A THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE
OF THE
MILITARY CHAPLAINCY
OF THE
ENGLISH-SPEAKING CHURCHES

BY
PETER GRAHAM MOLL

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of Religious Studies
University of Cape Town
1984
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I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university.

Peter Graham Moll

1 October 1984
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* ABSTRACT *
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The essence of this thesis is a critique of the structure and form of the military chaplaincy in South Africa in terms of theological presuppositions that can generally be associated with Karl Barth's understanding of ministry. It focuses on the military chaplaincy of the English-speaking churches of South Africa; the period selected is the past ten years.

After surveying the rather scarce literature on the military chaplaincy in South Africa and several Western countries, the author briefly outlines those aspects of the theology of ministry of Karl Barth pertinent to this thesis. In addition, the author explains his own position on war and conscientious objection, which is generally speaking in keeping with what may be referred to as the Barthian perspective on ministry.

The author then examines the South African Chaplains' Service. He finds several aspects incompatible with the theology of ministry outlined in Chapter 2: rank, uniform, military appointment of
senior staff, command influence of the military over chaplains, the hierarchical structure of the Chaplains' Service, in-house training of chaplains, security clearance and secrecy. He argues that the real test of the freedom of the military chaplaincy is whether chaplains are free to convey the church's message of peace. The author concludes that the English-speaking churches can not yet be assured of the freedom of their chaplains, and shows that the "complete freedom" to which most of the Permanent Force chaplains lay claim is illusory.

Material for this section was drawn from three important sources among others:

1) Documents published by the South African Chaplains' Service and the South African Defence Force

2) Open-ended interviews by the author with some 36 chaplains

3) Correspondence by the author with some 11 chaplains.

Since the military chaplaincy is a highly controversial topic in the English-speaking churches in South Africa, and since the perceptions of all observers are coloured by denominational, political, racial, class-related and other factors, the author made an attempt to exclude bias by writing up the interviews, and sending them back to the interviewees for their comments and corrections, before using them in the analysis. This method is essentially the Harvard Business School case study procedure.

However, it should be noted that only a small part of the thesis is dependent on the use of this interview method. By far the larger part of the work consists of theological reflection on the
ministry offered by the military chaplaincy, with the use of published documents.

In conclusion the author recommends that the chaplaincy be demilitarized, and suggests several steps toward the achievement of this aim.
ALPHABETICAL LIST
OF
ABBREVIATIONS

ANC  African National Congress

CB    The church and the bomb

CC+CC Karl Barth, The Christian community and the civil community

CCMC  Connexional Committee of the Methodist Church of South Africa

CCN   Council of Churches in Namibia

CD    Karl Barth, Church dogmatics

CF    Citizen Force

CIGS  Centre for Intergroup Studies, University of Cape Town

CIIR  Catholic Institute for International Relations

CPPD  Karl Barth, The church and the political problem of our day

CPSA  Church of the Province of Southern Africa

DiO   Karl Barth, Dogmatics in outline

CT    Cape Times
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Participation of the Episcopal Church in the ministry to the Armed Forces of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELC</td>
<td>English Literature Commission of the SACHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>General Assembly, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB</td>
<td>Handbook for Chaplains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB</td>
<td>Information Brochure on the Chaplains' Service, SADF</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLK</td>
<td>Kapelaanslektuurkommissie van die Drie Afrikaanse Kerke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>A manual of the laws and discipline of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCSA</td>
<td>Methodist Church of Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC-UMC</td>
<td>A U.M.C. (United Methodist Church of USA) study entitled Military Chaplaincy (1979)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Military Discipline Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMP</td>
<td>Ministries to military personnel, a study by the United Church of Christ, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGAS</td>
<td>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Algemene Sinode</td>
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<td>NGK</td>
<td>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk</td>
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<td>NGSK</td>
<td>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkerk</td>
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NS National Service

OCLL Office of Church Life and Leadership of the United Church of Christ, USA

PCSA Presbyterian Church of Southern Africa

PD Peace and disarmament: Documents of the World Council of Churches and the Roman Catholic Church

PF Permanent Force

PPP Progressive Federal Party

PWS Peace and War Subcommittee of the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference

RR Karl Barth, Church and state

SACBC Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference

SACC South African Council of Churches

SACHS South African Chaplains' Service, of the SADF

SADF South African Defence Force

SADFO South African Defence Force Order (e.g., on Religion)

SC Security Council, United Nations

SWA South West Africa

SWAPO South West African People's Organization

UBFC United Board Free Churches
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>United Church of Christ, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMC</td>
<td>United Methodist Church, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US or USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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The military chaplaincy has for several years been a matter of intense controversy in South African church assemblies and synods. A great many arguments have been advanced both for and against the current style of ministry to military personnel. Consequently I have been compelled, in this thesis, to deal with as many of these hotly contested points as possible. As a result this thesis is rather bulkier than most, and contains several lengthy but unavoidable digressions. Whereas references have been embedded in the text, these longer discussions are numbered sequentially and are placed at the end of the work. Some important sections like those on the war in South Africa, the Geneva Conventions, and the rights and duties of the chaplain in terms of national and international law, have been relegated to appendices, so as not to interrupt the flow of the argument.

My interest in the military chaplaincy began in the 1970s when I became a conscientious objector. This experience has obviously influenced my perception of the argument pursued in this thesis. It is this personal involvement which perhaps justifies a short and, some would say, academically extraneous, autobiographical comment. I recall with affection the many hours I spent in the office of ds. Dawid Botha, the unit chaplain of the Detention
Barracks in Voortrekkerhoogte, where I was held for a year starting in December 1979. He tried his utmost to convince me to return to the army. Other chaplains were, in turn, strongly supportive of my stand, and were on occasion silenced by the army. Ironically the 1983 legislation on conscientious objection (which grants community service to certain categories of "religious objector", but forbids most forms of conscientious objection on pain of six years' jail) was formulated by none other than the present Chaplain-General. My interest duly whetted, I commenced the present study in 1983.

It should be mentioned that this study is not an attack on military chaplains in their capacity as pastors. It is readily granted, as Harper says in his fine article, that "The chaplain is still sought out by servicemen as representative of an abiding order of deeply human and personal values in a life that too often becomes inhuman and impersonal. In the midst of relationships necessarily authoritarian, here is one relationship in which a man can acknowledge his loves and hates, his doubts and fears, his resentments and conflicts of loyalties without being called on the carpet for insubordination" (1981:38).

Rather this study is intended to be a carefully considered and balanced investigation of one specific area of the chaplain's work. This area will be defined with more precision in the text, but may crudely be designated as the prophetic task of the church with respect to its ministry to military personnel.
1. Obstacles to research

The obstacles faced in researching this subject were considerable. Among the main difficulties were: the non-cooperation of the South African Chaplains' Service, doubts about documentation, and the fear of reprisals against chaplains and against myself by the South African Defence Force.

First, it proved impossible to enlist the cooperation of the South African Chaplains' Service. Given that this thesis presents a case for relieving chaplains of their military status, this is hardly surprising, since the Permanent Force chaplains in 1978 declared their unanimous belief that military status is essential for their ministry (Permanent Force Chaplains' Statement; Stuart, Nov. 1983). Permission to examine South African Chaplains' Service archives was denied on the grounds that the author was not a serving member of the South African Defence Force (Letter from Brig. J.F. Pretorius, 29.12.1983). This closed attitude is to be contrasted with the openness of, for example, the MCSA Connexional Committee, which willingly granted the use of its minutes for research purposes. After a certain date, some chaplains referred my letters to the Chaplain-General or simply did not answer them (e.g. Letter from Rev. J. Daines, 17.5.1984; my (registered) letters to Brig. J.F. Potgieter, 22.3.1984 and 22.6.1984). An example is that of Rev. Dennis van der Spuy, who replied,

"I regret to inform you that I cannot answer your letter personally, since Maj Gen C.P. Naude has requested that all correspondence with you be dealt with by his office ... I would caution that you deal through correct channels..."
Communication with senior officials of the South African Chaplains' Service was often fruitless. Some replies were contentless; others, evasive. Consider, for example, an exchange which began on 4 October 1983 when I asked the Chaplain-General,

"...may a chaplain represent fully his church's views on ethical matters? In particular, may chaplains of the Methodist, Anglican and Catholic churches instruct troops about their churches' call for the withdrawal of the South African military from South West Africa?"

He replied,

"It is expected from each chaplain to proclaim the gospel (sic) of Jesus Christ and to take care of the spiritual needs of his Church members, and nothing more" (31.10.1983).

This cryptic reply came nowhere near a factual answer to my question. Two further letters of 21.3.1984 and 22.6.1984, enquiring about an "Information Brochure" published by the South African Chaplains' Service, received an evasive answer. The Chaplain-General replied,

"The problem with the production of a brochure is that by the time it is produced and disseminated it is already out of date and it is for this reason that I am not at all happy about circulating documents outside of our own organisation that are only relevant for a short period of time ..."

"Chaplains and members of my staff receive requests for information from you from time to time and I would appreciate this ceasing forthwith, for while the information
is accurate at the time it is given it may give an entirely false picture or impression if used at another time or in another context" (Letter, 16.7.1984).

If it is true that the South African Chaplains' Service is changing at such a velocity that it is impossible for outsiders to have knowledge of the working of the organization, how does the Chaplain-General expect the churches to satisfy themselves that this is a valid form of ministry?

Second, several problems arose in connection with documentation. Many key documents relating to the South African Chaplains' Service are restricted. On 12 January 1983 I wrote to Rev. J. Daines, asking for some documents which he had quoted in a paper distributed at the 1982 Provincial Synod of the Church of the Province of South Africa. His reply was instructive:

"As a man under authority and working with classified documents I am afraid I cannot supply them and would suggest that you contact the appropriate people" (Letter, 25.1.1983).

Accordingly I wrote to the Chaplain-General for one of these, the "South African Defence Force Order on Religion", on 28 January 1983, but was refused it (Letter from Col. A.W. van den Aardweg, 16.2.1983). Presumably the same confidentiality applies to the "Handbook for Chaplains", since it contains the "South African Defence Force Order on Religion" 1/21/78. This discussion should not be understood as a personal criticism of the chaplains involved. It is intended to indicate the problems I faced as a researcher -- problems which arise out of the chaplaincy as an integral part of the military institution.
Two documents represent tantalizing views about the military chaplaincy. The first, which I shall refer to as Document A, is "Die siening van bevs tov die kpln in die ops gebied" ("The attitude of officers commanding to the chaplain in the operational area", 6 pages, mimeo). The second, which I shall refer to as Document B, is "Die rol van die Leer kapelaan in revolusionêre oorlogvoering" ("The role of the Army chaplain in revolutionary warfare", 7 pages, mimeo). Both were obtained from chaplains. However, neither carries the author's name or official South African Chaplains' Service authorization. Can these documents be used for analysis of the chaplaincy or can they not? No doubt the officials would deny that they have any standing, if only because of some of the theological enormities which they contain. For instance, Document A urges that chaplains implant a "counter-ideology" in the hearts of soldiers to help them to fight "Communism" more effectively. The writer goes on,

"I would almost assert that just as SWAPO uses its political commissars, so we should use our chaplains within reasonable limits" (p 5; my translation).

Document B asserts that the church is the strongest anti-revolutionary force in South African society. The chaplain, as the proclaimer of "higher values", should promote the morale of soldiers by ridding them of doubt about the justice of the cause and the aim of the war (pp 5,3).

Could it be that Document A represents the kind of behaviour expected of chaplains in the operational area? Could it be that Document B represents the kind of instruction given in chaplains' courses, which often include a section on the role of the Army chaplain in revolutionary warfare? The thought patterns of
Document B seem fairly widespread within the military chaplaincy; for instance, they are mentioned in the book "The Chaplain's Wife" (pp 164f).

However, after careful consideration and discussion with my supervisor, I decided to exclude both these documents and several other similar sources from the analysis. Their use would considerably strengthen my arguments, but would lay the entire work open to the criticism of being "unscientific". The analysis presented in Chapter 3 is therefore a deliberate understatement.

Third, there was the problem of fear of reprisals by the South African Defence Force. As far as South African Defence Force ideology is concerned, the analysis would be strengthened by quotations from "Guide to Psychological Action" (Directorate Operations, Army Headquarters, August 1976), and the "Burgersake Agtergrundreeks", Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10 (SA Leerhoofkwartier, 1977 and 1978). However, these are restricted documents and it was felt that the litigation and prison sentences that could follow would not be worth the advantages of "objectivity". The penalty for disclosing the contents of any document to an unauthorized person to the prejudice of the Defence Force, is a maximum of 5 years' prison (Clause 8f of the First Schedule, Defence Act No. 44 of 1957). In addition to this, some chaplains were afraid to relate to me all of their experiences. Others allowed me to use only those parts of their interviews which they deemed "common knowledge"; a few wanted very little or nothing quoted. It is of note that Bekker, in his research on the police chaplaincy, encountered similar difficulties. Chaplains were afraid to talk, he said, because this could be damaging for the police and for the country. He urged that the chaplains make a "drastic effort" to
inform the church about their work, since secrecy of this kind gives the chaplaincy a "very poor image" (1981:70f; my translation). However, I had no alternative but to make the best of these limitations. A few chaplains are referred to as Chaplain A, Chaplain B etc., for their own protection; my supervisor and the examiners have been supplied with their names. Unfortunately, several devastating accounts about torture of "enemies", and reprisals against chaplains who complained about these and other aspects, could not be used. The hesitancy of these chaplains was quite understandably based on fears of legal action; some also added that they feared they would be deprived of their status of chaplain and called up as troops, in which case they would face even more severe dilemmas of conscience. Once again, to exclude this testimony is to play down the acute problems that beset an official military chaplaincy.

2. Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Human Sciences Research Council in this project.

Special thanks goes to my supervisor, Dr. Charles Villa-Vicencio, who was faced with the burdensome task of ploughing through my numerous long drafts. I should also like to thank the many chaplains who consented to my being interviewed -- some repeatedly -- and who wrote me letters and supplied me with published South African Chaplains' Service materials. Without their help this thesis would not have been possible. I am grateful to ds. Ben Kotze, a Citizen Force chaplain, and to Rev. James Gray, who was once a Permanent Force chaplain, for checking a draft of Chapter 3; to Prof. Tom Bennett, for checking the legal sections of
Appendix A and the whole of Appendix D; and to Mr. Keith Gottschalk and Dr. Bill Nasson, for checking Appendix A. Of course all inaccuracies and errors of judgement are my own responsibility.

Peter Graham Moll
c/o Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit
University of Cape Town
Rondebosch 7700
1. MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY

At its 1974 National Conference, the South African Council of Churches issued a strongly worded statement on conscientious objection (documented in Church and conscience:1ff). In it the Council challenged its member churches to consider whether Christians should become conscientious objectors, in view of its conviction that the war South Africa was fighting found its origin in injustice and discrimination. The statement was greeted with anger and derision by the press (English and Afrikaans alike) and the government (CIIR,1982:30f). However, its significance lay in the fact that, perhaps for the first time, the churches in South Africa were jolted into questioning the good conscience and complacency with which they had traditionally justified war, as exemplified in, for example, their unreflective deployment of chaplains as full members of the military (see, e.g., CIIR, 1982:31-33, 46ff; see also the section on the ethics of war in Chapter 2).

The statement by the National Conference of the SACC had wide ramifications. The first was that legislation was passed forbidding all encouragement of conscientious objection, on pain of a sentence of six years or R5000 or both (Section 121(c) of the Defence Act No. 44 of 1957). Another was that in due course
young men started to refuse to obey their SADF call-ups. A third was that the member churches of the SACC began critically to reappraise the form of their ministry to military personnel (1). In fact this concern sprang from a clause of the 1974 Statement, in which the Conference

"questions the basis upon which chaplains are seconded to the military forces lest their presence indicate moral support for the defence of our unjust and discriminatory society".

In accordance with this, the MCSA, PCSA and the Catholic Church sought, in 1977 and 1978, to renegotiate the structure of their ministry to military personnel. They attempted both to provide ministry to the guerrilla forces and to reduce the degree of identification of their chaplains with the military by restoring to them their civilian status and dress (cf. CIIR, 1982:68ff). The effort failed for two reasons. First, the military insisted that the then current practice of appointing chaplains as commissioned officers was the only practicable means of seeing to the spiritual needs of soldiers. Second, the churches were divided. Many people, and especially chaplains, felt that the main problem was not over-identification with the military; it was the churches' failure to support the chaplains in their important, but difficult, task of ministering to soldiers. They felt that the churches' renegotiation efforts, far from safeguarding the integrity of their ministry, were placing their ministry in question and jeopardizing the churches' entire relationship with the armed forces (e.g. Letter from Rev. J. de Metz, Seek (Jan. 1979)). The final word on the matter was had by the Permanent Force chaplains of the English-speaking churches, who issued a
statement in 1978, explaining their strong conviction that full military status for chaplains should be retained (Permanent Force Chaplains' Statement, 1.3.1978).

The issue surfaced intermittently at church conferences in the ensuing years (cf. "Synod clash on church role in army", Argus 28.6.1979). Then at its National Conference in 1984, the SACC adopted a statement in which it urged each member church to "demilitarize its chaplains by relieving them of the symbols of military status like rank and uniform", and to "bring its chaplains under church authority, thereby releasing them from military influence" (see Appendix E). This new determination to demilitarize the chaplaincy arose from two sources: first, the churches' growing conviction that the SADF should withdraw from Namibia (cf. Report, and Statement), and second, from an increasingly influential anti-militarism lobby within the churches and the universities (e.g. see the magazine "Objector" of the Conscientious Objectors Support Group, which was first published in 1983).

Controversy about the manner in which ministry to military personnel is conducted is not as unprecedented or inappropriate as conservatives in the churches seem to have thought. In the United States, concern about the military chaplaincy is almost as old as the institution itself. For instance, a Founding Father and early President, James Madison, opposed military chaplaincy on grounds of church-state independence (Williams, in Cox, 1971:30). A study by the United Church of Christ in the United States defined the issue succinctly. It said,

"the special nature of the chaplaincy is not to be found in its purpose, the coming of shalom, which is the purpose it
shares with the whole ministry of the church, but rather in the peculiar perils and promises inherent in exercising the ministry in the midst of the military enterprise" (MMP:6).

It might be said that it is the "peculiar perils and promises" inherent in military chaplaincy that make it a subject for continual inquiry and reformulation, in South Africa as elsewhere. The "promise", as seen by the UCC, was

"the opportunity to support, guide, and care for those who have conscientiously chosen to exercise their vocation within the military" (MMP:7).

The "perils", in turn were those

"moral and spiritual perils [which] pervade institutions where people live in circumstances that are exceptional, authoritarian, and controlled by the state... the danger of idolatry when the goals of the nation are identified with the purpose of God, of apostasy when the loyalties of the officer displace the duties of the clergy, of false witness when the Christian presence in the military comes to signify the church's blessing of violence and indulgence of all wars" (MMP:7).

This study takes as its point of departure the recent South African debate about the military chaplaincy. In the light of these "promises and perils", it attempts to conduct a theological and ethical examination into the manner in which certain South African churches are presently running their ministry to military personnel. Such an inquiry is long overdue, since the criticisms voiced by the SACC in 1974 and the ill-fated renegotiation talks of 1977/8 had been informed neither by research on chaplaincies
those churches which originated in Britain and which are full members of the SACC (see, e.g. de Gruchy, 1979:85). However, for the purposes of this thesis it is loosely employed to include the Catholic Church and the Baptist Union as well. It is readily conceded that the term is inaccurate, because most of the members of these churches speak African languages. However, this set of churches may be broadly distinguished from the "Afrikaans" churches and their black counterparts on the one hand, and from the Pentecostal churches on the other. Furthermore, the term "English-speaking" churches is used by the military chaplains themselves. In the absence of any better term, this one, together with its synonym the English churches, is used.

The third limitation is that this study concerns itself, in the main, with theological and ethical questions relating to the form of the churches' ministry to military personnel. It must be conceded that the military chaplaincy could have been investigated from several other standpoints, e.g. from a constitutional and legal point of view, or from a historical point of view. Furthermore, this study is not intended to be a comprehensive inquiry in the sense of dealing with every aspect of the chaplain's work, i.e. no attempt is made at a general portrayal of the work of the chaplain as is done, for example, by Meyer (1979) and Bekker (1981). Instead, psychological and pastoral aspects of ministry are dealt with only as they impinge on the theological and social-ethical aim of this study.

3. LITERATURE SURVEY

If military chaplaincy is based on the profound theological truth that the ministry of the church knows no boundaries, but reaches
out at all times to all people and all institutions, criticism of the military form of chaplaincy may perhaps be said to arise from the equally profound truth that the church should minister in integrity, which means offering ultimate allegiance not to the state or the military but to God. When surveying the literature on the military chaplaincy, one is struck by the continued effort, on the part of both opponents of military chaplaincy and of chaplains themselves and their supporters, to measure this extraordinary form of ministry in terms of the sometimes competing principles of effectiveness and integrity in ministry. I now try very briefly to show how recent literature on the subject of the military chaplaincy addresses these two principles. The survey covers literature from the United States, West Germany, Britain, France and South Africa, in that order.

3.1. United States

The military chaplaincy in the United States is typical of chaplaincies in the West. Chaplains are paid and housed by the government; they wear uniform and have rank; they are subject, as officers, to military discipline; and they generally take on the task as a career. They are theologically trained, like other ministers of their churches, at church seminaries or universities, and their chaplaincy work is under regular review by church boards. In the opinion of its protagonists, it is a system of careful checks and balances to preserve the chaplain's independence.

However, Burchard's sociological study in 1953 suggested that chaplains experience "role conflict", arising from their dual role as military officers and ministers of the Gospel. Moreover, this
conflict tends to be resolved in favour of the military role (1953:352). Twenty years later, a similar investigation by Abercrombie showed the opposite: that chaplains saw their clerical and military role-values as almost identical (1973:67). Abercrombie attributed Burchard's findings to his assumption, stemming from his pacifist commitment, that role conflict must necessarily be present in the Christian minister associated with warfare. Unsubstantiated statements by Burchard tend to confirm Abercrombie's view, e.g.: "... the fact that (the chaplain) is responsible to his commanding officer rather than to God.." (Burchard, 1953:165). Abercrombie concluded that one cannot profitably study "role conflict" among chaplains at all (1973:67). His chief finding, then, was that chaplains for America's wars could be recruited from the mainstream of American Christianity; it would not be necessary for the Army to socialize them or alter their values (1973:53). He believed, furthermore, in the possibility of a "prophetic chaplaincy" which could "bring to the army a message that came from outside the military attitude-complex" (1973:222). However, Abercrombie's form of "prophecy" seems confined to problems within the military environment; it could not question the raison d'être of the military establishment itself (see pp 228-231).

Appelquist's work of 1969 included a series of church statements suggesting that, in the 1960s, several American churches were aware of the "inherent dangers" in institutional chaplaincies of all kinds, since they "may be tempted to find subtle forms of establishment". Nevertheless, these churches were confident that, with careful vigilance, the chaplaincy would continue to be a viable form of ministry (1969:21-24).
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The My Lai incident ended this period of complacency. Since the incident had reached the ears of the American public through the efforts of a few conscience-stricken GIs, it spawned many critical attacks on the chaplains, alleging that they had remained silent in the face of atrocity (Cox, 1971; Ecumenical Witness Conference; A Proposal). Church commissions were appointed to inquire how the chaplaincy could be restructured to ensure greater critical independence for chaplains. In 1973 a United Church of Christ study called for a sweeping demilitarization of the chaplaincy (MMP: 92ff,121,123). However, its recommendations were not adopted; another study was commissioned the following year, and eventually the decision was taken to retain the military chaplaincy, as "a principal model of ministry to military personnel" (OCLL:3). A Protestant Episcopal Church study recommended, in 1976, that the validity of this ministry be recognized despite the "inherent tensions it generates" (EC:1). A letter from the Episcopal Bishop for the Armed Forces admitted that the military chaplaincy is an "imperfect vehicle", but insisted that it "provides a solid basis for ministry"; thus no significant changes were made as a result of the study (Letter from the Rt. Rev. Charles L. Burgreen to P.G. Moll, 29.12.1983). The 1976 General Conference of the United Methodist Church decided to take "immediate steps" to demilitarize its chaplaincy. Its thorough study, however, recommended that a civilian chaplaincy not be established, but also recommended against the assumption that the issue was settled forever (MC-UMC:1,2). The 1980 Conference of the United Methodist Church reaffirmed the status quo (Letter from Rev. R. McLean to P.G. Moll, 3.10.1983). In 1982 a proposal for a demilitarized chaplaincy was submitted to the Catholic Archdiocese of Denver, but thus far nothing has been
hears of its progress ("Military Chaplaincy Proposal").

Two main convictions seem to underlie the decision of the United Church of Christ, the Protestant Episcopal Church, and the United Methodist Church to retain military chaplaincy in its current form. The first was that military chaplaincy was seen as a workable form of ministry, whereas demilitarized chaplaincy presented practical difficulties like finance which were felt to be too large (e.g. Letter from Rev. R.H. Naylor, of the UCC, to P. G. Moll, 7.10.1983). The second was that the church had a fundamental confidence in the United States Armed Forces and felt that they, despite some excesses, were the honourable guardians of a lifestyle and values the churches held dear. Provided sufficient vigilance was maintained, they felt the military chaplaincy need not issue in compromise (for further references, see previous paragraph).

Meanwhile, chaplains had been formulating their own responses to the charge of their being state lackeys. A fine example of earlier work is Harper (1957, 1981). The equivalent of a "chaplains' bill of rights" was formulated in 1970 (Chaplaincy IV:4 (1981)). Thorough histories of the chaplaincy were written by Venzke (1975) and others. The triumphantistic tone of the latter was avoided by Hutcheson (1973 and 1975), who, unlike Abercrombie, accepted that "role conflict" is inevitable, but insisted that it might be a creative element in the chaplain's task (1975:20). However, in his description of the military chaplain as ministering in a "total institution", he misuses Erving Goffman's concept, as I attempt to show in Chapter 2.

Finally, the chaplains organized ethics workshops (Stover, 1976). Since the 1970s, a challenge to the chaplaincy has come from a
different quarter: the courts. This follows a lengthy debate about the legal and constitutional aspects of the military chaplaincy. For instance, Figinski (1964; as quoted in "The constitutionality suit":50) argues that it is constitutionally legitimate, but Rimlinger (1974) reasons otherwise. The debate remained on a purely theoretical level until 1980 when two Harvard Law School students filed a suit charging that the chaplaincy violates the constitutional separation of church and state. The Secretary of Defense introduced a motion to dismiss the complaint ("The constitutionality suit":29-61). However, Federal Judge McLaughlin upheld the constitutionality of the military chaplaincy, arguing that, by affording soldiers opportunities for worship, it preserves the religious neutrality of the government (The Christian Century 22.2.1984).

3.2. Europe

3.2.1. West Germany

A problem was encountered in locating West German literature on the chaplaincy, due to poor South African library facilities and the great expense of obtaining documents from overseas. With the available literature the following picture emerges.

Of all the forms of ministry to military personnel in the West, the West German model comes the closest to being termed "church-based". The importance of this lies in the fact that the military chaplaincy is most often faulted for being under military control; though the chaplains' military status may facilitate their work in certain respects, critics insist that membership of
the military entails military influence and results in a loss of integrity. The West German model of chaplaincy was adopted in order to avoid a repeat of the Third Reich experience when chaplains were so distanced from the church as to come under the control of the Wehrmacht (Stueber, 1975:177; Weymann, 1970:126; Bastian, 1971:407f; cf. Potgieter, 1971:291). Perhaps the most recent history of the controversy surrounding the reintroduction of the military chaplaincy in 1957 is that of Kruse (1982), who is a military chaplain and the Scientific Director of the Sozialwissenschaftlichen Institut der Bundeswehr in Munich.

The West German model embodies several elements which stress the primacy of church control over the chaplaincy. Chaplains are given temporary appointments only; they are freed from regular church work for six or eight years, to work in the military setting. They have no rank, are not subject to the Military Discipline Code, and do not wear the regular military uniform. They have as their head a Military Bishop, who, also a civilian, runs the chaplains' service as a "Nebenberuf", viz. in addition to his normal duties.

However, there are other elements in the arrangement which show that the chaplaincy is not as independent of the state as is suggested by documents like "Military chaplaincy service". Between the Military Bishop and the chaplains are several administrators whose appointment to the armed forces is permanent, and who have military status ranging from colonel to major-general (Potgieter, 1971:294). On manoeuvres chaplains wear protective overalls (Letter from Militaerdekan K. Weymann to P.G. Moll, 20.11.1983). All chaplains are saluted (Potgieter, 1971:295). They have offices provided by the military and have military
vehicles with drivers (Potgieter, 1971:295f). Finally, they are paid by the government, supposedly because it is the extraordinary state-imposed separation from normal life that has occasioned the need for an extraordinary form of ministry in the first place (Stueber, 1975: "Military chaplaincy service"). Perhaps the arrangement had best be termed a "semi-civilian" or "semi-church-based" chaplaincy.

Interestingly, there are some military chaplains who are critical of Germany's contribution to the arms race, and who feel that the chaplaincy should play no part in the "moral armament" of soldiers (Sueddeutsche Zeitung 4.4.1983). However, this attitude is by no means universal. Most chaplains are supportive of the Bundeswehr and German military strategy (e.g. Kruse, 1982:490; "Militarerpfrarrer zerbrach fast seelisch an Kollegen in Mayen", Frankfurter Rundschau 13.7.1983). Members of the peace movement in Germany are sharply critical of the moral support which they give to the military machine (Interview with Pfarrer Hermann Schaeufele, Stuttgart, July 1983).

Theological works edited by people involved in the military chaplaincy, e.g. Gramm and Blaschke (1980) and Hessler (1975), indicate an awareness of the ambiguity of the chaplain's position. They contain articles and addresses by chaplains, about their relation to the military and to the state, about their participation in "character-building" ("Innere Fuehrung") in the Bundeswehr, and about the history of the chaplaincy. They attempt to show that this form of ministry is effective, while not ignoring the accusation of pacifists that any intimate association with the Bundeswehr undermines the integrity of ministry. In these works, and in church press items like "Military chaplaincy
service", stress is laid on the fact that the chaplaincy is run solely by the church. References are even made to the "tradition of disobedience" to immoral commands inaugurated by the attempted removal of Hitler of 20 July 1944 (Sixt, 1980). They therefore insist that the chaplaincy is not beholden to the state. Kruse's monograph, in similar vein, presents the case that the chaplaincy is a "cooperative partnership" of church and state, and that the mere fact of involvement of both does not imply that religion is being instrumentalized for military purposes (1982:160, 163).

Critical works, concentrating on the problem of integrity in ministry, have been written from political and theological viewpoints. Bamberg (1970) tries to show that the chaplaincy encourages accommodation to the status quo and depicts foreign policy as a struggle of light with darkness; but, as Huber remarks, his selection of sources is one-sided (1973:226; similarly Kruse, 1982:60). From a theological point of view, Weymann criticizes the hierarchical structure of the chaplaincy (1970:126ff). In a more thorough fashion, Huber tries to identify the aims which the military chaplaincy has set for itself, and to find out whether these are capable of realization within the present chaplaincy structure (1973:229). He concludes that the present structure lends itself to instrumentalization for military purposes (1973:263).

3.2.2. Britain and France

I was able to obtain only very little British and French literature. Probably the paucity of literature and its difficulty of access is a reflection of the fact that, unlike the situation in the USA and West Germany, the wars these countries have
recently fought have not been seriously questioned by a large constituency within the churches. Nevertheless one of the best-known critical works on the military chaplaincy is that by Gordon Zahn, on the Royal Air Force service (1969). Like Burchard and Abercrombie, Zahn is a sociologist, and also addressed the phenomenon of "role tension", preferring this term to Burchard's "role conflict". He found that when role tension was present and recognized by the chaplains, tension was most likely to be resolved in favour of the military dimension of the role (1969:32,175,200,259f). As a pacifist in the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, he was critical of the chaplains' role in morale-building (1969:224), in marked contrast to the Deputy Chaplain-General of the British Forces, whose book, written at the height of World War II, was explicitly aimed at helping chaplains to build up the morale of the troops on the base of religion (Brumwell, 1943:55-71). Finally, Wilkinson's thoughtful article takes as its point of departure that "the very existence of military chaplains is a paradox" (1981:249). He concludes that most forms of ministry embody paradox of some kind; military chaplains should continually ask themselves at what point a paradox becomes a scandal (1981:250).

The most notable French work obtained was that of Cucne et al. It deserves mention because, unlike the above-mentioned studies, it investigated the attitudes of soldiers, rather than those of chaplains, with respect to the military chaplaincy (Cuche:2). They found that the military chaplaincy was seen as a source of companionship and friendship; through exchange and reflection, chaplains were able to deepen the spiritual lives of soldiers (Cuche:9). At the same time, many soldiers wanted chaplains to be more independent and critical of the army (Cuche:16ff). Cuche
and his colleagues concluded with a call for a demilitarized chaplaincy (Cuche:22f).

Marcan and Treffay (1962) argued that the chaplaincy should be more committed to the spiritual problems of youth and less old-fashioned, especially in areas like sexuality (1962:32f). Chaplains should be more concerned, they said, about the moral problems of war; indeed, "The war in Algeria should be at the centre of our concerns" (1962:47). Beside these two works, only a few articles (Donadille; Un aumonier catholique; Rossiniere; and Vassaux) and reports of meetings of the chaplaincy service were available (e.g. L'Aumonier Protestant).

3.3. South Africa

The best-known work on the military chaplaincy in South Africa is the 1971 doctoral dissertation of Brig. (ds) J.F. Potgieter, who is one of the senior administrators of the SAChS. In 1983 he was the Director Chaplains Ministry (South African Baptist, Oct. 1983, p 4). In this work he deals chiefly with the history of the chaplaincy in South Africa. As a result, the study materials on the history of the chaplaincy given in chaplains' courses are culled from his thesis. In addition to the history of the chaplaincy, he documents much information on the structure of the military chaplaincies of the Western world. His lack of critical theological analysis, however, becomes most clear when dealing with the structure of the military chaplaincy in South Africa. He passes too quickly over the theological problem that its structure cannot be reconciled with traditional Reformed teaching on church and state, and excuses the fact that the chaplaincy is under the direct authority of the state by arguing simply that this
"extraordinary arrangement" is "unavoidable" (1971:342). Little awareness, if any, is shown of the moral dilemmas faced by chaplains, much less of those dilemmas faced by chaplains in the South African context. The chaplain's task is, among other things, that of "morale-builder of the unit" (1971:372).

Meyer (1979) deals with the pastoral problems encountered by military chaplains, stressing the great importance of this form of ministry (1979:74f). He refers to the lack of published works about the place of youth in the military. More aware than Potgieter of the moral problems of ministry in a military context, he rejects rank and uniform for chaplains (1979:43,45). However, he does not relate the structure and task of the chaplaincy to the ethics of war in the South African context. Thus the two chief works on the military chaplaincy in South Africa tend to concentrate on the problem of its "effectiveness" in ministry at the expense of inquiring into its theological integrity as a form of ministry.

Harrington (1973) investigates the attitudes of national servicemen to church attendance, in the light of R.K. Merton's functional analysis. He finds that Afrikaans-speaking national servicemen are still deeply religious, but that church attendance is dropping. This he ascribes to certain "dysfunctional" elements, e.g. that church liturgy is too old-fashioned. Though not specifically on the military chaplaincy, this work is another example of the concentration of the literature on the "effectiveness" of ministry as distinct from its impact on social ethics. Viewed from another angle, the literature tends to concentrate on the expansion of the ministry of the church, without self-critically pausing to inquire into the moral aspects
of its ministry.

Van Wyk (1984) has written a general theological work on the church and peace. Unfortunately it suffers from lack of incorporation of significant works on the subject written in the past decade, because the book was completed as a doctoral dissertation in 1974, but published almost unchanged in 1984. His chief conclusions are the rather unsurprising ones that both "total war" and "absolute pacifism" are unacceptable in terms of Christian social ethics. His book includes a chapter on the military chaplaincy in which he points out that the Gereformeerde Kerk has for some time felt that the military chaplaincy represents a sacrifice of prophetic freedom. Van Wyk is of the opinion that the message of the chaplain is nothing but that of shalom. Therefore the present "path of compromise" should be avoided, because

"The church of Jesus Christ may never become so implicated and identified with one single human institution that its unique message can no longer be heard or understood, on account of being drowned out by human voices" (1984:210; my translation).

Besides these works, the following sources might be mentioned: (a) documents issued by the SACHs, like the "Handbook for chaplains"; (b) short articles, mostly by Afrikaans chaplains, published in "Paratus"; (c) reports on the debate about the military chaplaincy in church newspapers; (d) a few writings in English: Oestreicher (1977), CIIR (1982), Stuart (Nov. 1983), Spectrum (1983), and Storey (1977); and (e) a related work on the police chaplaincy by Bekker (1981). No extended treatment has been given the subject by a writer from the English-speaking churches, nor has the
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chaplaincy been examined in the light of those churches' changing perceptions of the function of the military in South Africa.

4. NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

It is apparent from the literature survey that a variety of methods have been used to investigate the military chaplaincy. Those studies of a more sociological kind used lengthy questionnaires enquiring into attitudes and beliefs (Burchard, 1953; Zahn, 1969; Abercrombie, 1973; and Cuche). Some were archival (Potgieter, 1971; Venzke, 1975; Kruse, 1982). Some made use of interviews (Burchard, 1953; Potgieter, 1971; Meyer, 1979). Some consisted of analyses of materials published by chaplains and by the armed forces (Bamberg, 1970; Berger, in Cox, 1971; Huber, 1973). Others consist largely of theological reflection (Harper, 1957 and 1981; Weymann, 1970; Cox, 1971; Hutcheson, 1973 and 1975; Huber, 1973; MMP; EC; MC-UMC; "Military Chaplaincy Proposal").

For the purposes of this study it would have been ideal to run a full-length questionnaire, in order to obtain the maximum amount of information about the ministry that is presently being conducted by the military chaplains. However, this course of action seemed unwise. It was noted that Zahn's study was cut short after a certain number of questionnaires had been completed, when the British Chaplain-General forbade any further chaplains from participating. It was speculated that a questionnaire study in South Africa could be obstructed in a similar way because church-military relationships are more strained, and because the SADF is presently on a war footing. It was feared that some chaplains would not be willing to write down their answers to probing questions like those of Burchard, Zahn and Abercrombie.
Hence the idea of obtaining information by a questionnaire was discarded. This turned out to have been a wise decision. As has been indicated in the preface, it was not possible to gain the cooperation of the SACHS officials in Pretoria, and, at a certain point, chaplains were requested not to correspond with the author personally but to refer all his letters to the Chaplain-General (cf. Letters to P.G. Moll from Rev. D. van der Spuy, 16.7.1984, and from ds. C. Naude, 16.7.1984).

It would also have been ideal for this study to have access to archival material. A negative answer was received from the SACHS, however, on the grounds that the author is not a serving member of the SADF (Letter from Brig. J.F. Potgieter to P.G. Moll, 29.12.1983). A negative answer was also received from the United Board Free Churches (Letter from Rev. A.W. van den Aardweg to P.G. Moll, 14.2.1984). By contrast, the minutes of the Connexional Committee of the Methodist Church were available, but these extend back only as far as 1980. Accordingly, an archival and historical study had to be ruled out. Regrettably, this means that the present study suffers from an unavoidable lack of historical perspective.

Hence the author was left with three main avenues of inquiry:

(a) Theological and ethical reflection, which was aided by materials obtained from overseas, at great effort and expense.

(b) Analysis of materials published by the SACHS and the SADF, some of which was freely available and some of which, like the "Handbook for Chaplains", became available only after many patient inquiries. As has been indicated in the preface, prudent decisions had to be taken regarding which of these could be used.
and which not, both for reasons of scientific objectivity and for reasons of legality.

(c) In-depth interviews with such chaplains as were willing. Most chaplains approached were willing to be interviewed, although some refused. The problems of understatement and self-censorship in the interviews have been explained in the preface. The author took careful notes of the interviews, wrote them up, and mailed them back to the interviewees for checking and comment. Only after the corrected versions were returned were they used in the analysis. Many hours were spent in discussion with Dr. C. Villa-Vicencio in the attempt to eliminate all subjectivity and bias in the interpretation of the interviews. This method is essentially the case study procedure used by the Harvard Business School, and which has been successfully employed to distinguish opinion from fact in the area of human rights (Evans and Evans, 1983:v,vi).

All but three of the chaplains mailed back the corrected interview write-ups. One declined to do so because his ideas had changed, and also for "reasons that I'd rather not put on paper". Two wrote back angry letters, accusing the author of deliberate misrepresentation. Both, incidentally, were Permanent Force chaplains; the significance of this will become clear in Chapter 3. These views contrasted strongly with the majority, however, who felt that their opinions had been faithfully reported. One representative comment was, "You have given a very accurate and honest account of our interview and [I] am quite happy for you to use it as it stands" (Letter from Rev. Bill Blakeway to P.G. Moll, 16.5.1984).

A list of all the chaplains interviewed is given in Appendix F.
This chapter continues with a brief historical overview of the concept of the chaplaincy in the West and the development of the military chaplaincy in South Africa. The study proper commences with an explanation of the theological assumptions which underlie the inquiry (Chapter 2). It proceeds to an analysis of the conditions of ministry of the SACNs, focusing on the effect of the military status of the chaplains upon ministry (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4, an attempt is made to draw out the implications, for the chaplains' military status and their task, of the stance that certain churches have assumed regarding the war. Recommendations are made for changes to the structure of the military chaplaincy, and these are followed by speculation as to how and to what extent these recommendations could be effected. Chapter 5 consists of appendices on the ethics of war in South Africa, the Geneva Conventions, military obedience in terms of national and international law, the SACC statement on the military chaplaincy in 1984, and lists of chaplains consulted. After the appendices come all the footnotes. Finally, a consolidated bibliography is presented, which lists the works consulted alphabetically, by the author's name where possible, or, failing this, by the name of the sponsoring organization or the publication title.
6. HISTORICAL SURVEY

6.1. The title "chaplain"

Potgieter suggests the following definition of a chaplain:

"a member of the clergy who, outside the parish context, performs religious exercises and religious functions in and around a chapel" (1971:1; my translation).

One might question whether the reference to a chapel is essential, since the work of chaplains in war zones and in many present-day hospitals is obviously not dependent on the existence of a chapel. Yet this concise definition includes most of the important characteristics of chaplains as they are presently known: they are, by and large, ministers or priests; they work outside of the local parish context; they have a religious function and perform religious exercises. The definition is also general enough to encompass, not only military chaplains, but all institutional chaplains. If there is any area in which this definition is wanting, it is its failure to specify the chaplaincy's moral/ethical purposes and effects, and to indicate the ethical dilemmas that beset this extraordinary form of ministry.

It is generally accepted that the word "chaplain" finds its origin in the Latin word "capa", meaning a cloak. It refers to the cloak of St. Martin of Tours which was preserved as a relic by the French and which accompanied the tent where Mass was celebrated by military chaplains (Potgieter, 1971:1-3). Gradually the term "chaplain" came to refer to priests who served private chapels of dignitaries or institutions like parliament, prisons, universities.
or the armed forces (Potgieter, 1971:5).

Potgieter then supplies the following definition of the military chaplain:

"a member of the clergy of a particular denomination who is responsible for the spiritual care of members of the armed forces (and their dependants) both at the base and in the field" (1971:11; my translation).

This definition accords with the generally accepted notion of military chaplaincy, but for its failure to mention the church-state accommodation/conflict inherent in it.

6.2. The origin of the chaplaincy in the West

The office of the military chaplain originates in the ancient religious practice of providing moral support for the belligerents in time of war (Potgieter, 1971:20). With the official recognition of the Christian religion by Constantine, Christianity became committed to the sanction of war and became reconciled to the calling of the soldier (1971:55; Hornus, 1980:179ff). The first chaplains of Christendom were appointed during this time (Potgieter, 1971:65f). Apparently chaplains were not uncommon in the fifth century, as is evident from pronouncements by the Councils of Rome (402) and Tours (461) which forbade priests to bear arms (Potgieter, 1971:67. Also see Hornus, 1980:190ff, who argues similarly, but points out that the canons attributed to the Council of Rome were really those of Damasus). The significance of the Council of Ratisbon (742 A.D.) lies in the fact that this was the first council to specify the numbers and the tasks of military chaplains. Among their main tasks were to carry the
reliquary, hear confessions, and say the Mass (Potgieter, 1971:69).

During the Crusades it appears that the ancient rule against the bearing of arms by priests was lifted (Potgieter, 1971:70). During this period, religion and war went hand-in-hand, as the Church itself summoned all and sundry to battle against the infidel. Military orders were founded, and it became common for bishops to be accompanied by large entourages which included soldiers (see also Brumwell, 1943:9f). Potgieter points out that even during this period of militarization of religion, chaplains were especially appointed to see to the spiritual needs of soldiers (1971:74f).

Potgieter points out that from the seventeenth century, the institution of the chaplaincy became a regular and integrated part of the armed forces of Europe (1971:79ff; cf. Brumwell, 1943:12ff). During this period, the office of the principal chaplain became common in England and France (Brumwell, 1943:13f). Chaplains were first appointed in the USA at the start of the Revolution in 1775 (Williams, in Cox, 1971:16ff).

Chaplaincies were vastly increased in size during World War I and II, and have, in the twentieth century, become an integral part of the armed forces of the West. Two reasons for this development may be advanced. The first is that the size of standing armies, and the extent and efficiency of conscription, have increased tremendously in the twentieth century (e.g. see Sivard, 1982:26, and Williams, in Cox, 1971:47,50ff). The second is that military commanders are aware of the prestige and psychological strength that religion can give to the armed forces (see the lengthy treatment of this in Chapter 3).
6.3. The origin of the chaplaincy in South Africa

The paucity of research on the military chaplaincy in South Africa means that, for matters of historical detail, the writer was heavily dependent on the only major work available, that of Potgieter (1971). With permission to consult Defence archives denied (Letter from Brig. J.F. Potgieter to P.G. Moll, 29.12.1983), cross-checking could not be done. Hence the remarks offered on the period 1912 to the present are necessarily of a tentative nature.

Potgieter locates the origin of the South African military chaplaincy in the "sieketroosters" who accompanied Dutch East India Company ships passing the Cape on their way to the Far East (1971:103ff). In due course, fully-fledged congregations were founded; as early as 1703, the Kerkraad of the Dutch Reformed Church in Cape Town considered the militia of the Castle as a distinct group requiring ministry (1971:110).

With the first British occupation of 1795, established military chaplains first made their appearance (1971:115f). During the nineteenth century, Anglican chaplains were regularly appointed to minister to British troops stationed in South Africa (1971:119ff). During this time much chaplaincy work of other denominations was performed by civilian ministers operating in a part-time capacity (Potgieter, 1971:132,136). Full-time military chaplains also accompanied the British troops who were brought out to South Africa at various times: the Basuto war, the first annexation of the Transvaal, and the Anglo-Boer War (Potgieter, 1971:133ff). After the war, imperial troops remained in Pretoria until 1915, and were accompanied by British chaplains until their departure.
As far as the Afrikaans churches were concerned, an important advance occurred during the Basuto War of 1865, when the President of the Free State took the initiative of sending ministers of religion with the "burghers" (1971:144). In the war against the Sekukhuni in 1896, the president of the Transvaal Republic himself conducted services for troops (1971:144). Ministers accompanied the troops in the war of 1880-1. But the office of the "Veldprediker" — as these chaplains were called — is best known for its appearance in the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902). Ministers accompanied the troops of the Republics in battle, in prisoner-of-war camps and in concentration camps (1971:147ff). Interestingly, the father of the famous Beyers Naude, Jozua Francois Naude, served as a "Veldprediker" under General Christiaan Frederick Beyers, whence the first name of his son. At the end of the war, Naude was one of the six Boer delegates to the Vereeniging peace talks who refused to sign the treaty (Randall, 1982:2).

