provisions of the Memorandum on Native Affairs of 23 October 1916 had not been observed in 11 districts throughout the country and that the contract labour system and pass laws were not enforced. In 1918 he complained that the Memorandum 'is practically a dead letter as far as the Police are concerned.' As late as 1920 he lamented that

it has not been found possible in the absence of constant and firm supervision, with the staff and police at our disposal, to carry out the excellent directions laid down [in the Memorandum].(152)

The implementation of the pass laws fared no better. In his Annual Report for 1918 the same magistrate stated that

it is quite evident that the police rarely if ever ask any native whether he has any complaints, or
examine passes of natives encountered on patrols at farms or elsewhere. (153)

According to the magistrate, this obviously rendered pass laws ineffective.

The State and Labour Tenancy

But if the Union's attempts to legitimise its rule over S.W.A. brought about a relaxation, albeit to some extent involuntarily, of 'native administration', there was another important factor which limited the scope of state intervention in favour of settler farmers. This was the limited sanctioning by the state of rent-paying squatters on Crown land.

Although regulations existed to control squatting, several Native Affairs officials found 'the whole question of squatting and grazing stock on Government Lands...to be rather obscure' in 1916. (154) The reason for this has to be sought in part in the fact that the colonial state gave its qualified approval to rent-paying squatters. According to the Officer in Charge of Native Affairs in the district of Windhoek

The position, as I understand it now (1916), is that any Native may apply for and obtain a license to graze his stock on any government land, and squatting there must naturally follow. The licenses are of a temporary nature and the Natives may be turned off at any moment if the farm is required for other purposes; this has already occurred. (155)

According to Circular No.58 fees for occupation licenses and
grazing were 3d per head of large stock per month and 2s 6d per 10 head of small stock. In order to discourage this practice, black males over the age of 16 had to pay 2s 6s per head. (156) While it is not possible to determine the percentage of pastoralists who squatted ‘legally’ by having taken out such licenses, Table 2.2 below gives an indication of the number of licenses taken out in the years 1917-1919.

Table 2.2 Leases and Grazing Licenses granted, 1917-1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Grazing Licenses</th>
<th>Leases</th>
<th>Grazing Licenses</th>
<th>Grazing Licenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aroab</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethany</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibeon</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grootfontein</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gobabis</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keetmanshoop</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karibib</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luederitzbucht</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maltahoehoe</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okahandja</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omaruru</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjiwarongo</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outjo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehoboth</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swakopmund</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsumeb</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek</td>
<td>1085</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmbad</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1616</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: It is not clear whether dashes indicate that no records existed or that no licenses were issued.

The policy of sanctioning rent-paying squatters on state land stood in direct contrast to Union policy laid down by the 1913 Land Act. The principal object of the Act was to create an increased farm labour supply for whites by transforming squatters into labour tenants. (157) This was to be achieved by 'restrict[ing] African land leasing and purchasing rights to the existing reserves...'. The Act further proposed to extend existing reserves by releasing extra land, and that this land 'would be kept exclusively for Africans.' (158)

In contrast to the situation in South Africa, however, most blacks in the Police Zone had lost access to land as a result of German colonial policy. After conquest only seven reserves existed in the Police Zone, mainly for Nama and Damara communities. The Herero did not have any reserved land in 1915. Moreover, the Union was constitutionally prevented from disposing of Crown land in S.W.A. for the duration of the war. It was therefore not possible to set aside permanent reserves as in the Union. (159) The colonial administration identified the lack of reserves in the Police Zone as an important factor contributing to the labour shortage on farms. In 1916 the
Officer in Charge of Native Affairs in the Windhoek district went so far as to suggest that at present towns were supplying rural areas with labour, a situation he regarded as 'unhealthy and not conducive to voluntary service on farms.' The reasons for this state of affairs had to be sought in the German policy of allowing natives no land whatever as a home, and so teaching them that locations alone may be regarded as a place where they can live their domestic life unfettered by the white man's dominance. (160)

In an attempt to encourage blacks in towns to return to the rural areas, the state gave limited sanction to the development of a rent-paying squatter peasantry on Crown land. The perceived advantages of this policy were spelled out by the Officer in Charge of Native Affairs in the district of Windhoek. He argued that a healthier condition would prevail were it made law that natives may not live in locations except while under contract to town residents. In short they must be made to realise that their home is on the settlements and that the location is only an abiding place for the time being while they are working. Married women and children should live on the reserves and have the benefit of the milk from the cattle and the men go out like the natives of the Transvaal and leave their women at home on the reserves, until they return. (161)

It is clear from this that the colonial administration did not wish to create a class of stock owners who would be able, in time, to live independently of wage labour. Rather, its object was to develop a subsistence economy as the basis for the establishment of reserves, which were regarded desirable as
'farm labour producing centres'. Being places where blacks could leave their stock, reserves would become 'the most attractive centre[s] for the natives of the district.'

It is submitted as a logical conclusion that the natives would prefer farm labour to town labour if they had grazing reserve within reasonable distance of their places of employment. (162)

Given the constitutional constraints regarding the establishment of reserves, such 'farm labour producing centres' were officially regarded as 'temporary' or 'grazing reserves'. Far from providing an escape from wage labour as settler farmers alleged, the colonial administration saw reserves as doing exactly the opposite. The state could levy and collect taxes from black pastoralists concentrated into these reserves, and in so doing force them out of the reserves into wage labour. As an official put it, reserve residents would be forced to seek employment through economic pressure the labour market thus not being seriously affected. On the contrary, it is felt that such a course would act as a stimulus to labour, for the natives would be under close control and the payment of such taxes as may be levied could be effectively enforced. These taxes would have to be earned. (163)

Moreover, as Swanson has pointed out, the recognition of temporary reserves represented an attempt by the colonial administration to regularise and control squatting. (164) By 1920 a large number of temporary reserves had been established in S.W.A., as Table 2.3 indicates.
### Table 2.3 Temporary Reserves in S.W.A., 1920(165)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>RESERVE</th>
<th>EXTENT (ha.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(approximate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmbad</td>
<td>Bondelswarts</td>
<td>175 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hirachabis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethanie</td>
<td>Bethanien (incl. Soromas)</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keetmanshoop</td>
<td>Vaalgras (or Witbooisende)</td>
<td>46 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Berseba</td>
<td>736 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibeon</td>
<td>Witbooisvlei</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maltahoehe</td>
<td>Neuhof</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehoboth</td>
<td>Hoachanas</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek</td>
<td>Orumbo north</td>
<td>6 071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okatumba south</td>
<td>4 593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eros</td>
<td>1 316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aukeigas</td>
<td>4 479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fueratenwalde</td>
<td>6 386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okakuramea/Ovini-eikiro<a href="i">(sic)</a></td>
<td>no figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gobabis</td>
<td>Uichinas</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gunichas</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aminuis</td>
<td>30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okahandja</td>
<td>Ovitoto</td>
<td>15 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okawayo[(sic)]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karibib</td>
<td>Autarwib Ost[(sic)]</td>
<td>13 958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neubrunn</td>
<td>13 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Otjimbingue</td>
<td>13 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omaruru</td>
<td>Otjohorongo</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okombahe</td>
<td>172 713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outjo</td>
<td>Zesfontein</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fransfontein</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Otjeru</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grootfontein</td>
<td>Ovisune</td>
<td>4 645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Otavifontein</td>
<td>2 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gauss</td>
<td>5 674</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** (i) According to LW 1 3/15/2 Depression Commission: Memorandum Native Affairs Windhoek,
14.6.1923 this area comprised about 20 farms.

When it is considered that only seven of these reserves (Zesfontein, Franzfontein, Otjeru, Okombahe, Gunichas, Berseba and the Bondelswarts reserve) had been granted under treaty by the German colonial administration, the rapid growth of temporary reserves becomes much clearer. As the next chapter will show, the Native Reserves Commission of 1921 proposed the closure of many of these reserves in favour of consolidated areas. As far as the Herero were concerned, this was to mean reserves in more arid areas.

Resistance to the Rhenish Mission Society

The discussion so far has been concerned with showing how changes in the wider economy and colonial policy had enabled many Herero to escape from lowly-paid farm labour and resume a pastoral existence either as squatters on vacant Crown land or as tenants on settler farms. This change had wider implications for the Herero, however, and Ranger's claim that peasants in a Southern Rhodesian district 'took ideological initiatives which paralleled their productive responses' (166) can be observed to some extent among the Herero as well. The most fundamental manifestation of this was a change in relations between the Herero and the Rhenish Mission after 1915. Unfortunately, the war situation made it difficult for
missionaries to send detailed reports on the situation in S.W.A. to Germany. (167) As a result, evidence on the 'ideological initiatives' alluded to above is thin until 1919. The remainder of this chapter cannot do more, therefore, than to introduce very schematic indications of this process. These themes will be taken up in the next chapter and discussed more fully.

After 1915 missionaries noticed what they referred to as the awakening of a 'national' consciousness among the Herero, which, according to missionary Vedder, led to a deterioration of the relationship with the Rhenish Mission. (168) Some of them related this development directly to the economic and political changes that had occurred after 1915. Missionary Irle summarised this process in the following way:

> When our present government proclaimed freedom for the natives, permitted them to own unlimited numbers of stock and when because of this the natives regained the position they had lost after the Herero rebellion, many of our Christians joyfully reoccupied their former paradise. Sacrificial altar, circumcision, filing of teeth — the old customs — quietly occupied the hearts. The proclaimed freedom created the new heathen overnight, the idle native, the casual labourer. (169)

Despite its condescending tone, the conference report suggests a deep concern about developments after 1915. Indeed, popular resistance to wage labour was accompanied by resistance to and withdrawal from the Rhenish Mission. Unfortunately the missionaries themselves did not document this process very well.
in the five year period after 1915, but existing records indicate widespread dissatisfaction with the mission. Opposition frequently assumed the form of withdrawal from mission schools and church services.

School and church attendance had decreased, wrote missionary Pardey in his first annual report for the Grootfontein congregation after 1915. ‘Paganism, on the other hand, flourished. Pagan dances have become fashionable again, also among the Herero, who hardly ever dance.’ (170) In Okahandja the Augustineum school was closed in March 1916 because of rebellious activities of students there. Missionary Sieckmann wrote in a report covering the period 1913-1920 that when Union troops occupied Okahandja in May 1915 a ‘lack of discipline’ made itself felt among the people generally as well as the students. He observed that a new anti-German spirit had taken root, particularly among teenagers. Many parishioners had decided to stop paying their dues to the parish. Instead, pagan dances and heavy drinking made their appearance. (171)

The local magistrate in Okahandja received several complaints by representatives of the Herero about missionary Sieckmann. They alleged that he had agitated against the British before the latter conquered the country; that he was still praying for the German Kaiser in 1917; that he had permitted drunken members to partake in communion simply because they had paid
their dues, whereas he had refused 'good Christians' because they had not paid; that he did not let anybody leave the church before they paid 1 sh; and finally, he had allegedly threatened those Herero who had deserted from the German army that they would be hanged after the war. (172)

Missionaries from all over central S.W.A. reported similar incidents of defiance and resistance. (173) These and other actions by Africans culminated in a request to General Smuts in 1919 that have German missionaries be replaced by others. (174)

The Truppspieler

The awakening of 'national' consciousness among the Herero also found expression in the development of an organisation called the Truppspieler. (175) In 1917 the magistrate in Okahandja found that workers in the 'neighbourhood are all in touch with the movement.' (176) Numerous complaints were received from farmers 'that natives in their employ during the last month have been continually drilling during the night...'. (177) Because they possessed no rifles, sticks were used for drilling. (178)

The origin of the Truppspieler movement is somewhat
neculous. According to the testimony of a Herero who held the position of Major in the organisation, the movement had started as a benevolent society in 1905. From his testimony it seemed probable to the military magistrate that the movement is the outcome of the troop of Herero soldiers raised by the Germans prior to the Herero war at Outjo or Karibib. This troop deserted with their arms during the Herero war and gave the late Administration a great deal of trouble and I believe they never recovered the arms. This troop took an active part in the Herero war and on one occasion ambushed the Germans through the latter mistaking the German words of command shouted out in the bush by the former. (179)

As the name implies, the movement adhered to a military structure and military practices, modelled on the German colonial army. Each district had its own regiment with a name. The Windhoek regiment, for example, was known as the 'infantry'. (180) Within each troop, ranks were assigned to individuals, sometimes with the name of a prominent German officer or soldier behind it. The regiment in Okahandja was headed by a Kaiser [emperor]. His officers were known as H.E. the Governor von Deimling, State Secretary Heighler, Treasurer von Muenstermann, Oberst Leutnant Leutwein, Lieutenant Colonel Francke, Lieutenant Colonel Estorff, Major Mueller and Hauptmann and Adjutant Schmetterling von Preussen. (181) While there was no controlling officer for the whole movement, the Windhoek regiment was regarded as senior, because the general of the movement, referred to in the documents as 'one Germans Kandirikirira', belonged to it. (182) Apart from their own
names, some regiments also had distinctive uniforms. The Windhoek regiment wore khaki, while Keetmanshoop had a white German uniform and Luederitz had khaki tunics and white trousers. Most troops wore German distinctions, because they were freely available 'and have no legal recognisance anymore.' (183) It was also reported that the movement had no 'regularly drawn-up laws or regulations', because, as it was put, 'we do not aim at being a military organisation.' (184)

In 1917 it was reported that the Herero were organised into 17 companies countrywide. A farmer in the Otjiwarongo district felt that while the Herero were only playing at soldiers, the organisation could be turned against the authorities 'in serious cases.' (185) The military magistrate, however, felt that there was no need for apprehension. As far as he was concerned 'they are aping the German soldiers and their drill.' (186)

It would be misleading to argue that the Truppspieler movement embraced the entire Herero-speaking community. Certainly there were divisions. The basis for these divisions is more difficult to establish, however. It is clear, though, that by 1916 Herero headmen already experienced difficulty in enforcing government regulations among Truppspieler communities. More specifically, the colonial administration asked headmen to convey to their subjects 'that military
exercises by natives were undesirable.'

The headmen accepted the verbal ruling and endeavoured to put an end to the movement among their people. Other younger Hereros set the headmen's authority at defiance and in this way the tribe became split into two camps, commonly known as the "loyal and disloyal groups". Reportedly, the disloyalty was one directed against the headmen and not against the Administration at all. (187)

The same report also noted that

I was unable to get an order over to the Truppenspieler through my police staff. They sent messages back to say if I wanted to communicate with them, I should do so through a representative appointed by themselves. (188)

Division was also manifest elsewhere. Herero notables clashed not only with the Truppenspieler, but also between themselves. This point is illustrated by Chief Hosea Kutako's ascendancy to power. When Kutako came to Windhoek in 1915, the local headman of the Herero was Gerhard Kamaheke (Kaivaka). During the course of 1916 Kamaheke and a policeman by the name of Parmenas Zeraua registered their opposition to the reinstatement of Samuel Maharero as paramount chief of the Herero in S.W.A. They thought that they would be deposed if Samuel returned to South West Africa.' (189) Kamaheke was ousted as a result of dissatisfaction with him and Kutako elected to replace him 'on the understanding that Hosea Kutako would be the Regent pending the return of Chief Samuel Maharero'. Maharero gave his written approval for Hosea Kutako to succeed him in S.W.A. in 1919, and in 1920 Maharero had 'sent his son Frederick Maharero to place his hand on Hosea's head as a token that he had been appointed
as the leader of the Hereros.' (190)

Conclusion

The period of military rule witnessed the beginnings of reassertion of economic and ideological power of blacks generally, and Herero specifically. But the process of 'self-peasantization' was not equally successful for all pastoralists. As Emmett has pointed out:

At the low wages paid during this period, it would have been impossible for most blacks to obtain sufficient stock to qualify for exemption from forced labour. Strategies such as stock theft, desertion and living in the veld had their own limitations and difficulties. (191)

Unfortunately, however, no concrete data exists about stock and population numbers and their relative distribution. The first census in S.W.A. was conducted in 1921. Nor is it possible to determine demographic changes between urban, farm and reserve areas with any accuracy.

What emerges quite clearly, however, is that wage labour formed an essential part of the strategy of 'self-peasantization'. This is evident from the data on stock ownership and type of employment in the district of Windhoek. Of a total number of 982 head of large stock owned by blacks on cattle posts in the district in 1916, 363 or 37 per cent were owned by people classified as unemployed, while 60 per cent belonged to people
employed in Windhoek. The remainder was owned by people employed on farms. With regard to small stock 42 per cent of a total of 19,172 were registered in the name of unemployed people, whereas 44 per cent and 14 per cent fell into the other two categories respectively. (192) About 60 per cent of black stock owners in the district were thus employed as wage labourers. Although it is not possible to determine how many of these were Herero, it can be assumed that they formed a large proportion of these stock owners.

The consolidation of South African colonial rule which followed in the wake of the Treaty of Versailles in many ways threatened and reversed the limited gains which Herero pastoralists had made in reestablishing a pastoral economy. Both this process and Herero responses to it will are discussed in detail in the next chapter.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


2. T. Sundermeier, Die Mbanderu, Studien zu ihrer Geschichte und Kultur, (St. Augustin, 1977), p.20

3. Ngavirue, 'Political Parties', p.247


5. Troup, In Face of Fear, p.57


7. Union of South Africa, Report of the Administrator for the Year 1922, p.13. These annual reports will be referred to below as Report of the Administrator. See also SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 [Report of] Assistant Secretary to H. H. the Administrator, [19333], p.3

8. Troup, In Face of Fear, p.115; SWAA GL 37 Notes of an Interview H.H. the Administrator had on the 5th March, 1946, with representatives of the Herero Tribe, p.7; SWAA GL 37 Annexure E, p.1


11. Kriklar, 'Transvaal Agrarian Class Struggle', p.10

12. W.S. Rayner and W.W. D'Shaughnessey, How Botha and Smuts Conquered German South West Africa, (London, 1916), pp.95-98. For German attempts to thwart any cooperation by the local population with incoming British troops see, ibid, pp.186, 262f; S.J. Schoeman, 'Gwidwes-Afrika onder Militaire Bestuur. 1915–1920', M.A., UNISA, 1975, p.68; ADM 567/2 Vol.1 Memorandum concerning (a) the laws affecting the Native Population in the Protectorate of S.W.A.; (b) the practice followed by the present Administration in carrying out the provisions of these laws; (c) and the Native policy, generally, of the Protectorate Administration. Administrator’s Office, Windhoek, 3.8.1916, p.2; R. Kindt, Kriegsnachrichten. Tsumeb, Suedwestafrika, (Basel, 1973), p.64; W. Whittal, With Botha and Smuts in Africa, (London, 1917), pp.110, 113, 126; Trew, 'Botha Treks', p.72

13. My discussion of this is heavily indebted to T. Ranger,
Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe,
(Harare, 1985), chapter 1

14. Ibid, p.27
15. Ibid, p.31. Unfortunately, existing data on S.W.A. does not allow as detailed a discussion of this process as Ranger is able to provide. The present thesis nevertheless attempts to lay the foundations for such a study.
16. Ibid, p.27
19. AVEM C/h 15a Jahresbericht der Gemeinde Grootfontein 1916, pp.2-3
20. SWAA A 396/7 Copy of Report by Lieutenant Bentley regarding rumoured Native Discontent, 17.1.1916
21. ADM 3370 Annual Report Omaruru 1916, 5.1.1917, p.4; SWAA A 396/1 Officer in Charge C.I.D. Windhoek to Officer in Charge Constabulary and Police Windhoek, 17.12.1915
22. SWAA A 396/1 Kastl to Stadthaler Windhoek, 20.12.1915, p.1
23. ADM 3370 Annual Report Gobabis 1916, 20.1.1917, p.3
24. ADM 3370/3 Annual Report: Native Affairs Policy 1918, n.d., p.1
25. ADM 3370/4 Annual Report: The Office of Native Affairs, Windhoek and District 1919, 27.12.1919, p.1. See also ADM 3370/4 Lands Inspection Annual Report 1918[sic] (1919), n.d., p.2 where the Herero were described as "overbearing and masterful in [their] manner, and...generally untruthful and untrustworthy." Resistance to farm labour was not confined to the Herero, but was reported in the south of the country as well. In 1920, for example, an increase in desertions was reported from the Maltahoehe district. ADM 567/2 Vol.3 Sergt. in Charge S.W.A. Police Maltahoehe to Magistrate Maltahoehe, 6.8.1920
27. SWAA A 396/2 Lt.-Colonel de Jager to Secretary for the Protectorate, 11.12.1915, p.1
29. ADM 567/2 Vol.2 Gustav Schaeffer to Secretary for the Protectorate, 7.1.1920
30. ADM 567/2 Vol.3 Magistrate Okahandja to Secretary for the Protectorate, 9.3.1920
31. ADM 2163/3 (III) Secretary for the Protectorate to Officer in Charge Native Affairs Windhoek, 1.11.1920
32. ADM 3425/1 Officer in Charge Native Affairs to Secretary for the Protectorate, 8.1.1917
33. ADM 3370/4 Annual Report Gobabis 1919, 31.10.1919, p.2
34. SWAA A 396/1 Officer in Charge C.I.D. Windhoek to Officer in Charge Constabulary and Police, Windhoek, 17.12.1915
35. Schoeman, 'Suidwes-Afrika', p.159
36. Ibid, pp.164a, 165
37. SWAA A 396/1 Kastl to Stadthalter Windhoek, 20.12.1915, p.1
38. ADM 3370 Annual Report Okahandja 1916, 2.1.1917, p.10
39. NAW 30/1916/1 Officer in Charge Native Affairs Windhoek to Deputy Secretary for the Protectorate, 26.12.1916, p.1
40. SWAA A 396/1 Officer in Charge C.I.D. Windhoek to Officer in Charge Constabulary and Police Windhoek, 17.12.1915
42. ADM 567/6 Statement by Mrs. Ida Naenn, n.d. (1917)
43. ADM 2055/2 Military Magistrate Okahandja to Secretary for the Protectorate, 10.9.1916, pp.1-3; Military Magistrate Okahandja to Secretary for the Protectorate, 2.10.1916, p.2; Officer in Charge Detachment 2nd Military Constabulary Okahandja to Military Magistrate Okahandja, 10.10.1916
44. ADM 2163/3 (I) Farm Manager Macpherson to Secretary for the Protectorate Windhoek, 5.7.1916
45. ADM 567/2 Vol.1 Memorandum..., p.12
46. ADM 3370/3 Officer in Charge Detachment 2nd Military Constabulary Okahandja to Military Magistrate Okahandja, 21.1.1917
47. ADM 2163/3 (III) Extracts from Town Ranger's Reports to Town Clerk 1920
48. ADM 2055/2 Military Magistrate Okahandja to Secretary for the Protectorate, 10.9.1916, pp.1-2
50. Report of the Administrator, 1918, p.10
51. Ibid. See also 'Der Farmwirtschaftliche Ratgeber', Supplement to AZ, 23.8.1919, p.1
54. ADM C.1 6 Report of the Administrator...31.1.1916, p.31; Schoeman, 'Suidwes-Afrika', pp.46, 160; Paul Barth, Suedwest Afrika, (Windhoek, 1926), p.193; Rayner and O'Shaughnesssey, Rotha und Smuts, p.133
55. Schoeman, 'Suidwes-Afrika', pp.46-47 and 160; Barth, Suedwest-
See also ‘Bericht des Verbandes der Verwertungsvereinigungen’, AZ 12.12.1921
58. Barth, Südwes-Afrika, p.193
60. Report of the Administrator, 9 July 1915 - 31.3.1916 quoted in
Schoeman, ‘Suidwes-Afrika’, pp.119-120
61. ADM C.16 Report of the Administration...31.3.1916, pp.50-51; Coetzee, ‘Landelike Vestiging’, p.72
62. ADM 49/14 Financial Situation of the Protectorate:
quoted in Coetzee, ‘Landelike Vestiging’, p.72
63. Schoeman, ‘Suidwes-Afrika’, p.120. see also C. Terry, The Desert Bankers, The Story of the Standard Bank in South
West Africa, (Cape Town, 1978), p.59
64. Report of the Administrator, 1916, p.10
65. ‘Vorschläge an General Smuts’, AZ 22.11.1920
AZ 12.12.1921
67. ADM 3370/2 Constabulary, no title, 23.1.1918, p.4
68. Union of South Africa, Memorandum on the Country known as
German South-West-Africa, (Pretoria, 1915), p.59; Terry,
Desert Bankers, p.44
69. SWAA ADM 3370/4 Lands Inspector. Annual Report 1918 [sic]
(1919), p.4
70. Union of South Africa, Memorandum’, p.59
71. Terry, Desert Bankers, p.61
72. ADM 3370/4 Lands Inspector Annual Report 1918 (sic)
(1919), p.4
73. Union of South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly,
3.5.1916, p.280; Schoeman, ‘Suidwes-Afrika’, p.172
74. ADM 3370/2 (II) Untitled and undated Report for 1917
signed by Col. G.W.Lee; Schoeman, ‘Suidwes-Afrika’, p.173;
ADM, 3370/2 Administrator’s Annual Report, 1917, 16.2.1918,
p.27
75. Schoeman, ‘Suidwes-Afrika’, p.69. In the same year there were
1260 registered cattle brands and 1500 farms registered in
S.W.A. ADM 3370/2 (II) Untitled and Undated Report for
1917 signed by Col. G.W.Lee
76. Report of the Administrator 1918, p.10
77. Ibid, 1919, p.13
78. Ibid, 1928, p.18
80. ADM 3370/2 (II) Untitled and Undated Report for 1917,
signed by Col. G.W. Lee, pp.17-18
81. Ibid, p.18
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Financial and Economic Relations between the Union of South
Africa and the Mandated Territory of South West Africa,
(Pretoria, 1935), pp.6,8. This Commission will be referred
to below by the acronym EFRC.
83. Schoeman, 'Suidwes-Afrika', p.152
84. Report of the Administrator 1919, p.5
85. Ibid. 1918, p.18
86. Coetzee, 'Landelijk Vestiging', p.74
Ibid 1920, p.16
88. Ibid 1920, p.18
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90. Ibid 1919, p.18. For marked parallels
with Southern Rhodesia see Phimister, An Economic and Social
History of Zimbabwe, pp.113-135; Phimister, 'Meat and
Monopolies: Beef Cattle in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1938',
91. ADM 3370/2 (II) Annual Report Keetmanshoop 1917,
15.1.1918, p.2
92. House of Assembly Debates, 16.2.1916, p.74; ADM C.16
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94. Ibid, 32.2.1916, p.92
95. Ibid, 20.3.1917, p.92
96. ADM C.1. 6 'Report on Administration', pp.50-51
97. House of Assembly Debates, 18.4.1917, p.163
98. Report of the Administrator 1922, p.53
99. Union of South Africa, Memorandum, p.26; Union of South
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100. Union of South Africa, Official Yearbook No.4, p.933
101. House of Assembly Debates, 20.3.1917, p.92
102. Gorges - Smuts, 25.2.1917 in W.K. Hancock and J. van der
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103. Report of the Administrator 1918, p.10; ADM 4060
Bericht uebcr die 1. Haefte des laufenden Geschaeftsjahres
vom 1. April bis 30. September 1920, vorgelegt dem
Verbandsausschuss am 27. Oktober 1920, p.5
104. ADM 3370 Annual Report Gobabis District 1916, 20.1.1917,
p.3
106. ADM 3370 Annual Report Okahandja 1916, 2.1.1917, p.2
107. Native Reserves Commission, 1921, p.4
109. Ibid, 1919, p.5; NAV 39/1918/1 O.C. Native Affairs
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567/2 Vol.3 Deputy Commissioner of Police to Secretary
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111. ADM 2163/3 (I) Superintendent Locations to Officer in Charge Native Affairs, 8.3.1917

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113. ADM 567/2 Vol.1 Military Magistrate Omaruru to Secretary for the Protectorate, 20.11.1916

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121. ADM 4060 Vol.1 Assistant Magistrate Maltahoehe: Minutes of Public Meeting of Villagers and Farmers in the District of Maltahoehe, 10.2.1916; See also ADM 4060 Vol.1 Farmers' Association Section Kalkfeld to General Consulate of the U. S. of America, Cape Town, 1.5.1916

122. ADM 4060 Vol.1 Farmers' Meeting, 8.1.1916; ADM 4060 Vol.1 Resolution der Maltahoehe Farmervereinigung, 3.5.1916

123. ADM 4060 Vol.2 Farm Association Kalkfeld to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 13.11.1920, p.2

124. ADM C.1 6 'Report on Administration', pp.25-26

125. SWAA A 396/6 Dr. Seitz to H. E. the Administrator Windhoek, 24.1.1916, p.1


127. ADM 4060 Vol.1 Farmers' Association Omaruru, Section Kalkfeld to Administrator, 12.8.1916

128. ADM 4060 Vol.1 Telegram Secretary for the Protectorate to Military Magistrate Omaruru, 19.9.1916


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134. Emmett, 'Popular Resistance in Namibia', p.9

135. Ibid, p.11

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137. ADM 567/2 Vol.1 Memorandum...p.4; Emmett, ‘Popular Resistance’, p.11
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142. SWAA A 50/27 Vol.1 Deputy Secretary for the Protectorate to Officer in Charge Military Constabulary Windhoek, 29.3.1916; SWAA A 50/27 Vol.1 A.J.W. for Secretary of the Protectorate to Officer Charge Native Affairs, Windhoek, 27.2.1918
143. For an example see SWAA A 50/27 Vol.1 Officer in Charge Native Affairs to Secretary for the Protectorate, Windhoek, 26.5.1917
144. ADM 567/2 Vol.3 Elmenhorst to Minister of Justice, Pretoria, 15.2.1920. Cf. also Polle to Minister of Justice, Pretoria, 9.2.1920; March to Minister of Justice, Pretoria, 14.2.1920; A.Sim to Col. Lee, 18.3.1920
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147. ADM 3370 Administrator’s Annual Report 1916, 31.1.1917, pp.22-23, 24
149. Quoted by Schoeman, ‘Suidwes-Afrika’, p.111. For a general description of the quality of policemen see Gorges to Smuts, 25.2.1917 in Hancock et al, Selections, p.455
150. ADM 3370/2 Administrator’s Annual Report 1917, 16.2.1918, p.17
152. ADM 567 Vol.2 Magistrate Okahandja to Secretary for the Protectorate, 9.3.1920; Emmett, ‘Popular Resistance’, p.13;
154. ADM 164/3 Officer in Charge Native Affairs Windhoek to Deputy Secretary for the Protectorate, 30.3.1916, p.1
155. ADM 164/3 Officer in Charge Native Affairs Windhoek to Deputy Secretary for the Protectorate, 30.3.1916, p.2
156. Circulars, SWA Administrasie 1915- : Circular Minute No.58, 23.11.1915, pp.1-2


159. ADM 3370/2 [Constabulary] 1917, 25.1.1918, pp.4-5

160. ADM 3370/2 (II) Annual Report Native Affairs 1917, Windhoek and District, 7.1.1918, pp.6-7

161. ADM 3370/2 (II) Untitled Report 1917, p.19

162. ADM 2163/3 (I) Capt. Bowker, Officer in Charge Native Affairs to Secretary for the Protectorate, 19.13.1917

163. NAW 30/1916/1 Officer in Charge Native Affairs Windhoek to Deputy Secretary for the Protectorate, 10.7.1917, n.p. [p.4]; NAW 30/1916/1 Superintendent Reserves to Officer in Charge Native Affairs, Windhoek, 11.4.1918, p.4; Emmett, ‘Popular Resistance’, p.16


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166. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, p.43

167. See e.g. Berichte der Rheinischen Missionsgesellschaft 1916, p.266. The first conference report for Okahandja after the war, for example, covers the period 1913 to the end of February 1920. AVEM C/h 25a Conferenzbericht der Station Okahandja ueber die Zeit vom Jahre 1913 - Ende Februar 1920

168. AVEM C/s 2 Verhandlungen mit dem Sekretaer von Sued West Afrika, Mr. Courtney-Clarke, am 14. Maerz 1937; AVEM C/s 2 Zur Beantwortung des Fragebogens von Herrn Direktor Dr. Hartenstein. Von Dr. H. Vedder, Okahandja, n.d.[1938], n.p.; AVEM C/h 12a Konferenzbericht der Missionstation Gobabis, Mai 1926, p.2

169. AVEM C/h 12a Konferenzbericht der Missionsstation Gobabis, Mai 1926, p.2

170. AVEM C/h 15a Jahresbericht der Gemeinde Grootfontein 1915, p.2

171. AVEM C/h 25a Conferenzbericht der Station Okahandja S.W.A. ueber die Zeit vom Jahre 1913 - Ende Februar 1920

172. AVEM C/h 25a Conferenzbericht der Station Okahandja S.W.A. ueber die Zeit vom Jahre 1913 - Ende Februar 1920


174. AVEM C/h 15a Halbjahresbericht Grootfontein, 7.4.1923, p.6

175. Literally: troop players

176. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Military Magistrate Okahandja to Secretary for the Protectorate, 19.5.1917, p.1

177. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Military Magistrate Gobabis to Secretary for the Protectorate, 18.8.1919

178. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Officer in Charge of Native Affairs:
Interview with 5 Hereros, 4.10.1927, p.3

179. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Military Magistrate Okahandja to Secretary for the Protectorate, 19.5.1917, p.2; A 50/59 Vol.1 Officer in Charge of Native Affairs: Interview with 5 Hereros, 4.10.1927, p.1. See also SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Location Superintendent: Report of a Meeting held at the Omaruru Native Location regarding Military Plays, Exercising and Wearing of Uniforms. 11.3.1928, p.2

180. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Officer in Charge Native Affairs: Interview with 5 Hereros, 4.10.1927, p.2

181. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Military Magistrate Okahandja to Secretary for the Protectorate, 19.5.1917, p.2. It should be pointed out that some of these names corresponded to actual individuals. Von Deissling was General von Trotha's successor as Commander of the German forces in S.W.A.; von Estorff fought in the war of anti-colonial resistance in 1904-07 and in 1907 became Commander of the German forces in S.W.A. Leutwein in turn became Governor of S.S.W.A. in 1898 and Franke was an army captain who was also active during the wars of 1904-07. See H. Bley, South West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914, (London, 1971), pp.4,49,16-61

182. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Officer in Charge of Native Affairs: Interview with 5 Hereros, 4.10.1927, p.2

183. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.2 N.C. (??) Luederitz, 11.9.1930, p.4

184. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Military Magistrate Okahandja to Secretary for the Protectorate, 19.5.1917, p.3

185. ADM 3979 W. Eichhoff, Okamatangara to Military Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 29.3.1917

186. ADM 3979 Magistrate Otjiwarongo to Secretary for the Protectorate, 26.4.1917

187. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.2 Superintendent of Locations Windhoek to Additional Native Commissioner Windhoek, 9.7.1940, p.1

188. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.2 Superintendent of Locations Windhoek to Additional Native Commissioner Windhoek, 9.7.1940, p.2

189. 'The Life of Chief Hosea Kutako', mimeo, n.d., p.4. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Theo Sundermeier for having made this manuscript available to me.

190. Ibid, p.4


192. ADM 2163/3 (1) Superintendent Locations, Capt. P.J. Venter to O.C. Native Affairs, 21.8.1916
CHAPTER THREE: THE FIRST YEARS OF MANDATE, 1920 – 1928

Annexation and Settler Opposition

Under the terms of the Peace Treaty of Versailles signed on 28 June 1919, 'Germany relinquished its former colonial territories, including German South West Africa.' (1) Henceforth S.W.A. was to be administered as a 'C' class Mandate in terms of Article 22, Part 1, of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles. (2) On 7 May 1919 the Union of South Africa was assigned as the mandatory power. She in turn passed the Treaty of Peace and South West Africa Mandate Act, No. 49 of 1919 in September of that year, giving official effect to the mandate. As mandatory power, the Union obtained 'ownership of expropriated Herero and Nama lands and the right to grant permission to prospect for and mine minerals on land within the so-called police zone.' (3)

Although the mandate did not provide for outright annexation of former German colonies by the mandatory powers, the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated that

there are territories, such as South West Africa...which can best be administered under the laws of the Mandatory, as an integral portion of its territory, subject to the safeguards abovementioned in the interests of the indigenous population. (4)

The Union Government interpreted the Mandate to mean the de
In 1920 General Smuts as Prime Minister of the Union told a deputation of German settlers in S.W.A. that

The Union Government could extend to South West Africa its legal, judicial, administrative and financial systems, its civil service, its police, and its Railway Administration, and it could declare South West Africa a province of the Union, it could give Parliamentary representation, the only limit being in regard to natives. In effect, the relations between South West Protectorate and the Union amount to annexation in all but name.

General Smuts’ interpretation of the Mandate was not shared by all settlers, however. The older, German section of S.W. Africa’s settler population in particular was strongly opposed to becoming a fifth province of the Union of South Africa. They had earlier demanded what boiled down to “a self-governing Germanic state.” The commission appointed by the Union Government to inquire into S.W.A.’s future form of government found that “a considerable section of the population” entertained the aspiration that the territory would “develop into a state entirely independent of the Union.” Such demands were reinforced by Article 22 of the Peace Treaty which stipulated that the mandatory power “is placed in the position of a guardian only until such time as the people over whom the Mandate is granted is able to stand alone.”

Many German settlers regarded the Union of South Africa as unable to assist S.W.A. in its economic development. This
point of view was most radically and consistently articulated in the Allgemeine Zeitung, the German daily in Windhoek. An article in 1923 referred to budget deficits in the Union during the years 1920-1923 and concluded that the Union was not strong enough financially to develop S.W.A. The article argued that the recent adverse trend of capital investment in the territory was an indication of where the economy was going under Union rule. The diamond mines were closed because they competed with Union producers; the only major investor in S.W.A. — the Imperial Cold Storage (I.C.S) — was granted a monopoly of meat exports, thus eliminating local competition. Nothing was done to develop other export facilities in the territory.(8)

Integrating S.W.A. with S.A.: the Railways and Customs Union

The Union Government proceeded to ensure that the territory would become 'a captive market for both its investment and trade.'(9) It did so by incorporating S.W. Africa's railways into the Union and making the territory a member of the South African Customs Union. The subsequent economic effects, particularly on merchant and agricultural capital, were grist to the mill of those settlers who were radically opposed to any form of incorporation into the Union.

Although management and control of the S.W.A. Railways was only officially transferred to the Union by Act No.20 of 1922, the
Union Government had already adapted railway rates in the territory to those in the Union in July 1921. (10) As opposed to the former German rate which was devised to cater for short distance traffic from S.W. Africa's ports to inland points, the object of the Union tariff was 'to get as much traffic as possible over long distances and over their own railway system and to compete with the sea-borne traffic.' This was considered necessary to foster 'the importation of Union produce to the Mandated Territory and not specially for the purpose of coming to the assistance of the South West African producer.' (11)

Railway rates were determined on a sliding scale, slightly favouring long distance traffic to and from the Union. With the exception of livestock and passenger traffic, however, which enjoyed a through rate to Union destinations, the rates for all other goods were split at the S.A. - S.W.A. border. (12) While the main report of the Economic and Financial Relations Commission (EFRC) argued that this put S.W. African farmers in an advantageous position regarding rail tariffs to the Union, Dr. Hirsekorn pointed out in his Minority Report that farmers could not enjoy the full advantage of the tapering rate as it ceases to operate at 1000 miles and because the distance from Windhoek to Cape Town is 1383 miles and from Otjiwarongo to Johannesburg 1616 miles. (13)

Railage for longer distances was high, 'amounting for one animal from Windhoek to Cape Town to £2 and from Otjiwarongo to
Johannesburg to £2.4s.6d.' This constituted about 40 per cent of the average market value of an animal, an amount regarded as 'excessive and out of proportion to the price realised for such an animal' by farmers. (14)

Higher rates were fixed in S.W.A. than in the Union for certain products. This was done with wine, brandy, ale, beer, stout, ores and concentrates, for example. Guano, on the other hand, was classified at a lower rate, because it was 'badly needed by the farmers in the Union'. (15) These measures elicited considerable opposition from local merchants and farmers. Witnesses before the Commission complained that

the production of maize, wheat, vegetables, fruit, wine, brandy and tobacco were hampered owing to the competition which they encountered from products imported from the Union free of duty and at low railway rates... (16)

Railway rates worked in tandem with customs duties to subordinate economic development in S.W.A. to that of the Union. In terms of Union Act No.35 of 1921 S.W.A. 'became a member of the Customs Union of South Africa and other territories, which had been in existence for a generation.' (17) According to the Minority Report of Dr. Hirsekorn, 'customs duties are generally so calculated as to render it possible to undersell overseas importers with Union merchandise.' (18) S.W.A. therefore had to buy its goods from the Union, although in many instances these could be obtained more cheaply on the
world market. Incorporation into the Customs Union thus had the result that the cost of living in S.W.A. increased.

During the German regime maize, maize meal and lucerne were imported from the Argentine and coal from Germany or England. Even today with an adequate duty (the existing duty of 2s per 100 lbs, being too high) maize could be imported cheaper from the Argentine to be milled in the Territory. South African maize is exported to foreign countries at a much lower price. Owing to the productive duties the inhabitants of the Mandated Territory have to pay the fixed Union inland price, plus additional cost, and the South West African consumer is paying practically double the world's market price. Coal from overseas, duty free, or subject to a small duty could be landed cheaper at the South West African ports than from the Union...(19)

The increased cost of living is reflected in the consumer price index for the period 1920–1928 in Table 3.1 below. When it is kept in mind 'that the cost of living in the Union of South Africa is higher than in many other countries',(20) the full extent of the higher cost of living in S.W.A. becomes apparent.

Table 3.1 Consumer Price Index for Select Years 1920 – 1928

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>South Africa 1938=100</th>
<th>S. W. A. 1938=100 with Union figure as base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>145,8</td>
<td>191,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>110,1</td>
<td>135,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>108,3</td>
<td>129,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>106,3</td>
<td>137,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>106,9</td>
<td>139,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Union tariff policies also had the effect of stifling the development of S.W. African agriculture. Although the territory was burdened with irregular rainfall, Dr. Hirsekorn argued that with some protection, S.W.A. could grow "a certain quantity of the local requirements of vegetables, potatoes and tobacco... under irrigation." He was reiterating the views expressed by witnesses to the Commission that the cultivation of those crops presented no difficulties, and that production would increase with adequate protection. At present, however,

The South West Africa home producer suffers owing to the strong competition of the Union producer, and many witnesses expressed the opinion that such competition made the growing of certain products in South West Africa unprofitable. Union products are railed to the country at special low rates, and for good reasons on account of the facilitated competition of Union surplus stocks, local industries were either destroyed or have not been developed. (21)

It would appear that by 1928 the Union's tariff policies were paying off. In 1920 the Union exported goods to the value of £648 288 to S.W.A., representing about 30 per cent of the territory's total imports. This figure increased slightly to £749 488 in 1928, or 28 per cent of S.W. African imports. On average S.W.A. absorbed £341 000 worth of South African exports per annum between 1920 and 1928, leading the EFRC to conclude that this market was "of no inconsiderable importance to the commercial and industrial community of South Africa." (22) Over the same period the Union maintained a positive trade balance
with S.W.A. which stood at £629,209 during the period 1920-1924, and peaked at £1,128,400 in 1929. (23) While the proportion of Union produce appears to be rather small, it has to be kept in mind that in 1928 62 per cent of S.W.A.'s total imports came from and via the Union; 28 per cent representing goods manufactured in the Union and 34 per cent being goods imported via the Union from overseas manufacturers. (24)

Land Settlement and Economic Development

But more important in consolidating its position in S.W.A. was the Union's decision 'to establish in South West Africa as many Union nationals as possible.' (25)

Every effort was made by the state to facilitate the growth of the white settlers: cash advances of up to £750 per settler were made for the purchase of stock, implements, seeds etc.; farm leases were made available to settlers on a rent-free basis for the first year, 2% of the purchase price for the second and third years and 3.5% in the fourth and fifth years, and after five years the farm could be purchased over a twenty year period. (26)

In 1920 the Union Land Settlement Acts were applied to S.W.A. by the 'Land Settlement Proclamation, 1920' and a Land Board was established to facilitate rapid settlement. This was followed in 1921 by the establishment of a Land Bank, 'similar to that in the Union'. Regarding the Land Board, all important decisions such as 'the allotment of farms, granting of advances, remissions of rent etc. were reserved to the Administrator in a number of enabling clauses...'. (27) A number
of special conditions were created, however, to encourage settlement. Several amending proclamations were issued to allow for the remission of rents and legalise cash advances to prospective settlers in excess of the maximum £750 initially legislated. Moreover, a statement of advances to settlers did not have to and was never laid upon the Tables of both Houses of Parliament.

To assist the settlement of farmers from the Union of South Africa the Administrator of the Mandated Territory was empowered...to advance monies to a lessee for defraying the cost of conveyance by rail of the lessee and his family together with a reasonable amount of furniture, second-hand farming implements and animals for stud purposes from his ordinary place of residence in the Union of South Africa or within the Territory of South West Africa to the railway station nearest to the holding allotted to him. Such advance was not to exceed £100.(28)

In his evidence to the S.W.A. Commission in 1935 the former Secretary for S.W.A., H.P. Smit, stated that while the Administration at first had laid down a minimum capital of £250 for settlers to qualify for settlement, this policy was a somewhat lenient one...It was not too carefully scrutinised. As a rule, a settler would make up a statement that he possessed so much stock. When he fell short of the amount fixed, he just made it up by furniture and farming implements.(29)

Prospective settlers were not required by the land settlement laws to provide any capital for the land to be acquired. All that was required was that 'an applicant must...possess sufficient capital to develop and work the holding beneficially in the discretion of the Land Board.'(30) It was only after
1925 that S.W.A. was able to attract a type of settler from the Union who possessed any considerable amount of capital. As a result of this, the minimum capital necessary for settlers to qualify for settlement was raised to £500. (31)

Under such conditions the pace of land settlement in S.W.A. was rapid. By 1923, 662 farms comprising 5 650 087 ha. had been allotted to 831 settlers. (32) At the end of March, 1926 880 farms had been allotted to 1106 settlers under the Land Settlement Proclamations at a total valuation of £636 895. (33) Expenditure on advances and water boring for white settlers was equally impressive as, Table 3.2 indicates. For comparative purposes expenditure on 'native affairs' is provided where available.

Table 3.2 Expenditure on White Settlement and Native Affairs, 1920-1928 (in £)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White Settlement Advances</th>
<th>White Settlement Boring</th>
<th>Native Affairs Total</th>
<th>(Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Total amounts for 1920-1926:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>248 000</td>
<td>200 851</td>
<td>448 851</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>87 539</td>
<td>59 140</td>
<td>146 679</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>79 845</td>
<td>71 129</td>
<td>150 974</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>67 215</td>
<td>66 335</td>
<td>133 750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>482 599</td>
<td>397 655</td>
<td>880 254</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 151 -
During the period 1920-1926 an average of £41,300 p.a. was spent on advances to settlers from ordinary revenue in addition to an average of £33,475 on boring, totalling £74,775. After 1926 'about twice the amount spent annually on land settlement from revenue surpluses during the first six years under the Mandate was spent from loan money during the subsequent six years.' (34) The discrepancy between expenditure on white settlement and so-called native affairs hardly needs emphasizing.

In effect, S.W.A. had to pay for the settlement of Union nationals in the territory. The result of this was soon reflected in the territory's budget. Until 1925 the country did not have any debts and settlement expenditures were defrayed from revenue surpluses. From 1926, however, the territory had to raise loans in the Union to finance land settlement. At the end of the 1928-29 financial year, the public debt of the territory amounted to £406,800. (35) The

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Notes: Expenditures on 'native affairs' for the period up to 1923 are not available.
benefits to the Union of this state of affairs were clearly reflected in a resolution passed by the Administrator's Advisory Council in December 1924. It stated inter alia that

Without making any contribution towards the expenditure of the Territory since the introduction of civil administration, the Union Government has derived direct benefit therefrom, inasmuch as it has been relieved of a large number of persons who have come to the Territory as settlers and have received substantial financial assistance from the Administration. (36)

Economic Depression and Labour Conditions

White settlement in S.W.A. was ultimately premised on the subjugation of black S.W.Africans. Massive state grants and all the markets in the world would have been of limited use without cheap labour power and the unquestioned dominance of white settlers in the countryside. This required an assault on black pastoralists living on Crown land.

Stock farming in S.W.A. was critically dependent on sufficient supplies of cheap labour. This was particularly so, given the low level of development that characterised most farms in the 1920s, a factor not unrelated to the settlement policies of the Union. Most farms were not completely fenced and experienced a shortage of water points as well as transport difficulties, reinforcing the need for cattle herders. (37) However, labour shortages were a persistent feature of S.W. African agriculture. (38) Windhoek district alone was estimated to have
experienced a shortage of over 300 cattle herdsmen in 1923. (39)

Although no accurate figures exist as to the labour demands of mines and settler agriculture, indications are that labour shortages on farms were less a problem of absolute shortages than of distribution. This much was stated by the Administrator in 1922 when he noted that ‘the supply of ordinary labourers is about equal to the demand though unequally distributed.’ (40) He blamed conditions on farms for any shortages, in so far as employers who fed their labourers well had no problems obtaining labour, ‘while those with a contrary reputation experience constant difficulties and are a continuous source of trouble and embarrassment.’ (41)

Working conditions on settler farms were particularly harsh in the early 1920s. The brief post-war boom came to end within two years ‘and by 1922 the territory, along with other parts of the world, had entered the depths of the post-war recession.’ In addition the country was overtaken by drought. (42) Cattle markets in the Union were overstocked and S.W.A. prices plummeted to between 15s and 20s for a cow and 8s to 10s for a heifer. (43) By 1923 agricultural indebtedness had reached alarming proportions. The Registrar of Deeds reported that the total registered and uncancelled debt as recorded in the Debt Registers of the Deeds Office up to 31st December (1923) was £4 369 932 14s 9d and 18 189 154 Mark (coin) as compared with £3 893 123 and 21 835 415 Mark (coin) as at 31st December 1922. This represents an increase of £329 596. (44)
The manager of the Land Bank also complained about increasing agricultural debts.

He states that arrear interest and amortization payments have accumulated to such an extent, and the Bank has been obliged to take over so many properties which were hypothecated to it, that unless there is an immediate change for the better the Bank is faced with the prospect of having its capital locked up. (45)

These conditions directly affected farm labour. Many farmers found it impossible to pay wages at all. Even when they could pay cash wages, these lagged behind wages paid by the Administration and the mines. Wages on the Windhoek-Gobabis railway construction project, for example, ranged between 25s to 60s per month plus food as opposed to 10s to 20s on farms in the district of Windhoek. (46) Many complaints were received from farm workers "of ill-treatment, insufficiency or non-payment of wages and want of food." (47) In other cases, farmers paid their workers in kind, usually in stock. In 1922 the rate in Gobabis district was one sheep or goat per month. This effectively meant that workers were underpaid; whereas labourers were entitled to 15s per month, they only received the equivalent of 8s under this system of payment. The magistrate concluded that this "is not at all satisfactory and leads to endless trouble." To make matters worse, the high price for mealie meal led farmers to decrease the rations for their labourers "with the result that the Native is hard pressed at times to maintain his family, and there is practically no veldkost"
A graphic description of the hardship suffered by farm labourers as a result of the depression was provided by the magistrate of Outjo district. In his annual report for the year 1922, he wrote that the depression had hit black workers much more severely than their white masters, 'for the simple reason that he is being exploited by the white man.'

As a labourer he gets barely sufficient food for himself and his wage, which is more often than not paid in kind, is so small that if he has a family he is unable to provide for them with the result that he either has to steal or neglect his work to go and find "veld kos" for them. I have no compunction in stating that the scale of rations issued to natives in this country is not only lower than that obtaining anywhere in the Union but also manifestly inadequate...There is no getting away from the fact that, generally speaking, the native is being starved today. (49)

Despite the fact that the market began to improve towards the end of 1923, with prices for cattle reaching up to £17 10s, the lot of most farm workers had not improved by the late 1920s. (50) In 1927 the magistrate in Outjo district wrote that

The complaint frequently made by married natives is that they do not get sufficient food to enable them to keep their families and I think this complaint is well founded...One cannot expect glad and efficient service from a half-starved and ill-clad body. (51)
Labour Shortages, Squatting and Tenancy

Persistent labour shortages were also related to widespread squatting on Crown land. The process of 'self-peasantization' had progressed to such a level for some pastoralists that by the early 1920s a growing number of people found it impossible to accommodate their stock on white farms or in temporary reserves. As a result they attempted to buy private farms. A case in point was Jan Stephanus, a 'Damara' born in the Cape Colony. He was described by his lawyers as 'a loyal British subject [and] a progressive farmer...[owning] about 4500 small stock and about 270 large stock and horses.' He had leased the farm 'Abuchabis' in the Keetmanshoop district and was threatened with removal after it was advertised for sale in terms of the Land Settlement Act. The Native Reserves Commission confirmed the assessment of this man by his lawyers, when it stated that he was a man bearing 'an excellent character' who 'by thrift and honesty has accumulated this stock...'. Commenting on instructions from the local magistrate that upon his removal from the farm he should settle on the reserve 'Witbooisende', the Commission argued that he is 'driven from pillar to post in search of pasturage and we may say that we never contemplated that persons in his position—and their number is few indeed—should be accommodated in a reserve.' It recognised that forcing him to move to a reserve
would mean that he would 'lose what has taken him years to acquire.' Consequently the Commission 'strongly recommended' that his case be treated as a special one 'and that he be granted a lease of Crown land in the vicinity of the farm Vertwaal [sic] in the district of Keetmanshoop..."(54)

Apart from those few pastoralists who owned sufficient stock to be able to buy private land, squatting on Crown Land, white farms and Company land occurred throughout the 1920s. The South West Africa Company, for example, owned over 600,000 ha. in the Grootfontein district, representing 462 of 682 surveyed farms.(55) In the absence of any immediate buyers, the Company tolerated squatting on these farms and in this way accommodated large numbers of squatters, much to the annoyance of the local magistrate, who felt that this practice interfered with the labour supply in the district.(56)

Apart from the S.W.A. Company, many settler farmers in the Grootfontein district were desperate to lease their land to black tenants for ploughing. The local magistrate turned down many applications in this regard, arguing this would have a negative effect on the labour supply.(57) He conceded, however, that farmers stood to make 'considerably more' from renting out their land to blacks than they could make from leasing the whole farm to a single white. The lease of 50 ha. of agricultural land required the tenant to give the land owner
three out of every ten bags of maize reaped. The magistrate calculated that on average the tenant would reap about 20 bags over a three year period - ten bags/ha. in a good year, seven bags/ha. in a fair year and three bags in a poor year. On average, therefore, the lessor would receive two bags/ha. per annum or at current prices the value of £1/10/0 per ha. For his 50 ha. of agricultural land the settler would then receive the equivalent of £75 per annum. Given such a good return on his land and the economic conditions at the time, the magistrate concluded that 'the temptation to lease land to the natives is enormous...'(58)

Many stock farmers resorted to similar practices by charging extortionate fees for black-owned stock grazing on their farms. In 1921 farmers in the Otjiwarongo district were reported to have made more from grazing fees levied on black stock than from selling produce. (59) Reports from the Okahandja and Omaruru districts indicated that farmers allowed blacks to graze stock on their farms. According to the magistrate these stock owners were 'generally nominally working on the farm, but actually are peasants, owning enough stock to supply their wants.' (60) In 1922 the rate of grazing fees charged on farms in the Okahandja district was one shilling for ten head of small stock 'so that an owner of about 150 head does not get a penny out in wages.' (61)
While it is not possible to be precise about the extent of squatting and tenancy on white farms, it is clear that this practice persisted through the 1920s. (62)

**Black Competition and Settler Insecurity**

Given the low level of development of settler agriculture and the economic depression in the early 1920s, the accumulation of stock by black pastoralists was perceived as a threat by most white farmers. In a petition to General Smuts during his visit to S.W.A. in 1920, farmers had singled out the 'native question' for his special consideration. They submitted that the deterioration of labour relations posed a serious threat to the profitability of settler farming in Namibia. In particular, the matter of black ownership of stock on white farms demanded urgent attention.

The farmer has to decrease his stock of cattle at the same fast rate as native stock increases on white farms. Because of the labour shortage, he has no power to change the situation or to demand grazing fees for such stock. He would be without natives soon. For that reason it is necessary that government regulations laid down maximum numbers of stock for natives on farms and which can guarantee their implementation without the farmer losing all his labour. (63)

In the early 1920s the balance of power in the S.W. African countryside seems to have turned slightly against white settlers. Fears were expressed in the Grootfontein district, for example, that 'large areas of land were going out of
cultivation because there are no servants to plough and reap." Indeed, the local magistrate maintained in 1923 that occupancy rates on white farms had fallen by 50 per cent over the previous decade, while the proportion of black-owned stock had increased to about one third of the total. This growth in black-owned stock 'is the more remarkable because of its contrast with the increasing poverty of the Europeans'. He expressed the fear that 'because a Native can exist on a fraction of the amount a European requires, there is a danger of the Native ousting the European from the land.' This was particularly so, he added, because blacks were accumulating 'a commodity of a wrong type for which the demand in the world's markets is growing less year by year.' Moreover, he alleged that the value of land would drop because it was being under-utilised economically by producing cattle of an inferior quality. (64)

Similar reports were received from other districts. Several farmers claimed that they suffered losses as a result of labourers' small stock grazing on their land. It was alleged that especially in the central and northern districts where farmers tried to preserve their pastures for large stock, goats were a great nuisance. Some 'labourers' apparently owned upwards one thousand head of small stock and took no steps to limit numbers. (65)
The balance of forces in rural S.W.A. was succinctly assessed by the Karibib Farmer-Verein. In a memorandum setting out the severity of the labour problem in 1925, the Association stated bluntly 'that the native and not the white man is the real master on the farms.' Labourers could not be punished anymore, because they would give notice and seek new employers. The Association felt that the entire agricultural industry was threatened with survival.

The inferiority of the natives and the way they work against the white farmers has resulted in the small stock breeding in district Karibib [sic] passing almost entirely into native hands and the few white farmers who still own carakuls [sic] are thinking of giving up this form of sheep breeding, which used to be such a profitable one... The lack of labour must be put an end to or else farming will pass into the hands of the natives, as is already the case with small stock breeding... we see a time approaching when it will pay better to lease the farms to natives than to work them ourselves. We already know of cases in which natives have leased land from white men, and this is the beginning of the end. (66)

Table 3.3 overleaf indicates the extent of black stock ownership in S.W.A. in 1923. In particular, it reveals that more than twice as much black-owned stock was grazing on land outside temporary and permanent reserves than in them.

Class Struggle in the Countryside

The 1920s were thus characterised by heightened class struggle in rural S.W.A., frequently accompanied by violence. In the Mariental district for example, farmers warned the Union Prime
Table 3.3  Livestock owned by Blacks inside and outside Reserves, 1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
<th>Area (ha.)</th>
<th>Stock on Reserves</th>
<th>Stock outside Reserves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aroab</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>no figures available</td>
<td>1 056</td>
<td>13 288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethany</td>
<td>Soromas</td>
<td>8 212</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibeon</td>
<td>Witbois-vlei</td>
<td>10 400</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>3 212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freistadt</td>
<td>4 841</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>3 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ekukiro</td>
<td>178 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aminuis</td>
<td>230 000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gunichas</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grootfontein</td>
<td>Otjituuo</td>
<td>105 768</td>
<td>3 750</td>
<td>3 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karibib</td>
<td>Audawib O.</td>
<td>13 958</td>
<td>1 750</td>
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</tr>
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Minister about 'ernstige botsingen...tussen plattelands bijoners [sic] en naturellen groot skade word geleden aan vee doordat er geen verplichtend wet op de Kaffers is.' (67) Reports of ill-treatment and overworking on settler farms were frequent throughout the 1920s. (68) Although many cases were never brought before the courts, the Permanent Mandates Commission was blandly informed that often 'farmers became exasperated and overstepped the bounds of moderation when they corrected their servants.' (69)

While blacks on settler farms met with increasing violence, others on temporary reserves felt pressures of a different nature. Temporary reserves in the district of Windhoek, i.e. those occupied predominantly by Herero, were rapidly becoming overpopulated and overstocked. Reports of overgrazing and lack of water were received from many reserves. (70) At the end of 1919, the Officer in Charge of Native Affairs had recommended to the Secretary that existing temporary reserves should be extended since present stock numbers and growth rates of black-owned stock had rendered them too small. (71) By the time
the Native Reserves Commission heard evidence in 1921, the position on the Orumbo-Okatumba group of reserves was critical. The Officer in Charge of Native Affairs warned that

...if we are to save the cattle some outlet must be found for a number of the stock now on Orumbo, unless this is done it is anticipated that the death rate from poverty will be very high.(72)

To counter this increasing pressure, Herero allowed their stock to trespass on white-owned farm land. The absence of fences around farms and temporary reserves favoured such a strategy.(73) Farmers in turn retaliated by impounding reserve stock trespassing on their farms.(74) It was common practice by farmers to impound reserve stock and then demand a ransom for their return. In one case, a Mr. Held, who featured regularly in trespassing complaints in the Orumbo-Okatumba area, impounded 333 cattle belonging to a headman and other residents of the latter reserve. He was prepared to release them for '2 fat oxen of 6 years old and a bull', which were acquired by the headman for £10. The headman 'handed over the cattle under protest and reported to the Superintendent at once.' In another incident the same farmer demanded a sum of £2/1/0 for the release of 70 cows and calves.(75)

Herero stock owners fiercely resisted the impounding of their stock. One white farmer, Georg Baas, who impounded 600 head of cattle, was confronted by Herero armed with kieries. Driving their cattle back they told Baas that 'if I should seize their
cattle again they would kill me.' (76) The seriousness of the situation was acknowledged by Windhoek’s magistrate in a letter to the Secretary for S.W.A. in which he referred to reports from the Orumbo-Okatumba reserves which indicated that there is considerable risk of violence and lawlessness breaking out between the farming and native community of the locality in the near future unless some immediate steps are taken by the Administrator to relieve the congestion in the reserve. (77)

Colonial officials clamped down heavily on black trespassers. In 1919 the Officer in Charge of Native Affairs, Captain Bowker, ordered stock owners in Orumbo reserve living close to white-owned farms to move to the central location under threat of burning down their huts. In addition he deposed a headman, Bartholomeus, for not having reported trespassing cattle to the Superintendent. Concluding his speech, he warned that he did not want any more reports about trespassing to reach Windhoek: 'before that happens I will burn every hut on the reserves.' (78) He gave instructions to the Superintendent that

Stock found trespassing must be seized and impounded in Windhoek and the cost of herding, driving, pound fees and labourers’ food borne by the stock owner. If he cannot pay you are to seize stock sufficient in value to cover such cost — sell it, pay the charges and hand over the balance. You must look for trespassing stock, not wait till the farmers complain. (79)

While it was patently obvious to both officials and Herero pastoralists living on Orumbo-Okatumba that present land areas were inadequate and not sufficiently watered, the latter did
not want to give up their pastures. Instead they requested permission to buy land adjacent to the reserves.

I informed them that the Government was considering the question of retention or otherwise of Orumbo but requirements of population [sic] as a whole and not present residents had to be considered: that as Government proposed provision of adequate but supervised reserves for surplus stock and natives unable to work, necessity of purchase of ground did no arise, and in any case such latter course indicated a foolish idea of independence from administrative control which would not be countenanced. (80)

Settler Interests and Native Reserves

By 1920 the Union government was faced with contradictory demands over land and labour in S.W.A. On the one hand there was 'considerable agitation amongst the natives' for the establishment of permanent reserves. (81) This was violently opposed by settler farmers on the other hand, who demanded that temporary reserves be either suspended or removed 'to a less populated district as the nuisance and losses caused by the natives are becoming insupportable.' (82)

Settler opposition amounted to a full-scale assault on black labour tenants and squatters by limiting their access to land and controlling stock numbers. (83) Their main complaints were that temporary reserves were 'not under proper control [and] provided a refuge for vagrants and facilities for the concealment of stolen stock.' They also expressed the opinion
'that there was too much squatting on Crown lands' and demanded 'that native locations on private property be prohibited.' They complained that the stock qualifications for labour exemption introduced after 1915 were too low 'and tend to reduce the able-bodied natives available for employment, besides encouraging laziness.' Blacks were exempted from wage labour if they could prove that they owned a minimum of ten head of large stock or 50 head of small stock. Avoidance of wage labour was further aided by grazing fees which farmers considered too low, both on the reserves and on Crown Land. (84) Apart from demanding the limitation of black-owned stock on white farms, farmers' associations wanted far higher grazing fees to be levied on such stock, than those charged by the colonial state. (85)

Settlers depended crucially on state intervention to solve the labour problem, since it was intimately tied to the land question. The interconnection between these two issues was clearly recognised by the Administrator in his often quoted observations that 'the labour question...is synonymous with the native question' and 'the native question is the land question.' (86)

White farmers found themselves in a contradictory position. In the first place they demanded the abolition of reserves because reserves allegedly provided an important alternative to wage
labour. Yet the continued ownership of stock by black labourers was essential for capital accumulation to take place in settler agriculture as this enabled white farmers to pay their labour below the cost of its reproduction. This was very clearly stated by the magistrate for Karibib district when he noted that unless farm workers could own stock, they would be reduced to pauperism and will resort to thieving, for no ordinary farm labourer can possibly provide for his family out of the wages earned by him and his family must necessarily depend almost entirely on his stock. (87)

The Administrator emphasised the point in his annual report for 1921 when he argued that Europeans naturally object to natives with stock settling on their farms, large as the latter are, and the necessity for reserves is perhaps greater than in the Union, where natives' families on farms can, as a rule, produce food for themselves by planting crops. This is seldom possible here, and consequently those unable to work have to depend almost entirely upon such of their old staple diet, meat and milk, as they can get, unless assisted with money or provisions by relatives and friends in employment. (88)

However, the ownership of stock by farm labourers had important drawbacks too. Additional stock numbers on white farms meant that white farmers had to cut down the sizes of their own herds, particularly during the dry season and times of drought. Moreover, tenant labour interfered with the distribution of labour on settler farms, since it favoured farmers with sufficiently large farms to accommodate additional stock. The magistrate in Okahandja district addressed both these issues when he wrote in 1922 that
it would certainly be preferable to provide further grazing ground at one spot for native stock than allow them to take over more grazing on farms which can ill-afford much at certain times of the year. There is still further danger of a native bartering his services to those who allow him the most grazing with the result that the farmer who can only afford grazing for his own stock will find himself lacking the labour. (89)

While the ownership of stock by blacks could not be altogether prohibited under prevailing circumstances, officials agreed that stock numbers on settler farms in particular had to be limited. (90) One way of doing this was 'to provide a central area for surplus stock... and unemployable natives.' (91) Such reserves 'would greatly facilitate and render more effective the proper registration and branding of all native-owned stock. It would enable native servants out at work to place their stock on the reserves and collect there the old and infirm.' (92) To this end the Union administration appointed a commission in December 1920 to investigate, inter alia, the control, size of and conditions in existing reserves, and the availability and distribution of potential labour in those reserves for farms. (93)

The Native Reserves Commission and its Aftermath

The Native Reserves Commission of 1921 firmly set S.W.A. on the road to becoming a settler colony. Districts hitherto dotted with small temporary reserves were to become exclusively white
farming districts. In selecting sites for reserves the Commission had

studiously avoided the creation of "black islands" in the various districts, and for this reason ha[s] selected large areas in outlying parts of the country with a view also to accommodating therein natives belonging to more than one tribe. (94)

This would involve 'the removal of natives' settlements from essentially European areas' as the enlarged Commission was to point out. (95) The enlarged Commission 'affirmed[ed] the general principle of segregation as outlined in the report' and was influenced in this inter alia by 'the necessity of preventing renting of land to natives commonly known as "kaffir farming"' and 'the advisability of providing facilities for better and more efficient official control of reserves.' (96) It further recommended that temporary reserves should be closed and new land provided to accommodate 'natives removed from areas recommended for closure.' The Commission

also considered the question of setting aside a "Native Area" on similar lines to those of the Union Native Lands Act of 1913, whereby at some future time natives might be permitted to purchase or otherwise obtain ground for their own use away from "White Areas". An extensive area on the eastern side of the Gobabis and Waterberg districts and abutting the Bechuanaland border was recommended. (97)

These recommendations provided the basis for the dispossession and resettlement of Herero pastoralists into marginal areas on the eastern border of S.W.A. The temporary Herero reserves in the Orumbo-Dkatumba area in central S.W.A. had to be vacated for several reasons, the farms were required for settlers, they were too scattered to form a reserve
and thirdly they did not contain sufficient water and grazing for the stock accumulated by the Hereros... (98)

Similarly, Herero communities in the Waterberg area had to give up their well-watered land in favour of white settlers. Writing to the Secretary for S.W.A., the magistrate in Otjiwarongo stated that 'it should be remembered that in removing them [the Herero] from Waterberg we deprived them of their permanent water supply.' (99) Regarding a suggestion that in compensation for the loss of Waterberg two farms should be included in the recommended reserve, the same magistrate commented:

The two farms Omupanda and Trompetenhalter were prior to the war occupied and abandoned by German settlers owing to lack of permanent water. They are, however, eminently suited for the natives and an essential part of the reserve. (100)

The main problem with the new reserves was lack of water and inadequate pastures. In 1929, i.e. six years after initial occupation, Otjituo reserve in the north-east had only one borehole which lasted throughout the year. Since mid-1927 reserve residents had spent about £1500 out of reserve funds on water boring alone. (101) In Otjohorongo reserve with a proclaimed area of 330 000 ha., only one out of six boreholes sunk in 1924 produced water. By the early 1930s a total of 16 boreholes had been sunk at a cost of about £3200, of which only six yielded any water. 'All of these boreholes have been debited against the reserve Fund.' (102)
Aminuis and Epukiro reserves were no exception to this pattern. Stock owners in Aminuis had lost 'some 2500 head of large stock' by 1927 'in spite of the efforts of the natives to sink wells.' In October of the same year the superintendent reported that the situation regarding grazing and water was so bad in the reserve that I am of opinion that unless the Administration can come to the natives' immediate assistance...I venture to state that we may even expect the natives to pack up lock, stock and barrel and quit the reserve.(103)

Regarding Epukiro reserve, the Assistant Secretary for S.W.A. conceded that 'the high hopes that were entertained on the original inspection of the reserve were not borne out by experience, either in respect of the grazing potentialities or the water supplies.'(104) The reserve did not have any permanent open water, and well-sinking proved unsuccessful, 'the rock to be pierced being very compact and the water table lies rather at too great a depth.'(105) Although Epukiro had 'nine successful boreholes supplied with windmills and reservoirs' in August 1928, the Native Commissioner stated that the north-eastern portion of the reserve 'has been out of reach owing to there being no open water from which the drill could draw the necessary supplies.'(106)

Soils and pastures in many new reserves were of marginal quality. Although Epukiro was a large reserve, only a fraction
was useful as pasture for large stock, as the Veterinary Officer in Gobabis, Dr. Maag, testified. After an inspection tour of Epukiro he reported that while the veld along the omuramba

may be regarded as a good small stock veld, the soil is hard and good fine grasses and fodder bushes are growing there. But this veld is only a small strip along the omuramba, about half a mile to 1 mile broad. The veld outside the omuramba to the north and south must be described as a poor grazing veld for large stock and only suitable during the green season for small stock...The sickness amongst the cattle may be diagnosed as stiffsickness and may be caused by the poor veld.(107)

Generally, pastures in the new reserves were characterised by a lack of phosphorous, which gave rise to gallamsiekte or 'sandveld disease'.(108) In 1925 the superintendent of Aminuis reserve reported to the magistrate in Gobabis that grazing on the reserve was very poor: '...there is lots of grass but it is not edible for cattle. There is very little sweet grass here.'(109) Land south of Otjituuo reserve in the Grootfontein district was described as being
dotted with sand dunes and practically impassable by either man or beast...it is highly improbable water could be found in this locality. Grazing is reported to be of a sandveld type and it is considered this area does not warrant the expense of exploitation.(110)

Resistance, Repression and Control

The deliberations of the Native Reserves Commission were viewed with suspicion from the start. In September 1921 the Officer
in Charge of Native Affairs met 'a representative delegation of native headmen' which was very much perturbed over this matter and appear to be under the impression that their wants are not receiving the consideration they deserve [and] they also allege that they have not been consulted sufficiently on these questions which affect their future welfare so vitally...(111)

S.W. Africa's black inhabitants correctly recognised that the recommendations of the Commission with regard to 'native reserves' were dictated not by the need to create a sub-subsistence pastoral economy - though that is what resulted - but by consideration for the present and future land requirements of white settlers...(112)

Herero leaders rejected the proposed areas east of Waterberg and Gobabis because of their inferior quality. After an inspection tour of the area in 1924, Hosea Kutako made his position plain. He argued that

We are a big nation, and as such we shall not develop in a country like this where there is only deep borehole water. In fact it is a desert where no human being ever lived before. It is a country only good for wild beasts. On top of that it is not healthy for the people or the cattle. I told him only one farm can depend on borehole water but it is no use for a whole nation...We are the original inhabitants of S.W.A. and we know the best and the worst parts of the whole country...You should rather bring the Europeans here and let us stay where we are...(113)

Herero communities settled in temporary reserves east of Windhoek consequently resisted resettlement into permanent reserves further east. Kutako instructed them not to move to
Epukiro and sent messages to all headmen in the Gobabis district to go to Windhoek for a meeting on the issue. His main objection to Epukiro was lack of water. (114) As a result, 108 pastoralists 'steadfastly refused' to move from Okatumba to Epukiro taking up the standpoint that they are being required to remove from a place where they have open water sufficient for their requirements to one where the supply was not even assured. (115)

According to the Administrator, 'argument and persuasion had no effect, and it was only after they realised that they would be forcibly expelled that they left.' (116) In Orumbo reserve the government used violence in forcing people to move. Windmills and pumps were put out of action and huts were burned. Military aircraft dropped bombs into the hills to frighten people. (117) Headman Festus Kandjou related the events to the Reverend Michael Scott in the late 1940s:

We were...ordered to remove all our belongings from Orumbo to the new places where our cattle were, and never to dream of Orumbo again. In this way Orumbo became the land of the white man's farms. The people at first refused to leave Orumbo. Captain Bowker then came from Windhoek and set our houses and gardens on fire. Although the houses were burned, we remained at Orumbo for some time. But most of our cattle were on the other side of the fence and they were not allowed to return back to Orumbo. So, in this way, we were in the end obliged to leave there. (118)

A central concern of the colonial administration in establishing reserves was the issue of control. (119) One of the aims of the Native Reserves Commission was 'to tighten up Native Administration in order to prevent vagrancy and
In this regard,
larger, more consolidated reserves were preferred to
smaller, fragmented reserves, while any form of
government-controlled reserve was preferable to
squatter communities on white farms or in the
Rehoboth Gebiet.

To further facilitate improved control of S.W. Africa's black
population, the Union Government introduced a series of laws
between 1920 and 1924. These laws brought the territory in line
with existing legislation in the Union. The Suppression of
Vagrancy and Idleness Proclamation No. 25/1920 "was designed to
meet the labour problem" by making it an offence to "wander
abroad" being idle or "without visible means of support."(122)
It also "made provision for the removal of squatters from Crown
and mission land or land set aside for native locations."(123)
The Native Administration Proclamation No. 11/1922 provided
further legislation "to control both squatting and the movement
of blacks."(124) The Master and Servants Proclamation No.
34/1920 "made it a crime for a worker to change employers, or
leave a job, without his employer's permission while under
contract." The Curfew Regulations Proclamation No. 33/1922 and
the Native (Urban Areas) Proclamation No. 34/1924 "were "for the
better control of contracts of service with natives... and the
regulation of ingress of natives into" towns."(125) The Pass
Law Proclamation No. 11/1922 and 15/1928 "made it a crime for
any Namibian outside a reserve in the Police Zone to travel,
visit, live, seek a job, accept any job, work at any job or
carry on any business without the relevant pass..." (126)

By contrast to the legislation just outlined, control in the reserves was to be based less on direct coercion than the cooptation of traditional leaders. To facilitate this, a semblance of 'tribal' structures and customs had to be retained. The Native Reserves Commission thus recommended that

Whilst we do not of course advocate a return to tribal rule, we consider that the old native system might to a great extent be usefully applied through more personal control by approved officials than has been the case hitherto. This system has worked inexpensively and satisfactorily in Ovamboland. (127)

In effect, this system of administration meant that traditional chiefs were stripped of most of their powers. So-called traditional leadership was redefined. As a general rule, the colonial administration only implemented 'tribal rule' once it had deposed or otherwise destroyed powerful paramount chiefs. The case of Ovamboland illustrates the point well. 'Tribal rule' was only resorted to once the powerful Ukwanya chief Mandume had been killed in a battle with Union forces in 1922. (128) Instead of appointing a successor to Mandume, 'the tribe was governed directly by the Resident Commissioner, and later under a council of headmen.' (129) Although the system 'amounted to controlling the natives more and more through their own traditional leaders', (130) Native Affairs officials were the ones to issue directives and policies.

Through the influence of Government officials...the different tribal heads have more or less came to look
to the Native Affairs Staff for advice and guidance in determining their affairs, especially as far as the more complicated and inter-tribal or sectional questions are concerned. In this way it has been possible to obtain an increasing and stronger control over the different people. Cattle raids, fights, robberies, etc., which only a few years ago were very common occurrences, are now seldom heard of. (131)

The colonial administration did not wish to encourage the reconstitution of once powerful ‘tribes’, as the Herero were soon to learn. Their request to have Friedrich Maharero recognised as paramount chief in 1923 was refused by the Union Administration. In reply to this request

...it was explained to the natives that quite apart from any question of policy the reserve system made such a position impossible. The Hereros would be concentrated in various reserves widely separated, and each reserve would be placed under headmen who would be subject to the direct control of the Superintendent or Magistrate, as the case may be. If Frederick Maharero were appointed paramount chief, his people would naturally look to him for instructions and clashing would be almost inevitable. (132)

The administration was only prepared to concede that the chief would be made headman in his reserve of residence.

The fragmented nature of the reserves generally, and specifically those of the Herero, enabled the colonial government to render the unification of the Herero and other communities more difficult. This much was clear to the Administrator, Gijs Hofmeyr, who wrote to Smuts in 1921 that apart from providing labour, he had located the reserves in such a way that they would render 'concerted action or
organised effort on the part of the natives as a whole difficult.' (133)

Although the system of 'tribal administration' in Ovamboland was regarded as the ideal type for reserves generally, the situation was very different in the Police Zone. Here colonial dispossession and subjugation of the local people had smashed 'traditional' political structures so thoroughly that the Union Government experienced problems in grafting its administrative designs on to existing structures. The Permanent Mandates Commission was told that 'progress in the development of indigenous institutions had been retarded' in the Police Zone owing to the previous efforts of the German Government to destroy native tribal organisations. In such instances the Union Government had been obliged to establish popularly selected boards of headmen under the guidance of the European Welfare Officer. (134)

Under this system, government appointed headmen became 'the substitute for the old native chiefs.' (135)

Reserve boards were chaired by reserve superintendents. Their functions were limited to 'assisting and making suggestions in regard to the administration of the Reserve Fund, but they are also consulted in regard to all matters affecting their own welfare and reserve affairs generally.' (136) Beyond their advisory capacity, Reserve Boards had no power to lay down or enforce rules of their own. This remained the prerogative of
the magistrate and reserve superintendents. Reserve superintendents and not headmen or chiefs were given the power of making allotments of land, collecting taxes and fees, issuing passes, supervising sanitation, branding stock and generally controlling the reserve.’ (137) Headmen were subordinated to superintendents or so-called welfare officers and were regarded ‘as the connecting link between the European officials and the natives.’ (138)

The Development of Ethnic Consciousness

The consolidation of Union colonial structures in S.W.A., culminating in the proclamation of ‘native reserves’, posed a serious threat to the process of ‘self-peasantization’ embarked upon by Herero pastoralists after 1915. Indeed, many Herero saw the new reserves as a government ploy to dispossess them of their cattle. Moreover, reserves and pass laws made regular contact between urban and rural Herero more difficult. (139) Impending resettlement into marginal reserves was perceived as yet another wave of dispossession. Unable to challenge the colonial government through overt resistance, the Herero resorted to other forms of defiance. Most important of these was mobilisation along ethnic lines. In a different context, Beinart has examined the role of ethnicity in rural conflict and argued that

Ethnic identification did not preclude the pursuit of their interests by rural communities. On the
contrary, it could be an integral part of the way in which they defended themselves both from each other and from the pressures imposed in colonisation. (140)

The particular way in which Herero pastoralists had been incorporated into colonial structures favoured the development of an ethnic consciousness. The extent of dispossession experienced by the Herero was extreme even by the standards of S.W. African colonial history. This was clearly reflected in their perceptions about the past. In 1926 a Herero delegation told Native Affairs officers that:

When the present Government took over the country we were told that we would be free but instead of such being the case the Government has put fire into our lives. The Government has been to war with the Germans, Ovambos, Bastards [sic] and the Bondelswarts. The Herero nation has not made war yet, instead of growing up, it is going down, whereas people with whom war was made have benefited instead of being punished. (141)

Of course, the notion of a 'Herero nation' was not as straightforward as it was made out to be by the delegation. Instead, it referred to an 'imagined community' in the sense that a predefined Herero 'nation' did not exist but had to be created. (142). Certain Herero leaders acknowledged this in representations to the Government. Indeed, it may be argued that many of their demands were formulated in such a way so as to facilitate this process. In their address to Lord Buxton, then Governor General of the Union of South Africa, for example, they had pleaded with the colonial government to 'help us to grow as a new flower.'
We ask the government to give us a place where we can make gardens. We want a piece of land where we can live as a nation and where our families can grow into a nation. (143)

This process received a major stimulus in the course of the 1920s, and is traced in some detail in the remainder of this chapter.

**Opposition to the Rhenish Mission Society**

The revitalisation of pre-colonial symbols and customs among the Herero involved a complex process of disengagement from the Rhenish Mission Society. After the 1904-07 war, it was entrusted with the task of collecting Herero refugees in the countryside. Bereft of their chieftaincies and completely dispossessed of their land and stock, refugees regarded mission stations as a means to reestablish some kind of unity. As a result, many Herero became Christians. (144) However, changes in the political economy of S.W.A. in the 15 year period after the war of 1904-1907 and particularly after 1915, changed Herero perceptions of the role and usefulness of the Society. Increasingly, the Rhenish Mission came to be regarded as hampering the processes of 'self-peasantization' and ethnic identification.

The Mandate Period began on a bad note for the missionaries. In 1920 an Herero delegation submitted a memorandum to General
Smuts, demanding that all German missionaries be expelled from the country. (145) In the wake of this memorandum, growing numbers of Herero withdrew from the R.M.S. They boycotted the mission and church all over central S.W.A. (146) Church collections declined dramatically in the early 1920s. In Windhoek, for example, they dwindled from about 1200s in the period April - September 1921 to just over 240s for the same period in 1923. (147) Very soon the mission was faced with bankruptcy. On 28 November 1924 missionary Olpp sent a telegram to the Rhenish Mission Head Office in Wuppertal, Germany: 'Nama account completely [empty]...Herero account almost depleted. Help urgent.' (148) Herero defiance was sufficiently strong to dent the confidence of several missionaries severely. 'I shiver, when I see a couple of natives approaching my house together', lamented one, and another one: 'I am too scared to oppose their demands out of fear for causing another row.' (149)

According to the missionaries, the reason for this spirit of defiance had to be sought 'in the hearts of the people themselves.' Although they had formally accepted Christianity, they argued, the Herero had not progressed through it because they had not 'felt the inner experience of a conscious conversion.' (150) In line with this kind of reasoning a discourse on the Herero developed among Rhenish missionaries which portrayed them as wicked savages, devoid of the most
elementary moral sense. Promiscuity, drunkenness, excessive dancing, immorality, stinginess and avarice were among the characteristics allegedly displayed by Herero. (151) According to missionaries, Herero thinking was entirely focussed on material matters, which blinded them to spiritual and ethical questions.

Living together so closely with their cattle increased their already well developed sensuality and sexual life (Triebelenben) from childhood on and influenced mutual relations of the sexes so negatively that they could never develop a sense of human dignity... (152)

The Herero were described as conservative and averse to civilisation, resisting the cultural efforts of the missionaries. (153) Intellectually the Herero were still children, wrote missionary Meier 'but with regard to malice they have become men.' (154)

Behind these derogatory observations lay the painful realisation by missionaries that they were fast losing their previous status as saviours of the Herero. Indeed, they were regarded as having failed to save the Herero from colonial domination. A Herero informant subsequently explained that younger Herero especially had turned away from the mission in the 1920s because it seemed to them as though some of the churches thought too much on collecting dues and not enough on how it was used to enlighten the people. Some of the missionaries had succeeded in building up a large and widespread organisation, and had an almost exclusive influence over these peoples' minds but often they used that influence to confuse the minds of the people about the wrongs they suffered rather than
inspire them to fight and overcome these evils. (155)

During the 1920s Rhenish missionaries were increasingly identified by the Herero as accomplices in the process of their colonial dispossession and subjugation. In the light of these perceptions, the role of missionaries in collecting Herero from the countryside after 1904 acquired a new meaning. Far from being credited with having provided a safe haven for destitute Herero refugees, their involvement was now seen as deception, aimed at decimating the Herero even further. Missionaries were held directly responsible for Herero deaths after 1904. ‘When the war was over, missionaries came to the bush to call us and said it was peace, but it was not like that, because many were still killed afterwards.’ (156)

Criticism of the Rhenish Mission was more specific than the above quotation suggests, however. The mission was attacked for the deliberate destruction of Herero social and political structures, actions regarded as the root cause of Herero impoverishment. In 1931 mission inspector Driessler was told by a Herero man that

*It was a year of peace when the missionaries came into our land, because they brought the Gospel. But as they taught us, they took away our customs, our culture. They took away the right of men to marry more than one wife, and the right of a father to circumcise his child. Now polygamy is prohibited, and for that reason many of our people join with members of other nations, Ovambos, Bushmen, Capeboys and whites. Our tribal cohesion is being destroyed in this way...If we look at our nation now, then we have to say that we are a dying people.* (157)
Moreover, Rhenish missionaries were accused of having collaborated in the alienation of Herero land to white colonialists.

The gospel was a misfortune for us. In the past we were the owners, today it's the whites (i.e. those who came with the gospel). Who owns the land today, and where are the big herds our fathers used to own? It's been like that wherever the Gospel arrived, from South Africa to Togo. Things would have been better today, had our fathers never converted to Christianity. (158)

Criticism of the R.M.S. came to a head in 1928 when the mission was directly identified with the colonial state. 'You are not servants of God any longer, but servants of the English Government.' (159)

The Rhenish Mission and Proletarianization

Given the central role that cattle played in the social and religious system of the Herero, the success of the Rhenish Mission depended on the degree to which the cattle economy could be subverted. In this sense the proletarianisation of the Herero after the 1904 war served the interests of the Rhenish Mission very well, and it was loath to see this process reversed. Rural production became equated with 'idleness and lazy dreaming'. Loss of cattle enabled the Herero to transcend this condition by forcing them into wage labour.

The rising [1904-1907] has destroyed the previous favourable living conditions of the natives. They had lost land and cattle. As much as we regret this with regard to their general wellbeing, there can be no doubt that this may and should prove beneficial to
them. For the majority of the population the opportunity for idle and lazy dreaming had been stopped by this. They are forced to make a living in a different way, they are dependent on wage labour. From a Christian point of view this can only be welcomed, as a lazy people that shies away from work, is definitely not a favourable object for missionary work. (160)

This basic premise of missionary thinking was echoed in countless opinions on the topic of stock ownership and reserves well into the 1930s. The view expressed by missionary Werner in 1924 that 'the ownership of stock is a big misfortune for our natives, and for our congregations, not only in a material sense, but also in a moral one' (161) was repeated by missionary Olpp in 1935. In his evidence before the S.W.A. Commission, Olpp testified that the re-acquisition of stock by the Herero had enabled them to turn their backs on the mission and revert to pagan customs. On the Commissioner's question as to whether this should be construed to mean that 'the privilege...to own cattle' again was detrimental to the Herero, Olpp answered in the affirmative. He considered that Herero stock ownership harmed the interests of Christian missionaries. 'Because they get richer through cattle and this damages Christianity?' asked the Commissioner. 'Yes', came Olpp's reply. (162)

On the question of reserves, missionary Kuhlmann in Omaruru felt that these were of no benefit to the Herero since they would enable them to live according to the customs of their
ancestors. Therefore, he said, the Herero would not advance culturally. (163) Missionary Vedder reiterated this point in his testimony to the S.W.A. Commission. He argued that while the ownership of stock and access to land in the reserves may have been an improvement on the pre-1915 situation of the Herero, this development was inimical to progress. The Herero in the reserves 'will withdraw from the civilised world of South West Africa' and therefore from the influences 'which mould the natives for the future.'

South West is going to be the land of the whites and the Herero who lives in the reserve will remain where he has been from ancient times, and will not progress along the lines we see before us today, not even when he gets rich. He will remain where his ancestors were. (164)

The Herero and Mission Schooling

The content of missionary teachings and particularly missionary schooling reflected this strong anti-pastoralist bias, and if anything was geared towards proletarianized S.W. Africans. (165) The notion that stock rearing was incompatible with Christian living was exemplified in remarks made by missionary Kuhlmann. After a visit to the Otjohorongo reserve, he wrote that although the reserve did not necessarily encourage laziness, it did not seem right 'that a people should remain cattle herders for ever.' He carried on

Particularly us in the mission would like to see congregations grow out of these people, which have a superior basis for their existence, who pursue cultivation and trade. Congregations that will produce christians with better habits than the
"Fellherero"(166) who will lead a family life with regular daily routines and leisure time, with morning and evening prayer and who will go to church on Sundays after which they will sit like well-mannered Christians in front of their huts and whose children could be introduced to a Christian way of life through societies. Cattle breeding does not allow all this. Its daily life proceeds differently to what we desire for Christians.(167)

A particular point of friction between missionaries and their Herero congregations was the issue of polygamy (see below). So strongly did missionaries feel about the issue that a paper on the problems of Christian marriage among 'S.W. African heathen Christians' was prepared for one their conferences.(168) Unable or unwilling to understand the pre-colonial function of polygamy, missionaries were quick to denounce it as promiscuous and perverse, and set out to fight it. This took the form of tightening up church discipline and ostracising polygamous parishioners. In addition, the Society succeeded in persuading the administration to introduce civil marriages for black S.W. Africans, thus legally enshrining monogamy.(169)

But if Herero pastoralists found themselves at odds with the moral and ethical teachings of the Rhenish Mission, they did not readily accept mission schooling either. For many years the Rhenish Mission was responsible for black education in S.W.A.(170) In 1915 all educational institutions for blacks in S.W.A. were run by missionaries.(171) This situation did not change significantly after the Mandate was granted to the Union.
of South Africa. Although a Department of Education was established, missionary schools were allowed to remain in the hands of the mission societies for a number of reasons, the more important being that at that stage there was nothing to put in the place of the staff, the knowledge (particularly of native languages and customs) and the various facilities the missions supplied. (172)

As late as 1939 the R.M.S. ran 50 out of a total of 76 schools in the Police Zone, with another 25 run by other missionary societies and one by the government. The enrolment at R.M.S. schools was 3415 out of a total of 4605 pupils. (173)

Mission education was tailored towards the needs of the colonial economy. Its major concern was to turn black S.W. Africans into useful labourers rather than successful pastoralists or peasants. For Dr. Vedder, the head of the Augustineum teacher training school run by the Rhenish Mission under the supervision of the colonial state, the basic aim of education was very simple: 'the youth had to be educated for work. Only through labour could our natives build a future in which they can assert themselves as worthy members among other working peoples.' (174)

From the beginning of the Mandate, mission schools were run under the supervision of the colonial government. At an education conference in 1923, missionaries and the government accepted a four year syllabus for primary schools. Apart from
religion, reading, writing and arithmetic, students were required to learn either Afrikaans or English. But practical skills were taught as well 'in view of their future position in life.' (175) Accordingly, teaching time was divided between religious instruction, reading, writing and Afrikaans in the morning and practical instruction in the afternoon. This included carpentry, brick laying, wood work, soldering, shoemaking and elementary agricultural skills. (176)

Rhenish missionaries shared the colonial state's concern to equip blacks only with the skills required to make them better labourers. Consequently, they did not regard higher education for blacks as desirable. (177) Apart from its utility in providing appropriately educated labourers, education was seen by missionaries as an important means to 'undertake a general attack on the pagan Herero people.' (178) This attack centred on undermining traditional values and concepts of labour. Education for work and 'civil order' (buergerliche Ordnung) were considered essential elements in the establishment of 'organised parish life' (geordnetes Gemeindeleben). Literacy was important only in so far as it assisted a deeper understanding of the bible. (179)

Such educational concerns were not shared by most Herero, however. Instead of gratefully accepting the Rhenish Mission's attempts to place them on what the missionaries regarded as the
road to progress, they accused it of ‘preparing our youths only as hewers of wood and drawers of water, and good kitchen hands.’ (180) In 1922 Herero elders repeated their calls for children to stay away from missionary schools, which they regarded as inferior. (181) Herero in Grootfontein told missionary Pardey that their children were learning nothing at school; ‘we remained stupid with the mission’. They questioned the value of learning about religion only. They wanted to learn English and other subjects. (182)

Widespread boycotts of Rhenish mission educational facilities by Herero were reported throughout the 1920s. The school in Otjimbingwe, for example, had 95 children in 1926, but only nine of those were Herero. These, according to missionary Werner, were all close relatives of his evangelist. (183) The situation in Windhoek reflected a similar state of affairs. While there were 275 registered Nama children at school, only 74 Herero were enrolled. (184) Teacher training at the Augustinum teacher training school did not fare any better. Not a single Herero was among the 12 teachers who had successfully completed the first three-year training course in December 1925. (185) And in 1927 only six out of a total of 35 newly registered students for the course were Herero. (186) Many Herero regarded teachers who were a ‘product of the Okahandja Training College as incompetent’ and demanded teachers from the Union. Such criticism of teachers was reinforced by a
comparison with the education which other missionary societies provided. St. Barnabas College School, which was run by the Anglican Church in Windhoek, was the standard against which Rhenish Mission schools were measured. (187)

**Syncretism**

By insisting that its objectives were being advanced by the destruction of cattle-keeping, the Rhenish Mission Society failed to provide a 'blueprint' (188) for the pastoral ambitions of the Herero. For this reason many Herero distanced themselves from the Rhenish Mission. But this did not mean that they became heathens, as some missionaries were inclined to think. Herero response was considerably more nuanced. They desired a synthesis of Christian and traditional elements, a 'Hereroization' of Christianity, so to speak. (189)

In this regard the burial of former paramount chief Samuel Maharero was a watershed. He had died in Bechuanaland in March 1923 and his burial on 26 August 1923 was to have far-reaching symbolic value for the Herero in the future. The funeral did not proceed without a good measure of conflict with the local missionary. Missionary Werner was even hesitant to conduct the initial church service at which Maharero's death was announced. Although Maharero was baptised, the missionary had certain reservations about conducting a service which he felt
would compromise his Christian principles. (190) "Angry, the
leaders asked him who the actual owner of the Church was; who
built it; who supported it. One leader suggested that it was
not necessary that Werner lead the ceremony." (191) In the end,
Werner agreed to lead the service, but was left with the
impression that every single word he had said was subjected to
'a sharp, silent criticism." (192)

Conflict over the exact form of the funeral was not simply
between the Herero on the one side and the missionary on the
other. It was fought with equal vehemence among the Herero.
After the coffin arrived in Okahandja in August 1923 a heated
debate began among 'pagan and Christian' Herero over the way in
which the funeral should be conducted. To his amazement,
Werner found that both pagans and apostates desired a 'funeral
according to traditional custom' allegedly against the wishes
of the deceased. (193) Both parties decided to call a meeting to
resolve the issue. Missionary Werner attended the discussions
and noted that old customs and traditions were to be observed
during the funeral. For that reason some wanted him excluded
from the memorial service. According to Werner, the opponents
of the mission among the Herero argued that

    the white man with his customs could not prevail
    where the burial of the first Herero was concerned.
    In this case the old (heathen) custom dominated,
    [and] it was about time that it was lifted out of
degradation; neither myself nor any other missionary
    were Omuherero; we were and would remain
    foreigners. (194)
Consequently Werner declined to conduct the funeral service, which was eventually led by missionary Vedder. After the service Maharero was "buried with full traditional rites in the family grave where Tjamuaha (his grandfather) and Maharero (his father) were buried in 1861 and on 7 October 1890 respectively."(195) About 3000 Herero and 100 Europeans attended the funeral, with the Secretary for South West Africa reading an address on behalf of the Administrator.(196)

The five-month period between the announcement of his death and Maharero's funeral in Okahandja gave rise to various rumours. Some people began to doubt his death. Others speculated that he might have quietly escaped from banishment in order to appear in full force one day to liberate his people. Yet others thought that Maharero's corpse would be brought to Okahandja by the Americans — a reference to the Universal Negro Improvement Association — after which a battle would begin.(197)

Of particular interest was Maharero's last message, which he wrote in Serowe, Bechuanaland on 14 March 1923.(198) According to Poewe's informants, it contained 'a clear political message'. Using Christian metaphors, Maharero 'was speaking about the resurrection of the Herero nation'.(199) In his message Maharero declared his son Friedrich to be his successor and called on him to 'hold unto God and hold unto our
people.’ (200) He pleaded for strong central leadership of the Herero, but under the guidance of God. (201) He continued:

I beg you my son, Friedrich, I implore you by your father! When there is one among you who does evil, punish him with rigour. This my people, must be reinstated as the First Law. Thereto shall your judgements aim. (202)

Many Herero and most missionaries interpreted Maherero’s last message in different ways. Poewe maintains on the basis of information gained from Herero informants that behind these words lay a clear political message referring to the cementation of Herero clans into a nation as the first time, before 1900, when Samuel Maharero became their paramount chief. At the time they instituted as First Law the procedure that anyone who incited the break-up of the nation into small groups would be taken before a tribal court and severely punished. Maharero knew the danger of factionalism among his people. (203)

Missionaries on the other hand hoped that Maharero’s words were an admonition to return to the Christian church. (204) It is suggested here that an explanation of Maharero’s message has to incorporate both interpretations. By doing so, it becomes possible to see his message as a call to synthesize Christianity and pre-colonial customs. It was thus ‘not an invitation to return to the church of the missionaries, but a guide into syncretism.’ (205)

The Reintroduction of Pre-Colonial Customs

Developments subsequent to Maherero’s funeral support the view
that the Herero attempted 'to combine church and political life in such a way, that it would become one entity under Herero leadership.' (206) Maharero's death acted as a catalyst in the process of revitalising pre-colonial symbols and customs and in that way speeded up the elaboration of an ethnic identity. A new cultural consciousness asserted itself, which was most succinctly summarised in a message which Herero said fell from the skies and which God himself had dropped. Its contents were the following:

Herero, rejoice and exult, because you will be elevated, won't be subjected to another nation anymore! Leave the doctrine [i.e. the Christian one] that has made you unhappy for a long time; take out your loin cloth, reintroduce polygamy and circumcision, throw away your clothes and return to your former customs. Rekindle the holy fires and with it, fortune-telling, so that you won't die. (207)

This divine invitation to return to old customs was put into practice with great zeal. Circumcision, the filing of teeth, the holy fire and polygamy began to spread rapidly after 1923. In 1925 missionary Pardey reported that circumcision was not only practiced in the Otjituuo reserve, but in the entire district of Grootfontein and other places.