Following Union, the Union Defence Force was formed. During World War I both part-time and full-time chaplains were appointed. All the major denominations were catered for (Potgieter, 1971:183). It appears that in 1915 the first Principal or Senior chaplain was appointed to coordinate the work; he was accordingly promoted to the rank of Major (1971:184). Most other chaplains were appointed to the rank of captain. They were subject to the Military Discipline Code and wore normal military uniform with a Maltese Cross to distinguish themselves as ministers. They were not permitted to bear arms (1971:185). Not enough posts were available, however, and both the NGK and the Anglican church
financed their own chaplains in addition (1971:186). The chaplains accompanied their units to South West Africa, East Africa, the Middle East and France.

Potgieter observes that political factors made it difficult to persuade ministers of the Afrikaans churches to volunteer their services:

"The fact that there was division in the ranks of the white population of the Union with respect to the participation of the Union in the war, occasions no surprise. It was the natural outworking of reigning political and cultural factors" (1971:188; my translation).

It will become apparent later in this work that division about the purposes of the current war is in a similar way giving rise to doubts about the role of the chaplain.

Nearly all of the war-time chaplains returned to civilian employment after demobilization of the Active Citizen Force in 1918. In 1920 two full-time A.C.F. chaplains were appointed, Rev. Alfred Roberts (for the English churches), and Rev. John Neethling Murray (for the Afrikaans churches) (1971:197). At the same time, provision was made for part-time chaplains (1971:198). The two full-time chaplains were commissioned officers with captain's rank, although this was for protocol, and not for executive, purposes (1971:207). Rev. A.G.D. Coertse made special efforts in 1931 to obtain better service conditions for these chaplains. He argued that they should be appointed as Permanent Force members, referring to the fact that chaplains to the Imperial troops were on permanent staff. He argued, further, that the current (Citizen Force) rank of captain was
insufficiently respected: the chaplains were "outsiders", and their position was inferior. They had neither pension nor medical benefits and enjoyed no promotion (1971:205).

As a result of Coertse's efforts, the first two Permanent Force appointments were made in 1935, for a period of three years. In 1938 these posts were made permanent. At this time there were only three Permanent Force chaplains (1971:205f).

During World War II, the chaplaincy was greatly expanded, to a total of 517 chaplains, of whom 306 held full-time posts and 211 part-time posts (1971:223). Ordinary chaplains had the rank of captain, senior chaplains the rank of major, and principal chaplains the rank of lieutenant-colonel (1971:217). One principal chaplain was appointed for each of the following groupings: Afrikaans churches, the Anglican Church, the Free Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, and people of the Jewish religion (1971:216f). They were appointed on a temporary basis on the understanding that they would be demobilized at the end of the war. They were permitted to dispense with rank insignia at the battle front, in order to protect themselves from inferiority compared with other officers and to help them move on the same level as troops (1971:221). English chaplains wore a clerical collar. All chaplains were non-combatant, and neither bore nor handled weapons (1971:221). Part-time chaplains had neither rank nor uniform (1971:221). The chaplains accompanied troops in East Africa, the Middle East, France, Italy, Germany, and England.

After demobilization, ten Permanent Force posts were created. An important milestone was reached with the establishment of a Corps of Chaplains in 1946 (1971:225). In 1949, Rev. C.F. Miles-Cadman was appointed to the new post of Deputy
Chaplain-General. His task was that of liaison with the Chief of General Staff. The post was, however, not continued after his death in 1954 (1971:227). In 1955, it was decided to alter the dress of the chaplains in such a way that chaplains would be easily distinguished as clergy. Afrikaans chaplains would wear a white shirt with a black tie, while English chaplains would wear normal clerical dress. Unfortunately, the only available source, Potgieter, leaves the matter there, hanging tantalizingly in the air. To what extent was this decision motivated by the same sort of concerns about identification with the military as surfaced in the 1970's? We will probably never know. Rev. Stanley Pitts, who was a member of the UBFC at the time, could not remember anything about this (telephone call, 5.8.1984). As has been mentioned above, the author was denied perusal of the UBFC minutes. Potgieter closes the section undramatically by remarking that not all aspects of the new arrangement worked out well in practice (1971:228).

In 1957, a conference of chaplains made two further decisions regarding dress. First, it was decided to revert to army browns (1971:229). Second, it was decided to dispense with the insignia of rank; instead, chaplains would have the status of colonel and, for purposes of identification, carry a cross of gold on their shoulder. The intention of this decision was "to permit the chaplain to mix freely with men of any rank, higher or lower, without any obstacle such as the rank structure" (1971:229; my translation). In fact the latter decision was the repetition of a request by the principal chaplains in 1946, that rank be dispensed with "because it can hinder the execution of the chaplain's duties" (1971:234; my translation). However, only the first of these decisions was carried out (1971:230).
In preparation for the introduction of universal conscription for all white males in 1967, changes were made to the structure of the military chaplaincy. The Division of Physical and Spiritual Welfare was formed in 1966. Under the Director of this Division, fell a Senior Staff Officer Chaplains and Welfare, with rank of colonel. A chaplain was appointed to this post (1971:238). A chaplains' conference in 1966 requested further changes. It asked that all chaplains have equal status, viz. that of colonel; that chaplains cease to carry normal rank, substituting this with distinctive chaplaincy insignia; and that "chaplain" itself become a rank "which indicates ("aandui") the place of the chaplain in the rank structure" (1971:234; my translation). Requests were made soon after for another reorganization. This was to form a separate division of chaplains, as Potgieter says, "so that the church would gain its proper place in the Defence Force, grounded on the principle that the church should never be subject to a subdivision" (1971:233; my translation). This curious request begs the question of how the church can be subject to any part of the Defence Force at all; by what rule can one say that the church cannot be subject to a subdivision but may be subject to the highest authority in the Defence Force? (cf. also Potgieter's discussion of this, pp 321,340-344). Nevertheless, in 1968 the Corps of Chaplains was designated as an independent section under the Chief of Personnel, and its director now held the rank of brigadier. At the same time the chaplains' requests regarding rank were acceded to. Finally, in 1970, the Chaplains' Corps was instituted as an independent department under the direct authority of the Commandant-General. The head of the Corps was renamed the Chaplain-General (1971:237). By 1970 the number of chaplains had grown to 60, which represents significant progress, considering
that there were only two full-time chaplains after World War I and

The next major change came in 1977, when the first National
Service chaplains were trained and appointed with rank of two-pip
lieutenant ("National Service Chaplains"). This was in response
to the growing numbers of National Servicemen following the
lengthening of National Service from one to two years in 1977
(effective January 1978).

As of 1983, there were 126 full-time chaplains, all of whom were
ordained ministers in their respective denominations. In
addition, between 1300 and 1400 clergy served either as part-time

Some comments on the historical development of the chaplaincy in
South Africa might be appropriate. First, the churches seem to
have had little direct involvement in the decisions about the
status of their chaplains. Second, the past seven decades have
witnessed a continual effort by the chaplains themselves to secure
more favourable conditions of service. Whereas the first
full-time Active Citizen Force chaplains after World War I had the
rank of captain, now all Permanent Force and Citizen Force
chaplains have the (protocol) rank of colonel. Third, changes in
the structure of the chaplaincy, the style of dress, and the
nature of the rank carried by chaplains have come largely at the
instance of the chaplains themselves. They were neither imposed
by the military nor directly requested by the churches. Fourth,
chaplains have recognized since World War II that rank can
interfere with pastoral work. Hence the appointment of National
Service chaplains in 1977 with the rank of two-pip lieutenant
seems to contradict the very principles to which Potgieter says
the chaplaincy has traditionally adhered.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the military chaplaincy, I attempt, in this chapter, to make explicit the theological assumptions upon which this inquiry rests. This is done in commitment to critical scholarship, and is intended to be of assistance to the reader, who will undoubtedly be concerned to identify my presuppositions at the start of the inquiry.

This thesis is in no way intended to be a treatise in systematic theology. However, the subject of the military chaplaincy raises a number of complex theological issues. For instance, it raises the issue of church and state, because it represents an extraordinary form of church-state accommodation. It raises the issues of evangelism and pastoral care, because it is often argued that the military chaplaincy provides one of the few vehicles for these forms of ministry, given that all young South African males are subject to conscription. It raises the issue of the outward form and visibility of the church, since the military chaplaincy possesses a hierarchical structure which resembles military structures more closely than it does traditional church structures. It raises the issue of the response of the church to war, on two levels: first, because the existence of the military chaplaincy could be regarded as implying that the church deems participation in war by Christians to be ethically responsible; and second, because the existence of the military chaplaincy could
also be taken by many to presume that the church either supports, or at least does not oppose, the war in which the SADF is engaged. It could be argued that the essence of all these points is that the military chaplaincy raises the issue of ministry, viz. by whom is ministry performed, under whose authority, and in what context? More pointedly, does ministry arise out of the self-understanding of the church, or can it arise out of the psychological needs of young soldiers under stress or out of the military's need for religious involvement, if not legitimation?

It is clear that there are many far-reaching and difficult theological issues which underlie the concept of the military chaplaincy. Attempting to give a thorough theological treatment of all these issues would, given the small compass of a Master's thesis, preclude examination of the particularities of the military chaplaincy of the churches in South Africa. Some narrowing of the theological focus is therefore called for. After all, the present task is to examine a specific kind of ministry (military chaplaincy) of a certain group of churches (the English-speaking churches) in a set period of time (the past decade), and in a definite politico-military context (that of the SADF, both domestically and in Namibia).

In the attempt to narrow the theological focus, it was decided to locate the study within the Reformed tradition, and specifically to adopt the theological approach of Karl Barth. This was no arbitrary decision. My own theological understanding has been strongly influenced by my reading of Barth. More importantly, though, Barth is probably the best known, most prolific and, some would argue, most formative theologian of the twentieth century. Writing at a time of deep social conflict not dissimilar from that
reigning today, he forged a theology of ministry which is widely accepted among many Reformed writers, and more especially among many English-speaking Protestant ministers in South Africa today. His thought is also in many ways representative of ecumenical thought on the subject since World War II. As the exposition unfolds, reference is made to other Reformed writers like Berkhof, Torrance, Weber and Browning. Some material from other traditions is included for the sake of clarity and contrast -- for instance, reference is made to the US "evangelical" Henry, the Lutheran Thielicke and the Catholic Kueng. It is worth stressing that this exposition does not represent an attempt to be innovative, nor to present a finely honed dogmatic treatise. Quite deliberately, it comprises fairly "middle-of-the-road" assumptions which would be acceptable to a wide spectrum of Christians who do not necessarily have high levels of theological education. My aim is to present an argument with which, hopefully, many parish ministers could identify. Finally, this exposition is not intended to be definitive or final. It is a tentative theological statement, compiled in the knowledge that there are other theological approaches which would not necessarily reach the same conclusions regarding the military chaplaincy.

1. Barth's theology of ministry

The exposition commences with a brief outline of the Barthian conception of the locus of ministry.

Crucial to Barth's conception of ministry is his notion of the place of theology in the life of the church. Theology, for Barth, is the "scientific test to which the Christian Church puts herself regarding the language about God which is peculiar to her"
(CD I/1:1). For Barth, theology is inseparable from the life of the Church; it constitutes the critical self-examination of the church concerning its statements about God. Further, Barth argues, the church "measures her language about God by her existence as a Church" (CD I/1:2). Theology exists only because there is talk of God in the church. Theology follows, guides and accompanies the church's utterance concerning God (CD I/1:2). Thus for Barth neither the revelation of the Word of God, nor the understanding and exposition of the Word of God, nor theological reflection on the Word of God can be sundered from ecclesiology. Barth reinforces the point by stressing that the individual Christian is not free to adopt any current religious idea, and urge this upon the community. Rather, he or she should, in dialogue with God and fellow-Christians, reflect on the Word of God and be guided and stimulated by others. Preaching can only be adapted to the circumstances and edifying to the community if it is surrounded and stimulated by the questions and answers of the community (CD III/4:498f).

What is true of the community's reflection is also true of the community's ministry. This, too, is undertaken by the community of God as a whole, not by private individuals or groups within the church. The ministry of God's prophetic Word is entrusted to the community which is the body of Christ, i.e. Christ's earthly-historical form of existence (CD IV/3:681). It is the community that Christ sends out into the world. The task of the community is to confess Jesus Christ. Thus when Barth speaks of ministry, he does not refer to the private activity of an individual but to the ministry of the community (CD IV/3:830). Nor could it be otherwise. Ministry is the attestation of the Word of God (CD IV/3:830), and the Word of God, to Barth's mind,
is heard, reflected upon, and acted upon by the community.

At the risk of anticipating my conclusions, it might be pointed out that all the subsequent discussion about the military chaplaincy in South Africa will return continually to this central assertion: that ministry arises in the context of the church, and is subject neither to the tutelage of the state, nor to the interests of particular groups, nor to the whims of the individual. It is here that Villa-Vicencio's comments about the deideologising effects of ecumenical contact become relevant. Denominational exclusivism, he contends, can become functional to the development of an ideologised Gospel which legitimates partisanship and group interests. Ecumenical encounter, because it makes churches aware of the values and ideologies inherent in their own proclamation of the Gospel, can become a deabsolutising and therefore a deideologising force (Villa-Vicencio, June 1983). This point is of importance for the military chaplaincy because, as we shall see in Chapter 3, the structure of the SACHS is such that many chaplains have more contact with the military than with their churches; as a result they are isolated from the deideologising processes of the church, and more prone to identifying with the ideological forms prevalent in the military.

The touchstone of this work, then, is the Barthian assertion that ministry, which is the attestation of the Word of God, is entrusted to Christ's body the church.

As has been indicated above, however, the military chaplaincy raises several other related issues as well. I therefore outline the Barthian position on the six most immediate of these: church and state, the church's prophetic task, the exemplary role of the church, ministry as service, mission and evangelism, and pastoral
care. Finally, I deal with the ethics of war and make some applications in the South African situation.

Since so much of the discussion about the military chaplaincy revolves around the question of church and state (see the literature review), I proceed to discuss this issue first.

Barth reasons that the church accepts the necessity for the state, both in order to restrain sin and in order to be an instrument of divine grace, according to Rom.13:4,6 (CC+CC:154ff). Therefore, the church prays for the state (RR:129) and subordinates itself to it (CC+CC:158). Yet this does not mean that the church offers the "blindest possible obedience" to the state (CC+CC:159). Rather it means accepting joint responsibility with the state for the preservation of the civil community, coupled with participation in the human search for the best form of political organization. Leaving aside the thorny question of whether the church should proceed to distinguish between the "just state" and the "unjust state" (this has been criticized by Yoder as an "unBarthian" element in his ethics, being a concession to a natural law epistemology, cf. Yoder, 1970:130), it may be said that the church should be a continual reminder to the state of Christ's Lordship: in view of this the church's obedience to the state (any state) is limited. Nevertheless, the main service of the church to the state consists of occupying its own realm as church, by proclaiming the Gospel of justification and the coming Kingdom (RR:146). The church's decisive contribution to the state is its witness to it by being an example of what humanity can be when renewed by the Spirit. This, very briefly, is the essence of Barth's exposition of the external relations of the church with the state.
Regarding the relation of the state to the internal affairs of the church, Barth posits that the internal regulation of the church should be effected by it alone, on the basis of a hearing of the voice of Jesus Christ (CD IV/2:682). He insists that "there can be no question of its subjection to the rules which are valid ... for the constitution and action of other societies" (CD IV/2:681). Only as a free church will the community allow itself to be integrated into the order instituted by the state; but freedom means that the church enacts its own internal law "without even the slightest interference on the part of the national authority" (CD IV/2:690). The state, Barth reasons, cannot exercise jurisdiction within the church, because it misunderstands the church, taking it to be one social grouping among others. The state is not itself a church; it does not exercise faith, hope and love, nor does it repent and receive salvation. Even if many leaders of the state claim to be Christians, the church dare not assume that the state will understand the church's faith and confession in the same way that the church does. The church cannot therefore adopt the state's view of itself. Indeed, Barth is of the opinion that

"the root of almost all the errors which have arisen in this question is to be found in the fact that [the Church] has more or less consistently done so; that it has understood itself in terms of the world's misunderstanding" (CD IV/2:687).

Barth distinguishes carefully between those aspects of state regulation to which the church should, in general, submit and those to which the church can under no circumstances submit, in the following way. The state enacts a "ius circa sacra" which
determines its relationship with the church; to this the church adapts itself willingly, as it does not expect to be shielded from the jurisdiction of the state, or to be given special treatment above other social groupings. However, it adapts only inasmuch as the "ius circa sacra" is not an attempt to shape the church's will and rule its inner life. Therefore the church should be vigilant to see that the "circa sacra" does not become an "in sacra" in an attempt to control its preaching, doctrine and theology (CD IV/2:689).

A drawback in Barth's view is that it may convey a false impression of objectivity if it is taken simplistically and literally. In real life it may be difficult to distinguish between a "ius circa sacra" and a "ius in sacra". Some would see certain state actions as unwarranted interference, while others would see the same actions as the state's legitimate dealing within the sphere of its jurisdiction. It seems that the church should take each case on its own merits and examine it, complex though it may be, in the context of the relationship of church and state as a whole.

Second, it is apparent from Barth's writings that one corollary of this church-state stance is that the church has a task of prophecy or "Christian social criticism" (CD IV/3:892) vis-a-vis the state. As the church ministers to the needs of individuals through its diaconate, it is unable to close its eyes to the fact that disorders in society frequently give rise to these needs (CD IV/3:892; cf. Torrance, 1979:727, and Berkhof, 1979:371,418). Therefore the church "may raise its voice and with its proclamation of the Gospel summon the world to reflect on social injustice and its consequences and to alter the conditions and
relationships in question" (CD IV/3:892). In fact, Barth insists,

"the diaconate and the Christian community become dumb dogs, and their service a service of the ruling powers, if they are afraid to tackle at their social roots the evils by which they are confronted" (CD IV/3:893).

For Barth, this prophetic action is an integral part of the total witness and ministry of the church, since it concerns the Kingdom of God. Prophetic witness is

"an action based on perception into the meaning of the current events, relationships and forms both of its own history and that of the world around in their positive and negative connection to the imminent Kingdom of God attested by it and therefore in their significance for the concrete form of this witness" (CD IV/3:895).

Similarly, Berkhof argues that loving the neighbour and the enemy in an act of mercy may require that the church assume a prophetic task of confronting the authorities with the will of God and challenging them to promote justice, freedom and peace (1979:418). The church cannot avoid being a "critical societal watchdog" (1979:371).

Barth contends further that on many issues the church is unable to maintain a position of neutrality without engaging in "false prophecy"; it may have to choose decisively for one side against another (CD III/4:511f). The church has a charge, over against the state, to "call good good, and evil evil" (CPPD:56). To be sure, the church is required to do nothing more than witness to the "pure Gospel". But, as Barth points out, the pure Gospel may
mean taking sides and eschewing neutrality:

"The timeless or supra-temporal Gospel which is neutral and avoids contemporary events is certainly not the pure Gospel, and if its testimony is designed to be evangelical in an abstract sense it is not only not prophetic but is actually false prophecy. For if anything is false prophecy, it is the proclamation of a community which for safety's sake tries to withdraw into an inner line and to devote itself to neutrality" (CD III/4:512).

Other writers agree that to pretend to say nothing in an attempt to be apolitical, is an illusion, for to remain silent in a time of social conflict is to support the status quo, by default if nothing else. For instance, van Wyk notes pithily:


Henry argues similarly that the theological existence of the church involves an inescapable political dimension (1979:530). Moltmann goes so far as to say that the assertion of the sole Lordship of Christ cannot but issue in political conflict (1977:15).

However, the church's ministry of prophecy cannot remain only on the verbal level. Sometimes the most important "statement" that the church can make is the symbolic witness implicit in its own form and practice. On this its credibility rests. To the church's sorrow this implied witness might not tend to confirm its convictions; the church cannot avoid the uncomfortable fact that
"what the church is rather than what it says will be best understood by the world and the State" (CC+CC:187).

Third, this discussion leads us to consider the role of the church as the exemplar for humanity in general. The Christian church, as the body of Jesus Christ and therefore the earthly-historical form of His existence, is the "provisional representation of the humanity sanctified in Him" (CD IV/2:719). The church cannot give the world a direct portrayal of Jesus Christ, or of the peace, freedom and joy of the Kingdom of God; there is no question of its setting up the Kingdom of God on earth (CD IV/2:725). However, through its form, upbuilding and constitution, it can show that "there is already on earth an order which is based on that great alteration of the human situation" (CD IV/2:721). In this way, the church contributes to the improvement of human law, towards achieving "more serious order, more certain peace, more genuine freedom, and a more solid maintenance and fashioning of human life, and human life in society" (CD IV/2:723).

What, then, are the values which the church attempts to represent, in however provisional a fashion? Barth's answer is that the life of the Christian community is characterized by service. Service, he contends, "is not just one of the determinations of the being of the community. It is its being in all its functions" (CD IV/2:692). In the fellowship of the community there is "total common and reciprocal responsibility", which is achieved by the "total self-giving of each to all" (CD IV/2:724); every member of the community, irrespective of his or her estate, endowment, background or nature, is "treated absolutely as a brother". The church reminds the state that "man is its true theme and subject-matter" (CD IV/2:724). Furthermore, the church
is a model in that it conducts its affairs on the basis of mutual trust — "neither in its establishment nor its execution is it supported by any alien power" (CD IV/2:723).

Even though the community is to be characterized by service, it is not to become so impressed into the economy of human affairs that it loses its "alien character" (CD IV/3:744). The community "does not really belong"; it refuses to "maintain itself by adaptation to the world" and is thus seen to be "alien and disruptive" (CD IV/3:744). In its weakness as a pilgrim community maintaining a "marginal existence", it becomes the vehicle of God's strength (CD IV/3:745f).

Other writers also stress this exemplary role of the church. Berknoф describes the church as the "experimental garden of a new humanity" (1979:415), because it witnesses to the world about the new life in Christ which manifests itself in love and reconciliation, in new attitudes about materialism, work and possessions, and in demonstration of the fruit of the Spirit (cf. Gal. 5:22f; Mt. 5; Eph. 4:30-32; Phil. 4:8). Henry has a similar concept of the church as the "alternative society". For him the body of Christ is a tangible community consisting not merely of invisible relationships but one in which justice and peace are visibly united (1979:527). Jesus called this "new social reality" into being so that it might "live in ultimate loyalty not to worldly powers but to the risen Lord in a corporate life of truth, righteousness and mercy" (1979:529). The role of the church is "to witness to the world by a new way of life through voluntary subjection to the Lord the coming King" (1979:531). Henry stresses that to be persuasive the church should "convincingly embody what it preaches" (1979:541).
Fourth, the exemplary role of the church prompts consideration of the nature of the ministry which the church offers. For Barth, ministry is characterized by service, and should be performed by all members of the Christian community (CD IV/4:72). Not all Christians have to serve in the same function, but the service of the individual is indispensable to that of the whole: "Exalted into fellowship with Jesus Christ, each Christian as such is set in the lowliness of His service" (CD IV/2:693). Barth argues that "Law and order in the community are never the particular priesthood of a few, but the universal priesthood of all believers" (CD IV/2:694; cf. CD IV/4:38,201). Accordingly, Barth is careful in his use of the word "office": he cautions that it should be used only "on the understanding that in the Christian community either all are office-bearers or none; and if all, then only as servants" (CD IV/2:694). He sharpens his argument against "practical clericalism" yet further: "The unity and universality of the Church's ministry will always be, not a beautiful ideal, but the absolute law of the community" (CD IV/2:695), which excludes all possibility of "autonomy or a struggle for power and prestige" (CD IV/2:695). Indeed, he insists that those who perform functions in the church do so

"not in the form of a hierarchy, only in the form of service in special offices, which neither know of precedence among themselves, nor signify a precedence in their holders over the community members not in office, because in principle there is no other mediator, because the mediators have found their fulfilment in the Mediator of the New Testament" (CD I/2:105; cf. also CD IV/2:691).

Other Reformed writers echo these sentiments. Weber points out
that in the body of Christ the role of the "little" has been exchanged with that of the "great" (cf. Mt. 18:1-5, 19:13ff, Mk. 9:35). Therefore, he argues, relationships of authority are different in the body of Christ from the way they are in the world (1983:567). Furthermore, the leadership of the church arises through Christ's gracious presence in the community by the Holy Spirit, which grants the wealth of charismata and ministries listed in I Cor. 12 and Rom. 12 (Weber, 1983:580ff). Thus the order of the church does not derive from abstract principles of order, but from Christ's gift of offices to its members (1983:567f). Service excludes a ruling, autocratic office as well as all authoritarianism and hypostasization (Berkouwer, 1976:223). Office-bearers, too, must give account (Heb. 13:17), hence their relation to others in the body of Christ is one of mutual submission (Berkouwer, 1976:225). Moltmann even prefers the term "assignment" to "ministry", because of undertones of hierarchy and bureaucracy in the latter (1977:302). If service flows from compassion and mutual submission, then the person exercising ministry in the church should not use worldly power to enhance its success, for this "betrays the essential nature of service as service" (Torrance, 1979:728). Similarly, Thielicke insists that worldly prominence and conformity to those who rule are not characteristics of service (1982:237). He reasons that no-one exercising ministry has an "exclusive hierarchical position" in relation to the community (1982:231). He argues that since all have been entrusted with the responsibility of ministry, no-one should thrust himself forward and undertake tasks without the church's consent and selection; since ministry is entrusted to the church as a whole, it should be done representatively. Officebearers do not choose themselves but are chosen (Thielicke,
Likewise, Berkhof says that those who are chosen to administer the church "must have the confidence and the mandate of the congregation" (1979:379). It is of note that Kueng, from a Catholic perspective, also argues that since the Spirit grants charisms to all, there should be no division between the pastor and the people; rather pastors should maintain fellowship and collegiality, not only among themselves, but also with the people (1978:432,436).

It is of interest to mention in this regard that for Campbell the notion of ministry as service entails vulnerability on the part of the pastor. He tries to show how Christ as the Wounded Healer restores the broken relationships between God, humanity and the universe (1981:47ff). The images of the Suffering Servant (Is. 53:4ff) and the sacrificial Son of Man (Mt. 20:28) are ones of healing, since the power of God is discovered among weakness. The pastor who has not shielded himself or herself from pain is able to heal by conveying both an awareness and a transcendence of loss. Campbell suggests that "the authority with which we offer help to others derives from our own acquaintance with grief" (1981:50).

The fifth area of theological importance for this study of the military chaplaincy is that of mission and evangelism. In Barth's opinion, the church does not exist for itself; it exists for the Gospel (CD II/4:506). The church's ministry of witness is addressed both to those who are still in darkness, and who need to be summoned to the knowledge and obedience of the Gospel, and to those inside the church, since all Christians need to be nourished and comforted daily (CD IV/3:832). Barth stresses that this "outward reach" of the church is integral to its ministry: if its
work is not to become a work of "sterile inbreeding", it must accept the priority of its sending into the world (CD IV/3:833).

This aspect of the witness of the church has been sharpened by some. Wesley, for instance, uttered a profound theological truth in his aphorism, "The whole world is my parish". This does not mean "the whole world save for a few ugly areas where death and destruction and suffering are the paramount realities" (McAfee Brown, in Cox, 1971: 141). Rule 11 of "Rules of a Helper" urges all Christians to "go always, not only to those who want you, but to those who want you most" (LD:379). While recognizing the dangers of compromised ministry, Thomas points out that we are to follow Christ in ministering to all people caught in all kinds of dilemmas, and he rejects pious theologies of withdrawal, because "there is no theology of withdrawal that can be rationalized in the ministry of Jesus" (MC-UMC:9,13f).

However, it is crucial to bear in mind that Barth does not slide into an individualistic understanding at this point. Witness, for Barth, remains the witness of the community, and is combined with the church's important tasks of pastoral care, the diaconate, and prophetic action. Barth neither hierarchizes nor prioritizes these tasks in such a way as to suggest that evangelism and biblical teaching are more important than the diaconate and prophetic action. On the contrary, he asserts that in the diaconate

"the community has a unique chance unequivocally to accomplish and manifest its witness as a ministry of witness. This is what makes the diaconate formally so important and indispensable as a basic form of witness" (CD IV/3:891).
Indeed, it would be ridiculous to prioritize in this way, for, as he comments rhetorically,

"Is there any preaching, evangelisation or cure of souls which is not necessarily an act of diaconate, or which does not directly or indirectly include such an act? Is there any form of diaconate which is not implicitly or explicitly preaching, evangelisation and cure of souls?" (CD IV/3:890).

The sixth area which should be discussed is that of pastoral care. This is of particular relevance because, as will be seen in Chapter 3, many of the chaplains justify their role in the SADF by stressing that as pastors they must minister to men's needs, which task, they feel, is facilitated by their possessing military status. From a Barthian perspective, however, pastoral care cannot be divorced from the total ministry of the church. Thus while it would not be incorrect to underscore the diaconal aspect of pastoral care, its prophetic aspect should not be omitted. Let us discuss these aspects in turn.

(a) First I try to show that pastoral care includes a diaconal aspect responsive to people's needs. As the servant of others and the servant of God, the pastor has a special concern to alleviate physical and spiritual pain, to bring healing to human relationships, and to respond to the needs of the whole person. This role of the pastor is often modelled upon the biblical symbolism of the shepherd, who cares faithfully for the sheep, or upon the biblical account of Jesus' ministry of healing. This healing, helping and loving role of the pastor links up with the assertion that ministry has the character of service, which means self-giving out of love and compassion. This role also links up with the assertion that the church offers ministry to all.
pastor dare not be selective in his or her caring, but should demonstrate concern for people within and without the church, and especially for "those who want you most" (LD:379).

What sort of needs are the prior concern of the pastor? Views diverge widely as to what needs are paramount. I shall propose, following John Cobb, that the aim of pastoral care is to achieve "human wholeness", broadly defined (1977:11). This concept repudiates all notions of a bifurcation of body and soul.

Implicit in it is the assumption that the distinctive aim of the church for individual human beings can be summed up as health and strength of spirit, which in turn enables people to take responsibility for their lives (1977:12f). The church works toward the goal of human wholeness by bringing its accumulated wisdom to bear in helping people to understand the meaning of their existence through worship and the study of the Bible (cf. Cobb, 1977:18). It follows that the pastor will not be content to care only for superficial needs. His or her honesty and integrity will inspire a search for the truth of each situation and urge the persons being cared for to understand their deeper needs. Campbell insists that genuine care proceeds from the integrity of the pastor, which may be understood as that "inner strength which prevents us from bending to the influence of what is thought expedient or fashionable or calculated to win praise" (1981:24). The pastor of integrity is

"first and foremost a critic of himself, of tendencies to self-deception and escape from reality, of desire for a false inner security in place of the confrontation with truth which integrity demands" (1981:24).

Holmes also stresses integrity as a component of pastoral care.
The pastor should not "serve as a sop for a guilty conscience, an escape for the Christian unwilling to face the reality of his and his fellowman's sins within the present society. Racism, economic exploitation, and failures of justice are often covered by mysticism and religious privatism" (1971:247).

(b) Pastoral care also possesses a prophetic dimension. This is for at least three reasons. First, the prophetic dimension is an integral part of the Barthian vision of ministry. It must be taken seriously, for it is "a test of the genuineness of [the church's] ministry in every other function that in them too, in its preaching, prayer, diaconate, theology etc., its ministry should have this prophetic character regardless of the consequences" (CD IV/3:897). Second, this prophetic dimension in pastoral care follows from the notion of the integrity of the pastor which has been mentioned above. Third, it follows from the nature of the theological presuppositions which inform the ministry of the church as a whole. Browning, for instance, shows how the search for genuine caring can be facilitated by a moral and theological framework which covers the situation in question. He urges,

"Before the minister starts counseling a couple contemplating divorce, wouldn't it be well to deal with this within a context of meanings, more or less shared or assumed by the members of the church? When is divorce legitimate? What are the mutual obligations of the couple to examine themselves and their motives before the divorce? What fair and just procedure is to be followed in getting the divorce?" (1976:97)...
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"We must have a theological ethics of sexuality as a context for our work with persons in sexual difficulties. We must have something like a positive theology of interpersonal relations, death, illness, and aging before we can successfully care for and counsel people undergoing crises in these areas of life" (1976:16).

We might add that caring for and counseling people in a military context also needs a moral framework. Indeed, Browning suggests that there is an explicit or implicit moral context to all acts of care, even when these are performed by secular therapists (1976:11). He says that care in a Christian context should "exhibit a kind of practical moral inquiry into the way life should be ordered" (1976:15), since care is not only a question of "having the right emotional attitude and a little psychological knowledge" (1976:16). If possible, there should be a continuity between the goals and procedures of the church and the goals and procedures of pastoral care (1976:19). Just as the church sets itself the goal of summoning its people to an obedient hearing of the Gospel, so pastoral care should participate in this overall goal. This does not mean that the church uses pastoral care as an instrument to inculcate its views in the hapless client. This would lead to legalism and loss of regard for the conscience of the person being cared for. Campbell suggests that teaching in pastoral care need not be indoctrination but can take the form of exploration whereby the pastor "endeavours to evoke a questioning and searching response in the learner" (1981:17). Pastors, he says, should be companions, and not imagine themselves to be the representatives of a rigid orthodoxy (1981:15ff). Similarly Browning is of the opinion that a major task for training in pastoral care in the future is "how to enter into sensitive moral
inquiry with troubled and confused individuals without becoming moralistic" (1976:26). This concept of the pastor as helper, companion and fellow traveller is related to the assertion of the "priesthood of all believers". If, as is increasingly being recognized, the key to pastoral care is in the relationship, we might ask whether any person may not be a pastor "simply from the depths of his or her own humanity" (Campbell, 1981:22). If pastoral care is a relationship founded upon the integrity of an individual (1981:46), then it becomes possible to speak of the "pastorhood of all believers" (Campbell, 1981:41).

In sum we might say that the pastoral task embraces both a dimension of diaconal caring and a dimension of prophetic challenging.
2. Ethics of war

I now proceed to outline my presuppositions in the area of the ethics of war. My assumptions are four-fold: (i) respecting particular wars which occur, the church should at least make an effort to distinguish between just and unjust wars; (ii) in addition to this, the church also has a positive mission of peace-making; (iii) the church should support sincere conscientious objection, whether religious or not, and whether pacifist or selective; and (iv) the church should exercise its prophetic task by declaring the SADF presence in Namibia to be illegal and immoral, and by pointing out that SADF activities within South Africa's borders are basically in defence of apartheid. These assertions require substantiation.

(i) Vastly differing assessments of the possibility of moral discourse about war have been expressed. On the one hand, some nineteenth-century theorists held that war, as an instrument of national policy, was subject only to group interests; to moralize about war or to set limits to it would obstruct its purpose, which is to subdue the opponent (Best, 1980:143ff). Similarly, some Marxist commentators hold that all moralizing apart from class interest is illusion; the sole ethical reality is the logic of the class struggle. Should the latter issue in war, moral scruples to limit or prevent hostilities would only be counterrevolutionary. In accordance with this thesis, the North Vietnamese submission to the diplomatic conference which led up to the Geneva Protocols of 1977 allowed only for a "ius ad bellum" for anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist wars, excluding all "ius in bello" considerations (Best, 1980:313ff). On the other hand, a wide variety of secular commentators and virtually all writers
of theological ethics believe that our discourse about war is inevitably moral. They feel that war is not beyond moral reflection and is not subject only to calculations of utility, interest and greed. Walzer, for example, speaks of the "moral reality of war" (1977), apparent in the fact that the language of war is shot through with ethical evaluation. Since the present work is one of theological ethics, it seems safe for my purpose to assume that both recourse to war and actions within war are, theoretically at least, subject to moral limits.

The Christian church has traditionally expressed its moral seriousness about war through variants of the just war doctrine. This is the official position of the Catholic Church, expressed most clearly in Vatican II (Gaudium et Spes, n.79). The "just war" orientation emerges in the Augsburg Confession, the Thirty-Nine Articles, and the Westminster Confession (Marrin, 1971:94f). The 1689 Baptist Confession, which was definitive for the Particular Baptists of England and Wales for two centuries, and which was republished by Charles Haddon Spurgeon in 1855 and again by English Reformed Baptists in 1975, permits Christian participation in war "when this is found to be just and necessary" (A faith to confess:54). The World Council of Churches, despite its strong orientation toward peacemaking, has always allowed for the possibility that participation in certain wars may be justifiable for Christians (PD:10,15,21,62). Despite their clarion call for peace, the Reformed churches of West Germany retain the lineaments of the traditional "just war" ethic (Das Bekenntnis:27). Moreover, most "mainline" denominations have at least an implicit "just war" orientation, in that their members participate in wars, their theologies are not explicitly pacifist, and they have supported particular wars in the past, often
referring to the actions of the warring parties in vividly moral terminology. Most theologians and ethicists, pacifists excluded, normally make use of just war theory of some kind. Though superficially a departure from the just war tradition, Barth's "Grenzfall" ethic can also be described as a kind of just war theory. O'Brien has compiled a comprehensive bibliography of these writers, which is impressive for its ecumenical breadth and its sheer volume (1981:362f). The new journal "This World" reflects the recent resurgence of just war thought (as in van Rossum, 1982; Owens, 1983 and 1984; Finn, 1984; etc.) Significantly, many of the best-known writers are Protestants. These theologians, and several of the churches referred to above, are increasingly resorting to variants of just war theory in the search for guidelines about the arms race, guerrilla warfare, and nuclear warfare (cf. CB:95; PD passim; the pastoral letter of the US Catholic Bishops (Time 8.11.1982, 29.11.82, 11.4.83, 16.5.83); Das Bekenntnis). Johnson's conclusion is that the just war tradition is "the fundamental way we in the West think about the justification and limitation of violence" (1981:329). One suspects that if any view is a maverick one, it is the view that the church has no business distinguishing just wars from unjust ones!

However, this is not to make a case for just war doctrine. That system of thought has in any case done heavy weather in the twentieth century. Just war theory has properly been criticized, by pacifists and non-pacifists alike, for its tendency to justify war rather than limit it. It has been pointed out that conditions of reasonably controlled war which may have existed in past centuries no longer obtain (e.g. Hertz, 1968; CB:94-98). Of the major twentieth century theologians, Barth has been most
unequivocal in his rejection of the complacency with which the church has traditionally justified war (cf. CD III/4:453ff). The debate about whether a particular war can ever be declared just cannot be entered into here. Instead, my objective is the limited one of pointing out that all moral reflection about war, and just war theory in particular, is a double-edged sword. If ethical thought permits participation by Christians in war, provided certain conditions are fulfilled, then there is the possibility that participation is wrong if they are not fulfilled. It follows that the church may, as an outworking of its ministry of mercy, and in the exercise of its prophetic task in society, find that a particular war does not measure up to its standards of justice. That this process of judgement of the moral probity of a war is complex and risky is no reason for the church to shirk the effort. The enormous suffering and evil inflicted by war—especially in the twentieth century—demands that the church make every effort to decide what is the most moral course to adopt. Thus Barth, while rejecting pacifism, condemns various kinds of war, e.g. war to set right the internal conditions of another state, as "acts of murder", and insists that the church should rally against them:

"The Christian Church has to testify unambiguously that wars waged for such reasons are not just and therefore ought not to be undertaken ... the state must not be given carte blanche to grasp the ultima ratio of organizing mass slaughter in its dealings with other states ... [The Church] is certainly commissioned to oppose the satanic doctrine that war is inevitable and therefore justified, that it is unavoidable and therefore right when it occurs, so that Christians have to participate in it ... There is never in practice an absolute necessity of war" (CD
(ii) The church has a task of peace (1). At the outset a distinction may be drawn between a negative and a positive understanding of peace. The former regards peace primarily as the cessation of hostilities. Reference may be made to the Pax Romana, or the peace of mutual nuclear deterrence following World War II. However, this is to confuse "peace" with "truce", or "tranquillity". This sort of peace may not be incompatible with injustice; it may even be founded on injustice. Tacitus attributed a sage remark to a British chieftain regarding the Roman invasion: "They have made a desolation, and they call it peace" (quoted in Macquarrie, 1973:30). The positive understanding of peace, on the other hand, stresses the biblical tradition of "shalom" which means wholeness, well-being, and harmony with God and with fellow human beings. Along similar lines, Gerhard Liedke stresses that peace is better seen as a process than as a condition; and if it is a process it entails minimizing violence, suffering, lack of freedom, and fear (in Hessler, 1975:35-42). Peace, as shalom, is inseparable from justice. It is an anticipation of that eschatological ideal of peace which is fulfilled in the coming Kingdom of God. Peace is an aspect of the New Creation which is the destiny that God offers to all. Peace on earth springs from Christ's breaking down of barriers, starting with the hitherto alienated Jews and Greeks (Eph.2:14f). The Christian community, reconciled by the death of Christ (Eph.2:13), assumes the challenge of working for a just peace, proceeding from its special insight the love of enemies. Viewed in this light, the work of peace is constitutive of the Gospel itself. This fact has been taken seriously by the German Reformed churches which have, with an eye to the ever-present
threat of nuclear war, elevated the issue of peace to that of "status confessionis" (Das Bekenntnis:6).

The task of peace is linked to the assumptions made above. Because the church is the "experimental garden of a new humanity", it assumes the task of reconciliation of the estranged. Furthermore, the church's ministry of mercy and prophecy may be expressed in its search for a just peace. As part of this search, the church is called to participate in providing the means for communication among people of different races, cultures and political systems. Archbishop Kirill pointed out to the Sixth Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1983 that the churches of the USSR and the USA contributed to overcoming fear and alienation between the two sides during the "cold war", and were an important factor in replacing confrontation by dialogue. He added that the churches, to the extent that they constitute an ecumenical fellowship independent of national belonging and political views, have a "special role" of building trust among nations (1983:1,4).

What should the church do when war threatens? Barth stresses that the church should do all it can to fashion a true peace among nations to keep war at bay; it should press to the last for negotiation and compromise before war is permitted to break out. It should reject the "satanic doctrine" that war is inevitable and therefore justified. Only if the church has done this may it issue a "call to martial resolution" (CD III/4:460f). At this point, however, a break must be made with Barth's war ethics. He proceeds, on the basis of his "Grenzfall" ethic, to volunteer that "If war is ventured in obedience and therefore with a good conscience, it is also ventured in faith and therefore with
joyous and reckless determination" (CD III/4:463).

Perhaps the finest critique of this position -- and one with which the present author substantially agrees -- is that of Yoder (1970). Space does unfortunately not permit a more careful examination of this point. Suffice it to say that many European churches -- and, indeed, many churches throughout the northern hemisphere -- have, in view of the nuclear threat, departed from their naive just war positions and are insisting that their actions respecting war should be informed, in the first place, by a theology of peace (cf. literature cited at the start of this section). They are increasingly adopting the position that even if war breaks out, violence is not to be blessed as a technique of resolving conflict. War is always the tragic consequence of sin. Even though some of its members may feel constrained by conscience to participate in a particular war in order to protect the weak, the church cannot be called upon to justify violence and killing. Violence, as we are reminded by a theological statement from East Germany,

"always remains questionable ... we must call guilt by its name and damage by its name, and we must resist the temptation to make euphemisms for the use of violence as "just struggle" or "just rebellion" (quoted in Villa-Vicencio, March 1983:61).

The view has been expressed (in Conscientious Objection: A Counsellor's Resource Manual, pp 61-64) that participation in warfare, if contemplated at all, should take the form of "agonized participation". This position holds that "while war can never be an act of justice, it may sometimes be necessary for the prevention of a greater evil that would result from permitting
morally perverse power to gain political dominance". The participant, who supports the war on the grounds of a "tortured Christian sensitivity", conducts the war with an attitude of contrition free of vindictive hatred, in the full recognition that "military victory, while necessary, is but a negative attainment that clears the way for subsequent political and social programmes designed to re-establish reasonable justice and order".

This emphasis on "agonized participation" seems an appropriate one in view of the vastly more destructive technology available to modern armed forces. It would be a corrective to the vindictiveness that invites further rounds of violence, and could spare the excesses of violence that might be inspired by Barth's confidence that war can be pursued with "joyous and reckless determination" (CD III/4:463).

Like Luther's sorrowful judge (cf. Bainton, 1978:241), the self-critical attitude implicit in "agonized participation" could be a continual check on group pride and anger, and so help preserve the conviction that war is to be undertaken only in the last resort, and even then with the sole intention of bringing about a just peace.

(iii) The topic of peace leads on naturally to consideration of conscientious objection. I assume that the church should support all sincere conscientious objectors, whether religious or non-religious, and whether pacifist or selective. This seems reasonable, in the first place, in view of the fact that this is the position of all the English-speaking churches under consideration, as is evident from statements made in the past
decade. The position of these churches was also revealed in their rejection of the new 1983 legislation on conscientious objection, on the basis that it fails to allow for all the above-mentioned forms of conscientious objection (2).

In the second place, several of these churches have ancient traditions of respect for conscience. For instance, the first Baptist confession of 1646 in London upheld the freedom of conscience (3). Similarly, the Congregational Church has a concern for conscience which extends back to its Anabaptist origins. At the other end of the theological spectrum, the Catholic Church also has a long tradition, most clearly expressed in the Middle Ages, which championed the conscience (4). Whereas Pope Pius XII disapproved of conscientious objection under a democracy (PD:137), the Second Vatican Council reaffirmed the traditional doctrine that

"every man has in his heart a law written by God. To obey it is the very dignity of man" (Gaudium et Spes n.16), and went on to commend conscientious objection (Gaudium et Spes n.79). Pope Paul II regards conscientious objection as a "sign of maturity" (Southern Cross 11.3.1984). Accordingly the US Catholic Bishops hold that if conscience impels one not to participate in a particular war, then one "sins gravely" by taking part in it (documents reprinted in CIIR, 1982:105).

Within the Anglican tradition, successive Lambeth conferences have upheld the right of conscientious objection (CB:125). In addition there is much in the Reformed tradition to support the rights of conscience. Calvin writes,

"Our consciences have not to do with men but with God only
... the worship of God, and the spiritual rule of living righteously, are superior to all the decrees of men ... human laws...do not therefore in themselves bind the conscience" (Inst. IV/X,5).

Therefore, Calvin proceeds,

"We are subject to the men who rule over us, but subject only in the Lord. If they command anything against Him let us not pay the least regard to it" (Inst., IV/XX,32).

Kuyper insists that the government "must give way itself to the sovereign conscience" (1976:108). Conscience, in Kuyper's opinion,

"can never be subject to man but always and ever to God Almighty... In order that it may be able to rule MEN, the government must respect this deepest ethical power of our human existence. A nation, consisting of citizens whose consciences are bruised, is itself broken in its national strength" (1976:108).