Everybody who wanted to be counted as Herero had to undergo this procedure, because otherwise they [the Herero] would be derided as "Klipkaffirs", and would not be recognised as true Herero. (208)

Two years later,

almost all young men in the Omaruru reserves were circumcised, many with their fathers' consent, some without. Many young men had allegedly circumcised themselves. (209)
Specialists moved from place to place circumcising men for a fee which was 5sh in Grootfontein district in 1925. (210) Once again, what the missionaries regarded as a return to paganism was perfectly compatible with Christianity for the great majority of Herero. 'Many of these claimed that circumcision had nothing to do with heathenism and was purely a cultural matter. As such, both Christians and non-Christians were circumcised.' (211)

Women seem to have exerted strong pressure on men to undergo circumcision. In Windhoek district they were reported to have been the driving force behind the reintroduction of circumcision in 1924. According to missionary Meier,

it is mainly the women, who peremptorily demand this [circumcision], and treat every uncircumcised man with contempt. "We don't want such men anymore" say some; and others: "Alas, if we only had money, we would take our children to a Jew, who knows something about circumcision!" (212)

In Omaruru many women were reported to have barred uncircumcised men from having sexual intercourse with them. Missionary Kuhlmann alleged that they felt 'that only circumcised men...could lead them to orgasm and fully satisfy them as women.' (213)

Women generally played a prominent part in the process of revitalising customs. (214) A report by the superintendent of the Aminuis reserve suggests that women in the reserve were
conservative when it came to cultural matters. He wrote that many progressive men—i.e. those with European shaped huts with gable roofs, quite well constructed,...[with] proper doors, a clean bed with sheets, pictures on walls, knives, forks and spoons, and who wish their food properly cooked

were 'handicapped by the women', 'who say that these men wish to live like white people and expect too [sic] from the women, and the women do not want to stay with these men.' (215)

But of greater concern to missionaries was the reintroduction of the holy fire and the demand that polygamy become legal within the church. Spirit mediums were reported to be active on farms, encouraging people to rekindle holy fires. (216) Reports in 1924 confirmed that holy fires had been rekindled in the Otjituuo reserve in the Grootfontein district (217) and by the early 1930s they were reported to exist on nearly all settlements in the Waterberg East reserve. (218) Their existence was not confined to reserves, however, and in the mid-1930s they could be found on Herero settlements on at least half of the farms in the Gobabis district. (219)

Before colonial conquest, the holy fire and ancestor cult underpinned Herero social cohesion. The holy fire established the link between the dead and the living, between the past and present. (220) Life started with the ancestors and as the 'living dead' they were ever present in daily life. (221) [They] stabilise the existing order not only in that
they watched over rites and laws according to Herero beliefs, but they literally bring the people together when they are called to the graves. (222)

On a political level the holy fire was a means of establishing political clients. 'He who received from the holy fire of the chief, accepted his protection and thereby demonstrated his loyalty.' (223) It is perhaps in this light that Mahareros's vision of his resurrection has to be seen. (224) The message behind it may very well have been that although he was a Christian chief, he would not disappear altogether after his death, but would be received by his fathers. His death would therefore reestablish the link between living Herero and the dead.

Given the prominent role that women played in re-introducing customs generally, it must come as a surprise that the response of women to the holy fire differed markedly from that of men. Reports suggest that many women were opposed to them on the grounds that the existence of holy fires and continued church membership were incompatible. In 1926 almost all women in Otjituuo reserve were reported to have told their men that they would leave them if they rekindled the holy fires. Missionary Pardey claimed that most women remained in the church. (225) This corresponds to widespread reports that while most Herero men abstained from church services, sizable numbers of women were still attending. (226) It was even reported from Aminuis reserve in 1939 that Herero women would stay away from their
homes for weeks, busy proselytising in the reserve. (227)

The explanation for this has to be sought inter alia in the fact that Christianity enabled women to achieve limited power in a community which excluded them from all religious and political activity. (228) Bradford's observations with regard to the relationship of women and Christianity in South Africa seem to be a useful starting point in this respect. She argued that 'the Christian banner under which a crusade was launched against pre-capitalist societies heralded for women a partial lifting of the weight of older forms of oppression.' More specifically, the Christian church enabled them to escape 'a religion in which male homestead heads mediated between male ancestors and household members.' Moreover, the Christian church opposed polygamy and exhorted men to look after their women at home. (229) Further research concerning the place of Herero women in the reserve economy might well verify Bradford's observations in the S.W. African context.

But support for the holy fire by Herero men in particular cannot be equated with a complete rejection of the Christian faith. While missionaries condemned those Herero who had kindled holy fires as pagans, the latter did not generally regard holy fires and the Christian faith as mutually exclusive. Indeed, many justified their practices by referring to the Holy Bible. (230) They argued that the whites had their
own holy fire, the Bible and Christian ethic, and that the holy fire of the Herero also came from God. (231) Evangelist Wilhelm Kandjii was told in Aminuis reserve by a Herero: "We also pray and we know the word of God, we will never leave God." (232)

Arguably, compatibility of the holy fire and the Christian doctrine was possible because the meaning of the holy fire had undergone significant changes. More specifically, it had lost its original religious meaning to a large extent. In pre-colonial times 'all ritual was...conducted at the okuruuo.' Milk, the staple food, had to be tasted by the omurangere or religious leader at the holy fire before it could be consumed. It was also the place where the elders sat in council and communication was established with the ancestors by the omurangere. (233) A church elder told a missionary in Gobabis that Herero did not make sacrifices to either Karunga, Ndjambi or Mukuru at the holy fire as they used to in the past. (234) He pointed out that this was impossible because they did not possess holy cattle any more. Most of them no longer knew anything about the traditional sacrificial service. (235) By contrast, orunjara meetings around the holy fire in the late 1920s and 1930s showed a strong resemblance to Christian church rites and more specifically holy communion. During holy communion members of a congregation took small sips from the cup and were told that this was the blood of Jesus which would cleanse them and protect them from all evil. (236)
The superintendent of Aminuis reserve reported a very similar ritual at the holy fire in 1928. He had observed a place near Kutako’s hut at Toasis.

where a lot of cattle horns are, as soon as the sun sets and at sun rise a native woman is told to light a fire at this place. Hosea told me they sit around it and pray to their fathers who are dead, only the old men sit around it. I believe a dish of fat is put down on certain days and the younger men creep up to it on hands and knees and have a sip... (237)

While missionary Poennighaus reported that individuals at an orunjara meeting had to lick a bowl of sand he also mentions that participants smeared themselves with fat. This was regarded as cleansing the body of all evil and seen as promoting health among people and cattle. Orunjara meetings were compulsory for homestead members and were held in cases of illness or accident and family occasions. No uniform ritual existed, as every individual owner of a holy fire could determine it. (238)

Necessary as these changes in the religious and symbolic value of the holy fire were to facilitate the synthesis of Christian and pre-colonial values, this process was equally dependent on Herero attitudes towards Christianity. Their opposition was directed specifically against missionaries and not so much of the Gospel per se: 'The Gospel is good, but the missionaries are not good.' (239) What many Herero objected to was the "moralism and spiritualism" to which mission theology had
degenerated and 'which was indistinguishable from the strivings of colonialism.' (240) When asked by missionary Pardey in Grootfontein why they had 'left God', the Herero replied:

We have not left God, our fathers already had led us to God. It was only satan that we did not know anything about. It was the missionaries who told us about him for the first time.

For them there was no difference between the God of the Herero and the God of the whites. (241) This line of reasoning was confirmed by evangelist Wilhelm Kandji after a visit to Aminuis reserve. In his attempt to persuade a Herero man to return to the scriptures, the latter retorted:

We do not refuse to listen to the gospel. You don't want the holy fire, don't want circumcision, filing of teeth and polygamy and say: "you have got debts, have not paid parish dues." These are the things why we do not come to the gospel. We serve the Lord and don't listen to your words... If you want to preach, you should know that we are hungry and there is nobody, who has got the time to listen to the gospel. (242)

Similar sentiments were expressed by Hosea Kutako, when he asked an evangelist why the missionary never visited Aminuis reserve. The evangelist answered that there was no interest in the reserve, upon which Kutako replied:

If missionary Irle permits us to take as many wives as we want and to keep the holy fire, then he can always come to us and will then also visit his church services. (243)

Polygamy was the other serious point of conflict between the Rhenish Mission and the Herero. Reports by missionaries about the collapse of Christian marriage and alleged promiscuity and
sexual freedom were legion in the 1920s. (244) What lay behind these scathing reports was a return by many Herero to the practice of polygamy and brideprice. The payment of brideprice had ceased after the Herero war, 'as the natives did not own any stock.' After conquest, however, it was reintroduced, and even demanded for marriages that were made during the time that the Hereros did not own stock, and if the lobolo was not paid, the parents took the girl back again. (245)

Many marriages were broken up so as to enable parents-in-law to obtain brideprice, which frequently sons-in-law objected to or could not pay. (246) In 1920 missionary Meier reported from Windhoek that he had encountered cases where 'marriages were forcibly torn apart, where women were traded as objects...now bartered to this one, now to that one.' (247)

How widespread polygamy was, is difficult to ascertain. Despite reports by missionaries it seems reasonable to assume that it was confined to a few wealthier and more powerful men. At bride prices of about £15 or one ox, one heifer, one wether, one sheep ewe with lamb plus one other ewe during the 1920s and early 1930s, it was expensive enough to marry one wife. (248) In many cases where marriages were broken up for this reason, many men were hesitant to remarry, out of fear that a similar fate might meet them in future. (249) Traugott Maharero was reported to have had 'a harem of "select" women.' Moreover, he regarded it as his hereditary royal right to dissolve legitimate church
marriages, only to distribute the women thus affected amongst other men 'according to his discretion.' (250) What seems certain is that women rejected polygamy. On his return from an inspection tour through Epukiro reserve, Mission Inspector Driessler reported that women would rather leave their men than become one of several wives. Women in Otjituuo reserve were said to have had similar attitudes. They saw the main reason for men acquiring more than one woman as sexual. (251)

But polygamy also directly affected access to labour. While children had been a crucial source of labour in the pre-colonial economy of the Herero, the reestablishment of a pastoral economy was even more dependent on ample supplies of labour. One way of procuring and controlling such labour was through the institution of polygamy. The importance of children as a source of labour power was highlighted by missionary Kuhlmann when he observed in 1920 that school attendance had dwindled because children were needed to herd goats and look after gardens. (252) In attacking the mission for its complicity in the subjugation and impoverishment of the Herero, the latter repeatedly ascribed this to the prohibition of polygamy and consequent shortage of children.

Our fathers also had many wives and they were well. But then the missionaries came and said: this is not right. We followed their teachings, but where did we land up? Are our people not nearing the end? Therefore we have to take alternative paths. (253)
The Influence of Garveyism

Missionaries generally attributed the defiance displayed towards them to the activities of the Ethiopians, by which they meant Garveyism. In a brief retrospective, missionary Pardey wrote in 1923:

A difficult and disappointing time lies behind us. Almost the entire Herero congregation dissociated itself (innerlich losgesagt) from us, and its behaviour towards us is negative (ablehnend). This is the work of the Ethiopians...(254)

It would be wrong to explain the rejection of the Rhenish Mission by the Herero simply in terms of external influences. But Pardey's description is powerful testimony to the influence of Garveyist ideology, which he claimed was not limited to urban areas alone, but had reached 'almost all Hereros on the outposts.'(255)

The rise of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (U.N.I.A.), as well as its social composition in S.W.A. have been described by Emmett and Pirio.(256) What both analyses fail to do, however, is to relate the rise and decline of Garveyist ideology, particularly among the Herero, to the processes outlined above. Because of its importance in crystallizing several strands of thought already existing among the Herero, it is essential to deal with its history very briefly.
A branch of the U.N.I.A. and African Communities League was formed in Luederitzbucht in 1921. (257) It soon spread its wings beyond Luederitz and a branch was established in Windhoek in October 1921. By December of that year it had recruited 311 members, 'comprising all native and coloured communities found here, both male and female.' (258) In October 1922 the Windhoek branch sent out two Herero emissaries - John Mungunda and Theodor Hambue - to establish branches in Usakos, Karibib and Okahandja. At first Herero were hesitant to join the movement, saying 'that they wanted first to see what position their chiefs were going to take on the matter.' (259)

When the U.N.I.A. appeared in central S.W.A., the soil was already well tilled for its rapid growth. Its message supported attempts by the Herero to reassert themselves against the pervasive influence of the Rhenish Mission. The fact that the R.M.S. did not ordain any priests, nor intended to do so, led many evangelists to support the Garveyist movement. (260) The missionary in Windhoek reported that it was particularly the radicals among the evangelists who joined the Garveyist movement, i.e. those who for some time had been agitating for black missionaries and who had asked the Government 'a couple of days ago, to expel the white missionaries, because they had done very little for them with regard to the school.' (261) It is noteworthy in this context that despite fundamental dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the R.M.S. and the
impetus provided by Garveyism for an indigenous church run by blacks, this did not happen among the Herero until the mid-1950s.

But the U.N.I.A.'s message of deliverance from white rule also came at a time when the hopes of the Herero for greater freedom were being shattered by the consolidation of South African colonial structures in S.W.A. With the anticipated proclamation of new reserves, most Herero were going through uncertain times. Economic depression and drought in the early 1920s exacerbated the situation. Wages were frequently not paid and it became more difficult to pay taxes. Markets for the sale of stock were either non-existent or inaccessible. (262) Missionary Werner recognised that these wider political and economic factors had a negative influence on religious welfare and were "stirring up the native soul." (263) The Native Commissioner, Major Manning, summed up the reasons for unrest as being due in part to such causes as unsettled land questions, depression particularly of employers affecting wages and rations, less contact with officials, relaxation of previous laws of control of natives... (264)

In its initial stages the Windhoek leadership of the U.N.I.A. consisted of foreigners. In November 1922, however, a split in the leadership brought the Windhoek branch under the control of Herero leaders. Men such as Hosea Kutako, his brother Aaron Mungunda, Traugott Maharero and Nikanor Hoveka were
instrumental in spreading the influence of the
Association. (265) Kutako was suspected by the Administration of
having been the 'controlling spirit' behind the president of
the Windhoek branch, Aaron Mungunda. (266) Membership of the
movement grew rapidly. According to missionary Becker in
Windhoek, by January 1925 only the Zwartbooi people had refused
to join the Garveyist movement. (267) Apart from them, 'almost
all Hereros' in the outlying areas of the district were said to
be members of the U.N.I.A. (268) As mentioned above, almost the
entire congregation in Grootfontein had left its
missionary. (269) While support among the Herero was widespread,
it was not limited to them. The Damara were said to have
joined in large numbers as well. (270)

Broadly speaking, the propagated aims of the U.N.I.A. were
similar to those of Garveyism elsewhere and centered on the
reaffirmation of black pride as well as economic improvement
along industrial and educational lines. (271) In letter to the
Allgemeine Zeitung, Fritz Headley set out the goals of the
organisation:

The object of the Universal Negro Improvement
Association and African Communities League shall be
to establish a Universal Confraternity among the
race; to promote the spirit of pride and love; to
reclaim the fallen; to administer to the needy; to
assist in civilising the backward tribes of Africa;
to assist in the development of Independent Negro
Nations and Communities or Agencies in the principal
countries and cities of the world; for the
representation and protection of all Negroes
irrespective of nationality; to promote a
conscientious worship among the natives of Africa; to
establish Universities, Colleges, Academies and
Schools for the racial education and culture of the people; to conduct a world wide commercial and industrial intercourse for the good of the people; to work for better conditions in all Negro communities. (272)

Funds were collected to assist widows and orphans, provide bail for convicts, and for the building of better schools and hospitals. (273) Members were required to pay a monthly subscription of 2s 6d to 3s, and as a sign of membership they wore badges with the colours black-red-green. (274) It was estimated that £2000 had been collected by the end of 1922. (275)

As elsewhere, the guiding principle of the U.N.I.A. was the slogan 'Africa for the Africans'. It promised to rid S.W.A. of all whites in order to restore the land to its rightful owners. (276) In his welcoming speech in Windhoek in 1922 Fritz Headley declared that 'this our fatherland must be freed from white man's rule, for his reign is simply stifling the talents and progressiveness of our people.' (277) To bring this about the U.N.I.A. parent body in New York requested the League of Nations in a petition 'that South West Africa be turned over to members of the Negro race for self-government.' (278) Headley informed an audience in Usakos in 1922 that

we have sent a Delegation from the Parent Body in New York last month to the League of Nations, now sitting in Geneva, Switzerland, to ask that the Mandate of South West Africa be handed over to us to form a Government of our own. (279)
But Garveyism also had a very important religious message, which blended well with the syncretism developing amongst the Herero. In accordance with its basic philosophy, the U.N.I.A. propagated the establishment of a new church without white missionaries. Missionary Meier stated that the Monrovia movement, as it was referred to by the missionaries, was not only opposed to the government but also to the Rhenish Mission. He alleged that the main speaker at a meeting in Windhoek had said that he was neither baptised nor a pagan, but that he knew much more than his audience. He wanted to know from the latter what their missionaries had done over the years with regard to education. (280) Towards the end of the year Meier wrote that

> Even blacks from America have arrived and proclaimed the beginning of a new era. Now, they said, even our people would become human beings. They held out the prospect of a new church, led by natives and preach a different God, since the God of the whites was not the God of the blacks... (281)

Marcus Garvey was hailed as the redeemer who would liberate the country. Graves of black Christians were consecrated in his name without the knowledge or consent of the missionaries. (282)

**Garveyism, Rumours and Resistance**

The pronouncements of the U.N.I.A. generated a mood of great expectancy. (283) Farm labourers flocked to town to enquire when liberation would come. (284) 'The ships of Garvey were expected with the greatest eagerness. These failing, his airship was
expected.' (285) This new spirit was well captured by missionary Meier in 1922.

Some, who can’t hold to themselves anymore [Herero], can be seen displaying themselves on horseback with guns in town, even if only in side streets, something unthinkable before the beginning of the year, not asking for permits (for rifles), which they probably would not be getting anyway, threatening with a rising, telling whites they had lived the longest time in their houses, go to the municipality, enraged, and the Government... all trials of strength - all demands fulfilled, for the simple reason that the Government has no power (there is no military in the whole country) to meet those people that were incited by the Krooboys (Capeboys). This in short is the political situation as it presents itself to the contemporary observer, and it is more or less the same in the whole country. (286)

Meier asked himself whether the time had not arrived when a decision about the destiny of S.W.A. had to be taken. Was it to remain white or become black, he wondered.

Many of the black inhabitants of S.W.A. apparently looked forward to the promised liberation of their country by force. (287) Such militancy both anticipated and followed on from Garvey’s promise in June 1922 that he would send aeroplanes for the embattled Bondelswarts, who had risen against the colonial administration.

The Hottentots have no aeroplanes, and because of that the Boers and British can bomb them out of their holes and huts and ultimately subdue them. But around these American cities and this Western World we have many Negroes who can fly in aeroplanes. Why not build some and when the Hottentots need aeroplanes to combat aeroplanes, why not give them of our technical ability and help them to put over the big job that all of us want done. (288)
Warnings of impending risings persisted throughout the first half of the 1920s. (289) At the beginning of June 1921 word went around "from Luederitzbucht to Outjo that the Herero would rise with the next new moon." (290) A year later similar rumours were reported from the Okavango, where a missionary overheard a conversation on the Okavango river in which it was alleged that the Herero were to rise and kill all whites. They called upon the Okavango people to help them. When the reply was that they could not for lack of arms and ammunition, the Herero in question replied "We'll do it with knobkieries." (291) A police informer had told the police that while he was at Oviumbo temporary reserve in Windhoek district, he had heard that three days beyond Gobabis there are a lot of natives including Hereros, Bushmen and American negroes waiting for the white people to come there to start a fight. There are altogether about 300 natives there with rifles, and some without rifles. They still want more arms. A Herero came from there to get recruits...He said that these natives last month had stopped some white men from Omaruru who were on their way to the Union and sent them back. (292)

Reports were also received from Gobabis about plans for an uprising. According to the information supplied by a farmer in the district, one of his farm workers told him that "the beginnings of the rising against the whites (more precisely: against the government) was planned for after a good rainy season." Bigger towns in the country would be attacked first and then individual farms. "White women and children would not be spared this time as has happened in the Herero rising." (293)
At Wilhelmstal a white railway foreman was cautioned by a Baster to exercise restraint during an altercation with a black worker.

"Baas, you must not do quarrelling with your boys and don't you know the guns are loaded and must just be pulled off... Baas, if you know what I do you will never touch your labourers as the war is very near." (294)

From the scant evidence available it is clear that these rumours of war were strongly infused with Garveyist ideology. The rumoured war was clearly understood to be one between black and white. In the Okahandja district, for example, a farmer was told that the country belonged to the black man 'and that whites must be chased out of the country.' (295) Unshaken by the military defeat of the Bondelswarts, many farm labourers still believed in the possibility of war. This was underscored by a farmer in a letter to a local newspaper. According to the farmer, his wife tried to intimidate her servant by referring to the defeat of the Bondelswarts. She asked him how they intended to make war against the Union forces in the light of this defeat, whereupon he retorted: 'with kierie, arrow and bow, the rest will come by itself as there are no troops.' The remainder of the conversation sheds some interesting light on how Garveyist ideology had shaped the labourers's perception of such a war.

- Against whom are you going to make war?
- Against the white man, this country Africa belongs to the black man, so God meant it!
- You are forgetting the Bondelswarts rebellion?
- What? The Bondelswarts have won, they don’t need to pay
any more taxes. (296)

Despite occasional displays of militancy, though, the U.N.I.A. leadership was generally careful to avoid any overt reference to violence. Headley 'normally tempered his radicalism when dealing with the colonial authorities.' (297) Thus when he 'received a panicky letter' from Usakos informing him that the white population was arming itself, he "advised moderation." Professing ignorance about any war, he asked his followers to obey the laws of the Government, and abide by the Constitution of the Protectorate, and I am sure that the Government, or the farmers, cannot molest you...you are not against the Government...You are simply trying to better your condition to be a man and not always to be a lackey. (298)

John Mungunda echoed this attitude when he advised a meeting "that if any of the leaders broke the law of the land, or did not do their work properly, they [the people] must put them out and elect others." (299)

As Emmett has argued, these stirrings never developed into a serious challenge to the colonial state. (300) Instead, resistance took the form of defiance. In Windhoek black residents were reported to have stated that they would not pay taxes in future, as they were not prepared to work for the well-being of whites any longer. They also refused to clean the location, so that the municipality had to employ special workers for this purpose. (301) 'The whole of the Windhoek Location representatives' demanded several meetings with the
Town Clerk to air their grievances with regard to new sanitary arrangements. It was reported that their demands will include abolition of various fees and taxes; an account of monies paid in during last eight years; queries as to manner in which money has been spent by Government; and whether the natives pay for Superintendent in the Location and so on. The Negro and Kroo sections are said to have influenced the people. (302)

Acts of defiance were also widely reported from farms. A farmer from the farm Otjihavera in the Okahandja district complained to the Secretary for South West Africa in 1922 that the boys are indifferent as to the care of the stock etc. or implements under their charge - they are openly insolent if "checked off" for idleness - they malingering and take holidays as they choose. (303) He further complained that they had no respect for the law. When he threatened a passless black with police action, the latter retorted: "Police...(expression signifying human excrement)." It was difficult to bring such people to court, as they would resist arrest, resulting in a 'a fight between the "boy" and the arrestor.' Court cases became a farce, with workers denying charges and their oaths being as 'good as a white's.' (304) In another case, farm labourers gave their employer 'notice to leave his service.' They refused to take a letter in this regard to the magistrate, which led the farmer to conclude: 'The natives is not disobedient, but independent [sic].' (305)

Widespread resistance was also displayed towards the
Government's branding and inoculation campaigns. When Herero were told by a farmer in the Okahandja district to brand their stock, 'they replied they would not brand their stock until they had the permission of Traugott, the headman of Okahandja Location.' (306) But Traugott Maharero had instructed Herero in the district not to take out branding irons, nor brand their stock, but that he would get a brand for Kamaherero to brand all the stock in the Okahandja district belonging to all the natives, whether Herero, Ovambo or other. (307)

He told stock owners that should the magistrate refuse a request for a general brand for all Herero in the name of Samuel Maharero, 'they should make a plan as to whether they will have their cattle branded or not.' (308) The spirit of defiance was eloquently captured by an old Herero farm worker who stated:

They say that we must clean our small stock, even though they are clean. They take a hair from the sheep and say "there is sickness", and take the man to the gaol. That is not a good thing. We were told to buy cattle, now they say we must brand, but the only brand we know is to cut the ears. They say we must be vaccinated, and we say "No"; all Okahandja refuses this. They can say what they like, we will not brand our stock nor buy branding irons; they can take the stock if they like, or do what they like. (309)

The state's inoculation campaign against smallpox suffered a similar fate. Rumours that two people had died in Okahandja as a result of this campaign sparked off widespread opposition. (310) Attempts were made to coordinate countrywide resistance. Traugott Maharero wrote a letter to people in
Tsumeb in which he called on all black people to refuse vaccination. He also made an appeal that 'all the Natives must stand as one man.' (311) Mobilisation against vaccination seems to have been successful in many regions, as reports from Gobabis and Windhoek, where 400 women 'protested successfully' against it, indicate. (312) "In Waterberg East Herero women organised and openly defied the administration." (313) A Zulu informer alleged that Traugott and Eduard Maharero were responsible 'for the resistance to vaccination.' (314) His evidence supported the view that women had taken an active part in resisting vaccination. He speculated that

the women were instigated to take the leading part on the presumption that the authorities would not in any case deal severely with females, i.e. these were sent ahead to test the government's attitude. (315)

That the government did not view resistance to vaccination lightly is apparent from the fact that whites had to pay a £5 fine for refusing to be vaccinated. (316)

The Decline of the U.N.I.A.

The rapid development of the U.N.I.A. was matched by its equally swift decline. By 1923 the U.N.I.A. was reported to be 'practically a dead letter, no meetings have been held for some time and the local natives have ceased to subscribe to the movement.' (317) A number of factors contributed to this. Firstly, there was no evidence of new schools or hospitals. Of
the £2000 collected, only £80 remained by the end of 1922. (318)

For this reason most Herero stopped paying subscriptions in 1923. (319) The swiftness with which the decision to no longer pay fees was taken, may have been influenced by experiences with the Rhenish Mission. In the early 1920s Herero accused the latter of only taking their money without ever putting anything back. (320)

Another contributing factor may have been that some of the older Herero leaders found "Garvey's radical pronouncements on freeing Africa from colonial rule...unacceptable." (321) Hosea Kutako, for example, maintained an ambiguous relationship with the U.N.I.A. He was careful not to be blamed by the colonial government for the unrest so widely reported at the time. In November 1922 he gave the assurance that

from their [i.e. a Herero delegation] point of view reports of unrest cannot be due to local natives, but may be caused by foreign natives, who are not friends of theirs. (322)

Garveyist ideology, then, for all its emphasis on black liberation, did very little to put its promises into practice. As such it had an ambiguous impact on the desires of the Herero to reconstitute themselves as an ethnic community. Garveyism proved to be a two-edged sword: on the one hand its emphasis on cultural nationalism provided support and legitimacy for attempts to reconstitute the Herero as a 'nation'. On the other hand, however, the idea of 'a central nation for the race' (323)
in Liberia with Garvey as president did not seem to address Herero problems as colonial subjects in S.W.A. (324) In this context the influence of foreign nationals in the running of the U.N.I.A. in S.W.A. might have been perceived as the setting up of alternative power structures in which existing and aspirant headmen would not necessarily be dominant. It is not surprising that in 1923 struggles for the leadership of U.N.I.A. ensued, with Herero leaders having been intent on keeping leadership among themselves. (325)

Related to this was the general failure of the U.N.I.A. to provide a socio-economic model that fitted the aspirations of the Herero. The Association only once acknowledged the existence of rural communities in S.W.A. with their specific set of problems. Headley stated that

In Windhoek our people are known to be herdsmen, for that is the natural resources of this part of the continent, for all the arable land is in the hands of our oppressors.

He proceeded to identify the main problems facing people in the rural areas as 'excessive head and animal taxation and land shortage' and mentioned that rural people had no say in the Government. (326)

Despite of this, however, the movement failed to transcend its petty-bourgeois origins and interests. Essentially the U.N.I.A. 'was representing the interests of a small and
privileged minority, a distinctive and largely foreign black petty bourgeoisie." Issues such as trading rights for black shop owners in Luederitz dominated its early activities. (327) As a result the U.N.I.A., with the one exception mentioned above, never formulated any specific aims and demands for the rural areas. Any pronouncements that were made regarding agricultural development were focussed on Liberia which the Garveyist movement wanted to colonise, inter alia, in order to "assist in the development of her agricultural and natural resources." (328)

Care has to be exercised in making an overall assessment of the Garveyist movement in S.W.A. Emmett has argued that not only was it an externally-based organisation, but "the millenarian content of Garveyism tended to deflect Namibian resistance away from internal organisation towards a hopeless dream of external intervention". (329) But such a conclusion is too narrow, in that it defines resistance and political organisation solely at a national level. The U.N.I.A.'s failure on this level should not be construed to mean that it was altogether unsuccessful. Its real importance has to be sought in the contribution it made to the development of ethnic consciousness among the Herero. Edgar's observations about Ethiopianism in the Transkei are equally valid for S.W.A. He argued that the importance of Garveyism did not lie so much in "any outstanding accomplishments or triumphs...or its extravagant millenial
claims', but rather in the fact that

it brought together many strands of rural African thought in the mid-1920's: the linking of European Christianity and mission education with European rule, the attempt to construct alternative institutions for Africans, the desire to overthrow European rule and to control European wealth, the hostility towards government-inspired agricultural schemes, and the search for new inspirational leaders who could offer innovative answers and solutions for the traumatic changes which were taking place within African society. (330)

Evidence suggests that some Herero leaders soon discarded the millenarian element of the U.N.I.A., while acknowledging its utility in interpreting the colonial situation. John Mungunda summed this up very aptly at a meeting held in Okahandja. When asked when the Americans would come to liberate S.W.A. he answered:

If I told you that the American Negroes were coming to release you, I think you would be satisfied but it would be a lie. I know nothing about America. The Society has been formed through American ideas, but Americans only explained it, but will not do the work - we must do that. It is no use holding out false hopes about America, because I do not believe that they will ever be able to come here to help you. (331)

The Truppenspieler

Although the decline of Garveyism in S.W.A. coincided broadly with the growing popularity of the Truppenspieler, their exact relationship awaits further analysis. It is clear that the funeral of Maharero contributed greatly to the formalisation of the Truppenspieler movement. Maharero was given a hero's funeral:

Hereros had flocked to Okahandja from all parts of
the territory. Hundreds were on horseback. All men were drawn up in company formation under their own commanders. There was no shortage of German officers' uniforms, sashes and commands when the corpse arrived at the railway station. It was attempted to imitate what one had observed at funerals of German officers in earlier days. But this did not have any provocative reason. The great chief should be buried with as much honour as possible and the only examples that existed were German. (332)

Significantly, Maharero's coffin was not draped with the old German black-white-red flag, but with a Union Jack. (333)

Ngavirue has described these events as 'a symbolic resurrection of the Herero army in the eclectic style which it had adopted before the risings of 1904 to 1907.' (334) Significantly, Herero people started wearing the red scarves or bands associated with Samuel Maharero, and which 'had been worn by the Hereros as a symbol of unity and loyalty, particularly in times of war.' (335) They 'were to form the basis of a Herero association, Otjiserandu or Red Band Organisation', (336) which was to be responsible for the annual organisation of Herero Day. Although the Otjiserandu was only formed in 1923, there is no evidence to suggest that it was a rival organisation to the Truppenspieler. (337)

This 'symbolic resurrection of the Herero army' became an important source of strength and inspiration in both resisting and accommodating a changed colonial situation. In a very important sense, the Truppenspieler movement in its ethnically
more specific form of *Ovijerandu* mirrored developments that had taken place between the Herero and the Rhenish Mission Society. Defiance of the Rhenish Mission was never aimed at the complete rejection of Christianity but rather its subversion to Herero aims and objectives, i.e. its 'Hereroisation'. (338) The *Ovijerandu* or Truppspieler movement represented a similar process of adaptation to superior colonial military might by appropriating its symbols and structures.

In this way previous military defeats were inverted to become sources of inspiration and strength. A Herero farm labourer allegedly said the following:

> We native people have no rifles; in the German time the Germans fought with rifles, and we only had sticks, and we took rifles from them and fought with them. Now we will do the same to the "ministers" (meaning the police) who come with rifles and preach to us. The natives say that they are good preachers, and have leggings and uniforms and rifles, but they think that we are women and can do nothing to them...In former times the Germans beat us with their flat hands and afterwards shot us, and we took their rifles and fought them. We are going to do the same again. (339)

As if to emphasise his determination and militancy, the same farm labourer proceeded to ask the informer, one David Ngxiki, whether he knew about a recent case where the Magistrate in Gobabis was shot and killed by a group of San in the Kalahari. Without awaiting a reply, the labourer concluded:

> Those were native people who did that and all natives are the same. We can easily get rifles. We hear that all the Hereros in the Transvaal have got rifles, and shoot big game and do what they like. (340)
Memories of dispossession and the wars of resistance became powerful means of mobilisation. In one instance, for example, Traugott Maharero addressed a meeting in Ovitoto reserve where "there was much talk amongst the latter about their hardships and references were made to their previous manner of fighting the Germans..." (341)

After the mid-1920s the Truppenspieler movement underwent certain changes, and became more firmly rooted in the Police Zone. (342) The implementation of South Africa’s reserve system and the subsequent resettlement of the Herero finally dashed any hopes for the restoration of traditional lands which might have survived the military period. This, together with changes brought about at the political level by the new reserve leadership, added a more radical political dimension to the Truppenspieler. In the wake of the incorporation of traditional leaders into the colonial bureaucracy as reserve headmen, the leadership of the movement passed into the hands of younger people. In 1925 for example, Festus Kandjou, later to become a close aide of Kutako’s, "abandoned what he called "dangerous child’s play" and subsequently went to Epukiro reserve." He was Lt.Colonel of the Truppenspieler movement in Rehoboth, and as such participated actively in the Rehoboth rising in 1925. (343) The Officer in Charge of Native Affairs stated in the same year that

None of the responsible men or leaders are implicated
or take any part in it [Truppenspieler movement], and as far as can be gathered, look on the "troops" societies as an attempt on the part of the younger people to amuse themselves. (344)

Such evidence as there is suggests that the Truppenspieler movement was opposed to both the colonial administration and the traditional leaders who had filled the lower echelons of this administration. Moreover, resistance by the Truppenspieler was sufficiently strong in 1927 for the Native Commissioner to demand confidential reports from all Officers in Charge of Native Affairs and/or Magistrates in the territory with regard to the activities of the movement. (345) While most districts in the southern parts of the territory reported no activities of the troop movement, rumours about an impending rising by the Herero were reported from Wilhelmstal. (346) The presence of troops was reported from Walvis Bay, Usakos, Omaruru, Otjo, Tses Reserve, Otjiwarongo, Waterberg Reserve, Okahandja, Tsumeb, Swakopmund and Kalkfeld. It does appear from the reports that the creation of reserves had dispersed the movement in places. Towards the end of 1925, for example, a strong tendency towards organisation among the Herero was observed in Kalkfeld, but this was subsequently reported to have subsided, as 'nearly all the leading Hereros of my area have now removed to the Otjohorongo and Waterberg East Reserves.' (347)

In Rehoboth, the South African bombing raid in response to the
rising in 1925 had caused the Truppenspieler movement to cease its activities there. During the rising rebellious Bastards [sic]... were joined by a considerable number of mounted Herero who had no doubt been influenced to do so. These Herero, in spite of having no particular tribe or chief, were acting under some show of military organisation which, although of course not at all as thorough or in any way as formidable as the old Zulu system, had the effect of keeping them together. They were reliably reported as having "officers" of different ranks and so forth.(348)

Some of the reports also revealed that not all troops consisted only of Herero. In Usakos officers in the troop were Damara (349), and in Outjo about 20 blacks, 'both Herero and Klipkaffir have for considerable time bounded themselves together as soldiers and march out occasionally.'(350)

While the proclamation of new reserves disrupted the activities of the movement somewhat, they soon provided the basis for regrouping. In 1927 Waterberg reserve had "a fully organised Field Service", with a number of government employees involved in it. The superintendent believed that

In case of necessity (rebellion or defence) the Hereros can be mobilised under their local officers from the various districts by post or other means.(351)

There is no evidence that the Truppenspieler movement ever systematically planned violence against the colonial state. Nonetheless the Native Commissioner decided to act against it. In a letter to the Officer in Charge of Native Affairs he
informed him that the Administration could not 'sanction any organisation which provides for its members wearing uniforms and carrying out drills and parades or military evolutions.' For that reason 'the wearing of uniforms and drilling and carrying out military evolutions is forbidden and must be stopped.' (352) It would appear that this particular ban was not rigorously enforced, for in the mid-1930s, the colonial administration repeatedly slapped similar bans on the Truppenspieler movement. A possible reason for this is that up to then the movement did not fundamentally challenge or threaten colonial rule. This situation changed dramatically after the years of drought and Depression, and is discussed in Chapter Five.

As far as the 1920s are concerned, however, Emmett has argued that the Truppenspieler movement 'was associated with the more proletarianized members of the population who lived outside the reserves.' (353) This assertion is wrong. Indeed, Emmett made no attempt to substantiate this point. If anything, membership in the 1920s indicates that the movement drew its members from all walks of life, urban and rural. While membership was mainly confined to men, it was reported in 1927 that women were also allowed to become members in the Omaruru district. (354)

Similarly, its welfare function went beyond simply catering for proletarianized members. An important function was also to
provide funds for communal feasts, thus contributing to the development of ethnic solidarity and unity. Although no fixed or compulsory subscriptions existed, the 'Oberst' of the Windhoek regiment stated that "Collections for special purposes, e.g. burying paupers, procuring cattle for slaughter on occasion of feasts etc. are carried out by any member or members deputed by myself." (355) Fees ranged from 1s to 2s per month. (356) These funds were used to support soldiers' widows, pay court fines, pay for funerals and generally support people in need. As such it formed an important function in building solidarity and cooperation in the absence of any well developed traditional structures. It does not seem surprising in this context that the movement seems to have had a particular attraction for younger people, particularly the generation that grew up during and after the Herero rising of 1904. In 1927 some young members of the movement had told a colonial officer that

We younger men want our "Troop" or club; we help one another as a benevolent society would do on occasion as funerals etc. We also like to gather at Xmas [sic] time, kill some oxen and indulge in a combined feast, and also provide interest by marching around. (357)

In the light of this brief discussion, Ranger's observations with regard to Beni societies in East Africa have some resonance for S.W.A. Ranger concluded that the Beni societies were not pantomimes of white power nor protest movements against it. They were above all concerned with the survival, success, and reputation of their members, acting as welfare societies, as sources of prestige, as suppliers of skills. (358)
Moreover, "the Beni societies were not so much reflecting pre-existing communal identities as creating community contexts." (359) In S.W.A., though, this process was characterised by intense conflict, reflecting growing resentment in reserves and urban areas. Drought and Depression led to increasing hardship in the urban areas through unemployment, while at the same time throwing the inadequacy of reserves into sharp relief.
Notes and References

2. Ibid, p.49
5. du Pisani, S.W.A/Namibia, p.56. He reiterated this view in 1925 when he argued in the Union Parliament - this time as member of the Opposition - that annexation of South West Africa was unnecessary, since "The Mandate for me is enough, and it "would be enough for the Union. It gives the Union such complete sovereignty, not only administrative, but legislative, that we need not ask for anything more." Goldblatt, History of South West Africa, p.210
8. 'Finanzwirtschaft und Vormundschaft', AZ 18.4.1923; 'Selbstverwaltung - Selbsthilfe', AZ 5.4.1924. D. Innes came to a similar conclusion when he argued that the Union was granted the Mandate at a time when "the South African bourgeoisie was struggling to develop its own economic base in South Africa" and that as a result "South African capital was too weak to exploit Namibia's resources to the full." D. Innes, 'Monopoly Capital and Imperialism in Southern Africa. The Role of the Anglo American Group', Ph.D., University of Sussex, 1980, p.551. Chapter six of the thesis entitled 'South African Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Namibia: The Role of the Anglo American Group is not contained in D. Innes, Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa, (Johannesburg, 1984). See also H.-G. Hubrich and H. Melber, Namibia: Geschichte und Gegenwart. Zur Frage der Dekolonisation einer Siedlerkolonie, (Bonn, 1977), p.60
9. Innes, 'Monopoly Capital', p.553
11. Ibid, pp.107-108
12. Ibid, p.27
13. Ibid, p.25
14. Ibid, pp.114-115. While cattle from Rhodesia were subject
to higher rates for equal milage, distances were much shorter. Thus the distance Bulawayo-Johannesburg was 681 miles and Mafeking (Bettchuanaland)-Johannesburg 189 miles. Railage thus did not amount to more then £1 per head.

15. Ibid, pp.25,109

18. ERFC, pp.90,12
19. Ibid, p.91
20. Ibid, p.93
21. Ibid, p.100
22. Ibid, p.16
23. Ibid, p.72. In comparison, the Union exported an average £1 181 000 worth of South African produced goods to Southern Rhodesia, "excluding gold, government stores and species." Its trade surplus with the latter averaged around £1 388 850 for the periods 1925-1928. Ibid, p.74

24. Ibid, pp.18, 99
25. Ibid, p.157

28. ERFC, p.152
30. ERFC, p.152
31. KSW 3, File No.25, pp.1475,1478; 'Berichte aus dem Landesrat', AZ 12.5.1928
33. ERFC, pp.153-154. In 1926 Dr. Hirsekorn supplied slightly different figures on land settlement in the Legislative Assembly. According to these, 1066 farms had been allotted under the land settlement laws to 1313 settlers comprising a total area of 8 695 458 ha. and representing a value of
34. EFRC, pp.154-155. For more detail on expenditure on settlement see the 'Memorandum of Evidence to be submitted to the Financial Relations Commission by J.D. Lardner-Burke, Member of the Legislative Assembly of S.W.A.', Ibid, pp.204-208
35. Ibid, p.152. See also Raedel, 'Die Wirtschaft und die Arbeiterfrage', p.108
36. EFRC, p.154
39. The Chief Native Commissioner arrived at this figure by dividing available male labourers into the number of white-owned cattle in the district. In 1923 whites in the district owned 127 279 large stock and 84 208 head of small stock on 258 farms. Assuming that one herd could look after 100 cattle or 400 small stock, the district would have required 1483 black workers, being 183 more than the actual male population of 1300 in the district. If it is assumed that only 90 per cent of the total population just mentioned was available for work on farms, the shortage would rise to 313. See NAW 3/-, Officer in Charge of Native Affairs to Secretary for the Protectorate, 17.7.1923, p.2
40. Union of South Africa, Report of the Administrator for the Year 1922, p.21. These annual reports by the Administrator will be referred to below as Report of the Administrator.
41. Ibid
43. Report of the Administrator, 1921, p.18; ibid, 1923, p.7
46. Ibid
47. NAW 30 Native Reserves. Report for 1922, n.p.[5]
49. SWAA A 2/1/6 Annual Report Outjo 1922, 8.1.1923, p.2
51. SWAA Unregistered Papers. Annual Report Outjo 1927, p.2
52. SWA A 50/1 H. Wrensch & Co. to Secretary of the

For another example see SWAA A 50/51 D.J. Erasmus to Administrator, 11.4.1921


SWAA A 50/1 Magistrate Grootfontein to Secretary for SWA, 8.12.1923, p.2

SWAA A 50/1 Telegram Magistrate Grootfontein to Native Commissioner Windhoek, 4.12.1923; Native Commissioner Windhoek to Magistrate Grootfontein, 4.12.1923; Magistrate Grootfontein to Secretary for SWA, 8.12.1923

SWAA A 50/1 Magistrate Grootfontein to Secretary for SWA, 8.12.1923, p.2

SWAA Unregistered Papers. Annual Report Otjiwarongo 1921, p.1

SWAA Unregistered Papers. Annual Report Okahandja 1921, p.3


SWAA A 396/4 Constable Meiring to Post Commander SWA Police Okahandja, 17.10.1922


'Der Besuch des General Smuts. Eingabe der Farmerschaft', AZ 14.9.1920. See also ADM 2163/3 (II) Officer in Charge Native Affairs to Secretary for the Protectorate, 24.11.1919, p.20

SWAA A 2/1/7 Annual Report 1923: Native Affairs, p.4

SWAA A 196/3 Memorandum by 'Verband der Verwertungsvereinigungen zu Windhoek' to General Smuts, 25.8.1920. See also ADM 567/2 Vol.3 Elmenhorst to Minister of Justice, Pretoria, 15.2.1920; ibid, Polle to Minister of Justice, Pretoria, 2.1920; ibid, Polle to Minister of Justice, Pretoria, 9.2.1920; ibid, March to Minister of Justice, Pretoria, 14.2.1920


ADM 567/2 Vol.3 Telegram Mariental Boeren Vereniging to Premier, stamped Cape Town, 12.4.1920. Translated the sentence reads: 'serious clashes...between rural residents and natives big losses of stock are suffered because there
is no compulsory law on kaffirs.'


69. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 4th Session. 6th Meeting, 6.6.1924, p.47

70. See e.g. ADM 2163/3 I Superintendent Native Reserves to Officer in Charge Native Affairs, 5.10.1917; ibid, Officer in Charge of Native Affairs to Secretary for the Protectorate, 18.7.1918

71. ADM 2163/3, II Officer in Charge Native Affairs Windhoek to Secretary for the Protectorate, 24.11.1919

72. ADM 2163/3 III Officer in Charge Native Affairs Windhoek to Native Commissioner for SWA, 15.9.1921. See also ibid, Officer in Charge Native Affairs to Secretary for the Protectorate, 21.7.1919; ibid, Major Manning to Chairman of Native Reserves Commission, n.d. [end 1922]. For conditions in the southern districts cf. e.g. ADM C.1 67 Militray Magistrate to Secretary for the Protectorate 13.10.1919

73. ADM 2163/3 III Officer in Charge Native Affairs to Secretary for the Protectorate, Windhoek, 21.7.1919

74. NAW 30/1/22 Officer in Charge of Native Affairs to Native Commissioner SWA, 14.7.1922

75. NAW 30/2/22 Statement Rudolph Kalepwa, Orumbo 23.4.1922; Statement by Leonard Kaleambo, Orumbo, 23.4.1922 and Statement by Kawe Kanne, Orumbo, 23.4.1922; ADM 2163/3 IV Georg Baas to Commissioner of Police Windhoek, 19.7.1920

76. ADM 2163/3 IV Georg Baas to Commissioner of Police Windhoek, 19.7.1920, original emphasis

77. ADM 2163/3 III Acting Magistrate Windhoek to Secretary for SWA, 18.1.1922

78. ADM 2163/3 II Bowker addressing meeting at Orumbo, 21.7.1919

79. ADM 2163/3 II Officer in Charge of Natiave Affairs to Superintendent Reserves, 18.8.1919, original emphasis. These orders followed a severe reprimand by the Officer in Charge. Pointing out the unsatisfactory manner of control in the Orumbo-Okatumba reserves he concluded: ‘In short, you must exercise a strict control over the natives. On your reserves they are out of hand, disobedient, insolent, and unmannerly. You are much too lenient with them. They must be pulled up sharply and brought into line.’ Ibid, original emphasis.

80. ADM 2163/3 III Major Manning to Chairman of Native Reserves Commission, 14.5.1921 original emphasis

81. ADM 567/2 Vol.3 Secretary for the Protectorate to Secretary of the Prime Minister, Pretoria, n.d.[end 1919]

82. ADM 2163/3 I Settlers to van Niekerk, 13.4.1918; ADM 2163/3 III Superintendent Reserves to Officer in Charge Native Affairs Windhoek, 6.4.1922

83. See e.g. ‘Die Brennende Frage’, 6.4.1922

84. Native Reserves Commission, 8.6.1921, p.3
85. See e.g. ADM 567/2 Vol.4 Antrag Zillmann, Gau Okahandja, signed von Gossler, 1.5.1920; ADM 4060 Vol.2 Farm Association Kalkfeld to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 13.11.1920, p.2; Native Reserves Commission, p.3
87. SWAA Unregistered Papers. Annual Report Karibib 1921, pp.3-4; SWAA A 158/4 Miscellaneous Notes for Native Reserve Commission, Native Affairs Windhoek, 19.4.1921, p.1
88. Report of the Administrator, 1921, p.13
90. ADM 567/2 Vol.3 Magistrate Windhoek to Secretary for the Protectorate, 21.8.1920
91. SWAA A 158/4 Miscellaneous Notes for Native Reserve Commission, Native Affairs Windhoek, 19.4.1921, p.1
94. Report of the Native Reserves Commission, p.2
96. SWAA A 158/4 Minutes of a Meeting of the Native Reserves Commission for S.W.A.: Held at Windhoek on the 21st June 1921, p.1; Report of the Administrator, 1920, p.13
98. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.7 R.S. Cope to Allen [Additional Native Commissioner], 31.8.1948, p.2; SWAA A 158/7 Vol.1 Magistrate Gobabis to Native Commissioner Windhoek, 23.1.1925
99. SWAA A 158/23 Vol.1 Magistrate Otjiwarongo to Secretary of the Protectorate, 6.9.1923
100. Ibid, Magistrate Otjiwarongo to Native Commissioner, Windhoek, 16.8.1923, p.2
101. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Assistant Secretary to H.H. the Administrator, n.d.[1933], p.29
102. Ibid, pp.33-34
103. Ibid, pp.109-110
104. Ibid, p.14
105. Ibid, p.21
106. Ibid, p.19
107. Ibid, p.16. See also SWAA A 158/7 Magistrate Gobabis to Secretary of South West Africa, 14.8.1924
109. SWAA A 158/2 Superintendent Aminuis Reserve to Magistrate Gobabis, 16.2.1925, p.2
110. SWAA A 158/23 Vol.3 Superintendent Waterberg East Native Reserve to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 7.4.1923, p.1
111. SWAA A 50/1 Officer in Charge Native Affairs to Secretary for S.W.A., 6.9.1921, p.1
112. R. Moorsom, "Colonisation and Proletarianization: An Exploratory Investigation into the Formation of the Working
Class in Namibia under German and South African Rule to 1945', M.A., University of Sussex, 1973, p.76; Wellington, South West Africa, pp.278-281
114. SWAA A 158/7 van Niekerk, Superintendent Epukiro Reserve to Mr. Cope, 5.11.1923, pp.1-2
115. Report of the Administrator, 1924, p.21
116. Ibid
117. Hosea Kutako in Scott, 'In Face of Fear', p.63; Troup, In Face of Fear, p.77
118. Scott, 'In Face of Fear', p.58; Troup, In Face of Fear, p.74
120. Report of the Administrator, 1921, p.13
122. Gottschalk, 'S.A. Labour Policy in Namibia', p.80
124. Ibid
125. Gottschalk, 'S.A. Labour Policy in Namibia', p.81
126. Ibid
127. Report of the Native Reserves Commission, p.14
128. Goldblatt, History of South West Africa, p.207
129. Ibid, p.214
130. Bantu Commissioner, Ovamboland, quoted in M.J. Olivier, 'Inboorlingbeleid en -Administrasie in die Mandaatgebied van Suidwesafrika', Ph.D., University of Stellenbosch, 1961 p.196
132. Report of the Administrator, 1923, p.16
133. Quoted in K. Gottschalk, 'South African Imperialism with Special Reference to the Formation of South African Colonial Policy in Namibia 1915-1925', forthcoming Ph.D., University of Cape Town. I would like to express my gratitude to Keith Gottschalk for permission to quote from his draft thesis.
134. Quoted in Olivier, 'Inboorlingbeleid', p.187
136. SWAA A 158/1 Native Reserves General, Native Commissioner, 30.5.1928
139. AVEM B/c II 84 Meier to Olpp, Windhoek, 19.7.1921
140. W. Beinart, 'Conflict in Qumbu. Rural Consciousness, Ethnicity and Violence in the Colonial Transkei', in W. Beinart and

141. NAW 1/10 Herero Delegation, Windhoek Native Affairs Office, 28.9.1926


143. NAW 28/1919/1 Herero Address [to the Governor General, Lord Buxton] 1919

144. See the evidence of missionaries Olpp and Vedder to the SWA Commission, KSW Vol.2, File 20, p. 1115 and File 21, p. 1233; AVEM C/h 12a Konferenzbericht der Missionsstation Gobabis, 1926, p. 2


146. Poewe, The Namibian Herero, pp. 125-126


148. AVEM C/s Olpp to Missionshaus Barmen, 28.11.1924


151. See e.g. AVEM C/k 11 Verhandlungen, p. 6; AVEM C/h 18a Halbjahresbericht Karibib, April 1921

152. AVEM C/k 2b 'Das Problem der Christlichen Ehe unter den suedwestafrikanischen Heidenchristen', n.d. [1922], p. 1

153. AVEM C/h 30b Halbjahresbericht (vom 1.4. bis 30.9.), Omaruru, 30.9.1921, p. 3

154. AVEM C/h 50b 1. Halbjahresbericht, Windhoek, 9.5.1926, p. 1


156. AVEM C/h 15a Halbjahresbericht Grootfontein, 7.4.1923, pp. 2-3

157. Berichte der Rheinischen Missionsgesellschaft [RBM], 1932

158. AVEM C/h 50b Jahresbericht der Hererogemeinde Windhoek, 28.1.1924, p. 1. Sundermeier, Wir aber suchten Gemeinschaft, p. 92

159. AVEM C/h 12a Halbjahresbericht Gemeinde Gobabis, 1.4.1928-30.9.1928, p. 2

160. AVEM C/k 2b Konferenzreferat von H. Brockmann, 'Die Notwendigkeit der Erziehung unserer Eingeborenen zur Arbeit, vom christlichen und sozialen Standpunkt aus beleuchtet',

- 240 -

The term 'Fellherero' refers to pre-colonial Herero who wore hides instead of European clothes.

AVEM C/h 30b Halbjahresbericht (vom 1.4. bis 30.9) Omaruru, 30.9.1923, p.[2a]

See AVEM C/k 2b 'Das Problem der christlichen Ehe unter den suedwestafrikanischen Heidenchristen', n.d.[1922]

V. Wenecke, 'Die Gemeinschaft der Ahnen', p.89


See also *Report of the Administrator, 1939*, p.101

BRM, 1924, p.26. See also Olpp's statement that 'everywhere in the mission praying and work go hand in hand.' *BRM*, 1921, p.253 Social and cultural progress of the Herero as seen by Dr. Vedder was premised on manual labour. 'If the Herero is to develop into a useful member of society, he must work; South West Africa offers him many opportunities.' Vedder, 'The Herero', p.207. This attitude was not unique to S.W.A. In Southern Rhodesia, for example, missionaries considered industrial training in mission schools as 'character-building'. Peaden, *Missionary Attitudes to Shona Culture*, p.9

BRM, 1924, p.6

Ibid. See also *ibid*, 1924, pp.44-45; *ibid*, 1927, p.85

See, for example, Olpp's remarks to the SWA Commission, KSW Vol.2, File 20, 28th Public Meeting, Swakopmund, 28.8.1935, p.1125


Baumann, 'Einfluss und Bedeutung', p.77. In Southern Rhodesia 'missionaries said quite frankly that schools would assist
converts in developing the culture change necessary for the Christian life in a way which was not possible otherwise.'

Feaden, Missionary Attitudes, p.9

180. Troup, In Face of Fear, p.214; Baumann, ‘Einfluss und Bedeutung’, pp.80-81


182. BRM, 1923, p.116

183. Ibid

184. Ibid, p.173

185. Ibid, 1926, p.72

186. Ibid, 1927, pp.87,151

187. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 [Report by] Assistant Secretary to H.H. the Administrator, n.d.[1933], p.43

188. Poewe, The Namibian Herero, p.107

189. Wienecke, ‘Die Gemeinschaft der Ahnen’, p.85; Poewe, The Namibian Herero, p.129


191. BRM, 1923, p.92 as paraphrased by Poewe, The Namibian Herero, p.128; Engel, Kolonialismus und Nationalismus, p.223

192. Engel, Kolonialismus und Nationalismus, p.223. Poewe attributes the same descriptions to a memorial service held by Werner ‘on a Sunday afternoon in August 1923.’ This is inaccurate: missionary Vedder conducted the memorial service.

Poewe, The Namibian Herero, p.128

193. Engel, Kolonialismus und Nationalismus, p.224

194. Ibid, pp.224-225


196. Engel, Kolonialismus und Nationalismus, p.226

197. Ibid, pp.224,226

198. For the German version see BRM, 1923, pp.118-122. An English translation of most parts can be found in Poewe, The Namibian Herero, pp.130-133

199. Poewe, The Namibian Herero, p.131, emphasis in original

200. BRM, 1923, p.119 as translated by Poewe, The Namibian Herero, p.130; Wienecke, ‘Die Gemeinschaft der Ahnen’, p.86

201. BRM, 1923, p.119

202. Poewe, The Namibian Herero, pp.130-131, emphasis in original

203. Ibid, p.131

204. Wienecke, ‘Die Gemeinschaft der Ahnen’, p.86

205. Ibid, p.87

206. Ibid, p.85

207. AVEM C/h 50b Zweiter Halbjahresbericht, zugleich Konferenzbericht, Windhoek, 12.1.1927, p.1; Sundermeier, Wir abersuchten Gemeinschaft, p.92

208. AVEM C/h 15a Halbjahresbericht Grootfontein, 6.10.1925, p.1

209. AVEM C/h 30b Halbjahresbericht (von April bis Oktober) Omaruru, 30.9.1927, p.4
According to Vedder, "the Hereros know a supreme being whom they call by two names: Ndjambi Karunga. The name Karunga has an Ovambo derivation and is only known intimately to those Herero who have been in contact with the Ovambo in former times. The name Ndjambi as title for a supreme, divine being is known among many Bantu tribes...When the Herero speaks of "God", he calls him Mukuru and thinks of a human being who stands first in the genealogical table." Vedder, 'The Herero', pp.164-165

AVEM C/h 12a Halbjahresbericht Gobabis, 30.9.1929, p.1. See also Vivello, The Herero in Western Botswana, pp.124-125

AVEM C/k 20 F. Poennighaus, 'Abendmahl und Orunjara bei den Herero', n.d.[1935], p.2

SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Superintendent Aminuis to Native Commissioner Windhoek, 9.1.1928

AVEM C/k 20 F. Poennighaus, 'Abendmahl und Orunjara bei den Herero', n.d.[1935], p.1

AVEM C/h 12a Halbjahresbericht Gobabis, 30.9.1929, p.2


AVEM C/h 15a Halbjahresbericht Grootfontein, 6.4.1926

AVEM C/ii Reiseerlebnisse meines Evangelisten Wilhelm Kandjii im Eingeborenens reservat Aminuis, September/Okt oter 1927, p.5

AVEM C/h 12a Halbjahresbericht Gemeinde Gobabis, 1.10.1927 bis 31.3.1928, p.3


SWAA A 158/29 Vol.5 Memorandum by the Superintendent, Aminuis Native Reserve in connection with the South West Africa Commission, n.d.[September 1935], pp.[8-9]; AVEM C/h 18a Halbjahresbericht Karibib, Anfang April 1921, p.1

AVEM C/h 15a Konferenzbericht der Station Grootfontein ueber das Jahr 1919 mit einer Uebersicht ueber die Zeit von 1914-1918, p.5

AVEM B/c 84 Halbjahresbericht Windhoek 1920, 7.10.1920, p.1

SWAA A 158/29 Vol.5 Memorandum, p.10; AVEM C/h 30b Jahresbericht 1937, Omaruru 31.12.1937, folio 444

AVEM B/c 84 Halbjahresbericht Windhoek 1920, 7.10.1920, p.1

AVEM C/h 25a Halbjahresbericht der Missionstation Okahandja, Maerz 1923, p.2

BRM, 1932, pp.6-7

AVEM C/h 30b Halbjahresbericht 1920, Omaruru 28.10.1920, p.2

AVEM C/h 15a Halbjahresbericht Grootfontein, 8.4.1920, p.2; Sundermeier, Wir aber suchten Gemeinschaft, p.92

AVEM C/h 15a Halbjahresbericht Grootfontein, 17.4.1923, p.1

Ibid
257. Emmett, 'Popular Resistance', p.20
258. SWAA A 50/32 R.S. Cope to Secretary for S.W.A., 21.11.1922 quoted in Pirio, 'The Role of Garveyism', p.28
259. Ibid, p.31
260. AVEM C/h 15a Halbjahresbericht Grootfontein, 7.4.1923, p.1
261. AVEM C/h 15b Konferenzbericht der Herero-Gemeinde Windhoek, 16.3.1922, p.4
262. Engel, Kolonialismus und Nationalismus, p.189; AVEM C/h 50b Konferenzbericht der Gemeinde Windhoek, 16.3.1922, p.2
263. AVEM C/h 25a Halbjahresbericht der Missionsstation Okahandja, Oktober 1923, p.3; Engel, Kolonialismus und Nationalismus, p.221
264. SWAA A 396/4 Native Commissioner Manning in Conference Memo to Secretary for SWA, 14.9.1922, pp.1-2
265. Emmett, 'Popular Resistance', p.22
266. Ibid
267. AVEM C/h 50b Jahresbericht ueber die Gemeinde Windhoek, 9.1.1923, p.1
268. Engel, Kolonialismus und Nationalismus, p.199
269. AVEM C/h 15a Halbjahresbericht Grootfontein, 7.4.1923
270. Engel, Kolonialismus und Nationalismus, p.215
273. AVEM C/h 50b Konferenzbericht der Hererogemeinde Windhoek, 16.3.1922, p.3
274. AVEM C/h 50b Jahresbericht der Namagemeinde Windhoek, 9.1.1923, p.1
275. AVEM C/h 50b Zweiter Quartalsbericht Windhoek, 2.11.1922, p.2. See also AVEM C/s 1 Zusammenfassender Bericht ueber die Missionsarbeit in Suedwest Afrika im Jahre 1933, p.2 and KSW Vol.2 File 20, p.113 where Olpp told the SW.A. Commission on 26.8.1935 that the U.N.I.A. has collected 80 000s in the country.
276. AVEM C/h50b Jahresbericht ueber die Namagemeinde Windhoek, 9.1.1923, p.1; AVEM C/h 15a Halbjahresbericht Grootfontein, 7.4.1923, p.1
277. Quoted in Pirio, 'The Role of Garveyism', p.29
278. Ibid, p.27
279. Quoted in ibid
280. AVEM C/h 50b Konferenzbericht der Hererogemeinde Windhoek, 16.3.1922, p.3
281. AVEM C/h 50b Zweiter Quartalsbericht Windhoek, 2.11.1922, p.1; AVEM C/h 15a Halbjahresbericht Grootfontein, 7.4.1923, p.1; Engel, Kolonialismus und Nationalismus, pp.193-194
282. AVEM C/h 50b Jahresbericht ueber die Namagemeinde Windhoek,
9.1.1923, p.1; Sundermeier, Wir aber suchten Gemeinschaft, pp.89-90
284. AVEM C/h 50b Jahresbericht über die Namagemeinde Windhoek, 9.1.1923, p.1
286. AVEM C/h 50b Zweiter Quartalbericht Windhoek, 2.11.1922, p.1
Small groups of foreign workers, mainly from West Africa but also South Africa, who were employed largely in the coastal towns of S.W.A. were referred to as Krooboys by colonial writers.
287. AVEM C/h 50b Jahresbericht über die Namagemeinde Windhoek, 9.1.1923, p.1
288. Quoted in Pirio, ‘The Role of Garveyism’, p.34
290. AVEM B/c Meier an Olpp, Windhoek, 19.7.1922, p.4
291. SWAA A 396/4 Officer in Charge Native Affairs Otjiwarongo to Secretary for South West Africa, 15.10.1922, p.1
292. SWAA A 396/4 Statement made by David Nxiki on the 3rd October 1922, p.1
293. AVEM C/h 12a Bericht über das II. und III. Quartal 1927. Gobabis im September 1922, p.2; SWAA A 396/4 Constable Visagie to Post Commander SWA Police Okahandja, 3.10.1922, p.2
294. SWAA A 396/4 Constable Visagie to Post Commander SWA Police Okahandja, 3.10.1922, p.1
295. Ibid, p.2
296. SWAA A 396/1 [Translation of letter] To The Editor, Landeszeitung, 11.10.1922, p.2
297. Pirio, ‘The Role of Garveyism’, p.29
298. SWAA A 59/32 Headley to Joseph Hailand, 14.11.1922 quoted in Pirio, ‘The Role of Garveyism’, p.33
299. SWAA A 396/4 Report of John Retsang, 6.11.1922, p.2
301. Engel, Kolonialismus und Nationalismus, pp.196-197
302. SWAA A 396/5 C.H.M. to Acting Secretary, 13.10.1922, pp.1-2
303. SWAA A 396/5 Capt. H.M. Harris, Otjiwarero to Secretary for South West Africa, 22.9.1922, p.4
304. Ibid
305. SWAA A 396/4 Constable Koorts SWA Police Okahandja to Post Commander, SWA Police Okahandja, 22.9.1922
306. SWAA A 396/4 Affidavit Oskar Kischer, 10.8.1922
307. SWAA A 396/4 Acting Magistrate Okahandja to Secretary for South West Africa, Windhoek, 1.9.1922, p.1. See also SWAA A 396/4 Report of Native Corporal Jacob, 27.10.1922 in which he alleged ‘that the influential natives had advised him [Traugott Maharero] to obey the branding laws, but he told the people of Okahandja not to brand.’
308. SWAA A 396/4 Magistrate Okahandja to Post Commander SWA Police Okahandja, 24.8.1922, p.1
309. SWAA A 396/4 Acting Magistrate to Secretary for South West Africa, 1.9.1922, p.1
310. AVEM C/h 12a Bericht über das II. und III, Quartal 1922.

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Gobabis im September 1922, p.2
311. SWAA A 396/5 Statement [by Anton] taken by ? in Charge Police Tsumeb, 24.10.1922
312. AVEM C/h 50b Zweiter Quartalbericht Windhoek, 2.11.1922, p.1; AVEM C/h 12a Bericht ueber das II. und III. Quartal Gobabis im September 1922, p.2
313. Poewe, The Namibian Herero, p.116
314. SWAA A 396/4 N.C. to Acting Secretary, 9.10.1922, p.1
315. ibid, pp.1-2
316. AVEM C/h 50b Zweiter Quartalbericht Windhoek, 2.11.1922, p.1
317. SWAA A 396/5 Officer in Charge Native Affairs Windhoek, Memo: The Native Question. Missionary Meier’s Report. 28.9.1923, p.1;
318. AVEM C/h 50b Zweiter Quartalsbericht Windhoek, 2.11.1922, p.2
319. AVEM C/s 1/2 F. Dlpp an die Deputation der Rheinischen Missions-Gesellschaft Barmen, 26.6.1923, p.2
320. See e.g. AVEM C/1 Reiseerlebnisse meines Evangelisten Wilhelm Kandjii im Eingeborenenreservat Aminuis, September-UktrJber 1927, p.9;
322. SWAA A 396/5 Herero Deputation 10.11.1922
324. Herero in S.W.A. were called upon to collect money for a conference and subsequent development of Liberia as the new fatherland of the black race. AVEM C/h 50b Halbjahresbericht der Namagemeinde Windhoek vom 1.4.1924-30.9.1924, p.1
325. AVEM C/h 50b Jahresbericht ueber die Nama-Gemeinde Windhoek, 1.1923, p.2
326. Pirio, ‘The Role of Garveyism’, p.29
332. BNM, 1923, p.117; Poewe, The Namibian Herero, p.130. Following Ranger, it can be argued that Maharero’s funeral represened a symbolic attempt to restore the status and dignity of the Herero paramounty by drawing on European ceremonial traditions. Ranger, ‘The Invention of Tradition’,
in Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, pp.332f


335. Emmett, 'The Rise of African Nationalism', p.408. Poewe is wrong when she writes that 'black was also the national colour of Maharero's Herero' and again 'black was the symbol of only his [Maharero's] Herero and not that of the Ovambanderu... Red was the national colour of the Ovambanderu.' Poewe, *The Namibian Herero*, pp.128,130


337. It should be noted that several authors refer to the Otjikerandu movement whenever discussing the Truppenspieler. See e.g. Katjavivi, *A History of Resistance*, pp.25-26; Emmett, 'The Rise of African Nationalism', chapter ten


339. SWAA A 396/4 Acting Magistrate Okahandja to Secretary of South West Africa, 1.9.1922

340. Ibid

341. SWAA A 396/4 Re Willie Mhlongo's Statement, 21.10.1922


343. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Magistrate Rehoboth to Native Commissioner Windhoek, 29.10.1927, p.2

344. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Officer in Charge Native Affairs to Native Commissioner Windhoek, 20.7.1927

345. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Native Commissioner to all Magistrates, Officers in Charge, Superintendents of Native Reserves, 21.10.1927

346. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Post Commander SWA Police Karibib to Magistrate Karibib, 26.10.1927


348. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Magistrate Rehoboth to Native Commissioner Windhoek, 29.10.1927, pp.1-2

349. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Post Commander SWA Police Usakos to Magistrate Karibib, 26.10.1927

350. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Post Commander SWA Police Otjimbingwe to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 8.11.1927

351. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Superintendent Waterberg East Native Reserve to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 29.10.1927

352. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Native Commissioner to Officer in Charge Native Affairs Windhoek, 1.2.1928


354. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Magistrate Omaruru to Secretary for South West Africa, 2.11.1927

355. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Officer in Charge Native Affairs: Interview with 5 Hereros, 4.10.1927, p.1

356. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Magistrate Omaruru to Secretary for South
West Africa, 2.11.1927 and Superintendent Tses Reserve to Magistrate Keetmanshoop, 5.11.1927, p.1

357. SWAA A 50/9 Vol.1 Interview with 5 Hereros, 4.10.1927, p.1


359. Ibid, pp.63-63, original emphasis. See also Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition', in Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, pp.245-246
CHAPTER FOUR: DROUGHT AND DEPRESSION, 1929 - 1933

The Great Depression, coupled with a severe drought, dealt S.W.A. a severe blow. As in neighbouring South Africa, 'the particular form and effects of this crisis...were determined above all by [S.W.A's] position in the world economy as an exporter of minerals and agricultural commodities.' (1) Gross domestic product fell from a high of R13 million in 1929 to a low of R3.8 million in 1933. (2) The impact of the Depression affected the two major sectors of the colonial economy, mining and agriculture, differentially.

Mining and the Great Depression

1928 was the last year in which the Administrator could report satisfactory production levels in mining "in spite of the interference occasioned in nearly every instance by an almost chronic condition of labour shortage." (3) He forecast that diamond revenues would decrease from an average of £400 000 per annum before 1929 to not more than £80 000 for the 1929-1930 financial year. (4) Indeed, while demand for diamonds during the first half of 1929 showed a slight improvement over the previous year,

In the latter half uncertainty was apparent from the start; this towards the end of the year culminated in complete stagnation, mainly due to the American financial slump, but also abstention from buying.

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owing to the proposed change in United States of America tariff on polished goods. (5)

Diamond prices dropped significantly after the onset of the Depression. In the first half of 1931 a drop of 16.8 per cent was registered, followed by a further decrease of 26.5 per cent after June:

the total fall during the year thus being 43.3 per cent. To this must be added the fact that under the contract payment is affected in London, so that diamond producers here lose further the difference in the exchange between London and South Africa, which during the past month or two has ranged between 25 and 29 per cent. (6)

To counter the severe disruptions caused by the Depression, "producers were...faced with the necessity of curtailing production during the coming year." (7) Anglo American was well placed to cut back production both in the Union and S.W.A., as it "had...succeeded in bringing under its control all of the known diamondiferous resources in the capitalist world." (8) Output of its S.W. African diamond mines thus dropped from 597,189 carats in 1929 to 237,4 carats in 1933. (9)

The Depression did not abate and the Anglo American Group resorted to "the virtual cessation of diamond production throughout the world." (10) In S.W.A., Namaqua Diamonds Ltd. suspended operations in 1930 (11), followed by Consolidated Diamond Mines, which stopped production in June 1932 and confined its activities to prospecting along the Orange River. (12) The latter coincided with attempts by De Beers "to
bring all its southern African mines to a halt.' (13)

Other branches of mining suffered a similar fate. By 1931 prices for copper, silver and lead had 'fallen to a point which makes it practically economically impossible to produce these minerals.'(14) In July 1932 the Otavi Minen and Eisenbahn Gesellschaft closed its copper mines at Tsumeb 'and retrenched practically all employees, Europeans and natives, as it was found that it was impossible to produce copper at current prices.' (15) This was followed in August by the closure of the vanadium mines owned by the S.W.A. Company. By 1932 the Administrator observed that 'it may be said that the mining industry in the Territory was suspended.' (16) Table 4.1 reflects the decrease in mining exports as a result of the slump in the mining sector. Revenues derived from the production and sale of diamonds alone had decreased from £310 085 in 1926 to £67 025 in 1931-1932. (17)

Table 4.1 Exports of Diamonds and Base Metals, 1929-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Diamonds (£)</th>
<th>Base Metals (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1 563 805</td>
<td>1 020 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1 184 217</td>
<td>645 022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>226 720</td>
<td>357 731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>85 440</td>
<td>105 658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>10 100</td>
<td>2 695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These developments had a devastating effect on the S.W. African economy. Before the Depression, mining was responsible for the circulation of about two to £3 million in wages and payments in the territory. (18) By 1930, this amount had decreased to less than a million pounds and by 1934 had reached a low of about £139 000, as Table 4.2 shows.

Table 4.2 Wages and Purchases by Mines, 1930-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White Wages (£)</th>
<th>Black Wages (£)</th>
<th>Stores (local purchases) (£)</th>
<th>TOTAL (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>377 400</td>
<td>257 000</td>
<td>319 800</td>
<td>954 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>167 463</td>
<td>74 156</td>
<td>141 425</td>
<td>383 044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>125 765</td>
<td>41 487</td>
<td>51 781</td>
<td>219 033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>88 350</td>
<td>25 321</td>
<td>45 925</td>
<td>159 596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Windhoek Advertiser (WA), 29.7.1933, 6.4.1935

At the same time there were large scale retrenchments of white and black workers by the mining houses. As Table 4.3 below indicates, black employment on the mines plummeted from 9321 in 1929 to 1056 in 1933. Many unemployed mine workers, black and white, sought relief in urban areas such as Windhoek.
Although whites were reported to have taken 'up forms of employment which were previously occupied by natives' (19), they fared relatively better than their unemployed black colleagues. To begin with, Consolidated Dimond Mines paid compensation to each retrenched white worker. (20) In addition, the colonial state responded with relief work projects for unemployed whites. (21) By contrast, the urban sojourn of retrenched black workers was of a more temporary nature. By 1932 there were c.700 in Windhoek alone. Not favoured by state-run relief work schemes, they were repatriated to their respective reserves. 'Practically all of them were Ovambos.' (22) The retrenchment and subsequent repatriation of
mine workers did not significantly affect reserves in the Police Zone, as the vast majority of mine workers were migrants from areas outside the Police Zone.

Drought, Depression and Settler Agriculture

Settler farming was hit by a double calamity in the late 1920s. More or less coinciding with the onset of the Great Depression was a severe drought which first made itself felt towards the end of 1928. (23) By 1929 'the position had rapidly become worse and worse' and in January 1930 the Administrator declared the following districts drought-stricken: Warmbad, Aroab, Bethanie, Maltahoehe, Gibeon, Rehoboth, Windhoek, Okahandja, Karibib and Omaruru, (24) The severity of the drought, however, was as much a result of the Union's ill-considered land settlement policies as of insufficient rainfall. J.D. Lardner-Burke, Member of the Legislative Assembly of S.W.A., argued in his evidence before the Economic and Financial Relations Commission that

The Union does not appear to have carried out any proper investigation of farming conditions as affected by periodical drought, although it had at its disposal statistics regarding rainfall which had been compiled by the German Government from 1880 onwards. (25)

It allotted land with little regard to the need for emergency grazing in periods of sustained drought. Farmers were thus tied to their farms during the present drought, with little
prospects of finding vacant pastures. (26) Farmers and their representatives in the Legislative Assembly increasingly complained that their farms were too small:

We have some 4000 to 4500 farmers on the land—and what is the refrain we continually hear from them? That the farms are too small. That too much land has already been allotted leaving no veldt for drought years. That the country accordingly is already overstocked. (27)

The onset of drought in S.W.A. coincided with ‘splendid rains’ in the Union. South African herds benefited accordingly, with the result that Union markets failed to absorb their normal complement of S.W. African cattle. The Administrator noted in 1929 that whereas in September and October stock in the Union is usually in poor condition and it is best in South West Africa, so that during those months stock from the Territory finds an excellent market there, last year the conditions were reversed and the results are reflected in the low exports of stock. (28)

Exports of slaughter oxen from S.W.A. to the Union thus declined from 54885 in 1928 to a low of 36476 in 1930. (29) To compound matters, the Imperial Cold Storage Co. (I.C.S.) lost its share of a contract to export meat to Italy in 1932, and ‘several trial shipments of chilled beef’ to England were unsuccessful ‘as a considerable financial loss was sustained...’ (30)

Anxious to save settler farmers from complete economic ruin, the colonial state intervened with direct financial assistance and
transport rebates. It also undertook to supply water to needy farmers. (31) In an effort to find new markets for beef cattle, the Administrator appointed a commission in 1930 to 'visit all the countries on the West Coast of Africa and enquire into the possibilities of opening up their trade there.' (32) But the drought continued to take a heavy toll among settler farmers. Stock losses were high. Many farmers were 'still suffering from the effects of the last drought and it will take years for some of them to recover their losses.' (33) In the Karibib district 'the majority of farmers lost over 50 per cent of their stock in 1930 and some lost as many as over 90 per cent.' (34) In the south of the territory small stock losses were as high as 90 per cent. (35) In his address to the Legislative Assembly in 1931 the Administrator stated that 1930 will always be a period of painful memory to South West Africa...It was a bleak year indeed. Losses in cattle occasioned by the drought were 55641 and small stock 228 000. The value of this stock and the corresponding capital lost to the country can well be imagined. South West is a small and poor country and the loss nearly devastated the country. (36)

Financially most settler farmers were unable to fend off the combined impact of drought and Depression. A large number of them had not even exercised the option of buying the farms allotted to them under the land settlement laws. (37) As a result, an estimated '90% of the farmers are dependent on the Government either through the Land Bank or the Land Settlement branch.' (38) With no signs of the Depression abating, these
institutions were finding it difficult to provide continued financial support to settler farmers. Because of declining revenues from mining, the Administration was no longer able to provide for the full loan requirements of the Land Bank. For the 1929-1930 financial year it could only advance about half the sum applied for. As a result the Board of Management of the Land Bank was obliged to restrict the granting of loans to purposes implying urgent development only. For the present therefore virtually no money will be available for the purchase of land, for ordinary farm development or for fencing. (39)

Prospective applicants for loans were informed 'to seek to secure accommodation elsewhere.' (40)

Agricultural debt increased dramatically. Farmers fell in arrears with their payments for land granted under the country's land settlement laws. From 1930 onwards, the majority of farmers were 'unable to meet in full their obligations to the storekeepers, and interest payments to the Land Bank and Administration.' (41) Numerous bankruptcies were feared unless either the Administration - through the Land Bank - or the storekeepers decide to hold their hands and give farmers still another chance to meet their obligations during the coming cream season. (42)

In 1931 farms originally allotted at a value of 1/6 a hectare are held as security for advances of public monies which, inclusive of the first cost, amount to 15/- a hectare and over. Thousands of pounds have been lent for "improvements" not worth as many pence. Hundreds
of settlers are at this moment sitting on their farms in penury, having liabilities owing to the government and storekeepers amounting to anything between one and three thousand pounds, without any stock worth mentioning to provide them with an income and with their children being housed and fed at the State Hostels at the public's expense. (43)

By the end of the drought in 1933, the position of many farmers had become desperate. The magistrate in Okahandja district wrote in his annual report for 1933 that 'some farmers, who a few years back kept a good table, are today living on mealie meal, coffee and bread.' (44) These observations were echoed in the Otjiwarongo district where

The Post Commander... reports that the majority of farmers in his area are starving, that there will be no income for 80 per cent of them even if copious rains do fall this season, that they have practically lost every cow and only young stock remains. (45)

The Effects on Farm Labour

The effects of drought and Depression on farm labour depended to some extent on whether they were employed by established farmers or by recent settlers. The former were a minority of 'comparatively well-to-do farmers' who generally paid higher wages. In Mariental district, for example, they paid average monthly wages of 7s 6d for child labour and 15s for adults, plus food in both cases. By comparison, poorer settlers, usually the more recent arrivals in the territory, only paid one goat per month plus food. The goats were estimated to have had an average value of 8s to 10s, and the food consisted of
barest necessities and two or three slaughter goats and their skins per month, but (preferably) animals which have died or become useless to the employer.' Children worked for food and clothes alone. (46) Overall, labour conditions on farms worsened considerably after 1929.

The position of farm labourers was considerably weakened by the fact that Depression and drought caused a surplus in the labour supply. The ranks of unemployed mine workers were swelled by large numbers of people from Ovamboland, Angola and Barotseland who flocked to S.W.A. in search of employment as a result of widespread drought in the region. (47) This resulted in labour supplies far exceeding demand until the end of 1933. (48) Consequently, black workers in the rural areas were "in most cases...compelled to take employment at such rates as are dictated by the employer." (49)

Farmers were quick to take advantage of this. Whereas average wages paid to farm labourers in Okahandja and Otjiwarongo districts ranged between 15s and 30s per month plus food in 1930 (50), a year later the magistrate in Gobabis reported that farmers paid their labour at wage rates between 10s to 15s per month. They 'are none too scrupulous in regard to the rations', he added. (51) Two years later wages for Okahandja district showed a marked decline, varying between 5s to 10s per month plus food. At the same time wages in the towns were
between 10s and £1 plus food. (52) In some districts labourers earned as little as 3s per month plus food. (53)

While cash wages were low enough anyway, the Assistant Native Commissioner felt that 'real hardship is...caused by wages not being paid in cash but kind.' (54) In fact, wages in kind became common practice during the years of drought and Depression. (55) Labourers frequently received food and no cash, 'so that their families suffer from hunger.' (56)

In many cases farm workers were simply cheated out of their pay, no matter in what form this was promised. In Karibib district, for example, some labourers contracted themselves for stock in lieu of wages and for some reason or other were discharged from service before they had actually earned the stock agreed upon. (57)

Elsewhere reserve residents worked on farms to obtain the necessary money to pay grazing fees in the reserves, only to discover upon payment that they did not receive cash, but were paid in kind. (58) The squeeze on farm wages was not enough to relieve the economic plight of many settler farmers. Growing numbers 'reduced their labour requirements to a minimum' since drought and depression had obliged them 'to husband their financial resources to the utmost.' (59)

But if settler farmers had to decrease their labour force for
financial reasons, they found it equally difficult to continue
to accommodate stock owned by labourers on their farms. As
Table 4.4 shows, the majority of stock owned by black S.W.
Africans in the Police Zone before the drought was grazing in
rural areas outside the reserves, i.e. on settler farms. A
comparison with Table 3.3 indicates, however, that black-owned
stock on white farms was decreasing after 1923, while stock
numbers on reserves increased.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>On Reserves</th>
<th>In Rural Areas</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Stock</td>
<td>224 052</td>
<td>317 767</td>
<td>541 819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Stock</td>
<td>59 319</td>
<td>39 856</td>
<td>99 175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Report of the Administrator, 1927, p. 62

Moreover, about 60 per cent of the black population in the
Police Zone lived on settler farms. (60) As a result of drought,
however, the carrying capacity of settler farms had decreased
to such an extent that growing numbers of farmers began to
evict stock. The magistrate in Okahandja reported in 1930 that

On several farms where Native labourers ran their
stock the farmer found that the veld could no longer
carry the Natives' stock, so that there was knocking
on the doors of the reserves for entrance. (61)

Similar reports were received from the magistrate in
Grootfontein district in 1933.(62) As a result of such evictions, the number of black stockowners outside reserves in the Police Zone declined from 10828 in 1928 to 6538 in 1933.(63) Correspondingly, large stock owned by blacks outside reserves in 1933 was only 64 per cent of its 1929 level (see Table 4.5).

Table 4.5 Stock owned on Farms and in Reserves, 1929-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>OUTSIDE RESERVES</th>
<th>IN RESERVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large Stock</td>
<td>Small Stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>71,374</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>54,761</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>51,271</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>50,838</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>45,874</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dashes indicate that no figures are available. Large stock includes mules, donkeys and pigs.

Sources: Report of the Administrator, 1929, p.33; ibid, 1930, p.35; ibid, 1931, p.26; ibid, 1932, p.35; ibid, 1933, p.17; ibid, 1934, p.24

The process of evicting black-owned stock from settler farms was highly uneven, differing not only regionally, but also over time. Large scale evictions witnessed at the onset of drought in 1929 and 1930 were partly reversed in certain regions in subsequent years. Thus in 1931 the magistrate in Okahandja observed that as a result of severe drought in the Ovitoto
reserve many stock owners 'were obliged to seek pastures on farms and in the Waterberg East Native Reserve.' (64)

A number of factors may explain this. On the one hand, the highly erratic nature of rainfall in S.W.A. often resulted in significant regional differences in precipitation and consequently pastures. In 1930, for example, drought conditions in reserves in the Windhoek district were reported to have been 'severe'. At the same time, however,

offers were received from farmers in the east of this and the adjoining District of Okahandja where rain had fallen, to take a certain amount of stock in return for the owner's labour and a reasonable grazing fee... (65)

Similarly, at a time when labourers possessed of stock were forced off farms in the Okahandja district in 1930, 'several Natives with their stock found refuge on more bountiful farms, some in the Otjiwarongo district.' (66)

Increased Pressure on Reserves

Drought and Depression increased the pressure on resources in Herero reserves. Even before the onset of drought the rate of resettlement into new reserves was faster than the provision of adequate water supplies and other infrastructure, leading to early overstocking. By 1927 the 'occupied area' of Aminuis was overstocked in a most unreasonable manner and steps should be taken to avoid calamity... The redistribution of stock in the overstocked area to other parts of the reserve appears to be a
Towards the end of the year 'practically every reserve appears to be closed to natives who wish to, or who may be forced to, place their stock thereon.'

This coincided with first reports about drought conditions in Herero reserves. In February 1928 the superintendent of the Otjohorongo reserve stated that the reserve was experiencing a severe drought and that 'water [was] scarce and giving in at some wells. The old permanent holes have no grazing.' Late rains in mid-1929 only brought temporary relief to the reserve, so that in March 1930 the superintendent described the general situation in the reserve 'as bad as can be. Stock are dying daily. If no rain comes, which is already too late, all stock, but a few goats will die.' According to him, grazing was 'very bad, in fact nil.' As a result, pastoralists were provided with emergency grazing. By August 1930 about 100 families and their stock had been resettled in areas to the north west of the reserve. But emergency grazing with sufficient water was so scarce that by 1933 residents report big losses of large and small stock by poorness, there is hardly any grazing and water is getting so scarce that stock only can be watered every second day.

The drought caused famine conditions in Otjimbingwe reserve. No milk was obtained from cows or goats during 1930, with the result that many people
would have died of starvation unless pauper rations had been supplied to the old people, and the school children had been fed whilst attending school. (74)

Further east in the Aminuis, Epukiro and Waterberg East reserves the drought set in somewhat later. In January 1931 the superintendent reported that the whole reserve was gripped by drought and that 'the majority of natives have no milk for food, and if I suggest that they go to work, they say the farmers have no money to pay them.' (75) Two years later the situation was so bad that Chief Hosea Kutako approached the administration with a request for mealies on 'long credit', because the people were hungry. (76)

Nor did Waterberg East reserve escape the consequences of drought. It was regarded as the 'best of the Native Reserves set apart for occupation by the Herero' (77) and as a result became the home for many stock owners who were either evicted from farms or forced to leave other reserves in search for better pastures. Despite the fact that as early as 1929 stock owners had to leave the reserve in search for water the reserve had to absorb large numbers of new pastoralists. (78) This is reflected in stock increases recorded in the reserve in 1931 and 1932. (79) By October 1931 pressure on the resources in the reserve had increased to such an extent that the magistrate in Otjiwarongo expressed the opinion that

having regard to the fact that the dams and many of the sand pits were dry, the reserve was carrying as much livestock as was consistent with safety. (80)
By 1933 grazing was at a critically low level and the magistrate cautioned that:

if consequences calamitous in their results to the Herero tribes in particular, and this territory in general are to be avoided, immediate satisfactory arrangements are imperative. A repetition of the Ovamboland famine is avoidable and any steps which would consummate that object would, in my humble opinion, be justified. (81)

An estimated 10 000 head of large stock had to be accommodated outside the reserve. In the middle of the year a portion of the farm Okamatangara was leased on behalf of the reserve at 3d per head of large stock. 'Close on 10 000 head of large stock was accommodated on this farm.' (82) At the same time the reserve was closed to about 300 stock owners who had applied to move on to the reserve with over 1000 head of large stock, 'since the reserve is already overstocked.' (83) By the end of the year the situation for some people was desperate. In December 1933 headman Amatupa requested the administration to supply him with 50 bags of mealie meal against later payment. He pointed out that no rain had fallen and that 'many old people have nothing or very little to eat today, their cows having no milk.' (84)

For many pastoralists trekking to another reserve or vacant farms was impossible. Apart from emergency grazing being in short supply, family obligations and labour requirements at their place of residence prevented stock owners from being
absent for extended periods of time. None of the drought-stricken stock owners in Otjimbingwe reserve, for example, were able to utilise arrangements made by the government to take their stock to farms in the eastern portion of the Okahandja district, several hundred kilometres away.

Each native only had a few head of cattle and even if his cattle could stand the journey it would not pay him to spend months herding them away from his home where he was required to look after his family. The small stock in any event could not be taken because it was required for the maintenance of the family in the reserve, and the cost of getting the few head of large stock to the distant grazing ground and of maintaining the owner whilst he was there would be more than the value of the stock. (85)

Stock Losses in the Reserves

Drought conditions caused Herero stock owners to suffer severe stock losses. It is not possible, however, to provide accurate statistical data on such losses or their differential impact. Stock censuses during the drought years were notoriously inaccurate owing to the fact that many stock owners left their respective reserves in search of grazing and therefore could not be enumerated. The stock census for 1929, for example, showed a decline in the overall number of stock owners against 1928. While this could represent a decline in the number of pastoralists who owned stock the Administrator was inclined to think that many of the native owners had gone away in search of grazing and water, with the result that when taking the census the Police did not come in contact with them. It is known that many natives,
for example, left the Waterberg and other reserves for this reason. (86)

Aggregate stock numbers as represented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 do not, therefore, permit any precise conclusions about the effects of drought on stock numbers. Although four reserves show increases in large stock, this does not necessarily represent a general increase of individual herds. Corresponding to these increases are equally large decreases in other reserves, thus suggesting that stock may have been moved between reserves. In addition, large numbers of stock evicted from settler farms had to be accommodated on reserves. Large stock increases of between 1200 and 2000 in 1930 in Epukiro and Otjituuo, for example, were attributed to 'a number of natives who were evicted from farms owing to the farmers themselves not having sufficient grazing for their own use.' (87)

Table 4.6 Large Stock Numbers in Herero Reserves, 1929-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aminuis</td>
<td>11 588</td>
<td>11 884</td>
<td>11 188</td>
<td>12 802</td>
<td>14 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epukiro</td>
<td>6 806</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>7 735</td>
<td>9 139</td>
<td>8 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterberg</td>
<td>11 610</td>
<td>14 291</td>
<td>14 544</td>
<td>19 978</td>
<td>19 839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ovitoto</td>
<td>7 509</td>
<td>6 248</td>
<td>6 981</td>
<td>6 445</td>
<td>6 821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjituuo</td>
<td>5 886</td>
<td>7 636</td>
<td>7 069</td>
<td>7 490</td>
<td>7 306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjohorongo</td>
<td>6 931</td>
<td>3 871</td>
<td>2 467</td>
<td>3 668</td>
<td>3 038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjimbingwe</td>
<td>2 965</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>2 923</td>
<td>2 472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>53 295</strong></td>
<td><strong>52 639</strong></td>
<td><strong>50 910</strong></td>
<td><strong>61 445</strong></td>
<td><strong>61 093</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.7 Small Stock Numbers in Herero Reserves, 1929-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aminuis</td>
<td>25 826</td>
<td>24 792</td>
<td>28 242</td>
<td>25 371</td>
<td>25 586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epukiro</td>
<td>4 009</td>
<td>4 080</td>
<td>4 079</td>
<td>4 259</td>
<td>3 848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterberg</td>
<td>13 757</td>
<td>20 471</td>
<td>24 954</td>
<td>26 085</td>
<td>27 324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ovitoto</td>
<td>5 223</td>
<td>4 611</td>
<td>13 325</td>
<td>8 462</td>
<td>10 052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjituuo</td>
<td>4 586</td>
<td>4 186</td>
<td>2 450</td>
<td>4 670</td>
<td>3 388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjohorongo</td>
<td>41 890</td>
<td>32 878</td>
<td>18 893</td>
<td>22 419</td>
<td>17 824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjimbingwe</td>
<td>16 023</td>
<td>9 779</td>
<td>9 816</td>
<td>14 065</td>
<td>11 154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL        | 111 314 | 100 797 | 101 759 | 105 331 | 99 176 |

Sources: Report of the Administrator, 1930, p.77; ibid, 1932, p.71; ibid, 1934, p.46

Stock losses were reported from several reserves. In 1929 alone stock owners in Aminuis reserve lost 3000 head of large stock as a result of the drought and gallamsiekte, "which is always more virulent in dry seasons". (88) In 1931 the superintendent of the reserve was of the opinion "that on the whole the natives have less stock today than when they moved into the reserve." (89) By June 1930 practically half the large stock in Otjohorongo reserve had died. (90) Without providing much detail the annual report for 1929 mentioned heavy stock losses in the Waterberg East Reserve through drought and disease and estimated that Epukiro had lost about 10 per cent of its large stock population. (91) The following year about 50 per cent of large stock in the Gibeon reserve in the south of the country had died as a result of the drought. Otjimbingwe
had lost about 2000 large stock and 50 per cent of its small stock. (92) Subsequent annual reports until 1934 confirmed this state of affairs. (93)

Data on grazing fees arrears in Aminuis reserve allow some insight into how the drought affected the distribution and average size of herds. What follows has been computed from small and large stock figures for 669 stock owners who were registered in the reserve in 1929 and 1933. (94) Because the total number of stock owners in the reserve is not provided for either year, it is impossible to state how representative the existing sample is. It is reasonable to assume, however, that it covers the vast majority of stock owners on the reserve and can therefore be regarded as a fairly accurate reflection of the effects the drought has had on the average size of herds and their distribution. While Aminuis cannot be taken as representative of all Herero reserves, it shares more or less the same average annual rainfall, pastures and water problems as the Epukiro and Waterberg East reserves. Conclusions drawn from the Aminuis sample may thus be extrapolated to indicate similar tendencies on these reserves. The same is not necessarily true for Otjohorongo, however, which lies more to the west and is therefore subject to more arid conditions.