Also in the Reformed tradition, Barth argues that the question of war "is addressed specifically and in full seriousness to the individual .. [and] should be the theme of a supremely personal interrogation". To assert otherwise is to make an "illusory distinction between individual and social ethics" (CD III/4:464ff).

In the third place, there is massive evidence that churches throughout the world have, in the twentieth century, come to respect sincere conscientious objection of all the above-mentioned kinds. For example, "Words of Conscience" lists some 75 different
religious groupings and denominations in the USA which support sincere conscientious objection across the board. Among these are "main-line" Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopal, and Lutheran churches. The World Council of Churches has, since its inception, lauded those who "refuse military service of all kinds" (PD:16). (5) Recent opinion in the WCC and the Catholic Church embraces selective conscientious objection as well. For instance, an expert conference in Austria in 1970, reporting jointly to the WCC and the Pontifical Commission for Justice and Peace, allowed for this right (Bailey, 1972:20; cf. also WCC statements at Uppsala, 1968, documented by Kinchy, 1976:34).

In the fourth place, the view that conscientious objection is impermissible, or that it is limited to religious pacifism, appears to be restricted to a minority in the present century. Incidentally, Schleiermacher denied the individual the right to distinguish between just and unjust wars, because the individual does not have the information to make such a judgment, and must therefore obey authority (quoted in van Wyk, 1984:218). Heyns' view, later adopted as the official NGK view (NGAS:116), is that universal pacifism as a principle is unacceptable and foreign to the tradition of Christianity (Heyns, 1980:5,11,15). Furthermore, selective conscientious objection, because it strikes at the existence and orderly functioning of the state, and hence threatens society as a whole, is intolerable to any government (1980:7,8). For no stated reason, Heyns then asserts that universal pacifist objectors should be granted a non-military alternative to military service, but that selective conscientious objectors should not (1980:20). This self-contradictory position has been given a richly deserved rebuttal by Dr. Etienne de Villiers (in CIGS, 1984:42-46).
In conclusion, it seems reasonable that the church should support sincere conscientious objectors, whether religious or non-religious, and whether universal or selective.

(iv) My position on the conflicts in which the SADF is involved is essentially the same as those which certain South African churches have adopted. This section therefore consists of a brief exposition and defence of those positions. I commence with the case of Namibia before proceeding to discuss SADF activities within South Africa. Since this area is one of acrid controversy within the churches and elsewhere, I have included a much more thorough treatment of the subject in Appendix A.

In 1982 the South African Catholic Bishops issued a "Report on Namibia" which said there was "a universal consensus ... that South Africa has no right to be in Namibia", and urged the withdrawal of the South African security forces from the area as a precondition for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (Report:114). The following year both the CPSA and the MCSA adopted similar resolutions (Cape Times 19.4.1983, and Statement). This position is based, first, upon the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia. After World War I, South Africa administered the territory as a League of Nations mandate. After World War II, all former League mandatories were invited to submit their mandates to the UN trusteeship system. All but South Africa agreed. Later the National Party argued that the dissolution of the League terminated the mandate, and South Africa now ruled by right of occupation. (In fact this remained the official South African position until the 1970s). South Africa's motives were deeply distrusted when the Prime Minister announced that SWA was to be granted representation in the South African
parliament in order to knit the region constitutionally closer to South Africa. In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to confirm that South Africa was obliged to submit to UN supervision, and could not modify the mandate by making SWA into a "fifth province". However, the ICJ ruled in 1966 that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked the necessary locus standi to obtain a decision. Nevertheless, the General Assembly passed Resolution 2145 (XXI) in 1966 which terminated the mandate. In 1968 the Security Council endorsed the Assembly resolution and passed its own Resolution 276, which deemed South Africa's presence in the territory illegal. Thereupon the Security Council asked the ICJ for a legal opinion. After overruling South Africa's preliminary objections to the case, the ICJ gave its verdict. It doubted that the General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) was legally binding, but stressed that the Security Council Resolution 276 was legally binding under Article 25 of the Charter. South Africa was therefore obliged to withdraw from SWA. The ICJ case appears to hinge on the question of the UN succession to the League. In this regard it is of note that South Africa had itself acknowledged the UN succession by submitting a report on the territory to the General Assembly in 1946. The court had, moreover, insisted on UN succession in its judgements of 1950, 1955, 1956 and 1962 (Dugard, 1971:464). Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that South Africa has no legal right to administer the territory.

The position of the churches is based, second, on the fact of South African maladministration of the territory. As soon as 1922, Africans were confined to reserves and subjected to police checks and pass laws (CIIR, 1981:10). During the 1950s, the apartheid system was gradually extended in the territory, in con-
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The 1964 Odendaal Commission Report urged the implementation of the homelands policy in Namibia.

Resistance dates back to well before the 1950s, when chiefs and church leaders made representations to the government. In 1958 the Ovamboland People's Organization (later SWAPO) was formed. However, its non-violent efforts at reform were met with the violence of arrests, imprisonment and torture (CIIR, 1981:13ff; cf. UN International Conference, A/CONF. 120/5, n.44-66). SWAPO resorted to guerrilla warfare, using Angola as a base. The result was a massive South African troop buildup on the northern border of Namibia.

During the 1960s and 1970s the churches of Namibia adopted an ever stronger stance against the South African occupation. For instance, in an open letter to Dr. Henry Kissinger in 1976, church leaders expressed their conviction that "the vast majority" of black Namibians wanted South Africa to leave the territory, because of South Africa's "ever increasing role of terror" (Statements:5f). Neither the UN, nor SWAPO, nor the churches were satisfied with South Africa's repeated attempts to outflank the desires of the majority, from the Turnhalle Conference in 1975 to the Multi-Party Conference in 1984.

Thus it seems that the South African churches were justified in calling for the withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia.

Regarding the activities of the SADF within South Africa, the 1982 Provincial Synod of the CPSA adopted the standpoint that a "vital function" of the SADF has become the protection of the unjust structures of apartheid. It went on to express its "serious
doubts about the legitimacy of a military system whose role is increasingly seen as the protector of a profoundly immoral and unjust social order" (see CPSA, "Acts and Resolutions of the 24th Session of Provincial Synod, 1982", Resolution 13: "Service in the SADF", p 42f). This position should be understood, first, in the light of the perceived injustice of the racial order in South Africa. The foundations of the "homelands" system were laid by the 1913 Land Act which dispossessed thousands of Africans. From the 1950s on, Africans were stripped of their South African citizenship and made citizens of one or other of the "homelands", which together comprise some 13% of the area of South Africa. This political and economic dispossession of the majority, together with the innumerable laws which buttress this racial order, constitutes the fundamental injustice of the system which came to be known as apartheid. Crucially important, in the CPSA view, is that the reformist moves of Prime Minister Botha have not even attempted to tinker with this central aspect of South Africa's racial dispensation.

The English-speaking churches' tradition of opposition to racism extends back to the time of the early nineteenth century missionaries, and especially John Philip of the London Missionary Society. However, it was after the accession to power of the National Party in 1948 that the churches began to make strong public statements on racial policy. For instance, in that year most of them criticized proposed legislation aimed at depriving Africans of their limited Parliamentary representation (de Gruchy, 1979:54f). Apartheid also came in for attack by Prof. Ben Marais and Prof. B.B. Keet of the Dutch Reformed Church. A high point was reached with the promulgation, in 1957, of a clause of the Native Laws Amendment Bill which would have made it difficult for
black people to attend worship in churches in so-called white areas. Several of the English-speaking churches announced that they would be forced into disobedience should this Bill become law (de Gruchy, 1979:61f). The offending clauses were soon dropped.

In that year, the Catholic Bishops issued a statement in which apartheid was rejected as "fundamentally evil" (de Gruchy and Villa-Vicencio, 1983:145ff).

Another milestone was reached with the Cottesloe Consultation of 1960, which concluded that "no-one who believes in Jesus Christ may be excluded from any church on the grounds of his colour or race", and mentioned the evil effects of migratory labour and job reservation (de Gruchy, 1979:66). It also gave rise to the formation of the Christian Institute led by Beyers Naude. The "Message to the people of South Africa" marked a further stiffening in the position of the English-speaking churches. The "Message" declared that apartheid had become a "novel gospel" which conflicted with the Christian Gospel, because it "holds out to men a security built not on Christ but on the theory of separation, and the preservation of racial identity" (in de Gruchy and Villa-Vicencio, 1983:154-159). In 1977 the Lutheran World Federation declared that the situation in Southern Africa constituted a "status confessionis" (de Gruchy and Villa-Vicencio, 1983:160f). Finally, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, meeting at Ottawa in 1982, declared "that apartheid is a sin, and that the moral and theological justification of it is a travesty of the Gospel and, in its persistent disobedience to the Word of God, a theological heresy" (documented in de Gruchy and Villa-Vicencio, 1983:170).

The armed conflict in South Africa should be understood in the
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3. The argument for the military style of chaplaincy

With these theological presuppositions in mind, let us briefly examine the rationale commonly advanced for having military chaplaincy rather than a church- (or civilian-) based ministry to military personnel. The argument typically takes the following form. On the theological side of the equation, it is assumed (as I. nave above) that the church has an obligation to minister to all, and that this ministry includes giving all attention possible to the deep-seated and urgent needs of young men in the armed forces. On the institutional side of the equation, it is assumed that the military environment requires that ministry be performed by a full member of the armed forces. The institutional side of the argument calls for some elaboration.

It is argued that an elementary appreciation of the facts of military life leads to the acceptance of full military status including uniform as the best instrument for effecting this ministry. A civilian might not be trusted, and could be perceived as a security risk; civilian-based ministers could easily be disregarded by commanders and troops alike (cf. for example EC:68). To gain access to remote bases requires both security clearance and transport; the latter can frequently be offered only by the military, e.g. to outlying naval or air force bases. If this is true in time of peace, it is even more true in time of war. For example, a commander faced with a choice of taking a chaplain or taking an extra load of ammunition in a bomber might easily opt for the latter unless it is the chaplain's military right to accompany the troops (Abercrombie, 1979:51). (In South Africa it has also been argued that the Geneva Conventions require the chaplain to be a full uniformed member of
the armed forces (e.g. J. Daines, Letter to Seek, February 1984). Since the Geneva argument has been advanced, to my knowledge, only by South Africans, discussion of it is deferred to Appendix B). In order to respond fully to the total range of needs of the serviceman, it is felt that "insider status" within the military is necessary. This phrase is used by Hutcheson, a well-known writer about the US military chaplaincy, and so it will be worth our while to discover what he intends by the term. Now Hutcheson is not explicitly making an argument for the superiority of military chaplaincy over church-based chaplaincy; rather he contrasts the form of ministry of the ordinary parish priest with the specialized ministry of the military chaplain who operates in the "total institution" of the military. In doing this he makes extensive use of Goffman's work "Asylums" (1961). Since this work is so famous for its chilling revelations about the operations of "total institutions", I shall assume a basic familiarity with its contents on the part of the reader. Hutcheson modifies Goffman's concept considerably when applying it to the military environment. First, he says that the separation between officers and troops is by no means as rigid as that between staff and inmates in total institutions like mental hospitals. Officers, Hutcheson says, are "as totally involved and as subject to institutional control as enlisted men ... There is, consequently, a large measure of "we're all in this together" feeling between military officers and enlisted men which may not exist between staff and members of the autonomous total institution" (1975:44). Second, he says that in most total institutions staff perform some servicing function (e.g. healing, education, etc.) for the "insiders". In the armed forces, however, "members and staff are united in a task exterior to the
organization: national defense, fighting wars, ... This sense of commonality of endeavour does much to eliminate the kind of enmity which Goffman found to be characteristic of the autonomous total institutions which he examined" (1975:44).

Therefore, Hutcheson argues, military chaplains comprise one of the few groups of clergymen who can minister as "insiders" to a total institution. Shared insider status, moreover, has several important advantages:

(i) removal of the artificiality, even hypocrisy, which sometimes intervenes between the pastor and the parishioner who "wants to show only his Sunday self" (1975:50)

(ii) full sharing of the conditions under which parishioners live, and hence better preparation for a more effective pastoral ministry to their needs

(iii) continuing contact with the unchurched

(iv) the possibility of ministering creatively to the institution by changing the conditions of service, thus making of it a more humane environment (Hutcheson, 1975:48f).

On the basis of this line of argument, it has been argued that the military chaplaincy is the best, or even the only, form that "effective" ministry to military personnel can take (Boozer, 1979:78f: EC:66). Now the advantages of "insider status" should not be underestimated. Identification with parishioners by sharing the conditions they live under can be a valuable aid in ministry to them. One of the assumptions I have made above is that ministry should, as Hutcheson observes, include ministry to the institution by humanizing it. The church should also be grateful for added contact with the unchurched. However, the question is
whether these conditions of effective ministry can be gained only by chaplains' adopting full military membership including uniforms and other accoutrements of military status. If ministry by civilian- or church-based chaplains can also share in these advantages, then the "institutional side of the equation" referred to above breaks down. The most obvious reason why the institutional side of the equation does in fact collapse is that there is a counter-example: the chaplaincy to the West German Bundeswehr. As has been mentioned in the literature survey, this chaplaincy is church-based in several important respects, one exception being its reception of military pay, which is perhaps the most important legacy from the heavily militarized chaplaincy of the pre-World War II era. I am not aware of anything in the literature which suggests that the chaplains' semi-civilian and temporary (six to eight years) status is an impediment to ministry; or that officers do not respect them; or that officers decline to give them permission to minister on account of their civilian dress; or that the Geneva Conventions do not protect the chaplains; or that their semi-civilian status prevents them from humanizing the military environment in the way that Hutcheson says military chaplains can; or that they are seen by troops as outsiders or aliens to the point that their pastoral ministry is ineffective. On the contrary, the literature indicates that they do share the advantages cited above: absence of artificiality, effective ministry, contact, and ministry to the institution. It stands to reason that, as long as the military can be persuaded, as it was in West Germany, of the church's desire for independence from military control and membership, arrangements can be made to provide the chaplain with sufficient opportunities for ministry.

We might also weigh the adequacy of Hutcheson's interpretation of
Goffman's concept. Now Goffman's work is a devastating critique of total institutions. It shows how the process of "mortification of the self" systematically eliminates the former self to make the inmate/patient/member malleable in the hands of the institution -- a point which Hutcheson recognizes (1975:45). However, in his application of Goffman's concept to the military situation, Hutcheson deprives it of its force as critique. He refuses to regard the totalistic military environment as a theological problem. He proceeds to place the most favourable construction upon some selected observations that Goffman made, notably those referring to the inmate-staff relationship. Hutcheson has no critique of the "new institutional self" which (as he acknowledges) the military, as a total institution, creates; he has no critical word about the "insider world" of the institution, except to suggest that the chaplain may want to make humanitarian adjustments -- which in turn end up making the total institution run more smoothly (1975:50). He brushes over the "deep caesura" (Keijzer, 1978:37) between the officer class and servicemen, though in fairness he is writing of a volunteer army where the gap may well be reduced. He swiftly passes over the moral problem of "participating in organized killing in the face of the commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill'" (1975:48), without pausing to consider what implications this could have for ministry (Should the chaplain participate with his or her parishioners in any moral contradiction? How great was the moral contradiction in Vietnam? Should the chaplain seek "insider status" in any army, e.g. Hitler's Wehrmacht?, etc.) Hutcheson also ignores the aspect of propaganda and indoctrination. To unite people in the common objective of destroying the enemy, it is necessary in some armies to mould attitudes by means of propaganda; thus the feeling...
of camaraderie, which Hutcheson fondly refers to, does not necessarily exist on its own account, but may have to be created through means which the chaplain might not consider ethical. For these reasons Hutcheson's idealistic conception of the armed forces, his problem-free conception of the chaplaincy, and his almost opportunistic interpretation of Goffman are open to question.

Furthermore, there are several aspects of military life which are not as conducive to or compatible with ministry as Hutcheson would give us to believe. With Goffman's critique of the total institution in mind, I now try to examine some of these problematic aspects of military life. At the same time I bring to bear the other assumptions about the church and ministry which I have made above, noting, in passing, that most writers who defend the military form of chaplaincy have tended to concentrate on the "obvious" duty of the chaplain to minister to all people everywhere, to the exclusion of factors such as those which I raise. This brief examination is not done in order to "prove" that the church cannot exist within the military, as some extreme forms of pacifism would posit. Rather it is done in an attempt to show that the presence of the church in the military should be regarded as a theological problem, and that there is a certain incongruence between the values of the church and the values of the military. These assertions in turn form the backdrop to the discussion in chapters 3 to 5.

It may be valuable at this point to distinguish between official and unofficial chaplaincy. Unofficial chaplaincy, at its most extreme, is in church pay, is responsible only to the church and does not form an official part of the institution. The unofficial
chaplain may perform chaplaincy work in addition to normal church duties. Official chaplaincies, on the other hand, are more closely integrated with their respective institutions; at their most extreme they are in the institution's pay, are partly responsible to the institution, and form an official part of it. Institutional ministry may therefore be seen as a continuum of varying degrees of church and institutional integration, with, in practice, a tendency to concentrate at either end. In the military environment, official chaplaincy takes the form of military chaplaincy, which, at the extreme, entails military pay, uniform, commission and rank, partial military supervision, subjection to the MDC, basic training in the military, and voluntary use of arms. Unofficial chaplaincy in the military realm takes the form of church- or civilian-based ministry, by ministers or by lay people, who form no official part of the military, but who enter the military for specific periods, e.g. the limited six- or eight-year term of West German chaplains, or the weekly visits of SACHS part-time chaplains. Unofficial chaplaincy also includes ministry to military personnel outside the military context, e.g. when soldiers leave camps to go to church meetings. In practice most ministry to military personnel tends to be located somewhere between these extremes.

4. Characterization of the military

"It is the mission of organized use of violence, on behalf of the state, to guard its vital interests against interference, which primarily characterizes the military ... the management of violence [is] the characteristic trademark of the military" (Keijzer, 1978:31). The point of this very rough characterization
of the purpose of the military is merely to observe that in terms of the assumptions about the ethics of war made above, the presence of the church within the military cannot be assumed to be problem-free. The violence that the military uses always stands in need of justification. The church will only condone such violence if it is genuinely the last resort; and even then the church will not seek to find rationalizations and justifications for it. To the extent that the church always regards war as the tragic consequence of sin, it can never be at ease in the military environment.

Let us now return to the question of the inner nature of the military and examine what this implies for ministry within it. In all military systems, strict command and authority relationships are maintained. Obedience is the prime military virtue (Boozer, 1979:62; see also the sophisticated argument of Bradford, 1968). Huntington states the position succinctly:

"When the military man receives a legal order from an authorized superior, he does not argue, he does not hesitate, he does not substitute his own views; he obeys instantly. He is judged not by the policies he implements, but rather by the promptness and efficiency with which he carries them out. His goal is to perfect an instrument of obedience; the uses to which that instrument are put are beyond his responsibility" (1957:73).

Van den Aardweg quotes Kurt Lang as saying that the ordinary soldier "has no recourse but to obey; discipline is his primary virtue" (1971:114). When the virtue of obedience is lacking, threat and submission are essential to the maintenance of discipline. The Netherlands Regulation on Military Discipline
(1922) goes as far as declaring subordination to be the soul of military service (Keijzer, 1978:49). This factor is more prominent in conscript armies, as Hutcheson notes (1975:51ff). In the lower ranks, threats often concern physical forms of punishment. Although corporal punishment is normally illegal, as in the South African Army, it may nevertheless be crucial to the process of discipline, especially during the formative period of basic training. Among higher ranks the process of authority, obedience, threat and submission is more subtle and gentlemanly, resting finally upon the fear of loss of honour and rank, but it is no less real. Thielicke points out that, when patriotism fails, naked fear of punishment by a superior officer may be the only factor which will inhibit disobedience; undesirable though this may be, it is one of the sacrifices which has to be made if the nation seriously believes that it is engaged in a just war of defence (6). The writer's experience in the South African Army (1974) and the detention barracks (1980) bears out these insights. The importance of detention barracks for upholding discipline, and hence maintaining the conscription system, might be underlined. As the ultimate threat against recalcitrance among troops, the detention barracks in the SADF is fundamental to the maintenance of order and the efficacy of the conscription system. Within the detention barracks physical punishment in the form of square-dashing and "push-ups" is backed up with the threat of solitary confinement. Repeated two-week spells of solitary (11 in the case of the author) for minor infringements are not unknown (7).

These factors lead us back to Goffman's characterization of total institutions. In many respects it is true of the military: the total life of the member is spent within the institution; there
are often physical barriers to exit, especially in conscript armies and at the start of training; and a deliberate effort is made to make the conscriptee fit the institution's requirements, often including verbal abuse and other "informal" methods of exacting conformity. Van den Aardweg says that "the size, complexity, and special functions of the army are productive of, and make necessary ... a relative loss of the individuality of its members through discipline and regimentation" (1971:111). Use is made of propaganda (films) and ingroup/outgroup language ("communist") to unite soldiers in a common purpose. The implications for the church and its ministry of this more critical characterization of military life may be set out as follows.

There is a certain incongruence about the presence of the church as the "alternative society" within the military. Whereas no member of the Body of Christ should issue orders and threats, and exact obedience and submission from another, the military is dependent on this process for its very existence. To reply that ranking privileges are not exercised during church services, or that the Body of Christ is not of this world but spiritual is no solution to the dilemma, because this involves positing an "ideal church". The tangible reality (Weber, 1983:521) of the church would be denied if it were insisted that it ceases to have relevance on weekdays or outside the church building. To deny the operation of the special internal relationships of the Body of Christ amid the processes of the empirical world would be to deny the Body of Christ as such.

However, this incongruence between the alternative society and society at large must be seen in relative terms. If it were taken absolutely the church would have to secede from the world
altogether like the mediaeval monastic movement, for there is not a single social setting in which the presence of the church is not problematic to a certain extent. The church, as we have seen above, is the "experimental garden of a new humanity"; it strives to be an example of what humanity can be when renewed by the Spirit. It should, in full awareness of its own failure, carefully sift the norms, attitudes, rules, traditions and practices of every context in which it offers ministry. It should live as a "sign of contradiction" of such worldly influences and powers. It should recognize that some aspects of its ministry could vary, depending on the extent to which it saw its ideals enacted or denied in each context of ministry. Furthermore, it should be appreciated that some institutions, like the "totalistic military community" (Langford, 1979:36; cf. Boozer, 1979:63), come close to diametric opposition to the church's ideals. Sometimes the opposition can be so intense that the church cannot afford to be officially associated with them in the exercise of its ministry. That this principle is recognized in the current practice of the church emerges from the examples which follow presently. In parentheses it may be noted that there is next to no discussion of this question in the literature. The theological problem of the church's relationship with institutions has rarely been posed in this way. I suggest, then, that a distinction be made among three types of institution. The actions of the first type are essentially good, which gives rise to a presumption that an official chaplaincy may be offered. Some of the actions of the second type are questionable or even evil but the purpose of the institution may be justified as the lesser of two evils, and so an official chaplaincy may be conditionally offered or sometimes refused. The actions of the
third type are evil and can in no way be justified; hence the presumption is that no official chaplaincy should be offered. A few examples drawn from the current practice of the church illustrates this line of reasoning.

Hospitals and retirement communities are an example of the first type of institution. Under normal circumstances, the church has no qualms about allowing its ministers to serve on the staff of a hospital, because saving life and healing are praiseworthy actions. Similarly, the church has a long tradition of paid chaplaincy in schools and universities because of the unquestioned value of education. However, if hospitals were being used to repress dissidence by applying psychiatric "treatment" to political opponents of the regime, as happens in the USSR, the church would have to reconsider its official hospital chaplaincy. Similarly, if institutions for the handicapped or mentally ill were to practise euthanasia, as happened in Nazi Germany, the church might have to withdraw an official chaplaincy; alternatively, if its chaplains criticized the institution on the basis of the Gospel, they would probably be dismissed.

The second group includes the military, industries, the nation's security apparatus and the police. The military falls into the second group because its actions which include destruction of life and property are evil but are, in the view of many churches, justifiable for the sake of the defence of the community from greater evils. Depending upon the circumstances there is debate about whether the church should offer an official or only an unofficial chaplaincy. In most Western countries an official chaplaincy is offered to the military. In Western Germany the chaplaincy is only partly official for fear of repetition of the
Third Reich experience when the church found itself too intimately connected with an obviously unjust war.

Industrial chaplaincy also falls into the second group. Sometimes the church offers an official industrial chaplaincy. However, the church cannot allow an official chaplaincy to a firm or industry with a history of shady deals and graft or which was regularly in the news because of maltreatment of workers. Ministers of churches in the textile region of Gaston County made distasteful history because of the authority mill owners had over them through the selective payment of subsidies to churches (Pope, 1942: 149). Indeed, financial leverage resulted in ministers serving "as an arm of the employers in control of the mill villages" (1942: 161).

A nation's security apparatus also falls into the second group. For instance, there is a morally relevant distinction between an official chaplaincy to the highly reputable Scotland Yard and an official chaplaincy to the CIA, because the bad press that the latter has had, and some of its unpopular, not to say scurrilous political dealings, would make an official chaplaincy the object of derision and accusations of having been bought.

Likewise the police force falls into the second group. Nearly all Christians acknowledge the need for a police function within society because this conduces to the ultimate good of all; hence police chaplaincies are a common feature of the ministry of many churches. If the consensus was broken by regular and gross violations of human rights by policemen in a certain area then the police chaplaincy could conceivably be withdrawn. If, for instance, it was known that the police authorities had no intention of bringing to book the crimes of the South West African
paramilitary unit Koevoet, and that its members would continue to be trained in 'extermination', then the church would reluctantly have to withdraw its chaplaincy from Koevoet if it had ever had one.

Massage parlours and brothels fall into the third group. Under no circumstances would the church offer an official chaplaincy to these, even though ministry to this group is valued highly by the church. For instance, the church in Brazil does important ministry among prostitutes in the desperately poor areas of Fortaleza; the Southern Suburbs Vagrancy Project in Cape Town is focused on ministry to prostitutes. Independent abortion clinics, as in Japan, also fall into the third group, because they take life in a way which most churches consider morally unjustifiable except in extreme cases, as when pregnancy follows rape. Casinos are another example of the third group. Moreover, one of the purposes of a chaplaincy to such an organization would be to undermine it; but no institution would give official authorization to a chaplaincy which is designed to destroy it. Another example of the way in which the church distinguishes group two from group three institutions is its ministry to criminals. The church is willing to provide official chaplaincy to criminals through prison ministry, but it cannot put ministers on the payroll of criminal syndicates (DeWolf, 1979:24). If doctors were being used by the interrogation section of a police department to ensure that prisoners under torture would suffer maximum pain without dying, the church would probably consider an official chaplaincy to the medical service or the police department concerned a serious moral compromise. In fact Amnesty International has a section concerned specifically with this use of medical personnel by undemocratic regimes.
It therefore appears that several theological considerations would be ranged alongside pastoral needs -- in the present practice of the church -- in the decision whether to upgrade an unofficial chaplaincy into an official chaplaincy. If there is not sufficient congruence between its own values and those of the institution under question, the church seems, by and large, to offer only an unofficial chaplaincy. For instance, neither the distress and the physical danger of a woman seeking an abortion, nor the low self-esteem and lack of employment alternatives of a prostitute could serve as a rationale for an official chaplaincy at an abortion clinic or a brothel.

In conclusion it might be stated that the military, like all other institutions, constitutes a theological problem for the ministry of the church. The form of the chaplain's ministry in the military should take into account the particular character of the military, such as its rank and authority structure (which make it an example of a total institution) and its guiding purpose of war. A closer inquiry into some of these aspects now follows.
1. Introduction

Having set out a series of theological assumptions about ministry, I attempt in this chapter to apply these theological assertions to the situation of the military chaplaincy of the English-speaking churches of South Africa.

I first attempt to show that, as far as the SADF and the government are concerned, a crucial function of the chaplaincy is the maintenance of morale. However, it is apparent that most chaplains would reject indignantly any suggestion that their ministry is in any way subject to military morale objectives. They understand themselves to be first and foremost ministers of their own churches. This divergence of perspective calls for a more careful inquiry into the self-perception of the chaplains. To do this, I try to distinguish three groups of chaplains: the "pastoral chaplains", whose overriding concern is to minister to their church members, wherever they are; the "patriotic chaplains", who tend to agree with SADF perspectives on South Africa; and the "critical chaplains", who tend to reject these perspectives, or at least to feel uneasy with them. This typology emerges repeatedly in the subsequent discussion about the chaplaincy.
Next I examine the structure of the SAChS, analysing it in the light of my theological assumptions about ministry. I attempt to show that its hierarchical structure, rank, uniform, command influence, and in-house training for chaplains -- all elements of the chaplain's military status -- present problems for ministry. This is because they tend to drive in a wedge between the "normal" ministry of the church and its "special" ministry in the armed forces, in such a way as to erode the church's authority over its ministry to military personnel. The upshot of this analysis is that civilian status would be a better vehicle for the chaplain's ministry. However, detailed discussion of what concrete steps could be taken, is deferred to Chapter 4. Also deferred is discussion about the moral and theological implications of military status at a time when the church questions the justice of a particular war.

Finally, the question of freedom is dealt with. It is submitted that the reason why most chaplains, and especially the traditional chaplains, claim to be completely free in the military is that their views are in most cases congruent with those of the military. This congruency emerges in several areas, including that of military obligation, where many chaplains draw a distinction between "religious" and "political" objectors -- a distinction which is as uncongenial to the churches of which they are members as it is congenial to the military. I argue, in other words, that the freedom to which the pastoral and patriotic chaplains lay claim is a reflection of the correspondence of their views on military ethics with those of the institution for which they work. Thereafter additional evidence is led, mainly from critical chaplains, which suggests that it cannot be assumed without further ado that the current military style of chaplaincy
provides a completely free environment for ministry. Again, discussion of the alternative to military chaplaincy (viz. ministry by ministers with civilian status) is deferred. A common misconception, namely that the Geneva Conventions require chaplains to have full military status including uniform, is dealt with in Appendix B, so as not to interrupt the flow of the argument.

2. SADF expectations

Analysis of statements and writings of spokesmen of the SADF reveals an area of ambiguity about the role that the SADF expects the English-speaking chaplain to play. On the one hand, it appears that the SADF allows the church complete freedom to minister in the military context, without making any further demands of the chaplain. On the other hand, it appears that the chaplain is required to play the role of morale-builder in the unit. These assertions are now dealt with in detail.

2.1. The "freedom to minister" perspective

The "freedom to minister" perspective on SADF expectations of the chaplain is described first (1). It stresses the official emphasis on the independence and freedom of action of the church, the breadth of opportunity offered it by the SADF, and the assurance of SADF directives to the effect that the chaplain remains a priest/minister of the church (IB n.2k). These points are discussed in turn.

(a) Official SADF documents guarantee the authority of the church in the area of ministry. The "SADF Order on Religion" 1/21/78
makes the SAChS responsible for

"the pastoral care of members of the SADF (and dependants) in their own faiths and according to the doctrines, orders and customs of their own churches" (n.4; cf. IB n.7d).

The chaplain "must always remain a minister" (IB, n.7d), carrying out his "high calling" in this unique field of opportunity (HB:4). Chaplains have the status of colonel for protocol purposes, but do not carry colonel's rank; in fact their rank is that of chaplain, and this does not confer executive powers (cf. the discussion about the origin of this ruling in Potgieter, 1971:230-238). They are addressed by their church titles, viz. "Padre", "Dominee", or "Pastor" (HB:4). Chaplains are in the Defence Force because of their calling by God to proclaim the Word and build up the church in the SADF, according to the usages and practices of their denominations (HB:1,7). They have the further privilege of being co-ministers of the civilian congregations to which they are attached (HB:5).

(b) Official SADF documents grant the church and its chaplains many privileges which facilitate their spiritual work. In the chaplains' periods and in church and prayer parades, chaplains can educate the youth in church life and practice, and discuss current matters affecting the church and the faith (HB:9). Chaplains may attend church meetings without having to apply for special leave (HB:13). Since they conduct services on Sundays, they are entitled to take one day off per week (HB:14). Chaplains are given "all possible assistance" by officers in command for the execution of their duties. Permanent Force chaplains are entitled to official transport and to pension, medical, railway, insurance, sport and recreation, and housing privileges (HB:13ff).
Salaries of PF chaplains are determined according to their years of service in the church, not in the SADF (IB n.7c). In their capacity as officers, chaplains are subject to the Military Discipline Code (HB:5); as ministers, to the discipline of their churches (SADFO, n.26). The church and the SADF will deliberate in any disciplinary action contemplated by either of the two parties (SADFO, n.26).

The official documents carefully specify that there is no interference with church doctrine while chaplains are being trained. The training of chaplains deals with the place and task of the chaplain in the SADF and does not include theological or ecclesiastical training (SADFO, n.17).

While on duty, all chaplains but part-time chaplains who are not officers wear uniform, but all may wear clerical dress during public worship, and also when attending church functions where the wearing of uniform would be inappropriate (SADFO, n.51f). The relation between the church and the SACHS is determined by "Agreements" approved by the different churches and the SADF (2). Thus the SADF argues that

"without abandoning their autonomy, identity or ecclesiastical principles, the churches also fulfill their calling within the milieu of the SA Defence Force as in all other spheres of life" (SADFO, n.37).

Thus the freedom and opportunity given to chaplains, and the fact that they remain ministers of their own churches, under the protection of church-SADF agreements formulated on a presumed basis of equality, would seem, to many, ample justification of the chaplain's role.
Statements by Chaplain-General J.A. van Zyl appear to underscore the above exposition of the official documents. He is recorded by Fr. R. Cawcutt as saying, at a November 1981 conference of naval chaplains, that the chaplains should preach the Gospel according to the policy of their churches, and be ambassadors of the Kingdom of Jesus Christ in the SADF in the imitation of Christ (1982:1). Again, van Zyl is recorded in 1983 as emphasizing that the chaplains are not expected to subscribe to government policy, but are appointed to minister to their people as servants of the Word (CCMC, 7.3.1983:4).

2.2. Expectations of morale-building

However, several sources suggest another interpretation of SADF expectations. Both politicians and SADF officials see the chaplain as a dispenser of "religious preparedness" for war, and as a link between the officer commanding and the men, without envisaging any conflict between these roles and the chaplain's normal role as minister or parish priest (3).

Evidence from each of these two groups is dealt with in turn, starting with the politicians. The evidence is marshalled at considerable length because this point has so frequently been denied by military chaplains of the English-speaking churches (e.g. "At no time is the chaplain expected to motivate the soldier to be a soldier" (CCMC, 7.3.1983:1)).

In response to the 1974 SACC resolution on conscientious objection, which questioned the basis of appointment of military chaplains, politicians have regularly praised the SACChS in parliament. Mr P.J. Badenhorst noted that military, physical and
spiritual preparedness were the indispensable condition of victory. In waging the struggle, spiritual preparedness must bind the church and state together; for this reason he congratulated the chaplains for their contribution to the war in the form of spiritual preparedness (Hansard, 7.5.1976:6279ff). Mr W.M. Sutton concurred that the chaplains had effectively wielded the "mighty weapon" of faith in the spiritual preparation of soldiers for the struggle against the assault of communism (Hansard, 7.5.1976:6281ff. See similar statements, Hansard 17.4.1978:4917ff; 23.4.1979:4782; 30.4.1980:5242f; 24.9.1981:4720).

The Minister of Defence stated that

"Religious preparedness is ... of the utmost importance, and in this regard the Chaplains' Service is playing a significant role in keeping up the morale of our troops" (Hansard, 22.4.1982: 301(S)).

In 1979 Mr Kobie Coetzee, then Deputy Minister of Defence, addressed a Chaplains' Conference in Bloemfontein. Contemporary conditions demand that South Africa be "prepared", he said, and all facets of preparation are ultimately bound together by faith; that is why ("Juis daarom") the doors of the SADF are open to the church. Mr Coetzee continued by thanking the chaplains for their contribution in making soldiers "religiously and psychologically prepared" (In Hoc Signo, Oct 1979).

To summarize, National Party politicians believe that spiritual preparation is as important in the struggle against communism as any other part of the soldier's training, and are convinced that the spiritual preparation offered by the chaplains is successfully
Second, some of the important SADF expectations of the chaplaincy may be described as follows.

(a) The chaplain is required to be the morale-builder of the unit. By winning the confidence of the men, the chaplain becomes "the spiritual provider, counsellor, morale builder, cultural leader, welfare worker, friend and father of every member of the SADF" (HB:8). Chaplains' periods are to be used, among other things, to "promote esprit de corps in the SADF" (HB:9). During field exercises, chaplains' duties embrace "assistance with welfare and morale" (HB:10; cf. IB, n.7k.iv), and the officer commanding must "use the chaplain as a means at his disposal for the raising of the morale of his troops" (HB:10). Part-time chaplains, too, are responsible for "the building up of the morale of the serviceman" (HB:17); among the duties of Citizen Force chaplains is "working very closely with the Commanding Officer of the Regiment/Commando to build up the morale of the unit" (HB:19; cf. IB, n.6b.iv.2).

The SADF submission to the Eloff commission asserted that if the churches were to end their identification with the SADF, the respect and esteem of the religious community for the SADF would be undermined:

"[Sou dit] die aansien van die SAW in 'n relatief sterk godsdienstig georienteerde gemeenskap aantas"
(Getuigenis:23).

In its final report, the Eloff Commission concluded that if the churches were to bring their association with the SADF to an end, it "would possibly" mean that morale in the SADF would be "seriously undermined" (Eloff:200).
Statements by SADF officials confirm the views expressed in the official documents. Many such statements are available, and have shown remarkable consistency for over a decade. For instance, a senior SACHS official who has in the past run chaplains' courses, Brig. Dr. J.F. Potgieter, wrote in his doctoral dissertation that the task of the chaplain is "te stig, te versterk, te verseker, te bemoedig, te vertroos, te inspineer en te motiveer" (1971:362), since he is "die moraalbouer van die eenheid" (1971:372). Potgieter quotes with approval US Army injunctions that the chaplain "develop and maintain in the fighting man the moral and spiritual traits that will cause him to fight the enemy" (1971:365).

At the official opening of a new course for the first-ever intake of National Service chaplains, the Officer Commanding of the Army College, Col. George Kruys, said that "in every different sphere of warfare -- be it the service branch, medical, logistic or theological -- there is a distinctive way of preparing for war". The chaplains must be "willing to roll up their sleeves, and by their actual participation, if circumstances call for it, give their men moral support" (Paratus Supplement, Feb. 1977).

To quote a recent example, Col P. Jordaan, one of the directors of the Chaplains' Service, said at a 1983 conference of Jewish chaplains that

"When the situation in the operational area is quiet as is the case at present, that is when the chaplains have to work extra hard to keep up the morale".

He is quoted further as saying that the aim of the chaplain was to provide help to the troop in his fighting capacity and in his
living standards (Uniform, Feb. 1983:3).

It seems reasonable to conclude that the SADF expects chaplains to be morale-builders.

(b) The chaplain is required to prepare men spiritually for war. The Department of Defence "White Paper on Defence and Armament Production", 1973, said that the SACHS,

"by striving to provide the necessary religious equipment for each soldier... is making a most important contribution towards the development of spiritual preparedness of the members of the Defence Force" (n. 172).

The "White Paper" of 1977 referred similarly to the chaplains' contribution to preparedness; the SACHS also features prominently in the "White Paper" of 1984. The fact that the chaplains are referred to in these published documents on military strategy is significant. The spiritual preparedness they offer is seen by the Department of Defence as an important component in military success. This observation is underscored by the regular insistence upon this function of the chaplain in SACHS documents. The chaplain is reminded that the object of field exercises is "to prepare soldiers for war, and that everything, including the spiritual work, is subject to this end" (HB:10). In 1978 the Chaplains' Service Training Centre consisted, among other things, of a Religious Preparedness wing (SADFO, n.22e). Indeed, "religious preparedness forms an integral part of total preparation in the SADF" (SADFO, n.29; IB, n.6b.iv.2), and for this reason, chaplains' periods were to be presented alternately as church periods and religious preparedness periods (SADFO, n.30). One of the purposes of the SACHS is to make troops
n.7g). The chaplain and the officer commanding must work very closely together "to create a good spirit in the unit" (HB:8,19). To this end, the chaplain must participate in field exercises by holding services and prayer parades, and by assisting with welfare and morale (IB, n.7k.iv; SADFO, n.33). The chaplain must be involved in the planning of the exercise, attend unit order groups, and send a report to the Chaplain-General after every exercise (HB:10ff). It is apparent that the SADF does not afford the chaplain this opportunity of preaching the Gospel for entirely disinterested reasons. The SADF is confident that the chaplains' application of the Gospel will contribute to the country's defence capabilities. Thus chaplains "must seize the unique opportunity offered them of communicating the Gospel and relating it to the lives of those in uniform. Thus our youth will be equipped to do their duty in defence of our Country and many will be committed to the Church and the Kingdom of God" (IB, n.7k.iv).

To summarize, the SADF expects the chaplain to be the commanding officer's link with the troops and, in so doing, to promote esprit de corps.

2.3. Conclusion

The English-speaking chaplaincy seems uncomfortably poised between military demands for morale-building on the one hand and firm assurances that the church is the sole determinant of its ministry on the other. However, the English-speaking chaplains do not seem to be troubled by the morale expectations of the SADF. The
question arises why the English-speaking chaplains do not perceive these expectations to be subversive of their freedom to preach the Gospel as their churches understand it. Why do the English-speaking chaplains not perceive acute tensions between the "religious preparedness" role that the SADF prescribes for them, and the freedom from state control that their churches believe is necessary for the preaching of the Gospel?

It is not because these expectations are restricted to Afrikaans chaplains. If this were the case, the relevant documents would not have been issued in English (e.g. documents like HB, IB, SADFO, etc.) While the informal pressures associated with nationalism are probably greater for Afrikaans chaplains, the formal documents make no distinction. The explanation must be sought elsewhere.

One explanation for this apparent lack of tension lies in the above-cited ambiguity within the official stance on the tasks of the chaplaincy. The English-speaking chaplains are able to justify their role in the SADF by flatly denying that they are ever forced into a morale-building role and by simultaneously stressing the "freedom to minister" perspective on SADF expectations. Thus the MCSA chaplains argued in 1983 that "at no time is the chaplain expected to motivate the soldier to be a soldier" (CCMC, 7.3.83), and believe that misunderstandings regarding the task of the English-speaking chaplains are due to the Afrikaans title given to the chaplains' lectures, viz. "Godsdiensweerbaarheid" (CCMC, 7.3.83). Similarly, as we have seen, Fr. R. Cawcutt justified the role of Catholic military chaplains by quoting SADFO to the effect that the SACHS is responsible for the pastoral care of church members according to
the doctrines and usages of their own churches, and by quoting the Chaplain-General to the effect that chaplains are ministers of their own churches, called to preach the Gospel according to the policy of those churches (1982:1). It has thus far gone unnoticed that these interpretations of SADF requirements of the chaplaincy are selective, to the extent that they ignore several other aspects which could be profoundly disturbing to their respective churches. Were they to realize that the object of field exercises is "to prepare soldiers for war, and that everything, including the spiritual work, is subject to this end" (Hb:10), and that the chaplaincy's aim is "to provide the desired religious support to combat operations, according to the requirements of the church" (IB, n.5a.ii), their churches might want to question the basis upon which the chaplains are appointed to their posts. Could it be that the above-mentioned chaplains deliberately adopted a selective interpretation of the relevant SADF documents in order to justify their positions before their critics?

A second possible explanation is that the chaplains might not see the important contribution which they themselves make to morale merely by adopting full military status. What they might understand in purely instrumental terms (e.g. by arguing that the uniform is necessary to obtain chaplain's status in terms of the Geneva Convention), might better be understood in symbolic terms (e.g. the symbolism of uniform as representative of where the church really stands on the military issue in South Africa). This is discussed below under the heading of the authority structure of the SACHS.

A third possible reason for this lack of tension is that,
wittingly or unwittingly, the chaplains are making a contribution to morale through their pastoral work, even though they might not use that word. By imparting to troops "a confidence through faith in Christ" (cf. Stiglingh, quoted below), and by being there "to console and comfort" (cf. Daines, quoted below), the chaplains may be contributing importantly to morale-building. While they would see this as the simple execution of their pastoral duty, others would, by viewing the chaplain's work in the full context of South African and Namibian history, see this as functional to the existence of an oppressive military machine. Some comments on religion in the SADF by General Constand Viljoen seem to confirm that chaplains are indeed successful morale-builders. Viljoen said that a census among National Servicemen in the operational area showed that their main motivating factor was the retention of their freedom to worship and their faith in Christian principles (Argus 11.12.1980). Clearly the function of the chaplain requires careful investigation. As a first step in this investigation, what is needed is a closer inquiry into the self-perception of the English-speaking chaplains. No doubt they do not see themselves in the same light as the SADF sees them. What, then, is their own self-understanding? How do they see their role and task?
3. Self-perception of the English-speaking chaplains

Over the past decade the English-speaking churches have undergone profound changes in their understanding of social justice, the place of the military in South Africa, and conscientious objection. This has in turn led to changing perceptions of the role of the chaplain. Many chaplains have themselves arrived at new insights about their place and task. This mutation of attitudes makes characterization of the self-understanding of the English-speaking chaplains a perilous undertaking.

The researcher is faced with further difficulties, like reluctance on the part of some chaplains to speak to any outside inquirer, let alone a researcher publicly associated with conscientious objection; unavailability of material internal to the SACHS; and perhaps fear on the part of some chaplains that such investigations might jeopardize their position. Denominational and age differences; varying levels of political awareness; and the perpetually indefinable nature of human behaviour render any typology or generalized description of the chaplains inaccurate to a certain extent. Therefore, the following attempted characterization is tentative and subject to correction.

I shall propose a differentiation between three types of chaplain: the "pastoral chaplain", the "patriotic chaplain" and the "critical chaplain". This does not imply that every chaplain falls precisely into one or other category, nor that this is the only possible typology. It suggests that, by and large, most chaplains would feel a strong resonance with one of these types, and possibly that many would feel that their attitudes are described with reasonable accuracy by one of them. In other
words, this discussion makes use of the Weberian methodology of the "ideal type", which formulates a typology by identifying the significant features of its types, but without asserting that these are empirical averages (Weber, 1976:71, 200 n.28).

It is worth noting that the patriotic chaplains are more strongly represented among the Permanent Force chaplains, while the critical chaplains are more strongly represented among the National Service and Citizen Force chaplains. The patriotic chaplains tend, by and large, to adhere to the SADF point of view regarding South African society and the function of religion, while the critical chaplains tend to be uneasy with these and other military-related values. That this is so could have been anticipated, since Permanent Force chaplains have adopted ministry to military personnel as a career, and hence are more likely to feel at home in the military environment; while National Service and Citizen Force chaplains are no exception to the rule that civilian conscripts are prone to feeling a sense of compulsion about having to be in the military environment. Discussion about the chaplains' self-perception will arise throughout the course of this chapter, but especially in the final section about the freedom of the chaplaincy and the process of "self-selection".