The drought and drought-related cattle disease like gallamsiekte resulted in a decrease of the average number of
stock owned by pastoralists in Aminuis. For cattle the average dropped from 18.4 units in 1929 to 16.7 in 1933, while small stock units decreased from an average of 45.4 units to 34.3 units in 1933. The distribution of stock was not fundamentally changed by the drought, however. While 65 per cent of stock owners owned less than 20 head of cattle in 1929, this percentage had increased only marginally to 68 per cent in 1933. 36 per cent of all cattle owned fell into this category in 1929 compared to 37 per cent in 1933. This corresponded to a smoothing out of the distribution of cattle. Whereas the top 5.6 per cent of cattle owners owned about 22 per cent of the cattle in 1929, by 1933 this had decreased to about 17 per cent. As Tables 4.8 and 4.9 indicate, a slight shift in the ownership of stock towards the lower end of the scale occurred as a result of the drought. Moreover, the data suggests that in absolute terms bigger stock owners lost more cattle than poorer ones. The highest number of cattle owned by a single owner decreased from 119 in 1929 to 95 in 1933. Indeed, the largest stock owner in 1929 had lost 72 head of cattle, leaving him with a herd of only 47 in 1933. More illuminating than absolute losses would be their relative impact on rich and poor stock owners. But a discussion of this is complicated by the fact that many registered stock owners gained cattle during the drought years.
Table 4.8 Distribution of Cattle: Aminuis 1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Owners</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>No. of Cattle</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>14.94</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9</td>
<td>15.85</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>6.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 14</td>
<td>18.25</td>
<td>1477</td>
<td>12.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 19</td>
<td>16.59</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>15.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>1418</td>
<td>11.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>1175</td>
<td>9.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 34</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>8.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 39</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>8.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>4.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 59</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>7.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>9.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total         | 100.00     | 12 297        | 98.99      |

Table 4.9 Distribution of Cattle: Aminuis 1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Owners</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>No. of Cattle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>17.49</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9</td>
<td>17.19</td>
<td>838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 14</td>
<td>19.44</td>
<td>1526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 19</td>
<td>13.74</td>
<td>1546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>1416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 34</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>1263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 39</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>1089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 59</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total         | 100.00     | 11 212        | 99.97      |

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As Table 4.11 below shows, 367 stock owners or about 55 per cent had lost cattle, while 302 or 45 per cent gained some cattle. Regarding small stock, 283 owners or 42 per cent lost some small stock, with 257 or 38 per cent of stock owners having gained up to nine head. The remaining 20 per cent gained upwards of nine head. For 78 per cent of stock owners losses or gains ranged between one and ten head of cattle. Although no explanation of this could be found, it is possible that such gains in cattle represented a transfer of stock from drought-stricken settler farms to family members on the
reserves. In the next chapter the theme of differentiation will be taken up again to determine the impact of recovery after 1934 on the accumulation of livestock.

Table 4.11 Large Stock lost and gained, 1929 and 1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of large stock</th>
<th>No. of Owners</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 80 to 71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 70 to 61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 60 to 51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 50 to 41</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 40 to 31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 30 to 21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 20 to 11</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>9.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 10 to 1</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>41.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to 9</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>36.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 10 to 19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 20 to 29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 30 to 39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 40 to 49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 50 and over</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

669                100.12

Lack of Markets

The effects of drought on production in the reserves were exacerbated by their distance from a diminishing number of markets. Even before the onset of drought and Depression, reserve pastoralists had experienced severe problems in selling
In 1927 the superintendent of Aminuis reserve noted that recent investigations have disclosed that the Reserve is isolated, more particularly during the summer months, on account of the long distances between places where water is obtainable when travelling from European area [sic] to Native Reserve and movements of small stock to and from the Reserve can only take place with a certain amount of safety during the winter months...The native to pay his grazing fees is to some extent dependent upon buyers from outside for his stock but with the handicap in moving the stock purchased from the Reserve to the European area, buyers are few and far between and poor prices are realised. (95)

Although complaints of this nature were frequent, it seemed that marketing problems had eased by 1928. The Administrator reported that Aminuis and Epukiro reserves sold 990 large and 6000 small stock during the year. "Excellent prices were paid", he commented. (96)

The impact of the Depression reversed the situation, however. As did settler farmers, reserve stock owners suffered from the contraction in stock markets. Many stock buyers declined to buy reserve cattle 'owing to the uncertainty of the cattle market.' (97) Stock owners in the Otjohorongo reserve, for example, went as far as Karibib and Usakos in search of markets, but 'even then were not very successful as there is hardly any demand and the prices are very low.' (98) Pastoralists in Epukiro reserve were equally hard pressed to find buyers for their stock. (99)
Related to the lack of markets was a sharp fall in the price of cattle. As a result, Herero stock owners frequently refused to sell their stock. Large companies in particular, especially the I.C.S. and Liebigs, sought to exploit this desperate situation. In the mid-1920s the Liebigs Meat Extract Company was reported to have been willing "to purchase mature cattle of any condition and that the same prices are paid to Natives as to Europeans." (100) Within a year of this assertion, however, practice proved otherwise. In June and July 1927 an agent of the company bought 70 cattle from black pastoralists in the Otjiwarongo district for £2 8s per head, a price which the magistrate considered unsatisfactory. (101)

The I.C.S. and Liebigs continued to pay very low prices for reserve cattle after 1928. Frequently this was met with refusal by stock owners to sell. In 1931, for example, the government had arranged with the I.C.S. to come to the Waterberg East reserve to buy stock. Herero pastoralists refused to sell their stock, however, because the prices offered by the I.C.S. were too low. (102) Still in the same reserve, Liebigs fared no better in 1933 when pastoralists once again withheld their stock. In this they enjoyed the support of the reserve superintendent, who reported that

Several hundred head of cattle that were earmarked for Liebigs were not sold, as the prices paid were ridiculous to say the least and in fairness to the residents I could not recommend that they should sell

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for such prices, although the stock was got together for sale in order to save what little grazing we have left. (103)

**Dairy Production in the Reserves**

Unlike settler farming where dairy production had expanded rapidly in the second half of the 1920s, milk and cream production in the Herero reserves was slow to develop as an alternative to the marketing of beef cattle. (104) Attempts to introduce dairying in the reserves in the mid-1920s met with little success. In August 1926 the Native Commissioner, T. Edwards, addressed a memorandum to magistrates in the districts of Okahandja, Omaruru, Grootfontein, Otjiwarongo, Karibib, Gobabis, Keetmanshoop and Gibeon with a request

> to examine the position of the native population as producers of dairy products, with a view to deciding whether any steps can be taken to benefit their finances and at the same time increase the export trade of this country. (105)

Results of this survey varied regionally and between reserves. Magistrates of the districts of Keetmanshoop and Gibeon in the south of the country were all pessimistic about the idea, stating that the question could be 'safely left to the future.' (106) In the district of Gibeon most pastoralists owned tiny herds of small stock, with at most 30 cattle owned by some. In addition, goat's milk formed the staple diet of pastoralists in the district. The number of milch cows thus did not make the production of cream a feasible
Responses from magistrates in the central and northern districts were slightly more favourable. The superintendent of Aminuis reserve wrote that with good rains milk and cream would be abundant in the reserve, "but only for a limited period." (108) Similarly, the report submitted to the Secretary for S.W.A. by the magistrate for Otjiwarongo district stated that under normal circumstances a surplus of milk was produced during the rainy season by the c. 3000 cows in Waterberg East Reserve. At present, part of the milk was turned into sour milk, omaere, which formed the staple diet of the Herero, while a lesser quantity was used for the manufacture of butter. The balance, which was considerable in good years, was fed to dogs. (109) In adjacent Epukiro reserve, pastoralists were already converting surplus milk into butter fat, which they sold to a trader. (110)

Not all the reserves were equally well placed to produce the surplus of milk necessary for dairy production. A case in point was Otjohorongo reserve where all the milk produced was consumed. Dairy production for the market was thus impossible. A similar situation obtained in Okombahe reserve, where pastoralists told the superintendent that "there are no products." (111) In Otjimbingwe reserve stock owners accepted an offer by the local trader, Haelbich, to buy their cream "as
being beneficial to them and gave the assurance that they would cooperate." Part of his proposal was that he would separate the milk himself at three or four convenient spots in the reserve for about six months—January/February to July/August—per year. (112) Barely nine months later, however, the proposed scheme had to be abandoned, because individual reserve stock owners did not own enough cattle to supply milk regularly.

The members of the Reserve Board as well as the majority of the residents state definitely that the scheme is beyond them. Although there were some 1600 cows in the Reserve, they were distributed amongst many owners. Two out every five cows were dry at a time. They had given the matter much thought and were very anxious to co-operate in the scheme if there were any possibility of its being successful, but they had come to the conclusion that it was impracticable even if a few separators were provided for them. The proportion of milch cows each one owned was insufficient to guarantee a regular supply of milk. (113)

Other problems also threatened the development of dairying in the reserves. Most important among these, because it concerned not only dairying but the future prospects of livestock production in general, was the question of water supplies. The magistrate of Okahandja, for example, ruled out the possibility of dairy production in the Ovitoto reserve because of a lack of water. (114) Similarly, the magistrate in Otjiwarongo had to temper his initial positive assessment of possibilities for dairy production in Waterberg East reserve by stating that its further expansion depended on the provision of adequate water supplies. (115)
No amount of water, however, could guarantee the development of dairying in the absence of adequate marketing and transport facilities. The magistrate in Gobabis, for example, stated that ‘one of the difficulties with Aminuis Reserve is that it is too far off for Europeans to visit it periodically for purposes of trade.’ Dairy production in the reserve depended on the introduction of a motor lorry service from Mariental to the Nosob area and the ability of pastoralists to make their own arrangements for transporting cream from the reserve to Nosob. (116)

By 1928 dairy production in the reserves had not yet taken off. The Administrator’s annual report to the League of Nations attributed this to the reluctance of stock owners to sell milk and cream. He surmised that since most reserve cows were not ‘of dairy strains’, stock owners experienced problems in satisfying their subsistence requirements. ‘The natives in one reserve, however, did accept the suggestion and arrangements were made to take delivery of the milk, but hitherto no deliveries have been affected.’ (117)

Undeterred by such unfavourable prospects and spurred, no doubt, by a desire to increase butter production in its own dairies, the I.C.S. expressed an interest in collecting cream from Herero reserves. In 1930 the company proposed to send its
own lorry to Epukiro reserve to collect cream and return empty cans at a flat rate of 3s, regardless of distance, provided that the response by stock owners was satisfactory. (118)

A combination of specific conditions in the reserves and wider government policy made the proposed scheme impossible. In the first place, stock owners in the reserves did not, on average, have enough stock individually to 'make up one can of cream per week.' The implication was that if Herero pastoralists were to deliver cream on a regular basis, this would have to happen on a communal basis. The superintendent of Epukiro reserve suggested

that certain respected natives could collect cream from the smaller natives, and when his [sic] can was full, he could bring it to this office, I would book it up to him, send it away and the company would send the money through this office. (119)

This proposal was widely rejected by poorer stock owners, who expressed the fear that their more wealthy kinsmen might cheat them out of their monies. 'They say there would always be dissatisfaction when paying out that they were not getting enough money.' (120)

Secondly, the cream price was too low to be much of an incentive to start deliveries. In 1931 when the price paid for cream from the Waterberg East reserve had 'recently fallen to 9d, 8d, and 6d', the magistrate in Otjiwarongo considered it best to leave the matter of sending reserve cream to the local
Thirdly, stock owners lacked the capital to buy their own cream cans, of which they would need three each, at a cost of 20s per can. They suggested that the Reserve Trust Fund should advance the money to buy cans so that they could pay it back at a later stage.

However, the colonial state did not favour this suggestion, 'at least not for the present, owing to the apathy on the part of the natives.' The Secretary for S.W.A. stated that while 'everything possible should be done to encourage the natives to start selling their cream', the Reserve Trust Funds would not be permitted to advance the capital required for cream cans. He suggested that the I.C.S. could perhaps do so on a repayment basis. As a result, the development of dairy production was postponed until after copious rains broke the drought at the end of 1933. Even then, its development was uneven and characterised by conflicts, as the next chapter will show.

Poverty and Wage Labour in the Reserves

The Herero reserves experienced considerable economic decline as a result of drought and Depression. The drought had increased the dependence of stock owners on the purchase of basic foodstuffs from outside the reserves. Observations made by the magistrate in Otjiwarongo with regard to the situation...
in Waterberg East reserve can be regarded as representative of most Herero reserves. He wrote that

There the staple diet is milk, in its various forms, supplemented by veldkos. Normally there is an abundance of both; but during this year of drought there have been few, if any, indigenous foods procurable and the condition of the cows necessitated the early abandonment of milking. The oxen on the Reserve have, however, maintained a fair to good condition and owners have been able to sell at satisfactory prices, when necessary. The natives have thus been able to augment their natural diet by the purchase of other foodstuffs. (125)

The Assistant Native Commissioner in Windhoek added to this picture when he reported in the early 1930s that blacks in his district were far less prosperous than they were a couple of years ago. Money which they might have used to purchase stock has all been used up to tide them over periods of unemployment and to assist their relatives and friends who are out of work. (126)

And from the magistrate in Gobabis came the observation in 1931 that 'the natives on the whole are very poor.' He pointed out that the Depression had caused much hardship through a lack of markets. While there was no food shortage, 'as is evidenced by the fact that there is not a single individual on the pauper roll', a shortage of cash had compelled many reserve residents 'to obtain employment outside the reserves, in order to provide for their families.' (127) These assessments were echoed by the magistrate in Omaruru who wrote in 1933 that 'years ago the Herero were a wealthy tribe but successive years of severe drought have reduced them almost to a state of poverty.' (128)
The descriptions above strongly suggest that growing numbers of Herero had to resort to wage labour to survive. Despite this, indications are that of all reserve communities in S.W.A., the Herero were least dependent on wage labour before the drought and Depression. The Administrator commented in 1928 that they were "indolent" and not "industrious".

and if it were not for the fact that able-bodied natives are not allowed on our Reserves and that they have to pay taxes on their stock and for their dogs, they would not work at all. (129)

To some extent this observation reflects the degree of "self-peasantization" achieved by the Herero. It is further supported by the fact that in 1928, 64 per cent of the total reserve population in the Police Zone were classified as Herero. (130)

Although large numbers of Herero engaged in wage labour, this does not necessarily indicate an irreversible degree of proletarianization. Evidence suggests that for many, wage labour was a means to enlarge their herds or maintain their size in the face of taxes. Okahandja's magistrate noted in 1925 that Herero in the Ovitoto reserve "on occasions...have gone to work for 2 or 3 months rather than part with their stock." (131) Reserve residents out at work in the Gobabis district were reported to "all contribute to their families monthly." (132) Figures provided by the Native Reserves
Commission show that by 1928 the pastoral economy in the Herero reserves was still intimately tied to wage labour (see Table 4.12).

Table 4.12 Wage Labour 1928 - Select Reserves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
<th>Able-bodied men over 16</th>
<th>No. working out</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
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<td>Waterberg</td>
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<td>496</td>
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<td>Otjituwo</td>
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<td>473</td>
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<td>Otjohorongo</td>
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<td>Ovitoto</td>
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<td>Otjiibingwe</td>
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After 1928 dependence on wage labour continued. It is not possible, however, to provide accurate data on rates of migration or on the social composition of migrant workers. But general tendencies of migration in some reserves can be discerned from monthly reports. These reports suggest that the total male population in Aminuis, for example, remained fairly constant around 840 between November 1929 and January 1934. Men out at work varied between 288 in November 1929 and 253 in January 1934 with a low of 206 during most of 1930. Working on these estimates an average of 30 per cent of the male population was out at work at any one time between 1929 and
1934. (133) In Epukiro the percentage of men absent for work ranged between 37 per cent in October 1928 and 40 per cent in December 1930. (134)

**Impoverishment and Popular Struggles**

The form and content of popular struggles in the reserves was shaped by this process of general impoverishment. In the forefront of these struggles was a concern to stave off renewed proletarianization as far as possible by protecting what was left of Herero herds. As will become clear below, leaders like Kutako believed that this could best be achieved by displaying loyalty to the colonial government instead of open hostility.

Central to this concern were the related issues of stock sales and grazing fees. The colonial government had an interest in encouraging the sale of reserve stock. It hoped that such sales would relieve the pressure on reserve land, while at the same time increasing reserve revenues through the collection of grazing fees. Stock owners, however, carefully weighed the prices offered for their stock against the benefits accruing to them from such sales. An important standard against which they measured the adequacy of prices was the payment of taxes. Where stock sales did not enable them to come clear of their arrear taxes, pastoralists as a rule refused to sell. This point was stressed by Hosea Kutako, when he told the Secretary
for S.W.A. that

The people are willing to sell their stock, but say, for instance, you sell your stock for 10/-, £1.5/- or even £2, you cannot settle your debts with that money, and therefore, we do not want to have any disputes with the Administration. (135)

Reserve pastoralists put forward their own prices for stock, even if they were arrived at in rather unconventional ways. In Waterberg East reserve they informed the superintendent before cattle sales as to what prices they expected:

We bring the stock according to your instructions on the 18th and this is our price; For an eight year old ox the price is £8, because today there is no market. A seven year old ox is £7, a six year old ox is £6, a five year old ox is £5, a four year old is £4, a three year old ox is £3 and a two year old ox is £2, that is all. If the buyer does not give us this price we will take them back. The Government says there is no money and why does the stock only cost £1. The Government has not sent the money which will be enough price for the stock, we will send our stock back. We are going to wait until the Government can tell us that the bad times have passed. That is all. We finish with best regards to you. We are your people all of us. We say so. (136)

Low prices apart, there were other considerations for not wanting to sell stock in the reserves. The most prominent of these was the issue of taxation in the form of grazing fees. Stock sales in the reserves were controlled by the superintendent who would demand payment of taxes as soon as a sale was concluded. By selling outside the reserves, stock owners could largely evade taxation. In January 1933 the magistrate in Grootfontein provided a description of this in the Otjituuo reserve.

In November last, arrangements were made with a buyer
to go out to the reserve to buy oxen but only one or two oxen of the required class were produced although the natives had assured me they had over 100 fit for slaughter for disposal [sic]. On another occasion a local farmer visited the reserve and offered very good prices but was not able to obtain any, yet almost immediately afterwards the natives sold to another farmer at lower prices than he had offered. The natives do not wish to sell to anyone coming to the reserve as they know well they would then have to pay the arrears due. (137)

A year later the situation had not improved. According to the Native Commissioner in Grootfontein

Cattle buyers visited the [Otjituuo] reserve on eleven different occasions and in each instance were disappointed with the result. They reported that the natives want far too much...It is known that they sell their stock at a smaller price outside of the Reserve than that offered to them by buyers in the Reserve. The reason for this is that they know that the Superintendent usually retains part of it in payment of taxes. (138)

The inability of settler farmers to pay wages to labourers as a result of drought and Depression had its counterpart in the reserves. Here, pastoralists were increasingly unable to pay grazing fees. When pressed to pay, stock owners in Aminuis reserve told the superintendent that they had no money. Cattle buyers did not come to the reserve anymore, and when they did, the prices they paid were too low. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that employment was difficult to find, and nor did their families in urban areas have work or money. On farms they were paid in kind only. The superintendent was sympathetic to their plight and concluded that little could be done about the collection of grazing fees. To substantiate
this he pointed out that many pastoralists had to barter stock for food. (139)

Many stock owners had thus reached a position where they were forced to draw on their herds, already decimated by drought, to stay alive. In a petition to the superintendent of the Waterberg East, stock owners drew his attention to their gradual impoverishment. They stated that in the beginning they sold oxen, then heifers and now cows to pay their grazing fees and concluded that they 'do not wish to dispose of their cattle for the purpose of meeting their liabilities.' (140) Indeed, the drought was so severe in some reserves that at least one magistrate expressed the fear that at the rate at which stock was dying 'the losses...will so impoverish the people that in a few years hence they will not have the means to pay their grazing fees. It is no doubt for this reason that they all favour a Poll Tax in preference to the payment of Grazing fees.' (141)

With their economic base seriously threatened, stock owners began to agitate against grazing fees. Desirous not to confront the colonial state head-on, they submitted proposals for alternatives to grazing fees. These centered around requests to substitute grazing fees by a poll tax. In August 1931 a deputation consisting of headmen and members of the Reserve Board in Waterberg East reserve consulted with the
superintendent at Okakarara and laid the following resolution before him:

We wish, owing to the bad times, to pay Poll Tax in lieu of Grazing Fees in future. We have been sent by the people. We wish that this request of ours be forwarded to Windhoek for consideration. We suggest that every adult male should pay a tax of 25/- per annum and that no grazing fees should be paid for stock. (142)

In putting forward these demands stock owners in Waterberg and Aminuis were

in communication...on the subject of the substitution of Poll Tax for Grazing Fees and they have now written to Hosea [Kutako] asking him when he is going to Windhoek in connection with the matter. (143)

Although the 1931 delegation claimed to have been "sent by the people", demands to have grazing fees replaced by a poll tax emanated from better-off sections among Herero stock owners. The Annual Report on Native Affairs in the district of Grootfontein, for example, mentions in 1931 that "it is mainly the more wealthy natives who are backward in paying" their grazing fees and that they had embarked on "a form of passive resistance" by refusing to sell their stock to buyers who came to the reserves. (144) In Aminuis "some of the largest stock owners in the reserve and some...eminent persons of the Herero nation" were among those in arrears with their grazing fees. (145)

Poll tax and grazing fees affected different groups of stock owners differentially. The former would have placed a
relatively higher burden on poorer sections of the reserve community as "the poor man would have to pay just as much as the rich man." (146) Grazing fees on the other hand were a graduated tax system, taxing "the man who reaped the most benefit, i.e. had the most stock in the reserve" more than those less well off. (147) Moreover, under a poll tax system there would be "less incentive to sell stock" thus encouraging the accumulation of stock. (148)

For these and other, more technical reasons, the colonial administration refused to grant the request to have grazing fees replaced. (149) On the contrary, the Secretary for S.W.A. came close to suggesting the introduction of a poll tax in addition to grazing fees. "Grazing fees", he argued, have the merit of being a tax on wealth and also of preventing natives from accumulating more stock than the reserves will carry... There would, however, be no objection, if the request came from the natives themselves, to the imposition of a Poll Tax as well as grazing fees so as to catch those natives who do not own stock and who at present escape payment of any description. Under this class would fall the young able bodied natives who are away at work in the towns but have interests in the reserves. (150)

It was therefore resolved by the Advisory Council of the Administrator in 1931 not to substitute grazing fees by a poll tax.

In cases where the Superintendent is satisfied that natives in arrear with grazing fees are unable to pay, time should be given them, but he is to be firm with those who are able to pay. (151)

A final attempt to have grazing fees replaced by a poll tax was
made in June 1933 by a deputation of Herero pastoralists headed by Hosea Kutako. They requested that the decision of 1931 not to change the present system of grazing fees be reviewed and submitted to the Administrator for reconsideration. (152) Once again, the Administrator responded negatively.

Opposition to grazing fees was never conceived of as a strategy to confront the colonial state directly. On the contrary, wherever possible stock-owners attempted to meet their tax obligations by selling stock. (153) Moreover, as discussed above, opposition to grazing fees was complemented by proposals for another system of taxation. This strategy reflected the realisation by a section of stock owners centered around the reserve leadership that the future success of the process of 'self-peasantization' depended on adapting to the colonial state and improving the terms on which reserve stock owners were incorporated into its structures, rather than on open confrontation. Kutako expressed this strategy very well when he said in 1933 that among the Herero people there will be no-one who will become rich - there won't even be the strength among them. We are now people who are in the hands of our masters who should support us. For instance to possess a number of oxen and cows this can only be done by a person or persons who have got a large country. Such a time has not arrived yet to have so many stock and at the present time we only want to ask the Government to assist us and if the Government will give us the chance then we can seek for a large country in which to keep a number of cattle and small stock. (154)
As the main spokesman of the Herero, Kutako was anxious to avoid any sign of belligerency in his dealings with the colonial state. He was opposed, for example, to using previous wars of conquest as legitimation for additional land demands as had happened at a meeting in April 1930. When it was his turn to speak, he pointed out that 'this trouble amongst the people and the talk of the wars that happened in the past is no good. If we never made war with the Germans we might still have had our land.' (155) In a sense the colonial government was perceived as part of the solution to the economic crisis. 'If we have any trouble we must go to our father the Government' is how one person put it at a meeting in Aminuis reserve. (156)

This policy was in part a reflection of previous experiences of dispossession. At the same time, however, it displayed an awareness of the fact that the balance of power had unmistakably shifted in favour of white settlers. As a result of South African land settlement policies, little vacant land was left for distribution. This in turn limited the chances of Kutako and his fellow headmen obtaining additional land. Kutako acknowledged this state of affairs during a meeting with the Secretary for S.W.A. in 1933. He noted that whatever fertile land was still available for distribution 'of course...to-day belong[s] to the government.' He continued that it was difficult for him to point out any land that could be considered as future pastures for Herero pastoralists,
because, 'before we are allowed to go there, such a particular place has always been occupied by a white man and that is why it is difficult to say to the Government where to be sent to.' (157) This assessment of the colonial realities of S.W.A. ultimately resulted in Kutako and his fellow headmen pursuing a reformist strategy, which sought to improve conditions for accumulation in the reserves and possibly on additional land without jeopardising access to existing reserves.

The shortage of vacant land was skilfully exploited by some colonial officials to pressurise reserve residents into accepting government policy by conjuring up what could be called a 'blanke gevaar'. Amid vehement protests about the size of existing reserves and demands for more and better land during a meeting in 1930, the superintendent of Aminuis reserve countered at one point by referring to the eagerness of white settlers to take up land in Aminuis.

If all the natives were to leave Aminuis Reserve, it would be full of White people in six months, with their stock and all. It is good enough for the White people, but, I do not know if it is good enough for the Hereros...The fault lies not with the land, but with the Hereros...If the natives were to move away from this Reserve, the White people would immediately ask for the land there. (158)

Despite his concern not to alienate Native Affairs officials, Kutako attempted to obtain more land on the basis that existing reserves were inadequate. In 1933 he told the magistrate in Gobabis that
There is plenty of water [in Aminuis], but the land is not good for stock. Why did the Germans not take up the country, it would have made nice farms, but the farmers would not buy. There must therefore be a reason. All the white people live along the Nossob. Aminuis is a bad country. We have spoken about this many times, and have asked for another reserve, but have not got it. We want the Kaokoveld. In early days Samuel Maharero had the Okavango country, but that is now occupied. We do not say we die of thirst, but the land is bad. We see we cannot live there, and want to trek to Epukiro, Waterberg and Otjimbingue areas.(159)

Having been the only region still capable of accommodating moderate numbers of pastoralists, the Kaokoveld was demanded by stock owners in other reserves as well. In 1930 stock-owners in Otjohorongo reserve refused emergency grazing for 3000 head of large stock and 5000 head of small stock in Otjiwarongo district in the hope that this would pressurise the Government into granting them the Kaokoveld in June 1930. At a meeting with stock owners in the reserve the magistrate came in touch with the Chief Philemon, the Headmen, and practically all the natives. It was apparent that they had fully discussed the offer and made up their minds what they were going to ask for, for in spite of stating that the trek would be properly organised, that the grazing and water on this farm was good, that if so desired they could send some of their number to proceed to the farm and report, they definitely declined to entertain the idea of moving to it and I asked them their plans. Their plans were "cut and dried" and they asked to be allowed to move in a more northerly direction in the Kaokoveld where they assured me there was good water and grazing.(160)

Under the circumstances the administration acceded to their request to move to the Kaokoveld.
Although the colonial administration had granted the temporary occupation of Kaokoveld, not all stock-owners from the reserve moved north. Some remained on the reserve, confirming the contention made earlier that reserve leaders sought to acquire additional land while retaining what they possessed already. The magistrate in Omaruru commented on this strategy as follows:

Like the Europeans natives also have their differences, their dislikes and their advisers, they also know how to appear united in a project while not intending to follow it with the result that a number did not proceed to the Kaokoveld and there still remained on the reserve a number of natives with their stock, at this time I may state there was still grazing for small stock but the grazing for large stock was practically exhausted. - In a manner these natives appeared prepared to sacrifice their smaller herd of large stock than to move to a new place with their larger herds of small stock. (161)

Stock-owners in the drought-stricken temporary reserves of Auveigas and Fuerstenwalde close to Windhoek responded in a similar way to offers by white farmers in the Okahandja district 'to take a certain amount of stock in return for the owner's labour and a reasonable grazing fee.' They also refused to take their stock to the Waterberg reserve in June 1930. (162)

The accommodating attitude of reserve leaders vis a vis the colonial state gave rise to opposition from less well-off sections. Many pastoralists perceived Kukako and other reserve leaders as being responsible for their impoverishment by having
surrendered their temporary reserves close to Windhoek in the mid-1920s. (163) Such perceptions made Kutako the target of growing defiance in Aminuis reserve. In 1930 he informed colonial officials that he was losing the confidence of his subjects.

The people are always crying about their stock dying and praying for another place. They do not believe that I have taken their complaint to the Government. The Government forced the people to come here from Orumbo and Rehoboth, they did not want to come. (164)

Kutako also complained 'that he had become very unpopular by advising natives to go to Epukiro.' (165)

The growing rift between reserve headmen on the one hand and poorer stock owners on the other reflected two different strategies in dealing with the colonial government. The aim of reserve headmen was 'to wring concessions for land, educational facilities and other basic necessities from those in power' so as to improve conditions in the reserves, rather than to embark on a confrontational course. (166) Many less wealthy stock-owners opposed this approach. For them the acceptance that reserves could be 'reformed' by investing in vaccines and stock feed was tantamount to agreeing to their potential viability and therefore undermined demands for better pastures. It was for this reason that some stock owners in Aminuis refused to accept bonemeal to combat gallamsiekte in 1930. According to Kutako

The people will not take or use bonemeal for their stock because the Government forced them to come here. To me they say "You, Hosea! You came to
Rehoboth many times. You told us to come to Aminuis and we said that place is not good, you said we must come. Now you come to us with your talk of bonemeal, after all our stock died on the trek here more since then. What's the use of all your talk and your bonemeal now."(167)

The superintendent of the reserve clearly recognised the strategy behind this refusal to accept bonemeal. In February 1930 he wrote to the magistrate in Gobabis that

there seems to be a general plan to co-operate against the bone meal remedy; it seems to be partly distrust and partly that to use it, might mean that Aminuis reserve would be quite as good as any other part of the country, thus disproving the arguments of the older men.(168)

What pastoralists in Aminuis demanded was "a place near to Windhoek, like Orumbo, Okahandja and other places."(169)

Moreover, many stock owners were unwilling and unable to bear the costs of making the reserves viable. Chief Hosea Kutako informed the government in early 1930 that he did not think that any stock owners in his reserve would be prepared to pay for the treatment of stock disease, particularly gallamsiekte which was endemic in the region as a result of a lack of phosphates in the pastures. Instead, they demanded healthy pastures elsewhere.

He went on to say that when the question of settling at Aminuis was discussed the Hereros were most unwilling to go there as they knew that it was not a good cattle country, and said so at the time, that now that their cattle were dying they wanted another place to go to.(170)

The period of drought and Depression ended on a gloomy note.
Both reserve leaders and colonial officials came to the conclusion that existing reserves had failed to guarantee the reproduction of their inhabitants. On 2 June 1933 a meeting was held between a deputation of ‘all the leading Hereros’ and the Secretary of S.W.A. ‘to bring in review practically all the matters that had affected the relationship between the Administration and Herero people for the last ten years; and to ‘bring their alleged grievances before the Government.’ (171)

Kutako, as leader of the deputation, conveyed the feeling of the Herero to the Secretary.

Before we were sent out to the reserves, we complained to the Government and said we cannot go to such reserves as all the stock die there...the reserves to which you sent us are very bad. This complaint does not start today. We have complained for some time already. From the reserves we do not earn even one shilling to pay the Government and these reserves only make us go backwards. A number of people are very poor. They have lost a large number of their stock...The people are starving. They cannot get anything to eat and on account of hunger their children have left them and gone to the towns to work. (172)

The Secretary for S.W.A. compiled a 51 page report on the meeting for the information of the Administrator. After a thorough review of the situation in the reserves he conceded that the Herero had reason to complain and that the state had acted injudiciously in settling the reserves when it did.

From the above notes on the Epukiro, Aminuis, Tses, Ojituuo, Otjihorongo and Waterberg Reserves it will be apparent that the Hereros have some grounds for complaint, more especially in regard to the water supplies in the reserves in consequence of which they suffered serious losses from time to time. It is clear also that the land selected in the first
instance was in many cases unsuitable for the purpose of accommodating natives living under tribal conditions, but here the Administration was handicapped by the fact that the best areas in the country were already in the hands of European farmers by right of conquest or purchase. (173)
NOTES AND REFERENCES


4. 'The Country's Financial Position', WA 9.2.1929

5. Report of the Administrator, 1929, pp.41, 29

6. Ibid., 1931, p.21

7. Ibid., 1929, p.41


9. Report of the Administrator, 1924, p.34

10. Innes, Anglo, p.107

11. Ibid


13. Innes, Anglo, p.107


15. Ibid, 1932, p.30

16. Ibid, p.31

17. Union of South Africa, Report of the Commission on the Economic and Financial Relations between the Union of South Africa and the Mandated Territory of South West Africa, U.G.16-1935, p.163. This Commission will be referred to below by the acronym EFRC.


20. Report of the Administrator, 1930, p.31

21. For details on the number of whites employed on relief work schemes see e.g. Report of the Administrator, 1929, p.29; WA 10.4.1932, 16.4.1932, 17.9.1932, 27.3.1933, 'Legislative
24. WA, 26.4.1930; Report of the Administrator, 1929, p.28
25. EFR, p.205
27. WA 6.4.1932
28. Report of the Administrator, 1929, p.28
29. Report of the Administrator, 1928, p.44; ibid, 1930, p.36; ibid, 1933, p.19. See also EFR, p.19
31. See e.g. WA, 26.4.1930; WA 26.4.1930; Report of the Administrator, 1929 p.28
32. WA 26.4.1930. See also 'The Administrator in Otjiwarongo', WA 19.2.1930; WA 26.4.1930; J. H. Drummond-Hay to the Editor, WA 1.4.1931
33. SWAA Unregistered Papers, Annual Report Omaruru 1931, 5.1.1932, p.3
34. SWAA Unregistered Papers, Annual Report Karibib 1930 (sic), 19.1.1932, p.2
36. WA 9.5.1931. He estimated in his annual report for 1933 that the total number of small stock lost during the drought was about 567 600. See Report of the Administrator, 1933, p.19
38. Ibid, p.1495
39. Circular Letter from Land Bank to all Magistrates, 21.5.1929, quoted by Arthur Webster to the Editor, WA 26.6.1929
40. Ibid
41. 'South West Africa's Economic Position', WA 4.12.1932
42. Ibid
43. S. Procter, 'The Climax', WA 21.11.1931
44. SWAA Unregistered Papers, Annual Report [Okahandja] 1933, 10.1.1934, p.2
45. SWAA Unregistered Papers, Annual Report [Otjiwarongo] 1933, 8.1.1934, p.3
46. SWAA A 52/13 Vol.2 Acting Magistrate Mariental to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 24.8.1934, pp.1-2

49. SWAA A 52/13 Vol.2 Assistant Native Commissioner Windhoek to Secretary for S.W.A., 8.10.1934, p.1


54. SWAA A 52/13 Vol.2 Assistant Native Commissioner Windhoek to Secretary for S.W.A., 8.10.1934, p.1

55. SWAA A 521/13 Vol.13 Magistrate Warmbad to Secretary for S.W.A., 15.8.1934

56. Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft, 103. Jahresbericht vom Jahre 1922/23, p.25; SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Special Justice of the Peace Karibib to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 15.10.1934; Chief Native Commissioner to all Native Commissioners, Assistant Native Commissioners and Officers in Charge of Native Affairs, 4.8.1934

57. SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Special Justice of the Peace Karibib to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 15.10.1934. See also SWAA A 52/13 Vol.2 Assistant Native Commissioner Windhoek to Secretary for S.W.A., 8.10.1934, p.1

58. SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Superintendent Otjimbingue Reserve to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 29.8.1934, p.2


60. Report of the Administrator, 1928, p.56


63. Report of the Administrator, 1929, p.45, ibid, 1933, p.17

64. SWAA Unregistered Papers. Annual Report, 1931. Okahandja 14.1.1932, p.4


67. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.3 Magistrate Gobabis to Native Commissioner, Windhoek, 4.11.1927, pp.1-2; ibid, Native Commissioner to The Secretary: Aminuis Reserve, 23.7.1928.
p.1; ibid, Magistrate Gobabis to Native Commissioner, Windhoek: Aminuis Native Reserve. 15.5.1928, p.1
68. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.3 Officer in Charge Native Affairs Windhoek to Native Commissioner Windhoek, 3.11.1927, p.1
69. SWAA A 158/21 Vol.2 Report of the Superintendent on the Otjohorongo Native Reserve for the Month of February 1928, p.2
70. SWAA A 158/21 Vol.2 Report of the Superintendent on the Otjohorongo Native Reserve for the Months of February and March 1930
72. SWAA A 158/21 Vol.2 2/Sergeant L. L. Fourie to Magistrate Otjiwa, 30.8.1930. See also ibid, Magistrate Omaruru to Secretary for S.W.A., 16.8.1930
73. SWAA A 158/21 Vol.3 Report on the Otjohorongo Native Reserve for the Month of October 1933, p.2. The observation that the situation in the reserve was 'very serious' runs like a constant refrain through all the monthly reports for 1931 to 1933. See SWAA A 158/21 Vols.2 and 3
74. SWAA A 50/47/4 Vol.1 Magistrate Karibib to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 21.1.1931, p.2
75. SWAA A 158/29 Vols.3-4 Reports of the Superintendent Aminuis Native Reserve for the Months January to December 1930 and Vol.4 Superintendent Aminuis Native Reserve to Magistrate Gobabis, 28.1.1931
76. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.5 Superintendent Aminuis Native Reserve to Magistrate Gobabis, 26.8.1933
77. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Assistant Secretary to H.H. The Administrator, n.d. [end 1933], p.34
78. Ibid, p.36; Report of the Administrator, 1929, p.61
79. Report of the Administrator, 1931, p.60; ibid, 1932, p.74
80. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Assistant Secretary to H.H. The Administrator, n.d. [end 1933], pp.37-38
81. SWAA A 158/23 Vol.3 Magistrate Otjiwarongo to Secretary for S.W.A., 10.4.1933, p.4
84. SWAA A 158/23 Vol.4 Superintendent Waterberg East Native Reserve to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 10.11.1933
85. Report of the Administrator, 1930, p.79
86. Ibid, 1929, p.34
87. Ibid, 1930, p.78
elements, but in the absence of this the stock crave for these elements, and they pick up and eat bones lying about in the veld. When these bones rot and become infected with the bacillus parabotulinus, they cause the disease known as gallamsiekte when eaten by susceptible animals. The last preventive is bonemeal, calcium phosphate or some similar preparation, and during dry seasons farmers regularly feed their stock with these commodities." Report of the Administrator, 1929, p.62

89. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Superintendent Aminuis to Magistrate Gobabis: Petition presented by Hereros, Aminuis Reserve, 28.3.1931

90. SWAA A 158/21 Vol.2 Magistrate Omaruru to Secretary for S.W.A., Windhoek, 22.6.1930, p.2

91. Report of the Administrator, 1929, p.61

92. Ibid., 1930, p.78


94. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.25 Writing off of Grazing Fees [Aminuis], February 1934. It should be noted that only those 669 registered stock owners have been considered for the brief discussion below that were resident in the reserve in 1929 and 1933. Those that arrived later than 1929 have been ignored. The discussion that follows and Tables 4.8 to 4.11 have all been based on this file.

95. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.3 Magistrate Gobabis to Native Commissioner Windhoek, 4.11.1927, pp.2-3

96. Report of the Administrator, 1928, p.58


99. SWAA 158/7 Vol.4 Maandelikse Report Epukiro Reservaat, June 1931

100. SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 T. Edwards, Native Commissioner to all Magistrates and Superintendents of Reserves, 26.5.1926

101. SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 Magistrate Otjiwarongo to Native Commissioner Windhoek, 1.9.1927 and also 12.9.1927

102. SWAA A 158/23 Vol.3 Superintendent Waterberg East Native Reserve to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 21.7.1931


104. For a discussion of the diversification of settler farming into dairying and karakul farming see W. Werner, 'Drought and Depression in S.W.A.: 1929-1934', unpublished,
also Emmett, 'The Rise of African Nationalism', p.384


133. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.3-5 Monthly Reports for Aminuis Reserve November 1929 to January 1934


135. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.4 Superintendent Aminuis Native Reserve to Magistrate Gobabis, 22.10..1931, pp.1-2

136. SWAA A 158/23 Vol.3 Copy and Translation of letter received. Translated by headman Johannes Bruhaus and Asser. Okakarara, 18.7.1931. See also SWAA A 158/23 Vol.4 Superintendent Waterberg East Native Reserve to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 30.11.1933, where the superintendent informs the magistrate that stock owners were demanding £10 for their large stock which he thought 'would have been well paid at from 40/- to 50/- each.'


139. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.4 Superintendent Aminuis Native Reserve to Magistrate Gobabis, 22.10.1931, pp.1-2

140. SWAA A 158/23 Vol.3 Petition, 4.11.1931, p.2

141. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Magistrate ? to Secretary for S.W.A., 30.4.1930. See also SWAA A 158/23 Vol.2 Monthly Report (Waterberg East Reserve) July 1929, p.2

142. SWAA A 158/23 Vol.3 Magistrate Otjiwarongo to Secretary for S.W.A., 4.10.1931. See also SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Magistrate (?) to Secretary for S.W.A., 30.4.1930

143. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Superintendent (Aminuis) to Magistrate Gobabis, 12.10.1931


145. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.4 Superintendent Aminuis to Magistrate Gobabis, 11.4.1933, p.1
146. SWAA A 50/51 Herero Deputation. Minutes of a Meeting held in Office of the Secretary for S.W.A., Windhoek, 2.7.1934, p.4
147. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Secretary for S.W.A. to Administrator, 9.7.1931, p.2
148. Ibid, p.5
149. For the debate among superintendents, magistrates and senior officials in the Native Affairs Department concerning the pros and cons of grazing fees and poll tax see e.g. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Superintendent Aminuis to Secretary for S.W.A., 23.6.1931; Secretary for S.W.A. to Administrator, 9.7.1931
150. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.4 Secretary for S.W.A. to Magistrate Gobabis, 17.6.1931, pp.1-2, emphasis added.
151. SWAA A 158/23 Vol.3 Secretary for S.W.A. to Magistrate Otiwarongo, 22.10.1931. See also SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Assistant Secretary to H. H. The Administrator, n.d. (1933), p.41
152. Ibid
154. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Deputation of Representatives of the Herero People interviewed on Friday 2.6.1933 by the Secretary for S.W.A., pp.13-14
155. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.4 Notes of a Meeting held at Klein Aminuis by the Native Commissioner on the 12th of April 1930, p.6
156. Ibid, p.3. See also Ibid, Superintendent Aminuis Native Reserve to Magistrate Gobabis, 23.2.1930, pp.1-2 where Native Affairs officials were addressed as 'our master and guardian'. This contrasts sharply with Southern Rhodesia, where discriminatory measures by the colonial government increasingly led blacks to identify the state as enemy. See Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, pp.84f and Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, pp.196f
157. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Deputation of Representatives of the Herero People interviewed on Friday 2.6.1933 by the Secretary for S.W.A., pp.7,14
158. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.4 Notes of a Meeting held at Klein Aminuis by the Native Commissioner on the 12th April 1930, pp.3-4. No evidence was found to suggest that this was an intention actually expressed by white settlers.
159. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.5 Minutes of a Meeting held by the Magistrate with the Herero of the Aminuis Native Reserve on the 21st September 1933, p.2
161. Ibid, p.4
163. On seeing South African fighter bombers dropping bombs into the hills on Orumbo reserve, Kutako decided to leave the reserve with his followers for Bechuanaland, but eventually
settled in Aminuis. Headman Hoveka claimed to have been 'the first person to leave Orumbo with my people' in 1924. Troup, In Face of Fear, Michael Scott's Challenge to South Africa, (London, 1950), pp.77-79

164. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.4 Notes of a Meeting held at Klein Aminuis by the Native Commissioner on the 12th of April 1930, p.6

165. SWAA A 158/97 Assistant Secretary to Administrator, n.d. [end 1933], p.5


167. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.4 Notes of a Meeting held at Klein Aminuis by the Native Commissioner on the 12th April 1930, p.6

168. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.4 Superintendent Aminuis Native Reserve to Magistrate Gobabis, 23.2.1930, p.2

169. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.4 Notes of a Meeting held at Klein Aminuis by the Native Commissioner on the 12th of April 1930, p.3

170. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.4 Officer in Charge Native Affairs, Windhoek to Native Commissioner, Windhoek, 24.1.1930, p.1

171. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Assistant Secretary to H. H. The Administrator, n.d. [end 1933], p.1

172. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Deputation of Representatives of the Herero People interviewed on Friday 2.6.1933 by the Secretary for S.W.A., pp.4-5,8

173. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Assistant Secretary to H. H. The Administrator, n.d. [end 1933], p.39
CHAPTER FIVE: RECOVERY, DIFFERENTIATION AND POPULAR STRUGGLE, 1934-1946

By mid-1934 the 'financial position of ...'[S.W.A.] had reached a stage of complete and utter chaos', with public debt totalling more than £2,25 million pounds. (1) In large measure this situation was the result of drought and Depression, but it also reflected the consequences of the territory's economic integration with South Africa. Speakers in the S.W.A. Legislative Assembly identified the Union's land settlement policies as a root cause of this state of affairs. One prominent member of the Assembly, Mr. Lardner-Burke, singled out the system of state aid to settler farmers for particular criticism. He pointed out that it was 'ruinous to the country', observing that

The Administration had invested approximately £2 500 000 in farming. On that portion of this sum which it had been necessary to borrow from the Union, the country was paying an amount of £75 000 by way of interest. The maximum that could be collected from farmers this year would be less than half that sum by way of interest... The country was ruined... No matter what arrangements were made to put an end to our present financial difficulties, the situation would again become hopeless unless a saner financial policy were pursued in future. Farming must be made to depend upon itself and not on subsidies from the State. Under the present policy all that was happening was that the State was subsidising a large section of the community at the expense of the remainder of the population. (2)
These warnings were more than justified in view of the fact that the recovery of mining was slow and uneven. Low ore prices forced the closure of the Tsumeb copper mine between 1933 and 1936, but when ore prices began to improve in 1937, the mine reopened. With the outbreak of war, however, the mine closed once again as the fact that it was German-owned meant that it was placed in the hands of the Custodian of Enemy Property. (3) A recovery of the diamond market in the mid-1930s saw a sudden increase in production from just over 4,000 carats in 1934 to 128,464 carats in 1935. (4) Production peaked in 1937 at 196,802 carats, but then dropped significantly to 36,410 carats at the outbreak of war in 1939 due to 'unsatisfactory conditions in the diamond market.' (5)

The coming of the Second World unevenly stimulated production in every sector of the economy. While Allied demand for 'commodities of military-strategic significance like vegetable oils, metals and industrial diamonds' (6) was particularly strong, this was only of limited value to S.W.A. The closure of the Tsumeb mine for the duration of the war meant that no ore was hoisted. Limited exports of copper-lead ore, copper-lead matte, pig lead and cadmium made from stocks on hand declined dramatically in volume and in value throughout the war. (7) However, the production of diamonds increased steadily after
the outbreak of war and by the mid-1940s had reached its 1938 level again. (8) Generally speaking, though, mining production stagnated until after the war, and it was not until 1948 that the value of mining output reached its 1920 level again. (9)

Development of the Cattle Industry

Prospects for the rapid recovery of settler farming were equally besieged by problems. Most prominently, the market question was still unsatisfactory. In January 1935 an editorial in the Windhoek Advertiser argued that it was 'essential that the Administration should, without further delay, give its attention to the question of markets.' While acknowledging the importance of stock markets in South Africa, the editorial argued 'that the Union market is too unstable for this country to depend on.' (10) Indeed, the situation in Union cattle markets did not bode well for the future of cattle farming in S.W.A. As a result of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease towards the end of 1934, S.W.A. 'was placed under a stringent quarantine.' (11) With the exception of the months July - September 1934, exports to the Union ceased altogether between May 1934 and March 1935, when Union markets were partially opened again. Severe restrictions remained in force for the district of Gobabis, however. White settlers openly accused the Union Government of using the outbreak as an excuse for keeping cattle from the Territory out of the Union markets, and that what was
represented as a veterinary measure was really a measure granting the Union cattle farmers protection in the local market. (12)

Although the Deputy Director of Veterinary Services denied this categorically, the fact remains that the restrictions did coincide with a temporary oversupply of meat in the Union. (13)

Conditions on the world market were equally unfavourable for agricultural export commodities. In his 1935 Budget Speech, the Administrator painted a grim picture of international trade. He pointed out that the world economic crisis had not yet passed away altogether, 'although there are signs of a certain stabilization in the position, more particularly of what is known as the sterling group.' An artificial stimulation of agricultural commodities had led to a disastrous fall in the price of agricultural products and a steady curtailment of markets for the non-European producers of these articles. This has again resulted in the latter countries being able to take fewer manufactured goods from Europe and a demand for local production of manufactured articles. Higher prices for foodstuffs in Europe under the tariff and quota system has led to a decline in consumption as for instance in the cases of Germany and Italy in respect of meat. Thus one has the picture of the European manufacturing countries concentrating on the production of primary products at an increased cost and the non-European countries in the absence of markets for their primary products concentrating on producing their own requirements of manufactured articles at increased cost. Agrarian protection on the one hand and industrialisation on the other, the weapons being tariffs and quotas; the result, a steady decline in international trade. Every country retiring behind a wall of tariffs or separating off into groups. The effects of such a policy on a Territory such as South West Africa, which is entirely dependent on primary products and has no hope of establishing its own
The critical situation of cattle producers generally was aggravated by the decision of the only two big companies involved in overseas exports and local meat processing to cease operations in the mid-1930s. Although the Imperial Cold Storage and Supply Company had been granted generous assistance by the colonial administration to erect abattoir and cold storage facilities for the export of stock overseas, it soon found the obligations in connection with live-stock too onerous and was glad to be relieved thereof in due course." (15) The company suspended operations in 1933 and 1934, resumed production in 1935, but closed down permanently in 1936. During its eight years of operation from 1927 it exported 95 311 carcases or an average of 11 914 carcases per annum. (16) A similar fate was suffered by the Liebig's Meat Extract Factory in Okahandja, which had started producing meat extract in 1927. The factory briefly resumed production in 1936 after having suspended its operations in 1930, but shut down permanently in the same year. (17) The closure of the mines also meant that the domestic cattle market had shrunk to a minimum. (18)

But once the restrictions on stock exports were lifted in 1935, 'a brisk demand for South-West African cattle sprang up in the Union, where local supplies were insufficient to meet the increasing demands of Johannesburg and other centres.' (19) In
1935 and 1936 the country exported an abnormally high number of livestock to the Union as a result of the accumulation of slaughter stock during 1934 when exports had been restricted. Although unrepresentative of S.W.A.'s export capacity, this boom heralded the beginning of a remarkable growth in the livestock industry. In the course of the next decade the national herd in the Police Zone more than doubled from 622,400 cattle in 1934 to 1,340,900 in 1946. (20) The value of stock exports to the Union increased three-fold between 1934 and 1939. The growing demand for meat in the Union after the outbreak of the Second World War led to a further increase in the export of livestock, reaching a record value of £1,6 in 1943. These trends are summarised in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1 Livestock Exports from S.W.A. to South Africa 1934-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cattle Exported (i)</th>
<th>Value (£)</th>
<th>Sheep &amp; Goats Exported (i)</th>
<th>Value (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>29,523</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>99,600</td>
<td>62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>128,855</td>
<td>438,416</td>
<td>119,600</td>
<td>109,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>108,816</td>
<td>306,145</td>
<td>112,700</td>
<td>47,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>48,257</td>
<td>170,635</td>
<td>123,600</td>
<td>71,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>67,209</td>
<td>235,371</td>
<td>154,200</td>
<td>98,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>70,627</td>
<td>318,692</td>
<td>174,200</td>
<td>95,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>77,013</td>
<td>390,083</td>
<td>157,900</td>
<td>82,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>128,951</td>
<td>725,000</td>
<td>157,100</td>
<td>90,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942(ii)</td>
<td>110,322</td>
<td>830,039</td>
<td>174,800</td>
<td>129,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943(ii)</td>
<td>151,434</td>
<td>1,591,270</td>
<td>185,200</td>
<td>164,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>118,862</td>
<td>1,322,627</td>
<td>135,200</td>
<td>124,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>105,028</td>
<td>995,161</td>
<td>20,300</td>
<td>24,296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (i) Agricultural statistics display a
remarkable degree of disparity. As far as possible, though, this study has drawn on published official sources. Figures for cattle, sheep and goat exports in the Table above are based on the Report of the Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission and correspond to those found in the Administrator’s annual reports. With regard to the value of stock exports, the figures for 1935-1939 were taken from the annual reports of the Administrator. After 1939 they were derived from the Administrator’s budget speeches. His figures were estimates based on the average prices paid by stock dealers in S.W.A., and tend to differ from those published in the annual reports.

(ii) Cattle exports for 1942-43 include carcasses exported from Walvis Bay.


The decade after 1933 also witnessed the expansion of the dairy industry. Described in 1932 as ‘the mainstay of the cattle farmer’ because it constituted his ‘chief source of ready cash’(21) the dairy industry played an important role in the reconstruction of the cattle industry as a whole. By contrast with cattle farming which involved an average five year period before the first returns from stock could be expected, the ranch-dairy farmer...can negotiate these difficulties by the sale of cream during 4-6 months of the year and after weaning time by the sale of
tallies and culled heifers or cows. (22)

Dairy production thus became a favoured alternative and addition to beef cattle farming, soon overtaking the latter in terms of stock farmers' income. As Table 5.2 illustrates, by 1936 the export value of butter surpassed the value of cattle exports, and by 1937 exceeded the combined export value of sheep and cattle.

Table 5.2 Export Value of Livestock and Dairy Products, 1934-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Butter Exports (£)</th>
<th>Slaughter Stock Exports (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cattle (£)</td>
<td>Sheep (£)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>166 795</td>
<td>119 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>309 896</td>
<td>438 416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>337 195</td>
<td>306 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>344 215</td>
<td>170 635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>423 468</td>
<td>235 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>534 365</td>
<td>318 692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Report of the Administrator, 1939, pp.207-208; Raedel, 'Die Wirtschaft und die Arbeiterfrage', p.125

Unlike beef cattle ranching, the high grade of cream and butter produced in S.W.A. secured it a relatively firm export market, both in the Union and in Britain. (23) The steady improvement in the quality of dairy production was achieved through technical advice given to white farmers by government officers, as well
as by improvements in infrastructure and factory equipment. (24) In 1939, 95 per cent of export butter submitted for grading was accepted as first grade, compared to only 58 per cent in the Union. (25)

Dairy producers in S.W.A. were more competitive than their counterparts in the Union. Since artificial feeding of milk cows was impracticable in S.W.A., cows were grazed and milked on the veld. (26) This contrasted sharply with the Union where 75 per cent of the total butter output was produced under intensive farming methods, which included:

- the feeding of stock...
- the recording of cows to test out the worst cows, and...
- all the progressive methods which have been so pressed upon the farmer by the Agricultural Department. Only 25 per cent of the Union’s output is produced under the ranching system which obtains in South-West Africa. (27)

As a result, the cost of production was much lower in S.W.A., so much so that the marketing of S.W. African butter in the Union came under heavy fire in the South African Parliament. (28)

But opposition from Union farmers did not prevent the S.W.A. dairy industry from growing rapidly. Factory butter produced in the territory increased from 3 615 600 lb. in 1934 to a record of 11 088 500 lb. in 1943, after which it declined to 6 436 700 lb. in 1946. The production of factory cheese also increased from 188 800 lb. to 317 000 lb. between 1934 and
1943, but then decreased to 18 600 lb. in 1946. (29) Despite increases in output the dairy industry was characterised by low productivity until after the war. In the late 1940s the Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission concluded that ranch-dairy farming was still in an undeveloped state 'with respect to camps, drinking places, milking places, cooling and sterilisation facilities and, in the absence of these essentials, of proper grazing management and farm organisation.' (30)

The Development of the Karakul Industry

Commercial agriculture in S.W.A. received a considerable boost from the development of karakul farming. Karakul pelts became the territory's most important export staple in the decade after 1934. As the breeding of karakul sheep and the production of karakul pelts was limited exclusively to white settler farmers in the southern parts of the territory, it will only be referred to briefly here. (31)

Initial attempts to establish a wool industry in S.W.A. failed 'partly because of the importation of poor quality breeding stock and partly because of climatic conditions, water problems and poor grazing.' (32) However, the Great Depression proved to be a turning point in the fortunes of karakul farming. While the prices for all other agricultural commodities and mining
fell dramatically during the Depression, karakul pelts continued to obtain reasonable prices on overseas markets. Although average prices for karakul pelts decreased from a high of 25s per pelt in 1929 to 12s in 1932, they picked up again to reach 19s 7d and 19s 6d in 1933 and 1934 respectively. (33) Over much the same period, the contribution of karakul pelts to total exports from S.W.A. increased from 15 per cent in 1925 to 24 per cent in 1928 and 82 per cent in 1933. (34) On the whole 'the karakul pelt industry has suffered less during the period of world depression than any other branch of farming.' (35)

After 1935 merino sheep were rapidly replaced 'by the more active and more profitable karakul.' Karakul sheep produced quicker returns on capital. According to the Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission

Karakul farming had the undoubted advantage that it can on the same locality and under the same conditions bring earlier and better results from smaller herds than other sheep; a good quality ewe matched with a good ram produces a lamb which at birth yields a pelt equal in value to the purchase price of the ewe. (36)

A mature karakul ewe produced about three lambs in two years. Half of these lambs were slaughtered at birth, and three days after drying of the pelt 'obtain(ed) a tangible monetary value'. After eight years or approximately 12 lambs, the ewe could be sold as mutton. By comparison, mutton sheep could be sold only two years after service of the ewe. (37) Compared to mutton and wool sheep flocks which consisted of half ewes, one
quarter young ewes and one quarter harem, 'karakul flocks comprise three quarters ewes and one quarter young ewes'. Karakul farming thus meant that 'one quarter more of the flock is directly productive by lambing than in the case of other breeds on an area of equal size.' (38)

As a result, the number of karakul sheep expanded considerably after 1933. The total herd more than trebled between 1934 and 1939, from about 800 000 sheep to 2 616 000, and reached a peak of 3 183 000 in 1943. The number of pelts exported over the same period increased more than four-fold from about 350 000 in 1934 to just over 1,5 million in 1939, peaking in 1944 when over 2,5 million pelts were exported. (39) By 1946 karakul farming had become the single most important branch of agriculture, contributing £4 117 080 or approximately 54 per cent of total agricultural exports of £7 337 034. (40) Unlike other branches of agriculture, however, karakul farming remained the exclusive preserve of white settlers. In 1945 all 2 489 000 head of karakul sheep were on white farms and none on reserves. (41)

The onset of war provided a further stimulus for the export of livestock and dairy products (see Table 5.1 above). Overall, the boom in agriculture after 1934 far outweighed the decline in mining, with the result that this period was described as 'the most prosperous in the history of the territory.' (42)
Agricultural output not only expanded absolutely, but its relative contribution to GDP also increased steadily. While the contribution of mining to GDP ranged between 12 per cent in 1935 and 9.2 per cent in 1943, with a high of 25 per cent in 1938, the value of agricultural production showed a steady increase from about £1,098,000 or 41 per cent of GDP in 1934 to a high of £5,484,000 or 55 per cent of GDP in 1944. (43)

The prosperity associated with the rapid expansion in settler agriculture after 1934 was not evenly distributed. Moreover, it was insufficient to develop the forces of production in agriculture to any significant degree. In 1948 the Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission concluded that farming would remain at a very low level of development for some time to come.

All...[the farmer] is able to do is to produce food for the nation or raw products for its industries by exploiting the existing fertility of the land; he is not able to develop the productivity of his holding by fencing, camping, finding water or to make provision for drought or to apply measures for conservation of the soil. (44)

Labour Tenancy

The expansion of settler farming after 1935 brought in its wake a corresponding increase in the demand for cheap black labour. The low level of development of settler agriculture meant, however, that labour tenancy continued to coexist with wage labour as a form of labour exploitation. Earlier chapters
explored the role of labour tenancy both in the process of capital accumulation in settler agriculture, and in providing an opportunity for black stock owners to ward off the pressures of proletarianization. This latter theme is taken further now.

In 1936 the South African representative at the Permanent Mandates Commission, Mr. te Water, acknowledged the existence of labour tenancy arrangements on settler farms. Replying to a question by Lord Lugard as to the position of black S.W. Africans living on land sold to white farmers, he said that, in the first instance, natives on allotted farms squatted there under certain labour conditions. If they remained, they had to supply a certain amount of labour per year to the owner of the allotment. Natives were not allowed to move at will from one farm to another. (45)

By the second half of the decade squatting and/or labour tenancy arrangements on white farms were fairly widespread. In 1936 all magistrates in the territory were requested to report the names of settler farmers who 'allowed more than 5 native males to reside on their farms without having the necessary permission.' (46) This was followed by a Circular in September 1936 which informed magistrates that it had 'been ascertained that in a good many districts squatting was a general practice and that in several instances "kaaffir farming" was taking place.' While legislation permitted up to five labourers to be employed on farms without special permission, many farmers
employed more labourers 'than were legitimately required for bona fide farming purposes and...those natives were paying grazing fees for the right to keep their stock on the farms.' (47) The Circular stipulated that permission to employ more than five labourers should only be granted on condition that farmers did not charge grazing fees. (48) In 1936 the Chief Native Commissioner estimated that about 30 per cent of all labourers living on white farms in excess of five were doing so 'without proper permits', thus implying that they were either labour tenants or squatters paying grazing fees. (49)

The most common form of tenancy obliged the labourer and his family to provide labour all year round, in return for stock grazing rights. (50) In some cases labourers possessed of stock had to pay grazing fees for such stock, while in other cases the right to graze a certain number of stock on white farms was part of the remuneration. In Grootfontein district, for example, no grazing fees were charged in 1939, and in Gobabis, where 'the police take very active measures in regard to squatters on farms', only one farmer was prosecuted and fined for accepting grazing fees from squatters. 'Except in this instance, no grazing fees are being charged.' (51)

The situation was slightly different in Windhoek district. In 1939 the district had 298 farms. Of these, 250 farmers did not charge their labourers with stock any grazing fees, although 'a
few of them pay a lower rate of wage to stock-owning employees." (52) Altogether 5,388 head of large stock and 22,847 head of small stock grazed free of charge on these farms. The remaining 48 farmers or 16 per cent employed 333 labourers, of whom 236 paid grazing fees for 2,706 head of large stock and 6,629 head of small stock, totalling £77.9.4 per month or about £940 per annum. Rates of grazing fees differed from round figures ranging between 1s to 30s per month to 1s per head of large stock and 1d per head of small stock per month. In one case a labourer had to deliver 20 litres of milk each month to his employer. (53) In Grootfontein district, however, the situation seems to have been different again in that non-recruited labourers "very often find that their wages are never actually paid because the farmer makes [them] pay for the grazing of [their] stock and thereby completely wipes out the wage." (54) Table 5.3 below gives an indication of how widespread the ownership of stock by black labourers was on white farms.

Table 5.3 Farm Labour and Stock Numbers, 1934-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of labourers employed</th>
<th>No. of stock owned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>7 002(i)</td>
<td>39 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>--(ii)</td>
<td>68 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>19 254</td>
<td>65 563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>27 728</td>
<td>51 832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>30 202</td>
<td>75 792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>24 097</td>
<td>86 157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes: (i) Labour Statistics appear for the first time in the Annual Report for 1936. For 1934, however, the Annual Report gives detail about the number of stock owned by blacks outside the reserves and the number of owners. These figures include stock owned and grazed on urban commonages. It must be emphasized that figures provided in the Annual Reports are notoriously unreliable. An example is the figure provided for large stock in 1935. The Annual Report for 1935 gives the total number owned by blacks outside reserves as 50,778, while the figure calculated from the Annual Report for 1936 arrives at a total number of stock owned by blacks on farms as 68,143, i.e. more than the total for the entire Police Zone. Figures on labour employed and stock owned on white farms after 1939 could not be found.

(ii) No figure available


And nor did this situation change much during the war and its immediate aftermath. For example, in 1945 the magistrate in Otjiwarongo reported that 11 German farmers had been convicted during the year for charging their labourers for grazing under the pretence that it is only for bonemeal and phosphates etc...I am, however, not satisfied that these eleven farmers are the only ones charging their natives for grazing in this district, but the difficulty is to detect the real culprits as the natives will not speak, being afraid that the farmer will instruct him to remove his stock from his farm.(55)

In S.W.A.'s pastoral districts tenancy arrangements did not derive their importance from making tenants' means of
production available to the farmer, as was the case in many arable districts of the Union. (56) Rather, labour tenancy provided a means of attracting labour to white farms. Thereafter, depending on the changing balance of forces in the countryside, tenancy agreements could also be manipulated to tie labour to a particular farm. Apart from frequently paying labour in kind by extending grazing rights in lieu of wages, (57) farmers also advanced credit to their labourers in the hope of locking them into debt.

Some farmers have small stores. Other farmers usually purchase goods and supply them to their servants. Grazing fees have to be paid. Often, when all these deductions have been made little, if any, wage remains. In some cases natives work for years without ever getting out of their employer’s debt. (58)

Labour tenancy persisted because white farmers, particularly the undercapitalised majority, remained at a competitive disadvantage in the labour market vis-a-vis mines and urban centres which paid far higher wages. Real wages on S.W. African farms remained more or less static until after the war. The magistrate in Karibib, for example, wrote in 1948 that ‘farm labourers are in much the same position as they were 25 years ago, as far as wages are concerned...’ Farm wages at the end of the 1940s averaged between 9s and 30s, as compared with average wages of £7.10.0 per month for railway and government employees. ‘As prices are today’, concluded the magistrate, ‘the farm native cannot afford to buy clothes.’ (59)
Nor were low wages compensated for by adequate rations.

Malnourishment was a fairly common phenomenon. In 1948 the Native Labourers Commission found that on many farms the only meat which employees get is that of game shot during the culling season or of cattle or sheep that die, or of Karakul lambs slaughtered during the lambing season. The reason for this is that cattle and sheep fetch such high prices for slaughter purposes that it is considered to be uneconomic to slaughter these animals for native consumption. (60)

Similarly, housing on farms was primitive and unsatisfactory, and in some cases non-existent. This state of affairs is second only to the complaints against the low wages paid on farms in the list of grievances advanced by Extra-territorial and Northern natives against accepting employment on farms. (61)

Colonial officials realised that the labour problems experienced by settler farms were no reflection on the supply of labour. In 1937 the Assistant Native Commissioner pointed out that 'little difficulty is experienced in Reserves in obtaining labour for industries other than farming. It is therefore necessary to examine the reasons for the unpopularity of farm labour.' (62)

Most Herero tried to avoid farm labour because, as some of them put it, 'they are no better off for working seven days a week.' (63) In 1943 the magistrate in Okahandja wrote that the average wage of 12s per month plus rations was 'not
sufficiently attractive to induce the Herero in the Reserve, owning stock, to abandon his pleasant pastoral existence to take up employment, unless it be on the roads, etc. where the wages of 2s to 2s 6d per day are paid." (64) According to Wagner, writing in the early 1950s,

most Herero consider employment on a farm either as a temporary expedient when conditions in the reserves are unfavourable (owing, e.g., to drought or stock diseases) or as a more prolonged but still transitory arrangement by which to assemble a herd or [sic] large and small stock that will later allow them to settle on a reserve. If it were not for the fact that most reserves are overstocked and hence closed to newcomers with stock, it could safely be predicted that most Herero would move from farms to reserves as soon as they had accumulated sufficient stock to subsist on. (65)

Recruitment of Labour

The labour shortage experienced by settler farmers after 1933 called forth severe criticism of the Administration's reserve policy. According to the Legislative Assembly member for Okahandja, Mr. van Aardt,

The reserves were supposed to be homes for old and sick natives. Instead, they have become areas in which natives were congregating in large numbers and accumulating big herds of stock. The native was being encouraged as a competitor of the white man and in his Reserves was going backwards in culture. Thousands of young and active natives were loafing in the reserves and living upon others. (66)

Van Aardt argued that labour from Ovamboland was ignorant and only 'suitable to [sic] work with picks and shovels but not as farm assistants.' He considered the length of existing contracts too short for training such labourers to become
useful farm hands. In addition, it was too expensive for farmers to obtain contract labour through existing recruiting organisations. Pointing out that "today the mines and other concerns required 7 000 natives" he anticipated "that the chances of farmers obtaining labour even from Ovamboland, were diminishing." (67)

Van Aardt's assertions are not borne out by available evidence. While labour demand increased temporarily when the Tsumeb mine reopened in 1937, (68) it decreased towards the end of the 1930s. This is explained by the curtailment of activities on the part of a number of mine owners, including the Consolidated Diamond Mines, and by the temporary closing down of the Tsumeb copper mine in 1939. (69) This suggests that his argument was aimed at exerting pressure on the state to lower the cost of labour for farmers by forcing men in the reserves out to work. He alleged that they 'were full of able-bodied men too lazy to work' and proposed that a poll tax should be imposed on all able-bodied labourers in the Native reserves as a measure to induce natives to seek work on farms and elsewhere and thus to lessen the great shortage of labour and the prevailing evils in Native Reserves. (70)

Other members asked the Administrator to investigate allegations that large numbers of able-bodied males were 'idling' on the reserves. (71)
After investigating these issues, the Assistant Native Commissioner described 'the allegation that the Reserves are crowded with idle natives [as] incorrect.' Official figures showed that in 1936 only 6,163 adult males out of a total black adult male population of 40,491 in the Police Zone were not engaged in wage labour or living in the reserves. Many of these latter people were old and owned stock. If anything, he argued, S.W. African reserves were overexploited as far as labour was concerned. To support this contention he cited the International Labour Office's recommendation for Central Africa which

fixed a maximum percentage beyond which they consider it is impolitic to denude native areas of men. The figure, if I am not mistaken, is 15 per cent of the able-bodied male adults. I do not suggest that that figure should apply locally - but actually the local position is the exact opposite, 15 per cent in the reserves and 85 per cent working. (72)

It was anyway out of the question to tax idle natives merely for the purpose of forcing them to work. What we should do is to higher [sic] their standard of living and to teach them a money economy and the economic urge will drive them to seek work and earn money. (73)

The Windhoek Advertiser agreed. It noted that reserve stock owners in S.W.A. paid 'much heavier sums than under the Union native taxation system', and were already compelled 'to obtain cash to meet the fees either by sale of their stock or by working or sending members of their families out to work.' (74)

In addition to demanding that the colonial state increase
pressure on reserves, settler farmers also wanted a larger share of the contract labour recruited outside the Police Zone. The fact that contract labourers did not own any stock and worked for lower wages than workers from the Police Zone made them more attractive to farmers than the latter. Moreover, they were tied to farmers for the duration of their contracts. At a conference on farm labour convened in August 1937 by the Administrator to discuss the distribution of labour between the mining and agricultural sectors, farmers' representatives called for the establishment of their own recruiting organisation in order to cut recruiting costs. This proposal was rejected by the conference. Instead, it resolved to retain the two existing recruiting organisations formed in 1925, but that 'arrangements be made for Farmers' Associations, approved by the Recruiting Organisations and by the Administration, to have representation on the Board of the Northern Labour Organisation, Ltd.'

The 1937 conference was followed by a commission appointed on 9 November 1938 to enquire inter alia into 'the cost to farmers of obtaining recruited labour...[and] any question or proposal that may commend itself as promoting the more effective supply of native labour on farms'. With regard to farm labour, the commission observed that present supplies were satisfactory because the diamond mines were operating well below capacity. On the issue of the continued existence of two
recruiting organisations, the commission found that there was no evidence that this would have an adverse effect on the interests of employers. More specifically, the commission found that an amalgamation of the two organisations would not affect the recruiting charges of contract labour to farmers.\(^{(79)}\)

Recruitment thus remained in the hands of the Northern and Southern Labour Organisation until 1943, when the two companies amalgamated to form the S.W.A. Native Labour Association (Proprietary) Ltd.\(^{(80)}\) Farmers did, however, receive increasing numbers of contract labour from the N.L.O. Whereas the number of contract labourers recruited for farmers outside the Police Zone was only 943 in 1935, this increased rapidly to 7,260 in 1940 and 11,664 in 1946. The mining sector by contrast recruited an annual average of 2,500 labourers during the war years, with a low of 1,772 in 1946.\(^{(81)}\) By 1946 settler agriculture was by far the biggest employer of black labour in S.W.A., employing about 34,000 labourers or 65 percent out of a total labour force of 52,100. This compared to a total black labour force of 2,992 employed by the mines, 915 on roads, 2,507 on railways and 11,722 in urban areas.\(^{(82)}\) It was also the largest employer of contract labour.
Changes in 'Native Policy'

While settler farmers lambasted the Union administration for the failure of its reserve policy to provide sufficient labour, criticism of 'native policy' in S.W.A. came from official quarters as well. In 1936 the S.W.A. Commission, whose task it was inter alia to look into 'the effectiveness of the existing form of Government' tabled its report. It found that 'Native Administration in the Territory is not entirely satisfactory.' (83) After criticising the Union administration for the low quality of educational and medical services provided for S.W.A.'s black population, (84) the Commission further pointed out

that the Administrator and the Legislative Assembly have always been disinclined to be too liberal with appropriations for services peculiarly in the interests of the Natives and were given in times of financial stringency to pruning such services first. This was done on the principle that it would be inequitable further to tax the European for services conceived entirely in the interests of the Natives, who hardly contribute to the revenue at all. (85)

After exploring some of the reasons for this state of affairs, the commission recommended

that more active steps be taken by the Mandatory for the development of the Non-European races from their present backward condition in the direction enjoined by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and that financial appropriations be made for this purpose. (86)

Needless to say, the Union Government did not agree with the
criticisms levelled against its S.W. African 'native policy'. It rejected a suggestion made by the Chairman, Mr. Justice van Zyl, in a Minority Report that 'native affairs' matters could be better dealt with under the auspices of the Department of Native Affairs in the Union. (87) 'This suggestion was apparently made with the object of securing the expenditure of larger sums of money in the Territory and thus securing accelerated development.' (88) More specifically, the South African state reaffirmed its commitment to a policy of 'native reserves' in S.W.A. In its view, reserves had proved their usefulness by absorbing retrenched labourers during drought and Depression, thus relieving the colonial administration of 'responsibility for their repatriation and the maintenance of the local native population thrown out of work.' (89) These experiences, more than ever, had underlined the necessity for the Administration to so direct its native policy that the native population is not dependent on the temporary success of the Mining Companies, European commercial firms and European farmers during times of prosperity. (90)

Although the broad outlines of the Union's reserve policy thus remained firmly in place, it nonetheless underwent certain changes after 1934. Not surprisingly, the S.W.A. Commission was justified in its assertion that in times of 'financial stringency' expenditure on 'native services' was pruned first. Far from accelerating the development of the reserves and black S.W. Africans by providing more funds for this from the
national budget as the Commission had recommended, the colonial administration proceeded to scale down expenditure. Reserves policy was increasingly guided by the principle 'that it is impossible to force the development of the native races. Their advancement in civilisation must be a matter of gradual growth.' (91) It followed logically from this premise that reserve residents should 'depend on themselves' for the development of their reserves. Whereas

In earlier years the Administration did spend substantial sums out of the general revenue for the purpose of developing the water supplies [in the reserves]. It is of opinion that to continue this policy would not be in the interests of the native population...The residents know that new dams, windmills, fencing, schools, pedigree stock can be purchased when monies are available in the Trust Funds and this is an inducement to them to go out and work to save the monies required or to give their services in the Reserve. (92)

This statement was the first official acknowledgement of the changes introduced in 'native policy' after the Depression, and it drew strong comment from the Permanent Mandates Commission. Lord Hailey commented that 'it was very difficult to accept the view that in South West Africa it was preferable at this stage to teach the natives to depend on themselves', at a time, moreover, when Britain 'was spending large sums in other territories - for example £114 000 for water supplies in Bechuanaland and £208 000 for tsetse control and £57 000 for improving water supplies in Tanganyika - in the interests of the natives.' (93) However, another member of the Commission, M.
Rappard, recognised the reasons behind this change in policy very clearly. According to him

Prices had risen and the financial situation had improved. Consequently there was a greater demand for labour on farms and in industrial enterprises. The report [Administrator’s Annual Report for 1937] even went so far as to say that there was a considerable shortage of agricultural labour, necessitating the importation of native labour from outside the Police Zone, and that some adjustment in wages might be required. On the other hand the policy of making grants for native affairs was to be discontinued. M. Rappard could not help fearing that the motive underlying this change might be the desire to prevent an undue rise in wages by increasing the supply of labour. (94)

Developments in the Reserve Economy

The consequences of this shift in policy were somewhat contradictory. Government insistence that the costs of developing the reserves had to be borne by their inhabitants required that revenues generated in the reserves had to be increased sufficiently to guarantee their continued existence without placing any financial burden on the national budget. But the only way this could be achieved was to diversify and improve reserve agriculture, which placed the government in a bind of its own making. On the one hand it was under pressure from white farmers to draw as much labour from the reserves as possible, while on the other it had to stimulate agricultural production if the reserves were to pay their own way. The only possible way to solve this contradiction was to control economic development in the reserves very tightly. Indeed,
administrative controls over production and therefore accumulation in the reserves were the soil which nurtured opposition to the Union's colonial administration. This resistance culminated in the mid-1940s in a total rejection of the Union's attempts to incorporate S.W.A.

Like their white counterparts, stock owners in the reserves were able to rebuild their herds after good rains in 1933. Most reserves again received copious rains in 1934, enabling the Administrator to introduce the section on "Native Affairs" in his annual report to the League of Nations for 1934 on a positive note:

Generally speaking for the natives after the abundant rains the year was one of prosperity. In the reserves, with ample water and grazing, the stock increased rapidly. There was also an abundance in "veldkos" and the natives who are not burdened by the worries of arrear interest payments, bank overdrafts, and outstanding taxes which troubled the European, were happy and contented. (95)

Despite high livestock losses in the reserves as a result of drought, many Herero stock owners managed to save enough stock to rebuild their herds after 1933. They resorted to various strategies to fend off complete proletarianization. Stock owners would, for example, refuse to sell their stock when prices were too low to pay their grazing fees. Chief Kutako put this across very clearly when he told the Secretary for S.W.A. that

The people are willing to sell their stock, but say, for instance you sell your stock for 10/-, £1.5.- or
even £2, you cannot settle your debts with that money, and therefore we do not want to have any disputes with the Administration. (96)

As Chapter Four has shown, pastoralists were determined not to weaken their breeding stock for the sake of paying grazing fees. In order to succeed in this they sought to evade grazing fees wherever possible or simply refused to pay them. In Aminuis, for example, 'some of the largest stockowners', among whom 'some...eminent persons of the Herero nation' refused to pay grazing fees. (97) The Superintendent of the Waterberg East reserve reported that

it has been found that as soon as any resident exceeds the 100 head permitted, he produces or invents a relative, who then has the number in excess registered and branded in his or her name, thereby defeating the object of the legislation. (98)

Wage labour and tenancy arrangements on settler farms provided another limited way of maintaining or acquiring stock. As discussion above has shown, many Herero engaged in wage labour in a selective way. Where the aim was to earn cash, farm labour was shunned for the simple reason that wages were considered too low. On the other hand, if the aim was to save a small herd of cattle for which there was no room on the reserves, settlers who tolerated labour tenancy were preferred to railway work. The engagement in discretionary wage labour was dependent on the ability to utilise the labour of the extended family to look after existing stock on the reserves. Wagner noted that 'not all brand-owners live in the Reserve but
some have their stock looked after by a relative while they work on a farm or in town. (99) Apart from these options, the development of the dairy industry in the reserves also enabled some stock owners to obtain cash that could either be used to pay taxes or to purchase stock from neighbouring farms (see below). (100)

As important as attempts to evade grazing fees or repeated refusals to sell cattle in order to rebuild herds was the mobilization of homestead labour. In the mid-1930s some stock owners were described as tending their herds 'more carefully than ever'. Children were reported to have been taken out of schools to herd cattle on the reserves. (101) In addition, herd-offtake was much lower in the reserves than amongst settler farmers. Although no figures could be found for the 1930s, 'cattle sales...amounted to just over 4,6 per cent of the total cattle in 1949 and to 5,4 per cent in 1950.' (102) This compared to an average annual export of about 9 per cent during the period 1922 to 1947 for settler farmers. (103)

Table 5.4 reflects stock numbers on Herero reserves between 1934 and 1942.
### Table 5.4 Large Stock Numbers on Herero Reserves, 1934-1942

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Aminuis</th>
<th>Epukiro Waterberg Otjoho-rongo</th>
<th>Ovitoto</th>
<th>Otjituo</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>14 412</td>
<td>8 345</td>
<td>17 785</td>
<td>3 364</td>
<td>6 917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>14 619</td>
<td>9 855</td>
<td>19 233</td>
<td>5 395</td>
<td>7 972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>10 031</td>
<td>8 303</td>
<td>22 753</td>
<td>5 902</td>
<td>10 423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>11 907</td>
<td>8 368</td>
<td>24 090</td>
<td>8 094</td>
<td>9 774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>12 631</td>
<td>9 813</td>
<td>25 837</td>
<td>8 314</td>
<td>10 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>12 547</td>
<td>9 217</td>
<td>26 863</td>
<td>13 047</td>
<td>10 326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>13 140</td>
<td>10 544</td>
<td>30 039</td>
<td>13 647</td>
<td>10 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>12 531</td>
<td>11 882</td>
<td>28 319</td>
<td>8 979</td>
<td>8 550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>10 848</td>
<td>12 578</td>
<td>34 491</td>
<td>5 674</td>
<td>7 600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Report of the Administrator, 1935, p.43; ibid, 1937, p.53; ibid, 1939, p.25; SWAA Unregistered

### Table 5.5 Small Stock Numbers on Herero Reserves, 1934-1942

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Aminuis</th>
<th>Epukiro Waterberg Otjoho-rongo</th>
<th>Ovitoto</th>
<th>Otjituo</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>25 596</td>
<td>3 354</td>
<td>20 069</td>
<td>24 749</td>
<td>11 391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>19 000</td>
<td>5 331</td>
<td>14 346</td>
<td>39 485</td>
<td>13 419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>16 486</td>
<td>3 871</td>
<td>13 010</td>
<td>37 555</td>
<td>25 830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>17 876</td>
<td>5 924</td>
<td>11 519</td>
<td>45 283</td>
<td>22 530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>19 267</td>
<td>5 912</td>
<td>9 768</td>
<td>59 623</td>
<td>25 695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>18 103</td>
<td>4 275</td>
<td>6 445</td>
<td>67 696</td>
<td>25 516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>13 778</td>
<td>3 850</td>
<td>8 757</td>
<td>66 444</td>
<td>17 870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>21 178</td>
<td>5 950</td>
<td>10 979</td>
<td>47 899</td>
<td>13 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>17 193</td>
<td>5 683</td>
<td>10 880</td>
<td>42 022</td>
<td>8 602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Report of the Administrator, 1935, p.43; ibid, 1937, p.53; ibid, 1939, p.25; SWAA Unregistered

Papers: Annual Report 1940, para.1028; Annual Report 1942, para.1495
Distribution of Stock

Although the total number of livestock increased in Herero reserves during the period under discussion, this process was highly uneven. In the absence of detailed figures for the period before 1946, Wagner's data on 1951 will have to suffice for tendencies of differentiation. According to Wagner, the Aminuis, Otjituuo and Ovitoto reserves had a total of 1,388 male and 248 female stock owners in 1951. Of these only 17 men and 3 women possessed upwards of 75 head of large stock, while only two possessed more than 100 animals... 692 out of the total of 1,636 stock owners or 42.3 percent fell into the category below 15 head of large stock. (104) As Table 4.8 has shown, in 1933 just over 19 per cent of stock owners in Aminuis owned less than 15 cattle. Assuming that these figures are correct, Wagner's findings thus represent a considerable shift in stock ownership towards the lower end of the spectrum. Figures for Epukrio confirm this tendency. In 1933 and 1950 about 60 per cent of stock owners owned below 15 head of cattle (see Table 5.6 below). Impressionistic evidence corroborates this trend. In 1950 the Welfare Officer in the Epukrio reserve estimated that few people had more than 15 head of cattle. (105)
### Table 5.6 Cattle Distribution in Epukiro, 1933, 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock numbers</th>
<th>Number of stock owners</th>
<th>December 1933</th>
<th>June 1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 and less</td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 15</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 60</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 - 70</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 - 80</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>362</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** It is not clear whether the 362 stock owners for 1933 reflect all stock owners in the reserve. Also, the lowest category of owners in 1950 was 1 to 7 and 7 to 10. The highest category was over 50.

**Sources:** SWAA A 158/7 Vol.4 Magistrate Gobabis to Secretary for S.W.A., 12.3.1934 List 'A', pp.1-4; SWAA A 158/7 Vol.6 Welfare Officer Epukiro: Monthly Report on the Epukiro Reserve for the Month of June 1950, 9.7.1950, p.2.

Detailed figures on stock distribution in other reserves are more difficult to come by, but some fragmentary data exists. In 1942 headman Fritz Tjirije claimed that only two people had more than 50 head of large stock in Waterberg reserve. 'Some people have many heads registered in their names but the cattle belonged to five or six or even ten members of his family and were not his property.' He expressed the opinion that 'most people owned only five or six [head of cattle]' (106). This characterisation of stock ownership was corroborated broadly by the welfare officer who in 1943 inferred from entries in the
that more than half the stock owners in the reserve owned less than 12 head of large stock. (107) In Otjohorongo reserve, the average number of stock owned by residents in 1949 was 19 large stock and 57 small stock. (108) In parts of the reserve, however, some people owned from 500 to 700 head of small stock without government permission, and "large stock owners are also accumulating big herds and there are many owning from 50 to 100." (109) By the late 1940s the general feeling among welfare officers seems to have been that most reserve residents were poor. About 80 per cent of stock owners in Ovitoto reserve were classified as being poor. (110)

From the figures just presented, it is very difficult to establish definitive categories as to what constituted poor, middle and rich pastoralists. Wagner classified stock owners with less than 15 head of large stock as poor, and those owning more than 35 head of large stock as wealthy. (111) But it is not clear on what basis he did so. Data concerning minimum subsistence levels for pastoralists in reserves could not be found, so that it is hard to estimate the number of cattle beyond which one could talk about a marketable surplus. Cliffe and Moorsom's estimates for neighbouring Botswana may thus serve as a rough guide. They considered that 20 cattle and about 20 bags of grain provided 'an adequate subsistence in staple foods' in the early 1970s. (112) However, the parallel is not exact because 'cultivation of crops plays only an
insignificant role in the economic life of the Reserve Herero'. (113) Despite occasional attempts to augment reserve incomes by cultivating crops, rainfall in most reserves was too unreliable for this to be pursued on a continuous and reliable basis. In 1945 the total production of maize by blacks in the reserves in the Police Zone was 40,200 lbs. or about 200 bags of 200 lbs. each. Production by blacks on white farms added another 14,000 lbs. or 70 bags. (114) As a result, reliance on food purchased outside the reserves was much greater than was later the case in Botswana. The minimum number of large stock necessary for adequate subsistence on the reserves, therefore, has to be set at a higher level than the one cited for Botswana.

Stock Sales

The state was aware of social differentiation in the reserves. Concerned to maintain the flow of wage labour by reserve stock owners, the Administration was anxious to control the process of stock accumulation. It was this concern ultimately which determined state preference for grazing fees rather than a poll tax. As argued in the previous chapter, Native Affairs officials regarded grazing fees as 'a tax on wealth', operating 'to control the accumulation of individuals of large herds [sic].' (115) Taxation apart, the state had several other means of keeping stock accumulation in the reserves within limits.
One mechanism already touched on was that reserves were increasingly left to their own devices when it came to developing an economic infrastructure. More concretely, this meant that they were not eligible for the same government assistance for stock farming as white settlers. An example in this regard was the lack of state help for the purchase of vaccines. This was an important matter since certain stock diseases like 'gallamsiekte' (116) were endemic in some reserves because of deficiencies in the pastures. In 1948 pastoralists in the Aminuis reserve needed vaccines, but could not afford the high price of vaccines manufactured in the Union. They therefore requested that these should be provided at a reduced price and that the Reserve Trust Funds should pay for them. The Administrator refused the request, arguing that stock owners should use bonemeal and salt instead. (117)

The efficacy of grazing fees as a means of curbing stock accumulation depended partly on tight controls over stock sales. Private stock sales inside and outside reserves were prohibited. (118) Instead, pastoralists were forced to sell at official stock auctions, which enabled superintendents to be present during sales, ostensibly to attract a better class of buyer. (119) The real advantage of auction sales, however, was that reserve superintendents could collect taxes at the point of sale, thereby preventing uncontrolled accumulation.
The disadvantages of auction sales for reserve stock owners were recognised not only by the latter, but also by some colonial officials. The magistrate in Otjiwarongo argued that auction sales 'would open the door to forming rings to the detriment of the natives who will have no remedy against this evil.' Although they could withhold their stock they were in no position to bargain over prices with speculators. He concluded that

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It should not be overlooked that they do not understand the system of bidding or the language in which sales will be conducted and in such instances they will follow precious little of what transpires.(120)
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Stock-owners rejected auctions and preferred sales where they could bargain with speculators, as this introduced an element of competition, which tended to push up stock prices.(121) The importance of bargaining over prices was highlighted by the Welfare Officer in the Waterberg reserve, when he wrote in 1936 that

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The Hereros are every bit as cunning as the buyers and unless they are left well alone to argue for hours on the question of price, they believe that they either sold in too great a hurry or that they did not receive a square deal. In the simple and old-fashioned way they are good salesmen and once a deal is closed with a buyer the native is satisfied that he did not "give" his animal away, whereas the buyer invariably lives to regret his impatience which has cost him more.(122)
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Dairy Production in the Reserves

Discussion earlier in this chapter focussed on changes on
so-called 'native policy' and their contradictory consequences. Chief amongst these was the state’s attempt to facilitate dairy production while simultaneously trying to curb broadly-based accumulation. Increased revenues in the reserves could only be generated through the diversification of production. As in settler farming, dairying seemed to be the most feasible form of diversification since it did not require any fundamental changes to the existing pastoral economy. In the previous chapter it was shown that attempts to introduce dairying in the Herero reserves had failed in the late 1920s. Many stock owners had opposed dairying on account of the fact that the milk they produced was just enough for subsistence needs. But after 1934 the concern to save their breeding stock from disappearing as a result of grazing fee arrears, many stock owners demanded the introduction of dairy schemes in the reserves. The first dairies were started in 1934 in Waterberg and Aminuis reserves, and were ‘being encouraged as much as possible as it enables the natives to secure a regular monthly income and assist them in paying their grazing fees.’

The encouragement of dairying was welcomed not only by richer stock owners in Herero reserves, but also by white traders. Several of them proposed to set up dairy schemes in the reserves. Settler farmers, on the other hand, strongly opposed dairying in the reserves, on the grounds that this
'would result in flooding the local market to the detriment of the European farming community.' For many whites the production of cream was a major source of cash income at a time when the price of livestock was low and other markets non-existent. They objected in the racist terminology of the day that 'syphilitic natives were permitted to handle dairy products, which is [sic] placed on the European open market and consumed by the innocent European population.' Their demands were equally discriminatory: 'Opinions were expressed that such butter, if permitted on the open market, should be graded fourth grade and marked or stamped "Native butter for Cooking purposes only".' (127)

From the moment when reserve dairying was first mooted in the early 1920s, issues of sanitation and hygiene were prime targets for attack by white settlers. In order to minimize such hostility, the colonial administration had to convince farmers that tight control over production would be maintained. Settler farmers in Otjiwarongo, for example, were given the assurance that hygienic methods were adopted and that such dairies were situated long distances from existing kraals or werfts, and therefore absolutely free from contamination of filth or disease, either human or animal. (128)

To satisfy settler opposition, dairying in the reserves was only permitted under white control. This was made clear by the Chief Native Commissioner when he wrote to the magistrate in
we cannot jeopardise the Native Reserve Creameries by allowing individual natives to supply cream direct and not under supervision. Such a course would ultimately result in a boycott of native supplies. (129)

Opposition by white farmers to dairying was not the only reason why the state advocated tight control of the industry in the reserves. Although it was not intended to do so, the encouragement of dairying posed a potential threat to the supply of labour from Herero reserves by creating additional opportunities for some stock owners to accumulate wealth. The colonial administration was aware of this contradiction from the inception of reserve dairy schemes. In the mid-1930s the Secretary for South West Africa recognised that although the establishment of dairies in the Native Reserves was first undertaken to assist the residents in paying their grazing fees, a limit cannot be placed on their accumulating wealth. (130)

In practice, though, the state nonetheless tried to dilute this process in a number of ways. It did so, for example, by appropriating part of the income derived from cream sales through taxation. To prevent tax evasion, the establishment of reserve dairies had to ‘be undertaken through the Trust Fund and by the Superintendent.’ (131) A further consequence of this policy was that the state did not permit the operation of private separators in the reserves and, consequently, the delivery of cream by pastoralists. (132) Several Native Affairs
officials also expressed the fear that private dairies and the potential for accumulation that these provided would lead to another problem, namely the growing individualisation of households at the expense of 'tribal unity'. The 'tribal system' was regarded as essential for the successful administration of the reserves. (133) The superintendent of Waterberg East reserve succinctly expressed this view in 1938. He opposed the encouragement of individual dairy schemes, since the individual production of cream would result in the establishment of small cream depots all over the reserve.