3.1. Pastoral chaplains

The pastoral chaplains regard themselves primarily as servants of their own churches. They insist that their concern is to minister in the military context, not out of any militaristic motive, but only because there are members of their churches in the armed forces; whatever view the church may adopt regarding the morality of war, it nevertheless has to reckon with the reality of
war, with the fact of conscription, and by deduction, with the necessity of military chaplaincy. Most of its members in the armed forces are there by compulsion, and the church is obliged to minister to them (cf. letter from Rev. D. Hart, Seek (Nov. 1982). Therefore the chaplains' central task is pastoral care for their parishioners in the armed forces (so e.g. Hymer, Wittstock, Erasmus). This includes administration of the sacraments, leading men to a deeper experience of Christ, and providing counseling, encouragement and inspiration (cf. letters from Fr. Johan Strydom, Uniform (March/April 1983):7, Southern Cross (25.12.1983):6). Much of the chaplain's time is consumed by basic mission work, because many soldiers are nominal members of their churches only. The chaplains' task would be easier if local parishes did a better job of equipping their young men spiritually (Daines, 1983a:2). The pastoral chaplains believe that the church should provide "effective ministry" or "maximum ministry" to all as an integral part of its total mission (Daines, 1983a:1; Permanent Force Chaplains' Statement, n.9).

The universality of the mission of the church implies two things: first, that the church must do everything possible to minister to people on both sides of the conflict. In most wars in the western world Christian is likely to be pitted against Christian; if the church is to fulfil its role as a proclaimer of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, it must exercise the same responsibility to both sides (Daines, 1983a:1). Moralistic withdrawal of ministry from either side would be tantamount to negation of the Great Commission of Jesus found in Mt. 28:19. However, the argument cuts two ways. The universality of the church's mission implies, in the second place, that membership of the armed forces, together with uniform and officer status, is a precondition for effective
ministry. The uniform is important for influence on senior military personnel. Officers generally talk freely to officers but not to members of other ranks (Anderson). A civilian would be seen as a visitor, or could simply be disregarded by the officer commanding (Wittstock). Furthermore, full membership of the armed forces is necessary for the sake of availability for service; in order to be able to approach all officers and men; to save the church from an impossibly large financial burden; for the sake of freedom of movement, which in turn necessitates security clearance; and for better identification with the service and the men, and closer integration into the life of the unit (Permanent Force Chaplains' Statement: see the detailed discussion below). Finally, the First Geneva Convention (Article 24) makes no provision for the protection of chaplains unless officially and regularly appointed by the military authorities. To be able to offer maximum ministry to all its members, the church has to abide by the reasonable conditions laid down by those organizations open to its ministry; in the armed forces this means acceptance of full membership and uniform.

To submit to the reasonable conditions set by the armed forces does not, in the opinion of the pastoral chaplains, imply craven submission to its ideology. Two Permanent Force chaplains, Rev. J. Voegel and Rev. E. Hymer, chose not to use any weapon at all, which for them signified a reluctance to be fully identified with the aims and methods of the military. The pastoral chaplains believe that they are not expected to motivate the soldier to be a soldier (CCMC, 7.3.83). The English Language Commission has provided a set of lecture notes, but these are only a guide. There is a prescribed syllabus, but the chaplains have a free hand to construct their own (so, e.g., Lawrie). Their first call is
to be servants of their churches, who preserve the identity of their churches in the SADF (Daines, 1982:2). They are aware of the pitfall of becoming spokesmen for the values of a particular culture and are thankful for the conscientious objectors and others who remind them of these dangers (Daines, 1983b:8). The pastoral chaplains believe that they are completely free to expound the teaching of their own churches (so, e.g., Hymer, Clack, Lawrie, Royston). They are neither instructed what to preach nor discouraged from giving proper emphasis to any scriptural truth. In fact, they are freer than they would be in some churches, which prescribe the line to be adopted on doctrines like the Second Coming (Stiglingh). It would be contrary to the SADF's own commitment to religious freedom to prescribe to chaplains what to say -- indeed, the SADF is fighting communism in order to preserve, for all South Africa's citizens, the very religious freedom that it grants its chaplains. Therefore, the pastoral chaplains believe that the SADF does not require chaplains to be "morale officers".

3.2. Patriotic chaplains

Nevertheless, one senior chaplain, Rev. C. Stiglingh, argued that there is no doubt that chaplains are one of several factors which do contribute to morale, in the following way. They lead men to faith and trust in Christ and then teach them to exercise that faith in adverse circumstances. The troops in turn look upon the chaplains as men of God who can be a source of encouragement to them in the intangible things of life. Chaplains can share with them in their uncertainties, fears and frustrations and impart to them a confidence through faith in Christ (Stiglingh). Spiritual
well-being and hence high morale are, in a sense, inevitable results of the preaching of the Gospel. "If a man is a committed, practising Christian, he will be better prepared to meet his Maker, and make sacrifices for his fellows (give his life for them if necessary) than will the uncommitted and the unbeliever. This is the preparedness which every priest must strive for among his people. The chaplain must be there before the men go into action, whilst they are lying wounded or dying and when/if they return alive from battle. The chaplain must be there to console and comfort..." (Daines, 1982:3). The accusation that chaplains advance troop morale could equally be levelled at any civilian ministers or priests who have troops in their congregations (Daines, 1982:4).

The patriotic chaplains do not condone Nationalist ideology, but at the same time "we cannot however ignore the influence of Communism nor its imperialistic designs" (Daines, 1982:6). One chaplain expressed his admittedly rather extreme view in this way:

"The next point which needs clearing up is that "liberation" is two very different things: 1) It is a beautiful theory, And 2) When applied in practice in a sinful world, it always goes viciously wrong. Let us accordingly ask very carefully, "What does the fire look like, BEFORE we jump out of the frying pan?"

"I recently had the privilege of touring the operational area in S.W.A./Namibia, and saw at close quarters what "liberation" really looks like. It does people good to come down out of the Ivory Towers of Pure Theory, and see the Flesh at work. To me, "liberation" stinks of fear (did you know that fear can be smelt?), blood, rotting flesh,
faeces and stale urine, sometimes mixed with the acrid smell of TNT, and the musical jangle of spent AK47 cartridges. And the vast majority of the victims are black. The only "liberation" here is "all-the-way-to-the-Pearly-Gates-in-one-bang". Just remember too that it was a "liberation" regime that killed Archbishop Luwum. Even Hitler's Nazi party was a "liberation" regime, wresting power in order to "free" the German people from their bondage to crippling war reparations.

"Remember too that although this country has its Crossroads and its Robben Island, most of the "liberated" countries ARE Crossroads and Robben Islands. Most of them had to be "liberated" to discover what true oppression, poverty, and nopelessness really are. There is an ancient Chinese curse which says quite simply, "May you have an interesting day today". I believe it can very accurately be updated to a modern African curse which says equally simply, "May you live to see liberation".

"I am not trying to defend Apartheid and all that goes with it, but we would be irresponsible to refuse to admit that there are worse things. And liberation is one of them -- especially for Blacks.

I could never fight a war to "maintain white supremacy in an oppressionist society", but I have no difficulties about a war to keep "liberation" out of this country. Such a war, I believe, is just. In refusing to fight in such a war, are you not in fact aiding the advancement of "liberation"?"

(Letter from Rev. S. Middlemost to P.G. Moll, 3.5.1979)
The patriotic chaplains generally prefer to designate the enemy as "terrorists" rather than as "guerrillas" because of what they believe to be overwhelming evidence showing that the strategy of the latter is to terrorize and cow the local population (cf. Daines, 1982:4; Middlemost, Letter to P.G. Moll, 3.5.1979). They are aware of the church's role as "reconciler of man with man and man with God", and as the "conscience of both sides of the conflict" (Daines, 1983a:1). They believe that the role of the chaplain includes preaching on social justice, that plenty of opportunity is provided for this, and that the present English-speaking chaplains perceive this as an obligation (Cawcutt, 1982:1,2). Thus they are concerned about the evils of apartheid. However, the patriotic chaplains see no causal relationship between the war in which the SADF is involved and black nationalist reaction to apartheid. Brief examination of the geopolitical realities of southern Africa would dispel, they believe, any notion that the SADF is protecting sectional white privilege. The war is essentially a war of defence against external aggression. The prime cause of the war, in their opinion, is Soviet expansionism. The Soviets have repeatedly declared their objective of world domination and their opposition to all forms of religion. Their underwriting of nationalist causes in the southern tip of Africa is the clearest evidence of their imperialistic designs on the region, which are aimed ultimately at the Cape sea route and South Africa's mineral riches. Therefore the USSR and its surrogates Cuba, East Germany and Czechoslovakia give weaponry, finance and troop support to nationalist movements which, unaided, would be unable to survive. Thus the patriotic chaplains are in broad agreement with the overall aims of the Defence Force: South Africa's territorial
integrity must be maintained, the advance of communism through Soviet-sponsored terrorism must be contained, and in this way the existence of civilization and the church will be guaranteed.

The patriotic chaplains point out that the SADF is not only preserving peace, which is the precondition for meaningful change, but is itself opposed to apartheid. The SADF has progressed further in deracialization than most other government departments, and indeed a good deal further than many churches, even some English-speaking churches. On the border black and white are fighting together against the communist menace. Officers' salaries are the same across the races (Middlemost). All that remains to be done is racial equalization of salaries in the lower ranks -- but that is dependent on the vagaries of the Public Service Commission, not the SADF (Grundy, 1983:194; Letter from Maj.-Gen. A.P. Roux to P.G. Moll, 30.4.1984). One chaplain argued,

"there is virtually no evidence of apartheid in the SADF. We have officers and NCO's who are black and coloured who have exactly the same privileges as we have; they eat at the same mess; they stay at the same officers' clubs; there is no distinction" (Stiglingh).

Therefore they feel that it would be quite wrong to say that chaplains place a moratorium on their churches' social justice efforts. In reality the chaplains are pursuing their churches' struggle against apartheid.

Nevertheless the patriotic chaplains believe that they were not called by God to be politicians. They regard themselves as preachers of the Gospel of Christ and are not ashamed that this is
their primary duty. The SADF has provided the church with wonderful opportunities of evangelism. When young men are on the border, they are understandably apprehensive and there many of them start to take spiritual matters seriously for the first time. "This field of labour in the SADF has very little to equal it for reaching out for the Salvation of souls" (Stiglingh; similarly Erasmus). Any limitation of the chaplains' contact with the troops would have grave consequences for the church's ministry. Both parents and troops would feel strongly that the church had neglected them, or that their church was being discriminated against by its having less contact with its members (Permanent Force Chaplains' Statement:1,2). They warn that disparagement of this ministry could lead to its destruction, which would in the end be flagrant disregard of the Great Commission.

3.3. Critical chaplains

The critical chaplains adopt a rather more critical view of the theology of the SACHS, and of the political role played by the SADF. Their critical theological and political orientation finds expression in a distinct set of attitudes about the theology of warfare, the role of the SADF in South Africa and Namibia, the use of uniform and other symbols of soldiery, and the task of the chaplain, which differs markedly from the set of attitudes of the patriotic chaplains.

The critical chaplains are wary of the identification of the church with the institutions of war. For some, the instinctive sense that the church is the representative of the Prince of Peace and has been placed in the world to witness to God's salvation which overcomes sin and death, is enough to make them uneasy about
their visible identification with the SADF. Some have taken the further step of investigating the theology of pacifism (e.g. by reading the works of J.H. Yoder (1970, 1971 and 1972)) and embracing aspects of it. To register their apprehension about the taking of life, several critical chaplains are non-combatants. For instance, one of the first National Service chaplains took a firmly principled but by no means easy stand against using a rifle, and still has difficulty seeing how anyone could undergo training to make killing seem normal (Botsis).

The critical chaplains adopt a more critical position than do the patriotic chaplains with respect to the government ideology of total strategy and the communist menace. They do not deny a communist presence within the ANC and SWAPO, but feel that, in the main, these are nationalist movements with fairly widespread support in South Africa and Namibia respectively. They are aware that the larger churches in Namibia support SWAPO. They tend to agree with the Catholic Bishops' opinion that Namibian, international and UN censure of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia could mean that SWAPO will one day govern the territory. One chaplain recalled an embarrassing, but in the end deeply touching, encounter with an Ovambo Anglican minister who questioned whether the chaplain could really be a minister of God if he had on the uniform of an army which had no moral right to be in Namibia (Botsis). Regarding South Africa, the critical chaplains feel that constitutional methods are much the better way of bringing about change, but several of them believe that the government has restricted the available avenues of such change to the point where it is difficult or even hypocritical to expect blacks to abide by those alone. Hence some critical chaplains believe that the SADF is to a certain extent the instrument of the
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Government to forestall change.

These beliefs about the extent of support for the ANC and SWAPO, and about the dishonourable uses to which the SADF is being put, are held with differing intensity by the critical chaplains. For some critical chaplains, these beliefs amount to little more than a suspicion, and make little impact upon their preaching but for an occasional remark about mutual respect among races. For other chaplains, these beliefs call into question their own status as soldiers (Dixon, Brews, West, Mitchell). They are uncomfortable with the uniform, officer status, and, in the case of National Service chaplains, with lieutenant's rank; they wonder whether their reception of military pay would be a stumbling-block to black Christians; they are inclined to point out to troops their mistrust of the objectives of the SADF. Some critical chaplains are sharply critical of the Permanent Force chaplains' penchant for uniform and military status (Hart, Lawrie, Laxton, Royston). Some critical chaplains are so struck by the hollowness of the total strategy doctrine that they feel their ministry would be gravely compromised in its current military form. Therefore they prefer to minister in the local parish context where the probability of corruption of their own ministry is smaller. Thus, although there are differences of belief within the group designated as critical chaplains, there is a basic similarity which revolves around their rejection of identification with the attitudes and perceptions of the SADF. Among the critical chaplains interviewed were: Botsis, Hart, Mitchell, Brews, West, Veldhuysen, Long, Retief, Hovers, Fahey, Maree, and Attwell.

What impact have these critical perceptions made upon the work of the critical chaplains? As pointed out above, some have decided
to be non-combatants. Others have been reluctant to use the uniform, and this has led to disagreements with the SACHS. For instance, one chaplain attended a camp in clerical dress, and another wrote to the Chaplain-General stating that he was no longer able to don the uniform (Mitchell, West). Some critical chaplains find themselves in an extremely difficult situation. They can see good reasons of principle to diminish their identification with the SADF, but fear that a generalised effort to do so could result in even less ministry being provided by English-speaking ministers than at present. Since there are Christians on the border who do not see a chaplain of their own church for eight to nine months, and since these Christians are there because they have to be,

"It is disgraceful that part of the People of God ... in a situation of ethical conflict and political pressure must then hear that the Body of Christ is calling for a withdrawal of their ministers. We face the harsh judgment of Mt. 25:31-46" (Letter from D. Hart, Seek, Nov. 1982).

Nevertheless a few critical chaplains have left the service; the position that these latter have adopted differs little from that of the selective conscientious objector. For instance, one chaplain felt that the Council of Churches of Namibia was correct in refusing to send ministers to military bases as chaplains, and instead inviting soldiers to attend local churches in the territory. Being in agreement with the Council that SADF bases constitute an illegal presence in Namibia, he refused to go to the Walvis Bay base (Brews).

Some chaplains point out that rank and uniform are not really necessary for ministry in the military. They recognize that rank
and uniform give the chaplains added influence and status, and to that extent make their job easier. However, they are conscious of the "deep caesura" between commissioned officers and others in most armies, and hence of the psychological barrier that officer status places between the chaplains and the men. Some critical chaplains believe that their most effective times of ministry are at night when they are able to mix freely with the men, dressed in jeans and T-shirt. One of them pointed out that one does not need to be an alcoholic to minister to alcoholics, nor a jailbird to minister to prisoners; far from being a precondition for effective ministry, the uniform can sometimes inhibit it (Hart).

The critical chaplains tend to be more critical than the patriotic and pastoral chaplains of the SADF expectations of the chaplain as motivator. Religious preparedness, to them, is a confusing and mistaken concept, since it appears to rest on the assumption that there is a "total onslaught" directed against the RSA by the communist world with its allies and dupes. They have difficulty seeing how one can be religiously prepared for war -- especially a war whose purposes the church questions -- for this seems to instrumentalize religion for military purposes and to make God the servant of nationalistic aspirations (Laxton; cf. also Laxton's letter to SA Outlook, August 1984).

4. Structure of the SACHS

The SACHS is presently structured along the following hierarchical lines. At its head is the Chaplain-General, who is directly responsible to the Chief of the SADF. He carries the rank of Major-General, and is chosen from one of the Afrikaans churches. Responsible to him are the Assistant Chaplains-General of the
Army, Navy, Air Force and Medics, as well as several other staff personnel, e.g. Directors of Operations, Logistics and Finance, as of 1978 (IB, n.4). Under the Assistant Chaplains-General are command chaplains; under these are unit chaplains, to whom other Permanent Force chaplains, and also part-time chaplains, and National Service chaplains are responsible. The Chaplain-General, Assistant Chaplains-General and Directors all carry rank, from colonel to Major-General, and are addressed by means of it. They are not pastors so much as administrators. Other Permanent Force chaplains and Citizen Force Chaplains carry the "unique" rank of chaplain (HB:6), but are the equivalent of colonels for protocol purposes (HB:4). Part-time chaplains have no rank since they remain civilians. National Service chaplains are two-pip lieutenants.

From the theological point of view, these details of the SAChS structure are not as important as the deeper issue of church identification with military structures. However, as they are symbolic of the deeper issue, I now discuss the chaplaincy structure under the following heads: choice of administrators, command influence, rank, and uniform. In each case I pose the question: What are the implications of the theological principles outlined in Chapter 2 for this aspect of the authority structure?

In each case I show that the church faces difficult moral dilemmas, which together suggest that non-uniformed or church-based ministry might be a better option. At the outset, though, it is worth mentioning the problem that if the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers is taken to its logical conclusion, then it would seem inconsistent for a minister to refuse to do what parishioners do (viz. accept military status).
If something is wrong for one Christian is it not wrong for all? On one level this is quite true. All the dilemmas which emerge in the following pages apply to any ranking officer who exercises ministry. On the other hand these dilemmas can perhaps be said to apply most forcefully to ministers of the churches, because the latter (i) are specially set aside for the task of ministry; (ii) receive a salary in order to perform this ministry; (iii) are therefore special representatives of the church in a way in which parishioners are not (although it can be argued that this difference is one of degree, and not absolute); and (iv) therefore, the church may most speedily change its complexion by having its ministers change, which in turn can act as an example to parishioners who experience the same moral dilemmas with ministry on account of possessing military status. With this qualification in mind, let us turn to examining the chaplaincy structure in detail.

4.1. Choice of administrators

First, the church's involvement in the process of selecting the hierarchy is conspicuous by its absence. Nowhere in the available publications (IB, HB, Agreement) is reference made to church nomination or appointment of the Chaplain-General or other staff officers. Presumably they are appointed by more senior Defence Force officers. This is a matter of concern because the Chaplain-General has a certain amount of influence over most chaplains. "All matters concerning chaplaincy or church affairs are the concern of the Chaplain-General and must be referred to him" (HB:6). The SACHS is "commanded" by him (HB:6; SADFO, n.22a). "Under the command and direction of the Chaplain-General
... the Chaplains Service is solely responsible for all ecclesiastical and religious matters in the SADF" (SADFO, n.5). The Assistant Chaplains-General are directly responsible to him (IB, n.6a). It is his duty to hold meetings to gather information and discuss results and problem areas (IB, n.6a).

However, ministry is entrusted by Christ to the church as a whole; it should be done representatively. Senior administrators of the church's ministry should be selected by regularly appointed church bodies, whose task is to discern the Holy Spirit's gifts which entitle a person to spiritual office. This is essential to prevent the intrusion of alien or inimical values into the selection process. For instance, military aptitudes and attributes, obeisant attitudes to military authority, and the "right" political views should not become factors in the choice of the leadership of the church. To have the military appoint chaplains to leadership positions is an instance where the "ius circa sacra" has become a "ius in sacra", which could easily degenerate into an attempt by the state to shape the church's will and rule its inner life. An analogy might be made between the "Reichsbischof" at the time of the Third Reich, and the Chaplain-General of the SACHS. Like the Chaplain-General, the Reichsbischof was appointed by the state; the danger then existed that the state would use this power of appointment to control the church. This is not to assert that the political situation in South Africa is the same as that in Nazi Germany, or that the church-state situation in South Africa bears direct comparison with that of Hitler's time. For one thing, the South African government considers itself to be Christian, while National Socialist ideology was essentially opposed to Christianity. However, the similarity lies in the power of the state to appoint
church officials. In this regard it is of significance that the Barmen Declaration rejected this form of state control:

"The various offices in the Church do not establish a dominion of some over the others; on the contrary, they are for the exercise of the ministry entrusted to and enjoined upon the whole congregation. We reject the false doctrine, as though the Church, apart from this ministry, could and were permitted to give to itself, or allow to be given to it, special leaders vested with ruling powers" (documented in Ecunews (April 1984):21).

Admittedly, the CPSA "Agreement" does say that the Liaison Bishop and the Principal Chaplain must be consulted, and the approval of the Diocesan Bishop obtained, before CPSA chaplains are appointed to administrative posts (cf. also IB n.4c). On its own, however, this assurance is inadequate, because other churches have no say in CPSA appointments. The Defence Force may, if it chooses, "divide and rule" the churches by making strategic appointments which other churches have no right to veto (4). For instance, it might elevate to a very high position a man whose church is numerically insignificant, but whose "loyalty" to the SADF can always be relied on.

Another difficulty with the present structure is the dominance of ministers of the Afrikaans churches. For two decades, the most senior position in the chaplaincy has been occupied by a minister of one of the Afrikaans churches. Apart from the fact that this is not an ecumenical gesture, this situation is serious at a time when several of the English-speaking churches deem the theological justification of apartheid to be a heresy. How is it possible to have one's own ministers under the authority of a minister of a
church which adheres to a heretical theology? This is not only a problem with respect to the position of the Chaplain-General. Nearly all the area, unit and formation chaplains are ministers of the Afrikaans churches, because of the large numbers of the latter. Hence nearly all the English-speaking chaplains report directly to one of these chaplains, who in turn report to more senior people in the SACHS. (Rev. J. Voegel mentioned that he had to write regular reports on his work for the Wynberg Command Chaplain, despite the fact that he was Principal CPSA chaplain. Similarly, Fr. B. Royston said he had to write reports every six months for his superior). It might thus be argued that the SACHS represents an erosion of the church's authority over its own ministry.

4.2. Command influence

Second, the chaplaincy should be free of all command influence. This is because authority in the Body of Christ is not the same as authority in the world. In fact, authority in the Body of Christ takes the form of servanthood. However, the current chaplaincy structure is not free of command influence. The first way in which this occurs is through military appointment of the SACHS administrators. The second way is through reporting relationships of chaplains to line officers, of which the most prominent is that of the Chaplain-General to the Chief of the SADF. Every chaplain is responsible simultaneously to both SACHS and line officer superiors (5). For example, command chaplains are "accountable to" the Assistant Chaplains-General and to the Officer Commanding of the relevant command (1b, n.7b). The unit chaplain is "responsible to the Unit Commander for the effective
functioning of the religious and ecclesiastical activities in the unit" (IB, n. 7c).

However, the chaplains should be responsible solely to the church for the ministry they offer. It is granted that for certain purely administrative purposes the chaplain might be responsible to the Officer Commanding. However, the jurisdiction of officers commanding seems to go well beyond this, e.g. the officer commanding must "use the chaplain as a means at his disposal for the raising of the morale of his troops" (HB:10). Chaplains are expected to "work very closely" (HB:19) with officers commanding, and to "create an unshakeable unity" with them (HB:8). On the face of it, command influence seems to be considerable. At the Pretoria Detention Barracks in 1980, a Permanent Force chaplain was severely taken to task by the officer commanding, Major Krige, for having had a conversation with the author. Later in the year, a National Service chaplain was given the same treatment by the major and one Staff-Sergeant Erasmus, for the same offence, if "offence" is the word. In the available publications, the relationship of church and military responsibility is cursorily treated. It is assumed, in selecting the appropriate channel, that "Defence Force matters" are distinguishable from "matters concerning the church" (SADFO, n.27). No explanation is given as to how this distinction is made. Elsewhere this distinction is made in terms of "profession", referring to the SACHS chain of command, and "function", referring to the line officer hierarchy (IB, n.4e). Again, it is difficult to see how this can be of any use because it is so ill-defined. The same problem arises with respect to discipline. Theoretically the chaplain is subject both to ecclesiastical discipline, "which the Defence force honours", and to military discipline, with which the church agrees
not to interfere (IB, n.7f). Military discipline is maintained by line officers (IB, n.7g) in terms of the Military Discipline Code. By what rule does one distinguish between a military and an ecclesiastical breach of discipline? Which takes precedence if it is both? The available sources are of little help. This, precisely, is the rub. The churches have contracted into a system in which their ministers' lines of responsibility are not clear and disciplinary channels not defined. It appears that the military has considerable influence over the chaplaincy, which already suggests that a "ius in sacra" is operating. Due to the ill-defined nature of these channels, the danger always exists that they could be abused by the military.
CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICAN CHAPLAINS' SERVICE

4.3. Rank

Third, there is the question of the use of rank. This occurs in four ways: (a) all but part-time chaplains are commissioned officers; (b) National Service chaplains are two-pip lieutenants; (c) the SAChS hierarchy carry military rank (colonel to major-general); and (d) Permanent Force and Citizen Force chaplains are deemed to have the rank of colonel for protocol purposes.

Rank implies a hierarchy of status within the institution which is sustained by ritual and social distance. Van den Aardweg, a senior SADF chaplain, explains how the process of ritual and social distance upholds military status:

"The clicked heel, salute, formal courtesy calls by new officers upon the commanding officer, the standing to attention when addressed by an officer, all are ceremonial scaffolding holding up the status hierarchy of rank. These rituals and actual physical separation between officers and men ... help maintain the clearly defined social distance..." (1971:107).

The hierarchy of rank, he argues,

"exerts an all-pervasive influence on military society. It is an established system of stratification with respect to power, authority, status and privilege... Because of the stratification which exists there is a hiatus between the statuses of enlisted persons and officers" (1971:112,113).

(6)

Stated baldly, the theological problem which the chaplain faces is
that "power, authority, status and privilege" are values which run counter to those espoused by the church as the "alternative society". If the chaplain were to adopt officer status, this would, outwardly at least, not tend to convey the theological value of servanthood within the Body of Christ. Rather it would seem that discordant relationships of authority were being imported into the ministry of the church. The form and existence of the church could, in this case, convey their own message about the church's conformity with the military as an institution. More than this, the very notion of hierarchy within the church might be questioned. The Lutheran, Reformed, Congregational and Baptist traditions all reject the notion of a permanent hierarchy (while allowing for an efficient system of administration). As has been pointed out in Chapter 2, it is becoming increasingly accepted, even in Catholic circles, that since the heart of ministry is servanthood, the offices of priest and bishop involve collegiality not lordship (cf. Kueng, 1978:418). The Dutch Reformed writer Meyer argues,

"There is no hierarchy of offices in the Bible. Therefore to have a Chaplain-General at the head of the Chaplains' Corps is surely a situation devoid of both biblical and canonical justification. Clearly we have here a confrontation between two worlds: the military with its disciplines and the church" (1979:43; my translation).

A sort of hierarchy is implicit in the fact that Permanent Force chaplains have the (protocol) rank of colonel, but National Service chaplains the rank of two-pip lieutenant. One argument for this arrangement is that National Service chaplains cannot be raised above other National Servicemen simply because they are
ministers; apparently there is already some resentment at the fact that the chaplains' orientation course is much shorter than the regular officer's course for National Servicemen (Laxton). However, the effects of this arrangement (which was hastily introduced in 1977 with the extension of the period of military service) are to put some chaplains in an inferior position compared with others. One chaplain pointed out that

"when you are a Lieutenant it is difficult to say you are first a man of God and second an officer. You have to go through the channels. Whereas the chaplain's triangle gives you freedom of access" (Wittstock).

One National Service chaplain mentioned that a Permanent Force chaplain had used the prerogative of rank to tell him what to do; but noted that in practice chaplain's rank doesn't mean very much -- "A chaplain may be in a pub, and if a major walks in the men stand to attention", whereas by rights the major should ask the chaplain for permission to join the group (Veldhuysen).

It emerges, then, that officer's rank can create superior status as well as inferior status, both of which can interfere with the process of ministry. Incidentally, it was to avoid precisely these problems associated with inferior rank that South African chaplains were permitted to dispense with signs of rank during World War II:

"This arrangement was made to protect the chaplain, in view of his lower rank and consequent subjection to senior officers, and to place him in a position to move freely and on the same level as people of all ranks, including his inferiors, who otherwise would have been reticent towards
him" (Potgieter, 1971:221: my translation).

The problem of rank should not be viewed in black and white. The same sort of dilemma is faced by the church in other institutions. For instance, members of a theological faculty at a university -- who play a significant part in training ministers and thus influencing the pattern of the church's future ministry -- are awarded promotions by the university council. Promotions may be awarded for academic prestige, innovative thought, or service to the university -- none of which are necessarily identical to the church's discernment of the gifts that entitle one to minister. Extreme situations might even be imagined where the church would feel that a university promotion system had become a "ius in sacra" by subtly attempting to shape its ministry by selective promotion; the intimate association of church and state in Rumania, for example, could lead to such a position. On the other hand, there are advantages to be gained from university-based theological training; only a careful examination of the academic ethos, its effect on professors, the attitudes of professors and students to academic status differentiation, and the influence of all this on the church's ministry could reveal whether, on balance, the church could have a compact of this kind without compromising its sovereign control over its ministry. The problem is wider than the church's agreed relationships with specific institutions. This was shown by Pope's research into the unedifying case in Gaston County where financial leverage was exercised over ministers (Pope, 1942), and by Cochrane's research which showed that the social witness of the Anglican and Methodist churches in the early twentieth century was beholden to interest groups of capitalists (1983:326f). Within the local parish, powerful influences can be brought to bear which could harm the
church's witness. An example is the erstwhile racially differentiated salary system of some of the English-speaking churches in South Africa. One thing, at least, is clear: ministry is always vulnerable and subject to corruption (Langford, 1979:39), because there is always contention between the church and the controlling orders of life (Langford, 1979:32). The question is how the church responds to challenges to its understanding of the Gospel. With this in mind, we return to consider some other problematic aspects of rank.

The system of rank can be protected by coercion if need be. In an extreme case an officer may use a weapon to restore the authority of his or her rank. Much more common than this unlikely event is the resort to litigation or "press-ups", etc. Instances in which the chaplains are involved in enforcing discipline are probably rare, but they are not unknown, e.g. the author recalls the anger of a chaplain (who will be referred to as Chaplain D for his own protection) at the unwillingness of a past Permanent Force detainee, Mortimer Lee, to attend a service in the detention barracks in Pretoria. The chaplain ordered Lee to stand in front of the office of the Officer Commanding, Maj. Krige, and threatened to charge him, but withdrew the threat later. Obviously this is only an isolated case; more important is that inferior officers, especially corporals, enforce discipline and respect for the chaplain. This is all of a part with the compulsory nature of religion in the SADF. National Servicemen are "compelled" to attend one service per Sunday (SADF 1/21/78, n. 39). It seems that exemption may be obtained from attendance at these services (Director of Public Relations, SADF, writing in Argus 14.2.1980), but it is unlikely that many people would go to these disagreeable lengths. Moreover, chaplains' periods and
morning prayer parades are always compulsory as they constitute a normal part of the daily or weekly routine (see South African Baptist (October 1983), p7). To the mind of the SADF, this has a disciplinary function:

"Our policy is that every National Serviceman should attend a church service at least once a Sunday. Church attendance is also part of discipline, even if it only works towards self-discipline" (Director of Public Relations, SADF, in response to a letter "Why does my son have to attend church parades?" (Argus 14.2.1980)).

One chaplain conceded that "many resent having to attend a church service, yet it has been my joy to lead some of these very resentful young men to Christ" (Stiglingh, in South African Baptist (October 1983), p6). It appears that the coercive nature of the rank structure and the involuntary nature of religious observance in the SADF go hand-in-hand.

One unavoidable effect of rank is that soldiers -- or even an individual soldier alone in a room -- must spring to attention at the approach of a chaplain. In the words of one chaplain, troops are "petrified of rank", especially during basics; colonel's rank is "fine for those looking down, but not for those looking up" (Laxon). The message that the rank structure conveys to the soldier is clear: the structure of military life extends to religious observance; this applies to religious people and non-religious people alike. After bemoaning the paucity of literature on the pastoral problem implicit in rank, Meyer comments,

"This rank structure is a serious hindrance in practice ...
It is surely no way to create a spontaneous atmosphere which enables the serviceman to associate with such an officer. The situation is even uncomfortable when the chaplain receives a visit in his own office from a serviceman who is in need. On grounds of military discipline, the serviceman may not sit down before he has been ordered to" (1979:43; my translation).

Another aspect of rank is the influence it has upon the career objectives of chaplains. For obvious reasons, this applies more to Permanent Force chaplains. It is possible for the system of rank, together with the selective granting of military honours and medals, to create a spirit of competitiveness and rivalry. Clearly this is a problem that faces clergy of every church, and lay people as well; hence this point should not be made in a spirit of self-righteousness. Having said that, it is important to note that the rank structure lends itself to abuse by people with strong careerist and militaristic leanings. In the absence of hard empirical data, it would be invidious to make any assertion about this aspect of the rank structure in the SADF. However, it is worth noting that several of the National Service chaplains interviewed thought that many Permanent Force chaplains were rather too attached to their rank (Lawrie, Hart, West).

The unavoidable impact of rank on the chaplain's role may usefully be examined in light of the theological assertion in Chapter 2 about ministry as service. Rank makes a bad match with the notion of mutual submission in ministry. It can convey the impression that the church is making use of worldly power to enhance the success of its ministry, and can suggest that this reliance could supersede the church's reliance upon the testimony
of Jesus Christ, its ultimate source of empowerment (cf. Weber, 1983:569; Thielicke, 1982: 237; Torrance, 1979:728). From another angle, one could reason that if the key to pastoral care is in the relationship, and if the pastor is a companion, then rank might be a negative element in the process of pastoral care (7).

From yet another angle, officer status is uncongenial to the concept of the priesthood of all believers. For instance, it might be that Christ has given a special gift to a troop to minister to a chaplain. The hierarchical rank structure, imposing a gulf between the officer class and others, could be an inhibiting factor in the exercise of this ministry.

On the positive side, it cannot be denied, as Hutcheson in the US and many chaplains in South Africa have claimed from their personal experience, that officer status can enhance and facilitate certain aspects of ministry (e.g. Anderson, Laxton). A chaplain with high rank, having the ear of senior officers, can minister to soldiers by seeing that dehumanizing working conditions are changed. They are able to obtain transport with ease; their uniform and rank command immediate respect; there are fewer barriers between them and very senior officers. Thus chaplains of high rank are better able to pursue the chaplain's objective of ministry and evangelization. Like Paul, some chaplains argue, they are willing to be all things to all men for the sake of winning as many people as possible to Christ. On the other hand, non-commissioned rank or private's rank would lack several of these advantages which arise from the status of officer's commission.

In one sense these advantages are attractive. One thinks of
Abercrombie's notion of the "prophetic chaplaincy" which can help prevent war crimes (1973:222); or of Daines' notion of the chaplain as the "conscience" of the armed forces (1983a:1). Would rank not be of help in this prophetic aspect of the church's ministry? (8)

On the other hand, though, efficacy in achieving certain objectives is not the only criterion employed by the church in deciding how its ministry is to be done. The end cannot justify the means. This leads us back to the attempted characterization of institutions at the end of Chapter 2. Certain objectives, e.g. evangelism (of a kind) might well be promoted by the church's having an official chaplain at one of the less salubrious institutions cited in category three. However, the church also has to consider what sort of institution it is, the extent of the church's freedom to preach, and the question of what sort of witness to the world such a chaplain would constitute. Similarly, in the case of rank, the church has to consider the total environment in which rank is being used, e.g. its impact upon the church's prophetic witness, the extent to which it exemplifies the "alternative society", the extent to which it permits pastoral care, etc. The wider issue of the ethics of involvement with the SADF in the context of South Africa and Namibia should be considered carefully in this connection, but discussion of this is deferred to a later chapter. In the meantime it is worth noting that rank has itself been perceived, in the USA at least, as part of the problem, since it induces hesitancy to act as the conscience of the military. Possession of rank can become a factor in chaplains' reluctance to criticize, since it might be felt that only people at the top of the rank structure should do this. For example, when the author suggested
that the Anglican chaplains protest SADF actions in Namibia, Chaplain J. Daines replied that such suggestions should be sent either to the church representative (church matters) or to the Chaplain-General (military matters) (Letters to P.G. Moll, 13.4.1984 and 17.5.1984). This answer neatly sidestepped the issue of whether the chaplains could use their high-ranking influence to urge the armed forces to conform to the chaplains' own ideals of how a "Christian army" should act. This is because the Chaplain-General is from the Dutch Reformed Church (the official position of which is that the war is just (cf. Heyns, 1980:9, and NGAS:116)). In his high position on the general staff, it would be unlikely that he would take it up, because this would probably come too close to a fundamental questioning of the bona fides of the SADF.

As far as the other advantages of rank are concerned (easier fulfilment of the Great Commission, etc.), the question is whether the church should use worldly powers to achieve these valid and important aims of ministry. Clearly this assertion should be seen in relative terms. The church often makes use of the instruments the world provides for communicating its message and facilitating its ministry (e.g. radio, TV, universities, institutional chaplaincy, money, etc.) Their use is not wrong per se, but when it leads to the wielding of undue powers, and the incorporation of values foreign to the Body of Christ, these methods are set aside. For instance, force is one of these: the value of freedom of religion and of free response to the grace of Christ is held so firmly today that parents are reluctant to use force to make their teenage children attend church; this situation is a far cry from that of the Middle Ages church which had no scruples about the use of military force to obtain conversions.
In the case of ministry to military personnel, it might be argued that a minister should not give in to the temptation of using the instruments of state to obtain a hearing for the Gospel; the Gospel is its own best witness.

These points about the incompatibility of rank with several of the theological principles outlined in Chapter 2 should also be considered, finally, in the light of the central Barthian assertion that ministry should spring from the heart of the church. An insistence by the military that chaplains adapt themselves to the rank structure could be viewed as a "ius in sacra", since such a requirement would tend to shape the character of the church's ministry. If ministry is genuinely the product of the church's theological reflections, then the church could not tolerate a situation in which the military would set alien requirements and thereby influence the nature of its ministry.
4.4. Uniform

Rank is of course inseparable from uniform -- and this constitutes the fourth point in connection with the chaplaincy structure. A uniform can be worn only if some or other rank is selected, since the absence of rank is identical with the status of private or rifleman. As discussed earlier, the likely result of such a selection process is that the chaplains would be awarded fairly senior rank, which in turn presents theological and pastoral problems. In this way the uniform itself adds to the dilemma of the military chaplaincy.

The Dutch Reformed writer Meyer quotes favourably the German theologian Bastian (in Hessler, 1975:13), in support of his argument that a non-uniformed chaplaincy (i) permits a more spontaneous pastoral context and (ii) is a better link with the soldier's familiar environment, viz. the civilian environment, and thus serves as a reminder that life in uniform and subjection to military discipline are temporary (1979:45). Argument (i) underscores my previous point about the unnecessary formality introduced by military rank. At the risk of repetition, I quote Meyer's conclusion, which agrees substantially with mine:

"Correct military behaviour is not the essential point in the relationship between the chaplain and the serviceman. More important is the discovery of theological moments ("momente"), e.g. love of neighbour, etc. The most important question which the chaplain has to answer is whether he has succeeded, amid the environment of military discipline, in allowing these theological moments to break through" (1979:45; my translation).
Argument (ii) seems less convincing in the abstract sense, since conscripts hardly need any reminders that their military status is temporary; their day-counting syndrome and the disaffection written on the faces of AWOLers in detention barracks is abundant witness to that. However, argument (ii) does link up with the line of reasoning in Chapter 4, that civilian status can be an important witness to the military during a time when the church regards a particular war as unjust.

However, there are broader issues to be raised in connection with uniform. Of these the most important is what a uniform symbolizes. A dictionary definition is "distinctive dress worn by all members of a particular military or other institution" (Oxford Illustrated). Uniform, in the common use of the term, is a sign of belonging. It serves to identify the wearer with the organization. Implicit in the concept of uniform is a broad identification with the purpose and ideals of the organization, combined with a certain loyalty to it. It does not necessarily follow that dissidents are excluded, or that identification implies full assent (or mindless assent) to every aspect of the organization's purposes. Full membership and uniform may harbour considerable diversity. Yet this diversity is limited. It is limited, in the first place, by the attitude of the leadership of the organization, whose purpose in having a uniform (e.g. at a school, a church choir, a business security service, the police, the army, a prison, the Bantu Affairs Administration Board), is to indicate a unity of purpose, to encourage esprit de corps, to remind members that when they are in uniform they are expected to be good representatives of the organization, to facilitate order and discipline, to show to the public that the person concerned is a representative of the organization, etc. Improper behaviour
when in uniform is strongly discouraged, even if this behaviour is acceptable for someone in civilian dress. Improper behaviour may also be punished severely. An indication of the seriousness with which the SA Army takes the uniform is given by the treatment meted out to a non-member who wore the uniform to get a lift when hitch-hiking. The man, Mr Jan Isaacs, was picked up by a Military Police Staff-Sergeant. After a time he admitted to the Staff-Sergeant that he was not a member of the SADF. He was later charged and brought to court, where he was fined R150. Passing sentence, the magistrate took into account the customary military regulations regarding dress and security. He said that Isaacs had committed a very serious offence in the light of the present military situation in South Africa. He said if Isaacs had been arrested near a military camp or institution, the sentence would have been heavier (Argus, 16.2.1984). (9) The extreme reluctance of the SADF to allow Jehovah's Witnesses alternative overalls in detention barracks in the late sixties, and the insistence of the SADF in putting Steele, Moll, and Yeates in solitary confinement and then sentencing Yeates to a year's imprisonment for their refusal to wear military uniform, would seem to underscore the importance for the military of uniformity of external appearance.

Diversity is limited, in the second place, by members of the organization themselves. By and large, they come to adopt the way of life of the organization, identify broadly with its aims, and participate in its esprit de corps. The more strongly controlled the organization is, the greater the pressures that can be brought to bear by members upon other members to have them "live up to" the standards of the uniform they bear. That these pressures are subtle, having to do with self-image, competition,
the desire for repute among one's peers, etc., in no way detracts from their importance.

Diversity is limited, in the third place, by the attitudes of non-members. They, if anyone, regard the uniform as a symbol of identification with the organization. For instance, a member of the public knows that he or she must comply with the instructions of a uniformed policeman. It cannot be denied that black people see uniformed police as a symbol of dominance, because of the oppressive laws which the police are obliged to enforce. It is reasonable to assume that someone who wears church choir garb identifies with the church to the extent of being a believer. As signs of identification with their respective groups, students wear jeans, businessmen wear pin-stripe suits, and clergy wear clerical garb. Non-members in turn identify members of these respective in-groups by means of their dress, and come, by and large, to expect certain kinds of behaviour and certain kinds of attitudes from people who have been thus identified.

Thus it can be concluded that the uniform is a symbol of belonging; in the military context, it involves, generally speaking, identification with and allegiance to the military institution. Irrespective of their personal intentions, military chaplains are then part of the military institution, as symbolized by the uniform. However, the result is implicit religious legitimation for the armed forces. This is of great importance in the South African context, because the military chaplain conveys to the armed forces an aura of religious respectability -- a kind of moral underpinning which, in the absence of obvious prophetic ministry, tends to undercut and belie the church's convictions about the activities of the SADF in South Africa and Namibia. We
However, at this stage it is important to consider this implicit moral support for the military in the light of Barth's understanding of ministry. If the military insists that the uniform be a condition for the exercise of ministry, then the church stands in danger of bartering away its sole authority over its ministry. The military requirement of uniform could then be regarded as unwarranted interference by the state in matters internal to the church; to use Barth's words, a "ius in sacra" is operating.

The Permanent Force chaplains of the English-speaking churches are aware that some SADF members would prefer civilian pastors and that "strong feelings do exist among certain sections of the population that chaplains in uniform are identified with the SADF which appears to them to be the armed agent of the political party in power" (cf. their Statement of 1.3.1978). Nevertheless, they "strongly recommended" the retention of uniform for fifteen reasons, the essence of which are:

(a) Identification: Uniformed chaplains are fully identified with the service and are integrated into the life of the unit. This enables them to approach all officers and soldiers.

(b) Access: They have access to soldiers on manoeuvres, on the border and at sea.

(c) Administration: They have access to SADF training facilities. Being in uniform removes from the church responsibility for their medical, housing, and salary expenses, and transport and office facilities.
Security: Uniformed chaplains have security clearance. The SADF cannot be held responsible for the safety of civilians in certain operational areas. Civilians in certain operational areas "could be regarded as spies". The Geneva Conventions require official appointment by the military authorities.

Parents: Parents of National Servicemen would feel strongly if uniformed chaplains were withdrawn.

Ecclesiastical: "His being in uniform provides him with a voice and place in the structure of Church activities in the SADF".

It is important to note that the chaplains' decision to retain uniform was not based upon a theology of ministry. Interestingly, there is not a single explicit reference in the "Statement" to theological writings of any kind. And when the fifteen reasons are considered carefully in the light of the theological assumptions identified in Chapter 2, they throw up their own serious theological problems. Let us deal with them in order.

Identification: Identification can be understood in two ways: (i) as identification with the military as such, and (ii) as identification with the way of life of those being ministered to. (i) In 1978, as now, the churches were concerned to reduce their identification with the military to the minimum compatible with sympathetic ministry. I proceed to show, in Chapter 4, that the churches had, and still have, good reason for doing so. (ii) As I have tried to show above, it does not follow that uniform (with the high rank which is likely to accompany this) is good for pastoral identification. This point also raises Goffman's characterization of the armed forces as a "total institution".
How can the pastor best identify with the "mortification of the self" that the troop undergoes, during basics at least? How can the pastor identify with conscientious objectors? For example, several National Service chaplains thought that their best times of ministry were after hours, when they were dressed informally (e.g. Hart, Laxton). The author recalls the resentment of detention barracks inmates at some of the patronizing comments of chaplains who had no vague appreciation of the strains imposed by that cruel and deprived environment (11).

(b) Access: Since most chaplaincy work is done at settled bases, this is more an argument for uniformed ministry for certain defined occasions than an argument for uniformed ministry throughout. But even so the argument fails. Accessibility to personnel in remote areas by civilians is not impossible; it depends on whether the military is willing to allow such an arrangement. West German chaplains, for example, have unlimited access to soldiers despite their semi-civilian status. This applies both to in-camp and manoeuvre situations ("Military chaplaincy service"; Stueber, 1975; Potgieter, 1971:291-298).

(c) Administration: The issue of chaplains' training is deferred to a subsequent section, but in passing it might be stated that this aspect of the SAChS's work is not problem-free and has been censured by several National Service chaplains. It is possible, moreover, that if the church were to take on the responsibility of training its chaplains directly, it might be more committed to that form of ministry and might take it more seriously. The church's lack of responsibility for the housing, salary, etc. of its chaplains is not an unmixed blessing, for the same reason. If the church had to care for and pay its chaplains it might take
more trouble to inquire about the purposes to which its energies and money were being put. In any case things like medical, housing and salary expenses need not be dependent on uniform or even membership of the military; West German chaplains are paid by the government but remain civilians in many other respects.