...startling figures could be reflected, but does this practice serve any useful purpose? Does it not mean that we are instilling a certain greed for money, no matter under what conditions the milking takes place? Does it lead to the necessary co-operation that is essential for the good management of reserves; or is this 'get rich quickly contractor system' going to eventually undermine our work and perhaps close the doors of our Creameries to all native products? (134)

In line with this thinking, Native Affairs officials devised a system whereby the collection and marketing of reserve cream was awarded to white traders on a tender basis. (135) Once awarded, the tender amounted to a monopoly through which it became possible to control the production, marketing and prices paid to cream producers. Cream prices were determined by the magistrate, dairies and the cream contractor, with producers having no say in the matter. (136) Under the agreements entered into by cream contractors, they were under no obligation to disclose the prices obtained for reserve cream at the dairies
to producers in the reserves. The latter were thus not only left in the dark regarding price movements, but price increases of cream were frequently not passed on to producers. (137)

Private separators were only tolerated for as long as no white contractor was collecting cream in a particular reserve. Once contractors were appointed, stock owners were forced to surrender their separators. In Ovitoto, for example, private separators operated in three places in 1940, with one village separating as much as 35-40 gals. of cream per week. After tenders for the purchase of 'native cream' were invited, the owners of separators were informed that as soon as the milk contracts came into effect they would 'have to cease separating milk, and to sell milk to the contractor.' (136) As late as 1946 the private owner of a separator in Waterberg East Reserve was refused permission to sell his cream directly to the creamery. He was informed that he had to sell to the person who had the contract for the purchase of the cream in the reserve. As a result he was compelled to sell his separator to the contractor. (139)

Communal Dairy Schemes

While the collection and marketing of cream was reserved for white cream contractors, the state insisted that delivery to contractors was made on a communal basis. The administration's ability to enforce communal delivery schemes rested on two factors: the technical requirements of cream production, and
existing differentiation in the reserves. Cream had to be delivered in five gallon cans. To prevent a drastic decline in quality, the cans had to be transported to a dairy as soon as possible. Long distances from markets and inadequate transport facilities made the speedy dispatch of cans even more imperative. The Welfare Officer of the Waterberg reserve estimated that it took

The cream from 24 native cows...from ten to fourteen days to fill one five gallon cream can, by that time the cream is either 4th grade or turned into butter. (140)

In and of itself this may not have been a major problem. But given the degree of social differentiation in Herero reserves, the vast majority of stock owners were unable to fill cream cans from their own stock within anything like the time required for dairy processing. As Table 5.7 shows, over 50 per cent of cream producers in Otjimbingue received less than £1 per month from dairying in 1936, while about 30 to 35 per cent received between £1 and £2. Only a small minority, ranging from 14 per cent early in the season to 2 per cent or less at the end of the season received more than of £2.

A similar picture was observed in other reserves. In 1940 the Welfare Officer in Otjituo reserve noted that most participants in the scheme 'put only one animal in, a few go as far as 8.' (141) In Waterberg East reserve 'five or six members will milk at the most four cows each for cream purposes.' (142)
Table 5.7 Cream Supplies in Oti Jambingue 1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No. of Consignments</th>
<th>No. of Cans</th>
<th>No. of Suppliers</th>
<th>Classification of Amounts received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Under £1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS 33 377

Source: SWAA A158/118 Vol.1 Schedule appended to: Native Commissioner Karibib to Assistant Native Commissioner Windhoek, 4.12.1936

Individually, most stock owners were not in a position to deliver cream to commercial dairies. Reserve dairying was only viable for the majority of people if the stock of several owners contributed to one can on a communal basis.

Resistance to White Monopoly

Dairy schemes in Herero reserves generated considerable opposition and conflict. The cream marketing monopoly enjoyed by white contractors deprived all producers, but especially large ones, of considerable profits. They were generally paid prices well below current market prices. In 1935, for example,
the cream contractor in Epukiro reserve paid producers 3d per
lb. for second grade cream at a time when the price at the
Gobabis dairy was 8d/lb for first grade, 6d for grade two and
5d for grade three cream. (143) Eight years later producers in
the same reserve complained that the price of four and
three-quarter pence per lb. for cream was too low 'when we
consider the price paid for cream which is 1/3d, 1/ld and 11d
for 1st, 2nd and 3rd grade respectively.' (144) Similar reports
were received from Otjimbingue and Aminuis reserve. (145)

Under these conditions cream contractors reaped handsome
profits. The contractor in Otjimbingue reserve took 25 per
cent of the reserve's gross income from cream in 1936, without
incurring any expenditure as the Reserve Trust Fund had
provided separators and cans. (146) In the mid-1940s, the cream
contractor in Epukiro reserve made a profit of £800 in two
months, leading the magistrate in Gobabis to state that

I am of the opinion that the Contractor is making
excessive profits and the time is now ripe for a full
enquiry into this matter. The natives are receiving
too little for their products and the Contractor's
profit appears to be out of all proportion to the
work involved. (147)

The superintendent of the Otjituwu reserve came to a similar
conclusion when he stated that the contractor scheme was
unsatisfactory 'as it deprives them [dairy producers] of a good
deal of their profit.' (148)
Members of Reserve Boards complained regularly at Board meetings that price increases were not passed on to producers and that as a result prices received for cream were too low. The general mood of resentment was well captured by a speaker at a Reserve Board meeting in Waterberg East reserve in 1939. He argued that cream producers received no benefit from the existing dairy scheme.

The first thing is that we tried to live and handed our cows to the dairy to help us and to pay our grazing fees. — It does not help us — it helps the Europeans on the farms. What dairy is this? We wish to know if these dairies belong to the Government or to us. When the money arrives we do not see it — this makes us heartsore. In the other reserves everybody have [sic] their separators and they live well. What is wrong with this reserve — our heart is sore for this reason. (149)

In support of such complaints, producers in several reserves threatened to stop cream deliveries. Producers in Epukiro reserve, for example, decided at a meeting in 1935 that they would terminate cream deliveries upon being told that the contractor was only going to pay 2,5d per lb. for cream. (150)

In Otjituuo cream producers demanded that the dairy in the reserve be closed down as they were dissatisfied with it. Instead, they wanted to run their own dairies "at our own different werfts", presumably referring to homesteads. In support of their demand they argued that

We are not rich people. We cannot keep servants to work for us; by this we mean the people employed in the dairy. When men are poor they must do their own work. (151)
Although dissatisfaction with prices may have reflected the general feeling of dairy producers in Herero reserves, it is clear that socio-economic differentiation shaped resistance to and demands for alternative dairy schemes. While available evidence is particularly thin on this point, it does seem that the wealthier stock owners and members of reserve boards regarded the monopoly of cream contractors over cream marketing as a stumbling block to their own interests. They consequently agitated for the takeover of reserve dairying from white contractors.

Barely two years after the official establishment of a dairy scheme in Aminuis under a white contractor, Hosea Kutako wanted to know from the superintendent of the reserve whether it would be possible for pastoralists to take over from the contractor, as "they are very keen on doing everything themselves." He said that they wanted to buy separators and a lorry from Reserve Trust Funds to transport cream to the creamery in Gobabis. Such a demand not only depended on sufficiently large individually-owned herds to fill cream cans, but also on access to Reserve Trust Fund money, as the purchase of separators and cans represented a substantial outlay well beyond the means of even most richer stock owners. Indicative of this is the fact that in 1938 only about 12 stock owners in Otjituvo reserve had applied for permission to buy their own milk separator.
By contrast, poorer stock owners and those far away from markets depended on white contractors not only to supply cans and separators, but also to transport their cream from remote corners of reserves to urban centres. They were therefore inclined to retain dairy schemes in which white contractors collected their cream. They also favoured keeping communal dairy schemes. These divisions came to the fore at a meeting in Waterberg East reserve in 1939. At the meeting the communal scheme in operation in the reserve came under sharp criticism from wealthy stock owners. Under this particular scheme, producers were not paid according to the volume of cream delivered, but by the number of cows they milked for cream. This system was known as the 'per cow' system. Moreover, stock owners had to drive their stock to kraals close to a separator, where milking was done by women employed for this purpose. (155) Unfortunately the documents did not yield any specific information on why women were so employed.

Objections were voiced that cream producers received very little from dairying 'on account of the overhead charges being too high.' (156) More specifically, speakers rejected the system whereby cream producers were paid according to the number of cows they milked, regardless of the quality and quantity of cream thus delivered. It was felt that dairy producers in the Waterberg reserve
do not get enough for their cream. A man with a good cow gets the same as a man with a bad cow. Everything is too expensive, all the money goes in the expenses. (157)

Feelings on the issue were not unanimous, however. According to the welfare officer the meeting was not fully representative and the opinions expressed were those of a few agitators, who take it upon themselves to sign letters on behalf of the "women, children and the nation". The Headmen and Reserve Board members appear to be afraid to deal with these people effectively, for some unknown reason. This agitation is going the round [sic] in Reserves and has already made an appearance in the Omaruru and Grootfontein reserves. (158)

No agreement could be reached as to what kind of cream scheme to adopt. While most Reserve Board members favoured an individual scheme, a number of cream producers from the eastern portion of the reserve were in favour of retaining the white contractor. According to the welfare officer they "have many disadvantages to put up with and buyers are not over-keen to visit those parts...owing to its remoteness from Headquarters." (159) The Reserve Board, if not dominated by wealthier stock owners, then certainly speaking on their behalf, expressed the desire, however, 'to do our own dairying like the white farmers', and by 1941 it refused to have anything to do with the white contractor. (160)

A similar situation prevailed in Otjiulo reserve. The decision as to which system to adopt depended on access to transport. Producers in the northern area of the reserve were
much closer to Otjituo, the administrative headquarters, and favoured an individual scheme. Those living in the southern parts, on the other hand, favoured a contractor system. The welfare officer opposed the introduction of an individual scheme in the reserve, as he felt that it would only benefit a small proportion of stock owners. He pointed out that only three places in the reserve were less than 16 miles from the administrative headquarters. (161) Moreover, the south was separated from the north by a considerable expanse of very sandy country and, though a road of sorts has now been made between the two portions down the centre of the reserve, it can only be traversed with difficulty, and at a very slow pace. (162)

Private Dairies Proposed

The interests of richer pastoralists crystallized in demands put forward for a dairy scheme by stock owners in Otjohorongo reserve. The history of dairying in the reserve was slightly atypical, for it was not until 1938 that official attempts were made to introduce dairying in the reserve. (163) By that time stock owners had a good idea of the pros and cons of state sanctioned dairy schemes in other reserves and a clear preference for private dairies. Encouraged by the success of a dairy partnership in adjacent Okombahe reserve, a small number of stock owners began to buy their own milk separators, and in 1939 '11 separators were in full swing, all without
authority.’ (164) In 1939 one owner of a private separator, Simon Karireo, reportedly earned £20.15.10 in the month of April alone. Questioned by the Superintendent, he stated that he milked only 15 cows. But ‘when his memory was assisted by the Headman and the Welfare Officer that number increased to 35.’ (165) Jeremiah Tjatindi of the same reserve earned more than £39 from cream during the last seven months of 1944, averaging £5.10.0 per month. (166)

On the basis of these developments a communal dairy scheme as it operated in other reserves was rejected by cream producers. At a meeting of the Reserve Board in early 1939

Everyone was in favour of being allowed to buy their own separators and making their own arrangements to sell to the Omaruru Creamery. (167)

Although the quote purports to express the interests of all stock owners, other evidence suggests once again that opposition to the introduction of a communal scheme in Otjohorongo came from wealthier stock owners. They were particularly opposed to the ‘per cow’ system as it operated in Waterberg East reserve, and considered profits under the scheme to be too small. (168) As discussed above, this system particularly disadvantaged pastoralists with more productive cows. (169)

At a Reserve Board meeting held in August 1939, Otjohorongo dairy producers presented their own proposal for a dairy
scheme. The proposals requested that independent groups coinciding with what the Native Commissioner described as 'natural family arrangements of 5 or 6 members' be allowed to purchase and maintain their own plant and equipment. They would operate through a central cooler from which a transport contractor would collect the cream for delivery to the dairy. The Reserve Trust Fund could pay for the establishment of coolers. While the scheme was to operate under the supervision and control of the superintendent and be subject to definite rules regarding cleanliness, each group was to be paid directly by the creamery. Registered members of the scheme would be required to pay a small fee, 'say 1/- per can per month to the Trust Fund as rent for the use of the coolers.' (170) According to the Native Commissioner in Omaruru the proposed scheme had the advantages that it would utilise existing kraals and thus not only save on expenditure for the erection of new kraals, but also decrease the concentration of stock around one or two dairy centres. Moreover, it would not disturb 'the present social conditions' as

the family group will be maintained; each dairy will fall naturally into such a group. The head of the family will be responsible and receive payment from the Creamery. The distribution of the proceeds and expenditure will be settled to their own satisfaction. The Administration will only be concerned with the policy of cleanliness and first class produce. (171)

The new scheme was implemented for the first time in 1940 on a 12 month trial basis. (172) By 1945 the original proposals had
been slightly modified to the extent that prospective dairy operators had to apply to the Welfare Officer for permission to purchase separators. Once permission was granted they had to build a separator room ‘which must be a substantial building with cement floor and white-washed walls.’ While they had to pay for the cement, the lime for the white-wash was given to them. The owner and other participants in the dairy were registered by the Welfare Officer, with the dairy being given its own number to demarcate the cans belonging to it. At the end of each month the head of each dairy received a cash payment for the cream delivered and was responsible for paying out the members of his dairy. One shilling was deducted from each registered member in favour of the Reserve Trust Fund. (173) In 1945 there were 76 such dairies, with 139 registered participants in Otjohorongo reserve, or an average of about two participants per dairy. (174)

Official acceptance of the proposals put forward by dairy producers in Otjohorongo reserve and their gradual extension to other reserves was an important, if partial, step forward by wealthy cattle owners in consolidating their economic power in the reserves. While the scheme still provided for poorer stock owners, it had cut out white middlemen and put wealthy stock owners in charge of the collection and marketing of cream. (175)

But the scheme opened the way for renewed conflict. The
arrangement whereby the head of a registered dairy was responsible for the final distribution of income received from cream sales caused 'a good deal of dispute amongst the natives.' Conflict became so intense in Otjohorongo reserve in 1947 that the magistrate in Omaruru was led to believe that 'judging by the attitude of the Headmen I feel that these disputes have now reached a stage where they might endanger the continued success of the scheme.'(176) Losers under the Otjohorongo scheme were the 'the small supplier[s]' who, according to the Welfare Officer of the Epukiro reserve, were now put 'at the mercy of the head of the dairy.'(177)

Wealthy stock owners were determined to put an end to communal dairying altogether. In Otjohorongo reserve itself, Reserve Board member Mutanga stated quite unequivocally in 1947 that 'it would be better if each of us were allotted a number and sent our cream in our own cans.'(178) Such demands were put forward in other reserves as well. Board members suggested that capital should be borrowed from the government to buy the necessary utensils and a lorry for transport.(179) This was rejected by the Chief Native Commissioner who argued that 'the Government did not grant loans to assist private enterprise'.(180) Needless to say, the implementation of these demands would have further marginalised a large number of dairy producers in the reserve.
Dissatisfaction among wealthy Herero stock owners peaked in the mid-1940s and was a decisive factor shaping their opposition to S.W.A.'s incorporation into the Union of South Africa (see below). Headman Simeon Hoveka of Epukiro expressed these grievances eloquently at a meeting in 1947. He was quoted as having said that

The natives today were no better off than the birds or the beasts. They had no place they could call their own. The cream industry in the Reserves was in the hands of the white man and he provided the transport and the market. The white man was sucking the blood of the poor Native. Must the European own everything because he started them? A large field of industry should be opened up in the Reserves for the Natives. He supported the slogan "Africa for the Africans". (181)

At the same meeting headman Joshua Muvangua of Aminuis reserve demanded that

The Concession stores should be abolished, black men should be allowed to buy the stores or the Trust Funds should take them over and they should be called Reserve stores and financed with Reserve funds; profits should accrue to the Reserve Funds. These stores at the moment provided Europeans with the means of making money. Every man who wanted to become rich opened a shop in the Reserve. As these Europeans were educated men, they were able to tell their customers all sorts of yarns - prices for the people's produce were always down: never up, e.g. £1.10.0 would be offered for a five-year ox. These Europeans pretended to come as friends but actually they were killing the people - and that was why the people continued to be poor. (182)

Resistance

After 1934 the uneven rewards of economic recovery in the Herero reserves had a decided impact on anti-colonial
struggles. Increasingly, reserve headmen and urban councillors became the targets of popular resistance. In the forefront of such resistance was the Truppenspieler movement, which became considerably more radical as a result of the growing impoverishment brought about by drought and the Great Depression. Indeed, an official of the superintendent of the Windhoek Location, Stephanus Hoveka, alleged that the movement ‘took on a different colour’ in 1932/33. According to him, it demanded in 1933 that the Superintendent of Windhoek Location, Capt. Bowker, and his police be relieved of their duties and be replaced with new officials. Moreover, they agitated for the dismissal of boardmembers, and stopped Hoveka from carrying out his duties on many occasions. (183) His allegations were confirmed by Bowker himself, who felt that the movement was ‘making a bid for governmental power’. Indeed, Chief Hosea Kutako had asked Bowker to extend the term of office of the present Board on the grounds that the Truppenspieler intended making a bid at the next elections to get their men into office. (184)

During elections for a new Board in 1935 the ‘Truppenspieler leaders made a determined effort to oust old Boardmen.’ Several ‘unsavoury incidents’ were allegedly perpetrated by the movement during the elections, and the Assistant Native Commissioner was in no doubt that the Truppenspieler movement had campaigned intensively, if to no electoral effect. Unable to vote sitting Board members out of office, the ‘Governor’ of
the Truppenspieler movement, Festus Kaatura, headed a delegation of Herero to request that the Assistant Native Commissioner dismiss the Advisory Board, "who they state was inimical to the people." This request was denied. (185)

These actions by the Truppenspieler indicated very clearly that they "are antagonistic and hostile to the government and the men entrusted with the control of location affairs." (186) Hostility reached such a pitch that the Advisory Board in Windhoek held extensive discussions on the issue. At a meeting in November 1935 Board member Mungunda, a former leading activist of the U.N.I.A., argued that the movement was a bad influence on young people and did not recognise the authority of the Advisory Board. He alleged that "the young men obey the orders of an officer in the organisation, in preference to the Boardmen" and pleaded for its banning. (187) Other members of the Board supported his claim that "there is no longer any respect among the young people for their elders." (188) The meeting passed a motion by unanimous vote to the effect that this meeting is of the opinion that the organisation known as Truppenspieler is harmful to the morals of the young men of the location and that it is hostile to the properly constituted government of the locations. For these reasons the meeting asks the authorities to put a stop to the movement entirely. (189)

The colonial administration obliged by issuing a circular which sought to limit the activities of the Truppenspieler. Drilling
in uniforms was prohibited. The movement’s welfare activities were ‘viewed with approval’, however, the circular suggesting that the advice of Native Affairs officials be sought in their establishment and running, ‘to secure that the clubs are starting on regular lines and their finances are properly controlled.’(190)

The events surrounding the 1935 Advisory Board elections exacerbated divisions among the Herero community in Windhoek.(191) The Superintendent of Locations was of the opinion that there was ‘an element of danger in this cleavage’ and that it would be well to ‘heal the break quietly yet firmly.’(192) Colonial officials therefore appealed for Kutako’s help in healing the rift. Unknown to them, however, the antagonism displayed towards ‘the government and the men entrusted with the control of location affairs’ had spread to the reserves. Kutako in particular had lost his credibility among urban and significant sections of reserve Herero (see below).

Truppenspieler members in Windhoek felt that Kutako had sold out to the colonial government. Their attempts to enlist his support in their bid to oust Advisory Board members had failed.(193) In early 1936 leaders of the Truppenspieler movement wrote a series of letters to Kutako, complaining about colonial oppression and the restrictions placed on the
movement. Apart from these complaints, however, the letters contained thinly veiled resentment at Kutako's leadership. According to the Assistant Native Commissioner, Kutako interpreted the letters to mean that

For some reason or other the local Truppenspieler consider that Hosea is partly to blame for the action that was taken against their organisation - probably because they regarded him as a Government man. When they demanded a "banner" from him he considers they are taunting him - i.e. they say in effect: "You helped in disbanding us. What are you giving us in the place of what has been taken away from us." (194)

Available evidence does indeed suggest that significant sections of the Herero community regarded Kutako as a collaborator. This perception was particularly strong in his own reserve, Aminuis. Resentment towards Kutako and some of his fellow headmen was intimately related to the land and reserve question. In the mid-1940s an activist in the Truppenspieler movement, Isaak Katjingengue, recalled in a conversation with the Superintendent of the Waterberg reserve that the major points of dissatisfaction were the reserve question and the educational system. More specifically, promises of land made after 1915 were never kept by the new colonial rulers. Instead, the Herero were 'crowded into reserves' and were 'not permitted to have their own lands.' (195) Kutako was perceived as having played a major role in the process of resettlement in the mid-1920s. In fact, he complained to the Government 'that he had become very unpopular by advising natives to go to Epukiro.' (196)
Truppenspieler agitation against Kutako reached such a level in Aminuis that by 1938 he had ‘no influence over practically the whole reserve’.

He was left with a bare handful of followers, and this despite the fact that he had done all he could to appease his opponents and was known by the Administration to be an extremely just and capable leader. (197)

Kutako complained that the Truppenspieler would not have anything to do with him. ‘They ask only that Samuel Maharero’s son should take my place as leader of the Herero nation.’ (198) And indeed, some two years earlier, the Truppenspieler movement had begun to refer to itself as the Samuel Maharero Society and started to use the initials MPSM on letterheads. (199) Not only did this indicate profound disillusionment with Kutako, but it also represented an appeal to the Maharero lineage to provide a paramount chief in place of headmen appointed by the government.

Kutako’s fate at the hands of the Truppenspieler was shared to a greater or lesser extent by several other headmen. In Otjhorongo reserve headman Frederick Kariko lamented that

The foremen have no authority over the natives under their control. The foremen give orders and the natives please themselves whether they carry them out or not. Sometimes they just laugh at us. The Headman and his foremen must have some power over the natives, otherwise they are foremen in name only. The Headman at present is a nincompoop in the eyes of the natives and we want his authority restored. (200)
At the same meeting headman Justus Kapia also complained about having no control over his subjects and applied for permission to give lashes to recalcitrants.

In the German times the natives were obedient. If they disobeyed there [sic] were given 10 or 15 lashes and they were better for it, but now we cannot do so. (201)

Such complaints reflected the powerlessness of headmen generally. (202) Their powers were severely proscribed by the Native Reserve Regulations of 1924. Contrary to the situation in South Africa, no legislative provision was made for civil courts composed of headmen or chiefs. (203) Instead, Bantu Commissioners courts were established in terms of the Native Administration Proclamation No 15/1928 to settle disputes among black S.W. Africans.

This enables native disputes to be disposed of expeditiously and (in the case of civil matters) in accordance with their own laws and customs in so far as the same are not contrary to the principles of public policy or natural justice. (204)

In practice even this limited jurisdiction barely functioned. Available evidence does not support the Administrator's remarks. Asked by the S.W.A. Commission in 1935 whether headmen in his reserve were administering their own laws and customs, the superintendent of Waterberg East reserve replied:

In a way. We don't allow them for instance, to settle disputes amongst themselves, and to investigate matters themselves. With the exception of criminal cases, I give a decision with the help of the council [Reserve Board]. Criminal cases are handed over to the police. (205)
Consequently, Reserve Boards were ineffectual and unpopular among reserve residents. Board members were perceived to simply carry out instructions received from elsewhere. (206) In the mid-1940s a Native Affairs official noted that

The Board members have little or no influence with their followers and with a few exceptions are not much of assistance to the authorities in the administration of the reserves... The Headmen and Boardmen attribute this state of affairs to the fact that tribal bonds are weaker than they were and that the practice of tribal law is no longer allowed. (207)

Several instances were reported in the late 1930s and after 1945 where elections of Board members were boycotted. In 1939, for example, Truppenspieler successfully refused to participate in elections for the Reserve Board in Aminuis 'with the result that it could not be proceeded with.' From reports it was also clear that they took not the slightest interest in the reserve and never put forward any constructive proposals. They were simply agitators opposed to any sort of authority. (208)

Growing Truppenspieler opposition to Kutako and other headmen coincided with a brief flirtation by a section of the movement, mainly in Otjohorongo reserve, with Nazi ideology. (209) By mid-1938, 'persistent rumours' that the Germans would be returning to S.W.A. circulated in Windhoek, Usakos and Outjo. (210) The Secretary for S.W.A. believed that the Truppenspieler movement was used by Germany to spread Nazi propaganda. According to him it was mainly young, mission-educated Herero who supported this. The organisation,
he added, "is antagonistic to the old tribal leaders and aspires to take their places if they can undermine them." (211)

During its brief period of existence, the supporters of Nazi millenarianism conducted intensive campaigns for their cause. Activists were despatched as far north as Runtu in the Kavango region to spread its message. (212) Bizarrely analogous to promises of liberation held out by the U.N.I.A. in the early 1920s, the proponents of Nazi ideology envisaged Germany as liberating S.W.A. from Union rule. In Usakos, for example, Herero and Baster people talked about Germany's return and ostracised blacks from the Union of South Africa. An informant from the Union, Johannes Matspsa, stated in an affidavit:

As ons Uniekaffers na hulle danse toe gaan in die lokasie dan word daar altyd op ons geskimp as Engelse en Boere outjies, en hulle, die basters, is duitsers, en die meide moet nie met ons dans nie. (213)

Although the popularity and impact of Nazi millenarianism cannot be precisely established, it persisted until after the war. In 1946 a faction of the Herero engaged a lawyer to request the Government 'that the "Young Turk" party should not be allowed to go to Okahandja at all' for the annual Herero Day celebrations, as they allegedly were admirers of Hitler and would cause trouble there. If this request could not be met, police protection should 'be made available for the ordinary, peace-loving Hereros.' (214) The state responded by prohibiting marching and drilling, and only permitted the wearing of red
bands at the graveside. (215)

Government Responses

The rejection of colonial authority by the Truppspieler had an unsettling effect on headmen and galvanized the colonial authorities into taking action. The latter were determined to restore the authority of headmen in the reserves. This intention coincided with demands by Kutako that something should be done about the Truppspieler movement. (216) Consequently, the Assistant Native Commissioner recommended that Festus Katura, the "General" of the movement, Johannes Tjiumue, another leader and Isaak Kazongari, the "main agitator", be removed from Windhoek and an additional four people be dismissed from government service because of their involvement in the movement. (217) It does appear, however, that the three leaders were only given "a very stern warning" by the Chief Native Commissioner, and were threatened with removal should they not cease their activities. (218)

The colonial administration decided to curb the activities of the movement rather than ban it altogether. Thus marching and the wearing of uniforms at the annual celebrations in Okahandja were banned from 1936. The Additional Native Commissioner, for example, found "that the movement is not necessarily subversive". For reasons that are not clear, he still
believed, however, that it was potentially dangerous and therefore recommended that it be banned. Particularly disconcerting were 'attempts... on a large scale to undermine the loyalty of the natives towards the Union Government' by actions such as those described above. Above all, 'there [was] no sympathy or cooperation between it and the Administration... '(221)

Activists were harassed and deported from reserves, or at very least threatened with deportation. In 1939 four 'ringleaders' were deported from Aminuis, amongst them 'the leader of the women of our Union in Omongue [Aminuis].' In response, the movement appealed to reserve residents to donate money to enable it to consult lawyers, as 'we are not far from being arrested and be in gaol.'(222) The Secretary for S.W.A. used the opportunity of Herero Day in 1939 to urge those present to do away with their red bands and their German military regalia. He also reminded them of South Africa's military might:

If they should be disobedient and continue to appear in close formation, he pointed out, naturally with emphasis, the Union possessed very good soldiers and very good aeroplanes of whose power the Hereros no doubt had learnt during the campaign against Ipumbu.(223)

The colonial administration followed a dual strategy in dealing with the Truppenspieler. This comprised both intimidation and incorporation. Amongst other things, the annual Herero Day
celebrations became an important mechanism by which the Government sought to heal the rift between 'loyal' and 'disloyal' factions of the Herero in an attempt to rescue its administrative structures in the reserves from total collapse.

It did so by laying down strict conditions for the annual celebrations. In 1939 when the Truppenspieler leadership approached the Chief Native Commissioner for permission to hold bi-weekly prayer meetings, wear the 'Herero national band as heretofore without fear, do annual visits to the graves and hold small collections' (224), the government responded cautiously. Prayer meetings were readily approved provided they were not political. The wearing of armbands was also permitted, on condition that they 'must not be a mark of a political or other society'. Military paraphernalia was prohibited, however. Approval for annual meetings was 'not yet' refused,

but the meeting must be one of all Hereros and not of one section only. When the Herero Council is established, your representatives can discuss this matter further and ascertain the wishes of the people.

Nor did the Administration approve of 'non-official levies', and suggested that benefit societies should work through the Native Commissioner. (225) Indeed, the previous year the Chief Native Commissioner had decided 'to establish a box fund' into which every Herero would pay 5s per annum. Although representatives of the Herero would decide how the monies thus
collected would be spent, the Chief Native Commissioner’s suggestion was that the funds should go towards education and the training of nurses. (226) To this the Herero had agreed.

The Government also tried to incorporate the Truppenspieler politically. In proposing a total ban on the movement in 1938, the Assistant Native Commissioner suggested that if this were done

consideration should at the same time be given to diverting the activities of these men into something more useful. Perhaps action could now be taken along the lines contemplated by you for the establishment of a Herero Council. (227)

This would provide the opportunity for members of the movement ‘to express their views and wishes constitutionally’, and would ‘help to bring the two factions together again.’ (228) In 1946 the location Superintendent in Windhoek recalled his attempts in the late 1930s

to re-educate members of the Red Band and educate them to a policy to cooperate with other sections of the native community by attempting to get them represented on the Advisory Board. (229)

By 1940 such prominent leaders of the movement as Isaac Kazongari and Benestus Kandjou [sic] were represented on the Board. Bowker concluded from this experiment of his: ‘I no longer hear about Truppenspielers and non-Truppenspielers.’ (230)

Hosea Kutako’s demands for action against the Truppenspieler movement were much more radical than those of the government
discussed above. He was not satisfied with the ban on wearing uniforms and red bands.

The main thing is that they should be stopped altogether even if they don’t drill or wear uniforms or red bands. They should be made to listen to the leaders that have been placed in authority by the Government. At present they only listen to their own leaders. They are trying to make a government of their own. In the reserves they have their own “officers” to whom they listen. They will not listen to me. (231)

Anxious to reestablish his authority, Kutako urged the banning of the annual celebrations in Okahandja. (232)

Disunity over attendance at Herero Day had earlier been reported in 1937. Many Herero—‘and they are the loyal section’—did not attend the processions, ‘because they say it is becoming increasingly a ‘Truppenspieler show.’’(233) Kutako himself stopped going to the celebrations ‘because I am loyal and the people who go there are not loyal.’ (234) Over the years control over Herero Day had slipped away from Kutako into the hands of the Truppenspieler. In a sense, ‘invented tradition’ was turned against the very people who were instrumental in its formation and whose interests it was supposed to serve. (235) This is strongly suggested by Kutako’s reason for wanting the annual celebrations banned. He explained at great length to the Additional Native Commissioner that these celebrations were untraditional and that it had been he himself who applied for permission to have them on an annual basis.

We did not go there in accordance with Herero custom. We went there every year as an occasion to
show our loyalty to the Government and our thanks for the benefits that they had given us. When one's stomach is empty and he is hungry he prays and he gives thanks for what he gets, but now that the Herero nation have got their freedom and have got fat, they have forgotten how to be thankful...I asked for the Day in Okahandja and now I ask for it to be taken away and my people told that when they behave themselves again and are thankful for what the Government had given them that they can have their day back.(236)

The government would not entertain such drastic measures. It did, however, show sympathy for Kutako's concerns by expelling 'four of the [Truppenspieler] ringleaders' from Aminuis reserve (see above). The extent of the support they enjoyed in the reserve is illustrated by the fact that 110 people threatened to accompany them without permission, should the Welfare Officer implement the decision to remove them from the reserve.

They were warned that if they did this they would be contravening the law. Shortly afterwards three of the deportees arrived at Gobabis - distant 126 miles from the reserve - accompanied by 20 male sympathisers and, as they adopted a truculent attitude, it was deemed advisable to send out a police patrol of 24 men under major R. Johnston of the South African Police Contingent at Windhoek.(237)

The supporters of the deportees were 'sentenced for contravening the law' and sent back to the reserve. Officials warned reserve residents at meetings throughout the reserve to stop interfering in administrative matters, and subsequent reports indicated that the offending faction decided to withdraw their opposition to headman Hosea and at a large feast held in the Reserve a very friendly feeling prevailed which augers well for the future.(238)
Subsequent claims that the ‘organisation’s policy of opposition to [the] Administration [had] ended’ and that it had ‘more or less ceased to exist’ (239) proved unfounded. While local reconciliation with chief Kutako may have been successful, the situation in other reserves was not as amicable as reports from Aminuis might have suggested. In 1942 headman Nikanor Hoveka from Epukiros reserve wanted to know from the Government why the movement was ‘banned’ in Aminuis and not in his reserve: ‘ne and his people are worried about the activities of the Truppenspieler at Epukiros.’ He urged the Government to ban the movement in his reserve as well, as it defied authority and wanted ‘to set up a Government of their own.’ (240) The police, however, could find no evidence for these allegations. (241)

Available evidence does not reveal any major Truppenspieler activities during the war years. It was not until the Union attempted to incorporate S.W.A. in 1946 that renewed Truppenspieler activity prompted the government to investigate the movement and prepare a report. (242)

Attempts by the colonial administration to heal divisions among the Herero went beyond curbing the activities of the Truppenspieler movement. Most importantly these entailed changes to the system of Reserve Boards. Changes were intended to bring the Boards more in line with Native Councils operative in the Union. (243) In 1939 a delegation of seven Herero
headmen, including Hosea Kutako, were sent to the Union where they inter alia attended a session of the United Transkeian Territories General Council. The purpose of the visit was to show them the progress made by the natives in the Union of South Africa...and to give them an insight into the working of the Council system in the Union in view of the contemplated introduction of such system into South West Africa.(244)

The ultimate objective of the visit to the Transkei Funga and the proposed changes to Reserve Boards was 'to encourage the growth of a sense of tribal consciousness among the natives of the Police Zone.'(245)

The Natives' Trust Fund Proclamation No.23 of 1939 provided for the establishment of a Tribal Trust Fund and Tribal Councils. In terms of the proclamation, an annual levy had to be paid by all Herero, urban and rural, into a trust fund. 'It was contemplated that the Fund would provide for expenditure on institutions which would appeal to the tribe as a whole...' (246) To administer the Trust Funds, Native Councils were to be established. These consisted of the Chief Native Commissioner or his official deputy, chiefs and headmen or any other members appointed by the administrator, and 'would provide a means by which the members of the tribe could discuss and bring to the notice of the Government matters in which it was interested.'(247) According to the Administrator, the idea of creating Tribal Councils is to educate the Natives along the lines which have proved so successful in the Union to participate in the government of their own people. It is also felt that
the Council will take the place of the unofficial Councils which have been formed by the natives to enable them to express their feelings, and will provide a means whereby those natives who are inclined to be agitators and hotheads can be influenced by older and wiser men. (248)

Significantly, the new proclamation only provided for the establishment of a Trust Fund for the Herero, although it left the door open for others as well. According to the Administrator, the Herero "were consulted about and agreed wholeheartedly to the provisions contained in the Proclamation." (249) For his part Lord Hailey concluded that the reasons for "wholehearted agreement" lay in the fact that the Hereros give evidence of possessing a far stronger feeling of tribal consciousness than any of the other tribes in the Police Zone. They attach great importance to their annual assembly at the tombs of Maharero and his family at Okahandja. They give more evidence of being politically minded than any other tribe, and it is indeed in their tribe, rather than in any other, that we may expect to see in the future the expression of interests of a political character. (250)

But it is precisely the historical specificity of this 'tribal consciousness' which previous chapters in this thesis have explored. That the Herero displayed the 'strong feelings of tribal consciousness' noted by Lord Hailey is undoubtedly true. As earlier chapters argued, ethnic consciousness was 'reinvented' where it did not already exist. But this process was accompanied by conflicts which particularly expressed growing differentiation in the reserves. Indeed, the intensity of these conflicts threatened the very 'structure of colonial
administration and control. Looked at in this way, the Trust Fund Proclamation was an attempt by the colonial state to create new administrative and political structures which could absorb these tensions and enforce unity on terms set by the state in collaboration with older, wealthier and more conservative elements in Herero society. (251)

Incorporation into the Union of South Africa

Lord Hailey was also correct in his assertion that it was from the Herero, 'rather than any other tribe, that we may expect to see in the future the expression of interests of a political character.' (252) Indeed, opposition to the proposed incorporation of S.W.A. into the Union of South Africa in 1946 put Herero leaders in the forefront of anti-colonial struggle. (253) Barely four weeks after a motion was introduced in the South African House of Assembly on 26 February 1946 calling for the incorporation of S.W.A. into the Union, Chief Hosea Kutako sent a cable to the United Nations rejecting such proposals. (254) Although Kutako 'was the leading figure in the petitioning of the United Nations against incorporation', (255) chiefs and headmen from the southern region did not remain passive in this respect. (256) This thesis concludes by examining links between the process of 'self-peasantization' discussed in previous chapters and the central role which Herero headmen and chiefs played in opposing incorporation.
Colonial officials entrusted with the task of conducting a referendum to ascertain black opinion on the issue of incorporation recognised that 'of all the natives within the Police Zone it is generally realised that the Hereros are the most "difficult".' They should be approached first:

not only will they have a deeper appreciation of the question involved, but if their decision is favourable to the Government, it is almost certain that the Klip Kaffirs [Damaras], Hottentots and other smaller communities will follow their decision. (257)

Archival documents dealing with this subject make interesting reading. They show how colonial officials both in the Union and South West Africa tried to hoodwink black South West Africans into accepting incorporation. In countless top secret and confidential meetings and communications they discussed strategies and speeches to be delivered to the respective reserve communities. (258) A standard speech was drafted which was to be delivered in all the reserves on one particular day. After brief discussion, headmen and Board members were to be given a pre-printed acceptance form stating _inter alia_ 'that our people have been happy and have prospered under the rule of the Government of the Union of South Africa and that we should like that Government to continue to rule us.' (259) Officials agreed that in order to obtain Herero consent, a special strategy would have to be followed. The Administrator was of the opinion 'that the correct method of approach would be
firstly to ascertain the feelings of the Hereros in regard to the restoration of a system of tribal control similar to that of the Northern Native Territories.' (260) The hidden agenda involved in the phrase 'the restoration of a system of tribal control similar to that of the Northern Native Territories' was that additional land would be reserved for the Herero 'either by extending the areas of existing reserves where Crown Land is available or by setting aside the magisterial district of the Kaokoveld as a native reserve.' (261) At a conference in late 1945 the Administrator told a number of Herero headmen:

It is my wish to bring you Herero people together again as you are scattered. You will never become a nation unless you are brought together again. It will be necessary to give you one or two reserves where you can live and where you can establish tribal unity...I want the leaders to work with the Government and I want you to help me uplift the nation and it may be necessary that you now choose your traditional leaders. (262)

The Chief Native Commissioner, Dr. P.R. Botha expanded on these remarks by saying that

We want to assist you and help to get your farming going and to improve your stock. We want to help you with water and everything that is necessary to make you happy...I want that you must get a place where you can expand further. I don’t want to give you land that you do not want yourself. That is why I spoke of Epukiro, Waterberg and Kaokoveld. Maybe there is a chance for you to expand your farming there. (263)

Yet it was precisely these two issues which counted most heavily against the Union's record in administering the mandate. Indeed, such hurried promises (264) achieved very
little in reducing opposition to continued South African rule over South West Africa.

The issue of incorporation raised political awareness to unprecedented levels. Meetings were held in every reserve. In Waterberg reserve, for example, about 400 people attended a meeting in March 1946. The occasion was described by the Native Commissioner as an "extraordinary opkoms [sic]", not witnessed at any other meeting during the last five years. (265) A secret report prepared by the South African Police stated that it has been established that secret meetings are being held by delegates of various sections of the native population and that the subject mostly under discussion at these meetings is that relating to the incorporation. (266)

The colonial administration sought to counter the upsurge in popular opposition by separately consulting headmen of each reserve. This strategy was unanimously rejected by all headmen. Headman Justus Kokurama of Aminuis reserve argued that it is a question which concerns all the Non-Europeans in South West Africa, and before we can give a decision we would like to come together in Windhoek and discuss it with other leaders. We asked the residents and they say: "No, we can only give our views when we come together in Windhoek." We want to come together and give our answers as one people and not as separate entities. (267)

The dangers inherent in disunity had historical precedent, as Kutako pointed out. In rejecting the colonial administration's divide-and-rule he stated: "Samuel Maharero made a decision in
the German times without consulting the other leaders and they all turned against him." (268) As a result individual headmen were loath to express an opinion without prior consultation with their subjects. (269)

Kutako was acutely aware that it was the object of colonial rule to divide people along lines of its own doing. In a petition to the United Nations he stated that

The division of our people has resulted in the breakdown of our tribal organisation and has resulted, as it was intended to result, in making us the dependants of the white people on the farms and in the towns, rather than in asking us to make our own contribution to civilization in our own way. (270)

He argued that although the Union government boasted 'that its policy is to permit the growth and development of the Native people "along their own lines"', this had never been put into practice. Instead 'there is the persistent refusal to turn our land to us, while our people remain divided and scattered in Reserves which are for the most part unproductive and unhealthy.' (271)

The perceived failure of the South African colonial government to facilitate the reconstitution of the Herero nation reinforced appeals to paramount chief Frederick Maharero in Bechuanaland to return to S.W.A. to unite the Herero. (272) Such an appeal was contained in an anguished letter written to the chief by one Jonas Katjerungu in Keetmanshoop on 20 February 1946:
Chief Frederick, the heritage of your father’s orphans is about to be taken from them and because we cannot speak with one voice as we are scattered all over their country, our heritage may therefore fall to that side for which we have no liking. Let the chief despite pressing duties there come to us, we pray you, son of the chiefs of our fathers. Come quickly to us. Come, come, come. Without you your tribe cannot come together but remains scattered so please come quickly to bring us together. We shall expect you chief, and please do come quickly. (273)

The attitude of most Herero was one of ‘we do not want to be governed by the Boers or be subjected to them’. (274) Herero residents in Otjitzuuo reserve rejected incorporation with what amounted to prophetic insight into South Africa’s political future. Their fundamental fear was ‘that the extreme element amongst the Afrikaners in the Union would come into power and would then break away from the British Commonwealth.’ (275) So determined was Herero opposition to incorporation that government threats that they might end up being ruled by communists had no impact. When a meeting of Herero in Ovitoto reserve were told that under United Nations rule ‘it might happen that they might be handed over to the rule of any foreign country such as Russia, China etc...they said that they did not care.’ (276) In Otjohorongo reserve the demand was that ‘we want to be governed by the United Nations Organisation. We do not want the Union of South Africa.’ (277)

It is not easy to discern the different class interests represented in rejecting incorporation. Reports by colonial
officials suggested that the Herero community was divided over the issue. More specifically, it was alleged that Kutako and headman Hoveka "had allowed "small" men to speak" on the issue. "They, as leaders, had to fall in with the decision of the tribe which had deputed the others to speak." (278) According to such reports, younger elements, allegedly influenced by an article written by Moses Kotane in the Guardian under the heading 'Why we Oppose Incorporation', intimidated older leaders into opposing incorporation. (279) Still other reports hinted that leading elements of the Truppendeister movement 'advised the old traditional Herero leaders against incorporation.' (280) Fritz Kasuto, described as "the leader of the Herero-Red-Band Organisation" and a court interpreter in Windhoek, was placed under surveillance to determine his role in opposing incorporation. (281) But no conclusive evidence could be found to confirm these allegations. On the contrary, it appears from Kutako's consistent role in petitioning the United Nations (282) that reports of younger, more radical elements being behind the petitions were exaggerated.

Petitions contained specific grievances of the small class of reserve entrepreneurs who perceived themselves as modern stock farmers rather than 'traditional' pastoralists. Their consciousness was succinctly captured by Kutako when he explained to the Administrator that the
old Herero who had worn a skin around his waist was now dead. We are now used to clothes and we now live like white people. We live off our cattle, and when a time comes where we cannot sell our cattle, we cannot live...It will be difficult for us not to be able to sell our cattle in order to obtain our other necessities.(283)

For these stock owners the South African system of 'native reserves' restricted their future economic development. They regarded 'the present Reserves...[as] inadequate'(284) and felt that

The Union Government does not want the Native people to progress economically so that they may become economically independent. They restrict them regarding the cattle they may own and regarding other means livelihood.(285)

So pronounced, in fact, was the concern to ensure future agricultural accumulation that the Deputy Commissioner of Police was led to conclude that

From information received there is reason to believe that there is no active resistance on the part of the Hereros against the incorporation as such, but they, as Hereros would prefer to be placed on the same basis of [sic] the natives of Bechuanaland.(286)

At the same time, however, petitions to the United Nations had popular appeal to the extent that they articulated a general rejection of the 'native policy' implemented by S.A. in S.W.A. One of Kutako's petitions argued in a petition that 'It is the native policy of the Union which causes Africans in South West Africa, the Union and and Bechuanaland Protectorate to unite in protest against the annexation of South West Africa.'(287) Many of the issues raised affected all S.W. African blacks, both urban and in the reserves. Such issues included the pass laws;
the non-payment of wages on farms "beyond the right to run up
to twenty-five head of cattle and forty to fifty small stock on
their master's farms"; heavy taxation of stock in the reserves;
the dog tax; poll tax in urban areas and the registration of
workers generally.(288) Also of a popular nature was the demand
put forward by chiefs Kutako and Hoveka 'that our people be
reunited, and that their tribal organisation be re-established
on our traditional lands.'(289)

That Herero leaders such as Kutako, Hoveka and Kandjou
spearheaded opposition to incorporation also reflected the
differential incorporation of the black population into the
territory's colonial political economy. Their determination to
fight against incorporation and South African domination was
significantly strengthened by a powerful belief that of all
S.W. African blacks they had suffered most. The legacy of
dispossession and betrayed promises was an important factor in
determining their attitude towards incorporation. Indeed,
headman Hoveka linked acceptance of incorporation by some
Ovambo chiefs directly to the fact that they 'did not lose any
of their land but the Hereros lost part of theirs.'(290)

The land question was the single most important source of
opposition to incorporation. Incorporation was widely
perceived by the Herero as the final revocation of Lord
Buxton's promise in 1919 that the South African Government
would restore their pre-colonial pastures.

We reckon that if the Territory is incorporated into the Union, our land will never be returned to us. We fear that we would then receive no consideration. We do not want the Territory to be incorporated and it is our wish that our land should be returned to us.' (291)

In countless petitions to the United Nations, Herero leaders recalled with great bitterness how the Union Government had frustrated their hopes of having their pre-colonial pastures restored to them. Instead of keeping Lord Buxton's promise, the Union Government had given 'the fertile land of the Hereros to Anglo-Boers [sic] from Angola in preference to the Hereros.' (292) Pointed reference was made to Herero support for England against Germany during the Second World War. 'We hoped that England would win because we thought that our land would this time be returned to us.' (293) But now, despite the fact that Germany had been defeated, the Union sought to entrench the unequal distribution of land by incorporating S.W.A. 'We fought for freedom', lamented headman Kandjou.