(d) Security: Uniform is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for security. It is not a necessary condition because many non-uniformed people in the SADF have security clearance: Armscor officials, white female secretaries, and black workers. That it is not a sufficient condition is evident from the failure of the security system to prevent Commodore Dieter Gerhard from supplying the USSR with information for many years. Thus the issue of security clearance is no argument for uniformed ministry. Furthermore, the issue of security clearance throws up its own serious theological problems at a time when the church has fundamental questions about the war, as I explain below. The argument that the SADF cannot be held responsible for the safety of civilians in certain operational areas is at best an argument for uniformed chaplaincy in operational areas only. Most of this ministry, incidentally, is done at base camps within the operational area, where the SADF certainly is responsible for the protection of chaplains, be they civilians or otherwise. In any case many people change into casual or civilian clothing after work hours on the border. Some say that to have civilian clothes there can even be a point of prestige! On the other hand, one chaplain pointed out that uniform is necessary on the border because one tends to be assigned to units whose members do not know one and so the officer commanding might not treat one properly in the absence of any visible indication of who one is (Wittstock). In summary, it seems that much depends on the
officer commanding concerned; if he and the chaplains were properly introduced the "necessity" for uniform might fall away. For instance, Rev. Vivian Harris was told by one commanding officer that he regarded Harris' clerical garb "as a uniform", and therefore Harris could have free access to the troops (Telephone call, 6.8.1984).

The suggestion that civilian chaplains could be regarded as spies is revealing. If suspicion of disloyalty to the SADF is a reason for wanting uniformed chaplaincy, this raises theological difficulties, because the minister of God cannot be required to hold prescribed political or military views as a precondition for ministry. This would tend to undermine the church's sole competence to recognize the Holy Spirit's gifts and to ordain its ministers.

(e) Parents: Parents' fears of withdrawal of chaplains constitute an argument for the maintenance of ministry as such, but not necessarily for uniformed ministry.

(f) Ecclesiastical: This reason is rather obscure. I am unaware of any theological reason why military status should confer the right to speak in the church. On the other hand, it may be a poorly stated way of saying that officer status "gives the chaplain legitimate standing within the military establishment, removing his identity as an outsider and showing his identity with the men and the system" (MMP: 88). This point has been dealt with under (a) above.

The chaplains' reasons for retention of uniform would thus seem to be lacking in theological foundation.
4.5. Chaplains' training

In this section we discuss the in-house training given to chaplains by members of the SACns and SADF. This discussion refers primarily to the chaplains' orientation courses for National Service and Citizen Force chaplains. "Advanced chaplains' courses" for Permanent Force chaplains are not dealt with as information about them was too difficult to obtain.

4.5.1. Description

National Service chaplains do the orientation course after completing their basic training. Prospective Citizen Force chaplains, who have not previously worked as chaplains in the SADF, are normally required to undergo an orientation course. The orientation course lasts for a few weeks. It is run by senior men in the SACns, of whom Brig. ds. F.J. Potgieter, author of Die Militere Kapelaan, is one. Officially speaking it is not a theological course, since doctrine is the province of the church (IB n.6(d)iv). Instead it supplies the "background against which the ministry to the men is carried out" ("National Service Chaplains"). Information gleaned from the terse official documents indicate that the course includes the following:

* use of audiovisual aids
* "communism" ("National Service Chaplains")
* the organization of the SADF, the unit and the SACns
* the office and task of the chaplain ("National Service Chaplains")
* the "place, duty and function" of the chaplain (HB:5).
Interviews supplied a more comprehensive indication of the course content:

* revolutionary warfare and psychological warfare (Laxton)
* Geneva Conventions
* Task of the hospital chaplain (Lawrie, Royston, Thomas)
* Morale and motivation (Thomas, Laxton, Dixon)
* religious preparedness (Thomas, Laxton)
* "The church as the anti-revolutionary force in society" (Thomas)
* Pacifism and the New Testament (Royston)
* The war in Angola (Dixon)
* "Total Onslaught" (Royston)
* National Service Refusal or Conscientious Objection, done at least once by Maj.-Gen. C. Naude (Laxton, Thomas), and once by a professor from Pretoria University (Veldhuysen)
* Work of the chaplain in the operational area.

4.5.2. Discussion

At the outset two important points must be granted to the organizers of the orientation course. The first is that the orientation course gives no explicit instruction on doctrinal questions (e.g. baptism, the eucharist, etc.) and in this sense does not intrude upon the church's task. The second is that an orientation course of some kind is necessary for incoming chaplains to familiarize them with

(a) purely functional and uncontroversial aspects like SADF and SACHS organization, the Geneva Conventions, the use of audiovisual
aids, etc.

(b) Other elements peculiar to the military institution, which also constitute the background and context of the chaplain's ministry, and where understanding is necessary in order to exercise relevant and compassionate pastoral care. Examples are the ethics of warfare, the nature of the current war, conscientious objection, the "place and task" of the chaplain in the context of war, etc. The question, then, is whether these aspects are being communicated to the chaplains in a suitable way and by suitable personnel. As far as the purely functional aspects are concerned, none of the chaplains interviewed had any difficulties. It was with the latter, less easily definable category of instruction that they found themselves uncomfortable, bored, or irritated. One chaplain thought the course a "total waste" (Veldhuysen). While acknowledging the necessity of dealing with broader issues relating to the chaplain's task, they questioned some of the concepts conveyed and the awkward theological assumptions underlying them. For instance, the concept of religious preparedness was criticized for its political assumptions (e.g. that there is a communist-inspired "total onslaught" against the RSA) and its religious assumptions (e.g. that religion, as one of the elements of "total preparedness", could be used to bolster the morale of soldiers) (thus Laxton and others). For instance, one chaplain commented,

"I cannot recall much of what we were taught in our chaplains' course -- it was far from memorable. In fact I was not nearly the only one who thought the courses nonsensical and boring. (I remember one exception -- a very good lecture by the chaplain at Voortrekkernooogte Military Hospital on pastoral care for the wounded). The military
courses were in fact quite sensibly presented but the chaplaincy ones were hair raising at times. I detest militarism, but I find it particularly repulsive in ministers. I prefer not to mention names since I cannot remember either the more sickening references nor all the lectures. Perhaps many were innocent, but then the bad impressions created by the others stuck. (They were all army chaplains)." (Letter from Rev. D. Lawrie to P.G. Moll, 20.1.1983)

Let us therefore examine the second category more closely.

The problem with this category is that, however delicately it is treated, the form of its presentation will rest on theological and political assumptions which, in the South African context, are not necessarily held in common by the churches. One of the most important divides here is that between the Afrikaans churches on the one hand and the Catholic, Anglican, and Methodist churches on the other. Although the SAChS does not deal with theological matters explicitly, it assumes them, and communicates them, by ostensibly dealing with the "background" of the chaplain's work. Furthermore, this theological thinking is presented by the organizers (normally all dominees of the Afrikaans churches) as though it were fact, not recognizing that it is highly controversial. That denominational representatives are given some opportunity to present their views does not alter the fact that the central thrust of the orientation course contains theological assumptions uncongenial to some or all of the English-speaking churches. Some examples will suffice.

(a) Maj.-Gen. C. Naude's exposition of conscientious objection differentiates sharply between "political" and "religious"
objection. This depends upon the theological assumption of being able to regard the latter as "genuine", being the product of conscience, while simultaneously denying moral and religious value to the former. This is not done by the English-speaking churches (including the Baptist Union), as is clear from their rejection of the legislation on conscientious objection in 1983.

(b) Instruction on communism, revolutionary warfare and psychological warfare, done, as it is, by senior members of the SADF and SACHS, implies important assumptions about social change in general, and about social change in the South African apartheid state in particular. Now the English-speaking churches have what they believe to be theologically founded beliefs regarding social change in South Africa (e.g. see the "Message to the People of South Africa"). Hence there is already the potential for disagreement, on theological grounds, between the SADF and the SACHS, on the one hand, and the English-speaking churches on the other. Further assumptions arise, e.g. about capitalism, socialism, and communism, their desirability or otherwise, and about the ideological leaning of SWAPO and the ANC. The definition of these words is of immediate relevance to the churches because of the state's frequent assumption (as, for example, in the Eloff Commission) that the English-speaking churches are wittingly or unwittingly helping communists, through, for instance, statements like that on conscientious objection at Hammanskraal in 1974. The potential for sharp theological disagreement becomes greater when it is argued that the church should be an anti-revolutionary force in society, as this implies an array of theological assumptions about what apartheid is and does; here there can be no talk of commonality between the Afrikaans churches and the English-speaking churches.
(c) To perceive the chaplain's role as a motivator implies theological assumptions about the place of religion in war in general and about the ethical value/disvalue of the current war, which are not shared by the English-speaking churches. Furthermore, the theological stance of some leaders of the English-speaking churches would lead them to conclusions precisely opposite to those of the SADF and the Afrikaans churches, since the former believe that the SADF is so disastrously in the wrong that the church should motivate young men to be conscientious objectors (e.g. Archbishop Hurley, as quoted in Church and Conscience, and in Sunday Tribune, 8.2.1976).

4.5.3. Conclusion

It appears that the orientation course does convey theological values to chaplains, despite official statements to the contrary. It is possible that chaplains of a conservative religious and political outlook would not perceive that theological values are being conveyed, because their own religious and political assumptions do not differ markedly from those of the SACHS hierarchy. This might help explain statements like those of, for example, Stiglingh:

"The course itself has nothing to do with any Theological views or emphasis. All we are presented with is military procedure and organisation... I want to state emphatically, there are NO theological ideas or concepts presented to us. Let me quote to you the words of one of our then Senior Staff Officers: "Gentlemen, you are first and foremost ministers of the Word of God, that is your supreme task" (Letter to P.G. Moll, 8.10.1983; similarly letter from Rev.
Indeed, it is inevitable that theological values will be conveyed in some way when trying to deal with the context and background of the chaplain's work, for it stands to reason that not only sermon content but also perceptions of the chaplain's role, the SADF, South African society and other factors making up the chaplain's context are coloured by, and in turn colour, one's theological assumptions. In the final analysis it is impossible to drive in a wedge between theological and (allegedly) non-theological elements of the chaplain's work.

If the English-speaking churches, the Afrikaans churches and the SADF were able to view the chaplaincy as a partnership, the inculcation of theological values by the SAChS leadership would not present so serious a problem. For instance, the German chaplaincy is seen by one writer as a cooperative partnership between state and church, whereby each partner promotes its own interests as well as a common interest (Kruse, 1982:160-169). However, the commonality of interest upon which the German system rests is not present in South Africa where fundamental theological differences manifest themselves in realms like nationalism and apartheid, the relation of apartheid to the war, the ethics of war and conscription, the relation of church and state, and the limits of obedience to the state. If theological partnership is impossible, how should training of chaplains be done?

One solution is to allow each church, or any combination of churches which hold sufficient theological values in common, to take full control of all aspects of chaplaincy training, but for the purely functional elements identified above. If the church did this, its chaplaincy would more closely approximate the
Bartnian vision in which the church is the sole authority over its ministry.
5. Freedom of the chaplaincy

Huber comments that the church is nowhere more immediately confronted with the problem of peace than in the military chaplaincy: of all areas of church work, the military is the area where the church is most tempted to surrender its task of peace. Therefore, Huber argues, one test of whether the military grants the military chaplaincy freedom to preach the Gospel is whether the biblical message of peace can be preached freely in the military (1973:225). I shall suggest that this test be used as a point of departure for the discussion about the freedom of the South African military chaplaincy. This point is central to the Barthian conviction about the sole authority of the church over its ministry since, if the church is not completely free to preach the Gospel, the church's ministry is in danger of coming under the control of, or being influenced by, other powers -- in this case the military.

It is probably true to say that most of the chaplains of the English-speaking churches consider themselves to be at complete liberty in the military environment. All of the serving Permanent Force and several of the Citizen Force chaplains interviewed said as much. Perhaps this view is representative:

"It is true that I am paid by the state, but that in NO way remotely implies that I am controlled by the state. I have enjoyed a liberty in preaching the Word as if I were in any Baptist Church. In fact there are certain Baptist Churches I would not be able to accept an invitation from them (sic) to become their pastor because in their constitution they DEMAND that the pastor hold certain eschatological views..."
I can assure you the moment the state in any way suggests any thought of control regarding my ministry and preaching, I will resign without hesitation" (Stiglingh).

Is this freedom which the chaplains insist they have the same freedom to which Huber refers? I shall tentatively suggest that it is not the same freedom. The "self-selection" process, as well as these chaplains' attitudes about conscientious objection, their attitudes about obedience to the state, and their attitude about the role of the SADF considerably limit, if not altogether extinguish, the chances of chaplaincy-SADF friction. Therefore the issue of the church's freedom to preach its message of peace does not even arise for these chaplains. Therefore, I proceed to argue, these chaplains' subjective impression is not yet a reliable test of whether the church has freedom to preach its message of peace in the military environment. After this I try to show that the experiences of some chaplains suggest that the issue of the freedom of the chaplaincy is not a finally settled one.

5.1. "Self-selection"

It may be that the reason why the chaplains appear to have complete freedom in the military is that the chaplaincy consists of those ministers in the church who are favourably disposed to the military. It stands to reason that a "self-selection" process would operate: those who share military values are more likely to feel at home in the military, hence would volunteer for that work. Conversely, those who reject military values would not want to be involved in ministry to military personnel. Unfortunately, no sociological studies of this phenomenon have been done in South
Africa. If this process is operating in the SAChS, it would also serve to explain the differentiation made above between patriotic and critical chaplains, since the former are, by and large, volunteers, whereas many of the latter are conscripts with no specific sense of calling to ministry in the military. An American study contended that the process of "self-selection", along with the "pervasive acculturation processes of the military community which confirm and support that predisposition, combine to commission and create chaplains who strongly identify with the military. Augmented by the trend toward careerism and a stable professional chaplaincy in which the large majority remain until retirement, the turnover rate is low ... the chaplaincy is institutionalized and career oriented" (MMP:65f. Similarly Abercrombie, 1979:48f).

5.2. Chaplains' attitudes about conscientious objection

Nearly all the chaplains interviewed said that they were at least tolerant of, or supported, religious conscientious objection on pacifist grounds (12). Clearly the chaplains' attitudes have changed considerably -- in tandem with changes of attitude in the English-speaking churches generally -- since the days of the SACC resolution on conscientious objection at Hammanskraal in 1974, when the chaplains issued what amounted to a call to martial resolution:

"We, the chaplains of the English-language churches serving in the SADF, are dismayed by the decision of the SACC, taken at Hammanskraal, which appeared to encourage South Africans to refuse to serve in the defence of the country. We recognize injustices at all levels of our society but
believe that the statement that this society is so different from others that it warrants being described as basically unjust and violent, is unfounded and ill-considered. We therefore dissociate ourselves from this resolution. The SADF has never demanded anything else from us but the proclamation of the Word of God and the pastoral care of the members of our various denominations in the SADF. We, as chaplains in the SADF, who are familiar with the aims, objects and methods of the communistically inspired terrorists who by murder and force attempt to gain access to our land, urge every member of our churches and especially the young men to make their personal contribution in the defence of our country" (quoted in Hansard, 15.8.1974:803f).

However, by 1978 the chaplains were asking for alternative service for conscientious objectors:

"Bearing in mind the possibility of a man, not a member of a pacifist denomination, being at any particular time a conscientious objector, we recommend:

a. That the SADF make provision for such a man to do non-combatant service if he so desires; and

b. That the State institute a form of non-military national service. In order to establish whether a person is a bona-fide conscientious objector we recommend that Regional Boards be appointed;

c. These Boards should consist of SADF personnel, representatives of the legal profession and theologians nominated by the churches and appointed by the Minister;
d. To prevent the abuse of these privileges the possibility of a reasonable extension of the period of service may be considered" (Permanent Force Chaplains' Statement, 1.3.1978).

The meaning attached to the term "conscientious objector" in the 1978 statement is unspecified. Does it encompass religious pacifism only, or is it subject to a wider interpretation including non-religious forms of objection, as well as objection on ethical and moral grounds to a particular war? The 1978 document does not say. Hence we have to resort to interviews with chaplains and other pieces of evidence to discover how the chaplains view the phenomenon of conscientious objection.

From interviews conducted and letters written in 1983 it became clear that the chaplains had a certain regard for religious pacifism. Some were themselves noncombatants on more or less these grounds (e.g. Voegel, Botsis, Hovers, Hymer). Others rejected religious pacifism personally, but accepted that others might be conscientious objectors, e.g.:

"I am obviously not a conscientious objector. I find no Biblical Basis for this ... Where people disagree with me, I accept this, for I believe that every man must live by his own convictions and will one day be answerable to God alone for every decision and action" (Stiglingh).

Despite this respect for religious pacifism, as of 1983 the only monograph on the subject of the ethics of war distributed by the English Literature Commission of the SACHs was Major Aldworth Cowan's pamphlet "Pacifism?", which is essentially an attack on the idea that a Christian might be a pacifist. There was no
balancing pamphlet motivating pacifism -- or other forms of conscientious objection (Letter from Chaplain D. van der Spuy to P.G. Moll, 3.7.1984). To this extent the publications of the SACHS were far from representative of the theological understanding of the English-speaking churches. Now it may be that the views of the chaplains themselves differed from the thrust of their publications; but then the question is why the publications were not updated in, say, the seven-year period 1977 to 1983, despite the existence of a Commission with full-time staff. It may be, too, that the twelve-pamphlet series on conscientious objection of the CPSA prepared by Dr James Moulder has been distributed by Anglican chaplains. Even if this is the case, their distribution would seem to have been limited. Moreover, these pamphlets, unlike Cowan's work, are descriptive rather than motivational in nature.

Most of the chaplains seemed to treat the issue of the ethics of war passively, i.e. by tolerating and helping conscientious objectors but not by actively promoting thought and reflection about the subject by, for instance, using the SACC resolution, or the Catholic and Anglican statements on the war. One chaplain tells of his treatment of the problem:

"...some 15 000 troops have passed through our unit ... of these I can only recall two who were conscientious objectors by conviction. There have been others who have been somewhat uncertain and have come to share their feelings with me ... If they felt strongly about the matter, I would assure them that I would arrange for them to be placed in an administration post, or to serve in the medics" (Stiglingh).

Yet several entertained some suspicion of those who objected on
grounds other than "pure" religious pacifism. One chaplain had never met an objector who "connects the SADF with apartheid", and was not sure what such a person would mean; but asserted that "if it means that the SADF is responsible for apartheid, then I must reject it entirely" (Stiglingh). By contrast, a Catholic chaplain accepted the bona fides of objectors to a specific war:

"in one sense I do see the distinction between religious objectors and political objectors, but of course in another I would put politics in the realm of morality, so the distinction cannot be made. In that sense my full sympathy goes to the selective objector" (Cawcutt, Letter to P. G. Moll, 19.9.1983).

The response of some chaplains to the Naude Commission and the subsequent legislation on conscientious objection in the Defence Further Amendment Act of 1983 seems to confirm that there is a bifurcation in their views between religious pacifism and other forms of objection. Now the Act differentiates between "religious objectors" (to whom it grants a six-year period of "community service" in lieu of military service), and all other objectors (who are liable to a six-year jail sentence). A summary of the conclusions of the Naude Commission is given by Rev. D.R. Briggs of the United Board Free Churches. The parts which indicate the bifurcation referred to above read:

"Because conscientious objection is advanced by radical young men for political ends as well as by those with genuine religious scruples, the commission felt that the first need is to identify those who have genuine religious convictions. Conscience per se is not always a valid norm, since it can change according to circumstances in which the
objection finds himself. On the other hand, the commission had sympathy for those with strong religious objections and urged that these be considered apart from those whose objections are mainly or entirely of a political nature.

"...the commission recommends as follows:

"1. Non-combatants should be allowed to do military service which does not involve the carrying of arms or weapons training.

"2. Non-militarists (who refuse to wear uniform but are willing to do work beneficial to the Defence Force) should be employed out of the military system and not in uniform; their length of service should be one and one-half times the length of military service together with camps.

"3. Non-militarists unwilling to have any part of the Defence Force should be required to engage in other forms of national service (e.g., as firemen, hospital workers, in forestry), and, corresponding to provisions operating in other countries, their national service should be twice the length of military service plus camps operating at the time of their hearing by the board.

"4. Objectors on political grounds should not be placed in military detention, because theirs is not a military offence, but should be gaol ed for a period twice the length of military service, and in their case there would be no remission of sentence for good behaviour.

"The commission recognizes that objectors with genuine religious convictions would also be politically motivated,
but trusts that the board hearing the cases would be able to
distinguish these men from those whose convictions have only
a political, radical base" (Letter to J. Wing, 10.9.1982).

The restrictive terms of the Act have been rejected by the
Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, Congregational and
Baptist churches, in official letters written to SADF
representatives or to the Minister (see the section on
conscientious objection in Chapter 2). Since this is a highly
controversial and sensitive issue in the churches, it was not easy
to gauge the chaplains' response to the Commission, the subsequent
Act of 1983, and the operation of the Board for Religious
Objection, the task of which is to implement the terms of the Act.
However, the following tentative picture emerges.

First, although Maj.-Gen. C. Naude, who headed the Commission, is
a chaplain, the author is unaware of any serious attempt by the
chaplains to persuade him to recommend inclusion of a wider set of
conscientious objectors. It is not that Maj.-Gen. Naude operated
in total isolation from the chaplains. Admittedly, he might not
have consulted them or requested their opinion; but he did present
his ideas to them on several different occasions (Thomas,
Pretorius, Laxton). However, none of the individuals consulted
said that they had strongly motivated a broadening of Naude's
concepts; nor, apparently, was there any collective response.
Whereas they had taken the trouble to compile public statements on
conscientious objection in 1974 and 1978, in 1983 there was
silence, which can only be taken to imply consent. This is
significant in view of the fact that the 1983 legislation does not
meet all of their earlier demands. In 1978 they requested that
the theologians on the Board be nominated by the churches (see
above); but one of the main criticisms that the churches have made of the Board is that the theologians are appointed by the Minister of Manpower, completely by-passing the churches (see, e.g., SACC National Conference 1984, Resolution 39).

Second, a senior chaplain, Brig. A. van den Aardweg, has spoken in favour of the new legislation. At an Air Force memorial service he reportedly praised the "Christian soldiers" of the SADF who he said were "fighting the forces of atheistic communism", and then paid tribute to the Minister of Defence, General Malan, and the Chaplain-General, Maj.-Gen. Naude, for their contribution to the new legislation regarding conscientious objection (EP Herald, 2.5.1983). The Paratus report on the service quoted him as saying, "With God on our side, no-one can defeat us" (July 1983, p80). It would be naive to think that the military men present took this Rom. 8 paraphrase in its original sense; more likely is that they took it to mean that God is on the side of the SADF against its military and political "enemies".

That van den Aardweg is a Baptist makes his statement all the more surprising, in light of the Baptists' historic stance on conscience. The Baptist Union of South Africa resolved in 1912 in response to the recently passed Union Defence Act,

"that in harmony with the tradition of the Baptist denomination which has emphasized the sacredness of conscience and has stood for civil and religious liberty, we record our regret that the principle of compulsion should have been embodied in the SA Defence Act, and hereby urge Parliament to take such steps as may be necessary to withdraw the compulsory clauses as soon as possible" (quoted in South African Outlook (Feb. 1983):24).
Again, the Citizenship Committee of the Baptist Union wrote a letter to the Minister of Justice on 31 March 1983, protesting the differential treatment of "religious" and other objectors. Thus it would appear that one of the most senior SAChS officials is out of step with his own church in his restrictive understanding of the phenomenon of conscientious objection. This view may be contrasted with the more open view of the Catholic chaplain quoted above.

Third, the author discussed the legislation with the Assistant Chaplain-General (Navy), Rev. M.M. Pretorius, who disapproved of what he termed "political" refusal of military service. However, due to Pretorius' subsequent rejection of the entire contents of the author's write-up of the interview, this observation should be treated with circumspection.

Fourth, the response of the United Board Free Churches is enlightening in this connection. The UBFC has no official powers or constitution, and serves only as liaison between the SADF and the "Free Churches", who presently include only the Baptist, Presbyterian and Congregational churches (Letter from Brig. A. van den Aardweg to P.G. Moll, 23.9.1983). Maj.-Gen. Naude presented his plans for treatment of conscientious objectors to the UBFC, in much the same way as eventually emerged in the legislation (see above). Rev. D. R. Briggs was chairing the UBFC, on which sat some chaplains, including Brig. van den Aardweg. Briggs wrote to Rev. Joseph Wing saying that all members of the UBFC were present for the meeting, and after receiving the report gave their unanimous support to the recommendations (Letter, 10.9.1982). (13)

Fifth, one CPSA chaplain felt that a positive view of the Naude proposals should be taken (Middlemost). In fact he had some
years before written to the author, trying to persuade him not to be a conscientious objector (Letter from Rev. S. Middlemost to P.G. Moll, 3.5.1979, part of which is reproduced earlier in this chapter).

Thus it seems that there is broad agreement between the patriotic chaplains and the SADF over what constitutes valid conscientious objection. The pastoral consequences for potential conscientious objectors are often difficult as a result. Instead of a clerical advocate, the conscientious objector may be faced with a military adversary. One might speculate that this is exactly what the military wants of its chaplains. Hence it is unlikely that friction would arise out of these chaplains' understanding of the ethics of war. Indeed, some of the chaplains volunteered that they would urge or help conscientious objectors to seek noncombatant status (Clack, Stiglingh), which, in most cases until the new 1983 Act, could be obtained with relative ease. Even in the case of some chaplains who sympathize with selective conscientious objection, friction is unlikely to arise because of what seems to be a hesitancy, or even an unwillingness, to suggest to a troop courses of action which are not approved of by the SADF. This is sometimes justified on the grounds of a sort of clerical division of labour:

"I think our job is to work with those "in the business" -- there are other priests working with those not yet in, trying to help them to decide, which is of course difficult"


Hence it seems that the stance of several chaplains on the ethics of war is unlikely to be a real test of the church's freedom to preach its message of peace. Hence their subjective impression
of complete freedom should be understood against the backdrop of their restrictive, or alternatively, passive understanding of the church's message of peace as it relates to military obligation.

This is not to impugn the sincerity of the chaplains in question. They, according to their lights, believe they have complete freedom to preach the Gospel as they understand it. Yet a more durable test of the SADF's tolerance would be given if, say, Fr. David Russell of the CPSA were permitted, as a full-time but civilian-based chaplain, to teach troops about the Anglican position on war and explain to them, in the context of Anglican social teaching, why the CPSA has requested the withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia and has expressed the view that the SADF is defending a grossly unjust society. However, such a test is unlikely to arise, as the military would not permit it.

Furthermore, as suggested above, there probably occurs a process of "self-selection" whereby ministers who are favourably disposed to the SADF volunteer as chaplains, while ministers who identify with the Catholic, CPSA or MCSA stance on the SADF, fearing an unfree environment and not relishing rank, uniform and military command, would avoid chaplaincy work.
5.3. Chaplaincy and security clearance

But in any case, if a priest of, say, the Catholic church, who strongly identified with his church's rejection of the SADF presence in Namibia (see Chapter 2 and Appendix A), were to seek entry into the chaplaincy, he could be seen as a "Trojan Horse" and be barred by the security clearance mechanism. In this way the church's desire for freedom to preach its message of peace sets in high relief its difficulties with security clearance. On the one hand, it is clear that every military institution has to have some process of security clearance, to bar entry to people, literature or influences which would tend to hamper its purpose or worse, destroy it. On the other hand, if the church's message of peace includes

(a) the possibility that any Christian might be a conscientious objector
(b) the rejection of a particular war as unjust,

then it is obvious that a convinced representative of this message would be seen by the military to have a profoundly negative effect. It was not for nothing that the Eloff Commission said that the SACC's advocacy of conscientious objection gave rise to "deep perturbation" on the part of the SADF, because this "strikes at the root of a system on which the SADF is dependent for its existence and performance", and "could impair the capability of the SADF". Therefore, the Commission concluded, the SACC's stance is "inconsistent with the national interest" (Eloff:191,199f). Thus the SADF might deem it necessary to exclude a chaplain who held firmly to this SACC view, or to the CPSA or SACBC stance (the latter are dealt with in more detail in
Such a process of exclusion is not unknown in South African history. South African chaplains in World War II had to make a declaration that they were not opposed to the government's policy (Potgieter, 1971:220). The particular circumstances which probably gave rise to this ruling (viz. deep divisions among the parties whether to support Britain) do not diminish this point; they might strengthen the point as the divisions in the Southern African community over the war are also intense today (see Appendix A).

The consequence of this reasoning is that the military would probably not allow a chaplaincy that faithfully reflected the message of peace of, say, the CPSA and the Catholic Church. One might go further and speculate what would happen if some chaplains actually became selective conscientious objectors or war protesters. It is possible that the security clearance procedure would be used to exclude them. But the churches themselves have no such policy of excluding people on the basis of their beliefs about war. Therefore, if such a process were carried out by the SADF, one could rightly speak of discrimination; as the US UCC study put it, this would amount to

"denying one class of clergy equal opportunity for employment on the basis of religious belief, and inhibiting the church's free exercise of its right to determine the qualifications of clergy for ministry" (MMP:60).

The UCC study therefore recommended that the church and the military enter into a written agreement, providing adequate safeguards against the security clearance process acting as a test of either religious beliefs or political beliefs and legal political activity (MMP:61). In similar fashion, Abercrombie
recommended that the US United Methodist Church strongly protest and refuse to cooperate with the military requirement that chaplain appointees receive a "favourable" security check (1979:56).

Now in the SACHS the author has been able to locate only one case where the security clearance procedure has barred entry. It concerned the Rev. Neville Russell Campbell, a CPSA priest, who applied to become a military chaplain in the 1970s, but who did not get through the security clearance process. This, in his opinion, and in that of Rev. J. Voegel, the then Principal Anglican chaplain, was because of his involvement, some twenty years before, with the Congress of Democrats. During Campbell's interview with the security police (as part of the security clearance procedure), his security file was produced, containing photographs of him taking part in a demonstration. A "special appeal" was then lodged by Rev. Voegel, on the grounds that this involvement had taken place when Campbell was very young. However, this too was turned down. This is a dramatic illustration of the church's problem with security clearance. It means that the MCSA, CPSA and Catholic churches may be faced with a dilemma of how to perform ministry if they were to intervene in the "self-selection" process by encouraging the entry into the chaplaincy of ministers who more closely represent their message of peace. They might then have to heed the stern warning of the US United Presbyterian report on the military chaplaincy:

"it is all to easy to begin to surrender faithfulness to the gospel without realizing it. The church and its chaplains must be keenly sensitive to the erosion, exploitation or softening of its witness. The church needs to be
courageous enough to resist any such encroachment, and, if necessary, must not hesitate to exercise the right of withdrawal from such a system to establish such other approaches as it may devise" (Appelquist, 1969:42).

The issue of security clearance might also be viewed from another angle. Could it be that the trust reposed by institutions like the SADF in a chaplain through security clearance reveals something about the kind of ministry that that chaplain is offering? In other words, is not the fact that one is considered "trustworthy" by the SADF an indication that the SADF can safely anticipate only a certain kind of behaviour of one, viz. behaviour which will help the institution, or at least not hinder it? I state this in question form because there is no way of telling exactly how the SADF views the security status of the chaplains, except of course from the high command itself, which is unlikely to tell. However, one can afford to be a little more certain about the fact that various degrees of security clearance are awarded. The question might then be phrased in this way: why is the SADF willing to trust certain chaplains more than others? Would it not be easy for political judgments to enter into the security clearance process? For example, would a chaplain who agreed strongly with the Catholic Bishops' stance on Namibia be able to get a high degree of security clearance? If not, security clearance could become a theological problem, for it would be a powerful means whereby the state could mould the ministry of the church. Obviously ministry to military personnel is affected by the issue of security clearance irrespective of
CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICAN CHAPLAINS' SERVICE

whether it is civilian-based or military-based. Either way the implications of security clearance should not be obscured; it should be faced squarely as a theological problem that has the potential to challenge the integrity of the church's ministry.

5.4. Chaplains' attitudes about obedience

The attitude of the patriotic chaplains about church and state comes down fairly heavily on the side of obedience to the state. While there is some recognition that the church's obedience to the state is limited (e.g. in E.L.C. Lesson 18, "Authority"), in practice little weight is given to this teaching, on the grounds that the New Testament injunctions to obedience were given in the context of a grossly unjust government. Perhaps the following view is representative:

"I believe that both Paul and Peter made it quite clear that obedience to the state is a Christian responsibility. Remembering that both of them lived under the Roman government with its manifold injustices -- yet how clearly Peter puts it: "Be subject for the Lord's sake to every human institution, whether it be to the emperor, or to governors ... Honour all men, love the brotherhood, fear God. Honour the emperor". This is the inspired Word of God and for myself I would find great difficulty in bypassing this passage and Romans 13. This in no way implies that I agree with everything the government does, but I must be subject to it, and use legitimate means to bring about change" (Stiglingh).

The fact that this view was expressed in the context of a
discussion about selective conscientious objection is significant. It suggests that it is precisely in the area of military ethics that the chaplain concerned believes that the state's authority will normally hold sway. The literature distributed by the SACHS seems to confirm that this attitude about military obedience is fairly common among the chaplains. For instance, in the soldier's "Guide to National Service" compiled and distributed by the SACHS, the soldier is brusquely told that

"One of the first things you will learn is that every order must be obeyed. Unconditionally! ... It will not be prefaced by "please", nor followed by "thank you", but you will DO IT, and do it at once ... your response will be automatic... Immediate unquestioning obedience to orders will always contribute to the successful carrying out of whatever aim your superiors have in mind ... That is what authority and discipline are all about, and if you get the idea right away, it will help you to settle down" (Guide to National Service:llf).

In fairness, it is true that the writer of the "Guide" advances reasons why this obedience is necessary: it could save life, it could help the soldier to settle down better, it could aid the success of the military operation, etc. Nevertheless it is the case that a religious body, the SACHS, is here found to be using its religious prerogatives to encourage obedience. The efforts made by the SACHS to indicate the limits to obedience are on nothing like the same scale; as we shall see below, its assertion of the limits of obedience suffers a "death of a thousand qualifications". In this particular "Guide", this passage about the virtues of obedience is followed by a theologized legitimation
"DISCIPLINE HAS A SPIRITUAL VALUE. A true Christian is a disciple of Jesus Christ. Being a disciple has a strong link with "discipline" ... the discipline which the Christian exercises is learning how to deny himself ... the person who is prepared to discipline himself will not find military discipline an intolerable burden" (Guide to National Service:12).

Another SACHS publication, "The Whole Armour of God", supplies what seems to be an open-handed discussion about the dilemma of loyalty to God and loyalty to the State. This publication used to be distributed to troops in the 1970s but is apparently being replaced now. The author was given a copy by Assistant Chaplain-General Morel Pretorius in 1983. Its chief value is to indicate the theological position of the published materials of the SACHS at a point in time; unfortunately no more recent judgment could be made as there were no comparable materials available. The relevant part reads:

"Thus we come to the position where we can say that every totalitarian claim by the State is not acceptable to the Christian. Where, as would happen in a Communist State, the State claims your full loyalty, the Christian has no choice but to reject the State. The State cannot be given what belongs to God. So also Christians the world over believe there are certain principles involved in the ordinary affairs of State where their beliefs and the State policy clash. Again the Christian's first loyalty is to God. At the same time it must be firmly and strongly stated that every citizen has a responsibility to his
country. He is bound as a Christian to pay his taxes, to obey the laws of the land except where there is a clash of principle, and to fulfil the reasonable demands the country may require of him by way of service and sacrifice. Citizenship involves many privileges, and we cannot accept the privileges unless we share the responsibilities." (The Whole Armour of God:12f).

Leaving aside the gratuitous assumption that the Christian must reject (only?) the Communist state, let us see how this theory is applied in South Africa. The writer continues,

"Any person who now thinks about his solution will soon see that while the problem is solved in principle, the practical difficulties remain. We are not living in a State that makes totalitarian claims, and although some people do have convictions which involve clashes with certain State policies, it is the particular policy and not the whole attitude of the State which causes the clash" (The Whole Armour of God:13).

There is a logical leap between the former and the latter passage. The writer gives no explanation for his failure to consider whether or not apartheid makes "totalitarian claims", and whether or not the "whole attitude of the State" as exemplified in its policy of apartheid causes a clash of principle (which was precisely the burden of the "Message to the People of South Africa" and the Ottawa decision on apartheid by the W.A.R.C.). After this unsatisfactory application of his theory to the South African situation, the writer seems to forget his original statement that obedience can be offered only when there is no clash of principle:
"The State can rightly claim an exclusive authority for the promulgation of law, for the administration, defence and law enforcement within the State. Thus the Church must keep out of these areas, and should the Church feel that there needs to be improvement or change in these matters of State, the proper channels should be followed" (The Whole Armour of God:14).

It is well and good to follow the "proper channels", but the present debate is about what happens when there is a clash. This problem is suddenly forgotten, and the writer attempts to demarcate areas where the church has to "keep out", all the while failing to specify what should be done if the State makes no improvement following the church's request, and omitting to consider what happens if there exist few or no "proper channels". He also gives us no explanation of the contradiction inherent in saying that the church must "keep out", but that it may follow "proper channels" should it feel that improvement is needed. He also seems to be forgetful of the church's just war tradition, some strands of which say that the church and the individual Christian must decide on the justice of a particular war and act accordingly (see Chapter 2). But after all these ambiguities, contradictions and unsubstantiated opinions, the writer still comes down squarely in favour of conscription, as though there were no moral problem at all:

"... Thus National Service may even be seen as an opportunity of showing one's loyalty to God, the State and one's fellow men, for it offers wonderful avenues of service to each" (The Whole Armour of God:14).

Obviously individual chaplains' views may and do differ; but if
they differ significantly, why was this publication issued in the first place, and that in the name of the Corps of Chaplains? And if their views were different, why did they distribute it to troops? Clearly these observations are more relevant to the Permanent Force chaplains (and by implication the patriotic chaplains) because it is the former who control the compilation and distribution of literature in the SACHS.

When this set of attitudes about obedience is combined with the views of the patriotic chaplains about the war and the SADF as outlined above, it becomes possible to see why they feel they are at complete liberty within the military environment. Their freedom is a reflection of the congruency of their views with those of the SADF, rather than the consequence of a tolerant and self-critical attitude on the part of the armed forces. The obverse is also true in some respects. As we shall see, several chaplains whose views do not correspond to those of the SADF have on occasion had their freedom curtailed, if only until such time as negotiation with higher authorities had set matters right.

5.5. Curtailment of the freedom of chaplains

Several instances have come to light which suggest that some chaplains, at least, do not feel themselves to be completely free to communicate the church's message of peace. For their own protection some of these chaplains will not be named.

(1) Ecunews (29.10.1976) reported that Rev. Arthur Attwell stated to the Annual Conference of the MCSA in October 1976 that he had left the SADF chaplaincy because he could no longer identify with "the system". He later commented:
"By "the system" I meant the political set-up in the country. As a chaplain I received encouragement and cooperation from both the Chaplain-General and the Naval authorities, but one was conscious all the time of constraints -- one was placed in the invidious position of being part of a force whose task was to defend what was morally indefensible. I think this is what I meant by "the system". I think this also answers your second question: was I able to give full expression to the Gospel without let or hindrance? In so far as we were under constraint with regard to the social aspects of the Gospel, the answer was "no" (Letter to P.G. Moll, 25.9.1983).

(2) A National Service chaplain of the 1981/2 intake, to whom I shall refer as Chaplain A for his own protection, was asked to read a Code of Honour at a parade at which colours were being awarded by the State President. He found himself unable to comply, because of the Code's undue exaltation of country, military and nation, and because he felt unprepared to grant to these complete "loyalty, obedience and allegiance". The offensive sections of the Code included the following:

"I declare my awareness of the worthy tradition of the South African Defence Force..."

"I accept ... to live up to this awareness with the highest standard of integrity, loyalty, obedience and allegiance ..."

"I believe in God! I believe in my country! I believe in my nation! And I believe in myself!"

He was suspended from all active duty at the unit concerned. The matter was taken up by his church authorities and was eventually
resolved. The chaplain resumed his responsibilities at the unit.

(3) A Citizen Force chaplain, to whom I shall refer as Chaplain B for his own protection, was called up for a border camp. Although his views tended toward rejection of all participation in the SADF, he went, but informed his Officer Commanding that he held no brief for the SADF and would not condemn SWAPO. He was not permitted to preach and a few days later was dismissed from the camp. The fact that Rev. John Daines made inquiries and was told that a chaplain had stated that he supported SWAPO and was anti-SADF (Daines, 1983a:10) does not diminish my point. Even if it was the same man, and even if he did support SWAPO (as do the leaders of Namibia's largest churches -- see Appendix A), the fact that his message was censored confirms the view of some that the SADF grants only limited freedom to chaplains. They feel that their freedom is limited to what promotes SADF morale, or at least to what does not seriously challenge it.

(4) A Permanent Force chaplain, to whom I shall refer as Chaplain C for his own protection, had several clashes with the SADF. One concerned a protest about torture. On another occasion he was interrogated by police over some remarks about black political discontent made during a chaplain's period. These incidents were later cleared up with the SACHS authorities.

(5) A CF chaplain, to whom I shall refer as Chaplain E for his own protection, wrote to his superior in the SACHS, saying that he could, as a minister of the church, no longer identify with the SADF through uniform and reception of pay. A three-year conflict ensued, but did not resolve the matter. In fact, at a Chaplains' Conference, a member of the Chaplain-General's staff engaged in heated debate with him, which included a threat of prosecution.
Clearly none of these isolated incidents "proves" anything. It could be argued that misunderstandings arise in any organization; the mammoth size of the SADF, and the secrecy with which operations have to be conducted, do not make for smooth running of a chaplaincy. In addition, isolated incidents do not prove that there is a policy of unfreedom; in any case the Chaplain-General has on numerous occasions said, and the official documents stated, that no restrictions will be placed on the chaplains' message.

On the other hand, one might suspect that human nature is such that for each person who successfully resists authority there are several who do not (14). The disincentives to complaining are considerable: peer pressure, the expectations of "loyalty", and the threat of demotion, or court cases (e.g. for revealing a torture case after permission to do so has been denied). Some Citizen Force and National Service chaplains have the further problem that they fear that they might be deprived of chaplains' status and called up again as troops, in which case they would be forced into being selective or pacifist conscientious objectors. Whether these fears are justified or not is beside the point. All these factors together suggest that the issue of freedom of the chaplaincy is not a closed one. It cannot be assumed without further ado that the SADF grants full freedom to all its chaplains; even less can it be assumed that the SADF would grant full freedom to chaplains if the churches were to intervene decisively in the "self-selection" process.
1. Chaplaincy and the needs of the soldier

An argument regularly advanced for the maintenance of the military style of chaplaincy is that it is the only effective and practicable means of meeting the needs of soldiers. In this section I enter into debate about the nature of the needs of soldiers. I try to show that it is by no means obvious that soldiers' needs are best met by the current form of chaplaincy. In fact I suggest that certain needs are best met by civilian ministry quite unconnected with the military environment.

To begin with, let us examine some of the needs of soldiers and inquire how the current chaplaincy system is responding to them. Perhaps the needs which are most commonly identified by chaplains are twofold. First, there are specifically church-related needs. These include the eucharist, preaching, Bible study, prayer and counseling. Second, there are needs which arise from the strain of the military environment. The soldier is said to need comfort and consolation amid fear and tension; the soldier needs help and counseling when injuries are being suffered or lives are being lost; in the extreme case, the chaplain has to be present to administer the last rites. To this category some would add morale needs. Either they would point out, as Stiglingh did, that when a chaplain "imparts to soldiers a confidence through faith in Christ", morale improves. Or (and this emphasis is more
connected with the Afrikaans churches) they would say that chaplains should raise morale in order to promote the SADF's struggle against communism.

It is evident from the interviews conducted that these spiritual and pastoral needs of soldiers are catered for reasonably well under the present chaplaincy system. The chaplains have virtually unlimited contact with the men; being conscripts or military career men themselves they have a fine understanding of the pressures induced by combat. For example, at least two of the chaplains had undergone Parabat courses (Veldhuysen, Moore).

However, these needs merit closer examination, along three lines: (i) their relation to the needs of the institution; (ii) their time scale; and (iii) their exhaustiveness.

(i) It is apparent from the way chaplaincy work is presently being done, that to fulfil the above-mentioned needs of the soldier is simultaneously to satisfy the requirements of the military institution. For example, soldiers are less likely to be enthusiastic about their tasks if they feel that their religious needs are being ignored. Soldiers under tension perform less efficiently, and so the soothing words of a chaplain can contribute importantly to military efficiency. This observation raises the sociologists' question: For whom is pastoral work to be done? Whose needs is it satisfying? Thus Peter Berger, when analysing published materials of the US military chaplaincy, remarks that "what is therapeutically recommended for the individual turns out to be functional for the institution that sponsors the therapist" (Berger, in Cox, 1971:99). An American inquiry contends that the military expects the chaplain "to use counseling as a therapeutic device supporting the transformational
goals of the training" (MMP:43). A South African example of support for the transformational goals of training is given in the counseling work of a Baptist chaplain, Rev. Lucas Potgieter:

"My office, however, is the place where most of the personal work is done. Here the men can cry, laugh or be in deep discussion. Problems that are most common are men who cannot adjust to the pressures and difficulties of hard training because their lives were too "soft" at home. They may have never made a bed or ironed a shirt before... Many men hear the gospel really for the first time from the chaplain." (South African Baptist (Oct. 1983), p. 7)

Hence the danger exists that if the needs of the soldier are defined in an uncritical way as outlined above, the chaplaincy could be manipulated to serve purely military aims. What is it about the above list of needs that lends itself to instrumentalization for military objectives?

Perhaps the answer lies in the short-term nature of the second half of the above-listed needs -- and this raises (ii) the second point. Fear, tension, injury and death occur mainly during the (for conscripts) limited term of duty. The soldier's immediate need is that the chaplain alleviate these strains. The chaplain becomes a help in the soldier's struggle for survival in a harsh environment. The "tyranny of the present" can come to define the chaplain's task to the extent that the latter consists chiefly of helping soldiers to cope with the difficulties imposed upon them by the demanding military schedule. It became apparent from the interviews that South African military chaplains spend a good deal of their time attending to needs of this kind. The danger exists that their urgency may preclude attention to deeper and less
obvious needs.

This point brings us to (iii) the third point. Is the above list of needs exhaustive? It is worth noting that this list fits in with the narrow, pietistic understanding of evangelism and pastoral care that is evident particularly in the patriotic chaplains identified in Chapter 3. As long as evangelism is seen only as "saving souls", and pastoral care only as a process to help people overcome "personal" sins and failings, the prophetic and critical task of the church (and indeed of the pastor) is devalued. A pietistic understanding of evangelism and pastoral care can then be married with a social ethic which blindly and patriotically supports the military. In relation to the military chaplaincy it is important that the churches insist that the Gospel is far wider than this narrow theology of evangelism and pastoral care. In the light of their understanding of social processes in South Africa and Namibia, and the rejection by some of them of the war on moral/theological grounds, an added list of needs can be identified. Some of these will not apply exclusively to soldiers, but they will all be mentioned, as they lead to a fundamental reappraisal of the task of the chaplain. They are:

(1) The need of soldiers to know what they are being required to fight for, and how their participation in the war may be reconciled with, or is the outworking of, Christian ethics. Conversely, the need to know what to do if they are unable to reconcile their participation with Christian ethics.