Now we hear that we will be incorporated into the Union. We do not understand this. We have fought for freedom and want to be free. Is there no hope that we will ever get our land back? If this country becomes a fifth province of the Union we won't be free.' (294)
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1. "The Legislative Assembly", WA 9.6.1934
2. Ibid
5. Report of the Administrator, 1939, p.80; Union of South Africa, Official Yearbook, 1940, p.1116. This will be referred to below as the Official Yearbook.
7. Official Yearbook, 1946, p.41
8. Ibid, p.42
16. Ibid, para.498
17. Ibid, para.499. See also Raedel, "Die Wirtschaft und die Arbeiterfrage", pp.114-16
18. Raedel, "Die Wirtschaft und die Arbeiterfrage", p.116
20. Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission, para.251 and Table IV
21. Report of the Administrator, 1935, p.95; Raedel, "Die Wirtschaft und die Arbeiterfrage", p.120
23. Report of the Administrator, 1935, p.24; ibid, 1936, p.22; ibid, 1939, p.69; Raedel, "Die Wirtschaft und die Arbeiterfrage", p.120
24. See Report of the Administrator, 1938, p.24 where the Administrator ascribed "this all round improvement" largely to "the successful efforts of the Dairy Inspectors in advising farmers how to treat and handle cream, better transport facilities and modern machinery in factories which enable the manufacturer thoroughly to control all the stages of processing and manufacture."
25. Report of the Administrator, 1939, p.69
26. Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission, p.31
29. Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission, Table XVIII
30. Ibid, p.31
33. Krogh, 'The Karakul Industry', Chapter 3, p.31
34. Barnard, 'Streekpatrone', p.277
36. Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission, p.32
37. Krogh, 'Economic Aspects of the Karakul Industry', p.104. Although Krogh's prices are for the mid-1950s, the tendency just outlined can be inferred from them. He pointed out that 'A karakul ewe will earn its owner from £30 to £45 during its lifetime from lambs alone.'
38. Ibid,
39. Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission, p.64 and Table VI; Krogh, 'The Karakul Industry', Chapter 3, pp.11, 31
40. Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission, Table III
42. 'Sources of Revenue. The Finances of the Territory are Boyant', S.W.A. Annual, 1945, p.38
43. Krogh, 'National Income and Expenditure', p.5
44. Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission, p.28
45. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, 28th Session, 15th Meeting, 6.6.1936, p.130
46. SWAA A 50/6 Vol.1 W.L. Eedes to Secretary, 16.7.1936
47. SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Acting Chief Native Commissioner to Native Commissioner Karibib, 2.6.1937, p.1; Report of the Administrator, 1937, pp.46-47
48. SWAA A 50/6 Vol.2 Additional Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, 24.8.1938, p.2
49. SWAA A 50/6 Vol.1 Chief Native Commissioner to All Native Commissioners and Assistant Native Commissioners, Circular Minute No. A 50/6, 3.9.1936, p.1
50. Raedel, 'Die Wirtschaft und die Arbeiterfrage', p.478
52. SWAA A 50/6 Vol.2 Additional Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, 24.8.1938, p.1
53. Ibid. See also SWAA A 50/6 Vol.1 Appendix to Magistrate Windhoek to Secretary for S.W.A., 9.7.1936
54. SWAA A 158/131 Vol.1 Magistrate Grootfontein to Secretary for S.W.A., 31.3.1937, p.2. Individual cases of sharecropping were also reported. An example of this was farmer Carl Schlettwein in north western S.W.A. who permitted two blacks to cultivate wheat and tobacco on the farm Warmquelle. Half the crops were handed over to him, and 'no other agreements were entered into.' His justification for doing so was that the Administration had repeatedly prohibited the letting of the farm to a white farmer, while Schlettwein had to pay taxes and was unable to cultivate the farm. 'We have no funds', he stated. SWAA A 50/6 Vol.2 Carl Schlettwein to Magistrate Outjo, 8.11.1939
56. See, for example, T.J. Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrializing South Africa, The Southern Highveld to 1914, (Johannesburg, 1986), pp.86-95, 121
57. SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Memorandum: Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, 30.3.1937, p.4. See also Keegan, Rural Transformations, p.124
58. SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Memorandum: Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, 30.3.1937, p.4; SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Naturelle Arbeidskonferensie, Windhoek, 24.8.1937, p.4
further detail see SWAA A 50/51 Notes of Chief Native Commissioner's Meeting with Herero Leaders held at Omatjette on the 6th and 7th December 1948, p.8; SWAA 50/188/10 Annual Report 1945, Native Commissioner Rundu, 22.2.1945, p.1. In 1937 the Assistant Native Commissioner estimated that the average cash wage on farms was about 12/6. This contrasted with average wages for farm labour in the Union of £1 to £1.10 per month, plus food and quarters' for those labourers 'who have no rights on the farm to grow crops.' SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Memorandum: Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, 30.3.1937, p.4, 'Native Labour', WA 25.8.1937; SWAA A 158/131 Vol.1 Native Labour in South West Africa, n.d. [August 1937], p.10

60. South West Africa, Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into certain aspects of the Native Labour Question in the Territory, (Gobabis, 1939), p.37. This report will be referred to below as the Report on the Native Labour Question. In Outjo district it was reported that farm labourers 'never received a ration of vegetable food or the equivalent substitute. Meat is never rationed to them unless they purchase a goat out of their own pockets. Milk (skimmed) is only allowed as additional ration in the rainy season when milk is abundant. The slaughtered carcases of day old lambs are cooked and fed to the pigs. These are never freely issued to the native servants.' SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 T. Adams, Constable, Investigation Diary, S.A. Police Franzfontein, 15.10.1940; SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 C.J. Visser, District Surgeon Outjo to Magistrate Outjo, 10.10.1940. See also SWAA A 158/131 Vol.1 Magistrate Mariental to Secretary for S.W.A., 3.4.1937, pp.4-5; SWAA Unregistered Papers, Annual Report on Native Affairs Grootfontein 1948, p.2; SWAA A 521/13 Vol.3 Additional Native Commissioner to Secretary, Native Labourers Commission, n.d. [September 1945], pp.1-2; Raedel, 'Die Wirtschaft und die Arbeiterfrage', pp.468f, specifically pp.474-475


62. SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Memorandum: Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, 30.3.1937, p.3

63. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.6 Report of the Welfare Officer and Superintendent, Aminuis Native Reserve for the Month of June 1944, p.1

64. SWAA A 50/188/10 Annual Report Native Affairs 1943: District Okahandja, 6.1.1943, p.1. See also SWAA A 188/10 Annual Report on Native Affairs: Gobabis 1947, p.10 where it was said that 'Hereros are idle and dissolute and only accept work on roads and other Administration work. They refuse to leave the reserves to live on farms.'


66. 'The Legislative Assembly', WA 21.4.1937; SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner,
Memorandum: Farm Labour, 30.3.1937, p.1

67. 'The Legislative Assembly', WA 21.4.1937

68. Report of the Administrator 1937, p. 86; 'Mining at Tsumeb', S.W.A. Annual, 1950, p.73

69. Report of the Administrator, 1939, p.183; Report of the Native Labour Question, p.12; 'Mining at Tsumeb', S.W.A. Annual, 1950, p.73

70. 'The Legislative Assembly', WA 21.4.1937; SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, Memorandum: Farm Labour, 30.3.1937, pp.34

71. 'The Legislative Assembly', WA 5.5.1937

72. SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Memorandum: Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, 30.3.1937, p.2; SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Naturelle Arbeidskonferensie, Windhoek, 24.8.1937, pp.5-6

73. SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Memorandum: Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, 30.3.1937, p.1


75. SWAA A 521/13 Vol.2 Naturelle Arbeidskonferensie, Windhoek, 24.8.1937, p.2

76. Ibid, p.7

77. Report on the Native Labour Question, p.1

78. Ibid, p.19

79. Ibid, pp.10, 12

80. Ibid, p.10

81. Ibid, pp.5-6

82. Ibid, p.7

83. S.W.A. Commission, para.383

84. Ibid, para.383; Lord Hailey, 'A Survey of Native Affairs in South West Africa', typescript, 1946, p.74


86. S.W.A. Commission, para.386. Article 22 of the Covenant provided that 'The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation over the Territory subject to the present Mandate, as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the Territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require. The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well being of the inhabitants of the Territory subject to the present Mandate.'

Goldblatt, History of South West Africa, pp.207-8

87. S.W.A. Commission, para.418

88. Report of the Administrator, 1937, p.50


90. 'Native Labour', WA 25.8.1937, SWAA A 158/131 Vol.1 Native
Labour in South West Africa, p.1

91. Report of the Administrator, 1937, p.50

92. Ibid, p.51. A partial justification for this new policy was that the Administration "holds that it would be unfair to burden the European section of the population with further taxes for native development, when practically the whole of the native contribution to the revenue on the Territory is handed out to trust funds for the expenditure on the natives." The S.W.A. Commission stated, however, that "one should not be unduly impressed by this argument", as there was no income tax for whites in the territory. Moreover, the Commission held the view that revenues from the mining industry belonged to the country as a whole, "Native as well as European. The European's initiative and technical equipment did not create, but merely exploited the wealth. To this Native labour contributed," S.W.A. Commission, paras. 348(a), 385

93. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, 34th Session, 8th Meeting, 13.6.1938, p.78

94. Ibid, p.81

95. Report of the Administrator, 1934, p.45

96. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Deputation of Representatives of the Herero People invited on Friday 2.6.1933 by the Secretary for S.W.A., p.19. See also the discussion in chapter four on the substitution of a poll tax for grazing fees.

97. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.4 Superintendent Aminuis to Magistrate Gobabis, 11.4.1933, p.1


100. Ibid, p.120

101. Report of the Administrator, 1934, p.43

102. Wagner, 'Some Economic Aspects', p.122

103. Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission, Table VIII

104. Wagner, 'Some Economic Aspects', p.123


106. SWAA A 158/95 Vol.1 Minutes of the Annual General Meeting of the Residents of the Waterberg East Native Reserve held at Okakarara on the 13th November, 1943, pp.2-3. Part of the explanation for the lack of accurate figures on stock distribution has to be sought in the fact that not all stock owners were registered in the books of reserve superintendents. The extent of this problem can be gleaned from an observation by the welfare officer of the Otjhorongho reserve that had each single stock owner in the reserve been registered, he would have had to keep twice as many stock registers. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Omatjette to Magistrate Omaruru,
30.11.1946. See also Wagner, ‘Some Economic Aspects’, p.123

107. SWAA A 158/95 Vol.1 Welfare Officer to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 2.12.1943
108. SWAA A 50/223/1 Vol.1 Aantekeninge van Vergadering van Leiers van Herero Stam op 2 en 28 September 1949 te Epukiro, p.23
109. SWAA A 158/21/3 Extract from Monthly Report of the Otjohorongo Reserve for the Month of May 1948 by the Welfare Officer
111. Wagner, ‘Some Economic Aspects’, p.123
115. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Assistant Secretary to Administrator, n.d.[1933], p.40
116. See note 88, pp. 305-306 for a description of the disease
117. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.7 Notes for Aminuis Meeting, n.d.[April 1948], p.2. See also SWAA A 158/7/5 Vol.1 Uittreksel uit Maandelikse Rapport oor die Epukiro Naturelle Reservaat vir die Maand Oktober 1950
118. See e.g. SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 Native Commissioner Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 3.11.1936; SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 Notice [of Stock Sale in Epukiro Reserve], 7.7.1947; SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 Welfare Officer and Superintendent Waterberg East Native Reserve to Magistrate/Native Commissioner Otjiwarongo, 25.4.1947
119. SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 Chief Native Commissioner to Native Commissioners Otjiwarongo, Omaruru, Gobabis, 26.10.1936
120. SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 Magistrate Otjiwarongo to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 6.11.1936; SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Waterberg East Native Reserve to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 4.11.1936, pp.1-2; SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 Magistrate Gobabis to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 19.1.1937
121. SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 Magistrate Grootfontein to Chief Native Commissioner, 31.3.1937; SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Otjitu to Magistrate Grootfontein, 21.10.1944
122. SWAA A 50/31 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Waterberg East Native Reserve to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 4.11.1936, p.2
123. These attempts corresponded to developments elsewhere in Africa to increase the ‘production of export commodities as a means to greater revenues, and to a stronger administrative emphasis on peasant-cropping.’ Munro, Africa and the International Economy, p.155; G. Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya. The Making of an African Petite Bourgeoise 1905-1970, (London, 1980), pp.59f
124. SWAA A 158/117 Vol.1 Superintendent Otjitu to Native Reserve to Native Commissioner Grootfontein, 30.1.1936; SWAA A 

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158/123 Vol.1 Magistrate Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner: Otjohorongo Native Reserve Creamery, 7.8.1936


126. For detail of some of these proposals, see, inter alia SWAA A 158/23 Vol.1 S. Kohl Re: Establishment of Cream Separator Otjohorongo Reserve, 6.2.1936; SWAA A 158/119 Vol.1 C. Scott to Magistrate Omaruru, 30.3.1936; SWAA A 158/118 Vol.1 Superintendent Otjimbingue to Magistrate Karibib, 7.3.1936, p.1. The colonial administration did not, however, favour the control of reserve dairies by 'private enterprise'. SWAA A 158/119 Vol.1 Magistrate Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek: Otjohorongo Native Reserve Creamery, 7.8.1936

127. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Waterberg East Native Reserve to Native Commissioner Otjiwarongo, 22.11.1939, p.1

128. Ibid., p.2

129. SWAA A 158/119 Vol.1 Chief Native Commissioner to Native Commissioner Omaruru, 5.1.1939. In another directive the Chief Native Commissioner stated that 'the Administration is under an obligation to the Union Government to permit the production of cream only under European supervision'. SWAA A 158/115 Chief Native Commissioner to Native Commissioner Gobabis, 14.6.1939, original emphasis. See also SWAA A 158/117 Vol.1 Chief Native Commissioner to Native Commissioner Grootfontein, 9.11.1938; SWAA A 158/125 Vol.1 Chief Native Commissioner to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 7.1.1939. Regarding cream boycotts, the Welfare Officer in the Waterberg East Reserve realised that they might have negative effects on the industry. He argued 'that the more cream the Creameries had to handle the lower the overhead charges would be and any profits made would be to the benefit of the suppliers.' SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Waterberg East Native Reserve to Native Commissioner Otjiwarongo, 22.11.1939, p.1

130. SWAA A 158/125 Vol.1 Secretary for South West Africa to Native Commissioner Otjiwarongo, 10.11.1936, p.1

131. SWAA A 158/119 Vol.1 Chief Native Commissioner to Native Commissioner Omaruru, 4.5.1936

132. SWAA A 158/125, Vol.1 Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek to Native Commissioner Otjiwarongo, 7.1.1939; SWAA A 158/119 Vol.1 Native Commissioner Omaruru to Welfare Officer and Superintendent Otjimbutte, 19.12.1938; SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Native Commissioner Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner
Windhoek, 23.2.1939, p.2; SWAA A 158/125 Vol.1 Short Summary of Dairy Production in Waterberg East Native Reserve, 10.5.1948

133. In South Africa 'the idea of administration through traditional chiefs began to gain favour from about the mid-1920s...[Native Affairs] Department men wanted a policy to stop the tribal system breaking up.' M. Lacey, Working for Boroko. The Origins of a Coercive Labour System in South Africa, (Johannesburg, 1981), p.95


136. SWAA A 50/37 Meeting held in the Court Room, Magistrate's Office, Gobabis, 10.9.1935; SWAA A 158/128 Vol.1 Agreement entered into by Philip Rodulf Botha in his capacity as Chief Native Commissioner...and Louis le Grange Fourie, 9.6.1943, p.1; SWAA A 158/115 Vol.1 Magistrate Gobabis to Welfare Officer Aminuis Native Reserve, 27.1.1943

137. SWAA A 50/37 Vol.1 Minutes of Meeting held at Epukiro on 25th September in Presence of Magistrate, Mr. Burness (Superintendent), Mr. Kaiser, Nikanor Hoveka and almost 130 Hereros, pp.3-5

138. SWAA 158/149 Vol.1 Extract from Monthly Report on Ovitoto Native Reserve, February 1940; SWAA 158/149 Vol.1 Ovitoto Native Reserve Creamery in Okahandja District, 3.7.1948

139. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.2 Assistant Native Commissioner to Native Commissioner, 7.8.1946

140. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Waterberg East Native Reserve to Native Commissioner Otjiwarongo, 22.11.1939, p.3

141. SWAA A 158/117 Vol.1 Welfare Officer: Remarks on attached letter by Welfare Officer Otjiufo Reserve, 27.5.1940

142. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Waterberg East Native Reserve to Native Commissioner Otjiwarongo, 22.11.1939, p.3

143. SWAA A 50/37 Vol.1 Minutes of Meeting held at Epukiro on 25th September in Presence of Magistrate, Mr. Burness (Superintendent), Mr. Kaiser, Nikanor Hoveka and almost 130 Hereros, pp.3-5

144. SWAA A 158/128 Vol.1 Extract from Minutes of Quarterly Meeting of Epukiro Reserve Board held on 7.12.1943


146. SWAA A 158/118 Vol.1 Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 10.12.1936, pp.1-2

147. SWAA A 158/7 Vol.1.5 Magistrate Gobabis: Quarterly Meeting of Headmen and Residents held at Epukiro Native Reserve on the 20.6.1945, p.2; SWAA A 158/115 Vol.1 Chief Native Commissioner H.J.[Allen] re Cream Business Aminuis, 27.3.1940,

149. SWAA A 158/95 Vol.1 Minutes of a Meeting held at Okakarara on Wednesday the 8th February 1939, p.1

150. SWAA A 50/37 Vol.1 Minutes of Meeting held at Epukiro on 25th September in Presence of Magistrate, Mr. Burness [Superintendent], Mr. Kaiser, Nikanor Hoveka and almost 130 Hereros, p.4

151. SWAA A 158/117 Vol.1 Copy of a letter handed to the Welfare Officer for translation and submission to Chief Native Commissioner and Dairy Control Board, 27.5.1940

152. Equating what he termed a 'conservative attitude' among Herero stock owners with a concern to build up their herds by limiting stock sales, Wagner argued that 'the hard core of conservative attitude would obviously have to be looked for among the wealthier Natives, that is to say those owning upward of 35 to 40 head of large stock.' Wagner, 'Some Economic Aspects', p.123

153. SWAA A 158/115 Vol.1 Superintendent Aminuis to Magistrate Gobabis, 29.1.1937

154. SWAA A 158/117 Vol.1 Magistrate Grootfontein to Chief Native Commissioner, Windhoek, 31.10.1938

155. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Native Commissioner Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 12.6.1939, p.3-4. For more detail see SWAA A 158/118 Vol.1 Otjimbingue Native Reserve Dairy in Karibib District, 7.5.1948; SWAA A 50/37 Vol.1 Acting Native Commissioner Karibib to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 20.10.1938

156. SWAA A 158/102 Vol.1 Otjohorongo Native Reserve. Minutes of Meeting of Otjohorongo Native Reserve held at Omatjette on Monday 14.2.1938 at 10 a.m., p.2

157. SWAA A 158/102 Vol.1 Otjohorongo Native Reserve. Minutes of Quarterly Meeting. Reserve Board. Held at Omatjette on Monday 22.5.1939, p.3-4. See also SWAA A 158/115 Vol.1 Extract from Minutes of a Meeting between the Assistant Native Commissioner, Windhoek, and the following Hereros: Headmen Hosea Kutako and Nikanor Hoveka and Reserve Board member Eustace Kokurama [sic], n.d. [1939] for Kutako's demand to sell cream directly to the creamery in Gobabis.

158. SWAA A 158/95 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Waterberg East Native Reserve to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 22.2.1939


160. SWAA A 158/125 Vol.1 Minutes of a Reserve Board Meeting held at Okakarara on the 31st August 1943, p.1; SWAA A 158/125 Vol.1 Copy of Minutes of Board Meeting held at Okakarara
14.1.1941, p.2. See also SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Welfare Officer and Superintendent Native Reserves Omaruru to Native Commissioner Omaruru, 20.3.1939, p.2


162. SWAA A 158/117 Vol.2 Welfare Officer to Native Commissioner Grootfontein, 2.10.1946, p.1

163. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Native Commissioner Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 12.6.1939, pp.1-2

164. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Native Commissioner Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 12.6.1939, p.2; SWAA A 158/119 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Native Reserves Omaruru to Native Commissioner Omaruru, 12.12.1938, pp.1-2

165. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Native Commissioner Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 12.6.1939, p.4


167. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, Windhoek, 23.2.1939, p.1; SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Welfare Officer and Superintendent Native Reserves Omaruru to Native Commissioner Omaruru, 20.3.1939, p.2

168. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Welfare Officer and Superintendent Native Reserves Omaruru to Native Commissioner Omaruru, 20.3.1939, p.2. Participants in the Waterberg scheme put low profits down to excessive overhead costs. SWAA A 158/102 Vol.1 Otjohorongo Native Reserve. Minutes of Meeting of Otjohorongo Native Reserve held at Otjimbute on Monday 14.2.1938 at 10 a.m., p.2

169. SWAA A 158/102 Vol.1 Otjohorongo Native Reserve. Minutes of Quarterly Meeting. Reserve Board. Held at Otjimbute on Monday 22.5.1939, p.3-4. See also SWAA A 158/115 Vol.1 Extract from Minutes of a Meeting between the Assistant Native Commissioner, Windhoek, and the following Hereros: Headmen Hosea Kutako and Nikanor Hoveke and Reserve Board member Eustace Kokurama [sic], n.d. [1939] for Kutako’s demand to sell cream directly to the creamery in Gobabis.

170. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Native Commissioner Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 17.10.1939, pp.1-2; SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Administrator to Native Commissioner Otjiwarongo, 9.11.1939, pp.1-2

171. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Native Commissioner Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 17.10.1939, pp.2-3

172. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Native Commissioner Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 15.11.1940, pp.1-2; SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Otjohorongo Native Reserve to Magistrate Omaruru, 16.7.1945, p.1


174. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Otjohorongo Native Reserve...
Reserve to Magistrate Omaruru, 16.7.1945, pp.2-3


176. SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Magistrate Omaruru to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 3.4.1937; SWAA A 158/123 Vol.1 Welfare Officer Otjohorongo Native Reserve to Magistrate Omaruru, 16.7.1945, p.3


178. SWAA A 158/21 Vol.5 Minutes of the Quarterly Reserve Board Meeting held at Omatjette, Otjohorongo Native Reserve, on the 25th March 1947, p.1

179. For the costs involved in taking over the dairies in Aminuis and Epukiro, see SWAA A 158/115 Vol.1 Magistrate Gobabis to Secretary for S.W.A., 12.3.1937; SWAA A 158/28 Vol.1 Extract from General Report on the Epukiro Reserve by the Welfare Officer. Magistrate’s Minute No.2/18/12, 27.9.1928, pp.1-2

180. SWAA A 158/128 Vol.1 Chief Native Commissioner to Magistrate Gobabis, 16.2.1949; SWAA A 158/115 Vol.1 1st Clerk: Chief Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, 5.7.1948; SWAA A 50/51 Notes on Chief Native Commissioner’s Annual meeting with Herero Leaders held at Omatjette on the 6th and 7th December 1948, p.15

181. SWAA A 50/51 A 1947 Notes of Meeting held by Mr. J. Nesper, Chief Native Commissioner, with Herero Leaders in Waterberg East Reserve on the 26th and 27th May 1947, p. 25. Headman Festus Kandjou expressed similar views. Ibid, p.20; SWAA A 50/223/1 Vol.1 Notes of a Meeting held at Okakarara on the 26th and 27th May, 1947, p.25

182. SWAA A 50/51 A 1947 Notes of Meeting held by Mr. J. Nesper, Chief Native Commissioner, with Herero Leaders in Waterberg East Reserve on the 26th and 27th May 1947, p.34

183. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Stephanus Hoveka, Copy of Statement made before Capt. Bowker, Superintendent of Locations Windhoek, 26.11.1935

184. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Bowker to Town Clerk Windhoek, 27.10.1935, pp.1-2 and Annexure

185. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 20.1.1936, p.2

186. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Stephanus Hoveka, Copy of Statement made before Capt. Bowker, Superintendent of Locations Windhoek, 26.11.1935

187. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Advisory Board Minutes. Meeting of the 25th November 1935, p.5

188. Ibid, p.5

189. Ibid

190. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Circular Minute No. A 50/59, n.d.

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[14.1.1936]

191. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 30.10.1936
192. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Bowker to Town Clerk Windhoek, 27.11.1935, p.2
194. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, Windhoek, 13.10.1936, p.3; SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Headquarters to the Chief Headman of the Nation and all other Leaders, Windhoek, 7.1.1936. One of Kutako’s advisers, Festus Kandjou, also came under attack. It will be recalled that Kandjou was a 'Lt. Colonel' in the Rehoboth branch of the Truppenspieler until he abandoned the movement after the Rehoboth rising in 1925. See p.227 above.
195. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.2 Welfare Officer and Superintendent Waterberg East Native Reserve to Magistrate Otjiwarongo, 25.6.1946. See also SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Sworn Statement by Gabriel, Keetmanshaap, 4..2.1928 for the sentiments on this issue by Herero pastoralists in the Tses reserve.
196. SWAA A 158/97 Vol.1 Assistant Secretary for SWA to H.H. the Administrator, n.d. [1933], p.5. See also chapter four.
197. Report of the Administrator, 1939, p.132
198. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Extract of a Meeting, n.d. [1938]
199. MPSM stood for "Mukuru pu na Samuel Maharero" or God bless Samuel Maharero. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.2 F.Kasuto to F.Kaatura and L.Ngama, 23.9.1938
200. SWAA A 15/102 Vol.1 Minutes of Meeting of Otjohorongo Native Reserve held at Omatjette on Monday 14.2.1938, p.3
201. ibid., p.3
202. See e.g. SWAA A 158/125 Vol.1 Copy of Minutes of Meeting held at Okanjatu on Monday the 25th August 1941, p.1
203. Olivier, 'Inboorlingbeleid en -Administrasie', pp.228-29
205. S.W.A. Commission KSW Vol.2 File 17 Waterberg East Native Reserve. 17th Public Sitting, 23.8.1935, p.1003
206. Olivier, 'Inboorlingbeleid en -Administrasie', p.190
207. Quoted in ibid, p.190
208. Report of the Administrator, 1939, p.133. See also SWAA A 158/102 Vol.2 Notule van 'n Reserwe Raadvergadering gehou te Omatjette in die Otjohorongo Naturelle Reserwe op die 16de Mei 1949, p.1
209. For more detail on this see Werner, "Socio-Economic Developments", pp.107-110
210. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.1 Additional Native Commissioner Windhoek to the Acting Secretary for SWA: Nazi Propaganda amongst Natives, 2.6.1938. See also SWAA A 50/59 Vol.2 Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 4.3.1939
211. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.2 Secretary for SWA to Prime Minister,

212. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 2 Telegram from Native Affairs Runtu to Secretary for SWA Windhoek, 20.8.1940

213. "When we Union Kaffirs go to their dances in the location, we are looked down upon as English and Boer chaps, and they, the Basters, are Germans, and the maids must not dance with us." SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 1 Acting Commissioner SWA Police to Secretary for S.W.A.: Affidavit Johannes Matsosa, 17.5.1938

214. SWAA A 50/51 Handwritten Note initialled by Mr. Eaton, Assistant Native Commissioner, 20.8.1946

215. SWAA A 50/51 Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek to Magistrate Okahandja, 24.8.1946

216. SWAA A 50/51 Vol. 1 Acting Commissioner SWA Police to Secretary for S.W.A.: Affidavit Johannes Matsosa, 17.5.1938

217. ibid, p. 4

218. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 1 Notes of Interview on 9.5.1938, p. 3


220. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 1 Assistant Native Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 4.8.1936

221. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 2 J. N[eser] to the Secretary for SWA, 6.7.1938

222. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 2 Translation of letter from F.H. Mihuva and O.H. Tjituezu to the Honourable Groups, MPEWZ and MPESM, Kakutuata, 22.3.1939

223. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 2 Letter from Okahandja, n.d. [1939], p. 2, original emphasis

224. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 2 Festus Kaatura, Ludwig Uazama and four others to the Honourable Our Father and Our Saver, Mr. Courtney-Carke, 25.6.1939

225. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 2 Minutes of a Meeting between Assistant Native Commissioner and leading Truppenspieler, 21.7.1939

226. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 2 Message to the Hereros by Chief Native Commissioner, Windhoek, 22.7.1938, p. 4

227. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 2 J. N[eser] to the Secretary for SWA, 6.7.1938

228. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 1 Extract of Meeting, n.d. [1938]


230. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 2 Superintendent of Locations Windhoek to Additional Native Commissioner Windhoek, 9.7.1940, p. 2

231. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 1 Notes of Interview on 9.5.1938, p. 3

232. ibid, p. 5

233. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 1 Native Commissioner Windhoek to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 24.11.1937

234. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 1 Notes of Interview on 9.5.1938, p. 5

235. See chapter three for a discussion of how this tradition was invented around the death of Samuel Maharero. See also T. Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa", in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge, 1984)

236. SWAA A 50/59 Vol. 1 Notes of Interview on 9.5.1938, p. 5
237. Report of the Administrator, 1939, p.133
238. Ibid
239. SWAA A 158/29 Vol.6 Report of the Welfare Officer and Superintendent Aminuis Native Reserve for the Period ending 17.3.1939, p.4
240. SWAA A 50/59 Superintendent Locations to Deputy Commissioner South African Police, 19.8.1942
242. SWAA A 396/1 Deputy Commissioner SWA Police to Commissioner of SA Police, Pretoria, 20.6.1946, p.3
243. For discussion of these in the 1920s and 1930s see, for example S. Dubow, ‘Segregation and "Native Administration" in South Africa, 1920-1936’, Ph.D., University of Oxford, 1986; Lacey, Working for Boroko, chapter three
244. Report of the Administrator, 1939, p.130; Olivier, 'Inboorlingbeleid en -Administrasie', p.191
245. Lord Hailey, 'Report on Native Affairs in SWA', p.127; Olivier, 'Inboorlingbeleid en -Administrasie', pp.191, 398. According to Bundy, the Bunga 'penetrated deep into the social and political framework of the Transkei. It helped redefine locally dominant elements; it provided the central state with a local adjunct that enjoyed a relatively high level of legitimacy; and historically it provided an important precedent and forerunner to the system of Bantu Authorities introduced in the 1950s and subsequently expanded as the the Bantustan/"homelands"/"national states".' C. Bundy, 'Mr. Rhodes and the Poisoned Goods. Popular Opposition to the Glen Grey Council System, 1894-1906', in W. Beinart and C. Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa. Politics and Popular Movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape 1890-1930, (Johannesburg, 1987), p.141
250. Lord Hailey, 'Report on Native Affairs in SWA', p.128
251. An interesting parallel can be found in Southern Rhodesia where the colonial state 'attempted to counter the growth of popular dissatisfaction by restoring limited civil jurisdiction to chiefs under the Native Laws and Courts Act of 1937. At the same time, the Native Councils Act replaced the unofficial and mostly defunct "Boards" established at the end of the previous decade as listening posts for the opinions of progressive new elements such as teachers and agricultural demonstrators, with councils expressly designed to bolster
"traditional" authority reinvented by the settler state.
Their membership comprised "principally chiefs and headmen"
appointed by N[ative] C[ommissioners." Phimister, An Economic
and Social History, p.197

252. Lord Hailey, "Report on Native Affairs in SWA", p.128

253. See Werner, "Socio-Economic Developments", pp.126-129 for
more detail on discussions in the South African House
of Assembly.

254. Troup, In Face of Fear, pp.116-117; SWAFO Department of
Publicity and Information, To Be Born a Nation, The

255. Katjavivi, A History of Resistance, p.35

256. For early petitions by chiefs and headmen in the south see
for example United Nations General Assembly, Second Session,
Fourth Committee, Trusteeship Council, 16.9.1946 to
6.11.1946, pp.172-197

257. SWAA GL 37 Administrator P.I. Hoogenhout to D.D. Forsyth
Pretoria, 27.10.1945, pp.1-2. See also inter alia SWAA GL
Konferensie van Naturellekommissarisse: Suidwes-Afrika gehou
tele Windhoek op 19.1.1946 and classified "Geheim", p.2

258. See for example SWAA GL 37 Department of External Affairs
Pretoria to Administrator, Confidential, 26.11.1945; SWAA
GL 37 Secretary to the Prime Minister to Secretary for South
West Africa, Strictly Confidential, 10.10.1945; SWAA GL 37
Geheim: Konferensie van Naturellekommissarisse: Suidwes-
Afrika. Gehou te Windhoek op 19 Januarie 1946

259. See SWAA GL 37 for specimen copies of both; Katjavivi,
A History of Resistance, pp.34-35

260. SWAA GL 37 Administrator to D.D. Forsyth [Secretary to the
Prime Ministers] Pretoria, 27.10.1945, p.2

261. SWAA GL 37 Administrator to Secretary Department of Foreign
Affairs Pretoria, 7.12.1945, pp.1-2

262. SWAA GL 37 Confidential: Conference held in the Office of
His Honour the Administrator on Wednesday, 7th November, 1945
regarding the Re-institution of Herero Tribal Control, p.1

263. Ibid. The original Afrikaans version reads: 'Ons wil bystaan
en julle help om julle boerdery aan die gang te sit en om
julle vee te verbeter. Ons wil julle help met water en alles
wat nodig is om julle gelukkig te maak...Ek wil he julle moet
op 'n plek kom waar julle kan verder uitbrei. Ek wil julle
nie grond gee wat julle self nie wil he nie. Daarom het ek
gegraat van Epukiros, Waterberg en Kaokoveld. Miskien is daar
'n kans vir julle om daar meer met julle boerdery uit te
brei.' See also SWAA GL 37 Minutes of the Meeting of the
Windhoek Location Advisory Board held in the Windhoek Bantu
Welfare Club Hall on Wednesday the 21st August 1946, p.8

264. That they were hurried is evident from a confidential letter
to the Administrator in which he was cautioned with regard to
such promises, as "difficulties might...well arise should it
later not be found possible to concede any requests that
these natives may make and failure to grant any such requests
might well have an important influence upon the attitude of
the natives, particularly the Ova-Herero, towards the incorporation issue." SWAA GL 37 Department of External Affairs Pretoria to Administrator of S.W.A., 26.11.1945

265. SWAA GL 37/6/17 Naturellekommissaris to Sekretaris vir Suidwes-Afrika, 2.2.1946, p.1

266. SWAA GL 37/5 Deputy Commissioner [S.A.P.] to Secretary of South West Africa, 26.3.1946, p.1

267. SWAA GL 37/6/1 Magistrate / Native Commissioner Gobabis to Secretary for South West Africa, 4.2.1946, p.2; SWAA GL 37/6/17 Naturelle Kommissaris Otjiwarongo to Sekretaris vir S.W.A., 2.2.1946, p.2. The demands and position taken by the Herero leadership were supported by Chief David of the Nama and several other leaders in reserves and urban areas. Troup, In Face of Fear, p.111-112; United Nations General Assembly, 16.9.1946 to 6.11.1946, pp.174-177

268. SWAA GL 37/6/1 Native Commissioner Gobabis to Secretary for S.W.A., 4.2.1946, p.2. See also SWAA GL 37 Notes of an Interview His Honour the Administrator had on the 5th March 1946 with Representatives of the Herero Tribe, p.4 where Kutako remarked: 'We did not like being consulted separately by the various magistrates. We are not animals. That is the way the Germans treated us.'

269. SWAA GL 37/6/13 Magistrate/Native Commissioner Okahandja to Secretary for South West Africa, 5.2.1946, p.1


271. Ibid

272. Samuel Maharero was appointed as paramount chief of the Herero by the German colonial government in the early 1890s. No recognised paramount chief existed before then, so that this institution is a colonial 'invention' rather than 'traditional'. Frederick Maharero was the son of and successor to Samuel Maharero.

273. Troup, In Face of Fear, p.141

274. SWAA GL 37/6/17 Naturellekommissaris Otjiwarongo to Sekretaris vir S.W.A., 2.2.1946. The Afrikaans original reads: 'Ons wil nie deur Boere regeer word nie of onder hulle staan.'

275. SWAA GL 37/6/10 Native Commissioner/Magistrate Grootfontein to Secretary for S.W.A., 2.2.1946, p.1; SWAA GL 37 Notes of an Interview His Honour the Administrator had on the 5th March 1946 with Representatives of the Herero Tribe, p.2

276. SWAA GL 37/6/13 Magistrate/Native Commissioner Okahandja to Secretary for S.W.A., 5.2.1946, p.2

277. SWAA GL 37/6/11 Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Residents of the Otjohorongo Native Reserve held at Omatjette on the 1.2.1946, p.2

278. SWAA GL 37 Secretary for S.W.A. to Secretary of the Prime Minister, 15.3.1946, p.2

279. SWAA GL 37 P.I. Hoogenhout to Gen. J.C. Smuts, 14.3.1946, p.1; SWAA GL 37 Secretary for S.W.A. to Secretary of the Prime Minister, 15.3.1946, p.1

280. SWAA GL 37 Secretary for S.W.A. to Secretary of the Prime Minister, Cape Town, 15.3.1946, p.1
281. Ibid; SWAA GL 37/5 Deputy Commissioner S.A.P. Windhoek to Secretary S.W.A., 26.3.1946, p.1. The Deputy Police Commissioner added that 'great caution is required owing to the fact that Kasuto is obviously considerably superior in education and intelligence to the average non-Europeans of this Territory.' Ibid, p.2


283. SWAA GL 37 Conference held in the Office of His Honour the Administrator on Wednesday, 7th November 1945, regarding the re-Institution of Herero Tribal Control, p.10, my translation from the Afrikaans


285. Africa Bureau Box 148, File 5, Record of a Meeting with Chief Frederick Maharero and other Hereros from Bechuanaland, 14.6.7.1947, p.8

286. SWAA GL 37/5 Deputy Commissioner S.A.P. to Secretary S.W.A., 26.3.1946, p.1. See also SWAA GL 37 Annexure E: After Advice had been received that the Headmen were ready to give their Reply the Meeting resumed at 2.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 6th March 1946, p.2


288. Ibid, pp.166-167

289. Ibid, p.186

290. Troup, In Face of Fear, p.115

291. SWAA GL 37 Annexure E: After Advice had been received that the Headmen were ready to give their Reply the Meeting resumed at 2.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 6th March 1946, p.1. See also SWAA GL 37 Notes of an Interview His Honour the Administrator had on the 5th March 1946 with Representatives of the Herero Tribe, p.7


293. SWAA GL 37 Annexure E: After Advice had been received that the Headmen were ready to give their Reply the Meeting resumed at 2.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 6th March 1946, p.1; Troup, In Face of Fear, p.115

294. SWAA GL 37 Notes of an Interview His Honour the Administrator had on the 5th March 1946 with Representatives of the Herero Tribe, p.7; Troup, In Face of Fear, p.115
CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to build up a picture of the process of 'self-peasantization' of the Herero against the background of developments in the wider political economy. In doing so, it was necessary to deviate from the accepted proposition that the Union government 're-activated and intensified' the 'process of land seizure which was initially set in motion by the German colonialists.' (1) Although the South African colonial regime confirmed the general land dispensation of the late German colonial government, (2) its 'native policy' in the Police Zone resulted in the creation of reserves totalling 2.1 million hectares. (3) For the Herero in particular the allotment of reserves and official sanctioning of stock ownership was a fundamental departure from German colonial policy. Despite the marginal nature of land so allocated, this nonetheless provided the means for a section of Herero society to embark on a process of 'self-peasantization'.

The main body of this thesis has attempted to document this process in as much detail as possible and explores a number of recurring themes in the different chapters. With regard to the articulation of 'self-peasantization' with the wider political economy, persistent labour shortages and the system of labour tenancy were addressed in every chapter from Chapter Two to
By looking at wider economic developments, particularly in settler agriculture, it was shown how labour tenancy was an integral part of capital accumulation in that sector. Unable to compete successfully with mining and government departments for labour, settler farmers were forced to resort to labour tenancy to satisfy their labour demands. However, this form of labour exploitation favoured larger farmers with land to spare for the stock of labour tenants. Even then, tenants' stock put additional pressures on little developed settler farms. Where possible, therefore, farmers replaced tenants 'with natives recruited from outside the Police Zone who had no families or stock'.

Ironically, labour tenancy was also a device favoured by some Herero as a way of accumulating own stock. For although the terms of tenancy agreements have been harsh at times, labour tenancy nonetheless provided an opportunity for some Herero stock-owners to retain access to land and cattle outside the reserves. The constantly changing balance of class forces in the countryside gradually tipped the scales in favour of wage labour. In the wake of economic recovery after 1934 labour tenancy went into decline and by the late 1930s 'the general tendency was for native labour tenancy to give way to labour hire'.

Considerable attention was paid to production and
differentiation in the reserves. While all blacks suffered from colonial oppression, it was shown that far from condemning their inhabitants to inevitable poverty, the Herero reserves nonetheless facilitated a differentiated process of accumulation and impoverishment. Although precise figures to illustrate this point are unobtainable, sufficient impressionistic evidence survives to suggest that a relatively small section of stock owners accumulated enough wealth to exist independently of wage labour or engage in it selectively. The extension of commodity production in the reserves through the establishment of dairying in the 1930s significantly enhanced this process.

The primary function of reserves, however, was not to foster the development of a peasantry, but to supply the settler economy with cheap labour power. The colonial state thus kept tight control over stock sales and dairy production in the reserves in order to enforce the payment of grazing fees. Private stock sales were prohibited. Instead, cattle had to be sold at auctions arranged and attended by reserve superintendents. The state also laid down strict rules for the dairy industry in the reserves which enforced communal cream production and marketing. The collection and transport of cream to the dairies as well as payment was left to white contractors, who operated a monopoly.
Rules and regulations laid down by the state to control production in the reserves were not accepted passively. Indeed, while 'the dark years' (6) between the wars did not produce any organised, overt political rebellions, resistance of a localised nature occurred on many levels. Far from being irrelevant, such localised resistance shaped overall political consciousness and fed into later and wider anti-colonial struggles. Resistance in the reserves was rarely unified but reflected the process of differentiation taking place. This thesis attempts to explore specific class interests in such resistance, and in doing so goes beyond Emmett's admirable work on 'the rise of african nationalism' in Namibia. (7) Numerous examples were cited in Chapters Four and Five where demands put forward by reserve headmen were designed to facilitate accumulation by wealthy stock owners at the expense of poorer sections of the population. Proposals for the substitution of grazing fees by a poll tax were a case in point. And while the boycott of cream deliveries in support for better prices benefited all producers, the demand to have communal dairies abolished in favour of private ones put poorer cattle owners at a distinct disadvantage. As discussed in Chapter Five, proximity to dairy markets was an important factor shaping cream producers' responses to dairy schemes proposed by the state. Producers in more remote parts of the reserves generally preferred to deliver cream to white contractors, as the latter normally provided transport to and from commercial
Discussion of the dairy industry illustrates a further point. 'Native policy' was not simply implemented in the way that it was constructed. As shown by the history of the dairy schemes, the colonial state had to adapt its plans to the ebb and flow of resistance. This thesis thus supports the argument advanced in a South African context that 'pre-industrial societies' shaped the form of the state and in significant ways determined and constrained the operations of capital. (8)

Dissatisfaction and resistance was not only displayed towards the colonial state, however. Reserve headmen and urban councillors came to be identified with the colonial government and lost authority. By the late 1930s opposition had undermined the influence of many headmen to such an extent that the colonial state had to intervene in attempts to restore local authority. This conflict not only exemplified the extent to which Herero society was riven by political division and social differentiation, but also directed attention to an examination of attempts to create an Herero consciousness. The rejection of the ideological message of the missionaries was followed by the introduction of pre-colonial customs and symbols. Not only had the meaning of many of these changed as the discussion of the holy fire demonstrated, but new 'traditions' were invented as well. The most prominent example

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in this respect is the Truppenspieler movement and the traditions that arose around the funeral of Maharero in 1923.

This case study of the Herero not only reveals how ethnic consciousness is constructed in a specific historical context, but also shows that its content is constantly contested and redefined. The Truppenspieler movement, which became closely associated with Maharero and thus Herero traditionalism, increasingly expressed opposition to Kutako and his fellow headmen. As if to underline the fact that the traditions associated with Maharero's funeral were indeed created, Kutako called on the colonial state in the mid-1930s to have Herero Day cancelled. The colonial state did not oblige. Instead, it sought to facilitate the reconstitution of the Herero as a 'tribe' by laying the legal foundations for a tribal council modelled on the Transkeian Bunga.

By focussing on the case of the Herero, this thesis has attempted to show that an understanding and explanations of the development of social differentiation and ethnic identity have to take cognizance of the uneven colonial incorporation of different regions and communities.(9) Emphasis on the uneven penetration of colonialism does not imply that the wider context should be neglected. For it is the wider colonial setting which provides the context within which communities articulate their experiences and perceptions. But a more
regional focus as suggested above makes it possible to understand ethnic consciousness among the Herero, and by implication among other groups, not as 'an anachronistic cultural artifact from the past', (10) but as an ideological construct. More importantly, the process of this creation can be situated within the changing matrix of social differentiation. Ethnicity and the form it takes thus becomes a historically specific concept. It is suggested that by integrating regional analyses along the lines proposed in this thesis the wider processes which have shaped modern Namibia can be better understood.

While it is clearly impossible to draw any immediate conclusions from the analysis presented above for contemporary politics in Namibia, this thesis nonetheless suggests definite tendencies which undoubtedly have a bearing on the struggle for liberation. Perhaps the single most important aspect to emphasize is that by the mid-1940s some Herero stock-owners were committed to a future as cattle farmers rather than small-scale reserve pastoralists. The magistrate in Otjiwarongo captured this sentiment when he wrote in 1946 that '...it is a well-known fact that every Herero in this Territory would like to buy a farm'. (11) For this reason significant sections of Herero stock owners have not 'identify[d] [their] interests with the idea of national independence' quite as straightforwardly as Mbuende suggests. (12) And to the extent
that they have, it appears that the form of a post-independent Namibia they envisage differs from that of SWAPO. Politically this is expressed by the alliance of the National Unity Democratic Organisation or NUDO (13) with the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance headed by a white farmer. Given the emphasis which the DTA places on private land ownership in land, it stands to reason to assume that NUDO represents wealthier stock owners whose class interests correspond more closely to a capitalist system of private ownership than collective farming and land reform. While it is premature to speak of a rural bourgeoisie among Herero stock owners, a small class of cattle farmers has emerged which has bought farms from white settlers in the commercial farming area. Impressionistic evidence suggests, moreover, that those who have not been able as yet to acquire large commercial farms have begun to lay claim to private land and boreholes in the reserves by fencing in their own camps.(14) It remains the task of future researchers to explore and deepen the themes developed in this thesis in other regions of Namibia.
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6. SWAPO Department of Information and Publicity, To Be Born a Nation, p.165


11. SWAA A 50/59 Vol.2 Magistrate Otjiwarongo to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek, 15.7.1946


13. NUDO was formed in 1984 by the Herero Chief’s Council, 'probably...as an attempt by the Council to give itself a new, overtly political image to enable it to compete with SWANU and SWAPO.' Its leaders were chief Hosea Kutako, Clemens Kapuuo and Mburchuma Kerina. It never seriously attempted 'to win support...from communities other than the Hereros...' Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia, pp.51-52

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NAW 7/1916/6 (Staff Karibib Office) 1916 March
NAW 7/1916/10 Native Police previously employed by Wit Deep Ltd. 1915 December-1916 March
NAW 8/1915 Native Population - Greater Windhoek 1915 October
NAW 19/1916 Native Affairs: General Administration: General File 1916 May-December
NAW 19/1916/2 Native Affairs Office: Windhoek 1916 July-December
NAW 19/1916/3 Native Affairs Office: Karibib 1915 December-1916 October
NAW 19/1916/4 Native Affairs Office: Usakos 1915 December-1916 October
NAW 20/1917/1 Feeding and Clothing Ovambo 1916 March-December
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NAW 39/1919/1 Subfile 2 Protectorate Natives 1919 Feb.-June
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NAW 1/1920/1 Subfile C Indigents 1920 Feb.-March
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NAW 1/1920/1 Book A Subfile 1 General 1921 Jan.
NAW 1/1920/1 Book B Subfile 1 Windhoek Location - Vagrants 1921 Nov.
NAW (15) Burial of Samuel Maharero 1923 April-1924 May
NAW 3/- Native Commissioner Annual Report 1922
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NAW 1/9 Control of Natives in Location 1920 Dec.-1926 May
NAW 29 Vol.1 Stock Removal 1921 April-1929 May
NAW 30/1920/1 Subfile 1 General 1919 Sept.-1921 March
NAW 30/1920/1 Subfile 2b Stock: Outbreak of Disease 1919 Oct.-1920 May
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NAW 30/1920/1 Subfile 6 Dogs 1919 Jan.-1920 April
NAW 30/1920/1 Subfile 10 Proposed new Reserves 1917 March-1920 March
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NAW 30/3/22 Epukiro 1922 Aug.-Nov.
NAW 30/3/22 Okakuramea 1921 Nov.-1922 Dec.
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