(2) Arising from (1), the need to know that, should they die, their death would not be in vain; it would be for a just cause. This may be expressed as the basic human need for theodicy, i.e.
how to continue believing in a loving and just God amid the inexplicable suffering of the world. Conversely, this means the need to know how to take death if the military version of the "cause" is not credible.

(3) The need of soldiers to know that they are working for the ultimate, if not the proximate, good of all, i.e. that they are participating in God's work in the world. Conversely, if they are not convinced that they are working for the good of all, they may need to be reconciled with Namibians, and especially Namibian Christians, who feel that the soldiers' presence on Namibian soil is an arrogation of fundamental human rights and a denial of Christian charity.

(4) Arising from (3), the need to be reconciled with people in South Africa who feel that the military apparatus is stifling their aspirations for freedom and dignity. This includes the need for reconciliation with Christians and with members of their own churches who believe that the military is the "protector of a profoundly immoral and unjust social order".

(5) The need of the soldier to know what actions may and what actions may not be required of him, in terms of international and domestic law, and to have the support of the chaplain if the actions required of him fail to meet the demands of the law or of his own conscience. These legal aspects are dealt with in Appendices C and D.

This catalogue of needs brings us to the very heart of the questions of the ethics of war, of the individual's response to conscription, and of the chaplain's task.

Needless to say, this more critical understanding of the needs of
the soldier leads to a fundamental revision of the task of the chaplain as it is presently understood. This task would be conceived as much in terms of challenge as in terms of consolation; it would focus on fundamental as much as on immediate needs; and would in turn entail a revised conception of the nature of the church itself. Let us try, then, to comprehend the dimensions of a more critical style of ministry to military personnel.

This will imply at the start a more critical view of the traditional notion of the chaplain as dispenser of consolation. This is, of course, not to imply that all South African chaplains have a role which is functional to military objectives. We saw in Chapter 3 that there is a significant group of "critical chaplains", who would not want their ministry to be utilized for military purposes. On the other hand, there is little doubt in the author's mind, and even less, it would seem, in the minds of senior Defence Force officers, that some chaplains contribute importantly to morale. Moreover, the point of Chapter 3 was to show how the current system of chaplaincy lends itself to this traditional understanding of the chaplain's role (1). That the offer of consolation amid distress is an indispensable ingredient of Christian ministry is uncontested. However, it has been pointed out above that if consolation is only reactive, i.e. if it responds to need only as it arises out of military pressures, then it can be instrumentalized for military purposes (2). This is especially true at a time when the church rejects the war in which the armed forces are engaged. For at such a time the offer of comfort and consolation can help men to be more effective soldiers. Obviously this depends on the sort of situation in which comfort and consolation are offered. If a man is deeply
shocked at having shot someone or having witnessed a death, and is
offered comfort by a chaplain, which in turn enables him to go and
shoot again, then the ministry of the chaplain has made a direct
contribution to military efficiency. Similarly, if a man has
moral doubts about the activities of the army, and the chaplain
consolies him in his anguish by suggesting theological and moral
reasons why he may participate in war, then a significant
contribution to military efficiency has been made. Again, the
essential point to be made here is not that all the chaplains are
doing this, but that the present SACHS system lends itself to this
sort of role (3). However, these forms of pastoral care may be
distinguished from forms which, without any specific military
reference, might be offered at any non-military parish. For
instance, if a man distressed about his threatening divorce
obtained comfort from a chaplain, one could hardly take umbrage,
since this could have been done by any Christian engaging in
ministry. Obviously there is a fine line between the former and
the latter types of comfort. The one will sometimes shade into
the other. For instance, a man on the border may need counseling
for marital problems which were already in existence before he
entered the military, but which were exacerbated by his absence
from home and the strains of border patrol duty. Obviously some
contribution to military efficiency is made, but at the same time
there is not much difference between this situation and any normal
civilian parish situation. This discussion also raises the yet
more thorny question: Can the church maintain its integrity and
at the same time offer comfort and consolation to anyone in any
situation? For instance, what sort of comfort would the church
offer to Franz Stangl, the Kommandant of the extermination camp
Treblinka, who was convicted in 1971 for collaboration in the
death of 900 000 men, women and children? (cf. Sereny, 1974). Would one not have to insist that in this case the church would be primarily obligated to offer moral condemnation? To bring this discussion closer to home, we might consider the reaction of a 17-year-old soldier, Rifleman Steenkamp, to the sight of his first dead enemy body:

"When you look down at the dead man, you think, it could have been me. Being a Christian, you feel it's a life lost but there again it could have been an innocent life, a woman or a child [that the terrorist killed]. Because they don't care who they kill. They kill their own people because they are brainwashed by the communists. Somebody has to do it. I've got people I love at home and you are only doing your duty. You are not fighting for the white skin in South Africa, you are fighting for everybody. You are taken from school benches and expected to kill. People don't understand. They call you a racist. It's you or them" (Sunday Tribune 22/2/1981).

In this case, it is submitted that it would be the chaplain's pastoral duty to challenge the young man, in as sympathetic and gentle a way as possible, to reconsider this rationalization of his action. To leave him justifying the death of "the enemy" on these dubious bases would amount to gross pastoral neglect.

This discussion about comfort and consolation in pastoral care sets the background for discussion about the chaplain's task at a time when the church rejects the war. The church always has a duty to offer care and compassion, but this becomes problematic when it is offered in such a way as to contribute to military efficiency in an unjust war. If it does this, the consolation
that the church offers is hypocritical and insincere. If, for instance, a young man were afraid to die in combat, the church would find it impossible to help him find a personal theodicy without engaging in hypocrisy which would almost amount to deceit. Instead, the church would have to frame its ministry more in terms of challenge. The church would challenge young men to consider what they are doing; as a CPSA resolution (Number 13, "Service in the SADF") put it in 1982,

"allegiance to Christ demands of every Christian that before he takes up arms for any purpose, or enters the military, he should face our Lord and ask him whether this is truly what he should do".

This would involve a radical departure from one of the traditional functions of religion, viz. to integrate death into the system of meaning of society (cf. Berger, 1973:32f,62f). The church's questions, however gently and compassionately put, would intensify the anxieties of troops about the purposes for which their lives are being exposed to danger. Pastoral care of this kind can only be justified with the long term in mind. The church's priority is to attend to people's deepest needs, and these may sometimes conflict with their immediate perceived needs. For instance, the immediate or perceived need of a prostitute may be to find an apartment where she can receive clients without incurring police detection. Care which took the form of adopting an uncritical view of her needs by helping her find such an apartment would show little pastoral integrity, because it would involve avoidance of the confrontation with the truth which integrity demands. The pastor of integrity would strike the more challenging course of helping her towards "health and strength of spirit" by prompting
her to discover a new self-concept and a new job, etc. In the military sphere, the immediate or perceived needs of a soldier might be to find relief for his tensions or comfort for his troubled conscience. If the church sincerely believes the war to be unjust, it will not be able to offer these without a heavy sense of irony. Rather it would challenge the young man to take the theological thinking of his church more seriously, to reconsider his own response to God's Word, and to reflect carefully on his own political role in the South African or Namibian situation. At the same time, the church would offer care by supporting him in a position which involved conflict with the armed forces. It goes without saying that if the church understands the soldier's needs in this way, its pastoral work will be severely dysfunctional to the military organization.

The question is whether the military would be willing to accept a "prophetic chaplaincy" (Abercrombie, 1973:222; 1979:48,54). Some believe that the military would respond positively. O'Brien places greatest responsibility for implementation of just-war, international law-of-war, and limited war prescriptions on field commanders. For this they need faithful subordinates and disciplined troops as well as courageous "whistle-blowers" (1981:302-317,326). If, in these circumstances, chaplains supported the commander, won the confidence of the troops, and carried out their ethical charge by reporting dishonourable behaviour, the military would welcome them. In similar vein, Abercrombie says that generals need the chaplains' alternative information/communication system because regular military command channels harbour coverups. The generals would welcome the chaplains' "renewed emphasis on the old military virtue of integrity within our Army" (1973: 228,231).
However, the military response would be different if chaplains' criticisms extended to doubts about or objections to the cause itself. Boozer resolves this problem in favour of the armed forces by contending that

"it is unreasonable to expect the armed forces to sponsor or to allow within its domain any ministry which denies the moral legitimacy of a vocation which involves the use of armed force" (1979:75).

In another context, Bradford arrives at the same conclusion:

"The professional soldier cannot wear the uniform while challenging the moral validity of a state policy which involves the performance of military duty" (1968:43).

The military would suffer inconvenience if the churches were continually requesting explanations about alleged atrocities, or if large numbers of conscientious objectors had the chaplains' support, or if the chaplains dissociated themselves from military propaganda, or if they stressed the biblical teaching that the duty of obedience to human authority is not absolute. Moral inquiry could have a dispiriting effect on soldiers. Inquiry "inhibits the feeling of conviction so necessary for the high and sacred moments of practice. For practice is politics; and politics is, in the end, killing" (Gouldner, 1976:xv). It is true that "moral sensitivity is not the same as recalcitrance" (Boozer, 1979:75), but it would be short-sighted to think that the military would not identify the two. Maintaining morale in the face of a prophetic chaplaincy would become difficult and the chaplains could be perceived as subversives; in fact, the support that West German chaplains offer to conscientious objectors has
led to precisely this charge (cf. Gramm, 1975:52). Distrust of the chaplains' security status would follow. In an extreme case, commanders would be forced to demilitarize the chaplaincy or limit the chaplains' contact with the troops in some other way. Figinski argues for military chaplaincy with screening procedures to exclude "subversive" chaplains (quoted in "The constitutionality suit":50). O'Brien recognizes the problems of soldiers being taught the "wrong" values:

"Ultimately, responsible commanders cannot exact disciplined responses from troops encouraged by society to defy authority and scorn the virtues that are necessary for a soldier" (1981:359).

Benedict Reid contends that the chaplain should support everyone in their position of conscience and help soldiers to pray, work for peace, and love the enemy; but wonders whether the military would tolerate chaplaincy under these conditions (EC:81). Specifically, in South African military law there are several provisions which could be used against chaplains who offer challenge instead of consolation. Anyone who "improperly delays or discourages any action against the enemy", or who, "in action, or prior to going into action, acts in a manner or uses words calculated to create alarm or despondency" can be imprisoned for ten years (Defence Act No. 44 of 1957, First Schedule, 6). The chaplain might not intend to delay action against the enemy, nor want to create despondency, but it would be foolish to think that the offer of challenge would not be seen to have these effects.

These reflections about what the military would do to a chaplaincy exercising a more critical style of ministry, are pure speculation at this stage. However, they do yield a few insights, as they
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bring us back to reconsideration of what the church really is. Theologically this might be expressed as follows. I have tried to show that the church cannot content itself with the military definition of what the needs of soldiers are (viz. needs are functional to institutional needs) or with the military definition of what the chaplain is (a morale-booster). But then this suggests a break with the traditional notion of the social function of the church (i.e. the bulwark of the state). To use Barth's terminology, the church should come into its own by ceasing to understand itself in terms of the world's misunderstanding. Positively speaking, the church should then relate the needs of people to the acts of God in Christ (reconciliation, e.g. with those oppressed by the military); and seek its own definition of the chaplain (a "sign of contradiction" amid the powers). These can only occur if the church sticks to its own definition of what it is (viz. the "alternative society"), and of what its ministry is (viz. the full-orbed ministry of the community of God, not the service of a particular human institution).

2. Military status and rejection of the war

Let us proceed at this point to take up the argument of Chapter 3 about uniform and military status of chaplains, and relate this to the fact of the rejection by some churches of the war in Namibia and South Africa.

If, as has been supposed above, the uniform and military status are symbols of identification of the church with the military, and if they confer a certain religious endorsement upon the military, then there would be a strong argument for the chaplaincy to divest
itself of all accoutrements of military life (4). This should be done for two reasons. First, the church would want to avoid all suspicion in the minds of its members, troops, chaplains, the armed forces and the general public, that it in any way supports SADF activities in South Africa or in Namibia. Second, the church would for pastoral reasons not want its chaplains to have military uniform or possess military status of any kind, for fear that soldiers would misunderstand its convictions about the activities of the SADF. The chaplain in uniform cannot avoid the fact that "the medium of the chaplain is also his first message" (MMP:43). This argument carries especial force in view of the fact that among the soldiers are young men with developing convictions of conscience. If the church believes (i) that both pacifism and selective conscientious objection are theologically defensible positions, and (ii) that the SADF is engaged in activities which are questionable at the least, then it would not want these promptings of conscience to be repressed. But they are likely to be repressed if the chaplain is a full member of the military (5).

There is, however, an additional problem with the position of chaplains who minister to soldiers in Namibia. Even if they had no military status (viz. uniform, rank, pay, etc.), and even if they agreed fully with, say, the SACBC view of the SADF's presence in Namibia, they would still be seen to be associated with the SADF in a foreign policy exercise that has met with almost universal international censure. Furthermore, the very fact of being under SADF auspices is seen as a problem by the Council of Churches of Namibia (cf. interview with Pastor Zephania Kameeta, Appendix H). Bishop James Kauluma of the CPSA in Namibia (see Appendix G) insists that "the church cannot provide a chaplaincy
to a foreign and colonial army ... The decision of the South African churches who send their chaplains to Namibia cannot and shall not be understood in any other way, but as a clear siding and support of their national army" (Letter to P.G. Moll, 2.7.1984). That is why the Council of Churches of Namibia has said that it will not send any of its pastors to minister, even in a part-time capacity, to soldiers in SADF camps. However, it has stated that soldiers are welcome to attend services in local churches. One part-time chaplain of the MCSA decided, for these reasons, to end his association with the SADF (Brews). It may be noted in passing that a similar argument might be made with respect to part-time ministry to SADF members within South Africa. Thus one part-time chaplain quit this ministry because he believed that the SADF was engaged in maintaining the very injustice which his regular parishioners suffered (Maree).

This point should be taken seriously; it is an indication of the deep distrust, even anger, with which the SADF is viewed by Namibians. On the other hand, this situation might be compared with that of the Red Cross. The Red Cross has to secure the permission of an army to operate within a war zone. If any organization is careful not to compromise itself by association and identification with the political purpose of a warring nation, it is this one. Tightly controlled from Geneva, it enters any area on its own terms, and has thus far succeeded in avoiding all suspicion of collaboration or support for a particular side. It might be argued that chaplaincy services could be organized by local churches in Namibia along these lines. An important condition of this service would be its "all-or-nothing" policy with respect to personnel. This means that the churches would submit to the SADF a list of ministers who would be willing to do
part-time chaplaincy work, but would authorize those ministers to go ahead only if all of them were accepted simultaneously. If this were done, it would be difficult to see how this form of ministry could be seen to be compromised.

A shade more ambiguous is the position of South African clergy who accompany the SADF. They have to work under SADF auspices for much longer periods, on foreign soil where they have no right to be. They are in Namibia solely for the benefit of troops in the SADF; they are not linked, in the first place, with the local Namibian churches. Even if they were, on paper, under civilian control and direction, this would of necessity mean little because they would be in the SADF environment for a long period of time, with little contact with the church at home, and subject to military rulings on such important matters as transport. In this case, a non-compromised ministry is more difficult to imagine.

It is at this point that the theological values of ministry to all versus ministry with integrity can start to compete. In the end, the church may not be able to avoid a position of painful ambiguity with respect to its ministry to soldiers on foreign soil. However, there is one final consideration. If the war is wrong, then the church has a duty to inform its members that this is so, and sympathetically minister to them in such a way that they are enabled to understand their church's position and respond conscientiously. It might be argued that to send a chaplain of any description to accompany an army of occupation would be to belie this ministry of the church. Conversely, it may be that this ministry of challenging Christians to reconsider their stance on the military would best be furthered by refusing to provide any
ministry at all, should this require association with an army of occupation. It might be that the absence of a chaplain is the only way to jolt young soldiers into the realization that their church is entirely serious in its condemnation of the war. Perhaps ministry should not be restricted to a ministry of presence; it might be that a ministry of absence would serve better, in some cases, to press home these crucial moral issues.

It might be that the church has no choice but to distance itself, since to associate with the SADF in Namibia is, in some way, to legitimize the presence of the SADF in that area. This suggestion is offered only tentatively, though, because it tends to conflict with the church's duty to minister to all. It would be foreign to the notion of ministry to offer pastoral care selectively, or to offer it only to those who are thought to be in the right. However, this concern for ministry to all is likewise not an absolute; it should be held in tension with other aspects of the church's work, e.g. its ministry of prophecy, its task of peace, and its concern for pastoral integrity. In other words, I am unaware of any theological reason why either principle - "ministry to all" or "ministry with integrity" -- should override the other.

With respect to the position of chaplaincy to soldiers in Namibia, we are left with an inconclusive picture. This is hardly surprising, given the highly questionable nature of the South African involvement in the territory. What is clear is that, in view of (i) the moral and theological rejection of the war; and (ii) the present hierarchical structure of the chaplaincy, the churches should make an effort to demilitarize the chaplaincy. This could be done along the following lines.
3. The process of demilitarization

The church could start by informing the military, the public and its own members of its principles of ministry. Then it could compile a statement of intention, detailing how those principles may be enacted in reality. Finally, the church could embark on a series of concrete steps toward demilitarization. Here follows a suggested statement of principles and a statement of intention. It will be noted that the statement of principles is essentially an affirmation of a Reformed doctrine of ministry, as is especially clear from points 3 and 5.

3.1. Statement of Principles

1. The ministry of the chaplaincy should both express and remain true to the Gospel in its fullness.

2. It must ensure that the pastoral and prophetic witness of the church is not compromised.

3. The chaplaincy should not be controlled by the military in a way which undermines the freedom of the church to present the breadth and richness of its teaching in regard to the implications of the Gospel in this situation of conflict.

4. The chaplaincy should be sensitive to the inherent danger of allowing the ministry of the church to be used to give legitimacy to an unjust cause, and should be structured in such a way as to prevent this from occurring.

5. To enable this, the chaplaincy should be responsible to the local church, and come under the authority of the local church...
leadership.

3.2. Statement of Intention

In order both to express and to safeguard the above principles, the present form of chaplaincy should be changed along the following lines:

1. Chaplains should not remain permanently in this ministry. A limited term of office will help to ensure that the chaplaincy remains free of undue influence by the perceptions, policies and ethos of the SADF.

2. Chaplains should be directly responsible to the leadership of the local church. This will ensure a form of chaplaincy more in keeping with the church's understanding of ministry and authority within the Body of Christ.

3. Chaplains should not wear the uniform of the SADF. The wearing of the uniform manifestly identifies the chaplain with the SADF and its cause.

4. The chaplaincy should be demilitarized. This is the best way to safeguard what has been agreed to in the Statement of Principles.

3.3. Concrete steps towards demilitarization

Issuing statements of principle and intention could be the start of a process of negotiation with the military. The initiation of dialogue with the military would itself be warmly applauded by a significant constituency within the churches, who have noticed the
contradiction between the churches' anti-war stance and their retention of military chaplaincy. Negotiation and dialogue are, then, the precondition for taking concrete steps toward demilitarization. The situation is one of nothing ventured, nothing gained. Only when the negotiations are over will the churches have a clear idea of their ability or otherwise to persuade the military to accept their chosen style of ministry. It would be abdication of responsibility for the churches neither to state their position nor to initiate negotiations, merely because they suspect that the military would not entertain their requests. In any case it would be ridiculous that a church be forced into compromised forms of ministry by a confessedly Christian state — one whose constitution guarantees freedom of religion and professes allegiance to the Christian God. Let us now examine some concrete steps that can be taken.

3.4. Alternative non-military ministry

Military disapproval cannot prevent the church from instituting its own alternative non-military ministry to people who are involved in the conflict, both in South Africa and, in collaboration with the CCN, in Namibia. Some of the US church commissions recommended alternative ministry (e.g. EC:20ff, MMP:103f). This ministry would be in a strategic position to help recruits and chaplains come into contact with that sector of their church which perceives the military to be in alliance with apartheid. Its effectiveness in some areas would, of course, be partly dependent on the military attitude towards this form of ministry; the military could make efforts to limit the church's access to troops and chaplains. However, if the military were
reasonably flexible, the "parallel chaplains" could provide theological input at retreats for chaplains which could serve as an alternative to the SA Chaplains' Service conferences which are usually run by Dutch Reformed Church ministers. They could also help alleviate the difficulties that recruits suffer, arising from dislocation, transience, and sudden removal from their mode of life. On the other hand, much of the ministry of the "parallel chaplains" would be performed in realms where the military has no influence. For instance, they could provide a much-needed alternative to military propaganda by running courses for recruits prior to their entering the military. They could minister to conscientious objectors in a variety of ways: visits to prison, writing letters, running seminars, helping them compile their dossiers for presentation to the Board for Religious Objection, etc. They could help young men find employment after army service, or after community service, or after imprisonment. They could spread their activities further by seeking to help the victims of the conflict by channeling aid to them. This could perform the important task of bringing about reconciliation between Christians in South Africa and Christians in Namibia. They could also be assigned to work as chaplains to soldiers on the "other side", to the extent that this is possible. However, all this would also require reformulation of the concept of ministry during war-time. Perhaps the title "military chaplaincy" has always been a misnomer, suggesting that ministry be confined to ministry under military auspices. A broader notion would be "full-orbed ministry during a time of social conflict", which would encompass ministry to military personnel on "both sides", a witness of prophecy to the military institutions concerned, and relief to the victims of the conflict, wherever they might be.
3.5. Church-based chaplaincy within South Africa

Church-based chaplaincy can be arranged with relative ease within the borders of South Africa, through limited-term and part-time chaplaincy. Limited-term chaplaincy could serve as a bridgehead to fully church-based chaplaincy. There are good reasons, even during peace-time, for having chaplains do limited terms in the armed forces, because full integration can lead -- as indeed it can in any secular institution -- to vested interests and ideological acquiescence. In West Germany chaplains serve for a maximum of six to eight years. Ignoring temporarily (see below) the the moral difficulties involved, it could be reasoned that civilian status and state pay could be combined by appointing chaplains as Department of Manpower officials relating to the Defence Force as civilians. For this extraordinary kind of arrangement, the SADF has several equally extraordinary precedents: the secondment of national servicemen to Internal Revenue, the consignment of conscientious objectors to the Department of Manpower, its use of black civilian workers, white civilian secretaries and civilian managerial staff in Armscor and SADF Institute (for the latter, see the biographies of SADFI personnel, in Paratus (July 1983), pp 25-32).

It should not be overlooked that the current chaplaincy arrangement already has a church-based aspect in the form of part-time chaplains. The numbers of these could be extended; the church could grant them supplementary allowances to release them to perform this ministry.
3.6. Ministry in the operational area

A possible strategy of ministry in the operational area is to facilitate peer group ministry (cf. Clarke, 1982) and to extend the National Service chaplaincy. Since national servicemen have to be in the army anyway, their exercise of ministry as laity might not connote church sanction to the same degree as a military chaplaincy would, because, in the theology of many churches, parishioners do not represent the church in the special and visible way that a minister or priest does. One of the chaplains interviewed felt that peer group ministry was probably the most effective form of ministry available (Ashby).

The extension of the current National Service chaplaincy, as an interim measure, can be accomplished without significant structural changes. This could be done by having all National Service chaplains spend most of their time at the border, leaving civilian chaplains to minister to soldiers within the borders of South Africa. Steps would have to be taken to ensure the independence of National Service chaplains from SADF and DRC control. This would entail renegotiation of the form of the current three-week chaplaincy course, as well as revision of the National Service chaplains' use of rank; the motives for these moves have been explained in a previous chapter.

The disadvantage of this strategy of upgrading National Service and peer group ministry is that the church's ministry is still fitted to military structures to a large extent. Though this method might not connote religious legitimation of the military effort to the same extent as does the present form of military chaplaincy, it is nevertheless deeply implicated within military
structures.

At a lesser level of ambiguity, a church-based ministry could be run in the larger bases near towns in Namibia -- e.g. at Grootfontein and Oshakati. Prior understanding would have to be reached with the Namibian churches to enable Namibian and South African ministers to do this, and it would be limited to ministry outside the military bases themselves (see Appendices G and H). However, one chaplain said that even this would be impossible, since, in his view, the people would "run a mile" because they are scared of troops, and in any case they would not want troops to come into their churches with rifles (Voegel).

The possibility of an alternative uniform could be considered with a view to satisfying SADF requirements in the operational area. It should not be forgotten that the dress of South African chaplains has been changed repeatedly during this century (Potgieter, 1971:176-238). For instance, it was decided in 1955 to give the chaplains a distinctive dress which would clearly indicate their relationship with the church. In accordance with this principle, it was decided that Afrikaans chaplains would wear black shoes and socks, and a white shirt with a black tie; English chaplains would wear their customary clerical dress. However, this arrangement was only partially successful (Potgieter, 1971:228). Interestingly, during the Anglo-Boer War some chaplains on the British side wore military uniform, while others did not, but all used the Red Cross armband (see photograph of chaplains of the Natal army, in Watkins, 1901). An example of a successful attempt by a non-military agency to retain its distinctiveness, was that of the Friends Ambulance Unit, whose members wore a civilian khaki uniform which carried no military
insignia (Davies, 1947:12,14). Another alternative is the selection of a type of "Red Cross" uniform. As is explained in Appendix B, there is no legal barrier to prevent the church from negotiating with the military to grant these chaplains full protected status in terms of the Geneva Convention. Before all hope of ministry to soldiers in Namibia is abandoned, some or all of these models should be tested. However, as has been said above, the church may not be able to avoid a position of painful ambiguity with respect to its ministry to soldiers on foreign soil. This is one of the unfortunate, but, it would seem, inevitable consequences of a stance which questions the ethics of a particular war.

3.7. Long-term financial planning

It is a complex question whether money should be accepted from the SADF. On the one hand, it is only because of conscription and the separated nature of military life that the occasion has arisen to provide ministry to military personnel. Therefore the military is obligated to see to the bodily needs (food, recreation, etc.) of its soldiers under these separated conditions. It follows that it should foot the bill for their spiritual needs as well. This is the argument used by chaplaincies throughout the West (cf. the discussion on this in MMP:18ff). Worth noting is that this argument is also employed by the West Germans, who are more scrupulous than most in their concern for the independence of the chaplaincy from military control.

On the other hand, dangers arise when the military interprets the power to pay as the power to control. An American study concluded that "the Government care of religion may be a benefit
offered the church at the high cost of its singular purpose and the perversion of its unique mission. Government will regulate what it subsidizes" (MMP:36f). Suspicions can easily arise concerning the motives which the state has in paying chaplains. At its most crass, this can take the form of threats of withdrawal of pay. These suspicions are exacerbated when chaplains have higher salaries than their civilian counterparts. To people who believe that the military is supporting apartheid, and that the military chaplaincy is a compromised form of ministry, the conservative attitudes of the patriotic chaplains and their reception of military pay are two sides of the same coin. Hence the feeling that there should be a complete break with the military. A leaf could be taken from the government's book: if the state holds as an article of faith that the USSR controls the ANC by funding it (cf. White Paper 1984), and that foreign churches influence the SACC by underwriting the organization (cf. the discussion of this in the Eloff Commission), could it not be argued that the SADF is doing the same to the chaplaincy? This argument would be decisive, were it not for several complicating factors, which other writers have raised.

First, the church receives a subsidy from the state to the extent that it is tax-exempt (cf. Cox, 1971:xi). Second, other officers in the church receive state salaries, e.g. lecturers in theological departments at universities. Third, even if chaplains were paid by the state, they would still have to have an office at the military base and be dependent upon the military for transport in the operational area (Abercrombie, 1979:50). The first two are minor points. Tax exemption is granted to all non-profit organizations across the board; there does not appear to be be any threat of withdrawal of tax-exempt status in order to enforce
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state control. The church-state problem with respect to educational institutions is similar to that relating to military chaplaincy, as has been observed above. Here, too, vigilance has to be maintained to ensure that the university does not abuse its financial powers. Yet the crucial difference -- at present! -- is that the university is looked upon as a benignly tolerant institution, but the military is perceived to have a narrow ideological perspective, and to be a major perpetrator of injustice in Southern Africa.

The point about accommodation and transport of chaplains is more serious. However, if ministry is to be meaningful, some kind of arrangement regarding accommodation and transport is unavoidable; to reject these is to admit that ministry to military personnel is impossible. If ministry is desired, then some residual ambiguities will have to be borne. It could be reasoned that it is the greater matter of stipends that is decisive; to moralize about accommodation and transport borders on tokenism. However, the church might consider paying for these services in the same way as it pays for land or administrative offices. In conclusion, it would seem wiser for the church to shun military pay. But then the financial burden looms large. What is important is that a start be made.

Rome was not built in a day. The church could adopt a long-term staggered programme of change, starting by putting money aside (mainly for a housing programme) for small numbers of chaplains at first. In time, numbers of church-financed chaplains could grow, depending on the strength of the church's commitment to civilian ministry and the success of its parallel ministry.

If due to budgetary constraints it were accepted that a more
have no assurance of being able to slot into senior church positions. Thus an immediate transition to a 6- or 8-year term of chaplaincy would be stormy and could be marked by intense personal tragedy arising from feelings of rejection by the church and from feelings that their own personal and pastoral integrity was being questioned. Once a limited term chaplaincy was in place, however, there would not be the same problem of vested interests. It would be easier to introduce a limited-term chaplaincy gradually, by appointing all new chaplains on that basis. This would, however, fail to come to terms with the central problem that the current military style of chaplaincy is out of step with the church's commitment to social justice in South Africa and Namibia.

A related problem during transition is that the chaplains, and especially the Permanent Force chaplains, might feel that they are duty bound to resist the dictates of a church which in their opinion has lost sight of the gravity of the communist onslaught and is contemplating an unworkable concept of chaplaincy which could only result in abandoning its own parishioners in their most need. The angry reaction of Rev. J. Voegel at a consultation in May 1982 suggests that the possibility of resistance of some kind is not far-fetched. On that occasion he said,

"If provincial synod were to decide that chaplains should be withdrawn, the chaplains would have to get together and decide what action they would take in the matter" (Seek, July 1983, p7).

Again, the attempted renegotiation of the MCSA chaplaincy in 1977-8 caused great unhappiness, as is apparent from the interviews. One chaplain left the church to join the
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Congregational Church (Pretorius). The churches would be faced with an extremely perplexing situation if many chaplains were to refuse to comply with the instituted changes or to leave to join other churches or to leave the ministry and join the military. More conservative churches which support the military style of chaplaincy could easily be found: the Church of England, the Baptist Union (cf. the issue on Baptist pastors in uniform which shows virtually no awareness of the ethical dilemmas faced by chaplains, South African Baptist (October 1983)), and the Pentecostal churches (cf. the Pentecostal Commission's pro-military statement, "Declaration of Policy...", which Pentecostal National Service chaplains were required to sign (January 1981)).

It might be mentioned in passing that this issue of vested interests might itself constitute a reason for the church to avoid a military style of chaplaincy, for the system makes it extremely difficult to modulate or alter the form of the chaplaincy in response to changing circumstances. It can inhibit the church from inquiring too far into how to change the system so that it may best meet the needs of its parishioners.

It is therefore submitted that the church's severest problems in renegotiating its chaplaincy are internal to itself. It is here that the concept of a "confessing church" becomes relevant. The famous 1934 Barmen Declaration of the Confessing Church against Hitler was a statement of theological principle, but it divided the German church between those who supported the "Fuehrerprinzip" from those who opposed it. It might be that, in the South African context, the suggested statement of principles above might have a similar winnowing effect, as it would separate those who...
are strongly opposed to having their chaplaincy confer religious legitimacy on an unjust cause from those who are not. In the end, this could amount to a call for radical obedience to God. Karl Barth's call, born of his experience in the Confessing Church, has great significance in South Africa:

"No sentence is more dangerous or revolutionary than that God is One and there is no other like Him. All the permanencies of the world draw their life from ideologies and mythologies, from open or disguised religions, and to this extent from all possible forms of deity and divinity. It was on the truth of the sentence that God is One that the "Third Reich" of Adolf Hitler made shipwreck. Let this sentence be uttered in such a way that it is heard and grasped, and at once four hundred prophets of Baal are always in fear of their lives. There is no more room now for what the recent past called toleration. Beside God there are only His creatures or false gods, and beside faith in Him there are religions only as religions of superstition, error and finally irreligion" (CD II/1:444).

In addition to the probability of resistance on the part of chaplains, there is the certainty of divergent church opinions as to what is to be done. The divided state of the church in South Africa makes the formulation of proposals for consideration by the armed forces very difficult. Perceptions about the war differ in content and intensity. For instance, the MCSA has requested the withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia, but in nothing like the insistent tone of the Catholic Bishops. The CPSA has verbalized a position on the war on South Africa's borders; none of the other churches have done so. The Congregational and Presbyterian
churches have far fewer men in the chaplaincy and hence might not view the problem with the same urgency as the other churches. The Baptist Churches' strong commitment to their particular style of evangelism and their pietistic/conservative position on social questions make participation by them unlikely. Disunity enables the SADF to play one church off against another, and subtly exploit the fact that if one church pulls out of the deal altogether, other churches could step in and engage in "sheep stealing".

Perhaps the most promising alignment would be a combined MCSA-CPSA-SACBC effort. Their members combined represent over half of the English-speaking National Servicemen; hence these churches would be able to pull considerable weight with the SADF. However, even here many theological difficulties would have to be ironed out. For instance, the MCSA would probably go along with the above criticisms of the hierarchical rank structure of the chaplaincy, but the other two churches, with their own extended hierarchies, might not perceive this in so serious a light.

From this point on, our thinking is necessarily more speculative; but it would be profitable to consider what would happen if these three churches were to overcome their internal difficulties and seek renegotiation with the SADF, perhaps along the lines of the June 1984 call for demilitarized chaplaincy by the SACC National Conference (6). Would the SADF agree to a more civilian- or church-based chaplaincy? In one sense the SADF cannot afford not to agree. It cannot afford to be seen in the posture of dictating to the churches how their ministry should be conducted. Nor can it afford to be seen as an "unChristian army", as it no doubt would if there were a high-decibel pull-out by the churches.
If this happens, the SADF would lose face among Christians in South Africa, and the government would lose the last shreds of legitimacy that it might still have among churches overseas; this could push the latter in the direction of support for the Programme to Combat Racism. These considerations would urge the SADF in the direction of honouring the churches' requests for a demilitarized chaplaincy. In another sense, though, the SADF could also lose a great deal by accepting demilitarized chaplaincy. For this, too, would create by-products which involve a considerable loss of legitimacy for the SADF. If the 1974 Hammanskraal statement and subsequent church statements on conscientious objection signified the first open break between the military and the churches, there is a sense in which demilitarized chaplaincy would constitute a final break with the institution. The new system would be a symbol of the church's new understanding of itself as a "sign of contradiction" amid the powers, and would signify a break with the traditional concept of the church as the mainstay and legitimizer of the state. It would perhaps be the churches' clearest statement of their dissatisfaction with the role of the SADF in South Africa and Namibia. In this way it would tend to undermine the bases of legitimacy of the apartheid state itself. The desire of the churches for demilitarized ministry to military personnel would no doubt be perceived, as was the 1974 Hammanskraal statement, as an attempt to "discredit the SADF and bring it into disrepute" (Eloff:191) by "strike[ing] at the root of a system on which the SADF is dependent for its existence and performance" (Eloff:199). But here the analogy ends. Conscientious objection can, in a sense, be "co-opted" by both the church and the state: the church can claim to uphold the right of conscientious objection while supporting all those young
men who do cooperate with the conscription system. In the absence of any definite challenge by the church, most young men would probably end up cooperating. The state, for its part, can co-opt the phenomenon by, on the one hand, providing (rather unattractive) channels for limited forms of conscientious objection, while on the other hand punishing other forms of conscientious objection heavily and preventing debate about the subject by law. The small number of conscientious objectors that there have been in South Africa "have had no significant effect on the military capability of the SADF", as the Eloff Commission noted (Eloff:199).

Not so with demilitarized chaplaincy. In this case, the change is long-term and structural, and would of necessity involve every single chaplain. Its symbolic meaning before troops, members of the church, the military, and opponents of the regime would have its own ripple effects. It would prompt a great deal more questioning among chaplains themselves, and more critical attitudes would be the probable result. For young white men it would exercise a ministry by prompting them to question their participation in the military; this could in turn result in a much wider movement of conscientious objection than has been witnessed hitherto. It would mean that the church would take a firmer stand against torture, as chaplains are freed of the institutional bonds that inhibit protest. It would strengthen the hand of young men who are conscience-stricken about their own or their unit's participation in torture. A demilitarized chaplaincy would involve an admission by the church that its own form and ministry have to change in order to respond to changing circumstances. Just as the conscientious objection issue was the catalyst which led to closer investigation of the chaplaincy, so
the chaplaincy issue would be a catalyst for other social questions. For example, if it is admitted that the church should not advance troop morale when it opposes the war, might it not be thought that the church should encourage its members not to pay that portion of their taxes which supports the military?

All of these by-products of demilitarized chaplaincy would be feared by the military. Particularly offensive would be the thought that a demilitarized system of chaplaincy would permit ministry by people who did not support military aims, or who were frankly opposed to them. It would be difficult for the military to accept that there be an "alternative society" in its midst which would not offer the military its unqualified loyalty, and indeed might consider the role of the military to be that of "protector of a profoundly immoral and unjust social order". Such a chaplaincy could be likened to a "Trojan horse". The military bosses might therefore feel inclined to resist renegotiation, or at least make the terms of any renegotiation so unattractive and restrictive that the hand of the conservatives within the churches would be strengthened. The alliance between the state and the conservatives within the church would be cemented. Both would emphasize, as they have done in the past, that military chaplaincy is the only practicable solution, and that the churches have to choose between that and nothing at all. It would be in the interest of both to deny that any "middle road" is possible. Implicit in this is a veiled threat by the military that if the churches refused to bow to its terms, the military would refuse them all entry. The real situation, however, is not an "either-or". The military could easily create middle paths which the churches would find effective, as the churches in Germany have found over a period of nearly thirty years.
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS

However, it is not only the military that stands to lose. The churches' strongest "bargaining chip" is the military's fear of being labelled an "unChristian army" if the chaplaincy were discontinued; the military's strongest "bargaining chip" is the churches' fear of losing contact with young men of impressionable age. P.W. Botha was not so wide of the mark when he made the grandiose claim that "national service is the Church's last hope in South Africa" (Hansard (29.10.1974):6850). Thousands of young men have their only meaningful contact with ministers of religion when they are doing national service. Of course this observation begs the questions (i) whether the church should use the instruments of state to further its growth, and, if the answer is in the affirmative, (ii) what sort of instruments and under what conditions it may use them. Nevertheless the fact of the matter is that many of the English-speaking churches, which are suffering from declining attendance and inadequate numbers of clergy, consider themselves deeply dependent on the opportunities provided by the military.

I have tried to show in this thesis that there are important moral and theological considerations which urge that the churches themselves set the conditions for ministry, and that, in South Africa's current political climate, those conditions should take the form of demilitarized chaplaincy. How the negotiation process deals with these competing claims only time will tell.
In this appendix I take up the argument of Chapter 2 dealing with the ethics of the conflicts in which the SADF is engaged, both domestically and in Namibia. Ideally this would require a full analysis of just war theory and of South African and Namibian history, politics and economics, but this would take us well beyond the limits of this thesis. Accordingly I have chosen the more modest course of giving an exposition of the stance of some churches and assessing their validity, by examining their internal consistency and their essential correspondence to social reality. This is not to suggest that these are the only positions which the church could possibly adopt. In fact some of the English-speaking churches have no explicit position, and it is possible that some of them, like the Baptist Union, would adopt an attitude supportive of the SADF if required to choose (cf. van den Aardweg, quoted in EP Herald (2.5.1983); and South African Baptist (October 1983)). However, my limited objective is to explain the consequences only of those positions that have been adopted explicitly.

1. NAMIBIA
1.1. Church positions

1.1.1. The Roman Catholic Church

On 14 May 1982, the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference released a "Report on Namibia" which had been compiled after meetings with some 100 people who formed a representative sample of black Namibian opinion (Report:106). The bishops stated that most black Namibians

(a) consider the present regime a South African imposition, still "blatantly geared" to apartheid (Report:109);
(b) do not fear the SWAPO guerrillas but the South African security forces, viewing the latter as an army of occupation;
(c) support SWAPO, viewing it essentially as a national liberation movement.

After listing several SADF atrocities, and conceding that SWAPO also commits atrocities, the bishops concluded that

"there is a universal consensus, with South Africa virtually the only dissenting voice, that South Africa has no right to be in Namibia... the great majority of Namibians have one overriding desire and that is the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, resulting in a ceasefire, the withdrawal of the SA Security Forces and the holding of elections under UN auspices" (Report:114).
1.1.2. The CPSA

Following a study of the Namibian situation made by a delegation of Episcopal Synod, the bishops of the CPSA concluded, like the Catholic bishops, that

"the large majority of the people there neither want the SADF in the land, nor regard the SA Government as representing their best interests, welfare, or protection" (Cape Times, 19.4.1983).

On the basis of this conviction, the bishops called for "urgent and immediate steps" toward independence by all parties involved (Cape Times, 19.4.1983).

1.1.3. The MCSA

A statement issued on 5.5.1983 by the President of the MCSA Conference, chairmen of districts and departmental heads, pointed out that

"a significant proportion of the population in Ovamboland ... regard the South African armed forces as a source of insecurity and fear" (Statement:1).

Like the Catholic bishops, the Methodist representatives observed that both the SADF and SWAPO are responsible for the "needless suffering" of the Namibian people, and called on both parties to suspend military operations and to enter into urgent negotiations with each other and other interested parties, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (Statement:2).
These statements do not imply unanimous support within the three churches for the withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia. Large numbers of lay white people in South Africa, perhaps a majority, might disagree. Yet these statements issued by ecclesiastical authorities do represent a significant body of opinion, and especially black opinion, within the churches. In the case of the CPSA, that body of opinion appears to be fairly large: by 165 votes to 6, the Provincial Synod of the CPSA passed a resolution to the effect that the vital function of the SADF had become "the protection of unjust structures" in both Namibia and South Africa (P. Russell, 1983). It therefore seems reasonable to accept as a working hypothesis that the overall opinion of these three churches is that South Africa should cease its unjust occupation of Namibia.

I now proceed to examine briefly the validity of the call that these churches have made. Is it a position which Christians can legitimately adopt? Or is it a maverick and hopelessly idealistic position which ignores the historical, political and legal dimensions of the Namibian problem? To begin with, I examine the Namibian question in light of international law.

1.2. South Africa's presence in Namibia: Legal or illegal?

A strong case can be made that South Africa's presence in Namibia is a contravention of international law. The case rests upon the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice handed down in 1970. Because certain aspects of the Court's judgment are controversial, some explanation of the process leading up to the
events of 1970 will be necessary (cf. Landis, 1982).

In 1884 Germany declared a protectorate over the area now known as Namibia, naming it German South West Africa. When World War I broke out, the British government urged South Africa to invade South West Africa so as to place it "at the disposal of the Imperial Government" after the war. South Africa complied and in July 1915 the German forces in South West Africa surrendered. After the war the League of Nations established a system of mandates in accordance with President Woodrow Wilson's insistence on a "peace of no annexations". SWA became a C class mandate which South Africa, as mandatory, could administer as an "integral part" of the Union. It was the dissolution of the League at the end of World War II that gave rise to the legal wrangles which eventually issued in the 1970 ICJ opinion.

After World War II all former League mandatories were invited to submit their mandates to the United Nations trusteeship system on a voluntary basis. All but South Africa agreed. In due course the mandates were given independence. South Africa sought the approval of the General Assembly for the incorporation of SWA as part of the Union, claiming that the people of the territory desired it. The falsity of the claim was established later, but the Assembly, without the evidence, dismissed the South African case on the grounds that the Africans were not prepared to make the choice. South Africa submitted one annual report on its administration of the territory to the Assembly, but then, in reaction to criticism, discontinued the practice. The National Party argued that the dissolution of the League terminated the mandate, and South Africa now ruled by right of occupation (Hansard 19.3.1947, column 1327; 11.4.1947, column 2588).
Africa had some justification for this view, in that no agreement had been entered into at the formation of the League as to the rights and duties of member States at its dissolution. On the other hand, the absence of law regarding the succession of international bodies was due to the novelty of the League concept; South Africa could not expect the League to anticipate its imminent dissolution, and should have been prepared for innovative legislation. In the event South Africa went ahead and attempted to incorporate the territory piecemeal, starting by granting it representation in the South African parliament. South Africa's motives were deeply distrusted when the Prime Minister indicated that this was to knit SWA constitutionally closer to South Africa to inhibit its secession from the Union.

An advisory opinion of the ICJ in 1950 held that the functions previously exercised by the League now vested in the UN, but that South Africa was not obliged to submit SWA to the UN trusteeship system. The court was unanimous in finding that the right to modify the status of SWA lay with South Africa acting with the consent of the UN.

In 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia, both former League members, asked the ICJ to confirm, among other things, that South Africa was obliged to submit to UN supervision, and could not modify the mandate. They alleged moreover that South Africa had violated the mandate by attempting to modify the international status of the territory and by introducing apartheid which failed to promote the social progress of the inhabitants. South Africa raised a variety of preliminary objections, among others that the SWA mandate did not fall within the ambit of Article 37 of the Statute of the ICJ. The Court overruled the objections and commenced to
hear the merits of the case in 1965. South Africa submitted that she was not bound by the mandate because it was extinguished after the demise of the League; alternatively, if the mandate was still in force, the UN had not succeeded to the League. However, the Court announced in 1966 that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked the necessary locus standi to obtain a decision.

The Assembly passed Resolution 2145 (XXI) in 1966, declaring that since South Africa had failed to fulfill its obligations, the mandate was terminated and SWA came under the direct responsibility of the UN. The "Council for Namibia" was established as a kind of government in exile. In 1968, as a result of the "terrorist trial" of 37 South West Africans, the Security Council endorsed GA 2145 (XXI) and asked South Africa to withdraw before 4 October 1969. South Africa refused, whereupon the Security Council passed Resolution 276 which deemed South Africa's continued presence in the territory illegal. France and the United Kingdom abstained on the grounds that GA 2145 (XXI) was legally suspect. To remove all doubt, the Security Council asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the following question:

"What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding SC Resolution 276 (1970)"

The personnel of the ICJ had changed considerably since 1966, just as it had between 1962 and 1966. It returned to the jurisdiction of the 1950's, which the 1966 ruling had appeared to disavow. I briefly summarize the 1970 proceedings before returning to discuss their innovative character in the context of international jurisprudence and the historical development of the Court.
South Africa raised a host of preliminary objections, of which three were weightiest. First, South Africa submitted that the abstention of two permanent members from the Security Council resolution could not be taken as a concurring vote as required by Article 27(3) of the Charter. However, this argument ran counter to long-standing Security Council procedure. Second, South Africa required the recusal of three members of the Court because they had revealed their antagonism to South Africa. Third, South Africa suspected that the Court would be subject to political pressure. The Court tersely overruled each of these objections.

Proceeding to the merits of the case, the Court found that the UN succeeded to the supervisory powers of the League; since the League had an implied right to revoke the mandate unilaterally in the event of a material breach of its obligations, the UN was similarly entitled. South Africa contended that she would have been able to veto revocation under the unanimity rule. The Court in turn dismissed this objection because it would run counter to the general principle of law governing termination on account of breach. The brusqueness of this dismissal of the unanimity rule is retrieved, however, by the separate opinion of two judges that the veto had not been used by the League respecting mandates (Dugard, 1971:465).

The Court doubted, however, that GA 2145 (XXI) was legally binding, and found that the Assembly enlisted the cooperation of the Security Council. The Court then noted that SC 276 was not legally binding under Chapter VII of the Charter dealing with enforcement measures, but deemed it binding under Article 25 of the Charter. South Africa was therefore obliged to withdraw from SWA, and members of the UN were to refrain from actions which
would seem to support or to recognize the legality of the South African administration. Eleven of the fifteen members backed this part of the ruling. The Security Council adopted Resolution 301 (1971), which accepted the Court's ruling without endorsing its reasoning, whose most revolutionary aspect was that Article 25 of the Charter made the Security Council resolution binding even though it was not taken under Chapter VII.

The ICJ case appears to hinge on the question of UN succession to the League. As if to emphasize the validity of its jurisprudence, the Court spent much of its time discussing the UN succession, even though South Africa had acknowledged it by its statements and submission of a report on the territory to the Assembly in 1946. The Court had, moreover, insisted on UN succession in its judgments of 1950, 1955, 1956 and 1962 (Dugard, 1971:464). The succession question was treated by the Court in the same way as the question of the continuity of the mandates system. The Court was impressed by the overriding purpose of the system, viz. to ensure a "peace of no annexations", and argued that the system should not fall into desuetude only because of the difficulties of setting up a new international body on the demise of the League. Dugard shows that the ICJ, in contending this, typically employed a "teleological" approach, focusing on the objectives and purposes of a legal instrument (1971:471-474). For instance, the Court defended the view that the concepts "well-being and development" in the Covenant should, fifty years later, be interpreted as "self-determination and independence" (1971:472). Thus the Court's legal orientation allowed simultaneously for the continuity of the mandates system, for the validity of the UN succession, and for innovative interpretation of the clauses of the mandate.
By contrast the South African legal system tends to favour the British tradition of positivism or formalism, which focuses on the literal meaning of a legal text. Hence Pretoria's contention that incorporation of SWA was valid because the mandate was in practice not far removed from annexation (Dugard, 1971:473). However, the teleological approach cannot lightly be dismissed by South Africa, because it is so central an aspect of the international legal order, having been employed by the ICJ during most of its history and having regularly appeared in its advisory opinions.

South Africa had a strong case for two of its preliminary objections to the 1970 procedure. Both concerned the personnel of the Court. First, South Africa had requested the recusal of Judge Morozov, who had helped formulate the Security Council resolution condemning the "terrorist trial". The strength of the case is indicated by the dissent of four of the fifteen judges from the majority decision. Second, South Africa had also requested the appointment of an ad hoc South African judge to the Court. This request was also turned down, with five of the judges dissenting. However, Dugard is convinced that even if these requests had been granted, the ICJ opinion would not have been very different (1971:470).

More substantially, Dugard finds that Article 25 could not be used to evade the regulations of Chapter VII of the Charter. On this view SC 276 is not legally binding but recommendatory. Nevertheless he finds that the combined effect of GA 2145 (XXI) with subsequent Security Council resolutions is sufficient to impose a legal obligation upon South Africa to withdraw (1971:466,468).
In conclusion, it is submitted that South Africa’s preliminary objections were either weak or would not have made a significant impact on the final decision. Although there are difficulties with the legal force of SC 276, a combination of the Assembly and Security Council resolutions is probably enough to render the South African presence in Namibia illegal. Thus the case is strong, even though it is not overwhelming. It appears that the only alternative to accepting the ICJ ruling is anarchically to require the Court to overturn all its findings from 1950 and reform the entire system of international law in terms of South African and British positivism.

1.3. Namibia: Apartheid and resistance

By agreeing, in 1920, to administer South West Africa as a "sacred trust of civilisation", South Africa had undertaken to "promote to the utmost the material and moral wellbeing and the social progress" of the inhabitants of the territory. Nevertheless, the interests of whites were paramount from the start. By the 1922 Native Administration Proclamation, Africans were confined to reserves and subjected to police checks and pass laws (CIIR, 1981:10). This action was denounced by the Mandates Commission but the machinery did not exist to prevent it. With the electoral victory of the National Party in 1948, Namibia was made de facto a fifth province of South Africa. Apartheid was gradually extended in the territory. The 1954 SWA Native Affairs Administration Act empowered Pretoria to administer the affairs of black Namibians directly (CIIR, 1981:11). The 1964 Odendaal Commission Report suggested the implementation of the homelands policy in Namibia.
Colonialist and apartheid rule drew forth resistance from the local population. Chiefs and church leaders made representations to the government in the decades prior to the 1950s. In 1958 the first mass political organization was formed, called the Ovamboland Peoples' Organization, to combat racial discrimination. It was renamed the South West Africa Peoples' Organization in 1960, to underscore its national as opposed to tribal character, but most of its members have nevertheless been Ovambos, who comprise about half of the population. Herero speakers formed the South West Africa National Union. At first both organisations worked within the existing political order so as to change it. However, the South African government and the white inhabitants of Namibia showed no willingness to negotiate. The non-violent protest of the parties and the churches was met with the violence of arrests, imprisonment and torture (CIIR, 1981:13ff; cf. UN International Conference, A/CONF.120/5, n.44-66). For instance, police killed eleven people when they fired on a crowd protesting the forced clearance of the Windhoek suburb of Pionierspark in 1959 (CIIR, 1981:14). Despite his initial opposition to the employment of force, the founding president of SWAPO, Hermann Toivo ya Toivo, came to believe in the moral right of Namibians to engage in armed resistance against the oppressor. In 1966 guerrilla war began in earnest.

During this period, the churches of Namibia adopted an ever stronger stance against the South African occupation. A turning point occurred in 1971 when the boards of the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church (ELOC) and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in SWA (ELC) sent a memorandum to Mr B.J. Vorster, protesting the "race policy", Group Areas legislation, job reservation, the contract system, and the "humiliating espionage and intimidation"
used against those who expressed their thoughts openly (Statements:1f).

During the subsequent decade a series of statements, petitions and open letters, documented in Statements:2ff, were issued by representatives of the ELOC, the ELC, the Anglican church, the Methodist church, and the Catholic church, who together represent some 70% of the Namibian population (Statements:8). For instance, in an open letter to Dr Henry Kissinger in 1976, church leaders expressed their conviction that "the vast majority" of black Namibians wanted South Africa to leave the territory because of South Africa's "ever-increasing role of terror". They were convinced that the South African armed forces "are not in our country with the free consent or at the spontaneous request of the black population. The South African Army is forcing a civil war on this country, and every South African soldier ought to be made aware that he is taking part in this imposed civil war" (Statements:5f).

Aware that international and Namibian opinion was turning against occupation, the South African government attempted to outflank SWAPO and other resistance groups by instituting the Turnhalle constitutional conference in 1975. However, this did not find favour with the United Nations. A five-member Western Contact Group was formed to mediate in negotiations to guide the country to independence. Nor did the Turnhalle exercise find favour with the churches in Namibia, who dismissed it as being "without any moral or legal standing", and in any case it could "only maintain power with the might of the South African forces" (Statements:9). The churches continued to protest the presence of the SADF and demand a democratic, internationally-supervised election. For
instance, in 1979, they drew the attention of the Administrator-General, Prof. G. Viljoen, to the "frequent interruption of Church activities in our northern areas by the South African security forces ... the wilful destruction of Church property by those same security forces; the intimidation and arbitrary arrest of church workers and other innocent citizens" (Statements:31).

The same theme was repeated by the Council of Churches of Namibia in 1981 in its appeal to a visiting US delegation. The CCN requested that Security Council Resolution 435 be implemented immediately, because "it is our continued conviction and confidence that the only practical peaceful solution lies in the hands of the UN" (CIIR, 1981:80).

In light of this brief historical overview, it appears that the South African churches were justified in calling for withdrawal of the South African security forces. Their reasons for doing so were first, the illegality of the South African presence; second, the immorality of the apartheid practices introduced there; third, the unpopularity of the security forces and the popularity of SWAPO, as indicated in repeated statements by churches which represent the majority of the population; and fourth, the atrocities committed by the South African security forces. Fifth and finally, one could not expect either of the belligerents (South Africa and SWAPO) to administer democratic elections in the territory. This must be done by an outside party. The party which most Namibians seem to want is the UN, which has historically carried high prestige in the territory ever since its
should be seen in the context of the Soviet-funded military buildup in the subcontinent, by which the USSR "is disturbing the military balance in respect of the availability of military equipment in Southern Africa" and making the possibility of a conventional attack on the RSA more likely (White Paper, 1984, n.9). The interests of both the RSA and Namibia would suffer if the SADF were to withdraw from Namibia without an equivalent withdrawal by Cuba of her troops from Angola. So far from occupying Namibia, the security forces are doing a peace-keeping and holding operation, to prevent communist tyranny, and to make Namibia safe for genuine self-determination. The forceful military action of the SADF has created a successful strategy of deterrence which has made it possible "to conduct future negotiations in a calm and relaxed atmosphere, thereby gaining more time in which the negotiating process can develop, until lasting peace and prosperity is attained in the entire subcontinent" (White Paper, 1984, n.12). Contrary to those international observers who feel that negotiation should take place on United Nation terms, the South African government sees the United Nations as the "single most intimidating factor" in Namibia; such is its partiality towards SWAPO that UN-supervised elections would be farcical (Report:112).

The third component relates to beliefs about the sincerity of the government's intentions to negotiate. In this respect, the government argues that racial discrimination has been removed from the Namibian statute books in preparation for transition to self-rule (Report:112). Therefore, in the government view, the churches' efforts should be concentrated, not on urging South Africa to leave Namibia, but on exposing SWAPO's communist and undemocratic views, condemning the violence of SWAPO, and
emphasizing the "positive aspects of the security force presence" like the Civic Action Programme (Report:112f).

1.5. Reply to the government view

However, this sort of riposte to the churches' position on Namibia is scarcely tenable. In the first place, it ignores the fact that, since the International Court of Justice ruling of 1970, South Africa has had no legal right to administer the territory. Accordingly its actions in the area should not be judged as though Namibia were an integral part of South Africa. They should be assessed against the background of the illegality of South Africa's presence in the region, in the same way as one would judge the actions of the USSR in Afghanistan or those of Japan in Manchuria in 1938.

Second, the government view is hypocritical in its attempt to justify its presence by fastening upon SWAPO atrocities and its own ill-starred efforts to outmanoeuvre SWAPO. It ignores SWAPO's twenty-year history of mass political activity; the moral bankruptcy of the racial order imposed by South Africa on Namibia; and the unwillingness of the South African government over many years to heed the protests against this racial order by Namibians and the UN. Hence the third defect, viz. that the South African government refuses to recognize that SWAPO has more support among the local population than any other party. The unwillingness of the South African government to accept a UN-administered transition should be read against the background of its intense fears of an electoral victory by SWAPO. As far as SWAPO's chances of victory are concerned, the government has good reason
The largest churches reject violence of all kinds, but they are in firm support of SWAPO. (The Lutheran leader, Bishop Dumeni, thinks that SWAPO is "more Lutheran than marxist"! (Time, 17.10.1983, p65)). This support suggests that in an election SWAPO would probably gain at least enough votes to form a government with the help of an alliance. The church leaders are aware of SWAPO's marxist leanings (marxist rhetoric, some would say, looking at still-capitalist Zimbabwe), but feel that SWAPO is in the first place a national liberation movement which has every right to govern Namibia should it prove its popularity at the polling booth (So Kameeta, Interview at SACC National Conference, 28.6.1984).

The fourth drawback in the government view is its omission of the extent of atrocities by the South African security forces and its recently-established domestic collaborators. These have been cited repeatedly in statements by Namibian church leaders. They have been documented in publications like Hunke and Ellis (1978); Green, Kiljunen and Kiljunen (1981); and CIIR (1981).

One of the characteristics of this warfare is that all security forces "kills" are called "terrorists", whether proof of this fact is supplied or not (perhaps on the telling assumption that the whole population supports the guerrilla forces?) A dead body cannot protest its innocence! So it is generally believed that "many of the so-called SWAPO "terrorists" are in fact Ovambo civilian men, women and children" (quoted in J/R News, April 1981:5, from a Council of Churches in Namibia Newsletter of February 1981), and an estimate of the number of civilians among SADF "kill" figures is as high as 60% (CIIR, 1981:45). Two recent incidents deserve special mention. One is that of a 63-year-old
Kavango man, Ndara Kapitango, who was spit-roasted by two soldiers. He suffered third-degree burns and had to have his right arm amputated. The two soldiers were fined R50 each by a court-martial (Cape Times 1.3.1984). The other concerned a series of rape and murder crimes of which Koevoet members were found guilty. Curiously, one of the pieces of evidence offered in mitigation of their crimes of murder was that they had been trained as "killing machines" for the "elimination" of guerrillas (Cape Times, 1.10.1983). Koevoet, according to evidence led, employed skilled interrogators as well as "specialists in extermination" (Cape Times, 10.10.1983). Among other things, Koevoet members had impersonated SWAPO guerrillas (Cape Times, 29.9.1983). The result is that it is no longer possible for the government to claim that all atrocities are committed by SWAPO. The upshot of this evidence is that the South African government cannot view itself as the unselfish benefactor of the Namibian people. It is obviously impossible finally to judge whether the security forces (to use the government's euphemistic title for these entities) or SWAPO are the greater cause of atrocities; but this brief survey seems to indicate that the security forces have done at least as much damage as SWAPO. Certainly the image of the security forces has suffered damage; repeated CCN statements and the Catholic bishops' "Report on Namibia" suggest that most Namibians view the security forces with greater suspicion and fear than they do the SWAPO guerrillas.

The fifth defect in the government view is its belief that it has prepared for the transition by removing apartheid. Officially, apartheid is dead (Simon, 1984:1f). The lifting of racial restrictions has benefited a small coloured and black middle class and is used to justify claims that freedom of opportunity now
exists (Simon, 1984:22). However, through the ethnic structure of the second tier authorities, the moral equivalent of apartheid persists. Simon shows the continued segregation of social services like housing, health and education, and the persistence of a racial class hierarchy (1984:3).

In summary, the view that the three South African churches took with respect to Namibia seems amply justified. It is in accordance with the conclusions of an international Anglican delegation which visited Namibia in October 1983. The group, which included four bishops, referred to alleged SADF atrocities; to opposition by the local black population to the presence of the South African Army and the ethnic form of government; and to widespread support for SWAPO (Ecunews 10 (November 1983):14). The South African churches, after examining the South African presence in terms of its legitimacy (in the minds of Namibians, as far as this can be assessed), its history (viz. the imposition of apartheid), and its legality (in the eyes of international jurists), have justly concluded that South Africa's hold on the territory is both illegal and immoral.

2. SOUTH AFRICA

There is little doubt that in the past most English-speaking churches in South Africa have exhibited an orientation of support for the conscription system and the armed forces as a whole. They have not necessarily made their positions explicit; rather they have evinced this attitude of support through their prayers for the "boys on the border", their concern for young men doing national service, and their willing provision of chaplains. However, the 1980s have witnessed a gradual alteration of the
position, due to growing opposition to the apartheid system combined with a deepening suspicion that the origin of the guerrilla war lies in that system.

The only church which has made its new standpoint explicit is the CPSA, whose Provincial Synod has adopted a stance strongly critical of the SADF. A lengthy resolution (Number 13, "Service in the SADF") was passed, by 165 votes to 6, in November 1982. It points out that South Africa lacks democratic procedures which might allow for peaceful evolution towards a more just society. Since the majority of people in South Africa suffer "gross oppression and exploitation", and are unable to bring about peaceful change, a conflict has resulted which essentially stems from the determination to maintain this unjust society by force. Therefore the Synod expressed its "serious doubts about the legitimacy of a military system whose role is increasingly seen as the protector of a profoundly immoral and unjust social order".

Finally, the Synod said that this judgment has implications for the church as a whole and for individual Christians who are faced with compulsory military service. The Synod insisted that the church should speak of these matters and "endeavour to spell out the implications". In this thesis I attempt to carry out the Synod's proposal by exploring the implications of its convictions in the area of the church's ministry to military personnel. This must be preceded by an inquiry similar to that regarding Namibia. Is the view of the CPSA tenable in light of the history and politics of South Africa? When discussing this question I do not assert that the CPSA's is the only tenable view; my modest intention is only to show that it is a position which a reasonable person could adopt.
2.1. Apartheid

The social problem to which the churches have applied their mind is the system of racial separation that came to be known in the 1950s as apartheid. It may briefly be described as follows. The grand apartheid scheme demarcates Bantustans where African people may live, while leaving whites, coloureds and Asians in so-called "white" South Africa. Only a few Africans, namely those with Section 10 rights, are permitted to remain in "white" South Africa on a permanent basis; others are allowed to work in "white" South Africa temporarily; and the rest are confined to the homelands. Within "white" South Africa, most areas of life are racially segregated: education, housing, transport, entertainment, to name but a few. A large proportion of the items of legislation constituting the apartheid system were passed at the behest of the National Party in the 1950s. The system was strengthened by numerous items of "internal security" passed in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the roots of racial domination go back to the period of conflict and conquest by white settlers from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. For instance, the first pass law system, which regulated the movement of the Khoi, was created in the Cape in the form of the "Caledon Code" of 1809 (Newton-King, 1980: 176f). Parry examines the ideological shifts at the Cape from 1854 to 1890, during which period the "amalgamationist" policies of Grey were set aside in favour of the "segregationist" policies of Rhodes (1983: 377-391). The process of racial demarcation of areas began in 1894 with Rhodes' Glen Grey Act, and continued with the Land Act of 1913 and the Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936. Segregation was gradually enshrined in law over a period of decades: housing segregation,
by the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, the Native Building Workers' Act of 1951, and the Group Areas Acts of 1950 and 1957; job segregation, by the Factories, Machinery, and Building Works Amendment Act of 1960 and the Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act of 1967; union segregation, by the Industrial Conciliation Acts of 1924 and 1956; educational segregation, by the Bantu Education Act of 1953; and social segregation, by the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, the Population Registration Act of 1950, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, and the Immorality Act of 1927 (cf. the thorough treatment of apartheid legislation in Horrell, 1982). Growing segregation was combined with disenfranchisement of the black majority. The African vote in the Cape, which dated from 1853, was gradually whittled down until it was abolished in 1936. Coloureds were finally removed from the common voters' roll in the 1950s. Thus the system of racial discrimination was introduced in the period from, roughly, 1890 to 1960.

The English-speaking churches reject this arrangement essentially on two theological grounds. First, the system is based on the assumption of the fundamental irreconcilability of races. However, if God has reconciled the world to himself, and if reconciliation among people is both possible and constitutive of Christian faith, then the policy of apartheid is found to be incompatible with the very essence of the Gospel. And so the Message to the People of South Africa warned: "A thorough policy of racial separation must ultimately require that the Church should cease to be the Church" (Message to the People of South Africa:4).

The second reason for the rejection of apartheid by the
English-speaking churches is that this form of racial separation has caused enormous injustices which are contrary to those churches' ethical notions of equity and fairness. Among these injustices may be mentioned income inequality, land inequality, inequality in state spending, influx control, migratory labour, forced removals, and repression by detention, banning and torture.

I shall explain in a moment why many Christians consider the combination of these injustices to amount to a situation of "gross oppression and exploitation". However, an important objection to this procedure should be dealt with immediately. It might be expressed like this: "South Africa is in the process of adopting a new constitution, which includes Indians and Coloureds, and this will soon iron out many of the injustices in South African society -- injustices of which the National Party itself is well aware. Besides, many items of racial discrimination have already been removed since the advent of P.W. Botha's enlightened rule; therefore to characterize South African society as "profoundly immoral and unjust" is not merely incorrect but anachronistic".

However, to adopt a view of this kind is to see the problem of South African society in narrowly racial terms; to ignore the interaction of racism and capitalism; and hence to fail to come to grips with the profundity of the racial problem in South Africa. As will emerge from the ensuing discussion, this view arises from a shallow perception of South Africa history -- one arising from liberal historiography. A more inclusive view is given by the growing school of "revisionist" writers of South African history, who are turning to a "class analysis" to understand the dynamics of racism and apartheid. A useful but critical summary of this development is given by Wright (1977). In the revisionist
understanding, racism and responses to it are interpreted in the total context of all the institutions of society, and in particular its economic institutions. For instance, Newton-King finds that Ordinances 49 and 50 of 1828, long hailed by liberal historians as a humanitarian triumph, may better be seen as instances of state regulation of the Cape labour market arising out of the acute labour shortage of the time (1980:200). Similarly, Crehan finds that the early mission institutions, because of their convictions about the indissoluble link between Christianity, civilization and capitalism, and hence about the necessity for a "free" labour market, facilitated the incorporation of blacks into the market economy of the Cape (1978:159f). This approach suggests that, in a capitalist society like South Africa, race relations are a class question, into which, as Genovese has shown in his work on slavery,

"the race question intrudes and gives ... a special force and form but does not constitute its essence" (1969:7).

Structural, and not merely psychological and cultural, explanations of racism and segregation are being offered (cf. Adam, 1979:24). These writers break with the view, recently expressed by O'Dowd, that with economic growth,

"South Africa will follow the normal pattern of political, social and economic development from minority rule, through a liberal era, to a welfare state, and that in the process the "race question" will be solved" (1977:37).

Apartheid is no longer seen, in the liberal vision of the Oxford History of South Africa, as fundamentally irrational, and hence doomed to extinction under pressure of economic growth. Rather
racism and its institutional form of apartheid are seen as functional to capitalism and economic growth. This explains its persistence and entrenchment during the 1960s, during which period growth rates were higher than ever before or since (Houghton, 1976:40-44).

The revisionist writers have tried to show how, under economic pressures, racial legislation was enacted. With industrialization in the late nineteenth century, and expanding markets in food and labour, white farmers resorted to preventing competition by black farmers by limiting African landholdings and raising peasants' taxes (Bundy, 1972:382ff). In the early twentieth century, the labour contract system and the pass law system were refined to ensure adequate supplies of labour both to the mines and to white commercial agriculture (Greenberg, 1980:391f; Morris, 1976:24f). Simultaneously the contract system provided mining and industry with a rationale for paying lower wages than otherwise. State power was employed to destroy African unions. Wilson shows how, through manipulative legislation, the gold mining houses were able to keep African wages constant from 1911 to 1969. During the same period the ratio between white and black earnings increased from 9,0:1 to 17,9:1 (1972:66). The revisionist writers argue that racism in South Africa must be seen as an "ideology which sustains and reproduces capitalist relations of production" (Wolpe, 1972:454). Apartheid is not merely the result of racist attitudes. However, this does not mean that the question of racism should not be addressed directly; it means that when this is being done, its profound economic significance should be kept clearly in mind.

If the capitalist pattern of economic growth is an important cause
of twentieth century racism, how do these writers explain the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and its theories of apartheid? Apartheid is seen as a legitimizing ideology which uses modern philosophical traditions, especially German idealism, to play down the individual and uplift the "volk" or nation (Greenberg, 1980:393). Thus the revisionists are concerned with "decoding the 'reality' of apartheid from its expression at the level of ideology" (Legassick, 1974:7).

Controversy still rages about precise periodization and about the exact definition and influence of the various "class actors" involved (e.g. white farmers, mining capital, industrial capital, monopoly capital, white workers, the state bureaucracy, etc.) There is still disagreement about whether racism is wholly attributable to capitalism (which few writers would maintain); or in large part attributable to capitalism, while having in addition a life of its own. Furthermore, there is still disagreement on the extent to which ethnic mobilization is able independently to explain the current structure of society. For instance, Adam points out that class analysis fails to explain "why ethnic symbolism so easily succeeds in obscuring its beneficiaries ... even though the mobilization goes against their real interests" (1979:50). The classic treatment of ethnic mobilization as the cause of Afrikaner power is Moodie (1975); but this work, too, has received its revisionist reply in O'Meara (1983).

However, broad consensus has been reached on the essentials of the revisionist interpretation of South African history as explained above. Regrettably the conservative-liberal-revisionist debate cannot be entered into any further in this work. I have tried briefly to illustrate its explanatory power. While recognizing
that other approaches may lead to different ethical conclusions, I shall henceforward adopt the revisionist understanding of South African history. The significance of doing so will emerge more clearly once we have looked into the racial question and the involvement of the SADF in it. I shall enumerate the problems in the following order: inequality in land ownership and political representation; disparities in welfare; malnutrition; unequal state spending; influx control and relocation; and repression.

(a) Land ownership and political representation. Apartheid has come to mean gross inequality in land ownership and, parallel with this, inequality in political representation. White people in South Africa constitute about 17% of its population. The government regards the black population as divided into three groups: Africans (over 75%), 'Coloureds' (about 6%), and Asians (about 2%). Africans are further arbitrarily classified along supposedly tribal lines, and each of the ten 'tribes' is deemed to be a separate nation, whose rights are confined to the ten 'homelands'. The 'homelands' together comprise a paltry 13% of South Africa's land area. All African people within the remaining 87% of the country are there on sufferance and to serve white needs; none of them may vote or participate in government. A 1977 estimate puts their number at 9.5 million, i.e. about half of all Africans in South Africa (Horrell, 1982:79).

(b) Disparities in welfare. The racial form of economic and political development in South Africa is marked by large inequalities in welfare. Perhaps the most basic of these is the historically unequal distribution of land cited above. Income distribution figures, though imprecise due to paucity of data, are another telling indicator of disparities in welfare. McGrath
shows that, in the period 1917 to 1970, whites, who constitute approximately 14% of the population, received approximately 73% of all personal income, while all blacks together received the remaining 27% (1977:152). The income disparity ratio between whites and Africans has gradually widened, from 10,6 in 1946/7 to 12,9 in 1980 (McGrath, 1984:24). Archer has collected evidence showing that South Africa is one of the leaders of the world inequality league (1978:177). These conclusions should be treated with care. Persistent or growing inequality does not necessarily imply that levels of welfare are falling in absolute terms. McGrath indicates that real incomes of Africans rose by 1,5% per annum between 1946/7 and 1980; in the same period those of whites rose by 2% p.a. (1984:24) Thus McGrath's data suggests that, on average, incomes increased all round, but inequality grew. Budlender et al. show in their research on Industrial Council wage rates, that real wages of labourers rose by some 12,8% over the period 1973 to 1982, i.e. by slightly less than 1% p.a.; however, this gradual improvement should not blind one to the fact that most rates remain very low indeed. Only one of the scores of wage rates exceeded the Supplementary Living Level (1984:5). These measures of inequality do not purport to show that blacks in South Africa are all worse off than blacks elsewhere. Politicians are wont to point out that in income terms they are better off than, say, people in Upper Volta. This, however, is as true as it is irrelevant. Black people compare themselves, not with alien peoples of whom they know nothing, but with that small and visible group, comprising white people in the main, which enjoys a disproportionate share of the country's resources.

(c) Malnutrition. The results of South Africa's extreme
inequality are well known. Prof. John Hansen estimates that 6005 black children died from malnutrition in 1970 (1984:2); using Department of Health and Welfare data, he shows that some 2,25 million out of 9,75 million children are underweight for age in South Africa (1984:4). While there has been improvement in areas where incomes have risen, as for "coloureds" in Cape Town, in other areas, like the Ciskei, 60 to 70% of children are underweight (1984:7). The problem does not lie with agricultural supply. It is easy to show that enough food is produced in South Africa to provide every man, woman and child in the country with more than double the recommended daily allowance of calories (Moll, 1984:4,29). The malnutrition problem arises from sheer lack of resources which is in turn a function of access to land, employment and the state coffers. Some reply that a prime strategy against poverty is a national population control programme (e.g. Demographic Trends: 206-212). Others feel that fertility decrease is the result of urbanization and income growth rather than its cause (Grant, 1984). I shall not deal with this vexed question here except to repeat Prinsloo's warning that in black urban households in Cape Town and Durban, the average proportion of adults is sufficiently high to render population control an insignificant issue in the improvement of their economic status (1984:9,56).

(d) Unequal state spending. Beside inadequate land and low incomes, black people, and especially Africans, are faced with racially disparate state expenditures. Education spending is a case in point. In 1979-80, per capita expenditure on school pupils was R1169 for whites, R390 for Indians, R234 for "coloureds", and R91 for Africans. Similar disparities are observable in the years before and since (Pillay, 1984:2f). Low
black educational funding is reflected in South Africa's high black pupil-to-teacher ratios, which are poorer than those in several Third World countries, including Algeria, Botswana, Swaziland and Brazil (Pillay, 1984:16).

Nattrass has shown that the ratio of state assistance to white and black farming was a massive 197:1 between 1910 and 1936; subsequently it improved to 14:1 in the 1950s, and 2:1 by 1973. However, if the aid is reckoned in per farmer rather than in total terms, the gap is considerably wider because there are many more black farmers than white (1981:120).

(e) Influx control and forced removals. Other social problems arising from the powerlessness of black people are influx control and relocations. Africans in the "common area" who do not have section 10(a) or (b) rights are treated as temporary migrants. However, poverty in the rural areas is so great that migration continues unabated. As a result tens of thousands of Africans are prosecuted for offences under the pass laws each year. For instance, in 1979 the total number of pass law arrests by the South African Police in the whole Republic was 99,660 males and 20,209 females (Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1980:302). Indeed, the migratory labour system has been condemned by almost all the churches, including the white Dutch Reformed Church (Human relations and the South African scene:74-76). The history of forced relocation ("resettlement" in officialese) has been solidly documented by the Surplus Peoples' Project (1983), and summarized in "Relocations: The Churches' report on forced removals". So far some 3.5 million people have been removed, some more than once, in the government's effort to create the Bantustans. An estimated 2 million people are still to be moved. This is larger
than the forced migration of various Soviet peoples by Stalin (Relocations:13f). The disruption of stable communities and the systematic destruction of family life caused by forced relocation has been roundly condemned by many of the English-speaking churches.

(e) Repression. These glaring inequalities have engendered protest and resistance. To keep the system intact, the state has resorted to many techniques of repression. Bannings and detentions are used against political organizers, churchmen and trade unionists. The government justifies these extraordinary measures by claiming that the people involved are either "terrorists" or "communists", or their suspected supporters. However, these definitions are arbitrary and the means used subject to abuse. The Detainees' Parents' Support Committee has periodically submitted evidence suggesting that "systematic and widespread torture" has been used on detainees (e.g. Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1982:253). Several scores of people have mysteriously died in detention, one vivid example of this being the white doctor Neil Aggett. Many detainees are released months after their arrest without charges being laid. Censorship laws prevent the distribution of "undesirable" political literature. No reporting may be done on conditions inside prisons, and the Defence Force may inhibit the printing of anything not perceived to be in the interests of "national security". The former military intelligence chief Lt.-Gen. H. de V. du Toit has, along with opposition spokesmen, criticized the government's "almost total ban" on information to the public about military actions in Angola (Argus, 10.1.1984). Young men who feel that they cannot in conscience defend the system or participate in the occupation of Namibia have in the past faced prison sentences of normally a
year. The sentence was raised in 1983 to a period of 6 years, the same as that in the USSR ("Conscientious objection to military service in Europe", p70).

For many Christians, these injustices add up to a situation of fundamental injustice which may aptly be described, as it was by the CPSA, as a situation of "gross oppression and exploitation". Let us now consider the relation of this social injustice to the guerrilla war which the SADF and the South African Police are engaged in repulsing. How did the war come about? Did it originate in the perceived injustice of apartheid?

2.2. The roots of the conflict

The current conflict cannot be viewed outside the context of the history of resistance by black South Africans to the system imposed upon them. When the war is seen in this light, it is apparent that the forces that the SADF is called upon to fight against have made strenuous efforts to bring about change by peaceful means. On the other hand, the state has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to use violence to crush peaceful opposition. In the light of this history, which I shall deal with briefly, it also becomes clear why the black opposition came to feel that they had little hope of bringing about fundamental change without recourse to violence.

From the Act of Union in 1910 until the late 1940s, the ANC, the largest black political organization, had been dominated by small groups of intellectuals. They hoped, by means of petitions and deputations, to persuade the government to extend the franchise to blacks. In 1949, under the influence of its Youth League, the ANC
adopted a more militant Programme of Action. The Programme declared that the primary vehicle of struggle should be mass action. There was still a strong and explicit commitment to non-violence.

The next decade saw the passage of a barrage of discriminatory laws, and in response strike action, non-collaboration and boycotts. On May 1, 1950 a stay-away was called to protest against the racial policies of the government. Throughout the country, there were work stoppages and peaceful demonstrations. But at Alexandra township the police opened fire, killing 18 and wounding 30 people. The following month, a strike called to mourn the dead resulted in a nation-wide display of unity.

In 1952 the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and the ANC launched the "Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws". Volunteers broke discriminatory laws and then offered themselves for arrest. When the number of arrests exceeded 8500 and the jails were full to overflowing, the government passed legislation making it a serious criminal offence to break a law by way of protest against that or any other law. With the Defiance Campaign abruptly halted, even Albert Luthuli (later to win the Nobel Prize for Peace) came to question the path of moderation:

"Who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently, moderately and modestly at a closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of moderation? The past thirty years have seen the greatest number of laws restricting our rights until today we have reached the stage where we have almost no rights at all" (quoted by Stanbridge, 1980:73).
The decade of mass action also saw bus boycotts, education boycotts and the Congress of the People (at which the Freedom Charter was drawn up, pointing the way to a non-racial future for South Africa), and came to a head with the pass campaign of March 1960. On the 21st, Pan African Congress (PAC) supporters at Langa and Sharpeville left their passes at home, presented themselves to the nearest police station and demanded arrest. The events that followed are now history. The police opened fire, killing 59 people and wounding 178. Of those killed or wounded, 155 were shot in the back. A week later, a general strike was called to mourn those killed. The economy was paralyzed for almost three weeks.

Sharpeville marked the end of the commitment to non-violence. On April 8, the ANC and the PAC were declared unlawful organizations and their leaders went underground to prepare for an armed struggle. Nelson Mandela, when tried in 1963 for sabotage and conspiracy to overthrow the government, justified the formation of the armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, in these terms:

(On legal advice this passage was excluded. However the reference may be found in Stanbridge, 1980:78)
Whatever hope was left of the development of the African tradition of non-violent change had been officially snuffed out.

In contrast to Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the PAC, Poqo, did not restrict its activities to sabotage. In the early 1960s a number of civilians died as a result of their attacks, but by the end of the decade Poqo had been almost entirely crushed.

From the nature of the activities of the ANC since 1960, it seems that until recently its policy has been to avoid acts of random terrorism. Its attacks have mostly been directed at symbols of oppression or towards installations of strategic and economic significance. My purpose in discussing this history of black resistance is not to show that the violence of the resistance movements is justified. That would require an investigation which would take us far beyond the narrow limits of this thesis. Moreover, it is important to recall at this point the theological assumption made at the start of this work: since violence is the
tragic consequence of sin, one should not attempt to justify its use. Rather, my purpose in discussing this history is to point out that among black people there is massive dissatisfaction with the injustices of apartheid, and that it is primarily this dissatisfaction which has led to the war. In fact there is fairly wide agreement that the war may accurately be characterized as an internal and civil war.

2.3. Civil or external war

The state would have us believe that South Africa is involved in a defensive war against an external aggressor. It stresses the idea that South Africans are "defending our borders" against "the total onslaught" being waged by "terrorists" armed with Russian weapons. The external threat argument figures as the major motivation for present defence policy in the 1984 White Paper:

"The major threat to world peace remains the USSR's pursuit of world domination. This is reflected in that country's purposeful exploitation and/or instigation, either directly or indirectly, of conflict in all the strategically important parts of the world ... One of the major considerations of Soviet strategy with regard to Southern Africa is the control of the subcontinent's riches in strategic minerals and the denial of these to the West ... Indirect action in the form of a revolutionary onslaught serves to establish Soviet influence in Southern Africa. The South African Communist Party (SACP) and the African National Congress (ANC), which, for all practical purposes, has been integrated into the SACP and acts as its military wing, are the major elements of the Soviet plan to obtain..."
control of the RSA" (White Paper, 1984, n1,3).

However, this view ignores two important factors. The first is that military and financial support does not necessarily imply ideological subjection. That it may do so does not imply that it does in every situation. Indeed, if one took this argument to its logical conclusion one would have to insist that the chaplaincy, because it is in the pay of the military, is itself beholden to the military and pursues military rather than church objectives! More importantly, though, African countries, and notably Nasser's Egypt, have shown their strong desires for independence by instructing the Soviets to leave when their services were no longer wanted.

The second criticism to be made of the White Paper view is that it fails to grasp the significance of alliances and the complexity of foreign aid. When Stalin supported the West in overcoming Hitler, the West was not widely accused of being beholden to the Soviets. Thus it is not necessary to view USSR activity in Africa as evidence of a specific drive for domination. That the USSR is pursuing its own interests is clear and to be anticipated. Nevertheless many analysts reason that Soviet foreign policy with respect to South Africa is opportunistic rather than specific (e.g. Dr. T. Millar, an Australian strategist, in Cape Times 19.7.1984). If it is opportunistic, the root causes of the war must be sought elsewhere: in factors internal to the South African situation, rather than in factors external to it. Thus it has been argued that the war is at heart a civil war, the casus belli being the oppression to which black people have been historically subject. Let us examine some of the evidence.

The former CPSA Archbishop, Bill Burnett, showed deeper insight
than did the White Paper into the origins of the "total onslaught". He said in his enthronement sermon:

"We need to grasp the significance of the fact that some black South Africans, many of whom are Christians, are outside the country seeking to change our power structure by force" (Seek (September 1974):8).

He later warned, in a statement to the press on 16.2.1977, that "the society we have created for ourselves is morally indefensible. This is very serious at a time when we are asked to defend it" (Church and Conscience: 8).

Gerald Shaw, political correspondent for the Cape Times, in an article entitled "Call-up. Who is the enemy?" came to the conclusion that:

"The truth is that we are sliding into a civil war, albeit one of low intensity. The enemy is not some faceless communist horde from behind the Iron Curtain. The enemy are our own people, fellow South Africans, a guerrilla army of young people who fled from South Africa after the Soweto unrest of 1976 in their thousands and were recruited into the army of the African National Congress" (Cape Times, 26.3.1982).

Court statements of ANC guerrillas captured over the past few years confirm Shaw's statement (e.g. WIP 29 (October 1983), pp 53-58; WIP 27 (June 1983), pp 57-58; WIP 11 (February 1980), pp 45-48; etc.) Far from being regarded as a "peoples' army" (Steyn, 1980:63-78 passim), the SADF is seen by organizations like the United Democratic Front and the Azanian Students' Organization as
a defender of the racist system in South Africa, and as an obstacle to freedom and democracy in Namibia (Grassroots (January 1984):3,5). This perception of the role of of the SADF extends as far as conservative black 'homeland' leaders like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi:

"Our oppression is maintained by Whites and all Whites inside and outside the Churches through the South African Defence Force, of which all Whites up to the age of 60 are members, willy-nilly" (ABRECSA Newsletter 4 (March 1984):8).

Ironically, the state-appointed Rabie Commission of Inquiry into Security Legislation also provides confirmation of the fact that South Africa is involved in a civil war:

"After the riots (sic) in Soweto and elsewhere in the Republic in 1976 and 1977 many Black people -- mostly young people -- left the country. The South African Police believe that the number who had left the Republic up to the end of 1979 might be as high as 5000 or perhaps even 6000 ... About half -- probably about 2000 men -- of these people were recruited by the ANC" (p 58).

An opinion poll by the newspaper The World revealed that an overwhelming majority of blacks have no interest in fighting what they see as a "white man's war". This was the answer given by some 203 out of a total of 241 letters received in a letter competition in which the readers were asked whether they would fight for South Africa in the event of an attack by Angola (Rapport, 14.3.1976).

In its essence the South African conflict is a low intensity civil war. Mr Justice van Dyk said, in the Barbara Hogan case, that
the ANC is waging a "minor civil war" (Argus 21.10.1982). The guerrillas do receive training and aid from Eastern European and other African states; but this does not alter the fact that the people the SADF is called upon to fight are South Africans. There is also evidence that these "enemies of South Africa" have considerable support among the South African people.

2.4. Support for the guerrillas

It is difficult to assess the support of the black population for the guerrilla forces, but the evidence indicates that it is considerable. Thousands of people have attended the funerals of guerrillas and activists, e.g. an estimated 20000 turned out to bury Solomon Mahlangu. The Rabie Commission quotes an opinion poll conducted in Soweto shortly after the Silverton bank siege which showed that three out of every four black people had strong or qualified sympathy for the gunmen (p 69). This sympathy is reflected in the black press. After the Silverton incident, Post editorialized:

"On the one hand, the white community and its newspapers regard these people as nothing else but mere terrorists. The black community on the other hand continues to vocally acclaim these men as heroes as was demonstrated at the funeral of all three" (11.2.1980).

The well-qualified Buthelezi Commission observed, on the basis of attitude surveys, that most of their respondents thought that ANC guerrillas would receive sympathy and cooperation "from most or very many black South Africans". In addition, it found that

"the overwhelming majority of Black respondents
spontaneously predicted violence or social unrest on a large scale if meaningful policy reform did not occur in the near future".

The Commission found that on the Witwatersrand the ANC receives more popular verbal support than any other political grouping, and in Natal, after Inkatha, it is the only body with significant support (I:101).

2.5. SADF involvement in civilian actions

Those who are conscripted into the SADF cannot escape the fact that they are putting themselves in a situation where they can be commanded to act against South African civilians. The military have been used on a number of occasions to assist the police in "resettling" people at gunpoint. The two best known examples of this are the removal of more than 3000 people from Ditakwaneng to Deerward (Star, 16.11.1973) and the resettlement of 20000 people from Gatlhose-Maremne to Bophuthatswana (Diamond Fields Advertiser, 28.12.1977).

In the 1976/7 student uprising, troops were used to protect key installations and placed on standby for deployment in the townships (Rand Daily Mail, 17.6.1976). Since then, soldiers have been used on roadblocks outside black townships, as well as on "open roads". During the school boycott in June 1981, troops were used in "coloured" townships (Bosmont and Eldorado Park) along with the SAP to carry out house-to-house searches. Financial Mail noted that army personnel were increasingly being used in aid to the civil power, often in areas with direct security and political connotations. For instance, road blocks
were as likely to be manned by the army as by the police (24.9.1982). General Magnus Malan stated in Parliament in 1984 that 27 000 troops had helped man road blocks in South Africa in the past year. He emphasized that it is not only in Namibia but also in South Africa that "security force operations" are being conducted (Cape Times 18.5.1984).

2.6. The SADF as foreign aggressor

Under what General Constand Viljoen calls a policy of "offensive defence", South Africa seems to have claimed the right to invade neighbouring countries at will and to destabilize foreign economies. The objective of destabilization is to preoccupy neighbouring states with defence and internal security, and to prevent economic growth that might lessen dependence on South Africa. A second goal is to discourage support for the ANC, PAC and SWAPO.

As we have seen above, South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal, and it has become clear that most of the people there regard the SADF as a force of foreign occupation. Of the other Southern African states, Angola has suffered most at the hands of the SADF. In 1975, South African forces invaded almost as far as Luanda. American officials have estimated the total damage done to Angola since 1975 at over $7 billion (Jenkins, 1983:121). In August 1981 South Africa invaded again and remained in permanent occupation of large parts of Southern Angola until 1984. President dos Santos claimed that two brigades of South African troops (5500 men) were permanently stationed inside Angola and that 500 people had been killed since the time of the invasion (Africa Now (October 1982)). The most important aspect of South
African involvement in Angola was the practice of economic disruption, carried out largely by support for UNITA rebels. The intention was to prevent any normal life or economic activity. Traffic was strafed, bridges bombed and towns and communities reduced to rubble. In the South, UNITA operated in unison with regular South African forces, and was trained and supplied by them. In other areas, UNITA was engaged in sabotage with direct logistic support from the South Africans. The destabilization policy successfully disrupted the Benguela rail link with Zaire, a key transport link for the Angolan economy (Jenkins, 1983).

In Mozambique a similar pattern was followed. There were raids on Matola (January 1981), Ressana Garcia (July 1982), and Namacha (August 1982), but the principal means of destabilization was through support for the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). The objective was twofold. First, to spread chaos through as much of Mozambique as possible, giving the impression that the country was unstable, discouraging foreign aid and accentuating the country's economic crisis. The second objective was to disrupt transport links and the Beira-Umtali pipeline.

In Zimbabwe, South African forces operated in support of the Muzorewa forces in the final stages of the guerrilla war. Since independence, the Zimbabwean Army intercepted a SADF raiding party in the Sengwe communal area (August 1981). Three of the four raiders killed were identified as former Rhodesians serving in the SADF. The SADF claimed the men were on an unauthorized mission. The Zimbabwean economy has suffered from MNR sabotaging of oil and rail links with Beira. In 1981 South Africa acted more directly by withdrawing badly needed locomotives from Zimbabwe Railways and ending the preferential trade agreement between the two countries.
Both the locomotives and the agreement were restored in 1982, reportedly as a result of United States and British pressure (Jenkins, 1983:125).

Lesotho has not gone unscathed. The raid on Maseru (December 1982) resulted in the deaths of at least 30 refugees and Lesotho civilians. Chief Jonathan has also repeatedly claimed that South Africa shelters and supports the Lesotho Liberation Army, which has been responsible for a number of attacks in rural areas, acts of sabotage and assassinations.

Finally, there was the attempted Seychelles coup. The government holds that the mercenaries, who obtained their arms from the SADF, planned the coup without the knowledge of either the head of the SADF, the Minister of Defence, the Prime Minister or the intelligence services. The fact that no disciplinary action was taken against those involved in the issue of weapons suggests that the affair had been authorized from the top (cf. Cape Times editorial, 3.2.1983).

2.7. Conclusion

Now if it is true that apartheid is evil, that peaceful means of opposition to it are prevented by repressive legislation and state-sponsored violence, and that the war is being waged essentially against other South Africans, far-reaching conclusions follow. It means that the activities of the SADF are preserving the existing unjust structures of apartheid society. To put it bluntly, the SADF is defending apartheid. General Magnus Malan admitted as much in 1979 when he addressed a seminar in Port Elizabeth:
"Die Weermag steun die regeringsbeleid en is verantwoordelik vir vrede, reg en orde in die land. Hierdie beleid is dieselfde as wat destyds deur dr. H.F. Verwoerd neergelê is, naamlik veelvolkigheid en die selfbeskikking van volke. Met die ontwikkeling van die tuislande moet die volke die kans kry om hulself te beskerm" (Die Burger, 23.10.1979).

In slightly more sophisticated language, General Constand Viljoen stated that the SADF, while impartial to party politics, "is never impartial to national objectives" (Cape Times 11.12.1980). But the crux of the matter is that, at present, "national objectives" are set by the National Party, in just such a way as to prevent the majority of South Africans from helping to formulate those objectives; thus to admit that the SADF promotes "national objectives" is tantamount to an admission that the SADF promotes the most prominent of the ruling group's objectives, namely apartheid.

Mr Boet Botma, a National Party candidate in Walvis Bay, was asked by the Cape Times about his party's contribution towards achieving peace in Namibia. His reply was as follows:

"The ruling party is the only party which can make a contribution on a day-to-day basis, through its military wing, with its civil action programmes and so on, and through the Department of Foreign Affairs and their work for an internal settlement".

His claim that the SADF is the military wing of the National Party might not be startling; but it is startling that the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs refused to repudiate these statements (Cape Times 3.11.1982).
amount of deracialization and a certain extension of the franchise, it is at bottom an attempt to restructure the state and extend its political base of support to ensure the long-term survival of the system as a whole (Moss, 1980:10f; O'Meara, 1982:18). The state is attempting to foster its alliances with industry, and to create a black middle class which will mediate between the state and the majority of the population (Glaser, 1984:13f). Crucial to this process is that the Defence Force will, in due course, have much more manpower available when conscription is extended, which will play its part in shoring up the system.

It therefore appears that the CPSA is substantially correct in its conviction that a vital function of the SADF is the protection of "profoundly unjust and immoral" structures.
APPENDIX B:

CHAPLAINCY
AND THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS

For purposes of determining their international legal status, chaplains are subsumed under medical personnel, who are not considered part of the fighting forces, but are designated as "protected personnel". In terms of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, chaplains are expected to carry an identity card and wear an armband with the Red Cross (cf. Final Record). In the event of capture, chaplains are not deemed prisoners of war, but will at least benefit by all the provisions of the Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of war. Under capture they can continue to carry out their religious duties, and cannot be compelled to perform any other kind of work (Coursier, 1963:45f).

Some chaplains have argued that, since the Geneva Conventions require chaplains to be officially attached to the armed forces, they should be full uniformed members of the SADF in order to be granted immunity (J. Daines, Letter to Seek, Feb. 1984; Permanent Force Chaplains' Statement). This view tends to identify official attachment on the one hand with full membership and uniform on the other. If they are not identified, quite different conclusions follow, as we shall see.

In the West, chaplains have traditionally been full members of the armed forces, and therefore subject to certain conditions with
regard to military uniform, rank, pay and discipline, which derive from domestic law. Barring the necessity for the protective sign of the Red Cross and the Geneva identity card, Art. 24 of the First Convention does not lay down regulations respecting dress and comportment, nor does it explicitly oblige religious personnel to wear military uniform (de Preux). Hence by taking Art. 24 of the First Convention at face value, one cannot insist that the Conventions themselves require uniform, since it is domestic law that governs the formation, structure and organization of the armed forces -- and domestic law can be changed if necessary. In any case, though, Art. 24 is not the only basis upon which chaplains can be appointed to the armed forces. A legal expert of the International Committee of the Red Cross notes,

"It is quite conceivable that a State might, on the basis of Art. 26 of the First Convention, and by official mandate for example, allow in its armed forces religious personnel not subject to the usual constraints" (de Preux).

He adds that, as far as uniforms are concerned, the "Wounded and Sick" Convention of 1929 openly envisaged alternatives, but that these provisions were not incorporated into the First Convention of 1949, probably because the problem of uniform did not arise at that time. He infers that article 26 of the First Convention "allows for other solutions to be negotiated with the competent authorities, while respecting the conventional provisions" (de Preux). It seems safe to conclude that the church could negotiate with the SADF to authorize the presence of chaplains without military uniform and other accoutrements of military life. As an example of this, the West German chaplaincy is, for the most part, under civilian direction, and does not in the normal course
use military uniform or rank, but nonetheless acts within the
terms of the Geneva Conventions ("Military chaplaincy service"; 
and a letter of 20.11.1983 to P.G. Moll, from retired chief 
chaplain (Dekan) Konrat Weymann).

A more serious point mentioned by Rev. Daines (1983a:6) is the
dilemma surrounding "official attachment". The phrase arises 
from a commentary on the Geneva Conventions:

"Like medical personnel, [chaplains] must obviously abstain 
from all hostile acts. On the other hand, chaplains, to be 
accorded immunity, must be attached to the armed forces. 
They do not attach themselves. The decision will rest with 
the competent authorities and the relation must be an 
official one. Accordingly, ministers of religion who wish 
to serve in a non-official capacity, are not covered by the 
Convention, and, until such time as they have been regularly 
appointed, act at their own risk and peril" (from Pictet, 
"Commentary, Convention I", p220; quoted by ICRC, "Military 
chaplains and the bearing of arms", p3).

It could be argued that official attachment implies all that rank 
and uniform imply; how could one therefore reject rank and 
uniform, alleging compromise, but blithely accept official 
attachment? Conservatives could allege insincerity at this point 
because of the simultaneous disregard for South African tradition 
about chaplaincy and the reverence for international tradition 
about chaplaincy. Radicals could allege breach of principle due 
to an unwillingness to make a final break with the military 
machine.

In answer to this, two alternatives to official attachment might
be considered. The first is to surrender the ideal of immunity for chaplains, by having them minister in a non-official capacity. Some might favour this approach on the grounds that chaplains should not compromise themselves by relying on the protective umbrella of the Defence Force; on principle they should be willing to minister "at their own risk and peril", as in the commentary quoted above. The Defence Force would be unlikely to approve of such an arrangement, or lack of it. But if it did grant its approval (e.g. on the grounds that if any danger befell the chaplains concerned, it would clearly be the chaplains' fault and not that of the SADF), there would still be the problem of the disincentive inherent in the potential danger to the chaplains in the event of capture. However, this disincentive should be seen in its due perspective. It would only be operative in the operational area, which constitutes only a small part of the work which chaplains do. Furthermore it seems that, to deduce from the opinion of the Chaplain-General, a chaplain operating in a non-official capacity would not be in any more or less precarious position than military chaplains. This is because the SADF is itself pessimistic about the value of the Geneva Conventions' assurance of immunity in the present conflict with SWAPO. The Chaplain-General has stated:

"You may rest assured that the SA Defence Force and the Chaplains' Service subscribes (sic) to the Geneva Convention at all times even although our enemy certainly does not" (Letter to P.G. Moll, 30.9.1983).

One chaplain said that the chaplains informally take a cynical view of what would happen if they were captured -- they do not think that they would be treated as prisoners of war. He added
that medics do not wear any identifying mark, at least on the border, for fear of being shot up; thus the medics' tents have a cross but with a special flap to cover it if necessary. In addition he personally turns down his chaplain's insignia beneath the epaulette when walking between camps in the operational area (Middlemost). Actions of this kind, in turn, make it impossible for the "enemy" to abide by the Geneva Convention, because they are unable to distinguish combatants from non-combatants.

Thus the assumption that the "enemy" will not abide by the Geneva Convention could be used as an excuse for the SADF not to abide by the Convention itself. It is noteworthy that South Africa has not always taken care to abide by Convention, as was most dramatically illustrated in the Mariental incident. A US State Department human rights report noted that the South African Government had confirmed that it held 146 prisoners, including 14 Angolans, at a detention camp near Mariental, most of whom were captured in a raid on SWAPO bases near Cassinga, Angola, in 1978. Since the South African Government did not accord those persons prisoner of war status, and yet could not convict them of ordinary crimes, they remained in indefinite detention as political prisoners (Cape Times 2.5.1984).

This pessimism of the SADF and the SACHS about the value of Geneva Convention immunity suggests two conclusions: (i) that on the presuppositions of the chaplaincy itself, very little, if anything, would be changed if the chaplaincy were not officially attached to the armed forces; (ii) that it would be strange, perhaps hypocritical, for the SADF and SACHS to insist that all chaplains be appointed in terms of the Geneva Convention.

Thus the first alternative, namely to surrender the ideal of
immunity for chaplains, though unsatisfactory, seems to be a viable alternative at present. It is important to note that surrender does not imply violation. A chaplain who surrenders immunity through not making any claim to official status may still regard the Geneva Conventions in a positive light; it is merely that he or she personally does not want to lay claim to its protection.

The second alternative is to assign chaplains to an international body, independent of the SADF, with its own insignia and logistical capability. This international body would then see to the spiritual needs of soldiers on both sides of the conflict, in a similar way to the medical service performed by the International Red Cross. A pacifist movement among the American churches prior to the Korean War called for the replacement of the traditional chaplaincy with a "supra-national ministry to all men, friend and foe alike" (Venzke, 1975:126). The US Lutheran pastor Richard John Neuhaus expressed the view, at the time of the Vietnam War, that clerics in military service exposed themselves to "spiritual prostitution"; he said he would prefer to see military chaplains replaced by civilian clergy accredited to the armed forces like Red Cross personnel (Time (30.5.1969):50).

Note, once again, that this arrangement would apply only to the operational area. At base camps at Windhoek and Grootfontein, and within the borders of South Africa, there is far less need for Geneva-style immunity, due to the small likelihood of guerrilla activity there. Thus this second alternative is really a combination of (i) surrender of immunity in non-operational areas; and (ii) a supra-national chaplaincy in the operational area.

This arrangement could, however, not be effected in the short
term. To have a chaplaincy of the desired scale would call for a major international effort which would probably not be forthcoming, as the chaplaincy has not been so strongly contested an issue in most Western countries as it has in South Africa. It seems that this alternative is less satisfactory than the first.

This argumentation leads back to the original position of official attachment. What would this imply, and would the compromise be as serious as has been suggested?

A chaplaincy arrangement under Art. 26 allows the armed forces considerable leeway in prescribing conditions of attachment, while fulfilling the usual Geneva Convention requirements of carrying the prescribed identity card and the red cross on the arm. Art. 26 does, however, say that the staff of societies so attached "are subject to military laws and regulations" — which is precisely the problem with rank and uniform, as dealt with in detail above. But this is to misconstrue the position. Anyone, whether civilian or military, who enters an area controlled by the military, is subject to the laws of the military: for example, they may be tried by court martial if they engage in disorderly behaviour (Clauses 45 and 46 of the First Schedule of the Defence Act, No. 44 of 1957). Furthermore, anyone, whether civilian or military, who in any part of the country encourages conscientious objection, can be charged under Section 121 of Defence Act No. 44 of 1957. It is in this sense that a society which is attached to the military in terms of Art. 26 is "subject to military laws and regulations". It is a very different matter to be attached as a full member of the military, which implies voluntary assent, not only to the general laws which apply to everyone, but also to specific rules about behaviour, dress, military secrets, command,
etc., which are peculiar to military people. Thus attachment in terms of Art. 26 entails no more compromise or identification with the military than does, for instance, the presence of a foreign journalist in a military-controlled area. This form of attachment would best be compared with the formal accreditation of Red Cross units, whose internal policy is strictly controlled by the International Committee in Geneva, but who nonetheless have to seek the armed forces' permission to be in a particular area. On the other hand, some may consider even this form of association with the military to entail compromise; but this aspect has been dealt with in Chapter 4.

The moral dilemma of attachment may also be viewed from another angle, that of the minimum requirements of safety. Now there has to be a certain regularity in international combat so as to limit the destructiveness of war. If, then, immunity is desired by chaplains, certain conditions have to be fulfilled. The minimum condition, as set out by the Geneva Conventions, is official attachment to the armed forces concerned. The only reason why this is done is for personal protection. It has nothing to do with tacit compacts or understandings with the armed forces; still less does it have to do with identification with the armed forces. The only regulations to which the chaplain voluntarily assents are those which spring from international agreements which constitute the absolute minimum consistent with personal safety. It would be difficult to label this as compromise. In the event it includes a red cross, a card, and an official communiqué or statement by the armed forces that the chaplain is thereby authorized to claim immunity in terms of the Geneva Convention. Since this implies no rank, uniform, membership, military status or control, it would be the purest tokenism to insist that
attachment in terms of Art. 26 has moral or theological drawbacks. What might, as suggested above, have moral or theological drawbacks is the very fact of association with the military, at least in the eyes of those who believe that the only moral option at present is total boycott of the military (see Chapter 4).

Rev. John D. Daines made the further assertion that, since the Geneva Conventions permit medical and religious personnel to carry arms for their own defence and that of the wounded and sick, these personnel should be full, uniformed members of the armed forces (Letter to Seek, July 1984). Though plausible at first sight, this argument would not have been used at other periods in South African history. During World War I, South African chaplains were not permitted to bear arms (Potgieter, 1971:185); during World War II they were noncombatant and did not possess or handle weapons (Potgieter, 1971:221). More importantly, though, the Geneva Conventions do not require arms-bearing by chaplains; they allow for it. Therefore this line of reasoning does not overturn the observation made above, viz. that the Geneva Conventions do not require uniform. Nevertheless Rev. Daines is correct to the extent that the practice of the time was to appoint uniformed military chaplains who had the option of bearing arms. This custom persists today in Western countries.

The question of arms-bearing by chaplains deserves closer scrutiny. Why would chaplains carry arms at all? To the extent that chaplains are on the same footing as medical personnel, most chaplaincies in the West permit arms-bearing. The US Navy is an exception to this rule, and forbids its chaplains to carry weapons because they must

"be engaged exclusively in religious duties ... an
individual chaplain who violates this noncombatant status by carrying a weapon endangers the noncombatant status of other chaplains, offering the enemy an excuse to treat all chaplains as combatants" (Chaplains' Manual, n.1204).

Now it is unlikely that chaplains would have to use weapons, as medics may, for the "maintenance of order" among the units to which they are assigned, for much of their work is with combat troops and to presuppose indiscipline among them would be serious (cf. ICRC:3), apart from raising acute theological problems. It is also unlikely that a chaplain, being vested with officer rank, would in an extreme case need a weapon to protect the authority of that rank, for this too throws up theological difficulties. It is further unlikely that chaplains would use a weapon to fight off the enemy or to resist capture, for this would make them combatants and involve loss of immunity. Why, then, might chaplains need weapons?

There seem to be only three possible, but not necessarily convincing reasons. The first possible reason for arms-bearing is for pure self-defence, neither amidst an enemy attack on a unit nor in resistance to capture, but only when a chaplain is separated from the rest of the men and cannot be protected by them. This improbable situation might occur if a sniper gained access to the military camp. Returning fire under these conditions would not jeopardize a chaplain's immunity, because an attack directed specifically at a chaplain is a violation of international law. The second possibility is for protection of a medical unit, for, again, an attack on a medical unit is a violation of international law. However, it is not clear that chaplains should be engaged in defence of a medical unit, since
structurally they do not fall under medical staff. Thus a Red Cross monograph concludes that

"It is doubtful whether the First Geneva Convention entitles chaplains to bear arms ... The right to bear arms is in fact restricted to the personnel of a medical unit or establishment" (ICRC:7).

The third possible reason is to protect themselves from wild animals or reptiles like snakes or crocodiles on the border. This was mentioned by at least one chaplain (Wittstock).

The difficulty with all three of these reasons is that they violate the non-combatant status of chaplains. A chaplain who carries, say, a 9mm pistol in order to return sniper fire is no different, in the eyes of the enemy, from a chaplain who carries a rifle with the intention of engaging in combat. Clearly a pistol can less easily be used in long-distance combat than a R1 rifle; but the problem is that it can nevertheless be used. The crucial difference here is that between being armed and being unarmed, not that between sizes of weapon or intentions. Thus an excuse is offered to the enemy to treat all chaplains as combatants if any one of them uses a weapon. In fact the frequent use of arms by SACHS members on the border might be construed as a tacit recognition that the Geneva Conventions are not expected to be operative; however, this would be very serious in light of the fact that South Africa is a signatory to the Convention. In conclusion, it seems that the overriding consideration in international law is the necessity for non-combatant status of chaplains.
APPENDIX C:

CHAPLAINCY, OBEDIENCE

AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW

General von Moltke believed that prohibitions of means of war merely drag out hostilities, while "the greatest kindness in war is to bring it to a speedy conclusion" (quoted in Walzer, 1977:131). However, international consensus that the destructiveness of war should be limited has led to a series of multilateral agreements from the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law to the 1981 United Nations Convention Concerning Conventional Weapons which have Indiscriminate Effects (reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, 1982). Most scholars (e.g. Nagel, 1974; O'Brien, 1981), feel that these regulations do have a basis in morality because, despite their incoherence and arbitrariness they have a record of saving lives. For instance, Davis comments on the enormous numbers of soldiers taken prisoner in the world wars. During the first world war between 7 and 8.5 million, and in the second world war between 12 and 35 million soldiers were captured (1977:623f). Against this Wasserstrom submits that considerations of military necessity commonly override the laws of war (1972:13), and that that code of behaviour is "genuinely odious" (1972:19) because its defeasibility legitimates killing and maiming in the mind of the soldier (1972:18). This unfortunate consequence of the weakness of international law must readily be acknowledged; but what is the solution? In Wasserstrom's own words, the
solution is not the abandonment of the laws of war but a different conception of them which "refuses to regard as immutable the character of contemporary warfare and weaponry, and that requires instead that war itself change so as to conform to the demands of morality" (1972:19). In the meantime a less ambitious course has to be struck -- that of working within the current international system of law, imperfect as it is.

Telford Taylor suggests that the law of war can aid soldiers in learning the distinction between 'killing for reasons of state' and killing for its own sake or for revenge. If they do not learn the distinction, they can return to society as potential murderers (quoted in Wasserstrom, 1972:17). The concern of chaplains for the moral rectitude of soldiers should lead them to accepting the task of instructing them in the Laws of War as an integral part of their pastoral care (Bailey, 1972:20).

The Nuremberg Principles

Despite Churchill's initial intention to shoot the Nazi offenders "quickly and humanely as mad dogs" (Paskins and Dockrill, 1979:266), the German generals were tried in an unprecedented series of war crimes tribunals, of which the best known is that which occurred at Nuremberg. The Nuremberg Tribunal had a lasting impression on Allied countries because it reasserted the Western tradition of moral values in international conduct. It was the culmination of a centuries-long effort to establish the principle of natural law (cf. Stanley, 1980: 12-16).

With the chaplain's counseling concerns in mind, I shall focus on the aspect of individual responsibility of the soldier as it was dealt with by the Tribunal. After World War II international
victors' "jungle justice". Nevertheless for the chaplain there are important elements to be salvaged. First, the Tribunal has been defended by, among others, Paskins and Dockrill (1979:262-277). Second, while its legal force is in doubt its moral force remains; jurists did not question its assertion of individual responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity. O'Brein reasons that the Tribunal's lasting contribution was not

"the negative point that war criminals should be punished but the positive assertion that it is men, working in governments and military forces, who make the decisions and take the actions attributed to states" (1981:356f).

In similar fashion Falk contends that the essence of the Nuremberg tradition is

"The conviction that individuals of conscience are the most reliable check upon the war criminality of governments, given the contemporary world political setting" (1974:136).

While the punitive scope of the Tribunal was limited, in practice, to very senior German officials, its moral scope encompasses soldiers of all ranks. We might conclude that chaplains should assume as one of their tasks the duties of teaching soldiers the Principles, attempting to define the moral responsibility of soldiers, and encouraging soldiers to assume personal responsibility for their actions.
May a South African chaplain urge a soldier to disobey immoral instructions? The costs would seem to be high. The penalty for disobeying a lawful command is a stiff five years' imprisonment (Defence Act, No. 44 of 1957, First Schedule 19(1)). Encouraging someone to disobey a lawful command can receive the same penalty, viz. five years (First Schedule, 48). Moreover, any person who "causes actual or potential prejudice to good order and military discipline" can be sentenced to a year's imprisonment (First Schedule, 46).

However, there is an important exception to this rule. In most Western countries, legislation provides for disobedience of "illegal" commands, i.e. those which entail the commission of an offence. This suggests that a chaplain may, without fear of prosecution, advise such disobedience.

Unfortunately the problem is not so easily solved. What constitutes "illegality" is not always clear, especially under conditions of emergency (Keijzer, 1978:141f). Hence the definition of an "illegal" order is often left to the courts (Stanley, 1980:6).

A further difficulty is that in South Africa this duty to disobey is rather more circumscribed than in other Western countries.
Whereas, in the USA, the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands, one has a duty to disobey orders whose execution implies the commission of a punishable offence, in Israel the order has to be "manifestly unlawful" before one has the duty to disobey (Keijzer, 1978:221). Manifest illegality is defined as such illegality as would be obvious to an ordinary man (Keijzer, 1978:215). The situation in South Africa is similar to that in Israel. This emerges from the following considerations.

In a leading case which arose during the Anglo-Boer War, Justice Solomon ruled that a soldier is protected from liability for acts done in obedience to the orders of a superior, if the orders are not so manifestly illegal that the soldier must or ought to have known them to be so, if the soldier honestly believes that he is doing his duty in obeying them -- R. v. Smith, S.C. Vol. 17 (1900), pp. 561-568. Cf. another similar case in Kaplan v. Hanekom, S.C. Vol. 20, p.53ff. These cases are also summarized in Bisset and Smith, under: "Criminal and Civil Liability for Acts Done in Obedience to Orders of Superior Officer".

Hence we may conclude that a South African chaplain may with impunity counsel disobedience of "manifestly illegal" orders. Other adjectives used in these cases in place of "manifestly" are "obviously" or "grossly". But may a chaplain go further than this? It is submitted that the chaplain can. This is because the rule of "manifest illegality" is unsatisfactory, for two reasons.

(i) Ignorance of the law. Watermeyer, in R. v. Werner and Another, ruled slightly differently from Solomon (S.A. Law Reports 1947 (2), pp. 828-838). He qualified Solomon's judgment, as that suggested that ignorance of the law was an excuse. He noted,
however, that the conditions of the two cases were different. Solomon's involved military operations; Watermeyer's, a more settled prisoner-of-war camp. Hence Watermeyer felt justified in requiring greater responsibility of the accused. They were men of keen intelligence and ought to have known that the relevant order was illegal (pp. 833, 834). Furthermore, he ruled that the fear of punishment or reprisal which existed in the minds of the accused was not a justification (p. 837).

(ii) Military discipline. Burchell and Hunt contend that simple illegality of an order is not enough to establish a duty to disobey, because, concurring with Solomon, they argue that "soldiers would be hesitant to obey doubtful orders, which would be subversive of military discipline" (1970:300; cf. a similar argument by Williams, 1961:297). This is poor reasoning:

(a) Would not the action of drawing the line at "manifest illegality" also subvert discipline, though admittedly less often?

(b) This is a curious way to solve the problem of discipline. Would not the problem be better solved by giving soldiers more information about what they may or may not do? Morally speaking, if a soldier really thinks an act is legal when it is in fact illegal, should not the military be held responsible for not informing him in advance, as well as this may be done?

(c) Other Western military systems do not seem to have suffered for having drawn the line at simple illegality.

(d) It is increasingly accepted that the modern soldier is sentient and discerning -- as he must be, given that military systems are becoming more technologically sophisticated (cf. Keijzer, 1978:45ff).
It is therefore submitted, for these two reasons, that legislation regarding illegal commands should be modified to suit modern conditions. Soldiers should be taught to distinguish legal from illegal commands. In turn, then, a chaplain may, without overstepping the law, help to prevent atrocity and to limit the destructiveness of war by counseling disobedience to illegal commands.

Boozer, writing of the US chaplaincy, concurs:

"the authority which obligates every person to obey every legal order of a commander also obligates every person to disobey an illegal order" (Boozer, 1979:64).

Therefore, Boozer continues, the chaplain is

"both free and obligated to inform and sustain a person who is struggling in conscience with the legality of an order and is seeking the courage to act on the promptings of his or her conscience" (Boozer, 1979:74).
APPENDIX E:

STATEMENT ON THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY
ADOPTED BY
THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
AT ITS NATIONAL CONFERENCE
BOSMONT, JULY 1984

"33.1 The Conference, affirming

33.1.1 that the church has a responsibility to minister to people in all circumstances

33.2 and believing

33.2.1 that the theological justification of apartheid is a heresy
33.2.2 that apartheid is morally indefensible
33.2.3 that the SADF is engaged in an unjust war in Namibia

33.3 and noting

33.3.1 that the churches' ministry to military personnel is carried out primarily through military chaplains, who are full members of the SADF with rank, uniform and military pay
33.3.2 that this identification with the SADF may be taken to confer religious legitimacy on the institution

33.4 therefore urges its member churches

33.4.1 to persevere in their combined efforts to renegotiate the status of their chaplains with the SADF
33.4.2 to participate in these efforts if they have not yet decided to do so
33.4.3 to demilitarize their chaplains by relieving them of the symbols of military status like rank and uniform
33.4.4 to undertake all training and financing of their chaplains
33.4.5 to bring their chaplains under church authority, thereby releasing them from military influence".

This resolution was adopted, after discussion in plenary, by 49 votes to 0, with no abstentions, viz. unanimously.
### APPENDIX F:

**CHAPLAINS**

AND **CHURCH OFFICIALS**

**CONSULTED**

1. Chaplains with whom interviews were conducted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Permanent Force Chaplains</th>
<th>Citizen Force Chaplains</th>
<th>National Service Chaplains</th>
<th>Part-time Chaplains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CATHOLIC</strong></td>
<td>R. Cawcutt</td>
<td>H. Hovers</td>
<td>P. Fahey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>J. Rodrigues</td>
<td>B. Royston</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CPSA</strong></td>
<td>M. Moore</td>
<td>R. Horrocks</td>
<td>D. Hart</td>
<td>G. Ashby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Middlemost</td>
<td>B. Wittstock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J. Voegel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LUTHERAN</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>C. Maree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRESBY-</strong></td>
<td>J. Gray</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>B. Boyd</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TERIAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>R. Botsis</td>
<td>J. Dixon</td>
<td>S. Henderson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Church officials who were interviewed


3. Chaplains with whom correspondence was entered into


4. Interviews with foreign chaplains or church officials

H. Schaeufele (West Germany), A. Reid (Canada), D. Arther (United
States, resident in West Germany), D. Reeve (England).
Dear Peter,

Thank you for your letter of 2nd May, 1984. Please pardon the delay in replying. Concerning your question, both the Diocese of Namibia and the Council of Churches in Namibia hold the position that the SADF and the local recruits in Namibia as (sic) a foreign army fighting against Namibians. Its aim is to deny Namibians their national independence and freedom.

As such, the Church cannot provide a chaplaincy to a foreign and colonial army. Furthermore, the Diocese cannot licence foreign chaplains who come here to serve in their colonial foreign army.

The decision of the South African churches who send their chaplains to Namibia cannot and shall not be understood in any other way, but as a clear siding and support of their national army.

Wishing you God's blessings in your studies.

Yours sincerely,
APPENDICES

(signed) James H. Kauluma
Bishop of Namibia

--confidential--
APPENDIX H:

EXCERPTS FROM A PUBLIC INTERVIEW WITH

PASTOR ZEPHANIA KAMEETA

OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH OF NAMIBIA

AND THE NAMIBIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

(This interview was conducted by a journalist, Mr. Hennie Serfontein, at the National Conference of the South African Council of Churches, at St. Barnabas, Bosmont, Johannesburg, 28.6.1984).

Serfontein: What is your attitude to the military chaplaincy?

Kameeta: The churches belonging to the (Namibian) Council of Churches have taken a clear stand on chaplaincy. We do not want to give credibility to an army which is for apartheid -- for the apartheid god who is preaching a gospel which is contrary to the true Gospel of Jesus Christ -- a god who is dividing people, while Christ is reconciling people. Sending your pastors to serve that kind of an army is to say yes to the defence of that god. And that's why we took a clear stand rejecting that. We have been requested, asked back by the people responsible, but we told them clearly that we're not going to send our pastors as chaplains into that army. We cannot refuse to serve the people. We are inviting them, saying, "You are welcome to come and worship in your churches where you are members". But we are not going to
send our people there to serve in that army, wear that uniform, to be given rank. It is just unthinkable -- you know, "Major Kameeta"! (mirth) And I just want to say that in that stand we have been encouraged by the resolution of the SACC in 1974 on conscientious objection. Well, what is horrifying to us is to hear that there are some chaplains from those churches, belonging -- I hope I am wrong -- belonging to the SACC! That's our discouragement in the whole issue...
(1) Long before this, the Gereformeerde Kerk had, on several occasions, clashed with the SADF regarding military control over chaplains (see the historical account in van Wyk, 1984:209f). In 1979, the Gereformeerde Kerk complained that the authorities, among other things, determined the duties of chaplains; it therefore called for a thorough review of the agreement between the Defence Force and the church (Argus 24.1.1979; Star 16.1.1979). Finally, in 1982, it issued a long document, which inter alia rejected the use of rank, warned that all remuneration should come without strings attached, and questioned the use of non-ordained theological students as chaplains (Handelinge van die Een-en-veertigste Sinode, 1982:471-487).
FOOTNOTES FOR
CHAPTER 2: THEOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS

(1) The following is a sampling of the recent and growing literature on the church's task of peace: Yoder, 1971 and 1972; Baptist Peacemaker; Johnson, 1982 and 1983; Hertz, 1968; Peace and politics; Peace on earth; Der Friedensdienst der Christen; Sider and Brubaker, 1982; Das Bekenntniss; Nash, 1982; Deile, 1982.

(2) The Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Congregational, Presbyterian, and Baptist statements during the past decade are documented in "Church and Conscience". More recent Presbyterian and Congregational material is reproduced in "Study material on war, revolution, military service, conscientious objection" (1982). A further resolution was adopted by the CPSA Provincial Synod in 1982 (Resolution 13: "Service in the SADF"). The Catholic rejection of the new legislation of 1983 emerges in a letter written by Archbishop George Daniel to Colonel de Kok (Chief of Staff, Personnel) on 11.1.1983. The Baptist rejection emerges in a letter from the Baptist Union Citizenship Committee (to the Minister of Justice, 31.3.1983). The CPSA, Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational rejection emerges in a combined statement by representatives of these churches who met with ds. C. Naude on 5 January 1983 ("Response to the proposed legislation regarding conscientious objectors, as given at a briefing of the churches by the SADF on 5 January 1983"). The SACC rejection emerges in Resolution 39 of its National Conference of June 1984.
It should be appreciated, incidentally, that ecumenical concern about conscientious objection in South Africa goes back at least as far as 1952. In January of that year, the Christian Council of South Africa endorsed a WCC resolution to the effect that "conscientious objectors have the right to have their opinions respected" (CCSA Minutes 22/23 January 1952). In January 1957, the CCSA "strongly urged" that the Defence Act be amended to provide for conscientious objectors (Minutes of the Executive Committee of the CCSA, 10/11 January 1957).

(3) South African Outlook, February 1983:24. "It is the magistrate's duty to tender the liberty of men's consciences ... without which all other liberties would not be worth the naming ... But if any man shall impose on us anything that we see not to be commanded by our Lord Jesus Christ, we should rather ... die a thousand deaths, than do anything against the light of our own consciences". In this spirit, the Baptist Union of South Africa resolved in 1912 that the "principle of compulsion" should be removed from the recently passed Union Defence Act (South African Outlook, February 1983:24).

(4) Aquinas is a fair representative of the various theologies of conscience which made their appearance during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. He states that a correct conscience binds absolutely and in every circumstance. Thus

"anyone upon whom the ecclesiastical authorities, in ignorance of the true facts, impose a demand that offends against his clear conscience, should perish in excommunication rather than violate his conscience" (IV., Sent., dist. 38, art. 4, expos. text. Quoted by Rudin,
To Aquinas a mistaken conscience is also binding in general, because one incurs sin if one does not satisfy conscience ("Debated questions on truth" 17.4. Translation in Potts, 1980:135). Aquinas takes this assertion to its logical conclusion:

"Belief in Christ is good in itself and necessary for salvation. But if a Christian who held it wrong to believe in Christ were to do so, he would commit a sin" (Summa theologica, I/II, 19.5. Quoted by Rudin, 1973:109).

However, Aquinas does not hold the anarchic view that it is always wrong to act against one's conscience. A mistaken conscience is excused only if it arises from factual error; if the error is one of law, then it is no more excusable than a plea of ignorance of the law is excusable in the courts (cf. Potts, 1980:56-59).

The Spanish neo-scholastic, Francisco de Vitoria, asserted that if a subject is convinced of the injustice of a war, "he ought not to serve in it, even on the command of the prince" (quoted by Bailey, 1972:11).

(5) This accords with its programmatic statement in 1948 that

"War as a means of settling disputes is incompatible with the teaching and example of our Lord Jesus Christ. The part which war plays in our present international life is a sin against God and a degradation of man" (PD:15).

(6) 1969:414. According to the maxim of Frederick the Great, a soldier must fear his officers more than his enemies (Keijzer,
Basic training is the means used to create this disposition of respect, obedience and submission. During basic training, recruits are stripped of their identity and forced to accept new military roles even if those violate some of their basic values (Keijzer, 1978:50f). An American study expressed it this way: "The purpose of basic training, other than learning new skills, is conversion. This transformation consists of replacing the identity of the civilian youth with that of the soldier. The means used to achieve this change comprise a carefully programmed sequence utilizing the following: total control involving recruit independence and deprivation of all rights, a mortification process in which the old self is stripped, verbal depredation and coerced obeisance, a rewarding of soldierly skills only,... Basic training is ... the only radical and coerced change of identity and behaviour that youth can be legally subjected to for other than medical or punitive reasons, in comparable totalist institutions such as prisons or mental hospitals. We find the whole process disturbing ... the military inversion of many traditional Christian values fostered by church education and youth ministry" (MMP:41f).

It is interesting that, despite the military traditions of obedience, loyalty and duty, significant numbers of senior military officers have, on occasion, disobeyed or resigned when instructed to perform actions which ran counter to conscience. Some of these instances have been recounted in Denton's (1980) fine book: in it, Hoffmann (1980) shows how Beck and other German generals plotted against Hitler, Gruber (1980) shows how British officers refused to fight against the Americans in the War of Independence, and Stanley (1980) discusses the conscientious and ethical issues involved.
(7) A naval officer told a Cape Town magistrate that it was not in the public interest to tell the court about detention barracks. The punishment given there was "far greater than will ever be received in any jail. The fear of God is put into one when one hears about what takes place in detention barracks" (Rand Daily Mail, 5.2.1976).
FOOTNOTES FOR

CHAPTER 3: CHAPLAINCY IN SOUTH AFRICA

(1) It emerges from the "Handbook for Chaplains", the "SADF Order on Religion" 1/21/78, the "Information Brochure", and the SADF submission to the Eloff Commission. The "Handbook" appears to have been compiled in 1979 or later (HB:25). The SADFO referred to was issued in 1978. The "Information Brochure" was compiled in 1978 or later, to judge by its use of 1978 budget figures. Thus these sources are some six to seven years old. Nevertheless they illustrate SADF expectations at a point in time. These expectations do not appear to have changed substantially since then, as we shall see from statements of senior SACHS officials and the Eloff Commission.

(2) Some churches do not have such "Agreements". The Baptist Union and the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches have only a United Board Free Churches which is charged with liaison, but which has no constitution or written terms of reference (Letter from Rev. A.W. van den Aardweg to P.G. Moll, 14.2.1984). The Roman Catholic Church has no written agreement with the SADF (Letter from Archbishop G. Daniel to P.G. Moll, 6.6.1984). Other churches do have written "Agreements". That of the MCSA is recorded in the Minutes of the 98th Annual Conference, pp 215-222. Several clauses indicate a concern to protect the freedom of MCSA chaplains. For example, it is stated that chaplains, while responsible to the Chaplain-General, are under the oversight of
their Circuit Superintendent (Section B(d)). Furthermore, the Connexional Committee on Military Chaplaincy is charged to ensure that chaplains "represent clearly the essential elements of the Methodist witness, and that they shall not be the subject of training not in harmony with Methodist convictions" (Section C(h)). The Connexional Committee is also charged to "make representations to the Military Authorities concerned in respect of all actions which may be contrary to Methodist convictions" (Section C(j)).

The CPSA documents ("Agreement" and "The Principal Chaplain, CPSA SADF") insist, in a similar way to the MCSA document, that clergy be "as fully integrated as possible into their diocese" and that no lectures or courses be given without the approval of the English Language Literature Commission. They include a strong emphasis on consultation and liaison, and allow no hint of control or authority by the Chaplain-General.

On a superficial examination, therefore, it might be thought that the freedom of the MCSA and the CPSA is guaranteed. However, two points should be mentioned in this regard. First, nothing in these documents rescinds the official SADF documents like the "SADFO on Religion", or the very clearly expressed expectations of the politicians, senior Defence Force personnel, and chaplains' conferences. Second, even though these churches may have fine intentions of maintaining their denominational independence and identity, the point of this chapter is to show that the crucial factor is full military membership, which entails uniform, rank, security clearance and training, together with the various forms of legal and informal control that accompany these. Third, these documents do not amount to a "Chaplains' Bill of Rights". They
do not explicitly guarantee the free expression of conscience, as has been done by the USA military chaplaincy, in its document "Chaplains' guidelines for free and responsible expression of conscience in the military" (1970).

(3) This is hardly a startling statement, in view of the dependence of war machines everywhere on sound troop morale. To this there is abundant testimony. Consider, for example, such diverse sources as Martin Luther (as quoted in Abercrombie, 1973:89), Judge M.T. Steyn (Steyn Commission, p.23), Owens (1983), O'Brien (1981:359), Baynes (1967), and Meyers (1983).

Why are military commanders tempted to use religion to promote morale? This is because of the motivating force of religion. Expressing this in sociological language, Peter Berger asserts that religion plays a strategic part in the human enterprise of world-building (1973:30ff). It forms, according to Berger, an important part in the creation and maintenance of institutions. This central aspect of Berger's thought may be applied to the military as an institution. Viewed in this light, it is not surprising that religion should play a part in creating attitudes that enable the military to function -- e.g. patriotism, the willingness to surrender one's life for one's country, etc. Famous commanders have paid tribute to the contribution to morale made by chaplains, e.g. Field Marshal Montgomery (quoted in Wilkinson, 1981:254f); Dwight D. Eisenhower, US Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley, and the US General of the Army John J. Pershing (quoted in Venzke, 1975:58f). A representative of the German High Command told chaplains in 1942: "The primary task of the military chaplaincy is and remains to be a vital means of strengthening the fighting strength of the troops ... It can
never be to represent the special interests of the church" (quoted in Wilkinson, 1981:255). Conversely, in Germany in 1936 ministry to troops by local pastors was forbidden by the war ministry, so as to forestall the inroads that Confessing Church ministers might make on morale (Weymann, 1970:121). These expectations of morale-building are sometimes made official by their inclusion in military publications, e.g. in German chaplaincy materials both before and since World War II (quoted by Huber, 1973:247,261). The US Army Field manual 16-5 (published by the Department of the Army) conveys what was required of the US chaplain:

"It is the responsibility of the chaplain to make every effort to assist the soldier to perform a creditable service to the Army. He should be returned to civilian life ... strengthened in his religious outlook, more devoted as a citizen, and even more faithful to the flag he has served" (The Chaplain (Dec. 1967), p.8, quoted by Rimlinger, 1974:353).

Again, the US Army defence in the famous suit about the constitutionality of the chaplaincy was that the chaplaincy

"is a valid and necessary exercise of Congressional war power... raises the morale and increases the effectiveness of our fighting force... the presence of the chaplain and his enheartening effect on the troops is an essential ingredient to the successful conclusion of a war" ("The constitutionality suit", Chaplaincy IV (1981), pp. 12-61, at 48).

It hardly seems necessary to defend the view that chaplains should resist these efforts to make them into "morale officers".
Nevertheless it is instructive to quote some American studies on the question. Price, for example, contends that the morale effect of a military chaplaincy would be endurable if the cause were just (EC:67), but the question may be asked whether the chaplain should ever be used as a morale agent, even in a "just" war:

"The controlling identity of the chaplain is that of a person of righteousness, compassion and peace. The chaplain cannot bear arms, nor allow himself or herself to be used as a morale agent for the military organization or for the accomplishment of a specific military objective" (Boozer, 1979:72).

Clearest of all on this point is the UCC study:

"Turning the chaplain into a morale officer is an abuse of his or her clerical calling ... Here there is a danger of using religion as a rationale for the righteousness of our cause, sacrificing faith to the fighting spirit" (MMP:74).

(4) The UCC study feared that the military chaplaincy structure would "play one denomination off against another" (MMP:84).

(5) "His dual role under two completely separate and disparate systems of authority, both claiming his loyalty and exercising discipline over him, brings into focus the dilemma of the chaplaincy and the problem for the church. To whom does he really belong? Where is his primary loyalty?" (MMP:67).

(6) "The caste system in the military is assiduously cultivated and rigorously preserved by the rites of obeisance and the symbols
of superiority" (MMP:43). The rigidity of rank is emphasized by the fact that if any person holds himself out to be the holder of a rank other than his own rank, he can be sentenced to six months' imprisonment (Defence Act No. 44 of 1957, First Schedule, 43).

(7) An American study concluded that "inclusion as an officer is also the military absorption of the clergyman, sacrificing his alien and prophetic calling by identifying with the military establishment and its upper class at the expense of the enlisted personnel" (MMP:89).

(8) It is argued that rank "gives the chaplain clout with the commander, enabling him to humanize the military and forestall immoral or illegal actions" (MMP:75).

(9) Note a similar case where a R100 fine was given, in Cape Times 14.11.1980. The maximum sentence is R1000 or 5 years, ibid.

(10) The military chaplaincy tends to

"lock the church into an implicit legitimation of the war policies of the state, both the just and the unjust wars" (MMP:112).

(11) Regarding identification, an American study insisted, "In the military caste system, rank is the definitive divider. Rank is a real barrier, which some are able to overcome since they are the only officers even allowed to associate with enlisted personnel... rank is a hindrance to be overcome rather than a facilitator of the ministry to military personnel... the benefits seem to advance the chaplain's personal interests more than his ministry, to
further the ends of the military more than the purposes of the church. Rank identifies the church with the powerful instead of the powerless" (MMP:89,90).

(12) Chaplains in other countries have a mixed record with respect to conscientious objection. On the one hand, some have been apologists for the military. The US Army Chief of Chaplains, Maj.-Gen. Gerhardt W. Hyatt, justified his own participation in the military on traditional "just war" grounds, and opposed church support for selective conscientious objectors during the Vietnam War (quoted in A Proposal:4). In a 1966 resolution, the Military Chaplains' Association of the United States declared that chaplains who served in Vietnam were

"unanimous in their agreement that they, with the men they are committed to serve, are where they ought to be, that our mission is just and that the need of the people there for our support, military, financial and humanitarian, is real and urgent" (quoted in Zahn, "What did you do during the war, Father?", p196).

There are some recorded instances in the USA, in which a chaplain has "grossly violated the counseling process and the integrity of a youth, abusing his own clergy office" in the treatment of conscientious objectors (MMP:45). For example, a chaplain interviewed one Moroney, a conscientious objector, during the Vietnam period, and concluded that his objection was on "political" grounds. The man was consequently refused conscientious objector status. Subsequently a US magistrate found that Moroney was indeed a conscientious objector on religious grounds (cf. Moroney v. Laird, No. CA-6-260 (N.D.Tex. June 9,
1972.) For a contrast, see Silverman v. Laird, No. 71-92-J (D. Mass. March 15, 1972). On the other hand, a serving US chaplain is of the opinion that most American chaplains are now supportive of both pacifist and selective conscientious objection, whether on religious grounds or not (Arther).

Bamberg quotes the Italian military chaplains as saying in 1965 that conscientious objection was anti-Christian and an "insult to the Fatherland and its war heroes". They demanded that there be an end to "all discrimination against soldiers on all fronts and of all uniforms, who in dying gave themselves for the glorious ideals of the Fatherland" (1970:8, 9).

(13) Briggs has subsequently changed his views and supports the Congregational Church rejection of church participation on the Board. It may be that some of the chaplains have also changed their views since, but the highest-ranking of them, Brig. van den Aardweg, has not, as is evident from the quotations above.

(14) This suspicion follows from the famous Milgram experiments which showed that most people tend to obey legitimate authority, to the point of inflicting great and unnecessary pain upon others, even if no effort is made to enforce obedience (see the full account in Gergen et al., 1974:329ff). The same psychological tendency to conform was found by Janis in the political processes which led up to international fiascos like the Bay of Pigs incident. Janis concluded that a phenomenon of "groupthink" was frequently operative. By this he meant that "powerful social pressures are brought to bear by members of a cohesive group whenever a dissident begins to voice his objections to a group consensus" (1971:43). "Groupthink", he said, was characterized
by self-censorship of views that deviate from the group consensus; the construction of stereotypes of "enemy" groups; and the collective construction of rationalizations in order to discount negative feedback (1971:44-46; 74).
(1) Lifton’s research reveals that Vietnam War veterans deeply resent the kind of consolation that was offered them by chaplains. Recalling interviews he had with veterans, Lifton comments,

"With bitter enthusiasm, they gave endless examples of chaplains blessing the troops, their mission, their guns, their killing. As one of the men put it, "Whatever we were doing ... murder ... atrocities ... God was always on our side".

"The vets were trying to say that the only thing worse than being ordered by military authorities to participate in absurd evil is to have that evil rationalized and justified by "guardians of the spirit". Chaplains and psychiatrists thus fulfill the function of helping men adjust to committing war crimes, while lending their spiritual authority to the overall project.

"Chaplains and psychiatrists then formed "unholy alliances" not only with the military command but with the more corruptible elements of the soldier’s individual psyche. We may then speak of the existence of a counterfeit universe, in which all-pervasive, spiritually reinforced inner corruption becomes the price of survival" (1972:68f).
(2) "Seen individualistically and in terms of the troops, the problems involved become those of sexual licence, drinking and dope, personal faith and family relations. This mentality places the chaplain on the side of the command and uses religion to control the perennial problems generated by military life itself. At the same time, this inhibits the chaplain from focusing religion and ethics on the system, the military institution proper, which is a large scale social and political system raising moral problems on another dimension" (MMP:74f).

(3) J. Glenn Gray notes in his beautiful and moving book, "The Warriors", that "the most potent quieters of conscience are evidently the presence of others who are doing the same things and the consciousness of acting under the orders of people "higher up" who will answer for one's deeds" (1959:175). Similarly Keijzer observes that the reliance on superior orders reduces stress in combat operations (1978:47; see also the discussions about military obedience in Chapter 2 and on the defence of superior orders in Appendix C). As a senior officer, it is possible for the chaplain to act as a "quieter of conscience". As long as the chaplain does not experience moral anguish, why should a humble troop do so? Gray then reminds the reader that "it is a crucial moment in a soldier's life when he is ordered to perform a deed that he finds completely at variance with his own notions of right and good ... It means to set oneself against others and with one stroke lose their comforting presence ... Suddenly the soldier feels himself abandoned and cast off from all security" (1959:184f). It might be argued that the consolation that the chaplain should offer in this instance is that of helping the soldier to come to terms with the personal costs implicit in his
moral objections, and to help him to register his objections in the most effective fashion.

(4) "With full membership in the military, the chaplain offers his own ecclesiastical endorsement of the military enterprise. All the symbols involved speak of his full participation -- with the exception of a small cross. The image of the chaplain, let alone some of his required duties, says that the military and its mission are acceptable in the eyes of the church he represents. He is living testimony to his church's agreement that it is possible to be both a Christian and a soldier, that military life is compatible with the obligations of Christian faith and practice. The chaplain says that much by his presence alone" (MMP:92).

(5) "Expecting a sympathetic clergyman, the youth meets a military officer; and seeking an advocate, he or she finds a supporter of the system itself" (MMP:43).

(6) An ecumenical effort at renegotiation was initiated in early 1984 by the Archbishop of Cape Town (CPSA) and Rev. Peter Storey (MCSA) among others. However, as of July 1984, this group had neither publicized its findings nor met formally with the SADF.
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